1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) LAWRENCE THOMAS ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action 07-2188 (RCL) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, ) Social Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court on plainti ff’s motion for judgment of reversal of the defendant’s final administrative decision denying plaintiff’s cl aim for Disability Insurance Benefits. Upon consideration of plaintiff’s moti on [6] for judgment of re versal, the defendant’s motion [8] for judgment of affirmance, plaintiff’s opposition [11] to defendant’s motion for judgment of affirmance, the applicable law, and th e entire record herein, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and defendant’s motion is GRANT ED. The Court’s reasoning is discussed below. BACKGROUND I. Procedural Background Plaintiff, Lawrence Thomas filed applicati ons for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act on Mach 12, 2002. (Tr. 15.) Plaintiff alle ged a disability onset of June 13, 2001. ( Id. 48-50.) He alleged disability on the basis of sciatica and spinal stenosis caused by arthritis. (Pl.’s Mot.2 for J. of Reversal at 1.) Plai ntiff’s claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 33-37, 38, 39-42.) On June 22, 2005, at a hearing befo re an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), plaintiff was again denied benefits. ( Id. 1-2.) Leonard Perlman, a vo cational expert (“VE”) was also present at this hearing. ( Id. 15.) The ALJ determined that plaintiff could engage in work identified by the VE even though he had se vere spinal stenosis and arthritis. ( Id. 15-21.) The Appeals council determined there was no basis for a review of the ALJ. ( Id. 5-7.) Plaintiff then appealed to this Court and in an orde r dated August 28, 2006 the Court granted the Commissioner’s voluntary motion to remand, reversed the final administrative decision of the Commissioner, and remanded the case for further pro ceedings.” (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 2.) On March 13, 2007, the Appeals Council i ssued its remand order requiring a better articulation of the medical reco rds. (Tr. 262-266.) A supplemental hearing was held on July 17, 2007 and on October 2, 2007 the ALJ issued a decisi on again denying the plai ntiff’s claims. ( Id. 256, 271-289, 242-255.) The ALJ determined that plai ntiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to do “unskilled light work with a si t/stand option and limited dominant hand use.” ( Id. 249.) The plaintiff again brought suit in this Co urt challenging the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. II. Factual Background Plaintiff is a 38 year old man and was 30 year s old at the alleged on set of his disability. (Def.’s Mot for J. of Affirmance at 4.) He has a high school education and in the past plaintiff has worked as a truck driver. (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 2.) His past jobs have involved heavy lifting. (Def.’s Mot. for J. of Affirm ance at 4.) From June 13, 2001 through December 1, 2005 plaintiff claims he did not work because of his b ack injury. (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 2.) In June, 2001 plaintiff was diagnosed with re current disc herniation, w ith epidural fibrosis3 and moderate to marked spinal stenosis at L4-5 as well as having a disc protrusion at L3-4 with impingement upon the L4 nerve root and arthritis. ( Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff cl aims that he had back problems starting in 1998 and that the problem recurred in 2001. ( Id. at 2.) Plaintiff testified that since the onset of his disability he has worked modeling men’s clothing and selling men’s clothing for 9 months. (Tr. 231, 275, 278.) Plaintiff also claims that he could not work due to pain. (Def.’s Mot. for J. of A ffirmance at 5.) Records from the D.C. Chartered Family Health Center dated September 30, 2003 state that plainti ff was seen for a right hand second digit injury “poss. sport related.” (Tr. 201, 203.) Further, records from the same center dated July 7, 2004, stated that plaintiff was seen by orthopedics for f oot and knee pain that began after plaintiff “fell while playing basketba ll 1 1⁄2 weeks ago.” ( Id. 176.) Plaintiff testified that he takes his daughter to work and sometimes will attend to “busines s” until he picks her up in the afternoon. ( Id. 77.) Based on all the information, the ALJ ultimately found that plaintiff suffered from a severe back disorder and arthritis but determined that plainti ff was not credible as to the amount of pain he felt. ( Id. 243, 251.) DISCUSSION There is substantial evidence on the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled under the meaning of the Social Security Act. I. Legal Standard for Review of Final Decisi on of the Commissioner of Social Security The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) gi ves federal district co urts jurisdiction over civil cases that challenge the final decision of the Commissioner of Soci al Security. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Th e Court does not review the decision de novo , Smith v. Schweiker , 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986), but rather limits its review of the Commissioner’s decision to whether the decision is supporte d by substantial evid ence and whether the4 Commissioner applied the co rrect legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence “requires more than a scinti lla, but can be satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n , 315 F.3d 362, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Richardson , 402 U.S. at 390, 401 (defining “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”). “In seeking judicial review of a final determination of the Social Secu rity Commission, the plaintiff bear s the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner's decision is not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied. Curry v. Apfel , 209 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Shalala , 1994 WL 776887 (D.D.C. August 31, 1994) at **2.” Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart , 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 64 (D.D.C. 2006). The reviewing court must give considerab le deference to the Co mmissioner’s decision but remains obligated to ensure that the decision was based on “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Co mmissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]”); see also Richardson , 402 U.S. at 389. Therefore, this standard of review requires the Court to carefully scrutinize th e entire record to ensure that the Commissioner, through the ALJ, has both anal yzed all of the evidence available and has sufficiently explained his/her reasoning and the weights given to the facts. See Butler v. Barnhart , 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The ALJ, not the Court is ultimately responsible for weighing all of the evidence and coming to conclusion on any issues. See Hays v. Sullivan , 907 F.2d 1453, 145 (4th Cir. 1990). The Court w ill not disturb the Commissioner’s final decision if it is based on substant ial evidence in the record and co rrectly applies legal standards.5 II. The Judgment of the Administrative La w Judge is Supported by Substantial Evidence The plaintiff argues that the ALJ's “decision fails to be supported by substantial evidence, and is erroneous as a matter of law” because: (1) the ALJ “erroneously assessed the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity,” a nd (2) the ALJ “failed to prop erly assess the opinion of the plaintiff’s treating physician s.” (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 3-16.) The Social Security Act has specific require ments and a very detailed definition of disability to determine if someone qualifies for disability insurance bene fits or supplemental security income payments under the act. (Def.’s Mot. for A ffirmance at 2-3 (providing the definition of disability).) The Commissioner of So cial Security has developed a five-step inquiry for the ALJ to use when evaluating disabili ty claims. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. First, the claim is denied if the claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the claim is denied if the claimant is not engaged in gainful employment, and the judge has determined that the claimant does not have a “severe medically determinable physical [] impairment” which prevents him from performing basic work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, th e inquiry ends and disability is presumed if the claimant's impairment “meets or equals” the impairments listed on the Listing of Impairments, § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, if the im pairment does not “meet or equal” one of the Listing of Impairments, the claim is de nied if the judge determ ines the claimant’s RFC allows the claimant to perform hi s or her “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Finally, if the judge rules that the clai mant cannot perform “past relevant work,” the Commissioner must then prove that the claimant can perform other s ubstantial gainful work, ba sed on his or her age, education, work experience, and RFC or th e claimant is entitled to benefits. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).6 At step one in this case, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not engaged in substantial work activity. (Tr. 16.) At st ep two, it was determined that plaintiff’s back impairment and arthritis were severe impairments. ( Id. 16.) However, the impairments did not reach the level of any of the impairment listings at step three, requiring the ALJ to move to step four. ( Id. 17.) At step four the ALJ determined that plaintiff wa s unable to perform his past relevant work. ( Id. 18.) It was determined, with the help of a VE, at step five that plaintiff is “capable of making a successful adjustment to work that exists in si gnificant numbers in the national economy” and is therefore, not disabled under th e Medical-Vocational Rule 202.20. ( Id. 19-20.) A. The ALJ Correctly Assessed the Plaintif f’s Residual Functional Capacity Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to properly assess the [p]laintiff’s limitations as required pursuant to Social Securi ty ruling 96-8p.” (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 4.) Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the RF C assessment is unsupportable for a variety of reasons including; (1) the ALJ “failed to include a narrativ e discussion describing how the evidence supported each conclusion,” (2) th e ALJ “ignored the Appeals Council’s March 13, 2007 order” when he assessed pl aintiff’s RFC, (3) the ALJ “ignored pertinent evidence in assessing the plaintiff’s [RFC],” and (4) the AL J determined that “Dr. Braun’s opinion was entitled to substantive weight” [when], “in actuality, he afford ed these opinions no weight whatsoever.” ( Id. at 6-11.) The Ruling provides that the RFC assessmen t “is a function-by-functional assessment based upon all of the relevant evid ence of an individual’s ability to do work-related activities,” as well as a “narrative discussion de scribing how the evidence supports each conclusion . . . .” SSR 96-8p. However, “[p]reparing a function-by-f unction analysis for me dical conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credib le nor supported by the record is unnecessary.”7 Bayliss v. Barnhart , 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); see also SSR 96-8p (“When there is no allegation of a physical or mental limitation or re striction of a specific functional capacity, and no information in the case record that there is such a limitation or restriction, the adjudicator must consider the individual to have no limitation or restriction w ith respect to that functional capacity.”). i. The Narrative Discussion is supported by Sufficient Evidence The Court finds that the ALJ included suffi cient information to satisfy the narrative discussion requirement of the RFC assessment. The ALJ discussed generally the many different factors to consider and then summarized pl aintiff’s testimony—demonstrating that the ALJ planned to rely in part on this testimony. Further the ALJ spent tw o pages describing which medical and objective evidence he found credible and which he di d not. (Tr. 251-52.) The ALJ stated: After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reas onably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that the claimant’s statemen ts concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are credible only to the extent of the residual functional capacity. The claimant returned to work in December 2005 and, despite his subjective complaints of debilitating headach es and pain, the objective medical evidence and the other evidence of record when revi ews as whole, indicat e that he was not precluded from doing working consistent withthe established residual functional capacity for a period of 12 months or longer si nce his alleged onset date . . . . In addition, the undersigned has considered the claimant’s good activities of daily living. In April 2002, he reported that he took his child to school on weekdays. He does all of his household chores. He shopped. He drew pi ctures as a hobby. He watched television. He visited with family or friends and watche d movies. He stated that he cannot play basketball nor do other activities involving running but the medical records from D.C. Chartered Family Health Center show that he played basketball in 2004. Exhibits 4E and 11F. ( Id. ) When the ALJ finds that claims are not supported by evidence other than plaintiff’s subjective complaints and finds these complaints not fully credible, the ALJ does not have to8 perform a function by function analysis. See Bayliss , 427 F.3d at 1217. However, the ALJ does go into detail discussing which opinions he woul d rely on more heavily and which facts were most important to him. Plaintiff complains that the ALJ opinion does not indicate why he limited plaintiff. The ALJ limited plaintiff to perform “unskilled lig ht work with a sit/stand option and limited dominant hand use.” (Tr. 250.) The ALJ briefl y mentions plaintiff’s past work. Although, the ALJ does not specifically state that plaintiff is li mited to “unskilled” work because of plaintiff’s educational background and the prev ious work plaintiff had performed, it is a logical conclusion to draw based on the entire record. Second, the AL J limited plaintiff to “light work.” The ALJ indicates he is limited to light work because “Joseph Braun, M.D.., advised the claimant not to do any lifting or bending . . . [t]his opinion is gi ven substantive weight, be cause it is reasonable as a precautionary measure as the claimant sought emergency treatment after injuring himself at work lifting heavy boxes . . . the claimant was able to perform light work.” ( Id. 252.) Another doctor, Dr. Dennis, is not given as much weightbecause the ALJ noted, “Dr. Dennis’ opinion is not supported by his own findings on physical examination.” ( Id. ) “[I]n establishing why his RFC contained a restriction as to limited dominant hand use, the ALJ pointed to the fact that the plaintiff had a hand deformity and evidence of tendonitis ( Id. 171, 175, 249). Yet, the ALJ explained that as reflected by th e medical reports and the plainti ff’s testimony, he was capable of using his right hand on a regular basis ( Id. 254).” (Def.’s Mot. for J. of Affirmance at 15.) The ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. ii. The ALJ did Not Ignore the App eals Council’s March 13, 2007 Order On March 13, 2007, the Appeal’s Council directed the ALJ to: Give further consideration to the Claimant ’s maximum residual functional capacity, and provide appropriate rationale withspecific references to the ev idence of record in support9 of the assessed limitation. (Tr. 266). Although plaintiff is correct in that the ALJ “shall take any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council . . . .”, 20 C.F.R. § 404.977( b) (2008), in this case the ALJ did do as directed. As discussed above plaintiff provided more details in his determination of the plaintiff’s RFC. By comparison the ALJ spent le ss than one page discussing plaintiff’s RFC in the first opinion, (Tr. 18), compared with over three pages in the following opinion ( Id. 249-52). Quantity of discussion is not sufficient if it does notsatisfy a certain quality of discussion but the Court finds that the necessary consideration has been give n and the ALJ has provided enough evidence of record to support the assessed limitations. The ALJ discussed the credibility of plai ntiff as well as the treating doctors. ( Id. 252, 251 (finding “claimant’s statements concerning th e intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms” to be credible “only to the extent of the establis hed residual functional capacity.”).) “On January 29, 2003, Dr. Dennis opi ned that the claimant is totally and permanently disabled for at least one to two years.” ( Id. 252.) However, the ALJ relied more heavily on the opinion of Dr. Aleskow, where the ALJ determined that the consultative examination performed by Dr. Aleskow on January 20, 2003 was consistent with the established RFC but inconsistent with Dr. Dennis’ opinion. ( Id. ) Further, he pointedout certain activities that plaintiff participated in which tended to influence his opinion. The above discussion about the sufficiency of the narrative discussion also applies to following the Appeals Council’s order. iii. The ALJ did Not Ignore Pertinent Evidence Plaintiff argues that the AL J “provided no explanation for ignoring evidence of the severity of the [p]laintiff’s back condition pr ovided by his treating physic ians and his physical therapist.” (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 10.) Again, “[p]reparing a function-by-function10 analysis for medical conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the record is unnecessary.” Bayliss v. Barnhart , 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); see also SSR 96-8p. The ALJ discussed conflicting evid ence by the treating physicians and ultimately concluded that there was not e nough medical evidence to support a more limited RFC. The ALJ does not ignore these opinions but instead provides explanations for his decision not to address these findings throughout the opinion. For example, he specifically states that “Dr. Dennis’ opinion is not supported by his own findings on physic al examination.” (Tr. 252.) Therefore, there was no need for the ALJ to address certain parts of Dr. Dennis’s report. Other evidence concluded that th e back condition was not as seve re as plaintiff indicated. About the same time of this examination—January 20, 2003—Dr. Aleskow opined that “[d]espite this patient’s complaints, he has full range of motion of all extremities with no limitation in range of motion whatsoever.” ( Id. 136.) In addition, Dr . Kronthal who performed an MRI in July 2001 stated that plaintiff’s condi tion did not translate in to spinal arachnoiditis because plaintiff is able “to ambulate and pe rform fine and gross movements. . . .” ( Id. 249.) Even so, the differing physicians’ opinions are stil l partially incorporated into the RFC. For example, the physical therapist reported that the physical therapy sessions had no impact on resolving plaintiff’s subjective or objective si gns and symptoms but the ALJ still noted the subjective pains complained of in his opinion. ( Id. 251-52.) The ALJ gives the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt by limiting the work to light wo rk. Plaintiff also complains that there was no accommodation for the aggravated pain caused by standing or walking. This is untrue as the RFC requires a “sit/stand option.” Further, deference should be given to th e ALJ in the determination of whether a claimant’s alleged pain is credible, allowing th e ALJ to weigh some opinions more heavily than11 others. “In evaluating complaints of pain, an [ALJ] may properly consider the claimant's credibility. The ALJ's assessment of credibility is entitled to great weightand deference, since he had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor.” Infantado v. Astrue , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3313, at *17 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (“When ever a claimant's complaints regarding symptoms, or their intensity and persistence, are not supported by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a determination of the credibil ity of the claimant in connection with his or her complaints based on a consideration of the entire case record.”). The ALJ’s determination that plaintiff is not entirely cr edible is supported by the record. Although the plaintiff’s pain is discussed and used in a doctor’s report, the pain plaintiff is feeling is still a subjective complaint and therefore, the ALJ has the authority to dete rmine how much pain actually exists, relying on the entire record as a whole. iv. Limitation on Lifting and Bending is Sufficient Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ placed no limits on plaintiff lifting or bending. (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 11.) Sp ecifically, plaintiff points to Dr . Braun’s examination, which was accorded weight by the ALJ, where he advised plaintiff not to do any lifting or bending. ( Id. ) The record notes that plaintiff lifted up to 100 pounds at his previous j ob as a delivery truck driver. (Tr. 55.) The ALJ statedthat plaintiff is unable to perf orm past relevant work because it is “greater than simple unskilled light work.” ( Id. 252.) Therefore, lifting was at least taken into account. It should be noted that it was advised that plaintiff not bend over—it was not established that plainti ff could not bend over. The correct legal standard for weighing the evidence was used to find that there is sufficient evidence on the record to support the RFC as decide d by the ALJ. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that more discussion is needed to meet the requirements of SSR 96-8p. Further, the12 ALJ followed the direction of the Appeals Council.
B. The ALJ Properly Assessed the Opinion of the Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ failed to; (1) properly assess the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physicians pursuant to applicable regul ations, (2) properly asse ss whether the opinion should be given controlling weight, and (3) follo w the Appeal Council’s remand order. (Tr. 13- 15.) Plaintiff specifically argues that the ALJ fail ed to properly evaluate the plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Craig’s, medical opinion. (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal at 12 (noting Dr. Craig “determined that the [p]laintiff had demonstrated decreased range of motion, sensory, motor, and reflex loss, and muscle spasm. He was noted to have difficulties with his activities of daily living, and standing, walking, and s itting were reported to aggravat e the [p]laintiff’s pain).) “When the ALJ arrives at a conclusion regarding [] strength functions that contradicts some part of the evidence on the record, the ALJ must explain his rationale, for ‘[t]he judiciary can scarcely perform its assigned review function . . . without some indication . . . [as to] whether [the] evidence was rejected rather than simply ignored.’” Ross v. Astrue , 636 F. Supp. 2d 127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ( citing Brown v. Bowen , 794 F.2d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The ALJ has a duty to explain why they either ignored or rejected contradictory evidence. See See v. Wash. Metro.Transit Auth. , 36 F.3d 375, 384 (4th Cir. 1994). Th e ALJ explained his rationale for accepting some of the doctor’s opinions a nd ignoring others. (Tr. 252-53.) To begin with, the ALJ discussed the factor s he would consider in determining the credibility of plaintiff’s statements. ( Id. 250.) After considering these factors, the ALJ determined that plaintiff wa s not entirely trustworthy base d on his daily activities. ( Id. 251-52.) Therefore, the ALJ had to take on the task of determining which subjectiv e parts of the medical reports were accurate based on the lack of credibi lity of the plaintiff. In the beginning of his13 opinion the ALJ discussed severa l doctors’ opinions including the Prince George’s Hospital Center Emergency Room records, Dr. Alan Krot hal, Dr. Mitchell L. Craig, Dr. Dennis, D.C. Chartered Family Health Center records, and Dr. Elliot Aleskow. ( Id. 248-49.) From these reports the ALJ determined which pieces of information were findings of fact. ( Id .) Although the ALJ found that plaintiff was still able to work, he did not discount everything the physicians have stated. The ALJ recognized that plainti ff has severe disorders under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920( c), consisting of disorders of the back and arthritis. (Tr. 243.) The ALJ also took into account that pl aintiff was in pain, crediting the plaintiff that there is at least some level of intensity, pe rsistence and limiting effects from the pain. ( Id. 251.) If the doctors opinions were not at least considered then plain tiff would not have received the RFC of “unskilled light work with a sit/stand option and limited dominant hand use.” ( Id. 243.) The ALJ even stated that “the objective fi ndings on physical examin ation by Dr. Craig and Dennis show that within 12 months the claima nt was able to perform light work.” ( Id. 252.) Deference need only be given to the opini on of a treating physici an when sufficient medical data is available to substantiate his opinion. See Giddings v. Richardson , 480 F.2d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 1976). Specifically, controlling wei ght is only given to a treating physician’s opinion “[i]f we find that a treati ng source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical an d laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the othe r substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527( d)(2). There is suffi cient evidence on the record to determine that the ALJ could wei gh the evidence more heav ily in favor of the determined RFC. Dr. Craig referred plaintiff to Dr. Dennis in March 2002 for a specia lized evaluation of14 his back complaints. (Def.’s Mot. for J. of A ffirmance at 16.) However, when first referred, Dr. Dennis noted that plaintiff’s “gait and coordination are normal.” (Tr. 120.) The ALJ ultimately determined that “Dr. Dennis opinion is not supported by his own findings on physical examination.” ( Id. 252.) The ALJ discussed that Dr. Dennis stated plaintiff was “100% permanently disabled” because he “cannot st and, walk, lift or push” but the ALJ noted: [I]n that same report he reported that the claimant could walk and his range of motion was not significantly limited. His muscle strength was normal in all extremities or he was able to at least move against gravity and resistance. Also, about the same time that Dr. Dennis examined the claimant, Dr. Aleskow performed a consulta tive evaluation. Dr. Aleskow[‘s] findings on physical examination were not consistent with Dr. Dennis’ opinion. Despite the claimant’s subjective co mplaints of debilitating pain, Dr. Aleskow found the claimant had full range of motion of all extremities, no neurological deficits, and no significant limitation in fine motor skills. ( Id. 243, 252.) Parts of the opinions of Dr. Cr aig and Dr. Dennis were determined to be inconsistent with the record as a whole and ther efore, the ALJ need not give deference to the opinion of the treating physician. Plaintiff continues by describing the criteria for weighing of medical opinions set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(2006). (Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Re versal at 12-14.) Six factors are considered in deciding the weight to be given to any medical opinion including; examining relationship, treatment relationship, supportability, consiste ncy, specialization, a nd other factors. ( Id. ) Plaintiff argues that there is no indication that the ALJ considered these factors. ( Id. at 14.) However, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 does not specifically state that the factors must all be discussed in the opinion by the ALJ, as long as the ALJ c onsidered them while making his decision. It is clear that the ALJ did consider these factors. For example, 20 C.F.R § 404.1527 allows room for ALJ determination, stating; “[g]enerally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to thatopinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The ALJ has the authority to give Dr. Craig’s opini on less weight if, for example, he finds it to be less consistent15 with the record as a whole. Further, the Court finds that the ALJ did comply with the Appeal Council’s remand order by considering the me dical evidence of record. (Tr. 266.) CONCLUSION In order to affirm a final decision of th e Commissioner the Cour t must find that the Commissioner (1) made its decision based on subs tantial evidence, and (2) applied the correct legal standards. See Richardson , 402 U.S. at 390, 401. Both of these requirements have been met. Plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of reversal will be DENIED. Plaintiff has failed to show that the Administrative Law Judge’s decision wa s not based on substantial evidence or is erroneous as a matter of law. Th e Court will not issue an order re manding this case to the Social Security Administration. Defendant’s motion for affirmance will be GRANTED. A separate order will issue on this date. Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on January 7, 2010.