21614 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 12, 2022 / Notices 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’) (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 2 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). 

Dated: April 7, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07768 Filed 4–11–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Information Systems Technical 

Advisory Committee; Notice of 

Partially Closed Meeting—Revised 

Note: The Committee will meet for 

one day on April 27, 2022, instead of 

the two-day meeting published on April 

8, 2022. 

The Information Systems Technical 

Advisory Committee (ISTAC) will meet 

on April 27, 2022, at 1:00 p.m., Eastern 

Daylight Time. The meeting will be 

available via teleconference. The 

Committee advises the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary for Export 

Administration on technical questions 

that affect the level of export controls 

applicable to information systems 

equipment and technology. 

Wednesday, April 27 

Open Session 

1. Welcome and Introductions 

2. Working Group Reports 

3. Ideas for Wassenaar Proposals 2023 

4. Old Business 

Closed Session 

5. Discussion of matters determined to 

be exempt from the provisions 

relating to public meetings found in 

5 U.S.C. app. 2 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(3). 

The open session will be accessible 

via teleconference. To join the 

conference, submit inquiries to Ms. 

Yvette Springer at Yvette.Springer@

bis.doc.gov, no later than April 20, 2022. 

To the extent time permits, members 

of the public may present oral 

statements to the Committee. 

The public may submit written 

statements at any time before or after the 

meeting. However, to facilitate 

distribution of public presentation 

materials to Committee members, the 

Committee suggests that public 

presentation materials or comments be 

forwarded before the meeting to Ms. 

Springer. 

The Assistant Secretary for 

Administration, with the concurrence of 

the delegate of the General Counsel, 

formally determined on January 7, 2022, 

pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 

U.S.C. app. 2 (10)(d))), that the portion 

of the meeting concerning trade secrets 

and commercial or financial information 

deemed privileged or confidential as 

described in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4) and the 

portion of the meeting concerning 

matters the disclosure of which would 

be likely to frustrate significantly 

implementation of an agency action as 

described in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B) shall 

be exempt from the provisions relating 

to public meetings found in 5 U.S.C. 

app. 2 10(a)(1) and l0(a)(3). The 

remaining portions of the meeting will 

be open to the public. 

For more information, contact Yvette 

Springer via email. 

Yvette Springer, 

Committee Liaison Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07801 Filed 4–11–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–JT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 

Kozhevnicheskiy Lane, Moscow, 

Russia; Order Temporarily Denying 

Export Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of: Azur Air (‘‘Azur’’). 

OEE’s request and related information 

indicate that Azur is headquartered in 

Moscow, Russia, with a regional hub 

located in Vnukovo International 

Airport, Vnukovo, Russia. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 

may be ‘imminent’ either in time or 

degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that 

a violation is about to occur, or that the 

general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that the 

violation under investigation or charge 

‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order (‘‘TDO’’) 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

Effective February 24, 2022, BIS 

imposed expansive controls on aviationrelated (e.g., Commerce Control List 

Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, 

including a license requirement for the 

export, reexport or transfer (in-country) 

to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts 

specified in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 

(Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).2 BIS 

will review any export or reexport 

license applications for such items 

under a policy of denial. See Section 

746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS 

excluded any aircraft registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia from being eligible for license 

exception Aircraft, Vessels, and 

Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 12, 2022 / Notices 21615 

3 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022). 

4Section 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR provides: 

General Prohibition Ten—Proceeding with 

transactions with knowledge that a violation has 

occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation 

to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, 

reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, 

store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or 

otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item 

subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported 

with knowledge that a violation of the Export 

Administration Regulations, the Export 

Administration Act or any order, license, License 

Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder 

has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to 

occur in connection with the item. Nor may you 

rely upon any license or License Exception after 

notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that 

license or exception. There are no License 

Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 

740 of the EAR. (emphasis in original). 

5https://www.azurair.ru/en/azurair/our-fleet. 

EAR).3 Accordingly, any U.S.-origin 

aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes 

more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin 

content, and that is registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by, Russia or a national 

of Russia, is subject to a license 

requirement before it can travel to 

Russia. 

OEE’s request is based upon facts 

indicating that Azur engaged in recent 

conduct prohibited by the Regulations 

by operating aircraft subject to the EAR 

and classified under ECCN 9A991.b, on 

flights into Russia after March 2, 2022, 

without the required BIS authorization. 

Specifically, OEE’s investigation, 

including publicly available flight 

tracking information, indicates that after 

March 2, 2022, Azur operated multiple 

U.S.-origin aircraft subject to the EAR, 

including, but not limited to, those 

identified below, on flights into and out 

of Moscow and other cities in Russia 

from/to: Antalya, Turkey; Male, 

Maldives; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; 

and Nha Trang, Vietnam, respectively. 

Pursuant to Section 746.8 of the EAR, 

all of these flights would have required 

export or reexport licenses from BIS. 

Azur flights would not be eligible to use 

license exception AVS. No BIS 

authorizations were either sought or 

obtained by Azur for these exports or 

reexports to Russia. The information 

about those flights includes the 

following: 

Tail No. Serial No. Aircraft type Departure/arrival cities Dates 

VQ–BKF ........................ 26268 757–2Q8 (B752) .............................. Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ................ March 4, 2022. 

VQ–BKF ........................ 26268 757–2Q8 (B752) .............................. Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ................ March 5, 2022. 

VQ–BKF ........................ 26268 757–2Q8 (B752) .............................. Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ................ March 7, 2022. 

VQ–BKF ........................ 26268 757–2Q8 (B752) .............................. Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ................ March 9, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ................ March 14, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Antalya, TR/Kazan, RU ................... March 17, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ................ March 18, 2022. 

VQ–BTK ........................ 35302 777–3ZG (ER) (B77W) .................... Male, MV/Moscow, RU .................... March 5, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Male, MV/Moscow, RU .................... March 13, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Dubai, AE/Moscow, RU ................... March 5, 2022. 

VQ–BKF ........................ 26268 757–2Q8 (B752) .............................. Dubai, AE/Moscow, RU ................... March 6, 2022. 

VQ–BUO ....................... 27909 767–33A (ER) (B763) ...................... Dubai, AE/Samara, RU ................... March 6, 2022. 

VQ–BUO ....................... 27909 767–33A (ER) (B763) ...................... Dubai, AE/Moscow, RU ................... March 9, 2022. 

VQ–BUO ....................... 27909 767–33A (ER) (B763) ...................... Dubai, AE/Vladivostok, RU ............. March 10, 2022. 

RA–73034 ..................... 27612 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Dubai, AE/Moscow, RU ................... March 10, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Dubai, AE/Moscow, RU ................... March 14, 2022. 

RA–73030 ..................... 24746 767–3Q8 (ER) (B763) ..................... Dubai, AE/Moscow, RU ................... March 17, 2022. 

RA–73034 ..................... 27612 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Nha Trang, VN/Moscow, RU ........... March 6, 2022. 

RA–73032 ..................... 27614 767–306 (ER) (B763) ...................... Nha Trang, VN/Moscow, RU ........... March 15, 2022. 

Based on this information, there are 

heightened concerns of future violations 

of the EAR, given that any subsequent 

actions taken with regard to any of the 

listed aircraft, or other Azur aircraft 

illegally exported or reexported to 

Russia after March 2, 2022, may violate 

the EAR. Such actions include, but are 

not limited to, refueling, maintenance, 

repair, or the provision of spare parts or 

services. See General Prohibition 10 of 

the EAR at 15 CFR 736.2(b)(10).4 Even 

Azur’s continued use of such U.S.-origin 

aircraft only on domestic routes within 

Russia runs afoul of General Prohibition 

10, which (among other restrictions) 

prohibits the continued use of an item 

that was known to have been exported 

or reexported in violation of the EAR. 

For example, publicly available flight 

tracking data shows that between March 

25–28, 2022, aircraft RA–73030 (SN 

24746) and RA–73032 (SN 27614) flew 

on flights into and out of Moscow, 

Russia to/from the Russian cities of: 

Irkutsk, Kaliningrad; Mineralnye Vody, 

Novosibirsk and Samara. 

Moreover, additional concerns of 

future violations of the Regulations are 

raised by public information available 

as of the signing of this order. 

Specifically, Azur’s own website 

indicates that its fleet of 34 aircraft is 

entirely comprised of Boeing aircraft.5

Given BIS’s review policy of denial 

under Section 746.8(a) of the 

Regulations for exports and reexports to 

Russia, it is foreseeable that Azur will 

attempt to evade the Regulations in 

order to obtain new or additional 

aircraft parts or service its existing 

aircraft that were exported or reexported 

to Russia in violation of Section 746.8 

of the Regulations. 

III. Findings 

Under the applicable standard set 

forth in Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations and my review of the entire 

record, I find that the evidence 

presented by BIS convincingly 

demonstrates that Azur took actions in 

apparent violation of the Regulations by 

exporting or reexporting the aircraft 

cited above, among many others, on 

flights into Russia after March 2, 2022, 

without the required BIS authorization. 

Moreover, the continued operation of 

these aircraft by Azur, even on domestic 

routes within Russia and the company’s 

on-going need to acquire replacement 

parts and components, many of which 

are U.S.-origin, presents a high 

likelihood of imminent violations 

warranting imposition of a TDO. I 

further find that such apparent 

violations have been significant and 

deliberate. Therefore, issuance of the 

TDO is necessary in the public interest 

to prevent imminent violation of the 

Regulations and to give notice to 

companies and individuals in the 

United States and abroad that they 

should avoid dealing with Azur, in 

connection with export and reexport 

transactions involving items subject to 

the Regulations and in connection with 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
21616 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 12, 2022 / Notices 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’) (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 

IV. Order 

It is therefore ordered: 

FIRST, Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 

404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Lane, Moscow, 

Russia, when acting for or on their 

behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, 

or employees may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the EAR, 

or in any other activity subject to the 

EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license (except directly related to 

safety of flight), license exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the regulations, or engaging in any other 

activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or from any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. 

SECOND, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of Azur any 

item subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

Azur of the ownership, possession, or 

control of any item subject to the EAR 

that has been or will be exported from 

the United States, including financing 

or other support activities related to a 

transaction whereby Azur acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from Azur of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; 

D. Obtain from Azur in the United 

States any item subject to the EAR with 

knowledge or reason to know that the 

item will be, or is intended to be, 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to section 

764.3(a)(2) of the regulations; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by Azur, or 

service any item, of whatever origin, 

that is owned, possessed or controlled 

by Azur if such service involves the use 

of any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States except directly related to 

safety of flight and authorized by BIS 

pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the 

Regulations. For purposes of this 

paragraph, servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification, or 

testing. 

THIRD, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Azur by 

ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to 

the provisions of this Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Azur 

may, at any time, appeal this Order by 

filing a full written statement in support 

of the appeal with the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. A renewal 

request may be opposed by Azur as 

provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing 

a written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement, which must be received 

not later than seven days before the 

expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be provided 

to Azur and shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Dated: April 7, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07769 Filed 4–11–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

UTair Aviation JSC, Khanty-Mansiysk 

Airport, Tyumen Region, Russia 

628012; Order Temporarily Denying 

Export Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of: UTair Aviation JSC 

(‘‘UTair’’). OEE’s request and related 

information indicates that UTair is 

headquartered at Khanty-Mansisyk 

Airport, located in Khanty-Mansisyk, 

Russia, with domestic hubs at Surgut 

Airport and Vnukovo Airport. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES