NUMBER 13-20-00415-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF TERESA L. 

CAMPERO AND ADALBERTO CAMPERO AND IN THE 

INTEREST OF A.C., A.C.J., AND A.Z.C., CHILDREN

 

On appeal from County Court at Law No. 5

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

Appellant Teresa L. Campero appeals from a final decree of divorce dissolving her 

marriage to appellee, Adalberto Campero. In two issues, which we discuss together, 

Teresa argues that: (1) the trial court erred by rendering judgment on the parties’ 

mediated settlement agreement (MSA), and (2) the trial court erred by rendering judgment 

on a settlement agreement after Teresa revoked her consent. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Teresa and Adalberto were married on or about August 7, 2004. During their 

marriage, the Camperos had three children: A.C., A.I.C., and A.Z.C. On March 6, 2019, 

Teresa filed for divorce, and on May 6, 2019, Adalberto filed a counterpetition for divorce. 

On May 8, 2020, the parties attended mediation with counsel and reached an agreement. 

Both Teresa and Adalberto signed the resulting agreement, but only Adalberto’s 

attorney’s signature appears on the MSA. The MSA was filed with the trial court on June 

3, 2020, along with Adalberto’s amended motion to enter judgment.

1

Before the trial court rendered judgment on the MSA, Teresa withdrew her consent

by written objection. On July 14, 2020, Teresa filed: (1) a revocation of consent to the 

settlement agreement and (2) an objection to the entry of a final decree of divorce and a 

request for the court to decline to enter judgment. In both pleadings, Teresa argued that 

the purported MSA failed to meet the statutory requirements for such agreements.

Specifically, Teresa contended that because she was represented during mediation, the 

MSA needed to include her counsel’s signature to be valid. According to Teresa, because 

it failed to do so, the MSA was revocable.

On July 15, 2020, the trial court heard Adalberto’s amended motion to enter

judgment. Counsel for Teresa testified that he was present for the entirety of the 

mediation, but he did not specifically testify that he was present when Teresa signed the 

MSA. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held that the MSA was valid and 

1 No original motion to enter judgment appears in the record.
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stated, “I am going to sign a decree based on the provisions of the [MSA].”

On July 24, 2020, the trial court signed an order overruling Teresa’s objections to 

the MSA. The order states:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Mediated Settlement Agreement is 

binding on this Court and the parties and judgment is therefore rendered on 

the same. The parties are FURTHER ORDERED to submit a Final Decree 

of Divorce that comports with the terms and conditions of the valid Mediated 

Settlement Agreement on or before July 31, 2020.

Teresa’s counsel signed the order with the caveat that she was approving the order “only 

as to form,” and that “[b]y signing this Order, [Teresa] is not waiving any right to challenge 

the substance or validity of this Order.”

On September 1, 2020, counsel for Adalberto appeared at a subsequent entry 

hearing and informed the trial court that all parties had signed the final decree of divorce.

Teresa and her attorney did not appear at this hearing nor did they object to the entry of 

the final decree of divorce. The record reflects that both parties “approved and consented 

to” the final decree of divorce, whose terms differ from the MSA, “as to both the form and 

substance.” The trial court signed the final decree of divorce on September 3, 2020. This 

appeal followed.

B. Differences between MSA and Final Decree of Divorce

There were a number of different provisions included in the final decree of divorce 

that were not reflected in the MSA.

2

For example, the decree included the following language: 

On July 14, 2020, TERESA L. CAMPERO filed a Revocation of Consent 

2 For the sake of brevity, we will address only a few of those differences. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1

(“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses 

every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”)
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and Objection to Entry of Final Decree of Divorce and Request for Court to 

Decline to Enter Judgment on the basis that the parties’ Mediated 

Settlement Agreement was not a valid, binding, and irrevocable agreement 

in accordance with Sections 6.602, 153.0071[,] and 154.071 of the Texas 

Family Code. On July 15, 2020, the Court denied the request as evidenced 

by the Order on Respondent’s Motion for Entry of Final Decree of Divorce 

and Petitioner’s Request for the Court to Decline to Enter Judgment signed 

by the Court on July 24, 2020. In doing so, the Court made a specific finding 

that the Mediated Settlement Agreement signed by the parties on May 8, 

2020 constitutes a valid, binding and irrevocable agreement, satisfying all 

requirements of Sections 6.602, 153.0071[,] and 154.071 of the Texas 

Family Code and that ADALBERTO CAMPERO is entitled to judgment.

Without waiving any objection to the Mediated Settlement Agreement, 

TERESA L. CAMPERO hereby confirms that this Final Decree of Divorce is 

consistent with the intent and the terms of that Mediated Settlement 

Agreement and waives all objection to the Final Decree of Divorce and right 

to appeal based upon the form or the substance of the Final Decree of 

Divorce as evidenced by her signature attached hereto. Except as

specifically provided herein, in entering into the Final Decree of Divorce, 

neither party waives any other right of appeal available under Texas law.

However, in the MSA, Teresa did not agree to waive any right to appeal from the form 

and substance of the final decree of divorce. 

The parties agreed in the MSA that A.C. would attend either “IB in McAllen or Juan 

Diego in Mission,” A.I.C. would attend “Med High in Mercedes,” and A.Z.C. would attend 

“OLS.” The MSA also dictated that Adalberto would be responsible for paying “100% of 

the tuition” of A.Z.C. and of A.C. if she attended Juan Diego. However, in the final decree 

of divorce, this part of the agreement materially changed. The decree stated that both 

A.I.C. and A.C. would attend Juan Diego and that A.Z.C. would attend OLS. Adalberto 

was ordered in the decree to pay “all tuition, books, school-related equipment and 

supplies, uniforms, testing, application and registration fees, and lab fees related to each 

school” for all three children.
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The decree awarded several businesses to Adalberto as part of the division of 

community property, but these businesses were to be confirmed as his separate property 

per the MSA. The parties agreed in the MSA that no adult could be with the parties 

overnight while they were in possession of the children, unless that adult was within “[one] 

degree of consanguinity.” However, the final decree of divorce modified this to enjoin the 

parties from permitting any “unrelated adult with whom” they have “an intimate or dating 

relationship with to remain in the same residence with the children” overnight.

There were several additional financial details that changed from the MSA to the 

final decree of divorce. The parties agreed in the MSA that child support payments would 

begin on June 1, 2020, and that if Adalberto attempted to modify the child support amount, 

child support would then convert to a money judgment secured by collateral in the amount 

of $432,000 minus any amounts paid. In the decree, however, child support was to be 

paid entirely by a money judgment secured by collateral in the amount of $424,000,

regardless of any attempt by Adalberto to modify child support, with the first payment to 

be due on September 1, 2020. In the MSA, the parties agreed child support would not 

cease until their youngest child emancipated. However, in the final decree, Adalberto was 

required to pay in monthly installments of $4,000 “for a period of 106 months, or until the 

total amount due has been paid in full.” In the final decree of divorce, Adalberto was 

ordered to pay Teresa’s attorney’s fees “in an amount not to exceed $13,000.” However, 

no such cap was contemplated in the MSA.

II. FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

In two issues that we analyze together, Teresa contends that the trial court erred 
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in finding the MSA satisfied the statutory requirements and by enforcing the MSA by 

signing the final decree of divorce after Teresa revoked her consent to the MSA.

A. Applicable Law & Standard of Review

A mediated settlement agreement is valid if the agreement:

(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced 

type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject 

to revocation;

(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and

(3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the time 

the agreement is signed.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(b). An MSA that meets these statutory requirements “is 

binding on the parties and requires the rendition of a divorce decree that adopts the 

parties’ agreement.” Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2012). A party’s attempt 

to revoke its consent to a statutorily compliant MSA has no effect on the trial court’s 

obligation to render judgment on the MSA. Id. at 618 n.2; In re C.C.E., 530 S.W.3d 314, 

321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). A final judgment rendered on an 

MSA must be in strict or literal compliance with that agreement. In re M.E.H., 631 S.W.3d 

244, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Kramer v. Kastleman, 

No. 03-13-00133-CV, 2017 WL 5119211, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 3, 2017, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.)); In re A.E., 580 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. 

denied). The trial court is not permitted to modify an MSA as it sees fit and has no 

discretion to enter a judgment that varies from its terms. In re Marriage of Joyner, 196 

S.W.3d 883, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied). However, trial courts 

may include terms necessary to effectuate and implement the parties’ agreement, so long 
7

as they do not substantively alter it. In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 458 n.17 (Tex. 2013). A 

trial court’s rendition of judgment on an MSA is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Id. at 450.

Judgments typically go through three stages: (1) rendition, (2) signing, and (3) 

entry. Bazan v. Canales, 200 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 

2006, no pet.); Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no 

pet.). Whether a trial court’s actions constitute a rendition of judgment is a question of 

fact. Joyner, 196 S.W.3d at 887. “[A] trial court renders judgment when it officially 

announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk.”

Woods v. Woods, 167 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. App—Amarillo 2005, no pet.). 

An intent to render future judgment does not constitute a rendition of judgment. Id. 

If essential issues are left to be decided, a trial court’s pronouncement is also not 

considered a rendition of judgment. McShane v. McShane, 556 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Rather, the words spoken or written by the 

trial court must evince a present, as opposed to future, act that effectively decides the 

issues before the court. Id. In other words, the trial court’s rendition “must indicate the 

intent to render a full, final, and complete judgment at that point in time.” Joyner, 196 

S.W.3d at 886.

A trial court has plenary power to “vacate, modify, correct, or reform [a] judgment 

within thirty days after the judgment is signed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). Thus, even where 

a trial court has rendered judgment resolving the matters at issue, it is free to modify that 

rendition until a final judgment is signed. Cook v. Cook, 888 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. App.—
8

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1994, no writ); see Stallworth v. Stallworth, 201 S.W.3d 338, 

349 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). For MSAs, any ambiguity within must be resolved 

before an agreed judgment can be rendered. Milner, 361 S.W.3d at 623. In cases where 

the parties’ MSA specifies that the parties are to return to mediation to determine the 

meaning of ambiguities within the agreement, the trial court has no authority to supplant 

its interpretation of the agreement’s terms in place of the mediator’s. See id. at 622.

B. Analysis

It is undisputed that the trial court explicitly rendered judgment on the MSA in its 

order on July 24, 2020. However, neither party argues that this was a final judgment for 

purposes of appeal. The trial court did not purport to grant the parties’ divorce in this 

order, nor did it indicate within that it was a final, appealable order. See Parks v. DeWitt 

Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 157, 161 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, 

no pet.). Thus, the trial court was free to modify or vacate its judgment as it sought fit.

See Cook, 888 S.W.2d at 132; Stallworth, 201 S.W.3d at 349; Mercantile Bank of Hous.

v. Rozema, 508 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ) (holding 

that the trial court maintained jurisdiction to set aside a judgment where the judgment was 

not final). 

Judgment on an MSA must strictly comply with the MSA’s terms. See In re A.E., 

580 S.W.3d at 215. As discussed above, there were significant and substantive 

differences between the MSA and the final decree of divorce signed on September 3, 

2020. Teresa argues in her reply brief that “any additional terms included in the Final 

Decree of Divorce were not material changes, but instead were merely clarifications to 
9

the [MSA] for enforceability purposes.” It is unclear what Teresa alleges is ambiguous or 

unenforceable about the agreed term, “[h]usband to pay wife’s attorney[’]s fees” in the

MSA. Yet, the decree orders Adalberto to pay only $13,000 of Teresa’s attorney’s fees, 

rather than their entirety. Additionally, in the decree, Adalberto agreed to pay the tuition 

and fees for all three children, instead of, at most, tuition for two children, as was 

contemplated in the MSA. These substantively modified terms indicate the parties 

renegotiated.

Even if we were to conclude that the original provisions in the MSA were 

ambiguous and required clarification, the trial court did not have discretion to render 

judgment on the MSA unless any ambiguities had been resolved. See Millner, 361 S.W.3d 

at 623. Per the terms of the MSA, the trial court also would not have been the proper 

arbiter of ambiguous terms. See id. at 621. The MSA provided that to resolve disputes 

pertaining to the interpretation of its terms, the parties would attempt to return to mediation 

with the mediator who facilitated the MSA. The record does not reflect that the parties 

attempted to remediate any disputed terms of the MSA prior to the entry of the divorce 

decree.

There is no indication, in either the final decree of divorce or in the transcript from 

the September 1 hearing, that by virtue of signing the final decree of divorce, the trial 

court was rendering judgment on the MSA or incorporating the MSA into the divorce 

decree. The trial court’s prior representations at the July 15 hearing and in the July 24 

order are not dispositive on this issue. See S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 

857 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“The fact that the trial court believed that [it] had rendered 
10

judgment [previously] . . . is not dispositive.”).

The only mention of the MSA within the final decree of divorce is in the section 

concerning Teresa’s right of appeal. In that section, it is Teresa, not the trial court, who 

confirms the final decree of divorce is consistent with the MSA. Teresa’s acknowledgment 

that the final decree of divorce is consistent with the MSA is also not determinative on the

issue. The decree states that the trial court previously determined Adalberto is entitled to 

judgment on the MSA, but it does not state that the decree constitutes judgment on the 

MSA. Judgment on an MSA is not a mere formality, nor is it automatic. Highsmith v. 

Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Therefore, simply being 

entitled to judgment on an MSA does not mean a party has indeed received judgment on 

that MSA.

At the September 1 hearing, counsel for Adalberto informed the trial court that a 

final decree of divorce had been drafted and signed by both the parties and their 

attorneys. The trial court responded, “You said the magic words: You have got an 

agreement with signatures.” The trial court also informed counsel for Adalberto that “[i]f 

you submit that decree with signatures, the Court will sign off on it.” The court did not 

query into the decree’s compliance with the MSA. The final decree of divorce related that 

the court heard the case on September 1, rather than July 15—the date the trial court 

heard argument on the validity of the MSA. We therefore conclude that the final decree 

of divorce did not constitute judgment on the MSA. See In re Marriage of Russell, 556 

S.W.3d 451, 458–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

Instead, the trial court implicitly vacated its judgment on the MSA from July 24, 
11

2020, and entered its reformed judgment on September 3, 2020, based on the parties’ 

new agreement. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Wasiak, 883 S.W.2d 402, 411 

(Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (“[A]ny change in a judgment made by the trial court 

during its period of plenary power should be treated as a modified, corrected, or reformed 

judgment that presumptively vacates the trial court’s former judgment unless the record 

indicates a contrary intent.”); SLT Dealer Grp., Ltd. v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., 336 

S.W.3d 822, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Although a trial court has 

no discretion to set aside a statutory compliant MSA, neither party objected to this issue 

at trial nor complains on appeal of this error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1, 38.1(f); Martinez 

Jardon v. Pfsiter, 593 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.); see also 

Brooks v. Brooks, 257 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) 

(holding a party was estopped from seeking to enforce terms of MSA on appeal after 

requesting judgment on terms inconsistent with MSA). From the record, it appears the 

trial court believed at the September 1 hearing that an agreement had been reached by 

the parties as to the terms of the final decree of divorce and that therefore, the parties 

consented to the entry of the judgment.

“A party’s consent to the trial court’s entry of judgment waives any error, except for 

jurisdictional error, contained in the judgment, and that party has nothing to properly 

present for appellate review.” Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, 

no writ); see Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 441 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 2014, no pet.); Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); see also Gross v. Dannatt, No. 13-15-00309-CV, 2017 WL 
12

2705471, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 22, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. 

op.). To have a valid consent judgment, each party must explicitly and unmistakably give 

its consent on the record indicating that the parties came to some agreement as to the 

disposition of the case. See Sohocki v. Sohocki, 897 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1995, no writ); DeClaris Assocs. v. McCoy Workplace Sols., 

L.P., 331 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Consent must 

exist at the exact moment the trial court renders judgment on the agreement of the parties. 

Sohocki, 897 S.W.2d at 424. To determine whether a divorce decree is a consent 

judgment, we construe the decree as a whole with an aim to harmonize and give effect 

to all that is written. Durden v. McClure, 281 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2008, no pet.) (quoting Wilde v. Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1997)).

Here, both parties “approved and consented to” the final decree of divorce “as to 

both form and substance.” See Boufaissal v. Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“Because her signature signifies her approval and consent 

to the terms of the agreed decree as to both form and substance, Wife waived the 

complaints she now attempts to raise on appeal.”); but see First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. 

Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied) 

(holding that the phrase “approved as to form and substance,” standing alone, does not 

transform a judgment into a consent judgment). In addition, the following appeared in the 

decree acknowledgment section:

Petitioner, TERESA L. CAMPERO, and Respondent, ADALBERTO 

CAMPERO, each acknowledge that before signing this Final Decree of 

Divorce they have read this Final Decree of Divorce fully and completely, 

have had the opportunity to ask any questions regarding the same, and fully 
13

understand that the contents of this Final Decree of Divorce constitute a full 

and complete resolution of this case. Petitioner and Respondent 

acknowledge that they have voluntarily affixed their signatures to this Final 

Decree of Divorce, believing this agreement to be a just and right division 

of the marital debt and assets, and state they have not signed by virtue of 

any coercion, any duress, or any agreement other than those specifically 

set forth in this Final Decree of Divorce.

Teresa also “agree[d] and stipulate[d] that there shall be no retroactive child 

support paid to either party.” Teresa made further representations of her agreement as to 

the parties’ tax liabilities. Notably, she also agreed to waive her right to appeal from the 

form and substance of the final decree of divorce. See CQuentia Series Holdings, LLC v. 

Luminez Corp., 622 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (holding that a 

litigant’s right to appeal from a judgment may be waived by agreement even when consent 

to the judgment is challenged). While Teresa unmistakably attempted to revoke her 

consent to the MSA, the record does not reflect that Teresa attempted to revoke her 

consent to the entry of the final decree of divorce. Therefore, in construing the decree as 

a whole, we conclude that the final decree of divorce was a valid consent judgment. See 

Durden, 281 S.W.3d at 142.

As to the validity of the MSA, we express no opinion. While we have performed 

our analysis operating under the assumption that the MSA was statutorily compliant, we 

would reach the same conclusion were it noncompliant. In that case, the MSA would be

treated just like any other agreement incident to divorce. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 

§ 7.006; Lee v. Lee, 158 S.W.3d 612, 614 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). The 

order signed by the trial court on July 24 rendering judgment on that MSA would be void, 

as Teresa had revoked her consent prior to its entry. See Leal, 892 S.W.2d at 857.
14

However, the parties still had the option to revise their agreement prior to the rendition of 

the divorce. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006(a). The final decree of divorce would 

nevertheless be considered a consent judgment. Thus, because we conclude that the 

final decree of divorce is a consent judgment, Teresa has waived all non-jurisdictional 

error. See Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 766. We therefore hold that Teresa has waived the issues

she has presented to this Court. 

We overrule both of Teresa’s issues.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

GINA M. BENAVIDES

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

24th day of March, 2022.