1

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 11-268C

(Filed: February 20, 2013)

*******************************

SECURITYPOINT HOLDINGS, Inc., Claim construction;

Markman hearing; 

Plaintiff, plain and ordinary meaning.

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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M. Roy Goldberg, Washington, DC, for plaintiff. Nathaniel Bruno,

Washington, DC, of counsel.

Lindsay K. Eastman, United States Department of Justice, Civil

Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Washington, DC, with whom were

Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and John Fargo,

Director, for defendant.

OPINION

BRUGGINK, JUDGE.

This is a patent infringement case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498

(2006). Plaintiff SecurityPoint Holdings, Inc. (“SecurityPoint”) alleges that

the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) has infringed several

claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,888,460 (“460 patent”) by its use of trays and carts

at airport security screening checkpoints. Before the court now are the parties’

briefs regarding construction of seven claim terms used in the 460 patent. 

BACKGROUND

SecurityPoint is suing the United States for TSA’s unauthorized use of

SecurityPoint’s invention described in the 460 patent in claims 1-4, 6-9, and
 The parties presented their exhibits attached to their respective briefs but 1

numbered the exhibits consecutively from plaintiff’s exhibits to defendant’s

exhibits. They used those same numbers for the joint exhibits attached to their

joint claim construction statement. We cite to them as plaintiff’s exhibits

2

12-15. The 460 patent concerns a system of recycling trays through security

screening checkpoints by use of movable carts and the display of advertising

on the bins. The patent dates to the provisional patent application filed on July

3, 2002. 

Patents are comprised of two types of claims: independent and

dependent. Independent claims stand on their own as described in a single

claim; dependent claims refer to and add further limitations to an independent

claim or claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Here, the 460 patent is

comprised of one independent claim and 14 dependant claims. 

Claim 1 describes a method:

positioning a first tray cart containing trays at the proximate end

of a scanning device through which objects may be passed,

wherein said scanning device comprises a proximate end and a

distal end,

 

removing a tray from said first tray cart,

passing said tray through said scanning device from said

proximate end through to said distal end,

providing a second tray cart at said distal end of said scanning

device,

receiving said tray passed through said scanning device in said

second tray cart, and

moving said second tray cart to said proximate end of said

scanning device so that said trays in said second cart be passed

through said scanning device at said proximate end.

PX 1 at SP18 (the 460 patent). Claim 2 teaches that the scanning device is 1
(“PX”) and defendant’s exhibits (“DX”) as they were first filed. 

3

“selected from a group consisting of a manual inspection station, an x-ray

machine, a conveyor belt, and a particulate matter sensor.” Id. Claims 3 and

4 add that the trays are “nestable” and have “exposed sides capable of

displaying advertising.” Id. Claim 6 teaches that the “tray carts are adapted

to be rollable.” Id. Claim 7 adds that the method of Claim 1 also includes “the

step of repositioning said second tray cart from said distal end to said

proximate end.” Id. Claims 8 and 9 inform that a plurality of the trays are

“adapted to receive” various items such as a laptop, camera, purse, coat,

wallet, cell phone, and other similar items. Id. Claim 12 instructs that a third

cart is used in the method described in Claim 1. Claim 13 adds a step in which

the third cart “containing a plurality of trays” is substituted to replace the first

cart. Id. Claim 14 makes the bottoms of the trays “adapted to display

advertising” on the interior surface of the trays, and Claim 15 teaches that the

trays “are adapted to display a tag number.” Id. 

The parties presented the court with claim construction briefs and a

joint claim construction statement. The parties present seven terms for the

court’s construction. Plaintiff, however, believes that no special construction

is required for any of the terms because the plain and ordinary meaning of the

terms is sufficient. Plaintiff supplies preferred constructions in the event that

we find the plain and ordinary meaning to be insufficient. The following chart

presents the parties positions:

Term Claim(s) Using

Term

Plaintiff’s

Proposed

Construction

Defendant’s

Proposed

Construction

tray 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 13,

14, 15

a base with

upwardly

extending walls

same

trays 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 13,

14, 15 

a plurality of

bases, each with

upwardly

extending walls

more than one

tray of uniform

size and shape
4

tray cart 1, 6, 7, 12, 13 a movable cart

capable of

holding one or

more trays

a movable rack

or cart adapted

to holding or

storing a

plurality of trays

proximate end 1, 7 from the

reference point

of the initial

location of the

first tray cart,

nearest side, as

in the side of the

scanning device

into which an

object to be

scanned enters

the device

proximal or

nearest to;

referring to the

end of the

scanning device

where an object

enters the

device

distal end 1, 7 from the

reference point

of the initial

location of the

first tray cart,

farthest side, as

in the side of the

scanning device

from which an

object to be

scanned exits

the device

farthest from;

referring to the

end of the

scanning device

where an object

exits the device

nestable 3, 4 capable of

fitting

compactly or

within one

another

capable of

fitting at least

partially within

one another
 Mr. Huey worked in the security industry for 29 years as a manager, sales 2

representative, and consultant “on issues and projects involving complex

security management scenarios.” PX 10 ¶ 4. His work emphasized airport

security and security checkpoint operations. He is the first named inventor on

three patents relating to screening checkpoints. 

5

adapted 6, 8, 9, 14, 15 suited specially

designed or

made for a

specific purpose

receiving said

tray passed

through said

scanning device

in said second

tray cart

1 coming into

possession of

the tray in the

second tray cart

after being

passed through

the scanning

device at the

distal end of the

scanning device

after a tray has

passed through

the scanning

device from the

proximate end

to the distal end,

a second tray

cart receives the

tray

See Joint Pre-Markman Claim Constr. Hr’g Statement 3. The parties agreed

upon a package of exhibits in support, which includes the two declarations of

plaintiff’s expert, Mr. John Huey. Plaintiff did not call Mr. Huey at the 2

Markman hearing, which was held on November 14, 2012. 

DISCUSSION

 Claim construction is the first step in any patent infringement action

because it is necessary to understand precisely what the invention is before the

trier of fact can determine whether it has been used without permission. “The

claims of a patent define the invention . . . .” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d

1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The scope and meaning of the patent is a

question of law to be answered by the trial court. Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-90 (1996). 

The claim terms should be construed in accordance with their “ordinary

and customary meaning” as understood by “a person of ordinary skill in the art
Defendant did not propose a discrete statement of the field of art or the 3

person of ordinary skill because it believes those concepts are broad and not

well suited to definition in one or two sentences. See Hr’g Tr. 117-118, Nov.

14, 2012. If it becomes necessary to closely define the field of relevant art, the

court is prepared to do so in the future.

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in question at the time of invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Indus.,

Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The terms

should be read in the context of the whole patent not just the particular claim

in which the term appears. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Often the use of a term

in one claim will “illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims.”

TDM Am., LLC v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 774, 778-79 (2009) (citing

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314).

When the meaning of a term is not clear or is used idiosyncratically, the

court will look to “those sources available to the public that show what a

person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to

mean.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d

1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). These sources typically are the words of the

patent itself, the patent’s specification, and the patent’s prosecution history.

See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-19. These are intrinsic sources and are

preferred to extrinsic sources. See Apex, Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325

F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries,

treatises, and expert testimony, however, may be consulted as necessary in the

court’s discretion. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-19. Extrinsic evidence should

be read in view of the intrinsic evidence, id., and cannot be used to vary the

meaning of terms contrary to the claim specification and prosecution history,

id. at 1324.

Plaintiff asks the court to make a finding that the field of relevant art is

“security checkpoint screening operations,” and thus the person of ordinary

skill in the art is “someone who, as of July 3, 2002, possessed experience

sufficient to have a comprehensive understanding of security checkpoint

screening operations.” Pl.’s Opening Markman Claim Constr. Br. 14.

Defendant did not offer a specific competing definition other than to argue that

it should include operation of other areas of an airport because the patent’s

claims describe a method applicable outside of airport screening checkpoints.

The issue was briefly discussed at oral argument and lightly treated in the

briefing. It is not necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of security 3
 We do not rely on Mr. Huey’s testimony in regard to the necessary expertise 4

required in the field or art or upon his testimony in regard to any particular

claim term.

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checkpoint screening operations in order to understand what is taught by the

460 patent. Because it is unnecessary to our claim construction, and in the

absence of a competing discrete definition, we decline to adopt one. We turn

4

now to the terms at issue. The parties agree that the term “tray” is properly

understood to mean a “base with upwardly extending walls.” Joint Claim

Constr. Statement 3. We adopt this proposed construction. It comports with

the language and graphical representations in the patent specification. E.g.,

PX 1 at SP9-SP10 (Figures 11-14), SP14, SP15. Although a court need not

construe a term if its plain and ordinary meaning is clear and unambiguous in

the language of the claim itself, see U.S. Surgical Corp v. Ethicon, Inc., 103

F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the definition of a “base with upwardly

extending walls” makes clear that the term “tray” in the 460 patent has

vertically extending walls, which not all trays necessarily would have. We

thus adopt the parties’ construction because it makes that point clear.

A. Trays

Despite their unanimity on the term “tray,” the parties do not agree what

the plural of that word means. Defendant seeks to limit the understanding of

the term “trays” to only those that are “of uniform size and shape.” Joint

Claim Constr. Statement 3. It points to the patent specification language to the

effect that patent was aimed, at least partially, at alleviating the problem of

non-standardized sizing of trays. See, e.g., PX 1 at SP13-SP15. Plaintiff

responds by directing the court to other areas of the patent specification in

which it is contemplated that at least two different sizes of trays would be

used. SecurityPoint thus argues that the defendant’s construction is

inappropriately limiting and is at heart an attempt to support its invalidity

contentions.

 

We decline to add any verbiage to the term “trays.” See Harris Corp.

v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1997). It simply means more

than one tray and is in no need of further construction. Defendant’s

construction is too limiting. Plaintiff is correct that the specification

contemplates two different sizes of trays. See, e.g., PX 1 at SP14 (stating that

“the [tray cart] is adapted to receive two differentially sized stacks of trays”),
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SP15 (“The present invention has various sized trays which can be used to

hold larger items . . . and a second smaller size which can be used when items

such as keys, wallets, [etc.] are to be removed and placed in a tray for

inspection.”). The claim language itself is unambiguous; the term “trays”

simply means more than one tray and requires no special construction. 

B. Tray Cart

Plaintiff proposes that the term “tray cart” means “a movable cart

capable of holding one or more trays.” Defendant offers that it is “a movable

rack or cart adapted to holding or storing a plurality of trays.” The parties thus

agree that a tray cart is movable, and we concur. Whether the patent teaches

that a “tray cart” can be either a cart or a rack and whether a tray cart must be

adapted to storing as well as holding are closer questions. 

1. “Cart” Does Not Mean “Rack”

Defendant insists that “cart” and “rack” can be read interchangeably in

the 460 patent. It points to the use of the word “rack” in the patent

specification, see PX 1 at SP13, SP15, and the Petition to Make Special from

the patent’s prosecution history, see PX 3 at SP122 (“the invention includes

both uniform tray sizing so that trays may be easily stacked while remaining

accessible and specially-designed tray racks . . . to store empty trays in a

organized manner”). Defendant also notes that prior art cited during patent

prosecution used the word “rack.” See DX 20 at G314-G315 (Patent No.

5,586,493, Paper Recycling Rack). Defendant thus argues that “cart” should

be read to encompass “rack” because the two words are used interchangeably

in the patent specification, prosecution history, and cited prior art. 

Plaintiff points out that the word “rack” is conspicuously absent from the

language of the 460 patent’s claims. Its argument is that when the language of

the claim is unambiguous then “consideration of the rest of the intrinsic

evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear language of

the claims is specified.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256

F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.

SecurityPoint further argues that the use of the word “cart” without the word

“tray” preceding it, which appears several times in the patent specification,

shows that the patent contemplates a “cart” and not a “rack.” See, e.g., PX 1

at SP17-SP18. To the extent that there is any ambiguity, plaintiff asks the court

to consider the testimony of its expert, Mr. John Huey. Mr. Huey, in his first
 Claim 11 is not otherwise at issue in this opinion but is relevant in 5

understanding the terms as used elsewhere in the patent. The courtshould read

the claims together “[b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently

throughout the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.

9

declaration, testified that a “tray cart” would be understood by a person of

ordinary skill in the art to mean a movable cart and not a rack. See PX 10 ¶¶

17-18, 21. He further testified that a “rack” would have been understood to

mean a “device with shelves into which trays could be slid horizontally, which

is not taught by the ‘460 Patent.’” Id. ¶ 18. A cart, on the other hand, “would

have been considered a device onto which objects could be stacked, which is

taught throughout the ‘460 Patent.’” Id.

We begin with the strong presumption that the terms used in a claim

carry their ordinary meaning, CSS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d

1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and the Federal Circuit’s instruction that “[t]he

construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with

the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct

construction.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. What is clear from the claim

language is that the essential function of the tray cart is that it is movable and

suited for holding trays. There is one diagram of a tray cart in the patent. See

PX 1 at SP7 (Figure 9). The claim language itself, however, is devoid of any

particulars as to how the tray carts should be comprised other than to teach that

they should be “adapted to be rollable,” PX 1 at SP18 (Claim 6), and should

have a “tray platform further comprising a resilient member,” id. (Claim 11).5

Because the claims themselves are focused narrowly on the carts being rollable

and capable of holding trays, we decline to add a word not found in the claim

language. A “tray cart” is a “cart” suited to rolling and holding trays, nothing

more. That brings us to the next point of contention: holding versus holding

and storing. 

2. The Claims Do Not Require That a Tray Cart Be Adapted to Storing

 Defendant asks that we construe the “tray cart” as being “adapted to

holding or storing a plurality of trays.” It cites to language in the specification

identifying the need “for a system for a security area for moving the trays from

a starting position to an ending position which allows the trays to be efficiently

utilized, gathered, and stored to be later used again.” PX 1 at SP13. Plaintiff

urges the court to consider the use of the words “store,” “storing,” and “stored”
10

in the patent specification, in context, to describe a transient holding function.

We agree.

The 460 patent describes a method whereby trays are cycled through a

security checkpoint by use of movable tray carts. Our analysis of the claim

language concerning the makeup of the tray carts above is equally applicable

here. The function of the carts is to hold trays until the time comes to cycle the

tray cart to the next position in the method. Any storing function is only

temporary and the trays are in a constant movement from one tray cart to the

next via the scanning device. Defendant’s addition of the word “storing” would

either be entirely surplusage because the same function is described in the word

“holding,” or it as an attempt to read in a limitation not contemplated by the

claim language. We construe the term “tray cart” to mean a “movable cart

capable of holding one or more trays.” 

C. Proximate and Distal End

The parties offer competing definitions for the terms “proximate end”

and “distal end.” Plaintiff offers that the proximate end is “from the reference

point of the initial location of the first tray cart, nearest side, as in the side of the

scanning device into which an object to be scanned enters the device.” Jt.

Claim Constr. Statement 3. The distal end then is “from the reference point of

the initial location of the first tray cart, farthest side, as in the side of the

scanning device from which an object to be scanned exits the device.” Id.

Defendant asks the court to construe the proximate end as “proximal or nearest

to; referring to the end of the scanning device where an object enters the

device” and the distal end as “farthest from; referring to the end of the scanning

device where an object exits the device.” Id.

We begin with the words of the claims. Claim 1 teaches that the patent

is for a method in which the “first tray cart containing trays” is positioned “at

the proximate end of a scanning device . . . wherein said scanning device

comprises a proximate end and a distal end.” PX1 at SP18. A tray is then

removed from the first cart, passed through the scanning device “from said

proximate end through to said distal end,” after which it is received in a second

tray cart that is “at said distal end of said scanning device.” Id. The last step

of Claim 1 is the moving of the second tray cart to the “proximate end of said

scanning device so that said trays in said second cart be passed through said

scanning device at said proximate end.” Id. Claim 7 adds that “[t]he method

of claim 1, further comprising the step of repositioning said second tray cart
 Claims 12 and 13 teach the addition of the third tray cart seen in the diagram 6

attached at the end of this opinion.

 Claim 1 also refers to the proximate and distal ends of the scanning device 7

itself when it makes clear that a “scanning device comprises a proximate end

and a distal end.” PX1 at SP18. That does not change our view of the use of

the terms in describing the positioning of the tray carts as discussed above.

11

from said distal end to said proximate end.” Id. We have attached a diagram

at the end of this opinion that appears on the first page of the patent. It

represents the generic layout taught by the 460 patent method.6

The parties do not meaningfully disagree as to which end is referred to

by “proximate” and “distal.” The referent is the scanning device. The

“proximate end” is referring to the end of the scanning device where an object

enters the device. Likewise, the “distal end” is referring end of the scanning

device where an object exits the device. Plaintiff’s construction is potentially

confusing and adds surplusage not required to understand what the reference

point is. Defendant’s construction best reflects the ordinary meaning of the

words as used in Claims 1 and 7. 

 

We also note from the parties briefing that defendant reads in to its

construction of “proximate end” and “distal end” a seeming limitation in the

locations of the tray carts as taught by the patent. Defendant views its

definition of an “end” to be a precise point as compared to a more general area

at the extent or boundary of something. We do not share defendant’s

understanding of its construction; it implies a level of precision that we find

generally lacking in the 460 patent. The patent describes a method for cycling

trays through a scanning device at a security check point. It is not dependent

upon a great deal of precision in the location of the instrumentalities involved.

Perhaps if “proximate end” and “distal end” were used to describe the actual

physical entry and exit point of the screening device itself, defendant’s

understanding would be natural. Here, however, the claims use the terms to

describe the location of tray carts external to the device. As it is, “proximate 7

end”means “proximal or nearest to; referring to the end of the scanning device

where an object enters the device.” “Distal end” means “farthest from; referring

to the end of the scanning device where an object exits the device.” Nothing

further is implied by those definitions. 
Plaintiff originally proposed the definition to be “capable of fitting compactly 8

or within one another.” At oral argument, the court inquired as to why

plaintiff’s definition included the word “or” and counsel replied that its

definition attempted to capture both that the trays fit within one another and

that they do so snugly. See Hr’g Tr. 45. The use of “or” in the definition

creates a logical disjunction whereby either or both statements can be true.

The meaning sought by plaintiff is better served without the word “or” because

plaintiff intends that “nestable” means that the trays fit both compactly and

within one another. 

12

D. Nestable

Claim 3 states that a “plurality of said trays [used in Claim 1] comprises

nestable trays.” DX 1 at SP18. Claim 4 explains that the “nestable trays” are

comprised of “exposed sides capable of displaying advertising.” The parties

disagree as to what “nestable” means. Per plaintiff, “nestable” means “capable

of fitting compactly within one another.” Joint Claim Constr. Statement 3. 8

Defendant offers that “nestable” means “capable of fitting at least partially

within one another.” Id. 

At first glance it appears that both definitions are encompassed by the

plain meaning of the term “nestable.” What is important, however, is that

defendant’s construction would, as plaintiff points out, encompass a situation

not taught by the patent. The patent specification contains the following

examples of how the trays are to stack: “stacked inside one another,” PX 1 at

SP16; “be easily stacked within one another,” id.; “nested within one another,”

id.; and “placed within one another,” id. This tracks with plaintiff’s

construction of trays fitting “compactly within one another.” 

Defendant’s construction of “capable of fitting at least partially within

one another” is true of the examples quoted above, but is also true of other

situations that would not be consistent with the language used in the

specification. Plaintiff’s example of applying defendant’s definition is that “a

refrigerator is capable of fitting at least partially within one shoebox.” Pl.’s

Reply in Supp. 21. If we assume two sides of the shoebox are removed, that

point is well taken. As mentioned earlier, the specification contemplates at

least two different sized trays, one generally larger than the other. The larger

tray might be capable of fitting only partially within the smaller tray, but that

is clearly not what the method contemplates. We construe “nestable” to mean
13

“capable of fitting compactly within one another.” 

E. Adapted 

The parties disagree as to the meaning of the term “adapted” as used in

claims 6, 8, 9, 14, and 15. Those claims teach various attributes of the tray carts

and the trays themselves. Claim 6 states that “tray carts are adapted to be

rollable.” PX 1 at SP18. Claim 8 instructs that a “plurality of said trays are

adapted to receive an item selected from a group [and examples are given].”

Id. Claim 9 is the same as Claim 8 except that it describes items from a group

of smaller items. Claim 14 teaches that the “trays are adapted to display

advertising on an interior bottom surface.” Id. Claim 15 details that the trays

“are adapted to display a tag number.” Id. 

Defendant understands the term “adapted” to mean “specially designed

or made for a specific purpose.” Jt. Claim Constr. Statement 3. Plaintiff

believes the term “adapted” is synonymous with the term “suited.” We must,

in essence, decide whether the degree to which the tray carts and trays are

specially designed for the purpose they are used for in the 460 patent method

is necessary to the claim. We find that the claim uses “adapted” as akin to

“suited,” as plaintiff proposes. 

Although it is not clear at this point what difference it would make

whether the trays are “specifically designed” to receive certain items or merely

“suited” to do so, defendant’s construction is unnecessarily limiting and ought

not be read into the claims. Nothing in the specification or claims themselves

lead us to conclude that the tray carts must be specially designed to roll or that

the trays be specially designed to hold certain sized items, display advertising

on the bottom, and display tag numbers. That the tray carts can roll without

problem or additional modification and that the trays can and do hold certain

sized items, can display advertising on the bottom, and a tag number without

problem or additional modification is what is taught by the patent. This is best

encompassed in the meaning of the word “suited” as proposed by plaintiff

without the further limitation in the construction offered by defendant. The

plain and ordinary meaning of “adapted” is “suited.”

F. Receiving The Tray In The Second Tray Cart

The last disagreement between the parties concerns the meaning of the

term “receiving said tray passed through said scanning device in said second
14

tray cart,” which appears in Claim 1 of the 460 patent. Plaintiff proposes to

explain it as “coming into possession of the tray in the second tray cart after

being passed through the scanning device at the distal end of the scanning

device.” Jt. Claim Constr. Statement 4. Defendant offers that it means “after

a tray has passed through the scanning device from the proximate end to the

distal end, a second tray cart receives the tray.” Id. We view these as

distinctions without a difference.

The language at issue in this term is describing a step in the screening

process as taught by the 460 patent. After a tray has been taken from the first

tray cart, it is then passed through the scanning device, and received into the

second tray cart positioned at the other end of the scanning device, which the

patent describes as “receiving said tray passed through said scanning device in

said second tray cart.” PX 1 at SP18. Nothing further is necessary to

understand what is being taught. The Federal Circuit has warned against

adding “meaningless verbiage to the definition of the claimed invention.”

Harris Corp., 114 F.3d at 1152; see also Hastings v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl.

729, 732-34 (2007) (declining to construe a term where it would not add to the

understanding of the patent). We thus decline to construe the term because it

is unnecessary to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim.

CONCLUSION

The following table summarizes our holdings as to each term:

The Patent Term The Court’s Construction

tray a base with upwardly extending

walls

trays no construction

tray cart a movable cart capable of holding

one or more trays

proximate end proximal or nearest to; referring to

the end of the scanning device

where an object enters the device
15

distal end farthest from; referring to the end of

the scanning device where an object

exits the device

nestable capable of fitting compactly within

one another

adapted suited

receiving said tray passed through

said scanning device in said second

tray cart

no construction

The deadlines for discovery as set out in our March 27, 2012 order, as modified

by our order of December 10, 2012, are hereby amended to reflect that

proponent’s expert reports are due by March 8, 2013, and rebuttal expert reports

are due by April 10, 2013. We will convene a status conference to discuss

further modification of the schedule. 

 s/ Eric G. Bruggink 

ERIC G. BRUGGINK

Judge