NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERKIA PATRICIA MORAN ESQUIVEL,

AKA Erika Morales Esquival, AKA Erika

Martinez, AKA Erika Morales, AKA Erica

Patricia Moran Henrriquez, AKA Erika

Patricia Moran Henrriquez,

Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 16-71145

Agency No. A078-106-865

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 4, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, S.R. THOMAS, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Erika Moran Esquivel seeks review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 7 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

denying her application for withholding of removal.1 We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.

1. Petitioner argues that the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ’s

denial of her motion for a continuance, which was based on Petitioner’s outstanding

application for a U visa. We reject the government’s argument that this issue is 

moot, as the record contains no details concerning Petitioner’s U visa claim or 

application status. However, Petitioner had previously been granted two

continuances, and no relief for Petitioner was immediately available, as Petitioner’s

U visa application had not been acted upon at the time of the merits hearing on July

31, 2014, even though the U visa application had been filed on March 19, 2014. 

Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. See Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d

1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision to uphold the IJ’s denial

of withholding of removal. Petitioner argues membership in a particular social

group loosely defined as “Honduran woman combined with Petitioner’s kinship ties

and resisting gang oppression.” However, this is not a cognizable proposed social

group. See, e.g., Ramos Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We

have recently held, however, that resistance to gang membership is not a protected

1 While the case caption reads “Erkia Patricia Moran Esquivel,” Petitioner indicates 

her first name is spelled “Erika.”
3 

ground.”). Moreover, even assuming this proposed group is cognizable, Petitioner 

has failed to establish a nexus between the proposed group and fear of future 

persecution. Petitioner testified that her son was recruited by the Honduran gang 

MS-13 because “he’s a young man.” Petitioner testified that her brother was 

previously attacked by MS-13 for not paying a “war tax” to the gang, but that since 

her brother has begun paying the “war tax,” he has not experienced any further 

problems. The BIA did not err in finding that these harms were the result of 

generalized gang violence in the country, and were therefore not particular to any 

group.

3. Petitioner argues that she is “a devout member of a subsection of the 

Catholic religion” known as “Santa Muerte,” as evidenced by a tattoo on her back, 

and that MS-13 views her Santa Muerte tattoo as a sign of “membership in a rival 

gang.” The BIA affirmed the IJ’s “determination that the applicant’s fear of harm 

on the basis of religion, actual or imputed—based on her tattoo—is speculative.” 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion, as Petitioner has not testified to 

any instances of threatened or actual harm she or anyone she knows has suffered on 

account of Santa Muerte tattoos, and furthermore, Petitioner has previously 

disclaimed any belief in the Santa Muerte religion itself.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED