### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-50953 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. SAMUEL CLIFFORD PERRY, III, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 6:09-CR-268-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Samuel Clifford Perry III pleaded guilty to di s t r ib ution of crack cocaine (counts one through three), possession with intent to distribut e a t least five gr a m s o f crack cocaine (count four), and possession of a firearm during th e commission of a drug-trafficking crime (co u n t f iv e) and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment on counts one through four of 135 months, a consecutive term of imprisonment of 60 months on count five, and a total fiveyear term of supervised release. Perry reserved the right to appeal the district U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Octob er 5, 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 10-50953 Document: 00511622934 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/05/2011No. 10-50953

court’s denial of his motion to supp r e s s e vidence seized from his residence pursuant to a warrant. Perry argues tha t t h e g o o d faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not a p ply because Sargent Salazar’s February 5, 2009, search warrant affidavit is a “bare bone s ” affidavit, which failed to establish a nexus between the residence to be searched and the evidence sought. When a search has been conducted in accordance with a warrant, we use
a two part test to review the district court’s denial of a m o t i on to suppress. United States v. Froman , 355 F.3d 882, 88 8 ( 5th Cir. 2004). The first step involves examining whether the good-faith exceptio n to the exclusionary rule applies. Id. ; United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984). If the good-faith exception applies, this court’s inquiry ends, and the district court’s judgm e nt will be affirmed. Froman , 355 F.3d at 888. Only if the exception does not apply does this court address the issue of probable cause. I d. This court reviews de novo whether the exception applies. United States v. Cherna , 184 F.3d 403, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1999). The good-faith exception provides that e vi dence obtained by law enforcement officials acting in “objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon
a search warrant is admissible” even if the affidavit on which the warrant was grounded was insufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. Shugart , 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th C i r . 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation

o m i t t e d)

. An officer’s reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable and, therefore, he is not entitled to i nv o k e the good faith exception if, among other things, the affidavit upon which the warrant is founded is “so lacking in indicia of p r o b ab l e cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable” and is thus a “bare bones” affidavit. United States v. Mays , 466 F.3 d 3 3 5 , 3 4 3 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Pope , 467 F.3d 912, 916-17 (5t h C i r . 2006). A “bare bones” affidavit contains “wholly conclu s o ry s tatements, which lack the facts and

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circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause.” United States v. Satterwhite , 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 199 2). Although w e h av e held that “facts must exist in the affidavit which

e stablish a nexus between the house to be searched and the evidence sou gh t , ” this nexus may be established through direct observation or normal inferences. United States v. Freeman , 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982). Sargent Salazar’s knowledge of the habits of drug dealers, when considered in tandem with the facts that Perry had sold drugs in three controlled buys and had been arrested earlier that day, after leaving the residence in a vehicle found to contain crack cocaine, logically supports an inference that the items sought would be found at the residence. See id. The affidavit contains facts and circumstances from which

a probable cause determination can be made and is not “b a r e b o n e s . ” See Satterwhite , 980 F.2d at 320-21. The district court did not err in concluding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. See Shugart , 117 F.3d at 844. It is therefore unnecessary to consider Perry’s a r gu m e n t on the issue whether the affidavit in support of the warrant presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. See Cherna , 184 F.3d at 407. As the Government asserts, because Perry cites no relevant law in support of his fruit-of-the-poisonous tree argument with respect to the February 9, 2009, affidavit, Perry has waive d th e issue. See F E D
. R. AP P
. P. 28(a)(9)(A); United States v. Stalnaker , 571 F.3d 428, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2 009). AFFIRMED.

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