This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2013 UT 58

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

CRAIG GURULE,

Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20111053

Filed October 1, 2013

Fourth District, Provo Dep’t

The Honorable Samuel D. McVey

No. 101403433

Attorneys:

John E. Swallow, Att’y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst Att’y Gen., 

Salt Lake City, for appellee

Aaron P. Dodd, Provo, for appellant

JUSTICE PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING,

JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE LEE joined.

JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 After pleading guilty to possession of a controlled

substance in a drug free zone, Craig Gurule was sentenced to a term

of incarceration for five years to life. Gurule reserved his right to

appeal the district court’s ruling denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle.

¶ 2 On appeal, Gurule argues that the search was unlawful

because the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion that there

were drugs in his vehicle when they stopped him for a minor traffic

infraction. He further argues that the officers manipulated his Adult

Probation and Parole (AP&P) agent into requesting that they

conduct a warrantless parole search of Gurule’s vehicle. Gurule

argues that this search violated both his parole agreement and his

state and federal constitutional rights. The State responds that the

officers had reasonable suspicion that Gurule possessed illegal
STATE v. GURULE

Opinion of the Court

drugs, justifying Gurule’s detention. The State further responds that

Gurule’s AP&P agent possessed reasonable suspicion that Gurule

had violated his parole and therefore reasonably requested that the

officers search Gurule’s truck on the agent’s behalf.

¶ 3 We hold that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that

Gurule was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity. 

They improperly extended the duration of Gurule’s stop when they

abandoned the original purpose of the stop—to investigate a minor

traffic infraction—and instead undertook a prolonged investigation

into Gurule’s possible drug activity. The district court therefore

erred when it denied Gurule’s motion to suppress the evidence

obtained through the officers’ improper detention and search. 

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On November 3, 2010, Officer Raymond Flores of the

Springville Police Department received a call from dispatch

indicating that an anonymous caller had reported seeing two

Hispanic men exchange money and plastic baggies in the parking lot

of an Allen’s grocery store. The caller also reported that a gray

Dodge truck was involved. The truck was registered to an

individual with the last name of Luna.

¶ 5 Officer Flores and his partner, Detective Anderson,

recognized the name Luna and the gray Dodge “as having past drug

involvements.” The officers therefore responded to the Allen’s

grocery store, but they did not see the gray Dodge truck. After

waiting a few minutes, they observed a Hispanic male exit the

Allen’s store. Officer Flores recognized the man, but could not

initially remember his name. The man got into a black Ford truck,

and the officers ran the truck’s license plate. The truck was

registered to Andre Gurule, leading the officers to recognize the

driver as Craig Gurule, Andre Gurule’s son. Officer Flores knew of

Gurule because citizen informants and other detectives had told him

that Gurule was “possibly involved in drug activity.”

¶ 6 Gurule left the parking lot and the officers followed in an

unmarked police car. Officer Flores observed that Gurule’s turn

signal remained activated for approximately three blocks and that

the passenger tires of the truck were riding on the fog line. While

following Gurule, both officers remembered that he was on parole. 

Shortly thereafter, Officer Flores activated his overhead lights to

initiate a traffic stop based on Gurule’s failure to remain in his lane. 

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Opinion of the Court

¶ 7 After Officer Flores turned on his lights, Gurule slowed

down but did not immediately stop. Officer Flores testified that,

during this time, Gurule “was not paying attention to the road,” and

that Gurule “would glance at [the officers] and . . . was glancing

down towards the left side of his body.” Only after Officer Flores

activated two audible sirens did Gurule pull over and stop.

¶ 8 Officer Flores approached the driver’s side of the truck and

instructed Gurule to exit the vehicle. Officer Flores testified that he

was concerned for his safety because Gurule did not immediately

pull over, was watching the officers instead of the road, and had

repeatedly looked down to his left. Officer Flores then asked Gurule

why he had failed to pull over. Gurule responded that he had been

using his cell phone, but Officer Flores testified that he had not seen

Gurule doing so.

¶ 9 At this point, Detective Anderson conducted a frisk of

Gurule, and Officer Flores performed a plain-view search of “the

immediate area of the driver’s side of the vehicle for weapons or

anything [Gurule] was trying to conceal.” Neither Detective

Anderson nor Officer Flores found any weapons or contraband

during their respective searches.

¶ 10 Despite the fact that these initial searches revealed nothing

suspicious, the officers continued to detain Gurule and called for a

canine unit. No canine units were available. Detective Anderson

then called the on-call AP&P agent, Todd Dixon. Detective

Anderson relayed the circumstances of the officers’ detention of

Gurule. Agent Dixon then asked the officers “to preform [sic] a

search on the vehicle . . . for AP&P.” Gurule’s signed parole

agreement stated that he would “permit officers of AP&P to search

[his] person, residence, vehicle, or any other property under [his]

control without a warrant . . . on reasonable suspicion to ensure

compliance with conditions of [his] parole.” One of the conditions

of Gurule’s parole was that he would “obey all state . . . laws.”

¶ 11 The officers performed a lengthy and extensive search of

Gurule’s vehicle. Inside the driver’s side door, the officers found a

canvas bag containing a used syringe, a cut drinking straw with

residue on it, and a plastic baggie holding 2.9 grams of

methamphetamine.

¶ 12 The officers arrested Gurule. In a search incident to his

arrest, they found $2,335 in cash on his person. The officers once

again contacted AP&P to “let them know of [their] findings” and

were told that AP&P would now send an agent to the scene.

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Opinion of the Court

¶ 13 When the AP&P agent arrived, she requested that the

officers assist her in an AP&P parole search of Gurule’s home.

During the search of Gurule’s home, the officers found video

surveillance equipment that was recording the front yard and street,

a digital scale, and a small amount of marijuana.

¶ 14 Gurule was charged with possession of a controlled

substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone with a prior

distribution conviction enhancement for possession of

methamphetamine; possession or use of a controlled substance in a

drug-free zone with a prior distribution conviction enhancement for

possession of marijuana; possession of drug paraphernalia in a drugfree zone; possession, use, or control of a vehicle with a

compartment for contraband; driving on a suspended driver’s

license; and failure to stay in one lane. The State later dismissed the

marijuana and drug paraphernalia charges stemming from the

search of Gurule’s house because he entered a plea and was

sentenced on those charges in Spanish Fork Justice Court.

¶ 15 Gurule filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence found

during the searches of his person, truck, and house. Gurule argued

that after he was stopped for a minor traffic infraction, he was

unlawfully detained without reasonable suspicion of further illegal

activity and that the evidence was therefore illegally obtained. He

also argued that the officers’ search of his truck on behalf of AP&P

was illegal because AP&P improperly authorized the officers to

search his truck outside the presence of an AP&P agent.

¶ 16 The district court denied Gurule’s motion. It held that the

anonymous tip about drug dealing at the Allen’s store, combined

with the officers’ knowledge of Gurule’s background, Gurule’s

furtive movements after the officers turned on their lights, and

Gurule’s assertion that he failed to immediately pull over because he

was on a cell phone provided the officers with reasonable suspicion

that Gurule was involved in illegal drug activity.

¶ 17 The district court also upheld the legality of the search

conducted by the officers at the request of AP&P. Specifically, it

held that Agent Dixon possessed reasonable suspicion that Gurule

had violated the conditions of his parole and that “there was no

pretext or other funny business going on” between the officers and

Agent Dixon. Because “[Agent] Dixon of his own volition asked [the

officers] to search [Gurule’s truck],” which “was directly related to

[his] duty as a parole officer,” the court concluded that the officers’

search on behalf of AP&P was constitutionally valid.

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¶ 18 The case was scheduled for a jury trial. At the conclusion

of the State’s presentation during trial, Gurule entered a conditional

guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free

zone with a prior distribution conviction enhancement. Pursuant to

our decision in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988), he reserved

the right to appeal the district court’s ruling on his motion to

suppress. In return, the State dropped all other charges. Gurule

timely appealed.

¶ 19 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section § 78A3-102(I).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 20 “When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress, [we] disturb[] the district court’s findings of fact only

when they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 7, 229

P.3d 650. But “because there must be state-wide standards that

guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials,” State v. Hansen,

2002 UT 125, ¶ 25, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted),

we afford no deference to the district court’s “application of law to

the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases.” State v.

Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 699. Therefore, we review as a

matter of law “whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable

suspicion.” State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

ANALYSIS

¶ 21 Gurule argues that his detention was unconstitutional

under both the federal and Utah constitutions because the officers

improperly extended the duration of his detention.1

 The State

argues that the extension of Gurule’s detention was permissible

because the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify an

investigation into Gurule’s possible drug activity. While we

conclude that the officers were justified in initially detaining Gurule

1

 Although Gurule references both the federal and Utah Constitutions, he fails to undertake any independent analysis of the Utah

Constitution. While a defendant is not required to explicitly

compare the state and federal constitutional provisions at issue, the

“mere mention of state provisions will not suffice.” State v.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 37, 162 P.3d 1106. Because Gurule has

failed to undertake any meaningful analysis under the Utah

Constitution, we analyze his argument only under the Fourth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

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for a traffic infraction and undertaking a protective frisk, we agree

with Gurule that the officers unconstitutionally extended his

detention when the encounter transitioned from a traffic stop to a

drug investigation without reasonable suspicion.

¶ 22 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Although police

must have a warrant to conduct most searches and seizures, officers

may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a limited

investigation of the suspicion.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 11, 229

P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Fourth

Amendment, we apply a two-part test to determine whether the

duration and purpose of a detention is reasonable. Id. ¶ 12. “The

first step is to determine whether the [traffic stop] was justified at its

inception.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If so, we proceed

to the second step, in which we “determine whether the detention

following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

I. GURULE’S TRAFFIC INFRACTION 

JUSTIFIED THE TRAFFIC STOP

¶ 23 Shortly after Gurule left the Allen’s parking lot, the officers

observed his vehicle riding the fog line for a number of blocks. “[A]

police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the

stop is incident to a traffic infraction committed in the [officer’s]

presence.” See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Gurule’s traffic infraction

therefore provided the officers with justification for the initial stop. 

The officers were also justified in requesting Gurule’s driver’s

license and vehicle registration, conducting a computer check, and

issuing a citation. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 650. 

Because the only justification for the initial detention was a traffic

infraction, however, the officers were required to “remain focused

on the original purpose of the stop in the absence of reasonable

suspicion justifying an expanded investigation.” Simons, 2013 UT 3,

¶ 38.

II. THE OFFICERS’ PROTECTIVE FRISK AND 

PLAIN-VIEW-SEARCH WERE PROPER 

¶ 23 Almost immediately after Gurule brought his truck to a

stop, Officer Flores asked Gurule to exit the vehicle. While he

performed a plain-view search of the area around the driver’s seat,

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Detective Anderson performed a protective frisk of Gurule. Gurule

contends that this frisk and plain-view search were unconstitutional.

We disagree.

¶ 24 A seemingly benign traffic stop presents a very real threat

to law enforcement officers. “Due to this inherent dangerousness,

courts allow officers to take certain precautions to protect

themselves without having to justify their actions based on

reasonable suspicion.” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 24, 78 P.3d 590. 

One of these precautions is to allow officers to ask the driver and

passengers to exit the vehicle during the pendency of the stop. Id.

In Warren, we recognized that “once a motor vehicle has been

lawfully detained for a traffic infraction, police officers may order

the driver out of the vehicle to promote safety, even in the absence

of reasonable suspicion, without violating the Fourth Amendment’s

proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 2004 UT

36, ¶ 24 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–11 (1977)). 

Because the officers were justified in stopping Gurule for his traffic

infraction, Officer Flores’s request that Gurule exit the vehicle was

“at most a mere inconvenience [that] cannot prevail when balanced

against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.” Mimms, 434 U.S.

at 111.

¶ 25 Although an officer may order a driver from his vehicle

during a traffic stop, the officer is not automatically entitled to

conduct a protective search for weapons.2

 Rather, the officer must

“point[] to ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with

the rational inferences from those facts,’ would lead a reasonable

person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently

dangerous.” Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 29 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 26, 229 P.3d 650

(“During a lawful traffic stop, officers may conduct a pat-down

search of the driver and other vehicle occupants ‘upon reasonable

2

 In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer is

justified in undertaking a protective frisk during a lawful detention

when the officer reasonably believes that person is “armed and

presently dangerous to the officer or others.” 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). 

A protective frisk therefore requires both that the officer “[has] a

valid reason for stopping the person,” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,

¶ 13, 78 P.3d 590, and a reasonably objective belief that the suspect

is armed and presently dangerous. 

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suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.’” (citing Arizona

v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 332 (2009))).

¶ 26 During a protective frisk, “the only permissible

objective . . . is the discovery of weapons that may be used against

the officer or others.” State v. Peterson, 2005 UT 17, ¶ 12, 110 P.3d 699

(internal quotations omitted). Because “[t]he touchstone of our

analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness

in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of

a citizen’s personal security,” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108–09 (internal

quotation marks omitted), we evaluate the propriety of Officer

Flores’s frisk based on the totality of the circumstances, Terry, 392

U.S. at 21.

¶ 27 Officer Flores testified that after he activated his overhead

lights, Gurule did not immediately stop, but instead looked down to

his left and made reaching movements towards the driver’s side

door of the truck. Officer Flores further testified that while Gurule

slowed, he was looking back at the officers instead of paying

attention to the road. When Gurule exited the vehicle, Detective

Anderson noticed that Gurule had a suspicious bulge in his pants.

And Officer Flores testified that he disbelieved Gurule’s statement

that he had been distracted by his cell phone because he had not

observed Gurule use one. Both officers testified that this

combination of factors led them to fear for their safety.

¶ 28 Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, we conclude

that the officers observed “specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with the rational inferences from those facts,” would lead

an officer to the reasonable conclusion that Gurule was armed and

dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Our conclusion is bolstered by the

fact that “the inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops . . . should

be considered under the totality of the circumstances analysis.” 

Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 25. We hold that the officers were therefore

justified in asking Gurule to exit his vehicle to perform a minimallyinvasive protective search before continuing on with the original

purpose of the traffic stop.

¶ 29 Similarly, Officer Flores’s simultaneous plain-view search

of the vehicle did not unconstitutionally infringe on Gurule’s

reasonable expectations of privacy. While an officer may not search

a vehicle without probable cause, “an officer is not expected to

ignore what is exposed to observation from a position where he is

lawfully entitled to be, and he may view the interior of a vehicle

from such a position.” State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). Such

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observations do not constitute a search within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment. Id. Because Officer Flores did not perform an

invasive search of the vehicle, but rather only looked at what he

could see in plain-view, his plain-view search was proper.

III. THE OFFICERS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION

TO INVESTIGATE GURULE FOR POSSIBLE DRUG CRIMES

¶ 30 During the pendency of a traffic stop, if officers gain

reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, they may turn

their attention from the original purpose of the traffic stop to

“expediently investigate [their] new suspicion.” Baker, 2010 UT 18,

¶ 13. But “officers must diligently pursue a means of investigation

that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” State v.

Morris, 2011 UT 40, ¶ 18, 259 P.3d 116 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (recognizing that

an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person is or may be engaged

in criminal activity allows the officer to detain that person for a brief

time in order to investigate further).

¶ 31 To justify extending a detention, such “reasonable

suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual

is engaged in or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v.

Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶32, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Although officers “need not rule out the possibility

of innocent conduct,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002),

and “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level

required for probable cause,” id. at 274, reasonable suspicion “must

be supported by specific and articulable facts and rational inferences,

and cannot be merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

hunch,” State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10, 112 P.3d 507 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Warren, 2003

UT 36, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 590 (“In determining reasonableness, ‘due

weight must be given, not to [an officer’s] inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to specific reasonable

inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in

light of his experience.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 27 (1968)).

 ¶ 32 For instance, in State v. Simons, we reasoned that officers

permissibly extended the defendant’s detention arising from a traffic

stop when the officers noticed drug paraphernalia in plain view. 

2013 UT 3, ¶ 3, 296 P.3d 721. And in State v. Morris, we held that an

officer possessed reasonable suspicion that a defendant was driving

under the influence when the officer “smelled alcohol as soon as [the

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defendant] rolled down his window.” 2011 UT 40, ¶ 30, 259 P.3d

116.

¶ 33 We contrast these cases with our conclusion in State v.

Schlosser that reasonable suspicion did not exist. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah

1989). There, we reviewed the propriety of a highway patrol

officer’s search of the interior of a vehicle stopped for a minor traffic

infraction. Id. at 1133–34. The State argued that the officer had

reasonable suspicion of further illegal activity because after the

officer initiated the stop, the driver and passenger were “bending

forward, acting fidgety, turning to the left and to the right, and

turning back to look at the officer.” Id. at 1133. We concluded that

those movements “[did] not, without more, show a reasonable

possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to

occur.” Id. at 1138. Rather, we observed that “[w]hen confronted

with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers

alike to be nervous and excited and to turn to look at an approaching

police officer.” Id. And we held that “[a] search based on such

common gestures and movements is a mere ‘hunch,’ not an

articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

¶ 34 The State argues in its brief that even before the officers

stopped Gurule for a traffic infraction, they possessed reasonable

suspicion that Gurule was involved in drug dealing. The State

supports its arguments with the following facts: (1) Gurule was seen

leaving the location of a reported drug exchange, (2) the license plate

reported to dispatch belonged to someone involved in the drug

trade, (3) Gurule was Hispanic, (4) Gurule was in Officer Flores’s

“special attention folders,” and (5) Gurule was on parole. We

disagree that these facts are sufficient to give rise to a “reasonable,

articulable suspicion” that Gurule had been, was then, or was “about

to be engaged in criminal activity.” Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10

(internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 35 First, the anonymous tip that led the officers to the Allen’s

grocery store stated only that two Hispanic men were involved in a

possible drug deal and that a gray Dodge truck was involved.

Because the caller did not describe the physical appearance or dress

of the two men, it is presumptive to assume that Gurule was one of

the two men involved in the possible drug deal. Officer Flores

testified that Allen’s was regularly frequented by Hispanic men and

Gurule exited the store with shopping bags some time after the gray

Dodge truck described by the caller had left the scene. Further, the

State has provided absolutely no evidence that the gray Dodge truck

described by the caller had any connection to Gurule. The fact that

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the truck was registered to a person who was known to be involved

in the drug trade has no connection to Gurule or his presence at the

store. This leaves us with only Gurule’s status as a parolee and the

fact that he remained in Officer Flores’s “special attention folders.” 

But these facts regarding Gurule’s past conduct did not give rise to

a reasonable suspicion that Gurule was, at the moment, engaged in

or about to be engaged in criminal activity. Rather, they created

nothing more than an “unparticularized suspicion or hunch” that

Gurule may have a propensity to commit a crime. Markland, 2005

UT 26, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, during oral

argument, the State conceded that the officers did not possess

reasonable suspicion that Gurule was involved in illegal drug

activity based on these factors alone.

¶ 36 The State also argues that the officers’ observations during

the stop for the traffic infraction gave rise to reasonable suspicion.

Specifically, the State argues that Gurule’s failure to immediately

stop and his suspicious actions, “i.e., driving without full attention

to the road and intermittently glancing at one of the officers through

his driver’s side mirror and down to his left” created reasonable

suspicion of illegal activity. But just as we did in State v. Schlosser,

we conclude that such movements “do not, without more, give rise

to reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct had occurred or [is]

about to occur.” Id. at 1138. Because “it is not uncommon for

drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn

to look at an approaching police officer,” id., Gurule’s movements in

response to the initiation of the traffic stop do not give rise to a

reasonable suspicion of drug dealing or other criminal activity.

¶ 37 Finally, even assuming that the officers possessed

reasonable suspicion at the initiation of the traffic stop, that

suspicion was dispelled by the officers’ protective frisk and plainview search of the vehicle. The officers saw nothing to indicate that

Gurule was armed or involved in the possession or distribution of

illegal drugs. Therefore, after the completion of the protective frisk

and plain-view search, the officers were obliged to return their focus

to the original purpose of the traffic stop. But they did not. Instead,

they undertook a prolonged investigation into Gurule’s possible

drug activity.

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IV. THE OFFICERS’ SUSTAINED INVESTIGATION INTO

POSSIBLE DRUG ACTIVITY DID NOT CONSTITUTE

A DE MINIMUS EXCEPTION

 ¶ 38 In Arizona v. Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that

“[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for

the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other

than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably

extend the duration of the stop.” 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). In State v.

Simons, we relied on Johnson in holding that an officer’s single,

unrelated question to the defendant did not present an

unconstitutional extension of an otherwise lawful traffic stop. 2013

UT 3, ¶ 39, 296 P.3d 721. But we cautioned “that while some

unrelated questioning may be tolerated, officers must remain

focused on the original purpose of the stop in the absence of

reasonable suspicion justifying an expanded investigation.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 39 Here, the officers’ actions “bespoke an utter lack of

diligence in pursuing the original purpose of the traffic stop.” Id.

¶ 33 (internal quotation marks omitted). After the officers

completed their protective frisk and plain-view search, they did not

return to the original purpose of the stop. Instead, the officers made

two calls. They first made a call to request a canine unit to assist in

their drug investigation. Second, they called AP&P to describe their

observations. Neither of these calls had any relation to Gurule’s

traffic infraction and they did not constitute a de minimus extension

of the stop. Indeed, these calls, and the officers’ subsequent search

constituted the bulk of Gurule’s detention. Because the officers did

not possess reasonable suspicion that Gurule was engaged in or

about to engage in illegal drug activity, we hold that their search of

Gurule’s vehicle was unlawful and the evidence obtained as a result

should have been suppressed. 

CONCLUSION

¶ 40 The officers were justified in stopping Gurule for a traffic

infraction committed in their presence and their safety concerns

justified their separation of Gurule from his vehicle and the

subsequent protective frisk and plain-view search. But without

reasonable suspicion that Gurule was then engaged in any criminal

activity, the officers unconstitutionally extended the duration of the

stop when they undertook a sustained investigation of possible

illegal drug activity. The district court erred in refusing to suppress

the evidence seized as a result of that investigation. We accordingly

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reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

¶ 41 Because we conclude that the officers lacked reasonable

suspicion that Gurule was engaged in criminal activity, we do not

reach the issue of whether AP&P could lawfully delegate to the

officers its authority to perform a parole search based on reasonable

suspicion.

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