AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed May 5, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00820-CR No. 05-19-00830-CR DAVID ROMERO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F16-23494-W, F16-234493-W MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Goldstein, and Smith Opinion by Justice Smith A jury found appellant David Romero guilty of indecency with a child and sexual assault. The jury assesse d punishment at five years’ co nfinement for indecency with a child and ten years’ confinement for sexual as sault. The trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdicts and followed the jury’s recommendation to suspend imposition of confinement in the sexu al assault case and placed him on community supervision for ten years. In five iss ues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convi ctions, certain testimony of an expert witness, and inadmissible hearsay testim ony. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.–2– Background Appellant and Wife married at a young age and had five children together. Complainant was the oldest and had a close relationship with M. G., the second oldest daughter. The daughters described appellant as an “angry, mean, violent man,” especially when he drank. Desp ite appellant’s violent behavior , he shared a close relationship with complainant. A s complainant matured, things began to change. When she was fifteen or sixteen, appellant talked with her abou t sex and exposed her to pornography. Appellant sai d he wanted to prepare her fo r a relationship. One evening when complainant wa s alone, appellant came up behin d her and pressed himself against her back. She could feel his “hard” pe nis against her. When she tried to move, he moved with her. He stopped when her sist ers arrived home. He apologized the next da y and said he was drunk. Appellant’s physical interactions with complainant progressed. When she was eighteen, appellant began having nonconsensual sex with her . It occurred in the living room on the couch during the day and behind the couch at night after everyone went to bed. He eventually put a deadbolt on the bedroom so th ey could have sex without interruption. After she entered the bedroom, appellant refused to let her leave. The few times she tried , he hit or kicked her. Appella nt continued having nonconsensual sex with complainant into her twenties.–3– A few years later, when complain ant was about thirty years old, she noticed appellant began paying more attention to her youngest sister, w ho was fifteen (the same age appellant began touching complainant). Complainant th en decided she needed to tell someone about her abuse because she wanted to pr otect her sister. Shortly thereafter, complainant confided in M.G., and M.G. enco uraged complainant to go to the police. While at the station, officers took pictu res of bruising on complainant’s back from a coupl e days earlier when appellant hi t her. Complainant was thirty-four years old at the time of trial. Ap pellant and Wife challenged complainant’s credibility by painting a picture of a daughter who made false accusations because she was upset about money issues and hoped to gain access to appellant’s trust fund. The jury heard all the evidence and found appellant guilty of both indecency with a child a nd sexual assault. This appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally in sufficient to support his convictions for indecency with a child and sexual a ssault because complainant and M.G. were not cre dible and “concocted this stor y about their father to get back at him” because he no longer supported them. The S tate responds the evidence is legally su fficient. We agree. In a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in t he light most favorable to the verdict and dete rmine whether, based on that e vidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational factfinder could have found the–4– elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Ramjattansingh v. State , 548 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Davis v. State , 586 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). We may not substi tute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credi bility of the evidence.
Davis , 586 S.W.3d at 589. We defer to the factfinder to fairly reso lve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence , and draw reasonable inferenc es from basic facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The offense of indecency with a child required the State to pro ve that appellant, with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desi re, caused complainant, a child younger than seventeen years old, to engage in sexual c ontact by causing complainant to contact appellant’s genitals. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 21.11(a), (c). The offense of sexual assa ult, as alleged in the indictme nt, required the State to prove that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the pen etration of complainant’s sexual orga n without her consent. See T EX

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. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). Appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of any particular element of either offense, but instead cont ends complainant and M.G. are n ot credible and the accusations are false. He focuses on some of the sisters’ inco nsistent details, complainant’s known vivid imagination, and her one false accusa tion against another male when she was eleve n. Appellant emphasizes that Wi fe believed in his innocence and testified complain ant was a difficult child who c aused problems.–5– Appellant is asking this Court to reweigh the credibility of wi tnesses. This we cannot do. See Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638. The jury heard the conflicting evidence and found in f avor of the State. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the ve rdict is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that appellant was gui lty of indecency with a child when he pressed his penis, which complainant described as “something hard,” against her buttocks. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 21.11(a), (c); see, e.g. , Turner
v. State , 573 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tex. App.—A marillo 2019, no pet.) (uncor roborated testimony of child sexual abuse victim alone sufficient to supp ort conviction for indecency with child). Likewise, complainant’s testimony that appellant repeatedly forced her to have sex and was physically violent towards her i s legally sufficient to support his conviction for sexual assault. See T EX

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. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). We overrule appellant’s first issue. Expert Testimony Kristen Howell, CEO of Denton C ounty’s Children’s Advocacy Cent er, testified for the State regarding the therapy services she prov ided to complainant. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by allow ing Howell to testify as an expert witness because she was not qualified under Daubert . The State responds appellant did not obtain a ruling on the complaint he now raises on appeal; therefore, he presents nothi ng for review. We agree.–6– To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must mak e an objection and receive a ruling on the objection. See T EX

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. P. 33.1. When Howell began testifying tha t complainant’s symptoms relate d to posttraumatic stress disorder, appe llant objected and took the witn ess on voir dire. Counsel questioned Howell about h er educational background and expertise in diagnosing mental conditions. He then asked for a 702 hearing outside the presence of the jury, which the trial court granted. During the 702 hearing, Howell testified about her work with complainant based on the psychological assessment she received about compla inant’s PTSD, not that she diagnosed complainant w ith PTSD. Appellant then made the following objection: Your Honor, I have no objection to her testifying in what she d id as far as the treatment. I have an objection to her stating that ther e was a diagnosis made by someone els e. That would be hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection. The trial court did not rule on appellant’s objection to Howell ’s qualifications. Instead, the trial court ruled on his hearsay objection. Appel lant has not challenged the hearsay ruling on appeal. Because appellant did not obtain a ruling on his objection to Howell’s qualifications and the only issue he rais es here does not comport with the objection the tr ial court ruled upon, he has p reserved nothing for review. See Thomas v. State , 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We overrule appellant’s second issue.–7– In his third and fourth issues, appellant argues the trial cou rt abused its discretion by allowing Howell to t estify regarding the mental p rocessing of traumatic events and delayed outcries. First, we note that appellant “ad opted by reference as if the argument and authorities are set out verbatim in Issue n o. 2” to support his third and fourth issues. Appellant’s second issue did not disc uss delayed outcries or the mental processing of trauma tic events. The remaining porti on of his argument sets out the abuse of discretion standard of review and a gener ic recitation of rule
702. See T EX

. R. E VID . 702. Without any further analysis or explanation, he “submits that it was an abuse of discretion to allow this witne ss to testify as an expert on these topics.” Appellant has failed to present his issues for review. Texas R ule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires a brie f contain clear and concise ar guments for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. See T EX

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. P. 38.1(i). Here, appellant provided no substantive arguments to support his conclusions. A brief must compl y with rule 38.1 or the issues are inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived. Id .; see also McGee v. State , 342 S.W.3d 245, 247 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d). Even if appellant complied with rule 38.1(i), his third issue w ould still be overruled. Liberally construing appellant’s third issue, he ch allenges Howell’s qualifications to testify regard ing delayed outcries. However, at trial he only objected to Howell’s outcry testimony as irrelevant and not to her qualifications. As–8– such, his issue on appeal does not comport with his objection a t trial and is not preserved for review. See Thomas , 505 S.W.3d at 924. We overrule appellant’s third issue. Likewise, the trial court did no t abuse its discretion by allow ing Howell to testify regarding the mental p rocessing of traumatic events. See Sexton v. State , 93 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (reviewing trial court’s d ecision to exclude scientific expert testimony under abuse of discretion). Howell testified she has a bachelor’s and master’s degree in social work. She has worked in the discipline for twenty-three years. Although she is not a psychologist or psyc hiatrist, she has some training in both and is qualified to administer and interpret p sychological tests. She has taken advantage of dozens of hours of highly specialized tr aining in child abuse and domestic violence. She has testified as an expert on multi ple occasions in Dallas County as well as other counties. After explaining her backgro und, she briefly testified the brain is designed to remember bad things as a sur vival instinct so these memories can become “imprint ed” and “really strong.” Admissibility of expert testimony depends on whether a proposed expert possesses “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledg e [that] will help the trier of fact to understand or to determine a fact in issue.” T EX

. R. E VID . 702. No rigid formula exists for determining whether a particular witne ss is qualified as an expert. See Duran v. State , 163 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).–9– The trial court could have fo und Howell qualified to testify ba sed on her degrees, decades of experience, and her training in psychology and psychiatry. See,

e.g. , Moreno v. State , No. 04-18-00709-CR, 2020 WL 908024, at *6 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Feb. 26, 2020, Feb . 26, 2020, no pet.) (concluding no abuse of discretion allowing expert testim ony based on advanced degree, supervisory position at children’s advocacy center, and fourteen years’ exp erience). The trial court’s decision to admit her te stimony was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion. We ov errule appellant’s fourth issue. Hearsay In his final issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his hearsay objection to Wife’s testimony. The Stat e responds her statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and error, if any, was harmless because it was duplica tive of other evidence. Wife testified that appellant was innocent, and it was impossi ble he could have had sex with complainant for fifteen years without her knowledg e. During crossexamination, the State asked, “A re you aware of the specifics o f what [complainant] said happened to her?” She answered, “From what the police off icers told us.” When the State asked what officers told her, appellant objected to hearsay. The trial court conducted a brief, unreco rded bench conference and overru led the objection. The following exchange occurred:–10– Q: What did the officers tell you about the accusations that [complainant] made? A: The officers told me that sh e had said that her father rape d her. Hearsay is a statement, other th an one made by the declarant wh ile testifying at the trial, offered for the tr uth of the matter asserted. T EX

. R. E VID . 801(d). The State contends the statement i s not hearsay because it was offe red to establish the basis for Wife’s earlier opinion that appellant was not guilty of the offense. Such reasoning, if approved, runs the risk of making any testimony t he State later elicits admissible, even though the facts on which the subsequent state ment is based are inadmissible, without recourse to the hearsay objection. See, e.g. , May v. State , 139 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Tex. App.—Texar kana 2004, pet. ref’d). This is not consistent with the rule. “Matter asserted” in cludes any matter explicitly ass erted, and any matter implied by a statement, if the p robative value of the statement as offered flows from the declarant’s belief as to the matter. T EX

. R. E VID . 801(c). As such, Wife’s statement regarding what officers told her was hearsay to which no exception applies under the facts of this case. Although the trial court erre d by overruling appellant’s object ion, the error was harmless. The improper admission of evidence is not revers ible error if the same or similar evidence is admitted without objection at anoth er point in the trial. Leday v. State , 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Alizadeh v. State , No. 01-07-00604-CR, 2009 WL 469558, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st D ist.] Feb. 26, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Here, the same or–11– similar testimony was admitted, without objection, through comp lainant describing the sexual acts appellant commi tted, M.G. testifying that she t old officers appellant was having sex with complainant, and Detective Golladay testify ing that complainant indicated the charged offenses had occurred. We ov errule appellant’s fifth issue.
Conclusion Having overruled appellant’s iss ues, we affirm the trial court ’s judgments.

Do Not Publish T EX

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. P. 47.2(b) 190820F.U05 /Craig Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE–12– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT DAVID ROMERO, Appellant
No. 05-19-00820-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F16-23494-W. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Molberg and Goldstein participating. Based on the Court’s opinion o f this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered May 5, 2021–13– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT DAVID ROMERO, Appellant
No. 05-19-00830-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F16-23493-W. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Molberg and Goldstein participating. Based on the Court’s opinion o f this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered May 5, 2021.