### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 11 -C R

______________________________ CAREY DONYEL LSHI EL DS, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 54th J udicial District Court

McL ennan County , Texas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 20 07 -3 2- C2

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyThis case having been tr ansfe rre d to the Six t h C o u rt of Appe als pursuant to the doc ket 1 e qu a lizatio n p ro g ra

m. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . §§ 22.01(a) (2), 22.02( a)( 2) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007) (a ssault by 2 int e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

thr e a te nin g ano the r wi th imm ine nt bo dil y inj ur y , a nd a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult for use or exhibit ion of dea dly wea pon during assault, re spectively ). 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON A M c L e nn an Co un ty jur

y c on vic te d Ca

re y Do ny e ll Sh ie lds of

a g gr a v a t e d a s s a u l t , t hre a t w ith 1 a dea dly wea pon, in pointing a ha

ndg un at Tar

rah Williams. S h i el d s ra i s es t wo points of err or: 2 (1) a buse of discr etion in the trial court' s sua sponte supplemental charg e to t he alr eady -deliber ating jury ; and (2) f

undamental e rror

in severa l of the State' s voir dire c omments. F acts The primar

y contest ed i s sue at trial wa s whether Shields point ed the gun at Will iams and, if so, whether

that was intentional or a ccide ntal. On the day of the incide nt, Sh i el d s was driving Wil liams' boy friend' s car while the boy friend was in ja il. After Wil liams c onfronted Shields, S hields dr ov e a t Will iams, c a me to a qu ick sto p, jum pe d o ut o f t

he c a r, and pu lle d o ut a

g un . Wil liams testified Shields "pointed it at me" and " pulled the thing ba ck." Shields then laid the g un on the roof of the c ar. O n cross-e x amination, Wil liams admitted she did not indicate in her w ritten statement

ma de a t th e sc e ne that Sh ie lds ha d p oin te d th e g un a t he r, bu t a sse rt e d th a t sh e ha d to ld t his fa c t to the offic er at the scene

.Shields doe s not appea l the admission of the evidenc e and c oncede s that at least some of the 3 drug evidenc e is rele vant as re s g estae

. 3 Extraneous-O

ffense Evide nce Offic er H eath My

nar te stified to finding pla stic bag g ies consistent with dr ug packa g ing a

nd

c ra c k c oc a ine on

Shi e lds . M y

na r b e lie ve d Sh ie lds wa s und e r the inf lue nc e of na

rc oti c s at the tim e he wa s arr ested. My

nar state d that Shields rambled, sweated, was "geeking " ( coming down off a high) , told My

nar " stuff . . . y ou don' t te ll a n office r," and inexplicably stay ed at the sc ene w ith the g un for ab out thirty

minutes until office rs ar rived. My

nar te stified that Shields also volunteered

sever al times that he wa s under the inf luence and had be en doing cra ck all nigh t

. My nar te stified that Shields "told me sever al times he' s a dope deale r and he neede d to be off the streets" and that dope dea lers with g uns are g oing to wind up shooting kids. A chemist for the Texas D epar tment of Public Saf

ety (DPS) testified that the plastic ba g g ies found on Shields contained .64 g rams of c rac k coca ine. Limit ing In struct ion On Shields' motion in limine to exclude evidenc e of the crack c ocaine and the a rre st for that drug possession, t h e co u rt ru l ed that the evidence was a dmissibl e as " part of the res g estae ." T he

e vid e nc e of

Shi e lds ' dr

ug po sse ssi on , o f h is b e ingun de r t he inf lue nc e a t th e scen e, and of his statements re g ardingbeing a drug deale r wer e all admitted into e vidence without further obje ction fr om S hie lds

. 34

The in i t i al char g e g iven the jury contained no limiting instruction re g ardingthe appa rent extraneous offe nses; arguments to the jury wer e g iven af

ter it h ad b ee n p rese nted that cha rg e. Shields arg ued that the dr

ug evidenc e wa s there to he lp the jury understand w hat had happene d that day , but that the jury

should focus only

on the g un incident while deliber ating

. Af te r f ina l argume nts and

a ft e r t he jur y ha d b e g un it s deli be ratio ns , th e c ourt su a sp on te supplemented the c harg e with an a ddit i o n al i n s truction for it to consider other c rimes, wrong s, or acts only if the jurors be lieved beyond a re asonable doubt the acts to have be en committed by Shields and then only

for " deter mining the intent, motive, or a bsence of mistake or acc ident." Thoug h at the tim e of the su pp le me nta l c ha

rg e Shi e lds a ff

ir ma tiv e ly no te d he ha d n o o bje c tio n, Shi e lds no w a sse rt s the supplemental c h ar ge wa s err oneous under Article 36.16 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.16 (V ernon 2006)

. Cha rg e Erro r: Pr ese rv ati on an d H ar m As re g ard s an a lle g e d e rr or in the jur y c ha rg e , " an a ff

ir ma tiv e de nia l of

ob je c tio n, a s in

thi s

c a se , s ha ll b e de e me d e qu iva le nt t o a fa ilure to o bje c t. A n a

pp e lla nt may ra ise su c h uno bje c te d- to char g e e r r o r o na p p e a l, b u t m ay

n o t o b ta in

a r e v e r s a l f

o r s u c h e r r o r u n le s s it r e s u lt e d in e g r e g io us harm ." Bluit t v . S

tat e , 137 S.W .3d 51, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). F or fu rt he r a rt ic ulatio n o f the sta

nd ard fo r r e ve rs a l f

or un ob je c te d- to e rr or

un de r A rt ic le 36.16, we look fur

ther to Article 36.19. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.19 (V ernon 2006) ;

se e als o Fl or es v . S

tat e , 224 S.W .3d 212, 212–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Article 36.19 pr ovidesAl ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 4 5 that th e jud g me nt wil l not be re ve rs e d on th e ba sis of jur y c ha rg e e rr or un de r A rt ic le 36 .1 6 " un le ss the e rr or a pp e ari ngfr om t

he re c or d w a s c a lc ulate d to inj ur e the ri g hts of def e nd ant, or

un le ss i t app ears fro m th e reco rd th at th e defe nd ant has no t h ad a f air andim part ial tr ial ." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.19. The Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls has analy zed Article 36.19 unde r the Al ma nz a framework: "e rror that was called t o the court's attention will lead to reve rsal if there was

4 some harm to the appellant, but unobjected- to err or calls for rever sal only if it was so eg reg ious as to dep ri ve t he ap pel lan t o f a fai r and im part ial tr ial ." Flores , 224 S.W .3d at 213. An aly sis Ar tic le 36 .1 6 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art , " Af

te r the argume nt be g ins no fu rt he r ch arg e sh a ll be given to th e ju ry . . . ." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.16. In addition to the few statutory exceptions to thi s statutory require ment (which do not a pply in this case), a

trial court may

also, at any time before verdic t, c orre ct its c harg e if it is convince d that an err oneous char g e has be en g iven. Sm ith v . S tat e , 898 S.W. 2d 83 8, 85 4– 55 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Bu sti llo s v . S tat e , 464 S.W .2d 118, 125–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). Shields asserts on appe al, without providing a uthority or supply ing analy sis, that the char g e as or igina lly g iven was not e rrone ous and that it was, therefor e, er ror unde r Article 36.16 to have supplemente d it. I n deter mining whe ther the orig inal char g e wa s err oneous, we note that a limiting instruction is n o t r e qu ir e d w h e n s a me tr an s a c ti o n c o n te xtu a l ( i. e . , r e s g e s ta e ) e v id e n c e is involved. See6

Ha mm ock v. Sta te , 4 6 S. W.3 d 8 89 , 8 95 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ) ( fo r e vid e nc e a dmi tte d f or a ll purposes, a

limit ing instruction on the evidence is not "w ithin the law a pplicable to the c ase," and is not required) ; Cam ac ho v . S tat e , 864 S.W .2d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (finding no e rror in refusa l to submi t limi ting instruction). Mor eover , even w hen a limi ting inst ruction is appropr iate, "a limit ing instruc tion concer ning the use of e x trane ous offe nse evide nce should be reque sted, and g iven, i n the g uilt-stage jury char g e on ly

if the de fe nd ant re qu e ste d a lim iti ngins tr uc tio n at th e tim e th e evi den ce was fi rst adm it ted ." De lga do v . S tat e , 235 S.W .3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (empha sis added). Shields neve r re quested a limit ing instruc tion. As the case s i n d i ca t e t h e cour t

co m m i t t ed no error in omitting the limiting instruction in its origina l char g e, we cannot sa y the

c ourt ' s c ha

rg e he re wa s e rr on e ou s a s or ig ina lly g ive n. As su c h, the c ourt sh ou ld no t, u nd e r A rt ic le 36.16, have g iven the deliber ating jury the supplemental instruction. Nonethele ss, we do not find eg reg ious ha rm in the untimely

supplementation of the c harg e. I n assessing harm, we m ay consi der 1) the cha rg e itself; 2) the state of the e vidence , including contested issues a

nd the weig ht of the probative evidenc e; 3) arguments of counse l; and 4) any other rele vant information reve aled by the re cord of

the trial as a

whole. Hu tc h v. Sta te , 922 S.W .2d 166, 170–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We f ind the c ha rg e its e lf to b e the mos t im

po rt ant c on sid e ratio n in

the ha rm ana ly sis in t

his

case . Shields contends that the late instruction g iven to the alre ady -deliber ating jury "hig hlighted" the use of the ex trane ous offe nse evidence for t he particular purpose of de termining intent, motive,Shields does not assert that the l at e s u p plemental instruction constituted an improper 5 comment on t h e we i gh t o f t he evide nce. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.14 (V ernon 20 07 ); Br own v . S

tat e , 122 S.W .3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 7 or a bs e nc e of accide nt o r m ist a ke

. I nd e e d, the Te xas C ourt of Cr imi na l App e a ls h a s n ote d, in 5 deter mining that a c ourt has no sua sponte duty to g ive a limiting instruction, that a def endant mig ht be better off without such an instruction. Delgado , 235 S.W .3d at 250. I n some circ umstances, a limit ing instruc tion " would serve only to remind the jury

of what it has heard or

to re-e mphasize the evidenc e in the minds of the jurors, a nd perha ps to sugg est to the jury

a use f or the e vidence which is bes t l eftun men ti on ed. " Id. at 250 n.25 (quoti ng 1 Christopher B. Mueller & L aird C. Kirkpatrick, F ED ER A L E V I D EN CE § 41 at 221–22 (2d ed. 1994)). I ndeed, a fac ially -neutra l jury

instruction might even imprope rly

comment on the weight of the evidenc e " by singling out that evidence and inviting th e ju ry to pay

part icu lar

att ent io n t o i t. " Br own , 122 S.W .3d at 800–01. This is especia lly so when, in context, t he instruction is "simply unnece ssary " a

nd fails to clar ify

the law. Id. at 801. We are

c o g n i z an t t h a t s u c h e mp h a s i s m ay o n l y b e c o mp o u n d e d w h e n t h e u n n e c e s s ar y i n s t r uc tio n is supplemental and g iven to an alr eady -deliber ating jury

. But, any such har m of this ty

pe in this case w ould be spec ulative. " Under the A lm an za sta nd ard , th e re c or d mu st s ho w t hat a de fe nd ant h a s su ff

e re d a c tua l, r a the r t

ha n me re ly the or e tic a l, harm. . . ." Ngo v . S

tat e , 175 S.W .3d 738, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005 ). Whil e the suppleme ntal char g e was unnece ssary , it was not otherw ise incorr ect; in other w ords, the jury was, indee d, allowed to consider the evidenc e for the instructed pur

poses. B eca

use the e x trane ous-offe nse evide nce w as8

rec eived without such a

limit ing instruc tion, it bec ame part of the g ener al evidenc e and c ould be used for a ll purposes. See H

ammock , 46 S.W .3d at 895. The availability of the e vidence for a ll purposes

nece ssarily includes i ts use for deter mination of i ntent, motive, or absenc e of a ccide nt or mistake. I n other wor ds, the subsequently -cha rged "limited" pur

poses ar e mer ely

a subset of the ear lierchar g ed purpose s. We additionally note t hat t he evidence of g uilt was strong . Severa l witnesses, including the victim, offer ed the same ver sion of events. The "inc onsistency " betwee n Wil liams' written and ora l state me nts —a s to wh e the r o r n ot S hie lds po int e d th e g un a t he r— wa s e xpla ine d b y

Willi a ms' ref ere nce to the fea

r she still felt while wr iting the state ment at the sce ne af ter the police had ar

rived

and the inc ide nt ha d be e n g ott e n un de r c on tr ol. Se ve ra l wi tne sse s te sti fi e d to the fa c t th a t Will iams' oral stateme nts at the scene wer e consistent with her later te stimony

to the jury . Shields was found at the sce ne with the g un which was later discove red to have a c hamber ed bullet; from this, the jury could find fur

ther c orrobor ation of Will iams' asser tion that Shi elds had c ocked the g un and pointed it at her. We are cog nizant that S hields' counsel, in closing argument, urg ed the jury to focus only

on the e vid e nc e of the a lle g e d ass a ult to the e xclu sio n of the dr ug -r e la te d e vid e nc e . H ow e ve r, we no te that the jury

was not constra ined under the then-pr evailing instructions to do so. The jury was fr ee to find from Shields' "a cting cra zy , having dope" that he had intende d to threate n Wil liams with the g un, as the State ha d urg ed in its arg ument.9

On t h e r ec o rdas a w h o l e, we ca n n o tfi n d t h at t h e e rr o r i ns u

b m i t t i n g t h e s u

p p l em en t al ch ar ge to the a lr e a dy - d e li b e r a ti n g ju r y a f f e c te d th e v e r

y b a s is o f th e c a s e , d e p r iv e d th e d e f e n d an t of a valuable rig ht, or vi tally

aff ecte d a def

ensive theor

y . See Al ma nz a , 686 S.W .2d at 172 (op. on re h' g ). We find the rec ord as a

whole shows the charg e error was not so eg reg ious as t o deprive Shields of a fa ir and impartial tria l. The point of er ror is over

ruled. Im proper Voir D ire Com m ents Shi e lds ' se c on d p oin t of

e rr or is that th e Sta

te ' s v oir dir e c omm e nts c umu la tiv e ly de nie d h im a fa ir trial. Preserv ation of Error At tr ia l, Shi e lds lod g e d no ob je c tio n to the State ' s c omm e nts a bo ut wh ic h h e no w c omp la ins

. Shields now contends that the State' s comments constituted fundamenta l error so that no objection was required to preserve the complaint for a ppeal. Se e Ma rin v . S

tat e , 8 51 S.W. 2d

27 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1993). F undamental error must be so eg reg ious it prevents a fa ir and impartial tria l. See Al ma nz a , 686 S.W .2d at 171. I n v oir dir e , s ome c omm e nts by the trial c ourt

may be so fu nd a me nta lly

pr e jud ic ia l th a t a defe ndant' s rig ht to a fair t ri al is denied; such er ror is not waive d by

failure to object. See B lue v. Sta te , 41 S.W .3d 129, 130–31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plura lity op.). In Blue , it was fundame ntal

err or for the judg e to have said, among other c omments, "F rankly , obviously , I pref er the def endant to p le a d, " and

to h a ve a po log ize d to the jur

y fo r the a pp are nt wa ste of tim e in h a vin g to atte nd tr ia l.10

Id . at 130. This case , as contra sted to Blue , p re se nts no pr e jud ic ia l vo ir

dir e c omm e nt b y

the c ourt ; rathe r, Shields complains of voir dire c omments made by the State. Shields pre sents no authority for finding fundame ntal err or in the State' s, as opposed to the trial court' s, voir dire c omments. Se v er al ap pellate c ourts have hinted, thoug h not held, that fundame ntal err or under Blue is not extended to comments by the State. Se e, e. g. , Salc ido v . S tat e , No. 08-04-00346- CR, 2006 W L1132865 (Tex. App.—El P as o April 27, 2006, no pet.) ( not de sig nate d f

or pu bli c a tio n) ; Cle me nt v . S

tat e , N o . 0 8

- 03-00463

- CR , 2 0 0 5 WL 1 5 9 3 4 6 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so July 7, 20 05 , no pe t.) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) ; Ga lv e

z v . S tat e , No. 04-04- 00 46 0- CR, 20 05 WL 14 58 22 8, a t *1 –2 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio June 22 , 2 00 5, pe t. r e f' d) (m e m. op., not desig nated f

or publication) ( declining to find fundame ntal err or i n perva sive prosec utorial mis c on du c t a tta c kin g de fendan t ov er c ouns e l' s sh ou lde rs in v oir dir e , d ur ingte sti mony , a

nd in closing ); Be ltran v . S

tat e , 99 S.W .3d 807, 812 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, pet. re f' d) (addr essing prosec utor' s voir dire c omments in addition t o judge ' s comments). Nonethele ss, we will examine the State' s comments to determine if the y wer e so eg reg ious that Shields was preve nted by those comments to a fa ir and impartial tria l and, thus, w as not require d to obje ct timely in or der to c omplain of the comments on appea l. I n our re view, we should look at alleg edly improper voir dire statements in context. Se e Tut tlev . S tat e , No. 06-06-00251- CR, 2007 WL 2324004, at *2 (Te x . App.—Texarkana Aug . 16, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).11

State's Remarks: Pre

sumption of Innocenc e Shield s f ir s t c o mp la in s o f

th e St a te ' s c o mm e n ts r e lati n g to th e p r e s u mp ti o no f inn o cenc e. The St a te c o mm e n c e d it s v o ir d ir e b y s tati n g : " I a m v e r y p r o u d to b e p art o f a s y s te m in whic h ind ivi du a ls that are c ha

rg e d wi th c ri me s c an ple a d no t g uil ty and the burd e n b e ingup on

the State to prove the m guilty

bey ond a re as o n ab l e doubt." Af ter e x plaining the conce pt of a bifur cate d trial g ener ally , the State continued: " And also, bec ause of the burden of proof being upon the State, the Def ense doe s not have to put on any witnesses whatsoever. The -- like I said, the burde n of proof is on the State . . . ." L ater in the voir dire, the State make the complained- of comments (w ith the complained- of par

ts emphasized): And as I've indicated to y ou, there is a legal fiction as far as presumption of innocenc e. As the De

fendant sits here right now, he is presumed innoce nt and - - but th a t c a n c h a n g e a

ft e r y o u 'v e h e a rd

s o m e evide nce t h at y ou believe be y ond a rea sonable dou

b t a s to a ll o f

th e d if f e r e n t e le me n ts o f

th e o f f e n s e . A n d

if y o uf eel that the State has prove n that, then t hat pre sumption i s a re buttal [ sic] presumption wh ic h c an c ha

ng e to g uil ty

. B ut do y ou re c og nize that e ve ryon e that is c ha rg e d w ith a criminal offe nse i s presumed innocent unt il proven guilty ? Any one have a proble m wi th t hat? (Emphasis adde d.) Shields asserts, without prese nting a ny authority , that, in using the phrase " leg al fi cti on ," t he S tat e "to ldth e ju ry th at t he p res um pt io n i s n ot hi ng mo re t han legal gibb eri sh , a l ie. " A "le g al fiction" is an " assumption that something is true e ven thoug h it may be untrue , made

e sp . in jud ic ia l r e a so nin g to a lte r h owa le g a l r ule op e ra te s; s pe c if

., a de vi ce by

wh ic h a le g a l r ule or institut i o n i s diverted f rom its origina l purpose to ac complish indirectly some other objec t." B LACK ' S L AW D I C TI ONARY 91 3 ( 8th e d. 20 04 ); se e als o M ER R I AM -W EB S TER ' S C OL L E GI AT E12

D I C TI ONAR Y 465 (11th ed. 2006) (def ining "f iction," in se nse of "le g al fiction" as: " an assumption of a po ss ibi lity

a s a fa c t ir re sp e c tiv e of

the qu e sti on

of its tr uth " ); and see M ER R I AM -W E B S TER ' S C OL L EGI AT E D I C TI ONAR Y 71 0 ( 11 th e d. 20 06 ) ( de fi nin g " le g a l," in s e ns e of "le g a l f ic tio n" a s: "c reated by

the construc tions of the law" ). Howe ver, the first definition of " fiction" in the dictionary (and that commonly used and understood in our society) i s "some thing invente d by the imag ination

or fe ig ne d

. . . an inv e nte d sto ry ." See M ER R I AM -W EB S TER ' S C OL L EGI AT E D I C TI ONAR Y 465. Th e re fo re , w hil e the te rm " le g a l fic tio n" may be te c hn ic a lly tr ue in t he a bs olute ly str ic t le g a l se ns e of the w o r d an d w h il e it ma y w e ll b e f

u ll y u n d e r s to o d b y th o s e w h o ar e qu it e f a mi li ar w it

h leg al te rm ino log y , u sin g that phra se to e xpla in t o a jur y the c on c e pt of the pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e c ou ld

more e asily

mislead than eluc idate. Thoug h we f

ind the State' s choice of phra ses in char acte rizing this most fundamental rig ht to b e ill -a dv ise d a

nd da ng e ro us ly c los e to imp ro pe r, we no te that the State ' s c omm e nts , in c on te xt,

reve al a de tailed and g ener ally corr ect explanation of

a def endant' s presumption of innocenc e and the S t at e ' s b u r d e n o f p r o o f o n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d

. T h e S t a t e ' s c o m m e n t s , w h e n v i e we d in context, ar e not so eg reg ious a s to r ise to the level of fundame ntal err or. Cf. Sn e e d v . S tat e , Nos. 05- 06-00389-CR, 05-06-00390- CR, 05-06-00391- CR, 2007 WL 1125074, at *5–6 (Tex . App.—Dallas April 17, 2007, pet. re f' d [3 pets.] ) (not desig nated f or publication) ( State' s voir dire discussion, at venire member' s in s t i gation, of ade quate c ourt secur ity and the Atlanta

courthouse shooting s not13

fundame ntal err or, since f ollowed by statement of the pr esumption of innocenc e). A s such, Shields has failed to preser

ve er ror in fa iling to object. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 3. 1; Ma rin , 851 S.W .2d 275. State's Remarks: De

fendant's T

estifying Shi e lds a lso c omp la ins of the State ' s c omm e nts re la tin g to t he te sti mony

of the de fend a nt. The State c ommented: Do you unde r

s ta n d th a t th e S

ta te is p r o h ib it e d b

y la w, th e S

ta te fr o m c a ll in g

the D e fe n d a n t a s a witness? T h e Defenda nt has a c onstitut ional privileg e not to be called a s a witness to g ive t estimony ag ainst himself. This isn't just for this ty pe of case . This is for any

ty pe of c ase. I know all of us would like to beable to hear from eve ryone. B ut w ou ld a

ny on e fa ult or ho ld that a g a ins t th e State or the De fe nd ant i f h e w er e n o tt o t ak e th e st an d an d t es t i fy as a w i t n es s i nt h i s m at t er kn o wi n g t h at i t 's a Constituti onal rig ht and privileg e that we all have? Any one over here , would they h o l d t h a ta g a i n s tt h e S t a t e i f

w e d i d n o tc a l l h i m o r

h e d i d n o tt a k e t h e s t an d ?

. . . . And do you recognize t hat if he chooses to testify, that is his decision or dec ision of him and his attorney, and if hechooses to testify, he c an eve n overrule his attorney an d ta k e thesta nd

an d te sti fy tha t wil d h or se s c an no t ke e

p him off tha t st an d? So if he make s the decision to te

stify, that is his decision , and whatever that decision may be, will y ou hold it aga inst him or the State a s to whether or not he testifies? Any one over he re? Ag ain, we look at alleg edly improper voir dire statements in contex t. Se e Tut tle , 2 0 0 7 WL 2324004, at *2. Shields does not specify , in argument or authority , how the complaine d-of state me nts re g ard ing the F if th Am e ndme nt ri g ht are a lle g e dly imp ro pe r. At on e po int , Sh ie lds se e ms to a ssert that any

"c omments which conc erne d Appellant' s constitutional rig hts" or "dr ives home"14

the rig hts are imprope r. Shields a lso a sserts that the State " attacke d," " undermined," and " broug ht int o q ue sti on " Shi e lds ' ri g hts

. But mere ly mentioning the defe ndant' s rig hts is not i mproper or in error

. See, e .g. , Allen v. Sta te , 5 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d

3 6 4 , 3 6 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 7 6 ) ( v o i r d i r e co m m en t s re gar d i n g d ef en d an t 's choice to testify , and voir dire statement re g ardingdefe ndant' s cre dibilit y as witness, if he doe s te sti fy ); Hi ll v . S

tat e , 480 S.W .2d 670 (T ex . Crim. App. 1972) (voir dire comments reg arding de fe nd ant' s c ho ic e to t e sti fy , n o e rr or in d e nia l of

mis tr ia l) ; Mc Car

yv . S tat e , 4 7 7 S. W. 2 d

6 2 4 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 72 ) ( vo ir

dir e c omm e nts re g ard ingde fe nd ant' s c ho ic e to te sti fy ). Th e e rr or

is n ot i n mentioning the de fenda

nt's choice of whether to testify , but in voir dire comments that allude to or comment on the fai lur e to testify as a c ircumstance ag ainst the defe ndant. Se e Hi ll , 480 S.W .2d at 67 4; see also T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art 38 .0 8 ( Ve rn on

20 05 ); c f. Mo or e v . S

tat e , 849 S.W .2d 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (same, in trial a rg ument). The Houston First Court ha s declined to f ind f undamental err or in the State' s g ener al voir dire explanations of t he law reg arding a defenda nt's te stify ing. Se e Br itt

v . S tat e , N o. 01 -9 1- 00 10 3- CR, 1992 WL 76456, at *1 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April 16, 1992, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The Houston cour t noted that, beca

use the prose cutor' s statements wer e made befor e

any on e kn e w i f t

he de fe nd ant w ou ld or

wo uld no t te sti fy , th e c omm e nts " c ou ld n ot h a ve re fe rr e d to a fai lu re t o t est if

y th at h ad n oty et o ccurred. " Id. Ne ith e r d id the c ourt fi nd that th e c omm e nts

manif e stl y int e nd e d o r w e re of

su c h c ha

ra c te r t hat th e jur

y wo uld ne c e ss ari ly

take the m a s a15

comment on the subseque nt failure to testify

. Id. ; se e als o My e rs v . S tat e , 527 S.W .2d 307, 308–09 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 75 ); Beltran , 9 9 S.W .3 d at 81 1– 12 (r e fu sin g to f ind fu nd a me nta l e rr or

in pr os e c uto r' s vo ir dir e state me nt that sh e be lie ve d de fe nd ant g uil ty ). Duri ng a vo ir dir e in w hic h it is n ot y e t kn ow n if the de fe nd ant wil l tes tif y , it is not e rr or to qua lif

y the jur y by c or re c t st a te me nts of the law reg arding a defe ndant' s rig hts to testify or not testify

. Se e J

ac k so n v . S tat e , 536 S.W .2d 371, 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The State' s more florid languag e choic es re g ardinga tes t i fy i n g defe ndant wer e par t of a g ener ally even a nd corr ect voir dire on the re levant law. T he comment s , i n co n t ex t, could not natura lly and nec essar ily

be interpr eted by

a jury to comment on Shields' fa ilure to testify

. See Ga rc ia v . S

tat e , 887 S.W .2d 862, 877 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Neither are they of such nature as to undermine Shields' Fi ft h Amendment rig hts or otherwise c onstitut e funda mental er ror of constitutional dim ension. As such, Shields ha s failed to pr eser ve err or in failing to object. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 3. 1; Ma rin , 851 S.W .2d 275. Point of error two is ove rruled. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: Marc h 11, 2008 Date D ecide d: April 9, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh