F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

R O C I O A U R

O R A M A R T I N E Z

- D E R Y A N , P etitioner ,

v

.
M A T T H E W W H I T A K

E R , Acting Attorney General, Respondent. N o. 15-70759
Ag ency No. A096-025-359

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Submitted J uly

9, 2018 * San F rancisco, California

F iled J uly 17, 2018 Amended November 16, 2018

B efore: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit J udg es, and I van L .R. L e melle, * * District J udg e.

* T h e p an el un an i m o u sly c o n clu d es th at th is case i s su itab le f or d ecisio n w ith o u t o ral arg u m en t. Fed . R. A p p . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

** T h e Ho n o rab le Iv an L .R. L em elle, Un ited States District Ju d g e f or th e Eastern District o f

L ou isian a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.M A R T I N E Z

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Order;

Opinion by

J udg e Graber

SUMMARY * * *

Im m igration

T h e panel denied a p etition for review of the B o ard o f I mmig r a tion Appeals’ denial of M artinez

- de Ry an’s application for cancellation of r emoval on the g round that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The panel rejected the g o vernment’s c o n t ention that the void-for-vag

ueness doctrine does not apply at a l l t o any g rou nds of inadmissibility , such as crimes involving turpitude. Apply ing Jordan v. De George , 341 U

. S

. 223 (1951) (rejecting a v o i d-for-vag u eness challeng e to the phrase “crime of moral turpitude”) a n d T s e ung Chu v. Cornell , 247 F .2d 929 ( 9th Cir. 1957) (following Jordan ), t h e panel held that the crime involving moral turpitude statute, 8 U .S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I

), is not unconstitutionally vag ue. The pan el concluded that Jordan and Tseung Chu remain g ood law in lig ht o f the Supreme Court ’ s decisions in Johnson v

. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (conclu d ing that the residual cla use of the f

ederal criminal code’s d efinition o f “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally v a g u e ) , and Sessions
v. Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. 1 204 (2018) (ex t e n d i ng Johnson’s

*** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co urt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M A R T I N E Z

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E R 3 holding to the immig ration contex t). The panel ex plained that it was oblig ed to f

ollow on-point Supreme Court precedent— here, Jordan —even if later Supreme Court cases c a s t some doubt on its g eneral reasoni n g. The panel also pointed out tha t Johnson and Dimaya interpret statutory “residual”
c l a u ses whose wording does not include the phrase “moral turpitude” and which are not tethered to recog niz ed common law principles.

COUNSEL

K. A l e x a ndra Monaco, The Monaco L aw Group L td., L a s Veg as, Nevada; Kari E. H o n g, Boston Colleg e L a w School, Newton, Massachusetts; for Petitioner.

Allison F ray er, T rial Attorney ; Melissa Nei m a n -Keltin a nd Aimee J

. Carmichael, Senior L itig ation Couns e l ; J ohn W. B lakeley , Assistant Director; J oseph H. Hunt, Ass i s t a nt Attorney General; Office of I mmig ration L itig a tion, Civil Division, United States D epartment of J ustic e , Washing ton, D.C.; for Respondent. Stephen Manning , I nnovation L aw L a b , Portland, Oreg on, for Amici Curiae Alameda County Public Defender’s Office, L os Ang eles County Public Defender’s Office, Santa B a r b a r a County Public Defender’s Office, Santa Clara County Public Defender’ s O f

fice, San F rancisco Public Defender, J eff Adachi, S a n ta Cruz County Public Defender’s Office, Sonoma County Public Defender’s Off i c e , Jo s e Varela, Marin County Public Defender, and Dan deGriselles.M A R T I N E Z

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J ennifer L ee Koh, I mmig ration Clinic, W estern State Colleg e of L aw, I rvine, California; Evang eline G. Abriel, Santa Clara University School of L aw, Santa Clara, California; for Amici Curiae American I mmig ra t i o n L a w y e r s A s sociation, F lorence I mmig r a nt and Refug ee Rig hts Project, I mmig rant L eg al Resource Center, Nationa l I mmig ration Project of the National L awy ers Guild, and U.C. Davis I mmig ration Clinic.

ORDER

T he opinion filed on J uly 17, 2018, and publi s h e d at 895 F

. 3d 1191, is amended by the opinion f iled concurrently with this order.

W ith these amendments, the panel has voted to deny Peti t i oner’s petition for panel rehearing

. J udg e Graber has voted to d e ny Petitioner’s petition for rehearing e n banc, a nd J udg e s Tallman and L emelle have so recommended.

The f u l l c ourt has been advised of the petition for rehearing e n banc, and no judg e of the court has requested a vote on it.

Petitioner’s p etition for p anel rehearing and rehearing en banc is DENIED

. No further petitions for panel rehearing o r rehearing en banc may be filed.M A R T I N E Z

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OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:
Petitioner Rocio A urora Martinez -de Ry an is a native a nd citiz en of Mex ico who entered th e U n ited States without being inspected and admitted or paroled. She timel y seeks review of a decision issued by the B oard o f I m m i gration Appeals (“B I A”), which affirmed a n immig ration judg e’s decision pretermitting h er a pplication for cancellation o f removal and ordering her removed from the U nited States. She ar g ues (A) that her federal bribery conviction does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude and (B ) that the statutory phrase “ crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U .S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I

), i s u n constitutionally vag ue. W e disag ree.
Petitioner entered the United States some tim e b e fore 1999. A few y ears later, she provided ca s h p a y ments to an e m p l o y ee at the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles to influence and reward the employ ee for issuing identification documents to non-citiz e ns illeg ally prese nt in the United States. As a result, in 2010, Petitioner pleaded g uilty to o ne count of bribery , in v iolation o f 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), for which the max imum penalty is 10 y e ars’ imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner received a Notice to Appear, charg ing h er wi t h inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Throug h couns el, Petitioner conceded inadmissibility but soug h t cancellation of removal. An immig ration judg e ruled that P e titioner’s bribery conviction c onstituted a crime o f moral turpitude, renderi n g h er inelig ible for c ancellation o f removal. The B I A ag r eed, a n d this pe t i tion for r eview followed.M A R T I N E Z

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A. Bribery under § 666( a) ( 2) is Categorically a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

. “To determine whether a c r i me is categ orically one o f moral turpitude, we ex amine whethe r the full rang e o f conduct encompassed by th e criminal statute constitutes a crime o f moral turpitude.” Latter-Singh v. Holder , 668 F .3d 1156, 1 159 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation m a r k s omitted). “[ O] ne test ‘to determine if a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the a c t is a ccompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.’” I d. at 1161 ( quoting In re Ajami , 22 I . & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B

. I .A. 1999)). Section 666(a)(2) provides that whoever

co r r uptly g ives, offers, or a g rees to g ive any thing of value to any person, w ith intent to infl u ence or reward an ag ent of an org aniz ation or o f a State, local or I ndian tribal government, or any ag ency thereof, in connection with any business, transac t i on, o r series of transa c t ions of such o rg aniz ation, g overnment, or ag ency

involving any

thing of
va l u e o f $5,000 or more [ has committed a crime.] (Emphasis added.) A long with o t h er circuits, w e have h eld that “§ 666 c ontains

. . . a corrupt intent requirement.” United States v. Garrido , 713 F .3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2 013) (internal quotation marks om i t t e d ). “An act is done ‘corruptly ’ if it is performed voluntarily , deliberately , a nd d ishonestly , for the purpose of either accomplishing a n unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some othe rwise lawful end or lawful result by an unlawful method or means.”M A R T I N E Z

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United S t a t es v. McNair , 605 F .3d 1152, 1 193 (11th Cir. 2010); see Garrido , 713 F

. 3d at 1001–02 (citing McNair with approval).

B e cause § 666(a)(2) require s p ro of of a “corrupt mind,” Latter-Sin g

h , 668 F .3d at 1161, w e hold that a bribery conviction under § 666(a)(2) c a teg orically q ualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. Our holding comports with decades-old decisions by the B I A and b y the Second, F ourth, and F ifth Circuits that bribery involves moral turpitude. 1 See In re H- , 6 I

. & N. Dec. 358, 361 (B .I .A. 1954) (“[ T] he offense of bribery is a base and vile act which involves moral turpitude.”); Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions , 874 F .3d 8 7 1, 878 n.25 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that “bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude” (citing O kabe v. INS , 671 F .2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1 982)), c ert. denied , 201 8 W L 2290257 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2018) (No. 17-1559); United States v. Zacher , 586 F

. 2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1978) (“There c an be no que s tion but that any crime of bribery involves moral turpitude

. . . .” (quoting United States ex rel. Sollazzo v. Esperdy , 285 F .2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961))); United States v

. Po m p o n io , 511 F .2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1975) (same); see also In re Gruenangerl , 25 I

. & N. Dec. 351, 358 n.8 (B

. I

. A. 2010) (noting that bribery of a public official involves moral turpitude).

B

. The Statute is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

.
I n Jordan v. De G eorge , 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the Supreme Court considered a v ag u eness challeng e to the

1 P erh ap s b ecau se b rib e r y i s so co m m o n ly un d ersto o d t o in v o lv e m o ral tu rp itu d e, p etitio n ers in o th er cases h av e d eclin ed to ch allen g e th e p ro p ositio n

. E.g

. , M

e n d e z-Men d ez v. Mu ka sey , 5 2 5 F.3 d 82 8 , 8 3 1

– 3 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ); Ca rty v. Ash cro ft , 3 9 5 F.3 d 1 0 8 1 , 1 0 8 3 n .3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ).M A R T I N E Z

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E R 8 phrase “ crime of moral turpitude.” T h e non-citiz en in that
case h a d been convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States o f tax es and was, for that r eason, ordered deported on the g round that he stood c o nvicted of a “crime inv o l v i n g moral turpitude.” Id. at 223–26. I n v iew of the “g rave nature of deportation,” the C o u r t c onsidered the statute u nder the usual criteria p e rtaining to the void-for-vag ueness doctrine. Id. a t 231. The Court held on the merits t h a t the p hrase in q u estion was not so vag ue or meaning less as to b e a deprivation of due process. Id. at 229–32.

W e followed suit in Tseung Chu v

. Cornell , 2 47 F

. 2 d 929 (9th Cir. 19 5 7). Similarly , there, the non-citiz en was convicted of w i l lful tax e vasion. Id. at 931–32. His conviction occurred before his latest entry into the United States, a nd th e r e l e vant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a) (Section 212(a) of the I mmig ration and Na t ionality Act of 1952), provided that a

n alien c onvicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” w as inadmissible. Rely ing on the Su preme Court’s then-recent decision in Jordan , w e hel d that the phrase in question was not unconstitutionally vag ue. Tseung Chu , 247 F .2d at 938–39.

The g overnme n t first arg ues that the void-for-vag ueness doctrine d oes not apply at al l t o any g round o f inadmissibility , relying on Bout i l i e r v. INS , 387 U.S. 118 (1967). A s a three-judg e p an e l , we are bound by Tseung C h u ’s co n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e m e r i t s o f t his iss u e notwithstanding the f

act that the petitioner i n t h at case was inadmissible, rather than deportable. B ecause we do not read Boutilier q

uite as broadly as the g overnment does, we do not think that it is “clearly irreconcilable” w i t h T s eung Chu in this reg a rd. Miller v. Ga m m i e , 3 35 F

. 3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).M A R T I N E Z

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E R 9 Althoug h some of the Boutilier opinion’s wor d ing is broad, the c rux of the decision is that the petitioner was “ not being deported for conduct eng ag ed in after his entry into the United States, but rather for charact e ristics he possessed at the time of his entry .” 387 U .S. at 123. “A standard applicable solely to time o f entry could hardly be vag ue as to post-entry c onduct.” Id. at 124. Moreover, the petitioner was ex c luded by reason of a status o r condition (“psy c hopathic personality ” ), r ather than by reason o f a discrete criminal act. Id. at 118. And fin ally , althoug h the Court asserted that the “constitutional r e q uirement of fair warning has no applicability to standard s

. . . for a dmission of aliens to the United States,” id. at 123, the Court went on to decide on the merits that the pivotal phrase was, in f act, clear, id. at 123–24. Here, by c ontrast, Pe t i tioner eng ag ed in the conduct a t issue after the time of entry , and the conduct i n question was a criminal act, rathe r than a status or condition. A c cording ly , we a re not persuaded that Boutilier forecloses consi deration of whether a crime committed by a n on-citiz en constitutes a “crime o f moral turpitude” so as to render h er inadmissible. W e also n ote that at least one other c i rc u it has continued, after Boutilier , to analy

z e on the merits a void-for-vag ueness challeng e to the phrase “moral turpitude,” broug ht by a noncitiz en who was found to be inadmissible. Lagunas-Salgado

v. Holder , 584 F

. 3 d 7 0 7 , 7 10–11 (7th Cir. 2009); Ali v

. Mukasey , 521 F

. 3 d

737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Supreme Court’s recent d ecision in Sessions v

. Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. 12 0 4 ( 2 0 18), ex tending to the immig ration contex t its earlier opinion in Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551 ( 2015), does not e visce r ate our holding in Tseung Chu , such that we should overrule i t. Miller , 335 F

. 3d at 899–900. F irst, we a re oblig ed to f

ollow on-point Supreme Court precede n t —here, Jordan —even ifM A R T I N E Z

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later Supreme Court cases cast some d oubt o n i t s g eneral reasoning

. Bosse v. Oklahoma , 137 S. Ct. 1 , 2 (2016) ( p e r curiam). Second, Johnson and Dimaya interpret s tatutory “residual” clauses whose wording does not include the phrase “moral turpitude” and which are not tethered to recogn i z e d
common law principles. I n the c i r c u mstances, we remain bound by Jordan and Tseung Chu

. 2

P etition DENIED.

2 A t least th ree o f o ur sister circu i t s h a v e h eld , in cases po st- d atin g Jo h n so n , th at th e Su

p rem e Co urt’ s h o ld in g in Jo rd a n rem ain s g o o d law : th e p h rase “c r i m e in v o lv in g m o ral turp itu d e” is n o t un co n stitu tio n ally
v ag u e. Mo r en o v. Att’y Gen era l , 88 7 F

. 3 d 1 6 0 , 1 6 5

– 6 6 (3 d Cir. 20 1 8 ); Bo g g a la v. S essio n s , 8 6 6 F.3 d 5 6 3 , 5 6 9

– 70 (4 th Cir. 2 01 7 ), cert. d en ied , 1 3 8 S. C t. 1 2 9 6 (2 0 1 8 ); D o min gu ez-Pu lid o v. Lyn ch , 8 21 F.3 d 8 3 7 , 8 4 2

– 4 3 (7 th

Cir. 2 0 1 6 ).