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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39731

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KARENE MACHEL FAUBLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 409

Filed: March 19, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge. 

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified seven-year sentence 

with three-year determinate term for possession of a controlled 

substance, affirmed; order relinquishing jurisdiction, affirmed; order denying 

I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Karene Machel Fauble pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-

2732(c)(1). The district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with a three-year

determinate term, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and placed 

Fauble on probation. Subsequently, Fauble admitted to violating several terms of the probation, 

and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original 

sentence. However, the district court retained jurisdiction and sent Fauble to participate in the 

rider program. Thereafter, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. Fauble filed an I.C.R. 35 

motion for reduction of her sentence, which the district court denied. Fauble appeals, contending 
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that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and should have sua sponte 

reduced Fauble’s sentence upon revocation of probation. Fauble further asserts that the district 

court erred in relinquishing jurisdiction, that her sentence is excessive, and that the district court 

erred in denying her Rule 35 motions. 

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 

P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 

1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. 

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 

P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation 

has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the 

court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 

326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). 

The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 

162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal 

only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 

P.2d at 328. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the 

conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 

618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 

record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly 

made part of the record on appeal. Id. Fauble has not shown that the district court abused its 

discretion in revoking probation.

In this case, Fauble also asserts that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 

grant probation following a period of retained jurisdiction. After Fauble’s period of retained 

jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. We note that the decision to place a 

defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a 

matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal 

absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); 

State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). The record in this 
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case shows that the district court properly considered the information before it and determined 

that probation was not appropriate. We hold that Fauble has failed to show that the district court 

abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.

Fauble also contends that the unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of three years, is excessive and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Sentencing is 

also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be 

considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be 

repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. 

App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State 

v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length 

of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 

170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 

probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 

judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our 

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 

between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Fauble argues that all of the 

relevant goals of sentencing could have been accomplished with probation. As noted above, 

however, the district court found that probation was not an appropriate course of action in 

Fauble's case. The record does not indicate that the district court abused its discretion in this 

case. 

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 

23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In 

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of 

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 

motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our 

review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the 

same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 

113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987); Lopez, 106 Idaho at 449-51, 680 P.2d at 871-

73. Fauble has failed to show that the district court erred in denying her Rule 35 motion. 
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Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation, relinquishing jurisdiction, ordering 

execution of Fauble’s original sentence without modification, or denying her Rule 35 motion. 

Therefore, the orders revoking probation, relinquishing jurisdiction, and denying Fauble’s 

Rule 35 motion are affirmed.