PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4094

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH WATKINS,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:20-cr-00385-RJC-DCK-9)

Argued: May 8, 2024 Decided: August 2, 2024

Before KING and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and Gina M. GROH, United States 

District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judges

King and Groh joined.

ARGUED: Paul Stephen Kish, KISH LAW LLC, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. Amy 

Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 1 of 25
2

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

A federal jury convicted Kenneth Watkins of conspiracy to possess a controlled 

substance with intent to distribute it. On appeal, Watkins raises several objections to how 

his case was tried before that jury, as well as how the district court sentenced him following 

his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Facts

Steven “Ziggy” Cloud operated a Charlotte, North Carolina-based record label that 

produced rap music. Suspecting that Cloud and others involved with his label were dealing 

drugs, investigators obtained a wiretap for Cloud’s cellphone. They eventually determined 

that Kenneth “KennyMan” Watkins—an Atlanta, Georgia-based rap musician who 

operated a recording studio called K3Soundz—dealt drugs with Cloud. 

Evidence introduced at trial centered around three trips that Cloud directed two 

couriers to take from Charlotte to Atlanta to obtain pills for him. The first trip, in the 

summer of 2020, involved Jonquilla Sanders. At Cloud’s instruction (but without any 

money from Cloud), Sanders traveled to Atlanta to “pick up some pills.” J.A. 121–22. 

While there, Sanders received what she estimated to be 10,000 pills1 from someone she 

described as a tall, light-skinned black man who drove a red sportscar—a man she later 

testified was not Watkins. Sanders then drove back to Charlotte and left the pills in Cloud’s 

car.

1 Sanders said they “[l]ooked like X pills,” that is, ecstasy or MDMA. J.A. 123.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 2 of 25
3

The second trip took place from October 16 to 17, 2020. Cloud told Sanders that it 

would be “[t]he same thing” as before. Unlike the first trip, however, Cloud handed 

Sanders a stack of cash, which she never counted. Also unlike the first trip, Sanders did

not travel alone; Cloud sent along a man called “Reggie.” 

During this second trip, investigators intercepted calls among Sanders, Cloud, and 

Watkins. Those calls linked the three of them and suggested that Sanders was obtaining 

drugs from Watkins in Atlanta. The calls reflect that Sanders was to meet Watkins at Club 

Diamonds, where Watkins was performing—although Watkins explained over the phone 

that he would not “have it in there.” J.A. 136, 138; S.A. 7. Cloud also instructed Sanders 

to give the cash to Watkins and to speak only to him. Sanders duly complied.

The intercepted calls and Sanders’s testimony further established that, after Watkins 

finished performing at Club Diamonds, he and Cloud directed Sanders to drive to 

K3Soundz. Watkins eventually arrived at the studio and told Sanders that he still did not 

have “what [she] was coming to get.” J.A. 142. So Sanders followed Watkins in her 

vehicle to a residence located about fifteen minutes away. Watkins entered the house and 

soon emerged with a box, which he gave to Sanders. Sanders never looked inside the box 

but assumed it contained pills based upon her past dealings with Cloud and his remark 

about the “same thing.”2

 She returned to Charlotte and delivered the box to Cloud. 

The third drug-supply trip to Atlanta occurred later that month. Rather than Sanders, 

this trip involved another woman, Latisha Anderson. A week before the trip, Anderson 

2 Sanders pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute a controlled substance based 

upon that single transaction. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 3 of 25
4

texted Cloud, asking, “You have pills”? S.A. 43. Cloud said yes. He followed with 

another text telling Anderson that someone had “let sumone steal my bag wit 4000 in it last 

nite.” J.A. 201; S.A. 43. Anderson responded, “Damn omfg,” to which Cloud replied, 

“Yea man shit got me tight.” J.A. 201; S.A. 43. Two days later, Anderson texted Cloud 

and told him that she “needed pills but I guess I’ll get them tomorrow.” J.A. 199; S.A. 41. 

Cloud inquired of Anderson: “I’m almost ready again u gone take dat trip?” J.A. 199; 

S.A. 41. Anderson asked when, and Cloud stated that he did not know but had about “2000 

left.” J.A. 200; S.A. 41–42. 

Anderson drove to Atlanta on October 24, 2020. She arrived at ten o’clock in the 

morning, around the time the transaction was scheduled to take place. Frustrated after 

waiting an hour, Anderson began to return to Charlotte when Cloud finally called her at 

11:25 a.m.3

 Anderson complained that she had been on the road since 6:30 a.m. Cloud 

said he would try to call Watkins. Cloud then managed to connect Watkins to the call and 

explained that Anderson had been waiting for an hour. Watkins responded, “I’m fixing to 

go straight to her right now.” S.A. 11–12. Cloud gave Anderson the address to K3Soundz, 

which Anderson said was seventeen minutes away. Twenty minutes later (11:54 a.m.), 

Watkins told Cloud to let Anderson know he was on the way and would arrive in ten 

minutes. At 12:02 p.m., Cloud relayed the message to Anderson. At 12:42 p.m., Cloud 

called Anderson and asked if she was “situated”; Anderson answered, “Yeah.” S.A. 16.

3 At 10:49 a.m., Anderson had texted Cloud, “Bout to leave I will bring ur money 

when I get back to the city.” J.A. 369; S.A. 44.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 4 of 25
5

Based on their monitoring of Cloud’s phone and the similarities with Sanders’s 

earlier trips, investigators believed Watkins had supplied Anderson with drugs. They

therefore arranged for a uniformed local police officer to stop Anderson on the interstate 

highway between Atlanta and Charlotte at around two o’clock in the afternoon. After a 

drug canine alerted for narcotics, police discovered 8,909 pills inside a Versace box in the 

car. The pills were divided into eleven plastic bags by color and shape. Eleven of the 

pills—one from each of the plastic bags—were later tested and found to contain the 

schedule I controlled substance eutylone. Law enforcement also found $4,638 cash in the 

car’s center console.

B. Procedural History

A federal grand jury impaneled in the Western District of North Carolina issued a 

twenty-three-count superseding indictment that named Watkins as a defendant. The 

indictment alleged that Watkins conspired with eight others, including Cloud, to possess 

eutylone with an intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Watkins pleaded 

not guilty and proceeded to a three-day trial. 

At trial, Watkins’s defense focused on Anderson’s version of the events that took 

place during her October 24 trip to Atlanta. She testified that she “didn’t meet anybody

until 10:30 or 11 o’clock” in the morning but did not meet Watkins until between 12:30 

and 1:00 p.m.—implying that she met someone else between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. J.A. 

319–20 (emphasis added). And Anderson denied that Watkins gave her drugs when they 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 5 of 25
6

eventually connected at K3Soundz that afternoon. She claimed instead that Watkins gave 

her $4,500 cash, which she assumed was a music-related payment.4

 

That left the alleged 10:30–11:00 a.m. meeting that is not reflected in the texts or 

calls. Anderson testified in vague terms that she received a box “from a gentleman” whose 

identity she refused to disclose. J.A. 315, 323–24. “[She] rolled the window down and he

placed the box in the passenger seat.” J.A. 323. While driving back to Charlotte, Anderson 

opened the box and observed bags filled with pills. 

Two defense witnesses purported to corroborate Anderson’s receipt of the pills from 

the unidentified man. Ayesha O’Neill, who was involved with Watkins’s music, recalled 

seeing Anderson receive a large Versace box from a tall, light-skinned black man driving 

a red sportscar at a gasoline station near K3Soundz at about ten o’clock in the morning. 

O’Neill admitted that she saw Anderson meet Watkins at K3Soundz but said that was after 

seeing her with the man at the gas station. Similarly, Kizzy Childs, Watkins’s wife, 

testified that she saw a light-skinned black man driving a red sportscar hand the Versace 

box to Anderson at a gas station. Childs likewise said that she later saw Anderson at 

K3Soundz, where she observed Watkins hand Anderson $4,500 cash to deliver to Cloud 

as payment for a music video. 

Despite this testimony, the jury convicted Watkins and the district court sentenced 

him to a decade in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 fine. Watkins 

timely appealed.

4 Anderson did not explain why, two hours earlier, she texted Cloud that she was 

leaving and would bring him his money.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 6 of 25
7

II. Discussion

Watkins raises five arguments on appeal: First, that the district court erroneously 

denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Second, that the court erred in permitting 

inquiry about lyrics from his music. Third, that the court’s rejection of his proposed jury 

instructions was erroneous. Fourth, that the court erred in calculating the converted drug 

weight attributable to him. And fifth, that the court erroneously denied his motion for a 

downward departure. We reject each in turn.

A. Denial of Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

Following the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Watkins moved for a judgment of 

acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) (“After the government closes its evidence or after 

the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of 

acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”). 

The district court denied Watkins’s motion, and Watkins did not renew it at the close of all 

the evidence. See id. Instead, he waited until two weeks after conviction to renew the 

motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) (“A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, 

or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges 

the jury, whichever is later.”). The district court denied that motion, too. 

1. Standard of Review

In order for us to review de novo a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we must have before us a properly preserved motion for a judgment of acquittal. 

See United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 374 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Fuertes, 805

F.3d 485, 497 (4th Cir. 2015). As Rule 29 lays out, a defendant can move for acquittal at 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 7 of 25
8

three different times. Rule 29(a) states that the motion can be made either “[a]fter the 

government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence.” Rule 29(c)(1) 

provides that a defendant can move for acquittal (or renew a prior motion5

) “within 14 days 

after a guilty verdict.”

Not all of these motions, however, are considered properly preserved for appellate 

review. When a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rests

and then proceeds to present evidence at trial, he must later renew the motion to preserve 

appellate review. That is because, “[b]y introducing evidence, the defendant waives his 

objections to the denial of his motion to acquit.” United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 

164 n.1 (1954); see United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1082, 1084–85 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en 

banc) (Scalia, J.). If so waived, appellate review is foreclosed unless the defendant can 

show “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th 

Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 200 & n.10 (4th Cir. 2012).

Thus, a defendant who moved for acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case,

was denied, and then introduced his own evidence must move for acquittal again to 

preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. It is well-established that 

renewing a motion for a judgment of acquittal after the close of all the evidence, but before 

the case is submitted to the jury, properly preserves the defendant’s appellate challenge.

See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 433 F.3d 128, 136–37 (1st Cir. 2005). But Watkins 

didn’t do this. He waited until after he was convicted to move—pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1)

5 A defendant need not move for acquittal under Rule 29(a) to later move for 

acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1). Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 8 of 25
9

rather than Rule 29(a)—for acquittal. So we must ask if this later motion has the same 

preservative effect, despite the defendant’s failure to renew the motion at the close of all 

the evidence.6

We conclude that it does. Remember, the reason that we typically don’t review 

motions made and denied after the close of the prosecution’s evidence but never renewed 

is because the defendant is treated as having forfeited a challenge to the denial of his motion 

by subsequently presenting evidence. But that cannot be said of a Rule 29(a) motion made 

or renewed after the close of all the evidence, or of a postconviction Rule 29(c) motion,

because both motions are made (and then denied) after the defendant has submitted 

evidence. It would be odd to treat the submission of evidence as waiving review of a 

motion that hasn’t even been made. In accordance with this logic, courts consider Rule 

29(a) motions made or renewed after the close of all the evidence as properly persevered 

for appellate review. See 2A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 463 (4th ed. 2024); cf. Calderon, 348 U.S. at 164 n.1. We see no meaningful reason to 

treat Rule 29(c) motions any differently. See 2A Wright et al., supra § 469 (“If a defendant 

files a motion under Rule 29(c) after the verdict, . . . then that preserves the sufficiency 

issue for review . . . even if no motion was filed or renewed during trial.”). Thus, regardless 

6 One could read our precedent to have already determined that it does so. In United 

States v. Fall, Fall “moved for acquittal on Count 6 after the close of the government’s 

case, [but] failed to renew the motion after trial.” 955 F.3d at 374 (emphasis added). Thus, 

we held that “Fall failed to properly preserve th[e] issue,” and the argument was “waived.” 

Id. The negative implication is that “renew[ing] the motion after trial”—i.e., within 14 

days of the verdict pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1)—would properly preserve a motion made 

“after the close of the government’s case.” But this is only an implication, not a holding.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 9 of 25
10

of whether the defendant moves for acquittal after the close of all the evidence (under Rule 

29(a)), after the jury renders a verdict (under Rule 29(c)(1)), or both, he has not waived the 

right to challenge the denial of the motion.

Accordingly, we hold that a Rule 29(c)(1) postconviction renewal of a motion for a 

judgment of acquittal made after the prosecution rests its case-in-chief properly preserves 

for appellate review the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

7

 Such is 

the case with respect to Watkins. So we review the district court’s denial of Watkin’s

motion de novo. United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 2013). But, like the 

district court, we must give deference to the jury’s determination: “On an appeal 

challenging the sufficiency of evidence, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government, and the jury’s verdict must stand unless we determine that no rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id.8

7 Accord United States v. Gonzalez, 528 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008); United 

States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Pless, 982 F.2d 1118, 

1122 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976, 980 (1st Cir. 1992); 

United States v. Allison, 616 F.2d 779, 784 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Gov’t of Virgin 

Islands v. Carr, 451 F.2d 652, 654–55 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1971). 

8 The prosecution suggested in its briefing that Watkins filed his postconviction 

motion for a judgment of acquittal three months late. In that case, the district court would 

have no power to enter a judgment of acquittal. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 

421 (1996). But the prosecution made an understandable error. According to the cover 

pages of the trial transcripts in the joint appendix submitted to this Court, Watkins’s trial 

occurred from March 6–8, 2022. If this were right, then Watkins’s June 23 motion would 

be well without Rule 29(c)(1)’s time limit. Yet the district court’s docket says that

Watkins’s trial took place from June 6–8, 2022. And the evidence suggests that the 

docket’s dates are correct. For instance, the district court granted a motion to continue the 

(Continued)

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 10 of 25
11

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The jury convicted Watkins of a drug-trafficking conspiracy. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

To sustain its burden of proof, the prosecution had to establish: “(1) an agreement between 

two or more persons to engage in conduct that violates a federal drug law; (2) the 

defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary 

participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010). 

We conclude that a rational jury could find each of those elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

Watkins contends that there is insufficient evidence that he knew about the

conspiracy to distribute eutylone because there is no direct evidence “that [he] knew about 

the contents of the closed packages transported by the two women from Atlanta to 

Charlotte.” Opening Br. at 19. But a jury can infer that a defendant knew about a 

conspiracy from circumstantial evidence, “such as [the defendant’s] relationship with other 

members of the conspiracy, the length of his association, his attitude, conduct, and the 

nature of the conspiracy.” United States v. Landersman, 886 F.3d 393, 406 (4th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted). Indeed, a defendant’s knowledge or intent is ordinarily not susceptible 

to proof by direct evidence. It is generally through reasonable inferences from 

circumstantial evidence that a jury understands the defendant’s mind. See United States v. 

trial on March 18, which would have been after the trial already occurred were the

transcripts’ timeline correct. Moreover, the transcripts misstate the days of the week 

associated with the trial dates, but the docket does not. For example, the transcripts say 

that the trial began on Monday, March 6. But March 6 was a Sunday. June 6, by contrast, 

was a Monday.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 11 of 25
12

Hackley, 662 F.3d 671, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient 

to support a conviction for conspiracy.”). 

Even so, Watkins argues that the jury’s inferences about his knowledge were 

“unreasonable.” But this argument, in effect, asks us to reweigh the evidence that the jury 

properly considered. That is not our role. 

First, Watkins argues that the jury should have inferred from his sending $4,500 

cash to Cloud during the third trip to Atlanta that he could not have been the source of the 

drugs. For, according to Watkins, suppliers do not send cash to buyers. To start, the jury 

was not required to believe the testimony that Watkins sent cash to Cloud. But even if it 

did so, the ready exchange of cash among conspirators—whatever the reason for it—does 

little to undermine the existence or knowledge of a conspiracy. Indeed, a longstanding or 

multifaceted relationship can be probative of the existence of a knowing agreement to 

distribute drugs. See United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656, 669–70 (4th Cir. 2021); cf.

J.A. 120–21 (describing the relationship between Watkins and Cloud as like one between 

brothers).

9

Moreover, Watkins’s narrow focus on the transaction in which he allegedly 

provided cash loses the broader evidentiary context. Take Sanders’s October 16–17 trip to 

pick up pills: Sanders gave Cloud’s cash to Watkins; Watkins gave Sanders a box to deliver 

to Cloud. The jury surely could infer that the box was filled with pills based on the 

9 Though we need not hypothesize about why Watkins may have sent money to 

Cloud, some evidence at trial suggested that the alleged $4,500 cash payment was for a 

music video. A reasonable jury could have accepted that testimony and found that music 

was only one part of their relationship. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 12 of 25
13

surrounding circumstances, including Sanders’s experience with Cloud, his remark that she 

would be doing the “same thing” as before,

10 and the calls among the co-conspirators. The 

jury was not required to view the third trip in isolation even if we were to accept Watkins’s 

preferred explanation of it. 

Watkins’s second argument—that “[i]t is just as reasonable to infer that the ‘I don’t 

have it here’ statement . . . related to money, not to the Versace box”—can be quickly 

disposed of because Watkins conflates Sanders’s and Anderson’s trips. Watkins said that 

he wouldn’t “have it in there” on October 16–17, when Sanders was the courier. And there 

was no evidence he ever gave any money to Sanders. Anderson’s trip, which involved the 

Versace box, occurred on October 24, and Watkins made no similar statement on that day.

Finally, Watkins claims that the witnesses explained that Anderson got the box not 

from him, but from the tall, light-skinned man in the red car. And it is true that evidence 

of this version of events was presented: O’Neill and Childs said they saw Anderson receive 

10 Watkins argues that United States v. Pauling, 924 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2019), shows 

that no reasonable jury could have concluded that Cloud’s “same thing” comment meant 

Sanders would be picking up drugs. In Pauling, a drug buyer told one of two coconspirators—Conspirator A—that he wanted the “same thing as last time”; then the coconspirators sold the buyer 14 grams of heroin. See id. at 659. While recognizing that a 

jury could reasonably infer that the buyer had previously bought 14 grams of heroin from 

Conspirator A, the Second Circuit held that no rational jury could find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the buyer’s statement meant those possible prior 14 grams were attributable to 

Conspirator B. Id. But here we have no such attenuation. Evidence showed that Cloud 

sent Sanders to Atlanta to pick up drugs in the summer of 2020. And Sanders testified that 

Cloud asked her to take another road trip to Atlanta in October for the “same thing.” So a 

rational jury could easily infer that the second trip—wherein Watkins was a confirmed 

participant—also entailed picking up drugs. In fact, Sanders herself made that exact

inference and testified to it. See J.A. 128 (“[Prosecution:] Did you hear the point in the 

call where [Cloud] mentioned, he said ‘same thing?’ [Sanders:] Yeah. . . . I assumed he 

wanted me to pick up pills.”).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 13 of 25
14

the Versace box from a man of that description.11 But a rational jury was entitled to 

disbelieve that version of events. Both defense witnesses had apparent bias. Childs was 

Watkins’s wife. O’Neill, meanwhile, rented a booth at K3Soundz, styled hair for 

Watkins’s music videos, and sang Watkins’s praises on the witness stand. And, of course, 

it is not simply bias that entitles a rational jury to disbelieve a witness. The jury was also 

permitted to simply weigh Watkins’s version of events against the substantial evidence 

implicating him and conclude that the prosecution’s version of events occurred. 

Reweighing that evidence is, again, not our job.

Watkins was entitled to make these arguments to the jury, as he did. But the jury 

was not required to believe them. And since there is evidence from which a rational jury 

could have convicted Watkins, we decline to second guess the jury.12

B. Lyrics

Toward the end of his defense presentation, Watkins called his wife, Childs, as a 

witness. Childs testified that she and Watkins are devout Muslims, that Watkins is a good 

father, and that Watkins has a strong work ethic. She described Watkins as “into his 

11 Sanders, too, claimed to meet this man—in summer 2020, months before 

Anderson traveled to Atlanta in late October.

12 We also reject Watkins’s claim that the evidence failed to show that he 

participated in the conspiracy. Once a conspiracy is established, as it was here, “only a 

slight connection need be made linking a defendant to the conspiracy to support a 

conspiracy conviction, although this connection also must be proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Seigler, 990 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States 

v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). As the evidence already discussed

demonstrates, a reasonable jury could conclude that Watkins had at least a “slight” hand in 

the conspiracy; in fact, it could determine that Watkins was a principal player.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 14 of 25
15

religion” and asserted that it is “not in his character to do drugs.” J.A. 353. On crossexamination, the prosecution asked Childs whether she had heard a lyric from Watkins and 

Cloud’s song Don’t Do It: “They’ve got more money than all them. We got more guns 

than all of them.” J.A. 358. Childs said yes. The prosecution next asked Childs about 

another lyric, but Watkins objected on relevance grounds before Childs could answer, and 

the court sustained the objection. 

The prosecution then inquired about lyrics from more of Watkins’s songs but 

Watkins again objected. The district court called counsel to the bench, where Watkins 

explained that he did not see his lyrics’ relevance. The prosecution responded that Watkins 

“elicited character evidence . . . from his wife; that he’s a good Muslim and anything like 

this is out of character.” J.A. 359–60. The court replied:

Normally I would prohibit this kind of cross on lyrics, but I do think the door 

was open wide on character evidence on Direct with respect to character traits 

of the defendant. So I think this is responsive to it and covered by Rules 404 

and 405. And so any objection I’ll deny, but I will say that it’ll get 

cumulative soon.

J.A. 360. The prosecution thus asked Childs about the lyric “I’m a doper, for real,” in 

Watkins’s track You Know It. J.A. 360–61. Childs knew that line, too. 

On redirect, Childs explained that she thought Watkins gave Anderson cash to 

deliver to Cloud as payment for a music video for their song Truckloads. On recross, 

therefore, the prosecution asked whether “Truckloads is a song about dealing drugs.” J.A. 

364. Childs answered, “I wouldn’t say it’s just about dealing drugs.” Id. The prosecution 

then asked Childs if she was familiar with Watkins’s lyric, “I’ve got truckloads and bales, 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 15 of 25
16

don’t even put it on a scale.” Id. Watkins objected on relevance grounds but the district 

court overruled the objection, and Childs confirmed that she had heard the lyric. 

1. Standard of Review

Watkins objected to the cross examination using his lyrics as irrelevant. But on 

appeal, he argues that the evidence was inadmissible as hearsay or improper character

evidence. “To preserve an argument on appeal, the defendant must object on the same 

basis below as he contends is error on appeal.” United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459 

(4th Cir. 2014). So Watkins forfeited his hearsay and character-evidence arguments by not 

raising them below. 

“Forfeited arguments are reviewed for plain error.” United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 

550, 554 (4th Cir. 2021); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Fed. R. Evid. 103(e). Satisfying that 

standard requires: (1) an error; (2) that is clear or obvious under the law at the time of 

review; (3) that seriously affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).

2. Hearsay

Watkins suggests that his lyrics were hearsay. Hearsay is a declarant’s “statement,” 

not made “while testifying at the current trial,” that makes an assertion and is offered in 

evidence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 

Watkins’s lyrics were “statements” made by a “declarant” (Watkins) while not “testifying” 

that “asserted” something: “I’m a doper, for real,” and “I’ve got truckloads and bales, don’t 

even put it on a scale.” But the Rules of Evidence specifically provide that a partyUSCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 16 of 25
17

opponent’s out-of-court statements are “not hearsay.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); see

United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming the admission of lyrics 

under Rule 801(d)(2)(A)). Therefore, the district court did not plainly err in failing to 

exclude these statements under the hearsay rule.

3. Character Evidence

Watkins’s other argument on appeal is that the lyrics should have been excluded as 

propensity evidence. See Rule 404(a), (b). Yet “a defendant may offer evidence of the 

defendant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer 

evidence to rebut it.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A). Moreover, “[o]n cross-examination of 

the [defendant’s] character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific 

instances of the [defendant]’s conduct.” Id. 405(a).

Watkins argues that inquiring about his lyrics should have been prohibited under 

the character-evidence rules. The prosecution counters, and the district court found, that 

even if the lyrics were character evidence, Watkins “opened the door” to it by presenting 

Childs’s testimony of his good character. Specifically, Childstestified that Watkins neither 

sells nor does drugs—indeed, that “[i]t’s not in his character to do drugs.” J.A. 351, 353 

(emphasis added). Rather, Watkins is “into his religion and he’s into his family and . . . 

he’s into his work ethic.” J.A. 353. He is also a “very, very good father” who is “into 

making sure that he builds generational wealth for his children.” J.A. 345, 353.

The district court did not err in finding that Childs’s testimony opened the door. 

Childs not only noted that Watkins was a “good Muslim” but explained that it was “not in 

[Watkins’s] character to do drugs,” and she proceeded to support that opinion by reference 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 17 of 25
18

to Watkins’s faith, fatherhood, and work ethic. She painted a picture of Watkins as an 

upright family man and strongly suggested that, in accordance with that character, he would 

not have involved himself in the conspiracy to distribute eutylone. The district court 

reasonably concluded that those statements are character evidence that opened the door to 

counterevidence. See United States v. Mendoza-Prado, 314 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“Defendant testified that he was a family man who was busy providing for his 

family and lacked the time, the inclination, and the courage to become involved in dealing 

cocaine. . . . The foregoing evidence of general good character opened the door for the 

government’s evidence of prior bad acts to demonstrate bad character.”). 

Accordingly, the prosecution was entitled to “offer evidence to rebut” Watkins’s 

character evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A). But it did not even go that far. The 

prosecution did not “offer evidence.” Rather, pursuant to Rule 405(a), it only “inquir[ed] 

into relevant specific instances of [Watkins]’s conduct.” The prosecution merely asked 

Childs whether she was “familiar” with Watkins’s lyrics, accepting Childs’s answer each 

time and never pushing for more detail.13 

13 This represents yet another reason why the lyrics were not hearsay—Rule 405(a) 

questioning does not “offer” a statement “to prove the truth of the matter asserted” therein. 

“The theory is that, since the reputation witness relates what he has heard, the inquiry tends 

to shed light on the accuracy of his hearing and reporting.” Fed. R. Evid. 405 advisory 

committee’s notes; see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479, 483 (1948). It 

matters not whether the defendant actually did the things about which the prosecution 

inquires. See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 479 (“The prosecution may . . . show that damaging 

rumors, whether or not well-grounded, were afloat—for it is not the man that [the 

defendant] is, but the name that he has which is put in issue.”). The question is whether 

the witness is intimately familiar with the defendant’s character and/or reputation and, if 

so, is giving a complete picture thereof. See id. (“[The defendant’s] own witness . . . may 

(Continued)

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 18 of 25
19

So while the prosecution might have exploited Watkins’s decision to “open the 

door” to character evidence even more than it did, the district court did not err by permitting

the limited inquiry into Watkins’s lyrics.

C. Rejection of Proposed Jury Instructions

Before the district court issued jury instructions, Watkins proposed that the court 

issue a particular instruction with respect to the meaning of “reasonable doubt.”14 The 

court denied his proposal in favor of the “time-tested” instruction that “has been reviewed 

by the Fourth Circuit”: “[T]he term ‘reasonable doubt’ means just what it says. It is a 

doubt based upon reason and common sense. Its meaning is no doubt self-evident and 

understood by you, and the Court will not attempt to define the term further.” J.A. 374–

75.

Watkins contends that the district court erred in rejecting his proposed jury 

instructions. “Both the decision to give (or not to give) a jury instruction and the content 

of an instruction are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 

1098, 1107 (4th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998), 

we explained that “[t]he trial court is not required to define reasonable doubt as a matter of 

be required to disclose rumors and reports that are current even if they do not affect his 

own conclusion.”). The prosecution’s questions here took that form. 

14 “A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense after careful 

and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. If, based on your consideration 

of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, 

you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he 

is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.” 

Defendant’s Proposed Request to Charge, United States v. Watkins, No. 3:20-cr-0385 

(W.D.N.C. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 259.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 19 of 25
20

course so long as the jury is instructed that a defendant’s guilt must be proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt; the Constitution does not obligate a court to further define the standard.” 

Williams remains good law and forecloses Watkins’s argument. So we reject Watkins’s 

challenge to the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on his preferred explanation of 

reasonable doubt. 

D. Calculation of Converted Drug Weight

Following Watkins’s conviction, the probation officer submitted a presentence 

report that concluded that Watkins knew that his relevant conduct involved at least 4.39 

kilograms of eutylone, or that it was reasonably foreseeable to Watkins that it did so. In it, 

she noted that Anderson transported 2.39 kilograms of eutylone on October 24 and, based 

upon that figure and Sanders’s testimony, estimated that Sanders transported two kilograms

of eutylone during her October 16–17 trip. Because eutylone is not specifically referenced 

in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the probation officer calculated the converted drug 

weight as well. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. nn.6 & 8. She applied a 1-to-380-gram ratio—

each gram of eutylone representing 380 grams of converted drug weight—for a total 

converted drug weight of 1,668.58 kilograms. Based on an offense level of thirty and a 

criminal history category of two, the Guidelines advised a sentence of 108 to 135 months’ 

imprisonment. 

Watkins objected to the drug-quantity calculation, arguing that only the eleven pills 

tested by the forensic chemist should be considered in determining quantity. He also 

maintained that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Sanders 

transported two kilograms of eutylone when none of the pills from that delivery were 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 20 of 25
21

seized. Lastly, Watkins objected to the drug-conversion ratio applicable to eutylone. He 

contended that the probation officer should have used a 1-gram-to-250-milligram ratio 

because eutylone is analogous to the illicit drug MDMA, and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.9 

describes the typical weight of an MDMA pill as 250 milligrams. 

The district court overruled all of Watkins’s objections to the presentence report. It 

found that the drug-quantity calculation based on a 1-to-380-gram ratio was “consistent 

with the evidence in the case [and] the scientific testimony by the chemist.” J.A. 481. The 

court explained that sampling—testing a representative group of pills for their chemical 

properties and extrapolating the results to the untested pills—is “a very reasonable way of 

assessing drug weight, especially with respect to these facts where there’s a very large 

volume of pills, a pattern and practice established over time by the evidence.” Id. And as 

to the two kilograms attributed to Sanders’s second trip, the court “th[ought] that the 

estimate by the Government with respect to the October 17th Sanders trip ma[d]e[] sense 

based upon the evidence, text messages of stolen pills, remaining pills, and a dire need for 

the courier trip to occur to restock.” J.A. 482.

1. Standard of Review

“We review the district court’s calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to a 

defendant for sentencing purposes for clear error.” United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 

210 (4th Cir. 1999). A calculation isn’t clearly erroneous so long as it is “supported by 

competent evidence in the record.” Id. “Neither the Guidelines nor the courts have 

required precise calculations of drug quantity.” United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 

1019 (4th Cir. 1992). 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 21 of 25
22

2. Drug Quantity

First, Watkins says the district court erred in estimating the drug quantity in the 

8,909 seized pills based upon a sample of only eleven pills. But in doing so, the district 

court properly relied upon the testing performed by the prosecution’s forensic chemistry 

expert, which concluded that the 8,909 seized pills contained 2.39 kilograms of eutylone. 

The expert explained that such sampling is an accepted testing method and allowed him to 

conclude that each of the 8,909 pills, which were visually consistent and found together in 

a single parcel, contained eutylone. See United States v. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d 628, 639 

(8th Cir. 2004). This procedure met the prosecution’s burden to establish drug quantity by 

a preponderance of the evidence. See Uwaeme, 975 F.2d at 1019–21; United States v. 

Dinh, 920 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F.3d 85, 107–08 

(1st Cir. 2008). 

Second, Watkins argues that the district court erred in including the roughly two 

kilograms of eutylone involved in Sanders’s October 16–17 transaction in the drugquantity calculation. But he cannot identify any error, let alone clear error. The district 

court, having heard the evidence during trial, quite reasonably concluded that Watkins 

delivered to Sanders a box containing an estimated two kilograms of eutylone. See J.A. 

482 (discussing “messages deal[ing] with the volume of pills, the depletion of inventory 

based on theft, and sales that are consistent with the estimate that the Government [wa]s 

asking the Court to make”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (“Where there is no drug seizure 

. . . , the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance. In making this 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 22 of 25
23

determination, the court may consider . . . similar transactions in controlled substances by 

the defendant . . . .”).

Thus, the district court’s drug-quantity calculation was not clearly erroneous.

3. Converted Drug Weight

Next, Watkins asserts that the district court erred in applying a 1-to-380-gram drugconversion ratio to the 4.39 kilograms of eutylone attributed to him. Instead, Watkins 

argues, the district court should have analogized eutylone pills to MDMA and converted at 

a 1-gram-to-250 milligram ratio.

The district court did not err. The Guidelines state that, where the drug-conversion 

table does not list the substance involved in the offense, the court should look to the most 

analogous listed substance. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.6. The drug-conversion table 

explicitly lists “synthetic cathinones” and provides the 1-to-380-gram ratio. See id. cmt. 

n.8(D). The probation officer, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Watkins himself 

concur that eutylone is a synthetic cathinone. So the district court committed no error in

using the drug-conversion ratio specifically assigned for the category of substances into 

which eutylone falls. 

E. Denial of Motion for Downward Departure

Finally, Watkins asked the district court to depart downward under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.27(D). He argued that eutylone is similar to methylone, which note 27(D) 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 23 of 25
24

expressly mentions as potentially warranting a downward departure.15 But the court did 

“not believe that the facts in this case warrant[ed] a departure under 27D for the reasons 

that [it] previously stated.” J.A. 482. Those reasons included the chemist’s testimony 

about eutylone’s strength relative to other synthetic cathinones and the evidence linking 

Watkins to 4.39 kilograms of it.16 

“If a district court is cognizant of its authority to depart, but does not do so, such a 

refusal to depart downward from the guideline range is simply not appealable.” Burgos, 

94 F.3d at 876; see also United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 n.2 (4th Cir. 

2020) (distinguishing between the appeal of a variance and that of a departure). The district 

court’s explanation indicates that it understood its authority to depart downward under the 

Guidelines but “d[id] not believe that the facts in this case warrant[ed] a departure under 

27D.” J.A. 482. Its discretionary denial of Watkins’s request for a downward departure is 

not reviewable.

15 Note 27(D) explains that an upward or downward departure may sometimes be 

appropriate for synthetic cathinones because “there may be cases in which a substantially 

lesser or greater quantity of a synthetic cathinone is needed to produce an effect on the 

central nervous system similar to the effect produced by a typical synthetic cathinone.” So,

if the synthetic cathinone involved in a case is one that a person must consume a far greater 

quantity of to have the same physical effects as a typical synthetic cathinone—e.g., 

methylone—“a downward departure may be warranted.” Id. 

16 The district court also denied Watkins a downward departure based on his 

criminal record and recidivism. See J.A. 491 (“[Watkins was] convicted at age 19 for 

armed robbery, two counts, aggravated assault, spen[t] a substantial amount of time in 

prison, [was] released in 2016 and then engag[ed] in criminal conduct that b[rought] Mr. 

Watkins in front of th[e] court in 2020, just four years later.”).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 24 of 25
25

* * *

The district court’s decision is thus

AFFIRMED.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4094 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 25 of 25