Kenneth S. Apfel has been appointed Commissioner of the Social Securit y 1 Administration and is substituted as appellee. See Fed. R. App. P. 43. The Honorable Franklin H. Waters, United States District Judge for t he Western 2 District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3254

___________ Duane Fines, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District of * South Dakota. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * 1 Social Security, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: March 11, 1998 Filed: July 24, 1998

___________ Before BEAM and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and WATERS, District Judge. 2

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Duane Fi nes appeals the district court's affirmance of the denial of Socia l Security disability benefits. We affirm.-2-

I. BACKGROUND

Fines is sixty years old. He was employed for more than thirty years as a truck driver. He has an eighth-grade education and suffers from back and knee pain.

At the hearing, Fines testified that his work as a city delivery truck drive r gene rally involved lifting up to 100 pounds. He testified that he loaded and unloade d trucks and delivered freight all day. He estimated that he could presently lift no more than a bag of groceries. His activities include golf, mowing the lawn (with frequen t breaks), and doing the dishes. He is unable to sit for more than thirty minutes, but can drive a car. He testified that he has problems remembering things, and asserts that he has a possible learning disability.

The medical evidence shows that Fines has a history of back and knee pain and has m ild degenerative changes in his spine. He was examined and tested by a psyc hologist, who found that his I.Q. was in the "bright normal" range, although hi s memory was found to be in the "low average" range.
A vocational expert who also test ified at the hearing characterized Fines's former work as a truck driver as semiskilled and stated that Fines had acquired transferabl e work skills from that employment. He st ated that there were light and sedentary jobs in the national economy that a person with Fines's impairments and experience coul d perform. These jobs included check cashier, gaming cashier, time keeper, telephon e answering service operator, aut omobile service station attendant, sales clerk, park aide, and recreational facilities aide.

The ALJ found t

hat, although Fines had a severe impairment, he did not have an impairment that met the listing of presumpti vely disabling conditions found in Appendix 1 to Su bpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404 ("the Listings"). The ALJ then found that Fine s was unable to return to work as a truck driver, but that he had the residual functional-3-

capac ity to perform light and sedentary work, limited by a restriction on prolonge d sitting. He found that Fines had transferable skills and could perform v arious semiskilled light and sedentary jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. He ther efore concluded that Fines was not disabled within the meaning of the Socia l Security Act. The Appeals Council affirmed the decision, as did the district court.
On appeal, Fines argues, among other things, that his job as a deliver y truck driver was unskilled, and he thus acquired no transferable skills from that job.

II. DISCUSSION

Our t ask on appeal is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision i s supported by substanti al evidence in the record as a whole. See Siemers v. Shalala , 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough evidence that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion. See Oberst v. Shalala , 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993).

To be entitled to disability benefits, Fines must establish a physical impairmen t lasting a t least one year that prevents him from engaging in any gainful activity. Se e Ingram v. Chater , 107 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner mus t determine: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a "substantial gainfu l activity;" (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairme nt—one that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claim ant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, andwork experience); (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform h is or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the pas t work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in th e national economy that the claimant can perform. See id.-4-

The ALJ reli ed on the testimony of the vocational expert to find that Fines ha d acqui red skills as a truck driver that he could transfer to other jobs in the nationa l economy. This method of determining the existence of transferable skills is explicitly allowed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 566(e). See Stout v. Shalala , 988 F.2d 853, 854 (8th Cir. 1993). Moreover, the ALJ's conclusion in this regard is bolstered by reference to th e Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), a Labor Depart ment guide to job ability levels that h as been approved for use in Social Security cases. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1); see also Porch v. Chater , 115 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1997). The DOT is the Commissioner's primary source of reliable job information. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.15 66(d)(1). The Commissioner uses the DOT to classify occupations as skilled , semiskilled or unskilled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569.

In t he DOT, each job is assigned a number that reflects the job's specifi c vocational preparation time (SVP), i.e., how long it generally takes to learn the job. See United S tates Dep't of Labor, Employment and Training Admin., Dictionary o f Occupational Titles , Vol. II, Appendix C at 1009. An SVP level of "th ree" indicates that
a job requires more than one month and up to three months of training; while an SV P level of "four" would require more than three months and up to six months of training. See id. a t 1009. Unskilled work, on the other hand, requires less than thirty day s training. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569(a); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 201.00

. Unskilled work corresponds to an SVP of one or two in the DOT. See DOT at 1009.
The vocational expert testified that Fines prior work would be clas sified as "Truck Driver, Heavy" in the DOT. That job has an SVP level of four. See id. at 918. All of the other jobs mentioned by the vocational expert have an SVP of either three or four. Se e id. at 929 (automobile-service-station attendant— SVP 3);183 (gamblin g cashie r—SVP 4); 183 (check cashier—SVP 3); 187-88 (timekeeper—SVP 3); 20 7 (tel ephone-answering-service operator—SVP 3); 231 (sales clerk—SVP 3);25 1 (recreation-facility attendant—SVP 3). Thus, we find no support for Fines's contention that his former work as a truck driver was unskilled.-5-

Accordingly, we find substant ial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Fines acquired skills in his former semiskilled job as a truck driv er that he can transfer to other semiskilled jobs in the n ational economy. We have considered Fines's other arguments and find them lacking in merit.

III. CONCLUSION

The order of the district court is affirmed.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

In my view, the ALJ erred by determining that “eye-hand-foot coordination , mathematics, collection of money, use of a radio, and some light maint enance” constitute “skills” under the Social Security Act and by failing to make findings as to whethe r Fines’ kills are highly marketable. Accordingly, I dissent.

The majori ty correctly points out that a vocational expert may be used “i n determining . . . whether work skills can be used in other work and the specifi c
oc cupations in which they can be used.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e). The majorit y provides no support, how ever, for the proposition that a vocational expert is capable of determining what qualifies as work skills under the Act.

Fines wa s fifty-seven-years old at the time of the adverse decision, he ha d completed th e eighth grade, and worked delivering freight in the city. At hi s ad ministrative hearing, Fines described his duties: “I just unloaded trucks in th e morning, then I’d load my truck and deliver all day. Then I’d pick up people that were sh ipping stuff back out, and then I’d unload that into the trucks that were going out on the road. And that’s just what I did basically every day.” (Admin. R. at 33.)-6-

Inan attempt to clarify the concepts of “skills” and “transferability of skills” in disa bility determinations, the Social Security Administration (Administration) issue d Social Security Ruling 82- 41. ( See Appellant’s Addendum at 18.) The Administration defined “skill” as
knowledg e of a work activity which requires the exercise of significan t jud gment that goes beyond the carrying out of simple job duties and i s acquired through performance of an occupation which is above th e unskilled l evel (requires more than 30 days to learn). It is practical an d familiar knowledge of the principles and processes of an art, science o r trade, combined with the ability to apply them in practice in a proper and appro vedmanner. This includes activities like making precis e measurements, reading blueprints, and setting up and operating comple x machin ery. A skill gives a person a special advantage over unskille d workers in the labor market

. Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added). “Transferability” is defined as “applying work skill s which a person has demonstrated in vocationally relevant past jobs to meet th e requirement s of other skilled or semiskilled jobs.” Id. at 19. The Administratio n addressed the determination of whether a job is semiskilled and whether skills ar e transferable to other jobs, stating:

Th e regulations[’] definition of semiskilled work in regulations section s 404.15 68(b) and 416.968(b) states that semiskilled jobs “may requir e alertness and close attention . . . coordination and dexterity . . . as whe n hands o r feet must be moved quickly to do repetitive tasks.” Thes e descriptive terms are no t intended, however, to illustrate types of skills, in and of themselves. The terms describe worker traits (aptitudes or abilities) rather than acquired work skills.

Id.While “light maintenance” prese nts the closest case for a finding of “skill,” the 3 AL J’s finding that Fines could perform light maintenance is not supported b y substantial evidence in the record. -7- In my view, “eye-hand- foot coordination, mathematics, collection of money, use of a radio, and some light maintenance” are more appropriately classified as aptitudes or abilities. Consequently, the ALJ erred as a matter of law and should be reversed.

3
Even if Fines acquired transferable work skills, the ALJ erred by failing to make findings as to whether Fines’ skills are highly marketable. The regulations state:
[A] dvanced age (55 or over) is the point where age significantly affects a person’s ability to do substantial gainful activity. If you are severel y impai red and of advanced age and you cannot do medium work (see § 404.1567(c)), you may n ot be able to work unless you have skills that can be u sed in (transferred to) less demanding jobs which exist in significan t numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). Given the applic ability of § 404.1563(d), the disallowance of Fines’ disability benefits can be sustained only upon a finding that Fines’ s kills are highly
ma rketable. See Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 820 F.2d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Tom v. Heckler , 779 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Th e language i s unmistakably clear. Absent a finding that a claimant who is close t o retirement age has acquired skills which are also highly marketable, the regulations do not permi t a finding of transferability.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citin g Renner v. He ckler , 786 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)); see als o Emor y v. Sullivan , 936 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1991); Pineault v. Secretary o f Healt h & Human Services , 848 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The ALJ’ s failur e to make findings with regard to the marketability of Fines’ skills constitute s reversible error.
For the reasons stated above, I would reverse.-8-

A true copy.

Attest.
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.