13-4445 

Zheng v. Lynch

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A200 695 657

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S 

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH 

THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 27th day of August, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

PIERRD N. LEVAL,

ROBERT D. SACK, 

REENA RAGGI,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

XUEYUN ZHENG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 13-4445 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL,*

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Cora J. Chang, Esq., New York, New York. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; 

Edward J. Duffy, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

 

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney general Loretta E. 

Lynch is automatically substituted for former Attorney general Eric H. Holder, Jr., as 

Respondent. 
2

John M. McAdams, Jr., Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Xueyun Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, 

seeks review of an October 29, 2013 decision of the BIA affirming an April 4, 2012 

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zheng’s application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 

Xueyun Zheng, No. A200 695 657 (B.I.A. Oct. 29, 2013), aff’g No. A200 695 657 (Immig. 

Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 4, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 

and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision, including 

the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 

F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

 For asylum applications such as Zheng’s, which are governed by the REAL ID Act, 

the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on 

an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of her 

account, and inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the 

heart of [her] claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 

F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). 
3

 Zheng claimed that she feared persecution in China because of her Christian faith 

and that she had been subject to a forced abortion in China. However, during her credible 

fear interview, she did not mention the forced abortion. The agency properly determined 

that the record of Zheng’s credible fear interview “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to 

warrant its consideration by the agency.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d 

Cir. 2009). Moreover, Zheng was asked several questions during the interview which 

should have prompted her to mention the alleged forced abortion. Accordingly, her 

failure to do so seriously undercut her credibility, and her explanation, that she 

misunderstood the questions to be asking about her “direct reason” for leaving China, is not 

compelling. See Yun-Zui Guan, 432 F.3d at 398–99, see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 

F.3d 77, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2005). 

 As the agency found, Zheng’s testimony contained many other internal 

inconsistencies, for instance regarding the fate of her fellow church members in China after 

she narrowly escaped arrest. Her testimony also conflicted with that of her witness 

regarding details of their church attendance in the United States. At no point did Zheng 

rebut these inconsistencies with explanations that would compel a reasonable fact-finder to 

credit her. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Majidi v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 80–81. 

 Zheng’s argument that the agency erred in finding that her documentary evidence 

failed to rehabilitate her incredible testimony is also meritless. In light of the adverse 

credibility determination, the agency was not required to identify pieces of evidence that 

should have been provided, nor was it required to find that authors of unsworn documents 

could have been made available for cross-examination. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of 
4

Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). The agency reasonably found that the 

corroborating evidence Zheng did submit did not rehabilitate the testimony the agency had 

found to be incredible. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). 

 Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence 

supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 

at 167. Further, because the only evidence of a threat to Zheng’s life or freedom depended 

upon her credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes 

success on her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. 

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have 

completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 

is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is 

DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED 

in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit 

Local Rule 34.1(b). 

 FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court