alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2009141EN.01002401.xml

| 20.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 141/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 141/24

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Baranya Megyei Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 23 March 2009 — Ker-Optika Bt. v ÁNTSZ Dél-dunátúli Regionális Intézete

(Case C-108/09)

2009/C 141/43

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Referring court

Baranya Megyei Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ker-Optika Bt.

Applicant:

Defendant: ÁNTSZ Dél-dunátúli Regionális Intézete

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Does the sale of contact lenses constitute medical advice requiring the physical examination of a patient and thus not fall with the scope of Directive 2000/31/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does the sale of contact lenses constitute medical advice requiring the physical examination of a patient and thus not fall with the scope of Directive 2000/31/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market?

1

| 2. | If the sale of contact lenses does not constitute medical advice requiring the physical examination of a patient, must Article 30 EC be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which contact lenses may be sold only in specialist medical accessory shops? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the sale of contact lenses does not constitute medical advice requiring the physical examination of a patient, must Article 30 EC be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which contact lenses may be sold only in specialist medical accessory shops?

| 3. | Does the principle of the freedom of movement of goods laid down in Article 28 EC preclude the provision of Hungarian law which makes it possible to sell contact lenses solely in specialist medical accessory shops? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Does the principle of the freedom of movement of goods laid down in Article 28 EC preclude the provision of Hungarian law which makes it possible to sell contact lenses solely in specialist medical accessory shops?

---

(1)  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’); OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1-16 (ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) Hungarian Special Edition, Chapter 13, Volume 25, p. 399-414.

1

---
# C_2015056EN.01001201.xml

| 16.2.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 56/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.2.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 56/12

---

Judgment of the General Court of 17 December 2014 — Pilkington Group and Others v Commission

(Case T-72/09) (1)

1

((Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European market in carglass - Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC - Market-sharing agreements and exchanges of commercially sensitive information - Fines - Rights of defence - Retroactive application of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines - Value of sales - Passive or minor role - Deterrent effect of the fine - Taking into account fines previously imposed - Ceiling of the fine - Exchange rate for the calculation of the ceiling of the fine))

(2015/C 056/16)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Pilkington Group Ltd (St Helens, United Kingdom); Pilkington Automotive Ltd (Lathom, United Kingdom); Pilkington Automotive Deutschland GmbH (Witten, Germany); Pilkington Holding GmbH (Gelsenkirchen, Germany); and Pilkington Italia SpA (San Salvo, Italy) (represented by: J. Scott, S. Wisking, K. Fountoukakos-Kyriakakos, Solicitors, J. Turner QC, A. Bates, Barrister, C. Puech Baron and D. Katrana, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: European Commission (represented: initially by F. Castillo de la Torre, A. Biolan and M. Kellerbauer, subsequently by A. Biolan, M. Kellerbauer and N. von Lingen and lastly by A. Biolan, M. Kellerbauer and F. Ronkes Agerbeek, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of Commission Decision C(2008) 6815 final of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/39.125 — Carglass), as amended by Commission Decision C(2009) 863 final of 11 February 2009 and also by Commission Decision C(2013) 1119 final of 28 February 2013, in so far as it concerns the applicants, and also, in the alternative, for annulment of Article 2 of that decision in that it imposes a fine on the applicants or, in the further alternative, application for reduction of that fine.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1) | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1)

Dismisses the action;

| 2) | Orders Pilkington Group Ltd, Pilkington Automotive Ltd, Pilkington Automotive Deutschland GmbH, Pilkington Holding GmbH and Pilkington Italia SpA to bear 90 % of their own costs and to pay all of the costs incurred by the Commission and orders the Commission to bear 10 % of the costs incurred by the applicants. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Orders Pilkington Group Ltd, Pilkington Automotive Ltd, Pilkington Automotive Deutschland GmbH, Pilkington Holding GmbH and Pilkington Italia SpA to bear 90 % of their own costs and to pay all of the costs incurred by the Commission and orders the Commission to bear 10 % of the costs incurred by the applicants.

---

(1)  OJ C 102, 1.5.2009.

1

---
**Exhibit
32.2**
 
 
 **CERTIFICATION
BY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**
 **PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of GenVec, Inc. (the “Registrant”) on Form
10-K as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the “Report”), I, Jeffrey W. Church, as Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and
Corporate Secretary of the Registrant, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:
 
 (1)
    The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15 (d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
    The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Registrant for the dates and periods covered by the
  Report.
 
 This
certificate is being made for the exclusive purpose of compliance by the Chief
Financial Officer of the Company with the requirements of Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and may not be disclosed, distributed or used by
any person or for any reason other than as specifically required by
law.
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
GenVec, Inc. and will be retained by GenVec, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
 
 March
      15,
      2005/s/Jeffrey
      W. ChurchJeffrey
      W. ChurchChief
      Financial Officer, Treasurer
      &
      Corporate Secretary
EXHIBIT 31.1

                                CERTIFICATIONS

I, William Tay, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Norquest Acquisition
Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer
and have:

   (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report
is being prepared;

   (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

   (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business
issuer's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit
committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

   (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

   (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.


Date: May 7, 2008

NORQUEST ACQUISITION CORP.


/s/ William Tay
-------------------------------
William Tay, President and CEO
(Principal Executive and Financial Officer)
Michael CARDONA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7256.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
UNITED STATES, petitioner, v. Antwon JENKINS.

No. 17-97.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 14, 2018.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of *Sessions v. Dimaya,* 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018).
Wesley JEFFERSON, petitioner, v. Wendy KELLY, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.

No. 16-9377.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 12, 2018

No. 04-18-00126-CV

IN RE NEWPORT CLASSIC HOMES, L.P. L.L.C.

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice (dissenting with opinion)

Patricia O. Alvarez (not participating)

Luz Elena D. Chapa (not participating)

Irene Rios, Justice (joining in dissenting opinion)

A majority of the participating en banc court denies the motion for en banc 

reconsideration filed by real party in interest Rafael Lagunes. 

It is so ORDERED on December 12, 2018. 

 PER CURIAM

 ATTESTED TO: __________________________

 KEITH E. HOTTLE,

 Clerk of Court

 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2014-CI-02113, styled Rafael Lagunes v. Newport Classic Homes, L.P., 

L.L.C., pending in the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Rosie Alvarado presiding.
# C_2009082EN.01001501.xml

| 4.4.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 82/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 82/15

---

Action brought on 22 January 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic

(Case C-30/09)

(2009/C 82/27)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: A. Sipos and P. Guerra e Andrade, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Portuguese Republic

Defendant:

Forms of order sought

| — | Declare that, by not drawing up external emergency plans for the establishments requiring such plans, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11 of Council Directive 96/82/EC (1) of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, by not drawing up external emergency plans for the establishments requiring such plans, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11 of Council Directive 96/82/EC (1) of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003;

1

| — | Order the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

It is apparent from the letters sent by the Portuguese Administration to the Commission in this matter that none of the establishments required to draw up emergency plans has had its external emergency plan approved in accordance with the directive.

Article 11 of Directive 96/82 requires Member States to ensure that operators supply to the competent authorities the information necessary to draw up external emergency plans. The competent authorities must prepare such emergency plans.

Under Article 11(4) of the directive, internal and external emergency plans must be reviewed, tested, revised and updated at intervals of no longer than three years.

According to the Portuguese Administration's own information, none of those obligations has been fulfilled in Portugal.

---

(1)  OJ 1997 L 10, p. 13.

1

---
# C_2011252EN.01000602.xml

| 27.8.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 252/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.8.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 252/6

---

Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 15 February 2011 — Perfetti Van Melle SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Cloetta AB, legal successor to Cloetta Fazer AB

(Case C-353/09 P) (1)

1

(Appeal - Community trade mark - Regulation (EC) No 40/94 - Article 8(1)(b) - Invalidity proceedings - Community word mark CENTER SHOCK - Earlier national word mark CENTER - Examination of the likelihood of confusion)

2011/C 252/09

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Perfetti Van Melle SpA (represented by: P. Perani and P. Pozzi, avvocati)

Appellant:

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Novais Gonçalves, acting as Agent), Cloetta AB, legal successor to Cloetta Fazer AB (represented by: M. Fammler, Advocate, M. Treis, R. Niebel and E.M. Strobel, Rechstanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings:

Re:

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of 1 July 2009 in Case T-16/08 Perfetti Van Melle v OHIM — Cloetta Fazer dismissing an action for annulment brought by the proprietor of Community word mark ‘CENTER SHOCK’ for goods in Class 30 against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) of 7 November 2007 (Case R 149/2006-4) dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Cancellation Division granting the application for a declaration of invalidity of that mark made by the proprietor of the earlier national word marks ‘CENTER’ and ‘CLOETTA CENTER’ for goods in, inter alia, Class 30 — Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94

Perfetti Van Melle

OHIM — Cloetta Fazer

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2. | Perfetti Van Melle SpA shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Perfetti Van Melle SpA shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 267, 7.11.2009.

1

---
Jeffrey ALLEN, et al., petitioners, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

No. 17-1102.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 19, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
#### CHATEAU FRONTENAC, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 9752.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

March 12, 1945.

Field, Lovejoy & Buchholz and Samuel H. Rubin, all of Detroit, Mich., for petitioner.

Samuel O. Clark, Jr., J. P. Wenchel, Sewall Key, A. F. Prescott, and S. Dee Hanson, all of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before HICKS, ALLEN, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This cause was heard on the record, briefs and arguments of counsel, and it appearing that there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the Tax Court, it is therefore ordered and adjudged that the decision of that court entered on October 20, 1942, be and the same is affirmed upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the court filed the same day.
Thomas WHITLOW, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 16-9571.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Harold B. ROTTE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7303.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
Larry A. GOOCH, Jr., petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-8374.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 14, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.
Paul J. BEGNOCHE, Sr., petitioner, v. D.L. DeROSE, et al.

No. 17-7556.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 19, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Steven Michael JOHN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 16-9390.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3888 

To required the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to conduct a study on motor vehicle safety and impaired driving, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2019 

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington (for herself and Mr. MCNERNEY) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce 

A BILL 

To required the Administrator of the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration to conduct a study on 

motor vehicle safety and impaired driving, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Impaired Driving 

5 Study Act of 2019’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3888 IH

1 SEC. 2. NHTSA STUDY ON MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND IM2 PAIRED DRIVING. 

3 (a) STUDY.—The Administrator of the National 

4 Highway Traffic Safety Administration shall conduct a 

5 study on the ways in which the Administration can im6 prove motor vehicle safety, as defined in section 30102 

7 of title 49, United States Code, to address impaired driv8 ing, including alcohol, marijuana, and opioid-impaired 

9 driving. 

10 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date 

11 of enactment of this Act, and biannually thereafter, the 

12 Secretary of Transportation, in cooperation with other 

13 Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the Com14 mittee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep15 resentatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

16 and Transportation of the Senate a report on the fol17 lowing: 

18 (1) A description of the activities undertaken 

19 pursuant to subsection (a). 

20 (2) An update on the progress of the study pur21 suant to subsection (a). 

22 (3) The results of the study once it is com23 pleted. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS