This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0955 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. M. J. R. D., Appellant. Filed February 6, 2017 Affirmed Schellhas, Judge Washington County District Court File No. 82-K5-93-004038 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota, and Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hy dukovich, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent) Paul E. Overson, Steven M. Coodin, Cood in & Overson, PLLP, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHELLHAS , Judge Appellant asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of his second expungement petition. We affirm.2 FACTS On August 24, 1993, appellant M.J.R.D. grabbed a woman’s arm and breast and pushed her against a wall during an argument . Respondent State of Minnesota charged M.J.R.D. with fourth- and fifth-degree crimin al sexual conduct a nd fifth-degree assault (harm). M.J.R.D. pleaded guilty to fifth- degree assault as a misdemeanor and was sentenced to one year of supe rvised probation; the state dismissed the criminal sexual conduct charges, and the sentencing court did no t order M.J.R.D. to register as a predatory offender. M.J.R.D. was discharged from probation about a year later. In March 2008, M.J.R.D. filed a petition to expunge the record s relating to his 1993 misdemeanor assault conviction. The relevant county agencies and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) opposed th e petition. The district court denied the petition. On December 9, 2015, M.J.R.D. file d a second petition to expunge the records relating to his 1993 misdemeanor assault c onviction. The BCA opposed the petition, while the relevant county agencies took no position on the petition. The district court denied the petition. This appeal follows. 1
D E C I S I O N We review a district court’s denial of an expungement petition for an abuse of discretion. State v. M.D.T. , 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013). “Under an abuse of discretion standard, we will not overrule the district court unless the court exercised its

1 The relevant county agencies take no positi on on this appeal; the BCA has filed nothing in connection with this appeal.3 discretion in an arbitrary or capricious ma nner or based its ruling on an erroneous interpretation of the law.” State v. R.H.B. , 821 N.W.2d 817, 822 (M inn. 2012). Reversal also is warranted if the district court’s ru ling “is against the fact s in the record,” but “findings of fact will not be disturbe d unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 822 & n.3 (quotation omitted). In his expungement petition, M.J.R.D. clai med that he is entitled to expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3 (2014), which provid es that a petitioner may be eligible for expungement of “a ll records relating to an arrest , indictment or information, trial, or verdict” if “the petitioner was convicte d of . . . a . . . misdemeanor and has not been convicted of a new crime for at least two y ears since discharge of the sentence for the crime.” “There are two bases for expungemen t of criminal records in Minnesota: Minn. Stat. ch. 609A . . . and the judiciary’s inherent authority.” M.D.T. , 831 N.W.2d at 279. In his petition, M.J.R.D. did not seek to invoke the judiciary’s inherent authority, and the district court did not address its inherent aut hority to expunge criminal records in its order denying the petition. We therefore do not a ddress M.J.R.D.’s repeated references to inherent-authority expungement in his appellate brief. See In re Welfare of J.J.P. , 831 N.W.2d 260, 263 & n.2 (Minn. 2013) (addressing only statutory expungement where juvenile “petitioned the district court for expungem ent solely under the court’s statutory authority” and “did not invoke the court’s in herent authority to or der expungement”). M.J.R.D. argues that the district court’ s denial of his second expungement petition was an abuse of discretion because it was base d on the court’s erroneous interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4 (2014). Under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4, “[r]ecords4 of a conviction of an offens e for which registration is re quired under secti on 243.166 may not be expunged.” And under Minn. Stat. § 243.1 66, subd. 1b(a) (2014), “[a] person shall register” as a predatory offende r if he “was charged with . . . a felony violation of” an enumerated offense, including fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, “and convicted of . . . that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.” The district court accordingly reasoned that, because M.J.R. D.’s misdemeanor assault conviction arose out of the same set of circumstances as his ch arge of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, the assault conviction triggered a registration requirement under secti on 243.166, which in turn prohibited expungement. M. J.R.D. argues to the contrary that, because the sentencing court had the implicit authority to , and did in fact, waive his duty to register as a predatory offender, the expungement pr ohibition does not apply. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” J.J.P. , 831 N.W.2d at 264; see also State v. D.R.F. , 878 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Minn. App. 2016) (“Interpretation of the expungeme nt statute is a legal question subject to de novo review.” (quotation omitted)). “The object of all interpretation and c onstruction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). “In interpreting statutory language , we give words and phrase s their plain and ordinary meaning.” J.J.P. , 831 N.W.2d at 264. “Our first step in interpreting a stat ute is to examine the text of the statute to determine whether the language is ambiguous.” Id. “When the statutory language is clear and free of ambi guity, we enforce the plain language of the statute and do not explore its spirit or purpose.” Id.5 Again, the expungement statute provides that “[r]ecords of a conviction of an offense for which registration is required under section 24 3.166 may not be expunged.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4. We have found no published or unpublished case interpreting this statutory language. But we ha ve interpreted nearly identical language from the Minnesota sex offender community notifi cation act, Minn. Stat. § 244.052 (1996 & Supp. 1997). See In re Risk Level Determination of C.M. , 578 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn. App. 1998) (considering statutory definition of “sex offender,” for purposes of community notification, as “a person who has been convicted of an offense for which registration under section 243.166 is required” (quoting Minn. St at. § 244.052, subd. 1(4) (1996)) (quotation marks omitted)). We summarized the interpretive dispute in C.M. as follows: Relator contends that the phrase “convicted of an offense for which registration * * * is required” in section 244.052, subdivision 1(4), means that notification applies only where the offender is convicted of an offense that automatically results in registration because the offense is specifically listed in section 2 43.166. The state argued below . . . that the notification statute applies to any offender required to register under s ection 243.166, includi ng those convicted of an unlisted offense “arising out of the same set of circumstances” as a charged, liste d offense. Relator argues that if the legislature intended that result, it would simply have defined a sex offender as “a pers on required to register under section 243.166.” On appeal, the state argues that the legislature inserted the “convict ed of an offense” language to avoid application of the notifica tion statute to juveniles, who are required to register afte r being “adjudicated delinquent” rather than “convicted.” Id. at 395. After stating that “both parties’ interpretations are reasonable” and that the relevant statutory language “i s, therefore, ambiguous in its application to relator,” we ultimately concluded:6 [T]he state’s interpretation of section 244.052 to permit community notification where an offender is charged with, but not convicted of, a sex offense, would result in a violation of state and federal guarantees of due process. Accordingly, we adopt relator’s alternate constr uction, the cons titutionality of which is not challenged before us, under which notification applies only to offenders convict ed of an offense specifically listed in section 243. 166, subdivision 1. Id. at 395–96, 399. Here M.J.R.D. raises no constitutional argument against the district court’s interpretation of the expungement statute. Neither does M.J.R.D. take the equivalent of the relator’s interpretive position in C.M. by arguing that the expungement prohibition applies only where the petitioner was “convicted of an offense that automatically results in registration because the offense is specifically listed in section 243.166” and does not apply where, as here, the petitioner was “convicted of an unlisted offense ‘ari sing out of the same set of circumstances’ as a charged, listed offense.” See id. at 395. Instead, M.J.R.D. takes something like the state’s interpretive position in C.M. , essentially arguing that the expungement prohibition applies to “[petiti oners] required to register under section 243.166, including those convict ed of an unlisted offense ‘arising out of the same set of circumstances’ as a charged, listed offense.” See id. And M.J.R.D. implicitly concedes that his misdemeanor assault conviction arose out of the same set of circumstances as his fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. Still M.J.R.D. insists that the expungement prohibition does not apply to him because “he was never to this date required by anyone to register.”7 M.J.R.D. thereby attempts to shift our focus from the relevant question, whether section 243.166 designates his offense as one triggering the registrati on requirement, to a different question entirely—namely, whether M.J. R.D. ever was directed to register as a predatory offender in connection with his offense. This shift in focus is inconsistent with the plain language of the expungement statute, which generally restri cts the availability of expungement based on the nature of the offense of conviction ra ther than on the specific consequences that may flow fro m conviction of the offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4 (“Records of a conviction of an offense for whic h registration is required under section 243.166 may not be expunged.”); see also id. , subd. 3 (providing that expungement may be available if “petitioner was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a petty misdemeanor,” if “petitioner was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a gross misdemeanor,” or if “petitioner was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a felony violation of [one of 50 enumerated] offense[s]”); cf. State v. S.A.M. , 877 N.W.2d 205, 208– 09 (Minn. App. 2016) (concluding that stat utory expungement was not available to petitioner whose nonenumerated felony convic tion ultimately was deemed a misdemeanor by operation of law), review granted (Minn. May 31, 2016). In sum, even if we accept M.J.R.D.’s assertion that th e sentencing court waived his duty to register as a predatory offender , any such waiver was a then-authorized modification of section 243.166’s registra tion requirement , which M.J.R.D. implicitly8 concedes was triggered by his offense. 2 The plain language of Mi nn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4, prohibits expungement under these circumstances. Affirmed.

2 The duty to register as a pr edatory offender originally was not triggered by conviction of “another offense arising out of the same set of circumstan ces” as an enumerated offense. See 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 285, § 3, at 1325–26 (enacting regist ration statute without quoted language or its equivalent). The quoted lan guage was added to the registration statute by an amendment with an effective date of August 1, 1 993, fewer than 90 days before M.J.R.D.’s sentencing date. 1993 Minn. Laws ch . 326, art. 10, § 1, at 2090. The sentencing court’s silence on M.J.R.D.’s duty to regist er, then, may be explained by inadvertent omission rather than by intentional waiver.