SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1066 

CA 12-00482 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

TALIA M. ROTH, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KALEIDA HEALTH, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

(ACTION NO. 1.) 

------------------------------------- 

PHILLIP LANDI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V

 

KALEIDA HEALTH, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

(ACTION NO. 2.) 

 

LAW OFFICE OF J. MICHAEL HAYES, BUFFALO (J. MICHAEL HAYES OF COUNSEL),

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PHILLIP LANDI. 

LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE C. TENNEY, BUFFALO (COURTNEY G. SCIME OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TALIA M. ROTH. 

RUPP, BAASE, PFALZGRAF, CUNNINGHAM & COPPOLA LLC, BUFFALO (R. ANTHONY

RUPP, III, OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph

R. Glownia, J.), entered September 30, 2011 in personal injury

actions. The order denied the motion of plaintiff Talia M. Roth for

summary judgment, granted the motion and cross motion of defendant for

summary judgment and dismissed the complaints. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced these actions seeking damages

for injuries they sustained when they were struck by a motor vehicle

while they were crossing the street at an intersection. The vehicle

was driven by defendant’s employee, an “on-call” nurse who was

traveling home from the hospital at the time of the accident. Supreme

Court properly granted defendant’s “motion and cross motion” for

summary judgment dismissing the complaint in action No. 2 and the

complaint in action No. 1, respectively. “ ‘An employer generally is

not liable for an employee’s negligence while the employee is

traveling to or from work because the element of control is lacking’ ”

(Cicatello v Sobierajski, 295 AD2d 974, 975; see D’Amico v Christie,

71 NY2d 76, 88). In cases such as this, involving allegedly
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CA 12-00482 

employment-related travel, “ ‘the crucial test is whether the

employment created the necessity for the travel’ ” (Swartzlander v

Forms-Rite Bus. Forms & Print. Serv., 174 AD2d 971, 972, affd 78 NY2d

1060), i.e., the need to be on the particular route on which the

accident occurred (see Greer v Ferrizz, 118 AD2d 536, 538). Under the

dual purpose principle, “[i]f the travel would still have occurred

even [if] the business purpose [had been] canceled, then the employer

cannot be held liable” (Matos v Michele Depalma Enters., 160 AD2d

1163, 1164). Here, while defendant may have been able to exercise

some degree of control over its employee at the time of the accident

because he was “on-call,” defendant did not create the necessity for

the employee to take any particular route home after leaving the

hospital. We thus conclude as a matter of law that the employee’s

activities were not being controlled by defendant, nor was the

employee acting in furtherance of any duties owed to defendant by

returning home (see Lundberg v State of New York, 25 NY2d 467,

471-472, rearg denied 26 NY2d 883; Swartzlander, 174 AD2d at 972;

Matos, 160 AD2d at 1164; see generally Tenczar v Richmond, 172 AD2d

952, 952-953, lv denied 78 NY2d 859). 

Entered: September 28, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court