### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 21, 200 4 S es sio n
CA THER INE C LAIRE WILLC UTT S v. JOHN F RA NC IS WILLC UTT S

A Dire ct A ppeal f

rom the Chancer y Court for Mc Nairy County No. 7438 The Honorabl e Mar tha Brasfi eld, Chancellor

No. W2002-02636-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 4, 2004

Th is i s an a

pp e a l of a fi na l de c re e of

div or c e pr ima

ri ly a s it c on c e rn s cus tod

y of the pa rt ie s’
c hil dr e n. The tr ia l c ourt awa rd e d c us tod

y to m oth e r a

nd pr ov ide d f

or a su pe rv ise d v isi tatio n to fathe r. F ather

appea ls and, in addition to the custody issue, also prese nts issues pertainingto the trial
c o u rt ’ s o u t

- o f

- c o u rt i n t e r

v i e w w i t h t h e c h i l dr e n an d t h e m e n t a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p art ie s

. We
a ff ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Cla rk L e e Sha w, Na sh vil le , F or

Ap pe lla nt, JohnF ra

nc is Wi llc utt s
De be ra B e ll- B e a m, L ind e n, F or

Ap pe lle e , Cathe ri ne Cla ir e Willc utt s

OP IN ION
Catherine Clar e W i l l cu t t s (“Mother ” or “ Appellee ”) a nd J ohn Wil lcutts (“F ather ” or “Appe llant”) we re ma

rried on Dece mber 18, 1986 in Ga inesville, Florida. T he par ties’ union produce d three minor children. The pa rties sepa rate d in September 1992. In 1996, Mother became a m ember of t he Tsion Hada shah g roup , a re l igious c ommune of appr ox imately 187 members, c urre ntly

located on 100
acr es of land in r

ural McN airy

C o u n t y , T en n essee, near the community

of Rose Cree k. Mother’s brief r efe rs to the commune a s Rose Creek Comm unity , and we will do so as we ll for the re mainder of this opinion. The Rose Creek Communi ty has a rec og nized g roup of male leade rs and is operate d in acc ordanc e with the spec ific and unique relig ious beliefs of the c ommunity

.M o the r la te r a m e n d e d he r c o m p la int to inc lud e a s g ro u n d s fo r d ivo rc e F a the r’s c ru e l a n d inh u m a n tre a tm e n t. 1

-2- Members of

Rose Creek Community share food, mon ey , ca rs, homes, and othe r such
resour ces. A t the time of this appeal, Mother and the pa rties’ thre e childre n lived in a three bedroom tr a ile r wit h an oth e r fa

mil y of fi ve . T he c hil dr e n a

re ho me sc ho ole d b y

se ve ra l of

the a du lt f

e ma le
me mbe rs of

Ros e Cr e e k Co mmunit

y . T he c hil dr e n h a ve liv e d w ithMoth er si nce the pa rt ie s’ separ ation in 1992.

Father c urre ntly

resides in a

rente d home in Arka

nsas and is g ainfully

employ ed. Mother
curr ently works part-time at the community ’s re staurant, Anothe r Realm. The rec ord indicate s that F a the r h a s f

a ile d o r r e fu se d to pr ov ide fi na nc ia l su pp or t f or the c hil dr e n f

or the pa st s e ve ra l y e ars

. Father c ontends that Rose Cree k Communi ty is a n unsafe and unhealthy

environment for

the children, a

nd has expressed sincere conce rn reg arding the quality of the education be ing rec eived by the childre n. He ha s also raised repe ated alleg ations of sex ual abuse of the c hildren at the ha nds of the male lea der( s) of Rose Cre ek Community ; however , these a lleg ations are not substantiated by the re cord.

The rec ord in this ca se is littered with the super fluous pleading s and motions of Father filed
as a pro se litigant. I n the i ntere st of providing a concise and st ructure d acc ount of the proc edura l hi story in this case, we will only addre ss the pertinent motions of the par ties and the orde rs of the trial court submitted there on. On August 19, 1999, Mother filed a Complaint for Divorce ag ainst Father in t he Chanc ery Court of McNa iry County , Tenne ssee, a lleg ing me ntal and phy sical abuse , mental abuse upon the parties’ chi l d ren, and inappropr iate conduc t in the presenc e of the children. Mother’s c omplaint 1
so ug ht exc lus ive c us tod

y of the pa

rt ie s’ c hil dr e n, and

fu rt he r a ve rr e d th a t it

wa s in the be st i nte re sts of the c hildren to deny

Father “ visitation at thi s time.”

On Oc tob e r 7 , 1 99 9, F a the r f ile d a n Ans we r an d Coun te r Comp la int fo r Div or c e de nyinga ll alleg ations of abuse and inappr opriate c onduct and a lleg i n g t h at Mother wa s g uilty of dese rtion,
abandonme nt, and inappropr iate conduc t. Alternatively , he alleg es irre conc i l ab le diffe renc es

su ff ic ie nt t o w arr ant d iss olutio n of th e part ie s’ ma rr ia g e . F a the r s ou g ht c us tod y of the pa rt ie s’ children on g rounds that they wer e in an “unsaf

e, unhealthy environment and are in dang er of being depende nt and neg lected.”-3-

Father ne x t filed a M o t i o n fo r T empora ry Custody of the c hildren on Oc tober 21, 1999. F a the r ag a in not e d c on c e rn re g ard ingthe c hil dr e n’ s sa fe ty and we ll- be ing , a

nd state d th a t it

wa s in the be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil dr e n to awa

rd him te mpo ra ry c us tod y “ pe nd inga fi nal he ari ngin t his matter.” On Novembe r 5, 1999, Mother f iled response to Fathe r’s pleading and seve ral re lated motions. Mot her de nied alleg ations of depe ndency , neg lect, unsaf e envir onment, and unhea lthy living conditions. Mother asserted that Father had a “history of drug abuse, a c riminal history , and a history of violent behavior.” Mother moved for a c ontinuance of the divorce proce eding s pending the outcome of

her me ntal evaluation, and further reque sted a home study

of F ather ’s re sidence

.

A hea ring o n F a th e r ’ s M o ti o n

f o r T e mp o r a r y Cu s tody and Mother’ s responsive plea dings w as held on November

8, 1999. On Dec ember

17, 1999, the cha

ncer y court e ntere d a Te mporary Orde r of Custody

awa rding Mother tempora

ry custody of the c hildren, subject to the visitation privileg es announce d by

the cour t. The cour

t order ed psy cholog ical eva luations of both parties and the minor children. The court further order ed home studies of e ach pa rty ’s home situation. The cour t ordere d the c hil dr e n to be te ste d “ fo r e du c a tio n g ra de le ve l,” and the re su lts su bmi tte d to the c ourt

and bo th parties. The court’s or der se t forth a visitation schedule for Father and reiterate d the rig hts of a noncustodial pare nt as requir ed by statute.
On Octobe r 8, 2001, Mother f iled a petition for a

n Ex P a rte Ord er o f P ro te c tio n a g a ins t Father. Mother

aver red that she was in “immediate and prese nt dang er of abuse by [Father],” a

nd asked the court to issue an immediate order of protect i o n “enjoining [Father] from a busing or threatening abuse of

the petitioner.” As the basis for her pe tition, M other a lleg ed that F ather had made se vera l threate ning a nd abusive phone calls to her a nd eng ag ed in profa

ne, abusive , and da ng e ro us c on du c t in

the c hil dr e n’ s p re se nc e , c a us ingthe c hil dr e n to be fe arf ul o f t he a pp e lla nt.
Ten da y s later, the c hance ry

court e nte r e d

an Ex Parte Te mpo ra

ry Or de r o f P ro te c tio n a g a ins t Fa t h er

. T h e c o u rt ’ s o rd er re s t ra i n edan d

p ro h i b i t edFa t h er

fr o m ab u s i n g, t h re at en i n g, h ar as s i n g, stalking, or

committing ac ts of violence a g ainst Mother.
The re cord refle cts that an orde r wa s filed on Novembe r 30, 2001, allowingFather’s c ounsel to withdraw fr om repre sentation.

A final he aringon the divorce proce eding s was set for Dec ember

3, 2001. On the date of the h ea ri n g, Fa t h er , ac t i n g pr o s e , filed a Motion for Continuance so as to a llow him time to secure the service s of new c ounsel. The pa rties enter ed an A g ree d Orde r striking t h e m at t er from the trial docket a nd rese tting it for tria l on March 4, 2002.M ot her f i l ed a s econd M ot i on f

or San ct i ons approxi mat el y t hr ee mo nt hs l at er , al l egi ng t hat F at her au t hor i zed 2 hi s si st er t o m ai l a l et t er t o t he chancell o r and t he co urt

- ap p o i nt ed psy cho l o gi st who eval uat ed ap p el l ee and t he chi l d ren. M o t her al l eged t hat t he l et t er was an i m p rop er ex pa r t e com muni cat i on, and t her eby mo ved t he cour t t o s t r i ke t he l et t er
an d e n s u r e t h at i t w as n ot e n t er ed i n t o t h e r ec or d.

-4- On Fe bruar

y 1, 2002, Mother filed a Motion for Sanc tions , alleg ing that Fathe r wa s “abusing 2 the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss” and “ dr iv[i ng ] up h e r atto rn e y fe e s” by fi lin g sev eral fr ivo lou s “ mot ion s, ans we rs to ans wers to m oti on s and oth e r f ili ng s, wh ic h c ouns e l f

or Pla int if f h a s b e e n f

or c e d to
ans we r o ut o f a

n a bund anc e of

c a uti on .” A n on -jury tr ia l c omm e nc e d o n M arc h 4 , 2 00 2, wi th opening arguments and the testimony of seve ral witnesse s, including Mother . No cour t reporte r wa s presen t t o re cord the testimony , and F ather has filed no Statement of the Evidenc e re citing or detailin g t h e ev i d en ce presente d on this day . The c ourt, without objection from the pa rties or counsel, co nducted in cam era interviews of the par ties’ two oldest children. N either F ather nor M o t h e r o r h e r c o u n s e l w e r e p r e s e n td

u r i n g t h e i n t e r

v i e w s , an d

n o c o u rtr e p o rt e r

w a s p r e s e n t

. It
a pp e ars that

the tr ia l c ourt

did no t r e ve a l th e c on te nt o f t he se int e rv ie ws to t

he pa rt ie s o r c ouns e l. At the end of

the day , the cour

t continued the trial until J une 3 and 4, 2002.

On Marc h 30, 2002 the cour t entere d an orde r addr essing sever al motions filed by Father. T h e c o u rt’ s o r d e r e xp li c it ly r e s e r v e d r u li n g u p o n M o th e r ’ s mo ti o n s f

o r s an c ti o n s u n til trial. The court fur ther noted that the psy cholog ical eva luations of the par ties and the c hildren would be r ead in c amera , and any pertinent infor mation or rec ommendations contained in these evaluations and
no t de e me d b y

the c ourt to be de tr ime nta l to the c hil dr e n or pa rt ie s, wo uld

be fo rw ard e d to c ouns e l. The c ourt specif

ied:

I t is th e p o li c y

o f th is Co u rt t o a ll o w a tt o r n e y s to r e a d

the ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns wi th t he sti pu latio n th a t th e y

are e nti tle d to tell their clients o n l y

the re commendations of the psycholog ist or psy chiatrist. They

may not divulge history

or other statements made by the par ties to the psy cholog ist which were confiden tial or which
wo uld re su lt i n in c re a se d a

ng e r o f t he pa rt ie s o r whic h w ou ld c a

us e detriment, eithe r p hy sically , emotionally , or psy cholog ically , to the children.

I n J une 2002, Mother’s attorney , Ms. Deber a B ell-B eam ( “Ms. B ell-B eam” ) filed a motion entitled “Ex P arte Motion for Protective Or der f or P laintiff and for Pl aintiff’s Counsel and Plainti ff’ s Th ir d M oti on

fo r S anc tio ns .” Ms. B e ll- B e a m’ s mo tio n s tate s in pe rt ine nt p art :
On or a bout May 2 8 , 2 002, at 5:25 p.m., Defe ndant telephone d the law o ff ic e of De be ra B e ll- B e a m.

******************************************************-5- Debe ra Be ll-Be am has attache d to this motion an aff idavi t t hat contains the tra

nscription of the messa g e and w ill provide to the cour t the re corde d messag e at the he aringon J une 3, 2002.
The messa g e and its tone have m ade D eber a B ell-B eam f ear ful of her ph y sic a l sa fe ty

a t th e ha

nd s of Defendant a

nd /or me mbe rs of

his f a m i l y.
Moreove r, De bera

Be ll-Be am has g ood rea son to believe she ma y be in i mmi ne nt d ang er of harm w he n th e me ssa g e is c on sid e re d in context with Defenda

nt’s psy cholog ical p ro file that is part of the court’s r ecor d and ac counts of his past behavior.
Debe ra B ell-B eam moves this c ourt for an immediate Ex-Parte Orde r of Protection as t o Def

endant a nd all members of

his family

as Def endant ha s cause d her t o b e fearf ul of imminent dang er of harm fr om h im a

nd the m.
Debe ra B ell-B eam moves this cour t for a Per

manent Or der of Protection.

Couns e l f

or Pla int if f f ur the r m ov e s th is C ourt

fo r a n immed iate Permane n t Order

of Protection for

Plaintiff, based on this rec ent communication and De fenda nt’s threatening behavior

.

******************************************************
Debe ra B ell-B eam moves this C ourt to order any communications betwee n her a

nd the Pro Se Def

endant be done thr oug h the Clerk and Master’ s o ff

i ce a s there should be no further need f or direc t c omm un ic a tio ns be tw e e n th e m.
Fur ther, Debe ra Be ll-Be am ag ain moves this Court fo r s anctions ag ainst Defendant, who ha s committed assault ag ainst her by int e nti on a lly

pla c inghe r i n f

e ar o f i mmi ne nt d ang e r o f h arm

. The c ourt g ran

te d M s

. B ell-B eam a

n immediate Ex P

arte Orde r of Protec tion, and eventua lly enter ed an order gra

nting Ms. Be ll-Be am a permane nt order of protec tion ag ainst Father. The court re serve d
ru lin g on Ms. B e ll- B e a m’ s mo tio n f or sa nc tio ns un til the c on c lus ion of the tr ia l.
Trial resumed on J une 3 and 4, 2002. During this two-da y period, t h e c o u rt conducte d separ ate, brief examinations of eac h of the children reg arding two separ ate visits wit h Father since Marc h 2002. These e x aminations were conducte d without the presenc e of the parties or counse l, but-6-

neither pa rty or counsel objected to the se examinations. At the end of this two-da y period, the c ourt continued the r emainder

of the trial until September 26, 2002.

Th e tr ia l r e sume d a

nd wa s c omp le te d o n Se pte mbe r 2 6, 20 02

. Af te r co nc lus ion of

the tr ia l, the cour t entere d an order finding Mother’s r equests for sanctions “mer itorious.” The c ourt specific ally found t hat Father abused the judicial proce ss by filing repeated frivolous pleading s, and order ed Ms. B ell-B eam to submit an aff idavit setting out “the number of hour s she has spent out of court re ading and composing written re sponses to the documents” spe cified by the cour t, and “the number of in- court hours she spent making arguments ag ainst the content in [these] documents.”

On Octobe r 4, 2002, the cour t entere d a De cre e of D ivorce and Perma nent Pare nting Plan, g ranting Mother a divor ce on g rounds of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t. The decree divided the p art i e s ’ m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y, an d aw ar d e d M o t h e r $ 2 , 5 0 0

. 0 0 i na t t o r

n e y’ s f e e s a s a l i m o n y in sol

ido for Father’s f

iling of “ numerous and unn ec es s ar y motions” and his failure to f ollow the court’s instructions with reg ard to filing

. The trial court de termined that F ather would not be re quired to pay all of Mother’ s attorney ’s fe es due to her voluntary decision to rema in undere mploy ed, and f urther
n o t e d t h a tF a t h e r ’ s e qu i t y o f

$ 1 , 5 0 0

. 0 0 i n a t r a c t o f r e a l e s t a t e h e l d b y t h e p art i e s a s m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y, would “be c redited towa

rd [Mother’s] attorney

fee s, which [Father ] wil l owe to [Mother’s] attorney for attorney

fee s and sanc tions as set out in a n order dated September 26, 2002, and for other attorney fee s awa rded he rein.”
Wit h reg ard to the i s s u e o f custody of the minor childre n, the cour t examined all of the rele vant fa ctors set for

th in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a ) and a war ded p ri m ar y phy sical custody of the children to Mother . The c o u rt specific ally noted conc ern a s to Fathe r’s menta l illness, his ref usal or failure t o seek professional treatment or take the appr opriate me dication, and r epeated episodes of volatility

and instability , and found him g uilty of m ental abuse of his children. T he cour t further
r e c o g n i z e d

t h e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n tan d l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s i nt h e R o s e C r e e k C o m m u n i t y, and found F ather ’s conc erns with re g ard to the c h i l d re n ’s education to be valid. The c ourt specific ally

found t hat Father failed to provide a ny proof to substantiate his cla ims of sex ual abuse

. Finally , the court’s decr ee calculated Father’ s total child support arr ear ag es for 1997 throug h 2001 as $40,620.00.

Th e Pe rm ane nt P are nti ngPlan e nte re d by the c ourt g a ve Mo the r de c isi on makin g a uth or ity with reg ard to the e ducation and r elig ious upbringingof the c hildren. The plan spe cified that Fathe r was e ntitled to supervised visitation with the children until such time a s the court de termined that it was in the best intere sts of the children to allow uns upervised visit ation. The plan stated that the chanc ery court would consider gra nting Father unsupervised ove rnig ht visit ation with the children under the conditions that Father complete pare nting c lasses and a n ang er ma

nag ement prog ram, a

nd that he “ se e k c ouns e lin g fr om a ps y c ho log ist

and me dic a l tr e a tme nt f

rom a psy c hiatr ist

fo r h is bipolar illness.”
Withre g a rd to t he c hil dr e n’ s sc ho oli ngand e du c a tio n, the pla

n s tate d:-7- Schooling of

the Children
The mother w ill be responsible for the educational decisions
re g ard ingthe c hil dr e n w iththe fo llo wi nge xce pti on s:
1. Th e c hil dr e n a

re pr e se ntl y be ingho me sc ho ole d b y the ir mot he r. Th e fathe r has va lid c on c e rn s r e g ard ingthe qu a lity of thi s ed u ca t i o n

. A standar dized test has been g iven to the childre n. The fathe r believe s that it was not corr ectly monitored and administere d by a qualifie d test supervisor. The fathe r will be allowed e ach y ear , beg inning in the spring of 2003, to ha ve all thre e childre n underg o a standardized test. The f

ather will select t h e st andar dized test to be admi n is te r e d

. H e w il l b e r e qu ir e d to p ay f o r th e s e te s ts , a

n d to p ay fo r a qu a lif ie d o r c e rt if

ie d p e rs on

to m on ito r and a dmi nis te r t he te sts

. The father will g ive t he mot her two wee ks’ not ice as to the time, date, place , and the name of the m onitor who wil l administer t he test. The test results will be forwa

rded to the mother

and the f ather

. 2. Al l three childr e n w ill be re qu ir e d to take the G. E. D. te st when they

turn ag e 17, if they are not attending a publi c school. I f a
c hil d f a ils the te st o n th e fi rs t atte mpt , th e c hil d w ill be re qu ir e d to take the te st every

four months t h er ea ft er, until the child passe s the test or turns 18. By order ent er ed Oc t o ber 15, 2002, the court amended its divorce decr ee to include a j u d gm en tfo r $ 1 2 , 0 7 0

. 0 0 i nch i l d s u p p o rt o we d

b y Fa t h er t o M o t h e r f

o r J an u ary

1 , 2 0 0 2 t h ro u gh October 31, 2002. On October 24, 2002, the court enter ed an O rder Setting Attorne y

Fe es for fee s acc umulated by

Mother as a

result of F ather ’s improperly filed motions, documents, and other
ma tte rs . T he c ourt

awa rd e d M oth e r a

tot al ju dgme nt o f $ 2, 27 4. 00 . T he c ourt late r a me nd e d th is amount, g ranting Mother a total modified awa rd of $774.00 f

or attorne y ’s fe es. The modifie d awa rd incorpora ted the set-of

f spec ified by

the cour t in its decr ee of

divorce

. Father filed a

Notice of

Appea l o n Oc t o b er 26, 2002. Five da y s later, he filed three more mot ion s th a t th e c ha

nc e ry c ourt int e rp re te d a s mo tio ns to a lte r o r am e nd the c ourt ’s fi na l ju dg me nt, or, in the alter

native, motions for ne w trial. The c ourt denied a ll of these motions. On J anuar y 27, 2003, the cour

t entere d a stateme nt conce rning Father’s filing of a “trial transcr ipt,” concludingthat Father’s f iling wa s not a complete transcr ipt of t he trial. The court noted t hat a court re porter w as only prese nt for the pr ocee dings he ld on J une 3, 2002, J une 4, 2002, and Septe mber 26, 2002. No
c ourt re po rt e r w a s pr e se nt on

the fi rs t da

y of tr ia l, M arc h 4 , 2 00 2, and

the c ourt no te d th a t F a the r d id
n o tf u r n i s h a S t a t e m e n to f

t h e E v i d e n c e f

o r e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d

o nt h i s d ay.
On F e br ua ry 26 , 20 03 , Mothe r f

ile d a Mo tio n to Di smi ss F a the r’ s a pp e a l f or fa ilure to comply with Rule 24(b), (c ), or ( d) of the T enne s s ee Ru l es of Appellate Proce dure. This Court-8-

denied the motion and Mother next filed a plea ding that we tre ated a s a petition for re hear ing f iled pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. This petition was also denied.

F a the r p re se nts se ve ra l is su e s f or re vie w, wh ic h w e re state a s f oll ow s:
Whether the c hance ry

court a bused its discretion “when i t awar ded [Mot her] custody

and limited [ Father’s] visitation.
Wheth er the chanc ery

court c ommitt ed re versible e rror by interviewingthe childre n on two separ ate oc casions wi thout the pr e se nc e of

c ouns e l.
Whether the ch ancery

court c ommitt ed re versible e rror by relying upon psy cholog ical evaluations or repor ts of the par

ties and childre n to r e nd e r i ts o pin ion , d e sp ite havin g fa ile d to me e t th e re qu ir e me nts of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.
Whe the r t he c ha nc e ry c ourt e rr e d in iss uin g an Or de r o f P ro te c tio n in favor of Mother’ s attorney

ag ainst Father.
Whe the r F a the r i s e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s from hi s app e a l in thi s matter.
Since this case w as t ried by the cour t sitt ing w ithout a jury , we r eview the case de novo upon the re cord w ith a presumption of cor rec tness o f t h e fi n d i n gs of fa ct by the trial cour

t. Unless the evidenc e preponderates ag ainst the findi ng s, we must aff irm, absent error of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

Father fir st asks this C ourt to consider w hether the c h an ce ry court erre d in desig nating Mother as the primary

residential pa

rent for the childre n. I n child custody and visitation cases, the welfa re a nd best interest o f t h e ch ild are the para mount concer

ns. Whit aker v. Whitaker , 957 S.W .2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); T.C.A. § 36-6-106 ( 2001). The de termination of the c hild’s best interest mus t turn on the particular fa cts of ea ch ca se. Taylor v. Tay lor , 849 S.W .2d 319, 326 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; In r ePa rso ns , 91 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 9 , 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). I n Bah v. Bah , 668 S.W .2d 66 3 (T en n

. Ct. App. 1983), the Court established some guidelines for making the de te rm inatio n o f t

he c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st:
We ad op t w hat w e be lie ve is a c omm on se ns e a pp ro a c h to custody , one which w e will call the doctrine of “compa rative f itness.” Th e pa ra mou nt c on c e rn

in c hil d c us tod

y c a se s is the we lf

are and be st interests of the child. Mo lli sh v . M oll ish , 494 S.W .2d 145, 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). T here are literally thousands o f things that-9- must be taken into c onsideration in the lives of y oung children, Smith
v . Smith , 1 88 Te nn . 4 30 , 4 37 , 2 20 S.W. 2d 62 7, 63 0 (1 94 9) , and

the se fac tors must be review ed on a c omparative approa ch:

F i t n e s s f o r c u s t o d i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i s l ar g e l y a compar ative matter . No human beingis d eeme d pe rf e c t, h e nc e no human c an be de e me d a pe rf e c tly fi t c us tod ian. Nece ssa

ri ly , th e re fo re , th e c ourt s mu st deter mine which of two or

mo re available c ustodians is m or e or

le ss f it tha n o the rs

. Edwards v. Edw ards , 501 S.W .2d 283, 290-91 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1973) (empha sis suppli ed).

Bah , 668 S.W .2d at 666. The trial court must a lso c onsider fac tors set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6- 106. These f actor s include: 1) Th e lov e , a ff

e c tio n and

e mot ion a l ti e s e xistin g be tw e e n th e pa re nts and child; (2) The dispositi on of th e parents to provide the c hild with food, clothing, me dical care, e ducation and othe r nec essar y car e and the deg ree to which a pa

rent ha s been the primary car eg iver; (3 ) T h e im

p o rta n c e o f c o n ti nu it

y in th e c h il d ’ s li f

e an d th e le n g th of time the child has l ived in a stable, satisfactory environment; provided, th a t w h e r e th e r e is a f

in d in g , u n d e r § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 6 ( 8 ) , o f c h il d a buse, as define d in § 39-15-401 or § 3 9 -15-402, or child sexual abuse, as define d in § 37- 1- 602, by one (1) pare nt, and that a non- perpe trating pare nt has reloc ated in order to flee the per petrating pa

rent, that such
r e l o c a t i o ns h a l l n o tw e i g h a g a i n s tanaw ar d o f c u s t o dy; (4 ) T he sta

bil ity of the fa mil y un it o f t he pa re nts ; (5 ) T he me nta l a

nd ph y sic a l he a lth

of the pa re nts ; (6) The home, school and c ommunity rec ord of the c hild; (7 ) T h e r ea s o n ab l e p re fe re n ce o f t h e c h i l d i f twe l v e (1 2 ) y ea rs o f a ge or ol der

. T h e c o u rt m ay

h e ar th e p r e f e r e n c e o f a y o u n g e r c h il d u pon reque st. The pre fer ence s of older c hildren should n o rmally be g iven g reater we ight than those of y oung er c hildren;-10- (8) Evide nce of phy sical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other p ar ent or to any

other pe rson; provided, that whe re the re a re alleg ations that one (1) pa rent ha s committed child abuse, [as define d in § 39 -1 5- 40 1 o r § 39 - 1 5- 40 2], o r c hil d s e xua l a bu se , [a s def

ine d in § 3 7- 1- 60 2], a g a ins t a

fa mil y me mbe r, the c ourt

sh a ll c onside r a ll evidenc e re levant to the phy sical and e motional safe ty of t he child, and dete rm i n e, by

a cle ar pr eponder ance of the e vidence , whether such abuse ha s occur

red. The court s h al l i n clude in its decision a wr itten f i n d i n g o f a l l e v i d e n c e , an d a l l f i n d i n g s o f f a c t s c o n n e c t e d

t h e r e t o

. In
a dd iti on , th e c ourt sh a ll, wh e re a pp ro pr iate , re fe r a

ny iss ue s o f a

bu se to t he juv e nil e c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s; (9) The char acte r and behavior of any other person who resides in or fre quents the hom e of a parent and such per son’s interac tions with t he child; and (10) Ea ch par ent’s past a nd potent i al for f

uture pe rfor

mance of pare nting r esponsibiliti es, incl u d in g the willingne ss and ability of ea ch of the pare nts to fac ilitate a nd encour ag e a close and c o n tinuing pa re nt- c hil d r e latio ns hip be tw e e n th e c hil d a nd the oth e r p are nt, consistent with the best interest of the child. T.C.A. § 36-6-106( a) ( 2001). The pre sumption of corre ctness applica ble to a trial court’s findings of fac t pursuant to Tenn. R. App. 13(d) a pplies i n ch i l d cu stody

case s. Hass v. Kni

ghton , 676 S.W .2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984) ; Whit aker , 957 S.W .2d at 838.

I t is app ar e n t f

r o m t h e f a c e o f th e c h an c e r

y c o u rt’ s F in a l D e c r e e o f

D iv o r c e , th a t t

h e c o u rt proper ly eng ag ed in a c omparative fitness ana ly sis of the parties. The court specific ally relied upon the fa c tor s se t f

or th i n T .C. A. § 36 -6 -1 06 to g uid e its ana ly sis , s tatin g the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s o f f a c t:
The F actor s of T.C.A. § 36-6-106( a) (1) The testimony has indicated that the childre n have a g reat deal of love and a ffe ction an d strong emotional ties to their mother. The disturbing pr oblems which exist between the f at h er and the childre n stem from his bi-polar illness and a re discusse d above; (2 ) T he fathe r h a s a

g ood jo b a

nd is c e rt a inl y

fi na nc ia lly a ble to provide the c hildren with food, clothing , medical c are, etc. The mother has be en the pr imary car e-g iver fo r the c hildren since the pa rt ie s’ se pa

ratio n in 19 92 . Sh e is the on e wh o h a s lo ok e d af te r t he ir-11- needs a nd provided them with food, clothing, medica l car e, educ ation, etc. The fat h er has not even pr ovided child support for the children since 1996. The educational problems in the [R ose Cree k Communi ty ] have be en desc ribed a bove, and pr ovisions for solving some of these problems ar e made in the perma nent par enting plan; (3) The children ha

ve lived with their moth er, not their f ather , since the parties’ separ ation. They have ne ver lived in Ar

kansas whe re the fathe r pre sently

resides. The environment un d er whi ch the mother pr e se ntl y liv e s is no t on e that is no rm a lly fo un d in the Un ite d St a te s, but the children are comforta ble and happy in this environmen t , and t h e h o m e i s s a t i s f

a c t o r y; (4 ) T he mot

he r has d e mon str a te d th a t sh e is a ble to k e e p th e fa

mil y toge ther, a

nd that they

are a stable a

nd strong family

unit. The fathe r’s mental illness ha s cause d, and the Court fe els will continue to cause , instabilit y in the family unit if the father is named pr imary residential pa re nt; (5) The phy sical hea lth of both parents i s go o d

. The mother ha d a major mental psy choti c episode in approxim ately 1990. The evaluation perf

ormed by Dr. Rober

t W. Kennan shows that the mother is n owme nta lly

sta ble and fr e e of any me nta l il lne ss;
The fa ther sustained a

major psy chotic episode in 1997, as set out above. Dr . Nicholaus Paa l, Ph.D., who conducted the ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n o f the fathe r, ma de the fo llo wi ngdia g no sti c impressions: (1) B i-polar I Idisorder in pa rtial remissi o n ; and (2) schizoty pal persona lity disorder. Dr. Paal indicated t h at the persona lity

d i s o rd er is an enduring pattern of thinking and be havior
and that “ the lik e lih ood of ano the r o c c ur re nc e of a mpl if ie d s tr e ss would seem to be rather

high a nd preve ntative treatment would seem to be a wi se cours e of

a c tio n. ” Dr . Pa a l be lie ve d, a s d oe s th e Court , that the Def

endant is interested in the be st interests of his children a nd
wo uld lik e to p ro vid e a

su it abl e and

po sit ive ho me fo r t

he m. Howeve r, D r. Paal had c oncer ns that the Def

endant is at risk for furth e r e xa c e r b a ti o n s o f

h is il ln e s s , an d

th a t t h e r is k c o u ld be minimi zed if

he continued me dical tre atment, eve n when he is doing
rea sonably

well. Dr. Paa l further

rec ommended that, if the D efe ndant
wer e g rante d extended custody , th e Court should mandate that the De fe nd ant m a int a in “ a

tr e a tme nt r e latio ns hip wi th a m e nta l he a lth provider.” As stated above , the Def endant ha s rec eived no tre atment for approximately two months, a nd his sy mptoms have esca lated. The-12- Court ha s w itn e sse d th e a c tio ns of the Defendant t

hr ou g ho ut t

his proce eding . His mental illness prese ntly preve nts him from providing the suitable and positive home whic h he wa nts for his children; (6) The home of the mother appear s to be satisfac tory . School problems ar e addr essed in the attachment to the per manent par enting pla n. Th e c hil dr e n a

re ha pp y in t he ir pr e se nt e nv ir on me nt;
Th e fathe r i s r e nti nga

4- be dr oo m ho me , w he re e a c h c hil d w ill have his or her own be droom, which would a llow for priva cy which the childre n do not now enjoy . Fur ther, t h e fa ther would send the
c hil dr e n to pu

bli c sc ho ol, wh e re he c ou ld m on ito r t he ir aca de mic prog ress in a more satisf ac t o ry manner

than is prese ntly

being conducte d; (7 ) [T wo of

the min or

c hil dr e n] w ish

to c on tin ue to liv e wi th t

he ir mother. The Court has not aske d [t he third minor child] her pre fer ence beca use she is pre sently

11 y ear s old; (8 ) Wh ile the fathe r h a s a lle g e d th a t hi s c hil dr e n a re su bje c te d to ph y sic a l, s e xua l, a

nd e mot ion a l a

bu se wh ile in t

he ho me of

the ir mother, he ha s been una

ble to prove the se alleg ations. The childre n, th em s elves, have denie d his alleg ations. The Court would note that t h e fa t h er has emotional problems and ha s been know n to y ell and
sc re a m, t o c a ll h is c hil dr e n u g ly names, to b e rate the m, n ot f or the ir misbehavior, but for actions of others which they cannot c ontrol, and to c a u s e th e m to b e e xtr e me ly u p s e t, an d to c r

y , an d to b e f

e ar ful of him. The Court has stated a bove that his ac tions c onstitut e emotional abuse; ( 9 ) T h e f a t h e r a l l e g e s t h a t t h e m e mb e r s o f [ R o s e C r e e k C o m m u n i t y] wher e the mother lives have c ommitt ed sexual abuse on c hildren, but he has been unable to prove these alleg ations. The father lives alone ; and (10) The mother has, in the pa st, perfor med the pa renta l
re sp on sib ili tie s and

a pp ears to be a

ble to c on tin

ue to p e rf or m th e m. The fa ther is w illing to a cce pt pa renta l r esponsibility , but at the pre sent has trouble in communicating with and disc iplining his chil dren in a proper manner . The fa

ther has complained of times w hen he called the mot he r t o s pe a k w iththe c hil dr e n an d he wa s not al low e d to ta lk w ith the childre n, and that m em b er s of [Rose Creek Community ] have
ma de fu n o f h im a

nd be rate d h im i n f

ro nt o f h is chi ld ren . T hisW e n ot e t hat Fat her ’ s bri ef t o t hi s C our t mere l y s t at es t hat t he t r i al cour t abus ed i t s di s cr et i on whe n i t l i mi t ed 3 h is visita tio n w ith the c h ild re n , an d inc lud e s n o c itatio n to th e r e c o rd o r d e ta iled a rg u m e n t in s u p p o rt o f t h is a rg u m e n t. -13- problem has be en solved, be cause the father now h as specific times when the c hildren ca ll him and specific sha red pa rentingtimes on the
we e ke nd s.
The e vidence in the rec ord does not pre ponderate ag ainst the chancer y court’s de signation of Mo the r a s th e pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt f or the c hil dr e n b a se d u

po n th e a

bo ve -c ite d f

a c tor s. Moreove r, we note that Father failed to file a transcr ipt of t he evidence presente d on Marc h 4, 2002, t h e f i r s td ay o f t r i a l , n o r d i d h e f i l e a S t a t e m e n to f

t h e E v i d e n c e f

o r t h e p r o c e e d i n g o nt h i s d ay
. In Coa kle y v . D anie ls , 840 S.W .2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), this Court noted:
Whe re the iss ue s ra ise d g o to the e vid e nc e , th e re mus t be a tr ans c ri pt. I n the abse nce of

a t ra n s cr i pt of the evide nce, the re is a c onclusive pr e su mpt ion that the re wa s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e be fo re the tr ia l c ourt to support its judgment , and this Court must t here fore aff irm the judgme nt. McKinn ey v

. Educator an d Executive Insurers, In c. , 569 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977 ). This rule likewise a pplies wher e ther e is a stateme nt of t h e ev i d en ce which is incomplete. The burden is upon the appellant to show that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Capital City Bank v. Baker , 59 Te nn .App . 4 77 , 4 93 , 4 42 S.W. 2d 25 9, 26 6 ( 19 69). Th e burd e n is likewise on the a

ppellant t o provide the Court with a transcript of the evidenc e or a

stat ement of the evidenc e fr om which this Court can d et erm i n e if t h e e v i d en ce d o es p re p o n d er at e f o r o r a gai n s tt h e f

i n d i n gs of the trial c ourt.
Id . at 370. See also Scarbrough v. Scarbrough , 752 S.W .2d 94, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (“ When the tr ial c ourt

he ars the e vid e nc e , b ut t he e vid e nc e is n ot i nc lud e d in the re c or d o n a

pp e a l, i t is presumed that the evidenc e supports the rulingof the trial c ourt.”). Thus, insofar as the ruli ng s of t he court are premised on the evidence pr esente d on Marc h 4, 2002 hear ing, w e pre sume the evide nce suppor ts such ruling s.
To the extent that Fathe r’s brief to this Court c ould be rea d as pre senting for r eview the issue of whe ther the c hance ry

court fur ther e rre d in limi ting F ather to supervised visitation with the children, w e find that the e vidence in the rec ord does not pre ponderate ag ainst the cour t’s decision. 3 Th e Pe rm ane nt P are nti ngPlan s e ts f or th t he fo llo wi ngpe rt ine nt v isi tatio n ti me s/c on dit ion s:
Be cause of the Father’s illness as discusse d in the Final De cre e of Divorc e , A L Lshare d pare nting with the c hildren shall be supe rvised
un til the c ri te ri a

se t out be low are me t and the Court de te rm ine s it

wi ll-14- be in the childre n’s best intere sts to allow the Fathe r unsu p er v i sed share d p ar e n ti n g

. F o r w e e k e n d s h ar e d p ar e n ti n g , th e mo th e r may desig nate the pe rson to supervise the share d pare nting, or , if the per son desig nated by

the mother is unsatisfac tory to the fathe r, the father may seek supe rvision f

rom the mother’s relatives set out be low or may seek profe ssional supervision throug h the Depa rtmen t of Children’s Service s, the Carl Perkins Center , or som e o t h er pr ofessional counselingservice

. Father will be e ntitled to shared par enting ever y other
we eken d, on Sa tur da

y , f ro m 9 a .m. to 5 p. m. a

nd on Sun da y fr om 9
a .m. to 5 p. m. A ll e xch ang e s sh a ll take pla c e a t the Mc Na ir y County Criminal J ustice Center

.

******************************************************

T h e f at h er wi l l al s o h av e ex t en d ed o v ern i gh ts h ar edp ar en t i n g, which must be super

vised by one of the following : Mr. J oseph Kinnan, the mater

nal g randf

ather , Mrs. Sandy

Kinnan, the mate rnal g randmother , or Mrs. Mar y Kinnan B allard, t he mater nal aunt. Any of the se ind ivi du a ls may pic k up the c hil dr e n at the Mc Na ir y County Criminal J ustice Center

and tra ns p o rt t h em to the fathe r if the f ather is not available to pick them up, himself.

Th e father m ay take the c hil dr e n a ny wh e re he wi sh e s w ith in the continental United States a s long as this e x tended share d pare nting i s s u p e r v i s e d a s s e to u th e r e i n

. T h e f

a t h e r w i l l b e e n t i t l e d

t o 3 0 d ays of extended super

vised share d pare nting pe r y ear , but it must be taken in increme nts of no more than 10 c onsecutive da y s at one time.
When the fathe r wishes to exe rc i s e his extended share d pa re nti ng , h e mus t g ive the mot he r 1 4 d ay s’ no tic e of

his int e nt t o exercise his s h ar ed par enting . He must tell the mother the dates and times on wh ich he will exchang e the c hildren. He must also tell the mot he r h owthe c hil dr e n c an b e re a c he d p e r S e c tio n 3 .2 .F . set ou t in the Permane nt Parenting Plan.

Ba sed on our f

orego i n g discussion, we find that the e vidence in the rec ord does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s decision t o limit Father to supervised visitation with the children pending his completion of pare nting a nd ang er ma

nag ement cour ses, and c ontinge nt upon father
rec eiving counseling and medica l treatment for his mental illness, and the court’s final approva l of unsupervised visitation. Moreove r, we note that Father ha s t h e o p t i o n to enlist the service s of a profe ssional ag ency

to supervise his visitations in t he eve nt he is unhappy wi th the individual-15-

de sig nate d b y

Mo the r. F ur

the r, the ind ivi du a ls i de nti fi e d b y the c ourt a s p ro pe r p e rs on s to su

pe rv ise Father’s e x tended ove rnig ht visit ations with the children all testified on Father’s behalf at trial, and it appear s as thoug h Father ha s a civil relationship wit h eac h one.

Acc ording ly , we f

ind that the chanc ery court did not err in desig nating Mother as the primary residential parent for the children and gra nting Father supervised visit ation with the children pursuant to the share d pare nting state ment enter ed as a n attachme nt to the Permanent Pare nting Plan.

II.
The sec ond issue for r eview is whe ther t h e ch ance ry court c ommitt ed re versible e rror by int e rv ie wi ngthe min or

c hil dr e n o n tw o s e pa

ra te oc c a sio ns wi tho ut t

he pr e se nc e of

c ouns e l.

Father relies upon this Court’s decision in Whit ev . W hite , No. E1998-00664- COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 66066 (Tenn. Ct. App. J an. 27, 2000), for the proposition that the trial court’s inter views with the children a

re r ever sible err or. We believe the Father’s r el i ance on Whit ei s m i s p l a c e d

. In Whit e , the Court revers ed the c ustody awa rd “be cause we do not have a complete rec ord of the evidenc e hear d by

the trial judg e.” Id. at *1. The Court noted: “The rec ord establishes that the tr ial judge interviewe d the eigh t y ea r o l d child in chamber s, over the objec tion of th e mot her , and the
su b s t an ce of that interview is not before us throug h no fault of the a ppellant.” Id. a t *1 (e mph a sis added)

. I n the ca se at ba

r, neither of the pa rties objecte d to the court’s inter view with the children on Marc h 4, 2002 and the subsequent int ervie w on J une 3, 2002, without the presence of counse l. The
rec ord conta ins the interview of J une 3, 2002. Under the specific fac ts of the case at bar , we do not fi nd that Whit

ei s co n t ro l l i n g.
To reiter ate, the c hance ry

court twice c onducted se parate interview s with the children without the pr e s e n c e o f p arti e s o r c o u n s e l. O n M ar c h 4 , 2 0 0 2 , th e c h an c e ll o r in te r v ie w e d th e p artie s’ two oldest children in cha

mbers. The chanc ellor did not interview the young est child. No cour t reporte r was pre sent to rec ord the c hildren’s testimony or statements to the c hance llor. From our revie w of the re cord, it is appar ent that the cha ncellor did not re veal the c ontent of these c onversations or interviews to the pa

rties or counsel. I n a later proce eding , the trial cour t noted that these intervie ws wer e conduc ted with the conse nt of the par ties and counse l. At oral a rg ument, Father’s c ounsel appea red to sug g est that Father did not consent to the i nterview s. Howeve r, no transc ript or Statement
o f th e E v id e n c e f

r o m t h e M ar c h 4 , 2 0 0 2 p r o c e e d in g s w a s f il e d a s p art o f th e r e c o r d

o na p p e a l. We
re ite rate tha

t, i n th e a bs e nc e of a tr ans c ri pt o f t

he e vid e nc e or a State me nt of the Ev ide nc e , “ the re is
a c on c lus ive pr e sumpt ion

that th e re was su ffi cie nt e vid e nc e be fo re the tr ia l c ourt to s up po rt

its judgme nt, and thi s Court must t here fore aff irm the judg ment.” Coa kle y v . D anie ls , 840 S.W .2d 367, 3 7 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g McKinn ey v . Educator an d Executive Insurers, In c. , 569 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. A

pp. 1977)). In the ca se at ba r, the trial court a

ppare ntly felt that there was c onsent of the pa rt ie s f or the c hil dr e n’ s in ter vi ews and F a the r d oe s n ot p re se nt a ny thi ngc on tr a , e xce pt h is
argume nt i n th is C ourt

that he did

no t c on se nt.-16-

Duringthe cour se of the June 3, 2002 proce eding s, the cha ncellor inter

viewed all three
c hil dr e n. Th e c ha

nc e llo r int e rv ie we d e a c h of the thr e e c hil dr e n se pa rate ly , in a

c le are d c ourt

ro om. A c ourt re po rt e r wa s pr e se nt to re c or d the c hil dr e n’ s te sti mony , and the se state me nts are inc lud e d in the re c or d on a

pp e a l. Ne ith e r F a the r n or Ms. B e ll- B e a m vo ic e d o bje c tio n to the c ourt ’s de c isi on to int e rv ie w the c hil dr e n outs ide of the ir pr e se nc e

. At F a the r’ s re qu e st an d w iththe c hil dr e n’ s c on se nt, the cha ncellor disclose d the content of her inter views with the chil d ren to the pa rties and c ounsel.

I n Scarbrough v. Scarbrough , 752 S.W .2d 94, 97 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. 1 9 88), this Court noted that the pra ctice of

interviewingminor children in cha mbers as w itnesses in a child cu s t o d y case , without the presenc e of c ounsel, “should be discour ag ed.” A s in the case at bar , counsel for the respe ctive par

ties consente d to interviews of the children by the t rial j udg e outs ide of their pre sence , and no tra nscript of the pr ocee dings in c hamber s was take n. Id . This Court held:
The only purpose f or hea ring from the c hild is t o assist the trier of f act in m a kin g a

de te rm inatio n o f th e is su e s b e fo re it, wh ic h in thi s c a se was to dete rmine the be st interest for the c hild. Every person of sufficie nt capa city

to unde rstand the obligation of an oath is compe tent to b e a wi tne ss. T. C. A. § 2 4- 1- 10 1 ( Sup p. 19 87 ). I f t he re is s ome compelling rea son for the proce eding s to be held in chambers, the tria l
c ou rt , n e v e rt h e l e s s , s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e t h e qu a l i f

i c a t i o n s o f

a w i t ne ss and such w itness’ testimony should be preserve d in the rec ord. In the
case befor e us, it is c lear that the trial judg e, with the ac quiesce nce of the pa rt ie s, he ard

te sti mony

of the c hil d, bu t w e do no t ha ve the be ne fi t o f this testim ony

in the rec ord. When the trial cour t hear s the
e vid e nc e , b ut t

he e vid e nc e is n ot i nclud ed in the re c or d o n a pp e a l, i t is p re sume d th at th e evide nc e su pp or ts t he ru lin g of

the tr ia l c ourt

. Turner v. Turn er , 7 39 S.W. 2d 77 9 (T e nn . Ct. App . 198 6) . In th e c a se a t bar , t h e t r i a l c o u rth a d s h ar p c r e d i b i l i t y

i s s u e s i nm a k i n g i ts de te rm inatio n a s to the be st int e re st of the c hil d a

nd in a dd iti on

the re to considere d the testimony

of the c hild. Under the rec ord i n this case we cannot sa y that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the finding of the trial court that the best interests of the child are ser ved by the awa rd of custody to the Wife.

Id

. The Scarbrough court thus did not find the trial cour t’s decision to interview the minor child outside of the pre sence of counse l to be reve rsible er ror.
We note some conce rn in the instant c ase r eg arding Father’s status a s a pr o s elitigant and the court’s f ailure or ref usal to disclose the testimony or statements of the children f rom their Marc h 4, 2002 interviews. Father consented to all of t he int ervie ws conducte d by the cour t. Although pr o s e litigants ar e entitled to fa ir and e qual treatment, Whit aker v. Whirl

pool Corp. , 32 S.W .3d 222, 227-17-

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), pro se litigants are not e ntitled to shi ft the burde n of litigating their case to the courts. Id

. at 222. Pro se litigants ar e not excused fr om comply ing w ith the same substantive and proce dural re quirements that must be adhe red to by other re prese nted par

ties. Id

. at 222. W e thus fi n d that Father is cha

rg ed with the burde n of ente ring proper objections to the cha

ncer y court’s ruling s and dec isions, specifically the court’s decision t o interview the children outside the presenc e of counse l.

Our c oncer

ns are alleviated by

the fa ct that there is ample evidence in the re cord to support the chanc ery court’s decision that it wa s in the best interests of the c hildren to desig nate Mother as the primary

residential parent. In Davis v. Sm allwood , N o

. 8 6 1 4 , 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 7 0 6

- CH

- 0 0 1 3 1 , 1 9 9 8 WL 477649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 17, 1998), this Court noted:

Most importantly , the orde r of the tr ial court makes it clear that the trial court r elied on other evidenc e in making his decision. The orde r st a t e s t h a tt h e d e c i s i o no f t h e t r i a l c o u rtw a s b a s e d o nt h e p l e a d i ng s, the testimony of the witnesses, the interviews with the children a nd the
re c or d a s a

wh ole . “I t ha s lo ngbe e n th e ru le in T e nn e sse e tha t a pr ivate int e rv ie w o f t

he c ourt wi th a min or c hil d is not o bje c tio na ble wher e the de cision as to custody is based solely

or primar i l y

upon evidenc e hear d in ope n court.” Todd v. Todd, No. 03A01-9108- CH284, 1992 WL 55578, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1992) ( citing Hicks v. Hicks , 26 Tenn. App. 641, 176 S.W.2d 371 (1943)).

Id . at *2.

I n T o d d v. Todd , No. 03A01-9108- CH-284, 1992 WL55578 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 24, 1992), the Easter n Section explained: [P ]rejudice results, and ther efor e re versible e rror , wher e the tria l court fails to disclose to the par ties what occ urre d during the interv i ew, wh ic h w ou ld a ff

or d th e pa

rt ies an op po rt

un ity to r e bu t st a te me nts made dur ing the p rivate inter view, and renders its decision based up o n t he e lic it e d c o nv e r s a tion

. Hence, the r ecor d must support the Trial Court’s dec ision without reg ard to th e C o u rt ’s interviewof the mi n o r c h il d to a v o id p r e ju d ic e to [th e a

p p e ll an t]

. Id . at *2 (interna l citations omit ted) (e mphasis added)

. I n the instant case , the cha ncer y court ba sed its decision “upon the co m p l ai n t fi led by [Mot her], the answe r and c ounter-c omplaint filed by [Father], other motions and doc uments filed by the par ties, t h e t es t i m o n y

of the witnesse s, [and] exhibi ts on file....” Without consideration of the testimony of the minor childre n, we find that there is substantial e vidence in the rec ord of F ather ’s-18-

mental abuse of the c hildren, phy sical violence toward his f ormer wife, past strug g les with substance
a bu se , a nd nume ro us ins tanc e s o f u

ns ta ble and po te nti a ll y dan ge ro us be havio r. F or the se re a so ns , we f ind that the chanc ery

court’s de cision to interview the c hildren outside of the pr esenc e of c ounsel
wa s, a t mo st, ha

rm le ss e rr or . We the re fo re fi nd F a the r’ s is su e to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

III
. Father ne x t asks this Court t o consider whether the c h a n c e r y court “ committed reve rsible er ror by us ing ps y cho lo g ic a l r e po rt s to re nd e r i ts o pin ion wi tho ut m e e tin gthe re qu ir e me nts of Te nn . R. Civ. P . 35.” F ather

specific ally

argues that no fa ctual basis ex isted to justify or support the c ourt’s order direc ting Mother , Father, a nd the three children to submit to psy cholog ical eva luations.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 35 .0 1 s tate s:
Rule 35.01 Order for Exam ination When the mental or phy sical condition ( including th e blood g roup) of a par ty , or of a

perso n i n the custody

or under the leg al
c on tr ol of a pa

rt y , is in c on tr ov e rs y , the c ourt in wh ic h the a c tion is pending may order the party to submit to a phy sical or m en tal examination by

a suitably licensed or cer

tified examiner or to produc e for e x amination the per son in his custody or leg al control. The order may be made only

on motion for g ood cause shown and upon notice to the p er son to be examined and to all parties a nd shall specify

the time, place, ma

nner, conditions, and scope of t he ex amination and the person or persons by

whom it is t o be made

. I n her br ief to this Court, Mother states that “[b]ot h parties, who both then wer e re prese nted by counsel, filed mo t i o n s fo r examinations and neither filed obje ctions.” Howe ver, the rec ord on
a pp e a l do e s n ot c on ta in a

ny mot ion fi le d by e ith e r o f t

he pa rt ie s p ur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr o c e d u r e 3 5

. 0 1 r e qu e s ti n g me n ta l e xa mi n a ti o n s o r e v a lu a ti o n s of th e p arti e s o r th e c h il dr e n

. We note that a he aringupon Father’s Motion for T empora ry C u s t o d y was he ld on November

8, 1999. No tr ans c ri pt o r S tate me nt o f t he Ev ide nc e fr om t

his he ari ng wa s inc lud e d in th e re c or d o n a pp e a l. On Dec ember

17, 1999, the trial cour

t entere d a Te mporary

Orde r of Custody , sta ting in per tinent pa rt :
T HIS C AUS E came on to be hea rd on the 8th day

of November , 1999, befor e the Honorable Ma rtha B rasf ield, Chance llor, upon the pleading s, testimony of witnesses, and the statements in open Court, and ar g uments of counse l, the Court finds and Ord er s as fo llo ws :

******************************************************-19- Th a t e a c h o f the pa

rt ie s will ob ta in p sy c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns , inc lud ing a so c ia l histo ry , in add iti on e a c h of the pa rt ie s’ c hil dr e n w ill
re c e ive a ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n and so c ia l his tor y
. Sa id re po rt s w ill be su bmi tte d to the Court

and a tto rn e y s f

or the pa rt ie s.
Fr om our rea ding of

the cha ncer y court’s Final Decre e of Divorce , it is appare nt that the court
c on sid e re d ev ide nc e or inf or matio n co nta ine d in Moth e r an d F a the r’ s p sy c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns in conductinga compa

rative f itness analy sis of the parties. Although there is no evidenc e that a prope r Rule 35.01 motion was f

iled reque sting evaluation of the parties and children, and re g ardle ss of the fac t that the t rial court’s order failed to “spec ify the t ime, place , manner , conditions, and scope of the examination and the person o r persons by whom it is t o be made ,” we find that there is substantial evidenc e in the rec ord, without c onsideration of the se eva luations, to support the court’s finding that it w a s in the be st i nte re sts of

the c hil dr e n to de sig nate Mo the r a s th e pr ima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Moreove r, we not e t h at the cour t’s finding that Father wa s unstable and potentially dang erous wa s further based upon his beha

vior in court and documented acts of ag g ression or thre ateningbehavior

. The c ourt noted that F ather “display ed extreme volatility and instability

throug hout this court proce eding . His temp er h as fl ar ed in Court. He ha s threate ned [Mother’s] attorney throug h a telephone me ssag e, and [Mother’s] attorney was g rante d an orde r of pr otection.”

Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d as a w hole, we f ind t h at the cour

t’s relianc e upon or consideration of the mental ev al u ati ons in designating Mother as primar

y residential pa

rent of the
c hil dr e n c on sti tut e s h arm le ss e rr or . We the re fo re fi nd F a the r’ s is su e wi tho ut m e ri t.

IV.

Father’s f ourth issue is whether

the cha ncer y court erre d when it issued an order of protection to Mother’s attorne y , Ms. Be ll-Be am, ag ainst Father.
To brief ly reiter ate, Ms. B ell-B eam f iled an ex parte motion on J une 3, 2002, see king a n “immediate Ex-Parte Or der of Protection,” a

nd a “Per manent Or der of

Protection” a g ainst Father. Ms. Be ll-Be am also m oved the court for a n “immediate Per

manent Or der of

Protection” for

Mother ag ainst Father. Ms. B ell-B eam f iled her motion pursuant to the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, b u tfa i l edt o i d en t i fy

t h e p re ci s e r

u l e. M s

. Be l l -B ea m ’s m o t i o ni n cl u d ed a n a f f i d av i td et ai l i n g a thr e a te nin g ph on e mes sa g e le ft by F a the r o n h e r o ff

ic e ans we ri ngma c hin e on May 28 , 2 00 2. Ms. Be ll-Be am stated that the me ssag e ca used her to “fe ar imminent dang er of phy sical harm from Mr. Wil lcutts and/or member s of his family ,” and spe cifica ll y reque sted the cour

t to “order

any communications betwe en her and the Pro Se Def endant be done throug h the Clerk and Ma ster’s of fice as there should be no furthe r nee d for dire ct communications betwe en them.”

On J une 3, 2002, the c ourt enter ed an immediate Ex P arte Or d er o f P ro t ec t i o ns t at i n g:
Pursuant to an Ex P arte Moti o n for Protec tive Orde r for Plaintiff and for Plaintiff’ s Counsel and Plaintiff’s Third Mot ion for-20- Sanctions, and the Af

fidavit attac hed thereto, Ms. Deber a B ell-B eam is gr anted a

n Ex Parte Or der of

Protectio n as t o t he De fenda nt, J ohn Wil lcutts. Further , any communication between Ms. B ell-B eam a nd Mr. W i l l cu t t s shall be done throug h the Clerk & Master’ s Offic e or will be made in open cou rt . This shall include any oral or written dir e c t c omm

un ic a tio n b e tw e e n M s. B e ll- B e a m and Mr . Wil lc utt s.
A hea ring for a perma nent orde r of protection will be held on Mo nd ay , Jun e 3, 20 02

. F ur the r, a he ari ng wi ll be he ld to de te rm ine if Mr. Will cutts is in civil contem p t o f co urt for the lang uag e used ag ainst Ms. Bell-B eam on the a nsweringmachine.

I T I S SO ORDERED.
After the J une 3, 2002 hear ing, the court enter ed a Protective Orde r for Ms. Be ll-Be am ag ainst Father. Th e c ourt ’s or de r s tate s in pe rt ine nt p art :
This c ourt finds counsel’ s Motion for a Perma nent Orde r of Protec tion
we ll ta k e n , an d h e r e b y o r d e r s [F a th e r ] to c o mm u n ic a te w it

h counsel for [Mother] only

throug h mail and solely

for matter s to d o with the above- sty led ca se.
I n its Final Dec ree o f Di v o rc e, the chance ry court he ld, inte r a lia , that the “or ders of pr ote c tio n in

fa vo r o f [Ms. B e ll- B e a m] a g a ins t [F a the r] and in f a vo r o f [M oth e r] a g a ins t [F a the r] s ha ll
c o n t i nu e f

o r o n e ye ar f r o m t h e d a t e t h i s O r d e r i s f i l e d w i t h t h e C l e r

k & M a s t e r

o f M c N a i r y C o u n t y, Tenne ssee.”

F a the r a rgue s th a t Ms . B e ll- B e a m w a s n ot a pr op e r p art

y to s e e k p ro te c tiv e re lie f p ur su ant t o T.C.A. § 36-3-602. Whil e Father may be cor rec t in his argument that counsel for a par ty to a divorce and child custody

case is not entitl ed to file a motion or complaint for protec tion under this statute, we note that Ms. Be ll-Be am filed her motion pursua nt to the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e and, althoug h incorre ctly

titled, can be c onstured as a motion for a te m p o ra ry restra ining or der or i n j u n ct i o np u rs u an tt o T en n

. R

. C i v
. P

. 6 5

. 0 3 o r 6 5

. 0 4

. W e b as e o u r f i n d i n g u p o nt h e l an gu age utiliz ed by

Ms. Be ll-Be am in her motion, and the c ourt’s orde r there on. I n eff ect, Ms. B ell-B eam mov e d th e c ourt

to e nte r a n o rd e r re str ic tin g the me tho d an d co nte nt o f F a the r’ s c omm un ic a tio ns wi th he r. Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 65 .0 1 s tate s:
I njunctive re lief may be obtained by (1) restra ining order , (2) te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n, or (3 ) pe rm ane nt inj un c tio n in a fi na l ju dg me nt. A re straining order

shall only restric t the doing of

an ac t. An injunction may restric t or mandatorily

direc t the doing of

an ac t.-21-

We re a d the c ourt ’s pr ote c tiv e or de r o f Jun e 3, 20 02 a s im po sin g a re str ic tio n u

po n F a the r t o r e fr a in fr om a ll c omm

un ic a tio n wi th Ms. B e ll- B e a m oth e r tha n that sp e c if

ie d b y the c ourt in i ts o rd e r. Thus , he mus t no t di re c tly

c on ta c t he r a

nd is r e qu ir e d to c omm

un ic a te on ly

by ma il.

I t a pp e ars that, a lth ou g h mi sti tle d, Ms. B e ll- B e a m’ s mo tion w a s f ile d p ur su ant t o T e nn . R. Civ. P . 65.03 or 65.04 and not T.C.A. § 36-3- 602 as ar g ued by Father.

Restr a in in g order s and tempora ry injunctions may

be g rante d during the pende ncy of an a ction and ar e similar in many

respe cts. They

both are authorized by a verifie d complaint or af fidavit that the movant’s rig hts may

and will be viol ated and that the movant will suffer irrepa rable damag e or injury

. The court in which the action is pending may issue the re straining order or injunction pursuant to the provisi ons of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.03 and 65.04. Following these provisions, the cour t in the ins tant c a se wa s guid e d b y the pr ov isi on s o f T e nn . R

. Ci v. P. 6 5. 07 , w hic h s tate s a s f oll ow s in pe rt ine nt p art :
I n do mestic relation cases, r estrainingorder s or injunctions may be issued upon such terms a nd conditions and rema in in force for suc h time as shall s ee m just and proper to the judge to whom application the re fo r i s ma de , a

nd the pr ov isi on s of this ru le sh a ll be fo llo we d o nly insofar a s deeme d appropr iate by such judg e.
I n a notar ized affidavit attac hed to h er m o t i o n , Ms. Be ll-Be am stated that she r ece ived a telephone me ssag e on May 28, 2002, from a ma

n she believe d to be Father. Ms. B ell-B eam noted that the c al l er did not state his name , but aver red that she rec og nized Father ’s voice f rom previous
conver sations, and furthe r stated that “ the m atters to which [ the caller] refe rre d wer e those involving Mr . Wil lc utt s. ” Ms. B e ll- B e a m in c lud e d a wr itt e n tr ans c ri pt o f t

he me ssa g e , w hic h r e a ds :
Hi Debe ra, umm.... You know, I g otta war n y ou about my

sister and putting her on the war path... y ou know, s he was the abused one... uh, y ou know, I

never asked he r to write that letter... she did it on her ow n acc ord and she does things like that. I asked he r to send the pa

y ment to D r. Kenna

n and she se nt it and she told me she sent a le tter with it... uh... Ididn’t do any

thing o n this... uh... but considering how many letters she ha s written and how many have been thr own out and what she’s be en through a

nd the fa ct that she showe d up all the way from California for

the N o v em b er hearingin 1999... and Debe ra, you are really playing w ith fire. She’s a meane r B itch than y ou... y ou know, Idon’t know what this l aw pr ofession i s all about, but... y ou know... she thoug ht she would try to prick some peop l e’ s conscie nce... but uh... I ’ll tell y ou what... She’s g oing to g o afte r y ou like nothing e lse, honey . She’s just rea lly

g onna g o afte r you. Ican’ t stop her now. You did this to y ourself.-22-

Ms. Be ll-Be am stated that the tone and conte x t of the messag e ca used her “to fe ar imminent dange r of phy sical har

m from Mr. Willcutts and/or membe rs of his family ,” and f urther note d:

Iam also we ll awar e of Mr . Wil lcutts’ documented strugg le with ang er and mental he alth issues, which ser ve to heig hten my

conce rn.
Fin ally , this is t he sec ond inappropriate telephone call to my office from Mr. Willcutts, which further se rves to heig hten my conce rn.
I t is appare nt from our re ading of Ms. Be ll-Be am’s motion and af fidavit that she satisfied the require ments set forth in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.
The c ourt’s initial order inc ludes an “ Offic er’ s Return” c lause, e stablishing prope r service of pr oc e ss, and

the pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n h a s a

c e rt if ic a te of se rv ic e the re on . T his iss ue is wi tho ut m e ri t.

V.

Ba sed upon the for eg oing disc ussion, we find that F ather is not entitl ed to an a

war d of
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s fo r his a

pp e a l in thi s matte r. I n he r c on c lud ing pa ra g ra ph , Mo the r inc lud e s a

re qu e st for attorney ’s fe es, stating that “attorne y fee s should be paid by

the Appellant.” Mother’s a pplication for attorney ’s fe es on appe al is g rante d and the amount will be determined on re mand.

VI
. T h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n al d ec re e i s af fi rm edan d

t h e c as e i s re m an d ed fo r s u ch fu rt h er p ro ce ed i n gs a s ma y be ne c e ssa

ry . Co sts of thi s app e a l ar e a sse sse d a g a ins t th e a pp e lla nt, JohnF ra

nc is Wi llc utt s, an d h i s s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK CRAW FORD, P RE S I DI

NG J UD GE , W. S.