Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-680 | September 20, 2019 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kevin Wild

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. Mackenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eldridge Jerome Moore,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

September 20, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-680

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Barbara Cook 

Crawford, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G01-1704-MR-13141

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-680 | September 20, 2019 Page 2 of 16

[1] Eldridge Jerome Moore appeals his convictions for two counts of murder. He 

raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the evidence is sufficient 

to support his convictions and negate his claim of self-defense. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 5, 2017, Moore lived with his uncle, Phillip McBrady, and Phillip’s 

wife, Helen. Brandon Miller would visit their house in Indianapolis daily. 

Transcript Volume II at 30, 36. At some point that evening or the early

morning hours of April 6, Miller had a drink or two and wanted to talk to 

Phillip about a “job that he was doin’ for” a young man because Phillip had 

introduced them to each other. Id. at 38. Miller “just wanted to get a little 

more insight of . . . how the man worked as far as you know getting paid.” Id.

Miller’s girlfriend, Tonya Peete, dropped him off near Phillip and Helen’s

house, stated that she would return to pick him up, and went to purchase gas

for her vehicle. At some point, Moore shot Miller and Phillip.

[3] Meanwhile, Peete returned after “probably like about five minutes,” parked in 

the driveway, and waited for Miller to come out. Transcript Volume II at 31. 

When he did not, she exited the vehicle, knocked on the door, and heard “a 

bunch of ruckus and glass breakin’ and noises and people shufflin’ and movin’ 

around.” Id. She began beating on the door, heard gun shots, and ran for cover. 

[4] After retreating to her vehicle for “probably . . . about one, two minutes,” she 

knocked on the door again and called for Phillip and Miller. Id. at 31. Moore 

eventually opened the door, and Peete saw Phillip and Miller’s bodies on the 
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ground. Moore pushed her down on top of the bodies and her phone “went 

one way” and her keys “went the other.” Id. at 32. He dashed into a room, she

recovered her phone and keys and ran out the door and he ran out behind her. 

He “jumped in [Phillip’s] truck and he pulled off fast.” Id. at 33. She went 

back inside, called 911, and tried to resuscitate the lifeless bodies. Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) Officer Andrew Lamle responded 

to the scene and encountered Peete.

[5] Moore drove Phillip’s truck and arrived at the house of his cousin, Kim 

McBrady, at “[a]round twelve thirty-one AM in the morning.” Id. at 67. 

Moore told Kim that “he had messed up” and that, when he was at Phillip’s 

house, somebody knocked at the door, “him and whomever was at the door 

had gotten into a fight,” and “the guy was getting the best of him and he shot.” 

Id. He told her that “the tire had came [sic] off the truck,” he asked Kim to 

drop him off at 21st Street and Ritter Avenue, and they proceeded to that 

location. Id. at 68. She asked a couple of times that he call Phillip, and Moore 

indicated that “he’s not answerin’.” Id. at 70. When she asked him “well what 

do you think happened” and if he shot Phillip, Moore did not respond and 

“kind of jumped out of” the vehicle. Id. Kim turned around and drove to 

Phillip and Helen’s house, and she encountered and was questioned by police

officers on the scene. 

[6] Moore arrived at 1718 Layman Avenue, and Erika Mack, who had been in bed, 

let him in and laid back down. There was “[n]ot very much” discussion between 

the two, and Moore laid down with Mack. Id. at 76. Later, a knocking at the 
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door awakened Mack, police officers announced themselves and ordered her to 

open the door, and she let them enter. IMPD Detective Justin McGaha ordered 

Moore to show his hands, he “just stood there and stared at” the officers, and he 

eventually stepped out with both hands in the air. Id. at 115. The officers

ordered him to the ground, approached and handcuffed him, and found a small 

revolver handgun in his pocket. They transported and interviewed him at the 

homicide office. 

[7] A walkthrough of the scene of the crime at Phillip and Helen’s house revealed 

broken furniture, a hole in the drywall “like maybe somebody ran into” or 

“pushed into it,” and a fired bullet. Id. at 95. An autopsy of Miller revealed 

five gunshot wounds, one of which entered the back side of his neck and had a 

wound path in a leftward and downward direction. He had tears and scrapes

on his face and arms and had no significant injuries to his hands. An autopsy 

of Phillip revealed one gunshot wound, which entered on the left side of the 

chest and had a wound path directed slightly downward, a scraped bruising of 

the right upper cheek, a scrape of the side of the head, and a fracture of his 

orbital plate, or a “very thin park [sic] of the skull overlying the eye.” Id. at 143.

[8] The State charged Moore with two counts of murder and later alleged that he 

was an habitual offender. At Moore’s trial, the jury heard testimony from 

several witnesses, including Helen, Peete, Officer Lamle, Kim, Mack, Detective 

McGaha, IMPD Homicide Detective Leonard Nelson, Chief Forensic 

Pathologist Christopher Polous from the Marion County Coroner’s Office, 
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IMPD Officer Gregory Wilkerson, a crime scene specialist, and a forensic 

scientist specialized in firearms identification. 

[9] During Peete’s cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: 

Q Okay. Now [Miller] – you mentioned before that [Miller] can 

get a little agitated when he is drinking. Correct?

A I don’t recall telling you [Miller] get[s] agitated when he drinks.

Q Do you recall telling [a detective] that, you know, when he 

gets that kind of way, that you just hi try [sic] to walk it off?

A Well, I mean you know, that’s with anybody but he doesn’t 

always, like go on an outrage and go off and go crazy and do 

nothin’ stupid or anything.

Q Okay. And when you made a statement to [the detective] that 

night, you said [Miller] gets that way you figure let him walk it 

off, I’ll come pick him up in a little bit. Everything will be cool?

A Yeah. Or even when we’re together, he’ll just go to sleep. I

mean but he doesn’t get to the point where I’m fearful from him 

or I think he’s going to hurt me or do anything like [sic].

Id. at 40. Kim testified she saw Phillip’s truck when she stepped outside of her 

residence with Moore, that the tire “was off the rim,” and that she could tell 

when she saw the truck that it was disabled in some fashion. Id. at 68. During 

cross-examination, when asked if she remembered the statement she gave 

detectives and whether Moore mentioned “that he had shot the guy off of him,” 

she answered, “Yes,” and indicated that Moore had “said the guy was getting 

the best of me.” Id. at 72. The court allowed the prosecutor to conduct omitted 

direct examination, the prosecutor asked Kim if Moore complained of any pain
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or if he showed her any injuries he had received, and she answered in the 

negative. 

[10] Mack testified that she “didn’t hear him say that” he did not mean to shoot his 

uncle but that she did hear him “tell the officers he couldn’t get someone off of 

him.” Id. at 78. During cross-examination, Mack testified Moore loved his 

uncle and that, “when she was around,” he and Phillip “got along pretty good” 

and worked together. Id. at 80. On her omitted direct examination, Mack 

indicated that she did not notice any injuries on Moore, “but his face looked kid 

[sic] of red looking,” and that he did not complain to her of any pain. Id.

[11] Detective McGaha answered in the negative when asked whether Moore made 

any complaints about experiencing pain in his presence and whether he had 

noticed any injuries on Moore. Officer Wilkerson testified that he stood beside 

Moore at the 1718 Layman address and heard him say only “My uncle, I didn’t 

mean to kill him like that, but I couldn’t [sic] him off of me.” Id. at 120. 

During cross-examination, Chief Forensic Pathologist Polous indicated that 

Miller’s blood alcohol content was .141. 

[12] Detective Nelson testified about Moore’s interview in the homicide office, and 

the court admitted without objection a DVD video recording of the interview and 

an audio transcription as State’s Exhibit Nos. 56 and 57, respectively, published 

copies of State’s Exhibit No. 57 to the jury, and played State’s Exhibit No. 56. 

State’s Exhibit No. 57 contains the following interview:
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A: [Miller] knocked on the door. I go open the door and he 

come in talking all wild, talking about why this guy didn’t pay 

him his money, this and that. Somebody else knocks on the door 

while he explained this to my uncle[, Phillip]. I’m sitting in the 

chair. My uncle was on the couch right by the door. So as soon 

as he start woo-woo-woo-woo about his money his girl, whoever 

she is, she knocks on the door. So he was about to open the 

door. So I said, “Hey, man, don’t open that door. That’s not 

your door to open[.]” You know what I’m saying? Don’t, don’t 

open the door. So he turned around and started going off. “F[---

] you! I’ll do. [sic] this is my grandpa’s house!” And, uh; . . . he 

ain’t really no kin to my uncle. You know what I’m saying?

* * * * *

Q: Okay. Uh; what . . . was [Miller] talking about, about money 

or how did that come about?

A: He, he, he, uh; cuz some, he worked for these guys and they 

didn’t pay him and, and they wasn’t paying him and this and 

that. So he wanted my uncle to drive him to go and try to get his 

money, this and that. And then my uncle wasn’t doing none of 

that run himself up. 

Q: Okay. Then what happened.

A: And, uh; he spoke, cussed me out. “F[---] you, m[-----f-----]!” 

[T]his and that. 

Q: Uh-huh.

A: You ain’t all that. And, you know, one thing led to another. 

You know what I’m saying? So I said, “You ain’t all that!” You 

know?

Q: Okay I got to be more specific when you, and you have to be 

more specific . . . of the details when you say one thing led to 

another. 
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A: Oh, as far as, you know, he, uh; got all in my face, this and 

that. You know what I’m saying?

Q: Okay. So he was cussing you out in your face?

A: Yep, so, uh[] you know, I pushed him. He stole me. I stole 

him back. We got to fighting.[1]

Q: Okay.

A: So my uncle didn’t get up and try to break it up. He just let 

us fight. So, you know. And he, [Miller is] younger than me. 

He’s 29 or whatever. He, you know he, he was getting me. He 

had me on the ground on my knees. Had this coat right here 

over my head like, and it was, you know, swinging, you know.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: Uh; kind of, you know, fast and wild. So that’s when my 

uncle got up and said, “Okay, that’s enough! That’s enough!” 

So he was pushing him away getting him up off of me. 

Q: Now, your, your uncle, Phillip . . . 

A: Phillip.

Q: . . . got in . . . 

A: And got him off of me. 

Q: Okay. So y’all were on the ground. [Miller] was on top of 

you?

A: Yeah. So, uh; that’s when my uncle got him up off of me. I 

jumped up you know and, uh; and he bum rushed me again. Got 

away from my uncle and that’s when he slammed me on, on I 

 

1 Later, during the statement, Moore clarified that “stole” meant: “Hit . . . He hit, you know.” Exhibits 

Volume at 123. 
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don’t know what he slammed me on, but I know my ribs right 

here is messed up, but he slammed me. He said, “Uh-huh! Uhhuh! You met your match now! You met your match now!” I

said, “No, I ain’t, I ain’t met my match.” So I had a pistol in my

pocket. You know? So he had me on the couch. You know, so 

I reached in my pocket and then I shot him. Pow! You know, 

and he, [sic] “Oh, you shot me!” So he still, you know what I’m 

saying? He backed up and then he [sic] still bum rushing me.

You know, so I shot him a couple of more [sic]. I shot a couple 

of more times.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: And then I said I don’t know how my uncle got shot. I looked 

and he’s laying on the floor. And I didn’t understand that at all, 

why he got shot. I don’t. ‘Cause see [Miller] was in front of me.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: You know, unless my uncle was standing behind him or 

something. You know, I don’t know. I don’t know. I didn’t 

mean to shoot my uncle. I did not mean to shoot my uncle at all: 

you know, I meant to did [sic] what I did to that man. You 

know what I’m saying? Or whatever. I admit that. You know 

what I’m saying? My actions was intentionally for him, but I

didn’t meant [sic] for my uncle to get what he got. You know 

what I’m saying? I didn’t mean that [y]ou know, that’s my 

mother’s brother. I didn’t mean that at all. So I got scared. And 

I, I left. I jumped in his truck and I left. You know, I should 

have just stayed there, but I left. (Inaudible)

Exhibits Volume at 118-120. Later questioning in the interview included the 

following:

Q: As far as you know, [Miller] didn’t have a gun, though?
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A: I didn’t know what he had. I don’t think he had one. I don’t 

know. 

Q: I’m asking you what you . . .

A: No, he . . . 

Q: . . . what you saw.

A: No.

Q: Did you see a gun?

A: No, I didn’t see no gun.

Q: Okay. So, basically it would have start[ed] out with hands?

A: Yep. 

Id. at 124-125.

[13] Detective Nelson testified that the interview occurred approximately twelve 

hours after the shooting and that he did not see any significant bruising on 

Moore

[14] In closing, Moore’s defense counsel argued he acted in self-defense “plain and 

simple” and the jury must consider the situation from his perspective, 

highlighted Miller was drunk and not a peaceful person when he entered 

Phillip’s house, and characterized Moore’s push of Miller as “just a defensive, 

get out of my face.” Id. at 196, 198. Before discussing Moore’s video 

statement, his defense counsel stated: “Again we are not comparing two stories. 

Its [Moore’s] story. He’s in there. He knows what happened.” Id. at 201.
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[15] After the jury retired to deliberate, the court granted its request to rewatch 

State’s Exhibit No. 56, and republished copies of State’s Exhibit No. 57. The 

jury found Moore guilty as charged. Moore admitted to the habitual offender 

enhancement by plea agreement, and the court sentenced him to concurrent 

terms of fifty-five years on the two counts of murder, with an additional six 

years added to the second count for the habitual offender enhancement, for an 

aggregate term of sixty-one years. 

Discussion

[16] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support Moore’s convictions 

and negate his claim of self-defense. He asserts that the State failed to negate a 

single element of his self-defense claim. He points to his statement and Peete’s 

testimony and argues that the “much younger and stronger” Miller was legally 

intoxicated and agitated, became hostile and aggressive, and instigated and 

continued to pursue a violent fight. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He contends that 

Miller violently confronted him a second and third time following his and 

Phillip’s attempts to deescalate the conflict, and that, unable to prevent further 

serious bodily injury, he shot Miller. He contends his statement to the police, as 

the only complete version of what occurred, was shown to be reliable, accurate, 

and corroborated, and that no evidence clearly contradicts anything in his 

statement or demonstrates that he willingly participated in the violence. 

[17] The State maintains that the evidence is sufficient to rebut Moore’s claim of 

self-defense and sustain his convictions. It argues that Moore initiated the 
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altercation when he pushed Miller during a verbal argument, which began a 

fistfight between the two men, and that his statements to the police contain no 

mention of fear and show that he did not believe deadly force was necessary to 

prevent serious bodily injury. It points out that his withdrawal of a handgun 

from his pocket and the shooting of an unarmed Miller followed his retort of 

“No I ain’t, I ain’t met my match,” and it argues that he shot Miller because he 

was angry. Appellee’s Brief at 12. 

[18] At the time of the offense, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) provided that a “person who . 

. . knowingly or intentionally kills another human being . . . commits murder, a 

felony.” (Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 252-2017, § 10 (eff. Jul. 1, 

2017); Pub. L. No. 144-2018, § 18 (eff. Jul. 1, 2018); Pub. L. No. 203-2018, § 1

(eff. Jul. 1, 2018); and Pub. L. No. 215-2018(ss), § 16 (eff. Jul. 1, 2018)). Under 

the doctrine of transferred intent, “if the evidence shows the requisite mental state 

to exist in conjunction with the performance of a criminal act, then the law may 

punish the perpetrator, although the particular person injured was a mere 

bystander.” Henderson v. State, 343 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. 1976). Stated 

differently, “when one person (A) acts (or omits to act) with intent to harm 

another person (B), but because of a bad aim he instead harms a third person (C) 

whom he did not intend to harm, the law considers him (as it ought) just as guilty 

as if he had actually harmed the intended victim.” 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(d) (2d ed. 2003) (footnotes omitted). 

“Under the doctrine, a defendant’s intent to kill one person is transferred when, 

by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third person; the defendant may 
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be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed, even though the 

defendant intended to kill another.” Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 

1998) (citing White v. State, 638 N.E.2d 785, 786 (Ind. 1994). 

[19] Pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c), 

A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other 

person to protect the person or a third person from what the 

person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful 

force. However, a person:

(1) is justified in using deadly force; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to 

prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or 

the commission of a forcible felony.

(Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 107-2019, § 7 (eff. April 26, 2019)). 

Serious bodily injury means “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of 

death or that causes . . . extreme pain . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-292. A valid 

claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Wilson v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). In order to prevail on a self-defense 

claim, a defendant must demonstrate he was in a place he had a right to be; did 

not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and had a 

reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Id. The amount of force a 

person may use to protect himself or herself must be proportionate to the 

urgency of the situation. Harmon v. State, 849 N.E.2d 726, 730-731 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2006). When a person uses more force than is reasonably necessary under 

the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished. Id. at 731. 

[20] When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the 

State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. Wilson,

770 N.E.2d at 800. If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, 

we will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was 

negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 800-801. A mutual 

combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor, must declare an armistice 

before he or she may claim self-defense. Id. at 801; see Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)

(providing “a person is not justified in using force if . . . the person has entered 

into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person 

withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent 

to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue 

unlawful action”) (subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 107-2019, § 7 (eff. 

April 26, 2019)). The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any 

sufficiency of the evidence claim. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. We neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is 

sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of 

fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. 

[21] The record reveals that Miller suffered five gunshot wounds, one of which 

entered the back side of his neck and had a leftward and downward direction. 

The jury watched a video recording of Moore’s statement to the police, which it 
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asked to re-watch during its deliberation. In it, Moore indicated Miller “got all 

in [his] face, this and that,” answered affirmatively when asked, “[s]o he was 

cussing you out in your face,” and then expounded “so uh[] you know, I 

pushed him.” Exhibits Volume at 119. He stated: 

He said, “Uh-huh! Uh-huh! You met your match now! You 

met your match now!” I said, “No, I ain’t, I ain’t met my 

match.” So I had a pistol in my pocket. You know? So he had 

me on the couch. You know, so I reached in my pocket and then 

I shot him. Pow! 

Id. He admitted that he did not see Miller with a gun and offered that, although 

he did not mean to shoot his uncle, he had “meant to d[o] what [he] did to that 

man” and his “actions w[ere] intentional[] for” Miller. Id. at 120. Although 

Moore argues that the conflict with Miller was violent, Mack did not notice any 

injuries on Moore, Detective McGaha indicated that Moore did not complain 

about experiencing any pain and that he did not notice any injuries on him, and 

Detective Nelson testified that he did not see any significant bruising on him. 

The jury as the trier of fact was able to assess Moore’s demeanor and credibility

and, based upon all of the evidence before it, could determine that he provoked 

or instigated the violence, that he did not withdraw from the encounter, that he 

did not have a reasonable fear of great bodily harm, or that the amount of force 

he used was unreasonable under the circumstances. 

[22] We conclude that the State presented evidence of a probative nature from 

which a reasonable trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Moore did not validly act in self-defense and that he was guilty of the 
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charged offenses. See Bryant v. State, 498 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ind. 1986) (holding 

that the defendant’s “position amounts to no more than an invitation for us to 

reweigh the evidence” and noting that the State’s evidence was sufficient to 

negate self-defense).

[23] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Moore’s convictions. 

[24] Affirmed. 

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.