alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2011226EN.01000702.xml

| 30.7.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 226/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.7.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 226/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 16 June 2011 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria)) — Zollamt Linz Wels v Laki DOOEL

(Case C-351/10) (1)

1

(Community Customs Code - Regulation implementing the Customs Code - Articles 555(1)(c) and 558(1) - Vehicle which has entered the customs territory under the temporary importation procedure with total relief from import duties - Vehicle used for internal traffic - Unlawful use - Incurring of a customs debt - National authorities competent to levy customs duties)

2011/C 226/12

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Zollamt Linz Wels

Applicant:

Defendant: Laki DOOEL

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Interpretation of Articles 204(1)(a) and 215 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1), Articles 555(1)(c) and 558(1) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (OJ 1993 L 253, p. 1) and Article 61 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1) — Transport of goods by road in the European Union — Use of a vehicle that is not authorised in the Member State of destination of the goods — Place where the customs debt arises — Competence of the Member State of origin or of the Member State of destination

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 555(1) and Article 558(1)(c) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 993/2001 of 4 May 2001, must be interpreted as meaning that the irregularity in respect of the use of a vehicle imported into the European Union under the temporary importation procedure with total relief from import duties which is used for internal traffic must be regarded as occurring at the moment of crossing the border of the Member State in which the vehicle is used in breach of the national provisions in the field of transport, that is to say, without authorisation to unload given by the Member State of unloading, the authorities of that Member State being responsible for levying those duties.

---

(1)  OJ C 274, 9.10.2010.

1

---
# C_2005119EN.01000102.xml

| 20.5.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 119/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.5.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 119/1

---

Information relating to the entry into force of the Agreement between the European Community and the Principality of Andorra providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments

(2005/C 119/02)

The Agreement between the European Community and the Principality of Andorra providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments will enter into force on 1 June 2005, the procedures provided for in Article 15 of the Agreement having been completed on 26 April 2005.

---
Hamid MAHJOR, petitioner, v. GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC., et al.

No. 17-7236.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 14, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic 

and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any 

formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 17-BG-1258

IN RE WILLIAM STEVEN PALEOS

2017 DDN 238

A Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Registration No. 358580

BEFORE: Beckwith, Associate Judge, and Washington and Farrell, Senior Judges. 

O R D E R

(FILED – February 1, 2018)

On consideration of the certified order changing respondent’s status to practice 

law in the state of Maryland to inactive by consent, this court’s December 5, 2017, order 

suspending respondent and directing him to show cause why he should not be 

indefinitely suspended pursuant to a disability suspension under D.C. Bar R. XI § 13 as 

reciprocal discipline, the statement of Disciplinary Counsel wherein he states that 

respondent notified him that he did not oppose the imposition of reciprocal discipline, 

and it appearing that respondent did not file a response to this court’s order but did file 

his D.C. Bar R. XI § 14 (g) affidavit on January 2, 2018, it is 

ORDERED that William Steven Paleos is hereby indefinitely suspended from the 

practice of law in the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI § 13 nunc pro 

tunc to January 2, 2018. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that respondent’s attention is directed to the requirements 

of D.C. Bar R. XI § 13 (g) for reinstatement, as well as the provisions of Rule XI § 16 

(b) dealing with the requirements for reinstatement. 

PER CURIAM
David DELGADO, petitioner, v. Salvador GODINEZ, et al.

No. 17-7832.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 23, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
2002 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN



ADDENDUM
TO
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT

The following provisions are hereby incorporated into, and are hereby made a part of, that certain Stock Option Agreement (the "Option Agreement") by and between Borland Software Corporation (the "Corporation") and [_________] ("Optionee") evidencing the stock option (the "Option") granted to Optionee under the terms of the Corporation's 2002 Stock Incentive Plan, and such provisions are effective immediately. All capitalized terms in this Addendum, to the extent not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Option Agreement.

SPECIAL ACCELERATION

1.          To the extent the Option is assumed in connection with a Change in Control or otherwise continued in effect or replaced with a substitute option, the Option (or such substitute option) shall not accelerate to any extent upon the occurrence of that Change in Control, and the Option (or such substitute option) shall accordingly continue, over Optionee's period of Service after the Change in Control, to become exercisable for the Option Shares in one or more installments in accordance with the provisions of the Option Agreement.  However, upon termination of Optionee's Service other than for [Misconduct/Cause] (as such term is defined in Optionee's offer letter) or upon Optionee's  [Involuntary Termination/Constructive Termination] (as such term is defined in Optionee's offer letter) within twelve (12) monthsfollowing a Change in Control, then fifty percent (50%) of the Option (or such substitute option), to the extent outstanding at the time but not otherwise fully exercisable, shall automatically accelerate so that the Optionee shall be credited with an additional twelve (12) months of Service for purposes of the Vesting Schedule and such Option (or substitute option) may be exercised for any or all of those accelerated Option Shares (or other securities) as fully-vested shares, together with any other Option Shares (or other securities) for which the Option has already become vested and exercisable in accordance with the normal Vesting Schedule.

2.          In the event of any conflict, ambiguity, or inconsistency between the provisions of the Option Agreement and the provisions of this Addendum, to the extent possible such provisions will be interpreted so as to resolve any such conflict, ambiguity, or inconsistency, and if that is not possible, the provisions of the this Addendum will prevail.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Borland Software Corporation has caused this Addendum to be executed by its duly authorized officer as of the Effective Date specified below.

|                | BORLAND SOFTWARE CORPORATION
|--------------- | ----------------------------
|                |                             
|                |                             
|                | By:                         
|                |                             
|                | Title:                      
|                |                             
|EFFECTIVE DATE:
EXHIBIT 31.2

                           SECTION 302 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Mark Scott, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of IA Global, Inc.
("registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

   a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
      information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
      subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
      particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

   b) [omitted pursuant to the guidance of Release No. 33-8238 (June 5, 2003)];
      and

   c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
      procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
      effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of
      the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

   d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
      over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
      fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
      annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
      materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
      reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

   a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
      operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
      reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
      process, summarize and report financial information; and

   b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
      over financial reporting.

Date: April 15, 2005                    /s/ Mark Scott
                                        Mark Scott
                                        Chief Financial Officer
# C_2009069EN.01002501.xml

| 21.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 69/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 69/25

---

Action brought on 9 January 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-8/09)

(2009/C 69/45)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: C. Cattabriga and J. Sénéchal, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | declare that, by not adopting all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/17/EC of 8 February 2006 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain technical requirements for the donation, procurement and testing of human tissues and cells (1) or, in any case, by not communicating them to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by not adopting all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/17/EC of 8 February 2006 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain technical requirements for the donation, procurement and testing of human tissues and cells (1) or, in any case, by not communicating them to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

1

| — | order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The deadline for transposition of Directive 2006/17/EC expired on 1 November 2006. When this action was brought, the defendant had not yet adopted all the measures necessary to transpose the directive or, in any case, had not communicated them to the Commission.

---

(1)  OJ 2006 L 38, p. 40.

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                          14,200
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  182,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               301,000
<PP&E>                                         497,200
<DEPRECIATION>                                 447,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 492,600
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,077,100
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       171,600
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,584,500)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   492,600
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,900
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  198,400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (40,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              21,900
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (149,400)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (189,400)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                40,0000
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (149,400)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)
        

</TABLE>
Antonio White LANDELL, petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

No. 16-751.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 23, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied.
# C_2009129EN.01000401.xml

| 6.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/4

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 6 March 2009 — Eis.de GmbH v BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH

(Case C-91/09)

2009/C 129/06

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Eis.de GmbH

Applicant:

Defendant: BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Is there use for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104/EEC (1) where a third party provides as a keyword to a search engine operator a sign which is identical with a trade mark, without the consent of the proprietor of that trade mark, so that, on inputting the sign identical with the trade mark as a search term into the search engine, an electronic promotional link to the third party’s website advertising identical goods or services appears in an advertising block set apart from the list of search results, that link is marked as a sponsored link and the advertisement itself does not comprise the sign nor contain any reference to the trade mark proprietor or to the products it is offering for sale?

1

---

(1)  First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40 of 11.2.1989, p. 1).

1

---
J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, v. Gerardo ORTEGA, et al.

No. 17-1111.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 4, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
# C_2011139EN.01001102.xml

| 7.5.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 139/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 139/11

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 17 March 2011 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Greece)) — Navtiliaki Etairia Thasou AE (C-128/10), Amalthia I Navtiki Etairia (C-129/10) v Ipourgos Emborikis Navtilías

(Joined Cases C-128/10 and C-129/10) (1)

1

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom to provide services - Maritime cabotage - Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 - Articles 1 and 4 - Prior administrative authorisation for cabotage services - Review of conditions relating to the safety of ships - Maintenance of order in ports - Public service obligations - Absence of precise criteria known in advance)

2011/C 139/18

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Referring court

Simvoulio tis Epikratias

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Navtiliaki Etairia Thasou AE (C-128/10), Amalthia I Navtiki Etairia (C-129/10)

Applicants:

Defendant: Ipourgos Emborikis Navtilías

Defendant:

Intervener: Koinopraxia Epibatikon Ochimatagogon Ploion Kavalas — Thasou (C-128/10)

Intervener:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Simvoulio tis Epikratias — Interpretation of Arts 1, 2 and 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ 1992 L 364, p. 7) — National legislation requiring prior administrative authorisation for cabotage services — System aimed at verifying whether schedules can be implemented under conditions of safety for the ship and maintenance of order in the port — No precise criteria known in advance

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The provisions of Article 1 in conjunction with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which establishes a system of prior authorisation for maritime cabotage services providing for the adoption of administrative decisions imposing compliance with certain timeslots for reasons relating, first, to the safety of ships and order in ports and, second, to public service obligations, provided that such a system is based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, particularly in cases where more than one shipowner is interested in entering the same port at the same time. With respect to the administrative decisions imposing public service obligations, it is also necessary that a genuine public service need arising from the inadequacy of the regular transport services under conditions of free competition can be demonstrated. It is for the national court to determine whether in the main proceedings those conditions are met.

---

(1)  OJ C 134, 22.5.2010.

1

---
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.3

         RATIO OF EBITDA (AS DEFINED) TO INTEREST EXPENSE (AS DEFINED)
                            (Dollars in Thousands)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                        1997        1998        1999         2000      2001
<S>                                   <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>        <C>
EBITDA (as defined)                   $ 24,522    $ 43,547    $ 50,562    $ 54,011   $ 70,955
Interest expense (as defined)            3,463       3,175      20,722      25,924     28,968
                                      --------    --------    --------    --------   --------

Ratio                                      7.1        13.7         2.4         2.1        2.4
                                      ========    ========    ========    ========   ========
</TABLE>

                                      iii
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed March

5 , 2013

.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 12

- 00791

- CV

JACQUELINE WILLIAMS, EXECUTRIX FOR THE ES TATE OF JAVIER RAMIREZ CRUZ AND YOL ANDA ROSENDA RAMIREZ CRUZ , Appellant s

V.

PROVIDENT AMERICAN I NSURANCE COMPANY , Appellee

On Appeal from the 270th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2010

- 78994

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment signed August 1, 2012 . On February 22,
2013, appellants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted.

Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of J ustices Frost, Brown, and Busby.