United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

AMIR HEKMATI,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2021-2086

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:19-cv-01766-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.

______________________

Decided: October 13, 2022

______________________

EMILY GRIM, Gilbert LLP, Washington, DC, argued for 

plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by SCOTT DAVID 

GILBERT, BRANDON LEVEY, MARK A. PACKMAN. 

 SHARI A. ROSE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY, MEEN GEU OH.

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit 

Judges.

Case: 21-2086 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 10/13/2022
2 HEKMATI v. US

CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.

The special master of the United States Victims of 

State Sponsored Terrorism Fund awarded money to Amir 

Hekmati. Later, the special master reconsidered his decision and rejected Mr. Hekmati’s application to the Fund. 

Mr. Hekmati now appeals the United States Court of Federal Claims’ decision that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Hekmati’s claim seeking payment of the 

money that the special master initially awarded him. See 

Hekmati v. United States, 153 Fed. Cl. 800 (2021). We conclude that 34 U.S.C. § 20144 precludes judicial review of 

the special master’s reconsideration decision. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Hekmati is a United States Marine Corps veteran 

who completed two tours of service in Iraq between 2001 

and 2005. J.A. 86. He also worked as a military contractor 

between 2005 and 2011. Id. The last of Mr. Hekmati’s jobs

as a contractor led to him being stationed in Afghanistan. 

J.A. 87–88. On his way back to the United States, Mr. Hekmati made a trip to Iran, where, he claims, he intended to 

visit family. J.A. 90, 96. 

Then, on August 29, 2011, the Iranian government arrested Mr. Hekmati. J.A. 90. For the next four years, the 

Iranian government detained Mr. Hekmati and tortured 

him. J.A. 90–92. Finally, in 2016, the United States secured Mr. Hekmati’s release in a prisoner exchange. J.A. 

94.

After returning to the United States, Mr. Hekmati 

sued the Iranian government in the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Columbia, alleging that his detention and 

treatment constituted hostage-taking and torture under 

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. J.A. 95. The district court entered a default judgment in Mr. Hekmati’s favor the following year and awarded him about $63.5 

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HEKMATI v. US 3

million. J.A. 96. Mr. Hekmati then applied for compensation from the Fund. J.A. 99. Established by the Justice for 

United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act 

(the “Act”), 34 U.S.C. § 20144, the Fund provides money to

citizens to whom a United States district court has

awarded monetary damages against a foreign state that 

was a designated state sponsor of terrorism. Id.

§ 20144(c)(2)(A)(i). On December 13, 2018, the special 

master of the Fund, Kenneth Feinberg, informed Mr. Hekmati that he had “reviewed and approved” Mr. Hekmati’s

claim. J.A. 53.

Months passed. Mr. Hekmati received no money. J.A. 

173. In October 2019, the Fund’s interim special master, 

Deborah Connor, sent Mr. Hekmati a letter stating that the 

Department of Justice intended to seek reconsideration of 

the Fund’s approval of his claim. J.A. 175. Mr. Hekmati 

promptly sued the United States in the Court of Federal 

Claims to secure payment of the money the special master 

had awarded him. J.A. 31, 47–48.

Nevertheless, on January 15, 2020, Mr. Feinberg—

whom the Department of Justice retained again to review 

Mr. Hekmati’s case, J.A. 175—sent Mr. Hekmati a letter 

stating that he had “determined that Mr. Hekmati [was] 

not eligible for compensation from the USVSST Fund,” J.A. 

177. Specifically, Mr. Feinberg concluded that “Mr. Hekmati’s application and accompanying documents contained 

material omissions and false statements,” contrary to Fund 

procedures. Id. Mr. Hekmati had claimed that “the primary purpose of his trip to Iran was to visit family for personal reasons.” Id. But Mr. Feinberg determined that the 

primary purpose of Mr. Hekmati’s trip was different—it 

was “to sell classified U.S. national security information to 

the government in Iran.” Id. 

Mr. Hekmati proceeded to request a hearing before Mr. 

Feinberg under 34 U.S.C. § 20144(b)(4). J.A. 198. After 

the hearing, Mr. Feinberg affirmed his reconsideration 

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4 HEKMATI v. US

decision. J.A. 197–98. He also specified some of the evidence that led him to conclude that Mr. Hekmati intended 

to sell classified national security information, including

an FBI forensic analysis of Mr. Hekmati’s “computer/search access logs” while working as a contractor in 

Afghanistan, his “evasive, false and inconsistent statements” in FBI interviews, and the assertions of “four different, independent and reliable sources” that Mr. 

Hekmati traveled to Iran primarily for reasons unrelated 

to visiting his family. J.A. 199.

Mr. Hekmati then filed an amended complaint with the 

Court of Federal Claims, asserting that the “‘reconsideration’ and subsequent recission of Mr. Hekmati’s final 

award determination violate the terms of the USVSST 

Act.” J.A. 81, 109. The Government moved to dismiss Mr. 

Hekmati’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Hekmati, 153 Fed. Cl. at 802; J.A. 1533. The court granted 

the motion, concluding that the Act, by providing its own 

“detailed remedial scheme” where claimants can request a 

hearing before the special master under § 20144(b)(4), prevented Mr. Hekmati from invoking Court of Federal 

Claims jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. 

Hekmati, 153 Fed. Cl. at 802, 810. Alternatively, the court 

reasoned that Mr. Hekmati’s claim required the court to 

review the special master’s reconsideration decision, which

the Act precluded. Id. at 812. And even if Mr. Hekmati’s 

claim were framed as a permissible challenge to the Fund’s 

administration, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the Tucker Act as to non-monetary relief without there being a related claim for damages over which it 

did have jurisdiction. Id. at 811, 813–14.

Mr. Hekmati appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court of Federal Claims provided several reasons 

for why it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. 

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HEKMATI v. US 5

Hekmati’s claim. Mr. Hekmati now contests each of those 

reasons. We address whether the Act precludes judicial review of Mr. Hekmati’s claim and conclude that it does. Accordingly, we end our analysis there.

We review a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Taylor v. United States, 959 F.3d 1081, 

1086 (Fed. Cir. 2020). There is a “‘strong presumption’ in 

favor of judicial review that we apply when we interpret 

statutes, including statutes that may limit or preclude review.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 273 

(2016) (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 

486 (2015)). This presumption “may be overcome by ‘clear 

and convincing’ indications, drawn from ‘specific language,’ 

‘specific legislative history,’ and ‘inferences of intent drawn 

from the statutory scheme as a whole,’ that Congress intended to bar review.” Id. (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1984)). 

The Act includes specific language that Congress intended to bar judicial review of certain claims. Namely, the 

Act provides that all “decisions made by the Special Master 

with regard to compensation from the Fund” are “final” and 

“not subject to . . . judicial review.”1 34 U.S.C. 

§ 20144(b)(3)(B). Therefore, we must determine whether 

Mr. Hekmati’s claim requires the Court of Federal Claims 

to review a “decision[] made by the Special Master with regard to compensation from the Fund.”

1 Section 20144(b)(3)(B)’s bar on “administrative or 

judicial review” is subject to an exception under 

§ 20144(b)(4), which provides that a “claimant whose claim 

is denied in whole or in part by the Special Master may 

request a hearing before the Special Master.” 34 U.S.C. 

§ 20144(b)(4). Mr. Hekmati requested and received such 

an administrative hearing, J.A. 197–99, and so this exception is not relevant to the issue of whether the Court of 

Federal Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction.

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6 HEKMATI v. US

We reject Mr. Hekmati’s arguments. Mr. Hekmati 

seeks review of the special master’s reconsideration decision. Mr. Hekmati argues that he does not seek review of 

the reconsideration decision because he is attempting 

“merely to enforce the USVSST Act.” Appellant’s Br. 24. 

Therefore, he argues that he is merely raising a “programmatic challenge[]” to the Fund’s administration. Appellant’s Br. 31–32. But Mr. Hekmati’s operative complaint 

alleges that the “‘reconsideration’ and subsequent recission 

of Mr. Hekmati’s final award determination violate the 

terms of the USVSST Act.” J.A. 109. This allegation is, of 

course, necessary; if the reconsideration decision denying 

Mr. Hekmati’s claim is valid, then there is no award to Mr. 

Hekmati for the Court of Federal Claims to enforce. For 

Mr. Hekmati to succeed, the court must review whether 

Mr. Feinberg’s reconsideration decision complies with the 

Act.

Mr. Feinberg’s reconsideration decision constitutes a 

“decision[] made by the Special Master with regard to compensation from the Fund.” 34 U.S.C. § 20144(b)(3). Mr. 

Hekmati argues that the special master lacked authority 

to issue a reconsideration decision in the first place, meaning that it is procedurally invalid. Appellant’s Br. 33. The 

Act does not expressly provide a procedure by which the 

special master can reconsider decisions. See 34 U.S.C. 

§ 20144. But courts “have uniformly concluded that administrative agencies possess inherent authority to reconsider their decisions, subject to certain limitations, 

regardless of whether they possess explicit statutory authority to do so.” Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United 

States, 529 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (collecting citations). For example, in Tokyo Kikai, we affirmed the Department of Commerce’s inherent authority to reopen and 

reconsider a yearly administrative review of an antidumping order. Id. at 1359–62. And in GTNX, Inc. v. INTTRA, 

Inc., we held that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board has 

the inherent authority to reconsider its decisions to 

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HEKMATI v. US 7

institute inter partes review. 789 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015).

Nevertheless, there are three limits on this authority

pertinent to this case.2 First, an agency cannot “exercise 

its inherent authority in a manner that is contrary to a 

statute.” Tokyo Kikai, 529 F.3d at 1361; see Bookman v. 

United States, 453 F.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (noting 

that courts “will sustain the reconsidered decision of an 

agency” “absent contrary legislative intent or other affirmative evidence”). Second, where a statute “expressly provide[s] for reconsideration of decisions, the agency is 

obligated to follow the procedures for reconsideration set 

forth in the statute.” Tokyo Kikai, 529 F.3d at 1361; Civ. 

Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 329 

(1961) (holding that if the agency wishes to reconsider its 

decision, “it must proceed in the manner authorized by 

statute”). And third, the agency must “give notice to the 

parties of its intent to reconsider, and such reconsideration 

must occur within a reasonable time.” Tokyo Kikai, 529 

F.3d at 1361.

2 Tokyo Kikai also provides that “an agency may not 

reconsider in a manner that would be arbitrary, capricious, 

or an abuse of discretion.” 529 F.3d at 1361. This exception 

is not applicable here. To determine whether Mr. Feinberg’s reconsideration was arbitrary, capricious, or an 

abuse of discretion, we would need to reach the merits of 

Mr. Feinberg’s reconsideration decision. We cannot engage 

in such an analysis of the merits, however, because we are 

considering whether the Court of Federal Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction, an issue that must be resolved before reaching the merits. See Martin v. Sec’y of Health & 

Hum. Servs., 62 F.3d 1403, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding 

that a court must first “establish that there is jurisdiction”

and “[o]nly then may it adjudicate the merits of the claim”).

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8 HEKMATI v. US

No limit applies here. No provision expressly bars the 

special master’s reconsideration decision. See 34 U.S.C. 

§ 20144. The Act does state that all “decisions made by the 

Special Master with regard to compensation from the 

Fund” are “final and . . . not subject to administrative or 

judicial review.” 34 U.S.C. § 20144(b)(3)(B). But we have 

held that an agency can reconsider a decision even if a statute provides that such a decision is “final.” Medtronic, Inc. 

v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1382, 

1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing GTNX, 789 F.3d at

1312–13). In Medtronic, we addressed 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), 

which provides that a decision to institute inter partes review “shall be final and nonappealable.” 839 F.3d at 1383. 

We held that the Board can reconsider institution decisions 

despite § 314(d) because the language of that provision “is 

not limited to an initial determination.” Medtronic, 839 

F.3d at 1386 (quoting GTNX, 789 F.3d at 1312). Similarly, 

34 U.S.C. § 20144(b)(3)(B) is not limited to an initial decision, and so it does not bar reconsideration.

Nor could Mr. Feinberg have run afoul of the second 

limit. The Act does not expressly provide a procedure for 

the special master to reconsider his decisions. See 34 

U.S.C. § 20144. Thus, the Act could not obligate Mr. Feinberg to proceed differently with his reconsideration. See

Tokyo Kikai, 529 F.3d at 1361 (holding similarly).

At oral argument, Mr. Hekmati focused on the third 

limit. See Oral Arg. at 04:35–13:02, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=21-

2086_02082022.mp3. He did not contend that he lacked 

notice of the reconsideration. Indeed, Ms. Connor informed 

Mr. Hekmati on October 24, 2019, that Mr. Feinberg would 

reconsider his earlier decision. J.A. 175. Rather, Mr. Hekmati argued that reconsideration did not occur within a 

reasonable time. See Oral Arg. at 04:35–13:02. We disagree.

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HEKMATI v. US 9

Our predecessor court noted that a “reasonable time 

period will vary with each case, but absent unusual circumstances, the time period would be measured in weeks, not 

years.” Gratehouse v. United States, 512 F.2d 1104, 1109 

(Ct. Cl. 1975); see Oral Arg. at 08:05–08:18 (Mr. Hekmati 

arguing that reconsideration is only reasonable if it occurs 

within weeks of the initial decision). But this case is one of 

those unusual circumstances because Mr. Feinberg “consider[ed] new evidence that [Fund] proceedings were 

tainted by fraud.”3 See Home Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United 

States, 633 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We have held 

that an “agency’s power to reconsider is even more fundamental when, as here, it is exercised to protect the integrity 

of its own proceedings from fraud.” Tokyo Kikai, 529 F.3d 

at 1361 (citing Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 

650 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1981)). This conclusion reflects the

Supreme Court’s holding that when a question of administrative reconsideration emerges, “two opposing policies immediately demand recognition: the desirability of finality, 

on the one hand, and the public interest in reaching [w]hat,

ultimately, appears to be the right result on the other.” 

Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 367 U.S. at 321. Fraud implicates 

the public interest in reaching the right result.

At oral argument, Mr. Hekmati argued that Tokyo 

Kikai shows that reconsideration must occur within a reasonable time even if there was a discovery of fraud. Oral 

Arg. at 06:56–07:36. Indeed, the Fund must issue its reconsideration decision “within a reasonable time after 

3 While we cannot determine whether Mr. Feinberg 

was correct in determining that Mr. Hekmati’s Fund application “contained material omissions and false statements,” J.A. 177, Mr. Feinberg exercised his authority to

reconsider his earlier decision “to protect the integrity of 

[the Fund’s] proceedings from fraud,” Tokyo Kikai, 529 

F.3d at 1361.

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10 HEKMATI v. US

learning of information indicating that the decision may 

have been tainted by fraud.” Tokyo Kikai, 529 F.3d at 

1361–62. But the timing of the Fund’s reconsideration 

here is analogous to that of the Department of Commerce

in Tokyo Kikai. In that case, we concluded that it was reasonable for Commerce to issue its reconsideration order in 

March 2006—ten months after May 2005, the latest time 

when Commerce could have learned of the relevant fraud. 

Id. at 1357, 1361–62. 

Here, the record does not show exactly when the Fund 

learned of the Department of Justice’s concerns that Mr. 

Hekmati provided false information in his application. Mr. 

Hekmati suggests that the Fund must have learned of the 

Department of Justice’s concerns in January 2019 because 

that is when the Fund distributed payments to all claimants besides Mr. Hekmati. Oral Arg. at 08:41–08:50; see 

also Appellant’s Br. 12 & n.36 (citing Kenneth R. Feinberg, 

Report Regarding Second Distribution 10 (Feb. 2019), 

http://www.usvsst.com/docs/Congressional_Report.pdf). 

But even if we accept Mr. Hekmati’s argument that the 

Fund learned of the relevant information in January 2019, 

the special master would have issued his reconsideration 

decision twelve months later in January 2020. J.A. 177. 

This time period is only a few months longer than Commerce took in Tokyo Kikai. And the Fund had additional 

hurdles to face: the Department of Justice and the Fund 

had to navigate how the Department of Justice’s evidence 

would be declassified so that the special master and Mr. 

Hekmati could review it. Oral Arg. at 18:00–18:30. Because of our decision in Tokyo Kikai and the unique challenges presented in this case in navigating classified 

evidence, we hold that the special master issued his reconsideration decision within a reasonable time. Thus, the reconsideration decision was a valid exercise of the Fund’s 

inherent authority to reconsider its decisions.

Because the special master’s reconsideration decision 

is a valid “decision[] made by the Special Master with 

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HEKMATI v. US 11

regard to compensation from the Fund,” § 20144(b)(3)(B) 

precludes judicial review of that decision.4 The Court of 

Federal Claims therefore does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Hekmati’s claim. Accordingly, we need 

not reach Mr. Hekmati’s other arguments.

* * *

We do not have the evidence that led Mr. Feinberg to 

conclude that Mr. Hekmati attempted to sell classified national security information to the Iranian government. Nor 

do we attempt to discern whether Mr. Feinberg correctly 

reached that determination. All we conclude is that the 

Court of Federal Claims cannot review the special master’s

decision because Congress did not give it jurisdiction to do 

so under 34 U.S.C. § 20144.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the 

Court of Federal Claims.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

4 We need not decide whether the Act precludes any

review of a decision of the special master to reconsider, regardless of the circumstances. All we hold is that the special master did not lack authority to reconsider in this case 

and that the Act precludes review of the merits of the special master’s reconsideration decision.

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