UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4478

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT L. POAG,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:05-cr-00395-REP-1)

Submitted: July 16, 2010 Decided: July 26, 2010

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia 

Roberts-Brower, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. 

Platt, Research and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Angela 

Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM

Robert L. Poag appeals his twenty-four month sentence 

imposed on revocation of supervised release. Poag argues that 

the sentence imposed is plainly unreasonable because the 

district court did not adequately explain its decision to depart 

from the Guidelines range and because his sentence is 

disproportionately high compared to others similarly situated. 

The Government responds that the district court’s sentence is 

not unreasonable. We affirm

In United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 

(4th Cir. 2006), we held that “revocation sentences should be 

reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly unreasonable’ 

with regard to those [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) (2006) factors 

applicable to supervised release revocation sentences.” 

Although the district court must consider the Chapter Seven 

policy statements and the applicable requirements of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), “the court ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A 

sentencing court must provide a “statement of reasons for the 

sentence imposed.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 

(4th Cir. 2007) (probation revocation). However, the court need 

not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” or 
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“explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.” 

United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).

Our review of the record in this case convinces us 

that the district court adequately considered and explained its 

reasons for the sentence, and that sentence is neither 

procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. See United States 

v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), in reviewing a sentence to 

determine whether it is plainly unreasonable). Moreover, the 

sentence imposed does not reflect an undue disparity as to 

similarly situated defendants. Rather, the court opted to 

depart due to Poag’s multiple supervised release violations and 

his squandering of the prior drug treatment opportunity offered 

by the court. The decision to upwardly depart in these 

circumstances was not plainly unreasonable.

We therefore affirm Poag’s sentence. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED