IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

JAMES MURRAY REAVES III,

Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0253

Filed February 16, 2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. CR20170282001

The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore

REMANDED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

COUNSEL

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General

Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals

By Karen Moody, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson

Counsel for Appellee

James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender

By Alex Heveri, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Presiding Judge Eckerstrom authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Judge Vásquez and Judge Espinosa concurred.

E C K E R S T R O M, Presiding Judge:

James Reaves III appeals from his convictions and sentences 

for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and aggravated assault. He 

argues the trial court erred in denying his challenge to the state’s 

peremptory strike, brought pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

(1986), that it made multiple errors in its jury instructions, and that it 

incorrectly precluded evidence that he suffers from post-traumatic stress 

disorder. Because we agree the court erred in fulfilling the constitutional 

obligations set forth by Batson and its progeny, we remand for the court to 

make findings consistent with this opinion. We otherwise affirm Reaves’s 

convictions and sentences.

Factual and Procedural Background

We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

jury’s verdicts and resolve all inferences against Reaves. See State v. Felix, 

237 Ariz. 280, ¶ 30 (App. 2015). Reaves was involved in a romantic 

relationship with A.T. for a number of years. Beginning in December 2015, 

he lived with A.T. in a house she shared with her grandmother. In late 

December 2016, A.T. and Reaves argued, and he was asked to move out of 

the house. Within two days, Reaves removed his belongings and returned 

one of the two keys he possessed to the residence. Until the date of the 

incident, he lived out of his truck. 

One evening in early January 2017, Reaves let himself into the 

house when A.T. was not home and watched television for a while. He then 

took a nap in his vehicle, which was parked in the driveway. A.T. and a 

male friend, D.P., arrived at the house. After D.P. went inside, Reaves had 

a brief conversation with A.T., telling her that D.P.—whom Reaves did not 

trust—needed to leave and, at minimum, should not be allowed to stay in 

A.T.’s bedroom. Reaves later looked into the house’s windows and saw 

A.T. and D.P. together in her bedroom. 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

3

Reaves then drove to a gas station, where he told the 

attendant he was angry because he had caught his girlfriend cheating and 

wanted to damage her car. Reaves showed the attendant a metal bar he 

planned to take with him in case “the guy” tried to “come at him.” Reaves

continued to text and call A.T. about her relationship with D.P. During one

call, Reaves angrily asked A.T. if she and D.P. had just had sex, and she 

answered in the affirmative. Reaves then screamed at A.T. that she had 

“better start saying [her] goodbyes” because he was returning to the house 

and would kill D.P. if he was still there. 

Shortly afterward, Reaves arrived at A.T.’s house. He let 

himself in, visibly “[v]ery upset,” repeated that he was going to kill D.P.,

and exchanged the metal bar for knives from the kitchen, which he held in 

both hands. He entered the bedroom, told D.P. to get out, and D.P. refused. 

D.P. then approached Reaves—smirking according to Reaves—and 

extended his hand, as if for a handshake. Reaves ducked below D.P.’s hand 

and stabbed him seventeen times. He also cut A.T.’s arm when she 

attempted to intervene. D.P. died from his injuries. 

Reaves left the house and returned to the gas station, where 

he told the attendant he had stabbed a man. He washed his hands and 

changed out of his bloodied shirt, which he threw in a dumpster before 

looking up and smiling into a security camera. An acquaintance drove him 

out of town, where he remained for several days. During the drive, Reaves 

texted his father, including sending a link to the penalties associated with 

first-degree murder in Arizona. He also texted two other people, stating he 

had killed someone. Reaves later testified that he had planned to kill 

himself, and in preparation he recorded a video on his cell phone in which 

he admitted to killing D.P. But Reaves ultimately turned himself in to 

police. 

After a seven-day trial, Reaves was convicted of first-degree 

murder, first-degree burglary, and aggravated assault, and he was 

sentenced to natural life in prison, plus 7.5 years. This appeal followed. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 

13-4033(A).
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

4

Batson Challenge1

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any 

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” In the 

context of jury trials, this clause ensures that each individual venireperson 

carries “the right not to be excluded from [a jury] on account of race.” 

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991). It protects a core exercise of 

democratic participation, because “[o]ther than voting, serving on a jury is 

the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in 

the democratic process.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019). 

Therefore, “[e]xclusion of [B]lack citizens from service as jurors constitutes 

a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 

cure.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. In short, “[t]he Constitution forbids striking 

even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Flowers, 139 

S. Ct. at 2244. 

Since Batson, federal law has “vigorously enforced and 

reinforced the decision, and guarded against any backsliding,” Flowers, 139 

S. Ct. at 2243, recognizing that “[e]qual justice under law requires a criminal 

trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process,” id. at 2242. 

“[T]rial judges possess the primary responsibility to enforce Batson and 

prevent racial discrimination from seeping into the jury selection process.” 

Id. at 2243. 

Reaves is Caucasian. His jury pool included two mental 

health professionals. One, J.F., is Black and holds a PhD in clinical 

psychology. The other, A.S., is Caucasian, holds a master’s degree, and 

works as a licensed therapist. Each agreed that her professional experiences 

would not hinder her ability to be fair and impartial. After the state

peremptorily struck J.F., Reaves raised a challenge under Batson. The 

following exchange ensued:

Court: All right. So there’s a prima facie showing.

[State]?

[State]: Your Honor, the reason that we struck [J.F.]— 

 

1 Effective January 1, 2022, our state supreme court eliminated 

peremptory challenges from criminal and civil jury selection procedures. 

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021).
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

5

Court: Because she’s a clinical psychologist? 

[State]: —because she’s a clinical psychologist.

[Defendant]: But the State kept [A.S.], who is a therapist.

Court: Okay. All right. The court finds that the reason

for striking Ms. [J.F.] is race neutral, gender 

neutral, and that there hasn’t been a sufficient 

showing that it was done for any reason that 

would be—that would prejudice Mr. Reaves.

[Defendant]: I believe she referred to herself as a doctor.

Court: Yes, I remember that, which I thought was

amusing. As I said there’s been no purposeful 

discrimination, so the Batson challenge is 

denied. 

The state did not strike A.S., and she served as a juror. 

We will uphold the denial of a Batson challenge absent clear 

error. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008). We review issues of law 

de novo. State v. Ross, 250 Ariz. 629, ¶ 16 (App. 2021). A trial court’s Batson

ruling generally turns “on evaluation of credibility,” either counsel’s 

credibility in articulating a non-racial motive for the strike or the 

prospective juror’s demeanor and asserted ability to serve in a non-biased 

manner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769

(1995); State v. Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 11 (2021). Because this analysis “is 

fact intensive,” generally “the trial court is in a better position to assess” 

credibility than is an appellate court. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, ¶ 54 

(2006). We therefore “afford great deference to trial court findings in this 

context.” Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 6; see also Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.

However, “[d]eference does not by definition preclude 

relief.” Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El), 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (alteration in 

Miller-El) (applying doubly-deferential standard for reviewing Batson

challenges in federal habeas proceedings) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell

(Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“deference does not imply 

abandonment or abdication of judicial review”)); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 

478-79 (finding clear error “even under the highly deferential standard of 

review” applicable to Batson rulings when “trial judge simply allowed the 

[strike] without explanation”). Rather, to protect the basic principles 

outlined in Batson and its progeny, we must go beyond a cursory review; 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

6

we must consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial 

animosity.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478. 

A Batson challenge initiates a three-step process. Johnson v. 

California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, ¶ 53. First, the 

defendant must make a prima facie case that the strike was racially 

discriminatory. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767; Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, ¶ 53. If a 

prima facie case is made, “the State must provide race-neutral reasons for 

its peremptory strikes.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241. The explanation need 

not be persuasive or plausible; it must only be facially race-neutral. Purkett, 

514 U.S. at 768. “[T]he trial court must then decide (step three) whether the 

opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. at 

767. At this step, the court “must determine whether the prosecutor’s stated 

reasons were the actual reasons or instead were a pretext for 

discrimination.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241. To make this determination, 

“Batson ‘requires the judge to assess the plausibility of [the explanation 

offered for a challenged strike] . . . in light of all evidence with a bearing on 

it.’” Ross, 250 Ariz. 629, ¶ 22 (alterations and emphasis in Ross) (quoting 

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 251-52). The opponent of the strike bears the burden 

of persuasion to sustain a Batson challenge. Id. ¶ 17.

For the purposes of this appeal, we are concerned with 

whether the trial court satisfied the third step of the Batson analysis. Reaves 

argues the trial court erred when it allowed the state to peremptorily strike 

“the only African American on the juror panel.” In particular, he argues 

the court erred by “abandon[ing] the inquiry” before considering whether 

the strike was racially motivated. We agree that under the totality of the 

circumstances provided in the record before us, the court did not display a 

deliberative process “designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and 

inferences that discrimination may have infected” jury selection. Johnson, 

545 U.S. at 172. We so conclude based on several features of that terse 

record: (1) the trial court, rather than the prosecutor, first provided the 

non-discriminatory basis for the strike; (2) the court conducted no further 

inquiry and sought no further explanation after the defendant observed 

that the basis applied equally to a similarly situated Caucasian juror who 

was not struck; (3) the court did not address the juror comparison problem 

as to the non-discriminatory basis it had itself provided; and (4) the court 

concluded that inquiry with a gratuitous off-hand remark at the expense of 

the stricken juror. 

In determining whether the state has purposefully 

discriminated on the basis of race, “the court may consider the prosecutor’s 

demeanor, the juror’s demeanor, the reasonableness or improbability of the 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

7

explanations, and whether the proffered rationale has some basis in 

accepted trial strategy.” Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 11. In addition, the court 

may consider available factors including, as relevant here, “side-by-side 

comparisons of” stricken and non-stricken prospective jurors of different 

races and any “other relevant circumstances that bear upon the issue of 

racial discrimination.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243. This analysis is not pro 

forma; the “Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to 

suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury 

selection process.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172.

If “the reasons provided by the State are clearly pretextual,” 

the strike cannot stand. State v. Smith, 250 Ariz. 69, ¶ 67 (2020) (quoting 

State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶ 15 (2006)). For instance, “[i]f a prosecutor’s 

proffered reason for striking a [B]lack panelist applies just as well to an 

otherwise-similar non-[B]lack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence 

tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s 

third step.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241 (describing “side-by-side 

comparisons” of potential jurors as “[m]ore powerful” than “bare 

statistics”); see also Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 512 (2016) (venireperson 

comparison alone presented “compelling” evidence of purposeful 

discrimination). “The comparison can suggest that the prosecutor’s

proffered explanations for striking [B]lack prospective jurors were a pretext 

for discrimination.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2248. 

Although defendants have repeatedly asked our state’s 

appellate courts to conduct comparisons of similarly situated prospective 

jurors when reviewing a Batson ruling, we are aware of no prior reported 

case in which a defendant properly preserved that claim for review. See, 

e.g., Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶¶ 20-22 (finding waiver because defendant’s 

failure to raise issue below “deprived the prosecutor of the opportunity to 

distinguish allegedly similarly situated jurors and divested the trial court 

of the occasion to conduct an in-depth comparison of the jurors”); Smith, 

250 Ariz. 69, ¶ 71 (refusing to conduct comparative analysis because 

defendant “did not raise the issue in the trial court” and therefore waived 

it); State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, ¶¶ 48-49 (2013) (appellate court not 

required to conduct comparative juror analysis on “cold appellate record,” 

particularly when issue not raised at trial). Because Reaves preserved the 

issue by expressly drawing the comparison between J.F. and A.S. to the trial 

court’s attention, we address the issue. 

We conclude Reaves raised sufficient evidence the state’s 

strike was infected by purposeful discrimination to trigger the trial court’s 

duty to make a meaningful inquiry into the motive underlying the strike. 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

8

See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (“ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial 

motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike”).

Reaves’s jury pool included two mental health professionals, similarly but 

not identically situated, as one was a clinical psychologist with a PhD and 

the other was a therapist with a master’s degree. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 

2249 (defendant “not required to identify an identical white juror for the 

side-by-side comparison to be suggestive of discriminatory intent”); see also 

United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 566-67 (9th Cir. 2015) (suggesting 

law student with criminal defense experience would be similarly situated 

to other lawyers or law students). Other than confirming that they could 

remain fair and impartial, neither potential juror was questioned further 

about how her profession might influence her role as a juror. The state 

exercised its peremptory strike against only the Black mental health 

professional. And, although Reaves directly presented the side-by-side 

comparison of the stricken and the non-stricken potential jurors to the court 

during the brief Batson colloquy, neither the state nor the court offered any

explanation at all to rebut this “evidence tending to prove purposeful 

discrimination.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241. Instead, the court abruptly 

denied the Batson challenge, finding, without explanation, “no purposeful 

discrimination.” 

Were we to read in isolation the trial court’s finding that no 

purposeful discrimination had occurred, we might be disinclined to find 

clear error. After all, our state’s Batson jurisprudence does not uniformly 

require a court to make express findings on the record when ruling on a 

Batson challenge. See Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 17. However, “we must 

examine the whole picture,” being careful not to review a single strike “in 

isolation.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2250. Here, the trial court stopped the 

Batson inquiry when the non-discriminatory basis had been plausibly 

challenged and without seeking further explanation from the state. In this 

respect, the court’s finding of no discriminatory purpose “was not fairly 

supported by the record.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769.

Specifically, the state’s proffered reason for striking J.F. was 

that she worked as a clinical psychologist. Neither the state nor the trial 

court articulated in detail any reasons the state would wish to strike a 

clinical psychologist from this jury, although of course a venireperson’s 

occupation may constitute a permissible race-neutral reason to strike, 

absent other indicia of discrimination. See Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 16. The

state argues that it was “unsurprising” that it “would exclude a clinical 

psychologist in a case in which the only viable defense is that the defendant 

either snapped or acted in self-defense due to past traumatic experiences.” 

But this reasoning could apply similarly to the Caucasian therapist A.S., 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

9

whom the state did not strike and who ultimately served on the jury.

Compounding this evidence of potential pretext, the court had already 

precluded any evidence showing that Reaves suffers from post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) through rulings on the state’s motions in limine.

2 In 

fact, earlier in the voir dire proceedings, the court had directly stated that 

“there’s no issue about mental illness or anything like that in this case” 

while addressing another potential juror who ultimately did not serve on 

the jury. Under the totality of the circumstances, then, the record cannot 

support the court’s unquestioning acceptance of the state’s potentially 

pretextual motive for its strike of J.F.3

The state argues on appeal that the trial court’s “simple 

conclusion that there was no purposeful discrimination and its denial of the 

Batson challenge were all that was required by Arizona and Federal law.” 

For this assertion, the state cites extensively our supreme court’s recent 

opinion in Porter, which held that trial courts are not required to “make 

express findings on the credibility of a demeanor-based justification for a 

peremptory strike when a non-demeanor-based justification is also offered 

and there is no evidence that either justification is pretextual.”4 251 Ariz. 

 

2Later, during trial, the court again denied Reaves’s requests to 

introduce evidence showing that he suffers from PTSD, which makes him 

“hypervigilant” and “reactive.” Evidence of a PTSD diagnosis is opinion 

testimony going toward proving mental defect, State v. Jacobson, 244 Ariz. 

187, ¶ 20 (App. 2017), and it is generally inadmissible in Arizona for the 

purposes of proving an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea

element of a crime through a diminished-capacity defense, State v. Malone, 

247 Ariz. 29, ¶¶ 8-9 (2019).

3 During oral argument before this court, the state suggested a 

plausible distinction between the two mental health professionals. But any 

such distinctions were far from obvious and went wholly unexplored by 

the trial court—during a constitutionally required process that mandates a 

serious inquiry. 

4As Reaves argues, this narrow holding in Porter does not squarely 

control the circumstances here. There, the prosecutor offered both a 

demeanor-based and a non-demeanor-based reason for its strike of a 

potential juror. 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 2. Both reasons were race-neutral and not 

clearly pretextual, and the trial court explicitly deemed the 

non-demeanor-based reason to be credible. Id. ¶¶ 4, 25-26. Under those 

circumstances, our supreme court reasoned that no additional express 

findings were necessary regarding the demeanor-based justification 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

10

293, ¶¶ 1, 19. Although Arizona trial courts are not always required to 

make express findings when ruling on a Batson challenge, it does not 

necessarily follow that our jurisprudence contemplates no circumstances 

whatsoever in which such findings are necessary. To the contrary, our 

jurisprudence has not fully foreclosed the possibility that some 

circumstances might require express findings. See Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 1 

(considering only whether trial court addressing Batson challenge “must 

make express findings on the credibility of a demeanor-based justification 

for a peremptory strike when a non-demeanor-based justification is also 

offered and there is no evidence that either justification is pretextual”).

We conclude that more detailed findings at the third step of 

the Batson analysis were necessary under these circumstances, where 

Reaves timely raised non-frivolous evidence suggesting purposeful 

discrimination might have prompted the state’s peremptory strike and the 

state was deprived of the opportunity to provide a facially race-neutral 

reason for making the strike. Cf. State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 29 (App. 2007) 

(deferring to trial court’s assessment of prosecutor’s stated reasons for 

strikes, when record supported them). Unlike other cases where express 

findings were unnecessary, the record here does not clearly support the trial 

court’s conclusion that the strike was not pretextual. See Smith, 250 Ariz. 

69, ¶¶ 65, 68, 73 (relying on trial court’s “specific findings as to each juror” 

in determining state’s race-neutral reasons not pretextual, even while 

noting that “our precedent allows us to defer to” implicit findings). Despite 

that, the trial court went no further than to “simply deem the State’s 

explanations ‘plausible,’” id. ¶ 73, without articulating why the state’s 

given reason of J.F.’s mental health occupation was not pretextual. Under 

these facts, Reaves raised a colorable inference that discrimination had 

infected the jury selection process sufficient to compel the court to explain, 

on the record, why it found no such discrimination had occurred.

To be clear, we do not conclude that Reaves has “proved 

discrimination.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169-70 (noting that, in Batson, trial 

court’s actual error was “fail[ing] to demand an explanation from the 

prosecutor” after defendant made prima facie case that strike had 

discriminatory purpose). Nor do we suggest the court was necessarily 

bound to overrule the state’s strike, on this record. Rather, we conclude 

 

provided for the strike. Id. ¶ 26. Here, by contrast, the prosecutor provided 

a non-demeanor-based reason for his strike, and as we have discussed 

above, Reaves raised a non-frivolous inference that the reason given was 

potentially pretextual.
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

11

that under the totality of the circumstances here, where the court was 

confronted with “evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination,” 

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, it was required to either seek further explanation 

from the prosecutor or explain on the record why it found no such 

additional explanation necessary. 

Our state’s jurisprudence affords trial courts much latitude 

to make implicit findings when ruling on Batson challenges. But we cannot 

condone a process so abbreviated that it renders the Batson process an

empty ritual. Two additional features of the record support this conclusion. 

First, the trial court itself supplied a neutral basis for the strike 

before the state could articulate one. This disabled a primary mechanism 

in the Batson process for deterring attorneys from exercising peremptory

strikes in a racially discriminatory fashion: the knowledge that they will be 

called upon to provide a race-neutral basis for a strike and that their 

demeanor in doing so, and the plausibility of that basis, will be carefully 

assessed by the court. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“best evidence [of 

discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who 

exercises the challenge” (alteration in Snyder) (quoting Hernandez v. New 

York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991))); Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, ¶ 44 (at Batson’s 

second step, “prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike” 

(emphasis added)). Here, once the court volunteered a race-neutral basis

for the strike, the prosecutor could infer that neither his demeanor nor the 

plausibility of that basis would face any critical assessment by the court. 

Second, our record reflects that the trial court made a 

demeaning comment about the stricken psychologist as it denied the Batson

challenge: the judge stated he was amused by J.F.’s reference to herself as 

a doctor. The psychologist’s reference had not been proffered as a basis for 

striking her, and she holds a PhD in her field. The court’s offhand remark

could be read as both gratuitous and disrespectful. Notably, as a “[B]lack 

citizen,” J.F. is among the very class of persons the Batson standard was

designed to protect from discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (“Exclusion 

of [B]lack citizens from service as jurors constitutes a primary example of 

the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure.”). The court’s

inappropriate remark does not provide us with confidence that it

undertook the searching assessment the Batson standard compels. See 

Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172. 

In so holding, we do not aim to extend our state’s Batson

jurisprudence beyond the reach our supreme court has already articulated 

in the opinions cited above. Rather, we underscore a consistent theme of 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

12

that jurisprudence, which has repeatedly exhorted trial courts to “bolster 

their rulings and facilitate review on appeal” when addressing Batson

challenges. Porter, 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 27. Our federal circuit has similarly 

requested or required such express findings in situations with a similar 

inference of discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 

968-69 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (trial court must “evaluate meaningfully the 

persuasiveness of” state’s explanation).

In sum, the trial court never allowed or required the 

prosecutor to provide its potentially race-neutral reasons for its strike of 

J.F., and consequently its finding of no discrimination was unsupported by 

the record. On remand, the trial court shall hold a hearing to allow the state 

to present evidence as to its race-neutral reasons for the strike, and it shall 

determine whether the prosecutor violated Batson. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 

100 (remanding to require prosecutor to explain reasons underlying strikes

if prima facie showing of discrimination established on remand); see also 

Snyder, 552 U.S. at 486 (leaving open possibility that motivation for 

peremptory strike might be “profitably explored further on remand” under 

different circumstances); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(after trial court relied “on its own speculation as to” state’s reasons for 

strikes, remanding for evidentiary hearing for state to “present evidence as 

to the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons” and allow court to determine 

whether Batson violation occurred); State v. Urrea, 244 Ariz. 443, ¶¶ 11-17

(2018) (acknowledging that federal jurisprudence recognizes variety of 

remedies following Batson error); State v. Anaya, 170 Ariz. 436, 441 (App. 

1991) (remanding for trial court to attempt to reconstruct reasons 

underlying two peremptory challenges). If such a hearing cannot enable 

the trial court to make a sufficiently meaningful inquiry, the court must 

vacate Reaves’s convictions and sentences and order a new trial.5 

Denial of Requested Jury Instructions

Reaves also argues the trial court erred in denying him three 

requested jury instructions. We review a court’s denial of requested jury 

instructions for abuse of discretion, State v. Brock, 248 Ariz. 583, ¶ 16 (App. 

2020), and we review de novo whether the instruction correctly and 

adequately stated the law, id. ¶ 17. We “will not reverse a jury verdict based 

on an erroneous instruction unless the instructions, taken as a whole, could 

 

5Because the trial court may make adequate findings on remand to 

support its denial of Reaves’s Batson challenge, we address below the 

remainder of Reaves’s claims of error. 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

13

reasonably mislead a jury.” Id. “A party is entitled to an instruction on any 

theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 

58, ¶ 16 (1998). However, a court is not bound to “give every specific 

instruction requested by the defense,” so long as the “instructions 

adequately set forth the law applicable to the case,” id., “in understandable 

terms,” State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 284 (App. 1996).

Burglary Instruction

Reaves argues the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the 

jury that “a person cannot burglarize his or her own home,” language taken 

from a comment to the Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (RAJI) Stat. 

Criminal 15.07 (second-degree burglary) (5th ed. 2019). Reaves sought this 

particular language because he presented evidence, primarily through his 

own testimony, that he considered the house his legal residence on the date 

of the killing. Specifically, Reaves testified that on the night of the killing, 

he let himself into the house using a spare key—one that A.T. did not know 

Reaves still possessed. He also testified that the week before the killing, 

A.T. had told him the house was “still [his] home.” And during closing 

arguments, Reaves maintained the house was “his house,” re-emphasizing 

the evidence supporting that claim. Reaves now argues the court’s failure 

to give his requested instruction violated his constitutional rights to a fair 

trial, due process, and to present a complete defense.6

Rather than including Reaves’s requested language that one 

cannot burglarize one’s own home, the trial court instructed the jury that

“[a] person who has an absolute and unlimited right to be in a dwelling

cannot commit a burglary thereof.” We identify no error in this instruction. 

Whereas Reaves’s requested instruction reflected the comment to the RAJI, 

the final instruction directly quoted the case of origin for the RAJI comment. 

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 437 (App. 1990) (reversing burglary 

conviction when “defendant had an absolute and unconditional right to 

 

6Reaves also argues this alleged error infected his conviction for 

first-degree murder. However, the jury found Reaves guilty of both 

premeditated murder under A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1) and felony murder 

under § 13-1105(A)(2). Because the jury’s finding of guilt for premeditated 

murder did not require a conviction for burglary as an underlying offense, 

see § 13-1105(A)(1), any hypothetical error would be harmless as to Reaves’s 

first-degree murder conviction. See State v. Peraza, 239 Ariz. 140, ¶ 22 (App. 

2016) (erroneous jury instructions harmless if state can show beyond 

reasonable doubt that error did not affect verdict).
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

14

enter and remain on the property where he committed the crime”); see also

RAJI Stat. Crim. 15-07. 

Reaves presses that the trial court’s instruction was “not 

adequate” because “the jury could have found” the residence was his home

based on trial evidence that he considered the house to be his home. 

However, Altamirano did not hold that a defendant has an absolute and 

unlimited right to any dwelling he merely considers to be his legal 

residence, or his “own home.” See 166 Ariz. at 437 (distinguishing cases 

upholding “convictions for burglary where the defendant had some legal 

or possessory interest in the residence”). Rather, Altamirano concluded only 

that a defendant cannot be convicted of burglary when he or she has “an 

unlimited right to be in the dwelling,” such as in the defendant’s “own 

residence.” Id. at 435, 437. Importantly, it distinguished this conclusion 

from prior case law, particularly State v. Van Dyke, 127 Ariz. 335 (1980), 

which upheld a burglary conviction when the residence in question 

“primarily belonged to the victim” and the defendant had entered “with 

consent” but could claim “only limited possessory rights in the property.” 

Altamirano, 166 Ariz. at 435. And, Altamirano expressly reasoned that even 

though Van Dyke was decided under an earlier version of the Arizona 

burglary statute, it “continue[d] to be viable” under the existing statute on 

elements specifically at issue here: (1) burglary does not require a 

defendant to break and enter “into the dwelling of another,” and 

(2) burglary “emphasizes the subjective intent of the person who enters or 

remains unlawfully” in a structure. Id. at 434. Thus, Altamirano left 

undisturbed Van Dyke’s narrow holding that “a burglary charge can be 

maintained where entry is with consent and the defendant has only limited 

possessory rights in the property.” Id. at 435. 

Van Dyke offers a better parallel than Altamirano. The

defendant in Van Dyke lived periodically with his “on-again, off-again” 

girlfriend and had been staying and sleeping away from the residence in 

question on the date of the burglary. 127 Ariz. at 336. Similarly, Reaves’s 

testimony suggested that he previously resided at A.T.’s home and thought 

he might have a right to live there again, but had been living outside the 

residence for at least two weeks following a fight, had removed his items 

from the house, and had returned the only key the other occupants knew 

he possessed. Reaves’s situation therefore resembles the Van Dyke

defendant’s circumstances: both defendants might have had some 

possessory interest in the residences in which they committed a felony, but 

neither lived in the residence at the time of the crime and neither had an 

absolute or unlimited right to remain in the dwelling in question. Thus, the 

instruction given here reflected the law applicable to the case. Finally, 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

15

neither RAJI instructions nor their comments constitute binding authority. 

See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, ¶ 12 (2001) (RAJIS not approved by our 

supreme court). We therefore identify no error in the court’s refusal to give, 

verbatim, Reaves’s requested instruction from the RAJI comment.

Justification Instructions

Reaves also complains the trial court erred in refusing to 

provide the jury with defense-of-others and crime-prevention 7 jury 

instructions. A party is entitled to an instruction on any reasonably 

supported theory. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 16. Only the “slightest 

evidence” is necessary to warrant a defendant’s requested justification 

instruction. State v. Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (quoting State v.

King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶ 14 (2010)). This is a “low standard,” and we construe 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction. 

King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶¶ 13, 15. Under this standard, we do “not weigh the 

evidence or resolve conflicts in it,” but rather we merely “decide[] whether 

the record provides evidence ‘upon which the jury could rationally sustain 

the defense.’” Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Strayhand, 184 

Ariz. 571, 588 (App. 1995)). Thus, although we typically review the denial 

of a jury instruction for abuse of discretion, we “independently assess 

whether the evidence supported a justification instruction, because that is a 

question of law and involves no discretionary factual determination.” Id.

¶ 9. 

During trial, Reaves testified that he did not trust D.P., who

had indicated he possessed firearms. Reaves also testified that several days 

before the killing, D.P. had threatened to kill him, his family, and “anybody 

 

7The state argues Reaves forfeited and waived our review of the trial 

court’s denial of this instruction. However, Reaves requested the 

instruction, and the court addressed its reason for denying it. Because the 

court had the opportunity to rule on the issue, we exercise our discretion to 

deem the issue preserved for purposes of this appeal. See Banales v. Smith, 

200 Ariz. 419, ¶ 6 (App. 2001) (“party must have afforded the trial court and 

opposing counsel the opportunity to correct any asserted defects” to raise 

them on appeal). And because Reaves developed and supported this 

argument in his opening brief, he plainly did not waive the issue, either. 

State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (insufficient argument waives 

appellate review); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7) (opening briefs must 

contain argument with appropriate supporting citations to record and legal 

authorities). 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

16

it t[ook] to get” him. Reaves indicated he was “concerned about the people 

at” A.T.’s house and that he considered D.P. to be a “dangerous person.” 

Reaves also testified that that when he observed A.T. and D.P. 

together through her bedroom window, he believed A.T. was going to “get 

herself hurt.” Nonetheless, he left A.T. and D.P. together, and he did not

call law enforcement. Instead, Reaves repeatedly called and texted A.T., 

accused her of having sex with D.P., and upon her confirmation that she 

had done so, Reaves told her he was going to kill D.P. and it would be her 

fault. Reaves also told a gas station attendant he had caught his girlfriend

cheating on him and that he wanted to damage her car.

Reaves entered A.T.’s house, carrying a metal bar, sometime 

after 1:30 a.m., at least three hours after initially leaving. After grabbing the 

kitchen knives, Reaves walked into A.T.’s bedroom. He testified D.P. was 

standing by the bed, and that he told D.P. to leave. Reaves knew A.T.

typically kept a loaded firearm near her, but he did not know where the 

firearm was, or whether D.P. had access to it. Reaves said that he 

interpreted D.P.’s extension of his hand “as an attack,” “just reacted,” 

“snapped,” and ducked below D.P.’s hand before stabbing him. Reaves 

testified he was afraid D.P. was going to “try to trick [him] into something,” 

that he believed D.P. was “a danger to the house,” and that he “wanted to 

just defend [him]self.” He also repeatedly testified that he was acting at 

least partially in self defense.

The trial court provided the jury with Reaves’s requested

self-defense instruction, but refused to give his requested instructions 

regarding defense of third parties and crime prevention. The court 

explained it did not believe the evidence supported either of these 

instructions. Reaves argues he presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury 

to find he was acting in defense of others, thus warranting the instructions. 

Reaves’s requested crime-prevention instruction would have 

informed the jury that he was justified in acting with force “if and to the 

extent” he “reasonably believed that physical force or deadly physical force 

was immediately necessary to prevent another from committing or 

apparently committing . . . [b]urglary, sex assault, homicide, [or] any other 

felony of unlawful home entry with felony.” See A.R.S. § 13-411(A). Under 

§ 13-411, such force “can be used only to the extent it appears reasonable 

and immediately necessary to prevent commission of” any of the above 

crimes.
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

17

Reaves argues “the jury may have concluded his concerns 

after D.P. threatened to kill his family and anybody close to him were valid 

especially where [D.P.] told [Reaves] he had a gun.” He maintains this case 

is similar to Almeida, where we held a crime-prevention instruction was 

required “because the evidence tended to suggest ‘in the slightest degree’ 

that [the defendant] was acting to prevent gun violence or yet another 

aggravated assault from being perpetrated by the victim during his 

ongoing episode of road rage.” 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 11 (quoting State v. Johnson, 

108 Ariz. 42, 43 (1972)). However, the defendant in Almeida presented 

evidence that the victim had been driving aggressively, had waved a gun 

in the air, and had chased the defendant in his car, running red lights in the 

process. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. By contrast, Reaves presented no evidence that D.P. 

had taken any threatening action toward A.T., her housemates, or the 

general public, much less action that could be construed as imminently 

threatening. Rather, even read in the light most favorable to Reaves, his 

testimony established only that several days before the incident, D.P. had 

threatened to kill Reaves and any other unspecified individual who 

interfered with that outcome, that D.P. might have a firearm, and that D.P 

was in A.T.’s house, with her permission. This testimony does not provide

even the slightest evidence that D.P. was committing, would imminently 

commit, or had committed any of the crimes enumerated in Reaves’s 

requested instruction. See id. ¶ 9. 

Further, these facts do not establish that D.P. presented an 

immediate risk to any individual other than, arguably, Reaves himself. 

Indeed, as noted above, Reaves testified that, after seeing D.P. in A.T.’s

bedroom, he left the house, did not contact law enforcement to report D.P.’s 

threats, and returned hours later without any indication that D.P. had 

renewed his threats against Reaves or made any direct threats against A.T. 

or the house’s occupants. Reaves’s testimony did not contain even the 

slightest evidence that he reasonably believed D.P. presented an immediate 

threat to any third party. Cf. King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶¶ 14-16 (evidence that 

defendant acted in response to being hit in head by water bottle thrown by 

victim sufficient evidence to warrant self-defense instruction); State v. 

Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (1983) (collecting cases in which a victim’s “hostile 

demonstrations” sufficed to support self-defense instruction). Thus, even 

observing the low threshold entitling a defendant to a defense justification, 

we see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the record did not support 

the crime-prevention instruction.

We similarly find no error in the trial court’s refusal to 

provide a third-person-defense instruction. That instruction, as requested 

by Reaves, stated that he was justified in using physical force “in defense of 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

18

a third person” if both “[a] reasonable person in the situation would have 

believed that physical force was necessary to protect against” another’s use, 

attempted use, or threatened use “of unlawful physical force against a third 

person” and that “[t]he defendant used or threatened no more physical 

force than would have appeared necessary to a reasonable person in the 

situation.” See A.R.S. § 13-406; see also A.R.S. §§ 13-404, 13-405. In addition 

to the lack of evidence suggesting that any person other than Reaves was 

potentially in need of protection, the evidence also showed that Reaves 

exchanged a metal bar for kitchen knives before proceeding to stab D.P. 

seventeen times. Under these facts, no jury could rationally find that 

Reaves had used no more physical force than necessary in the situation. We 

thus also find no error in the court’s refusal to provide the 

third-party-defense instruction.

Premeditation Instruction

Reaves also argues the trial court erred by denying his 

requested instruction defining premeditation. Over Reaves’s objection, the 

court instructed the jury as follows:

Premeditation means the Defendant 

intended to kill another human being or knew 

that he would kill another human being, and 

after forming that intent or knowledge, 

reflected on the decision before killing. It’s this 

reflection, regardless of the length of time in 

which it occurs, that distinguishes first-degree 

murder from second-degree murder. 

An act is not done with premeditation if 

it is in the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or 

heat of passion. The time needed for reflection 

is not necessarily prolonged and the space of 

time between the intent or knowledge to kill 

and the act of killing may be very short.

As he argued at trial, Reaves maintains the court should not have included 

the last sentence of the instruction regarding the length of time necessary to 

allow for premeditation. Reaves argues “no special facts” allowed the jury 

to receive the instruction that “the passage of time may be very short,” and 

also that the court should have instructed the jury that the state had to 

“prove actual reflection.” He also argues the court should have instructed 

the jury “the state had to prove actual reflection to prove premeditation.” 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

19

And, he argues that the instruction’s treatment of time “negated” his 

heat-of-passion defense. 

We find no error in the instruction. Reaves correctly 

maintains that to prove premeditation, the state must go beyond merely 

proving time passed between the formation of an intent to kill and the act 

of killing. See State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 27, 29, 31 (2004)

(construing premeditation statute, A.R.S. § 13-1101(1), as requiring proof of 

reflection but allowing circumstantial evidence to constitute such proof). 

However, to accurately explain this law, the trial court was not required to 

give the instruction precisely as Reaves requested it. First, as we noted 

above, a defendant is not entitled to “every specific instruction” he or she 

requests. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 16. Further, the court’s instruction 

comported with the jury instruction recommend in Thompson, the 

prevailing case on this issue. Although Thompson concluded that a jury

instruction that “proof of actual reflection is not required” was erroneous 

“without further clarification,” it did not require courts to directly give the 

inverse instruction, that the state must prove actual reflection. 204 Ariz. 

471, ¶¶ 32-34. Rather, Thompson provided a model instruction that conveys

the legislature’s intent for “premeditation, and the reflection that it requires, 

to mean more than the mere passage of time.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 32. That model 

instruction explains to jurors that “reflection, regardless of the length of 

time in which it occurs,” is what “distinguishes first degree murder from 

second degree murder.” Id. ¶ 32. Thus, the Thompson instruction clearly 

requires the state to prove actual reflection to sustain a charge of 

first-degree murder. 

Here, the trial court’s instruction—taken nearly verbatim 

from the language suggested by Thompson and subsequently incorporated 

in our state’s statutory criminal jury instructions—fully encompassed the

principle that proof of reflection requires more than a mere showing that 

time passed. See id.; RAJI Stat. Crim. 11.05 (first-degree premeditated 

murder) (5th ed. 2019). And, although the state emphasized in its closing 

argument the amount of time that passed between when Reaves initially 

formed the intent to kill D.P. and when he actually stabbed D.P., it did not 

rely solely on the passage of time to prove the element of premeditation. 

Specifically, the state also presented evidence that Reaves reflected on his 

decision to kill D.P., including that he (1) told A.T. during a phone call that 

he was going to kill D.P., (2) exchanged his metal bar for kitchen knives 

upon entering A.T.’s house, and (3) upon entering, told A.T. to get her gun

to kill him before he killed D.P., and then actually stabbed and killed D.P. 

Thus, the use of time here as one portion of the evidence offered to support 

an inference of premeditation is distinguishable from what Thompson
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

20

identified as impermissible use of time as a complete substitute for evidence 

of reflection. See 204 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 29, 33. Similarly, the court’s instruction 

correctly recited Thompson’s instruction that “[a]n act is not done with 

premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of 

passion,” id. ¶ 32, and the inclusion of this language did not prevent Reaves 

from arguing that he had “snapped” and was guilty only of second-degree 

murder.

We also find no error in the trial court’s instruction that intent 

may be formed in a relatively short amount of time. Although the state 

presented evidence that Reaves may have formed an intent to kill well 

before entering A.T.’s house, other facts in evidence supported an inference 

that Reaves formed the intent to kill in a shorter amount of time. 

Specifically, the jury heard testimony that over the course of only a few 

minutes, Reaves “fl[ew] into the driveway” of A.T.’s house, stated he was 

going to kill D.P., picked up the kitchen knives, then entered the bedroom 

and stabbed D.P. repeatedly. 

In any event, even had the inclusion of this sentence been 

erroneous, any hypothetical error would have been harmless. See State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18 (2005) (error harmless if state proves “beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict”); 

see also Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, ¶ 34 (refusing to overturn conviction and 

sentence where beyond reasonable doubt that flawed jury instruction did 

not affect verdict). The state’s proof of premeditation did not rely solely on 

the passage of time, and the remainder of the evidence supporting an 

inference of intent was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that Reaves reflected on his decision to kill D.P. before 

doing so. 

Preclusion of PTSD Evidence 

Finally, Reaves argues the trial court erred when it denied 

him the opportunity to present “observation evidence” suggesting he 

suffers from PTSD, which he argues influenced his “reactiveness” to 

perceived threats to his and others’ safety. In denying the admission of the 

proffered evidence, the court reasoned that prevailing case law prevented 

testimony that Reaves has PTSD without support for that evidence, such as 

expert testimony or diagnostic testing. It also reasoned that Reaves’s 

assertion he suffers from PTSD could not be used as character trait 

evidence, because it could go only to a defense of diminished capacity or 

insanity. The court further reasoned that the evidence was “not relevant”

and, even if it were, that its probative value was not outweighed by the 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

21

danger of unfair prejudice or confusion for the jury, such that it was 

precluded under Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid. Reaves argues, as he did below, 

that preclusion of this evidence deprived him of his right to a defense, as 

protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. Specifically, he argues the evidence was admissible insofar 

as it supported his theories that he acted either in the heat of passion or in 

self defense. He further argues that the court’s ruling deprived him of his 

fundamental right to testify in his own defense. 

We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on the 

admissibility of evidence. State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 60 (2004). We 

review de novo questions of law. State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, ¶ 18 (2015). 

Because Reaves preserved this argument by raising it at trial, our review 

turns on whether any error occurred, and if so, whether it was harmless. 

See id.

We need only look to the latter requirement, however, 

because we agree with the state that any hypothetical error in the trial 

court’s preclusion of the proffered testimony was surely harmless. Even 

had the court admitted Reaves’s evidence that he suffers from PTSD, 

reactiveness, and hypervigilance, at best this evidence could only have 

served to rebut the element of premeditation in the first-degree murder 

conviction. But, as we outline above, the state’s evidence supporting 

premeditation was overwhelming. See id. ¶ 26. Given the breadth of 

evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Reaves reflected on the murder 

before committing it, the guilty verdict was surely unattributable to any 

claimed error in precluding evidence offered to support theories of nonpremeditated homicide. See id. ¶ 25; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 

275, 279 (1993).8 Furthermore, the jury separately found Reaves guilty of 

both premeditated murder, as defined by A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1), and felony 

murder, as defined by § 13-1105(A)(2). Even were we to reverse Reaves’s 

premeditated murder conviction, his first-degree murder conviction would 

stand as felony murder. Cf. State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, ¶ 59 (2005). 

 

8The United States Supreme Court has not identified the improper 

restriction of a defendant’s testimony as structural error putting it beyond

the scope of harmless error review. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 

309-12 (1991); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987) (recognizing 

that “the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation”). 
STATE v. REAVES

Opinion of the Court

22

Disposition

With respect to Reaves’s claim of error pursuant to Batson, we

remand to allow the trial court and the parties to augment the record to

make detailed findings consistent with this opinion. If, upon appropriate 

inquiry, the court concludes the strike injected impermissible 

discrimination into the jury selection process, the court must vacate 

Reaves’s convictions and sentences and order a new trial. With respect to 

Reaves’s other claims of error, we affirm.