Interim Decision #2065 

MATTER OF LAURENZANO, ET AL. 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-19328865, —869 

A-19328870, —1, —2 

Decided by. Board November 30, 1970 

■Iotwithstanding respondents, admitted as Argentine nationals for temporary visits, may now be stateless, having executed subsequent to entry 

declarations of renunciation of Argentine nationality under the United 

Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Act, and Covenants, their deportation to Argentina may nevertheless be directed under section 243 (a) of 

the Immigration and Natonality Act. 

!HARGES: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241 (a) (9) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (9)]—Nonimmigrant visitor—failed to comply with conditions 

of admission (Alien (1) ) 

Act of 1952—Section 241 (a) (2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2))—Nonimmigrant visitor—remained longer (Aliens (2) 

to (5) ) 

■I BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Murray H. Rittenberg, Esquire Irving A. Appleman 

11 Beacon Street Appellate Trial Attorney 

Boston, Massachusetts 02108 

Respondents appeal from orders of a special inquiry officer 

ding them deportable respectively on the above-stated charges, 

nying their applications for voluntary departure, and directing 

eir deportation to Argentina. The appeals will be dismissed. 

All five respondents .had hearings before the same special iniry officer at which they were represented by the same attory, who also represents them on these appeals. All five cases 

esent the same issue on appeal, were argued together before 

s Board, and can be adequately adjudicated in one opinion. 

Respondents are all male natives of Argentina, ranging in age 

art 22 to 28, who entered the United States as nationals of that 

entry as temporary visitors for pleasure on various dates in 

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1970 and were admitted for fixed periods of time. Within the period of his authorized admission, respondent Laurenzano was 

found gainfully employed, in violation of the conditions of his admission. The others were found here after expiration of their respective periods of admission. Orders to show cause were issued 

on October 22, 1970. 

At their respective deportation hearings, each respondent admitted the truth of the factual allegations contained in his order 

to show cause and conceded deportability on the charge stated. 

Our review of the records satisfies us that deportability has been 

established in each case by evidence which is clear, convincing 

and unequivocal. 

Counsel stated at each hearing that the respondent therein had 

given up his Argentine nationality. Each respondent applied for 

the privilege of voluntary departure but conceded that he lacked 

the funds needed to depart at his own expense. Since they all 

were thereby ineligible for voluntary departure under 8 CFR 

244.1, the special inquiry officer denied their applications. Under 

the circumstances, that action was proper. 

In the presence of counsel, each respondent was asked to state 

the country to which he wished to be deported. Without objection, 

each respondent designated Argentina. The orders of deportation 

before us on appeal direct deportation in each case to Argentina. 

At the oral argument, counsel for respondents handed up and 

asked us to consider five documents under seal, executed respectively by each respondent under oath before a notary public, 

which purport to constitute renunciations of their allegiance to 

Argentina and to render them stateless. The documents, while 

varying in dates of execution,' are identical in form. They refer 

to and invoke "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 

the Covenants on Human Rights, United Nations Treaty Series, 

No. 5158"; "the final act of the United Nations Conference on the 

Status of Stateless Persons, done at New York, on 28 September 

1954, registered ex officio on 6 June 1960"; "two covenants the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—

which were adopted by the General Assembly on December 16, 

1966"; and they specifically invoke and quote the amendments of 

Article 2 of the Declaration. 

On appeal, counsel does not challenge the finding of deportability or the denial of voluntary departure. His primary attack is on 

I Biancardi's and Bravo's are dated October 24, 1970. The three others are 

dated November 4, 1970. 

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the deportation orders' designation of Argentina as the country 

of deportation and he appears to present three alternative arguments. 

First, he contends that the Argentine travel documents needed 

7or respondents' deportation to Argentina, requested by the Immigration Service from the Argentine authorities, have not yet 

>een forthcoming and he asks for 60 days to "straighten it out 

me way or the other." The short answer is that the obtention of 

ravel documents needed to execute a deportation order is the reponsibility of Service officers engaged in enforcement functions. 

t is not within the competence of the special inquiry officer or 

pis Board, whose functions are quasi-judicial. We see no reason 

) defer action for 60 days. 

Second, counsel contends that, as stateless persons, respondents 

Lay not be deported to Argentina, the country of their former 

itionality. Assuming, arguendo, that respondents' ex parte decrations are sufficient to result in an effective loss of Argenne nationality and consequent statelessness, it by no means folws that they may not be deported to Argentina. The specific 

rms of the deportation statute require us to reject this argu-

?nt. 

The statutory scheme is relatively simple. Section 241 of the 

t defines the deportable classes of aliens, section 242 prescribes 

procedures for determining deportability, and section 243 preibes the manner of executing deportation orders. Section 

(a) gives the deportable alien the first choice. With certain 

eptions not here pertinent, it requires deportation "to a counpromptly designated by the alien if that country is willing to 

?pt him into its territory." Failing that, deportation is diRd to the country of the alien's nationality, if it will accept 

. Failing that, deportation may be effected to a number of alative destinations, including the country from which the alien 

entered the United States, the country in which he was born, 

any country in which he had previously resided. 

ach respondent specifically selected Argentina as his destinaSection 243 (a) does not require generally that the alien be a 

Dnal of the country he chooses as his destination. Thus, even 

B accept as established respondents' loss of Argentine nationand their consequent statelessness, there is no basis on 

h we can hold that the special inquiry officer's orders of deLtion to Argentina did not comply with the statute. 

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Counsel asserted at oral argument that the respondents had 

designated Argentina on his advice and that he had so advised 

them because the special inquiry officer in other cases had discouraged selection of a country other than that of the alien's nationality or origin. There is nothing in the records before us to 

support counsel's assertions or to indicate in any way that respondents' designation of Argentina did not represent their real 

choice. In any event, even if we accept counsel's version and ignore their designations, Argentina would still be the appropriate 

destination under section 243(a). If respondents are still nationals of that country. Argentina is the destination required by the 

second step of section 243(a). And if they are stateless, as they 

claim, Argentina is still a permissible destination under several 

of the alternatives afforded by the third step, e.g., as the country 

of their birth. 

Counsel's third argument is that, as stateless persons, respondents may not be deported to any country." He relies for this proposition on the United Nations Declaration, Act, and Covenants referred to in the instruments of renunciation executed by 

respondents. We reject this thesis. Quite apart from the fact that 

United Nations conventions adhered to by the United States are 

not self-executing and do not of themselves supersede our domestic immigration laws, 3counsel has pointed to nothing in any 

treaty, convention or protocol adhered to by the United States 

which can be construed as in conflict with the specific terms of 

section 293(a). On counsel's premise, all aliens illegally in the 

United States could thwart deportation and effectively obtain permanent residence here by the simple expedient of renouncing 

their foreign nationality and becoming stateless. Bearing in mind ' 

the careful system set up by Congress to limit and control immi2(Transcript of oral argument, page 4) : 

Chairman: Let me ask you this question, because I would like to get to the 

theory upon which you are here. 15 it your view that your clients are now 

stateless? And is it your view, since they are stateless, the U.S. Government cannot deport them to any country? 

Attorney: Exactly. 

Chaiiman : In other wcrds it is your view that an alien can come to the U.S. 

as a temporary visitor and then achieve what amounts to permanent residence by the mere device of executing a renunciation of his foreign nationality and becoming stateless? • 

Attorney: May I say according to U.S. laws, no, but according to 

international law a treaty which takes precedence over this government's 

laws, and signed by the U.S., yes. Absolutely yes. 

3See Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7 Cir., 1959) ; Hitai v. INS, 343 

F.2d 466 (2 Cir., 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 816. 

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gration, it is clear to us that Congress never contemplated such a 

result. We cannot construe section 243(a) as having • been 

amended in the manner suggested by counsel, in the absence of 

more conclusive evidence that this is actually what Congress intended. 

ORDER: Tt is ordered that the appeals be and they are hereby 

dismissed. 

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