* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 2 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARJORIE A. CREAMER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. LAIDLAW TRANSIT, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-1019 (D.C. No. 92-S-1673) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before MURPHY and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Ms. Creamer’s motion was untimely if she intended t o file pursuant to

Rules 60(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3) because those mot ions must be made no more than one year after the judgment. Rules 60(b)(4) a nd (b)(5) do not apply here.

-2- In August 1992, plaintiff-appellant Marjorie Creame r filed a complaint against her employer, Laidlaw Transit, Inc., allegi ng hostile work environment sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendant. Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 86 F.3d 167, 172 (10th Cir. 1996). More than six y ears after this court’s affirmance of the underlying jud gment, Ms. Creamer filed a pro se motion in the district court styled “Plain tiff’s Motion to Reopen with Additional Documents to Support and Add to the Arch ives.” The district court denied Ms. Creamer’s motion, and this appeal follow ed. We affirm. We construe Ms. Creamer’s motion as one filed underFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and review its denial for abuse of discretion, see LaFleur v. Teen Help , Nos. 02-4160, 02-4161, 02-4177, 2003 WL 22052834, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). 1 Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “is appropriate only w hen it offends justice to deny such relief. The denial of a 60(b)(6) motion will be reversed only if we find a complete absence of a reasonable basis and are ce rtain that the decision is wrong.” Yapp v. Excel Corp. , 186 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).-3-

Ms. Creamer’s motion in the district court requeste d that the underlying case be reopened and that certain documents be adde d to the record. On appeal from the denial of that motion, Ms. Creamer reargue s the facts of her case, contends that testimony from other employees shouldhave been admitted at trial, claims that her attorney had a conflict of interestbecause he represented one of those employees in a later suit against Laidlaw, an d charges the trial judge with bias and criminal libel. As noted above, we have already affirmed the distri ct court’s judgment against Ms. Creamer on the merits of her claim against Laidlaw. See Creamer , 86 F.3d at 172. In doing so, we rejected Ms. Cream er’s argument that a Ms. Danford should have been allowed to testify. Id. at 171. Any argument regarding another potential witness could presumabl y have been raised on direct appeal. Ms. Creamer’s untimely contention now fall s far short of the exceptional circumstance required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6 ). Because there is no showing as to how this potential witness’s testimony would have changed the outcome of her case, Ms. Creamer’s charges of attor ney conflict similarly fail to support the right to such relief. Ms. Creamer did not raise the issue of judicial bias or libel in the motion to the district court. We will thus not address it on appeal. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).-4-

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Ms. Creamer’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The judgment o f the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. Ms. Creamer’s motion for leav e to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees, as well as her motions for sanctions and for oral argument are DENIED.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge