No. 2--02--0714

_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS	

	SECOND DISTRICT

_________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF    )    Appeal from the Circuit

ILLINOIS,                     )    Court of Jo Daviess County.

                              )

	Plaintiff-Appellant,     )

                              )      

v.                            )    Nos. 02--CM--139     

                              )         02--CM--140

JASON J. KOESTER,             )         02--CM--142               

ANTHONY M. SKUTT,             )         02--CM--143     

CARRIE A. DAVENPORT,		)         02--CM--144

EMILY K. PEARSON,			)         02--CM--145

JOSEPHINE M. SKUTT,           )         02--CM--146

ERIKA S. YOUNG,			)         02--CM--147

ANNETTE L. SKUTT,			)         02--CM--148

                              ) 

	                         )    Honorable

						)    Victor V. Sprengelmeyer,

	Defendants-Appellees.	)    Judge, Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

	In this consolidated appeal, the State appeals the trial

court's granting of defendants' motions to suppress evidence and

confessions and motions to quash arrests.  We affirm.

	On March 31, 2002, defendants Jason J. Koester, Carrie Ann

Davenport, Emily Kay Pearson, Josephine M. Skutt, Erika S. Young,

and Annette L. Skutt were charged with consumption of alcohol by a

person under the age of 21 years old.  235 ILCS 5/6--20 (West

2000).  Defendant Anthony M. Skutt was charged with contributing to

the delinquency of a child.  720 ILCS 130/2a (West 2002).  All

defendants filed motions to quash arrests, suppress evidence, and

suppress confessions.  

	At the joint evidentiary hearing, Jo Daviess County deputy

sheriff Byran Purchis testified that he was dispatched to the Skutt

home in response to a "911" call wherein the female caller hung up

before speaking to the police dispatcher.  The call came from the

Skutt home.  When the police dispatcher called the number back, the

female who answered denied that anyone called "911" and stated that

she was alone, despite the fact that the dispatcher heard voices

and noise in the background.  Purchis received a call from the

dispatcher to investigate.  The dispatcher also sent two additional

squad cars as back up.  Purchis testified that a hang-up "911" call

is treated as an emergency because a concern arises that a victim,

perhaps a rape or battery victim, may be prevented from calling or

coerced into denying the call.  The voices and noise in the

background heightened the concern.  Purchis used his emergency

lights and siren while driving to the Skutt home.

	Purchis stated that the Skutt home is located on a quiet,

narrow gravel lane.  When Purchis arrived at the Skutt home, it

looked as if a party was going on; there were 12 vehicles parked

along the lane and in the driveway, there were beer cans and

glasses outside the home, and many lights were on in the home.  Tim

Heidenrich, an 18-year-old high school student who was doing a

"ride along," told Purchis that he recognized some of the cars as

belonging to fellow high school students.

	Purchis testified that, when he knocked at the side door of

the home, defendant Anthony Skutt answered the door.  Purchis saw

three men, who appeared to be over the age of 21, sitting at the

kitchen table.  In response to Purchis's inquiry about the 911 call, Anthony first denied that a 911 call had been made and then

explained that the caller may have been his sister.  Anthony told

Purchis that there were only four people in the home.  When Purchis

asked to enter the home to determine whether everything was okay,

Anthony replied that Purchis would need a warrant to enter the

home.

	Purchis then called his supervisor, patrol sergeant Colin

Fulrath, and advised Fulrath of the situation.  Fulrath told

Purchis to stand by while Fulrath called the State's Attorney's

office. About 10 to 15 minutes later, Fulrath arrived at the Skutt

home and spoke with the State's Attorney's office.  Purchis heard

no yelling, screaming, thumping, or gunshots coming from the home. 

However, Purchis told Fulrath that he believed an emergency

situation existed in the Skutt home.  Fulrath returned to his squad

car and spoke with the State's Attorney's office.  After the phone

conversation, Fulrath told Purchis that exigent circumstances

existed and that they could enter the Skutt home without a warrant. 

	Purchis testified that during the half-hour period from the

time that Purchis first spoke with Anthony until the time Fulrath

told Purchis they did not need a warrant, Anthony stayed outside

the home in the vicinity of the deputies.  Anthony was "very

cooperative" and did not give Purchis any problems. 

	The deputies, now three with the arrival of deputy sheriff

Turner, told Anthony that they could enter the home due to exigent

circumstances.  Anthony told the deputies that he understood and

then escorted them into the home.  Purchis testified that their

purpose in entering the home was to determine whether police or medical assistance was needed.  However, Purchis stated that he

brought only his portable breath-testing device into the home and

not his first aid kit. The deputies had no idea what type of

emergency situation they might encounter.  The deputies did not

burst into the house because they did not want to be faced with a

civil lawsuit or motion to suppress.  That is why they contacted

the State's Attorney's office before entering the house.

	Purchis stated that three men were sitting at the kitchen

table.  In response to Purchis's question, the men indicated that

everything was okay.  Anthony escorted Fulrath around the first

floor of the home while Purchis remained in the kitchen and Turner

checked the basement.  No female subjects were found on the first

floor or in the basement.   Anthony then escorted Fulrath upstairs. 

After about five minutes, Purchis left the kitchen to join Fulrath. 

Purchis stated that there were many people near a darkened bedroom. 

In the bedroom at least seven people were under a twin bed and

under the covers of the bed.  The deputies smelled alcohol on the

subjects' breath.  Purchis asked the subjects, who were wearing

pajamas, if everything was alright. The subjects denied making a

911 call.  Because no medical emergency existed and the deputies

smelled alcohol on the subjects' breath, the focus of the

investigation changed.  Fulrath escorted the subjects downstairs

and asked them again if everything was alright.  After determining

that there was no medical emergency, the deputies asked the

subjects who was under 21 years of age.  The deputies told the

subjects that they could be arrested for underage drinking because of the odor of alcohol and asked the subjects to submit to breath

tests.  None of the subjects were placed under arrest at this time. 

	Fulrath testified that the deputies went to the Skutt home to

determine whether anyone was injured or in need of medical

assistance due to the 911 hang-up call.  Fulrath stated that he

went upstairs because he had not found a female downstairs who

could have been the caller.  In an upstairs bedroom, Fulrath saw

people in bed and others lying against the wall, all sleeping or

pretending to be asleep, covered with blankets.  No one responded

when Fulrath shined his flashlight and asked if anyone was injured

or needed help.  Fulrath shook some of the subjects to wake them

up.  When everyone was awake, Fulrath asked them to go downstairs. 

Fulrath woke two others who were sleeping in another bedroom and

asked them to go downstairs.  Fulrath explained that he asked

everyone to go downstairs so that he could determine, in better

lighting, whether anybody had been injured and to find out who had

made the 911 call.  Fulrath noticed an odor of alcohol on a couple

of the subjects.  

	Defendant Annette Skutt testified that she drank 11⁄2 to 2 beers

that night.  Defendants Erika Young, Emily Pearson, Carrie

Davenport, and Jason Koester were all sleep-over guests at her

home.  Annette stated that when Fulrath entered the bedroom he did

not ask her or her friends whether everything was alright.  Fulrath

just shined the flashlight in the bedroom and told everyone to get

up and go downstairs.

	On June 27, 2002, the trial court granted defendants' motions,

holding that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the deputy sheriff's warrantless entry into the Skutt residence.  The

State filed a certificate of impairment, and the cases were

consolidated on appeal.

	On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by

suppressing the evidence and quashing the arrests because the

warrantless and nonconsensual entrance into the Skutt home was

justified by exigent circumstances.

	As an initial matter, we note that the State bears the burden

of demonstrating exigent need for a warrantless search or arrest. 

We will not disturb a trial court's findings of fact after a

suppression hearing unless they are against the manifest weight of

the evidence.  People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31 (2001). However, where there are no factual disputes, we review de novo the trial court's decision.  Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431.

	The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution bars

warrantless, nonconsensual searches and seizures in a person's home

absent exigent circumstances.  U.S. Const., amend. IV; People v. Calderon, 336 Ill. App. 3d 182, 196 (2002).  It is well established that exigent circumstances may exist if officers reasonably believe

an emergency exists mandating immediate action to aid someone in

the home.  People v. Greene, 289 Ill. App. 3d 796, 801 (1997).

	In Greene, this court held that exigent circumstances existed where a 911 caller hung up and only an answering machine was heard

on redial.  Greene, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 801-02.  When the police arrived at the home and knocked on the door, the defendant walked

to the door, dead bolted the lock, and then hid something under the

sofa.  Greene, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 803.  However, the defendant later consented to the officers' entrance into his residence. 

Greene, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 803. 

	In this case, it is undisputed that Anthony Skutt refused to

consent to the officers' entry into his home.  Moreover, the

officers' purported belief that an emergency situation existed in

the home is belied by the record.  In contrast to Greene, in this case, Anthony Skutt opened the door to Purchis and responded to his

questions, stating that everything was fine and explaining that his

sister probably placed the 911 call.  Yet, instead of either asking or demanding to speak with Anthony's sister, the officers waited for half an hour before entering the home.  This delay places doubt

on the officers' testimony that they believed an emergency

situation existed.  In addition, Officer Purchis brought his

breathalyzer test equipment into the home, but not his first aid

kit.  It is difficult to reconcile this action with Purchis's

stated belief that the 911 caller may have been raped or battered. 

Even when the officers entered the home and found people sleeping

upstairs, they did not ask to speak with Anthony's sister or try to

determine who made the 911 call.  In light of Purchis's testimony

that he believed a party was going on in the house, the beer cans

in the driveway, and Heidenrich's statement to Purchis that the

cars belonged to his high school classmates, the trial court's

finding that the officers entered the home to investigate underage

drinking and not to search for and/or give aid to a person in need

is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Thus, the

trial court did not err by suppressing the evidence and arrests.

	In light of our holding that the trial court properly

suppressed the evidence and quashed the arrests based on the lack

of exigent circumstances, we need not address the State's argument

that the trial court erred by finding that no crime was committed

on the premises.

	The judgment of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County is

affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.