J-A13042-20

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

VLADIMIR VOLOCHIN,

 Appellee

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TATIYANA VOLOCHIN,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 908 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree and Order Entered February 15, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Domestic Relations at No(s): July Term, 2011 No. 8497

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2020

Tatiyana Volochin (Wife) appeals from the February 15, 2017 decree 

and order, which finalized the divorce between Wife and Vladimir Volochin 

(Husband), ordered equitable distribution of their marital property, denied 

Wife’s request for alimony, and awarded counsel fees. Upon review, we 

affirm.

We provide the following background. Husband and Wife were married 

on August 20, 1997. They did not have any children. Husband initiated 

divorce proceedings in July 2011. 

Husband filed [] an amended complaint on November 21, 2011. 

Wife filed a counter-affidavit on September 11, 2013, in which 

she opposed the entry of a divorce decree and raised a claim for 

economic relief. During the course of the litigation Wife has 

consistently received alimony pendente lite (APL) in varying 

amounts. In 2014, the amount of APL was $552.95 per month. 

Husband sought to modify that amount in a petition filed on 

December 1, 2014. That petition was heard before a support 
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master, was granted pursuant to an interim order dated March 

19, 2015, and Wife’s APL award was modified to $199.68 per 

month based upon the changed circumstance of Husband’s 

having lost his job. Both Husband and Wife filed exceptions to 

the master’s recommendation. By order dated October 5, 2015, 

the court granted in part and denied in part each of the 

exceptions and by agreement the matter was remanded to the 

support master for a full hearing on Husband’s current earning 

capacity and ability for Husband to provide medical coverage.

After a remand hearing, the support master recommended denial 

of Husband’s petition to modify on April 28, 2016, keeping the 

APL award at $199.68 per month. Wife filed exceptions that 

alleged, inter alia, error by the master in not concluding that 

Husband and/or his attorney had intentionally misled the court in 

2014 by withholding a document purportedly showing that 

Husband had been dismissed from his employment for cause. 

Wife’s exceptions were denied on November 18, 2016.

Simultaneous to the support litigation, a series of hearings 

were held before a divorce master regarding equitable 

distribution. Each of the parties was represented by counsel at 

the hearings, and on October 20, 2015, the master filed his 

report and recommendation. Wife then filed a praecipe for trial 

de novo, and the matter was assigned to Judge Ourania 

Papademetriou on February 1, 2016. The trial commenced on 

June 16, 2016, and was continued for an additional protracted 

hearing on January 25, 2017. At the conclusion of the trial, the 

[trial court] took the matter under advisement. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 1-2 (emphasis, quotation marks, original 

brackets, and citations omitted).

On February 15, 2017, the trial court entered an order declaring 

Husband and Wife divorced, and resolving their claims of equitable 

distribution, alimony, and counsel fees, as indicated above. Regarding

equitable distribution, the trial court, inter alia, awarded Wife full ownership 

of the marital home and 50-50 ownership of an apartment in Ukraine, as 
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well as $5,108.98 from an escrow account,1 which held a total of 

$18,108.98. Trial Court Order, 2/15/2017, at ¶ 18. The trial court denied 

Wife’s request for alimony and APL. Id. at 21-22. Both Wife and Husband 

sought an award of counsel fees, which the trial court granted by dividing 

the remaining $13,000 from the escrow account between counsel, 50-50. 

Id. at 24. 

Wife filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on 

March 1, 2017. This timely filed notice of appeal followed.2, 3 On appeal, 

Wife raises the following questions for our review.

1. Did the court err in not recalculating the [APL] order from 

2012[4] after Husband (by his attorney) admitted to the court 

that he had withheld for [21⁄2] years (for the purpose of 

intentionally misleading the court) a critical material 

document that led the court to an improper APL award?

2. Did the court err in accepting Husband’s statements at the 

APL hearings that his change of circumstances [was] a result 

of action not within his control?

 

1 This account was established to pay the arrears on the mortgage for the 

marital home. 

2 Both Wife and the trial court have complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

3 This Court stayed the appeal because Wife had initiated bankruptcy 

proceedings. The bankruptcy proceedings have been terminated and the 

stay has been lifted.

4 For clarity, based on Wife’s argument, she is challenging the 2014 

recalculation following Husband’s termination from employment, not the 

original 2012 calculation. 
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3. Did the court err in not considering how the effect of the 

recalculated [APL] order would affect equitable distribution?

4. Did the court err in not considering that Wife’s family had 

purchased the apartment in Ukraine?

5. Did the court err in awarding counsel fees to be paid from an 

account specifically set up to pay or negotiate payment of the 

parties’ mortgage for the marital residence? Without this 

account, it would be impossible to negotiate a settlement with 

the mortgage company thus resulting in the eviction of [Wife] 

from the marital residence. In fact, the court’s action directly 

led to the filing of a bankruptcy [action].

6. Did the court err in not awarding Wife some amount of 

alimony because of her age and health (in addition to her role 

as homemaker who stayed home for 14 years to care for 

Husband) until the time that he left and he filed for divorce?

7. Did the court err in an equitable distribution order of 50-50, 

leaving Wife, who is older and in worse health, without 

alimony after she stayed at home to take care of Husband for 

15 years?[5]

Wife’s Brief at 4-5 (emphasis, unnecessary capitalization, and Wife’s answers 

omitted).

Preliminarily, we note that Wife has failed to develop meaningfully any 

argument in support of her third, fourth, sixth, and seventh issues. See

Wife’s Brief at 12 (presenting two sentences in support of third issue; 

presenting two sentences in support of fourth issue), 14 (combining sixth 

and seventh issues into one argument spanning three sentences). Indeed, 

 

5 We note the discrepancy between Wife’s sixth and seventh questions for 

review in terms of whether she stayed home for 14 or 15 years. Because we 

find these issues waived for the reasons stated infra, we need not determine 

which calculation, if either, is correct.
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the nugatory arguments proffered in support of these issues lack any 

citation to the record or legal authority. 

Our rules of appellate procedure require an appellant to support 

his or her argument with pertinent analysis, including citation to 

and discussion of relevant authority and facts of record. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119. This court will not become the counsel for an 

appellant and develop arguments on an appellant’s behalf, and 

waiver of an issue results when an appellant fails to properly 

develop an issue or cite to legal authority to support his

contention in his appellate brief.

Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations omitted). Accordingly, these issues are waived. 

We thus begin our analysis with Wife’s challenge to the APL 

modification following Husband’s termination from employment.

6

 Wife’s 

Brief at 10-12. Specifically, Wife assails the reduction of the initial APL 

award because she alleges that Husband intentionally misled the master by 

withholding a termination letter. Id. We review this claim mindful of the 

following.

Our standard of review for awards of [APL] is: If an order of APL 

is bolstered by competent evidence, the order will not be 

reversed absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

APL is based on the need of one party to have equal 

financial resources to pursue a divorce proceeding 

when, in theory, the other party has major assets 

 

6 We note that Wife listed two separate APL claims in the statement of 

questions (claims one and two) but addressed them together in the 

argument section of her brief, in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The 

argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued[.]”). However, because the claims are interrelated and can be

consolidated into a single argument, we will address them as one claim.
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which are the financial sinews of domestic warfare. 

... APL focuses on the ability of the individual who 

receives the APL during the course of the litigation to 

defend her/himself, and the only issue is whether the 

amount is reasonable for the purpose, which turns 

on the economic resources available to the spouse.

In ruling on a claim for [APL], the court should consider the 

following factors: the ability of the other party to pay; the 

separate estate and income of the petitioning party; and the 

character, situation, and surroundings of the parties.

Ileiwat v. Labadi, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 2894895 at *5 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“An award of [APL] may be modified or vacated by a change in 

circumstances.... It is the burden of the party seeking to modify an order of 

support to show by competent evidence that a change of circumstances 

justifies a modification.” Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1255 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our Rules of Civil Procedure 

provide guidelines for seeking a modification of a support order based on a 

reduction in income. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d); 1910.19(c). When a 

party files a petition for modification, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(c) provides in 

pertinent part that “the trier-of-fact may modify [] the existing support order 

in any appropriate manner based on the evidence presented without regard 

to which party filed the petition for modification” so long as the “trier-of-fact 

finds that there has been a material and substantial change in 

circumstances[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(c). Relevant to this appeal, however,

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(1) provides that a when a party “is fired for cause, 
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there generally will be no effect on the support obligation.”7 On the other 

hand, “appropriate adjustments will be made for substantial continuing 

involuntary decreases in income, including but not limited to the result of []

termination[] unless the trier of fact finds that such a reduction in income 

was willfully undertaken in an attempt to avoid or reduce the support 

obligation.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(2).

By way of background, in 2014, Husband moved to modify the APL 

award following his termination from employment. On March 19, 2015, the 

master entered an interim order reducing the APL award to $199.68 per 

month. Both Husband and Wife filed exceptions, which the trial court

granted in part and denied in part. The parties agreed to a remand hearing 

before the support master on Husband’s ability to pay and earning capacity.

Although the hearing was limited to those two issues, at the January 

20, 2016 hearing, Husband introduced a termination letter, dated April 1, 

2014. See N.T., 1/20/2016, at 141-45. The record is unclear because 

counsel were talking over each other, but it appears that Wife’s counsel had 

not seen the letter previously. At the subsequent April 18, 2016 hearing, 

Wife’s counsel questioned Husband extensively about the termination letter

 

7 “For cause” termination is not defined in the statute or relevant case law, 

but this Court has held that decisions and findings of fact by the 

Unemployment Compensation Bureau “are not necessarily reliable in a 

subsequent civil action and have no preclusive effect in those later 

proceedings.” Ewing v. Ewing, 843 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Regardless, as discussed infra, Wife does not challenge the finding that 

Husband was not fired for cause. 
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and whether it indicated that he was terminated for cause, contrary to his

prior testimony.

8 On April 28, 2016, the master kept the reduced APL award 

in effect and found, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to 

conclude that Husband had been terminated for cause. Wife filed exceptions

claiming that the master erred in not concluding that Husband had

intentionally misled the master by withholding a document that established 

Husband had been terminated for cause. The trial court denied Wife’s 

exceptions, explaining its reasoning for doing so in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion, as follows. 

The document [that Wife claims Husband withheld] is a letter 

from Husband’s former employer dated April 1, 2014, that 

advised Husband that his employment was terminated because 

he had acted in “direct violation” of the company’s policies 

regarding access to and use of its computer systems. ... 

Wife’s arguments ignore the role of the trial court in 

determining issues of credibility and consideration of evidence. 

Whether the letter advising Husband of his termination due to a 

violation of company policy constituted a termination for cause 

was a matter within the discretion of the trial court. The weight 

to be afforded to this evidence was also within its discretion. 

The [trial c]ourt considered the letter[] and determined that it 

was not sufficient to establish that Husband had been terminated 

for cause. In fact, Husband received unemployment 

compensation benefits from his former employer for a six-month 

period after his employment was terminated. A permissible 

inference from Husband’s having received unemployment 

benefits is that his former employer did not establish that 

 

8 We cannot review Husband’s prior testimony in this regard because the 

record only contains the January 20, 2016 and April 18, 2016 hearing 

transcripts. According to the Master’s recap, Husband testified that “he was 

let go[] because he was spending too much time with personal problems and 

not doing an accurate job of doing his job.” N.T., 1/20/2016, at 7.
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Husband was terminated for cause. As such, the competent 

evidence and the inference to be drawn therefrom supports the 

determination that the letter informing Husband of his 

termination from employment was not probative of [whether] 

Husband, or his attorney, withh[eld] a “critical material 

document” from the support master. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 7-9 (record citations omitted).

On appeal, Wife does not argue that the master erred in concluding 

that Husband was not terminated for cause. Rather, she contends that she 

is entitled to a remand and recalculation of the APL order because she 

believes that Husband knowingly lied about his termination circumstances in 

earlier hearings and intentionally withheld the termination letter. Wife’s 

Brief at 11. According to Wife, “[i]f the support modification is upheld, the 

message to the payor would be ‘just lie[,’] there are no consequences.” Id.

at 12.

Wife’s argument ignores that the master had the benefit of the 

termination letter prior to entering its order sustaining the reduced APL 

award. Moreover, the master had the opportunity, at the April 18, 2016 

hearing, to observe Husband as Wife’s counsel cross-examined him 

extensively about the circumstances of his termination, his prior testimony, 

when he received the termination letter, the content of the termination 

letter, and why it was not presented earlier. Despite Wife’s averments that 

Husband and his counsel intentionally withheld the document from the 

support proceedings, the master ultimately considered the termination letter 

in determining whether to sustain the reduced APL award and concluded that 
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the termination letter did not affect its conclusion that Husband was not 

terminated for cause. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s denial of Wife’s exceptions to the master’s conclusion regarding 

Husband’s alleged intentional withholding of the document. Accordingly, 

Wife is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

Finally, we address Wife’s claim that the trial court erred in awarding 

the payment of counsel fees from the escrow account “at the expense of the 

parties.”9 Wife’s Brief at 12. We consider this claim mindful of the following. 

Section 3702 of the Domestic Relations Code permits the trial 

court to award reasonable counsel fees where appropriate. 23 

Pa.C.S.[] § 3702.[10]

 

9 Wife also argues that the trial court erred in awarding counsel fees to 

Husband without any showing of need by Husband. Wife’s Brief at 13-14. 

See also Wife’s Brief at 9 (Summary of the Argument) (emphasis in

original) (stating “the trier of fact erred in awarding any counsel fees to 

Husband’s counsel. This reward to one who deceptively sleazed the court 

and []Wife should not be rewarded for his actions, the trial court should 

have referred it to the Disciplinary Board.”). However, Wife did not 

challenge the award of counsel fees to Husband in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. Instead, she challenged the trial court’s decision to order 

payment of counsel fees from the escrow account. See Wife’s Concise 

Statement of Matters, 4/5/2017, at ¶ 5. Accordingly, any claim challenging 

the award itself is waived. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 

775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (holding that any issues not raised in an ordered Rule 

1925(b) statement are waived on appeal). 

10 Subsection 3702(a) provides as follows.

(a) General rule.--In proper cases, upon petition, the court 

may allow a spouse reasonable alimony pendente lite, spousal 

support and reasonable counsel fees and expenses. Reasonable 

counsel fees and expenses may be allowed pendente lite, and 

the court shall also have authority to direct that adequate health 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We will reverse a determination of counsel fees and 

costs only for an abuse of discretion. The purpose of 

an award of counsel fees is to promote fair 

administration of justice by enabling the dependent 

spouse to maintain or defend the divorce action 

without being placed at a financial disadvantage; the 

parties must be ‘on par’ with one another.

Counsel fees are awarded based on the facts of each 

case after a review of all the relevant factors. These

factors include the payor’s ability to pay, the 

requesting party’s financial resources, the value of 

the services rendered, and the property received in 

equitable distribution.

Counsel fees are awarded only upon a showing of 

need. In most cases, each party’s financial 

considerations will ultimately dictate whether an 

award of counsel fees is appropriate. Also pertinent 

to our review is that, in determining whether the 

court has abused its discretion, we do not usurp the 

court’s duty as fact finder.

Brubaker v. Brubaker, 201 A.3d 180, 191 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

In response to Wife’s claim that the trial court erred in ordering 

payment of counsel fees from the escrow account, the trial court provided 

the following explanation for its order in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Wife’s contention ignores the fact that there were no other 

monies available to pay counsel fees. Wife had filed for 

bankruptcy on February 25, 2016, and averred that her monthly 

net income was $122. In the same bankruptcy filing, Wife 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

and hospitalization insurance coverage be maintained for the 

dependent spouse pendente lite.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3702(a).
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averred that the amount of the claim for the mortgage on the 

marital residence was $182,738. By virtue of asking for an 

award of counsel fees, Wife gave her tacit approval for the [trial 

c]ourt to award counsel fees from whatever source was 

available. The credible evidence established that the only liquid 

asset for the payment of counsel fees was the escrow account. 

Wife may not now assert error where the [trial c]ourt provided 

relief that was specifically requested by her. 

Further, at the time that the distribution was ordered, 

there was no credible evidence that a negotiated settlement with 

the mortgage company was feasible. ... As noted, the 

outstanding balance on the mortgage was $182,738, 

approximately ten times the amount in the escrow account. 

Therefore, the [trial c]ourt awarded counsel fees, as 

requested by both parties, from a source of funds that was then 

available. It was apparent to the [trial c]ourt that the original 

purpose for which the escrow account had been created could 

not be realized and that further delay in distribution of the 

escrowed funds was not reasonable. Exercising its discretion 

akin to the doctrine of cy pres, the [trial c]ourt awarded counsel 

fees as sought by the parties. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 15-16 (record citations omitted).

Wife rebukes the trial court’s decision to order payment of counsel fees 

from the escrow account as “merely div[vying] up a marital asset, giving 

each counsel more than each party.” Wife’s Brief at 13 (emphasis in 

original). Beyond this criticism, Wife fails to present any argument or cite to 

any legal authority in support. Instead, her entire argument focuses on the 

award of counsel fees to Husband’s counsel, which Wife has waived, as 

discussed supra. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s ordering payment of counsel fees from an account with available 
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funds that would not or could not be used for its intended purpose. 

Accordingly, Wife is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree and order. 

Decree and order affirmed.11

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/20

 

11 Husband filed an application to quash based on Wife’s failure to ensure 

inclusion of the June 16, 2016 transcript in the certified record. Our review 

indicates that this transcript related to the equitable distribution of the 

parties’ assets – an issue we do not reach due to waiver. As such, we deny 

Husband’s application to quash.