### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE June 26, 200 7 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA RC US DWA YN E WELC OME

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 81546 Richard R. Baum gartner , Judge

No. E2006-01839-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Septem ber 27, 2007

The defenda

nt, Marc us Dway

ne W elcome, appea ls as of rig ht his Knox County Criminal Court jury

co n v ic ti o n f

o r c r im in a l r e s p o n s ib il it

y f o r a g g r a v a te d r o b b e r

y f o r w h ic h h e r e c e iv e d a s e n te n c e of twenty y ear s as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender . On appe al, he c ontends that double jeopa rdy prec ludes his conviction, that t h e verdict form incor rec tly and pre judicially char acte rized criminal responsibility

as a le sser include d offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry , that the trial cour t should have g rante d a mistrial based upon the witness’s re fer ence to the defe ndant’s previous inca rce ration, that the trial cour

t erre d in ruling a

prior robbe ry admissible for impeachment purposes, and that the trial court c ommitt ed er

rors related to se ntencing

. Following our revie w, the judgme nt of the trial cour t is affirme d.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d

D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., joined. J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., filed a c oncurr ing opinion.
Mark Stephens, D istrict Public Def ender ; and J ohn Halstea d, Assistant District Publ ic Def ender , for appellant, Ma

rcus Dw ay

ne Welcome.

Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Ra chel West Ha rmon, Assistant At t orney Ge ne ra l; Ra

nd a ll E . N ic ho ls , Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ja me s D . H oll e y , Jr. , a nd Takis ha M. Fitzge rald, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Th e de fen da

nt’ s c on vic tio n a

ri se s f ro m hi s p art ic ipatio n in

the a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry

of his eighty -two -y ea r- o l d

u n cl e, J es s e W i l l ar d

T u rn er

. T u rn er

t es t i fi edt h at t h e d ef

en d an tvisited him often and had be en at his home s ever al t imes ear lier i n the day on September 24, 2004. He said that on

one occ asion, th e def

endant lef

t his jacket. Turne r testified that a round midnight, a s he wa s-2-

prepa ring to take a shower, he heard a knock at his door. He recog nized the defendant’s voic e and, althoug h nude, opene d the door to allow the de fenda nt to retrieve his j ac k et

. Upon entering the

re sid e nc e , in ste a d o f w a lki ngtow ard the ja c ke t, the de fe nd ant w a lke d s tr a ig ht t o T ur ne r’ s b e dr oo m. Turner stated that another individual f ollowed the defe ndant into the home and that he wa s armed wi th a g un . T he ind ivi du a l dir e c te d Tur ne r not to loo k at him, a re qu e st that Tur ne r state d he qu ic kly complied with out of fe ar f or his own safe ty . Turner

rec alled that the de fenda

nt told him that no one was g oing to hur

t him but they just wa

nted some money

. As the defe ndant and the othe r individual

we nt t o lo ok

fo r m on e y , T ur

ne r t e sti fi e d tha t he ra

n nud e to a ne ig hb or ’s ho us e , w ho g a ve him so me clothes t o wea

r, and c alled the police . The police arr ived at the sc ene a pproxi mately

forty -five minut es l ater and Turne r re turned home to find his wa llet and its contents scatter ed on the f loor. Mis sin g fr om t

he wa lle t we re on e hund

re d an d fif

ty do lla rs he ha d s a ve d f

or c ar i ns ur anc e and

so me
emer g ency

money . Turner

testified that the police told him that they would not pursue the c ase a nd advised him to file a wa

rra nt “since he [knew] who it was” but also stated that “[b]ecause it’s y our nephew , y ou probably

ain’t g oing to do nothing about it.”

On cr oss-examination, Turner a cknowledg ed that he lived in a dang erous are a of town, but state d th a t he op ened the d oo r i n th e nu de be c a us e he re c og nize d th e de fe nd ant’ s v oic e . H e a lso stated that the de fenda

nt never threatened him with a we apon and that t he only arme d person wa s the unidentified individual who foll owed the defe ndant i nto the hom e. He a cknowledg ed that the police did not take a

ny fing erpr ints, but ex plained that was b ec au se he ha d told them that the de fe nd ant c omm itt e d th e ro bb e ry . H e te sti fi e d th a t he wa s n ot i nju re d d ur ingthe inc ide nt.

Erroneous Verdict Form and D ouble Je opardy Issues

The de fenda

nt a rg ues that his c onviction f or criminal responsibility for ag g ravated robbe ry should be reve rsed because , he claims, the j ury acquitted him of agg ravated robbe ry as set out in the

ve rd ic t f or m. T he ve rd ic t f

or m, i n p e rt ine nt p art , r e a ds a s f oll ow s:

We th e Ju r y , f in d th e def endant ( g uilty )(not g uilty )[circle one ] of Ag g ra v a ted Robbery

.
IF YO U F IND T HE D EF EN DA NT G UI LTY OF A G RE AT ER OF F EN SE, Y OU DO NO T N EED TO C ON SID ER ANY OF THE F OLLO WI NG

LESSER

IN CL UD ED OF F EN SES:

We the J ury , find the def endant (gu i l t y

)(not g uilty )[circle one ] of Crimi nal R e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f

A g g r a v a t e d

R o b b e r y.

We the J ury , find the defe ndant (guilty )(not g uilty )[circle one ] of Fac ilitation of a F elony , a le

sse r in c lud

e d o ffe ns e

.
We the J ury , find the def endant ( g uilty)( n o t gu ilty )[circle one ] of Robbery , a le

sse r in c lud

e d o ffe ns e

.-3-

(E mph a sis a dd e d) . T he ve rd ic t f or m li sts , in de sc e nd ingor de r, ro bb e ry , a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , a ssa ult

and the ft a s les se r inc lud e d o ff e ns e s o f a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry . F a c ili ta tio n o f a fe lony is a lso pr op e rl y listed as a lesser

included off

ense of ag g ravated robbe ry . I ncluded in ea ch ver dict option is t he phrase “a le sser i n cluded offense ” whe re a ppropriate for a

lesser inc luded offe nse. The ve rdict option r eleva

nt to criminal responsibility does not inc lude the phrase “a lesser incl u d ed o ff ense.” I n returningits verdict, the jury circ led “not g uilty ” for

the offe nse of ag g ravated robbe ry but circle d g uilty for c riminal responsibility for a g g ra v at ed robber

y . The g uilty verdic t as announc ed by the fore person was for c riminal responsibility for a g g ravated robbe ry

as we ll. The defe ndant contends that a plain re ading of the ve rdict for m shows that the jury

found him to be not guilty of ag g ravated robber y . There fore , he ar g ues, this amounts to an acquittal of the c harg ed off ense unde r all theorie s of culpa bility embra ced in the indictment. The state ar g ues that the trial court proper ly instructed the jury that criminal re sponsibili ty for the co nduct of a

nother wa s one theory

of culpa bility for ag g ravated robbe ry

and that the ve rdict announc ed re prese nted a special ver dict relative to the theory of culpabilit y

. There fore , the s tate arg ues, t he conviction should be affirme d despite the wor ding of the orde r of c onsideration on the ve rdict for m.

A cr iminal defenda

nt has the rig ht to a complete and acc urate char g e of the law g iven to the jury by the trial cour

t. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 555 (Tenn. 1994). For the purposes of dete rmining w hether

a def endant ha s been a ffor ded that rig ht, the j ury char g e shoul d be “vie wed in its en t i rety ” and “ considere d as a w hole.” I d. (citing Otis v. Cambridge Mutual Fire I nsuranc e Co., 850 S.W .2d 439, 446 (Tenn. 1992) ). Our supr eme c ourt has explained that “incon s i s t en t or contra dicto ry i n s t ructions ‘do not neutralize or validate e ach othe r’” and that “‘ [t ]he parties ar e entitled to a cle ar a

nd consistent char g e, as w ell as a c orre ct one, that justice ma y be re ache d.’” I d. (quoting Citi zens St ree t Railroad Co. v. Shepherd, 107 Te nn. 444, 64 S.W . 710, 711 (1901))

. There fore , this court’s inquiry must be whether

the l ang uag e of the verdic t form re nders the jur y i n s t r u c t i o ni n c o n s i s t e n to r

c o n t r a d i c t o r

y w h e nr e a d

i ni t s e n t i r e t y.

Re le va nt t o c ri min a l r e sp on sib ili ty , th e tr ia l c ourt c or re c tly ins tr uc te d th e jur

y that:

The de fenda

nt is criminally

responsible a s a p ar ty

to the offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry or any lesser inc luded offe nses i f t he offe nse wa s committed by the def en d ant’s own c onduct, by the conduct of another for which the defe ndant is c riminally responsible, or by both. Each pa

rty to the offe nse may

be cha rg ed with the commission of the offe nse.

Th e de fe nd ant i s c ri min a lly re sp on si bl e fo r a

n o ff e ns e
c omm itt e d b y

the c on du c t of

ano the r i f a c tin gwi th t he in te nt t o promote or a ssist t he commission of the off ense or to b enef it in the pr oc e e ds or

re su lts of the of fe ns e , th e de fe nd ant so lic its , d ir e c ts, a ids , or attempts to aid another person to commit the offe nse.A s su c h , o u r c o u rts h a v e he ld tha t a sp e c ia l ve rd ic t re g a rd ing c rim ina l re s p o n sib ili ty i s n o t co n stitutio n a lly 1 requir ed

. Lem acks, 99 6 S.W

. 2d at 1 7 1

. T heref o re, t he t ri al co urt co ul d have subm i t t ed t hi s case t o t he jur y wi t ho ut any sp e c ifi c fi n d ing o n the ve rd ic t f o rm re g a rd ing c rim ina l r e s p o n s ib il it y. W e re c o m m e n d tha t t ria l co u rts fo llo w this p ra c tice in o rd e r to a v o id sim ilar issu e s w ith v e rd ic t f o rm s in fu tur e c a se s.
-4- Be for e you fin d th e de

fe nd an t gu ilt yof b e ing

c rim ina lly responsible for said offense committed by the conduc t of another, you must find that

all the essential eleme nts of said of fen s e have be en proven by

the state bey ond a reasonable doubt.
(E mph a sis a dd e d) . In it s p re lim ina ry ins tr uc tio ns to t

he jur y , th e tr ia l c ourt we nt f

ur the r t o e xpla in that criminal re sponsibili ty means that “y ou can be guilty as t he principal of t he off ense, or y ou can be cr iminally

responsible for

the conduc t of the per s o n t h at committed the offe nse. I f y ou’re criminally

responsible, y ou share the same culpability for the c rime as the pr incipal of the of fense .” The trial c ourt also cor

rec tl y outlined the lesser inc luded offe nses of a g g ravated robbe ry , never listi ng criminal re sponsi bility as such, a

nd alway s distinguished cr iminal responsibilit y from the le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e s in its ins tr uc tio ns to t

he jur y . F ur the rm or e , th e tr ial co ur

t c or re c tly instructed that “[i]f y ou find him guilty of any offe nse, y ou do not need to g o on and conside r any le s s e r
- in c lu d e d o f

f e n s e s

. B u t if y o u f

in d h im n o t g u il ty o f th e c h arg ed off ense or criminal responsibilit

y or fa cilitation

, then y ou g o on to consider the lesser- included offe nses in desce nding order .”

The trial c ourt corr ectly instructed the jury t hat cr iminal responsibilit y for the c onduct of

ano the r i s n ot a

se pa rate of fe ns e , b ut i s me re ly

a the or y of lia bil ity fo r a n off e ns e

. State v. L e ma c ks , 1 996 S.W .2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999) . I n order to convict a de fenda

nt of criminal re sponsibili ty , the elements of the principal offe nse m ust be proven bey ond a re asonable doubt. Furthe rmore, a person found g uilty

of an of fense throug h a criminal responsibility theory is g uilty of the same offe nse and

su bje c t to the same punis hme nt a s th e pers on wh o a c tua lly

c omm its the c on du c t; i n o the r w or ds , criminal re sponsibili ty

is not a lesser include d offe nse. I t is clea r from a re view of the instructions in their entirety

that the trial cour

t understood all of these principles and c orre ctly instructed the jury

acc ording ly . As previously noted, the trial c ourt did not s p ec ifically char acte rize criminal responsibility

as a le sser include d offe nse in the ver dict form as it did the actua l lesser include d of fe ns e s o f r ob be ry , f

a c ili ta tio n, a gg ravate d a ssa ult , a ssa ult and the ft . T his c ourt

c on c lud e s th a t, despite the inartful wording of t he transition l ang uag e of the verdic t form, the jury ’s notation on the verdic t form is a spec ial verdic t that repre sents the deter mination by

the jury that the def

endant wa s
no t the pr inc ipa l of

fe nd e r bu t is c ri min a lly re sp on sib le fo r the un ide nti fi e d ind ivi du al’ s ac tio ns

. Suc h a de te rm inatio n is cert ain ly re a so na ble in l ig ht o f t

he e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y the vic tim

r e g ar d i n g t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s p art i c i p a t i o n i n c o mp ar i s o nt o t h a to f t h e u n i d e n t i f

i e d c o
- p e r p e t r a t o r

. It is clear from this rec ord that the jury understood the instructions a nd corr ectly applied the law to the fa c ts o f t his c a se . T he re fo re , th is c ourt c on c lud e s th a t the ju ry ins tr uc tio ns , w he n r e a d in

the ir

e nti re ty , a re no t inc on sis te nt or c on tr a dic tor y

. We furt

he r co nc lud e that th e ve rd ic t do e s n ot v iol a te double jeopar dy . The ve rdict as a nnounced by

the fore per s o n an d as not ed on the ve rdict for m clea rly repr esents a f

inding by the j ury that the defendant was not g uilty as a principal offende r, but-5-

was guilty as som eone criminally responsible for the conduc t of the unidentified pe rpetrator, a theor y of culpa bility encompa ssed in the char g ed offe nse and corr ectly instructed to the jury . The de fenda nt is not entitl ed to re lief re g ardingthis iss ue.
Refere nce to Prior Inc arceration of Defendant

Th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld h a ve de c lare d a

mis tr ial whe n th e vic tim , Turner , ref

err ed to his prior incarc eration during cross-e x amination. The state a rg ues that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in refusing to decla re a mistrial beca

use t he testi mony

was e licited

on cross-e x amination, the trial court ga ve an a ppropriate curative instruction, and the streng th of the

case was g reat beca

use Turne r wa s t h e only

witness prese nted and his testimony was undisputed. On d i r e c t e xam i n a t i o n , T u r n e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f

e n d an t h a d n o t l i v e d w i t h h i m . O n c ro ssexamination, the following e x chang e occ urre d:

Q: . . . You said Mar cus Welcome is y our nephe w? A: Yea

h. Q: But y ou said he’s ne ver lived with you? Are y ou sure he didn’t live wi th you fo r a c ou ple of mon ths ? A: No. When he g ot out of the penitentiary , my – my sister called f rom Ohio and aske d me t o l et him move in with me, and I told him, no. He c ou ldn ’t

mov e in w ithme . Can ’t no bo dy mov e in w ithme be c a us e a ll I c an d o, have a

vis ito r f or 14 da y s, and a ft e r 1 4 d ay s, if Idon’t put them on the lease , I ’l l b e convicted – I mean put out. I didn’t have no pla ce e lse to g o. So I couldn’t let him live with me.

The de fenda

nt immediately

reque sted a mistrial. The tria l court denie d th e m otion for a mistrial beca use the jury

was “ g oing to he ar a

bout some prior convictions in t his case” should the defe ndant testify . The trial c ourt offe red a curative instruction instead. The tria l court instructed the jury that Turn e r’ s c omm e nt r e g ard inga pr ior inc arc e ra tio n o f the de fe nd ant “ sh ou ld h a ve no be ari ngon thi s
case one wa

y or the other ” and told the jury to “put t hat out of y our minds” and do not “c onsider that for a ny purpose in this trial in making a decision in this case.”
The purpose of declaring a mi strial is to corr ect damag e done to the judicial proc ess when

some eve nt has occ urre d which pre cludes a n impartial verdic t. State v. Wi lliams, 929 S .W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App.1996) . A mistrial is only appropr iate whe n the trial cannot continue without causing a miscarr iag e of justice. See State v. McPherson, 882 S.W .2d 365, 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). F or a mistrial to be de clar ed, ther e must be a “ manifest nec essity .” S tate v. R obinson, 146 S.W .3d 469, 494 (Tenn. 2004) . The de cision to g rant a mistrial is within the discre tion of the trial

c ourt , a nd that de c isi on

wi ll n ot b e dis tur

be d o n a pp e a l un le ss t

he re wa s an a

bu se of dis c re tio n. State

v. Re id, 91 S.W. 3d

24 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 2)

. I n re vie wi ng fo r an a bu se of dis c re tio n, thi s c ourt ha s h e ld t h a tt h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e f

a c t o r s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d : ( 1 ) w h e t h e r t h e S t a t e e l i c i t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y, (2) whe ther the tria l court g ave a curative instruction, and (3) the relat i v e streng th or wea kness of the State' s proof. State v. L awr ence Taylor, 2003 WL 402276, No. W2002-00183-CCA-R3-CD, at-6-

*10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Fe b. 14, 2003). I n applying these considerations to this case, we note that the re fer ence to the penitentiary was brie f and in an attempt to explain a response to a question on

c ro ss- e xami natio n. Th e tr ia l c ourt g a ve a pr omp t c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n. Th e se fa c tor s w e ig h a g a ins t the g rant of a

mi s t ri al

. Furthermore , we a g ree that the state’s c ase w as strong in light of the

un c on tr ov e rt e d te sti mony of the de fe nd ant’ s unc le . T he re fo re , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did

no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe mot ion

fo r m ist ri a l.

Admissibili ty of Prior Robbery for Impe achme nt

The de fenda

nt c ontends that the trial court err ed in r uling that a prior c onviction for robbe ry could be used for impeachme nt pur suant to T ennesse e Rules of Evidence 609. He a rg ues that the prejudicia l effe ct of the c onviction outweig hed its probative va lue. We disag ree

. Rule 609(a) (3) of

the Ten n essee Rules of Evidence allows for the admission of a prior conviction to impeach the cre dibilit y of a de fenda nt testify ing at trial. Prior to its admis sion, the trial

c ourt is r e qu ir e d to de te rm ine wh e the r “ the c on vic tio n’ s p ro bativ e va lue on c re dib ili ty ou tw e ig hs its

un fa ir pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t on su bs tanti ve iss ue s. ” Te nn . R. Ev id. 60 9( a )( 3) . T his c ourt wi ll o nly

reve rse a trial court' s decision only if the trial court abused its discr etion. State v. Wil liamson, 919 S.W .2d 69, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995)

.
I n de te rm ini ng wh e the r the pr ob a tiv e va lue of a pr ior c on vic tio n o n th e iss ue of c re dib ili ty outweig hs its unfair pre

judicial eff

ect on the substantive issues, a trial court should consider (1) the rele vance of the impea ching conviction with respe ct to cre dibilit y , and (2) the s imilarity betwee n the crime in que stion and the unde rly ing impea ching conviction. State v. Waller, 118 S.W.3d 368, 371 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 3 )

. T h i s c o u rt h a s h e l d t h a t r o b b e r y i s a c r i m e o f

d i s h o n e s t y an d

p r o b a t i v e o f

c r e d i b i l i t y. State v. Caruther s, 676 S.W .2d 935, 941 (Tenn. 1984) . The fa ct that a pr ior conviction involves the

s a m e o r s i m i l ar c r i m e f

o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d an t i s b e i n g t r i e d d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e quir e its exclusion. State v. Ba

ker, 956 S.W .2d 8, 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Miller, 737 S.W .2d 556, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. Howeve r, if “the prior convic tion and instant offense are simil ar in nature the possible prejudicial e ffe ct incre ases g reatly and shoul d be more car efully scrutinized.” L ong v. State, 607 S.W .2d 482, 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The trial court must ana ly ze the prior

c on vic tio n a

nd the of fe ns e on tr ia l to de te rm ine if the c on vic tio n’ s pr ob a tiv e va lue on c re dib ili ty

is outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.

I n this case the tr ial court de termined that the de fenda nt’s pri o r co n v i cti on for a g g ravated robber y was a crime of dishonesty

and probative of the defe ndant’s cre dibilit y

. The trial c ourt g ave specific considera

tion to the simil arity betwee n the prese nt a g g ravated robber y char g e and the defe ndant’s pre vious conviction for robbe ry

. I t determined that the robber y should be admitted for impeachme nt purposes bec ause “ cre dibilit y [wa s ] ev er y

thing in [the] case.” We c annot conc lude under the circ umstances of this case that the tr ial court a bused its discretion in deter mining that the probative va lue of the defe ndant’s robber y conviction relative to cre dibilit y outweig hed any

dang er of un fa ir pr e jud ic e to t

he de fe nd ant. Se e State v. B le vin s, 968 S. W.2 d 8 88 , 8 93 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ) ( c on c lud ingthat th e tr ia l c ourt did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in a llo wi ngthe de fe nd a nt t o-7-

be impeac hed with burg lary , robber y , and lar ceny convictions when the def endant wa s on trial for burg lary of a motor vehicle) ; se e also State v. L amar io Sumner, No. W2005-00122-CCA-R3-CD, at *3-4 (T enn. Crim. App. J an. 6, 2006) ( aff irming the trial court’ s decision to allow the def endant to be impeac hed with a pr ior ag g ravated robbe ry conv i ction when the de fenda nt was on trial for ag g ravated robbe ry

). The de fenda

nt is not entit led to relief

on this iss ue.

Sentenc ing

Th e de fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t hi s tw e nty -y e ar s e nte nc e a s a Rang e I I , mu lti ple of

fe nd e r i s
err oneous. He contends that the t rial court applied enhance ment fac tors in violation of Blake ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. 2 96 , 1 24 S. Ct . 2 53 1 ( 20 04 ). He a lso c on te nd s th a t th e de te rm inatio n o f h is

ra ng e status wa s e rr on e ou s b e c a us e the e xiste nc e of

pr ior c on vic tio ns that it

is b a se d u

po n s ho uld have be en subm i t t ed t o a j u ry . I n summary , he ar g ues that the prope r sentenc e is the minimum sentenc e of e ight y ear s as a Rang e I , standard of fende r.
An appe llate cour

t’s revie w of sentenc ing is de novo on the rec ord with a pre sumption t hat th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e te r

mi n a ti o n s ar e c o r

r e c t. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 4 0 1 ( d ) (2003). As the SentencingCommi ssion Com ments to this s ection n o t e, on appea l the burden is on the de fenda nt to show that the s entenc e is improper. I f t he trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made f indings of f

act that a re a dequate ly

sup p o rt ed in the re cord, a nd g ave due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors and princ iples that are rele vant to sentenc ing unde r the 1989 Sentenc ing Act, th is c o u rt ma

y n o t d is tu

r b th e s e n te n c e e v e n if a d if f e r e n t r e s u lt w e r e p r e f

e r r e d . State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.
Ho we ve r, “ t h e p r e s u mp t i o no f c o r r e c t n e s s w h i c h a c c o mp an i e s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s a c t i o nis conditioned upon t he af

firmative showingin the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing principles and all rele vant fac ts a nd circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In this respec t, for the pur pose of mea

ningf ul appellate r eview,
[T] he trial c o u rt m

u s t p la c e o nth e r e c o r d

it s r e a s o n s f

o r ar r iv in g a t t

h e f inal sentenc ing de cision, identify the m itigatingand enha nceme nt fac tors found, state the specific fac ts supporting e ach e nhance m en t fa ctor found, and ar ticulate how the mitigating and enha

nceme nt fac tors have b e e n e v a lu a te d a n d b alanc ed in deter

mining the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(f) (1990).

State v. J ones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994).

Pur su ant t o th e 19 89 Se nte nc ingAc t, the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e to be imp os e d f or a Cla ss B felony su c h a s a g g r a v a te d r o b b e r y w a s th e mi n im

u m in th e r an g e

. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 40-35- 21 0( c )(200 3). Th e 19 89 Se nte nc ingAc t a lso pr ov ide d th a t, p ro c e dura lly , th e tr ia l c ourt wa s to incre ase the sentenc e within t h e ra n ge based on the exis tence of enha nceme nt fac tors and, then,

r e d u c e t h e s e n t e n c e a s a

p p r o p r i a t e f

o r an y m i t i g a t i n g f

a c t o r s

. Id

. at (d) an d (e) . The we ight to be aff orded a n exis ting f

actor was lef t to the trial co u rt ’s d i s cr etion so long a s it complied with the-8-

purp os e s and

pr inc iples of the 19 89 Se nte nc ingAc t and the c ourt ’s fi nd ing s w e re a de qu a te ly

su pp or te d b y the re c or d. I d. § 40- 35 -2 10 (2 00 3) , Sen te nc ing Com mis sio n Comme nts ; Stat e v. Mo ss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 237 (Tenn. 1986) ; see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

In c o n d u c t i n g i t s d e n o v o r e v i e w , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u rtm u s tc o n s i d e r ( 1 ) t h e e v i d e n c e , i f

a n y,
rec eived at the trial and sente ncing hear ing, ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the p ri n ci p l es of sentenc ing a

nd arguments as to sentenc ing a lternatives, ( 4) the n at u re and cha rac teristics of the criminal conduc t, (5) any mitigating or statutory

enhanc ement fa ctors, (6) any statem en t that the defe ndant made on his own be half, a nd (7) the pote ntial for re habilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, - 103, -210 (2006); see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168; Moss, 727 S .W.2d at 236-37

.
The trial c ourt deter

mined that the defe ndant qualified as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender based

u p o nh is h is to r

y o f c r im in a l c o n v ic ti o n s

. T h e d e f endant arg ues th a t t

h is v io late s B la

k e ly

. We dis a g re e . T o b e se nte nc e d a s a Rang e I I , mu lti ple of

fe nd e r t he de fe nd ant mus t have be e n p re vio us ly convicted of

“[a] mi nimum of two ( 2) but not more than four ( 4) prior f elony convictions within the conviction class, a

highe r cla ss, or within the next two (2) lower felony classes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 06 (a )( 1) . T he de fe nd ant’ s c ri min a l hi sto ry c on ta ins fe lony

c on vic tio ns fo r t

wo ro bb e ri e s, ag g ravated burg lary , burg lary , automobile burg lary , witness coer cion and fe l o n y esca pe. Any of the se c on vic tio ns e xce pt f or the a uto mob ile burg lary

and fe lony e sc a pe , b oth Cla ss E fe lon ie s, qu a lif y to esta bli shthe de fe nd ant a s a

Rang e I I , mu lti ple of

fe nd e r. As thi s c ourt

ha s p re vio us ly noted, “the United States Supreme Court ha s exempted pr oof of a def endant’ s prior convic tions from the re quirement that fa cts used to enha nce a defe ndant 's s en t en ce be found by a jury bey ond a

rea sonable doubt.” State v. Moha med M edhet Karim, 2007 WL 1435390, M2006-00619-CCA-R3- CD, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. M ay 16, 2007)(c iting Apprendi v. New J erse y , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct . 2348, 2362-63 (2000) ). Ther efor e, we conclude that the defendant wa s proper ly classified a s a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender

.
I n arr iving at the appropr iate leng th of the def endant’ s sentence, t h e trial court found the fo llo wi nge nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s a pp lic a ble :
(2) The defe ndant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior, in addition to thos e nec essar y to establish the appropr iate ra ng e; (3) The defe ndant was the leade r in the commission of an off ense invo l v i n g two or

mor e c ri min a l a c tor s; (7 ) T he pe rs on a l in

jur ie s in fl ict e d u

po n, or the a mou

nt o f d a ma g e to p ro pe rt y
su sta ine d b y

or take n f ro m th e vic timis p art ic ula rl y g re a t; (9) The d ef

en d an t befor e trial or se ntencingfailed to c omply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase into the c ommunity ; and (15) The defe ndant abuse d a posi tion of public or pr ivate trust or used a profe ssional license in a manner that signific antly fac ilitated the commission or fulfillment of the offe nse.D e fen se c o u n se l d isc u sse d the U n ited S ta te S u p re m e C o u rt’s gr a n t o f ce rtio ra ri in C u n n ing h a m in its 2

ar g u men t t o t h e t r i al c ou r t t h at B l ak el y a ppl i es t o ou r s en t en ci n g s ch eme ar g u i n g t h at “ [ t ] h at s ee ms t o be a n i n di ca t i on tha t [the S u p re m e C o u rt] w a n t[s] to sa y , o h , ye s [i]t d o e s a p p ly, b u t no n e the le ss, I d o re c o g n iz e rig h t no w [B la k e ly i s ina p p lica b le ] . . . a n d if

the y re v e rs e C u n n ing h a m , the y’ll p ro b a b ly re m a n d G o m e z to re c o n sid e r in li g h t o f C u n n ing h a m .”

-9- Tenn. Co de Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) , (3), ( 7), (9) and (15) (2003). B ased upon the se enha nceme nt fac tors and the absenc e of mitigating fac tors, the court sentenc ed the defe ndant to t h e m ax i m um sentenc e of twe nty

y ear s.
We note initially that the sentenc ing hear ing in this case was held on May 26, 2006. At that time, the trial court relied upon our supreme court’s holding in State v. Gomez, 1 6 3 S

. W

. 3 d 632 (Tenn. 2005) , that ruled B lakely inapplicable to our

sentenc ing statute

. Ho we v er, B lakely ’s

a pp lic a tio n to T e nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ingstatut e ha s si nc e be e n c lari fi e d b y the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court’s rele ase of

Cunningha

m v. California, 127 S. Ct

. 8 5 6 (2 0 0 7), and the subsequent g rant of

cer tiorari vac ating our supre me cour t’s judgme nt in Gomez v. Tennesse e, 127 S. Ct. 1209 (2007). 2 Howeve r, we need not a ddress the pr opriety of the trial c ourt’s application of the enha nceme nt fa c to r s p u r s u an t to B la

k e ly if th e r e ar e a

p p r o p r iate f

a c to r s s u f f ic ie n t to ju s ti f

y th e tr ia l c ourt’s imp os iti on

of se nte nc e . Se e Ka

ri m, a t *4

. As pr e vio us ly state d, Ap pr e nd i and its pr og e ny of B lake ly and Cunning ham spec ifically exempted from the re quirement of a jury finding those fac ts reg arding a def endant’ s criminal convictions that ar e used to inc rea se a se ntence . There fore , reg ardle ss of any

e ff e c t B lake ly

may have on th e app li c a tio n o f e nh anc e me nt f a c tor s ( 3) , ( 7) , ( 9) and

(1 5) , w e sh a ll

e x am i n e t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s a p p l i c a t i o no f

e n h an c e m e n tf

a c t o r ( 2 ) w h i c h i s n o ti mp l i c a t e d b y B l a k e l y.

The trial c ourt place d g reat significa nce on the defe ndant’s history of criminal convictions when stating that “[i] t’s not just t wo or thre e driving offe nses or two or three shopliftings. He ha s a string of cr iminal convictions over the y ear s. He spent a signific ant amount of t i m e in t he penitentiary .” The trial court also found t he absence of any mitigating fac tors. We ag ree with the tr ia l c ourt that the e vid e nc e re g ard ing fa c tor (2 ) is su bs tanti a l. Th e re fo re , we c on c lud e th at t his fac tor alone justifies the imposition of the twenty -y ear maxi mum sentence in this case.

CONCL USI ON
Having conclude d that none of the alleg ed err ors appea led by the defe ndant merit relief , the judgme nt of the trial cour t is affirmed.

___________________________________ D. KEL L Y THOMAS, JR ., J UDGE