Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2022 / Notices 21209 

Waiver No. XR0869719 issued to Craig 

S. Rosenblum, M.D. I further hereby 

deny any pending application(s) of 

Craig S. Rosenblum, M.D., to renew or 

modify these registrations, as well as 

any other pending application(s) of 

Craig S. Rosenblum, M.D., or Aurora 

Surgery Center LP for registration in 

California. This Order is effective May 

9, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07727 Filed 4–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Christopher King, C.N.P.; Decision and 

Order 

On December 18, 2019, a former 

Assistant Administrator, Diversion 

Control Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Christopher 

C. King, N.P. (hereinafter, Applicant) of 

Manchester, Maine. Request for Final 

Agency Action (hereinafter, RFAA), 

Exhibit (hereinafter, RFAAX) 2 (OSC), at 

1. The OSC proposed to deny 

Applicant’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration application, Number 

W19022896M, as well as to deny any 

pending applications for renewal or 

modification of such registration and 

any applications for any other 

registrations pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4) and 823(f), because 

‘‘[Applicant’s] registration is 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

Id. 

The OSC alleged that Applicant had 

‘‘exhibited negative experience in 

handling controlled substances . . . and 

[had] failed to comply with applicable 

federal and state laws relating to 

controlled substances.’’ Id. at 2. 

Specifically, the OSC alleged that, while 

employed at Mercy Hospital from April 

10, 2013, to June 13, 2013, Applicant 

diverted controlled substances on at 

least two different occasions in violation 

of federal and state law. Id. at 4–6. The 

OSC also alleged that, while employed 

at St. Mary’s Regional Medical Center 

(hereinafter, St. Mary’s Hospital) from 

August 25, 2014, until November 1, 

2016, Applicant diverted controlled 

substances on at least five different 

occasions in violation of federal and 

state law. Id. at 2–3. 

The OSC notified Respondent of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 3 (citing 21 

CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Respondent of the opportunity to 

submit a corrective action plan. Id. at 6– 

7 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

Adequacy of Service 

In a Declaration dated August 23, 

2021, a Diversion Investigator 

(hereinafter, the DI) assigned to the 

Manchester District Office stated that on 

December 18, 2019, she sent a copy of 

the OSC to ‘‘both [Applicant’s] 

registered and mailing address via First 

Class Mail’’ and ‘‘sent the [OSC] via 

certified mail on the following day.’’ 

DI’s Declaration, at 2. The DI stated that 

on December 19, 2019, she ‘‘contacted 

[Applicant] by phone at the mobile 

number listed on his application.’’ Id. 

According to the DI, she ‘‘explained 

what an [OSC] was, and requested that 

[Applicant] contact [her] when he 

received a copy of the [OSC].’’ Id. The 

DI stated that on December 26, 2019, she 

received an email from Applicant that 

read, ‘‘ ‘I have received the hard copy of 

the [OSC] in the mail. I do not want to 

pursue this matter and do not feel it is 

necessary to meet and discuss.’ ’’ Id.; see 

also RFAAX 3 (email from Applicant). 

The Government forwarded its RFAA, 

along with the evidentiary record, to 

this office on August 26, 2021. In its 

RFAA, the Government represents that 

Applicant did not request a hearing. 

RFAA, at 1. The Government requests 

that ‘‘the Administrator issue a final 

order denying the DEA Certificate of 

Registration application for [Applicant]’’ 

because ‘‘Applicant’s [r]egistration is 

not in the public interest.’’ Id. 

Based on the DI’s Declaration, the 

Government’s written representations, 

and my review of the record, I find that 

the Government accomplished service 

of the OSC on Applicant on or before 

December 26, 2019. I also find that more 

than thirty days have now passed since 

the Government accomplished service 

of the OSC. Further, based on the DI’s 

Declaration, the Government’s written 

representations, and my review of the 

record, I find that neither Applicant, nor 

anyone purporting to represent 

Applicant, requested a hearing, 

submitted a written statement while 

waiving Applicant’s right to a hearing, 

or submitted a corrective action plan. 

Accordingly, I find that Applicant has 

waived the right to a hearing and the 

right to submit a written statement and 

corrective action plan. 21 CFR 

1301.43(d) and 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C). I, 

therefore, issue this Decision and Order 

based on the record submitted by the 

Government, which constitutes the 

entire record before me. 21 CFR 

1301.43(e). 

I. Findings of Fact 

A. Application for DEA Registration 

On March 12, 2019, Applicant 

applied for a DEA Certificate of 

Registration as a practitioner in 

Schedules II through V with a proposed 

registered address of 29 Bowdoin St, 

Manchester, ME 04351. RFAAX 1, at 1. 

Applicant’s application was assigned 

Control No. W19022896M. Id. 

B. Government’s Case 

The Government’s RFAA includes the 

DI’s Declaration and 10 attached 

Exhibits, including a copy of 

Applicant’s application for DEA 

registration, various documents 

pertaining to the drug diversion 

allegations against Applicant at both St. 

Mary’s Hospital and Mercy Hospital, 

and a copy of a Consent Agreement 

between Applicant and the Maine Board 

of Nursing in which Applicant’s license 

to practice nursing was suspended. See 

RFAAX 1–10. 

The DI’s Declaration described the 

investigation into Applicant, including 

the collection of the Government’s 

Exhibits. DI’s Declaration, at 1–3. On 

June 13, 2013, Mercy Hospital issued a 

letter to Applicant following an 

investigation regarding Applicant’s 

‘‘suspicious behavior’’ during his shift 

on June 4, 2013. RFAAX 9. According 

to the letter, on June 4, 2013, ‘‘medical 

waste (wet bloody paper towel, open 

syringe wrapper, syringe cap, open band 

aid wrapper, and an open alcohol wipe 

wrapper) was found in the bathroom in 

the staff break room.’’ Id. Applicant’s 

nurse manager ‘‘had noted that 

[Applicant] had recently come into the 

area and had been in the bathroom.’’ Id. 

According to the letter, video footage of 

the Emergency Department area prior to 

the medical waste being found was 

reviewed, and Applicant was observed 

pulling Dilaudid from the Pyxis 

machine and then entering the patient 

area for several minutes. Id. The video 

footage showed Applicant going to a 

supply cart and putting supplies in his 

pants pocket, then exiting the 

Emergency Department and entering the 

staff break room around the same time 

that Applicant’s nurse manager had 

seen Applicant enter the bathroom. Id. 

The video footage showed Applicant 

returning to the Emergency Department 

several minutes later and going 

immediately to a sharps disposal 

container, where he pulled something 

from his pants pocket to dispose of in 

that container. Id. Finally, the video 

footage showed Applicant requesting an 


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additional dose of Dilaudid from the 

ordering physician for the patient. Id. 

According to the letter, after review of 

Applicant’s other worked shifts since 

his start at Mercy Hospital, there was 

‘‘further concern that similar behavior 

occurred on another shift.’’ Id. During a 

meeting with Applicant on June 4, 2013, 

Applicant ‘‘indicated that the patient 

did receive both doses of Dilaudid on 

that day; however, [Applicant was] 

unable to provide a clear answer as to 

why [he] had put a sharp in [his] pocket 

and later disposed of it [ ] when there 

are sharps containers in every patient 

bay[ ].’’ Id. Moreover, during a phone 

conversation on June 12, 2013, 

Applicant ‘‘declined to return to Mercy 

[Hospital] to participate in a follow-up 

conversation to [the] investigation.’’ Id. 

According to the letter, Applicant was 

told that because of his behavior, Mercy 

Hospital had concerns that he may have 

been diverting medication, and 

consequently, Applicant’s employment 

at Mercy Hospital was terminated 

effective June 13, 2013. Id. 

On November 1, 2016, a Risk Manager 

at St. Mary’s Hospital issued a 

Memorandum to the HR department 

regarding an ‘‘Investigation of Suspicion 

of Drug Diversion.’’ RFAAX 6, at 1. 

According to the Memorandum, on 

September 24, 2016, Applicant ‘‘was 

found to have pulled a medication for 

another Emergency Department nurse’s 

patient.’’ Id. Further, chart 

documentation ‘‘notes the medication as 

‘contaminated’ and another vial was 

pulled and given to the patient by the 

nurse assigned to that patient.’’ Id. The 

medication pulled was 

‘‘Hydromorphone 1 mg/1 mL Syringe.’’ 

Id. According to the Memorandum, 

‘‘[w]hen handed to the other nurse, she 

noticed that the vial had been accessed 

and reported it to the nursing supervisor 

who then contacted the Director of the 

Emergency Department.’’ Id. Staff was 

then instructed to safeguard the vial so 

that it could be sent for testing, with the 

results of the testing showing that the 

vial was at half concentration, 

indicating that it had been tampered 

with. Id.; see also RFAAX 7. 

According to the Memorandum, there 

had been other suspicious incidents 

involving Applicant and several sharps 

containers in the Emergency 

Department. RFAAX 6, at 1. ‘‘On one 

occasion, [Applicant] lost his ring in a 

sharps container in the [Emergency 

Department].’’ Id. ‘‘On another occasion, 

[Applicant] was found to be bleeding 

from his hand,’’ and although he told 

staff he had cut himself on the sink, ‘‘no 

blood was found on the sink but blood 

was noted on the sharps container 

located in that area.’’ Id. The 

Memorandum notes that ‘‘[t]here was no 

confirmation that [Applicant] accessed 

this sharps container.’’ Id. 

The Memorandum further states that 

‘‘[a] chart audit was performed to 

determine Pyxis access by [Applicant]’’ 

and ‘‘[a] report of [Applicant’s] Pyxis 

access from August 25, 2016 to 

September 24, 2016 was run and 

reviewed against patient charts for that 

time period.’’ Id. Further, ‘‘[i]t was also 

reviewed against a full Pyxis report for 

all users for the same time period.’’ The 

Memorandum states that ‘‘[s]everal 

missing waste documentation was 

found from this initial chart audit.’’ Id. 

On September 3, 2016, a 1 mg/1 mL 

syringe of Hydromorphone was 

removed, but only 0.5 mg was 

documented to be given to the patient, 

with no waste documented for the 

excess controlled substance. Id. On 

September 5, 2016, a 100 mcg/2 mL vial 

of Fentanyl Citrate for another nurse’s 

patient was removed, but only 50 mcg 

was documented to be given to the 

patient, with no waste documented for 

the excess medication. Id. at 2. On 

September 10, 2016, a 2 mg/1 mL vial 

of Lorazepam was removed, but only 0.5 

mg was ordered and documented to be 

given to the patient, with no waste 

documented for the excess controlled 

substance. Id. Finally, on September 11, 

2016, a 100 mcg/2 mL vial of Fentanyl 

Citrate was removed, but only 50 mcg 

was ordered and documented to be 

given to the patient, with no waste 

documented for the excess controlled 

substance. Id. 

On November 1, 2016, St. Mary’s 

Hospital issued a letter to Applicant 

notifying him of his immediate 

dismissal from employment. RFAAX 5. 

In addition to the incidents of potential 

drug diversion previously identified in 

the above-described Memorandum, the 

letter also stated that Applicant 

‘‘falsified and omitted pertinent facts 

from [his] St. Mary’s [Hospital] 

Employment Application by indicating 

that [his] prior employment at CMMC 

was still ‘present’ and for omitting 

pertinent employment information for 

[his] work and termination from Mercy 

Hospital in 2013.’’ Id. 

On October 16, 2017, Applicant 

signed a Consent Agreement for 

Reprimand, Suspension, and Probation 

(hereinafter, Consent Agreement) issued 

by the State of Maine Board of Nursing 

(hereinafter, the Board). RFAAX 10, at 1 

and 5. The Consent Agreement includes 

facts pertaining to Applicant’s alleged 

diversion while employed at St. Mary’s 

Hospital, along with additional facts, 

such as that Applicant ‘‘has a March 31, 

2014 letter of concern on file with the 

Board in which the Board 

communicates its concern regarding ‘the 

importance of the proper 

administration, waste and disposal of 

scheduled drugs in any employment 

setting.’ ’’ Id. at 1–2. By signing the 

Consent Agreement, Applicant agreed to 

accept a Reprimand and agreed that his 

license would be suspended for one 

year followed by at least two years of 

probation. Id. at 2–3. Applicant also 

agreed that during the period of 

suspension, he would not ‘‘work in any 

capacity requiring a nursing license’’ 

and that he would continue to 

participate in the Maine Medical 

Professionals Health Program 

(hereinafter, MPHP) and ‘‘remain in 

compliance with all the terms of his 

current MPHP monitoring agreement.’’ 

Id. at 2. 

II. Discussion 

A. 21 U.S.C. 823(f): The Five Public 

Interest Factors 

Pursuant to section 303(f) of the CSA, 

‘‘[t]he Attorney General shall register 

practitioners . . . to dispense . . . 

controlled substances . . . if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense . . . 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which he practices.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). Section 303(f) further 

provides that an application for a 

practitioner’s registration may be denied 

upon a determination that ‘‘the issuance 

of such registration . . . would be 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

Id. In making the public interest 

determination, the CSA requires 

consideration of the following factors: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing, or conducting research with 

respect to controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

21 U.S.C. 823(f). 

The DEA considers these public 

interest factors in the disjunctive. Robert 

A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 

(2003). Each factor is weighed on a caseby-case basis. Morall v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 412 F.3d 165, 173–74 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). Any one factor, or combination of 

factors, may be decisive. David H. Gillis, 

M.D., 58 FR 37507, 37508 (1993). Thus, 

there is no need to enter findings on 

each of the factors. Hoxie v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 

2005). Furthermore, there is no 


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1As to Factor Three, there is no evidence in the 

record that Applicant has been convicted of an 

offense under either federal or state law ‘‘relating 

to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(3). 

However, as Agency cases have noted, there are a 

number of reasons why a person who has engaged 

in criminal misconduct may never have been 

convicted of an offense under this factor, let alone 

prosecuted for one. Dewey C. MacKay, M.D., 75 FR 

49956, 49973 (2010). Agency cases have therefore 

found that ‘‘the absence of such a conviction is of 

considerably less consequence in the public interest 

inquiry’’ and is therefore not dispositive. Id. 

As to Factor Five, the Government’s evidence fits 

squarely within the parameters of Factors One, 

Two, and Four and does not raise ‘‘other conduct 

which may threaten the public health and safety.’’ 

21 U.S.C. 823(f)(5). Accordingly, Factor Five does 

not weigh for or against Applicant. 

requirement to consider a factor in any 

given level of detail. Trawick v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 861 F.2d 72, 76–77 (4th 

Cir. 1988). The balancing of the public 

interest factors ‘‘is not a contest in 

which score is kept; the Agency is not 

required to mechanically count up the 

factors and determine how many favor 

the Government and how many favor 

the registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry 

which focuses on protecting the public 

interest . . . .’’ Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 

M.D., 74 FR 459, 462 (2009). When 

deciding whether registration is in the 

public interest, the DEA must consider 

the totality of the circumstances. See 

generally Joseph Gaudio, M.D., 74 FR 

10083, 10094–95 (2009) (basing sanction 

on all evidence on record). 

The Government does not dispute that 

Applicant holds a valid state nursing 

license and is authorized to dispense 

controlled substances in the State of 

Maine where he practices. See OSC, at 

2. While I have considered all of the 

public interest factors 1 in 21 U.S.C. 

823(f), the public interest factors that are 

most relevant to the Government’s case 

for denial of Applicant’s application are 

Public Interest Factors One, Two, and 

Four. See RFAA, at 5–6. Moreover, the 

Government has the burden of proof in 

this proceeding. 21 CFR 1301.44. I find 

that the Government’s evidence with 

respect to Factors Two, and Four 

satisfies its prima facie burden of 

showing that Applicant’s registration 

would be ‘‘inconsistent with the public 

interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(f). Specifically, 

I find that the record contains 

substantial evidence that Applicant 

violated both Maine law and federal law 

when he diverted controlled substances 

from Mercy Hospital and St. Mary’s 

Hospital. I further find that Applicant 

failed to provide evidence to rebut the 

Government’s prima facie case. 

1. Factor One 

In determining the public interest 

under Factor One, the ‘‘recommendation 

of the appropriate State licensing board 

or professional disciplinary authority’’ 

shall be considered. 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(1). 

‘‘Two forms of recommendations appear 

in Agency decisions: (1) A 

recommendation to DEA directly from a 

state licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority (hereinafter, 

appropriate state entity), which 

explicitly addresses the granting or 

retention of a DEA COR; and (2) the 

appropriate state entity’s action 

regarding the licensure under its 

jurisdiction on the same matter that is 

the basis for the DEA OSC.’’ John O. 

Dimowo, 85 FR 15800, 15809 (2020); see 

also Vincent J. Scolaro, D.O., 67 FR 

42060, 42065 (2002) (‘‘While the State 

Board did not affirmatively state that the 

Respondent could apply for a DEA 

registration, [the ALJ] found that the 

State Board by implication acquiesced 

to the Respondent’s application because 

the State Board has given state authority 

to the Respondent to prescribe 

controlled substances.’’). 

As previously discussed, on October 

16, 2017, Applicant entered into a 

Consent Agreement issued by the Board. 

RFAAX 10, at 1 and 5. The Board’s 

Consent Agreement includes some of 

the allegations against Applicant that 

were addressed in the OSC and RFAA— 

namely, those pertaining to Applicant’s 

alleged diversion while employed at St. 

Mary’s Hospital. Id. at 1–2. Further, the 

Consent Agreement includes additional 

facts related to Applicant’s alleged 

history of diversion such as that 

Applicant ‘‘has a March 31, 2014 letter 

of concern on file with the Board in 

which the Board communicates its 

concern regarding ‘the importance of the 

proper administration, waste and 

disposal of scheduled drugs in any 

employment setting.’ ’’ Id. at 2. The 

Consent Agreement suspends 

Applicant’s license for one year 

followed by at least two years of 

probation. Id. at 2–3. The Consent 

Agreement also prohibited Applicant 

from ‘‘work[ing] in any capacity 

requiring a nursing license’’ during the 

suspension and required him to 

‘‘continue to participate in the MPHP 

and remain in compliance with all the 

terms of his current MPHP monitoring 

agreement.’’ Id. at 2. 

While the Board’s Consent Agreement 

is not a ‘‘direct recommendation’’ for 

purposes of Factor One, it does indicate 

a recommendation by the appropriate 

state entity regarding a large portion of 

the allegations and evidence before me. 

John O. Dimowo, 85 FR at 15180. The 

Consent Order makes clear that the 

Board was aware of Applicant’s alleged 

diversion incidents from his time as an 

employee at St. Mary’s Hospital. The 

Consent Order also makes clear that the 

Board was aware that Applicant had a 

history of diversion allegations against 

him by including in its factual findings 

that, in March 2014, Applicant received 

a letter of concern from the Board that 

alluded to possible diversion in an 

employment setting. The Consent Order 

does not, however, make clear whether 

the Board was aware of Applicant’s 

alleged diversion incidents from his 

time as an employee at Mercy Hospital 

nor whether the 2014 letter of concern 

was in reference to those allegations or 

something else. Additionally, the Board 

implemented a multi-year disciplinary 

action that included a year of total 

suspension from practice followed by a 

probationary period in which 

Applicant’s practice would be 

‘‘restricted to structured settings with 

on-site supervision.’’ RFAAX 10, at 3. 

The Board also required that Applicant 

‘‘sign a monitoring agreement with the 

MPHP, to remain in effect for at least 

two (2) years of [his] employment in the 

practice of nursing.’’ Id. 

The Board’s Consent Agreement is not 

dispositive of the public interest inquiry 

in this case. The Board’s suspension of 

Applicant’s nursing license, as well as 

its probationary conditions, do not 

indicate a substantial amount of trust in 

Applicant. Ultimately, I find the Board’s 

Consent Agreement to weigh slightly in 

favor of Applicant, but its weight is also 

minimized by the ambiguity regarding 

the Board’s awareness of the full extent 

of Applicant’s history of diversion 

allegations, the sanctions imposed by 

the Board, and the fact that I have no 

information from Applicant to mitigate 

the circumstances. See John O. Dimowo, 

85 FR 15810–11 (citing Brian Thomas 

Nichol, M.D., 83 FR 47352, 47362–63 

(2018)). 

2. Factors Two and Four 

The unrebutted record evidence 

demonstrates that Applicant has a 

history of diversion, which comprises 

multiple documented incidents from at 

least two different places of 

employment. Although Applicant has 

denied at least some of the allegations 

from his time as an employee at St. 

Mary’s Hospital, (RFAAX 10, at 1–2), 

Applicant nonetheless signed the 

Board’s Consent Agreement in which he 

agreed that there was ‘‘sufficient 

admissible evidence for the Board to 

find that it [was] more likely than not’’ 

that he engaged in the conduct 

described in the allegations. Id. at 2. 

Furthermore, Applicant provided no 

contrary evidence on the record. 

Accordingly, I find that Applicant’s 

history of diverting controlled 

substances constitutes negative 

dispensing experience and weighs 


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2 I am not including a finding on this particular 

state law, because the Government failed to provide 

any arguments related to these allegations in the 

RFAA or further information related to the Maine 

schedules. It is clear to me that Applicant’s 

registration is not in the public interest due to his 

diversion in spite of the limited arguments in the 

RFAA. 

against granting Applicant’s application 

for a registration. 

Furthermore, the Government alleges 

that Applicant repeatedly violated state 

and federal laws related to controlled 

substances by diverting controlled 

substances on at least two different 

occasions while employed at Mercy 

Hospital and on at least five different 

occasions while employed at St. Mary’s 

Hospital. OSC, at 2 and 4 (citing 21 

U.S.C. 843(a)(3); 21 CFR 1301.22(c); 17– 

A Me. Rev. Stat. § 1107–A; 32 Me. Rev. 

Stat. § 2105–A(2)(F) and (H); and Maine 

State Board of Nursing Rule Ch. 4 

§ 3(P)). 

According to Maine law, ‘‘a person is 

guilty of unlawful possession of a 

scheduled drug if the person 

intentionally or knowingly possesses 

what that person knows or believes to 

be a scheduled drug, which is in fact a 

scheduled drug’’ 2 unless ‘‘the person 

possessed a valid prescription for the 

scheduled drug or controlled substance 

that is the basis for the charge and[ ], at 

all times, the person intended the drug 

to be used only for legitimate medical 

use in conformity with the instructions 

provided by the prescriber and 

dispenser.’’ Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17– 

A, §§ 1107–A(1) and (4) (Westlaw, 

current with legislation through the 

2021 First Regular Session and Second 

Special Session of the 130th 

Legislature). Further, Maine regulation 

states that nurses are prohibited from 

engaging in unprofessional conduct as 

well as from violating Board rules, 

including, ‘‘[d]iverting drugs, supplies 

or property of patients or health care 

provider[s].’’ 02–380 Me. Code R. Ch. 4, 

§ 3(P) (Westlaw, current through the 

June 16, 2021 Maine Weekly Rule 

Notice). 

Under federal law, it is unlawful ‘‘to 

acquire or obtain possession of a 

controlled substance by 

misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, 

deception, or subterfuge.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

843(a)(3). Federal law also states that 

‘‘[a]n individual practitioner who is an 

agent or employee of a hospital or other 

institution may, when acting in the 

normal course of business or 

employment, administer, dispense, or 

prescribe controlled substances under 

the registration of the hospital or other 

institution which is registered in lieu of 

being registered him/herself, provided 

that . . . [s]uch dispensing, 

administering or prescribing is done in 

the usual course of his/her professional 

practice.’’ 21 CFR 1301.22(c). Federal 

law defines an individual practitioner as 

an ‘‘individual licensed, registered, or 

otherwise permitted, by the United 

States or the jurisdiction in which he/ 

she practices, to dispense a controlled 

substance in the course of professional 

practice.’’ 21 CFR 1300.01. 

In this case, the evidence supports a 

finding that Applicant diverted 

controlled substances on at least two 

different occasions while employed at 

Mercy Hospital and on at least five 

different occasions while employed at 

St. Mary’s Hospital. In doing so, he 

clearly acted outside of the usual course 

of his professional practice and 

dispensed controlled substances in 

violation of state and federal law. Given 

the repeated nature of Applicant’s 

violations of federal and state 

regulations related to controlled 

substances, I find that Factors Two and 

Four strongly weigh against Applicant’s 

registration and I find Applicant’s 

registration to be inconsistent with the 

public interest in balancing the factors 

in 21 U.S.C. 823(f). 

III. Sanction 

Where, as here, the Government has 

met its prima facie burden of showing 

that grounds for denial exist, the burden 

shifts to the Applicant to show why he 

can be entrusted with a registration. 

Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 

18882, 18910 (2018) (collecting cases). 

In this case, Applicant did not request 

a hearing and did not avail himself of 

the opportunity to refute the 

Government’s case. See RFAA, at 1 and 

RFAAX 3. As such, Applicant has not 

expressed any remorse nor provided any 

assurances that he would implement 

remedial measures to ensure his 

misconduct is not repeated, and such 

silence weighs against his registration. 

Zvi H. Perper, M.D., 77 FR 64131, 64142 

(2012) (citing Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, 73 FR 363, 387 (2008)); 

see also Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 

FR 23848, 23853 (2007). Further, due to 

the lack of a statement or testimony 

from Applicant, it is unclear whether 

Applicant can be entrusted with a DEA 

registration. Therefore, I find that 

sanction is appropriate to protect the 

public from a recurrence of Applicant’s 

unlawful actions. See Leo R. Miller, 

M.D., 53 FR 21931, 21932 (1988). 

Accordingly, I shall order the sanctions 

requested by the Government, contained 

in the Order below. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

823(f) and 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby 

deny the pending application for a 

Certificate of Registration, Control 

Number W19022896M, submitted by 

Christopher C. King, N.P., as well as any 

other pending application of 

Christopher C. King, N.P. for additional 

registration in Maine. This Order is 

effective May 9, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07718 Filed 4–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Crosby Pharmacy and Wellness; 

Decision and Order 

I. Introduction 

On October 23, 2021, the Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Crosby 

Pharmacy and Wellness (hereinafter, 

Applicant) of Montgomery, Texas. OSC, 

at 1. The OSC proposes the denial of 

Applicant’s registration application, 

Control No. W20008908A (hereinafter, 

registration application). It alleges that 

Applicant materially falsified its 

registration application and that 

Applicant’s registration would be 

‘‘inconsistent with the public interest, 

as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 

823(f).’’ Id. 

Specifically, the OSC alleges that, 

during an onsite visit when Applicant 

was a registrant, the Government 

discovered ‘‘serious recordkeeping 

violations,’’ including not maintaining 

an initial inventory, not maintaining a 

biennial inventory, and not maintaining 

accurate records of all controlled 

substances received and sold. Id. at 1– 

2 (citing 21 CFR 1304.11(b), 1304.11(c), 

1304.21(a)). The OSC also alleges that 

Applicant materially falsified its 

registration application by answering 

‘‘no’’ to the question of whether it had 

‘‘ever surrendered (for cause) or had a 

federal controlled substance registration 

revoked, suspended, restricted, or 

denied, or is any such action pending.’’ 

Id. at 2. 

The OSC notifies Applicant of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing; the procedures for electing each 

option; and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 3 (citing 21 

CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notifies 


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