Filed 9/25/13 P. v. Alvarado CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DANIEL ALVARADO, Defendant and Appellant. D062347

(Super. Ct. No. SCD237395)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of San Diego County, Laura W. Halgren, Judge. Affirmed. Kristine M. Watkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant A ttorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Kathryn A. Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plain tiff and Respondent.2 Daniel Alvarado pleaded guilty to grand theft of personal property. 1 (Pen. Code, 2 § 487, subd. (a).) The court found Alvarado had a strike prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2).) The court sentenced him to prison for f our years, and awarded him 254 days of actual custody credit and 126 days of conduct credit, for a total of 380 days of presentence custody credit. Alvarado appeals, contending the stat utory construction of section 4019 and principles of equal protection entitle him to an additional 128 da ys conduct credit. We conclude the enhanced conduct credit provision of section 4019 applies only to defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Further, we conclude section 4019 does n ot violate principles of equal protection. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

1 Alvarado was charged with various crimes that occurred between December 2008 and April 2011. The grand theft of pe rsonal property occurred on December 2, 2008, and Alvarado was not in cu stody until November 8, 2011. 2 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.3 DISCUSSION 3
I STANDARD OF REVIEW Alvarado's claim to additional conduct credits involves issues of statutory interpretation and constituti onality--pure questions of law--and we apply a de novo standard of review. ( Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799-801.) Thus, we exercise our independent judgment without de ference to the trial court's ruling. ( Ibid. ) II CONDUCT CREDITS Alvarado contends he is entitled to in creased presentence conduct credits for the time he was in presentence custody afte r October 1, 2011. He further contends that the second sentence of section 4019, su bdivision (h) adds am biguity to the statute because it fails to explain how to calcula te conduct credits for a third group of defendants: those who committed a crime before October 1, 2011, but served presentence custody on or after October 1, 2011. We disagree. A defendant is entitled to accrue both actual pr esentence custody credits under section 2900.5 and conduct cr edits under section 4019 for the period of incarceration before sentencing. Conduct credits may be earned under sectio n 4019 by performing

3 Because the facts of the underlying offe nse are not relevant to the issues in this appeal, we omit the traditional statement of facts.4 additional labor (§ 4019, subd. (b)) and by an inmate's good behavior. (§ 4019, subd. (c).) Section 4019 has been amended a number of times. Historically, the statute entitled defendants to "one-for-two conduct cr edits, which is two days for every four days of actual time served in presentence custody." ( People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App. 4th 42, 48 ( Rajanayagam ).) Operative October 1, 2011, section 4019 was amended to provide a formula of four days' credit for every two days served. (§ 4019, subd. (f); Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, §§ 35, 46; Rajanayagam , supra , at p. 49.) Alvarado committe d the crime on December 2, 2008, before the effective date of this amendment. However, he was in presentence custody from November 8, 2011 to July 18, 2012, after the effective date of this amendment. The first sentence of section 4019, subdiv ision (h) states: "The changes to this section enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall appl y prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who ar e confined to a county jail . . . for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011." 4 This sentence is clear and straightforward. Because the changes to the statute are prospective an d Alvarado committed his crime before October 1, 2011, he is not entitled to conduct credit at the enhanced rate.

4 As part of the Realignment Act, the Legislature amended section 4019 to enhance the rate at which defendants could earn presentence conduct credits. (§ 4019, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482.) The Legislature added subdivision (h) to section 4019 to clarify that the changes to c onduct credits apply to offenses committed on or after October 1, 2011.5 The second sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h) prov ides: "Any days earned by a prisoner prior to Oc tober 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law." Arguably, this sent ence implies any days earned by a defendant after October 1, 2011, are to be calculated at the rate required by the current law, without regard for when the offense was committed. However, reading the second sentence in this manner renders the first sentence meaningless, and ignores the first sentence's express direction that the amendment is to apply prospectively. "A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and inte nt. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connec tion with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole." ( Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268 .) Alvarado's proffered interpretation would "defy the Legislature's clear intent in subdivision (h)'s first sentence and contra dict well settled principles of statutory construction." ( Rajanayagam , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) This interpretation is not unique. "[S] ubdivision (h)'s first sentence reflects the Legislature intended the enhanced conduc t credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision (h)'s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to any other group, namely those defendants who committe d offenses before October 1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdi vision (h)'s second sentence attempts to clarify that defendants who committed an offense before6 October 1, 2011, are to earn credit under the prior law. However inartful the language of subdivision (h), we read the second sentence as reaffirming that defendants who committed their crimes before October 1, 2011, still have the opportunity to earn conduct credits, just under prior law." ( Rajanayagam , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52; see also People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1553 ( Ellis ).) Because Alvarado committed his crime before Oc tober 1, 2011, amended section 4019's enhanced conduct credit calculation does not apply. Therefore, the court properly calculated Alvarado's conduct credits under the prior law. (§ 4019, subds. (f), (h).) III EQUAL PROTECTION Alvarado next argues that were section 4019 interpreted to apply only to crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011, it would violate equal protection principles. We disagree. The first inquiry in an equal protection claim is whether the state has adopted a classification that applies different treatment to two or more groups that are similarly situated for purposes of the challenged law. ( People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199.) For purposes of section 4019 , there are two classes of incarcerated inmates: (1) those in jail on or after Octobe r 1, 2011, having committed a crime on or after October 1, 2011; and (2) those in jail on or after Oc tober 1, 2011, having committed the same offense before October 1, 2011.7 In the context of section 4019 credit s, courts are split on whether the two classes of incarcerated inmates are similarl y situated. Three appellate courts have held the two classes of incarcerated inmates are not similarly situated in that they are not similarly encouraged to alter their beha vior because the plain language of section 4019, subdivision (h) makes clear the new credit calculation rate applies only to individuals who committed a crime on or after October 1, 2011. ( Ellis , supra , 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1551-1553; People v. Garcia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 530, 541; People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 395- 399.) Two other appellate courts have held the current version of section 4019 creates a clas sification that affects two similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (See People v. Verba (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 991, 995-996 ( Verba ); Rajanayagam , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) We agree with Alvarado that the two groups of incarcerated inmates are similarly situated and are treated differe ntly with respect to sect ion 4019, subdivision (h). Defendants who committed offenses and earned conduct credit before October 1, 2011, are treated more harshly than those who committed the same crimes and earned conduct credit on or after October 1, 2011. "The two groups are similarly situated in the sense that they committed the same offenses but are treated differently in terms of earning conduct credit based solely on the dates their crimes were committed. For purposes of receiving conduct credit, nothing distinguishes the stat us of a prisoner whose crime was committed after October 1, 2011, from one whose crime was committed before that date." ( Verba, supra , 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 995-996.)8 Although unequal treatme nt exists, Alvarado must also show there is no rational basis for applying amended section 401 9, subdivision (h) onl y to those crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011. Assuming the state had adopted a classification that affected two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner, the next step would be to determ ine whether those clas sifications bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state pur pose. The Legislature's stated purpose for passing the Realignment Act was "to reduce recidivism and improve public safety, while at the same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice spending." ( People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 679; § 17.5.) We conclude that the classification regarding conduct credits is ra tionally related to the Legislature's stated goal of cost savings. The effective date of the Realignment Act was a" legislative determination that its stated goal of reducin g corrections costs was best served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011." ( Rajanayagam , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.) While the same goal could have been met by awarding additional conduct credits to defendants in Alvarado's position, the Legisla ture is entitled to es tablish an effective date for statutory amendments and "to discri minate between rights of an earlier and later time." ( Ibid .) "Under the very deferential rational re lationship test, we will not second-guess the Legislature and conclude its stated pu rpose is better serv ed by increasing the group of defendants who ar e entitled to enhanced conduct credits when the9 Legislature has determined the fiscal crisis is best ameliorated by awarding enhanced conduct credit to only those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011." ( Rajanayagam , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.) We agree with the decisions in Rajanayagam and Ellis, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, that the enhanced conduct credits established in am ended section 4019, su bdivision (h) do not apply to crimes committed before October 1, 2011, and this classification is not a violation of equal protection. Consequently, Alvarado is not entitled to additional presentence conduct credits. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J. WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

McDONALD, J.