SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5445-18T3

ALEXANDRA COSTA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION, NOT IN

ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE

FOR THE RMAC TRUST,

SERIES 2016-TT,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Submitted September 29, 2020 – Decided 

Before Judges Hoffman and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-3911-19.

Alexandra Costa, appellant pro se.

Pluese, Becker, & Saltzman, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Stuart H. West, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 25, 2020
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Plaintiff Alexandra Costa appeals the trial court's August 5, 2019 order 

granting defendant U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the RMAC 

Trust, Series 016-CTT's (defendant) motion to dismiss plaintiff's Law Division 

complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). We affirm.

I.

This case involves a residential foreclosure that has been the subject of 

earlier appeals. Our consolidated opinion in two of the earlier cases explained

the foreclosure proceedings.

In July 2007, defendant executed a note in the amount 

of $410,000 in favor of Bank of America, N.A. (Bank 

of America).

To secure payment on the note, both [plaintiff] and 

Victor Costa executed a mortgage securing the debt 

with the property located at 39 Fillmore Street in 

Newark. The mortgage was recorded on August 1, 

2007.

On February 1, 2009, [plaintiff] and Victor Costa failed 

to make the requisite payment on the note. No 

payments have been made on the loan since that date.

In November 2012, Bank of America assigned the 

mortgage to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Nationstar). 

The assignment was recorded on December 31, 2012.

Nationstar filed a foreclosure complaint in December 

2014. Nationstar then assigned the mortgage to

[defendant]. On February 1, 2017, the court granted 

leave for [defendant] to substitute for Nationstar in the 
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foreclosure action. The court granted an order of 

default before issuing final judgment and a writ of 

execution in July 2017.

Six months later, [plaintiff] made her first appearance 

in the matter, filing a motion to vacate final judgment. 

The chancery court denied the motion.

[U.S. Bank National Association v. Costa, Nos. A4718-17 and A-0404-18 (App. Div. Aug. 13, 2019)

(slip op. at 1-2).]1

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion to vacate the final judgment of 

foreclosure. Id. at 2. 

In July 2017, the Fillmore Street property was sold to defendant for $100 

at the sheriff's sale auction. Ibid. A year later, plaintiff filed a motion to set 

aside the sheriff's sale. That motion was denied in September 2018 and plaintiff 

filed an appeal of that order.2 

While the appeals were pending, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law 

Division in May 2019. The one-count complaint alleged a cause of action for 

"[f]raud, [d]ishonesty, [d]eceit or [m]isrepresentation" arising from the

1 We cite to this unreported opinion because it involves the same parties and 

issues presented in this appeal.

2 Plaintiff filed a complaint against counsel for defendant, but this was 

dismissed. She filed a motion to expunge the sheriff's deed. This was dismissed 

because the trial court lacked jurisdiction given the then-pending appeals.
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foreclosure and from defendant's purchase of the property for $100 at the 

sheriff's sale. Plaintiff alleged defendant had as its "sole purpose" to 

"fraudulently transfer the . . . property" for less than fair market value. She 

challenged defendant's standing to foreclose, alleging defendant never 

established it had ownership of the mortgage through merger or acquisition. The 

complaint demanded compensatory damages and treble damages under the 

Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -195. She alleged actual 

damages of $207,100 and requested punitive damages.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e).

Plaintiff filed in opposition, alleging her complaint raised a claim under the CFA

and that defendant's motion was improperly supported by a hearsay certification 

from its attorney. 

The trial court's August 5, 2019 order dismissed the complaint. In the 

memorandum opinion, the trial judge found the "core of the allegation[]" made 

by plaintiff in the complaint is that defendant "lacked standing to foreclose on 

the property because it did not establish valid ownership of the mortgage." The 

court found this argument "is identical" to the argument plaintiff made in her

earlier motion to vacate the final foreclosure judgment, which was rejected by 
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the Chancery Division, and in which defendant was found to have "standing to 

foreclosure as a valid assignee of the subject mortgage." 

On August 2, 2019, we issued a consolidated opinion in the pending

appeals. See Costa, slip op. at 2. In the opinion, we rejected plaintiff's claim 

that defendant did not have standing to sue in this foreclosure. 

Nationstar, the original plaintiff in the action, received 

the mortgage via an assignment executed on November 

7, 2012 and recorded the following month. Therefore, 

Nationstar possessed an assignment of the mortgage at 

the time it filed its complaint on December 8, 2014. 

Plaintiff then received the mortgage via a subsequent 

assignment, and later filed a motion to substitute for 

Nationstar as plaintiff. Defendant did not oppose the 

motion. Thus, plaintiff had standing to proceed with 

the foreclosure.

[Id. at 4.]

We also rejected plaintiff's claim that the sheriff's sale was invalid, explaining 

that plaintiff

fails to identify any circumstances to justify an order 

vacating the judgment, under Rule 4:50-1. The record 

on appeal contains a Report of Sale and a copy of the 

Sheriff's Deed to plaintiff. This proof of sale is 

sufficient for us to conclude the chancery court did not 

abuse its discretion.

[Ibid.]

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following argument:
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POINT I: THE APPELLATE COURT MUST 

DETERMINE WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 

FAILED TO FIND WHETHER PLAINTIFF SET 

FORTH A CLAIM [AGAINST] DEFENDANT UPON 

WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED PURSUANT 

TO R. 4:6-2 AND WHETHER DEFENDANT RELIED 

UPON [AN] OBJECTIONABLE HEARSAY 

CERTIFICATION TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION TO 

DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM, AS A MATTER OF 

LAW.

II.

We review de novo an order from a trial court granting or denying a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e). Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 88 (App. Div. 

2017) (citing Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 

103, 114 (App. Div. 2011)). When a court grants a party's motion to dismiss, "[w]e 

approach our review of the judgment below mindful of the test for determining the 

adequacy of a pleading: whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts." 

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting 

Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). We accord no 

deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Rezem, 423 N.J. Super. at 114. 

Plaintiff's complaint raised the issue of standing by contending defendant did 

not establish ownership of the mortgage. It also challenged the validity of the 

sheriff's sale. We agree with the trial judge that plaintiff's complaint raised the issues 

that previously were addressed and decided. 
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Res judicata applies to bar this litigation. See Nolan v. First Colony Life 

Ins. Co., 345 N.J. Super. 142, 153 (App. Div. 2001) (providing res judicata is a 

doctrine declaring that once a matter has been fully litigated and resolved, it 

cannot be relitigated). For it to apply, there must be: (1) a final judgment by a 

court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of issues, (3) identity of parties, and 

(4) identity of the cause of action. Brookshire Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza, 

346 N.J. Super. 310, 318 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted). 

All of these factors are met. Plaintiff's case was dismissed with finality 

on August 5, 2019. She is raising the issue of standing to sue and the validity 

of the sheriff's sale, which are the same issues raised and decided previously. 

The parties are the same, as is the cause of action that is based on the foreclosure 

lawsuit and sheriff's sale. 

Plaintiff argues her complaint raises a consumer fraud claim because 

defendant purchased the property for $100, which was below fair market value. 

A sheriff's sale is not set aside on this basis alone. See G.E. Capital Mortgage 

Servs. Inc. v. Marilao, 352 N.J. Super. 274, 285 (App. Div. 2002) ("Inadequacy 

of price alone normally does not warrant setting aside a [s]heriff's sale."). The 

fair market credit also may be an issue in a deficiency suit. See Citibank, N.A. 

v. Errico, 251 N.J. Super. 236, 248 (App. Div. 1991) (providing "a debtor is not 
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required to object to a foreclosure sale price as a prerequisite for claiming a fair 

market value credit in a deficiency suit under N.J.S.A. 2A:50–3."). Plaintiff 

cites no legal authority to support her argument that a low bid at a sheriff's sale 

auction is an unconscionable commercial practice under the CFA. 

Citing Rule 1:6-6, plaintiff argues the trial court improperly relied upon 

"[d]efendant's certification of its counselor Stuart West, Esquire of the law 

office of Pluese, Becker & Saltzman, LLC which constitutes objectionable 

hearsay." However, an attorney's certification is an acceptable method to 

provide the court with copies of the pleadings and attachments for the court's 

reference. See Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 21 n.19 (App. Div. 2010)

(determining counsel's certification in support of summary judgment was 

permissible "as a vehicle" to provide the court with authentic copies of earlier 

pleadings and materials).

In his certification, defense counsel said he was responsible to represent 

defendant in this case, that defendant was the plaintiff in the underlying 

foreclosure and his firm represented that entity in the foreclosure. He certified 

he reviewed the foreclosure file, attached pleadings and records from that file to 

his certification, and represented these were true copies. The certification did 

not contain any argument by counsel. There is nothing objectionable about this 
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certification being presented in support of defendant's motion to dismiss the 

complaint.

After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable legal principles, 

we conclude that plaintiff's further arguments are without sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.