Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

\this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MICHAEL J. SPENCER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Bloomington, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

CHRISTINE REDELMAN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

Office of Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ANNA M. SEBREE

Indiana Department of Child Services

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION )

OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP )

OF: J.A. (Minor Child), )

)

And )

)

M.R. (Mother), )

)

Appellant/Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 53A01-1307-JT-306

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee/Petitioner. )
2

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Stephen R. Galvin, Judge

Cause No. 53C07-1210-JT-624

December 31, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Judge

Case Summary

M.R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her young son, 

J.A. She argues that the trial court should have allowed her to reopen evidence and

submit additional information about the status of her older child, who was not involved in 

these proceedings. We find that the trial court did not err in rejecting this request. 

Mother also challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying the court’s decision to 

terminate her parental rights. But J.A. has been in foster care essentially from birth, and 

since that time, Mother has not proven that she is capable of caring for J.A.’s special

needs. Mother also failed to comply with all of the trial court’s orders. Thus, there was 

sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

J.A. was born prematurely in April 2011. Because he weighed just one pound at 

birth, he was transferred from a Bloomington hospital to Riley Hospital for Children in 

Indianapolis. Doctors diagnosed J.A. with a number of medical conditions, including a 

chromosomal disorder, esophageal reflux, chronic lung disease, failure to thrive, and 

developmental delays. Because J.A. could not swallow, he was fed through a 
3

gastrointestinal tube (“g-tube”). Mother did not visit J.A. during the first two weeks of 

his life. The local Monroe County Department of Child Services (“MCDCS”) took 

custody of J.A. and filed a petition alleging that he was a child in need of services 

(“CHINS”). 

Mother appeared at the initial hearing on the CHINS petition and denied the 

allegations.

1

 After a fact-finding hearing, the trial court adjudicated J.A. a CHINS. The 

court ordered Mother—who had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and 

explosive disorder and struggled with substance abuse—to complete mental-health and 

substance-abuse assessments, follow all resulting recommendations and take all 

prescribed medications, refrain from using drugs and take random drug screens, and 

participate in home-based services. Mother was also ordered to learn how to care for 

J.A.’s medical needs and exercise parenting time regularly. 

In 2012, Mother moved from Bloomington to Indianapolis. She moved against the 

recommendation of a caseworker who told Mother it would make it difficult to comply 

with the court’s orders—particularly exercising parenting time with J.A., who had been 

placed in a Bloomington foster home, and participating in local services.2 

Mother completed an initial diagnostic evaluation. As a result of the evaluation, a 

parenting assessment, substance-abuse treatment, and therapy were recommended for 

Mother. But Mother routinely missed appointments designed to help her in each of these 

 

1 No other parent was named in the CHINS or termination proceedings; J.A.’s paternity has never 

been established. 

2 Mother married around this time. At the termination hearing, there was testimony suggesting 

that Mother’s marriage was unstable; however, we need not discuss this issue in our analysis. 
4

areas, as well as scheduled parenting time. She also declined home-based services in 

Indianapolis. Meanwhile, her attendance at J.A.’s doctor appointments was inconsistent. 

In October 2012, MCDCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

The evidence at the hearing on the termination petition focused primarily on two issues: 

Mother’s failure to complete services and her inability to care for J.A.’s special needs. 

Caseworkers testified that Mother failed to complete psychiatric, home-based, 

substance-abuse, and other therapeutic services. Mother also continued to struggle with 

substance abuse. Specifically, Mother admitted that in December 2012, she smoked 

marijuana and drank a half-pint of vodka to help her sleep. See Tr. p. 21-22. She also 

used prescription medication without a prescription. Id. at 42. Mother understood that 

such decisions “put [her] at risk of not getting her child back.” Id. at 21. Mother also 

admitted that she missed scheduled parenting time with J.A. Id. at 9. 

J.A.’s special needs were also discussed at length. J.A.’s foster mother 

summarized J.A.’s diagnoses:

He has duplicate chromosome sixteen which is a chromosomal disorder. 

He has esophageal refl[u]x which is where the food comes up his windpipe. 

He has chronic lung disease from being ventilated which means that he is at 

a high risk for his lungs to deteriorate. And then he’s been diagnosed with 

low weight or failure to thrive[], and then [he has] developmental delays 

related to his prematurity. 

Id. at 60. According to his foster mother, J.A.’s greatest challenge was eating. At nearly 

two years old, he was fed through his g-tube: “continually at night for ten hours at 60ccs 

an hour and then he gets three bonus feedings or feedings where you have to sit right with 

him the entire time where he gets six ounces of formula at nine, one and five [o’clock].” 

Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added). This precise schedule and formula amount was critical—
5

“if you overfeed him he will vomit and it’s more likely that he will develop aspiration 

pneumonia.” Id. at 63. 

In addition to a pediatrician, J.A.’s foster mother explained that J.A. was treated 

by a number of doctors, including an ophthalmologist, audiologist, and 

gastroenterologist, as well as developmental, physical, and speech therapists. Id. at 63-

64. J.A. wore glasses and braces on his legs, and took a number of prescription 

medications. Id. at 68-69. 

It was difficult for Mother to understand and manage J.A.’s special needs. 

Although she was required to attend all of J.A.’s doctor appointments, she missed more 

than thirty-eight appointments in the time leading up to the terminating hearing. Id. at

136. She could not identify all of J.A.’s doctors. Id. at 11. She could not name all of 

J.A.’s medications or say when he was supposed to take them. Id. at 6-7. She was not 

sure how to feed J.A. at night. Id. at 29. She could not recall the name of J.A.’s formula,

but said she believed he got eight ounces of formula at each feeding. Id. at 8. She

acknowledged that it was important for J.A. to have his glasses and braces, but admitted 

that she failed to return those items to his foster mother on more than one occasion. Id. at 

16. Mother also admitted that her parental rights to her other son had been terminated. 

Id. at 26.

Tamara Saltzman, J.A.’s court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”), told the 

court that Mother was not capable of caring for J.A. full-time:

I think that those issues of [Mother] being able to get herself to 

appointments let alone being able to make all of [J.A.’s] appointments 

would be way too much for her. I just don’t think mentally she can handle 

all of that. And . . . his future relies upon the therapy that he gets between 
6

now and maturity. And I think it’s very important that he makes all of 

these appointments and if he’s not there at the appointments it’s not [going 

to] help him. If you skip one it’s not [going to] help him. If you go

occasionally it’s not [going to] help him and I think he needs someone that 

is . . . organized enough to. . . get him where he needs to be because I think 

that’s crucial for him. 

Id. at 179. When asked if additional services would enable Mother to care for J.A. fulltime, CASA Saltzman said no, “because she hasn’t taken advantage of the services 

provided to her so far and I think that the gauge of future behavior is past behavior.” Id. 

She recommended terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

Melissa Richardson, Mother’s case manager, echoed CASA Saltzman. In addition 

to highlighting Mother’s failure to consistently attend doctor appointments and parenting 

time—Mother missed thirty-eight doctor appointments and sixty-five percent of her 

scheduled parenting time—Richardson said that Mother understood only “bits” of what 

doctors told her about J.A.’s care, and struggled to remember it or “put it all together.” 

Id. at 138, 140. Richardson said that Mother was simply not capable of caring for J.A. all 

the time. Id. at 161. 

Although J.A. was doing very well in his foster home, MCDCS acknowledged that 

it was not a pre-adoptive home. Caseworkers testified that they had recently begun the 

process of finding an adoptive home for J.A. Specifically, MCDCS caseworker Laura 

Farmer testified that she was working with a specialist from their special-needs adoption 

program called “SNAP.” Id. at 171. 

The court took the matter under advisement. Two weeks later, Mother filed a 

motion to reopen evidence, seeking to introduce additional information about her older 

son—specifically, evidence that he also had special needs and had never been adopted 
7

after her parental rights were terminated, as well as evidence that J.A. had been removed 

from his foster home shortly after the termination hearing. 

In September 2013, the trial court entered its order with findings terminating 

Mother’s parental rights. See Appellant’s App. p. 8-16. The court also denied Mother’s 

motion to reopen evidence. Id. at 17. 

Mother now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to 

reopen evidence. She also challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying the trial 

court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. 

I. Motion to Reopen Evidence

Mother argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to reopen evidence. 

“Evidence must be offered during the course of a trial[,] and it is a matter of discretion 

whether a trial court will permit a party to present additional evidence or testimony once 

the party has rested, once both parties have rested, or after the close of all of the 

evidence[.]” In re D.Q., 745 N.E.2d 904, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will disturb the 

trial court’s decision only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

Mother sought to introduce evidence that her older son also had special needs and 

had never been adopted after her parental rights were terminated. Even if this fact was 

unknown to Mother at the time of the termination hearing, it is not relevant to the issue of 

what permanency plan is appropriate for J.A., a different child with entirely different 

special needs. Mother also sought to introduce evidence that J.A. had been removed 
8

from his foster home shortly after the termination hearing. But J.A.’s foster-care 

placement at the time of the termination hearing was not permanent; it was clear that J.A. 

would not stay in that non-adoptive home. Thus, we fail to see how this issue had 

bearing on the court’s determination regarding Mother’s parental rights. We cannot say 

that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to reopen evidence.3 

At the close of her brief, Mother also implies that the trial court’s denial of her 

motion to reopen violated her due-process rights. See Appellant’s Br. p. 21 (“[T]he 

refusal to allow the [additional] evidence prejudiced a substantial right of [Mother], 

namely the right to raise one’s children.”). Although due process has never been 

precisely defined, the phrase denotes fundamental fairness. See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d

910, 917 (Ind. 2011) (citation omitted). When the State seeks to terminate the parentchild relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of the dueprocess clause. Id. (citation omitted). A fundamental requirement of due process is the 

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way. Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Due process in parental-rights cases involves the balancing of three factors: (1) the 

private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s 

chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing government interest supporting the use of 

the challenged procedure. Id. (citation omitted.). The private interest affected by the 

proceeding is substantial—a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of her 

 

3 Mother also argues unpersuasively that she should have been permitted to reopen evidence 

because MCDCS later did so. See Appellant’s Br. p. 21. It is not clear from the record why MCDCS was 

later permitted to reopen evidence; however, this fact has no bearing on whether Mother met her burden 

in seeking to reopen evidence. 
9

child. Id. (citation omitted). The State’s interest in protecting the welfare of a child is 

also substantial. Id. Because the State and the parent have substantial interests affected 

by the proceeding, we focus on the risk of error created by DCS’s actions and the trial 

court’s actions. Id.

Mother attended the termination hearing and testified at length—she had the 

chance to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way. And because the 

additional evidence Mother later wished to present was not relevant to the trial court’s 

determination regarding her parental rights, we think the risk of error in denying 

Mother’s motion to reopen was minimal. Moreover, Mother offers no explanation of 

how she was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial. We find no error here. 

II. Termination of Parental Rights

“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re K.T.K., 989 

N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013) (citations omitted). The parent-child relationship is one of 

our culture’s most valued relationships. Id. (citation omitted). “And a parent’s interest in 

the upbringing of their child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 

recognized by the courts.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). 

But parental rights are not absolute—“children have an interest in terminating parental 

rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous 

relationships.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a parent’s interests must be subordinated to 

a child’s interests when considering a termination petition. Id. (citation omitted). A 

parent’s rights may be terminated if the parent is unable or unwilling to meet their 
10

parental responsibilities by failing to provide for the child’s immediate and long-term 

needs. Id. (citations omitted). 

When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 1229 (citation omitted). Instead, 

we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Id.

(citation omitted). “Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous.” 

Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). In determining whether the court’s decision to 

terminate the parent-child relationship is clearly erroneous, “we review the trial court’s 

judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the 

findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six 

(6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are 

not required, including a description of the court’s finding, 

the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding 

was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been 

under the supervision of a local office or probation 

department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent 

twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is 

removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged 

to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;
11

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). “DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and 

convincing evidence.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (citation omitted). On appeal, Mother

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment as to 

subsections (B), (C), and (D) of the termination statute. 

A. Conditions Remedied

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Thus, 

MCDCS was required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, only one of the 

three requirements of subsection (B). The trial court found that subsections (B)(i) and 

(B)(ii) were satisfied, and Mother challenges both of those findings on appeal. But 

because we find it to be dispositive, we address only Mother’s arguments regarding 

subsection (B)(i); that is, whether there was a reasonable probability that the conditions 

resulting in J.A.’s removal or the reasons for his placement outside Mother’s home would 

be remedied.
12

When determining if there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in a child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not be 

remedied, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for their child at the time of 

the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re 

I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The court must also 

evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a 

substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. Similarly, courts 

may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, 

history of neglect, and failure to provide support. Id. The services offered to the parent 

and the parent’s response to those services may also be considered as evidence of 

whether conditions will be remedied. Id. 

The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the 

conditions resulting in J.A.’s removal from Mother’s care or placement outside the home

would not be remedied. See Appellant’s App. 14. The court found that Mother 

“consistently failed to take advantage of the services offered,” and drank alcohol and 

used drugs while the termination case was pending. Id. at 15. The court also found that 

Mother demonstrated no meaningful understanding of J.A.’s special needs, including his 

medical treatments and feeding schedule, and she had not attended all of his doctor

appointments. The court explained that J.A. was a “medically fragile child” who required 

“appropriate 24[-]hour care to ensure his health and safety.” Id. at 15-16. The court 

concluded that “placing a child with his physical limitations and overwhelming medical 

needs in [Mother’s] care would clearly endanger his life.” Id. at 16. 
13

Mother does not dispute her failure to complete services or her use of alcohol and 

drugs. Instead, she implies that she will take advantage of services in the future and 

characterizes her substance abuse as “only [] a few relapses.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12-13. 

This is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. Mother also argues 

that J.A.’s health has improved since birth and—citing two termination cases involving 

children with special needs—claims that she “has shown that she desires to be involved 

in [J.A.’s] medical care.” Id. at 13-14. While J.A.’s health may have improved

somewhat with time, the evidence at the termination hearing shows that he still requires 

careful, precise feeding and monitoring. He also sees a number of doctors and takes 

many medications. And as for Mother’s contention that she has shown a desire to be 

involved in his medical care, this statement is contradicted by the evidence, including the 

fact that she missed thirty-eight of his doctor appointments. 

While Mother may desire to be involved in J.A.’s medical care, the evidence 

shows that she is not capable of doing so on a meaningful level. At the termination 

hearing, Mother could not identify all of J.A.’s doctors, could not name all of J.A.’s 

medications or say when he was supposed to take them, and incorrectly stated that J.A. 

was to be fed eight ounces of formula.4 Mother argues on appeal that she has a system to 

help her keep track of this information without having to remember it, which makes her 

inability to recall some information not “particularly vital,” but this is an impermissible 

invitation to reweigh the evidence. 

 

4

J.A.’s foster mother testified that he received six ounces of formula. Tr. p. 60-61. Melissa 

Richardson, Mother’s caseworker, testified that J.A. had never taken eight ounces of formula and had 

only recently been “bump[ed]” to six ounces. Id. at 141. 
14

The evidence supports the conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that 

the conditions resulting in J.A.’s removal from Mother’s care or placement outside the 

home would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

A determination of what is in the best interests of a child should be based on the 

totality of the circumstances. See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 

N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. A parent’s historical inability to 

provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do the same 

supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Id.

Trial courts need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, 

mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating a parent’s 

rights. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. Permanency is a central consideration in 

determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court found that termination was in J.A.’s best interests because 

Mother was incapable of caring for J.A. and J.A. deserved permanency. See Appellant’s 

App. p. 16. The court explained that if Mother’s rights were not terminated, J.A.—who 

had been in foster care essentially since birth—would be forced to continue to wait for 

Mother to be an appropriate parent “although she has never demonstrated an ability to 

care for either of her children.” Id. Indeed, those involved with the case testified that 

Mother was incapable of managing J.A.’s special needs, and they recommended 

terminating her parental rights. 
15

We conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in J.A.’s best interests. See In re A.I., 825 

N.E.2d 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (testimony of caseworkers, together with evidence that 

the conditions resulting in placement outside the home will not be remedied, was 

sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in child’s best 

interests), trans. denied; see also In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 

(children’s needs are too substantial to force them to wait while determining if their 

parents will be able to parent them). In the face of this evidence, Mother argues that 

termination of her rights “will alienate J.A. from those who love him.” Appellant’s Br. p. 

17. This argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. 

C. Satisfactory Plan

Mother’s final claim is that MCDCS failed to prove it had a satisfactory plan for

J.A.’s care and treatment. 

In order for the trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must 

find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. Ind. Code § 

31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). That plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of 

the direction the child will go after the parent-child relationship is terminated. In re L.B., 

889 N.E.2d 326, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

MCDCS’s plan for J.A.’s care and treatment was adoption. Mother argues that 

this plan was unsatisfactory because MCDCS had not identified a potential adoptive 

family, and she reiterates that her other special-needs son was never adopted after her 

parental rights were terminated. But we have previously held that adoption is 
16

a satisfactory plan even if a potential adoptive family has not been identified. E.g.,

Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375. And the unfortunate fact that J.W. has not been adopted does 

not mean that adoption is not a satisfactory plan for his half-sibling or, as Mother implies, 

that the same fate awaits J.A. We likewise reject Mother’s assertion that “considering the 

possible difficulty in finding a suitable and willing adoptive family for a child with 

special needs, adoption does not seem like a satisfactory plan.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18. 

While there may be challenges in finding the right adoptive homes for children with 

special needs, DCS has programs specifically designed to meet these challenges: 

MCDCS caseworker Laura Farmer testified that she was working with a specialist from 

their special-needs adoption program called “SNAP” to find a home for J.A. Seeking out 

such homes is certainly a worthwhile endeavor that enables many children to find loving, 

permanent families, and we hope that will happen in this case. Mother has not shown 

that MCDCS’s plan of adoption for J.A. was unsatisfactory. 

Affirmed. 

RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.