COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bray 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JAMES LEE STEVENS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2416-97-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 NOVEMBER 10, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

James M. Lumpkin, Judge Designate 

 Ronald M. Maupin (Gardner, Maupin & Sutton, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 The trial judge convicted James Lee Stevens of aggravated 

sexual battery, see Code § 18.2-67.3, and lasciviously exposing 

his genital parts to a child under the age of fourteen, see Code 

§ 18.2-370(1). On appeal, Stevens contends that (1) the trial 

judge erred in refusing to suppress his confession and (2) the 

evidence was insufficient to corroborate his confession to 

exposing his genital parts to the child. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the convictions. 

 I. 

 The standard of review of the trial judge's ruling on the 

motion to suppress is as follows: 

 In reviewing a trial [judge's] denial of a 

motion to suppress, "[t]he burden is upon 

[the defendant] to show that th[e] ruling, 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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when the evidence is considered most 

favorably to the Commonwealth, constituted 

reversible error." "Ultimate questions of 

 . . . both law and fact . . . are reviewed de

novo on appeal. In performing such analysis, 

we are bound by the trial [judge's] findings 

of historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or 

without evidence to support them and we give 

due weight to the inferences drawn from those 

facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers. 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 

261 (1997) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

 The evidence at the suppression hearing proved that Deputy 

Sheriff Gregory Call went to Ashton Berry's residence on January 

2, 1997, because Berry and James Stevens had gotten into an 

altercation. Berry told the deputy sheriff that Stevens, who 

rented a room in Berry's residence, had sexually assaulted 

Berry's children. The deputy sheriff saw Stevens lying on his 

stomach on the kitchen floor rocking back and forth with both 

arms extended over his head. Although the deputy knew Stevens 

and was aware that Stevens was an epileptic, he told Stevens to 

get up because he believed Stevens was not having an epileptic 

seizure. When Stevens immediately stood, the deputy sheriff 

noticed a small gash on Stevens' forehead that was not bleeding. 

 The deputy sheriff testified that Stevens spoke coherently and 

was responsive to his questions. When Berry made the sexual 

allegation against Stevens, Stevens responded that he "didn't do 

anything." 

 After the rescue squad took Stevens to the hospital, the 
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deputy sheriff went to the hospital and located Stevens on a 

gurney near the emergency room. The deputy sheriff testified 

that Stevens was "awake, conscious and oriented" while waiting to 

be treated. Based on numerous conversations with Stevens in the 

ten years he had known Stevens and on a prior occasion when he 

arrested Stevens for being drunk in public, the deputy testified 

that Stevens' speech patterns and habits at the hospital were the 

same as he had always known them to be. When he asked Stevens 

how he was feeling, Stevens said his head hurt. 

 The deputy sheriff read Stevens his Miranda rights, asked 

Stevens if he understood his rights, and asked Stevens whether he 

wanted to talk about Berry's allegations. Stevens said he 

understood his rights and would talk without an attorney. 

 When the deputy sheriff asked Stevens if he had touched the 

"privates" of the two boys, aged 3 and 4, Stevens said he "didn't 

know anything about it." In response to the deputy sheriff's 

questioning, Stevens said he was in his room on New Year's Eve 

talking on the telephone with a "sex woman" and masturbating. 

Stevens said he heard a noise behind him, saw the boys standing 

in his room, and continued to masturbate for thirty minutes while 

the boys were in the room. 

 Detective Robert Jones arrived at the hospital and asked 

Stevens whether the deputy sheriff had informed him of his 

Miranda rights. Stevens responded "yes" and said he would talk 

to Detective Jones without a lawyer. When the detective told 
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Stevens that the younger boy said Stevens touched his penis, 

Stevens denied doing so. However, Stevens again admitted that 

the boys were in the room when he spoke on the telephone and 

masturbated. When the detective asked Stevens how the boys' 

pants got down, Stevens said he didn't know and said he pulled up 

the older boy's pants after he finished masturbating. Stevens 

also said he may have touched the younger boy's penis when he 

pulled up the boy's pants. The detective asked Stevens if the 

boys were imitating what he was doing. Stevens responded "yes" 

and said he was "show[ing] them how to do it right." Stevens 

denied touching the older boy. 

 After the detective left the hospital to obtain arrest 

warrants, the hospital personnel gave Stevens Novocain, put 

stitches in his head wound, and released him. The deputy sheriff 

testified that Stevens did not exhibit any physical distress 

after he was discharged from the hospital and taken to the 

magistrate's office. 

 A psychological evaluation of Stevens, which was performed 

by Dr. Frank DeForest, a licensed clinical psychologist, was 

admitted as evidence. In his report, Dr. DeForest noted the 

following: 

 [Stevens] has been diagnosed in the past as 

functioning in the mildly retarded range with 

respect to verbal reasoning ability, and 

persons with intellectual impairments are 

often perceived to be particularly 

susceptible to influence from others. 

However, such acquiescent tendencies were not 

especially noticeable during the interview, 

and his attribution of malevolent motives to 
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several of the parties involved is not 

consistent with the blindly trusting attitude 

presumed to underlie acquiescence. 

Noting that "there is reason to suspect that the basis for 

[Stevens'] apparent intellectual limitations is organic, being 

the result of poisoning as a small child," Dr. DeForest stated, 

however, that Stevens' "limitations are not consistent across 

areas of functioning." Dr. DeForest noted that, despite Stevens' 

lengthy history of being treated as mentally retarded, Stevens 

was, "in many spheres, . . . able to function at the level of 

someone with average ability." 

 According to Dr. DeForest, Stevens' failure to take his 

seizure medication had not had any effect on his "reasoning 

ability." Dr. DeForest noted that in the absence of evidence 

that Stevens' "orientation and functioning" had been affected by 

the blow to his head, Stevens "most likely understood his rights 

adequately, was able to weigh his options sufficiently to make an 

intelligent choice and was not unduly susceptible to being 

intimidated or duped into giving a statement." He reported that 

Stevens recalled having his rights read to him prior to giving 

the police a statement and that Stevens gave Dr. DeForest a 

"nearly verbatim recitation of the Miranda warning." When Dr. 

DeForest asked Stevens whether he understood the meaning of the 

"right to remain silent," Stevens replied, it "means I can talk 

to him or talk to my attorney." 

 Barbara Westerby testified that Stevens, whom she has known 
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for fifteen years, will not take a bath, change his underwear, or 

change his clothes without someone making him do so. She also 

testified that Stevens behaves like a five year old. In a 

similar vein, Hazel Dickinson testified that Stevens "is a man in 

a six year old body. He thinks like a child. To me, he thinks 

like a child. And he -- if you tell him to go jump the moon, he 

will try to jump it. I mean, he'll do whatever you tell him to 

do." Julia May Higham testified that Stevens has the mental 

capacity of an eight year old, cannot dress himself, and must be 

told to bathe and shave. 

 Stevens, who is thirty-seven years old and has a tenth grade 

education, testified extensively at the suppression hearing. He 

testified that when he was three years old, he and his stepsister 

drank from a water hose contaminated with pesticide. Stevens' 

stepsister died. He testified concerning the events that led to 

his placement in a foster home and his medication. Although he 

should take Dilantin for epileptic seizures and hyperactivity, on 

January 2, 1997, when the police questioned him, he had not taken 

his epilepsy medicine in six months. Stevens testified that 

after Berry pushed him into a kitchen table, causing an injury to 

his head, he had a seizure. 

 Stevens testified that the deputy sheriff read Miranda

rights to him prior to the questioning at the hospital. He said 

that he understood his Miranda rights but could not remember 

whether the deputy sheriff asked him if he wanted to have a 
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lawyer present. Stevens testified that after he denied Berry's 

accusations, "[the deputy sheriff] kept on, kept on, until I just 

could not take it any more, and [I] said 'Look, maybe I 

accidentally touched him somewhere when I pulled his pants up,' 

because [the deputy sheriff] kept pressuring me." Stevens 

testified that the deputy sheriff made him confess and that "I 

didn't want to say, you know, I touched him when I didn't touch 

him." 

 II. 

 Stevens contends that the trial judge's refusal to suppress 

his statement was erroneous because the statements to the police 

were not voluntary. "For a confession given during custodial 

interrogation to be admissible, the Commonwealth must show that 

the accused was apprised of his right to remain silent and that 

he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right." 

Green v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 646, 652, 500 S.E.2d 835, 838 

(1998). "[I]n determining voluntariness, [the test to be 

applied] is whether the statement is the 'product of an 

essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,' or . . . 

whether the maker's will 'has been overborne and his capacity for 

self-determination critically impaired.'" Stockton v. 

Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (1984) 

(citation omitted). 

 Stevens' "relatively low intelligence and limited education 

[are] factors to be weighed, along with all surrounding 
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circumstances, in determining whether he voluntarily and 

intelligently waived his constitutional rights, and whether his 

confession was voluntary." Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 

535, 547-48, 323 S.E.2d 577, 586 (1984). However, Dr. DeForest's 

report, the interviewing officers' testimony concerning Stevens' 

alertness and responses, and Stevens' own responses and coherent 

testimony at the hearing tend to establish voluntariness. 

 The deputy sheriff, who had spoken with Stevens on numerous 

occasions in the past, testified that Stevens was oriented and 

coherent at the hospital. The detective confirmed that Stevens 

was alert and responsive when he began his questioning. Stevens 

himself acknowledged that he understood the Miranda rights. Dr. 

DeForest's report confirms that. Based on this evidence, 

including the trial judge's observation of Stevens' "attitude, 

appearance, [and] demeanor," the trial judge found that although 

Stevens is "somewhat retarded," he understood the Miranda

warnings and their consequences. In view of the judge's factual 

findings and opportunity to assess Stevens' demeanor and 

responsiveness at trial, we hold that the evidence proved that 

the statements were voluntary. 

 III. 

 Stevens also contends that the evidence failed to adequately 

corroborate his confession concerning the charge of taking 

indecent liberties with a minor. We disagree. 

 The principle is well established that an accused cannot be 
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convicted solely on his or her uncorroborated extrajudicial 

confession. See Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 210-11, 

116 S.E.2d 282, 284-85 (1960). To sustain a conviction based on 

an extrajudicial confession, the evidence must corroborate the 

corpus delicti. Id. Establishing the corpus delicti "involves 

the proof of two distinct propositions: first, that the act was 

done; and secondly, that it was done by the person charged." 

Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741, 750, 21 S.E. 364, 367 

(1895). See also Claxton v. City of Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 152, 

154, 421 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1992) (noting that "[t]he term corpus

delicti, meaning 'the body of a crime,' refers to 'the objective 

proof or substantial fact that a crime has been committed' . . . 

[and] 'ordinarily includes two elements: the act and the 

criminal agency of the act'"). 

 The principle is equally well established that "[w]hen . . . 

the commission of the crime has been fully confessed by the 

accused, only slight corroborative evidence is necessary to 

establish the corpus delicti." Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 

124, 133, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984). 

 It is not necessary, however, that there be 

independent corroboration of all the contents 

of the confession, or even of all the 

elements of the crime. The requirement of 

corroboration is limited to the facts 

constituting the corpus delicti. . . . 

 The confession is itself competent 

evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti, 

and all that is required of the Commonwealth 

in such a case is to present evidence of such 

circumstances as will, when taken in 

connection with the confession, establish the 
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corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Further, corroborative facts supporting the 

corpus delicti may be furnished by 

circumstantial evidence as readily as by 

direct evidence. 

Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 348-49, 385 S.E.2d 50, 54 

(1989). 

 In addition to Stevens' confession, Stevens testified at 

trial. His own testimony proved he was talking with a "sex 

operator" on the telephone on December 31, 1996, and 

masturbating. Other evidence proved that while Stevens lived 

with the Berry family, he had his own room and his own telephone 

line connected to his room. Stevens was in his bedroom between 

11:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., a time when the two minors were 

separate from the other adults in the house. A pediatric nurse 

practitioner, who specializes in the assessment of child sexual 

abuse cases, testified that the child's penis was bruised. She 

further testified that the bruise could have been caused by the 

application of pressure by a hand and that the age of the bruise 

was consistent with an occurrence on December 31, 1996. 

 Under Code § 18.2-370, to prove a charge of indecent 

liberties, the Commonwealth had to prove that "[a]ny person 

eighteen years of age or over, . . . with lascivious intent, 

. . . knowingly and intentionally: (1) Expose[d] his or her 

sexual or genital parts to any child under the age of fourteen 

years to whom such person is not legally married or propose[d] 

that any such child expose his or her sexual or genital parts to 
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such person." The evidence at trial corroborated the date and 

time of the offense, the presence of the children in the house 

apart from their parents, and the location of the touching to 

which Stevens confessed. Stevens' own testimony corroborated his 

presence in his room on the night of the offense as well as his 

previously confessed conduct that he was masturbating while 

talking on the telephone in the presence of the children. The 

evidence, which was extraneous to Stevens' confession, 

sufficiently corroborated Stevens' confession that he committed 

the charged offense. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.