This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A16-0955 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

M. J. R. D., 

Appellant. 

Filed February 6, 2017 

Affirmed 

Schellhas, Judge 

Washington County District Court 

File No. 82-K5-93-004038 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota, and 

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County 

Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Paul E. Overson, Steven M. Coodin, Coodin & Overson, PLLP, Lake Elmo, Minnesota 

(for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

SCHELLHAS, Judge 

 Appellant asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of his second expungement 

petition. We affirm. 
2 

FACTS 

On August 24, 1993, appellant M.J.R.D. grabbed a woman’s arm and breast and 

pushed her against a wall during an argument. Respondent State of Minnesota charged 

M.J.R.D. with fourth- and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct and fifth-degree assault 

(harm). M.J.R.D. pleaded guilty to fifth-degree assault as a misdemeanor and was 

sentenced to one year of supervised probation; the state dismissed the criminal sexual 

conduct charges, and the sentencing court did not order M.J.R.D. to register as a predatory 

offender. M.J.R.D. was discharged from probation about a year later. 

 In March 2008, M.J.R.D. filed a petition to expunge the records relating to his 1993 

misdemeanor assault conviction. The relevant county agencies and the Minnesota Bureau 

of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) opposed the petition. The district court denied the 

petition. On December 9, 2015, M.J.R.D. filed a second petition to expunge the records 

relating to his 1993 misdemeanor assault conviction. The BCA opposed the petition, while 

the relevant county agencies took no position on the petition. The district court denied the 

petition. 

This appeal follows.1

D E C I S I O N 

We review a district court’s denial of an expungement petition for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013). “Under an abuse of 

discretion standard, we will not overrule the district court unless the court exercised its 

 

1

 The relevant county agencies take no position on this appeal; the BCA has filed nothing 

in connection with this appeal. 
3 

discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or based its ruling on an erroneous 

interpretation of the law.” State v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Minn. 2012). Reversal 

also is warranted if the district court’s ruling “is against the facts in the record,” but 

“findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 822 & n.3 

(quotation omitted). 

In his expungement petition, M.J.R.D. claimed that he is entitled to expungement 

under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3 (2014), which provides that a petitioner may be 

eligible for expungement of “all records relating to an arrest, indictment or information, 

trial, or verdict” if “the petitioner was convicted of . . . a . . . misdemeanor and has not been 

convicted of a new crime for at least two years since discharge of the sentence for the 

crime.” “There are two bases for expungement of criminal records in Minnesota: Minn. 

Stat. ch. 609A . . . and the judiciary’s inherent authority.” M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. In 

his petition, M.J.R.D. did not seek to invoke the judiciary’s inherent authority, and the 

district court did not address its inherent authority to expunge criminal records in its order 

denying the petition. We therefore do not address M.J.R.D.’s repeated references to 

inherent-authority expungement in his appellate brief. See In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 

N.W.2d 260, 263 & n.2 (Minn. 2013) (addressing only statutory expungement where 

juvenile “petitioned the district court for expungement solely under the court’s statutory 

authority” and “did not invoke the court’s inherent authority to order expungement”). 

 M.J.R.D. argues that the district court’s denial of his second expungement petition 

was an abuse of discretion because it was based on the court’s erroneous interpretation of 

Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4 (2014). Under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4, “[r]ecords 
4 

of a conviction of an offense for which registration is required under section 243.166 may 

not be expunged.” And under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a) (2014), “[a] person shall 

register” as a predatory offender if he “was charged with . . . a felony violation of” an 

enumerated offense, including fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, “and convicted of 

. . . that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.” The district 

court accordingly reasoned that, because M.J.R.D.’s misdemeanor assault conviction arose 

out of the same set of circumstances as his charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, 

the assault conviction triggered a registration requirement under section 243.166, which in 

turn prohibited expungement. M.J.R.D. argues to the contrary that, because the sentencing 

court had the implicit authority to, and did in fact, waive his duty to register as a predatory 

offender, the expungement prohibition does not apply. 

 “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” J.J.P., 831 

N.W.2d at 264; see also State v. D.R.F., 878 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Minn. App. 2016) 

(“Interpretation of the expungement statute is a legal question subject to de novo review.” 

(quotation omitted)). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to 

ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). “In 

interpreting statutory language, we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary 

meaning.” J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d at 264. “Our first step in interpreting a statute is to examine 

the text of the statute to determine whether the language is ambiguous.” Id. “When the 

statutory language is clear and free of ambiguity, we enforce the plain language of the 

statute and do not explore its spirit or purpose.” Id.
5 

 Again, the expungement statute provides that “[r]ecords of a conviction of an 

offense for which registration is required under section 243.166 may not be expunged.” 

Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4. We have found no published or unpublished case 

interpreting this statutory language. But we have interpreted nearly identical language from 

the Minnesota sex offender community notification act, Minn. Stat. § 244.052 (1996 & 

Supp. 1997). See In re Risk Level Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn. 

App. 1998) (considering statutory definition of “sex offender,” for purposes of community 

notification, as “a person who has been convicted of an offense for which registration under 

section 243.166 is required” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 1(4) (1996)) (quotation 

marks omitted)). We summarized the interpretive dispute in C.M. as follows: 

Relator contends that the phrase “convicted of an 

offense for which registration * * * is required” in section 

244.052, subdivision 1(4), means that notification applies only 

where the offender is convicted of an offense that 

automatically results in registration because the offense is 

specifically listed in section 243.166. The state argued below 

. . . that the notification statute applies to any offender required 

to register under section 243.166, including those convicted of 

an unlisted offense “arising out of the same set of 

circumstances” as a charged, listed offense. Relator argues that 

if the legislature intended that result, it would simply have 

defined a sex offender as “a person required to register under 

section 243.166.” On appeal, the state argues that the 

legislature inserted the “convicted of an offense” language to 

avoid application of the notification statute to juveniles, who 

are required to register after being “adjudicated delinquent” 

rather than “convicted.” 

Id. at 395. After stating that “both parties’ interpretations are reasonable” and that the 

relevant statutory language “is, therefore, ambiguous in its application to relator,” we 

ultimately concluded: 
6 

[T]he state’s interpretation of section 244.052 to permit 

community notification where an offender is charged with, but 

not convicted of, a sex offense, would result in a violation of 

state and federal guarantees of due process. Accordingly, we 

adopt relator’s alternate construction, the constitutionality of 

which is not challenged before us, under which notification 

applies only to offenders convicted of an offense specifically 

listed in section 243.166, subdivision 1. 

Id. at 395–96, 399. 

 Here M.J.R.D. raises no constitutional argument against the district court’s 

interpretation of the expungement statute. Neither does M.J.R.D. take the equivalent of the 

relator’s interpretive position in C.M. by arguing that the expungement prohibition applies 

only where the petitioner was “convicted of an offense that automatically results in 

registration because the offense is specifically listed in section 243.166” and does not apply 

where, as here, the petitioner was “convicted of an unlisted offense ‘arising out of the same 

set of circumstances’ as a charged, listed offense.” See id. at 395. Instead, M.J.R.D. takes 

something like the state’s interpretive position in C.M., essentially arguing that the 

expungement prohibition applies to “[petitioners] required to register under section 

243.166, including those convicted of an unlisted offense ‘arising out of the same set of 

circumstances’ as a charged, listed offense.” See id. And M.J.R.D. implicitly concedes that 

his misdemeanor assault conviction arose out of the same set of circumstances as his 

fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. Still M.J.R.D. insists that the expungement 

prohibition does not apply to him because “he was never to this date required by anyone to 

register.” 
7 

M.J.R.D. thereby attempts to shift our focus from the relevant question, whether 

section 243.166 designates his offense as one triggering the registration requirement, to a 

different question entirely—namely, whether M.J.R.D. ever was directed to register as a 

predatory offender in connection with his offense. This shift in focus is inconsistent with 

the plain language of the expungement statute, which generally restricts the availability of 

expungement based on the nature of the offense of conviction rather than on the specific 

consequences that may flow from conviction of the offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, 

subd. 4 (“Records of a conviction of an offense for which registration is required under 

section 243.166 may not be expunged.”); see also id., subd. 3 (providing that expungement 

may be available if “petitioner was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a petty 

misdemeanor,” if “petitioner was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a gross 

misdemeanor,” or if “petitioner was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a felony 

violation of [one of 50 enumerated] offense[s]”); cf. State v. S.A.M., 877 N.W.2d 205, 208–

09 (Minn. App. 2016) (concluding that statutory expungement was not available to 

petitioner whose nonenumerated felony conviction ultimately was deemed a misdemeanor 

by operation of law), review granted (Minn. May 31, 2016). 

In sum, even if we accept M.J.R.D.’s assertion that the sentencing court waived his 

duty to register as a predatory offender, any such waiver was a then-authorized 

modification of section 243.166’s registration requirement, which M.J.R.D. implicitly 
8 

concedes was triggered by his offense.2

 The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 

4, prohibits expungement under these circumstances.

Affirmed. 

 

2

 The duty to register as a predatory offender originally was not triggered by conviction of 

“another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances” as an enumerated offense. 

See 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 285, § 3, at 1325–26 (enacting registration statute without quoted 

language or its equivalent). The quoted language was added to the registration statute by 

an amendment with an effective date of August 1, 1993, fewer than 90 days before 

M.J.R.D.’s sentencing date. 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 326, art. 10, § 1, at 2090. The sentencing 

court’s silence on M.J.R.D.’s duty to register, then, may be explained by inadvertent 

omission rather than by intentional waiver.