[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Miller v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-831.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -831
T HE S TATE EX REL
. M ILLER v . H AMILTON C OUNTY B OARD OF E LECTIONS

ET AL
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Miller v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-831.] Elections—Prohibition—Writ of prohibition sought to prevent board of electionsfrom placing mayoral candidate’s name on the May 4, 2021 primaryelection ballot—Relator failed to show that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable la w by accepting candidate’s nominating petitions with circulator statements that were not in the form of sworn affidavits but did substantially comply with the nominating-petition form prescribed by the city charter—Writ denied. (No. 2021-0274—Submitted Marc h 12, 2021—Decided March 18, 2021. )
I N P ROHIBITION

.

__________________ Per Curiam.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 1} Relator, Mark W. Miller, seeks a writ of prohibition barring respondents Hamilton County Board of Elections and its members 1 from placing the name of respondent Aftab Pur eval on the ballot as a candida te for mayor of Cincinnati in the May 4, 2021 nonpa rtisan primary election. Mi ller claims the board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by denying his protest of Pureval’s candidacy, because Pureval’s part-petition s did not include sworn affidavits of the petition circulators, which Miller clai ms the Cincinnati City Charter requires. Respondents and amicus curiae, the city of C incinnati, counter that when all applicable sections of the charter are considered , Pureval’s petition met the requirements. We agree , and we therefore deny the writ

. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND {¶ 2} The Cincinnati City Charter provi des that “candidates for mayor shall be determined at a nonpartisan pr imary election to be held on t he first Tuesday after the first Monday in May * * *.” Article IX, Section 1a, Cincin nati City Charter. To be placed on the primary-election ballot, a mayoral candidat e must submit a petition to the board of elections. Article IX, Section 2, Cin cinnati City Charter.
Pureval submitted his nominatin g petition, consisting of 76 par t-petitions, to the board on February 10, 2021. {¶ 3} On February 24, the board received from Miller, a registered el ector in the city of Cincinnati, a written protest of Pureval’s petit ion under R.C. 3501.39(A). Miller’s protest letter alleged that under the Cin cinnati City Charter, circulator statements on part-petitions must be by sworn affida vit. The letter claimed that Pureval’s part-petitions contained only unsworn ci rculator statements
and that the board should theref ore reject his petition. On Fe bruary 24, the board set a protest hearing for March 2.

1. The respondent board members are Gwen L. McFarlin, Joseph L . Mallory, Charles H. Gerhardt III, and Alex M. Triantafilou.January Term, 2021

3 {¶ 4} At the hearing, the board heard arguments from counsel for Mill er and
counsel for Pureval. The latter argued that the Cincinnati Cit y Charter prescribes a form of petition that Pureval’s part-petitions complied with; t hat under R.C. 3501.38(L), Pureval’s petition could not be rejected because he obtained his petition forms from the board within 90 days of the filing dead line; and that all of the other mayoral candidates had used the same forms. These la st two claims were
based on unsworn factual assertions made by Pureval’s attorney. {¶ 5} The board’s counsel then advised that Pureval needed only to “substantially compl[y]” with the charter and that his petition s (as well as those of the other mayoral candidates) did substantially comply. The bo ard voted unanimously to deny the protest, without comment. The board th en certified Pureval and five other mayora l candidates to the ballot. {¶ 6} Miller filed this prohibition action on March 3. We ordered ex pedited briefing, see __ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-574, __ N.E.3d __, which is now complete. The city of Cincinnati filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
board.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Threshold Issues {¶ 7} Pureval asserts four threshold a rguments. We reject all four.
1. S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02’s Affidavit Requirements {¶ 8} Pureval first argues that we must dismiss the cause because the affidavit accompanying the complaint does not comply with S.Ct. Prac.R. 12.02(B), which states that a complaint in an original action “shall be s upported by an affidavit specifying the details of the claim,” S.Ct.Prac.R. 12 .02(B)(1). The affidavit “shall be made on pers onal knowledge, setting forth f acts admissible in evidence, and showing affirmatively that the affiant is compete nt to testify to all
matters stated in the affidav it.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2). “ We have routinely dismissed original actions, othe r than habeas corpus, that were not supported by anS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 affidavit expressly stating that the facts in the complaint wer e based on the affiant’s personal knowledge.” State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes , 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002- Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 1050, ¶ 24. {¶ 9} Miller’s complaint was accompanied by an affidavit in which his attorney, Curt C. Hartman, declar es that Hartman “has personal knowledge of the factual allegations above and su ch allegations are true and acc urate.” Pureval argues that the affidavit is insufficient because it is devoid of specific details or
admissible facts and contains no information establishing that Hartman is competent to testify to the ma tters alleged in the complaint. {¶ 10} We rejected a similar argument in Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections , 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 420. In that c ase, the relator’s affidavit “state[d] that he ha[d] ‘reviewed the f acts contained in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and affirm [sic] th at they are accurate based on my person al knowledge.’ ” Id . at ¶ 16. We reasoned,

By specifying in his affidavit that he swore to the accuracy of the facts in the petition and stating that those facts are b ased on his personal knowledge, Sheriff Wellington satisfied the rule because his petition—as verified by his affidavit—specified the details of his claim, set forth facts admissible in evidence, a nd affirmatively established that he is competent to testify to th e material facts—i.e., he filed a protest challenging Aey’s candi dacy for sheriff, and the board denied the protest at the conclusion of a hearing at which he testified and presented evidence. He did no t need to repeat these same statements in his affidavit, which al ready
verified the truth of these statements.

Id . at ¶ 19.January Term, 2021

5 {¶ 11} Similarly, here, the complaint specifies the details of the cla im, sets forth admissible facts, and establishes Hartman’s competency to testify to the material facts, as he was presen t for and involved in the prote st proceedings. We will not dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with S.Ct. Prac.R. 12.02.
2. Laches {¶ 12} Pureval next argues that Miller’s claim is barred by the doctri ne of laches. “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the i njury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections , 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277 (1995). {¶ 13} Miller filed his complaint one day after the board rejected his protest. Pureval does not, however, challenge Miller’s delay in the cont ext of this case. Rather, he asserts that Miller’s true challenge is not to Purev al’s candidacy but to the board’s interpretation of t he Cincinnati City Charter, whic h he claims has been consistent since 2001. He therefore argues that Miller unreaso nably delayed for 20 years, without excuse—causing prejudice to Pureval by making th is case an expedited election matter. {¶ 14} We reject this argument, which ignores such questions as whethe r Miller had knowledge of the board ’s longstanding interpretation or was eligible to challenge it before he proteste d Pureval’s pe tition. Moreover, despite the potential for broader implications, the subject matter of this prohibitio n action is the board’s rejection of Pureval’s 2021 mayoral petitions, see R.C. 3501.39(A). Because Miller filed this action one day after the board rejected his protest, we find that laches does
not bar his claim.
3. Unclean Hands {¶ 15} Pureval next argues that Miller’s claim is barred by the doctri ne of unclean hands. Pureval argues that Miller has, without explana tion, singled himS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 out by challenging his petition but not those of the other mayo ral candidates who used the same forms. He argues that this calls Miller’s motive s into question and amounts to discriminatory targeting. {¶ 16} Pureval cites no authority for a pplying the equitable doctrine of unclean hands in this prohibiti on action. We have, however, oc casionally recognized its potential applicability in mandamus actions. See State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington , 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 53, quoting State ex rel. Albright v. Haber , 139 Ohio St. 551, 553, 41 N.E.2d 247 (1942) (“On rare occasions, we have recognized that ‘while mand amus is considered a legal remedy, equitable principles often govern it s issuance, and it may be denied to those who do not com e before the court with cl ean hands’ ”). {¶ 17} In any event, “the doctrine of un clean hands requires a showing that [the relator] engaged in reprehensible conduct, not merely negl igent conduct,” State ex rel. Columbus Coalition for Responsive Govt. v. Blevins , 140 Ohio St.3d 294, 2014-Ohio-3745, 17 N.E.3d 578, ¶ 12, yet the record here is und eveloped on the question of Miller’s motivations. We find that the doctrine of unclean hands does
not bar Miller’s claim.
4. Failure to Join Necessary Parties under Civ.R. 19(A) {¶ 18} Finally, Pureval argues that we must deny Miller’s requested re lief for failure to join necessary parties under Civ.R. 19(A). He a rgues that the equalprotection clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions would prohibit the selective enforcement of the Cincinnati City Charter, instead r equiring the rejection of all mayoral petitions if his is rejected. He therefore argu es that complete relief cannot be accorded in this action without joinder of the other five mayoral
candidates. {¶ 19} However, Pureval’s equal-protec tion argument is undeveloped, an d he has not established that this court (as opposed to the board ) would be able—let alone required—to reject petitions that were not protested befo re the board underJanuary Term, 2021

7 R.C. 3501.39(A). As the scope of this prohibition action is li mited to whether the board abused its discretion by rejecting the protest to Pureval ’s petition, we will not dismiss the complaint for failure to join parties necessary to accord complete relief.
B. Elements of the Prohibition Claim {¶ 20} To be entitled to a writ of prohi bition, Miller must prove that the board exercised quasi-judicial power, that it lacked the author ity to do so, and that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Keith v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Elections , 159 Ohio St.3d 128, 2019-Ohio-4766, 149 N.E.3d 449, ¶ 5. Miller lacks an adequate remedy due to the pr oximity of the May
4 election. State ex rel. Tam O’Shanter Co. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections , 151 Ohio St.3d 134, 2017-Ohio-8167, 86 N.E.3d 332, ¶ 15.
1. Quasi-Judicial Power {¶ 21} “Quasi-judicial authority is the power to hear and determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.” State ex rel. Wright v. Oh io Bur. of Motor Vehicles , 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999). Miller argues that the board exercised quasijudicial power by hearing and rejecting his protest, which was brought pursuant to R.C. 3501.39(A), noting our obser vation that “R.C. 3501.39(A) r equires a board of elections to conduct a quasi-judi cial hearing on a petition pro test,” State ex rel. Barney v. Union Cty. Bd. of Elections , 159 Ohio St.3d 50, 2019-Ohio-4277, 147 N.E.3d 595, ¶ 12. {¶ 22} The board conceded in its answer and acknowledged at the protes t hearing that it was exercising quasi-judicial power. However, Pureval argues that the board did not exercise quasi-judicial power because it did not consider sworn testimony at the hearing. And in its brief, the board appears to hedge on its previous admission. On the one hand, it c ites our statement that “[a] b oard of elections exercises quasi-judicial power w hen it ‘conducts a protest hear ing pursuant to statute,’ ” Keith at ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 Medina , 157 Ohio St.3d 423, 2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 29. O n the other hand, the board a llows that quasi-judicial proceedings “g enerally involve the taking of sworn testimony.” {¶ 23} Our recent opinions have included statements such as, “A board of elections exercises quasi-judici al authority when it makes a de cision regarding a protest after a mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony .” E.g. , Barney at ¶ 12; see also State ex rel. Meyer v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-4863, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 9, citing Barney at ¶ 12. And in Save
Your Courthouse , we stated,

When a public entity takes official action but does not conduct proceedings akin to a j udicial trial, prohibition will not issue. For example, a board of elections did not exercise quas ijudicial authority when it denied an election protest, because it did not consider sworn testimony, receive documents into evidence, or in any other fashion “conduct a hearing sufficiently resembling a judicial trial.”

Id . at ¶ 27, quoting State ex rel. Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections , 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893 (2000). {¶ 24} However, we took care to clarify in Baldzicki that the protest at issue was not brought pursuant to any statute, distinguishing it from “statutory protests requiring quasi-judicial proceedings.” Baldzicki at 242. And as the statement quoted above indicates, we have ac knowledged that sworn testimo ny is one—but
not the only —indicator that a hearing re sembled a judicial trial. {¶ 25} As we have noted on many occasions, R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) requires the board to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing. E.g. , State ex rel. Wright v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections , 120 Ohio St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-5553, 896 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 9January Term, 2021

9 (“This is not a case involving written protests against petitions or candidacies , which would have required quasi-j udicial proceedings. Cf. R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) and (2)” [emphasis sic]); State ex rel. Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections , 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093, 895 N.E.2d 177, ¶ 16 (“Here , R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) required that the board of elections conduct a qu asi-judicial hearing on relators’ protest”); State ex rel. Cooker Restaur ant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections , 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 306, 686 N.E.2d 238 (1997) (“a board of elections, like a board of revisi on, is a quasi-judicial body w hen it considers protests”); State ex rel. Harbarger v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections , 75 Ohio St.3d 44, 45, 661 N.E.2d 699 (1996) (“A protest hearing in election m atters is a quasijudicial proceeding”); State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections , 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 291, 649 N.E.2d 1205 (1995) (“Since R.C. 3501.3 9 required a hearing which in some respects resembled a judicial trial, the board exercised quasijudicial authority in denying Thurn’s protest and deciding to p lace the proposed ordinances on the ballot”). {¶ 26} The secretary of state’s Election Official Manual likewise advises boards that “[w]hen resolving a protest, a board is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Secretary of State Directive 2021-08, Section 1.04, Ohio Election Official Manual, at 12-9 availa ble at https://www.sos.state.oh. us/globalassets
/elections/directives /2021/dir2021-08-ch12.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GUX-4EGM]. The secretary’s guidelines for “ Acting in a Quasi-Judicial Capa city” advise boards to “[p]lace anyone who will provide testimony under oath” and t hat decisions should be “based on evidence provided to the board at the heari ng and information the board may retain on its own, such as voter registration inf ormation.” Secretary of State Directive 2021-02, Secti on 1.03, Ohio Election Officia l Manual, at 2-32, available at https://www.sos.st ate.oh.us/globalassets/elections /directives/2021/ dir2021-02-ch02.pdf [https://p erma.cc/7UMB-F588].S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 {¶ 27} The board was doubtless under an obligation to conduct a quasijudicial hearing. Pureval’s attorney offered factual statement s at that hearing. The board failed to adhere to the secretary’s directive to place hi m under oath; however, as the attorney pointed out at the hearing, he referred to fact s that were documented by information retained by the board. We conclude that under t hese circumstances, the board conducted a hearing sufficiently resembling a judicia l trial such that it was exercising qua si-judicial power.
2. Lack of Authority {¶ 28} The question whether the board lacked authority hinges on wheth er it “acted fraudulently or corruptly, abused its discretion, or clearly disregarded applicable law.” State ex rel. Brown v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections , 109 Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 23. There is no allegation of fraud or corruption here. {¶ 29} Miller argues that the board abused its discretion and disregar ded applicable law by denying his protest, because the Cincinnati C ity Charter requires circulator statements on mayoral petitions to be sworn affidavi ts, yet the statements on Pureval’s part-petitions were unsworn statements made on pen alty of elections falsification. We reject this ar gument and conclude that the b oard did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law, because the cha rter prescribes a form demonstrating what constitutes an affidavit for purposes of the circulator-statement requirement and Pureval’s part-petitions substantially complied with the charter’s prescribed form. {¶ 30} The Cincinnati City Charter set s forth specific requirements fo r mayoral and council elections in the city. With respect to may oral-candidate petitions, the charter states the following: “to each separate [petition] paper there
shall be attached an affidavit of the circulator thereof statin g that each signature
thereto was made in the circulat or’s presence and is the genuin e signature of theJanuary Term, 2021

11 person whose name it purports to be.” Article IX, Section 2, C incinnati City
Charter. {¶ 31} Miller argues that “affidavit” means a statement sworn before a n officer authorized to administer oaths, citing Toledo Bar Assn. v. Neller , 102 Ohio St.3d 1234, 2004-Ohio-2895, 809 N.E.2d 1152, ¶ 10, and State ex rel. Johnson v.
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. , 95 Ohio St.3d 463, 2002-Ohio-2481, 768 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 5. However, those cases were a pplying provisions of the Ohio Revised Code. {¶ 32} The Cincinnati City Charter provides, “[T]he provisions of the general election laws of the state shall apply to all such elec tions except as provision is otherwise made by this charter .” (Emphasis added.) Ar ticle IX, Section 1, Cincinnati City Charter. The cha rter does not expressly define “affidavit.” However, Article IX, Section 3a of the charter sets forth a pre scribed form of petition for mayoral candidates. Section 3a states that the “f orm of the nominating petition papers shall be substantially as follows,” and the cir culator statement of the
form that follows reads:

Statement of Circulator I, _______ [name of circulator of petition], declare under penalty of the election falsifi cation laws of the state of Ohio that I am a qualified elector of the city of Cincinnati; that I reside at the address appearing below my signature; that this petition paper contains _____(number) signatures; that I witnessed the affixin g of every signature; and that every signature is to the best of my knowledge and belief the signature of the person whose signatur e it purports to be. Signed: _____ Address: _____ Date: _____S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 Article IX, Section 3a , Cincinnati City Charter. The form clea rly does not provide
for a circulator statement in th e manner of a sworn affidavit, but rather one that is styled after the form set forth in R.C. 3513.261. {¶ 33} “[W]hen construing city charters, we apply general rules of sta tutory interpretation.” State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino , 155 Ohio St.3d 123, 2018-Ohio3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, ¶ 19. One of these r ules is that we do not simply consider words in isolation, but consider the text as a whole. Vossman v. AirNet Sys., Inc. , 159 Ohio St.3d 529, 2020-Ohio-872, 152 N.E.3d 232, ¶ 14. Purev al, the board, and the city all argue that Section 2 and Section 3a must be read i n pari materia and that when read together, it is clear t hat Section 3a provides the wo rding and the form of the “affidavit” required by Section 2. We agree. It would be nonsensical to read the charter otherwise—for exampl e, as requiring both a sworn af fidavit and a nearly
identical circulator statement ma de under penalty of elections falsification. Miller argues that State ex rel. Ditmars v. McSweeney , 94 Ohio St.3d 472, 764 N.E.2d 971 (2002), controls this issue. In Ditmars , we held that the Columbus City Charter required circulator statements in the form of sworn affidavits. Id . at 474-475. However, in Ditmars , the charter did not define “affi davit” or contain a prescribe d petition form. Id . Because Section 3a of the Cinc innati City Charter includes a prescribed petition form clarifying the meaning of the affidavi t requirement set forth in Section 2, we conclude that Ditmars is inapplicable. {¶ 34} Pureval’s part-petitions included circulator statements substan tially in the form prescribed in Secti on 3a of the Cincinnati City Cha rter. We therefore
conclude that the board did not abuse its discretion by rejecti ng Miller’s protest.
III. CONCLUSION {¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we deny the writ.
Writ denied.January Term, 2021

13 O’C ONNOR , C.J., and D E W INE , D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and B RUNNER , JJ.,

concur. K ENNEDY , J., concurs in judgment only.
F ISCHER , J., dissents.

_________________ The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartma n and Curt C. Hartman, for relato r. Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Dav id T. Stevenson and Jesse K. Daley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent Hamilton County Board of Elections. McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, and Derek S. Clin ger; Katz Teller Brant & Hild, Peter J. O’Shea, and Evan T. Nolan, f or respondent Aftab
Pureval. Andrew W. Garth, City Solicitor, Emily Smart Woerner, Deputy Ci ty Solicitor, and Erica Faaborg, Assistant City Solicitor, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, cit y of Cincinnati.

_________________