### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 597 -CR

Jo hn M ic hae l M ac huc a , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 06- 1460 -K 368 , HO NORAB LE B URT CARNES , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
J ohn Michae l Machuc a appeals a judgme nt of conviction for possessing more than four g rams of 3,4- methy lenedioxy methamphetamine w ith intent to deliver. See T ex . Hea lth & Sa fe ty Cod e Ann. § 481 .1 13 (a ), (d ) (We st 2 00 3) ; se e als o id
. § 4 81 .1 03 (We st Su pp . 2 00 8) (p e na lty g roup 2). The court a ssessed punishment at forty y ear s’ imprisonment and orde red that the sentenc e be cumulate d with the sentenc e pre viously imposed in another c ase. In two points of er ror, a ppellant
c o n te n d s th a t th e c u mu lati o n o r d e r w a s ana b u s e o f d is c r e ti o nan d

c o n s ti tute d

d o u b le je o p ar dy . We
overr ule these c ontentions and aff irm the conviction. Af te r m idn ig ht on Au g us t 26, 200 6, a pp e lla nt fata lly sh ot Aus tin

Ta y lor -Wo od s in Travis County , took a bag of ecsta sy tablets that had be en in Tay lor-Woods’s possession, and drove
awa y in Taylor-Woods’s g irlfriend’ s pickup t ruck. Appellant drove into Willi amson County , wher e a police of

fice r saw him driving err atically . Appellant did not comply when the office r attempted2

to stop him , and he th er ea ft er led the police on a twenty -five- minute chase befor e he w as finally appre hended. The orig inal indictment in this cause , filed in Octobe r 20 0 6 , accused a ppellant of possessing 3,4- methy lenedioxy methamphetamine with intent to de liver, tampering with evidence , and eva ding a

rre st. A ppellant was also indicted in T ravis County for Taylor-Woods’s murder. O n Janu ary 30 , 2 00 8, wh il e th is cau se wa s p e nd ing , a pp e lla nt p le a de d guil ty

in t he Tr a vis County murder c ase a

nd was sente nced to f

orty y ear s in prison. The Travis County judgme nt contains an order stating, “ The Court O RDERS that the sente nce in this conviction shall run c onsecutively and shall beg in only

when the judg ment and sente nce in the f ollowing c ase ha s cea sed to operate: WI L L I AMSON COUNTY CASE . . . .”

I n May 2008, appellant wa s reindicted in Williamson C ounty
. I n addition to the three offe nses alleg ed in the orig inal indictment, the new indictment c o n t ained a fourth count a ccusing app el l an t of the a g g ravated robbe ry of Tay lor-Woods. I n J uly

2008, pursuant to a plea barg ain, appellant plea ded g uilty

to the controlled substance count and the other counts wer e dismissed. The plea ba rg ain called for a forty -y ear sentenc e, with appellant pr eser ving the rig ht to appeal should the trial court make a cumulation order
. The trial court adjudg ed appellant g uilty , imposed sentence , and order ed that the sentenc e is to beg in w hen the sentenc e in the Travis County murder c ase ha s cea sed to operate. This appea l followed.

The Travis County murder and the controlled substance offe nse for which appe llant
was c onvicted in this cause a rose out of the same c riminal episode. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 3.01 (We st 20 03 ) (d e fi nin g “ c ri min a l e pis od e ” ). I f the tw o of fe ns e s ha d be e n pr os e c ute d in th e same3

criminal ac tion, it would have been ma ndatory for t h e s en t ence s to run concur rently
. Se e id
. § 3.03(a) (West Supp. 2008). Be cause the offe nses wer e not tr ied toge ther, howeve r, the cour t below had the discr etion to order that the sentenc e in this c au s e b e s er v ed either c oncurr ently with the Travis County

sentenc e or a fter that sent en ce h as ce as ed to oper ate. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08(a ) (West 2006). The court c hose the latter option. Appellant contends that the cumulation order constitutes double jeopar dy under the F if th Ame nd me nt. Ap pe lla

nt c on c e de s th a t th e Tr a vis County dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c umu la tio n o rd e r i s a nullity beca use appellant had not bee n tried or se ntence d in this cause whe n that order was e ntere d. Se e id . ( a uth or izin g c umu la tio n o f s e nte nc e in su bs e qu e nt p ro se c uti on wi th s e nte nc e imp os e d in pr e vio us pro sec uti on ); se e als o E xpa rteW

ar d , 274 S.W .2d 693, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955) (applying prede cessor statute). Appellant argues, howe ver, that having soug ht a cumulation orde r in t he Tr a vis County

c a se , th e State sh ou ld no t ha ve be e n g ive n a

se c on d o pp or

tun ity to c umu la te the sen ten ces. Th is a

rgume nt f

a ils be c a us e the Do ub le Jeop ard

y Cla us e do e s n ot e xten d to noncapital se ntencingproce eding s. Mo ng e v . Ca lif or nia , 524 U.S. 721, 724 (1998). Alternatively , appellant c ontends that the trial cour t ab u s ed i t s discretion by cumulating the sentenc e in this cause with the sente nce imposed in the Tr avis County prosec ution b e c a u s e h e c o u l d

h a v e b e e nt r i e d

f o r b o t h o f f e n s e s i na s i n g l e p r o c e e d i n g i nW i l l i a m s o nC o u n t y. Appellant re asons as follows. T ay l or-Woods was robbe d and murde red at the same location. B e c a us e a pp e lla nt w a s p ro se c ut e d f

or the mur de r i n T ra

vis County

bu t in dic te d f

or the ro bb e ry

in Wil liamson County , appellant infers that the robber y -murder must have bee n committed within four hundred y ards of

the boundar

y betwee n the two counties. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 13.044

(West 2005) (venue for of fense committed on or near county boundary ). Thus, appe llant argues that he c ou ld h a ve be e n p ro se c ute d f or the mur de r i n Wil liamso n Co un ty and , b e c a us e the mur de r o ff

e ns e
and the c on tr oll e d sub sta

nc e of fe ns e aro se ou t of the same c ri min a l epi so de , th e tw o o ff e ns e s c ou ld have be en joined for

prosec ution at a sing le trial. See Tex. Pena l Code Ann. § 3.02(a) (West 2003). Citi ng code of

criminal proc edure article 27.05, appellant asserts t hat the leg islature has e x presse d a pre fer ence for concurr ent s entenc es for offe nses arising out of t he same criminal episode, and the failure to follow that pref

ere nce in this cause was an abuse of discretion. Article 27.05 pr ovides that a defenda nt may asser

t as a specia l plea that he has alre ady been convicted for t he same or a differe nt offe nse arising out of t he same criminal episode that was or should have been c onsolidated into one trial. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 27.05 (West 2006).

We rejec t appellant’s a

rg ument fo r two re asons. Fir st, there is no evide nce that
a pp e lla nt c ou ld h a ve be e n tr ie d f

or mur de r i n Wil liamso n County
. Th e re c or d be fo re us re fl e c ts o nly that Taylor-Woods was robbed and murdere d in Travis Count y . The W illiamson County indictment
acc using appellant of robbing Taylor-Woods is not e vidence that the robber y -murder was c ommitt ed within four hundre d y ards of the county

line. For all we know from t his recor d, appellant mig ht have been a ble to succe ssfully

challeng e his prosec ution for r o b bery in Wi lliamson Count y

on venue g rounds had that c ount not been aba ndoned by

the State as pa

rt of the plea

barg ain. S e c o n d , e v e ni f

a p p e l l an tc o u l d

h a v e b e e nt r i e d

f o r m u r d e r i n W i l l i a m s o nC o u n t y, article 27.05 does not apply . Under penal c ode sec tion 3.02, offense s arising out of a sing le cr iminal
e p is o d e ma

y b e c o n s o li d a te d f

o r tr ia l, b u t c o n s o li d a ti o n is n o t ma n d a to r y . See Nelso n v . S

tat e , 86 4 S. W.2 d 496 , 498 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ) (h old ing de fe nd ant doe s not have ri g ht to c on so lid a te5

of fe ns e s com mit te d in sa

me c ri min a l e pis od e ); Ste v e ns v . S tat e , 6 67 S.W. 2d

53 4, 53 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ) ( “ [se c tio n] 3. 02 re fers to permissi ve joi nd e r” ). As Steve ns explains, t he leg islature amende d article 27.05 to add the “should have been consolidated” langua g e in the expectation that the ne w ( c ur

re nt) pe na l c od e the n und e r co ns ide ratio n wou ld pr ov ide fo r m and a tor y joi nd e r i n s ome circ umstances. Steve ns , 667 S.W .2d at 537. As it turned out, the mandatory joinder provisions wer e omitted from the pena l code a s enac ted, but article 27.05 was not altere d to ref lect that re ality
. Id
. I f appe llant had fil ed a s p ec i al p lea of former conviction base d on the theory that the murder

and controlled substanc e off

enses should ha

ve been consolidated for trial, the motion would have be en proper ly overr uled. Id . at 538. Finally , appellant a

rg ues that the c umulation order was an abuse of discretion in light of his ag e. Appe llant points to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that per sons under e ighte en y ear s of ag e “c annot with reliability be cla ssified among the worst off ender s.” Roper v. Si mmons , 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). Appellant, who was seventeen y ear s old when the off enses at issue were committed, argues that in light of Roper , it wa s an ab us e of dis c re tio n f or the tr ia l c ourt

to e ff e c tiv e ly sentenc e him to eig hty

y ear s in prison for off

enses a rising out of

the same c riminal episode. The issue in Roper

was the c onstitut ionality

of executing a per son who was less than eig hteen y ear s old at the time he committed a c apital offe nse. Id . at 555-56. In holding that the constitution forbids the death pena lty in suc h a case , the Supreme Court affir med the judg ment of the state supre me cour

t refor ming the de fenda

nt’s punishment from death to life i m p risonment without parole. Se e id . at 560, 579. Ther e is nothing in Roper to s ug g e st that it

wa s unla wf ul t o
s en t en ce ap p el l an tt o a c u m u l at i v e ei gh t y y ea rs i n p ri s o n fo r th e o ff en s es h e a d m i t t edco m m i t t i n g.6 Th e c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls h a s sa id t

hat w he n a

tr ia l c ourt

lawf ull y e xer c ise s it s dis c re tio n to c umu la te se nte nc e s p ur su ant t o a rt ic le 42 .0 8, that de c isi on is una ssa ila

ble on a pp e a l. Be e dy v . S

tat e , 250 S.W .3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Finding no basis for c oncluding that the c umu la tio n ord e r wa s unla wf ul, we ov e rr

ule a pp e lla nt’ s con te nti on that the or de r w a s an a bu se of the trial c ourt’s discre tion.

The points of er

ror a re ove rruled, a

nd the judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: May

21, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh