FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROCIO AURORA MARTINEZ-DE

RYAN,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW WHITAKER, Acting

Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 15-70759

Agency No.

A096-025-359

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 9, 2018*

San Francisco, California

Filed July 17, 2018

Amended November 16, 2018

Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit

Judges, and Ivan L.R. Lemelle,** District Judge.

* The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for

decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
2 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER

Order;

Opinion by Judge Graber

SUMMARY***

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of Martinez-de Ryan’s

application for cancellation of removal on the ground that she

was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The panel rejected the government’s contention that the

void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply at all to any

grounds of inadmissibility, such as crimes involving

turpitude.

Applying Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)

(rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge to the phrase

“crime of moral turpitude”) and Tseung Chu v. Cornell,

247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) (following Jordan), the panel

held that the crime involving moral turpitude statute, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is not unconstitutionally vague. The

panel concluded that Jordan and Tseung Chu remain good

law in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (concluding that the

residual clause of the federal criminal code’s definition of

“crime of violence” is unconstitutionallyvague), and Sessions

v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (extending Johnson’s

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER 3

holding to the immigration context). The panel explained that

it was obliged to follow on-point Supreme Court precedent—

here, Jordan—even if later Supreme Court cases cast some

doubt on its general reasoning. The panel also pointed out

that Johnson and Dimaya interpret statutory “residual”

clauses whose wording does not include the phrase “moral

turpitude” and which are not tethered to recognized common

law principles.

COUNSEL

K. Alexandra Monaco, The Monaco Law Group Ltd., Las

Vegas, Nevada; Kari E. Hong, Boston College Law School,

Newton, Massachusetts; for Petitioner.

Allison Frayer, Trial Attorney; Melissa Neiman-Keltin and

Aimee J. Carmichael, Senior Litigation Counsel; John W.

Blakeley, Assistant Director; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant

Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; for Respondent.

Stephen Manning, Innovation Law Lab, Portland, Oregon, for

Amici Curiae Alameda CountyPublic Defender’s Office, Los

Angeles County Public Defender’s Office, Santa Barbara

County Public Defender’s Office, Santa Clara County Public

Defender’s Office, San Francisco Public Defender, Jeff

Adachi, Santa Cruz County Public Defender’s Office,

Sonoma CountyPublic Defender’s Office,JoseVarela, Marin

County Public Defender, and Dan deGriselles.
4 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER

Jennifer Lee Koh, Immigration Clinic, Western State College

of Law, Irvine, California; Evangeline G. Abriel, Santa Clara

University School of Law, Santa Clara, California; for Amici

Curiae American ImmigrationLawyersAssociation, Florence

Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, Immigrant Legal

Resource Center, National Immigration Project of the

National Lawyers Guild, and U.C. Davis Immigration Clinic.

ORDER

The opinion filed on July 17, 2018, and published at

895 F.3d 1191, is amended by the opinion filed concurrently

with this order.

With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny

Petitioner’s petition for panel rehearing. Judge Graber has

voted to deny Petitioner’s petition for rehearing en banc, and

Judges Tallman and Lemelle have so recommended.

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a

vote on it.

Petitioner’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en

banc is DENIED. No further petitions for panel rehearing or

rehearing en banc may be filed.
MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER 5

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Rocio Aurora Martinez-de Ryan is a native and

citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without

being inspected and admitted or paroled. She timely seeks

review of a decision issued by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed an immigration judge’s

decision pretermitting her application for cancellation of

removal and ordering her removed from the United States. 

She argues (A) that her federal bribery conviction does not

constitute a crime involving moral turpitude and (B) that the

statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is unconstitutionally vague. We

disagree.

Petitioner entered the United States some time before

1999. A few years later, she provided cash payments to an

employee at the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles to

influence and reward the employee for issuing identification

documents to non-citizens illegally present in the United

States. As a result, in 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one

count of bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), for

which the maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment.

Shortly thereafter, Petitioner received a Notice to Appear,

charging her with inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 

Through counsel, Petitioner conceded inadmissibility but

sought cancellation of removal. An immigration judge ruled

that Petitioner’s bribery conviction constituted a crime of

moral turpitude, rendering her ineligible for cancellation of

removal. The BIA agreed, and this petition for review

followed.
6 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER

A. Bribery under § 666(a)(2) is Categorically a Crime

Involving Moral Turpitude.

“To determine whether a crime is categorically one of

moral turpitude, we examine whether the full range of

conduct encompassed by the criminal statute constitutes a

crime of moral turpitude.” Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d

1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[O]ne test ‘to determine if a crime involves moral

turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a vicious

motive or a corrupt mind.’” Id. at 1161 (quoting In re Ajami,

22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999)).

Section 666(a)(2) provides that whoever

corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give

anything of value to any person, with intent to

influence or reward an agent of an

organization or of a State, local or Indian

tribal government, or any agency thereof, in

connection with any business, transaction, or

series of transactions of such organization,

government, or agency involving anything of

value of $5,000 or more [has committed a

crime.]

(Emphasis added.) Along with other circuits, we have held

that “§ 666 contains . . . a corrupt intent requirement.” United

States v. Garrido, 713 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “An act is done

‘corruptly’ if it is performed voluntarily, deliberately, and

dishonestly, for the purpose of either accomplishing an

unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise

lawful end or lawful result by an unlawful method or means.” 
MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER 7

United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1193 (11th Cir.

2010); see Garrido, 713 F.3d at 1001–02 (citing McNair with

approval).

Because § 666(a)(2) requires proof of a “corrupt mind,”

Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1161, we hold that a bribery

conviction under § 666(a)(2) categorically qualifies as a

crime involving moral turpitude. Our holding comports with

decades-old decisions by the BIA and by the Second, Fourth,

and Fifth Circuits that bribery involves moral turpitude.1See

In re H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 358, 361 (B.I.A. 1954) (“[T]he

offense of bribery is a base and vile act which involves moral

turpitude.”); Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871, 878

n.25 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that “bribery is a crime involving

moral turpitude” (citing Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th

Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 2018 WL 2290257 (U.S. Oct. 9,

2018) (No. 17-1559); United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912,

915 (2d Cir. 1978) (“There can be no question but that any

crime of bribery involves moral turpitude . . . .” (quoting

United States ex rel. Sollazzo v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341, 342

(2d Cir. 1961))); United States v. Pomponio, 511 F.2d 953,

956 (4th Cir. 1975) (same); see also In re Gruenangerl, 25 I.

& N. Dec. 351, 358 n.8 (B.I.A. 2010) (noting that bribery of

a public official involves moral turpitude).

B. The Statute is Not Unconstitutionally Vague.

In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the

Supreme Court considered a vagueness challenge to the

1 Perhaps because bribery is so commonly understood to involve

moral turpitude, petitioners in other cases have declined to challenge the

proposition. E.g.,Mendez-Mendez v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 828, 831–32 (9th

Cir. 2008); Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005).
8 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER

phrase “crime of moral turpitude.” The non-citizen in that

case had been convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United

States of taxes and was, for that reason, ordered deported on

the ground that he stood convicted of a “crime involving

moral turpitude.” Id. at 223–26. In view of the “grave nature

of deportation,” the Court considered the statute under the

usual criteria pertaining to the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 

Id. at 231. The Court held on the merits that the phrase in

question was not so vague or meaningless as to be a

deprivation of due process. Id. at 229–32.

We followed suit in Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929

(9th Cir. 1957). Similarly, there, the non-citizen was

convicted of willful tax evasion. Id. at 931–32. His

conviction occurred before his latest entry into the United

States, and the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Section

212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952),

provided that an alien convicted of a “crime involving moral

turpitude” was inadmissible. Relying on the Supreme Court’s

then-recent decision in Jordan, we held that the phrase in

question was not unconstitutionally vague. Tseung Chu,

247 F.2d at 938–39.

The government first argues that the void-for-vagueness

doctrine does not apply at all to any ground of

inadmissibility, relying on Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118

(1967). As a three-judge panel, we are bound by Tseung

Chu’s consideration of the merits of this issue

notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner in that case was

inadmissible, rather than deportable. Because we do not read

Boutilier quite as broadly as the government does, we do not

think that it is “clearly irreconcilable” with Tseung Chu in

this regard. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899–900 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc).
MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER 9

Although some of the Boutilier opinion’s wording is

broad, the crux of the decision is that the petitioner was “not

being deported for conduct engaged in after his entry into the

United States, but rather for characteristics he possessed at

the time of his entry.” 387 U.S. at 123. “A standard

applicable solely to time of entry could hardly be vague as to

post-entry conduct.” Id. at 124. Moreover, the petitioner was

excluded by reason of a status or condition (“psychopathic

personality”), rather than by reason of a discrete criminal act. 

Id. at 118. And finally, although the Court asserted that the

“constitutional requirement of fair warning has no

applicability to standards . . . for admission of aliens to the

United States,” id. at 123, the Court went on to decide on the

merits that the pivotal phrase was, in fact, clear, id. at 123–24. 

Here, by contrast, Petitioner engaged in the conduct at issue

after the time of entry, and the conduct in question was a

criminal act, rather than a status or condition. Accordingly,

we are not persuaded that Boutilier forecloses consideration

of whether a crime committed by a non-citizen constitutes a

“crime of moral turpitude” so as to render her inadmissible. 

We also note that at least one other circuit has continued,

after Boutilier, to analyze on the merits a void-for-vagueness

challenge to the phrase “moral turpitude,” brought by a noncitizen who was found to be inadmissible. Lagunas-Salgado

v. Holder, 584 F.3d 707, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2009); Ali v.

Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sessions v.

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), extending to the

immigration context its earlier opinion in Johnson v. United

States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), does not eviscerate our

holding in Tseung Chu, such that we should overrule it. 

Miller, 335 F.3d at 899–900. First, we are obliged to follow

on-point Supreme Court precedent—here, Jordan—even if
10 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. WHITAKER

later Supreme Court cases cast some doubt on its general

reasoning. Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per

curiam). Second, Johnson and Dimaya interpret statutory

“residual” clauses whose wording does not include the phrase

“moral turpitude” and which are not tethered to recognized

common law principles. In the circumstances, we remain

bound by Jordan and Tseung Chu.

2

Petition DENIED.

2 At least three of our sister circuits have held, in cases post-dating

Johnson, that the Supreme Court’s holding in Jordan remains good law: 

the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not unconstitutionally

vague. Moreno v. Att’y General, 887 F.3d 160, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2018);

Boggala v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 563, 569–70 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,

138 S. Ct. 1296 (2018); Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 837,

842–43 (7th Cir. 2016).