Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 27, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 34091

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent overheating of the brakes,

which could result in cracked pistons and

consequent leakage and burning of the

hydraulic fluid, accomplish the following:

Brake Piston Replacement

(a) Within 7 weeks after the effective date

of this AD, replace the left and right brake

assemblies having part number (P/N)

AHA2227–2 with modified brake assemblies

having P/N AHA2227–3, in accordance with

Dornier Service Bulletin SB–328J–32–029,

Revision 1, dated August 4, 2000.

Note 2: Replacement of the brake

assemblies prior to the effective date of this

AD in accordance with Dornier Service

Bulletin SB–328J–32–029, dated June 14,

2000, is also acceptable for compliance with

the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD.

Spares

(b) As of the effective date of this AD, no

person may install a brake assembly having

P/N AHA2227–2 on any airplane.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(c) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, Transport

Airplane Directorate, FAA. Operators shall

submit their requests through an appropriate

FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who

may add comments and then send it to the

Manager, International Branch, ANM–116.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the International Branch,

ANM–116.

Special Flight Permits

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(e) The actions shall be done in accordance

with Dornier Service Bulletin SB–328J–32–

029, Revision 1, dated August 4, 2000. This

incorporation by reference was approved by

the Director of the Federal Register in

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR

part 51. Copies may be obtained from

FAIRCHILD DORNIER, DORNIER Luftfahrt

GmbH, P.O. Box 1103, D–82230 Wessling,

Germany. Copies may be inspected at the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at

the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North

Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington,

DC.

Note 4: The subject of this AD is addressed

in German airworthiness directive 2000–288,

dated September 21, 2000.

Effective Date

(f) This amendment becomes effective on

August 1, 2001.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 19,

2001.

Kalene C. Yanamura,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–15935 Filed 6–26–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–308–AD; Amendment

39–12287; AD 2001–13–07]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 737–300, 737–400, 737–500,

737–600, 737–700, 737–800, 757–200,

757–200PF, 757–200CB, and 757–300

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Boeing Model 737–

300, 737–400, 737–500, 737–600, 737–

700, 737–800, 757–200, 757–200PF,

757–200CB, and 757–300 series

airplanes. This AD requires a test of the

two electrical circuits that close the fuel

shutoff valve on the wing spar, and

repair, if necessary. This action is

necessary to prevent inability to shut off

the flow of fuel to an engine after an

uncontained engine failure, which

could result in a fire spreading to other

parts of the airplane. This action is

intended to address the identified

unsafe condition.

DATES: Effective August 1, 2001.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of August 1,

2001.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Boeing Commercial Airplane

Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,

Washington 98124–2207. This

information may be examined at the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules

Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kathrine Rask, Aerospace Engineer,

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA,

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–1547; fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

include an airworthiness directive (AD)

that is applicable to certain Boeing

Model 737–300, 737–400, 737–500,

737–600, 737–700, 737–800, 757–200,

757–200PF, 757–200CB, and 757–300

series airplanes was published in the

Federal Register on December 29, 2000

(65 FR 82957). That action proposed to

require a test of the two electrical

circuits that close the fuel shutoff valve

on the wing spar, and repair, if

necessary.

Explanation of New Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–28–1164,

Revision 1, dated May 10, 2001, which

describes procedures for a one-time test

of the two electrical circuits that close

the fuel shutoff valve on each wing spar

to determine if there is continuity, and

location and repair of any discontinuity.

The procedures described in Revision 1

of the service bulletin are essentially

similar to those described in the original

issue of the service bulletin, dated

August 24, 2000, which was listed in

the proposed rule as the appropriate

source of service information for Boeing

Model 737–300, 737–400, and 737–500

series airplanes. Revision 1 merely

corrects the location of two electrical

connectors. Accomplishment of the

actions specified in Revision 1 of the

service bulletin is intended to

adequately address the identified unsafe

condition.

In consideration of this new service

information, the FAA has revised

paragraph (a) of this final rule to refer

to Boeing Service Bulletin 737–28–1164,

Revision 1, in addition to the original

issue of the service bulletin, as an

acceptable source of service information

for accomplishment of paragraph (a) on

Boeing Model 737–300, –400, and –500

series airplanes.

Comments

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to the

comments received.

34092 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 27, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

Support for the Proposal

Two commenters support the

proposed rule.

Provide Credit for Use of Telexes

One commenter requests that the FAA

revise the proposed AD to give credit for

accomplishment of the proposed actions

using the following telexes:

• Boeing All Base Telex M–7200–00–

01064, dated April 24, 2000

• Boeing Telex SWA–DAL–00–

00182H, dated March 27, 2000

• Boeing Telex CAL–IAH–00–

00681H, dated April 7, 2000

• Boeing All Base Telex M–7200–00–

01231, dated May 31, 2000

• Boeing Telex AAL–AFW–00–

00324H, dated March 27, 2000

The commenter states that the

instructions in these telexes are

consistent with those in the service

bulletins referenced in the proposed

AD. The airplane manufacturer issued

the telexes to provide adequate

instructions to operators that wanted to

perform the tests on their airplanes

before the applicable service bulletins

were available.

The FAA concurs with the

commenter’s request, and has added

Note 3 to this AD to give credit for using

the referenced telexes to accomplish the

requirements of this AD before the

effective date of this AD.

Revise Cost Impact Estimate

Two commenters state that the

proposed actions have already been

accomplished on certain airplanes in

their fleets. The FAA infers that the

commenters are requesting that the FAA

revise the ‘‘Cost Impact’’ section of the

proposed AD to reflect the

accomplishment of the proposed

requirements on some airplanes. The

FAA concurs with the commenters’

request and has revised the ‘‘Cost

Impact’’ section of this AD to reflect that

some airplanes have already complied

with this AD.

One commenter states that the test, as

proposed, takes two hours. Though the

commenter does not specify which

airplane model its estimate applies to,

the FAA infers that the commenter is

requesting that the FAA increase the

estimate of work hours for Model 737–

300, –400, and –500 series airplanes

from one to two work hours. The FAA

concurs with this request, and has

revised the ‘‘Cost Impact’’ section of this

AD accordingly.

Request To Consider Need for

Repetitive Tests

One commenter requests that the FAA

and the airplane manufacturer review

the Maintenance Planning Document for

the affected airplane models to assess

whether repetitive tests of the circuits

subject to the proposed AD are

necessary. The commenter does not

request a change to the proposed rule.

The FAA acknowledges the

commenter’s concern. At this time, the

Maintenance Planning Document for the

Model 737 and 757 series airplanes

includes only a check of the fuel shutoff

valve. The procedure for this check is

similar to the functional test that is

performed during production of the

airplane, which was described in the

proposed AD, in that the test only

verifies that one of the two circuits

needed to supply power for the fuel

shutoff valve operates correctly. The

FAA and the airplane manufacturer are

coordinating development of a new

functional test that would verify that

both circuits work correctly. No change

to the final rule is necessary in this

regard.

Request To Extend Compliance Time

One commenter requests that the FAA

extend the compliance time from 6

months to 18 months for the test

specified in the proposed AD. The

commenter states that an 18-month

compliance time will allow operators to

perform the test in the proposed AD at

a regularly scheduled maintenance

interval. The commenter notes that a 6-

month compliance time does not align

with the provisions of Air Transport

Association Specification 111, which

states, ‘‘to capture the majority of

scheduled maintenance periods, a

nominal ‘intermediate’ check described

by an interval of 18 months and an

aircraft downtime of one-to-three days

should be considered.’’

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s request. The commenter

provides no technical justification for

increasing the compliance time as

requested. The unsafe condition

addressed by this AD—inability to shut

off the flow of fuel to an engine after an

uncontained engine failure—is a

significant safety issue, and the FAA has

determined that the compliance time of

6 months, as proposed, is warranted.

This decision is based on the

anticipated rate of latent failures in the

system. In developing an appropriate

compliance time for the actions required

by this AD, the FAA considered not

only those safety issues, but the

manufacturer’s recommendations, parts

availability, and the practical aspect of

accomplishing the required test within

an interval paralleling normal

scheduled maintenance for the majority

of affected operators. In light of all of

these factors, the FAA considers 6

months an appropriate compliance time

wherein safety will not be adversely

affected. No change to the final rule is

necessary in this regard.

Conclusion

After careful review of the available

data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes

previously described. The FAA has

determined that these changes will

neither increase the economic burden

on any operator nor increase the scope

of the AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 3,403 Model

737–300, 737–400, 737–500, 737–600,

737–700, 737–800, 757–200, 757–

200PF, 757–200CB, and 757–300

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet.

The FAA estimates that this AD will

affect 795 Model 737–300, –400, and

–500 airplanes of U.S. registry. The

required test will take approximately 2

work hours, at an average labor rate of

$60 per work hour. A commenter has

advised the FAA that two of these U.S.-

registered airplanes have already been

tested according to the requirements of

this AD. Therefore, based on the figures

stated above, the FAA estimates the

future cost impact of this AD on U.S.

operators of Model 737–300, –400, and

–500 series airplanes to be $95,160, or

$120 per airplane.

The FAA estimates that this AD will

affect 820 Model 737–600, 737–700,

737–800, 757–200, 757–200PF, 757–

200CB, and 757–300 airplanes of U.S.

registry. The required test will take

approximately 3 work hours on each of

these airplanes, at an average labor rate

of $60 per work hour. A commenter has

advised the FAA that 30 of these U.S.-

registered airplanes have already been

tested according to the requirements of

this AD. Therefore, based on these

figures, the FAA estimates the future

cost impact of this AD on U.S. operators

of these airplanes to be $142,200, or

$180 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed

above are based on assumptions that not

all operators have yet accomplished the

requirements of this AD action, and that

no more operators would accomplish

those actions in the future if this AD

were not adopted. As explained

previously, commenters have advised

the FAA that some airplanes have been

tested according to the requirements of

this AD, and the estimated future cost

impact has been reduced accordingly in

this final rule. The cost impact figures

discussed in AD rulemaking actions

represent only the time necessary to

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 27, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 34093

perform the specific actions actually

required by the AD. These figures

typically do not include incidental

costs, such as the time required to gain

access and close up, planning time, or

time necessitated by other

administrative actions.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will

not have a substantial direct effect on

the States, on the relationship between

the national Government and the States,

or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, it is

determined that this final rule does not

have federalism implications under

Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3)

will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a

substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has

been prepared for this action and it is

contained in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it may be obtained from the Rules

Docket at the location provided under

the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference,

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

2001–13–07 Boeing: Amendment 39–12287.

Docket 2000–NM–308–AD.

Applicability: The following models and

series of airplanes as listed in the service

bulletins below, certificated in any category:

Airplane Model Boeing special attention

service bulletin

737–300, 737–

400, 737–

500.

737–28–1164, dated August

24, 2000.

737–600, 737–

700, 737–

800.

737–28–1160, Revision 1,

dated October 26, 2000.

757–200, 757–

200PF,

757–200CB.

757–28–0060, Revision 1,

dated October 26, 2000.

757–300 ......... 757–28–0061, Revision 1,

dated October 26, 2000.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent inability to shut off the flow of

fuel to an engine after an uncontained engine

failure, which could result in a fire spreading

to other parts of the airplane, accomplish the

following:

Test and Repair

(a) Within 6 months after the effective date

of this AD, perform a test to determine if

there is continuity or to measure voltage, as

applicable, of the two electrical circuits that

close the fuel shutoff valve on the wing spar.

Do the test per Boeing Special Attention

Service Bulletin 737–28–1164, dated August

24, 2000, or Boeing Service Bulletin 737–28–

1164, Revision 1, dated May 10, 2001 (for

Boeing Model 737–300, 737–400, and 737–

500 series airplanes); or Boeing Special

Attention Service Bulletin 737–28–1160,

Revision 1 (for Boeing Model 737–600, 737–

700, and 737–800 series airplanes); Boeing

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757–28–

0060, Revision 1 (for Boeing Model 757–200,

757–200PF, and 757–200CB series airplanes);

or Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin

757–28–0061, Revision 1 (for Boeing Model

757–300 series airplanes); all dated October

26, 2000; as applicable.

(1) For Boeing Model 737–300, 737–400,

and 737–500 series airplanes: If any

discontinuity is detected, prior to further

flight, repair per Boeing Service Bulletin

737–28–1164.

(2) For airplane models other than those

listed in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD: If any

measurement is not between 21 and 34 volts

direct current (DC), prior to further flight,

repair per the applicable service bulletin.

Note 2: Tests accomplished per Boeing

Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–28–

1160 (for Boeing Model 737–600, 737–700,

and 737–800 series airplanes), dated June 5,

2000; Boeing Special Attention Service

Bulletin 757–28–0060 (for Boeing Model

757–200, 757–200PF, and 757–200CB series

airplanes), dated June 15, 2000; or Boeing

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757–28–

0061, dated June 15, 2000 (for Boeing Model

757–300 series airplanes); as applicable; are

acceptable for compliance with paragraph (a)

of this AD.

Note 3: Tests accomplished prior to the

effective date of this AD per Boeing All Base

Telex M–7200–00–01064, dated April 24,

2000; Boeing Telex SWA–DAL–00–00182H,

dated March 27, 2000; Boeing Telex CALIAH–00–00681H, dated April 7, 2000; Boeing

All Base Telex M–7200–00–01231, dated

May 31, 2000; or Boeing Telex AAL-AFW–

00–00324H, dated March 27, 2000; are

acceptable for compliance with paragraph (a)

of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 4: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(d) The actions shall be done in accordance

with Boeing Special Attention Service

Bulletin 737–28–1164, dated August 24,

2000; Boeing Service Bulletin 737–28–1164,

Revision 1, dated May 10, 2001; Boeing

Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–28–

1160, Revision 1, dated October 26, 2000;

Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin

757–28–0060, Revision 1, dated October 26,

2000; or Boeing Special Attention Service

Bulletin 757–28–0061, Revision 1, dated

October 26, 2000; as applicable. This

incorporation by reference was approved by

the Director of the Federal Register in

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR

part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing

Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707,

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. Copies may

be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington; or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite

700, Washington, DC.

Effective Date

(e) This amendment becomes effective on

August 1, 2001.

34094 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 27, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 19,

2001.

Kalene C. Yanamura,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–15934 Filed 6–26–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–250–AD; Amendment

39–12286; AD 2001–13–06]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 747–100, –200, –300, and 747SP

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD);

applicable to certain Boeing Model 747–

100, –200, –300, and 747SP series

airplanes; that requires certain

inspections to find missing and alloysteel taperlock fasteners (bolts) in the

diagonal brace underwing fittings; and

corrective actions, if necessary. For

airplanes with missing or alloy-steel

fasteners, this AD also mandates

replacement of certain fasteners with

new fasteners, which constitutes

terminating action for the repetitive

inspections. This action is necessary to

prevent loss of the underwing fitting

load path due to missing or damaged

alloy-steel taperlock fasteners, which

could result in separation of the engine

and strut from the airplane. This action

is intended to address the identified

unsafe condition.

DATES: Effective August 1, 2001.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of August 1,

2001.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Boeing Commercial Airplane

Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,

Washington 98124–2207. This

information may be examined at the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules

Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Tamara L. Anderson, Aerospace

Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120S,

FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–2771; fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

include an airworthiness directive (AD)

that is applicable to certain Boeing

Model 747–100, –200, –300, and 747SP

series airplanes was published in the

Federal Register on January 23, 2001

(66 FR 7433). That action proposed to

require certain inspections to find

missing and alloy-steel taperlock

fasteners (bolts) in the diagonal brace

underwing fittings; and corrective

actions, if necessary. For airplanes with

missing or alloy-steel fasteners, that

action also proposed to mandate

replacement of certain fasteners with

new fasteners, which would constitute

terminating action for the repetitive

inspections.

Comments

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to the

comments received.

Support for the Proposal

One commenter supports the

proposed rule.

Request To Clarify Potential Damage

Conditions

One commenter, the airplane

manufacturer, requests that the FAA

revise language in the preamble and

paragraph (b)(1) of the proposed AD,

which specifies, ‘‘an open-hole high

frequency eddy current (HFEC)

inspection to detect cracks at the bolt

hole locations * * *.’’ The commenter

requests that these sections refer to

corrosion and damage in addition to

cracking. The commenter states that

corrosion is often present in bolt holes

where cracked alloy steel bolts have

been removed, and that fastener holes

may be damaged during removal of

bolts.

The FAA concurs with the

commenter’s request to reference all

conditions that may be found during the

open-hole HFEC inspection, and has

revised paragraph (b)(1) to specify ‘‘an

open-hole [HFEC] inspection to detect

cracks, corrosion, or damage at the bolt

hole locations of the aft 10 taperlock

fasteners in the diagonal brace

underwing fitting.’’ Paragraphs (b)(3)

and (c) have also been revised to

acknowledge that conditions other than

cracking may be present. The FAA finds

that these changes will not result in any

additional burden for operators because

the open-hole HFEC inspection is used

to indicate whether there is a

discrepancy, regardless of whether the

discrepancy is a crack, corrosion, or

other damage. The section of the

preamble which the commenter asked to

be changed is not restated in this final

rule; thus, no change is necessary in this

regard.

Request To Estimate Cost of Corrective

Action

Two commenters request that the

FAA revise the cost impact information

included in the proposed AD to include

an estimate of the cost for replacement

of alloy-steel fasteners. One of the

commenters also requests that the FAA

estimate the number of airplanes on

which this replacement may be

necessary. The commenters note that,

based on inspections accomplished thus

far, it is highly probable that many

operators will find alloy-steel fasteners

installed on their airplanes. One of the

commenters specifically requests that

the FAA use the work hour estimate of

448 work hours per airplane that is

provided in Boeing Alert Service

Bulletin 747–57A2312, dated June 15,

2000.

The FAA concurs with the

commenters’ requests, though we note

that the cost impact estimate included

in ADs is typically limited only to the

cost of actions actually required by the

rule. The cost estimate does not

typically consider the costs of ‘‘oncondition’’ actions, such as repairing a

crack if one is detected during a

required inspection (‘‘repair, if

necessary’’). Such ‘‘on-condition’’ repair

actions would be required to be

accomplished—regardless of AD

requirements—in order to correct an

unsafe condition identified in an

airplane and to ensure operation of that

airplane in an airworthy condition, as

required by the Federal Aviation

Regulations.

In this case, however, the FAA

acknowledges that many operators will

probably find alloy-steel fasteners

installed; thus, we agree that it is

acceptable to provide an estimate of the

costs associated with replacement of

alloy steel fasteners. Accordingly, the

FAA has added an estimate of the cost

of the replacement of alloy steel

fasteners to the ‘‘Cost Impact’’ section of

this final rule. The FAA is unable to

accommodate the commenter’s request

to estimate the number of airplanes that

will actually require bolt replacement,

but has instead estimated the total cost

if all U.S.-registered airplanes subject to

this AD must accomplish the bolt

replacement. Operators will note that