J-S65044-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.M.R., A 

MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.R., MOTHER :

: No. 641 WDA 2016

 

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court at No.: CP-02-AP-0000187-2015 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, OLSON, AND PLATT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2016

M.R. (Mother) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County entered April 13, 2016, that terminated her parental rights 

to her son D.M.R., born in December of 2013 (Child). We affirm.1 

Mother has two older sons; one lives with her former paramour by 

court order and the trial court terminated her parental rights to the other. 

Mother received limited prenatal care and tested positive for marijuana at 

Child’s birth. Child left the hospital in Mother’s care with assistance from 

crisis in-home services. (See N.T. Hearing, 4/04/16, at 45-46). When 

Mother was subsequently incarcerated, the Allegheny County Office of 

Children, Youth, and Families (CYF) removed Child from Mother’s care via an 

emergency custody authorization on September 26, 2014. (See id. at 52). 

 



 Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of R.W. (Father), the 

parental rights of an unknown father. Neither Father nor the unknown 

father appealed those terminations.
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The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on October 10, 2014, and placed 

him in the care of his maternal grandfather and maternal step-grandmother 

(Grandmother) where he remains. (See id. at 54, 72). 

Since Child’s removal, Mother has been incarcerated for the following 

periods: February 17, 2015 to March 26, 2016; August 19, 2015 to 

September 15, 2015; October 27, 2015 to November 13, 2015; and 

December 8, 2015 to December 9, 2015. (See id. at 59). Mother’s criminal 

history consists of convictions for criminal trespass, simple assault, false 

identification to law enforcement, retail theft, criminal conspiracy, DUI, 

disorderly conduct, receiving stolen property, and theft by deception. At the

time of the termination hearing in this case, Mother was incarcerated for 

violation of probation and was awaiting trial on criminal charges dating back 

to 2014 and 2015. (See id. at 59, 91-92).

CYF filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on 

December 8, 2015. The trial court held a hearing on that petition on April 4, 

2016. Testifying at the hearing, in addition to Mother, were CYF caseworker, 

Michelle Matthews; and psychologist, Beth Bliss, Psy.D. 

Mother testified that it takes Child a while to warm up to her during 

their visits because he does not see her that often and he is not used to 

being around her. (See id. at 95-96). She explained that Child was not 

used to seeing her because she was in and out of jail. (See id.). Mother 

stated she did not want to take Child from her stepmother, but “I don't feel 
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like I should lose my rights so I wouldn’t be able to see him 

(indiscernible)[2] his life.” (Id. at 99). 

On January 13, 2016, Beth Bliss, Psy.D, licensed psychologist, 

performed interactional evaluations of Child and Grandmother and Child and 

Mother and an individual evaluation of Mother. (See id. at 9). Child called 

Grandmother “Mommy” and appeared bonded to her. (See id. at 10-11). 

Dr. Bliss reported that when Mother first entered the room, Child did not 

approach her or respond to her in any way. 

Mother did not understand Child’s developmental stage and chose 

activities that were above his level. Mother spent much of the evaluation 

holding Child and talking to Dr. Bliss. Dr. Bliss did not see any bond 

between Mother and Child. (See id. at 15).

Mother told Dr. Bliss that she rarely drinks now, but drinks to the point 

of intoxication when she does. She has decreased her marijuana use to 

every few days. (See id. at 17). Dr. Bliss diagnosed Mother with major 

depressive disorder, moderate recurrent episode with anxious distress, and 

cannabis use to borderline moderate. (See id. at 26). Dr. Bliss opined that 

Mother is unable to meet Child’s emotional needs due to her mental health 

and substance abuse problems and the way she handled Child’s emotional 

distress during the evaluation. Dr. Bliss recommended that Mother attend a 

 

2

 The hearing was recorded and later transcribed.
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dual diagnosis treatment program, undergo random drug screens, and take 

parental education classes. (See id. at 27). 

Dr. Bliss opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not 

have a negative effect on Child and would meet his needs and welfare. (See 

id. at 28).

CYF Caseworker, Michelle Matthews, testified that she observed the 

interaction between Mother and Child on one occasion during a visit at the 

CYF office on August 17, 2015. (See id. at 69). Ms. Matthews testified that 

the two-hour visit ended thirty minutes early at Mother’s request because 

Child was upset during the visit. (See id.).

The trial court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b) on April 13, 2016. 

Mother filed her notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on 

appeal on May 5, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The trial court entered 

its opinion on June 29, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1).

Mother raises the following question on appeal:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter 

of law in concluding that [CYF] met its burden of proving that 

termination of [] Mother’s parental rights meets the needs and 

welfare of [C]hild pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b) by clear 

and convincing evidence[?]

(Mother’s Brief, at 5).

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 
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presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of 

the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8), (b). 

The trial court concluded that termination was appropriate under 

Section 2511(a)(8). 

With regard to Section 2511(a)(8), in order to terminate 

parental rights, an agency must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that (1) that the child has been removed from the care 

of the parent for at least twelve (12) months; (2) that the 
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conditions which had led to the removal or placement of the 

child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations 

omitted).

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make 

specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child, but 

our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 
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is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).

. . . If a court finds grounds for termination . . . a court must 

determine whether termination is in the best interests of the 

child, considering the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this 

regard, trial courts must carefully review the individual 

circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how a 

parent’s incarceration will factor into an assessment of the child’s 

best interest. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830-31 (Pa. 2012).

Even though Mother does not challenge the termination of her parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a), we have examined the record and are 

satisfied that it contains sufficient credible evidence to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). 

Child was removed from Mother’s care in September of 2014, and has 

been in kinship foster care continuously since then. The conditions that led 

to Child’s placement, Mother’s abuse of alcohol and marijuana, still exist. 

Mother admits to marijuana use and to drinking herself into occasional 

states of intoxication. Credible testimony by Dr. Bliss and Ms. Mathews 

demonstrates that Child is safe and that all his needs are met in 

Grandmother’s care. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when 

it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).
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Mother supports her claim that there was insufficient evidence to 

terminate her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) by reviewing the 

testimony of Dr. Bliss and Ms. Matthews and concluding: 

Dr. Bliss and Ms. Matthews had only singular opportunities in 

unnatural situations and very limited time frames in which to 

observe the interaction and upon which to formulate their 

opinions as to the substantive nature of the parent-child 

relationship. Therefore, the record lacks competent evidence 

upon which a finding can be made that the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of 

[Child] pursuant to [S]ection 2511(b).

(Mother’s Brief, at 17).

We disagree. The testimony of Dr. Bliss and Ms. Matthews, cited 

above, is sufficient evidence upon which a trial court could base a 

determination that termination is in the best interest of Child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). In the present case, the trial court, as trier of fact, 

credited the testimony of Dr. Bliss and Ms. Matthews. Absent a showing of 

an abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb a trial court’s finding of 

credibility based on sufficient evidence, even if we could reach a different 

conclusion. See In re M.G., supra at 73-74. 

Mother has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it terminated her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and 

(b) and we conclude that it did not. See In re L.M., supra at 511. 

Therefore, Mother’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

terminated her parental rights pursuant to subsection (b) is without merit. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County that terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/23/2016