15-2396 

Diaz v. Sessions 

BIA 

Straus, IJ 

A206 515 518

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

16th 4 day of August, two thousand seventeen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 MIGUEL ANGEL RENE DIAZ CHACON, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-2396 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Jon E. Jessen, Stamford, CT. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal 

26 Assistant Attorney General; Carl 

27 McIntyre, Assistant Director; 

28 Margaret A. O’Donnell, Trial 

29 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

30 Litigation, United States 

31 Department of Justice, Washington, 

32 DC. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Miguel Angel Rene Diaz Chacon (“Diaz”), a native 

6 and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a July 2, 2015 decision 

7 of the BIA affirming a March 13, 2015 decision of an Immigration 

8 Judge (“IJ”) denying Diaz’s application for asylum, withholding 

9 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

10 (“CAT”). In re Miguel Angel Rene Diaz Chacon, No. A206 515 518 

11 (B.I.A. July 2, 2015), aff’g No. A206 515 518 (Immig. Ct. 

12 Hartford Mar. 13, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

13 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for 

15 the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland 

16 Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable 

17 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 

18 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d 

19 Cir. 2009). 

20 An applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal “must 

21 establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

22 particular social group, or political opinion was or will be 

23 at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 
3

1 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 

2 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010) (applying the “one central reason” 

3 standard in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) to withholding of 

4 removal standard in § 1231(b)(3)(A)). A particular social 

5 group must be: “(1) composed of members who share a common 

6 immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and 

7 (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter 

8 of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see also 

9 Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195-98 (2d Cir. 2014). A group 

10 is not defined with particularity unless “terms used to describe 

11 the group have commonly accepted definitions in the society of 

12 which the group is a part,” and the group is “discrete and [has] 

13 definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, 

14 diffuse, or subjective.” Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 

15 214 (B.I.A. 2014), remanded on other grounds by Reyes v. Lynch, 

16 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 

17 I. & N. Dec. at 239 (“A particular social group must be defined 

18 by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for 

19 determining who falls within the group.”). Social distinction 

20 “exists where the relevant society perceives, considers, or 

21 recognizes the group as a distinct social group.” Matter of 

22 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217. “[A]sylum may be granted where 

23 there is more than one motive for mistreatment, as long as at 
4

1 least one central reason for the mistreatment is on account of 

2 a protected ground.” Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d 

3 Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

4 Before the IJ, Diaz argued that he belonged to a particular 

5 social group: the families of government workers, specifically 

6 bus drivers. He alleged that, in 2013, members of a gang (he 

7 suggested the Maras) attacked him and his cousin in a park, but 

8 he conceded that their attackers said nothing about Diaz’s 

9 family or his father’s work as a bus driver. Based on that 

10 testimony, the agency did not err in finding that a protected 

11 ground was not “at least one central reason for the 

12 mistreatment” Diaz suffered. Id.

13 The agency was also on sound footing when it rejected Diaz’s 

14 proposed social group. Diaz’s only evidence of such a group 

15 was his mother’s testimony and a single newspaper article. His 

16 mother testified that, in 2001, she overheard her husband 

17 (Diaz’s father) receive a threatening phone call; that he 

18 subsequently disappeared; and that one of his colleagues was 

19 found dismembered. The 2014 article reported that the police 

20 captured two men who planned to kill a bus driver. The agency 

21 did not err in concluding that this evidence failed to establish 

22 the particularity and social distinction required for a 

23 particular social group. As to particularity, Diaz did not 
5

1 articulate a “clear benchmark for determining who falls within 

2 the group”—e.g., whether if included nuclear families only, or 

3 all family members. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 

4 As to social distinction, “[e]vidence such as country 

5 conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press 

6 accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical 

7 animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and 

8 is perceived as ‘distinct’ . . . in a particular society.” Id. 

9 at 244. But Diaz presented no evidence that Guatemalans view 

10 bus drivers’ families as a coherent group, or that the families 

11 view themselves that way. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 

12 at 217. Moreover, his mother did not describe a threat that 

13 was linked to her husband’s job. Her testimony that his 

14 colleague was later killed did not compel the agency to make 

15 that inferential leap. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 

16 (2d Cir. 2007) (“So long as there is a basis in the evidence 

17 for a challenged inference, we do not question whether a 

18 different inference was available or more likely.”). 

19 Diaz cites cases recognizing that, under certain 

20 circumstances, a family may be a cognizable social group, and 

21 claims that his proposed particular social group consists of 

22 family members of murdered bus drivers. He did not raise that 

23 specific argument before the agency, and we decline to consider 
6

1 it for the first time on this petition for review. Lin Zhong 

2 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir. 2007) 

3 (“Judicially-imposed doctrines of issue exhaustion . . . will 

4 usually mean that issues not raised to the BIA will not be 

5 examined by the reviewing court.”). Regardless, this new 

6 description does not provide the missing evidentiary link 

7 between his father’s 2001 disappearance and Diaz’s 2013 beating 

8 by unidentified individuals. 

9 Diaz also seeks humanitarian asylum. The agency has the 

10 discretion to grant humanitarian asylum “if the alien ‘has 

11 demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable 

12 to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past 

13 persecution,’ . . . even though he does not have a well-founded 

14 fear of future persecution.” Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 

15 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). 

16 Diaz did not exhaust this claim, and so we decline to consider 

17 it. Lin Zhong, 480 F.3d at 123. 

18 Diaz does not challenge the denial of CAT relief. Yueqing 

19 Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). 

20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

22 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

23 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 
7

1 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

2 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

3 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

4 34.1(b). 

5 FOR THE COURT: 

6 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk