### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary 8, 200 8 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. C HARLOTTE YV ONN E TU RN ER

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Obi on Coun ty No. C07-192 William B. Acre e, Jr., Judge

No. W2007-01590-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 29, 2008

The State of Tenne ssee appea ls the decision of the Obion County Circuit Court suppressing e vidence obtained as a

result o f a p o l i ce searc h of the re sidence of the Appe llee, Charlotte Yvonne Turner

. Turner , a par olee, wa s convicted of drugrelated o ff

en s es i n Kentucky , with her pa role be ing
su bs e qu e ntl y

tr ans fe rr e d to Te nn e sse e . T ur ne r’ s ve hic le wa s st op pe d b y Un ion City po lic e of fi c e rs , who wer e familiar with her status as a parole e. After the stop, Turner

and the ve hicle we re se arc hed fo r d ru g s b a se d u

po n one of

fi c e r’ s susp ic ion that she wa s invo lve d in dr uga c tiv ity . A ft e r a

fr uit le ss sear ch for contra band of both he r per son and vehic le, the off icer demande d th at T u rn er all ow a sear ch of he r home, pursua nt to a condition of her parole . No drug s were found duringthe sea rch of he r re sid e nc e ; how e ve r, Turn e r dir e c te d off ic e rs to a hand g un , whi c h wa s loc a te d in a be dr oo m. The we apon wa s seized, and Turne r wa s subsequently indicted for unlawful possession of a w eapon by a convic ted fe lon. Turner filed a motion to suppress the evidenc e, which the trial court g rante d. On appe al, the State ar g ues that the sear ch of the residenc e was lawful under the rec ent holding of the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court decision of Sa ms on v . Ca lif or nia , 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct . 2193 (2 00 6) . A ft e r r e vie w, we c on c lud e that th e po lic e se arc h of Tu rner ’s r e sid e nc e wa s unr e a so na ble and af firm the rulingof the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E. Willis , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Thomas A. Thomas, District Attorney Gene ral; and James T. Cannon, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellant, State of

Tenne ssee.
J ames T. Powell, Union City , Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee, Charlotte Yvonne Turner

.

OP IN ION

F actual Background & P roce dural Hi storySuch par ol e t r ans f er s ar e g over ned by t he I nt er s t at e Co mp act f or Su perv i s i on of

Ad ul t O f

f ender s , wh i ch i s s et 1 f or t h a t T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 28- 401 a n d - 402.
-2- On J une 4, 2007, an O bion County g rand jury returne d an indictment cha rg ing the Appellee with unlawful possession of a wea pon by a per son who has bee n convicted of a fe lony drugoffe nse, pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-17-1307(b)( 1) (2006) . The A ppellee f iled a motion to s uppress the e vidence , and a he aringwas he ld on the motion on J une 22, 2007. The following sequence of events was established at t he suppression hear ing. Offic er Shawn Pa lme r, a Un ion City po lic e of fi c e r a ssi g ned to the 27 th Jud ic ia l D ru g Ta sk F or c e , te sti fi e d th a t, ba se d upo n his pos iti on in law e nf or c e me nt, he wa s f

amil iar w iththe Ap pe lle e ’s c ri min a l hi sto ry in Ob ion Cou nty . H e wa s f

ur the r a wa re that the Ap pe lle e wa s o n p aro le in K e ntu c ky fo r a dr ugof fe ns e and that her

parole had been transfe rre d to a parole office r in T ennesse e. Offic er Palmer testified 1 that, sometime prior to April 3rd, he had re ceive d information from an unidentified informant that the Appellee was sellingcra ck coc aine. He rec alled that he briefly discussed the Appe llee’s status wi th h e r p aro le of

fi c e r whil e inv e sti g a tin g thi s in fo rm a tio n. A c op y of the Appel lee ’s pa

ro le
cer tificate f rom Kentuc ky

was admitt ed as an ex hibit at t he hearing

. Also admitted was a doc ument containingthe rules a

nd conditions of her parole in Tennesse e, which w as sig ned by the Appellee

. Rule 8 of the par ole document states t hat t he Appellee “ag ree [s] to a sea rch, w ithout a warr ant, of my person, ve hicle, prope rty , or p l ac e o f residence by any Probation/Parole Off

icer or law enfor ceme nt, at any

time.” On April 3, 2007, Offic er Palmer saw the A

ppellee dr iving he r vehic le in Union City . He testified that he stopped the Appellee ’s vehicle for a s ea t b elt violation; however, he admitted that the se a tbe lt v iol a tio n w a s, “ wi tho ut a do ub t,” a pr e te xt a

nd that he a c tua lly int e nd e d to inv e sti g a te the alleg ed tip reg ardingposs i b l e d ru g possession and ac tivity . At the sce ne of the vehicle stop, Offic er Palmer

conta cted the Appellee’ s parole of fice r ag ain to verify

her r ules of par ole. He testified that he c onducted a sear ch of the Appellee, and he f ound $975 in her poc ket, which he seized. Howeve r, Officer Palmer did not find any controlled substanc es in the Appe llee’s c ar or on her pe rson.
Offic er Palmer

testified that he infor

med the Appellee that the offic ers wa nted to sear ch her house, but she initially

ref used conse nt. He re sponded to her r efusa l, “[ f] i n e, we ’ll just call y our parole office r [and] tell her that y ou’re not c ooperating.” After the Appellee called he r par ole offic er, she ag ree d to meet t he officer s at her house. Approximately twenty minutes later, the Appe llee met the offic ers at her re sidence and admitted that ther e wa s a gun inside the house. Af ter the A ppellee unlocked he r door, the pol ice officer s sear ched the house and rec overe d a loaded .38 caliber revolve r on a bed a nd a round of ammunition in a dresser dr awe r. No drug s or drugpara pherna lia wer e found inside the reside nce. T he Appe llee wa s subsequently arr ested for

unlawful possession of a

handgun by a convicted felon. Offic er Palmer testified that, from the initial traffic stop to the conclusion of the home sea

rch, the time elapsed w as appr ox imately one hour.I n S ta te v . D a v is , t hi s cour t r evi ewed a condi t i on of probat i on i dent i cal t o t he parol e c ondi t i on pre s ent l y at 2 i ss ue i n t hi s case. W e co ncl ud ed i n D a vis tha t it w a s “u n n e c e ssa ry to a d d re ss th e b ro a d e r issu e o f t h e c o n stitutio n a lit y o f the w a rr a n tless s earch co nd i t i o n of p rob at i o n” b ecause t he search was perm i t t ed ba sed o n t he f act s t hat : “ (1) t he
war r ant l es s s ear ch provi s i on was r eas onabl y r el at ed as a c ondi t i on of t he [ a] pp el l ant ’ s probat i on; an d (2) t he at t emp t ed
wa r r an t l ess s ea r ch of

t h e [ a] ppel l an t ’ s r es i den ce w as s u ppor t ed by r ea s on abl e s u s pi ci on

. ” 191 S. W

. 3d 118, 121- 22 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. 2006)

.

-3- The Appe llee testified that whe n Offic er Palmer stopped her vehicle, he instructed he r to g et out of the ca

r, and he beg an searching her. She stated t hat Off icer Palmer did not ask for he r driver ’s license or vehicle r eg istration, and he sa id nothing re g ardinga seatbelt violation. After Of fice r Palmer searche d her ve hicle, the Appe llee re called that he instructed he r to drive to her house and apprised he r that he intende d to searc h the house. She testified th at Off icer Palmer told her “ if I did n’ t go to my ho us e he wa s g onna [sic ] ca ll my

[paro le of

fi c e r] o r h e wa s g onna

[sic ] take me to ja il a ny wa y .” Th e Ap pe lle e c a lle d h e r p aro le of fi c e r, wh o r e a d her Rule 8, re g ard ingwa rr antl e ss sear ches by

law enf orce ment, and she me t the office rs at her house, which th ey

sear ched. T he Appellee testified that the tim e el ap s ed betwee n the initial traffic stop and her a rre st was approximately

two hours.

At the c on c lus ion of the he ari ng , the tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d th e Ap pe lle e ’s mot ion to s up pr e ss. Although the court found that the initial st op and sear ch of the Appellee was rea sonable, it found that the offic ers’ req u i re m ent of the Appellee “ to go to a nother location with no basis whatsoever a nd detain her for one to two hours . . . constitute[d] an har assing , capr icious and ar bitrary sear ch[,] ” that the se arc h o f t

he Ap pe llee’s ho me was not su pp or te d b y re a so na ble su sp ic ion , a

nd that it wa s in vio latio n o f t

he F ourt h A me ndme nt. Th e State a pp e a ls t his ru lin g of

the tr ia l c ourt

. Ana lys is
Th e State argue s o n a

pp e a l th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in grant ing the Ap pe lle e ’s mot ion to suppress, relying on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Samson , 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct . 2193. The State c ontends that in Samson , the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court was “c ry stal clea r in its ruling that a police office r i s not prohibited from conducting a s uspicionless sear ch of a parole e who is subject to conditions of parole permitting suc h sear ches.” 2

Our standa

rd of r eview f

or a tria l court’s finding s of fact and c onclusions of law on a motion to suppress evidenc e wa s set forth in State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18 (Tenn. 1996)

. Under this standard, “a

trial court’s findings of fac t in a suppression hear ing w ill be upheld unless the evide nce pr eponder ates other wise.” [ Odom , 928 S.W .2d] at 23. As is c us tom ary , “ the pr e va ili ng pa rt y in the tr ia l c ourt is a ff or de d the ‘s tr on ge st leg itimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .’” S ta te v. Carter , 16 S.W .3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000) (q u o t i n g Sta tev . Ke ith , 978 S.W .2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998) ).-4-

State v. Cox , 171 S.W .3d 174, 178-79 (Te nn. 2005). Ne verthe less, we r eview de novo th e t ri al
c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f the law to the fa c ts, wi tho ut a c c or din g any pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss to t

ho se conclusions. Id. at1 7 9 (c i t i n g State v. W alton , 4 1 S. W.3 d 7 5, 81 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Crutcher , 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999) ).
The F ourth Amendment to the United St at es Constit ution gua rante es that “the rig ht of the people to be se cure . . . ag ainst unrea sonab l e s ea rc hes and se izures, shall not be violated and no
war rants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” Ar ticle I , section 7 o f t he Te nnessee Con sti tut ion

pr ov ide s: [t]hat th e pe op le sh a ll b e se c ur e in t he ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs and po sse ssi on s, from unreasonable sear ches a nd seizures; and that g ener al war rants, whe reby

an office r may

be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout evidence of the fa ct committed , or to seize any person or

persons not name d, whose off ence s are not particula rly descr ibed and supporte d by evidenc e, ar e dang erous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d. State v. Stephe nson , 1 95 S.W. 3d 57 4, 59 2 n .1 3 (T enn . 200 6) . T his c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on is identical in intent and purpose with the Four th Amendment. Id. (c i t i n g State v. Y eargan , 958 S.W .2d 6 2 6 , 6 2 9 ( T e n n

. 19 97 )) ; se e als o S ne e d v . S tate , 423 S.W .2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968) . “The tou c hs ton e of

th e Fourth A me ndme nt i s r e a so na ble ne ss, and

the re a so na

ble ne ss o f a

se arc h is deter mined ‘by

assessing , on the one ha nd, the deg ree to which it in t rudes upon a n individual’s pr iva c y and , on the oth e r, the de g re e to wh ic h it is ne e de d fo r the pro mo ti on of leg iti mate g overnme ntal interests.” Un ite d S tates v . Kn igh ts , 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001) (q u o t i n g W

yoming v. H

oughton , 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999)) . Under both the fede ral a nd s tate constitutions, warra ntless seizures are presumed unr easona ble and e vidence obtained fr om such seizures should be suppre ssed unless the State demonstrates by a pre pondera

nce of the e vidence that the sea rch or seizure was c onducted pur suant t o an ex ception to t he wa rra nt require ment. Coo lid

gev . Ne w H

am ps hir e , 403 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5, 91 S. Ct . 2 02 2, 20 32 (1 97 1) ; Sta te v. W atkins , 827 S.W .2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992)

. In Sa ms on v . Ca lif

or nia , the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court addre ssed the constitutionality of
a California statute which provided that ever y prisoner elig ible for rele ase on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject to sear ch or se izure by a parole office r or other peac e off icer at any time of the day or nig ht, with or without a sear ch wa rra nt and with or without cause .” Samson , 547 U.S. at 846, 126 S. Ct . at 2196. The petitioner, a par olee, wa s observe d by police wa lking down the street with a woman a

nd a child, and one police office r, who knew that the petitioner was on parole and be lie ve d th a t he fa c e d a

n o uts tand ing wa

rr ant, sto pp e d the pe tit ion e r and se arc he d him ba se d on his parole status. Id . I n the pocke t of the petitioner, the of fice r found a

cig are tte box containing methamphetamine. Id

. at 847, 126 S. Ct. at 219 6

. T he Samson Court discussed the State of Ca lif or nia ’s int e re sts in r e du c ingre c idi v i s m , t h e r e b y p r o m o t i n g

r e i nt e gr a t i o n a n d p o s i t i v e c i t ize ns hip
amon g pr ob a tio ne rs and

pa ro le e s, and

no te d th at th e se int e re sts wa rr ant p r i v a c y

i nt r u s i o ns that w ou ld not otherwise be tolerate d under the Four th Amendment. Id

. at 853, 126 S. Ct. at 2200. The Court-5-

fu rt he r n ote d th a t “ the F ourt h A me ndme nt d oe s n ot r e nd e r t he State s p ow e rl ess to a dd re ss t he se c on c e rn s e

ffecti v e ly .” Id

. (c i t i n g Kni gh ts , 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S. Ct . at 587). In balanc ing the interests pre sented, the Supre me Court held that the suspicion less sear ch of a California pa

rolee , conducte d pursuant to the California law requiring all parole es to ag ree to be subjecte d to searc h or seizure at any

time, did not viol ate the F ourth Amendment. Id . at 857, 126 S. Ct. at 2202.
The State relies extensively upon the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Samson to advanc e its curr ent position that the searc h of th e Ap p el l ee ’s home in this case wa s valid. Howeve r, the State’s a

rgument i gn o re s an important aspec t of the Samson holding. The Samson majority specific ally

addre ssed a pr imary

conce rn of the dissent, that Califor nia’s par ole sea

rch la w pe rm itt e d “ a

bla nk e t g ra nt of dis c re tio n unte the re d b y

any pr oc e dura l sa fe g ua

rd s. ” In r e sp on se to this c oncer

n, the majority rea soned that, althoug h California lawauthorizes a suspicionless sea rch
o f a p ar o le e , p r e v a il in g Ca li f o r n ia la w a ls o r e qu ir e s th a t a s u s p ic io n le s s s e ar c h o f a p ar o lee be
c on du c te d w ith in r e a so na ble c on str a int s:
The c oncer

n that California’s su s p i cionl ess sea rch sy stem g ives offic ers unbr idled discretion to conduc t se arc hes, there by inflicting dig nitary

harms that ar ouse strong rese ntment in parolee s and under mine t h ei r ab ility

to reinteg rate into productive
s o ci et y , i s b el i edb y

C al i fo rn i a’ s p ro h i b i t i o n o n “a rb i tra ry , cap ri ci o u s o r h ar as s i n g”
se arc he s.

. . . The dis se nt’ s c la im that pa ro le e s und e r C a lif

or nia law a re su bje c t to capr icious sear ches c onducted at the unchec ked “whim” of law enf orce ment office rs . . . ignor es this conce rn.
Id

. a t 85 6, 12 6 S. Ct. a t 22 02 (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Pe ople v. Re yes , 968 P.2 d 445 , 451 (C a l. 1998). L ikewise, it is established pre cede nt in Tenn es s ee that “[t] he esse nce of the prohibition ag ainst unrea sonable sea

rche s and seiz ures under t he F ourth Amendment is to ‘saf eguard the privac y and security of i ndividuals ag ainst arbitra ry invasions of g overnme nt officials.’” State v. Randolph , 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 3 3 0 , 3 3 4 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco , 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct . 1727, 1730 (1967))

. I t is se ttl e d la

w that a “ se izur e that is lawf

ul at it s in c e pti on

c a n v iol a te the Fou rt

h Amendment if its manner of execution unrea sonably i n fring es intere sts protected by the Constit ution.” Illinois v. Caball es , 5 4 3 U. S

. 4 0 5 , 4 0 7 , 1 2 5 S

. C t

. 8 3 4 , 8 3 7 (2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Jac obsen , 4 6 U. S

. 1 0 9 , 124, 104 S. Ct . 1652, 1663 (1984)) . In deter mining whe ther a person ha s been se ized, our supreme court has adher ed to a tot ality of the c ircumstance s approa ch. Randolph , 74 S.W .3d at 336. Fur thermore , our supreme court ha s consistently applied the standa

rd set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Un ite d S tates v . M e nd e nh all , 4 46 U. S. 5 44 , 1 00 S. Ct. 1870 (1980), i.e., whe ther “ in view of a ll th e ci rc u m s tance s surroundingthe incident, a
rea sonable person would have be lieved he or she wa s not free to leave.” Id

. (c i t i n g State v. Daniel , 12 S.W. 3d

42 0, 42 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Pulley , 863 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993) ).
A line betwe en re asonable detention for r outine investigat i o n and dete ntion which could be c hara cter ized as capr icious and ar bitrary cannot ne atly

be dra wn. But due-6-

reg ard f or the pract i ca l n ecessities of eff ective la w enf orce ment require s that the validity of brief , informal dete n t i o n be re cog nized wheneve r it appea rs from the tot a li ty of the c ir c ums tanc e s th a t th e de ta ini ngof fi c e rs c ou ld h ave ha d r e a so na ble g ro un ds fo r t

he ir act io ns

. A fo un de d s us pic ion is a ll that is ne c e ssa

ry , s ome ba sis fr o mwh i ch th e c o urt ca n d et erm i n e th at th e [ s ei z ure ] wa s n o t ar b i tra ry o r h ar as s i n g.
State v. Goad, 5 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 7 , 3 7 9 (T en n

. 1 9 7 7 ) ( qu o t i n g W ilson v. Porter , 361 F .2 d 4 12 , 4 15 (9 th Cir . 1 96 6) ); see also State v. M cLennan , 5 03 S.W. 2d 90 9, 91 1 (T e nn

. 19 73 ), c e rt . d e nie d, 41 4 U .S. 1112, 94 S. Ct . 843 (1973). The Appe llee in this case w as initially subje ct ed to a police sear ch of he r per son and her vehicle afte r a tra ffic stop for a seatbelt violation, which Office r Palmer a dmitted was a pre tense for inv e sti g a tin g an a lle g e d ti p f ro m an in fo rm ant t

hat th e Ap pe lle e wa s se lli ngc ra c k c oc a ine . D e sp ite an abse nce of

contra band on the pe rson o f t h e Appellee or in her ve hicle, Of fice r Palmer then dem an d ed t h at t he Appe llee mee t the police off icer s at her home so that they could ef fec tuate a sear ch of he r re sidence . The proof established that the Appe llee complied with Of fice r P al m er’ s reque st and met the police at her home a pproxi mately twenty minutes later. The tot al time elapse d from the initial traff

ic stop to the time of the ar rest at the Appellee ’s home wa s betwee n one and two ho ur s. Th e a

pp lic a tio n of the re a so na

ble pa ro le c on dit ion by the po lic e of fi c e rs , in thi s c a se , b e c ame unrea sonable a s a re sult of this l eng thy seiz u re o f t h e Appellee . We conclude that the resulting
sear ch and seizure occur

ring at the home of the Appellee was, acc ording ly , unrea sonable unde r the state and fe de ra l c on sti tut ion s and that th e tr ia l c ourt

c or re c tly su pp re sse d th e e vid e nc e se ize d a s a result of this sear ch.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nt of the Obion County Circuit Court is affirmed.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE