February 11, 1988 

Honorable Robert P. McGuill Opinion No. JM-855 

Refugio County Attorney 

P. 0. Box 307 Re: Whether a county comRefugio, Texas 78377 missioner may contract with 

his county to lease hangar 

space at a county airport 

for the purpose of operating 

a private business (RQ-1306) 

Dear Mr. McGuill: 

you ask the following question: 

May a county commissioner, directly or 

indirectly, contract with a county to lease 

hangar space at a county airport for the 

purpose of operating a private business 

enterprise for profit without violating his 

oath of office as set forth in section 

81.002 of the Local Government Code? 

In asking your question, you explain that the commissioner would use approximately 30,000 square feet of 

hangar space, rented at $56.25 per year, for the operation 

of a private flying service. Section 81.002(a) of the 

Local Government Code provides: 

(a) Before undertaking the duties of the 

county judge or a countv commissioner, a 

person RR& take the official oath and swear 

in writina that the nerson will not be 

interested, directlv or indirectlv, in a 

contract with or claim aaainst the countv 

except: 

(1) a contract or claim expressly 

authorized by law; or 

(2) a warrant issued to the judge or 

commissioner as a fee of office. (Emphasis 

added.) 

p. 4135 

Honorable Robert P. McGuill - Page 3 (JIG855) 

public officials, and prohibits those identified officeholders from engaging in certain activities. See 

55171.001(1), 171.003, 171.004. Under the rules of 

statutory construction, we must, if possible; read 

together and harmonize two statutes that relate to the 

same subject. Calvert v. Fort Worth National Bank, 356 

S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1962); Conlev v. Dauahters of the 

Renublic, 156 S.W. 197, 201 (Tex. 1913); Attorney General 

Opinion No. JM-693 (1987). The only exception to the 

absolute prohibition in section 81.002 is a contract 

expressly authorized by law. We find nothing in chapter 

171 that expressly authorizes a county commissioner to 

contract with the county. Another rule of statutory 

construction directs us to apply the more specific statute 

where two provisions apply to the same subject matter but 

cannot be harmonized. Citv of Houston v. Arnev 680 S.W.Zd 

867, 874 (Tex. APP. - Houston 1984, no writ;; Attorney 

General Opinion Nos. M-524 (1969); WW-1127 (1961). Under 

that rule, we find that section 81.002 must control 

because that statute applies only to county judges and 

commissioners while chapter 171 applies to a broader group 

of public officials. For the above reason, we find that 

a county commissioner may not directly or indirectly 

contract with the county to lease hangar space at the 

county's airport. 

Having found that the county commissioner may not 

enter into such a contract with the county, we need not 

address the issue of whether such a contract would 

constitute a grant of public money or thing of value by 

the county in violation of article III, section 52, of the 

Texas Constitution. 

SUMMARY 

A county commissioner may not, directly 

or indirectly, contract with the county to 

lease hangar space at the county#s airport. 

Very truly yo , d-%/22;ts

. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

MARY KELLER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

p. 4137 
Honorable Robert P. McGuill - Page 4 (JM-855) 

LOU MCCRKARY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Karen C. Gladney 

Assistant Attorney General 

-; 

p. 4138