UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, 

Respondent.

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) CFTC Docket No. 23-09

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO

SECTION 6(c) AND (d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) has reason to believe that 

from in or about April 2015 to at least September 2016 (“Relevant Period”), Goldman Sachs & 

Co. LLC (“Respondent” or “Goldman”) violated Section 4s(h)(1) of the Commodity Exchange 

Act (“Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1), and Sections 23.431 and 23.433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.431, 23.433, 

of the Commission Regulations (“Regulations”) promulgated thereunder. Therefore, the 

Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative 

proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to determine whether Respondent engaged in the 

violations set forth herein and to determine whether any order should be issued imposing 

remedial sanctions.

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondent has 

submitted an Offer of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept. 

Respondent makes the admissions set forth in Section V(C), and otherwise neither admits nor 

denies the findings of fact and conclusions of law herein. Respondent consents to the entry of 

this Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Section 6(c) and (d) of the Commodity Exchange 

Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (“Order”), and acknowledges service 

of this Order.1

1 Respondent consents to the use of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Order in this proceeding and 

in any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party or claimant, and agrees 

that they shall be taken as true and correct and be given preclusive effect therein, without further proof. Respondent 

does not consent, however, to the use of this Order, or the findings or conclusions herein, as the sole basis for any 

other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party or claimant, other than: a 

proceeding in bankruptcy or receivership; or a proceeding to enforce the terms of this Order. Respondent does not 
2

In accepting Respondent’s offer, the Commission recognizes Respondent’s cooperation 

with the Division of Enforcement’s investigation of this matter.

II. FINDINGS

The Commission finds the following: 

A. SUMMARY

In 2015 and 2016, Goldman failed to satisfy the Commission’s Business Conduct 

Standards when soliciting U.S.-based clients to trade certain equity index swaps. Specifically, in 

dozens of swap transactions, Goldman failed to disclose to clients the pre-trade-mid-marketmark (“PTMMM”) of the swap—often disclosing a PTMMM for a different swap, thereby 

obscuring the value of the transacted swap. Furthermore, Goldman failed to communicate in a 

fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.

During the Relevant Period, Goldman solicited certain clients to enter into an 

unconventional type of equity index swap transaction, called a “same-day” swap. In a “sameday” equity index swap, the equity leg of the swap strikes on the “same day” as the other 

material terms of the swap are agreed upon, rather than—as is typical—the day after the date of 

agreement. Goldman opportunistically solicited or agreed to enter into same-day swaps only on 

days and at times that were financially advantageous to Goldman and disadvantageous to its 

clients. In doing so, Goldman personnel failed to provide the clients with the transparency that 

the regulations require and communicated in a manner that caused the same-day swaps to appear 

more economically advantageous to the client than they actually were. 

In accepting Respondent’s Offer, the Commission recognizes the cooperation of 

Respondent with the Division of Enforcement’s investigation in this matter. 

B. RESPONDENT

Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC is a limited liability company with its main office in New 

York City. It is registered with the Commission as a futures commission merchant and has been 

provisionally registered as a swap dealer since December 2012. 

C. FACTS

1. Market Background 

a. Equity Index Swaps 

In an equity index swap, the parties exchange exposure to an equity index for an interest 

rate for a set period of time, or “term,” of the swap. Party A goes “long” an equity index in 

exchange for paying Party B an interest rate. Party B goes “short” the equity index in exchange 

for receiving the interest rate. If the index is higher at the end of the term of the swap than it was 

 

consent to the use of the Offer or this Order, or the findings or conclusions in this Order, by any other party in any 

other proceeding.
3

at the beginning, Party B pays Party A that difference, multiplied by the number of units in the 

swap contract. If the index declines over that time, Party A pays Party B the difference, 

multiplied by the number of units in the contract. Regardless of market movement, Party A pays 

Party B the interest rate.

The equity index leg of the swap has a “strike” price, sometimes referred to as the “initial 

price.” This is the initial index value against which future index movement will be measured for 

purposes of determining profit and loss on the equity leg over the term of the swap. Importantly, 

equity index swaps traditionally strike on a “T+1” basis. This means that the “strike” price, or 

“initial price,” of the swap equals the index value published the day after the parties agree to the 

trade. This one-day lag ensures that none of the components of the index that will form the 

initial valuation have priced at the time the swap is agreed upon, reducing the likelihood of 

potential information asymmetries regarding the projected index values. 

Bids and offers for equity index swaps are expressed in terms of the interest rate leg—

more specifically, the spread above a benchmark rate (such as 3-month LIBOR) that Party A will 

pay to Party B. The PTMMM—which swap dealers, like Goldman, are required to disclose to 

U.S. counterparties—is also expressed in terms of the interest rate. So, for example, a swap 

dealer might quote an equity index swap as “3mL +68/+72 (PTMMM +70)”—indicating that the 

swap dealer would pay 68 basis points above 3-month LIBOR to go long the index or receive 72 

basis points above 3-month LIBOR to go short the index, and that the PTMMM of the swap is 70 

basis points above 3-month LIBOR. 

b. MSCI EAFE Index and Corresponding Proxy Instruments

Almost all the “same-day” equity index swaps at issue in this matter were swaps tied to 

the MSCI Europe Australasia and Far East (“EAFE”) Index (“EAFE Index Swaps”). The MSCI 

EAFE Index tracks a basket of stocks from Japan, Europe, Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, 

and Australia, among others. The MSCI EAFE Index level (or, index price) is published once 

per day, in the early evening, New York time (“Index Settlement Value”). It is calculated by 

MSCI, using a formula based on the closing prices of the index’s component stocks. The foreign 

exchanges on which the component stocks trade, however, close hours before New York 

exchanges do—some before the New York trading day even begins. In other words, most of the 

component prices used to calculate the Index Settlement Value are stale—at least several hours 

old—by the time the Index Settlement Value gets published in New York.

Though most of the component stocks in the EAFE Index trade on exchanges that close 

well before the New York markets do, there are other “proxy” instruments that generally track 

the market value of the components of the EAFE index and trade throughout the New York 

trading day. For example, there is an exchange traded fund (“ETF”) that tracks the MSCI EAFE 

Index. It trades on the NYSE throughout the New York trading day and reflects the market’s 

view of the real-time value of the basket of stocks in the corresponding index—despite the fact 

that the markets in which the underlying stocks trade may be closed. There are also futures 

contracts on the EAFE Index that trade during U.S. market hours.

The result is twofold: (1) since most of the markets in which the underlying equities 

traded closed hours before the Index Settlement Value was published, sophisticated parties with 
4

the wherewithal and resources to access relevant market data could know—or have a very good 

approximation of—what the daily Index Settlement Value would be hours before that 

publication; and (2) during the New York trading day, the real-time market value of the 

components of the index, as reflected in proxy instruments like the EAFE ETF, can—and did—

diverge from the projected Index Settlement Value. For example, during the New York trading 

day, the ETF and other proxies could be trading above (at a “premium” to) the projected Index 

Settlement Value. Or, the ETF and other proxies could be trading below (at a “discount” to) the 

projected Index Settlement Value.2

2. Goldman Solicits Clients to Enter “Same-Day” EAFE Equity Index Swaps 

Goldman traders saw an opportunity in these premium/discount scenarios. On days and 

at times where the EAFE proxies were trading at a premium to the projected Index Settlement 

Value, if Goldman could get a client to sell it an EAFE Index swap that struck the “same-day”—

as opposed to the normal, “T+1” strike—Goldman could sell the EAFE proxies at the higher, 

premium price and buy exposure to the EAFE Index from the client (synthetically through the 

swap) at the lower Index Settlement Value published at the end of the day, profiting from the 

difference. Conversely, on days and at times where the EAFE proxies were trading at a discount 

to the projected Index Settlement Value, if Goldman could get a client to buy an EAFE Index 

swap that struck the “same-day,” Goldman could buy the EAFE proxies at the lower, discount 

price and sell exposure to the EAFE Index to the client (synthetically through the swap) at the 

higher Index Settlement Value published at the end of the day, profiting from the difference. 

Put simply, through a “same-day” swap trade, Goldman could go long the index at a 

below-market level or go short the index at an above-market level. This was more or less a zerosum game, however. Indeed, any client taking the other side of the trade would be buying the 

index at an above-market level or selling the index at a below-market level. In other words, 

under these circumstances, the client would start the equity leg of the swap underwater. 

a. Goldman Failed to Disclose a PTMMM for Same-Day Swaps 

In soliciting and quoting prices on “same-day” swaps with clients, however, Goldman 

failed to meet its disclosure obligations and obscured the cost of such swaps to the clients. As a 

threshold matter, Goldman did not disclose a PTMMM for the “same-day” swaps, depriving its 

clients of transparency into the relative value of the swap Goldman was offering them. Instead, 

in pre-trade communications regarding “same-day” swaps, Goldman often disclosed the 

PTMMM for the “T+1” swap, which, as explained below, caused Goldman’s bids and offers to 

appear more attractive than they actually were.

Importantly, a PTMMM of the “same-day” swap, had it been disclosed, would have been 

different than the T+1 PTMMM. Specifically, when the proxy instruments are trading at a 

premium or discount to the projected Index Settlement Value, any PTMMM for the “same-day” 

 

2

 Goldman also traded “same-day” equity index swaps tied to the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. 

Many of the components stocks of this index also trade on exchanges that close many hours before the index is 

published. Like the EAFE Index, there are also proxy instruments such as ETFs and futures contracts that reflect the 

market’s view of the real-time value of the basket of stocks in the Emerging Market Index and may diverge from the 

projected Index Settlement Value during the New York trading day.
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swap would (or should) have accounted for the disadvantage at which the client would start the 

equity leg. For example, where proxy instruments are trading at a premium to the projected 

Index Settlement Value and transacting “same-day” would thereby entail the client selling the 

index to Goldman at a below-market level, the PTMMM (i.e., the mid-market interest rate that 

the seller should receive) for the “same-day” swap should be higher than the PTMMM for the 

analogous “T+1” swap—theoretically, an amount above the analogous T+1 level that would 

adequately compensate the client for the below-market rate at which it would be selling the 

Index to Goldman. 

b. Goldman Failed to Communicate in a Fair and Balanced Manner and in 

Good Faith 

By disclosing a PTMMM for a T+1 swap, rather than the same-day swap, Goldman gave 

clients the impression they were getting advantageous pricing when, in fact, they were not. For 

example, on January 21, 2016, Goldman told a client that Goldman could “bid” for a nine-month 

EAFE Index Swap. Specifically, Goldman said: “normal T[+]1 is 3mL+55 bid (+60 mid). for 

today's strike can show 3mL+91.” By bidding the same-day swap at a rate that appeared to be 31 

basis points over the PTMMM for the T+1 swap, Goldman gave the client the impression that 

the same-day swap was a better deal for the client than the T+1 swap. It was not. Indeed, at the 

time, the EAFE index proxies were trading at a premium to the projected Index Settlement 

Value—meaning that the client would be selling the equity leg to Goldman at a below-market 

rate. Although Goldman offered the client a higher interest rate than the client would have 

received by trading a T+1 swap, Goldman’s higher same-day interest rate did not adequately 

compensate the client for the disadvantage on the equity leg. 

This was typical of the same-day swap transactions Goldman entered with clients. As 

noted above, Goldman would only solicit or agree to a “same-day” swap when the client would 

be buying or selling the equity leg underwater and Goldman, conversely, would be selling or 

buying the equity leg at a level it could immediately cash in for a profit through the index proxy 

instruments. Yet, the “preferential” interest rates that Goldman offered clients to entice them to 

transact same-day did not fully compensate the clients for the disadvantage at which the client 

would start the equity leg. Indeed, on many occasions, the value of the net interest rate benefit to 

the client paled in comparison to the value of Goldman’s advantage of the equity leg. 

As a result, “same-day” swaps were particularly lucrative for Goldman. For example, on 

August 25, 2015, Goldman offered to enter a same-day swap with a client at an interest rate that, 

according to internal communications, was 15 basis points above what the client would have 

received in an analogous “T+1” swap. The client agreed to transact “same-day” at this 

seemingly preferential rate. The strike price the client received on the equity leg, however, was 

at least 60 basis points below market at or around the time of the agreement. As a result, 

Goldman traders estimated that they had earned a $1,620,000 profit that day on this swap and the 

corresponding index proxy trades alone.3

 The client, for its part, thought it was getting a good 

deal; it did not understand why Goldman was offering the high interest rate. 

 

3

 By way of another example, the same-day swaps and corresponding index proxy trades that Goldman 

entered on October 5, 2015, netted an estimated profit that day of approximately $1,200,000. On several other 
6

To be sure, the market prices of the index underliers, as well as projections of the end-ofday Index Settlement Value based on then-prevailing market prices of underliers (or, for 

underliers that had closed for the day, the closing prices), as well as the pricing of the index 

proxy instruments are publicly available. Parties with the resources and wherewithal to do so 

could, like Goldman, see when the proxy instruments were trading at a premium or a discount to 

the projected Index Settlement Value and, therefore, whether the projected Index Settlement 

Value was above or below the real-time market value of the components of the Index. 

Goldman’s clients, however—particularly, the ones to whom Goldman repeatedly returned to 

execute “same-day” swaps—rarely demonstrated such sophistication and often appeared to 

believe they were receiving an advantageous interest rate, with no strings attached. 

Goldman’s efforts to induce clients that did not demonstrate such sophistication to enter 

same-day swaps went beyond simply communicating bids and offers that, on their face, appeared 

preferential. In a June 24, 2016, communication to one particular client, a Goldman personnel 

stated: “we’re bidding wayyy above our PTMMMs today”—indicating that Goldman was 

offering the client great deal. When the client responded with interest, Goldman quoted a bid 

that appeared to be 34 basis points over the PTMMM. This was not actually the case. Rather, 

any marginal benefit Goldman offered on the interest rate leg would be more than outweighed by 

the cost to the client on the equity leg when transacting “same-day.” That information was not 

disclosed. 

On another occasion, in January 2016, Goldman personnel asked a client: “any interest in 

[EAFE swaps]? We have an axe if you’re looking to put on more short exposure.” When the 

client, who had never traded “same-day” before responded with interest to sell $90 million 

notional, the Goldman salesperson quoted: 

For Tomorrow’s strike: 3mL+50 bid (PTMM +53) 

for TODAY’s strike: 3mL+100

When the client responded with interest in the T+1 strike, the Goldman salesperson replied: 

“tomorrow’s strike? You’re not interested in today’s at the much better level?”—explicitly 

suggesting that the client would be better off trading same-day. Yet, the salesperson failed to 

disclose the disadvantage—that the client’s equity leg would start underwater, at a below-market 

strike price. 

Additional communications by Goldman’s trading and sales personnel reflect their efforts 

to emphasize the benefits to the client on the interest rate leg, without disclosing the client’s 

disadvantage on the equity leg. Furthermore, communications show that Goldman personnel 

believed that the less the clients understood about the economics of the same-day swaps, the 

more profit Goldman could make. As a Goldman trader told a Goldman salesperson, disclosing 

more detail about same-day swaps “makes it easier for them to squeeze us; we usually just say 

we have an axe.”

 

occasions, Goldman’s estimated profit that day on same-day swaps and the corresponding index proxy trades was in 

the mid or high-six figures, at least. 
7

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Violations of Commission Regulation 23.431 and 7 U.S.C. 6s(h)(1): Failure to 

Disclose All Material Information, Including the Pre-Trade-Mid-Market Mark

Section 4s(h)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1), and Regulation 23.431, 17 C.F.R. § 23.431, require 

swap dealers to disclose to certain counterparties (1) information about the material 

characteristics of the swap, (2) the swap dealer’s material incentives and conflicts of interest 

related to the swap, and (3) a daily mark of each uncleared swap transaction. The Regulation 

additionally requires, as part of the disclosure of material incentives and conflicts of interest, 

disclosure of a PTMMM. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431. These disclosure rules “are intended to level the 

information playing field . . . to enable counterparties to make their own informed decisions 

about the appropriateness of entering into the swap.” Business Conduct Standards for Swap 

Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9759 (February 

17, 2012). The PTMMM should represent “an objective value,” providing counterparties with “a 

baseline to assess swap valuations . . . .” Id. at 9768. 

As described above, in connection with dozens of same-day swap transactions with U.S.-

based clients, Goldman failed to disclose the PTMMM. In connection with many of these sameday swap transactions, Goldman disclosed a PTMMM for the wrong swap. Indeed, Goldman 

disclosed a PTMMM for the analogous “T+1” swap, not for the “same-day” swap that had been 

transacted—sometimes making it appear that the PTMMM for the T+1 swap applied to the 

same-day swap when, in fact, it did not. This conduct violated Section 4s(h)(1) of the Act and 

Regulation 23.431. 

B. Violations of Commission Regulation 23.433 and 7 U.S.C. 6s(h)(1): Failure to 

Communicate in Good Faith and in a Fair and Balanced Manner

Section 4s(h)(1) and Regulation 23.433 require swap dealers to communicate with 

counterparties in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith. 

The rule “supplement[s] requirements to inform counterparties of material incentives and 

conflicts of interest that would tend to be adverse to the interests of the counterparty,” see 77 

Fed. Reg. 9770, and highlights the importance of “complete” disclosures, id. As described 

above, Goldman opportunistically solicited and entered same-day swap transactions on days and 

at times that were advantageous to Goldman and disadvantageous to its clients. In doing so, not 

only did Goldman fail to provide clients the minimum level of transparency the Regulations 

require; communications by its sales and trading personnel caused these transactions to appear 

economically favorable to the client, when they were not. By touting the supposed benefits of 

same-day swap transactions but not the corresponding costs, Goldman failed to communicate in 

a fair and balanced manner. Moreover, Goldman understood that the lucrative nature of the 

same-day swaps for Goldman depended on this informational imbalance. Under these 

circumstances, Goldman’s communications were not fair and balanced and reflected a lack of 

good faith. This conduct violated Section 4s(h)(1) of the Act and Regulation 23.433. 
8

IV. FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that, during the Relevant Period, Goldman

violated Section 4s(h)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1), and Regulations 23.431 and 23.433, 17 C.F.R. 

§§ 23.431, 23.433. 

V. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT

Respondent has submitted the Offer in which it: 

A. Acknowledges service of this Order; 

B. Admits the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to all matters set forth in this 

Order and for any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based 

on violation of or enforcement of this Order; 

C. Admits that for nearly all “same-day” swaps executed in 2015 and 2016,4 it either failed 

to disclose any PTMMM or failed to disclose an accurate PTMMM, and that this conduct 

violated Regulation 23.431; 

D. Otherwise neither admits nor denies the findings and conclusions set forth herein; 

E. Waives: 

1. The filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing; 

2. A hearing;

3. All post-hearing procedures;

4. Judicial review by any court;

5. Any and all objections to the participation by any member of the Commission’s 

staff in the Commission’s consideration of the Offer;

6. Any and all claims that it may possess under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 

U.S.C. § 504, and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and/or the rules promulgated by the 

Commission in conformity therewith, Part 148 of the Regulations, 17 C.F.R. 

pt. 148 (2022), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding; 

7. Any and all claims that it may possess under the Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, §§ 201–253, 110 

Stat. 847, 857–74 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and in scattered 

sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding; 

and

 

4 The “same-day” swaps at issue in this matter were swaps tied to (i) the MSCI Europe Australasia and Far East 

(“EAFE”) Index or (ii) the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.
9

8. Any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding or the 

entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any 

other relief, including this Order; 

F. Stipulates that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely of the 

findings contained in this Order to which Respondent has consented in the Offer; and 

G. Consents, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission’s entry of this Order that: 

1. Makes findings by the Commission that Respondent violated Section 4s(h)(1), 

7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1), and Regulations 23.431 and 23.433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.431, 

23.433; 

2. Orders Respondent to cease and desist from violating Section 4s(h)(1), 7 U.S.C. 

§ 6s(h)(1), and Regulations 23.431 and 23.433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.431, 23.433; 

3. Orders Respondent to pay a civil monetary penalty in the amount of fifteen million 

dollars ($15,000,000), plus any post-judgment interest; and

4. Orders Respondent and its successors and assigns to comply with the conditions 

and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set forth in Part VI of this Order.

Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer. 

VI. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

A. Respondent shall cease and desist from violating Section 4s(h)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1), 

and Regulations 23.431 and 23.433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.431, 23.433. 

B. Respondent shall pay a civil monetary penalty in the amount of fifteen million dollars 

($15,000,000) within 10 business days of the date of the entry of this Order (“CMP 

Obligation”). If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full within 10 business days of the 

date of entry of this Order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue on the unpaid portion 

of the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be 

determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this Order 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

Respondent shall pay the CMP Obligation and any post-judgment interest by electronic 

funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check, or bank 

money order. If payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the 

payment shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent 

to the address below:

MMAC/ESC/AMK326

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 
10

HQ Room 266 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

9-amz-ar-cftc@faa.gov

 If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondent shall contact Tonia 

King or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall fully 

comply with those instructions. Respondent shall accompany payment of the CMP 

Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the paying Respondent and the name and 

docket number of this proceeding. The paying Respondent shall simultaneously transmit 

copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, 

Washington, D.C. 20581, and to Manal Sultan, Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission, 290 Broadway, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10007. 

C. Respondent and its successors and assigns shall comply with the following conditions 

and undertakings set forth in the Offer: 

1. Public Statements: Respondent agrees that neither it nor any of its successors and 

assigns, agents or employees under its authority or control shall take any action or 

make any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or 

conclusions in this Order or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this 

Order is without a factual basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision 

shall affect Respondent’s: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal 

positions in other proceedings to which the Commission is not a party. 

Respondent and its successors and assigns shall comply with this agreement, and 

shall undertake all steps necessary to ensure that all of its agents and/or 

employees under its authority or control understand and comply with this 

agreement. 

2. Partial Satisfaction: Respondent understands and agrees that any acceptance by 

the Commission of any partial payment of Respondent’s CMP Obligation shall 

not be deemed a waiver of its obligation to make further payments pursuant to this 

Order, or a waiver of the Commission’s right to seek to compel payment of any 

remaining balance.

3. Change of Address/Phone: Until such time as Respondent satisfies in full its 

CMP Obligation as set forth in this Order, Respondent shall provide written 

notice to the Commission by certified mail of any change to its telephone number 

and mailing address within ten calendar days of the change.

4. Until such time as Respondent satisfies in full its CMP Obligation, upon the 

commencement by or against Respondent of insolvency, receivership or 

bankruptcy proceedings or any other proceedings for the settlement of 

Respondent’s debts, all notices to creditors required to be furnished to the 

Commission under Title 11 of the United States Code or other applicable law with 

respect to such insolvency, receivership bankruptcy or other proceedings, shall be 

sent to the address below: 
11

Secretary of the Commission

Office of the General Counsel

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Three Lafayette Centre 

1155 21st Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20581 

The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date.

By the Commission.

_________________________________ 

Robert N. Sidman 

Deputy Secretary of the Commission

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Dated: April 10, 2023