IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kimberly Clark Corporation , : Petitioner :

: v. :

: Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Bromley) , : No. 656 C.D. 2016 Respondent : Submitted: October 14 , 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE MAR Y HANNAH LEAVITT , President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI , Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 4, 2017

Kimberly Clark Corporation (Employer) petitions this Court for review of the Workers’ Compensation ( WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) March 30, 2016 order affirming the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision granting Sharon R. Bromley’s (Claimant) Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation b y Dependents of Deceased Employees ( Fatal Claim Petition). E ssentiall y , t here are two issues before this Court: (1) whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the WC
Act (Act) 1 of proving th at her deceased husband Donald J. Bromley’s (Bromley) injury and/or death were cause d by exposure to chemicals in Emplo yer’s workplace
and , ( 2 ) whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision. 2 After review, we affirm

.

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended , 77 P.S. § 411( 1 )

. 2 Employer presented six issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the Act of proving that Bromley’s injury and/or death were caused by exposure to chemicals in Employer’s workplace; (2) whether Claimant sustained her factual burden of proving that Bromley was exposed to various workplace chemicals, and that such exposure rose to the level of a hazard; (3) whether Claimant sustained her burden under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the Act of pro ving medical causation between Bromley’s workplace exposure and his injury and/or death; (4) whether the WCJ erred by overruling Employer’s objection during Barry L. Singer , M.D.’s June 25, 2010 deposition; (5) whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the Act of proving Bromley’s exposure within 300 weeks of his injury and/or death;2 Employer operates a paper manufacturing business which produces napkins, toilet tissue and paper towels. See Reproduced Record ( R.R. ) at 12a

- 13a. Bromley was employed as one of Employer’s Chester plant electrician s from 1973 to 2005 , during which time he was exposed to various chemicals used in E mployer ’s production

. In the summer of 2005, Bromley was diagnosed with metastatic bladder

cancer which caused his death o n June 23, 2006

.

On August 4, 2008 , Claimant filed a Claim Petition for WC (Claim Petition), seeking lost wages from August 11, 2005 through June 23, 2006, plus medical benefits and counsel fees arising from Bromley’s work injury, which was
descr ibed as bladder cancer, multiple pulmonary metastatis and asbestos

- related pleural plaques

. See Certified Record (C.R.) Item 4. On that same date, Claimant filed a Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation By Dependents For Death Resulting From Occupational Disease (Fatal OD Claim Petition) under Section 301(c)(2) of the
Act , alleging that Bromley’s death was due to an occupational disease

- metastatic
bladder cancer

- caused by exposure to carcinogens during the course and scope of his employment with Employ er. See C.R. Item 1. Cla imant also filed the Fatal
Claim P etition pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act seeking widow’s benefits 3

and, (6) whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision. Because the first five issues relate to whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the WC Act, they are all subsumed thereunder.

3 Under Section 307(2) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 561(2), widows are entitled to 51% of the decedent’s wages, not to exceed the statewide average weekly wage. Claimant’s general eligibility is undisputed. The WCJ found:

[Claimant], age 62 as of her testimony, is clearly [eli]gible to receive benefits as a widow; no dispute exists as to her status. Here, there was a forty

- one (41)[

- ]year marriage (date of marriage, April 20, 1965) during which [Claimant and Bromley] live d together; they were living together as of the date of [Bromley’s] death. [Claimant] is the sole dependent entitled to benefits. Three children were born of the marriage, but all are above the usual entitlement age, and no ne are disabled; none were depe ndent on [Bromley] for support.
WCJ Dec. at 1.3

due to Claimant ’s work

- related death. See C.R. Item 1 0

. In all of the Petitions, Claimant averred that Bromley’s date o f injury/last date of employment was August 11, 2005. Employer denied the allegations in each of Claimant’s Petitions and raised
various affirmative defenses

. See C.R. Items 3, 6, 12.

WCJ h earings were held on September 17, 2008, January 7, June 1 an d September 16, 2009, and January 20, April 19, July 26 and October 25, 2010 . By February 4, 2011 decision, the WCJ granted the Fatal Claim Petition and ordered Employer to pay Claimant benefits based upon Bromley’s $1,738.08 average weekly

wage , commenci ng on June 23, 2006 , the date of Bromley’s death (Original Decision)

. The WCJ also directed Employer to pay 10% interest on all deferred WC payments, $3,000.00 toward Bromley’s funeral expenses, plus litigation costs and attorney’s fees. Employer appeale d to the Board which, on August 9, 2013 , held that, although the WCJ found that Bromley’s death was due to work

- related exposure to carcinogens, since the WCJ did not state whether the conclusions were made pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) or 301(c)(2) of the Act, the Board could not determine whether
substantial evidence s upport ed the WCJ’s award. Accordingly, the Board remanded the matter for the WCJ to specify whether he had awarded the benefits pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act or under Section 301 (c)(2) of the Act

. 4

On remand, the WCJ conducted additional hearings on March 7 and September 10, 2014. On September 16, 2014, the WCJ reaffirmed his Original
Decision and added that “ Claimant has met the burden of proof required under
Section 30 [ 1 ] (c)(1 ) of the Act , with benefits to [Claimant] being appropriately

4 Under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act, claimants who establish that certain occupational diseases enumerated in Section 108 of the Act, added by Section 1 of the Act of October 17, 1972, P.L. 930 , 77 P.S. § 27 .1, are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the diseases are work

- related

or “ arose out of and in the course of [] employment [

. ]” Section 301(e) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 413. Section 301(c)(1) of the Act does not allow for a similar presumption. See Pawlosky v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. , 525 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1987)

.4

granted as entered in the [O]riginal Decision.” WCJ Remand Dec. at 3 (emphasis added)

. The WCJ specifically held: “The instant matter meets the provisions of Section 301(c)(1) [of the Act] as a repetitive/cumulative [

- ] type injury by way of exposure to carcinogenic agents in the workplace over an extended period of
time resulting in bladder cancer and death[.]” WCJ Remand Dec

. at 3 (emphasis added). Employer appealed from the WCJ’s remand deci sion to the Board. On March 30, 2016, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s remand decision

. Employer appealed
to this Court. 5

Initially, Section 301(c)(1) of the Act provides, in relevant part:

The terms ‘ injury ’ and ‘ personal injury, ’ as used in this [A] ct, s hall be construed to mean an injury to an employe , regardless of his previous physical condition,

. . . arising in the course of his employment and related thereto , and such disease or infection as naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reacti vated or accelerated by the injury; and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under this [A] ct, it shall mean only death resulting from such injury

. . . , and occurring within three hundred weeks after the injury

. 77 P.S. § 411(1) (empha sis added). Accordingly, “[i]n a fatal claim proceeding, the surviving family member bears the burden of proving that the decedent sustained an injury in the course and scope of employment and that the decedent’s death was causally related to the work

- rel ated injury

. ” J.D. Landscaping v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Heffernan) , 31 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

“[T]he word ‘injury’ . . . is given no express statutory meaning” in Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, and “does no more than state that an injur y is an injury.”

5 “On review[,] this Court must determine whether constitutional rights were violated, errors of law were committed, or necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial compete nt evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.) , 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Employer filed with this Court a request for supersedeas pending the appeal. By July 1, 2016 memorandum and order, this Court denied the supersedeas request.5

Pawlosky v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. , 525 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. 1987). However, the term “ has been broadly defined to encompass all work

- related harm including ‘ any hurtful or damaging effect which may be suffered by anyone. ’”
Jackson Twp. Volunteer Fire Co. v. W orkmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Wallet) , 594 A.2d 826, 828 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Pawlosky , 525 A.2d at 1209). Thus, our courts have declared that an “injury” under Section 301(c)(1) of the
Act need not arise f

rom an accident or specific physical bodily trauma, but can include a disease not statutorily defined as an “occupational disease” under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act or The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act (the ODA) , 6 that is caused by exposure to a j ob

- related hazard

. See Pawlosky ; see also McCullough v. Xerox Corp. , 581 A.2d 961 (Pa. Super. 1990); Standard PA Practice 2d (2011) §§ 167:220, 167:241. Specifically, “[b]ased on [the] Pawlosky [] [ Court’s ] broad interpretation of ‘injury’ in [S]ection 30 1(c)(1) [of the Act], it is now well settled that a claimant can establish a right to benefits for an ‘injury’ in the nature of a
work

- related disease [ , ] ” i.e. , a disease as an injury claim

. 7 Brockway Pressed

6 Act of June 21, 1939, P.L.566, as amended , 77 P.S. §§ 1201

- 1603

. 7 Accordingly, there is no support for Employer ’s argument t hat bladder cancer “is not an alleged injury” and “is not a condition that falls within the statutory mea ning of” Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, or that “it can only be classified as an occupational disease under [ the ODA

. ]

. ” Employer Br. at 32. When the ODA was enacted in 1939, occupational diseases were listed therein that were not covered by the Act. Howe ver, in 1972, Sections 108 and 301 (c) of the Act were amended to include occupational diseases as compensable injuries. The amendments covered only disabilities due to exposures after June 30, 1973, whereas the ODA remained in force for older claims. See David B. Torrey & Andrew E. Greenberg, Workers’ Compensation: Law & Practice §§ 5:1, 5:2, 5:10 (3 rd ed. 2008).

The [ODA] remains unrepealed. Obviously, one of the main reasons for not repealing it was to make clear that the [ODA] was to remain in force with respect to occupational diseases contracted prior to the effective date of the 1972 disease provisions of the [ Act ]

. It is worth noting that the diseases covered by the [ODA] are essentially similar to those provided for in [S] ection 108 of the [ Act ]

. Pawlosky , 525 A.2d at 1210 n.9

.6

Metals v. W

orkers’ C omp

. Appeal Bd . (Holben) , 948 A.2d 232, 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis added)

.

I. Whether Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act. Employer argues that Claimant failed to me e t her burden under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the Act of proving that Bromley’s death w as caus ed by his exposure to chemicals in the workplace within the 300 weeks preceding his death

. We dis agree.

In support of her Fatal Claim Petition, C laimant testified that, with the exception of a broken leg in 1964, hernia surgery in 1993 and a diabetes dia gnosis approximately three years before his death, 8 s ee R.R. at 400 a , Bromley was “ very healthy ” up to the time that he noticed blood in his urine in May or June 2005. R.R.
at 384a

. Claimant recounted that, because Bromley’s physician thought he had a

Moreover, our Superior Court specifically stated that,

f ailure to meet the definition of occupational disease [under Section 301(c)( 2 ) of the Act ] does not exclude a claimant from compensation under the [WC] system. S ee generally Pawlosky

. . . . Such definitions are merely procedural means of creating a non

conclusive presumption that an injury was work

- related. F ailure to establish the presumption [under Section 301(c)( 2 ) of the Act ] is not dispositive; the claimant may still go forward in making out a case for [ WC benefits under Section 301(c)( 1 ) of the Act ] absent the presumption

. McCullough v. Xerox Corp. , 581 A.2d 961, 964 ( Pa. Super. 1990) (emphasis added). Thus, disability due to an occupational disease that i s not specifically listed in the ODA or Section 108 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 27.1, as incorporated by Section 301(c)(2) of the Act , may still be compensable, as long as the requisite causation is established. Pawlosky

. Finally, S ection 444 of the Act, added by Section 6 of the Act of October 17, 1972, P.L. 930 , provides, in pertinent part, that “a ny person may pursue, in the alternative, a claim for compensation under this [A] ct and a claim for compensation under [the ODA]

. ” 77 P.S. § 1000

. Accordingly,

“ [ WC b]enefits for disabilities due to occupational diseases may be claimed under either [the ODA or the Act,] or under both in the alternative.” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Workmen ’ s Comp. Appeal Bd. , 425 A.2d 879, 879 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).

8 Claimant articulated t hat Bromley’s diabetes was controlled with diet and medication (Glucophage). See R.R. at 384a, 399a, 405a.7

pr ostate infection, Bromley was prescribed a six

- week course of Cipro. See R.R. at 407a. Bromley underwent diagnostic testing of his bladder in June 2005, and surgery to remove a tumor on August 11, 2005. See R.R. at 403a

- 404a.

Claimant explained that B romley served his four

- year electrician apprenticeship at Sun Ship Building and Dry Dock (Sun Ship) in the 1960s . H e worked for Scott Paper’s foam division until approximately 1971 . Thereafter, he was employed at DuPont for approximately six months . In 1973 , he returned to Scott Paper at Employer’s Chester facility. See R.R. at 362a

- 364a.

Claimant related that Bromley worked at Employer’s plant until August 2005, but returned to work for Employer for an additional 40 hours in February 2006
in orde r to retire with seven paid vacation weeks. See R.R. at 400a

- 401a. She testified that, although she did not have first

- hand knowledge of Bromley’s working conditions, she observed that the entire time he worked for Employer, “[h]is clothes
would have lit tle holes in them,” and “he would have die [sic] on his hands when he came home.” R.R. at 369a. She also recalled that there regularly was paper dust and dye on his work clothes, the latter of which she could never get out. See R.R. at
370 a

- 373a. Claim ant could not specify how often Bromley came home with dye on his hands or clothes, only that “[he] went to work, came home and sometimes he had die [sic] on it and sometimes he did not,” but it happened frequently enough that she just expected it. R.R. a t 372a.

Further, Claimant described that Bromley smoked for approximately one year, but he quit in 1965 when Claimant became pregnant, and he never smoked
thereafter. See R.R. at 392a

- 395a. She reported that although Bromley’s father
smoked at home whil e Bromley was growing up, Bromley’s mother required his
father to smoke outside. See R.R. at 391a, 395a

- 397a.

Robert Bonkowski (Bonkowski) testified that he has been an electrician for Employer since 1971. See R.R. at 5a , 32a

. He met Bromley during t heir8

electrician apprenticeships at Sun Ship in the 1960s. See R.R at 46a. He related that Bromley start ed the four

- year program before he did, but they overlapped three of those years, and they worked together at Employer’s facility from 1973 until Brom ley
retired. See R.R. at 46a.

Bonkowski described that Employer’s facility consists of six major buildings housing four types of operation areas

– a powerhouse , pulp delivery , tissue
mill , and finishing/distribution

– all of which he has worked in over the years. See
R.R. at 6a

- 7a. Bonkowski reported that the electricians were charged with keeping the process running so, “ [ i ] f it was part of the process, [they] worked on it

. ” R.R. at 24a; see also R.R. at 14a.

Bonkowski stated that Employer’s electric ians initially worked from a central shop and were assigned around the plant as needed, to regularly repair and test machines, and to conduct “capital work” like new machin e wiring, lighting, construction, clean

- up, etc. 9 R.R. at 9a. Bonkowski specified that he and Bromley
were leaders from 1993 to 1997 , meaning that they also purchased needed materials, conducted safety meetings and created electrician job assignments

. See R.R. at 8a , 11a. Moreover, Bonkowski recalled that when the central shop was dis mantled in
1997 and the electricians were “assigned to individual assets” or families ( i.e. , given specific area assignments) , he was assigned to tissue mill 17 and Bromley was assigned to the cogenerat ion facility (CC F ) until 2000, when Bromley replaced t he napkins department electrician . R.R. at 8a ; see also R.R. at 29a , 32a

- 33a , 43a

.

Bonkowski arti culated that, as electricians who work ed throughout Employer’ s facility, he and Bromley came into contact with the various chemicals

use d in Employer’s proc essing

. See R.R. at 14a , 23a

. He expounded :

9 Bonkowski testified that j obs we re assigned by work order, horn call or shift supervisor’s verbal request. See R.R. at 14a.9 There was [sic] chemicals that were taken away from us because they were called

-- considered hazardous. One of them was xylene, was a cleaning solvent that was used on the machines. We were exposed to Tap Fr ee that was taken [] away from the mechanics [in the 1980s] , because it was considered dangerous. [ 10 ] Tazcon (ph) was a penetrating oil that was removed, a lot of them just disappeared. I don ’ t know if you can say they were removed, but I know our cleanin g tank, where we had a wash

- up tank in the shop that had the One

- One

- One in it, and I know that was removed. Q. A cleaning solvent One

- One

- One?
A. Yeah. It had a code One

- One

- One on it. I don ’ t know what the breakdown is but that was considered bad. W e were exposed to

-- I guess we were exposed to [polychlorinated biphenyl (]PCBs[)], which were replaced, I guess, with number 10 transformer oil. PCBs that we used to check test and work a lot with other vendors and stuff like that. I mean, even the proc esses were changed, they took kerosene out of the plant. They took formaldehyde out of the plant [in the late 1980s]

. They took milk of lime, which was used for bleaching [recycled paper] , which was chlorine and lime and it was mixed, and it was called m ilk of lime that was pumped out the plant, it was a bleach plant, actually we had a bleach plant there [until the mid

- 1990s]

. They had chlorine tanks, tanker trucks, train tanks, I guess you would call them. That was full of chlorine. Q. And you would co me in contact with that as an electrician? A. Sure, because we had to disconnect motors, replace [] rotted conduits, seal tights, the pipe fighters [sic] might be pulling a pump. So in order to get the pump out, we had to pull the motor out to make room fo r the new pump [to go] in, and the mechanics would have to draw tap the motor bases and things like that, so yeah. Q. And when things would either disappear or be directly pulled, were there ever any safety meetings with management where that would be disc ussed?

10 Bonkowski clarified that although Employer no longer stocked Tap Free or Tap Magic, the electricians all had cans of it that they continued to use thereafter until it was gone. See R.R. at 40a.10 A. No, not really. Just went out and did your j ob. Q. Is there any particular manager that would ever give you any direction at all in safety, in dealings with these chemicals that you recall? A. I would say no, not really. Now, they did take asbe stos brakes out of the areas [in the early 1990s]

. We did a lot of asbestos brakes, transfer asbestos brakes, we used to take care of the elevators. The freight elevators, they were all asbestos brakes, and we would repair the motors in the shop with asb estos brakes, blow out the motor and just blow them out in the shop, and we didn ’ t have any special HIPAA [sic] vacuum cleaner like they have today.

R.R. at 15a

- 17a ; see also R.R. at 19a

- 2 3 a , 42a

.

Bonkowski d escribed that, u ntil the xylene tank was remov ed from the plant , he and Bromley came into contact with xylene when they changed motor

pumps , and when it was sprayed on f elts to clean them before starting the manufacturing process. See R.R. at 18a. Bonkowski described that “the fumes were
so bad and they stunk so bad you’d be gagging and coughing, you’d have to leave the
area . . . .” R.R. at 18a. He recounted that Employer eventually installed an alarm for people to leave areas where xylene was in use. See R.R. at 18a. He understood that xylene was removed from the plant after the tank leaked into the well shop and created an environmental hazard in approximately the late 1980s or early 1990s. See R.R. at 17a, 19a, 39a

- 40a. Bonkowski recalled that, although he did not actually witness Bromley w ith xylene on his clothes , all of the electricians were exposed, and “[Bromley] being on shift longer . . . was probably exposed to it more[.]” R.R. at
19a. Bonkowski also expressed that the electricians, including Bromley, were exposed to signi ficant amounts of industrial dyes, not only in the large tubs, and through the dispensing hoses, but because dye was splashed everywhere, including on motors, walls, doors, handrails, steps, starters and the floor, and they would touch it11

and kneel in it t o do their work, particularly in the CCF and napkins area

. See R.R. at
23a

- 27a. Bonkowski specifically recalled that silica ash also covered every surface in the CCF, including electrical panels, the dust system, walkways, doorways, floors and
even the r oad due to trucks hauling it to the landfill. See R.R. at 28a , 35a . He also asserted that dust from culm ( i.e. , cheap coal) burned at Employer’s facility was “all over the place” in the CCF. R.R. at 29a ; see also R.R. at 30a.

Bonkowski rec ounted that, d uring the 21⁄2 years that he and Bromley
worked the same shift:

A. Well, we worked on brakes together, we worked on cranes together, because we were the two electricians assigned to the main plant. So we were exposed to asbestos dust on the cranes, elevator s, brake dust. We pulled cable and wire through the p owerhouses and through the basements, asbestos on top of the old pipes, when you pull wire across the pipes the insulation was junky, so as you ’ re wiring upon wire y ou ’ re cutting into the

-- sawing into the asbestos through the old basements and stuff, the old pipe covering. Q. Did you see any flaking or dust in that atmosphere?
A. Sure. Q. Where else did you work with him? A. Well, I mean, we ’ ve been all through the bleach plant
area. I mean, we ’ ve b een through

-- covered all the calls in the bleach plant, the pulp prep department, in the beaters and allies (ph), and things like that, that ’ s where kind of a lot of the old pumps were resin pumps, stuff like that.

R.R. at 30a

- 3 1 a.

Bonkowski acknowle dged that , although he and Bromley worked in

s eparate areas between 1997 and 2000, and he did not know specifically what day

- to

day work Bromley did at that time , Bonkowski was aw are of the conditions Bromley was exposed to in the CCF during that time, “be cause [Bonkowski had] been over12

there and [the ash was] everywhere.” R.R. at 35a; see also R.R. at 34a, 36a. Bonkowski also knew that the napkin s area where Bromley worked from 2000 until 2005 was approximately 80 by 300 feet in size and contained four m achines , one of which dyed the napkins, but since dye was splashed all over the area, Bromley would have been in contact with it, whether he was working on the dye machine or not. See R.R. at 44a, 52a

- 53a.

Bonkowski testifi ed that Employer’s electri cians were given plastic,
accordion

- type dust masks to wear, but their use was emphasized only when employees made motor brush changes or worked on brakes, due to carbon dust and
asbestos. See R.R. at 20a

- 21a. He also stated that protective clothing and leather gloves were available to the electricians, but that no one really pushed their use or warned that they should not enter a dye area without them, and when they did wear the leather gloves they would get soaked with dye. See R.R. at 27a

- 28a, 41a.
A lthough he remembered Employer providing protective suits at some point, he does not recollect when, and he explain ed that since they were not rubber, he could not say whether they were water, dye or ink

- repellant. See R.R. at 41a. In addition,
Bonkowski recalled Employer’s medical department fit

- testing and assigning respirators to the electricians a pproximately every 12 to 18 months , and the
electricians undergoing pulmonary function tests every three years as a condition of their employment. See R.R. at 36a

- 37a. He pronounced that the respirators were used primarily for ash rather than dye exposure. See R.R. at 28a, 37a

- 38a, 41a.

Bonkowski did not believe that he and Bromley were exposed to
asbestos or other chemicals during their Sun Ship apprent iceships because the ships

were empty steel hulls, and the apprentices were not informed that there was asbestos present. See R.R. at 48a

- 49a . Employer, on the other hand, expre ss ly notified employees that there was asbestos at its facility , and pipes we re so marked. See R.R.13

at 48a. Bonkowski represented that he did not witness Bromley smoke during the more than 40 years that he knew him

. See R.R. at 49a

- 50a.

Jack Parris (Parris) testified that he has worked for Employer as an electrician since 1969

. See R.R. at 70a. He confirmed that electricians are responsible for handling any electrical problem throughout Employer’s facility. See R.R. at 70a. Parris represented that he has known Bromley since 1966, when they worked at Sun Ship together. See R.R. at 70a , 97a . He recalled that he and Bromley worked together for Employer from 1973 until 2006. See R.R. at 70a

- 71a. Parris explained that since he worked swing

- shift for the past 20 years, he and Bromley worked together at least one

- third of the t ime. See R.R. at 95a

- 97a , 104a

. Parris asserted that he and Bromley have had essentially the same job duties, and he observed Bromley at work. See R.R. at 71a.

Parris described that he has been exposed to hazardous chemicals for
decades while working for Employer , including carbon dust from cranes and motors , asbestos, xylene, bleach, formaldehyde, and dust and liquid dyes. See R.R. at 73a

80a. He declared that he and Bromley were exposed to carbon dust while working on

cranes , brakes and motors, an d asbestos throughout the facility. Parris specifically recalled that xylene was sprayed freely from a n 11⁄2 inch hose to clean Employer’s
machines , which he and Bromley would smell and then experience headaches

. See
R.R. at 75a

- 77a

. He recounted that Emp loyer eventually used an alarm to warn employees to leave areas where xylene was being sprayed. See R.R. at 75a. Parris
articulated that he and Bromley while working together for Employer were exposed
for decades to bleach liquor, formaldehyde and asbest os. See R.R. at 76a

- 79a , 88a

. Parris further recollected a time when the electricians were told not to drink water from the central shop fountain because, although it was clean enough to use for processing, the city water may have been mixed with chemica ls and sewage. See
R.R. at 87a

- 88a.14 Regarding industrial dye exposure, Parris testified that he and Bromley
worked together in the several areas where the dyes were used. Parris described that powder dyes were used in the pulp prep area:

[W]e had to go in there and change the motors out . . . [and] work on the motor starters and . . . , you go like that, (indicating) tap something you gotta watch because [there] would be [powder dye] dust flying, so you knew you had to be careful when you went in ther e. Never wore a respirator. They never said wear a respirator . . . , and you’d get it on your hands.

R.R. at 80a.
Parris explained that, although the liquid dye was more contained than the powder dye, the electricians had to work on the pumps under t he vats. See R.R. at
81a. He related that the liquid dye was all over the machine areas and the walls, and he and Bromley, as the young guys, were sent there together because the older electricians avoided the messy jobs. See R.R. at 82a

- 83a , 107a

- 108a

. Parris recalled
that the electricians sometimes wore suits to keep from dirtying their clothes, but no one ever told them not to touch the dye. See R.R. at 81a. He maintained that e ven when the motors were brought to the electricians for service, they were covered in dye that w ould get on their hands. See R.R. at 81a , 106a

.

Parris stat ed that the electricians were not given respirators to work with the dyes. See R.R. at 83a , 108a

. He specified that employees were only trained to

wear their respirat ors in the CCF for protection from silicone. See R.R. at 83a

- 84a , 108a . Parris not ed that he also used his respirator in areas like the coal yard due to the dusty mist, but not if he was simply going there to flip a switch. See R.R. at 84a

85a. He conf

irmed that the electricians were tested and fitted for personal respirators every three years. See R.R. at 84a.

Parris also testified that he has worked around Employer’s asbestos

covered pipes in the fan houses, attics, ceilings and t he electrician’s central shop.15

See R.R. at 85a. He represented that the 15 by 15 “motor rec room ” where electricians’ computers have been located for years, has the highest concentration of asbestos, but since it is not flaking, Employer has yet to clos e it up. R.R. at 86a.

Parris confirmed that Brom l ey left shift work in the early 1990s, Bromley and Bonkowski were leaders , Bromley was next assigned to CCF, then to napkins until the equipment was sold and the department closed down in approximately 2000 and Bromley removed the power. See R.R. at 89 a

- 91a , 102a

103a. He described that, as a leader between 1993 and 1997, Bromley did mostly office work but, he would have done whatever electrical work was necessary when he
worked overtime

. See R.R. at 91a

- 92a. Parris stated that Bromley worked in napkins
until the last machines were removed within the six months before Bromley left Employer. See R.R. at 91a, 93a

- 94a, 111a. Even without the napkin machines, Bromley was exposed to the remaining dye unt il his last day of work. See R.R. at
111a

- 112a. Parris concluded that Bromley was exposed to all of the same contaminants that he was exposed to over their decades of working for Employer.
See R.R. at 88a. Parris admitted that he and Bromley smoked, bu t less than a pack a day, and he recalled that Broml e y quit more than 30 years earlier. See R.R. at 99a

102a.
Claimant presented the October 19, 200 9 and June 25, 2010 deposition testimony of Barry L. Singer , M.D. (Dr. Singer) . Dr. Singer explained th at his practice has focused primarily on oncology and hematology over the past 25 years, only 2% to 3% of which has involved bladder cancer because “[i]t’s not one of the most common cancers.” R.R. at 131a; see also R.R. at 134a. In preparation for
Broml ey's evaluation, Dr. Singer reviewed Bromley’s medical records
, including his
chest x

- rays which reflected that Bromley had “ asbestos lungs. ” R.R. at 141a. He
also read Claimant’s, Parris’ and Bonkowski’s deposition testimony, Employer’s material safety data sheets (MSDS) , materials from the National Institute for16

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and the independent medi c al evaluation report of Employer’s oncology expert Alan J. Lippman, M. D. (Dr. Lippman). Dr. Singer stated that he also
reviewed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) information, the NIOSH carcinogen list and a KC Safety Tech Library Chemical Index. See R.R. at
165a

- 168a. Dr. Singer described that any tox ins or their byproducts that get into the urine sit in the bladder and damage the transitional epithelium therein, which can lead to metaplasia or dysplasia and, eventually, cancer. See R.R. at 140a

- 141a , 204a . Dr. Singer declared that smoking is the pri me cause for approximately 50% of bladder

cancer cases , due to benzene in cigarettes , but stated that 20% to 30% of bladder

cancers are cause d by occupational exposure to chemicals

. See R.R. at 140a , 142a

143a , 163a

- 165a , 176a

. He stated that workers who are not protected or who use minimum protection are at a higher risk of occupational exposure , unless that work

area is 100% sealed

. See R.R. at 1 76a

- 177a , 216a

.

Dr. Singer produced abstracts of medical articles he reviewed that link
bladder cancer to ch emical and asbestos exposure

. See R.R. at 199a, 221a

- 231a,
244a

- 250a, 593a

- 622a. In particular, i n Occupation and Bladder Cancer Among Men in Western Europe (2003), higher bladder cancer risks were observed in electrical workers and men employed in indus trial chemical manufacturing. See R.R. at 244 a

. In Bladder Cancer and Asbestos in Spain (1988), “the results [of a study conducted between 1978 and 1982] showed that bladder cancer is associated with occupational exposure to asbestos.” R.R. at 246a. Th e Italian study summarized in Occupation and Risk of Bladder Cancer (1990), “confirm[ed] the well[

- ]known association between bladder cancer risk and dyestuff production[.]” R.R. at 248a. In Occupational Exposure to Chemical and Petrochemical Industries and Bladder
Cancer Risk in Four Western Canadian Provinces (2004), the study suggested that17

there is an increased risk of bladder cancer in workers exposed to asbestos and benzidene over the general population. See R.R. at 249a. In Occupational and Non

O ccupational Risk Factors in Bladder Cancer Patients in an Industrialized Area
Located in Former East

- Germany (2005), bladder cancer was found to have been overrepresented in patients with occupational exposure to asbestos and chlorinated
solvents. See R.R . at 250a.

Dr. Singer testified that Bromley’s work took him all over Employer’s plant, and the portion of MSDS for chemicals used by Employer in areas where Bromley worked since 1995 that he examined 11 reflect that Bromley would have been exposed to multi ple carcinogenic compounds

. Dr. Singer further explained:

Asbestos has some relationship to all cancers involving the colon, the bladder, [and] the lung. So less so [sic] in the bladder but certainly has potential to cause damage in conjunction with ot her irritants. As a sole exposure, it would be less likely but with [a] combination of exposure with other compounds like

11 Dr. Singer clarified that he did not review all of the (approximately 250

- 30 0) MSDS that he was given, because after he located approximately 15 which reflected carcinogenic compounds used at Employer’s plant, he “felt it was sufficient.” R.R. at 206a; see also R.R. at 200a

. Dr. Singer identified the following carcinogenic compo unds to which Bromley was exposed: ethyleneimine ( decorating dye; see 1997 request to approve 2

- day trial in napkins

- R.R. at 251a

- 254a), butadiene ( see 1997 MSDS for coupling grease

- R.R. at 255a

- 264a ), crystalline silica ( see 1995 MSDS for quick metal press fit, 1997 MSDS for CCF ash and a conditioning agent, 1999 MSDS for permanent threadblocker, 2004 MSDS for pipe sealant

- R.R. at 265a

- 289a, 333a

- 340a) , nickel compound ( see 2004 MSDS for petroleum coke

- R.R. at 290a

- 297a) , toluene ( see 1996 MSDS for aerosol spray paint and 1999 MSDS for stencil ink spray

- R.R. at 299a

- 303a, 316a

- 321a) , xylene ( see 1996 MSDS for aerosol spray paint, 1996 MSDS for xylene and 2001 MSDS for metal and textile markers

- R.R. at 304a

- 309a, 316a

- 326a), ethylbenzene ( see 199 6 M S DS for xylene

- R.R. at 322a

- 327a), trimethylbenzene ( see 1996 MSDS for petroleum cleaner

- R.R. at 310a

- 315a), dicholorobenzidene ( see 2000 MSDS for Bayprint yellow pigment

- R.R. at 328a

- 332a), titanium dioxide ( see 1995 MSDS for quick metal press fi t and 2001 MSDS for metal and textile markers

- R.R. at 304a

- 309a, 333a

- 340a), and trichloroethylene ( see 2001 MSDS for lectra clean aerosol

- R.R. at 341a

- 344a). See R.R. at 157a, 201a

- 202a, 206a

- 215a, 217a, 220a, 251a

- 344a. He could not determine from the MSDS whether, when or where Employer used those chemicals. See R.R. at 217a

- 218a.18 benzene and the aniline dyes [, it] certainly would be a co

contributing factor.

R.R. at 144a. Dr. Singer explained that the use of aniline dyes was prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, and they were use d by Employer, but they were mostly discontinued by industries in approximately 1985 after they were known to be carcinogenic. See R.R. at 146a, 162a

- 163a, 214a.

Dr. Singer did not b elieve that Bromley’s brief past smoking history was significant in his developing bladder cancer because the benzene exposure was “not long enough and the exposure was minimal.” R.R. at 141a. He did not consider
second

- hand smoke exposure significant in Bromley’s case, since his wife did not smoke, and his father smoked outside. See R.R. at 164a.

Dr. Singer represented that because bladder cancer generally occurs later in life, and Bromley was only in his late 50s and did not smoke, his cancer was due to “an intense exposure

. ” R.R. at 146a. He also deemed a significant sign of exposure intensity that Bromley’s cancer was in the most advanced stage when it was diagnosed, meaning that it had progressed rapidly and aggressively. See R.R. at
146a

- 147a.
D r. Singer articulated that , based on the MSDS for the xylene Employer

u sed , the benzene compound ethylbenzene made up 15% of it

. See R.R. at 143a , 150a

. Dr. Singer reflected :

According to the reports I have read from the chemicals that he was expos ed to and the dyes and the silica and asbestos that he was exposed to, [Bromley] had significant exposure to chemicals and potential carcinogens or actual carcinogens while at work at [Employer’s facility] and he, according to [his] co

- workers, he worked i n areas that certainly had exposure to xylene, previously to aniline dyes and certainly he had exposure to asbestos because he had asbestos lungs on [his] chest x

- ray.19

R.R. at 141a. He stated: “[Bromley’s] risk factors were . . . primarily the xylene,
whi ch contained the 15% benzene, cert a inly the co

- exposure to asbestos and silica, especially the asbestos, [and] also some exposure that he had to the aniline dyes.
Those were the three main [sic]. ” R.R. at 146a. Dr. Singer could not point to any
scholarl y journal article in which it was concluded that either asbestos, silica or xylene alone could be a substantial factor in the development of bladder cancer. See
R.R. at 170a , 221a

- 231a . However, he concluded within a reasonable degree of
medical certaint y that Bromley’s cumulative exposure to those chemi c als at Employer’s plant was a substantial contributing factor in his development of bladder cancer and, thus, his death

. See R.R. at 148a , 205a

- 206a , 221a

.

Dr. Singer acknowledged that he did not know wh en or how much xylene was used by Employer during Bromley’s employment , or whether Bromley required medical attention for any acute exposure s to xylene, silica or asbestos, although it was clear that Bromley’s lungs revealed chronic changes due to asbestos

exposure and Claimant reported that Bromley experienced occasional rashes and
holes in his clothes

. 12 See R.R. at 153a

- 154a , 157a , 172a

- 173a , 213a , 218a

- 219a

.

Employer presented the testimony of its e nvironmental m anager Gary
Baker (Baker )

. 13 Baker desc ribed that he has been responsible for environmental compliance , industrial hygiene accountability and testing at Employer’s Chester plant
since 1995. See R.R. at 417a

- 419a , 445a

. He explained that, as chemical control coordinator, he has had to review, approve and track all chemicals used in Employer’s facility , and he inspects the site approximately once every six months

.

12 Dr. Singer also admitted that Bromley’s medical records do not reference occupational exposure to chemicals, but explained that he would not expect that there would be any such references in oncology reports because the goal at that point is keeping the patient alive. See R.R. at 159a

- 161a, 175a, 218a

- 219a.

13 Baker was a safety, health and environmental coordinator at Employer’s corporate center from 1990 to 1995.20

See R.R. at 418a , 442a

- 443a , 465a

. Baker presented MSDS for dyes used by Employer , some of which date back to the late 1980s , and a sbestos abatement and
removal records. See R.R. at 419a

- 420a , 437a , 444a , 451a , 460a

. Baker repor t ed that he has Employer’s monthly chemical use inventory reports dating back only to 1995, and they do not contain cleaning or maintenance chemicals, or oil s and greases that

everyone uses. See R.R. at 464a

- 465a , 471a

.

Baker articulated that since the CCF was built in the mid

- 1980s, it did not
contain asbestos. See R.R. at 420a

- 421a. He stated , however, that the manufacturing facility does contain a sbestos and, although a lot of it w as removed in the 1980s and early 1990s , there is still asbestos there, which Employer monitors daily. See R.R. at
421a

- 422a, 451a , 455a

. Baker explained that although there is less asbestos now, asbestos transite panel s used for fireproofing walls remain in the facility. See R.R. at 455a, 459a. He added that there are also pipes covered in asbestos that are encapsulated in aluminum, the ends are capped in material and the material is painted

over. See R.R. at 438a , 4 55a

. Baker e xpressed that the asbestos could be exposed if someone damages the steam line by cutting through the metal and into the insulation.
See R.R. at 439a. He claimed that electricians would normally be working on
electrical conduit that do es not contain asbestos. See R.R. at 439a.

Baker related that when employees notify him of asbestos compromise on the premises, an investigation is conducted regarding the cause and the exposure potential then the compromise is either repaired or abated, and t he air is monitored to ensure there is no additional exposure risk. See R.R. at 424a

- 425a , 455a

- 458a , 459a

. Based upon his review of the results, Baker confirmed that, after asbestos repairs and removals conducted at Employer’s facility, all actual and c learance testing fell below permissible exposure levels. 14 See R.R. at 425a

- 426a.

14 All asbestos clearance testing is conducted by an outside firm. See R.R. at 425a.21

Baker disclosed that because there is the potential for employee exposure to silica in the facility’s boiler 10 and CCF areas (including the office and water treatment areas) due to anthracite coal burning, employees are required to wear respirators in the CCF, particularly in the ash building. See R.R. at 426a

- 427a , 460a

.

Baker agreed that Employer’s process was very different in 1970 than it is now, and that he has no reason to dispute Bonkowski’s or Parris’ testimony about xylene being sprayed to clean Employer’s mill prior to 1995. See R.R. at 449a. He asserted that he has not approved or disapproved Employer’s use of xylene, and is not aware of any xylene use at th e facility since 1995. See R.R. at 429a. He recalled that, since he has worked for Employer, an alarm is sounded to warn people to leave the mill when the cleaning chemicals are being sprayed, but understands that has not always been the case. See R.R. at 450a.

Baker claimed that Employer has only used kerosene to fuel small , five

gallon , portable heaters used to heat certain areas of the plant during winter
shutdowns. See R.R. at 429a

- 430a. He stated that t he heaters are not used in CCF,
since the m achines generate their own heat. See R.R. at 430a. Baker recalled that although the PCB transformers at Employer’s facility have been reduced because they impose an environmental hazard, three still exist on

- site, which are sealed and regularly checked s uch that electricians and others who must work on them, are not exposed to PCBs. See R.R. at 430a

- 431a , 461a

- 462a . He was not aware of any employee reporting PCB exposure since 1995. See R.R. at 431a.

Baker reported that “[b]leach liquor refers to . . . the old style of mixing two components together to make

. . . c oncentrated sodium hypochlorite,” used by Employer to whiten paper. R.R. at 431a. He confirmed that Employer still uses sodium hypochlorite in the filter plant and in tissue manufacturing bu t, since at least 1995, a pre

- mixed solution is shipped in

. See R.R. at 431a , 462a , 471a

- 472a

. He reported that neither formaldehyde nor milk of lime have been used in the mill from22

1995 to the present. See R.R. at 438a

- 440a

. Although he recalled conce rns being expressed about the drinking water supplied by the Chester Water Authority, he stated that Employer had it tested and confirmed that it “pretty much” matched bottled water and, thus, was potable. R.R. at 433a.

Baker admitted that coal dust exist s at Employer’s facility in the coal yard , conveyor building and parts of the boiler building, and confirmed that CCF personnel are exposed to the coal yard. See R.R. at 431a

- 432a. B aker acknowledged that paper dus t is generated in the paper mill areas o f Employer’s facility, and where parent rolls are converted to consumer

- sized rolls, and some is evident in CCF or where napkins are made. See R.R. at 433a.

Baker testified that he reviewed the MSDS for dyes and uncovered that
since the late 1980s only on e

– a bay print yellow

– contained aniline and other carcinogens , which was to be trialed for paper towels at Chester in approximately 2000 but, since it was not approved, it was never used. See R.R. at 434a

- 435a , 437a , 451a , 460a , 463a

- 464a . He recounte d that powdered dyes had been used in the pulp prep area of Employer’s plant to color tissues, but is not aware of powdered dyes being used in the plant since 1995. See R.R. at 436a

- 437a.

Baker described that industrial dyes, inks, chemicals, silicas an d asbestos are still present at Employer’s facility, but that employees are trained on safe chemical use, and are instructed regarding what safety equipment is needed for its

use. See R.R. at 468a , 470a . He stated that employe e s are required to report po tential chemical or other substance exposures to the medical and safety departments

. See
R.R. at 424a, 433a

- 434a , 458a , 462a

. He believed that the expectations are represented in Employer’s safety handbook , which has been amended occasionally , and that i t falls under employee safety obligations to say no if they are asked to do23

unsafe work, notify others that are doing unsafe work and report unsafe work. 15 See
R.R. at 434a , 466a

.

When asked whether there have been chemicals employees routinely
worked wi th since 1995 that were eventually deemed hazardous and removed from use at the facility, Baker replied: “Nothing jumps to mind[.]” R.R. at 441a; see also R.R. at 446a. He testified that Employer attempts to be proactive and remove
chemicals when it beco mes known that they are dangerous. See R.R. at 467a

- 468a.
He recalled that he has made recommendations since 1995 to reduce environmental impacts, like reducing volatile organic compounds and paper dust and silica

exposure. See R.R. at 446a

- 447a.

Ba ker recall ed Bromley’s name but could not recollect his face, and he
admitted that h e never directly supervised Bromley or even worked with him , nor did
he do the type of work Bromley did for Employer. See R.R. at 443a

- 444a.

E mployer also presented Dr. Lippman’s April 7 and May 26, 2010 deposition testimony , which disagreed with Dr. Singer’s statements that Bromley had significant exposure to chemicals and carcinogens during his employment . Dr. Lippman further disputed Dr. Singer’s opinion that Bromley’ s bladder cancer resulted from Bromley’s exposure to a combination of chemicals , since there is no literature to support such a conclusion

. See R.R. at 503a. Rather, Dr. Lippman ultimately concluded that Bromley would have suffered from bladder cancer wh ether he worked at Employer’s facility or in a bookstore all of those years. See R.R. at 577a.

T he law is well established that “[t]he WCJ is the ultimate factfinder and has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight.” Uni v. of

15 Baker described that employees undergo regular medical check

- ups, and the respirators are fit

- tested to each employee. See R.R. at 428a

- 429a. He stated that, at least si nce 1995, employees who do not wear the necessary respiratory protection are progressively disciplined with counseling, verbal reprimands, written reprimands, suspensions and so on, depending upon the number of violations. See R.R. at 427a.24

Pa. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hicks) , 16 A.3d 1225, 1229 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “The WCJ, therefore, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses.” Griffiths v. Workers’ Comp. Appe al Bd. (Red Lobster) , 760 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

Based upon the evidence presented in the instant case, the WCJ granted
the Fatal Claim Petition because Claimant met her burden of proof under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act. I n reaching his decis ion, the WCJ made the following relevant credibility determinations:

3. On review, the evidence presented in support of this claim is found credible and persuasive, and is accepted over the defense evidence as there is a conflict. . . . 4. The testimony and opinions of Dr. Singer are found credible and persuasive. His opinions are accepted over those of Dr. Lippman as there is a conflict. The testimony of both co

- workers ( [] Bonkowski and [] Parris ) , along with the testimony of [ Claimant ] , is found cred ible and persuasive as their testimony, individually and collectively, suppor t the opinions of Dr. Singer

.

. . . . 9. [] Baker’s testimony would negate any significant exposure since 1995; he did not however, dispute the testimony of the two co

- workers (e. g., the spraying of xylene previously

. . . . ), and acknowledged the continued presence of a number of compounds at the facility, such as asbestos, paper dust, and coal dust, and silica exposure

. . . . Dr. Singer noted . . . that [] Bromley’s work enviro nment subsequent to 1995 (within the last 300 weeks of [] Bromley’s employment; he worked until August 2005) exposed him to ‘multiple compounds that were carcinogens.’ . . . Dr. Singer concluded that the occupational exposure resulted in the bladder can cer . He testified: ‘ . . . the total exposure that he had to all these chemicals was the cause of his bladder cancer.’25 10. Dr. Singer is well qualified to express relevant opinions in this case. . . .
11. Dr. Lippman . . . totally negated the workplace as a causal factor in [] Bromley’s bladder cancer . At the same time, he did not seek to specifically identify the cau s e of the bladder cancer. . . . Given the record of [Bromley’s] work duties as an electrician, in various sections of the plant, with as sociated exposure to carcinogen agents over many years as described by his co

- workers ([] Bonkowski and [] Parris), the opinion s of Dr. Singer are found more reasonable and more credible than those of Dr. Lippman on the issue of causation . This conclusion is strengthened given Dr. Lippman’s inability to express any specific opinion as to the cause of [Bromley’s] bladder cancer (and even more so, considering that he acknowledged that some 20 percent of bladder cancers are generally accepted to be associate d with specific occupational exposures

. . . )

. Dr. Lippman’s

. . . challenge [to Dr. Singer’s opinions] goes to the weight to be given to Dr. Singer’s opinions; the undersigned, in turn, has found Dr. Singer’s testimony credible and persuasive, and as
n oted the more reasonable and credible given the circumstances presented by this record.
WCJ Dec. at 1, 3

- 4 (emphasis added)

.

Neither the Board nor the Court may reweigh the evidence or the WCJ’s credibility determinations. Sell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd . (LNP Eng’g) , 771 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2001). Specifically, “Section 422(a) [of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834,] does not permit a party to challenge or second

- guess the WCJ ’ s reasons for credibility determinations. [Thus, u]n less made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ’s credibility determinations will be upheld on appeal

. ” 16 P a. Uninsured Emp ’ rs Guar. Fund v.
W orkers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lyle) , 91 A.3d 297, 303 (Pa. Cmw lth . 2014) (quoting

16 Capricio us disregard “ occurs only when the fact

- finder deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence .” Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.

- Fairless Works) , 862 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Capricious disregard, by definition, does not exist where, as here, the WCJ expressly considered and rejected the evidence. Id

.26

Dorsey v. Workers ’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 191, 195 (P a. Cmwlth. 2006) )

.

On appeal after remand, the Board agreed that substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant met her burden under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act. 17 In particular, the Board declared that “Dr. Singer’s testimony,

acce pted as credible by the WCJ, is unequivocal in attributing [Bromley’s] bladder cancer to workplace exposure primarily to xylene, with co

- exposure to asbestos and silica and some exposure to aniline dyes

. ” Board Op. at 1 5

.

“As with all claim petitions, the elements necessary to support [a fatal claim petition] award must be established by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gibson v. W orkers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Armco Stainless & Alloy Prods.) , 861 A.2d 938, 943 (Pa. 2004). Here, a lthough it is undisputed that Bromley’s death was due to bladder cancer, the parties do not agree that Bromley’s bladder cancer was caused by workplace exposur e within the 300
weeks before his death. Employer specifically contends that t he l ay witness testimony was insufficient to prove Bromley’s alleged workplace exposure, and that Dr. Singer ’s opinions on causation were based upon an inadequate factual record and
lacked scientific or medical basis.

17 We agree with Employer that, in Finding of Fact 11, t he WCJ appears to have implied that Employer had a burden to demonstrate an alternative cause for Bromley’s cancer ( i .e. , “ [Dr. Lippman] did not seek to specifically identify the cause of the bladder cancer.” WCJ Dec. at 3; “Dr. Lippman’s inability to express any specific opinion as to the cause of Claimant’s bladder cancer[.]” WCJ Dec. at 4). Claimant here had “ a nevershif ting burden of proving not only that [Bromley’s] injury arose in the course of his employment but also that the injury was related to it. ” Pawlosky , 525 A.2d at 1211 (emphasis added). However, since other substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s conclusi on, those references in the WCJ’s finding constituted harmless error.27

a. T hree H undred

- W eek Calculation

. I n order for a fatal claim to be compensable under Section 301(c)(1) of
the Act , an employee’s death must occur “within three hundred weeks [ 18 ] after the injury .” 77 P.S. § 411(1) (emphasis added)

. Accordingly, “ [t] his Court has consistently held, without exception, that Section 301(c)(1) [of the Act] denies benefits to a claimant when more than 300 weeks have elapsed between the commencement of the compensable injury and t he injury

- related death.” Whitesell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Staples, Inc.) , 74 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (emphasis added); see also Olsen Bodies, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Gavas) , 573 A.2d 238, 240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (“there is no r ecovery for death occurring more than three hundred weeks after a non

- occupational disease[

- ]type injury”). 19 However, “[i]t is well settled that for an injury to be compensable under the Act, it is not required that the injury resulted from any sudden occ urrence or accident; it may be due to daily trauma

. . . .” Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc. v.
W orkers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Williams) , 814 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (emphasis added)

.

The parties do not cite and our research has not disclosed any r eported judicial decision that defines precisely when the “injury” occurs in disease as injury

cases under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act

. However, David B. Torrey and Andrew E. Greenberg, in Workers’ Compensation: Law & Practice (3 rd ed. 2008) , opined: “Th e commencement date applicable to a disease as injury case [under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act] is appropriately conceived of as the last date of injurious exposure to the agent causing the disease, whether or not such last exposure is disabling.” Id. § 5 :1 9

18 “Three hundred weeks is the equivalent of five years, nine months and one week.” City of McKeesport v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Miletti) , 746 A.2d 87, 89 n.5 (Pa. 2000). The date 3 00 weeks prior to Bromley’s June 23, 2006 death was September 22, 2000.

19 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since stated: “[N] owhere in the Act is there any such phrase as ‘occupational disease

- like.’ An ailment is either an occupational disease or i t is not. The quoted phrase is meaningless, and it causes confusion. ” Pawlosky , 525 A.2d at 1210 n.8.28

(emphasis added)

. Specifically, for death claims in disease as injury cases, Torrey and Greenberg declared that if “the employee dies more than 300 weeks after the injury (last injurious exposure to the hazardous condition), then the fatal claim will be barred.” Id. § 5: 20.

Further, in Kuo

- Hom Hsu v. W orkers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Rohm & Haas) (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 328 C.D. 2013, filed Oct ober 15, 2013) , this Court declared that the Board properly required the claimant to

prove [ for purposes of Sec tion 301(c)(1) of the Act ] that [the d]ecedent was exposed to a hazard that caused his brain cancer or injury within 300 weeks of his July 3, 2007 death , . . . because, in a death claim, Section 301(c)(1) [of the Act] requires that death occur within three hundred weeks of the injury. 77 P.S. § 411(1)

. Slip op. at 3 (emphasis added). 20 Thus, this Court has determined for a fatal disease as injury claim to be compensable under Section 301(c) of the Act, the employee’s
hazardous exposure is the injury from w hich the 300 week look

- back period must be calculated.

Here, the WCJ concluded on remand that the instant matter meets the provisions of Section 301(c)(1) [ of the Act ] as a repetitive/cumulative[

- ]type injury by way of exposure to carcinogenic agents in the workplace over an extended period of time resulting in bladder cancer and death

-- as other repetitive/cumulative[

- ]type injuries to the muscles/nerves of the body have been found compensable under this provision of the Act.

WCJ Remand Dec. at 3. I ndeed, th is Court has consistently held that “[a]n injury [under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act] is compensable when it develops over a period

20 We acknowledge that this Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for [their] persuasive value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414 of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414. In light of the nearly identical facts of this more recently

- decided case, it is cited herein for its persuasive value.29

of time and results from a number of work activities in which the employee engaged.” Curran v. Workmen’s Comp. App eal Bd. (Maxwell Indus.) , 664 A.2d 667, 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). In such cases, “determinations of the date of injury depend largely on the facts of each case, the purpose for which the injury date must be established, and the medical evidence presented.” 21 Id. at 671.

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that, i n order for Claimant’s claim to be compensable under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act , she had to prove by substantial evidence that Bromley ’s last exposure to a hazard occurred on or after September 2 2, 2000

. 22

21 “ I n cumulative trauma cases [ under Section 301( c)(1) of the Act ] , the last day of employment is generally used as the date of injury for purposes of notice and filing limitations. ” Meenan Oil Co., L.P. v. W orkers’ Comp

. Appeal Bd. (Pownall) , 846 A.2d 793, 795 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (emphasis added); s ee also City of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Williams), 851 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2004).

22 Our conclusion is consistent with proofs required for occupational diseases under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act . Thereunder, if an employee did not file a lifetime b enefit claim, his death due to a statutorily

- defined occupational disease must occur “within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease[.]” 77 P.S. § 411(2); Ingram v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ford Elecs. & Refrigeration Corp.) , 940 A.2d 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared: Although Section 301(c)(2) [of the Act] references the employee’s ‘last date of employment,’ 77 P.S. § 411(2 ), . . . the 300

- week period begins on the last day of employment

- based exposure to the hazard

. See Sporio v. [ Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. ] (Songer Constr.), . . . 717 A.2d 525 [] ([Pa.] 1998); Cable v. [ Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. ] (Gulf Oil/Chevron USA), . . . 664 A.2d 1349 [] ([Pa.] 1995) (plurality). Tooey v. AK Steel Corp. , 81 A.3d 851, 870 n.6 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added); see also Farr v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (TRW, Inc.) , 823 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“[t]he three

hundred week period p rescribed in [Section 301(c)(2) of] the Act is measured from the last date of exposure to the hazard alleged to cause the disease, not from the last date of employment”).30

b. Whether a workplace hazard existed to which Bromley was exposed on or after September 22, 2000

. R elative to WC claims brought pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act,
this Court has declared:

[ W ] h ether a hazard exists is a question of fact fo r the [ WCJ ] to determine . Furthermore,

. . . a claimant’s burden of proof related to this issue is not overly demanding. We have also asserted that ‘[s]ince claimant’s exposure is a factual question, the claimant need not present scientific evidence or e xpert testimony to prove the existence of the hazard in the workplace.’ Mauger [ & ] Co [

. ] v. Workmen’s Comp [

. ] Appeal B [ d. ] (Waltz), . . . 598 A.2d 1035, 1037 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991). ‘ The [ WCJ ] may rely solely on the testimony of the claimant or other witnes ses to prove the existence of and exposure to the hazard .’ Id. Gray v. W

orkmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.) , 657 A.2d 77, 80

- 81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (emphasis added)

.

As to proof of the existence of the disease

- causing element in the work en vironment, the courts have accepted lay testimony , as well as other expert testimony, to support a finding that the disease

- causing element is present

. However, the testimony of a lay person appears to require testimony of personal experience with the ill ness

- causing element and personal knowledge

. Craftex Mills, Inc. of PA v. W orkers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Markowicz) , 901 A.2d 1077,
1080

- 81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (emphasis added). Accordingly, l ay testimony of f irst

hand knowledge of a hazard gained from pract ical experience can be sufficient
to prove the existence of and exposure thereto

. Gibson

.

Because the WCJ did not have the benefit of Bromley’s personal testimony regarding his specific workplace exposures to hazardous chemicals , the
law permitted the WCJ to consider and rely upon first

- hand lay testimony regarding31

Bromley’s work environment. 23 Claimant testified regarding her personal knowledge
that over the years that Bromley worked for Employer, his clothing contained small holes, and was covered in paper dust and dye.

Bonkowski and Parris worked with Bromley a s electricians in Employer’s Chester plant from 197 3 until 2005 , they had essentially the same job
duties and they observed Bromley at work

. E mployer’s e lectricians were charged with keeping Employer’s entire process running, so they were directly exposed to all areas of the plant, in, under and around the machinery, pipes and elevators

. Bonkowski testified from his personal experience that he and Bromley were regularly exposed to industrial oils, bleach, formaldehyde, PCBs, kerosene, milk of lime,
bleach , coal ash, silica ash, carbon dust asbestos, and significant amounts of xylene liquid and fumes and industrial dyes over the years since 1973 , because coal and silica dust and dyes covered t he surfaces of Employer’s facility, and that asbestos
flakes and dust could be seen in the air. Bonkowski also specifically recalled seeing Bromley with xylene

- soaked pants on at least one occasion. Although several of the chemical hazards were abated, a nd Bonkowski and Parris worked more closely with Bromley before he was assigned to CCF in 1997 and the n apkins after 2000, they
were aware that Bromley continued to be exposed to coal dust, silica ash and

23 Employer relies upon Gibson and May Department Stores v. Workmen’s Compensation App eal Board (Smith) , 525 A.2d 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), to argue that the conclusory lay testimony offered in this case was insufficient to support the WCJ’s findings. In Gibson , the co

- worker’s lay testimony was deemed insufficient to establish the decedents’ workplace asbestos exposure where the co

- worker “simply testified that he saw [the decedent] near a dusty, cottony material that [the

co

- worker] was unable to identify.” Id. at 484. In May , this Court rejected decedent’s doctor’s conclusion that the dec edent contracted Legionnaire’s disease at work, because it was based solely on the doctor’s assumptions that since the decedent worked with air

- conditioning units, he was exposed to damp environments, and that people who work in damp environments seem to b e more susceptible to Legionnaire’s disease than the normal population. Bonkowski’s and Parris’ testimony of first

- hand experience with specifically

- described chemicals and their personal observations of Bromley’s exposure to them makes this case factuall y distinguishable from Gibson and May

.32

industrial dyes in CCF between 1997 and 2000 , and s ignificant amounts of dye in napkins from 2000 until he retired.

Baker admitted that Employer’s asbestos abatement records and h is monthly chemical inventory reports are limited in time, and that the latter do not
include the cleaning or maintenance chem icals or oils and greases employees commonly use d at the facility. Moreover, s ince Baker’s deposition was conducted before Employer produced the MSDS for CCF and napkins from 1997 through 2005
which reflected that Employer continued to use hazardous chemi cals in areas where Bromley was assigned ( includ ing xylene containing benzene , despite Baker’s representation to the contrary ) , Baker did not address them . Baker’s testimony did not in any way contradict or refute Bonkowski ’s or Parris’ testimony about th e continued use of hazardous chemicals or their specific presence in CCF and napkins
until 2005. Moreover, Baker confirm ed that Employer’s e mployees , including Bromley, during the relevant time period we re exposed to silica dust and coal ash , particularly in CCF, to dyes particularly in napkins, and asbestos throughout Employer’s pre mises

.

T his Court has held:

‘ In performing a substantial evidence analysis, this [C] ourt must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed before t he factfinder. ’ ‘ Moreover, we are to draw all reasonable inferences which are deducible from the evidence in support of the factfinder’s decision in favor of that prevailing party. ’ It does not matter if there is evidence in the record supporting finding s contrary to those made by the WCJ; the pertinent inquiry is whether the evidence supports the WCJ ’ s findings

. 3D Trucking Co., Inc., v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fine & Anthony Holdings
Int ’l ) , 921 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) ( quoting Waldameer P ark, Inc. v.33

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) ) (citations omitted ).

The WCJ made specific findings that the testimony offered by Claimant, Bonkowski and Parris was credible. Baker’s testimony did not refute t hat Bromley was exposed to chemicals while working for Employer after September 22, 2000.
See WCJ Dec. at 1, Finding of Fact 4; see also Finding of Fact 9. Although a significant amount of Claimant’s hazardous exposure evidence established that Bromley w as regularly exposed to harmful substances throughout Employer’s premises between 1973 and 2000, viewing the evidence in Claimant’s favor in this case, as we must, we hold that the undisputed lay testimony offered by Bonkowski,
Parris and even Baker consti tuted substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s findings of Bromley’s exposure to asbestos, silica dust, xylene and dyes in Employer’s workplace on or after September 22, 2000

. 24

c. Whether Bromley’s workplace hazard exposure was a substantial contributin g cause of his bladder cancer

.

“ [I]n the case of a fatal claim petition, [the surviving family member has the burden to prove] that th [e] injury or disease was a substantial contributing

cause in bringing about the death of th [e] employee. ” Gibson , 861 A .2d at 943 (emphasis added). “ I f the causal connection is not obvious, the connection must be established by unequivocal medical testimony.” Dietz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lower Bucks Cnty. Joint Mun. Auth.) , 126 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “[M]edical testimony is unequivocal if a medical expert testifies, after providing foundation for the testimony, that, in his professional opinion, he believes or thinks a

24 Bromley’s exposure on Employer’s premises during the 40 hours he returned to work in February 2006 is not clear.34

fact exists.” 25 Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods) , 37 A.3d 72, 8 0 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting O’Neill v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (News Corp., Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50, 58 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)).

Dr. Singer received his medical degree from Johns Hopkins University
and is board

- certified in internal medicine . He has specialize d in oncology (75% of his current practice) since the 1970s, and he has been involved with the treatment of bladder cancer over his 40 years of practice. See R.R. at 126a

- 134a. Based upon his experience and extensive review of Bromley’s medical records, the depositions, Employer’s MSDS , NIOSH, OSHA and IARC literature and journal articles, he concluded that Bromley’s co

- exposure to xylene, asbestos, silica and dyes over the years while working at Employer’s facility since 1973 until August 11, 2005 was th e substantial cause of the bladder cancer from which Bromley died. 26

25 “The question of whether expert medical testimony is unequivocal, and, thus, competent evidence to support factual determinations is a question of law subject to our review.” Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods) , 37 A.3d 72, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)

.

26 E mployer argues that t he WCJ erred by overruling Employer’s objection that Dr. Singer’s June 25, 2010 testimony of a definitive link between asbestos and b ladder cancer lacked foundation because Dr. Singer “never established any scientific facts or data based on his own personal knowledge or from any other source[.]” Employer Br. at 53

.
“ I t is well settled that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the WCJ. ” Washington v. W

orkers’ Comp. Appeal Bd . (State Police) , 11 A.3d 48, 59 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) . “[A] WCJ ’ s determination regarding the admission of evidence will not be overturned without a showing of an abuse of that discretion. ” Id. Further,

[t] he law provides that
expert testimony is incompetent if it lacks an adequate basis in fact. While an expert ’ s opinion need not be based on absolute certainty, an opinion based on mere possibilities is not competent evidence. This means that expert testimony cannot be based solely upon conjecture or surmise. Rather, an expert ’ s assumptions must be based upon such facts as the jury would be warranted in finding from the

e vidence

. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence prescribe a threshold for admission of expert testimony dependent upon the extent to which the expert ’ s opinion is based on facts and data:35 “As this Court has stated on numerous occasions, it is within the [WCJ’s] power to determine which medical witness he or she accepts as credible, in whole or in part.” Mauger & Co. v. W orkmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Waltz) , 598 A.2d 1035, 1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).

The fact that [Dr. Singer’s] opinion conflicted with those of [Dr. Lippman] does not make it equivocal. As long as [Dr. Singer] could state, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that . . . [Bromley’s] condition was caused by his total and cumulative exposures . . . at Employer ’ s place of business . . . , Claimant provided substantial competent evidence to support a finding of causation. McGraw Edison Power Sy s. v. W orkmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kuzior) , 561 A.2d 1327, 1330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Here,

[t] he record discloses that [Dr. Singer] testified with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [Bromley’s bladder cancer] resulted directly from [co

- ] exposure to [xylene, asbestos, silica and dyes] . Notwithstanding

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.

Pa.R.E. 703.
Helpin v. Trustees of Univ [

. ] of P [ a

. ] , 969 A.2d 601, 617 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc. , 51 A.3d 841, 849 (Pa. Super. 2012) (emphasis added)

. Where, as here, Dr. Singer’s opinions were based upon his experience and extensive review of Bromley’s medical records, the depositions, Employer’s MSDS, NIOSH, OSHA and IARC literature and journal articles, th e re was a foundation for a link between asbestos and b ladder cancer and, thus, the WCJ did not abuse his discretion by overruling Employer’s objection

. See R.R. at 199a; WCJ Dec. at 2.36 [Employer’s] artful cross

- examination to induce testimony on the possibility of other etiologies, [Dr. Singer] never recanted h [is] initial assertion of causation and, in fact, reiterated on cross

- e xamination that [Bromley’s co

- ] exposure to [xylene, asbestos, silica and dyes] was the [] explanation for the disease. Superior Tube Co. v. W

orkmen’s Comp

. Appeal Bd. (Unger) , 572 A.2d 258, 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (footnote omitted).

Here, the WCJ made sp ecific findings that the testimony offered by Claimant, Bonkowski and Parris was credible, and that such evidence individually and collectively supported Dr. Singer’s credited testimony that Bromley’s workplace hazard exposure was a substantial contributin g cause of his bladder cancer. See WCJ Dec. at 1, Finding of Fact 4; see also Finding of Fact 9. Accordingly, we conclude
that the WCJ ’ s findings of fact are supported by substantial record evidence

.

Because there is substantial record evidence to suppor t the WCJ’s findings that Bromley sustained an injury in the course and scope of employment that caused his death within 300 weeks of his last exposure, the WCJ properly determined
that “ Claimant has met the burden of proof required under Section 30 [ 1 ] (c)( 1) of
the Act [.]” WCJ Remand Dec. at 3 (emphasis added).

II. Whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision. Employer also argues t hat the WCJ’s decision was not reasoned “because the WCJ found that Claimant met her burden of proof on her Fatal Claim Petition, which [Employer] respectfully submits that she did not,” and “because, in granting Claimant’s Fatal Claim Petition, the WCJ relied upon insufficient evidence to reach his decision” and, finally, “because the WCJ merely adopted Claimant’s Proposed Findings of Fact.” Employer Br. at 50

- 51. We disagree

.37 Section 422(a) of the Act [ 27 ] requires a WCJ to issue a decision that permits an appellate court to exercise adequate appellate review. In order to satisfy this standard, a WCJ does not need to discuss every detail of the evidence in the record. Rather, Section 422(a) of the Act requires WCJs to issue reasoned decisions so that this Court does not have to ‘imagine’ the reasons why a WCJ finds that the conflicting testimony of one witness was more credible tha n the testimony of another witness. Although our Supreme Court has held that a WCJ need not explain credibility determinations relating to a witness who testifies before the WCJ, Section 422(a) of the Act requires some explanation of credibility determina tions by a WCJ with regard to conflicting deposition testimony in order to enable this Court to review a WCJ’ s decision. Under Section 422(a) of the Act, a WCJ must articulate the objective rationale underlying his credibility determinations where the tes timony of such witnesses is conflicting. A WCJ may satisfy the reasoned decision requirement if he summarizes the witnesses ’ testimony ‘and adequately explains his credibility determinations .’ Clear Channel Broad. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Perry), 93 8 A.2d 1150, 1157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Thus, while summaries of testimony alone would be insufficient to satisfy the reasoned decision requirement, where a WCJ summarizes testimony and also objectively explains his credibility determinations, the decision will satisfy the requirement

. Further, other evidence in the record may provide the objective support necessary under Section 422(a) of the Act for adequate credibility determinations

. Amand to , 37 A.3d at 76 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Here, b eca use the WCJ clearly and extensively summarize d the testimony and objectively explain ed his credibility determinations, we hold that the
WCJ issued a reasoned decision in accordance with Section 422(a) of the Act.

Based upon the foregoing, the Board’s or der is affirmed.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

27 77 P.S. § 834.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kimberly Clark Corporation, : Petitioner :

: v. :

: Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Bromley), : No. 656 C.D. 2016 Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4 th day of May , 201 7 , the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s March 30, 2016 order is affirmed

.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge