FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT J ULY 13, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 06- 1354 8 D. C. Docket N o. 04-00424 -CR- RW S-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us W ILLIAM C. CAM PBELL, D ef en dant- Appe llant. Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia (J ul y 13 , 200 7) Before DU BIN A and BLA CK, Circuit Judges, and RE ST AN I, *Jud ge. DU BIN A, Circuit Judge:

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ *Honora ble J ane A . Restani, Chief J udg e, United States Court of International Trade , sitti ngby desig nation.2

Appe llant W ill iam

C. Cam pbe ll ap pe al s hi s c onvi ct ion s and s en te nc es f or ta x f ra ud. O n a ppe al , Cam

pbe ll ra ise s th e fo llo w ing iss ue s: ( 1) w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n and v iol at ed Cam pbe ll’ s S ixth A m en dm en t ri ght to co unse l whe n it

dis qua lif ie d hi s c ouns el of

c hoi ce ; and ( 2) w he the r the 30- m onth c onc ur

re nt p ri son se nte nc es Cam pbe ll re ce ive d w er e unr ea sona ble . F or the re as ons that f

oll ow , w e af

fi rm the c onvi ct ion s and s en te nc es . I. BACKGRO UND From 1994 to 200 2, Cam

pbell served as m ay or of the City of A tlanta, Geo rg ia(“ Ci ty”). App ro xi m at el y two an d aha lf years aft er Ca m pb el l l eftoff

ic e, a federa l grand jur

y issued an ind ictm ent charging him with (1) having conducted City aff airs through a pattern of rackete ering activity , in violation o f the Ra cketeer In fl ue nc ed

and C or ru pt O rg an iz at ion s A ct

( “ RI CO ”) , 18 U . S. C. § 19 62( c) ( 2000 ) (c ount one ); ( 2) a cc ep tin g c as h paym en ts w iththe int en t t o be inf lue nc ed and rew arded in connection with City busin ess transactions, in violatio n of 18 U. S. C. §§ 6 66( a) (1 )( B) and 2 ( 2000 ) (c ount s tw o th ro ugh fo ur ); and ( 3) ta x f ra ud, in vi ol at io n o f 26 U.S.C. § 7 20 6( 1) (20 00 ) (co un ts fiv e th ro ug h s ev en ). A cc or din g to the ind ic tm en t, w hil e in o ff ic e, Cam pbe ll sol ic ite d and acce pted und ocum ented paym ents of m oney from indiv iduals and b usiness es se ek ing to do b usi ne ss w iththe Ci ty and tre at ed

f av or ab ly tho se w ho p ai d. O ne of3

the m or e not ab le tr an sa ct ion s in vol ve d $5 5, 000 Cam pbe ll re ce ive d ine xc hange fo r an awardof l uc rat iv e co nt ract s co nc ern in g t he Cit y ’s com pu te r syste m s. A nothe r inv olv ed

paym en ts C am

pbe ll re ce ive d f

ro m anig ht c lub ow ne r w iththe unde rs tandi ng tha t C am

pbe ll w oul d a

ppr ove the ow ne r’ s a

ppl ic at ionf

or ali quor license. Am ong o ther things , the indictm ent also accused Cam pbell of hiring an as sis tant o n th e Ci ty

pay ro ll to t en d to his pe rs ona l ne ed s, inc lud ing c oll ec tin g corrupt paym ents on Cam pbell’s behalf

. T he ind ic tm en t f

urthe r ch ar ge d th at

Cam pbe ll ac tiv el y

sou ght to co nc ea l the paym en ts h e re ce ive d, w hic h in cl ude d su ppos ed c am pa ignc ontri but ion s th at

he uti liz ed f or f ri vol ous pe rs ona l e xpe nse s. I n c ar ry ing out his c or ru pt a ct ivi tie s, Cam pbe ll co m

m itt ed m ai l and w ir e fr au d. F urthe rm or e, he und er -r ep orte d hi s in co m e to th e IRS fro m

tax y ears 19 97 th ro ug h 1 99 9. It is dif fi cu lt to o ve re m

pha siz e the br ea dthand d ep th o f the c or ru pti on unde rl y ing the c as e ag ai nst Cam pbe ll. A t the ti m e of

Cam pbe ll’ s se nte nc ing , f

ive high -level offic ials in his form er a dm inistration and five business m en we re en snare d inthe gov er

nm en t’ s in ve sti ga tio n of

Cam pbe ll an d e ith er

ple d gu ilty

or we re c onvi cted of char ges sim ilar to those Cam pbell faced. A ll but two received prison sent ences. O thers charged w ith wrongdoin g, including one busin essm anNo ta bly , in a dd re ssi ngthe RI CO c ha

rg e on the ve rd ic t f

or m, t he jur y ind ic ate d th at it 1 found Campbell guilty

of the pre dicate a ct of mail fr aud in conne ction with solicitation of campa ign c ontributions. The indictment had not char g ed Campbell sepa rate ly for that c rime, howeve r. 4 w ho a dm itt ed

br ibi ng C am

pbe ll, str uc k de al s w iththe gov er

nm en t t o avoi d pr os ecu ti on . E ar ly in the pr oc ee din gs l ea din g to Cam pbe ll’ s tr ia l, a ft er

a lr ea dy havin g s e c u r e dl e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , C a mp b e l l s o u g h tt o r e t a i n an a d d i t i o n a l a t t o rn e y, Cr ai g A. G i l l en (“Gi l l en ”) . Th e g o v ern m en t qu i ck l y o p p o s edGi l l en ’s represe ntation because G illen’ s law par tner, W ilm er P arker (“ Parker ”), had re pr es en te d bu sin es sm anG eo rg e G re en e on c or ru pti on c harg es r el at ed

to tho se Cam pbell faced. T he governm ent intended to call G reene (“ Gr eene”) , who had ple d gu ilty

and b ee n se nte nc ed

to 15 m onths i n pr iso n, a s aw itn es s init s c as e ag ai nst Cam pbe ll. T he re fo re , the gov er nm en t arg ue d, G ill en ’ s r ep re se ntatio n would create a conflict of inter est. T he district court agreed and disqualified Gil le n. Following a trial, the j ury acquitted Cam

pbell of the RICO and bribery ch ar ge s bu t f

ound Cam pbe ll gui lty

of the ta x f ra ud c harg es . A ft er

ase nte nc ing 1 he ar ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed Cam pbe ll to 3 0 m onths i n pr iso n and 1 25

m onth s on supervised release, in additio n to a fine of $6,000. C am pbell then pe rfec te d t hi s ap pe al . II. DISC US SION A . G ill en ’s D isq ua lif

ic at ion Cam pbell contend s that the dist rict court’ s decision to disqu alify Gillen v i o l a t e dh i s S i x th Ame n d men tr i g h tt o c o u n s e l o f h i s c h o i c e . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Cam pbe ll co nte nds that a

c ourt’ s in te re st i n m ai nta ini ng p ubl ic c onf ide nc e in the cr im ina l j ust ic e sy ste m

is ins uf fi ci en t i n ge ne ra l and w as not suf fi ci en tly a t r isk in this case to justify

disqu alify ing Gillen when (1) G illen had no t represe nted G re en e; ( 2) G ill enpos se sse d no c onf ide nti al inf

orm at ionabout

G re en e; and ( 3) Cam pb el l h adkn owi ng ly andvo lu nt ari ly w ai ve d a ny po te nt ia l co nf li ctof i nt eres t. Cam pbell also con tends that th e district court err oneous ly failed to consider al te rn at iv es to di sq ua li fic at io n.

“ A tr ial court’ s decision to disqu alify the defendant’ s counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” U nit ed Sta tes v . R oss , 33 F. 3d 15 07, 1522 (11t h Cir. 1994 ) (c iti ng W

heat v. U nited Sta tes , 486 U . S. 153 , 163 -6 4, 108 S . Ct . 169 2, 1699 -1700 (198 8)). In apply ing th e abuse of discretion standard, w e re cognize that a district court has a “ a range of choice[, ] . . . and so lon g as its decision does not a m ount to a cl ear er

ro r of j udgm en t w e w ill not

r ev er se e ve n if

w e w oul d have6

gone the oth er w ay

had the choice been ours to m ake.” M cM ahan v . T oto , 256 F. 3d 11 20, 1128 (11t h Cir. 2001 ). T he S ixth A m en dm en t gu ar an te es that “ [i ] n a ll cr im ina l pr ose cu tio ns, the ac cu se d sh al l e nj oy

the r igh t . . . to have the A ssi stanc e of Co unse l f

or his de fe nc e. ” U . S. Co nst . a m en d. V I. “ [A ] n e sse nti al part of that r igh t i s th e accu se d’s ab il it y

to sel ectth e co un se l o f hi s ch oi ce.” R oss , 33 F.3dat 1 52 2.

“ Thus, a crim inal defendant has a presum ptive right to counsel of choice.” Id . Ne vertheless, “ while the right to . . . be repre sented by one’ s prefer

red attor ne y is co m pr eh en de d by

the S ixth A m en dm en t, the e sse nti al a im of the A m en dm en t i s to guarante e ane ff ec tiv e advoc at e fo r ea chc ri m ina l de fe ndant rather than to ensure that a def endant will inexorably

be repre sented by

the law y er whom he prefe rs.” W

he at , 48 6 U.S. at15 9, 1 08 S. Ct. at 16 97 . Thu s, a de fen da nt ’s rig ht to th e co un se l o f hi s ch oi ce i s n ot ab so lu te . Id . ( not ing som e of the c ir cum stanc es in w hic h th e ri ght to co unse l of

c hoi ce is “ ci rc um sc ri be d” ); see als o R oss , 33 F . 3d at 15 23.

“ The nee d for fa ir, effic ient, and orderly adm inistration of j ustice overcom es the r igh t t o c ouns el of

c hoi ce w he re an a tto rn ey ha s an a ct

ua l c onf lic t of int er es t, suc h a s whe n he ha s pr ev iou sly r ep re se nte d ape rs on who w ill be c al le d a s a witness against a curre nt client at a cr im inal trial.” Id . E m pha siz ing theCampbell’s asser tions to the contr ary

notwithstanding, United States v. Gonzalez- Lopez , 2 548 U.S. ____, 126 S. C t. 2557 (2006), did not deflate the W heat opinion’s emphasis on the nee d to balance the rig ht to counsel of choic e with the nee d to ensure the integ rity of the c riminal justice sy stem and the public a ppear ance of fa irness. In fac t, Gonzalez-Lopez e xpre ssl y ree mphasized the point and stated, “Nothingwe have said today casts any doubt or place s any qu a lif ic atio n u po n o ur pr e vio us ho ldi ng s th at li mit the ri g ht t o c ouns e l of

c ho ic e . . .. ” 54 8 U .S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2565. The Court further noted that “[n]one of these limitations on t he right to choose one ’s counse l is relevant he re.” Id. at 2566. Th is c ourt

a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll F if th C ir c uit de c isi on s is su e d p ri or

to 3 October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala. , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) ( en banc ). 7 j u d i c i a r y’ s i n t e r e s ti n e n s u r i n g an dma i n t a i n i n g th e i n t e g r i ty o f o u r j u d i c i a l s ys t e m, the U . S. S upr em e Co urt he ld i n W he at that “ wher e a c ourt justifiably finds an actua l co nf

li ctof i nt eres t, the re c an b e no d oubt tha t i t m ayde cl ine a pr off er of waiver . . . . ” 4 8 6 U. S . a t1 6 2 , 1 0 8 S . C t . a t1 6 9 8 ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d ) . I mp o rt a n t l y, 2 for the purpose of the instant case, “ if one attorney in a firm has an actual conflict of int er es t, w e im

put e that c onf

lic t t o a ll the a tto rn ey s inthe f irm , sub j ec tin g th e entire fir m to disq ualification.” R oss , 33 F . 3d at 15 23 ( ci tin g United States v. Ki tc hin , 592 F. 2d 90 0, 904 (5th Cir. 1979)). 3 Be ca use w e ar e de al ing he re w ithan im put ed c onf lic t, it is not ne ce ssary

to decide whether

Gillen him self had a direc t conflict of interest. W e inquire instead whether Gillen’ s law par

tner, Parker , w ouldhave had an actual or ser ious p otential co nf li ctof i nt eres t h adCam

pb el l re ta in edhi m . Inde ci din g w he the r the a ct ua l or pot entia l c onf

lic t w ar rants dis qua lif ic at ion , w e ex am ine w he the r the sub j ec t m atte r of

the f ir st8

rep res en ta ti on is subs ta nt ia ll y rel at edto th atof t he sec on d. Ki tc hin , 592 F. 2d at 90 4; see U

nited Sta tes v. James , 708 F. 2d 40 , 46 (2d Cir. 1983 ). O ur goal is to di scover whether the defense lawy er has div ide d lo y al tie s th at

pr ev en t hi m

f ro m e ff ec tiv el y r ep re se nti ng the de fen da nt . Se e U

nit ed Sta tes v . M

osc ony , 927 F . 2d 7 42, 750 ( 3d Ci r.), cert. denied , 501 U . S. 121 1, 111 S . Ct . 281 2, 115 L . E d. 2d 9 84 (1 991) . I f the c onf

lic t co uld ca

use the de fe nse a tto rn ey

im pr ope rl y to use privileged comm

unication s in cross-exam ination , then disqu alification is appropriate. I ndeed, it is also true that dis qua lif ic at ionis equa lly

appr opr ia te if

the c onf lic t co uld de te r the de fe nse atto rn ey

f ro m int en se pr obi ng o f the w itn es s onc ro ssexam ination to protect privileged comm unication s with the form er cl ie nt or t o a dv an ce t he att orne y ’s own pe rs on al in te res t. In sh or t, the co urt m ust pro te ct it s in de pe nde nt i nte rest i n e nsur ing tha t the int egrit y of t he judic ial

sy ste m is prese rv ed

and tha t tria ls a re co nduc te d w ith in e thi ca l standa rds . R oss , 33 F.3dat 1 52 3 (e m ph as is ad de d) . W e ar e fa ce d inthe ins tant c as e w iththe sam e co nc er ns w e dis cu sse d in R oss , which uph eld the district court’ s decision to disqu alify the crim inal de fen da nt ’s cou ns el of c ho ic e. Id. at 152 3- 24. W ith out

doubt, P ar

ke r, w ho de fe nde d G re en e ag ai nst

c ri m ina l c harg es ari sin g f ro m the sam e co rr

upt ion ch ar ge s le ve le d a ga ins t C am pbe ll, w oul d have ha d an a ct ua l c onf lic t of int er es t th atwou ldwarran t d is qu al ifi cat io n. See id. ; se e als o W he at , 486 U . S. a t 16 3- 64, 108 S. Ct. at 1699-17 00 (upho lding a district court’ s decision to disqu alify an attor ne y w ho h ad r ep re se nte d ac o- co nspi rator w hom the gov er

nm en t i nte nde d toCampbell’s arguments to some ext ent conf late the e x istence of

a dire ct or indirec t 4 c on fl ic t w iththe e xiste nc e of an a c tua l or

po te nti a l c on fl ic t. T he fa c t th at an im pute d c on fl ic t is , b y d e f i n i t i o n , ani n d i r e c tc o n f

l i c td o e s n o tm e anth atani mp u t e d c o n f l i c ti s s o m e h o wm e r e l y a po te nti a l c on fl ic t. I

n th e ins tant c a se , a s a

matte r o f l aw, Pa

rk e r’ s a c tua l c on fl ic t w a s im pute d to and , th e re fo re , b e c ame Gi lle n’ s actual conflict. Se eFre un d v . B utte rwo rth , 165 F.3d 839, 863 n. 33 (1 1th

Cir . 1 99 9) (n oti ngthat a

c on fl ic t of

on e me mbe r o f a

law f ir m “ imp ute s e qu a lly” to the re st of the law f

irm). Consequently , Campbell’s relianc e on our opinion in In re Parady ne Corp. , 8 03 F .2 d 6 04 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 6) , to the e xtent th at Paradyneaddre ssed potential, as opposed to actual, c onflicts is mispl ace d. Bayshore Ford Truck

Sales, Inc. v . Ford Motor Co. (“ Ba y sh ore ” ), 38 0 F .3 d 1 33 1 ( 11 th Cir. 2004), on which Campbell also re lies, is inapposite as well. In Ba y sh or e , we de alt with an alleg ation of a c onflict arisingfrom dual r epre sentation, but the attorney promptly withdrew f

rom repr esentingone of the parties, whom he had pre viously repr esente d only

in “ unrelated matters.” Id. at 1338 (e mphasis added) . Although dicta in Paradyne may leave the impression that Gillen’s conf lict may be 5 resolvable with a waive r fr om Campbell, see 803 F.2d at 610, n.18, the scope of the district c ourt ’s dis c re tio n to dis qu a lif y an atto rn e y

un de r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s si mpl y wa s n ot at is su e in Paradyne . See ge nerally id. The opinions expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court and this cour t in W heat and Ro ss , respe ctively , both of which we re issued a fter Paradyne , c ontr ol t he outc ome in this case. 9 c a l l a s awi tn e s s ) . I n d e e d , C a mp b e l l d o e s n o tar g u e o th e rw i s e . C o n s e qu e n t l y, G ill en , too , suf

fe re d f ro m the sam e co nf

lic t of int er es t. 4 While it is true that Cam

pbell was fr ee to w aive the conflict, the district co ur t was no t re qu ire d t o a ccep t h is waiv er. R oss , 33 F . 3d at 15 24. U nli ke in 5 R oss , w he re a ll of

the r el ev an t c o- de fe ndants w ai ve d any pot entia l c onf

lic t, G re en e re fu se d to w ai ve the a tto rn ey -c lie nt p ri vil eg e, w hic h m eans tha t the ins tant ca se pr es en ts a

str onge r j ust if

ic at ionf or dis qua lif ic at ionthan e ve n R oss . By dis qua lif y ing G ill en , the dis tr ic t c ourt c hose to av oid asit uatio n inw hic h th eThe W he at Court relied on rule s g overningattorney conduct to esta

blish the releva

nt 6 “standa rds of the pr ofession.” 486 U .S. at 160, 108 S. C t. at 1698. There fore , we note that our holding in this case is entirely consistent with the Geor g ia Rules of Profe ssional Conduct. See Ga. Rules of Prof

’l Conduct 1.9, 1.10 (addr essing , respe ctively , conflicts ar ising fr om the repr esentation of a for

mer c lient and imputation of conflicts of inter est). 10 fairness of Cam

pbell’s tr ial undo ubtedlyand quite legiti m ately would have been cal le d i nt o a cco un t, wh ethe r by Cam pb el l o r by Green e. W

he at an d R oss m ak e it cl ear that su chac hoi ce is w ith in the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sc re tio n. 6 Cam pbell also con tends that th e district court failed to properly consider al te rn at iv es to di sq ua li fic at io n t ha t m ay ha ve rem ed ie d t he co nf

li ctof i nt eres t. T he r ec or d do es not

sup port C am

pbe ll’ s arg um en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c le ar ly and care fu lly c onsi de re d C am

pbe ll’ s pr opos ed

m ea sur es , and i ts d ec isi on n ot t o im plem ent them

wa s well- reasoned. Assum ing, without deciding , that the district court wa s required to consider alternatives in these circum stances, the district co urt un doub te dly

sa tis fi ed it s ob lig at ionto do s o. T he re fo re , w e hol d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a

buse it s di sc re tio n w he n it dis qua lif ie d G ill en . B. Cam pbell’ s Sent ence s Following Cam

pbell’s tr ial, the district court held a sentencing hearing at w hic h, a ft er

r ec ei vin g e vid en ce , the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed Cam pbe ll to 3 0 m onths i n pr iso n ( 30 m onths o n e ac h c ount to run c onc ur

re ntl y ) an d 12 m onths o nCitations refer to the 1998 edition of the Guidelines. 7 11 supe rv ise d r el ea se , in ad dit ionto a $6, 000 fi ne . T o c lari fy the r at ion al e supp ortin g th e se nt en ces , th e d is tri ctco ur t i ss ue d ade ta il edsen te nc in g o rd er. A ft er e xpl ic itl y

a ddr es sin g and d isp osi ng o f Cam pbe ll’ s num er ous obj ec tio ns t o th e U . S. P ro ba tio n O ff ic e’ s pr e- se nte nc e inv es tig at ionr ep ort, the district court turned its attent ion to the U. S. Sentencing Com m issio n Guidelines Manua l ( “ U . S. S. G . ” or

“ the G uid el ine s” ). R el y ing on the 199 8 e dit ionof the Guidelines, which correlates the r elevant base offense level to the am ount of tax los s to the gov er

nm en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at C am pbe ll’ s ba se of

fe nse le ve l was 13 . See U . S. S. G . § 2T 1. 1( a) (1 ). T he c ourt the n a dde d atot al of six 7 l e v e l s : tw o f

o r f a i l i n g “t o r e p o rto r

t o c o rr e c t l y i d e n t i f

y t h e s o u r c e o f

i n c o me exceeding $10,000 in any y ear from

crim inal activity ,” see U. S. S. G. § 2T1.1( b)(1); tw o f or uti liz ing “ soph ist ic at ed

m eans” to im

pe de dis co ve ry

of the e xis te nc e or ex te nt of h is frau d, see U. S. S. G. § 2T1.1( b)(2); and two f or obstruction of j ustice, see U. S. S. G. § 3C1.1. The district court declined the governm ent’ s requests for an in crea se in th e b as e o ffen se lev el forab us e o f a p os it io n o f trus t, see U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.3 , anddi srup ti on of g ov ern m en ta l fu nc ti on , see U. S. S. G. § 5K2.7. H owever , the district court also denied Cam pbell’s r equest for a downw ard departure based on hi s p ub li c se rv ic e. See U . S. S. G . § 5H 1. 11 ( statin g th at pub lic se rv ic e is “ not12

or din ar ily r el ev ant i n de te rm ini ng whe the r a de part ur e is w ar rante d” ). T hus, the dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at Cam pbe ll’ s of fe nse le ve l w as 19 and tha t C am pbe ll fell w ithin crim inal histo ry category I, the lowest of the cr im inal histo ry cate gor ie s. C onse que ntl y , the G uid el ine s r ec om m en de d pr iso n se nte nc es r an gin g fro m 30 to 37 m on th s. Following its assess m ent of the Guidelines range, the district court expressly considered the additio nal factors set f orth in 18 U. S. C. § 355 3 (2000), thou gh it lim ited its detailed dis cussion to thos e fa ctors found to be “ of particular im portance.” U

nit ed Sta tes v . Ca m

pbe ll , N o. 1:0 4- CR -0 424- RW S, sli p op . a t 25 (N .D . G a. June 15, 2006 ) (sentencing order). T he district court found th at Cam pbe ll ha d publi cl y

sou ght to “ m ini m iz e his c ri m es ” an d “ his c ulp ab ili ty f or the cr im es ” fo r w hic h he w as c onvi ct ed and n ote d th e ne ed

to de te r publ ic of

fi ci al s in pa rti cu la r fro m

cri m in al co nd uc t. Id

. at 25-27. N evertheless, the district court im pose d on ly

the m ini m

um se nte nc es r ec om

m en de d by

the G uid el ine s. A t the se nte nc ing he ar ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt a cknow le dge d C am pbe ll’ s a cc om

pli shm en ts as m ay or and his devo tion to his children. T he district court’ s sentencing o rder cl earl y ind ic at es that the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso c onsi de re d “ se nte nc es im pose d up on oth er de fe ndants w ho w er e pr ose cu te d a s part of thi s sam e inv es tig at ion , ” the13

circum stances surroundi ng the related conviction s, and “ sentences that are generally im posed for tax offenses.” Id . a t 27 . Cam pbell challenges several aspects of the sentences im posed bythe district co urt. F ir st, Cam

pbe ll co nte nds that the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed se ve ra l e rr or s in calculating the appropriate Guidelines range and settling o n the sentences ult im at el y

iss ue d. T hus, Cam

pbe ll co nte nds, his se nte nc es are pr oc ed ur al ly unr ea sona

ble . L as tly , Cam

pbe ll co nte nds that the c ir cum stanc es of thi s c as e ren de r hi s s en te nc es subs ta nt iv el y un reas on ab le .

“ W e re view the sentence im posed bythe district court for re asonableness.” United States v. T

alley , 431 F . 3d 7 84, 785 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) . “ Re vie wf or re as ona ble ne ss i s de fe re nti al . W e m ust e va luate w he the r the se nte nc e im pose d by the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ai l t o a ch ie ve the pur

pose s of se nte nc ing state d inse ct ion 3553 (a). ” Id

. at 788. “ W e do not appl y the rea sonablen ess standard to each ind ivi dua l de ci sio n m ad e dur ing the se nte nc ing pr oc es s; r athe r, w e re vie wthe final sentence for reasonableness.” U nit ed Sta tes v . W

ini nge ar , 422 F . 3d 1 241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005). “ [T ] he party who challenges the sentence bear s the burden of establishin g that the sentence is unreasonable in th e light of both th[e] rec ord and the factors in section 355 3(a). ” Talley , 43 1 F .3dat 7 88 .We rec og nize that the Court’s rationale in Ri ta calls into question our rea sons for not 8 aff ordinga pre sumption of reasona bleness. Con tra st R ita , 551 U.S. ___, slip op. at 7-16, with Hunt , 459 F.3d at 1185. Booke r require s courts to consider the sentenc e re commended by the Guidelines a s one 9 of se ve ra l f a c tor s me nti on e d in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3. 54 3 U .S. at 26 4- 65 , 1 25 S. Ct . at 76 7- 68 ; see als o Hunt , 459 F.3d at 1184-85. 14 W e do n ot i n th is c ir cu it pr es um e re as ona ble ase nte nc e w ith in the pr ope rl y cal cu la te d Gu id el in es ran ge . Se e U nit ed Sta tes v . H

unt , 459 F . 3d 1 180, 118 5 (11th Cir. 2006). Rece ntly , how ever, the U. S. Suprem e Court upheld oth er circuits’ decisions affording su ch a presum ption , noting that a sentence, ind ep en de ntl y

c al cu la te d by

the dis tr ic t c ourt i n a cc or danc e w ith Booker , that f al ls w ith in the pr ope rl y

c al cu la te d G uid el ine s r an ge “ sig nif ic an tly inc re as es the likeliho od that th e sentence is a r easonable one.” Rita v. United States , 551 U. S. ___, slip op . at 8 (June 21, 2007 ). 8

“ Af ter Booker , ase nte nc e m ay be r ev ie w ed

f or pr oc ed ur al or sub stanti ve unreasonableness.” H

unt , 459 F . 3d at 11 82 n . 3; see also United States v. B ooker , 543 U . S. 220 , 125 S . Ct . 738 ( 2005 ) . Ase nte nc e m ay be pr oc ed

ur al ly un reas on ab le if “ itis th e p ro du ctof a pro cedur e th atdo es no t fo ll ow Booker ’s requirem ents, re gardless of the actual sentence. ” Id . “ Additionally , a

sentence 9 m ay be substant ively

unreasonable, re gardless of the procedure used.” Id . 1. P ro ce du ra l U nr ea son ab le ne ss15

Cam pbe ll fi rs t c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r el ianc e on c ondu ct f orm ing the basis of crim inal charges on which he had been acquitted wa s uncons titutio nally

excessive. Cam

pbell do es not contendthat the evidence wa s insufficient to support the dis trict court’ s relevant fa ctual findings . Furtherm ore, Cam pbe ll co nc ed es that our pr ec ed en ts h av e co nsi ste ntl y uph el d di str ic t c ourts’ us e o f su ch rel ev an t co nd uc t wh en de te rm in in g a n app ro pr ia te sen te nc e. See , e. g. , U nit ed Sta tes v . D unc an , 400 F . 3d 1 297, 130 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( ci tin g c as es in this circuit extendin g as far back as 1991). Cam

pbell contend s noneth eless that the e xte nt o f the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r el ianc e on h is a cquitte d c ondu ct vio la te d hi s co nst itu tio na l r igh ts.

“ W e rev ie w de nov o constitu tional challenges to a sentence. ” United States v. Ca nte lla no , 43 0 F .3d11 42 , 11 44 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ), cert. denied , 547 U . S. 103 4, 12 6 S . Ct. 1 60 4 (2 00 6) . Cam pbe ll ar gue s th at

in lig ht o f the U . S. S upr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ngs in B ook er an d B lak

el y v. W ashi ngton , 542 U. S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), there m ust e xis t l im its on a

dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a

bil ity to re ly on a cquitte d c ondu ct , and the dis tr ic t c ourt e xc ee de d th ose li m its in thi s c as e. W e do n ot quib ble w ith Cam pbe ll’ s pr em ise that the Co nst itu tio n li m its c ourts’ abil ity to ca lc ulate apr iso n sentence in part on the basis of acquitted con duct. I ndeed, w e acknowledged asTo the extent that Campbell’s brief c ould possibly be interpr eted a s arguing that the 10 conduct upon whic h the district court re lied was not suffic iently rele vant to the cha

rg e for which he wa s c onvic te d ( Ap pe lla nt’ s B r. at 41 ), his a ssi g nme nt o f e rr or , whic h is imp lic it at be st, is insufficient for

the purpose of

appellate revie w. See , e.g. , Un ite d S tates v . G up ta , 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2006) (de emingwaived a n appea l that lacked a

rgument and citation to leg al authority ), cert. de nied , 75 U.S.L .W. 3585 (May 21, 2007) (No. 06- 1388). The U.S. Supreme Court in Rita re a ff ir me d o ur vie w that Booke r

and Blak e ly do not 11 l i m i tth e d i s tr i c tc o urt s ’ a b i l i ty t o c o n s i d e r

f o r s e n t e n c i n gp ur

p o s e s f a c t s p r o v e nt o th e j u d g e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e so longas the sente nce imposed doe s not ex cee d the maxim um permitted by

the jury verdic t. Ri ta , 5 51 U. S. _

__ , s lip op . at 13 , 1 4 ( dis c us sin gpa re nth e tic a lly the re levant holding s in Booke r and Blak e ly ). 16 m uc h in D unc an w he n w e not ed that “ Booker doe s no t su gge st tha t the co nsi de ratio n of

a cquitte d c ondu ct

vio late s th e Si xthA m en dm en t as long as t he jud ge does no t i m

posea se nte nc e tha t e

xc ee ds w hat

is authori

ze d bythejur

y verdict .” 40 0 F .3dat 1 30 4 (e m ph as is ad de d) . Cam

pb el l h as fai le d t o c it e, an d we ar e ind ep en de ntl y

unaw ar e of

, c ontro lli ng a

uth or ity e sta bli shi ng a ddi tio na l l im its , as sum ing the c ondu ct

r el ie d up on i s r el ev an t. C am pbe ll’ s r el ianc e on B lak

el y 10 an d Booker

is m isp la ce d. O ur

opi nio n in D unc an w as iss ue d su bse que nt t o bo th B lak el yand Booker , and w e the n he ld tha t “ nothin g in Booker e ro de s our [r el ev an t] bin din g pr ec ed en t. ” 400 F . 3d at 13 04- 05. 11 Cam pbe ll w as c onvi ct ed

on thr ee c ount s of

ta x f ra ud, a s th at

of fe nse is defined in 26 U.S .C. § 7206 (2000). S ection 720 6 provid es for a m axim umthreey ear pr iso n se nte nc e an d $1 00, 000 fi ne . C am pbe ll’ s c onc ur

re nt 3 0- m onth pr iso n sentences and $6,000 fine do n ot exceed the m axim um “ authorized by

the j ury17

verdict;” theref

ore, we conclude that the dis trict court’ s reliance on ac quitt ed conduct di d not v iolate Cam pbell’s c onsti tutio nal rights. O n the contrary , given th e c i rc u m s t an ce s o f t h i s ca s e, th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s d ec i s i o n t o al l o w C amp b el l ’s thr ee se nte nc es to run c onc ur re ntl y and t o im

pose af ine of onl y $6, 000 de m on st rat es co ns id erab le len ie nc y an d re st rai nt . See , e. g. , United States v. Tafoya , 757 F . 2d 1 522, 153 0 ( 5thCi r. ) (u phol din g ase nte nc e tot al ing six y ears on two co un ts of t ax frau d) , cert. denied , 474 U. S. 921, 106 S. Ct. 252 (198 5). Cam pbe ll furthe r ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ai le d to pr ope rl y

c onsi de r the central m andate of the key sentencing statu te, 18 U. S. C. § 355 3 (2000), as w ell as th e f a c t o r s a d dr e s s e di n § 3 5 5 3 th a tar e i n d e p e n d e n to f th e Gu i d e l i n e s . F i n a l l y, Cam pbell contend s that the dist rict court er roneously calculated the Guidelin es range . W e be ginour

ana ly sis w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c al cu la tio n of the Guidelines range.

“ W e re vie wf

or c le ar e rr or the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing s of

f ac t r eg ar din g whe th er a d efen da nt sh ou ldrece iv e an en ha nc edsen te nc e u nd er t he . . . Guidelines.” U

nit ed Sta tes v . Clay , 3 7 6 F. 3 d1 2 9 6 , 1 3 0 0 (1 1 th Ci r. 2 0 0 4 ). We rev ie w de novo the “ dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in te rp re ta tio n of the G uid el ine s and i ts application o f the G uidelin es to the facts. ” U nit ed Sta tes v . M

cG ill , 450 F . 3d 12 76 , 12 78 (11 th Cir . 20 06 ).18

In a footnote in his brief, Cam pbell contend s that the dist rict court in co rrec tl y

de te rm in edth e am ou nt of t ax lo ss th atledto th e b as e o ffen se lev el . Cam pb el l’s ar gu m en t, h owe ve r, is no th in g m or e th an an ass ig nm en t o f erro r. He ci te s to no a

uth or ity , le ga l or

oth er w ise , f or his pare nth et ic al sug ge sti on tha t the d i s tri ct co u rt ’s t ax l o s s ca l cu l at i o n wa s n o t“ a r ea s o n ab l e e s t i m at e. ” ( Ap p el l an t ’s Br. at 51 (citing U. S. S. G. § 2T1.1, com m entary (n.1) .) T herefor e, Cam

pbell has fai le d t o ra is e th is arg um en t i n am an ne r su ffi ci en t t o a ll ow fo r ap pe ll at e rev ie w. G upta , 46 3 F .3dat 1 19 5. Cam pbe ll al so c ont en ds tha t the e vid en ce did not de m onstrate that he uti liz ed sop his tic at ed

m eans t o c onc ea l the c ri m e fo r w hic h he w as c onvi ct ed . T he dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that C am pbe ll uti liz ed

c am pa igna cc ount s and c re dit c ar ds iss ue d to oth er

pe opl e to c onc ea l c as h e xpe ndi tur es in “ a de lib er at e atte m pt t o im pe de the dis co ve ry

of both th e ex ist en ce and e xte nt o f his ta x f ra ud. ” Cam

pbe ll su gg es ts th atth e ev id en ce d em on st rat es m erel y “ un us ua l s pe nd in g p at te rn s.” (Ap pe ll an t’s Br . at 5 2, n .20 .) In l ig ht of t he ev id en ce b efo re t he di st ric t co ur t, we believe it was r easonable for the district court to conclude that Cam pbell engaged in hi s “ un us ua l s pe nd in g p at te rn s” to co nc eal hi s fr au d o n t he go ve rn m en t. See U nit ed Sta tes v . B arak

at , 130 F . 3d 1 448, 145 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( ag re ei ng w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n th at the de fe ndant’ s pr ac tic e of f ilt er ing f undsIn Barakat , we va cate d the def endant’ s sentence beca

use it was not clea

r whe ther the 12 dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d a pp lie d a so ph ist ic ate d me ans e nh anc e me nt t o th e ba se of fe ns e le ve l w ith respe ct to the tax evasion conviction, which we deter mined would not have be en cle ar e rror , or with respec t to the mail fraud c harg e, which w e conc luded would have been e rror . 130 F.3d at 1457-58. 19 thr oughhis a tto rn ey ’ s tr

ust a cc ount c onst itu te d asop his tic at ed m eans o f concealing tax evasion). Furtherm ore, Cam pbell’s dec eptive practices w ere at 12 le as t a s so phi sti cate d a s th e pr ac tic e at iss ue in B arak

at . T he f ac t tha t C am

pbe ll did not use of fs hor e bank a cc ount s or

tr an sa ct ion s th ro ugh fi ct iti ous busi ne ss en ti ti es is un av ai li ng . See U . S. S. G . § 2T 1. 1, c om m en tary ( n. 4) ( pr ovi din g a none xc lus ive li st o f ex am ple s of sop his tic at ed

m eans o f co nc ea lm en t) . I n te rm s of the sop his tic at ionof

the c onc ea lm en t, w e se e no d if fe re nc e be tw ee n “ hid ing a sse ts or tr an sa ct ion s . . . thr oughthe use of f ic tit iou s e nti tie s, c or

por at e she lls , or offshore financial ac counts,” id. , and h idi ng a sse ts o r tr an sa ct ion s th ro ugh the use of a st raw m an or c am

pa ig n fu nd . Fi na lly , w ithr es pe ct

to the dis tr ic t c our

t’ s Guid el ine s c al cu la tio n, Cam pbe ll co nte nds that the e vid en ce w as ins uf fi ci en t t o de m onstrate that he w ill fu lly ob st ru ct edjus ti ce. See U . S. S. G . § 3C 1. 1. W e dis ag re e. A t the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e d is tri ctco ur t h eardtes ti m on y fro m Gabe Pas care ll a (“ Pas care ll a”), a pe rs on of i nt eres t t o t he go ve rn m en t dur in g i ts in ve st ig at io n o f Cam pb el l. Pa sc ar el late sti fi ed

that he ha d no tif

ie d C am pbe ll of the gov er

nm en t’ s in te nti on t o20

int er vie whim , and, tog ethe r, the y planne d to have P as care lla sur re pti tio usl y re co rd the int er vie w . F oll ow ing the gov er nm en t’ s in te rv ie w , Cam

pbe ll m et w ith Pa sc ar el la , and the tw o di sc uss ed the int er vie wa s w el l a s asub poe nathe governm ent had issu ed to Pascar ella re quiring him to produce docum ents related to the inv es tig at ion . P as care lla inf orm ed Cam pbe ll that he pos se sse d r el ev an t reco rd s t ha t wo ul d, int er

ali a , e vidence Cam

pbell’s use of P ascare lla’ s credit car d to p ay pe rs ona l e xpe nse s. A t C am pbe ll’ s r eque st, P as care lla tur ne d so m e of

the re co rd s ov er

to him . T he gov er

nm en t di d no t be co m e aw ar e of the r ec or ds Pas care ll a g av e Cam

pb el l u nt il aft er t he tri al . T he onl y e vid en ce r eb utt ing P as care lla ’ s te sti m ony a t the se nte nc ing he ari ng was a n a ffi da vi t fr om Cam pb el l s ta ti ng th athe ha d n ot tak en an y reco rd s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c hose to be lie ve P as care lla ’ s te sti m ony , how ev er , w hic h, unl ike Cam pbell’s sw orn statem ent, w as subject to cross-exam ination , and Cam pbell has failed to argue that its decision to d o so was clearly err oneous . Given the district court’ s unchalleng ed cre dibil ity determ ination , w e conclude that the evidence uponw hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt r el ie d w as suf fi ci en t t o de m onstrate that C am pbe ll too k th e re co rd s f

ro m P as care lla

w iththe int en t t o “ co nc ea l[ ] . . . e vid en ce that i s m aterial to an off

icial investigatio n.” See U. S. S. G. § 3C1.1, c omm entary (n.4( d)) (p ro vi di ng ex am

pl es of c on du ctth atqu al ifi es as o bs tru ct io n o f jus ti ce).The g overnme nt did not file a cross- appea l of Campbell’s sentenc es. Ther efor e, we 13 need not de cide whe ther the se ntence s are sufficie nt to comply with the purposes of se ntencingas set forth in § 3553. 21 Ther efore, the district court’ s decision to add two levels to the base offense level fo r ob st ru ct io n o f jus ti ce was no t erro r. W e co nc lud e that the r em ai nde r of Cam pbe ll’ s arg um en ts r eg ar din g procedural rea sonablen ess are lacking in m erit. It is clear not onlythat the district court adequately

considered the § 355 3 factors, but also th at the sentences handed down w er e the pr oduc t of c onsc ie nti ous de lib er at ion . Whil e w e re m ai n un ce rt ai n w he the r the se nte nc es are “ suf fi ci en t . . . to co m

ply w iththe pur

pose s” of se nte nc ing , c onsi de ri ng a s w e m ust the f ac tor s se t f

orth i n § 3 553, w e ar e ce rt ai n that they are “ not greater than necessar y .” See 18 U . S. C. § 35 53. T he re fo re , the district court adhered to the relevant aspect of § 3553's central m andate. 13 Inc onc lus ion , w e hol d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y f oll ow ed the pr oc ed ur es out lin ed

in Booker . T he re fo re , Cam pbe ll’ s se nte nc es are not pr oc edur al ly unr eas on ab le . 2. Su bs ta nt ive U nr ea son ab le ne ss Cam pbe ll as ks this c ourt t o ov er tur n hi s se nte nc es due to (1 ) his status a s a

“ first offe nder with an exce ption al personal histo ry who cannot be considered likely to com m it further cr im es,” (2) his service to the public, and (3) statistics that22

indicate that Cam

pbell’s sentence s greatly

exceed the average sentences im posed up on th os e co nv ic te d o f ta x c rimes. W e d ecl in e to do so . T ha t C am pbe ll ha s be enc onvi ct ed

onl y onc e doe s no t m ak e him af ir st of fe nde r. H e w as c onvi ct ed on thr ee se parate c ount s of ta x f ra ud, w hic h he en ga ge d inon thr ee se parate oc ca sio ns o ve r the c our se of thr ee y ears . H e soug ht to c onc ea l hi s c ri m es and w ill fu lly im pe de d th e gove rn m en t’ s e ff orts t o pr ose cu te him . Moreover, the fac t that Cam pbell, a lawy er and form er f ederal prosecutor, co m m itt ed his c ri m es w hil e m ay or

of am aj or m etro pol itan c ity , kno w ing a s he m ust have that hi s a ct ion s w oul d be pub lic ly and d ee ply

sc ru tin iz ed , be lie s hi s assertion that he “ cannot be consid ered likely to com m it further cr im es.” Further, Cam pbe ll ha s f

ai le d to dir ec t this c ourt t o e vid en ce that hi s pu bli c se rv ic e w as so ex tr ao rd inary

a s to j ust if

y de viatin g f

ro m the standard

appl ic at ionof

the Gui de li ne s, wh ic h g en eral ly precl ud es co ns id erat io n o f pu bl ic ser vi ce. U.S.S.G. § 5H 1. 11. F ina lly , the statis tic s C am pbe ll ci te s are bare num

be rs w ith out

c ont ex t an d, t he refo re, d o n ot pe rs ua de us th athi s s en te nc es are u nr eas on ab le . Brief ly , w e address Cam

pbell’s c ontenti on that hi s sentences refle ct disrespect for the j ury

trial sy stem . Obviouslyand m istakenlyequating acquitt al“ [A]n a c qu itt a l on c ri min a l c ha

rg e s d oe s n ot p ro ve that th e de fe nd a nt i s inno c e nt; it 14 mere ly proves the e x istence of

a re asonable doubt as to his guilt.” United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms , 465 U.S. 354, 361, 104 S. C t. 1099, 1104 (1984), quoted in United Sta te s v . W att s , 519 U.S. 148, 155, 117 S. C t. 633, 637 (1997). 23 t o i n n o ce n ce , Ca m

p b el l co n t en d s th at th e d i s tri ct co u rt ci rc u m v en t edth e ju ry’s 14 de ci sio n to a cquit

him w ithr es pe ct

to the m or e eg re gio us c harg es by “ es se nti al ly convict[ing ] Cam

pbell of corruption and sentenc[ing] him as if the j ury ’ s acquittal wa s of no m om ent.” (Reply Br. at 17.) As the district court noted, the r ecord ev ide nc es Cam

pbe ll’ s f ai lur e or r ef usa l t o se ri ousl y

a cknow le dge his w ro ngdo ing or the pot en tia l c onse que nc es ari sin g th er ef ro m , not onl y to him se lf

but a lso to the pe opl e of the Ci ty of A tlanta . I n li ght

of the e vid en ce that C am

pbe ll did w ha t the governm ent say s he did, his belief that he is currently im prisoned for acquitted cr im ina l c harg es f

urthe r unde rs co re s hi s f

ai lur e to r ec ogni ze the gr av ity of his sit ua tio n. H ad

he be enc onvi ct ed

of one of the br ibe ry

c harg es , Cam

pbe ll w oul d have face d up to 10 y ears in prison. 18 U. S. C. § 666 (a) (2000). H ad he been convicted of one of the RICO charges, Cam pbell would have faced up to 20 y ears in pri so n. See 18 U. S. C. § 196 3(a) ( 2000 ). A nd, had the governm ent charged him se parate ly

f or m ai l f ra ud, of w hic h th e j ur

y did f ind Cam pbe ll gui lty , he li ke wis e wou ldha ve face d up t o 2 0 years i n p ris on . 18 U.S.C. § 1 34 1 (2 00 0) . Cam pbe ll’ s se nte nc es , w hic h are c onsi de ra bly le ss than th e m ax im

um a llo w ed f or24

the crim es for which he was c onvi cted, do no t am ountto sentences for the cr im es fo r whi ch he was n ot co nv ic te d. W e have tho ro ughl y

r ev ie w ed the r ec or d onappe al and h av e co nsi de re d a ll of th e ap pl ic ab le fact or s s etfor th in 18 U.S.C. § 3 55 3, as di d t he di st ric t co ur t. Af ter careful consideration, w e conclude that Cam pbell’s sentence s are su bs ta nt iv el y

reas on ab le . III. C ONC LUS ION W e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n w he n it dis qua lif ie d C am pbe ll’ s c ouns el . F urthe r, Cam pbe ll’ s se nte nc es are both p ro ce dura l l y an ds ub s t an t i v el y re as o n ab l e. Ac co rd i n g l y, we a ff i rm Ca m p b el l ’s co nvi ct ion s and s en te nc es . AFFIRMED.