1

Filed 5/6/22 Jamison v. McNeal CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

KURITA JAMISON,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and 

Respondent,

v.

LINTON McNEAL, Jr.,

Defendant, Cross-complainant, 

and Appellant.

 A161846

 (Solano County 

 Super. Ct. No. FCS049179)

Plaintiff Kurita Jamison (Jamison) and defendant Linton McNeal 

Jr. (McNeal) are joint tenants of property that is the subject of this 

partition action (Code Civ. Proc., tit. 10.5, § 872.010 et. seq. 1). 

Following a four-day bench trial, the court entered an interlocutory 

judgment in which it ordered the property to be partitioned and 

declared each party an owner of an undivided one-half interest in the 

1 All undesignated statutory sections refer to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
2

property. McNeal appeals the interlocutory judgment on various 

grounds. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background

On November 30, 2005, Jamison and McNeal purchased a singlefamily home on a parcel of land, which is the subject of this partition 

action. They took title as joint tenants, with each owning an undivided 

one-half interest in the property. At the time of the purchase the 

parties, who were never married, had been living together since 1992 

and had two minor children. According to Jamison, the parties had 

purchased the house to own their home and for the children’s future 

inheritance.

The parties and their children lived together in the house until 

May 2011, when Jamison (and only Jamison) stopped living there. At 

the time of the 2017 partition action, McNeal lived in the house with 

one of the parties’ children, by that time an adult. 

The parties disputed their arrangement regarding mortgage 

payments. They did agree that, after the first two years, McNeal was 

to make the monthly payment on the first mortgage (together with 

taxes and insurance) from his checking account, and Jamison would 

make the monthly payment on the second mortgage from her separate 

checking account. Jamison paid the utility bills from her separate 

checking account. Jamison made all her payments from 2005 until she 

left the property in mid-2011; house expenses incurred after she left 

were paid by McNeal.

Approximately one year after Jamison’s departure from the 

property, on April 9, 2012, McNeal recorded a forged quitclaim deed, by 
3

which Jamison purportedly transferred her entire interest in the 

property to McNeal. In 2014, McNeal secured a modification of the 

mortgages (hereafter “loan modification agreement”) after representing 

to the bank that Jamison was a co-owner of the property and arranging 

for the forgery of Jamison’s signature on the loan application.2 Jamison 

contacted the Real Estate Fraud unit of the Solano County District 

Attorney on two occasions, the first time after she learned she had been 

removed from the property title by the forged quitclaim deed, and the 

second time after she learned that the loan modification agreement had 

been secured based on an application that contained her forged 

signature.

On March 26, 2015, the Solano County District Attorney filed an 

amended felony complaint charging McNeal with several offenses 

including forgery of the quitclaim deed (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (c))

(count 2) and forgery related to the loan modification agreement (id., 

subd. (d)) (count 5). Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate 

held McNeal to answer for counts two and five, as well as other offenses 

2 Under the loan modification agreement, which modified the first 

lien mortgage (deed of trust November 17, 2005), Jamison was 

financially responsible for “a final balloon payment in the amount of 

$145,153.53,” payable at the end of the 30-year term in 2035. Defense 

expert witness Ari Bulmash testified that despite the balloon payment, 

both parties financially benefited by the modification, which reduced 

the principal balance and over the term of the loan resulted in a 

significant interest saving. However, he conceded Jamison’s forged 

signature on the loan application made her financially liable for the

loan payments for which she could be civilly sued if the payments were 

not made. During the trial, the court was informed that the mortgage 

bank had not taken any action against McNeal based on the loan 

modification agreement and Jamison was bringing this action for 

partition and sale to extinguish the outstanding mortgage loan.
4

relating to the forgeries. On April 8, 2016, McNeal agreed to and 

pleaded no contest to the felony offense of forging the loan modification 

agreement, and the remaining charges in the information were 

dismissed with a Harvey waiver (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 

754). As part of the plea agreement, McNeal acknowledged he had 

arranged for Jamison’s forged signature on the quitclaim deed, and he 

agreed to the issuance of a court order declaring the forged deed void 

and cancelled as of the date of its execution; the court order was 

recorded on March 7, 2017. 

B. Partition Action

On July 11, 2017, Jamison filed this statutory action seeking 

partition of the property by sale and a division of the sale proceeds 

between the parties. (§ 872.710, subd. (b).) 

McNeal filed an answer and a cross-complaint, later amended, 

challenging the request for partition and seeking title by adverse 

possession and to quiet title, as well as monetary damages for breach 

for contract. McNeal alleged, in pertinent part, that Jamison was not 

entitled to partition as the property was the home of McNeal and their

children who would be adversely affected by any partition; in addition, 

Jamison had no interest in the property due to her abandonment of the 

property and failure to contribute her proportionate share towards the 

mortgage, maintenance, improvements, and repairs. McNeal also 

alleged he was entitled to sole ownership of the property under a claim 

of adverse possession as he had been in actual, continuous, open, 

notorious, and hostile possession since Jamison had been “put . . . out” 

of the property, and he had made permanent and valuable 

improvements valued at approximately $180,000. As to his claim for
5

breach of contract, McNeal alleged Jamison had breached the parties’ 

verbal agreement requiring her to make monthly mortgage payments 

and other payments that had been paid for by McNeal since Jamison 

had abandoned the property. Before trial each party filed a brief 

asking the court to deny all the relief requested by the other party 

under the doctrine of unclean hands. 

A bench trial was held over the course of four days. The court 

heard testimony from Jamison and McNeal, plaintiff’s witnesses Laura 

Pagey (former Solano County Assistant District Attorney) and Stephen 

R. Camden (expert qualified to testify as to residential rental values in 

City of Vallejo), and defense witness Ari Bulmash (expert qualified to 

testify as to real estate, loans, and loan modifications). The court also 

considered documentary exhibits submitted by both parties including 

judicially noticed documents from the criminal prosecution against 

McNeal. At the conclusion of the evidentiary phase, the court heard 

closing arguments and the matter was submitted. 

The court ruled from the bench, finding in favor of Jamison on 

her request for partition, and finding against McNeal on his crosscomplaint. The court explained that, pursuant to well settled law 

governing partition actions, Jamison, as “[a]n owner of a concurrent 

interest in real property,” was “entitled to partition as a matter of 

absolute right with no need to give any reasons unless the right has 

been waived,” and her “title in fee” could not be divested by 

“abandonment.” The court denied McNeal’s request for any and all 

damages, including expenditures for repairs made to the house, on the 

“separate basis,” that “his testimony both about his time and the value 
6

of his repair work is not credible, is self-serving, and is minimally 

supported by documentary evidence.”

The court issued the following interlocutory judgment: 

“1. Jamison and McNeal purchased the property . . . on 

November 30, 2005. They took title as joint tenants with each having 

an undivided one-half interest in the property. The parties were never 

married to each other.

“2. Jamison left the residence in 2010 [sic]. McNeal recorded a 

quitclaim deed on April 9, 2012, quitclaiming Jamison’s entire interest 

in the property. Jamison discovered that she had been removed from 

the title to the property and contacted the Solano County District 

Attorney’s [O]ffice. 

“3. On March 4, 2014, the District Attorney filed a felony 

complaint against McNeal.

“4. On October 26, 2015, the District Attorney filed an 

amended felony complaint against McNeal.

“5. On April 6, 2016, McNeal pled no contest to Count 5 of the 

amended felony complaint, felony forgery, under Penal Code Section 

470 subsection (d) [based on the forgery related to the loan modification 

agreement] . . . for the property.

“6. The Court ordered that the quitclaim deed that McNeal 

recorded on April 9, 2012, was void and cancelled as of the date of its 

execution.

“7. Accordingly, the Court finds in favor of Jamison and grants 

her request for partition of the Subject Property.

“8. As to McNeal’s Cross-complaint, the Court finds 

inequitable conduct on the part of McNeal by forging Jamison’s name 

on a quitclaim deed and recording that deed on April 9, 2012. It is not 

only unconscionable and inequitable, but it is felonious. McNeal’s 

conduct in forging Jamison’s name on the quitclaim deed was an 

ouster, which is wrongful conduct and related directly to the issue in 

controversy. Accordingly, McNeal’s . . . claim of breach of contract is 
7

denied under the doctrine of unclean hands. McNeal’s claim of adverse 

possession is denied under the doctrine of unclean hands. 

“9. On separate grounds, McNeal’s claim for adverse 

possession is denied for failure to state all of the requisite elements. 

The Court finds that in September 2014, McNeal represented to [the 

mortgage bank] that he was the joint owner of the property with 

Jamison for the purpose of securing a lower mortgage interest rate, 

which benefited both parties according to the defense witness, attorney 

Ari Bulmash. Accordingly, McNeal acted in a manner that was not (1) 

hostile to Jamison’s interest; or (2) under a claim of exclusive title. 

According, McNeal’s action for adverse possession fails, and the Court 

finds in favor of Jamison.

“10. McNeal’s claim to quiet title is denied under the doctrine of 

unclean hands and because he presented no evidence to support his 

claim.

“11. The doctrine of unclean hands extinguishes McNeal’s claim 

for any and all damages, including expenditures both capital and labor 

related for any repairs made to the property. The doctrine of unclean 

hands extinguishes McNeal’s claim for any payment of principal and 

interest on the mortgage of any lien, payment of insurance for the 

common benefit, and protection and preservation of title, as well as any 

claims for any repairs or improvements that were made to the property. 

McNeal shall take nothing for his mortgage payments, his property tax 

payments, and any and all repairs under the doctrine of unclean 

hands.”

The interlocutory judgment ordered the partition of the property

and declared Jamison and McNeal owners of an undivided one-half 

interest in the property, subject to a deed of trust dated November 17, 

2005, and recorded November 30, 2005. The court set a hearing for 

February 2, 2021 to hear additional evidence to determine the manner 

of partition, for the appointment of a referee, to establish the balance of 

the first mortgage, and for further proceedings. 
8

McNeal’s timely appealed ensued. (§ 904.1, subd. (9) [appeal may 

be taken from an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition 

determining the rights and interests of the respective parties and 

directing partition to be made].) 

DISCUSSION

We must begin by noting that our review is significantly impaired 

by McNeal’s submission of an opening brief that fails to comply with 

our California Rules of Court 3, which inform parties as to the proper 

format in which they are to present their arguments to this court.

Specifically, the opening brief contains many factual assertions 

unsupported by any record citations, “in dramatic noncompliance with 

appellate procedures.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 

1245–1246.) Additionally, while the opening brief includes point 

headings, within some of the point headings McNeal discusses issues 

that are not related to that point heading, makes factual assertions 

without any record citations, and fails to offer any legal authority or 

cogent analysis as to how or why the court erred in its determinations 

or how he was prejudiced by those determinations. 

McNeal’s contention that Jamison’s responsive brief suffers from 

similar record citation deficiencies and fails to address all his appellate 

arguments does not inure to his benefit. As the appellant, it is McNeal 

who has the burden of showing prejudicial error. (See Del Real v. City 

of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) He cannot demonstrate 

reversible error by arguing that Jamison has not addressed, or 

adequately addressed, contentions for which he himself does not 

3 All undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of 

Court.
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present cogent arguments supported by record citations and relevant 

legal authority.

Hence, as delineated below, when McNeal makes a legal 

argument under a point heading, but fails to support it with record 

citations and/or cogent arguments and citations to authority, we will 

treat the point as forfeited. (See, e.g., Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc.

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“[w]hen an appellant asserts a 

point but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 

authority, we treat the point as forfeited”]; Falcon v. Long Beach 

Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267 [“plaintiffs make 

numerous factual assertions in their briefs without record citation” but 

“[w]e are entitled to disregard such unsupported factual assertions”]; 

Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 

[“ ‘[i]t is the duty of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by 

appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact 

page citations;’ ” “[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the 

necessary citations to the record, that . . . argument [may be] deemed to 

have been waived”]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 

Cal.App.4th 691, 699 [appellate court ignores contention supported 

only by citations to general law but no argument applying the law to 

the circumstances of the case].) 

We find unavailing McNeal’s attempt to use his reply brief to 

supplemental his opening brief arguments. This he cannot do as 

“[f]airness militates against our consideration of any arguments that 

[he] has chosen not to raise until [his] reply brief, and the authorities 

holding to that effect are numerous.” (Reed v. Mutual Service Corp.

(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372, fn. 11; see also Paulus v. Bob Lynch 
10

Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685 [appellant’s “belated 

attempt to address [issues] . . . in his reply brief – after the 

respondents’ brief noted his failure to address the [issues] – did not 

salvage those abandoned issues”].)

With these principles in mind, we now address McNeal’s 

arguments. 

I. Grant of Partition

Under various point headings, McNeal challenges the trial court’s 

ruling that Jamison was entitled to partition under section 872.710, 

subdivision (b), which allows that “partition as to concurrent interests 

in the property shall be as of right unless barred by a valid waiver.” He 

contends Jamison was not entitled to partition because the parties do 

not hold “concurrent interests” in the property. The basis for this 

argument is that Jamison’s joint tenancy interest was voluntarily 

severed when she abandoned the property and failed to honor her 

financial obligations and, therefore she has no equitable interest in the 

property. We see no merit to this argument.

In granting partition, the trial court found Jamison, who held 

title to the property as a joint tenant, was an owner of a concurrent 

interest in the property. As such, she was entitled to partition as a 

matter of absolute right with no need to give any reasons unless the 

right was waived, and her title in fee could not be divested by

abandonment.

The trial court’s ruling is supported by well settled law: “[A] 

cotenant is entitled to partition as a matter of absolute right; that he 

need not assign any reason for his demand; that it is sufficient if he 

demands a severance; and that when grounds for a sale are duly 
11

established it may be demanded as of right. To grant it is not a mere 

matter of grace. The only indispensable requirement to [partition] . . . 

is that a clear title be shown, and in no event is a partition to be denied 

because it will result in financial loss to the cotenants.” (De Roulet v. 

Mitchel (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 120, 124, and the cases cited therein; see 

Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich (1952) 39 Cal.2d 48, 50 (Lazzarevich) [“in 

the absence of waiver a joint tenant is entitled as a matter of right to 

have his interest severed from that of his cotenant”].) 

We see no merit to McNeal’s assertion that he and Jamison were 

not concurrent, but rather “successive,” owners of the property, which 

required the trial court to consider the parties’ “ ‘best interests’ ” (§ 

872.710 (c)), as well as the independent and broader “ ‘requirement of 

fairness.’ ”

4

McNeal’s claim that Jamison did not have a “concurrent” interest 

in the property is based on his contention that Jamison abandoned her 

interest in the property and failed to timely pay certain expenses. 

However, it is well settled that a cotenant, holding title in fee, is not 

barred from pursuing partition by either abandonment (see Ferris v. 

Coover (1858) 10 Cal. 589, 631; Hunter v. Shultz (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 

24, 28) or the failure to pay a proportionate share of property expenses 

(Lazzarevich, supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 50-51). None of the cases cited by 

McNeal support his claim that Jamison lost her status as a 

“concurrent” owner based on her abandonment and failure to pay her 

proportionate share of property expenses. 

4 In support of this argument, McNeal asks us to consider an 

unpublished decision, which “must not be cited or relied on by a court 

or a party” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a)), and in any event, does 

not support his claim of error. 
12

We also see no merit to McNeal’s reliance on section 872.710, 

subdivision (c), which reads: “Partition as to successive estates in the 

property shall be allowed if it is in the best interest of all the parties. 

The court shall consider whether the possessory interest has become 

unduly burdensome by reason of taxes or other charges, expense of 

ordinary or extraordinary repairs, character of the property and change 

in the character of the property since creation of the estates, 

circumstances under which the estates were created and change in the 

character of the property since creation of the estates, and all other

factors that would be considered by a court of equity having in mind the 

intent of the creator of the successive estates and the interests and 

needs of the successive owners.” (Ibid., italics added.) Because the 

trial court properly found the parties’ interests in this case were 

concurrent, it properly ruled Jamison was entitled to partition as a 

matter of right absent a valid waiver. 

McNeal’s “ ‘requirement of fairness’ ” appears to be based on 

American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 

1008 (AMI), in which the court stated: “In addition to the limitation on 

the right of partition derived from express or implied waiver by 

agreement, there is an even wider and more general limitation. This 

limitation subjects the right of partition to the ‘requirement of 

fairness’ ” (id. at p. 1015). However, the AMI decision is not pertinent 

as the case does not address section 872.710, which was enacted the 

same year that AMI was decided. (See McDowell & Craig v. Santa Fe 

Springs (1960) 54 Cal.2d 33, 38 [“language used in any opinion is to be 

understood in light of the facts and the issue then before the court;” 

“cases are not authority for propositions not considered”].)
13

To the extent McNeal appears to challenge the trial court’s 

implied factual finding that Jamison had not waived her right to 

partition, we cannot determine whether there is any merit to the 

contention as McNeal has not tendered the issue “together with a fair 

summary of the evidence bearing on the challenged finding, 

particularly including evidence that arguably supports it.” (Huong Que, 

Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409–410.) “[W]hen an 

appellant urges the insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings 

it is his duty to set forth a fair and adequate statement of the evidence 

which is claimed to be insufficient. He cannot shift this burden onto 

respondent, nor is a reviewing court required to undertake an 

independent examination of the record when appellant has shirked his 

responsibility in this respect.” (Hickson v. Thielman (1956) 147 

Cal.App.2d 11, 14–15.)

The cases cited by McNeal do not support an argument that the

trial court was required to find, as a matter of law, waiver of the right 

to partition based on evidence of Jamison’s abandonment and failure to 

pay her proportionate share of property expenses. Whether Jamison 

waived her right to partition was a question particularly for the trial 

court as the trier of fact who heard the testimony and considered the 

documentary evidence. The trial court could “accept part of the 

testimony of a witness and reject another part even though the latter 

contradicts the part accepted. [Citations.] As was said in Nevarov v. 

Caldwell (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 762, 777, ‘[the trier of fact] properly 

may reject part of the testimony of a witness, though not directly 

contradicted, and combine the accepted portions with bits of testimony 

or inferences from the testimony of other witnesses thus weaving a 
14

cloth of truth out of selected available material. [Citations.]” (Stevens 

v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 67–68.) “[N]either conflicts in 

the evidence nor ‘ “testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion . . 

. justif[ies] the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of 

the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth 

and falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ 

[Citations.]” (Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1065.) 

These rules “will obtain even though to some triers of fact the evidence 

. . . would have seemed so improbable, impossible and unbelievable that 

a judgment contrary to that now on appeal would have inevitably 

followed.” (Romero v. Eustace (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 253, 254.) 

II. Dismissal of McNeal’s Cross-Complaint

a. Adverse Possession Claim

In seeking to quiet title based on adverse possession McNeal had 

the burden to prove every element of the claim: “(1) Possession must be

by actual occupation under such circumstances as to constitute 

reasonable notice to the owner. (2) It must be hostile to the owner’s 

title. (3) The holder must claim the property as his own, under either 

color of title or claim of right. (4) Possession must be continuous and 

uninterrupted for five years. (5) The holder must pay all the taxes 

levied and assessed upon the property during the period.” (Dimmick v. 

Dimmick (1962) 58 Cal.2d 417, 421.) Here, the trial court found 

McNeal’s 2014 representation to the mortgage bank that he held the 

property in joint ownership with Jamison was evidence that his claim 

of ownership was not exclusive or hostile to Jamison’s title.

In challenging the trial court’s ruling, McNeal makes no mention 

of his 2014 representation to the mortgage bank that he held the 
15

property in joint ownership with Jamison. And, more significantly for 

purposes of our review, he makes no argument that such evidence is 

insufficient to defeat his claim of title by adverse possession. 

Consequently, his claim of error is forfeited. 

b. Application of Unclean Hands Doctrine 

“ ‘The [unclean hands] doctrine demands that a [party] act fairly 

in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come into court 

with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, 

regardless of the merits of his claim.’ [Citation.] The doctrine of 

unclean hands requires unconscionable, bad faith, or inequitable 

conduct by the [party] in connection with the matter in controversy. 

[Citations.] Unclean hands applies when it would be inequitable to 

provide [the party] any relief, and provides a complete defense to both 

legal and equitable causes of action.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu 

Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 56.) “Whether the unclean 

hands doctrine applies turns on the particular facts of the specific case. 

The doctrine must be pleaded or called to the attention of the trial court 

in order that it may pass on the defense and also to permit the person 

against whom it is sought to be applied the opportunity to present such 

evidence as might bear on that issue.” (Fibreboard Paper Products 

Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 726–

727.) 

In his opening brief McNeal presents no cogent recitation of the 

evidence with citations to the record or legal analysis challenging the 

court’s application of the unclean hands doctrine. For the first time in 

his reply brief, McNeal argues the doctrine of unclean hands was 

misapplied in this case. He contends in a conclusory fashion, with no 
16

citation to the record or relevant legal authority, that the court should 

have applied the doctrine of unclean hands to Jamison’s request for 

partition based on her “numerous breaches and subsequent 

abandonment” of the property that precipitated the actions leading to 

this litigation. He also asserts that Jamison’s “unclean hands” were

“the catalyst” for all the litigation including the criminal case against 

him. Because McNeal has not properly briefed the issue, lacking both 

citation to the record and relevant legal authority in support of his 

contention, his claim of error is forfeited.

c. McNeal’s Request for Credit for Expenses Incurred 

for Property Repairs and Maintenance

In challenging the trial court’s ruling rejecting his request for 

credit for expenses incurred for property repairs and maintenance, 

McNeal asks us to consider case law governing void judgments due to 

fraud, and contends, without any record citation, that “[i]n this matter 

Jamison testified to untruths or matters that she fabricated to benefit 

partitioning”; “Jamison has no equitable interest and is not entitled to 

partitioning”; and “McNeal prepared over 100 pages of receipts and 

evidence the Trial Court refused to allow it.” Because McNeal has not 

properly briefed the issue, lacking citation to the record and relevant 

legal authority specifically directed at the court’s ruling regarding his 

request for credit for expenses incurred for property repairs and 

maintenance, this claim of error is forfeited. 

III. Evidentiary Rulings

McNeal also argues the interlocutory judgment should be 

reversed because the trial court erroneously denied his request to 

present relevant witnesses and evidence and allowed irrelevant 
17

evidence of the criminal prosecution against him. However, his briefing 

does not allow for review. Again, he does not set forth in a cogent 

manner a description of each document sought to be admitted, counsel’s 

arguments and the court’s ruling, why the ruling was in error, and how 

he was prejudiced by the ruling. Similarly, his challenge to the trial 

court’s refusal to allow certain defense witnesses to testify does not set 

forth a clear description of the proposed testimony, counsel’s arguments 

and the court’s ruling, why the ruling was in error, and how he was 

prejudiced by the ruling. Simply saying that the court erred in 

excluding certain evidence, followed by a recitation of record citations, 

does not demonstrate that the documents and proffered testimony were 

relevant evidence that should have been admitted by the court. 

Moreover, McNeal cites no legal authority in support of his contention 

that his proffered evidence should have been admitted as relevant and 

the evidence of the criminal prosecution against him should have been 

excluded as irrelevant. 

The lack of adequate briefing on this issue is not a mere technical

issue, but squarely impacts our ability to review the matter. The trial 

court has “ ‘broad discretion’ under Evidence Code section 352 to 

‘exclude even relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice [or] of confusing the issues . . . 

. ” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 60 (Merriman).) “[T]he 

balancing process mandated by [Evidence Code] section 352 requires 

‘consideration of the relationship between the evidence and the 

relevant inferences to be drawn from it, whether the evidence is 

relevant to the main or only a collateral issue, and the necessity of the 
18

evidence to the proponent’s case as well as the reasons recited in 

section 352 for exclusion.’ ” (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 

585.) 

As an appellate court, we cannot reverse based on a trial court’s 

evidentiary rulings “unless it is shown ‘ “the trial court exercised its 

discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that 

resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. ” ’ ” (Merriman, supra, 60 

Cal.4th at p. 74; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“[n]o judgment shall be 

set aside . . ., in any cause, on the ground . . . of the improper admission 

or rejection of evidence, . . ., unless after an examination of the entire 

cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the 

error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”]; People v. 

Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did 

not violate defendant’s right to present a defense]; People v. 

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [defendant not deprived of due 

process by exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary 

point]; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301 [Evid. Code, § 352

“empowers courts to prevent . . . trials from degenerating into 

nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues;” “ ‘the trial 

court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is 

repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal 

relevance’ ”].)

Accordingly, McNeal’s challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings is forfeited for lack of adequate briefing. Because it is not our 

function to act as appellate counsel, we decline to independently review 

the record (hundreds of pages) to determine if the evidentiary rulings 

were in error or to speculate how McNeal may have been prejudiced by 
19

the rulings. (See Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 

68, 106 [we are “not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to 

make arguments for parties”].) 

IV. Denial of Statement of Decision

McNeal also argues for reversal of the interlocutory judgment 

based on the trial court’s refusal to provide a statement of decision. 

However, in his opening brief McNeal makes a merely conclusory 

argument, without any record citation, that he requested a statement 

of decision and the court denied the request. In his reply brief, McNeal

cites to the appropriate portion of the record, and again argues his 

counsel made a request for a written statement of decision and the 

request was denied. He then contends that a statement of decision was 

necessary as Jamison had no interest in the property to support 

partition (an argument which we have already found to be without 

merit) and the statement of decision would have “provided specifically” 

as to how the property was to be partitioned and “what was the lawful 

basis” for partition. We see no merit to this claim of error.

Section 632 provides that a request for a statement of decision

must be made within 10 days after announcement of a tentative 

decision and “shall specify those [principal] controverted issues” to be 

addressed by the court. (Ibid., italics added.) Rule 3.1590(d) similarly 

provides that, within 10 days after announcement of the tentative 

decision, a party may request a statement of decision to address the 

principal controverted issues; the principal controverted issues “must

be specified in the request.” (Ibid.; italics added.) Here, the record 

shows McNeal’s request for a statement of decision did not specify any 

controverted issues to be addressed in a statement of decision. Having 
20

failed to so specify, McNeal has waived his right to object to the failure 

of the court to issue a statement of decision. (See City of Coachella v. 

Riverside County Airport Land Use Com. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1277, 

1292–1293 (City of Coachella) [“a general, nonspecific request for a 

statement of decision does not operate to compel a statement of decision 

as to all material, controverted issues”]; Atari, Inc. v. State Bd. of 

Equalization (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 665, 674–675 [“[s]ection 632 

requires a party requesting a statement of decision to specify those 

controverted issues as to which it is requesting a finding;” “[f]ailure to 

request findings on specific issues results in a waiver as to those 

issues”].) 

Moreover, McNeal has failed to demonstrate prejudice by the lack 

of a written statement of decision. The trial court’s ruling following 

trial and its written findings in its interlocutory judgment state the 

“lawful basis” for granting Jamison’s request for partition, and the 

manner of partition was appropriately left to be resolved in further 

proceedings. We therefore conclude the court’s denial of McNeal’s 

request for a statement of decision does “not constitute error requiring 

redress by this court.” (City of Coachella, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 

1293.) 

V. Trial Court’s Conduct

While McNeal has a subpoint heading entitled, “Judicial Bias is 

Evident in the Record,” he makes no assertion that he made any 

objections based on judicial bias in the trial court. Because McNeal did 

not object in the trial court, he has forfeited any right to raise this issue 

on appeal. (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 698 [claim of 

judicial bias not preserved for appellate review as appellant “failed to 
21

object to the allegedly improper acts and never asked the judge to 

recuse himself”]; accord, Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 

111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218.)

Even if the issue were preserved, we see no merit to the claim of 

judicial bias. McNeal contends the trial court showed judicial bias 

because it allowed “Jamison to include evidence and repeatedly refer to 

the criminal action against him despite numerous objections;” “accused” 

defense counsel of interrupting when the trial court posed a question; 

erroneously determined the financial care of two children was 

“ ‘irrelevant’ ” to maintaining or modifying a mortgage; allowed 

Jamison to present derogatory and irrelevant criminal information; 

although the trial court granted his “motion to remove a derogatory 

term,” Jamison referred to McNeal “mentioning a derogatory term 

several times regardless;” and allowed Jamison to present witnesses 

concerning the criminal case against McNeal, but refused to allow 

McNeal to present rebuttal witnesses. 

The complained-of conduct does not show judicial bias. “When an 

attorney engages in improper behavior, such as ignoring the court’s 

instructions or asking inappropriate questions, it is within a trial 

court’s discretion to reprimand the attorney, even harshly, as the 

circumstances require. [Citation.] . . . Moreover, a trial court’s 

numerous rulings against a party – even when erroneous – do not 

establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to 

review.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111–1112.) 

To the extent McNeal contends the above-described actions of the 

trial court, whether considered singly or in combination, constituted 

judicial error, misconduct, or bias warranting reversal, he has failed to 
22

provide supporting legal authority or any cogent analysis showing that 

the court’s conduct or rulings were erroneous or require reversal of the 

interlocutory judgment.

5

DISPOSITION

The interlocutory judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff, crossdefendant and respondent Kurita Jamison is awarded costs on appeal.

5 We conclude by noting we have made a concerted effort to 

address McNeal’s arguments in his briefs. Any argument not 

specifically mentioned is omitted due to McNeal’s failure to properly 

brief the issue.
23

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

A161846/Jamison v. McNeal