2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

11-5-2003 

# E dwa r d s v . P A T ur npi k e C omm P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 02-4279

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/1381 Ho nora ble B erle M . Schille r, U.S . District Ju dge, E astern Distric t of P enns ylvania

sitting by designation. NOT PRE CEDENT IAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT No: 02-4279 TERRI LYNN EDWA RDS, Appellant

v. PENNS YLVANI A TURNPI KE COMMIS SI ON,

Appellee Appeal from the fi nal order entere d on October 23, 2002 i n the Un ited Sta tes D istrict Co urt for the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania in

Civil Action No. 1:CV-01-0357 Distri ct Court: Hon. John E. Jones Submitte d Pursuant to Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

September 18, 2003 Be for e: M cK EE and SM ITH , Circuit Judges , and SC HI LL ER , Distri ct Judge

. 1 (Opinion fi led: November 5, 2003)

OPI NION M cK EE , Circuit

Judge

. Plaintiff, Terri Lynn E dwa rds appea ls from the d istrict court’s grant of sum mary judgement for

the defendant , the Pennsyl vania Turnpi ke Commission (t he “Commission”) as well as the dis tri ct court ’s deni al of pl ainti ff’s moti on to suppl ement the j udgment

reco rd. F or th e rea son s tha t foll ow , we wil l aff irm t he r ulin g of the d istrict cou rt.2 We review the dis tri ct court ’s grant of a motion for

summary j udgment using a plenary standar d. We must als o (i) resol ve confli cting e vidence i n favor of the non mo vant, (ii) n ot eng age in credib ility determin ation, an d (iii) draw all reaso nable infere nces in fav or of the no nm ovan t.

3 We review the district court’ s denial of a motion to supplement the record for abuse of discr etion. I. Bec ause we write o nly for the parties, it is n ot nec essary to re cite the f acts of this case in de tail . It

is suff icie nt to note that

Edwards, a former

employe e of the Co mm ission, f iled a c om plaint in the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania p ursua nt to T itle VI I ofthe C ivil R igh ts A ct of 196 4, 42 U.S .C. § 200 0e, et se q., as am ende d by the C ivil Rights Act of 1991, against the Commission. Edwards alle ged that she was denied a promotion and terminat ed from her employ ment because of he r race a nd/or i n retal iati on for hav ing raise d di scrim inati on c laim s. After dis coverywas closed, the Commission f iled a motion for s ummary judgment and four months l ater Edwards fi led a moti on to suppl ement the s ummary judgment record wit

h after -acquired evidence. The district c ourt gr anted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment 2 , denied E dwa rd’s motion to supplem ent the record 3 and enter ed judgment for

the Commission. This appealfollowed. II. As no ted, Edw ards appe als both the district court’s gran t of the Co mm ission’s motion for s ummary judgment as well as the court ’s deni al of her motion t o supplement th e r ec or d. E ac h i ss ue w ill b e d isc us se d s ep ar ate ly.A. Motion f or Summary Judgment Sum mary jud gm ent is ap prop riate “if th e plea ding s, dep osition s, answ ers to interrogatories, and ad missions on file, together with the a ffidavits, if any, show th at there is no genui ne issue as to anymateri al fact and that the moving party is entitl ed to a judgm ent as a m atter of law.” F ed. R. C iv. P. 56© ); see a lso C elotex Co rp. v. C atrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322- 323 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrati ng the absence of a genui ne issue of materi al fact . To be a genuine issue, the evi dence must be “such that

a reasonabl e jurycould ret urn a verdi ct for t

he non-moving part

y. ” Anderson v. Libe rty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 ( 1986). Materi alit y wil l be det ermined bythe substant ive la w of the case. Id. Therefore, “the mere exi stence of so me alle ged factual disput e between parties wil l not def eat an otherwise pr operlysupporte d motion for summary j udgment; the requirement is t hat the re be no genuine issue of material fact. ” Id. In disparate t

reatment cases br ought under Ti tle VII , once the plai ntiff has establish ed a p rima f acie ca se of discrim ination the bu rden shifts to the de fend ant “to artic ulate som e leg itima te no ndi scrim inato ry reas on f or th e em plo yee’s r ejec tion .” M cD onn ell D oug las C orp . v. G ree n, 411 U.S. 792, 802 ( 1973). Once the defendant has met thi s burden, the pla inti ff must show that the nondis criminatoryreason articul ated by the d efe nda nt is in fac t a pr etex t for disc rimi natio n. Id. at 80 4. In a Title VII act

ion, to avoid summaryjudgment after the e mployer has proffered a legiti mate, nondiscriminatoryreason for adverse employment action, the plaintiff mustprod uce e viden ce w hich: (1 ) casts su fficien t dou bt up on ea ch pr offe red rea son s o that a

fact finder could reasonably conclude that each reason was fabrication, or (2) al lows a fact fi nder to i nfer that dis crimination was more l ikely than not a

motivating or determi native cause of action. See F uente s v. Pe rskie , 32 F.3d 759 ( 3d Cir. 1994) . The plaint iff, theref

ore, must cast doubt

on the le giti mate reas on for an employ ment decis ion advanced by the employ er. Thi s burden i s met thr ough a demonstrat ion that such “weaknesses, implausibili ties , inc onsistencies, incohere ncies, or contr adictions i n the employe r’s pr offered l egiti mate reas ons for i ts action are such t hat a re asonable f

actfi nder could rat ionall y fi nd them ‘unworthy of credence’ ” Id.. Here, Edwards est ablis hed a prima faci e cas e, as the b urd en is not ove rly hea vy. The Comm issi on then sust ained i ts burde n by advanc ing a multitude of reasons f

or Edwards’ terminati on other t han discrimination. The l egiti mate reas ons incl uded Edwards’ poor j ob performance as evidenced bya written warning is sued to Edwards for threat s she al legedl y made agai nst a co- worker, as well as a two-day sus pension i ssued as a result of certain job deficiencies, includ ing an incide nt whe re Edw ards put a 9 -1-1 dispat cher on hold s o that s he could continue a per sonal phone ca ll. After the se measures were taken, Edwards was warned that under the appl icabl e Collective Bargai ning Ag reem ent, th e ne xt ste p in the d iscip linar y proc edu re w oul d be Ed wa rds’ term inati on. Finall y, in May of 1999, Edwards was terminated for a vari etyof other i nfractions. The Commission pres ented evi dence which showed she was ins ubordinate to her direct supervi sor and al so charged per sonal periodica l subscripti ons and a seminar to theCo mm issio n w itho ut p erm issio n.

Edw ards argue s that the legitimate reason s proffered by the Com mission to sup port their employment

decisi ons are merel y a pr etext for raci al dis crimination. Edwards does not attem pt to cas t do ubt upo n th e C om mis sion ’s pr off ered reas ons for her term inati on. Instea d, she attem pts to b ring fo rth evid ence from wh ich a re ason able f act fin der co uld conclude that rac ial di scri minati on was more likel y than not a moti vating c ause for her disc har ge. See F uente s v. Pe rskie , 3 2 F. 3d 7 59 ( 3d Ci r. 199 4) . I n su ppo rt of t hi s c la im, Edwards assert s that

her actions at

work were not unusual , in t hat othe r employ ees behaved in a s imil ar unprofes sionalmanner. She al so clai ms that co- workers and superiors had referenced her race by criticizing her fo r talking “too black ,” Plaintiff’s Exh ibit E at p age 3 , and la beled her as a “trou ble-m aking f----- –--- -,” Plain tiff’s E xhib it A at page 26, and t

hat another white e mployee who was also written up for insubordination received no disci pline in response to his actions. The evidence pr esented by Edwards is i nsuffici ent to c reate a reasonabl e infer ence that t he Commission’s arti culat ed legi timat e, nondi scri minatory reasons are fal se, or

that an invidious discri minatory reason was more likelya motivating or determinati ve cause for her disc har ge. See To rre v . Ca sio, In c., 42 F.3d 825, 830 ( 3d Cir. 1994) . We agree with the di stri ct court ’s det ermination that the remarks made about her race ar e not suffici ent to s ustai n her burden. The remarks were made bysupervi sors unr elat ed to the decisio n to term inate E dw ards a nd th e rem arks w ere also temp orally rem ote fro m the date of th e de cisio n. T her efo re th ey w ere “ stray” rem ark s an d no t giv en g reat w eigh t. See4 Our conclusi on may have been di fferent if Edwards had provi ded suffici ent proof that the supe rvisors wh o m ade th e rem arks w ere inv olved with the de cisions leadin g to her terminati on. Ezold v. Wolf, Bl ock, Schorr & Soli s-Cohen , 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 199 2). 4 Also , we f ind E dw ards’ c onten tion tha t she w as treate d diff erently than a W hite employe e who engaged in si milar be havior i nsuffici ent to s ustai n her burden. Although both Edwards and the White employ ee were charged wit h simil ar infr acti ons, Edwards was fired whil e the White e mployee was not. However, t he two employ ees were at differe nt st ages of the disci plinar y sc heme outli ned in the Collective Bargai ning Agreement. The Commissi on’s fai lure t o terminate the White employ ee, therefore, does not create an i nference of r acialdiscrimination. Finall y, we find no merit in Edwards’ cl aim that she was not promot ed because of ill egal di scri minati on. Edwards appli ed for a posi tion i n Januaryof 1999, which she was denied. However, she has not present ed any e vidence fr om which a reasonabl e fact fi nder could fi nd she was more quali fied than the appl icant s who were recommended for the position. Furthermore, Edwards was not even el igibl e for one of the promotions she mentions bec ause of her termination. Edwards has not pr esented s uffici ent evi dence to show that she was the subject of unlawful di scri minatory treat ment by t

he Commission. Therefore, we find ther e is no genu ine issu e as to a ny mate rial fact re gard ing the Co mm ission’s decisio n to term inate her. B. Motion to Supplement Summary Jud gment RecordThe district co urt den ied E dw ards’ m otion to supp leme nt the su mm ary judgm ent

record, which was made more than fi ve months aft er dis covery had closed. We review the dis tri ct court ’s deci sion usi ng an abuse of di scretion st andard. An abuse of dis creti on is found w here w e are left with the “definite and firm con viction that the trial court committed aclear

error of judgment. ” Lo gan v. D ayto n H uds on C orp ., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir ., 1989) The evidence Edwards sought to int roduce was merel y cor

roborative of evidence alreadyon the rec ord and would not have alte red the de cisi on of the di stri ct

cour t. We find th at the ru ling of the distric t court d enying E dw ards’ m otion to supplement t

he record was t

herefore not

an abuse of di scretion. III. Fo r the abo ve r eas ons , we wil l aff irm t he r ulin g of the d istrict cou rt.

TO THE CLERK OF THE CO URT:

Please fi le the foregoing Opini on.

/s/ Theodore A. McKee, Circuit Judge

DAT ED: November 5, 2003