### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 13, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. GINGE R JA CKS ON

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for F ranklin County No. 14462 Thomas W. G raham , Judge

No. M2003- 02539-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 4, 2005

The de fenda nt, Ginge r J ackson, was convicted of sol icitation of first deg ree murder. The trial c ourt imposed a Rang e I

sentenc e of e ight y ear s and six months. I n this appeal, the de fenda nt asserts (1) that the trial court erre d b y t h e ad mission of certain testimony ; (2) that the tria l court er red by

a dmi tti ng int o e vid e nc e c e rt a in a ud iot ape re c or din g s; ( 3) that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rred by fa ili ng to instruct the jury

reg arding the inaudible portions of the audiotape rec ording s; ( 4) that the trial court

err ed by failing to suppr ess the audiotape rec ording of the defe ndant' s arr est; (5) that the trial court

err ed by deny ing the defe ndant' s motion for a judg ment of ac quittal at the close of the state' s proof; (6) that the tr ial court e rre d by excluding ce rtain evidenc e offe red by the defe ndant; (6) that the trial
court e rre d b y ad m i t t i n g into evidence testimonyreg arding lawsuits involving the def endant a nd

va ri ou s p ub lic e nti tie s; ( 7) that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y fa ili ng to r e qu ir e the state to el e c t th e sp e c if ic d at e o n wh i ch t h e o ff

en s e o cc u rr ed ; (8 ) t h at t h e t ri al co u rt er re d b y d en y i n g al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g; and (9) that the sentenc e is e x cessive. The defe ndant has also asked this court to review he r sentenc e under the g uidelines of B lakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judg ment of the trial court is a ffirme d. The sentenc e is modified and the ca use is rema nded for

consideration of the de fenda nt's suitability for pr obation.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed in Par t; M odif ied in Part ; Rem anded

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the co u rt , i n wh i ch D AVI D H. W ELLES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Paul D. Cross, Monteag le, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Ging er Jackson.

Paul G. Summers, At t o rn eyGene ral & Reporter ; Helena Walton Yarbroug h, Assistant Attorney Gene ra l; a n d St e v e n M

. B lo u n t, A s s is ta n t D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l, f o r th e ap p e ll e e , State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

I n the spring of 2001, the de fenda nt was invol ved in a bitter divorc e with the victim, Anthony J ackson. Du ri n g t h at time, the def endant a pproac hed Stacy

Rackley , an ac quaintance who had perf ormed odd jobs for he r, and e x presse d a desire to have the victim killed, explaining t hat " her life would be better

if [the victim] wasn' t around." Whil e Rac kley initiallybelieved that the defe ndant was joking , he ultimatel y determined that she wa s serious. Afte r an a ltercation with the victim at their son' s school, the defendant arra ng ed a me eting with Rackley . Her friend Connie Shetter s, who

was a lso involved in a contested divorce , also attende d the meeting . The de fenda nt, whom Rackley described as " enra g ed," told Rackley that "be cause of wha t transpired she woul d ra t h er see [the victim] g one than in her

son' s life." She asked Rack l ey t o p o i son the victim with "rat poison, . . . methamphetamines [or] [ e]cstacy ."

At tr ia l, C on nie She tte rs , w ho ha d b e e n a frie nd to the de fe nd a nt f

or app ro xima te ly

te n y e ars , testified as a witness for the state. Acc ording to Ms. Shetters, she overhe ard the defe ndant inform Rackley that she wa nted to have the victim kill ed. She reme mbere d that the defe ndant often ta lked about poisoning the victim. She rec alled that the defe ndant, who" was banking on winning a pending EEO lawsuit that wa s ag ainst the base, multipl e lawsuits," or collecting the victim's life insura nce, of fe re d to pa y

Ra c kle y $2 0, 00 0 to kil l th e vic tim

.

Ms. Shetters testified that an incide nt on November 29, 2001, involving the de fenda nt and the victim "e nrag ed" the defendant, who, acc ording to Ms. Shetters, sugg ested a "two f or one de al," with Rackley . Ms. Shetters
, who admit ted eng ag ing in " idle conver sation" w ith Rackley about having her husba nd killed, sta ted that she later informed Rackley that she " wasn' t interested in that." She stated t hat t he defenda nt, however , persisted with her plan bec ause she wanted c ustody of the

c ou ple ' s so n, Da lto n, a ndc on tr ol o f the vic tim ' s a sse ts.

Ms. She tte rs te sti fi e d th a t on on e oc c a sio n, the de fe nd a nt s ho we d h e r a n e mpt y liq uo r b ott le that she had taken fr om the victim's re sidence

. Acc ording to Ms. Shetters, the def endant intende d
t o u s e t h e b o t t l e t o p o i s o n t h e v i ct i m

. M s

. S h et t er s ad m i t t ed t h at s h e i n i t i al l y d en i ed an y

k n o wl ed ge of the de fenda nt's pla n when questioned by the police, e x plaining that she was a fra id and asha med. During cross-e x amination, Ms. Shetters acknow ledg ed that during the time perio d i n which the defe ndant asked Rackley to kill the victim, the defe ndant " was in a ve ry emotional, err atic, irrational state."

J erry

Way ne Spry , J r., bene fits manag er at the victim's plac e of e mploy ment, testified that the def endant wa s named a s a beneficiary on the vi ctim's company -paid li fe insurance policy , which had a total de ath bene fit of $75,000. Spry confirme d that the def

endant was named as the bene ficiary of the victim' s pension plan, which would have entitled her to a lump sum pay ment of $29,594.76 upon his death, and the victim's 401(k) plan, which would ha ve entitled he r t o a payment of $96,277.52.-3-

The victim testified t h at he filed f or divorce from the de fenda nt in J anuary of 2001, describing the e nsuing litig ation as " mes s y " an d "te rrible." He state d that the primary issues of contention wer e custody

of the pa rties' minor child, Dalton, and the divis ion of marital prope rty . The victim admitted that he had an a lcohol problem and s t at ed that he liked to drink Georg e Dicke l whiskey and Sundrop. The victim r eca lled that on November 12, 2001, the Chance ry Court ruled on the custody

issue and provide d the parties with a handwritten pare nting plan. Accor ding to the victim, the Chancery

Court named him as the primary residential pa

rent a nd this ang ere d the de fe nd a nt.

Th e vic tim

te sti fi e d th a t a

pp ro xima te ly

tw o w e e ks la te r a n in c ide nt occ ur re d b e tw e e n h im and the de fenda nt at Dalto n 's s ch ool. Accor ding to the vic tim, he sent a friend to pick Dalton up from school. When he w ent to the frie nd' s house to g et his son, no one was home . He then dr ove to the school, wher e he sa w the def endant standing i n fr o n t o f h er car . There wer e also police office rs in the par

king lot. The victim stated t hat when he got out of hi s vehicle, the defe ndant g ot in t o her c ar a nd drove towa rd him. I n response , he g ot back into his vehicle a nd pulled into a parking spot. The def

endant a g ain drove her car toward his vehicle " like she wa s g oing to hit it" a nd then " came back a nd made se vera l attempts to try to run at the door to ke ep [him] in the car ." T he vic tim de sc ri be d w ha t ha

pp e ne d n e xt:

I neede d to go in the sc hool to find out what was g oing on. I made a n attempt to c ro ss f ro m th e park in g area

to the sid e walk o f the sc ho ol. She tr ie d to ru n me down then, either

forwa rds or ba ckwa

rds. I was running

. Then the police chief from Es til l Sp ri ng s c a me ou t of the sc ho ol. He sa w w ha t w a s g oin g on a ndhe imm e diate ly

came to me a n d to ld me to g e t b a c k in to my c ar a n d I a s k e d h im if it w o u ld be possible that I

g o in [ the] s ch o o l and find out wha t's g oing on. I did not know
anything t h at wa s go i ng on y et at this time. So he said go a head a nd g o into the school. I waited a minute a nd he wa s try ing to g et her out of her ve hicle, telling her to stop an d ro l l t h e window down, and I walked dow n probably

30 fee t and then made a jaunt acr oss. She came at m e aga in with him try ing, he was beating on the window telling he r to stop, and I went on into the school to se e what had happe ned or wha t was g oing on. At that time the y had, the lady that I had picking up Dalton,
t h eyh ad ca rr i ed h er t o t h e b ac k s i d e o f t h e s ch o o l an d t h eyes co rt ed Da l t o n t h ro u gh the school and put Da lton in her vehicle and they drove of f.

The victim stated that he ha d no direc t contact with the de fenda nt after this incident. Shortlybefor e Christmas of that same y ear , he wa s informed by law enf o rcement that the def

endant ha d been

arr e ste d f or so lic iti ng his mur de r. Th e vic tim c on fi rm e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s n ame d a s a benef iciary on his life insurance policy , his company pension plan, and his 401(k) plan.

During cross-e x amination, the victim testified that during the time fra me that the def endant was ha ving disc ussions with R ackle y , she appe are d hy sterica l and sometimes i rr at i onal. He described her

demea nor as " down rig ht mean." The victim stated that the de fenda nt had v isited a
ps y c ho log ist

in r e la tio n to he r l a ws uit a g a ins t th e g ov e rn me nt.-4-

Stacy Rackley , a witness for the state, testified that the de fenda nt wanted the vic tim kil led so that she could have all the marital assets and sole custody of Dalton. He sta ted that the def endant offe red him $20,000 to do the job, expl aining to him that "if this occur red be fore the final divorc e decr ee that she would be the he ir to the life insuranc e policy and . . . if that didn't pan out that she had a f eder al lawsuit that she had filed ag ainst someone on an Air For ce base." Rackley testified that he bec ame c oncerned for

the victim's sa fety

and telephone d his brother-in- law, a corr ectional of fice r

a t th e Cof fe e Cou nty ja il, fo r a dv ic e . A ft e r m e e tin g wi th Inv e sti g a tor Da nn y War re n o f the F ra nk lin CountySheriff' s Depa

rtment, Rackley ag ree d to se cre tly rec ord a conve rsation with the def endant

a ndto sug g e st tha t sh e hir e a pr of e ssi on a l hi t ma n. Du ri ng a me e tin g wi th the de fe nd a nt a ndMs. Shetters on Dec ember 4, 2001, Rackley wore a re cording device and sug g ested that the de fenda nt procur e the se rvice s of a pr ofessional hit man. Rackley testified that the def endant wa s not rece ptive
to the ide a

of hiring a pr of e ssi on a l a ndthat wh e n h e me nti on e d d oin g so , th e de fe nd a nt o rd e re d h im
to lift hi s s h irt a n dta

k e d o w n h is p a n ts s o th a t s h e c o u ldd e te r mi n e if h e w a s w e ar in g a

" wire." Ac c or din g to R a c kle y , th e de fe nd a nt d id no t disc ov e r the wi re be c a us e it w a s h idd e n in his Tenne ssee Titans c ap.

At the direc tion of I nvestig ator Warr en, R ackle y returne d to the defendant' s residenc e on the
next d a y w e ar in g a p a g e r th a t w o u ld a c t a s a tr a n s mi tt in g d e v ic e

. A c c o r d in g to Rackley , the defe ndant said that she wa nted the victim killed before the final divorce decr ee, which was sc heduled
to occur within the month, and sugg ested that he poison the victim's liquor. Rackle y reme mbere d that the def

endant told him the victim would be alone at his residence betwee n Dec ember 19 and 24. Rackley stated that one w eek la ter, while Ms. Shetters w as pre sent, t h e d efendant ag ain offe red Rackle y $ 2 0
, 0 0 0 to k il l th e v ic ti m. T h e f o ll o w in g d a y , th e d e f

e n d a n t to ld Ra c k le y th a t s h e had chang ed her

mind and did not want the victim killed. Rackley rec alled tha t fo u r day s later, the defe ndant cha ng ed her

mind ag ain and a sked that he murde r the victim. Acc ording to Rackley , the defe ndant told him that she would have a n alibi betwee n Dec ember 19 and 24 and that if they g ot caug ht, she would claim that she wa s "ove r[-]m edicated."

Rackley testified that he r eturne d to the d ef en d an t's r esidenc e on De cembe r 19 and the defe ndant g ave him " a Sundrop bottle partially filled[,]

. . . a . . . jug with just a litt le bit left in it [ of] Geor g e Dickel[,] .

. . [and] [a] liquor soaked pair of socks." Rackley rec alled th at t h e d ef endant inf or me d h im tha t th e vic tim , a he a vy dr ink e r, ty

pic a lly us e d G e orge Dic ke l a ndc ha se d it wi th Sundrop. Acc ording to Rackley
, the defendant also provided him with two sets of key s, one which belong ed to the victim' s Ford T hunderbird a nd one which belong ed to the victim' s L incoln Townca r. Rackley testified that the defe ndant g ave him the key s so that he could put the liquor soake d socks into the victim's ca

rs and $200 to purc hase poison or dr ug s to kill t h e v i ct i m. The def endant provided Rac kley

with directions to the victim's r esidenc e, told him where to pa rk, and instruc ted him on how to ga in entry

into the house. Rackley

stated that the de fenda nt directe d him to call her fr om a pa y te le ph on e a ft e r he ha d fi nis he d the job a ndinf or me d h im tha t " sh e wo uldc ry , s he wo uld be upset."-5-

Ronald Ed w ar d D u rh a m, a d e p u ty w ith th e F r a n k li n Co u n ty Sh e r if f' s D e p ar tm e n t, w ho

arr ested the de fenda nt pursuant to an ar rest wa rra nt at her br other' s house in Coffe e County on D e c e m b e r

2 1
, 2 0 0 1
, t e s t i f

i e d t h a tw h e n h e c o n f

r o n t e d h e r , t h e d e f

e n d a n ta s k e d
, " I s h e a l i v e ?"

David Cook, Chief of Police fo r t he Estill Springs Police Depa rtment, testified that on Nove mb e r 2 9
, 2 0 0 1
, h e w a s c a ll e d to th e Ro c k Cr e e k Sc h o o l to e s c o r t th e d e f e n d a n t f r om the premises. Chi ef Cook stated tha t he aske d the def endant, who ha d attempted to take D alton from school in violation of a court order, to leave the bui lding and she di d so. Approxim ately five minutes later, he saw the de fenda nt in the front par king lot spee ding towa

rd the victim. Chief Cook testified that he orde red the defe ndant t o stop her vehicle and direc ted the victim into the building, at which
po int , th e vic tim

" wa lk[e d] in fr on t of

the ve hic le a ndsh e pu t it

in d ri ve a nda c c e le rate d to wa rd s h im that way . He we nt on in the building to g et out of the way of t he vehicle. . . . I ' m beating on her door or window of the vehicle, the driver' s door, telling he r to stop and she just kept driving ."

Fr ankli n C o u n t ySheriff' s Depa rtment I nvestig ator Da nny Warren te stified that he wa s

c on ta c te d b y

I nv e sti g a tor

B ill y Ma rc um o f the Cof

fe e Cou nty

She ri ff ' s D e pa rt me nt, wh o a sk e d h im to contact Rac kley

. I nvestig ator Warren confirme d that he asked Rackley to w ear a body wire so that his conversa t i o n s wi t h the def endant a nd Ms. Shetters could be monitored. D uring I nvestig ator Warren' s testimony , portions of the tape rec ording s o f the mee tings be tween Ra ckley and the defe ndant wer e play ed for the jury . I nvestig ator Warr en testified that afte r Rackle y ' s final meeting wi th the de fe nd a nt, Ra c kle y g a ve him tw o on e -h un dr e d- do lla r bil ls, tw o s e ts o f c ar k e y s, a pla sti c ba g c on ta ini ng so c ks that sm e lle d li ke a n a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e , a Ge or g e Di c ke l bo ttl e , a nda bo ttl e of Sun dr op . A tap e re c or din g of the de fe nd a nt' s ar re st on the fo llo wi ng da y wa s a lso a dmi tte d in to evidenc e.

Eric B urch, a n attorney

who re p rese nted the victim during the divorce proce eding s, was

c a lle d a s a wi tne ss f or the de fe ns e . B ur c h te sti fi e d th a t du ri ng the tim e pe ri od su rr ou nd ing he r a rr e st, the def endant' s "r esponses a nd actions we re a bnormal at times." He char acte rized the divorce as " the most heated divorc e ca se [ he had] ever been involved in." Bur ch stated tha t the defe ndant re ceive d

near ly $250,000 in the final divorce decr ee. D uring cross-e x amination, Bur ch ac knowledg ed that if the victim had bee n killed beforethe e n t ry of the divorc e dec ree , the def endant would ha ve

re c e ive d mo re tha n d ou ble that a mou nt.

Mic he lle B e nja min , w ho repr e se nte d th e de fe nd a nt d ur ing 20 00 a nd20 01 in a la ws uit claiming damag es for emotional distress, described the def endant' s mental state during that time as

" ve ry , ve ry po or ." Ms. B e nja min state d that " [a]n y tim e [the de fe nd a nt] c a me [to] th e of fi c e , mo st of the tim e we ' d ha ve to se nd he r ba c k home
, . . . re sc he du le the app oin tme nt a ndt[e ll] h e r t o c a ll be fo re ha ndif

sh e tho ug ht s he wa s in a ny be tte r co nd iti on ." She state d tha t the de fe nd a nt wa s h e a vil y medicate d at t h e t ime and re membere d that, shortly befor e the Rock Cre ek School incident, the de fe nd a nt " se e me d to be ou t of c on tr ol of re a lly re a lit y ." Du ri ng c ro ss- e xami na tio n, Ms. B e nja min

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t a s to the c ivi l li tig a tio n, the mor e e mot ion a l dis tr e ss e xhibi te d b y the de fe nd a nt, the g re a te r the po te nti a l f or da ma g e s.-6- I The de fenda nt first asserts that the tria l court er re d b y admitting into evidenc e testimony
reg arding the incident at the Rock Creek School in violation of Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 404(b). She also contends that, even if the admis sion of t he testi mony was proper, the trial court should have
pr ov ide d a

lim iti ng ins truc tio n. Th e state su bmi ts tha t t he evi de nc e wa s a dmi ssi ble un de r R ule 404(b) a nd that the trial court's f ailure to provide a limiting instruction was ha rmless err or.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 40 4 p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art a s f oll ow s:

Othe r C ri me s, Wro ng s, or Ac ts. Ev ide nc e of oth e r c ri me s, wr on g s, or

a c ts i s

no t a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve the c ha ra c te r of a

pe rs on in o rd e r t o s ho w a c tio n in conformitywith the char acte r trait. It may , h o we ver, be admissible for other purposes. Th e conditions which must be satisfied be fore allowing inquiry on

cross-e x amination about spec ific instance s of conduc t are : (1) The court upon re quest must hold a hearing outside the jury ' s prese nce; (2) The court must determine that a material issue exis ts other than conduc t conform i n g wi t h a char acte r trait and must upon re quest state on the r ecor d the materia l issue, the ruling , and the r easons f or admitting the evidenc e; and (3) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). A fourth pre requisite to admissibilit y is that the trial court f

ind by clea r and convincing evidenc e that the de fenda nt c ommitt ed the other crimes or

bad ac ts. St ate v. DuB ose, 953 S.W .2d 649, 654 (Tenn. 1997)

.

Rule 404 was patterned in g reat measure on State v. Parton, 694 S.W .2d 299 (Tenn. 1985)
, wh e re in o ur

su pr e me c ou rt

ru le d th a t e vid e nc e of

oth e r c ri me s is g e ne ra lly

ina dmi ssi ble

. Th e te rm s of thi s rule e sta

bli sh that c ha

ra c te r ev ide nc e c a nn ot be us e d to pr ov e that a pe rs on ha s a

pr op e ns ity to commit a crime. Te nn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 94 ). Mo st auth or iti e s su g g e st tha t tria l c ou rt s take a “ re stric tiv e app ro a c h o f 4 04 (b ) .

. . be c a us e ‘other a ct’ e vidence car

ries a signific ant potential for unfairly influencing a jury .” Neil P. Cohen e t al., Tenne ssee L aw of

Evidence § 4.04[8 ][ e] (4th ed. 2000). That perha ps best explains t he
tr a dit ion a l po stu re of

the c ou rt s th a t a ny

te sti mon y

of oth e r b a d a c ts bya

de fe nd a nt i s n ot u su a lly admissible when used as substantive evide nce of g uilt of the crime on tria l. Parton, 694 S.W .2d at 302-03. I n those instances w here the other c onduct or a cts ar e s i m i l ar t o the crimes on trial, the potential for a pre

judicial result incre ases. State v. B ordis, 905 S.W .2d 214, 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Unlike the F eder al rule ba rring such evide nce, our rule doe s not specifica lly enumer ate the
purposes fo r wh i ch such evide nce ma y be off ere d. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W .3d 266, 271 (Tenn. 20 00 ). Th e Ad vis ory Com mis sio n spe c if ic a lly omi tte d suc h a list so tha t law y e rs a ndjud g e s w ou ld

" ' us e c are in i de nti fying the iss ue s to be a dd re sse d b y the Rul e 40 4( b) e vid e nc e .' " I d. (q uo tin g Ne il P. Co he n e t a l., Te nn e sse e L a w o f E vid e nc e § 4 04 .6 , a t 16 9 n .4 57 (3 d e d. 19 95 )). Th erefore , in-7-

e ve ry c a se in w hic h e vid e nc e of oth e r c ri me s, wro ngs, or a c ts i s o ff

e re d, thetr ia l c ou rt

sh ou ld

car efully scrutinize the rele vance of the e vidence and the rea sons f or which it is being offe red. I d. Although Rule 404( b) does not ex plicitly list these ex ceptions, our courts have held that evidenc e of other c ri m es m aybe admissible to show motive, intent, guilty knowledg e, identity

of the defe ndant, abse nce of

mistake, and the ex istence of a common sche me or plan. See , e.g ., Collard v. State, 526 S.W .2d 112, 114 (Tenn. 1975) ; see a lso Neil P. Cohe n et al., Te nnessee L aw of Evidence § 4.04[8] (4th ed. 2000). Even if the cha lleng ed evide nce is re levant to an issue other than char acte r, it must be excluded if the dang er of unfair prejudice outweig hs the probative value of the other c rime evide nce. State v. H owell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 2 5 4 (T enn. 1993); see also State v. Z ag orski, 701 S.W .2d 808 (Tenn. 1985) ; State v. Tay lor, 669 S.W .2d 694 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)

. B e c a us e the tr ia l cou rt su bs ta nti a lly c omp lie d with the re qu ir e me nts of Rul e 40 4( b) , th is c ou rt wi ll revie w the trial court’s deter mination f or an abuse of discretion. See DuB ose, 953 S.W .2d at 652.

Prior to the trial in this case, the tria l cou rt ru l ed t h e defe ndant' s attempt to drive over the vic tim a t th e Roc k Cr e e k Sc ho ol w a s r e le va nt a ndwo uldbe a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve mot ive a ndint e nt, pe rm iss ibl e pu rp os e s u nd e r the ru le
, bu t re se rv e d ru lin g on the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e un til trial. During the course of the trial, the court determined that the evidenc e wa s more probative than prejudicia l.

I n our view, the rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s dete rm i n at i o n t h at the testimony was pr op e rl y a dmi tted as evi de nc e of the de fe nd a nt’ s in te nt a ndmot ive . T he te sti mon y wa s a lso adm issib le to e sta

bli sh the na tur e of

the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e de fe nd a nt a ndthe vic tim

. “[V]i olent acts indica ting the r elationship betwee n the victim of a viol ent crime and the de fenda nt pr ior to the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e are re le va nt to sh ow de fe nd a nt’ s h os til ity tow ardthe vic tim
, malice, intent, and a

settled purpose to harm the victim.” State v. Smith, 868 S .W.2d 561, 574 (Tenn. 1993) ; see a ls o S t at e v. Turnbill, 640 S .W.2d 40, 46-47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 905-906 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1981). The tria l court specific ally found that the pr ob a tiv e va lue of

the te sti mon y

ou tw e ig he d th e da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e . U nd e r the se circ umstances, it is our view that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony

abo ut the e ve nts that tr a ns pir e d a t th e Roc k Cr e e k Sc ho ol.

The de fenda nt contends and the state conc edes tha t the tri al co u rt s h o uld have pr ovided a lim iti ng ins truc tio n c on fi nin g the jury ' s c on sid e ratio n o f this e vid e nc e to the pe rm iss ibl e pu rp os e s. The state a sserts, howeve r, that the failure to g ive a limit ing instruction w as harmless. The trial c ourt declined to g ive a limiting instruction af ter making the following observa tion:

Wel l, I do n' t thi nk it c ome s in so le ly in 40 4,

. . . th is w ho le tr ia l is su pp os e dly about an intent, bec ause y ou' re ad m i t ting that a dmissions otherwise w ould be damning to y ou[r] client, so y o ur only defe nse is intent, and so the evide nce of her
p r o p e n s i t y t o b e m a d a n d a n g r y a n d c o n t r o l
, e v e n , a l l th o s e m a t t e r s ar e d i r e c t [ l y] [] rele vant to the issue of intent. I don' t know whywe would ha ve to tell a jury

. . . something tha t might be misleading, t hat something is not evidence , the testimony he re is n ot e vid e nc e , th a t y ou ma y c on sid e r in this c a se , but is only fo r the pu rp os e-8-

of motive, scheme , plan and is t o be given such weig ht as y ou may deter mine as the common, scheme , plan, or motive. Well, y ou rea lly haven' t said anything ther e.

. . . I f the State thinks that there is some other instruction that in some way oug ht to be g iven, I ' ll be happy to c onsider any body ' s choice of words, but it appe ars to be that when y ou say

that some t est imony

is not evidence of g uilt, but i t may be evidenc e as to motive, y ou know. I mean, why

are y ou saying that? I f motive and int e nt i s o ne of

the e le me nts of

the c ri me , w hy

wo uldy ou sa y

that?

Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 105 provides that "[w]hen evidenc e which is a dmissibl e . . . for

on e pu rp os e bu t no t a dmi ss ib le

. . . f or a no the r p ur

po se is a dmi tte d, the c ou rt up on re qu e st s ha ll restric t the evidenc e to its proper sc ope and instruc t the jury acc ording ly ." T enn. R. Evid. 105; see also Howe ll, 868 S.W .2d at 255 (stating that "limiting instruction s are critica l in preventing the improper a nd prejudicia l use of proof of other c rimes" ). I n our view, the trial court e rre d by failing to limi t the j ury ' s consideration of the Rock Cre ek School incident. The jury should not have bee n permit te d to s p e c u late o n th e d e f e n d a n t' s p r o p e n s it y to c o mm it th e c r im e c h ar g e d

. B e c a u se there

was a n abundanc e of proof of the defe ndant' s g uilt, howe ver, the err or qualifies as harmless, ha ving no eff ect on the ve rdict. See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

II T h e d ef en d ant next contends that the trial court erre d by admitting into evidenc e the audiotape r ecor dings of

her conversations with Rackley . Specifica lly , she cla ims that the qualityof the audiotape s is so poor as to rende r them irre levant. The state sub m i t s t h at the quality of the

a u d i o t ap e s a f

f e c t s t h e w e i g h to f

t h e e v i d e n c e a n d n o ti t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y.

I nitially , the def

endant ha s failed to include the audiotape r ecor dings a s a part of the re cord
on appea l. It is the duty of the appellant to pr epar e a c omplete and a ccur ate r ecor d on appea l. Tenn. R. A pp . P. 24 (b ). Th e fa ilu re to p re pa re a n a de qu a te re c or d fo r re vie w of a n is su e of te n r e su lts in

a wa iver of that issue. Thompson v. St ate, 958 S.W.2d 156, 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

More important, the de fenda nt is not entit led to relief on the mer i t s of the issue. To be admissible, audiotapes, like photog raphs, must be re levant to some issue at trial. See T enn. R. Evid. 401. An audiotape may be excluded, howeve r, if its probative value is substantiallyoutweig hed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the def endant or to confuse or

mislead the jury . See Te nn. R. Evid. 403. The a dmissibi lityof evide nce is a matter within the t ri al co u rt' s discretion and w ill not be

reve rsed on appea l a

bsent an abuse of discretion. State v. Har ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 66 (Tenn. 1992)

.

I n this case, the a

udiotapes ar e re levant, as the y are rec ording s of conve rsations betwee n R a c k l e y a n d t h e d e f

e n d a n tw h e r e i n t h e d e f

e n d a n ta g r e e s t o p a y

R a c k l e y t o m u r d e r t h e v i c t i m

. In addition, the probative va lue of this evidenc e is so g reat as to substantiallyoutweig h the dang er of

u n fa i r p rejudice. Ther e wa s no objection to the authenticity of the tape s. That portions of the

a ud iot ape s a

re ina ud ibl e do es no t a ff

e c t th e ir a dmi ssi bil ity . " Pr ov ide d th a t a tape re c or din g is
proper ly authenticated, the incompletene ss of it g oes onl y to its weig ht and not to its admiss ibilit y ."-9-

State v

. Ha rr i s , 6 3 7 S.W .2d 896, 898 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) ; see a lso St ate v. B easle y , 699 S.W. 2d56 5, 56 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 85 ); Al dr idg e v. Sta te , 5 62 S.W. 2d21 6, 21 8 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 77 ). I n o ur

vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt

didno t a bu se its di scr eti on by a dmi tti ng the tape s in to evidenc e.

I n a related iss ue, the defe ndant asserts that beca use t here must be a unanimous ver dict, the trial court e rre d by

failing to instruct the j ury that it must unanimously ag ree as to what wa s hear d

on the audiotapes. The state submits that the jurors wer e not r equire d to r en d er a u nanimous decision as to the c ontent of ea ch tape but only as to the def

endant' s g uilt of the s i n gl e charg ed offe nse.

There is, of course , a funda mental constitutional right under Tenne ssee law to a unanimous verdic t before a conviction for a c riminal offe nse may be imposed. State v. Shelton, 851 S.W .2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) ; State v. Brow n, 823 S.W .2d 576, 581 (Tenn. Crim App. 1991) ;

see a lso St ate v. B rown, 762 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tenn. 1988). Protec t i o n o f t his right may require
sp e c ia l pr e c a uti on s b y

the tr ia l c ou rt to ens ure that th e jury do e s n ot r e a c h a

" pa tc hw or

k v e rd ic t" based on differ ent offe nses. State v. For bes, 918 S.W .2d 431, 445-46 (Tenn. Crim

. Ap p

. 1 995). When the proof shows the c ommissi on of multipl e acts with multiple results, the results being

se pa rate c ri min a l of

fe ns e s, a ndthe re are ins uf fi c ient c ou nts in the c ha rg ing ins trume nt t o

acc ommodate all of the offe nses s hown, t he usual prec aution to assure jury unanimity

is to require the elec tion of offenses. State v. Bur lison, 501 S.W .2d 801, 804 (Tenn. 1973); State v. Clabo, 905 S.W .2d 197, 205 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ; Shelton, 851 S.W .2d at 137. " The jury ' s consideration

mus t be fo c us e d on one or mor e c ha rg e d off e ns e s by so me e ff

e c tiv e me a ns of e le c tio n, in o rd e r t o

e ns ur e un a nim ity

on th os e off

e ns e s a ndno oth e rs ." She lto n, 85 1 S. W.2 d a t 13 8. Whe n th e state pr e se nts pr oo f o n ma ny

of fe ns e s w ith in a n a lle g e d ti me per iod , b ut n e g le c ts e le c tio n, the jury is essentially

permitted to " rea ch into the brimming bag of offe nses and pull out one for e ach c ount." Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W .2d 497 (Tenn. 1996). The duty to e nsure unanimity exis ts on the part of the trial court even in the absenc e of a specific reque st by the defe ndant. Bur lison, 501 S.W.2d at 804; see a lso St ate v. Mitche ll, 737 S.W .2d 298, 300 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

I n support of her

position, t he def

endant c ites St at e v. R ickman, 877 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1994). I n our view, how ever , Rickman is inapplicable unde r t h e fa cts of this case . The Rickman decision involved the state' s failure to elect the pa rticular a ct upon which it was r ely ing f or conviction on a c harg e of c hild rape. H ere , the def endant wa s char g ed with a s i n gl e count of solicitation of first deg ree murder ba sed upon an a ccumulation of e vi d en ce o v er a period of time. The audiotape re cording s can be classified a s an ong oing ne g otiatio n b et we en the de fenda nt and Rackley . There is no require ment that the jurors unanimously ag ree on the contents of the audiotapes bu t on ly that th e y un a nim ou sly

a g re e that the de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d the c ri me of so lic itatio n of fi rs t deg ree murder. B eca

use there was proof of only one offe nse, there was no dang er of a patchwork verdic t. Forbe s, 918 S.W .2d at 445-46. The defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.-10- III The de fenda nt contends t h at t he trial c ourt err ed by ref using to suppre ss the audiotape

re co rdi ng of her

arr est as violative of he r rig ht to remain silent. Whil e the state conce des that the de fe nd a nt w a s in c us tod y wh e n th e reco rdi ng wa s ma de , it arg ue s th a t th e re wa s n o e rr or be c a us e she wa s not interrog ated.

The standard of revie w applicable to suppr ession issues is w ell established. When the trial court make s a finding of fa cts at the c onclusion of a suppression hear ing, the fac ts are a ccor ded the

we i gh to f aj u ryv er d i ct

. S t at e v. S t ep h en s o n , 8 7 8 S

. W

. 2 d 5 3 0
, 5 4 4 (T en n

. 1 9 9 4 ). T h e t ri al co u rt 's fi nd ing s a re bin din g up on thi s cou rt un le ss the e vid e nc e in the re c or d p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e m. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); see a lso St ephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 544; St ate v. Goforth, 678 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Que stions of credibility of witnesses, the weig ht and value of t he evidence and re solution of conflicts in evidence are matters entr usted to the
tr ia l ju dg e a s th e tr ie r o f f a c t. T he pa

rt y pr evai li ng in the tr ia l c ou rt is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate view of the e vidence adduce d at the suppre ssion hearing as we l l as all re asonable and l egi t i m at e i n fe re n ce s t h at m ayb e dr aw n fr o mt h e e v i d en ce

. Od o m , 9 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 2 3

. T h i s co u rt 's revie w of a

tri al co u rt ' s application of law to the fac ts, however , is conducted unde r a de novo standard of

revie w. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Crutcher , 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)

.

Th e F if th A me nd me nt t o th e Un ite d Sta te s Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s that " no pe rs on

. . . s ha ll be c omp e lle d in a ny c ri min a l ca se to be a wi tne ss ag a ins t hi mse lf ." U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . V ; se e a lso Ma llo y v. Ho g a n, 37 8 U .S. 1, 6 (19 64 ) (hol din g tha t th e F if th A me nd me nt' s p ro te c tio n a g a ins t compulsory

self-inc rimination is applicable to the states throug h the Fourteenth Amendme nt). Article I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Constituti on provides that " in all criminal prose cutions, the

acc used . .

. shall not be compelled to g ive evidenc e ag ainst himself." Te nn. Const. art. I , § 9. "T he signific ant diffe renc e betwe en these two provisions is that the test of voluntariness f or conf essions

un de r A rtic le I , § 9 is br oa de r a ndmor e pr ote c tiv e of ind ivi du a l r ig hts tha n th e te st o f v olu nta ri ne ss under the Fifth Ame ndment." State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tenn. 1992).

Ge n e r a ll y , o n e mu s t a f

f irmati v e ly

in v o k e th e s e c o n s ti tu ti o n a l p r o te c ti o n s

. A n e xc eption arises, how ever , when a

g overnme nt ag ent makes a custodial interrog ation. Statements made dur ing the course of a custodial police interrog ation are inadmissible at trial unless the state e stablishes that the def endant wa s advised of his rig ht to remain silent and his rig ht to counsel and that the de fenda nt then waive d those rig hts. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-75 (1966); see also Dicke rson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000); Stansbury v. California, 51 1 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). A de fe nd a nt' s r ig hts to c ou ns e l a nda g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n may

be wa ive d a s lo ng a s th e wa ive r i s

ma de vo lun tari ly , k no wi ng ly , a ndint e lli g e ntl y

. Mir a nd a , 38 4 U .S. a t 47 8; S ta te v. Mid dle br oo ks
, 84 0 S. W.2 d 3 17 , 3 26 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . I n o rd e r to e ff e c t a wa ive r, the a c c us e d mu st b e a de qu a te ly apprised of

his right to re main silent and the conse quence of deciding to a bandon the right. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 544 -4 5 (Tenn. 1994). I n determining whe ther a confe ssion was voluntary and knowing
, t h e t otality of the c ircumstance s must be examined. St ate v. B ush, 942 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 9
, 5 0 0 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ). I f t h e "gr ea t erwe i gh t " o f t h e ev i d en ce s u p p o rt s t h e c o u rt 's ru l i n g,-11-

it will be upheld. I d. This court must conduct a de novo review of the trial court' s application of law to fac t. State v. Bridge s, 963 S.W .2d 487 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Yea rg an, 958 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1997).

I n Miranda, the United States Supreme Court limited its hol ding to a "c ustodial interrog ation." Mira nda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The Court def ined the phra se " custodial interrog ation" as " questioning initiated by law enforce ment office rs after a pe rson has be en take n into custody or oth e rw ise de pr ive d o f h is f re e do m of

a c tio n in a ny

sig nif ic a nt way ." I d. a t 44 4. A p e rs on is " in custody " w ithin the meaning of Miranda if there has bee n "a

' formal a rre st or restra int on f

ree dom of movement' of the de g ree associate d with a formal arr est." California v. Be heler
, 463 U.S. 1121, 11 25 (1 98 3) (c ita tio n o mit te d) . T he Cou rt has re fu se d to e xten d th e ho ldi ng in M ir a nd a to non-custodial int er ro gations. See Ore g on v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) ( holding that a n

acc used' s confe ssion was admissible beca use t here was no indica tion that the questioning took plac e in a context where his free dom to depart wa s restricte d in any way ); see a lso Behe ler, 4 6 3 U.S. at 1124-25 (noting that the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a "f ormal arr est or re straint on fre edom of moveme nt" of the deg ree associate d with a forma l ar re s t ). I n determining whe ther a

re a so na ble pe rs on wo ul d co ns ide r h ims e lf or he rs e lf in c us tod y , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt

c on sid e rs a

v ar i et y o f f ac t o rs , i n cl u d i n g t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

"the time and location of th e interr og ation; the duration and c hara cter of the questioning; the of

fice r' s tone of voice and g ener al demea nor; the suspec t's me thod of tr a ns po rt a tio n to the pla c e of qu e sti on ing ; th e nu mbe r o f p oli c e of fi c e rs pr e se nt; any limit ation on movement or other form of restra int imposed on the suspect during the interrog ation; any interac tions betwee n the officer and the suspec t, including the words spoken by

the offic er to the suspe ct, and the su s p ec t ' s verba l or nonverba l
response s ; the extent to which the suspect is confr onted with the law e nforc ement office r' s suspicions of g uilt or evidenc e of g uilt; and finally , the extent to which the suspect is made a war e that he or she is fre e to refr ai n from answering questions or to end the intervie w at will."

Walton, 41 S .W.3d at 82-83 (quoting State v. A nderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996))

.

B e c a us e th e d e f

e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e h a d b e e n arr e s t e d p u r s u a n t t o a w arr a n t , s h e w a s in custody

. The relevant question, there fore
, is whether she wa s interrog ated by the ar resting office r. The re cord e stablishes that the offic er r ead the arr est war rant to the de fenda nt and place d her unde r

arr est. She was ha ndcuffed an d seate d in the backse at of a patrol ca r. The of fice r did not ask the defe ndant any

questions. Moreover , nothing sug g ests that the offic er ma de a statement or e ng ag ed in any action that wa s intended to illicit an incriminating r esponse. See R hode I sland v. I nnis, 446 U. S. 2 91 , 3 01 (1 98 0) ("[ T]he t e rm ' int e rr og a tio n' un de r M ir a nd a re fe rs no t on ly

to e xpre ss qu e sti on ing , b ut al so to any wo rd s o r a c tio ns on the pa rt of the po lic e (o the r tha n th os e no rm a lly attendant to ar

rest and c ustod y ) t h at t h e police should know ar e re asonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspec t.")

. Under these circumstance s, it is our vi ew that the trial court prope rly

denied the de fenda nt's motion to suppress this evidence

.-12- IV The de fenda nt contends that the trial court erre d by ref using to g rant a

motion for judgme nt of a c qu itt a l bas e d on the ins uf fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e

. She arg ue s th a t be c a us e sh e wa s " ir ratio na l" during the period of time that she aske d Rackley to kill the victim, the state fa iled to establish her int e nt t o c omm it the of

fe ns e . Sh e a lso a sse rt s th a t Ra c kle y wa s n ot a

c re dib le wi tne ss.

Rul e 29 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s, in r e le vant p art , a s f oll ow s: The c ourt on motion of a def endant or of i ts own motion shall order the entry of judgme nt of ac quittal of one or more offe nses cha rg ed in the indictment or information af

ter the evidence on either side is c losed if the evide nce is insuffic ient
to s us ta in a

c on vic tio n o f s uc h o ff

e ns e or of fe ns e s. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(a).

Th is r ule e mpo we rs the tr ia l ju dg e to d ir e c t a jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l when the e vid e nc e is insufficient to wa

rra nt a conviction either

at the time the stat e re s t s or at the c onclusion of all the evidenc e. Ove rturf v. State, 571 S.W .2d 837 (Tenn. 1978). At the point the motion is made, the trial court must favor

the opponent of the motion with t h e st rong est leg itimate view of the e vidence
, including a ll reasona

ble infer ence s, and discar d any counter vailing evidence

. Hill v. St ate, 4 Te nn. Crim. App. 325, 470 S.W.2d 853 (1971). When the motion for ac quittal is m ade at the conclusion of the state' s evidenc e and is not g rante d, the def endant " may

offe r evide nce w ithout having r eser ved the rig ht." Te nn. R. Crim. P . 29(a)

.

Whe n c on sid e ri ng a

su ff ic ie nc y qu e sti on on app e a l, the state is en tit le d to the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nd a ll re a so na ble inf e re nc e s wh ic h mig ht be dr a wn the re fr om. Sta te v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of t he witnesses, the weig ht to be
g iven their testimony , and the rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof a re ma tters entrusted to the jury as the trier

of fa ct. B yrg e v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). W hen the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva nt question is whether, a fter r eviewing the evidenc e in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r ab le to th e s tate , a n y r a ti o n a l trie r o f f a c t c o u ld h a v e f

ound the essential ele ments of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Wil liams, 65 7 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983) . Be cause a ver dict of g uilt aga inst a defe ndant

remove s the presumption of innoce nce a nd raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted c riminal de fe nd a nt be ars the bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in a

g uil ty verdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).

The proo f a d d u c e d a t tria l e s ta b li s h e d th a t s h o r tl y a f

te r r e c e iv in g a n a d v e r s e ru li n g in her petition for custody , the def endant of fer ed Rac kley

money to kill the victim. Rackley testified that he initially

believed that the defe ndant was not serious but became conce rned w hen her demea nor

c ha ng e d a ndsh e app e are d int e nt on ha vin g the vic tim mur de re d. He re po rt e d th e po ssi ble c ri me to the police, who fitted him with a rec ording device . The tape -re corde d conver sations establish that the defendant, on more than one occasion, offere d Rackley $20,000 to kill the vi ctim, sug g esting that he do so by poisoning his drink. The defenda nt provided Rackley with $200 to purchasepoison or drug s to pu t i n t he victim' s drink and g ave him a pla stic bag containing near ly empty bottles of-13-

Geor g e Dicke l and Sundrop, the ing redie nts for t h e v i ctim's drink of choice . That the de fenda nt provided Rac kley

with dir ections to the victim's house, key s to the victim's c ars, a nd instructions on how to g et into the residenc e all sug g est her intent to have the victim kill ed. The re w as proof that the def endant wa nted the victim dea d s o t h at s h e could ha ve full custody of their son a nd total

c on tr ol o f the c ou ple ' s a sse ts. Th e jury a c c re dit e d th e te sti mon y

of the state ' s witn e sse s, a s w a s it s prer og ative. See State v. Summera ll, 926 S.W .2d 272, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). I n our view, the evidenc e wa s sufficient f or a r ational trier of

fac t to have found be y ond a re asonable doubt that the de fe nd a nt s oli c ite d th e mur de r o f the vic tim

.

V The de fenda nt asserts that the tria l court erred by ref using to a llow into evidence the
perma nent par enting plan issued in Dece mber of 2002 a nd testimonyreg arding the stabilityof the defe ndant' s relationship with the vi ctim afte r she was arr ested. The state submits that the trial court
pr op e rl y e xclu de d th e e vid e nc e a s ir re le va nt.

"Re levant evide nce" is evidence "ha ving a ny tendenc y to make the exis tence of any fac t that is o f c on se qu e nc e to the de te rm inatio n o f the a c tio n mo re pr ob ableor le ss p ro bab le than it w ou ld have be en without the evidenc e." Tenn. R. Evid. 401. I n State v. For bes, t his court discussed the
sta nd ardof

re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ' s d e te rm inatio n o f r e le va nc y :

"B eca use an a ssessment of whe ther a pieceof evide nce is re levant re quires an understanding of the c ase’ s theory and other evidenc e as well as a familiarity with the evidenc e in question, appe llate courts give g reat defe renc e to a tria l judge ' s decision

on re le va nc e iss ue s. Of

te n it is sta te d tha t a tria l cou rt ' s dec isi on on re le va nc e wi ll be re vers ed o nl y

foran ab us e of d is cret io n.

. . ."

918 S.W .2d 431, 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 9 5 ) (q uoting Ne il P. C ohen et. a l., Tennesse e L aw of Evidence § 401.5 (2d ed. 1990) ).

Th e de fe nd a nt s ou g ht a dmi ssi on of the pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng pla n she ha d e nte re d in to w ith the victim almost a y ear

afte r her arr est in an ef

fort to show a " normalization of relations" betwee n the parties. The trial c ourt excluded the evide nce, r u l i n g t h at " to say that [t he def

endant a nd the victim] later . . . a g ree d to chang e the c ustody arr ang ement is r eally irrele vant . . . to the matters that this [ c] o u rt needs to de termine." As indicated, the pare nting plan of fer ed by the def endant wa s develope d near ly

a y ear afte r t he arrest of the defendant. I n conseque nce, it was not re levant to any issue at trial. That rela tions be tween the defe ndant and the victim ha d become more stable sinc e the d e f e n d a n t ' s arr e s td i d n o tt e n d t o m ak e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y f a c tm o r e p r o b ab l e o r l e s s p r o b ab l e

. In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidenc e.

VI Th e de fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y pe rm itt ing e vid e nc e that sh e ha d a la ws uit pending ag ainst a military base. She also contends that the trial c ourt err ed by not gr anting a mistrial-14-

when a state witness violated the tria l court' s ruling that identityof the de fenda nts of the lawsuit not be re veale d.

I nitially , the defendant has failed to cite any authority for her arg ument and it is, theref ore, waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7); Te nn. Ct. Crim. App. R

. 10(b). Moreove r, she is not entitled
to r e li e f o n th e me r it s o f h e r c la im

. " T h e e n try o f a mi s tria l is ap p r o p r iate w h e n the trial ca nnot continue for

some rea son, or if the trial doe s continue, a misca rriag e of justice w ill occur." State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . "G ener ally a mistrial will be decla

red in a cr iminal case only

when ther e is a ' manifest nec essity ' requiring such ac tion by the trial judg e." State v. Millbrooks, 819 S .W.2d 4 4 1
, 4 4 3 (T enn. Crim. App. 1991) (c iting Arnold v. State, 563 S.W. 2d 79 2, 79 4 (Ten n. Cr im. Ap p. 19 77 )) . It is on ly wh e n th e re is " no fe a sib le a lte rn a tiv e to h al t i n g the proc eeding s" tha t a manife st nece ssityexis ts. St ate v. Knig ht, 616 S.W .2d 593, 596 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 81 ). Th e de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n o f e sta bli sh ing a ma nif e st n e c e ssi ty . St a te

v. Se a y , 9 45 S.W. 2d 75 5, 76 4 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). Th e de c isi on to g ra nt a mis tr ia l is wi thi n the sound discre tion of the trial court, and this court will not dis turb the trial court’s determination unless a cle ar a

buse of discr etion appea

rs on the re cord. Mc Pherson, 882 S.W.2d at 370.

The trial c ourt determined that the e xis te n c e of the law suit was rele vant bec ause it established the means by

which the de fenda nt might pay Rackley to kill t he victim. T h e co urt also ruled, howeve r, t h at t h e details of the lawsuit were irrele vant. During direc t examination, M s. Shetters testified that the def

endant intende d pay Rackley from the proce eds of he r " pending EEO lawsuit that

was a g ainst the base, multiple lawsuits."

I n our vi ew, the trial court did not abuse its discre tion by admitting testimony

reg arding the exis tence of the pending lawsuit. This e vidence was re levant bec ause it established a possible source from which the defe ndant could pay Rackley to mur der the victim. I n addition, it is our view that the sing le re fer ence to the details of the law suit had no eff ect upon the r esults of the trial. The trial

c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

re fu sin g to g ra nt a

mis tr ia l.

V II The de fenda nt contends that the trial c ou rt er re d b y failing to require the state to ele ct the specific date on whic h the offe nse occ urre d. The state submits t h at election was not require d beca use there was not proof

of more tha n one off

ense. A s indicated, it i s o u r v i ew that the taperec orded c onversa tions qualified as an on g o in g n e g o ti ati o nb e tw e e nth e d e f e ndant and Rac kley

rathe r tha n s e pa rate of fe ns e s o f s oli c ita tio n. I n c on se qu e nc e , th e state wa s no t re qu ir e d to e le c t th e of fe ns e on which it wa s rely ing for conviction. See, e.g ., Burlison, 501 S.W.2d at 804; Cl abo, 905 S.W.2d

a t 20 5; S he lto n, 85 1 S. W.2 d a t 13 7. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

V III As he r fi na l iss ue , the de fe nd a nt c on te nd s that tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by the app lic a tio n of c e rt a in

e nh a n c e m e n tf

a c t o r s a n d b y

d e n y i n g f

u l l p r o b a t i o n

. T h e d e f

e n d a n th a s a l s o a s k e d t h i s c o u r tto revie w the sente nce in lig ht of the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court's decision in Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004). The state submits that t h e d ef en d an t h as wa ived any-15-

c ha lle ng e to h is se nte nc e un de r B lake ly by fa ili ng to r a ise the iss ue a t tria l. A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e state

asserts that the sentenc e is appropriate under both the terms of the 1989 Sente ncing Act and unde r t h e r e a s o n i n g o f

B l ak e l y.

When there is a challeng e to the l eng th, rang e, or manner of service of a sentence, it i s the duty of t his court to conduct a de novo revie w wit h a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court a

re corr ect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing pr inc ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) ; see State v. J ones, 8 8 3 S.W .2d 597, 600 (Tenn. 1994) . “I f the trial c ourt applies inappr opriate f actor s or

o t h er wi se fa ils to follow the 1989 Sentencing Act, the pr esumption of corr ectne ss falls.” State v. She lto n, 85 4 S. W.2 d 1 16 , 1 23 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Th e Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts provide that the bur den i s o n t h e defenda nt to show the impropriety of the sente nce. T enn. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.

Our re view re quires an a naly sis of (1) the e vidence
, if any , rec eived at the trial and se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the pri n ci p l es o f sentencing and the a rg uments of counse l rela tive to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of t he off ense; (5) any

mitigating or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for re habilitation or t re at ment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-102, -103, - 210; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. The pre sumptive senten ce fo r s o l i citation of first deg ree murder, a Class B fe lony , is the minimum in the rang e if ther e ar e no enha nceme nt o r m i t i gat i n g fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f there are enhanc ement fa ctors but no mitigating fac tors, the t rial court shall set the
sentenc e at or

above the presumptive term. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(d) . I f thereare mitigating fac tors but no enhanc ement factors, the trial court shall set the sentenc e at or below the pr esumptive term. I d. A sentenc e involving both e nhance ment and mitiga ting fac tors require s an assig nment of rela tive weig ht for the enhanc ement factors as a means of incre asing the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). The sentenc e should then be reduc ed within the r ang e by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d.

At the s entenc ing hearing, L aura Prosser, who prepar ed the pr esente nce r eport, testified tha t the def endant exhibi ted consider able a nimosit y toward the victim during the ir interview. She sta ted that s he had dif

ficulty keeping the def

endant on subjec t and that the def endant " seeme d to be obsessed by

g etting [the victim] i nto trouble."

David Cook, Chief of the Estill Spring s Police Depa rtment, testified as to the incide nt that took place at the R o ck C re ek S chool. He r eiterated that the def endant attempted to run over the vic tim e ve n a s h e or de re d h e r t o sto p he r ve hic le

. Chi e f Coo k a dd e d that a ft e r the vic tim we nt i nto the school, he g ot into his patrol ca r and pur sued the defe ndant. He stated that the def endant did not stop, e ven afte r he had ac tivated his emerg ency equipment, and he ultimately stopped the def

endant-16-

by pulling his vehicle in front of he rs. Acc ording to Chief C ook, the defendant refused to open the door and of

fice rs wer e for ced to br eak a window and f

orcibly remove her f

rom the vehic le.

I nvestig ator Da nny

Marc um testified that when he first interviewe d Rackley , he lea rned tha t the def endant ha d al s o as k ed R ac k ley to kill C hief Cook and De puty Paul Sanson, who had bee n inv olv e d in he r ar

re st fo r the Roc k Cre e k Sch oo l inc ide nt. Ac c or din g to M arc um, Ra c kle y tol d h im that the def

endant " had aske d him to obtain som e explosives to do harm to two police offic ers."

The victim testified at the se ntencing hearing that he continued to fe ar f or his safe ty and for that of his son, of whom the defe ndant had joint custody . He state d that afte r she wa s convicted, the defe ndant continued to display animositytoward him and ha d tried to g et him fired f rom his job.

J oanne B obo of the South Central Community Serv ice Ag ency

testified that she wa s assig ned

as a c ase of

fice r to Dalton Jackson, the son of the defe ndant and the victim. Ms. Bobo stated tha t t h e d ef en d an tt el ep h o n ed h eri n De ce m b ero f 20 0 2 an d re l at ed t h at s h e w as co n ce rn ed fo r D al t o n 's

sa fe ty be c a us e the vic tim "was suic ida l a ndthe re wa s g un s a ll o ve r the pla c e a ndsh e wa nte d it stopped befor e he g ot hurt." Acc ording to Ms. Bobo, she telephoned the victim at work a nd asked him to meet her a t his residenc e. Ms. B obo then sea rche d interior of the victim's re sidence and wa s unable to find a ny

g uns. She did find some g uns locked in a sa fe w hich was loc ated in the g ara g e. Ms. B obo testified that when she informed the defe ndant that she would not make a ref err al to the D e p ar t m e n to f

C h i l d r e n ' s S e r v i c e s , t h e d e f e n d a n tb e c a m e a n g r y.

Dr. John Garrison, a c linical psy cholog ist, testified on behalf of the defe ndant. He state d that the def endant initially

came to him for ang er manag ement assist ance

. Dr. Garrison diag nosed the defe ndant as ha ving a

panic disorde r, which h e described a s "a series of phy sical and e motional
sy mpt oms , in c lud ing he art pa lpita tio ns , c ho kin g se ns a tio ns , d if fi c ult y br e a thi ng that c a n o c c ur

in

rea ction to differ ent stressors. It comes suddenly
, u s u al l y l as t s about 10 to 15 minutes and then passes." Dr. Ga

rris o n ac k n o wl edg ed that the de fenda nt exhi bited substantial hostil ity toward the vic tim , e xpla ini ng that sh e ha d " fi xate d" on the vic tim

.

Dr. Na ncy

Gar rison, also a c linical psy cholog ist, testified that s h e h ad been a ppointed by Dalton J ackson' s g uardia n ad litem in J u ne of 2002 to e valuate the rela tionship between the defe ndant and Da lton. Dr. Gar rison stated that the de fenda nt had b ec o m e " more c alm" during thera py

. During cross-e x amination by the state, Dr. Gar rison acknow ledg ed that the defe ndant neve r told her that she ha d been c onvicted of soliciting the murder of the v i ct i m

. S h e stated that the de fe nd a nt' s e xpre ssi on s o f a ng e r t ow ardthe vic tim , w hil e le ss f re qu e nt, we re sti ll p re se nt.

Pa tr ic ia She rrill , t he de fe nd a nt' s mo the r, te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d n ot s e e n th e de fe nd a nt i n approximately

ten y ear s beca

use the victim had pre vented he r fr om doing so. She c laimed that the vic tim abu se d th e de fe nd a nt.

I n arriving a t the sentenc e of e ight y ear s and six months, the trial court applied the following enhanc ement fa ctors: (2) that the defe ndant has a p revious history of criminal convictions or-17-

criminal beha vior in addition to that nece ssary to e stablish the appropriate rang e; and (16) that the defe ndant abuse d a position of private trust. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(2), ( 16) (2003) . The trial court a

pplied enhanc ement fa ctor (2) based upon the defe ndant' s prior criminal behavior "e stablished by

the testimony

of the e vent at the s ch o o l
, als o by the testimony

of the [victim] that

encour ag ement to appa

rently assault oth ers oc curr ed during the marriag e." The trial c ourt found fac tor (16) applicable, observing that "[w]hen y ou tell somebody how to kill som ebody based on tha t pe rs on ' s p ri va te ha

bit a ndpr e dil e c tio ns that no t e ve ry bo dy kn ow s,

. . . th a t is us e of priv a te trus t information." The trial c ourt applied a sing le mitigating fac tor, that the def endant wa s suffering f

rom a mental or

phy sical condition that sig nificantly reduc ed her culpability for the offe nse. See Te nn. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 13 (8 ). Th e c ou rt ru le d, ho we ve r, that thi s fa c tor wa s e nti tle d to o nly " sli g ht"

we ig ht.

The de fenda nt asserts that the tria l court er red by apply ing e nhance ment fac tor ( 2 ) b a s e d u pon the Roc k Cr e e k Sc ho ol i nc ide nt. Th e state su bmi ts tha t, u nd e r the te rm s o f the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t, the trial court appropriately considere d the def

endant' s criminal be h av i or in its application of

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor (2 ). I n ou r vie w, the re wa s a mpl e pr oo f of the de fe nd a nt' s a tta c k o n th e vic tim

a t Ro c k Cr e e k Sc ho ol. B oththe vic tim a ndChi e f Co ok tes ti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt atte mpt e d to strike the victim with her ve hicle more than one time. Chief Cook further stated tha t the defe ndant ref used to stop when pursue d by the police a nd eventua lly had to be dr agge d fr o m h er vehicle. Under our traditional law, the trial court did not er r by apply ing this enha nceme nt fac tor.

The de fenda nt also contends that the trial court err ed by apply ing enhanc ement fac tor (16), that the def

endant a bused a position of private trust. I n State v. Ki s s i n ger , 9 2 2 S.W .2d 482, 487 (T e nn . 1 99 6) , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt he ld tha t "[t]h e de te rm inatio n o f the e xiste nc e of a po sit ion of

trus t does not depe nd on the leng th or forma lityof the re lationship, but upon t he n at ure of the rela tionship." Her e, ther e wa s proof that the de fenda nt and the victim had b ee n m arried for mor e tha n a de c a de . Ra c kle y

te sti fi e d th a t the de fe nd a nt tol d him that the vic tim dr a nk to e xce ss a ndc ou ld be killed by

placing poison in his l iquor. She procur ed bottles of Geor g e Dickel a nd Sundrop, the ing r e d ie n ts f

o r th e v ic ti m' s d r in k

o f c h o ic e , f r o m h is r e s id e n c e

. T h e d e f e n d a n t a ls o informed Ra c kle y wh ic h d a y s th a t he r s on wo uldbe in h e r c us tod y a ndde sc ri be d w ha t th e vic tim wo uldlik e ly b e d o i n g d u ri n g t h at p er i o d

. Fu rt h er , t h e d ef en d an td es cr i b ed fo r R ac k l eyt h e l ay o u to f t h e v i ct i m 's residenc e, whe re he kept his liquor, and wher e he pa rked his cars. By

the terms of the 1989 Act, the trial court did not er

r by apply ing this fa ctor.

The de fenda nt also contends th at t h e t ri al court erre d by failing to apply

three mitigating fac tors: that she acted under strong provocation; that the offense was c ommitt ed under such unusual circ umstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated the c onduct; and that sh e ha d obta ine d psy c hiatr ic he lp. Se e Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -1 13 (2 ), (1 1) , (13 ). Th e state submits t hat the def

endant f ailed to prove these fa ctors by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e.

As to miti g ating fac tor (2), tha t the defe ndant ac ted under strong provocation, the defe ndant

asserts tha t he r rocky rela tionship with the victim a nd their tumultuous divorce provi d ed s t rong provocation for the crime. Reg ardle ss of any abuse she may

have suf fer ed while mar

ried to the-18-

victim, the couple had been separ ated for over a y ear befor e the c ommissi on of the c rime. More over, there was proof

that the def

endant a nd not the victim wa s the cause of many of the conf licts during the pende ncy

of their divorc e. Fi n al l y , t hat the def endant wa s in a bitter custody dispute with the victim does not nece ssarily qualify as provoc ation. I n our view, the trial court did not err by ref using to apply this factor.

Wit h reg ard to mitigating factor (11), that the crime w as committed under suc h unusual

c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t it

wa s u nli ke ly

that the de fe nd a nt wa s mot ivate d by a su sta ine d in te nt t o v iol a te the la w, the de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t be c a us e he r div or c e fr om the vic tim is n ow c omp le te , it

is u nli ke ly that sh e wi ll t

ry to h a ve him

kil le d ag a in. I n our vie w, the de fe nd a nt fa ile d to e sta bli sh that sh e did not possess a s ustained i ntent to violate t he law. The proof at trial established tha t the defe ndant had di scu ss io ns wi th R a c kle y abo ut kill ing the vic tim

fo r a pe ri odof mor e tha n tw o w e e ks . Pr ior to t h o s e d i s cu s s i o n s , s h e h a d t ri ed t o s t ri k e t h e v i ct i mwi t h h erca r i n t h e p ar k i n g l o to f t h ei r s o n 's school. Moreove r, L aura

Prosser, who pr epar ed the pr esente nce r eport, testified that the def endant

c on tin ue d to ho ld g re a t a nim os ity tow ardthe vic tim . T he tr ia l c ou rt did no t e rr by re fu sin g to a pp ly this factor.

Wit h reg ard to mitigating f actor (13), the " catc hall" f

actor , the def

endant a sserts that the trial court should have considere d as mitigation her participation in counsel i n g. T he proof at the
sentenc ing hearing, howeve r, established that the de fenda nt had not soug ht counseling of her own

accor d b ut h a d b e e n o rd e re d to do so a s a pa rt of he r d ivo rc e pr oc e e din g s. Un de r the se circ umstances, it is our view t hat the trial c ourt did not err by ref using to a

pply this factor. Acc ording ly
, under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act, the de fenda nt's se ntence of eig ht y ear s and six months is warrante d.

The de fenda nt has also aske d this court to review the sentenc e under the re asoni n g of Blakely . I nitially
, the s tate contends that the defendant’s Blake ly claim is waived be cause it was not raised in the trial court. Rec ently , howeve r, in State v. Chester Way ne Walters, No. M2003-03019- CCA-R3- CD
, s li p o p

. a t 2 1 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. , a t N a s h v il le
, O c t. 4
, 2 0 0 4
, a s c o rr e c te d Dec . 10, 2004), this court re

jected the state’s position:

We acknowle dg e that B lakely extended Appre ndi’s holdin g t h at, under the Six th Amendment, a jury must find all facts used to incr ease a def endant’ s sentence bey ond the statutory

maxi mum. Ho we v er, nothing in Apprendi sug g ested that the phrase “statutory

maxi mum” equate d to any thing other than t h e m ax imum in t he
rang e. To the c ontrary , the United States Supreme Court stated t he is sue in Appre ndi as “w hether the 12-y ear

sentenc e imposed . . . wa s permissible, g iven that it was above the 10-y ear

maxi mum for the offe nse char g ed in that c ount.” 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S

. C t

. at 2354. We also note that the Supreme Court has consider ed the

re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t of the ho ldi ng in R ing v. Arizon a , 5 36 U. S. 5 84 , 5 92 -9 3, 12 2 S. Ct. 2 4 2 8
, 2 4 3 5 n

. 1
, 1 5 3 L

. E d

. 2 d 5 5 6 (2 0 0 2 ), as a n ew ru l e f o r c ap i t al ca s es ev en t h o u gh it was based on A pprendi. See Sch ri ro ,

_ _ _ U. S. at ___, 124 S. C t. at 2526-27. Perh ap s th is r e s u lt e d f

r o m th e f a c t th a t Ri n g o v e rru le d a c a s e th a t h a d held the-19-

opposite. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S. C t. 3047, 111 L . Ed. 2d 511 (1990). In this reg ard, w ith our own supreme court e x pressly ap p roving our sentenc ing pr ocedur e under Appre ndi, we have a

difficult time faulting a def endant in T e nn e sse e fo r n ot r a isi ng th e is su e bef or e B lake ly . We c on c lud e that B lake ly alters Te nnessee courts’ inter preta tion of the phrase “statutory m ax i m u m” and establishes a ne w rule in this state. The defenda nt’s raising the issue while his direc t appea l was still pending is prope r.

I n any event, even if Blakely did not establish a new rule, the United States Sup re me Cou rt

in A pp re nd i sta te d tha t the de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht to ha ve a jury fi ndfa c ts that in c re a se his se nte nc e abo ve the pr e sc ri be d s ta tut ory ma ximum

is ro ot ed in his Fourteenth Amendme nt rig ht to due proce ss and his Six th A mendment rig ht to a jury trial. 30 U.S. at 476, 1 2 0 S

. C t . at 2355. I n State v. Ellis, 953 S .W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn. Cri m

. App. 1997), this court he ld that although the re w as no common law rig ht to waive a jury

trial, Rule 23, Tenn. R. Crim. P., allowed a defenda nt to “waive a jury trial if the waiver is in writing and is knowing ly executed.” A bsent a written

wa ive r, “ it m us t app e ar fr om the re c or d tha t the de fe nd a nt pe rs on a lly g a ve e xpre ss consent [to waive a jury

trial] in open court.” Ellis, 953 S.W .2d at 221. B lakely , as an extension of Appre ndi, also require s proof in the r ec ord that the de fenda nt pe rs on a lly

wa ive d th a t r ig ht.

This rea soning is per suasive. The defe ndant’s B lakely claim in this case ha s not been wa ived.

The United St ates Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely calls into question the continuing validity of our c urre nt sentencing scheme . I n that case
, the C ourt, apply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U. S. 466, 490 (2000), struck down a provision of the Washington se ntencing
g uid e li n e s th a t p e r mi tt e d a tria l ju d g e to imp o s e a n “ e xc e p ti o n a l s e n te n c e ” u p o n th e f inding of

certain statutorily

enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. The Court obs er v ed that “the ‘statutory

ma ximum ’ f

or Ap pr e nd i pur

po se s is the ma ximum se nte nc e a jud g e ma y

imp os e so le ly

on the ba sis of the fa cts ref

lected in the jury

verdic t or admitted by the defe ndant.” Blakely
, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. F ina lly , th e Cou rt c on c lud e d that “ e ve ry de fe nd a nt ha s a ri g ht t o in sis t th a t th e pr os e c uto r p ro ve to a jury [bey ond a re asonable doubt] all fac ts leg ally essential to the punishment.” I d. at 2543.

Under t h e ru l e established in B lakely , any prior convic tions may

be used to e nhance a sentenc e. The defe ndant had none . The other enhanc ement fa ctor applied by the trial court, fac tor (16), is not based upon prior convictions and wa s not admitted by the def endant. In conseque nce, the holding in B lakely

would prec lude its application. Un d er the ra tionale of B lakely , which controls, a se ntence of eig ht y ear s, the minimum within the rang e, is war rante d.

Finally , the def

endant a sserts that the trial c ourt err ed by deny ing probation or other alternative sentenc ing. B eca use we have modifie d the defendant' s sentenc e to eig ht y ear s, it is our view that the c ase should be r emande d to the trial court f or the c onsideration of her suitabilityfor probation. The de fenda nt was orig inally sentenc ed to g reater than e ight y ears an d
, there fore , was-20-

not eligible f

or probation consideration. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-303(b) . I n conseque nce, the
tr ia l c ou rt didno t c on sid e r he r s uit abil ity , o r l a c k th e re of , f or pr ob a tio n. B e c a us e the se nte nc e mus t be mod if ie d to e ig ht y e ars un de r the B lake ly rul e, pro bat ion mus t a t le a st b e c on sid e re d a s a

se nte nc ing op tio n. Th is c ou rt wo ul d po int ou t, h ow e ve r, that th e de fe nd a nt r e ma ins statut or ily ineligible f

or community corr ections beca use she has bee n convicted of a violent crime ag ainst the
person. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106( a)( 3); State v. L isa Diane Mu rp h y , No. 01 C01 -9 70 8- CR- 00 35 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. , a t Na sh vil le
, Oc t. 2 1, 19 98 ). I n a dd iti on , th e de fe nd a nt, as a Class B felony offe nder, is not entitled to a presumption in favor of alternative sente ncing . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(6)

.

The c onviction is affirmed. T he sente nce is modified to eig ht y ear s. The c ause is re manded so that the trial court has the opportunity to consider the de fenda nt's suitability for pr obation.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE