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*********************************************** 
FRANK P. CANNATELLI v. STATEWIDE

GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

(AC 39703)

Elgo, Bright and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff attorney appealed to the trial court from the decision of the

reviewing committee of the defendant Statewide Grievance Committee

directing the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the plaintiff for his alleged violation of certain Rules of Professional Conduct.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal

and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to

this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s

motion to dismiss and determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal; this court has determined previously that an order

of presentment is an initial step in disciplinary proceedings against an

attorney and that the committee’s decision directing that a presentment

be filed in Superior Court is interlocutory in nature and not a final

judgment from which an appeal to the Superior Court may be filed, the

plaintiff’s claim that he was aggrieved by the order of presentment

implicated the issue of standing and had no bearing as to whether the

order of presentment constituted a final judgment for purposes of appeal,

and the plaintiff’s reliance on federal case law for the proposition that

federal law permits his interlocutory appeal because it arises out of a

violation of his constitutional rights was unavailing, as the case law was

inapposite in that it had no import on the issue of whether a party

properly can take an interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court from

an order of presentment.

Argued October 11—officially released November 13, 2018

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s reviewing

committee directing the disciplinary counsel to file a

presentment against the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where

the court, Miller, J., granted the defendant’s motion to

dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which

the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Frank P. Cannatelli, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, with

whom, on the brief, was Beth L. Baldwin, assistant

chief disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented plaintiff, Frank

P. Cannatelli, appeals from the judgment of the Superior

Court dismissing his appeal from a decision of the

defendant, Statewide Grievance Committee, and from

the court’s subsequent denial of his motion to reargue

the judgment of dismissal. On appeal, the plaintiff

claims that the court improperly determined that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal for

lack of an appealable final judgment. We affirm the

judgment of the Superior Court.

The following procedural history is relevant to this

appeal.1 The statewide bar counsel filed a grievance

complaint, dated July 28, 2014, against the plaintiff, an

attorney, alleging that he overdrafted funds from his

IOLTA account.2 After an audit and a full hearing, the

reviewing committee found by clear and convincing

evidence that the plaintiff committed unethical conduct

and violated rules 1.15, 1.3, and 8.4 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct, as well as Practice Book § 2-

27. On November 20, 2015, the reviewing committee,

pursuant to Practice Book § 2-35 (i), ordered that the

plaintiff be presented to the Superior Court. On February 3, 2016, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel filed a presentment against the plaintiff. See Disciplinary

Counsel v. Cannatelli, Superior Court, judicial district

of New Haven, Docket No. CV-16-6060188-S.3

On February 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed an appeal to

the Superior Court from the decision of the reviewing

committee that ordered presentment, claiming, among

other things, violations of his constitutional rights. On

February 16, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal on the ground that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because

the order of presentment is not an appealable final

judgment. On March 28, 2016, the plaintiff filed an objection arguing that the court had jurisdiction, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the order of presentment

was being challenged on constitutional grounds.

On June 20, 2016, the court concurrently granted

the defendant’s motion to dismiss and overruled the

plaintiff’s objection. The court, relying upon Miniter v.

Statewide Grievance Committee, 122 Conn. App. 410,

998 A.2d 268, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 923, 4 A.3d 1228

(2010), and Rozbicki v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 157 Conn. App. 613, 115 A.3d 532 (2015), concluded

that an ‘‘order of a presentment has been clearly found

to be wholly interlocutory and it cannot properly be

the basis of an appeal.’’ The court also concluded that

the ‘‘[p]laintiff has not presented the court with any

persuasive authority that [42 U.S.C. § 1983] controls the

attorney grievance process in any way.’’ On July 6, 2016,

the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue the judgment of

dismissal, renewing his argument posited in his March
28, 2016 objection. On September 22, 2016, the court

summarily denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue. This

appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal for lack of an appealable final

judgment. We disagree.

This court’s decisions in Miniter and Rozbicki are

dispositive of the plaintiff’s appeal to this court. In both

cases, this court, in holding that an order of presentment

is not a final judgment for the purposes of appeal, stated:

‘‘An order of presentment is an initial step in disciplinary

proceedings against an attorney. Following the filing of

a presentment complaint, a hearing on the merits is

held after which the court renders judgment on the

presentment complaint. See Practice Book § 2-47 (a).

The committee’s decision directing that a presentment

be filed in Superior Court is interlocutory in nature

and not a final judgment from which an appeal to the

Superior Court lies.

‘‘[The] interlocutory order is not immediately appealable under State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d

566 (1983), because it neither terminates a separate and

distinct proceeding, nor so concludes the rights of the

parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.

Following an order of presentment by the committee,

a presentment complaint is filed, and the matter continues in the Superior Court until judgment is rendered on

the presentment complaint.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Rozbicki v. Statewide Grievance Committee,

supra, 157 Conn. App. 616–17; see Miniter v. Statewide

Grievance Committee, supra, 122 Conn. App. 413–14.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

Superior Court in the present case properly determined

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal

from the order of presentment because such an order

is not a final judgment for the purposes of appeal.

Although the plaintiff in his brief on appeal to this court

attempts to distinguish the holdings of Miniter and

Rozbicki from the present case, we are unpersuaded.

First, the plaintiff argues that he has been aggrieved by

the order of presentment because the publication of

the notice of presentment damages his reputation. Even

if we assume this to be true, it does not change our

analysis. The determination as to whether the plaintiff

has been aggrieved by a judgment is an issue of standing;

see Arciniega v. Feliciano, 329 Conn. 293, 301, 184

A.3d 1202 (2018); which is entirely distinct from the

determination as to whether a judgment is final for the

purposes of appeal.4 See Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc.,

330 Conn. 75, 83–84, 191 A.3d 983 (2018).

Second, the plaintiff, relying upon Miller v. Washington State Bar Assn., 679 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1982), argues

that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits the present interlocutory
appeal because it arises out of a violation of his constitutional rights. In Miller, the court principally held that

a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a § 1983

claim that alleges a constitutional challenge stemming

from a disciplinary action taken by a state bar association where no such review is available as of right in

the state courts. Id., 1314–18. We hold that Miller is

inapposite because it has no import on whether a party

properly can take an interlocutory appeal from an order

of presentment to the Superior Court. Accordingly, we

reject the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish the present

case from Miniter and Rozbicki.

Therefore, we conclude that the Superior Court did

not err by dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal and did not

abuse its discretion when it denied his subsequent

motion to reargue because it properly determined that

it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 Although the appendix of the defendant’s appellate brief substantially

is comprised of documents purportedly evincing the grievance proceedings,

those documents were not before the Superior Court and, thus, are not

part of the Superior Court record. Nevertheless, because the underlying

procedural history is uncontested, we take judicial notice of the disciplinary

proceeding, which stems from the grievance proceedings, brought against

the plaintiff in the Superior Court; see Disciplinary Counsel v. Cannatelli,

Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-16-6060188-

S; and the filings therein contained. See Lyons v. Citron, 182 Conn. App.

725, 728 n.4, 191 A.3d 239 (2018) (Appellate Court may take judicial notice

of files of Superior Court in any case).

2 Rule 1.15 (a) (5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant

part: ‘‘ ‘IOLTA account’ means an interest—or dividend—bearing account,

established by a lawyer or law firm for clients’ funds at an eligible institution

from which funds may be withdrawn upon request by the depositor without

delay. . . .’’

3 As of the date of oral argument before this court, the hearing on the merits

of the presentment against the plaintiff had not occurred. See Disciplinary

Counsel v. Cannatelli, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-16-6060188-S.

4 The plaintiff likewise argues on appeal that the court erred by not

affording him an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issue as to whether

he was aggrieved. We reject this argument because, as previously outlined,

standing is an issue collateral to the determination as to the existence of a

final judgment.