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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41836

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL 

RIGHTS OF JANE (2014-06) DOE.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE (2014-06) DOE,

Respondent-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 510

Filed: May 19, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Carolyn M. Minder, Magistrate. 

Decree terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender; Tahja L. Jensen, Deputy Public 

Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Marcy J. Spilker, Deputy Attorney 

General, Lewiston, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge

Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate’s decree terminating her parental rights to her two 

children. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 2012, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare filed a petition for hearing 

under the Child Protective Act (CPA). The petition identified two children, ages one and three, 

that the Department removed from Jane after law enforcement found the children to be in 

imminent danger. The petition requested that the children be placed in the Department’s custody 

due to neglect by Jane and the father (John Doe). Both parents waived their right to a shelter 

care hearing. The magistrate entered an order of temporary custody as to the parents, placing 
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both children in the Department’s custody. Jane and John signed stipulations vesting custody of 

the children in the Department. The magistrate entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

an order of legal custody as to the children. The magistrate also approved a case plan for each 

parent.

After the children had been in the Department’s custody for twelve months, the 

magistrate conducted a permanency hearing to review the plan for permanent placement of the 

children. At the hearing, the magistrate granted a three-month extension of foster care with the 

primary goal of returning the children home with Jane.

In October 2013, the Department filed a petition for termination alleging Jane and John 

neglected the children. Each parent responded to the petition. The magistrate held a trial on the 

termination petition over the course of two days. Jane and John appeared at trial, each with their 

respective attorneys. After trial, the magistrate entered a memorandum decision and order 

terminating the parental rights of both Jane and John. The magistrate concluded each had 

neglected the children and that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. Jane appeals.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In June 2012, officers responded to Jane’s home regarding a call from family members. 

The call indicated family members discovered the children unsupervised and naked. One child 

had feces on her and the other child had a bruise on her forehead and scratches on her leg. 

Officers discovered Jane intoxicated, passed out, and incapable of caring for the children. 

Officers also observed food items strewn about the kitchen and living room area. It appeared 

that the children attempted to feed themselves, and spilled the food in the process. Officers also 

discovered children’s clothing with fecal matter inside and fecal matter inside a bathtub. 

Officers arrested Jane for injury to a child, at which time Jane became combative and hostile 

toward officers.1

At the time of trial, the children were three and five years of age and had been in the 

Department’s custody for eighteen months. The magistrate heard testimony from twelve 

witnesses over the course of two days. Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence. The 

 

1 At the time the officers removed the children, John was incarcerated on convictions for 

domestic violence in the presence of children and violation of a no-contact order.
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magistrate found by clear and convincing evidence that Jane had neglected the children. 

Specifically, the magistrate found Jane was unable to discharge her responsibility to and for the 

children and, as a result of such inability, the children lacked the parental care necessary for their 

health, safety, and well-being. The magistrate also found Jane neglected the children by failing 

to comply with the magistrate’s orders or the case plan and determined it was in the best interest 

of the children to terminate Jane’s parental rights. Jane appeals.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 

341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible,

family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of 

due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 

383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a 

parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a 

fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a 

court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). See also I.C. § 16-2009; 

In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d 

at 652.

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable 

inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights 

be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test 

requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported 

by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. Doe v. 

Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally 
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understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 

certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate’s 

decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d 

at 600.

Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the 

parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five 

factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between 

the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or 

(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each 

statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 

1117.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Neglect

Jane argues the magistrate erred in concluding the Department proved the existence of 

neglect by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, Jane asserts the magistrate failed to 

consider the efforts Jane made to maintain sobriety, a stable home, and steady employment.

Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in 

I.C. § 16-1602(26), as well as situations where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s 

orders or the case plan in a CPA case, and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of 

the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been 

accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary 

or legal custody of the Department. Here, the magistrate found neglect under I.C. § 16-

1602(26)(b) and I.C. §§ 2002(3)(b)(i) and (ii). Each basis will be addressed in turn.

1. Inability to discharge parental responsibilities

Idaho Code Section 16-1602(26)(b) provides that “neglected” means a child, “[w]hose 

parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the 

child and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, 

safety or well-being.” The magistrate found that Jane was unable to discharge her parental 
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responsibilities and to provide proper parental care for her children. There is substantial and 

competent evidence to support this finding.

Jane’s failure to remain sober formulated the primary reason for her inability to parent. 

Throughout the CPA case, Jane exhibited a pattern of sobriety followed by repeated relapses 

with alcohol. Jane’s emotional instability exacerbated these problems. This history of problems 

with alcohol dated back before the Department declared the children to be in imminent danger. 

The record indicates Jane entered an alcohol treatment program in 2011, but the program 

discharged her for noncompliance. Jane engaged in a second treatment program in January 

2012. Again, the treatment program discharged her just one month later for noncompliance.

The incident leading to the injury to child charges reveals a glimpse into how severe 

Jane’s drinking problem was. On June 6, 2012, Jane began drinking at 3:00 a.m., and then went 

back to bed. When Jane awoke around 11:00 a.m., she took the children to the park. After this, 

she returned home and resumed drinking. At approximately 4:00 pm, officers responded to the 

home and discovered the children naked (one with feces on herself), food items strewn about the 

house, an unloaded shotgun in an area accessible to the children, clothing from one of the 

children with fecal matter inside, and fecal matter in the bathtub. Officers found Jane passed out, 

intoxicated, and incapable of providing care for the children.2

After the children were placed in the Department’s custody, Jane engaged in a third 

program for alcohol treatment. The program began in October 2012 and required Jane to attend 

counseling sessions and submit to random testing. Between October 2012 and December 2013, 

the program required that Jane take 114 drug tests. Jane failed to show up for 55 of these tests. 

As a result of these missed tests, Jane’s probation officer filed a probation violation charge one 

month before trial. Further, the timing of the missed tests demonstrates Jane experienced 

problems with alcohol right up to the time of trial. Jane missed tests scheduled in October, 

 

2 Jane takes issue with the magistrate’s finding that she was intoxicated when officers 

responded to the home. Jane contends the magistrate based this on information not adduced at 

trial but, rather, contained in the underlying CPA case. However, a review of the trial transcript 

belies this claim. An officer testified the police discovered Jane “passed out” in the home. The 

officer also testified he interviewed Jane the next day and that she appeared hung over and still 

smelled of alcohol. This is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s 

finding that Jane was intoxicated when officers responded to the home.
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November, and December of 2013--tests scheduled after the Department filed the petition for 

termination.

In addition to the missed tests, during July 2013, Jane tested positive for alcohol on three 

separate occasions. She admitted to alcohol use on these three occasions. One of these incidents 

occurred during an unsupervised visit between Jane and her children at a shelter for women and 

children. Workers discovered the children unsupervised in a community bathtub. When they 

confronted Jane about the incident, they observed signs of alcohol consumption. Jane denied any 

use. However, as the manager spoke with Jane, the manager could smell alcohol. When the 

manager informed Jane of this, she became very emotional. Two days later, Jane admitted to 

consuming alcohol that night. The substance abuse counselor from the shelter reported another 

incident in October 2013. At that time, Jane admitted to the counselor that she had been drinking 

for six days.

Furthermore, Jane suffered from emotional issues that went unmitigated throughout this 

period. Shortly after the children were placed in the Department’s custody, Jane had a 

psychological assessment. The assessment resulted in the recommendation that Jane complete 

substance abuse treatment, develop a specific plan for preventing relapse, and stay out of the 

abusive relationship with John. Jane failed to follow these recommendations. She continued 

drinking and continued to have contact with John, despite a no-contact order being in place. 

Jane’s emotional instability is highlighted at various points throughout the record. For example, 

when confronted about leaving her children unattended in the bathtub, Jane responded with an 

emotional outburst toward the worker at the shelter. Likewise, Jane’s caseworker testified that 

Jane left her a screaming voicemail message in the middle of the night. Also, after Jane told her 

caseworker she had been drinking for six days, Jane became belligerent and became verbally 

abusive to her caseworker. In addition, Jane was charged with driving under the influence and 

incurred probation violations in both Ada and Canyon Counties.

The foregoing facts demonstrate Jane failed to achieve sobriety, and as a result, was 

unable to provide the parental care necessary for the health, safety or well-being of the children. 

Thus, the magistrate’s finding of neglect under I.C. § 16-1602(26)(b) is supported by substantial 

and competent evidence.

2. Failure to comply with the case plan

Neglect may also occur where:
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The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan 

in a child protective act case and:

(i) The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for 

fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and

(ii) Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the 

fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of 

the department.

I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). It is undisputed that the Department had custody of the children for 

eighteen months at the time of trial. Thus, the sole issue is whether Jane failed to comply with 

the case plan.

When the Department removed the children from Jane’s home, she was not able to care 

for them due to her level of intoxication. Because of these circumstances, Jane’s case plan 

focused on substance abuse issues, sobriety, maintaining a safe and healthy home, and 

addressing mental health issues so that Jane could meet her children’s needs. The most 

important task of the case plan required Jane to stay sober and comply with alcohol and drug 

testing. Jane failed this task in all relevant aspects. She missed 55 of 114 tests, had three 

positive tests in July 2013, and admitted to drinking for six days straight in October 2013. While 

Jane submitted to a psychological evaluation, she failed to successfully complete the 

recommendations set forth in the evaluation. This evaluation, along with the case plan, 

instructed Jane not to have contact with John. Jane disregarded these instructions and had 

continued contact.

Jane contends the magistrate erred because she made progress in working toward 

sobriety, maintained employment, maintained housing, completed parenting classes, and 

attended group treatment. However, the crux of the magistrate’s ruling indicated Jane’s inability 

to remain sober made it impossible for her to properly care for the children. As to this task, Jane 

did not make progress, but rather failed miserably. Without Jane’s sobriety, her limited 

successes become insignificant. Even where a parent makes some progress on a case plan, 

termination is proper where the parent fails to meet the primary requirements of the plan. Idaho 

Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 151 Idaho 498, 502, 260 P.3d 1169, 1173 (2011). Here, the 

primary requirement of the plan was that Jane achieve sobriety. Thus, the magistrate’s finding of 

neglect under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) was supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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C. Best Interest of the Children

Jane contends the magistrate erred in concluding termination was in the best interest of 

the children. Specifically, Jane contends the magistrate erred because her visits with the children 

went well and she and the children are very affectionate. The Departmnet responds that 

substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s finding.

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 

determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). Expert testimony is 

not required to establish that termination would be in the child’s best interest. Doe v. Roe, 133 

Idaho 805, 809, 992 P.2d 1205, 1209 (1999). When determining whether termination is in the 

child’s best interest, the trial court may consider the stability and permanency of the home, the 

unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the 

child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the 

parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the 

law. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014); see Doe, 133 Idaho at 809-10, 

992 P.2d at 1209-10; Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 648, 837 P.2d 

319, 323 (Ct. App. 1992). A finding that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate 

parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds, supported by substantial and 

competent evidence. Doe, 152 Idaho at 957, 277 P.3d at 404.

For the reasons previously articulated above, termination was in the best interest of the 

children. During the course of proceedings, Jane not only failed to improve her situation, but 

continued to engage in the very conduct that led to the Department taking her children in the first 

place. Her inability to stay sober demonstrated termination was in the best interest of the 

children. Thus, the magistrate did not err.

V.

CONCLUSION

There is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s finding of neglect 

under I.C. § 16-1602(26)(b) and I.C. §§ 2002(3)(b)(i) and (ii) and that termination was in the 

best interest of the children. Accordingly, the magistrate’s decree terminating Jane’s parental

rights to her two children is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge LANSING, CONCUR.