FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT April 29, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble Eug ene E . Siler, J r., United States Circuit J udg e for the Six th Circuit, sit ting * by desig nation. [ P U B L I S H ]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1612 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-14032 -CR- KMM UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us J AM ES J OS EP H B RO WN Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A pr il 29, 200 8) Be fo re T JO FL A T , F A Y and S IL E R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * T JO FL A T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge : Purs uant t o aple a ag re em en t, Jam es Jos ep h B ro w n pl ed gui lty to usi ng a facility and m eans of interstate com m erce to entice a m inor to engage in sexu alThe fa cts set out above a re taken fr om the Presentenc e Investig ation Report (“ PSI ”) 1 prepa red by the district court’s pr obation office and adopte d by the cour t. Brown made no ob je c tio n to the PSI ’s na

rr atio n o f what le d to B ro wn ’s c onvic tio n; t hu s, B ro wn

is d e e me d to have a dmitted these fac ts. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005). 2 ac tiv ity , in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 24 22( b) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed him to prison for a term

of 235 m onth s. H e now appeals his conviction and sentence.

I. A. On April 30, 2004, at around 7:30 a. m ., Brow n, who was logged on to an A m er ic a O nli ne c ha t r oom c al le d “ Fam

T ab oo, ” ini tiate d ac onve rs at ionvia Instant Messenger with an undercover St. Lucie County , F lorida, Sher iff’ s Of fice d et ec t i v e p o s i n g as a mem b ero f t h e c h at ro o m . Th e S t . Lu ci e C o u n ty Sh er i ff ’s 1 O ff ic e w as part ic ipatin g inam ult i- ag en cy

ta sk f or ce ( the “ T as k F or ce ”) inv olv ing federa l, state, and local law enforcem ent agencies, that investi gated Internet cr im es a ga ins t c hil dr en . A m ong oth er thi ngs, the T as k F or ce w as m oni tor ing In te rn et c ha t r oom s, inc lud ing F am T ab oo. T he y

sus pe ct ed

that m em be rs of the Fam T ab oo c ha t r oom

w er e inv olv ed

w ithinc es t and the tr ad ing of c hil d p o rn o g r ap h y. D ur ing his ini tia l c onve rs at ionw iththe de te ct ive , Br ow n id en tif ie d hi m se lf as “ dad of 13 and 17 daughters” and asked the detective if he had “ fam ily fun.”The PSIstates that B rown ha s two daug hters, although it does not indicate their a g es. 2 B ro wn did no t sp e c if

y , n or do e s th e re c or d r e fl e c t, whic h d a ughte r h e wa s r e fe rr ingto i n h is online conver sation with the detec tive. There is no evidence in the rec ord to indicate that Brown was e ver a

rre sted or cha

rg ed with sexually

abusinghis daug hters. 3 Br ow n id en tif

ie d hi s in te re sts a s “ w ork, se x, c am pin g, se x, nud ist , se x, harl ey s, sex, lol and m

y daughters” and asked the detective how long h e had been

“play ing” with his “ daught er, ” w hom the detective had described as being fourteen y ears old and m en ta lly

il l. B ro w n e xpr es se d an in te re st i n havin g se x w ithhe r an d inquir ed : “ w oul d y ou tra de he r? . . . I m ean if I br ough t m

y gir l [ fo r y ou t o have se xu al in te rco ur se wit h] . . . wou ldy ou swap y ou rs I’m be in g v ery real .” Bro wn 2 and the detective discuss ed m eeting later that day , at which point Brown explained that he w oul d no t be able to br ing his daught er to the m ee tin g, a s sh e w as in sc hool , but

of fe re d th e de te ct ive $10 0 to have se xua l i nte rc our se w ithhis daught er . T he de te ct ive a gr ee d to thi s pr opos al , and B ro w n e nde d th e onl ine co nv ers at io n b y

gi vi ng hi m

hi s t el ep ho ne nu m

be r an d a sk in g h im

to cal l. T he de te ct ive c al le d w ith in an ho ur , and B ro w n a ga in e xpr es se d an in te re st in s ex ua l i nte rc our se w iththe de te ct ive ’ s da ught er . T he y

arr an ge d am ee tin g a t a H oli day I nn i n F ort P ie rc e. B ro w n li ve d in P om pano B ea ch , 100 m ile s aw ay , so i t w oul d take him

about tw o ho ur s to ge t the re . H e tol d th e de te ct ive that he sho uld arrive at the Holiday

Inn shortlybefore 11:00 a.m . Brow n provid ed a phy sicalBr own’s wife was intervie wed by St. Lucie County

police off

icer s after Br own’s ar

rest. 3 She stated that her

husband’s AO L“scr een na me” wa s “Gatorbrown01.” Br own was the manag er of two-per son sprinkler re pair c ompany , Gator’ s Sprinkler 4 Service . 4 de sc ri pti on o f him se lf

, state d th at

his nam e w as “ G at or ” an d th at he w oul d be dr ivi ng a r ed D odge tr uc k. T he de te ct ive a ske d th at Br ow n br ing gif

ts f or his 3 da ug ht er an d aco nd om . At a pproxim ately

10:50 a. m ., Brow n, driving a red D odge truck, arr ived at the Holiday

Inn. H e brought a vid eo cam era, which, he explained to the detective, he intended to use to videot ape the sexual encounter with the detective’ s daught er, an d astuf fedan im al an d l arg e lo ll ip op as p res en ts forhe r. At th atpo in t, Br own was arre st ed , anda se arch of h is pe rs on rev eal edth athe was c arrying a co nd om . During the we ek following his arrest, Brow n was interview ed by several T as k F or ce a ge nts . H e tol d th em that, pr ior

to le av ing f

or F ort P ie rc e an d th e Holiday Inn, he told his wife and a co-w orker that he wa s goin g there to see 4 som eo ne he ha d m et

in a ch at r oom , w ho h ad

of fe re d to le t hi m

have se x w ithhis fo urte en -y ear- old

daught er , and tha t i f a gir l ha ppe ne d to be in the hot el r oom w he re the y

w oul d be m ee tin g, he w oul d c al l the pol ic e. T he a ge nts sub se que ntl y learned that Br own had not said th ese things to his wife and co-worker before dr ivi ng t o F ort P ie rc e on Apr il 30.Although the rec ord is not clear on this point , we pr esume that B rown’s c ase w as 5 transfe rre d from the St. Lucie County Sheriff’ s Offic e to a f

eder al ag ency

that was a

participa nt in the Task F orce . Th e ve rs ion

of 18 U. S.C. § 2 42 2( b) in e ff e c t at th e tim e of

B ro wn ’s of

fe ns e state s: 6 (b ) W h o ev er , u s i n g th e m ai l o r a ny fa ci l i ty o r m ean s o f i n t er s t at e o r f o re i gn commerc e, or w ithin the special maritime and te rritorial jurisdiction of the United States knowing ly

persua des, induce s, entices, or coer ces a ny individual who has not attained the a g e of 18 year s, to eng ag e in prostitution or any sexual activity

for which any

person c an be c harg ed with a c riminal offe nse, or attempts to do so, shall be fined unde r this titl e and imprisoned not less than 5 year s and not more tha n 3 0 ye ars . 5 B. Brow n was indicted by

a Southern D istrict of Florida grand j ury on May 5 27, 200 4, on o ne c ount

of vio la tin g 18 U . S. C. § 24 22( b) . O n Augus t 3, 200 4, 6 Br ow n a ppe ar ed be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt w ithhis r et ai ne d a tto rn ey , Ja son K re iss , and tendered a plea of guilty . During his colloq uy with the court, Brow n stated that he w as takin g th re e m ed ic at ion s f or sc hiz ophr en ia . T he c ourt a ske d hi m if the m edication had any

eff ect on his abilityto und erstand the proceedings; he said th at i td i dn o tan dth a th e w a s r e a dy t o p l e a dg u i l ty. T h e c o u rtd i r e c t e dth e s a me qu es ti on to Krei ss . He st at edth atth e m ed ic at io n app eare d t o b e aff ect in g B ro wn adversely as Brown’ s “ affe ct” at that m om ent was m arkedly differ ent from

what h e h ado b s erv edi nm ee t i n g wi th h i m ea rl i er . Th e c o u rt , c o n ce rn edwi th Br o wn ’s co m pe te nc y to ple ad gui lty , or de re d th at

Br ow n be e xam ine d. B ro w n r ec ei ve d aTh e c ourt or de re d th at B ro wn

be e xami ne d f

or his sa nit y at th e tim e of

the of fe ns e in 7 a dd iti on to h is c omp e te nc y

to p le a d guil ty

or sta nd tr ia l. B ro wn

do e s n ot c ha lle ng e his competenc y

to enter the guilty

plea at issue; nor does he c ontend that he wa s insane at the time of the offe nse. 6 psy chiatric evaluation at the Feder al Corre ctional Institu tion in W aseca, Mi nne sot a, and w as f

ound to be c om

pe te nt. 7 O n Apr il 27, 200 5, Br ow n, havin g e nte re d in to a ple a ag re em en t w iththe Governm ent, tendere d a plea of guilty to the § 242 2(b) offense. T he plea agreem ent stated that “ the defendant and the [United State s Attorney ’ s Of fice] sti pul at e to the f

oll ow ing appl ic at ion s of

the se nte nc ing gui de lin es in co m put ing [an] advisory

guidelin e range: Base O ffense L evel 21; Use of C om puter & Internet A cc es s + 2; A cc ep tanc e of Re spon sib ili ty

- 3. ” T he G ove rn m en t r es er ve d th e ri ght to seek an additio nal two-point upward adj ustm ent for obstruction o f j ustice, pur suant t o U . S. S. G . § 3C 1. 1, ba se d onBr ow n’ s a tte m pt t o ge t hi s w if

e an d c oworker to tell the authorities th at he intended to call the poli ce once he arrived at th e H o l i d ay In n . Th e a g re emen tco n t ai n edn o s t i p u l at i o nre g ar d i n g Br o wn ’s cr im ina l hi sto ry

c at eg or y ; tha t w oul d be de te rm ine d by the c ourt’ s pr obatio n of fic e. The plea agree m ent also provid ed that “ any rec omm endation th at gove rn m en t m ak es to co urt a s to se nte nc ing . . . is not bin din g onthe c ourt. ” T heTh e ple a a g re e me nt c onta ine d a

pr ov isi on

wh e re by B ro wn wa ive d th e ri g ht t o a

pp e a l hi s 8 sentenc e unless it was a

bove the statutory

maxi mum or the result of a n upwar ds depar

ture fr om the Guidelines ra

ng e esta blished by

the cour t. In enter

taining B rown’s guilty

plea, the c ourt fa ile d to a dd

re ss t his pr ov isi on

and the re fo re did

no t de te rm ine wh e the r B ro wn ha d a g re e d to it voluntarily . As the Gove rnment prope rly conce des, the provision is there fore invalid and unenfor cea

ble. See United States v. B ushert, 997 F .2d 1343, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1993). 7 co ur t co ul d “ de pa rt f

ro m th e ad vi so ry

sen te nc in g g ui de li ne ran ge . . . an d . . . im pose any sentence w ithin and up to th e statutory m axim um authorized by

law fo r [h is ] of

fen se .” 8 During the April 27, 2005 , plea hearing, the c ourt first established th at Brow n was c urrently

taking ps y chiatric m edication and then ask ed him whether the m edication “ affe ct[ed] in any way [his] ability

to und erstand the proceedings.” Brow n stated that it didnot. T he court also asked Brown’ s counsel if he “ wa s aw ar e of any r ea son w hy

his m ed ic at ionm igh t a ff ec t hi s a bil ity to en te r a know ing and volu ntary

plea. ” K reiss responded in th e negative and added that Brown w as

“ a differ ent person tod ay , a s the court could prob ably see also, if y ou rem em

ber the way he presented last tim e w e w ere here. I have no re ason to believ e that there are any com petency issues at this tim e. ” T he c ourt the n a ske d B ro w n w he the r he “ ha d r ec ei ve d ac opy of the [i ] ndi ctm en t pe ndi ng a ga ins t [ him ] in thi s c as e an d [ ha d he ] f ull y dis cu sse d th ose ch ar ge s and the c as e in g en er al w ith[ his ] a tto rn ey ?” B ro w n r ep lie d th at he ha d. N ex t, ba se d onBr ow n’ s r es pons e to a se ri es of que sti ons, the c ourt c onf irm ed ,On Octobe r 20, 2004, McAda ms replac ed De borah Stuart, the A ssistant United St ates 9 Attorney who had be en prose cutingBr own’s ca se since its ince ption. Th e c ourt

a sk e d: “ [H]ow

do you ple a to t he Ind ic tme nt whic h c ha

rg e s you wi th 10 attempting to knowing ly

persua de and induc e an individual who ha d not attained the a g e of 18 y ear s of ag e to eng ag e in sexual activity under suc h circ umstances a s would constitute a cr iminal o f f e n s e : gu i l ty

o r n o tgu i l ty ?” 8 am ong o ther things , that Br own (1) understood the right s attendant up on a j ury trial and that he wa s waiving such rights ; (2) understood th e term s of the plea ag re em en t and tha t no one ha d m ad e any “ oth er or dif fe re nt p ro m ise [s ] or as su ran ce[s ] to hi m ” o th er t ha n t ho se reci te d i n t he pl ea ag reem en t; (3) th atBro wn co uld r ec ei ve apr iso n se nte nc e of up t o th irty

y ears ; ( 4) that the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s w er e advis or

y ; ( 5) and tha t the te rm s of the ple a ag re em en t are “ m er el y re co m m en da tio ns t o th e co urt” and tha t the c ourt c oul d “ im pose ase nte nc e that i s m ore severe than y ou m ay anticipate.” T he c ourt a ske d th e pr ose cu tor , A ssi stant Unit ed S ta te s A tto rn ey

Jim McAd am s, t o re ci te th e “ go ve rn m en t’s ev id en ce i f th e cas e were t o g o t o t ria l.” 9 McA dam s did so , r eciting sub stantially what w e have set out in sub part A ., supra, an d B ro wn s ta te d t ha t h is reci ta ti on was c orrect . The co ur t t he n i nf orm edBro wn of the elem ents of his offense, a s stated in the ind ictm ent, and asked hi m how he wa s p l ea d i n g . Br o wnre p l i ed : “ Gu i l ty, y o u r h o n o r. ” T h e c o u rtac ce p t edBr o wn ’s 10 pl ea.9 C. On Augus t 29, 2005, the court’ s probation office issued a Presentence In ve sti ga tio n R ep ort ( PS I) . T he P SI f ound Br ow n’ s ba se of

fe nse le ve l t o be 21 pu rs ua nt to U.S.S.G. § 2 A3.2 (a)( 2) , enh an ceditby two l ev el s u nd er U.S.S.G. § 2A 3. 2( b) (3 ) be ca

use Br ow n us ed

ac om put er to fa ci lit at e his tr av el to en ga ge in pr ohi bit ed

se xua l c ondu ct , and tw o f urthe r le ve ls unde r U . S. S. G . § 3C 1. 1 f or obstru ct ionof

j ust ic e. T he n, c re dit ing Br ow n w itha cc ep tanc e of r es pons ibi lity pur suant t o U . S. S. G . § 3E 1. 1( a) (b ), the P SI r ed uc ed Br ow n’ s of

fe nse le ve l by th ree l ev el s, arriv in g a t a t ot al off en se lev el of 2 2. The P SI r evealed that Brown had been convicted o f nineteen prior offe nses as an a dul t, and s ev er al m or e as aj uve nil e. T he pr obatio n of fi ce w as able to consider onlytwo of these off enses in calculating Brown’ s crim inal histo ry score, how ev er , be ca

use the oth er

of fe nse s ha d oc curr ed

ove r fi ft ee n y ears pr ior

to the ins tant c onvi ct ion . U . S. S. G . § 4A 1. 2( e) (3 ). U sin g th es e tw o of fe nse s, the probation office set Brow n’ s crim inal histo ry score at six, which y ielded a crim inal histo ry category of II I. G iven a total offense level of 22 and a cr im inal histo ry cat eg ory of I II, Bro wn’s s en te nc e ran ge cam e to 51 -6 3 m on th s. O n Ju ly 28, 200 5, w e de ci de d U nit ed S ta te s v. S earc y , 418 F . 3d 1 193, 119 8 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) , hol din g th at avio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 24 22( b) sho uld beThe ve rsion of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.11 in e ffe ct as of the time of the off enses 11 ind ic ate d in

the a bo ve te xt re a d a s f

oll ow s: A) No pe rson, by

forc e, stea lth, or dece ption, shall trespass in an occ upied str uc tur e , a s d e fi ne d in

se c tio n 2 90 9. 01 of

the Re vis e d Co de , o r i n a se pa ra te ly se c ur e d o r s e pa

rate ly oc c up ie d p or

tio n th e re of

, w ithpurp os e to c omm it the re in any theft off ense, a s defined in se ction 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any f e l o ny, w h e nany o f

th e f o l l o w i n ga

p p l y: (1) The offe nder inflicts, or attempts or threate ns to inflict phy sical har m on another ; (2 ) T he of

fe nd e r h a s a

de a dly we a po n o r d ang e ro us or dn anc e , a s d e fi ne d in se c tio n 2 92 3. 11 of

the Re vis e d Co de , o n o r a bo ut h is p e rs on

or un de r h is c ontr ol; (3) The occupie d structure involved is the permane nt or temporar y habitation of any pe rs on , in

wh ic h at th e tim e any

pe rs on is p re se nt o r l ike ly

to b e pr e se nt. (B ) Whoever violate s this section is guilty of ag g ravated burg lary , an ag g ravated felony of the fir st deg ree . 10 co ns id ereda “ cri m e o f vi ol en ce” u nd er U.S.S.G. § 4 B1 .1. Sec ti on 4B 1.1 m andates that a defendant convicted of a “ crim e of violence, ” w ho had been convicted of two prior crim es of violence (or “ controlled su bstance offenses”), shou ld b e co nsi de re d a“ care er of fe nde r” and r ec ei ve e nhanc em en ts o f both hi s of fen se lev el an d h is cri m in al cat eg ory . Fo llo w ing S earc y ’ s pu

bli catio n, the pr obatio n of fi ce iss ue d an a dde ndum

to the P SI r ec om

m en din g th at

Br ow n be se nte nc ed

a s ac ar ee r of

fe nde r. T he ad de ndum

ide nti fi ed

thr ee of Br ow n’ s pr ior

of fe nse s a s pr ed ic at e “ cr im es of violence”: (1) a D ecem

ber 21, 1979, conviction o n one count of aggravated bur glary in Stro ngsv ill e, O hio , in vio la tio n of O hio Re v. Co de A nn. § 29 11. 11; 11 (2) a M ay 29, 1980, conviction on three counts of aggravated burglary in Parm a,The PSI , and supportingdocumentation, indicate d that Br own had be en convic ted on 12 J anuar y 31, 1990 for six counts of ag g ravated burg lary in Cleveland, Ohio. These convictions wer e later reve rsed on a

ppeal, a fter which B rown pled guilty to one count of a g g ravated burg lary on Fe bruar

y 5, 1994. Prior convictions may

only be conside red in de termininga def endant’ s criminal history 13 score if the def

endant wa s convicted or

incar cer ated f

or the off ense w ithin fifteen year s of the instant offense , U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)( 3); the same r ule g overns whe ther a

conviction ca

n be considere d as a pr edicate offe nse for the ca ree r off ender enhanc ement. U.S.S.G § 4B.1.2, comment (n.3). Pursua

nt to this rule, of the three prior off enses discusse d in the above te x t, the initial P SIcounted only

the Fe bruar

y 4, 1994, conviction in calc ulating B rown’s c riminal history score . The a ddendum to the PSIstated, howe ver, that “ac cordingto the State of Ohio, Depa rtment of Reha

bilitation and Correction,” B rown wa s incarc erated for the May 29, 1980, offe nse until Dece mber 1999, makingthat offe nse elig ible to be consider ed as pr edicate for the imposit ion of the ca

ree r off ender enhanc ement. The addendum did not make a ny simil ar corr ection re g ardingthe Dec ember 21, 1979, conviction. Since B rown wa s supposedly incar cer ated f

or the May

29, 1980, offe nse until Dece mber 19 99 , b ut w a s th e n c onvic te d o f a dd iti on a l a g g ra vate d b ur g lari e s o n Jan

ua ry 31 , 1 99 0, se e no te 12, supra, this leads to the que stion of whether Br own was a ctually

incar cer ated f

or the May

29, 1980 ag g ravated burg lary conviction within the require d fiftee n-year period prior

to the instant offe nse. None theless, Kre iss did not present this question to t he district cour t, nor did the F e de ra l Pu

bli c De fe nd e r, wh o r e pr e se nts B ro wn in t his a pp e a l, r a ise it i n B ro wn ’s br ie f t o th is Court. We therefor e do not addr ess the question of whe ther the district c ourt err ed in findingthat the May 29, 1980, conviction constituted a § 4B 1.2 predic ate of fense . Strongsville, Parma , and Clevela nd are all located in Cuyahog a County , Ohio. 14 11 O hio ; ( 3) aF eb ru ar

y 4, 199 4, c onvi ct ionon o ne c ount of a ggr av at ed

bur glary in 12 Cl ev el an d, O hio . 13 As evidence f

or the De cem

ber 21, 1979 convi ction, the probation o ffice downlo ad ed

and p ri nte d ou t a

doc ke t sh ee t f

ro m the Cuy ah ogaCo unty , O hio , 14 Court of Com

m on Pleas we bsite. T he docket sheet stated that Brown had pled gui lty to “ Co unt

I of the ind ic tm en t” w hic h ha d c harg ed a“ fe lon y of the f ir st degree. ” A s evidence suppo rting the latter two convictions, the probation office12

accum ulated certified c opies of Brown’ s indictm ents for the May 29 and February 4 offenses and downloaded do cket sheets from the Cuy ahoga County , O hio, Court of Com m on Pleas we bsite. T he indictm ents sho we d that Brown had been char ged w itha ggr av at ed

bur glary , in vio la tio n of

O hio Re v. Co de A nn. § 29 11. 11, f or en te ri ng r es ide nc es . T he doc ke t sh ee t r ef le ct ing the May

29, 198 0, c onvi ct ion st at edth ata “ Ja m es J Br own ” h adpl edgu il ty to t hr ee co un ts of “ Agg Bu rg la ry . . . in v iol of T RC 291 1. 11 a s 1s t D eg re e Fe lon ie s. ” T he doc ke t sh ee t r ef le ct ing the Fe br uary 4, 199 4, c onvi ct ion , a lso r ef er ri ng t o a“ Jam es J B ro w n” state d: [S] aid defendant retra cts his / her form er plea of not gui lty heretofore en te re d, and f

or ple a to s ai d in dic tm en t say s he /sh e is g uil ty of ag gr av at ed

bur glary , R. C. 291 1. 11 ( A G G F -1 ) as a m en de d inc ount one of the ind ic tm en t, w hic h pl ea/pl ea s onthe r ec om m en da tio n of

the pr ose cu tin g a tto rn ey

is/ ar e ac ce pte d by

the c ourt. O nc e the P SI c la ssi fi ed

Br ow n a s ac ar ee r of

fe nde r, it se t hi s to ta l of

fe nse level at 31 and his crim inal histo ry category at V I. T his resulted in a Guidelines se nt en ce ra ng e cal li ng fora pr is on term of 1 88 to 23 5 m on th s. D. B r o w n ’s s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g wa s s c h e du l e df o r Oc t o b e r 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 . Th a td ay, prior to the hearing, K

reiss filed an obje ction to two aspects of the PSI . He argued that the r etro ac tiv e ap pli catio n of S earc y vio la te d th e E x P ost

F ac to C lause , and, alternatively , that the e videnti ary bases for the three Ohio aggravated burglary13

co nvi ct ion s be ing use d a s pr ed ic at e of fe nse s f or the c ar ee r of

fe nde r enhanc em en t w er e ins uf

fi ci en t. S pe ci fi ca lly , he c la im ed that the pr obatio n of

fi ce ’ s us e of

the ind ic tm en ts and d oc ke t sh ee ts a s e vid en ce of Br ow n’ s pr ior

c onvi ct ion s f

or ag gr av at ed

bur glary w as barr ed

by the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n inS he pard v. U nit ed S ta te s, 544 U . S. 13, 125 S . Ct . 125 4, 161 L . E d. 2d 2 05 ( 2005 ). H e did not , however, contend that aggravated burgl ary under Ohio Rev. Code § 2911 .11 w as not a“ cr im e of

vio le nc e” ; r athe r his arg um en t f oc use d so le ly

on the im perm issib ility

of the evidence used by

the probation office to determ ine that Bro wn h adin factbe en co nv ic te d o f ag gr av at edbu rg la ry . T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onsi de re d th es e obj ec tio ns a ft er c onve nin g th e se nte nc ing he ar ing . T he c ourt f ir st a ddr es se d and r ej ec te d K re iss ’ s E x P ost

F ac to ar gum en t, e xpl ai nin g th at “ ex pos t f

ac to g oe s to statut or

y m ax im um pos sib le pe na lti es . ” T he c ourt c ont inu ed , statin g: I m ean y ou are t ry in g t o i njec t t ha t i nt o t he sen te nc in g g ui de li ne s. Andwe’ll g etto itfro m

th e st an dp oi nt th atI th in k t he fir stth in g we ne ed to do i n te rm s of

pr oc es s is to go thr oughthe c al cu latio n of the gui de lin es and the appr opr ia te pr ovi sio ns, m ak e sur e that w e’ ve hit them , and then g o ahead and disagree w ith that calculation andthen w e ’l l ju s tp u tth e m as i d e an da c c e p tth e g u i d e l i n e s a s a d v i s o ry, inc lud ing the c ar ee r of

fe nde r pr ovi sio n, and w e w ill se nte nc e him ou ts id e th e g ui de li ne s t o t he same sen te nc e an d s ay it ’s reas on ab le . I m ean is that wha t y ou w an t t o do ? W e’ ll giv e y ou tw o bi te s a t the ap ple . W e w ill giv e y ou a gui de lin e se nte nc e an d th enw e’ ll giv e y ou14

a sentence outside the gui delines that is reasonable because its [sic] co nsi ste nt w iththe gui de lin es that y ou are obj ec tin g to . I m ean, ac tua lly w e co uld giv e y ou m or e than th at . W e co uld giv e y ou u

p to the statutory

m axim um and consid er that re asonable when y ou loo k at hi s re co rd . Kr eiss replied, “ And I understand that.” T he c ourt f

urthe r state d: So I m ean, I thi nk the f

ir st thin g to do the n is to go thr oughhowthe guid elines wer e calc ulated, m ake sure that w e’ ve calculated them co rr ec tly , if

y ou thin k th er e is any

gui de lin e pr ovi sio n th at

ha s no t been calculated corr ectly , then w e can identify that and y ou can pr es er ve that f or appe llate r ev ie w , and w e w ill go thr oughthe w hol e pr oc es s and the n w he n w e’ ve f ini she d w iththat the n w e’ ll take up gui de lin e se nte nc e out sid e– w e w ill take up a

se nte nc e out sid e the guid eline, and m ake a deter m ination of w hat is a rea sonable sentence out sid e the gui de lin es , and tha t w ay if f or som e re as on w e’ ve m iscalculated the guidelin es then we can, the appellate court can ei the r co rr ec t us on tha t, or the y c anc onsi de r in the a lte rn at ive the se nte nc e that i s im

pose d ou tsi de the gui de lin es and d et er m ine whe th er i t’s re as on ab le . T he c ourt the n c onsi de re d th e ev ide nc e the pr obatio n of fi ce ha d ob ta ine d in supp ort of the Ohio convictions and Kr eiss’ s objections to the sufficiency of that ev ide nc e. T he c ourt f

ir st r ev ie w ed

the doc ke t sh ee t su

bm itt ed a s e vid en ce of

the 1979 c onvi ct ionand a ske d th e pr ose cu tor : “ Mr . Mc A dam s wha t [ the she et state s] i s af e l ony i n the f i r st d e gr e e . D oe s thi s r e qu i r e thati tb e ac r i m e o f v i ol e nc e ? A nd d o w e knoww ha t the f el ony w as ?” M cA dam s e xpl ai ne d th at the pr obatio n office had bee n unable to o btain an official j udgm ent for the conviction, but had15

contacted a probation officer in O hio who said that th e “ felony ” w as an aggravated bur glary . T he c ourt de cl ine d to c onsi de r the 197 9 c onvi ct iona s apr ed ic at e of fe nse , hol din g th at

the doc ke t sh ee t and h ears ay te sti m ony

w er e ins uf

fi ci en t t o showby apr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce that B ro w n ha d be enc onvi ct ed of ag gr av at edbu rg la ry . T he c ourt the n r ev ie w ed

the ind ic tm en t and d oc ke t sh ee t pr int out ind ic at ing that B ro w n ha d pl ed

gui lty to ana ggr av at ed

bur glary on M ay 29, 198 0. K

re iss ar gue d th at

“ [t ] his is ex ac tly

the sc en ar io S he pard

spe ak s of

. W e have ac harg ing docum ent which is com

pletely generic talking about trespassi ng on an occupied dw el lin g and a

c om put er pr int out . T his Co urt, in or de r to d et er m ine that this is a crim e of violence, needs to kno w what he actually pled to, w hat was in the plea colloqu y , what facts w ere adm itted or denied.” The c ourt replied: “ [T he docket sheet] say s he pled guil ty to aggravated bur glary . I t say s it

r igh t i n he re . T ha t’ s wha t he w as c harg ed w ithtoo . Wha t do y ou thi nk – he was char ged with j ay wa lking ?” The court concluded that

“ ag gr av at ed

bur glary is a cr im e of

vio le nc e . . . a s am atte r of law ” an d th at

the evidence presented by

the Governm ent was suff icient to sho w that Br own had be enc onvi ct ed

of a ggr av at ed

bur glary on M ay 29, 198 0. R el y ing on this re as oni ng, the c ourt a lso f ound , ove r K

re iss ’ s ob j ec tio n, suf

fi ci en t e vid en ce to16

sh ow t ha t Br own ha d b een co nv ic te d o f ag gr av at edbu rg la ry on Feb ru ary 4, 1 99 4. T he c ourt a lso a ske d th e pr ose cu tor to obt ai n a ddi tio na l e vid en ce in supp ort of the 1 9 7 9 co n v i ct i o n , “ i nca s e t h i s co m es b ac k .” Ha v i n g s u s t ai n edn o n e o f Kre i s s ’s ob jecti on s, wi th th e ex cep ti on of t he 19 79 co nv ic ti on , th e co ur t h el d t ha t Br own was subjec t t o aGui de li ne s s en te nc e o f 18 8 t o 2 35 m on th s. T he c ourt the n st at ed

it w oul d c onsi de r the se nte nc ing f ac tor s li ste d in18 U . S. C. § 35 53 and a ske d K re iss w he the r “ he ha d anythi ng w ithr es pe ct to a se nte nc e that w oul d be ar ea sona ble se nte nc e usi ng the gui de lin es a s si m ply advis or y . ” K re iss a cknow le dge d B ro w n’ s “ ex te nsi ve c ri m ina l hi sto ry , ” but ch arac te riz edBro wn as a pr od uc t o f hi s “ ho rri fic , abo m in ab le ch il dh oo d.” He noted th at Brown had been heavily abused by

his father, who had been investig ated for m

urdering Brown’ s m other and two stepm others. H e also stated that Brown’ s prior offenses “ all occur[r ed] within a sm all am ount of tim e w here m any of these sentences w ere consoli dated for sentencing purpo ses.” K re iss the n pr es en te d te sti m ony f ro m Cathl ee n N une z, Br ow n’ s si ste r. S he t e s t i f i e dth a tth e i r

c h i l dh o o dc o n s i s t e do f

b o th p h ys i c a l an ds e x u a l ab u s e f r o m a ve ry y ou ng ag e. Sh e st at edth atth ei r fat he r “ be at[Bro wn] sen se le ss as ach il d,” one ti m e cr ac kin g op enhis he ad , and “ loc ke d hi m in the a tti c fo r day s” w ith out food. A s teenagers, they

we re kicked out of the hous e, and Nunez testified thatThe PSIstates that B rown wa s imprisoned in Ohio, based on his J anuar y 31, 1990, 15 conviction, see note 12, supra, f rom J une 1, 1990, until Dece mber 2, 1999.

17 she sur viv ed on a cc ount

of Br ow n’ s burg lari es , w hic h a llo w ed the m “ to p ay f or the apartm ent and get groceries. ” A ft er N une z’ s te sti m ony

c onc lud ed , the c ourt pr es en te d th e ratio na le f or the sentence it contem

plated im posin g. I t review ed the PSI , stating “ I though t I hear d de fe nse c ouns el say

that he w as , his of

fe nse oc curr ed

in a shor t pe ri od o f tim e, but ac co rd ing to the P SI . . . I c ount the f ir st o f ap pr oxi m at el y

38 arr es ts tha t w e know of start[ing] at age 15 w hen he was c harged with burglary .” T he court then recited int o th e re co rd

a ll of the pr ior arr es ts tha t w er e lis te d inthe P SI . T he c ourt ne xt stated that it sho uld cons ider the fac tors listed un der § 3553 andrec ited the factors li st edin th is st atut e. It t he n a sk edforan y all oc ut io n b y

Bro wn. Br ow n, e xe rc isi ng h is r igh t of a llo cu tio n, tol d th e co urt tha t hi s pr ior burglaries began “ as a m atter of survival,” but “ becam e . . . a habit.” H e explained that he “ never hurt a person in [his] life” and “ never w ent into a hom e w hen any bodywa s hom e or [it] wa s occupied.” H e em phasized his s truggle with m ental ill ne ss and h owm

uc h he ha d turn ed

his li fe aro und sin ce be ing r el ea se d f ro m p r i s o ni n1 9 9 9 b y g e t t i n g marr i e dan ds t art i n g h i s o w ns p r i n k l e r r e p a i r c o mp an y, un ti l “ th is ba d ju dg m en t h ap pe ne d.” 1518

Upon the c onc lus ionof

B ro w n’ s te sti m ony , the c ourt se nte nc ed Br ow n to 235 m onth s im

prisonm ent, f

ollowed by

five y ears of supervised release. T he court fo und that “ the se nte nc e is c onsi ste nt w iththe gui de lin es c al cu la tio n a s w el l a s a finding that it was a

rea sonable sentence consid ering the guid elines as advisory .”

II. Br ow n arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ai le d to c om

ply w iththe r equir em en ts of F ed er al Ru le of

Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 11 i n e nte rt ai nin g and a cc ep tin g hi s pl ea of gui lty and tha t hi s pl ea

w as the re fo re inv oluntary , in vio la tio n of the F if th A m en dm en t. B ro w n f

ai le d to pr es en t this arg um en t t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt; consequent ly , w e re view the court’ s acce ptance of his guilt y plea for plain er

ror. Uni te d S ta te s v . Mo ria rty, 429 F.3d10 12 , 10 18 -1 9 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 5) (pe r cu ria m ). Under this standard, B rown m ust establis h “ (1) er

ror (2) that is plain and(3) that af fe ct s [ his ] sub stanti al r igh ts. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Mo nr oe , 353 F . 3d 1 346, 134 9 (1 1thCi r. 200 3) ( quot at ionom itt ed ). I n a ddi tio n, to obt ai n th e va catio n of his gui lty ple a, Br ow n m

ust de m onstrate “ a re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity that bu t f or the error , he would not h ave entere d the plea.” United State s v. D om ingu ez Be nitez, 542 U . S. 74, 83, 124 S . Ct . 233 3, 234 0, 159 L . E d. 2d 1 57 ( 2004 ). I n e sse nc e, he m ust c onvi nc e us tha t “ the e rr or se ri ousl y a ff ec ts the f ai rn es s, int eg ri ty , or

pub lic re put at ionof

j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. ” Mo nr oe , 353 F . 3d at 13 49 ( quot at ionand19

citation om itted). A. The r equirem ents of Rule 11 serve to ensure that the district court addresses thr ee c or e co nc er

ns i n e nte rt ai nin g aple a of gui lty : ( 1) that the ple a is f re e fr om co er ci on; ( 2) that the de fe ndant unde rs tands the na tur e of the c harg es pr es en te d; an d ( 3) that the de fe ndant k now s and unde rs tands the c onse que nc es of ple ad ing guilt y . United States v. Siegel, 102 F.3d 477, 481 (11t h Cir. 1996 ). T he court has wide latitude in satisfy ing th ese core concerns. “ [T ] here is no one m echanical w ay or pr ec ise j unc tur e that a

dis tr ic t c ourt i s r equir ed

to inf orm the de fe ndant o f the na tur e of the c harg es in the Ru le 11 c oll oquy . ” U nit ed S ta te s v. W igg ins , 131 F. 3d 1 440, 144 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) . T he e xte nt o f the c ourt’ s e xpl an at ionof the el em en ts o f the c harg ed

of fe nse de pe nds larg el y

on the c om

ple xity of the el em en ts, se e U nit ed

S ta te s v. By

rd , 804 F . 2d 1 204, 120 5- 06 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) , and the de fe ndant’ s “ soph ist ic at ionand i nte lli ge nc e. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Be ll, 776 F . 2d 965, 968-69 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation andcitation om itted). Br ow n st at es in his br ie f that at the ti m e he ple d gu ilty , in Apr il 2005 , he wa s taking two psy chiatric drugs, m edication that couldhave caused him to suffer fr om “ dr ow sin es s, f

at igu e, and d if

fi cu lti es in co nc en tr at ion . ” K now ing thi s, the co urt sh oul d have r ea d th e ind ic tm en t t o hi m , “ expla in[ ed ] the e le m en ts o f theBr own’s brie f does not provide any further detail as to the spec ific ele ments of the § 16 2422(b) of

fense the cour

t should have explained more f ully . As indicated in note 10, supr a, and acc ompanying te x t, the court, in advisingBr own of the of fense with which he ha d been c harg ed, re a d th e c ha

rg e a s it a pp e are d in

the ind ic tme nt. Th e te xt of

Rul e 11 re a ds , in

re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: 17 (1) Advisingand Que stioning the De fenda nt. Be fore the cour

t acc epts a plea

of guilty or nolo contende re, the defe ndant may be plac ed under

oath, and the c ourt must address the de fenda nt personally

in open cour

t. Duringthis address, the c ourt mus t in fo rm

the de fe nd ant o f, and

de te rm ine that th e de fe nd ant u nd e rs tand s, the fo llo wi ng : . . . ( G) the natur e of e a c h c ha rg e to whic h th e de fe nd ant i s pleading . Fe d. R. Crim. P . 11(b)( 1)(G) (2002). Br own does not conte nd that the district failed to follow the te x t of Rule 11; rather , he conte nds that the cour

t failed to satisfy

one of the Rule’s core conce rns. The district c ourt’s satisfac tion of the cor e conc erns, r ather

than its lit era l compliance w ith the dictates of the Rule, is the f ocus of our re view. See United States v. Monroe, 353 F .3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2003) (“ This Court has upheld plea c olloquies that fail to addre ss an item expressly require d by

Rule 11 so long a s the overa ll plea colloquy

adequa tely addre sses these thre e cor e conc erns.” ).

20 offense or any

of the technical ter

m s like intent which were necessary for a co nvi ct ion , ” and i nqui re d a s to w he the r he und er sto od the e le m en ts o r ha d any 16 que sti ons as to the ir

m eanin g. B ut the c ourt f ai le d to do this , he sub m its , and, in the pr oc es s, f

ai le d to e nsur e that he und er sto od the na tur e of the c harg es a ga ins t him , ac or e co nc er

n of Ru le 11. 17 Br ow n’ s r ep re se ntatio n a s to howthe psy ch ia tr ic dr ugs he w as takin g m igh t have be ena ff

ec tin g hi m

a t the ti m e he te nde re d hi s gu ilty ple a ha s no be ar ing on our pla in e rr or

ana ly sis . T he psy ch ia tr ist s who h ad e va luate d B ro w n ha d f

ound21

him c om pe te nt t o pr oc ee d – e ith er on a ple a of gui lty or w ithatr ia l. Whe n th e Ru le 11 p le a he ar ing be gan, the c ourt qu es tio ne d bo th B ro w n and K re iss a s to w he the r the psy ch ia tr ic “ m ed ic at ion[ w oul d] a ff ec t i n any w ay [ Br ow n’ s] abil ity

to understand th e proceedings.” Both stated that it wouldnot. T he court therefor e pr oc eed edto en te rta in Bro wn’s p le a. T he c ourt’ s f

ai lur e to e xpl ai n th e el em en ts o f Br ow n’ s of fe nse – a s it

w oul d in c harg ing aj ur

y – or que sti on B ro w n a s to his und er standi ng o f tho se e le m en ts, w hil e not ide al , did

not a m ount to pla in e rr or . B ro w n w as c er ta inl y aw ar e of the el em en ts o f his of

fe nse . T he c ourt a ske d hi m if he ha d di sc uss ed

the ind ic tm en t and the plea agreem ent, both of which listed the elem ents of the § 242 2(b) offense, with his attorney

and he aff

irm ed that he had done so . In addition , the c ourt recited the e lem ents before ac cepting his plea of guilty . See W iggin s, 131 F. 3d at 1442 ( hol din g no Ru le 11 v iol at ionf or f ai lur e to e xpl ai n e le m en ts o f of fe nse and fi ndi ng i t m at er ia l tha t “ the dis tr ic t c ourt at l ea st i nc or por at ed the sub stanc e of those elem ents in a statem ent later on in the plea colloquy ”) . Br ow n w as a lso aw ar e of w ha t the G ove rn m en t c oul d e sta bli sh w er e the c as e to p ro ce ed to tr ia l; th e p ro se cu to r pr ov id eda fu ll st at em en t o f th e fac ts th e ev id en ce wo ul d e st ab li sh . T he e le m en ts o f the of

fe nse w er e not

c om ple x or dif fi cu lt to unde rs tand. W iththe ex ce pti on o f “ m eans o f int er state c om m er ce , ” the e le m en ts h ad the sam e m eanin g22

in l eg al usa ge a s inor din ar y usa ge . S ee , e . g. , O xf

or d E ngl ishD ic tio nary

( 2d e d. 1989 ) (def

ining knowinglyas “ intellig ently , c onsciou sly , intentionally , e tc”); Black’ s Law D ictionary

(8th ed. 2004) (defining kno wingly as “ [d] eliberate; co nsc iou s, akno w ing a tte m pt t o c om m it fr au d” ). T he phr as e “ m eans o f int er state com m erce ” w as explained by the indictm ent’ s statem ent that Am erica Online w as the “ m eans” Br own used. B rown cla im ed to have a college degree and had ex te nsi ve e xpe ri en ce w iththe c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m . S ee Be ll, 776 F . 2d at 96 9 (holdin g that two college cre dits and in volv em ent in real estate busin ess wer e su ffi ci en t t o c la ss ify defe nd an t as “ so ph is ti cat edan d i nt el li ge nt ”). Giv en th es e ci rcu m st an ces , itis di ffi cu ltforus to im ag in e h ow Br own could have failed to und erstand the elem ents of his offense, e ven absent a detailed explana tio n f

ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt. I d. a t 97 1 ( “ T his c as e is unli ke Mc Carthy [ v. U nit ed S ta te s, 394 U . S. 459 , 89 S . Ct . 116 6, 22 L . E d. 2d 4 18 ( 1969 )] , w he re the Su pr em e Co urt [ hol din g th at Ru le 11 h ad

be envio la te d] w as able to poi nt o ut se ve ra l sp ec if

ic , ‘ co nc ei vable ’ w ay s inw hic h th e de fe ndant m ay have m isund erstood the elem ents of the crim e w ith which he wa s charged.” ); see United St at es v. Ca

ba lle ro , 159 F ed . Appx. 902 , 907 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( unpu bli she d) (h old ing , on s im ilar fa ct s, that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ai lur e to e xpl ai n th e el em en ts o f Cab al le ro ’s off

en se di d n ot co ns ti tu te pl ai n e rro r).23

N or ha s B ro w n c onvi nc ed

us tha t e ve n if

the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d e xpl ai ne d th e elem ents of the offense, he w ouldhave rej ected the plea, as D om ingu ez Be nitez requires as a conditi on to relief. In U nited States v. S teele, we listed three fac tors that w e w oul d c onsi de r in d et er m ini ng the “ re la tiv e sig nif ic an ce of the Ru le 11 er ro r on the de fe ndant’ s pl ea de ci sio n: l at er

pr ote sts by

the de fe ndant ( fo r ex am ple , a t se nte nc ing ), the ove ra ll str en gthof the gov er

nm en t’ s c as e, and poss ibl e de fe nse s th at

appe ar f ro m the r ec or d. ” 148 Fe d. Appx. 823 , 826 -2 7 ( 11th Cir. 2005 ) (unpublis hed). Brow n, focusing on th e third factor, as he m ust, given th e ab s en ce o f al at erp ro t es tan dth e o v erwh el m i n g s tre n g th o f t h e G o v ern m en t ’s case, argues that this case w as asti ng o pe ratio n w hic h di d no t a ct ua lly inv olv e any

a ct ua l m ino r at any sta ge of the of fe nse . S uc h sc en ar ios r ai se the pos sib ili ty of en trapm en t d efen se s o r de fen se s re la ti ng to a la ckof c riminal in te nt . Ther e is nothin g in the record to show that Brow n und erstood he was w ai vin g su chde fe nse s, and the c ourt’ s de fi ci en t c oll oquy r eg ar din g th e n atur es of t he ch arg es di d n ot cu re t hi s p ro bl em . W e unde rs tand B ro w n to m ean th at ha d th e co urt m or e fu lly

e xpl ai ne d th e elem ents of his offense, he w ouldhave perce ived the existence of these defenses an d e le ct edto st an d t ria l. In co n s i d er i n g Br o wn ’s ar g u m en t , we fa i l t o s ee h o w t h e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s explana tio n c oul d have m ad e a dif fe re nc e – B ro w n or , m or e re al ist ic al ly spe ak ing ,24

K re iss , a ssum ing his c om

pe te nc e, w oul d have r ec ogni ze d th e poss ibi lity of r ai sin g the se de fe nse s inr ev ie w ing the c ir cum stanc es giv ing r ise to Br ow n’ s arr es t, in de pe nd en t o f wha t t he di st ric t co ur t s ai d t o B ro wn dur in g t he pl ea co ll oq uy. Mor eo ve r, giv enthe sig nif ic an t w eakne sse s inthe se de fe nse s, e ve n if Br ow n or K re iss w er e fi rs t a le rt ed

to the e xis te nc e of

the se de fe nse s a t the se nte nc ing he ar ing , w e ar e not

c onvi nc ed

that a r ea sona ble de fe ndant w oul d have f or gone thi s ple a ag re em en t t o r isk

the se de fe nse s a t tri al . S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. Murr el l, 368 F. 3d 12 83, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2004) (re j ecting Murrell’ s argum ent that he lacked the specific intent to vio late § 2422(b) when no actual m inor was involved); U nit ed S ta te s. v. Ro be rt s, 174 F ed . Appx. 475 , 480 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) ( unpu bli she d) (a ff irm ing dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ej ec tio n of e ntr ap m en t de fe nse to § 24 22( b) of fe nse whe n “ Ro be rts in it ia te d c on ta ctwit h t he go ve rn m en t’s u nd erco ve r in ve st ig at or ”). Br ow n ha s no t c onvi nc ed us tha t an in -d ep th e xpl an at ionof the e le m en ts o f his offense – say , in the language the court would have used in ins tructing the jury at th e en d o f a § 24 22 (b ) tr ia l –wou ldha ve alt eredhi s d eci si on to pl eadgu il ty. B. Br ow n a lso arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt vi olate d ac or e co nc er n of Ru le 11 by f ai lin g to inf

orm him of the c onse que nc es of

his ple a – sp ec if

ic al ly , the poss ibilitythat he could be sentenced as a car eer offender. H ad Brow n been aware25

o f th a tp o s s i b i l i ty, h e c l a i ms , h e wo u l dn o th a v e p l e dg u i l ty. Brow n poin ts to no provisio n of Rule 11 or j udicial decision requiring that the district court inform

a defe ndant of the po tential sentencing enhancem ents that could appl y

under the Guidelines. R ather, our decisions hold th at Rule 11 requires onlythat the court inform the defendant of the m axim um statutory penalty that could be im

posed andensure the defendant is aw are of the Guidelines and has dis cu sse d th em

w ithc ouns el . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mo sle y , 173 F . 3d 1 318, 132 7- 28 (11th Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Crim . P . 11(b)( 1)(H ), (M). Rule 11 does not require that a dis tr ic t c ourt m ak e the de fe ndant aw ar e of pos sib le G uid el ine se nte nc ing enhancem ents. Se e U nited States v. Bozz a, 132 F.3d 659, 661 (11t h Cir. 1998 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. P ears on, 910 F . 2d 2 21, 223 ( 5thCi r. 199 0) ( hol din g th at Ru le 11 does not require district court to inform defendant of possib ility

of car eer offender enhanc em en t) ; F ed . R. Cr im . P . 11 a dvi sor y c om m itt ee ’ s no te ( 1989 ) (“ Si nc e it w ill be im

pr ac tic ab le , if

not im poss ibl e, to knoww hic h gu ide lin es w ill be r el ev an t pr ior to the f orm ulatio n of apr es en te nc e re port and r es olu tio n of dis put ed f ac ts, [R ule 11] doe s no t r equir e the c ourt t o sp ec if y w hic h gu ide lin es w ill be im portant orwhi ch gro un ds forde pa rtu re m ig ht pro ve to be si gn ifi can t.”) . C. Ina ddi tio n to his Ru le 11 c ha lle nge s, Br ow n arg ue s th at his gui lty

ple a is26

invalidunder the Due P rocess Clause, because it w as induced bya m isrepresentation by

the governm ent. B rown contends that the probatio n officer handlin g his case and the prosecutor assured Kre iss, w ho in tu rn assured him , that he would not be su bje ct to the care er off ender enhancem ent if he pled guilty . See Ma br y v. Joh nson , 467 U . S. 504 , 509 , 104 S . Ct . 254 3, 254 7, 81 L . E d. 2d 4 37 (1984) (“ [A ] plea of guilty . . . m ust standunless in duced by threats . . . . [or] m isr ep re se ntatio n ( inc lud ing unf ulf ill ed or unf ulf ill ab le pr om ise s) ”) ( quot at ion om itt ed ); F inc h v. V au ghn, 67 F . 3d 9 09, 914 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ( “ [W ] he n th e de fen da nt pl ead s g ui lt y

on a fal se pre m is e in th e p ro se cu ti on ’s pl ea ag reem en t, a gu il ty ple a v io la te s t he Due P ro ces s C la us e.”) (q uo ta ti on om it te d) . In suppo rt of his argum ent, Br own proffe rs an af fidavit from

Kr eiss which state s, in part , Pr ior to en te ri ng the a gr ee m en t, I c ondu ct ed e xte nsi ve r es earc h to determ ine whether or not Mr. B rown w ouldbe subjec t to the caree r of fe nde r enhanc em en t . . . . T his inc lud ed e xte nsi ve c onve rs at ion s w ithpr ose cu tin g a tto rn ey s . . . and Unit ed S ta te s P ro ba tio n O ff

ic er s. The understanding of every one invo lved in th ose conversations wa s that Mr. Brow n was not subject to the 4B1.1 care er off ender enhancem ent . . . . I believed and was assured [ by the United State s Attorney ’ s Of

fice] that the care er off

ender enhancem ent was inappli cable, and I advised Mr. Brow n accordingly . I can also state, havin g ha d se ve ra l c onve rs at ion s w ithMr . Br ow n duri ng the c our se of the case, that Mr. Brow n would never have entered into the plea agreem ent had he thou ght th ere wa s any possi bilitythe car eer o f f e n d e r e n h an c e men two u l dap p l y.27

O ur “ inh er en t e qui ta

ble pow er s a llo w[ us] to supp le m en t the r ec or d w ith inform ation no t review ed by the district [court] , though th is power is not often exercised. ” Ca

balceta v. Standard Fr

uit Co., 883 F.2d 1553 , 1555 (11th Cir. 1989 ). S uc h su

ppl em en ta tio n, how ev er , is en tir el y ina ppr opr ia te in re vie w ing a case f or plain error. In conducting plain error r eview, we exam ine the record before the district court for error that is “ clear

or obviou s.” W e ar e lookin g over the tr ia l j udge ’ s sh oul de r, e xam ini ng wha t w as be fo re the j udge . K re iss ’ s a ff idavit w as not be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt; he nc e, w e de cl ine to supp le m en t the r ec or d and consider it. Se e U nited States v. Ric hardson, 166 F.3d 1360 , 1361 (11th Cir. 1999 ). As K

reiss’ s affidavit indicates, B rown’ s due process claim rests on factual al le ga ti on s, t he ve raci ty of whi ch we can no t as cert ai n fr om th e rec or d b efo re u s. Inthi s r es pe ct , Br ow n’ s du e pr oc es s c la im is sim ilar to an in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of co unse l c la im , w hic h w e ge ne ra lly w ill not he ar on d ir ec t a

ppe al , be ca

use the cl ai m f re que ntl y r equir es the de ve lop m en t of f ac ts o uts ide the or igi na l r ec or d on ap pe al . See Un it edSta te s v . Ben de r, 29 0 F .3d12 79 , 12 84 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). As w ithan in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of

c ouns el c la im , Br ow n’ s c la im is be st r es olv ed

in a collateral proce eding un der 28 U. S. C. § 225 5, where the district court w ill have an oppo rt uni ty to co nve ne ahe ar ing , e nte rt ai n th e re le vant e vid en ce , and m ak e28

f i n d i n g s o f

f a c t . We th e r e f

o r e d e c l i n e t o r e a c h th e me r i t s o f B r o w n ’s c l a i m. III . Br o wn ch al l en g es h i s s en t en ce o nfo u r g ro u n d s . F i rs t , t h e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s retroac tive application of Searcy and consequent application of the caree r offe nder enhanc em en t de nie d hi m due pr oc es s – s pe ci fi ca lly , af ai r w ar nin g of the co n s eq u en ce s o f h i s cr i m i n al co n du ct . S ec o n d , t h e c o u rt ’s u s e o f t h e O h i o co u rt ’s docket sheets to findthat he had been convicted of two predicate off enses violated his S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o have aj ur y de te rm ine the e xis te nc e of tho se convictio ns. T hird, his sentence is unreasonable. F ourth, the court dem onstrated subs tanti al bia s and p re

j udi ce tow ar d hi m

a t the se nte nc ing he ar ing , the re by de pr ivi ng h im

of his due pr oc es s r igh ts t o af ai r he ar ing . W e ad dr es s e ac h gr ound in tu rn . W e re view de novo consti tutio nal challenges to a sentence, assum ing th ey are properly

preserved. See United State s v. Pa z, 405 F.3d 946, 948 (11t h Cir. 2005 ). W e re vie wthe r ea sona ble ne ss o f a se nte nc e unde r the abuse of dis cr et ion standard . G al l v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 552 U . S. ___, 128 S . Ct . 586 , 597 , 169 L . E d. 2d 445 (2 007) . I n so doi ng, w e “ co nsi de r the f ina l se nte nc e, in its e nti re ty , in lig ht o fThe § 3553(a ) fa ctors include: ( 1) the nature a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse and the 18 history and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt; (2) the nee d for the se ntence (A) to r efle ct the seriousness of the offe nse, to promote re spect for the law, a

nd to provide just punishment for the offe nse, (B ) to aff

ord ade quate de terre nce to c riminal conduct, (C) to pr otect the public f rom further crimes of the def endant, a nd (D) to pr ovide the def

endant with nee ded educ ational or vocational tra ining or

medical c are ; (3) the kinds of se ntence s available ; (4) the Sentenc ing Gu ide lin e s r ang e ; ( 5) pe rt ine nt p oli c y state me nts of

the Se nte nc ingCommis sio n; ( 6) the ne e d to avoid unwar

rante d sentenc ing dispa

rities; (7) and the need to pr ovide re stitut ion to victims . See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -(7) . 29 the [ 18 U . S. C. ] § 35 53( a) f ac tor s. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. V al nor , 451 F . 3d 7 44, 750 18 (1 1thCi r. 200 6) ( quot at ionand c itatio n om itt ed ). Ase nte nc e is unr ea sona ble if it

“ fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in section 35 53(a). ” U nited St at es v. T al le y , 431 F . 3d 7 84, 788 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) . B ro w n “be ar s th e bur de n of es ta bli shi ng tha t the se nte nc e is unr ea sona ble in the li ght

of both [ the ] r ec or d and th e fac to rs in sec ti on 35 53 (a).” Id. A. T he D ue P ro ce ss C lause guarante es “ the r igh t t o f ai r w ar nin g” of the

“ attaching of crim inal penalties to what previousl y had been innocent con duct.” Ro ge rs v. T enn. , 532 U . S. 451 , 459 , 121 S . Ct . 169 3, 169 8- 99, 149 L . E d. 2d 6 97 (2001). Consequently , the “ j udicial constructio n of a cr im inal statute,” which w oul d c ri m ina liz e co nduc t i nnoc en t whe n th e of fe nse w as c om

m itt ed , w ill vio la te the D ue P ro ce ss C lause if it is “ une xpe ct ed

and i nde fe nsi ble by

r ef er en ce to the laww hic h ha d be ene xpr es se d pr ior to the c ondu ct

in iss ue . ” I d. a t 46 1, 121 S . Ct .Although K reiss inaptly

invoked the Ex P ost Fac to Clause in support of his objection – 19 the Ex Pos t F a c to C la

us e on ly a pp lie s to le g isl atio n –

we un de rs tand

him to h ave su

bs tanti ve ly objected to the r etroa ctive application of Searc y on the g round that B rown lac ked suff icient notice that he w ould be pena liz ed as a car eer offe nder. The ref

ore, w e conside r B rown a s having proper ly prese rved a

Due Proc ess Clause objec tion. B ro wn ’s argume nt r e sts on the pr e mis e that th e Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e re qu ir e me nt o f f

a ir 20 war ning a pplies to a judicial dec ision that increase s the pena lty for a n offe nse, rather than to a de c isi on that c ri min a lize s c on du c t inno c e nt at th e tim e of c omm iss ion . T he Sup re me Court , howeve r, has ne ver he ld that the Due Proc ess Clause re quires fa ir war ning a s to the conseque nces of cr iminal conduct, nor have we . In at least two prior decisions, howeve r, we have a ssumed arguendo that the Due Process Clause doe s so apply , and we make this assumption ag ain her e. See United States v. Dunc an, 400 F .3d 1297, 1307 n.12 (11th Cir. 2005); Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307, 1311 n.13 ( 11th Cir. 2000). 30 at 1700 (qu otation om itted). 19 Br ow n arg ue s th at

the r etro ac tiv e ap pli catio n of S earc y vio la te d th e D ue Pr oc es s C lause . H e not es that the G uid el ine s de fi ne a“ cr im e of vio le nc e” a s “ any offense under fe deral or state law . . . that (1) has as an ele m ent the use, attem pted us e, orth reat en edus e o f ph y si cal for ce ag ai ns t t he pe rs on of a no th er, o r (2 ) . . . otherwise involves cond uct that presents a serious poten tial risk of phy sical injury to anothe r. ” U . S. S. G . § 4B 1. 2. A§ 22 42( b) of fe nse , Br ow n arg ue s, “ do[ es ] not ne ce ssari ly

im pli cate ase ri ous ri sk o f phy sic al inj ur y to an oth er . ” T he re fo re , he re as ons, S earc y ’ s c onc lus ionthat § 2242 (b ) w as , a s am atte r of law , ac ri m e of vio le nc e unde r § 4B 1. 2 w as “ une xpe ct ed and i nde fe nsi ble , ” an d, c onse que ntl y , he la ck ed f ai r w ar nin g th at his of fe nse c oul d tr igg er

ac ar ee r of

fe nde r enhanc em en t and result in a twenty -y ear prison sent ence. 20Although w ere we to re ach this issue, we doubt we would hold in Br own’s fa vor. See 21 Nieder stadt v. Nix on, 505 F.3d 832, 837 ( 8th Cir. 2007) (en ba nc) ( “A r uling on a n unsettled issue of . . . law w ill rarely if eve r be une x pecte d and indef ensible.”) . 31 It is not necessary

for us to reac h the issu e of whether Searcy wa s an

“ une xc ep te d and i nde fe nsi ble ” de ci sio n , a s B ro w n’ s arg um en t i s f or ec los ed by 21 United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 , 1306-08 (11th Cir. 2005 ). In U nited States v. Booker, the C ourt issu ed two m aj ority opini ons: th e first, by

Justice St ev en s, he ld tha t the S ixth A m en dm en t r equir ed that a se nte nc e be ba se d so le ly on f ac ts f ound by the j ur y or a dm itt ed to by the de fe ndant, the re by

m ak ing the Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s, a s th ey the n op er at ed , unc onst itu tio na l. 543 U . S. 220 , 244, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). T he second, by Justice Br ey er , r em ed ie d th is c onst itu tio na l vi olatio n by se ve ri ng the pr ovi sio ns o f the Se nte nc ing Re fo rm

A ct of 198 4 w hic h m ad e the G uid el ine s m an da tor y . I d. a t 24 5, 124 S. Ct . a t 75 6- 57. D unc anw as se nte nc ed be fo re Bo oke r w as de ci de d. 400 F. 3d at 13 00. T he j ur

y f ound him gui lty of pos se ssi on o f co ca ine w ithint en t t o dis tr ibu te , w ar

ranti ng a ba se of fe nse le ve l of

32; the dis tr ic t c ourt su

bse que ntl y found th at D uncan had also been in p ossessi on of cocaine base, which incre ased his of fe nse le ve l t o 38 . I d. D unc ansou ght the be ne fi t of

the r etro ac tiv e ap pli catio n of

Bo oke r’ s c onst itu tio na l ho ldi ng, w hic h he arg ue d w oul d r ed uc e his se nte nc e by

inv al idatin g th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac t f ind ing , the re by

m ak ing himThis argument presumed that if Booke r’s c onstitut ional holding we re a pplied 22 r e tr o a c t i v e l y, b u tth e r e m e d i a l h o l d i n gw e r e n o t , th e nth e G u i d e l i n e s w o u l d r e m a i nm an d at o r

y, but would not allow the imposit ion of any sentenc ing e nhance ment based on a findingby

the district court. 32 su bjec t o nl y

to th e se nt en ce au th or iz edby the jury ve rd ic t. Id . at 1 30 6- 07 . He f u rth e r ar g u e dth atB o o k e r ’s r e med i a l h o l d i n g s h o u l dn o tb e ap p l i e dr e tr o a c t i v e l y, be ca use that ho ldi ng w oul d m ak e the se nte nc e au tho ri ze d by the j ur y ve rd ic t the statutory m axim um , r ather than the lower sentence he w ouldhave rec eived under the retroac tive application of Booker’ s constit ution al holdin g, and that he lacked 22 fa ir w ar nin g, in vio la tio n of

his due pr oc es s r igh ts, that he w oul d be sub j ec t t o th e st atut ory m ax im um , rat he r th an a se nt en ce b as edon th e Gui de li ne s. Id . at 1 30 7. W e expla ine d th at

D unc an , de spi te havin g c om m itt ed an of fe nse w he n th e Guidelines wer e m andatory , w as on noti ce that “ the law of this Circuit [as es tabl is he d i n Un it edSta te s v . San ch ez, 2 69 F.3d12 50 , 12 68 (11 th Cir . 20 01 )] . . . reco gn iz edth e U.S. Co de as t he so ur ce o f th e m ax im um sen te nc e.” Id . at 1 30 8. Mor eo ve r, “ the Guid el ine s . . . a lso inf orm ed D unc anthat a

j udge w oul d e nga ge in fact- finding to determ ine his sentence and couldim pose up to a sentence of life im pr iso nm en t. ” I d. a t 13 07. C onse que ntl y , “ D unc an. . . ha d am ple w ar nin g a t the tim e he c om

m itt ed his c ri m e that [ re ce ivi ng the statut or y m ax im um ] w as a pot en tia l c onse que nc e of his a ct ion s. Appl y ing the pr inc ipl es announc ed in Ro g er s [v . Te n n , 5 3 2 U.S . 4 5 1 , 1 2 1 S. Ct . 1 6 9 3 , 1 4 9 L. Ed . 2 d6 9 7 (2 0 0 1 )],33

D unc an ’ s du e pr oc es s r igh ts c annot be sa id t o have be envio la te d. ” I d. B ro w n, fo llo w ing our

r ea soni ng i n D unc an , ha d su ff ic ie nt n oti ce w he n he c om m itt ed his offense that he could be sentenced to the statuto ry m axim um attendant on th at offense, which w as thirty y ears, ten y ears m ore than the sentence he re ceived ba se d onthe c ar ee r of

fe nde r enhanc em en t. T he r etro ac tiv e ap pli catio n of our hol din g inS earc y

is sim ply im m at er ia l t o th e iss ue of

w he the r Br ow n ha d th e co ns ti tu ti on al ly requ ire d “ fai r warn in g.” B. Br ow n’ s ob

j ec tio n to the use of

the O hio doc ke t sh ee ts a s e vid en ce of his p ri o r c o n v i ct i o n s fo r a g g ra v at edb u rg l ary re s t s en t i re l y o nth e S up re m e C o u rt ’s de ci sio n inS he pard

v. U nit ed S ta te s, 544 U . S. 13, 125 S . Ct . 125 4, 161 L . E d. 2d 205 (2 005) . B ro w n r ea ds S he pard a s ho ldi ng tha t the S ixth A m en dm en t pr ohi bit s the use of all but judicial re cords of “ conclusiv e significance” to provide evidence of a prior off

ense as a pre dicate for the im posit ion of the caree r offe nder en ha nc em en t. See id . at 2 5, 1 25 S. Ct. at 12 62 . The Oh io do ck etsh eet s, Br own co nte nds, f

al l be ne ath th e standard

of “ co nc lus ive sig nif

ic an ce ” pur

porte dly es ta bli she d inS he pard , be ca

use the y are unc er tif ie d and the Cuy ah ogaCo unty Cl er k’ s w eb sit e fr om

w hic h th ey

w er e downlo ad ed

w ar ns u se rs that “ onl y

the official court r ecords . . . available in person, shouldbe relied upon as accurate.”The ter m “cr ime of violence ” mea ns any offe nse under

fede ral or 23 state law, punishable by imprisonment for a ter

m exceedingone y ear , that - - ( 1) has a s an ele ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another , or 34 T he re fo re , Br ow n c la im s, the c ourt’ s us e of the O hio doc ke t sh ee ts t o e sta bli sh the e xis te nc e of

his pr ior c onvi ct ion s w as avio la tio n of his S ixth A m en dm en t rig ht to ha ve a jury m ak e th atde te rm in at io n. Br ow n’ s arg um en t r es ts o n af undam en ta l m isunde rs tandi ng o f the pr oc es s by which a district court deter m ines whether a

defendant is subjected to a c aree r of fe nde r enhanc em en t. T his de te rm inatio n pr oc ee ds i n tw o st ag es . F ir st, the dis tr ic t c ourt m

ust de te rm ine if

the de fe ndant h as be enc onvi ct ed of the pr ior of fe nse . I n so de te rm ini ng, the c ourt m ay c onsi de r “ any

inf orm at ion , inc lud ing reliable hear say , r egardless of the inform ation's adm issib ility at trial, provided th at there ar e sufficient indicia of re liabilityto supp ort its probable accuracy ” as ev ide nc e of

apr ior c onvi ct ion . U nit ed

S ta te s v. A ndr ew s, 953 F . 2d 1 312, 131 9 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) ( quot at ionand c itatio n om itt ed ). T he c ourt m ay f ind that a de fe ndant w as pr ev iou sly c onvi ct ed

f or ac er ta in o ff en se w ith out

tr ea din g onthe Sixth Am endm ent. S ee United States v. S helton, 400 F.3d 132 5, 1329 (11th Cir. 20 05 ). Se co nd, the c ourt m

ust de te rm ine if

the pr ior of fe nse c onst itu te s a“ cr im e of vio le nc e” a s de fi ne d inU . S. S. G . § 4B 1. 2. I n so doi ng, the c ourt sh oul d in iti al ly 23(2) is burg lary of a dw elling, a

rson, or e x tortion, involves use of explos ives, or other

wise involves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. In both Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20-21, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1259-60, 24 12 61 ,1 61 L . E d. 2d

20 5 ( 20 05 ) a

nd Un ite d St ate s v . T aylor , 4 95 U. S. 5 75 , 6 00 -0 2, 11 0 S. Ct. 2143, 2159-60, 109 L . Ed. 2d 607 (1990), the Court limi ted the ty pe of e vidence a sente ncing c ourt c ou ld c on sid e r i n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a state c onvic tio n f

or burg lary wa s b a se d o n f

a c ts that would qualify

it as a “violent fe lony ” under the Arme d Caree r Criminals Act (“ ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA states that burg lary is a violent felony , but does not define the elements of burg lary . T he Ta

ylor Court he ld t hat th e AC CAre fe rr e d to burg lary in t he “ g e ne ri c se ns e in which the ter

m is now used in the criminal code s of most St ates,” to wit: “an unlawf ul . . . entry int o o r r e ma ini ngin a

bu ild ingor

oth e r s tr uc tur e , w iththe int e nt t o c omm it a c ri me .” 49 5 U .S. at 599, 110 S. Ct . at 2158. The Court, thoug h, rec og nized that some states’ statutory definition of burg lary wa s b ro a de r t

ha n th e g e ne ri c de fi nit ion ; f or e xamp le , a

burg lary statut e c ou ld criminalize entry

into places other

than buildings or struc tures, such a s boats or ca rs. I d. at 599- 600, 110 S. Ct . at 2158-59. The exis tence of these “ non-g ener ic” statutes r aised a signific ant question: if the defe ndant was c onvicted under a non-g ener ic statute, but the under lying f acts of his offense , e.g ., he broke into a building, not a boat, would have se cure d a convic tion under a g ener ic statute, what evidence could the sente ncingcourt c onsider to show the fa cts underly ing the def endant’ s conviction. The Ta ylor Court held that a sente ncingcourt wa s g ener ally limit ed to consider ing “ the 35 lookto the judgm ent of conviction and the statute und er which the defendant was co nvi ct ed . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. S pe ll, 44 F . 3d 9 36, 938 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . I f the j udgm ent is am

bigu ous or the statut e overbroad, i.e. , it penalizes c ondu ct that m ay not c onst itu te ac ri m e of

vio le nc e as de fi ne d in§ 4B 1. 2, the n th e co urt m ay onl y co nsi de r the ty

pe s of e vid en ce pe rm itt ed

by U nit ed S ta te s v. T ay lor , 495 U . S. 575 , 110 S. Ct . 214 3, 109 L . E d. 2d 6 07 ( 1990 ), and i ts p ro ge ny , S he pard , in determ ining whether

the conduct for which the defe ndant was convicted constitu tes a cr im e of violence. See United State s v. A guilar- 24statut or

y de fi nit ion

of the pr ior of fe ns e ,” but c ou ld a lso c on sid e r a lim ite d r ang e of

highly co n cl u s i v e e v i d en ce , s u ch as ani n d i ct m en tan d j ury i n s tru ct i o n s , t o s h o w th e f ac t s un d er l yi n g a conviction for a

“non-g ener ic” bur g lary

based on a

guilty verdic t. I d. at 600-02; 110 S. Ct. at 2159-60. The Court ba sed its holding on its interpre tation of the ACCA and its prudential conce rn that allowingless conclusive e vidence to be consider ed would lea d to mini-trials on the fac ts underlying a

prior convic tion. I d. (“In other c ases, howe ver, only the Gover

nment’s ac tual proof at trial would indicate whe ther the de fenda nt’s conduct c onstitut ed g ener ic burg lary . Would t he Gove rnment be pe rmitted to introduce the tria l transcr ipt before the sentenc ing c ourt or . . . pre sent the testimony of witnesses. “ ). In Shepard, the g overnme nt argued that sente ncingcourts should be a llowed to consider a mor e e xpans ive ra

ng e of e vid e nc e , s uc h a s p oli c e re po rt s a nd c omp la int

a pp lic atio ns , in de te rm ini ngthe fa c ts und e rl yinga guil ty ple a to a no n- g e ne ri c burg lary . 5 44 U. S. at 21 , 1 25 S. Ct. at 1260. The Court ref used to allow such e vidence , rea soning that it would undermine the rule e stablished in Taylor: “We are , afte r all, dea ling with an issue of statutory interpre tation and the claim to adhe re to c ase la w is g ener ally

power ful once a dec ision has settled statutory me anin g .” I d. at 23 , 1 25 S. Ct . at 12 61 . Rathe r, the Court he ld t hat a se nte nc ingc ourt

c ou ld o nly consider doc uments, such as a transcr ipt of the plea c olloquy or a written plea a g ree ment, that wer e similarly

deter minative as to the fa cts underly ing a plea a s the documents allowe d by Taylor wer e to the fa cts underly

ing a guilty verdic t. I d. at 20-21, 125 S. Ct. at 1259-60. A plurality of the Court reinfor ced its limitation on t he amount of e vidence allowable to the se ntencingcourt by rea soning that in the absenc e of doc uments with the “conc lusive signific ance of a pr ior judicial rec ord” the district court would be f orce d to eng ag e in fa ct findingas to the nature of the predic ate of

fense which could of

fend the Six th Amendment, but the Court’s holding w as square ly g rounded on Ta

ylor’s interpr etation of the A CCA. I d. at 25-25, 125 S. Ct. at 1262-63.

36 O rt iz , 450 F . 3d 1 271, 127 4 n. 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) ( “ U nde r the T ay lor li ne of c as es in thi s C ourt, e vid en tiary

li m itatio ns o n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

se nte nc ing en ha nc em en ts ap pl y

in bo th ACCA an d n on -ACCA ca se s.”) . Addressing an argum ent sim ilar to that m ade by Brow n, w e held in United St at es v . C an t el l an o , 4 3 0 F. 3 d1 1 4 2 , 1 1 4 7 (1 1 th Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ), th at Sh ep ar d ’s ev ide nti ar

y r es tr ic tio ns are non -c onst itu tio na l and a ppl y onl y to the se co nd s ta ge of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n of w he the r a pr ior

of fe nse c onst itu te s apr ed ic at e offense for the im

posit ion of the caree r offe nder enhancem ent. S ee also U nitedBr own, additionally , does not argue that the doc ket shee ts lacked “ sufficie nt indicia of 25 reliability to support [ their] probable a ccur acy” as e vidence of the prior convictions. See United States v. Andrew s, 953 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1992) ( quotation and citation omitted). 37 St at es v. N er i- H er

nande s, 504 F . 3d 5 87, 591 ( 5thCi r. 200 7) ( “ Sh ep ar d do es not ap ply w he n de te rm ini ng whe the r the gov er nm en t ha s satis fi ed

it s burd enof

pr oof as to the e xis te nc e of

apr ior c onvi ct ion . ”) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. Z uni ga -C have z, 464 F. 3d 11 99, 1204 (10t h Cir. 2006 ) (“ The [ Shepard] [C] ourt did n ot address what docum ents can be used to prove the fact of a prior conviction , but w as concerned onl y w ithw ha t do cum en ts c anbe use d to pr ove the f ac ts unde rl y ing ac onvi ct ion wher e the elem ents of the state crim e do not precisely m irror the f

ederal de fi nit ion . ”) . B ro w n’ s arg um en t i s f oc use d so le ly

on whe the r the c ourt vi olate d hi s constitu tional right s by

rely ing on the docket sheets to findthat he wa s convicted of a ggr av at ed

bur glary , i. e. , he obj ec ts t o th e use of the doc ke t sh ee ts at the f ir st sta ge of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ana ly sis of his pr ior of fe nse s. B ro w n do es not

arg ue that a ggr av at ed

bur glary , a s de fi ne d by

O hio Re v. Co de A nn. § 29 11. 11, is not a cr im e of vio le nc e unde r U . S. S. G . § 4B 1. 1 and tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in re ly ing on the doc ke t sh ee ts t o de te rm ine the f ac ts unde rl y ing his c onvi ct ion s. T hus, 25 Br ow n’ s r el ianc e on S he pard is en tir el y

m isp la ce d and o ur

de ci sio n inCante llano fo recl os es hi s cl ai m . Br ow n si m ilarl y

m isunde rs tands our

de ci sio n inU nit ed

S ta te s v. S pe ll, 4438

F. 3d 9 36 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . H e ar gue s th at S pe ll stands fo r the pr opos iti on tha t a pr ior c onvi ct ionm

ust be de m onstrate d by

“ a j udgm en t or

c om para ble r ec or d of

the dis posi tio n of

c harg es . ” S pe ll sim

ply he ld, how ev er , that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in re ly ing upo n aj udgm en t of c onvi ct ionto aw ar d a

c ar ee r of fe nde r enhanc em en t t o the de fe ndant, be ca

use the te xt o f the j udgm en t di d no t c le ar ly state w ha t sp ec if

ic of fe nse the de fe ndant h ad

ple d gu ilty

to. I d. a t 93 9- 40. S pe ll sa id n oth ing about re qui ri ng a

c er ta in ty pe of doc um en t t o pr ove the e vid en ce of apr ior c onvi ct ion , no r were t he do ck etsh eet s i n t hi s ca se un cl ear a s t o t he off en se to whi ch Bro wn h a dp l e dg u i l ty. Br ow n f urthe r co nte nds that the G ove rn m en t f ai le d to e sta

bli sh “ w ith co nc lus ive j udi ci al doc um en ts” the da te s f or w hic h he w as inc ar ce rate d a s ar es ult of his c onvi ct ionon M ay

29, 198 0, and the re fo re vio la te d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t ri ght s a s e luc idate d inS he pard . F or the r ea sons dis cu sse d a

bove , thi s c la im

is wit ho ut m eri t. C. Br ow n ob j ec ts t o th e re as ona

ble ne ss o f his se nte nc e on the gr ound s th at the c o u rtf a i l e dt o c o n s i d e r

tw o § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f

a c t o r s : ( 1 ) th e “ u n w arr an t e dd i s p ar i ty” cr eate d be tw ee n de fe ndants c onvi ct ed und er § 24 22( b) w ho w er e subj ec t t o th e retroac tive application of Searcy and those who wer e not, beca use they we re39

se nte nc ed be fo re S earc y

w as hande d do w n, se e 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) (6 ); and ( 2) Brow n’ s traum atic childhoo d and efforts to live a lawabiding life af ter he w as rel eas edfro m

pri so n i n 1 99 9. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n inse nte nc ing Br ow n to pr iso n for 235 m onth s. A s for Br own’ s first argum ent, w e construe statutory language as to avoi d a bsur d r es ult s, se e Me rr itt v. D ill ar d P ap er

Co . , 120 F . 3d 1 181, 118 8 (11th Cir. 1997), and Cong ress could not have intended that “ unwarr anted disparities” in sentencin g includ e disparities caused by the application of statut ory enhancem ents to defendants v is-à-vis defendants who, having been sentenced earlier , w ere not su bje ct to those enhancem ents. Congress adds statutory enhanc em en ts and i nc re as ed statut or y m ax im um s f re que ntl y ; c ourts r eg ularl y int er pr et e nhanc em en ts t o e xpand o r co nstri ct the ir r ea ch . C ongr es s di d no t i nte nd to pre ve nt co ur ts fro m

im po si ng su ch laws or i nt erp ret at io ns . W e fi nd o ur

r ec en t de ci sio n inU nit ed S ta te s v. A m ed eo , 487 F . 3d 8 23, 832 - 34 (11th Cir. 2007 ), instructive as to Brown’ s second argum ent. A m adeo co nte nde d th at

his se nte nc e w as unr ea sona ble be ca use the c ourt “ im

pr ope rl y ign or ed ” vari ous m iti ga tin g f ac tor s. W e expla ine d th at “ in i m posi ng a r ea sona ble sentence, the district court need onlyacknowledge that it considered the § 355 3(a) fa ct or s, ” as the dis tr ic t c ourt di d duri ng i ts s en te nc ing c oll oquy w ithBr ow n, and40

“ ne ed not dis cu ss e ac h of

the se f ac tor s ine ith er

the se nte nc ing he ar ing or in the se nt en ci ng ord er.” Id . at 8 33 (qu ot at io n a ndcit at io n o m it te d) . Thu s, we co nc lud ed

that “ al tho ugh the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s se nte nc ing or de r m ad e no m en tio n of ev ide nc e that arg uably

m iti ga te d inA m ed eo ’ s f av or und er § 35 53( a) , w e cannot say that the court’ s failure to discuss thi s m itigatin g evidence m eans that the court erro n eo u s l y i g n o re do r f

ai l edt o co n s i d erth i s ev i d en ce i nd et erm i n i n g Am ed eo ’s s en t en ce .” Id . ( qu o t at i o no m i t t ed ). We re ac h th e s ame c o n cl u s i o nas t o Br o wn ’s se nt en ci ng he ari ng . Brow n’ s sentence wa s within the correc tly calculated Guidelin es range. See Ta lley , 431 F. 3d at 788 . ( “ Although either a defendant or the governm ent can appeal a sentence w ithin the Guidelines range and argue that it is unreasonable, or din ar ily w e w oul d e xpe ct

ase nte nc e w ith in the G uid el ine s r an ge to be reasonable.” ). A lthou gh the court’s j ustification for its sentence couldhave been m or e ex te nsi ve and d et ai le d, it appe ar s c le ar

to us tha t i t ba se d it s se nte nc e on Br ow n’ s le ngthy

c ri m ina l hi sto ry

and the ne ed

to de te r Br ow n f

ro m c om m itt ing fu tur e of fe nse s. S ee 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) (2 )( C) . A s su ch , the se nte nc e w as not un reas on ab le . D. Fi na lly , Br ow n c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt di spl ay ed “pe rv as ive bia s”In Bonne r v. Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir.1981) (en ba nc), w e adopte d, as 26 binding pr ece dent in the Eleve nth Circuit, all decisions of the for mer F ifth Circuit announce d prior to Octobe r 1, 1981. 41 an da “ h i g h d e g r e e o f

an t a g o n i s m t o w ar d s B r o w n ” du r i n g th e s e n t e n c i n g c o l l o qu y, the re by de ny ing him

his due pr oc es s r igh t t o a f ai r an d im

part ia l se nte nc ing he ar ing . S ee Cr oss v. S ta te of G a. , 581 F . 2d 1 02, 104 ( 5thCi r. 197 8) ( “ D ue process requires a f

air trial before a

fair and im

partial j udge.”). Brown seeks as 26 his rem edy

the rever sal of his sentence and rem and to a differe nt judge for r ese nt en ci ng . When couns el fails to preser ve an objec tion to the court’ s allegedly biased statem ents, that obje ction m ay not be raised on appeal unless the appellant can de m onstrate f

undam en ta l e rr or . U nit ed S ta te s v. Ram os, 933 F . 2d 9 68, 974 ( 11th Ci r. 199 1) . W e have sug ge ste d th at f undam en ta l e rr or

m ay be de m onstrate d by show ing “ suc h pe rv as ive bia s and p re j udi ce that i t un fa ir ly

pr ej udi ce s on e of

the part ie s. ” I d. a t 97 3. B ro w n of

fe rs thr ee e xam

ple s of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s be havio r w hic h, he al le ge s, ind ic at e the c ourt’ s pe rv as ive bia s to w ar ds h im : ( 1) the c ourt’ s le ngthy st at em en t t o Kre is s i n re sp on se to hi s Ex Po stFact o o bjec ti on , whi ch Bro wn charac terizes a s dem onstrating the court’ s predeterm ined intent to sentence him as a car eer offender; ( 2) the court’ s statem ents to the prosecuto r that he shouldget42

the doc um en ts n ec es sary

to subs tanti at e Br ow n’ s D ec em be r 21, 197 9, c onvi ct ion

“ i nca s e t h i s co m es b ac k ,” an d(3 ) w h at Br o wn ch ar ac t er i ze s as th e c o u rt ’s

“ ridicule” of K

reiss for his objec tions to the use of the Ohio conviction s as predicate off

enses, such as the court asking Kre iss whether he thought the docket sheet “ said he was c harged with j ay wa lking .” Br o wn fo cu s es h i s at t en t i o no nth e f o l l o wi n g s eg m en to f t h e c o u rt ’s co llo quy w ithK re iss , r ec ite d inw hol e supr a part I . D , r eg ar din g hi s E x P ost F ac to o b je c t i o n : “ th e nwe ’l l ju s tp u tth e m as i d e an da c c e p tth e g u i d e l i n e s a s a d v i s o ry, inc lud ing the c ar ee r of

fe nde r pr ovi sio n, and w e w ill se nte nc e him out sid e the guid elines to the sam e sentence and say it’ s reasonable.” I f th e c o u rt ’s s t a t e me n tt o K r e i s s i n d i c a t e dth a tth e c o u rth a dr e a c h e ds o me unsh ak ea ble c onc lus iona s to Br ow n’ s se nte nc e pr ior to the he ar ing , it

w oul d be ca use f or c onc er n. T he state m en t, tho ugh, take n init s f ull c ont ex t, is sim

ply the co urt’ s a tte m

pt t o e xpl ai n to K

re iss w hy his E x P ost

F ac to o bj ec tio n w as w ith out m eri t b y di sc us si ng th e p ro cedur e u nd er wh ic h B ro wn wo ul d b e se nt en ced . To paraphrase, the court wa s stating that the Guidelines wer e no long er m andatory and therefore Brown’ s classification as a car eer offender w as not determ inative as to the se nte nc e he w oul d r ec ei ve ; r athe r, the c ourt c oul d aw ar d any r ea sona ble se nt en ce.43

Af ter m aking th e statem ent to which Brow n objects, the court considered K re iss ’ s c ha lle nge to the a dm iss ionof the thr ee O hio c onvi ct ion s a s pr ed ic at e of fe nse s, r uli ng i n hi s f

av or a s to one c onvi ct ion . T he c ourt the n he ar d arg um en t fr om K re iss a s to Br ow n’ s ho rr if ic upb ri ngi ng and atte m

pts to ra ise his f

am ily and s t art ab u s i n e s s a f

t e r h i s r e l e a s e f

r o m p r i s o ni n1 9 9 9 an dt e s t i mo n y t o th e s a me ef fe ct f ro m Br ow n and C athle enN une z, his sis te r. T hus, “ nothin g inthe r ec or d of this case com

pels us to conclude that the dis trict j udge closed h is m ind to evidence favorable to the appellant before the sentencing proceedings were concluded.” United States v. Gr eenm an, 700 F. 2d 13 77, 1379 (11t h Cir. 1983 ) (holding th at j udge ’ s c om

m en t “ [I ] ha d a lr ea dy

m ad e a de ci sio n a s to w ha t the se nte nc e shou ld be in thi s c as e” in re spon se to ap pe llant’ s ob j ec tio n to a dm iss ionof

e vid en ce in se nte nc ing he ar ing did

not e vid en ce bia s whe n th e co m m en t, und er sto od i n co nte xt, r ef

er re d to the spe ci fi c obj ec tio n m ad e by appe llant and “ [t ] he j udge be lowdid

not r ef use or f ai l t o c onsi de r any

e vid en ce or

arg um en t f

av or ab le to ap pe llant. H e re vie w ed

a ll re le vant r ep orts and g av e ap pe llant an op portun ity to speak before im

posit ion of the sentence.”) (quotation om itted); see U nited States v. V er nie r, 152 F ed . Appx. 827 , 833 -8 34 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( unpu bli she d) ( hol din g that di str ic t c ourt’ s announc em en t tha t i t i nte nde d to de part f ro m the G uid el ine s, m ade at the start of

sentencing hearing, did not evidence bias when court allow ed44

“ de fen se to arg ue bo th th e fac ts an d t he law at th e h eari ng ”). Bro wn’s t wo o th er ex am

pl es of b ia s d o n ot warran t ex te nd eddi sc us si on . As the Supre m e Court has explained, “ j udicial rem arks during th e course of a trial that are c ri tic al or

dis ap pr ovi ng o f or

e ve n ho sti le to co unse l, the part ie s, or the ir ca se s, or din ar ily

do n ot s uppo rt

abia s or part ia lity c ha lle nge . . . the y

w ill do s o if the y r ev ea l su chahig h de gr ee of f av or iti sm or anta goni sm

a s to m ak e fa ir j udgm en t i m

poss ibl e. ” L ite ky

v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 510 U . S. 540 , 555 , 114 S . Ct . 1147 , 115 7, 127 L . E d. 2d 4 74 ( 1994 ). T he c om m en ts tha t B ro w n c al ls t o our attention d o not reveal such a “ high degree” of antagonism on behalf of the district j udge . C f. S an dstro m

v. Butte rw orth, 738 F . 2d 1 200, 121 3- 14 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) (h old ing that j udge ’ s st at em en ts tha t pe tit ion er w as “ ru de and n as ty ” an d “ ac tin g like an anim al” w ere sufficient to indicate bias to th e degree that it denied pe ti ti on er a fa ir t rib un al ). IV. Fo r the r ea sons he re in s ta te d, the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s AFFIR MED.