DLD-056 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3832

___________

EUGENE E. CHATMAN,

Appellant

v.

THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH PA; OFFICER HIROS; OFFICER FREEMAN; 

LEGACY APARTMENTS; MCCORMACK BARON RAGAN; MELANIE BROWN, 

The Property Manager

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00638)

District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 1, 2011

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed December 5, 2011)

_________________

OPINION

_________________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Eugene Chatman appeals the District Court‟s order dismissing his 

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have 
2

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District 

Court‟s order. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 & n.4 (3d Cir. 

2010). For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s 

order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

On May 13, 2011, Chatman filed a handwritten pro se complaint along with a 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The District Court dismissed the complaint as 

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On appeal, we agreed with the District Court that 

Chatman had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, but held that the 

Court should have provided Chatman with an opportunity to amend the complaint. We 

therefore vacated the District Court‟s order dismissing the case and remanded for further 

proceedings.

On remand, Chatman filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint, like 

the initial complaint, is exceedingly terse. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 

which the District Court granted. Chatman then filed a timely notice of appeal to this 

Court. 

We agree with the District Court‟s disposition of this case. As we explained when 

the case was last before us, to avoid dismissal, a complaint‟s “[f]actual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint “must not be „so undeveloped that it 

does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by [Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8].‟” Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) 
3

(quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). 

Here, as the District Court held, Chatman‟s complaint fails to satisfy these 

standards. Chatman has merely listed, in summary fashion, interactions that he has had 

with the building manager, his neighbors, and police officers. However, he has not 

explained how any of these interactions violated his federal rights or identified any 

causes of action. His vague assertions are simply insufficient to state a legally cognizable 

claim. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that a 

complaint may be dismissed if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

We will thus summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment.