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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER MYERS

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 573 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000112-2017

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2019

Appellant, Christopher Myers, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment 

of sentence entered in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his negotiated guilty plea to three counts of burglary.1 We affirm and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On 

November 21, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to three counts 

of burglary. Before accepting the plea, Appellant completed a written guilty 

plea colloquy and the court conducted an oral plea colloquy to confirm 

Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court sentenced 

Appellant that day to the negotiated aggregate sentence of 61⁄2 to 13 years’ 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1).
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imprisonment, plus five years’ probation. Appellant did not file post-sentence 

motions or a direct appeal.

On September 21, 2018, Appellant filed a pro se petition under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).2 In his petition, Appellant alleged counsel was 

ineffective for failing to file requested post-sentence motions and a requested 

direct appeal. Specifically, Appellant claimed he wanted to challenge the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence, which required preservation in the trial 

court. Appellant sought reinstatement of his post-sentence motion and direct 

appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The court appointed counsel on September 25, 

2018. On January 24, 2019, with agreement from the Commonwealth, the 

court restored only Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc on February 22, 

2019. On February 25, 2019, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Counsel subsequently filed a statement of intent to file a petition to withdraw 

and Anders3 brief, per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). 

As a preliminary matter, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw her 

representation pursuant to Anders and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 

Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: 1) 

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2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

3 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 
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petition the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review 

of the record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly 

frivolous; 2) file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and 

advise him of his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any 

additional points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at 

173-79, 978 A.2d at 358-61. Substantial compliance with these requirements 

is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super. 

2007). 

In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing 

requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw 

representation:

Neither Anders nor McClendon4requires that counsel’s 

brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of 

argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat, 

what the brief must provide under Anders are references 

to anything in the record that might arguably support the 

appeal. 

* * *

Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by 

counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and 

counsel’s references to anything in the record that arguably 

supports the appeal. 

Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

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4 Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981). 
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counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations 

to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) 

state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361. After confirming that counsel has met the 

antecedent requirements to withdraw, this Court makes an independent 

review of the record to confirm that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also 

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc). 

Instantly, appellate counsel has filed an amended petition to withdraw.5 

The petition states counsel conducted a conscientious review of the record and 

determined the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Appellant 

with a copy of the brief and a proper letter explaining Appellant’s immediate 

right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se to raise any additional issues 

Appellant deems worthy of this Court’s attention. In the Anders brief, counsel 

provides a summary of the facts and procedural history of the case and refers 

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5 Counsel initially filed an Anders brief on May 29, 2019, but her letter 

advising Appellant of his rights was deficient. Consequently, this Court denied 

counsel’s withdrawal petition and remanded the matter briefly with 

instructions for counsel to file an amended petition to withdraw including a 

new letter to Appellant advising him of his immediate right, either pro se or 

with privately retained counsel, to file a brief on any additional points 

Appellant deemed worthy of review. On September 3, 2019, counsel 

complied. 
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to relevant law that might arguably support Appellant’s issue. Counsel further 

states the reasons for her conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 

Therefore, counsel has substantially complied with the technical requirements 

of Anders and Santiago. 

Counsel raises the following issue on Appellant’s behalf:

DID APPELLANT ENTER HIS GUILTY PLEA KNOWINGLY, 

VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY?

(Anders Brief at 4).6 

In general, “[a] defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a 

guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file 

a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.” 

Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 624 Pa. 688, 87 A.3d 319 (2014) (holding defendant failed to preserve 

challenge to validity of guilty plea where he did not object during plea colloquy 

or file post-sentence motion to withdraw plea). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i) (stating post-sentence motion challenging validity of 

guilty plea shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of sentence). 

Where the court reinstates direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, the 

defendant is not automatically entitled to reinstatement of his post-sentence 

rights nunc pro tunc as well. Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977 

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6 Appellant has not responded by the deadline to the Anders brief, either pro 

se or with new counsel. 
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A.2d 1089 (2009). Nevertheless, a PCRA court can reinstate a defendant’s 

post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc if the defendant successfully pleads and 

proves he was deprived of the right to file and litigate post-sentence motions 

as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 19 n.9, 977 A.2d at 

1094 n.9 (noting counsel may be deemed ineffective for failing to file postsentence motions when claim asserted requires preservation in trial court for 

purposes of appellate review). 

Instantly, Appellant entered a guilty plea on November 21, 2017, to 

three counts of burglary in exchange for the negotiated sentence of 61⁄2 to 13 

years’ imprisonment, plus five years’ probation. The court immediately 

imposed the negotiated sentence. Appellant did not file post-sentence 

motions or a direct appeal. 

On September 21, 2018, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition 

requesting reinstatement of his post-sentence motion and direct appeal rights 

nunc pro tunc. Significantly, Appellant did not contend that he wanted to 

challenge the validity of his guilty plea. Rather, Appellant claimed only that 

he wanted to challenge the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, 

although the negotiated plea agreement effectively precluded that claim. See 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777 (Pa.Super. 2015) (holding appellant 

was prohibited from challenging discretionary aspects of sentence where court 

imposed negotiated sentence following appellant’s guilty plea; one who pleads 

guilty and receives negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary 
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review of that sentence). The Commonwealth agreed to reinstate only 

Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Given the issue Appellant 

asserted as the basis for his post-sentence motion, the court had no reason 

to reinstate post-sentence-motion rights nunc pro tunc. See Liston, supra. 

Compare Commonwealth v. Rivera, 154 A.3d 370 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 642 Pa. 121, 169 A.3d 1072 (2017) (affirming 

reinstatement of post-sentence-motion rights nunc pro tunc because issue 

appellant sought to raise, regarding withdrawal of his plea, required

preservation in trial court). Absent a challenge in the trial court to the validity 

of his guilty plea, Appellant has no viable claim for appeal. See Lincoln, 

supra; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Following our independent 

review of the record, we agree the appeal is frivolous. See Palm, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm and grant counsel’s amended petition to withdraw. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed; counsel’s amended petition to withdraw 

is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/19