alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                  5
       
<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                         SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               321,906
<SECURITIES>                                         2,903,812
<RECEIVABLES>                                        000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         000
<INVENTORY>                                          000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     23,355<F1>
<PP&E>                                               000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       35,912,554<F2>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                122,054<F3>
<BONDS>                                              000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                000
<PREFERRED>                                          000
<COMMON>                                             000
<OTHER-SE>                                           35,611,182
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         35,912,554<F4>
<SALES>                                              000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     105,760<F5>
<CGS>                                                000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     259,116<F6>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       000
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      000
<CHANGES>                                            000
<NET-INCOME>                                         (2,306,761)<F7>
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (33.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        000
<FN>
<F1>Included in Current Assets: Prepaid insurance $7,738 and Interest receivable $15,617
<F2>Included in Total Assets: Investments in Local Limited Partnerships $32,663,481
<F3>Included  in Current  Liabilities:  Accounts  payable to  affiliates  $66,735 and accounts  payable and accrued
expenses $55,319.
<F4>Included in Total Liabilities and Equity: Deferred revenue $179,318
<F5>Total Revenue includes: Investment $96,834, Other $8,926
<F6>Included  in  Other  Expenses:   General  and   Administrative   $129,364,   Asset  management  fees  $114,572,
Amortization $15,180.
<F7>Net Loss includes:  Equity in losses of Local Limited Partnerships of $2,153,405
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### L. Anderson *v.*The State.

See the Statement of this Case for an entry on the minutes of the court, below which is held to be sufficient to show compliance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure in regard to the presentment of the indictment in court, and the entry thereof upon its minutes. Pasc. Dig., Arts. 2857, 2858.

Appeal from the District Court of Colorado. Tried below before the Hon. E. Lewis.

The indictment was for assault with intent to murder, and the verdict, guilty, with five years’ service in the penitentiary.

The entry in the minutes of the court below, to which reference is made in the opinion and the head-note, is as-follows:

“ Sept. 6th, 1876. This day the grand jury appeared in open court, with their foreman, and presented the following indictments, to wit:

*“The State of Texas*v. *Levi Anderson. No. 1478. Assault with intent to kill and*murder.”

No brief for the appellant.

*George*McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Ector, P. J.

The motion of the appellant, in the lower court, to quash the indictment was properly overruled. That portion of the record of the minutes of the district court of December 6, 1876, which is given in defendant’s motion, is sufficient to show that the indictment is the action of the grand jury of Colorado county, and that the grand jury presented it in open court, and delivered the same to the judge of the district court of Colorado county, a quorum of said jury being present .on such occasion. In fact, the entry upon the minutes of the court is sufficient to show that the requirements of the Code of Criminal Pro*289cedure in Articles 2857 and 2858 (Pasc. Dig.) were substantially complied with.

The indictment is good, and it appears therefrom that it was presented in a court having jurisdiction of the offense set forth in it, and it appears to be the act of a grand jury of the proper county.

The evidence, as it appears in the record, is sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. The court did not commit any material error calculated to injure the rights of the defendant.

*Affirmed.*
THOMAS E. PROCTOR HEIRS TRUST, petitioner, v. CORNWALL MOUNTAIN INVESTMENTS, L.P., et al.; and Margaret O.F. Proctor Trust, petitioner, v. Cornwall Mountain Investments, L.P., et al.

No. 17-1127.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 30, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg Office denied.
Release: #4151-98
    (98 Civ. 2908)

For Release: June
    8, 1998

NEW YORK FEDERAL
    COURT ENTERS PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST S. DAVID FRIEDMAN, INTERCAP
    INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND THE WHITEHALL TRUST IN CFTC ANTI-FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
    ACTION;

CFTC Charges
    Defendants with Commodity Pool Fraud and Conversion of Customer Funds, in
    Addition to Recordkeeping Violations

WASHINGTON -- The
    Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced today that on May 8,
    1998, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
    entered, under seal, a consent order of permanent injunction against the
    following defendants in a CFTC anti-fraud enforcement action: S. David
    Friedman whose last known residential address was in Lyme, Connecticut;
    Intercap International, Inc., based in New York, New York; and The Whitehall Trust, which has a post office box address in the British
    Virgin Islands.

The order, which
    was unsealed on June 4, 1998, permanently enjoins the defendants from,
    among other things, accepting new investors' funds and engaging in
    violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations. The
    order also requires the defendants to make repatriation of all funds
    located outside of the United States. In addition, the court entered an ex parte order freezing the defendants' assets and property and
    prohibiting the defendants from destroying their books and records related
    to their commodities business.

Friedman is
    registered with the CFTC as an Associated Person of Intercap International,
    which is registered as a Commodity Trading Advisor. Whitehall Trust has
    never been registered with the CFTC.

CFTC's
    Complaint Charges the Defendants With Fraud and Conversion of Investor
    Funds in Connection with the Operation of a Commodity Pool, Among Other
    Violations

The court's
    injunctive order stems from a five-count CFTC complaint filed under seal on
    April 24, 1998. The CFTC's complaint charges the defendants with, among
    other things, fraud and conversion of investor funds in connection with the
    operation of a commodity pool, in violation of Sections 4(b), 4o,
    and 9a of the CEA. The complaint also charges Intercap with recordkeeping
    violations. The defendants allegedly committed these violations by failing
    to provide customers, when requested, with account statements of customers'
    allegedly profitable equity trading balances and with failing to return
    money to customers when demanded, according to the complaint.

The U.S. Attorneys
    Office for the Southern District of New York has filed a complaint against
    Friedman, alleging violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. �
    1343.

# #
    #
Michael A. MAGGIO, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-6272.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 6, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
# C_2012073EN.01002702.xml

| 10.3.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 73/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.3.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 73/27

---

Judgment of the General Court of 31 January 2012 — Spar v OHIM — Spa Group Europe (SPA GROUP)

(Case T-378/09) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition procedure - Application for Community word mark SPA GROUP - Earlier national figurative marks SPAR - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - No similarity between the signs - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009)

2012/C 73/53

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Spar Handelsgesellschaft mbH (Schenefeld, Germany) (represented by: R. Kaase and J.-C. Plate, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: S. Hanne, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Spa Group Europe Ltd & Co. KG (Nuremberg, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Re:

Re:

Action for annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 July 2009 (Case R 123/2008-1) in relation to opposition proceedings between Spar Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Spa Group Europe Ltd & Co. KG.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Spar Handelsgesellschaft mbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Spar Handelsgesellschaft mbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 282, 21.11.2009.

1

---
Andrew FELDMAN, petitioner, v. AMERICAN DAWN, INC., et al.

No. 17-172.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 10, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of WestPoint Stevens Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I,
Holcombe T. Green, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

    /s/ Holcombe T. Green, Jr.
------------------------------
HOLCOMBE T. GREEN, JR.
Chief Executive Officer
June 26, 2003
Alty ADAMSON, petitioner, v. Thomas GRIFFIN, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.

No. 17-8017.

Supreme Court of the United States

July 16, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
CONSENT OF GLENN R. CLARK & ASSOCIATES LIMITED

We hereby consent to
the use of our name in connection with the following report and documents, which
are being filed as exhibits to and incorporated by reference into the
registration statement on Form 40-F of Gammon Gold Inc. (the "Company") being
filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission:

1. Information relating
  to the mineral reserve and mineral resource calculations for the Ocampo
  property;
2. Information relating
  to the mineral reserve and mineral resource calculations for the El Cubo
  property;
3. The technical report
  dated May 31, 2006 entitled "El Cubo Gold Silver Mine, Guanajuato, Mexico,"
  (the "Guanajuato Report"); and
4. The annual
  information form of the Company dated March 26, 2008, which includes reference
  to my name in connection with information relating to the Ocampo property and
  the Guanajuato Report, and the properties described therein.

|Date: March 31, 2008 | GLENN R. CLARK & ASSOCIATES LIMITED          
|-------------------- | ---------------------------------------------
|                     |                                              
|                     | By: /s/ Glenn R. Clark                       
|                     | Name: Glenn R. Clark, P. Eng.                
|                     | Title: President, Glenn R. Clark & Associates



---
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-20274

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN ADDISON BALLIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-92-CR-85-1)

July 17, 1996

Before JOHNSON, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

John Anderson Bal lis argues the district court abused its

discretion by finding that his failure to file a timely notice of

appeal was not due to excusable neglect. Ballis was attempting to

appeal the district court’s order of April 3, 1995, dismissing his

motion for a reduction of sentence under former F ED R. C RIM

. P. 35.

Despite numerous opportunities to do so, Ballis has failed to offer

any reason for his failure to timely file his noti ce of appeal

when--by his own admission--he did receive the district court’s2

order on the tenth and final day to make a timely response. Under

such circumstances we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion in failing to find excusable neglect on the part of

Ballis. S ee United States v. Clark

, 51 F.3d 42, 43 (5th Cir.

1995).

AFFIRMED.
April LAKEY, petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITAL.

No. 17M93.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 26, 2018.

Motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
1 The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

2 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United St ates District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-2452

___________ Bonnie McCaslin, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Nebraska. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner * of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 12, 2006 Filed: February 15, 2006

___________ Before SMITH and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, 1 District Judge.

___________ PER CURIAM. Bonnie McCaslin appeals an or der of the district court 2granting her application for supplemental security income, but re jecting her request to reopen a previous decision denying her disability insurance bene fits due to res judicata. On June 4, 1990, McCaslin sought Title II disability bene fits and Title XVI supplemental security-2- income benefits, claiming she was disabledas a result of numerous maladies. An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision denying all benefits on November 27, 1992. McCaslin did not appeal the decision. McCaslin reapplied for Title II and Title XVI benefits on July 13, 1993. A second ALJ conducted two hearings before issuing a decision on July 16, 1997. The second ALJ’s decision, which found McCaslin was not disabled, ma de no reference to the first ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council granted M cCaslin’s request for review and vacated the second ALJ’s decision. The Appeals C ouncil remanded the matter, finding several unresolved issues, including the second ALJ’s failure to discuss the doctrine of res judicata. The Appeals Council directed th e ALJ, on remand, to evaluate McCaslin’s claims in light of the res judicata provisi ons of 20 C.F.R. § 404. 957(c)(1). On remand, a third ALJ issued a partially favorable decision. The th ird ALJ, applying the doctrine of res judicata, concluded the first ALJ’s decision was the final decision of the Commissioner with respect to McCaslin’s clai m for Title II benefits. Thus, the third ALJ dismissed McCaslin’s request for Title II benefits. However, the third ALJ also concluded McCaslin was entitle d to Title XVI benefits. The Appeals Council denied McCaslin’s request for review. McCaslin filed suit in the district court. The district court affirmed the third ALJ’s decision, and McCaslin filed the instant appeal.
Having conducted a de novo revi ew of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evid ence on the record as a whole. SeeHarris v. Barnhart , 356 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 2004). The November 27, 1992, order denying McCaslin’s 1990 claim for Title II disability insurance benefits was not reopened and, thus, was res judicata as to McCaslin’s 1993 claim for Title II benefits. This case presents no novel issues to jus tify an extended disc ussion. We reject McCaslin’s contentions for the reasons provide d in the district court’s opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We thus affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4258 Received in Senate (RDS)]

<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4258

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 14, 2019

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To authorize the Marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court 
 Police to protect the Justices, employees, and official guests of the 
   Supreme Court outside of the Supreme Court grounds, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Reauthorizing Security for Supreme 
Court Justices Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. PROTECTION AUTHORITY OF MARSHAL OF THE SUPREME COURT AND 
              SUPREME COURT POLICE.

    Section 6121 of title 40, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding 
                subparagraph (A), by striking ``any State'' and 
                inserting ``any location''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (3)--
                            (i) by striking ``violation of federal or 
                        state law'' and inserting ``violation of 
                        Federal or State law''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``regulation under federal 
                        or state law'' and inserting ``regulation under 
                        Federal or State law''; and
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) by striking paragraph (2);
                    (B) by striking ``Additional Requirements'' and all 
                that follows through ``Duties under'' and inserting 
                ``Authorization To Carry Firearms--Duties under''; and
                    (C) by striking ``any State'' and inserting ``any 
                location''.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 13, 2019.

            Attest:

                                             CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET OF WINDSOR PARK PROPERTIES 7 AS OF MARCH 31, 1997 AND THE RELATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE THREE MONTHS THEN ENDED AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         514,600
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  282,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      13,700,600
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,073,100
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              18,059,400
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                      7,420,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  10,344,400<F1>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                18,059,400
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               684,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  251,300
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               180,600
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             168,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 83,500
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             83,500
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    83,500
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.52<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Limited and general partners equity.
<F2>Net income per limited partnership unit.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
Mark William JOHNSON, petitioner, v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

No. 17-5363.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 10, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.