An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-207

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 16 September 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Mecklenburg County

No. 11 CRS 246140

KEVIN CELLENT

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 12 April 

2013 by Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Mecklenburg County 

Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Narcisa Woods, 

Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by David W. 

Andrews, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendantappellant.

DAVIS, Judge.

Kevin Cellent (“Defendant”) appeals from his 

conviction for first-degree rape. On appeal, he contends

that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by limiting 

the scope of his cross-examination of the victim; and (2) 

committed plain error by admitting into evidence unredacted 

police reports concerning the investigation of the crime 
-2-

for which he was charged. After careful review, we 

conclude that Defendant received a fair trial free from 

prejudicial error.

Factual Background

The State presented evidence at trial tending to 

establish the following facts: On 1 August 2011, Jennifer 

Lambert1 (“Ms. Lambert”) met her Social Security 

representative, Debra Green, at approximately 3:00 p.m. in 

front of a CVS store located on the corner of Mallard Creek 

Road and Sugar Creek Road in Charlotte, North Carolina and 

received payment for disability benefits. Ms. Lambert then 

proceeded to spend the remainder of the afternoon playing 

Internet sweepstakes at the Sugar Creek Business Center —

which was in the same strip mall as the CVS store at which

she had met Ms. Green — and at the AA Business Center 

directly across the street.

Around 9:00 p.m., Ms. Lambert called her mother and 

several friends in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a ride 

home. She ultimately decided to take the bus home. While

she was waiting at the bus stop on Mallard Creek Road by 

the CVS store, she saw a white SUV with two male occupants 

drive past her. The SUV then turned around and drove past 

 

1 To protect the identity of the victim, the pseudonym 

“Jennifer Lambert” will be used throughout this opinion.
-3-

her again.

Several minutes later, Ms. Lambert saw Defendant 

walking down the sidewalk towards her. Defendant 

approached her and inquired when the next bus was arriving. 

Ms. Lambert indicated to Defendant that there was a nearby 

sign with the bus schedule on it. Defendant then walked 

directly up to Ms. Lambert, pressed a pistol against her 

stomach and said: “You know what it is.” At that point, 

Defendant grabbed Ms. Lambert’s arm and forced her into a 

wooden enclosure directly behind the bus stop.

Defendant ordered Ms. Lambert to get on the ground in 

front of him. He took Ms. Lambert’s purse and emptied its 

contents onto the ground. Defendant then commanded Ms. 

Lambert to perform oral sex on him and she complied. 

Defendant picked up Ms. Lambert’s debit card and ordered

her to give him her personal identification number.

Defendant then called the phone number printed on the card 

and was told that the account number linked with the card 

had a net balance of zero.

Defendant told Ms. Lambert to get on her hands and 

knees and proceeded to have vaginal intercourse with her.

While doing so, Defendant hit her forehead, kicked her back 

and shoulders, and stepped on her fingers.

Ms. Lambert then saw the white SUV she had previously 
-4-

observed pull up to the bus stop. She heard the driver 

yell to Defendant to hurry up because the SUV was running 

low on gas. Defendant responded: “[A]ll right, man, I’m 

coming.” He then got into the SUV, taking Ms. Lambert’s 

phone with him.

Ms. Lambert gathered her belongings and ran to the 

Sugar Creek Business Center. Upon her arrival, she

encountered Deann Gordon (“Ms. Gordon”) who observed that 

Ms. Lambert was shaking uncontrollably. After going 

inside, Ms. Lambert told Ms. Gordon that she had been raped 

and robbed and asked in a “frantic voice” for someone to 

call the police and her mother. Ms. Lambert then suffered 

a seizure, so an employee called 911.

Officer N. Gould (“Officer Gould”) with the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”) was the first 

officer to arrive on the scene, and Officer Kirsten Bartsch 

(“Officer Bartsch”), also employed by the CMPD, arrived 

approximately fifteen seconds later. Ms. Lambert told 

Officer Bartsch that she had been raped by a man who had 

fled in a white SUV. Shortly thereafter, emergency medical 

personnel arrived to assist Ms. Lambert.

Ms. Lambert was transported via ambulance to 

Presbyterian Hospital at approximately 11:00 p.m. She was 

examined the following morning by Nurse Heather Waleski 
-5-

(“Nurse Waleski”), a sexual assault nurse examiner. Nurse 

Waleski performed an examination of Ms. Lambert and used a

rape kit to collect a DNA sample as well as other forensic 

evidence.

Detective Christopher Rush (“Detective Rush”) with the 

CMPD’s Sexual Assault Unit was assigned to investigate the 

case on 2 August 2011. Detective Rush met with Ms. Lambert 

on 11 October 2011 and showed her a picture of Defendant. 

Ms. Lambert identified Defendant as her assailant. On 14 

October 2011, Detective Rush met with Defendant, and after 

interviewing him, he obtained two DNA samples from 

Defendant.

Shereen Elghamrawi (“Ms. Elghamrawi”), an expert in 

forensic serology and DNA analysis with the CMPD Crime Lab, 

analyzed the evidence obtained from the rape kit used on 

Ms. Lambert. Ms. Elghamrawi developed a DNA profile from 

the rape kit samples and compared them to the DNA samples 

obtained from Defendant by Detective Rush. Using 

statistical analysis software, she formed the opinion that 

the DNA profiles were a match and that “[t]he probability 

of selecting an unrelated person at random who could be the 

source of this DNA profile is approximately 1 in 16.5 

quadrillion for Caucasians; 1 in 121 trillion for AfricanAmericans, and 1 in 21.1 quadrillion for Hispanics.”
-6-

On 24 October 2011, Defendant was indicted on (1) one 

count of first-degree rape; (2) one count of first-degree 

sexual offense; (3) one count of first-degree kidnapping; 

(4) one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon; and (5) 

one count of communicating threats. A jury trial was held 

in Mecklenburg County Superior Court on 8 April 2013.

Nurse Waleski testified at trial and stated that Ms. 

Lambert suffered an acute break in the skin of her fossa 

navicularis in her vaginal area that, in her opinion, was 

caused by blunt force trauma. Nurse Waleski also stated

that during her examination of Ms. Lambert, Ms. Lambert

related the manner in which the incident occurred, telling 

Nurse Waleski that she had been hit on her forehead, back, 

and shoulders and that her fingers had been stepped on. 

Nurse Waleski testified that Ms. Lambert’s injuries were 

consistent with her account of the incident.

Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree 

rape and was acquitted of first-degree sexual offense, 

first-degree kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous 

weapon. The trial judge dismissed the communicating 

threats charge. Defendant was sentenced to 220-273 months 

imprisonment and ordered to register as a sex offender and 

to enroll in satellite-based monitoring for the remainder 

of his natural life. Defendant gave notice of appeal in 
-7-

open court.

Analysis

I. Cross-Examination of Victim

Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court 

abused its discretion by limiting the scope of Defendant’s 

cross-examination of Ms. Lambert pursuant to North Carolina 

Rule of Evidence 611(b). Specifically, Defendant contends 

that the trial court erred by prohibiting his trial counsel 

from fully cross-examining Ms. Lambert, and attempting to 

impeach her credibility, by questioning her about (1) a 

bottle of pills found in her purse; and (2) the fact that 

prior to this incident she had committed a probation 

violation by failing to provide an accurate address to her 

probation officer.

At trial, Defendant’s counsel was able to elicit 

testimony from Ms. Lambert that at the time of the 1 August 

2011 incident, she was on probation for a felony. However, 

when Defendant’s counsel attempted to question her about 

the conditions of her probation, the State objected, and 

the trial court proceeded to conduct a voir dire

examination outside of the presence of the jury. During 

the voir dire hearing, Ms. Lambert testified, in pertinent 

part, as follows:
-8-

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Loven, what 

is it that you think is relevant to 

this inquiry.

VOIR DIRE BY MR. LOVEN:

Q. Didn't your probation have a curfew?

A. Not at this time, no, it didn't.

Q. Did they have any conditions upon 

not being in the possession of any 

controlled substances outside of your 

prescription bottles?

A. I believe so.

Q. Isn't it true that one of those 

bottles from your purse is not in a 

prescription bottle?

A. All of them are prescription 

bottles.

Q. Isn't the Abilify in a bottle that 

does not have a prescription on it?

A. This is the way the prescriptions 

come in the Abilify bottle.

Q. Didn't you just previously testify 

that it came in a box and that the box 

had a label?

A. The box is sealed when you get your 

medication, so you can't open the box 

and put the label on it.

Q. Does that bottle contain a 

prescription label on it?

A. It says —

Q. Does it have your name on it?

A. No, it's the label.
-9-

Q. So that bottle is not a bottle with 

a prescription label on it, is it?

A. The bottle itself, no.

Q. And that would have been a violation 

of a condition of your probation?

A. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. My 

medical records show that I'm on 

Abilify. It was prescribed from all of 

my doctors.

Q. Isn't it true that you were 

subsequently violated for probation 

violations?

A. In the past.

Q. Right after this?

A. I was already in violation of the 

probation.

Q. I'm sorry. Why where you in 

violation?

A. It could have been fines. I don't 

recall because I'm no longer on 

probation.

Q. At the time you were on probation; 

correct?

A. I was on probation and I was also 

displaced, meaning homeless, so it was 

possible that I was in violation 

because I didn't have an address or I 

hadn't paid the fines in a timely 

fashion.

Q. Didn't you testify you were living 

with your mother?

A. I was staying with my mother. You 

can't live in a senior citizen 

building.
-10-

Q. Had you given an address to your 

probation officer?

A. Yes. My probation officer had that 

address where I could be located.

Q. So are you saying you were in 

violation of the terms of your 

probation by where you were living?

A. I don't know what the terms of the 

violation were at the time because at 

the time I did not violate.

Q. Okay. Did you have to give the 

probation officer an address?

A. They always had an address. They 

came and visited me at my mother's.

Q. Okay. And that's where you told 

them you were living?

A. At the time of the rape I was 

staying at my mother's. A few weeks 

prior I was kind of in between houses 

and did not have an address. That may 

have caused an issue.

Q. Well, did it cause an issue? You 

said you were in violation of 

probation.

A. Now that I think about it, because I 

haven't thought about this, Mr. Loven, 

in two years, the time the probation 

officer did violate me because he did 

not know the address for which I was 

living because I had no contact for the 

two weeks before I was able to get 

permission to stay in my mother's 

senior citizen building.

Q. Okay. Weren't other conditions of 

your probation that you not test 

positive for drugs?
-11-

A. That's true.

Q. Okay. Had you been given any tests 

ever while on probation?

A. Sure.

Q. Had you ever failed any?

A. Previously.

Q. Didn't you testify — excuse me. 

Didn't the records you gave to the 

hospital say you never used drugs?

A. No. They asked me did I use any. I 

said no.

Q. You said you tested positive. Are 

you saying those tests were incorrect?

A. Say that again.

Q. You just testified that you used 

drugs.

A. I take prescription medication. The 

drugs in question are illegal street 

drugs. I was not taking them at that 

time. I had been on probation for 

almost seven, eight years. Over the 

course of that eight years I hadn't.

Q. You had previously tested positive 

for street drugs?

A. In the past.

Q. And that was a violation of your 

probation?

A. That violated me, it did.

Q. And if you were to test positive for 

street drugs again that would also have 
-12-

been a violation of your probation at 

that time; correct?

A. If they came to test me on one of my 

appointments, yes, I would have been 

violated.

MR. MERRIWEATHER: I ask that she be 

allowed to answer.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. LOVEN

Q. And you still had a probation 

officer at this time?

A. That's correct.

Q. Who could have tested you?

A. That's correct.

. . . .

Q. One last question. You were 

subsequently violated on this 

probation; correct?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. What was the reason for that 

violation?

A. Because they had not been able to 

locate me in the past. They did not 

know my mother's address, so he said, 

and if you further continue to 

question, my probation was released and 

I was not punished any further.

Q. You were found to be in violation of 

probation?

A. The probation officer violated me 

but the judge released me.
-13-

Q. Did the judge terminate your 

probation or find no violation?

A. Terminated probation.

Q. So there was no finding one way or 

the other, was there?

A. Termination. I don't know what the 

terms mean. It was terminated.

Defendant’s trial counsel then made the following 

argument to the trial court: 

MR. LOVEN: Your Honor, we would contend 

as far as motive here, somebody to 

claim — make a false accusation under 

these circumstances, she would have 

potentially have been in violation of 

probation had the police searched her, 

so this would be a motive for her to 

give a description of something else 

and, therefore, goes to her credibility 

as a witness.

Also, although this is out of the 

presence of the jury, I think some 

questions as to her ability to recall 

these events and relate to — saying 

what she's done previously has come up 

yet again, but, of course, this was out 

of the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: All right. So your request 

to examine further into the probation 

violation is denied. The Court will 

find that the questions posed do not 

address the issues of truthfulness of 

this client [sic] and will not allow 

you to examine her further with regard 

to that.

Rule 611(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence 

provides that “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any 

matter relevant to any issue in the case, including 
-14-

credibility.” N.C.R. Evid. 611(b). Rule 611(a) restricts 

the scope of subsection (b), however, by providing that 

“[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the 

mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting 

evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and 

presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, 

(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 

witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” N.C.R. 

Evid. 611(a).

While it is axiomatic that the crossexaminer should be allowed wide 

latitude, the trial judge has 

discretion to ban unduly repetitious 

and argumentative questions, as well as 

inquiry into matters of tenuous 

relevance. Moreover, the trial judge 

retains the discretion to prohibit 

cross examination that is intended to 

harass, annoy or humiliate a witness. 

The trial judge's rulings in 

controlling cross examination will not 

be disturbed unless it is shown that 

the verdict was improperly influenced.

State v. Hatcher, 136 N.C. App. 524, 526, 524 S.E.2d 815, 

816 (2000) (internal citations, quotation marks, and 

brackets omitted).

A. Possession of Pills

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to allow Ms. Lambert to be crossexamined about her possession of the pills contained in her 
-15-

purse because “[Ms.] Lambert had a motive to lie to police 

officers about what happened with [Defendant] in order to 

avoid having her probation revoked because she possessed 

controlled substances.” We believe the trial court acted 

within its discretion in barring cross-examination on this 

topic for two reasons.

First, Ms. Lambert testified that the bottle of pills 

she possessed contained Abilify — a mood stabilization drug 

that had been prescribed to her by a physician. She 

explained that the pill bottle did not have her name on it

because the Abilify bottle came packaged in a box with her 

name and prescription listed on the box itself instead of 

on the bottle. Defendant failed to offer any evidence 

rebutting Ms. Lambert’s testimony that the pills had been 

prescribed to her by a physician such that her possession 

of them would not have constituted a violation of the 

conditions of her probation.

Second, and more basically, it was Ms. Lambert who

requested that the police be called in the first place. 

Upon reaching the Sugar Creek Business Center and 

encountering Ms. Gordon, Ms. Lambert frantically told her 

to “[p]lease call my momma. Please call the police.” As 

such, Defendant’s contention that she had a motive to 

fabricate the allegation of rape to distract police 
-16-

officers from finding the pills in her possession is 

undermined by the fact that she was the one who requested 

that law enforcement officers be called. Accordingly, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring crossexamination about this subject.

B. Failure to Provide Accurate Address to Probation 

Officer

Defendant further argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by not allowing his trial counsel to crossexamine Ms. Lambert about the fact that she had previously

violated the terms of her probation by failing to keep her 

probation officer continually advised of the address at 

which she was living during her probation period. During 

voir dire, Ms. Lambert testified that she “was kind of in 

between houses and did not have an address” for a short 

period of time during her probation period because she was 

homeless but that she subsequently moved in with her mother 

and advised her probation officer that she could be reached 

at her mother’s residence.

Ms. Lambert’s voir dire testimony did not clearly 

establish that she had actually lied to her probation 

officer about her address. Rather, it suggested that she 

had failed to make him aware of a two-week period during 

which she was homeless while she sought permission to live 
-17-

in her mother’s building. Given the tenuous relevance of 

this testimony to Ms. Lambert’s truthfulness, we believe 

the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to 

allow cross-examination on this subject.

II. Admission of Unredacted Police Reports

Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court 

erred in admitting into evidence two unredacted police 

reports indicating that investigating officers found Ms. 

Lambert’s allegations to be credible. Because Defendant 

did not object at trial to the admission of these reports, 

we review this contention solely for plain error.

For error to constitute plain error, a 

defendant must demonstrate that a 

fundamental error occurred at trial. 

To show that an error was fundamental, 

a defendant must establish prejudice —

that, after examination of the entire 

record, the error had a probable impact 

on the jury's finding that the 

defendant was guilty. Moreover, 

because plain error is to be applied 

cautiously and only in the exceptional 

case, the error will often be one that 

seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.

State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 

(2012) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets 

omitted).

The two reports at issue are preprinted forms 

containing statements made by Ms. Lambert and Ms. Gordon, 
-18-

respectively. Defendant does not contest the admissibility 

of the witness statements themselves that are contained on 

these forms. Rather, he challenges the failure to redact 

notations made by officers on these forms before the forms 

were admitted into evidence.

The first report was a statement provided by Ms. 

Lambert to Officer M. Bell (“Officer Bell”) on 1 August 

2011. Ms. Lambert dictated her account of the subject 

incident, and Officer Bell transcribed her account on the 

report form which Ms. Lambert subsequently reviewed and 

signed.

The first page of this report contained a box titled 

“Original Offense/Charge.” Next to this box, Officer Bell 

wrote: “Sexual Assault/1st Forcible Rape.” Officer Bell 

also checked “Open” in connection with the box on this 

report which was titled “UCR Clearance Status” and also 

checked “Active” as to the box titled “Investigative 

Status.” On the second page of the report, in the third 

box titled “Original Offense/Charge,” Officer Bell wrote 

“1st Rape (Forcible)” and wrote “1st Degree Forcible Rape” 

in a subsequent box titled “Correct Incident 

Classification.” Officer Bell also checked “Open” and 

“Active” in two additional boxes on that page titled “UCR 

Clearance Status” and “Investigative Status,” respectively.
-19-

The second report was a statement provided by Ms. 

Gordon to Officer Gould on 1 August 2011 at the Sugar Creek 

Business Center shortly after Ms. Lambert had been taken to 

the hospital. Ms. Gordon dictated the account of her 

interaction with Ms. Lambert from the time Ms. Lambert ran 

up to her in the Sugar Creek Business Center parking lot 

until the time the 911 call was made. Officer Gould 

transcribed her account on the report form, and Ms. Gordon 

subsequently signed it.

On this report, Officer Gould wrote “Forcible Rape (1st

Degree)” in connection with a box titled “Original 

Offense/Charge” and wrote “Forcible Rape (1st Degree)” in a 

subsequent box titled “Correct Incident Classification.” 

Officer Gould also checked “Open” with regard to a box 

titled “UCR Clearance Status” and checked “Active” in 

connection with a box titled “Investigative Status.”

Defendant argues that these notations on the two forms 

conveyed to the jury the notion that the police officers 

believed Ms. Lambert’s account of the incident. Even 

assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in 

allowing these unredacted reports to be admitted, we 

believe any such error does not rise to the level of plain 

error.
-20-

The evidence against Defendant at trial was 

overwhelming as to the rape charge. Ms. Lambert identified 

Defendant as her assailant in a photograph shown to her by 

Detective Rush. DNA analysis matched Defendant’s DNA with 

the semen found in Ms. Lambert’s body. At the time Ms. 

Lambert reported the rape, she was shaking uncontrollably 

and speaking in a “frantic” tone of voice. She 

subsequently suffered a seizure. Nurse Waleski’s 

examination of Ms. Lambert confirmed the presence of the 

injuries to her forehead, back, shoulders, and fingers that 

corroborated Ms. Lambert’s account of the incident. In 

addition, Nurse Waleski testified that the injuries to Ms. 

Lambert’s genital area, notably a break in the skin of her 

fossa navicularis, were caused — in her opinion — by blunt 

force trauma and were consistent with the types of injuries 

commonly suffered in cases of sexual assault.2

Thus, we conclude that Defendant has failed to meet 

his heavy burden of demonstrating plain error. See State 

v. Ross, 207 N.C. App. 379, 396, 700 S.E.2d 412, 424 (2010) 

 

2 While Defendant points to a statement made by Nurse 

Waleski on cross-examination that she could not say whether 

Ms. Lambert’s injuries came from consensual or 

nonconsensual intercourse, there was no evidence offered at 

trial regarding a consensual sexual encounter. Moreover, 

as noted above, Nurse Waleski’s opinion was that the injury 

to Ms. Lambert’s vaginal area was the result of blunt force 

trauma.
-21-

(“Even assuming arguendo that it was error for the trial 

court to allow the introduction of the detective's 

[hearsay] testimony . . . we conclude that it did not rise 

to the level of plain error, as the record in the case sub 

judice contains overwhelming evidence of defendant's 

guilt.”), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 346, 717 S.E.2d 377 

(2011); see also State v. Johnson, 203 N.C. App. 718, 723, 

693 S.E.2d 145, 147-48 (2010) (declining to decide whether 

trial court erred in admitting statement in computergenerated police report summarizing actions police officer 

took on morning of defendant’s arrest because even if 

admission of document was erroneous, its admission was not 

prejudicial).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that 

Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial 

error.

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

Judge HUNTER, JR. concurred in this opinion prior to 6 

September 2014.