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O

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

CUNWEN ZHU and JUSTBY

INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 2:23-cv-4937 MEMF (AGRx)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 25]

Before the Court is the Motion for Default Judgment filed by Plaintiff Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission. ECF No. 25. For the reasons stated herein, the Court thereby GRANTS the 

Motion for Default Judgment.

/ / /

/ / /

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I. Background 

A. Factual Background1

Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) is an independent federal 

regulatory agency charged by Congress with the administration and enforcement of the Commodity 

Exchange Act and Regulations (“Act and Regulations”). Compl. ¶ 20. Defendant Justby 

International Auctions (“Justby”) is a corporation that purports to engage in the business of 

purchasing and selling art, antiques, and collectibles. Id. ¶ 21. Justby was established by Defendant 

Cunwen Zhu (“Zhu,” and collectively, “Defendants”) in April of 2021. Id. Zhu was Justby’s Chief 

Executive Officer and registered agent. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Defendants have never registered with the 

Commission in any capacity. Id. 

From approximately April 2021 through March 2022 (the “Relevant Period”), Zhu and 

Justby, while acting as a common enterprise with other known and unknown entities (the “Scheme 

Entities”), engaged in a scheme to defraud at least twenty-nine (29) U.S. customers (“Scheme 

Customers”) by misappropriating at least $1,352,843 in connection with the sale of leveraged, 

margined, or financed agreements, contracts or transactions in off-exchange retail foreign currency 

(“forex”) contracts and/or digital asset commodities, such as Bitcoin, to U.S. customers who were 

not eligible contract participants. Id. ¶ 1. 

The Scheme Entities solicited customers to invest in forex and/or digital asset commodities 

by providing them with false trading records and failing to disclose material information. Id. ¶ 3. 

Defendant Zhu, individually, and as the controlling person of Justby, accepted Scheme Customers’ 

funds into Justby’s bank accounts knowing, or recklessly disregarding, that these funds were 

intended to be used to engage in forex and/or digital asset commodity transactions on behalf of the 

Scheme Customers. Id. ¶ 2. Defendants misappropriated the $1,352,843 they received from the 

Scheme Customers by transferring the funds from Justby’s bank accounts to Zhu’s personal bank 

accounts. Id. Once in his bank account, a portion of the misappropriated funds were used by Zhu to 

pay for his personal expenses, while the majority of the funds were transferred again to other bank 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from the allegations in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). 

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accounts, digital asset commodity trading accounts and digital wallet addresses controlled by

Defendants and the Scheme Entities. Id. The Scheme Entities controlled third-party applications 

(“applications”) which gave the appearance that Scheme Customers were profitably trading forex 

and/or digital asset commodities on legitimate trading platforms. Id. ¶ 5. Unbeknownst to the 

Scheme Customers, these trading accounts were a complete ruse, and no actual trading took place on 

behalf of the Scheme Customers. Id.

The Scheme Customers ultimately lost nearly all of their trading funds. Id. ¶ 11. Defendants 

misappropriated all of the $1,340,000 sent to Justby by the Scheme Customers, and did not return 

any of the funds sent to them by the Scheme Customers. Id. ¶¶ 12, 79. 

B. Procedural History

On June 22, 2023, CFTC filed an action alleging violations of the Act and Regulations, 

specifically fraud in connection with forex and fraud by deceptive device or contrivance, and 

seeking injunctive and other equitable relief. ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”).

On July 21, 2023, CFTC filed proofs of service indicating that Defendants had been served

with the Summons and Complaint in this action on June 30, 2023. ECF Nos. 20, 21. On July 25, 

2023, CFTC requested default to be entered against Defendants. ECF No. 22. On July 28, 2023, the 

Clerk entered default against Defendants. ECF No. 23.

On August 25, 2023, CFTC filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment against 

Defendants. ECF No. 25 (“Motion”). On November 29, 2023, the Court ordered CFTC to provide 

notice to Defendants of the December 7, 2023, hearing date on the Motion, and file a proof of 

service indicating that such notice was given. ECF No. 32. On December 4, 2023, CFTC filed a 

proof of service indicating that Defendants were served notice of the Motion and hearing date. ECF 

No. 34. The Court called the matter for hearing on December 7, 2023. Neither Defendants nor 

anyone representing Defendants appeared at the hearing. The Court provided CFTC with a tentative 

order in advance of the hearing. At the hearing, CFTC informed the Court that it would submit on 

the tentative order. 

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Applicable Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes a district court to grant default judgment 

after the Clerk of the Court enters default under Rule 55(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Local Rule 55-1 

requires the party seeking default judgment to file a declaration establishing: (1) when and against 

what party the default was entered; (2) the pleading on which default was entered; (3) whether the 

defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is represented by a 

general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has appeared; (4) that the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was properly 

served with notice if required by Rule 55(b)(2). C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1. 

Once default has been entered, the factual allegations in the complaint, except those 

concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); 

TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). However, default 

judgment is not automatic upon the Clerk’s entry of default; rather, it is left to the sound discretion 

of the court. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 1980). When deciding whether to 

enter default judgment, courts consider seven factors, commonly known as the Eitel factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s 

substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at 

stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) 

whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy 

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

III. Discussion

CFTC requests that the Court grant its Motion for Default Judgment. Before doing so, the 

Court must consider whether CFTC has satisfied the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55 and Local Rule 55-1 and whether the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting 

default judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that CFTC has satisfied the 

procedural requirements and the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 

A. CFTC has Satisfied Procedural Requirements

As an initial matter, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 (codifying federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (providing that U.S. 

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district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States or by any 

agency expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress). The Court is satisfied that personal 

jurisdiction exists over Defendants and venue is proper—Zhu resides in California, Justby is a 

corporation registered with the state of California, and a number of the alleged violations by 

Defendants occurred in California. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10, 16, 17. 

Defendants were served on June 30, 2023. ECF Nos. 20, 21. Pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55, CFTC sought entry of default by the Clerk of the Court, which was entered on 

July 28, 2023. ECF Nos. 22, 23. In accordance with Local Rule 55-1, CFTC has represented that 

default has been entered against Defendants, they are not infants or incompetent persons, and the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply. ECF No. 25-2 (“Kenmotsu Decl.”) ¶¶ 10, 11. 

Therefore, the requisite procedural requirements for seeking default judgment have been met. 

B. The Eitel Factors Weigh in Favor of Granting Default Judgment

The Court next considers the Eitel factors and finds that they weigh in favor of granting 

default judgment. 

i. CFTC will suffer prejudice in the absence of default judgment. 

First, the Court considers whether CFTC will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not 

entered. Here, based on the facts established by the Complaint, the Court concludes that CFTC 

would suffer prejudice from being deprived of the opportunity to enforce its rules and obtain a 

judgment on the merits against defendants who have committed fraud in violation of the Act and 

Regulations. Specifically, CFTC has congressionally mandated interests in enforcing the Act and 

Regulations and deterring future wrongdoing through penalties, and if default judgment were denied 

here, it would be unable to act on its mandate. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting 

default judgment. 

ii. The Complaint sufficiently states meritorious claims. 

Next, the Court considers whether CFTC has stated valid claims for which it can seek relief. 

See Kloepping v. Fireman’s Fund, 1996 WL 75314 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1996) (“The Ninth Circuit 

has suggested that [the factors] involving the substantive merits of plaintiff’s claim and the 

sufficiency of the complaint – require that plaintiffs’ allegations ‘state a claim on which the 

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[plaintiff] may recover.’”) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)). 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2(c)(2)(C) provides CFTC with jurisdiction over the forex solicitations and transactions at issue in 

this action.

As discussed next, the Court finds that the Complaint demonstrates meritorious claims of (1) 

fraud in connection with forex, and (2) fraud by deceptive device or contrivance, in violation of the 

Act and Regulations, which weighs in favor of granting default judgment. The Court also finds that 

Defendants are jointly and severally liable with each other, as well as the Scheme Entities, for these 

violations. 

1. Fraud in Connection with Forex (Count One)

7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C), makes it unlawful: 

[F]or any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any 

contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery, [ . . . ] that is made, or to be 

made, for or on behalf of, or with, any other person other than on or subject to the 

rules of a designated contract market— (A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat 

or defraud the other person; (B) willfully to make or cause to be made to the other 

person any false report of statement . . . [or] (C) willfully to deceive or attempt to 

deceive the other person by any means whatsoever in regard to any order or contract 

or the disposition or execution of any order or contract, or in regard to any act of 

agency performed, with respect to any order or contract for or, in the case of 

paragraph (2), with the other person.

Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(iv) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b applies to the forex 

transactions, agreements, or contracts offered by Defendants “as if” they were contracts of sale of a 

commodity for future delivery. Specifically, 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i)(I)(aa) applies to “any 

agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency that is offered to, or entered into with, a 

person that is not an eligible contract participant.” Here, CFTC has alleged that “[m]ost of the 

Scheme Customers were not eligible contract participants pursuant to Section 1a(18)(A)(xi) of the 

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Commodity Exchange Act.” Compl. ¶ 4.2 The Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently establishes

fraud by Defendants through misrepresentation, as well as fraud through misappropriation.3

a. Fraud by Material Misrepresentations and Omissions 

“Under 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(a)(2), it is unlawful for a person to ‘cheat or defraud’ a customer 

through trades, or to willfully ‘deceive or attempt to deceive the other person.’” Chu v. CFTC, 823 

F.3d 1245, 1251 (9th Cir. 2016). Liability under this statute “contains an element of scienter which is 

more than ‘[m]ere negligence, mistake, or inadvertence.’” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has set forth

three elements to establish liability for fraud based on misrepresentations and omissions under 

Section 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C) of the Act and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1)-(3) (2022)—specifically,

CFTC must prove that: (1) a misrepresentation, false or misleading statement, or deceptive omission 

was made; (2) with scienter; and (3) the misrepresentation, false or misleading statement, or 

deceptive omission was material. CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 

2002); see also CFTC v. Capitol Equity FX LLC, 2017 WL 9565340, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2017).

Here, Defendants are alleged to have made intentional and material misrepresentations and 

omissions to Scheme Customers. Defendants, in concert with the Scheme Entities, provided false 

information to Scheme Customers in the form of false trading records and bank statements. Compl. 

¶¶ 6–8, 49–55. The trading applications used by the Scheme Entities provided false trade 

information to Scheme Customers, including false trade reports, account balances, profits and losses. 

Id. In addition, Justby’s bank account records were falsified and sent to at least one Scheme 

Customer. Id. 54–55. Moreover, Defendants failed to disclose material facts to the Scheme 

Customers, including that: (i) their funds would not be used for trading; (ii) their funds would be 

2 Section 1a(18)(A)(xi) provides that an “eligible contract participant” only includes individuals who have 

“amounts invested on a discretionary basis, the aggregate of which is in excess of—$10,000,000; or 

$5,000,000 and who enters into the agreement, contract, or transaction in order to manage the risk associated 

with an asset owned or liability incurred, or reasonably likely to be owned or incurred, by the individual.”

3 The language of 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1)-(3) (2022), mirrors that of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C), with the 

additional element that the conduct must involve the “use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of 

interstate commerce.” Here, as Defendants are alleged to have used means and instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce, including wire transfers, and electronic communications in connection with their conduct, the 

Court finds this additional element established. 

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misappropriated; and (iii) the applications used by the Trading Firms were completely fraudulent, no 

trading occurred and the posted returns were fake. Id. ¶ 8. These omissions are sufficiently material 

for purposes of Defendants’ liability as in this case, these representations would have caused the 

Scheme Customers to give money to Defendants. See R.J. Fitzgerald & Co, Inc., 310 F.3d at 1328–

29. (“A representation or omission is ‘material’ if a reasonable investor would consider it important 

in deciding whether to make an investment.”). 

Defendants also acted with the requisite scienter to violate 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C) of the 

Act and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1)-(3) (2022). Scienter requires proof that a defendant committed the 

alleged wrongful acts intentionally or with reckless disregard for his or her duties under the Act. See 

CFTC v. Noble Metals Int’l, 67 F.3d 766, 774 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that scienter is established 

when defendants act intentionally or with “careless disregard”); see also Lawrence v. CFTC, 759 

F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the Commission only needed to show that a defendant’s 

actions were “intentional as opposed to accidental”). The evidence here shows that Defendants acted 

knowingly or, at the very least with reckless disregard for the truth of the fraudulent conduct, by 

accepting Scheme Customer deposits that were intended for trading forex and/or digital asset 

commodities and then misappropriating said funds. Scienter is established here based on the 

Defendants knowingly or recklessly accepting $1,352,843 in Scheme Customer funds, some of 

which was flagged and designated for trading investments and then immediately transferring those 

funds to Zhu’s personal bank accounts. As the sole signatory on the Justby bank accounts, Zhu had 

personal knowledge of the origin of funds being accepted into the accounts and was responsible for 

the disposition of those funds.4 Defendants accepted Scheme Customer funds knowing they had no 

legitimate business relationship with the Scheme Customers and knowing that some of the funds 

were given to them for investment purposes. 

4 Zhu’s scienter can be imputed to Justby. Courts have imputed scienter to a corporation based on the actions 

of their agents who are acting in the scope of their employment or apparent authority. See In re ChinaCast 

Educ. Corp. Securities Litigation, 809 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2015) (in the context of securities fraud, 

holding that a CEO’s “scienter can be imputed to the corporation”); see also Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc.,

544 F.3d 1230, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Corporations, of course, have no state of mind of their own. Instead, 

the scienter of their agents must be imputed to them.”).

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b. Fraud by Misappropriation 

Courts have also held that the misappropriation of customer funds in connection with forex 

trading constitutes fraud in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A) and (C) of the Act and 17 C.F.R. § 

5.2(b)(1) and (3) (2022). See CFTC v. Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d 968, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding 

that “[s]oliciting or obtaining funds from investors for trading, then failing to trade the funds while 

using them for personal and business expenses, is misappropriation” and granting summary 

judgment to CFTC on claims that commodity pool operator’s misappropriation of customer funds 

violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b and 6o of the Act); CFTC v. Weinberg, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (C.D. 

Cal. 2003) (“Defendant’s misappropriation of funds entrusted to him for trading purposes is ‘willful 

and blatant fraudulent activity’ that clearly violates Section 4b(a) of the Act.”).

Here, in addition to fraudulently procuring the customer funds, Defendants are alleged to 

have misappropriated the funds in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A) and (C) of the Act and 17 

C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1) and (3) by failing to use the funds to trade and diverting the funds for their 

personal use and to digital wallets, digital asset trading platforms, and bank accounts controlled by 

the Scheme Entities. Compl. ¶ 2. Scienter is also established because Defendants had control over 

the bank accounts from which Scheme Customer funds were accepted and misappropriated. Driver, 

877 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (finding fraud with requisite scienter where defendant “had control over the 

bank accounts where [customer] funds were deposited and controlled the futures trading accounts”). 

This is sufficient to establish fraud by misappropriation, in addition to fraud by misrepresentation.

2. Fraud by Deceptive Device or Contrivance (Count Two)

7 U.S.C. § 9(1) of the Act makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to: 

[U]se or employ, or attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a 

contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on 

or subject to the rules of any registered entity, any manipulative or deceptive device 

or contrivance, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 

shall promulgate . . . . 

17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-(3) (2022), provides that: 

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any 

swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for 

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future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or 

recklessly: 

(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, scheme, 

or artifice to defraud; 

(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material fact 

or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made 

not untrue or misleading; 

(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which 

operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . .

While there does not appear to be binding precedent holding as such, the Court is satisfied 

that Bitcoin falls under the definition of a “commodity” under these statutes. As defined under 7 

U.S.C. § 1a, a commodity includes “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which contracts for 

future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” Although previously the Commodity 

Exchange Act applied mostly to agricultural commodities, the 1974 amendments expanded the 

definition of a commodity with the purpose of allowing “regulation of futures contracts and other 

transactions in a growing number of commodities such as coffee, sugar, and foreign currencies that 

were being traded” on unregulated exchanges. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 

1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds by S.E.C. v. Board of Trade of City of 

Chicago, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982); see also CFTC v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd., 99 F.3d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 

1996) (noting that Congress “broadened the reach of the CEA to cover additional commodities,” 

including foreign currencies that were not transacted on organized exchanges). Here, the Court finds 

no reason to treat Bitcoin, a virtual currency, differently than any other good that CFTC does have 

the power to regulate.

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5 Other courts have held that digital asset commodities such as Bitcoin are encompassed in the definition of a 

“commodity” under 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), and contracts for their sale are subject to the prohibitions of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1) of the Act, and 17 C.F.R. § 181(a)(1)-(3) (2022). See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 

(E.D.N.Y. 2018), recons. denied, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366, 367-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that “[v]irtual 

currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a commodity . . . They fall well-within the common definition of 

‘commodity’ as well as the [Act’s] definition of ‘commodities’ as ‘all other goods and articles . . . in which 

contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.’”); Carmel v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 2019 WL 

10186488, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2019) (noting that “Bitcoin itself is a commodity”).

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To state a claim for violation of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-(3) (2022),

CFTC needs to allege that Defendants: (1) engaged in prohibited conduct (i.e., employed a 

fraudulent scheme, made material misrepresentations or materially misleading omission, or 

misappropriated customer funds); (2) in connection with the sale of a commodity in interstate 

commerce; and (3) with scienter. See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, 332 F. Supp. 3d 641, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 

2018).

a. Defendants Engaged in a Prohibited Fraudulent Scheme

The same conduct that violates 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C) of the Act also violates 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-(3) (2022), and the same scienter analysis above regarding 7 

U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C) applies here as well. See CFTC v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1325 

(11th Cir. 2018). 

Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-(3) (2022) by conducting a 

scheme to defraud customers in connection with the sale of contracts for the trading of forex and/or 

digital asset commodities, including deceiving customers by, among other things: 

(i) misappropriating Scheme Customer funds; (ii) sending, or causing false trading records to be sent 

to Scheme Customers; (iii) sending or causing false bank records to be sent to a Scheme Customer; 

and (iv) omitting to provide material information to Scheme Customers. This type of conduct falls 

within the Act and Regulations and has been recognized as a violation subject to an enforcement 

action. See McDonnell, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (holding 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-

(3) (2022) were violated by misappropriating funds and fraudulent misrepresentations in connection 

with virtual currency transactions).

The “in connection” with requirement of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-(3) 

(2022) is satisfied where the contract of sale of a commodity in interstate commerce and the fraud 

are not independent events. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818–26 (2002) (finding, in the securities 

context, the “in connection with” requirement was satisfied where a broker sold customer securities 

for the purpose of transferring the proceeds to his own account); SEC v. DiBella, No. 3:04-CV-1342-

EBB, 2005 WL 3215899, at *6 (D. Conn. Nov. 29, 2005) (“A fraudulent scheme that coincides with 

the sale of securities satisfies the ‘in connection with’ requirement of section 10(b) [of the Exchange 

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Act] and Rule 10b-5.” (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825)). The “in connection with” requirement is 

construed broadly. See, e.g., SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also

Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices 

and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,405 (July 14, 2011) (“The 

Commission interprets the words ‘in connection with’ broadly, not technically or restrictively.”). 

In this case, the fraudulent conduct occurred, and the material misrepresentations and 

omissions were made, in connection with contracts of sale of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

Defendants obtained at least $1,352,843 from Scheme customers located in the U.S. for the purpose 

of entering into contracts for the trading of forex and/or digital asset commodities as evidenced by 

the Scheme Customers’ wire notations and “trading account” records. This is sufficient to 

demonstrate prohibited conduct in connection with the sale of a commodity in interstate commerce.

b. Defendants Acted with Scienter

The level of scienter required to plead a cause of action under 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) is 

reckless or intentional. CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1015 (N.D. Il. 2015) (citing 

76 Fed. Reg. at 41,404). This standard is satisfied if a defendant “intended to defraud, manipulate, or 

deceive, or if [d]efendant’s conduct represents an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary 

care.” R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d at 1328. It is also satisfied when a defendant’s conduct 

“involves highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that present a danger of misleading 

[customers] which is either known to the Defendant or so obvious that Defendant must have been 

aware of it.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Kraft, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1015 (scienter requires facts 

showing that conduct was reckless or intentional and is satisfied by a showing of “an extreme 

departure from the standards of ordinary care”).

The same evidence that supports scienter in the analysis regarding 7 U.S.C. Section 6b(a) of 

the Act applies here. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Defendants acted willfully or, at the 

very least, with reckless disregard for the truth. Defendants accepted customer funds knowing they 

were not trading forex and/or digital asset commodities for Scheme Customers, knowing they had no 

legitimate business relationship with Scheme Customers, and knowing they were misappropriating 

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funds they accepted from Scheme Customers. Accordingly, Defendants acted with the requisite 

scienter to support a violation of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1)-(3).

3. Defendants are Jointly and Severally Liable for the Violations

a. Common Enterprise

The Complaint alleges that Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the Scheme 

Entities’ alleged violations because the individuals and entities operated and functioned as a 

common enterprise. When entities and individuals operate as a common enterprise, each may be held 

liable for the unlawful acts and practices of other members of the enterprise. FTC v. Network 

Services Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (common enterprise may be 

“demonstrated by a showing of strongly interdependent economic interests or the pooling of assets 

and revenues”); FTC v. WV Universal Mgmt., LLC, 877 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2017) 

(recognizing that courts have justly imposed joint and several liability where a common enterprise 

exists); see also FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F 3d 611, 637 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming 

finding a common enterprise and imposition of joint and several liability where each of the corporate 

and individual defendants made up a “messy maze of interrelated business entities”).

There is no universal test for a common enterprise, but the inquiry is fact-specific, and courts 

often look at a number of factors to determine whether there was a common enterprise, including 

whether the companies operated under common control, whether they shared office space and/or 

officers, whether their business was transacted through interrelated companies, whether they 

commingled corporate funds or failed to maintain separation of the companies, whether they had 

unified advertising, and whether the evidence reveals that no real distinction existed between the 

corporate defendants. See Network Services Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d at n.6 (affirming district court 

finding that the defendants constituted a “single enterprise,” where there was shared ownership and 

management, phone numbers, employees, emails, and all were involved in the promotion and sale of 

the same thing); see also CFTC v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd., 117 F. Supp. 3d 29, 38–39 (D.D.C. 

2015) (setting forth the following common enterprise factors under Commodity Exchange Act cases: 

“(1) maintain officers and employees in common, (2) operate under common control, (3) share 

offices, (4) commingle funds, and (5) share advertising and marketing,” as well as whether 

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“corporate formalities are observed and whether the companies conduct business at arm's length”) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Defendants and the Scheme Entities are alleged to have acted as a single, integrated 

common enterprise—they shared common control, assets, customers, solicitations, funds, resources, 

had a unified marketing strategy, and business scheme. Compl. ¶¶ 67–70. Scheme Customer funds 

were commingled in Justby’s bank accounts, and even when Scheme Customers withdrew money, 

the funds came from other accounts under the control of the Scheme Enterprise. Id.

In addition, the transfer and flow of funds between the Defendants and the Scheme 

Enterprise indicates that they were part of a common enterprise. Defendants purchased digital asset 

commodities which were transferred to platforms controlled by the Scheme Entities, and Defendants 

also sent wire transfers to bank accounts controlled by the Scheme Entities. Compl. ¶ 78. Wire 

transfers from Scheme Customers into Justby’s bank accounts were reflected quickly in their 

fictitious trading accounts, which were controlled by the Scheme Entities. Id. ¶¶ 50, 53. The sharing 

common bank accounts, digital asset wallets, and digital asset commodity trading accounts indicates 

a common enterprise. Accordingly, the Court finds a common enterprise here that supports joint and 

several liability between Defendants and the Scheme Entities. 

b. Principal-Agent and Controlling Person Liability

Under 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), and 17 C.F.R. § 1.2, a principal is strictly liable for the 

violations of its officials, agents, or other persons acting for it within the scope of their employment 

or office. Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e have no doubt that 

section 2(a)(1) imposes strict liability on the principal . . . provided, of course, as the statute also 

states expressly, that the agent’s misconduct was within the scope or (equivalently but more 

precisely) in furtherance of the agency.”); see also Dohmen-Ramirez v. CFTC, 837 F.2d 847, 858 

(9th Cir. 1988) (finding “[i]t is not necessary to show control to establish agency under the CEA”). 

The fraudulent conduct of Zhu occurred within the scope of his employment with Justby. Therefore, 

Justby is liable for Zhu’s violations of the Act and Regulations pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), 

and 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2022). 

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Further, 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b) provides that any person who, directly or indirectly, controls any 

person who has violated the Act, or the Regulations promulgated thereunder, may be held liable for 

such violations to the same extent as the controlled person. To establish liability as a controlling 

person pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), plaintiff must show that the person possesses the requisite 

degree of control and either: (1) knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting the 

violation; or (2) failed to act in good faith. CFTC v. Equity Fin. Grp. LLC, 572 F.3d 150, 160-61 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (finding individual defendants liable as controlling persons for corporation’s failure to 

register as commodity pool operator). 

To establish the first element, a defendant must possess general control over the operation of 

the entity principally liable. See, e.g., R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1334 (recognizing an individual 

who “exercised the ultimate choice-making power within the firm regarding its business decisions” 

as a controlling person). Evidence that a defendant is the sole principal, stockholder, member of the 

board of directors or the authorized signatory on the company’s bank accounts indicates the power to 

control a company. CFTC must also show that a defendant possessed specific control, which is “the 

power or ability to control the specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation was 

predicated.” Monieson v. CFTC, 996 F.2d 852, 860 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The defendant does not need to participate in or benefit from the wrongdoing; the 

issue is whether the defendant has the power to address the illegal conduct. Id. 

In addition to control, CFTC must show the controlling person knowingly induced, directly 

or indirectly, the acts constituting the violation, or did not act in good faith. To show knowing 

inducement, the Commission must show that a defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of 

the core activities that constituted the violation of the Act or the Regulations, and allowed the 

activities to continue. R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1334. To show lack of good faith, CFTC must 

show that a defendant failed to maintain a “reasonably adequate system of internal supervision and 

control” or did not oversee the system “with any reasonable diligence.” Monieson, 996 F.2d at 860 

(quoting Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Here, Zhu is liable as a controlling person. Zhu was the sole owner, CEO and registered 

agent of Justby. Compl. ¶ 31. Zhu admitted to Division staff that he exercised sole control over 

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Justby, set up Justby’s bank accounts and was responsible for its employees. Id. ¶ 32. Zhu controlled 

Justby’s bank accounts and used the accounts to misappropriate Scheme Customer funds. Id. ¶ 78. 

Therefore, Zhu knowingly induced the violations because he had actual or constructive knowledge 

of the wrongdoing, and can be found liable for Justby’s violations. 

iii. The sum of money at stake is reasonable to the conduct alleged.

This factor considers “the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of the 

defendant’s conduct,” and weighs in favor of a default judgment. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Los Potros Dist. 

Ctr., LLC, No. CV-07-2425, 2008 WL 942283, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2008). Defendants’ fraudulent 

conduct constitute violations of the Act and Regulations. The relief sought by CFTC is reasonable—

both restitution and civil monetary penalties are authorized by the Act and Regulations. See 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13a-1(d); see also CFTC v. Saffron, 2023 WL 561316, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023) (affirming 

district court’s award of “restitution, disgorgement, and civil monetary penalties”). Moreover, the 

relief sought is consistent with prior default judgment awards in similar CFTC actions. See e.g., 

CFTC v. Am. Bullion Exch. ABEX Corp., No. SACV10–1876, 2014 WL 12603558, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 

Sept. 16, 2014) (entering default judgment for CFTC and ordering defendants to pay a civil 

monetary penalty exceeding $14 million); CFTC v. Safevest, LLC, No. SACV08–00474, 2009 WL 

2448116, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (after defendants’ default, Court ordered $18.4 million in 

disgorgement and $2 million in civil monetary penalties); cf. CFTC v. Schiera, No. CV05 2660 

CAS, 2006 WL 4586786, at *7, *9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2006) (entering default judgment and 

ordering defendants to disgorge $3 million and pay a $9 million civil monetary penalty). 

iv. There is little possibility of dispute concerning the material facts. 

Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except those 

relating to damages. See TeleVideo Systems, 826 F.2d at 917-18. Here, the Complaint alleges the 

facts necessary to establish its claims, and default has been entered against Defendants. Moreover, 

CFTC has submitted a sworn declaration from an investigator who has made findings in this case to 

support its claims. ECF No. 25-3 (“Vilenskiy Decl.”). As Defendants have not appeared nor asserted 

any defenses, there is no possibility of a dispute of material fact at this time. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that this factor weighs in factor of granting default judgment. 

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v. It is unlikely that Defendants acted with excusable neglect. 

The Court next considers whether the default resulted from excusable neglect. It appears that 

Defendants were properly served with the Summons and Complaint. ECF Nos. 20, 21. Moreover, 

Defendants were provided notice of the Motion as well as the hearing date and failed to appear. ECF 

No. 34.6 Accordingly, it appears unlikely that the default is a result of excusable neglect, and 

therefore this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 

vi. The policy favoring resolution on the merits is negligible. 

Although there is a preference to resolve cases on the merits, it is Defendants’ failure to 

respond to the Complaint that makes such a resolution impossible. Therefore, the Court finds that 

this factor negligible in making a finding on whether to grant default judgment. 

IV. Remedies & Damages

A. Permanent Injunction

7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) authorizes CFTC to seek injunctive relief against any person that has 

engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any 

provision of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) 

(2012), “[t]he CFTC is entitled to a permanent injunction upon a showing that a violation [of the Act 

or Regulations] has occurred and is likely to continue unless enjoined.” Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 

981 (citations omitted). As a result, “[o]nce a violation is demonstrated, the [CFTC] need show only 

that there is some reasonable likelihood of future violations.” CFTC v. Wilson, No. 11CV1561, 2011 

WL 6398933, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2011) (quoting CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 

1979)). 

The Court may infer a likelihood of future violations of the Act and Regulations from past 

unlawful conduct. See Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (“In drawing such an inference from past 

violations, ‘the Court should look at the totality of the circumstances, and factors suggesting that the 

infraction might not have been an isolated occurrence are always relevant.’”) (quoting Co Petro 

Mktg. Grp., Inc., 502 F. Supp. at 818). In deciding whether to issue a permanent injunction, the 

6 Defendants were also served notice of the initial hearing date of the Motion on November 9, 2023, in 

addition to the continued date of December 7, 2023. ECF No. 28. 

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Court may also consider “the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions, whether the violation was 

isolated or recurrent, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances 

against future violations, the defendant’s recognition of his conduct’s wrongfulness, and the 

likelihood that the defendant’s occupation will present opportunities for future violations.” Driver, 

877 F. Supp. 2d at 981-82. 

Here, the Court finds that given Defendants’ past conduct, and the egregiousness of the 

conduct, it is likely that they will be repeat violators of the Act and Regulations unless permanently 

enjoined by this Court. As alleged, Defendants fraudulently solicited and misappropriated at least 

$1,352,843 from twenty-nine (29) individuals during the Relevant Period. Compl. ¶ 78; Vilenskiy 

Decl. ¶ 7–8.7 Moreover, Defendants went to great lengths to conceal their fraud, including by 

converting scheme customer funds to less-traceable digital assets, such as stablecoins, and funneling 

funds through various banks and digital wallets. Id. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the 

allegations of the Complaint, and the evidence CFTC has submitted in this action establish that

Defendants have and there is a reasonable likelihood that Defendants will continue to violate the Act 

and Regulations unless permanently restrained and enjoined by this Court. The intentional and 

egregious nature of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct warrants permanent injunctive relief, including 

registration and trading bans. See Saffron, 2023 WL 561316, at *2 (affirming a district court’s 

permanent injunction banning a defendant from commodities trading). Accordingly, the Court will 

award injunctive relief. 

B. Restitution, Civil Monetary Penalty, and Post-Judgment Interest 

i. Restitution 

7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(3)(A) authorizes CFTC to seek, and the Court to impose, equitable 

remedies for violations of the Act, including “restitution to persons who have sustained losses 

proximately caused by such violation (in the amount of such losses).” Restitution exists to “restore 

the status quo” and reflects “the difference between what defendants obtained and the amount 

7 Vilenskiy has submitted that during the Relevant Period, he identified transactions from Scheme Customers, 

and specifically that $758,500 was deposited into Justby’s JP Morgan Chase Bank account, $230,100 was 

deposited into Justby’s Wells Fargo Bank account, and $364,243.38 was deposited into Justby’s Bank of 

America account. Vilenskiy Decl. ¶¶ 17, 21, 23. 

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customers received back . . . .” Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (entering default judgment and 

ordering restitution equal to the amount of money solicited minus the amount returned to customers). 

Defendants’ illegal conduct caused clients to incur net losses totaling $1,352,843, which 

reflects the total funds Defendants fraudulently misappropriated minus the funds they returned to 

Scheme Customers. See n.7, supra. Accordingly, the Court will order Defendants to pay restitution 

in the amount of $1,352,843, which reflects clients’ net losses plus post-judgment interest thereon. 

ii. Civil Monetary Penalty

Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1)(A) and 17 C.F.R. § 143.8(b)(1) (2022), CFTC is 

authorized to seek a civil monetary penalty (“CMP”) equal to the higher of triple a defendant’s 

monetary gain from each violation of the Act or Regulations, or $214,514 per violation.8 A court 

may “fashion a civil monetary penalty appropriate to the gravity of the offense and sufficient to act 

as a deterrent.” CFTC v. Trimble, No. 11-cv-02887-PAB-KMT, 2013 WL 317576, at *9 (D. Colo. 

Jan. 28, 2013) (citing Miller v. CFTC, 197 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999)). Here, the Court finds 

that a significant CMP is warranted as Defendants’ conduct was intentional and caused significant 

harm to the Scheme Customers. See Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (noting that “a high civil 

monetary penalty is warranted where customers have been defrauded of a substantial amount of 

money”). Specifically, the Court finds that a CMP of triple the gain to Defendants from the fraud to 

be reasonable under these circumstances. See id. at 981, 983 (ordering payment of $9.5 million 

restitution and a CMP of $31.8 million). The total monetary gain to Defendants was $1,352,843; 

triple the monetary gain to Defendants is $4,058,529. Accordingly, the Court will order a civil 

monetary penalty in the rounded amount of four million dollars ($4,000,000) (“CMP Obligation”). 

V. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion for Default Judgment and 

ORDERS as follows:

8

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Specifically for non-manipulation violations, it provides that the civil monetary penalty to be imposed by a 

federal district court in a civil injunctive action is $214,514 for violations after November 2, 2015. 17 C.F.R. 

§ 143.8(b)(1). 

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1. The Court finds that Defendants have violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C) and 17 C.F.R. 

§ 5.2(b)(1)-(3) (2022);

2. The Court finds that Defendants have violated 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and 17 C.F.R. §

180.1(a)(1)-(3) (2022);

3. Defendants and their agents, servants, employees, assigns, attorneys, holding companies, 

alter egos, and persons in active concert or participation with them, including any of their 

successors, are permanently restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from directly or 

indirectly:

a. engaging in conduct that violates 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(2)(A)-(C), 9(1), and 17 C.F.R. 

§§ 5.2(b)(1)-(3) and 180.1(a)(1)-(3) (2022); 

b. trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is defined in 

7 U.S.C. § la(40));

c. entering into any transaction involving “commodity interests” (as that term is 

defined in 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(yy)) for their own personal account or for any account 

in which they have a direct or indirect interest;

d. having any commodity interests traded on their behalf;

e. controlling or directing trading for or on behalf of any other person or entity, 

whether by power of attorney or otherwise, in any account involving commodity 

interests; 

f. soliciting, receiving, or accepting any funds from any person for the purpose of 

purchasing or selling any commodity interests;

g. applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the CFTC 

in any capacity, and engaging in any activity requiring registration or exemption 

from registration with the CFTC, except as provided for in 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) 

(2022);

h. acting as a principal (as that term is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (2022)), agent, 

or any other officer or employee of any person registered, exempted from 

registration, or required to be registered with the CFTC, except as provided for in 

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17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2022); and

i. engaging in any business activities related to commodity interests.

4. Defendants are ordered to pay, on a joint and several basis, restitution in the amount of 

$1,352,843, which reflects clients’ net losses plus post-judgment interest thereon (the 

“Restitution Obligation”). Post-judgment interest shall accrue beginning on the date of 

entry of this Order and shall be determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

a. The Court appoints the National Futures Association (“NFA”) as Monitor to 

distribute payments made against the Restitution Obligation to Defendants’ 

clients. The Monitor shall collect restitution payments from Defendants and make 

distributions as set forth below. Because the Monitor is acting as an officer of this 

Court in performing these services, NFA shall not be liable for any action or 

inaction arising from NFA’s appointment as Monitor, other than actions involving 

fraud.

b. Defendants shall make Restitution Obligation payments under this Order to the 

Monitor in the name “Cunwen Zhu Restitution Fund” and shall send such 

payments by electronic funds transfer, or by U.S. postal money order, certified 

check, bank cashier’s check, or bank money order, to the Office of 

Administration, National Futures Association, 300 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 

1800, Chicago, Illinois 60606, accompanied by a cover letter identifying 

Defendants and the name and docket number of this proceeding. Defendants shall 

simultaneously transmit copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the 

Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three 

Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.

c. The Monitor shall oversee the Restitution Obligation and shall have the discretion 

to determine the manner of distribution of such funds in an equitable fashion to 

Defendants’ clients identified by the CFTC, or may defer distribution until such 

time as the Monitor deems appropriate. In the event that the amount of Restitution 

Obligation payments to the Monitor are of a de minimis nature such that the 

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Monitor determines that the administrative cost of making a distribution to 

eligible clients is impractical, the Monitor may, in its discretion, treat such 

restitution payments as civil monetary penalty payments, which the Monitor shall 

forward to the CFTC pursuant to the instructions for civil monetary penalty 

payments set forth below.

d. Defendants shall cooperate with the Monitor as appropriate to provide such 

information as the Monitor deems necessary and appropriate to identify 

Defendants’ clients to whom the Monitor, in its sole discretion, may determine to 

include in any plan for distribution of any Restitution Obligation payments. 

Defendants shall execute any documents necessary to release funds that they hold 

in any repository, bank, investment, or other financial institution, wherever 

located, in order to make partial or total payment toward the Restitution 

Obligation.

e. The Monitor shall provide the CFTC at the beginning of each calendar year with a 

report detailing the disbursement of funds to Defendants’ clients during the 

previous year. The Monitor shall transmit this report accompanied by a cover 

letter identifying the name and docket number of this proceeding to the Chief 

Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette 

Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.

f. The amounts payable to each client shall not limit the ability of any client to 

prove that a greater amount is owed from Defendants or any other person or 

entity, and nothing herein shall be construed in any way to limit or abridge the 

rights of any client that exist under state or common law. 

g. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71, each Scheme Customer who 

suffered a loss is explicitly made an intended third-party beneficiary of this Order 

and may seek to enforce this Order to obtain satisfaction of any portion of the 

Restitution Obligation that has not been paid by Defendants, to ensure continued 

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compliance with any provision of this Order, and to hold Defendants in contempt 

for any violations of any provision of this Order. 

h. To the extent that any funds accrue to the U.S. Treasury for satisfaction of the 

Restitution Obligation, such funds shall be transferred to the Monitor for 

disbursement in accordance with the procedures set forth above. 

5. Defendants shall pay, jointly and severally, a civil monetary penalty in the rounded 

amount of four million dollars ($4,000,000) (“CMP Obligation”). If the CMP Obligation 

is not paid within 30 days of entry of this order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue 

on the full CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be 

determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

a. Defendants shall pay the CMP Obligation by electronic funds transfer, U.S. postal 

money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check, or bank money order. If 

payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the payment 

shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to 

the address below:

MMAC/ESC/AMK326

 Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

 Division of Enforcement 

 6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 

 Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

 (405) 954-6569 office 

 (405) 954-1620 fax 

 9-AMC-AR-CFTC@faa.gov

b. If payment by electronic funds transfer is chosen, Defendants shall contact Marie 

Thorne or her successor at the address above to receive payment instructions and 

shall fully comply with those instructions. Defendants shall accompany payment 

of the CMP Obligation with a cover letter identifying Defendants and the name 

and docket number of this proceeding. Defendants shall simultaneously transmit 

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copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.

6. Acceptance by the CFTC or the Monitor of any partial payment of the Restitution

Obligation or the CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a waiver of Defendants’

obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order, or a waiver of the CFTC’s 

right to seek to compel payment of any remaining balance;

7. The injunctive and equitable relief provisions of this Order shall be binding upon 

Defendants, upon any person under their authority or control, and upon any person who 

receives actual notice of this Order, by personal service, email, facsimile or otherwise 

insofar as he or she is acting in active concert or participation with Defendants;

8. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action to ensure compliance with this Order and 

for all other purposes related to this action, including any motion by Defendants to 

modify, or for relief from, the terms of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 7, 2023 ___________________________________

MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG

United States District Judge

Case 2:23-cv-04937-MEMF-AGR Document 36 Filed 12/07/23 Page 24 of 24 Page ID #:220