[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22

- 10649

Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________

JEFFERY WOODEN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus
THE TOWN OF EATONVILLE, ROY SMITH, Individually, ROBERT L. JONES, Individually, ANTHONY GRANT, in his official capacity as mayor of Eatonville, Florida, JOSEPH JENKINS, individually and in his official capacity as deputy chief of the Eatonville police department, USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 1 of 232 Opinion of the Court 22

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TOWN OF EATONVILLE,

Defendants

- Appellees.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:19

- cv

- 02382

- CEM

- EJK

____________________

Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL P RYOR , and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Jeffery Wooden, proceeding pro se , filed an action for false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution under Florida law against the town of Eatonville, Roy Smith, RobertJones, Anthony Grant, and Joseph Jenkins (collectively, “Defendants”). Wooden now appeals the district court’s order granting in part the Defendants’ partial motions to dismiss several of his claims
and its order gran ting summary judgment to the Defendants on the remaining claims in his complaint.
On appeal

, Wooden first argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants because there was no probable cause for any of his arre sts. Second, he argues that the district court erred in granting the Defendants’ USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 2 of 2322

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motion to dismiss his state law false imprisonment claims against
Officers Roy Smith and Jones on the ground that they were entitled to immunity under state law

. For the fol lowing reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
In March 2021, Wooden filed the operative complaint against Defendants and asserted eleven claims. In Counts I to III

, he alleged that Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith falsely arrested and imprisoned him without probable cause and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. In Counts IV and V , he brought claims under
Monell 1 against Jenkins and Grant in their official capacities, contending that they participated in a longstanding practice causing the deprivation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment for his false imprisonment and arrest. In Counts VI to VII , Wooden alleged state tort claims for false imprisonment against Jones, Roy Smith, and the Town of Eatonville . In Counts IX and X , he alleged malicious prosecution claims against Jones and Jenkins. And, in

Count XI , he alleged a defamation claim against Jenkins.
A. Allegations in the Complain t

1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 691

– 94 (1978) (holding that, although a § 1983 plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold a municipality liable for its employees’ actions, a municipality can be liable for such actions under § 1983 if its “policy or custom” caused the deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal right). USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 3 of 234 Opinion of the Court 22

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In the operative complaint, Wooden alleged the following.
Wooden’s mother , Debbie Smith, 2 owned a hotel in Eatonville known as the Eatonville Home Town Suites. In 2002, Wooden’s mother sold a partial ownership interest in the hotel to the Eatonville mayor, Anthony Grant. Wooden’s mother later passed

away , and Wooden was named the personal representative of his mother’s estate, in which his mother’s ownership interest was an

estate asset . After being appointed personal representative, Wooden and Grant had a business relationship, which deteriorated
after Wooden noticed that Grant was mismanaging the hotel. After the relationship deteriorated, Grant misused his power as mayor to have Wooden arrested for trespassing on the property to prevent the latter from entering the hotel to inspect the books and

recor ds. Wooden later obtained an order from the Orange CountyProbate Court granting him access to the hotel property to monitor or review , in an orderly fashion, the hotel records on weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Wooden further alleged that, on Decem ber 17, 2015, he went to the hotel and found it locked, so he hired a locksmith so that he could access the property. Shortly after, Grant arrived anddemanded that Wooden leave the premises. Soon after, two officers from the Eatonville Police Department arrived at the hotel torespond to Grant’s call about a “burglary in process.” Wooden explained that he was the partial owner of the hotel and showed the

2 Because one of the defendants also has the last name of Smith, for the rest of the opinion, we refer to each Smith by their full names. USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 4 of 2322

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officers a copy of the order allowing him access to the property.
The officers told Grant that the d ispute was a civil matter that should be resolved through the courts. While the officers were leaving, Jenkins arrived and was hostile to Wooden, stating that he needed to leave the hotel because “the mayor said so.” Wooden informed Jenkins that he was p artial owner of the hotel and had legal authority to be there, and he refused to leave the property. Jenkins stated that he would talk to the state attorney’s office to determine if Wooden was illegally on the property because Grant
did not want him on th e property and stated that he was the mayor.

Wooden further stated that on December 18, 2015, he returned to the hotel, and, shortly after, Grant arrived with Jenkins and Officer Jones. Jones then arrested Wooden for trespassing, and Wooden was transpor ted to jail. However, the case was dismissed because it was deemed “unsuitable for prosecution.” On January 16, 2016, Wooden was standing on the hotel property to watch a Martin Luther King , Jr., Day parade, and Jones approached him. Grant had called Je nkins, who ordered Jones to go to the hotel to “handle the situation.” Jones told Wooden that he knew he should not be there, and Wooden told Jones that he had legal authority to be on the premises and showed him the notice showing that the charges agains t him arising out of the December 18 arrest had been
dismissed because the case was deemed unsuitable for prosecution. Jones arrested Wooden and took him to jail. However, there were no court records that showed that Wooden ever had an open case
for that arrest. USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 5 of 236 Opinion of the Court 22

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Wooden further alleged that from February 2016 to about October 2016, the probate court banned both Grant and Wooden from the property and established a curatorship, which was later
dissolved. Wooden was reappointed as personal representative of
his mother’s estate and co

- owner of the hotel property. On November 16, 2016, Wooden went to the property and was approached by Grant and Gary Lowry, a hotel employee, who called
Officer Roy Smith to come to the hotel. Roy Smith began to verbally abuse a nd curse Wooden, slamming handcuffs tightly on his wrists and telling him not to resist, although he was not resisting. Roy Smith put Wooden in the police car before turning around and releasing Wooden, telling him that “he’d better not return” to the

pro perty. On November 15, 2016, Wooden again entered the hotel to “trespass a vagrant” on the property after noticing a high level of crime on the property. Due to this high level of crime, he set up
a make

- shift security office in room number 127. On Nove mber 18, 2016, Jenkins obtained an arrest warrant to arrest Wooden for attempted burglary of room 127. After finding out about the arrestwarrant on January 17, 2017, Wooden turned himself in to the police and was placed in jail. However, the case was di smissed and deemed unsuitable for prosecution.

B. The Motions for Partial Dismissal
Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith answered, denied liability, and asserted certain defenses. Jenkins then filed a partial motion to dismiss claims brought against him in his o fficial capacity, arguing
that either h e or the municipality should be sued, but not both. Roy Smith, Jenkins, and Jones also filed a partial motion to dismiss USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 6 of 2322

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Counts VI and VII , arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief against them in their individual capacities because Wooden did not allege that they acted in bad faith or with a malicious purpose. They also argued that Count XII should be dismissed because Jenkins had an absolute privilege regarding any statement he made incidental to his official duties, shielding him
from a defamation claim arising from actions taken within the scope of his employment.
C. The Motions for Summary Judgment
Following discovery, Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith, in their individual capacities, filed motions for summary judgment on Wooden’s claims. In support of their motions, they filed certainevidentiary materials, including a transcript of Wooden’s deposition, the shareholder’s a greement between Grant and Wooden’smother, documents showing that Wooden was the personal representative of his mother’s estate, information regarding the guardianship of Wooden’s mother, judges’ access orders allowing Wooden to inspect the hotel, a judge ’s order revoking two orders, and affidavits from Jones and Roy Smith. Further, in support of his motion for summary judgment in his official capacity, Jenkins filed
additional documents , including various arrest warrants, trespass warnings, and offense r eports for Wooden.
Wooden stated the following in his deposition. On December 17, 2015, he was present at the hotel exercising his rights as personal representative of his mother’s estate to see how business was going. He became personal representative o f his mother’s estate USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 7 of 238 Opinion of the Court 22

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in 2010 based on a decision of his siblings. His sister, MoniqueWashington, had a guardianship over his mother and was originally the personal representative after her mother died without a will. Later, the siblings agreed to make Wooden the personal representative. His family built the hotel in 1960 and owned it for forty years. Wooden’s mother needed help maintaining the hotel, so she partnered with Grant and created a corporation, Eatonville Holdings, Inc., where Wooden’s mothe r owned forty percent equity of the company and Grant owned sixty percent. Wooden’s mother and Grant participated in a lawsuit over mismanagement
of funds . According to Wooden, this lawsuit was resolved on the basis that “everything just went back to the shareholders agreement,” and neither party was required to pay the other a monetary
payment. As to the hotel, Wooden’s responsibilities included maintaining the books and records. He also helped maintain the
hotel. He had a court order from 2012 that s aid that he was not trespassing when he was present at the hotel and had a right to inspect documents. However, from December 2015 through November 2016, he did not have access to the financial information of
the hotel.

Wooden further stated that on Decem ber 17, 2015, he went to the property to review records. Debbie Jefferson or Garry Lowry, who both worked at the hotel, contacted Grant, who came to the hotel with Jenkins. Grant said that Wooden was trespassing and that he wanted him off the property, b ut Jenkins said that he
did not know if he could do that and would check with a local state attorney. The next day, Jenkins said he spoke to the attorney who USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 8 of 2322

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told him that this was a civil matter. Jenkins said he was shown documentation regarding Wooden’ s rights to the property and asked him to file a complaint with the police department, which Wooden did, and then he returned to the hotel office. However, Grant again returned with Jenkins and Jones, and Jenkins said that
Wooden needed to leave because h e was trespassing. Wooden resisted and said he would not leave, and Jones arrested him and took him to jail for trespassing. Jenkins never personally arrested
Wooden , but he was close by during the arrest on December 18, 2015, when Jenkins ordered Jones to arrest him. Wooden claimed
that the Eatonville Police violated his civil and constitutional rights, but there were no specific policies or procedures he could name.
Wooden talked to the state attorney, who said she could not believe he went to jail an d said that this charge was unsuitable for prosecution. The charges were eventually dropped, and he was never adjudicated guilty of any offense for the events of that day.
Wooden further stated that on January 16, 2016, he returned to the property becaus e he believed the trespassing order was not in effect, as he was not prosecuted for the previous alleged trespass. He was present on the property to watch the Martin Luther King, Jr., parade with his family. He entered the hotel office as he was waiting for the parade to pass, and Jones approached him and asked what he was doing there. Wooden stated that he was waiting for the parade, and Jones told him he was not supposed to be there. Wooden showed him the paperwork that his previous trespass was
deeme d unsuitable for prosecution, and Jones said that he did not care and was taking Wooden to jail, which he did. Jenkins was not USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 9 of 2310 Opinion of the Court 22

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present the day of the arrest. Wooden was later released and not criminally charged.

Wooden also stated that a curator took ove r the property from around February or March to October 2016, and he was not allowed on the property until the curatorship ended. After that, the ownership went back to the shareholder agreement, where Wooden was again personal representative of his mothe r’s estate. There were no arrests between January 16, 2016, to November 2016. However, on November 13, 2016, Wooden went to room 127 of the hotel for security purposes because of a high rate of crime and drug use on the property. In the meantime , Grant, Jenkins, and Roy Smith persuaded a judge to issue a warrant for Wooden’s arrest, saying that he burglarized the room, which was occupied. T his was false information , Wooden asserted, because he did not burglarize the occupant’s room. According t o Wooden,

t he room was vacant and destroyed and not occupied. He had to
have the occupant removed from the apartment for using drugs on the property. Later, in December 2016, Wooden discovered the warrant for his arrest and turned himself in in January 2 017.
Wooden further stated that as to the November 16, 2016, incident, the police report from that day said that he threatened to kill or injure Grant. As the officer was taking Wooden to jail, the officer turned around, told him not to go back to the ho tel, and released him. Jenkins was not present at this arrest. The reason he was released was because Jenkins said that a witness’s statement that the police used in support of the arrest was not true. He again USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 10 of 2322

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was not prosecuted for the offense. As to his malicious prosecution claim, Wooden conceded that he was not prosecuted as a result of any of the arrests.
A police report for the November 13, 2016, arrest stated that an officer obtained a copy of a judge’s order, which stated that “[t]he curator shall immediately give all the assets of the corporation Eatonville Holdings, Inc., back to the majority shareholder, Anthony Grant.” The order also stated that “assets of a corporation cannot be taken into an estate as assets of the estate.” The report stated that Wooden disputed the information.
The attached shareholder agreement stated that DebbieSmith and Anthony Grant entered into a business agreement forming Eatonville Holdings, Inc., where Debbie Smith had a forty percent stock ownership in the mo tel and Grant had a sixty percent stock ownership. The first access order from the Orange County, Florida, state court said that the personal representative of Debbie Smith’s property had the right to access the hotel on July 9, 2010, to inspect the prope rty’s financial records. On August 6, 2012, a third access order granted Wooden authority to go to the hotel “in an orderly fashion” to “monitor or review any records or receipts
of revenue for the said property from Monday through Friday from

9 a.m. to 1 p.m. without pay.” An order on May 28, 2014, revoked
the first access order and a second access order not in the record. The order stated that Wooden was directed to “file the necessary forms and documents to close th[e] Estate within 90 days from the
d ate of th[e] Order.” USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 11 of 2312 Opinion of the Court 22

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Jones stated the following in an affidavit. Jones arrived at the hotel on December 18, 2015, where he saw Wooden, Grant, and Jenkins, and Wooden was causing a disturbance. He knew from personal knowledge that Grant was the owner and operator of the hotel, and Grant signed a trespass warning directed at Wooden, which had an expiration date of December 18, 2016. Jones personally served Wooden with the trespass warning in front of Grant and Jenkins and repeatedly ordered Wooden to leave thepremises, but he refused. Jones thus arrested Wooden for trespassing under Florida Statute § 810.08. On January 16, 2016, Jones again arrested Wooden for trespassing at the hotel pursuant to the trespass warning issued on December 18, 2015. The affidavit included a copy of the arrest affidavit from January 16, 2016, from Jones, which stated that Wooden falsely gained entry to the officewith a locksmith after showing the locksmith some papers and asking him to open the front door. Jones further sta ted that the person who called the police felt that Wooden was disrupting the business with his presence.

Roy Smith also stated the following in an affidavit. On November 16, 2016, he responded to a call at the hotel relating to a disturbance, where he me t with Grant, who he knew as the owner and operator of the hotel. Roy Smith was aware of the previous trespass warning that had an expiration date of December 18, 2016.
Grant told Roy Smith that Wooden had approached him and the hotel manager, Gary Lowry , at the back of the hotel, where Wooden stated three times, “I’m gonna kill you and lay your bitch ass down.” Lowry confirmed these statements. Based on these USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 12 of 2322

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sworn statements from Grant and Lowry, Roy Smith took Wooden into custody on charges of intimi datio n

— t hreat to kill or injure, in violation of Florida Statute § 836.10. On November 13, 2016, he also approached the hotel and was advised that Wooden gained access to room 127, occupied by a tenant named Timothy Davis, by using a crowbar, and that Woo den removed Davis’s possessions and placed them on the sidewalk. Davis provided a sworn statement, stating he wished to prosecute Wooden for burglarizing
his hotel room. Roy Smith also obtained a sworn statement from the front desk clerk, Jefferson, who confirmed the incident. Following the incident, Roy Smith completed an affidavit for arrest, and a state court judge signed an arrest warrant.
Jenkins also stated the following in an affidavit. He was the Chief of Police for the Eatonville Police Depart ment during all incidents in Wooden’s complaint. He was present on December 18, 2015, when Wooden was causing a disturbance at the hotel and Grant signed a trespass warning directed at Wooden. Despite the
fact that Jones serv ed him with the warrant and d irect ed him to leave, Wooden refused and was arrested in Jenkins’s presence. Jenkins was not present for any of the other arrests, but in Jenkins’s
view, there was probable cause for the arrests based on the trespass warning or sworn witness statements.

W ooden filed responses opposing all of the motions for summary judgment.
D. The District Court’s Rulings USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 13 of 2314 Opinion of the Court 22

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A magistrate judge prepared a report and recommendation (“R&R”), first recommending denying Jenkins’s motion to dismiss and construing Counts Four and F ive against Jenkins as claimsagainst Eatonville. Second, as to Wooden’s state law false imprisonment claims against Jones and Roy Smith, the magistrate judge stated that Wooden had failed to allege facts showing that Jones
and Roy Smith acted maliciously or in bad faith and thus recommended dismissal of those claims based on sovereign immunity. Third, the magistrate judge recommended dismissing Wooden’sdefamation claim because Jenkins was covered by absolute privilege for statements made related to his official duties and Woodenhad failed to allege that Jenkins acted outside these duties by preparing a warrant. The magistrate judge also provided a notice to the parties that they had fourteen days after service of the R&R to object and that a “party’s f ailure to file written objections waive[d] that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected

- to factual findings or legal conclusion the district court adopt[ed] from the [R&R].”
Then, the district court issued an order addressing the pending motion s to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. First, noting that no objections had been filed to the R&R, the districtcourt adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation with the exception that it disagreed with the magistrate judge that Wooden had dropped Eatonville from the suit because Wooden clearly listed the town in the “Parties” section of his amended complaint. USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 14 of 2322

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The district court then addressed the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and analyzed whether there was probable
cause for Wooden’s four arrests, which would bar all his remainingclaims under § 1983 and for state law false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The court first noted that it was undisputed that

Grant was an o wner of the property and that the only evidence provided by Wooden as the basis for his right to legally be on the property was his authority as personal representative of his mother’s estate pursuant to the Letters of Administration, the Shareholder agree ment, and the access orders in the probate case.

As for the December 17, 2015, incident, the district court noted that Wooden was not arrested or prosecuted as a result, and therefore there was no basis for claims of false imprisonment or malicious prose cution based on this incident. Even if there were, the district court explained, the claims would fail because there was probable cause to arrest him. It determined that Wooden only hadauthorization from the letters of administration, shareholder agreem ent, and access orders to go on the property “in an orderly fashion,” which Wooden did not do when he hired a locksmith to break into the property and disrupt the business’s operation. The court thus determined that there was probable cause to believe tha t Wooden had exceeded his authority to be on the property, which, together with the property owner ’s request that Wooden leave, was sufficient probable cause to arrest Wooden for trespass.

As to Wooden’s December 18 arrest for again using a locksmith to ga in access to the office on the property, the district court USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 15 of 2316 Opinion of the Court 22

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determined there was information sufficient to find probable cause

. The district court reached this conclusion because Wooden’s access to the property exceeded his authority, and Jones and Jenkin s had reason to believe the access order was no longer valid given
that the incident occurred well beyond the ninety

- day deadline that had been set to close the probate case. Further, the district court rejected Wooden’s argument that probable cause did n ot exist because this was a civil matter . As the district court explained, even if that were true, the officer’s decision to arrest someone was different from the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or not, and it did
not affect whether probable cause ex isted for the arrest in the first place

. For the January 16, 2016, arrest, the district court determined that Jones knew that Wooden had been issued a trespasswarning that was still in effect and that the probate court had entered an order reasonably rea d to have revoked Wooden’s accessto the property, which was enough to create probable cause to arrest Wooden for trespass. Further, the district court determined that even if Jones believed the third access order was still in effect, Wooden’s presence on the property was beyond what was allowed in that order, as he only had authority to review any records or receipts of revenue, which did not give him authority to enjoy the Marin Luther King , Jr., Day parade with his family like he admitted to doing. Las tly, the district court said that the state attorney’s decision not to prosecute Wooden for the December 2015 incident did not render the trespass warning ineffectual or impact whether there was probable cause for his arrest. USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 16 of 2322

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As for the November 13, 2016, arrest, the district court held that breaking into a room in the hotel and installing a security office was clearly beyond the authority Wooden had based on the probate order and gave grounds for probable cause for trespass and burglary. While the court noted that Wooden maintained that the room was vacant, it stated that two witnesses had provided Roy Smith with statements establishing that the room had been rented to Davis and Davis’s property had been removed from the room.

As for the November 16, 201 6, arrest, the district court held that there was probable cause that Wooden threatened to injure
Grant based on the sworn statements of two witnesses and the history between the parties, which Roy Smith was aware of. The district court held that even if there were not probable cause to arrest Wooden for threatening to kill Grant, there was probable cause to arrest him for trespass based on the previous trespass notice thatwas still in effect and a probate order that plainly stated that all assets and man agement of the property belonged to Grant.

Thus, the district court held that , because there was probable cause to arrest Wooden in each instance, the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all remaining claims. This appeal ensued.

I I.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Amy v. Carnival Corp.

, 961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020) ( quoting Guevara v. NCL USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 17 of 2318 Opinion of the Court 22

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(Bahamas) Ltd. , 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) ). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence shows that “there isno genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a). “But it is improper if a reasonable jury could find for the non

- moving party.” Amy , 961 F.3d at 1308. In addition, documents filed by pro

se litigants are to be liberally construed and must be held to less stringent standards than documents drafted by attorneys. Estelle v.
Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by pr obable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). A warrantless arrest lacking probable cause violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim , “but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville , 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010)

. “Probable cause exists where the facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient tocause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is b eing committed.” Id. In deciding whetherprobable cause exists, police officers need not resolve every inconsistency found in the evidence, as long as it is reasonable to conclude from the totality of the circumstances that a crime was committed. Paez v . Mulvey , 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019)

. Some conflicting evidence or a possible affirmative defense does not USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 18 of 2322

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“necessarily vitiate probable cause.” Id. “That a defendant is subsequently acquitted or charges are dropped against the defendant
is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest itself.” Marx v. Gumbinner , 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990)

. The standard for determining probable cause is the same under Florida
and federal law. Rankin v. Evans , 133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998)

. Probable cause is an absolute bar to state law and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest. Id. at 1435. “The existence of probable
cause constitutes an affirmative defense to the claims of false arrest and imprisonment under Florida law.” I d . at 1436. The existence of probable cause will also defeat a claim for malicious prosecution
under Florida law. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream , 942 F.3d 1277, 1309 (11th Cir. 2019).

Florida law defines “ trespass ” as Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or conveyance, or, having been authorized, licensed, orinvited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the premises, or by a person authorized by the owner or lessee, to depart an d refuses to do so, commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance. Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1). Florida law defines “ burglary " as “[e]ntering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premi ses are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter.” Id

. § 810.02(1)(b). As relevant here, Florida law defines the crime of USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 19 of 2320 Opinion of the Court 22

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threats, in relevant part, as “[w]hoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communic ation, maliciously threatens to accuse another of any crime or offense, or by such communication maliciously threatens an injury to the person, property or reputation of
another.” Id . § 836.05.
Here, the district court did not err in granting the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment because there was probable
cause for each of Wooden’s arrests, which was fatal to each of his
claims. First, the fact that criminal charges were dropped or not brought against Wooden for the arrests has no bearing on the probable cause analysis. Marx , 905 F.3d at 1507. Next, although the administration of Wooden’s mother’s estate was a civil matter generally, Wooden could not engage in alleged criminal activity of trespassing, burglary, and threats related to his mother ’s estate.
Further, the district court also properly rejected Wooden’s argument that there was not probable cause to arrest him because he was authorized by the probate court to enter the property as the personal representative of his mother’s estate. Ev en assuming the
access order was still valid at the relevant times that Wooden wasarrested, Wooden could only enter the property “in an orderly fashion” to review the books and records. But, reviewing each of the four incidents, there was probable cause for each arrest.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to all claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution, and we affirm as to this issue.

II. USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 20 of 2322

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We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss. Chua v. Ekonomou , 1 F.4th 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2021). We will accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id

. Florida’s sovereign immun ity statute grants immunity to police officers unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). “An officer acts maliciously when he acts with ‘ the subjective intent to do wrong. ’ ” Baxter v. Roberts , 54 F.4th 1241, 1271 (11th Cir. 2022) (qu oting Peterson v. Pollack , 290 So. 3d 102, 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) ). Additionally, we have held that a plaintiff’s
intentional infl iction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution claims were barred by Florida’s sovereign immunity statute. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.

, 792 F.3d 1313, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015).

Under 11th Circuit Rule 3

- 1, “a party who fails to objec t to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation ‘ waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected

- to

- factual and legal conclusions ’ ” so long as “the party who failed to object ‘ was informed of the time period for

o bjecting and the consequences for failing to do so. ’ ” Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4 , 977 F.3d 1185, 1191

– 92 (11th Cir. 2020) ( quoting 11th Cir. R. 3

- 1 ). “[H]owever, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the inter ests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3

- 1. We will find plain error only when (1) USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 21 of 2322 Opinion of the Court 22

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an error has occurred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Dupree v.
Warden , 715 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). An error is plain if the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent from the Supreme Court or us directly resolves the issue. United States v.

Innocent , 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020)

. Finally, w e have “long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. , 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Campbell , 26 F.4th 860,873 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (holding in the criminal context that issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances), cert. denied

, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).

Here, as an initial matter, Wooden did not argue on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing his defamation claim against Jenkins . As a result, he forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of this claim. Sapuppo , 739 F.3d at 681. Further, Wooden did

n ot file any objections to the R&R recommending partial dismissal, so he is, at most, entitled only to plain error review. And Wooden
has not shown that the district court plainly err ed in granting the partial motions to dismiss because the officers were shielded by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we also affirm as to this issue.

* * * * USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 22 of 2322

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order s

.
AFFIRMED. USCA11 Case: 22-10649 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2023 Page: 23 of 23