* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 29, 2005 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROWANA K. RIGGS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee. No. 04-3165 (D.C. No. 03-CV-4111-RDR)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff-appellant Rowana K. Riggs appeals from th e district court’s affirmance of defendant Social Security Commissione r’s denial of disability-2-

insurance benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. On appeal, Ms. Riggs continues to argue, as she did in the dis trict court, that the ALJ (1) did not follow legal standards; (2) did not properly co nsider her reaching restrictions with her upper extremities; and (3) did not adequat ely consider Dr. Summerhouse’s walking restrictions. She also argues that (4) no one would hire her due to her many medical problems and restr ictions and (5) the district court failed to consider the entire record when dec iding her appeal. We review the ALJ’s decision only to determine whether the co rrect legal standards were applied and whether the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). Reviewing pursuant to these standards, we affirm. At all times Ms. Riggs has proceeded pro se. She a lleges disability since May 9, 2000, due to bilateral carpel tunnel syndrom e. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that with this impairment Ms. Rig gs has a residual functional capacity for a range of s edentary activities with lifting or carrying 10 pounds with no overheadwork, no climbing ladders, no vibration tools, no repetitive grasping and the need to avoid frequent flexion, twisting, torquing, extension, pushing, pulling and repetitive or extended periods of use of the upper extremities. R., Vol. 2 at 22; see also id. at 20. Although the ALJ decided Ms. Riggs could not perform her past relevant work, the ALJ decidedshe could perform a significant range of sedentary work. Specifically, based on testimony of a-3-

vocational expert, the ALJ found that Ms. Riggs cou ld perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy including te lephone solicitor, telephone answering operator, motor assignment clerk or credi t card clerk. Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded Ms. Riggs was not disab led and was not entitled to disability insurance or SSI benefits. Because the Appeals Council found no basis for revi ew, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Ms. Riggs appealed to the district court. In a thorough and well-reasoned de cision, that court upheld the Commissioner’s decision. Ms. Riggs’ first three arguments on appeal, which w ere presented to the district court, are that the ALJ (1) did not followlegal standards; (2) did not properly consider her reaching restrictions with he r upper extremities; and (3) did not adequately consider Dr. Summerhouse’s walking r estrictions. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude, for substantiall y the same reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum and Order of March8, 2004, that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, the ALJ proper ly considered her reaching restrictions and walking restrictions and substanti al evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 19. Next, Ms. Riggs argues that because she has many me dical restrictions and problems, no one would hire her. As indicated abov e, the record supports the-4-

ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Riggs is not disabled. T he Commissioner need not also prove that she actually would be hired for a job. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (claimant is not disabled if she can“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the nation al economy, regardless of whether . . . a specific job vacancy exists for [he r], or whether [she] would be hired if [she] applied for work”). Lastly, Ms. Riggs argues that the district court di d not consider the entire administrative record before making a decision. Th is argument is conclusory; Ms. Riggs does not indicate what evidence the distr ict court failed to consider. In any event, upon our review of the record, it is cle ar to us that the district court did consider the entire record. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Th e mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby Circuit Judge