NO. 01-15-00609-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS

VICTOR ANTONIO SANCHEZ 

Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee 

On Appeal from Cause Number 1458825 

From the 230thDistrict Court of Harris County, Texas 

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ALEXANDER BUNIN

 Chief Public Defender 

Harris County, Texas 

 MELISSA MARTIN

 Assistant Public Defender 

 Harris County, Texas 

TBN. 24002532 

1201 Franklin, 13th floor 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Phone: (713) 368-0016 

Fax: (713) 437-4319 

 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

ACCEPTED

01-15-00609-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

12/29/2015 10:42:33 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 12/29/2015 10:42:33 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
ii

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANT: Victor Antonio Sanchez 

TDCJ # 02005365

Luther Unit, TDCJ

1800 Luther Dr

Navasota, TX 77868

TRIAL PROSECUTORS: Alison Baimbridge

Assistant District Attorney

 Harris County, Texas

 1201 Franklin St 6th Floor

Houston, TX 77002

DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL: Dorian Claude Cotlar.

Attorney at Law

723 Main Ste. 826

Houston, TX77002

PRESIDING JUDGE: Hon. Brad Hart

 230th District Court 

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin St 16

th floor

Houston, TX 77002

COUNSEL ON APPEAL FOR APPELLANT: Melissa Martin

 Assistant Public Defender

 Harris County, Texas

 1201 Franklin St 13th floor

Houston, TX 77002
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL...................................................................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 1

ISSUE PRESENTED................................................................................................................... 2

COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL BELIEVES THAT THE APPEAL IN THIS 

CASE IS FRIVOLOUS, SINCE THERE ARE NO ARGUABLE GROUNDS FOR 

APPEAL FROM THE APPELLANT’S PLEA OF GUILTY FOLLOWING A PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION.

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................. 2

A. ANDERS BRIEFS, GENERALLY .................................................................................... 2

 B. THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS FRIVOLOUS................................................................... 4

1. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT ...................................................................... 5

2. ANY ADVERSE PRETRIAL RULINGS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO RULINGS 

ON MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, MOTIONS TO QUASH, AND MOTIONS FOR SPEEDY 

TRIAL......................................................................................................................... 6

3. WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AGREEMENT TO STIPULATE, JUDICIAL 

CONFESSION, AND COURT ADMONISHMENTS .................................................... 7

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 11

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................... 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................................................................................... 13
iv

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................................................... 14
v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)...........2, 3, 4, 12

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .................................................... 4

Breaux v. State, 16 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) ...... 8

Carroll v. State, 42 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ...................................................... 8

Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ..................................................... 3

Ex Parte Douthit, 232 S.W. 3d 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)................................................. 7

Ex Parte Smith, 678 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)..................................................... 9

Ex parte Wilson, 965 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).................................................... 12

Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).................................................... 4

Griffith v. State, 391 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (citation omitted). ................... 8

High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ....................................................... 3

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) .................................................... 2

Lomax v. State, 133 3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)............................................................ 5

McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988). .............................. 2

Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267)........................................................................................... 10

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) ........................................................................... 6

Mitchell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).............. 4

Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)...... 11

Sowels v. State, 45 S.W.3d 690 (Tex.App.--Waco 2001, no pet.) ........................................ 2
vi

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)............................................... 3, 4

State v. Villareal, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 16, 2015) .................................... 6

Stephens v. State, 35 S.W.3d 770 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).......... 12

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ....................................................................... 6

Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W. 3d 68, 72 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) .................... 7

Villareal v. State, 214 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) ................................................. 7

Statutes

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13............................................................................................ 7

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.25............................................................................................ 7

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a) ..................................................................................... 9

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a) (1)-(5).......................................................................... 8

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(b) .................................................................................... 9

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(c) ..................................................................................... 9

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(d). .................................................................................. 10

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(h). .................................................................................... 9

Tex. Penal Code §12.32 ....................................................................................................... 11

Tex. Penal Code §19.02(b)(3) (West 2015)...................................................................... 1, 5

Tex. Penal Code §49.04(a) (West 2015)........................................................................... 1, 5

Tex. Penal Code §49.09(b)(2) (West 2015)...................................................................... 1, 5
vii

Other Authorities

http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/pdf/AndersGuidelines.pdf................................ 4

Constitutional Provisions

Tex. Const. art. I, §10............................................................................................................. 7
1

Statement of the Case

This is an appeal from a conviction for first-degree felony murder, with the 

underlying felony of driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense, pursuant to Tex. 

Penal Code Ann., §§19.02(b)(3); 49.04(a), & 49.09(b)(2) (West 2015). It was further 

alleged that appellant had a prior felony conviction for arson. The instant offense 

occurred on or about May 25, 2014 (C.R. at 7). On March 27, 2015, appellant Victor 

Sanchez pled guilty (C.R. at 174-182) and the case was reset for a hearing on a 

presentence investigation (C.R. at 183). The hearing took place on June 22, 2015 and 

the trial court sentenced Mr. Sanchez to 18 years in the Institutional Division of the 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice (C.R. at 184; 2 R.R. at 56).

Statement of Facts

Appellant was accused of and pled guilty to driving on the wrong side of the road 

while intoxicated and colliding with the complainant’s vehicle; the complainant was 

killed in the collision (C.R. at 7). Appellant also pled guilty to having had two prior 

felony DWI convictions prior to the accident (C.R. at 7). The state abandoned the 

felony arson enhancement paragraph (C.R. at 174).

Summary of the Argument

The undersigned has thoroughly reviewed the record and concluded that there 

are no meritorious grounds for appeal from the appellant’s plea of guilty following a 

pre-sentence investigation. Therefore, the undersigned moves to withdraw from 
2

representing the Appellant and has filed, simultaneously with this brief, a motion to 

withdraw. 

Issue Presented

Court-appointed counsel believes that the appeal in this case is 

frivolous, since there are no arguable grounds for appeal from the 

appellant’s plea of guilty following a pre-sentence investigation.

Argument

A. Anders Briefs, generally

An attorney has an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal. In 

re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). If an appointed attorney finds, 

following a professional, conscientious evaluation of the record, that a case is wholly 

frivolous, his obligation to his client is to seek leave to withdraw. Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Counsel’s obligation to the appellate 

court is to assure it, through an Anders brief, that such a complete review of the record 

has been undertaken and that the request to withdraw is well-founded. Id. 

A wholly frivolous appeal is one that “lacks any basis in law or in fact.” See McCoy 

v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988). A reviewing court must 

resolve doubtful issues in the appellant’s favor. Id. In the brief which accompanies his 

motion to withdraw, counsel must make references to the appellate record as well as to 

any applicable statutes, rules, and cases that lead counsel to the conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous. Sowels v. State, 45 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex.App.--Waco 2001, no pet.). 

The brief must contain references to anything in the record that might arguably support 
3

the appeal, even though counsel believes that the appeal is frivolous. Anders v. California, 

supra; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Counsel is not required to make arguments that would not be made on behalf of 

a client who has retained counsel for the appeal; counsel is not required to make 

arguments for which there is no merit. Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1974). If counsel concludes that there are no arguable grounds for appeal, then counsel 

should so state and should make references to the record, statutes, and cases which 

support that conclusion. Stafford v. State, supra; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1978). When discussing the record, counsel must discuss the evidence introduced 

at trial and must provide the appellate court “with ready references to the record.” 

Stafford v. State, supra at 510 n.3; High v. State, supra. Conclusory statements in the brief 

are insufficient. Anders v. California, supra; High v. State, supra; Currie v. State, supra.

Counsel must furnish a copy of the motion to withdraw and a copy of the brief 

to appellant and must advise appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro 

se brief. Counsel must certify or otherwise show the appellate court that appellant has 

been furnished with a copy of the motion and brief and that appellant has been advised 

of his right to obtain the record and to file a pro se brief.

After appellant has himself raised the points that he wishes to raise, or the time 

has passed for him to do so, the appellate court must conduct an independent 

examination of the proceedings and determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. 

Anders v. California, supra; Mitchell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 
4

2006, no pet.). If the court finds that the appeal is wholly frivolous and that there are 

no arguable grounds for appeal, it will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

Although a reviewing court may issue an opinion explaining why the appeal lacks 

arguable merit, it is not required to do so. Id., at 767. If the court determines that there 

are arguable grounds, it will abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court 

with instructions that the trial court appoint new and different counsel to represent 

appellant on appeal to present those arguable grounds, as well as any others that new 

counsel might wish to present. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005). The appellate court does not make a decision on the merits of any issue, 

except to determine whether an appeal is wholly frivolous and that there either are or 

are not arguable grounds for appeal. Anders v. California, supra; Stafford v. State, supra. An 

appellant may challenge a holding that there are no arguable grounds for appeal by filing 

a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Bledsoe, supra, at 

827-828, fn 6.

B. The appeal in this case is frivolous

The undersigned has evaluated the record from this case with the help of the 

“Anders Guidelines” posted on the website of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. See

http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/pdf/AndersGuidelines.pdf.
5

1. Sufficiency of the indictment

The elements of “felony” murder under Tex. Penal Code §19.02(b)(3) (West 

2015) are 1) a person 2) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than 

manslaughter and, 3) in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, 

or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt 4) commits or attempts to 

commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

The elements of DWI, third offense are 1) a person 2) commits an offense if 3) 

the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle 4) on a public roadway and 

the offense is a felony of the third degree if 5) it is shown on the trial of the offense 

that 6) the person has previously been convicted 6) two times of any other offense 

relating to the operating of a motor vehicle. Tex. Penal Code §§49.04(a) & 49.09(b)(2) 

(West 2015).

The indictment in the instant case alleges each element as prescribed by the 

statutes (C.R. at 7). It has been held that DWI may be the underlying felony for purposes 

of felony murder because the legislative intent in drafting 19.04 (b)(3) was clearly to 

preclude a culpable mental state. Lomax v. State, 133 3d 302, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Nothing else raises a question regarding the indictment, or which would suggest that it 

should have been challenged in the trial court by defense counsel; it tracks the pertinent 

statutes and is therefore sufficient to provide notice.

The indictment further alleges a prior conviction for the felony offense of arson, 

that enhancement was dropped at the plea (C.R. at 174).
6

2. Any adverse pretrial rulings, including but not limited to rulings on 

motions to suppress, motions to quash, and motions for speedy trial

There were no adverse pretrial rulings. Defense counsel filed no motion to 

suppress the blood draw, even though there was no warrant and appellant was 

unconscious and therefore unable to consent when the blood was drawn (C.R. at 10).

The draw arguably was not a valid search under the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution as no exigent circumstances existed to preclude the officers getting 

a warrant and consent under these circumstances could not have been implied under 

the statute cited in the probable cause statement. See, e.g. State v. Villareal, __ S.W.3d __ 

(Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 16, 2015); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).

The record is silent, however, as to why defense counsel failed to raise the issue

in a motion to suppress, therefore it cannot be determined whether or not counsel had 

a reasonable trial strategy for not doing so; neither prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984), therefore can be met to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, 

the record indicates that the state abandoned the felony enhancement paragraph alleged 

in the indictment and agreed to a cap at 40 years at the plea, which could well have had 

a bearing on defense counsel’s strategy in failing to prosecute a suppression motion 

(C.R. at 174; 1 R.R. at 6).

As noted above, there was no motion to quash filed; the indictment alleged all 

the requisite elements of the offense and raised no reason to attempt to quash it. There 

were no limitations or speedy trial issues. The offense occurred on May 25, 2014 and 
7

was first indicted on a prior cause number on August 8, 2014. That indictment was 

dismissed and reindicted on the instant cause number on February 19, 2015 (C.R. 7 & 

8). Appellant pled guilty on March 27, 2015 and was sentenced on June 22, 2015 (C.R. 

at 174 & 184; 2 R.R. at 56).

3. Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, Judicial 

Confession, and Court Admonishments

The defendant in a criminal proceeding, other than a capital case, has the right 

to waive the right to trial by jury. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13. The defendant’s 

written waiver must be filed with the case and it must show that it was made before the 

defendant entered his plea and it must be in person and in open court. Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 1.13. In addition, the waiver must include signed approvals from the 

defendant’s attorney, the court, and the state. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13. Despite 

these requirements, a defect in the defendant’s waiver is not reversible error unless the 

defect is a jurisdictional defect, or a constitutional or fundamental error. Ex Parte 

Douthit, 232 S.W. 3d 69, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

The defendant also has a right to confront witnesses at trial. Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 1.25; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. That right attaches during the trial process and 

not before, and the defendant may waive this right by waiver or by failing to object. 

Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W. 3d 68, 72 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). The 

defendant also has a right against self-incrimination. Tex. Const. art. I, §10; See Villareal 

v. State, 214 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948). The right against self-incrimination 
8

may be waived by written waiver upon a plea of guilty, and in unitary cases, the waiver 

extends to both the punishment and sentencing phases. Carroll v. State, 42 S.W.3d 129, 

132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The case becomes unitary when there is a guilty plea in 

front of a judge or a jury. Carroll, 42 S.W.3d at 134. Furthermore, when a confession 

and a stipulation(s) are admitted into evidence without objection, they are sufficient to 

comply with provisions “requiring the state to introduce evidence into the record 

showing the guilt of the accused who waives and pleads guilty to a non-capital felony.” 

Griffith v. State, 391 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (citation omitted). In 

addition, a judicial confession will support a plea of guilty if it is voluntarily given before 

the court or magistrate during legal proceedings. Breaux v. State, 16 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).

Mr. Sanchez signed and filed a document entitled “Waiver of Constitutional 

Rights, Agreement to Stipulate and Judicial Confession” (1 R.R. at 174). The contents 

of that document are identical to the indictment but for the fact that the felony 

enhancement paragraph has been crossed out, thereby limiting the minimum sentence 

to five years. This document shows Mr. Sanchez waived the following rights before he 

entered his guilty plea to murder: his right to trial by jury, the right to appearance, 

confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the right against incrimination.

He pleaded guilty in open court to the trial judge and the record shows the court 

complied with Art. 23.13(a)(1)-(5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (1 R.R. at 
9

3-5). Mr. Sanchez stated he was a U.S. citizen and the court, nevertheless, admonished 

him that he would be deported, should he not be a citizen (1 R.R. at 4). 

In compliance with Art. 26.13(b), the trial court asked defense counsel if it was 

their opinion appellant was competent to go forward, which they confirmed he was. 

Appellant himself averred that he understood the information in his agreement with 

the state regarding the range of punishment, which included a cap at 40 years, and the 

court’s discretion to sentence him anywhere within that range 1 R.R. at 4-5). Further, 

the court confirmed appellant’s understanding of the waiver of constitutional rights, 

agreement to stipulate and judicial confession (1 R.R. at 6). Appellant further confirmed 

that he understood all the written admonishments he had initialed and signed (1 R.R. at 

7; 1 C.R. at 176-79). 

As part of the court’s evaluation of the voluntariness of the plea, it is required to 

admonish the accused. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a). The admonishment must 

include, among other matters, the range of punishment for the charged offense, or any 

plea bargain agreements. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a). The standard for 

complying with the rules of admonishment is substantial compliance, unless the accused 

can show that he was misled, unaware of, or harmed by the admonishment. Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(c). However, failure to comply with substantial compliance does 

not set aside the conviction, sentence, or plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc art. 26.13(h). 

Substantial compliance is deemed to have occurred when the admonishment is given. 

Ex Parte Smith, 678 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The admonishment may be 
10

made orally or in writing; however, if the court chooses to make a written 

admonishment, it must receive a statement by the accused and his attorney stating that 

the accused is aware and understanding of the consequences. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

art. 26.13(d).

In this case appellant was admonished both orally by the court. He further 

initialed and signed written admonishments (C.R. at 176-79). The trial court, therefore, 

was more than substantially compliant with Art. 26.13.

Mr. Sanchez was interviewed by a presentence investigator on June 18, 2015 with 

his defense counsel (2 R.R. at State’s Ex. 2). Objections were made by neither side (2 

R.R. at 7). Appellant denied having had an abusive childhood and stated he had never 

been diagnosed with or treated for mental health problems. The report writer noted 

that appellant’s juvenile probation file from January 2009 included a diagnosis of Axis 

I –Disruptive Behavior Disorder NOS, ADHD, and cannabis abuse.

Mr. Sanchez initialed a paragraph in the Admonishments document filed at his 

plea to this offense, stating he was mentally competent (C.R. at 178). As noted in the 

discussion of the plea colloquy, his defense counsel stated his opinion that Mr. Sanchez 

was competent at that time and the trial court agreed (1 R.R. at 6).

Mr. Sanchez and his father both testified for the defense at the PSI hearing, so

punishment evidence was presented on appellant’s behalf, attempting to mitigate 

appellant’s actions (2 R.R. at 25 & 1, respectively). The record demonstrates no reason 

to believe defense counsel failed to seek out mitigation evidence. See, e.g. Milburn v. State, 
11

15 S.W.3d 267, 270). Even had there been reason to believe there was no mitigation 

investigation, appellant did not raise the issue in a motion for new trial so the issue is 

waived.

Mr. Sanchez’s sentence falls within the range of punishment for a first-degree 

felony (Tex. Penal Code, §12.32). No objection was made to his sentence in the trial 

court or in a post-trial motion; therefore any error in sentencing was made for purposes 

of appellate review. Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complain that a sentence 

is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant 

must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific 

grounds for the ruling desired.”)

Conclusion

Appellate counsel certifies that she has diligently reviewed the entire appellate 

record in this cause as well as relevant case law. In her opinion, the appeal of Mr. 

Sanchez’s guilty plea and the trial court’s sentencing in this cause lacks merit and is 

wholly frivolous because the record reflects no reversible error.

A copy of the entire appellate record (which comprises one volume of the Clerk’s 

record and two volumes of the Reporter’s Record) has been sent to the Appellant, 

Victor Antonio Sanchez, TDCJ # 02005365, Luther Unit, TDCJ, 1800 Luther Dr., 

Navasota, TX 77868.
12

In addition to sending Mr. Sanchez a copy of this brief, the undersigned also sent 

him a letter explaining the brief and how he might pursue issues that cannot be raised 

on direct appeal in an 11.07 writ, as well as a copy of the attached Motion to Withdraw. 

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.E. 2d 493 (1967) and Stephens 

v. State, 35 S.W.3d 770, 771 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)(motion to 

withdraw pursuant to Anders brief is properly directed to the appellate court, not the 

trial court).

Should this Court grant the undersigned’s Motion to Withdraw, the undersigned 

will inform the Appellant of the result of his appeal and will also inform Mr. Clark that 

he may, on his own, pursue discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals. See 

Ex parte Wilson, 965 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

PRAYER

Counsel for appellant asks that this Court grant the motion to withdraw as 

counsel filed with this brief.

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER BUNIN

Chief Public Defender

Harris County Texas 

/s/Melissa Martin

______________________________

MELISSA MARTIN

Assistant Public Defender 

Harris County Texas 
13

1201 Franklin 13th Floor

Houston Texas 77002

(713) 368-0016

(713) 437-4319 e-fax

TBA No. 24002532

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I provided a copy of the foregoing brief to the Harris County 

District Attorney on the day the brief was accepted.

/s/ Melissa Martin

______________________________

MELISSA MARTIN

Assistant Public Defender 
14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3), undersigned counsel certifies that this brief complies 

with the type-volume limitations of Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(e)(i).

1. Exclusive of the portions exempted by Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4 (i)(1), this brief 

contains 3,088 words printed in a proportionally spaced typeface.

2. This brief is printed in a proportionally spaced, serif typeface using Garamond 

14 point font in text and Garamond 12 point font in footnotes produced by Microsoft 

Word software.

3. Upon request, undersigned counsel will provide an electronic version of this brief 

and/or a copy of the word printout to the Court.

4. Undersigned counsel understands that a material misrepresentation in completing 

this certificate, or circumvention of the type-volume limits in Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(j), 

may result in the Court's striking this brief and imposing sanctions against the person 

who signed it.

/s/ Melissa Martin

______________________________

MELISSA MARTIN