J-S43011-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAJOUR ARI JAMES

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 222 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 10, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003166-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2019

Appellant, Dajour Ari James, appeals from the order entered in the 

Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition 

brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On 

June 23, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of 

third-degree murder and was sentenced that day per the plea agreement to 

14 to 28 years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion 

or a direct appeal. On May 7, 2018, Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA 

petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel on May 8, 2018, who filed a nomerit letter and a petition to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
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550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc) on September 4, 2018. The PCRA 

court denied counsel’s petition to withdraw on October 10, 2018. Counsel 

filed a second Turner/Finley letter and petition to withdraw on November 

21, 2018. 

On December 12, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to 

dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant filed a pro se response to the 

Rule 907 notice, styled as an amended PCRA petition, on December 31, 2018. 

On January 10, 2019, the PCRA court denied relief and granted counsel’s 

petition to withdraw. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on 

February 6, 2019. The following day, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file 

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Appellant timely complied on February 21, 2019, and filed a pro se

amended Rule 1925(b) statement on February 28, 2019.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT’S PRIVATELY HIRED 

EXPERT WITNESS PATHOLOGIST/NEUROLOGIST 

PRECLUDING TESTIMONY FROM TRIAL BY THE GRANTING 

OF COMMONWEALTH’S MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE 

PROFFERED TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESS?

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION BY THE GRANTING OF COMMONWEALTH’S 

MOTION TO PRECLUDE PROFFERED TESTIMONY OF EXPERT 

WITNESS, NEUROLOGIST/PATHOLOGIST?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6 unpaginated). The argument section of Appellant’s brief 

contains three additional claims where he contends that: (a) the PCRA court 
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erred in denying Appellant’s petition; (b) trial counsel was ineffective for not 

filing a direct appeal regarding the preclusion of Appellant’s expert; and (c) 

PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing a Turner/Finley no-merit letter 

instead of an amended PCRA petition. Appellant did not include these issues 

in his statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating 

Appellant must include question in statement of questions involved to warrant 

review). 

Initially, we observe: “Issues not raised in the [PCRA] court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); 

Commonwealth v. Mason, 634 Pa. 359, 130 A.3d 601 (2015) (stating failure 

to include issue in PCRA petition or in court-approved amendment to petition 

constitutes waiver). Moreover, to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the 

petitioner must plead and prove his conviction resulted from one or more of 

the grounds set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i-viii). Commonwealth 

v. Zook, 585 Pa. 11, 887 A.2d 1218 (2005). “Generally, an appellant may 

not raise allegations of error in an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief as if 

he were presenting the claims on direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Price, 

876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706, 897 A.2d 

1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902, 127 S.Ct. 224, 166 L.Ed.2d 179 

(2006). 

Additionally, any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be 

deemed waived for appellate review. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 
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395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005). An appellant’s concise statement must identify 

the errors to be addressed on appeal with sufficient specificity. 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683 (Pa.Super. 2001) (stating Rule 

1925(b) statement which is too vague to allow court to identify issues raised 

on appeal is functional equivalent of no Rule 1925(b) statement). An appellant 

cannot raise issues for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement. 

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Instantly, in his PCRA petition Appellant claimed his guilty plea was

involuntary because plea counsel was ineffective for failing to: file a motion to 

withdraw the plea; properly investigate or prepare any type of defense; 

present alibi or character witnesses; and communicate with Appellant during 

the plea negotiations. Appellant raised his two identified appellate issues of

trial court error for the first time in his response to Rule 907 notice, which was

not a court-approved amendment to his PCRA petition. Therefore, these

issues are waived. See id. See also Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 

1177 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 631, 64 A.3d 631 (2013)

(holding petitioner’s response to Rule 907 notice will not be construed as 

amended PCRA petition). Further, Appellant raised his two identified appellate 

issues in terms of trial court error, which is impermissible in the PCRA context. 

Thus, his stated issues are waived for this reason as well. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9544(b). 

With respect to those claims embedded in the argument section of his 
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brief, Appellant’s complaint that the PCRA court erred or abused its discretion 

when it denied Appellant’s petition without a hearing is presented baldly and 

without further explanation. See Dowling, supra. Therefore, it is waived. 

See id. Appellant’s claim regarding plea counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing 

to appeal the preclusion of Appellant’s expert, is stated for the first time in 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and is also waived. See Coleman, 

supra. Additionally, Appellant raised his claim regarding PCRA counsel’s 

ineffective assistance for the first time in his amended Rule 1925(b) 

statement. The proper avenue to raise issues of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness 

was in Appellant’s response to Rule 907 notice. So, this claim is waived as 

well. See Rykard, supra (stating Appellant waives issue of PCRA counsel 

ineffectiveness if issue is not raised in response to Rule 907 notice); Coleman, 

supra. Thus, Appellant has waived all of his appellate issues on one or more 

grounds. Accordingly, we affirm. See generally In re K.L.S., 594 Pa. 194, 

197 n.3, 934 A.2d 1244, 1246 n.3 (2007) (stating where issues are waived 

on appeal, we should affirm rather than quash appeal). 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/13/2019