IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JARRETT OLSEN,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D22-147

LT Case No. 2018-CA-002110

FIRST TEAM FORD, LTD D/B/A

AUTONATION FORD SANFORD,

A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Appellee.

_______________________________/

Opinion filed April 21, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Seminole County,

Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.

Dimitrios A. Peteves and Bryan S. 

Gowdy, of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., 

Jacksonville, and Carolyn Salzmann 

and Jennifer Karr, of Legally Pink Law, 

PLLC, Orlando, for Appellant.

Hinda Klein, of Conroy Simberg, 

Hollywood, for Appellee.

BOATWRIGHT, J.
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Appellant, Jarrett Olsen, appeals the trial court’s entry of final summary 

judgment in favor of Appellee, First Team Ford, LTD d/b/a Autonation Ford 

Sanford, a Florida Limited Partnership (“the Dealership”). Appellant argues 

the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment was improper due to the 

existence of a genuine dispute of material facts. We agree and therefore 

reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Background

Ryan Matthews (“Mr. Matthews”) is the general manager of the 

Dealership, and he oversees all departments of the Dealership, including its 

service department. On December 21, 2016, Mr. Matthews drove his wife’s 

vehicle, a Chevy Tahoe (“Tahoe”), into the Dealership. While at the 

Dealership, Mr. Matthews executed a document entitled “Loaned Vehicle

Agreement” in order to drive home a Ford Expedition (“Expedition”) owned 

by the Dealership. Mr. Matthews left the Dealership in the Expedition, and, 

on his drive home, he got into an accident with Appellant.

As a result of the accident, Appellant filed a complaint against Mr. 

Matthews and the Dealership, alleging a negligence claim against Mr. 

Matthews and a vicarious liability claim against the Dealership under 

Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine. Appellant settled with Mr. 

Matthews, and the case proceeded solely against the Dealership.
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In his deposition, Mr. Matthews stated that, on the day in question, he 

brought the Tahoe into the Dealership to get the oil changed, but he admitted

that the oil was never changed. He also stated that he and his wife were 

thinking about purchasing an Expedition, as the lease on the Tahoe was 

close to the end, and he wanted to see if an Expedition would fit in his garage. 

As a result, Mr. Matthews testified that his intention in executing the Loaned 

Vehicle Agreement was to take the Expedition home overnight and show his 

wife so she could decide whether she wanted to buy the vehicle. 

However, later in Mr. Matthews’ deposition, he tried to clarify his 

reason for executing the Loaned Vehicle Agreement. Mr. Matthews asserted 

that if the oil change had been completed, he would not have driven the 

Expedition home that day and instead would have brought his wife to the 

Dealership to show her the vehicle. Thus, Mr. Matthews alleged a dual 

purpose for executing the Loaned Vehicle Agreement: (1) he needed a 

vehicle to drive as the oil change had not been completed on his Tahoe; and 

(2) he was interested in test driving the Expedition. 

In the deposition of the Dealership’s service manager, further 

testimony was elicited that cast doubt on whether Mr. Matthews’ Tahoe was 

actually brought in for service. The service manager did not work for the 

Dealership at the time of this incident; thus, he had no personal knowledge 
4

as to whether Mr. Matthews brought the Tahoe in for servicing. The service 

manager for the Dealership testified that service records are kept in the 

normal course of business when a vehicle is brought in for servicing. These 

records would have been kept at the time Mr. Matthews alleged that he 

brought the Tahoe in for servicing. However, when he was directly asked 

whether Mr. Matthews brought in the Tahoe on the date of the incident, the 

service manager was not able to verify that information. Furthermore, no 

records were ever produced by the Dealership evidencing that Mr. Matthews 

brought his Tahoe in for servicing. The reason for this is that apparently there

was not a record of Mr. Matthews bringing his vehicle in for servicing, as the 

Dealership’s counsel conceded during the summary judgment hearing that 

there was no “service order.” 

After discovery was completed, the Dealership responded to 

Appellant’s complaint with a motion for summary judgment, arguing 

Appellant’s claims were barred by the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 

30106. In particular, the Dealership argued that the Graves Amendment 

shields the owner of a rented or leased vehicle from damages caused by the 

vehicle while it is leased or rented. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a). The 

Dealership asserted that it rented the Expedition to Mr. Matthews while his 

vehicle was being serviced and noted that it routinely provides loaner 
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vehicles to customers, like Mr. Matthews, while their vehicles are being 

serviced.

Appellant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and an 

opposition to the Dealership’s motion for summary judgment. In his 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Appellant argued that Mr. 

Matthews’ use of the Expedition was solely for a test drive and that the Tahoe 

was never actually serviced on the day of the accident. Appellant further 

contended that any intent by Mr. Matthews to have his vehicle serviced was 

undermined by inferences drawn from the record. Thus, Appellant asserted 

that because the Graves Amendment does not apply to gratuitous test 

drives, a genuine dispute of material facts existed which precluded summary 

judgment in favor of the Dealership. 

The trial court held a hearing on both parties’ motions for summary 

judgment. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the 

Dealership’s motion for summary judgment and then subsequently amended 

its order. In its amended final judgment, the trial court specifically found that 

there were no genuine disputes of material fact as to the following: (1) The 

Dealership operates a vehicle service department, and it provides short term 

rental vehicles to customers who bring their vehicle to the service 

department; (2) Mr. Matthews was an employee of the Dealership, and was 
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also a customer of the Dealership, when he brought his Tahoe to the 

Dealership’s service department to be serviced (i.e., to undergo an oil 

change); (3) At the time he dropped his Tahoe off for service, Mr. Matthews 

executed a Loaned Vehicle Agreement with the Dealership to secure a 

loaner vehicle; (4) Mr. Matthews was provided a short term rental/loaner 

vehicle, the Expedition, pursuant to the Loaned Vehicle Agreement while his 

Tahoe was to be serviced; (5) Mr. Matthews was driving the Expedition, while 

his Tahoe was at the Dealership’s service department, when he was involved 

in a motor vehicle collision with Appellant; and (6) Mr. Matthews’ vehicle 

never underwent service on the day of the accident.

Based on these findings, the trial court found Appellant’s vicarious 

liability claim against the Dealership to be barred by the Graves Amendment. 

In particular, the trial court found that the Dealership had rented the 

Expedition to Mr. Matthews in exchange for his agreement to have his 

vehicle serviced at the Dealership. The trial court reasoned that even though 

Mr. Matthews did not have his Tahoe serviced, it was his intent to have the 

Tahoe serviced that day which determined that he rented the Expedition 

under the Graves Amendment. Thus, the trial court ruled this exchange 

constituted a valid rental under the Graves Amendment to shield the 

Dealership from liability. 
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On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court erroneously granted 

summary judgment when there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether Mr. Matthews intended to have his Tahoe serviced at the 

Dealership. The Dealership, on the other hand, argues there are no genuine 

disputes as to any material fact. We agree with Appellant.

Analysis

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is subject to a 

de novo standard of review. Baxter v. Northrup, 128 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2013) (citing Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 

So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, 

the movant must show that (1) “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact” and (2) “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. 

Civ. P. 1.510(a). When determining if there is a genuine dispute of material 

fact, “[t]he court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and a genuine dispute occurs when the evidence would allow 

a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party.” Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 48 

Fla. L. Weekly D583d (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 17, 2023) (citing Baum v. Becker 

& Poliakoff, P.A., 351 So. 3d 185, 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)).

In amending Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, the Florida 

Supreme Court sought to align Florida’s summary judgment rule with the
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federal summary judgment standard. In re: Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc.

1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 74 (Fla. 2021). According to the Florida Supreme 

Court, “those applying new rule 1.510 must recognize the fundamental 

similarity between the summary judgment standard and the directed verdict 

standard.” Id. at 75. Both standards focus on “whether the evidence presents 

a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Id. (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)). And under 

both standards, “[t]he substantive evidentiary burden of proof that the 

respective parties must meet at trial is the only touchstone that accurately 

measures whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to be tried.” Id.

(citations omitted). Those applying the new rule 1.510 must recognize that 

the correct test for the existence of a genuine factual dispute is whether “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, in Florida 

it will no longer be plausible to maintain that “the existence of any competent 

evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial 

or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the

‘slightest doubt’ is raised.” Id. (citation omitted). 

One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to 

“isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” In re: 
9

Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 2020)

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)). However, 

the Florida Supreme Court, in adopting this amendment, reaffirmed “the 

bedrock principle that summary judgment is not a substitute for the trial of 

disputed fact issues.” Id. As the United States Supreme Court itself has 

emphasized, the summary judgment rule must be implemented “with due 

regard . . . for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are 

adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury.”

Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327). 

Here, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of 

the Dealership because there are genuine disputes of material fact that 

preclude the entry of summary judgment. First, Mr. Matthews’ deposition 

testimony raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to his purpose in 

executing the Loaned Vehicle Agreement. Mr. Matthews initially testified that 

his intent in signing the Loaned Vehicle Agreement was so that he could take 

the Expedition home overnight to show it to his wife, as the lease on their 

Tahoe was close to its end, and they were interested in purchasing an 

Expedition. Mr. Matthews additionally stated that he wanted to see if the 

Expedition would fit in his garage before deciding to buy one. Mr. Matthews 

subsequently attempted to clarify this testimony by stating that another 
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purpose in executing the Loaned Vehicle Agreement was that he needed a 

vehicle to drive while his Tahoe was awaiting service at the Dealership’s 

service department. By providing two potential reasons for executing the 

Loaned Vehicle Agreement, Mr. Matthews created a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to his true intent, which required a finder of fact to resolve. 

Further, the trial court found that it was undisputed that Mr. Matthews 

brought the Tahoe into the Dealership to be serviced based on Mr. Matthews’

deposition testimony. However, the record supports differing inferences on 

this issue. The service manager for the Dealership testified that records were 

customarily kept of vehicles brought in for service by the Dealership. Yet, no 

records were ever produced by the Dealership showing that Mr. Matthews 

brought his Tahoe in for servicing. In fact, the Dealership’s counsel stated at 

the summary judgment hearing that there were no service records, which, 

when combined with the service manager’s testimony, supports the 

inference that Mr. Matthews never brought his Tahoe in for servicing. 

Therefore, there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. 

Matthews brought his Tahoe in for servicing. 

Finally, the trial court impermissibly relied on the intent of Mr. Matthews 

when it decided that there was no dispute as to any material fact. In 

particular, the trial court stated that even though Mr. Matthews did not have 
11

his vehicle serviced, it was his intent to do so. As a result, the court reasoned 

that it was Mr. Matthews’ intent to have his Tahoe serviced which determined 

that he rented the Expedition under the Graves Amendment. But because

“intent is a question of fact that should not be decided on a summary 

judgment,” it was improper for the trial court to base its summary judgment 

ruling that the Graves Amendment applied on Mr. Matthews’ intent. See

Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So. 3d 719, 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); see also

Kuppinger v. JM. JZ Enters., Inc., No. 21-80492-CV, 2021 WL 6054564, at 

*9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2021) (finding that under Florida law, “intent is a 

question of fact that should not be decided on a summary judgment 

[motion]”). 

The genuine disputes of fact raised by the record evidence are material 

under the summary judgment rule, since they relate to whether the 

Dealership rented the Expedition to Mr. Matthews. The trial court held that 

there was a valid rental agreement because Mr. Matthews submitted his 

Tahoe for service in consideration of receiving the Expedition. This 

exchange, according to the trial court, constituted a valid rental agreement 

under the Graves Amendment.

However, the facts in the record and the inferences from them 

demonstrate that Mr. Matthews’ purpose could have been to just take the 
12

Expedition home for a test drive, as opposed to taking the Expedition home 

because his Tahoe was still awaiting service. In fact, there are sufficient 

material facts in dispute as to whether he even brought the Tahoe in to be 

serviced at all. Therefore, there is a genuine dispute regarding whether Mr. 

Matthews ever submitted his vehicle for servicing at the Dealership, which is 

what formed the basis for the trial court’s ruling that there was a valid rental 

agreement between Mr. Matthews and the Dealership. Thus, the issue of 

whether Mr. Matthews brought his vehicle in to be serviced should have been 

submitted to a jury for resolution and not decided by the trial court on 

summary judgment. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment for the Dealership, as there are genuine disputes of material fact 

that relate to the Dealership’s Graves Amendment defense. Accordingly, we 

reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand the matter to the 

trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

JAY and SOUD, JJ., concur.