IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-41012

Summary Calendar

SILVERIO B. SALINAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for Structured Asset 

Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-WF1; 

BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, L.L.P.; WELLS FARGO 

BANK, N.A.; VICKI HAMMONDS; JUDGE DUNCAN NEBLETT, JR., 

Individually and in his Official Capacity as Judge in the Justice of the Peace 

Court, Precinct 4, Nueces County, Texas,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:13-CV-147

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Silverio B. Salinas appeals the dismissal without 

prejudice of his civil suit, which challenged the foreclosure of his home, for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. He contests the district court’s determination

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 1, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-41012

that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 and argues that 

his claims fall within three exceptions to the doctrine, namely, exceptions 

based on a void judgment, fraud, and a denial of due process.

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a district court from exercising 

subject matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to 

adjudicate if the federal plaintiff seeks to overturn a state judgment. Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). The doctrine 

“is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.” Id. at 284.

The record supports that Salinas initiated the instant federal 

proceedings to attack collaterally and to seek enjoinment of a preexisting state 

judgment in a forcible detainer suit and writ of possession rendered in favor of 

U.S. Bank National Association. Salinas’s arguments implicate the validity of 

the state foreclosure judgment, and he seeks legal determinations that would 

allow him to retain, or reclaim, possession of his home. Because Salinas’s 

present claims arise from the state court proceedings and are “inextricably 

intertwined” with the state court’s judgment–i.e., reversal of the state court’s 

judgment would be a necessary part of the relief requested by Salinas, and the 

source of his claims is the state judgment and writ of possession–the district 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review his claims under the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291; Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 

375 (5th Cir. 1995). 

1 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine refers to the doctrine derived from two Supreme Court 

cases, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. 

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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Moreover, Salinas’s contention that his case presents exceptions to the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is without merit. As to his first argument, under 

some circumstances, a federal court may review the state court record to 

determine if the judgment is void. See United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 

925 (5th Cir. 1994). A Texas judgment is only void if “the rendering court 

(1) lacked jurisdiction over the party or his property; (2) lacked jurisdiction 

over the subject matter of the suit; (3) lacked jurisdiction to enter the particular 

judgment rendered; or (4) lacked the capacity to act as a court.” Id. at 925 n.5. 

Salinas’s complaint, however, is devoid of any factual allegations that the 

Texas justice court did not have jurisdiction or the proper capacity to act. 

Salinas also relies on a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

However, “there is no such thing as a ‘fraud exception’” to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 384 n.6 (5th Cir. 

2013). Further, Salinas’s claims that the state court judgment was procured 

through fraud are not “independent” and instead are presented for purposes of 

contesting the parties’ rights to foreclose on his property and the implication 

of those rights for the validity of the state court action. See id. at 384 & n.3. 

Finally, Salinas’s attempt to place his claims within a due process exception 

fails, as there is no procedural due process exception to the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 350 

(5th Cir. 2003); see also Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 

1994).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The request of 

Defendant-Appellees Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P. and Vicki 

Hammonds that this court strike Salinas’s appellate brief is DENIED as moot.

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