COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Decker, AtLee and Malveaux 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KATHY LORRAINE STAIGER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0652-15-2 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. 

 JANUARY 10, 2017 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 

Leslie M. Osborn, Judge 

Corinne J. Magee (The Magee Law Firm, PLLC, on brief), for 

appellant.

 Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. 

Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 The Circuit Court of Mecklenburg County convicted Kathy Lorraine Staiger of felony 

driving under the influence, third offense within five years. On appeal, Staiger argues “the 

Commonwealth had not proven two prior convictions of driving under the influence.” We 

disagree with Staiger, and affirm her conviction. 

I. BACKGROUND

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth 

v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). On April 16, 2014, Staiger left home 

in her Mazda Miata to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. On her way, she drove her car 

off the public highway and into a roadside embankment. Although she had a cell phone with 

her, Staiger did not call anyone to report the accident. Instead, leaving her car with its “back end 

. . . still sitting in the roadway,” she returned to her house on foot. There, she got in another of 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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her cars, a BMW, and set out again. This journey (on the same public highway) ended no better: 

she veered “off the roadway to the right, striking a mailbox and going into . . . a slight 

embankment.” The two accidents happened within thirty minutes of each other, and the crash 

sites were only two miles apart. 

At the scene of the second accident, to which the Virginia State Police responded first, 

Staiger admitted crashing both cars. Her eyes were dilated, her speech was slurred, and she was 

unsteady on her feet, “staggering back and forth.” She failed four of the five field sobriety tests 

she performed. The troopers saw no signs that Staiger had been drinking alcohol; however, she 

said she had taken an antidepressant earlier. She was transported to a nearby hospital where a 

nurse drew her blood pursuant to Virginia’s implied consent law. Because Staiger had a 2013 

conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”), the Commonwealth charged her with two 

additional DUIs for the two separate accidents that occurred on April 16, 2014. One charge was 

a DUI, second offense within five years (a misdemeanor); the other a DUI, third offense within 

five years (a felony). The indictment by which Staiger was charged with the felony DUI alleged 

that she did: 

unlawfully and feloniously drive or operate a motor vehicle while 

under the influence of alcohol or other self-administered intoxicant 

or drug, such offense being a third offense and having been 

committed within five years of an offense under Virginia Code 

§ 18.2-266 or a substantially similar law or ordinance, in violation 

of §§ 18.2-266; 18.2-270 of the Code of Virginia (1950) as 

amended. 

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a certified copy of Staiger’s 2013 DUI 

conviction. Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced a certificate of analysis prepared by the 

Virginia Department of Forensic Science. That certificate memorialized the analysis of Staiger’s 

blood, drawn by the nurse on the night of the two accidents, and showed that the analyzed 
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sample contained “Lorazepam 0.065 mg/L.”1

 According to the testifying toxicologist, 

Lorazepam is a benzodiazepine similar to “Xanax, Valium, [and] Klonopin.” As a “central 

nervous system depressant,” Lorazepam “will slow down or [a]ffect anything that you need your 

central nervous system to do” and can cause “dizziness, drowsiness, disorientation, and slurred 

speech.” Lorazepam can also impair balance, reaction times, fine motor skills, and 

decision-making. 

Staiger argued to the circuit court that the Commonwealth had “not proven two prior DUI 

convictions.” The circuit court disagreed, and found her guilty of both DUI charges.2 The 

circuit court ultimately sentenced Staiger to five years in the penitentiary on the felony DUI, 

suspending all of that time except the six-month mandatory minimum.3 This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

Staiger’s assignment of error requires us to interpret the Code, a task we undertake de 

novo. Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 66, 758 S.E.2d 225, 229 (2014). When a statute 

uses unambiguous language, we accord that language its plain meaning, and “we must give 

effect to the legislature’s intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal 

interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity.” Bd. of Supervisors of James 

City Cty. v. Windmill Meadows, LLC, 287 Va. 170, 179-80, 752 S.E.2d 837, 842 (2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Leone, 286 Va. 147, 150, 747 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2013)). “[T]he 

 1

 A forensic toxicologist employed by the Virginia Department of Forensic Science 

testified that this meant the sample contained “.065 milligrams [of Lorazepam] per liter of 

blood.” 

2

 The circuit court also convicted Staiger of driving on a revoked license. She did not 

appeal that conviction. 

3

 On the DUI second offense, the circuit court sentenced Staiger to one year in jail with 

all of that time suspended except the twenty-day mandatory minimum. Her petition for appeal 

contained several assignments of error related to this conviction, but these assignments of error 

were denied. 
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plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, 

or strained construction.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 

(1983). 

 This appeal turns on the meaning of Code § 18.2-270, which prescribes the punishment 

for violations of Virginia’s DUI statute, Code § 18.2-266.4

 Code § 18.2-270(C)(1) states: 

Any person convicted of three offenses of [Code] 

§ 18.2-266 committed within a 10-year period shall upon 

conviction of the third offense be guilty of a Class 6 felony. The 

sentence of any person convicted of three offenses of [Code] 

§ 18.2-266 committed within a 10-year period shall include a 

mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days, unless the three offenses 

were committed within a five-year period, in which case the 

sentence shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of 

confinement for six months. In addition, such person shall be 

fined a mandatory minimum fine of $1,000. 

We find this language unambiguous, and thus give it its plain meaning. Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2003). In giving a statute its plain 

meaning, we “may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly 

did not mean what it actually has stated.” Gunn v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587, 637 

S.E.2d 324, 327 (2006) (quoting Williams, 265 Va. at 271, 576 S.E.2d at 470). 

 4

 Code § 18.2-266 states, in relevant part, that 

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor 

vehicle . . . (iii) while such person is under the influence of any 

narcotic drug or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of 

whatsoever nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree 

which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . 

safely . . . . 
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 Referencing subsection E of Code § 18.2-270,5 Staiger argues that “there must be a 

conviction on the [second] offense before the individual is charged with a third offense.” The 

Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Williams, the only difference being that the 

appellant in that case argued that “under the language of Code § 18.2-270, elevation of an 

offense to a felony and the resulting enhancement of punishment can occur only if a defendant 

has been convicted of two previous offenses under Code § 18.2-266 at the time the third offense 

is committed.” Williams, 265 Va. at 270, 576 S.E.2d at 469-70. The Court went on to observe 

that the enhanced punishment 

is activated, in the language of the statute, by a defendant’s 

conviction of a third or subsequent “offense committed within ten 

years.” The General Assembly’s use of the words “offense” and 

“committed” signals its clear intent to authorize enhanced 

punishment for a third DUI offense occurring within the prescribed 

time period even though the second DUI offense has not resulted 

in a conviction before the third offense is committed. 

Id. at 271, 576 S.E.2d at 470. In explaining its reasoning, the Court quoted Code § 18.2-270 as it 

existed at the time. The General Assembly has since altered the wording of Code § 18.2-270 

slightly, but the difference is not meaningful to our analysis. See Code § 18.2-270 (making the 

enhancement applicable to “[a]ny person convicted of three offenses of [Code] § 18.2-266 

 5

 Code § 18.2-270(E) states: 

For the purpose of determining the number of offenses 

committed by, and the punishment appropriate for, a person under 

this section, an adult conviction of any person, or finding of guilty 

in the case of a juvenile, under the following shall be considered a 

conviction of [Code] § 18.2-266: (i) the provisions of [Code] 

§ 18.2-36.1 or the substantially similar laws of any other state or of 

the United States, (ii) the provisions of [Code] §§ 18.2-51.4, 

18.2-266, former [Code] § 18.1-54 (formerly [Code] § 18-75), the 

ordinance of any county, city or town in this Commonwealth or the 

laws of any other state or of the United States substantially similar 

to the provisions of [Code] § 18.2-51.4, or [Code] § 18.2-266, or 

(iii) the provisions of subsection A of [Code] § 46.2-341.24 or the 

substantially similar laws of any other state or of the United States. 
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committed within a 10-year period”). In Thomas v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 256, 260, 487 

S.E.2d 289, 291 (1997), aff’d, 256 Va. 38, 501 S.E.2d 391 (1998), this Court analyzed another 

recidivist statute, Code § 46.2-357, the habitual offender statute, and observed that “[a] person of 

ordinary intelligence would understand that any second or subsequent driving in violation of [the 

statute] would make him eligible for the enhanced punishment provision, whether or not he had 

been convicted of the earlier offense before the occurrence of the second driving offense.” See 

also Able v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 542, 549, 431 S.E.2d 337, 341 (1993) (interpreting the 

recidivist portion of Code § 18.2-248, which criminalizes distribution of Schedule I or II 

controlled substances, noting that “[t]he statute does not require that, in order for the enhanced 

penalty provision to obtain, the defendant must have been convicted of a first offense before 

committing the second offense”). A “contrary interpretation . . . would permit an offender to 

violate the statute repeatedly without being subjected to a felony charge simply because he could 

not be tried and convicted in the brief time periods separating the several offenses.” Williams, 

265 Va. at 271, 576 S.E.2d at 470. Staiger attempts to distinguish her facts from those in 

Williams. She points out that the question in Williams was whether the Commonwealth could 

charge a third offense even though Williams had not been convicted of a second offense at the 

time the third offense was committed. In Staiger’s case, she frames the question as whether the 

Commonwealth could charge her with a third offense even though she had not been convicted of 

a second offense at the time the third offense was charged. We find that distinction 

inconsequential. 

 Staiger appears to quibble with the idea that one can be convicted of both a DUI second 

offense and a DUI third offense in one proceeding. To the extent she attempts to make this 

point, her argument is barred both by her failure to object contemporaneously to that procedure 

at trial, as required by Rule 5A:18, and by her failure to assign error to that procedure in her 
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petition for appeal, as required by Rule 5A:12(c)(1). Furthermore, nothing prevents the 

simultaneous trial of a second DUI and a third DUI. In Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 

250 S.E.2d 760 (1979), Ansell pled guilty to three counts of using a firearm in the commission of 

felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. Ansell had committed all three crimes “within a period 

of 45 minutes,” and pled guilty to all three at one hearing. Id. at 759, 250 S.E.2d at 761. The 

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to punish one of the offenses as a first offense, 

and the other two as second or subsequent offenses, under the recidivism provision of Code 

§ 18.2-53.1. See also Mason v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 260, 262-63, 430 S.E.2d 543, 544 

(1993) (reviewing the recidivism portions of Code § 18.2-248(C), noting “an enhanced 

punishment may be applied where there are multiple convictions for separate offenses in a 

simultaneous prosecution”). Because precedent from this Court and the Supreme Court permits 

the manner by which the circuit court convicted Staiger, we affirm her conviction. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, we find the circuit court did not err in finding Staiger guilty 

of felony DUI, third offense within five years. 

Affirmed.