IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kimberly Clark Corporation, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Bromley), : No. 656 C.D. 2016

Respondent : Submitted: October 14, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 4, 2017

Kimberly Clark Corporation (Employer) petitions this Court for review 

of the Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) March 30, 2016 order 

affirming the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision granting Sharon R. 

Bromley’s (Claimant) Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation by Dependents of 

Deceased Employees (Fatal Claim Petition). Essentially, there are two issues before 

this Court: (1) whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)(1) of the WC 

Act (Act)1of proving that her deceased husband Donald J. Bromley’s (Bromley) 

injury and/or death were caused by exposure to chemicals in Employer’s workplace

and, (2) whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision.2 After review, we affirm.

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 411(1). 

2

Employer presented six issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether Claimant met her 

burden under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act of proving that Bromley’s injury and/or death were 

caused by exposure to chemicals in Employer’s workplace; (2) whether Claimant sustained her 

factual burden of proving that Bromley was exposed to various workplace chemicals, and that such 

exposure rose to the level of a hazard; (3) whether Claimant sustained her burden under Section 

301(c)(1) of the Act of proving medical causation between Bromley’s workplace exposure and his 

injury and/or death; (4) whether the WCJ erred by overruling Employer’s objection during Barry L. 

Singer, M.D.’s June 25, 2010 deposition; (5) whether Claimant met her burden under Section

301(c)(1) of the Act of proving Bromley’s exposure within 300 weeks of his injury and/or death; 
2

Employer operates a paper manufacturing business which produces 

napkins, toilet tissue and paper towels. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 12a-13a. 

Bromley was employed as one of Employer’s Chester plant electricians from 1973 to 

2005, during which time he was exposed to various chemicals used in Employer’s 

production. In the summer of 2005, Bromley was diagnosed with metastatic bladder 

cancer which caused his death on June 23, 2006. 

On August 4, 2008, Claimant filed a Claim Petition for WC (Claim 

Petition), seeking lost wages from August 11, 2005 through June 23, 2006, plus 

medical benefits and counsel fees arising from Bromley’s work injury, which was 

described as bladder cancer, multiple pulmonary metastatis and asbestos-related 

pleural plaques. See Certified Record (C.R.) Item 4. On that same date, Claimant 

filed a Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation By Dependents For Death Resulting 

From Occupational Disease (Fatal OD Claim Petition) under Section 301(c)(2) of the 

Act, alleging that Bromley’s death was due to an occupational disease - metastatic 

bladder cancer - caused by exposure to carcinogens during the course and scope of 

his employment with Employer. See C.R. Item 1. Claimant also filed the Fatal 

Claim Petition pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act seeking widow’s benefits3

 

and, (6) whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision. Because the first five issues relate to whether 

Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)(1) of the WC Act, they are all subsumed thereunder.

3 Under Section 307(2) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 561(2), widows are entitled to 51% of the 

decedent’s wages, not to exceed the statewide average weekly wage. Claimant’s general eligibility 

is undisputed. The WCJ found:

[Claimant], age 62 as of her testimony, is clearly [eli]gible to receive 

benefits as a widow; no dispute exists as to her status. Here, there 

was a forty-one (41)[-]year marriage (date of marriage, April 20, 

1965) during which [Claimant and Bromley] lived together; they were 

living together as of the date of [Bromley’s] death. [Claimant] is the 

sole dependent entitled to benefits. Three children were born of the 

marriage, but all are above the usual entitlement age, and none are 

disabled; none were dependent on [Bromley] for support.

WCJ Dec. at 1.
3

due to Claimant’s work-related death. See C.R. Item 10. In all of the Petitions, 

Claimant averred that Bromley’s date of injury/last date of employment was August 

11, 2005. Employer denied the allegations in each of Claimant’s Petitions and raised 

various affirmative defenses. See C.R. Items 3, 6, 12. 

WCJ hearings were held on September 17, 2008, January 7, June 1 and 

September 16, 2009, and January 20, April 19, July 26 and October 25, 2010. By 

February 4, 2011 decision, the WCJ granted the Fatal Claim Petition and ordered 

Employer to pay Claimant benefits based upon Bromley’s $1,738.08 average weekly 

wage, commencing on June 23, 2006, the date of Bromley’s death (Original 

Decision). The WCJ also directed Employer to pay 10% interest on all deferred WC 

payments, $3,000.00 toward Bromley’s funeral expenses, plus litigation costs and 

attorney’s fees. Employer appealed to the Board which, on August 9, 2013, held that, 

although the WCJ found that Bromley’s death was due to work-related exposure to 

carcinogens, since the WCJ did not state whether the conclusions were made pursuant 

to Section 301(c)(1) or 301(c)(2) of the Act, the Board could not determine whether 

substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s award. Accordingly, the Board remanded 

the matter for the WCJ to specify whether he had awarded the benefits pursuant to 

Section 301(c)(1) of the Act or under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act.

4

On remand, the WCJ conducted additional hearings on March 7 and 

September 10, 2014. On September 16, 2014, the WCJ reaffirmed his Original 

Decision and added that “Claimant has met the burden of proof required under 

Section 30[1](c)(1) of the Act, with benefits to [Claimant] being appropriately 

 

4 Under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act, claimants who establish that certain occupational 

diseases enumerated in Section 108 of the Act, added by Section 1 of the Act of October 17, 1972, 

P.L. 930, 77 P.S. § 27.1, are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the diseases are work-related 

or “arose out of and in the course of [] employment[.]” Section 301(e) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 413. 

Section 301(c)(1) of the Act does not allow for a similar presumption. See Pawlosky v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd., 525 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1987). 
4

granted as entered in the [O]riginal Decision.” WCJ Remand Dec. at 3 (emphasis 

added). The WCJ specifically held: “The instant matter meets the provisions of 

Section 301(c)(1) [of the Act] as a repetitive/cumulative[-]type injury by way of 

exposure to carcinogenic agents in the workplace over an extended period of 

time resulting in bladder cancer and death[.]” WCJ Remand Dec. at 3 (emphasis 

added). Employer appealed from the WCJ’s remand decision to the Board. On 

March 30, 2016, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s remand decision. Employer appealed 

to this Court.5

Initially, Section 301(c)(1) of the Act provides, in relevant part:

The terms ‘injury’ and ‘personal injury,’ as used in this 

[A]ct, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, 

regardless of his previous physical condition, . . . arising in 

the course of his employment and related thereto, and 

such disease or infection as naturally results from the 

injury or is aggravated, reactivated or accelerated by the 

injury; and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for 

compensation under this [A]ct, it shall mean only death 

resulting from such injury . . . , and occurring within 

three hundred weeks after the injury.

77 P.S. § 411(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[i]n a fatal claim proceeding, the 

surviving family member bears the burden of proving that the decedent sustained an 

injury in the course and scope of employment and that the decedent’s death was 

causally related to the work-related injury.” J.D. Landscaping v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Heffernan), 31 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

“[T]he word ‘injury’ . . . is given no express statutory meaning” in 

Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, and “does no more than state that an injury is an injury.” 

 

5

“On review[,] this Court must determine whether constitutional rights were violated, errors 

of law were committed, or necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial competent 

evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

Employer filed with this Court a request for supersedeas pending the appeal. By July 1, 

2016 memorandum and order, this Court denied the supersedeas request. 
5

Pawlosky v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 525 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. 1987). 

However, the term “has been broadly defined to encompass all work-related harm

including ‘any hurtful or damaging effect which may be suffered by anyone.’” 

Jackson Twp. Volunteer Fire Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Wallet), 594 A.2d 

826, 828 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Pawlosky, 525 A.2d at 

1209). Thus, our courts have declared that an “injury” under Section 301(c)(1) of the 

Act need not arise from an accident or specific physical bodily trauma, but can 

include a disease not statutorily defined as an “occupational disease” under Section 

301(c)(2) of the Act or The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act (the ODA),

6

that 

is caused by exposure to a job-related hazard. See Pawlosky; see also McCullough v. 

Xerox Corp., 581 A.2d 961 (Pa. Super. 1990); Standard PA Practice 2d (2011) §§ 

167:220, 167:241. Specifically, “[b]ased on [the] Pawlosky[] [Court’s] broad 

interpretation of ‘injury’ in [S]ection 301(c)(1) [of the Act], it is now well settled 

that a claimant can establish a right to benefits for an ‘injury’ in the nature of a 

work-related disease[,]” i.e., a disease as an injury claim.

7

 Brockway Pressed 

 

6 Act of June 21, 1939, P.L.566, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1201-1603.

7 Accordingly, there is no support for Employer’s argument that bladder cancer “is not an 

alleged injury” and “is not a condition that falls within the statutory meaning of” Section 301(c)(1) 

of the Act, or that “it can only be classified as an occupational disease under [the ODA.].”

Employer Br. at 32.

When the ODA was enacted in 1939, occupational diseases were listed therein that were not 

covered by the Act. However, in 1972, Sections 108 and 301(c) of the Act were amended to 

include occupational diseases as compensable injuries. The amendments covered only disabilities 

due to exposures after June 30, 1973, whereas the ODA remained in force for older claims. See

David B. Torrey & Andrew E. Greenberg, Workers’ Compensation: Law & Practice §§ 5:1, 5:2, 

5:10 (3rd ed. 2008). 

The [ODA] remains unrepealed. Obviously, one of the main reasons 

for not repealing it was to make clear that the [ODA] was to remain in 

force with respect to occupational diseases contracted prior to the 

effective date of the 1972 disease provisions of the [Act]. It is worth 

noting that the diseases covered by the [ODA] are essentially similar 

to those provided for in [S]ection 108 of the [Act].

Pawlosky, 525 A.2d at 1210 n.9.
6

Metals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Holben), 948 A.2d 232, 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2008) (emphasis added).

I. Whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act.

Employer argues that Claimant failed to meet her burden under Section 

301(c)(1) of the Act of proving that Bromley’s death was caused by his exposure to 

chemicals in the workplace within the 300 weeks preceding his death. We disagree.

In support of her Fatal Claim Petition, Claimant testified that, with the 

exception of a broken leg in 1964, hernia surgery in 1993 and a diabetes diagnosis 

approximately three years before his death,8see R.R. at 400a, Bromley was “very 

healthy” up to the time that he noticed blood in his urine in May or June 2005. R.R. 

at 384a. Claimant recounted that, because Bromley’s physician thought he had a 

 

Moreover, our Superior Court specifically stated that, 

failure to meet the definition of occupational disease [under Section 

301(c)(2) of the Act] does not exclude a claimant from compensation 

under the [WC] system. See generally Pawlosky. . . . Such 

definitions are merely procedural means of creating a nonconclusive presumption that an injury was work-related. Failure to 

establish the presumption [under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act] is not 

dispositive; the claimant may still go forward in making out a case 

for [WC benefits under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act] absent the 

presumption.

McCullough v. Xerox Corp., 581 A.2d 961, 964 (Pa. Super. 1990) (emphasis added). Thus, 

disability due to an occupational disease that is not specifically listed in the ODA or Section 108 of 

the Act, 77 P.S. § 27.1, as incorporated by Section 301(c)(2) of the Act, may still be compensable, 

as long as the requisite causation is established. Pawlosky.

Finally, Section 444 of the Act, added by Section 6 of the Act of October 17, 1972, P.L. 930,

provides, in pertinent part, that “any person may pursue, in the alternative, a claim for compensation 

under this [A]ct and a claim for compensation under [the ODA].” 77 P.S. § 1000. Accordingly, 

“[WC b]enefits for disabilities due to occupational diseases may be claimed under either [the ODA 

or the Act,] or under both in the alternative.” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 

425 A.2d 879, 879 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).

8 Claimant articulated that Bromley’s diabetes was controlled with diet and medication 

(Glucophage). See R.R. at 384a, 399a, 405a.
7

prostate infection, Bromley was prescribed a six-week course of Cipro. See R.R. at 

407a. Bromley underwent diagnostic testing of his bladder in June 2005, and surgery 

to remove a tumor on August 11, 2005. See R.R. at 403a-404a.

Claimant explained that Bromley served his four-year electrician 

apprenticeship at Sun Ship Building and Dry Dock (Sun Ship) in the 1960s. He 

worked for Scott Paper’s foam division until approximately 1971. Thereafter, he was 

employed at DuPont for approximately six months. In 1973, he returned to Scott 

Paper at Employer’s Chester facility. See R.R. at 362a-364a. 

Claimant related that Bromley worked at Employer’s plant until August 

2005, but returned to work for Employer for an additional 40 hours in February 2006 

in order to retire with seven paid vacation weeks. See R.R. at 400a-401a. She 

testified that, although she did not have first-hand knowledge of Bromley’s working 

conditions, she observed that the entire time he worked for Employer, “[h]is clothes 

would have little holes in them,” and “he would have die [sic] on his hands when he 

came home.” R.R. at 369a. She also recalled that there regularly was paper dust and 

dye on his work clothes, the latter of which she could never get out. See R.R. at 

370a-373a. Claimant could not specify how often Bromley came home with dye on 

his hands or clothes, only that “[he] went to work, came home and sometimes he had 

die [sic] on it and sometimes he did not,” but it happened frequently enough that she 

just expected it. R.R. at 372a. 

Further, Claimant described that Bromley smoked for approximately one 

year, but he quit in 1965 when Claimant became pregnant, and he never smoked 

thereafter. See R.R. at 392a-395a. She reported that although Bromley’s father 

smoked at home while Bromley was growing up, Bromley’s mother required his 

father to smoke outside. See R.R. at 391a, 395a-397a.

Robert Bonkowski (Bonkowski) testified that he has been an electrician 

for Employer since 1971. See R.R. at 5a, 32a. He met Bromley during their 
8

electrician apprenticeships at Sun Ship in the 1960s. See R.R at 46a. He related that 

Bromley started the four-year program before he did, but they overlapped three of 

those years, and they worked together at Employer’s facility from 1973 until Bromley 

retired. See R.R. at 46a. 

Bonkowski described that Employer’s facility consists of six major 

buildings housing four types of operation areas – a powerhouse, pulp delivery, tissue 

mill, and finishing/distribution – all of which he has worked in over the years. See

R.R. at 6a-7a. Bonkowski reported that the electricians were charged with keeping 

the process running so, “[i]f it was part of the process, [they] worked on it.” R.R. at 

24a; see also R.R. at 14a.

Bonkowski stated that Employer’s electricians initially worked from a 

central shop and were assigned around the plant as needed, to regularly repair and test 

machines, and to conduct “capital work” like new machine wiring, lighting, 

construction, clean-up, etc.9 R.R. at 9a. Bonkowski specified that he and Bromley 

were leaders from 1993 to 1997, meaning that they also purchased needed materials, 

conducted safety meetings and created electrician job assignments. See R.R. at 8a, 

11a. Moreover, Bonkowski recalled that when the central shop was dismantled in 

1997 and the electricians were “assigned to individual assets” or families (i.e., given 

specific area assignments), he was assigned to tissue mill 17 and Bromley was 

assigned to the cogeneration facility (CCF) until 2000, when Bromley replaced the 

napkins department electrician. R.R. at 8a; see also R.R. at 29a, 32a-33a, 43a.

Bonkowski articulated that, as electricians who worked throughout 

Employer’s facility, he and Bromley came into contact with the various chemicals 

used in Employer’s processing. See R.R. at 14a, 23a. He expounded:

 

9 Bonkowski testified that jobs were assigned by work order, horn call or shift supervisor’s 

verbal request. See R.R. at 14a.
9

There was [sic] chemicals that were taken away from us 

because they were called -- considered hazardous. One of 

them was xylene, was a cleaning solvent that was used on 

the machines. We were exposed to Tap Free that was taken 

[] away from the mechanics [in the 1980s], because it was 

considered dangerous.[10] Tazcon (ph) was a penetrating oil 

that was removed, a lot of them just disappeared. I don’t 

know if you can say they were removed, but I know our 

cleaning tank, where we had a wash-up tank in the shop that 

had the One-One-One in it, and I know that was removed. 

Q. A cleaning solvent One-One-One?

A. Yeah. It had a code One-One-One on it. I don’t know 

what the breakdown is but that was considered bad. We 

were exposed to -- I guess we were exposed to 

[polychlorinated biphenyl (]PCBs[)], which were replaced, I 

guess, with number 10 transformer oil. PCBs that we used 

to check test and work a lot with other vendors and stuff 

like that. I mean, even the processes were changed, they

took kerosene out of the plant. They took formaldehyde out 

of the plant [in the late 1980s]. They took milk of lime, 

which was used for bleaching [recycled paper], which was 

chlorine and lime and it was mixed, and it was called milk 

of lime that was pumped out the plant, it was a bleach plant, 

actually we had a bleach plant there [until the mid-1990s]. 

They had chlorine tanks, tanker trucks, train tanks, I guess 

you would call them. That was full of chlorine.

Q. And you would come in contact with that as an

electrician?

A. Sure, because we had to disconnect motors, replace[]

rotted conduits, seal tights, the pipe fighters [sic] might be 

pulling a pump. So in order to get the pump out, we had to 

pull the motor out to make room for the new pump [to go] 

in, and the mechanics would have to draw tap the motor 

bases and things like that, so yeah.

Q. And when things would either disappear or be directly 

pulled, were there ever any safety meetings with 

management where that would be discussed?

 

10 Bonkowski clarified that although Employer no longer stocked Tap Free or Tap Magic, 

the electricians all had cans of it that they continued to use thereafter until it was gone. See R.R. at 

40a. 
10

A. No, not really. Just went out and did your job.

Q. Is there any particular manager that would ever give you 

any direction at all in safety, in dealings with these 

chemicals that you recall?

A. I would say no, not really. Now, they did take asbestos 

brakes out of the areas [in the early 1990s]. We did a lot of

asbestos brakes, transfer asbestos brakes, we used to take 

care of the elevators. The freight elevators, they were all 

asbestos brakes, and we would repair the motors in the shop 

with asbestos brakes, blow out the motor and just blow 

them out in the shop, and we didn’t have any special 

HIPAA [sic] vacuum cleaner like they have today.

R.R. at 15a-17a; see also R.R. at 19a-23a, 42a.

Bonkowski described that, until the xylene tank was removed from the 

plant, he and Bromley came into contact with xylene when they changed motor 

pumps, and when it was sprayed on felts to clean them before starting the 

manufacturing process. See R.R. at 18a. Bonkowski described that “the fumes were 

so bad and they stunk so bad you’d be gagging and coughing, you’d have to leave the 

area . . . .” R.R. at 18a. He recounted that Employer eventually installed an alarm for 

people to leave areas where xylene was in use. See R.R. at 18a. He understood that 

xylene was removed from the plant after the tank leaked into the well shop and 

created an environmental hazard in approximately the late 1980s or early 1990s. See

R.R. at 17a, 19a, 39a-40a. Bonkowski recalled that, although he did not actually 

witness Bromley with xylene on his clothes, all of the electricians were exposed, and 

“[Bromley] being on shift longer . . . was probably exposed to it more[.]” R.R. at 

19a. 

Bonkowski also expressed that the electricians, including Bromley, were 

exposed to significant amounts of industrial dyes, not only in the large tubs, and 

through the dispensing hoses, but because dye was splashed everywhere, including on 

motors, walls, doors, handrails, steps, starters and the floor, and they would touch it 
11

and kneel in it to do their work, particularly in the CCF and napkins area. See R.R. at 

23a-27a. Bonkowski specifically recalled that silica ash also covered every surface in 

the CCF, including electrical panels, the dust system, walkways, doorways, floors and 

even the road due to trucks hauling it to the landfill. See R.R. at 28a, 35a. He also 

asserted that dust from culm (i.e., cheap coal) burned at Employer’s facility was “all 

over the place” in the CCF. R.R. at 29a; see also R.R. at 30a.

Bonkowski recounted that, during the 21⁄2 years that he and Bromley 

worked the same shift:

A. Well, we worked on brakes together, we worked on 

cranes together, because we were the two electricians 

assigned to the main plant. So we were exposed to asbestos 

dust on the cranes, elevators, brake dust. We pulled cable 

and wire through the powerhouses and through the 

basements, asbestos on top of the old pipes, when you pull 

wire across the pipes the insulation was junky, so as you’re 

wiring upon wire you’re cutting into the -- sawing into the 

asbestos through the old basements and stuff, the old pipe

covering. 

Q. Did you see any flaking or dust in that atmosphere?

A. Sure.

Q. Where else did you work with him?

A. Well, I mean, we’ve been all through the bleach plant 

area. I mean, we’ve been through -- covered all the calls in 

the bleach plant, the pulp prep department, in the beaters 

and allies (ph), and things like that, that’s where kind of a 

lot of the old pumps were resin pumps, stuff like that.

R.R. at 30a-31a.

 Bonkowski acknowledged that, although he and Bromley worked in 

separate areas between 1997 and 2000, and he did not know specifically what day-today work Bromley did at that time, Bonkowski was aware of the conditions Bromley 

was exposed to in the CCF during that time, “because [Bonkowski had] been over 
12

there and [the ash was] everywhere.” R.R. at 35a; see also R.R. at 34a, 36a. 

Bonkowski also knew that the napkins area where Bromley worked from 2000 until 

2005 was approximately 80 by 300 feet in size and contained four machines, one of 

which dyed the napkins, but since dye was splashed all over the area, Bromley would 

have been in contact with it, whether he was working on the dye machine or not. See

R.R. at 44a, 52a-53a. 

Bonkowski testified that Employer’s electricians were given plastic, 

accordion-type dust masks to wear, but their use was emphasized only when 

employees made motor brush changes or worked on brakes, due to carbon dust and 

asbestos. See R.R. at 20a-21a. He also stated that protective clothing and leather 

gloves were available to the electricians, but that no one really pushed their use or 

warned that they should not enter a dye area without them, and when they did wear 

the leather gloves they would get soaked with dye. See R.R. at 27a-28a, 41a. 

Although he remembered Employer providing protective suits at some point, he does 

not recollect when, and he explained that since they were not rubber, he could not say 

whether they were water, dye or ink-repellant. See R.R. at 41a. In addition, 

Bonkowski recalled Employer’s medical department fit-testing and assigning 

respirators to the electricians approximately every 12 to 18 months, and the 

electricians undergoing pulmonary function tests every three years as a condition of 

their employment. See R.R. at 36a-37a. He pronounced that the respirators were 

used primarily for ash rather than dye exposure. See R.R. at 28a, 37a-38a, 41a. 

Bonkowski did not believe that he and Bromley were exposed to 

asbestos or other chemicals during their Sun Ship apprenticeships because the ships 

were empty steel hulls, and the apprentices were not informed that there was asbestos 

present. See R.R. at 48a-49a. Employer, on the other hand, expressly notified 

employees that there was asbestos at its facility, and pipes were so marked. See R.R. 
13

at 48a. Bonkowski represented that he did not witness Bromley smoke during the 

more than 40 years that he knew him. See R.R. at 49a-50a. 

Jack Parris (Parris) testified that he has worked for Employer as an 

electrician since 1969. See R.R. at 70a. He confirmed that electricians are 

responsible for handling any electrical problem throughout Employer’s facility. See 

R.R. at 70a. Parris represented that he has known Bromley since 1966, when they 

worked at Sun Ship together. See R.R. at 70a, 97a. He recalled that he and Bromley 

worked together for Employer from 1973 until 2006. See R.R. at 70a-71a. Parris

explained that since he worked swing-shift for the past 20 years, he and Bromley 

worked together at least one-third of the time. See R.R. at 95a-97a, 104a. Parris 

asserted that he and Bromley have had essentially the same job duties, and he 

observed Bromley at work. See R.R. at 71a. 

Parris described that he has been exposed to hazardous chemicals for 

decades while working for Employer, including carbon dust from cranes and motors, 

asbestos, xylene, bleach, formaldehyde, and dust and liquid dyes. See R.R. at 73a80a. He declared that he and Bromley were exposed to carbon dust while working on 

cranes, brakes and motors, and asbestos throughout the facility. Parris specifically 

recalled that xylene was sprayed freely from an 11⁄2 inch hose to clean Employer’s 

machines, which he and Bromley would smell and then experience headaches. See

R.R. at 75a-77a. He recounted that Employer eventually used an alarm to warn 

employees to leave areas where xylene was being sprayed. See R.R. at 75a. Parris 

articulated that he and Bromley while working together for Employer were exposed

for decades to bleach liquor, formaldehyde and asbestos. See R.R. at 76a-79a, 88a. 

Parris further recollected a time when the electricians were told not to drink water 

from the central shop fountain because, although it was clean enough to use for 

processing, the city water may have been mixed with chemicals and sewage. See

R.R. at 87a-88a. 
14

Regarding industrial dye exposure, Parris testified that he and Bromley 

worked together in the several areas where the dyes were used. Parris described that 

powder dyes were used in the pulp prep area:

[W]e had to go in there and change the motors out . . . [and] 

work on the motor starters and . . . , you go like that, 

(indicating) tap something you gotta watch because [there] 

would be [powder dye] dust flying, so you knew you had to 

be careful when you went in there. Never wore a respirator. 

They never said wear a respirator . . . , and you’d get it on 

your hands. 

R.R. at 80a. 

Parris explained that, although the liquid dye was more contained than 

the powder dye, the electricians had to work on the pumps under the vats. See R.R. at 

81a. He related that the liquid dye was all over the machine areas and the walls, and 

he and Bromley, as the young guys, were sent there together because the older 

electricians avoided the messy jobs. See R.R. at 82a-83a, 107a-108a. Parris recalled 

that the electricians sometimes wore suits to keep from dirtying their clothes, but no 

one ever told them not to touch the dye. See R.R. at 81a. He maintained that even 

when the motors were brought to the electricians for service, they were covered in 

dye that would get on their hands. See R.R. at 81a, 106a. 

Parris stated that the electricians were not given respirators to work with 

the dyes. See R.R. at 83a, 108a. He specified that employees were only trained to 

wear their respirators in the CCF for protection from silicone. See R.R. at 83a-84a, 

108a. Parris noted that he also used his respirator in areas like the coal yard due to 

the dusty mist, but not if he was simply going there to flip a switch. See R.R. at 84a85a. He confirmed that the electricians were tested and fitted for personal respirators 

every three years. See R.R. at 84a. 

Parris also testified that he has worked around Employer’s asbestoscovered pipes in the fan houses, attics, ceilings and the electrician’s central shop. 
15

See R.R. at 85a. He represented that the 15 by 15 “motor rec room” where 

electricians’ computers have been located for years, has the highest concentration of 

asbestos, but since it is not flaking, Employer has yet to close it up. R.R. at 86a. 

Parris confirmed that Bromley left shift work in the early 1990s,

Bromley and Bonkowski were leaders, Bromley was next assigned to CCF, then to 

napkins until the equipment was sold and the department closed down in 

approximately 2000 and Bromley removed the power. See R.R. at 89a-91a, 102a103a. He described that, as a leader between 1993 and 1997, Bromley did mostly 

office work but, he would have done whatever electrical work was necessary when he 

worked overtime. See R.R. at 91a-92a. Parris stated that Bromley worked in napkins 

until the last machines were removed within the six months before Bromley left 

Employer. See R.R. at 91a, 93a-94a, 111a. Even without the napkin machines, 

Bromley was exposed to the remaining dye until his last day of work. See R.R. at 

111a-112a. Parris concluded that Bromley was exposed to all of the same 

contaminants that he was exposed to over their decades of working for Employer. 

See R.R. at 88a. Parris admitted that he and Bromley smoked, but less than a pack a 

day, and he recalled that Bromley quit more than 30 years earlier. See R.R. at 99a102a. 

Claimant presented the October 19, 2009 and June 25, 2010 deposition 

testimony of Barry L. Singer, M.D. (Dr. Singer). Dr. Singer explained that his 

practice has focused primarily on oncology and hematology over the past 25 years, 

only 2% to 3% of which has involved bladder cancer because “[i]t’s not one of the 

most common cancers.” R.R. at 131a; see also R.R. at 134a. In preparation for 

Bromley's evaluation, Dr. Singer reviewed Bromley’s medical records, including his 

chest x-rays which reflected that Bromley had “asbestos lungs.” R.R. at 141a. He 

also read Claimant’s, Parris’ and Bonkowski’s deposition testimony, Employer’s 

material safety data sheets (MSDS), materials from the National Institute for 
16

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the International Agency for Research 

on Cancer (IARC), and the independent medical evaluation report of Employer’s 

oncology expert Alan J. Lippman, M.D. (Dr. Lippman). Dr. Singer stated that he also 

reviewed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) information, the 

NIOSH carcinogen list and a KC Safety Tech Library Chemical Index. See R.R. at 

165a-168a. 

Dr. Singer described that any toxins or their byproducts that get into the 

urine sit in the bladder and damage the transitional epithelium therein, which can lead 

to metaplasia or dysplasia and, eventually, cancer. See R.R. at 140a-141a, 204a. Dr. 

Singer declared that smoking is the prime cause for approximately 50% of bladder 

cancer cases, due to benzene in cigarettes, but stated that 20% to 30% of bladder 

cancers are caused by occupational exposure to chemicals. See R.R. at 140a, 142a143a, 163a-165a, 176a. He stated that workers who are not protected or who use 

minimum protection are at a higher risk of occupational exposure, unless that work 

area is 100% sealed. See R.R. at 176a-177a, 216a.

Dr. Singer produced abstracts of medical articles he reviewed that link 

bladder cancer to chemical and asbestos exposure. See R.R. at 199a, 221a-231a, 

244a-250a, 593a-622a. In particular, in Occupation and Bladder Cancer Among Men 

in Western Europe (2003), higher bladder cancer risks were observed in electrical 

workers and men employed in industrial chemical manufacturing. See R.R. at 244a. 

In Bladder Cancer and Asbestos in Spain (1988), “the results [of a study conducted 

between 1978 and 1982] showed that bladder cancer is associated with occupational 

exposure to asbestos.” R.R. at 246a. The Italian study summarized in Occupation 

and Risk of Bladder Cancer (1990), “confirm[ed] the well[-]known association 

between bladder cancer risk and dyestuff production[.]” R.R. at 248a. In 

Occupational Exposure to Chemical and Petrochemical Industries and Bladder 

Cancer Risk in Four Western Canadian Provinces (2004), the study suggested that 
17

there is an increased risk of bladder cancer in workers exposed to asbestos and 

benzidene over the general population. See R.R. at 249a. In Occupational and NonOccupational Risk Factors in Bladder Cancer Patients in an Industrialized Area 

Located in Former East-Germany (2005), bladder cancer was found to have been 

overrepresented in patients with occupational exposure to asbestos and chlorinated 

solvents. See R.R. at 250a.

Dr. Singer testified that Bromley’s work took him all over Employer’s 

plant, and the portion of MSDS for chemicals used by Employer in areas where 

Bromley worked since 1995 that he examined11 reflect that Bromley would have been 

exposed to multiple carcinogenic compounds. Dr. Singer further explained:

Asbestos has some relationship to all cancers involving the 

colon, the bladder, [and] the lung. So less so [sic] in the 

bladder but certainly has potential to cause damage in 

conjunction with other irritants. 

As a sole exposure, it would be less likely but with [a] 

combination of exposure with other compounds like 

 

11 Dr. Singer clarified that he did not review all of the (approximately 250-300) MSDS that 

he was given, because after he located approximately 15 which reflected carcinogenic compounds 

used at Employer’s plant, he “felt it was sufficient.” R.R. at 206a; see also R.R. at 200a. Dr. Singer 

identified the following carcinogenic compounds to which Bromley was exposed: ethyleneimine 

(decorating dye; see 1997 request to approve 2-day trial in napkins - R.R. at 251a-254a), butadiene 

(see 1997 MSDS for coupling grease - R.R. at 255a-264a), crystalline silica (see 1995 MSDS for 

quick metal press fit, 1997 MSDS for CCF ash and a conditioning agent, 1999 MSDS for 

permanent threadblocker, 2004 MSDS for pipe sealant - R.R. at 265a-289a, 333a-340a), nickel 

compound (see 2004 MSDS for petroleum coke - R.R. at 290a-297a), toluene (see 1996 MSDS for

aerosol spray paint and 1999 MSDS for stencil ink spray - R.R. at 299a-303a, 316a-321a), xylene

(see 1996 MSDS for aerosol spray paint, 1996 MSDS for xylene and 2001 MSDS for metal and 

textile markers - R.R. at 304a-309a, 316a-326a), ethylbenzene (see 1996 MSDS for xylene - R.R. at 

322a-327a), trimethylbenzene (see 1996 MSDS for petroleum cleaner - R.R. at 310a-315a), 

dicholorobenzidene (see 2000 MSDS for Bayprint yellow pigment - R.R. at 328a-332a), titanium 

dioxide (see 1995 MSDS for quick metal press fit and 2001 MSDS for metal and textile markers -

R.R. at 304a-309a, 333a-340a), and trichloroethylene (see 2001 MSDS for lectra clean aerosol -

R.R. at 341a-344a). See R.R. at 157a, 201a-202a, 206a-215a, 217a, 220a, 251a-344a. He could not 

determine from the MSDS whether, when or where Employer used those chemicals. See R.R. at 

217a-218a.
18

benzene and the aniline dyes[, it] certainly would be a cocontributing factor.

R.R. at 144a. Dr. Singer explained that the use of aniline dyes was prevalent in the 

1970s and 1980s, and they were used by Employer, but they were mostly 

discontinued by industries in approximately 1985 after they were known to be 

carcinogenic. See R.R. at 146a, 162a-163a, 214a. 

Dr. Singer did not believe that Bromley’s brief past smoking history 

was significant in his developing bladder cancer because the benzene exposure was 

“not long enough and the exposure was minimal.” R.R. at 141a. He did not consider 

second-hand smoke exposure significant in Bromley’s case, since his wife did not 

smoke, and his father smoked outside. See R.R. at 164a. 

Dr. Singer represented that because bladder cancer generally occurs later 

in life, and Bromley was only in his late 50s and did not smoke, his cancer was due to 

“an intense exposure.” R.R. at 146a. He also deemed a significant sign of exposure 

intensity that Bromley’s cancer was in the most advanced stage when it was 

diagnosed, meaning that it had progressed rapidly and aggressively. See R.R. at 

146a-147a. 

Dr. Singer articulated that, based on the MSDS for the xylene Employer 

used, the benzene compound ethylbenzene made up 15% of it. See R.R. at 143a, 

150a. Dr. Singer reflected:

According to the reports I have read from the chemicals that 

he was exposed to and the dyes and the silica and asbestos 

that he was exposed to, [Bromley] had significant exposure 

to chemicals and potential carcinogens or actual 

carcinogens while at work at [Employer’s facility] and he, 

according to [his] co-workers, he worked in areas that 

certainly had exposure to xylene, previously to aniline dyes 

and certainly he had exposure to asbestos because he had 

asbestos lungs on [his] chest x-ray.
19

R.R. at 141a. He stated: “[Bromley’s] risk factors were . . . primarily the xylene, 

which contained the 15% benzene, certainly the co-exposure to asbestos and silica, 

especially the asbestos, [and] also some exposure that he had to the aniline dyes. 

Those were the three main [sic].” R.R. at 146a. Dr. Singer could not point to any 

scholarly journal article in which it was concluded that either asbestos, silica or 

xylene alone could be a substantial factor in the development of bladder cancer. See

R.R. at 170a, 221a-231a. However, he concluded within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that Bromley’s cumulative exposure to those chemicals at 

Employer’s plant was a substantial contributing factor in his development of 

bladder cancer and, thus, his death. See R.R. at 148a, 205a-206a, 221a.

Dr. Singer acknowledged that he did not know when or how much 

xylene was used by Employer during Bromley’s employment, or whether Bromley 

required medical attention for any acute exposures to xylene, silica or asbestos, 

although it was clear that Bromley’s lungs revealed chronic changes due to asbestos

exposure and Claimant reported that Bromley experienced occasional rashes and 

holes in his clothes.

12

 See R.R. at 153a-154a, 157a, 172a-173a, 213a, 218a-219a. 

Employer presented the testimony of its environmental manager Gary 

Baker (Baker).

13

 Baker described that he has been responsible for environmental 

compliance, industrial hygiene accountability and testing at Employer’s Chester plant 

since 1995. See R.R. at 417a-419a, 445a. He explained that, as chemical control 

coordinator, he has had to review, approve and track all chemicals used in 

Employer’s facility, and he inspects the site approximately once every six months. 

 

12 Dr. Singer also admitted that Bromley’s medical records do not reference occupational 

exposure to chemicals, but explained that he would not expect that there would be any such 

references in oncology reports because the goal at that point is keeping the patient alive. See R.R. at 

159a-161a, 175a, 218a-219a.

13 Baker was a safety, health and environmental coordinator at Employer’s corporate center 

from 1990 to 1995.
20

See R.R. at 418a, 442a-443a, 465a. Baker presented MSDS for dyes used by 

Employer, some of which date back to the late 1980s, and asbestos abatement and 

removal records. See R.R. at 419a-420a, 437a, 444a, 451a, 460a. Baker reported that 

he has Employer’s monthly chemical use inventory reports dating back only to 1995, 

and they do not contain cleaning or maintenance chemicals, or oils and greases that 

everyone uses. See R.R. at 464a-465a, 471a. 

Baker articulated that since the CCF was built in the mid-1980s, it did not 

contain asbestos. See R.R. at 420a-421a. He stated, however, that the manufacturing 

facility does contain asbestos and, although a lot of it was removed in the 1980s and 

early 1990s, there is still asbestos there, which Employer monitors daily. See R.R. at 

421a-422a, 451a, 455a. Baker explained that although there is less asbestos now, 

asbestos transite panels used for fireproofing walls remain in the facility. See R.R. at 

455a, 459a. He added that there are also pipes covered in asbestos that are 

encapsulated in aluminum, the ends are capped in material and the material is painted 

over. See R.R. at 438a, 455a. Baker expressed that the asbestos could be exposed if 

someone damages the steam line by cutting through the metal and into the insulation. 

See R.R. at 439a. He claimed that electricians would normally be working on 

electrical conduit that does not contain asbestos. See R.R. at 439a. 

Baker related that when employees notify him of asbestos compromise on 

the premises, an investigation is conducted regarding the cause and the exposure 

potential then the compromise is either repaired or abated, and the air is monitored to 

ensure there is no additional exposure risk. See R.R. at 424a-425a, 455a-458a, 459a. 

Based upon his review of the results, Baker confirmed that, after asbestos repairs and 

removals conducted at Employer’s facility, all actual and clearance testing fell below 

permissible exposure levels.14 See R.R. at 425a-426a.

 

14 All asbestos clearance testing is conducted by an outside firm. See R.R. at 425a.
21

Baker disclosed that because there is the potential for employee exposure 

to silica in the facility’s boiler 10 and CCF areas (including the office and water 

treatment areas) due to anthracite coal burning, employees are required to wear 

respirators in the CCF, particularly in the ash building. See R.R. at 426a-427a, 460a. 

Baker agreed that Employer’s process was very different in 1970 than it 

is now, and that he has no reason to dispute Bonkowski’s or Parris’ testimony about 

xylene being sprayed to clean Employer’s mill prior to 1995. See R.R. at 449a. He 

asserted that he has not approved or disapproved Employer’s use of xylene, and is not 

aware of any xylene use at the facility since 1995. See R.R. at 429a. He recalled 

that, since he has worked for Employer, an alarm is sounded to warn people to leave 

the mill when the cleaning chemicals are being sprayed, but understands that has not 

always been the case. See R.R. at 450a. 

Baker claimed that Employer has only used kerosene to fuel small, fivegallon, portable heaters used to heat certain areas of the plant during winter 

shutdowns. See R.R. at 429a-430a. He stated that the heaters are not used in CCF, 

since the machines generate their own heat. See R.R. at 430a. Baker recalled that

although the PCB transformers at Employer’s facility have been reduced because 

they impose an environmental hazard, three still exist on-site, which are sealed and 

regularly checked such that electricians and others who must work on them, are not 

exposed to PCBs. See R.R. at 430a-431a, 461a-462a. He was not aware of any 

employee reporting PCB exposure since 1995. See R.R. at 431a.

Baker reported that “[b]leach liquor refers to . . . the old style of mixing 

two components together to make . . . concentrated sodium hypochlorite,” used by 

Employer to whiten paper. R.R. at 431a. He confirmed that Employer still uses 

sodium hypochlorite in the filter plant and in tissue manufacturing but, since at least 

1995, a pre-mixed solution is shipped in. See R.R. at 431a, 462a, 471a-472a. He 

reported that neither formaldehyde nor milk of lime have been used in the mill from 
22

1995 to the present. See R.R. at 438a-440a. Although he recalled concerns being 

expressed about the drinking water supplied by the Chester Water Authority, he 

stated that Employer had it tested and confirmed that it “pretty much” matched 

bottled water and, thus, was potable. R.R. at 433a.

Baker admitted that coal dust exists at Employer’s facility in the coal 

yard, conveyor building and parts of the boiler building, and confirmed that CCF 

personnel are exposed to the coal yard. See R.R. at 431a-432a. Baker acknowledged 

that paper dust is generated in the paper mill areas of Employer’s facility, and where 

parent rolls are converted to consumer-sized rolls, and some is evident in CCF or 

where napkins are made. See R.R. at 433a.

Baker testified that he reviewed the MSDS for dyes and uncovered that

since the late 1980s only one – a bay print yellow – contained aniline and other 

carcinogens, which was to be trialed for paper towels at Chester in approximately 

2000 but, since it was not approved, it was never used. See R.R. at 434a-435a, 437a, 

451a, 460a, 463a-464a. He recounted that powdered dyes had been used in the pulp 

prep area of Employer’s plant to color tissues, but is not aware of powdered dyes 

being used in the plant since 1995. See R.R. at 436a-437a. 

Baker described that industrial dyes, inks, chemicals, silicas and asbestos 

are still present at Employer’s facility, but that employees are trained on safe 

chemical use, and are instructed regarding what safety equipment is needed for its 

use. See R.R. at 468a, 470a. He stated that employees are required to report potential 

chemical or other substance exposures to the medical and safety departments. See

R.R. at 424a, 433a-434a, 458a, 462a. He believed that the expectations are 

represented in Employer’s safety handbook, which has been amended occasionally, 

and that it falls under employee safety obligations to say no if they are asked to do 
23

unsafe work, notify others that are doing unsafe work and report unsafe work.15 See

R.R. at 434a, 466a. 

When asked whether there have been chemicals employees routinely 

worked with since 1995 that were eventually deemed hazardous and removed from 

use at the facility, Baker replied: “Nothing jumps to mind[.]” R.R. at 441a; see also

R.R. at 446a. He testified that Employer attempts to be proactive and remove 

chemicals when it becomes known that they are dangerous. See R.R. at 467a-468a. 

He recalled that he has made recommendations since 1995 to reduce environmental 

impacts, like reducing volatile organic compounds and paper dust and silica 

exposure. See R.R. at 446a-447a. 

Baker recalled Bromley’s name but could not recollect his face, and he 

admitted that he never directly supervised Bromley or even worked with him, nor did 

he do the type of work Bromley did for Employer. See R.R. at 443a-444a. 

Employer also presented Dr. Lippman’s April 7 and May 26, 2010 

deposition testimony, which disagreed with Dr. Singer’s statements that Bromley had 

significant exposure to chemicals and carcinogens during his employment. Dr. 

Lippman further disputed Dr. Singer’s opinion that Bromley’s bladder cancer resulted 

from Bromley’s exposure to a combination of chemicals, since there is no literature to 

support such a conclusion. See R.R. at 503a. Rather, Dr. Lippman ultimately 

concluded that Bromley would have suffered from bladder cancer whether he worked 

at Employer’s facility or in a bookstore all of those years. See R.R. at 577a. 

The law is well established that “[t]he WCJ is the ultimate factfinder and 

has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight.” Univ. of 

 

15 Baker described that employees undergo regular medical check-ups, and the respirators 

are fit-tested to each employee. See R.R. at 428a-429a. He stated that, at least since 1995, 

employees who do not wear the necessary respiratory protection are progressively disciplined with 

counseling, verbal reprimands, written reprimands, suspensions and so on, depending upon the 

number of violations. See R.R. at 427a. 
24

Pa. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hicks), 16 A.3d 1225, 1229 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011). “The WCJ, therefore, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the 

testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses.” Griffiths v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Red Lobster), 760 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). 

Based upon the evidence presented in the instant case, the WCJ granted 

the Fatal Claim Petition because Claimant met her burden of proof under Section 

301(c)(1) of the Act. In reaching his decision, the WCJ made the following relevant 

credibility determinations:

3. On review, the evidence presented in support of this 

claim is found credible and persuasive, and is accepted over 

the defense evidence as there is a conflict. . . . 

4. The testimony and opinions of Dr. Singer are found 

credible and persuasive. His opinions are accepted over 

those of Dr. Lippman as there is a conflict. The testimony 

of both co-workers ([] Bonkowski and [] Parris), along 

with the testimony of [Claimant], is found credible and 

persuasive as their testimony, individually and 

collectively, support the opinions of Dr. Singer.

. . . .

9. [] Baker’s testimony would negate any significant 

exposure since 1995; he did not however, dispute the 

testimony of the two co-workers (e.g., the spraying of 

xylene previously . . . .), and acknowledged the 

continued presence of a number of compounds at the 

facility, such as asbestos, paper dust, and coal dust, and 

silica exposure . . . . Dr. Singer noted . . . that []

Bromley’s work environment subsequent to 1995 

(within the last 300 weeks of [] Bromley’s employment; 

he worked until August 2005) exposed him to ‘multiple 

compounds that were carcinogens.’ . . . Dr. Singer 

concluded that the occupational exposure resulted in 

the bladder cancer. He testified: ‘ . . . the total exposure 

that he had to all these chemicals was the cause of his 

bladder cancer.’ 
25

10. Dr. Singer is well qualified to express relevant opinions 

in this case. . . . 

11. Dr. Lippman . . . totally negated the workplace as a 

causal factor in [] Bromley’s bladder cancer. At the 

same time, he did not seek to specifically identify the cause 

of the bladder cancer. . . . Given the record of [Bromley’s] 

work duties as an electrician, in various sections of the 

plant, with associated exposure to carcinogen agents over 

many years as described by his co-workers ([] Bonkowski 

and [] Parris), the opinions of Dr. Singer are found more 

reasonable and more credible than those of Dr. 

Lippman on the issue of causation. This conclusion is 

strengthened given Dr. Lippman’s inability to express any 

specific opinion as to the cause of [Bromley’s] bladder 

cancer (and even more so, considering that he 

acknowledged that some 20 percent of bladder cancers are 

generally accepted to be associated with specific 

occupational exposures . . . ). Dr. Lippman’s . . . challenge 

[to Dr. Singer’s opinions] goes to the weight to be given to 

Dr. Singer’s opinions; the undersigned, in turn, has found 

Dr. Singer’s testimony credible and persuasive, and as 

noted the more reasonable and credible given the 

circumstances presented by this record.

WCJ Dec. at 1, 3-4 (emphasis added).

Neither the Board nor the Court may reweigh the evidence or the WCJ’s 

credibility determinations. Sell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (LNP Eng’g), 771 

A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2001). Specifically, “Section 422(a) [of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834,] does 

not permit a party to challenge or second-guess the WCJ’s reasons for credibility 

determinations. [Thus, u]nless made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ’s credibility 

determinations will be upheld on appeal.”

16

 Pa. Uninsured Emp’rs Guar. Fund v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lyle), 91 A.3d 297, 303 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting 

 

16 Capricious disregard “occurs only when the fact-finder deliberately ignores relevant, 

competent evidence.” Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 

A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Capricious disregard, by definition, does not exist where, as 

here, the WCJ expressly considered and rejected the evidence. Id.
26

Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 191, 195 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). 

On appeal after remand, the Board agreed that substantial evidence 

supported the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant met her burden under Section 

301(c)(1) of the Act.17 In particular, the Board declared that “Dr. Singer’s testimony,

accepted as credible by the WCJ, is unequivocal in attributing [Bromley’s] bladder 

cancer to workplace exposure primarily to xylene, with co-exposure to asbestos and 

silica and some exposure to aniline dyes.” Board Op. at 15.

“As with all claim petitions, the elements necessary to support [a fatal 

claim petition] award must be established by substantial evidence. Substantial 

evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gibson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Armco Stainless & Alloy Prods.), 861 A.2d 938, 943 (Pa. 2004). Here, although it is 

undisputed that Bromley’s death was due to bladder cancer, the parties do not agree 

that Bromley’s bladder cancer was caused by workplace exposure within the 300 

weeks before his death. Employer specifically contends that the lay witness 

testimony was insufficient to prove Bromley’s alleged workplace exposure, and that 

Dr. Singer’s opinions on causation were based upon an inadequate factual record and 

lacked scientific or medical basis. 

 

17 We agree with Employer that, in Finding of Fact 11, the WCJ appears to have implied that 

Employer had a burden to demonstrate an alternative cause for Bromley’s cancer (i.e., “[Dr. 

Lippman] did not seek to specifically identify the cause of the bladder cancer.” WCJ Dec. at 3; “Dr. 

Lippman’s inability to express any specific opinion as to the cause of Claimant’s bladder cancer[.]” 

WCJ Dec. at 4). Claimant here had “a nevershifting burden of proving not only that [Bromley’s] 

injury arose in the course of his employment but also that the injury was related to it.” Pawlosky, 

525 A.2d at 1211 (emphasis added). However, since other substantial evidence supported the 

WCJ’s conclusion, those references in the WCJ’s finding constituted harmless error.
27

a. Three Hundred-Week Calculation.

In order for a fatal claim to be compensable under Section 301(c)(1) of 

the Act, an employee’s death must occur “within three hundred weeks[18]after the 

injury.” 77 P.S. § 411(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[t]his Court has 

consistently held, without exception, that Section 301(c)(1) [of the Act] denies 

benefits to a claimant when more than 300 weeks have elapsed between the 

commencement of the compensable injury and the injury-related death.” Whitesell 

v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Staples, Inc.), 74 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) 

(emphasis added); see also Olsen Bodies, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Gavas), 573 A.2d 238, 240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (“there is no recovery for death 

occurring more than three hundred weeks after a non-occupational disease[-]type 

injury”).19 However, “[i]t is well settled that for an injury to be compensable under 

the Act, it is not required that the injury resulted from any sudden occurrence or 

accident; it may be due to daily trauma . . . .” Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Williams), 814 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)

(emphasis added).

The parties do not cite and our research has not disclosed any reported 

judicial decision that defines precisely when the “injury” occurs in disease as injury 

cases under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act. However, David B. Torrey and Andrew E. 

Greenberg, in Workers’ Compensation: Law & Practice (3rd ed. 2008), opined: “The 

commencement date applicable to a disease as injury case [under Section 301(c)(1) of 

the Act] is appropriately conceived of as the last date of injurious exposure to the 

agent causing the disease, whether or not such last exposure is disabling.” Id. § 5:19

 

18 “Three hundred weeks is the equivalent of five years, nine months and one week.” City of 

McKeesport v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Miletti), 746 A.2d 87, 89 n.5 (Pa. 2000). The date 300 

weeks prior to Bromley’s June 23, 2006 death was September 22, 2000. 

19 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since stated: “[N]owhere in the Act is there any 

such phrase as ‘occupational disease-like.’ An ailment is either an occupational disease or it is not. 

The quoted phrase is meaningless, and it causes confusion.” Pawlosky, 525 A.2d at 1210 n.8.
28

(emphasis added). Specifically, for death claims in disease as injury cases, Torrey 

and Greenberg declared that if “the employee dies more than 300 weeks after the 

injury (last injurious exposure to the hazardous condition), then the fatal claim will be 

barred.” Id. § 5:20.

Further, in Kuo-Hom Hsu v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Rohm & Haas) (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 328 C.D. 2013, filed October 15, 2013), this Court 

declared that the Board properly required the claimant to 

prove [for purposes of Section 301(c)(1) of the Act] that 

[the d]ecedent was exposed to a hazard that caused his 

brain cancer or injury within 300 weeks of his July 3, 

2007 death, . . . because, in a death claim, Section 

301(c)(1) [of the Act] requires that death occur within three

hundred weeks of the injury. 77 P.S. § 411(1).

Slip op. at 3 (emphasis added).20 Thus, this Court has determined for a fatal disease 

as injury claim to be compensable under Section 301(c) of the Act, the employee’s 

hazardous exposure is the injury from which the 300 week look-back period must 

be calculated. 

Here, the WCJ concluded on remand that 

the instant matter meets the provisions of Section 301(c)(1) 

[of the Act] as a repetitive/cumulative[-]type injury by way 

of exposure to carcinogenic agents in the workplace over an 

extended period of time resulting in bladder cancer and 

death -- as other repetitive/cumulative[-]type injuries to the 

muscles/nerves of the body have been found compensable 

under this provision of the Act.

WCJ Remand Dec. at 3. Indeed, this Court has consistently held that “[a]n injury 

[under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act] is compensable when it develops over a period 

 

20 We acknowledge that this Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for 

[their] persuasive value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414 of the Commonwealth 

Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414. In light of the nearly identical facts 

of this more recently-decided case, it is cited herein for its persuasive value.
29

of time and results from a number of work activities in which the employee 

engaged.” Curran v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Maxwell Indus.), 664 A.2d 667, 

670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). In such cases, “determinations of the date of injury depend 

largely on the facts of each case, the purpose for which the injury date must be 

established, and the medical evidence presented.”21 Id. at 671. 

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that, in order for Claimant’s claim to 

be compensable under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, she had to prove by substantial 

evidence that Bromley’s last exposure to a hazard occurred on or after 

September 22, 2000.

22

 

21 “In cumulative trauma cases [under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act], the last day of 

employment is generally used as the date of injury for purposes of notice and filing limitations.” 

Meenan Oil Co., L.P. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pownall), 846 A.2d 793, 795 n.5 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2004) (emphasis added); see also City of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Williams),

851 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2004).

22 Our conclusion is consistent with proofs required for occupational diseases under Section 

301(c)(2) of the Act. Thereunder, if an employee did not file a lifetime benefit claim, his death due 

to a statutorily-defined occupational disease must occur “within three hundred weeks after the last 

date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such 

disease[.]” 77 P.S. § 411(2); Ingram v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ford Elecs. & Refrigeration 

Corp.), 940 A.2d 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared:

Although Section 301(c)(2) [of the Act] references the employee’s 

‘last date of employment,’ 77 P.S. § 411(2), . . . the 300-week period 

begins on the last day of employment-based exposure to the 

hazard. See Sporio v. [Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.] (Songer 

Constr.), . . . 717 A.2d 525 [] ([Pa.] 1998); Cable v. [Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd.] (Gulf Oil/Chevron USA), . . . 664 A.2d 1349 [] 

([Pa.] 1995) (plurality). 

Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851, 870 n.6 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added); see also Farr v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (TRW, Inc.), 823 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“[t]he threehundred week period prescribed in [Section 301(c)(2) of] the Act is measured from the last date of 

exposure to the hazard alleged to cause the disease, not from the last date of employment”).
30

b. Whether a workplace hazard existed to which Bromley was exposed on 

or after September 22, 2000.

Relative to WC claims brought pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, 

this Court has declared: 

[W]hether a hazard exists is a question of fact for the 

[WCJ] to determine. Furthermore, . . . a claimant’s 

burden of proof related to this issue is not overly 

demanding. We have also asserted that ‘[s]ince claimant’s 

exposure is a factual question, the claimant need not 

present scientific evidence or expert testimony to prove 

the existence of the hazard in the workplace.’ Mauger [&]

Co[.] v. Workmen’s Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (Waltz), . . . 598 

A.2d 1035, 1037 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991). ‘The [WCJ] may 

rely solely on the testimony of the claimant or other 

witnesses to prove the existence of and exposure to the 

hazard.’ Id.

Gray v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.), 657 A.2d 77, 80-81 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (emphasis added).

As to proof of the existence of the disease-causing element 

in the work environment, the courts have accepted lay 

testimony, as well as other expert testimony, to support a 

finding that the disease-causing element is present. 

However, the testimony of a lay person appears to require 

testimony of personal experience with the illness-causing 

element and personal knowledge. 

Craftex Mills, Inc. of PA v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Markowicz), 901 A.2d 1077, 

1080-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (emphasis added). Accordingly, lay testimony of firsthand knowledge of a hazard gained from practical experience can be sufficient 

to prove the existence of and exposure thereto. Gibson. 

Because the WCJ did not have the benefit of Bromley’s personal 

testimony regarding his specific workplace exposures to hazardous chemicals, the 

law permitted the WCJ to consider and rely upon first-hand lay testimony regarding 
31

Bromley’s work environment.23 Claimant testified regarding her personal knowledge 

that over the years that Bromley worked for Employer, his clothing contained small 

holes, and was covered in paper dust and dye. 

Bonkowski and Parris worked with Bromley as electricians in 

Employer’s Chester plant from 1973 until 2005, they had essentially the same job 

duties and they observed Bromley at work. Employer’s electricians were charged 

with keeping Employer’s entire process running, so they were directly exposed to all 

areas of the plant, in, under and around the machinery, pipes and elevators. 

Bonkowski testified from his personal experience that he and Bromley were regularly 

exposed to industrial oils, bleach, formaldehyde, PCBs, kerosene, milk of lime, 

bleach, coal ash, silica ash, carbon dust asbestos, and significant amounts of xylene

liquid and fumes and industrial dyes over the years since 1973, because coal and 

silica dust and dyes covered the surfaces of Employer’s facility, and that asbestos 

flakes and dust could be seen in the air. Bonkowski also specifically recalled seeing 

Bromley with xylene-soaked pants on at least one occasion. Although several of the 

chemical hazards were abated, and Bonkowski and Parris worked more closely with 

Bromley before he was assigned to CCF in 1997 and the napkins after 2000, they 

were aware that Bromley continued to be exposed to coal dust, silica ash and 

 

23 Employer relies upon Gibson and May Department Stores v. Workmen’s Compensation 

Appeal Board (Smith), 525 A.2d 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), to argue that the conclusory lay testimony 

offered in this case was insufficient to support the WCJ’s findings. In Gibson, the co-worker’s lay 

testimony was deemed insufficient to establish the decedents’ workplace asbestos exposure where 

the co-worker “simply testified that he saw [the decedent] near a dusty, cottony material that [the 

co-worker] was unable to identify.” Id. at 484. In May, this Court rejected decedent’s doctor’s 

conclusion that the decedent contracted Legionnaire’s disease at work, because it was based solely 

on the doctor’s assumptions that since the decedent worked with air-conditioning units, he was 

exposed to damp environments, and that people who work in damp environments seem to be more 

susceptible to Legionnaire’s disease than the normal population. Bonkowski’s and Parris’ 

testimony of first-hand experience with specifically-described chemicals and their personal 

observations of Bromley’s exposure to them makes this case factually distinguishable from Gibson

and May. 
32

industrial dyes in CCF between 1997 and 2000, and significant amounts of dye in 

napkins from 2000 until he retired. 

Baker admitted that Employer’s asbestos abatement records and his 

monthly chemical inventory reports are limited in time, and that the latter do not 

include the cleaning or maintenance chemicals or oils and greases employees

commonly used at the facility. Moreover, since Baker’s deposition was conducted 

before Employer produced the MSDS for CCF and napkins from 1997 through 2005 

which reflected that Employer continued to use hazardous chemicals in areas where 

Bromley was assigned (including xylene containing benzene, despite Baker’s 

representation to the contrary), Baker did not address them. Baker’s testimony did 

not in any way contradict or refute Bonkowski’s or Parris’ testimony about the 

continued use of hazardous chemicals or their specific presence in CCF and napkins

until 2005. Moreover, Baker confirmed that Employer’s employees, including 

Bromley, during the relevant time period were exposed to silica dust and coal ash, 

particularly in CCF, to dyes particularly in napkins, and asbestos throughout 

Employer’s premises.

This Court has held: 

‘In performing a substantial evidence analysis, this [C]ourt 

must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

party who prevailed before the factfinder.’ ‘Moreover, we 

are to draw all reasonable inferences which are deducible 

from the evidence in support of the factfinder’s decision in 

favor of that prevailing party.’ It does not matter if there is 

evidence in the record supporting findings contrary to those 

made by the WCJ; the pertinent inquiry is whether the 

evidence supports the WCJ’s findings.

3D Trucking Co., Inc., v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fine & Anthony Holdings 

Int’l), 921 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Waldameer Park, Inc. v. 
33

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)) 

(citations omitted). 

The WCJ made specific findings that the testimony offered by Claimant, 

Bonkowski and Parris was credible. Baker’s testimony did not refute that Bromley 

was exposed to chemicals while working for Employer after September 22, 2000. 

See WCJ Dec. at 1, Finding of Fact 4; see also Finding of Fact 9. Although a 

significant amount of Claimant’s hazardous exposure evidence established that 

Bromley was regularly exposed to harmful substances throughout Employer’s 

premises between 1973 and 2000, viewing the evidence in Claimant’s favor in this 

case, as we must, we hold that the undisputed lay testimony offered by Bonkowski, 

Parris and even Baker constituted substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s findings 

of Bromley’s exposure to asbestos, silica dust, xylene and dyes in Employer’s 

workplace on or after September 22, 2000.

24

 

 

c. Whether Bromley’s workplace hazard exposure was a substantial 

contributing cause of his bladder cancer.

“[I]n the case of a fatal claim petition, [the surviving family member has 

the burden to prove] that th[e] injury or disease was a substantial contributing 

cause in bringing about the death of th[e] employee.” Gibson, 861 A.2d at 943

(emphasis added). “If the causal connection is not obvious, the connection must be 

established by unequivocal medical testimony.” Dietz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Lower Bucks Cnty. Joint Mun. Auth.), 126 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

“[M]edical testimony is unequivocal if a medical expert testifies, after providing 

foundation for the testimony, that, in his professional opinion, he believes or thinks a 

 

24 Bromley’s exposure on Employer’s premises during the 40 hours he returned to work in 

February 2006 is not clear.
34

fact exists.”25 Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 

72, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting O’Neill v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (News 

Corp., Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50, 58 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)).

Dr. Singer received his medical degree from Johns Hopkins University 

and is board-certified in internal medicine. He has specialized in oncology (75% of 

his current practice) since the 1970s, and he has been involved with the treatment of 

bladder cancer over his 40 years of practice. See R.R. at 126a-134a. Based upon his 

experience and extensive review of Bromley’s medical records, the depositions, 

Employer’s MSDS, NIOSH, OSHA and IARC literature and journal articles, he 

concluded that Bromley’s co-exposure to xylene, asbestos, silica and dyes over the 

years while working at Employer’s facility since 1973 until August 11, 2005 was the 

substantial cause of the bladder cancer from which Bromley died.26

 

25 “The question of whether expert medical testimony is unequivocal, and, thus, competent 

evidence to support factual determinations is a question of law subject to our review.” Amandeo v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

26 Employer argues that the WCJ erred by overruling Employer’s objection that Dr. Singer’s 

June 25, 2010 testimony of a definitive link between asbestos and bladder cancer lacked foundation 

because Dr. Singer “never established any scientific facts or data based on his own personal 

knowledge or from any other source[.]” Employer Br. at 53. 

“It is well settled that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the WCJ.” 

Washington v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (State Police), 11 A.3d 48, 59 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “[A]

WCJ’s determination regarding the admission of evidence will not be overturned without a showing 

of an abuse of that discretion.” Id. Further, 

[t]he law provides that

expert testimony is incompetent if it lacks an adequate basis 

in fact. While an expert’s opinion need not be based on 

absolute certainty, an opinion based on mere possibilities is 

not competent evidence. This means that expert testimony 

cannot be based solely upon conjecture or surmise. Rather, 

an expert’s assumptions must be based upon such facts as 

the jury would be warranted in finding from the 

evidence. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 

prescribe a threshold for admission of expert testimony 

dependent upon the extent to which the expert’s opinion is 

based on facts and data:
35

“As this Court has stated on numerous occasions, it is within the 

[WCJ’s] power to determine which medical witness he or she accepts as credible, in 

whole or in part.” Mauger & Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Waltz), 598 A.2d 

1035, 1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). 

The fact that [Dr. Singer’s] opinion conflicted with those of 

[Dr. Lippman] does not make it equivocal. As long as [Dr. 

Singer] could state, with a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty, that . . . [Bromley’s] condition was caused by his 

total and cumulative exposures . . . at Employer’s place of 

business . . . , Claimant provided substantial competent 

evidence to support a finding of causation. 

McGraw Edison Power Sys. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kuzior), 561 A.2d 

1327, 1330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Here, 

[t]he record discloses that [Dr. Singer] testified with a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty that [Bromley’s 

bladder cancer] resulted directly from [co-]exposure to 

[xylene, asbestos, silica and dyes]. Notwithstanding 

 

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an 

expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 

perceived by or made known to the expert at or before 

the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by 

experts in the particular field in forming opinions or

inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not 

be admissible in evidence.

Pa.R.E. 703.

Helpin v. Trustees of Univ[.] of P[a.], 969 A.2d 601, 617 (Pa. Super.

2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841, 849 (Pa. Super. 2012) (emphasis added). Where, 

as here, Dr. Singer’s opinions were based upon his experience and extensive review of Bromley’s 

medical records, the depositions, Employer’s MSDS, NIOSH, OSHA and IARC literature and 

journal articles, there was a foundation for a link between asbestos and bladder cancer and, thus, the 

WCJ did not abuse his discretion by overruling Employer’s objection. See R.R. at 199a; WCJ Dec. 

at 2.
36

[Employer’s] artful cross-examination to induce testimony 

on the possibility of other etiologies, [Dr. Singer] never 

recanted h[is] initial assertion of causation and, in fact, 

reiterated on cross-examination that [Bromley’s co-

]exposure to [xylene, asbestos, silica and dyes] was the []

explanation for the disease.

Superior Tube Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Unger), 572 A.2d 258, 260 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1990) (footnote omitted). 

Here, the WCJ made specific findings that the testimony offered by 

Claimant, Bonkowski and Parris was credible, and that such evidence individually 

and collectively supported Dr. Singer’s credited testimony that Bromley’s workplace 

hazard exposure was a substantial contributing cause of his bladder cancer. See WCJ 

Dec. at 1, Finding of Fact 4; see also Finding of Fact 9. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the WCJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial record evidence.

Because there is substantial record evidence to support the WCJ’s 

findings that Bromley sustained an injury in the course and scope of employment that 

caused his death within 300 weeks of his last exposure, the WCJ properly determined 

that “Claimant has met the burden of proof required under Section 30[1](c)(1) of 

the Act[.]” WCJ Remand Dec. at 3 (emphasis added).

II. Whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision.

Employer also argues that the WCJ’s decision was not reasoned

“because the WCJ found that Claimant met her burden of proof on her Fatal Claim 

Petition, which [Employer] respectfully submits that she did not,” and “because, in 

granting Claimant’s Fatal Claim Petition, the WCJ relied upon insufficient evidence 

to reach his decision” and, finally, “because the WCJ merely adopted Claimant’s 

Proposed Findings of Fact.” Employer Br. at 50-51. We disagree.
37

Section 422(a) of the Act[27]requires a WCJ to issue a 

decision that permits an appellate court to exercise adequate 

appellate review. In order to satisfy this standard, a WCJ 

does not need to discuss every detail of the evidence in the 

record. Rather, Section 422(a) of the Act requires WCJs to 

issue reasoned decisions so that this Court does not have to 

‘imagine’ the reasons why a WCJ finds that the conflicting 

testimony of one witness was more credible than the 

testimony of another witness. 

Although our Supreme Court has held that a WCJ need not 

explain credibility determinations relating to a witness who 

testifies before the WCJ, Section 422(a) of the Act requires 

some explanation of credibility determinations by a WCJ 

with regard to conflicting deposition testimony in order to 

enable this Court to review a WCJ’s decision. Under 

Section 422(a) of the Act, a WCJ must articulate the 

objective rationale underlying his credibility determinations 

where the testimony of such witnesses is conflicting. A 

WCJ may satisfy the reasoned decision requirement if 

he summarizes the witnesses’ testimony ‘and adequately 

explains his credibility determinations.’ Clear Channel 

Broad. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Perry), 938 A.2d 

1150, 1157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Thus, while summaries of 

testimony alone would be insufficient to satisfy the 

reasoned decision requirement, where a WCJ summarizes 

testimony and also objectively explains his credibility 

determinations, the decision will satisfy the requirement. 

Further, other evidence in the record may provide the 

objective support necessary under Section 422(a) of the Act 

for adequate credibility determinations.

Amandto, 37 A.3d at 76 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Here, because the WCJ clearly and extensively summarized the

testimony and objectively explained his credibility determinations, we hold that the 

WCJ issued a reasoned decision in accordance with Section 422(a) of the Act. 

Based upon the foregoing, the Board’s order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

 

27 77 P.S. § 834.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kimberly Clark Corporation, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Bromley), : No. 656 C.D. 2016

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of May, 2017, the Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board’s March 30, 2016 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge