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******************************************************LEON SANDERS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 37512)
DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Schaller, Js. Argued September 8—officially released December 20, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Fuger, J.)
Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, onthebrief, wereMaryM. Galvin, formerstate’s attorney, and Courtney M. Chaplin, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).Opinion DiPENTIMA, C. J. The petitioner, Leon Sanders, appeals followingthe denial ofhis petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction on charges of assault in the first degree and being a persistent dangerous felony offender. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2) improperly denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that counsel in both his underlying criminal prosecution and his first postconviction habeas corpus proceeding rendered ineffective assistance. Because the petitioner did not demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, we dismiss the appeal.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our decision. The petitioner was charged with two counts ofassault in the first degree and with being
a persistent dangerous felony offender. These charges stemmed from an incident in Ansonia on May 23, 2001, in which Kente Douglas was shot multiple times in the back. ‘‘Atthetimeoftheshooting, Douglaswasreaching through the back door of a parked automobile to
remove a child’s car seat. Jackie Garcia, Douglas’ girlfriend, was standing near the automobile with the couple’s fouryear old daughter in her arms. An automobile drew up beside Douglas, and the [petitioner] fired a gun at Douglas through the passenger side window. Douglas fell to the ground, and the [petitioner] continued to fire gunshots at him until the automobile left the area. During the shooting, Garcia went inside with her child. After the [petitioner] left, she returned to the street with a cordless telephone. She dialed 911, reported to the operator that her boyfriend had been shot and named the [petitioner] as the shooter. When the police arrived, an officer spoke with Garcia, who told him that the [petitioner] had pulled up in a car and shot Douglas five or six times. Apolice detective spoke with Douglas, who also stated that the [petitioner] had shothim. Later, as Douglaswastransportedinanambulance to a hospital, he told another police officer that the [petitioner] had shot him. In June, 2001, the [petitioner] was arrested and charged. Following the jury trial, atwhichhewasconvictedoftwo countsofassault, the [petitioner] was tried to the court on the part B information in which he was accused ofbeing apersistent dangerous felony offender and was convicted on that charge as well. Thereafter, the court imposed a sentence of forty years imprisonment.’’ State v. Sanders, 86 Conn. App. 757, 759, 862 A.2d 857 (2005). On the petitioner’s appeal from his conviction, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id.Following his conviction, the petitioner brought several petitions for writs of habeas corpus. At issue in thepresentappealisthepetitioner’sthirdsuchpetition, which was filed on December 12, 2012, and amended for a fourth time on September 25, 2014 (operative petition).1Thepetitionersetforththreeseparate claims. In count one, the petitioner alleged that his first habeas counsel, Sebastian DeSantis, ‘‘was ineffective in failing to allege in the prior habeas petition a claim ofineffective assistance of [his criminal defense counsel, Robert Berke] for his failure to properly advise him of the state’s offerofeightyears incarceration onaguiltyplea, and had he been properly advised, he would not have rejected it.’’ In count two, the petitioner alleged that his state and federal rights to due process of law were violated because Berke had not properly advised him whether to accept or reject the state’s pretrial offer of eightyearsincarcerationonaguiltyplea. Incountthree, the petitioner alleged actual innocence, but he withdrew that claim prior to trial.
At the trial on December 2, 2014, the petitioner presentedevidence describingthe state’spleaoffer. Specifically, the petitioner submitted the transcript from the first habeas trial, which was held on October 2, 2008, when he had testified that the state’s plea offer was for eightyearswiththerighttoargueforless. Thepetitioner repeatedthis testimonyatthe proceeding on December 2, 2014. Berke, however, testified that there was a plea offer extended bythe state, but he could not remember the exactterms ofthe plea offer. Berke furthertestified that he did not recall the alleged plea offer of eight years imprisonment. In terms of how he advised the petitioner regarding the state’s plea offer, Berke testified that although he could not recall any specific discussion with the petitioner, he typically presents his clients with ‘‘the positive [and] the negatives of going to trial—the risks oftrial [and] the maximum exposure. [He does not] present [his] opinion on whether they should take an offer or not.

. . . [T]hat was their decision and not [his].’’ Following the trial, the court, Fuger, J ., denied the operative petition in an oral decision in which it concluded that Berke and DeSantis had provided the petitioner with effective assistance of counsel.2 With respect to the first count, the court determined that it couldnot ‘‘findanydeficientperformanceby [DeSantis] in his representation of [the petitioner] at the first habeas trial’’ and, therefore, it denied the first count of the petition. In rejecting the claim that DeSantis rendered ineffective assistance for failing to allege in the first habeas action a claim that Berke’s performance
was ineffective for inadequately advising the petitioner regarding the state’s plea offer, the court made several findings. ItexpresslycreditedthetestimonyofDeSantis that the petitioner did not raise any concerns to himregarding Berke’s representation in connection with the plea offer, and that the petitioner made it clear to DeSantis that he wanted to go to trial to prove his innocence. The court also specifically found, in accordance with DeSantis’ testimony, that in order to determine which issues to raise in the habeas petition, he reviewed Berke’s file, examined the criminal trial transcripts and files, conversed with the petitioner, hired
an investigator, reviewed the relevant police reports and reviewed the petition with the petitioner before he filedit. Indraftingthehabeaspetition, DeSantistestified that he tried to be overinclusive in order to preserve issues for future litigation, and his typical practice was to include a claim in the petition if the petitioner was adamant about including it, unless it was frivolous. In addition, DeSantis agreed with counsel for the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, that the first habeas court, Nazzaro, J ., ‘‘found that it was clear that the petitioner wanted to go to trial and to prove his innocence rather than take a plea offer

. . . .’’
As to the petitioner’s second count, the court determined that Berke’s performance in the petitioner’s underlyingcriminalproceedingswasnotdeficient. With respect to this conclusion, the court explained that the petitioner ‘‘rejected apleabargain that was apparently eight years with the right to argue for a lower sentence. [The petitioner] went to trial and received, after being found guilty by the jury, a sentence of forty years of confinement.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court expressly noted that ‘‘Berke did convey and discuss the plea bargains with [the petitioner]. The record is crystal clear that [thepetitioner] protestedhis innocence andalways asserted that he wished to proceed to trial. The court is convinced based upon the testimony of [Berke], the testimony at the first habeas trial, that [Berke] did in fact adequately explain the pretrial offer, discuss the case, discuss the maximum punishments, discuss the pros and cons of pleading guilty or not guilty, but left,
as he should have, the final decision as to whether to accept orreject such offerto [the petitioner].’’ Itfurther found Berke’s representation of the petitioner to be ‘‘sufficientlywithinthatband ofrepresentationthatwill pass constitutional muster.’’
The court then explained that the petitioner had the burden of proving that ‘‘it was reasonably probable that a court, a judge would have accepted the [state’s alleged] eight year [plea] offer in this case.’’ The court proceededto explainthatit couldnot ‘‘makethefinding thatthe petitioner [establishedthat] it [was] reasonably probable that [the trialjudge] would have accepted the eight year offer, the key word being probable.’’ With respect to this finding, the court highlighted: the petitioner’s prior conviction ofmanslaughter, forwhichthe petitioner had served an eleven year prison sentence; thatthepetitionerhadbeen arrestedin connectionwith
a shooting incident soon after he was released afterserving his sentence for his manslaughter conviction; andthatthe petitionerhad other convictions for crimes involving firearms. On the basis ofthe evidence before it, the court concluded that the petitioner had not met his burden of proving by a ‘‘preponderance of the evidence that it [was] reasonably probable that a court would have accepted’’ the state’s eight year plea offer. As aresultofthisfinding, the courtdeniedthe operative petition claiming ineffective assistance by Berke and DeSantis. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition forcertificationtoappeal. Inthatpetition, thepetitioner stated that the grounds for appeal are: ‘‘Whether [the] habeas court erred when it found that [Berke] was not ineffective when he discussed the strengths [and] weaknesses of the state’s case but did not advise the petitionerwhetherhe shouldaccept orrejectthe state’s plea offer.’’3 On December 4, 2014, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.
The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because it improperly denied his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Berke and DeSantis. ‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, [thepetitioner] mustdemonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion.

. . . Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversedonthemerits.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Melendez v. Commissioner of Correction, 151 Conn. App. 351, 357–58, 95 A.3d 551, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 914, 100A.3d 405 (2014). To prove thatthe denial ofhis petition for certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, ‘‘the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves issues that] are debatable amongjurists ofreason; that
a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];
orthatthequestionsareadequateto deserveencouragement to proceed further.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 207, 214, 145 A.3d 362 (2016).
‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, wenecessarilymustconsiderthemeritsof thepetitioner’s underlying claimsto determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appealwas frivolous. In otherwords, we review the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or moreof the three criteria

. . . adopted by [our Supreme Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas court’s denial ofthe petition for certification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn. App. 716, 721, 133 A.3d 185, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 926, 133 A.3d 458 (2016). Here, the petitioner’s underlying claims are that the habeas court improperly concluded that (1) Berke provided effective assistance of counsel and (2) DeSantis provided effective assistance of counsel. After determining the merits of these underlying claims, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.
Our standard ofreview ofa habeas court’sjudgment
on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled. ‘‘The habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.

. . . The application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Horn v. Commissioner of Correction, 321 Conn. 767, 775, 138 A.3d 908 (2016). Therefore, ‘‘our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kearney v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn. App. 223, 228, 965 A.2d 608 (2009).
It is well established that ‘‘[a] criminal defendant is constitutionallyentitledto adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings

. . . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.

. . . As enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

. . . A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components: a performance prongandaprejudiceprong. Tosatisfytheperformance prong

. . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Horn v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 321 Conn. 775. ‘‘To satisfy the second prong ofStrickland, that his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, the petitioner must establish that, as a result of his trial counsel’s deficient performance, there remains a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict that resulted in his appeal.

. . .The second prong is thus satisfied if the petitioner can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for that ineffectiveness, the outcome would have been different.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Id., 776. ‘‘An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will succeed only if both prongs [of Strickland] are satisfied.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 162 Conn. App. 722–23. The court, however, ‘‘may decide against apetitioner on either prong, whichever is easier.’’ Lewis v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 165 Conn. App. 441, 451, 139 A.3d 759, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 901, 138 A.3d 931 (2016).
I
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court abuseditsdiscretionindenyinghispetitionforcertification to appeal because it improperly denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Berke. As described in the preceding paragraph, to determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, this court will look at the underlying merits ofthe petitioner’sclaims. SeeBozelkov. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 162 Conn. App. 721. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the habeas court improperly concludedthat (1) Berke’s performance concerningthe state’s plea offer was neither deficient nor prejudicial and (2) Berke’s failureto advisethe petitioneron accessorial liability did not constitute ineffective assistance. We will address each claim in turn.
A Turning to the petitioner’s first claim, we agree with the petitioner that Berke’s performance pertaining to the state’s plea offer was deficient; however, we are not persuaded that the petitioner established that he
was prejudiced by the deficient performance. As ‘‘ ‘[a]n ineffectiveassistance ofcounselclaimwillsucceedonly ifbothprongs [ofStrickland] aresatisfied’ ’’; id., 722–23;
we conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden ofestablishing his ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim with respect to Berke’s performance pertaining to the state’s plea offer. Because the petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Berke’s deficient performance, he cannot demonstrate that the issues pertaining to this claim are debatable amongjurists of reason, that a court could resolve those issues differently or that the questions raised deserve encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, as we discuss subsequently in this opinion, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal as to this claim.
We begin by setting forth the governing legal principles in cases involving claims of ineffective assistanceof counsel in the plea bargain context. As previously noted, under the Strickland test, ‘‘[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists oftwo components:
a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong

. . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill inthe criminallaw.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Mahonv. CommissionerofCorrection, 157 Conn. App. 246, 253, 116 A.3d 331, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 917, 117 A.3d 855 (2015). ‘‘Pretrial negotiations implicating the decision of whether to plead guilty is a critical stage in criminal proceedings

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘[P]lea bargaining is an integral component of the criminaljustice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.

. . . Commentators have estimated that between 80 and 90 percent ofcriminal cases in Connecticut result in guilty pleas, the majority of which are the product of plea bargains.

. . . Thus, almost every criminal defendant is faced with the crucial decision of whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial. Although this decision is ultimatelymade bythe defendant, the defendant’s attorney must make an informed evaluation of the options and determine which alternative will offer the defendant the mostfavorable outcome.A defendantreliesheavily upon counsel’s independent evaluation ofthe charges anddefenses, applicablelaw, theevidenceand therisks andprobable outcomeofa trial.’’ (Emphasisin original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ebron v. CommissionerofCorrection, 120 Conn. App. 560, 572, 992 A.2d 1200 (2010), rev’d in part on other grounds, 307 Conn. 342, 53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone

v. Ebron, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013). ‘‘To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because ofcounsel’s deficientperformance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel. Defendants mustalso demonstrate areasonableprobabilitytheplea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they hadthe authorityto exercise that discretionunderstate law. To establish prejudice in this instance, it is necessaryto showareasonableprobabilitythatthe endresult ofthe criminalprocesswouldhavebeenmorefavorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.

. . . To prevail on a claim of ineffectiveassistance ofcounsel, bothprongsoftheStrickland test must be satisfied.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Mahonv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 157Conn. App. 253–54, quotingMissouriv. Frye, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012); see also Ebron v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 307 Conn. 342, 357, 53 A.3d 983 (2012) (to show prejudice in rejected plea case, petitioner must establish: ‘‘[1] it is reasonably probable that, if not for counsel’s deficient performance, the petitioner would have accepted the plea offer, and [2] the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the plea agreement ifit had been presented to the court’’), cert. denied sub
nom. Arnone v. Ebron, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013).
1
In his challenge to the habeas court’s conclusion as to Berke’s performance, the petitioner contends that Berke’sfailuretoprovidethepetitionerhisprofessional advice, assistance and opinion on the petitioner’s best
course of action concerning the state’s plea offer fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, thus, constituted deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. We agree. In focusing on the performance prong, we are guided by our case law, which provides that ‘‘[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.

. . . Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable

. . . . Because ofthe difficulties inherentinmakingthe evaluation, acourtmust indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challengedactionmightbe consideredsoundtrialstrategy.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Helmedachv. Commissioner ofCorrection, 168 Conn. App. 439, 453, A.3d (2016).
The petitioner bore the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish that Berke’s actions constituted deficient performance. In order to establish that Berke’s performance was deficient, the petitioner was requiredto overcomethepresumptionthatBerke’s conduct was reasonable. See Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 168 Conn. App. 218. In determining what is reasonable, we are guided by ‘‘[p]revailing

norms ofpractice as reflectedinAmericanBarAssociation standards and the like

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664, 679, 51 A.3d 948 (2012), quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 688.This court has recently stated that counsel performs effectively and reasonably when he or she provides a petitioner with adequate information and advice upon which the petitioner can make an informed decision as towhetherto acceptthe state’spleaoffer. SeeMelendez

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 151 Conn. App. 359. We are mindful that ‘‘[c]ounsel’s conclusion as to how bestto advise a client in orderto avoid, on the one hand, failingto give advice and, onthe other, coercing a plea enjoys a wide range of reasonableness

. . . .’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Barlowv. Commissioner ofCorrection, 150 Conn. App. 781, 795, 93 A.3d 165 (2014). Accordingly, ‘‘[t]he need for recommendation depends on countless factors, such as the defendant’s chances ofprevailing at trial, the likely disparity in sentencing after a full trial compared to the guilty plea

. . . whether [the] defendant has maintained his innocence, and the defendant’s comprehension of the various factors that will inform [his] plea decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In denying the petitioner’s claim with respect to Berke, the habeas court expressly concluded that Berke’s representation was not controlled by our decision in Barlow

. The habeas court explained: ‘‘[B]ased upon the facts that have been produced in this trial, [Berke] does not fit within the specific boundaries of Barlow

. . . . [Berke] did not simply act as a conduit. [Berke] did go further. Later on in 2014, and Barlow is
a 2014 case—later on in 2014, the case ofMelendez v. Commissioner, 151 Conn. App. 351, reaches a contrary conclusion finding that the representation by counsel for Mr. Melendez did pass constitutional muster. That
was a more detailed explanation in which the counsel offered explanations, pros and cons, and a recommendation.’’4 In addition, the court noted that ‘‘[i]t is clear from all of the testimony that [Berke] did convey and discuss the plea bargains with [the petitioner]. The record is crystal clear that [the petitioner] protested his innocence and always asserted that he wished to proceed to trial. The court is convinced, based upon the testimony of [Berke], the testimony at the first habeas trial, that [Berke] did in fact adequately explain the pretrial offer, discuss the case, discuss the maximum punishments, discuss the pros and cons ofpleading guilty or not guilty, but left, as he should have, the final decision as to whether to accept or reject such offer to [the petitioner].

. . . While it would appear that [Berke’s] representation may be closer to that of Barlow than it isMelendez, nevertheless, the court will find that [Berke’s] representation was sufficiently within that band ofrepresentation that will pass constitutional muster.’’ We disagree.
InBarlowv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 150 Conn. App. 789–90, 796–97, this court held that the petitioner’s defense counselhadrendereddeficientper-formance in failing to advise the petitioner adequately regarding the court’s plea offer. We noted that the petitioner’s counsel had testified during the habeas trial that she refrained from givingthe petitioner any advice
as to the plea offer proposed by the trial court. Id., 801. Counsel furtherhad testified that she ‘‘merely gave [the petitioner] the facts of the offer, [and] provid[ed] no assistance or advice as [the petitioner] weighed his options.’’ Id. We concluded that ‘‘[a]lthough we agree with the habeas court that [counsel] had no obligation in this case specifically to tell the petitioner whether to take the court’s plea offer

. . . [counsel did have]
an obligation to provide advice and assistance to the petitioner regarding that plea offer, which, she admittedly failed to do.’’ Id., 796–97. We reasoned that ‘‘[a]lthough the [petitioner] ultimately must decide whether to accept a plea offer or proceed to trial, this critical decision, which in many instances will affect a [petitioner’s] liberty, should be made by a represented [petitioner] with the adequateprofessional assistance, advice, and input of his or her counsel.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 800. We further noted that ‘‘a crucial component ofcounsel’s effective representation during plea negotiations is giving professional advice to a [petitioner].

. . . [C]ounsel should give the [petitioner] his or her professional advice on the best course of action given the facts of the particular case and the potential total sentence exposure.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 799–800. Therefore, we concluded that counsel’s ‘‘performance was deficient because she did not give the petitionerherprofessional advice and assistance concerning, and her evaluation of, the court’s plea offer.’’ Id., 802.
InBarlow, the petitioner’s trial counsel testified that she did not provide any advice to the petitioner concerning the plea offer proposed by the court. Id., 801. Similarly, in this case, Berke testified during the habeas trial that it was his general practice never to advise his client orgive him advice asto whetherhe shouldaccept
or reject a plea offer.5 As this court held in Barlow, advisingthepetitioneronthe strengths andweaknesses of his case, alerting him to his potential exposure and explaining to him the terms of the plea offer is insufficient; without the professional advice as to the best
course of action, such representation constitutes deficient performance. Id., 800–802. Although the petitioner maintained his innocence during pretrial discussions with Berke, Berke had an obligation to provide the petitioner his ‘‘professional advice on the best course of action given the facts of the particular case and the potential total sentence exposure.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 800; see Cardozav. Rock, 731 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2013) (‘‘defense counsel have a constitutional duty to

. . . advise their clients
on the crucial decision whether to accept a plea offer’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Vazquezv. Commissioner of Correction, 123 Conn. App. 424, 437, 1 A.3d 1242 (2010) (stating that ‘‘[a] defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his clientfully
on whether aparticularplea to a charge appears to be desirable’’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 901, 23 A.3d 1241 (2011).
The respondent, however, argues thatBerke’sperformance was not deficient for failing to make a specific recommendation as to whether the petitioner should accept or reject the state’s plea offer because such a recommendation was not required under Barlow

. Although we agree that Barlow did not establish a per
se rule obligating counsel to provide recommendations regarding plea offers, we are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument. Barlow set forth an obligation for defense counsel to provide professional advice, assistance and an ‘‘informed opinion as to what pleas [to] enter’’ and to make ‘‘an informed evaluation ofthe options and determine which alternative will offer the [petitioner] the mostfavorable outcome.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Barlowv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 150 Conn. App. 798. We, therefore, read Barlow to require counsel to provide the petitioner his professional advice, assistance and opinion on the petitioner’s best course ofaction concerning the state’s plea offer. This, Berke admits, he did not do.
We note that in his argument that Berke’s performance was not deficient pursuant to the standard set forth in Barlow, the respondent relies on our decision inAndrews v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 155 Conn. App. 548, 110 A.3d 489, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 911, 112 A.3d 174 (2015). That reliance is misplaced.
In Andrews, the petitioner challenged the habeas court’s finding that he failed to showthat his trial counsel was deficient.6 Id., 551. In support of his claim on appeal, the petitioner relied on Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 150 Conn. App. 781. See Andrews v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 155 Conn. App. 553. This court, however, concluded that because the facts inAndrews were distinguishable, the petitioner’s reliance onBarlow was misplaced. Id. Specifically, we explained that ‘‘[u]nlike trial counsel in Barlow, who provided no advice or assistance to her client onthe plea offer, trial counsel in the present case explained to the petitioner the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case, the charges he was facing, and the maximum sentence he would be exposed to if he was unsuccessful at trial. Trial counsel explained that the petitioner would likely receive a significantly higher sentence than twelve years if he was convicted at trial, that he believed that the state had a strong case against the petitioner, and that it would be a difficult
case to win because most ofthe witnesses were police officers, and one of the police officers had sustainedpermanent serious injury. Although trial counsel left the ultimate decision of whether to accept or to reject the offer to the petitioner, he provided the petitioner with adequate professional advice on [his] options and the bestcourse ofaction, unliketrial counselinBarlow, given the facts ofthe case and the petitioner’s potential total sentence exposure.’’ Id., 554–55.
Unlike counsel in Andrews, Berke did not provide the petitioner with his opinion as to whether the state would prevail at trial, nor did he provide advice on the best course ofactionforthepetitioner. This case isthus distinguishable from Andrews, where defense counsel explainedto the petitionerthatin hisprofessional opinion the state had a strong case against the petitioner. See id. Here, the extent of Berke’s advice concerning the plea offer was to discuss with the petitioner the specific strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case. This is distinguishable fromthe facts inAndrews where defense counsel provided detailed advice on the petitioner’s options andbestcourse ofaction. See id. Therefore, we rejectthe respondent’s argumentthatAndrews

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 155 Conn. App. 554–55, compels us to reach a different conclusion.
Forthe foregoing reasons, we conclude thatthis case falls within the reasoning of Barlow, and, therefore, contrary to the conclusion ofthe habeas court, Berke’s failure to provide the petitionerhis professional advice, assistance and opinion on the petitioner’s best course of action concerning the state’s plea offer constituted deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland

. 2 Having concludedthatBerke’sperformance concerning the state’s plea offer was deficient, we turn now to the prejudice prong of Strickland

. The petitioner contends that the court did not provide any factual or legal basis for its ‘‘belief’’ that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was prejudiced by Berke’s deficient performance. We disagree.
The following legal principles are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In order to show prejudice stemming from apetitioner’s rejection ofapleabargain due to ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘‘a petitioner need establish only that (1) it is reasonably probable that, ifnotforcounsel’s deficientperformance, thepetitioner would have accepted the plea offer, and (2) the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the plea agreement ifit had beenpresented to the court.’’ Ebron

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 307 Conn. 357. ‘‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

. . . In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner’s burden of proving that a fundamental unfairness had been done is not met by speculation

. . . but by demonstrablerealities.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn. App. 537, 553–54, 124 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 910, 128 A.3d 954 (2015). ‘‘If the habeas court determined that

. . . it is not reasonably probable that thetrialcourtwouldhaveimposedthesentence embodied in the plea agreement, the prejudice prong has not been satisfied.’’ Ebron v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 355–56. Although the petitioner testified that he would have accepted the state’s plea offer but for Berke’s deficient performance, he has failed to establish, in accordance withEbron, thatthere was areasonableprobabilitythat the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the state’s plea offer. With respect to this conclusion, we find that the evidence adduced at the habeas trial provided both factual and legal support for the court’s determination. In the habeas court’s decision, Judge Fuger stated that ‘‘while I cannot categorically say yes
or no that such a plea bargain would have been accepted, I can say that I do not believe the

. . . petitioner in this case has met his burden of proving with
a preponderance of the evidence that it is reasonably probable that a court would have accepted the eight year offer.’’ To support this finding, the court expressly stated various factors, including that the petitioner had ‘‘a prior conviction for manslaughter for which he served an eleven year sentence. Very shortly after serving that sentence, he was arrested for a shooting incident in which somebody was apparently severely injured. [The petitioner] has other convictions [that] involved a firearm.’’
The court also recognized ‘‘the difficulty of trying to prove that [a court would have conditionally accepted the state’s plea offer], particularly in a case such as this where the identities ofthe particularjudges apparently
are unknown.’’ Both our Supreme Court and this court have considered the difficulty of trying to prove that the trial court would have accepted the plea offerwhen the identities of the judges are unknown and/or the record does not provide sufficient evidence regarding the trial court’s general practices. For example, in Ebronv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 307 Conn. 361, our Supreme Court recognized that ‘‘when there is evidence that aparticularjudge had indicated that he would have conditionally accepted the plea agreement, such evidence is probative on the question of what a reasonable courtwouldhave done. Wefurtherconclude that such evidence is sufficient to prove prejudice in the absence of any evidence that the particularjudge’s practice deviated significantlyfromthe normalpractice
or that the particular sentence would have been an outlier. Because there was no such evidence in the present case, we conclude that the factual finding that [the trialjudge] would have conditionally accepted the plea agreement was sufficient to establish prejudice.’’Id. Inaddition, inLewisv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 165 Conn. App. 454, this court held that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice because there
was ‘‘no evidenceintherecordthatthetrialcourtwould have accepted [the] plea agreement

. . . .’’ It then explainedthat ‘‘[t]oholdotherwise ontherecordbefore
us would amount to pure speculation, in which we decline to engage.’’ Id.
In accordance with the legal principles pertaining to the prejudice prong ofStrickland, as set forth inEbron and Lewis, the record before us does not reveal the identity of the trial judge who would have been presented with the plea offer or whether there was a reasonable probability that a trial judge would have conditionally accepted the state’s plea offer. The facts therefore are distinguishable from those in Ebron, where the record revealed the identity ofthe trialjudge to whom the plea would have been presented and evidence that the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the plea. Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 307 Conn. 346 n.1. Specifically, in Ebron, the prosecutor ‘‘testified at the habeas proceeding that [the trial judge] thought [that] the state’s [plea] offer
was appropriate and that she would not be adjusting it, loweringitorchangingit. Whenaskedif[theprosecutor] had any reason to believe that [the trial judge] would not have imposed the agreed on sentence if the petitioner had accepted the plea offer, [the prosecutor] stated that [the trial judge] was a quite experienced judge, and that she would have indicated that the plea offer was too high or too low if she did not intend to accept it. Accordingly, [the prosecutor] believed that [the trial judge] would have imposed [the agreed on sentence].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ContrarytothefactsofEbron, here, the onlyevidence intherecordpertainingtowhetherthetrialjudgewould have conditionally accepted the plea offer was Berke’s testimony describing the plea offer as reasonable. We notethatBerkewasveryhesitantto make such adefinitive statement concerning the reasonableness of the pleaoffer. Further, Berke admittedthathe didnotknow whether a trial judge would have accepted the state’s plea offer, given the facts of this case.7 Even with Berke’s testimony, the habeas court determined that, due to the paucity of evidence, it could not find that the petitioner established that there was a reasonable probabilitythatthe trialjudge wouldhave conditionally accepted the plea offer.
Weemphasizethat‘‘thepetitioner’sburdenofproving that afundamental unfairness has been done is not met by speculation

. . . but by demonstrable realities.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 159 Conn. App. 553–54. The petitioner’s failure to satisfy his burdenofestablishingthattherewasareasonableprobabil-ity that the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the state’s plea offer is fatal to this claim. See Henderson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 129 Conn. App. 188, 196, 19 A.3d 705, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice because he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claim that there was a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the plea offer. See Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 165 Conn. App. 454.
We thus conclude thatthe petitionerfailedto demonstrate that his claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel with respectto Berke’s representationpertaining to the state’s plea offer involved issues that are debatable amongst jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the issue is adequate to deserve encouragementto proceedfurther. Therefore, we conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denyingthe petition for certification to appeal as to this claim. See Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 162 Conn. App. 729–30.
B
The petitioner next claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because the court erred in finding that Berke’s alleged failure to advise the petitioner on accessorial liability did not constitute ineffective assistance.8 Specifically, the petitioner argues that Berke had a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the facts, evidence andlawin determiningwhichtheoryhewould rely on to defend the petitioner ifhe proceeded to trial and to inform the petitioner of the ways he could be convicted and sentenced, including as an accessory to the crimes at issue. We disagree.
As enunciated in our well established case law, ‘‘the United States Supreme Court [has] determined that [ineffective assistance of counsel claims pertaining to counsel’s obligation to investigate the facts and legal principles ofeach case] must be supported by evidence establishing that

. . . counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and

. . . counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been differenthaditnotbeenforthe deficientperformance.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn. App. 378, 393–94, 966 A.2d 780 (2009). ‘‘An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will succeed only if both prongs [ofStrickland] aresatisfied.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 162 Conn. App. 722–23. Accordingly, in addressing this claim we focus on the performance prong of the Strickland test.‘‘While it is incumbent on atrial counsel to conduct a promptinvestigationofthe caseandexploreallavenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction

. . . counsel need not track down each and every lead or personally investigate every evidentiarypossibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn. App. 517, 525–26, 865 A.2d 1231 (2005). ‘‘In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations orto make areasonable decision that makes particularinvestigations unnecessary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 159 Conn. App. 547. ‘‘In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner’s burden of proving that a fundamental unfairness had been done isnotmetbyspeculation, butbydemonstrable realities.

. . . One cannot successfully attack, with the advantage of hindsight, a trial counsel’s trial choices and strategies that otherwise constitutionally comport with the standards of competence.

. . . Because this court is constrained to evaluating demonstrable realities, we will not engage in mere speculation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 526. ‘‘[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challengedactionmightbe consideredsoundtrialstrategy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 168 Conn. App. 218.
The following additional facts, as set forth by the habeas court, are relevant to this claim. In its decision, the court stated: ‘‘It was the state’s theory at trial that [the petitioner] was the person who did the shooting based upon statements of eyewitnesses. Based upon the testimony of [the petitioner at the habeas trial], he [was] not the person who did the shooting. He [was], in fact, the driver of the car. Unfortunately, [the petitioner] did not properly communicate these facts to [Berke].’’ In light of this, the court concluded that ‘‘Berke proceeded on the belief that his client was not involved in this shooting, and the reason why [Berke]
was under that misapprehension [was] not because he failed to investigate, not because he was ineffective, it was because he trusted that his client, under the protection ofattorney-client privilege, was going to tell him the truth, and he did not. As a result, [Berke] went into this process with a client who had lied to him, whose story was not inconsistent with his adamant assertion of innocence, and who made it clear that in
no way, shape or form did he intend to take a plea bargain, that he wanted to go to trial and have his day in court.’’
Weagreewiththehabeascourtandarenotpersuadedthat the petitioner met his burden of establishing that Berke’s performance pertaining to accessorial liability
was deficient. The authority cited in the respondent’s brief, namely, Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 585, 940 A.2d 789 (2008), supports the respondent’s assertion thatthe petitioner did not establish that Berke’s advice and investigation concerning accessorial liability was deficient.
In Crawford, our Supreme Court concluded that the habeascourtproperlydeniedthepetitioner’sineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to investigate ‘‘[b]ecause the petitioner did not admit untiljust before jury selection that he had been the driver ofthe vehicle

. . . .’’ Id., 599. Our Supreme Court further concluded that‘‘[thepetitioner’s] trialcounsel’sattemptto develop
a defense relating to misidentification was reasonable in light of the petitioner’s insistence that he had not been the driver of the vehicle.’’ Id., 599–600. The facts in Crawford are analogous to those in the present case, where the petitioner failed to communicate to Berke that he was ‘‘driving the vehicle when [the victim] was shot

. . . [t]hat [he] drove the shooter to the location

. . . [he was] aware that [he was] driving the shooter to the location for the purpose ofthe shooter shooting [the victim]’’ and therefore ‘‘Berke proceeded on the beliefthatthe petitionerwas not involved in this shooting

. . . .’’ Here, as in Crawford, the petitioner continued to claim that he was innocent throughout the discussions, thetrialandsentencing, anditwasnotuntil afterthepetitionerwas sentencedthatBerke receiveda communication from the petitioner that was inconsistentwiththepriorinformation. Inaddition, theevidence at the habeas trial established only that Berke could notrecallwhetherhe had discussedaccessorialliability with the petitioner.
As defense counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance unless deficient performance is affirmatively proven, the petitioner in the present case hasfailedtorebutthisstrongpresumptionwithcredible evidence. See Sanders v. CommissionerofCorrection, 83 Conn. App. 543, 551, 851 A.2d 313, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 914, 859 A.2d 569 (2004). Because the petitioner failed to establish that Berke rendered deficient performance, his ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim fails.
We thus conclude thatthe petitionerfailedto demonstrate that his claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel with respect to Berke’s performance pertaining to accessorial liability involved issues that are debatable amongst jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the issue is adequate to deserve encouragementto proceedfurther. We, therefore, further conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal with respect to this claim.
IIThe petitioner finally claims that the habeas court abuseditsdiscretionindenyinghispetitionforcertification to appeal because it improperly denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to DeSantis’ performance during the first habeas trial. As previously noted, to determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, this court will look atthe underlying merits of the petitioner’s claims. See Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 162 Conn. App. 721. As set forth in count one ofthe operative petition, the only allegation of deficient performance as to DeSantis is his failure to raise the issue of Berke’s ineffective assistance during the plea process. Therefore, the sole claim on appeal against DeSantis is the petitioner’sallegationthatheprovidedineffective assistance of counsel during the petitioner’s first habeas trial, by failing to raise the issue ofthe ineffective assistance of Berke.
When a petitioner challenges the habeas court’s denial of his operative petition on the basis of ineffective assistance of both his first habeas counsel and his criminal defense counsel, the petitioner must prove both that (1) his habeas counsel was ineffective and (2) his criminal defense counsel was ineffective. Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 113 Conn. App. 394. Therefore, we are ‘‘mindful that the petitioner’s [claim] related to his habeas counsel must fail if [his] claims ofineffective assistance of [his criminal defense] counsel are unavailing.’’ Id., 395.
As we previously concluded in part I ofthis opinion, the petitioner failed to establish his claim ofineffective assistance of Berke. Therefore, the petitioner cannot establish that DeSantis’ performance was deficient in failing to raise the claim of ineffective assistance as to Berke inthe petitioner’s firsthabeas corpus proceeding because the petitioner did not establish the underlying claimonwhichthatclaimispredicated, i.e., thatBerke’s representation constituted ineffective assistance.
We thus conclude thatthe petitionerfailedto demonstrate that his claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel with respectto DeSantis involved issues that are debatable amongst jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the issue is adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. We, therefore, conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal with respect to this claim.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Thepetitionerfiledhisfirsthabeaspetitionallegingineffectiveassistance of his defense counsel, Robert Berke, concerning Berke’s failure to file a ‘‘motionto suppress suggestive identification ofprosecution’s chiefwitness’’ and claiming that the communication between Berke and the petitioner fell below the standard of what a reasonable attorney would have exercisedunder similar circumstances. Following a trial, the habeas court denied the petition. The petitioner appealed from that denial, and we dismissed the appeal. Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction, 118 Conn. App. 905, 984 A.2d 122 (2009). On August 2, 2010, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition, but that was withdrawn on November 6, 2012.

2 The petitioner also claims that his state and federal rights to due process of law were violated when Berke failed to properly advise him concerning the plea offer and accessory liability, and when DeSantis failed to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning Berke’s performance. Inturn, the respondent, the CommissionerofCorrection, inrelying onDavis

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 160 Conn. App. 444, 455–56, 124 A.3d 992, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 957, 125 A.3d 1012 (2015), contends thatthe petitioner’s due process claim is unreviewable because the habeas court neither considered nor ruled on the merits of that claim and the petitioner failed to obtain a ruling on it. See id. (declining to review claim when habeas court neither considered nor ruled on it and petitioner failed to alert the habeas court that ruling was inaccurate or incomplete). In the alternative, the respondent further argues that the petitioner also cannot obtain [review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)] of this unpreserved constitutional claim because it arises out of the criminal trial proceedings, and not the acts or omissions of the habeas court. See Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 67 n.2, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) (Golding review available only where petitioner challenges actions of habeas court). We agree with the respondent. We also are not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument that his due process claim should be reversed pursuant to the plain error doctrine;

see Practice Book § 60-5; or this court’s supervisory authority over the administration of justice. See Lacks v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn. App. 225, 234, 866 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 922, 871 A.2d 1027 (2005). We disagree. Pursuant to our case law, a habeas petitioner cannot establish that the court abused its discretion in denying certification on issues not raised in the petition for certification to appeal. Kowalyshyn v. Commissioner of Correction, 155 Conn. App. 384, 389, 109 A.3d 963, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 909, 111 A.3d 883 (2015). Accordingly, as the petitioner’s due process claim

was raisedin counttwo ofhis operativepetition, therecord does notprovide any evidence that the habeas court determined and ruled on this claim. The petitioner stated his grounds for his request for certification to appeal as follows: ‘‘Whether [the] habeas court erred when it found that trial counsel

was not ineffective when he discussed the strengths [and] weaknesses of the state’s case but did not advise the petitioner whether he should accept

or reject the state’s plea offer

. . . [and] such other claims of error found after a complete review ofthe record.’’ Therefore, ‘‘[b]ecause the petitioner failed to raise [his due process claim] in his petition for certification’’ to appeal; Kowalyshyn v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 391; we decline to afford it review.

3 The petitioner also stated as a ground for appeal: ‘‘Such other claims of

error found after a complete review ofthe record.’’ This claim, however, is meaningless because it does not provide the trial judge with notice. ‘‘It is well established that [w]e do not entertain claims not raised before the habeas court but raised for the first time on appeal.

. . . The purpose of the [petition] is to put the [respondent, the Commissioner of Correction]

on notice of the claims made, to limit the issues to be decided, and to preventsurprise.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.)Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 362, 369, 90 A.3d 368, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100 A.3d 852 (2014).

4 In Melendez v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 151 Conn. App. 359, this court concluded that counsel effectively and reasonably ‘‘provided the petitioner with adequate information and advice upon which the petitioner could make an informed decision as to whether he should accept the state’s initial five year plea offer.’’ With respect to this conclusion, this court noted that counsel specifically advised the petitioner to accept the plea offer. Id.

5 As found by the first habeas court, ‘‘the petitioner and [Berke] agree that [Berke] did not recommend specifically the taking of any plea bargain.

. . . Indeed, [Berke] did not recall the specifics of a plea, but that it was his custom, and in this instance he did not recommend the taking of a plea and that it was not his custom to recommend pleas one way or the other but to leave the decision to the client.’’ Duringthe habeasproceedingbeforeJudge Fuger, the following exchangeoccurred between the petitioner’s counsel and Berke:

‘‘Q. [A]nd is—is it your practice to advise the client or give him advice

as to whether or not he thinks it’s a good idea to take an offer or a bad idea to take an offer? ‘‘A. I never do. ‘‘Q. Okay. And could you explain to the court why you do that? ‘‘A. I present them the positive, the negatives of going to trial

. . . the risks oftrial, the maximum exposure. I don’tpresent my opinion on whether theyshouldtake an offerornot. That’stheirdecision. I’ve always maintained that that was their decision and not mine. I don’t influence clients on what decisiontheymake. I do—I do presentthem, atleastfrom alegal andfactual opinion, the strengths and weaknesses of their case

. . . by defense.

. . . ‘‘Q. But yourjob is to give them professional legal advice as to whether

or not they should take the plea or whether or not they should go to trial. ‘‘A. I don’t tell clients to take the plea.’’

6 In the habeas petition, the petitioner in Andrews claimed that ‘‘his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that he accept the plea offered by the trial court

. . . .’’ Andrews v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 155 Conn. App. 550. The habeas court, however, found thatthe petitionerfailedto showthathistrial counsel’s advice was deficient. Id., 551.

7 In addition, the testimony during the first habeas trial provides further insight into whetherit was reasonablyprobable that such aplea offer would have been conditionally accepted, as Berke testified that he could not recall the exact details of the state’s plea offer and that ‘‘the issue of being a persistent offender [did] not come up until well into the game, the initial discussions and the pleas discussions did not include any reference that the state was going to charge him as a persistent offender.’’

8 In the operative petition, the petitionermade no explicit claim ofineffective assistance of counsel as to accessorial liability, which he now raises

on appeal.