Filed: November 4, 1997

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-4701

(CR-96-21-A)

United States of America,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

Bryant Pierre Boone, a/k/a Ice,

Defendant - Appellant.

ORDER

The Court amends its opinion filed October 22, 1997, as

follows:

On the cover sheet, section 3, line 4 -- the district court

number is corrected to read "CR-96-21-A."

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4701

BRYANT PIERRE BOONE, a/k/a Ice,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

James C. Cacheris, Chief District Judge.

(CR-96-21-A)

Submitted: October 7, 1997

Decided: October 22, 1997

Before HALL, ERVIN, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Raymond D. Kline, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F.

Fahey, United States Attorney, James D. Villa, Special Assistant

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Bryant Pierre Boone was convicted, following a jury trial, of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine

and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). On appeal,

Boone argues that the evidence adduced at trial failed to establish that

he was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Boone further

contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for

acquittal because the evidence was all circumstantial and consisted

primarily of the testimony of "impeached" coconspirators. We affirm.

We review a denial of a motion for acquittal under a sufficiency

of evidence standard.1 To sustain a conviction, the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the government, must be sufficient for a rational jury to have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.2 All reasonable inferences from the

facts established to those sought to be established may be made.3

The Government must establish the following elements to prove

conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute drugs:

(1) agreement between two or more persons, tacit or express, to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute drugs; (2) that the

defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy.4 We recognize

that evidence of a buyer-seller relationship is relevant to the question

of whether a conspiratorial relationship exists. 5 In addition, evidence

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1 See United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992).

2 See United States v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1993);

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

3 See United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).

4 See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating

that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove knowledge and participation).

5 See United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 485 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993)

(holding that "evidence of a buy-sell transaction, when coupled with a

substantial quantity of drugs, would support a reasonable inference that

the parties were coconspirators.").

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of continuing relationships and repeated transactions can support the

finding that there was a conspiracy, especially when coupled with

substantial quantities of drugs.6 In this case, the government presented

testimony showing that Boone was a participant in the drug conspiracy and that Boone sold substantial quantities of cocaine on several

occasions.

The evidence at trial primarily consisted of coconspirator James

William Hicks's testimony that he purchased approximately twenty

kilograms of cocaine from Boone on numerous occasions. On the

evening of Boone's arrest, Hicks had arranged to sell an undercover

officer sixteen ounces of cocaine, identifying Boone as the supplier

of the drugs. That night, Boone was seen talking with Hicks and was

later in the area where Hicks and coconspirator Daniel Metzger were

arrested; Boone attempted to flee when the undercover officer identified himself. Metzger testified that Boone supplied him and others

with both powder and crack cocaine.

An unindicted coconspirator, Brandy Farr, testified that she had

known Boone since 1993 as a source from whom Hicks had purchased cocaine. Farr witnessed at least one of these transactions in her

home and personally purchased cocaine from Boone. Another coconspirator, Dennis Thompson, testified that he observed numerous occasions on which Boone sold cocaine to Hicks. Thompson also

personally received between three and four kilograms of cocaine from

Boone through Hicks. All coconspirators similarly testified about the

manner in which Boone conducted business--including the method of

contacting Boone via his pager and the usual locations of the transactions.

We conclude that the evidence of repeated transactions involving

substantial quantities of drugs was sufficient to show that Boone was

involved in more than a mere buyer-seller relationship.7 Further, we

find that, viewing the evidence of the continuing relationship and

repeated transactions in the light most favorable to the Government,

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6 See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858; Mills, 995 F.2d at 485 n.1.

7 See Mills, 995 F.2d at 485 n.1.

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any rational trier of fact could find Boone guilty, beyond a reasonable

doubt, of conspiracy to distribute and distribution. 8

While Boone argues that the government's evidence consisted

exclusively of testimony by coconspirators-defendants that was selfinterested and therefore unreliable, such an argument is unavailing.

Boone had every opportunity to challenge the criminal histories,

biases, and motivations of the government's witnesses during crossexamination and argument. The jury found the government's evidence believable and the jury's decision on the credibility of witnesses is not reviewable by this court.9 

Accordingly, we affirm Boone's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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8 See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80; Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858.

9 United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).

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