See P E N AL C ODE § 1 9
. 0 3 (a)( 2 ) & (3). 1 

## IN TH E C OU RT OF C RI MIN A L A PP EA LS

O F T E XAS
AP-75,633
HO WARD PAU LGU I DR Y , App e lla

nt
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Direc t Appeal f

rom Case No. 1073163 of the 23 0th Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, Ha rris C ounty
W O M ACK , J., delive red the opinion of the Court, in w hich K EL L ER , P.J., and J

OHN S ON , K EAS L ER , H ERV EY , H O L C O MB , and COCHRAN

, JJ., joined. M

EYERS and P RICE , J J ., c on c urre d in thejud

gm e nt. The a ppellant cha lleng es his conviction for c apital murder for his par t in the 1994 1 shooting of F ara

h Fr atta. Pursuant to the jury ’s answe rs to the spec ial punishment issues, the trialG ui dry - 2

See C ODE C R IM . P ROC . art . 37
. 0 7 1 , § 2 (b), (c) , & (g)
. 2 G u id ry v . S ta te , 9 S.W
. 3 d 13 3 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 9 ). 3 G ui dry v. D r etke , 200 3 U
. S. D i s t . LE X I S 26 19 9 (S. D
. T ex. 200 3). T he appel l ant was gr ant ed r el i ef bas ed 4 o n the a d m i ssi o n o f

wh at t he d i st rict co urt f o un d t o b e two i l l eg all y ob t aine d co nfessi o ns to p o l i ce o f f i ce rs. G ui dry v. D r etke, 39 7 F.3d 30 6 (5t h C i r. 20 0 5 ). 5 T hi s st at ut e p rovides, i n pa rt , “ N o evi d ence o b t ai ned by an of f i cer or o t her person i n vi o l at i o n of any 6 pr ov i s i on s of

t h e Cons t i t u t i on or l aw s of t h e St at e of

T ex as , or of

t h e Cons t i t u t i on or l aw s of t h e U n i t ed St at es of A m e ric a , sha ll b e a d m itt e d in e v id e n c e a g a ins t t h e a c c u se d o n the trial o f an y c rim ina l ca se .” jud g e se nte nc e d th e a

pp e lla nt t o d e ath. Th e a

pp e lla nt r a ise s f ourt e e n p oints o f e rr or

on thi s 2 dir e c t a pp e a l. F ind ingno e rr or , w e sh a ll a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. PROCEDURALBA CKGROUND On Marc h 21, 1997, the appe llant was found guilty of the c apital murder

of F ara h Fr atta, and he w as sentenc ed to death on March 26. I n 1999, this court aff

irmed his conviction on direc t
a pp e a l. In 2000, this court denied the a ppellant’s application for habe as cor pus. In 2003, the 3 Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Southe rn

Di stric t of

Te xas gra

nte d r e lie f o n a

pe tit ion fo r wri t of ha be a s c or pu s, or de ri nga

ne w tri a l. The Court of Appe als for the Fifth Circuit af firmed on 4 J anuar y 14, 2005. In the appe llant’s second tria l for ca pital murder, he was found guilty on 5 Fe bruar y 22, 2007, and wa s sentence d to death on Mar ch 1 of that year . This is his di rec t appea l from that convic tion. TE STIMO NYOF DR . B ASI NG ER In p oints o f e rr or

on e thr ou gh thre e , th e a

pp e lla nt c onte nd s th at th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in
a dmi tti ngthe te sti mony

of Dr . Sc ott B a sin g e r, in v iol atio n o f h is rights un de r t he F if th Amendment and unde r Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
. Dr. B asing er w as hired 6 by the appe llant as a mitigation ex pert for the punishment phase of

his first trial. DuringtheG ui dry - 3

M i r anda v

. Ar iz ona, 38 4 U
. S. 43 6 , 44 4 (19 6 6 ). 7 c ours e of an inte rv ie w w iththe a

pp e lla nt i n p repa

ra tio n f or that tria l, t

he a pp e lla nt a dmi tte d to Dr. B asing er that he had c ommitt ed the murde r. On c ross-examination at the trial, the prose cutor asked D r. B asing er whether the appe llant had admitted to the shooting. O ver de fense objection, Dr. B asing er r esponded in the a ffirmative. In the sec ond trial, Dr. B asing er w as ca lled as a f act witness by

the prosec ution and was a sked about his testimony at the pre vious capital trial. Ove r objection, Dr. B asing er a g ain testified that the a ppellant had a dmitted to the murder. The appellant now a

rgues that his statements to Dr. B asing er w ere compelled by the illeg al admission of his confe ssions to pol ice, a nd that the admission to Dr. Ba singe r wa s the “fr uit of the poisonous tree” of the c onfessions to police. He also argued that the a dmission t o Dr. B asing er
wa s o bta ine d in

vio latio n o f Art ic le 38 .2 3, and that, b ut f

or the ill e g a lly

ob ta ine d c on fe ssi on s to police, the a

ppellant would not have ma de an inc riminating state ment to Dr. B asing er. The F ifth Amendment to the Constitut ion of the United States pre vents the prose cution from using“stateme nts, whether e x culpatory or inculpatory , stemming fr om custodial int e rr og atio n o f t

he de fe nd ant u

nle ss i t de mon str ate s th e us e of pr oc e dural sa fe gua

rd s e ff e c tiv e to
secur e the privilege ag ainst self-incrimination. By custodial interrog ation, we mea n questioning ini tiate d b y

law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs a ft e r a

pe rs on ha s b e e n ta

ke n into c us tod

y or oth e rw ise deprive d of his fre edom of a ction in any signific ant way .” 7 In this case, Dr . Ba singe r wa s not workingon behalf of the police when the a

ppellant’s admission was made to him. Rather, he was wor king on be half of the appellant himself a s anG ui dry - 4

S e e Wilke rso n v . S ta te , 17 3 S.W
. 3 d 52 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 5 ). In Wi l ke rs on , t h e def en dan t ma de 8 i ncul p at o ry s t at em ent s t o a C hi l d P rotect i ve Se rvi ces caseworker whi ch were ad m i ss i b l e, even t ho ugh t he d ef end ant was i n c us t od y at t he t i me, becau s e t he cas ewor ker was not wor ki ng on beha l f of t he po l i ce. M i chiga n v. Tucker , 41 7 U
. S. 43 3 , 44 5 (19 7 4 ), quo t i ng M ur phy v. Wat er

f r ontCom m i s s i on , 378 U
. S. 52, 9 5 5 (19 6 4 ). 39 2 U
. S. 21 9 (19 6 8 ). I n Har r i s on , t he d ef end ant t est i f

i ed at hi s o wn t ri al af

t er hi s p revi o us co nf

ess i o ns 10 wer e e nt er ed i nt o evi dence
. T he conf es s i ons wer e s ubs equen t l y deemed t o hav e been obt ai ned i l l ega l l y , an d t he d e fen d a n t wa s g ra n te d a ne w trial. A t t h e se c o n d trial, the d e fen d a n t’s f o rm e r te stim o n y w a s intr o d u c e d into evi dence
. T he def

endan t cont ended t hat hi s f ormer t es t i mo ny was i nadmi s s i bl e a t t he s econd t r i al becau s e h e h ad b een co m p el l ed t o t est i f y due t o t he i nt rod uct i o n of t he t ai nt ed co nf ess i o ns. T he C o urt hel d t hat t he f o rme r t est i m o ny w as inad m i ssi b l e b ec au se the d efen d an t t esti f i ed o nly t o o ve rco m e the im p ac t o f t he i l l eg all y ob t aine d co nfessi o ns, a fter the c o n fes sio n s w e re a d m itt e d . T h e C o u rt re v e rs e d his se c o n d c o n v ic tio n . expert witness. In short, the appe llant was neve r “e x posed to the ‘the c ruel trilemma of 8 self-a ccusation, perjury

or conte mpt.’” Thus, the Fif th Amendment is not directly implicated. 9 The a ppellant furthe r argues that his admission to Dr. Ba singe r is the “f ruit of the poisonous tree,” wher e the primary violation was the evide nce of illega lly procur ed conf

essions to police admitted at the a ppellant’s first c apital trial. The a ppellant contends that but for the illega lly obtained conf

essions, Dr. B asing er ne ver w ould have testified at trial, beca use no trial
ever would have ta

ken plac e. Relying he avily on Ha rri so n v . U nite d S tates, the a

pp e lla nt c la ims 10 that Dr. B asing er’ s testimony was c ompelled by

the admission of the illeg ally obtained confe ssions to the police, a nd was ther efor e inadmissible. Th e c a se at ba

r i s d ist inguis ha

ble fr om Harrison for two r easons. F irst, the decision to put Ha rriso n o n th e sta

nd wa s ma de on ly

a ft e r t he ill e g a lly

ob ta ine d c on fe ssi on s w e re a dmi tte d into evidenc e, as w ere his inculpatory statements. Her e, the inculpatory admission to Dr. Ba singe r was made befor e the f

irst trial, and there is no evidence that it was in response to the a dmission of the illeg ally

obtained conf

essions. Second, in Harrison the def endant himself c hose to testify
at tria l, u nli ke he re , whe re the te sti mony orig inate d f

ro m a wi tne ss o the r t

ha n th e de fe nd ant. Harrison specifie d that it was limit ed to the testimony of a de fenda

nt who is compelled to testifyG ui dry - 5

Ha rriso n , 3 9 2 U .S ., at 224 n
. 2. 11 H u dso n v. U

n i t ed S t a t es, 54 7 U
. S. 58 6 , 59 2 (20 0 6 ). 12 W o n g S u n v. U

n i t ed S t a t es, 37 1 U
. S. 47 1 , 48 7
- 8 8 (19 6 3 ) ( q uo t i ng M AGUI RE , E V I D EN C E O F G U I LT 221 13 (19 5 9 ))
. See Na r do ne v. Uni t ed St at es , 30 8 U
. S. 33 8 , 34 1 (19 3 9 ).

14 72 4 S.W
. 2 d 78 0 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 6 ). 15 on his own behalf be cause of the introduction of a n illega lly obtained conf

ession. In that case , the Court e xpre ssl y de c lin e d to e xten d it s h old ingto i nc lud e the te sti mony of a thi rd -p art

y wi tne ss. 1

1 Acc ording ly

this court declines to do so. Fur thermore , although the admission to Dr. Ba singe r may not have c ome to light but for the illeg al ac tions of police, “e x clusion may not be pre mised on the mere fac t that a constitutional vio latio n w a s a

‘b ut- fo r’ c a

us e of ob ta ini nge vid e nc e . O ur

c a se s sh owthat ‘ but- fo r’ c a us a lity is only a nec essar

y , not a suffic ient, condition for suppre ssion.” “ Rathe r, the mor e a pt q ue sti on in 12 such a c ase is ‘whether , grantingestablishment of the primar y illega lity , the evidenc e to which instant objection is made has be en come by at the exploitation of that il leg ality or instead by means suff

iciently distinguishable a s to be purg ed of the primary taint.’” Attenuation ca

n occur 13 when the c ausal c onnection is remote. 1 4 In Be ll v . S

tatethis court announce d fac tors in determiningattenuation, which inc luded the furnishingof Miranda war nings, the temporal proximity of the a rre st and the conf

ession, the prese nce of

interveningcirc umstances, a nd the purpose a

nd flagranc y

of the off icial mis c on du c t. In applying those fac tors to this case, we look to the passag e of time, the

15 appellant’ s appointment of counse l, the hiringof an e x pert witness, a nd other preparation for trial. Tog ether , they

provide a sufficie nt break in the chain of causation stemmi ngfrom theG ui dry - 6

R. A PP . P
. 33
. 1 (a). 16 See C ODE C R IM . P ROC . a r t . 36. 14. 17 A lm a n za v . S ta te , 68 6 S.W
. 2 d 15 7 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 4 ) ( co nst rui ng C ODE C R IM . P ROC . art . 36
. 1 9 ). 18 U nder Sect i on 19. 03 ( a) ( 2) of t he P ena l Co de, a per s on comm i t s ca pi t al mur der i f he i nt ent i onal l y ca us es 19 t he d eat h of an i nd i vi d ual i n t he co urs e o f co m m i t t i ng or at t em p t i ng co m m i t any of several off enses , i ncl ud i ng b urgl ary . U nd er Secti o n 19
. 0 3 (a)( 3 ), a pe rs o n co m m i t s cap i t al m urder i f he i nt ent i o nal l y or kno wi ngl y causes t he d eat h of an i nd i vi d ual f o r r em unerat i o n or t he p rom i se of remunerati o n. K itch e n s v . S ta te , 8 2 3 S .W .2 d 2 5 6 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 1 ), cer t
. deni ed , 504 U
. S. 958 ( 1992) ( n ot 20 f und am ent al err o r t o s ub m i t , i n one pa ragraph o f t he charge, al t ernat i ve t heo ri es of cap i t al m urder co m m i t t ed i n t he c o u rs e o f co m m itt ing ro b b e ry o r se x u a l as sa u lt). primary illega lity . We conclude that Dr. B asing er’ s testimony was a dmissibl e. Points one, two, and thre e ar e over

ruled. J URY UNAN I MI TY In points of error

four through seven, the appellant a rgues that the c ourt’s cha rg e to the j ur y d e n i e d h i s r i gh tt o a

un an i m o u s v e r d i c t , thu s v i o l at i n gs e v e r a l c o n s t i tut i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . In
or de r t o p re se rv e a

c omp la int

fo r a pp e llate re vie w, a

pa rt y g e ne ra lly mus t ha ve pr e se nte d a

tim e ly reque st, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired r uling, if the y

are not appar ent from the c ontextof the re quest, objection or motion. A statute spec ifically require s 16 that a def endant objec t to the char g e of the court. In the ca se bef ore us, ther e wa s no objection 17 to the charg e at tria l, and thus the issue was not pre serve d under that statute. Acc ordingto this court’s construction of a nother statute, whe n err or in the cha rg e wa s not called to the trial court’s attention, a judgme nt of conviction will be re verse d only on a showing that th e de fe nd ant w a s d e nie d a fa ir tr ia l. Th e e ighth

po int of e rr or argue s th at th e re wa s a 18 de nia l of a fa ir tr ia l be c a us e the c ha

rg e a llo we d th e jur

y to c onvic t w ith out a gre e ingun anim ou sly whether the def endant c ommitt ed murde r for remune ration or murde r in the cour se of c ommitt ing burg lary . Th is c ha

rg e did no t de ny the a pp e lla nt a fa ir tr ia l. I nd e e d, it w a s n ot e rr on e ou s. 19 20G ui dry - 7

M a rtin e z v . S ta te , 129 S. W
. 3d 101 ( T ex. Cr. Ap p. 200 4) ( over r ul i ng cl ai m t hat i t was er r or f or t he t r i al 21 cour t t o permi t t he pros ecu t or t o ar gu e t hat t he j ur y ne ed not un ani mo us l y ag r ee whe t her t he murder was comm i t t ed i n t he co urs e o f

rob b ery or sexual ass aul t ). See M a ta v . S ta te , 2 2 6 S.W
. 3 d 42 5 , 43 0 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 7 ); R ob er ts v. St at e, 220 S. W
. 3d 521, 533 22 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 7 ).

Se e St r i ck l and v

. Was hi ngt on , 46 6 U
. S. 68 8 (19 8 4 ). 23 “When an indictment alleg es diffe rent methods of c ommitt ing c apital murder in the conjunctive, the jury may properly be cha rg ed in the disjunctive. ... The una nimity require ment is not viol ated by instructing the jury

on alternative theories of committing the same offe nse ....” 21 Points four through eight are overr uled. EFF ECTIVE ASSI STANCE OF COUN SEL In his ninth and tenth points of error, the appellant c omplains that he was de nied his right to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel under the Six th Amendment to the Constitut ion of the United States beca

use his attorney

neither obje cted to, nor r equeste d a hea ringon the admissibility

of, the te sti mony

of Mary Gi pp -M c Ne ill
. As this court has pre viously noted, since the r ecord does not usually ref lect the 22
rea soning or

motivation behind counsel’s ac tions or inactions, it is rarely possible to assess such
a c la im f a ir ly on dir e c t a pp e a l. B e c a

us e of thi s, the a

pp e lla nt w ill ra re ly be a ble to m e e t th e fi rs t prongof the Strickland

test, which is to show that counsel’s pe rfor mance fell below a

n objective standard of

rea sonablene ss. Absent a motion for ne w trial and a n examination of counsel’s 23 str ate gy , th e re c or d is no t su ff ic ie ntl y de ve lop e d, and

the iss ue is m or e a

pp ro priate ly

a dd re sse d in
an a pp lic atio n f

or writ o f h a

be a s c or pu s whe re de fe ns e c ouns e l w ill have the op po rt un ity to explain his acts or omissions. Point s nine and ten a re ove rruled.G ui dry - 8

47 6 U
. S. 79 , 81 (19 8 6 ). 24 H e rro n v . S ta te , 8 6 S .W .3 d 6 2 1 , 6 3 0 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ); M at hi s v St at e, 67 S.W
. 3 d 91 8 , 92 4 (T ex. C r. 25 A p p . 20 0 2 ).

H e rro n , 86 S. W
. 3d, a t 630
. 26 I bi d. 27 I bi d. 28 I bi d. 29 BATSON CHAL L ENGE In his eleventh point of er ror, the a ppellant contends, unde r authority of Batson v. Kentucky , that the trial cour t erre d in overrulinghis objection to the State’s exercise of a 24 pere mptory

challeng e in violation of the Equal Protec tion Cl ause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. A def endant objec ting unde r Batson must make a pr im a fa c ieshowingof ra cial dis c ri min atio n in

the State ’s e xer c ise of

its pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s. The burde n then shifts to the

25 State to p ro vid e ra c e -n e utr a l e xplanatio ns fo r i ts p e re mpt or y strike s. I f the State a

rticulates r ace 26 neutra l expl anations, the burde n shifts back to the de fense to show that the State’s re asons ar e prete x ts for discrimination. Th e tr ia l c ourt mus t r ule a s to wh e the r t

he de fe ns e ha s c arrie d it s 27 burden of provingpurposef

ul discrimination. This determination is acc orded great defe renc e 28
and wi ll n ot b e ov e rt

ur ne d o n a pp e a l un le ss t

he ru lin gis c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. 2

9 Her e, the de fense objected unde r Batson t o th e S t at e’ s u s e o f ap er emp t o ry ch al l en ge ag ainst Venire man Matthew Washing ton
. The c ourt inquired into the prosec ution’s rea sons for the per emptory

challeng e. The prosec ution ex plained: To start with, he’s a

member of

[name omitt ed ] C h urch. And we have a r unning a gre e me nt, my

pa rt ne r L uc i D avid so n a

nd Ihave, sin c e we sta

rt e d, that pe op le wh o g o to [that chur ch] are scre wballs and nuts. I ’m very familiar with that chur ch. That’s one re ason that scar ed me a

bout the man.G ui dry - 9

5 3 7 U
. S. 32 2 , 34 0 (20 0 3 ). 30 The ne x t rea son is when aske d why people commit violent crimes, his answe r bef ore we star ted talkingto him today is “no education, no opportunities.” In my mind, people who have no education, no opportunities might be bums, might be slacke rs, might be lazy , but that doesn’t justify

committing a violent crime. In addition to that, he talks about the fa ct t h at h e’ s been disc riminated ag ainst at work, a nd he say s on those occa sions, two to three of them, whe n he wa s discriminated ag ainst, 85 perc ent of the group that was discriminating ag ainst him was white. The othe r 15 perc ent was “ other” and whe n presse d, he said they wer e Asian. That’s happened on more than one oc casion a

nd the people that passed him over were white. Right a fter that he went ri ght o n a nd so rt of we nt on to say , in eve ryda y lif e , w e ’r e a ll tre ate d a s se c on d- c la ss c iti zen s. And there ’s two black me n on this jury that are wonder ful men that didn’t see m to have any iss ue s at a ll a

bo ut a ny thi ng lik e that a

bo ut be ing bla c k me n in Am e ri c a tod ay . T his man is differ ent. He w as ver

y hesi t an t i n an sweringmy questions. He didn’t see m like he was comforta ble answe ringany

of the questions. I didn’t g et a g ood fee ling talkingto him, unli ke ever y other juror

who I put on this j ury , Ididn’t fee l that way talking to Mr. Washington. And t hen , to s um i t a ll u

p , h e mi gh t k

n o wJe f f Str an g e , wh o ’ s a

p r o s e c uto r

in F o rt Be n d C o unty . Inth e c o rn er

– i nth e c o nt ex to f th i s co urtro o m , Icans ay Ikn o w J ef

f S tran ge very , very

well and knowingJ eff

Strang e, just beca

use he’ s a pr osecutor, doe sn’t mean any thing. That doesn’t mean a ny thing in my

opinion. F ina lly , h e say s h e ’s an a c tiv e me mbe r o f the NAAC P to the de gre e that he g oe s a ll the way back home to Snook, C aldwell, B urleson County , Texas, to attend the meeting s that his mom and dad never mi ss. The NAACP’s stated obj ective – one of them is to ge t rid of the de ath p e na lty , to be op po se d to the de ath p e na lty , to ta lk to p e op le a bo ut h owto g e t r id of the de ath pe na lty and the y are ve ry , ve ry muc h for the L e g a l De fe ns e F un d, wh ic h it s ma in o b j e c t i v e i s t o o p p o s e th e d e athp e n a l ty. The last thing , J udg e, is one of the number o n e advocates and supporte rs of the NAAC P inHa

rris C ounty

is Q ua ne ll X . I am qu ite sure Mr
. Was hin g ton kn ow s who Qu ane ll X is and Qu ane ll X cou ld ve ry we ll be a de fe ns e wi tne ss i n th is tri a l, b e c a us e Qu ane ll Xis on e of the pe op le that Ho wa rd Gu idr y wa nte d to ta lk to wh e n he too k a ho st age on d e ath row. So Q u an e ll X is g o in g to b e c o mi n g u p to th is tria l an d I d o n ’ t w ant a man who’s supportive of the NAACP as Mr. Washington is t o be any wher e near thi s jury
. And those ar e my r a c e - n e utr a l , v e r

y r a c e - n e utr a l r e a s o n s f

o r why I e x e r c i s e d

a p e r e mp t o r

y. The trial c ourt found that the State e x erc ised its challeng e fa irly and for rac e-ne utral
rea sons. The def

ense did not attempt to demonstrate that the State’s re asons wer e pre textual, and expli citly stated that it neither objec ted to nor desire d to chang e the c ourt’s dec ision. As the Supreme Court state d in Mi lle r-El v . Co c k re ll: 30G ui dr y - 10

M i l l e r - El , 53 7 U
. S., at 33 9 , ci t i ng W ai nwr ightv. Witt

, 4 6 9 U .S . 4 1 2 , 4 2 8 (1 9 8 5 ); s ee als o W at ki ns v. 31 S ta te , 2 4 5 S.W
. 3 d 44 4 , 45 7 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 8 ). “[T] h e is s u e c o me s d o wnto wh e th e r th e tria l c o urt f

in d s th e p r o s e c uto r ’ s r a c e -neutra l exp l an at i o n s to be cr edible. Credibility can be measure d by , amongother fa ctors, the prosec utor’s deme anor; by how reasonable, or how i mprobable, the explanations are ; and by wh e th e r th e p r o f f e r e d r ati o n a le h a s s o me basis in a c c e p te d tria l s tr ate gy

. . . Inth e c o nte xt of dir e c t r e vie w, the re fo re , w e have no te d t hat “th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on on the ult imate question of discriminatory inte n t re p re sents a findingof fa ct of the sor t acc orded great defe renc e on appe al” a

nd will not be overturne d unless clea rly err oneous . . . .” 31 Sin c e the re c ord d oe s n ot i nd ic ate that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin gwa s c le arl y e rr on e ou s, point of err or ele ven is overr uled. VI CTI M-I MPACT EVI DENCE In p oints o f e rr or

tw e lve thr ou gh f

ourt e e n, the a

pp e lla nt c la ims that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in
ov e rr uli nghis ob

je c tio n to the a dmi ssi on

of te sti mony

a bo ut t he e ff e c t of e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s. Si n c e th e o n ly

o b je c ti o nat t

r ia l w a s to r e le v an c e , it

is th e o n ly

gr o un d p r e s e r v e d f o r a p p e a l. We shall not address the a

ppellant’s Eighth and Four teenth Amendme nt arguments which ar e made fo r t he fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. Paulette Scott, Chantal Peve, Ge ne Hove rmale, a nd J eane tte Ble dsoe we re c alled as witnesses for

the prosec ution at the punishment phase of the trial. Eac h of them testified a s to the eff ect a n extraneous offe nse, committed by the appe llant, had on them. (The appellant r obbed the first three witnesses at a

bank. The fourth witness wa s a prison guard whom the appellant took ho sta g e .) Th e tr ia l c ourt

ov e rr ule d th e a pp e lla nt’ s o bje c tio ns . Article 37.071, Sec tion 2(a)( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedur e provide s that “evide nce ma

y be pre sented by

the state a

nd the def

endant or the def endant’ s counsel as to a

ny matter that the c ourt dee ms releva nt to sentence ....”G ui dr y - 11

22 0 S.W
. 3 d 52 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 7 ). 32 Id ., at 53 1 , ci t i ng G a rc ia v . S ta te , 12 6 S.W
. 3 d 92 1 , 92 9 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 4 ). S ee a lso G u e v a ra v . S ta te , 33 9 7 S .W .3 d 5 7 9 , 5 8 3 (T e x . C r. A p p 2 0 0 3 ); M a th is v . S ta te , 67 S.W
. 3 d 91 8 , 92 8 (T ex. C r. A p p 20 0 2 ).

A s t hi s co urt recent l y exp l ai ned i n Hay d e n v . S ta te ,

_ _ S.W
. 3 d __ , __ , 20 0 9 W L 9 2 8 5 6 9 , * 3 , 20 0 9 T ex. 34 C rim . A p p . L E X IS 5 1 0 , *8 -9 ) (T e x . C r. A p p ., P D -0 8 6 0 -0 7 , A p ril 8 , 2 0 0 9 ), “[i] n the p a st, we ha v e o c c a sio n a lly re fer re d to ‘vic tim im p a c t ev id e n c e ’ as a b ro a d c a te g o ry th a t i n c lud e s b o th v ic tim c h a ra c te r e v id e n c e a n d vic tim im p a c t ev id e n c e . ( E. g. S a l a za r, 9 0 S .W .3 d a t 3 5 5 .) R e g re ttab ly, this im p re c isio n ha s b e c o m e e n tre n c h e d in this sta te ’s ju risp ru d e n c e . V ic tim ‘i m p a c t’ e v id e n c e is ev id e n c e o f t h e e ff e c t o f t h e vic tim ’s d e a th o n o the r p e o p le .” C ODE C R IM . P ROC . ar t. 3 7 .0 7 1 , § 2 (b )( 1 ) (“ w h e the r th e re is a p ro b a b ili ty t h a t t h e d e fen d a n t wo u ld 35 co m m i t cri m i nal act s o f vi o l ence t hat wo ul d co nst i t ut e a co nt i nui ng t hreat t o s o ci et y ... ”). As this court stated in Ro be rts v . S tate , “‘V ictim impact’ evidenc e is evidenc e of the 32 eff ect of an off ense on pe ople other

than the victim.” The “ offe nse” in que stion is the one that 33 is at issue in the guilt st ag e of the trial. In this case, the te stimony was a bout the eff

ect of
e xtra ne ou s c ri me s o n th e vic tim s o f t ho se c ri me s. The testimony at issue in this case is not 34 victim-impact evidenc e, and r efe rringto it as such only serve s to confuse the issue. The testimony offe red he re w as admissible under Article 37.071 a nd was re levant to the future
dang erousne ss issue. Points of er ror twe lve, thirteen, a

nd fourtee n are overr

uled. 35 The trial c ourt’s judgment is affirme d.
Deliver ed Oc tober 21, 2009. Do not publish.