In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-3374

JANICE ARRES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

IMI CORNELIUS REMCOR, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 6542—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2003—DECIDED JUNE 25, 2003

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. IMI Cornelius Remcor,

Inc., a manufacturer of soft drink dispensing machines,

hired Janice Arres as a human resources administrator

in 1996 and fired her three years later. Arres brought

suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Remcor acted because of her race and national

origin. She also contended that Remcor violated Illinois

law by retaliating against her for attempting to follow

immigration law. The district court granted summary

judgment to Remcor. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15177 (N.D. Ill.

August 15, 2002). On appeal Arres has abandoned her

claims under federal law and contends only that Illinois
2 No. 02-3374

law blocks an employer from firing someone who tries to

remove from the payroll aliens not entitled to work in

the United States.

In March 1999 the Social Security Administration

informed Remcor that 10% of the W-2 forms filed by its

employees showed names or numbers that did not agree

with federal records. After cross-checking, Arres found

that the fault lay with the workers rather than with

Remcor. She believed that persons who would furnish

bogus Social Security numbers must be aliens who lack

visas that authorize work within the United States. Arres

recommended to both her immediate supervisor, Dan

Weinick, and Weinick’s supervisor, Mike Long, that

Remcor immediately fire these employees. According

to Arres, Remcor’s longstanding practice had been to

discharge persons who furnished fraudulent information.

At Long’s direction, Weinick informed Arres that he

would handle the situation. After consulting with the Social Security Administration and one of Remcor’s attorneys, Weinick decided to send letters to the employees

asking them to correct any errors. Arres believed that

approach to be unlawful, and she refused to process the

information employees submitted in response. Arres submits that Remcor fired her because of this refusal, a

step that she says constitutes retaliatory discharge in

violation of Illinois law.

This theory required Arres to show: (1) that she had

been discharged; (2) that her discharge was in retaliation

for her activities; and (3) that her discharge violated a

clearly mandated public policy of the state of Illinois.

Hinthorn v. Roland’s of Bloomington, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 526,

529, 519 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1988). In seeking summary

judgment, Remcor argued that the existence of a federal

anti-retaliation rule, 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(5), forecloses

any state remedy, and alternatively that the real cause

of Arres’ discharge was poor performance. The district
No. 02-3374 3

court, relying on the first argument, awarded summary

judgment to Remcor, concluding that:

[b]ecause §1324b(a)(5) . . . unequivocally sets forth

a remedy for individuals who have filed a charge

or complaint with the INS and then were consequently retaliated against, a claim for retaliatory

discharge in Illinois is not actionable.

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15177 at *16-17 (citation omitted).

That reasoning is inconsistent with Brandon v.

Anesthesia & Pain Management Associates, Ltd., 277

F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2002), which holds that the availability

of a federal remedy does not automatically preclude a

state retaliatory-discharge claim. What’s more, §1324b(a)(5)

does not provide a remedy for Arres in the first place.

Section 1324b(a)(5) states (emphasis added):

It is also an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity to . . .

retaliate against any individual for the purpose

of interfering with any right or privilege secured

under this section or because the individual intends to file or has filed a charge or complaint . . .

under this section.

This does not cover all activities that implicate any provision of the immigration laws; it is limited to complaints

and charges regarding discrimination based on national

origin and citizenship, the subject of §1324b. Arres does

not contend that her refusal to process the employees’

paperwork was designed to ensure the correct implementation of §1324b. Instead, she says, her acts were designed

to prevent Remcor from violating 8 U.S.C. §1324 and

§1324a, which concern employment of aliens. There is

accordingly no overlap between §1324b and the statelaw theory Arres presents.

Although Remcor is wrong to argue that Illinois never

protects employees who try to follow federal law, Arres
4 No. 02-3374

is wrong to suppose that either state or federal law gives

her any right to follow an idiosyncratic view of the law’s

demands. Remcor did exactly what the Social Security

Administration and its legal counsel suggested: before firing anyone, it tried to separate those who had made

inadvertent errors from those who are not entitled to

work in the United States. Doing this enabled Remcor to

respect the rights of aliens who have work authorization while also following its duties under §§ 1324 and

1324a. A human resources manager is not free to impose

a different approach unilaterally; that’s nothing but

insubordination. Imagine the disruption in workplaces

everywhere if every person were legally privileged to act

(or not act) based on her own view of what the law (federal

or state) requires, and managers were helpless to do

anything in response. Neither state nor federal law

creates such an untenable system. That Arres did not

agree with counsel’s view of Remcor’s legal obligations is

not a justification for insubordination. Brandon does not

hold otherwise. Dr. Brandon reported suspicions to his

colleagues. Rather than consult with federal authorities

or counsel, they dismissed his concerns and fired him. The

employer in Brandon spurned its legal duties; Remcor

sought out and followed legal advice. It was entitled to

insist that Arres, like its other employees, follow the advice received from counsel—which is not alleged to be

erroneous, let alone so transparently wrong that even a

lay person is bound to know better. (Even with the aid

of discovery, Arres has not established that the employees

in question were aliens, let alone that any aliens among

them lacked green cards. For all this record shows, each

had made a simple error in transcribing a Social Security number.)

Arres faces another problem. Her brief states that the

Illinois public policy is found at 8 U.S.C. §1324a, which

prohibits the employment of aliens who lack proper creden-
No. 02-3374 5

tials. We observed in Brandon that “it is a clearly established policy of Illinois to prevent its citizens from violating federal law and that the state’s public policy

encourages employees to report suspected violations of

federal law if that law advances the general welfare of

Illinois citizens.” 277 F.3d at 942. This follows from the

principle that federal law is the law of the states. The

Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution requires

Illinois to treat federal law as part of state law. See Claflin

v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876). Although the

state’s Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]here is

no precise definition of [public policy]”, it has explained

that public policy “concerns what is right and just and

what affects the citizens of the State collectively. . . .

[The] matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s social

rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will

be allowed.” Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.

2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981). Discharging persons who endeavor to implement federal law thus

usually violates Illinois law. See Brandon, 277 F.3d at 942-

43; Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502,

511, 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (1985).

Usually differs from always, however; some rules of

federal law must be implemented only as the national

government determines. Labor law is one such subject;

states may not adopt rules that require, or prohibit, things

arguably prohibited or arguably required by federal labor

law. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236 (1959). Immigration law is another domain

of this kind. “[T]he supremacy of the national power in the

general field of foreign affairs, including power over

immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made

clear by the Constitution”. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,

62 (1941). “[T]he states are granted no such powers; they

can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully

imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and
6 No. 02-3374

residence of aliens in the United States or the several

states.” Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S.

410, 419 (1948). See also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982);

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Federal immigration

power is not just superior to that of the states; it is exclusive of any state power over the subject. Illinois is not

entitled to have a policy on the question what precautions

should be taken to evaluate the credentials of aliens who

may, or may not, hold visas authorizing them to work.

Whether persons in Arres’ position are entitled to implement private understandings of federal immigration policy,

free from any risk to their status within the firm, is a

question of federal law alone. Congress provided an antiretaliation provision in §1324b and omitted one from

§1324a. Illinois is not free to obliterate this difference

through state law—and we have no reason to suppose that

the Supreme Court of Illinois would try. That leaves Arres

without a legal footing for her claim of retaliatory discharge

and makes it unnecessary for us to explore the question

whether Arres has established causation.

AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—6-25-03