COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Decker and O’Brien Argued at Richmond, Virginia

DANIEL THORNSBURY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No . 2035-16-2 JUDGE MAR Y GRACE O’BRIEN AUGUST 15, 2017 CHESTERFIELD-COL ONIAL HEIGHTS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Frederick G. Rockwell, III, Judge Todd M. Ritter (Daniels, Willia ms, Tuck & Ritter, on brief), for appellant. Emily C. Russell, Assistant Coun ty Attorney; Lisa Way Piper, Guardian ad litem for the infant children (Je ffrey L. Mincks, County Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
Daniel Thornsbury (“appellant”) , the father of two children, a ppeals the termination of his residual parental rights under Co de § 16.1-283. He asserts two assignments of error: 1. The trial court committed rev ersible error by terminating t he Appellant’s residual p arental rights when clear and convincing evidence was not presented to prove it was in the best interest s of the children to terminate Appella nt’s residual parental rights. 2. The trial court committed reversible error by terminating Appellant’s residual p arental rights when clear and convincing evidence was not presented to pr ove he had, without good cause, been unwilling or unabl e within a reasonable period of time, no t to exceed twelve (12) months from the date the children were placed in foster care, to subs tantially remed y the conditions w hich led to the children’s placement in foster care. Finding no error, we affirm.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing at trial, the Chesterfield-Colonial Heights Department of Social Services (“t he Department”). Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App . 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005). Appellant was the sole custodian of his two dau ghters, E.T., born A ugust 4, 2004, and J.T., born May 4, 2006. 1 Between April 2012 and Octobe r 2014, Richmond Chil d Protective Services (“RCPS”) received three complaints alleging that appellan t had abused and neglected the children due to h is alcohol and substance abuse. RCPS conducted a family assessment and implem ented a safety p lan; however, the agency closed the case when appellant and his children move d to Chesterfield County. On October 2, 2015, th e Department received a referral from Ch esterfield County Child Protective Services (“CPS”) concerning appellant’s care of his daughters. The referral alleged that appellant, while intoxicated, grab bed J.T.’s shirt and spanked her after she tried to take his beer away. The caller also reported that the children did not have sufficient food or weather-appropriate clothing. On October 9, 2015, the Department received another CPS referral that appellant, who was again intoxicated, took the girls to a residence where he h ad them sleep on a “smelly, dirty couch” while he “smok[ed] someth ing out of a gla ss pipe.” On O ctober 12, 2015, RCPS received a report that appellant’s mother’s paramour, w ith whom she reside d, had sexually abused E.T. and attempted to sexua lly assault J.T. A Chesterfield County detective and a CPS family services spec ialist interviewed appellant at his home on October 21, 2015. They obse rved a hole in the r oof where a tree had fallen, and also noted that appellant appeared to be under the influence of alco hol. Appellant a cknowledged drinking a twelve-pack of beer on each of his two days off per week, and he admitted to smoking

1 The children’s mother pled gui lty to child endangerment in Nov ember 2011, and agreed not to have contact with children under the age of eighteen as a condition of her parole.- 3 - marijuana the night that the girls slept on the couch. He also said that he had used cocaine within the preceding two day s. Appellant admitt ed that he brought his daughters back to his mother’s house despite the pending sexual assault investig ation of her p aramour because he did not have another babysitter for them. Appellant agreed to enter into a safety plan with the Departme nt requiring him to abstain from drugs and alcoho l in the presence of his children, vacate the residence, and leave the children in the physical custod y of his roommate. A ppellant subsequentl y failed to bring his daughters to a forensic interview concerning the sexual assault complaint, and the Department was unable to contact him. As a result of concerns about the girls’ safety, the Department assumed emergency custody of E.T. and J.T . on October 23, 2015. On December 18, 2015, the Chesterfield Ju venile and Domestic R elations District Court (“JDR court”) approve d an initial foster c are plan with the goa l of returning the children to their father. The primary focus of th e plan was for appellant to cea se his use of alcohol and illicit substances. The JDR court incl uded a provision that “[appellant] shall not consume any alcohol or illegal substance during the pen dency of this plan.” The Depar tment agreed to assist appellant in obtaining substance abuse treatment. Additionally, appellant w as required to comply with other conditions such as mai ntaining employment and not allowing his mother’s paramour to have any contact with the children. Although appellant i nitially complied with s ome of the plan’s conditions by maintaining employment and completing a psyc hological evalua tion, he failed to abstain from drugs and alcohol. During his psychological interview, he stated that he did not believe his children had been affected by his drug and alcohol use. He also indicated in the interview that he believed his daughter fabricated the sexual abuse allegations against his mo ther’s paramour. 2 In March 2016,

2 RCPS later determined that th e complaint was “founded.”- 4 - appellant completed the intake form for a substance abuse treat ment program but did not return for further services. He tested pos itive for cocaine or marijuana approximately ten times between December 2015 and July 2016. He refused or missed approximatel y fifteen screens between March and August 2016. During the pende ncy of the foster care plan, appellant returned fewer than five clean screens. In September 2016, the Department changed the goal of the fost er care plan to adoption and filed a petition to ter minate appella nt’s parental rights. The Department asserted that due to appellant’s continuing substance abuse issues, it was not in th e children’s best interests to return to his care. Following a hearing, the JDR court approved the fost er care plan and terminated appellant’s parental rights. Appellant appealed , and the circuit court conducted a de novo hearing on November 10, 2016. At that hearing, the Department’s social worker testifie d that visits between appellant and the children “went well overall and that [appellant] was receptive to parenting instruction.” However, the social worker also stated that appellant failed most of his drug tests, and his lack of transportation made it difficult for him to receive substance a buse treatments, despite the Department’s offer to transport him to all counseling and thera py sessions. Additionally, appellant missed a team decision-making mee ting and a permanency planning hearing. Appellant testified that he atte nded four substance abuse clas ses but stopped because the classes conflicted with his work schedule. He told the court that he was unable to enroll in another drug treatment program because h e did not bring the proper docu mentation. He al so acknowledged that he had returned positive sc reens for narco tics; however, h e asserted that he was currently not using drugs. At that point, the court directed appellant to su bmit to a urine screen. The results were inconclusive.- 5 - Appellant described his living situation. He was residing in a studio apartment located above his place of e mployment. He advis ed that he built a part ition in the apartment to create a separate bedroom for his daughters. Because appellant works un til two a.m., he planned to ask his sister to bring his sixteen-year-old niece to babysit his daugh ters while he was working. He did not contest that while the children have been in foster care, J.T. has continued to do w ell in school and E.T.’s grades have improved. At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant requested that the court grant him three more months to comply with the foster care plan. He argued that his mother’s death in August 2016, ten months after his daugh ters were placed in foster care, was an “ extraordinary circumstance” that warranted granting him additiona l time. The court denied appel lant’s request and entered final orders terminating his parental rights with respect to each chi ld.
ANALYSIS When reviewing the termination o f residual paren tal rights, th is Court presumes the trial court “thoroughly weighed all th e evidence, consid ered the stat utory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E. 2d 656, 659 ( 2005) (quoting Farley v. Fa rley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). The court ha s “broad discretion in ma king the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests,” and its decision will not be reversed “unless plainly wrong or without evidence to su pport it.” Farley, 9 Va. App. a t 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795. A. Assignment of Error One Appellant contends that the Department failed to prove that te rminating his parental rights was in his daughters’ best int erests. Code § 16.1-283(C) provi des: The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child placed in foster care as a result of cour t commitment . . . may be termin ated if- 6 - the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child. A court must consider several f actors when deter mining a child’ s best interests, such as the age and physical and mental condition of the child or child ren; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and each child; the n eeds of the child or children; the r ole which each par ent has played , and will play in the future, in the u pbringing and care of the chil d or children; and such other factors as are necessary. Harrison v. Tazewell Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149 , 161, 590 S.E.2 d 575, 581-82 (2004) (quoting Bark ey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 6 62, 668, 34 7 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986)). Here, appellant’s substance abus e issues prevent ed him from ef fectively parenting his children. The initia l RCPS referral resulte d from complaints c oncerning appellant’s behavior around his daughters while he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol. De spite express prohibitions in the foster care plan, appellant continued to co nsume alcohol and ille gal substances. He did not complete drug treatme nt and regularly tested positiv e for cocaine and marijuana. Further, appellant did not cooperate with the investigation in to the alleged sexual abuse of the children. Because he believed that the allegations were fa lse, appellant allowed contact between the children and the alleged per petrator until th e Department t old appellant not to bring the children to his mother’s home again. He also ignored the RCPS request t o interview the children. Appellant conceded that both gi rls were doing well in their fo ster care placement. They were well-adjusted and on-trac k academically. Considering all the evidence, the court did not err by finding that clear and convincing evidence established that ter mination of appellant’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. B. Assignment of Error Two Appellant contends the court erred by finding that he was unab le to remedy the conditions that led to his daughters’ foste r care placement and that termi nation was appropriate under Code- 7 - § 16.1-283(C)(2). He argues that he corre cted some of the cond itions, and therefore he should have been afforded more time to comply with the foster care plan bef ore his rights were terminated. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides fo r termination of parental rig hts if [t]he parent or parents, withou t good cause, have been unwillin g or unable within a reasonable peri od of time not to exceed 12 mont hs from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions whi ch led to or re quired continuat ion of the child’s foster care placemen t, notwithstanding the reasonab le and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such e nd. Proof that the parent or parents, without good cause, have failed or been unable to make substant ial progress towards elimination of the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement in accordance with their obligations under and within the time lim its or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court . . . shall constitute prima facie evi dence of this condition. Appellant acknowledges that he failed to comply with the alcoh ol and substance abuse components of the foster care plan . However, he argues that th e court should have granted him additional time to address these issues because his mother’s de ath was an “extraordinary circumstance” that prevented him from abstaining from drugs and alcohol and completing substance abuse treatment. He asserts that if he were given “another thr ee months,” he would have been able to remedy these conditions which required his daughters’ placem ent into foster care. We have held that “past actions and relationships over a meani ngful period serve as good indicators of what th e future may be expected to hold.” Linkou s v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 ( 1990) (quoting Frye v . Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). Nothing in the record supports appellant’s contention that he could successfully remedy his alcohol and drug addiction in three months. T he children e ntered foster care i n October 2015. When his mother died on August 2 0, 2016, appellant had already failed approximately ten drug tests and refused as many as fifteen others. Additionally, despite t he Department’s offer of assistance with transportation, he failed t o continue attending drug treat ment.- 8 - “It is clearly not in the best interests of [the children] to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or eve n if, a parent will be capable of resuming his re sponsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 1 0 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 49 2, 495 (1990). At the time the court entered the order terminating appellant’s residual parental rights, the children had been in foster care for thir teen months. Although appellan t had maintained gainful employment and found stable housin g, his substance abus e, which remained u nabated, significantly limited his ability to care for his daughters. We find no error in the cou rt’s determination that appellant had not substantially remedie d the conditions that brought his daughter s into foster care, and accordingly, the court properly terminated ap pellant’s residual parental rig hts. Affirmed.