IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–1329

Filed October 24, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

ZACHARIAH J. ROGERSON,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, 

Monica L. Ackley, Judge.

The defendant in a criminal case brings an interlocutory appeal 

from the district court’s pretrial order allowing several of the State’s

witnesses to testify by two-way videoconference. REVERSED AND 

REMANDED.

Brian D.W. Spannagel, Boffeli & Spannagel, P.C., Dubuque, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant 

Attorney General, and Ralph Potter, County Attorney, for appellee.
2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case requires us to decide when the Sixth Amendment 

permits a witness to appear by live, two-way video instead of testifying in 

person. In a prosecution for four counts of serious injury by operating a 

motor vehicle while intoxicated, see Iowa Code § 707.6A(4) (2013), the 

State moved to allow three out-of-state victims of the car accident and 

three state-employed lab analysts to testify via a two-way 

videoconferencing system. The defendant objected, contending the 

remote testimony would violate his Sixth Amendment right to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him. The district court held a 

hearing on the motion and granted the State’s request for the witnesses 

to testify remotely. The defendant filed an application for an 

interlocutory appeal, which we granted.

Applying Sixth Amendment precedent, we now hold that two-way 

videoconference testimony should not be substituted for in-person

confrontation absent a showing of necessity to further an important 

public interest. Because the grounds advanced by the State do not reach 

that level, we hold the district court erred in allowing the videoconference 

testimony. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand 

for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

According to the minutes of testimony, early in the morning on 

August 13, 2012, the defendant, Zachariah Rogerson, was involved in a 

single-vehicle car accident on Hales Mill Road in Dubuque County. 

Dubuque County sheriff’s deputies responding to the scene encountered 

four other people at the crash site, all of whom were injured. Kyle 

Rohman suffered a shattered elbow, fractured ribs, and a partially 

collapsed lung. Kelly Barrett’s sternum was cracked and her back 
3

fractured. Jack Cole’s injuries included fractured ribs, a cracked 

collarbone, and a collapsed lung. Terrie Totse was airlifted to University 

of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics for treatment of her broken back and 

shoulder.

Two of the injured parties identified Rogerson as the driver of the 

wrecked vehicle. Sergeant Pothoff of the Dubuque County Sheriff’s Office 

made contact with Rogerson at the scene of the accident and detected an 

odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. Rogerson was transported to 

Mercy Hospital Emergency Room where he was sedated and intubated. 

The attending physician, Dr. Gudenkauf, signed a “Dead or 

Unconscious” form indicating that Rogerson was physically unable to 

give consent to a blood alcohol content test. Deputies then obtained a 

blood draw showing Rogerson’s blood alcohol content to be .150.

The State charged Rogerson with four counts of unintentionally 

causing serious injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. See Iowa 

Code § 707.6A(4). Rogerson entered a plea of not guilty to all four 

counts. Before trial, the State filed a motion requesting that several of its 

witnesses be permitted to testify remotely via two-way videoconferencing 

technology rather than physically appearing in court. In its motion, the 

State asserted that three of the parties injured in the crash, Rohman, 

Barrett, and Totse, resided outside the state of Iowa and that remote 

video “testimony would greatly expedite and facilitate their participation 

in the Trial.” The motion also sought authorization for three employees 

of the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) Criminalistics Laboratory
4

to testify remotely because they worked in Ankeny, and their testimony 

was “not dependent upon the specific fact pattern of this case.”1

Rogerson opposed the State’s motion, arguing that permitting the 

witnesses to testify via videoconferencing technology would violate his 

Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 

Rogerson explained that video testimony was not an adequate substitute 

for face-to-face confrontation. He urged the trial court to deny the 

State’s motion because there were no special circumstances justifying 

remote testimony.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion for distance testimony. 

At the hearing, the State reiterated its arguments that remote 

videoconferencing would facilitate the testimony of its out-of-state

witnesses and of the state lab technicians. The State posited two-way 

videoconferencing fulfilled the Sixth Amendment confrontation 

requirement because both the defendant and witness could 

simultaneously see and hear each other. The prosecution stated that its 

witnesses had suffered “serious injury” during the accident but did not 

present any evidence from doctors or the witnesses themselves that they 

were unable to travel at the time set for the trial. With respect to the DCI 

employees, the State emphasized the convenience of “them walking down 

the hall and testifying” via videoconference rather than “giving up a day, 

at least coming up from the State lab in [Ankeny]” to testify.

In opposition to the motion, Rogerson argued that the State had 

failed to show that it was necessary, rather than merely convenient, for 

its witnesses to testify remotely. Rogerson again stated his concern that 

1Ankeny is approximately 200 miles driving distance from Dubuque, where trial 

would be held.

 
5

permitting videoconference testimony would violate his Sixth Amendment 

confrontation right. He urged the court to adopt a standard requiring 

the State to prove the necessity of distance testimony before allowing 

witnesses to testify via two-way video.

The trial court granted the State’s motion for distance testimony. 

The court explained,

The statements to be offered by the Division of Criminal 

Investigation through [its employees] are non-testimonial 

and are factual. Therefore, the use of the ICN2 network for 

the presentation of their testimony is deemed not to violate 

the confrontation[] clause.

The primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to 

secure the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. 

The secondary purpose of the confrontation clause is to 

enable the judge and the jury to obtain the elusive and 

incommunicable evidence of a witness’s deportment while 

testifying. To allow the witnesses who are residing outside of 

the State of Iowa with the opportunity to appear on the ICN 

network provides the Defendant with an opportunity for 

cross-examination. The personal presence of these 

individuals over the network, which transmits their image 

simultaneously, allows the judge and the jurors the 

opportunity to observe the witness during testimony. Any 

non-verbal communication may be therefore viewed during 

this live testimony. It is therefore deemed that the use of the 

ICN network to permit the injured named victims the 

opportunity to remain in a place of comfort during their 

recuperation period to provide testimony in this trial does 

not violate the Defendant’s rights under the confrontation 

clause.

(Citations omitted.)

Rogerson applied to this court for permission to bring an 

interlocutory appeal, again asserting that the trial court’s decision to 

permit the State’s witnesses to testify remotely violated his constitutional 

2The Iowa Communications Network (ICN) is a statewide, governmental network 

that includes a two-way videoconferencing system. See generally Iowa Communications 

Network, http://www.icn.iowa.gov/ (last visited October 13, 2014).

 
6

right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. He contended that 

the district court had applied the wrong standard for determining 

whether two-way video testimony in a criminal trial is permissible. He 

further urged that the State failed to meet its burden under the correct 

standard.

We granted Rogerson’s application to proceed with an interlocutory 

appeal and retained the case.

II. Standard of Review.

We review constitutional claims, including those based on the 

Confrontation Clause, de novo. State v. Schaer, 757 N.W.2d 630, 633 

(Iowa 2008).

III. Analysis.

A. Constitutionality of Two-Way Video Testimony Under the 

Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 

him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.3 Courts have long construed the 

Confrontation Clause to “guarantee[] the defendant a face-to-face 

meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 

487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 864

(1988). In Coy, the United States Supreme Court referenced both history 

and precedent, emphasizing the fundamental role that face-to-face 

confrontation has always played in judicial proceedings:

3In his appellate brief, Rogerson also maintains that article 1, section 10 of the 

Iowa Constitution requires reversal of the trial court’s decision. Because we agree with 

Rogerson’s argument under the United States Constitution, we do not need to reach his 

contentions under the Iowa Constitution or determine whether they have been 

preserved.

 
7

The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of face-to-face 

encounter between witness and accused serves ends related

both to appearances and to reality. This opinion is 

embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity 

in part to convey that there is something deep in human 

nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between 

accused and accuser as “essential to a fair trial in a criminal 

prosecution.” What was true of old is no less true in modern 

times.

Id. at 1017, 108 S. Ct. at 2801, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 864–65 (quoting Pointer 

v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 926 

(1965)).

In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has clarified

that while the Confrontation Clause does express a strong preference for

face-to-face confrontation, the latter is not an absolute constitutional 

requirement. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849–50, 110 S. Ct. 

3157, 3165–66, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 680–82 (1990). This preference for 

face-to-face confrontation “ ‘must occasionally give way to considerations 

of public policy and the necessities of the case.’ ” Id. at 849, 110 S. Ct. 

at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 681 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 

237, 243, 15 S. Ct. 337, 339–40, 39 L. Ed. 409, 411 (1895)).

In Craig, the trial court permitted a child victim of sexual abuse to 

testify via a one-way, closed-circuit television system under which the 

defendant could see and hear the testimony, but the child could neither 

see nor hear the defendant. See id. at 840–42, 110 S. Ct. at 3160–61, 

111 L. Ed. 2d at 675–76. The Court set forth a two-prong test to 

determine when face-to-face confrontation with a child victim of alleged 

sexual abuse may be excused and one-way, closed-circuit television 

testimony used in its place. In such cases, the State must prove: (1) that 

the “denial of [face-to-face] confrontation is necessary to further an

important public policy,” and (2) that “the reliability of the testimony is 

otherwise assured.” Id. at 850, 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682.
8

Under this test, the Craig Court determined that protecting child 

abuse victims from the psychological harm of testifying was a sufficiently 

important public policy concern to justify denying face-to-face 

confrontation. Id. at 853, 110 S. Ct. at 3167, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 683.

Then, applying the second prong, the Court held that Maryland’s closedcircuit video system assured the reliability of remote testimony because 

the witness testified under oath; the defendant was still able to fully 

cross-examine the witness; and the judge, jury, and defendant could see 

the witness’s demeanor and body language as he or she testified. Id. at 

857, 110 S. Ct. at 3170, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 686. The Court emphasized 

that, although it had approved remote testimony in the Craig scenario, 

substituting video for live testimony in other cases would require a factspecific finding of necessity. Id. at 855, 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d 

at 685.

Since deciding Craig twenty-four years ago, the Supreme Court has 

not further examined the constitutionality of remote video testimony. 

Justice Scalia has twice dissented from the Court’s denials of certiorari 

in cases involving the remote testimony of child abuse witnesses because 

he believed the lower courts had inappropriately expanded the exception 

to face-to-face confrontation. Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034, 1034–35, 

120 S. Ct. 574, 575, 145 L. Ed. 2d 436, 437 (1999) (mem.) (Scalia, J., 

dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criticizing the expansion of the 

exception to face-to-face confrontation where the trial court allowed a 

witness who had been abused by the defendant in a prior incident to 

testify remotely upon a finding that there might be emotional trauma); 

Danner v. Kentucky, 525 U.S. 1010, 1011, 119 S. Ct. 529, 530, 142 L. 

Ed. 2d 439, 440 (1998) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 

certiorari) (disagreeing that a fifteen-year-old witness who expressed only 
9

some apprehension at testifying in front of her alleged abuser should be 

permitted to testify through video).

The Court also has not had occasion to consider the

constitutionality of new types of video technology available to facilitate

remote testimony. Craig involved a one-way video system in which the 

witness could not see or hear the defendant, but the defendant, judge, 

and jury could see and hear the witness. 497 U.S. at 840–42, 110 S. Ct. 

at 3160–61, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 675–76. In contrast, two-way video 

systems—like the one at issue in this case—allow both the defendant and 

the witness to see and hear one another simultaneously during the 

testimony.

Thus, the Supreme Court has not decided what test should govern

two-way video testimony. See Wrotten v. New York, 560 U.S. 959, 960, 

130 S. Ct. 2520, 2520–21, 177 L. Ed. 2d 316, 316 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., 

respecting denial of certiorari) (noting some differences between one- and 

two-way video and stating that the Court has not yet decided the 

appropriate standard to govern two-way testimony). The Court did reject 

a proposed change to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, however, 

that would have permitted unavailable witnesses to testify via two-way 

video. Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 91 (2002). In an 

accompanying statement, Justice Scalia wrote, “I share the majority’s 

view that the Judicial Conference’s proposed Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26(b)

is of dubious validity under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .” Id. at 93 (statement 

of Scalia, J.). He added, 

As we made clear in Craig, a purpose of the Confrontation 

Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make their 

accusations in the defendant’s presence—which is not 

equivalent to making them in a room that contains a 
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television set beaming electrons that portray the defendant’s 

image. Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect 

virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient 

to protect real ones.

Id. at 94 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that twoway video technology was constitutionally distinct from the one-way 

system examined in Craig: “I cannot comprehend how one-way 

transmission (which Craig says does not ordinarily satisfy confrontation 

requirements) becomes transformed into full-fledged confrontation when 

reciprocal transmission is added.” Id. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice 

O’Connor, dissented from the Court’s refusal to submit the proposed rule 

to Congress. Id. at 96 (dissenting statement of Breyer, J.).

Thus, we need to determine here if the standard set forth in Craig

applies to two-way videoconferencing technology. If we do apply the 

Craig test, we must assess whether an adequate finding of necessity 

exists in this case to warrant denying face-to-face confrontation. 

Rogerson argues that remote testimony of any kind is less satisfactory

than face-to-face confrontation and therefore urges that the Craig

standard should govern both one- and two-way video testimony. The 

State maintains that two-way videoconferencing is distinct from one-way,

closed-circuit television and asks that we find two-way video to be an 

adequate substitute for live testimony and therefore not violative of the 

Confrontation Clause.

Until now, Iowa courts have seemingly used the Craig test only in 

the scenario for which it was designed, i.e., in determining when to 

permit child victims of abuse to testify via one-way video systems. For 

example, in State v. Rupe, we employed the Craig standard and permitted 

a minor sexual abuse victim to testify via closed circuit television

because the State presented evidence that the child would suffer 
11

emotional trauma if he were required to testify in the defendant’s 

presence. 534 N.W.2d 442, 443–44 (Iowa 1995). Our opinion did not 

mention whether the video system was one- or two-way, and we have not 

addressed the potential constitutional distinctions between one-way and 

two-way video testimony. See id.

Other courts, however, have addressed the constitutional 

significance of one- versus two-way video systems under the Sixth 

Amendment. The vast majority of those courts have chosen to apply 

Craig to both one- and two-way videoconferencing; only the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has formulated a standard 

distinct from Craig’s necessity test to govern the constitutionality of twoway video testimony. For example, the Eighth Circuit applied Craig in 

determining the constitutionality of two-way video testimony of child 

abuse victims in United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 

2005). The court reasoned that although two-way videoconferencing 

might better approximate face-to-face confrontation than one-way video, 

it was nevertheless virtual and less desirable than in-person testimony. 

Id. The court stated “ ‘confrontation’ via a two-way closed circuit 

television is not constitutionally equivalent to a face-to-face 

confrontation.” Id. The Bordeaux court attributed the problem in part to 

the prevalence of entertainment technology: “Given the ubiquity of 

television, even children are keenly aware that a television image of a 

person (including a defendant in the case of a two-way system) is not the 

person [and] something is lost in the translation.” Id. As the Eighth 

Circuit put it,

The virtual “confrontations” offered by closed-circuit 

television systems fall short of the face-to-face standard 

because they do not provide the same truth-inducing effect. 

The Constitution favors face-to-face confrontations to reduce 
12

the likelihood that a witness will lie. “It is always more 

difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind 

his back.’ ” . . . [T]he touchstone for deciding whether a 

“confrontation” satisfies the Constitution is whether it is 

likely to lead a witness to tell the truth to the same degree 

that a face-to-face confrontation does, and in this respect 

two-way systems are like one-way systems: they both fall 

short.

Id. (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019, 108 S. Ct. at 2802, 101 L. Ed. 2d at

866). Because of its concerns about virtual confrontation of any kind, 

the Eighth Circuit chose to apply the Craig standard to two-way as well 

as one-way video systems. Id. at 554–55.

The Eleventh Circuit also followed Craig to invalidate the use of

two-way video testimony for witnesses who resided in Australia and 

refused to travel to the United States for trial. United States v. Yates, 

438 F.3d 1307, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2006). Like the Eighth Circuit, it 

expressed concern that virtual confrontation, even through a two-way 

system, fell short of the Confrontation Clause’s promise:

The simple truth is that confrontation through a video 

monitor is not the same as physical face-to-face 

confrontation. . . . [T]he two are not constitutionally 

equivalent. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to 

confront one’s accuser is most certainly compromised when 

the confrontation occurs through an electronic medium.

Id. at 1315 (citation omitted). In applying the first prong of the Craig

test, the court held that the government’s stated interests of 

“expeditiously and justly resolving the case” and “providing the factfinder with crucial evidence” were not necessary to further an important 

public interest. Id. at 1315–16. The court thus ruled that the use of 

two-way video testimony violated the defendant’s confrontation right and 

ordered a new trial. Id. at 1319.

Several state appellate courts have also utilized Craig as the 

standard for assessing the constitutionality of two-way video testimony. 
13

In a recent case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that allowing a 

state-employed scientific analyst to testify by two-way video about the 

defendant’s blood alcohol content violated the Confrontation Clause 

because the trial court had not determined that such remote testimony 

was necessary to further an important public interest. State v. Smith, 

308 P.3d 135, 136 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). The Smith court agreed with the 

Eighth Circuit that the “[v]irtual presence created by television falls short 

of physical presence in satisfying the elements of confrontation.” Id. at 

137. Similarly, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has applied Craig to 

hold that allowing an imprisoned witness to testify via two-way 

videoconferencing technology without a finding of necessity violates the 

Confrontation Clause. Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 987 A.2d 743, 751–

52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). The court noted the opinions of the Eighth and 

Eleventh Circuits that two-way video testimony should be subjected to 

the same high standard as one-way testimony. Id. at 750 (citing Yates, 

438 F.3d at 1313–14).

The Florida Supreme Court likewise declined to allow two-way 

video testimony in lieu of face-to-face confrontation without a showing of 

necessity. Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1368–69 (Fla. 1998). Much 

as the State urges us to do in the present case, the State of Florida asked

the court to permit two-way video testimony in lieu of live testimony 

whenever the prosecution desired, calling it “the equivalent of physical, 

face-to-face confrontation.” Id. at 1368. Declining to adopt such a 

blanket rule, the court instead employed Craig’s two-part test. Id. at 

1369. It stated, 

We are unwilling to develop a per se rule that would allow 

the vital fabric of physical presence in the trial process to be 

replaced at any time by an image on a screen. . . . [W]e do 

not conclude that virtual presence is the equivalent of 
14

physical presence for the purposes of the Confrontation 

Clause.

Id. at 1368–69. The Harrell court ultimately found adequate state 

interests justifying two-way video testimony because the Argentine 

witnesses were beyond the court’s subpoena power, they were essential 

to the case, and one of the witnesses was too ill to make the trip to the 

United States. Id. at 1369–70.

The Michigan Court of Appeals similarly adopted Craig as the test 

to determine when two-way video testimony infringes a defendant’s 

confrontation right. People v. Buie, 775 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2009). Citing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Bordeaux, the court 

noted “ ‘the intangible but crucial differences between a face-to-face 

confrontation and a ‘confrontation’ that is electronically created by 

cameras, cables, and monitors.’ ” Id. (quoting Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 

554–55). It concluded that the state had not given a justification for why 

its expert witnesses needed to testify remotely and remanded the case for 

the trial court to make a necessity determination in line with Craig. Id.

at 826.

In addition to the foregoing courts that have expressly considered 

the differences between one- and two-way video systems and determined 

that the Craig standard should govern both, a number of other courts 

have applied Craig to both types of systems without separate analysis. 

See, e.g., United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 753–54 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(applying Craig’s necessity standard to a two-way video system without 

discussion of the one-way/two-way distinction); United States v. Garcia, 

7 F.3d 885, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Farley, 992 

F.2d 1122, 1124–25 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); State v. Stock, 256 P.3d 

899, 905 (Mont. 2011) (same); People v. Beltran, 970 N.Y.S.2d 289, 296 
15

(App. Div. 2013) (same); State v. Seelig, 738 S.E.2d 427, 434 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 2013) (same); Gonzales v. State, 818 S.W.2d 756, 764 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1991) (same); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E.2d 486, 491 (Va. 

Ct. App. 2003) (same); Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 215–16 (Wyo. 2008) 

(same). A federal trial court in Washington was asked to assess the 

constitutionality of allowing a foreign witness in a drug smuggling case to 

testify by two-way videoconference. United States v. Rosenau, 870 F. 

Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (W.D. Wash. 2012). The court applied Craig

without specifically discussing whether it should govern two-way as 

opposed to one-way video testimony. Id. at 1112–13. The court noted 

that the two-way nature of the video system was an added assurance of 

adequate confrontation, but nevertheless required the state to 

demonstrate video testimony was necessary to further an important 

public interest in accordance with the Craig test. Id. at 1113.

In contrast to the numerous courts that have applied the Craig test 

to two-way as well as one-way videoconferencing technology, the Second 

Circuit alone has declined to require a finding of Craig-based necessity 

before allowing witnesses to testify via two-way video. United States v. 

Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d. Cir. 1999).4 In Gigante, the Second Circuit 

upheld the trial court’s decision to allow an ill witness to testify remotely 

via two-way videoconference. Id. Rather than assessing the need for 

remote technology under Craig, the Second Circuit formulated a test 

based upon the federal standard for when depositions may be used to 

4A Minnesota case appeared to read Craig and Gigante as consistent with one 

another. State v. Sewell, 595 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). The court stated 

that to allow a witness to testify via video technology, a court must first determine the 

witness cannot appear in person and show the necessity of his testimony, id. (citing 

Craig, 497 U.S. at 850, 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 681–82), and then assess 

the reliability of the testimony using the factors set forth in Gigante, 166 F.3d at 80, id.

at 212–13.

 
16

perpetuate testimony for trial purposes. Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 

15(a)).5 The court reasoned that two-way closed circuit television 

“afforded greater protection of Gigante’s confrontation rights than would 

have been provided by a Rule 15 deposition,” since the witness actually 

had to testify live before the jury (although not in their actual presence). 

Id. Therefore, the Second Circuit held that “[u]pon a finding of 

exceptional circumstances, . . . a trial court may allow a witness to testify 

via two-way closed-circuit television when this furthers the interest of 

justice.” Id. The court determined that witness’s terminal illness and his 

status in the witness protection program satisfied the “exceptional 

circumstances” requirement and therefore upheld the trial court’s use of 

two-way video testimony. Id. at 81–82.

The Gigante court listed what it saw as the four primary benefits of 

face-to-face confrontation: “1) the giving of testimony under oath; 2) the 

5Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a)(1) provides in part:

A party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order to 

preserve testimony for trial. The court may grant the motion because of 

exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice.

We have a similar rule in Iowa:

Whenever the interests of justice and the special circumstances of a case 

make necessary the taking of the testimony of a prospective witness not 

included in rule 2.13(1) or 2.13(3), for use at trial, the court may upon 

motion of a party and notice to the other parties order that the testimony 

of the witness be taken by deposition . . . . For purposes of this 

subsection, special circumstances shall be deemed to exist and the court 

shall order that depositions be taken only upon a showing of necessity 

arising from either of the following:

. . . .

(2) Other just cause necessitating the taking of the deposition.

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.13(2)(a); see generally State v. Rainsong, 807 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 2011) 

(discussing this provision).

It should be noted, of course, that when such a deposition is taken, the 

defendant normally is present. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c); State v. Turner, 345 N.W.2d 

552, 559 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).

 
17

opportunity for cross-examination; 3) the ability of the fact-finder to 

observe demeanor evidence; and 4) the reduced risk that a witness will 

wrongfully implicate an innocent defendant when testifying in his 

presence.” Id. at 80. The court found these four components satisfied by 

the two-way system because the witness was sworn, he was subject to 

cross-examination, he testified in full video-view of the jury and judge, 

and he testified with the defendant watching. Id.

Upon our review, we agree with the vast majority of courts that 

have considered the issue and determined that Craig’s test should apply 

to two-way as well as one-way video testimony. Concededly, two-way 

videoconferencing technology available today more closely approximates 

face-to-face confrontation than one-way video. But despite its 

preferability over one-way transmission, we do not believe two-way 

videoconferencing is constitutionally equivalent to the face-to-face 

confrontation envisioned by the Sixth Amendment. In Craig, the Court 

stated that it is

[t]he combined effect of these elements of confrontation—

physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation 

of demeanor by the trier of fact—[that] serves the purposes of 

the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted 

against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous 

adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American 

criminal proceedings.

497 U.S. at 846, 110 S. Ct. at 3163, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 678–79 (emphasis 

added). Only the combination of all of these elements of confrontation—

including face-to-face testimony—fully protects a defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment rights.

Our founders presumably believed that accusers would be more 

reluctant to make false accusations when they were in the personal 

presence of the accused. “A witness ‘may feel quite differently when he 
18

has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by 

distorting or mistaking the facts.’ ” Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019, 108 S. Ct. at 

2802, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 866 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Blessings 

of Liberty 35 (1956)). Technology has changed since the late eighteenth 

century, but human nature has not. This social pressure to tell the 

truth can be diminished when the witness is far away rather than 

physically present with the defendant in the courtroom. The Supreme 

Court has expressed a strong preference for in-person encounters

between witnesses and defendants that no form of virtual testimony can 

fully satisfy. Two-way video technology may permit the witness and 

defendant to see one another, but the screen and the physical distance 

between the two tend to reduce the truth-inducing effect of the 

confrontation. The Supreme Court has recognized “that face-to-face 

confrontation enhances the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk 

that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.” Craig, 497 

U.S. at 846, 110 S. Ct. at 3164, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 679. Remote testimony 

of any kind should not be lightly substituted in its place.

In addition to having the right to be confronted by witnesses 

against him, the criminal defendant is also entitled to be present for all 

critical phases of the proceedings. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 

522, 526, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490 (1985); see also

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L. Ed. 2d 

353, 356 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the 

Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the 

courtroom . . . .”). The Supreme Court has explained that the right to be 

present is grounded in both the Confrontation Clause and the Due 

Process Clause:
19

[W]e have recognized that [the right to presence] is protected 

by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the 

defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence 

against him. . . . [A] defendant has a due process right to be 

present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a 

relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his 

opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . [T]he presence 

of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent 

that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his 

absence . . . .”

Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S. Ct. at 1484, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 490. 

(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105–06, 107–08, 54 S. 

Ct. 330, 332, 333, 78 L. Ed. 674, 678, 679 (1934)).

Like the confrontation right, the related right to be present ensures 

the integrity of criminal proceedings because the defendant’s presence 

impresses the gravity of the proceedings upon the participants. See

Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259, 113 S. Ct. 748, 751, 122 L. 

Ed. 2d 25, 31 (1993) (“This [common law right to be present] was 

premised on the notion that a fair trial could take place only if the jurors 

met the defendant face-to-face and only if those testifying against the 

defendant did so in his presence.”). Yet this right to be present loses 

some meaning if witnesses are permitted to appear on a video monitor. 

We therefore find that in-person testimony should be excused only in the 

rare situations recognized in Craig.

Hence, before permitting a witness to testify via two-way 

videoconference, the court must make a case-specific determination that 

the denial of the defendant’s confrontation right is necessary to further 

an important public interest. If the court finds such an interest, it must 

assure the reliability of the remote testimony. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 

851, 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682.

Here, the State not only would have us depart from Craig, it wants 

to go beyond Gigante. It contends that two-way video is constitutionally 
20

equivalent to live, in-person confrontation and asks us to declare the two 

interchangeable. No court to our knowledge has gone so far as to adopt 

a rule permitting two-way videoconferencing testimony simply upon the 

government’s request. Even the Gigante court, which rejected the 

application of Craig to two-way video testimony, still required a finding of 

“exceptional circumstances” before excusing face-to-face confrontation. 

Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81. While permitting two-way video testimony 

under the facts of that case, the court cautioned that “the use of remote, 

closed-circuit television testimony must be carefully circumscribed.” Id.

at 80.

The State’s proposal also presents logistical problems. Although a 

witness can be placed under oath when testifying remotely, the State 

does not explain how a court in one state could hold a recalcitrant 

witness in contempt when he or she is located hundreds of miles away in 

another jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, Ltd., 860 F.

Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[F]oreign depositions are suspect and, 

consequently, not favored, due, in significant part, to the fact that the 

witness is not subject to the imposition of sanctions of perjury or 

contempt for testifying falsely or evasively.” (Internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted.)). Impeachment of a witness with documents or 

prior statements also becomes more cumbersome and less attentiongrabbing when performed through a video connection. Furthermore, 

technological limitations could prevent the jury from adequately 

observing the witness’s demeanor.

We are aware that technology evolves and improves all the time. 

Some day virtual electronic presence in the courtroom may become an 

adequate constitutional substitute for actual physical presence. But we 

are not there yet. Because face-to-face confrontation is constitutionally 
21

preferable to remote testimony of any kind, we believe Craig applies to 

two-way video testimony, which should be acceptable only upon a 

showing of necessity to further an important public interest and only 

when the testimony’s reliability can be otherwise assured.

B. Applying the Craig Standard Here. Guided by Craig, we turn 

now to whether the justifications shown by the record in this case qualify 

as sufficiently important to allow the State to present remote video 

testimony. This is the necessity prong of the Craig test, and we believe it 

is sufficient to resolve the present dispute. As recognized in Craig, 

protecting child victims from the trauma of testifying in front of their 

alleged abusers can justify remote testimony in certain cases. Craig, 497 

U.S. at 853, 110 S. Ct. at 3167, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 683; see also Rupe, 534 

N.W.2d at 444.

Illness has been another justification that courts have found 

sufficient to satisfy the Craig “necessity” prong. For example, in Bush, 

the witness in question lived out of the state and had suffered congestive 

heart failure, rendering him unable to appear personally at trial. 193 

P.3d at 214. The court concluded that permitting the seriously ill

witness’s “testimony via video conference was necessary to further the 

important public policy of preventing further harm to his already serious 

medical condition.” Id. at 215–16. Additionally, the North Carolina 

Court of Appeals approved remote testimony of a witness who suffered 

such a severe panic attack before the trial that he was consequently 

unable to travel. Seelig, 738 S.E.2d at 435. Similarly, the witness in 

United States v. Benson was “elderly and infirm” and the Sixth Circuit 

allowed her to testify via videoconferencing technology. 79 F. App’x 813, 

820–21 (6th Cir. 2003).
22

Courts vary on whether the fact that a witness resides in a foreign 

country beyond the state’s subpoena power is an adequate justification 

for remote testimony. Most seem to require some impediment to 

testifying beyond mere unwillingness to travel. In Yates, the witnesses 

lived in Australia and refused to come to the United States to testify. See 

438 F.3d at 1310. The Eleventh Circuit did not find the state’s interests 

in “expeditiously and justly resolving the case” and “providing the factfinder with crucial evidence” enough to meet Craig’s necessity 

requirement. Id. at 1315–16. In contrast, the Harrell court did find 

adequate justification for remote testimony when the foreign witnesses 

were beyond the court’s subpoena power and one was also ill. See 709 

So. 2d at 1369–70. Similarly, in Rosenau, a Canadian court order had 

prevented the witness from entering the United States, and the federal 

district court approved of his testimony via videoconference. See 870 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1113.

There is also a general consensus among courts that mere 

convenience, efficiency, and cost-saving are not sufficiently important 

public necessities to justify depriving a defendant of face-to-face 

confrontation. In Smith, the trial court had permitted a state-employed 

lab analyst to testify via two-way video about the defendant’s blood 

alcohol content at the time of his arrest. 308 P.3d at 136. The New 

Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, stating “that the witness’s convenience 

or the convenience of his employer are not situations that demonstrate 

necessity” sufficient to overcome the Confrontation Clause’s preference 

for face-to-face testimony. Id. at 138. Similarly, the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court held that an incarcerated witness could not be permitted 

to testify via two-way video merely because the state would have to 

arrange and pay for prisoner transport. Atkinson, 987 A.2d at 751. That 
23

court stated that although video testimony might be logistically easier,

“convenience and cost-saving are not sufficient reasons to deny 

constitutional rights.” Id.

In this case, the State represented at the hearing on its motion

that the witnesses who were involved in the car crash resided a 

significant distance from Iowa and had suffered serious injuries.6 The 

State did not present evidence that the witnesses were beyond the court’s 

subpoena power or that they were unable to travel because of their 

injuries. Under Craig and the other precedents discussed above, this is 

insufficient. The State has not shown that the witnesses cannot appear 

in person or even that personal appearance would cause severe stress.

Concerning the DCI lab employees, the State did not even argue 

that they resided out of state or had suffered injuries. Rather, the State’s 

justification below was that their testimony was not “accusatory.” On 

appeal, the State no longer advances that argument.7 In effect, it simply 

maintains it would save time and money if these witnesses did not have 

to attend trial in person. The present situation is analogous to Smith, 

where the New Mexico Court of Appeals held a state lab analyst could not 

testify via two-way video simply because it was more convenient. In 

sum, the State’s justifications of mere distance, cost, and efficiency are 

insufficient to overcome Rogerson’s Sixth Amendment rights, and there is 

6According to the State, one lived in New Orleans, Louisiana, one lived in Key 

West, Florida, and a third previously resided in West Virginia. They were visiting Iowa 

when the accident occurred.

7The United States Supreme Court has dispensed with the notion that some 

witnesses for the prosecution are exempt from the Confrontation Clause. See MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313–14, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533–34, 174 L. Ed. 2d 

314, 323 (2009) (“Contrary to respondent’s assertion, there is not a third category of 

witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.”). The 

DCI employees in the present case are witnesses for the prosecution and are, therefore, 

subject to the Confrontation Clause.

 
24

no evidence the witnesses are unable to travel. We therefore agree with 

Rogerson that the district court’s order allowing the witnesses to testify

by two-way teleconferencing should be reversed.

IV. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the standard set forth in 

Maryland v. Craig governs the constitutionality under the Sixth 

Amendment of two-way videoconferencing as a substitute for in-person 

testimony. We further hold the State failed to meet the necessity prong 

of that standard. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order 

granting the State’s motion for distance testimony and remand the case 

for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except Hecht, J., who concurs specially.
25

#13–1329, State v. Rogerson

HECHT, Justice (concurring specially).

This appeal presents two essential questions. First, did the State 

show exceptional circumstances supporting the district court’s ruling 

that four of the State’s witnesses could testify without being physically 

present in the courtroom (the “necessity question”)? Second, if 

exceptional circumstances have been shown, did the State establish the 

technology it proposed to use would adequately protect Rogerson’s right 

of confrontation (the “reliability question”)? Although my colleagues 

suggest they decide only the necessity question in this case, their opinion 

expresses views about reliability with which I am not prepared to concur. 

I agree the State made no attempt to show necessity, and I agree the 

district court’s order should be reversed for that reason. I write 

separately, however, because I do not share my colleagues’ conclusion 

that current two-way video technology is inadequate and cannot 

accomplish the constitutional objectives of confrontation.

The text of the Sixth Amendment does not expressly require 

confrontation be achieved with testimony by witnesses who are 

physically present in the courtroom. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The 

drafters of the Sixth Amendment likely did not contemplate the 

possibilities presented by present-day technology; they were concerned 

principally with convictions by affidavit. Mattox v. United States, 156 

U.S. 237, 242, 15 S. Ct. 337, 339, 39 L. Ed. 409, 411 (1895) (“The 

primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions 

or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of 

personal examination and cross-examination of the witness . . . .”). The 

notion witnesses should be physically present in the courtroom springs 

at least in part from courts’ linguistic analysis of the word “confront.” 
26

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163, 111 L. Ed. 

2d 666, 678 (1990) (“The word ‘confront,’ after all, also means a clashing 

of forces or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness.”); 

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800, 101 L. Ed. 2d 

857, 864 (1988) (“[T]he word ‘confront’ ultimately derives from the [Latin] 

prefix ‘con-’ (from ‘contra’ meaning ‘against’ or ‘opposed’) and the noun 

‘frons’ (forehead).”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175, 90 S. Ct. 

1930, 1944, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 506 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 

(“Simply as a matter of English the clause may be read to confer . . . a 

right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at 

trial.”).

Going beyond linguistics, the Supreme Court has concluded a 

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not establish 

an absolute requirement the accuser be physically present in the 

courtroom when testimony is presented in a criminal case. Craig, 497 

U.S. at 853, 110 S. Ct. at 3167, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 683. The goal of 

confrontation—assuring “the reliability of evidence”—can be achieved 

without an accuser’s physical presence in the courtroom if four 

conditions are met: (1) the accuser must testify under oath, (2) the 

defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine the accuser, 

(3) the jury must be able to observe the demeanor of the accuser while 

testimony is given, and (4) the accuser must testify in the presence of the 

accused. Id. at 845–46, 110 S. Ct. at 3163, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 678. Craig

established that a youthful accuser’s presence can be accomplished 

under exceptional circumstances consistent with the Confrontation 

Clause through the use of closed-circuit technology permitting the 

defendant and fact finder(s) to observe the accuser during her testimony, 

but not permitting the accuser to see the defendant. Id. at 857, 110 
27

S. Ct. at 3170, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 686. As my colleagues recognize, twoway video technology allows the witness and the defendant to see one 

another. Accordingly, the form of transmission the State proposed to use 

in this case is “very different from th[e closed-circuit system] used in . . . 

Craig.” See Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 101 (2002) 

(advisory committee’s note to proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 26(b), reprinted 

as an appendix to the statement of Breyer, J.).

Whether a defendant’s right of confrontation is adequately 

protected when witnesses testify via two-way video technology turns 

largely, in my view, on fact determinations. I believe that in this case, 

the question whether the sufficiency of the technology could have been 

shown should be left completely open. The answer to this question in a 

future case should be informed in part by the latest social science

addressing the extent, if any, to which the actual physical presence of a 

witness in a courtroom produces a sufficiently enhanced opportunity for 

confrontation when compared to presence achieved through two-way 

video technology. Indeed, the answer to this fact question is essential, in 

my view, to a determination of whether the difference between actual and 

virtual presence supports the continued maintenance of a strict 

constitutional distinction. 

I, of course, concede my colleagues’ observation that virtual 

presence is not “the same” as physical presence. However, I believe 

social science should inform our answer to the question whether existing 

state-of-the-art technology can achieve the goal of confrontation through 

an accuser’s virtual presence. If technology has evolved to the point 

where real-time video testimony neither significantly diminishes the fact 

finders’ ability to assess credibility nor lessens accusers’ motivation to 

tell the truth, courts should not cling to old forms for consistency’s sake. 
28

I acknowledge some scholars have suggested we simply do not know the 

answers to these questions. See Richard D. Friedman, Remote 

Testimony, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 695, 702–03 (2002) (“I do not know of 

any extant studies that can give substantial comfort on [the effect of 

remote testimony].”); Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through 

Screens, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 769, 787 (2004) [hereinafter Gertner] 

(calling “for more studies of [videoconferencing’s] significance in enabling 

jurors to evaluate testimony”); Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual 

Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and Tomorrow’s—HighTechnology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 799, 820 (1999) [hereinafter 

Lederer] (“[W]e lack any experimental evidence that might indicate 

whether remote witnesses are more or less likely to tell the truth than incourt witnesses.”); Marc Chase McAllister, Two-Way Video Trial 

Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Fashioning a Better Craig Test in 

Light of Crawford, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 835, 875 (2007) [hereinafter 

McAllister] (“[T]he precise effects of virtual confrontation are still 

unknown.”). Yet, years have passed since those scholars weighed in. 

The advance of technology continues. More recent social science 

scholarship bearing on the subject could inform a future decision on 

these important questions.

My colleagues posit that the “social pressure to tell the truth can 

be diminished when the witness is far away rather than physically 

present with the defendant in the courtroom,” and assert “the screen and 

the physical distance between the [witness and the defendant] tend to 

reduce the truth-inducing effect of the confrontation.” These intuitive 

assumptions bearing on the assessment of reliability may be true, but 

maybe not. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the 

Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 
29

72 Neb. L. Rev. 1157, 1173–74 (1993) (asserting the profound effect of 

confrontation and the difficulty of lying to someone’s face are “accepted, 

but unfounded” premises). More importantly, however, the majority’s 

statement of these assumptions suggests—at least implicitly—that my 

colleagues are addressing more than the necessity question in this case.

I do not presume my colleagues’ assumptions are true or false. I 

would prefer instead to determine such matters based upon a record 

revealing the fullness of witnesses’, defendants’, and fact finders’ 

perceptions permitted by two-way technology utilized or proposed for use 

in a particular case. Assumptions supporting the requirement of 

witnesses’ physical presence in the courtroom—and eschewing evidence 

presented via two-way video technology—should be tested against expert 

opinions from the social sciences on the question whether the purposes 

of confrontation are in fact significantly advanced by physical presence.8 

Courts have persisted in viewing witnesses’ physical presence as a 

core feature of confrontation, but they have offered little more than 

intuition in support. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 846, 110 S. Ct. at 

3164, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 679 (“[F]ace-to-face confrontation . . . reduc[es] 

the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.”); 

Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019, 108 S. Ct. at 2802, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 866 (“It is 

always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind 

his back.’ ”); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 

2005) (relying on “intangible elements” in concluding both that two-way 

confrontation “is not constitutionally equivalent to a face-to-face 

8Some studies suggest that, “as a general rule, people are poor human lie 

detectors”—perhaps no matter the medium. Gertner, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 785 

n.93 (collecting studies); see also Lederer, 50 S.C. L. Rev. at 820 (“Four experiments 

have indicated that jurors perceive remote witnesses just as they perceive in-court 

witnesses, neither better nor worse.”).

 
30

confrontation” and that two-way systems “fall short”). I would prefer to 

have evidence bearing upon several questions before deciding whether 

virtual presence can satisfy—beyond the limited circumstances present 

in Craig—the essential purposes of the confrontation right. Does 

available technology permit the witness and the defendant a sufficient 

view of each other to achieve the purposes of face-to-face confrontation? 

Does available technology allow fact finders a sufficient opportunity to 

hear and see the witness in assessing credibility?9 Do witnesses sworn 

to tell the truth really tend to feel a greater motivation for honesty when 

they are physically present in the courtroom with the defendant than 

when they are able to see and experience the defendant’s presence on a 

monitor as they testify via two-way video technology? To what extent do 

the “trappings” or symbols of the courtroom tend to emphasize the 

solemnity of judicial proceedings and increase the likelihood that 

witnesses will tell the truth when they testify in person? If—as we 

sometimes assume—there is a correlation between the factors 

emphasizing the solemnity of the proceedings and witnesses’ motivation 

toward honesty, should we really believe those factors cannot be 

effectively communicated to witnesses through currently available twoway video technology? 

The State provided no evidence in this case illuminating the court’s 

answers to these questions. Accordingly, I associate myself—for now—

with my colleagues’ conclusion that “[r]emote testimony of any kind 

9Some have posited that a monitor “necessarily limits the jurors’ ability to see 

the witness’s body.” Gertner, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 786. While this ability is 

an important aspect of determining credibility because body language may be less 

controllable than facial expressions and therefore deemed an indicator of possible 

deception, see id., I leave room for the possibility the court could consider camera 

angles and capacity in deciding the adequacy of confrontation permitted by two-way 

video technology.

 
31

should not be lightly substituted” in place of live testimony by witnesses 

physically present in the courtroom. However, I would not assume or 

decide without more evidence that effective confrontation cannot be 

provided in criminal cases through currently available two-way video 

technology.10 

Courts must maintain their relevance over time by utilizing 

emerging technologies consistent with constitutional purposes, rather 

than steadfastly adhering to the way it used to be. See Harrell v. State, 

709 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (Fla. 1998) (“[C]ourtrooms . . . cannot sit idly by, 

in a cocoon of yesteryear, while society and technology race [forward].”). 

Although courts have interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring 

in-person testimony except in exceptional circumstances, this 

interpretation was developed long before technology allowed excellent 

two-way video transmission. Similarly, although my colleagues allow for 

the possibility that virtual presence will someday be sufficient for 

purposes of the Confrontation Clause, they conclude “we are not there 

yet.” Lacking sufficient information, I am not prepared to join in that 

conclusion today. 

I agree the State did not prove necessity, so the district court’s 

order must be reversed. However, I would allow for the possibility that, 

with current technology and reasonable precautions employed by 

counsel and carefully enforced by courts, virtual presence might permit 

constitutionally sufficient confrontation.

10I believe the proposed (but rejected) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(b) 

had attractive features. See Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. at 99–104. It 

would have required a showing of necessity as a condition of presenting testimony 

through two-way video. See id. at 99 (allowing video testimony only if “the requesting 

party establishes exceptional circumstances”). Upon a showing of necessity, the court 

would assess the adequacy of the proposed technology and impose any procedural 

precautions it deems appropriate. Id. (requiring “appropriate safeguards”); see also 

McAllister, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. at 870–71 (proposing a test for permitting two-way 

video testimony that includes safeguards and technical requirements).