UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

In the Matter of: 

Glencore International AG, 

Glencore Ltd., and 

Chemoil Corporation, 

Respondents. 

) 

) 

)

) 

) 

)

) 

CFTC Docket No. 22-16

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 6(c) AND (d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) has reason to believe that 

Glencore International AG, Glencore Ltd., and Chemoil Corporation (collectively, “Glencore” or 

“Respondents”) have, for conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011 to at least 2018 

(“Charging Period”), violated Sections 6(c)(1), 6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), and 9(a)(2) of the 

Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13(a)(2), and Regulations 

180.1 and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 (2021) of the Commission 

Regulations (“Regulations”). Therefore, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public 

interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to determine 

whether Respondents engaged in the violations set forth herein and to determine whether any 

order should be issued imposing remedial sanctions. 

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondents have 

submitted an Offer of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept. 

Without admitting or denying any of the findings or conclusions herein, except to the extent that 

Respondents admit those findings in any related action against Respondents by, or any 

agreement with, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or any other governmental 

agency or offices, and admit those findings in In re Emilio Heredia Collado, CFTC No. 21-04, 

2021 WL 2182105 (Mar. 25, 2021) (consent order), Respondents consent to the entry of this 

Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Section 6(c) and (d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 
2 

Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (“Order”) and acknowledge service of this 

Order.1

 

II. FINDINGS 

The Commission finds the following: 

A. Summary 

Glencore is a Switzerland-based commodity trading and producing multinational 

conglomerate that is among the largest companies of its kind in the world. Its significant 

physical and derivative oil trading operations are conducted worldwide, including substantial 

trading operations based in New York, New York, and San Francisco, California. From 

approximately 2007 to at least 2018 (the “Relevant Period”), Glencore engaged in a scheme to 

manipulate oil markets and defraud other market participants through corruption and 

misappropriation of material nonpublic information, designed to increase profit and decrease 

losses from physical and derivatives trading. 

Glencore’s conduct during the Relevant Period involved the manipulation or attempted 

manipulation of price assessments of various fuel oil products published by S&P Global Platts 

(“Platts”), a price-reporting agency, and derivatives such as futures and swaps that settled by 

reference to those assessments, including derivatives traded on United States exchanges such as 

the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) and ICE Futures U.S. Inc. During the 

Relevant Period and the Charging Period, Glencore had derivatives and physical trade positions, 

including positions held in the United States, that exposed Glencore to fluctuations in the Platts 

price assessments. Glencore traders understood that Platts made price assessments of various 

fuel oil products based primarily on the trading activity in a daily trading window, a process 

through which market participants could submit bids, offers, and trades on set amounts of 

particular oil products. On certain days on which Glencore had significant exposure to these 

Platts price assessment benchmarks, Glencore traders placed bids or offers in the relevant trading 

window with the intent of pushing or controlling the results of the trading window, and thus 

Platts’s price assessments, in a direction and manner intended to benefit Glencore’s exposure 

arising from its associated physical and/or derivatives positions. Glencore engaged in this 

scheme on hundreds of days during the Relevant Period and the Charging Period in order to 

manipulate Platts price assessments connected to four fuel oil products, and the associated 

derivatives, in three different United States geographic markets. 

Glencore’s conduct during the Relevant Period also involved fraud, corrupt payments 

(e.g., bribes and kickbacks) to employees and agents of certain state-owned entities (“SOEs”), 

 

1

 Respondents consent to the use of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Order in this proceeding and 

in any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party or claimant, and agree 

that they shall be taken as true and correct and be given preclusive effect therein, without further proof. 

Respondents do not consent, however, to the use of this Order, or the findings or conclusions herein, as the sole 

basis for any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party or claimant, other 

than: a proceeding in bankruptcy or receivership; or a proceeding to enforce the terms of this Order. Respondents 

do not consent to the use of the Offer or this Order, or the findings or conclusions in this Order, by any other party in 

any other proceeding. 
3 

including in Brazil, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Venezuela, and misappropriation of confidential 

information from employees and agents of certain SOEs, including in Mexico. Glencore or its 

affiliates made the corrupt payments in exchange for improper preferential treatment and access 

to trades of oil and oil products with the SOEs. Glencore’s conduct was intended to and did 

secure unlawful competitive advantages in trading physical oil products and related derivatives 

to the detriment of its counterparties and market participants, including those located in the 

United States. 

Glencore’s manipulative, fraudulent, and corrupt conduct involved traders and other 

personnel throughout its oil trading group, including senior traders, desk heads, and supervisors 

up to and including the global head of the oil group, and resulted in hundreds of millions of 

dollars in improper gains. 

Glencore’s manipulative and deceptive conduct undermined the legitimate forces of 

supply and demand and the integrity of the global physical and derivatives oil markets, including 

in the CFTC regulated U.S. derivatives markets and related physical markets. 

B. Respondents 

Glencore is a sophisticated, multinational energy and commodities trading firm that is 

one of the world’s largest global diversified natural resource companies and a global trader of oil 

and oil products. Affiliates comprising Glencore include, among others, Glencore Ltd., based in 

New York, New York; Glencore International AG, based in Baar, Switzerland; and Chemoil 

Corporation, based in New York, New York, with operations in California, among other places. 

During the Relevant Period and the Charging Period, Glencore actively traded physical and 

derivatives oil products across major trading hubs in the United States, the Americas, and 

beyond. Neither Glencore nor any of its affiliates has ever been registered with the Commission. 

C. Facts 

1. Market Background 

The global oil markets include physical commodity flows among oil producers, refiners, 

shipping and storage facilities, and consumers. Numerous oil products are traded in these 

markets, including crude oil, distilled and refined products, and oil byproducts blended to various 

specifications that are used for a variety of purposes. These varied oil products flow across 

geographic regions before reaching distributors and end-user consumers. The United States is a 

world leader in the global markets for physical oil and oil products. Significant trading hubs in 

the United States include, among others, the U.S. West Coast, the U.S. Atlantic Coast, and the 

U.S. Gulf Coast. 

The physical flows of oil products around the world are linked in various physical and 

derivatives markets, including in the U.S. oil markets. Market participants use the derivatives 

markets, which include among other things futures, options, and swaps, to manage physical price 

exposures and to speculate on price trends. The United States is a world leader in the derivatives 

markets; Commission-registered entities in the United States and abroad offer and clear many 

derivatives products tied to the prices of oil products. Reflecting the global nature of the oil 

markets, for example, the contract specifications of NYMEX’s Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures 
4 

Contract, a core referenced futures contract under Regulation § 151.2(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 

151.2(c)(2) (2021),2

 provide that delivery can be made using crude streams of domestic as well 

as foreign origin, such as northern Europe (Brent Blend or Oseberg Blend), Nigeria (Bonny 

Light or Qua Iboe), and Colombia (Cusiana). 

Platts is a London-based price reporting agency that has offices in thirty-five countries, 

including the United States. Platts provides benchmark prices for a variety of energy-related 

products and markets throughout the world, including oil products. Benchmarks provided by 

Platts often serve as the underlying reference price for settlement of oil product derivatives such 

as swaps and futures. The benchmarks also are often used by market participants as a price 

reference for physical contracts. These contracts are generally set at an agreed-upon benchmark 

value, plus or minus a negotiated dollar differential that may reflect the quality of the product or 

other aspects of the trade. 

The Platts benchmarks with relevance here are assessed in the United States. 

Specifically, the Platts Los Angeles Bunker Fuel Oil 380 CST 3.5% Ex-Wharf benchmark (the 

“Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark”), the Platts New York Harbor No. 6 1% Fuel Oil benchmark 

(the “New York LSFO Benchmark”), the Platts New York Harbor No. 6 3% Fuel Oil benchmark 

(the “New York HSFO Benchmark”) and the Platts U.S. Gulf Coast High Sulfur Fuel Oil 

benchmark (the “USGC HSFO Benchmark”) are assessed from Platts’s offices in Houston, 

Texas. The benchmarks are assessed by Platts using a “market-on-close” (MOC) methodology. 

Like other Platts benchmarks, Platts widely and globally reported these daily benchmarks as part 

of its subscription market-reporting services. End-users and other market participants, including 

those in the United States, used this information as price benchmarks in industries such as 

shipping, bunker, and utilities, and as reference prices for the settlement of numerous derivatives. 

During the Relevant Period, Platts generally determined the benchmarks for a given day 

based primarily on bids to purchase, offers to sell, and trades in the relevant product during a 

defined period of time called the “window” that Platts-authorized market participants reported to 

Platts, and which Platts then widely reported to subscribers.3

 With limited exceptions, Platts 

generally required physical performance of window trades. Each day, before commencement of 

the trading window, Platts typically reported to market participants a market price level referred 

to as the “peg.” The peg typically served as a starting reference price at the beginning of the 

trading window for Platts-authorized market participants’ bids or offers. Platts typically 

 

2

 Under CFTC Regulations, core referenced futures contracts are those that have particular “importance . . . to their 

respective underlying cash markets, including that they require physical delivery of the underlying commodity; and 

. . . to the national economy of the commodities underlying the . . . contracts.” See Final Rule, Position Limits for 

Derivatives, 86 Fed. Reg. 3236, 3238 (Jan. 14, 2021). 

3

 As relevant to those benchmarks and the MOC process during the Relevant Period, the bids, offers, and trades 

reported in the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark window were generally for a trade size of 1,000 metric tons of 

bunker fuel; in the New York LSFO Benchmark and New York HSFO Benchmark windows, for a trade size of 

50,000 barrels; and in the USGC HSFO Benchmark window, for a trade size of 45,000 barrels. During the Charging 

Period, market participants typically reported bids, offers, and trades through online chats or through an interface 

called the Platts eWindow. 
5 

determined the peg in part based on information about trades or other market information that 

market participants such as Glencore reported to Platts. 

Generally, physical oil prices, oil derivatives prices, and oil benchmark prices are 

interrelated. Derivatives products such as futures and swaps allow market participants to hedge 

physical transactions, manage price risks, conduct price discovery, and complement their 

physical trading activities. Benchmarks may serve as references both to physical trades, and to 

futures contracts and swaps that price in reference to the benchmarks. Such futures contracts 

trade on exchanges based in the United States, like NYMEX, a Designated Contract Market 

(“DCM”) owned by CME Group, Inc., and are cleared on registered Derivatives Clearing 

Organizations (“DCOs”), such as ICE Clear Europe Ltd. Similarly, swaps priced by reference to 

these benchmarks include those cleared through DCOs in the United States, as well as those not 

centrally cleared, but rather reported to the Commission through swap data repositories. At 

times, market participants use futures contracts to engage in exchange-for-physicals transactions, 

in which a futures position is traded for a physical commodity, and then the futures position is 

submitted for clearing by a DCO. 

2. Glencore’s Manipulative and Fraudulent Conduct 

One of the world’s largest commodity traders, Glencore typically trades more than one 

billion barrels of physical oil and oil products each year. Glencore also is a major participant in 

the oil derivatives markets and other swaps markets. During the Relevant Period, Glencore 

traded trillions of dollars notional value of derivatives such as futures contracts and swaps, 

including, for example, interest rate swaps, cross currency swaps, and oil and oil product swaps, 

including with U.S. counterparties and swap dealers registered with the Commission. As part of 

its business, Glencore often entered into related physical and/or derivatives positions in groups of 

connected trades called “strategies.” 

Glencore’s oil trading group was active in the United States as well as various locations 

around the world, including the United Kingdom, Asia, Africa, and South America. 

a. Manipulation 

i. Trading Activity and Benchmark Exposures 

Glencore’s physical trading activities included, among other things, large-quantity trades, 

sometimes called “cargos,” of fuel oil. Glencore also traded smaller-quantity trades of bunker 

fuel, sometimes called “bunkers,” typically with end-users such as ship owners. Among the 

cargo trades engaged in by Glencore were numerous cargo trades with a Mexico-based SOE (the 

“Cargo Trades”), including those for delivery to and from the Los Angeles market. A senior 

trader (“Trader-1”) based in San Francisco engaged in and oversaw these trades. 

During the Relevant Period, more than approximately 100 Cargo Trades with the SOE 

were priced by reference to the Platts Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark. The price of the Cargo 

Trades was determined by the average of the daily benchmark price on specified days (“Cargo 

Pricing Days”), plus or minus a specified dollar amount negotiated by the parties. Like other 

Platts benchmarks, Platts widely reported the daily Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark as part of its 
6 

subscription market-reporting services, which information end-users and other market 

participants used as price benchmarks in the shipping and bunker industries. 

On Cargo Pricing Days, Glencore’s trading positions generally had significant price 

exposure to the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark. When the Cargo Trades were sales by 

Glencore to the SOE, Glencore’s Cargo Trade position would be more profitable if the average 

Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark on the Cargo Pricing Days was higher: if the Los Angeles 

Bunker Benchmark rose, Glencore would sell to the SOE at a higher price. Conversely, when 

the Cargo Trades were purchases by Glencore from the SOE, Glencore’s Cargo Trade positions 

would be more profitable if the average Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark on the Cargo Pricing 

Days was lower: if the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark fell, Glencore would buy from the SOE 

at a lower price. 

Between in or around December 2012 and in or around January 2016, Glencore and the 

SOE entered into a coordinated, informal “joint venture” (the “JV”) by which (a) the SOE would 

purchase fuel oil cargos from a counterparty (the “JV Cargo Trades”) priced by reference to the 

Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark on specified days (the “JV Pricing Days”), (b) Glencore would 

sell to the SOE an oil product sometimes referred to as “cutter stock” for blending with the fuel 

oil obtained through the JV Cargo Trades, and (c) the SOE would sell the resulting blend into the 

Singapore market. Glencore and the SOE coordinated the planning and sharing of profits of the 

venture. The JV thus generally had significant price exposure to the Los Angeles Bunker 

Benchmark. The JV Cargo Trade positions would be more profitable if the average Los Angeles 

Bunker Benchmark on the JV Pricing Days was lower: if the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark 

fell, the SOE would buy from its counterparty at a lower price, generating more profit to be 

shared by Glencore and the SOE. 

In the U.S. Gulf Coast and New York Harbor markets, in addition to physical cargos and 

bunkers, Glencore’s trading activities included derivatives such as futures and swaps that settled 

based on the average daily benchmark assessment for a given month or portion thereof.4

 Like 

other Platts benchmarks, Platts widely and globally reported these benchmarks as part of its 

subscription market-reporting services, which information end-users and other market 

participants used as price benchmarks. At times during the Charging Period, Glencore’s physical 

and derivatives trading positions had significant price exposure to the New York LSFO 

Benchmark, the New York HSFO Benchmark, or the USGC HSFO Benchmark, and Glencore 

traders sometimes increased their positions in derivatives such as futures and swaps, thereby 

amplifying their exposure, and thus potential profit from manipulating the benchmarks, rather 

than using the derivatives to offset Glencore’s exposure to the relevant benchmark. 

 

4

 For example, certain “BALMO” products, short for “balance of month”—such as the Gulf Coast HSFO (Platts) 

BALMO Futures contract traded on NYMEX and the USGC HSFO (Platts) Balmo Futures contract traded on ICE 

Futures U.S., Inc.—are settled by reference to the average daily price assessment beginning at a selected start date 

through the end of the month. 
7 

ii. Manipulation of the Benchmarks and Associated 

Futures and Swaps 

During the Relevant Period, on hundreds of occasions, Glencore manipulated or 

attempted to manipulate the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark, and attempted to manipulate the 

U.S. Gulf Coast HSFO Benchmark, the New York Harbor LSFO Benchmark, and the New York 

Harbor HSFO Benchmark, and thereby the derivatives such as swaps and futures that settled to 

the benchmarks, in order to increase Glencore’s profits (or reduce losses) from its derivatives 

and physical trades that priced by reference to the benchmark. Such trading conduct was a 

regular practice at Glencore, and supervisors were aware of and at times directly involved in the 

conduct. 

In the Los Angeles fuel oil market, Glencore did so in order to increase Glencore’s profits 

on the Cargo Trades and JV Cargo Trades priced by reference to the Los Angeles Bunker 

Benchmark, including by distorting the prices of the Cargo Trades in Glencore’s favor, and by 

distorting the prices of the JV Cargo Trades in the JV’s favor. Typically, in furtherance of the 

manipulation, Glencore submitted generally increasing bids or generally decreasing offers to 

Platts during the trading window, which Platts then reported to its subscribers. In addition, 

Glencore personnel at times conveyed misleadingly incomplete, “cherrypicked,” or inaccurate 

information to Platts outside the window, such as information regarding Glencore personnel’s 

purported views of the market conditions or of supply and demand, knowing that such 

information could and did influence Platts’s assessment. By such conduct, Glencore intended to 

create, and did create, artificially high (or artificially low) Los Angeles Bunker Benchmarks on 

Cargo Pricing Days and JV Pricing Days not reflective of legitimate forces of supply and 

demand, so that Glencore could sell cargos to the SOE at artificially high prices (or so that 

Glencore could buy cargos from the SOE at artificially low prices). 

In the U.S. Gulf Coast and New York Harbor fuel oil markets, Glencore engaged in the 

manipulative conduct in order to increase Glencore’s profits (or reduce losses) from its net 

exposure to the U.S. Gulf Coast HSFO Benchmark, the New York Harbor LSFO Benchmark, 

and the New York Harbor HSFO Benchmark arising from derivatives such as futures and swaps, 

as well as from physical trades priced by reference to the benchmarks. Typically, in furtherance 

of the manipulative conduct, as in the West Coast, during months when its net exposure to the 

benchmark was significant, Glencore submitted generally increasing bids or generally decreasing 

offers to Platts during the trading window, which Platts then reported to its subscribers. By such 

conduct, Glencore intended to create artificially high (or artificially low) benchmarks not 

reflective of legitimate forces of supply and demand, so that Glencore’s derivatives and physical 

positions would settle or price at levels more favorable to Glencore. 

As a result of the manipulative conduct, Glencore earned millions of dollars in additional 

profits or savings. 

iii. Examples 

The following are examples of the hundreds of instances of manipulative conduct in the 

U.S. West Coast, U.S. Gulf Coast, and New York Harbor markets. Glencore acted with the 

intent to manipulate the relevant benchmarks, and in the U.S. Gulf Coast and New York Harbor 
8 

markets, derivatives priced by reference to the relevant benchmarks, and to create an artificial 

price, and at times succeeded in creating artificial prices. 

Los Angeles. In or around May 2013, Glencore entered into a Cargo Trade for the sale of 

approximately 40,000 metric tons of fuel oil to the SOE, priced by reference to the average Los 

Angeles Bunker Benchmark on May 28, 29, and 30, 2013. Trader-1 directed a Glencore 

employee to submit bids to Platts during the window, and to increase the prices of those bids. 

The Glencore employee did so approximately 27 times on May 28, 23 times on May 29, and 9 

times on May 30, 2013. This trading activity led to an artificial Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark 

on each day that was significantly higher than the day’s starting peg, to the benefit of Glencore’s 

positions in the Cargo Trade that priced on those days.5

 Glencore’s activity in the window on the 

Cargo Pricing Days of May 28, 29, and 30, 2013, resulted in substantial improper additional 

revenue to Glencore. 

Los Angeles. In or around October 2015, Glencore entered into two Cargo Trades 

together consisting of the purchase of approximately 40,000 metric tons of fuel oil from the 

SOE. Both trades were priced by reference to the average daily Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark 

on October 23, 26, and 27, 2015. Trader-1 directed a Glencore employee to submit offers to 

Platts during the window, and to decrease the prices of those offers. The Glencore employee did 

so approximately 39 times on October 23, 38 times on October 26, and 22 times on October 27, 

2015. This trading activity led to an artificial Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark on each day that 

was significantly lower than the day’s starting peg, to the benefit of Glencore’s positions in the 

Cargo Trades that priced on those days.6

 Glencore’s activity in the window on the Cargo Pricing 

Days of October 23, 26, and 27, 2015, resulted in substantial improper savings to Glencore. 

United States Gulf Coast. In or around November 2012, Glencore had long exposure to 

the average daily Platts USGC HSFO Benchmark for that month in excess of 8,800,000 barrels. 

An increase of the month average benchmark thus would generate extra revenue to Glencore. 

The exposure arose from both derivatives such as swaps and futures related to the benchmark 

that month, and from Glencore’s physical trades that were priced by reference to the benchmark 

during the month. To benefit that exposure, Glencore traders reported bids and raised bids to 

Platts approximately 728 times that month, and reported approximately 59 cargo purchases. 

Glencore was highly active on the buy-side of the Platts window, comprising the majority of all 

bids and raised bids that month. Glencore’s activity in the window on that month was intended 

to manipulate upward the daily Platts USGC HSFO benchmark, and the numerous derivatives 

 

5

 On May 28, 2013, Platts assessed the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark at or around $26.50 above the day’s starting 

peg of $585 per metric ton. On May 29, 2013, Platts assessed the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark at $23.00 above 

the day’s starting peg of $607.50 per metric ton. And on May 30, 2013, Platts assessed the Los Angeles Bunker 

Benchmark at $8.50 above the day’s starting peg of $628.50 per metric ton. The Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark 

thus was assessed at an average of $19.33 above the peg on those three days. 

6

 On October 23, 2015, Platts assessed the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark at $39.50 below the day’s starting peg of 

$230 per metric ton. On October 26, 2015, Platts assessed the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark at $38.00 below the 

day’s starting peg of $230 per metric ton. On October 27, 2015, Platts assessed the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark 

at $22.00 below the day’s starting peg of $210 per metric ton. The Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark was assessed at 

an average of $33.17 below the peg on those three days. 
9 

such as swaps and futures settled by reference to the benchmark, potentially resulting in 

substantial improper revenue to Glencore.7

United States Gulf Coast. In or around July 2018, Glencore had short exposure to the 

average daily Platts USGC HSFO Benchmark for that month in excess of 4,000,000 barrels. A 

decrease of the month average benchmark thus would generate extra revenue to Glencore. The 

exposure arose from both derivatives such as swaps and futures related to the benchmark that 

month, and from Glencore’s physical trades that were priced by reference to the benchmark 

during the month. To benefit that exposure, Glencore traders reported offers and lowered offers 

to Platts approximately 530 times that month, and reported approximately 26 cargo sales. 

Glencore was highly active on the sell-side of the Platts window, comprising the majority of all 

offers and lowered offers that month. Glencore’s activity in the window on that month was 

intended to manipulate lower the daily Platts USGC HSFO benchmark, and the numerous 

derivatives such as swaps and futures settled by reference to the benchmark, potentially resulting 

in substantial improper revenue to Glencore.8 

New York Harbor. In or around December 2016, Glencore had long exposure to the 

average daily Platts New York LSFO benchmark for that month in excess of 450,000 barrels. 

An increase of the month average benchmark thus would generate extra revenue to Glencore. 

The exposure arose from derivatives such as swaps and futures related to the benchmark that 

month. To benefit that exposure, Glencore traders reported bids and raised bids to Platts 

approximately 70 times on certain days that month. Glencore was highly active on the buy-side 

of the Platts window on those days, comprising the majority of all bids and raised bids. 

Glencore’s activity in the window on that month was intended to manipulate higher the daily 

Platts New York LSFO Benchmark, and the numerous derivatives such as swaps and futures 

settled in reference to the benchmark, potentially resulting in improper revenue to Glencore.9 

New York Harbor. In or around September 2016, Glencore had long exposure to the 

average daily Platts New York HSFO Benchmark for that month of nearly 800,000 barrels. An 

increase of the month average benchmark thus would generate extra revenue to Glencore. The 

exposure arose from both derivatives such as swaps and futures related to the benchmark that 

month, and from Glencore’s physical trades that were priced by reference to the benchmark 

during the month. To benefit that exposure, Glencore traders reported bids and raised bids to 

Platts approximately 107 times on certain days that month, and reported approximately 5 cargo 

purchases. Glencore was highly active on the buy-side of the Platts window on those days, 

comprising the majority of all bids and raised bids. Glencore’s activity in the window on those 

 

7

 On October 31, 2012, Platts assessed the USGC HSFO Benchmark at $92.10 per barrel. The average daily Platts 

USGC HSFO Benchmark for the month of November 2012 was approximately $92.93 per barrel. 

8

 On June 29, 2018, Platts assessed the USGC HSFO Benchmark at $70.28 per barrel. The average daily Platts 

USGC HSFO Benchmark for the month of July 2018 was approximately $67.16 per barrel. 

9

 On November 30, 2016, Platts assessed the New York Harbor LSFO Benchmark at $43.81 per barrel. The average 

daily Platts New York Harbor HSFO Benchmark for the month of December 2016 was approximately $47.32 per 

barrel. 
10 

days was intended to manipulate higher the daily Platts New York HSFO Benchmark, and the 

numerous derivatives such as swaps and futures settled by reference to the benchmark, 

potentially resulting in substantial improper revenue to Glencore.10 

* * * 

By manipulating or attempting to manipulate these U.S. benchmarks, Glencore also 

manipulated and distorted, or was attempting to manipulate and distort, other benchmarks that 

were assessed directly or indirectly by reference to these benchmarks, as well as numerous 

futures, swaps, and other derivatives and physical trades that price by reference to the 

benchmarks. This would be to the detriment of market participants that had opposite exposure 

(including Glencore’s counterparties), or who looked to rely on the benchmarks as a fair price 

reference for physical or derivatives trades, including U.S. futures contracts and swaps. 

b. Fraud and Corrupt Practices 

i. Misappropriation of Confidential Information 

At various times during the Relevant Period and the Charging Period, directly and 

through intermediaries, Glencore improperly obtained nonpublic information from employees 

and agents of the SOEs, including in Mexico. This information was material to Glencore’s 

business and trading, such as transactions with the SOE as well as derivatives trading. SOE 

agents who had access to confidential information—and who owed a duty to the SOE under law 

and applicable employment policies to keep the information confidential—disclosed nonpublic 

information, including information material to Glencore’s transactions with the SOE or to related 

physical and derivatives trading, to Glencore. Glencore traders in knowing possession of the 

confidential information then entered into related physical transactions and derivatives 

transactions and otherwise used the information in their business, including U.S.-based 

transactions and business. 

Glencore traders understood the sensitivity of improperly obtained confidential 

information and took steps to maintain it in confidence and ensure that the SOE would not learn 

they had it in their possession. For example, as one Glencore staff cautioned a Glencore trader 

regarding improperly obtained information: “this is confidential and [the SOE] doesn’t know we 

have this [information] available.” 

Glencore traders considered the information material to certain of Glencore’s trading and 

business decisions such as in formulating business and negotiation strategies. For example, in or 

around October 2013, Glencore personnel including a U.S.-based Glencore trader used 

information obtained from an SOE explicitly acknowledged as “confidential” to analyze the 

economics of a potential project relating to the SOE and determine potential positions that 

Glencore could take in negotiations with the SOE. This economic analysis was prepared for a 

meeting with the global head of the Glencore oil department, among others. At times, the 

 

10 On August 31, 2016, Platts assessed the New York Harbor HSFO Benchmark at $35.39 per barrel. The average 

daily Platts New York Harbor HSFO Benchmark for the month of September 2016 was approximately $38.08 per 

barrel. 
11 

confidential information was disseminated among Glencore oil traders and personnel, including 

Glencore traders in the United States, London, and Singapore, for use in related physical and 

derivatives transactions and otherwise in their business. 

ii. Corrupt Payments for Preferential Treatment and 

Trades 

At various times during the Relevant Period and the Charging Period, Glencore, by and 

through its traders and agents, made corrupt payments to employees and agents working at SOEs 

of Brazil, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Venezuela.11 Glencore or its affiliates made the corrupt 

payments in exchange for improper preferential treatment and access to trades with the SOEs. 

Glencore’s conduct was designed to increase Glencore’s profits from certain physical and 

derivatives trading in oil markets around the world, including U.S. physical and derivatives 

markets. Glencore engaged in this corrupt conduct in connection with derivatives such as swaps 

and futures contracts subject to the rules of Commission-registered entities, as well as trades with 

U.S. counterparties, and at times during the Relevant Period and the Charging Period, Glencore 

personnel engaged in aspects of the scheme from the United States. The corrupt conduct was 

widespread within Glencore’s oil business, and supervisors were aware of and at times directly 

involved in the corruption. 

To conceal the corruption, the corrupt payments at times were in large amounts of cash, 

and in some instances, corrupt payments also were invoiced through third-party companies, with 

deceptive invoices to Glencore for euphemistic costs or services such as “advance payment,” 

“marketing services,” or “commission.” Glencore traders and intermediaries at times used coded 

language such as “filings,” “newspapers,” or “chocolates” when referring to the corrupt 

payments. 

Regarding trading involving Nigeria and Cameroon, from at least as early as 2007 

through at least 2015, Glencore made corrupt payments to SOE agents over several years 

amounting to millions of dollars in exchange for preferential treatment and access to more than 

100 oil cargo trades, including crude oil. Regarding trading involving Venezuela, from at least 

in or around 2012 to in or around 2014, Glencore via an intermediary made corrupt payments to 

SOE agents relating to demurrage and late fees arising from trades of oil and oil products with 

the relevant SOE. Regarding Brazil, during the Relevant Period, Glencore made corrupt 

payments via intermediaries to SOE agents in exchange for, among other things, preferential 

treatment and access to trades. 

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

A. Manipulative or Deceptive Device or Contrivance in Violation of 

Section 6(c)(1) of the Act and Regulation 180.1 

Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9, and Regulation 180.1, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2021), 

prohibit the use or attempted use of any manipulative or deceptive device, untrue or misleading 

statements or omissions, or deceptive practice, in connection with any swap or contract of sale of 

 

11 Similar conduct occurred during the Relevant Period in Equatorial Guinea and Ivory Coast. 
12 

any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery. Specifically, 

Regulation 180.1(a)(1)–(3) makes it: 

[U]nlawful . . . , directly or indirectly, in connection with any swap, 

or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or 

contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 

registered entity, to intentionally or recklessly (1) [u]se . . . or 

attempt to use . . . any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to 

defraud; (2) [m]ake, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading 

statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 

necessary in order to make the statements made not untrue or 

misleading; (3) [e]ngage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, 

or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or 

deceit upon any person. 

Section 6(c) of the Act and Regulation 180.1 prohibit fraud or manipulation. CFTC v. 

Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. 966, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding, in the context of leveraged 

transactions, “the CFTC may sue for fraudulently deceptive activity regardless of whether it was 

also manipulative.”).

To establish fraud or manipulation in violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act and 

Regulation 180.1(a)(1)–(3), the Commission must establish that Respondents: (1) attempted to 

engage or engaged in prohibited fraudulent or manipulative conduct (i.e., employed a 

manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; made a material misrepresentation, 

misleading statement or deceptive omission; or engaged in a business practice that would operate 

as a fraud); (2) with scienter; and (3) in connection with any swap, or contract of sale of any 

commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of 

any registered entity. CFTC v. McDonnell, 332 F. Supp. 3d 641, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); In re 

McVean Trading, CFTC No. 17–15, 2017 WL 2729956, at *10 (June 21, 2017) (consent order); 

see also CFTC v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018). 

For manipulative conduct, Section 6(c)(1) of the Act and Regulation 180.1 do not require 

the showing of an intent to affect prices or an actual effect on prices. E.g., McVean Trading, 

2017 WL 2729956, at *10; In re Grady, CFTC No. 18–41, 2018 WL 4697026, at *5 (Sept. 26, 

2018) (consent order) (internal citations omitted). Nor does either require “a showing of reliance 

or harm to market participants in a government action brought under CEA section 6(c)(1) and 

final Rule 180.1.” McVean Trading, 2017 WL 2729956, at *10. The Commission “will consider 

all relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether a violation of Section 6(c)(1) and 

Regulation 180.1 has occurred.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

Glencore violated Section 6(c)(1) of the Act and Regulation 180.1, among other ways, in 

connection with swaps, contracts of sale of a commodity in interstate commerce, and contracts 

for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, by intentionally or 

recklessly: (1) submitting manipulative bids and offers and otherwise engaging in manipulative 

trading activity relating to Platts physical fuel oil price benchmarks associated futures and swaps, 

in order to benefit, among other positions, physical positions and related derivatives positions 
13 

held on U.S. derivatives markets12; (2) using misappropriated and corruptly obtained nonpublic 

information material to, for example, Glencore’s trading of physical oil products and related 

derivatives contracts13; and (3) obtaining improper preferential treatment and access to trades 

from agents of its counterparties as a result of corrupt payments to benefit its trading of physical 

oil products and related derivatives contracts in the global oil markets, including in the United 

States, and thereby defrauding its counterparties and harming other market participants.14 

 

12 In re Vitol Inc., CFTC No. 21–01, 2020 WL 7258884, at *8 (Dec. 3, 2020) (consent order) (finding Respondents 

employed a manipulative device by “submitting manipulative bids and offers and otherwise engaging in 

manipulative trading activity relating to Platts . . . benchmarks . . . to attempt to benefit” related physical and 

derivatives positions); In re Total Gas & Power N. Am. , Inc., CFTC No. 16–03, 2015 WL 8296610, at *9 (Dec. 7, 

2015) (consent order) (finding “Respondents intentionally employed a manipulative device by purchasing and/or 

selling large volumes of fixed-price natural gas at the relevant hubs before and during bid-week that were intended 

to benefit . . . related financial positions); see McVean Trading, 2017 WL 2729956, at *10 (internal citations 

omitted); In re Goldman Sachs Group, CFTC No. 17–03, 2016 WL 7429257, at *23 n. 11 (Dec. 21, 2016) (consent 

order) (“Irrespective of whether the Goldman traders had an interest in hedging, the traders engaged in attempted 

manipulation when they placed bids and offers or executed trades . . . with the improper intent to move the 

[benchmark rate] in Goldman’s favor” to benefit related positions); see also SEC v. Lek Sec. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 3d 

49, 58–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (conduct injecting “false pricing signals into the market” or designed to deceive or 

mislead market participants as to how others have valued the traded item may constitute manipulation under the 

securities laws, even if otherwise legal or done in open market) (citation omitted). 

13 CFTC v. EOX Holdings L.L.C., 405 F. Supp. 3d 697, 708-16 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (finding complaint charging 

intentional or reckless trading on basis of, and tipping of, material nonpublic information in breach of a pre-existing 

duty to source stated claim under Section 6(c)(1) of the Act and Regulation 180.1); see also United States v. 

Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 30–37 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding misappropriation of confidential nonpublic information 

constituted fraud in violation of various federal fraud statutes) (citations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 2021 

WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286–89 (2d Cir. 2012) (addressing tipper and tippee liability 

in context of SEC Rule 10b–5) (citations omitted). 

14 Vitol, 2020 WL 7258884, at *8 (trading house’s deceptive scheme to obtain preferential treatment and access to 

trades from counterparties through corrupt payments violated Section 6(c)(1) of the Act and Regulation 180.1); In re 

Sogemin Metals Inc., CFTC No. 00–04, 2000 WL 136059, at *1–4 (Feb. 7, 2000) (consent order) (holding broker’s 

kickback scheme “defrauded the . . . clients [two Chilean government-owned metals companies] within the meaning 

of Section 4b of the Act and Section 30.9 of the Regulations,” where broker of London Metal Exchange’s trades 

failed to disclose the kickback scheme involving brokerage commission payments channeled to, among others, the 

Chilean companies’ employees or to their family members); see also Riordan v. S.E.C., 627 F.3d 1230, 1230–34 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming finding of liability, where scheme to provide bribes and kickbacks—in exchange for 

being directed business, seeing competitors’ bids outside the normal competitive bidding process, and ability to 

submit bids outside the normal competitive bidding process, such as past due date—constituted scheme to defraud in 

violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(b), 17(a), and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5) (Kavanaugh, J.), abrogated on other grounds by 

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017); S.E.C. v. Zwick, 2007 WL 831812, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding scheme 

to provide bribes, kickbacks, and items of value to a third party’s employee, in exchange for that employee directing 

trades to payer of bribe, constituted “scheme to defraud” in violation of Exchange Act §§ 17(a) and 10(b), and 

S.E.C. Rule 10b-5), aff’d, S.E.C. v. Zwick, 317 Fed. Appx. 34 (2d Cir. 2008). 
14 

B. Price Manipulation in Violation of Sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, and 

Regulation 180.2 

Section 9(a)(2) of the Act makes it unlawful for “[a]ny person to manipulate or attempt to 

manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or 

subject to the rules of any registered entity.” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). 

Section 6(c)(3) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(3), prohibits the manipulation or attempted 

manipulation of the price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future 

delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, and Regulation 180.2 makes it 

“unlawful . . . directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any 

swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the 

rules of any registered entity.” 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2021). 

Glencore specifically intended to manipulate the Los Angeles Bunker Benchmark, the 

New York LSFO Benchmark, the New York HSFO Benchmark, and the USGC HSFO 

Benchmark, and associated derivatives such as futures and swaps, in order to benefit, among 

other things, Glencore’s related physical and derivatives positions, including swaps, futures on or 

subject to the rules of entities registered with the Commission, and physical contracts that were 

priced by reference to benchmarks. In furtherance of that intent, Glencore traders and personnel 

submitted bids, offers, and trades to Platts during the benchmark trading windows in order to 

skew the relevant Platts benchmark, and consequently the value of Glencore’s positions that 

were priced by reference to the benchmark, in Glencore’s favor. Through these actions, among 

others, traders and others at Glencore could, and at times did in Los Angeles, cause artificial 

prices in the benchmarks and thus the associated derivatives and physical trades. By this 

conduct, Respondents violated Sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act and Regulation 180.2. 

C. False, Misleading, or Inaccurate Reports Concerning Oil Products, in 

Violation of Sections 9(a)(2) and 6(c)(1)(A) of the Act, and 

Regulation 180.1(a)(4) 

Section 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2), makes it unlawful for any person 

“knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate 

commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or other means of communication false or 

misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions 

that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.”15 

 

15 See also United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 703-05 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming conviction for false reporting of 

natural gas trades in violation of the Act and finding that “it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury’ 

would have found that the Defendants-Appellants had knowledge that their reports affected or tended to affect the 

price of natural gas”); United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352, 354-57 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing and remanding to 

the district court and holding that the knowledge requirement of the reporting prong of Section 9(a)(2) of the Act 

applies to the false or misleading character of the reports, as well as to delivery and inaccuracy); CFTC v. Johnson, 

408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding that the facts alleged in the CFTC’s complaint adequately stated 

a claim against the defendants for the delivery of knowingly inaccurate market information); In re Bunge Global 

Markets, Inc., CFTC No. 11–10, 2011 WL 1099346, at *4 (March 22, 2011) (consent order) (Respondents violated 

Section 9(a)(2) by delivering false and misleading electronic orders on a DCM’s trading platform). 
15 

Section 6(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1)(A), and Regulation 180.1(a)(4), 

17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(4) (2021), similarly prohibit intentionally or recklessly making false or 

misleading reports of market information. Specifically, Regulation 180.1(a)(4) makes it: 

unlawful . . . directly or indirectly, in connection with any swap, or 

contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or 

contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 

registered entity, to intentionally or recklessly . . . deliver or cause 

to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be delivered, for 

transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, . . . a false or 

misleading or inaccurate report concerning . . . market information 

or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity 

in interstate commerce. 

During the Relevant Period, Glencore, through electronic, telephonic, and other means of 

communication, knowingly, and intentionally or recklessly, caused to be delivered bids, offers, 

and trades, as well as information concerning market activity and views of supply and demand, 

to Platts, the service that determined various benchmark price assessments, such as the Los 

Angeles Bunker Benchmark, the New York LSFO Benchmark, the New York HSFO 

Benchmark, and the USGC HSFO Benchmark. Such market information affected or tended to 

affect the prices of commodities in interstate commerce, including the prices of the assessments 

themselves, prices of contracts of sale of commodities that priced by reference to those 

assessments such as fuel oil and bunker fuel, and the futures, swaps, and other financial 

instruments that settled in reference to assessments. Respondents’ reported bids, offers, and 

trades, and other information, constituted false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate reports 

because they did not reflect legitimate forces of supply or demand, but rather reflected 

Glencore’s desire to distort the relevant benchmark price assessments and associated derivatives 

higher or lower in order to benefit their related physical, futures, and/or swaps positions, 

including at times those entered into while in possession of misappropriated information and/or 

entered into through fraudulent means. Glencore knew that these reports contained false, 

misleading, or knowingly inaccurate information. 

Accordingly, Respondents violated Sections 6(c)(1)(A) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, and 

Regulation 180.1(a)(4). 

IV. FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS 

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondents violated Sections 

6(c)(1), 6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13(a)(2), and 

Regulations 180.1 and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 (2021). 

V. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT 

Respondents have submitted the Offer in which Respondents, without admitting or 

denying the findings and conclusions herein, except to the extent that Respondents admit those 

findings in any related action against Respondents by, or any agreement with, the United States 

Department of Justice or any other governmental agency or office, or to the extent those findings 
16 

are admitted in In re Emilio Heredia Collado, CFTC No. 21-04, 2021 WL 2182105, (Mar. 25, 

2021) (consent order): 

A. Acknowledge service of this Order; 

B. Admit the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to all matters set forth in 

this Order and for any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the 

Commission based on violation of or enforcement of this Order; 

C. Waive: 

1. The filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing; 

2. A hearing; 

3. All post-hearing procedures; 

4. Judicial review by any court; 

5. Any and all objections to the participation by any member of the 

Commission’s staff in the Commission’s consideration of the Offer; 

6. Any and all claims that Respondents may possess under the Equal Access 

to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and/or the rules 

promulgated by the Commission in conformity therewith, Part 148 of the 

Regulations, 17 C.F.R. pt. 148 (2021), relating to, or arising from, this 

proceeding; 

7. Any and all claims that Respondents may possess under the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–

121, §§ 201–253, 110 Stat. 847, 857–68 (codified as amended in scattered 

sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), relating to, or arising from, this 

proceeding; and 

8. Any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding 

or the entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary 

penalty or any other relief; 

D. Stipulate that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely 

of the findings contained in this Order to which Respondents have consented in 

the Offer; 

E. Consent, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission’s entry of this Order 

that: 

1. Makes findings by the Commission that Respondents violated Sections 

6(c)(1), 6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 
17 

9(1)(A), 9(3), 13(a)(2), and Regulations 180.1 and 180.2, 

17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 (2021)); 

2. Orders Respondents to cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(1), 

6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 

13(a)(2), and Regulations 180.1 and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 

(2021); 

3. Orders Respondents to pay, jointly and severally, a civil monetary penalty 

in the amount of eight hundred sixty-five million, six hundred thirty 

thousand, seven hundred eighty-four dollars ($865,630,784), plus any 

post-judgment interest, within ten (10) business days of the date of entry 

of this Order; 

4. Orders Respondents and their successors and assigns to comply with the 

conditions and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set forth in 

Part VI of this Order, including but not limited to the undertaking by 

Respondents to pay, jointly and severally, disgorgement in the amount of 

three hundred twenty million, seven hundred fifteen thousand, sixty-six 

dollars ($320,715,066) plus any post-judgment interest, within ten (10) 

business days of the date of entry of this Order; and 

5. Provides that the civil monetary penalty obligation and the disgorgement 

obligation (collectively, the “Monetary Sanction”) of one billion, one 

hundred eighty-six million, three hundred forty-five thousand, eight 

hundred fifty dollars ($1,186,345,850) will be offset, up to eight hundred 

fifty-two million, seven hundred ninety-seven thousand, eight hundred ten 

dollars ($852,797,810), by the amount of any payment made pursuant to 

the resolutions concerning manipulation and corruption between 

Respondents and the United States Department of Justice dated on or 

around May 24, 2022 (the “Criminal Resolutions”). 

Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer. 

* * * 

VI. ORDER 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

A. Respondents shall cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(1), 6(c)(1)(A), 

6(c)(3), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13(a)(2), and 

Regulations 180.1 and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 (2021)); 

B. Respondents shall pay, jointly and severally, a civil monetary penalty in in the 

amount of eight hundred sixty-five million, six hundred thirty thousand, seven 

hundred eighty-four dollars ($865,630,784), plus post-judgment interest, within 

ten (10) business days of the date of entry of this Order (the “CMP Obligation”). 

If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full or otherwise satisfied within ten business 
18 

days of the date of entry of this Order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue on 

the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be 

determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this 

Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

The Monetary Sanction of one billion, one hundred eighty-six million, three 

hundred forty-five thousand, eight hundred fifty dollars ($1,186,345,850) will be 

offset, up to eight hundred fifty-two million, seven hundred ninety-seven 

thousand, eight hundred ten dollars ($852,797,810), by the amount of any 

payment made pursuant to the Criminal Resolutions. Respondents shall provide 

(to the persons and addresses listed below) proof of any payment under the 

Criminal Resolutions, including the case name(s) and number(s) in connection 

with which such payment has been made, and the amount by which the Monetary 

Sanction is to be reduced, within ten business days of making such payment. 

Respondents shall pay the CMP Obligation, except for any portion satisfied by 

offset, and any post-judgment interest by electronic funds transfer, U.S. postal 

money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check, or bank money order. If 

payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the payment 

shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to 

the address below: 

MMAC/ESC/AMK326 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Division of Enforcement 

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 

HQ Room 181 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

(405) 954-6569 office 

(405) 954-1620 fax 

9-AMC-AR-CFTC@faa.gov 

If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondents shall contact 

the email address 9-AMC-AR-CFTC@faa.gov to receive payment instructions 

and shall fully comply with those instructions. Respondents shall accompany 

payment of the CMP Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the Respondents 

and the name and docket number of this proceeding. The Respondents shall 

simultaneously transmit copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the 

Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three 

Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20581. 

C. Respondents and their successors and assigns shall comply with the following 

conditions and undertakings set forth in the Offer: 
19 

1. Monitor 

Respondents agree to retain independent compliance monitor(s) pursuant to 

the terms described in the Criminal Resolutions and Attachment(s) D thereto.

2. Public Statements 

Respondents agree that neither Respondents nor any of Respondents’ 

successors and assigns, agents, or employees under Respondents’ 

authority or control shall take any action or make any public statement on 

behalf of Respondents or any of Respondents’ affiliates denying, directly 

or indirectly, any findings or conclusions in this Order or creating, or 

tending to create, the impression that this Order is without a factual basis; 

provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall affect 

Respondents’: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal 

positions in other proceedings to which the Commission is not a party. 

Respondents and Respondents’ successors and assigns shall comply with 

this agreement, and shall undertake all steps necessary to ensure that all of 

its agents and/or employees under its authority or control understand and 

comply with this agreement. The parties understand and agree that, to the 

extent that the Commission brings an enforcement action against any 

employee or agent of Respondents arising from the same nexus of facts as 

this Order, this provision shall not apply to actions or public statements by 

such employee made in connection with that enforcement action. 

3. Disgorgement 

Respondents shall pay, jointly and severally, disgorgement in the amount 

of three hundred twenty million, seven hundred fifteen thousand, sixty-six 

dollars ($320,715,066) plus post-judgment interest, within ten (10) 

business days of the date of entry of this Order (the “Disgorgement 

Obligation”). If the Disgorgement Obligation is not paid in full or 

otherwise satisfied within ten business days of the date of the entry of this 

Order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue on the Disgorgement 

Obligation beginning on the date following the entry of this Order and 

shall be determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date 

of entry of this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

Respondents shall pay the Disgorgement Obligation, except for any 

portion satisfied by offset, and any post-judgment interest by electronic 

funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier’s 

check, or bank money order. If payment is to be made other than by 

electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be made payable to the 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address below: 
20 

MMAC/ESC/AMK326 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Division of Enforcement 

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 

HQ Room 181 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

(405) 954-6569 office 

(405) 954-1620 fax 

9-AMC-AR-CFTC@faa.gov 

If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondents shall 

contact the email address 9-AMC-AR-CFTC@faa.gov to receive payment 

instructions and shall fully comply with those instructions. Respondents 

shall accompany payment of the Disgorgement Obligation with a cover 

letter that identifies the Respondents and the name and docket number of 

this proceeding. The Respondents shall simultaneously transmit copies of 

the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 

21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20581. 

4. Cooperation with the Commission 

Respondents shall cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Commission, 

including the Division, in this action, and in any current or future 

Commission investigation or action related thereto. Respondents shall 

also cooperate in any investigation, civil litigation, or administrative 

matter related to or arising from, this action. As part of such cooperation, 

Respondents agree to do the following for a period of three (3) years from 

the date of the entry of this Order, or until all related investigations and 

litigations in which the Commission, including the Division, is a party, are 

concluded, including through the appellate review process, whichever 

period is longer: 

a. Preserve all records relating to the subject matter of this 

proceeding, including, but not limited to, audio files, electronic 

mail, other documented communications, and trading records; 

b. Comply fully, promptly, completely, and truthfully with all 

inquiries and requests for non-privileged information or 

documents, subject to applicable laws and regulations; 

c. Provide authentication of documents and other evidentiary 

material; 

d. Provide copies of non-privileged documents within Respondents’ 

possession, custody, or control, subject to applicable laws and 

regulations; 
21 

e. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, make Respondents’ 

best efforts to produce any current (as of the time of the request) 

officer, director, employee, or agent of any Respondent, regardless 

of the individual’s location, and at such location that minimizes 

Commission travel expenditures, to provide assistance at any trial, 

proceeding, or Commission investigation related to the subject 

matter of this proceeding, including, but not limited to, requests for 

testimony, depositions, and/or interviews, and to encourage them 

to testify completely and truthfully in any such proceeding, trial, or 

investigation; 

f. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, make Respondents’ 

best efforts to assist in locating and contacting any prior (as of the 

time of the request) officer, director, employee, or agent of any 

Respondent; and 

g. Respondents also agree that they will not undertake any act that 

would limit their ability to cooperate fully with the Commission. 

Respondents will designate an agent located in the United States of 

America to receive all requests for information pursuant to these 

Undertakings, and shall provide notice regarding the identity of 

such Agent to the Division upon entry of this Order. Should any 

Respondent seek to change the designated agent to receive such 

requests, notice of such intention shall be given to the Division 

fourteen (14) days before it occurs. Any person designated to 

receive such request shall be located in the United States of 

America. 

5. Prohibited or Conflicting Undertakings 

Should the Undertakings herein be prohibited by, or be contrary to, the 

provisions of any obligations imposed on Respondents by any presently 

existing, or hereinafter enacted or promulgated laws, rules, regulations, or 

regulatory mandates, then Respondents shall promptly transmit notice to 

the Commission (through the Division) of such prohibition or conflict, and 

shall meet and confer in good faith with the Commission (through the 

Division) to reach an agreement regarding possible modifications to the 

Undertakings herein sufficient to resolve such inconsistent obligations. In 

the interim, Respondents will abide by the obligations imposed by the 

laws, rules, regulations, and regulatory mandates. Nothing in these 

Undertakings shall limit, restrict, or narrow any obligations pursuant to the 

Act or the Regulations, including, but not limited to, Regulations 1.31 and 

1.35, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 1.35 (2021), in effect now or in the future. 
6. Partial Satisfaction 

Respondents understand and agree that any acceptance by the Commission 

of any partial payment of the CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a 

waiver of Respondents' obligation to make further payments pursuant to 

this Order, or a waiver of the Commission's right to seek to compel 

payment of any remaining balance. 

7. Change of Address/Phone 

Until such time as Respondents satisfy in full the CMP Obligation as set 

forth in this Order, Respondents shall provide written notice to the 

Commission by certified mail of any change to its telephone number and 

mailing address within ten calendar days of the change. 

8. Bankruptcy Notice 

Until such time as Respondents satisfy in full their Disgorgement 

Obligation and CMP Obligation, upon the commencement by or against 

Respondents of insolvency, receivership or bankruptcy proceedings or any 

other proceedings for the settlement of Respondents' debts, all notices to 

creditors required to be furnished to the Commission under Title 11 of the 

United States Code or other applicable law with respect to such 

insolvency, receivership bankruptcy or other proceedings, shall be sent to 

the address below: 

Secretary of the Commission 

Legal Division 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Three Lafayette Centre 

1155 21st Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20581 

* * * 

The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date. 

By the Commission. 

Dated: May 24, 2022 

Christopher J. K1rkpatrick 

Secretary of the Commission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

22