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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4209 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4209

To enhance the national interest and security of the United States and 
     its European allies and partners by countering malign Russian 
                   influence, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            August 27, 2019

  Mr. Engel introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To enhance the national interest and security of the United States and 
     its European allies and partners by countering malign Russian 
                   influence, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Countering Russian Influence Through 
Interagency Coordination And Leadership Act'' or the ``CRITICAL Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Foreign adversaries of the United States are currently 
        using malign influence to disrupt, alter, and undermine United 
        States foreign and domestic policy and democratic processes at 
        low cost and low risk to themselves.
            (2) In exporting malign influence, foreign adversaries use 
        ambiguity to their advantage, employing proxies, hackers, 
        private sector companies, ``independent'' research agencies, 
        and other actors with varying degrees of separation from their 
        governments in an effort to obscure foreign government 
        involvement and maintain deniability.
            (3) Since the Cold War, the Soviet Union and now the 
        Russian Federation (in this Act referred to as ``Russia'') has 
        attempted to use these types of tools of statecraft to 
        influence the foreign and domestic policies and actions of the 
        United States government, as well as the beliefs and political 
        decisions of America and its citizens.
            (4) The United States intelligence community has credibly 
        concluded that Russia interfered in the 2016 election for 
        President of the United States, and European allies and 
        partners have credibly concluded that Russia attempted to 
        influence several key European votes in 2016 and 2017, 
        including the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and 
        elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany.
            (5) Russia has attempted to deter or derail aspiring NATO 
        members from achieving accession, as evidenced by their 
        aggression against Ukraine and Georgia and the attempted 
        violent coup in Montenegro in 2016 with the assistance of local 
        Serbian nationalists.
            (6) Russia has leveraged its gas monopoly over Europe to 
        influence politics and political decisions of our NATO allies 
        and European Union partners, as it has done repeatedly in 
        Ukraine and across Eastern Europe.
            (7) Russia has attempted to finance fringe political 
        movements in countries throughout Europe, using a network of 
        oligarchs and organized criminal enterprises in an effort to 
        obscure Kremlin involvement.
            (8) Russia operates Russia Today (RT), Sputnik, and other 
        state-sponsored media outlets in dozens of languages across 
        Europe and the United States to spread disinformation and 
        undermine government and electoral systems. It also assaults 
        American institutions and those of our European allies using 
        cyber proxies, troll farms, and other tools in the information 
        space.
            (9) The United States national security apparatus has 
        credibly concluded that Russia continues to utilize malign 
        influence to undermine our democracies and will continue to do 
        so for the foreseeable future.
            (10) Parts of the United States Government interagency 
        response, such as the Global Engagement Center (GEC), were 
        empowered to address specific elements of Russian malign 
        influence, particularly disinformation.
            (11) The mission of the GEC is ``to direct, lead, 
        synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal 
        Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter 
        foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and 
        disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the 
        policies, security, or stability of the United States and its 
        allies and partner nations''.
            (12) The GEC plays an important role in countering the 
        disinformation tactics used by foreign adversaries and 
        coordinating these responses across the United States 
        Government.
            (13) Russia's use of a broad range of tools of malign 
        influence, including disinformation, necessitates a robust, 
        dynamic, and coordinated United States Government interagency 
        response.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that United States Government efforts 
to counter Russian malign influence should be led by the Department of 
State in close coordination with the Department of Defense, the 
intelligence community, and other relevant Federal departments and 
agencies and relevant private sector and civil society entities.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to--
            (1) continually seek to strengthen the United States 
        defenses, and the defenses of its European allies and partners, 
        against malign Russian influence by closing off vulnerabilities 
        that Russia can exploit, including by strengthening civil 
        society, media literacy, and cyber defenses;
            (2) clearly state the costs that should be imposed on 
        Russia for its attempts to utilize tools of malign influence 
        against the United States and its European allies and partners;
            (3) proactively mitigate Russian attempts to influence or 
        interfere with the United States and its European allies and 
        partners through deterrence, denial, and resilience measures 
        such that the damage inflicted upon the United States and its 
        allies and partners when attacks do occur is reduced; and
            (4) promote stronger ties with democratic countries around 
        the world, understanding that the best defense against malign 
        Russian influence is a strong democracy and respect for 
        individual liberty and the rule of law.

SEC. 5. RUSSIA INFLUENCE GROUP.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established a Russia Influence Group 
(in this Act referred to as the ``RIG'').
    (b) Functions.--The RIG shall--
            (1) hold not fewer than two senior-level meetings annually, 
        at which all members are present, to coordinate and provide 
        guidance on the interagency efforts to counter malign Russian 
        influence in Europe and the United States;
            (2) hold not fewer than four working-level meetings 
        annually, at which the RIG shall--
                    (A) conduct interim assessments and formulate 
                proposed improvements to the RIG's efforts to counter 
                malign Russian influence in Europe and the United 
                States, which shall be presented at the senior-level 
                meetings;
                    (B) review monitoring and evaluation assessments by 
                the individual agencies, departments, and third-party 
                evaluators for programs and efforts designed to counter 
                malign Russian influence, with particular emphasis on 
                programs designed to counter such influence in Europe 
                and the United States; and
                    (C) develop methods and plans for applying the 
                results of such assessments to modify activities on an 
                iterative basis across relevant Federal departments and 
                agencies;
            (3) hold additional subgroup meetings on a regular basis 
        with relevant Federal departments or agencies to address 
        different tools of malign Russian influence individually, 
        including election interference, disinformation, illicit 
        finance, political influence and corruption, energy influence, 
        and economic influence;
            (4) collaborate with United States embassies in each 
        relevant country, and work with domestic and international 
        actors, as appropriate, such as partner governments, 
        intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 
        academic institutions, private sector entities, and research 
        institutions, to counter malign Russian influence in a more 
        effective and collective manner; and
            (5) provide recommendations and best practices that could 
        be applied to countering malign Russian influence in other 
        regions.
    (c) Chair and Membership.--The RIG--
            (1) shall be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State 
        for European and Eurasian Affairs;
            (2) shall include representatives of--
                    (A) the Department of State, including the Bureau 
                of European and Eurasian Affairs, the Global Engagement 
                Center (GEC), and the Bureau of Energy Resources;
                    (B) the Department of Defense, including United 
                States European Command;
                    (C) the Department of Homeland Security;
                    (D) the Department of Energy;
                    (E) the Department of Justice;
                    (F) the Department of the Treasury;
                    (G) the United States Agency for International 
                Development;
                    (H) the staff of the National Security Council; and
                    (I) the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence; and
            (3) may include representatives from such other entities as 
        the Chair determines appropriate.
    (d) Responsibilities of the Chair.--The Chair of the RIG shall--
            (1) coordinate and promote interagency and multilateral 
        efforts to protect the United States, its citizens, and its 
        European allies and partners from malign Russian influence;
            (2) establish mechanisms and seek to resolve interagency 
        differences in responding to malign Russian influence;
            (3) convene not fewer than two annual senior-level meetings 
        as described in subsection (b)(1);
            (4) engage chiefs of mission at relevant United States 
        embassies and senior officials of partner governments, 
        intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental 
        organizations to ensure high-level support for efforts to 
        counter malign Russian influence;
            (5) lead the development and biennial updates of the 
        interagency strategy required by section 6; and
            (6) submit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
        annual report required by section 7.

SEC. 6. STRATEGY TO COUNTER MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE.

    Not later than nine months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act and every two years thereafter, the Chair of the RIG, in 
consultation with all members of the RIG, shall submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate an interagency strategy for countering 
malign Russian influence, including the following:
            (1) Objectives for the RIG over one year, five year, and 
        ten year time periods.
            (2) Roles and responsibilities for each Federal department, 
        agency, or entity with membership on the RIG.
            (3) Methods of malign influence used by Russia, including 
        the following:
                    (A) The use of a variety of tools to interfere in 
                democratic processes in the United States and Europe, 
                including using illicit financing, dark money, and 
                corruption of political candidates and parties.
                    (B) The use of disinformation and misinformation to 
                create instability.
                    (C) The use of energy as a tool of coercion and 
                political leverage.
                    (D) The use of cyber tools to hack, leak, disable, 
                threaten, or otherwise coerce in order to achieve its 
                political or security objectives.
                    (E) The manipulation of cultural, religious, and 
                other identities to leverage European countries toward 
                its sphere of influence.
                    (F) The use of proxy forces or misidentified 
                Russian forces for the sake of deniability in kinetic 
                aggression against its neighbors.
            (4) A prioritized list of gaps or areas in which the 
        coordination and activities of such Federal departments, 
        agencies, and entities should be enhanced.
            (5) An updated and prioritized list of European ``Watch 
        Countries'' with respect to which malign Russian influence is 
        likely to pose a significant threat to the interests or 
        security of the United States or Europe and on which to focus 
        RIG efforts.
            (6) A description of the costs and risks of the current 
        United States approach to countering malign Russian influence.
            (7) The resources necessary to achieve the goals 
        established in the strategy.

SEC. 7. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE.

    The Chair of the RIG, acting through the RIG and in consultation 
with the heads of the Federal agencies and departments with membership 
on the RIG, shall annually submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate a report that includes the following:
            (1) Descriptions of what activities the RIG and each entity 
        participating in the RIG undertook to counter malign Russian 
        influence in Europe and the United States.
            (2) An identification of the activities, programs, or 
        actions that are planned for the upcoming year.
            (3) Assessments of whether the activities conducted over 
        the previous year achieved the intended outcomes.
            (4) Descriptions of the methodology and results of 
        monitoring and evaluation, including lessons learned and best 
        practices.
            (5) Descriptions of how such results and lessons learned 
        will be used on an iterative basis to modify activities.
            (6) An updated assessment of progress made towards the 
        objectives for the RIG established in the strategy required 
        under section 6 for five-year and ten-year time periods, 
        including the following:
                    (A) The methodology used for such assessments.
                    (B) The lessons learned and best practices from 
                such assessments.
                    (C) Any changes to be made to future activities, 
                programs, or actions in response to such lessons 
                learned.

SEC. 8. COMMISSION ON COUNTERING GLOBAL MALIGN INFLUENCE.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established an independent commission 
to be known as the ``Commission on Countering Global Malign Influence'' 
(in this section referred to as the ``Commission''). The Commission 
shall examine global malign influence from authoritarian state 
competitors and non-state actors, including Russia, China, Iran, and 
North Korea, seeking to undermine the United States, its national 
interests, and its allies, and make recommendations with respect to 
United States and allied efforts to counter such influence and such 
state and non-state competitors and actors.
    (b) Composition.--
            (1) Membership.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 
        members appointed as follows:
                    (A) Three members appointed by the chair of the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives.
                    (B) Three members appointed by the ranking member 
                of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives.
                    (C) Three members appointed by the chair of the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
                    (D) Three members appointed by the ranking member 
                of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
            (2) Co-chairs.--
                    (A) The chair and ranking member of the Committee 
                on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
                shall designate one member of the Commission to serve 
                as a co-chair of the Commission.
                    (B) The chair and ranking member of the Committee 
                on Foreign Relations of the Senate shall designate one 
                member of the Commission to serve as a co-chair of the 
                Commission.
            (3) Period of appointment; vacancies.--Members shall be 
        appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the 
        Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original 
        appointment.
    (c) Prohibition.--
            (1) In general.--The Commission may not include--
                    (A) Members of Congress or any other person serving 
                in an elected office of the Federal government; or
                    (B) any person serving in an elected office of a 
                State or local government.
            (2) Member of congress.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``Member of Congress'' includes a Delegate or Resident 
        Commissioner to the Congress.
    (d) Duties.--
            (1) Threat assessment.--The Commission shall conduct a 
        comprehensive assessment of the efforts of authoritarian state 
        competitors and non-state actors to undermine the United 
        States, its national interests, and its allies through tools of 
        malign influence, including election interference, 
        disinformation, illicit finance, political influence and 
        corruption, energy influence, economic influence, and the use 
        of proxy and state-backed forces in coercive ways, below the 
        threshold of conventional warfare.
            (2) Review.--The Commission shall review the current tools 
        of the United States Government that are used or could be used 
        to counter malign influence from authoritarian state 
        competitors and non-state actors, including Russia, China, 
        Iran, and North Korea.
            (3) Analysis and recommendations.--The Commission shall--
                    (A) conduct an analysis of the current preparedness 
                of the United States to counter malign influence 
                described in this subsection, taking into account both 
                the assessment of threat and the ability of the United 
                States Government to respond to such influence; and
                    (B) provide to the individuals and entities 
                specified in subsection (f)(1) recommendations on how 
                to improve such preparedness and ability.
            (4) Compliance.--The provisions of the Federal Advisory 
        Committee Act and the provisions of any rule, order, or 
        regulation promulgated under such Act shall apply with respect 
        to the Commission.
    (e) Cooperation From Government.--
            (1) Cooperation.--In carrying out its duties, the 
        Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of the 
        Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland 
        Security, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development, the Attorney General, the National 
        Security Advisor, the Director of National Intelligence, and 
        other relevant officials of the United States Government in 
        providing the Commission with respect to analyses, briefings, 
        or other information necessary for the fulfillment of its 
        responsibilities.
            (2) Liaison.--The officials specified in paragraph (1) 
        shall designate at least one officer or employee of their 
        respective agencies to serve as a liaison officer between such 
        agencies and the Commission.
            (3) Facilitation.--The Secretary of State shall take 
        appropriate actions to facilitate the Commission in the 
        discharge of the duties of the Commission under this section.
    (f) Report.--
            (1) Final report.--Not later than one year after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to 
        the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, 
        Energy, and Homeland Security, the Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development, the Attorney 
        General, the National Security Advisor, the Director of 
        National Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate a report on the Commission's findings, 
        conclusions, and recommendations. The report shall address the 
        following:
                    (A) Tools of malign influence, including election 
                interference, disinformation, illicit finance, 
                political influence and corruption, energy influence, 
                economic influence, and proxy and state-backed forces 
                being used against the United States, its national 
                interests, and its allies.
                    (B) How malign influence actors may be using these 
                tools in combination with other tools.
                    (C) How malign influence actors may be learning 
                from each other's adaptations.
                    (D) The types of malign influence against which the 
                United States Government should prioritize defenses and 
                proactive measures.
                    (E) Prioritized recommendations for actions the 
                United States should take to counter malign influence.
                    (F) The current roles and responsibilities 
                designated to each relevant Federal department and 
                agency to counter malign influence, and any recommended 
                changes to such roles and responsibilities.
                    (G) The estimated resources necessary for each 
                relevant Federal department and agency to fulfill such 
                roles and responsibilities.
                    (H) The current mechanisms for coordinating among 
                relevant Federal departments and agencies to counter 
                malign influence, and any recommendations for improving 
                such coordination.
                    (I) The current short- and long-term methodology 
                and metrics used to monitor and evaluate the 
                effectiveness of efforts to counter malign influence, 
                the lessons learned from such monitoring and 
                evaluation, and any recommendations for improving such 
                monitoring and evaluation.
                    (J) The risks associated with the recommended 
                approach to countering malign influence, including the 
                relationships and tradeoffs among priorities, roles, 
                and resources.
                    (K) Any other matters the Commission determines 
                relevant.
            (2) Interim briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall provide 
        to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate a briefing on the status of its assessment and review 
        under this section, including a discussion of any interim 
        recommendations.
            (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (g) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Commission $6,000,000 for fiscal year 2020 to carry out this section. 
Amounts made available to carry out this section shall be managed by 
the Department of State and utilized for--
            (1) compensation for the appointed members of the 
        Commission;
            (2) expenses for the basic operations of the Commission; 
        and
            (3) additional expenses that may arise over the life of the 
        Commission.
    (h) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on the date that 
is six months after the date of the submission of the report required 
under subsection (f)(1).
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