alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2009073EN.01004101.xml

| 19.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 73/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 73/41

---

DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE

No 7/2009

of 5 February 2009

amending Annex II (Technical regulations, standards, testing and certification) to the EEA Agreement

THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, as amended by the Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the European Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Agreement’, and in particular Article 98 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Annex II to the Agreement was amended by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 49/2008 of 25 April 2008 (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Annex II to the Agreement was amended by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 49/2008 of 25 April 2008 (1).

| (2) | Commission Directive 2007/67/EC of 22 November 2007 amending Council Directive 76/768/EEC, concerning cosmetic products, for the purpose of adapting Annex III thereto to technical progress (2) is to be incorporated into the Agreement, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Commission Directive 2007/67/EC of 22 November 2007 amending Council Directive 76/768/EEC, concerning cosmetic products, for the purpose of adapting Annex III thereto to technical progress (2) is to be incorporated into the Agreement,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The following indent shall be added in point 1 (Council Directive 76/768/EEC) of Chapter XVI of Annex II to the Agreement:

| ‘— | 32007 L 0067: Commission Directive 2007/67/EC of 22 November 2007 (OJ L 305, 23.11.2007, p. 22).’ |
| --- | --- |

‘—

32007 L 0067: Commission Directive 2007/67/EC of 22 November 2007 (OJ L 305, 23.11.2007, p. 22).’

Article 2

The text of Directive 2007/67/EC in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages, to be published in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, shall be authentic.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on 6 February 2009, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the Agreement have been made to the EEA Joint Committee (*1).

Article 4

This Decision shall be published in the EEA Section of, and in the EEA Supplement to, the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 5 February 2009.

For the EEA Joint Committee

The President

Alan SEATTER

---

(1)  
  OJ L 223, 21.8.2008, p. 45.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 305, 23.11.2007, p. 22.

2

(*1)  No constitutional requirements indicated.

*1

---
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**428 CA 15-01458** 
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND NEMOYER, JJ.

MICHAEL JABCZYNSKI AND BRENDA JABCZYNSKI, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ADVANCED DRYING AND RESTORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT.

MCCABE, COLLINS, MCGEOUGH, FOWLER, LEVINE & NOGAN, LLP, BUFFALO (TAMARA HARBOLD OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

PETER D. CLARK, FREDONIA, FOR PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Deborah A. Chimes, J.), entered November 19, 2014. The order granted plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the jury verdict, directed judgment as a matter of law that a contract existed between plaintiff Michael Jabczynski and defendant Advanced Drying and Restoration, and granted plaintiffs a new trial on the issues of breach of contract, proximate cause and damages.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this breach of contract action, Advanced Drying and Restoration (defendant) appeals from an order granting plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the jury verdict, directing judgment as a matter of law on the issue that a contract existed between defendant and plaintiff Michael Jabczynski, and ordering a new trial on the issues of breach, proximate cause, and damages. We affirm.

“[W]hile the existence of a contract is a question of fact, the question of whether a certain or undisputed state of facts establishes a contract is one of law for the courts” ( Resetarits Constr. Corp. v Elizabeth Pierce Olmsted, M.D. Center for the Visually Impaired [appeal No. 2], 118 AD3d 1454, 1455 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is well settled that a motion to set aside a verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence invokes the court’s discretion’ . . . , and ‘that discretion is at its broadest [where, as here,] it appears that the unsuccessful litigant’s evidentiary position was particularly strong compared to that of the victor’ ” ( Pellegrino v Youll , 37 AD3d 1064, 1064; see CPLR 4404 [a]).**-2- 428 CA 15-01458** 

Contrary to defendant’s contention, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the verdict inasmuch as the evidence adduced at trial, including the signed agreement between the parties, established as a matter of law the existence of an enforceable contract ( see generally Resetarits Constr. Corp. , 118 AD3d at 1455).

Entered: May 6, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS OF THE MID-ATLANTIC, INC., petitioner, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.

No. 17-1506.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 11, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern District denied.
#### LAUGHLIN v. BENNETT, Director, U. S, Bureau of Prisons.

No. 8730.

United States Court of Appeals District Of Columbia.

Argued Dee. 12, 1944.

Decided Feb. 12, 1945.

Mr. James J. Laughlin, of Washington, D. C., appellant, pro se.

Mr. Charles B. Murray, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Edward M. Curran, United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.

PER CURTAM.

Appellant, an attorney, applied to appellee, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, for permission to visit a client in the federal prison at Ailanta, Georgia. Appellee thought appellant’s reasons insufficient and refused permission. The District Court granted appellant a preliminary injunction which restrained appellee from “interfering with the right of plaintiff to visit his client.” Appellant then visited his client and had a conversation with him in the presence and hearing of officials. Because the officials did not permit a' private conversation appellant moved that appellee be adjudged in contempt. The District Court dismissed both the motion and the complaint. This appeal is from that order.

The order is clearly correct. Since appellant was allowed to visit his client there was no contempt. We need not decide whether any right of appellant or his client has been infringed. If so, it was infringed by officials in Georgia. We need not decide whether, because of appellee’s presence in the District of Columbia and his control over the warden in Atlanta, courts here have jurisdiction over rights of attorneys and clients there. Since such matters can be dealt with more conveniently where the prisoner is confined and where any conference with his attorney will take place, a complaint like the present one should seldom if ever be entertained elsewhere. In other words the jurisdiction, if it exists, should not be exercised elsewhere unless in extraordinary circumstances. Cf. Laughlin v. Cummings, 70 App.D.C. 192, 105 F.2d 71; Sanders v. Allen, 69 App. D.C. 307, 100 F.2d 717.

Affirmed.
xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?


L\_2006053EN.01006503.xml


| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 23.2.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 53/65 |

---

Corrigendum to Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 92/2005 of 8 July 2005 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) to the EEA Agreement

(
[Official Journal of the European Union L 306 of 24 November 2005](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2005_306_R_TOC)
)

On page 12, in the Annex, first line of point 3:

for:

| | |
| --- | --- |
| ‘3. | The following points shall be inserted after point 121 ...’, |

read:

| | |
| --- | --- |
| ‘3. | The following points shall be inserted after point 120 ...’. |

---
Russell K. HARDEN, petitioner, v. MARYLAND.

No. 17-8357.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 4, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland denied.
Exhibit 31.b

I, Marc N. Teal, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Boston Capital Tax Credit Fund II Limited Partnership (the "Partnership");
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



1. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
2. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
3. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and





1. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



1. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
2. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.



|Date:  August 20, 2007 | /s/ Marc N. Teal                     
|---------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                       | Marc N. Teal, Chief
Financial Officer



69
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In connection with the Annual Report of RPM Advantage Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2007
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, David R. Presler, Secretary, Treasurer and Chief
Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: July 15, 2011




/s/ DAVID R. PRESSLER





David R. Pressler
Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF AMERICAN MEDIA OPERATIONS, INC. FOR THE FISCAL QUARTER
ENDED SEPTEMBER 27, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-27-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-27-1999
<CASH>                                           8,108
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,809
<ALLOWANCES>                                       469
<INVENTORY>                                      8,119
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                36,715
<PP&E>                                          25,755
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,658
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,038,901
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           77,162
<BONDS>                                        590,874
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             2
<OTHER-SE>                                     208,459
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,038,901
<SALES>                                        140,565
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               140,565
<CGS>                                          116,779
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  116,779
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    51
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              28,172
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (4,335)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,317
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (6,652)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 (2,581)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (9,233)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
Release:#3981-96

For Release:December 13, 1996

### CFTC Appeals Frankwell Bullion Ltd., Et. Al.
    Decision

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission today filed a petition
    requesting the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to rehear
    an October 29 decision by a panel of the Court dismissing, for lack of
    jurisdiction, a Commission injunctive action against Frankwell Bullion,
    Ltd. and four related firms. CFTC v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd., et al.,
    Nos. 95-16977, 17298 (9th Cir.). The Commission's complaint alleged that
    the defendants were violating Section 4(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
    U.S.C. 6(a), by engaging in the offer and sale of foreign currency futures
    contracts to the general public, when these contracts were not traded on or
    subject to the rules of a board of trade designated by the Commission as a
    contract market.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
    dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for Frankwell based on
    its conclusion that the so-called "Treasury Amendment," 7 U.S.C.
    2(a)(1)(A)(ii), excludes from Commission jurisdiction all foreign currency
    futures not traded on a "formally organized exchange." The panel's decision
    affirmed the district court's opinion.

In its petition, the Commission argues that the panel's decision
    profoundly impacts the CFTC's law enforcement authority by stripping it of
    power to protect the general public from fraud and abuse in the offer and
    sale of off-exchange foreign currency futures contracts. The Commission
    also argues that the panel's decision ignores the intent of Congress that
    transactions by the public in foreign currency futures be provided the same
    regulatory protections afforded customers in other futures markets. The
    Commission's petition also informs the Court that the decision creates for
    the first time a regulatory gap in which no federal agency is empowered to
    protect the public from fraud and abuses in the offer and sale of foreign
    currency futures.

According to Daniel R. Waldman, the CFTC's General Counsel, "fraud in
    the offer and sale of off-exchange futures contracts on foreign currencies
    is a growing problem in this country. We view the panel's decision as a
    setback in our fight to protect the public from unscrupulous bucket shop
    and boiler room operators selling foreign currency futures to the
    public."

Action on the Commission's petition is expected this winter. The United
    States Supreme Court is already considering a similar issue on the
    interpretation of the Treasury Amendment in CFTC v. Dunn, No.
    95-1181. A decision on Dunn is expected by the Spring of 1997.

---
In re Lockett, Minors 

Docket No. 344409 

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan 

ORDER 

LC No. 17-000151-NA 

Christopher M. Murray 

Presiding Judge 

Cynthia Diane Stephens 

Michael J. Riordan 

Judges 

The Court orders that the February 12, 2019 opm10n 1s hereby VACATED, and 

a new opinion is attached. 

A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr., Chief Clerk, on 

f EB 1 9 2019 

Date
Kenneth WILLIAMS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7953.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 2, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6626

JELANI HUSANI SIMBA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WILLIE J. THOMPSON; HENRY HOLIDAY; DAVIDA

GREEN; M. T. THORNSBY; S. H. HUBBARD; MICHAEL

EDWARDS; R. H. HAMM; V. T. TAYLOR,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (CA-99-433-5-F)

Submitted: August 29, 2003 Decided: June 9, 2004

Before WILKINSON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jelani Husani Simba, Appellant Pro Se. Jonathan A. Berkelhammer,

Virginia Anne Bain, SMITH MOORE, L.L.P., Greensboro, North

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jelani Husani Simba appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

for the reasons stated by the district court. See Simba v.

Thompson, No. CA-99-433-5-F (E.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2002). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00461-CV

Zackery Phillips, Appellant

v.

Branch Banking and Trust Company, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

NO. 10-1637-CC4, HONORABLE JOHN MCMASTER, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In this forcible-detainer action, appelleeBranchBanking andTrust Companyhas filed

a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. Branch Banking and Trust Company states that appellant

Zackery Phillips failed to supersede the judgment, a writ of possession was issued, Phillips

voluntarilyvacated the subject property, and Branch Banking and Trust Companyhas had possession

of the property since March 2, 2012. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007 (West Supp. 2012).

Branch Banking and Trust Company also certifies that the motion to dismiss is

unopposed. See Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006)

(appeal from forcible-detainer judgment when the defendant is no longer in possession of the

premises is moot unless the defendant asserts a “potentially meritorious claim of right to current,
actual possession”);Wilhelmv.FannieMae, 349 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2011, no pet.) (same). Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal as moot.1

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Rose and Goodwin

Dismissed as Moot

Filed: September 20, 2012

Also pending before this Court is appellee’s motion for extension of time to file response 1

brief. We also dismiss this motion as moot.

2
Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General, petitioner, v. Wilson Emilio Peguero MATEO.

No. 17-1235.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 11, 2018.

Motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.