COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 28, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2023AP1058-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF860

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JAMIE P. POOLE,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Fond du Lac

County: PETER L. GRIMM, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further 

proceedings with directions. 

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Lazar, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2023AP1058-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jamie P. Poole appeals a judgment of conviction 

entered upon his guilty pleas to two felony possession-of-drug offenses. He 

argues the circuit court erred by denying his suppression motion after concluding 

that no constitutional seizure occurred when a police officer parked his squad car 

behind Poole’s vehicle such that Poole could not leave and illuminated Poole’s 

vehicle with the squad’s spotlight. He also argues that the stop was not 

constitutionally permissible. We reverse and remand for further proceedings with 

directions to grant the suppression motion.1

BACKGROUND

¶2 In the early morning hours of December 7, 2020, a Fond du Lac 

County Sheriff’s Department patrol deputy discovered Poole’s vehicle legally 

parked in a parking area at the trailhead to a piece of public land often used for 

hiking. The vehicle was running, and the headlights were off. The deputy found 

this unusual. In the previous month or so of patrols, he had not seen a vehicle 

parked there during his shift. The deputy acknowledged that there was nothing 

suspicious about the vehicle itself. However, he testified it was not “uncommon to 

have parking areas like that throughout the county ... where people park and walk 

and try to burglarize homes or do illegal activities.” 

 

1

 Poole’s brief-in-chief cites only to his appendix in violation of WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.19(1)(d) and (e) (2021-22), which requires that the statement of the case and argument 

be supported by appropriate references to the appellate record. We admonish Poole’s appellate 

counsel that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See 

WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) (2021-22).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2023AP1058-CR

3

¶3 The deputy decided to investigate further. He parked his squad car 

behind Poole’s vehicle such that he was blocking the rear passenger corner. This 

effectively trapped Poole’s vehicle: Poole could not pull his vehicle forward 

because there was a fence surrounding the parking area, and Poole testified he 

likely would have hit the squad car if he tried to back up. The deputy then 

illuminated Poole’s vehicle with the squad’s headlights and with a spotlight.

¶4 The deputy approached Poole’s vehicle and identified himself as a 

sheriff’s deputy. He could see that the two front seats were occupied, and he 

asked the individuals what they were doing. Poole, the driver, responded that they 

were just talking. The deputy asked for identification, which both occupants 

provided. Ultimately, the passenger was taken into custody on an active warrant, 

and police seized some narcotics, which Poole claimed ownership of. 

¶5 Poole filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from the stop, 

alleging he was unlawfully detained. Following an evidentiary hearing at which 

the deputy and Poole testified, the circuit court made findings of fact consistent 

with the facts described above. The court determined the detention was supported 

by reasonable suspicion, emphasizing the rural nature of the area, the time of the 

morning, the deputy’s testimony that he had not previously seen anyone there, and 

the “officer’s suspicions or concerns that there was crime, whether burglary or 

other crimes.” Though it was not argued by the parties, the court also stated it was 

a “wise decision by the officer under [the police] community caretaking [function] 

to check on the [vehicle] occupants, make sure they’re not passed out from 

noxious fumes from the car, and to make sure they weren’t overdosed.”2 Poole 

 

2

 The State’s brief has abandoned any reliance on the community caretaker doctrine to 

justify the seizure.
No. 2023AP1058-CR

4

then entered guilty pleas to the two possession offenses pursuant to a plea 

agreement with the State. He now challenges the suppression ruling pursuant to 

WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of 

constitutional fact. State v. VanBeek, 2021 WI 51, ¶22, 397 Wis. 2d 311, 960 

N.W.2d 32. “[W]e uphold a circuit court’s findings of historic fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous.” Id. However, we independently determine whether the facts 

known at the time of the seizure justified the government intrusion. Id. 

¶7 The parties first dispute when the seizure occurred. The State argues 

Poole and his passenger were first seized when the deputy withheld their proof of 

identification while awaiting backup on the outstanding warrant. On the other 

hand, Poole argues he was seized when the deputy positioned his squad car behind 

his vehicle in a way that prevented Poole from leaving without striking the 

deputy’s car. 

¶8 A seizure occurs when an officer, “by means of physical force or 

show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” County of 

Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, ¶20, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 243 (citing United 

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980)). The operative test is whether a 

reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that he or she was 

not free to leave. Id., ¶24.

¶9 We conclude Poole was seized the moment the deputy parked 

behind him and illuminated his vehicle with a spotlight. The State’s argument 

emphasizes the deputy’s use of the spotlight, citing State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, 
No. 2023AP1058-CR

5

¶65 n.18, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729, for the proposition that the use of a 

spotlight is not a show of authority sufficient to effect a seizure. But Young was 

very clear that the use of a spotlight in conjunction with other displays of authority 

may constitute a seizure, id., ¶65, and here, the deputy also prevented Poole from 

leaving by placing his squad car within Poole’s only available path of departure. 

See State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 247, 258-59, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996) 

(holding seizure occurred when officers blocked car with their own vehicle). 

¶10 The State rather incredibly asserts that no seizure occurred because 

Poole only thought he would hit the squad car if he tried to leave. The State 

suggests that maybe Poole was wrong and that he could have performed some 

undescribed vehicular maneuver to avoid the squad car that the deputy had placed 

directly in the exit path of Poole’s vehicle.

¶11 At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden to prove that a 

warrantless seizure is constitutionally reasonable. State v. Radder, 2018 WI App 

36, ¶15, 382 Wis. 2d 749, 915 N.W.2d 180. If the State wanted to rely on Vogt, 

356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶42, it was incumbent upon the State to prove at the suppression 

hearing that there was an avenue by which Poole could have actually left the 

scene. It did not do so, and the circuit court’s finding that Poole would have hit 

the squad car had he tried to leave is not clearly erroneous. 

¶12 We next turn to whether the seizure comports with the constitutional 

prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. art. IV. An 

investigatory stop comports with the Fourth Amendment if the police have 

reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is 

about to be committed. State v. Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 
No. 2023AP1058-CR

6

N.W.2d 41. Whether law enforcement would reasonably suspect that criminal 

activity is afoot is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. Id., ¶9.

¶13 The State’s argument that the deputy here possessed reasonable 

suspicion fails because the State can point to no “specific and articulable facts” 

suggesting that anyone in Poole’s vehicle was up to anything nefarious. See id., 

¶8. The State is correct that the time and location at which the deputy observed 

Poole’s vehicle is relevant to the analysis. See State v. Matthews, 2011 WI App 

92, ¶11, 334 Wis. 2d 455, 799 N.W.2d 911. The deputy’s perceived oddity of a 

car lawfully parked in a public area during early morning hours hardly suffices as 

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, though. Indeed, even a person’s 

presence in a “high crime” area—which nothing suggests this was—adds nothing 

to reasonable suspicion absent other factors suggesting criminal behavior. See 

State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, ¶15, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.

¶14 The States suggests that something else was present in this case: the 

deputy’s knowledge that, in the State’s words, “some stealthy criminals left their 

cars in similar areas before burglarizing nearby homes or engaging in other 

unlawful activity.” This argument is unconvincing. As Poole explains, there was 

no evidence of recent burglaries in the area and no reports of suspicious persons or 

burglaries that evening. The State did not even establish at the suppression 

hearing that there were feasible burglary targets within walking distance of the 

trailhead—the circuit court described the area as “highly rural.” 

¶15 Considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputy lacked 

specific and articulable facts objectively suggesting that Poole or anyone else in 

the vehicle was engaged in anything unlawful. The deputy was operating merely 
No. 2023AP1058-CR

7

on a hunch, which is insufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Genous, 

397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8. 

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further 

proceedings with directions. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.