J-S13002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.N., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 37 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001900-2012

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.H.N., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 39 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000518-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.N., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 40 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000519-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: W.N., A 

MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER

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: No. 41 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000520-2019

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 07, 2023

D.B. (Mother) appeals from the orders entered December 1, 2022, which 

granted the petitions of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) 

and changed the permanency goals of her children, M.A.N. (born in May of 

2010), H.H.N. (born in October of 2013), M.M.N. (born in April of 2016), and 

W.N. (born in March of 2018) (collectively, Children), from reunification to 

adoption.

1

 Because we conclude that Mother has waived all of her issues for 

review, we dismiss these appeals. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother timely filed separate appeals from the trial court’s November 1, 2022 

decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

This Court docketed those appeals at 3024 EDA 2022, 3025 EDA 2022, 3026 

EDA 2022, and 3027 EDA 2022 and addressed them in a separate opinion. In 

that opinion, we concluded that the trial court violated Children’s right to 

counsel under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), vacated the decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. However, for the 

reasons set forth below, we conclude Mother has waived any claims regarding 

Children’s right to counsel in the dependency proceedings.
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Briefly, on July 9, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Children dependent. 

The trial court held periodic permanency review hearings throughout the 

pendency of these cases. Initially, on March 28, 2019, the trial court 

appointed the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Child Advocacy Unit to 

serve as Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and legal counsel. However, the 

trial court appointed a separate attorney (Children’s TPR counsel) to serve as 

Children’s legal counsel on January 31, 2022. 

On June 13, 2022, DHS filed goal change petitions for all four Children, 

requesting that the trial court change Children’s permanency goals from 

reunification to adoption. The following day, DHS filed petitions seeking the 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to all four 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

The trial court held a combined termination of parental rights (TPR) and 

goal change hearing on November 1, 2022. At the beginning of the hearing, 

Children’s TPR counsel informed the trial court that he had not yet interviewed 

Children due to scheduling problems. In response, the trial court chastised 

Children’s TPR counsel for being unprepared and proceeded with the TPR 

hearing as scheduled. N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 6-7. However, the trial court 

indicated that it would take what evidence it could that day at the TPR hearing 

and scheduled another hearing date concerning the goal change from 

reunification to adoption. Id. 
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DHS’s first witness was Community Umbrella Association (CUA) case 

manager Larry Patrick. Id. at 8. During Mr. Patrick’s testimony, the trial 

court interrupted and remarked:

I just want to take a moment since it’s an appropriate break in the 

flow of the testimony occasioned by three outbursts from 

[Children’s TPR counsel’s] phone. And I observed [Children’s TPR 

counsel] all throughout the hearing and all he’s been doing is 

playing on his [phone] throughout the hearing, making no notes, 

not paying attention to the testimony. The purpose of my doing 

this is now because I’m going to excuse [Children’s TPR counsel]

from the hearing.

We’re looking for a short date to bring everyone back because I 

have to entertain his report from [C]hildren, but I’m not going to 

belabor this hearing now with his presence.

Id. at 26. 

The trial court then announced it would hold an additional hearing on 

December 1, 2022, concerning the goal change at which point Children’s TPR 

counsel would be required to provide the trial court with a report regarding 

his interviews with Children. Id. at 26-28. Thereafter, the trial court 

dismissed Children’s TPR counsel from the hearing. Id. at 29. At that time, 

Farrell Bernstein, Esq., Children’s GAL, expressed her concern about Children’s 

TPR counsel’s absence, and stated that it was her understanding that 

Children’s legal counsel must be present for the entire hearing. Id. The trial 

court responded:

They [i.e., Children’s legal counsel] don’t [have to be present for 

the TPR hearing]. The only purpose is to offer their report as 

to their conversation with [C]hildren. They don’t . . . 

represent any other party, and . . . they’re not attorneys of record 

for any other party. They’re TPR counsel for [C]hildren. And 
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based upon the case law, the purpose for their appearance is 

to offer their report as to their conversations with 

[C]hildren. They do not have to be present.

Id. (emphases added). The trial court then proceeded with the TPR hearing 

in Children’s TPR counsel’s absence.2 Id. 

DHS also presented testimony from S.Y., the kinship caregiver for

M.A.N., H.H.N., and W.N.3 Mother also testified at the TPR hearing. Lastly 

DHS called Jovanna Tagertt as a rebuttal witness. Ultimately, the trial court 

concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under 

Section 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). Id. at 105-06. The trial 

court then entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children. 

At the hearing on December 1, 2022, Children’s TPR counsel reported 

that he had interviewed Children, that all of them were happy with their 

current caregivers, and that the eldest child, M.A.N., said that he wanted S.Y. 

to adopt him. N.T. Hr’g, 12/1/22, at 5, 7-8. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the trial court entered orders changing Children’s permanency goals from 

reunification to adoption. 

Mother simultaneously filed timely notices of appeal and concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 

____________________________________________

2 We note that Mr. Patrick also presented testimony regarding permanency 

review and changing Children’s permanency goals during the November 1, 

2022 TPR hearing. See N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 31-35, 48-52. 

3 The kinship caregiver for M.M.N. did not testify at the TPR hearing. 
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1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) at each trial court docket number.

4

 The trial court judge 

has since retired, and the records were forwarded to this Court without a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review, which 

reorder as follows:

1. Did the court below err in proceeding with the TPR hearing in 

the absence of legal counsel for Children?

2. Did the court below err when it found that DHS by clear and 

convincing evidence had met its burden to change [Children’s] 

goal to adoption?

3. Did the court below err in finding that [DHS], had met its 

burden in proving grounds for termination of parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)?

4. Did the court below err in finding that DHS had met its burden 

to prove that termination would be in [Children’s] best 

interests, under [23 Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 8 (some formatting altered). 

Children’s Right to Counsel

In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred by dismissing 

Children’s TPR counsel from the TPR hearing. Id. at 16-23. Mother contends 

that the trial court violated Children’s statutory right to counsel by directing 

Children’s TPR counsel to leave the courtroom and conducting the TPR hearing 

in Children’s TPR counsel’s absence. Id. at 16, 20-21 (citing, inter alia, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2313(a)). In support, Mother notes that this Court has recognized 

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4 On January 30, 2023, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513. Order, 1/30/23. 
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that the role of a child’s legal counsel is “to engage in client-directed advocacy 

on behalf of the child.” Id. at 20-21 (citing, inter alia, Interest of D.N.G., 

230 A.3d 361, 366 (Pa. Super. 2020)). Therefore, Mother concludes that 

because the trial court deprived Children of their statutory right to legal 

counsel, the goal change orders must be reversed. 

We begin by stating our standard of review:

The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate 

court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations 

of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not 

require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences 

or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of 

discretion.

In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and 

not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the 

parent’s rights are secondary. The burden is on [DHS] to prove 

the change in goal would be in the child’s best interests. In 

contrast, in a termination of parental rights proceedings, the focus 

is on the conduct of the parents under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1172-73 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). 

A child’s right to counsel in dependency proceedings is governed by 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6311; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) (providing that a child has a 

right to counsel in contested TPR proceedings). 

Initially, before addressing the merits of this issue, we must determine 

whether Mother has adequately developed her claim for review. This Court 

may raise this issue of waiver sua sponte. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 

A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007). “The issue of waiver presents a question of 
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law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary.” Trigg v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 

260, 269 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). 

“It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is 

developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by 

citations to relevant authority.” In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that 

an appellant must support her argument with discussion of and citation to 

authorities). “Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a 

claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any 

other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” 

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66 (citation omitted and formatting altered); 

see also Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (explaining 

that this Court will “not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we 

scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will 

deem [the] issue to be waived” (citation omitted)). 

Here, Mother argues that the trial court violated Children’s right to 

counsel in TPR proceedings under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) and has cited 

numerous TPR cases in support of her claim. Mother’s Brief at 16-23. Mother 

does not discuss Children’s right to counsel in dependency proceedings

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311. Therefore, because Mother has failed to support 

her claim with relevant authority, we are constrained to conclude that she has 

waived any claim that the trial court violated Children’s right to counsel with 
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respect to the dependency proceedings.5 See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-

66. 

Goal Change

In her second claim, Mother argues that DHS did not prove by clear and

convincing evidence that changing Children’s permanency goal was in 

Children’s best interests and that the trial court erred by failing to perform a 

proper analysis under the Juvenile Act. Mother’s Brief at 31-32 (citing, inter 

alia, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), (f.1)). 

Before we address the merits of Mother’s claim, we must determine 

whether she has preserved it for appeal. Issues not raised in an appellant’s 

Rule 1925(b) statement are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing 

that issues not included in a Rule 1925(b) statement are waived); see also 

Dietrich v. Dietrich, 923 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

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5 We note that in the context of TPR proceedings, our Supreme Court has held 

that the failure to appoint counsel to represent a child’s legal interests is nonwaivable structural error. See, e.g., In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1086-87 (Pa. 

2018). However, Pennsylvania courts have not recognized that a child’s 

statutory right to separate legal counsel under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311 in 

dependency proceedings is non-waivable. See, e.g., D.N.G., 230 A.3d at 363 

& n.2, 367-68 (vacating the decree terminating the mother’s parental rights 

and remanding for a new TPR hearing where the child’s right to counsel under 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313 had been violated but affirming the goal change order 

because the mother had abandoned her issues relating to her appeal from the 

goal change order). 
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Here, Mother did not include any claim regarding the goal change orders 

in her Rule 1925(b) statement.

6

 Although Mother reserved the right to 

supplement her statement after the preparation of the transcript, see

Mother’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/30/22, at 2 (unpaginated), Mother did 

not seek to do so after receiving a copy of the transcript. 

Therefore, we conclude that Mother has waived her claim relating to the 

goal change orders.

7

 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Dietrich, 923 

A.2d at 463. 

TPR Issues

Mother’s final two issues relate to the November 1, 2022 TPR decrees. 

Mother’s Brief at 23-30.8 As previously stated, Mother has appealed 

separately from the TPR decrees. This Court will not review issues which are 

beyond the scope of the instant appeals from the December 1, 2022 goal 

changes order. See generally M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1069 n.6 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (declining to review the denial of the grandmother’s petition to 

intervene in a dependency case where the grandmother only filed a notice of 

____________________________________________

6 Mother filed identical Rule 1925(b) statements at each trial court docket 

number. 

7 Additionally, even Mother had preserved her goal change claim in her Rule 

1925(b) statement, we would conclude that she waived this claim because 

she failed to develop her arguments beyond bald assertions and failed to 

support her arguments with citations to the record. See Milby, 189 A.3d at 

1079; M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

8 We not that although Mother’s appeals from the dependency orders were not 

consolidated with Mother’s appeals from the TPR decrees, Mother has filed 

identical briefs for both appeals. 
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appeal from the order dismissing her complaint for custody). Therefore, 

Mother’s third and fourth issues are not cognizable in the instant appeals from 

the goal change orders. 

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that all of the issues that 

Mother has raised are either waived or not cognizable. Accordingly, we are 

constrained to dismiss Mother’s appeals. 

Appeals dismissed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/7/2023