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The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for

the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation

of the Honorable Franklin L. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge

for the District of Minnesota. 

_____________

No. 96-1684

_____________

United States of America, *

 *

Plaintiff-Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Jimmy Brown, also known as * 

Marlus Andrew Singleton, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: July 11, 1996

 Filed: December 4, 1996 _____________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges. _____________

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Jimmy Brown was convicted of two drug-related charges. In

this direct appeal, Brown challenges the district court's1 denial

of his motions to suppress a statement made at the time of his

arrest and evidence seized from his vehicle. We affirm. 

On September 18, 1995, a police informant, who had previously

provided reliable information, notified Officer Donald Sebesta of

the Bloomington Police Department of an impending drug transaction.

The informant explained that an individual known as "Dre" (Deandre

Norris) was staying at the Exel Inn in Bloomington and was
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expecting a delivery of crack cocaine that day. The crack would be

delivered by a female courier who would arrive at noon on a flight

from Los Angeles, California. The informant indicated that Norris

would be driving either a white Buick or a turquoise Camaro Z-28 to

the airport to pick up the courier. The informant did not mention

Jimmy Brown or the name of the courier. 

That morning, police surveillance verified that Norris had

checked into Room 234 of the Exel Inn and that a turquoise Camaro

Z-28 was parked outside. At 10:30 a.m. two males (later identified

as Norris and Jimmy Brown) left the Exel Inn in the Camaro, with

Brown driving. Officers followed as the car drove to downtown

Minneapolis, then to the Mall of America parking ramp, and finally

to the baggage claim area of the Minneapolis-St. Paul International

Airport. Shortly after noon, a female (later identified as

Sherdana Conklin) arrived on a flight from Los Angeles with two

bags, one blue and one black. Conklin left the airport in the

Camaro that had been waiting outside the baggage claim area.

Officers followed the Camaro as it returned to the Exel Inn along

another curious route -- through the Mall of America parking ramp

and the parking lot of an office complex. When they arrived at the

Exel Inn, Norris and Conklin took the bags from the Camaro and went

into Room 234. Brown, still unidentified at this time, left in the

Camaro. 

When the officers detained Norris and Conklin, they discovered

cocaine in the black bag. The officers then pursued and stopped

the Camaro and placed the driver under arrest. When asked his

name, Brown told the officers that his name was Marlus Singleton.

Not until the next day did the officers learn that his true name

was Jimmy Brown. The officers searched the Camaro at the scene of

the arrest. The search revealed no controlled substances, but the

officers seized three cellular telephones, a pager, a telephone

book, $500 cash, and a drivers license in the name of Marlus

Singleton. 
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Brown, Norris, and Conklin were each charged with one count of

aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and

one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to

distribute crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Norris became

and remains a fugitive, Conklin negotiated a guilty plea, and Brown

proceeded to trial.

Brown filed pretrial motions, seeking to suppress his

statement of a false name to officers at the time of his arrest and

the evidence seized from the Camaro. Adopting the magistrate

judge's report and recommendation, the district court denied the

motions. The district court held that the false name was

admissible as part of routine booking procedures. The court also

held that the evidence seized from the Camaro was admissible

because it was lawfully obtained through a search incident to

arrest. Following a jury trial, Brown was convicted of both counts

of the indictment. He now appeals the denial of his motions to

suppress. 

Brown first contends that the district court erred by not

suppressing his statement of a false name at the time of his

arrest. Brown argues that questioning him about his name at the

scene of the arrest constitutes custodial interrogation for

investigative purposes because the police were not aware of his

identity at the time. Thus, he contends he was entitled to

warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and

the statement, obtained in violation of Miranda, should have been

suppressed. We disagree.

It is well-settled that routine biographical data is exempted

from Miranda's coverage. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601

(1990); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir.

1989); United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir.

1985). We have said:
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A request for routine information necessary for basic

identification purposes is not interrogation under

Miranda, even if the information turns out to be

incriminating. Only if the government agent should

reasonably be aware that the information sought, while

merely for basic identification purposes in the usual

case, is directly relevant to the substantive offense

charged, will the question be subject to scrutiny.

McLaughlin, 777 F.2d at 391-92. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14

(during booking procedures, government may not ask questions "that

are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions"). 

Brown was arrested because the police had observed him

participate in a drug-related crime immediately prior to his

arrest. This provided probable cause for his arrest, regardless of

the fact that the police did not know his name. His name was not

directly relevant to the substantive offense charged, but wholly

incidental. His name was necessary to the booking process, and the

question was not investigative in nature. If Brown had merely

provided his true name, the information would not have been

incriminating. Clearly, this falls within the routine booking

question exception. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02 & n.14. The

district court did not err in denying Brown's motion to suppress

his statement. 

 Brown also contends that the district court erred by denying

his motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his vehicle.

Brown argues that this was an improper inventory search because the

officers did not follow any standardized police procedures.

Because he does not contend that the arrest was made without

probable cause, however, and our review of the record indicates

that probable cause existed for his arrest, the search of the

interior of Brown's car was valid as a search incident to arrest.

See United States v. Morgan, 997 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1297-98 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 989 (1990). The district court did not err by
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denying Brown's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the

search of his car. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.