alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II-00433

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Chris Ruiz <yr.retarded@gmail.com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 7:44 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Chris Ruiz

2800 Swisher St. Apt. 118

Austin, TX 78705
Raashed L. HALL, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7966.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 2, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied.
II-00582

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Linda Neff <lln 116@juno. com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 2:04 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Linda Neff

11 Skimmer Lane

Port Monmouth, NJ 7758
Gloria NAVARRETE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7999.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 16, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Stoney LESTER, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-1366.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 21, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
# C_2010011EN.01003601.xml

| 16.1.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 11/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11/36

---

Action brought on 13 November 2009 — Slovak Telekom v Commission

(Case T-458/09)

2010/C 11/67

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Slovak Telekom a.s. (Bratislava, Slovak Republic) (represented by: M. Maier, L. Kjølbye and D. Geradin, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the contested decision;

| — | Order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In the present case, the applicant seeks the annulment of Commission decision C(2009) 6840 of 3 September 2009 ordering it, in accordance with Articles 18(3) and 24(1) of Council Regulation 1/2003 (1) to provide the information in the framework of the Case COMP/39523 — Slovak Telekom relating to a proceeding under Article 82 EC and imposing the periodic penalties in case of non compliance with the decision.

1

In support of its claims the applicant puts forward three pleas in law.

First, the applicant argues that the contested decision is in breach of Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003 regarding the information covering a period that predates the Slovak Republic’s accession to the EU. In the applicant’s opinion, prior to this date the Commission did not have power to apply the EC law to conduct engaged in within the territory of the Slovak Republic; as a consequence, it is not entitled to use its power of investigation enshrined in this article to obtain information pertaining to that same period.

Second, applicant claims that the contested decision infringes the principle of procedural fairness enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Commission’s investigation into the applicant’s conduct during a period where EC law was not applicable and it was under no obligation to comply with these rules may be prejudicial to the applicant.

Third, the applicant contends that the contested decision infringes the principle of proportionality as reflected in Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003, according to which the Commission is empowered to require undertakings to provide all necessary information. In this regard, the applicant claims that the Commission failed to establish the required link between the requested pre-accession information and the allegedly illegal conduct after 1 May 2004. As a result, in the applicant's opinion, information or documents pertaining to the pre-accession period are not necessary in order to enable the Commission to assess whether the applicant’s post-accession conduct complies with the EC law.

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty; OJ L 1, p. 1

1

---
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive
Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
the undersigned officer of T REIT, Inc. (the
Company) hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that:



| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (i) the accompanying Annual Report on
    Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended
    December 31, 2003 (the Report) fully complies
    with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange
    Act of 1934, as amended; and
|
| | (ii) the information contained in the Report
    fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
    condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                                           



| |                        
| | -----------------------
| | /s/ ANTHONY W. THOMPSON
| |                        
| | Anthony W. Thompson    
| | Chief Executive Officer

Date: June 30, 2004

The foregoing certification is being furnished
solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is not
being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document. The signed original of this written statement required
by Section 906 has been provided to T REIT, Inc. and
will be retained by T REIT, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Robert EVERY, petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, et al.

No. 17-1262.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 16, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements for the quarterly period ending September 30, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                          44,252
<SECURITIES>                                 1,246,297
<RECEIVABLES>                                  425,533
<ALLOWANCES>                                    17,955
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,877,775
<PP&E>                                          47,919
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,411
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,623,031
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          232,355
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,226
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,616,152
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,623,031
<SALES>                                      4,731,746
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,731,746
<CGS>                                        2,885,763
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,773,313
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (58,151)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 16,584
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    16,584
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
Jesse J. VALE, petitioner, v. Connie GIBSON, Warden.

No. 16-9521.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Ervin Ronaldo MALDONADO-GOMEZ, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-8150.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 23, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Vincent W. FERST, petitioner, v. Eric TICE, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al.

No. 16-9741.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
# C_2012174EN.01000602.xml

| 16.6.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 174/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 174/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 26 April 2012 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Expendedores de Tabaco y Timbre (ANETT) v Administración del Estado

(Case C-456/10) (1)

1

(Free movement of goods - Articles 34 TFEU and 37 TFEU - National legislation prohibiting tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products - Rule concerning the existence and operation of a monopoly on the marketing of tobacco products - Measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions - Justification - Consumer protection)

2012/C 174/07

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Asociación Nacional de Expendedores de Tabaco y Timbre (ANETT)

Applicant:

Defendant: Administración del Estado

Defendant:

Intervening parties: Unión de Asociaciones de Estanqueros de España, Logivend SLU, Organización Nacional de Asociaciones de Estanqueros

Intervening parties:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Tribunal Supremo — Interpretation of Article 34 TFEU — National monopoly on the marketing of tobacco products — Prohibition of tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products imposed for the benefit of wholesalers — Proportionality

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 34 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products from other Member States.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 4.12.2010.

1

---
# C_2010113EN.01002302.xml

| 1.5.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 113/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.5.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 113/23

---

Action brought on 11 February 2010 — European Commission v Ireland

(Case C-82/10)

2010/C 113/36

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: N. Yerrell, Agent)

Applicant:

Defendant: Ireland

Defendant:

The applicant claims that the Court should:

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Declare that in failing to apply the European Union insurance legislation in its entirety to all insurance undertakings on a non-discriminatory basis, the Republic of Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under, in particular, Articles 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24th July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance, as subsequently amended, and Articles 22 and 23 of Council Directive 92/49/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that in failing to apply the European Union insurance legislation in its entirety to all insurance undertakings on a non-discriminatory basis, the Republic of Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under, in particular, Articles 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24th July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance, as subsequently amended, and Articles 22 and 23 of Council Directive 92/49/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357; and

| — | order Ireland to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission is of the opinion that i) the Voluntary Health Insurance Board (hereinafter referred to as VHI) could not properly continue to benefit from an exemption under article 4 of directive 73/239/CEE with effect from the first change to its capacity by virtue of the entry into force of the Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act 1996, and ii) from this date it became fully subject to the requirements of the European Union insurance legislation, including in particular those relating to authorisation, financial supervision, establishment of technical provisions and a solvency margin including the guarantee fund.

VHI currently continues all its operations without having obtained authorisation from the Irish Financial Regulator, nor having complied inter alia with the necessary solvency requirements.

---
#### HOUSE v. MAYO.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 14, 1944.

There were no appearances in the case.

Before HUTCHESON, WALLER and LEE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

 The petition is for leave to appeal as a poor person under Sec. 832, Title 28 U.S.C.A. The appeal is from a “final decision by a court of the United States in a proceeding in habeas corpus where the detention complained of is by virtue of process issued out of a State court”. Under the provisions of Sec. 466, Title 28 U.S.C.A., a certificate of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite to such an appeal. Millslagle v. Olson, 8 Cir., 130 F. 2d 212; Genna v. Frazier, 5 Cir., 24 F.2d 706. Plaintiff does not present such certificate, but, on the contrary, there appears in the record a finding and order of the district judge that no probable cause exists. The petition is denied.
#### In re BARCIA.

No. 219.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 13, 1945.

See also 47 F.Supp. 156.

Jacob Pesachowitz, of New York City, for appellants.

Krause, Hirsch, Levin & Heilpern, of New York *City*(Elliot L. Krause, of New York City, of counsel), for trustee-appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, SIMONS, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

In possession when bankruptcy occurred of an endowment policy on the life of the bankrupt, Anna, his wife, sought contradictorily with the trustee to maintain that she was entitled to the proceeds as owner, or, in the alternative, as lienor for the return of amounts paid as premiums and to discharge a policy loan. The referee, after a hearing, found against her *on*both contentions, and, his report cdnfirmed, she was denied relief. Here, pointing to the undisputed testimony that, on May 7, 1935, she was designated as beneficiary with “right of insured to change the beneficiary not reserved”, and to the testimony of herself and her husband that from 1931 on she had paid all the premiums on the policy, under an understanding with him that she was to have it, and that she had also repaid the $500.00 borrowed against it, she insists that the findings against her are clearly erroneous and that the judgment based thereon should be reversed.

A careful examination of the evidence, bearing in mind the principle that the findings of the referee on oral evidence are entitled to great weight, convinces us that the finding against her on her claim of ownership may not be overturned. The referee was not required to accept as true the testimony of appellant and her husband; and the discrepancies between the affidavit testimony on first submission and the oral testimony on the rehearing, coupled with the fact that no effort was made to comply with provision 4 of the policy, requiring assignments to be in writ*289ing and on forms provided by the company, furnish ample warrant for rejecting the claim that an assignment was made in 1931.

On her claim as to premiums paid after May 7, 1935, when she became beneficiary, the finding that she did not pay the premiums is directly contrary to the undisputed evidence and to all reasonable inferences therefrom, and it was error to deny her an award of the policy proceeds to the extent of these premiums with interest on each from the date of payment.

As to the premiums paid before 1935, during which period she was neither the owner nor the beneficiary, and as to the claimed repayment of the loan, we cannot say that the finding of the referee against her was without support in the evidence.

The order dismissing the petition for review must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to award the proceeds of .the policy between the trustee and appellant, in accordance herewith. Judgment reversed with costs divided.
**Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 24 November 2011 – Commission v Italy**

**(Case C-379/10)**

Failure to fulfil obligations – General principle that Member States are liable for the infringement of European Union law by one of their courts adjudicating
at last instance – Exclusion of any liability on the part of the Member State for an interpretation of the rules of law or an assessment of
the facts and evidence carried out by a court adjudicating at last instance – Limitation by the national legislature of the Member State’s liability to cases of intentional fault or serious misconduct
committed by such a court

Union law – Rights conferred on individuals – Infringement by a Member State – Obligation to make good damage caused to individuals – Conditions in the case of infringement ascribable to a supreme court – Whether the infringement is obvious – National legislation under which liability is incurred only in cases of intentional fault or serious misconduct – Unlawful (see paras 40-42, 46, 48 and operative part)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Infringement of the general principle that Member States are liable for the infringement of European Union law by one of their courts adjudicating at last instance – Liability limited to cases of intentional fault or serious misconduct. |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Declares that, |

–        by excluding all liability of the Italian State for damage caused to individuals through an infringement of European Union
law on the part of a court adjudicating at last instance when that infringement results from an interpretation of the rules
of law or an assessment of the facts and evidence carried out by that court and

–        by limiting that liability to cases of intentional fault or serious misconduct,

pursuant to Article 2(1) and (2) of Law No 117 on the reparation of damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions and
the civil liability of judges [legge n. 117 (sul) risarcimento dei danni cagionati nell’ esercizio delle funzioni giudiziarie
e responsabilità civile dei magistrati], of 13 April 1988 the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under
the general principle that Member States are liable for the infringement of European Union law by one of their courts adjudicating
at last instance;

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs. |