NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARY ALLEN HARRINGTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LARRY MENTEER, Assistant Water 

Master, District 13; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Defendant.

No. 17-35610 

D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00200-CL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 15, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 24 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-35610 

Gary Allen Harrington appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and we may affirm on any basis 

supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 

2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Harrington’s false arrest, false 

imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, and due process claims because 

Harrington failed to file his action within the applicable two-year statute of 

limitations. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the state law statute 

of limitations for personal injury actions, and that the applicable Oregon statute of 

limitations is two years).

The district court properly dismissed Harrington’s trespass, breach of 

fiduciary duty, takings, and impairment of contractual obligation claims for 

damages because it would not have been clear to every reasonable state official 

that entering Harrington’s property and taking action authorized by a court order 

was unlawful under the circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 

(2011) (discussing qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established 

only if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing 
3 17-35610 

violates that right” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

To the extent any of Harrington’s claims are not time-barred and seek 

injunctive relief, dismissal of such claims was proper because they constitute a 

forbidden “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments against Harrington or 

are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 

1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing proper application of the RookerFeldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the relief 

sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision 

was wrong and thus void”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or documents and facts not presented to the district court. See 

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Elias,

921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990). 

AFFIRMED.