*

Joseph F. Frankl is substituted for his predecessor Joseph P. Norelli, as

Regional Director of Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to

(continued...)

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH F. FRANKL,* Regional Director

of Region 20 of the National Labor

Relations Board, for and on behalf of the

National Labor Relations Board,

 Petitioner - Appellee,

 v.

HTH CORPORATION; KOA

MANAGEMENT, LLC, DBA Pacific

Beach Hotel; PACIFIC BEACH

CORPORATION, 

 Respondents - Appellants.

No. 10-15984

D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00014-JMSLEK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2011

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed July 13, 2011

Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges. *

 *

FILED

JUL 13 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*

(...continued)

Fed. R. App. 43(c)(2).

2

Opinion by Judge BERZON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal of an injunction issued pursuant to § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j),

of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., (the “NLRA” or the

“Act”), raises two questions, one difficult, the other relatively straightforward. 

The straightforward question is whether the injunction should be affirmed on

its merits. We have little difficulty concurring in the District Court’s assessment

that the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”) is likely to

determine, and be affirmed by this Court in so determining, that appellants (the

“Hotel”) engaged in violations of § 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act by refusing to

bargain in good faith and excluding five union activists from the workforce. The

District Court likewise did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the other

requisites for § 10(j) relief were met.

The somewhat more difficult question is the logically prior one of whether

the District Court had the power to issue the injunction. In 2007, the Board

assigned the authority to approve § 10(j) petitions to the General Counsel of the

Board. See Minute of Board Action, Dec. 20, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,

the General Counsel approved the filing of the instant § 10(j) petition. The Hotel
3

argues that the Act requires that petitions for § 10(j) relief be individually approved

by the Board before they are filed with a district court. Because the Regional

Director did not obtain such approval, the Hotel argues, he did not have authority

to petition for the injunction, and the District Court was without the power to grant

it. Like all the federal courts of appeals to have addressed the question, we

disagree. See Osthus v. Whitesell Corp., No. 09-3209, —F.3d—, 2011 WL

1517949, at *2 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2011); Overstreet v. El Paso Disposal, L.P., 625

F.3d 844, 851-52 (5th Cir. 2010); Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534,

539-40 (4th Cir. 2009).

I. BACKGROUND

When the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issues a

complaint alleging an unfair labor practice and commences proceedings before the

Board, it takes considerable time—sometimes years—for the administrative process

to conclude. But “[t]ime is usually of the essence [in labor disputes].” Miller v.

Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 455 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting S. Rep.

No. 80-105, at 8 (1947) (second alteration in original)). As a result of “the

relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and order, followed many months later

by an enforcing decree of the circuit court of appeals . . . [i]t [may be] possible for

persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed
4

under any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible [for the

Board] to restore . . . the status quo.” Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 27 (1947).

To remedy this problem, Congress added § 10(j) to the NLRA, as part of a

comprehensive labor law reform in 1947. See Labor-Management Relations Act,

1947 (the “Taft-Hartley Act”), Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 149,

codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). Section 10(j) provides:

(j) Injunctions

The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as

provided in subsection (b) of this section charging that any person has

engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any

United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair

labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such

person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief

or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court

shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and

thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary

relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.

29 U.S.C. § 160(j). The purpose of a § 10(j) injunction is “to protect the integrity of

the collective bargaining process and to preserve the Board’s remedial power while

it processes” an unfair labor practice complaint. Miller, 19 F.3d at 459-60. 

The circumstances leading to the application for a § 10(j) injunction in this

case are as follows: In 2002, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union,

Local 142 (the “Union”) began to organize employees at the Pacific Beach Hotel in
1

 We use the term “Hotel” to refer the facility itself as well as the three

business entities, appellants here, that have owned and managed it. Where the

referent is not clear from context, we eschew the term.

5

Waikiki, Honolulu.1

 A representation election was held in July, 2002, but the

Board set it aside, finding that the Hotel had “engaged in objectionable conduct by

coercively interrogating employees and maintaining an overly broad no-solicitation

policy.” HTH Corp., 342 N.L.R.B. 372, 374 (2004). After a second election,

preceding which, the Board found, the Hotel again engaged in objectionable

conduct, see generally Pac. Beach Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1160 (2005), the Union was

certified, prevailing by a one-vote margin.

Bargaining between the Union and the Hotel did not go well. Between

January 22, 2007 and August 29, 2008, the Union filed numerous unfair labor

practice charges with the Regional Director of Region 20 of the Board (the

“Regional Director” or the “Director”). The Director investigated the charges and

issued an unfair labor practice complaint. 

On September, 30 2009, after thirteen days of hearings, a Board

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that the Hotel had violated § 8(a)(1),

(3) and (5) of the Act and recommended that the Board order the Hotel to cease and

desist from various unfair labor practices and to take other remedial actions. The
2

The Board modified the ALJ’s order in two respects. First, in accord with

its decision in Ky. River Med. Ctr., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (2010), the Board required

(continued...)

6

Hotel filed extensive exceptions to the ALJ’s ruling with the Board, and the

Director filed limited ones. The case remains pending before the Board.

On January 7, 2010, the Director filed a petition in the District Court for

injunctive relief under § 10(j) of the Act. In accordance with the Board’s 2007

delegation of litigation authority, the filing of the petition was approved by the

Board’s General Counsel but not by the members of the Board itself. The Hotel

opposed the petition on its merits but also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction, contending that the Director’s failure to obtain the

Board’s approval to file the § 10(j) petition deprived the District Court of

jurisdiction. Siding with the Director, the District Court issued an injunction

requiring the Hotel to bargain with the Union, to reinstate certain discharged

employees, to rescind unilateral changes to the bargaining unit members’ terms and

conditions of employment, and to take various other remedial measures. 

The Hotel appealed. On June 14, 2011, while this appeal was pending, the

Board issued its decision in the underlying action. See HTH Corp., 356 N.L.R.B.

No. 182 (2011). It affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, findings, and conclusions, and it

modified the ALJ’s recommended remedies in respects not relevant here.2
2

(...continued)

that back pay and other monetary awards be paid with interest compounded on a

daily basis. Second, the Board modified the ALJ’s order to provide for the posting

of notice in accord with J. Picini Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (2010). 

7

II. MOOTNESS

Before turning to the substantive issues at stake in this case, we must first

address the issue of mootness. A Section 10(j) proceeding, in which the Board seeks

injunctive relief to protect the lawful status quo while litigation is pending, can

become moot when the NLRB issues its decision in the underlying administrative

proceeding. See Miller v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Here, however, the Board filed in the district court a motion for civil contempt on

February 14, 2011–while the Hotel was subject to the District Court’s injunction,

after this appeal was filed, and before the Board issued its order. The original

contempt motion sought both coercive and compensatory relief, including back pay

for an employee allegedly terminated in violation of the injunction and the Board’s

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding. 

After the Board issued its decision, the Director notified the District Court that he

no longer sought coercive remedies and, receiving an extension of time to file an

amended civil contempt motion, withdrew the original contempt motion. On July 8,
3

Although a panel of three Board members issued the NLRB’s final order,

this circumstance does not affect the General Counsel’s authority (or lack thereof)

to commence the § 10(j) action.

8

2011, the Board filed an amended civil contempt motion seeking compensatory

relief.

We hold that this appeal is not moot because its resolution is crucial to a

pending claim for retrospective monetary relief sought by the Board against the

Hotel in a civil contempt proceeding. See Trans Int’l Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 1980). “Despite superseding events, an

issue is not moot if there are present effects that are legally significant.” Jacobus v.

Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003). The validity of a civil contempt

adjudication turns on the legitimacy of the underlying injunction. See, e.g.,

Kirkland v. Legion Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95 (1947). The

legitimacy of the District Court’s injunction, in turn, depends on whether the

District Court abused its discretion in granting the Board’s § 10(j) petition. It also

depends on the antecedent question whether the Board has authority to assign

§ 10(j) decisions to the General Counsel.3

 Accordingly, we hold that neither the

delegation issue nor the merits of the injunction are moot. Cf. Trans Int’l Airlines,

650 F.2d at 957 (holding that alternative grounds for the injunction underlying a
9

contempt proceeding remained live on appeal and noting a reluctance to fragment

an appeal into “live” and “moot” issues). 

III. THE BOARD’S AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN § 10(j) DECISIONS TO THE

GENERAL COUNSEL

The Hotel contends that each petition for relief under § 10(j) must be

individually authorized by a quorum of NLRB members. Because the particular

petition in this case was not so authorized, the Hotel maintains, the petition was

improperly before the District Court and should have been dismissed for want of

subject-matter jurisdiction.

A.

1.

The circumstances surrounding the 2007 delegation of litigation authority to

the General Counsel here contested was described recently by the Supreme Court:

As 2007 came to a close, the Board found itself with four

members and one vacancy. It anticipated two more vacancies at the

end of the year, when the recess appointments of Members Kirsanow

and Walsh were set to expire, which would leave the Board with only

two members—too few to meet the Board’s quorum requirement. The

four sitting members decided to take action in an effort to preserve the

Board’s authority to function. On December 20, 2007, the Board

made two delegations of its authority, effective as of midnight

December 28, 2007. First, the Board delegated to the general counsel

continuing authority to initiate and conduct litigation that would

normally require case-by-case approval of the Board. Second, the
10

Board delegated “to Members Liebman, Schaumber and Kirsanow, as

a three-member group, all of the Board’s powers, in anticipation of the

adjournment of the 1st Session of the 110th Congress.” 

. . . .

On December 31, 2007, Member Kirsanow’s recess

appointment expired. Thus, starting on January 1, 2008, Members

Liebman and Schaumber became the only members of the Board.

New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2638-39 (2010) (citations

omitted). New Process Steel went on to consider the second of the two described

delegations, holding that a three-member group with one vacancy could not

exercise the powers of the Board. Id. at 2641-42. Section 3(b) of the Act

authorizes delegations to three-member groups, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b), but, the

Supreme Court reasoned, such a “delegee group ceases to exist once there are no

longer three Board members to constitute the group.” New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct.

at 2642 n.4.

At the same time, New Process Steel expressly declined to discuss the

legality of the Board’s assignment of litigation authority to the General Counsel, the

delegation challenged in this case. The Supreme Court explained:

Our conclusion that the delegee group ceases to exist once there are

no longer three Board members to constitute the group does not cast

doubt on the prior delegations of authority to nongroup members,

such as the regional directors or the general counsel. The latter

implicates a separate question that our decision does not address.
11

Id. We now consider that “separate question,” beginning with a brief survey of the

relevant history.

2.

From 1935, when the NLRA was enacted, to 1947, the Board consisted of

three members responsible for both the prosecution and the adjudication of all cases

over which the Board had jurisdiction. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L.

No. 74-198 (the “Wagner Act”), § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935); id. § 10, 49 Stat.

at 453-55; 2 JOHN HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2656-57 (5th ed.

2006). In response to criticism that the Board’s exercise of both prosecutorial and

adjudicatory functions was improper, Congress established the position of General

Counsel of the Board and assigned the General Counsel the Board’s prosecutorial

functions, as well as other roles. See id. at 2657; Taft-Hartley Act, § 101, 61 Stat. at

139, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). The Taft-Hartley Act also increased the

membership of the Board to five. Id., codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). Section 3(d)

of the Act now provides, in pertinent part:

There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall be appointed

by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for

a term of four years. The General Counsel of the Board shall exercise

general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board (other

than administrative law judges and legal assistants to Board members)

and over the officers and employees in the regional offices. He shall

have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
12

investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160

of this title, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints

before the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may

prescribe or as may be provided by law.

29 U.S.C. § 153(d).

As a matter of the Board’s historical practice, the General Counsel has not

always sought case-specific approval before filing a § 10(j) petition. Immediately

after the Taft-Hartley Act’s passage, for instance, the General Counsel and the

Board entered into a “memorandum of understanding” according to which the

“General Counsel [was to] exercise full and final authority and responsibility on

behalf of the Board for initiating and prosecuting injunction proceedings as

provided for in Section[] 10(j).” Evans v. Int’l Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp.

881, 888 (S.D. Ind. 1948) (quoting the memorandum) (emphasis added); see also

National Labor Relations Board—Procedures § 202.35, reprinted in 20 Labor

Relations Reference Manual 3117-18 (1947) (“Whenever the Regional Director

deems it advisable to seek temporary injunctive relief under Section 10(j) . . . the

officer or Regional Attorney to whom the matter has been referred will make

application for appropriate temporary relief . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

In 1950, however, the Board published a memorandum in the Federal Register

“describ[ing] the statutory authority and set[ting] forth the prescribed duties and
4

 The 1950 Memorandum had been revoked in 1954, when the Board

assigned litigation authority to its Associate General Counsel. See Nat’l Lab. Rel.

Bd., Revocation of Statement of Description of Authority and Assignment of

Responsibilities to the General Counsel, 19 Fed. Reg. 8830, 8831 (Dec. 21, 1954).

13

authority of the General Counsel of the Board.” Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., General

Counsel—Description of Authority and Assignment of Responsibilities, 15 Fed.

Reg. 6924, 6924 (Oct. 14, 1950) (the “1950 Memorandum”). That memorandum

provided that “[o]n behalf of the Board, the General Counsel of the Board will[,] in

full accordance with the directions of the Board, . . . initiate and prosecute injunction

proceedings as provided in section 10(j) . . . Provided, however, That the General

Counsel will initiate and conduct injunction proceedings under section 10(j) . . . only

upon approval of the Board . . . .” Id. In other words, the 1950 Memorandum

authorized the General Counsel to file § 10(j) petitions on the Board’s behalf, but

required him to seek case-specific authorization from the Board before filing them. 

The Board issued a new memorandum in 1955 containing an assignment of litigation

authority to the General Counsel identical to that in the 1950 Memorandum. See

Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., Authority and Assigned Responsibilities of General Counsel of

National Labor Relations Board, 20 Fed. Reg. 2175, 2175 (April 6, 1955) (the “1955

Memorandum”).4

 These two memoranda set forth what was the Board’s standard,
5

 The Board delegated generic § 10(j) authority to the General Counsel for a

brief period in 2001 and 2002, see Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., Order Delegating Authority

to the General Counsel Before Chairman Peter J. Hurtgen, and Members Wilma B.

Liebman and Dennis P. Walsh, 66 Fed. Reg. 65998, 65998 (Dec. 21, 2001); Kentov

v. Point Blank Body Armor, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327-28 (S.D. Fla. 2002).

In addition to this 2001 order, the Board has published amendments to the

1955 Memorandum in the Federal Register, but these amendments relate to parts of

the memorandum that are of no relevance here. See Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., General

Counsel—Further Amendment to Memorandum Describing Authority and

Assigned Responsibilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 62992, 62992 (Oct. 9, 2002) (citing other

amending memoranda).

14

but not invariant,5

 practice until the 2007 delegation at issue in this case. The

General Counsel’s § 10(j) Manual describes that procedure in greater detail:

After the Region [i.e., a regional office of the agency]

determines that a case has merit and believes 10(j) proceedings are

appropriate, the Region makes a recommendation in writing to the

General Counsel, through the Injunction Litigation Branch (ILB) of

the Division of Advice, as to whether it believes that Section 10(j)

relief is warranted. . . . If the General Counsel agrees that 10(j)

proceedings should be sought, the Region’s memorandum provides

the foundation for the General Counsel’s request for authorization

from the Board.

. . . .

After the General Counsel reviews and signs ILB’s cover

memorandum to the Board, the entire case, including the Region’s

memorandum and attachments, is submitted to the Board. . . . At this

point, at the latest, the Region should immediately begin preparing

papers to file in district court. . . . If the Board authorizes Section

10(j) proceedings, the ILB will immediately notify the Region. 
6

The redacted § 10(j) Manual is available at

http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/44/redacted_10j_manual_5.0_re

duced.pdf (last visited June 8, 2011).

7

 The relevant section of the Case Handling Manual is available at

http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/44/chm_ulp_2011.pdf (last

visited June 8, 2011). We later discuss the relevance of § 10(l).

8

 For whatever reason, § 10(j) petitions have historically been filed in the

name of a regional director “for and on behalf of the Board.” See Gottfried v.

Frankel, 818 F.2d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting this practice). In accord with

this longstanding practice, the plaintiff in this case is “Joseph F. Frankl, for and on

behalf of the Board,” not simply the “Board.”

15

NLRB Office of the General Counsel, Electronic Redacted § 10(j) Manual §§ 5.2,

5.3, & 5.5 at 12 & 14 (2002).6

 The § 10(j) Manual does not describe the Board’s

procedure upon receipt of the General Counsel’s memorandum, but the Board’s

Case Handling Manual suggests that the ordinary practice has been for the Board to

vote on each petition individually:

The Regional Office, based on either the Director’s sua sponte

determination or a request from the charging party, initially considers

whether 10(j) relief is warranted. In contrast to 10(l) injunctive relief,

where by statute interim relief must be sought whenever certain unfair

labor practices have occurred and are likely to continue, the Board

decides on a case-by-case basis whether to authorize the Regional

Office to seek 10(j) relief.

NLRB Case Handling Manual, Part I, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings § 10310

(2009).7

 After obtaining the Board’s approval, the Regional Director files the § 10(j)

petition in district court.8

 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.37 (“Whenever it is deemed advisable
9

 In McDermott v. Ampersand Publishing, 593 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2010), we

considered an appeal from a denial of a § 10(j) petition approved by the General

Counsel, but not by the Board. See id. at 956. We affirmed the district court on

the merits without addressing the propriety of the procedure by which the agency

arrived at the decision to file the petition. See id. at 956 n.4. Even if, as the Hotel

maintains, a district court’s jurisdiction turns on that procedure’s propriety,

McDermott is not of precedential significance as to that issue. See Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the existence of

unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect.”).

16

to seek temporary injunctive relief under section 10(j) . . . the officer or regional

attorney to whom the matter has been referred will make application for appropriate

temporary relief . . . .”).

The Director and the Hotel dispute whether this procedure, case-by-case prefiling approval by the Board of § 10(j) petitions, is mandated by the Act. We

conclude that it is not.9

B.

The parties and some of the courts to have considered the question have

assumed that if a Regional Director failed to obtain the necessary authorization to

file a § 10(j) petition, that failure would deprive a district court of subject-matter

jurisdiction. See Osthus, 2011 WL 1517949, at *2 (holding that the Board’s

delegation did not deprive the district court of “subject matter jurisdiction”); El Paso

Disposal, 625 F.3d at 851-52 (same); cf. Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political

Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 98-99 (1994) (dismissing a petition for certiorari for lack
17

of jurisdiction because the FEC lacked “statutory authority to litigate th[e] case in”

the Supreme Court without the Solicitor General’s authorization). In support of its

contention that a district court’s jurisdiction hangs in the balance, the Hotel observes

that § 10(j)’s first sentence describes the manner and circumstances in which a §

10(j) petition may be filed, and its second sentence then provides that “[u]pon the

filing of any such petition the court . . . shall have jurisdiction.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j)

(emphasis added). The use of the word “such,” the Hotel argues, means that a

district court does not have jurisdiction to grant § 10(j) relief if the petition seeking it

was not approved in accordance with the terms of the first sentence. 

An alternative view of the statutory language is that as long as the petition is

facially regular—that is, is filed on behalf of the Board in the appropriate court,

specifies that a complaint alleging an unfair labor practice has been issued, and

requests appropriate relief—it is “such [a] petition” and the district court has

jurisdiction to consider it. On that view, issues concerning whether the petition was

properly approved might at most be considered on the merits, but would not

implicate the court’s jurisdiction. We regard it unlikely that Congress intended a

district court’s jurisdiction to depend on the backstage subtleties of how a facially

proper petition came to be before it, especially as both the court and the respondent
18

in § 10(j) proceedings will often have no reason to suspect that a petition was not

properly authorized.

Here, however, the issue of the propriety of the Board’s 2007 delegation of its

authority to approve § 10(j) petitions to the General Counsel has been squarely

raised before us. Because we conclude that the General Counsel’s exercise of that

authority was permitted by the statute, it does not matter—except at one point in the

analysis, see infra section II.D—whether the District Court’s jurisdiction turned on

the issue. We shall therefore assume, without deciding, that an improperly

authorized § 10(j) petition would have implications for a district court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.

C.

1.

The Hotel urges us to read § 10(j)’s language as requiring that the Board

approve each individual § 10(j) petition. That section provides, “The Board shall

have power . . . to petition . . . for appropriate temporary relief . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §

160(j) (emphasis added). “The Board,” the Hotel insists, means the five members of

the Board, acting as a group, not the General Counsel and not the Regional
10 In some contexts, there is a certain ambiguity as to what “the Board” is. 

“The Board” may refer to the entire agency responsible for the oversight of most

private-sector labor relations in the United States (and so include the General

Counsel and the regional directors), or it can refer only to the five-member council

that governs that agency. Section 10(j)’s reference to “the Board” refers to the

five-member council. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(10) (defining “the National Labor

Relations Board” throughout the Act as “the National Labor Relations Board

provided for in section 153”); id. § 153(a) (“the National Labor Relations Board

(hereinafter called the ‘Board’) . . . is continued as an agency of the United States,

except that the Board shall consist of five instead of three members . . . .”).

19

Director.10 By contrast, § 10(l), which was also added by the Taft-Hartley Act in

1947, provides that, upon the filing of certain kinds of charges with the Board, the

charges must be investigated and

[i]f, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom

the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such

charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of

the Board, petition [the appropriate] United States district court . . .

for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the

Board with respect to such matter.

29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (emphases added). In other words, § 10(l) makes clear that an

officer of the Board—not the Board itself—not only may, but must, seek temporary

injunctive relief to remedy certain narrow violations of the Act. That § 10(j)

references only the Board, not the Board’s officers or regional attorneys, the

argument goes, suggests that the Board itself must approve each § 10(j) petition

before it is filed. 
20

We conclude that these statutory considerations are more than

counterbalanced by a number of others. As we explain, § 10(j) gives the Board the

power to petition a court for relief, which the Board necessarily does through

counsel, but does not specify the level of involvement that the Board must have with

each individual petition. The contrast with § 10(l) reflects only that § 10(l) removes

from the Board the authority, left to the Board in § 10(j), to determine how and by

whom the filing of petitions is to be authorized. § 3(d) of the Act, providing that the

General Counsel shall, in addition to the duties prescribed by the statute, “have such

other duties as the Board may prescribe,” supplies the Board’s authorization to

assign the General Counsel the duty to decide whether § 10(j) petitions should be

filed. Relying on these statutory features, we hold that, although the Board may

reserve to itself the ultimate decision whether to petition for § 10(j) relief in

individual cases, it may also exercise its power to petition for § 10(j) relief by

authorizing the General Counsel to decide in which cases to seek relief on the

Board’s behalf. 

2. 

We begin with the observation that § 10(j) provides only that “[t]he Board

shall have power . . . to petition” for relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). It does not specify
21

how the Board must exercise that power, or that the Board may not allow anyone

else to decide when that power should be exercised in individual cases. 

Section 10(j) is quite different in this respect from § 10(c), the provision of the

Act discussing the Board’s power to issue orders in unfair labor practice

adjudications. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). That section provides that “[i]f upon the

preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion” that an

unfair labor practice has occurred, “then the Board shall state its findings of fact and

shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair

labor practice.” Id. (emphases added). This language contemplates that the Board

shall form its own opinion and state its own findings of fact. There is no analogous

suggestion in the language of § 10(j). Indeed, there is even a subtle difference

between § 10(c)’s statement that the Board “shall issue . . . an order” and § 10(j)’s

provision that the Board “shall have power . . . to petition” for relief. The former

identifies the Board as the taker of the action in question (issuing orders), while the

latter merely assigns the Board a power, without any clear implication as to how that

power must be exercised or to whom it may be delegated.

Further, § 10(c) begins with a recognition that testimony may be “taken by [a

Board] member, agent, or agency” of the Board, see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), before

stating that after such a member, agent, or agency takes testimony, “in its discretion,
11 Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), provides:

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging

(continued...)

22

the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument.” Id. § 160(c)

(emphases added). The section then goes on to describe, in the manner recounted

above, the Board’s duties to state its findings of fact, form its opinion, and issue

orders in unfair labor practice cases. This distinction between the Board on the one

hand and Board members, agents, and agencies on the other underscores that §

10(c)’s later references to the “Board’s”—but not Board “members’, agents’ or

agencies’”—duty to decide unfair labor practice cases and issue orders in them is

further evidence that the Board may not authorize others to adjudicate individual

unfair labor practice cases on its behalf. Again, there is no similar contrast in §

10(j), and so no basis for inferring a requirement that the Board itself make § 10(j)

decisions on a case-by-case basis.

Another provision of the Act similarly supports through structural comparison

the view that § 10(j) does not direct the Board to decide itself, on an individualized

basis, whether to file petitions for interim relief with district courts. Unlike § 10(j),

§ 10(b) expressly contemplates the possibility of an “agent or agency designated by

the Board for . . . purposes” of exercising the Board’s “power” to issue complaints. 

29 U.S.C. § 160(b).11 But an examination of the statutory history of § 10(b) reveals
11(...continued)

in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency

designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue

and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the

charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the

Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at

a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said

complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any

unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing

of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon

the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person

aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of

service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall

be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may

be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing

or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an

order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right

to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear

in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed

in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency

conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed

to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such

proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance

with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the

United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts

of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United

States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28.

23

that the inference to be drawn from that provision is that the use of the term “power”

to describe a particular Board activity does not preclude its assignment on a generic

basis to another official or officials.

Section 10(b), including its mention of an “agent or agency designated by the

Board” to exercise the Board’s “power” to issue complaints, was included in the
12 The Hotel strenuously objects to the notion that § 3(d) has anything to do

with the General Counsel’s authority to approve § 10(j) petitions, an objection to

which we later return. But, for now, the salient points are that § 10(j) is silent as to

the level of generality at which the Board must exercise its power to petition, and

that the Act has from the outset recognized that the Board can sometimes exercise

its statutory “powers” by assigning them generically to other affiliated officials and

allowing them to decide in which individual cases they should be exercised.

24

original Wagner Act, see 49 Stat. at 453-54, and left largely unamended by the TaftHartley Act. See 61 Stat. at 146-47. The Taft-Hartley Act, however, added § 3(d) to

the NLRA, creating the position of General Counsel, designating the General

Counsel as having “final authority, on behalf of the Board,” to issue complaints, and

providing generally for the assignment of “other duties” to the General Counsel. 61

Stat. at 139. The new § 3(d) thus both negated the Board’s ability to make the

specific delegation of Board “power” to issue unfair labor practice complaints

contemplated by § 10(b) by assigning that “final” authority to the General Counsel,

and obviated the need for any specific authorization within § 10(j) for discretionary

delegations of the Board’s powers, by providing generically in § 3(d) for such

assignments to the General Counsel. So the mention of designated agents in § 10(b),

far from defeating the notion that the Board’s § 10(j) power may be exercised by an

entity other the Board, in fact suggests that the Board’s “powers” are not inherently

nondelegable.12
25

Finally, comparison between § 10(j) and § 10(l), does not detract from the

conclusion that nothing in § 10(j) requires the Board to make case-by-case decisions

as to § 10(j) petitions. For a subset of unfair labor practice cases, § 10(l) mandates,

rather than allows, application for interim relief if “the officer or regional attorney to

whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe [the] charge is true

and that a complaint should issue.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(l). The section also assigns the

task of making the application for interim relief to “the officer or regional attorney to

whom the matter may be referred . . . on behalf of the Board.” Id. Section 10(l) thus

establishes a mandatory procedure in respect to when to petition for interim relief

and who should file the petition. By contrast, § 10(j) sets neither type of

requirement, and so provides the Board with flexibility both as to whether to petition

for mandatory relief and as to the decisionmaking process for determining whether

to do so.

Section 10(j)’s silence speaks loudly enough that we might end the matter

there, concluding that the Board may exercise its § 10(j) power by having the

General Counsel decide whether to petition for § 10(j) relief in an individual case. 

Indeed, unlike stating findings of fact or issuing orders in unfair labor practice

proceedings, it is hard to delineate the precise action that constitutes an exercise of

the § 10(j) power. Surely, the multi-member Board is not required to make every
26

decision that arises in the course of litigating a § 10(j) petition. The multi-member

council need not, for example, appear before the district court and recite its oral

argument in unison. The Board’s lawyers do—indeed, must—make such litigation

decisions and so they are necessarily involved in the exercise of the Board’s power

to petition under § 10(j). 

No more than it requires the Board’s involvement in each decision relating to

a § 10(j) petition does the language of the statute require that the Board approve each

individual petition. In other words, nothing in the statute makes the individual

petition the unit of analysis for determining when the Board is exercising its § 10(j)

power. Moreover, petitioning a court for relief is a lawyerly function and the

General Counsel is, after all, the supervisor of the Board’s legal staff. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 153(d). So it seems quite natural that the Board could assign to the General

Counsel the duty to decide when to exercise its power to petition. Cf. Am. Bar

Ass’n, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (“[T]he client may authorize the

lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without further consultation . . . . 

[A] lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization.”).

3.

More generally, we have previously observed that as far as delegation to

subordinates is concerned, “[e]xpress statutory authority for delegation is not
27

required.” Loma Linda Univ. v. Schweiker, 705 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1983); see

U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“When a statute

delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate

federal officer or agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of

a contrary congressional intent.”); see also Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v.

Glickman, 88 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Without express congressional

authorization for a subdelegation, we must look to the purpose of the statute to set its

parameters.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

It is true that the General Counsel’s status as the Board’s subordinate is not

unequivocal. The General Counsel is an independently appointed and confirmed

officer whose prosecutorial role Congress deemed it prudent to segregate from the

Board’s adjudicatory one. That fact complicates the application of the general

presumption that delegations to subordinates are permissible in cases of statutory

silence. 

But the General Counsel is the Board’s subordinate at least insofar as § 3(d) of

the Act requires the General Counsel to perform “such other duties as the Board may

prescribe.” 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). The Act, in other words, is not silent. Upon careful

consideration, we conclude that § 3(d) authorizes the Board to prescribe to the
28

General Counsel in particular the responsibility and authority to decide when to seek

§ 10(j) relief.

Section 3(d) of the Act provides that the General Counsel

shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the

investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under [section 10],

and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board,

and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may

be provided by law. 

29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (emphasis added). The Hotel contends that § 3(d) authorizes

the delegation only of “duties,” not of “powers,” and so, because the Act describes

the authority to petition for a § 10(j) injunction as a “power,” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j),

not as a “duty,” § 3(d) cannot authorize the Board to delegate to the General

Counsel generic authority to approve § 10(j) petitions.

A careful reading of § 3(d), informed by the Act as a whole, reveals that its

use of the word “duties” does not contemplate that functions elsewhere described

as “powers” may not be prescribed to the General Counsel. Section 3(d) provides

that the General Counsel shall have “such other duties” as the Board may

prescribe; it does not say simply say “such duties.” 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (emphasis

added). For the use of the word “other” to be linguistically proper, § 3(d) must be

read as having already listed some functions that may be construed as duties of the

General Counsel. And, unsurprisingly, it has: The sentence in § 3(d) authorizing
29

the prescription of “other duties” begins by stating that the General Counsel “shall

have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of

charges and issuance of complaints under [section 10], and in respect of the

prosecution of such complaints before the Board.” 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). For the

word “other” in the phrase “other duties” to make sense, § 3(d) must be read as

presupposing that these enumerated functions of the General Counsel (i.e., the

investigation of charges and the issuance and prosecution of complaints) are also

“duties.” 

Other parts of the Act, however, refer to these same enumerated functions as

“powers.” Section 10 of the Act, for instance, sets forth the Board’s authority to

issue complaints and is explicitly cross-referenced by § 3(d). It provides that:

the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such

purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such

person a complaint . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, Congress prefaced §§ 11 and 12

of the Act, which describe the Board’s authority to investigate unfair labor

practices, with the heading “Investigatory Powers.” Wagner Act, 49 Stat. at 455;

Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. at 150 (emphasis added); see Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he heading of a section [is a] tool[]

available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.”) (internal
30

quotation marks omitted). So, read as a whole, the Act cannot be fairly said to

contain any clear-cut distinction between “powers” and “duties.” 

That the Act appears to use the terms “power” and “duty” as largely

interchangeable is unsurprising. One can only be under a duty to do that which

one has the power to do, and a duty need not be an obligation to exercise a

ministerial power. Cf. Osthus, 2011 WL 1517949, at *4-5 (Colloton, J.,

concurring) (observing that “it is not logically inconsistent for Congress to say that

a superior body (the Board) may task a subordinate official (the General Counsel)

with the ‘duty’ to exercise some of the Board’s ‘power’” and drawing an analogy

to similar language in the Internal Revenue Code). The sum of the matter is that

any inference from the text of the statute that the Act precludes the Board from

assigning to the General Counsel the task of deciding in which individual cases §

10(j) petitions should be filed is, at best, exceedingly weak.

4.

One final consideration reinforces the conclusion that the Act permits the

assignment of § 10(j) petition decisions to the General Counsel: Section 10(e) of

the Act has long been interpreted and applied to permit the General Counsel, and

not the Board itself, to make the ultimate decision whether to commence litigation

in individual cases. Section 10(e)’s structure is nearly identical to that of § 10(j). 
31

The agency’s longstanding practice under § 10(e) is therefore persuasive evidence

of the legality of its more short-lived and episodic practice under § 10(j). See New

Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2641-42.

Violation of an order issued by the Board at the conclusion of unfair labor

practice proceedings does not result in any penalties for the violator. See 2

HIGGINS, supra, at 2802. “To secure compliance, the Board must apply to an

appropriate U.S. court of appeals” for enforcement of its order. Id. Section 10(e)

of the Act sets forth the power of the Board to petition for judicial enforcement of

its orders, using language closely parallel to that of § 10(j). Specifically, § 10(e)

provides, in part, that “[t]he Board shall have power to petition any court of

appeals of the United States . . . for the enforcement of [its] order.” 29 U.S.C. §

160(e) (emphasis added). Section 10(e) then includes a grant of jurisdiction that is

structured in a manner essentially identical to § 10(j)’s, providing that “[u]pon the

filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served . . . , and

thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined

therein.” Id.

From 1950 to 2007, the General Counsel’s litigation authority on behalf of

the Board was, with rare exceptions, governed by memoranda containing the

following language:
13 Because § 10(j) relief may expire upon the issuance of a final Board order,

§ 10(e) also provides that a court “shall have power to grant . . . temporary relief or

[a] restraining order” pending the enforcement proceedings. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 

A request for such temporary relief is distinct from a petition to enforce an order of

the Board.

Section 10(f) of the Act allows “person[s] aggrieved” by Board orders to

petition for their review by a court and allows the court to grant temporary

(continued...)

32

On behalf of the Board, the General Counsel of the Board will,

in full accordance with the directions of the Board, petition for

enforcement and resist petitions for review of Board Orders as

provided in section 10(e) and (f) of the act, initiate and prosecute

injunction proceedings as provided in section 10(j), seek temporary

restraining orders as provided in section 10(e) and (f), and take

appeals either by writ of error or on petition for certiorari to the

Supreme Court: Provided, however, That the General Counsel will

initiate and conduct injunction proceedings under section 10(j) or

under section 10(e) and (f) of the act and contempt proceedings

pertaining to the enforcement of or compliance with any order of the

Board only upon approval of the Board, and will initiate and conduct

appeals to the Supreme Court by writ of error or on petition for

certiorari when authorized by the Board. 

1955 Memorandum, 20 Fed. Reg. at 2175; 1950 Memorandum, 15 Fed. Reg. at

6924; see section II.A.2, supra. In other words, the memoranda assigned to the

General Counsel generic authority to petition for enforcement of the Board’s

orders under § 10(e) of the Act. In the proviso, the Board required the General

Counsel to obtain case-specific approval only to seek injunctive relief under §

10(j), (e) and (f) of the Act, to petition for Supreme Court review, and to bring

contempt proceedings.13
13(...continued)

injunctive relief similar to that available under § 10(e). 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). 

33

The agency’s longstanding practice of having the General Counsel, and not

the Board, exercise final authority in approving petitions for enforcement under §

10(e) is strongly supportive of that practice’s validity. See New Process Steel, 130

S. Ct. at 2641 (drawing on the “longstanding practice of the Board” as “persuasive

evidence” that the Court’s interpretation of the Act “is the correct one”); Karsten v.

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011) (according

deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), to agencies’ views

in part because of “[t]he length of time the agencies have held them”); Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (“[A]n administrative agency’s

consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which it operates is

entitled to considerable weight.”). To conclude that the General Counsel could not

exercise such authority would be to hold decades of unchallenged agency practice

unlawful—a practice, moreover, in which courts have acquiesced thousands of

times over by granting petitions for enforcement. 

In NLRB v. C&C Roofing Supply, Inc., 569 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), for

example, relying on the 1955 Memorandum, we observed that “[t]he General

Counsel’s authority to petition the courts of appeals for enforcement . . . is
34

permanently within the General Counsel’s authority,” explaining that such power

“does not derive from the temporary delegation of 2007.” Id. at 1098. Although

we did not directly address the validity of the 1955 Memorandum’s assignment of

§ 10(e) authority, the fact that we characterized the delegation as permanent

evidences its longstanding nature and the history of judicial acquiescence in it.

Of course, if the statute clearly precluded the generic assignment of when to

exercise the Board’s § 10(e) power to the General Counsel, it would be our duty to

tell the agency that it had been wrong all along. But the statute contains no such

preclusion. Instead, it affirmatively suggests that the Board may exercise its power

to petition for enforcement under § 10(e) by authorizing the General Counsel to

decide when to petition for enforcement of Board orders in individual cases, for the

same reasons, already discussed, that it may do the same under § 10(j). See IBP,

Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory

interpretation [is] that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are

generally presumed to have the same meaning.”); Overstreet v. United Bhd. of

Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2005)

(same). The converse is, of course, also true. As long as the Board may grant

generic authorization to the General Counsel to approve petitions for enforcement

under § 10(e), the same must be the case under § 10(j). 
35

In sum, we hold that the text of the Act, reinforced by the Board’s

longstanding practice under § 10(e), allows the Board to assign the General

Counsel final authority in deciding when to petition for injunctive relief under §

10(j) in particular unfair labor practice cases pending before the Board.

The three other circuits that have addressed the question agree that district

courts may entertain § 10(j) petitions approved by the General Counsel pursuant to

the authority granted him by the Board in December 2007. See Osthus v. Whitesell

Corp., No. 09-3209, —F.3d—, 2011 WL 1517949 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2011);

Overstreet v. El Paso Disposal, L.P., 625 F.3d 844, 851-52 (5th Cir. 2010);

Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 539-40 (4th Cir. 2009). Although

our reasoning differs somewhat from that in those cases, our conclusion with

regard to the validity of the Board’s 2007 delegation of litigation authority under §

10(j) is identical.

D.

Because we have assumed, without deciding, that the Regional Director’s

authority to petition for § 10(j) relief may have jurisdictional implications, we

consider an issue that the Hotel did not raise, but that other circuits have

considered and rejected—whether the reduction of the Board’s membership to two,

where it stood at the time the General Counsel approved the filing of the § 10(j)
36

petition here at issue, affected the ability of the General Counsel to file § 10(j)

petitions. See El Paso Disposal, 625 F.3d at 853; Osthus, 2011 WL 1517949 at *2

(following El Paso Disposal); see also Williams v. United Airlines, Inc., 500 F.3d

1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting our duty to raise questions of the district court’s

jurisdiction nostra sponte). 

In a case decided before New Process Steel, the D.C. Circuit suggested that

the reduction of the Board’s membership to two would have such an effect. See

Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C.

Cir. 2009). Considering the 2007 delegation of adjudicatory authority also at issue

in New Process Steel, Laurel Baye drew on principles of agency and corporations

law, broadly reasoning that “[i]n the context of a board-like entity, a delegee’s

authority . . . ceases the moment that vacancies or disqualifications on the board

reduce the board’s membership below a quorum.” Id. 

But New Process Steel rejected the D.C. Circuit’s underlying premise in

Laurel Baye: The Supreme Court emphasized that a quorum requirement only

specifies the “number of members who must participate for [a multi-member

organization] to take an action,” not “a membership requirement that must be

satisfied or else the power of any entity to which the Board has delegated authority

is suspended.” New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2642 n.4. In other words, New
37

Process Steel instructs that the Act’s quorum requirement must be satisfied when

the Board is acting directly through its members, but does not need to be satisfied

for the Board’s earlier exercises and assignments of its authority, made with a

proper quorum, to remain valid and in effect.

Given that distinction, the Board-member quorum requirement in § 3(b) of

the Act has only limited pertinence with regard to § 10(j). As we developed

earlier, § 10(j) assigns the Board a “power” but does not mandate the case-by-case

involvement of the Board as a multi-member organization in exercising that power. 

Thus, with respect to the Board’s power to file petitions under § 10(j), it was

sufficient that a quorum of the Board in 2007 decided to assign decisions as to

individual petitions to the General Counsel. Under the distinction explained in

New Process Steel, nothing in the Board’s quorum requirement would cause the

General Counsel’s ability to file § 10(j) petitions to lapse after the Board’s

membership fell below a quorum. 

IV. THE MERITS OF THE INJUNCTION

We now consider the injunction on its merits.

Section 10(j) permits a district court to grant relief “it deems just and

proper.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). “To decide whether granting a request for interim

relief under Section 10(j) is ‘just and proper,’ district courts consider the traditional
38

equitable criteria used in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction.” 

McDermott v. Ampersand Publ’g, LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus,

when a Regional Director seeks § 10(j) relief, he “must establish that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct.

365, 374 (2008). “‘[S]erious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of

hardships that tips sharply towards the [Regional Director] can support issuance of

a preliminary injunction, so long as the [Regional Director] also shows that there is

a likelihood of irreparable harm and that the injunction is in the public interest.” 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In

all cases, however, the Regional Director “must establish that irreparable harm is

likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 1131

(emphasis omitted); see Small v. Operative Plasterers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 200, 611

F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing that Winter abrogated Miller’s holding

that a mere “possibility of irreparable harm” can be adequate); McDermott, 593

F.3d at 957 (same). “[T]he court must evaluate the traditional equitable criteria

through the prism of the underlying purpose of section 10(j), which is to protect the

integrity of the collective bargaining process and to preserve the Board’s remedial
39

power.” Scott v. Stephen Dunn & Assocs., 241 F.3d 652, 661 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by

McDermott, 593 F.3d at 957.

The District Court determined that the Director was likely to succeed on the

merits and likely to suffer irreparable harm; that the balance of hardships tipped in

the Director’s favor; and that a preliminary injunction would be in the public

interest. The District Court therefore enjoined the Hotel from various activities

that, in its view, the Board would likely determine, and be affirmed by the Ninth

Circuit in so determining, are unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1), (3)

and (5) of the Act. 

We may reverse the grant of a § 10(j) preliminary injunction “only where the

district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal

standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 455. “Where

the district court is alleged to have relied on erroneous legal premises, review is

plenary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these standards, we

affirm.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Legal Standards
14Although the Board’s June 14, 2011 decision, HTH Corp., 356 N.L.R.B.

No. 182 (2011), does not affect our analysis, its conclusions strongly support our

own.

40

On a § 10(j) petition, likelihood of success is a function of the probability

that the Board will issue an order determining that the unfair labor practices

alleged by the Regional Director occurred and that this Court would grant a

petition enforcing that order, if such enforcement were sought.14 Cf. McDermott,

593 F.3d at 964. We have explained that when the General Counsel, and not the

Board, gives final approval to file a § 10(j) petition, “we do not presume that the

Regional Director’s position will ultimately be adopted by the Board.” 

McDermott, 593 F.3d at 964; see also Small, 611 F.3d at 491 n.3 (expressing

hesitation about whether according weight to the Regional Director’s decision to

file a § 10(l) petition is appropriate in evaluating the likelihood of success because

such petitions are filed without the Board’s approval); United Bhd. of Carpenters,

409 F.3d at 1207 n.12 (same). Because the Board did not approve the petition

here, we do not accord significance to the fact of the petition’s filing in evaluating

the Director’s likelihood of success. 

Nonetheless, in evaluating the likelihood of success, “it is necessary to factor

in the district court’s lack of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and the

deference accorded to NLRB determinations by the courts of appeals.” Miller, 19
41

F.3d at 460. It is, after all, the Board and not the courts, which “has primary

responsibility for declaring federal labor policy.” Id. Additionally, and for similar

reasons, “even on an issue of law, the district court should be hospitable to the

views of the General Counsel, however novel.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Given these considerations, it remains the case—whether or not the

Board itself approved the filing of the § 10(j) petition—that the regional director in

a § 10(j) proceeding “can make a threshold showing of likelihood of success by

producing some evidence to support the unfair labor practice charge, together with

an arguable legal theory.” Id.; see also Scott, 241 F.3d at 662 (“[T]o satisfy the

‘likelihood of success’ prong of the traditional equitable test, [the Director] need

only show a better than a negligible chance of success.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). But if the Director does not show that success is likely, and instead

shows only that there are serious questions going to the merits, then he must show

that the balance of hardships tilts sharply in his favor, as well as showing that there

is irreparable harm and that the injunction is in the public interest. See Alliance for

the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.

2. Statutory provisions

The District Court held that the Board would likely determine, and be

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in so determining, that the Hotel committed
15 The Hotel has not challenged on appeal the District Court’s determination

that the Board will find that the three entities constitute a single employer for

(continued...)

42

violations of § 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair

labor practice to “discriminat[e] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any

term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any

labor organization,” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); § 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor

practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives

of his employees,” id. § 158(a)(5); and § 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice

to “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of their rights to

organize and to bargain collectively. Id. § 158(a)(1). “[A] violation by an

employer of any of the four subdivisions of Section 8, other than subdivision one,

is also a violation of subdivision one.” 1 HIGGINS, supra, at 87 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

3. Underlying facts

The Hotel is comprised of three business entities: the HTH Corporation, the

Pacific Beach Corporation, and Koa Management, LLC. The three entities are

owned by the Hayashi family and have officers and managers in common. All

three entities are named respondents on the § 10(j) petition and are a single

employer.15
15(...continued)

purposes of the Act. 

43

From January 1, 2007 until December 1, 2007, a fourth entity, Pacific Beach

Hotel Management, LLC (“PBHM”), a subsidiary of an otherwise unrelated hotel

chain, the Outrigger Group, managed the Hotel. Neither the Outrigger Group nor

PBHM is a respondent in this case or in the proceedings before the Board.

Initially, Robert Minicola and David Mori played the lead roles in collective

bargaining. Minicola, the Regional Vice President of Operations of the HTH

Corporation and the Pacific Beach Corporation had decision-making authority as

to all labor-related issues for the Hotel and represented the Hotel in the

negotiations. David Mori served as the chief spokesperson for the Union.

As previously noted, the Union was certified on August 15, 2005. Between

November 29, 2005 and December 14, 2006, the Union and the Hotel engaged in

thiry-seven bargaining sessions. Throughout these sessions, the Hotel insisted on

three contractual provisions that the Union charged were so objectionable as to

evidence the Hotel’s refusal to bargain in good faith. 

First, the Hotel insisted on a union recognition clause providing:

The employer has and shall maintain at any and all times its sole and

exclusive right to unilaterally and arbitrarily change, amend, and

modify the certified bargaining unit . . . and any and all hours, wages,

and/or other terms and conditions of employment at-will [sic]. 
44

The Hotel also proposed a management rights clause specifying that all terms and

conditions of employment, including the right “to select, hire, discipline and

discharge employees at will,” “shall remain vested exclusively in the Hotel.” The

third objected-to provision set forth the Hotel’s proposed grievance procedure: 

The Hotel insisted that all employee or Union complaints be adjudicated by the

relevant department manager, with appeals to the director of human resources and

ultimately to the general manager of the Hotel. 

As the ALJ remarked,

these three proposals [were] all of a piece. The first is a demand for

[cession] of any control whatsoever over the bargaining unit itself. 

The second sets parameters which allow the Union virtually no say in

the nature of the jobs held by employees which the Union represents. 

The third, [while] facially allowing for some sort of appeal procedure

in the event of an on-the-job grievance, actually sets up only an

illusion . . . [as] it all end[s] up in the hands of the general manager . .

. .

In large part because of the Hotel’s insistence on these three provisions, the

parties had not reached an agreement on an initial contract by January 1, 2007. On

that date, PBHM assumed management of the facility and workforce. 

PBHM, a newly formed subsidiary of the Outrigger Group, had entered into

a management agreement with the Pacific Beach Corporation on September 6,

2006, well after collective bargaining with the Union had begun. The management
45

agreement required PBHM to hire all current Hotel employees at the same jobs,

with the same rates of pay and benefits and the same seniority dates. PBHM was

also to be responsible for bargaining with the Union. Under the terms of the

management agreement, however, the approval of the Hotel’s owner was required

before PBHM could agree to any contract “if the cost to the Hotel under that

[contract] exceeds . . . $350,000,” or if the contract exceeded one year in duration

and could not be terminated upon thirty days’ notice. Because, as PBHM’s lead

negotiator testified, a collective bargaining agreement lasting less than a year or

terminable upon thirty days’ notice would be of limited value and also because any

plausible agreement lasting longer than a year would cost more than $350,000, the

management agreement effectively gave the Hotel veto power with regard to

PBHM’s negotiations with the Union. The management agreement also required

that its terms be kept confidential, so PBHM could not inform the Union of the

Hotel’s broad reservation of the right to reject contracts.

The Union and PBHM reached tentative accord on most items and, by the

end of June, 2007, were on the verge of reaching an overall agreement. PBHM

requested Hotel approval to propose a contract which it believed the Union would

accept. PBHM also requested that the Hotel permit it to disclose to the Union the

Hotel’s reservation of the right to reject contracts. When the Hotel did not consent
46

to the contract or to disclosure, PBHM informed the Hotel that if the Hotel

continued to refuse to grant its two requests for consent, PBHM would believe

itself unable to fulfill its obligation to bargain in good faith under the Act, and the

Hotel would be in violation of its covenant to “reasonably consent to . . . requests”

under its management agreement with PBHM. Four days later, the Hotel exercised

its right to terminate the management agreement with PBHM. 

Effective December 1, 2007, Pacific Beach Corporation resumed its

management of the facility. The Hotel required all employees to reapply for their

jobs, and then reinstated most, but not all, employees. The District Court found

that, out of union animus, the Hotel did not continue the employment of five

bargaining committee members. Also effective December 1, 2007, the Hotel

withdrew recognition from the Union, based on Minicola’s observations that

attendance at Union rallies had declined and unspecified “verbal and written

indications that the majority of employees did not want to be represented by the

Union.” From then on, the Hotel refused to bargain with the Union. The Hotel

also unilaterally granted wage increases to certain employees and changed

employees’ work schedules and responsibilities. In July, 2008, the Hotel

determined that it had received signatures from a majority of bargaining unit
47

employees on a petition stating that the employees did not desire Union

representation and thereupon purported to withdraw recognition a second time.

4. Likelihood of success: § 8(a)(5)

The Board will find that an employer has violated its duty to bargain under §

8(a)(5) of the Act if the employer has failed to bargain in good faith with a union,

see Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 671, 671 (2005), or if it has engaged

in a per se violation of its duty to bargain, regardless of its good faith. See, e.g.,

NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). 

To determine a party’s good faith, the Board looks to the “totality of the

[r]espondent’s conduct, both at and away from the bargaining table.” Hardesty

Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 259 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), enf’d 308

F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002). An employer is not required to “make concessions or

yield any position fairly maintained,” NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc.,

465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972), but is “obliged to make some reasonable effort

in some direction to compose his differences with the union.” Regency Serv. Carts,

Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Thus, “mere pretense at negotiations with a completely closed mind and without a

spirit of cooperation does not satisfy the requirements” of § 8(a)(5). Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). 
48

Here, the ALJ determined that the Hotel violated § 8(a)(5) by (1) engaging

in bad faith bargaining in 2006; (2) engaging in bad-faith bargaining through

PBHM in 2007; and (3) committing per se violations by refusing to bargain and

unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment after it withdrew

recognition from the Union in December 2007. The Regional Director argues, and

the District Court concurred, that the Board is likely to agree with the ALJ’s §

8(a)(5) conclusions and likely to be upheld in that respect upon judicial review. 

We agree.

(i) “[T]he Board has held that a proposal that vested exclusive control in the

employer on the setting of wages, while offering little more than the status quo in

return, was significant evidence of an intent to frustrate agreement, and in

conjunction with other indicia of bad faith, violated of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.” 

In re Liquor Indus. Bargaining Grp., 333 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (2001), enf’d 50 F.

App’x 444 (D.C. Cir. 2002). More generally, while “the mere insistence upon a

management-rights clause is not a per se violation of the Act, the Board has

consistently held that a violation is made out when, as here, the employer demands

a contractual provision which would exclude the labor organization from any

effective means of participation in important decisions affecting the terms and

conditions of employment of its members.” United Contractors Inc., 244 N.L.R.B.
49

72, 73 (1979) (footnote omitted), enf’d 631 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1980). Taken

together, the Hotel’s proposed recognition clause, management rights provision,

and one-sided grievance procedure would exclude the Union from any meaningful

representational role. As a result, the Board is likely to find that the Hotel’s

insistence on these three clauses is exceedingly persuasive evidence of the Hotel’s

lack of good faith in bargaining during 2006.

In addition, the Regional Director points to, and the ALJ and the District

Court both found, other evidence of bad-faith bargaining. See A-1 King Size

Sandwiches, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 850, 858 (1982) (adopting the ALJ’s conclusion

that an employer bargained in bad faith “primarily” based on the employer’s

“bargaining proposals and positions,” especially “viewed in the light of statements

indicative of [the employer’s] attitude toward collective bargaining”). That

evidence included Minicola’s repeated reminders that the Union had won by a onevote margin, notwithstanding the fact that the Board found that the Hotel had

engaged in objectionable conduct preceding the election that quite possibly

affected the margin of victory. Moreover, the Hotel’s objectionable conduct

preceding both elections, as well as its subsequent violations of § 8(a)(3) and (5),

discussed below, constitute further evidence from which the Board may infer that

the Hotel had no intent to resolve its differences with the Union in 2006. In light
16 One initial point bears consideration with regard to this time period: It

would seem not to matter whether the Hotel engaged in bad-faith bargaining while

the PBHM management agreement was in effect, if it did so both before and

afterward, as we would affirm the interim bargaining order no matter whether the

Hotel bargained in bad faith during the PBHM management agreement period. 

The District Court, however, ordered the Hotel to “resume contract negotiations

and honor all tentative agreements entered into from the point [the Hotel] and the

Union, and PBHM and the Union, left off negotiations on November 30, 2007.” 

Thus, whether it was “just and proper,” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), to require the Hotel to

resume bargaining from the tentative agreements reached by PBHM could turn on

whether the Hotel was a statutory employer when PBHM reached those

agreements. For that reason, we reach the latter issue.

50

of this evidence and the Hotel’s bargaining position, the Director has established a

sufficient likelihood that the Board will reasonably determine that the Hotel

bargained in bad faith in 2006. 

(ii) The Hotel also challenges the District Court’s finding that the Board is

likely to determine that the Hotel bargained in bad faith from January 1, 2007 to

December 1, 2007, the period during which PBHM was responsible for bargaining

with the Union. The Court held the record adequate to support the conclusion that

PBHM acted as an agent for the Hotel in collective bargaining and that the Hotel’s

cancellation of the management agreement with PBHM, when a collective

bargaining agreement was imminent, while continuing to keep its veto authority

over a prospective agreement secret, constituted bad-faith bargaining. The

Regional Director asks us to affirm that holding.16
51

The District Court’s reasoning as to this point was comprehensive and

persuasive. Rather than repeat and summarize it, we append that portion of the

District Court’s opinion, with some clarifying redactions. See infra Appendix A.

The Hotel’s three objections to that reasoning are unavailing. It is true that

the ALJ did not hold that PBHM was the Hotel’s agent, but he did nonetheless hold

that the Hotel was the statutory employer during the period of the management

agreement. The District Court was under no obligation to adopt the ALJ’s

reasoning wholesale to issue § 10(j) relief. The District Court instead needed only

to determine whether the Board was likely to determine that the Hotel was the

statutory employer, and to be affirmed by this Court in so determining. 

The Hotel challenges the District Court’s agency determination on its merits

only by arguing that that determination stands in tension with PBHM’s statement

that the HTH Corporation was no longer the employer and that the District Court

based its agency finding “simply” on the Hotel’s power to cancel the management

agreement. Neither of these objections bears weight. PBHM’s statements about

who the employer was do not prevent the Board from answering that legal question

itself. And the District Court based its agency determination on the fact that the

Hotel reserved the right, in secret, to veto any likely collective bargaining

agreement, not simply on its power to cancel the management agreement. 
52

(iii) Finally, as the District Court determined, the Regional Director has a

strong likelihood of establishing that the Hotel violated § 8(a)(5) after December 1,

2007, the date as of which the management agreement with PBHM ended. It is

undisputed that the employer from that date on was the Hotel. The Hotel did not

resume bargaining at that point. Instead, it withdrew recognition from the Union. 

An employer may only withdraw recognition from a union based on

“objective evidence” of a loss of majority support, see Levitz Furniture Co. of the

Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 723-25 (2001), and, even then, withdraws

recognition “at its peril,” id. at 725. “If the union contests the withdrawal of

recognition in an unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer will have to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the union had, in fact, lost majority

support at the time the employer withdrew recognition. If it fails to do so, it will

not have rebutted the presumption of majority status, and the withdrawal of

recognition will violate Section 8(a)(5).” Id. (footnote omitted). The Hotel has not

presented any objective evidence of a loss of majority support as of December 1,

2007. 

In any case, “employers may not withdraw recognition in a context of

serious unremedied unfair labor practices tending to cause employees to become

disaffected from the union.” Id. at 717 n.1. The Board is likely to find that the
53

Hotel’s bad-faith bargaining in 2006 and 2007, as well the § 8(a)(3) violations

discussed below, constituted pervasive unfair labor practices sufficient to taint any

evidence showing that the Union had lost the support of employees. Consequently,

the Hotel could not have validly withdrawn recognition in December 2007, even if

it had had objective evidence of the Union’s loss of majority support. 

The Hotel argues that it will be able to rebut the presumption that the unfair

labor practices caused the loss of majority support. But it is unlikely to be able to

do so. The Hotel did not resume bargaining with the Union after the unfair labor

practices in 2006 and 2007. See Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 322

N.L.R.B. 175, 178 (1996) (“In the absence of unusual circumstances, . . . [the]

presumption of unlawful taint can be rebutted only by an employer’s showing that

employee disaffection arose after the employer resumed its recognition of the

union and bargained for a reasonable period of time without committing any

additional unfair labor practices that would detrimentally affect the bargaining.”). 

The Board is therefore likely to determine, and to be affirmed by this Court in so

determining, that the Hotel committed a violation of § 8(a)(5) when it withdrew

recognition on December 1, 2007. 

The July 2008 petition submitted by the Hotel and purporting to show a loss

of majority support for the Union is, as the District Court found, irrelevant, both
54

because of the effect of the prolonged unfair labor practices on employee support

for the Union and because the Hotel withdrew recognition on December 1, 2007,

without any objective evidence of the loss of union support, and refused to bargain

with the Union thereafter. Whether the Hotel purported to withdraw recognition a

second time, and whether it had a basis for doing so, simply does not matter. 

Additionally, if the Board finds that the withdrawal of recognition was

improper, it will likely also find that the Hotel committed a per se violation of §

8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of bargaining unit

employees’ employment after unlawfully withdrawing recognition from the Union. 

See Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008).

5. Likelihood of success: § 8(a)(3)

The District Court determined that the Director was likely to succeed in

showing that the Hotel violated § 8(a)(3) by terminating five Union leaders, all

long-term Hotel employees and all members of the Union’s negotiation team, when

it reclaimed management responsibilities from PBHM. The Hotel limits its

challenge to this determination to arguing that the District Court applied the wrong

legal standard, maintaining the Hotel did not terminate but only refused to rehire

the employees on December 1, 2007. The theory is that PBHM was a distinct

employer from the Hotel, so that the latter was hiring afresh as of December 2007. 
17 As the above discussion of PBHM’s status as an agent suggests, we do not

mean to indicate that the Hotel did not remain the statutory employer throughout. 

If it did remain the employer, then the District Court was correct to apply the test

for terminations, not refusals to hire. Our point in the text is only that this

consideration does not matter for purposes of the § 8(a)(3) analysis.

55

The District Court found that the Hotel decided not to continue the

employment of the five long-term employees because of their leadership roles in

the Union. The Hotel does not now argue that this finding was clearly erroneous. 

Refusing to hire new employees because of their prior union involvement is as

much an unfair labor practice as is firing current employees for that reason. See

FES (A Division of Thermo Power), 331 N.L.R.B. 9, 12 (2000), enf’d 301 F.3d 83

(3d Cir. 2002); id. at 12-13 (applying the discriminatory discharge framework from

Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), to refusal-to-hire violations). While the

General Counsel must in the hiring context prove “that there was at least one

available opening for the applicant,” id. at 12, the Hotel does not contest that there

were such openings here. As to union animus, the burden is on the Regional

Director to demonstrate its role in motivating the employment decision with regard

to either a termination or a failure to hire, and both the ALJ and District Court

found that the Regional Director had met that burden for each of the five excluded

employees.17

B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
56

Small rejected, as inconsistent with Winter, Miller’s holding that a court may

presume irreparable harm in § 10(j) and § 10(l) cases if a likelihood of success on

the merits in the unfair labor practice proceeding is established. 611 F.3d at 490,

494. At the same time, Small retained from Miller, as consistent with Winter, the

underlying irreparable injury standard applicable in cases such as this one: In the

context of the NLRA, “permit[ting an] alleged unfair labor practice to reach

fruition and thereby render meaningless the Board’s remedial authority is

irreparable harm.” Id. at 494 (quoting Miller, 19 F.3d at 460) (alteration in

original). In other words, while a district court may not presume irreparable injury

with regard to likely unfair labor practices generally, irreparable injury is

established if a likely unfair labor practice is shown along with a present or

impending deleterious effect of the likely unfair labor practice that would likely

not be cured by later relief. In making the latter determination, inferences from the

nature of the particular unfair labor practice at issue remain available.

For instance, with regard to the central statutory violations likely established

here, violations of § 8(a)(5), continuation of that unfair labor practice, failure to

bargain in good faith, has long been understood as likely causing an irreparable

injury to union representation. The Board long ago observed that:
57

Employees join unions in order to secure collective bargaining. 

Whether or not the employer bargains with a union chosen by his

employees is normally decisive of its ability to secure and retain its

members. Consequently, the result of an unremedied refusal to

bargain with a union, standing alone, is to discredit the organization in

the eyes of the employees, to drive them to a second choice, or to

persuade them to abandon collective bargaining altogether.

Karp Metal Prods. Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 621, 624 (1943) (footnote omitted). As the

Seventh Circuit has likewise noted, “[a]s time passes, the benefits of unionization

are lost and the spark to organize is extinguished. The deprivation to employees

from the delay in bargaining and the diminution of union support is

immeasurable.” NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d 1559, 1573 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Consequently, even if the Board subsequently orders a bargaining remedy, the

union is likely weakened in the interim, and it will be difficult to recreate the

original status quo with the same relative position of the bargaining parties. That

difficulty will increase as time goes on. And the Board generally does not order

retroactive relief, such as back pay or damages, to rank-and-file employees for the

loss of economic benefits that might have been obtained had the employer

bargained in good faith. See 2 HIGGINS, supra, at 2775. Thus, a finding of

likelihood of success as to a § 8(a)(5) bad-faith bargaining violation in particular,

along with permissible inferences regarding the likely effects of that violation, can

demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable injury, absent some unusual circumstance
58

indicating that union support is not being affected or that bargaining could resume

without detriment as easily later as now.

In a similar vein, “the discharge of active and open union supporters risks a

serious adverse impact on employee interest in unionization and can create

irreparable harm to the collective bargaining process.” Pye v. Excel Case Ready,

238 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id.

(observing that other employees’ “fear of employer retaliation after the firing of

union supporters is exactly the ‘irreparable harm’ contemplated by § 10(j)”). For

these reasons, a likelihood of success as to a § 8(a)(3) violation with regard to

union activists that occurred during contract negotiations or an organizing drive

largely establishes likely irreparable harm, absent unusual circumstances.

We have already determined that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion or make any errors of law in finding that the Director had established a

likelihood of success with regard to the bad-faith bargaining and the exclusion of

union leaders from the workforce violations. The same evidence and legal

conclusions, along with permissible inferences regarding the likely interim and

long-run impact of the unfair labor practices likely to be found, preclude the

conclusion that the District Court abused its discretion in finding a likelihood of

irreparable harm.
59

The Hotel’s primary argument as to why the Director cannot show

irreparable harm is the contention that the Director’s delay in filing the § 10(j)

petition is fatal to his claim that interim relief is necessary to prevent irreparable

harm. The first unfair labor practice charge was filed on January 22, 2007; the

Director issued an administrative complaint on August 29, 2008, covering many

incidents, including the withdrawal of recognition and the exclusion of the five

union leaders from the workplace, that occurred long after the initial charge was

filed. The Director filed the § 10(j) petition on January 7, 2010, after the ALJ

decision upholding the Director’s various unfair labor practice allegations. By

awaiting the ALJ decision, the Director made the District Court’s task in

evaluating the propriety of interim relief much easier, and much more likely to be

carried out accurately, as the Court had the benefit of a record developed over

thirteen days of hearings and also of the ALJ’s legal analysis and conclusions.

For its excessive delay contention, the Hotel relies on McDermott, in which

this Court held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that, given a

thirteen- to seventeen-month delay between the alleged occurrence of unfair labor

practices and the filing of a § 10(j) petition, “an interim order . . . [was unlikely to]

provide any genuine reassurance to employees beyond that provided by a final

Board order.” McDermott, 593 F.3d at 965 (internal quotation marks omitted). At
60

the same time, McDermott recognized that “delay by itself is not a determinative

factor in whether the grant of interim relief is just and proper.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[t]he factor of delay is only significant if the

harm has occurred and the parties cannot be returned to the status quo or if the

Board’s final order is likely to be as effective as an order for interim relief.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

McDermott’s observation regarding the effect of delay in that case is

inapposite for several reasons. First, with respect to its conclusion that the delay in

seeking relief properly supported the finding of a lack of irreparable harm, because

of the First Amendment interests the employer in that case invoked, McDermott

was applying a special, heightened standard. See McDermott, 593 F.3d at 958

(adopting and applying United Bhd. of Carpenters’s conclusion that “in light of the

risk that protected First Amendment speech would be restrained . . . ‘only a

particularly strong showing of likely success, and of harm . . . as well, could

suffice’” (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters, 409 F.3d at 1208 n.13) (second

ellipsis in original) (emphasis added)); id. at 964 (“In light of the First Amendment

issues in this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

declining to grant preliminary relief. The standard for such relief is a tough one,

taking into account [United Bhd. of Carpenters’s] increased demands.” (emphasis
61

added)). As the District Court in this case noted, no First Amendment interests are

here at stake, and viewed under ordinary irreparable injury standards, “[a]s more

time passes, it becomes less likely that these discharged employees will return to the

Hotel,” undermining the unionization effort. Norelli v. HTH Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d

1176, 1203-04 (D. Haw. 2010).

Second, in this case, the record provided specific support for the conclusions

that there would likely be irreparable harm beyond that which could be remedied

once the Board had ruled, and that interim relief was more likely to curb the

ongoing unfair labor practices than subsequent relief. For one thing, the former

employees whose interim reinstatement the Regional Director sought were

members of the bargaining committee. Having current employees on the bargaining

committee in daily contact with the other employees and therefore able to judge the

impact of various bargaining proposals on their constituencies is likely to affect not

only the other employees’ willingness to adhere to union support, but also the

interim bargaining process itself. For that reason, the § 8(a)(3) relief in this case is

intimately tied up with the interim bargaining order.

Moreover, here, the passage of time did not entirely preclude the District

Court’s ability to restore the status quo. The Union was willing to represent the

employees and to bargain on their behalf under an interim bargaining order. 
62

Recognizing and bargaining in good faith during the period the Board is

considering the exceptions to the ALJ’s ruling both would directly restore to the

employees the advantages of day-to-day union representation during that period,

advantages that cannot be restored retroactively, and also could lead to the

conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement, with concomitant employee

benefits, during the interim period. Thus, the interim relief ordered immediately

remedied statutory injuries as to which no retroactive relief is available.

Finally, of course, there is the fact that McDermott was reviewing denial of

interim relief under an abuse-of-discretion standard, while we are reviewing the

grant of relief under that same standard.

For each of these independent reasons, we conclude that the District Court

was not required to deny relief because the Regional Director awaited the ALJ’s

decision before filing the § 10(j) petition.

C. Balance of the Hardships

The District Court determined that the balance of the hardships weighed in

the Director’s favor. The primary hardship the Hotel had advanced was the

protection of its employees from the Union, which, the Hotel claims, the employees

did not want to represent them. The Hotel renews that hardship argument before us. 

We also reject it.
63

“[I]n considering the balance of hardships, the district court must take into

account the probability that declining to issue the injunction will permit the

alleged[] unfair labor practices to reach fruition and thereby render meaningless the

Board’s remedial authority.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. For that reason, the District

Court’s determination that the Regional Director had shown likely irreparable harm

to the collective bargaining process meant that there was also considerable weight

on his side of the balance of the hardships.

The Hotel’s asserted countervailing interest, its employees’ alleged desire not

to be represented by the Union, fails to outweigh the hardships advanced by the

Regional Director. As an initial matter, there is “nothing unreasonable in giving a

short leash to the employer as vindicator of its employees’ organizational freedom.” 

Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996). For that reason,

courts generally are skeptical about an employer’s claimed “benevolence as its

workers’ champion against their certified union.” Id.; see also Fall River Dyeing &

Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 50 n.16 (1987). 

More importantly, by establishing a strong likelihood of success on the merits

of the alleged § 8(a)(3) and (5) violations, the Regional Director showed that it was

more likely than not that the Hotel had committed pervasive unfair labor practices. 

As the Board’s case law indicates, in the context of pervasive unremedied unfair
64

labor practices, it becomes impossible to know if employees truly no longer want

representation by the elected union, as their expressed preferences are generally

tainted by the effects of the unfair labor practices. See Lee Lumber, 322 N.L.R.B. at

177-78. In all likelihood, it will only be possible accurately to gauge union support

after the Hotel ceases and desists from its allegedly unfair labor practices and

resumes bargaining with the Union—precisely the relief the Regional Director

sought and the District Court granted. The District Court, therefore, had no reason

to give significant weight to the Hotel’s assertions concerning support for the

Union, and so properly assessed the balance of the hardships.

D. Public Interest

“In § 10(j) cases, the public interest is to ensure that an unfair labor practice

will not succeed because the Board takes too long to investigate and adjudicate the

charge.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Ordinarily then, when, as here, the Director makes

a strong showing of likelihood of success and of likelihood of irreparable harm, the

Director will have established that preliminary relief is in the public interest. 

The Hotel contests that conclusion as applied here, objecting that the Director

“was literally asking the District Court to grant the Board’s remedy, before the

Board itself even has a chance to decide the case.” But, in most bad-faith

bargaining cases, a § 10(j) remedy will be identical, or at least very similar, to the
18 We also decline the Hotel’s invitation to follow Eisenberg v. Hartz

Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1975), which imposed a six-month

temporal limitation on all § 10(j) relief (subject, in certain circumstances, to

extension). No other court of appeals has followed Eisenberg in imposing such a

rule. Cf. Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1025 (1st Cir. 1995)

(“abjur[ing] the Third Circuit’s rule” and leaving the decision to impose a temporal

limitation on § 10(j) relief within “the sound discretion of the district court”). We

have never adopted a per se rule imposing a fixed temporal limitation on all § 10(j)

relief. Under no requirement to impose such a limitation, the District Court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to do so in this case. 

65

Board’s final order. This precept follows from the nature of interim § 10(j) relief

and of the Board’s final remedial power. 

The purpose of § 10(j) relief is “to preserve the Board’s remedial power.” 

Miller, 19 F.3d at 459-60. The task of the Board in devising a final remedy is “to

take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have

been had there been no unfair labor practice.” Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424

U.S. 747, 769 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Very often, the most

effective way to protect the Board’s ability to recreate such relationships and restore

the status quo will be for the court itself to order a return to the status quo. See

Scott, 241 F.3d at 660 (observing that “injunctive relief under section 10(j) is

intended to preserve the status quo pending final action by the Board”). So the

District Court cannot have abused its discretion just because it entered an order

similar to the one the Board will likely enter in this case.18 We have thus no reason
66

to disturb the District Court’s determination that injunctive relief was in the public

interest.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s injunction is AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX A

Appended Excerpt of Norelli v. HTH Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Haw. 2010)

c. Whether Respondents engaged in bad faith bargaining from January 2007

through November 2007

In September 2006, Koa and PBHM signed the [Management Agreement (the

“MA”)] for PBHM to take over “the marketing, operation, direction, Hillsborough

maintenance, management, and supervision of all portions of the Hotel,” effective

January 2007. Both Respondents and PBHM told the Union that in light of the MA,

PBHM and not Respondents was the employer of the Hotel employees. Despite

these assertions, the ALJ found that “although Respondents contractually delegated

PBHM to run the Hotel and to bargain collectively with the Union on Respondents’

behalf [during this time], at no time were Respondents relieved of the obligation to
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bargain in good faith with the Union” and that Respondents engaged in bad faith

bargaining during this time period.

The ALJ came to this conclusion by finding that Respondents were the “true

employer” of the Hotel staff during this time. Petitioner has filed a limited

cross-appeal requesting that the Board make an explicit finding of agency. As

explained below, the court does not reach whether the Board will determine that

Respondents were the “true employer,” but rather concludes that the Board will find

and the Ninth Circuit will affirm that PBHM was an agent of Respondents for

purposes of negotiating a [collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)], and that

Respondents never intended to permit PBHM to enter into a CBA with the Union.

i. Respondents’ and PBHM’s principal/agent relationship as to CBA negotiations

An “employer” for purposes of the NLRA “includes any person acting as an

agent of an employer, directly or indirectly.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). The NLRA further

provides that “[i]n determining whether any person is acting as an ‘agent’ of

another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question

of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently

ratified shall not be controlling.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(13).

The Board applies common law agency principles to determine the existence

of an agency relationship. See, e.g., Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 1335,
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1336 (2004). An agency relationship may therefore exist between a purported agent

and principal where the agent possesses either actual or apparent authority to act on

the principal’s behalf: “actual authority refers to the power of an agent to act on his

principal’s behalf when that power is created by the principal’s manifestation to

him. That manifestation may be either express or implied.” Id. (quoting Commc’n

Workers Local 9431 (Pacific Bell), 304 N.L.R.B. 446 n.4 (1991)).

Petitioner has presented evidence from which the Board will likely conclude

and the Ninth Circuit will affirm that PBHM was simply acting as Respondents’

agent for purposes of negotiating the CBA. Respondents, through the MA, gave

PBHM express authority to negotiate a CBA with the Union. Despite the MA’s

assertion that PBHM “is an independent contractor, and nothing in this Agreement

or in the relationship of [Respondents and PBHM] shall constitute a partnership,

joint venture, agency, or other similar relationship,” Respondents retained ultimate

control over the negotiations. Specifically, the MA required PBHM to obtain

Respondents’ approval prior to entering into any CBA:

Operator shall obtain Owner’s approval of any agreement

affecting the Hotel (i) the term of which is more than one

(1) year in length and that cannot be terminated upon

thirty (30) days’ notice by Operator, or (ii) if the cost to

the Hotel under that agreement exceeds Three Hundred

Fifty Thousand Dollars ($350,000.00), or (iii) that
3

 The court’s conclusion is confirmed by Respondents’ decision to cancel the

MA only four days after PBHM sought their approval of contract terms that would

have resulted in a CBA. As explained below, it appears that Respondents canceled

the MA to prevent the Union from learning of its role in negotiations.

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extends beyond the Initial Term and cannot be terminated

upon thirty (30) days’ notice by Operator.

Section 3.2.c of the MA effectively gave Respondents veto power of any

proposed CBA between PBHM and the Union-given the long term negotiations

with the Union, PBHM was not interested in a CBA for less than one year because

it “would hardly give [PBHM] . . . a[ ] stable period to develop relationships with

the employees and [ ] to operate the business.” Additionally, a one-year collective

bargaining agreement would cost the Hotel more than $350,000, requiring

Respondents’ approval.

Indeed, despite Minicola’s and PBHM’s outward statements to the Union that

HTH was no longer operating the Hotel, PBHM worked under the assumption that

Koa—as the Hotel’s “owner”—must approve any CBA between PBHM and the

Union. For example, both Wilinsky and Rand sent letters to Respondents, seeking

Koa’s approval on proposals to the Union, which PBHM believed would result in a

CBA. Wilinsky explained to [the Hotel’s owner] that “[PBHM] cannot bargain in

good faith with the Union until and unless [it] receive[s] [Koa’s] consent.”3
70

In opposition, Respondents suggest that the MA was a “typical management

agreement” under which PBHM operated as the owner and employer at the Hotel.

The court rejects this argument. While Respondents may have hoped to create the

appearance that PBHM was . . . the . . . employer, the MA was not “typical” but

rather allowed Respondents to retain control over the Union negotiations, creating

the principal-agent relationship described above.

In sum, the record supports that while Respondents certainly attempted to

distance themselves from the Union negotiations by using PBHM as the “official”

operator of the Hotel, PBHM’s control was illusory because Respondents held the

ultimate authority over Union negotiations. Accordingly, the Board will likely find

and the Ninth Circuit will affirm that the MA did not vest to PBHM Respondents’

employer status but instead merely made PBHM Respondents’ agent.

The court recognizes that the ALJ did not make an agency determination and

instead found that Respondents were the “true” employers of the Hotel employees.

The ALJ’s “true employer” language does not change the court’s analysis.

Petitioner alleged in its Conformed Complaint that PBHM served as Respondents’

agent within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) for the purposes of engaging in

collective bargaining with the Union and operating the Hotel. Further, implicit in

the ALJ Decision’s finding that Respondents were the true employers is that PBHM
71

was acting on Respondents’ behalf during this time period. Given that Petitioner

seeks a limited cross-appeal seeking an agency determination, the court finds that

on the record presented, the Board will likely make and the Ninth Circuit will

affirm this determination.

ii. Respondents’ bad faith bargaining during this time period

On August 3, 2007—four days after PBHM sought its approval of contract

terms which would have resulted in a CBA—Respondents canceled the MA with

PBHM. Based upon the record presented, Petitioner asserts that Respondents never

had any intention of allowing PBHM to enter into a CBA with the Union and

canceled the MA to prevent Respondents from having to reject the proposed CBA

and/or disclose its veto power over the CBA to the Union. The court agrees that the

Board will find and the Ninth Circuit will affirm that Respondents engaged in bad

faith bargaining over this time period by having PBHM negotiate with the Union

while at the same time knowing that it would never approve any CBA.

The evidence establishes that Minicola clearly did not want a CBA with the

Union, much less any Union presence at the Hotel. During initial negotiations,

Minicola told PBHM that [the Hotel’s owner] was upset with the employees for

voting for the Union, and that Respondents would move to decertify the Union at

the end of the certification year in 2006. Rather than move to decertify the Union,
72

Respondents entered into the MA with PBHM, who was well aware that Minicola

was “very unhappy” with the concept of a CBA.

The terms of the MA required that it be kept confidential, and the Union was

not aware of its language giving Respondents veto power over a CBA. PBHM

nonetheless negotiated with the Union and by June 29, 2007, the parties were close

to entering into an agreement with only “a few issues outstanding.” Respondents

were aware that a CBA was imminent—PBHM told Respondents of this progress

and even requested direction given its understanding that Respondents did not want

a finalized CBA. By letter dated July 30, 2007, PBHM asked Koa, as “owner”

under the MA, to consent to PBHM providing the MA’s contract approval provision

to the Union (along with other provisions as well), and that Koa approve 11 specific

proposals for the CBA. PBHM explained that if it made these 11 proposals, the

Union would accept them and the parties would likely enter into a CBA. PBHM

further asserted that if Respondents refused to consent, Respondents would be in

breach of the MA and that PBHM would no longer be able to bargain in good faith

with the Union. PBHM received no response from Respondents. Instead, on

August 3, 2007, Respondents terminated the MA, effective December 30, 2007.

At the time Respondents canceled the MA, they were faced with some hard

decisions regarding PBHM and the Union. They could reject PBHM’s proposals
73

and allow PBHM to disclose the MA’s contract approval provision to the Union,

but then the Union would know of Respondents’ involvement and authority on

Union negotiations. Alternatively, Respondents could have approved the proposals,

but then the Union would be on the verge of a CBA—the very result Respondents

had been trying to avoid since negotiations began in 2006. The third alternative—to

cancel the MA and purport to take over the Hotel operations as a new

employer—avoided both of these results. Given the facts presented, it appears that

Respondents canceled the MA simply to derail the final stages of the Union

negotiations and prevent the Union from learning of its role in negotiations over

this time period. Accordingly, the Board will likely find and the Ninth Circuit will

affirm that Respondents engaged in bad faith bargaining during this time period.

In opposition, Respondents provide no explanation why they terminated the

MA except for a vague reference to “performance issues,” which, from the record,

may refer to PBHM’s delay in installing Stellex, PBHM’s failure to keep occupancy

rates up, PBHM’s changes to projected performance figures, disputes over fees and

commissions, and the fish deaths in the aquarium. The record does not support that

these excuses are valid reasons for terminating the MA.

As to the delay in installing Stellex, Outrigger’s proprietary property

management and reservation system, it was eventually installed and properly
74

operating within the Hotel by May 2007. Further, Minicola had worked at

Outrigger for 15 years and was familiar with the Stellex system, such that he should

have anticipated that installing Stellex takes significant effort.

As to PBHM’s projected occupancy rate and performance figures,

Respondents asserted before the ALJ that PBHM did not perform up to par with its

projections, yet Minicola testified that the decline in the Hotel’s occupancy was in

part due to the decline in the tourism economy. Moreover, Wallace explained

during the time PBHM was managing the Hotel, profits “were in excess of

[PBHM’s] projections and considerably in excess of the prior year’s operations.”

As for PBHM’s changes to projected performance figures, the MA required

PBHM to submit a formal budget to Respondents within 90 days of the start of its

management of the Hotel. PBHM submitted a preliminary budget in a timely

fashion, and Respondents approved PBHM’s request to extend the time allotted to

PBHM to prepare a formal budget, allowing PBHM enough time to acquire

knowledge of how the property operates. Once PBHM finished its formal budget,

PBHM revised its projected performance figures to take into account the formal

budget. These changes were therefore in line with basic budgeting principles and

not a basis for termination.
75

Regarding the fees and commissions, Respondents and PBHM had

disagreements regarding the 1.5% chain service fee PBHM proposed to charge

Respondents for providing services to the Hotel and the 2.5% commission

Respondents wanted to charge PBHM on all Japanese wholesale business. The

parties resolved these disputes, however, with Respondents accepting the 1.5%

charged to the Hotel after PBHM explained the basis for this charge, and PBHM

continuing to pay the 2.5% commission to Respondents.

Finally, as for the dead fish in the aquarium, it is unclear whether

Respondents truly assert this problem as a reason for terminating the MA because

Minicola did not identify it as a reason in his affidavit before the ALJ. In any event,

PBHM apparently addressed this issue by meeting with the chief engineer to

stabilize the oxygen in the tank and replacing the dead fish.

In sum, Respondents’ alleged reasons for terminating the MA are

unsupported. The Board will likely find and the Ninth Circuit will affirm that

Respondents engaged in bad faith bargaining by allowing PBHM to negotiate with

the Union while at the same time knowing that they would never approve a CBA,

and then canceling the MA simply to derail the negotiations between the Union and

PBHM and hide their position as Hotel employer.
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COUNSEL

For Petitioner-Appellee Joseph F. Frankl, Regional Director of Region 20 of the

National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations

Board: Judith Ilene Katz, Margaret E. Luke (argued), and Steven Lewis Sokolow,

National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.; Jill H. Coffman and Olivia

Garcia, National Labor Relations Board Region 20, San Francisco, Calif.; Thomas

W. Cestare, Trent Kiyoshi Kakuda, and Dale Kanayo Yashiki, National Labor

Relations Board Sub-Region 37, Honolulu, Hawaii. 

For Respondents-Appellants HTH Corporation, Pacific Beach Corporation, and

Koa Management, LLC: Wesley Fujimoto (argued) and Ryan Sanada, Imanaka

Kudo & Fujimoto LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii.