IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs November 7, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JEFFREY GLYNN MCCOY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Gibson County

No. 19202 Clayburn Peeples, Judge

No. W2016-01619-CCA-R3-CD

The defendant, Jeffrey Glynn McCoy, appeals the total effective sentence of 12 years 

imposed for his Gibson County guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary and theft of 

property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, arguing that the trial court 

erred by imposing terms of 12 years and by ordering that he serve the effective sentence 

consecutively to a sentence previously imposed in South Carolina. Discerning no error, 

we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR.,JJ., joined.

William Milam, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffrey Glynn McCoy.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Robert W. Wilson, Assistant 

Attorney General; Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General; and Jerald Campbell and 

Hillary Lawler Parham, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

The Gibson County Grand Jury charged the defendant with burglary of the 

Food Rite and the theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 from 

the Food Rite on May 7, 2012. Shortly after the defendant’s July 13, 2016 trial began, 

the defendant indicated that he wanted to accept the State’s previous offer to plead guilty 

to the charges in exchange for a Range III, 10-year sentence. By that time, however, the 

State had withdrawn the offer. The defendant then entered into a “blind plea.” Upon 

being questioned by the court, the defendant admitted his involvement in the burglary and 

theft of items from the Food Rite.

12/19/2017
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At the December 2, 2016 sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the 

presentence report and the arguments of counsel. The presentence report established that 

the 42-year-old defendant’s criminal history dated back to 1993 and included convictions 

from Tennessee, Florida, and South Carolina. The defendant’s criminal history included 

multiple convictions of theft, burglary, driving under the influence, and drug possession. 

The convictions that gave rise to the 25-year South Carolina sentence–burglary, 

safecracking, and larceny–were nearly identical to the convictions in this case, where the 

defendant and his cohorts burglarized the Food Rite and cracked the safe inside. In 

contrast to the lengthy criminal history, the presentence report contained no employment 

history at all.

The court found that the defendant was a Range III offender as to his theft 

conviction and a career offender as to his burglary conviction. In keeping with its finding 

that the defendant was a career offender as to his burglary conviction, the trial court 

sentenced the defendant to serve 12 years at a 60 percent release eligibility percentage. 

The court imposed a sentence of 12 years with a release eligibility percentage of 45 

percent for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered the 12-year sentences to be 

served concurrently to one another. Based upon its finding that the defendant was a 

professional criminal and “that his record of criminal activity is extremely extensive,” the 

trial court ordered that the 12-year effective sentence be served consecutively to the 25-

year sentence from South Carolina.

In this appeal, the defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to impose 12-

year sentences and to align his 12-year effective sentence consecutively to the 25-year 

South Carolina sentence, arguing that “too much weight” was given to his prior criminal 

history. The State asserts that the sentence is appropriate.

Our standard of review of the trial court’s sentencing determinations in this 

case is whether the trial court abused its discretion, but we apply a “presumption of 

reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of 

the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 

(Tenn. 2012). The application of the purposes and principles of sentencing involves a 

consideration of “[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of 

the defendant . . . in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to be 

imposed.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5). Trial courts are “required under the 2005 

amendments to ‘place on the record, either orally or in writing, what enhancement or 

mitigating factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for the sentence, in order 

to ensure fair and consistent sentencing.’” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706 n.41 (citing T.C.A. § 

40-35-210(e)). Under the holding in Bise, “[a] sentence should be upheld so long as it is 
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within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in 

compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709.

With respect to consecutive sentencing, our supreme court has held that the 

standard of review adopted in Bise “applies similarly” to the imposition of consecutive 

sentences, “giving deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to 

impose consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on the record establishing at least 

one of the seven grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b).” 

State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tenn. 2013). In State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 

933 (Tenn. 1995), the supreme court imposed two additional requirements for 

consecutive sentencing when the “dangerous offender” category is used: the court must 

find that consecutive sentences are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses 

committed and are necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct. Id. at 

937-39; see State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 707-08 (Tenn. 2002).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court, in sentencing the defendant, 

considered all appropriate principles set forth in Code section 40-35-210(b). The court 

had no discretion to impose a sentence other than 12 years for the defendant’s conviction 

of burglary. See T.C.A. § 40-35-108(c) (“A defendant who is found by the court beyond 

a reasonable doubt to be a career offender shall receive the maximum sentence within the 

applicable Range III.”); id. § 40-35-112(c)(4) (“A Range III sentence is . . . [f]or a Class 

D felony, not less than eight (8) nor more than twelve (12) years.”). The court enhanced

the sentence imposed for the defendant’s conviction of theft based upon the defendant’s 

extensive criminal history. In our view, no error attends this decision.

The trial court ordered consecutive alignment of the 12-year effective 

sentence with the 25-year South Carolina sentence the defendant was serving at the time 

he pleaded guilty in this case based upon its finding that the defendant was a professional 

criminal and that he had an extensive criminal history. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(1) 

(“The defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted the defendant’s 

life to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood . . . .”); id. § 40-35-115(b)(2) (“The 

defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive . . . .”). The 

record thoroughly supports both findings. As indicated, the defendant’s history spanned 

more than two decades and included multiple convictions of burglary and theft, the same 

crimes at issue in this case. In contrast to his lengthy and extensive criminal history, the 

defendant had no employment history.

Because the record fully supports the trial court’s sentencing decision, we 

affirm the judgments of the trial court.
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_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE