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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NISHAD SINGH, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 23-CV-1684

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE

AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF 

AND FOR CIVIL MONETARY 

PENALTIES UNDER THE 

COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT

AND COMMISSION REGULATIONS 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or “Commission”), by and 

through its undersigned attorneys, hereby alleges as follows: 

SUMMARY 

1. Nishad Singh (“Singh” or “Defendant”) was an early and central employee of both

the centralized digital asset exchange doing business as FTX.com (“FTX”) and its sister-company, 

Alameda Research LLC (“Alameda”), a digital asset trading and investment firm. As a lead and 

supervising engineer for FTX, Alameda and other entities operated by Samuel Bankman-Fried 

(“Bankman-Fried”), Singh knew of, maintained and/or had access to certain code features that 

enabled Alameda to impermissibly access and use over $8 billion in FTX customer assets. 

2. On December 21, 2022, the CFTC filed an Amended Complaint charging

Bankman-Fried, FTX, Alameda and others with a scheme to defraud, among other charges. CFTC 

v. Bankman-Fried et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-10503-PKC (S.D.N.Y.). Singh participated in the same

scheme to defraud, through the conduct set forth herein. 

3. Up until the abrupt collapse of FTX and Alameda in early November 2022

following public revelation of Alameda’s misappropriation of FTX customer funds, Singh was the 

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Director of Engineering of FTX and Chief Engineer of FTX US. Singh also supervised the 

software development teams for FTX, FTX US and Alameda, and was responsible for creating or 

maintaining various features in the underlying code for FTX that, together with other changes, 

granted Alameda numerous undisclosed privileges and advantages on FTX, including the ability 

to withdraw FTX customer assets. Singh reported directly to Bankman-Fried, who was the 

controlling majority owner of the FTX, Alameda and FTX US constellation of companies. The 

companies under Bankman-Fried’s control operated as a single, integrated common enterprise, 

referred to herein as the “FTX Enterprise.” Singh remained a key executive of the FTX Enterprise 

until the time of its collapse and bankruptcy filing on November 11, 2022. 

4. Beginning no later than May 2019 and continuing through at least November 11, 

2022 (the “Relevant Period”), unbeknownst to all but a small circle of insiders including Singh, 

FTX customers assets, including fiat currency and digital assets such as bitcoin (BTC), ether 

(ETH) and stablecoins such as tether (USDT), each a commodity in interstate commerce, that were 

intended to be used for trading or custodied on FTX, were regularly accepted, held by and/or 

misappropriated by Alameda for its own use. 

5. At Bankman-Fried’s direction, Singh and others created various features in the 

underlying code for FTX that, together, allowed Alameda to maintain an essentially unlimited line 

of credit on FTX. Singh and others also created other exceptions to FTX’s standard processes that 

allowed Alameda to have unfair advantages when transacting on the platform, such as exemptions 

from the platform’s publicly-touted auto-liquidation risk management process. 

6. During the Relevant Period, relying on the code features created by Singh and 

others, Alameda used FTX assets, including customer assets, to trade on other digital asset 

exchanges and to fund a variety of high-risk digital asset industry investments. 

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7. During the Relevant Period, through a web of subsidiaries, affiliates and other 

related entities collectively constituting the FTX Enterprise, Singh and other FTX executives 

misappropriated customer assets for their own use and benefit. Singh personally misappropriated 

assets, including FTX customer assets, including through a series of poorly-documented “loans” 

from Alameda and other improper withdrawals from FTX. Singh used these assets, at least in part, 

for his own purposes, including purchasing residential property and making political donations. 

This unauthorized use of FTX customer assets was not disclosed to or known by FTX customers. 

Singh took loans from Alameda and withdrawals from FTX even after he knew or should have 

known that the source of those assets derived, at least in part, from FTX customer assets. 

8. Despite this, FTX widely represented, in its Terms of Service and elsewhere, that 

customers were the owners of all assets in their accounts, had control over the assets at all times, 

and that those assets were appropriately safeguarded and segregated from FTX’s own assets. The 

FTX Enterprise also widely represented that FTX’s operations were effectively separated and 

walled-off from those of Alameda. On information and belief, Singh knew that these types of 

representations were being made by and on behalf of the FTX Enterprise and that such 

representations were false. Singh nevertheless engaged in willful acts, as described herein, that he 

knew were directly contrary to such representations. 

9. Through this conduct and the conduct further described herein, Singh committed 

commodities fraud in violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act” or 

“CEA”), 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Commission Regulation (“Regulation”) 180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. 

§180.1(a) (2022). 

10. In addition to being directly liable for his violations of the Act as set forth herein, 

Singh also, through this conduct and conduct further described herein, willfully aided and abetted 

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the same violations of the Act committed by FTX, Alameda and Bankman-Fried. Therefore, 

pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §13c (a), Singh is responsible as a principal for their 

violations of Section 6(c)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act” or “CEA”), 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1), and Commission Regulation (“Regulation”) 180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. §180.1(a) (2022). 

11. Unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, Singh is likely to continue to engage 

in the acts and practices alleged in this Complaint and similar acts and practices, as more fully 

described below. 

12. Accordingly, the CFTC brings this action pursuant to Section 6c of the Act, 

7 U.S.C. § 13a-l, to enjoin Singh’s unlawful acts and practices and to compel his compliance with 

the Act. In addition, the CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties and remedial ancillary relief, 

including, but not limited to, trading and registration bans, disgorgement, restitution, pre- and postjudgment interest, and such other relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

13. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal 

question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (district courts have original jurisdiction over civil 

actions commenced by the United States or by any agency expressly authorized to sue by Act of 

Congress). Section 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a), authorizes the CFTC to seek injunctive 

relief against any person whenever it shall appear to the CFTC that such person has engaged, is 

engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of 

the Act or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder. 

14. Venue properly lies with this Court pursuant to Section 6c(e) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13a-1(e), because Singh transacted business in the Southern District of New York and engaged 

in certain acts and practices in violation of the Act and Regulations within this District. 

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PARTIES 

A. The CFTC 

15. Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the independent federal 

regulatory agency charged by Congress with the administration and enforcement of the Act and 

Regulations promulgated thereunder. 

B. Defendant 

16. Nishad Singh is a United States citizen who has resided in various locations during 

the Relevant Period and currently resides in the United States. Singh was an executive and 

shareholder of FTX during the Relevant Period, and was also a co-founder and shareholder FTX 

US. Singh served as Director of Engineering of FTX and FTX US and also had various roles and 

responsibilities relating to Alameda. Singh resided in and/or performed work for the FTX 

Enterprise in various locations during the Relevant Period, including in the United States and in 

this District. He has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity. 

C. Other Relevant Individuals and Entities 

17. Samuel Bankman-Fried (“Bankman-Fried”) is a United States citizen who 

currently resides in the United States. Bankman-Fried is the founder and majority owner of the 

FTX Enterprise, including FTX and Alameda. Bankman-Fried resided in and performed work for 

FTX and Alameda in various locations during the Relevant Period, including in the United States. 

On December 9, 2022, Bankman-Fried was charged with conspiracy to commit commodities 

fraud, among other criminal charges, in this District. United States v. Bankman-Fried, Case No. 

22-cr-673 (S.D.N.Y.). He has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity. 

18. FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX Trading”) is a corporation registered in Antigua and 

Barbuda. During the Relevant Period, FTX Trading Ltd. along with its subsidiaries and affiliate 

entities, including without limitation FTX Digital Markets Ltd. (“FDM”), located in the Bahamas, 

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collectively did business as “FTX.com” or “FTX” and operated the digital asset trading exchange 

during the Relevant Period. FTX had numerous employees, including key personnel, that were 

based in and perform work from the United States, including in this District. FTX had regularly 

engaged in advertising and promotional activities in the United States. None of the FTX entities 

has ever been registered with the Commission in any capacity. FTX is currently in Chapter 11 

bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. 

19. Alameda Research LLC (“Alameda”) is a Delaware limited liability company. 

During the Relevant Period, Alameda, along with its parent, subsidiary and affiliate entities, 

including without limitation Alameda Research Bahamas Ltd. and Alameda Research Ltd (BVI), 

collectively operated and did business as the digital asset trading and investment firm “Alameda.” 

Alameda was founded in, maintained offices in and had numerous employees, including key 

personnel, that were based in and performed work from the United States during the Relevant 

Period. Alameda has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity. Alameda is 

currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of 

Delaware. 

20. Caroline Ellison (“Ellison”) is a United States citizen who currently resides in the 

United States. Beginning in October 2021, Ellison served as a CEO of Alameda, specifically under 

appointment as co-CEO and later sole CEO of Alameda Research Bahamas Ltd. and Alameda 

Research Ltd (BVI), both operating entities doing business as Alameda. On December 19, 2022, 

Ellison pled guilty to conspiracy to commit commodities fraud, among other criminal charges, in 

this District. United States v. Caroline Ellison, Case No. 22-cr-673 (S.D.N.Y.). She has never 

been registered with the Commission in any capacity. 

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21. Zixiao “Gary” Wang (“Wang”) is a United States citizen who currently resides in 

the United States. He is a co-founder and co-owner of FTX and Alameda. Wang served as the 

Chief Technology Officer (“CTO”) of FTX and also performed key functions for Alameda during 

the Relevant Period. Wang resided in and performed work for FTX and Alameda in various 

locations during the Relevant Period, including in the United States. On December 19, 2022, 

Wang pled guilty to conspiracy to commit commodities fraud, among other criminal charges, in 

this District. United States v. Zixiao (Gary) Wang, Case No. 22-cr-673 (S.D.N.Y.). He has never 

been registered with the Commission in any capacity. 

22. During the Relevant Period, FTX and Alameda, together with other entities under 

the majority ownership and control of Bankman-Fried operated as a single, integrated common 

enterprise under the ultimate authority of Bankman-Fried as their mutual owner, and identified 

herein as the FTX Enterprise. Singh and others aided Bankman-Fried in the operation and 

management of the FTX Enterprise, including by exercising discretion over firing, hiring and 

certain operational decisions. The FTX Enterprise failed to observe corporate formalities, 

including failure to segregate assets, operations, resources and personnel, or to properly document 

intercompany transfers of assets and other resources. The entities regularly shared office space, 

systems, accounts and communications channels. Assets flowed freely between the FTX 

Enterprise entities, often without documentation or effective tracking. 

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

23. The purpose of the Act is to “serve the public interests . . . through a system of 

effective self-regulation of trading facilities, clearing systems, market participants and market 

professionals under the oversight of the Commission,” as well as “to deter and prevent price 

manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity; to ensure the financial integrity of all 

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transactions subject to [the] Act and the avoidance of systemic risk; to protect all market 

participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales practices and misuses of customer assets; and 

to promote responsible innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, other markets and 

market participants.” Section 3 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 5. 

24. A digital asset is anything that can be stored and transmitted electronically and has 

associated ownership or use rights. Digital assets include virtual currencies, such as bitcoin (BTC), 

ether (ETH) and stablecoins such as tether (USDT), which are digital representations of value that 

function as mediums of exchange, units of account and/or stores of value. Digital assets such as 

including bitcoin (BTC), ether (ETH), stablecoins such as tether (USDT) and others are 

“commodities” as defined under Section 1a(9) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9). 

25. In recent years, as digital asset markets have evolved, the CFTC has approved the 

offer of futures contracts on digital asset commodities, including bitcoin and ether futures and 

options, by boards of trade registered with the Commission, including the Chicago Mercantile 

Exchange (“CME”) and Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”). 

26. Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), in relevant part, makes it unlawful for 

any person, directly or indirectly, to: 

use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, 

or a contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future 

delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, any manipulative 

or deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of such rules and 

regulations as the Commission shall promulgate . . . 

27. CFTC Regulation 180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a), promulgated pursuant to the 

authority in CEA Section 6(c)(1), makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in 

connection with any swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract 

for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or recklessly: 

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(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, 

scheme, or artifice to defraud; or 

(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a 

material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 

the statements made not untrue or misleading; or 

(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, 

which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person 

28. Section 13(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a), establishes responsibility as a principal 

for any person who willfully aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures violations of 

the Act, or that acts in combination or concert with another person who commits violations of the 

Act. Specifically, Section 13(a) states that: 

Any person who commits or who willfully aids, abets, counsels, commands, 

induces, or procures the commission of, a violation of any of the provisions 

of this chapter, or any of the rules, regulations, or orders issued pursuant to 

this chapter, or who acts in combination or concert with any other person in 

any such violation, or who willfully causes an act to be done or omitted 

which if directly performed or omitted by him or another would be a 

violation of the provisions of this chapter or any of such rules, regulations, 

or orders may be held responsible for such violation as a principal. 

FACTS 

A. Founding of Alameda and the FTX Exchange 

29. In 2017, Singh, a personal friend and classmate of Bankman-Fried’s younger 

brother, was working full-time as a software engineer at a tech company in California. Shortly 

after founding Alameda, Bankman-Fried recruited Singh, and he began working nights and 

weekends for Alameda. Singh ultimately resigned his other employment to join Alameda fulltime in December 2017 as a software engineer. He later became the engineering manager and then 

head of engineering at Alameda, supervising all developers except Wang. 

30. Initially, Alameda primarily engaged in high-frequency digital asset arbitrage 

trading across a large variety of digital asset exchanges, including certain exchanges operating in 

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the United States. Alameda also acted as a “market maker” and “liquidity provider,” essentially 

serving as an always-available counterparty to traders in certain digital asset markets. Alameda 

subsequently expanded its activities into a number of new digital asset business models, including 

making large equity investments in various companies in the digital asset industry and taking large 

directional positions in various digital asset markets. All of this activity was frequently facilitated 

through large loans Alameda obtained from digital asset lending platforms and other sources, 

which enabled Alameda to increase the size and variety of its digital asset industry positions. 

31. Simultaneously with operating Alameda, Bankman-Fried and Wang, later with 

Singh’s assistance, also began building the digital asset exchange that would ultimately become 

FTX. In early 2019, Bankman-Fried, Wang and others moved to Hong Kong to finalize and launch 

the FTX platform to the public. Although Singh contributed to building FTX, he initially remained 

in California and supervised the Alameda engineering team. In or around May 2019, when the 

FTX.com website was released to the public, Singh transitioned to working primarily for FTX. 

Singh initially worked for FTX remotely from California, then relocated to Hong Kong in early 

2020. Singh became the Director of Engineering of FTX, and in that capacity was responsible for 

supervising all FTX developers other than Wang, who was the FTX Chief Technology Officer. 

Singh, Wang and developers working under them were primarily responsible for the design and 

implementation of the code underlying FTX.com (i.e. the computer programming instructions that 

direct the function of the FTX platform). Singh was a senior executive of FTX and reported 

directly to Bankman-Fried. 

32. FTX offered trading in a large variety of digital assets, including digital asset 

commodities such as bitcoin, ether, stablecoins such as tether and others. FTX operated primarily 

as a derivatives exchange and offered trading in various types of options, futures, swaps, “perpetual 

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futures” and other digital asset commodity derivative products. FTX allowed customers to place 

buy (long) and sell (short) orders in an electronic order book and matched customer orders via its 

“trading engine” or “matching engine.” FTX also offered a number of additional services related 

to the trading of digital asset products. For example, FTX operated a peer-to-peer (P2P) margin 

lending program where customers could offer margined offerings to one another. 

33. Customers could access the FTX platform through the FTX.com website, through 

a mobile application and through an Application Programming Interface (API). FTX also offered 

an off-exchange “over the counter” (OTC) portal that enabled customers to connect and request 

quotes for spot digital assets and trade directly, rather than placing orders on a central limit order 

book. Singh, Wang and other developers working under Singh’s supervision were responsible for 

the design and implementation of the code for the FTX API and OTC portal. 

34. FTX also relied on Alameda resources, assets and personnel to carry out a number 

of core functions for the FTX platform, including creating liquid submarkets for all of the products 

offered on FTX, maintaining an appropriate balance of various digital assets on the exchange and 

supporting the “peer to peer” margin lending program. Singh was the ultimate supervisor of the 

Alameda developers who had responsibilities related to those functions. Alameda likewise relied 

on various FTX resources, assets and personnel, including Singh, Wang and FTX developers 

reporting to Singh for a number of functions. 

35. FTX grew quickly. By June 2019, for example, just months after its launch, 

according to FTX, the daily volume of futures trading on FTX often exceeded $100 million. 

Beginning no later than 2020, FTX was consistently ranked as one of largest digital asset 

exchanges in the world by trading volume. In 2021, according to FTX, FTX entities held 

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approximately $15 billion in assets on their platforms, accounted for approximately 10% of global 

digital asset volumes and transacted $16 billion of volume per day. 

36. Because of the perception of potential conflicts of interest between FTX and 

Alameda, FTX Enterprise executives and employees, including Singh, understood that it was 

important to present a public perception that there was strong separation between Alameda and 

FTX. Bankman-Fried and others reinforced a separate spheres narrative in their public statements. 

37. On information and belief, Singh knew that these types of representations were 

being made by and on behalf of the FTX Enterprise and that such representations were false. He 

nevertheless engaged in willful acts that he knew were contrary to such representations. 

Throughout the Relevant Period, Alameda and FTX continued to share office space, first in 

Berkeley, California and later in Hong Kong and the Bahamas. They also shared key personnel, 

technology and hardware, intellectual property and other resources, including developer personnel 

and resources provided and/or supervised by Singh. Singh and other executives at Alameda and 

FTX also had widespread access to many of each other’s systems and/or accounts. 

38. In January 2020, Singh, Bankman-Fried and Wang established a separate group of 

entities operating a digital asset exchange specifically for U.S. persons. These entities collectively 

did business as “FTX US.” The FTX US entities were incorporated primarily in the State of 

Delaware, including under the registered name “West Realm Shires Inc.,” and also held various 

registrations, including as a licensed Money Transmitter under the laws of the State of South 

Dakota. FTX US offered trading to U.S. persons in a variety of digital assets, including, but not 

limited to, spot digital asset commodities. Singh was the Chief Engineer of FTX US, and was also 

represented to be the Chief Security Officer for FTX US in certain official paperwork and 

correspondence. 

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39. Singh, Bankman-Fried and Wang came to be known internally within the FTX 

Enterprise as “the founders.” FTX also publicly represented, including in submission to U.S. 

government departments and/or agencies, that “The FTX group of companies (FTX Group or 

FTX) was established by three Americans, Samuel Bankman-Fried, Gary Wang and Nishad Singh, 

with international operations commencing in May 2019 and the U.S. exchange starting in 2020.” 

40. During the Relevant Period, FTX purported to block U.S.-based customers from 

using its exchange to transact in digital asset products and to instead direct those U.S. customers 

to transact exclusively through the FTX US and FTX US Derivatives entities. On information and 

belief, some U.S. persons and entities were able to use FTX to transact in digital assets, including 

digital asset commodity products, futures, options, swaps, “ perpetual futures” and derivatives. 

B. FTX and Alameda Commingled, Mishandled and Misappropriated 

FTX Customer Assets from the Moment of FTX’s Launch 

41. At the time FTX was launched, it did not establish the requisite bank accounts to 

accept and hold customer assets. Instead, customers seeking to deposit “fiat” currency (i.e. 

traditional government-issued currency) into their FTX accounts were directed to wire their fiat 

deposits to bank accounts that were owned and controlled by Alameda. Some of those bank 

accounts were opened in the name of an entity called North Dimension, a Delaware-registered 

wholly-owned subsidiary of Alameda that, on information and belief, deliberately did not have a 

name that was readily-identifiable with Alameda. Certain of these bank accounts were located and 

based in the United States. 

42. Once received, FTX customer assets were not segregated from Alameda assets or 

placed into accounts designated as being “for the benefit of” (FBO) FTX customers. Initially, 

when FTX customer assets were deposited into Alameda bank accounts, Alameda personnel 

manually credited FTX customer accounts with the corresponding amount of fiat currency on FTX 

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internal ledger system. During the Relevant Period, customers accessing their FTX accounts 

would be able to observe on the exchange’s website (and later mobile application) that their 

deposits had been posted to their FTX accounts, even though the fiat deposits actually remained 

in Alameda-controlled bank accounts. During the Relevant Period, Singh knew of this process 

and of access Alameda was granted to FTX’s systems that enabled Alameda’s continued and 

undisclosed holding and use of FTX customer funds. 

43. FTX allowed customers to deposit their assets in one denomination and withdraw 

their assets in another denomination that was treated as equivalent. For example, a customer could 

deposit dollars and withdraw USDC or tether (USDT), or vice versa. Alameda was responsible 

for facilitating this FTX feature. Alameda personnel thereby had the ability to access and withdraw 

assets, including customer assets, stored in FTX digital asset “hot” (i.e. online) wallets to make 

the digital asset exchanges necessary to support this functionality. Singh knew of and willfully 

maintained certain features in the FTX code related to these functionalities. Alameda’s role in this 

process and the corresponding access to customer accounts granted to Alameda to facilitate this 

were not disclosed to or known by FTX customers. 

44. The Alameda-owned bank accounts holding FTX customer fiat assets were 

collectively reflected on FTX’s internal ledger systems as the “fiat@ftx.com” account. During the 

Relevant Period, this account held a liability of as much as $8 billion in FTX customer assets. 

Often, those assets were not maintained as bank deposits or converted to stablecoins in FTXcontrolled wallets, but rather diverted to and used by Alameda. Even after FTX opened its own 

FBO bank accounts, previously transferred FTX customer assets were not moved into FTX’s bank 

accounts and instead continued to be reflected in the “fiat@ftx.com” account. In addition, at least 

some FTX customers continued to send fiat deposits to Alameda-owned accounts. Singh willfully 

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designed, coded, implemented, facilitated, maintained and/or was responsible for certain 

components of these functionalities. During the Relevant Period, Singh knew that this 

“fiat@ftx.com” liability consisted of FTX customer assets. 

45. In approximately mid-2022, Singh and other FTX employees who reported to Singh 

undertook a project to segregate, account for and reconcile the “moral balances” between 

comingled FTX assets—including customer assets in the “fiat@ftx.com” account—and 

Alameda’s own assets. After several months of effort, this project failed, due in part to a lack of 

adequate documentation of the sources of funds contained in various accounts. The failure of this 

project exemplified the depth of the practically irreconcilable comingling of FTX customer assets 

with FTX and Alameda’s own assets, and put Singh and others on clear notice of the same. 

46. Consistently from the launch of FTX and throughout the Relevant Period, Alameda 

accessed and used FTX customer assets for Alameda’s own operations and activities, including to 

fund its trading, investment and borrowing/lending activities. Alameda’s use of FTX customer 

assets included both customer fiat deposits that were sent to Alameda-owned bank accounts and 

customer digital asset deposits and holdings that Alameda accessed via the essentially unbounded 

withdrawal capabilities of its FTX account. During the Relevant Period, Singh knew that Alameda 

accessed and used FTX customer assets for undisclosed purposes and knew of features in the FTX 

code that enabled these practices. Singh willfully maintained and/or was responsible for at least 

certain components of code related to these functionalities. 

47. Singh was aware of business justifications underlying at least some of Alameda’s 

undisclosed access to FTX customer assets. During the Relevant Period, Singh also gradually 

became aware that these same functionalities enabled and resulted in the misappropriation of FTX 

customer assets. Singh also directly participated in the misappropriation. Beginning no later than 

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mid-2022, Singh also gradually became aware that Alameda’s liability to FTX customers was one 

that Alameda and FTX were not able to repay. In or around September 2022, Singh participated 

in conversations with Bankman-Fried and other FTX and Alameda senior management about how 

they could fill the large hole in FTX’s balance sheet. 

48. Alameda’s access to and use of FTX customer assets was not authorized by or 

disclosed to FTX customers. To the contrary, for example, FTX’s Terms of Service provide that 

customers retain title and control of their assets, and that “None of the Digital Assets in your 

Account are the property of, or shall or may be loaned to, FTX Trading.” Internal policy 

documents recognized the FTX Entities’ “responsibility to ensure that customer assets are 

appropriately safeguarded and segregated from its own funds.” Furthermore, in public venues 

such as Twitter and when providing information to the U.S. Congress, the CFTC and/or other 

federal and state government agencies, and to investors, representatives of the FTX Enterprise 

including Bankman-Fried consistently and repeatedly reiterated, in a variety of contexts, that 

customer assets were properly segregated and custodied by FTX at all times.

49. On information and belief, during the Relevant Period, Singh knew that these and 

other representations that FTX carefully segregated and protected customer assets were false, and 

he engaged in willful acts that he knew were contrary to of such representations. For example, 

during the Relevant Period, Singh knew that Alameda and FTX commingled assets and freely used 

FTX customer assets. Singh also gradually became aware that Alameda used FTX customer assets 

as capital to deploy in their own trading and investment activities. While Singh had earlier been 

under the impression that Alameda would be able to return and repay the misappropriated FTX 

customer assets when customers sought to make withdrawals, he later became aware that 

Alameda’s misappropriation had greatly exceeded its ability to repay. 

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50. Singh and other FTX executives used FTX assets, including FTX customer assets, 

for a variety of personal expenditures, including to purchase property, make political donations 

and for other personal uses. Singh personally took millions in poorly documented “loans” and 

other withdrawals from Alameda and FTX, including in the fall of 2022—after he knew that 

Alameda had caused a significant shortfall of FTX customer assets that FTX and Alameda could 

not repay. This included at least one leveraged withdrawal collateralized by digital assets that 

Singh knew or should have known would plummet in value once the misappropriation of FTX 

customer assets became public. 

C. Alameda’s Special Privileges and Functions on FTX 

51. From the launch of FTX, Alameda operated as a primary market maker on FTX 

and acted as an always-available buyer and seller of digital assets in order to provide sufficient 

liquidity and an available trading counterparty to FTX customers. This included functioning as a 

primary market maker for more low volume and/or illiquid digital assets. In that capacity, unlike 

other market makers on FTX, Alameda was permitted to “sell” such digital assets to an FTX 

customer even if it did not at that time have ownership of the digital assets it was purportedly 

selling, which was known internally at FTX and Alameda as a “long tail” sale. In such a case, 

FTX customer accounts were credited as owning that digital asset at the time of the transaction, 

even if there was no corresponding digital asset for their benefit in FTX’s wallets. FTX customers 

were not made aware of this. 

52. Alameda performed a number of other undisclosed core functions on behalf of FTX 

throughout the Relevant Period, including maintaining a balance of various digital assets, 

including but not limited to stablecoins, to be available to trade on FTX. FTX customers were not 

made aware that this function was performed by Alameda rather than FTX, or that this function 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 17 of 34
18

required certain undisclosed permissions for Alameda’s account on FTX that could be exploited 

for other purposes, including misappropriation of FTX customer assets. 

53. Alameda also had an undisclosed role with respect to the functionality of FTX’s 

backstop liquidity provider (“BLP”) program. In marketing materials and in communications with 

federal regulators and others, FTX touted its auto-liquidation risk management engine, crossmargin functionality and BLP program as unique features of FTX that more effectively limited 

and managed risk on the exchange. Singh, Wang and developers working with them under Singh’s 

supervision were primarily responsible for the design and implementation of the code underlying 

these features of FTX. Alameda was a leading participant in the BLP program. 

54. On certain occasions during the Relevant Period, Singh directly and willfully 

implemented changes for the automated “delevering” risk management engine and BLP program 

that had the effect of overriding public representations made by or on behalf of FTX about the 

operation those features. For example, in May 2022, Singh “reprice[d] some liquidations for some 

users,” including by “changing the price of user’s fills” for certain past liquidation events for which 

Alameda served as the BLP. One goal of this and similar actions Singh undertook was to show 

“insurance fund losses to be less.” On information and belief, Singh knew that the changes 

introduced by his code were contradictory to public representations about the effectiveness and 

functionality of FTX’s risk management programs and nevertheless engaged in willful acts that he 

knew were contrary to such representations. 

55. Alameda enjoyed certain essential and undisclosed benefits and privileges on FTX 

throughout the Relevant Period. These advantages were programmed into the code for FTX by 

Singh, Wang and other developers supervised by Singh, typically at the direction of BankmanFried. For one, Alameda was exempt from FTX’s “auto-liquidation” risk engine functions, which 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 18 of 34
19

would automatically liquidate (sell) a customer’s open position when their “Maintenance Margin 

Fraction” fell below a certain determined level. Customers who took on too much leverage or risk 

on FTX would be auto-liquidated by the exchange. Alameda was exempt from this—it could not 

be liquidated on FTX under any condition. Alameda’s exemptions from the liquidation protocol 

were hard-coded into FTX’s system through various, sometimes redundant means, some of which 

were willfully coded and implemented by Singh. 

56. Alameda also enjoyed order execution timing privileges for its transactions on FTX 

during the Relevant Period. Singh willfully designed, coded, implemented, facilitated, maintained 

and/or was responsible for these functionalities. On information and belief, Singh also knew that 

these advantages were not publicly disclosed during the Relevant Period and nevertheless engaged 

in willful acts to further Alameda’s undisclosed advantages. 

57. Alameda’s account on FTX had a special designation in the FTX code throughout 

the Relevant Period, labeled as an “allow negative flag,” which allowed Alameda to execute a 

transaction even if it did not have the assets available in its account to do so. Singh originally 

created the “allow negative” functionality and a related “can withdraw below borrow” 

functionality in the FTX code in 2019 and, on information and belief, these functionalities were 

later utilized by other FTX executives to extend this functionality to Alameda’s trading accounts. 

In August 2020, Singh also created a feature in the FTX code that would send an alert when 

Alameda’s account would otherwise be subject to liquidation pursuant to FTX’s risk management 

function in lieu of proceeding with liquidation. This was intended as a backstop to enable Alameda 

to transfer assets to avoid liquidation. Contemporaneously with implementing this change, Singh 

alerted Wang that he had created this feature in the code. Wang responded to Singh that liquidation 

of Alameda was unlikely to ever occur and that this feature was therefore not likely to be triggered. 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 19 of 34
20

Alameda’s borrowing limit on FTX was gradually raised over time and was ultimately raised to 

approximately $65 billion. Alameda’s borrowed assets could also be withdrawn from FTX. Singh 

willfully designed, coded, implemented, facilitated, maintained and/or was responsible for various 

functionalities that ultimately enabled Alameda to withdraw unlimited assets from FTX to put 

towards its off-platform activities. 

58. Alameda also engaged in various undisclosed activities in order to benefit FTX 

during the Relevant Period. Some such activities created a false impression that FTX had highperforming automated functionalities, when in fact those functionalities were being executed 

and/or supported by Alameda. Singh willfully engaged in acts that he knew were contrary to of 

such implicit and explicit understandings and representations. For example, as Singh explained in 

an internal communication, “[A]lameda . . . and a few other [market makers] have the ability to 

market make on markets pre-listing (so that when we go live they have real orderbooks).” Singh 

willfully designed, coded, implemented, facilitated, maintained and/or was responsible for these 

functionalities. FTX customers were not made aware of Alameda’s role in such functionalities. 

D. Alameda Escalated its Misappropriation of Customer Assets in 2022 

59. In approximately May and/or June 2022, Alameda was subject to a large number 

of margin calls and loan recalls as a result of certain digital asset market events. It did not have 

sufficient liquid assets to service its loans. Instead, Alameda greatly increased its usage of FTX 

customer assets to meet its external debt obligations. Alameda was able to rely on its undisclosed 

ordinary-course access to FTX credit and customer assets to facilitate these large withdrawals, 

which were several billion dollars in notional value. By approximately mid-2022, FTX’s internal 

ledgers reflected that Alameda’s fiat liability to FTX totaled approximately $8 billion, a staggering 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 20 of 34
21

amount that exceeded FTX total lifetime revenue. Bankman-Fried had acknowledged this large 

outstanding balance to a small group of key personnel of FTX and Alameda, including Singh. 

60. During this time, Singh became overtly aware that Alameda’s liability to FTX 

customers was one that Alameda and FTX were not able to repay. For example: in approximately 

June 2022, Singh participated in conversations with Bankman-Fried, Ellison and others where the 

decision was made that Alameda would use large quantities of FTX assets, which included 

comingled FTX customer assets, to cover Alameda’s debt obligations; in approximately 

September 2022, Singh participated in conversations about how—and whether—FTX and 

Alameda could repay those obligations; also in September 2022, Singh also participated in 

conversations with Bankman-Fried and others about whether Alameda should be shut down in 

light of its significant losses. 

61. At approximately this same time in or around mid-2022, Singh reallocated 

Alameda’s approximately $8 billion in liabilities to a customer account on FTX’s systems that 

Bankman-Fried would later refer to as “our Korean friend’s account” and/or “the weird Korean 

account.” He was asked to do this, at least in part, to prevent Alameda from paying interest on its 

large outstanding balance. This account was designated as a sub-account of Alameda’s main 

account, but unlike other Alameda sub-accounts on FTX, it was not opened under an “@alamedaresearch.com” identifier and was not otherwise readily identifiable as being an Alamedaassociated account. The system notes associated with the account described it as “FTX fiat old.” 

The same type of “allow negative flag” and exemption from liquidation characteristics were 

carried over to the so-called Korean account. After this transfer, it was no longer readily apparent 

on FTX’s ledgers that Alameda had an $8 billion negative balance on its FTX account. BankmanFried and others were aware of this transfer at the time it occurred. 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 21 of 34
22

E. November 2022 Collapse of FTX and Alameda 

62. On November 2, 2022, the online digital asset news publication Coindesk.com 

published an article titled “Divisions in Sam Bankman-Fried’s Crypto Empire Blur on His Trading 

Titan Alameda’s Balance Sheet,” and subtitled: “Alameda had $14.6 billion of assets as of June 

30, according to a private document CoinDesk reviewed. Much of it is the FTT token issued by 

FTX, another Bankman-Fried company.” This article reported on a purported leaked Alameda 

balance sheet that showed that, at least as of June 30, 2022, an extremely high portion of Alameda’s 

$14.6 billion in assets consisted of the FTT token. 

63. On November 6, 2022, Singh and others discussed ways to respond to the 

increasing “FUD” (fear, uncertainty and doubt) resulting from the leaked Alameda balance sheet. 

Singh and others offered proposed responses that Ellison could post on Twitter. Ellison thereafter 

posted two tweets that indicated that the balance sheet was not a complete statement of Alameda’s 

assets and positions. 

64. On the evening of November 6, as they monitored and reacted to the movements in 

FTT prices and the contagion effects on the digital asset market more broadly, Bankman-Fried, 

Ellison and another Alameda executive expressed surprise that these events had not had a larger 

negative impact on the prices of bitcoin, saying in a chat message:

[Alameda executive 1]: “I'm surprised BTC isnt down more” 

Ellison: “me too” 

Bankman-Fried: “yea me 3” 

At this time, bitcoin market prices, including on U.S. exchanges, had indeed begun to decline, 

likely as a direct or indirect result of the events described herein. 

65. At the same time, an increasing number of FTX customers began requesting to 

withdraw their assets from the exchange. FTX personnel, including Singh and developers working 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 22 of 34
23

under his direction, initially managed to keep FTX’s systems operating quickly enough to keep up 

with withdrawals, but soon fell behind.

66. By late in the day on November 7, it was apparent to FTX executives, including 

Singh, that FTX did not have sufficient assets to cover all customer withdrawals, and that there 

were not sufficient assets held in various FTX accounts to cover all customer deposit obligations. 

67. Singh, Bankman-Fried, Ellison and other key personnel of FTX and Alameda 

acknowledged internally that this shortfall was not merely a matter of having sufficient liquid

assets on hand to cover customer withdrawals in the short term; rather, FTX customer assets were 

irrevocably lost because Alameda had misappropriated them. 

68. That same day, the Alameda traders who had been liquidating Alameda’s open 

positions to free up capital for FTT buybacks were directed to instead sell everything that could 

be sold quickly from Alameda’s holdings, to maximize open lines of credit or any other available 

sources of capital, and generally do anything possible to quickly obtain billions of dollars in capital 

to send to FTX. 

69. On or about November 7, FTX US executives asked Singh and Wang to evaluate 

the solvency of FTX US. They were readily able to carry out this request because they both had 

access to and oversight of the FTX US (but not FTX US Derivatives) code, database and ledgers 

in the ordinary course of their duties. With Singh’s assistance, Wang ultimately identified a 

shortfall on FTX US that FTX executives did not understand and were unable to fully quantify. 

Bankman-Fried thereafter directed Alameda traders to prioritize meeting FTX US capital 

requirements and to send excess capital to FTX US. Alameda sent in excess of $185 million to 

FTX US to help fill its shortfall. Ellison later attributed this shortfall, at least in part, to Alameda’s 

margin trading position on FTX US. 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 23 of 34
24

70. In direct contradiction of this internal series of events, on November 7, in public 

statements and various Twitter messages, Bankman-Fried and others acting on behalf of FTX 

continued to portray the shortfall that was causing customers to be unable to withdraw their assets 

as merely a liquidity problem. They affirmatively, and falsely, stated that FTX continued to be 

solvent and that all customer deposits were safe. For example, Bankman Fried tweeted: 

71. This and other iterations of proposed tweets by Bankman-Fried were debated and 

rewritten among a small group of FTX executives and other of Bankman-Fried’s confidants, 

including in a message chat group called “PR Super Sensitive,” which included Singh. Several 

individuals, including Singh, expressed concerns in chat messages and/or in-person conversations 

that Bankman-Fried’s tweet was inaccurate and/or misleading. 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 24 of 34

SBF O 

@SBF_FTX 

1) A competitor is trying to go after us with false 

rumors. 

FTX is fine. Assets are fine. 

Details: 

12:38 PM · Nov 7, 2022 · Twitter Web App 

611 Retweets 407 Quote Tweets 2,599 Likes 

. SBF 

,B FT 0 l#HH·Y 

2) FTX has enough to cover all client 

holdings. We don't invest client assets 

(even in treasuries). We have been 

processing all withdrawals, and will 

continue to be. Some details on 

withdrawal speed : 

twitter.com/FTX_ Official/s ... (banks 

and nodes can be slow) 

12 38 PM 7 rJov 2022 
25

72. Prior to sending these and similar tweets, on the evening of November 6, BankmanFried said to Singh in a one-on-one chat message “I think Im’ [sic.] going to tweet btw unless you 

really thin [sic.] it’s bad.” Singh did not respond to this question. Instead, several hours later, 

Singh sent Bankman-Fried a message asking for Bankman-Fried’s authorization to “unwind” and 

“get rid of” the loans he owed to the companies, saying “one thing that’d seriously help me is if I 

didn’t have debts.” Singh suggested a backdated transaction to “sell ftt or srm earlier in 2022” as 

one solution. Bankman-Fried responded “I think that’s probably fine.” Singh later also asked 

another other FTX executive about the possibility of erasing his loan obligations. Singh did not 

ultimately proceed with any such transaction. 

73. At the same time as Bankman-Fried was making public assurances, he and 

numerous others acting on behalf of FTX were also reaching out to as many sources of funding as 

possible in an attempt to quickly raise several billion dollars to cover the shortfall in customer 

assets. As the calculation of the amount of the shortfall grew from $1-2 billion, to $2-4 billion, to 

as much as $8 billion, the number of viable potential rescue options diminished. Numerous parties 

declined to bail out FTX regardless of the favorable terms being offered. 

74. At approximately this same time, Bankman-Fried prepared or caused to be prepared 

a balance sheet to be shared with prospective investors showing the assets and liabilities of the 

companies. That balance sheet was unorthodox in a number of respects. Most notably, the balance 

sheet included an $8 billion negative balance from a “hidden, poorly internally labeled ‘fiat@’ 

account.” 

75. The existence and nature of the “fiat@” account was in fact known to BankmanFried, Singh and others. For example, just a few months prior, with Bankman-Fried’s knowledge, 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 25 of 34
26

Singh had redirected the “fiat@” account on the FTX system by transferring the “fiat@” balance 

to the “Korean friend” sub-account of Alameda with the notation “FTX fiat old.”

76. On the morning of November 9, 2022 at approximately 10 AM ET, Ellison held an 

“all-hands” meeting with Alameda staff. In that meeting, Ellison acknowledged that earlier that 

year, she, Bankman-Fried and other individuals had decided to use FTX customer assets to pay 

Alameda’s debts, and that Singh and Wang knew of this. She also explained that Alameda could 

access user assets without requiring FTX’s approval as the “structure” allowed Alameda to “go 

negative in coins.” Most Alameda employees resigned shortly thereafter. Singh did not attend 

this meeting, but tendered his resignation on the same day. 

77. On November 10, 2022, FTX and FTX US halted all trading and withdrawals, and 

Bankman-Fried announced that Alameda was being wound down. Bankman-Fried also posted a 

lengthy Twitter thread purporting to explain how he “f[***]ed up.” 

78. On November 10, 2022, at approximately 4:00 am ET, Bankman-Fried signed a 

document resigning his position as CEO of FTX and, as majority owner of all the FTX and 

Alameda companies, authorizing the appointment of an independent CEO of the FTX Enterprise 

and the filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 

79. The next day, on November 11, 2022, 134 separate companies of the FTX 

Enterprise simultaneously filed for Bankruptcy. Those proceedings are ongoing and being jointly 

administered in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. 

F. Impact of These Events on Digital Asset Commodity Futures Markets 

80. The foregoing series of events had a significant, observable negative impact on 

digital asset commodity markets. For example, between the release of the November 2, 2022 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 26 of 34
27

Coindesk article and the events of November 9, 2022, the price of bitcoin futures fell more than 

23% to two-year low prices. 

81. Various data visualizations demonstrate a clear connection between the foregoing 

events and the price movement of digital asset commodities, including bitcoin and ether. 

82. The foregoing conduct by Singh in common enterprise with others caused, directly 

or in directly, significant negative price impact on the value of commodities in interstate commerce 

in the U.S., including bitcoin and ether spot and futures prices, as illustrated in the following three 

market data charts. 

83. The following chart is a visualization of the price movement of bitcoin and ether 

digital asset commodity spot and futures prices on various major exchanges at the time of the 

foregoing events. On information and belief, the significant price movement demonstrated in this 

chart is a result of the conduct described herein:

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 27 of 34

105 

100 

95 

90 

"' ., 

u 

~ 85 

80 

75 

70 

65 

Nov 2 

2022 

How Prices Reacted to FTX Events (using Nov 1 as base) 

Nov 4 Nov 6 Nov 8 Nov 10 Nov 12 

Time in EST 

-- Binance BTC usdt 

-- Coinbase BTC usd 

-- Binance ETH usdt 

-- Coinbase ETH usd 

BTC Futures 

-- ETH Futures 
28

84. The following chart is a visualization of the impact of various of the foregoing 

market events on bitcoin futures prices on the U.S. CME exchange, with several of the key 

foregoing events identified on the price and time line. On information and belief, the significant 

price movement demonstrated in this chart is a result of the conduct described herein: 

85. The following chart is a visualization of the impact of various of the foregoing 

market events on ether futures prices on the U.S. CME exchange, with several of the key foregoing 

events identified on the price and time line. On information and belief, the significant price 

movement demonstrated in this chart is a result of the conduct described herein: 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 28 of 34

22k 

21k 

20k 

19k 

18k 

17k 

16k 

15k 

14k 

Wednesday 11AM: Alamed a 

balance sheet leaked 

Nov 2 

2022 

How CME Bitcoin Futures (Nov Expiry) Reacted to FTX Events 

Monday 7AM: SBF tweets, 

"FTX is fi ne. Assets are 

fine. FTX has enough to 

cover a ll client holdings.• 

Sunday 10AM : CZ tw-eet s 

decision to sell FTT (FTX 

token) 

Tu esday 11AM: CZ tw eets 

that FTX asked for help and 

Tuesday 2PM: BTC/USO drops 

more than 12% over 3 hours 

Wednesday 4PM : Binance 

tweets they .,.,ill no kl ngu 

acquire FTX.com 

Wednesday 4PM : BTC/USO 

bottoms more than 23% down 

since the Alameda leak Thursday 6AM: FTX suspends 

on-boarding and withdrawa ls 

Nov 4 Nov 6 Nov 8 Nov JO Nov 12 

Time in EST 
29

VIOLATIONS OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT AND REGULATIONS 

COUNT I: FRAUD 

Violations of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 

Regulation 180.1(a)(1), (3), 17 C.F.R. 180.1(a)(1), (3) (2022) 

86. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 85 are re-alleged and incorporated 

herein by reference. 

87. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Singh, intentionally or recklessly, in 

connection with any swap, or contract of sale or any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract 

for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, directly or indirectly: used or 

employed, or attempted to use or employ, a scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or engaged in, or 

attempted to engage in, acts, practices, or a course of business that operated or would operate as a 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 29 of 34

1700 

1600 

1500 

1400 

1300 

1200 

1100 

1000 

VI. 

Wednuday 11AM: Alameda 

ba lance shut leaked 

Nov 2 

2022 

How CME Ethereum Futures (Nov Expiry) Reacted to FTX Events 

Monday 7AM : SBF tw eets, 

"'FTX is fine. Assets are 

Sunday 10AM: CZ tweets 

decision to sell FTT (FTX 

token} 

Tuuday 11AM: CZ h-1eets 

that FTX asked for he lp and 

Binance intends to acquire 

FTX.com 

more tha n 12% ove r 3 hours 

Wednesday 4PM: Bina nee 

tweets they will no longer 

acquire FTX.com 

W•dnesday 4PM: BTC/USO 

bottoms more than 23% do\'m 

since the Alameda leak 

Friday 10AM: SBF twHts 

that he filed bankruptcy 

for FTX, FTX US, and 

Alameda 

Thursday 6AM: FTX suspends 

on•boarding a nd withd rawa ls 

Nov 4 Nov 6 Nov 8 Nov 10 Nov 12 

Time in EST 
30

fraud or deceit on any person, including, but not limited to, FTX customers and/or other market 

participants. Defendant Singh did so by taking “loans” from Alameda that he knew or should have 

known consisted, at least in part, of misappropriated FTX customer assets, as alleged in the 

foregoing paragraphs; 

88. As a result of the foregoing conduct, Singh misappropriated funds in violation of 

Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1), (3), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 180.1(a)(1), (3). 

89. Each and every use or employment or attempted use or employment of any 

manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; or act of engaging, or attempting to engage, in 

acts, practices or courses of business that operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit on 

any person, including FTX customers and/or other market participants, is alleged as a separate and 

distinct violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1), (3), 

17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1), (3). 

COUNT II: AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD COMMITTED BY 

FTX, ALAMEDA AND BANKMAN-FRIED 

Violations of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 

Regulation 180.1(a)(1)–(3), 17 C.F.R. 180.1(a)(1)–(3) (2022) 

90. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 89 are re-alleged and incorporated 

herein by reference. 

91. During the Relevant Period, by the conduct described above, Defendant Singh 

willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured and/or committed acts in 

combination or concert with FTX, Alameda and/or Bankman-Fried that constituted violations of 

Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1)–(3), 17 C.F.R. 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 30 of 34
31

§ 180.1(a)(1), (3). Therefore, as a result of the foregoing conduct, pursuant to Section 13(a) of the 

Act, 7 U.S.C. §13c(a), Singh is liable for FTX, Alameda and Bankman-Fried’s violations of 

Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1)–(3), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 180.1(a)(1)–(3). 

92. Each and every willful act engaged in by Singh in furtherance of the violations of 

Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1), (3), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 180.1(a)(1)–(3) committed by FTX, Alameda and/or Bankman-Fried constitutes a separate and 

distinct violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a)(1)–(3), 

17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)–(3) for which Singh is responsible as if he were principal under Section 

13(a) of the Act. 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court, as authorized by 

Section 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-l, and pursuant to the Court’s own equitable powers, enter: 

A. An order finding that Defendant Singh violated Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1), and Regulation 180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2022). 

B. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Singh from engaging in conduct 

described above, in violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and Regulation 

180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2022), or aiding and abetting such violations. 

C. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Singh from directly or indirectly: 

(i) trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is 

defined in Section la of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(40)); 

(ii) entering into any transactions involving “commodity interests” (as that term 

is defined in Commission Regulation 1.3, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2022)), or digital asset 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 31 of 34

VII. 
32

commodities, as that term is described herein, for his own accounts or for any 

account in which he has a direct or indirect interest; 

(iii) having any commodity interests or digital asset commodities, as that term 

is described herein, traded on his behalf; 

(iv) controlling or directing the trading for or on behalf of any other person or 

entity, whether by power of attorney or otherwise, in any account involving 

commodity interests or digital asset commodities, as that term is described herein; 

(v) soliciting, receiving, or accepting any funds and/or assets from any person 

for the purpose of purchasing or selling any commodity interests or digital asset 

commodities, as that term is described herein; 

(vi) applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the 

Commission in any capacity, and engaging in any activity requiring such 

registration or exemption from registration with the Commission, except as 

provided for in Regulation 4.14(a)(9), 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2022); 

(vii) acting as a principal (as that term is defined in Commission Regulation 

3.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (2022)), agent or any other officer or employee of any 

person registered, exempted from registration or required to be registered with the 

Commission except as provided for in Regulation 4.14(a)(9); 

D. An order directing Singh to disgorge to any officer appointed or directed by the Court 

all benefits received including, but not limited to, trading profits, revenues, salaries, commissions, 

loans, or fees derived, directly or indirectly, from acts or practices which constitute violations of 

the Act as described herein, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 

E. An order directing Singh to rescind, pursuant to such procedures as the Court may 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 32 of 34
33

order, all contracts and agreements, whether implied or express, entered into between, with, or 

among Singh and any customer or investor whose funds and/or assets were received by Singh as 

a result of the acts and practices that constituted violations of the Act, as described herein; 

F. An order requiring Singh to make full restitution by making whole each and every 

customer or investor whose funds and/or assets were received or utilized by them in violation of 

the provisions of the Act as described herein, including pre-judgment interest; 

G. An order directing Singh to pay civil monetary penalties, to be assessed by the Court, 

in an amount not more than the penalty prescribed by Section 6c(d)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a1(d)(1), as adjusted for inflation pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act 

Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–74, 129 Stat. 584, Title VII, Section 701, see Commission 

Regulation 143.8, 17 C.F.R. § 143.8 (2022), for each violation of the Act, as described herein; 

H. An order requiring Singh to pay costs and fees as permitted by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 

and 2412(a)(2); and 

I. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff CFTC hereby demands a jury trial. 

Dated: February 28, 2023 Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

By its attorneys: 

/s/ Nina Ruvinsky

 Nina Ruvinsky (Pro Hac Vice pending) 

Senior Trial Attorney 

nruvinsky@cftc.gov

Carlin Metzger (Pro Hac Vice pending) 

Senior Trial Attorney 

cmetzger@cftc.gov 

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 33 of 34

VIII. 
34

Elizabeth N. Pendleton (Pro Hac Vice pending) 

Chief Trial Attorney 

ependleton@cftc.gov 

 Robert T. Howell (Pro Hac Vice pending) 

Deputy Director 

rhowell@cftc.gov 

Scott R. Williamson (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming) 

Deputy Regional Counsel 

swilliamson@cftc.gov

 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Ralph Metcalfe Federal Office Building 

77 W. Jackson, Suite 800 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

(312) 596-0700 

(312) 596-0714 (fax) 

John C. Murphy (Local Counsel)

Trial Attorney 

jmurphy@cftc.gov 

290 Broadway, 6th Floor 

New York, NY 10007 

646-746-9700 

646-746-9888 (fax) 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Case 1:23-cv-01684 Document 1 Filed 02/28/23 Page 34 of 34