RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0111-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.L.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted September 24, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, 

Docket No. FO-13-0268-17.

Christopher T. Campbell, attorney for appellant.

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica do 

Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 1, 2018
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After a bench trial, defendant appeals from her conviction of disorderly 

persons contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2), for violating a restraining order (RO) 

previously obtained by her mother (the mother) under the Prevention of 

Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.1 The judge believed 

the mother's testimony, concluded that defendant purposely violated the RO, and 

imposed a one-year probationary sentence. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points:

POINT I

THE [JUDGE] ERRED [BY] FINDING THE 

[MOTHER] CREDIBLE FOR ONE ISSUE OF FACT 

BUT NOT [FOR] ANOTHER.

POINT II

THE [JUDGE] ERRED [BY] DENYING . . . 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.

POINT III

THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT'S 

MERE PRESENCE IN THE PARKING LOT NEXT 

TO THE [MOTHER'S] CAR WAS A VIOLATION OF 

THE [RO]. 

We affirm. 

 

1

 The judge acquitted defendant of petty-disorderly-persons harassment, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c).
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Our review of a finding of guilt in a contempt proceeding is limited to 

determining "whether the record contains sufficient [credible] evidence to 

support the judge's conclusion." State v. J.T., 294 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App.

Div.1996) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Factual findings 

of the trial judge are generally accorded deference given the judge's "opportunity 

to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the 

stand; [the judge] has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review 

of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 

104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 

293 (2007)). Nevertheless, in evaluating a trial judge's findings in a criminal 

case, we must ensure that the State has carried its burden of proving a 

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, about six weeks after the mother obtained the RO – which barred 

defendant from the mother's residence and having any contact with the mother 

– defendant drove to the mother's residence, arriving early in the morning. The

mother heard a noise, looked out the window, and saw defendant standing in the 

parking lot near the mother's car, which was parked directly in front of her 

apartment. The mother also noticed defendant's Audi convertible parked in the 

lot. The mother saw defendant "punch [the mother's] tire, [get] back in 
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[defendant's] car with a cigarette in her hand," and look the mother "in [the]

face." She yelled to defendant and told her she was calling the police. When

the police arrived, they informed the mother that her tire was leaking air, and it 

would need to be replaced. 

Defendant elected not to testify at the trial. The evidence at the trial 

consisted of various stipulations, a photograph showing the outside of the 

mother's apartment, and the mother's testimony. The judge candidly 

acknowledged that the mother gave some inconsistent testimony. But as to the 

contempt charge – and the primary issue of whether defendant knowingly 

violated the RO – the judge assessed the mother's credibility and found that her 

testimony was "clear," "unwavering," and "very credible." Relying on her 

testimony, the judge found that 

[the mother] saw [defendant], she knows [defendant]. 

She knows [defendant's] car. She[,] with detail[,]

described [defendant's] car as an Audi convertible. She 

testified that she had been in that convertible when she 

and [defendant] shared a better relationship, and that 

she had driven around with [defendant] in that car. 

Although it was dark, she explained that there 

were enough lights on the [apartment] complex 

building to allow her to see [defendant]. There were no 

obstructions to her view. She described looking out her 

front door windows on the second floor, down to where 

[defendant's] car was parked in front of [the mother's] 
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space, and described exactly where she saw [defendant] 

next to [the mother's] car in front of her building. 

She described her complex as one single 

driveway in and out. [Defendant] would have no other 

reason to be there [except] to be directly in front of [the 

mother's] home. The [RO] . . . barred [defendant] from 

returning to the residence of the [mother]. 

Applying our deferential standard of review, we see no reason to disturb the 

judge's findings.

We reject defendant's argument that her "mere presence" in front of the 

mother's apartment was insufficient to show that she violated the RO. The RO 

prohibited defendant from the mother's residence and barred her from having 

any communication with the mother. Defendant essentially argues that her 

presence at the mother's apartment was of a trivial nature that did not warrant 

guilty findings. 

To obtain a conviction of the disorderly persons offense of contempt for 

violating a RO issued under the Act, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant knowingly violated such an order. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2);

see also State v. Finamore, 338 N.J. Super. 130, 138 (App. Div. 2001). "[T]he 

evidence must allow at least a reasonable inference that a defendant charged 

with violating a [RO] knew his conduct would bring about a prohibited result. " 

State v. S.K., 423 N.J. Super. 540, 547 (App. Div. 2012). N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2) 
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states in relevant part: "A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of 

his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of 

that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability 

of their existence."

This is not a situation where defendant's actions amounted to a "trivial, 

non-actionable event." State v. Krupinski, 321 N.J. Super. 34, 45 (App. Div. 

1999) (stating that the defendant's dropping off the children to the front door, 

returning a car seat, and requesting a lawn mower – conduct not proscribed by 

the RO – amounted to a "trivial, non-actionable event"). We have also held – in 

a different context – that expressing some level of anger during a parenting 

exchange is insufficient to prove the requisite mental state. See Finamore, 338 

N.J. Super. at 138-39 (finding the evidence insufficient to demonstrate a

knowing violation of the FRO). As we have said, the Act "was not intended to 

attempt to regulate and adjudicate every loss of temper, angry word, or quarrel 

between persons connected by a familial relationship." State v. Wilmouth, 302 

N.J. Super. 20, 23 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that despite the existence of a 

restraining order, the defendant's statement to his estranged wife in the presence 

of a police officer was not a violation subject to a prosecution for criminal 

contempt). 
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But unlike Krupinski, Finamore, and Wilmouth, here, defendant's actions 

were not "trivial" because the RO specifically barred her from the mother's 

residence. The undisputed evidence demonstrated that defendant knew her 

mother lived in the apartment. And yet, defendant went to the residence, exited 

her Audi, and stood next to the mother's car. Our Supreme Court has stated that 

"[a]n abuser who spontaneously appears or makes surprising communications 

without any legitimate purpose enhances the victim's apprehension. The fears 

of a domestic violence victim and the turmoil she or he has experienced should 

not be trivialized." State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 586 (1997). Such is the 

case here. We therefore conclude that there exists sufficient evidence in the 

record to support the judge's finding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

As to defendant's remaining assertion that the judge erred by denying her 

motion for acquittal pursuant to State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967), we reject 

such an argument and conclude that it is without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the following brief 

remarks.

We review a trial court's denial of a motion for acquittal de novo, State v. 

Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593-94 (2014), using "the same standard as the [judge] 
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in determining whether a judgment of acquittal was warranted." State v. Ellis, 

424 N.J. Super. 267, 273 (App. Div. 2012). Like the judge, we "must consider 

only the existence of such evidence, not its 'worth, nature, or extent.'" State v. 

Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting State v. Kluber, 

130 N.J. Super. 336, 342 (1974)). A motion for judgment of acquittal at the 

close of the State's case may be granted "if the evidence is insufficient to warrant 

a conviction." R. 3:18-1. 

[T]he question the trial judge must determine is 

whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be 

that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the 

State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well 

as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably 

could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find 

guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

[Reyes, 50 N.J. at 458-59.]

Giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we conclude that the 

judge could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Affirmed.