NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RRAFMAN KOCI,

Petitioner,
v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-72547 Agency No. A075-682-288
MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Im m igration Appeals Subm itted July 25, 2022 * * Pasadena, California Before: TASHIMA, WARDLAW * * * , and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges. In 2008, we denied Rrafm an Koci’s petition for review of a Board of Im m igration Appeals (“BIA”) order dism issing his appeal from an imm igration 

# FILED
NOV 3 2023 M OLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The panel unanim ously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argum ent. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

*** Judge Wardlaw was drawn to replace Judge Watford, who resigned his judgeship shortly after this case was subm itted for decision.judge’s denial of his application for asylum , withholding of rem oval, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture. Koci v. Mukasey , 270 F. App’x 644 (9th Cir. 2008). In 2017, we denied Petitioner’s third m otion to reopen on the grounds that it was untim ely and successive and that Petitioner failed to dem onstrate a
m aterial change of conditions in Albania. Koci v. Sessions , 708 F. App’x 323, 324 (9th Cir. 2017); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii) (allowing a party to file only
one m otion to reopen and requiring the m otion to be filed “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final adm inistrative decision was rendered,” unless the
m otion is “based on changed circum stances arising in the country of nationality . . . , if such evidence is m aterial and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”). Petitioner has now filed a m otion to term inate rem oval proceedings or, alternatively, to reopen those proceedings, relying on new precedent, Pereira v. Sessions , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The BIA, construing the m otion as an untim ely
m otion to reopen, found Pereira inapplicable and declined to exercise its discretion to sua sponte reopen proceedings. We review the BIA’s denial of a m otion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Dominguez v. Barr , 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020) (denial of m otion to term inate); Aguilar Fermin v. Barr , 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2020) (denial of
2m otion to reopen). Petitioner has failed to establish that the BIA abused its

discretion. We have lim ited jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a m otion to reopen sua sponte , reviewing only to determ ine whether the BIA based its decision on legal or constitutional error. See Lona v. Barr , 958 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2020) (“BIA denials of sua sponte relief prem ised on legal or constitutional error
rem ain the ‘one narrow exception’ to our rule that the agency’s sua sponte authority is not subject to judicial review.” (quoting Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr , 929 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019))). Petitioner has failed to raise any colorable legal or constitutional errors in the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review that denial of relief. See id . at 1235 (where the BIA’s denial of sua sponte relief “was untainted by legal or constitutional error . . . there is nothing left for us to review”). 1. Petitioner contends that his m otion to reopen should be considered tim ely because equitable tolling applies to the 90-day deadline in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). See Iturribarria v. INS , 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This court . . . recognizes equitable tolling of deadlines and num erical lim its on m otions to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error . . . .”). Petitioner argues that the notice to
3appear (“NTA”) was defective under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) because it failed

to specify adequately the place of his rem oval hearing, as required by Pereira , thus
m aking himeligible for new, previously unavailable relief. 1 See Lona , 958 F.3d at 1230-31 (“Although claim s for equitable tolling typically arise in conju nction with claim s of ineffective assistance of counsel, claim s based on changes in the law are not unheard of, nor are they prohibited.” (citation om itted)). Contrary to Petitioner’s argum ent, the NTA did contain the correct address of the im m igration court where the hearing was to be held – 606 S. Olive Street, 15th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90014-0000,which the governm ent points out is “identical to the address provided on the Departm ent of Justice website for the Los Angeles Im m igration Court.” Although the specific courtroom on the 16th Floor was not included in the NTA, this does not render the NTA defective within the
m eaning of Pereira or Niz-Chavez v. Garland , 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), which both discussed NTAs that failed to specify either a tim e or place of the proceedings. Instead, the address m ight be characterized as som e what incom plete. Nonetheless,

1 The NTA notified Petitioner that his hearing would be held at “606 S. Olive Street, 15th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90014-0000.” This is the address of the imm igration court; however, Petitioner pointed out in his brief to the BIA that “there are no im m igration judges on the 15th Floor.” Subsequent hearing notices used the sam e address, including the 15th Floor designation, but added another line, which states “16th Floor, Courtroom ‘O.’” 4it did direct Petitioner to the official address of the im m igration court. Petitioner

accordingly is not entitled to relief under Pereira and has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling. We therefore deny the petition as to this argum ent. 2. In support of his request for sua sponte reopening, Petitioner contends that jurisdiction never vested in the im m igration court because the NTA was defective for failure to comply with the requirem ent in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b)(6) that the NTA include “[t] he address of the Im m igration Court where the Service will file the . . . [NTA] .” See Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2110 (holding that an NTA “that does not inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for rem oval proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a)’ and therefore does not trigger the stop-tim e rule” for purposes of accrual of continuous physical presence to be eligible for cancellation of rem oval). Thus, the argum ent goes, the IJ lacked jurisdiction, and the BIA should have term inated rem oval proceedings and abused its discretion in failing to do so. However, “ Pereira articulated the requirem ents for an NTA in regards to the stop-tim e rule under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)” and “did not address the requirem ents for an NTA to vest an im m igration court with jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14.” Aguilar Fermin , 958 F.3d at 893. The alleged defect in the NTA accordingly did not deprive the im m igration court of jurisdiction. Id. at 895. The BIA’s denial of discretionary relief as to his claim is
5accordingly free from legal or constitutional error, and we therefore lack

jurisdiction to review it. Lona , 958 F.3d at 1235. 3. Petitioner contends that he has established eligibility for cancellation of rem oval because the defective NTA did not trigger the stop-tim e rule. He argues that, in denying sua sponte reopening, the BIA com m itted legal error in finding that the NTA “contained a typographical error rather than a defect.” Contrary to the governm ent’s contention, the subsequent notices of hearing cannot correct a deficient NTA, if the NTA is indeed defective. See Niz-Chavez , 141 S. Ct. at 1479–86 (holding that all the requisite inform ation regarding the hearing must be contained in a single NTA). Nonetheless, as discussed above, we conclude that the NTA is not defective under P ereira . The BIA’s denial of discretionary relief as to this claim is accordingly free from legal or constitutional error, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review it. Lona , 958 F.3d at 1235.

• ! • For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is D ENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART
.

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