IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Houghton Enterprises, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 930 C.D. 2021

: Argued: September 14, 2022

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of State, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: April 21, 2023

Houghton Enterprises, Inc. (Houghton) petitions for review from the

final adjudication and order of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, of the 

Department of State (Department), filed August 17, 2021, which affirmed a ceaseand-desist order (C&D) issued by its Bureau of Corporations and Charitable 

Organizations (Bureau), precluding Houghton from conducting the services of a 

professional solicitor in Pennsylvania as defined by the Solicitation of Funds for 

Charitable Purposes Act (Act).1 Upon review, there is substantial evidence of record

establishing that Houghton is in the business of soliciting donations on behalf of 

charitable organizations. Therefore, we affirm.

1 Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1200, as amended, 10 P.S. §§ 162.1-162.24.
2

I. BACKGROUND2

Houghton is a family-owned, for-profit corporation based in 

Cochranville, Pennsylvania. The corporation runs a portable amusement park and

providesrides, games, and food for carnivals at locations in Pennsylvania, Maryland, 

and Delaware. The majority of Houghton’s clients are nonprofit organizations. 

Houghton receives 70% of the ride ticket revenue, as well as profits from the 

concession and game stands. Houghton’s website advertised testimonials from its 

clients regarding its fundraising success and noted that the carnival booking did not 

cost anything but, rather, the company “donate[s] a percentage of [its] gross sales to 

your organization or event” to help raise money. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 

1/26/21, at 25-29, Ex. C-7.

The Bureau opened an investigation into Houghton’s operations and 

finances based on its review of Houghton’s contract with the Malvern Fire Company 

(Fire Company), in which Houghton received a percentage fee from the carnival 

event. The investigation was to determine if Houghton was operating in violation 

of the Act, which requires professional solicitors to register with the Bureau.3 

On April 10, 2019, the Bureau sent Houghton a demand letter by 

certified mail requesting three years’ worth of information concerning professional 

fundraising counsel or professional solicitor services, including contracts with 

charitable organizations. The demand letter noted that the failure to provide such 

information could result in the issuance of a C&D. The Department averred that 

2 Unless stated otherwise, we derive this background from the final adjudication of the 

Secretary, which is supported by the record. See Final Adjudication, 8/17/21, at 1-8.

3 Professional solicitors are for-profit companies or individuals retained by charitable 

organizations to request and raise funds from Pennsylvania citizens for charitable purposes and 

which receive compensation related to the amount of contributions received. See Section 3 of the 

Act, 10 P.S § 162.3.
3

Houghton received the letter, although Houghton did not provide any of the 

requested information or register with the Department.

On June 27, 2019, the Department issued an order directing Houghton 

to cease and desist from soliciting contributions or conducting any services as a 

professional solicitor in the Commonwealth until Houghton (1) provided the Bureau 

with the previously requested information and (2) registered with the Bureau or 

established its exemption from registration under the Act.

Houghton timely appealed the issuance of the C&D and appeared 

before a Bureau hearing examiner. The Department and Houghton presented 

testimonial and documentary evidence. The Department presented evidence that a 

C&D had been issued against Houghton on the basis that it was a nonregistered 

professional solicitor. Further, Houghton had not complied with any of the remedies 

provided that would allow the Department to lift the C&D. Houghton averred that 

it was not required to register under the Act and that the C&D should not have been 

issued. The parties, along with amicus Pennsylvania State Showman’s Association, 

Inc. (Amicus), filed post-hearing briefs.4

The Secretary denied Houghton’s appeal, concluding that the C&D was 

properly entered because Houghton had failed to respond to the Bureau’s 

information request and had not duly registered under the Act. Further, the Secretary 

concluded that Houghton was indeed a professional solicitor. Houghton timely filed 

a petition for review with this Court. Contemporaneously, Houghton filed 

applications for supersedeas with the Department and this Court, which were both 

4 Additionally, in this Court, Amicus has filed an amicus brief. Amicus is an amusement 

industry trade association with headquarters in Lehighton, Pennsylvania, and has a large 

membership base (approximately 500) located in Pennsylvania. Amicus filed its brief in support 

of Houghton’s position.
4

denied. Houghton Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of State, Pa. Cmwlth., (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

930 C.D. 2021, filed Oct. 13, 2021) (denying on the basis that Houghton failed to 

establish the factors outlined in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process 

Gas Consumers Group, 467 A.2d 805, 808-09 (Pa. 1983)).

II. ISSUES

On appeal, Houghton raises four issues for our review. First, Houghton 

contends that the Department erred in upholding the C&D after Houghton provided 

sufficient evidence that it is not a “professional solicitor” pursuant to the Act. 

Houghton’s Br. at 16. 

Second, Houghton contends that the Department erred as a matter of 

law in concluding that Houghton is a “professional solicitor” contrary to the 

definition of the statute and pursuant to the evidence. See id. at 20. 

Third, Houghton contends that the Department erred in failing to 

consider the evidence of record and/or concluding that Houghton is not a 

“commercial coventurer.” See id. at 25. 

Finally, Houghton contends that the Department erred as a matter of 

law by failing to consider it compelling that the burdens that go along with 

registering and operating as a professional solicitor are unduly burdensome and 

impractical and will eviscerate the amusement industry. See id. at 28-32.

III. ANALYSIS

The Act requires the registration of charitable organizations, 

professional fundraisers, and professional solicitors, and provides the Department 

with the means to impose civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act. See

Section 2 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.2. In passing the Act, the General Assembly 
5

intended to protect and inform the citizens of this Commonwealth with relevant 

information concerning the solicitation of contributions for charitable purposes. 

This Court’s scope of review in resolving questions related to the Act 

is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an 

error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence. Rehab. Ctr. & Workshop, Inc. v. Commc’n on Charitable 

Orgs., 405 A.2d 980, 983 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979); 2 Pa. C.S. §704. Substantial evidence 

is defined as such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion. Younkin v. Bureau of Pro. & Occupational Affairs, State 

Real Estate Comm’n, 774 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). For questions of law and 

statutory construction, our review is plenary. Malt Beverages Distribs. Assoc. v. Pa.

Liquor Control Bd., 8 A.3d 885, 892 (Pa. 2010).

In matters where violations of the Act are at issue, the Secretary of State 

may initiate the appropriate proceedings to enforce this act, and the Secretary may 

decide matters relating to the issuance, renewal, suspension or revocation of 

registrations at issue, and may conduct hearings and make adjudications accordingly. 

See Section 4 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.4. Accordingly, the Secretary acts as 

factfinder in such matters, and as such is “the ultimate judge of credibility and 

resolves all conflicts in the evidence.” See Lodge v. Robinson Twp. Zoning Hr’g. 

Bd., 283 A.3d 910, 925 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). 

A. Whether the C&D was Supported by Substantial Evidence

Houghton contends that the Department erred in upholding the C&D 

after Houghton provided sufficient evidence that it is not a “professional solicitor” 

pursuant to the Act. Houghton’s Br. at 16. First, Houghton argues that it never 

received the demand letter but nevertheless provided enough evidence at the hearing 
6

that any failure to produce requested documents was remedied. See id. at 16. 

Second, Houghton contends that the evidence did not support the Department’s 

decision to uphold the C&D. See id. at 19. Houghton points to the testimony of its 

president that it is a for-profit company and that its compensation for providing 

services is a percentage of the ticket revenue and profits from concession stands, less 

a flat fee per stand. See id. Houghton avers that there is nothing in its contracts 

requiring it to request contributions from anyone attending the event, and no 

representations are made to attendees that a portion of the proceeds go to a charitable 

organization. See id. Accordingly, Houghton argues that the C&D should not have 

been issued or upheld. See id. at 19.

The Department responds that Houghton did not provide any 

documents or information in response to the demand letter and that, accordingly, the 

C&D was properly entered. See Dep’t’s Br. at 9-10. Additionally, the Department 

avers that the evidence provided by Houghton at the hearing was largely irrelevant 

and self-serving. See id. at 10. The Department contends that once it proved that 

the C&D was supported by the Act and should be sustained, Houghton failed to 

provide information sufficient for the Department to determine that it was exempt 

from the Act. See id.

1. Houghton’s Receipt of Notice and Initial Issuance

Houghton first argues that it did not receive notice of the demand letter 

and that the C&D was entered in error. See Houghton’s Br. at 16. The Act prohibits 

persons operating in violation of the requirements of the Act, regardless of intent or 

injury. Section 15 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.15. The Commonwealth may conduct 

investigations into the activities of potential professional solicitors. See Section 16 

of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.16. Specifically, the Secretary may “[r]equire or permit 
7

any person to file a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as to all the facts 

and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated;” “[r]equire the 

attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any books, accounts, 

papers, records, documents, audits and files relating to any solicitation or any 

practice subject to this act or the regulations of the department;” and “[e]xamine 

witnesses and receive evidence during any investigation or public or private 

hearings.” Section 16(a) of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.16(a).

When a person or organization does not comply with an investigation, 

the Secretary may refuse to register, revoke, or suspend the registration of any 

professional solicitor when he finds that the professional solicitor is operating in 

violation of the provisions of the Act, the regulations of the Department, or an order 

issued by the Secretary; or has failed, after notice, to produce requested records or 

disclose any information required to be disclosed by the Act. See Section 17(a) of 

the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.17(a). When the Secretary makes such a finding, the Secretary 

may issue an order directing that the person cease and desist specified fundraising 

activities, as well as impose administrative fines for each act or omission constituting 

the violation of the Act and additional penalties for each day during which the 

violation continues. See Section 17(b) of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.17(b).

The record reflects that the Department sent its demand letter by 

certified mail. See N.T. at 31; Ex. C-4. After sending the letter, Drew Koser, the 

Department’s investigator, was contacted by Houghton’s accountant and by 

someone from the company named Gladys Houghton. See id. at 32. Koser informed 

the accountant that the Department had determined that Houghton was a professional 

solicitor based upon its website. See id. Koser sent copies of the Act and the 

registration form to Gladys Houghton. See id. at 33. He received no response from 
8

Houghton or any employee thereof. See id. at 34-35. Houghton’s president, on the 

other hand, testified that he never received the demand letter because the company 

was on the road in April. See id. at 75. 

The burden of proof rests on the Commonwealth to prove that the 

issuance of the C&D was supported by the Act and should be sustained. See, e.g., 

Samuel J. Lansberry, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 578 A.2d 600, 601-02 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1990). Here, the evidence showed that the Commonwealth sent the 

appropriate notice, and the Secretary credited the testimony of the Commonwealth 

and did not credit the testimony of Mr. Houghton, noting that Houghton was served 

with “all notices, pleadings and orders filed of record in this matter” and had an 

opportunity to be heard. See Final Adjudication, 8/17/21, at 9. The language of the 

Act provides that, in cases where a person or organization does not comply with the 

investigation, the Secretary has the power to issue a C&D. See Section 17 of the 

Act, 10 P.S. § 162.17. This is exactly what the Commonwealth and the Secretary 

did in this matter, and there is no error in the initial issuance. See Younkin, 774 

A.2d at 1286-87; see also Section 4 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.4 (Secretary is 

empowered to hold hearings and make adjudications).

2. C&D Supported by Substantial Evidence

Houghton also argues that the Secretary erred in upholding the C&D 

because the record lacks substantial evidence that Houghton is a professional 

solicitor. See Houghton’s Br. at 16. Houghton’s arguments center around the fact 

that there is nothing in its contractsrequiring Houghton to request contributions from 

people attending its events and there are no representations made to attendees that 

the proceeds go to a charitable organization. See id. at 19.
9

A professional solicitor is any organization retained for financial or 

other considerations by a charitable organization to solicit for contributions for 

charitable purposes. See Section 3 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.3.5 A solicitation is a 

direct or indirect request for a contribution on the representation that such a 

contribution will be used in whole or in part for a charitable purpose. See id. 

Contributions may be indirect, in the form of payment for goods, services, or 

admission to fundraising events, and an indication of a professional solicitor is 

whether the compensation is related to the amount of contributions received. See id.

The Act specifically defines the sale of tickets, services, and announcements 

requesting the public attend a carnival as acts of solicitation. See id.

5 The full definition of a “professional solicitor” is

[a]ny person who is retained for financial or other consideration by a 

charitable organization to solicit in this Commonwealth contributions for 

charitable purposes directly or in the form of payment for goods, services 

or admission to fundraising events, whether such solicitation is performed 

personally or through his agents, servants or employees or through agents, 

servants or employees especially employed by or for a charitable 

organization who are engaged in the solicitation of contributions, the sale 

of goods or services or the production of fundraising events under the 

direction of such person, or a person who plans, conducts, manages, carries 

on, advises, consults, whether directly or indirectly, in connection with the 

solicitation of contributions, sale of goods or services or the production of 

fundraising events for or on behalf of any charitable organization, but does 

not qualify as a professional fundraising counsel within the meaning of this 

act. A person who is otherwise a professional fundraising counsel shall be 

deemed a professional solicitor if his compensation is related to the amount 

of contributions received. A bona fide salaried officer or regular, 

nontemporary employee of a charitable organization shall not be deemed to 

be a professional solicitor provided that the individual is not employed or 

engaged as professional fundraising counsel or as a professional solicitor by 

any other person.

10 P.S. § 162.3.
10

Instantly, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at the hearing 

established that Houghton contracts with nonprofit organizations to provide rides, 

food concession stands, and games, during a carnival-type event held by the 

charitable organization. N.T. at 80-81. Houghton contracted with the Fire Company 

to provide fundraising carnivals each year from 2016 through 2019. N.T. at 20; 

Commonwealth’s Ex. 10. Houghton receives 70% of the ride and ticket revenue, 

100% of the profits from the concession stands and games, minus a flat fee for the 

booths. N.T. at 84-85. Houghton’s website advertised that its carnivals could 

benefit “local hospitals, churches, fire companies, and other non-profit 

organizations,” and that it could “help [them] raise the needed funds for [their] 

organization[s].” N.T. at 28; Commonwealth’s Ex. 9. Houghton later removed this 

language from its website but continues to advertise carnivals using the names of the 

charitable organizations. N.T. at 74-78, Houghton’s Ex. B. Although Houghton’s 

president testified that Houghton also contracts with for-profit corporations, he did 

not provide evidence to support his claims. N.T at 84-85.

We reject Houghton’s argument that it is not a professional solicitor 

solely because the contracts do not explicitly require it to solicit. The Act itself 

provides that requests for contributions to charitable organizations may be in the 

form of admission to fundraising events and that the sale of tickets and services, and 

announcements requesting that the public attend a carnival constitute acts of 

solicitation. See Section 3 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 162.3. The Act delineates between 

professional fundraising counsel and professional solicitors, noting that professional 

solicitors take percentages of the profit as payment. See id. The evidence introduced 

by the Commonwealth established that Houghton advertised its services for the 

benefit of non-profit organizations to raise necessary funds and took a percentage of 
11

the profits as payment. Houghton did not provide any evidence to the contrary

beyond Mr. Houghton’s own testimony, which the Secretary rejected. Accordingly, 

there is substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision, and the Secretary

did not err in finding that there was substantial evidence to support upholding the 

C&D. Younkin, 774 A.2d at 1286-87.

B. Houghton’s Status as a Professional Solicitor

Houghton argues that its contracts do not contain any provisions 

indicating that it was retained to solicit contributions. See Houghton’s Br. at 23-24. 

Further, although Houghton does not contend that the statute is ambiguous, it avers 

that a finding that “a professional solicitor is any person who plans, conducts, 

manages, or carries on . . . in connection with the sale of goods or services” would 

be an absurd result. See id. at 24. Therefore, Houghton contends that it cannot be a 

professional solicitor. See id.

The Department notes that the statute is not ambiguous. See Dep’t’s 

Br. at 17. The Department argues that Houghton is a professional solicitor and points 

to several facts in the record to support this. First, Houghton is the one requesting 

and collecting funds from the public and being compensated by a portion of the 

proceeds of the solicitation. See id. at 12, 15-16. Second, the Department notes that 

the vast majority of Houghton’s clients are non-profit organizations. See id. at 13. 

The Department argues that solicitation is not always a direct or overt ask, and 

Houghton’s advertisement of the events linking to particular charities on its websites 

falls within the definition of solicitation. See id. at 14-15. 

Instantly, we note that “when engaging in statutory construction, a 

court’s duty is to give effect to the legislature’s intent and to give effect to all of a 

statute’s provisions.” Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 234 A.3d 
12

665, 674 (Pa. 2020) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a)). The best indication of legislative 

intent is “the plain language of the statute.” See id. (citation omitted). When 

determining the plain meaning of the statute, we “consider the statutory language in 

context and give words and phrases their ‘common and approved usage.’” See id. 

Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must “give effect to the words of 

the statute and not disregard the text to implement its objective.” See id. (citing 1 

Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)). 

“Only if the statute is ambiguous, and not explicit, do we resort to other 

means of discerning legislative intent.” Id.; see, e.g., 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)

(enumerating further considerations). For example, we may presume that the 

legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or 

unreasonable. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599, 605 (Pa. 2022); 1 Pa. C.S. 

§ 1922(1). A statute is ambiguous if there are two or more reasonable interpretations 

of the statutory language. Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Givner), 

39 A.3d 287, 294 (Pa. 2012). 

Houghton does not argue that the statute is ambiguous but nevertheless 

asserts that finding it is a professional solicitor would be an absurd result that the 

General Assembly could not have intended. However, if the statute is not 

ambiguous, we need not delve into the intent of the legislature or consider whether

the results would be “absurd.” Here, the statute is not ambiguous and accordingly, 

this analysis does not delve into the intent of the legislature.6 See Crown Castle, 234 

A.3d at 674; see, e.g., 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). Further, as discussed above in relation 

6 Again, we note that the General Assembly’s legislative intent is enshrined in the statute 

and that the Act was specifically intended to “protect the citizens of the Commonwealth” from 

“fraud, deception, and misrepresentation perpetrated in the name of charity.” Section 2 of the Act, 

10 P.S. § 162.2.
13

to Houghton’s first issue, substantial evidence supported the issuance and upholding 

of the C&D. Younkin, 774 A.2d at 1286-87.

C. Houghton’s Status as a Commercial Coventurer

Houghton contends that the Department erred in failing to consider the 

evidence of record when it concluded that Houghton is not a “commercial 

coventurer.” See Houghton’s Br. at 25. Houghton argues that the evidence showed 

that it is a for-profit company primarily engaged in trade or commerce other than for 

the raising of funds. See id. Houghton avers that although its trade may benefit 

charitable organizations, it is not a fundraising company and that its primary purpose 

is its own profit. See id. at 26-27. Thus, Houghton concludes that the difference 

between commercial coventurers and professional solicitors is the primary intent of 

the business. See id. at 26. Accordingly, Houghton argues that it is entitled to 

operate for the benefit of charitable organizations without rising to the level of a 

professional solicitor subject to the “burdensome oversight” of the Department. See 

id. at 27-28.

The Department responds that Houghton cannot be a commercial 

coventurer as defined by the Act. See Dep’t’s Br. at 18-19. According to the 

Department, Houghton’s entire business model is based upon contracting with 

charitable organizations or other non-profit organizations, and the record is devoid 

of an example of similar contracts with a for-profit business. See id. at 20. 

Accordingly, the Department contends that Houghton cannot be a commercial 

coventurer. See id.

The Act defines a commercial coventurer as any person “who for profit 

is regularly and primarily engaged in trade or commerce other than in connection 

with the raising of funds [for charitable organizations]” or “any other thing of value 
14

when offered at the usual retail price comparable to similar goods or services” and 

“who advertises that the purchase or use of goods, services, entertainment or any 

other thing of value will benefit a charitable organization.” See Section 3 of the Act,

10 P.S. § 162.3. Commercial coventurers may also advertise that “the purchase or 

use of goods or services or attendance at events or performances offered or 

sponsored by the commercial coventurer will benefit, in whole or in part, a charitable 

organization[.]” See id. Commercial coventurers are not subject to the Act’s 

registration requirements for professional solicitors. See Section 9 of the Act, 10 

P.S. § 162.9. However, charitable organizations utilizing the services of commercial 

coventurers must disclose the names and addresses of the coventurers acting on their 

behalf on the registration statements. See Section 5(b)(10) of the Act, 10 P.S. § 

162.5(b)(10).

Here, the operable language in the definition of a commercial 

coventurer is “any person who for profit is regularly and primarily engaged in trade 

or commerce other than in connection with the raising of funds.” Section 3 of the 

Act, 10 P.S. § 162.3 (emphasis added). Instantly, Houghton argues that it is engaged 

in a trade or commerce other than raising funds for charities. However, Houghton 

did not introduce any evidence of contracts with for-profit companies at the hearing, 

and Houghton’s website advertises that its business benefits charitable 

organizations. Although Houghton’s business is itself a for-profit business, the 

evidence introduced at the hearing showed that Houghton solely facilitated fundraising carnivals for non-profit and charitable organizations. The Secretary correctly 

observed that “all the upcoming events listed on [Houghton’s] website appeared to 

involve charitable organizations . . . contracting with charitable organizations and 

other non-profit organizations is integral to [Houghton’s] very business model.” 
15

Final Adjudication, 8/17/21, at 18. Based on the evidence introduced at the hearing, 

the Secretary did not err in determining that Houghton was not a commercial 

coventurer. Younkin, 774 A.2d at 1286-87.

D. Implications for the Amusement Industry

Finally, Houghton contends that the Department erred as a matter of 

law by failing to consider it compelling that the burdens that go along with 

registering and operating as a professional solicitor are unduly burdensome and 

impractical. See Houghton’s Br. at 28. Houghton argues that subjecting it and all 

other portable amusement operators to the Act’s requirements would result in an 

absurd application of the Act and would effectively kill the amusement industry. See 

id. at 28-29. Houghton argues, without averring ambiguity, that the record 

maintenance requirements of the Act would produce absurd results when applied to 

portable amusement park operators by increasing overhead costs and hampering it 

with record-keeping obligations. See id. at 30-32.

The Department responds that the statute is not ambiguous. See Dep’t’s 

Br. at 34. Further, it is only Houghton that is the subject of this action, and the 

Department is not aware how other portable amusement parks operate. See id. at 21. 

The Department points out that the legislative intent in the Act factors the public 

interest, requiring accountability for both charitable organizations and for-profit 

companies soliciting on behalf of those charities. See id. at 22. For example, the 

Department notes that carnival-goers are likely unaware that 70% of the ride-ticket 

sales and almost 100% of the money spent on food and games goes to Houghton 

rather than the Fire Company. See id. at 22-23. There is no financial accountability 

for day-of-event ticket sales or concessions paid for by cash. See id. at 23.
16

As discussed above, because the statute is not ambiguous and because 

Houghton does not allege ambiguity, we do not consider other factors of statutory 

interpretation such asthe intent of the General Assembly or whether or not the statute 

would lead to an absurd result. Crown Castle, 234 A.3d at 674; see also 1 Pa. C.S. 

§ 1921(b). Accordingly, Houghton’s arguments regarding the effects of registration 

upon its business and potential impacts upon the amusement industry at large are not 

arguments we may consider on appeal. See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the Secretary’s final adjudication, 

determining that the C&D was properly issued and upheld; that Houghton is a 

professional solicitor; and that Houghton is not a commercial coventurer.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Houghton Enterprises, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 930 C.D. 2021

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of State, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of April, 2023, the final adjudication and 

order of the Secretary of State, entered August 17, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge