IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-KA-01172-SCT LAQUNN GARY

a/k/a LAGUNN GARY

a/k/a LAQUNN SHAROD GARY

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/22/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF W EILL, SR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: BENJAMIN ALLEN SUBER GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALICIA MARIE AINSW O RTH DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ROBERT SHULER SMITH NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/08/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.
MAX WELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Laqunn Gary carjacked Vizavian Trent Darby at gunpoint. W hen Darby ref used to get out of the c ar, Gary shot Darby in the head, k illing him

. At Gary ’s trial, the jury watched

a video of Gary conf

essing to killing Darby

. The jury f ound G ary g uilty of capital m urder. He was sentenced to lif

e in prison without parole. ¶2. On appeal, Gary

challenges the adm ission of his conf e ssion. Bef

ore trial, Gary

hadf

iled a m o tion to suppress h i s c o n f e ssion, claim ing he had not voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights. 1 The trial c o u r t r u l e d t h e conf ession w as v oluntary

. But it reached this conclusion without holding a f ull suppression hearing in which the S tate carried the burden
to prove voluntariness. Because this violated Gary ’s due-process r ights, we rem anded this

case to the trial court to conduct a suppression hearing. 2 At this hearing, the State presented

one of the detectives who was present when Gary c onf essed. She testif

ied Gary had not been coerced or prom ised any r eward. I nstead, Gary signed the Miranda waiver and a n swered the detectives’ questions voluntarily

. Based on her testim ony , the signed M i r anda statem ent, and Gary ’ s dem e anor during t he video conf ession, the t rial j udge determ ined Gary ’s conf ession was voluntary

. ¶3. To this decision, we apply the high standard of m anif est error. 3 Because the evidence supports that G ary ’ s conf ession was voluntary , we af f i rm the t rial court’s d enial of the

m otio n t o s u p p r e ss. W e also f ind n o m erit t o Gary ’s claim s that t he evidence was insuf f icient, the verdict was against the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence, or reversal is warranted based on cum

ulative error. ¶4. W e thus af

f irm Gary ’s capital m

urder conviction a nd sentence of lif e without parole.
B ackground Facts and Procedural History

1 M ira n d a v. A rizo n a , 3 8 4 U .S

. 4 3 6 , 8 6 S

. C t. 1 6 0 2 , 1 6 L

. E d

. 2 d 6 9 4 (1 9 6 6 ) (req u irin g th at, p rio r to a cu sto d ial in terro g a tio n , th e p erso n b e w arn ed h e h as a rig h t to rem ain silen t, th at an y statem en t h e m ak es m ay b e u sed a s e v id e n ce a g a in st h im , an d th at h e h as a rig h t to th e p r esen ce o f an atto rn ey , eith er retain ed o r ap p o in ted ).

2 G a ry v. S ta te , 2 0 1 6 WL 7 0 1 4 0 2 6 (M i ss. D ec. 1 , 2 0 1 6 ) ( G a ry I ).

3 S co tt v. S

ta te , 8 S o . 3 d 8 5 5 , 8 6 2 (M iss. 2 0 0 8 ). 2I. Investigation

¶5. On February 1 1, 2012, Jackson police of f icers f ound Darby ’s body ly ing in the grass at the corner of

Carter Avenue and Markham Street. He had been shot in t he head. Darby had last been seen alive d riving away f

rom his house in a white Dodge Charger his m other had rented w h i l e h e r c ar was in the shop. 4 Two day s later, police discovered the Charger abandoned nearby

. The windshie l d w a s c r a c ked. Forensic analy sis linked the crack to im p act f rom a project i l e f

rom t he inside of the v ehicle. The crim e scene investigator’s on-site testing also revealed the presence of blood not v isible to the naked e y e . Later DNA testing showed the blood in the car belonged to Darby

. ¶6. The police picked up Gary as a suspect on February 14, 2 012. Detective E ric Sm ith and his partner Detective Patricia W ilder were assigned the case. A f ter advising G ary of his
Miranda r ights and obtaining a written waiver, they questioned h im

. Gary ’s interview was recorded by

a video cam e ra. ¶7. At f

irst, Gary claim ed h e had been walking down the street w hen Darby stopped the

car in f ront o f him

. Gary said he then saw his f riend Jam iria Travis jum

p out of the car and

run across the railroad tracks. Gary claim ed Darby then drew a gun on him

. Gary said it was

a “him or m e” situation. So G ary pulled his pistol a nd shot him

. Gary s aid h e did not know Darby and could not explain why Darby would jum

p out of his car and pull a gun on him

. ¶8. The detectives t hen explained they had a lready talked to Travis, and Gary ’s story was inconsistent with hers. Plus, f orensic evidence showed Darby had been shot inside the car.

4 T h e ren tal ag reem en t

also au th o r ized D arb y

to d riv e th e v eh icle. 3Gary

then conf

essed to what actually

happened. Travis h ad told Gary that Darby had a car and s om e m oney . The plan w as to rob him

. Travis c alled Darby to com e pick her up at Gary ’s house and g i ve her a r ide. W h en Darby arrived, Travis g ot in the f ront seat and Gary in the back. Gary

had a gun, and apparently so did Darby . W hen Darby ref used to get out of the car, Gary shot Darby in the b ack of the h ead. Gary and Travis then drug Darby ’s body
out of the car. G ary d

rove Travis to South Jackson. Then he hid both his and Darby ’s guns underneath a church and dum ped the car. ¶9. Af ter the interrogation, Gary led Detective Sm ith and Deputy Chief B rent W instead
to the h i dden guns. Gary also turned in the clothes he had been wearing the day he shot Darby , which he happened to be still wearing. His s h irt was tested b y t he Mississippi Crim e Lab, which f

ound traces of

Darby ’s blood and DNA. ¶10. Gary and Travis w ere indicted f or capit a l mu r d e r, with r obbery as the underly ing f elony

. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2014). 5
II. Motion to Suppress ¶11. Only Gary was tried. Bef ore trial, Gary ’s counse l mo v e d t o s u p p r e s s t h e video conf ession, along with Gary ’ s signed statem ent. Gary ’s counsel argued Gary had only been
seventeen y ears old in February 2012—too y oung to voluntarily wai v e h i s c o n stitutional rights. ¶12. The State’s position was that Gary ’s c onf ession was voluntary

. But i t c ould not call Detective Sm ith to verif

y this, because Detective Sm ith had b e en shot a nd killed while

5 T h e in d ictm en t also in clu d ed a g u n en h an cem en t f o r “h av in g u sed a f

irearm d u rin g th e co m m issio n o f a f

elo n y ” in v io latio n o f

M ississip p i C o d e S ectio n 9 7 -3 7 -3 7

. 4interviewing a suspect in an unrelated case . T he State also had trouble getting Detective

W i lder to testif

y . She had witnessed her p artner’s m urder and p u r p o r t e d l y was suf f ering f rom post-traum atic stress disorder (PTSD). The State f iled a pretrial m otion to determ ine her availability as a witness. D e t e c t i v e W i lder responded with a m otion to quash her subpoena. Four d a y s bef ore trial, the t r i a l c o urt heard both m otions. At this hearing, Detective W ilder’s therapist testif ied about W ilder’s PTSD and the potential harm f ul im pact testif y ing m ight have on her. ¶13. B o t h t h e S t a t e and G ary inf orm ed t he court that D etecti v e Wi l d e r ’ s p o t e n t i a l unavail a b i l ity would i m

p a ct Gary ’s suppression hearing, since the State intended to call Detective W ilder to prove Gary ’s conf ession was voluntary and t o authenticate t he video of the c onf ession. Gary ’s counsel rem inded t h e c o u r t a b o u t G a r y ’s p ending suppression m otion, urging an age-based c hallenge t o the voluntariness o f his Miranda waiver. At this point, a disagreem ent arose about Gary ’s t rue age. W hile Gary ’s counsel asserted he was seventeen whe n h e c o n f

essed, the State insisted Gary was in f act eighteen, based on his b irth date. Though the current hearing was about W i lder’s a vailability to t estif y —not the adm issibility of Gary ’ s conf

e ssio n

— G a r y ’ s c o unsel of f ered t o put Gary on the stand f or the lim ited purpose of

conf irm ing the y ear he was born. ¶14. W h en Gary testif

ied he was bor n i n Novem b er 1994, which would have m ade him
seventeen in February 2012, the State requested t hey be allowed to cross-exam ine Gary

. The
State showed Gary t he M

iranda waiver f

orm and written s tatem ent, which listed his date of birth. Gary conf

irm ed t hat he could read and write and that it was his s ignature on two of the

5pages. But he insisted the of f icers never asked him about his b irthday

. At this point, the
State asked to show the v ideo conf ession, suggesting that within the f irst t hirty s e con d s of the video s t a t em e nt, G ary told Detective Sm ith and Detective W ilder he was born in
1993—m a king him eighteen, n ot s eventeen. Over Gary ’s objection, the t rial court perm itted several m inutes of the video to b e p l a y e d—up to when Gary was a sked about his date of birth. Gary conf

irm ed that he was the person in the video, that the video depicted him being interviewed by

the two detectives, and that he had told the detectives he was born in 1993. ¶15. Af ter Gary ’s b rief testim ony , the hearing shif ted back t o t h e i s s u e o f D e t e c t ive
W i l d e r’s availability to testif y . The hearing ended with the trial court taking the issue of Detective W ilder’s availability under advisem ent. ¶16. On the m orning of trial, the court announced that i t had deem e d D etective W ilder an unavailable witness. The court also conf i rm ed it was deny ing Gary ’s m otion to s uppress his written s t a t e m e n t a

n d v i d e o -recorded conf

e s sion. Gary ’s counsel spoke up, arguing Gary had
not been heard on his m otion to suppress. A nd t hough the court agreed w ith Gary ’s counsel that Gary “was not f

ully h eard o n his m otions” to suppress the written statem e nt and videorecorded conf

ession, the court still ruled his conf ession was voluntary

. ¶17. During tr i a l , G a r y ’ s v i d e o conf ession and Miranda waiver w as adm itted through Deputy Chief W instead, who w as present when Gary w as b rought in f or questioning, though
not in the interrogation room . 6 T he jury f ound Gary guilty of c a p i t a l mu r der. He was sentenced to lif

e im prisonm ent without parole.

6 T h e j u ry a lso h eard f

r o m o th er in v estig atin g o f f icers, D arb y ’s m o th er, an d sev eral f o ren sic ex am in ers. 6III. Appeal

¶18. Gary

appealed, raising f

our issues: (1) The trial court erred by not suppressing the interrogation video; (2) The evidence was insuf f icient to convict Gary o f capital m urder instead of m anslaughter; (3) The trial court erred in d eny ing Gary ’s m otion f or a new trial because the verdict was against t he overwhelm ing weight o f the evidence; and (4) Th e re was c um

ulative error that deprived Gary of his right to a f undam entally

f air and im

partial trial. ¶19. In Gary I

, we addressed the f

irst issue o nly

. Gary v. State , 2016 W L 7 014026 (Miss.
Dec. 1, 2016). Because Gary had a due-proces s right to a suppression hearing, which the trial court acknowledged Gary h a d not a c tually been given, we r em anded this issue to the trial court to conduct a suppression hearing. 7 I d.
IV. Hearing on Rem and ¶20. Com

p ly ing w ith our m a ndate, the trial c ourt held the suppression hearing on May 4, 2017. To m eet its burden to prove the conf ession was voluntary , t he State c alled Detective
W i lder. 8 She t estif

ied she h a d b een present when Gary w as r ead h is rights and signed the

7 S e e J a ck so n v. D e n n o , 3 7 8 U

. S

. 3 6 8 , 3 9 4 , 8 4 S

. C t. 1 7 7 4 , 1 7 9 0 , 1 2 L

. E d

. 2 d 9 0 8 (1 9 6 4 ) (rem an d i n g a crim in al case to th e state co u rt to co n d u ct a c o n stitu tio n a l ly ad eq u ate su p p ressio n h earin g , b ecau se, if af ter a p ro p er s u p p ressio n h earin g , th e co n f e ssio n is f o u n d to b e v o lu n tary a n d ad m issib l e, th er e i s “ n o co n s titu t io n al n ecessity at th at p o in t f o r p ro ceed i n g w ith a n ew trial”); see a lso C o n erly v. S

ta te , 7 6 0 S o . 2 d 7 3 7 , 7 4 2 (M iss. 2 0 0 0 ) (rem an d in g a b u r g l a r y case to th e trial co u rt f o r a p ro b ab le-cau s e h earin g , b ecau se n o p ro b ab l e-cau se d eterm in atio n h ad b een m ad e b ef o re ad m ittin g e v i d e n ce f

o u n d d u rin g th e d ef en d a n t ’s arrest).

8 D etectiv e Wild er h ad sin ce lef t th e Jack so n P o lice D ep artm en t an d b eco m e a d ep u ty w i th th e H in d s C o u n ty S h e rif f ’s O f f ice. A t th e s u p p ressio n h e arin g , sh e id en tif ied h erself 7Miranda waiver. She conf irm ed Gary

had knowingly

and voluntarily

waived his rights. ¶21. Gary

then testif

ied. In his pre-trial m otion to suppress, h e had claim ed he was only

s e v e n t e en and too y oung to intelligently waive his c onstitutional rights. On rem and at th e suppression hearing, he abandoned this claim

. I nstead, h e insisted he had b e e n h i g h on

m arijuana when the police picked him up on February 14, 2012, and that he was never read his Miranda righ t s . He also claim ed D etective Sm ith had reassured him he was “just investigating the case” and would let him go af ter the interview. ¶22. Detective W i lder testif ied that she was not aware of any private conversation between
D e t e c t ive Sm ith and G ary . And neither she n or D etective Sm ith m ade a ny threats o r
prom ises to Gary

. Further, Gary had not appeared drunk or intoxicated i n any way . If so, she and her partner would not have interviewed him

. ¶23. T h e trial court f

ound the State h ad m et its burden t o prove Gary ’s conf ession w a s voluntary

. And Gary h ad f ailed to rebut this. Gary ’ s assertio n that he had been high was contradicted by Detective W i lder’s testim ony and b y G ary ’s d em eanor on the video. So was his assertion t h at he had n o t b e e n r e ad his Miranda r ights. A nd Gary ’s c laim Detective
Sm ith said he was “just investigating the case” could not be c onstrued as an of f er or reward that induced Gary ’s conf

ession. ¶24. Having determ i ned Gary ’s conf ession was voluntarily and adm issible, the trial court denied Gary ’s m otion to suppress. The trial c ourt then f iled its o rder with this Court f or our consideration. W e now take up all f ou r i s s ues raised in Gary ’s a ppeal, starting with the

as P a tricia Wild er William s. B u t f o r co n sisten cy , w e co n tin u e to ref er to h er as “D etectiv e Wild e r.” 8m otion to suppress.
Discussion

I. Motion to Suppress ¶25. W i th our m andate in Gary I went Gary ’ s initial argum ent why the t rial court erred in
not granting his m otion to suppress. Gary had argued the trial court should have not relied

on his testim ony at the pretrial hearing to conf irm t hat his c onf

ession was voluntary

. Instead,

t h e State should have been required to m ake a p rim a f a cie c ase that t he conf

ession was voluntarily

m ade without any

threats, coercion, or of

f er of reward. ¶26. W e agreed. Because he challenged the voluntariness o f his conf ession, Gary had “a due p rocess right to a reliable determ ination t h a t t h e c o nf ession was i n f

a ct voluntarily given,” which is protected by a h e aring outside the presence of the jury

. Gary I

, 2016 W L 7014026, at *3 (quoting Cox v. State , 5 86 So. 2d 761, 763 (Miss. 1991)). At this hearing, it i s t he State—not t he def endant—who b ears the burden to prove bey ond a reasonable doubt that the conf

ession was voluntarily m ade. “And only af ter the S tate m akes i ts prim a f acie

case does the def

endant have to put on evidence o f coercion or involuntariness.” Id. (citing Agee v. State , 185 So. 2d 671, 673 (Miss. 1966)). Because the trial court had not required the State to m ake a prim a f acie showing that Gary ’ s conf ession was voluntary , w e rem anded this i ssue to the trial court t o hold a suppression hearing to decide if Gary ’s c onf ession had been in f a ct adm issible. I

d. (citing Jackson v

. Denno , 378 U.S. 368, 3 94, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964); Conerly v. State , 760 So. 2d 737, 742 (Miss. 2000). ¶27. The trial court f

ollowed o u r ma n d a t e . A t the suppression hearing, the b urden was

9placed squarely on the State to prove the conf ession had been voluntary

. See A gee , 183 So. 2d at 673. The State m et this burden through t h e testim ony of Detective W ilder, who personally witnessed Gary being read his M iranda rights and signing the Miranda waiver f orm . Detective W ilder testif i ed Gary had not b een threatened, coerce d , o r o f f e r ed any reward f or testif y ing. And he had not appeared to be under the inf luence. ¶28. In his supplem ental brief , f iled a f t e r the suppression hearing, Gary argues the trial
court erred “by lim iting the cross-exam ination” o f D etective W i lder. Gary cites Walley v. State , 2 40 Miss. 136, 126 So. 2d 534, 535 (1961), a s support f or why h e had a right to crossexam ine Detective W il d e r a b o u t her m ental health, perception, m em ory , and t rustworthiness.
He claim s the trial court lim i ted t his right because, t hough it gave counsel “a l ittle latitude”

o n q u estions a

bout her m ental condition, i t f orbade “an e valuation into her m en t a l a n d phy sical condition.” But the hearing transcript does not support this claim

. The State did object to questions a

bout Detective W ilder’s m edical treatm ent in 2014—the tim e of Gary ’s tri a l

— c l a i mi n g irrelevance. But the trial court overruled the objection. The j udge told Gary ’s counsel, “I’m going t o give y ou a little m ore room on this, C ounsel. B u t y ou need to

m ake it relevant. A n d a f ishing expedition into h er m ental a nd phy sical concerns are
appro a c h i n g irrelevant.” At this point, counsel proceeded with p ointed questions about Detective W ilder’s P TSD, which she answered. Counsel then m oved on t o another topic on his o wn volition. At no point did counsel ask a question about Detective W ilder’s m ental or phy sical health to which the trial court sustained an objection. And Gary h as f ailed to show what questions his c ounsel would have asked but f o r the trial court’s prohibition. So Gary ’s

1 0assertion that the trial court som ehow lim ited his c r oss-exam ination of D etective W ilder is

without m erit. ¶29. “The trial judge is the f a ct-f inder during a suppression hearing[ .]” Butler v. State , 102 So. 3d 260, 270 (Miss. 2 0 12). In this role, “the judge m ust consider the totality

of the circum stances to determ i ne if a def endant intelligently , knowingly , and v oluntarily waived his Miranda rights.” Scott v. State , 8 So. 3d 855, 862 (Miss. 2 008). And if a judge m akes such a d eterm i nation and denies a m otion to suppress a conf e ssion, this C ourt ca n r e v erse only based on “m anif

est error.” Id. at 861. “The s tandard of m anif est error is high, and this
Court cannot reverse unless the trial judge’s ruling has gone against the substantial weight of the evidence.” I

d. ¶30. Here, the judge considered both Detective W ilder’s and Gary ’s testim ony , the signed
Miranda waiver, and the video conf ession to r e a c h the ultim ate conclusion that Gary ’s conf ession was voluntary

. B ecause “the e vid e n c e s upports the trial judge’s denial to suppress the conf

e ssion,” we “cannot reverse.” Id. at 862.
II. Motion for Judgm ent Notw ithstanding the Verdict ¶31. W e now turn to the other issues Gary raised that were not addressed in Gary I

. ¶32. Gary next argues t he trial judge erred by not granting h i s p o s t t r i a l m otion f or a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict. Gary claim s the e vidence was insuf f icient to convict him of capital m urder. At m ost, he argues, the State proved he com m itted m anslaughter. ¶33. Gary wa s i n d i c t e d a n d c o nvicted of violating Section 97-3-19(2)(e). Under this provision—

1 1The killing of a hum an being without the authority of law by any m eans or in

any ma n n e r s hall b e capital m urder

. . . [ w]hen done with or without any design to ef

f ect death, b y any person engaged in the c om m ission of the crim e of rape, burglary , kidnapping, arson, robbery , sexual battery , unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensu al u n n a t ural intercourse with m ankind, or in a n y attem pt t o com m it suc h f elonies[ .] Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e). The u n d e r l y i n g crim e in this case was robbery

. So the
State’s burden was to prove bey o nd a reasonable doubt t hat Gary k i l l e d D a r by without authority o f law while e ngaged in the com m ission of a robbery o r in t he attem pt to com m it a robbery

. ¶34. Gary argues the State f ailed to m eet this burden b ecause it did n ot prove each elem ent of robbery

. “Robbery h as t hree essential elem e nts: (1) f elonious intent, (2) f

orce o r putting in f ear as a m e ans of ef

f ectuating t he intent, and (3) by that m eans taking and carry ing away the property of another f

rom his p erson or in h is presence.’” V eazy v. State , 113 So. 3d 1226, 1229 (Miss. 2013) (quotin g C r oft v. State , 992 So. 2 d 1151, 1157 (Miss. 2008)). And as Gary sees it, the intent elem ent was lacking because the State did not prove Gary intended
to take a ny of Darby ’s property

. At m ost, the evidence e stablished Gary intended t o f orcibly take the car, which he claim s did not belong to Darby since his m other had rented i t. But we have m ade clear “that robbery r e l a t e s to possession of property , not to t itle.” Id. at 1232 (em phasis added). And, here, it was undisputed that Darby was in lawf ul p ossession of the Dodge Charger when Gary jum p ed in the backseat to steal it. S ee Bullock v. State , 391 So. 2d 601, 606-09 (Miss. 1980) (af f irm ing capital-m

urder c onviction, w ith underly ing f elony of robbery of a vehicle, w here it w as undisputed the v ictim w as in lawf u l possession of the

1 2vehicle when the def endant carjacked and m

urdered him ). ¶35. Wh e n r e v i ewing the suf f iciency of the evidence, “the r elevant question is whether, af ter viewing t he evidence in the light m o st f av o r able to the prosecution, any rational trier of f act could have f

ound the essential e lem ents of the crim e bey ond a reasonable doubt.”
Bush v. State , 895 So. 2 d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005). I n the video, Gary adm itted the plan was
to steal Darby ’s car. Travis called Darby to com e pick h er and Gary up. And Gary brought his gun with him to f

orcibly take the car f

rom Darby ’s personal possession. W hen Darby resisted, Gary said he shot D arby in the back of the head, killing him

. Viewing t his evidence in the l ight m ost f

avorable to the State, a rational juror could have certainly f ound bey ond a reasonable doubt that all the elem ents of capital m urder—including all the elem ents of the underly ing crim e of

robbery

— had been proven. ¶36. T h us, the t rial c ourt did not e r r i n d e n y i n g G a r y ’ s mo t i o n f o r a j u d g me n t notwithstanding the verdict.
III. Weight of the Evidence ¶37. Alter n a t i v e l y , G a r y a r g u e s his posttrial m o tion f o r a new trial should have been granted because the jury ’s verdict was contrary t o the overwhelm ing weight of the e vidence. ¶38. A m otion f

or a new trial based on the w eight of the evidence f a lls squarely within the trial court’s discretion. Little v. State , 2 017 W L 4546740, at *4 (Miss. Oct. 12, 2017). W hen reviewing the denial o f such m otion, “we weigh t he evidence in the light m o st f avorable to the verdict, ‘ only disturbing a verdict when it is s o contrary to the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence t h a t to allow it to s tand would sanction a n unconscionable injustice.’” Id.

1 3(quoting Lindsay v. State , 212 So. 3d 44, 45 (Miss. 2017)).

¶39. Here, the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence is consistent with, not contrary to, the jury ’s guilty verdict. Not only did Gary conf ess, but his conf

ession was consistent with the other evidence presented. Forensic exam ination p roved D arby was shot in t he car—just as Gary said. Darby ’s b l ood was f o und on Gary ’s shirt, which Gary adm i tted he had been wearing the day

he shot Darby . And Gary him self led the police to the m

urder weapons. ¶40. Still, Gary asserts there were “f ar too m any questions lef

t unanswered to convict [ him ] of capital m

urder.” S pecif

ically , G a r y p o i n t s t o t he f act analy sts only f

o und o ne spot of Darby ’s b l ood on Gary ’s shirt, though Gary c laim e d h e dragged Darby ’s body out of the car. And why , if he had m

u rdered D arby , would he still be wearing the sam e s hirt t hree d a y s later? Gary also suggests the State avoided bringing up Travis, perhaps to downplay that Gary had a lesser role in the m urder. ¶41. But resolving f

actual questions is precisely why w e have juries. See Evans v. State , 159 Miss. 561, 566, 132 So. 563, 564 (1931) (“[ J]uries are i m paneled f or the very

purpose of passing upon such questions o f disputed f act[ .]”). And this Court w ill not disturb a jury ’s verdict when substantial evidence supports it. Bridges v. State , 7 16 S o. 2d 614, 617 (Miss. 1998). ¶42. W e f

ind the j ury w as presented am ple evidence Gary

com m itted the m

urder. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing Gary ’s m o tion f o r a new trial.
IV. Cum ulative Error ¶43. Finally , Gary c laim s cum ulativ e e r ror warrants a new trial. But “ where there is no

1 4reversible error in any part, there is no reversible e rror to the w hole.” Gray v. State , 887 So.

2d 158, 172 (Miss. 2004). ¶44. The one error we f

o u nd—the trial court’s f

ailure to hold a f

orm a l suppression hearing, in w hich the State a nd not Gary was require d t o p r o v e t he voluntariness of the conf ession—was rem edied through o r d e r i n g a suppression hearing in Gary I

. At this hearing, the trial court f

ound Gary ’ s conf

e ssion was voluntary and adm issible. See Jackson , 378 U.S. at 394, 84 S

. Ct. at 1790 (holding that, if af t er a p roper suppression hearing the conf ession is f

ound to be v oluntary and adm issible, there is “n o c onstitutional necessity at that po i n t f

or p roceeding w ith a n ew trial”). S o Gary i s not entitled to a n ew trial on this claim

. ¶45. Because Gary has pointed to no other errors, “there can be no cum ulative ef f ect and no adverse im

pact upon his constitutional right to f air trial.” Id. at 172-73. ¶46. W e theref

ore af f irm G ary ’s conviction of capital m urder and sentence to lif

e in prison without parole. ¶47. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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