COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Frank and Petty 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JOSEPH ANTHONY STROUD 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1135-08-4 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

JUNE 16, 2009 

DEBRA LYN STROUD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Leslie M. Alden, Judge 

 James Ray Cottrell (John K. Cottrell; Cottrell, Fletcher, Schinstock, 

Bartol & Cottrell, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 James A. Watson II (Richard J. Colten; Robert M. Worster III; 

Colten Cummins Watson & Vincent P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 Joseph Anthony Stroud, husband, appeals the trial court’s ruling denying him an award of 

attorney’s fees on remand from a decision of this Court in Stroud v. Stroud, 49 Va. App. 359, 

641 S.E.2d 142 (2007) (hereinafter “Stroud I”). He contends the trial court erred in finding: 

1) husband’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Paragraph 28 of the property 

settlement agreement between him and Debra Lyn Stroud, wife, was barred by res judicata

and/or collateral estoppel; (2) the mandate of this Court limited the trial court’s authority on 

remand, thus barring an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on his successful enforcement 

of the parties’ property settlement agreement in the Court of Appeals; and (3) wife was not in 

default or otherwise failed to abide by the terms of the property settlement agreement. 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm. 
 - 2 -

BACKGROUND

The parties were divorced by final decree entered April 7, 1999, which ratified, affirmed, 

and incorporated a property settlement agreement dated March 22, 1999 (hereinafter “PSA”). 

The PSA provided for the payment of spousal support to wife from husband with the limitations 

set forth in Paragraph 11(B): 

[T]he aforesaid payment shall end upon the death of either party, 

the remarriage of Debby and/or her cohabitation with any person to 

whom she is not related by blood or marriage in a situation 

analogous to marriage for a period of thirty (30) or more 

continuous days, or with the payment due on February 25, 2009, 

whichever event first occurs. 

The PSA also provided in Paragraph 15(A) that each party would be responsible for their 

own attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result of the filing of the divorce, yet Paragraph (B) 

provided: 

Nothing contained herein will bar or prevent either party from 

seeking, or any court from awarding, counsel fees in the event of 

breach or application for modification of this Agreement. 

Paragraph 28 of the PSA provided: 

DEFAULT BY PARTY. Should either Joe or Debby fail to abide 

by the terms of this Agreement, the defaulting party will indemnify 

the other for all reasonable expenses and costs, including 

attorney’s fees, incurred in successfully enforcing this Agreement. 

Husband later learned wife was cohabitating with another person to whom she was not 

related by blood in a situation analogous to marriage. He believed this was a termination event 

under Paragraph 11(B) of the PSA. Husband’s counsel wrote to wife, advising her that husband 

would cease paying spousal support. She received her last payment on January 25, 2005. 

On April 20, 2005, wife filed a petition for enforcement of court order and sought a rule 

to show cause alleging husband violated the final decree and PSA by failing to pay spousal 

support. On September 21, 2005 wife filed a motion for judgment for a $24,000 arrearage upon 
 - 3 -

the same basis. Husband defended by contending his obligation to pay spousal support 

terminated upon wife’s cohabitation with another woman. 

In Stroud I, the trial court found as a matter of law that people of the same sex cannot 

cohabit under Virginia law in a situation analogous to marriage. Alternatively, the trial court 

found husband had not met his burden to prove cohabitation analogous to marriage. Therefore, 

the trial court found husband had a continuing duty to pay spousal support. Further, the trial 

court denied each party an award of attorney’s fees because the evidence was “in equipoise” and 

“the issue was close enough.” 

Husband filed objections to the decree, entered December 9, 2005, embodying the trial 

court’s rulings. Husband objected, inter alia, to the trial court’s failure to award him attorney’s 

fees pursuant to the terms of the final decree of divorce and the PSA. 

Husband appealed the trial court’s judgment to this Court contending the trial court erred 

in finding husband had not proven cohabitation and in finding, as a matter of law, that 

individuals of the same sex cannot cohabit in a situation analogous to marriage.1

 Wife assigned 

error to the trial court’s failure to award her attorney’s fees. 

In Stroud I, 49 Va. App. at 379, 641 S.E.2d at 151, we held “the trial court erred in 

concluding that, for the purposes of interpreting the contract between husband and wife, same 

sex individuals may not cohabit in Virginia as a matter of law.” This Court remanded the case to 

the trial court “for entry of a decree conforming to this opinion.” Id. We also affirmed the trial 

court’s failure to award wife attorney’s fees, finding no abuse of discretion. Id. at 380, 641 

S.E.2d at 152.2 

 1

 Husband did not appeal the trial court’s failure to award him attorney’s fees, but prayed 

for an award of attorney’s fees and costs for the appeal. We did not address the latter in Stroud I. 

2

 This ruling was based not on the terms of the PSA (Paragraph 28), but on the general 

law awarding attorney’s fees upon a consideration of “the circumstances and equities of the 
 - 4 -

 

On remand, husband filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to 

the terms of the PSA, contending that since he prevailed on appeal, he successfully enforced the 

terms of the PSA. He sought attorney’s fees and costs for the previous proceedings and for 

“attorneys’ fees incurred with respect to successfully enforcing the parties’ Agreement.” 

Wife filed a plea in bar, arguing husband’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs was 

barred by “the mandate rule and/or law of the case doctrine; res judicata; collateral estoppel; and 

the doctrine of estoppel by inconsistent positions, i.e., judicial estoppel.” 

The trial court, on February 28, 2008, sustained wife’s plea in bar. In a written order 

entered on April 10, 2008 the trial court concluded: 

(a) [Husband] is precluded by the bar of res judicata and/or 

collateral estoppel from here relitigating a request for attorney’s 

fees and costs incident to the prior litigation and on appeal, where 

an award of such fees and costs was the subject of unappealed 

former adjudications, in the prior litigation before this Court and 

incident to [husband’s] appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 

expressly and/or impliedly denying relief. And 

(b) In the alternative, and in addition, under the facts and 

circumstances of this case, that [wife’s] actions in the prior 

litigation, as demonstrated by the record in this cause and in 

briefing and oral argument, do not support a finding, as a matter of 

law, that the [wife] committed a breach or default of, or otherwise 

failed to abide by the terms of the parties’ written Agreement or 

any duty imposed by law, in a manner that would entitle the 

[husband] to an award of fees and costs pursuant to Paragraph 28 

of the said Agreement. 

This appeal follows. 

entire case.” Stroud I, 49 Va. App. at 379, 641 S.E.2d at 152 (citing Gamer v. Gamer, 16 

Va. App. 335, 346, 429 S.E.2d 618, 626 (1993)). 
 - 5 -

ANALYSIS

Husband argues that wife defaulted pursuant to Paragraph 28 of the PSA by filing the 

petition to enforce spousal support in contravention of the terms of the agreement. He reasons 

that she “failed to abide by the terms of the contract” by making a demand for spousal support 

that was not in conformance with the PSA. Thus, says husband, he had to expend large sums of 

money to defend his rights under the PSA. Wife responds that husband was not entitled to 

unilaterally modify the terms of the PSA and that if he sought to enforce the “cohabitation” 

clause, he should have applied to the trial court for adjudication of that issue. Thus, she claims 

she had no choice but to initiate proceedings for resolution of the issue. We agree with the wife 

and conclude wife was not in default by bringing the action to enforce the PSA. 

On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact are accorded great deference and its judgment 

will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Bandas v. Bandas, 

16 Va. App. 427, 432, 430 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1993). However, “[t]he trial court’s interpretation 

of [a] PSA is an issue of law that we review de novo.” Stacy v. Stacy, 53 Va. App. 38, 43, 669 

S.E.2d 348, 350 (2008) (en banc). 

The parties entered into a PSA that was affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into the April 

7, 1999 final divorce decree. Thus, the final decree “embodied and enforced . . . a negotiated 

agreement between the parties vesting” husband with a “contractual right” to terminate wife’s 

spousal support in the event that wife habitually cohabitated with another person in a relationship 

analogous to a marriage for thirty days or more. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 44 Va. App. 93, 98, 603 

S.E.2d 172, 174 (2004). Furthermore, “[t]he decree’s contractual character places it within the 

general rule recognizing that vested contractual rights — whether incorporated by, memorialized 

in, or merged into a final decree — ‘cannot be judicially modified or terminated at the unilateral 

request of a contract party unless the agreement expressly authorizes such relief.’” Id. at 99, 603 
 - 6 -

S.E.2d at 174 (quoting Newman v. Newman, 42 Va. App. 557, 568-69, 593 S.E.2d 533, 539 

(2004) (en banc)). 

[I]t is the obligation of the divorced husband to pay the specified 

amounts according to the terms of the decree and that he should 

not be permitted to vary these terms to suit his convenience. 

[When circumstances change], and warrant a change in the terms 

of the decree . . . [husband’s] remedy is to apply to the court for 

such relief. To permit him to increase the amount of the specified 

payments at one time, reduce them at another, and require an 

adjustment of the differences in the future, would lead to 

continuous trouble and turmoil. 

Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 519, 118 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1961). “Although the Newton case 

involves a child support decree, the ‘rule applies to awards of spousal support or to unitary 

awards for spousal support and independent child support.’” Sanford v. Sanford, 19 Va. App. 

241, 246, 450 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1994) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 14 Va. App. 642, 646, 418 

S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992)). 

“Support agreements that are voluntarily made by the parties are subject to the same rules 

of construction applicable to contracts generally.” Goldin v. Goldin, 34 Va. App. 95, 107, 538 

S.E.2d 326, 332 (2000). Consequently, where, as here, the terms of the agreement are 

unambiguous, courts must “adhere to the plain meaning of [the agreement’s] stated terms,” 

Southerland v. Estate of Southerland, 249 Va. 584, 588, 457 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1995), and may 

not “‘read into [the agreement] language which will add to or take away from the meaning of the 

words already contained therein.’” Id. at 590, 457 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting Wilson v. Holyfield, 

227 Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)). 

Termination of wife’s spousal support, if she allegedly cohabits with another in a 

relationship analogous to marriage, is not self-executing. Resolution of this issue is governed by 

the interpretation of the words “cohabitation” and “situation analogous to marriage,” terms 

undefined in the property settlement agreement, yet the subject of litigation in our appellate 
 - 7 -

courts. See Schweider v. Schweider, 243 Va. 245, 248, 415 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1992) (concluding 

that “cohabit” means “to live together in the same house as married persons live together, or in 

the manner of husband and wife”); Penrod v. Penrod, 29 Va. App. 96, 101, 510 S.E.2d 244, 246 

(1999) (finding ‘“cohabitation’ must be based upon evidence concerning the overall nature of the 

relationship, not merely a piecemeal consideration of individual factors such as its sexual or 

financial components”); Frey v. Frey, 14 Va. App. 270, 272, 416 S.E.2d 40, 41 (1992) (reversing 

the trial court’s ruling that “cohabitation analogous to a marriage” necessarily requires an 

agreement or arrangement between the parties in regard to financial support). 

Thus, it is clear that the terms “cohabitation” and “analogous to marriage,” as contained 

in the PSA, have a “precise legal meaning,” Frey, 14 Va. App. at 273, 416 S.E.2d at 42, and are 

therefore subject to judicial interpretation. Only if and until a court makes such a determination, 

is husband entitled to discontinue making support payments under the terms of the agreement. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a provision can be self-executing only when the 

triggering event is empirically determined, such as a date certain, reaching a specific age, or 

death.3 On the other hand, provisions that require subjective determinations, such as elements of 

proof, interpretation, or witness credibility, cannot be self-executing simply because of the need 

for judicial resolution. Thus, we hold the provision of the PSA regarding termination of spousal 

support was not a self-executing provision and that husband was not entitled to unilaterally 

terminate support payments without seeking entry of a proper court order. Once husband 

independently withheld support payments, wife had no choice but to seek a judicial remedy and 

have the trial court determine if she was cohabitating in a situation analogous to marriage. Thus, 

 3

 We emphasize that this is not an exclusive list of empirically determined triggering 

events. 
 - 8 -

we find that wife’s enforcement of the agreement was not a default, but a proper means of 

seeking recourse in what she believed was non-compliance with the PSA. 

Here, Paragraph 28 of the PSA expressly provides for reasonable attorney’s fees when a 

party is in default by “fail[ing] to abide by the terms of this Agreement.” “The noun ‘default’ is 

defined as a ‘failure to do something required by duty or law.’” Clevert v. Soden, Inc., 241 Va. 

108, 111, 400 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1991) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

590 (1986)) (holding that breach in performing contract would be default). Appellant claims that 

“failing to abide” is broader in scope than simply defaulting, namely, that “failing to abide” 

encompasses affirmative acts such as bringing an action against husband in contravention of the 

terms of the PSA. We find this to be a distinction without a difference, as we conclude that 

under either definition, wife’s actions were not a breach of the PSA. Thus, Paragraph 28 of the 

PSA is not applicable here. See O’Hara v. O’Hara, 45 Va. App. 788, 799, 613 S.E.2d 859, 865 

(2005) (affirming the trial court’s ruling that a provision in the settlement agreement providing 

for attorney’s fees “in the event that either party defaults” was inapplicable because the case 

“involved[d] a proceeding to modify or terminate the spousal support award” and, thus, was not 

a proceeding to enforce a default in the performance of the agreement). Thus, husband was not 

entitled to attorney’s fees because wife was not in default in the performance of any provision of 

the agreement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to award attorney’s fees to 

husband based upon Paragraph 28 of the PSA. 
 - 9 -

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.4

Affirmed.

 4

 Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred regarding res judicata/collateral 

estoppel and the trial court’s limited authority pursuant to this Court’s mandate in Stroud I, we 

find that such error was harmless and does not require reversal. See Chretien v. Chretien, 53 

Va. App. 200, 206-07, 670 S.E.2d 45, 49 (2008). The court’s error is only reversible if it 

“substantially swayed” the judgment. Billips v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 805, 810, 652 S.E.2d 

99, 102 (2007). In light of the trial court’s alternative ruling that husband was not entitled to 

attorney’s fees and costs because wife was not in default, it is clear that the procedural error had 

no effect on the ultimate judgment. Because the trial court would have reached the same result 

even if it had found for husband on the procedural issues, any error in finding husband’s motions 

were barred is harmless.