February11,1988

Honorable Robert P.McGuill Opinion No. JM-855 Refugio County Attorney P. 0. Box 307 Re: Whether acounty comRefugio, Texas 78377 missioner may contract with his county to lease hangar space at a county airport forthepurpose of operating aprivate business (RQ-1306)
DearMr. McGuill:
you ask the following question: May a county commissioner, directly or indirectly, contract with acounty to lease hangar space ata county airport for the purpose of operating a private business enterprise forprofit without violating his oath of office as set forth in section 81.002 of the Local Government Code?
Inasking your question, you explain that the commissioner would use approximately 30,000 square feet of hangar space, rented at $56.25 per year, forthe operation ofa private flying service. Section 81.002(a) of the Local Government Code provides:

(a) Before undertaking the duties of the county judge or acountv commissioner, a person RR& take the official oath and swear inwritina that the nerson will not be interested, directlv or indirectlv, in a contract with or claim aaainst the countv except: (1) a contract or claim expressly authorized by law; or (2) awarrant issued to the judge or commissioner asa feeof office. (Emphasis added.)

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public officials, and prohibits those identified officeholders from engaging in certain activities. See 55171.001(1), 171.003, 171.004. Under the rules of statutory construction, we must, if possible; read together and harmonize two statutes that relate to the same subject. Calvert v. Fort Worth National Bank, 356 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex.1962); Conlev v. Dauahters of the Renublic, 156 S.W. 197, 201 (Tex. 1913);Attorney General Opinion No. JM-693 (1987). The only exception to the absolute prohibition in section 81.002 is a contract expressly authorized by law. We findnothing inchapter 171that expressly authorizes a county commissioner to contract with the county. Another rule of statutory construction directs us to apply themore specific statute where two provisions apply to the same subject matter but cannot beharmonized. Citv ofHouston v.Arnev 680 S.W.Zd 867, 874 (Tex. APP. - Houston 1984, nowrit;; Attorney General Opinion Nos. M-524 (1969);WW-1127 (1961). Under that rule, we find that section 81.002 must control because that statute applies only to county judges and commissioners while chapter 171applies to abroader group ofpublic officials. For the above reason, we find that acounty commissioner may not directly or indirectly contract with the county to lease hangar space at the county's airport. Having found that the county commissioner may not enter into such acontract with the county, we need not address the issue of whether such a contract would constitute agrant ofpublic money or thing of value by the county inviolation ofarticle III, section 52, of the Texas Constitution.
SUMMARY

A county commissioner may not, directly or indirectly, contract with the county to lease hangar space at the county#s airport. Very truly yo , 

# d-%/22;ts,

.

JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELLER FirstAssistant Attorney General

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LOUMCCRKARY Executive Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Committee Prepared by Karen C.Gladney Assistant Attorney General

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