24134 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2022 / Notices 

1E.O. 14036, 86 FR 36987, Section (r) (iii) (July 

9, 2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2021-07-14/pdf/2021-15069.pdf#page=1. 

2Software applications are often referred to as 

‘‘apps,’’ and the term is used throughout to refer to 

mobile apps, either native or web-based. 

3State of the U.S. App Economy: 2020. ACT: The 

App Association (Jan. 31, 2021) (ACT Report 2020), 

https://actonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020- 

App-economy-Report.pdf. 

4ACT Report 2020. 

posted on the NTIS website as soon as 

they are available (https://www.ntis.gov/ 

about/advisorybd/index.xhtml). 

The teleconference will be via 

controlled access. Members of the 

public interested in attending via 

teleconference or speaking are requested 

to contact Ms. Shaw at the contact 

information listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section above not 

later than Wednesday, June 1, 2022. If 

there are sufficient expressions of 

interest, up to one-half hour will be 

reserved for public oral comments 

during the session. Speakers will be 

selected on a first-come, first-served 

basis. Each speaker will be limited to 

five minutes. Questions from the public 

will not be considered during this 

period. 

Speakers who wish to expand upon 

their oral statements, those who had 

wished to speak but could not be 

accommodated on the agenda, and those 

who were unable to attend are invited 

to submit written statements by 

emailing Ms. Shaw at the email address 

provided in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section above. 

Dated: April 19, 2022. 

Gregory Capella, 

Director. 

[FR Doc. 2022–08631 Filed 4–21–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–04–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration 

[Docket No. 220418–0099] 

RIN 0660–XC052 

Developing a Report on Competition in 

the Mobile App Ecosystem 

AGENCY: National Telecommunications 

and Information Administration, U.S. 

Department of Commerce. 

ACTION: Notice; request for comment. 

SUMMARY: Restoring competition in the 

American technology sector is a critical 

priority of the President’s Executive 

order on Promoting Competition in the 

American Economy. On behalf of the 

U.S. Department of Commerce, the 

National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration (NTIA) is 

requesting comments on competition in 

the mobile application ecosystem. The 

data gathered through this process will 

be used to inform the Biden-Harris 

Administration’s competition agenda, 

including, but not limited to, the 

Department of Commerce’s work 

developing a report to submit to the 

Chair of the White House Competition 

Council regarding the mobile 

application ecosystem. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before 11:59 p.m. Eastern 

Time on May 23, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: All electronic public 

comments on this action, identified by 

docket number NTIA–2022–0001 may 

be submitted through the Federal 

e-Rulemaking Portal at 

www.regulations.gov. The docket 

established for this rulemaking can be 

found at www.regulations.gov, NTIA– 

2022–0001. Click the ‘‘Comment Now!’’ 

icon, complete the required fields, and 

enter or attach your comments. 

Responders should include a page 

number on each page of their 

submissions. Please do not include in 

your comments information of a 

confidential nature, such as sensitive 

personal information or proprietary 

information. All comments received are 

a part of the public record and will 

generally be posted to Regulations.gov 

without change. All personal identifying 

information (e.g., name, address) 

voluntarily submitted by the commenter 

may be publicly accessible. For more 

detailed instructions about submitting 

comments, see the ‘‘Instructions for 

Commenters’’ section at the end of this 

Notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Please direct questions regarding this 

Notice to app-rfc@ntia.gov, indicating 

‘‘Notice and Request for comment’’ in 

the subject line, or if by mail, addressed 

to Ruth Yodaiken, National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue 

NW, Room 4725, Washington, DC 

20230; telephone: (202) 482–4067. 

Please direct media inquiries to NTIA’s 

Office of Public Affairs, telephone: (202) 

482–7002; email: press@ntia.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background and Authority 

On July 9, 2021, the President signed 

Executive Order 14036 on Promoting 

Competition in the American Economy 

(E.O.).1 As the E.O. explains, ‘‘[t]he 

American information technology sector 

has long been an engine of innovation 

and growth, but today a small number 

of dominant internet platforms use their 

power to exclude market entrants, to 

extract monopoly profits, and to gather 

intimate personal information that they 

can exploit for their own advantage. Too 

many small businesses across the 

economy depend on those platforms 

and a few online marketplaces for their 

survival.’’ 

The E.O. includes numerous 

initiatives to address the problem of 

dominant tech platforms undermining 

competition and reducing innovation. 

Included among them is a directive to 

the Secretary of Commerce to, in 

consultation with the Attorney General 

and the Chair of the Federal Trade 

Commission (FTC), conduct a study— 

including by conducting an open and 

transparent stakeholder consultation 

process—of the mobile application (app) 

ecosystem, and submit a report to the 

Chair of the White House Competition 

Council, regarding findings and 

recommendations for improving 

competition, reducing barriers to entry, 

and maximizing user benefit with 

respect to the ecosystem.2

By one account, the app economy was 

valued at $1.7 trillion in 2020, and over 

300,000 U.S. companies work in this 

sector, employing more than 5.9 million 

Americans.3 The two main app stores 

are operated by companies with 

headquarters in the United States. 

Global consumer spending in this 

ecosystem is also growing rapidly, 

estimated by some as nearly doubling 

from 2016 to 2020, to reach $120 

billion.4 Entire new sectors of industries 

have been spawned as a result of app 

innovation, such as ride sharing, or have 

experienced technical advancement, 

such as smart home appliances. The app 

economy is becoming a fundamental 

way that Americans interact with their 

environment. Thus, it is critical that this 

market be robust, open, innovative, and 

secure—and without barriers to entry 

and growth. 

On behalf of the Department, and in 

furtherance of this requirement, NTIA is 

requesting comments from the public on 

competition in the ecosystem in which 

mobile apps exist. The goal is to support 

the Administration’s efforts to promote 

competition in the tech sector and to 

inform NTIA’s analysis of ways to 

support healthy competition in the 

market for mobile apps, in particular. 

NTIA is the executive branch agency 

that is principally responsible by law for 

advising the President on 

telecommunications and information 

policy. NTIA studies and develops 

policy advice for the Administration 

related to communications and the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2022 / Notices 24135 

5See 47 U.S.C. 902 (b)(2)(D) and (H). 6NTIA has also examined the economic aspects 

of modern technology. See, e.g., Internet Policy 

Task Force & Digital Economy Leadership Team, 

Dep’t of Commerce, Fostering the Advancement of 

the Internet of Things (Jan. 2017), https://

www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iot_green_

paper_01122017.pdf. 7See, e.g., NTIA ACCESS BROADBAND, 2021 

Report (Dec. 2021), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ 

ntia/publications/ntia_access_broadband_2021_

report.pdf. 8This is similar to how the mobile ecosystem is 

described by United Kingdom’s Competition and 

Markets Authority (CMA) in its study of the 

‘‘Mobile ecosystems.’’ See CMA, Market Study 

Notice; Mobile Ecosystems, para. 2, June 15, 2021 

(UK) (‘‘In this notice the supply of ‘mobile 

ecosystems’ means the supply of smartphones and 

tablets, and associated software such as operating 

systems, app stores, browsers, and applications’’). 

9See, e.g., Majority Staff of, H. Subcommittee on 

Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law, 

Comm. on the Judiciary, Rep. and 

Recommendations on Investigation of Competition 

in Digital Markets 2020 (House Subcommittee 

Digital Markets Report) (e.g., descriptions of Google 

and Apple ecosystems, starting at 211 and 332, 

respectively), https://judiciary.house.gov/ 

uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf; 

see also CMA, Mobile Ecosystems; Market Study 

Interim Report, Dec.14, 2021 (UK) (UK CMA 

Interim Report), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 

publications/mobile-ecosystems-market-studyinterim-report; Netherland Auth. for Consumers & 

Markets, Market Study Into Mobile App Stores 

(2019) (referring to bottlenecks at 40), https://

www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/marketstudy-into-mobile-app-stores.pdf. 

10Barriers that could make it harder to enter a 

field or succeed might include funding hurdles, 

restrictions by operating services or regulators, 

technical variations requiring additional software 

development and maintenance, or obstacles that 

prevent a business from obtaining a big enough user 

base to make their product workable (e.g., a dating 

app). 

11See, e.g., United States et al. v. Google, LLC, 

No. 1:20–cv–03010, (D.D.C. amended complaint 

filed Jan 15, 2021); ‘‘FTC Staff Presents Report on 

Nearly a Decade of Unreported Acquisitions by the 

Biggest Technology Companies,’’ FTC press release, 

Sept. 15, 2021 (study of acquisitions by Alphabet/ 

Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft), 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 

2021/09/ftc-report-on-unreported-acquisitions-bybiggest-tech-companies; see also Substitute 

Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other 

Equitable Relief at 44, FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 

No. 1:20–cv–03590 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021). 

12See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Utah v. Google 

LLC, No. 3:21–cv–05227 (N.D. Cal Nov. 1, 2021) (37 

AGs v. Google) (37 Attorneys General allege 

Google’s conduct has driven up competitor prices, 

limited consumer choice, misrepresented security 

risks of apps outside of its app store); see also 

Hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on 

Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer 

Rights, Antitrust Applied: Examining Competition 

in App Stores (April 21, 2021), https://

www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/antitrustapplied-examining-competition-in-app-stores; 

Digital platform services inquiry, Interim report No. 

2—App marketplaces, Australian Competition & 

Consumer Commission, March 2021. 

13See, e.g., South Korea: Amended 

Telecommunications Business Act Will Ban App 

Payment Monopolies, Library of Congress, 2021, 

https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/ 

2021-09-16/south-korea-amendedtelecommunications-business-act-will-ban-apppayment-monopolies/; KCC Draws Up Standards to 

Determine Violation of Prohibited Acts By App 

Market Business Operators, Press Release, Korea 

Communications Commission (Mar. 10, 2022); Epic 

Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20–cv–05640 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 10, 2021) (regarding Apple taking a 

percentage of apps’ revenues and limiting their 

communication with consumers); see also, Deal on 

Digital Markets Act: EU rules to ensure fair 

competition and more choice for users, Press 

Release, European Parliament, IMCO (Mar. 24, 

2022) (noting the proposed legislation requires 

‘‘that the largest messaging services (such as . . . 

iMessage) will have to open up and interoperate 

with smaller messaging platforms, if they so 

request’’), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ 

en/press-room/20220315IPR25504/deal-on-digitalmarkets-act-ensuring-fair-competition-and-morechoice-for-users. 

14See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Executive Order on 

Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 

The White House (July 9, 2021), https://

www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-onpromoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/; 

see also, House Subcommittee Digital Markets 

Report, supra note 6, at 43. 

15See, e.g., 37 AGs v. Google, supra note 9; see 

also, House Subcommittee Digital Markets Report, 

supra note 6, at 178. 

16See, e.g., FCC, 2020 Communications 

Marketplace Report, GN Doc. No. 20–60 (Dec. 31, 

2020); FCC, Annual Report and Analysis of 

Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 

Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile 

Services, DA–16–1061, WT Doc. No. 16–137, paras. 

124–7 (Sept. 23, 2016) (19th Mobile Competition 

Report) (discussing mobile applications). 

17See, e.g., CFPB, Consumer Access to Financial 

Records, advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 

CFPB–2020–0034, 85 FR 71003 (Nov. 2020). 

internet,5 including to promote the 

efficient and effective use of 

telecommunications and information 

resources.6 In that role, NTIA regularly 

works on national policies on the 

communications infrastructure.7

Additionally, the Department more 

broadly is charged with promoting job 

creation and economic growth. 

This study is aimed at examining 

unique aspects of competition involving 

apps on mobile phones and tablets.8 In 

doing so, we recognize that the general 

mobile ecosystem is comprised of a 

number of distinct types of entities and 

interrelated markets. Mobile service 

providers play a role in a range of 

relevant aspects, including broadband 

service and determining which apps are 

pre-loaded or set as defaults. At the 

same time, functionality and app 

distribution are also dependent upon 

operating systems and app stores, which 

function as sub-ecosystems.9 For this 

study, we are seeking to look beyond the 

general to examine particular 

environments in which different types 

of apps and associated businesses 

operate. For example, there might be 

different opportunities and barriers 10

that distinguish some types of apps, 

such as those used for medical 

purposes, payments, streaming, socialnetworks, messaging, or apps that 

connect to other items by virtual or 

physical connections (e.g., to tracking or 

Internet-of-Things devices). Other app 

ecosystems that exist or extend beyond 

mobile, such as those for gaming 

consoles and personal computers, might 

be relevant to our review, but only to 

the extent that analysis of them offers 

clear facts for comparison. 

The Executive Order specifically 

requires consultation on the NTIA study 

with the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

and the FTC, who are the primary 

enforcers of competition law at the 

federal level. Law enforcement agencies 

have been assessing the evolving digital 

markets in which apps operate.11 Along 

with actions by the states, private actors, 

the courts, and legislators, such legal 

examinations are shaping the mobile 

app ecosystem and have helped elevate 

the discussion of competition barriers, 

as well as proposals to facilitate greater 

competition in the app marketplace.12

These actions have also been tangibly 

altering the ecosystem. For example, the 

roles of the two major app stores, 

including the commission fees they 

charge, and restrictions they place on 

how apps interact with consumers, as 

well as technical barriers, have been 

impacted by decisions by lawmakers 

across the globe.13

Another area of inquiry has centered 

around the potential for abuse of 

commercial data obtained by 

competitors, to the detriment of privacy 

and competition.14 In addition, there are 

concerns about whether companies 

interfere with the creation of innovative 

new products and services by limiting 

the ability of mobile apps and their 

associated products and services from 

accessing a particular set or network of 

customers.15 While this study will not 

include a legal assessment of whether 

certain practices violate the law, we are 

interested in learning of rules and 

practices that make it harder to open 

and run businesses or that harm 

innovation. 

In addition to competition agencies, 

other agencies have relevant roles in 

overseeing specific types of apps as part 

of a broader ecosystem. For example, 

the Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC) also oversees the 

communications marketplace, including 

aspects of competition between mobile 

service providers, and has for years 

assessed the competitive elements of the 

ecosystem.16 The Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau (CFPB) has also been 

examining payment ecosystems.17

In the study, NTIA will take a holistic 

approach to analyzing the mobile app 

ecosystem with the goal of identifying 

recommendations to improve 

competition, reduce barriers to entry, 

and maximize user benefit with respect 

to the ecosystem. In addition to 


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24136 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2022 / Notices 

18See, e.g., Jennifer Bjorhus, Minnesota teen wins 

Ann Bancroft grant for app to reduce litter, 

StarTribune (Dec. 24, 2021), https://

www.startribune.com/minnesota-teen-wins-annbancroft-grant-for-app-to-reduce-litter/600130173/ 

?refresh=true. 

19See, e.g., L. Ceci, Number of apps installed by 

mobile users in the United States as of 3rd quarter 

2019, Statista (Oct. 19, 2021) (‘‘Statista 2021’’), 

https://www.statista.com/statistics/267309/numberof-apps-on-mobile-phones; Stephanie Chan, U.S. 

Consumers Used an Average of 46 Apps Each 

Month in the First Half of 2021, Sensor Tower (Aug. 

19, 2021), https://sensortower.com/blog/apps-usedper-us-smartphone. 

20See, e.g., Using Pirate Metrics to Analyze Your 

Mobile Application’s Audience, Jacob Parcell, 

General Services Administration (May 12, 2016), 

https://digital.gov/2016/05/12/using-pirate-metricsto-analyze-your-mobile-applications-audience/. 

21See, e.g., Why Consumers Download, and 

Delete, a Retailer’s Mobile App: Promos and 

rewards drive downloads, eMarketer (July 14, 

2016), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/WhyConsumers-Download-Delete-Retailers-Mobile-App/ 

1014212. 

22See, e.g., L. Ceci, Number of apps available in 

leading app stores as of 2021, Statista (Dec. 14, 

2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/ 

number-of-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores/. 

23State of Mobile 2021, App Annie, at 8, (last 

visited April 14, 2022), https://www.data.ai/en/go/ 

state-of-mobile-2021/; see also App Annie: Global 

app stores’ consumer spend up 19% to $170B in 

2021, downloads grew 5% to 230B, Sarah Perez, 

TechCrunch, Jan. 12, 2022, https://techcrunch.com/ 

2022/01/12/app-annie-global-app-stores-consumerspend-up-19-to-170b-in-2021-downloads-grew-5-to230b/?utm_medium=TCnewsletter&

tpcc=TCappnewsletter. 

24See, e.g., Letter from Congresswoman Eshoo 

and colleagues to Director Panchanathan, National 

Science Foundation, and Acting Director Jarmin, 

Census Bureau, Nov. 4, 2021, https://

eshoo.house.gov/sites/eshoo.house.gov/files/Annual

BusinessSurveyLetter11421.pdf. 

fundamentals about the structure of the 

ecosystem, including how the apps are 

distributed, there are many issues that 

might be relevant to developers and app 

users. For example, common 

occurrences of fraud—or perceptions of 

it—might impact whether consumers 

download apps and businesses are 

comfortable offering their products 

through specific distribution channels. 

While there are many issue areas and 

markets that could be brought into this 

study, the scope will only address 

topics most relevant to the mobile app 

ecosystem. 

Given the incredible promise that the 

app system holds, NTIA is also 

interested in learning what app users 

need to maximize user benefit,18

particularly users who use apps in their 

daily life or for business operations. 

There is limited information on how 

people use apps. For example, some 

sources estimate that each mobile 

device has 20–46 apps loaded at any 

time, but there is limited comparable 

data to confirm whether that is an 

accurate or optimal number to foster 

innovation.19

Topic areas that the agency will use 

to address mobile app ecosystem 

competition in the forthcoming report 

will be informed by input from public 

comment. Possible topics are outlined 

below. 

II. Request for Comment 

Through this Request for Comment, 

NTIA is seeking public input to further 

develop its understanding of 

competition within the mobile app 

ecosystem. NTIA is looking for concrete 

and specific information as to what app 

developers, organizations, and device 

(i.e., phones; tablets) users experience, 

and any potential challenges or barriers 

that limit app distribution or user 

adoption. To the extent commenters 

choose to respond to the specific 

questions asked, responses should 

generally follow the structure below and 

note the number corresponding to the 

question. As detailed below, through 

this Request for Comment, NTIA is 

seeking information on the state of 

competition, the factors affecting app 

development and distribution, and 

active ways to increase competition, 

through government or private sector 

action. 

Definitions and Statistics 

1. How should we measure whether 

the app ecosystem is competitive? 

a. How should the ‘‘success’’ of an 

app be measured? 20

b. How should the ‘‘failure’’ of an app 

be measured? 21 What is known about 

the reasons that app developers no 

longer offer or support apps? 

c. Does the reported total of the 

number of apps available at any one 

time in an app store have bearing on the 

state of competition among apps or 

particular categories of apps? 22

2. Are there any important and 

specific entities (or categories of 

entities) such that it would be a mistake 

to omit—or improperly include—them 

by defining the ‘‘mobile app ecosystem’’ 

to focus on mobile devices, such as 

phones and tablets? 

a. If so, how should this study be 

scoped so that it is optimal but feasible? 

b. For example, should mobile apps 

offered specifically for enterprise use 

(e.g., for use by businesses, not for 

consumers) be considered in this study? 

3. Apps are not all the same. For 

example, some have different technical 

features and capabilities (e.g., locationbased apps compared to messaging 

apps), while others are bound by 

specific regulatory guardrails (e.g., 

banking apps or children’s apps). In the 

context of framing competitiveness 

within the ecosystem, how should we 

categorize types of apps so that they are 

grouped by distinguishable barriers and 

other significant factors? Are there ways 

to best categorize or segment the market 

to diagnose specific market barriers, 

such as those that could impact app 

developers, or consumers? 

a. Should distinctions be made based 

on type of content and app 

functionality? 

b. Should distinctions be made based 

on the level of hardware or operating 

system integration required for the app 

to function? For example, categories 

might include apps that access location 

data, special-purpose hardware (e.g., 

near field communications), secure 

elements for payment, or other 

credentials. 

c. Should a distinction be made for 

apps that are the primary way (or the 

only way) the app provider interacts 

with users, as opposed to apps that are 

an extension of an existing digital or 

physical business? Do app-based 

businesses face different competitive 

constraints than businesses that have a 

brand and presence outside of mobile 

apps? 

4. How should web apps (browserbased) or other apps that operate on a 

mobile middleware layer be 

categorized? 

5. There are some indicators that there 

is a difference in kind between some 

apps that generate large amounts of 

money or are downloaded often and 

most other apps. For example, one 

industry analyst reported that 97% of 

publishers that monetize through the 

Apple App Store earned less than $1 

million per annum in 2021, compared to 

other reports of more than $1 billion 

earned by the top 13 apps (including 

games) on both Apple and Google 

platforms.23 What is the best way to 

assess the competition environment for 

less popular apps and start-ups? 

a. Can any potential harms, such as 

deficiencies in data security and privacy 

protections, be traced back to the 

current market imbalance? 

b. Is there evidence to suggest that 

consumers are less likely to avoid or 

stop using a particular app even if they 

would prefer a more privacy enhancing 

environment because of a lack of 

competitors offering similar services? 

Software and Support for Developers 

6. What unique factors, including 

advantages and obstacles, are there 

generally for app development — 

especially start-ups — that are relevant 

for competition? 24

a. Are there unique market dynamics 

in this ecosystem (such as the existence 

of a small number of dominant 

technology companies) that affect 


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25See, e.g., Written Testimony of FTC 

Commissioner Rohit Chopra before the U.S. House 

of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 

Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and 

Administrative Law Hearing on Online Platforms 

and Market Power, Part 3: The Role of Data and 

Privacy in Competition, (Oct. 18, 2019) (expressing 

concern ‘‘that many investors are reluctant to 

allocate capital to innovators that seek to challenge 

and disrupt this dominance. Instead, investors tell 

me they prefer to fund companies that can 

eventually be sold an incumbent’’), https://

www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_

statements/1549812/chopra_-_testimony_at_

hearing_on_online_platforms_and_market_power_

part_3_10-18-19.pdf. 

26 see, e.g., Free and paid distribution for Android 

and iOS 2022, Statista, March 14, 2022, (last visited 

April 14, 2022) (Most apps are offered at no direct 

monetary cost to the user), https://

www.statista.com/statistics/263797/number-ofapplications-for-mobile-phones/#:∼:text=As%20of

%20March%202021%2C%2096.7%20percent

%20of%20apps,Store%20and%20Google

%20Play%20as%20of%20March%202021. 

27See, e.g., Congressional App Challenge, 

Inclusion and Diversity, https://www.congressional

appchallenge.us/impact/#Diversity; see, generally, 

Congressional App Challenge (last visited April 18, 

2022), https://www.congressionalappchallenge.us/. 

28See, e.g., App Development Costs, Business of 

Apps (2022) (April 1, 2022), https://www.business

ofapps.com/app-developers/research/appdevelopment-cost/; contrast Sophie Zoria, How the 

Fragmentation of iOS and Android Platforms 

Affects App Development, Medium, Swag Soft, 

June 23, 2020, https://medium.com/swag-soft/howthe-fragmentation-of-ios-and-android-platformsaffects-app-development-f992cb87bafc. 

29For descriptions of some difficulties reported in 

this area, see Majority Staff of, H. Subcommittee on 

Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law, 

Comm. on the Judiciary, Rep. and 

Recommendations on Investigation of Competition 

in Digital Markets, at 102–104 (2020). 

30While the UK CMA’s Interim Report, for 

example, refers to some studies in this area, the raw 

data and it suggests further study is necessary. See, 

e.g., UK CMA Interim Report at 277. 

31See, e.g., Letter to Kate Reader and Morag 

Bond, Co-General Managers, Digital Platforms Unit, 

Australian Competition and Consumer Comm’n, 

from Microsoft, Oct. 16, 2020, https://

www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Microsoft%20%2816

%20October%29.pdf. 

32See, e.g., Report regarding Fact-Finding Survey 

on Digital Platforms (Business-to-Business 

transactions on retail platform and app store), Fair 

Trade Commiss’n, (Oct. 31, 2019) (Japan). 

mobile apps’ ability to secure 

funding? 25

b. Are some methods of monetization 

essential to the economic success of an 

app? What are they? For example, is 

there pressure to incorporate advertising 

or collect personal data of users 26 or 

engage in unique relationships with 

data aggregators? 

7. Are there particular obstacles 

preventing more development from 

different communities, such as by 

location/region, ethnicity/race, 

language, or gender? 27

8. Are there studies or specific 

examples of the costs or advantages for 

app developers to build apps for either, 

or both, of the main operating systems, 

iOS and Android (which have different 

requirements)? 28

a. What are the challenges specific to 

multi-platform development and how 

can they be mitigated? 

b. What are the costs and advantages 

of developing standalone apps for these 

platforms relative to other means of 

providing the same services or content, 

such as web apps, which can operate 

across platforms? 

9. What role does interoperability 

play in supporting and advancing a 

competitive mobile app ecosystem? 

a. What are the key characteristics of 

interoperability as it relates to the 

mobile app ecosystem? 

b. What other barriers (e.g., legal, 

technical, market, pricing of interface 

access such as Application Programing 

Interfaces [APIs]) exist, if any, in 

fostering effective interoperability in 

this ecosystem? How are these barriers 

different or similar than those present in 

other ecosystems? 

c. How does data portability, or lack 

thereof, factor into consumers keeping 

the same app if they switch from one 

operating system (iOS or Android) to 

another? 29

10. While apps can be coded from 

scratch, Software Development Kits 

(SDKs) and other technical tools can 

make it easier for developers to create 

apps. What data is available to show 

how such tools shape the ecosystem and 

affect the ability of developers to 

compete? 

a. Which tools are most often used by 

app developers and what are the entities 

that offer those tools? 

b. Do these tools make it easier for a 

developer to create apps for multiple 

platforms? How so? Are there any tradeoffs (e.g., performance, battery life, or 

stability) for using these tools? 

c. Are developers of certain types of 

apps more likely to use the assistance? 

d. Are there privacy or security 

concerns associated specifically with 

these tools? 

e. What empirical data exists to 

support findings on this topic? 

11. How do policy decisions by firms 

that operate app stores, build operating 

systems, or design hardware impact app 

developers (e.g., terms of service for app 

developers)? What empirical data exists 

to support those findings? 

a. In particular, how does a lack of 

transparency about app market 

rejections affect app developers (e.g., 

costs)? 

b. How do the policy decisions affect 

or limit the feasibility or availability of 

alternative models of app development 

(e.g. open source), delivery (e.g. 

browser-based apps), or funding (e.g. 

non-commercial or donation-based 

models)? 

12. What types of labor restrictions or 

workforce pipeline challenges, if any, 

limit paths for app innovation? What 

may solutions look like? 

Avenues for App Distribution 

13. Some mobile apps are pre-loaded 

on mobile devices or set as default apps, 

while others are only available through 

an app store, through a browser (web 

apps), or, for devices using the Android 

system, by sideloading. Is there data 

comparing these mechanisms and their 

effect on app distribution? 

a. Is there a competitive advantage to 

being preloaded or available by default 

to the users of phones and tablets? What 

is the evidence to support or contradict 

there being an advantage? 30

b. Is there data on the number of 

developers that have been able to have 

their apps preloaded or available as 

default apps or the types of apps? 

c. What information is available on 

the types of agreements these 

developers reached and with whom to 

preload or set their app as a default app? 

14. As noted above, governments and 

courts are already exploring concerns 

about control of app access to users 

exercised by mobile app stores and 

other ecosystem participants. 

a. What data and studies exist that 

identify specific additional obstacles 

that developers and businesses might 

face related to the distribution of 

apps? 31 Commenters may reference 

factual findings in existing cases and 

filings in government explorations.32

b. In particular, what studies have 

been done on requirements that apps 

use an app store or operating system’s 

own services or the appeal of alternative 

mechanisms that do not tie app access 

to using other products or services from 

those mechanisms? 

15. How do, or might, alternative app 

stores (other than Google Play or the 

Apple App Store), affect competition in 

the mobile app ecosystem? 

a. What data is there to assess how 

well existing alternative stores 

distribute apps, in general or specific 

types of apps? 

b. What unique barriers are there 

affecting each of the main operating 

systems (Android, iOS) that might 

prevent web apps or—to the extent 

allowed on Android system—alternative 

app stores and sideloading, from gaining 

more popularity with users and app 

developers than they currently have? 

c. Is there analysis comparing 

competition on iOS ecosystem (where 

app distribution is limited) to that of 

alternative distribution mechanisms on 

Android operating systems? 

16. What evidence is there to assess 

whether an app store model is necessary 


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24138 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2022 / Notices 

33See, e.g., App Store stopped over $1.5 billion 

in suspect transactions in 2020, Apple, https://

www.apple.com/newsroom/2021/05/app-storestopped-over-1-5-billion-in-suspect-transactions-in2020/; see also Google Developer Policy Center 

(with policies prohibiting items such as 

impersonation of other apps) (last visited April 14, 

2022), https://play.google.com/about/developercontent-policy/. 

34See, e.g., Complaint, In the Matter of Support 

King LLC (SpyFone.com), FTC, No. 1923003 (filed 

Dec. 21, 2021) (complaint filed with settlement 

decision and order), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 

files/documents/cases/1923003c4756spyfone

complaint_0.pdf. 

35For more on mobile vetting and security issues, 

see, e.g., Vetting the Security of Mobile 

Applications, Revision 1, NIST Special Publication 

800–163, National Institute of Science and 

Technology (NIST) (April 2019), https://nvlpubs.

nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800- 

163r1.pdf; see also Mobile Device Security: 

Corporate-Owned Personally-Enabled (COPE), NIST 

Special Publication 1800–21 (Sept. 2020), https://

doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-21. 

36See, e.g., Testimony of Testimony of Kirsten 

Daru, Chief Privacy Officer and General Counsel for 

Tile, Inc., before the Senate Committee on the 

Judiciary Subcommittee on Competition Policy, 

Antitrust, and Consumer Rights (April 2021), 

https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 

04.21.21%20Kirsten%20Daru%20Senate

%20Judiciary%20Testimony%20Final.pdf. 

37See, e.g., Adapting ahead of regulation: a 

principled approach to app stores, Brad Smith, 

President & Vice Chair, Microsoft, Feb 9, 2022, 

https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/02/ 

09/open-app-store-principles-activision-blizzard/. 

for mobile devices, instead of the 

general-purpose model used for desktop 

computing applications? 

17. Mobile app stores act as initial 

screeners and responders for concerns 

about mobile app content, such as 

fraudulent apps and malware.33 Similar 

issues for screening and responding 

exist in other contexts, such as website 

hosting and search engine retrieval. 

What empirical data is there analyzing 

any unique content screening issues 

related to mobile app stores that affect 

competition? 

a. Is there evidence of legitimate apps 

being rejected from app stores or 

otherwise blocked from mobile devices? 

Is there evidence that this is a common 

occurrence or happens to significant 

numbers of apps? 

b. What assessments are there of their 

effectiveness, or lack therefore, on 

security and privacy of end users? 34

c. Are there disincentives or unique 

barriers affecting the degree of security 

and privacy protections offered by 

alternative app stores? 

18. Are there other areas, specific 

technologies or procedures, that offer 

lessons on more and less successful 

ways to screen out problematic apps? 

What are the characteristics of such 

success? 

a. Are there good examples by 

enterprise users? 35

b. For example, some devices allow 

sideloading only after warning the user 

to make sure they trust the app before 

proceeding with the download, in a way 

similar to how some browsers issue 

warnings for unknown websites. What 

material exists about the efficacy of such 

methods? 

c. What roles, if any, do independent 

or third party security testing play in the 

app store ecosystem? 

d. Does the current model discourage 

competition and innovation in the 

development or advancement of 

security testing? 

19. How does the existence of 

imposter and other fraudulent apps 

affect developer incentives or legitimate 

app lifecycles? 

App Users 

20. What research exists regarding the 

number of active apps consumers have 

on their mobile devices at any one time 

and how often they try new ones? 

a. Are there generalizations that can 

be made based on items such as the cost 

of the app, type of broadband access or 

device, or even categories of phone 

users? 

21. How do most consumers find and 

make decisions to use apps? 

a. Is there data to show whether the 

usage of an app or any other relevant 

metric for performance is tied to 

existing brand visibility outside of the 

mobile app ecosystem? 

b. Is there data about how often 

people use the search feature in an app 

store, search engines through browsers, 

or particular ranking lists of popular 

apps or app storefronts? 

c. Is there empirical data that 

examines how app rankings, app 

reviews, or other objective measures of 

apps (for example, popularity, quality, 

or number of downloads) are used (or 

manipulated) to influence consumer 

choices? 

22. The E.O. asks the Department to 

explore ways to maximize ‘‘user 

benefit’’ with regard to competition in 

the mobile app ecosystem. How should 

we measure or consider user benefit? 

a. What is the appropriate scope of 

users for consideration? Should it 

include developers? 

b. If there are conflicts between enduser and developer interests, how does 

this affect the assessment of user 

benefit? 

c. How might convergence of endusers and developers—through lowcode environments, for example—affect 

this dynamic moving forward? 

23. Do apps that are developed for, or 

used by, certain communities (such as 

by income, ethnicity/race, or gender) 

face significantly different competitive 

challenges? What are the challenges? 

Other Factors 

24. Some apps make use, or would 

like to make use, of additional mobile 

device components beyond those that 

are more commonly accessible (e.g., 

camera, microphone, contacts) in order 

to offer an innovative product or 

service, but the operating system or 

device provider does not allow such 

access.36 Similarly, for some apps, it 

might be essential to be able to 

interconnect to other hardware and 

services, such as cloud services. What 

are the valid security concerns and 

technical limitations on what device 

functionality an app can access? 

a. What factors should be considered 

in striking a balance between 

encouraging companies to ensure proper 

security measures, while allowing third 

parties to access the protected features 

that might allow for further innovation 

and competition? 

b. Are there specific unnecessary (e.g., 

technical) constraints placed on this 

ability of app developers to make use of 

device capabilities, whether by devicemakers, service providers or operating 

system providers, that impact 

competition? 

c. Are there other means or factors to 

consider for mitigating specific risks 

that would not inhibit competition? 

25. What unique challenges, if any, do 

software updates pose for app 

competition, including updates driven 

by the app developers and those 

necessitated by other ecosystem 

changes, such as operating system 

updates? How does this impact security 

and costs for those apps, products, and 

services? 

26. Are there governance practices, 

regulations or laws that impact 

competition among certain categories of 

apps more than others, or their non-app 

counterparts? 

Potential Actions To Increase 

Competition 

27. What specific measures might the 

federal government take to foster 

healthy competition—especially for 

nascent app innovation—in the mobile 

app ecosystem? 

28. What specific actions could the 

private sector and civil society take to 

ensure and promote healthy app 

competition (such as technical 

standards development or 

monitoring)? 37

Instructions for Commenters 

NTIA invites comment on the full 

range of issues presented by this Notice, 

including issues that are not specifically 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2022 / Notices 24139 

38See also 15 CFR 4.9(c) (concerning the 

designation of business information by 

commenters). 

raised in the above questions. 

Commenters are encouraged to address 

any or all of the questions above. To the 

extent commenters choose to respond to 

the specific questions asked, responses 

should generally follow the structure 

above and note the number 

corresponding to the question. 

Comments that contain references to 

studies, research, and other empirical 

data that are not widely available 

should include copies of the referenced 

materials along with the submitted 

comments. Commenters should include 

the name of the person or organization 

filing the comment, which will facilitate 

agency follow up for clarifications as 

necessary. 

Commenters are advised not to 

incorporate information that concerns 

business trade secrets or other 

confidential commercial or financial 

information as part of the comment.38

Dated: April 18, 2022. 

Milton Brown, 

Chief Counsel (Acting), National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2022–08573 Filed 4–21–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–60–P 

COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM 

PEOPLE WHO ARE BLIND OR 

SEVERELY DISABLED 

Strategic Plan Notice 

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase From 

People Who Are Blind or Severely 

Disabled. 

ACTION: Request for comments on the 

agency’s draft Strategic Plan for FY 

2022–2026; reopening of comment 

period. 

SUMMARY: The Commission is reopening 

the deadline for the submission of 

written comments in response to its 

March 18, 2022, draft Strategic Plan. 

DATES: The comment period for the draft 

Strategic Plan, a non-rulemaking notice 

published March 18, 2022, at 87 FR 

15412, is reopened. Initial written 

comments must now be received no 

later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on 

April 30, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by CPPBSD–2022–0003 only 

by the following method: Internet— 

Federal eRulemaking Portal. Electronic 

comments may be submitted through 

https://www.regulations.gov. To locate 

the document, use CPPBSD–2022–0003 

or key words such as ‘‘Strategic Plan,’’ 

‘‘Committee for Purchase,’’ or 

‘‘AbilityOne,’’ to search documents 

accepting comments. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Please be advised that comments 

received will be posted without change 

to https://www.regulations.gov, 

including any personal information 

provided. 

Accessible Format: On request to the 

program contact person listed under FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT, 

individuals with disabilities can obtain 

this document in an alternative 

accessible format. 

Electronic Access to This Document: 

The official version of this document is 

the document referenced in the Federal 

Register of March 18, 2022. You may 

access the official edition of the Federal 

Register at www.govinfo.gov. You may 

also access Commission documents 

published in the Federal Register by 

using the article search feature at: 

www.federalregister.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shelly Hammond, Director of 

Contracting and Policy, by telephone 

571–457–9468 or by email at 

shammond@abilityone.gov. 

During and after the comment period, 

you may inspect all public comments 

about the draft Strategic Plan by 

accessing Regulations.gov. 

Assistance to Individuals With 

Disabilities in Reviewing the Draft 

Strategic Plan: Upon request, we will 

provide an appropriate accommodation 

to an individual with a disability who 

needs assistance to review the draft 

Strategic Plan. If you want to contact us 

to request assistance, please contact the 

person listed in this section. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 

18, 2022, the Commission issued a 

request for comments on the agency’s 

draft FY 2022–2026 Strategic Plan. To 

ensure that members of the public have 

sufficient time to comment, and to 

ensure the Commission has the benefit 

of a complete record, the Commission is 

reopening the deadline for submission 

of initial comments to no later than 

11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on April 30, 

2022. 

Michael R. Jurkowski, 

Acting Director, Business Operations. 

[FR Doc. 2022–08616 Filed 4–21–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6353–01–P 

COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM 

PEOPLE WHO ARE BLIND OR 

SEVERELY DISABLED 

Procurement List; Additions 

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase From 

People Who Are Blind or Severely 

Disabled. 

ACTION: Additions to the Procurement 

List. 

SUMMARY: This action adds a product to 

the Procurement List that will be 

furnished by nonprofit agencies 

employing persons who are blind or 

have other severe disabilities. 

DATES: Date added to and deleted from 

the Procurement List: May 22, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase 

From People Who Are Blind or Severely 

Disabled, 1401 S Clark Street, Suite 715, 

Arlington, Virginia 22202–4149. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Michael R. Jurkowski, Telephone: (703) 

785–6404 or email CMTEFedReg@

AbilityOne.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Additions 

On 11/26/2021, the Committee for 

Purchase From People Who Are Blind 

or Severely Disabled published notice of 

proposed additions to the Procurement 

List. This notice is published pursuant 

to 41 U.S.C. 8503(a)(2) and 41 CFR 51– 

2.3. 

After consideration of the material 

presented to it concerning capability of 

qualified nonprofit agencies to provide 

the product(s) and impact of the 

additions on the current or most recent 

contractors, the Committee has 

determined that the product(s) and 

service(s) listed below are suitable for 

procurement by the Federal Government 

under 41 U.S.C. 8501–8506 and 41 CFR 

51–2.4. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification 

I certify that the following action will 

not have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The major factors considered for this 

certification were: 

1. The action will not result in any 

additional reporting, recordkeeping or 

other compliance requirements for small 

entities other than the small 

organizations that will furnish the 

product(s) to the Government. 

2. The action will result in 

authorizing small entities to furnish the 

product(s) to the Government. 

3. There are no known regulatory 

alternatives which would accomplish 

the objectives of the Javits-WagnerO’Day Act (41 U.S.C. 8501–8506) in 


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