IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

LAURA DANIELS and JOHN HALVERSON, No. 58952-4-II

Appellants,

v.

GEORGE SOMMERS, DBA INTERSTATE PUBLISHED OPINION

JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT, an

Individual, and DAVID SWANSON, an

individual,

Respondents.

MAXA, J. – Laura Daniels and John Halverson appeal the trial court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of George Sommers and David Swanson and dismissing all of 

Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims with prejudice based on a lack of specific personal jurisdiction.

In 2009, Daniels retained an attorney to handle her dissolution and child custody action in 

California. Daniels and Halverson later married, and they moved to Oregon and then to 

Vancouver, Washington. The attorney subsequently filed a complaint in a California court 

against Daniels and Halverson for breach of the retainer agreement, and in 2011 the California 

court entered a default judgment against them.

Several years later, the attorney assigned the judgment to Sommers. Halverson worked at 

a Lowe’s store in Vancouver. Sommers applied for a wage garnishment order against Halverson 

in a California court, and the order was served on Lowe’s in California. Halverson’s 

Washington wages were garnished. Sommers later assigned the judgment to Swanson. Swanson 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 1, 2024
No. 58952-4-II

2

applied for a wage garnishment order in a California court, and the order was served on Lowe’s 

in California. Halverson’s Washington wages again were garnished.

Daniels and Halverson filed suit against Sommers and Swanson in Washington, alleging 

that they violated the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.16 RCW, and they committed 

acts of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. The trial court dismissed their claims with 

prejudice, ruling that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Sommers and Swanson.

We conclude that for purposes of a CR 12(b)(2) motion, (1) the trial court had specific 

personal jurisdiction over Sommers and Swanson under RCW 19.86.160, the CPA’s long arm 

provision, for Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims that Sommers and Swanson violated the CPA by 

acting as unlicensed debt collectors and engaging in deceptive practices; (2) the trial court had 

specific personal jurisdiction over Sommers and Swanson under RCW 4.28.185(1), 

Washington’s general long arm statute, for Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims that Sommers and 

Swanson committed acts of fraud; and (3) the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over 

Sommers and Swanson does not violate due process because they intentionally initiated a 

garnishment that would be executed in Washington with knowledge that Daniels and Halverson 

would be harmed in Washington. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the CR 

12(b)(2) motion regarding Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims that Sommers and Swanson violated 

the CPA by acting as unlicensed debt collectors and engaging in deceptive practices, and their 

tort claims.

However, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims that 

Sommers and Swanson violated the CPA by failing to comply with Washington garnishment 

laws and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, because 

Daniels and Halverson fail to provide any meaningful argument regarding jurisdiction for these 
No. 58952-4-II

3

claims. But we agree with both parties that the dismissal of these claims should be without 

prejudice.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

Background

Daniels and Halverson are a married couple, who now live in Washington. Halverson 

works at Lowe’s in Vancouver. Sommers and Swanson live in California.

Before moving to Washington, Daniels lived in California. In 2009, Daniels signed a 

retainer agreement with attorney Paul Palant to represent her in dissolution and child custody 

proceedings in California involving her then spouse. Sometime before 2011, Daniels and 

Halverson were married.

In 2011, Palant filed a complaint in a California superior court against Daniels and 

Halverson for breach of the retainer agreement that Daniels signed. He claimed damages of 

$8,000, interest, and attorney fees. Neither Daniels nor Halverson received notice of this lawsuit 

because it was served at a location where they no longer lived. The California court entered a 

default judgment in the amount of $10,955 against Daniels and Halverson in the action. Daniels 

and Halverson were unaware of the default judgment.

In October 2019, Palant assigned the judgment to Sommers, who operated a business 

called Interstate Judgment Enforcement. In July 2020, Sommers filed a writ of execution, which 

listed the judgment amount as $20,425.40. Sommers entered an address in Vancouver for 

Halverson. He entered for Daniels her former father-in-law’s address in South Lake Tahoe, 

California. At the time, the last address of record in California court records for Daniels and 
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Halverson was in Sandy, Oregon, which is where they lived before they moved to Washington. 

At some point, the last address of record was changed to the South Lake Tahoe address. In 

November, Sommers filed a memorandum of costs and declaration of accrued interest, on which 

he entered the South Lake Tahoe address for both Daniels and Halverson. Halverson had never 

lived at the South Lake Tahoe address and Daniels had not lived there since 2006.

In early 2021, Sommers filed an application to renew the judgment. At this time, the 

judgment amount was $21,546.87. He again sent notice to the South Lake Tahoe address.

In May 2022, Sommers filed another memorandum of costs and a declaration of accrued 

interest, listing a renewed judgment of $24,244.66. He also filed a writ of execution. He sent 

notice to Daniels and Halverson at two different addresses in Vancouver. Daniels and Halverson 

lived at one of the addresses, but not the other. This was the first notice Daniels and Halverson 

had received of the default judgment.

Sommers submitted an application for wage garnishment in a California superior court. 

In August, the garnishment order was served on Lowe’s in California. This caused the 

garnishment of Halverson’s wages at Lowe’s in Washington.

In October, Daniels and Halverson filed a motion to set aside or vacate the default 

judgment against them related to the Palant judgment. The trial court denied their motion 

because the statute of limitations had expired six months after the entry of the judgment, which 

had occurred 11 years earlier.

In November, Sommers assigned the judgment to Swanson. In February 2023, Swanson 

submitted an application for wage garnishment in a California superior court. Garnishment 

paperwork again was served on Lowe’s in California. Halverson’s wages were garnished. 

Halverson did not receive any notice of the garnishment order.
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Daniels’ and Halverson’s Lawsuit

In June 2023, Daniels and Halverson filed an amended complaint for damages against 

Sommers and Swanson in Washington, asserting several claims.

First, they argued that Sommers and/or Swanson violated the CPA by (1) acting as a debt 

collection agency without a license in violation of RCW 19.16.110; (2) failing to follow the 

requirements in chapter 6.27 RCW for issuance of a writ of garnishment and service on 

Halverson and his employer; and (3) committing a deceptive act in violation of the CPA by 

intentionally using the South Lake Tahoe address to send notices of the judgment renewal, 

resulting in interest to accrue on the debt notice to Daniels and Halverson.

Second, they argued that Sommers and Swanson violated the FDCPA because they used 

false, deceptive, and misleading representations when they attempted to collect on the judgment. 

Specifically, they argued that Sommers and Swanson used false, deceptive, and misleading 

representations by mailing materials to the South Lake Tahoe address instead of mailing them to 

Daniels’ and Halverson’s address in Vancouver.

Third, they argued that Sommers and Swanson committed common law fraud, and that in 

the commission of the fraud, Sommers and Swanson intentionally, recklessly, or negligently 

inflicted emotional distress on Daniels and Halverson. They argued that Sommers and Swanson 

unlawfully contacted Halverson’s employer to garnish the debt, and in doing so harmed his 

reputation with his employer.

CR 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss

Sommers and Swanson filed a motion to dismiss based on CR 12(b)(2) for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. They emphasized that they resided in California and that all of their acts 

took place in California. Sommers served paperwork on Lowe’s in California to garnish 
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Halverson’s wages. Swanson similarly had Lowe’s served in California in order to garnish 

Halverson’s wages. They argued that they took no actions within Washington and therefore 

were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington as defined in RCW 4.28.185(1). They 

argued that Washington did not have jurisdiction over them simply because their actions had 

some effect in the state.

In support of their motion, both Sommers and Swanson filed declarations. Daniels’ and 

Halverson’s attorney and Halverson both filed declarations in response. Sommers’ and 

Swanson’s attorney filed a declaration in reply.

The trial court granted Sommers’ and Swanson’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. The trial court considered the declarations and exhibits submitted by the parties in 

its ruling. The trial court explained that, although the motion to dismiss was based on CR 

12(b)(2), the motion must be treated as a summary judgment motion because the court

considered declarations and exhibits in addition to the pleadings. The trial court dismissed 

Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims with prejudice, entering the order pursuant to CR 56.

Daniels and Halverson appeal the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss.

ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

CR 12(b) states that several defenses may be asserted by motion, including “lack of 

jurisdiction over the person.” CR 12(b)(2).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a CR 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction de novo. State v. LG Elecs., Inc., 186 Wn.2d 169, 176, 375 P.3d 1035 (2016). 

“When a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is resolved without an evidentiary 

hearing, the plaintiff’s burden is only that of a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Id. We treat 
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the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as verities for a CR 12(b)(2) motion. Id. at 182. A CR

12(b)(2) motion must be denied “if any state of facts could exist under which the [plaintiff’s] 

claim could be sustained.” Id. at 183 (adopting CR 12(b)(6) standard).

Nothing precludes a trial court from considering declarations that present evidence 

outside of the complaint. However, “[e]ven when the trial court considers matters outside the 

pleadings, we treat the allegations in the complaint as established for purposes of determining 

jurisdiction.” Montgomery v. Air Serv Corp., 9 Wn. App. 2d 532, 538, 446 P.3d 659 (2019). 

The Supreme Court in LG Electronics stated that “we decline to find that an allegation in the 

complaint is defeated by a contrary statement in a declaration.” 186 Wn.2d at 184.

The trial court treated Sommers’ and Swanson’s motion to dismiss as a summary 

judgment motion under CR 56 because it considered multiple declarations with exhibits. CR 

12(b) states,

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 

pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 

pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated 

as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56.

(Emphasis added.) By its express terms, CR 12(b) allows a trial court to convert a motion to 

dismiss to a summary judgment motion only for a motion filed under CR 12(b)(6), not for a 

motion filed under CR 12(b)(2). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in treating the 

CR 12(b)(2) motion as a summary judgment motion. However, because our review is de novo, 

this error does not affect our analysis.

We note that as stated above, at the CR 12(b)(2) motion stage the plaintiff need only 

make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction based on the assumption that the allegations in the 

complaint are true. LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 176, 182. But the court in LG Electronics stated, 

“Nothing in our opinion precludes the [defendants] from renewing their motions after further 
No. 58952-4-II

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discovery bearing on relevant facts.” Id. at 184. In other words, a defendant can bring a later 

summary judgment motion on jurisdiction even after a CR 12(b)(2) motion is denied.

B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Daniels and Halverson argue that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss 

because the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Sommers and Swanson under the 

CPA’s long-arm provision, RCW 19.86.160, and Washington’s general long-arm provision, 

RCW 4.28.185, and the exercise of jurisdiction would not violate due process. We agree, except 

for claims for which Daniels and Halverson presented no meaningful argument.

1. Legal Principles

A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the 

defendant’s claim-specific contacts with that state. Montgomery, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 540. This 

type of jurisdiction is called specific personal jurisdiction. Id.

The CPA’s long-arm provision, RCW 19.86.160, states,

Personal service of any process in an action under this chapter may be made upon 

any person outside the state if such person has engaged in conduct in violation of 

this chapter which has had the impact in this state which this chapter reprehends. 

Such persons shall be deemed to have thereby submitted themselves to the 

jurisdiction of the courts of this state within the meaning of RCW 4.28.180 and 

4.28.185.

(Emphasis added.)

The general long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185(1), states:

Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 

through an agent does any of the acts in this section enumerated, thereby submits 

said person . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action 

arising from the doing of any said acts:

. . . .

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state.

(Emphasis added.)
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Even if personal jurisdiction exists under Washington’s long-arm provisions, the exercise 

of jurisdiction also must comply with due process. Noll v. American Biltrite, Inc., 188 Wn.2d 

402, 411, 395 P.3d 1021 (2017) (RCW 4.28.185(1)); LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 176 (RCW 

19.86.160). The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s due process clause 

requires individuals to have “ ‘fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the 

jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’ ” LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 176 (alteration in original)

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 

(1985)). “[A] state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 

defendant only if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state, such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 176.

The court in LG Electronics confirmed that to comply with due process, personal 

jurisdiction over an individual must satisfy three requirements: “(1) purposeful ‘minimum 

contacts’ must exist between the defendant and the forum state, (2) the plaintiff’s injuries must 

‘arise out of or relate to’ those minimum contacts, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be 

reasonable, that is, consistent with notions of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 176-77 

(quoting Grange Ins. Ass’n v. State, 110 Wn.2d 752, 758, 757 P.2d 933 (1988)) (internal 

quotations omitted).

To establish sufficient minimum contacts, the party must purposefully avail itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, invoking the benefits and protections of 

its laws. LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 177.

In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court – the United States 

Supreme Court’s most recent personal jurisdiction case – the Court focused on only two 
No. 58952-4-II

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requirements. 592 U.S. 351, 359,141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021). First, the 

defendant “ ‘must take some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958)). Second, the plaintiff’s 

claim must “ ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” Ford, 592 U.S. 

at 359 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. 255, 262, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 

198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017)).

A defendant’s physical presence in a state is not required to invoke personal jurisdiction 

in that state. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. “So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are 

‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the 

notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Id. (quoting 

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 

(1984)).

2. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under the CPA

We first analyze whether Daniels and Halverson sufficiently pleaded their claims that 

Sommers and Swanson violated the CPA such that they are subject to the CPA’s long arm 

provision in RCW 19.86.160. Daniels and Halverson alleged in their complaint that Sommers 

and Swanson violated the CPA by (1) operating a collection agency without a license, (2) 

fraudulently representing their address to the California court to renew the judgment without 

giving them proper notice, and (3) violating Washington garnishment law.

 a. Operation of Collection Agency Without License

First, Daniels and Halverson argue that Sommers and Swanson violated the CPA by 

operating a collection agency without a license. RCW 19.16.110 states that no person shall act 
No. 58952-4-II

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as a “collection agency” without obtaining a license. RCW 19.16.100(4)(a) defines “collection 

agency” to include “any person directly or indirectly engaged in . . . collecting or attempting to 

collect claims owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another person.” The operation of a 

collection agency without a license constitutes an unfair act or practice under the CPA. RCW 

19.16.440. And the CPA states that unfair acts or practices are unlawful. RCW 19.86.020.

Sommers and Swanson do not dispute the fact that they took steps to collect on the 

California judgment. Sommers filed an application to renew the judgment in California and then 

submitted an application to garnish Halverson’s wages. Then, Sommers assigned the judgment 

to Swanson, and Swanson also submitted an application for wage garnishment.

Instead, Sommers and Swanson argue that they are not a “collection agency” because 

they do not fit within any of the definitions set forth in RCW 19.16.100(4). However, by 

attempting to garnish Halverson’s wages they clearly “engaged in . . . collecting or attempting to 

collect claims owed or due . . . to another person.” RCW 19.16.100(4)(a). In addition, Daniels’ 

and Halverson’s complaint alleges that Sommers and Swanson are unlicensed collection 

agencies and we must treat these allegations as verities for a CR 12(b)(2) motion. LG Elecs., 186 

Wn.2d at 182.

We conclude that the allegations in Daniels’ and Halverson’s complaint are sufficient to 

establish that Sommers and Swanson acted as unlicensed collection agencies and thereby 

violated the CPA. In addition, the allegations show that their conduct “had an impact on this 

state” as required in RCW 19.86.160 because they garnished Halverson’s wages in Washington. 

Therefore, for purposes of a CR 12(b)(2) motion, the trial court had long-arm jurisdiction under 

RCW 19.86.160 for the collection agency claim.

 
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 b. Deceptive Practices

Daniels and Halverson allege that Sommers violated the CPA by engaging in deceptive 

acts when he fraudulently represented their address to the California court in order to renew the 

California judgment, which resulted in them receiving insufficient notice of the action.

RCW 19.86.020 states that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” are unlawful. Violation 

of RCW 19.86.020 allows an injured person to file suit for damages under the CPA. RCW 

19.86.090.

Daniels and Halverson alleged in their complaint that Sommers, despite having a 

Vancouver address for Halverson and knowing that Daniels and Halverson lived in Washington, 

failed to send notice of the renewal of the judgment and information about his collection efforts 

to the Vancouver address. Instead, Sommers sent it to the South Lake Tahoe address. Daniels 

and Halverson argue that this constituted an unfair or deceptive act under RCW 19.86.020. They 

claim that Sommers knew that Daniels and Halverson lived in Washington, but purposefully 

misrepresented their address to the California courts in order renew the judgment and to allow 

the interest on the judgment to continue to accrue without notice to them. This permitted 

Sommers to hide what he was doing and prevented Daniels and Halverson from being proactive 

earlier when the interest would have been lower. Assuming the truth of these allegations, it is 

possible that his actions amounted to unfair or deceptive acts under the CPA.

We conclude that the allegations in Daniels’ and Halverson’s complaint are sufficient to 

establish that Sommers engaged in unfair or deceptive acts and thereby violated the CPA. In 

addition, their conduct “had the impact in this state” as required in RCW 19.86.160 because they 

garnished Halverson’s wages in Washington. Therefore, for purposes of a CR 12(b)(2) motion, 

the trial court had long-arm jurisdiction under RCW 19.86.160 for the deceptive practices claim.
No. 58952-4-II

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 c. Violation of Washington Garnishment Law

Daniels and Halverson alleged in their complaint that Sommers and Swanson violated the 

CPA by failing to follow the requirements in chapter 6.27 RCW for issuance of a writ of 

garnishment. However, Daniels and Halverson present no argument regarding why failing to 

comply with chapter 6.27 RCW violates the CPA or regarding personal jurisdiction for this 

claim. We generally decline to consider an issue when the appellant has failed to provide 

meaningful argument. Wiklem v. City of Camas, ___ Wn. App. 2d ___, 551 P.3d 1067, 1078 

(2024). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing this claim.

3. Jurisdiction for FDCPA Violation

Daniels and Halverson alleged in their complaint that Sommers and Swanson violated the 

FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692. However, Daniels and Halverson present no argument regarding 

personal jurisdiction for this claim. As noted above, we generally decline to consider an issue 

when the appellant has failed to provide meaningful argument. Wiklem, 551 P.3d at 1078. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing this claim.

4. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under RCW 4.28.185

Daniels and Halverson argue that the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction under 

the general long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185, because they alleged that Sommers and Swanson 

committed tortious acts within Washington. We agree.

The primary tort that Daniels and Halverson alleged in their complaint was common law 

fraud in attempting to collect the debt. The harm alleged was emotional distress, embarrassment, 

and damage to Halverson’s reputation with his employer. Assuming the truth of these 

allegations, the issue under RCW 4.28.185 is whether Sommers and Swanson engaged in the 

“commission of a tortious act within this state.”
No. 58952-4-II

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The common law fraud claim apparently relates to giving the California court the wrong 

addresses for Daniels and Halverson. Those acts occurred in California. And obtaining a writ of 

garnishment also occurred in California. However, the garnishment itself occurred in 

Washington and the alleged injury occurred in Washington. In general, a tortious act is deemed 

to have occurred in Washington for purposes of the long-arm statute when an injury occurs in 

Washington. Swank v. Valley Christian School, 188 Wn.2d 663, 688, 398 P.3d 1108 (2017).

We conclude that the allegations in Daniels’ and Halverson’s complaint are sufficient to 

establish that Sommers and Swanson committed tortious acts within Washington. Therefore, for 

purposes of a CR 12(b)(2) motion, the trial court had long-arm jurisdiction over Daniels’ and 

Halverson’s tort claims under RCW 4.28.185(1)(b).

5. Due Process

Even though some of Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims fall within the long-arm 

jurisdiction of RCW 19.86.160 and RCW 4.28.185(1)(b), we must evaluate whether exercising 

personal jurisdiction over Sommers and Swanson complies with constitutional due process. As 

noted above, exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper if (1) there 

are purposeful minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, which involves 

purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state; (2) the 

plaintiffs’ injuries arose out of or relate to the defendants’ contacts; and (3) exercise of personal 

jurisdiction is consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice. LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d 

at 176-77.

 a. Purposeful Minimum Contacts

Minimum contacts exist if the “defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
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laws.’ ” LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 177 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (internal citations 

omitted). The purposeful availment requirement ensures that defendants will not be pulled into a 

jurisdiction simply because of random or chance contacts or the independent actions of another 

party. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.

All of Sommers’ and Swanson’s conduct occurred in California. They received 

assignments of Palant’s California judgment in California. They obtained writs of execution in 

California. They allegedly misrepresented Daniels’ and Halverson’s addresses in California. 

They filed an application for wage garnishment in California. And they served the garnishment 

documents on Lowe’s in California.

However, the allegations in Daniels’ and Halverson’s complaint are sufficient to show 

that Sommers and Swanson knew that Halverson lived in Washington and they knew that his 

wages would be garnished in Washington. The question is whether Sommers and Swanson 

obtaining garnishment orders that they knew would result in garnishment in Washington of 

Halverson’s Washington wages constitutes purposefully availing themselves of the privilege of 

conducting activities in Washington.

In Calder v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court adopted an effects test for 

jurisdiction involving intentional acts (Calder effects test). 465 U.S. 783, 789, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 

79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). In that case, Jones sued a Florida-based newspaper, an editor, and a 

reporter in California state court based on an allegedly libelous article. Id. at 785-86. Jones was 

a California resident and the newspaper was distributed in California. Id. at 785. Neither the 

editor nor the reporter had any significant contacts with California other than telephone calls to 

sources in California for the article. Id.
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The Court held that California courts could exercise jurisdiction over the Florida-based 

defendants “based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id. at 789 (quoting 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 37 (AM. L. INST. 1971)). Restatement § 37 

states,

A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes 

effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action 

arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual’s 

relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.

(Emphasis added.)

The Court elaborated:

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California 

resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career 

was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the 

brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury 

to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the 

focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.

Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89 (footnote omitted). The Court emphasized that the defendants’ 

“intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California” and “they knew 

that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and 

works.” Id. at 789-90. The Court concluded, “We hold that jurisdiction over petitioners in 

California is proper because of their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to 

respondent in California.” Id. at 791.

Federal Courts of Appeal have developed a three-part test based on Calder. It is proper 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants if they “(1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows 

is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 

1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011).
No. 58952-4-II

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Here, Sommers and Swanson committed an intentional act – obtaining a garnishment 

order allegedly based in part on prior misrepresentations to the California court about Daniels’ 

and Halverson’s address. The garnishment order was expressly aimed at Washington because 

Sommers and Swanson knew that Halverson worked in Washington and that his wages would be 

garnished there. And Sommers and Swanson knew that the harm – garnishment of Halverson’s 

wages – would be suffered in Washington. In the words of Calder, Sommers’ and Swanson’s 

intentional conduct in California was “calculated to cause injury to” Daniels and Halverson in 

Washington. 465 U.S. at 791. Therefore, under the Calder effects test, we conclude that 

Sommers and Swanson had sufficient purposeful contacts with Washington to invoke personal 

jurisdiction.

Sommers and Swanson argue that their actions in obtaining the garnishment orders, 

enforcing the California judgment without registering in Washington, and failing to comply with 

Washington garnishment law were proper and lawful. They rely on out-of-state cases to support 

these arguments. However, these arguments relate to the merits of Daniels’ and Halverson’s 

claims, not whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction. Therefore, they are immaterial to the 

CR 12(b)(2) motion.

Sommers and Swanson do not directly address the Calder effects test. But they argue 

that, even if their collection efforts had some impact on Washington, that impact was insufficient 

to establish personal jurisdiction over them. They cite to Walker v. Bonney-Watson Co., 64 Wn. 

App. 27, 823 P.2d 518 (1992) and Montgomery, 9 Wn. App. 2d 532.

In Walker, Walker’s husband died while traveling through Idaho. 64 Wn. App. at 30. An 

Idaho sheriff’s deputy delivered a plastic bag containing Walker’s husband’s remains – including 

body parts – to an Idaho funeral home, which then sent the remains to a Washington funeral 
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home. Id. at 31. An employee of the Washington funeral home delivered the bag containing 

Walker’s husband’s remains to Walker, and the contents of the bag fell out when she opened it. 

Id. Walker sued an Idaho county and the Idaho and Washington funeral homes for negligently 

delivering her husband’s remains, causing her serious emotional harm. Id. The trial court 

dismissed the Idaho county and the Idaho funeral home for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 

32.

Division One of this court held that it would violate due process to exercise jurisdiction 

over the Idaho county and the Idaho funeral home because they did not purposefully avail 

themselves of Washington laws. Id. at 34-36. The county’s acts were all performed in Idaho, 

and the county solicited no business from Walker. Id. at 35. And the Idaho funeral home 

holding the decedent’s remains was done solely at the request of the sheriff’s office, and there 

was nothing in the record to establish that the funeral home sought or received compensation 

from Walker for its services. Id. at 36.

This case is different than Walker. Unlike the Idaho county and funeral home in Walker,

Sommers and Swanson were not passively involved in the harm that Halverson suffered in 

Washington. They intentionally engaged in activities that targeted and caused harm to Halverson 

in Washington by serving garnishment papers on Lowe’s in California knowing that Halverson 

worked at a Lowe’s store in Washington.

In Montgomery, Montgomery’s estate filed a wrongful death action in Washington 

against ABM, alleging negligent provision of wheelchair services in a Texas airport. 9 Wn. App. 

2d at 534. ABM is an airline and airport services company that has an affiliate location at 

SeaTac airport, but ABM did not provide wheelchair services at SeaTac. Id. at 535. The trial 

court denied ABM’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 536.
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Division One held that the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Id. at 545. The court emphasized that for specific jurisdiction, the claim must arise 

from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Id. at 543. Although ABM had contacts with 

Washington it performed services at SeaTac, those contacts were unrelated to the estate’s claims. 

Id.

Montgomery does not apply to this case. As discussed below, there is no question that 

Daniels’ and Halverson’s alleged injuries arose from Sommers and Swanson’s contacts with 

Washington – garnishing Halverson’s wages in Washington.

We hold that Sommers and Swanson established purposeful minimum contacts with 

Washington because they committed intentional acts expressly aimed at Washington and caused 

harm that they knew was likely to be suffered in Washington.

 b. Injuries Related to Minimum Contacts

In order for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out of state defendants to comply 

with due process, the plaintiffs’ injuries must arise out of or relate to the defendants’ minimum 

contacts with the forum state. LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 177.

Here, Sommers’ and Swanson’s contact with Washington was obtaining and serving a 

writ of garnishment knowing that Halverson’s wages would be garnished in Washington. 

Daniels and Halverson alleged that they were harmed as a result of Sommers’ and Swanson’s 

wage garnishment activities. Therefore, we conclude that Daniels’ and Halverson’s injuries 

arose out of or were related to Sommers’ and Swanson’s contacts with Washington.

 
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 c. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

The final requirement identified in LG Electronics for specific jurisdiction is whether the 

assertion of personal jurisdiction over Sommers and Swanson comports with notions of fair play 

and substantial justice. 186 Wn.2d at 177.1

We consider the following when determining whether exercising personal jurisdiction 

comports with fair play and substantial justice:

the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, 

the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate 

judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, 

and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 

social policies.

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (internal quotations omitted). “Only in rare cases will the exercise 

of jurisdiction not comport with fair play and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant 

has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state.” Downing v. Losvar, 21 

Wn. App. 2d 635, 679, 507 P.3d 894 (2022).

Washington has an interest in ensuring that its debt collection laws are followed. Panag 

v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 54, 204 P.3d 885 (2009). The inconvenience of 

Sommers’ and Swanson’s defending in Washington after intentionally establishing minimum 

contacts with the state does not outweigh Washington’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, 

Daniels’ and Halverson’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and efficiently 

resolving this controversy. We held above that Sommers and Swanson purposefully established 

minimum contacts with Washington, and this is not the rare case in which the exercise of 

jurisdiction does not comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice. Downing, 21 Wn. 

App. at 679.

 

1

It is unclear whether this requirement still applies after Ford.
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 d. Summary

The trial court had long-arm jurisdiction over certain CPA claims under RCW 19.86.160 

and over the tort claims under RCW 4.28.185(1)(b). The exercise of that jurisdiction does not 

violate due process under the Calder effects test. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred 

when it dismissed two of Daniels’ and Halverson’s CPA claims and their tort claims for lack of 

personal jurisdiction.

We emphasize that this opinion addresses only personal jurisdiction under CR 12(b)(2) 

while treating the allegations in Daniels’ and Halverson’s complaint as verities. We express no 

opinion regarding the merits of Daniels’ and Halverson’s claims.

C. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Daniels and Halverson argue in the alternative that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it dismissed their claims with prejudice rather than without prejudice. Sommers and 

Swanson concede that the trial court erred.

On remand, the trial court must enter an order dismissing Daniels’ and Halverson’s 

violation of garnishment law and FDCPA claims without prejudice.

D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

In their conclusion, Daniels and Halverson request attorney fees under RAP 18.1 and 

RCW 4.84.185. However, RAP 18.1(2) states that a party must request attorney fees in a 

separate section of its brief. Daniels and Halverson did not comply with this requirement. In 

addition, RCW 4.84.185 – which addresses frivolous civil actions – does not apply to appeals. 

Finally, although Daniels and Halverson are the prevailing party, Sommers’ and Swanson’s 

arguments on appeal are not frivolous. Accordingly, we reject Daniels’ and Halverson’s request 

for attorney fees on appeal.
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CONCLUSION

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

MAXA, P.J.

We concur:

LEE, J.

PRICE, J.