alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSE BUSK; LAURIE CASTRO, on

behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-16892

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-01854-

RLH-RJJ

ORDER

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court

Filed July 7, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and

Jerome Farris and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Pursuant to the Opinion of the Supreme Court in Integrity

Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 513

(2014), the judgment of the district court dismissing

Plaintiffs’ claims that they were entitled to compensation for

time spent passing through security screening at the end of

the work day under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29

U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as amended by the Portal -to-Portal Act
2 BUSK V. INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS

of 1947, § 251 et seq., and under parallel state law, is

AFFIRMED. Costs are awarded to Defendant in the amount

of $1,077.25.
Exhibit
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


RULE
      13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES


EXCHANGE
      ACT OF 1934 AND 18 U.S.C. 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I,
      J.
      Scott Tomer, Chief Executive Officer of YTB International, Inc., a Delaware
      corporation (the “Registrant”), in connection with the Registrant’s Quarterly
      Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), do hereby
      represent, warrant and certify, in compliance with Rule 13a-14(b) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1.
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
                and




2.
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Registrant.





/s/ J.
                Scott TomerName:
                J. Scott TomerTitle:
                Director and Chief Executive OfficerDate:
                November 14, 2008
First, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying 

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating and 

presenting mitigation evidence, including testimony from family members 

who would have testified to appellant's good character. According to 

appellant, because the district court was not presented with full and 

accurate information about him, his sentence was "based on impalpable or 

highly suspect evidence." The district court denied this claim, concluding 

that appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice considering the serious 

injuries appellant's drunk driving inflicted on the 20-year-old victim, 

including brain and facial injuries that left the victim partially blind and 

significantly disabled for the remainder of his life. We conclude that the 

district court did not err in this regard. 

Second, appellant argues that the district court erred by 

denying his claim that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for not 

challenging the district court's consideration of his illegal alien status in 

sentencing him. In denying the post-conviction petition, the district court 

expressly stated that appellant's illegal alien status had no role in 

fashioning his sentence. Looking at the record as a whole, it appears that 

the sentencing court was most influenced by the victim's significant lifelong injuries. The district court was also aware of appellant's prior felony 

DUI conviction that resulted in injury to two people. We cannot say on 

this record that the district court erred by denying this claim." 

'Appellant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise any credible issues on appeal or claims related to Fifth 

Amendment due process violations, cruel and unusual punishment, and 

equal protection. In this, appellant has raised nothing but bare claims for 

continued on next page . . . 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2 

MEI= 
Saitta 

3 

MEWFtalg ErTiEEDEVEffiNI DEMME 

Having considered appellant's claims and concluded that they 

lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

cc: Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge 

Karla K. Butko 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

. . . continued 

relief and therefore no relief is warranted. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 

498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). 

2To the extent appellant contends that his sentence is excessive and 

based on his illegal alien status, we note that those claims should have 

been raised on direct appeal and fall outside the scope of claims 

permissible in a post-conviction habeas petition challenging a judgment of 

conviction based upon a guilty plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

WiU003121121331EMSEMBES
William J. VAJK, petitioner, v. Robert P. YOUNG, Jr., et al.

No. 17-1416.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 11, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Peter McNEAL, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA.

No. 17-5090.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District denied.
From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Sally Miller <smiller@iib.org > 

Monday, July 08, 2013 10:24 AM 

Gensler, Gary 

Cc: Ridley, Deborah; Miller, Ryne; Kim, Carlene; Josephson, Sarah E 

Subject: Final Cross-border guidance and Cross-border phase-in exemptive order 

Dear Chairman Gensler, 

I understand that the CFTC intends to consider on Friday, July lih, whether to adopt final cross-border guidance and a 

cross-border phase-in exemptive order. As you know, clarity on cross border issues and a reasonable transition period 

are absolutely critical for the foreign banking community. 

In particular, if firms need to adapt to a new definition of U.S. person or different treatment for guaranteed affiliates and 

"conduits," they will need several months to obtain the requisite client representations and re-code their compliance 

systems. In addition, if different aggregation requirements or" counting" rules for de minimis exemption purposes 

could result in a need to register additional legal entities, each of those entities will need several months to prepare its 

registration application and establish necessary compliance infrastructure. To the extent the CFTC determines that a 

firm is not eligible for a substituted compliance determination, the phase-in exemptive order should provide sufficient 

time for the firm to come into compliance with what in some cases will be brand new requirements. Moreover, as a 

matter of fundamental fairness and good public policy, any changes from the final exemptive order, for example with 

respect to the definition of U.S. person, aggregation requirements or de minimis counting rules, should be applied solely 

on a prospective basis. 

I would welcome the opportunity to meet with you and your staff to discuss these important timing issues. 

Best regards, 

Sally 

Sarah A. Miller 

Chief Executive Officer 

Institute of International Banlters 

?.99 Park Avenue, J./th Floor 

New York, NY 10171 

Direct: (646) 213-1147 

Fax: (212) 421-111.9 

~·iain: (212) 421-16!.1 Ext.l4/ 

E··rnail: smiller@iib.org 

www.iib. org 

"Advancing the Interests of the International 

Banking Community in the United States" 

Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail 

·, • '< 

-' q l 

,{(. 

1
2002 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN



ADDENDUM
TO
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT

The following provisions are hereby incorporated into, and are hereby made a part of, that certain Stock Option Agreement (the "Option Agreement") by and between Borland Software Corporation (the "Corporation") and [_________] ("Optionee") evidencing the stock option (the "Option") granted to Optionee under the terms of the Corporation's 2002 Stock Incentive Plan, and such provisions are effective immediately. All capitalized terms in this Addendum, to the extent not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Option Agreement.

SPECIAL ACCELERATION

1.          To the extent the Option is assumed in connection with a Change in Control or otherwise continued in effect or replaced with a substitute option, the Option (or such substitute option) shall not accelerate to any extent upon the occurrence of that Change in Control, and the Option (or such substitute option) shall accordingly continue, over Optionee's period of Service after the Change in Control, to become exercisable for the Option Shares in one or more installments in accordance with the provisions of the Option Agreement.  However, upon termination of Optionee's Service other than for [Misconduct/Cause] (as such term is defined in Optionee's offer letter) or upon Optionee's  [Involuntary Termination/Constructive Termination] (as such term is defined in Optionee's offer letter) within twelve (12) monthsfollowing a Change in Control, then the Option (or such substitute option), to the extent outstanding at the time but not otherwise fully exercisable, shall automatically accelerate so that the Optionee shall be credited with an additional twelve (12) months of Service for purposes of the Vesting Schedule and such Option (or substitute option) may be exercised for any or all of those accelerated Option Shares (or other securities) as fully-vested shares, together with any other Option Shares (or other securities) for which the Option has already become vested and exercisable in accordance with the normal Vesting Schedule.

2.          In the event of any conflict, ambiguity, or inconsistency between the provisions of the Option Agreement and the provisions of this Addendum, to the extent possible such provisions will be interpreted so as to resolve any such conflict, ambiguity, or inconsistency, and if that is not possible, the provisions of the this Addendum will prevail.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Borland Software Corporation has caused this Addendum to be executed by its duly authorized officer as of the Effective Date specified below.

|                | BORLAND SOFTWARE CORPORATION
|--------------- | ----------------------------
|                |                             
|                |                             
|                | By:                         
|                |                             
|                | Title:                      
|                |                             
|EFFECTIVE DATE:
Juan Jose ESPINOZA-BAZALDUA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7490.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 11, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
Jerry N. BROWN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-6344.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 16, 2018.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for further consideration in light of that court's opinion in *United States v. Naylor,*887 F.3d 397 (CA8 2018).
Shay PANIRY, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7227.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
In Re Anthony D. JONES, petitioner.

No. 17-8559.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 14, 2018.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of
Standard Management Corporation for the quarter ended September 30, 2004, we
Ronald D. Hunter and Paul B. (Pete) Pheffer, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of Standard Management Corporation, respectively hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of our knowledge and belief, that:  (1)
    
    such Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in such Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of Standard
Management Corporation. November 12, 2004 /s/ Ronald D. Hunter  
 /s/ Paul B. (Pete) Pheffer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-2301
RONNIE L. WHITLEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus BLACK & DECKER (U.S.) INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-95-23-5-BO(2)) Submitted: December 19, 1995 Decided: April 12, 1996 Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ronnie L. Whitley, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Broughton Russell, POYNER & SPRUILL, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing this employment discrimination action for insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and lack of jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no abuse of discretion and no reversible error. See Despain v. Salt Lake Area Metro Gang Unit , 13 F.3d 1436, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, although we decline to address whether the complaint was filed within the limitations period, we affirm the dismissal of this action for failure to effect service upon the Defendant. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Robert C. MILLS, petitioner, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, et al.

No. 17-7533.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 19, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District denied.
Anthony W. ACCURSO, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-8522.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 21, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                           5
<LEGEND>
         This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from
         Greenland  Corporation  March  31,  1998  financial  statements  and is
         qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>                        0000852127
<NAME>                       Greenland Corporation

       

<S>                                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                     MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                                            12,274
<SECURITIES>                                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                     146,586
<ALLOWANCES>                                                      0
<INVENTORY>                                                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                  159,160
<PP&E>                                                            43,053
<DEPRECIATION>                                                    (13,652)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                    4,414,427
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                             193,134
<BONDS>                                                           405,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                             0
<PREFERRED>                                                       0
<COMMON>                                                          34,388
<OTHER-SE>                                                        3,781,905
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                      4,414,427
<SALES>                                                           10,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                  10,620
<CGS>                                                             0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                     495,077
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                8,450
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                   (484,457)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                      0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                               (484,457)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                   0
<CHANGES>                                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                                      (484,457)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                     (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                     (.02)
        



</TABLE>
James HACKNEY, petitioner, v. ALLMED HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT INC.

No. 17-102.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Darrel THORN, petitioner, v. Melvin McGARY, et al.

No. 17-5311.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
Anthony SIMMONS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-5569.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3938 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3938

   To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that children of 
 certain permanently disabled or deceased veterans shall be preference 
  eligible for purposes of appointments in the civil service, and for 
                             other purpose.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 24, 2019

Mr. Taylor (for himself, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Cisneros, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. 
       Bacon, Mrs. Luria, Mr. Steube, Mr. Baird, Mr. Waltz, Mr. 
Krishnamoorthi, Mr. Panetta, and Ms. Wasserman Schultz) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                                 Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that children of 
 certain permanently disabled or deceased veterans shall be preference 
  eligible for purposes of appointments in the civil service, and for 
                             other purpose.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Gold Star Children Act''.

SEC. 2. PREFERENCE ELIGIBLE STATUS FOR CHILDREN OF CERTAIN PERMANENTLY 
              DISABLED OR DECEASED VETERANS.

    Section 2108(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``and'' after the 
        semicolon; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(I) the child (including an adopted child, 
                recognized natural child, stepchild, or foster child) 
                of--
                            ``(i) an individual who lost his or her 
                        life under honorable conditions while serving 
                        in the armed forces during a period named by 
                        paragraph (1)(A); or
                            ``(ii) a service-connected permanently and 
                        totally disabled veteran;''.
                                 <all>
```
Robert Earl BUTTS, Jr., petitioner, v. Eric SELLERS, Warden.

No. 17-8788 (17A1221).

Supreme Court of the United States

May 4, 2018.

Application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice THOMAS and by him referred to the Court denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia denied.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 27, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 129592 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 129592 COA: 260409 Ingham CC: 00-075787-FC AVERELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 16, 2005 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

d1219 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 27, 2005

Clerk