COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Fe lton and Senior Judge Willis

LASHON DIANE BROWN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record Nos. 1398-04-1, 1399-04-1, 1400-0 4-1, PER CURIAM 1401-04-1 and 1402-04-1 AUGUST 2, 2005
NORFOLK DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Norman A. Thomas, Judge (B. Cullen Gibson, on brief), for appellant. (Bernard A. Pishko, City Attorn ey; Martha G. Rollins, Deputy City Attorney; Kelly B. St. Clair, Guardian ad litem , for the minor children, on brief), for appellee. 1

Lashon Diane Brown (Ms. Brown) appeals the trial court’s decision terminating her parental rights to each of her five minor children, V.C., T.J. B., S.B., Tff.B., and Tam.B. Ms. Brown contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the terminations under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C); and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to meet in chambers with Brown’s fourteen-year-old daughter, V.C., during the termination hearing. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the partie s, we conclude that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisi on of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 We grant the motion of the guardian ad litem to join the brief of the appellee.- 2 - Background We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence proved that on July 2, 2001, the Norfolk Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (J&DR court) entered a Preliminary Child Protective Order regarding two of Ms. Brown’s children, V.C. and T.J.B. “[I]inadequate housing, inappropriate sexual interaction and inadequate supe rvision by the parents” formed the basis for issuance of that order. The children were placed in foster care at that time. On August 1, 2001, the J&DR court granted a pe tition filed by the Norfolk Division of Social Services (NDSS) for removal of all fi ve of Ms. Brown’s children, based upon allegations that her husband, Mr. Brown, “sexually abused at le ast two of the children” and that “all children are believed to be at risk.” The affidavit of th e investigating social work er indicated “there is substantial evidence that has been gathered by this agency, which leads this agency to believe that abuse has taken place, by the parents,” in cluding a physical examination by a physician of one of the complainant children indicative of penetration by an adult, the children’s corroboration of their disclosu res of sexual abuse when inte rviewed separately, and an assessment by the therapist who counseled the ch ildren indicating that their disclosures were credible. In addition, the affidavit indicated that a 1995 psychological report generated in New Jersey to assess Mr. Brown’s parenting capacity indicated that he was “the product of severe emotional and physical abuse.” That report further indicated that “[h]is in formation is frequently contradictory and he portrays himself alternativ ely as both a violent and loving person. This father seemingly does not have the personal resources needed to function adequately as a parent . . . .” The social worker noted thatMr. Brown had an extensive criminal record,- 3 - including both misdemeanor and felony convictio ns, and that he was criminally charged and found guilty of child abuse of one of his older children, resulting in him serving jail time and the victim child being placed in foster care. The J&DR court conducted evidentiary heari ngs over a series of dates from August 2001 through January 29, 2003. The J&DR court approve d foster care plans for the children on July 25, 2002 with the goal of “return to parents.” On that date, Mr. Brown absconded from the courtroom during the hearing, thereby avoi ding service of warrants for his arrest. On August 16, 2002, the J&DR court issued protective orders denying the Browns contact with the children base d upon NDSS’s affidavit indicating th at there were allegations of sexual abuse by Mr. Brown with the knowledge oracquiescence of Ms. Brown and that there were criminal charges currently before the Norfol k Circuit Court. That affidavit alleged that Ms. Brown continued to be involved with Mr. Brow n and that her contact with the children could put them at risk; that Mr. Brown was not in cust ody and a warrant for his arrest was on file; and that he was stalking the children with the possi ble assistance of Ms. Brown. The J&DR court heard the protective order matters on Augus t 22, 2002 and October 31, 2002, and merged them with the underlying case. On December 18, 2002, the J&DR court denied Ms. Brown’s motion to rehear the protective order to enable visitation with V.C. On January 29, 2003, at a permanency pla nning hearing held upon petition filed by NDSS on January 8, 2003, the J&DR court made findi ngs of abuse and neglect with respect to all five children. Permanency plans approved at that hearing set forth the permanent goal of adoption. Pursuant to its permanency planning orders, the J&DR court approved the plans on an interim basis for six months, at which time a second permanency hearing would be held to- 4 - achieve the permanent goal. Those orders pr ohibited contact with th e children by Mr. Brown until further order of the court. 2 On September 3, 2003, NDSS filed petitions in the J&DR court for new permanency plans with the goal of adoption for Ms. Brown’s children. In the new permanency plans, NDSS recognized that although Ms. Brown “has participated in several activities[, including parenting classes and support groups] to suppor t her children’s return, but sh e continues to maintain that this agency or it representatives evoked lies from her children so they could be put up for adoption.” NDSS noted that Ms. Brown “objects to seeing the therapist w ho is currently seeing her children.” In addition, NDSS noted that some of the children presente d a series of physical, emotional, and educational problems that requi red therapeutic intervention. The plans also indicated the belief that Ms. Brown remained in contact with Mr. Brown, who remained a fugitive. The plans requested the go al of adoption due to the following: [Ms. Brown] and [Mr. Brown] have not made any appreciable changes that point to increas ed knowledge of appropriate parenting, setting boundaries, and id entifying significant risks to their children. Mr. Brown remains absent after a year of avoiding court action to resolve charges of sexual abuse, indecent liberties, and improper conduct with a child. Mr. Brown has an extensive history of involvement with CPS in both the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Virginia relati ng to child abuse and neglect, which led to the subsequent adoption of three of his children. Ms. Brown passionately expresses he r belief that her children did not say the things they have said and that Mr. Brown is innocent of any charges levied against him. If she is unable or unwilling to

2 Ms. Brown appealed the January 29, 2003 pe rmanency planning orders to the circuit court. After taking evidence on October 31, 2003 and hearing argument on December 23, 2003, the circuit court, by order entered January 27, 20 04, upheld the findings of abuse and neglect and found that the removal order and preliminary prot ective order were approp riate. However, the circuit court did not approve the goal of adoption presented in the Foster Care Permanency Plans filed on January 8, 2003, ordered NDSS to submit new petitions and plans, and remanded the cases to the J&DR court for additional proceedings.- 5 - acknowledge the potential for danger to her children by her husband, she will be less likely to exercise due caution to protect them. Since custody of her childr en was awarded to the agency, Ms. Brown has repeatedly heard evidence depicting Mr. Brown as inappropriate in his interactions with some of his children. She is vigorous in her denial of his ac tions, as well as denial of the allegations made by the children of her own involvement in the offenses against them. These issues might be resolved if Ms. Brown becomes serious in her attempts to educate herself and position herself for interventions. These interventions will help Ms. Brown to realize that her children were telling the truth and will help her move beyond the recognition of that truth to a more protective mode of keeping her children safe. NDHS suspects that Mr. Brown is st ill in contact with Ms. Brown, by evidence presented by Ms. Brown. She stated with pride that Mr. Brown donated the new residence she moved into in January 2003, and as recently as July 2003, she has commented to the CASA worker that her husband is going to get her a lawyer. Ms. Brown continually maintains to this worker that she has not seen or been in contact w ith her husband for over a year. On November 21, 2003, the J&DR court approved th e permanency plans for adoption, and set a hearing for termination of Ms. Br own’s residual parental rights. On February 12, 2004, upon petitions filed by NDSS, and after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the J&DR court entered orders terminating the residual parental rights of Ms. Brown and Mr. Brown pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), a nd gave NDSS authority to place the children for adoption. At the May 18-19, 2004 termination hearing in th e circuit court on appeal from the J&DR court, various social workers and therapists, w ho had evaluated the children and assisted NDSS in planning for them, testified as expert witn esses in the areas of child welfare and child abuse/neglect. Their testimony detailed the children’s reports of ne glect and sexual abuse alleged to have occurred prior to their re moval from the Browns’ home in August 2001, and alleged to have been perpetrated by Mr. Brow n, their siblings, and some other children,- 6 - sometimes in Ms. Brown’s presence and with her knowledge. The testim ony of the therapists and social workers established that each of the children sustained trauma prior to their removal from the Browns’ home in August 2001 and that they presented various significant and severe developmental, emotional, physical , and educational difficulties. Belinda Brewster, a licensed clinical social worker, who was providing therapy to four of the children as of the date of the terminat ion hearing, opined that the safety and overall well-being of the children would be in jeopardy if they were retu rned to Ms. Brown. Brewster testified that NDSS informed her that Ms. Brow n refused to attend therapy with her and the children. Dr. Viola Vaughan-Eden, a licensed clinical social work er at the Child Abuse Program at Children’s Hospital of King’s Daughters, receiv ed medical evidence indicating that V.C. had been sexually abused. Jean Tatum, a social worker for the Browns’ children until May 2003, testified that at a meetin g after the July 25, 2002 hearing where Mr. Brown absconded, Ms. Brown told her “she didn’t need to protect her children because she had no reason to protect them. Mr. Brown would not do anything like that.” Phyllis Spriggs, the children’s social worker beginning in June 2003, testified that when she met with Ms. Brown at that time, at her a ddress at 146 West Seaview, Ms. Brown told her that Mr. Brown “did all the decorations” in her ho me. Yet, Ms. Brown consistently told Spriggs that she had no contact with Mr. Brown since he left the courtroom in July 2002. On May 11, 2004, about one week before the termination heari ng, Ms. Brown told Spriggs that she was still living at the 146 West Seaview address. Howeve r, when Spriggs checked the accuracy of that information, she found that Ms. Brown had been evicted from that residence in January 2004. Spriggs testified that all five children di splayed educational and emotional problems. At the termination hearing, when asked w hy her children were removed from her home, Ms. Brown claimed that Tamirrah, one of Mr. Brown’s daughters with Virginia Wiggs, “lied- 7 - from day one” “[a]bout the sexual abuse acts.” Ms. Brow n testified that the charges against her and Mr. Brown with respect to that child were ultimately dismissed. Ms. Brown claimed she completed anger management, psychological ev aluations, a psychosexual evaluation, and parenting classes and that she attended different types of c ounseling and therapy, as she was ordered to do. She admitted she refused therapy offered by NDSS, but claimed she did so because she was seeing another therapist. Ms. Brown acknowledged that T.J.B. was sexually abused by one of Wiggs’s and Mr. Brown’s sons . Ms. Brown claimed that she and Mr. Brown called social services about the sexual abuse of T.J.B. She continued to deny the allegations of sexual abuse against her, and maintained that she would never let anyon e, including Mr. Brown, hurt her children. She claimed, “this is all a mi stake, a mistake made. They are blaming my husband and me. I’m not blaming Social Services. It was a mistake. It was really a mistake, and I blame more Virginia Wiggs than I do Social Services.” When asked whether she believed her husband abused her children in any way, Ms. Brown responded, “No, I don’t. I believe that what it is a misunderstanding.” She also claimed she did not believe that her children had said they were abused “because they told me di fferent.” Ms. Brown testified as follows: The children told me different. They told me that their daddy didn’t do anything. I asked th em that question. I asked my children. I really did. I asked them in front of Dr. Wald when he had the parent – like they got al l the kids up, and he’s watching through the glass mirror thing a nd the kids ar e blurting out themselves. I didn’t coach them or nothing like that. I didn’t say nothing to encourage it. They just came out and started telling me everything of what happened to them in foster care where they got abused. They started saying that Tamirrah lied about their daddy raping them, and the kids said and they told me – I asked the doctor did he jot it down. He told me yeah. The kids said the foster mother was beating them. . . . Ms. Brown claimed the trauma sustained by her children occurred after they were removed from her home in August 2001, due to be ing questioned over and over and “it gets to- 8 - them and they just lie.” Other than the abus e by one of Wiggs’s sons to T.J.B., Ms. Brown denied any other source of trauma to her childrenbefore they were removed from her home in August 2001. She denied having any contact with Mr. Brown since he left the J&DR court on July 25, 2002. Ms. Brown admitted she had no appropriate housing for her children. At the termination hearing, Ms. Brown’s former landlord, Cathleen Stewart, testified that Mr. Brown entered into a six-month lease, da ted October 30, 2003, to re nt property from her located at 146 West Seaview. Mr. Brown signe d the lease in Stewart’s presence. Stewart indicated that she had seen and talked to both Mr. and Mrs. Brown at the property after July 25, 2002; that Mr. Brown lived ther e and made repairs; that ar ound October 2003, Ms. Brown asked her to tell NDSS that Mr. Brown was not living at the property; and that the Browns were evicted in January 2004. Stewart stated that she saw Mr. Brown at the property about two weeks before the eviction, and she also believed Wiggs a nd her children were living at the property. In response to Stewart’s testimony, Ms. Brown claimed that she had a friend pose as her husband in dealing with Stewart. Ms. Brown also claimed that Stewart lied when she testified that she had contact with Mr. Brown in 2004. Based upon this record, the circuit court gran ted the petition to terminate Ms. Brown’s residual parental rights, reiter ating its finding by clear and convi ncing evidence that all five children, while in the home and under Ms. Brown’ s care and custody, were neglected and abused within the statute and that such abuse and negl ect was substantial and le d to “deep-rooted and lasting traumatization of these children.” Th e circuit court found it wa s not reasonably likely that the conditions, which led to th e abuse and neglect, were substa ntially corrected or eliminated to allow the children’s safe return to Ms. Br own within a reasonable time. The trial court recognized Ms. Brown’s efforts at evaluations, assessments, th erapy, and parenting education, but noted her continuing denial of the underlying trauma of her children, finding that she will not- 9 - or cannot protect them from future abuse and ne glect. The trial court did not find Ms. Brown to be a credible witness, noting the conflict s between her testimony and Stewart’s testimony regarding her contact with Mr. Brown in 2003 and 2004. The trial court concluded that Ms. Brown had not ceased her ongoing relationshi p with Mr. Brown, “who was at a minimum a substantial contributo r to the children’s trauma in their home situation.” Finally, the trial court concluded that Ms. Brown had “not met the goals of eliminating the cause or the prospect of likely future abuse and neglect of [her] child ren by adequately prot ecting them from it.”
I. “[T]ermination of residual parental rights is a grave, drastic, and irreversible action,” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991). When considering termination of a parent ’s residual parental rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determina tion based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without ev idence to support it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). Code § 16.1-283 provides for the termination of residual parental ri ghts under carefully defined circumstances. Here, the trial court conc luded that the evidence warranted termination of Ms. Brown’s residual parental rights to he r five children on altern ative grounds, i.e., under subsections (B) and (C ) of Code § 16.1-283. Where a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court and, if- 10 - we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Boone v. C. Arthur Weaver Co. , 235 Va. 157, 161, 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1988). Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), a pa rent’s residual parental rights may be terminated if the c ourt finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that: 1. The neglect or abuse suffe red by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and 2. It is not reasonably like ly that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. . . . The record amply supports the trial court’s fi nding that each of Ms. Brown’s children suffered from such neglect and abuse as to presen t a serious and substantia l threat to his or her life, health, or development. The record also supports the trial court’s finding that it was not reasonably likely that th e conditions which resulted in the ch ildren’s abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the safe return of the children to Ms. Brown within a reasonable time period. Ms. Brown argues, however, that the trial cour t erred by failing to consider the efforts she made towards remedying the conditions that led to the children being rem oved from her care and custody. Nothing in the record supports thatcontention. NDSS acknowledged Ms. Brown, after initial refusals to do so, participated in the progr ams the department offered. In addition, the trial court recognized that Ms. Brown “after initial difficulty and unwillingness” undertook efforts at evaluations, assessments, therapy, and parenting classes. Howeve r, the trial court concluded from the evidence that Ms. Brown “has not ev er accepted and indeed continues to deny the underlying trauma of her children, and she will no t or cannot adequately protect these children- 11 - from the continuation of the afflicting abuse and neglect that occurred while they were in her
care.” In its role as fact finder, the trial court did not find Ms. Brown to be credible, and concluded that she had not ceased her ongoing relationship with Mr. Brown, “who was at a minimum a substantial contributor to the children’s trauma in th eir home situation.” The trial court noted that Ms. Brown did not currently ma intain a stable or even a minimally suitable residence for the children and would not be able to provide one in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the trial court determined that it wa s not likely that the cond itions which resulted in the neglect and abuse of the children could either be substantially corrected or eliminated to allow their safe return to mother within a reas onable time. Thus, the tr ial court concluded that termination of Ms. Brown’s residual parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Based on our review of the record, we concl ude that the trial c ourt’s decision was not plainly wrong or without eviden ce to support it. Credible evid ence supports the trial court’s findings that the neglect and abuse suffered by the children presented a substa ntial threat to their life, health, and development and that Ms. Brow n failed to substantially remedy the conditions that resulted in the removal of the children from her care and custody and their placement into foster care. Accordingly, we will not di sturb the trial court’s decision on appeal.
II. Ms. Brown also argues that th e trial court abused its discre tion in denying her motion that the trial judge meet in chambers with V.C. In denying that motion, the trial court concluded that V.C. “was developmentally delayed and otherw ise not at an age of discretion” under Code § 16.1-283(G), and therefore, even if V.C. objecte d to the termination, the trial court would not give weight to her testimony.- 12 - The record reflects that V.C. was enroll ed in special education classes, was developmentally delayed, and suffers from sick le-cell anemia. Dr. Vaughan-Eden, as well as Brewster, V.C.’s current therapist, diagnosed V.C. as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. Brewster also diagnosed V.C. as suffering from “adjustment disorder with depression.” Dr. Vaughan-Eden testified that V.C. was at the highest risk because she was unable to discuss the trauma she suffered. Dr. Vaughan-Ed en noted that V.C. had scars on her body, yet she could not talk about how she got them due to fear and anxiety. Dr. Vaughan-Eden believed V.C. had been talking with Ms. Brown on the phone. V.C. told Dr. Vaughan-Eden that Ms. Brown had placed Mr. Brown on the phone and th at he had reassured V.C. that they were going to get her back, but that “she really needed not, again, share their business with the community.” V.C. presented to Dr. Vaughan-Eden as a child who was “w illing to sacrifice and keep quiet, because . . . the goal is my parents had promised that I will return home if I keep quiet.” Dr. Vaughan-Eden found that V.C. idealized her situation as if she had been coached. Dr. Vaughan-Eden testified that in making her recommendations to NDSS, she based her opinions, in part, upon actual phy sical evidence of sexual abuse of V.C. that she received. Code § 16.1-283(G) provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provisi ons of this section, residual parental rights shall not be termin ated if it is established that the child, if he is fourteen years of ag e or older or otherwise of an age of discretion as determined by the court, objects to such termination. However, residual pare ntal rights of a child fourteen years of age or older may be te rminated over the objection of the child, if the court finds that any di sability of the child reduces the child’s developmental age and that the child is not otherwise of an age of discretion. Based upon this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that V.C., although chronologically four teen years of age, had a disabili ty that reduced her developmental- 13 - age and that she was not otherwise of an age of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Ms. Brown’s motion that the tria l judge talk to V.C. in chambers during the termination hearing. For these reasons, we summarily affirm the trial court’s decision. Affirmed.