Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A04-1605-DR-1161 | March 10, 2017 Page 1 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Lori B. Schmeltzer

Schmeltzer Law PLLC

Traverse City, Michigan

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Kristina J. Jacobucci

Newby, Lewis, Kaminski & Jones, 

LLP

La Porte, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Imre L. Falatovics,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Amy L. Falatovics,

Appellee-Petitioner

March 10, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

46A04-1605-DR-1161

Appeal from the La Porte Superior 

Court

The Honorable Michael S. 

Bergerson, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

46D01-1302-DR-59

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] For the third time, this matter comes before us for review. Imre L. Falatovics 

(“Husband”) and Amy L. Falatovics (“Wife”) were divorced. Following the 
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issuance of the dissolution decree, Wife filed an appeal and Husband filed an 

Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion (“Trial Rule 60(B) Motion”) to set aside the 

dissolution decree. After this Court reversed a portion of the dissolution decree 

and remanded, another appeal ensued. Once this Court’s opinion was certified,

Wife moved to dismiss Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motion and his addendum 

to his Trial Rule 60(B) Motion (“Addendum”) (sometimes collectively referred 

to as “Trial Rule 60(B) Motions”). The trial court granted Wife’s motion and 

dismissed Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motions. 

[2] Husband now appeals the dismissal of his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions. He argues 

that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to follow the proper procedure 

for bringing his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions. He also asserts that Wife is barred 

by the doctrines of laches and/or invited error from arguing that he failed to 

follow the proper procedure. Finally, he also contends that his constitutional 

rights were violated because he did not receive an evidentiary hearing on his 

motions. Wife contends that Husband’s appeal is frivolous and in bad faith and 

requests that we award her appellate attorney fees.

[3] We conclude that trial court did not err in finding that Husband failed to follow 

the proper procedure. We further conclude that neither laches nor invited error 

applies and that Husband was not deprived of his constitutional rights. We 

affirm the judgment and deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees.
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Facts and Procedural History

[4] On December 19, 2013, the trial court issued the dissolution decree, dissolving 

the parties’ marriage and dividing the marital estate. On January 13, 2014, 

Wife appealed. On January 29, 2014, the Court of Appeals acquired 

jurisdiction when the notice of completion of clerk’s record was entered in the 

chronological case summary (“CCS”). Ind. Appellate Rule 8. 

[5] While the appeal was still pending, on May 7, 2014, Husband filed in the trial 

court his verified Trial Rule 60(B) Motion to set aside the dissolution decree, 

asserting that “Wife committed fraud to the court by not disclosing assets, 

vehicle(s) and bank accounts” owned during the divorce proceedings. 

Appellant’s App. at 26. The trial court set the matter for hearing on August 26, 

2014. On August 5, 2014, Wife filed a motion to continue the hearing, stating

that her appeal was pending, and therefore the trial court had no jurisdiction to 

hear Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motion “until after a decision on the Appeal 

has been rendered.” Id. at 28. The trial court granted Wife’s motion.

[6] On August 14, 2014, this Court issued its opinion on Wife’s appeal. Falatovics 

v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Falatovics 1”). In her appeal, 

Wife argued that the trial court erred in excluding from the marital estate 

Husband’s interest in two parcels of real estate (“Parcels 1 and 2”) that he held 

with his brother as joint tenants subject to a life estate in his mother. Husband 

did not file a brief, and therefore we reviewed the trial court’s judgment for 

prima facie error. We concluded that Husband held a present pecuniary 

interest in Parcels 1 and 2, and therefore the trial court improperly excluded his 
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interest in them from the marital estate. In addition, we observed that the 

parties had agreed on the value of Husband’s interest in Parcels 1 and 2, and 

therefore, we reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to 

include Husband’s interest in Parcels 1 and 2 in the marital estate and divide 

the marital estate based on the new valuation in a manner it deemed fair. Id. at 

111-12. Neither Husband nor Wife sought rehearing or transfer of our opinion, 

and it was certified as final on September 26, 2014. 

[7] On October 29, 2014, the trial court held a status conference and addressed the 

remanded issues. On November 14, 2014, Husband filed his Addendum, 

claiming that the appraisals for Parcels 1 and 2 submitted by Wife “during the 

final hearing” were mistaken in fact and valuation. Appellant’s App. at 36. On 

November 25, 2014, the trial court issued its amended dissolution decree, 

wherein it included Husband’s interest in Parcels 1 and 2 in the marital estate, 

revised the value of the estate accordingly, and equally divided the marital 

estate based upon this revised valuation. On December 9, 2014, the trial court 

scheduled a hearing for all pending issues on March 2, 2015. 

[8] On December 23, 2014, Husband appealed the amended dissolution decree. 

On January 23, 2015, the notice of completion of clerk’s record was entered in 

the CCS.

[9] On February 17, 2015, Wife filed in the trial court a motion for continuance of 

the hearing on Husband’s pending Trial Rule 60(B) Motions, declaring that his

appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, and therefore the trial court 
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had no jurisdiction to hear the motions until after the appeal was rendered. Id. 

at 42. The same day, Husband filed an objection to continuance, claiming that 

the appeal briefing schedule was stayed and that “his pleadings before [the trial] 

Court must be heard prior to the appeal and it’s [sic] briefing schedule.” Id. at 

43. On February 23, 2015, Wife filed a response to Husband’s objection, 

asserting that the CCS did not show that the briefing schedule for the appeal 

had been stayed. The same day, the trial court granted Wife’s motion for 

continuance. 

[10] On March 12, 2015, Husband filed in the Court of Appeals a motion to stay 

appeal and remand jurisdiction to the trial court to consider his Trial Rule 60(B) 

Motions. Husband attached his Trial Rule 60(B) Motion and Addendum and 

averred that a ruling on these motions “may resolve some or all of the issues 

raised on appeal.” Appellee’s App. at 10. On March 30, 2015, Wife filed her 

objection to Husband’s motion to stay appeal, asserting that Husband waived 

all issues raised in his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions by failing to seek leave of the 

Court of Appeals to file his motions. Id. at 18. On April 10, 2015, this Court 

denied Husband’s motion to stay appeal. It did not provide the basis for its 

denial.

[11] On November 5, 2015, this Court handed down its memorandum decision on 

Husband’s appeal of the amended dissolution decree. Falatovics v. Falatovics, 

No. 46A03-1412-DR-449, 2015 WL 6777221 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2015), 

trans. denied (2016) (“Falatovics 2”). In this appeal, Husband challenged the 

equal division of the marital estate. We concluded that the trial court did not 
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abuse its discretion in equally dividing the martial estate. Id. at * 3. We also 

rejected Husband’s attempt to relitigate issues regarding his interest in Parcels 1 

and 2 and their valuation. Id. at * 2. Accordingly, we affirmed the amended

dissolution decree. Husband petitioned for transfer, which was denied on 

February 11, 2016. 

[12] On February 15, 2016, the matter was certified back to the trial court. On 

March 14, 2016, Wife filed a motion to dismiss Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) 

Motions. Husband filed a response. In April 2016, following a hearing, the 

trial court granted Wife’s motion to dismiss, finding that Husband failed to 

follow the appropriate procedure for bringing his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions, and 

that therefore he had waived his arguments and was not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court did not err in granting Wife’s 

motion to dismiss.

[13] Husband challenges the dismissal of his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions. His first 

Trial Rule 60(B) Motion alleged that Wife committed fraud in failing to disclose 

assets, and his Addendum alleged that Wife’s appraisals of Parcels 1 and 2 were 

based on mistakes of fact and valuation. Trial Rule 60(B) provides, “On 

motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party ... from a 

judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons: (1) 

mistake, ... and (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
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extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party[.]” Trial 

Rule 60(D) states, “In passing upon a motion allowed by subdivision (B) of this 

rule the court shall hear any pertinent evidence.” 

[14] As an initial matter, we must resolve the parties’ dispute as to the proper 

standard of review. Husband claims that this is an appeal of the trial court’s 

decision on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B), which we review 

de novo. Wife contends that the trial court’s dismissal of Husband’s Trial Rule 

60(B) Motions is effectively a denial, which we review for an abuse of 

discretion. 

[15] We conclude that the trial court’s dismissal of Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) 

Motions is effectively a denial. See Jahangirizadeh v. Pazouki, 27 N.E.3d 1178, 

1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (equating dismissal of Trial Rule 60(B) motion with 

denial). In general, we review a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside 

judgment for an abuse of discretion. Id. However, in this case the issue 

presented involves purely a question of law, which we review de novo. See

Goodson v. Carlson, 888 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (observing that 

when appeal of trial court’s denial of motion to set aside judgment involves 

question of law, our review is de novo).

[16] Husband first asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to follow 

the appropriate procedure for bringing his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions and 

therefore waived his claims and is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

Husband filed his Trial Rule 60(B) Motion after Wife appealed the dissolution 
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decree. On January 29, 2014, the Court of Appeals obtained jurisdiction when 

the notice of completion of the clerk’s record was entered in the CCS. Husband 

filed his Trial Rule 60(B) Motion on May 7, 2014. Thus, when Husband filed 

his Trial Rule 60(B) Motion, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the 

case. 

[17] In Logal v. Cruse, 267 Ind. 83, 368 N.E.2d 235 (1977), cert. denied (1978), our

supreme court set forth the proper procedure to follow when a party wishes to 

pursue a Trial Rule 60(B) motion while an appeal is pending. There, the trial 

court dismissed Logal’s lawsuit because he failed to comply with a discovery 

order. Logal appealed the dismissal. During the pendency of the appeal, Logal 

filed in the trial court a motion to set aside the dismissal and reinstatement of

the lawsuit. The trial court “overruled” Logal’s motion, and he appealed that 

ruling. Id. at 83, 368 N.E.2d at 236. Our supreme court consolidated Logal’s 

appeals and adopted the following procedure for bringing a motion to set aside 

while a judgment is on appeal (“the Logal Procedure”): 

(1) The moving party files with the appellate court an application 

for leave to file his 60(B) motion. This application should be 

verified and should set forth the grounds relied upon in a specific 

and non-conclusory manner.

(2) The appellate court will make a preliminary determination of 

the merits of the movant’s 60(B) grounds. In so doing the 

appellate court will determine whether, accepting appellant’s 

specific, non-conclusory factual allegations as true there is a 

substantial likelihood that the trial court would grant the relief 

sought. Inasmuch as an appellate court is not an appropriate 
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tribunal for the resolution of factual issues, the opposing party 

will not be allowed to dispute the movant’s factual allegations in 

the appellate court.

(3) If the appellate court determines that the motion has sufficient 

merit, as described in the preceding paragraph, it will remand the 

entire case to the trial court for plenary consideration of the 60(B) 

grounds. Such remand order will terminate the appeal and the 

costs in the appellate court will be ordered taxed against the party 

procuring the remand. The decision to remand does not require 

the trial court to grant the motion. If the trial court denies the 

motion, the movant should file a motion to correct errors 

addressed to this denial, and appeal the denial. In this new 

appeal any of the issues raised in the original appeal may be 

incorporated, without being included in the second motion to 

correct errors.

(4) If the trial court grants the motion, the opposing party may 

appeal that ruling under the same terms as described in 

paragraph (3). The original appeal shall be deemed moot.

Id. at 86-87, 368 N.E.2d at 237 (citations omitted). The Logal court explained

that “this procedure will allow full and fair consideration of grounds for relief 

from judgment with a minimum of disruption of the appellate process.” Id. at 

87, 368 N.E.2d at 237.

[18] The Logal court then considered the issues raised in the two consolidated 

appeals. “For purposes of illustration and in the interests of fairness,” the Logal 

court considered Logal’s motion to set aside the dismissal as though he had 

followed the procedure set forth above. Id., 368 N.E.2d at 237. The court 

concluded that there was not a substantial likelihood that Logal would succeed 
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in his claim that he did not have notice of the trial court’s discovery order. Id., 

368 N.E.2d at 238. In addition, the court reviewed whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in dismissing the lawsuit and concluded that it had not. Id.

at 88, 368 N.E.2d at 238. Accordingly, the Logal court affirmed the trial court’s 

dismissal of the action and the denial of Logal’s motion to set it aside. Id., 368 

N.E.2d at 238.

[19] The Logal Procedure was enforced in Southwood v. Carlson, 704 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999). There, Southwood brought a medical malpractice action 

against various medical care providers. The trial court granted the medical care 

providers’ summary judgment motion, and Southwood appealed. Before the 

trial clerk submitted the record of proceedings to the Court of Appeals,

Southwood filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) 

with the trial court. After the Court of Appeals obtained jurisdiction over the 

case, the trial court granted Southwood’s motion for relief from judgment and 

set aside its grant of summary judgment in favor of the medical care providers. 

The medical care providers appealed the grant of Southwood’s motion for relief 

from judgment. 

[20] The medical care providers’ appeal and Southwood’s appeal of the summary 

judgment ruling in favor of the medical care providers were consolidated. The 

Southwood court began by addressing the medical care providers’ argument that 

the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant Southwood’s motion for relief 

from judgment. The court rejected Southwood’s contention that because the 

Court of Appeals had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case at the time he 
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filed his motion, the Logal Procedure was inapplicable. Id. at 165. The court

concluded that Southwood was obligated to follow the Logal Procedure when 

the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction, and he had not. Id. Therefore, the 

court concluded that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule upon 

Southwood’s motion for relief from judgment and vacated the trial court’s ruling 

granting his motion. Id. at 166. 

[21] The Southwood court then considered the trial court’s summary judgment ruling 

in favor of the medical care providers. Southwood argued that there was a 

genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment and that the trial 

court erred by refusing to consider his designated affidavits. The Southwood

court concluded that Southwood’s designation of evidence was untimely, and 

therefore the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the 

health care providers. Id. at 169.

[22] Here, Husband concedes that he did not follow the Logal Procedure, but he 

contends that Logal and Southwood are distinguishable, and therefore the Logal

Procedure is inapplicable. First, he asserts that in Logal and Southwood, the 

party seeking to have the trial court’s judgment set aside was also the appellant

and the issue raised in the motion to set aside and the appeal was the same. 

Thus, according to Husband, the movant/appellant in those cases was seeking 

to have two bites of the same apple. Husband points out that he filed the Trial 

Rule 60(B) Motion, but Wife brought the first appeal, and he claims that the 

issue he raised in his Trial Rule 60(B) Motion was different from the issue 

raised in Wife’s appeal. 
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[23] We reject the contention that the identity of the movant and the appellant is 

relevant to the rationale underlying the Logal Procedure; namely, to permit fair 

consideration of the motion without unduly disrupting the appeals process. 

The trial court loses jurisdiction over the case once the Court of Appeals obtains 

jurisdiction regardless of who initiated the appeal. We also reject Husband’s 

assertion that the issues must be the same. As long as the same judgment is the 

subject of the appeal and the motion for relief from judgment, the issues raised 

could result in the judgment or a portion of it being reversed or set aside. If a 

judgment is on appeal, and there are grounds to set aside that same judgment, it 

is a waste of the parties’ and the court’s resources to follow through with the 

appeals process only to have that same judgment set aside albeit for a different 

reason. The motion to set aside should be heard before the appeal proceeds so 

that all issues can be appealed at once. In fact, the circumstances of this case 

are a perfect illustration of this concept.

[24] Here, Husband claims that the potential for competing results is not present 

because the issues presented to this Court and the trial court were different. We 

disagree. Wife’s appeal addressed the exclusion of Husband’s interest in 

Parcels 1 and 2 from the marital estate, and Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motion 

addressed the exclusion of Wife’s assets as a result of her failure to disclose 

assets. Wife’s appeal and Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motion both directly 

affected the same judgment. Each raised issues pertaining to the 

exclusion/inclusion of marital assets, which affects the ultimate determination 

of the value of the marital estate and the equitable distribution thereof. Thus, 
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the failure to follow the Logal Procedure would result in piecemeal decisions 

regarding the same judgment and multiple appeals as to the fair distribution of 

the marital estate. Furthermore, Husband’s Addendum and the first appeal 

both addressed Husband’s interest in Parcels 1 and 2, and inclusion of 

Husband’s interest in that property was the reason for the issuance of the 

amended dissolution decree. Husband recognized in his motion to stay appeal 

that a ruling on his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions “may resolve some or all of the 

issues raised on appeal.” Appellee’s App. at 10. 

[25] Another distinction Husband attempts to make is that the movant/appellant in 

both Logal and Southwood had the issues in their motions to set aside heard on 

the merits, whereas he has not. However, Logal did not have his motion to set 

aside heard on the merits. The Logal court considered only whether there was a 

substantial likelihood that the trial court would grant the relief Logal sought in 

his motion to set aside in accordance with the procedure it had outlined. Thus,

the Logal court did not hear evidence in support of Logal’s motion to set aside 

and the opposing party was not permitted to dispute the movant’s factual 

allegations. Logal, 267 Ind. at 86-87, 368 N.E.2d at 237-38. 

[26] Husband’s comparison to Southwood is also unavailing. In Southwood, although 

the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Southwood’s motion for 

relief from judgment and issued a ruling, the appellate court vacated that ruling 

because the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the case. 704 N.E.2d at 

166. We fail to see the benefit of having a hearing on a motion when the ruling 

on the motion is vacated. Finally, we note that although Trial Rule 60(D) 
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generally requires trial courts to hold a hearing on any pertinent evidence before 

granting Trial Rule 60(B) relief, a party is not always entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. See Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 

(concluding that appellant was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on his Rule 

60(B)(1) motion based on excusable neglect where he alleged that his attorney 

was negligent but attorney negligence will not support a finding of excusable 

neglect as a matter of law), trans. denied (2005). Accordingly, we are 

unpersuaded that the distinctions between this case and Logal and Southwood

render the Logal Procedure inapplicable.

[27] Next, Husband claims that Wife’s motion to dismiss is barred by the doctrines 

of laches and/or invited error. “Laches is an equitable defense that may be 

raised to stop a person from asserting a claim that he would normally be 

entitled to assert.” Ind. Real Estate Comm’n v. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Laches requires: ‘(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a 

known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in 

existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the 

adverse party.’” SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cty. Airport Auth., 831 

N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 231 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). Husband argues that he filed his Trial Rule 60(B) 

Motion on May 7, 2014, but Wife did not file her motion to dismiss until 

almost two years later on March 14, 2016, which constitutes inexcusable delay. 

Husband ignores that two appeals occurred during that time period. Wife filed 

her motion to dismiss within thirty days of the trial court resuming jurisdiction 
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on February 15, 2016, when the decision in Falatovics 2 was certified. We 

cannot say that Wife inexcusably delayed in filing her motion to dismiss.

[28] “The doctrine of invited error is grounded in estoppel.” Witte v. Mundy ex rel. 

Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005). Under this doctrine, “a party may not 

take advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or which is the natural 

consequence of her own neglect or misconduct.” Evans v. Evans, 766 N.E.2d 

1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Husband argues that Wife invited the error by 

moving for two continuances, rather than dismissal, of the Trial Rule 60(B) 

Motions, indicating to the trial court that “the matter could not be adjudicated 

and heard until after the appeal was completed.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. 

Husband overstates the effect of Wife’s motions for continuance. In her 

motions, she merely informed the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to 

entertain evidentiary hearings while the case was pending on appeal. That was 

not error. If the trial court had ruled on Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motions

when the appeals were pending, the judgment would have been void. See 

Southwood, 704 N.E.2d at 166. We conclude that the doctrine of invited error 

does not apply. 

[29] Finally, Husband claims that the dismissal of his Trial Rule 60(B) Motions 

without an evidentiary hearing violates his federal constitutional due process 

rights and his state constitutional right to open access to the courts. The 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits any state 

from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 

Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “All courts shall be 
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open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or 

reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Indiana courts have 

consistently construed Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution as 

analogous to the federal due process clause. Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 

988 (Ind. 2003). 

[30] We observe that Husband had an opportunity to be heard on the issue raised in 

the Addendum—the valuation of Parcels 1 and 2—before the dissolution decree 

was issued, but at that time he apparently agreed to the valuation of properties

in Wife’s appraisals. See Falatovics 1, 15 N.E.3d at 111 (“The parties agreed that 

the value of Husband’s interest in Parcels 1 and 2 was $106,700.”). As for his 

Trial Rule 60(B) Motion, parties are not entitled to evidentiary hearings when 

procedural requirements have not been satisfied. See Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of 

Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 2013) (concluding that Plank forfeited 

opportunity for evidentiary hearing on his constitutional challenge to Medical 

Malpractice Act damages cap); Bunker v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8, 14 

(Ind. 1982) (concluding that statute of limitations in Occupational Diseases Act 

was constitutional as applied to worker’s claim for permanent disability). Here, 

Husband would have received an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his 

motion if he had followed the proper procedure. Husband was not completely 

denied an opportunity to be heard merely by being required to follow the proper 

procedure. We find no violation of Husband’s constitutional rights.
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Section 2 - Wife is not entitled to appellate attorney’s fees.

[31] As a final matter, we address Wife’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to 

Indiana Appellate Rule 66, which permits this Court to assess damages, 

including attorney’s fees, if an appeal is frivolous or in bad faith. “Our 

discretion to award attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited 

to instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, 

frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 

797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “[W]e must use extreme restraint 

when exercising this power because of the potential chilling effect upon the 

exercise of the right to appeal.” Id. “A strong showing is required to justify an 

award of appellate damages and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere 

lack of merit but something more egregious.” Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish 

Cmty., Inc., 982 N.E.2d 329, 339-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). While we find 

Husband’s argument unpersuasive, his appeal is not permeated with frivolous 

claims or brought in bad faith. Therefore, we decline Wife’s request for 

attorney’s fees.

[32] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the dismissal of Husband’s Trial Rule (60)(B) 

Motions.

[33] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.