UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

DANILLE MORRIS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 17-3074 

(D.C. No. 2:16-CR-20022-JAR-3) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

The events underlying Danille Morris’s convictions and sentence—a bank 

robbery, a car chase, wild gunshots, a rollover accident, and an attempted 

carjacking—seem ripped from a movie script. But the 200-month sentence from 

which she appeals is quite real. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 9, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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BACKGROUND 

Morris had an intimate relationship with Gary Jordan. On March 9, 2016, 

Jordan asked her to be his getaway driver for a bank robbery. Bringing her 

19-month-old daughter, Morris drove her 2003 Chevrolet Tahoe to pick up Jordan 

and then another man, Jacob Smith. She drove the men as they looked for a good 

target, eventually ending up at the First National Bank in Stilwell, Kansas. 

Pretending to look for work, Morris went in and cased the bank, then reported 

the number of employees to Jordan and Smith. Carrying handguns, Jordan and Smith 

robbed the bank of more than $15,000 while Morris waited with the Tahoe running. 

After the robbery, Jordan took the wheel. Morris was in the front passenger seat, 

with Smith and Morris’ daughter in the backseat. Morris and Smith began putting the 

money into a backpack. 

Within minutes, police spotted and chased the Tahoe. For approximately 

21 miles, Jordan drove at high speeds, evaded “stop sticks” the police deployed, ran 

at least a half-dozen red lights, and drove on the sidewalk to get around traffic. 

During the chase, Smith fired numerous shots at the pursuing police cars, hitting one 

car near the driver’s door. 

Believing that the police could not cross state lines, Morris told Jordan to head 

for Missouri. Shortly after they entered Missouri, the chase ended when Jordan lost 

control and rolled the Tahoe. None of the Tahoe’s occupants (including Morris’ 

daughter) was seriously injured, and officers were able to arrest Morris and Smith 
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with little trouble. Jordan, on the other hand, ran and tried to carjack another vehicle 

before being apprehended. 

Morris pleaded guilty to one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & (d) and 2, and one count of using, carrying, brandishing, and 

discharging firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possessing 

those firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2. Her presentence report recommended increasing her offense 

level by 8 levels for relevant conduct (2 levels for Jordan’s carjacking and another 

6 levels for Smith’s firing on police officers). With these increases, the presentence 

report established a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months for the bank robbery. The 

firearm conviction carried a mandatory 120-month consecutive sentence. 

Suggesting she was a minor participant in the crimes, particularly with regard 

to the relevant conduct, Morris requested an offense-level reduction under Sentencing 

Guideline § 3B1.2. She also requested that the district court vary downward and 

order a sentence totaling 150 months (30 months for the bank robbery and 120 

months for the firearm conviction). The government opposed both requests and 

moved for an upward variance. The district court denied the § 3B1.2 request and 

declined to vary either downward or upward. It imposed a within-Guidelines 

sentence of 80 months for the bank robbery and 120 months for the firearms 

violation, for a total sentence of 200 months. 
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DISCUSSION 

Morris raises two issues on appeal. First, she challenges the district court’s 

denial of her § 3B1.2 request. Second, she challenges the substantive reasonableness 

of her sentence. 

I. Section 3B1.2 Adjustment 

Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.2 establishes offense-level deductions for minimal 

and minor participants. Morris relies on § 3B1.2(b), which provides a two-level 

deduction for a minor participant. A “minor participant” is one “who is less culpable 

than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be 

described as minimal.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2, cmt. n.5 

(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). 

Morris has the burden of proving minor-participant status by a preponderance 

of the evidence. United States v. Adams, 751 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2014). A 

minor-participant determination is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. Id. “To 

constitute clear error, we must be convinced that the sentencing court’s finding is 

simply not plausible or permissible in light of the entire record on appeal, 

remembering that we are not free to substitute our judgment for that of the district 

judge.” United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 478 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

While recognizing that Jordan and Smith did the robbing, Jordan was the 

getaway driver, and Smith did the shooting, the district court found that Morris had 

provided the Tahoe, had driven Jordan and Smith to the bank, and then had cased the 
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bank. The district court therefore denied the § 3B1.2(b) reduction because she had 

“engaged in both the planning and provided the car that allowed for the robbery 

itself.” R., Vol. 2 at 63. 

Morris asserts that the district court improperly relied on her “essential role” in 

the robbery, Aplt. Br. at 9, and it ignored her lower culpability in the relevant 

conduct. We disagree. The district court explicitly noted what she did not do, but it 

then determined that what she did do exceeded minor participation. On this record, 

we cannot conclude that the district court’s findings were implausible or 

impermissible. 

“[A] defendant is not entitled to a minor-participant reduction merely because 

[s]he is the least culpable among several participants in a jointly undertaken criminal 

enterprise.” Adams, 751 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Adams, 

this court identified several cases in which defendants with roles similar to Morris’s 

were denied minor-participant reductions. See id. at 1179-80. Morris’s arguments 

how various factors would support a minor-participant reduction essentially seek to 

have this court re-weigh the evidence, which we do not do on clear-error review. 

See United States v. Gilgert, 314 F.3d 506, 515-16 (10th Cir. 2002). 

II. Reasonableness of Sentence 

 Morris next argues that her sentence is unreasonable in light of the sentencing 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that the district court should have granted 

the downward variance. These arguments invoke substantive reasonableness 

analysis. See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A 
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challenge to the sufficiency of the § 3553(a) justifications relied on by the district 

court implicates the substantive reasonableness of the resulting sentence.”). 

“We review sentences for reasonableness under a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Adams, 751 F.3d at 1181 (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “A sentencing decision is substantively unreasonable if it 

exceeds the bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and the applicable law. 

Further, we presume a sentence is reasonable if it is within the properly calculated 

guideline range.” United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) 

(brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). “[G]iven the district 

court’s institutional advantage over our ability to determine whether the facts of an 

individual case justify a variance . . . , we generally defer to its decision to grant, or 

not grant, a variance based upon its balancing of the § 3553(a) factors.” United 

States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2008). 

Morris argues that the district court gave too much weight to those factors 

concerning the nature of the offense and too little weight to mitigating factors such as 

her complete lack of criminal history. But we do not consider the § 3553(a) factors 

de novo. See Smart, 518 F.3d at 808 (“[W]e must . . . defer not only to a district 

court’s factual findings but also to its determinations of the weight to be afforded to 

such findings.”). “[A]s long as the balance struck by the district court among the 

factors set out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable, 

we must defer to that decision even if we would not have struck the same balance in 

the first instance.” United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008). And 
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although Morris disagrees with the district court’s balancing, she has failed to show 

that the balance the court struck was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 

unreasonable. 

CONCLUSION 

 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge