6470 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 14 / Monday, January 22, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

Substances Limitations

*******

Manganese Violet (manganese ammonium pyrophosphate; CAS Reg.

No. 10101–66–3).

For use at levels not to exceed 2 percent by weight of polymers. The

finished articles are to contact food only under conditions of use A

through H as described in table 2 of § 176.170(c) of this chapter.

*******

Dated: December 27, 2000.

Janice F. Oliver,

Deputy Director, Center for Food Safety and

Applied Nutrition.

[FR Doc. 01–1565 Filed 1–19–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4160–01–F

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR PART 16

[AAG/A Order No. 212–2001]

Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: The Department of Justice is

further exempting the United States

Marshals Service (USMS) Internal

Affairs System, JUSTICE/USM–002,

from subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) of the

Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

552a(j)(2), (k)(2) and (k)(5). This system

is currently exempt from subsections

(c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(2) and (3), (e)(4)(G)

and (H), (e)(8), (f) and (g) pursuant to

subsections (j)(2) and (k)(5). In addition

to records compiled during the course of

investigations of allegations of

misconduct or criminal violations by

USMS personnel, this system also

contains records compiled for law

enforcement investigations related to

actual or potential civil and regulatory

violations. The additional exemptions

are necessary to avoid interference with

such law enforcement investigations

and to protect the privacy of third party

individuals.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule will be

effective January 22, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mary E. Cahill on (202) 307–1823.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposed rule with invitation to

comment was published in the Federal

Register on November 8, 1999 (64 FR

60753). The public was given 30 days in

which to comment. No public

comments were received.

This order relates to individuals

rather than small business entities.

Nevertheless, pursuant to the

requirements of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601–612, it is

hereby stated that the order will not

have a ‘‘significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities.’’

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16

Administrative Practice and

Procedure, Courts, Freedom of

Information Act, Government in the

Sunshine Act, and Privacy.

Dated: January 8, 2001.

Stephen R. Colgate,

Assistant Attorney General for

Administration.

Pursuant to the authority vested in the

Attorney General by 5 U.S.C. 552a and

delegated to me by Attorney General

Order No. 793–78, 28 CFR Part 16 is

amended as follows:

1. The authority for Part 16 continues

to read as follows:

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g),

553; 18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510,

534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.

2. 28 CFR 16.101 is amended by

revising paragraphs (e), introductory

text, (e)(1), (f)(1), and (f)(3); by

redesignating paragraphs (f)(7), (f)(8)

and (f)(9) as paragraphs (f)(8), (f)(9) and

(f)(10) and adding new paragraph (f)(7)

as follows:

§ 16.101 Exemption of U.S. Marshals

Service (USMS) Systems—limited access,

as indicated.

* * * * *

(e) The following system of records is

exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4),

(d), (e)(1), (2) and (3), (e)(4)(G) and (H),

(e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g).

(1) Internal Affairs System (JUSTICE/

USM–002)—Limited access. These

exemptions apply only to the extent that

information in this system is subject to

exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

552a(j)(2), (k)(2) or (k)(5). Where

compliance would not interfere with or

adversely affect the law enforcement

process, the USMS may waive the

exemptions, either partially or totally.

(f) * * *

(1) From subsections (c)(3) and (d) to

the extent that release of the disclosure

accounting may impede or interfere

with civil or criminal law enforcement

efforts, reveal a source who furnished

information to the Government in

confidence, and/or result in an

unwarranted invasion of the personal

privacy of collateral record subjects or

other third party individuals.

* * * * *

(3) From subsection (e)(1) to the

extent that it is necessary to retain all

information in order not to impede,

compromise, or interfere with civil or

criminal law enforcement efforts, e.g.,

where the significance of the

information may not be readily

determined and/or where such

information may provide leads or

assistance to Federal and other law

agencies in discharging their law

enforcement responsibilities.

(4) * * *

(5) * * *

(6) * * *

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in

the collection of information for law

enforcement purposes it is impossible to

determine in advance what information

is accurate, relevant, timely and

complete. With the passage of time,

seemingly irrelevant or untimely

information may acquire new

significance and the accuracy of such

information can only be determined in

a court of law. The restrictions imposed

by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the

ability to collect information for law

enforcement purposes and interfere

with the preparation of a complete

investigative report or otherwise impede

effective law enforcement.

* * * * *

[FR Doc. 01–1737 Filed 1–19–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–04–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 25

[AG Order No. 2354–2001]; [FBI 105F]

RIN 1110–AA02

National Instant Criminal Background

Check System Regulation

AGENCY: Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The United States Department

of Justice (‘‘DOJ’’ or ‘‘the Department’’)

is publishing a final rule amending the

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 14 / Monday, January 22, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 6471

DOJ regulation implementing the

National Instant Criminal Background

Check System (‘‘NICS’’) pursuant to the

Brady Handgun Violence Prevention

Act (‘‘Brady Act’’): to establish a

reduced retention period of 90 days for

information relating to allowed firearm

transfers in the system transaction log of

background check transactions (‘‘NICS

Audit Log’’), to clarify that only the FBI

has direct access to the NICS Audit Log,

and to clarify that, in furtherance of the

purpose of auditing the use and

performance of the NICS, the FBI may

extract and provide information from

the NICS Audit Log to the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (‘‘ATF’’)

for use in ATF’s inspections of Federal

Firearms Licensee (‘‘FFL’’) records,

provided that ATF destroys the NICS

Audit Log information about allowed

firearm transfers within the applicable

retention period (unless discrepancies

are found) and maintains a written

record certifying the destruction.

EFFECTIVE DATE: March 5, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Fanny Haslebacher, Attorney-Advisor,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Module

A–3, 1000 Custer Hollow Road,

Clarksburg, West Virginia 26306–0147,

(304) 625–2000.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This

document finalizes the rule proposed in

the Federal Register on March 3, 1999,

(64 FR 10262). The FBI accepted

comments on the proposed rule from

interested parties until June 6, 1999, and

slightly over 150 comments were

received. With the exception of two

technical changes explained below, the

proposed rule is adopted as final.

Significant Comments or Changes

The Retention Period

Many of the comments asserted that

the FBI was violating the requirements

of the Brady Act by keeping information

about approved firearm transfers for any

period of time in the NICS Audit Log.

Commenters stated that, in their view,

the Brady Act requires immediate

destruction of identifying information

about individuals who have been

approved for the transfer of a firearm.

Commenters also asserted that the

retention of information about approved

firearm transfers in the NICS Audit Log

constituted a firearms registry in

violation of section 103(i) of the Brady

Act. Some commenters labeled the NICS

Audit Log a ‘‘back door’’ registration

system or a de facto registry and

expressed concern that such a ‘‘registry’’

could lead to future gun confiscations.

The Department of Justice received

and considered similar comments when

promulgating the final NICS regulation

that established the current retention

period of six months for information in

the NICS Audit Log about approved

firearm transfers. The discussion

accompanying the final rule provided

the following explanation of the

Department’s construction of the Brady

Act as it relates to the record destruction

requirement and the question of

whether the NICS Audit Log constitutes

a firearms registry:

The FBI will not establish a federal

firearms registry. The FBI is expressly barred

from doing so by section 103(i) of the Brady

Act. In order to meet her responsibility to

maintain the integrity of Department systems,

however, the Attorney General must establish

an adequate system of oversight and review.

Consequently, the FBI has proposed to retain

records of approved transactions in an audit

log for a limited period of time solely for the

purpose of satisfying the statutory

requirement of ensuring the privacy and

security of the NICS and the proper operation

of the system. Although the Brady Act

mandates the destruction of all personally

identified information in the NICS associated

with approved firearms transactions (other

than the identifying number and the date the

number was assigned), the statute does not

specify a period of time within which records

of approvals must be destroyed. The

Department attempted to balance various

interests involved and comply with both

statutory requirements by retaining such

records in the NICS Audit Log for a limited,

but sufficient, period of time to conduct

audits of the NICS.

63 FR 58304.

The United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

recently held that the Attorney General

reasonably interpreted the Brady Act to

permit the temporary retention of

certain information regarding NICS

background checks for purposes of

auditing the NICS. The court held that

the six-month retention period was

reasonable. National Rifle Ass’n of

America, Inc. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122

(D.C. Cir. 2000), rehearing denied (Oct.

26, 2000).

The temporarily retained information

on approved firearm transfers is used

only for purposes related to discovering

misuse or avoidance of the system or

ensuring the proper operation of the

system: e.g. (1) comparing system

records of a transaction with FFL

records of the same transaction in order

to detect cases where discrepancies in

personal identifying information or

missing records may reveal either (a)

unauthorized NICS checks or (b) the

submission of inaccurate information to

the NICS for the purpose of avoiding a

background check on the person to

whom the gun is transferred; (2)

reviewing system records in response to

allegations of system misuse; (3)

performing internal employee audits to

monitor employee performance and

adherence to established procedures; (4)

evaluating system performance,

identifying and resolving operational

problems, and generating statistical

reports; and (5) assisting in the

resolution of appeals of NICS denials.

Many of these system audits would not

be possible with just the NICS

Transaction Number and the date on

which it was issued.

A number of comments incorrectly

interpreted the proposed rule as

intending to allow the FBI and/or ATF

to regularly conduct continued scrutiny

or ‘‘audits’’ of persons who have been

approved for purchase of a firearm. It is

true that, if during the course of any

authorized system activity it is

determined that a purchaser who should

have been denied was given a proceed

or a purchaser who should have been

given a proceed was denied, the FBI

will attempt to remedy the error. In the

case of someone who was approved for

a transfer who should have been denied,

the NICS will notify the FFL of the

error. If the NICS is informed that the

firearm was transferred, the NICS will

notify ATF. However, other than in

conjunction with activities which are

linked to discovering misuse or

avoidance of the system or ensuring the

proper operation of the system, proceed

transactions are not subjected to

continued scrutiny.

Some comments doubted the ability

of the audits to prevent abuses or halt

illegal or falsified transfers of firearms.

The Department believes that

examination of FFL records in

conjunction with statistical reports (i.e.,

the number of approved and

disapproved transactions for a particular

time period) combined with information

in the NICS Audit Log about the

background checks may reveal misuse

of the system or improper record

keeping practices when, for instance, (1)

the FFL has requested more background

checks than indicated by the number of

ATF Firearm Transaction Record Form

4473s (‘‘4473s’’) on file, (2) the FFL has

requested fewer background checks than

the number of 4473s on file, or (3)

personal information recorded on the

4473s is significantly different from the

information provided in the NICS

background checks.

One comment suggested that the vast

majority of FFLs are honest and would

not abuse the system, and that if an FFL

were to intentionally submit false

information to the system, he or she

would not record different information

on the 4473 that would allow for the

discovery of the discrepancy. While this

scenario is possible, it is also possible,

for example, that the information

6472 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 14 / Monday, January 22, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

recorded on the 4473 may in fact be

different from the information provided

to the system, or that there may be fewer

4473s than NICS checks that have been

requested by the FFL. The latter

scenarios would reveal possible system

misuse. The Department believes that it

is essential to retain approval

information temporarily to allow for the

possibility of discovering such abuses.

At a minimum, allowing for the

possibility of audits should have a

deterrent effect on FFLs who might

otherwise consider abusing the system.

If approval information were destroyed

immediately, the NICS would have to

rely completely on the ‘‘honor system’’

without any means to determine

whether FFLs or FFL employees submit

accurate identifying information about

prospective purchasers to the NICS. If

approval information were destroyed

immediately, there would be no

safeguards against the submission of

false information to the NICS for the

purpose of avoiding Brady background

checks or doing unauthorized checks.

While most FFLs and their employees

are honest and conscientious, even one

instance of gun violence that results

from an unlawful firearm transfer

allowed by uncheckable and undeterred

system abuse can have a devastating

impact on the lives of individual

victims and communities. The Brady

Act’s purpose is to prevent gun violence

resulting from unlawful firearm

transfers. The temporary retention of

information about allowed firearm

transfers is meant to advance this

statutory purpose, as well as the

statutory obligation to protect the

privacy and security of the information

of the system.

A number of comments asked how the

privacy interests of individuals

approved for a firearm transfer have

been accounted for in the rule. Those

interests have been addressed in the

rule first by reducing the retention

period for information about allowed

transfers to the shortest practicable

period of time that will allow audits.

The numerous comments received

expressing concern about the privacy of

individuals purchasing guns is the

reason the original proposal of an 18-

month retention period was first

reduced to six months, and now has

been reduced to 90 days, even though a

longer retention period would increase

the FBI’s ability to detect and deter

misuse of the system. In fact, the 90-day

period has been adopted

notwithstanding comments from two

law enforcement representatives and the

FBI’s Criminal Justice Information

Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board

(an advisory committee made up of

representatives of various government

agencies involved in the criminal justice

process which provides advice to the

Director of the FBI on the management

of criminal justice information systems

operated by the FBI’s CJIS Division) that

recommended increasing the temporary

retention of approved transactions from

six months to one year.

The privacy interests of individuals

approved for a firearm transfer have also

been accounted for in the rule by the

limitation on direct access to

information about allowed transfers. As

stated in the amended § 25.9(b)(2) of the

regulation, the temporarily retained

‘‘[i]nformation in the NICS Audit Log

pertaining to allowed transfers may be

accessed directly only by the FBI for the

purpose of conducting audits of the use

and performance of the NICS.’’ Limiting

direct access to allowed transfers in the

NICS Audit log to the FBI ensures

controlled access to the information so

that it is used only for the authorized

purposes discussed above.

Individual privacy interests are also

protected through compliance by the

NICS with the Privacy Act of 1974. The

Privacy Act regulates the collection,

maintenance, use and dissemination of

personal information by federal

government agencies. A Privacy Act

notice has been published for the NICS

system (63 FR 65223) (November 25,

1998) which explains the system’s

purpose, routine uses, and policies and

practices for storing, retrieving,

accessing, retaining, and disposing of

records in the system. As stated in the

NICS Privacy Act notice, ‘‘The NICS

regulations are to be read together with

the NICS system notice.’’ (63 FR 65224.)

Thus, for example, Routine Use ‘‘C’’

provides for further coordination among

law enforcement agencies for the

purposes of investigating, prosecuting,

and/or enforcing violations of criminal

or civil law or regulation that may come

to light during NICS operations. This

portion of the routine use notice, read

together with the NICS regulations,

makes it clear that only the FBI has

direct access to allowed transactions in

the NICS Audit Log for purposes of

conducting audits of the use and

performance of the NICS, and that, if

any record is found during this activity

that indicates, either on its face or in

conjunction with other information, a

violation or potential violation of law,

that record may be disclosed to the

agency responsible for investigating the

matter. By limiting direct access to

information concerning allowed

transfers to the FBI, and by limiting

dissemination of information pursuant

to published routine uses, the

Department believes that it has struck

the appropriate balance between

protecting the personal privacy of

individuals in the system and ensuring

the proper and authorized operation of

the system.

Several comments expressed concern

that the information about allowed

firearm transfers in the NICS Audit Log

could fall into the hands of thieves who

could target the homes of gun owners.

The security measures used by the FBI

at its computer facilities exceed

industry standards to prevent either

unauthorized destruction or theft of

information. It is extremely unlikely

that FBI firearm transaction records

could be accessed or obtained by

unauthorized individuals or entities.

Finally, one comment observed that if

the NICS used technology that sent an

encrypted ‘‘digital signature’’ of the

information received by the system

about prospective firearm purchasers

back to the FFL, the goal of having such

information available to audit the

system could be achieved without any

retention of the identifying information

about approved purchasers by the FBI.

In such a case, the FBI could destroy the

information immediately and then

simply provide to ATF the ‘‘key’’ that

would unlock the encrypted

information retained by the FFLs for use

when ATF performed its FFL

inspections. The Department believes

that this approach is not currently

feasible since its implementation would

require an electronic interface with the

system on the part of all FFLs. Although

the FBI is working toward providing

electronic access to the NICS by FFLs,

such access has not yet been

established, and, even when available,

only FFLs with the appropriate

computer equipment will be able to take

advantage of the electronic link to NICS.

In addition, the Brady Act requires that

the system must, at a minimum, provide

FFLs with telephone access to the NICS.

It would not be easy or reliable to

transmit digital signature information to

FFLs over the telephone. Thus, while on

its face this approach to the record

retention and audit issues may have

some appeal, there are technical and

legal hurdles that do not make it feasible

to pursue such an approach at this time.

In addition, while such an approach

would make record retention by the FBI

unnecessary for FFL audits, it would not

eliminate the need for some temporary

retention of information about approved

transfers to accomplish internal audits

and to enable system troubleshooting.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 14 / Monday, January 22, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 6473

Providing NICS Audit Log Information

to ATF

Many of the comments dealt with the

proposed provision allowing the FBI to

share data with ATF for the purpose of

comparing background check data

received by the FBI with information

recorded on the corresponding Form

4473 on file with an FFL. The

commenters stated that the Brady Act

requires immediate destruction of such

records, thus making them unavailable

for sharing; they also stated that the

keeping and sharing of information

about allowed firearms transfers

constitutes a firearms registry. For the

reasons cited above, the Department

does not believe that the Brady Act

requires immediate destruction of these

records or that the temporary retention

of NICS transaction information for the

limited purpose of auditing use and

performance of the system constitutes a

firearms registry.

Several comments also stated that

section 103(i)(1) of the Brady Act

specifically prohibits transferring these

records to ATF. Section 103(i)(1)

provides that Federal officials may not

‘‘require that any record or portion

thereof generated by the system

established under [the Brady Act] be

recorded at or transferred to a facility

owned, managed, or controlled by the

United States or any State or political

subdivision thereof.’’ The Department

believes, however, that section 103(i),

which is entitled ‘‘Prohibition Relating

to Establishment of Registration Systems

With Respect to Firearms,’’ is intended

only to prevent the establishment of a

firearms registry and to prevent the

government from requiring third parties

outside the government from recording

information about firearm transactions

at a government facility. See National

Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d at 131.

Therefore, since neither the NICS Audit

Log itself nor the proposed provision of

information to ATF for use in its

inspections of FFLs (together with the

proviso that ATF destroy the

information about allowed transfers

within the 90-day retention period)

operates as or otherwise establishes a

firearms registry, the sharing of such

information with ATF does not violate

section 103(i)(1).

Finally, some comments expressed

the belief that the transfer of

information from the NICS Audit Log to

ATF also violates the Firearm Owners’

Protection Act (FOPA), as codified in 18

U.S.C. 926(a). Section 926(a) provides,

in relevant part, that regulations

implementing the Gun Control Act

promulgated by the Secretary of the

Treasury after enactment of FOPA may

not require that records that must be

maintained by an FFL be recorded at or

transferred to a government facility.

Since these regulations are promulgated

by the Department of Justice pursuant to

the Brady Act, and since the NICS Audit

Log information that will be provided to

ATF consists of NICS system records,

not records of an FFL, section 926(a)

does not apply to the regulation adopted

here.

Technical and Editorial Changes

When the Retention Period Begins To

Run

The Department did not adopt the

change we proposed in section

25.9(b)(1) of the NICS regulation to

provide that the retention period begins

to run on ‘‘the day after the NICS check

is received,’’ instead of the day the

‘‘transfer is allowed.’’ The intention of

this proposed change was to provide a

uniform date from which to begin the

retention period. It was noted by NICS

Operations Center staff, however, that

beginning the retention period on the

day after the NICS check was received

would complicate the processing of

appeals that result in the reversal of a

NICS denial in cases where the reversal

occurs more than 90 days after the

request for the NICS check was

received. Under the NICS appeals

process, the system gives the successful

appellant a form certifying to the FFL

that the system has changed the NICS

determination from ‘‘denied’’ to

‘‘allowed.’’ When presented with the

certificate, the FFL must contact the

system to confirm the ‘‘allowed’’

determination. The system would not be

able to provide such confirmation

unless the record of the ‘‘allowed’’

determination is retained for a

reasonable period after the transaction is

allowed. For this reason, the provision

in § 25.9(b)(1) of the regulation

providing that the retention period

begins running from the date the

transfer is allowed is being left

unchanged.

Syntactical Change

A syntactical change was made to

clarify the following sentence in the

proposed rule: ‘‘Information in the NICS

Audit Log pertaining to allowed

transfers may only be directly accessed

by the FBI for the purpose of conducting

audits of the use and performance of the

NICS.’’ In the final rule, the sentence

reads as follows: ‘‘Information in the

NICS Audit Log pertaining to allowed

transfers may be accessed directly only

by the FBI for the purpose of conducting

audits of the use and performance of the

NICS.’’ This change was made to better

convey the intended meaning of the

proposed language, i.e., that only the

FBI has direct access to the NICS Audit

Log.

Applicable Administrative Procedures

and Executive Orders

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

The Attorney General, in accordance

with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5

U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this final

regulation and by approving it certifies

that this regulation will not have a

significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

While many FFLs are small businesses,

they are not subject to any additional

burdens by the plan adopted to audit

their use of the NICS. In addition, the

rule will not have any impact on an

FFL’s ability to contact the NICS, nor

will it result in any delay in receiving

responses from the NICS.

Executive Order 12866

The Department of Justice has

completed its examination of this final

rule in light of Executive Order 12866,

section 1(b), Principles of Regulation.

The Department of Justice has

determined that this rule is a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866,

and thus it has been reviewed by the

Office of Management and Budget

(OMB).

Executive Order 13132

This final rule will not have a

substantial direct effect on the states, on

the relationship between the national

government and the states, or on the

distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that this rule does not

have sufficient federalism implications

to warrant the preparation of a

Federalism Assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

This final rule will not result in the

expenditure by state, local, and tribal

governments, in the aggregate, or by the

private sector, of $100,000,000 or more

in any one year, and it will not

significantly or uniquely affect small

governments. Therefore, no actions were

deemed necessary under the provisions

of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

of 1995.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act of 1996

This final rule is not a major rule as

defined by the Small Business

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of

1996. 5 U.S.C. 804. This rule will not

6474 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 14 / Monday, January 22, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

result in an annual effect on the

economy of $100,000,000 or more, a

major increase in costs or prices, or have

significant adverse effects on

competition, employment, investment,

productivity, innovation, or on the

ability of United States-based

companies to compete with foreignbased companies in domestic and

export markets.

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

The collection of information for

NICS previously was approved by OMB

and issued OMB control numbers 1110–

0026, 1512–0129, and 1512–0130.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 25

Administrative practice and

procedure, Business and industry,

Computer technology, Courts, Firearms,

Law enforcement officers, Penalties,

Privacy, Reporting and record keeping

requirements, Security measures,

Telecommunications.

Accordingly, part 25 of title 28 of the

Code of Federal Regulations is amended

as follows:

PART 25—DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

1. The authority citation for Part 25

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Pub. L. 103–159, 107 Stat. 1536.

Subpart A—The National Instant

Criminal Background Check System

§ 25.9 [Amended]

2. In § 25.9, paragraph (b) is revised to

read as follows:

* * * * *

(b) The FBI will maintain an

automated NICS Audit Log of all

incoming and outgoing transactions that

pass through the system.

(1) The NICS Audit Log will record

the following information: type of

transaction (inquiry or response), line

number, time, date of inquiry, header,

message key, ORI, and inquiry/response

data (including the name and other

identifying information about the

prospective transferee and the NTN). In

cases of allowed transfers, all

information in the NICS Audit Log

related to the person or the transfer,

other than the NTN assigned to the

transfer and the date the number was

assigned, will be destroyed after not

more than 90 days after the transfer is

allowed. NICS Audit Log records

relating to denials will be retained for

10 years, after which time they will be

transferred to a Federal Records Center

for storage. The NICS will not be used

to establish any system for the

registration of firearms, firearm owners,

or firearm transactions or dispositions,

except with respect to persons

prohibited from receiving a firearm by

18 U.S.C. 922 (g) or (n) or by state law.

(2) The NICS Audit Log will be used

to analyze system performance, assist

users in resolving operational problems,

support the appeals process, or support

audits of the use of the system. Searches

may be conducted on the Audit Log by

time frame, i.e., by day or month, or by

a particular state or agency. Information

in the NICS Audit Log pertaining to

allowed transfers may be accessed

directly only by the FBI for the purpose

of conducting audits of the use and

performance of the NICS. Permissible

uses include extracting and providing

information from the NICS Audit Log to

ATF in connection with ATF’s

inspections of FFL records, provided

that ATF destroys the information about

allowed transfers within the retention

period for such information set forth in

paragraph (b)(1) of this section and

maintains a written record certifying the

destruction. Such information, however,

may be retained as long as needed to

pursue cases of identified misuse of the

system. The NICS, including the NICS

Audit Log, may not be used by any

Department, agency, officer, or

employee of the United States to

establish any system for the registration

of firearms, firearm owners, or firearm

transactions or dispositions. The NICS

Audit Log will be monitored and

reviewed on a regular basis to detect any

possible misuse of the NICS data.

* * * * *

Dated: January 12, 2001.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc. 01–1616 Filed 1–19–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–06–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 117

[CGD07–01–002]

RIN 2115–AE47

Drawbridge Operation Regulations:

Hillsborough River

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Temporary final rule.

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is

temporarily changing the operation of

the Brorein and Platt Street Drawbridges

across the Hillsborough River in Tampa,

Florida. This temporary rule allows the

Brorein and Platt Street Drawbridges to

remain closed to navigation from 10

a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturday, January 27,

2001. This action is necessary to

facilitate the Ye Mystic Krewe of

Gasparilla Invasion and Parade.

DATES: This rule is effective from 10

a.m. to 6 p.m. on January 27, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Material received from the

public as well as documents indicated

in this preamble as being available in

the docket are part of docket [CGD07–

01–002] and are available for inspection

or copying at Commander (obr), Seventh

Coast Guard District, 909 S.E. 1st

Avenue, Miami, Florida, between 7:30

a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through

Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Barry Dragon, Seventh Coast Guard

District, Bridge Section, at (305) 415–

6743.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Regulatory Information

We did not publish a notice of

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for this

rule. Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast

Guard finds that good cause exists for

not publishing an NPRM. Publishing an

NPRM was impracticable because there

was not sufficient time remaining after

the bridge owner notified us of the need

for the bridge to remain closed for the

Gasparilla event.

For the same reason, under 5 U.S.C.

553(d)(3), the Coast Guard finds that

good cause exists for making this rule

effective less than 30 days after

publication in the Federal Register.

Background and Purpose

The Brorein and Platt Street

Drawbridges, miles 0.16 and 0.0

respectively, across the Hillsborough

River, have vertical clearances of 15.6

feet at mean high water and a horizontal

clearance of 80 feet between fenders.

The existing operating regulations in 33

CFR 117.291(a) require the bridge to

open on signal after two hours notice.

The City of Tampa Department of

Public Works requested that the Brorein

and Platt Street Drawbridge operations

be temporarily changed to allow the Ye

Mystic krewe of Gasparilla Invasion and

Parade. This temporary change to the

drawbridge operating regulations will

allow the drawbridge to remain closed

from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., Saturday,

January 27, 2001.

Regulatory Evaluation

This rule is not a ‘‘significant

regulatory action’’ under section 3(f) of

Executive Order 12866 and does not

require an assessment of potential costs

and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that

order. The Office of Management and