In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 21, 2023

S23A0053. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.

 PINSON, Justice.

Malik Taylor was the driver in a drive-by shooting in which one 

of his passengers, Jyleel Solomon, was killed by return fire. Taylor 

was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with 

the shooting.1 At trial, he claimed that he was shot at first and fired 

 1 The crimes occurred on November 6, 2017. On March 14, 2018, a 

Baldwin County grand jury indicted Taylor with two co-defendants, Jemerius 

Goodman and Brandon Walls. Counts 1-4 charged all three with the felony 

murder of Solomon, predicated respectively on aggravated assaults with 

firearms charged in Counts 5-8. Each of Counts 5-8 specified a different 

victim—respectively, Malik Murray, Elijawon May, Brian Hitchcock, and 

Keonna Lewis. Goodman alone was also charged with possessing a pistol with 

an altered serial number (Count 9) and with three counts of concealing physical 

evidence (Counts 10-12). Walls pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and 

aggravated assault. Taylor and Goodman were tried together from November 

6 to November 13, 2018, and both were convicted on all counts. We affirmed 

Goodman’s convictions on appeal. See Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762 (873 

SE2d 150) (2022). Taylor was sentenced to life in prison on Count 4 and 20 

years in prison on each of Counts 5-7, all to be served consecutively, for a total 

sentence of life plus 60 years. The remaining counts were merged for 

sentencing or vacated by operation of law. Taylor filed a timely motion for new 
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his gun in self-defense. The jury rejected that claim, and on appeal, 

Taylor contends that the trial court’s jury instruction on the 

affirmative defense of justification could have led the jury to wrongly 

believe that Taylor bore the burden of proof on that defense. 

We reject Taylor’s argument because we reject his reading of 

the jury instruction. In context, it is clear the instruction correctly 

informed the jury about the defense of justification, including the 

principle that the defendant may not assert the defense if he used 

force during the commission of a felony. So we affirm Taylor’s 

convictions and sentence.

1. On the evening of November 6, 2017, Taylor was driving 

around Milledgeville with Jemerius Goodman, Brandon Walls, and 

the victim, Solomon. The foursome was armed with handguns, and 

Solomon had an AK-47 rifle. At the same time, a number of people,

 

trial on November 14, 2018, which he amended once through trial counsel and 

several times through new counsel, most recently on July 9, 2021. After four 

hearings, the trial court denied the amended motion for new trial on July 1, 

2022. Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal on July 6, 2022. The case was 

docketed to the December 2022 term of this Court and orally argued on 

December 8, 2022.
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including Malik Murray and Keonna Lewis, were gathered outside 

a nearby home at 126 Central Avenue. As Taylor and his group 

approached the home, Taylor turned off his headlights and turned 

the corner near the house.

Gunfire erupted. The first shots were fired from Taylor’s car, 

and Murray returned fire. Two people were hit. Lewis was hit in the 

lower buttock by a shot that came from the car. Solomon was shot in 

the head by Murray. 

In the back seat of the car, Walls saw that Solomon had been 

shot. He alerted the others. The foursome dropped off Goodman so 

he could get rid of their guns, and then they drove toward the 

hospital. On the way, they passed a gas station and food market with 

a police car parked outside. They pulled in to seek help from the 

officer. Solomon was taken to the hospital, where he later died from 

his injury. 

Taylor gave a statement to investigators, some of which was 

played at trial. According to Taylor, when he was driving past 126 

Central Avenue, he heard shots coming from his left, although he 
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could not recall if they were coming from inside or outside the car. 

Taylor said that when he heard the shots, he grabbed a pistol and 

started firing in the air.

Taylor was charged with the felony murder of Solomon, 

predicated on the aggravated assaults of the group at 126 Central 

Avenue. At trial, he asserted self-defense. At the charge conference, 

Taylor’s counsel requested the jury charge for self-defense and 

specified that the claim of self-defense “was to the aggravated 

assault charge.” 

The trial court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows: 

Ladies and gentlemen, the Defendant in this case, 

Malik Nashiem Taylor, has raised what we call an 

affirmative defense and so, in the next set of instructions, 

these instructions will apply only to Malik Nashiem 

Taylor.

An affirmative defense is a defense that admits the 

doing of the act charged2, but seeks to justify, excuse or 

mitigate it. Once an affirmative defense is raised, the 

burden is on the State to disprove it beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The fact that a person’s conduct is justified is a 

defense to prosecution for any crime based on that 

 2 We have since disapproved the language describing an affirmative 

defense as “admit[ting] the doing of the act.” See McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 

885-865 (1) (834 SE2d 96) (2019). Taylor, however, does not advance any 

argument about this language on appeal.
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conduct. The defense of justification can be claimed when 

the person’s conduct is justified under the defense of self 

or others and the defense of habitation.

A person is justified in threatening or using force 

against another person when and to the extent that he 

reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary 

to defend himself or a third person against the other[’s] 

[im]minent use of unlawful force. A person is justified in 

using force that is intended or likely to cause death or 

great bodily harm only if that person reasonably believes 

that such force is necessary to prevent death or great 

bodily harm or injury to himself or a third person or to 

prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified. A 

person is not justified in using force if that person initially 

provokes the use of force against himself with the intent 

to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon 

the assailant or is attempting to commit, is committing or 

is fleeing after the commission of a felony. And in this 

case, the arguable felony has been alleged to be 

aggravated assault.

A forcible felony is any felony that involves the use 

or threat of physical force or violence against any person.

An aggravated assault is a felony defined as follows: 

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when 

that person assaults another person with a deadly 

weapon. To constitute such assault, actual injury to the 

alleged victim need not be shown. It is only necessary that 

the evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Defendant attempted to cause a violent injury or that the 

person attempted to cause a violent injury to the alleged 

victim or intentionally committed an act that placed the 

alleged victim in reasonable fear of immediately receiving 

a violent injury.
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Taylor did not object to this instruction during trial and did not 

challenge it in his motion for new trial.

2. Taylor contends that the trial court’s instruction on selfdefense was error because it misled the jury about who bore the 

burden of proof for that affirmative defense. Because Taylor did not 

object to the jury instruction at trial, we review it now only for plain 

error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 26 (3) (b) 

(880 SE2d 158) (2022). “To show plain error, an appellant must show 

that (1) the alleged error was not affirmatively waived, (2) it was 

obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) it affected the appellant’s 

substantial rights, which ordinarily means showing that it affected 

the outcome of the trial.” Willis, 315 Ga. at 26 (3) (b). If those three 

showings are made, an appellate court may remedy the error only if 

it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

Taylor’s argument that this instruction was misleading focuses 

on the following sentence: “It is only necessary that the evidence 
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show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant attempted to 

cause a violent injury or that the person attempted to cause a violent 

injury to the alleged victim or intentionally committed an act that 

placed the alleged victim in reasonable fear of immediately receiving 

a violent injury.” In Taylor’s view, that sentence, in its most natural 

reading, wrongly instructed the jury that it could not find that 

Taylor was justified in shooting at the group outside 126 Central 

unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 126 Central 

group put Taylor in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury. 

We think that Taylor’s reading of this sentence is strained at 

best and not one the jury was likely to have considered. “Jury 

instructions are read and considered as a whole in determining 

whether there is error,” Campbell-Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 585, 

588 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 583) (2020) (citation omitted), and here the 

context in which the instruction was given leaves its meaning clear.

To see why, let us walk through the instruction. The trial court 

first told the jury that Taylor was asserting the affirmative defense 

of justification. The court explained that the defense may apply if 
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the defendant reasonably believes he must use force to defend 

himself. And it explained that the defense does not apply if the 

defendant uses force while he “is attempting to commit, is 

committing or is fleeing after the commission of a felony.” The next 

words from the trial court were: “And in this case, the arguable 

felony has been alleged to be aggravated assault.” By using the 

connective word “and” and referring to “the arguable felony,” the 

trial court made clear it was now proceeding to discuss the felony 

that could disqualify Taylor from the defense of justification. It was 

at that point that the court described the elements of aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon, including the sentence that Taylor 

now objects to.3 So, the trial court was telling the jury that Taylor 

could not rely on the affirmative defense of justification if it found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that “[Taylor] attempted to cause a 

 3 The objected-to sentence tracks the pattern jury instruction on 

aggravated assault, see Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal 

Cases § 2.20.21 (4th ed. 2007, updated Aug. 2022). See also OCGA § 16-5-21 

(a) (defining aggravated assault); Lyons v. State, 309 Ga. 15, 19 (3) (843 SE2d 

825) (2020) (holding it was “proper” to instruct jury that defendant could be 

guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempted to cause a violent injury” to the 

victims or “intentionally committed an act that placed” the victims “in 

reasonable fear of immediately receiving a violent injury”).
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violent injury to [the 126 Central group] or intentionally committed 

an act that placed [the 126 Central group] in reasonable fear of 

immediately receiving violent injury”—that is, if Taylor committed 

aggravated assault. 

Because this is easily the more natural and reasonable reading 

of the portion of the instruction to which Taylor objects, we reject 

Taylor’s alternative reading, and thus his argument that the 

instruction shifted the burden to prove self-defense to him.4 So 

 4 We note that these instructions on justification and aggravated assault 

arguably could have been misleading in a different way. The instructions 

stated the law correctly in explaining that a person is not justified in using 

force “if that person . . . is attempting to commit [or] is committing . . . a felony.” 

But by then stating that “in this case, the arguable felony has been alleged to 

be aggravated assault” and listing the elements of that felony, the instructions 

could have been understood as requiring the jury to reject justification as a 

defense if the jury found that the State proved those elements of aggravated 

assault—even though Taylor was raising justification as a defense to the 

aggravated assault charge itself. That potential reading would be wrong: the 

State does not prove that the defendant’s conduct was not justified merely by 

proving the elements of the charged offense. That said, it could be that the jury 

rejected this potential reading of these instructions in light of the instructions 

on justification as a whole, including the instruction that “[a] person is justified 

in using force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm 

only if that person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent 

death or great bodily harm or injury to himself . . . or to prevent the commission 

of a forcible felony.” And in any event, Taylor does not raise any such argument 

on appeal. But given these instructions’ potential for confusion, we note them 

here and would urge trial courts to take care to avoid structuring instructions 
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Taylor has not demonstrated that the instruction was plain error.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

 

in a way that could suggest that committing the felony for which a defendant

claims justification could disqualify him from claiming justification for that 

very felony. Compare, e.g., State v. Brown, 314 Ga. 588 (878 SE2d 445) (2022) 

(defendant charged with murder for fatal shooting during card game; 

defendant asserted self-defense; State contended self-defense was unavailable 

because defendant was in process of committing different felony—robbing 

other players in the card game—when gunfire broke out).