Filed 7/17/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JORGE VELASQUEZ , JR.,
Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent;

THE PEOPLE ,
Real P art y in Interest. No. B253327
(Super. Ct. No. B A412589 ) ( Laura F. Priver , Judge)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in prohibition. Laura F. Priver , Judge. Petition
d enied

. Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender, Alb ert J. Menaster, Kenneth Erlich and Dylan Ford, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner

. No appearance for Respondent. Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama, Matthew Brown and Beth L.
Widmar k , Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.2 INTRODUCTION
While ridin g his bicycle, Jorge Velasquez , Jr. collided with a pedestrian, seriously injuring her. He was charged with recklessly driving a “vehicle” under Vehicle Code
section 23103. 1 One section of the c ode , however, defines “ vehicle ” in a way that
exclude s bicyc les

. (§ 670.) A nother section of the c ode subjects a bicycl ist to “ all the provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle. ” (§ 21200, subd. (a).) Given the seeming tension between the two sections, c an a bicyclist be charged with reckless ly driving a “vehicle ” ? We conclude, yes , a bicyclist can be charged with recklessly driving a vehicle
under section 21200

. BACKGROUND On April 1, 2013, Velasquez was drinking at Dodger Stadium. After the game, he
left on his fixed gear bicycle , which had no brakes and could be stopped only with foot

pressure

. While going downhill , he veer ed o nto the wrong side of the road to avoid a car that pulled in front of him

. Velasquez hit Sudha Russell, who suffered broken bones to
her face
, loss of memory
, and loss of con sciousness for 10 days. Velasquez’s blood
alcohol content was 2 .18

. On June 19, 2013, the People filed a felony complaint for arrest that alleged reckless driving causing specified injury ( § 23105, subd. (a) )

. 2 At the preliminary hearing, Velasquez move d to dismiss the complaint on the ground that , under section 670, a bicycle i s not a “ vehicle ” for purposes of the reckless driving statute. The magistrate denied the motion.
On November 7, 2013
, t he People filed a n information alleging reckless driving causing specified injury ( §§ 23103, 23105, subd. (a) )

. Velasquez filed a motion to set

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

2 The People intended to allege a violation of section 23103, the reckless driving statute. Section 23105, subdivision (a)
, prescribes penalties for violating section 23103. Where, as here, the victim suffers one or more delineated injuries, the crime may be charged as a felony. (§ 23105, subd. (a); Pen. Code § 1170, subd. (h).)3

aside the information (Pen. Code, § 995) , again based on the definition of “vehicle” in the
code . T he trial court denied the motion and invited the defense to take thi s writ

. DISCUSSION Velasquez was charged with violating section 23103, subdivision (a) , which prohibits recklessly driving a “ vehicle” in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property

. A “vehicle” is “a device by which any person or pr operty may be propelled, moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.” (§ 670 .) 3 Under section 670, b icycles like the one Velasquez drove are not “vehicles

. ” Vel asquez therefore contends he cannot be charged with recklessly driving a “vehicle” under section 23103, subdivision (a).
The d istrict a ttorney counters that Velasquez can be charged with tha t crime
, based on section 21200. 4 S ection 21200 , subdivision (a), provides : “A person riding a bicycle .

. . upon a highway has all the rights and is subject to all the provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this division, including, but not limited to, provisions concerning driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages or drugs, and by Division 10 (commencing with Section 20000 ), Section 27400, Division 16.7 (commencing with Section 39000), Division 17 (commencing with Section 40000.1), and Division 18 (commencing with Section 42000), except those pro visions which by their very nature can have no application.” In interpreting section 21200, our primary duty “ is to ‘ “determine an d
effectuate” ’ the Legislature’ s intent. [Citation.] To that end, our first task is to examine the words of the statute, g iving them a commonsense meaning. [Citation.] If the language is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry ends. [Citation.] However, a statute ’ s

3 Section 670 is in Division 1, Words and Phrases Defined, of the Vehicle Code. “Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, these definitions shall govern the construction of this code.” (§ 100.)

4 Sections 21200 , 23103, and 23105 are in Division 11, Rules of the Road , of the code.4

language must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter
must be harmonized to t he extent possible. [Citation.]” ( Van Horn v. Watson (2008)
45 Cal.4t h 322, 326 , fn. omitted , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 719 & fn. 14 .) A specific statute prevails over a more general one on the same subject. ( People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 163 ; People v. Calderon (2013 ) 214 Cal.App.4th 656, 664

- 665 .) Section 21200 specifically addresses bicyclists, and the section, on its face, is
clear. It makes bicyclist s like Velasquez “subjec t to all the provisions applicable to the
driver of a vehicle.” (§ 21200, subd. (a).) Those “ provisions ” include section 23103, the reckless driving statute. Therefore, although section 670 generally defines a “vehicle” in a way that excludes bicycles, section 21200 specifies that bicyclists are governed by the same provisions applicable to the driver of a motor vehicle. The specific statute, section 21200, prevails over the general one, section 670. Velasquez attempts to create tension between section 670 and section 21200 by citing Clingenpeel v. Municipal Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 394 ( Clingenpeel ), in
which this d ivision took a contrary view of section 21200

. C lingenpeel
, however,
in ter preted a former version of section 21200

. At that time, s ecti on 21200 provided :

“ ‘ Every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway or any paved shoulder has all the rights and is subject to all the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this division and Division 10 (commencing with Section 20000 ) , except tho se provisions which by their very nature can have no application. ’ ” ( Clingenpeel, at p. 399.) The bicyclist in Clingenpeel was charged with operating a “vehicle” while
intoxicated
, a violation of former section 23102. 5 Clingenpeel found that section 231 02

was not directly applicable to a bicyclist because of the narrow definition of “vehicle” in
section 670. T he People countered that section 21200 made the offense of operating a

“ vehicle ” while drunk applicable to bicyclists. ( Clingenpeel
, supra , 108 C al.App.3d at
p. 399.)

5 Section 23102 has been renumbered section 23152.5

Clingenpeel rejected that argument , based primarily on section 21200’s legislative history

. Section 21200’s predecessor was section 452. Section 452 made bicyclists

“ ‘ subject to the provisions of this division applic able to the dri ver of a vehicle

. ’ ” ( Clingenpeel, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 399.) Those “ provisions ” included criminal offenses such as drunk driving. ( Id. at p. 400.) A 1943 amendment omitted the language subjecting bicyclists to the “ ‘ provisions of this division ’ ” and replaced it with language subjecting bicyclists to all the “ ‘ duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this
division. ’ ” ( Clingenpeel
, at p. 399 .) Clingenpeel found that the 1943 amendment
rendered section 21200 ambiguous: “If the Legisla ture had intended to inform cyclists that they would be subject to prosecution and would suffer the same punishments as motorists, it would have been very simple to do so either by simply leaving the section as
it was [before the 1943 amendment] or by prov iding that cyclists ‘shall be subject to all
of the duties, prohibitions and punishments applicable to the driver of a vehicle.’ ” ( Clingenpeel, at p. 400. ) Clingenpeel reasoned that section 21200 was ambiguous b ecause it made bicyclists subject only to t he rights and duties applicable to a drive r of a vehicle “ ‘ by this
division and Division 10. ’ ” ( Clingenpeel, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at pp. 399 , 400.) The section did not incorporate Division 17
, which then, as now, contained criminal sanctions
for viola tions of a driver’s duties

. (§ 40000.1 et seq.; Clingenpeel, at p. 400.) By failing expressly to incorporate Division 17
, Clingenpeel held that imposing the criminal sanction in Division 17 on an intoxicated bicyclist would violate the bicyclist’s proced ural due process rights . ( Clingenpeel, at p. 402.) Our Legislature respon ded to Clingenpeel by amend ing section 21200 in 1982

. The amended section provided :

“ (a) Every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway or any paved shoulder shall
have all the r ights and shall be subject to all the provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this division, which include, but are not limited to, the provisions dealing with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, or the combined influen ce thereof, Division 10 (commencing with Section 20000), and Division 17 (commencing6

with Section 40000), except those provision s which by their very nature can have no application. “(b) Any person who rides a bicycle upon a highway while under the influe nce of intoxicating liquor or drugs, or under the combined influence thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250). ” 6

T h is 1982 amendment addressed each concern Clinge n peel raised about section
21200. ( See People v . Fong (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 3 [ “ [ T ] he clear legislative intent expressed in section 21200 was to make bicycles subject to the same rules of the road as motor vehicles. To rule otherwise would inevitably frustrate the manifest purposes of the leg islation as a w hole and lead to absurd results ” ].) 7 The 1982
amend ment replaced the language the 1943 amendment omitted; namely, the 1982
amendment clarified that bicyclists “shall be subject to all the provisions applicable” to
the driver of a vehicle

. (Former § 21200, subd. (a), 1982 version.) The 1982 amendment spelled out that those “ provisions ” included “this division ” ( Division 11 ) and “Division
17 , ” containing criminal sanctions. (See, e.g., Fong , at Supp. 3 [ bicyclist could be
convicted of trave ling at an unsafe speed in violation of section 22350 in Division 11 of
the c ode] .) And , to make clear that an intoxicated bicyclist i s subject to punishment, the
1982 amendment created subdivision (b).
S ection 21200’s post

- Clingenpeel legislative history also removes any doubt that bicyclists are generally subject to the same rights and burdens as motorists. ( See generally
, People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622 [i f the statutory language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we m ay consider various extrinsic

6 In 1985, the Legislature made subdivision ( b) of section 21200 into a separate statute, section 21200.5: “Notwithstanding Section 21200, it is unlawful for any person to ride a bicycle upon a highway while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug

. . . .” A violation of the sectio n is punishable by a $250 fine.

7 A ppellate department decisions have persuasive value, but they are of debatable strength as precedents and are not binding on higher reviewing courts

. ( Singh v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 387, 401, fn. 12.)7

aids, including “ ‘ “ ‘the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory schem e encompassing the statute’ ” ’ ” ] ; see also
In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4 th 535, 5 39 .) Assemblyman Pat rick J. Nolan authored the 1982 amendment to section 21200, Assembly Bill No. 1576. Nolan, after referring to Clingenpeel ’s suggestion the punitive sections in Divisions 10 and 11 did not apply to bicyclists, said the amendment would “clarify the fact that the actions of bicyclists are governed by the Vehicle Code” and “that the rules of the road apply to bicyclists as well as motorists.” (Assemblyman Nolan, sponsor of Assem. Bill No. 1576 (1981

- 1982 Reg. Sess.), letter to Governor Ed mund G. Brown , Jan. 14, 1982.) According to a legislative analysis, the bill p rovide d “ that persons riding bicycles on the roadway will be subject to the same provisions as motor vehicle drivers, and expressly includes those provisions
which relate to dri ving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. [¶] Existing law grants persons riding bicycles all the rights and duties accorded drivers of motor vehicles. In order to clarify penalty provisions relating to persons riding bicycles under
the influence of intoxicating alcohol or drugs, this bill expressly subjects bicycle riders to these penalties.” (Legis

. Analyst, a nalysis of Assem. Bill No. 1576 (1981

- 1982 Reg. Sess.) May 17, 1981 , p. 86 ; see also Legis. Analyst, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1 31 (1983

- 1984 Reg. Sess.) [“The law in 1981 provided that bicyclists were subject to the provisions of Divisions 10 .

. . and 11

. . . . It was assumed at that time that a violation of those provisions would invoke penalty provisions

. . . . However, the courts ruled that drunk driving penalties could not be imposed on bicyclists because they were too severe.
The statute was therefore amended in 1982 to specify that drunk driving provisions and
Division 17 .

. . apply to Bicyclists”]. )
Section 21200 cont inues substantively unchanged from the 1982 amendment

. Section 21200 explicitly makes a bicyclist “subject to all the provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle,” including the provisions of Division 11. Section 23103, prohibit ing reckless driving, and section 23105, delineat ing the criminal penalties for reckless driving, are in Division 11. An allegedly reckless bicyclist, such as Velasquez, is therefore subject to those criminal penalties.8

Velasquez, however, argues it is unfair to subject bicycl ists to the same criminal penalties as motorists. B icyclists and d rivers of motor vehicles will often pose different levels of threats by virtue of the contraption they drive

. R eckless or intoxicated bicyclists

are generally less likely to inflict the “ ‘ carnage and slaughter ’ ” drivers of motor vehicles
can inflict. ( Clingenpeel, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at pp. 401

- 402.) But t he code contemplates that there may be varying degrees of culpability. S ection 21200.5, for example, imposes a lesser sanction of a $250 fine on an intoxicated bicyclist . Sections 23103 and 23105 also create different penalties for reckless drivers ranging from a fine (§ 23103, subd. (c)) to imprisonment for those who proximately cause one or more delineated injuries (§ 23105).
Ve lasquez , while intoxicated, rode his bicycle and struck Russell with such force that they both lost consciousness, Russell for 10 days. She also sustained broken facial bones and memory loss. Where, as here, it is alleged that a reckless , intoxicated dri ver of a bicycle inflicted one of the injuries listed in section 23105 , section 21200 provides notice that the bicyclist could be subject to the same criminal penalties as a reckless
driver of a motor vehicle.
We therefore conclude that Velasquez was pro per l y charged with violating
sections 23103 and 23105.9 D I SPOSITION The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

KITCHING , J.