IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 208 

Chronicling the efforts of United States and Coalition forces to bring freedom, 

safety, and security to Iraq and recognizing the importance of the ‘‘surge 

strategy’’ in completing that mission. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 4, 2009 

Mr. KING of Iowa (for himself, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. PENCE, Mr. MCCOTTER, 

Mr. CARTER, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, 

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. KLINE of Minnesota, Mr. AKIN, Mr. 

MILLER of Florida, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. 

WITTMAN, Ms. FALLIN, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. HENSARLING, Mr. BURGESS, 

Mr. COLE, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. SHADEGG, Mr. PITTS, Mrs. SCHMIDT, Mr. 

GINGREY of Georgia, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. WESTMORELAND, Mrs. 

BACHMANN, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. RADANOVICH, Mr. LUCAS, Mr. 

LINDER, Mr. MCCAUL, Ms. FOXX, Mr. LATTA, Mr. BROUN of Georgia, 

and Mrs. LUMMIS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 

Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within 

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

RESOLUTION 

Chronicling the efforts of United States and Coalition forces 

to bring freedom, safety, and security to Iraq and recognizing the importance of the ‘‘surge strategy’’ in completing that mission. 

Whereas, on October 11, 2002, the House of Representatives 

passed H.J. Res. 114, Authorization for Use of Military 

Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, authorizing the 


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President to use military force to ‘‘defend the national 

security of the United States against the continuing 

threat posed by Iraq’’ and ‘‘to enforce all relevant United 

Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq’’; 

Whereas, on March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush 

gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an 

ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war; 

Whereas in providing the rationale for this ultimatum, President Bush pointed to the universal consensus of intelligence gathered by the United States and other governments which concluded Iraq continued to develop, possess, and conceal weapons of mass destruction and the 

means to deliver them; the threat posed to the United 

States and other countries by the growing threat of 

chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist attacks launched 

by or in collusion with the Hussein regime; the failure of 

peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime; the unanimously approved United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, which found that Iraq ‘‘has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant 

resolutions, including resolution 687, in particular 

through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations 

inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the [disarmament] actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of 

resolution 687’’; the Hussein regime’s use of weapons of 

mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against 

Iraq’s people; the regime’s history of reckless aggression 

in the Middle East; the aid, training, and harbor the regime had given to terrorists, including operatives of Al 

Qaeda; the United States Congress’ overwhelming vote on 

October 11, 2002, to support the use of force in Iraq; the 

need to disarm Saddam Hussein in order to diminish the 


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terrorist and security threat to America and the world; 

and the United States of America’s sovereign authority 

to use force in assuring its own national security; 

Whereas, on March 19, 2003, after Saddam Hussein and his 

sons refused to leave Iraq, the United States led an international coalition military force in launching Operation 

Iraqi Freedom to disarm and topple the Hussein regime, 

bring freedom to the people of Iraq, and establish a 

democratic government in Iraq capable of defending and 

sustaining itself and acting as an ally in the War on Terror; 

Whereas the Hussein regime was toppled on or about April 

9, 2003; 

Whereas a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was subsequently established in Iraq to provide governance and to 

facilitate the transition of Iraq into a democracy capable 

of providing its own internal security, sustaining itself, 

and acting as an ally in the War on Terror; 

Whereas from March 19, 2003 to the present time, the 

United States and Coalition Forces from 39 countries 

have engaged many enemies on the battlefields of Iraq, 

including the ‘‘Fedayeen Saddam’’ and other militias 

loyal to Saddam and the Baathist resistance; various localized Sunni militias providing protection to certain 

Sunni neighborhoods and population groups; terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda in Iraq; Shiite militias, 

including Moqtada Al Sadr’s Mahdi Army; Shiite vigilante groups acting much like their Sunni counterparts; 

Iranian supported Shiite groups, including the Supreme 

Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq’s Badr Corps; and 

members of, as well as forces trained and supplied by, 


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the Qods Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and other 

Iranian agents; 

Whereas, on December 28, 2004, Al Qaeda released an audio 

message from Osama Bin Laden in which he stated, 

‘‘The most important and serious issue today for the 

world is this Third World War . . . . It is raging in the 

land of the two rivers [Iraq]. The world’s millstone and 

pillar is in Baghdad, the capital of the caliphate.’’ He 

said ‘‘the whole world is watching this war,’’ and it will 

end in ‘‘victory and glory or misery and humiliation.’’; 

Whereas by December 2006, the security situation in Iraq 

had severely deteriorated largely as the result of increased Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence sparked by the 

February 22, 2006, bombing by Al Qaeda in Iraq of the 

Askariya Shitte mosque in Samarra and fueled by the 

many violent acts that followed which were perpetrated 

by Al Qaeda in Iraq and the various other sectarian and 

political enemy groups competing for power and attempting to defeat United States and coalition forces in Iraq; 

Whereas in their report, The Way Forward—A New Approach, the members of the Iraq Study Group stated they 

could ‘‘support a short-term redeployment or surge of 

American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed 

up the training and equipping mission, if the United 

States commander in Iraq determines that such steps 

would be effective’’; 

Whereas as a result of the deteriorating security situation in 

Iraq, President Bush announced ‘‘A New Way Forward’’, 

on January 10, 2007, which called for a surge of 28,500 

American troops into Iraq to execute new counter insurgency strategies, as outlined in FM 3–24 CounterinsurVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:29 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HR208.IH HR208

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gency, under the command of that document’s principal 

author, General David Petraeus; 

Whereas President Bush showed great leadership, judgment, 

and fortitude as commander in chief in ordering the 

adoption of the ‘‘surge strategy’’, despite being counseled 

by some of his top military advisors not to pursue the 

troop build up; 

Whereas the goal of the ‘‘surge strategy’’ was to increase the 

size of the American military force on the ground in Iraq 

to secure the Iraqi population by killing or capturing the 

terrorists and militia who had unleashed the destructive 

wave of violence in Iraq since 2006, and to move American forces into Iraqi neighborhoods to partner with Iraqi 

civilians and security forces in clearing those neighborhoods of enemy forces and maintaining security control 

to hold those areas once cleared; 

Whereas President Bush and General Petraeus, among others, believed that by increasing the size of the American 

force in Iraq and following the counter-insurgency tactics 

developed in FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency, United States 

and Coalition forces, working with Iraqi Security Forces, 

could bring safety and security to the Iraqi people; provide the time necessary to train and equip Iraqi Security 

Forces, of which there are now more than 613,000; and 

provide the Iraqi Government with the stable security environment needed to bring about the reconciliation necessary to establish that government’s relevance and authority throughout the country; 

Whereas one of the first signs of the success of the ‘‘surge 

strategy’’ was the development of the Sunni ‘‘Awakening,’’ in which Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar Province 

responded to, and allied themselves with, United States 


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military and Coalition forces in turning against Al Qaeda 

in Iraq; 

Whereas some of the most dangerous streets in the world 

have become peaceful centers of commerce; 

Whereas Anbar Province, where Marines have been stationed 

throughout much of the war and which was once one of 

the most dangerous parts of Iraq, has been pacified to 

the point at which on January 23, 2009, General James 

Conway, the Commandant of the United States Marine 

Corps, explained that the combat portion of the Iraq war 

is effectively over, stating ‘‘The time is right for Marines 

in general terms to leave Iraq.’’; 

Whereas the mayor of Fallujah has declared the city to be 

a ‘‘city of peace’’; 

Whereas since implementing the President’s ‘‘surge strategy’’ 

in Iraq, civilian deaths have dropped by more than 90 

percent since December 2006, to levels not seen since 

2004; 

Whereas President Bush’s adoption of the ‘‘surge strategy’’ 

has made Iraq a safer place for American troops; 

Whereas since July 1, 2008, more American troops in Iraq 

have been killed in accidents than by the enemy; 

Whereas the surge strategy has delivered a significant defeat 

to the terrorist and militia organizations that once controlled vast areas of Iraq and were responsible for the 

formerly high levels of violence in Iraq; 

Whereas, on May 25, 2008, Ryan Crocker, the United States 

Ambassador to Iraq, stated that Al Qaeda in Iraq ‘‘has 

never been closer to defeat’’ and on July 25, 2008, said 

that the Sunni insurgency, writ large, is ‘‘not much of a 

challenge any more’’ to Iraq’s future; 


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Whereas ethno-sectarian violence has diminished significantly, 

falling 98 percent from its highest monthly death toll of 

2,086, recorded for December of 2006; 

Whereas the security of the International Zone in Baghdad 

(the Green Zone) was transferred to the Iraqi Security 

Forces on January 1, 2009; 

Whereas 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces are now entirely the responsibility and under the control of Iraqi Security 

Forces; 

Whereas the self-evident fact that al Qaeda in Iraq has been 

defeated as a military force, a fact that has become clear 

over the past year, beginning with statements made by 

Abu-Tariq, a local Al Qaeda leader near Balad, in a letter captured by American forces in early 2008. In the letter, Abu-Tariq states that as a result of the Sunni Awakening that followed the implementation of the ‘‘surge 

strategy’’, ‘‘The Americans and the apostates launched 

their campaigns against us and we found ourselves in a 

circle not being able to move, organize or conduct our 

operations . . . . This created weakness and psychological 

defeat. This also created panic, fear and the unwillingness to fight. The morale of the fighters went down . . . . 

There was a total collapse in the security structure of the 

organization.’’; 

Whereas 17 of the 18 benchmarks, established by Congress 

and signed into law on May 25, 2007, by President Bush 

as part of H.R. 2206, the United States Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, to provide for an 

objective analysis of progress toward reconciliation and 

self-governance by the Iraqi Government have been subVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:29 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HR208.IH HR208

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stantially or completely met since the ‘‘surge strategy’’ 

was adopted; 

Whereas one of the most important benchmarks was recently 

met when new provincial elections were held successfully 

in Iraq on January 31, 2009; 

Whereas the final unmet benchmark, increasing Iraqi Security Force units’ capability of operating independently, 

requires a continued United States presence to ensure 

full attainment in the future; 

Whereas, on February 4, 2009, Ambassador Ryan Crocker 

stressed the importance of a continued United States 

presence in Iraq when he said ‘‘Iraq’s development will 

be a long-term project, requiring the long-term strategic 

commitment of the United States’’; 

Whereas there have been two legitimate, nationwide elections 

in Iraq on January 30, 2005, and on December 15, 

2005; 

Whereas the Iraqis, on October 15, 2005, by popular vote, 

ratified their constitution, which establishes the Rule of 

Law in Iraq; and 

Whereas the ‘‘surge strategy’’ has ushered in a level of safety 

and security in Iraq such that the United States and the 

Government of Iraq were able to sign a Status of Forces 

Agreement on November 17, 2008, and which took effect 

on January 1, 2009, that continues the transfer of security responsibilities within Iraq to Iraqi forces and provides for the withdrawal of United States forces from 

Iraq in 36 months by the end of 2011: Now, therefore, 

be it 

1 Resolved, That— 


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1 (1) it is the sense of the House of Representa2 tives that the surge strategy articulated by President 

3 Bush as part of A New Way Forward has succeeded 

4 in providing security and stability to the Iraqi peo5 ple, addressing the threat posed to the Government 

6 of Iraq and the continued existence of a unified and 

7 independent country of Iraq by terrorist organiza8 tions and sectarian militias, and facilitating the op9 portunity for the Government of Iraq to make the 

10 decisions necessary for national reconciliation and 

11 governance to occur; and 

12 (2) the House of Representatives— 

13 (A) recognizes the enormous sacrifices 

14 made by the men and women of the United 

15 States and Coalition forces from 39 countries to 

16 secure the successes gained in Iraq and thanks 

17 these heroes for their courage, nobility, and sac18 rifice to defend freedom and defeat our en19 emies; 

20 (B) extends its gratitude to all those with21 in the military and civilian departments and 

22 agencies of the United States Government re23 sponsible for directing the implementation of 

24 the ‘‘surge strategy,’’ including General David 

25 Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker; 


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1 (C) recognizes the importance and signifi2 cance of victory in the Iraqi theater of the larg3 er, global struggle against radical, Islamic 

4 Jihadist terrorists; and 

5 (D) commits itself to working with Presi6 dent Obama and his administration to continue 

7 the progress that has been made on the ground 

8 in Iraq since the ‘‘surge strategy’’ was imple9 mented, recognizing that a definable victory has 

10 been achieved in Iraq and that history will 

11 judge President Bush’s successor by his ability 

12 to maintain his predecessor’s victory. 

Æ 


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