Filed 9/21/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

LOS ANGELES COLLEGE 

FACULTY GUILD LOCAL 1521,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY 

COLLEGE DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

B313085

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 20STCP03557)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Robert S. Draper, Judge. Affirmed.

Lawrence Rosenzweig for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Joshua E. 

Morrison and Rebeca Delatorre for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

The Los Angeles College Faculty Guild (Guild) represents 

faculty at the nine community colleges in the Los Angeles 

Community College District (District). The Guild appeals the 

trial court’s judgment of dismissal of its petition to compel 

arbitration of grievances relating to the District’s decision to 

cancel all remedial for-credit English and mathematics courses 

two levels below transfer level. The Guild contends the court 

erred in determining it, rather than an arbitrator, should decide 

the issue of arbitrability and further erred in finding the 

grievances non-arbitrable. The Guild maintains the grievances 

involve violations of several provisions of the collective 

bargaining agreement (CBA) between the parties and so are 

subject to the arbitration provision of that agreement. We affirm 

the trial court’s order denying the motion and petition and its 

subsequent judgment of dismissal.

BACKGROUND

In 2018, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 

No. 705 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 705) in response to 

concerns that too many students were being referred to remedial 

courses upon entering the community college system. The 

Legislature found that placement in such remedial courses 

discouraged students from pursuing a college education and 

made them less likely to achieve their educational goals and to 

complete a degree, certificate or transfer outcome within a sixyear period.1 (Stats. 2017, ch. 745, § 1.)

1 The trial court granted the District’s request to take 

judicial notice of the 2018 legislative history of Assembly Bill 705. 

On our own motion, we also take judicial notice of this legislative 

history. (Evid. Code, § 452.)
3

Assembly Bill 705 amended Education Code section 78213 

to provide that “[a] community college district or college shall 

maximize the probability that a student will enter and complete 

transfer-level coursework in English and mathematics within a 

one-year timeframe.” (Ed. Code, § 78213, subd. (d)(1)(A).) The 

amendment also specified that a “community college district or 

college shall not require students to enroll in remedial English or 

mathematics coursework that lengthens their time to complete a 

degree” unless a placement assessment which included their high 

school record “shows that those students are highly unlikely to 

succeed in transfer-level coursework.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) The 

amendment provided that a “community college district or college 

may require students to enroll in additional concurrent support 

. . . during the same semester that they take a transfer-level 

English or mathematics course, but only if it is determined that 

the support will increase their likelihood of passing the . . . 

course.” (Ibid.)

In response to Assembly Bill 705, the District and each 

member college consulted with experts and formulated a model 

compatible with this goal. According to a declaration filed by the 

deputy chancellor for the District, some of the models included 

remedial for-credit courses one level below transfer, but none 

included for-credit courses which were two levels below transfer. 

For reasons which are not clear from the record, the colleges’ Fall 

2019 schedules included for-credit remedial courses two levels 

below transfer. The deputy chancellor described the inclusion of 

these courses as “inconsistent” with the colleges’ own models and 

the implementation plan for Assembly Bill 705.
4

The District removed those courses from the Fall 2019 

schedule and the chancellor sent an email to all faculty 

explaining that the courses had been removed because they were 

inconsistent with the implementation plan for Assembly Bill 705. 

The email explained that “ ‘[f]or students desiring to gain content 

mastery below one level below transfer, they will be directed to 

non-credit course offerings, the English Writing Center, math 

labs, and other academic supports.’ ”

The Guild at eight of the District’s nine colleges filed 

grievances. When the grievances were denied, the Guild 

submitted the matter to arbitration pursuant to the grievance 

procedure of the CBA. The District refused to arbitrate, 

contending the claims in the grievances were outside the scope of 

representation under the Educational Employment Relations Act 

(EERA) (Gov. Code, § 3540 et seq.)

2 and also outside the scope of 

the CBA.

The Guild filed a motion and petition to compel arbitration. 

The trial court denied both and dismissed the action. The court 

found the CBA did not delegate the arbitrability decision to the 

arbitrator, and so it was for the court to decide. The court found 

the claims were outside the scope of representation under EERA 

and so were not arbitrable. The court also found the Guild had 

not raised arbitrable issues under Articles 12(F), 32(I) and 

17(D)(1) of the CBA. Put differently, the court found cancellation 

of the courses did not violate those articles. This appeal followed.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Government Code.
5

DISCUSSION

A. Arbitrability Was an Issue for the Court.

The Guild contends the trial court erred in finding the issue 

of arbitrability should be decided by the court and not by the 

arbitrator. It is undisputed the CBA does not contain an express 

delegation of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Guild claims the 

parties’ prior practice of allowing the arbitrator to decide 

arbitrability and the broad language of Article 28(G)(4) of the 

CBA, together with Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co. (1960) 

363 U.S. 574 (Warrior & Gulf) and Southern California Dist. 

Council of Laborers v. Berry Constr., Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 

340, effectuate a delegation.

1. There Is No Relevant Evidence of Past Practices.

The Guild contends it is undisputed that “in previous 

arbitrations, the arbitrator has decided arbitrability.” The Guild 

has not provided a record citation to support this broad claim, let 

alone details of those arbitrations. Without such information, 

past practices are meaningless. Similarly, the Guild’s reference 

to “a well-established arbitration process that the parties have 

operated for many years” is unsupported by citation to the record 

and lacks any detail, rendering it meaningless.3

3 The Guild states that “Darrell Eckersley, the Guild 

Grievance Representative, has been involved in ‘approximately 

50 arbitrations’ between the parties.” The Guild cites to pages 

383 and 384 of the Clerk’s Transcript to support this claim, but 

this citation is to respondent’s Answer to the Petition to Compel 

Arbitration, which does not mention Eckersley or the 

involvement of any Guild representative in arbitration. Thus, 

the Guild’s claim about common law also lacks a factual 

foundation.
6

This lack of information about past practices alone belies

the Guild’s reliance on Warrior & Gulf. While that case holds 

that the “common law” of the industry and the shop is 

incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement, the case was 

decided in 1960 and involved steel workers. The Guild has not 

shown what that common law is in its industry or shop today. 

Further, the Court there made clear that “arbitration is a matter 

of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 

arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” 

(Warrior & Gulf, supra, 363 U.S. at p. 582.)

As the United States Supreme Court has more recently 

explained, courts “should not assume that the parties agreed to 

arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’

evidence that they did so.” (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.

Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944, italics added.) The

presumption in favor of arbitration, which applies when a valid 

arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to the 

arbitrability of a particular dispute, does not apply to “silence or 

ambiguity” with respect to the delegation question. (Id. at 

pp. 944–945.) Rather, “the law reverses the presumption.” (Id. at 

p. 945.) Thus, the court is presumptively the appropriate entity 

to review the question of arbitrability when the parties “did not 

clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to 

arbitration.” (Id. at p. 947.) The Court subsequently confirmed

that arbitration in commercial and labor cases should be 

analyzed using the same initial framework. (Granite Rock v.

Intern. Broth. of Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287, 296 (Granite

Rock) ([“It is well settled in both commercial and labor cases that 

whether parties have agreed to ‘submi[t] a particular dispute to 

arbitration’ is typically an ‘ “ issue for judicial 
7

determination.” ’ ”].) The Court indicated this would be true of 

the delegation question as well, that is, the issue of whether the 

parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. (Id. at p. 297, fn. 5.)

2. The Language of the CBA Does Not Delegate the Issue 

of Arbitrability to the Arbitrator.

The Guild also relies on Article 28(4)(G) of the CBA, which 

provides: “The arbitrator’s decisions shall be limited to a specific 

finding regarding the alleged misinterpretation, misapplication 

or violation of a specific item of this Agreement or of a written 

rule or regulation of the District.” The Guild contends “similar 

language” was found to authorize the arbitrator to determine 

questions of arbitrability in Southern California Dist. Council of 

Laborers v. Berry Constr., Inc., supra, 984 F.2d 340.

The Ninth Circuit has now rejected the proposition that a 

broad arbitration clause is sufficient to delegate the issue of 

arbitrability to the arbitrator. As the Ninth Circuit recently 

acknowledged, a number of its decisions which predated First 

Options “constru[ed] a broad arbitration clause as conferring 

authority on the arbitrator to decide arbitrability ‘[as] an act of 

legitimate contract interpretation.’ ” (SEIU Local 121RN v. Los

Robles Regional Med. Ctr. (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 849, 853 (Los 

Robles).) These decisions culminated in United Broth. of

Carpenters # 1780 v. Desert Palace (9th Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 1308 

(Desert Palace), in which the Ninth Circuit “concluded that the 

broad arbitration clause [before it], which covered matters of 

interpretation and application of the agreement and did not 

explicitly exclude arbitrability or jurisdictional issues, evinced 

the parties’ agreement to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability.” 

(Los Robles, at p. 853.) The Los Robles Court concluded Desert 

Palace was inconsistent with First Options and Granite Rock and 
8

expressly found Desert Palace had been abrogated. (Los Robles, 

at p. 861.) As the Ninth Circuit explained, under those 

controlling United States Supreme Court precedents, “we must 

determine whether there is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence of 

the parties’ intent to have an arbitrator—rather than the court—

decide whether the grievance is arbitrable. Under Article 38 of 

the CBA, an arbitrator is tasked with resolving any ‘dispute or 

disagreement involving the interpretation, application or 

compliance with specific provisions of [the CBA].’ The CBA is 

otherwise silent as to the arbitrator’s authority to determine its 

own jurisdiction, and SEIU does not provide any other evidence 

of an agreement to have an arbitrator decide that issue. [¶] . . . 

Without ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence, then, we rely on the 

well-settled principle ‘that whether parties have agreed to submit 

a particular dispute to arbitration is typically an issue for judicial 

determination.’ Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 296, 130 S.Ct. 2847 

(citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks omitted). We 

therefore hold that the district court is responsible for 

determining whether the grievance filed by SEIU is arbitrable.” 

(Los Robles, at p. 861.)

B. Arbitrable Issues Are Circumscribed by EERA.

The arbitration agreement is part of a collective bargaining 

agreement and is therefore subject to the EERA. (United

Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 

54 Cal.4th 504, 512 (UTLA) [EERA covers collective bargaining 

for grades K-14].) “Government Code section 3548.5 provides: ‘A 

public school employer and an exclusive representative who enter 

into a written agreement covering matters within the scope of 

representation may include in the agreement procedures for final 

and binding arbitration of such disputes as may arise involving 
9

the interpretation, application, or violation of the agreement.’ 

The statute makes clear that authorization to arbitrate is 

predicated on the existence of a collective bargaining agreement 

‘covering matters within the scope of representation.’ ” (UTLA, at 

p. 515.) “In the EERA, as in federal labor law, collective 

bargaining arbitration is part of a system of workplace selfgovernment that allows employees to join organizations that

represent them ‘in their professional and employment 

relationships with public school employers’ and afford them ‘a 

voice in the formulation of educational policy.’ (Gov. Code, 

§ 3540.) However, because labor relations in this area 

significantly intersect with educational goals affecting society as 

a whole, the Legislature has limited the scope of such selfgovernance by withdrawing from collective bargaining certain 

matters in the Education Code. The Legislature has decided that 

those matters should be exclusively management prerogatives, 

subject only to the constraints of statute. . . . [T]he EERA makes 

clear that a grievance is inarbitrable when it arises from a matter 

. . . on which collective bargaining is statutorily preempted.” 

(UTLA, at pp. 519–520, italics added.)

Under the EERA, “[t]he scope of representation shall be 

limited to matters relating to wages, hours of employment, and 

other terms and conditions of employment. ‘Terms and 

conditions of employment’ mean health and welfare benefits . . . , 

leave, transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions of 

employment, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation 

of employees, organizational security, . . . procedures for 

processing grievances . . . , the layoff of probationary certificated 

school district employees . . . , and alternative compensation or 

benefits for employees adversely affected by pension limitations.” 
10

(§ 3543.2, subd. (a)(1).) Conversely, “[u]nder the EERA the 

‘definition of educational objectives, the determination of the 

content of courses and curriculum, and the selection of textbooks 

to the extent such matters are within the discretion of the public 

school employer under the law’ are matters on which the 

exclusive representative has only the right to consult.” (San

Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd.

(1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 862; see § 3543.2, subds. (a)(3) & (a)(4).)

The decision to cancel remedial for-credit English and 

mathematics courses two levels before transfer level is, in 

essence, a decision about the content of courses and curriculum. 

Put differently, it is a decision not to offer courses which contain 

such content. Thus, it is a matter within the discretion of the 

district, and so not within the scope of representation. It is 

therefore not an arbitrable issue.

As the District points out, the Public Employment 

Relations Board (PERB) treated a community college’s decision to 

cancel summer school classes as an unenumerated right within 

the meaning of section 3543.2, subdivision (a)(4) which provides: 

“All matters not specifically enumerated [in the scope of 

representation] are reserved to the public school employer and 

may not be a subject of meeting and negotiating, except that this 

section does not limit the right of the public school employer to 

consult with any employees or employee organization on any 

matter outside the scope of representation.” (§ 3543.2, subd. 

(a)(4); Mt. San Antonio Community College District (1983) PERB 

Dec. No. 297 [7 PERC ¶ 14109] (Mt. SAC).) The Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) in that case applied PERB’s three-pronged test 

to the cancellation right and concluded the “decision as to which 

classes to cancel, and on what basis is therefore a non-negotiable 
11

management prerogative.” (Mt. SAC, at p.46.)4 PERB adopted 

that finding. (Id. at p. 2.) Thus, even if we were to view the right 

4 That test “first analyzes: (1) whether the subject logically 

and reasonably relates to an ‘enumerated’ term and condition of 

employment [under EERA]; next (2) whether the subject is of 

such concern to both management and employees that a conflict 

is likely to occur which can best be resolved in the mediatory 

arena of collective bargaining; and (3) whether such collective 

bargaining would significantly abridge the employer’s freedom to 

exercise those managerial prerogatives, relating to matters of 

fundamental policy and economic consideration ‘essential to the 

achievement of the [employer’s] mission.’ ” (Mt. SAC, supra, 

PERB Dec. No. 297 at pp. 42–43.)

Applying this test, the ALJ concluded the “decision as to 

which classes to cancel, and on what basis is therefore a nonnegotiable management prerogative.” (Mt. SAC, supra, PERB 

Dec. No. 297 at p. 46.) In essence, the ALJ recognized that 

faculty members had an interest in teaching these classes, which 

were similar in almost every way to classes during the regular 

school year, but offered the possibility of additional compensation 

and benefits, and so involved enumerated rights. At the same 

time, the ALJ concluded the decision to cancel courses or an 

entire session and “to reduce the kind and number of courses 

offered” (id. at p. 45) was a management prerogative “derived 

from the need to efficiently manage the work force and make 

policy determinations in the face of fiscal changes. The overall 

goal to provide a district’s students and constituents with an 

educational program encompassing the total needs of the student 

body must be balanced against the cost of providing these 

programs and their relative importance in the overall mission of 

the particular school district. These are considerations which 

inherently belong to the management of the school district. 

[Citation.] [W]hile teachers may have an interest in teaching the 

courses offered, the decision whether to offer courses is not easily 
12

to determine whether to offer remedial courses more narrowly as 

the right to cancel remedial courses and treat it simply as a right 

which is not enumerated in the statutory scope of representation, 

such a posture would not assist the Guild. The decision would be 

a managerial one outside the scope of representation and so nonarbitrable.

C. The Guild Has Not Shown Arbitrable Issues under the 

Specified Provisions of the CBA

As PERB recognized in Mt. SAC, while the decision to 

cancel courses is a management decision, such cancellations can 

affect matters in a collective bargaining agreement which are 

within the EERA scope of representation, notably pay and 

benefits. (Mt. SAC, supra, PERB Dec. No. 297 at p. 3.) 

Accordingly, we consider the Guild’s claims that the cancellation 

of the remedial courses violated certain provisions of the CBA.

As discussed in more detail below, we do not agree that a 

reasonable reading of the Articles at issue shows they apply to 

the course cancellations at issue. Assuming for the sake of 

argument that the Articles can be understood to apply to these 

course cancellations, they would be outside the scope of 

representation and so non-arbitrable. (UTLA, supra, 54 Cal.4th 

at pp. 519–520 [“EERA makes clear that a grievance is 

inarbitrable when it arises from a matter . . . on which collective 

bargaining is statutorily preempted”].)

resolved by the give and take of collective bargaining.” (Id. at 

pp. 45–46)
13

1. Article 12(F).

The Guild contends the trial court erred by finding that 

Article 12(F) was not the issue involved here. The Guild 

contends the issue was raised in the Pierce College grievance. 

The court in fact found “there is no issue raised here that fits into 

this category.” The court was correct.

As the Guild points out, Article 12(F) was cited in the 

grievance, but as the grievance itself shows, the substance of the 

article did not apply. Article 12(F) provides: “Responsibility for 

canceling classes because of low enrollment or low attendance 

shall rest with the appropriate vice president or designee, after 

consultation with the department chair and the faculty member 

involved whenever possible.”

There is nothing in the record on appeal to suggest that the 

classes at issue were cancelled due to low enrollment or low 

attendance. The grievance refers to a memo from the chancellor 

about class cancellation. That memo was sent on the first day of 

registration for fall classes, and states that classes are being 

cancelled as a result of an Assembly Bill 705 compliant model. It 

makes no mention of low enrollment, and the timing precludes 

any inference that low enrollment was a reason for the 

cancellation.

2. Article 32(I)

The Guild contends the court erred in finding there was “no 

issue raised here which fits into this category” of Article 32(I). 

The Guild points out the Pierce College grievance states: “Article 

32.I of the [CBA] stipulates that ‘The District and the AFT 

recognize that decision-making in an academic environment is 

generally made via committee.’ ” The Guild contends the 

District’s cancellation of courses was a “departure from the 
14

normal procedure” of committee decision-making which had to be 

justified.

Article 32 contains six numbered subsections concerning 

committees. Article 32(I) is the first subsection, making the first 

sentence of Article 32(I) the first sentence of the entire article. 

Article 32(I) is the only numbered subsection without a heading, 

indicating it contains introductory or prefatory information. In 

this context, the first sentence is simply acknowledging the major 

role committees play in academic decision-making. It is 

descriptive, not directive.

The remainder of Article 32(I) states: “Committees may 

address union issues of wages, hours, and working conditions, or 

shared governance concerns such as facilities oversight, 

educational planning, resource allocation, and long-term strategic 

goal-setting. Committees that are negotiated as part of [the 

CBA] shall include AFT and Academic Senate participation as 

designated. All committees should operate under the principles 

of participatory decision-making. In each instance where AFT 

committee membership is designated, the AFT chapter president 

shall select those faculty member(s) to serve. In each instance 

where Academic Senate committee membership is designated, 

the Academic Senate President shall select those faculty 

member(s) to serve.”

Read as a whole, then, Article 32(I) conveys that since 

committees play an important role in academic decision-making, 

all committees created pursuant to the [CBA] must have AFT 

(Guild) and Academic Senate representatives on them. It is not 

reasonable to understand Article 32(I) as requiring all decisionmaking to be made by committee, or even all course-related 

decision-making. The list of optional and required committees is 
15

found later in the Article, and there is no information in the 

grievance about the existence or scope of any of those 

committees.5

The court correctly focused on the latter (and longer) part 

of the Article, noting that it provides that committees “shall 

include AFT and Academic Senate participation as [designated].” 

The court was correct that the focus of the Article is the 

participation of the AFT and Academic Senate in committees, 

and that there were no claims that those entities were prevented 

from participation in the committees.

3. Article 17(D)(1)(b)

The Guild contends the trial court erred in rejecting its 

interpretation of Article 17(D)(1)(b) based on speculation that 

that interpretation would permit department chairs to schedule 

any sort of class they wished, even classes outside their 

department.

Article 17(D)(1)(b) indicates department chairs are 

responsible for “preparing class schedules.” Common definitions 

of “schedule” are “a procedural plan that indicates the time and 

5 Immediately before citing Article 32(I), the grievance 

states: “[T]he Chancellor’s directive contravenes the shared 

governance agreement between the Board of Trustees and the 

District Academic Senate, as related to educational program 

development, degree and certificate requirements, policies on 

student preparation and success, and curriculum.” This 

statement suggests that it is the Academic Senate which has the 

responsibility for educational program development and 

curriculum. The Academic Senate, however, is not a party to this 

action, and the shared governance agreement is not before us.
16

sequence of each operation”6 and “a list of the times when events 

are planned to happen, for example the times when classes 

happen.”7 Thus, the most reasonable understanding of the 

phrase “preparing class schedules” is “setting the days and 

times for classes.”

The Guild is not complaining that the remedial courses 

were scheduled for inappropriate days or times. Instead, the 

Guild makes much of the fact that the courses were cancelled 

after they were placed on the tentative schedule for Fall 2019. 

The Guild, however, does not assert any schedule-related harm 

from the timing of the decision. It does not, for example, 

complain that the chairs were not permitted to reschedule 

remaining courses in light of schedule openings arising from the 

cancellations. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that there was 

no arbitrable claim under Article 17(D)(1)(b) was correct.

4. Article 4

The Guild points out, correctly, that the trial court did not 

consider whether the violation of Article 4, mentioned in the 

Mission College grievance, was arbitrable. That grievance simply 

asserts, without supporting analysis, argument or legal citations, 

that the cancellation of the courses “violates the rights of faculty 

to ‘. . . guarantee freedom of learning to students.’ ” In this 

6 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online (2022) 

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/schedule> [as of 

Sept. 20, 2022], archived at <https://perma.cc/CJC2-JNFQ>.

7 Cambridge Dictionary Online (2022) 

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ 

english/schedule> [as of Sept. 20, 2022], archived at 

<https://perma.cc/H5V6-B9JD>.
17

appeal, the Guild contends, without supporting analysis, 

argument or legal citations, that the faculty is entitled to 

guarantee “freedom of learning to the students” by dictating that 

the best method for “the development of a segment of the student 

population” is enrollment in for-credit courses two levels below 

transfer. The meaning of “freedom of learning” is not obvious, 

and its relationship to specific remedial courses is even less clear. 

The Guild has therefore forfeited this claim. “We may and do 

‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by 

pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by 

which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to 

adopt.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [“ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an 

appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent 

argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the 

record.’ ”].)

5. Article 6(E)

The Guild points out, correctly, that the trial court

did not consider whether the violation of Article 6(E), mentioned 

in the Mission College grievance, was arbitrable. The grievance 

states the course cancellation violates the provision of Article 

6(E) that “[b]oth parties agree to comply with state and/or federal 

laws.” The grievance appears to be based on the premise that 

Article 6(E) is violated whenever any applicable state or federal 

law is violated, and therefore all claims that the District violated 

a law are arbitrable. More specifically, the grievance claims 

Assembly Bill 705 did not require the course cancellations and 

Education Code section 66010.4 required community colleges to 

provide remedial instruction.
18

This is an extremely broad reading of the sentence, which 

is not a reasonable one when the sentence is read in context. 

Article 6 contains “General Provisions” of the CBA and 

subsection (E) provides in full: “This Agreement is not intended 

to modify or replace by any of its terms the rights of every faculty 

member in the bargaining unit under the law. Both parties agree 

to comply with state and/or federal laws.” In this context, the 

provision is simply clarifying that faculty members are not giving 

up any rights under the law by entering into the CBA and the 

District is agreeing to follow applicable state and federal law 

concerning the rights of its faculty members.

Education Code section 66010.4 itself does not confer any 

rights on faculty members so it cannot be invoked by Article 6(E). 

Subdivision (a)(2), quoted in the grievance, provides: “In addition 

to the primary mission of academic and vocational instruction, 

the community colleges shall offer instruction and courses to 

achieve all of the following: [¶] (A) The provision of remedial 

instruction for those in need of it and, in conjunction with the 

school districts, instruction in English as a second language, 

adult noncredit instruction, and support services which help 

students succeed at the postsecondary level are reaffirmed and 

supported as essential and important functions of the community

colleges.” (Ed. Code, § 66010.4, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, even 

assuming for the sake of argument that the District had violated 

this section of the Education Code, it would not also be a violation 

of Article 6(E).
19

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s judgment of dismissal is affirmed. 

Appellant Los Angeles College Faculty Guild to bear costs.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.