J-S36031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

IN RE: E.C. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: N.C. No. 2172 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree November 17, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2014-1720

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 17, 2016

N.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated and entered November 

17, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County by the 

Honorable Jay J. Hoberg, granting the petition filed by Lancaster Children 

and Youth Service Agency (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to the minor, male child, E.C. (born in December of 2012) 

(“Child”), pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (6), and (8) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (6), and (8) and (b).1 We 

affirm. 

The trial court has set forth the relevant history of this case in its

Opinion. See Trial Court Memorandum Opinion, 11/17/15, at 2-9. We 

adopt the trial court’s recitation for purposes of this appeal. See id. On 

August 21, 2014, CYS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 

 

1 On December 15, 2015, the trial court terminated V.B.-F.’s (“Father”) 

parental rights to Child. Father is not a party to this appeal, nor did he file a 

separate appeal. 
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Mother to Child. On October 7, 2014 and August 11, 2015, the trial court 

held hearings on that petition. At the hearings, Robert Pratt, a CYS 

supervisor, Suzanne Ail, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist; Angela Sypolt, CYS 

caseworker; Franziska Sexton, Mother’s life coach; and Mother testified. On 

November 17, 2015, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to 

Child.

On December 15, 2015, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along 

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Was the decision of the trial court based on insufficient 

evidence?

2. Was the decision of the trial court against the weight of the 

evidence?

Mother’s Brief, at 4.

In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 

608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 

[614 Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality 

opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does 

not result merely because the reviewing court might have 
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reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett 

v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 

51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 

838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
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This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Accordingly, for the purpose of our review, we will focus on the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8). The relevant statutory provisions state, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—[...] With respect to any 

petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

When considering a termination petition, the trial court must initially 

focus on the conduct of the parent and determine whether statutory grounds 

for termination under Section 2511(a) are met. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 
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901 A.2d at 508. Subsection (a)(8) requires clear and convincing proof “(1) 

that the child has been removed from the care of the parent for at least 

twelve (12) months; (2) that the conditions which had led to the removal or 

placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 511. In a 

Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, the focus is solely on whether the conditions 

which led to the child’s initial placement continue to exist. “Termination 

under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s 

current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused 

placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency services.” In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted). This Court has 

explained:

We recognize that the application of Section (a)(8) may 

seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress 

toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of 

her children. ... However, by allowing for termination when 

the conditions that led to removal of a child continue to 

exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a 

child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent 

attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the 

future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that 

contemplates only a short period of time, to wit eighteen 

(18) months, in which to complete the process of either 

reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed in 

foster care. 

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513 (emphasis in original) (citations 

omitted). “A parent is required to exert a sincere and genuine effort to 
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maintain a parent-child relationship; the parent must use all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship.” In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa.Super. 2003) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

Furthermore, “we are instructed that we may not consider any effort 

by the parent to remedy the conditions described in subsection[](a)(8) if 

that remedy was initiated after the parent was given notice that the 

termination petition had been filed.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citation 

omitted); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Further, this evidentiary limitation 

applies to the entire termination analysis. Id. The court, however, may 

consider post-petition efforts if the efforts were initiated before the filing of 

the termination petition and continued after the petition date. Id.

In her appellate brief and Rule 1925(b) statement, Mother first argues 

the decision of the trial court was based on insufficient evidence. Id. at 4. 

Mother also avers that the decision of trial court was against the weight of 

the evidence. Id. While Mother does not state with specificity her issues of 

appeal in her Rule 1925(b) statement and in her brief, we do not deem the 

issues waived, and we review the issues in Mother’s brief challenging the 

termination of parental rights. See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 

1058 (Pa. 2007). 
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After careful review of the record, including the notes of testimony 

from the October 7, 2014 and August 11, 2015 hearings, the parties’ briefs, 

and the well-reasoned decision of the Honorable Jay J. Hoberg, we affirm on 

the basis of the trial court’s decision. See Trial Court Memorandum Opinion, 

11/17/15, at 11-19 (holding Child has been removed from Mother’s custody 

for thirty-two months; the conditions which led to the removal still exist 

including Mother’s instability, mental health issues, and relationship with 

Father; CYS presented credible evidence regarding the needs, welfare and 

best interests of Child; Child’s resource family meets Child’s developmental 

and emotional needs; and Child has stability and permanency in his resource 

home). Accordingly, having perceived no abuse of discretion, we affirm the 

trial court’s decree. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/2016