NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

TYTRELL TREVON BRYANT, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0057 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-107856-001 

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Carlos Daniel Carrion 

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 2-21-2019
STATE v. BRYANT

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Tytrell Trevon Bryant appeals from his convictions and 

sentences for aggravated assault, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and 

misconduct involving weapons. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 In February 2017, Bryant and another man confronted the 

victim as he was seated in the front passenger seat of a friend’s vehicle. 

After exchanging words with the victim, Bryant allegedly struck him in the 

head with a gun. Bleeding from the blow to his head, the victim attempted 

to flee but fell shortly after exiting the vehicle. Bryant then approached the 

victim as he lay on the ground and shot him. The bullet penetrated and 

went through the victim’s arm. Despite his injuries, the victim managed to 

get to his feet and escape. 

¶3 Bryant was subsequently arrested and indicted on four

counts: (1) one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a class 3 

dangerous felony, for striking the victim in the head with a gun; (2) a 

second count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a class 3 

dangerous felony, for shooting the victim; (3) one count of misconduct 

involving weapons, a class 4 dangerous felony, for possessing a handgun 

as a prohibited possessor; and (4) one count of unlawful discharge of a 

firearm, a class 6 dangerous felony, for firing the gun during the 

confrontation with the victim. The State also alleged Bryant had two 

historical prior felony convictions, committed the offenses charged in the 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Bryant. State v. Harm, 

236 Ariz. 402, 404, ¶ 2, n.2 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 

495 (App. 1996)).
STATE v. BRYANT

Decision of the Court

3 

indictment while on release from confinement, and the offenses involved

several aggravating circumstances. 

¶4 After a four-day trial, a jury found Bryant guilty of the second 

count of aggravated assault, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and 

misconduct involving weapons, but could not reach a verdict on the first 

count of aggravated assault. The trial then moved to the aggravation phase. 

In this phase, the jury had to determine whether: (1) the offenses involved 

the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury, Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-701(D)(1); and (2) the offenses caused physical harm to 

the victim, A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9). The jury also had to determine whether 

Bryant was on release at the time of the offenses. However, the jury was not 

instructed on the statutory definition of “serious physical injury.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-105(39). The jury found the three allegations proven for all three 

offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶5 The court sentenced Bryant to an aggravated term of 17.5 

years’ imprisonment on the second aggravated assault count. The court also 

sentenced Bryant to 12 years’ imprisonment on the misconduct involving 

weapons count and 4.5 years’ imprisonment on the unlawful discharge of 

a firearm count, to be served concurrently with the aggravated-assault 

sentence. Bryant timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by

Failing to Define “Serious Physical Injury.” 

¶6 Bryant argues the superior court erred by failing to instruct 

the jury regarding the statutory definition of “serious physical injury,” see 

A.R.S. § 13-105(39), before the jury considered the aggravating 

circumstance of whether Bryant’s criminal conduct involved the “infliction 

or threatened infliction of serious physical injury,” see A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1).

Bryant contends the failure to define serious physical injury “lessened the 

burden that the State had to carry,” because the jury was instructed as to 

the definition of “physical injury” at a separate phase of the trial. We 

disagree.

¶7 Because Bryant did not object to the failure to give the 

instruction, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Valles, 162 Ariz. 

1, 6 (1989). Our supreme court has recently described a defendant’s burden 

on fundamental error review as follows:
STATE v. BRYANT

Decision of the Court

4 

A defendant establishes fundamental error by showing that 

(1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error 

took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) 

the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have 

received a fair trial. If the defendant establishes fundamental

error under prongs one or two, he must make a separate 

showing of prejudice, which also “involves a fact-intensive 

inquiry.” If the defendant establishes the third prong, he has 

shown both fundamental error and prejudice, and a new trial 

must be granted.

State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 141, ¶ 21 (2018) (citation omitted) (quoting 

State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 568, ¶ 26 (2005)). With respect to jury 

instructions, “the test is whether the instructions adequately set forth the 

law applicable to the case.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 16 (1998). 

“We view jury instructions in their entirety when determining whether they 

adequately reflect the law.” Id. at 61–62, ¶ 16. 

¶8 At the outset, we reject the implication of Bryant’s argument 

that without instruction on the statutory definition of “serious physical 

injury,” the jury equated “physical injury” with “serious physical injury.”

During the guilt phase of the trial, the jury was instructed to determine 

whether Bryant “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused a physical 

injury to another person.” See A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1). The jury was also 

instructed on the statutory definition of “physical injury,” which means 

“the impairment of physical condition.” See A.R.S. § 13-105(33). At the 

aggravation phase of the trial, the jury was instructed to determine whether 

the offenses “involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 

physical injury,” A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1) (emphasis added). The jury was also 

instructed to “decide each aggravating factor separately on the evidence 

with the law applicable to it.” We presume the jurors read and followed 

these instructions. See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 69 (2006). The 

question then is not whether the jury improperly equated “physical injury” 

with “serious physical injury.” Instead, we must determine whether the 

common meaning of the word “serious,” coupled with the statutory 

definition of “physical injury” available to the jury, has essentially the same 

meaning as the statutory definition of “serious physical injury.” See State v. 

Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 66 (1983) (when statutory definition and common 

definition are “essentially the same,” failure to include statutory definition

in jury instructions is not fundamental error); Valles, 162 Ariz. at 6–7 

(finding no error in failure to define “deadly weapon” when the common 

definition and statutory meaning of “deadly weapon” were essentially the 

same). 
STATE v. BRYANT

Decision of the Court

5 

¶9 A common definition of “serious” in the context of an injury 

is “having important or dangerous possible consequences.”

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1136 (11th ed. 2012); see also

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2073 (1969) (defining 

“serious” as “grave in disposition, appearance, or manner”). Black’s Law 

Dictionary further defines the term “serious” for an injury as “dangerous; 

potentially resulting in death or other severe consequences.” Serious, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The common meaning of the term 

“serious,” combined with the statutory definition of physical injury, tracks

with the statutory definition of “serious physical injury,” which “includes 

physical injury that creates a reasonable risk of death, or that causes serious 

and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health or loss or 

protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-105(39). Consequently, there was no danger that the failure to instruct 

the jury on the definition of “serious physical injury” lowered the State’s 

burden to prove the offenses involved the infliction or threatened infliction 

of serious physical injury, and we find no fundamental error here.

¶10 We find further support for this conclusion in State v. Perry, 5 

Ariz. App. 315 (1967). In Perry, this court found no error in the failure to 

define the phrase “serious bodily injury” in jury instructions because the 

superior court was not required to define “words of ordinary 

significance . . . well understood by any jury of ordinary intelligence.” Id. at 

318. The statutory definition of “serious physical injury” in A.R.S. 

§ 13-105(39) parallels the definition of “serious bodily injury” in the Model 

Penal Code, “upon which Arizona has based its criminal code.” State v. 

George, 206 Ariz. 436, 442, ¶ 11 (App. 2003); Model Penal Code § 210.0(3)

(1962). Accordingly, we are confident that the jury in this case, like the jury 

in Perry, was readily equipped to determine and apply the proper meaning 

of “serious physical injury” even without a specific instruction defining it. 

See State v. Dodd, 244 Ariz. 182, 186–87, ¶ 16 (App. 2017) (citing Perry, 5 Ariz. 

App. at 317–18) (jury could use “their collective common sense” to 

determine whether the evidence “satisfied the definition of ‘serious 

physical injury’ in A.R.S. § 13-105(39)”). 

B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding that Bryant’s 

Criminal Conduct Involved the Infliction or Threatened Infliction 

of Serious Physical Injury. 

¶11 Bryant also argues the jury lacked enough evidence to find, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offenses involved the “[i]nfliction or 

threatened infliction of serious physical injury.” A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1). 

Bryant contends “the court would not have given a slightly aggravated 
STATE v. BRYANT

Decision of the Court

6 

sentence” but for the jury’s erroneous finding of that aggravating 

circumstance. 

¶12 We review the sufficiency of evidence de novo. State v. West, 

226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

[aggravating circumstance] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 16 

(quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence . . . is such proof that reasonable 

persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted).

¶13 In this case, the criminal offenses charged by the State

stemmed from a single series of events: Bryant attacking and then shooting

the victim. However, Bryant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his convictions for this conduct. Instead, Bryant 

argues that without evidence concerning the medical impact of the victim’s 

gunshot wound, there is not sufficient proof that he inflicted serious

physical injury pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1). To support this assertion, 

Bryant cites the definition of “serious physical injury” in A.R.S. 

§ 13-105(39). He also cites George, which held that, absent evidence of the

serious impairment caused by the injury, a gunshot wound was not a 

“serious physical injury” for proving aggravated assault under A.R.S. 

§ 13-1204(A)(1). See George, 206 Ariz. at 442, ¶ 14. 

¶14 Bryant’s argument ignores the fact that A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1) 

requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct

involved either the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury 

during the commission of the offense. George is thus inapposite as the 

statute at issue in that case required the State to prove the defendant caused

serious physical injury. 206 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 3. The State here, on the other 

hand, was only required to prove that Bryant’s criminal conduct involved 

the threatened infliction of serious physical injury.2 Indeed, during its 

closing argument at the the aggravation phase, the State specifically 

informed the jury that it only sought to prove that Bryant’s conduct 

threatened the infliction of serious physical injury. The evidence the State 

 

2 Although we need not address George further, we note that a recent 

opinion of this court called into doubt George’s conclusion “that a gunshot 

wound which penetrates the neck and exits through the armpit is not 

necessarily a ‘serious physical injury.’” See Dodd, 244 Ariz. at 186, ¶ 16 

(observing that the holding in George is “extraordinary”). 
STATE v. BRYANT

Decision of the Court

7 

presented at trial established Bryant attacked the victim and shot him as he 

attempted to flee. Based on their common sense and experience, reasonable 

jurors certainly could conclude this conduct involved the threatened

infliction of serious physical injury; it would stretch the boundaries of belief 

to say otherwise.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bryant’s convictions and 

sentences.