Filed 7/27/21 P. v. Core CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RICHARD NORMAN CORE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B302551

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA072950)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Charles A. Chung, Judge. Affirmed.

Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Court of

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________
2

Richard Norman Core appeals from a judgment entered 

after a jury convicted him of second degree murder. Core drove a 

tractor-trailer truck that veered onto the sidewalk and hit and 

killed a pedestrian before crashing into a building. Core contends 

the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct 

the jury on vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included offense of 

murder because the failure to do so violated the Equal Protection 

Clause of the United States and California Constitutions (U.S. 

Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) notwithstanding 

the Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Sanchez (2001) 

24 Cal.4th 983, 992 (Sanchez), overruled on another ground in 

People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228-1229, that vehicular 

manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of murder.

Core also argues the trial court erred in admitting course 

materials from a drug rehabilitation program he attended, 

photographs of the victim, and unreliable expert testimony. 

Further, he contends the prosecutor committed multiple 

instances of prejudicial misconduct during his closing argument. 

In addition, Core contends there was not substantial evidence he 

was subjectively aware of the danger of driving while under the 

influence of methamphetamine to support the implied malice

murder conviction. Finally, Core requests we review the sealed 

record of the trial court’s in camera hearing to determine whether 

the court disclosed all relevant complaints in response to his 

Pitchess1 motion seeking discovery of a California Highway Patrol 

officer’s personnel records. We affirm.

1 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-538 

(Pitchess).
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Prosecution Case

1. The day before the crash

Core was employed by Abe’s Trucking, Inc. The owner, 

Abraham Gutierrez, testified his company maintained its trucks 

and kept them in good mechanical order because “[i]f they are not 

safe, they could cause an accident.” Gutierrez stated that on 

June 22, 2017, the day before the accident, Core picked up a load 

from Long Beach, California to drive it to Texas. Core was 

supposed to take Interstate-10 East to get to Texas. According to 

Gutierrez, Santa Clarita was not on the route.

At about 10:00 a.m. on June 22 California Highway Patrol

Officer Brian Powers and his partner Officer Clive Sheen 

received a call concerning a truck blocking a road lane and being 

“high centered in [a] parking lot” in Santa Clarita. The truck 

driven by Core (a tractor-trailer) was stuck in the parking lot of a 

restaurant because “the trailer had gotten caught up on the high 

point” of the driveway.2 The tractor was partially blocking the 

number three lane of the road and the trailer was backed into the 

driveway. After the officers called a tow truck, they “did the 

whole complete walk around of the truck.” Officers Powers and 

Sheen did not see anything about the truck that would make it 

dangerous to drive or cause it to drive off the road.

2 Officer Powers explained that a “driveway has a slight 

elevation and then a decline so there is a high point in there. The 

truck [and] the trailer had gotten caught up on that high point, 

. . . what they call high centered. So it was unable to move

. . . because the front of the truck was down and the trailer was 

down and the middle of the trailer got stuck.”
4

Officer Powers also reviewed Core’s log book.

3 He asked 

Core “why there [were] discrepancies” because Officer Powers

“found a receipt saying that the load was picked up at a certain 

time but that wasn’t documented on the log book correctly.” Core

acknowledged “the hours didn’t match up with what [Core] had in 

his log book.” Core told Officer Powers he had gone to the current 

location to sleep in his truck in a sleeper berth. Officer Powers 

explained, “[Core] said that he had been up for a while. And like 

I said, it didn’t coincide with what his log book said. So based on 

the fact that there was a bunch of inconsistencies I had to place 

him out of service for that.” Officer Powers took Core out of 

service at 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. for a minimum of 10 hours.

Officer Powers, who had training in roadside impairment 

detection and had made over 400 arrests of people driving under 

the influence (DUI), did not think Core was impaired. Officer 

Powers testified, “[Core] was running around frantic. It was kind 

of a hot morning. Sweating. I didn’t get any impairment at that 

time.” But when asked if Core appeared tired, Officer Powers 

answered, “[H]e did appear a little bit tired but most of the time 

mostly he was frantic. Just running around.” On crossexamination, Officer Powers reiterated that Core “seemed 

fatigued.” Officer Powers explained what he meant by fatigued, 

“Just tired. [Core] said he had been working on trying to get the 

truck unstuck for hours. So just trying to do all that. Obviously 

3 According to Officer Powers, a log book “is a daily record 

that commercial drivers are required to do” by the federal and 

state governments that “documents their hours that they 

drive . . . so they don’t get too tired and thus cause a collision 

because they are driving fatigued.” 
5

that is a lot of physical labor trying to move that truck. Fatigued 

in that way.”

2. The crash, investigation, and arrest

The following morning, on June 23, 2017, Core was driving 

on Palmdale Boulevard in Palmdale when his truck jumped a 

sidewalk curb and hit and killed a pedestrian, Gary Burris, 

before crashing into a building. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Rowell Quemuel, a traffic investigator and certified drug 

recognition expert, arrived at the scene at approximately 6:15 

that morning. Deputy Quemuel “saw a tractor trailer in a jack 

knifed position on the south curb line of Palmdale Boulevard.” 

He testified, “I saw a lot of damage to business storefronts. A lot 

of breaks, a lot of truck damage, and also a trailer with a big 

cargo box on the back of it.”

Core was sitting on the back of the trailer holding a lit 

cigarette. Deputy Quemuel allowed Core to smoke for a minute 

“based on [Core’s] shock” but then asked him to extinguish the 

cigarette. At first Core “didn’t do anything” and seemed to be in 

“a state of confusion.” After a second request, Core complied.

Deputy Quemuel explained, “[Core] seemed very out of it. 

Seemed like he was in shock. Had his head down. Seemed 

confused. Lost. Almost lethargic.” Deputy Quemuel asked Core 

“if he was the driver[,] and he didn’t answer.” Deputy Quemuel 

added, “I asked him what happened and he still had his head 

down. Didn’t seem to understand or acknowledge that I was 

asking him a question.” Further, Core did not answer when 

Deputy Quemuel “asked him if he was injured and if he needed 

any type of medical attention.” But Deputy Quemuel added, 

“After about three times I asked him what had happened and he 
6

said to me that his truck lost control and somehow veered to the 

right and that’s when he drove up the curb.” 

As part of the standard procedure for a fatal collision 

investigation, Deputy Quemuel asked Core to take field sobriety 

tests to determine whether Core was impaired. Core did not 

agree to take the tests despite three requests. As Deputy 

Quemuel explained, “The first time I remember he didn’t respond 

to me. He had his head down. The second time he looked at me 

kind of in a daze. And then the third time, if I remember 

correctly, he asked for his lawyer.” However, Deputy Quemuel 

acknowledged at trial the field sobriety tests were not mandatory. 

Deputy Quemuel also twice asked Core to take a blood test. After 

the second request, Core agreed to submit to the test.

Deputy Quemuel examined the accident scene “to see 

where the truck may have gone off the road.” He did not see any 

obstruction in the roadway that would have caused the truck’s

wheels to jerk or turn. Deputy Quemuel then spoke with Core for 

about an hour. Deputy Quemuel explained, “Towards the end of 

my time with him he began to come around and acknowledge the 

questions that I was asking him, and that’s when he finally 

agreed to submit to the chemical sample, the blood sample, and 

asked what we were going to do with his dog.” Core had his dog 

with him tied to a leash, and he was “very concerned about his 

dog.” Core wanted to know where his dog would go if he took a 

blood test. Deputy Quemuel added, “At one point towards the 

end of my contact with him . . . he mumbled, ‘I know I messed up. 

I know my life is over.’”

On cross-examination, Deputy Quemuel acknowledged 

Core was responsive to questions about where Core was coming 

from, where he was going, and the street and direction he was 

driving. Deputy Quemuel also admitted Core seemed lethargic to 
7

him in part because Core did not make eye contact. Deputy 

Quemuel did not suspect Core was under the influence or had 

ingested alcohol or drugs.

On redirect examination, Deputy Quemuel testified Core’s 

demeanor was different from other people with whom he had 

spoken after a vehicle accident. Deputy Quemuel stated, “If I 

were to ask somebody their name or their license, registration at 

the scene of a collision, somebody normally would give it to me 

right away.” He added, “Even if they were in shock. They would 

be a little confused but they would have an idea of what I’m 

asking them.”

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Kyle Efflandt arrived 

at the scene the morning of the accident. He obtained a recorded 

statement from Core,

4 who stated, “I was traveling eastbound on 

138, roughly 45, 40 miles an hour. I came through the

intersection, I was in the right lane, and, everything appeared to 

be fine. I know I had some overhang. And I, I don’t know what 

happened. I don’t know if I, my load caught something on the 

side, or my tire caught something on the side, but the steering 

wheel just jerked to the right and was ripped out of my hand, and 

turned me into the building. That’s where I ended up. I just 

ducked and held on.” Deputy Efflandt did not note in his traffic 

collision report any signs that Core was under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs. However, Deputy Efflandt marked on the 

report that Core was sleepy or fatigued. Deputy Efflandt based 

this notation on Core’s statement, in response to Deputy 

Efflandt’s inquiry, that “he was just tired from waking up early.” 

On cross-examination, Deputy Efflandt acknowledged he only 

4 The prosecutor played the video of Core’s statement for the 

jury.
8

spoke with Core briefly. Deputy Efflandt added, “He was just 

[shaken] up from the accident. He was slow to respond and I took 

that as he was just involved in a serious accident.”

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Eduardo Saucedo, a

traffic investigator, was in charge of the traffic collision 

investigation. He took photographs of the truck on the day of the 

crash. Deputy Saucedo described one photograph (exhibit 13) 

showing “the trailer along the curb and the tractor facing 

southbound on the sidewalk.” The photograph also depicted 

white sheets on the ground that covered Burris’s remains. 

Deputy Saucedo took another photograph of the accident scene 

after the tractor was removed from the sidewalk by a tow truck

(exhibit 17), which he testified showed a fluid leak on the ground.

Another photograph (exhibit 16) showed the remains of Burris on 

the sidewalk under fallen bricks from the building.5 Deputy 

Saucedo spoke with Core for “[a] few minutes” at the accident 

scene. Core seemed distraught, but Deputy Saucedo did not 

believe Core was under the influence of any drug.6

Deputy Saucedo searched the truck after it was impounded.

He found two eyeglass cases containing “a few bindles of 

methamphetamine” and two used glass pipes. A criminalist 

performed a chemical analysis on the off-white solid recovered by 

Deputy Saucedo and determined it was 3.47 grams of a solid 

substance containing methamphetamine. Two criminalists

performed chemical analyses of Core’s blood sample and found it

5 Deputy Saucedo described the photographs, but he did not 

display them for the jury.

6 Deputy Saucedo was previously a drug recognition expert, 

but he was no longer certified.
9

contained 25 nanograms per milliliter of amphetamine and 250 

nanograms per milliliter of methamphetamine; it did not contain 

any alcohol.

Eight to 10 months after the crash Deputy Saucedo 

received Core’s toxicology report, at which time Core was 

arrested. The prosecutor played a video of Core’s booking for the 

jury. Core stated in the booking video, “I was running about 

130,000 pounds, and went over a set of railroad tracks, and the 

load dropped, and something mechanical in the truck broke, and 

the cab made a hard right into a building. And it was, and 

[inaudible] was killed.”

3. The truck inspections

Alan Byrum, a California Highway Patrol motor carrier 

specialist with the multi-disciplinary accident investigation team 

(MAIT), inspected the truck and trailer in the course of two days 

over a year after the collision. He also reviewed the collision 

scene photographs from the sheriff’s department and researched 

the truck’s steering gear. In addition, Byrum ran a vehicle 

history report to “see if there’s been any total loss or any damage 

reported.” Further, Byrum went to a truck dealership to 

photograph a similar truck and to obtain information on the 

manufacturer’s recalls.

Byrum focused his inspection “on the steering, the throttle 

and the brake system.” He did not find any mechanical problem

with the truck that would have caused it to crash. Byrum found 

“no deficiencies with the accelerator pedal” of the truck. In 

addition, although the brake was missing a pin, this was “not 

enough to place the truck out of service.” When Byrum inspected 

the truck’s steering system, he noticed the bolts from the steering 
10

box were broken, with the bolt heads missing.7 He removed the 

four broken bolts from the steering box and laid them on the 

trailer before installing new bolts to test the steering box. The 

steering box worked when Byrum tested it.

Byrum sought to determine whether the bolts broke, 

causing the crash, or whether the truck crashed, causing the 

bolts to break. He explained as to the first theory, “Had these 

bolts failed at the railroad track, it would have caused a severe 

power steering leak and there would have been a fluid trail to the 

collision scene and there was no fluid trail.” The prosecutor 

showed Byrum a photograph of the accident scene, and Byrum 

confirmed there was no fluid trail in the photograph, although 

there was fluid on the sidewalk and all over the steering gear. As 

to the second theory, Byrum identified two bolts in the debris 

field shown in the photographs of the accident scene. Both bolts 

were consistent with the kind of bolts that were used on Core’s 

truck to close the steering box. When asked what force would 

need to be applied to blow off the bolt heads, Byrum responded,

“[T]he right front wheel struck something very hard which put a 

lot of force on the steering mechanism. So that force was 

transmitted through the tie rod and through the drag link. As 

the axle was pulled backwards, it thrusted this Pittman arm 

rearward, which caused an upward thrust of the internal 

mechanism in the box, which popped those four bolt heads.” The 

type of force necessary to blow off the bolt heads would be 

consistent with a collision, for example, running a truck into a 

post or building.

7 The photographs of the steering gear taken on the day of 

the crash showed it was intact; however, someone had partially 

disassembled it by the time Byrum conducted his inspection.
11

The prosecutor asked Byrum a hypothetical question in 

which someone was driving the truck and its steering box came 

apart. Byrum explained in this situation there would be “a 

complete disconnect, you are not going to feel anything.” But if 

the driver feels the steering wheel jerk out of his or her hand

while driving, “the steering [is] intact and there is no disconnect. 

That whatever is causing the front wheels to react, you are 

feeling it in the steering wheel.”

On cross-examination, Byrum admitted he did not know 

what happened to the broken bolts he removed from the steering

box. Byrum acknowledged that if he had the broken bolts, a 

metallurgist could examine them and determine whether there 

were preexisting fractures in the bolts before the collision. 

Byrum had heard of broken bolts being sent to a metallurgist, but 

he had never done so.

Over a year after the collision, California Highway Patrol

Officer Thomas Bomar, a MAIT investigator, conducted an 

inspection of the truck’s electronic data stored in its computer 

module. The computer module contains a record of a hard stop or 

sudden deceleration of the truck. The computer module 

generated a sudden vehicle deceleration report (deceleration 

report), a graph from which was admitted into evidence. The

graph shows the truck’s speed during the 60 minutes before and 

10 minutes after a “sudden deceleration event,” with the sudden 

deceleration event depicted as zero. Bomar also reviewed the 

reports and photographs provided by the sheriff’s department 

and visited the accident scene. Bomar testified his “inspection 

was limited to imaging or copying that data and analyzing that 

data from the engine modules of truck.”

Bomar calculated that the truck went over the railroad 

tracks, which were 600 to 700 feet from the accident scene, 20 to 
12

21 minutes before a sudden deceleration event. At the time the 

truck went over the tracks, it was travelling at approximately 14 

to 15 miles per hour. The truck’s speed then increased to 24 

miles per hour, and a minute before the sudden deceleration 

event, the truck’s speed was travelling in the middle to high 30 

miles per hour range. The truck was still running at 100 percent 

throttle two seconds before the sudden deceleration event. The 

data indicated Core did not depress the brakes until one second

after the sudden deceleration event. The truck’s warning lamp 

came on approximately six seconds after the sudden deceleration 

event. Bomar opined, “In this case the absence of the warning 

lamp in that right most column would tell me the computer of the 

truck basically sensed that everything was working normally or 

as it should be.”

On cross-examination, Bomar clarified the time marked as 

zero on the deceleration report is “the time the vehicle speed is 

sensed by the computer as decelerating at least 9 miles per hour 

over a one-second period, but not necessarily when the impact 

occurs.” Further, the warning lamp would only warn that 

something was wrong with the engine or power train. Another 

vehicle problem such as a blown tire would not trigger the 

warning lamp.

4. Drug recognition expert testimony

Anthony Marks, a professor of criminal justice and a former 

drug recognition expert instructor, testified for the prosecution as 

a drug recognition expert (D.R.E.).

8 Marks explained, “D.R.E. 

8 Marks indicated he usually testified for the defense, and 

“[p]robably in the 95 percent range is when I’m consulted by the 

defense first.”
13

reconstruction is not an official term but it is a term recognized 

by the D.R.E. community, which is a very, very small community 

of law enforcement officers. It is a term recognized by that 

community of individuals that look at information that is 

provided pursuant to somebody being under the influence, like in 

the instance of a crash, and look at observations by peace officers, 

by medical personnel, a combination of toxicology, an individual’s 

behavior, whether it’s driving behavior or behaviors during 

standardized field sobriety tests, and make[] a determination 

whether or not a substance or a chemical played a role in an 

individual’s degree of impairment or if they were impaired during 

a crash.”

Marks testified methamphetamine causes the release of 

excess dopamine in the brain, which creates a high by increasing 

the body’s pulse, blood pressure, and temperature, and causes

“fast repetitive speech, sweating, [and a] jerky kind of behavior.”

To be in homeostasis, the body will produce a chemical to remove 

the excess dopamine, like squeezing the chemical out with a 

sponge. When the dopamine is “removed,” the other 

neurotransmitters are still present in the brain, and at that 

point, “instead of looking up, you can appear to be very down.” At 

this point the person experiences the “downside” effect of 

methamphetamine, which causes drowsiness as well as

“confusion, an inability to pay attention, perhaps disorientation,

[and] a lack of coordination.”

Methamphetamine can be prescribed to treat “mild

depression, attention deficit disorder, narcolepsy, [and] some 

eating disorders.” On cross-examination, Marks testified he was 

unable to determine whether the methamphetamine levels shown 

in Core’s toxicology report fell within a therapeutic level for Core 

because that level is different for each person. Further, Marks 
14

opined the relevant question is whether a person is impaired, not 

whether he or she is taking methamphetamine at a therapeutic 

level, because a person “still might be impaired within a 

therapeutic range.”

Marks opined methamphetamine-induced impairment

played a role in the crash. Marks relied on observations by the 

deputies in their traffic collision reports indicating Core “was in a 

fog” and “had trouble answering questions.” Marks added, “But 

as a result of a collision of this degree, you might expect that 

from somebody at first. But what I do remember in the report is 

that the officers made these observations over a period of time, 

which leads me to believe that fogginess and that haze was due to 

something other than the effects of the crash.” Marks believed 

the officers made the observations over a 15- to 20-minute period. 

Marks admitted he did not review the video of Core’s interview 

with the deputy. But Marks recalled the report stated Core 

“mumbled answers and then seemed lethargic and unaware of his 

surroundings.” Marks admitted none of the reports stated Core 

was impaired or under the influence of a drug. But Marks 

testified, “As a reconstructionist, it’s implied. . . . Inattentive, 

confused, mumbled answers, and lethargic and unaware of his 

surroundings. Those are—word for word imply impaired.”

5. Core’s 2009 commercial driver license application and 

participation in a 2013 drug treatment program

The prosecution introduced evidence that in 2009 Core 

applied for and was granted a commercial driver’s license. The 

application contained an advisement that provides: “I am hereby 

advised that being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or 

both, impairs the ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. 

Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to human life to drive while 
15

under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. If I drive while 

under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and as a result, a 

person is killed, I can be charged with murder.” The court also 

admitted evidence of Core’s participation in a drug treatment 

program in 2013 and the materials from the program.

B. The Defense Case 

William Focha, an accident reconstruction expert and 

former traffic investigator, testified on behalf of Core. Focha 

inspected the truck’s steering, brakes, and “what was left of the 

suspension system.” Focha focused on the steering because the 

report from the sheriff’s department indicated Core said “he felt 

the steering wheel either get jerked out of his hand or pull in his 

hand.” Focha noticed the steering box differed from the 

photographs taken at the accident scene. In the photographs the 

cap covering the input shaft had separated from the steering box,

and the bolts were broken. When he inspected the truck, “the cap

was back in place and it had brand new bolts holding it in place.”

Focha was unable to determine whether the bolts were 

broken as a result of the accident because he did not have the 

broken pieces to examine. If he had the broken bolts, he would 

have sent them to a metallurgist or a mechanical engineer, who 

could determine whether the bolts had a defect prior to their 

failure. On cross-examination, Focha admitted in his 

approximately 20 years as an accident reconstruction expert, he 

had never sent bolts to be tested by a metallurgist.

Focha opined that if the steering box separates while a 

driver is on a smooth, flat road, “he is not going to feel a lot other 

than heaviness in the wheel as he starts to turn the steering 

wheel,” and he would “have a total lack of control.” If only some 

of the bolts break, the driver would still be able to steer the truck. 
16

But if all four bolts broke, the driver would not be able to steer.

Moreover, if the bolts broke, the steering box fluid would leak 

onto the ground. Defense counsel showed Focha a photograph of 

the curb where the truck came to rest at the accident scene. The 

photograph depicted a bolt on the ground, but Focha could not 

determine whether it was a bolt from the steering box because 

there was not sufficient definition in the photograph. Focha 

observed there was no steering box fluid around the bolt, which 

he would have expected to see if it was a bolt to the steering box. 

On cross-examination, Focha acknowledged that hitting a pillar 

or building at 20 to 30 miles per hour could cause the steering 

box to separate.

Focha also reviewed the electronic data Bomar obtained 

from the truck’s engine control module. Focha testified a truck 

driver would typically use the clutch to start or stop the truck, 

but not when shifting gears. When a truck “goes into a jack 

knife” position,9 the driver “is going to get slammed all around in 

the cab,” making it hard to control the clutch, brake, or throttle. 

On cross-examination, Focha agreed the collision likely occurred 

right around zero on the deceleration report graph, when the 

speed precipitously dropped.

C. The Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found Core guilty on count 1 of second degree

murder. The trial court sentenced Core to 15 years to life on 

count 1 (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); 364 days in county jail on 

count 2 for misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine 

9 According to Focha, a truck goes into a jack knife position if 

the drive wheels lock up.
17

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11377);

10 and the upper term of three 

years on count 3 for possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,

§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The court ordered the sentences on counts 

2 and 3 to run concurrent with the sentence on count 1.

Core timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Vehicular Manslaughter Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of 

Murder, and Failure To Instruct on Vehicular 

Manslaughter Did Not Constitute a Violation of Equal 

Protection

In Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 992, the Supreme 

Court held gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not 

a lesser included offense of murder. The Supreme Court 

explained, “Although it long has been held that manslaughter is a 

lesser included offense of murder, this tradition has not explicitly 

included offenses requiring proof of specific elements unique to 

vehicular manslaughter. Unlike manslaughter generally, 

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of 

elements that are not necessary to a murder conviction. The use 

of a vehicle while intoxicated is not merely a ‘circumstance,’ but 

an element of proof when the charge is gross vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated.” (Id. at p. 991; accord, People v. 

Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 154 (Munoz) [“Our Supreme 

Court has held that gross vehicular manslaughter while 

10 Prior to trial, Core pleaded no contest to misdemeanor 

possession of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a 

felon. The jury therefore did not hear evidence as to Core’s 

possession of a firearm.
18

intoxicated also is not a lesser included offense of murder under 

the statutory elements test.”].) Like gross vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated, vehicular manslaughter requires 

proof of driving a vehicle, which is not an element of implied 

malice murder. (See People v. Bettasso (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 

1050, 1059 [“Because vehicular manslaughter with or without 

gross negligence requires proof of elements that are not necessary 

to the offense of murder, vehicular manslaughter (as so defined) 

is not a necessarily lesser included offense of murder.”].)

Core urges us to reexamine Sanchez in light of the 

dissenting opinions in the case, but we are bound by the Supreme 

Court’s pronouncement of the law. (K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 

3 Cal.5th 295, 308 [“‘it is established that a holding of the 

Supreme Court binds all of the lower courts in the state, 

including an intermediate appellate court’”]; People v. Johnson

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 527-528 [decisions of Supreme Court are 

binding on appellate courts].)

Core also contends notwithstanding Sanchez, the failure to 

treat vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included offense of 

murder violates equal protection by treating defendants who are 

charged with implied malice murder based on a vehicular 

homicide differently from similarly situated defendants who are 

charged with murder and other types of manslaughter, for 

example based on heat of passion or unreasonable self-defense. 

Thus, Core argues, defendants charged with murder based on a 

vehicular homicide are at a disadvantage because the jury is 

given an all-or-nothing choice that other defendants convicted of 

implied malice murder do not face. We find no constitutional 

violation.

“The concept of equal treatment under the laws means that 

persons similarly situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the 
19

law should receive like treatment. [Citation.] “‘“The first 

prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection 

clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification 

that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal 

manner.” [Citation.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons 

are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are 

similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.”’” (People v. 

Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408; accord, Cooley v. Superior 

Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.)

If the court finds a law treats similarly situated persons 

differently, we consider whether the challenged law disparately 

affects a suspect classification or “burdens fundamental rights.” 

(People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288; accord, Munoz, 

supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) A right is fundamental if it is 

“‘“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” . . . and 

“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither 

liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.”’” (Jimenez v. 

County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 142, quoting 

Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, 720-721; accord, 

Munoz, at p. 159.) If a law does not burden a fundamental right, 

“[w]e find a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational

relationship between a disparity in treatment and some 

legitimate government purpose.” (Chatman, at pp. 288-289; 

accord, Munoz, at p. 160.)

“[T]here is no federal constitutional right of a defendant to 

compel the giving of lesser-related-offense instructions. 

[Citations.] Further, except [in specified situations in capital 

cases] . . . , there is no federal constitutional right to instruction 

on lesser necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Rundle (2008) 

43 Cal.4th 76, 148, disapproved on another ground by People v. 

Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; accord, Munoz, supra,
20

31 Cal.App.5th at p. 160; People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 

673, 688.) Moreover, “a trial court’s obligation to instruct a jury 

as to lesser included offenses is based on state constitutional law, 

not the federal Constitution.” (Wolfe, at p. 688; accord, Munoz, at 

p. 160.) Although the California Supreme Court has highlighted 

the importance of instructing on lesser included offenses to 

“prevent[] the ‘strategy, ignorance, or mistakes’ of either party 

from presenting the jury with an ‘unwarranted all-or-nothing 

choice,’ encourag[ing] ‘a verdict . . . no harsher or more lenient

than the evidence merits’” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 

142, 155), we agree with our colleagues in Division 1 of the 

Second Appellate District that the right to an instruction on a 

lesser included offense is not a fundamental right for purposes of 

an equal protection challenge. (See Munoz, at p. 162; see also

Wolfe, at p. 688.) Accordingly, Core’s challenge is subject to 

rational basis review.

We need not reach whether defendants convicted of implied 

malice murder based on a vehicular homicide are similarly 

situated to those whose convictions rest on nonvehicular 

homicides because we conclude there is a rational basis for the 

Legislature’s treatment of vehicular manslaughter differently 

from nonvehicular manslaughter. We agree with the conclusion 

of our colleagues in Division 1 of this district in Munoz, supra, 

31 Cal.App.5th at page 162, in rejecting an equal protection 

challenge to the trial court’s failure to instruct on vehicular 

manslaughter as a lesser included offense of implied malice 

murder: “[T]he vehicular manslaughter statutes are reasonably 

related to the legitimate legislative purpose of providing a wider 

and more nuanced range of penalties given the ubiquity of 

automobiles and the resulting deaths caused by motorists. In 

short, the vehicular manslaughter statutes, and the 
21

corresponding exclusion of vehicular homicides from the 

involuntary manslaughter statute, do not violate Munoz’s right to 

equal protection of the laws.” (Accord, People v. Bettasso, supra, 

49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059, fn. 8 [“Bettasso provides no reason for 

us to reject Wolfe’s conclusion that the differential treatment of 

vehicular and nonvehicular manslaughter passes rational basis 

review.”].)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting

Photographs of the Victim 

1. Proceedings below 

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected 

to the admission of three photographs of Burris’s remains under 

the rubble of the building, arguing the prejudice outweighed the

photographs’ probative value. The People argued the 

photographs were relevant to show that Burris died and to 

explain what was under the white sheet in the photographs. The 

trial court overruled the objection and admitted the photographs. 

The court reasoned, “I have very much weighed and considered 

the appropriateness of admitting it. Ultimately I’m going to 

admit it but I want to explain why. [¶] A trial is a search for the 

truth. Sometime that truth is fairly benign and sometimes it’s 

not graphic. Sometimes it is. [Evidence Code section] 352 is 

written such that we are searching for the truth. [¶] That line 

gets crossed when a prosecutor tries to inflame a jury by 

overemphasizing a point unduly, which is not the case here. The 

prosecutor is just trying to present the truth. Whether it’s 

graphic or not, it is not of his doing. . . . And in this case the 

truth is graphic, unfortunately.”

The court added, “But I do agree that [the prosecutor] is 

walking a fine line. I think if I were the prosecutor, I would be 
22

arguing to push for the video to be admitted. I think I would 

want the jury to see a body essentially exploding into different 

pieces when a massive vehicle hits the victim full force. . . . [¶] 

And this is a close case, factually speaking. And I would fully 

understand if [the prosecutor] in his desire to win this case would 

opt for the video but he is not. He is showing restraint and I 

think commendable restraint. [¶] For example, there are photos 

where you literally have the license plate embedded into 

mutilated flesh of the victim. . . . [¶] And the argument could be 

made, look, here is the sheer weight of the force. That this semi 

truck ran into this body with such force that even the license 

plate got embedded into the body. But he is not doing that 

either.”

The court explained further, “[A]nd I have heard evidence 

of how the methamphetamine can actually be helpful to drivers, 

it can for a short duration enhance the alertness, enhance the 

energy level, enhance the ability to stay awake for a period of 

time, and as I have listened to the evidence, in my mind I 

thought this was going to be a very difficult case to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt. And I think in large part that’s because I 

haven’t appreciated the danger of just how big this truck was. I 

have seen pictures of it and I have seen pictures of what it did to 

the building but I haven’t really had an appreciation of just why 

we have these laws, why the government has even micromanaged 

truck drivers to the point where we want them to keep a log of 

how many hours they sleep . . . . [¶] So I think these photos, 

while graphic, simply do the following: they show the truth of 

what happened. . . . I don’t think it’s our place to sanitize life and 

death. It is our place to make sure that the evidence is not 

inflammatory.” Moreover, “the results that are shown go to the 

implied malice.” As discussed, at trial, Deputy Saucedo 
23

confirmed he took the three photographs of Burris’s remains at 

the scene, but he did not show the photographs to the jury.

The prosecutor also sought to introduce a photograph of 

Burris while he was alive. Defense counsel indicated that would 

be fine “[a]s long as it’s noninflammatory.” Defense counsel 

noted, “[W]e may be able to just come up with a stipulation as to 

proof of life also to avoid a family member actually having to take 

the stand and talk about the decedent.” During the trial, the 

prosecutor offered a stipulation between the parties that 

“People’s exhibit 27 is a photograph of Gary Burris.” Defense 

counsel stipulated.

 

2. Governing law

“‘Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency in 

reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action.”’” (People v. 

Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87; accord, People v. Daveggio and 

Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822.) “‘The court in its discretion 

may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will 

(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 

of misleading the jury.’ (Evid. Code, § 352.)” (Hardy, at p. 87; 

accord, People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 105.)

“‘[T]he prejudice which exclusion of evidence under 

Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the 

prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from 

relevant, highly probative evidence. “[A]ll evidence which tends 

to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s case. 

The stronger the evidence, the more it is ‘prejudicial.’ The 

‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to 
24

evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against 

the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on 

the issues.”’” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 610; accord, 

People v. Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 105 [“‘“Evidence is not 

prejudicial, as that term is used in [the Evidence Code] 

section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent’s 

position or shores up that of the proponent.”’”].) “‘[T]he trial 

court is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance and 

in weighing the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its 

probative value. Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal 

absent an abuse of that discretion.’” (People v. Hardy, supra, 

5 Cal.5th at p. 87; accord, Bell, at p. 105.)

3. Core forfeited his challenge to the admission of 

Burris’s photograph while alive, and he has failed to 

show ineffective assistance of counsel 

Core contends it was error to admit the photograph of 

Burris when he was alive because it was not relevant to any 

disputed issue in the case. But defense counsel indicated

admission of the photograph was fine “[a]s long as it’s 

noninflammatory.” The prosecutor selected a photograph that 

was not inflammatory, simply showing Burris standing with 

another man. Further, defense counsel stipulated to admission of

the photograph of Burris. Core therefore forfeited his claim of 

error. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Cage (2015) 

62 Cal.4th 256, 282 [“Defendant forfeited his claims by failing to 

object to any of the testimony on the grounds he now raises.”]; 

People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 721 [“‘“In accordance with 

[section 353 of the Evidence Code], we have consistently held that 

the ‘defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection’ on 
25

the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not 

cognizable.”’”].)

Core alternatively argues that defense counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. “‘“To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient 

performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have 

been more favorable to the defendant.”’” (People v. Rices (2017) 

4 Cal.5th 49, 80; accord, People v. Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 125; 

see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.)

“On direct appeal, if the record ‘“sheds no light on why 

counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,”’ we must 

reject the claim ‘“unless counsel was asked for an explanation 

and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no 

satisfactory explanation.”’” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 

488; accord, People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [“[A] 

reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative 

evidence that counsel had ‘“‘no rational tactical purpose’”’ for an 

action or omission.”]; see People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 

972 [“[E]xcept in those rare instances where there is no 

conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s actions, claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas 

corpus, not on direct appeal.”].)

Here, the record shows defense counsel stipulated to the

admission of the photograph to “avoid a family member actually 

having to take the stand and talk about the decedent.” Thus, 

defense counsel made a tactical decision to avoid having a family 

member testify about Burris, potentially making Burris more 
26

sympathetic to the jury. Core has therefore not shown ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting photographs of Burris’s remains 

“So long as the probative value of graphic or disturbing 

material is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effects, 

a prosecutor is entitled to use such evidence to ‘present a 

persuasive and forceful case.’” (People v. Merriman (2014) 

60 Cal.4th 1, 80; accord, People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332,

357 [“Graphic evidence in a murder case is always disturbing 

[citation] but it is not inadmissible simply because it is 

unpleasant to view.”]; People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 196 

[“‘“As a rule, the prosecution in a criminal case involving charges 

of murder or other violent crimes is entitled to present evidence 

of the circumstances attending them even if it is grim” [citation], 

and even if it “duplicate[s] testimony, depict[s] uncontested facts, 

or trigger[s] an offer to stipulate.”’”]; People v. Booker (2011)

51 Cal.4th 141, 171 [the prosecution “is not required to sanitize 

its evidence”].) “‘The admission into evidence of photographs lies 

within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent 

an abuse of that discretion.’” (People v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 

496, 518; accord, People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1304.)

Core contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting the photographs of Burris’s remains, arguing they 

were highly prejudicial and were not probative of any disputed 

issue. “A defendant, however, ‘cannot prevent the admission of 

relevant evidence by claiming not to dispute a fact the 

prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

jury was entitled to learn that the physical evidence . . . supports 

the prosecution’s theory of the case.’” (People v. Steskal, supra, 
27

11 Cal.5th at p. 356; accord, People v. Roundtree (2013) 

56 Cal.4th 823, 852.)

We agree the photographs are gruesome, showing body 

parts under the rubble from the building. But as the trial court 

observed, the photographs were relevant to prove that Burris 

died and the cause of his death. In addition, the photographs 

were relevant to prove implied malice by showing the enormous 

impact from a large tractor-trailer truck crashing into a 

pedestrian, supporting the People’s theory that Core drove the 

truck while impaired in a manner in which the natural and 

probable consequences were dangerous to human life. (See 

People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 965 [“‘We have 

interpreted implied malice as having “both a physical and a

mental component. The physical component is satisfied by the 

performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are 

dangerous to life.’ [Citation.] The mental component is the 

requirement that the defendant ‘knows that his conduct 

endangers the life of another and . . . acts with a conscious 

disregard for life.’”’”].)11

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting 

the Drug Recognition Expert’s Testimony

“‘“A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has 

special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 

11 The People also argue admission of the photographs was 

not prejudicial because the exhibits were not sent into the jury 

room. However, the trial court instructed the jury, “These 

exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin 

to deliberate.” It is not clear from the record whether the 

exhibits were later sent into the jury room.
28

sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his 

testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) An expert may 

express an opinion on “a subject that is sufficiently beyond 

common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the 

trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)’” (People v. Duong 

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 60; accord, People v. Sanchez (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 665, 675.) “The witness’s expertise ‘may be shown by 

any otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.’” 

(People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 97 (Morales), quoting 

Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (b); accord, People v. Nelson (2016) 

1 Cal.5th 513, 536.) “‘The trial court has broad discretion in 

deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony [citation], 

and its decision as to whether expert testimony meets the 

standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of 

discretion.’” (Duong, at p. 60; accord, Morales, at p. 97 [“‘“‘“The 

trial court’s determination of whether a witness qualifies as an 

expert is a matter of discretion and will not be disturbed absent a 

showing of manifest abuse.”’”’”].)

Core contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting Marks’s expert testimony because no foundation was 

laid for him to testify about drug recognition “reconstruction” 

based on the observations of other police officers and the facts set 

forth in the toxicology and other reports.12 The trial court did 

not abuse its discretion.

12 Core concedes defense counsel did not object to Marks’s 

expert testimony. But Core argues his claim of error is not 

forfeited because his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel by failing to object. We do not reach whether defense 

counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Marks’s

expert testimony.
29

Marks was qualified to testify as a drug recognition expert. 

He worked as a pharmacy technician for 30 years for the Los 

Angeles County Probation Department before becoming a college 

professor of criminal justice. Marks also was a non-sworn reserve 

officer with the Los Angeles Police Department. In addition, he 

was a certified drug and alcohol counselor. Marks received 52 

hours of intensive training from the Los Angeles Police 

Department as a drug recognition expert. To obtain his 

certification, Marks passed a National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration Knowledge Exam and a minimum of 12 field 

certification exams. In addition, Marks was a former drug 

recognition instructor, which required an additional 40 hours of 

training.

Although Marks did not describe any training he received 

specific to drug recognition reconstruction, Marks explained 

reconstruction is “recognized by the D.R.E. community” as a valid 

approach to determine “whether a substance or a chemical played 

a role in an individual’s degree of impairment or if they were 

impaired during a crash.” Core fails to provide any support for 

his contention a drug recognition expert must take specific 

additional training (or such training exists) for the expert to 

apply his or her experience to a reconstruction scenario.

Core also asserts Marks did not have sufficient information 

to form a reconstruction analysis because there was no evidence 

of poor driving or speeding prior to the accident, no information 

about Core’s pulse rate and pupil size, and no field sobriety test 

results. But there is no evidence Marks needed this information 

to form an opinion about Core’s impairment. Marks testified to 

the contrary: “[M]aking a determination of impairment involves 

a totality of circumstances. It does not hang its hat on any one 

specific detail such as pulse rate.”
30

Core further argues Marks relied on the deputies’ reports 

to determine whether Core was impaired, but none of the

deputies believed Core was impaired or going through 

withdrawal, including Deputy Quemuel, a drug recognition 

expert, and Deputy Saucedo, who was previously a drug 

recognition expert. Core also asserts Marks’s testimony is not

reliable because Marks believed the deputies observed Core over 

a period of time, but the reports did not contain any time stamps. 

Core’s challenges to the reliability of Marks’s testimony based on 

the deputies’ reports goes to the weight of the evidence, not its 

admissibility. (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97 [“‘“‘“Where a 

witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to 

entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of 

his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than to its 

admissibility.”’”’”]; People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 143 

[“questions regarding the validity or the credibility of an expert’s 

knowledge go to the weight of such testimony, not its 

admissibility”]; see People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 35, 

fn. 6 [“it is the jury’s role to decide the weight to accord to the 

expert testimony and ‘courts must . . . be cautious in excluding 

expert testimony’ so as not to usurp that role”].)

Core also criticizes Marks for relying on the toxicology 

report because Marks acknowledged the amount of 

methamphetamine in Core’s blood could fall within the 

therapeutic range for methamphetamine. But Marks testified he 

could not determine whether the amount of methamphetamine in

Core’s blood fell “within or outside of a therapeutic range for 

[Core] specifically.” And he explained an individual “still might 

be impaired within a therapeutic range.” Again, Core’s 

challenges go to the weight of the evidence rather than its 
31

admissibility. (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97; People v. 

Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 143.)

D. Core Forfeited His Challenge to Admission of the Drug

Rehabilitation Course Materials and Has Failed To Show 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Proceedings below

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected 

to the admission of course materials from a drug rehabilitation 

program attended by Core in 2013. Defense counsel stated, “I 

would object to have his Prop. 36 classes coming in. I think it’s 

more prejudicial because the jurors are going to see that if 

someone is taking Prop. 36 classes, they can draw the conclusion 

that this person has a drug problem or drug history, possibly a 

drug addict, even though the classes go back to, I think, four or 

five plus years ago. [¶] So I would ask the court to keep the 

Prop. 36 classes or any reference to them out of the eyes and ears 

of the jurors.” The trial court responded, “I am going to allow it. 

Again, it goes to his knowledge, which goes to implied malice. 

However, I’m going to keep out the fact that—in other words, we 

can make it somewhat generic. That in the past he was required 

to take classes. In the course of those classes this is what he 

learned.”

Defense counsel then argued, “[T]he People still need to 

establish a foundation that my client was actually there, he was 

actually explained these things and not just some documents that 

are submitted from the class that say, hey, this is our curriculum 

and Mr. Core was ordered to take these classes. They still need 

to lay the foundation that my client was actually there and 

taught these things.” The trial court replied, “I think that goes to 

weight, not admissibility.” The court added, “I think . . . when a 
32

search warrant is provided for the Prop. 36 class and it shows the 

defendant was there . . . I think that is all that is required.”

Before closing arguments, the parties stipulated: “People’s

Exhibit 28 are records for defendant Richard Core subpoenaed by 

the People from Ventura County Behavioral Health, a drug and 

alcohol rehabilitation program. The exhibit includes both the 

program’s internal records and copies of materials used during 

the program.” Exhibit 28 contains an admission checklist; a 

questionnaire about Core’s prior and current drug use, including

methamphetamine; an attendance record reflecting Core’s 

attendance at an intake session, three group sessions, and a 

discharge session; three progress notes for Core; a discharge 

summary; and a treatment plan after discharge requiring Core’s 

biweekly attendance at a self-help group. The progress notes 

show that Core was enrolled in the “Early Recovery” program 

entitled “Living in Balance.” According to the exhibit, the “Early 

Recovery group is a 12-15 week treatment course.” The discharge 

summary reflects that Core successfully completed the program 

after two months. The exhibit contains the course materials from 

three sessions: alcohol and tobacco (session 5); stress and 

emotional well-being (session 8); and the twelve steps (session 

14). Each session contains educational information and exercises 

to be completed by the participant. The exhibit does not contain 

course materials for the other sessions.

The People move to augment the record on appeal with “a 

complete version of People’s Exhibit 28,” which they contend was 

the exhibit admitted at trial, pursuant to California Rules of 

Court, rules 8.155(a) and 8.340(c). Significantly, the proffered 

version of exhibit 28 contains a section on the effects of drugs on 

the body, whereas exhibit 28 includes only a session on alcohol 

and tobacco. But the proffered exhibit is by no means “complete.” 
33

Unlike exhibit 28, the proffered exhibit does not include the

program’s internal records showing Core’s attendance and 

progress in the program.

The People argue that the proffered exhibit is the one 

admitted at trial, noting that the prosecutor in his closing 

argument referred to the discussion in the course materials about 

methamphetamine and the downside effects of the drug. It does 

appear the prosecutor at trial believed the exhibit admitted into 

evidence and provided to the jury contained session materials on 

drug use. But that does not mean the prosecutor provided a 

complete version of the course materials to the court or that the 

admitted version of the exhibit provided to the jury contained the 

additional session materials the People now seek to include in the 

record. To the contrary, it is exhibit 28 (with no relevant 

materials on drug use) that contains an official green Los Angeles 

Superior Court exhibit label signed by the clerk indicating it was 

“admitted in evidence.” Because the proffered exhibit was not 

admitted into evidence or shown to the jury, we deny the People’s 

motion to augment the record.

2. Core forfeited his claim of error 

Core contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting the drug rehabilitation course materials because the

admitted document does not contain any relevant information on 

the risks from using methamphetamine and driving. As 

discussed, the program materials in exhibit 28, in contrast to the 

proffered exhibit we decline to consider, do not address 

methamphetamine or its effects, including drowsiness. On this 

basis, Core argues the course materials had no probative value, 

and they were prejudicial because they did nothing more than 

inform the jury that Core previously had a drug issue. Core also 
34

asserts the prosecutor failed to lay a proper foundation for 

admission of the document because there was no evidence the

materials were used during the program Core attended.

Although defense counsel initially objected to admission of 

the course materials, he later stipulated to admission of exhibit 

28. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [“‘[W]hen a 

party enters into a voluntary stipulation, he generally is 

precluded from taking an appeal claiming defects in the 

stipulation.’”]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 623

[same].) Moreover, defense counsel never raised an objection that 

exhibit 28 did not include any materials on the effects of drug 

use. Thus, Core has forfeited his claims of error.

3. Core has failed to establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel 

In the alternative, Core contends his trial attorney’s 

failure to object to admission of the course materials constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel. But defense counsel likely made 

a tactical decision to stipulate to admission of the drug 

rehabilitation course materials to avoid having a witness from 

the drug rehabilitation program testify about Core’s attendance 

at the program. Or defense counsel may have been aware that 

the prosecutor failed to include the course materials on the effects 

of drug use in the exhibit and decided not to object to admission 

of the exhibit so as not to alert the prosecutor to the omission. 

Thus, Core has not met his burden to show defense counsel had 

“‘“‘no rational tactical purpose’”’ for [his] action or omission.” 

(People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198; accord, People v.

Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 514.)
35

E. Core Forfeited His Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct and 

Has Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. The prosecutor’s closing argument

During his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that 

the day before the crash Core had “been trying to sleep on the 

way but he’s clearly not getting enough sleep because he [got] his 

truck stuck on something exiting the parking lot of that strip 

mall in Valencia.” Core had not slept enough “so Officer Powers 

took him out of service for ten hours.” The prosecutor added, 

“And I don’t know how long it takes to get the truck 

unstuck. . . . But I will tell you what he doesn’t do. Is sleep 

enough.”

The prosecutor also asserted Core smoked

methamphetamine to stay awake while he was driving, noting 

Detective Saucedo found two separate eyeglass cases “full of 

meth” and “it was in his blood the next morning after this crash.” 

The prosecutor added, “[T]hat blood draw comes back positive for 

meth. It is a lot of meth, actually. It is like 250 nanograms per 

milliliter of meth in his blood.” The “downside effects” of the

methamphetamine caused Core to “nod[] off,” resulting in Burris

being “left in pieces on the sidewalk.”

The prosecutor argued Core’s behavior did not match “with 

what someone would do if the steering box failed,” and Core did 

not “hit the brakes until six seconds after the crash.” The 

prosecutor added, “In fact, the truck is stopped at second 3 and he 

still has got his foot all the way down on the gas. The throttle is 

all the way down on the floor while the truck is sitting there not 

moving. And for three seconds he sits there not moving with his 

foot on the gas. And, oh, puts it on the brake. That is someone 

that fell asleep.”
36

The prosecutor explained “an abiding conviction” as 

something that is “reasonable to believe.” He argued, “And if you 

say, yeah, I am convinced it happened this way, I’m convinced he 

smoked meth and it wore off and he nodded off and killed this 

guy, that’s it. You are done. That is all it is. An abiding 

conviction.”

The prosecutor then argued there was implied malice 

because Core knew “driving a big rig when he [was] exhausted” 

was dangerous to human life but he “disregarded it.” The 

prosecutor added, “[Core] actually was told that it’s dangerous to 

drive exhausted. The State makes him keep that sleep log. They 

make him say what he is doing every 15 minutes. The State tells 

him you cannot drive tired. . . . The [California Highway Patrol] 

officer said . . . if I even can’t tell the last time he slept, you are 

out for ten hours. That’s how important it is. If I am not sure, 

you are out for ten hours. . . . The day before this happened they 

told him, it’s so important. I can’t be sure when you slept. You 

are out. Go get sleep. . . . [¶] Does he know that he is too tired 

on that day? What was the evidence? The biggest one to me—

second biggest, he forged his sleep log. He faked the log. . . . 

That is 100 percent proof that he knew [he had not] had enough 

sleep because he is looking at the log and realizing this isn’t right 

and I’m just going to fake it. [¶] He got the truck stuck the day 

before. Like I said, that is a big flashing warning sign to him. 

Don’t drive. You are not in a good condition. Don’t drive. Officer 

Powers told him to go to sleep. [¶] He is so tired he drives the 

wrong route. [¶] And then he told them he was tired. Deputy 

Efflandt, the blond deputy, said, yeah, I asked him what’s up and 

he told me he hadn’t slept enough. He told me that and so that’s 

why I marked that on my report. He said he was too tired.”
37

The prosecutor added, “And then the biggest one probably 

is that he chose to smoke meth. Why? To stay awake because he 

knows he’s too tired. The only reason to smoke that before he 

gets behind the wheel is he is saying to himself, I’m too tired to 

drive. I’m going to smoke some meth to stay awake. [¶] But 

what about when it wears off? And he knows that, too. That it’s 

dangerous. That if this doesn’t work, that it’s not safe to drive 

this way. He knows it because of two things. . . . And we didn’t 

even put it up on the overhead so you haven’t seen any of this yet. 

But the first thing we put in was his application to be a truck 

driver, and on the application it tells him it’s dangerous to 

human life to use drugs to drive. And that if you do and someone 

is killed, you can be charged with murder. [¶] But, look, that’s 

on his driver’s license application. There is a bunch of stuff on 

there. He’s going to say, well, maybe he didn’t read it. Maybe he 

didn’t.”

The prosecutor then argued, “But in 2013 the defendant 

went through drug rehab for meth. We put the whole packet of 

documents in. It is like 100 pages. I won’t put them all up here

but I want to talk about some of the things that are on it. So he 

does this program in 2013. He spends 64 days, and he 

successfully completes the program and gets discharged. . . . And 

what do they tell him in that drug program? The same thing Mr. 

Marks told you about how meth works and what happens with 

the downside effect. They tell him about neurotransmitters in 

your brain and how they work. That they can be too high or too

low or imbalance. That is homeostasis. They told him that when 

you use drugs, a person’s neurotransmitters may be temporarily 

used up. It is that dry sponge used up. No more dopamine. And 

that the withdrawal symptoms when the meth wears off begins 

within hours of your last use and includes a bunch of things. 
38

Irritable, anxious, tired and that you can sleep excessively. That 

you can fall asleep. He knows that. He personally was told that 

in 2013. And then in 2017 smokes meth to try to stay awake and 

this is the result.”

The prosecutor added, “And any one of those things is 

enough. . . . Like, you could look and say he forged his sleep log. 

Yeah, that tells me for sure he didn’t sleep enough. I’m done. 

These are all completely separate things. Pieces of evidence. 

Any one of them works. There is six of them there. So that’s 

overwhelming evidence that he knew it’s dangerous. He knew he 

is too tired. He did it anyway. That’s it. The case is over. He is 

guilty.”

Finally, the prosecutor argued Core showed “a disregard for 

human life.” The prosecutor stated, “[Core] did it in getting 

behind the wheel when he knew he was too tired and smoking 

meth to try and stay awake. And it really comes through when 

they are talking to him after because all he wants to talk about is 

himself. I don’t want to do this. . . . I’m not going to do your 

tests. I don’t want a blood test. Me, me, me, me, me. And then 

he says, ‘My life is over.’ Your life is over. Gary Burris’s life is 

over. His life goes on. His life is not over. But what does he say 

after he kills somebody? ‘My life is over.’ Me. He cared more 

about his dog than he cared about killing Gary Burris. And if 

that’s not disregard for human life, I don’t know what is.”

2. The prosecutor committed misconduct, but Core 

forfeited his claim by failing to object 

“‘“A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 

conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render 

the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves 

deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the 
39

trier of fact.”’” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 

657; accord, People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 943.) “‘“A 

defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial 

misconduct, however, unless it is reasonably probable that a 

result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached 

without the misconduct.”’” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 

932-933; accord, People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010.)

Core asserts multiple grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. 

He contends the prosecutor misstated the law for implied malice

because he told the jury that if they were “convinced [Core] 

smoked meth and it wore off and he nodded off and killed this 

guy, that’s it.” But this statement was made in the context of the 

meaning of an “abiding conviction,” not implied malice. The 

prosecutor explained implied malice was Core “doing something 

[he] knows is dangerous and accidentally killing someone while 

doing it.” The prosecutor later added implied malice is “doing 

something he knows is dangerous to human life but he does it 

anyway.” The prosecutor did not misstate the law on implied 

malice.

Core’s argument the prosecutor falsely stated Core was 

sleep deprived likewise lacks merit. The prosecutor based his 

argument on a reasonable inference drawn from Core’s statement 

to Officer Powers the day before the crash that he had gone to the 

parking lot to sleep; Officer Powers’s statement Core appeared a 

“little bit tired”; and Core’s statement to Deputy Efflandt after 

the crash that “he was just tired from waking up early.”

Likewise, the prosecutor had latitude to argue Core’s concern for

himself and his dog over that of the victim following the crash 

showed his disregard for human life in driving while under the 

influence before the crash. Similarly, the prosecutor did not 

commit misconduct by arguing Core’s toxicology report showed “a 
40

lot of meth” in his blood. (See People v. Seumanu, supra, 

61 Cal.4th at p. 1330 [“A criminal prosecutor has much latitude 

when making a closing argument. Her argument may be 

strongly worded and vigorous so long as it fairly comments on the 

evidence admitted at trial or asks the jury to draw reasonable 

inferences and deductions from that evidence.”]; People v. 

Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 736 [same]; People v. Panah 

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 463 [a prosecutor “‘has the right to fully 

state his views as to what the evidence shows and to urge 

whatever conclusions he deems proper’”].)

But the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts 

not in evidence. “It is well settled that it is misconduct for a 

prosecutor to base argument on facts not in evidence.” (People v. 

Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 906; accord, People v. Rodriquez 

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480 [“‘“Statements of supposed facts not in 

evidence . . . are a highly prejudicial form of misconduct, and a 

frequent basis for reversal.”’”].) Officer Powers testified he took 

Core out of service because of the discrepancies in Core’s log book, 

not that the book was forged or fake or he believed Core needed 

more sleep. Further, Officer Powers noted Core was fatigued 

from trying to move his truck from where it was stuck (not a lack 

of sleep), and he did not direct Core to get more sleep. Moreover, 

the prosecutor claimed Core did not depress the brakes until six 

seconds after the crash, but the electronic data from the truck 

showed Core applied the brakes one second after the sudden 

deceleration event, which was not necessarily after the crash. 

More troubling, the prosecutor argued Core went to a drug 

rehabilitation program in 2013 and was “told about how meth 

works and what happens with the downside effect.” But as 

discussed, the drug rehabilitation course materials in exhibit 28 
41

only focus on the effects of alcohol and tobacco, not 

methamphetamine.

However, Core forfeited his claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct by failing to object. “‘“As a general rule a defendant 

may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in 

a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made 

an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be 

admonished to disregard the impropriety.”’” (People v. Beck and 

Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 657; accord, People v. Hoyt, supra,

8 Cal.5th at p. 942 [defendant “failed to object to nearly all such 

instances [of prosecutorial misconduct during his closing 

argument] and has therefore forfeited these claims on appeal”].) 

“‘The lack of a timely objection and request for admonition will be 

excused only if either would have been futile or if an admonition 

would not have cured the harm.’” (Hoyt, at pp. 942-943; accord, 

People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 171.) Had Core’s attorney 

objected, the trial court could have reminded the jury, as it had 

instructed, that the attorneys’ closing arguments were not 

evidence, and they should only consider the witness testimony 

and exhibits as evidence. In addition, as to the drug 

rehabilitation materials, the court could have specifically 

instructed the jury that the materials did not include any 

discussion of the effects of drugs.

3. Core has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel

Core argues his attorney was ineffective for failing to object 

to the prosecutor’s argument. This argument fails because Core 

has not shown his attorney’s failure to object was prejudicial. 

(See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [“[A] 

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the 
42

defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”]; People v. King

(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298 [“If [the defendant] cannot 

show prejudice, we may reject his claim of ineffective assistance, 

and need not address the adequacy of trial counsel’s 

performance.”].) The defendant “bears the burden of showing 

prejudice, that is, a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.’” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676, 

quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; accord, People v. 

Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332, 350 [“‘In demonstrating 

prejudice, the appellant “must carry his burden of proving 

prejudice as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to 

the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.”’”].)

Core has failed to show it is reasonably probable the jury 

would have reached a result more favorable to him absent the 

prosecutorial misconduct. Before closing arguments, the trial 

court instructed the jury, “Evidence is the sworn testimony of 

witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else 

I told you to consider as evidence. [¶] Nothing that the attorneys 

say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing 

arguments, the attorneys discuss the case but their remarks are 

not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the 

witnesses’ answers are evidence.” We presume the jury 

understood and followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. 

Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 405; People v. Frederickson (2020) 

8 Cal.5th 963, 1026.)

Further, the prosecutor did not rely only on the drug

rehabilitation course materials as evidence of implied malice. 

The prosecutor argued Core’s statements to the deputies show 

Core was tired, and he used methamphetamine to continue 

driving as shown by his positive test for methamphetamine after 
43

the crash. In addition, Core was aware of the dangers of using 

methamphetamine and driving because his 2009 driver’s license 

application advised him that being under the influence of drugs 

“impairs the ability to safely operate a motor vehicle,” and if he 

drove while under the influence of drugs and as a result killed a

person, he could be charged with murder.

Moreover, the records from the drug rehabilitation program 

show Core first used methamphetamine at the age of 22 and 

attended the program because he had an “amphetamine 

dependence” problem. As someone who previously used 

methamphetamine, Core had personal experience with the 

downside effects of methamphetamine. As Marks testified, the 

downside effect of methamphetamine causes drowsiness, 

confusion, inability to pay attention, and a lack of coordination. 

Thus, Core was personally aware of the risks of using 

methamphetamine and driving. 

The prosecutor’s other misstatements were less significant. 

The prosecutor attributed to Officer Powers a belief that Core 

was tired, but Core did tell Deputy Efflandt he was “tired from 

waking up early.” And both officers encountered Core after he 

had driven off route and, although he was an experienced truck 

driver, had gotten his truck stuck on the driveway to a parking 

lot, blocking a road lane. Although there was no evidence the log 

book was forged, there was evidence it had discrepancies that led 

Officer Powers to take Core out of service for 10 hours. As to 

when Core depressed the brakes, whether he did so one second or 

six seconds after the sudden deceleration event was not 

significant. The principal issue at trial was whether Core acted 

with implied malice by driving under the influence of 

methamphetamine. On this record, it is not reasonably probable 
44

that a result more favorable to Core would have been reached 

absent the prosecutorial misconduct.

F. Substantial Evidence Supports Core’s Conviction of Murder

1. Standard of review

“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence for a jury finding, we review the entire record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We 

evaluate whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and 

credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting 

the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People 

v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820; accord, People v. Penunuri 

(2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 [“‘To assess the evidence’s sufficiency, 

we review the whole record to determine whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.’”].) 

“‘“Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable 

suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the 

exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the 

credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon 

which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither 

credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial 

evidence.”’” (Penunuri, at p. 142; accord, People v. Mendez (2019) 

7 Cal.5th 680, 703.)

“‘“The standard of review is the same in cases in which the 

prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”’” (People 

v. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 820; accord, People v. Rivera

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 324 (Rivera).) “‘We presume in support of 

the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact 

reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, 
45

reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the 

circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding.’” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 

713; accord, People v. Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 142 [“‘A 

reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it 

appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

substantial evidence to support’” the jury’s verdict.’”].)

2. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of 

implied malice 

“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with 

malice aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Malice may 

be expressed or implied. (Id., § 188.) “‘Malice is implied when 

the killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural 

consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was 

deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct 

endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious 

disregard for life.’”’” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 

1165; accord, People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197.) “[A]

finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the 

defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective 

standard.” (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297.)

Core contends there was not substantial evidence he was 

subjectively aware his actions were dangerous to human life and 

that he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human 

life. This contention lacks merit. Core is correct the drug 

rehabilitation course materials in exhibit 28 do not discuss the 

“downside effects” of methamphetamine or the dangers of using 

methamphetamine and driving. But as discussed, the program 

records show Core first used methamphetamine at the age of 22, 

and he attended the drug rehabilitation program in 2013 because 
46

he had an amphetamine dependence problem. Having previously 

used methamphetamine, Core personally experienced 

methamphetamine’s downside effects, as described by Marks, and 

he was advised in his 2009 commercial driver’s license

application that driving while under the influence of drugs was 

dangerous to human life, and if he caused someone’s death, he

could be charged with murder. Substantial evidence supports the 

jury’s finding of implied malice.13

 

G. The Trial Court Complied with Its Obligations Under 

Pitchess

1. Core’s Pitchess motion 

On September 20, 2019 Core filed a Pitchess motion

pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043, seeking discovery of 

Officer Powers’s personnel records concerning “[a]ll complaints 

. . . relating to violation of constitutional rights, fabrication of 

charges, fabrication of evidence, false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, 

writing of false police reports, and any other evidence of 

misconduct amounting to moral turpitude.” On October 4, 2019 

the trial court granted the motion, ordering disclosure of any 

information concerning Officer Powers’s dishonesty. The court 

conducted an in camera hearing and found no disclosure was 

required.

13 Core contends he suffered cumulative prejudice from 

multiple errors. Because we reject Core’s claims of error (or find 

no prejudice), there was no cumulative prejudice. (People v. 

Powell, supra 6 Cal.5th 136, 194 [no cumulative prejudice where 

“[a]ny errors, actual or arguable, were minor”]; People v. 

Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th 658, 746 [no cumulative prejudice 

because there was no error, or if assuming error, there was no 

prejudice].)
47

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 

“‘When a defendant shows good cause for the discovery of 

information in an officer’s personnel records, the trial court must 

examine the records in camera to determine if any information 

should be disclosed.’” (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 338; accord, 

People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391.) “‘The court may 

not disclose complaints over five years old, conclusions drawn 

during an investigation, or facts so remote or irrelevant that their 

disclosure would be of little benefit.’” (Rivera, at p. 338; accord, 

People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 424; see Evid. Code, 

§ 1045, subd. (b).) “‘Pitchess rulings are reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion.’” (Rivera, at p. 338; accord Anderson, at p. 391.)

Core requests we review the sealed portion of the record, 

which includes the transcript of the in camera hearing. The 

People do not object to our review. Core’s request for an 

independent review of the sealed record is proper. (People v. 

Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 391 [“Defendant properly asks us 

to review the sealed record of the in camera hearing to determine 

whether the court erroneously failed to provide discovery that he 

should have received.”]; Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th 306, 338-339 

[court reviewed sealed transcript of both in camera hearings and 

sealed exhibits].)

We have reviewed the sealed record. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding there was no discoverable 

information to disclose to Core. (See People v. Anderson, supra, 

5 Cal.5th at p. 391; People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 424.)
48

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

McCORMICK, J.*

* Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.