UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAMES RUDNICK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

RICK RAEMISCH; JOHN 

CHAPDELAINE; JENNIFER 

ANDERSON; NICOLE WILSON; ERIC 

HOFFMAN; BROWN; DAVID CUSTER; 

DARREN COREY; WILLIAM 

SHERWOOD, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 18-1260 

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-02071-RM-KLM) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 James Rudnick appeals a district court order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I 

 Rudnick sued numerous individuals employed by the Colorado Department of 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 22, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Corrections (“CDOC”). He alleged defendants violated his constitutional rights by 

restricting his access to the prison’s law library and his ability to print legal materials; 

viewing, sharing, and threatening to delete his legal files; and confiscating his personal 

eyeglasses and replacing them with state-issued eyeglasses. 

 From the 186 pages comprising the second amended complaint, the district court 

discerned seven claims for relief: (1) blocked access to the courts in violation of the First 

Amendment; (2) seizure of legal materials in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 

(3) denial of due process and equal protection regarding access to legal files; (4) violation 

of the right to confidentiality; (5) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; 

(6) deliberate indifference to medical needs; and (7) unconstitutional policies concerning 

administrative remedies. 

 Acting under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the district court sua sponte dismissed 

various defendants against whom there were no allegations of personal participation, and 

dismissed claims for monetary damages against other defendants sued in their official 

capacities. It also denied Rudnick’s motion for injunctive relief. In an interlocutory 

appeal, we affirmed the injunction ruling. See Rudnick v. Raemisch, 731 F. App’x 753, 

756 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished). 

 The remaining defendants moved to dismiss in the district court. A magistrate 

judge recommended Rudnick’s claims be dismissed because he failed to allege a 

plausible constitutional violation and defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 

Over Rudnick’s objections, the district court accepted that recommendation and entered 

judgment in defendants’ favor. Rudnick now appeals. 
3 

II

 We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

due to qualified immunity. Denver Justice & Peace Comm., Inc. v. City of Golden, 405 

F.3d 923, 927 (10th Cir. 2005). “To survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified 

immunity, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that show—when taken as true—the 

defendant plausibly violated his constitutional rights, which were clearly established at 

the time of violation.” Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 579 (10th Cir. 2012). 

 Rudnick argues that dismissal was inappropriate because his claims were 

supported by the weight of the evidence and because the district court did not consider all 

his filings cumulatively. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, the focus of the judicial 

inquiry is on the complaint’s factual allegations. See SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 

(10th Cir. 2014). A district court may consider “documents that the complaint 

incorporates by reference” and “documents referred to in the complaint if the documents 

are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ 

authenticity.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

But Rudnick does not explain how any specific document he filed supports the 

plausibility of any particular claim for relief. Although we liberally construe a pro se 

litigant’s filings, we nevertheless require a pro se litigant to provide “succinct, clear and 

accurate” arguments “with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which 

[he] relies.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir. 

2005) (quotation omitted). We may not “serv[e] as the litigant’s attorney in constructing 

arguments and searching the record.” Id. at 840. 
4 

 Rudnick contends the district court erred by deciding the motion to dismiss 

without a hearing. But a hearing on a motion to dismiss is not required. See Steele v. 

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other 

grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). To the extent Rudnick asserts that 

his right to a jury trial forecloses a motion to dismiss, he is mistaken. See Smith v. 

Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 1997). Rudnick further argues the district court 

erred by failing to include in its ruling the facts and law cited in his injunction appeal and 

by construing his complaint as containing seven claims rather than five claims. But he 

again fails to explain how these points bear on the plausibility of any of his claims for 

relief. 

On the merits, Rudnick argues the deprivation of proper eyeglasses violates the 

Eighth Amendment. He is correct that “the removal of [an inmate’s] prescription 

eyeglasses” is constitutionally problematic. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1443 

(10th Cir. 1996). But Rudnick alleged he was given state-issued eyeglasses that matched 

a prior prescription, and he was given the opportunity for an eye exam and new stateissued eyeglasses within one year. These allegations do not support a plausible deliberate 

indifference claim, which requires that a prison official “knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

 Next, Rudnick contests the dismissal of his claim that CDOC grievance 

procedures violate his procedural due process rights. As the magistrate judge correctly 

pointed out, however, prisoners lack a liberty interest in grievance procedures. See 

Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Geiger v. Jowers, 404 
5 

F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Accordingly, Rudnick’s procedural due 

process claim fails. 

 Finally, Rudnick challenges the dismissal of his access-to-courts claim. But a 

plausible access-to-courts claim requires a prisoner demonstrate he “was frustrated or 

impeded in his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim concerning his conviction or 

his conditions of confinement.” Gee, 627 F.3d at 1191. Rudnick fails to carry this 

burden. 

III 

AFFIRMED. Because Rudnick fails to advance “a reasoned, nonfrivolous 

argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal,” DeBardeleben v. 

Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991), we DENY his motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis, and we direct him to make full and immediate payment of all 

outstanding appellate filing fees.1

 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 1

 To the extent Rudnick’s May 2, 2019 “Demand for Order” requests waiving the 

appellate filing fee due to the expenses of his multiple other court cases, the request is 

denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).