alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DAVID C. DETWILER, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. §

§ No. 184, 2021 § § § § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § § Cr. ID No. 1407000434 (S) §

Submitted: July 7, 2021 Decided: July 12, 2021

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES , Justices.

ORDER After careful consideration of the notice to show cause and the parties’ responses, it appears to the Court that: (1) On June 7, 2021, the appellant, David Detwiler, filed a notice of appeal from his 2015 criminal conviction and sentence for terroristic threatening. The Superior Court sentenced Detwiler on September 24, 2015. Under Supreme Court Rule 6, a timely notice of appeal should have been filed within thirty days of Detwiler’s sentencing. 1

1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(iii).2

(2) On June 8, 2021, the Senior Court Clerk issued a notice directing Detwiler to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely filed. In his response to the notice to show cause, Detwiler asserts that the sentencing judge intended to waive the thirty-day period for filing an appeal. (3) At the Court’s request, the State filed an answer to Detwiler’s response to the notice to show cause. The State attached to its response the Superior Court sentencing order, which contains the notation: “Court waives requirement of three (3) month request for modification of sentence [under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b)].” It is clear that Detwiler is aware that this waiver applied to motions to modify because he, in fact, filed a motion to modify outside of the 90-day prescribed time frame and cited the Superior Court’s sentencing order in support of his otherwise untimely application. (4) The time period within which to file a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and thus mandatory. 2 Under Delaware law, the jurisdictional defect that was created by the untimely appeal cannot be excused unless the appellant can demonstrate that the delay in filing his appeal was attributable to court-related personnel. 3 Detwiler does not allege, and the record does not reflect, that Detwiler’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal is attributable to court-related personnel. Moreover, the Superior

2 Carr v. State , 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1989). 3 Bey v. State , 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979).3 Court cannot waive issues regarding appellate jurisdiction, 4 and a careful reading of the Superior Court’s sentencing order makes it clear that the Superior Court did not intend to do so in the first place. Therefore, Detwiler’s appeal must be dismissed. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

4 See Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Eid , 114 A.3d 955, 959 (Del. 2015) (holding that parties cannot waive issues regarding appellate jurisdiction and cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court by agreement).
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








The undersigned, Alexis C. Korybut, the CEO and President of Tactical Air Defense Services, Inc. (the “Company”), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:





1.      The Company’s First Amended Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.      Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this statement as of May 10, 2011.








/s/ Alexis C. Korybut


Alexis C. Korybut


President


(Principal Executive Officer)








A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Tactical Air Defense Services, Inc. and will be retained by Tactical Air Defense Services, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The forgoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM AUDITED
BALANCE SHEET AT SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR
ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

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<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
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<CASH>                                       1,825,352
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          434,353
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,655,482)
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FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 MAY 06, 2003 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 02-15326

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 02-00030-CR-004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDWIN JETER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Alabama

_________________________

(May 6, 2003)

Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a federal prisoner currently serving a 168-month sentence

imposed following a plea of guilty to conspiracy to manufacture
2

methamphetamine, in violation 21 U.S.C. § 846, challenges his sentence on the

ground that the district court, in applying the Sentencing Guidelines, erred in

denying him a minor role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 

Appellant is a career offender. Under the Guidelines, a defendant is a career

offender if the following three elements are present (as they are here):

(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the

time the defendant committed the instant offense of

conviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a

felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two

prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. While a career offender’s criminal history category is always

Category VI, § 4B1.1 indicates that with respect to the defendant’s offense level,

as distinguished from his criminal history category, “[i]f an adjustment from §

3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) applies, [a court must] decrease the offense

level by the number of levels corresponding to that adjustment.” U.S.S.G. §

4B1.1. 

In contending that the court should have granted him a minor role

adjustment under § 4B1.1, appellant relies on the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity

applies if a statute – in this instance, a sentencing guideline – is ambiguous.

United States v. Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 685 (11th Cir. 1998). Because § 4B1.1,
3

by its express terms, only authorizes an adjustment based on acceptance of

responsibility, and does not mention the minor role adjustment, and since “the

inclusion of one implies the exclusion of others,” United States v. Koonce, 991

F.2d 693, 698 (11th Cir. 1993), the guideline is not ambiguous and the rule of

lenity does not apply. Johnson, 155 F.3d at 685.

In a previous opinion, we appeared to join several sister circuits in holding

that the minor role adjustment is not available to a defendant sentenced under the

career offender provision. See id. at 684 & n.4 (citing to the First, Seventh,

Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, all of which have held that mitigating role adjustments

do not apply in the career offender scenario). Today we make it clear that minor

role adjustments are not available to defendants sentenced under § 4B1.1. 

Appellant’s sentence is, accordingly,

AFFIRMED.
TEXAS, plaintiff, v. NEW MEXICO and Colorado.

No. 141, Original.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 14, 2018.

Motion of the former Special Master for allowance of fees and disbursements granted, and the former Special Master is awarded a total $10,101.86, for the period March 13, 2017, through April 2, 2018, to be paid as follows: 37.5% by Texas, 37.5% by New Mexico, 20% by the United States, and 5% by Colorado.
Joseph ROBERTS, petitioner, v. FNB SOUTH OF ALMA, GEORGIA.

No. 17-1495.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 18, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, David J. Pecker, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q of American Media Operations, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
# C_2010037EN.01004502.xml

| 13.2.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.2.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/45

---

Action brought on 14 December 2009 — Evonik Industries AG v OHIM (Representation of a purple rectangle with a rounded right side)

(Case T-499/09)

2010/C 37/65

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Evonik Industries AG (Essen, Germany) (represented by J. Albrecht, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (Fourth Board of Appeal) of 2 October 2009 (Case R 491/2009-4); |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (Fourth Board of Appeal) of 2 October 2009 (Case R 491/2009-4);

| — | order OHIM to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order OHIM to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Community trade mark concerned: a figurative mark representing a rectangular shape in the colour Purple Pantone 513 C, for goods and services in classes 1 to 45 (Application No 7 235 179)

Community trade mark concerned:

Decision of the Examiner: registration rejected

Decision of the Examiner:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: appeal dismissed

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: misapplication of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (1), on the ground that the trade mark concerned has the requisite distinctive character

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

1

---
Exhibit 32.1

INSWEB CORPORATION    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of InsWeb Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark P. Guthrie, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to InsWeb Corporation, and will be retained by InsWeb Corporation and furnished to the
Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

|/s/MARK P. GUTHRIEMark P. Guthrie
President and Chief Executive Officer
Dated: March 26, 2004 |  | 
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

---

QuickLinks
_______________________________________ __ ___________________ ________________ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order
Lansing, Michigan
September 3, 2008

136799

KENNETH HERSHEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant-Appellee. Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, J ustices

SC: 136799 CoA: 285115

On order of the Chief Justice, plaintiff-appellant having failed to pay the partial filing fee as required by the order of July 25, 2008, the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to close this file.

jm I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
September 3, 2008
Clerk
Jose Mario RUBIO-SORTO, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-8109.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 25, 2018.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Sessions v. Dimaya,* 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018).
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<CASH>                                       2,137,216
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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</TABLE>
Javier REYES-RAMIREZ, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-9061.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 25, 2018.

*2695Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Michael CHANEY, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7592.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 25, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
EXHIBIT 23

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements of dELiA*s Corp.: (a) Form S-1 (Registration
No. 333-90435), (b) Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-53670), (c) Form S-3 (Registration
No. 333-36300) (d) Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-91837), (e) Form S-3 (Registration
No. 333-54430), (f) Form S-4 (Registration No. 333-44916), (g) Form S-3 (Registration
No. 333-62354) and (h) Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-83508) of our report dated April 29, 2003 (except for the first paragraph
of Note 10 and the third paragraph of Note 15, as to which the date is May 12, 2003), with respect to the consolidated financial statements of dELiA*s Corp. included in the Annual
Report (Form 10-K) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended February 1, 2003.

ERNST &
YOUNG LLP

New
York, New York
May 14, 2003

---

QuickLinks
Marvin Steve MARTINEZ-HERNANDEZ, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7448.

Supreme Court of the United States

July 16, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
Andres Orlando MAJANO-CHICA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-5647.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
Michael Wayne BOGAR, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-9020.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 18, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
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</TABLE>
Donald COVINGTON, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-8628.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 29, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.