UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHANDA L. GILYARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Jerome B. Friedman, 

Senior District Judge. (4:10-cr-00039-JBF-TEM-1)

Submitted: June 23, 2011 Decided: July 8, 2011

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy V. Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, Virginia Beach, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. McBride, United States 

Attorney, Brian J. Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Robert Murdough, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Shanda L. Gilyard was convicted by a jury of one count

of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1344, 1349 (2006) (Count One); seven counts of bank fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (Counts Two through Eight); 

six counts of possessing and uttering counterfeit securities, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 513(a), 2 (2006) (Counts Nine through 

Fourteen);*

 * The judgment erroneously cites 18 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006) 

for these counts of conviction. However, Gilyard was convicted 

of violating § 513(a), as charged in the indictment. Because 

the judgment does not accurately recite the disposition of this 

case, we remand this case to the district court for correction 

of the written judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. 

and one count of aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2006) (Count Fifteen). Gilyard 

was sentenced to a total of 192 months’ imprisonment. Gilyard’s 

counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738, 744 (1967), stating that he found no meritorious issues for 

appeal, but questioning whether the district court erred in 

denying Gilyard’s post-verdict motions and in adopting the 

factual findings contained in the presentence report (“PSR”)

over Gilyard’s objections. Gilyard filed a pro se supplemental 

brief also challenging the denial of her post-verdict motions, 

which are based on Gilyard’s belief that a witness perjured 

himself at trial. Although we affirm Gilyard’s convictions and 
3

sentence, we remand for the purpose of correcting a clerical 

error in the judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

Gilyard first challenges the district court’s denial 

of her post-verdict motions for substitution of counsel and for 

a continuance. Both motions center on Gilyard’s allegation that 

a Government witness committed perjury. We review the district 

court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 739 (4th Cir. 2006). The 

trial court abuses its discretion when its denial of a motion 

for continuance is “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon 

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” 

Id. Whether to grant a motion for substitution of counsel is 

also within the district court’s discretion. United States v. 

Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004). 

In evaluating whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying a defendant’s motion for substitution of 

counsel, we consider: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the 

adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint 

about her attorney; and (3) whether the attorney/client conflict 

was so great that it resulted in total lack of communication 

preventing an adequate defense. Id. We weigh these factors 

against the district court’s “interest in the orderly 

administration of justice.” Id. at 157. In addition, a 

district court has wide latitude in limiting a defendant’s right 
4

to counsel of choice, based upon fairness and the demands of the 

court’s calendar. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 

140, 152 (2006).

We have reviewed the record and find that all three 

factors weighed against granting Gilyard’s motion for substitute 

counsel. Therefore, we conclude without difficulty that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

motion. Moreover, because the district court’s ruling was not 

arbitrary, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Gilyard’s motion for a continuance. 

Next, counsel generally questions whether the district 

court erred in adopting the PSR’s factual findings over 

Gilyard’s objections. However, Gilyard has not made an 

affirmative showing that the PSR’s findings are unreliable or 

inaccurate. United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 

1990). Therefore, the district court did not err in adopting 

the PSR’s factual findings.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm Gilyard’s convictions and sentence. We 

note, however, that the judgment contains a clerical error. The 

judgment states that Gilyard was convicted of Counts Nine 

through Fourteen under 18 U.S.C. § 512(a). Gilyard, however,

was charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 513(a)
5

with respect to these counts of the indictment. We accordingly 

remand for the purpose of correcting this clerical error. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. 

This court requires that counsel inform Gilyard, in 

writing, of her right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Gilyard requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Gilyard. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED