[Cite as State v. Littler, 2023-Ohio-4759.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

:

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 22CA37

:

v. :

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

RYAN T. LITTLER, : ENTRY

: 

 Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 12/26/2023

APPEARANCES:

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for Appellant.

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, Pamela C. Wells, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Ryan T. Littler appeals the September 1, 2022 Judgment Entry of 

Sentence of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas. Littler asserts a sole 

assignment of error challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, 

given that a lack of competency had been suggested earlier during the trial court 

proceedings. For the reasons which follow, we find no merit to the assignment of 

error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} On February 5, 2021, Mr. Littler was indicted in Case Number 

21CR44, for Count One, Aggravated Murder, R.C. 2903.01, with a firearm 
Ross App. No. 22CA37 2

specification, and Count Two, Murder, R.C. 2903.02, also with a firearm 

specification. The indictment alleged that on or about January 6, 2021, purposely 

and with prior calculation and design, Littler caused the death of Joseph Sprouse. 

The record contains few details surrounding Mr. Sprouse’s death. 

{¶3} Both parties indicate that Mr. Sprouse was shot when Mr. Littler 

discovered Sprouse exiting a trailer in Littler’s driveway. The State’s brief

indicates that Littler suspected Sprouse was stealing from him. Littler’s brief

makes the same assertion, but also indicates that Sprouse attacked him. Littler 

claims not to have known that it was Sprouse when he shot at the intruder.

{¶4} Upon arraignment, Littler was appointed counsel and later co-counsel. 

On July 2, 2021, Littler’s attorneys filed a Motion for Determination of 

Competency. The reason for the motion was set forth as follows:

Counsel met most recently with Mr. Littler at the Ross County 

Jail on June 10, 2021, 25, and 28 for approximately one or two hours 

each visit. During those meetings it became increasingly obvious to 

counsel for the Defendant that [Littler’s] ability to communicate in a 

rational and coherent fashion was becoming more labored with each 

visit. Mr. Littler’s condition became most obvious during the meeting 

on June 25, when Mr. Littler met with both counsel for the first time. 

It appeared that the addition of new counsel created a reset that further 

effects his ability to assist in his defense. 

The trial court granted the motion. 

{¶5} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(G)(3), Kevin J. Edwards, Ph.D., a forensic 

psychologist at the Netcare Forensic Center, conducted a forensic evaluation of 
Ross App. No. 22CA37 3

Mr. Littler on September 6, 2021. Dr. Edwards prepared a report dated September 

13, 2021.1 In the report, Dr. Edwards explained that he conducted a competency 

interview approximately two hours in length. During the interview he gathered a 

personal history and conducted a mental status examination and a behavioral 

observation. Dr. Edwards reviewed documents relating to the criminal 

proceedings. Dr. Edwards gave several opinions: (1) Littler did not have a 

historical diagnosis, and his current mental condition was not marked by 

impairment consistent with a mental disorder; (2) Littler did not meet criteria for 

intellectual disability; (3) Littler had intact capacity for factual and rational 

understanding of the nature and objective of the legal proceedings against him; 

and, (4) Littler was capable in assisting in his own defense. At Littler’s 

competency hearing on October 6, 2021, both parties stipulated to Dr. Edwards’

report. Thereafter, the trial court found, having reviewed the report and based 

upon the stipulation of both parties, that Littler was competent to proceed to trial. 2

{¶6} Littler’s case was scheduled for a jury trial. However, on August 19, 

2022, Littler entered into a plea agreement to resolve the underlying matter subject 

of this appeal and another felony case, 21CR33.3 The record reflects that Littler 

1 The cover letter attached to the report contains an apparent error, showing the date as “September 13, 2020.”

2 During the proceedings, Littler filed a pro se motion to dismiss the case against him as being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Littler also filed a motion to dismiss his counsel. The trial court overruled these motions. 

3 According to the Ross County Clerk of Courts, this case was a two-count indictment, both counts being complicity 

to felonious assault and involving different victims. We may take judicial notice of such matters. See State v. 

Hazelton, 4th Dist. Washington No. 22CA18, 2023-Ohio-2498, at fn.1.
Ross App. No. 22CA37 4

executed a written Plea of Guilty which also set forth the terms of the plea 

agreement. 

{¶7} Littler was sentenced on August 26, 2022. During the dispositional 

hearing, the trial court heard from several of Joseph Sprouse’s family members. 

Mr. Sprouse was a Marine Corps veteran and hero of the war in Iraq. Mr. 

Sprouse’s mother and other family members indicated that Mr. Sprouse struggled 

with his health and made poor choices when he returned from his service. Littler 

also spoke and apologized to Sprouse’s family. When the trial court sentenced 

Littler, he described as tragedy the fact that Mr. Sprouse had lost his life and Mr. 

Littler, also a veteran, had lost his freedom. 

{¶8} The trial court imposed a prison term of 20 years to life, along with the 

mandatory gun specification of 3 years to be served first and consecutively. The 

sentence imposed in Case Number 21CR33 was to be served concurrently. The 

trial court also awarded restitution to Mr. Sprouse’s mother for funeral expenses.

{¶9} This timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS 

OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE 

OHIO CONSTITUTION AND CRIM. R. 11(C).
Ross App. No. 22CA37 5

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶10} Littler challenges the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of 

his plea to aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and the 

accompanying firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the 

acceptance of guilty pleas by the trial court in felony cases and provides that a trial 

court should not accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant 

personally and:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges 

and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that 

the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the 

imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing 

hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the 

rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, 

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the 

defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the 

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which 

the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself 

or herself.

{¶11} “Thus, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a ‘court must inform the 

defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 

his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory 
Ross App. No. 22CA37 6

process of witnesses.’ ” State v. Tolle, 2022-Ohio-2839, 194 N.E.3d 410, at ¶ 9 

(4thDist.), quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. See also Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). “In addition to these 

constitutional rights, the trial court must determine that the defendant understands 

the nature of the charge, the maximum penalty involved, and the effect of the 

plea.” State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, 

¶ 41.

{¶12} When reviewing a defendant's constitutional rights (right to a jury 

trial, right to call witnesses, etc.), a trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c). Tolle, supra, at ¶ 10; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. In contrast, when reviewing a defendant's nonconstitutional rights (maximum penalty involved, understanding effect of plea, 

etc.), a trial court must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). 

Tolle, at ¶11; State v. Veney, supra, ¶ 18. “ ‘[S]ubstantial compliance’ means that 

‘under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the 

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.’ ” State v. Morrison, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 07CA854, 2008-Ohio-4913, at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Puckett, 4th Dist. 

Scioto No. 03CA2920, 2005-Ohio-1640, at ¶ 10, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio 

St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977); State v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 396 N.E.2d 

757 (1979).
Ross App. No. 22CA37 7

{¶13} In Veney, the Court held as follows regarding the acceptance of guilty 

pleas:

“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the 

plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea 

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.” Veney, supra, at ¶ 7, quoting State v. 

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996); State v. 

Montgomery, supra, at ¶ 40; State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 

2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9.

See also, Tolle, at ¶ 12. “ ‘It is the trial court's duty, therefore, to ensure that a 

defendant “has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 

consequence.” ’ ” Tolle, at ¶ 13, quoting Montgomery at ¶ 40, quoting Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969); State v. Conley, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, at ¶ 34.

{¶14} When appellate courts evaluate whether a defendant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, a court must independently 

review the record to ensure that the trial court complied with the Crim.R. 11 

constitutional and procedural safeguards. See Tolle, at ¶ 14; State v. Leonhart, 4th 

Dist. Washington No. 13CA38, 2014-Ohio-5601, at ¶ 36; State v. Eckler, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 09CA878, 2009-Ohio-7064, at ¶ 48; Veney, supra, at ¶ 13. (Internal 

citations omitted.)

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶15} In his brief, Littler does not assert that the trial court 
Ross App. No. 22CA37 8

failed to meet the procedural safeguards for acceptance of his plea. Instead, he 

argues that because his competency to stand trial was placed at issue earlier in the 

proceedings, this somehow affects his competency to enter pleas. Littler contends 

that at the plea hearing, the trial court never revisited the competency issue and 

allowed him to plead guilty, despite the earlier suggestion in the record. Littler 

concludes this omission by the court demonstrates a violation of his due process 

rights. Thus, Littler urges us to conclude that his plea was not knowingly and 

voluntarily made, must be vacated, and the finding of guilt reversed. For the 

reasons which follow, these arguments are completely without merit. 

{¶16} Due process requires a criminal defendant be competent 

to stand trial. State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA33, 2021-Ohio-2866, at

¶ 14; see Lechner, supra, at ¶ 25; State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 1995-

Ohio-310, 650 N.E.2d 433. “It has long been accepted that a person who lacks the 

capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to 

consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to 

a trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 95 S.Ct. 896, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Thus, 

“[c]onviction of an accused while he or she is legally incompetent is a violation of 

due process.” State v. Merryman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA28, 2013-Ohio-4810, 

¶ 14.
Ross App. No. 22CA37 9

{¶17} “ ‘The United States Supreme Court established the test for 

competency and requires the court to determine if an accused “has sufficient 

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of 

the proceedings against him.” ’ ” Smith, at ¶15, quoting Lechner, supra, at ¶ 26, 

quoting Dusky v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Ohio has 

codified the competency test in R.C. 2945.37(G) as follows:

A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. If,

after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 

evidence that, because of the defendant's present mental 

condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature 

and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or of 

assisting in the defendant's defense, the court shall find the 

defendant incompetent to stand trial and shall enter an order 

authorized by section 2945.38 of the Revised Code.

{¶18} Under the above subjective test, if a defendant is capable of 

understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings and assisting in the 

defense, then the defendant is competent to stand trial. Smith, supra, at ¶ 16. A 

defendant with mental illness or intellectual deficiencies may still be competent to 

stand trial. See Lechner, at ¶ 27.

 “Incompetency must not be equated with mere mental or 

emotional instability or even with outright insanity. A defendant 

may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be 

capable of understanding the charges against him and of assisting 

his counsel.” Lechner, supra, quoting State v. Bock, 28 Ohio 

St.3d 108, 110, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986).
Ross App. No. 22CA37 10

{¶19} At Littler’s competency hearing both parties stipulated to the report’s 

findings and the trial court found Littler competent to proceed to trial. The 

competency standard for entering a plea “is the same as the competency standard 

for standing trial.” State v. Morrison, 4th Dist. Adams No. 07CA854, 2008-Ohio4913, at ¶ 11. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1992); 

State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1064, ¶ 57; State v. Bolin, 128 Ohio 

App.3d 58, 713 N.E.2d 1092 (1998); State v. Jenkins, 3d. Dist. Henry No. 07-05-

06, 2005-Ohio-5616, ¶ 8. However, “ ‘[a] finding that a defendant is competent to 

stand trial * * * is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead 

guilty or waive his right to counsel.’ ” Morrison, supra, quoting Godinez at 400-

401. As discussed above, “a trial court must satisfy itself whether the waiver of his 

constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” Godinez, supra. (Citations 

omitted.) 

 {¶20} In Merryman, the appellant appealed his convictions

upon guilty pleas to one count of kidnapping and two counts of rape. He first 

argued that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him competent to stand 

trial because although two defense experts evaluated him and found him not 

competent, the trial court credited the state’s expert who did find competency. 

Merryman argued that due to some evidence of incompetency, his plea was not 
Ross App. No. 22CA37 11

voluntary and violated his due process rights. This court rejected both arguments. 

We observed:

 The crux of Merryman's argument that his pleas were not 

voluntary is based on his assertion that he was incompetent to 

make the plea because Dr. Bram's and Dr. Reardon's reports find 

him incompetent to stand trial. However, we have already 

concluded that the trial court properly found Merryman 

competent to stand trial in spite of expert testimony to the 

contrary. Therefore, we reject Merryman's underlying premise 

that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea. It follows, ipso 

facto, that his “voluntariness” argument is meritless.

Merryman, at ¶ 38. We concluded:

Although Merryman does not specifically contend that the trial 

court failed to satisfy the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), a 

review of the record indicates that the trial court properly advised 

Merryman of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty 

involved, the effect of the plea, as well as all of the rights 

Merryman was waiving by pleading guilty. The record indicates 

that Merryman understood the consequences of his plea and 

understood what rights he was waiving. Thus, we cannot say that 

Merryman's plea was anything but knowingly and voluntarily 

made. 

Id. at ¶ 39.

 {¶21} In Smith, supra, from the the beginning of the proceedings Smith was 

uncooperative and belligerent, refused to acknowledge his legal name, interrupted 

the judge and his attorney, filed various irregular documents pro se, refused to 

acknowledge the court’s jurisdiction, and had to be removed from the courtroom 

during the trial court proceedings. During Smith’s jury trial, he was removed to 

jail due to his behavior. He watched the trial proceedings from the remote 
Ross App. No. 22CA37 12

location, except for his own testimony. On appeal, Smith claimed that the trial 

court abused its discretion in determining he was competent to stand trial during 

the pretrial proceedings. However, based upon our review of the record, we did 

not agree. Like Littler, Smith had a court-ordered competency evaluation, was 

found competent and capable of assisting in his own defense, and the parties 

stipulated to the competency report at the competency hearing. We found, despite 

Smith’s multiple and repeated outbursts and objections, the record demonstrated 

that the trial court handled Smith’s competency determination properly and in 

accordance with the controlling statutes. 

{¶22} As previously discussed, the parties stipulated to Dr. Edwards’ report

at Littler’s competency hearing and the trial court made a finding of competency. 

And as noted above, the competency standard for entering a plea is the same as for 

standing trial. Given that Littler has not challenged his plea on any other basis, our 

analysis could safely end here. Nevertheless, we will briefly examine the plea 

colloquy.

{¶23} We note that after the prosecutor explained the terms of the plea 

agreement, to which Littler’s counsel acknowledged understanding of the terms, 

the trial court addressed Littler as follows:

 Mr. Littler, before I can accept your pleas in both of these 

cases, I need to ask you a series of questions to make sure you 

understand the nature of these proceedings and any potential 

penalties that you are facing.
Ross App. No. 22CA37 13

The court asked Littler’s name, age, date of birth, educational level, fluency 

in English, ability to read and write, and citizenship and military status. 

Littler responded appropriately and affirmatively. The colloquy continued 

in pertinent part:

Court: All right, are you presently under the

influence of any medication, drugs, 

or alcohol?

Defendant: No, Your Honor.

Court: Do you now or have you ever suffered from any 

mental illness, disease, or incapacity?

Defendant: No, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)

***

Court: Has anybody threatened or coerced you into 

entering this [sic] pleas today?

Defendant: No, Your Honor. 

Court: Aside from the plea negotiation has anyone 

promised you anything in exchange for your pleas?

Defendant: No, Your Honor.

Court Now, Mr. Marks has read into the record the terms 

of the plea agreement that you have reached with 

the state. Did you hear what the prosecuting 

attorney just said?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
Ross App. No. 22CA37 14

Court: Is that the same information you discussed with 

your attorneys before today’s hearing?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

***

Court: Do you have any specific questions for the court 

about the terms of that plea agreement?

Defendant: No, Your Honor.

***

Court: *** Did you have an opportunity to review those 

plea forms with your attorneys?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

***

Court: Do you believe you understood what those plea 

forms said?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

Court: And did you voluntarily sign those plea 

forms?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. 

Court: Do you understand that by signing the plea forms 

you are making a complete admission of your guilt 

to the charges listed in those plea forms?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

Court: All right. You understand that while you and the 

state have presented to the court a recommendation 

for sentencing this court does not have to accept it?
Ross App. No. 22CA37 15

Defendant: That is correct Your Honor. 

***

Court: All right. Knowing that the court is not obligated to 

follow the plea recommendation do you still wish to 

proceed with your plea today?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

{¶23} As in Smith, the trial court handled Littler’s competency 

determination properly and in accordance with the controlling statutes. As in 

Merryman, Littler has not specifically contended that the trial court failed to satisfy 

the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). However, as in Merryman, our review of 

the trial court proceedings herein convinces us that the trial court properly advised 

Littler of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved, the effect of 

the plea, as well as all the rights Littler was waiving by pleading guilty. The 

record herein indicates that Mr. Littler understood the consequences of his plea and 

understood what rights he was waiving. Therefore, we cannot find that Mr. 

Littler’s plea was anything but knowingly and voluntarily made. 

{¶24} Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to Littler’s argument in this 

appeal. Accordingly, we overrule the sole assignment of error and affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 22CA37 16

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to 

Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON 

BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR 

THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon 

the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant 

to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the 

pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will 

terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the 

Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day 

appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal 

prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Hess, J., & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

__________________________________

Jason P. Smith

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.