## NO. 12-07-00093-CR
IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

KEN NE TH D. FREEM

AN , § APP EAL FRO

M T HE 2 41 ST APPELLANT
V . § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATE OF TEX AS, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY, T EXAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Kenne th D. Fr eema

n appea ls his conviction for delivery of a c ontrolled substance . I n three issues, Appellant conte nds that t h e ev i d en ce w as not leg ally or fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the jur y ’ s v e r d ic t an d th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in a ll o w in g e v id e n c e o f e xtr an e o u s o f f e n s e s to be int ro du c e d. Th e State did

no t f ile a br ie f. We a ff

ir m.

B ACKG ROUND I n Aug ust 2006, o f

f ic e r s f r o m t h e City of Tyler Police De partment c onducted a n investigation of Appellant. The police office rs used a conf idential informant in their investig ation who ar rang ed

a m ee t i n g wi th Appellant to purcha se cr ack c ocaine . The mee ting wa s scheduled at a Wal-Mart reta il store in Ty l er , T ex as . Tyler police office rs conduc ted video and a udio surveillance of the meeting . Appellant did not deliver the coca ine to the informant himself. Instead, a ccor ding to the State’s theory

of the c ase, he used Ke vin Cain as an interme diary . Cain sold c ra ck co ca i n e to t he informant in the Wal-Mar t p ar k i n g l o t

. Although the informant had c ontact only with Cain, the police obser

ved Ap p ellant in the Wal-Mart pa rking lot at the time of the transa ction, and they observe d Cain enteringAppellant’s ve hicle af ter c ompleting the sa le.2

Th e inf or mant c on ta c te d App e lla

nt the fo llo wi ng da

y to p ur c ha se mor e c ra c k c oc a ine . T his time the meeting was arr ang ed at a Denny ’s re staurant. As be fore , the informant pur chase d coca ine from Cain, and the police obser ved Appe llant in the are a. Cain was ar

rested f or selling coca ine to the informant. He told the police that he wor ked for Appellant, and he identified Appe llant in the video rec ording s of t he two transac tions. He furthe r
s t a t e d t h a t A p p e l l an t h a d dr i v e n h i m t o t h e t w o t r an s a c t i o n s an d t h a t t h e dr u g s h a d b e l o n g e d to Ap pe lla nt. A Smith C ounty

g rand jury

returne d two indictments, one for e ach de li v er y of coc aine, ag ainst App el l an t. Appellant pleade d not guilty , and the indictment alleg ing the Wal-Mart transac tion procee ded to trial. The jur y found Appe llant guilty

of the off ense a s char g ed. Appe llant pleade d true to the a lleg ation that he had a prior fe lony

conviction, and the jur

y assessed punishment at life imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. T his appea l followed.

S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE I n h is f ir st a nd se c on d is su e s, Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s that the e vid e nc e wa s n ot l e g a lly or fa c tua lly suff ic ie n t to s u

p p o rt h is c o n v ic ti o n
. Sp e c if ic a ll y , Ap p e ll an t ar g u e s th e r e w a s n o e v id e nce tha t he pe rs on a lly

de liv e re d c ra c k c oc a ine to t he inf or mant. Stand ard of Review L eg al suffic iency

is the constitutional mi nimum required by the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fo u rt ee n t h Am en dm en tt o s u s t ai na c ri m i n al co n v i ct i on. J acks on v . V irg inia , 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct . 2 78 1, 27 86 -8 7, 61 L . E d. 2d 56 0 ( 19 79 ); Ros s v . St ate , 1 33 S.W. 3d

61 8, 62 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Wil

lis v . St ate , 192 S.W .3d 585, 592 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2006, pe t. ref’ d). The sta ndard for r eviewing

a leg al suffic iency challeng e is whether any rational trier of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the off ens e b ey ond a re asonable doubt. Jackson , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9, 99 S. Ct

. a t 27 89 ; Wil

lia ms v. Sta te , 235 S.W .3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The evidenc e is ex amined in the light most favor able to the jury ’s ver dict. J a c kson , 4 4 3 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct . at 2789; W i l l ia ms , 235 S.W .3d at 750. I n revie wing fac tual sufficie ncy , we c onsider all the e vidence weighed by the jury that tends to p ro ve the e xiste nc e of the e le me nta l fa c t in dis pute and c omp a re it t o th e e vid e nc e that te nd s to3

disprove that fac t. Sant

e lla n v . St ate , 939 S.W .2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Although w e
are authorized to disag ree with t h e j u ry ’s deter mination, even if probative evidenc e exists t hat

su pp or ts the ve rd ic t, o ur

e va luatio n s ho uld

no t su bs tanti a lly

int ru de up on the jur

y ’s ro le a s th e so le judge of t he weight and cre dibilit y of witness testimony

. Id. ; see Cle wis v . St ate , 922 S.W .2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Where ther e is conflictingevidenc e, the jury ’s ver dict on such matters is ge nera lly

reg ard ed as conc lusive. V an Z and t v . St ate , 9 32 S.W. 2d

88 , 9 6 ( Te x. Ap p. –E l Pa so 19 96 , p e t. r e f’ d) . U lti mate ly , w e mus t a sk wh e the r a ft e r a ne utr a l r e vie w o f a ll the e vid e nc e , b oth for a nd ag ainst the findi ng , the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine c onfidenc e in the jury ’s deter

mination, or the proof of

g uilt, although ade quate if taken a lone, is g reatly outweig hed by contra ry proof. Jo hnso n v

. St ate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A verdict will be set

a sid e “ on ly

if the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g g uil t is so ob vio us ly weak , or the c on tr ary e vid e nc e so
overw helmingly

outweig hs the supporting e vidence , as to rende r the c onviction clear ly wrongand manifestly

unjust.” Ortiz

v . St ate , 93 S.W. 3d 79 , 87 (T e x. Cr im . Ap p. 20 02 ); see also Watson v. Sta te , 204 S.W .3d 404, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Sims v . St ate , 99 S.W. 3d 60 0, 60 1 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2003). Un de r e ith e r the le g a l su ff ic ie nc y or fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard , o ur

ro le is t hat of a pp e llate

r e v i e w , an d

t h e f a c tf i n d e r i s t h e s o l e j u d g e o f t h e w e i g h t an d c r e d i b i l i t y o f

a w i t n e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. We sb ro ok v . St ate , 29 S.W. 3d 10 3, 11 1- 12 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th e fa c t f ind e r m ay c ho os e to believe a ll, som e, o r none of a witness’s testimony

. Shar p v . St ate , 7 0 7 S. W. 2 d

6 1 1 , 6 1 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1986). The suff iciency of the e vidence is measure d ag ainst the elements of t he offense a s defined b y a h y p o th e ti c a ll y

c o r r e c t j ury char g e. Ma lik

v . St ate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a c harg e would include one that “ac curately set s o u t the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnece ssarily incre ase the State’s burden of proof or unnec essar ily restric t the State’s theorie s of liability , and adequately descr ibes the particula r offe nse for which the de fenda nt was tried.” Id. As limit ed by

the indictment, a per son commits th e o ff ense of delivery of a c ontrolled substance by

knowing ly

deliver i n g, ei ther a ctually or construc tively , a contr olled substance, specific ally

coca ine, in an amount of more than one g ram but less t han four g rams. T EX
. H E AL TH4

& S AF ETY C ODE §§ 481.002(8), 481.112( a)( c) ( Ver non 2003). Ana lys is Although c hara cter izi ng his argument in terms o f t h e leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e, Appe llant’s co m p l ai n t stems from the trial c ourt’s dec ision to subm it two theories of lia bil ity to t he jur y . Spe c if ic a lly , the tr ia l court ins tr

uc te d the jur

y that it co uld

fi nd Ap pe lla nt guil ty if he a ctually

transfe rre d coca ine to the informant or if he c onstructively

transfe rre d it to the informant. Appellant argues that there is no evidence that he ac tually transfe rre d coca ine to the inf or mant, that the tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld n ot h a ve ins tr

uc te d th e jur

y on tha t th e or y , a nd that he sh ou ld be ac quitted or have a new trial bec ause of

a lac k of evide nce of

an ac tual transfe r. Appellant neve r aske d the trial cour t not to instruct the jury

on alternate theorie s beca use of a lac k of evide nce, a

nd this co m p l ai n t i s n o t preser ved for our re view. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 33.1 (a )( 1) (A ); see also T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN
. arts. 36.14, 36.15 (V ernon Supp. 2007); Almanza v

. St ate , 6 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 7 , 1 7 1 (T ex
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 1 9 8 5 ). Ap p el l an t d i d o b j ec t t o t h e c h ar ge arguing t h at t h e S tate should be for ced to e lect betwe en the two theor ies, ac tual or construc tive delivery , beca

use he w as entitled to a una nimous verdict on one theor y or anothe r. Appellant does not a

rgue this issue on appea l. Moreover , the trial cour t properly overr uled thi s o bje c ti on bec a

us e in a de liv e ry of a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e c a se , th e State may

ple a d a lte rn a te forms of de livery , and it may n o t b e forced to e lect a pa rticular me thod on which to prosec ute. Rod rig ue z v . St ate , 89 S.W .3d 699, 701–02 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2002, pet. re f’d) (citing Kitc he ns v

. St ate , 82 3 S. W.2 d 2 56 , 2 57 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 )) ; see also Ngo v . St ate , 175 S.W .3d 738, 746–48 (T ex . Crim. App. 2005). Eac h method may be submitted alternatively in the jury char g e. Za nghe tti v

. St ate , 6 18 S.W. 2d

38 3, 38 6– 87 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ); Atue sta v . St ate , 788 S.W. 2d 38 2, 38 5 ( Te x. Ap p. –H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 90 , p e t. r e f’ d) . Wh e re a ge ne ra l ve rd ic t is returne d and the e vi d en ce i s s u fficient to support a finding under a ny of the a lternative pa

rag raph alleg ations submitt ed, no er ror is shown. He rri

n v . St ate , 125 S.W .3d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 02 ); se e als o K

it c he ns , 8 2 3 S.W .2d at 258 (“ I t is appropriate wher e the a lternate theories of committing the same offe nse ar e submitted to the jury in the disjunctive for t h e j ury to return a g eneral ver dict if the evide nce is suff icient to support a findingunder a ny of the theor ies submitt ed.”)

.5

There fore , in evaluatingthe suffic iency of the e vidence , we turn our attention to the two theories alleg ed in the indictment, that Appellant ac tually transfe rre d the coc aine to the infor mant and that he ma de the same transf er c onstructively . Transf err ing a co n t ro l l ed substance to a n intermediar

y to be transf

err ed to a third part y i s a co n s t ructive tra nsfer

. See Sims v

. St ate , 117 S.W .3d 267, 277–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). There wa s ev i dence that Appellant tra nsfer red the

coca ine to the intermediar y and that it wa s then transfe rre d to a third party , the informant. B oth the inf or mant a nd Ca in te sti fi e d a

bo ut a se ri e s of e ve nts tha t be g an w ithAp pe lla

nt’ s g ivi ngc oc a ine to Cain and ende d with Cain’s selling the c ocaine to the informant. Additionally , Cain testified that Appellant drove him to the Wal–Mart and that he wor ked for Appellant. F inally , the video of the transac tion showed Appellant at the scene , and an inmate testified that Appe llant had admitted the

arr ang ement to him, saying that he could not be c onvicted f o r deliver ing c ocaine to the informant beca use he had not per sonally

done so. This is evidence that Appellant construc tively delivere d the

coca ine. Cain made the a ctual deliver y of coc aine to the infor

mant. Howeve r, the jury

was instructe d on the law of parties. Under the law of parties, a person, in this case Appellant, is responsible f or the ac tions of another if he , with the intent to promote or assist the co mmissi on of the off ense, solicits, e n co u rag es, aids, or attempts to aid the other per son to commit t he off ense. T EX
. P EN AL C ODE ANN
. § 7.02(a) (2) (Ve rnon 1994). Cain’s testimony , along with the circ umstantial evidence including A

ppellant’s pre sence at the sce ne and A ppellant’s ar

rang ing the transac tion with the inf or mant, is e vid e nc e that Ap pe lla nt a ide d Ca in in the de liv e ry of c oc a ine wi th t he int e nt t o p ro mot e or assist that delivery

. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the jury ’s ver dict, the jury could have

rea so nably

deter mined that Appellant construc tively delivere d the cr ack c ocaine to the informant throug h Cain. Alternate ly , applying the law of pa rties, the jury

could have rea sonably

conclude d that Ap pe lla nt a ide d Ca in i n th e a c tua l tr ans fe r o f t he c oc a ine . T he re fo re , th e evi den ce wa s le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s ve rd ic t. A r e vie w o f a ll o f t

he e vid e nc e wi tho ut t

he lig ht mos t fa

vo ra ble to the ve rd ic t r e ve a ls s ome evidenc e that is contra

ry to the verdic t. Specifica lly , there wer e re asons t h at t he jury might have doubted the testimony

of the infor

mant as we ll as that of Cain. Appellant pre sented e vidence that6

Cain had a pe nding dr

ug char g e and the informant had been compensated. Fur thermore , Appellant prese nted evidenc e fr om a witness who cla imed that the conve rsation in the jail about the drugdeal did not happen. Nonethele ss, we must consider this evidenc e in the conte x t of the re cord a s a whole. Ap p el l an twa s at t h e s ce n e o f t h e o ff en s e. W h i l e t h e i n fo rm an t ’s an d C ai n ’s t es t i m o n y d i d n o tgo uncontested, the jury

could have believed t heir testimony , which wa s supported by signific ant circ umstantial evidence

. Ge ne ra lly , it is fo r the jur

y to de te rm ine the we ig ht to be a ff or de d th e te sti mony

of a wi tne ss and to re solve any

conflicts in the evide nce. See Wesbrook , 29 S.W .3d at 111 (T ex
. C ri m
. App. 20 00 ); see also Watson , 204 S.W .3d at 409. The issues raised by Appellant ar e not so troubling a s to cause us to conclude that the g reat weig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s verdic t or t hat t he guilty verdic t is “cle arly wrong ” or “manifestly unjust.” See Watson , 204 S.W .3d at 417. Our r eview of

the re cord a s a whole, w ith consideration g iven t o all of t he evidence both f or
and a g a ins t th e jur

y ’s fi nd ing , h a s n ot c a

us e d u s to c on c lud e that th e pr oo f of g uil t is so ob vio us ly

weak or is otherwise so g reat l y outweig hed by

contra ry proof a s to render

Appellant’s c onviction

c le arl y wr on g or manif e stl y un jus t. T he re fo re , w e ho ld th at the e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o
su pp or t th e jur y ’s ve rd ic t. We ov e rr

ule Ap pe lla

nt’ s f ir st a nd se c on d is su e s.

E X TR A N EO U S O FF ENSES I n his third issue, Appellant contends that the tria l court er red in ad m i t t i ng evidenc e of extraneous offe nses bec ause the State did not provide prior notice of its intent to uti liz e the e vidence at trial as r equire d by

Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The evidenc e in question is the second drug transac tion at the Denny ’s re staurant and evidenc e that Appellant’s house was a place wher e cr ack

c oc a ine c ou ld b e purc ha se d. App ell ant d oe s n ot c on te nd that th is e vid e nc e wa s su bs tanti ve ly ina dmi ssi bl e ex tr aneo us con du ct, bu t i ns tea d ad dres ses on ly th e pro cedu ral is su e of w het he r t he Sta te provided suff

icient notice of

intent to use this evidence. Appli cable Law Rul e 40 4( b) of

the Te xas R

ule s o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:7 E vi dence of

ot her cr i mes, wr ongs or act s i s not admi s s i bl e t o prove t he cha r act er of a per s on i n or der t o s how t hat he ac t ed i n c onf ormi t y t her ewi t h. I t may , howev er , be admi s s i bl e f or ot her pur po s es , s uch as pr oof of mot i v e, oppor t u n i t y , p repa r at i on , pl an , k n owl edg e, i den t i t y , or a bs en ce of mi s t ak e or a c c id e n t, p ro v id e d tha t up o n ti m e ly re q u e st b y the a c c u se d in a c rim ina l ca se , re a so n a b le n o ti c e is gi ven i n a dvanc e of

t r i al of i nt ent t o i nt r od uce i n t he St at e’ s cas e- i n- chi ef su ch ev i dence o t her t han t hat ari si ng i n t he same tr ansact i o n.

T EX
. R. E V ID . 404(b). Thus, Rule 404(b) conditions the admissibil ity of extran eous off

ense e vidence on the State’s compliance wi t h t h e noti ce pr ovision found in the rule. T EX
. R. E V ID
. 404(b); He rna nde

z v . St ate , 176 S.W. 3d 82 1, 82 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). Whe n s ub sta nti ve ly a dmi ssi ble extraneous offe nse evide nce is improper ly admitted beca

use the State failed to provide the r equire d notice, the harm analy sis is differ ent from when the evidenc e is substantively inadmissible. Id . at 824–25. Be cause th e n o t i ce re q uirement found in Rule 404(b) does not relate to the substantive

a dmi ssi bil ity

of the e vid e nc e , th e la c k of no tic e do e s no t re nd e r t he e vid e nc e inh e re ntl y

unre lia ble or inadmissible. Id

. (c i t i n g Roe the l v . St ate , 80 S.W .3d 276, 281–82 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, no pet.)). The harm analy sis then must focus on the ef fec t of the proc edura l noncompliance w ith the defe ndant’s ability

to prepa re f or the e vidence

. Id

. Ana lys is The State did provide A

ppellant with notice of the prior bad a cts in the materia ls it produced as par t of pretr ial discovery . Specifica lly , in its di scover y compliance form, the State che cked a spot
ne xt to a se nte nc e that r e a d a s f

oll ow s:

Stat e i nt end s t o off

er extra n e o u s o f

f enses or b ad act s i ncl ud ed i n at t ached do cum ent s, i ncl ud i ng d e fen d a n t’s p rio r c rim ina l histo ry a s w e ll a s a n y b o n d vio la tio n c o m m itt e d b y the d e fen d a n t wh ile on b ond f

or t hi s o f f ens e, under [T exa s R ul e o f E vi dence ] 4 04 ( b) and 6 09 [ , ] rul es of cr i mi nal [ s i c] evi dence [ , ] an d 37

. 07 ( 3)( G ) [ , ] code of cr i mi nal procedur e.
Appellant does not de ny

that this provides some kind of constructive notice, but argues that it did n o t g iv e h im

“ r e a s o n a b le , s p e c if

ic n o ti c e ” o f

w h a t i t w a s th a t t

h e St a te inte n d e d

to o ffe r. Appellant argues further that he was not pr epar ed to de fend ag ainst the addit i o n al information beca use of the deficie ncy of t he noti ce. Notice of extraneous ac ts that refe rs to other mate rials has been he ld to be sufficie nt to meet the re quirement of the rule. In Spl awn v . St ate , 160 S.W .3d 103, 11 2 ( Te x. Ap p. –T e xar

ka na 20 05 , pe t. re f’ d) , the c ourt he ld t hat th e State ’s no tic e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o8

allow the appe llant to prepar e for trial bec ause, a lthough it ref ere nced othe r mater ial, it was

rea sonably

calc ulated to draw defe nse counsel’s attention to a n extraneous offe nse desc ribed in the ref ere nced materia l. Howeve r, the notice ref err ing to othe r mater ial in Spl awn was far more detailed than the one se ntence ref

ere nce in this c ase. A nd there is at least a theor etical r isk that a broad notice of intent to rely on cer

tain evidenc e will not provide the “ rea sonable notice ” suff icient to apprise the other side of

the intent to offer

the evidenc e. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals ha s held that a trial c ourt, when c onsideringan objec tion due to lack of notice , should not evaluate the State’s complianc e with Rule 404(b) in ter ms of whether the def endant is har

med, but look instead t o whether the State provided the require d notice. Hernandez , 1 7 6 S

. W

. 3 d

a t8 2 3

– 2 4

. Ap p e l l a t e r e v i e w , h o w e v e r , d o e s c o n s i d e r t h e h ar m , i f an y,
occa sioned by the l ack of notice of substantively admissible evidence

. Id

. a t 82 5. An d a ny e rr or in admitting such e vidence is not “injurious” if the def endant wa s not surprised. Id

. There was no sur

p r is e in th is c a s e
. D u r in g th e h e ar in g o nth e matt e r , Ap p e ll an t’ s c o u n s el sp e c if ic a lly state d, “ Judg e , I

did n’ t sa y Iwa s su rp ri se d o r I wa s disa dv anta g e d. Al l I ’m sayingis i t didn’t meet the require ments of 404(b), J udg e.” There fore , we ne ed not dec ide whethe r the notice was suff icient t o ap p ri se Appe llant of the evide nce be cause his counsel was not surpr ised by the

e xtra ne ou s in fo rm a tio n. Sa id an oth e r wa y , ev e n if the State ’s no tic e wa s n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o c omp ly with the rule, Appe llant’s ability to prepa re f or the e vidence was not hamp er ed and he was not surprised or

harme d. We overrule Appellant’s third issue.

D I S P OS I T I ON Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d App e lla

nt’ s thre e iss ue s, the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt

is affirm ed

.


### BRIAN HO Y LE J ustice Opinion delivere d May

21, 2008. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.
(DO N OT PUBL I SH)