Kenneth S. Apfel has been appointed Commissioner of the Social Security

1

Administration and is substituted as appellee. See Fed. R. App. P. 43. 

The Honorable Franklin H. Waters, United States District Judge for the Western 2

District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-3254

___________

Duane Fines, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* South Dakota.

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of *

1

Social Security, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 11, 1998

Filed: July 24, 1998 

___________

Before BEAM and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and WATERS, District Judge. 2

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Duane Fines appeals the district court's affirmance of the denial of Social

Security disability benefits. We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

Fines is sixty years old. He was employed for more than thirty years as a truck

driver. He has an eighth-grade education and suffers from back and knee pain.

At the hearing, Fines testified that his work as a city delivery truck driver

generally involved lifting up to 100 pounds. He testified that he loaded and unloaded

trucks and delivered freight all day. He estimated that he could presently lift no more

than a bag of groceries. His activities include golf, mowing the lawn (with frequent

breaks), and doing the dishes. He is unable to sit for more than thirty minutes, but can

drive a car. He testified that he has problems remembering things, and asserts that he

has a possible learning disability.

 

The medical evidence shows that Fines has a history of back and knee pain and

has mild degenerative changes in his spine. He was examined and tested by a

psychologist, who found that his I.Q. was in the "bright normal" range, although his

memory was found to be in the "low average" range. 

A vocational expert who also testified at the hearing characterized Fines's former

work as a truck driver as semiskilled and stated that Fines had acquired transferable

work skills from that employment. He stated that there were light and sedentary jobs in

the national economy that a person with Fines's impairments and experience could

perform. These jobs included check cashier, gaming cashier, time keeper, telephone

answering service operator, automobile service station attendant, sales clerk, park aide,

and recreational facilities aide. 

The ALJ found that, although Fines had a severe impairment, he did not have an

impairment that met the listing of presumptively disabling conditions found in Appendix

1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404 ("the Listings"). The ALJ then found that Fines

was unable to return to work as a truck driver, but that he had the residual functional
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capacity to perform light and sedentary work, limited by a restriction on prolonged

sitting. He found that Fines had transferable skills and could perform various semiskilled

light and sedentary jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. He

therefore concluded that Fines was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. The Appeals Council affirmed the decision, as did the district court. 

On appeal, Fines argues, among other things, that his job as a delivery truck driver

was unskilled, and he thus acquired no transferable skills from that job. 

II. DISCUSSION

Our task on appeal is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Siemers v. Shalala, 47

F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but

enough evidence that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.

See Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993). 

To be entitled to disability benefits, Fines must establish a physical impairment

lasting at least one year that prevents him from engaging in any gainful activity. See

Ingram v. Chater, 107 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a "substantial gainful

activity;" (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment—one that significantly limits

the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the

claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education,

and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past

work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. See id.
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The ALJ relied on the testimony of the vocational expert to find that Fines had

acquired skills as a truck driver that he could transfer to other jobs in the national

economy. This method of determining the existence of transferable skills is explicitly

allowed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e). See Stout v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 853, 854 (8th Cir.

1993). Moreover, the ALJ's conclusion in this regard is bolstered by reference to the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), a Labor Department guide to job ability levels

that has been approved for use in Social Security cases. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1566(d)(1); see also Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1997). The DOT

is the Commissioner's primary source of reliable job information. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1566(d)(1). The Commissioner uses the DOT to classify occupations as skilled,

semiskilled or unskilled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569.

In the DOT, each job is assigned a number that reflects the job's specific

vocational preparation time (SVP), i.e., how long it generally takes to learn the job. See

United States Dep't of Labor, Employment and Training Admin., Dictionary of

Occupational Titles, Vol. II, Appendix C at 1009. An SVP level of "three" indicates that

a job requires more than one month and up to three months of training; while an SVP

level of "four" would require more than three months and up to six months of training.

See id. at 1009. Unskilled work, on the other hand, requires less than thirty days

training. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569(a); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 201.00.

Unskilled work corresponds to an SVP of one or two in the DOT. See DOT at 1009.

The vocational expert testified that Fines prior work would be classified as "Truck

Driver, Heavy" in the DOT. That job has an SVP level of four. See id. at 918. All of

the other jobs mentioned by the vocational expert have an SVP of either three or four.

See id. at 929 (automobile-service-station attendant— SVP 3);183 (gambling

cashier—SVP 4); 183 (check cashier—SVP 3); 187-88 (timekeeper—SVP 3); 207

(telephone-answering-service operator—SVP 3); 231 (sales clerk—SVP 3);251

(recreation-facility attendant—SVP 3). Thus, we find no support for Fines's contention

that his former work as a truck driver was unskilled.
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Accordingly, we find substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Fines

acquired skills in his former semiskilled job as a truck driver that he can transfer to other

semiskilled jobs in the national economy. We have considered Fines's other arguments

and find them lacking in merit.

III. CONCLUSION

The order of the district court is affirmed.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

In my view, the ALJ erred by determining that “eye-hand-foot coordination,

mathematics, collection of money, use of a radio, and some light maintenance” constitute

“skills” under the Social Security Act and by failing to make findings as to whether

Fines’ kills are highly marketable. Accordingly, I dissent.

The majority correctly points out that a vocational expert may be used “in

determining . . . whether work skills can be used in other work and the specific

occupations in which they can be used.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e). The majority

provides no support, however, for the proposition that a vocational expert is capable of

determining what qualifies as work skills under the Act. 

Fines was fifty-seven-years old at the time of the adverse decision, he had

completed the eighth grade, and worked delivering freight in the city. At his

administrative hearing, Fines described his duties: “I just unloaded trucks in the

morning, then I’d load my truck and deliver all day. Then I’d pick up people that were

shipping stuff back out, and then I’d unload that into the trucks that were going out on

the road. And that’s just what I did basically every day.” (Admin. R. at 33.)
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In an attempt to clarify the concepts of “skills” and “transferability of skills” in

disability determinations, the Social Security Administration (Administration) issued

Social Security Ruling 82-41. (See Appellant’s Addendum at 18.) The Administration

defined “skill” as 

knowledge of a work activity which requires the exercise of significant

judgment that goes beyond the carrying out of simple job duties and is

acquired through performance of an occupation which is above the

unskilled level (requires more than 30 days to learn). It is practical and

familiar knowledge of the principles and processes of an art, science or

trade, combined with the ability to apply them in practice in a proper and

approved manner. This includes activities like making precise

measurements, reading blueprints, and setting up and operating complex

machinery. A skill gives a person a special advantage over unskilled

workers in the labor market.

Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added). “Transferability” is defined as “applying work skills

which a person has demonstrated in vocationally relevant past jobs to meet the

requirements of other skilled or semiskilled jobs.” Id. at 19. The Administration

addressed the determination of whether a job is semiskilled and whether skills are

transferable to other jobs, stating:

The regulations[’] definition of semiskilled work in regulations sections

404.1568(b) and 416.968(b) states that semiskilled jobs “may require

alertness and close attention . . . coordination and dexterity . . . as when

hands or feet must be moved quickly to do repetitive tasks.” These

descriptive terms are not intended, however, to illustrate types of skills, in

and of themselves. The terms describe worker traits (aptitudes or abilities)

rather than acquired work skills.

Id.
While “light maintenance” presents the closest case for a finding of “skill,” the 3

ALJ’s finding that Fines could perform light maintenance is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record.

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In my view, “eye-hand-foot coordination, mathematics, collection of money, use

of a radio, and some light maintenance” are more appropriately classified as aptitudes

or abilities. Consequently, the ALJ erred as a matter of law and should be reversed. 3

Even if Fines acquired transferable work skills, the ALJ erred by failing to make

findings as to whether Fines’ skills are highly marketable. The regulations state:

[A]dvanced age (55 or over) is the point where age significantly affects a

person’s ability to do substantial gainful activity. If you are severely

impaired and of advanced age and you cannot do medium work (see §

404.1567(c)), you may not be able to work unless you have skills that can

be used in (transferred to) less demanding jobs which exist in significant

numbers in the national economy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). Given the applicability of § 404.1563(d), the disallowance of

Fines’ disability benefits can be sustained only upon a finding that Fines’ skills are highly

marketable. See Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 820 F.2d 777, 781

(6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The

language is unmistakably clear. Absent a finding that a claimant who is close to

retirement age has acquired skills which are also highly marketable, the regulations do

not permit a finding of transferability.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citing

Renner v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)); see also

Emory v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1991); Pineault v. Secretary of

Health & Human Services, 848 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The ALJ’s

failure to make findings with regard to the marketability of Fines’ skills constitutes

reversible error.

For the reasons stated above, I would reverse.
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A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.