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ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. NV-11-1305-PaJuH

)

TIMOTHY L. BLIXSETH, ) Bk. No. 11-15010

)

Alleged Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

STATE OF MONTANA, Department )

of Revenue, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) O P I N I O N 

)

TIMOTHY L. BLIXSETH, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on July 20, 2012

at Pasadena, California

Filed - December 17, 2012

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Nevada

Honorable Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Lynn Hamilton Butler, of Brown McCarroll, LLP,

argued for Appellant; Charles D. Axelrod, of Fox

Rothschild LLP, argued for Appellee.

 

Before: PAPPAS, JURY, and HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pappas

Dissent by Judge Hollowell

FILED

DEC 17 2012

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule 1

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

 MDOR asserts this amount is the undisputed portion of its 2

(continued...)

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PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judge:

The Montana Department of Revenue (“MDOR”) appeals the order

of the bankruptcy court dismissing the involuntary bankruptcy

petition it and others filed against the alleged debtor, Timothy

Blixseth (Blixseth), for improper venue. We REVERSE.

FACTS

On April 5, 2011, MDOR, along with the Idaho State Tax

Commission and the California Franchise Tax Board, filed an

involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition (the “Petition”) 1

against Blixseth in the bankruptcy court for the District of

Nevada. The Petition listed Blixseth’s residence and mailing

address as Medina, Washington, and Blixseth’s “county of

residence or principal place of business” as Las Vegas, Nevada. 

The box on the Petition titled “Location of Principal Assets of

Business Debtor (if different from previously listed address)”

was left blank. The “Venue” box on the Petition indicated that

venue in the District of Nevada was appropriate because Blixseth

had been domiciled, had a residence, principal place of business,

or had principal assets, in the District of Nevada for the longer

part of 180 days before the petition was filed.

In the Petition, MDOR asserted a claim against Blixseth in

the amount of $219,258, the Idaho State Tax Commission asserted 2
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(...continued) 2

larger claim held against Blixseth. Blixseth and MDOR are

engaged in litigation before the Montana State Tax Appeals Board

regarding the balance of MDOR’s tax claim, which exceeds $56

million. That litigation was stayed, however, when the

bankruptcy case was filed pursuant to MDOR’s stay motion.

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a claim against Blixseth for $1,117,914, and the California

Franchise Tax Board asserted a claim against Blixseth for

$986,957.95, all for unpaid taxes. Just a few days later, on

April 20, after settling their claims with Blixseth, the Idaho

State Tax Commission and the California Franchise Tax Board

withdrew as petitioning creditors in the Petition, leaving MDOR

as the sole petitioning creditor.

Meanwhile, on April 8, 2011, the bankruptcy court, acting

sua sponte, had entered an “Order to Show Cause Why Venue in This

District is Proper And Why Transfer of Case is Not Appropriate”

(the “OSC”). In the OSC, the bankruptcy court noted that

Blixseth’s Washington street and mailing address were listed in

the Petition. The court expressed concern that venue in Nevada

was not proper “because of the paucity of the connection between

Blixseth and the petitioning creditors’ selected venue.” The OSC

required the petitioning creditors to present admissible evidence

sufficient to support a finding that venue in Nevada complied

with 28 U.S.C. § 1408. That statute provides in pertinent part

that:

[A] case under title 11 may be commenced in the

district court for the district –

(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place

of business in the United States, or principal assets

in the United States, of the person or entity that is

the subject of such case have been located for the one

hundred and eighty days immediately preceding such
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 Blixseth also challenged MDOR’s status as an eligible 3

petitioning creditor and asserted that MDOR filed the involuntary

petition in bad faith as a tactic to gain a litigation advantage

in the state tax court.

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commencement . . .;

The petitioning creditors responded to the OSC on April 18,

2011. In their response they asserted that, based on a thorough

review of public records, the only indicator they had to

determine proper venue for the involuntary bankruptcy case under

28 U.S.C. § 1408 was their discovery that Blixseth recently “had

transferred most of his assets out of his personal name and into

two Nevada corporate entities.” The petitioning creditors

asserted that Blixseth’s principal assets consisted of his 98%

partner’s interest in Desert Ranch LLLP, a Nevada limited

liability limited partnership (“Desert Ranch”), and his 40%

member’s interest in Desert Ranch Management LLC, a Nevada

limited liability company (“Desert Management”). The creditors

contended, because Blixseth’s equity interests in the two Nevada

entities were his principal assets, venue was proper in Nevada. 

Additionally, the petitioning creditors outlined several factors

that they argued militated against transfer of the case to

another district.

In response to the OSC, Blixseth filed a motion to dismiss

(“MTD”) the Petition. Blixseth asserted that there was no basis 3

for venue for the bankruptcy case in Nevada. Blixseth stated

that he had resided in Washington since 2007, after previously

residing in California. Moreover, Blixseth asserted that he
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conducted no business in Nevada, had no place of business in

Nevada, and had no property in Nevada.

Importantly, though, in a declaration filed to support the

MTD, Blixseth acknowledged that his primary asset was indeed his

98% limited partnership interest in Desert Ranch. Blixseth

Supplemental Omnibus Declaration at ¶ 21, May 4, 2011 (“All of my

income derives from entities held by Desert Ranch LLLP.”). 

However, he explained that Desert Ranch is a holding company for

a number of non-Nevada entities whose principal assets are real

estate holdings located in Idaho, Washington, California, Mexico

and the Turks & Caicos. He stated that the business records and

original partnership agreement for Desert Ranch are maintained in

Idaho; its bookkeeping is done in California; and the company

conducts no business in Nevada.

Blixseth also admitted that his 40% member’s interest in

Desert Management comprised the rest of his principal assets. 

Blixseth explained that Desert Management is the general partner

of Desert Ranch, and its only asset is a 2% interest in Desert

Ranch. Blixseth noted that he and his son co-manage Desert

Management, and that the LLC has no offices or place of business,

and does not conduct business, in Nevada. Other than the

interests in Desert Ranch and Desert Management, Blixseth stated,

he owns only his personal effects.

A hearing on the OSC was conducted by the bankruptcy court

on April 22, 2011. MDOR, by then the only petitioning creditor,

argued that, based on Nevada’s charging order statutes for LLCs

and LLLPs, and a decision by a Washington appellate court

interpreting a statute similar to the Nevada laws, for venue
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 The non-venue related issues raised in the MTD were 4

deferred by the bankruptcy court to be considered with the motion

(continued...)

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purposes, the location of a debtor’s uncertificated interest in a

limited liability company or a limited liability partnership is

the entity’s state of registration. The bankruptcy court

continued the hearing so that the parties could submit briefs to

more fully: (1) address the location of Blixseth’s equity

interests in Desert Ranch and Desert Management; (2) analyze the

Nevada statutes regarding the right to obtain a charging order

against a limited partner’s partnership interest; and (3) discuss

how Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) would treat

Blixseth’s interests in Desert Ranch and Desert Management.

At the initial hearing, the bankruptcy court also asked MDOR

to address why the interests of justice and convenience to the

parties required that the case remain in Nevada, rather than

transferring the case to a different venue. MDOR conceded that,

as to the convenience of the parties, venue in Nevada made little

difference since the petitioning creditors were not located in

Nevada. However, MDOR argued that “the heart of a creditor’s

concern is the transfer of the assets . . . into Nevada vehicles

that are created for asset protection measures.” Hr’g Tr. (Apr.

22, 2011) at 28:21-23. MDOR argued that because Nevada law could

apply to unwind the transfer, Nevada had a greater interest in

the case than another state. Thus, MDOR argued that transfer to

another venue was not in the interests of justice.

On April 27, 2011, Blixseth filed a renewed motion to

dismiss and a motion for sanctions. Blixseth and MDOR submitted 4
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(...continued) 4

for sanctions. Proceedings concerning both motions have been

stayed pending this appeal.

-7-

their supplemental briefs on May 4, 2011, and the continued

hearing on the OSC was held May 18, 2011.

At the hearing on May 18, the bankruptcy court identified

the issue before it as when “all someone has is an equity

interest in a Nevada limited-liability, limited-partnership and a

membership interest in an LLC, can you say for purposes of [28

U.S.C. §] 1408 that his principal assets are in Nevada?” Hr’g

Tr. (May 18, 2011) at 20:23-21:1. In its arguments to the court,

MDOR asserted that Blixseth had a statutory connection with

Nevada with respect to the governance and operation of Desert

Ranch and Desert Management. Furthermore, MDOR reiterated its

position that, based on the Nevada charging order statutes that

require a creditor to enforce a judgment against a debtor’s

interest in an LLLP or LLC solely in a Nevada court, the location

of the debtor’s interest is the state of registration. Blixseth,

however, argued that the common law principle that intangible

assets are located at the person’s domicile applied in this case

and was supported by case law and the UCC.

At the close of the second hearing, the bankruptcy court

announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ruled

that venue of the bankruptcy case in Nevada was improper. While

Blixseth had not argued so, the bankruptcy court concluded that

intangible ownership interests have no physical location. 

Therefore, the bankruptcy court determined that, in this case,

venue based on the location of Blixseth’s principal assets was
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unavailable. And because it was undisputed that Blixseth did not

reside, was not domiciled, and did not have a principal place of

business in Nevada, there was no other basis for venue in Nevada.

In the alternative, the bankruptcy court noted that because

courts have, for various non-venue purposes, ascribed a location

for intangible assets, the bankruptcy court could also in this

case determine the location of Blixseth’s ownership interests in

Desert Ranch and Desert Management. The court decided, applying

the common law, that “you look to the residence of the owner of

the intangible.” Hr’g Tr. (May 18, 2011) at 62:16-17. In the

court’s opinion, this view was “supplemented and buttressed by”

the notion that creditors would look to Article 9 of the UCC to

determine where to perfect a security interest in a borrower’s

intangible asset and that, under the UCC, general intangibles are

located at the owner’s residence. Hr’g Tr. (May 18, 2011) at 62-

63. Thus, to the extent they had any cognizable situs at all,

the bankruptcy court held that, for the purpose of determining

the proper venue for an involuntary case against him, Blixseth’s

intangible ownership interests in the Nevada entities were not

located in Nevada. Based upon this analysis, the bankruptcy

court ruled that venue in the District of Nevada was improper.

An order dismissing the Petition against Blixseth was

entered on May 27, 2011, and MDOR timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 157(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1334. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 158.

///
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ISSUE

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, for venue purposes

under 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1), Blixseth’s principal assets,

consisting of his intangible equity interests in Desert Ranch and

Desert Management, were located in Nevada.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo

and its factual findings for clear error. Hopkins v. Cerchione

(In re Cerchione), 414 B.R. 540, 545 (9th Cir. BAP 2009). Unless

there are pertinent factual disputes, a bankruptcy court’s

interpretation of the venue statutes and its determination of

whether a case is filed in an improper venue are reviewed de

novo. Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 533 (6th

Cir. 2002); Modaressi v. Vedadi, 441 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53-54

(D.D.C. 2006).

DISCUSSION

A. Venue Law

The statute 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) provides that venue for a

bankruptcy case may be based upon any of four alternatives: the

debtor’s (1) domicile, (2) residence, (3) principal place of

business in the United States, or (4) principal place of assets

in the United States. Proper venue is determined by reference to

the facts existing within the 180-day period prior to the filing

of the bankruptcy petition. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1). Any one of the

four bases is sufficient to support proper venue. Broady v.

Harvey (In re Broady), 247 B.R. 470, 472 (8th Cir. BAP 2000); In

re Shelton, 2001 WL 35814440, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 12,

2001). Even so, the “ground of location of assets will not
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frequently provide a real alternative because the residence of an

individual is likely to be located in the district in which the

individual’s principal assets are located.” 1 COLLIER ON

BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 4.02[c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,

16th ed., 2012).

Venue statutes “speak[] to an appropriate, geographically

identified forum for the effective administration of the

bankruptcy process.” In re Murrin, 461 B.R. 763, 782 n.36

(Bankr. D. Minn. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, Murrin v. Hanson

(In re Murrin), 477 B.R. 99 (D. Minn. 2012); see also VE Holding

Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed.

Cir. 1990) (venue statutes protect a defendant “from the

inconvenience of having to defend an action in a trial court that

is either remote from the defendant’s residence or from the place

where the acts underlying the controversy occurred”); In re

Washington, Perito & Dubuc, 154 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1993) (“The purpose of statutory venue requirements is to ensure

that a case is filed in a forum that is convenient for the

parties in interest.”). Even when a bankruptcy petition is filed

in a proper district, the bankruptcy court may still transfer the

case to another district “if the court determines that the

transfer is in the interest of justice or for the convenience of

the parties.” Rule 1014(a)(1). If a petition is filed in an

improper district, the court “may dismiss the case or transfer it
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 The authority to transfer cases is governed by the Rules; 5

there is no bankruptcy-specific venue statute similar to 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a) requiring transfer or dismissal of a case if

venue is improper. U.S. Tr. v. Sorrells (In re Sorrells), 218

B.R. 580, 585-86 (10th Cir. BAP 1998).

 MDOR does not argue that Blixseth’s principal place of 6

business was located in Nevada as a result of his ownership of

Desert Ranch and Desert Management. According to Blixseth’s

declaration, it appears that Desert Ranch and Desert Management

conduct no business in Nevada. Blixseth Dec. (May 4, 2011) at 3.

See also In re Murrin, 461 B.R. at 787 (ownership interests in

entities that hold real estate outside the state are eliminated

as “business” for venue purposes).

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to any other district” to accommodate the interest of justice or

convenience of the parties. Rule 1014(a)(2).5

Here, MDOR asserts that the fourth alternative under 28

U.S.C. § 1408(a)(1) provides the basis for venue for this

bankruptcy case in Nevada. In explaining the decision to file

the Petition in Nevada, the petitioning creditors explained that

it was unclear whether Blixseth resided or was domiciled in

Washington because the public real property records indicated his

residence there was owned by a corporation. See Hr’g Tr. (May

18, 2011) at 17-19. On the other hand, because they discovered

that Blixseth had transferred all of his valuable assets into

Desert Ranch, which is co-managed by Blixseth and his son through

Desert Management, the creditors felt justified in asserting in

the Petition that Blixseth’s principal assets were located in

Nevada. The creditors’ decision to file the Petition in Nevada 6

gives rise to the substantive question in this appeal: whether

Blixseth’s principal assets, consisting of his equity interests
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in the entities Desert Ranch and Desert Management, are located

in Nevada for purpose of venue of the bankruptcy case.

B. The Location of Blixseth’s Principal Assets

It is undisputed that Desert Ranch and Desert Management

were established under, and exist pursuant to, Nevada law. 

N.R.S. 88.350—88.415 [LLLP] and N.R.S. 86.011 et seq. [LLC]. 

Blixseth also does not contest that his interests in these Nevada

entities constitute his “principal assets.” Thus, because the

bankruptcy court decided no questions of fact, we review de

novo its legal conclusion that Blixseth’s ownership interests in

Desert Ranch and Desert Management were not located in Nevada for

bankruptcy venue purposes.

Of course, Blixseth’s uncertificated member’s interests in

the Nevada LLC and partner’s interest in the LLLP are intangible. 

Intangible property has no physical location; the location or

situs of intangible property is a “legal fiction.” Delaware v.

New York, 507 U.S. 490, 498 (1993) (“intangible property is not

physical matter which can be located on a map”); Office Depot

Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2010) (“attaching

a situs to intangible property is necessarily a legal fiction”);

In re Murrin, 461 B.R. at 788 (intangible property is “almost

completely independent of physical presence”); In re Shelton,

2001 WL 35814440 at *4 (intangible property has no physical

characteristics that would serve as a basis for assigning it to a

particular locality). As a result, we are tempted to agree with

the bankruptcy court’s primary holding in this case that because

intangible property has no physical location, the fourth basis to

support venue in a bankruptcy case where a debtor’s principal
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assets consist of intangible property is simply inapplicable, and

therefore, bankruptcy venue must be based on one of the other

three alternatives in 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1).

However, though intangible property has no physical

location, courts have frequently ascribed a location to

intangible assets for various purposes. Thus, the Ninth Circuit

has held in a case involving internet domain names that, in

determining the location of intangible property for venue

purposes, a trial court must adopt a “context-specific” analysis

that employs a “common sense appraisal of the requirements of

justice and convenience in particular conditions.” Office Depot

Inc., 596 F.3d at 702 (citation omitted). Indeed, the Ninth

Circuit made clear that a single intangible property may be

located in multiple places for different purposes. Id.

MDOR and Blixseth both acknowledge that assigning a location

to Blixseth’s intangible ownership interests in this bankruptcy

case requires a common sense, context-specific analysis. But

while the cases that the parties cite may address what location

should be ascribed to intangible property in different scenarios,

none address the situs of intangible property based on the

principal place of a debtor’s assets in a bankruptcy case. See,

e.g., Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 (dispute among states

over right to escheat intangible personal property); Office Depot

Inc., 596 F.3d 696 (quasi in rem jurisdiction challenge to

complaint for turnover of internet domain names owned by judgment

debtor to satisfy a judgment); Koh v. Inno-Pac. Holdings, Ltd.,

54 P.3d 1270 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (judgment creditor seeking to

enforce foreign judgment via a charging order against a debtor’s
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interest in an LLC); Oliner v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 311

N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (jurisdictional challenge in

ownership dispute of stock certificates). We, also, have been

unable to locate case law discussing the location of intangible

assets for bankruptcy venue purposes in general, nor more

particularly, the location of a member’s interest in an LLC or a

partner’s interest in an LLLP.

Because the approach dictated by the Ninth Circuit mandates

a context-specific analysis for the particular purpose at issue,

in gauging the venue for a bankruptcy case, we believe that the

“principal place of assets” should “[l]ogically . . . be

construed in a way most resonant with the functional concerns of

the administration of the bankruptcy estate [since] all assets in

question will be administered by a trustee serving under the

jurisdiction of the forum court.” In re Murrin, 461 B.R. at 788.

In contrast to this approach, the bankruptcy court opted for

alternative “bright-line” rules for determining the location of

intangible property for bankruptcy venue purposes. It held that

intangible assets either have no location at all or are always

located at the debtor’s residence.

Because the Ninth Circuit instructs that, in this situation,

we must examine the context of a particular case, and that we

apply “common sense” notions of justice and convenience based

upon the particular circumstances, we respectfully disagree with

the bankruptcy court’s “one-size-fits-all” approach. Moreover,

while the bankruptcy court’s particular conclusions may be

justified under other facts, under the circumstances in this

case, we disagree that Blixseth’s interests in Desert Ranch and
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Desert Management should either have no situs at all, or should

be deemed to be located in Washington, where Blixseth resides.

We first consider the context of this contest. This venue

issue arises in a creditor’s action to place Blixseth into

involuntary bankruptcy so that his available assets may be

liquidated for the benefit of his creditors, including MDOR. 

Viewed in this way, an involuntary bankruptcy case is, at bottom,

a creditor collection device. If successful in prosecuting the

Petition, Blixseth’s creditors, acting through a bankruptcy

trustee, will seize and sell Blixseth’s interests in Desert Ranch

and Desert Management to satisfy their collective claims. Given

that goal, it is important to consider what rights a bankruptcy

trustee would have to seize and liquidate Blixseth’s interests in

the Nevada LLLP and LLC.

An LLC is governed by the laws of the state in which it is

organized. See generally Weddell v. H2O, Inc., 271 P.3d 743

(Nev. 2012) (discussing Nevada’s enactment of the uniform LLC

statute found in the N.R.S. at Chapter 86 and the applicability

of that statute to Nevada’s LLC’s). An LLC is formed in Nevada

by the execution and filing of articles of organization, along

with paying a filing fee, with the Secretary of State. Id. at

749. The owners of an LLC are called members. A member is “the

owner of a member’s interest in a limited-liability company.” 

Id. A “member’s interest” is defined by statute as “a share of

the economic interests in a limited-liability company, including

profits, losses and distributions of assets.” N.R.S. 86.091. 

“The interest of each member of a limited-liability company is

personal property.” N.R.S. 86.351. A Nevada LLC is a separate
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entity from its members. N.R.S. 86.371 (“[N]o member or manager

of any limited-liability company formed under the laws of this

State is individually liable for the debts or liabilities of the

company.”).

Under Nevada law, a partnership, including an LLLP, is “an

association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a

business for profit[.]” N.R.S. 87.060(1), 88.606(1). A

partnership may register as an LLLP at the time of filing its

certificate of limited partnership by filing a combined

certificate of limited partnership and limited liability limited

partnership with the Nevada Secretary of State. N.R.S.

88.606(4). An LLLP comes into existence with the filing of the

LLLP certificate of registration. N.R.S. 88.606(5). The owners

of an LLLP are referred to as “Partners,” and may be either

General Partners or Limited Partners. N.R.S. 88.315(6); (7). 

General Partners participate in the control of the partnership;

Limited Partners do not. N.R.S. 88.455. A partner in an LLLP,

General or Limited, is a separate entity from the LLLP, “unless

the trier of fact determines that adherence to the fiction of a

separate entity would sanction fraud or promote a manifest

injustice.” N.R.S. 88.608(1).

Importantly, the Nevada legislature has made clear that a

creditor, looking to seize a debtor’s member interest in an LLC,

or a partner interest in an LLLP, as a means of satisfying the

debtor’s debts, can do so in only one way. Under N.R.S. 86.401,

upon “application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any

judgment creditor of a member, the court may charge the member’s

interest [in a Nevada LLC] with payment of the unsatisfied amount
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 § 544. Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to 7

certain creditors and purchasers

(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of

the case, and without regard to any knowledge of the

trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of,

or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or

any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable

by--

(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the

time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains,

at such time and with respect to such credit, a

judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a

simple contract could have obtained such a judicial

lien, whether or not such a creditor exists[.]

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of the judgment with interest.” N.R.S. 86-401(1) (LLCs). This

remedy is referred to as a “charging order.” Weddell, 271 P.3d

at 749-50. “No other remedy . . . is available to the judgment

creditor attempting to satisfy the judgment . . . .” N.R.S. 86-

401(2). The same exclusive remedy is provided for creditor

actions targeting a partner’s interest in a Nevada LLLP. N.R.S.

88.535(1) (the same wording as N.R.S. 86-401(1), except

substituting “partner” for “member”). Like N.R.S. 86-401(2),

N.R.S. 88-535(2) is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment

creditor of a limited liability limited partner (or an assignee

of the partner) may satisfy a judgment out of the partnership

interest of the judgment debtor.

As can be seen, Blixseth’s creditors’ rights to seize his

assets as a member in Desert Management and Limited Partner in

Desert Ranch are prescribed exclusively by Nevada’s statutes. In

a bankruptcy case, employing the powers granted by § 544(a)(1),7

Blixseth’s bankruptcy trustee could assert the same rights as his
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creditors to pursue his interests in the LLC and LLLP. Under

Nevada’s statutes, because a creditor seeking to realize the

value of Blixseth’s interests would be limited to asking a Nevada

court for a charging order, the trustee must also resort solely

to the state court to secure a charging order. In our opinion,

when this involuntary bankruptcy case is viewed in context, we

are persuaded that because Blixseth’s interests in the LLC and

LLLP were created and exist under, and his creditor’s remedies

are limited by, Nevada state law, that is sufficient reason to

deem Blixseth’s interests to be located in Nevada.

The case law, while sparse, is not to the contrary. While

there are no similar bankruptcy decisions, one case involving

facts closely aligned with this one is Koh, 54 P.3d 1270. There,

in determining whether Washington’s courts could exercise quasi

in rem jurisdiction in a creditor’s action for a charging order

concerning a nonresident’s member’s Washington LLC interest, the

state court held that the proper situs of that member’s interest

was Washington, the state in which the LLC was created. 

Referring to the language in the Washington statutes which, like

Nevada, are based on the uniform laws, specifying that a

collecting creditor is limited to the remedy of a charging order,

the court concluded that “where a partnership organizes under the

laws of a state, the partnership interest is located within that

state.” Id. at 1272.

In addition to pursuing a charging order, a bankruptcy

trustee in Blixseth’s case may have other methods of liquidating

his interests in Desert Ranch and Desert Management. As a

practical matter, since these interests would constitute property
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 The trustee may seek to dissolve either Desert Ranch, an 8

LLLP, Desert Management, an LLC, or both. The legal mechanisms

for judicial dissolution of the two business structures are

nearly identical.

N.R.S. 88.550 lists five situations in which an LLLP must be

dissolved. The first four are initiated within the partnership. 

The fifth provides for judicial dissolution: “A limited

partnership is dissolved and its affairs must be wound up upon

the happening of the first of the following to occur: . . . 

5. Entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under NRS 88.555.”

N.R.S. 88.550(5). N.R.S. 88.555, in turn, provides that “On

application by or for a partner the district court may decree

dissolution of a limited partnership whenever it is not

reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity

with the partnership agreement.”

In nearly identical language, N.R.S. 86.491 provides for

judicial dissolution of an LLC. Three situations are initiated

within the company. The fourth provides that “A limitedliability company must be dissolved and its affairs wound up: . .

. (d) Upon entry of a decree of judicial dissolution pursuant to

NRS 86.495.” N.R.S. 86.491(d). N.R.S. 86.495(1) then provides

the authority to dissolve the company in the Nevada district

court: “Upon application by or for a member, the district court

may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it

is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the

company in conformity with the articles of organization or

operating agreement.”

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of the bankruptcy estate under § 541(a), by standing in

Blixseth’s shoes as a member or partner in the entities, the

trustee could seek to judicially dissolve the companies and

distribute their assets to the members. But just as they do with

creditor actions seeking entry of a charging order, the Nevada

statutes grant exclusive jurisdiction for such a proceeding to

the Nevada district courts. In analogous settings, the courts 8

of several states have held that jurisdiction to dissolve a

corporation rests only in the courts of the state of

incorporation. Young v. JCR Petroleum, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 889, 892
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(W. Va. 1992) (“The courts of one state do not have the power to

dissolve a corporation created by the laws of another state.”);

Valencia Bartels de Nunez v. Valencia Bartels, 684 So. 2d 1008,

1012 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Warde-McCann v. Commex, Ltd., 522

N.Y.S.2d 19, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Spurlock v. Santa Fe

P.R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 313 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see also 19

C.J.S. CORPORATIONS § 932 (1990) (“[T]he courts of one state or

country have no jurisdiction or power to dissolve a corporation

created by another state or country[.]”). Of special interest

here, in a case dealing with an action to dissolve a Nevada LLC,

an Ohio court held that there was no basis for concluding that an

Ohio court has the authority to dissolve a Nevada LLC. Durina v.

Filtroil, Inc., 2008 WL 4307892, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)

(citing, inter alia, Kulp v. Fleming, 62 N.E. 334, 339 (Ohio

1901) (“[O]ur courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate the

affairs of a foreign corporation, and any attempt to wind up its

business by a comprehensive decree in our courts would be

futile.”)).

In sum, the Nevada legislature has made it clear that, to

sell Blixseth’s member interests, a bankruptcy trustee must

resort to the Nevada courts either to obtain a charging order

against Blixseth’s interest in the LLLP or LLC, or to dissolve

those entities. Through these restrictions, in our opinion, the

statutes implicitly reflect the legislature’s assumption that a

member’s or partner’s interests are “located” in Nevada. 

Consistent with that assumption, in the context of this case, we

believe Nevada should be deemed the location of Blixseth’s

interests in Desert Ranch and Desert Management.
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For several reasons, our conclusion that Nevada is the

proper venue for this case is also bolstered by notions of

justice and convenience of the parties under these facts.

First, it is undisputed that Blixseth availed himself of the

benefits of establishing the Nevada LLLP and LLC. It is also

uncontradicted that he then transferred all of his valuable

assets into those entities. Presumably, in organizing the Nevada

entities, and conveying his valuable properties to them, Blixseth

desired to take advantage of the separate legal identities

bestowed on Desert Ranch and Desert Management under Nevada law

in his future dealings with business associates and personal

creditors. Given Blixseth’s strategy in dealing with his assets,

we find it disingenuous that he now argues that, although he

chose to take advantage of the Nevada statutory scheme in

creating the LLLP and LLC, into which he then transferred all of

his valuable assets, now Nevada is not a proper venue for his

creditors to pursue their efforts to seize and liquidate those

assets. Surely, if notions of justice carry any weight,

Blixseth’s conduct warrants a conclusion that venue in Nevada is

proper.

Moreover, as noted above, if Blixseth is eventually

adjudicated an involuntary debtor, it is obviously more

convenient for a Nevada trustee to administer his bankruptcy

case. Put another way, how can it be anything other than

inconvenient, assuming as Blixseth apparently argues that

Washington is a proper venue for the bankruptcy case, for a

trustee appointed there to have to come to a Nevada court to

obtain a charging order or to dissolve Desert Ranch and Desert
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 We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague 9

that the common law, or provisions of the Uniform Commercial

Code, compel a different result in determining the venue of an

involuntary bankruptcy case prosecuted under these facts. 

Indeed, as to the common law, one of the cases cited in the

dissent (involving a lien perfection dispute, not a venue

contest), quoting Justice Cardozo, states that, in determining

the appropriate situs for general intangibles, “the root of the

selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the

requirements of justice and convenience in particular

conditions.” In re Iroquois Energy Mgmt., LLC, 284 B.R. 28, 31

(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002) quoting Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London &

Lancashire Ins. Co., 174 N.E. 299, 300 (N.Y. 1931). Moreover,

the UCC provisions cited in the dissent govern perfection of a

security interest in a debtor’s assets by a secured creditor, not

the collection rights of unsecured creditors like MDOC. In

applying the UCC, the bankruptcy court in In re Washington,

Perito & Dubuc, 154 B.R. 853 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), the other

case cited in the dissent, found that the accounts receivable

were located at the principal place of business of the debtor, a

dissolving law firm, not where some of the account debtors were

located. We agree with that bankruptcy court that, given the

fact that the law firm had an established place of business, the

accounts should be deemed located there. We also agree with the

court’s observation that the bankruptcy court should avoid “venue

being placed in distant locations having only attenuated

connections to the [debtor] or its creditors.” Id. at 862.

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Management. Under these facts, as compared to Washington, Nevada

would seem to be the much more convenient venue for the

bankruptcy case.9

Again, we acknowledge that the bankruptcy court’s decision

that intangible assets may have no situs or that, if they do

possess a “location,” it should be the same as the debtor’s

residence, may be defensible when founded on different facts. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that, in determining

where a debtor’s assets are located for venue purposes, common

sense, context, justice and convenience must guide a trial court. 
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When we consider those factors and this record, we think

Blixseth’s interests in Desert Ranch and Desert Management should

be deemed to be located in Nevada, and that venue for this

involuntary bankruptcy case is proper there.

VI. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the order of the bankruptcy court dismissing this

involuntary bankruptcy case for improper venue.

Dissent begins on next page.
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HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge, Dissenting:

I agree with the majority that resolution of this appeal

requires a “context specific” analysis. However, the majority

has distorted that analysis by interpreting context-specific as

“case-specific.”

“Context” is defined as the “interrelated conditions in

which something exists or occurs.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY 250 (Frederick C. Mish, ed., 10th ed. 2000). The

majority’s conclusion that the location of an intangible asset

for bankruptcy venue purposes is the jurisdiction where

collection must be pursued focuses on what may happen during (or

at the end) of a case instead of on conditions as they exist at

the commencement of the case. Thus, the majority’s analysis is

based on what may happen if an order for relief is actually

entered against Blixseth, but that was not the question the

bankruptcy court had to address. The issue at the beginning of

the case was not how to collect Blixseth’s assets but simply

where those assets were located. I believe that the bankruptcy

court correctly looked to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial

Code (UCC) to decide the location of Blixseth’s intangible

personal property interest in the LLLP and LLC.

At common law, intangible property follows the person

(mobilia sequuntur personam) and is located where a person is

domiciled. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 503 (1993). Like

the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (and Revised ULLCA),

the UCC has been adopted by Nevada. Article 9 of the UCC follows

the common law doctrine by locating, for perfection purposes,
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intangible property at a debtor’s residence. See Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 88.528 (describing interest in limited partnership as personal

property); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.9102(pp) (defining general

intangibles); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.9301 (perfection principles). 

As the bankruptcy court noted, the UCC governs how Blixseth would

have pledged or otherwise encumbered his partnership interests. 

Because it also governs the perfection of any pledged interest,

it provides notice to competing creditors and parties in interest

of the existence and priority of any encumbrances. A number of

courts have, therefore, determined that using the place of

perfection is the best approach for determining the location of a

debtor’s intangible property for purposes of venue of a

bankruptcy case. In re Iroquois Energy Mgmt., Inc., 284 B.R. 28,

32 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Washington, Perito & Dubuc, 154

B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).

I fail to see why the majority assumes that Nevada’s

enactment of the ULLCA or its laws regarding limited partnerships

should determine the location of an intangible asset. Nevada has

also adopted the UCC which, unlike the uniform LLC statute, has a

specific provision that answers the question of where an

intangible asset is located.

When venue is based on the location of a debtor’s principal

assets, using the UCC to make that determination is straight

forward and predictable. The majority’s approach is neither. 

Instead it requires courts to reach into a case and engage in

speculation about facts that have not yet been established. 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.