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                  United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

                       ____________________

No. 97-1991

                       MOHAMMED MEGUENINE,

                           Petitioner,

                                v.

             IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

                           Respondent.

                                 
                       ____________________

                PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

                 THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
                       ____________________

                              Before

                      Boudin, Circuit Judge,

                 Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                
                   and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                      ____________________
                                
     Robert M. Warren for petitioner.

     Margaret Perry, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Mark C.
Walters, Assistant Director, and Frank W. Hunger, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, were on brief, for respondent. 
                                
                      ____________________
                                
                         March 17, 1998
                      ____________________
                                    �      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  Petitioner Mohammed Meguenine
    seeks reversal of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA or Board) denying his application for asylum under the
    Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) � 208, 8 U.S.C. � 1158,
    and his application for withholding of deportation under INA �
    243(h), 8 U.S.C. � 1253(h).  Meguenine's most substantial claim
    is that the agency improperly required him to produce evidence
    of individualized threats of persecution in violation of 8
    C.F.R. � 208.13(b)(2) (1997).  Although the BIA failed to refer
    to that regulation in its opinion, its reasoning was consistent
    with the regulation and was otherwise supported by "substantial
    evidence."  We affirm.
                                I.
                                        Mohammed Meguenine is a citizen of Algeria who came
    to the United States on July 19, 1993 on a six-month tourist
    visa at a time when violence between Algeria's military
    government and its armed Islamic fundamentalist opponents was
    growing.  Meguenine overstayed his visa. On February 9, 1995,
    he applied for asylum under INA � 208(a), which gives the
    Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to "refugees," as
    defined by the INA, and for withholding of deportation under
    INA � 243(h), which requires the Attorney General to withhold
    deportation to a country in which an alien is "likely" to face
    persecution on account of specified grounds.  Following his
    interview with an asylum officer, the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (INS) brought deportation proceedings
    against him.  At a proceeding before an Immigration Judge (IJ),
    Meguenine conceded deportability, and reasserted his
    application for asylum and withholding of deportation.
        The IJ found Meguenine ineligible both for asylum and
    for withholding of deportation, and agreed to grant him
    voluntary departure in lieu of deportation.  Meguenine appealed
    the IJ's decision to the BIA.  On August 7, 1997, the BIA
    affirmed the IJ's decision.  Meguenine's case is governed by
    the "transitional rules" of the Illegal Immigration and
    Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
    208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (enacted Sept. 30, 1996). 
    That is because the BIA's decision dismissing his case was
    issued after October 31, 1996, but proceedings were brought
    against him prior to April 1, 1997 (IIRIRA's "Title III-A
    effective date").  See IIRIRA � 309(c)(1), as amended by Act of
    Oct. 11, 1997, � 2, Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656, 3657
    (aliens "in proceedings" before April 1, 1997, but whose
    deportation becomes final after October 31, 1996, are governed
    by IIRIRA's "transitional rules").  In general, under those
    "transition rules," aliens appealing a denial of a decision to
    grant asylum under INA � 208(a) or to withhold deportation
    under INA � 243(h) must file a petition for review within
    thirty days under former INA � 106.  See IIRIRA � 309(c)(4)
    (providing that aliens under the "transition rules" continue to
    be governed by former INA � 106, subject to certain exceptions
    which do not apply here).  As Meguenine filed the requisite
    petition for review within thirty days, this court has
    jurisdiction.
                               II.
                                        Meguenine's application for asylum must be understood
    in light of the violent conflict between the Algerian
    government and its armed Islamic fundamentalist opponents.  In
    1989, Algeria opened its political process to parties other
    than its ruling secular party.  An Islamic fundamentalist
    party, the Islamic Salvation Front, soon became the most
    important opposition party.  In December 1991, the government
    held elections in two stages.  After the Islamic Salvation
    Front won the first stage, the military cancelled the second
    stage.  The civilian president resigned and a military junta
    took power.  Radical Islamic fundamentalists, who had recently
    formed the Armed Islamic Group, launched terrorist attacks to
    destabilize the new government.  The military government's
    forces fought back.  Both sides have acted with considerable
    brutality toward the civilian population.  So far, tens of
    thousands of Algerians have died in the conflict.
        Meguenine worked for many years as a nurse in a
    government-run hospital in his native city of Oran, Algeria. 
    He testified before the IJ that he is a moderate Muslim, not a
    fundamentalist, that he favors neither side in the present
    conflict, and that he has never been active in politics.  He
    nevertheless seeks asylum because, he says, the Islamic
    fundamentalists have targeted health care workers in general,
    and those at his hospital in particular, if they refuse to
    accede to demands that they stop treating government soldiers
    who are injured in the violence.  Meguenine says that, as a
    health care professional, he feels ethically obliged to treat
    any injured person regardless of that person's beliefs or
    affiliation in the present conflict, and that he feared
    violence because of a threatening terrorist note at his
    hospital that warned hospital personnel not to treat soldiers. 
    Meguenine notes that, after this note appeared, other health
    care workers at his hospital and elsewhere in the country were
    injured or killed by the terrorists.  He contends that this
    evidence suffices to show that he has a "well-founded fear of
    persecution on account of" either his "religion" as a moderate
    Muslim, his "membership in a particular social group" of health
    care professionals, or his "political opinion" of neutrality in
    the conflict. INA � 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. � 1101(a)(42)(A)
    (1994).
        The BIA disagreed.  First, it considered the evidence
    Meguenine placed before the IJ in support of his contention
    that neutral health care workers are, in general, subjects of
    systematic persecution by the Islamic fundamentalist groups. 
    Finding this evidence insufficient to show that such
    persecution of neutral health care workers was taking place on
    a systematic basis, it concluded that Meguenine had not shown
    that a nexus existed between his fear of harm at the hands of
    the Islamic fundamentalists and his status as a nurse in a
    government-run hospital.  Second, it considered a threatening
    note Meguenine observed personally at his hospital.  The Board
    found that this threat was too general and isolated to cause
    Meguenine reasonably to fear that he personally had been
    targeted for persecution on account of his refusal to accede to
    demands that he refuse to treat soldiers fighting the Islamic
    fundamentalists.
                               III.
                                        On a petition for review under old INA � 106, this
    court reviews the BIA's decision that Meguenine is ineligible
    for asylum and withholding of deportation to determine of it is
    supported by "substantial evidence."  Ipina v. INS, 868 F.2d
  511, 513 (1st Cir. 1989).    The court reviews the BIA's legal
    conclusions de novo, although it gives deference, where
    appropriate, to the agency's interpretation of the underlying
    statute in accordance with administrative law principles.  SeeAlvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990).  
        It is important to note that the BIA did not reject
    Meguenine's application as a matter of law because it regarded
    Meguenine's theory of persecution as legally insufficient to
    establish eligibility for asylum.  The BIA's decision took no
    position on whether a health care professional who refuses to
    violate his ethical obligations to treat all injured combatants
    in a violent conflict, and who has a well-founded fear of
    persecution for taking such a stand, qualifies as a "refugee"
  under INA � 101(a)(42)(A).    Rather, it rejected Meguenine's
    application because it found the evidence that he presented
    insufficient to show that the Islamic fundamentalists were in
    fact systematically targeting neutral health care workers, and
    that the evidence that he individually had faced threats for
    this reason was too scant to support eligibility for asylum.
        Meguenine first argues that the BIA committed legal
    error.  He says that the BIA's decision, which relied in part
    on the lack of threats directed at him individually, violated
    a regulation that governs the circumstances in which an
    applicant may be required to produce such evidence.  That
    regulation, 8 C.F.R. � 208.13(b)(2)(i) (1997), provides:
             In evaluating whether the applicant
        has sustained his burden of proving that
        he has a well-founded fear of persecution,
        the Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge
        shall not require the applicant to provide
        evidence that he would be singled out
        individually for persecution if:
    
               (A) He establishes that there is
             a pattern or practice in his country
             of nationality or last habitual
             residence of persecution of groups of
             persons similarly situated to the
             applicant on account of race,
             religion, nationality, membership in
             a particular social group, or
             political opinion; and
    
               (B) He establishes his own
             inclusion in and identification with
             such group of persons such that his
             fear of persecution upon return is
             reasonable.
    
    Although the BIA did not mention this regulation in its
    opinion, its reasoning is entirely consistent with it and we
    find no violation.  The regulation puts the burden on Meguenine
    to "establish that there is a pattern or practice" of
    persecution directed at "persons similiarly situated to the
    applicant" and to establish his inclusion in such a group.  The
    BIA's decision first considered whether Meguenine had shown
    that neutral health care workers face systematic persecution
    from the Islamic fundamentalists.  Only after it had found
    Meguenine's evidence insufficient to show such a "pattern or
    practice" of persecution did it consider whether the
    threatening note at Meguenine's hospital was sufficiently
    directed at Meguenine to cause him reasonably to fear harm
    because he personally had been targeted for his persistence in
    treating all patients regardless of their political or
    religious beliefs or affiliation in the present conflict.  This
    is precisely the procedure that the regulation contemplates.
        As the BIA's decision is not based on an error of
    law, we review these conclusions to determine if they are
    supported by substantial evidence.  A reasonable factfinder
    could determine on this record, as did the BIA, that there was
    no pattern or practice targeting neutral health care workers
    and that Meguenine's claimed fears stemmed from the general
    insecurity in Algeria and not from persecution against him on
    one of the statutorily enumerated grounds.  See INS v. Elias-
    Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
        In support of his claim that health care workers were
    subject to systematic persecution at the hands of the Islamic
    fundamentalists if they refused demands not to treat government
    soldiers, Meguenine proffered the following evidence.  First,
    Meguenine testified to the anonymous warning note at his
    hospital.  Second, he testified that the newspaper reported
    that a gynecologist at that hospital was murdered by the
    fundamentalists because he treated women.  Meguenine also had
    heard that his friend, a nurse, was murdered even though,
    according to Meguenine, "he never speak out (sic)."  He had
    also heard that his superior, the director of the hospital, was
    shot and injured by the terrorists and fled to France.  Next,
    he proferred testimony by a lawyer who does business in Algeria
    who said that Meguenine's story was plausible and that threats
    such as the note on the wall were to be taken "very seriously"
    and that "virtually anyone" working for a government
    institution in Algeria, such as a hospital, could be a target
    of terrorist violence.  Finally, Meguenine submitted human
    rights reports that recount the terrorist assassinations of
    three prominent physicians elsewhere in the country.
        This evidence did not compel the Board to find in
    Meguenine's favor, either on his claim that health care workers
    faced systematic persecution or on his claim that he reasonably
    feared persecution individually.  The evidence could be read to
    tend to support the accuracy of Meguenine's contentions, but it
    is not so persuasive that we feel free to reject the BIA's
    conclusions when reviewing the BIA "under a deferential
    substantial evidence standard."  Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d
    482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
        In turn, the BIA's reasons for rejecting Meguenine's
    arguments are rational.  The Board noted that, according to the
    human rights reports, the three prominent physicians who were
    assassinated were prominent opponents of the fundamentalists,
    not apolitical health care workers like Meguenine.  Indeed,
    those reports contained exhaustive lists of those groups that
    the fundamentalists had singled out for persecution, and
    "health care workers" who choose to remain neutral were not
    among them.  Those reports also lend support to the
    government's view that terrorist violence is indiscriminate and
    is not directed at any particular identifiable group of
    civilians other than known supporters of the government.  Next,
    the Board observed that Meguenine failed to present competent
    evidence concerning the reason why the physicians at his
    hospital were attacked, thus raising the possibility that they
    were also targeted for their opposition to the fundamentalists
    rather than because of their status as health care workers. 
    The Board also noted that hundreds of nurses worked at the
    hospital who had not been harmed, even though, like Meguenine,
    they had not heeded the threat.  Finally, the Board noted that
    Meguenine worked at the hospital for more than a year after the
    threat appeared, undercutting his claim that the threat
    reasonably caused him to fear persecution from the
    fundamentalists.
        This was a valid application of the "well-founded
    fear" standard as set forth in Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
    Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).  It is entirely reasonable for people to
    fear harm if they are required to return to Algeria during the
    current conflict, but Congress has not chosen to open the door
    to this country on such a basis.  As the government correctly
    notes, it is the law that general fears (even "well-founded"
    ones) of future harm from political upheaval or terrorist
    violence are not sufficient to establish eligibility for asylum
    under � 208(a) of the INA.  See Novoa-Umania, 896 F.2d at 5. 
    The BIA chose to reject Meguenine's argument that the facts
    establish that an identifiable group of "health care workers"
    face a "pattern or practice" of persecution in Algeria from
    armed Islamic fundamentalist terrorists if they persist in
    treating government soldiers.  A careful review of the record
    reveals that substantial evidence permitted the Board's
    conclusion.  Likewise, the Board could reject Meguenine's fears
    of specific harm on this record as insufficiently severe and
    particular to support eligibility for asylum or for withholding
    of deportation.
        The order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is
    affirmed.
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