IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of: Clarence Foster :

 : No. 1257 C.D. 2022

:

From a Decision of: :

School District of Philadelphia :

Board of Education : Argued: April 9, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOLF FILED: May 6, 2024

Clarence Foster (Appellant) appeals from an order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) entered on September 30, 2022, affirming 

an adjudication of the School District of Philadelphia Board of Education (Board),

dismissing Appellant from employment with the School District of Philadelphia 

(District). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Appellant was hired by the District in October of 2010. At the time of the 

incident in question, Appellant worked as a one-to-one special education classroom 

assistant at the Kensington Creative & Performing Arts High School (School). 

Hearing Officer’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 2.1 

By letter dated March 10, 2020, the District notified Appellant that it was 

recommending termination of his employment for “incompetency, neglect of duty 

1 The Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are found at pages 422a35a of Appellant’s Reproduced Record (R.R.). 
2

and improper conduct” pursuant to Section 514 of the Public School Code of 1949

(School Code).2 The notice further advised Appellant that he had a right to contest 

the recommendation by requesting a hearing. F.F. Nos. 3, 4. 

Appellant elected to challenge the recommendation and a hearing was held

before a Hearing Officer on September 23, 2021. At the hearing, the District 

presented the following witnesses in support of the charges: Lissette AgostoCintron, the School’s Principal (Principal), Theresa Zenak, special education teacher

(Teacher), and Sheila Wallin, a labor relations officer in the District’s Office of 

Employee & Labor Relations (Labor Relations Officer Wallin). Appellant, 

represented by Counsel, testified on his own behalf. Appellant did not present any 

other witnesses. F.F. Nos. 6-9, 12. 

The District’s witnesses testified to the following. During the 2018-2019 

school year, Appellant was assigned to assist a special education student with the 

initials J.G. J.G. is nonverbal and intellectually disabled. Appellant’s duties 

included staying with J.G. all day, transitioning J.G. from one activity or location to 

the next, and monitoring J.G. in educational and community settings. F.F. Nos. 15-

17. 

On March 29, 2019, Teacher, Appellant, and another classroom assistant 

accompanied a group of special education students to a Walmart store for their 

weekly life-skills trip. Appellant was responsible for monitoring and caring for J.G. 

during the trip. F.F. Nos. 18, 19.3 

2 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §5-514. 

3 Appellant testified he was assigned to monitor three students (including J.G.) on the trip; 

however, Teacher testified that Appellant was only assigned to monitor J.G. The Hearing Officer

observed: “Either way, everyone agreed that monitoring J.G. was [Appellant’s] responsibility.” 

F.F. No. 19 n.5. 
3

When the group boarded the bus to return to the School, Teacher asked the 

assistants if all of their assigned students were with them. The assistants responded

“Yes,” including Appellant. F.F. No. 20. Teacher “relied on those confirmations 

instead of conducting a roll call of the students by name.” Id., No. 21. The Hearing 

Officer noted: “Given that J.G. is nonverbal, both [Principal] and [Labor Relations 

Officer] believed it was reasonable for [Teacher] to rely on [Appellant’s] response.” 

Id., n.6. 

The bus returned to the School around 12:30 p.m. and the students were to go 

to their art classes. Appellant was supposed to accompany J.G. to his art class but 

failed to do so. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Appellant left the School building, 

without asking Principal for the required authorization to do so. Appellant did not 

sign out of the building although he knew he was required to do so. F.F. Nos. 22-

26. 

At around 2:00 p.m., Principal was informed that the School secretary had 

received a telephone call from Walmart stating that a student was in its security 

office and that J.G. matched the student’s description. Principal called Teacher, who 

indicated she had been looking for J.G. because he did not return to her class after 

art class. Teacher stated that she had called Appellant who stated he was not in the 

building and that J.G. was not with him. Teacher proceeded to send another 

classroom assistant to pick up J.G. F.F. Nos. 27-29. 

Principal conducted an investigation and interviewed Teacher, Appellant, two 

other classroom assistants, a social-emotional learning teacher, and two Walmart 

employees. Based on her investigation, Principal concluded that Appellant left J.G. 

unattended, which resulted in J.G. being left behind at Walmart. Further, Appellant
4

left the School building without authorization and without noticing that J.G. was 

missing. F.F. Nos. 30, 31. 

On May 22, 2019, Principal held an investigatory conference with Appellant, 

Ed Olsen (Union Representative) and Kevin Moore (a labor relations officer). At 

the conference, Appellant was given the opportunity to tell his version of what 

occurred on the day in question. F.F. No. 32. 

Appellant related that the last time he saw J.G. was at the McDonald’s located 

inside the Walmart. The trip participants had gathered there for lunch prior to 

boarding the bus. F.F. No. 34. Appellant admitted that he did not count his assigned 

students and did not realize that J.G. was not on the bus even though J.G. was his 

“one-to-one” student. Id., No. 35. Appellant did not know J.G. was missing until 

he received a phone call from Teacher asking if J.G. was with him. Appellant 

responded that, as far as he knew, J.G. was in the building. Id., Nos. 36, 37. 

Principal prepared a summary of what occurred at the conference and 

recommended Appellant be terminated from employment because he: left J.G. 

unattended, resulting in him being left behind at the Walmart; and left the school 

building without authorization and without noticing that J.G. was missing. F.F. Nos. 

38, 39. 

On September 19, 2019, Principal held another conference to discuss her 

recommendation with Appellant, Union Representative, and a labor relations liaison. 

At that conference, Appellant was provided with another opportunity to present his 

version of events. Principal reaffirmed her recommendation for termination. F.F. 

Nos. 40-42. 

On January 22, 2020, Labor Relations Officer Wallin conducted a “secondlevel conference” with Appellant and Union Representative. F.F. No. 43. At this 
5

conference, Appellant and his union representative were given an opportunity to 

respond to a neutral party regarding Principal’s findings and recommendation. F.F. 

No. 44. After reviewing all of the documents submitted and conducting the secondlevel conference, Labor Relations Officer Wallin found that Appellant failed to 

support his assertion that he was not responsible to monitor the students assigned to 

him on the date in question; Appellant was so negligent that a vulnerable student 

was left behind; and Appellant abandoned his responsibility to notify the 

administration regarding his departure from the building on the date in question. Id.,

No. 45. Labor Relations Officer Wallin concluded that it was an egregious violation 

of Appellant’s job duties to leave a nonverbal student at a remote location and tell 

the teacher J.G. was on the bus when he was not. Labor Relations Officer Wallin 

agreed with Principal’s recommendation to terminate Appellant. Id., Nos. 46-48. 

Appellant admitted the following during his testimony. He was working with 

and was assigned to J.G. since the fall of 2018. He was assigned to monitor and 

escort J.G. on the trip to the Walmart store. Appellant did not see J.G. on the bus 

before it returned to the school. Appellant did not alert Teacher that J.G. was not on 

the bus. When the group returned to the school, Appellant did not escort J.G. off the 

bus and into the building. He did not know where J.G. was when the bus returned 

to the school. F.F. No. 50a-50f. 

In his defense, Appellant denied that Teacher asked if his assigned students 

were on the bus. The Hearing Officer found this denial not credible because: 

Appellant made no such assertion in the written statement he provided to Principal; 

he made no such assertion in either of the conferences with Principal; he made no 

such assertion with Labor Relations Officer Wallin at the second-level conference; 

there is no evidence that he made such an assertion at any time before the hearing; 
6

the assertion was contradicted by Appellant’s own testimony that “once we basically 

got on the bus, we sat down, [Teacher] said was everybody here if I remember 

correctly and we came back to the school”; and the assertion was contradicted by all 

other testimony and exhibits describing what was said on the bus. F.F. No. 51a-51f. 

The Hearing Officer also addressed Appellant’s contention that Teacher failed 

to take roll call to assure that all students were on the bus before leaving the store. 

The Hearing Officer observed that it was reasonable for Teacher to rely instead on 

the adults’ responses that all their students were on the bus, especially because J.G. 

was not able to respond to roll call himself. F.F. No. 52. Furthermore, to the extent 

Appellant argued he was not provided with adequate training and professional 

development, the Hearing Officer rejected this argument as well. In the Hearing 

Officer’s view, none of that was necessary to fulfill his responsibility to monitor his 

one-to-one student. F.F. No. 53. 

With regard to his absence from the School building, Appellant testified that 

he told Teacher on the day of the incident and the previous day that he needed to go 

to the District’s administration building during his lunch break to discuss some 

issues and she “said that was ‘appropriate’ and ‘wasn’t a problem.’” F.F. No. 54. 

The Hearing Officer rejected this testimony stating:

[N]o evidence was presented to establish that teachers 

were authorized to approve such departures and 

[Principal] testified that only she had that authority. Thus, 

if the asserted conversations occurred, they merely 

indicated that [Teacher] was not opposed to [Appellant] 

leaving the [S]chool building during his lunch break and 

were not a substitute for the required authorization from 

[Principal].
7

Id. (citation to transcript omitted). The Hearing Officer similarly rejected 

Appellant’s testimony that he informed the school secretary when he left the building 

because Appellant did not dispute that he had no authorization from Principal and 

did not sign out as required. F.F. No. 55. 

The Hearing Officer concluded that Appellant was employed by the District 

in a capacity that is not within the School Code’s definition of a “professional 

employe[e],” a “substitute” or a “temporary professional employe[e].” See Section 

1101(1)-(3) of the School Code, 24 P.S. §11-1101(1)-(3). Accordingly, Appellant’s 

employment could be terminated for “incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, 

violation of any of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other improper 

conduct.” Section 514 of the School Code. Hearing Officer’s Conclusions of Law

(C.L.) Nos. 2-3. 

Based on the above findings of fact, the Hearing Officer believed there was 

sufficient cause to terminate Appellant’s employment for incompetency because he 

performed his required duties so poorly that he left J.G., his assigned student, behind 

at a Walmart store where he remained without supervision for more than two hours. 

C.L. No. 6. Further, there was sufficient cause to terminate Appellant’s employment 

for neglect of duty because he failed to supervise J.G. and left school without 

authorization while J.G. was missing, leaving his duties undone and endangering 

J.G.’s health, safety, and welfare. Finally, there was sufficient cause to terminate 

Appellant’s employment for “other improper conduct” as his actions broke the trust 

of both his employer and his student, were contrary to established school district 

standards, and may fairly be considered equivalent to incompetency, intemperance, 

neglect, or violation of school laws. Id., Nos. 10, 15. 
8

The Hearing Officer concluded that the District provided Appellant with 

“ample and sufficient due process, including appropriate notice of the charges 

against him and a hearing with an opportunity to be represented and heard.” C.L. 

No. 20. In addition, the Hearing Officer rejected the following: Appellant’s 

assertion that it was improper for Labor Relations Officer Wallin to conduct the 

second-level conference because she is employed by a contractor that provides 

administrative support to the District, not by the District itself; Appellant’s assertion 

that assigning Labor Relations Officer Wallin to conduct the second-level 

conference violated “the Past Practice Clause of the [Union] Contract”; Appellant’s 

argument that the administrative procedure followed by the District violated 

Appellant’s due process rights because he was suspended without pay before being 

provided with a right to an attorney and a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; 

Appellant’s contention that administrative employees of the District have no 

authority to suspend the pay of an employee without prior Board action; and 

Appellant’s assertion that his suspension without Board resolution violated the 

Sunshine Act.4 Id., Nos. 20-25. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer believed that

substantial evidence existed to support the District’s recommendation to terminate 

Appellant’s employment. On January 3, 2022, the Hearing Officer issued his 

recommendation that the Board terminate Appellant for the reasons set forth in his 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

On January 27, 2022, the Board voted to terminate Appellant’s employment. 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) 415a-20a. The Board’s Public Meeting Minutes state:

4

65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716.
9

RESOLVED, [Appellant] is dismissed from his 

employment by [the District] as a classroom assistant, 

effective immediately.

FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Hearing Officer’s 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file with the 

minutes of the [Board] are adopted as the reasons for this 

decision.

FURTHER RESOLVED, that this decision was made in 

accordance with [the School Code], following an 

independent review of the record by the individual 

members of the [Board]. 

Id. at 419a. 

 Appellant appealed to the trial court. By order entered September 30, 2022, 

the trial court denied Appellant’s appeal. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal 

to this Court.5

5 On December 14, 2022, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 

opining that Appellant failed to preserve any issues for appellate review by virtue of his failure to 

timely file a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (1925(b) Statement) with the trial 

court’s Office of Judicial Records and the trial court judge. Appellant filed an application for relief 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 123 with this Court, arguing that the 1925(b) Statement was timely filed. 

We remanded this action to the trial court for a determination of whether the 1925(b) Statement 

was timely. The trial court issued a supplemental opinion concluding that the 1925(b) Statement 

was timely filed and addressing the merits of Appellant’s case. 
10

ISSUES6

Appellant raises 10 issues on appeal to this Court.7 First, he asks this Court 

to consider whether the District followed the procedures outlined in Section 514 of 

the School Code when it terminated his employment. Subsumed therein is the 

question of whether the District had the authority to suspend his pay pending the 

outcome of termination proceedings and whether he was afforded sufficient due 

process. Appellant also challenges whether his actions, as found by the Board, 

justify the termination of his employment. 

DISCUSSION

Section 514 of the School Code sets forth the procedural requirements 

for the dismissal of a nonprofessional employee like Appellant. It states:

The board of school directors in any school district, except 

as herein otherwise provided, shall after due notice, giving 

the reasons therefor, and after hearing if demanded, have 

the right at any time to remove any of its officers, 

employes, or appointees for incompetency, intemperance, 

neglect of duty, violation of any of the school laws of this 

Commonwealth, or other improper conduct.

24 P.S. § 5-514. In Lewis v. School District of Philadelphia, 690 A.2d 814, 817 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1997), a case that involved the termination of a school custodian, this Court 

recognized that nonprofessional public school employees have a property right in 

their expectation of continued employment, as defined in Section 514 of the School 

6 Our scope of review of a trial court’s order affirming a school board’s dismissal of an 

employee under Section 514 of the School Code is limited to considering whether constitutional 

rights were violated, whether the board committed an error of law, and whether the board’s 

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. School District of Philadelphia v. Puljer, 

500 A.2d 905, 907 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).

7 We paraphrase them here for clarity and ease of discussion. 
11

Code, and that a school board must comply with procedural due process safeguards 

when dismissing them for cause.8 

In its decision, the Lewis court held that the Board has broad discretion to 

delegate to hearing officers the task of conducting hearings and concluded that the 

Board had fully complied with the requirements of due process by “(1) appointing a 

hearing officer to hold a hearing at which Lewis was represented by counsel and had 

the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses; (2) reviewing the officer’s findings of 

facts, conclusions of law and recommendation; and (3) making an independent 

ruling based on the entire record.” Lewis, 690 A.2d at 817. 

In this case, there is no dispute that Appellant was a nonprofessional employee 

of the District and, therefore, his discharge was governed by Section 514 of the 

School Code. The overarching issue presented is whether the procedural safeguards

set forth in Section 514 were followed when Appellant was dismissed from his 

position as a one-to-one special education classroom assistant. 

Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the procedural 

requirements of Section 514 were not followed or that Appellant’s right to due 

process was violated. The District gave Appellant multiple opportunities to provide 

his version of events prior to receiving notice of the reasons for his dismissal and 

the opportunity for a hearing. Specifically, Appellant was interviewed during 

Principal’s investigation; participated in two investigatory conferences on May 22, 

2019 and September 19, 2019 that included Appellant, Union Representative, and a 

labor relations officer; and took part in a January 22, 2020 “second-level conference” 

8 These procedural requirements are different from those required for the dismissal of 

professional school employees, like teachers. Teacher terminations are governed by Sections 

1101, 1122, 1126, 1127, 1129 and 1130 of the School Code, 25 P.S. §§ 11-1101, 11-1122, 11-

1126, 11-1127, 11-1129 and 11-1130. 
12

with Labor Relations Officer Wallin and Union Representative. On March 10, 2020, 

the District sent Appellant a statement of charges and notice of right to hearing

(statement of charges). The statement of charges clearly and succinctly set forth the 

allegations against Appellant and provided him with the opportunity to request a 

hearing under the Local Agency Law.9 

Upon Appellant’s request, a full hearing was held before a neutral arbiter and 

Appellant, represented by counsel, was given the opportunity to present testimony 

and evidence, and to cross-examine the District’s witnesses. Moreover, contrary to 

Appellant’s claims, the record indicates that the Board reviewed the Hearing 

Officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, and made a 

ruling based on the entire record. See R.R. 419a.10, 11

9

2 Pa.C.S.§§ 551-555, 751-754.

10 To the extent Appellant argues that the Board failed to participate in, or deliberate on, 

Appellant’s case, the argument is without merit and borders on frivolous. Appellant did not present 

any evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, as noted in Lewis, the Board has broad discretion to 

delegate to hearing officers the task of conducting hearings. 

11 Appellant raises an additional, albeit brief, argument concerning the trial court’s review 

of the Board’s adjudication. He cites the case of Belasco v. Board of Public Education of the 

School District of Pittsburgh, 510 A.2d 337 (Pa. 1986), to support his proposition that the trial 

court should have reviewed the Board’s action de novo. This argument is without merit. Belasco 

involved the termination of a teacher and was therefore governed by, inter alia, Section 1131 of 

the School Code, 25 P.S. §11-1131, which provides that in an appeal brought by a professional 

employee from the action of a school board, the Secretary of Education may hear and consider 

additional testimony if advisable. The issue in Belasco was whether the Secretary had appellate 

or de novo review where no additional testimony was taken. The Belasco court held that the 

Secretary is vested with the authority conduct de novo review whether he takes additional 

testimony or merely reviews the record of the proceedings before the board. 

Belasco is distinguishable from the instant action because Appellant is a nonprofessional 

employee. Nonprofessional employees appeal a school board’s action to a trial court pursuant to 

Section 752 of Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §752. Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, 2 

Pa.C.S. §754, addresses the disposition of such appeals and provides: 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
13

We next address Appellant’s challenge to his suspension. Appellant argues 

that he was suspended by the District’s administrative staff “without any knowledge 

of the Board members and without any ‘action’ of the Board.” Appellant’s Brief at 

31. In Appellant’s view, his suspension was the equivalent of termination and he 

was, therefore, entitled to a hearing before his suspension occurred. 

This Court recently resolved a similar claim in Slater v. School District of 

Philadelphia, 309 A.3d 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (Slater). In Slater, a tenured 

teacher (teacher) was involved in an altercation with middle school students. The 

school principal conducted an investigation of the incident by interviewing and 

taking signed statements from the teacher, two other teachers, and 19 students. The 

principal issued investigative results indicating that the teacher and two students 

engaged in a brief physical conflict which resulted in injuries to the students and the 

teacher. Two investigatory conferences followed, as well as a “204 Second-Level 

conference” conducted by a district official. Following the second-level conference, 

the district official recommended to the Board that the teacher’s employment be 

(a) Incomplete record.--In the event a full and complete 

record of the proceedings before the local agency was not made, the 

court may hear the appeal de novo, or may remand the proceedings 

to the agency for the purpose of making a full and complete record 

or for further disposition in accordance with the order of the court.

(b) Complete record.--In the event a full and complete record 

of the proceedings before the local agency was made, the court shall 

hear the appeal without a jury on the record certified by the agency. 

After hearing the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall 

find that the adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights 

of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or that the 

provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and 

procedure of local agencies) have been violated in the proceedings 

before the agency, or that any finding of fact made by the agency 

and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 
14

terminated. The district official further advised the teacher that he would be 

suspended without pay effective immediately pending final action of the Board. 

Following a Board resolution and a hearing before a hearing officer, the Board 

dismissed the teacher from his employment. On appeal, the Department of 

Education affirmed. 

On appeal to this Court, teacher argued, inter alia, that “[the district official],

a member of the [District’s] administrative staff, had no authority to suspend his pay 

under the School Code without any knowledge or ‘action’ of the Board. [Teacher 

argued] that his suspension without pay was ‘in effect’ a termination of his 

employment.” Slater, 309 A.3d at 1155. The Slater court soundly rejected this 

argument stating: 

Here, as in Prieto [v. School District of Philadelphia 

(Department of Education) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 144 C.D. 

2021, filed December 28, 2022), appeal denied, (Pa. No. 

58 EAL 2023, filed August 22, 2023)], [teacher] was not 

terminated on [the date of the second-level conference 

summary], rather he was suspended without pay for cause 

as of that date. A suspension for cause without hearing is 

permissible where the teacher’s conduct is potentially 

harmful to the safety of the children. . . . 

In this case, [teacher’s] use of extreme physical force on 

several students and his inability to maintain classroom 

order would have allowed the [District] to suspend him 

without any type of investigatory hearing at all. However, 

the [District] went above and beyond in providing 

numerous opportunities for [teacher] to hear the 

allegations against him and to respond to them. No further 

process was required. 

Id. at 1156. Citing Prieto, the court went on to note: 

Pennsylvania courts have long permitted suspensions 

pending dismissal for public employees, including 
15

teachers. See Burger v. Board of School Directors of 

McGuffey School District, 839 A.2d [1055] (Pa. 2003)

(upholding suspension without pay of school district 

superintendent in instance of serious charges of 

misconduct); Kaplan [v. School District of Philadelphia, 

130 A.2d 672, 276 (Pa. 1957)] (permitting suspension 

without pay for a teacher pending dismissal); City of 

Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 

592 A.2d 779, 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (holding that a 

suspension without pay is not a de facto termination). In 

Kaplan, the Supreme Court stated that to ‘allow 

compensation to a teacher who deliberately breaks the 

moral law which makes him unfit to teach[ ] would result 

in an absurd and unreasonable interpretation of the act.’

130 A.2d at 680 (internal citations omitted).

Id. at 1156-1157 (citing Prieto, slip. op. at 14-15).

Although Slater, and the majority of cases it cites, involve a tenured 

professional, the same rationale applies to Appellant. The safety of students is 

paramount. There is no question that Appellant’s egregious actions in leaving J.G. 

at the Walmart and then leaving the School premises without permission constituted 

conduct harmful to the safety of a child. Based on the facts of this case, we conclude 

the District acted well within its powers and indisputably took appropriate steps in 

suspending Appellant from his employment without pay. Appellant’s argument to 

the contrary holds no weight.

12

12 We also reject Appellant’s argument that his suspension without a resolution of the 

Board violated the Sunshine Act. No Board resolution was necessary prior to Appellant’s 

suspension. See Lukacs v. Plum Borough (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1846 C.D. 2007, filed July 16, 2008) 

(holding there is no requirement in the Sunshine Act mandating a school board’s public vote prior 

to the suspension of a school district business administrator). Unreported memorandum opinions 

of this Court filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value pursuant to Rule 

126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) 

of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a). 
16

Finally, we address whether substantial evidence support’s the Board’s 

decision to terminate Appellant’s employment. We need not belabor this argument. 

Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Rife v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Whitetail Ski Co.), 812 A.2d 750, 754 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (citing 

Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Skirpan), 572 

A.2d 838 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)). It exists only when, upon examination of the whole 

record, including inferences therefrom, it is found to be such that a reasonable man 

might have reached this decision. Id.

Here, Appellant was not employed under the School Code as a professional 

employee; thus, pursuant to Section 514 of the School Code, 24 P.S. §5-515, the 

Board had the right to terminate his employment for “incompetency, intemperance, 

neglect of duty, violation of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other 

improper conduct.” The District need only establish a single charge to support a 

termination of Appellant’s employment. Metz v. Bethlehem Area School District, 

177 A.3d 384, 393 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). 

Appellant reiterates his version of the facts in support of his contention that 

he was wrongly terminated. Appellant asserts that the Board failed to consider the 

“contributory negligence” of Teacher, Principal, and the District. In this regard, 

Appellant avers that Teacher’s failure to take roll on the bus is what caused J.G. to 

be left behind. Appellant further intimates that the lack of professional development, 

training, or a “manual” somehow makes his conduct tolerable. 

Clearly, Appellant’s finger pointing will not excuse what occurred in this case. 

The record fully supports the conclusion that Appellant: was assigned to be J.G.’s 

one-to-one classroom assistant; left the vulnerable child behind at the Walmart;
17

failed to report the incident; and proceeded to leave School grounds without 

permission. Such neglectful, dangerous and inexcusable behavior cannot and should 

not be viewed as a “one-off” mistake. We conclude, without question, that 

substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Appellant’s actions constituted

sufficient grounds for his dismissal pursuant to Section 514 of the School Code. 

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in affirming the District’s determination that 

Appellant should be terminated because, in a dereliction of his duties, he left his 

assigned nonverbal, intellectually disabled student behind during a class trip, failed 

to report the student missing, and left the School premises without permission. Such 

behavior plainly constitutes incompetency and neglect of duty under Section 514 of 

the School Code. 

The order of the trial court is affirmed. 

__________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of: Clarence Foster :

 : No. 1257 C.D. 2022

:

From a Decision of: :

School District of Philadelphia :

Board of Education :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 6

th day of May, 2024, the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County entered on September 30, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge