IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE , ETC. ,

Appellant ,
v. Case No. 5D 14

- 4033 JAMES W. LAIRD AND KAREN A. CRANE, ET AL. ,

Appellee s

. ________________________________/ Opinion filed July 1, 2016 Appeal from the Circuit Court fo r Osceola County, Rob ert J. Pleus, Jr., Senior Judge

. Kimberly S. Mello , Jonathan S. Tannen, and John A. Wirthlin, of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tampa, Michele L. Stocker, of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Thomas Erskine Ice , Amanda Lundergan and Steven J. Brotman , of Ice Appellate, Royal Palm Beach, for Appellee s

.

PER CURIAM. In this foreclosure case, Appellant challenges the final order entered following a
bench trial in which the trial court denied Appellant's request for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure and dismissed the action based upon Appellant's failure to2

establish standing at the inception of the lawsuit and failure to satisfy a condition
prec ed ent of providing notice of accelera tion as required by paragraph 22 of the mortgage. We reverse. We apply a de novo standard of review in determining whether a party has standing to b ring an action. Boyd v. Wells F argo Bank, N.A. , 143 So. 3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA
2014 ) (citing Dix

on v . Express Equity Lending Grp., LLLP , 125 So. 3d 965, 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013))

. A party seeking foreclosure has the burden to establish that it had standing at the time it filed the foreclosure complaint. Id. (citation omitted). Here, Appellant was not the original lender. However, if the promissory n ote does not name the plaintiff as the payee, the plaintiff may still foreclose if the note bears either a speci fic endorsement in favor of the plaintiff or a blank i ndorsement. See R iggs v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC. , 36 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)

. Appellant attached to its complaint a copy of the note and a copy of an allonge which contained a specific i ndorsement in favor of Appellant. Appellant later filed with the court the original note and allonge in the same condition as the copies attached to the complaint. This was sufficient to establish that Appellant had actual possession of the note at the time the complai nt was filed and, therefore, had standing to bring the forecl osure action. See O rtiz v. PNC Bank, N at’l
A ss’n , 188 So. 3d 923, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Although Appellant's witness at trial did
not know the specific date that the i ndorsement was placed on the allonge, this is no t critical here because, logically, the i ndorsement had to have occurred prior to the complaint being filed. As to the second basis for dismissing the action, the trial court essentially concluded that Appellant's evidence at trial was insufficient to e stablish that it timely3

mailed noti ce of acceleration to Appellees. Paragraph 22 of the mortgage contains
various c onditions precedent with which Appel lant was required to comply before bringing the fore closure action, including that Appel lant had to provide Appelle e s thirty days ’ notice of the default on the note and the right to reinstate the loan. The accel eration letter from
the loan se rvicer that was admitted into evidence was dated January 18, 2009, was correctly addressed to Appellees' address , and provided the requisite th irty da ys ’ notice under paragraph 22. Ho wever, in its final order, the trial court noted that January 18, 2009, was a Sunday and found that the evidence presented by Appellant at trial regar ding the m a iling of the letter was contradictory

. Essentially, the tria l court determined that the evidence presented was not competent to establish that Appellant mailed the January 18 letter on Sunday, J anuary 18. We disagree. Paragraph 15 of the mortgage permitted Appellant to send the notice letter in question by first class mail. Appellant's primary witness at trial testified that the date on
the letter from the servicer of the note was the date the letter was drafted and mailed.
Also admitted into evidence were business records from the servicer indicating that the lette r was crafted and mail e d on January 18, 2009. Although the witness later testified that she was uncertain whether the servicer worked on Sundays, she clarified that she
did not work on weekends and never definitively testified that the servicer did not work on Sundays . Thus, the evidence was not c ontradictory

. Accordingly, we reverse the final order of dismissal and remand for a new trial. REVERSED and REMANDED. SAWAYA, EVANDER and LAMBERT , JJ., concur.