UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

KEITH DOUGHERTY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 15-cv-0582 

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se plaintiff Keith Dougherty (“Plaintiff”), who is a resident of Pennsylvania, 

has filed a lengthy complaint that recites block quotes from various court opinions in 

seriatim and appears to challenge the rulings of numerous judges assigned to various 

lawsuits that Plaintiff previously filed in federal and state courts in Pennsylvania and 

Maryland. (See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ VII.I.A–VII.I.D.32.) As far as this Court 

can discern, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is his disagreement with the judges’ 

determination that, as a non-lawyer, Plaintiff is prohibited from representing in court 

various entities that he has incorporated. (See, e.g., id. ¶ III.1.) Plaintiff has named as 

defendants the United States; the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Third Circuit and the judges of that Court; the Chief Deputy of the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and three judges of that court; 

two judges of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland; various 

Pennsylvania state judicial officers; a Maryland state judicial officer; and a variety of 
other individuals and companies. (See id. at 1–3.) 1 Moreover, Plaintiff purports to sue 

the judicial officer defendants (i.e., the judges, court clerks, and other court staff) and 

certain non-judicial defendants both in their official and personal capacities. 

Before this Court at present are seven separate motions to dismiss the complaint 

that various Defendant groups have filed.

2 The Defendants’ motions assert myriad and 

overlapping bases for dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint, including lack of personal 

jurisdiction, failure to state a plausible claim, sovereign immunity, Eleventh 

Amendment immunity, improper venue, res judicata, statute of limitations, standing, 

and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Having considered Plaintiff’s 

complaint, as well as Defendants’ motions and Plaintiff’s responses thereto, this Court 

1

 Page numbers herein refer to those that the Court’s electronic case filing system automatically 

assigns.

2

 These motions are as follows:

• Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Fed. Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 43 (filed by the United 

States, Chief Judge Theodore McKee, Judges Anthony Scirica, D. Brooks Smith, Michael 

Chagares, Kent Jordan, Thomas Vanaskie, Robert Cowen, Maryanne Trump Barry, D. Michael 

Fisher, Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., William Caldwell, John E. Jones, III, J. Frederick Motz, and 

Deborah Chasanow, Chief Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson, Marsha Waldron, and Peter 

Welsh); 

• State Judiciary Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“PA State Judiciary 

Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 10 (filed by Defendants Judge Bruce Bratton, Judge Stephen 

Linebaugh, Judge Kevin Hess, Judge Thomas Placey, Jennifer Traxler, Pamela Lee, and 

Superior Court Unnamed Staff Attorneys);

• Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Stevens & Lee, P.C., Matthew W. Rappleye, & Tricia S. 

Lontz (“S&L Mot.”), ECF No. 6 (collectively as the “S&L Defendants”);

• Motion of Defendant Jonathan Snyder to Dismiss Complaint (“Snyder Mot.”), ECF No. 17;

• Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Keith Dougherty by Defendants Richard C. 

Daniels, Esquire and Daniels & Daniels LLC (“Daniels Mot.”), ECF No. 20 (collectively, the 

“Daniels Defendants”);

• Motion to Dismiss Complaint by Defendants JP Haddad and Cluck-U, Corp. (“Cluck-U Mot.”), 

ECF No. 23 (collectively, the “Cluck-U Defendants”); and

• Motion to Dismiss Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Geter Mot.”), 

ECF No. 26 (filed by the Honorable Melanie M. Shaw Geter, a judge of the Circuit Court for 

Prince George’s County, Maryland).

2

 
concludes that it must dismiss the instant complaint in its entirety for several reasons, 

which are explained further below. In short, this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to 

entertain the claims for monetary damages that Plaintiff makes against the United States 

and the judicial officer defendants in their official capacity—due to sovereign immunity 

with respect to the federal defendants and the Eleventh Amendment with respect to the 

state defendants—and the Court further finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction 

over the S&L Defendants, Snyder, or any of the judicial officer defendants in their 

individual capacities. The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state any 

plausible claim for monetary relief against any of the other defendants named in the 

complaint, and to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief with respect to the 

claims he has made against any of the defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

failed to state any claim that would entitle him to such relief. Consequently, the seven 

pending motions to dismiss will be GRANTED to varying degrees and Plaintiff’s entire 

complaint will be DISMISSED. Moreover, although the Court will refrain from issuing 

a pre-filing injunction at this time, it will caution Plaintiff against seeking to continue 

his litigation crusade by filing additional actions in this Court arising from these same 

matters. 

A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND

The story underlying the instant lawsuit appears to begin in 2007, when, 

according to Plaintiff, defendant Snyder issued a “retaliatory Stop Work Order” related 

to construction work that Plaintiff was performing on a building in Pennsylvania. 

(Compl. ¶ VII.D.2.) Plaintiff responded to this stop work order by filing a lawsuit in 

3
Pennsylvania state court—a lawsuit that was ultimately dismissed, and the dismissal of 

the action was eventually affirmed on appeal. See Dougherty v. Snyder, No. 1200 C.D. 

2009, 2009 WL 9108133, at *1–3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 29, 2009) (summarizing 

Plaintiff’s litigation history in Pennsylvania state courts). In the years that followed, 

Plaintiff filed several lawsuits in state and federal courts relating to the dismissal of his 

first complaint and Snyder’s issuance of the stop work order (collectively, the “Snyder 

Litigation”), each of which was unsuccessful. See id.; In re Dougherty, 563 F. App’x 

96, 97 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (recounting history of Plaintiff’s federal court 

litigation); see also In re Dougherty, 563 F. App’x at 97, 98 n.3 (describing Plaintiff as 

“a frequent and frequently vexatious litigator [who] has filed petitions for writs of 

mandamus relying largely on arguments we already have rejected in other cases[,]” and 

describing the various complaints as “largely unintelligible”); see, e.g., Best v. U.S. 

Foods, Inc., No. 14-00922 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (tort action that Plaintiff brought against 

Judges Bratton and Hess arising from decisions those judges made in another matter 

Plaintiff had filed). 

Apparently, in the course of the Snyder Litigation, Plaintiff unsuccessfully 

sought “to assert claims pro se on behalf of his single-member Pennsylvania limited 

liability company, Docson Consulting LLC” (“Docson Consulting”). Dougherty v. 

Snyder, 469 F. App’x 71, 72 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Contemporaneously with 

pursing the Snyder Litigation, Plaintiff also sought, and was denied, the ability to 

represent Docson Consulting in other lawsuits. See, e.g., Cluck-U, Corp. v. C.U.C. of 

Md., Inc., No. 10cv2105, 2010 WL 3516937, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 7, 2010) (remanding to 

state court a case that Plaintiff had removed on behalf of Docson Consulting, where 

4
notice of removal was defective because Plaintiff could not represent Docson 

Consulting); see also In re Dougherty, 408 F. App’x 692, 692 (4th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (declining to grant mandamus relief to allow Plaintiff to represent the interests 

of his company in the Cluck-U matter). 

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on April 15, 2015. Although it is difficult to 

ascertain the legal bases for Plaintiff’s allegations, the complaint makes a series of 

references to various of legal standards. For example, Plaintiff asserts that the actions 

of the judicial defendants that he names in the instant complaint evince “a pattern of 

RICO corruption by local custom in violation of ‘due process due[.]’” (Compl.

¶ I.A.2.) Plaintiff also maintains that “[t]he 3rd and 4th Cir have/has become a RICO 

enterprise ‘whereby the Chief of the Circuit’ uses ‘mob tactics’ to enforce ‘Simbraw [or 

LR 101(a)] as the Prime Directive’ denying ‘due process due’ [as a retaliation] for all 

‘closely held for profit entities and owners’ [who attempt to appear ‘personally’][.]”

(Id. ¶ IV.A (second through fourth brackets in original).) 3 And Plaintiff generally 

purports to bring certain claims against different subclasses of defendants—i.e., Bivens

claims against “Chief McKee and the Clerks, Judges and Lawyers” of the Third Circuit 

(id. ¶ I.A.2 (referring to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim against the 

United States, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–820 (id.); a Monell claim against the “Superior 

Court Staff Attorneys” and the State Court Judges, staff, and attorneys (id. (appearing 

to reference Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978))); 

3 Plaintiff appears to be referencing Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966), in 

which the Third Circuit held that a corporation cannot proceed pro se in litigation, and instead must 

retain an attorney. Id. at 374.

5

 
and a “defamation suit” against unspecified defendants (id. ¶ I.B). With respect to the 

remedy sought, Plaintiff asks this Court to “‘invalidat[e] . . . Simbraw’ 367 F.2d 373 

(3rd Cir. 1966) on constitutional and statutory grounds” (id. ¶ I.A), and to issue a 

preliminary injunction that, in effect, would void all judgments of the Third Circuit that 

rely on the Simbraw decision and “‘compel the 3rd Cir[cuit] to produce a Rule in 

compliance with both 28 USC § 46(b) and 28 USC § 2077’” (id. at 31). 

Seven groups of defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, each 

asserting a number of arguments in support of dismissal, many of which overlap. (See, 

e.g., Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (sovereign immunity, personal jurisdiction, failure to state a 

plausible claim, judicial immunity, venue, statute of limitations, and failure to exhaust 

FTCA remedies); PA State Judiciary Defs.’ Mot. at 1–2 (Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, personal jurisdiction, failure to plead a plausible claim, judicial immunity, 

res judicata, and statute of limitations); Geter Mot. at 1–2 (Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, personal jurisdiction, failure to state a plausible claim, judicial immunity,

statute of limitations, and Rooker-Feldman doctrine 4

); S&L Mot. at 1 (personal 

jurisdiction and failure to plead a plausible claim); Mem. in Supp. of Snyder Mot., ECF 

No. 17-1, at 1, 2–6 (personal jurisdiction, failure to plead a plausible claim, res 

judicata, and statute of limitations); Daniels Mot. at 1–2 (failure to state a plausible 

claim, res judicata, lack of standing, and Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Mem. in Supp. of 

Cluck-U Mot., ECF No. 23-1, at 2–3 (failure to state a plausible claim and res 

4 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over 

cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district court review 

and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 

(2005); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462 (1983).

6

 
judicata).) In addition, some of the defendants have asked the Court to impose a prefiling injunction against Plaintiff, barring him from initiating future actions in this 

Court without first obtaining leave to file. (See Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 31; PA State 

Judiciary Defs.’ Mot. at 2.) In addition to filing oppositions to the motions to dismiss, 

Plaintiff has also filed a follow-on motion for a preliminary injunction that seeks the 

same injunctive relief that he requests in his complaint, and two motions for leave to 

amend his complaint. (See Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 4; Mots. to Amend 

Caption and or File an Am. Compl., ECF Nos. 11, 32.) Each of these motions is now 

ripe for consideration. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity or Eleventh Amendment 

immunity is evaluated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) as a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is clear beyond cavil that the plaintiff 

bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Halcomb v. Office of the 

Senate Sergeant-at-Arms of the U.S. Senate, 209 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D.D.C. 2002). 

Indeed, when it comes to Rule 12(b)(1), it is “‘presumed that a cause lies outside [the 

federal courts’] limited jurisdiction,’ unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the Court possesses jurisdiction[.]” Muhammad v. FDIC, 751 F. 

Supp. 2d 114, 118 (D.D.C. 2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).

7
“When a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 

12(b)(6), this Circuit has held that the court must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) 

challenges . . . because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject[-]matter 

jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to 

be determined[.]” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 

2011) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. 

EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, 

and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, “the 

court must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more closely when considering a motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under . . . Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt, 

826 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (citing Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C. Cir. 

2003)). Still, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint 

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Brown v. District of 

Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), but it need not “accept inferences 

unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual 

allegations[,]” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001).

B. Motions To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction And 

Insufficient Service Of Process Under Rules 12(b)(2) Or (b)(5)

“Until the court has established personal jurisdiction [over a party], any assertion 

of judicial power over the party violates due process.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. 

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). However, unlike 

subject-matter jurisdiction, the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived if not 

raised, see Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and a 

8
court is authorized to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (when raised)

without first assessing whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, id. at 1086. 

To evaluate a contention that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant in a case before it, the Court must analyze whether District of Columbia law

permits the exercise of either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over the

defendant, see United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995)—an 

evaluation that is based primarily on an assessment of the individual defendant’s degree 

of contact with the District, see D.C. Code §§ 13-422, 13-423; see, e.g., Turner v. 

Abbott, 53 F. Supp. 3d 61, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no personal jurisdiction where 

defendant was not domiciled in the District, and where the complaint alleged no facts 

connecting defendant to the District). Notably, federal employees are not subject to suit 

in the District of Columbia based merely on the fact that their employing agency is 

headquartered in this jurisdiction or maintains offices here. Akers v. Watts, 740 

F.Supp.2d 83, 92 (D.D.C. 2010). Rather, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over the employees or 

officers of a corporation in their individual capacities must be based on their personal 

contacts with the forum and not their acts and contacts carried out solely in a corporate 

capacity.” Wiggins v. Equifax, 853 F. Supp. 500, 503 (D.D.C. 1994); see also Stafford 

v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 543–45 (1980) (a court may not exercise personal jurisdiction 

over a federal officer in his individual capacity without minimum contacts other than 

those arising from federal employment). Additionally, with respect to an individual 

capacity suit against a federal employee, the plaintiff must serve the defendant 

personally in accordance with the service requirements of the Federal Rule of Civil 

9
Procedure 4; service on the government does not suffice. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Acree, 

79 F.R.D. 669, 670 (D.D.C. 1978). 

When a defendant seeks dismissal of a complaint on the grounds that the Court 

lacks personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of establishing that 

the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is proper. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. 

Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 1998). The plaintiff “must demonstrate 

that each defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum[,]” Alkanani v. Aegis 

Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted), and the court 

need not accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true in making the personal 

jurisdiction assessment, see id. Furthermore, the court is fully authorized to consider 

“materials outside of the pleadings, including declarations and evidence produced 

during the course of jurisdictional discovery,” id.; however, the court can also dismiss a 

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction without permitting the plaintiff to take 

discovery or holding an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to 

allege specific facts that connect the defendant with the forum state, see FC Inv. Grp. 

LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

C. Motions To Dismiss For Failure To State A Plausible Claim

Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Even if a plaintiff successfully mounts a jurisdictional bar to the advancement of 

his complaint, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that the defendant may 

move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 

complaint must comply with Rule 8, which requires that the complaint contain “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

10
Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(explaining that this requirement is meant to “give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”) (citation omitted). “Although 

‘detailed factual allegations’ are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must furnish ‘more than labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Busby v. 

Capital One, N.A., 932 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). In other words, the plaintiff must provide “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). This means that “mere conclusory statements” of misconduct are not enough to 

make out a cause of action against a defendant. Id. Rather, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court must view the 

complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all 

reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations.” Busby, 932 

F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citation omitted). Although the court must accept as true the facts 

in the complaint, it need not accept the inferences that the plaintiff draws if the facts set 

out in the complaint do not support such inferences. See Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns 

Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nor is the court “bound to accept as true a 

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation 

omitted). 

11
D. Application Of The Pleading Rules To Pro Se Parties

Finally, when applying the legal framework discussed above to evaluate the 

pending motions to dismiss, this Court must be mindful of the fact that Plaintiff is 

proceeding in this matter pro se. It is well established that the pleadings of pro se

parties are to be “liberally construed” and that a pro se complaint, “however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (emphasis in 

original) (citations omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). 

However, it is also quite clear “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 

(D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 

(1993). 

Thus, even a pro se plaintiff must meet his burden of proving subject matter 

jurisdiction if his complaint is to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., 

Green v. Stuyvesant, 505 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing complaint 

where pro se plaintiff failed to prove subject matter jurisdiction). Likewise, although a 

pro se complaint “must be construed liberally, the complaint must still present a claim 

on which the Court can grant relief[.]” Budik v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F. 

Supp. 2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Moore v. Motz, 437 F. Supp. 

2d 88, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that “[e]ven a pro se plaintiff’s inferences . . . need not 

be accepted” if they “are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint” (citation 

omitted)); see also Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting 

that a pro se complaint must state a claim upon which relief can be granted).

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III. ANALYSIS

The seven motions to dismiss the complaint that are pending in this matter make 

a variety of arguments in support of dismissal, to wit: immunity, lack of personal 

jurisdiction, failure to state a plausible claim, improper venue, res judicata, the statute 

of limitations, lack of standing, and failure to exhaust. Plaintiff’s opposition to these 

motions is largely incoherent, because it primarily consists of unexplained quotes from 

various inapposite cases and disjointed statements regarding legal theories that Plaintiff 

apparently believes are related to an alleged overarching judicial conspiracy against 

him. Although Plaintiff’s complaint might well be subject to dismissal simply and 

solely because the claims asserted therein appear to be “so patently insubstantial that no 

federal question suitable for decision can be discerned[,]” Hu v. Dep’t of Def., No. 

12cv1640, 2013 WL 1968497, at *1 (D.D.C. May 13, 2013), aff’d sub nom., Hu v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Def., No. 13-5157, 2013 WL 6801189 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2013), each of the 

defendants in this matter—save one—has briefed several other issues related to this 

Court’s jurisdiction and the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, and, as a result, this Court has 

proceeded to evaluate the myriad legal contentions that Defendants have put forward in 

support of their motions to dismiss. 5

As explained further below, this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s entire complaint 

must be dismissed because (1) sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment bar 

Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages brought against the United States and the 

5

 The one defendant who has not submitted any motion to dismiss appears in the caption of Plaintiff’s 

complaint by the name “NHT” and is never mentioned again. In light of this silence, this Court will 

dismiss the complaint against NHT sua sponte, for failure to state a claim. See Perry v. Discover Bank, 

514 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95 (D.D.C. 2007) (courts may dismiss a complaint sua sponte where there is simply 

“no factual or legal basis for alleged wrongdoing by defendant[]”). 

13

 
judicial officer defendants in their official capacities; (2) the Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over the S&L Defendants, Snyder, and all of the judicial officer defendants 

in their individual capacities; (3) Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against 

the Daniels and Cluck-U Defendants; and (4) there is no cause of action for the

injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks. 

A. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff’s

Claims For Monetary Damages Against The United States And 

The Judicial Officer Defendants In Their Official Capacities

1. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims For Monetary 

Damages Against The United States And Its Officers 

Plaintiff has brought suit seeking monetary damages against the United States

and several judges and employees of federal courts in the Third and Fourth Circuits in 

their official capacities, alleging that these defendants are part of a conspiracy to deny 

him “equal access and equal protection” and “due process due” in connection with cases 

that Plaintiff has litigated in those courts. (Compl. ¶¶ III.1, IV.C.) In the memorandum 

that accompanies their motion to dismiss, the federal defendants argue that the doctrine 

of sovereign immunity—which bars any suit for damages against the United States or 

its employees sued in their official capacities in the absence of express Congressional 

authorization—compels dismissal of these constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction. 

(Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 13 (arguing that “the United States has not waived its sovereign 

immunity for damages for alleged constitutional violations”).) 

This Court agrees. For starters, “[i]t is axiomatic that the United States may not 

be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for 

jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see also FDIC v. 

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”). 

14
Moreover, it is clear beyond cavil that a suit against a government employee in his 

official capacity qualifies as a suit against the government. See Kentucky v. Graham, 

473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1985); Cornish 

v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 198, 205 (D.D.C. 2012). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims for 

monetary damages against the United States and the federal judicial officers acting in 

their official capacity can only survive upon a showing that there has been an applicable 

waiver of the sovereign immunity bar. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 (1994) (“Absent a 

waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from 

suit.”); Cornish, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (same). 

Plaintiff has not pointed to any such waiver of sovereign immunity, and this 

means that he has failed to carry his burden with respect to establishing that this Court 

has subject-matter jurisdiction. In other words, even construing the complaint’s claims 

liberally, the Court agrees with these defendants that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary 

damages fall within the broad ambit of the sovereign immunity doctrine and that 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there has been an express Congressional waiver 

of sovereign immunity for such claims. See Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United 

States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the 

United States, as well as the official capacity claims that he has brought against 

individual federal judicial officers, must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. 

2. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiff’s Claims For Monetary 

Damages Against State Judicial Officers Acting In Their Official 

Capacity

Plaintiff has also brought claims for monetary damages against various Maryland 

and Pennsylvania judicial officer defendants in their official capacity—Plaintiff 

15
maintains that these defendants are part of the same overarching conspiracy to deprive 

him of his constitutional rights. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ III.1.) As with the claims for 

monetary damages against the federal judicial officers discussed above, Plaintiff’s

official capacity claims against the state judicial officers qualify as claims against the 

states of Maryland and Pennsylvania themselves, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 

(1991); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (a suit brought 

against a state official “is no different from a suit against the State itself[]”), and the 

state judicial defendants have moved to dismiss these claims arguing that the Eleventh 

Amendment bars any such claims against the states (see PA State Judicial Defs.’ Mot. 

at 9–11; Mem. in Supp. of Geter Mot., ECF No. 26-1, at 7–9). 

Once again, it is clear that these damages claims are barred on immunity 

grounds. The Eleventh Amendment “grants a [S]tate immunity from suit in federal 

court by its own citizens.” Kent v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 716 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 

2010) (citations omitted); see also U.S. Const. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the 

United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State[.]”); Bd. of 

Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars 

private citizens suing nonconsenting states in federal court). Where a plaintiff seeks 

monetary damages from a State, there are only two exceptions to the Eleventh 

Amendment immunity bar—(1) abrogation of immunity by Congress through the 

enactment of a federal statute, and (2) waiver of immunity by the State, Kent, 716 F. 

Supp. 2d at 5–6—and the state judicial officer defendants are correct to contend that 

neither exception applies in the instant case. That is, Congress has not abrogated 

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Eleventh Amendment immunity for Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages, see

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676–77 (1974), and Plaintiff further fails to establish 

that either Maryland or Pennsylvania has waived its immunity for his claims for 

monetary damages, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-104 (waiving sovereign 

immunity only for certain tort actions brought in Maryland state court); 42 Pa. Const. 

Stat. § 8521 (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the 

immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Therefore, the official capacity 

claims for monetary damages that Plaintiff asserts against the state judicial defendants 

must be dismissed.

B. Plaintiff Cannot Bring Individual Capacity Lawsuits Against 

The Judicial Officer Defendants, Nor Can He Sue The S&L 

Defendants and Snyder, Because The Court Lacks Personal 

Jurisdiction Over These Defendants

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages brought against the 

United States and the various federal and state judicial officers acting in their official 

capacity, this Court turns to address the claims for monetary damages that Plaintiff 

brings against the judicial officer defendants in their individual capacity, as well as his 

damages claims brought against private entities. Certain defendants—i.e., all of the 

federal and state judicial officer defendants (including Geter), the S&L Defendants, and 

Snyder—have argued that Plaintiff’s claims against them should be dismissed pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of either general or specific personal jurisdiction. 

(See Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 16–17 (arguing that this Court cannot exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the federal judicial officers because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts 

individually connecting them to the District of Columbia); PA State Judicial Defs.’

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Mot. at 12–13 (arguing that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish personal 

jurisdiction because his complaint states no facts connecting the Pennsylvania judicial 

officers with the District of Columbia); Mem in Supp. of Geter Mot. at 5–7 (arguing 

that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Judge Geter because Plaintiff’s 

complaint does not establish any connection between her and this jurisdiction); S&L 

Mot. at 4–6 (arguing that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish either specific or 

general jurisdiction over the S&L Defendants); Mem in Supp. of Snyder Mot. at 2–4 

(arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state any facts in his complaint that would permit 

this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Snyder).) 

This Court finds that the pending motions to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction are well-founded. “The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual 

basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane v. New York 

Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Court may exercise general 

jurisdiction over a defendant under the District’s long arm statute if that defendant that 

is “domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintain[s] his or its principal place of 

business in, the District of Columbia[.]” D.C. Code § 13-422 (2015); see also 

Segelstrom v. Citibank, N.A., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2014) (for a court to 

exercise general jurisdiction, the defendant must have “continuous and systematic” 

contact with the forum state). In the absence of such contacts, this Court may exercise 

specific jurisdiction over a defendant if (1) a provision of the District’s long arm statute 

authorizes jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction “accords with the demands 

of due process.” Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828; see also D.C. Code § 13-423 (2015). 

Furthermore, in order for a court to exercise either general or specific personal 

18
jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff must either serve the defendant with process 

or secure a waiver of service. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 

U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)–(d). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to articulate—either in his complaint or his response to 

their motions—a single fact that establishes any connection between these defendants 

and the District of Columbia. As such, this Court can assert neither general nor specific 

jurisdiction over these defendants. See D.C. CODE §§ 13-422, 13-423; see also

Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828–31 (district court correctly found that it could not assert 

personal jurisdiction over defendant who lacked sufficient contacts with District of 

Columbia to satisfy due process requirements). In addition, this Court finds that it 

cannot assert personal jurisdiction over any of the federal judicial officer defendants 

with respect to the individual capacity claims that Plaintiff asserts because Plaintiff has 

not met his burden of establishing that these defendants have been properly served. 

(See Fed. Defs.’ Mem. at 14–16); see also Reuber v. United States, 787 F.2d 599, 599 

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“[O]nce a defendant timely asserts the absence of 

personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that jurisdiction is properly 

exercised.”).

Accordingly, this Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for money damages 

against the defendants who have asserted that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

them—i.e., the federal and state judicial officer defendants in their individual 

capacities, the S&L Defendants, and Snyder.

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C. Plaintiff Fails To State A Plausible Damages Claim Against The 

Remaining Defendants, And No Cause Of Action Exists For The 

Injunctive Relief That Plaintiff Seeks

What remains at this point in the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s claims and the 

various defendants’ asserted grounds for dismissal of the instant complaint is Plaintiff’s 

damages claims against the Daniels and Cluck-U Defendants, and also Plaintiff’s 

request for injunctive relief. With respect to the former, the Daniels and Cluck-U

Defendants argue that the complaint is devoid of any facts that give rise to a plausible 

claim for relief against them (see Mem. in Supp. of Daniels Mot., ECF No. 20-1, at 8–9; 

Mem. in Supp. of Cluck-U Mot. at 2); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (explaining 

that a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face”), and this Court agrees that Plaintiff’s complaint fails 

to state a plausible claim against any of these movants. Indeed, with respect to the 

Daniels Defendants and one of the Cluck-U Defendants (JP Haddad), Plaintiff does 

nothing more than include their names in the caption. See James v. United States, 48 F. 

Supp. 3d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing claim against defendant for failure to state a 

plausible claim under Twombly where the only mention of defendant was in the caption 

of the complaint).

As for Cluck-U itself, Plaintiff mentions that entity only once in the text of the 

complaint, stating that, “As of 10/7/2011 The Clerk intervened and ‘stayed all briefing’

assigning 11-2631 to the Panel of Scirica, Smith and Chagares, who were already 

reviewing (an unrelated case) Cluck U v. Docson Consulting LLC[.]” (Compl. 

¶ VII.I.D.21.) This Court cannot discern any grounds for the legal claim that Plaintiff

apparently intends to bring against Cluck-U based on this bald statement alone, and, as 

noted, this statement is all that the complaint says about Cluck-U. Thus, just as with 

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the Daniels Defendants, Plaintiff has clearly fallen well short of stating any plausible 

claim against the Cluck-U Defendants in this matter. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

With respect to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, the instant complaint asks 

this Court to (1) “vacate all ‘3rd Cir Judgments as void’ under Marshal v. Jerrico for 

‘appearance sake’ [and to disqualify the Clerks, Judges, Panels and remand (for 

procedures consistent with the constitution)];” and (2) “compel the 3rd Cir to produce a 

Rule in compliance with both 28 USC § 46(b) and 28 USC § 2077” (Compl. ¶ I.C; id. at 

31 (brackets in original); see also Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 4, at 1 

(requesting an injunction requiring “the Clerk of the Middle District of PA [t]o ‘abide 

by the clerk’s Manual’”).) The motion to dismiss that was submitted on behalf of the 

federal defendants asserts that Plaintiff’s request must be dismissed on the grounds that 

Plaintiff “has not demonstrated any semblance of merit to his claim[,]” (Fed. Defs.’ 

Mot. at 30–31)—and this argument is undoubtedly correct. Put simply, there is no 

cause of action that would allow this Court to vacate judgments of the Third Circuit, or 

to order that that Court either adopt a particular local rule or otherwise take any specific 

actions regarding its handling of cases, and, on that basis alone, Plaintiff’s claims for 

such injunctive relief must be dismissed. See John Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t of D.C., 

445 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under Rule 

12(b)(6) where no cause of action existed); Sabre Int’l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. 

Sols., 60 F. Supp. 3d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims under Rule 

12(b)(6) where no cause of action existed).

Accordingly, this Court will dismiss those portions of Plaintiff’s complaint that 

remain after its prior jurisdictional analysis—i.e., the claims that seek monetary 

21
damages from the Daniels and Cluck-U Defendants, and Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive 

relief. 

D. A Pre-Filing Injunction Is Not Warranted At This Time.

Finally, to the extent that certain defendants’ have requested that this Court issue 

an injunction barring Plaintiff from filing future pro se actions without leave of Court 

(see Fed. Defs.’ Mem. at 35–36; PA State Judiciary Defs.’ Mot. at 17–18), this Court 

will decline to do so—at least for now. There is no doubt that “a court may employ 

injunctive remedies” such as filing restrictions “to protect the integrity of courts and the 

orderly and expeditious administration of justice.” Kaempfer v. Brown, 872 F.2d 496, 

496 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 

1985)). But a court’s power to issue a pre-filing injunction must be exercised 

cautiously, so that any restrictions imposed to protect institutional interests do not 

“unduly impair a litigant’s right of access to the courts.” In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 

430 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Urban, 768 F.2d at 1500); see also id. at 431 (pre-filing 

injunctions “should remain very much the exception to the general rule of free access to 

the courts, and the use of such measures against” pro se plaintiffs “should be 

approached with particular caution[]” (citation omitted)). Given these concerns, judges

in this district ordinarily follow three steps prior to issuing pre-filing injunctions: 

“first, notice and the opportunity to be heard are provided; second, the court develops a 

record for review that considers both the number and content of the plaintiff’s filings; 

and third, the court makes substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of 

the litigant’s actions.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 2d 28, 46 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

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This Court has considered these factors with respect to the instant request, and 

has determined that a pre-filing injunction is not warranted at this time. In so ruling, 

the Court notes that this is the first action that Plaintiff has filed in this jurisdiction, and 

while the Third Circuit has characterized Plaintiff as a “vexatious litigator” and 

threatened him with sanctions for his conduct before that Court, Dougherty v. Carlisle 

Transp. Prods., Inc., 563 F. App’x 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam), cert. denied, 135

S. Ct. 409 (2014), there is no indication in the record before this Court that any court 

(including the Third Circuit) has previously enjoined Plaintiff from filing future 

actions. That said, like the Third Circuit before it, this Court will caution Plaintiff that 

any future filings in this Court relating to the subject matter of the instant complaint 

may subject him to sanctions or a future pre-filing injunction. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety for several reasons, 

including sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, this Court’s lack of personal 

jurisdiction over certain defendants, and Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim or to 

otherwise establish that he has any cause of action arising from the facts that appear to

underlie his legal claims. These defects are generally incurable, and in any event, the 

amendments to the complaint that Plaintiff has now proposed in response to defendants’ 

motions do not, in fact, correct the flaws identified in this decision. Accordingly, as set 

forth in the accompanying order, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint are 

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GRANTED6

; moreover, Plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction and for leave 

to amend the complaint are DENIED.

A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: January 19, 2016 Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge 

6 Because the Court is granting Defendants’ motions and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety 

on the particular grounds analyzed in this opinion, it declines to consider the additional arguments in 

support of dismissal that defendants raise in their motions to dismiss. 

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