UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NATASHA GRIFFITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDUCAP, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 16-cv-1541 (DLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, see Griffith’s 

Mot., Dkt. 38; EduCap’s Cross-Mot., Dkt. 41, and their supplemental briefing on the basis for 

this Court’s jurisdiction, see EduCap’s Suppl. Br., Dkt. 47; Griffith’s Suppl. Br., Dkt. 48. For 

the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction

and deny the cross-motions for summary judgment as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND

According to plaintiff Natasha Griffith, HSBC Bank extended a student loan to Robert 

Blocker on February 13, 2007, and Griffith co-signed the loan so that Blocker could attend 

Bowie State University. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 25–26, Dkt. 23. When Blocker eventually

defaulted, defendant EduCap, Inc., a student loan servicer, filed a debt collection action against 

Griffith in D.C. Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 31. The complaint in that action identified the 

plaintiff as “EDUCAP Inc. on behalf of HSBC Bank USA, National Association.” Id. ¶ 29; see

also Griffith’s Mot. Attach. 3 (Verified Compl.) at 1, Dkt. 38-3. 

On May 26, 2015, the D.C. Superior Court granted EduCap’s motion for summary 

judgment and entered judgment against Griffith in the amount of $24,855.80, plus interest and 
2

certain attorney fees. May 26, 2015 Order & J. at 9–10, Dkt. 41-7. In the course of that ruling, 

the Superior Court rejected one of Griffith’s several arguments: that “Edu[C]ap [was] not the real 

party in interest and only HSBC ha[d] the right to file suit against her.” Id. at 4. 

In February 2016, however, the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary 

judgment on EduCap’s monetary claims because EduCap was not the real party in interest, and 

only the real party in interest—here, HSBC—may sue to enforce a substantive right. Griffith’s 

Mot. Attach. 3 (Feb. 24, 2016 Mem. Op. & J.) at 96–97. It then remanded “for the trial court to 

exercise the responsibility entrusted to it by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 17(a), namely to 

allow ‘a reasonable time for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 

substitution of, the real party in interest,’ HSBC.” Id. at 97 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3)). 

On remand, the trial court accepted the invitation to substitute HSBC, reasoning that

there was no evidence of bad faith or “willful waiver of a fair opportunity to join” HSBC and 

that Griffith had “not made compelling arguments as to whether HSBC’s substitution would 

prejudice her case.” July 11, 2016 Order at 5, Dkt. 41-8. It explained that “the underlying facts, 

law, and loan instruments w[ould] remain the same, whether Edu[C]ap or HSBC prosecute[d]

the claim.” Id. But it refused to grant summary judgment in favor of HSBC, on the ground that 

Griffith would be prejudiced if she were denied an opportunity to obtain discovery against the 

bank. Id. at 5–6. HSBC then continued to prosecute its claims for nine months before it 

dismissed the action with Griffith’s consent. See Griffith’s Mot. Attach. 3 (Apr. 20, 2017 Order)

at 100. 

Meanwhile, Griffith sued EduCap, Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, and HSBC in this 

Court for violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, violations of the D.C. Debt 

Collection Law (DCDCL), abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Third Am. 
3

Compl. ¶¶ 50–87. Among other things, she alleged that “EduCap ha[d] been filing thousands of 

debt collection lawsuits across the country falsely claiming to be the real party in interest by 

suing ‘on behalf of HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,’” id. ¶ 23, and that it “willfully engag[ed] in unfair 

or unconscionable conduct to collect [Griffith’s] debt in filing suit falsely claiming Griffith 

‘entered into a written promissory note with EduCap.’” id. ¶ 70. In support of this Court’s 

jurisdiction, she alleged that the federal claim provided federal question jurisdiction and that the 

Court also had diversity jurisdiction because there was complete diversity of citizenship and the 

amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.

The parties have submitted several rounds of briefing since Griffith filed her third 

amended complaint.

1

 In response to a motion to dismiss, this Court dismissed all but the 

DCDCL claim against EduCap. See Sept. 10, 2018 Order, Dkt. 36. Within a week, Griffith 

moved for summary judgment without seeking discovery. See Griffith’s Mot.; see also Joint 

Case Mgmt. Report at 2, Dkt. 42 (“The parties agree that discovery should not commence until 

the Court issues its ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.”). EduCap then 

timely filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. See EduCap’s Cross-Mot. 

And after reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing 

“addressing whether the Court has jurisdiction over the sole remaining claim in this action” and, 

to the extent the parties maintain that the Court has diversity jurisdiction, explaining “with 

specificity how the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Sept. 6, 2019 Minute Order. The 

parties have since provided that supplemental briefing. See EduCap’s Suppl. Br.; Griffith’s 

Suppl. Br.

 1 On December 5, 2017, this case was transferred to the undersigned.
4

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is “presumed that a cause 

lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The plaintiff therefore bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Id.; see also 

Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Moreover, “because it involves a court’s power 

to hear a case,” subject matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived.” Arbaugh v. Y&H 

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, courts have 

“an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the 

absence of a challenge from any party.” Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141

(2012) (“When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider 

sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.” (italics omitted)). And 

if a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss 

the action” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). 

III. ANALYSIS

Both parties maintain that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over this case, but they 

disagree on the basis of that jurisdiction. Griffith argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction. 

See Griffith’s Suppl. Br. at 2–5. EduCap argues that the amount in controversy does not permit 

diversity jurisdiction, but it contends that the Court should nevertheless exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction based on the now-dismissed federal claim. See EduCap’s Suppl. Br. at 2–3. The 

Court concludes that it does not have diversity jurisdiction, and it declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction.
5

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” With respect to the amount-in-controversy 

requirement, “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good 

faith.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (footnote 

omitted). “But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the 

plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like 

certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount,” the court must dismiss the 

suit. Id. at 289. The D.C. Circuit has explained that, although the “legal certainty” standard is 

forgiving, “the burden of establishing the amount in controversy . . . rests squarely with the 

litigant asserting jurisdiction.” Martin v. Gibson, 723 F.2d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also 

King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The burden of establishing the amount 

in controversy is on the person claiming jurisdiction, and the district court may question at any 

time whether the jurisdictional amount has been shown.”). And if the plaintiff’s claimed sum is 

“disputed by his opponent or by the court sua sponte,” it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish with 

evidence “that it does not appear to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the 

jurisdictional amount.” Payne v. Gov’t of D.C., 559 F.2d 809, 820 & n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

(opinion of Robinson, J.) (footnote omitted); see also Rosenboro v. Kim, 994 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993) (the plaintiff must “produce evidence supporting a legal uncertainty about whether she

could prove [the claimed damages]”); McQueen v. Woodstream Corp., 672 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 

(D.D.C. 2009) (“The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if it is highly improbable that the 
6

amount in controversy could exceed the jurisdictional threshold, and when the plaintiff submits 

no evidence to the contrary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Griffith argues that she is entitled to more than $75,000 in (1) compensatory damages 

based on the attorney fees expended to defend the D.C. debt collection lawsuit and (2) punitive 

damages. Griffith’s Suppl. Br. at 2–4. These damages, both separately and cumulatively, fail to 

satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.

First, Griffith has not shown that she can recover the attorney fees as damages for the 

alleged DCDCL violations. Griffith alleges violations of several DCDCL provisions, all of 

which derive from a single misdeed: EduCap’s improper assertion that it was the real party in 

interest to collect on a defaulted loan owed to HSBC. See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64–70. Each of 

the provisions that EduCap allegedly violated also share a common damages provision. Under 

D.C. Code § 28-3814(j)(1), “[p]roof, by substantial evidence, that a creditor or debt collector has 

wilfully [sic] violated any provision of the [statute] shall subject such creditor or debt collector to 

liability to any person affected by such violation for all damages proximately caused by the 

violation.” 

Although the D.C. courts do not appear to have interpreted “proximately caused” in this 

context, they have previously defined proximate causation in tort actions as “that cause which, in 

natural and continual sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, 

and without which the result would not have occurred.” Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1125 

(D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). And nothing in the text of the DCDCL suggests 

a different definition. Cf. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(“[N]othing in the text or structure of [18 U.S.C.] § 2259 leads us to conclude that Congress 

intended to negate the ordinary requirement of proximate cause.”).
7

To establish proximate causation, Griffith argues that the $91,417.50 in fees she incurred 

to defend the underlying debt collection action was “the direct result of Edu[C]ap’s lawsuit 

falsely claiming to be the lender and creditor,” and she provides an affidavit and invoice 

detailing the fees incurred until HSBC was substituted for EduCap as the real party in interest. 

Griffith’s Suppl. Br. at 4; see also id. Ex. A, Dkt. 48-1. The problem is that those fees resulted 

from Griffith’s status as a defaulting debtor, not EduCap’s error in pursuing the debt collection 

action in its own name. Put differently, Griffith has not shown that, even in the absence of 

EduCap’s DCDCL violation, HSBC would not have pursued the debt collection action in its own 

name and Griffith would not have incurred the same attorney fees regardless. As the D.C. 

Superior Court explained, “the underlying facts, law, and loan instruments [were] the same,” no 

matter whether HSBC or EduCap (on behalf of HSBC) prosecuted the action. July 11, 2016 

Order at 5. That is why the court permitted the substitution of HSBC for EduCap and allowed 

the action to “proceed[] as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). And that is why HSBC continued to prosecute the action in its own 

name for nine months after the Rule 17 substitution. The Court therefore concludes to a legal 

certainty that Griffith could not obtain the claimed attorney fees as damages for the alleged 

DCDCL violations. Cf. Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., 174 F. Supp. 3d 146, 161 

(D.D.C. 2016) (“question[ing]” whether a jury could determine that certain emotional damages 

were “proximately caused” by various DCDCL violations where the “plaintiff’s own statements 

indicate that it was the existence of the debts themselves, combined with the fact that a law firm 

had gotten involved, that was causing [her] to suffer emotional distress” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded on other grounds, 857 F.3d 939 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017); O’Connor v. Sand Canyon Corp., No. 14-cv-00024, 2015 WL 225423, at *4 (W.D. 
8

Va. Jan. 16, 2015) (dismissing a fraud claim where it was “speculative at best” that the plaintiff 

would have kept her property absent the alleged fraud). 

The Court also notes that, even if EduCap’s error could be understood to have 

proximately caused Griffith to incur fees litigating the Rule 17 issue, Griffith does not provide 

any argument to that effect. In addition, her invoice does not indicate which fees were incurred 

for that purpose alone, and it is wholly implausible to suggest that even a majority—let alone 

more than $75,000—of the $91,417.50 in fees Griffith claims she incurred in the debt collection 

action were attributable to the Rule 17 issue.

Second, Griffith has failed to establish that she may recover punitive damages. “In 

applying the legal certainty test where the availability of punitive damages is the sine qua non of 

federal jurisdiction[,] the District Court should scrutinize the punitive damage claim to ensure 

that it has at least a colorable basis in law and fact.” Kahal v. J. W. Wilson & Assocs., 673 F.2d 

547, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “Liberal pleading rules are not a license for plaintiffs to shoehorn 

essentially local actions into federal court through extravagant or invalid punitive damage 

claims.” Id.; see also Hardaway v. Cross State Moving, 729 F. App’x 8, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(same).

To be sure, the DCDCL authorizes punitive damages for those “affected by a wilful [sic]

violation of the [statute.]” D.C. Code § 28-3814(j)(2). But punitive damages may be awarded

only if there is “a basis in the record for an award of actual damages.” Maxwell v. Gallagher, 

709 A.2d 100, 103 (D.C. 1998). And as discussed, Griffith has not established that EduCap’s 
9

error caused any damages.

2

 Thus, the Court concludes to a legal certainty that the amount in 

controversy does not exceed $75,000 and diversity jurisdiction does not exist. 

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction 

When a court lacks diversity jurisdiction, it may still exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over certain state-law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within [a court’s] original 

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But 

“[w]hether to retain jurisdiction over pendent state and common law claims after the dismissal of 

the federal claims is a matter left to the sound discretion of the district court.” Shekoyan v. Sibley 

Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. 

(“Pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not a plaintiff’s right.” (alteration adopted and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). And “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 

dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction 

doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Id. at 424 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

 2 Indeed, Griffith’s failure to establish any entitlement to compensatory damages is why 

Pietrangelo v. Refresh Club, Inc., No. 18-cv-1943, 2019 WL 2357379, at *7–8 (D.D.C. June 4, 

2019), and Portfolio Recovery Assocs. v. Mejia, No. 1216-cv-34184, at 8 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 4, 

2015)—the cases on which Griffith relies, see Griffith’s Suppl. Br. at 4—are inapposite. In both 

cases, the plaintiff, unlike Griffith, had established his or her entitlement to substantial 

compensatory damages. The Court also notes that, even if Griffith had established her 

entitlement to some small amount of compensatory damages, it is highly improbable that the 

Court could constitutionally award sufficient punitive damages to clear the $75,000 threshold. 

See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (explaining that,

although there is no “bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed,” “an 

award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of 

constitutional impropriety”); see also Ham v. TJX Cos., No. 17-cv-01463, 2018 WL 1143156, at 

*3 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2018) (citing State Farm and concluding that “even the inclusion of a 

generous punitive damages [award] does not get Plaintiff to the amount-in-controversy 

requirement”). 
10

This case is not so exceptional that supplemental jurisdiction remains appropriate after

the dismissal of the only federal claim. The case is still in its early stages, and the parties have 

yet to engage in any discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)

(dismissal appropriate “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early 

stages and only state-law claims remain”); Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 424 (same even though “the 

litigation proceeded for four years in the district court prior to the dismissal of the last of [the 

plaintiff’s] federal claims”). Moreover, the D.C. courts, which have resolved the Rule 17 issue 

and presided over the underlying debt collection action, have familiarity with this case and are 

well-equipped to decide the novel questions of local law at issue here—including the definition 

of willful in the DCDCL. See EduCap’s Br. at 14, Dkt. 41-1. In these circumstances, exercising 

supplemental jurisdiction would be inappropriate. See Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

775 F.3d 409, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that a district court abuses its 

discretion when it maintains jurisdiction over a removed case presenting unsettled issues of state 

law after the federal claims have been dismissed.”). 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court dismisses this case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction

and denies the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as moot.

________________________

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH

United States District Judge

September 27, 2019