IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Adam Todd, Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, 

Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster 

Holdings Limited Corporation (d/b/a Digitex 

Futures) 

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO: 

Hon.____________________ 

Jury Trial Demanded 

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF AND 

CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 

AND COMMISSION REGULATIONS 

 Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or “Commission”), an 

independent federal agency, alleges as follows:

SUMMARY 

1. Between December 2017 and the present, (the “Relevant Period”), Defendant 

Adam Todd (“Todd”) owned, built, and operated an illegal digital asset derivatives trading 

platform through a common enterprise of corporate entities including Defendants Digitex LLC, 

Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation. This 

complaint refers collectively to the entity Defendants listed in the preceding sentence as “Digitex 

Futures” and the web-based exchange as the “Exchange.” Through the operation of the Exchange 

and the activities described in greater detail below, Digitex Futures and Todd violated applicable 

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I. 
2

sections of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act” or “CEA”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–26, and Commission 

Regulations promulgated thereunder (“Regulations”), 17 C.F.R. Pts. 1–190 (2021). 

2. The Exchange operated from no later than July 31, 2020, the date of its “launch,” 

through at least May 2022, the approximate date Digitex Futures removed the trading interface 

from its website (the “Exchange Period”). During the Exchange Period, Digitex Futures accepted 

customer funds as margin and matched customer orders for digital asset derivatives such as bitcoin 

futures contracts and ether futures contracts. In connection with its offering of digital asset futures 

contracts, Digitex Futures allowed users, including customers located in the United States, to trade 

with leverage of up to 100 to 1. 

3. Through the operation of the Exchange, Digitex Futures became subject to the 

requirements under Section 4 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6, to register with the Commission as a 

designated contract market (“DCM”) or foreign board of trade (“FBOT”), as well as the 

requirement under Section 4d of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6d, to register as a futures commission 

merchant (“FCM”). Digitex Futures and Todd have never been registered with the Commission 

in any capacity and therefore violated 7 U.S.C. §§ 6 and 6d. 

4. Because Digitex Futures also met the statutory definition of an FCM, Regulation 

42.2, 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2021), required it to comply with applicable provisions of the Bank Secrecy 

Act (“BSA”), including requirements to implement effective know-your-customer (“KYC”) 

procedures and a customer information program (“CIP”). However, Digitex Futures did not have 

effective KYC procedures at any time nor did it implement an effective CIP, thus violating 

17 C.F.R. § 42.2. 

5. Digitex Futures’ business model, memorialized in a “white paper” penned by Todd, 

promised an exchange with commission-free trading. To realize this “futures trader’s Utopian 

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dream,” Digitex Futures planned to require users to margin all trading activity on the Exchange 

with its “native currency,” a digital asset with the symbol DGTX. 

6. Digitex Futures was the sole initial source of DGTX. Beginning no later than 

January 2018, Digitex Futures sold DGTX tokens directly to market participants; although once 

sold by Digitex Futures, DGTX subsequently traded in the secondary market on third-party digital 

asset exchanges. 

7. In addition to the registration and regulatory violations described above, between 

approximately May 1, 2020 and at least August 15, 2020 (the “Attempted Manipulation Period”), 

Todd attempted to manipulate the price of DGTX by engaging in non-economic trading activity—

here, trading that was expected to lose money rather than make money—on third-party digital asset 

trading platforms with the intent to artificially inflate (or “pump”) the price of DGTX to increase 

the value of the DGTX tokens held by Todd and Digitex Futures and to benefit Digitex Futures by 

attempting to legitimize its “native currency.” Todd’s attempted manipulation of DGTX violated 

Section 6(c)(1), 6(c)(3), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(3), and 13(a)(2), and 

Regulations 180.1(a)(1) and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1(a)(1), 180.2 (2021). 

8. Unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, Defendants are likely to continue to 

engage in the acts and practices alleged in this complaint and similar acts and practices, as more 

fully described below. 

9. Accordingly, the CFTC brings this action pursuant to Section 6c of the Act, 

7 U.S.C. § 13a-l, to enjoin Defendants’ unlawful acts and practices and to compel their compliance 

with the Act. In addition, the CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties and remedial ancillary relief, 

including, but not limited to, trading and registration bans, disgorgement, restitution, pre- and postjudgment interest, and such other relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate. 

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

10. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal 

question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (district courts have original jurisdiction over civil 

actions commenced by the United States or by any agency expressly authorized to sue by Act of 

Congress). Section 6c of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a), authorizes the CFTC to seek injunctive 

relief against any person whenever it shall appear to the CFTC that such person has engaged, is 

engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of 

the CEA or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder. 

11. Venue properly lies with this Court pursuant to Section 6c(e) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13a-1(e), because Defendants transacted business in the Southern District of Florida, and 

Defendants engaged in acts and practices in violation of the CEA and Regulations within this 

District. 

PARTIES 

A. The CFTC 

12. Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the independent federal 

regulatory agency charged by Congress with the administration and enforcement of the CEA and 

Regulations promulgated thereunder. 

B. Defendants 

13. Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited, and 

Digitex LLC are a common enterprise of corporate entities that comprise Digitex Futures, as 

defined above, which operated the Exchange from an office in Miami, Florida. None of the entities 

comprising Digitex Futures has ever been registered with the Commission in any capacity. Digitex 

Limited was registered in the Republic of Seychelles on December 11, 2017. Digitex Software 

Limited was registered in Ireland on March 8, 2018, and operated in Dublin with a small staff of 

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TT. 

III. 
5

software developers for several months. At all times relevant to the Proposed Complaint, Todd 

owned Digitex Limited and Digitex Software Limited. Since at least January 27, 2021, Todd has 

co-owned Blockster Holdings Limited, a Gibraltar entity. On April 27, 2021, Todd and Blockster 

Holdings Limited applied to form Digitex LLC in St. Vincent & the Grenadines. 

14. Defendant Adam Todd is a natural person who resides in Miami, Florida. Todd is 

the founder and CEO of Digitex Futures. Todd owned and controlled all of the entities comprising 

Digitex Futures at all times relevant to this complaint. Todd has never been registered with the 

Commission in any capacity. 

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

15. The purpose of the CEA is to “serve the public interests . . . through a system of 

effective self-regulation of trading facilities, clearing systems, market participants and market 

professionals under the oversight of the Commission,” as well as “to deter and prevent price 

manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity; to ensure the financial integrity of all 

transactions subject to [the] Act and the avoidance of systemic risk; to protect all market 

participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales practices and misuses of customer assets; and 

to promote responsible innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, other markets and 

market participants.” Section 3 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 5. 

16. Derivatives are financial instruments such as futures, options, or swaps that derive 

their value from something else, like a benchmark or a physical commodity. The CEA requires 

that, subject to certain exemptions, commodity derivative transactions must be conducted on 

exchanges designated by, or registered with, the CFTC. For example, trading of commodity 

futures contracts must be conducted on a board of trade designated by the CFTC as a contract 

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TV. 
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market or on a registered foreign board of trade. Section 4 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6; Regulation 

48.3, 17 C.F.R. § 48.3 (2021). 

17. A digital asset is anything that can be stored and transmitted electronically and has 

associated ownership or use rights. Digital assets include virtual currencies, such as bitcoin or 

ether, which are digital representations of value that function as mediums of exchange, units of 

account, and/or stores of value. Certain digital assets are “commodities,” including those alleged 

herein, as defined under Section 1a(9) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9). 

18. Some digital assets function as “native” tokens or currencies, which are designed 

to have specific uses on particular platforms or applications, similar to a poker chip in a casino. 

19. In recent years, as digital asset markets have evolved, the CFTC has approved the 

offer of futures contracts, including bitcoin and ether futures and options, on certain digital assets 

by boards of trade registered with the CFTC such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and 

Chicago Board Options Exchange. 

20. The provisions of the Act and Regulations that apply to DCMs—i.e., the markets 

where trading of U.S. futures is required to occur—establish important protections for United 

States derivatives markets and market participants. For example, DCMs must conform to core 

principles that are designed to achieve the prevention of market abuse, Section 5(d)(12)(A) of the 

Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(12)(A); ensure their financial stability, Section 5(d)(21) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 7(d)(21); protect their information security, Regulation 38.1051(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 38.1051(a)(2) 

(2021); and safeguard their systems in the event of a disaster, Regulation 38.1051(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 38.1051(a)(3) (2021). Further, DCMs must ensure that the contracts they list for trading are “not 

readily susceptible to manipulation,” Section 5(d)(3) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3); DCMs must 

“prevent market disruption,” Section 5(d)(4) of the Act,7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(4); DCMs must impose 

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position limits designed to reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or congestion, 

Section 5(d)(5) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(5); DCMs must establish and enforce rules to minimize 

conflicts of interest, Section 5(d)(16) of the Act,7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(16); and DCMs must maintain 

and retain important records and provide them to the Commission, Section 5(d)(18) of the Act, 

7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(18). 

21. An FCM is an individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that is: 

(i) engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for regulated transactions, including futures, swaps, 

commodity options, or retail commodity transactions; or (ii) acts as a counterparty to retail 

commodity transactions; and (iii) which, in connection with these activities, “accepts any money, 

securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades 

or contracts that result or may result therefrom.” Section la(28)(A) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ la(28)(A). 

22. FCMs can accept and hold customer funds to margin commodity derivative 

transactions. They are a critical component of the U.S. financial system, and therefore must 

comply with applicable requirements under the Act and Regulations. Among the most 

fundamental of these requirements is Section 4d(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a), which makes it 

illegal for any person to act as an FCM unless registered as such with the Commission. FCMs 

must establish safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest, Section 4d(c) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 6d(c); segregate customer assets to protect them from the risk of the FCM’s insolvency, Section 

6d(a)(2) of the Act; 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2); and employ only salespeople who register with the CFTC 

and meet strict proficiency requirements, Section 4k(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6k(1). 

23. Regulation 42.2, 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2021), requires, among other things, that every 

FCM shall comply with applicable provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), regulations 

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promulgated by the Department of the Treasury under the BSA and codified at 31 C.F.R. 

chapter X, and requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) and the implementing regulation jointly 

promulgated by the Commission and the Department of the Treasury at 31 C.F.R. § 1026.220 

(2021), which require that a CIP be adopted as part of the FCM’s BSA compliance program. 

24. FCMs are required to implement effective KYC procedures to verify the identity of 

any person seeking to open an account, maintain records to verify a person’s identity, and consult 

lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations (such as those created and 

distributed by the Office of Foreign Asset Control of the United States Department of Treasury 

(“OFAC”)) to determine whether a person seeking to open an account appears on any such list. 

See 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 and 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l). 

25. Regulation 42.2 specifically mandates compliance with 31 C.F.R. chapter X, which 

requires that every FCM must: (1) implement a written CIP that, at a minimum, includes 

procedures for verifying the identify of each customer sufficient to enable the FCM to form a 

reasonable belief that it knows the true identify of each customer; (2) retain records collected 

pursuant to the CIP; and (3) implement procedures for determining whether a customer appears on 

any list of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations. 

26. Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 180.1(a)(1) (2021), make it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with 

any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce to intentionally or recklessly use or 

employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. 

27. Section 6(c)(3) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(3), and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 

(2021), make it “unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to 

manipulate the price . . . of any commodity in interstate commerce . . . .” 

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28. Finally, Section 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2), makes it unlawful for “[a]ny 

person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.” 

FACTS 

A. The Digitex Futures Exchange and Products 

29. During the Exchange Period, Todd operated Digitex Futures from Miami, Florida. 

For substantial portions of the Relevant Period, Todd exercised strategic control of all business 

decisions from Digitex Futures’ Miami office. In addition, throughout the Relevant Period, 

Digitex Futures conducted major portions of its business from its Miami office, including 

marketing of the Exchange by Todd and Digitex Futures’ chief marketing officer, and “launching” 

the Exchange on July 31, 2020—an event that included a YouTube “livestream” broadcast from 

Florida and interviews of Todd with United States-based “influencers.” 

30. Digitex Futures offered to enter into or execute, and accepted funds to margin, 

transactions in off-exchange leveraged digital asset futures to customers in the U.S. and throughout 

the world. Digitex Futures made the Exchange accessible on its website, available variously at the 

U.S.-hosted URLs www.digitexfutures.com and www.digitex.io, and through the Digitex Futures 

mobile application, until the Exchange was removed from the website in May 2022. 

31. Todd published his “white paper” on the internet on December 5, 2017. The “white 

paper” is titled “DIGITEX—A commission-free, trustless futures exchange for trading digital 

currency prices . . . v.1.1,” and theorizes about a platform with commission-free trading in which 

all profits, losses, margin requirements, and account balances on the Exchange would be 

denominated in its “native currency,” DGTX. In lieu of transaction fees for digital asset futures 

trading, Digitex Futures was to earn revenue by selling DGTX to the Exchange’s market 

participants, commencing in January 2018. Out of the contemplated supply of 1 billion DGTX 

tokens, at least 300 million would be retained by Todd and Digitex Futures. 

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V. 
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32. Beginning January 15, 2018, customers could obtain DGTX tokens directly from 

Digitex Futures at the digitexfutures.com or digitex.io websites, or in the secondary market by 

trading at third-party digital asset exchanges. Todd publicly represented in 2018 that the Digitex 

Futures’ initial DGTX token sales raised $5.2 million in 17 minutes. 

33. Todd’s business plan called for periodic sales of tranches of DGTX to the public 

after the launch of the Exchange to generate revenue for Digitex Futures. Sales of DTGX were 

the sole source revenue for Digitex Futures, consistent with Todd’s “white paper.” Beginning in 

2019, the Digitex Futures “treasury” sold DGTX tokens to customers at a 5% mark-up over the 

DGTX price, as published by CoinMarketCap, a third-party aggregator of digital asset-related 

information. 

34. Traders were required to hold DGTX to participate on the Exchange, where DGTX 

served multiple specific purposes. For example, traders were required to maintain margin balances 

denominated in DGTX, minimum “tick sizes” on the Exchange equaled the value of one DGTX 

token, and traders’ profit-and-loss was denominated in terms of DGTX. 

35. DGTX tokens did not confer any ownership rights in the Exchange and did not 

permit the token holder to participate in any matters concerning the corporate governance of 

Digitex Futures. 

36. According to Todd’s “white paper,” Digitex Futures intended to offer DGTX 

futures contracts to Exchange users so users could hedge any price risk associated with their DGTX 

tokens. These DGTX futures contracts, called a “peg system,” would “allow[ ] anyone who owns 

DGTX tokens to lock in a sale price at the current market price, whilst keeping physical possession 

of their DGTX tokens . . . .” 

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37. DGTX was a digital asset, a digital representation of value that functioned as a 

medium of exchange, and also traded on web-based trading platforms that were accessible to 

market participants in the United States, including Todd, and therefore was a commodity in 

interstate commerce. 

38. During the Exchange Period, Digitex Futures allowed customers to trade at least 

two futures contracts: bitcoin/USD and ether/USD. Transactions in these futures contracts that 

were entered into on the Exchange did not occur on a DCM or FBOT; instead, Digitex Futures 

purported to operate its own unregulated trading platform. 

39. Digitex Futures’ “white paper” provided the standardized contract specifications 

for its futures contracts, which were fungible contracts that featured a 24-hour duration with an 

automatic “roll” of any open positions into a new contract at the end of the trading day. A 

transaction in the Exchange’s futures contracts did not result in a transaction in the underlying 

digital asset or delivery of the underlying digital asset, and Digitex Futures customers were 

required to exit a position in the futures contracts through an offsetting transaction on the 

Exchange. 

40. For each contract listed on the Exchange, the customer interface displayed the 

relevant contract’s price, transaction volume over the most recent 24 hours, a 7-day price chart, 

and the unexecuted orders to buy and sell at various prices that made up the Exchange’s central 

limit order books, sometimes called price “ladders.” The Exchange’s customer interface also 

displayed mechanisms by which customers could submit orders, including a button that said 

“trade.” 

41. The Exchange allowed customers to place buy and sell orders in an electronic order 

book and matched customer orders in what it called its “trading engine.” 

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42. The Exchange allowed customers to exchange bitcoin or ether for DGTX, and 

customers could use DGTX to margin, guarantee, or secure futures transactions on Digitex 

Futures. 

43. Digitex Futures acted as the counterparty to transactions on its platform due to its 

trading as a “market-maker” in various products. 

Acceptance and/or Control of Customer Funds 

44. Digitex Futures deployed a smart contract to accept customer funds in the form of 

DGTX as margin and controlled the circumstances under which a customer’s collateral was subject 

to a margin call. 

B. Todd Controlled Digitex Futures and Operated Digitex Futures as a 

Common Enterprise 

45. At all relevant times, Todd has been the majority shareholder or owner of each of 

the various corporate entities that comprise Digitex Futures and has exercised general control over 

the Exchange’s operations. 

46. Since January 2018, Todd has controlled virtually all material aspects of the Digitex 

Futures business, including strategic decisions, business development, and marketing of Digitex 

Futures. For example, Todd has: 

a. been responsible for building and overseeing the Exchange’s trading engine; 

b. determined the contract specifications of Digitex Futures’ financial products; 

c. overseen the development of and deployment of the Digitex Futures’ internal 

market maker trading algorithms, which engaged in proprietary trading on the 

Exchange; 

d. signed contracts for Digitex Futures; 

e. controlled Digitex Futures’ bank and trading accounts; and 

f. hired, fired, and determined the compensation of Digitex Futures employees. 

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47. Digitex Futures operated as a common enterprise at all relevant times. Digitex 

LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited were 

interrelated companies that shared common ownership and management through Todd, as well as 

common employees, software development resources, email domains, office space, and marketing 

efforts. 

48. Blockster Holdings Limited holds the U.S. trademark on the word “Digitex” and 

the trademark application described Digitex’s Goods and Services as including the following 

items: 

a. “Cryptocurrency exchange services;” 

b. “Cryptocurrency trading services;” 

c. “Futures brokerage;” 

d. “Futures exchange services;” 

e. “Agencies for commodity futures trading;” 

f. “Brokerage houses in the fields of stocks, commodities and futures;” 

g. “Financial brokerage services for cryptocurrency trading;” 

h. “Financial services, namely, dealing in securities as a market maker and trading 

commodities, options, futures, equities and fixed income products in the United 

States and overseas market securities;” and 

i. “Financial services, namely, proprietary trading in commodities, securities, 

options, futures, equities and fixed income products in the United States and 

overseas market securities.” 

C. Digitex Futures Failed To Implement an Effective Anti-Money Laundering 

Program, KYC Procedures, or a Customer Information Program 

49. KYC procedures and CIPs collect verifiable customer identifying information such 

as a copy of a government-issued ID or beneficial ownership information that allows a financial 

services firm like an FCM to know who its customers are and where they are located. 

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50. During the Exchange Period, Digitex Futures failed to implement an AML program 

and did not implement any KYC procedures or a CIP that would have enabled it to identify U.S. 

persons on the platform—or the true identity of its customers, whether from the U.S. or elsewhere. 

51. In March 2020, Digitex Futures posted a YouTube video of Todd conceptually 

disparaging anti-money laundering programs (in particular, KYC procedures) and stating his 

refusal to comply with them: 

We do not need to do KYC. People are not laundering ethereum into Digitex to 

fund international terrorism. It’s [expletive] ridiculous to say that. I’m calling out 

the charade, for the crock of [expletive] that it is. We are not doing KYC on 

anybody for any reason. . . . We don’t have the right to ask you for those 

documents, you should not have to give them in order to use my product. You 

should not have to give them because the U.S. government or whatever other 

[expletive] government in the world says that you need to. You do not need to. You 

just do not. 

52. Digitex Futures allowed customers to open accounts with only an anonymous email 

and password, and did not require that customers provide any additional identity-verifying 

documentation. 

53. As Digitex Futures’ CEO and principal owner, Todd had control over whether or 

not Digitex Futures would implement an effective AML program, a CIP, or KYC procedures. 

D. Todd’s and Digitex Futures’ Attempted Manipulation of the Price of 

DGTX Tokens 

54. During the Attempted Manipulation Period, Todd attempted to artificially increase 

the price of DGTX tokens. As founder and control person of Digitex Futures (and by extension, 

the individual who controlled the issuance and primary sales of the Exchange’s “native currency” 

DGTX), Todd had inside information concerning the supply of DGTX and ability to impact the 

price of DGTX. 

55. Todd’s attempted manipulation generally consisted of trying to drive up, or 

“pumping,” the price of DGTX by touting DGTX and the Exchange to increase demand for DGTX 

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and engaging in non-economic trading activity on third-party exchanges to benefit Defendants’ 

accumulated positions in DGTX. Digitex Futures required customers to own DGTX to trade on 

the platform. 

56. The price of DGTX rose sharply during the Attempted Manipulation Period, 

consistent with Todd’s communications, as reflected below in the price chart based on data 

maintained by CoinMarketCap. This chart shows the price of DGTX between May 1, 2020 and 

September 15, 2020; the y-axis is denominated in U.S. dollars. 

57. Todd’s scheme to pump the price of DGTX included buying DGTX on third-party 

exchanges—notwithstanding Todd’s and Digitex Futures’ ownership of hundreds of millions of 

DGTX tokens. Todd’s trading activity on third-party exchanges was intended to increase the 

market price that was reflected on those exchanges, which in turn was incorporated into the price 

of DGTX as reported by CoinMarketCap. Because Digitex Futures priced its direct sales of DGTX 

based on CoinMarketCap’s reported price, Todd’s plan was therefore intended to increase the price 

at which Digitex Futures could sell DGTX out of its “treasury.” 

58. Todd’s plan was exemplified by communications and transactions between Todd 

and a Digitex Futures’ customer (“Customer A”), who is a U.S. citizen that resided in Illinois 

Case 1:22-cv-23174-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/30/2022 Page 15 of 30

O.t2 

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16

during the Attempted Manipulation Period. In late June 2020, Todd and Customer A began 

discussing Todd’s plan to manipulate the price of DGTX to its all-time high price just ahead of the 

launch of the Digitex Futures Exchange on July 31, 2020. Todd explained his intention to 

influence the price of DGTX to customer A on June 24, 2020, when DGTX was trading at a price 

of 3.5 cents per token: 

Big exchange listing confirmed for July 3rd so it’s gonna pop then. July 10th we’ll 

announce the big public launch and livestream trading event for end of July with 

$300k of prizes and giveaways on the day and I’ll have a bunch of big influencers 

and trading view traders coming in as guests and talking about how they trade on 

[Digitex Futures]. Price will break ATH1 by this launch I think and then shortly 

after that we’ll drop the Digitex City whitepaper which will be very bullish and 

then we’ll launch the Digitex Spot market and then we’ll announce our first big 

$50m IEO/STO which is Blockster. DGTX price going to go crazy in July dude, 

hang on . . . 

59. And on July 8, 2020, Todd predicted to Customer A: “DGTX will pop on 

July 17th.” 

60. Throughout July 2020, Todd promoted the July 31, 2020 Exchange launch on social 

media platforms and the Digitex Futures blog and enlisted others to help him generate interest in 

DGTX and the Exchange. Todd told U.S. Customer A that “[a] big crypto youtuber is announcing 

the launch date on July 17th and he will talk about Digitex on his show for 6 minutes saying that 

we’re back from the dead and the exchange is great and there’s loads of users and he’s trading on 

there and he loves it and DGTX is going to blow up.” 

61. By July 16, Todd reported to Customer A: “Things are heating up. DGTX at 52 

week high.” 

62. Digitex Futures also marketed DGTX’s increasing prices to the public. On July 20, 

2020, Digitex Futures tweeted: “Growing demand has pushed the price up by nearly 167% 

 

1

 ATH is slang for “all time high” in the digital asset space. 

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throughout July. Despite the massive gains already posted, different on-chain metrics suggest 

#DGTX is poised for higher highs.” At this time, Digitex Futures did not publicize the fact that 

its owner, Todd, was engaged in non-economic trading activity on third-party exchanges for the 

purpose of “pumping” the price of DGTX. 

63. While soliciting money from Customer A on July 23, 2020, Todd described his 

intent to push up the DGTX token price: “I want to do a big pump this week to break our ATH 

leading up to the launch day and get the FOMO2 going crazy so if you can get me that $300k by 

tomorrow . . . . I’ll spend the lot on buying DGTX over the weekend 💥💰[.]” Customer A wired 

$300,000 to Todd’s personal bank account on July 23, 2020. 

64. Between July 23, 2020 and the July 31, 2020 Exchange “public launch,” both Todd 

and Customer A continued to enter bids (buy orders) on a third-party exchange to purchase DGTX, 

putting upward pressure on the price. For example, on July 24, 2020, Todd reported to Customer A 

that as a result of his relentless DGTX buying, to which Todd represented he committed “$100k 

in last 12 hours,” Todd finally “broke” a 10.2-cent price barrier set by sellers in the DGTX market. 

65. On July 25, 2020, Customer A told Todd he “bought about $50k.” Todd responded 

that he bought “$150 DGTX” and reported that the price “just popped to 11 [cents]. There were 

some aggressive sellers but looks like they ran out of tokens.” Customer A subsequently told Todd 

that he bought another 1 million DGTX tokens and “Got [the DGTX token price] back up to 11 

cents.” 

66. On July 29, 2020, two days before the Exchange “public launch,” Todd described 

the mechanics of his plan to Customer A to manipulate the price of DGTX through non-economic 

trading: 

 

2

 FOMO is slang for “fear of missing out” in the digital asset space. 

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I’m setting up OTC sales desk to get big fiat buy orders coming in which I will then 

fill by aggressively buying on [another exchange] . . . That will be the key to the 

big move I think. . . . I’ll be losing money on the otc trades but should get [the price 

of DGTX] pumping. 

In other words, Todd hoped to receive large orders for DGTX directly from market participants 

(as opposed to through orders placed on the Exchange), and then take the money he received from 

those prospective purchasers and use it to buy DGTX on third-party digital asset trading platforms 

(as opposed to simply filling the order out of the Digitex Futures “treasury,” which held hundreds 

of millions of DGTX tokens with a cost basis to Digitex Futures of zero). This transaction 

pattern—realize trading losses while filling off-exchange orders (also called over-the-counter or 

“OTC” orders) on third-party platforms to pump the price of DGTX—is exactly what Todd stated 

he would do with Customer A’s $300,000 cash transfer, described above, on July 23. 

67. Customer A asked why Todd anticipated losing money on the over-the-counter 

trades—that is, Customer A asked Todd why Todd would engage in non-economic trading. Todd 

replied that he hoped to benefit from his pumping activity due to the impact the increased price of 

DGTX would have on the value of the holdings of the Digitex Futures “treasury”: 

I’ll sell big block of dgtx [in an OTC transaction] and then I will take that money 

and buy DGTX with it on [another exchange] at higher prices than I just sold for to 

pump it up some more. Rinse and repeat, every big otc buy order I’ll send straight 

into [another exchange]. . . . But with a higher price I make more from the Digitex 

Treasury sales on the website. . . . . Treasury sells at 5% premium on cmc price you 

can see the price on the Buy DGTX page of the website. . . . So it doesn’t exert any 

downward pressure on the price because only people who don’t want to deal with 

a crypto exchange buy from the treasury. 

68. On July 31, 2020, Todd hosted a 5-hour live YouTube launch during which he 

continued to tout the DGTX price, stating “the token price was at 4 cents at the start of July and it 

went to 12 cents.” During the livestream, Todd did not disclose his own non-economic trading 

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activity and instead predicted the DGTX price would reach $1 per token by the end of 2020 while 

downplaying the risks of trading on the Exchange and price volatility of DGTX: 

So, yes, you do have to hold the Digitex token in order to benefit from very liquid 

markets with no cost at all, but holding the Digitex token is actually a good thing. 

You can make money from trading on the exchange and during that time your 

tokens are also becoming more valuable. 

So, you know, it’s actually a double whammy while we’re moving up, and for the 

foreseeable future, we’re going to be moving up because we’ve got crazy, crazy 

plans to create just ridiculous demand for the Digitex token. 

69. Todd assured an “influencer” interviewing him during the Exchange launch that the 

liquidity on the Exchange “is not being provided by me or the exchange. [T]his liquidity is coming 

from other traders that are trading just like I am doing now.” 

70. Later in the live launch, another “influencer” asked Todd about the approximate 

200% increase in the token price in the weeks leading up to the launch. Todd responded: “Right, 

and we sold millions of tokens during that time. . . . You would think that selling tokens means the 

price goes down. It really doesn’t.” Todd did not disclose to this “influencer” that he was engaging 

in non-economic trading activity in DGTX on third-party exchanges with the intent to “pump” the 

price of DGTX. 

71. Todd continued his efforts to solicit or retain funds from Customer A after the 

Exchange’s “public launch” by disclosing his plan to pump the price of DGTX through activity on 

other exchanges. For example, the day after the Exchange launched, Todd told Customer A that 

he planned to put $100,000 into his “pump machine bot,” which Todd explained was an 

algorithmic trading strategy he deployed on other exchanges to drive up the price of DGTX. 

72. Thereafter, on August 4, 2020, Todd told Customer A that he held accounts on 

third-party digital asset exchanges with as much as 11.5 million DGTX for the purpose of creating 

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“relentless pressure that isn’t noticed as much because I do it through my market making bot that 

is always buying more than it is selling” to pump up the market price of DGTX. 

73. Todd resided in Florida during the Attempted Manipulation Period and therefore 

engaged in the “pumping” activity described above from the United States. 

74. According to Todd, 1,500 customers deposited at least $1.5 million worth of DGTX 

into the Exchange in the seven days prior to August 4, 2020. 

75. According to documents provided by Todd to Customer A, during the first two 

months after the Exchange’s “public launch” on July 31, 2020, at least 13,920 customers deposited 

$2,412,220 worth of DGTX into accounts at the Exchange. 

76. Through at least June 23, 2022, Digitex Futures continued to tout, mint, and sell 

DGTX tokens from the Digitex “treasury.” 

VIOLATIONS OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT AND REGULATIONS 

COUNT I 

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 

Violations of Section 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3), 13(a)(2), and 

Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2021) 

Attempted Manipulation of the Price DGTX 

77. Paragraphs 1 through 48 and 54 through 76 of this Complaint are re-alleged and 

incorporated herein by reference. 

78. During the Relevant Period, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex 

Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, and Todd, all acting as a common 

enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, and their officers, employees, and agents, 

violated 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 by, directly or indirectly, attempting 

to manipulate the price of “native currency” DGTX,a commodity in interstate commerce. 

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VT. 
21

79. Defendants, directly or indirectly, in connection with a contract of a commodity in 

interstate commerce, intentionally attempted to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate 

commerce. 

80. Defendants specifically intended to create or affect a price or price trend that did 

not reflect legitimate forces of supply and demand. 

81. Defendants took overt actions in furtherance of an attempt to manipulate the price 

of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

82. The acts and omissions of Todd and other officers, employees, or agents acting for 

Digitex Futures described in this Complaint were done within the scope of their office, 

employment, or agency with Digitex Futures. Therefore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) and 

17 C.F.R. § 1.2, Digitex Futures is liable as a principal for each act, omission, or failure of the 

other officers, employees, or agents acting for Digitex Futures, constituting violations of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(3) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.2. 

83. Each and every overt action in furtherance of the attempt to manipulate prices, and 

each act of attempted manipulation is alleged herein as a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.2. 

COUNT II 

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 

Violations of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and 

Regulation 180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2021) 

Fraud and Manipulation by Deceptive Device or Contrivance 

84. Paragraphs 1 through 48 and 54 through 76 of this Complaint are re-alleged and 

incorporated herein by reference. 

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85. During the Relevant Period, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex 

Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, and Todd, all acting as a common 

enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, and their officers, employees, and agents, 

violated 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) by, directly or indirectly, using a manipulative 

or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the sale of “native currency” DGTX, a 

commodity, in an attempt to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

86. Defendants, directly or indirectly, in connection with a contract of a commodity in 

interstate commerce, recklessly attempted to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate 

commerce. 

87. Defendants took actions that were an extreme departure from the standard of 

ordinary care and should have known their actions could create or affect a price or price trend that 

did not reflect legitimate forces of supply and demand. 

88. Defendants took overt actions in furtherance of an attempt to manipulate the price 

of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

89. The acts and omissions of Todd and other officers, employees, or agents acting for 

Digitex Futures described in this Complaint were done within the scope of their office, 

employment, or agency with Digitex Futures. Therefore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) and 

17 C.F.R. § 1.2, Digitex Futures is liable as a principal for each act, omission, or failure of the 

other officers, employees, or agents acting for Digitex Futures, constituting violations of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). 

90. Each and every overt action in furtherance of the attempt to manipulate prices, and 

each act of attempted manipulation is alleged herein as a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). 

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COUNT III 

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 

Violations of Section 4(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(a), or, alternatively, Section 4(b) of the Act, 

7 U.S.C. § 6(b) and Regulation 48.3, 17 C.F.R. § 48.3 (2021) 

Execution of Futures Transactions on an Unregistered Board of Trade 

91. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 48 are re-alleged and incorporated 

herein by reference. 

92. Since at least July 31, 2020, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex 

Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common enterprise and 

doing business as Digitex Futures, and through Todd and their officers, employees, and agents, 

violated 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) by: 

a. confirming the execution of contracts for the purchase or sale of digital assets for 

future delivery; and 

b. conducting an office or business in the U.S. for the purpose of soliciting, or accepting 

any order for, or otherwise dealing in, any transaction in, or in connection with 

contracts for the purchase or sale of digital assets for future delivery— 

without conducting its futures transactions on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that was 

designated or registered by the CFTC as a contract market. 

93. In the alternative, since at least July 31, 2020, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex 

Limited, Digitex Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, and Adam Todd, all 

acting as a common enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, and through their officers, 

employees, and agents, violated 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) and Commission Regulation 48.3, 17 C.F.R. 

§ 48.3 (2021), by permitting direct access to its electronic trading and order matching system 

without obtaining an Order of Registration for a foreign board of trade from the Commission. 

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94. Each offer to enter into, execution of, and/or confirmation of the execution of illegal 

off-exchange futures transactions, including, without limitation, those specifically alleged herein, 

is alleged as a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) or, alternatively, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) 

and 17 C.F.R. §48.3. 

95. During the Relevant Period, Todd directly or indirectly controlled Digitex Futures, 

and did not act in good faith or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting 

Digitex Futures’ violations described in this Count. Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13c(b), Todd is therefore liable for Digitex Futures’ violations described in this Count to the 

same extent as Digitex Futures. 

COUNT IV 

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 

Violation of Section 4d of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6d 

Failure to Register as a Futures Commission Merchant 

96. Paragraphs 1 through 48 of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated herein 

by reference. 

97. Since July 31, 2020, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software 

Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, and through Todd and their officers, 

employees, and agents, operated as an FCM by: 

a. engaging in soliciting or accepting orders for the purchase or sale commodities for 

future delivery; 

b. and, in or in connection with these activities, accepting money, securities, or 

property (or extending credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure 

resulting trades on the Exchange. 

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98. Since July 31, 2020, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software 

Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common enterprise and doing 

business as Digitex Futures, and through Todd and their officers, employees, and agents, violated 

7 U.S.C. § 6d by failing to register with the Commission as a Futures Commission Merchant. 

99. Each act in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6d, including, but not limited to, those 

specifically alleged herein, is alleged as a separate and distinct violation. 

100. Todd directly or indirectly controlled Digitex Futures and did not act in good faith, 

or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting Digitex Futures’ violations of 

7 U.S.C. § 6d. Therefore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Todd is liable as a control person for each 

of Digitex Futures’ violations of 7 U.S.C. § 6d. 

COUNT V 

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 

Violations of Regulation 42.2, 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2021) 

Failure to Implement Customer Information Program, and Failure to Implement Know 

Your Customer and Anti-Money Laundering Procedures 

101. Paragraphs 1 through 53 of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated herein 

by reference. 

102. As alleged in paragraphs 96 through 100, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex 

Limited, Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a 

common enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, operated as an FCM. FCMs are 

required comply with 17 C.F.R. § 42.2. 

103. Since July 31, 2020, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software 

Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common enterprise and doing 

business as Digitex Futures, and through their officers, employees, and agents, violated and are 

continuing to violate 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 by failing to implement a Customer Information Program, 

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failing to implement KYC policies and procedures, failing to implement an Anti-Money 

Laundering program, failing to retain required customer information, and failing to implement 

procedures to determine whether a customer appears on lists of known or suspected terrorists or 

terrorist organizations such as those issued by OFAC. 

104. Each act in violation of 17 C.F.R. § 42.2, including, but not limited to, those 

specifically alleged herein, is alleged as a separate and distinct violation. 

105. Todd directly or indirectly controlled Digitex Futures and did not act in good faith, 

or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting Digitex Futures’ violations of 

17 C.F.R. § 42.2. Therefore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Todd is liable as a control person for 

each of Digitex Futures’ violations of 17 C.F.R. § 42.2. 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court, as authorized by 

Section 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-l, and pursuant to the Court’s own equitable powers, enter: 

A. An order finding that Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software 

Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited, collectively doing business as Digitex Futures, and 

through their officers, employees, and agents, including without limitation Todd, violated Section 

4(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) or, in the alternative, Section 4(b) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) and 

Regulation 48.3, 17 C.F.R. § 48.3 (2021); Section 4d of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6d; Sections 6(c)(1), 

6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(3), and 13(a)(2); and Regulations 42.2, 180.1(a), 

and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 42.2, 180.1(a), and 180.2 (2021). 

B. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants and any other person or 

entity associated with them, from engaging in conduct described above, in violation of 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 6(a) (or, in the alternative, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 48.3), 6d, 9(1), 9(3), and 13(a)(2), 

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VII. 
27

and 17 C.F.R. §§ 42.2, 180.1(a) and 180.2. 

C. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants and any of their affiliates, 

agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns, attorneys, and persons in active concert or 

participation with Defendants, from directly or indirectly: 

(i) trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is defined 

in Section la of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(40)); 

(ii) entering into any transactions involving “commodity interests” (as that term is 

defined in Commission Regulation 1.3, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2021)) or digital assets 

that are commodities (as that term is described in this complaint), for 

Defendants’ own accounts or for any account in which they have a direct or 

indirect interest; 

(iii) having any commodity interests or digital assets that are commodities (as that 

term is described in this complaint) traded on Defendants’ behalf; 

(iv) controlling or directing the trading for or on behalf of any other person or entity, 

whether by power of attorney or otherwise, in any account involving 

commodity interests or digital assets that are commodities (as that term is 

described in this complaint); 

(v) soliciting, receiving, or accepting any funds from any person for the purpose of 

purchasing or selling any commodity interests or digital assets that are 

commodities (as that term is described in this complaint); 

(vi) applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the 

Commission in any capacity, and engaging in any activity requiring such 

registration or exemption from registration with the Commission, except as 

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provided for in Regulation 4.14(a)(9), 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2021); 

(vii) acting as a principal (as that term is defined in Regulation 3.1(a), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 3.1(a) (2021)), agent or any other officer or employee of any person 

registered, exempted from registration or required to be registered with the 

Commission except as provided for in Regulation 4.14(a)(9); 

D. An order directing Defendants and any third-party transferee and/or successors 

thereof, to disgorge to any officer appointed or directed by the Court all benefits received 

including, but not limited to, trading profits, revenues, salaries, commissions, loans, or fees 

derived, directly or indirectly, from acts or practices which constitute violations of the Act as 

described herein, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 

E. An order directing Defendants and any successors thereof, to rescind, pursuant to 

such procedures as the Court may order, all contracts and agreements, whether implied or express, 

entered into between or with Defendants and any customer or investor whose funds were received 

by Defendants a result of the acts and practices that constituted violations of the Act, as described 

herein; 

F. An order requiring Defendants to make full restitution by making whole each and 

every customer or investor whose funds were received or utilized by them in violation of the 

provisions of the Act as described herein, including pre-judgment interest; 

G. An order directing Defendants to pay civil monetary penalties, to be assessed by the 

Court, in an amount not more than the penalty prescribed by Section 6c(d)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13a-1(d)(1), as adjusted for inflation pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 

Act Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–74, 129 Stat. 584, title VII, Section 701, see

Commission Regulation 143.8, 17 C.F.R. § 143.8 (2021), for each violation of the Act, as 

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described herein; 

H. An order requiring Defendants to pay costs and fees as permitted by 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1920 and 2412(a)(2); and 

I. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial. 

Dated: September 30, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

By its attorneys: 

/s/ Ansley H. Schrimpf

 

Ansley H. Schrimpf 

Trial Attorney 

Special Bar # A5502922 

aschrimpf@cftc.gov 

312-596-0574 (direct) 

Joseph C. Platt 

Trial Attorney 

Special Bar #A5502676 

jplatt@cftc.gov 

Allison V. Passman 

Chief Trial Attorney 

Special Bar #A5502489 

apassman@cftc.gov 

Scott R. Williamson 

Deputy Regional Counsel 

swilliamson@cftc.gov

 

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Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

77 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 800 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

(312) 596-0700 

(312) 596-0714 (fax) 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

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