1

Filed 4/22/15 Peterson v. Bonner CA1/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

JAMES A. PETERSON et al., 

 Cross-complainants and Respondents, 

v. 

ERNEST LINCOLN BONNER, JR., 

 Cross-defendant and Appellant. 

 A139033 

 (Contra Costa County 

 Super. Ct. No. MSC0700904) 

KGMW, LP, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

ERNEST LINCOLN BONNER, JR., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A140846 

 (Contra Costa County 

 Super. Ct. No. MSC0700904) 

 Ernest Lincoln Bonner, appearing in propria persona, appeals judgments entered in 

favor of James A. Peterson, doing business as J&E Investments (J&E) and KGMW, LP, 

on their causes of action for damages, and in favor of Placer Title Company and its 

employee, Terese Johnson, (collectively Placer) on Bonner’s cross-complaint for breach 

of fiduciary duty. The claims at issue all arise out of Bonner’s efforts to obtain financing 

for the purchase of property in Lafayette, which was one part of what the trial court 

described as a “massive” real estate fraud engineered by one Derek Wheat. Bonner 

asserts that he was an innocent victim of Wheat’s fraud, but the record amply supports 

the trial court’s finding that Bonner was aware of some, if not all, of Wheat’s fraudulent 
2

activity and knowingly attempted to take advantage of his fraudulent scheme. 

Accordingly, we shall affirm. 

Factual and Procedural History1

 In 2004, Wheat and Edward Cunningham agreed to work together to “flip” — i.e., 

buy, improve, and resell — houses. The first property they purchased was located on 

Estates Drive in Lafayette, California. The property consisted of two parcels with the 

same street address: parcel 6, on which they planned to build a new residence, and parcel 

7, which was a vacant and unbuildable lot.2

 It is unclear from the record whether the 

property was already subdivided or whether the subdivision occurred at the time of the 

purchase. In any event, Cunningham purchased parcel 6 for $1 and separately purchased 

parcel 7 for $2,250,000. Cunningham obtained a $999,999 loan from Countrywide Loans 

Inc. (the Countrywide loan) that was secured by a deed of trust on parcel 7. Johnson of 

Placer Title Company served as the escrow agent for Cunningham’s purchase of parcel 7. 

Johnson recorded a grant deed to Cunningham on parcel 6 as an accommodation to 

Cunningham, but not as part of the escrow. Title to both parcels was placed in 

Cunningham’s name only. 

 In November 2005, Cunningham secured a $638,250 construction loan from 

CityFed Capital Inc. (CityFed) for construction of improvements on parcel 6.3

 The 

promissory note on the loan was transferred by CityFed to J&E and a deed of trust to 

secure repayment of the promissory note was recorded against parcel 6. 

 

1

 The action below involved numerous parties and was tried in phases. Some claims were 

tried before a jury and others before the court. We have narrowed the summary of the 

facts to those that bear directly on the issues on appeal. 

2

 Our references to the “property” or “Estates Drive property” are intended to include 

both parcels. 

3

 CityFed is a licensed real estate brokerage firm. Both Cunningham and Bonner testified 

they believed CityFed was Wheat’s company or that Wheat had a controlling interest in 

CityFed. 
3

 The relationship between Cunningham and Wheat subsequently broke down and 

Wheat then suggested to Bonner that he purchase the Estates Drive property.4

 Bonner had 

known Wheat for more than 10 years and Wheat was, at some point, the chief financial 

officer of Bonner’s biotech company, FICARR, Inc. Bonner agreed to purchase the 

property for $2.5 million.5 With assistance by Wheat and others, Bonner obtained a $2.4 

million loan from Equity Funding Group, LP and EFG Mortgage Acq., LLC (collectively 

EFG) for the purchase of the property. Plaintiff KGMW, LP is the successor in interest to 

EFG. 

 An escrow account at Placer Title Company was used for the transaction, with 

Johnson serving as the escrow agent. On October 23, 2006, Bonner signed the 

preliminary title report prepared by Placer. The report identifies the property by address, 

but the legal description of the property describes only parcel 6, not including parcel 7. 

The preliminary title report indentifies, among other encumbrances, J&E’s deed of trust 

securing payment of the $638,250 construction loan. On October 24, Bonner signed a 

document entitled “Assumption Agreement with Release of Liability” (the assumption 

agreement) which provides that “[a]s part of the purchase price of the above-described 

property” Bonner assumes Cunningham’s liability under the promissory note secured by 

J&E’s deed of trust. 

 Within minutes of signing the assumption agreement, after reviewing additional 

documents calling for his signature, Bonner stopped the escrow proceedings because he 

 

4

 Bonner testified at trial that he did not learn until much later that the property was 

actually two separate parcels. At their first meeting, Wheat told him that “there was a 

possibility of subdividing a piece of the property at the top end and putting another house 

there.” 

5

 The record includes a settlement statement from the U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development that shows a contract sales price of $3.2 million and a California 

Residential Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions, dated September 1, 2006, 

which lists the purchase price of the property at $4.3 million, both of which bear 

Bonner’s signature. At trial, however, Bonner denied that he signed the purchase contract 

claiming that there was no written contract for the purchase and that he agreed to 

purchase the property for $2.5 million. 
4

knew he “did not want that loan.” He claimed that he had just discovered the J&E deed of 

trust and that he had not agreed to assume the additional $638,250 obligation as part of 

the purchase price of the property. He told the escrow agent that he was leaving and 

would not sign any additional documents relating to the transaction. 

 The following day, Bonner received a phone call from one Fidel Nwamu, who 

Bonner knew through a prior real estate transaction. Nwamu told Bonner that he had just 

recorded a deed of trust against the Estates Drive property based on a $500,000 loan that 

he had made to Bonner. Bonner told Nwamu he knew nothing about such a loan and that 

he had not even purchased the property yet. Nwamu faxed Bonner a copy of the deed of 

trust. The deed of trust was recorded against parcel 7 and, according to Bonner, contained 

his forged signature. That afternoon, Bonner sent a letter to Placer directing that the 

escrow not be closed and immediately contacted Wheat. 

 Wheat told Bonner that J&E was owned by Wheat’s company, CityFed, which had 

originated the loan, and “that there was no real loan that existed or that I had an 

obligation to pay.” Bonner also learned that the money from Nwamu had gone directly to 

Wheat. Wheat told him that because Bonner had not completed the purchase, Nwamu’s 

loan was not valid. Wheat also told him that an application had been submitted to the city 

for subdivision of the property but that parcel 7, against which Nwamu’s deed of trust 

was recorded, was not a legally recognized parcel. 

 Shortly after this conversation, Bonner and Wheat signed an agreement in which 

Wheat acknowledged having received $570,000 from Nwamu. Wheat agreed to repay 

that loan and relinquish all of his stock holdings in Bonner’s company, FICAAR, Inc., in 

exchange for Bonner’s purchase of both parcels 6 and 7. Bonner explained at trial that it 

was at this time that he first “began to have suspicions about Mr. Wheat” and that is why 

he had Wheat sign the “agreement wherein he relinquished all stock ownership in my 

company. . . . [T]he first order of business was to get him out of that.” 

 Around the same time, Wheat told Bonner that he would need to submit a new 

loan application to the lender because “the lender had a problem with [him] refusing to 

go through with the escrow.” At Wheat’s request, Bonner signed two blank loan 
5

applications. Bonner explained that he was relying on Wheat to obtain the financing 

needed to complete the purchase. It was his “perception at the time, that [Wheat] had 

some sort of controlling or ownership interest in a mortgage company that actually 

funded loans, and it was [his] perception at that time that the funding was actually 

coming through [Wheat].” 

 EFG received two uniform residential loan applications, dated October 23, 2006 

and November 1, 2006, from Bonner that falsely represented that Bonner would make a 

cash deposit of $718,467 toward the purchase of the property and that Bonner’s assets 

included over $1.1 million in stocks and bonds. Bonner does not dispute that he did not 

contribute any cash towards the purchase of the property and at trial acknowledged that 

he does not have the $1.1 million in assets listed on the application. Bonner claimed that 

all of the false information was filled in by Wheat after he had signed blank forms. 

 EFG also received, in support of Bonner’s loan application, copies of bank 

statements showing $718,467 in cash, and securities account statements showing $1.1 

million in assets. Bonner acknowledged the information contained in the documents was 

false but claimed that all of the supporting documentation was manufactured by Wheat 

without his knowledge. Bonner claimed that he filled out a different and accurate 

handwritten loan application and gave it to Wheat, but he did not keep a copy and none 

was presented at trial. 

 On October 30, Bonner advised Placer that he was retracting his prior instruction 

to terminate the escrow and that the title company should proceed with the close. On the 

same day, Bonner signed “Buyer’s Instructions” which falsely stated that he had made a 

$200,000 cash down payment. The buyer’s instructions acknowledge that the purchase 

was subject to a deed of trust in favor of J&E with an unpaid principal balance of 

$638,250. The estimated settlement statement, which Bonner acknowledges signing, 

showed a purchase price of $3.2 million. 

 On November 6, 2006, Placer recorded a grant deed transferring title of Parcel 6 to 

Bonner. 
6

 In February or March 2007, Bonner first learned of the Countrywide loan against 

parcel 7 and immediately notified Countrywide that he suspected fraud was involved in 

the transaction. He also made a report to the District Attorney’s office. 

 In April 2007, EFG filed a complaint against Bonner alleging, among other things, 

causes of action for negligent and intentional misrepresentation. EFG claimed that 

Bonner made numerous false representations to obtain the $2.4 million loan and that but 

for the false representations, EFG would not have made the loan. EFG’s complaint also 

alleged causes of action against Placer and J&E, as well as many additional defendants, 

none of which are at issue on appeal. 

 In October 2007, J&E filed a cross-complaint against Bonner alleging, among 

other things, claims to recover on the promissory note secured by the deed of trust on 

parcel 6. 

 In December 2007, Bonner filed a cross-complaint against Placer alleging, among 

other things, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty based on Johnson’s failure to 

disclose, in connection with the recording of his 2006 purchase, the fraud allegedly 

committed by Wheat and others against Countrywide in connection with the purchase of 

the property by Cunningham in 2004. 

 Following a lengthy trial, the court rejected each of Bonner’s claims and defenses, 

including his repeated assertion that he was merely an innocent victim of Wheat’s 

fraudulent scheme, in the course of which Wheat fraudulently obtained some $7 million 

of loans from multiple lenders secured by the same property. In its decision, the court 

states, “The parties to this dispute agree about one thing. Cross-defendant Derek Wheat 

was involved in massive fraudulent activities that resulted in the real property originally 

known as 1140 Estates Drive, Lafayette, being financed by four different lending entities 

such that almost $7 million dollars was extracted from the lenders by various 

dishonesties. From the evidence heard by the court, . . . the court concludes that while 

each of these parties[6] may not have been aware of each and every aspect of every 

 

6

 The parties include Bonner and two other defendants who were involved with Wheat. 
7

dealing in which Wheat engaged, the circumstantial evidence clearly establishes that each 

of them, [including] Bonner . . . , was aware that dishonesties were taking place and that 

lenders were being cheated. . . . [¶] Each of these three parties had a strong motive to 

participate in Wheat’s various dealings in whole or in part. The reason was simply the 

greed involved with seeing a possibility of making a large windfall profit by ‘investing’ 

with Wheat. [¶] Bonner saw the possibility of working with Wheat in ultimately 

completing construction for a relatively small amount and ‘flipping’ the Estates Drive 

property, with absolutely no cash outlay on his part. In order to do so he was willing to 

sign documents in blank that a person with his vast education and experience would 

never do, overlook clear indicators that things were ‘wrong’, and proceed forward in 

hopes that at the end of the day the property could be sold for what he believed would be 

its finished value, $5 million.” 

 With respect to EFG’s claims for negligent and intentional misrepresentation, the 

court rejected defendant’s argument that he was not liable because he had not personally 

made the misrepresentations that were made by Wheat, who engineered the “massive 

fraud” without his knowledge. The court concluded that even assuming Bonner did not 

know about the transmission of false information to EFG, he was liable nonetheless 

because he and Wheat were engaged in a joint enterprise to purchase and “flip” the 

property for a profit. 

 The court also found in favor of Placer on Bonner’s cross-complaint. The court 

explained that Bonner had not “established that Placer violated any duty which it had as 

the escrow holder in [the 2006] transaction” and that, in any event, “the totality of the 

evidence shows that Bonner was aware of numerous facts which put him on notice of 

wrongdoings of Wheat, and by his conduct he clearly was willing to take abnormal risks 

since he had no actual financial investment in the Estate Drive Property.” 

 Finally, the court found in favor of J&E on its claim for payment of the 

promissory note. The court noted that Bonner admitted signing the assumption agreement 

and found that he understood the effect of the agreement. The court rejected Bonner’s 

claims that the agreement was procured by fraud. 
8

 On June 21, 2013, Bonner filed a notice of appeal from the judgments entered in 

favor of J&E in the amount of $1,093,601.947

 and in favor of Placer on Bonner’s crosscomplaint. On January 14, 2014, Bonner filed a notice of appeal from the judgment 

entered in favor of KGMW in the amount of $2,487,265.00.8

 On Bonner’s motion, the 

appeals were consolidated for purposes of briefing, oral argument and decision. 

Discussion

1. KGMW /EFG v. Bonner

 A cause of action for intentional misrepresentation requires: 

“ ‘ “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) 

knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; 

(d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” ’ ” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical 

Group, Inc., (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974.) The scienter element may be satisfied by 

showing “either that defendant had actual knowledge of the untruth of his statements, or 

that he lacked an honest belief in their truth, or that the statements were carelessly and 

recklessly made, in a manner not warranted by the information available to defendant.” 

(Yellow Creek Logging Corp. v. Dare (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 50, 57, 58; Civ. Code, 

§ 1710, subd. (2).) If a defendant makes a false statement, honestly believing it to be true, 

but without reasonable ground for such belief, the defendant is liable for negligent 

misrepresentation. (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 407-408.) 

 As noted above, the trial court found that Bonner was liable for both negligent and 

intentional misrepresentation. The court observed that Bonner “cannot sign a document 

without reading it and then claim ‘fraud in the execution’ of the document” as a defense 

 

7

 The court awarded J&E “$500,000 in principal, plus interest of $480,205.56, plus 

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $174,516.50, plus costs of suit in the amount of 

$10,279.88 for a total judgment of $1,093,601.94.” Bonner does not separately challenge 

the calculation of the award. 

8

 The court awarded KGMW, LP. “$1,444,800.00 in compensatory damages plus 

punitive damages in the amount of $480,000.00, plus attorney fees in the amount of 

$562,465.00 for a total judgment of $2,487,265.00.” Apart from his argument, discussed 

below, that substantial evidence fails to support the award of punitive damages, Bonner 

does not challenge the trial court’s calculation of the award. 
9

to EFG’s claims and that “Bonner is bound by those false representations on a respondeat 

superior basis, whether Wheat is deemed a partner, joint venturer or a mere agent.” 

Bonner contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the court’s findings that 

Wheat was his agent or that he was anything other than a victim of Wheat’s fraud. We 

disagree. 

 Civil Code section 2295 defines an agent as “one who represents another, called 

the principal, in dealings with third persons.” “A principal who puts an agent in a position 

that enables the agent, while apparently acting within his authority, to commit a fraud 

upon third persons is subject to liability to such third persons for the fraud. The principal 

is liable although he is entirely innocent, although he has received no benefit from the 

transaction, and although the agent acts solely for his own purposes. Liability is based 

upon the fact that the agent's position facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in that, 

from the point of view of the third persons, the transaction seems regular on its face and 

the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the business confided to him 

[citations]. The law reasons that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the loss 

should be accepted by the principal who is responsible for the selection of the agent and 

for the definition of his authority.” (Reusche v. California Pacific Title Ins. Co. (1965) 

231 Cal.App.2d 731, 736-737.) Moreover, a principal may be liable for acts of his agent 

if he ratifies the agents prior unauthorized acts. “Ratification is the subsequent adoption 

by one claiming the benefits of an act, which without authority, another has voluntarily 

done while ostensibly acting as the agent of him who affirms the act and who had the 

power to confer authority [citation]. A principal cannot split an agency transaction and 

accept the benefits thereof without the burdens.” (Id. at p. 737.) 

 Here, Bonner acknowledged that Wheat arranged the purchase and that he was 

relying on Wheat to obtain the financing needed to complete the transaction. Bonner does 

not dispute that when he signed the blank loan applications, he was expecting Wheat to 

fill in the missing information and that he knew the applications would be given to the 

lender. By his own admission, when he signed the blank loan applications, Bonner 

already had suspicions about Wheat’s honesty, having learned that Wheat forged 
10

Bonner’s name on Nwamu’s deed of trust and received $500,000 from Nwamu based on 

the forged document. Despite these red flags, Bonner did not terminate the transaction. 

He instructed the title company to proceed with the close of escrow and he accepted the 

benefit of the loan facilitated by Wheat. Moreover, it appears that Bonner made use of 

Wheat’s questionable conduct in negotiating the relinquishment of Wheat’s interests in 

Bonner’s company. 

 This evidence amply supports the conclusion that Wheat was acting as Bonner’s 

agent for the purpose of securing financing for the purchase of the property and that 

Bonner knowingly authorized or at least ratified Wheat’s fraudulent acts. This same 

evidence refutes Bonner’s additional argument that there is no substantial evidence of his 

“personal culpability” sufficient to support the award of punitive damages. (Hale v. 

Farmers Ins. Exch. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 681, 691, overruled on other grounds in Egan 

v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 822, fn. 5 [“California follows the 

rule laid down in Restatement of Torts, section 909, which provides punitive damages 

can be properly awarded against a principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if 

‘(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was 

unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or (c) the agent was employed in a 

managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the employer or a 

manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.’ ”]; see also Civ. Code, § 3294, 

subd. (b) [employer may be liable for punitive damages based upon the acts of employee 

if “the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed 

him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or 

ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally 

guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”].) 

2. J&E v. Bonner

 Bonner contends the court erred in holding him liable to J&E for repayment of the 

$638,250 loan. He argues that no contract was ever formed between Bonner and J&E “as 

there was never any mutual assent” to his assumption of the loan. The record, however, 
11

amply supports the court’s finding that Bonner intended to sign the document assuming 

the loan. 

 Bonner does not dispute that he signed the assumption agreement or that he signed 

the buyer’s instructions acknowledging that his purchase was subject to the deed of trust 

in favor of J&E securing the note with an unpaid principal balance of $638,250. He 

argues that the fact that he terminated the escrow when he learned of the assumption 

demonstrates the lack of mutual assent to the agreement. However, this argument is 

undermined by Bonner’s admission that he went forward with the purchase after Wheat 

told him that J&E was owned by Wheat’s company, CityFed, which had originated the 

loan, and “that there was no real loan that existed or that I had an obligation to pay.” It is 

clear that Bonner knew the assumption was part of the transaction when he rescinded his 

objection and instructed the title company to proceed with the close of escrow.9

 The fact that Bonner may have been misled by Wheat with regard to whether he 

would have to repay the loan does not excuse his obligation to EFG, the holder of the 

promissory note. As the trial court noted, “even to the extent that Bonner was in any 

manner misled in going into the transaction, the fraud if any was perpetrated, according 

to Bonner, by Derek Wheat who was, at the very least, Bonner’s agent and more likely 

his joint venture partner. J&E cannot be charged with the wrong-doings of Bonner’s 

partner or agent.” Having found substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that 

Wheat was acting as Bonner’s agent, we find no error in the courts conclusion on this 

issue as well. 

3. Bonner v. Placer

 Bonner contends the court erred in concluding that Placer had no duty to disclose 

to him information known to Placer agents about the 2004 escrow transaction involving 

 

9

 Bonner also claims that he refused to sign the agreement between J&E and EFG 

subordinating J&E’s deed of trust to EFG’s deed of trust and that his signature on that 

agreement is a forgery. Bonner’s signature on the subordination agreement, however, was 

not integral to his assumption of the J&E loan and his refusal to sign that document 

proves little with regard to his intent to assume the J&E loan. 
12

parcel 7 through which Cunningham purchased the property. He argues, “The trial court 

acknowledged that the escrow officers who handled appellant’s escrow in 2006 had 

knowledge of the fraudulent transfer of the property in the 2004 transaction and further 

acknowledged that the fraud involved an outside party, Derek Wheat, who was also 

involved in appellant’s escrow in 2006.[10] Appellant was not a party to the 2004 

transaction and the trial court held that the escrow holder was under no duty to disclose 

that prior fraud to appellant. Appellant, however, asserts that the escrow holder, Placer 

Title Company, had a fiduciary duty to disclose its knowledge of the prior fraud to 

Appellant because there was clear evidence of a fraudulent scheme in the 2004 

transaction; the same parties and the same real property involved in the 2004 fraudulent 

scheme were also involved in appellant’s 2006 transaction; and appellant was a principal 

in the 2006 transaction but not in the prior 2004 transaction . . . . The trial court’s finding 

that the escrow holder was under no fiduciary duty to disclose to appellant the 2004 

fraudulent transfer of the property was an abuse of discretion which is reversible error.” 

We disagree. 

 While an escrow holder is an agent and fiduciary of the parties to the escrow, 

“[t]he agency created by the escrow is limited-limited to the obligation of the escrow 

holder to carry out the instructions of each of the parties to the escrow.” (Summit 

Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 705, 711.) 

“In delimiting the scope of an escrow holder’s fiduciary duties, . . . we start from the 

principle that ‘[a]n escrow holder must comply strictly with the instructions of the parties. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.] On the other hand, an escrow holder ‘has no general duty to 

police the affairs of its depositors’; rather, an escrow holder’s obligations are ‘limited to 

faithful compliance with [the depositors’] instructions.’ [Citation.] Absent clear evidence 

 

10 Contrary to Bonner’s argument, the court did not find that Placer was aware in 2006 of 

any fraud involved in the 2004 transaction. Rather, the court noted that while the 

evidence presented “can certainly be construed as establishing a reasonable likelihood 

that two of the escrow agents at Placer Title were conspiring with Derek Wheat to 

defraud,” there was no reason to make factual findings as to their conduct because “[i]t 

did not occur during the Equity Funding/Bonner escrow.” 
13

of fraud, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’ 

instructions.” (Ibid.) 

 There is no dispute that Placer properly complied with the 2006 escrow 

instructions and there are no allegations of fraud by Placer with respect to the 2006 

transaction. The 2004 escrow included only parcel 7. Despite any agreement Bonner may 

have had with Wheat to the contrary, parcel 6 was the only parcel conveyed in the 2006 

escrow. Johnson testified that early in the 2006 transaction, she emailed the mortgage 

broker, who brokered the loan with EFG, asking for “confirmation . . . as to which 

parcels [Placer] is covering[,] . . . both parcels or just one” and the broker replied that the 

escrow was only for parcel 6 “per Derek Wheat.” All of the escrow documents support 

this understanding. The preliminary title report refers only to parcel 6. The deeds of trust 

recorded for the EFG and J&E loans reference only parcel 6, and the grant deed signed 

by Bonner describes only parcel 6. 

 Although Bonner testified that he asked Johnson to research the title on both 

parcels after receiving Nwamu’s phone call and learning about parcel 7, Johnson denied 

ever receiving such a request from Bonner and the request is not in writing. The court 

reasonably could have found that Bonner’s testimony was not credible. In any event, 

even assuming Bonner made such a request, he did not pursue that request after speaking 

with Wheat and instead willingly completed the purchase. Thus, Placer had no occasion 

or obligation to provide Bonner any title information about parcel 7. 

Disposition

 The judgments are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. 
14

 _________________________ 

 Pollak, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

McGuiness, P. J. 

_________________________ 

Jenkins, J.