UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MICHAEL A. WOOTEN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CALVIN HAYDEN; WAYNE RECTOR; 

WAYNE BAKER; DALE REED; (FNU) 

HOSTETLER; JOSEPH MAZZEI; (FNU) 

BERG; (FNU) PREW; (FNU) (LNU) (1); 

JASON COVINGTON; KELLY RYAN, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 21-3065 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-03067-SAC) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Michael A. Wooten appeals pro se from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

action challenging his pretrial detention in solitary confinement. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 2, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I 

 Wooten is a pretrial detainee at the Johnson County Adult Detention Center 

(JCADC), where he has been held on state charges since 2017. The district court 

summarized the factual background as follows: 

Plaintiff is charged with aggravated indecent liberties and sexual 

exploitation of a child. He was taken into custody in October 2017 and 

was ordered to have no contact with the juvenile victim. However, he 

repeatedly contacted the victim by telephone from the jail; in a state 

court proceeding, the State described the contents of the calls as 

including extensive witness intimidation [by which] the defendant 

discussed with and suggested to the juvenile victim that she commit 

suicide. The jail became aware of these calls and took steps to block the 

victim’s phone number. Despite this, the plaintiff was able to contact 

the victim using different telephone numbers that were not programmed 

into the jail telephone system. 

In December 2017, the state district court ordered that plaintiff be 

prohibited from using the telephone in the JCADC. The jail responded 

by placing plaintiff in a solitary confinement cell with release for three 

hours daily. 

R. at 305 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).1

 In his second amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, Wooten 

claimed his due process rights were violated because a sheriff at JCADC, Calvin 

Hayden, and a state court judge, Kelly Ryan, “made the decision to punish [him] by 

[placing him in] solitary confinement,” R. at 296. He also alleged he had been held 

1

 Recognizing Wooten’s pro se status and the liberal pleading standard, the 

district court gleaned these facts in part from supplemental materials Wooten filed 

with the district court. Wooten does not object either to the district court’s reference 

to his supplemental materials or its recitation of the facts. 

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in solitary confinement for two-and-a-half years with no finding of guilt, and he 

sought $15 million in compensatory damages.2

 On screening, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The court determined that Wooten failed to state a due 

process violation because his placement in solitary confinement was not punishment 

but a restriction reasonably related to the jail’s legitimate interest in preventing him 

from contacting the victim. The court further determined that Wooten asserted a 

speedy-trial claim, which must be brought in state court or in a federal habeas 

petition. Finally, the court concluded that Wooten’s claim for compensatory 

damages was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 

II 

 We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under § 1915A(b)(1) for 

failure to state a claim. See Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). 

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ‘a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ghailani v. Sessions, 

859 F.3d 1295, 1303 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements” are not enough. Id. at 1304 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The complaint must “include[] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

2

 Wooten also named as defendants “Sgt. Hostetler plus 6 remaining on 

additional sheet.” R. at 295. He did not, however, explain how they participated in 

any wrongdoing. We constrain our analysis accordingly. 

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plausible on its face.” Young, 554 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although we afford pro se pleadings a liberal construction, we do not advocate for 

pro se parties, who are obligated to follow the same rules of procedure that govern 

other litigants. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 

(10th Cir. 2005). 

 On appeal, Wooten repeats many of the same allegations that the district court 

found deficient, but he does not directly address the district court’s reasons for 

dismissing his claims. His failure to do so waives appellate review of the district 

court’s rulings. See Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 

2015) (affirming dismissal where appellant failed to challenge the district court’s 

grounds for dismissal).3

 

Even so, we perceive no error in the district court’s analysis. Wooten insists 

his placement in solitary confinement violated his due process rights as a pretrial 

detainee, but the district court correctly explained there was no due process violation 

so long as the restriction was not punishment. Indeed, “[a]bsent a showing of an 

expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, th[e] 

3

 Wooten’s opening brief makes several undeveloped statements that have no 

apparent relationship either to his claims or to the grounds for the district court’s 

dismissal. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 4 (“Inadequate counsel . . . Incorrect evidentiary 

ruling, Prosecutorial misconduct all resulting from Isolation.”); id. (“Inadequate legal 

representation can have major consequences for a criminal proceeding . . . .”); id.

(“Biased or lost evidence by judge[.]”). We do not consider these comments because 

“scattered statements” made in the context of other issues “fail to frame and develop 

an issue sufficient to invoke appellate review.” Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 

1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994). 

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determination [of whether a restriction constitutes punishment] generally will turn on 

whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is 

assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 

purpose assigned to it.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably 

related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may 

infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment.” Id. at 539. But 

“the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is 

a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial 

detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.” 

Id. at 540. 

 Wooten’s placement in solitary confinement was not punishment. It was a 

facility management tool implemented by JCADC to effectuate the state court’s order 

prohibiting Wooten from contacting the victim. JCADC officials attempted 

alternative, less restrictive measures, including blocking the victim’s phone number, 

but Wooten circumvented those measures and persisted in calling the victim. This 

more restrictive measure was reasonably related to JCADC’s legitimate interest in 

managing the facility in a way that prevented Wooten from contacting the victim in 

contravention of the state court’s order. See id. (recognizing that restrictions 

reasonably related to a detention facility’s legitimate management goals are not 

punishment); Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(concluding there was no due process violation where pretrial detainee was placed in 

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segregation as a managerial decision for lack of bed space in general population and 

as a security measure where detainee admitted to an escape plot from his previous 

facility). 

 The district court also correctly determined that, to the extent Wooten asserted 

a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim, he should have brought it either via a federal 

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or through the normal channels available in 

his state criminal proceedings, see Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353-54 & n.2 

(10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that after exhausting his state remedies, a state pretrial 

detainee may bring a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim under § 2241 to force the 

state to go to trial, but noting that “federal courts should abstain from the exercise of 

. . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial on the merits in 

the state court or by other state procedures available” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 

state court defendant attacking his pretrial detention should bring a habeas petition 

pursuant to the general grant of habeas authority contained within 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241.”). 

 Finally, the district court correctly determined that Wooten’s claim for 

compensatory damages was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which states: 

No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, 

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or 

the commission of a sexual act . . . . 

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Id. Wooten sought compensatory damages “for [the] mental [and] physical stress of 

unlawfully being incarcerated [without a] speedy trial and years of solitary 

confinement.” R. at 300 (capitalization omitted). He did not, however, identify a 

physical injury or sexual act as a result of the alleged speedy-trial violation or his 

placement in solitary confinement. Consequently, his claim for compensatory 

damages was barred. See Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) 

(recognizing that § 1997e(e) “limits the remedies available . . . if the only injuries are 

mental or emotional”); Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 

1999) (holding that § 1997e(e) barred claim for compensatory damages to the extent 

plaintiff alleged only mental or emotional harm).4

III 

 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. Wooten’s motion to proceed without 

prepayment of costs and fees is granted. 

Entered for the Court 

Joel M. Carson III 

Circuit Judge 

4

 Although Wooten referred to “physical stress,” R. at 300, he did not allege 

that he suffered any “physical injury” as required by § 1997e(e). We also note that 

the first amended complaint did allege injury and sexual assault, but those allegations 

do not appear in the operative complaint, so we may not consider them. See Mink v. 

Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n amended complaint 

super[s]edes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal 

effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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