PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 

EDDIE M. YATES 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 981474 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 April 16, 1999 

PITMAN MANUFACTURING, INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY 

Keary R. Williams, Judge 

 In this products liability personal injury case, we decide 

whether the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff, who 

was not the purchaser of the product, must have given notice of 

breach of warranty to the product's manufacturer as a 

prerequisite to recovery for breach of warranty. We also decide 

whether the trial court erred in striking the plaintiff's 

express warranty claim. 

I 

 Eddie M. Yates sued Pitman Manufacturing, Inc. (Pitman), 

seeking $3,000,000 in damages for injuries he sustained when an 

outrigger on a crane unit manufactured and sold by Pitman came 

down onto and crushed Yates' left foot. Yates claimed that (1) 

Pitman breached its implied warranty by selling a crane truck 

system and outriggers that were not of merchantable quality or 

fit for ordinary purposes; (2) Pitman breached its express 

warranty that the crane unit, including the outriggers, met all 

requirements of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
Standard B30.5-1968; (3) Pitman breached its duty to him to 

design and market a crane system that was reasonably safe and 

such negligence proximately caused his injuries; and (4) Pitman 

negligently failed to maintain the crane truck by failing to 

install an audible warning device for use with the outriggers. 

 Prior to trial, Yates moved the court to exclude all 

evidence concerning whether he had provided reasonable notice to 

Pitman of its breach of warranty. The trial court overruled 

Yates' motion, holding that the notice provision of Code § 8.2-

607(3) applied and required Yates, who was not the buyer of the 

crane unit, to give notice of breach of warranty to Pitman. 

 At trial, at the conclusion of Yates' case-in-chief, the 

trial court struck Yates' evidence on his breach of express 

warranty claim. The court held that Yates had failed to produce 

any evidence that the crane unit did not comply with any 

affirmation or promise made by Pitman. 

 Thereafter, the case was submitted to the jury on the 

breach of implied warranty and negligence claims. The jury 

returned its verdict in favor of Pitman, and the trial court 

entered judgment on the verdict. We awarded Yates this appeal. 

II 

 In 1982, Pitman sold the crane unit to Shelton Witt 

Equipment, a distributor. At the time, Pitman certified that 

"these cranes meet applicable design and construction standards 

2
as prescribed in ANSI B30.5-1968." When the unit was sold, ANSI 

Standard B30.5-1968 mandated that "[e]ach outrigger shall be 

visible from its actuating location." 

 On July 19, 1991, when Yates was injured, Koch Carbon 

(Koch) owned the unit and was using it to deliver equipment to 

Baldwin Coal Corporation, Yates' employer. At the time Yates 

was injured, he was releasing restraining chains from the crane 

truck's bed when suddenly, without warning, one of the 

outriggers dropped onto his foot. Unbeknownst to Yates, Ira 

Stiltner, a Koch employee, had activated the outrigger from the 

front of the truck. When Stiltner activated the outrigger, he 

could not see either Yates or the outrigger. 

III 

 First, we consider whether the trial court erred in holding 

that Yates was required to provide Pitman with notice of breach 

of warranty as a prerequisite to recovery therefor. The issue 

is one of first impression for this Court. 

 To resolve the issue, we look to Code § 8.2-607(3), the 

only provision of the Sales title of the Uniform Commercial Code 

(the UCC) that requires notice to be given to a seller of goods. 

The section provides, in pertinent part, the following: 

 Where a tender has been accepted . . . the buyer 

must within a reasonable time after he discovers or 

should have discovered any breach notify the seller of 

breach or be barred from any remedy. 

3
 It is firmly established that, when a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, a court must accept its plain meaning and not 

resort to extrinsic evidence or rules of construction. Gonzalez

v. Fairfax Hospital System, 239 Va. 307, 310, 389 S.E.2d 458, 

459 (1990). The pertinent language in Code § 8.2-607(3) is 

unambiguous and clearly states that "the buyer must . . . notify 

the seller of [the] breach." (Emphasis added.) Thus, accepting 

the statute's plain meaning, it is apparent that the notice of 

breach is required from the "buyer" of the goods. 

 In the present case, Yates was not the buyer of the crane 

unit. Therefore, the notice requirement of Code § 8.2-607(3) 

does not preclude Yates from maintaining a breach of warranty 

action. 

 We hold, therefore, that only buyers; i.e., those who buy 

or contract to buy goods from a seller, Code § 8.2-103(a), must 

give notice of breach of warranty to the seller as a 

prerequisite to recovery. Consequently, the trial court erred 

in ruling that Yates was required to have given Pitman such 

notice.∗

IV 

 

∗

The conclusion we reach is consistent with the decisions of the 

vast majority of other courts that have ruled on the issue. 

See, e.g., Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th

Cir. 1998), and the decisions cited therein. 

4
 Next, we consider whether the trial court erred in striking 

Yates' evidence relating to his express warranty claim. As 

previously noted, Pitman certified that, at the time of sale, 

the crane unit met "applicable design and construction standards 

as prescribed in ANSI B30.5-1968." At that time, ANSI Standard 

B30.5-1968 required each outrigger to be "visible from its 

actuating location." Yates, however, presented evidence that, 

from the actuating station, the crane operator, "[n]ot only 

[could] not see the outrigger, but he [could not] see that 

there's a person [who] might come into contact with that 

hazard." 

 Pitman contends that the trial court correctly struck 

Yates' express warranty claim because Yates (1) "offered no 

evidence that the ANSI certification was part of the bargain in 

any sales transaction involving the product" and (2) failed to 

produce any evidence that the crane unit's design and 

construction violated the ANSI Standard. We do not agree. 

 Code § 8.2-313, the express warranty statute, provides as 

follows: 

 (1) Express warranties by the seller are created 

as follows: 

 (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by 

the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 

becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 

express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 

affirmation or promise. 

5
 (b) Any description of the goods which is made 

part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 

warranty that the goods shall conform to the 

description. 

 (c) Any sample or model which is made part of the 

basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that 

the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or 

model. 

 (2) It is not necessary to the creation of an 

express warranty that the seller use formal words such 

as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific 

intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation 

merely of the value of the goods or a statement 

purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or 

commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 

 An affirmation of fact is presumed to be a part of the 

bargain, and any fact that would remove such affirmation 

out of the agreement "'requires clear affirmative proof.'" 

Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73, 78, 413 S.E.2d 336, 339 

(1992) (quoting with approval Official Comment 3 to § 8.2-

313). Additionally, a plaintiff is not required to show 

that he relied upon the affirmation in order to recover 

under an express warranty claim. Id. at 77-79, 413 S.E.2d 

at 338-39. 

In the present case, Pitman presented no evidence that 

would take its affirmation out of the agreement. 

Therefore, its affirmation was a part of the basis of the 

bargain. See id. at 80, 413 S.E.2d at 339. See also

Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 105 (4th 

Cir. 1997). Thus, we hold that Pitman's affirmation of 

6
fact created an express warranty that applied to Yates even 

though he was not the purchaser of the crane unit. We also 

hold that Yates presented evidence from which a jury could 

reasonably conclude that the crane unit did not comply with 

ANSI Standard B30.5-1968. Therefore, the trial court erred 

in striking Yates' express warranty claim. 

V 

 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the trial 

court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial 

consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded. 

7