COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Decker and O’Brien 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DANIEL THORNSBURY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2035-16-2 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN 

 AUGUST 15, 2017 

CHESTERFIELD-COLONIAL HEIGHTS 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Frederick G. Rockwell, III, Judge 

 Todd M. Ritter (Daniels, Williams, Tuck & Ritter, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Emily C. Russell, Assistant County Attorney; Lisa Way Piper, 

Guardian ad litem for the infant children (Jeffrey L. Mincks, County 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 Daniel Thornsbury (“appellant”), the father of two children, appeals the termination of his 

residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283. He asserts two assignments of error: 

1. The trial court committed reversible error by terminating the 

Appellant’s residual parental rights when clear and convincing 

evidence was not presented to prove it was in the best interests of 

the children to terminate Appellant’s residual parental rights.

2. The trial court committed reversible error by terminating 

Appellant’s residual parental rights when clear and convincing 

evidence was not presented to prove he had, without good cause,

been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time, not 

to exceed twelve (12) months from the date the children were 

placed in foster care, to substantially remedy the conditions which 

led to the children’s placement in foster care. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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BACKGROUND 

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing at trial, the 

Chesterfield-Colonial Heights Department of Social Services (“the Department”). Toms v. Hanover 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005). Appellant was the sole 

custodian of his two daughters, E.T., born August 4, 2004, and J.T., born May 4, 2006.1 Between 

April 2012 and October 2014, Richmond Child Protective Services (“RCPS”) received three 

complaints alleging that appellant had abused and neglected the children due to his alcohol and 

substance abuse. RCPS conducted a family assessment and implemented a safety plan; however, 

the agency closed the case when appellant and his children moved to Chesterfield County. 

 On October 2, 2015, the Department received a referral from Chesterfield County Child 

Protective Services (“CPS”) concerning appellant’s care of his daughters. The referral alleged that 

appellant, while intoxicated, grabbed J.T.’s shirt and spanked her after she tried to take his beer 

away. The caller also reported that the children did not have sufficient food or weather-appropriate 

clothing. On October 9, 2015, the Department received another CPS referral that appellant, who 

was again intoxicated, took the girls to a residence where he had them sleep on a “smelly, dirty 

couch” while he “smok[ed] something out of a glass pipe.” On October 12, 2015, RCPS received a 

report that appellant’s mother’s paramour, with whom she resided, had sexually abused E.T. and 

attempted to sexually assault J.T. 

 A Chesterfield County detective and a CPS family services specialist interviewed appellant 

at his home on October 21, 2015. They observed a hole in the roof where a tree had fallen, and also 

noted that appellant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Appellant acknowledged 

drinking a twelve-pack of beer on each of his two days off per week, and he admitted to smoking 

 1

 The children’s mother pled guilty to child endangerment in November 2011, and agreed 

not to have contact with children under the age of eighteen as a condition of her parole. 
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marijuana the night that the girls slept on the couch. He also said that he had used cocaine within 

the preceding two days. Appellant admitted that he brought his daughters back to his mother’s 

house despite the pending sexual assault investigation of her paramour because he did not have 

another babysitter for them. 

 Appellant agreed to enter into a safety plan with the Department requiring him to abstain 

from drugs and alcohol in the presence of his children, vacate the residence, and leave the children 

in the physical custody of his roommate. Appellant subsequently failed to bring his daughters to a 

forensic interview concerning the sexual assault complaint, and the Department was unable to 

contact him. As a result of concerns about the girls’ safety, the Department assumed emergency 

custody of E.T. and J.T. on October 23, 2015. 

 On December 18, 2015, the Chesterfield Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court 

(“JDR court”) approved an initial foster care plan with the goal of returning the children to their 

father. The primary focus of the plan was for appellant to cease his use of alcohol and illicit 

substances. The JDR court included a provision that “[appellant] shall not consume any alcohol or 

illegal substance during the pendency of this plan.” The Department agreed to assist appellant in 

obtaining substance abuse treatment. Additionally, appellant was required to comply with other 

conditions such as maintaining employment and not allowing his mother’s paramour to have any 

contact with the children. 

 Although appellant initially complied with some of the plan’s conditions by maintaining 

employment and completing a psychological evaluation, he failed to abstain from drugs and 

alcohol. During his psychological interview, he stated that he did not believe his children had been 

affected by his drug and alcohol use. He also indicated in the interview that he believed his 

daughter fabricated the sexual abuse allegations against his mother’s paramour.2

 In March 2016, 

 2

 RCPS later determined that the complaint was “founded.” 
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appellant completed the intake form for a substance abuse treatment program but did not return for 

further services. He tested positive for cocaine or marijuana approximately ten times between 

December 2015 and July 2016. He refused or missed approximately fifteen screens between March 

and August 2016. During the pendency of the foster care plan, appellant returned fewer than five 

clean screens. 

 In September 2016, the Department changed the goal of the foster care plan to adoption and 

filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights. The Department asserted that due to 

appellant’s continuing substance abuse issues, it was not in the children’s best interests to return to 

his care. Following a hearing, the JDR court approved the foster care plan and terminated 

appellant’s parental rights. 

 Appellant appealed, and the circuit court conducted a de novo hearing on November 10, 

2016. At that hearing, the Department’s social worker testified that visits between appellant and the 

children “went well overall and that [appellant] was receptive to parenting instruction.” However, 

the social worker also stated that appellant failed most of his drug tests, and his lack of 

transportation made it difficult for him to receive substance abuse treatments, despite the 

Department’s offer to transport him to all counseling and therapy sessions. Additionally, appellant 

missed a team decision-making meeting and a permanency planning hearing. 

 Appellant testified that he attended four substance abuse classes but stopped because the 

classes conflicted with his work schedule. He told the court that he was unable to enroll in another 

drug treatment program because he did not bring the proper documentation. He also acknowledged 

that he had returned positive screens for narcotics; however, he asserted that he was currently not 

using drugs. At that point, the court directed appellant to submit to a urine screen. The results were 

inconclusive. 
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 Appellant described his living situation. He was residing in a studio apartment located 

above his place of employment. He advised that he built a partition in the apartment to create a 

separate bedroom for his daughters. Because appellant works until two a.m., he planned to ask his 

sister to bring his sixteen-year-old niece to babysit his daughters while he was working. He did not 

contest that while the children have been in foster care, J.T. has continued to do well in school and 

E.T.’s grades have improved. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant requested that the court grant him three more 

months to comply with the foster care plan. He argued that his mother’s death in August 2016, ten 

months after his daughters were placed in foster care, was an “extraordinary circumstance” that 

warranted granting him additional time. The court denied appellant’s request and entered final 

orders terminating his parental rights with respect to each child. 

ANALYSIS 

 When reviewing the termination of residual parental rights, this Court presumes the trial 

court “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child’s best interests.” Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 

Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 

S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). The court has “broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to 

guard and to foster a child’s best interests,” and its decision will not be reversed “unless plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it.” Farley, 9 Va. App. at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795. 

A. Assignment of Error One 

 Appellant contends that the Department failed to prove that terminating his parental rights 

was in his daughters’ best interests. Code § 16.1-283(C) provides: 

The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child placed in 

foster care as a result of court commitment . . . may be terminated if 
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the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is 

in the best interests of the child. 

A court must consider several factors when determining a child’s best interests, such as 

the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; 

the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the 

relationship existing between each parent and each child; the needs 

of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and 

will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or 

children; and such other factors as are necessary. 

Harrison v. Tazewell Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 161, 590 S.E.2d 575, 581-82 

(2004) (quoting Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986)). 

 Here, appellant’s substance abuse issues prevented him from effectively parenting his 

children. The initial RCPS referral resulted from complaints concerning appellant’s behavior 

around his daughters while he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Despite express 

prohibitions in the foster care plan, appellant continued to consume alcohol and illegal substances. 

He did not complete drug treatment and regularly tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. 

 Further, appellant did not cooperate with the investigation into the alleged sexual abuse of 

the children. Because he believed that the allegations were false, appellant allowed contact between 

the children and the alleged perpetrator until the Department told appellant not to bring the children 

to his mother’s home again. He also ignored the RCPS request to interview the children. 

 Appellant conceded that both girls were doing well in their foster care placement. They 

were well-adjusted and on-track academically. Considering all the evidence, the court did not err by 

finding that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of appellant’s parental rights 

was in the best interests of the children. 

B. Assignment of Error Two 

 Appellant contends the court erred by finding that he was unable to remedy the conditions 

that led to his daughters’ foster care placement and that termination was appropriate under Code 
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§ 16.1-283(C)(2). He argues that he corrected some of the conditions, and therefore he should have 

been afforded more time to comply with the foster care plan before his rights were terminated. 

 Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides for termination of parental rights if 

[t]he parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or 

unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months 

from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of 

the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof that the parent or parents, 

without good cause, have failed or been unable to make substantial 

progress towards elimination of the conditions which led to or 

required continuation of the child’s foster care placement in 

accordance with their obligations under and within the time limits or 

goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court . . . shall 

constitute prima facie evidence of this condition. 

 Appellant acknowledges that he failed to comply with the alcohol and substance abuse 

components of the foster care plan. However, he argues that the court should have granted him 

additional time to address these issues because his mother’s death was an “extraordinary 

circumstance” that prevented him from abstaining from drugs and alcohol and completing substance 

abuse treatment. He asserts that if he were given “another three months,” he would have been able 

to remedy these conditions which required his daughters’ placement into foster care. 

 We have held that “past actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good 

indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 

390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 

(1987)). Nothing in the record supports appellant’s contention that he could successfully remedy 

his alcohol and drug addiction in three months. The children entered foster care in October 2015. 

When his mother died on August 20, 2016, appellant had already failed approximately ten drug tests 

and refused as many as fifteen others. Additionally, despite the Department’s offer of assistance 

with transportation, he failed to continue attending drug treatment. 
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 “It is clearly not in the best interests of [the children] to spend a lengthy period of time 

waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” 

Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). 

At the time the court entered the order terminating appellant’s residual parental rights, the children 

had been in foster care for thirteen months. Although appellant had maintained gainful employment 

and found stable housing, his substance abuse, which remained unabated, significantly limited his 

ability to care for his daughters. We find no error in the court’s determination that appellant had not 

substantially remedied the conditions that brought his daughters into foster care, and accordingly, 

the court properly terminated appellant’s residual parental rights. 

Affirmed.