[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10649

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JEFFERY WOODEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE TOWN OF EATONVILLE, 

ROY SMITH, 

Individually, 

ROBERT L. JONES, 

Individually,

ANTHONY GRANT,

in his official capacity as mayor of Eatonville, Florida,

JOSEPH JENKINS,

individually and in his official capacity as deputy chief 

of the Eatonville police department,

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TOWN OF EATONVILLE,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cv-02382-CEM-EJK

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jeffery Wooden, proceeding pro se, filed an action for false 

arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort 

claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution under 

Florida law against the town of Eatonville, Roy Smith, Robert 

Jones, Anthony Grant, and Joseph Jenkins (collectively, “Defendants”). Wooden now appeals the district court’s order granting in 

part the Defendants’ partial motions to dismiss several of his claims 

and its order granting summary judgment to the Defendants on the 

remaining claims in his complaint.

On appeal, Wooden first argues that the district court erred 

in granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants because 

there was no probable cause for any of his arrests. Second, he argues that the district court erred in granting the Defendants’ 

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motion to dismiss his state law false imprisonment claims against

Officers Roy Smith and Jones on the ground that they were entitled 

to immunity under state law. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2021, Wooden filed the operative complaint 

against Defendants and asserted eleven claims. In Counts I to III, 

he alleged that Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith falsely arrested and 

imprisoned him without probable cause and in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. In Counts IV and V, he brought claims under 

Monell1 against Jenkins and Grant in their official capacities, contending that they participated in a longstanding practice causing 

the deprivation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment for his 

false imprisonment and arrest. In Counts VI to VII, Wooden alleged state tort claims for false imprisonment against Jones, Roy

Smith, and the Town of Eatonville. In Counts IX and X, he alleged 

malicious prosecution claims against Jones and Jenkins. And, in 

Count XI, he alleged a defamation claim against Jenkins.

A. Allegations in the Complaint

1Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978) (holding 

that, although a § 1983 plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold a municipality liable for its employees’ actions, a municipality can 

be liable for such actions under § 1983 if its “policy or custom” caused the 

deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal right). 

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In the operative complaint, Wooden alleged the following. 

Wooden’s mother, Debbie Smith,2 owned a hotel in Eatonville 

known as the Eatonville Home Town Suites. In 2002, Wooden’s 

mother sold a partial ownership interest in the hotel to the 

Eatonville mayor, Anthony Grant. Wooden’s mother later passed 

away, and Wooden was named the personal representative of his 

mother’s estate, in which his mother’s ownership interest was an 

estate asset. After being appointed personal representative, 

Wooden and Grant had a business relationship, which deteriorated 

after Wooden noticed that Grant was mismanaging the hotel. After the relationship deteriorated, Grant misused his power as 

mayor to have Wooden arrested for trespassing on the property to 

prevent the latter from entering the hotel to inspect the books and 

records. Wooden later obtained an order from the Orange County 

Probate Court granting him access to the hotel property to monitor or review, in an orderly fashion, the hotel records on weekdays 

from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 

Wooden further alleged that, on December 17, 2015, he 

went to the hotel and found it locked, so he hired a locksmith so 

that he could access the property. Shortly after, Grant arrived and 

demanded that Wooden leave the premises. Soon after, two officers from the Eatonville Police Department arrived at the hotel to 

respond to Grant’s call about a “burglary in process.” Wooden explained that he was the partial owner of the hotel and showed the 

2 Because one of the defendants also has the last name of Smith, for the rest of 

the opinion, we refer to each Smith by their full names.

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officers a copy of the order allowing him access to the property. 

The officers told Grant that the dispute was a civil matter that 

should be resolved through the courts. While the officers were 

leaving, Jenkins arrived and was hostile to Wooden, stating that he 

needed to leave the hotel because “the mayor said so.” Wooden 

informed Jenkins that he was partial owner of the hotel and had 

legal authority to be there, and he refused to leave the property. 

Jenkins stated that he would talk to the state attorney’s office to 

determine if Wooden was illegally on the property because Grant 

did not want him on the property and stated that he was the mayor. 

Wooden further stated that on December 18, 2015, he returned to the hotel, and, shortly after, Grant arrived with Jenkins 

and Officer Jones. Jones then arrested Wooden for trespassing, and 

Wooden was transported to jail. However, the case was dismissed 

because it was deemed “unsuitable for prosecution.” On January 

16, 2016, Wooden was standing on the hotel property to watch a 

Martin Luther King, Jr., Day parade, and Jones approached him. 

Grant had called Jenkins, who ordered Jones to go to the hotel to 

“handle the situation.” Jones told Wooden that he knew he should 

not be there, and Wooden told Jones that he had legal authority to 

be on the premises and showed him the notice showing that the 

charges against him arising out of the December 18 arrest had been 

dismissed because the case was deemed unsuitable for prosecution. 

Jones arrested Wooden and took him to jail. However, there were 

no court records that showed that Wooden ever had an open case 

for that arrest.

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Wooden further alleged that from February 2016 to about 

October 2016, the probate court banned both Grant and Wooden 

from the property and established a curatorship, which was later 

dissolved. Wooden was reappointed as personal representative of 

his mother’s estate and co-owner of the hotel property. On November 16, 2016, Wooden went to the property and was approached by Grant and Gary Lowry, a hotel employee, who called 

Officer Roy Smith to come to the hotel. Roy Smith began to verbally abuse and curse Wooden, slamming handcuffs tightly on his 

wrists and telling him not to resist, although he was not resisting. 

Roy Smith put Wooden in the police car before turning around and 

releasing Wooden, telling him that “he’d better not return” to the 

property. On November 15, 2016, Wooden again entered the hotel 

to “trespass a vagrant” on the property after noticing a high level 

of crime on the property. Due to this high level of crime, he set up 

a make-shift security office in room number 127. On November 

18, 2016, Jenkins obtained an arrest warrant to arrest Wooden for 

attempted burglary of room 127. After finding out about the arrest 

warrant on January 17, 2017, Wooden turned himself in to the police and was placed in jail. However, the case was dismissed and 

deemed unsuitable for prosecution.

B. The Motions for Partial Dismissal

Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith answered, denied liability, 

and asserted certain defenses. Jenkins then filed a partial motion to 

dismiss claims brought against him in his official capacity, arguing 

that either he or the municipality should be sued, but not both. 

Roy Smith, Jenkins, and Jones also filed a partial motion to dismiss 

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Counts VI and VII, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim 

for relief against them in their individual capacities because 

Wooden did not allege that they acted in bad faith or with a malicious purpose. They also argued that Count XII should be dismissed because Jenkins had an absolute privilege regarding any 

statement he made incidental to his official duties, shielding him 

from a defamation claim arising from actions taken within the 

scope of his employment.

C. The Motions for Summary Judgment

Following discovery, Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith, in their 

individual capacities, filed motions for summary judgment on 

Wooden’s claims. In support of their motions, they filed certain 

evidentiary materials, including a transcript of Wooden’s deposition, the shareholder’s agreement between Grant and Wooden’s 

mother, documents showing that Wooden was the personal representative of his mother’s estate, information regarding the guardianship of Wooden’s mother, judges’ access orders allowing 

Wooden to inspect the hotel, a judge’s order revoking two orders, 

and affidavits from Jones and Roy Smith. Further, in support of his 

motion for summary judgment in his official capacity, Jenkins filed 

additional documents, including various arrest warrants, trespass 

warnings, and offense reports for Wooden.

Wooden stated the following in his deposition. On December 17, 2015, he was present at the hotel exercising his rights as personal representative of his mother’s estate to see how business was 

going. He became personal representative of his mother’s estate 

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in 2010 based on a decision of his siblings. His sister, Monique 

Washington, had a guardianship over his mother and was originally the personal representative after her mother died without a 

will. Later, the siblings agreed to make Wooden the personal representative. His family built the hotel in 1960 and owned it for 

forty years. Wooden’s mother needed help maintaining the hotel, 

so she partnered with Grant and created a corporation, Eatonville 

Holdings, Inc., where Wooden’s mother owned forty percent equity of the company and Grant owned sixty percent. Wooden’s 

mother and Grant participated in a lawsuit over mismanagement 

of funds. According to Wooden, this lawsuit was resolved on the 

basis that “everything just went back to the shareholders agreement,” and neither party was required to pay the other a monetary 

payment. As to the hotel, Wooden’s responsibilities included 

maintaining the books and records. He also helped maintain the 

hotel. He had a court order from 2012 that said that he was not 

trespassing when he was present at the hotel and had a right to inspect documents. However, from December 2015 through November 2016, he did not have access to the financial information of 

the hotel.

Wooden further stated that on December 17, 2015, he went 

to the property to review records. Debbie Jefferson or Garry 

Lowry, who both worked at the hotel, contacted Grant, who came 

to the hotel with Jenkins. Grant said that Wooden was trespassing 

and that he wanted him off the property, but Jenkins said that he 

did not know if he could do that and would check with a local state 

attorney. The next day, Jenkins said he spoke to the attorney who 

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told him that this was a civil matter. Jenkins said he was shown 

documentation regarding Wooden’s rights to the property and 

asked him to file a complaint with the police department, which 

Wooden did, and then he returned to the hotel office. However, 

Grant again returned with Jenkins and Jones, and Jenkins said that 

Wooden needed to leave because he was trespassing. Wooden resisted and said he would not leave, and Jones arrested him and took 

him to jail for trespassing. Jenkins never personally arrested 

Wooden, but he was close by during the arrest on December 18, 

2015, when Jenkins ordered Jones to arrest him. Wooden claimed 

that the Eatonville Police violated his civil and constitutional rights, 

but there were no specific policies or procedures he could name. 

Wooden talked to the state attorney, who said she could not believe he went to jail and said that this charge was unsuitable for 

prosecution. The charges were eventually dropped, and he was 

never adjudicated guilty of any offense for the events of that day. 

Wooden further stated that on January 16, 2016, he returned 

to the property because he believed the trespassing order was not 

in effect, as he was not prosecuted for the previous alleged trespass. 

He was present on the property to watch the Martin Luther King, 

Jr., parade with his family. He entered the hotel office as he was 

waiting for the parade to pass, and Jones approached him and asked 

what he was doing there. Wooden stated that he was waiting for 

the parade, and Jones told him he was not supposed to be there. 

Wooden showed him the paperwork that his previous trespass was 

deemed unsuitable for prosecution, and Jones said that he did not 

care and was taking Wooden to jail, which he did. Jenkins was not 

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present the day of the arrest. Wooden was later released and not 

criminally charged.

Wooden also stated that a curator took over the property 

from around February or March to October 2016, and he was not 

allowed on the property until the curatorship ended. After that, 

the ownership went back to the shareholder agreement, where 

Wooden was again personal representative of his mother’s estate. 

There were no arrests between January 16, 2016, to November 

2016. However, on November 13, 2016, Wooden went to room 

127 of the hotel for security purposes because of a high rate of 

crime and drug use on the property. In the meantime, Grant, Jenkins, and Roy Smith persuaded a judge to issue a warrant for 

Wooden’s arrest, saying that he burglarized the room, which was 

occupied. This was false information, Wooden asserted, because 

he did not burglarize the occupant’s room. According to Wooden, 

the room was vacant and destroyed and not occupied. He had to 

have the occupant removed from the apartment for using drugs on 

the property. Later, in December 2016, Wooden discovered the 

warrant for his arrest and turned himself in in January 2017. 

Wooden further stated that as to the November 16, 2016, 

incident, the police report from that day said that he threatened to 

kill or injure Grant. As the officer was taking Wooden to jail, the 

officer turned around, told him not to go back to the hotel, and 

released him. Jenkins was not present at this arrest. The reason he 

was released was because Jenkins said that a witness’s statement 

that the police used in support of the arrest was not true. He again 

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was not prosecuted for the offense. As to his malicious prosecution 

claim, Wooden conceded that he was not prosecuted as a result of 

any of the arrests. 

A police report for the November 13, 2016, arrest stated that 

an officer obtained a copy of a judge’s order, which stated that 

“[t]he curator shall immediately give all the assets of the corporation Eatonville Holdings, Inc., back to the majority shareholder, 

Anthony Grant.” The order also stated that “assets of a corporation 

cannot be taken into an estate as assets of the estate.” The report 

stated that Wooden disputed the information.

The attached shareholder agreement stated that Debbie 

Smith and Anthony Grant entered into a business agreement forming Eatonville Holdings, Inc., where Debbie Smith had a forty percent stock ownership in the motel and Grant had a sixty percent 

stock ownership. The first access order from the Orange County, 

Florida, state court said that the personal representative of Debbie 

Smith’s property had the right to access the hotel on July 9, 2010, 

to inspect the property’s financial records. On August 6, 2012, a 

third access order granted Wooden authority to go to the hotel “in 

an orderly fashion” to “monitor or review any records or receipts 

of revenue for the said property from Monday through Friday from 

9 a.m. to 1 p.m. without pay.” An order on May 28, 2014, revoked 

the first access order and a second access order not in the record. 

The order stated that Wooden was directed to “file the necessary 

forms and documents to close th[e] Estate within 90 days from the 

date of th[e] Order.”

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Jones stated the following in an affidavit. Jones arrived at 

the hotel on December 18, 2015, where he saw Wooden, Grant, 

and Jenkins, and Wooden was causing a disturbance. He knew 

from personal knowledge that Grant was the owner and operator 

of the hotel, and Grant signed a trespass warning directed at 

Wooden, which had an expiration date of December 18, 2016. 

Jones personally served Wooden with the trespass warning in front 

of Grant and Jenkins and repeatedly ordered Wooden to leave the 

premises, but he refused. Jones thus arrested Wooden for trespassing under Florida Statute § 810.08. On January 16, 2016, Jones 

again arrested Wooden for trespassing at the hotel pursuant to the 

trespass warning issued on December 18, 2015. The affidavit included a copy of the arrest affidavit from January 16, 2016, from 

Jones, which stated that Wooden falsely gained entry to the office 

with a locksmith after showing the locksmith some papers and asking him to open the front door. Jones further stated that the person 

who called the police felt that Wooden was disrupting the business 

with his presence.

Roy Smith also stated the following in an affidavit. On November 16, 2016, he responded to a call at the hotel relating to a 

disturbance, where he met with Grant, who he knew as the owner 

and operator of the hotel. Roy Smith was aware of the previous 

trespass warning that had an expiration date of December 18, 2016. 

Grant told Roy Smith that Wooden had approached him and the 

hotel manager, Gary Lowry, at the back of the hotel, where 

Wooden stated three times, “I’m gonna kill you and lay your bitch 

ass down.” Lowry confirmed these statements. Based on these 

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sworn statements from Grant and Lowry, Roy Smith took 

Wooden into custody on charges of intimidation—threat to kill or 

injure, in violation of Florida Statute § 836.10. On November 13, 

2016, he also approached the hotel and was advised that Wooden 

gained access to room 127, occupied by a tenant named Timothy 

Davis, by using a crowbar, and that Wooden removed Davis’s possessions and placed them on the sidewalk. Davis provided a sworn 

statement, stating he wished to prosecute Wooden for burglarizing 

his hotel room. Roy Smith also obtained a sworn statement from 

the front desk clerk, Jefferson, who confirmed the incident. Following the incident, Roy Smith completed an affidavit for arrest, 

and a state court judge signed an arrest warrant. 

Jenkins also stated the following in an affidavit. He was the 

Chief of Police for the Eatonville Police Department during all incidents in Wooden’s complaint. He was present on December 18, 

2015, when Wooden was causing a disturbance at the hotel and 

Grant signed a trespass warning directed at Wooden. Despite the 

fact that Jones served him with the warrant and directed him to 

leave, Wooden refused and was arrested in Jenkins’s presence. Jenkins was not present for any of the other arrests, but in Jenkins’s 

view, there was probable cause for the arrests based on the trespass 

warning or sworn witness statements.

Wooden filed responses opposing all of the motions for 

summary judgment.

D. The District Court’s Rulings

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A magistrate judge prepared a report and recommendation 

(“R&R”), first recommending denying Jenkins’s motion to dismiss 

and construing Counts Four and Five against Jenkins as claims 

against Eatonville. Second, as to Wooden’s state law false imprisonment claims against Jones and Roy Smith, the magistrate judge 

stated that Wooden had failed to allege facts showing that Jones 

and Roy Smith acted maliciously or in bad faith and thus recommended dismissal of those claims based on sovereign immunity. 

Third, the magistrate judge recommended dismissing Wooden’s 

defamation claim because Jenkins was covered by absolute privilege for statements made related to his official duties and Wooden 

had failed to allege that Jenkins acted outside these duties by preparing a warrant. The magistrate judge also provided a notice to 

the parties that they had fourteen days after service of the R&R to 

object and that a “party’s failure to file written objections waive[d] 

that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual 

findings or legal conclusion the district court adopt[ed] from the 

[R&R].”

Then, the district court issued an order addressing the pending motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. First, 

noting that no objections had been filed to the R&R, the district 

court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation with the exception that it disagreed with the magistrate judge that Wooden 

had dropped Eatonville from the suit because Wooden clearly 

listed the town in the “Parties” section of his amended complaint. 

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The district court then addressed the Defendants’ motions 

for summary judgment and analyzed whether there was probable 

cause for Wooden’s four arrests, which would bar all his remaining 

claims under § 1983 and for state law false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The court first noted that it was undisputed that 

Grant was an owner of the property and that the only evidence 

provided by Wooden as the basis for his right to legally be on the 

property was his authority as personal representative of his 

mother’s estate pursuant to the Letters of Administration, the 

Shareholder agreement, and the access orders in the probate case. 

As for the December 17, 2015, incident, the district court 

noted that Wooden was not arrested or prosecuted as a result, and 

therefore there was no basis for claims of false imprisonment or 

malicious prosecution based on this incident. Even if there were, 

the district court explained, the claims would fail because there was 

probable cause to arrest him. It determined that Wooden only had 

authorization from the letters of administration, shareholder agreement, and access orders to go on the property “in an orderly fashion,” which Wooden did not do when he hired a locksmith to break 

into the property and disrupt the business’s operation. The court 

thus determined that there was probable cause to believe that 

Wooden had exceeded his authority to be on the property, which, 

together with the property owner’s request that Wooden leave, 

was sufficient probable cause to arrest Wooden for trespass.

As to Wooden’s December 18 arrest for again using a locksmith to gain access to the office on the property, the district court 

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determined there was information sufficient to find probable cause. 

The district court reached this conclusion because Wooden’s access to the property exceeded his authority, and Jones and Jenkins 

had reason to believe the access order was no longer valid given 

that the incident occurred well beyond the ninety-day deadline that 

had been set to close the probate case. Further, the district court 

rejected Wooden’s argument that probable cause did not exist because this was a civil matter. As the district court explained, even 

if that were true, the officer’s decision to arrest someone was different from the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or not, and it did 

not affect whether probable cause existed for the arrest in the first 

place. 

For the January 16, 2016, arrest, the district court determined that Jones knew that Wooden had been issued a trespass 

warning that was still in effect and that the probate court had entered an order reasonably read to have revoked Wooden’s access 

to the property, which was enough to create probable cause to arrest Wooden for trespass. Further, the district court determined 

that even if Jones believed the third access order was still in effect, 

Wooden’s presence on the property was beyond what was allowed 

in that order, as he only had authority to review any records or 

receipts of revenue, which did not give him authority to enjoy the 

Marin Luther King, Jr., Day parade with his family like he admitted 

to doing. Lastly, the district court said that the state attorney’s decision not to prosecute Wooden for the December 2015 incident 

did not render the trespass warning ineffectual or impact whether 

there was probable cause for his arrest. 

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As for the November 13, 2016, arrest, the district court held 

that breaking into a room in the hotel and installing a security office 

was clearly beyond the authority Wooden had based on the probate order and gave grounds for probable cause for trespass and 

burglary. While the court noted that Wooden maintained that the 

room was vacant, it stated that two witnesses had provided Roy 

Smith with statements establishing that the room had been rented 

to Davis and Davis’s property had been removed from the room. 

As for the November 16, 2016, arrest, the district court held 

that there was probable cause that Wooden threatened to injure 

Grant based on the sworn statements of two witnesses and the history between the parties, which Roy Smith was aware of. The district court held that even if there were not probable cause to arrest 

Wooden for threatening to kill Grant, there was probable cause to 

arrest him for trespass based on the previous trespass notice that 

was still in effect and a probate order that plainly stated that all assets and management of the property belonged to Grant. 

Thus, the district court held that, because there was probable cause to arrest Wooden in each instance, the Defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment on all remaining claims. This appeal ensued.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual 

inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Amy v. Carnival Corp., 

961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Guevara v. NCL

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(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence shows that “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “But it 

is improper if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving 

party.” Amy, 961 F.3d at 1308. In addition, documents filed by pro 

se litigants are to be liberally construed and must be held to less 

stringent standards than documents drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a 

felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is 

consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported 

by probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). A 

warrantless arrest lacking probable cause violates the Constitution 

and can underpin a § 1983 claim, “but the existence of probable 

cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 

F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). “Probable cause exists where the 

facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, 

derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to 

cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Id. In deciding whether 

probable cause exists, police officers need not resolve every inconsistency found in the evidence, as long as it is reasonable to conclude from the totality of the circumstances that a crime was committed. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019). Some 

conflicting evidence or a possible affirmative defense does not 

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“necessarily vitiate probable cause.” Id. “That a defendant is subsequently acquitted or charges are dropped against the defendant 

is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest itself.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990). The 

standard for determining probable cause is the same under Florida 

and federal law. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th Cir. 

1998). 

Probable cause is an absolute bar to state law and § 1983 

claims alleging false arrest. Id. at 1435. “The existence of probable 

cause constitutes an affirmative defense to the claims of false arrest 

and imprisonment under Florida law.” Id. at 1436. The existence 

of probable cause will also defeat a claim for malicious prosecution 

under Florida law. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 

1309 (11th Cir. 2019). 

Florida law defines “trespass” as

Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or 

conveyance, or, having been authorized, licensed, or 

invited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the premises, or by a person authorized by the owner or lessee, 

to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of 

trespass in a structure or conveyance.

Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1). Florida law defines “burglary" as “[e]ntering 

a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit 

an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the 

public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter.” Id. 

§ 810.02(1)(b). As relevant here, Florida law defines the crime of 

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threats, in relevant part, as “[w]hoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of any crime or offense, or by such communication maliciously threatens an injury to the person, property or reputation of 

another.” Id. § 836.05. 

Here, the district court did not err in granting the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment because there was probable 

cause for each of Wooden’s arrests, which was fatal to each of his 

claims. First, the fact that criminal charges were dropped or not 

brought against Wooden for the arrests has no bearing on the probable cause analysis. Marx, 905 F.3d at 1507. Next, although the administration of Wooden’s mother’s estate was a civil matter generally, Wooden could not engage in alleged criminal activity of trespassing, burglary, and threats related to his mother’s estate.

Further, the district court also properly rejected Wooden’s 

argument that there was not probable cause to arrest him because 

he was authorized by the probate court to enter the property as the 

personal representative of his mother’s estate. Even assuming the 

access order was still valid at the relevant times that Wooden was 

arrested, Wooden could only enter the property “in an orderly fashion” to review the books and records. But, reviewing each of the 

four incidents, there was probable cause for each arrest.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to all claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, 

and malicious prosecution, and we affirm as to this issue.

II.

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We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

dismiss. Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2021). We 

will accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

Florida’s sovereign immunity statute grants immunity to 

police officers unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious 

purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard 

of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). 

“An officer acts maliciously when he acts with ‘the subjective intent to do wrong.’” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1271 (11th 

Cir. 2022) (quoting Peterson v. Pollack, 290 So. 3d 102, 109 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 2020)). Additionally, we have held that a plaintiff’s 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution claims were barred by Florida’s sovereign immunity statute. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1330 

(11th Cir. 2015). 

Under 11th Circuit Rule 3-1, “a party who fails to object to 

a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation ‘waives the 

right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to-factual and legal conclusions’” so long as “the 

party who failed to object ‘was informed of the time period for 

objecting and the consequences for failing to do so.’” Harrigan v. 

Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th 

Cir. 2020) (quoting 11th Cir. R. 3-1). “[H]owever, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of 

justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. We will find plain error only when (1) 

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an error has occurred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Dupree v. 

Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). An error is plain if 

the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent from the 

Supreme Court or us directly resolves the issue. United States v. 

Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020).

Finally, we have “long held that an appellant abandons a 

claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises 

it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments 

and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 

681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 

873 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (holding in the criminal context that issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and will not 

be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances), cert. denied, 

143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).

Here, as an initial matter, Wooden did not argue on appeal 

that the district court erred in dismissing his defamation claim

against Jenkins. As a result, he forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of this claim. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Further, Wooden did 

not file any objections to the R&R recommending partial dismissal, 

so he is, at most, entitled only to plain error review. And Wooden

has not shown that the district court plainly erred in granting the

partial motions to dismiss because the officers were shielded by 

sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we also affirm as to this issue. 

* * * *

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22-10649 Opinion of the Court 23

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s orders.

AFFIRMED.

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