COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00139-CR

NO. 02-10-00140-CR

NO. 02-10-00141-CR

VICTOR T. STEVENS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Victor T. Stevens appeals his convictions for fraudulent use or 

possession of five or more but less than ten items of identifying information, 

fraudulent use or possession of ten or more but less than fifty items of identifying 

information, two counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and theft of 

a vehicle valued at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000. In three points, 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Stevens argues that the trial court erred by not submitting an accomplice-witness

instruction in the jury charge for the aggravated robbery offenses, that legally 

insufficient evidence exists to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court 

erred by allowing testimony about Stevens‘s alleged gang activity. We will affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., three men entered a house rented to three 

Texas Christian University students and robbed the people inside at gunpoint. 

Ryan Ross and Albert Rayle were spending the night at the house in addition to 

the three tenants. One of the robbers put a pistol to the back of Ross‘s head and 

forced his face down on the couch. Another robber pointed a gun at Rayle and 

led him upstairs to the bedrooms. The robbers kept asking the students where 

―the stash‖ was. Forrest Goodall, one of the tenants of the house, opened the 

door to his room and saw a man holding a sawed-off shotgun to the back of 

Rayle‘s head. The robbers rummaged through Goodall‘s room, asking ―Where‘s 

the stash? Where‘s the stash?‖ The three robbers tied up the students and left 

in Goodall‘s Ford truck with credit cards and other items from the home.

A few days after the robbery, a Fort Worth police officer saw the stolen 

Ford truck at a motel in Fort Worth. A person at the motel told the police that the 

truck was related to room 135 of the motel. Police knocked on the door to room 

135, and Monica Reyes answered. She was in the room with her sleeping 

children. Reyes initially denied knowing anything about the truck, but when 

police later returned, she told them that Stevens had given her a ride in the truck 
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to get food for her children; she had assumed Stevens owned the truck. She 

informed the police that her husband was Arturo Gonzalez, a friend of Stevens. 

Police obtained Reyes‘s consent to search the room and found a black Nike bag 

under the bed. The bag contained IDs and credit cards belonging to the TCU 

students, as well as clothing that Reyes had seen Stevens wearing earlier that 

day. She told police that she did not know the bag was there. Reyes was initially 

charged with possession of the stolen credit cards, but the district attorney‘s 

office did not take the case; she was never a suspect in the robbery. Police 

found fingerprints belonging to Stevens on the stolen Ford truck and on a 

checkbook box that was inside the black Nike bag.

Goodall ultimately identified Stevens from a police photo spread as the 

robber who had held the sawed-off shotgun during the robbery. Goodall was 

unable to identify the other two robbers.

In three cause numbers, Stevens was charged with fraudulent use or 

possession of five or more but less than ten items of identifying information, 

fraudulent use or possession of ten or more but less than fifty items of identifying 

information, two counts of organized criminal activity—aggravated robbery, two 

counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and theft of a vehicle 

valuing $20,000 or more but less than $100,000. The jury acquitted Stevens of 

both counts of organized criminal activity; convicted him of the remaining counts; 

and assessed his punishment at thirty-five years‘ imprisonment for both robbery 

convictions, fifteen years‘ imprisonment for the theft conviction and for each 
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fraudulent-use-or-possession conviction, and a $1,500 fine for each conviction. 

The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently.

III. ACCOMPLICE-WITNESS INSTRUCTION

In his first point, Stevens argues that the trial court erred by refusing to 

include his requested accomplice-witness jury instruction in the charges for the 

aggravated robbery offenses. He argues that he was entitled to the instruction

because Reyes was in possession of the bag containing stolen items and 

because she had received a ride in the stolen truck.2The State argues that the 

trial court did not err by refusing to include an accomplice-witness instruction 

because no evidence showed that Reyes was a party to the aggravated robbery

offenses.

Appellate review of error in a jury charge involves a two-step process. 

Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Sakil v. State, 

287 S.W.3d 23, 25–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Initially, we must determine 

whether error occurred. If it did, we must then evaluate whether sufficient harm 

resulted from the error to require reversal. Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731–32.

Under the accomplice-witness rule, a conviction cannot be secured upon 

an accomplice‘s testimony unless corroborated by other evidence tending to 

connect the defendant to the offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14

(West 2005); Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. 

 

2Stevens argues that police saw Reyes in the stolen truck, but this is not 

supported by the record. Reyes told police, and testified at trial, that Stevens 

gave her a ride in the truck.
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denied, 552 U.S. 1028 (2007). An accomplice witness is a person who 

participates in the offense before, during, or after its commission with the 

requisite mental state and who testifies against another. Smith v. State, 332 

S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a) 

(West 2011) (the law of parties); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (the 

accomplice-witness rule). An accomplice must have engaged in an affirmative 

act that promotes the commission of the offense that the accused committed. 

Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439. A person is not an accomplice if the person knew 

about the offense and failed to disclose it or helped the accused conceal it or if 

the person was merely present at the crime scene. Id. And complicity with an 

accused in the commission of another offense apart from the charged offense 

does not make that witness an accomplice witness. Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498.

A witness may be an accomplice either as a matter of law or as a matter of 

fact, and the evidence in each case determines what jury instruction, if any, 

should be given. Id.; Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1287 (2007). If the evidence is clear that the 

witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, that is, the witness has been, or 

could have been, indicted for the same or lesser-included offense, then the trial 

court must instruct the jury on the law of accomplice-witness testimony. Cooke, 

201 S.W.3d at 747–48. If there is conflicting evidence about whether a witness is 

an accomplice, the court should submit the question to the jury inquiring whether 

the jury finds that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of fact. Id. at 748. If 
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there is no evidence that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court is not 

obligated to provide an accomplice-witness instruction. Id.

In this case, the evidence shows that three men participated in the

robbery; no evidence suggests that a woman went to the house or was with the 

robbers on the night of the robbery. Several days after the robbery, Reyes 

received a ride from Stevens in the stolen truck, but she assumed that the truck 

belonged to him. Although a bag containing the students‘ stolen IDs and credit 

cards was found under a bed in the motel room rented to Reyes, she told police 

that she did not know it was there. Even if evidence existed that Reyes knew the 

truck was stolen or knew the bag was under the bed, no evidence shows that, 

acting with the required culpable mental state, she actively participated in the 

robbery before, during, or after its commission or that she acted in a manner to 

promote the robbery. See, e.g., Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 500 (―[M]erely assisting 

after the fact in the disposal of a body does not transform a witness into an 

accomplice witness in a prosecution for murder.‖) (citing Paredes v. State, 129 

S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Roden v. State, 338 S.W.3d 626, 630 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref‘d) (holding that accomplice-witness 

instruction not required when evidence showed that witness dragged one robber 

away from house and was inside appellant‘s house with stolen property but also 

showed that witness did not enter burglarized house and steal property). 

Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to include an 

accomplice-witness instruction in the jury charges for the aggravated robbery 
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offenses. We overrule Stevens‘s first point.

IV. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

In his second point, Stevens argues that legally insufficient evidence exists 

to support his five convictions for fraudulent use or possession of five or more but 

less than ten items of identifying information, fraudulent use or possession of ten 

or more but less than fifty items of identifying information, two counts of 

aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and theft of a vehicle valued at

$20,000 or more but less than $100,000. The State‘s sole response is that 

Stevens‘s point is inadequately briefed. 

In order to present issues to this court for review, an appellant‘s brief must 

contain clear and concise arguments for the contentions made, with appropriate 

citations to authorities and to the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). If a party does 

not refer the appellate court to the pages in the record where the error allegedly 

occurred, the appellate court may properly overrule the point as inadequately 

briefed. Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App.) (stating that the 

court ―has no obligation to construct and compose appellant‘s issues, facts, and 

arguments  ̳with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record‘‖), cert. 

denied, 129 S. Ct. 625 (2008).

In his brief, Stevens provides the applicable standard of review and 

argues, without citation to the record, that the State ―did not meet its burden of 

proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in that it failed to prove that [Stevens] 

committed the offense[s] as is set out in the indictments.‖ Stevens does not set 
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forth the elements of the offenses for the five convictions that he challenges for 

legal sufficiency, and he does not provide any argument, record references, or 

substantive analysis as to how the evidence is insufficient to support any of the 

elements of those offenses. Given these circumstances, given that there are five 

convictions for four different offenses that involve different elements, given that 

the State relies only on inadequate briefing in its response without analyzing the 

evidence as to any of the five convictions, and given the large record, we are 

constrained to agree with the State that Stevens‘s legal sufficiency challenge to 

these five convictions is inadequate. We conclude that his inadequate briefing

presents nothing for review, and we overrule his second point. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 38.1(i); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App.) (holding that 

merely stating standard of review for determining sufficiency of evidence 

constitutes inadequate briefing and presents nothing for appellate review), cert. 

denied, 522 U.S. 844 (1997).

V. EVIDENCE OF GANG MEMBERSHIP

In his third point, Stevens argues that the trial court erred by allowing 

testimony of his alleged gang membership. Although he does not specifically 

point to the testimony forming the basis of his complaints and does not explain

how the testimony was inadmissible, he provides a record citation corresponding

to the testimony of Tarrant County Sheriff‘s Deputy Richard Almendarez. The 

State argues that Stevens waived his complaint and that, alternatively, any error

was harmless.
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Deputy Almendarez testified that he received, by email, a photograph of 

graffiti that Stevens had drawn on the wall of his jail cell. Deputy Almendarez 

testified that he decided to interview Stevens because the graffiti appeared to be 

gang-related. When the State asked Deputy Almendarez about his training and 

experience ―with regard to spotting the signs of gang activity,‖ defense counsel 

objected that the deputy had not been qualified as a gang expert. The trial court 

overruled the objection, stating that it ―would like to hear about his qualifications.‖ 

Deputy Almendarez explained that he has been responsible for ―gang 

intelligence‖ within the Tarrant County jail since 1996, that he takes a training 

class in gang activity at least once a year, and that he has testified in the area of 

gang tattoos and gang affiliation on ―[m]any‖ occasions. Deputy Almendarez

then testified that Stevens had denied any gang affiliation during his interview 

and that it is important to know when inmates are affiliated with a gang ―to 

maintain the safety and security of the jail facility.‖

A party may challenge expert testimony on at least three specific grounds: 

(1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance. See Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 

128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The three requirements raise distinct questions 

and issues, and an objection based on one of these requirements does not 

preserve error as to another. Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 584 n.5 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref‘d) (holding that an objection based on 

the expert‘s qualifications did not preserve the reliability issue), cert. denied, 129 

S. Ct. 1325 (2009); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
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Here, even assuming that Stevens‘s complaint on appeal is adequately 

briefed,3his complaint does not comport with his objection at trial. At trial, 

Stevens objected to Deputy Almendarez‘s qualifications as a gang expert, but on 

appeal, Stevens appears to complain that the deputy‘s testimony was not 

relevant—―the testimony did not assist the trier of fact.‖ Accordingly, Stevens‘s 

third point was not preserved. See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009) (―Whether a party‘s particular complaint is preserved depends

on whether the complaint on appeal comports with the complaint made at trial.‖); 

Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 584 n.5. We overrule Stevens‘s third point.

VI. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Stevens‘s three points, we affirm the trial court‘s 

judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ. 

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: October 27, 2011

 

3Other than generally asserting that the trial court erred by allowing 

testimony of his alleged gang membership, Stevens‘s brief contains only the law 

applicable to expert witness qualifications and a conclusory statement that 

―[t]here was no evidence that this alleged robbery was gang related and the 

testimony did not assist the trier of fact.‖