UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MICHAEL A. WOOTEN, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CALVIN HAYDEN; WAYNE RECTOR; WAYNE BAKER; DALE REED; (FNU) HOSTETLER; JOSEPH MAZZEI; (FNU) BERG; (FNU) PREW; (FNU) (LNU) (1); JASON COVINGTON; KELLY RYAN, Defendants - Appellees. No. 21-3065 (D.C. No. 5:18- CV-03067-SAC) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , McHUGH , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Michael A. Wooten appeals pro se from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his pretrial detention in solitary confinement. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 2, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 12 I Wooten is a pretrial detainee at th e Johnson County Adult Detention Center (JCADC), where he has been held on stat e charges since 2017. The district court summarized the factual background as follows: Plaintiff is charged with aggrav ated indecent liberties and sexual exploitation of a child. He was ta ken into custody in October 2017 and was ordered to have no contact with the juvenile victim. However, he repeatedly contacted the victim by telephone from the jail; in a state court proceeding, the State describe d the contents of the calls as including extensive witness intimi dation [by which] the defendant discussed with and suggested to th e juvenile victim that she commit suicide. The jail became aware of these calls and took steps to block the victim’s phone number. Despite this , the plaintiff was able to contact the victim using differe nt telephone numbers that were not programmed into the jail telephone system. In December 2017, the state district court ordered that plaintiff be prohibited from using the telephone in the JCADC. The jail responded by placing plaintiff in a solitary conf inement cell with release for three hours daily. R. at 305 (citations and intern al quotation marks omitted). 1 In his second amended complaint, whic h is the operative complaint, Wooten claimed his due process right s were violated because a sheriff at JCADC, Calvin Hayden, and a state court judge, Kelly Ry an, “made the decision to punish [him] by [placing him in] solitary confinement,” R. at 296. He also alleged he had been held

1 Recognizing Wooten’s pro se status and the liberal pleading standard, the district court gleaned these facts in part from supplemen tal materials Wooten filed with the district court. Wooten does not obj ect either to the dist rict court’s reference to his supplemental materials or its recitation of the facts. Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 23 in solitary confinement for two-and-a-half years with no finding of guilt, and he sought $15 million in compensatory damages. 2 On screening, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The court determ ined that Wooten fa iled to state a due process violation because his placement in solitary confinement was not punishment but a restriction reasonably re lated to the jail’s legitimate interest in preventing him from contacting the victim. The court furt her determined that Wooten asserted a speedy-trial claim, which must be brought in state court or in a federal habeas petition. Finally, the court concluded th at Wooten’s claim for compensatory damages was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
II We review de novo the district c ourt’s dismissal under § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim . See Young v. Davis , 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). “A pleading that states a claim for relief mu st contain ‘a short an d plain statement of the claim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief.’” Ghailani v. Sessions , 859 F.3d 1295, 1303 (10th Ci r. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements ” are not enough. Id. at 1304 (internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint must “i nclude[] enough facts to stat e a claim to re lief that is

2 Wooten also named as defendants “S gt. Hostetler plus 6 remaining on additional sheet.” R. at 295. He did not, however, explain how they participated in any wrongdoing. We constrai n our analysis accordingly. Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 34 plausible on its face.” Young , 554 F.3d at 1256 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Although we afford pro se pleadings a lib eral construction, we do not advocate for pro se parties, who are obligated to follow the same rules of pr ocedure that govern other litigants. See Garrett v. Selby C onnor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). On appeal, Wooten repeats many of the sa me allegations that the district court found deficient, but he does not directly address the district court’s reasons for dismissing his claims. His failure to do so waives appellate review of the district court’s rulings. See Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 784 F.3d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal where appellant failed to challenge the district court’s grounds for dismissal). 3 Even so, we perceive no error in the dist rict court’s analysis . Wooten insists his placement in solitary confinement viol ated his due process rights as a pretrial detainee, but the district c ourt correctly explained there was no due process violation so long as the restriction was not punishme nt. Indeed, “[a]bsent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, th[e]

3 Wooten’s opening brief makes severa l undeveloped statements that have no apparent relationship either to his claims or to the groun ds for the district court’s dismissal. See, e.g. , Aplt. Br. at 4 (“Inadequate c ounsel . . . Incorrect evidentiary ruling, Prosecutorial misconduct al l resulting from Isolation.”); id. (“Inadequate legal representation can have majo r consequences for a crimin al proceeding . . . .”); id. (“Biased or lost evidence by judge[.]”). We do not cons ider these comments because “scattered statements” made in the context of other issues “fail to frame and develop an issue sufficient to inv oke appellate review.” Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994). Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 45 determination [of whether a restriction cons titutes punishment] generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationa lly be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears ex cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.” Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f a restriction or conditi on is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbi trary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the gov ernmental action is punishment.” Id. at 539. But “the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restri ctions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intende d as punishment.” Id. at 540. Wooten’s placement in solitary confin ement was not punishment. It was a facility management tool implemented by JCADC to effectuate the state court’s order prohibiting Wooten from contacting the victim. JCADC officials attempted alternative, less rest rictive measures, including bloc king the victim’s phone number, but Wooten circumvented thos e measures and persisted in calling the victim. This more restrictive measure wa s reasonably related to JCADC ’s legitimate interest in managing the facility in a way that preven ted Wooten from contacting the victim in contravention of the st ate court’s order. See id. (recognizing that restrictions reasonably related to a dete ntion facility’s legitimate management goals are not punishment); Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs. , 422 F.3d 1090, 11 06 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding there was no due process viola tion where pretrial detainee was placed in Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 56 segregation as a managerial decision for lack of bed space in general population and as a security measure where detainee admitted to an escape plot from his previous facility). The district court also correctly determin ed that, to the extent Wooten asserted a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim, he s hould have brought it either via a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or th rough the normal channels available in his state criminal proceedings, see Capps v. Sullivan , 13 F.3d 350, 353-54 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that after exhausting his stat e remedies, a state pretrial detainee may bring a Sixth Amendment spee dy-trial claim under § 2241 to force the state to go to trial, but noti ng that “federal courts should abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved e ither by trial on the merits in the state court or by other state procedur es available” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Walck v. Edmondson , 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 ( 10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] state court defendant attacki ng his pretrial detention sh ould bring a habeas petition pursuant to the general grant of habeas authority contained within 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”). Finally, the district court correctly determined that Wooten’s claim for compensatory damages was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which states: No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility , for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a pr ior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act . . . . Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 67 Id. Wooten sought compensatory damages “f or [the] mental [and] physical stress of unlawfully being incarcerated [without a] speedy trial and y ears of solitary confinement.” R. at 300 (capitalization omitted). He did not, however, identify a physical injury or sexual act as a result of the alleged speedy-tr ial violation or his placement in solitary confin ement. Consequently, hi s claim for compensatory damages was barred. See Searles v. Van Bebber , 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that § 1997e(e) “lim its the remedies available . . . if the only injuries are mental or emotional”); Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr. , 165 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1997e(e ) barred claim for compensato ry damages to the extent plaintiff alleged only mental or emotional harm). 4
III The district court’s judgment is affirm ed. Wooten’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs a nd fees is granted.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge

4 Although Wooten referred to “physical stress,” R. at 300, he did not allege that he suffered any “physical injury” as required by § 1997e (e). We also note that the first amended complaint di d allege injury and sexual as sault, but those allegations do not appear in the oper ative complaint, so we may not consider them. See Mink v. Suthers , 482 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n amended complaint super[s]edes an original complaint and rende rs the original comp laint without legal effect.” (internal quot ation marks omitted)). Appellate Case: 21-3065 Document: 010110613247 Date Filed: 12/02/2021 Page: 7