[Cite as In re R.H., 2017-Ohio-467.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104455

IN RE: R.H. 

A MINOR CHILD

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. DL 13117582 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., Blackmon, J., and Laster Mays, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anita Barthol Staley 

7327 Center Street 

Mentor, Ohio 44060 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Brandon A. Piteo 

Scott C. Zarzycki 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

The Justice Center, 8th and 9th Floors 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

Danielle L. Williams 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Children and Family Services Unit 

8111 Quincy Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44104 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM

Jonathan Z. Wilbur 

13940 Cedar Rd., Suite 246 

Cleveland, Ohio 44118 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Juvenile-appellant, R.H., appeals the disposition ordered by the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”). He raises the 

following assignments of error for our review: 

1. The juvenile court erred to the prejudice of the appellant by sentencing 

him to consecutive sentences, as it was not necessary to protect the public, 

and said sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses. 

2. The juvenile court erred to the prejudice of the appellant by sentencing 

him to 18 months actual incarceration, as said sentence is excessive. 

{¶2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm. 

I. Procedural History

{¶3} In July 2015, R.H. admitted to allegations of an amended complaint in 

Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL 13117582 and was adjudicated to be delinquent of possession of 

cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the fifth degree if committed by an adult. 

 R.H. further admitted to a parole violation in Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL 11102284. At a 

dispositional hearing in August 2015, the juvenile court imposed a six-month 

commitment at the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) in Case No. DL 

13117582, but suspended the commitment. R.H. was released to the custody of his 

uncle and was ordered to comply with the terms of his supervised release. 
{¶4} Subsequently, R.H. was adjudicated to be delinquent in Cuyahoga J.C. No. 

DL 15118059 of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the 

second degree if committed by an adult. In addition, R.H. was adjudicated to be 

delinquent in Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL 16100920 of receiving stolen property in violation 

of R.C. 2913.51(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree if committed by an adult. 

{¶5} At a dispositional hearing in March 2016, the juvenile court committed R.H. 

to ODYS for a period of one year in Case No. DL 15118059 and a period of 90 days in 

Case No. DL 16100920. The commitment period imposed in Case No. DL 16100920 

was extinguished once R.H. was given credit for time served. 

{¶6} With respect to Case No. DL 13117582, the juvenile court found that R.H. 

had violated the terms of his parole and imposed the suspended commitment to ODYS for 

an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum period 

not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The court further ordered the terms imposed in 

Case Nos. DL 15118059 and DL 16100920, to “run consecutively to the term imposed in 

DL 13117582,” for a total commitment period of 18 months. 

{¶7} R.H. now appeals from the juvenile court’s order of disposition. 

II. Law and Analysis

{¶8} In his first and second assignments of error, R.H. argues the juvenile court 

committed reversible error by imposing consecutive commitments. R.H. contends that 

his aggregate 18-month commitment to ODYS was excessive, was not necessary to 

protect the public, and was disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and the 
danger he poses to the public. For the purpose of judicial clarity, we address R.H.’s 

assignments of error together. 

{¶9} A juvenile court’s order of disposition will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 6. An 

abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). 

{¶10} On appeal, R.H. argues the juvenile court plainly abused its discretion by 

imposing consecutive commitments without making the necessary findings under former 

R.C. 2929.14(E). R.H.’s reliance on the statutory framework for imposing consecutive 

sentences in adult criminal cases, now governed by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), is misplaced. 

As this court has stated, there is no requirement for a juvenile court to support the 

decision to impose consecutive sentences with any specific findings as is required for 

adult offenders. In re R.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 84543, 84545, and 84546, 

2005-Ohio-26, ¶ 11. 

{¶11} This is because systemic differences exist between juvenile and adult 

criminal courts. In re Kirby, 101 Ohio St.3d 312, 2004-Ohio-970, 804 N.E.2d 476. 

The purposes of juvenile court dispositions include providing for the care, protection and 

development of children, protecting the public from wrongful acts, holding the offender 

accountable, and rehabilitating errant children. R.C. 2152.01. On the other hand, the 
purpose of adult felony sentencing is to protect the public from future crime and to punish 

the offender. R.C. 2929.11. 

{¶12} Generally, consecutive commitments in juvenile proceedings are governed 

by R.C. 2152.17(F), which states: 

If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing two or more acts 

that would be felonies if committed by an adult and if the court entering the 

delinquent child adjudication orders the commitment of the child for two or 

more of those acts to the legal custody of the department of youth services 

for institutionalization in a secure facility pursuant to section 2152.13 or 

2152.16 of the Revised Code, the court may order that all of the periods of 

commitment imposed under those sections for those acts be served 

consecutively in the legal custody of the department of youth services, 

provided that those periods of commitment shall be in addition to and 

commence immediately following the expiration of a period of commitment 

that the court imposes pursuant to division (A), (B), (C), or (D)(1) of this 

section. A court shall not commit a delinquent child to the legal custody 

of the department of youth services under this division for a period that 

exceeds the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age. 

{¶13} By the plain language of the statute, R.C. 2152.17(F) only applies when a 

child has been adjudicated delinquent for the commission of two or more acts that would 

be felonies if committed by an adult. In this case, the state concedes that R.C. 

2152.17(F) is inapplicable, as the statute does not specifically state that a court may order 

a commitment term for a new felony offense to be served consecutively to a term for a 

supervised-release violation. 

{¶14} However, in In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, 7 N.E.3d 

1173, the Supreme Court of Ohio was asked to decide whether, as at issue in this case, a 

juvenile court has the authority to commit a delinquent juvenile to ODYS for a 

supervised-release violation and order that period of commitment to be served 
consecutively to the commitment period imposed for the crime that resulted in the 

violation of supervised release. The court recognized that R.C. 2152.17(F) authorizes a 

court to impose consecutive commitment periods when a juvenile commits two or more 

acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult. The Court observed, however, that 

even though the crime that resulted in H.V.’s supervised-release violation was a felony, 

R.C. 2152.17 did not apply because the supervised-release violation did not, itself, 

represent an additional felony. The Court nevertheless determined that this did not mean 

the juvenile court lacked authority to impose consecutive terms for the crime and the 

violation. According to the Court, “[a]uthority to impose consecutive terms can be 

found in R.C. 2152.19(A)(8), which provides that ‘[i]f a child is adjudicated a delinquent 

child, the court may * * * [m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper. * * 

* .’” H.V. at ¶ 18. 

{¶15} The court pointed out that simply because R.C. 2152.17 sets forth 

circumstances under which a juvenile court may impose consecutive terms of 

commitment, it does not necessarily follow that juvenile courts lack statutory authority to 

impose consecutive terms in other situations. H.V. at ¶ 19. The court emphasized that 

H.V. was a repeat offender whose criminal conduct was escalating. Under such 

circumstances, the court determined it would be contrary to the purposes of juvenile 

dispositions in Ohio which require, among other things, juvenile courts to protect the 

public interest and safety as well as hold offenders accountable for their actions by 

imposing graduated sanctions. H.V. at ¶ 20, citing R.C. 2152.01(A). Thus, the court 
found that R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) provides a separate statutory mechanism for juvenile 

courts to impose a potentially more severe sanction when necessary to achieve the 

purposes set forth under R.C. 2152.01(A). 

{¶16} Applying the foregoing to the circumstances of this case, we find it was 

within the inherent authority of the juvenile court to run R.H.’s parole violation 

consecutively to the ODYS commitments for his new crimes pursuant to R.C. 

2152.19(A)(8). See H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, 7 N.E.3d 1173 at ¶ 20; 

see also In re N.P., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0024, 2013-Ohio-1288, ¶ 17; In re 

K.P., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010183, 2012-Ohio-5814, ¶ 7. 

{¶17} Moreover, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court carefully 

considered the overriding purposes of R.C. 2152.01(A) and imposed a commitment 

period that was reasonably calculated to achieve those purposes. At the disposition 

hearing, the juvenile court noted the seriousness of the relevant offenses and expressed 

concern with R.H.’s history of repeated and escalating delinquent behavior, stating, in 

pertinent part: 

 I don’t know what treatment plan to give you. I don’t know what 

to do to get you to knock it off. I understand that you don’t have much of 

an education and you’re 16 years old. I understand that you don’t have 

much of a trade and the people you hang out with up and down, left and 

right, family, non-family, everyone is a criminal. 

So I don’t know how to break this cycle with you. So the only 

thing I have right now, my ability is limited because of your behavior. 

{¶18} As referenced by the court at the disposition hearing, R.H. has numerous 

delinquency adjudications involving serious offenses and has a history of truancy and 
fleeing from court-ordered programs. Despite the repeated efforts of the juvenile court, 

R.H. has demonstrated no signs of rehabilitation or accountability. In our view, the 

juvenile court’s disposition committing R.H. to consecutive terms is consistent with the 

policies of holding offenders accountable for their actions and imposing graduated 

sanctions for those who have repeatedly offended. As the Supreme Court of Ohio has 

noted: 

[s]ome juveniles exhibit more serious criminal tendencies and behavior than 

do other juveniles. It would be unfair to require that a child who has 

committed numerous delinquent acts to be committed for the same period of 

time as a child who was determined to be delinquent for only one act. The 

first child should not be rewarded for a crime spree by an interpretation that 

limits the discretion of a juvenile court. 

In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 161, 666 N.E.2d 1367 (1996). 

{¶19} In light of the conduct that caused the underlying charges to be filed, as well 

as R.H.’s past and ongoing behavior, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in 

fashioning an order of disposition that involved the imposition of consecutive terms. 

{¶20} Moreover, we find no merit to R.H.’s position that his term of commitment 

was excessive. As stated, R.H.’s aggregate 18-month commitment derived from his 

delinquency adjudications for possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony 

of the fifth degree if committed by an adult; and felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree if committed by an adult. 

{¶21} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.16(A): 

(1) If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that 

would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may commit 
the child to the legal custody of the department of youth services for secure 

confinement as follows: 

* * * 

(d) If the child is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that 

is not described in division (A)(1)(b) or (c) of this section and that would be 

a felony of the first or second degree if committed by an adult, for an 

indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of one year and a maximum 

period not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age. 

(e) For committing an act that would be a felony of the third, fourth, or 

fifth degree if committed by an adult or for a violation of division (A) of 

section 2923.211 of the Revised Code, for an indefinite term consisting of a 

minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed the 

child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age. 

{¶22} Applying the foregoing, we find the court imposed a commitment period for 

each felony offense that was expressly authorized by statute. Accordingly, the trial 

court’s disposition was not excessive and constituted a reasonable exercise of sound 

discretion. 

{¶23} R.H.’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶24} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR