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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 18-2758

U NI T E D S TAT E S OF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

M AUR I C I O M ARC HAN

, Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s, Ea stern Di v i s i o n. No . 1 7CR

0 0 0 0 5 -2 — G a ry Fe ine rma n, Judg e.

A RGU E D M A

Y 16, 2019

— D E C I D E D A UGUS T 1 3, 2019

Befor e B AU E R

, H AMI L T O N

, and S T

. E V E, Circuit Judges

. B A U E R , Cir cuit Judge. Followi ng a j ur y tr i al, Maur i cio Mar chan w as conv i cted of one count of possessi on wi th intent to di str ib u t e 500 gr ams or mor e of cocaine, in v i olati on of 21 U.S .C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and one count of di str ib uti on of 500 gr ams or mor e of cocaine in v i olati on of 21 U.S .C. § 841(a)(1).2 No. 18-2758
Mar chan appeals hi s conv i cti on ar guing that the tr i al pr oceedings wer e r eplete wi th er r or s and, a s a r esult, he w as deni ed a fundamentally fai r tr i al. After consi d e r i n g the ev ents at tr i al,

w e b eli ev e that the di str i ct cour t j udge d i li gently pr esi ded ov er the tr ia l , but to the extent any er r or s w er e made, they w er e har mless. Accor dingly

, w e affi r m. I. BACKGROUND In the ear ly ev ening of Januar y 4, 2 017, Pedr o Chav elas, a gov er nment in for mant, met wi th Vi ctor Rami r e z , who had

a g r eed to faci l i tate Chav elas’s pur chase of tw o ki logr ams o f cocain e. The tw o met in a T ar get p ar king lot in Chi cago’s Ar cher Hei ghts nei ghbor hood. After a br i ef r ecor ded di scussi on, Rami r ez and Chav elas m et w i th Mar chan who in for med them the cocaine w as wi th “[t] h e g u y in the l i ttle whi te car .” After Chav elas confi r med that the cocaine w as pr esent, agents
mov ed in. Mar chan, Rami r ez, and the “guy in th e li ttle whi te car ” (“Mor eno”), w er e ar r ested. Agents sear ched the whi te c ar and

r ecov er ed a ki l ogr am of cocaine. Agents also seiz e d c ell phones fr om Mar chan, Rami r ez, and Mor eno. An examinati on of telephone r ecor ds show ed multi ple calls betw een Rami r ez and Mar chan and Mar chan and Mor eno leadin g up to thei r ar r est. On S eptember 14, 2017, a gr a nd j ur y r etur ned a super seding indi ctment char gi ng Mar chan wi th one count of p ossessi on wi th intent to di str ibute 500 gr ams o r m o r e of c ocain e, in
v i olati on of 21 U.S .C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 8 4 6 , a n d one c ount of di str ibuti on of 500 gr ams or mor e of cocaine, in v i olati on of 21 U.S .C. § 841(a)(1). On Mar ch 5, 2018, hi s j ur y tr i a l began.No. 18-2758 3
Befor e tr i al the gov er nment submi tted a Santiago pr offer pur por tin g to show a conspi r acy to d i str ib u t e c o c aine. In hi s obj ecti on M a r chan poi nted out that, under thi s ci r cui t’s pr ecedent, a single nar coti cs tr ansacti on, wher e only a buy er seller r elati onshi p exi sts, i s not enough to establi sh a conspi r acy
. See United States v
. Johnson , 592 F

. 3 d 749, 754 (7th Ci r
. 2010). Ther eafter the gov er nment w i th d r ew i ts pr offer after d e c i d ing not to c all Rami r ez, upon whose testi mony the pr offe r
w as lar gely based. At tr i a l the gov er nment pr oduced a multi tude of wi tnesses: S peci a l Agent B i lly C o nr ad (“S A Conr ad”), who testi fi ed about
some of the sur v ei llance conducted dur ing the oper ati on; Dr

. Ca t a lin a Johnson (the “T r anslator ”), who tr anslated the S pani sh language audi o made by Chav elas’s hi dden r ecor ding dev i ce; T ask For ce Of f ic e r Fr anci s co Gomez (“TFO Gomez”), who di scussed the pending tr ansacti on wit h Chav elas and moni tor ed the tr ansacti on as i t occur red; and the I nv e s t i g a t i o n s Case Agent Ow en Putman (“Agent Putman”), who testi fi ed about how Chav elas came to be a gov er nment infor mant and the cooper ati on agr eement. When Chav elas w as calle d t o t e sti fy he spoke about hi s
c o o p e r a ti on agr eement w i th th e g o ve rnm e n t , th e g o v e rnm e nt ’ s pr omi se to r ecommend a sentence r educti on, hi s status as an i llegal ali en, and the gov er nment’s pr otecti on agai nst depor tati on. When C ha v elas testi fi ed about the tr ansacti on, he descr ibed hi s par ti ci pati on in the a r r est of Rami rez, Mar chan, and Mor eno. He also w alked the co ur t thr ough the sur v ei llance

v i deo and the r ecor ded conv er sati ons. On cr oss-examinati on, Chav elas admi tted that he had only hear d the audi o r ecor ding4 No. 18-2758
thr ee ti mes and not unti l ov er a y ear after they w er e made. He also stated that he hear d phr a ses that w er e not tr anscr ibed. Next, the gov er n ment called S peci al Age n t A d a m S t a checki (“S A S tachecki ” ), who w as one of th e a r r e s ti n g offi cer s, to i denti fy Mar chan. S A S tachecki also t e s t i fi ed that he per sonally

r ecov er ed the cocaine fr om the whi te c ar
. Next, Gr oup S uper v i sor Coli n Di ckey (“S up e r v i sor Di ckey”), testi fi ed that he obser v ed the sur v ei llance oper ati on and on cr oss-examinati on di scussed the i mpor tance of sear ching an infor mant b efor e any coo r d in a t e d tr ansacti on. Fi nally , Intelli gence Analyst Gabr i ella Per ez (“Ana ly s t Pe r e z ” ), intr oduced v a r i ous char ts and r ecor ds per tai ning to Mar chan and Rami r e z ’s telephone calls. The defense intr oduced a sti pulati on that no finger pr int analysi s
w as per for med. Followi ng the close o f e v i d e n c e b u t b e fo r e d e l iber a ti ons, the par ti es agr eed that the S pani sh language r ecor ding w ould not be gi v en to the j ur y; only the tr anslated tr anscr i pt w ould be pr ov i d ed. How ev er

, the j ur y later r equested the audi o r ecor ding, whi ch the cour t sent back ov er Mar chan’s obj ecti on. Ulti mately

, the j ur y r etur ned a gui lty v er d ic t o n both counts of the indi ctment. On July 26 , 2 018, Mar chan w as sentenced to 60 months in the custody of the Bur eau of Pr i sons. II. ANAL

YSIS Mar chan ar gues that hi s tr i al w as tai nted w i th numer ous
er r or s that depr i v ed hi m of a fai r tr i al. He fi r st asser ts that the tr i al cour t abused i ts di scr eti on when i t deni ed hi s moti on for

a mi str i al following the gov er nment’s soli ci tati on of inadmi s si

ble co-conspi r ator statements. He ar gues the cour t er r ed whenNo. 18-2758 5
i t l i mi ted hi s cr oss-examinati on of Chav elas r egar ding h i s bi as. He next ar gues the cour t er r ed when i t per mi tted the j ur y to consi der the S pani sh language a udi o r ecor ding of the tr ansacti on in a ddi ti on to the tr anscr i p t. And finally , he ar gues that a
new tr i al i s r e qu ir ed because of the cumulativ e effect of the abov e er ror s. For t h e r easons below , w e di sagr ee and affi r m the deci si on of the di str i ct cour t. A. Marchan’s Motion for Mistrial Mar chan ar gues that testi mony eli ci ted by the gov er nment dur ing the di r ect exami nati ons of T FO Gomez, Agent Putman, and Chav elas, w as an attempt to s how that Chav elas and Rami rez ar r anged the tr ans a c t i o n—all of whi ch w as inadmi s si

ble hear sa y

. He ar gues that b ecause the gov er nment i m pr oper ly intr oduced h ear say stat e m e n t s fr om Rami r ez, the cour t should hav e gr anted a mi str i al. “A mi s tr i al i s appr opr i a te when an ev ent dur in g tr i al has a
r eal li keli hood of p r e v e nti ng a j ur y fr om ev aluating the
ev i dence fai r ly a nd accur ately , s o that the defendant has not been depr i v ed of a fai r tr i al.” United States v
. Hilliard, 851 F .3d 768, 7 78 (7th Ci r
. 2017) (inter nal quotati ons and ci tati on omi tted). Impr oper ly admi tted statements may be gr ounds for

a mi str i al. See United States v
. Cardena , 842 F .3d 9 5 9 , 9 93 (7th Ci r
. 2016) (di scussing co-conspi r ator statements in the context of United States v
. Santiago , 5 82 F .2d 1 1 28 (7th Ci r
. 1 978)). The di str i ct cour t’s deni al of Mar chan’s moti on f o r a m is tr i al i s
r ev i ew ed for abuse of dis c r e t io n. Hilliard, 851 F .3d at 778 (ci tati ons omi tted). Mar chan sugge sts that ov er multi ple days and fr om multi ple w i tnesses, the gov er nment eli ci ted hear say testi m ony6 No. 18-2758

whi ch show ed Chav elas coor d in ated wi th Ra m i r e z t o p u r ch a s e cocain e fr om hi m. Absent t h is ev i dence, he a r gues, ther e w as no other ev i dence to establi sh hi s par ti ci pati on in the tr ansacti on. How ev er

, the contested statements w er e not admi tted to pr ov e the tr uth of the matter asser ted and when inadmi ssi ble testi mony w as gi v en, the cour t instr ucted the j ur y to i gnor e the statements. TFO Gomez testi fi ed about h i s meeti ng wi th Chav elas and stated h e beli ev ed he w as m eeti ng w it h hi m to di scuss a for thcomin g n a r coti cs tr ansi ti o n
. H e then s poke about the acti ons he took on December 28 and 30, 2016, l eading up to the

nar coti c s tr ansacti on. He di d n ot testi fy about what w as sai d a t these meeti ngs. TFO Gomez’s testi mony w a s n o t gi v en to pr o v e t h e tr uth of the matter asser ted, Fed. R. Ev i d. 801(c) (definin g hear say), instead, the statements w er e made to show the cour se of the i nv esti gati on. United States v. Cruse , 805 F .3d 795, 810 (7 t h C ir

. 2015) (“statements offer ed to establi sh the
cour se of the inv esti gati on, r ather than to pr ov e the tr uth of the matter asser ted, a r e nonhear s ay and ther e f o r e admi ssi ble.”) ( quoting United States v
. T aylor , 569 F .3d 742, 749 (7th Ci r .2009)). Whi le w e ar e r eluctant to per mi t “cour s e of the inv esti gati on”

r a ti onale for fear of i ts abuse or m i sus e, Carter v
. Douma , 796 F .3d 726, 736 (7th Ci r
. 2015); see United States v
. Haldar , 751 F .3d 450, 454 fn.1 ( 7th Ci r
. 2014), h e r e the di str i ct cour t car efully li m i ted any contr ov er si al testi mony
. Agent P utman’s testi mony w a s si mi lar to TFO G omez. He testi fi ed about hi s c oor dinati on wi th Chav elas and the cour se of the inv esti gati on leading u p to a nd including the tr ansacti on
on the ev ening of Jan u a r y 4, 2017. Li ke wi th TFO Gomez, the defense di d not obj ect to the maj or i ty of these questi ons. WhenNo. 18-2758 7
the defense di d obj ect, the cour t sustained the obj ecti on and instr ucted the j ur y to di sr egar d the questi on and answer
. Because the contested statements ar e cour se of inv esti gati on statements not hear say , the cour t w as cor r ec t t o p e r mi t the testi mony

. Cruse , 805 F .3d at 810. The defense also takes i ssue w i th much o f C h a v elas’s testi mony

. He ar gues that the i denti fi cati ons of Mar chan w er e inappr opr i ate, but no obj ecti on w as made at tr i al and the i d e nt i fi cati ons ar e not inadmi s s ible under the hear say rule. The defense n ext ar gues that the exchange wher e Chav elas di scussed the pur pose of the meeti ng wi th Rami r ez w as inappr opr i ate. T ypi cally , a co-conspi r ator ’s statements ar e excluded fr om the defini ti on of hear say , Fed. R. E vi d

. 801(d)(2)(E), b ut her e the gov er nment w i t h d r ew the Santiago pr offer so the di str i ct c our t nev er deci ded i f ther e w as a conspi r acy as a matter of law

. Ho w e v er

, ev en i f Chav elas’s statements w er e hear say , any er ror i s har mless because TFO Gomez a nd Agent Putman alr eady testi fi ed to the i ssues challenged, cor r obor ating hi s testi m ony

. Because Chavelas’s testi mony w as cumulati v e a nd cor r obor ated, w e find any er r or w as h ar mless. See United States v
. Castelan , 219 F .3d 690, 696 (7th C i r
. 2 000) (ar ti culating the test for har mle s s er r or ). Mor eov er , the few obj ecti ons tha t w er e made at tr i al w er e lar gely sustained and the c our t instr ucted the j u r y to di sr egar d the questi ons and answe r s
. “ A bsent a showin g to the contr ar y , thi s Cour t pr esumes that the jur y li m i ted i ts consi der ati on of testi mony in
accor d a nce wi th the tr i al cour t's instr u cti on.” Uni t e d S t ates v
. Bermea-Boone, 563 F .3d 621, 625 (7th Ci r . 2009).8 No. 18-2758
B. The Scope of Chavelas’s Cross-Examination Befor e Chav elas test ifi ed, Mar chan mov ed in limine to explor e hi s cooper ati on agr eement w i th the gov er n ment and any mandator y min i mum sentence h e may or may not hav e
av oi ded. The gov er nment opposed the moti on ar guin g that: any cr oss-examinati on explor ing Chav elas’s man d ator y mini m um w ould li kely confuse th e ju ry an d ob f uscate the i ssue at bar ; and a mandator y m ini mum w ould be the r e s u l t of the gov er nment’s char gi ng deci si ons not Chav elas’s cooper ati on at pr esent. Th e cour t pr ohibi ted a n y c r oss-examinati on of Chav elas r egar ding any mandat o r y mini mum he mi ght face. No w , M ar chan ar gues that the cour t’s cur tai l of hi s cr osse x aminati on vi olated the S i xth Amendment’s confr ontati on clause because he w as unable to explor e t he wi tness’s bi as agai nst hi m. The S i xth Amendment guar a ntees cr i minal defendants the

r i ght to confr ont wi tnesses agai nst them. U.S

. C o n s t

. a m end VI. When the di str i ct cour t’s li m i tati ons on cr o s s -examinati on di r ectly i mpli cates the cor e v alues of the Confr ontati on Clause
our rev i ew i s de novo , o t her wi se w e r ev i ew for abuse of di scr eti on. United S t a t e s v
. T rent, 863 F .3d 699, 704 (7th Ci r
. 2017) (ci tati ons omi tted). Her e, th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p e r m i t t e d M a r ch an to cr oss-examine Chav elas about hi s under lyi ng bi a s. Chav elas testi fi ed that he beli ev ed hi s cooper ati on w ould r esult in a rec o mmendati on for

a r educed s entence and that h i s Gui delines sentence w as betw een 4 6 to 57 month s
. O n cr oss-examinati on, Chav elas testi fi ed that he faced a maxi mum penalty of 20 y ear s incar cer ati on and w as hopi ng the gov er nment w ould r e commend aNo. 18-2758 9
downw ar d depar tur e of 23 months. Because Mar chan w as able to a ddr ess Chav elas’s bi as agai n st hi m, the appr opr i ate standar d of r ev i ew i s for abuse of di scr eti on. The gr av amen of Mar chan’s a r gument i s that the gov er nment chose to lev y a l esser char ge agai nst Chav elas. He suggests th a t, h a d the gov er nment w anted to, the U.S

. Attor

ney’s offi ce w ould hav e b e e n able to “find” an a ddi ti onal .2 gr ams of her oi ne to subj ect Chav elas to a har sher char ge wi th a mandator y mi ni mum s entence of ten y ear s. Thi s i s the ki nd of r easonable li mi tat i on that the d i s tr i ct c our t i s expected to put
on cr oss-examinati on. At b e s t, thi s ar gument w ould hav e confused the j ur y and, at w or st, i t suggests i mpr opr i ety b y the g o v e r nment wi thout suppor ti ng ev i dence. United States v
. Cavender, 228 F .3d 792, 798 (7t h C ir

. 2000) (“The di str i c t cour t
r etains wi de l a ti tude to i mpose r easonable li mi ts on the scope and extent of cr oss-examinati on based on c o nc er ns about thi ngs li ke h a rassment, pr ej udi ce, confusi on of the i ssues, or inter rogati on that i s r epeti ti v e or only mar gi n ally r elev ant.”). Chav elas’s testi mony at tr i al w a s sufficient to expose hi s b ia s a gai nst Mar chan and i llustr ate the benefi ts he mi ght

r ecei v e in connecti on wi th h i s testi mony
. Confr ontati on Clause
concer n s ar e ameli or ate d b y exposing a wi tness’s m oti v ati on to li e and bi ases tow ar ds the defendant

. I t i s of secondar y concer n “how much oppor tuni ty defense c ounsel gets to hammer that poi nt home to the j ur y
. ” United States v
. W

illiams , 8 9 2 F

. 3 d 242, 248 (7th Ci r
. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S

. Ct. 4 6 7 (2018). The di str i ct cour t di d not abuse i ts di s c r eti on by li mi ti ng Mar chan’s cr oss-examinati on of Chav elas.10 No. 18-2758
Addi ti onally

, Mar chan a rgues he should be p er mi tted to
cr oss-examine Chav elas concer ning h i s subj ecti v e u nder

standing of the char ges he w as facing b efor e hi s agr eement to cooper ate wi th the gov er nment. He ar gues that the r estr i cti on of hi s abi li ty to i nqui r e about the length of sentence Chav elas hoped to av oi d i s r ev er si ble er r or
. W

e di sagr ee. W h il e anythi n g that moti v ates a wi tness to testi f y is pr oper l y wi thi n the confr ontati on clause, T rent, 863 F .3d at 705, her e the exclusi on of thi s line of questi oni ng i s not fatal to the gov er nment’s case. As noted abov e, Chav elas’s testi mony and
cr oss-examinati on w as extensi v e. He w as questi oned about hi s moti v ati on for c ooper ati ng wi th th e gov er nment and testi fying at tr i al. H e also testi fi ed about his maxi mum sentence, a poten t i a lly r educed sentence, and hi s hopes that the gov er nment w ould r ecommend a sentence of 23 months. A s n oted abov e, Chav elas’s testi mony w as suffi ci ent t o expose hi s bi as and inter est. Accor d in gly , w e need n ot addr ess whether the di str i ct cour t abused i ts di scr eti on when i t pr ohibi ted cr oss-examinati on concer ning an av oi d ed mandator y mi ni mum sentence. C. The Jury’s Consideration of the Audio Re c ording During Deliberations Followi ng tr i a l, b u t befor e delib er ati ons commenced, the par ti es agr eed the j ur y w ould not be gi v en the audi o r ecor ding. Instead, they w ould o n ly be fur ni shed wi th a tr anscr i pt pr epar ed by the T

r anslator

. After deliber ati ons began, the j ur y sent out a note r equesting the audi o re c or ding of the tr ansacti on. The gov er nment agr eed and, ov er obj ecti on, th e cour t per mi tt e d t he r ecor ding to be consi der ed by the j ur y , noti ngNo. 18-2758 11
that i t w as p r oper ly admi tted into ev i dence ev en though i t w as not publi shed at tr i al. Mar chan ar gues that the di str i ct cour t
er r ed w h e n i t per mi tted the j ur y to consi der the S pani sh language audi o of the tr ansacti on. The di str i ct c our t has br oa d d iscr eti on when consi der ing what ev i dence to per mi t in the deliber a ti on r oom when exhibi ts a r e pr oper ly admi tted at tr i al. United Sta t es v
. Biggs , 491 F .3d 616, 623 (7th Ci r
. 2007). “W e r ev i ew the di str i ct c our t's handlin g of the exhibi ts for a clear abuse of di scr eti on.” Id

. Mar chan’s pr inci pal ar gument in the pr ese nce of S pani sh speaking j u r or s means thei r S pani sh language ski lls wi ll
necessar i ly come into play when they li sten to the audi o. Accor dingly

, they wi ll wi eld undue in fluence in the j ur y r oom. But, when the j ur or s w er e pr ov i d ed wi th the audi o r ecor ding, they wer e r ecalled into the cour tr oom and instr ucted that they

w er e to deter mine the accur acy of the tr ansla t io n gi v en the T r anslator ’s quali fi c ati on and the ci r cumstances sur r ounding i ts pr oducti on. They w er e admoni s hed n ot to r ely on thei r own S pani sh language ski lls. Ther e i s a r e buttable pr esumpti on that j ur i es f ollow the instr u c t i ons gi v en by the cour t. United States v
. Flournoy, 842 F .3d 5 24, 528 ( 7 th Ci r
. 2016). Her e, Mar chan has done nothing to per suade us that the j ur y i gnor ed the cour t’s ins t r ucti ons. Our analysi s in United States v
. Magana, i s in for mati v e. 118 F .3d 1173 (7th Ci r
. 1997). In Magana, the di str i ct c our t p r ohibi ted the gov er nment fr o m g iv ing tr anscr i pts and audi o r ecor dings to the j ur y tha t w e re not pr ev i ously publi s hed at tr i al, despi te being pr oper l y admi tted into ev i dence. B u t, thr ou g h a mi sunder standin g , many tr anscr i pts w er e pr ov i ded whi ch w er e12 No. 18-2758

n ot accompani ed by a tape that had been publi shed at tr ia l

. Ulti mately

, the tr anscr i pts pr o v i ded w er e r emov ed fr om deliber ati ons and t h e j ur y w as instr ucted to d i sr egar d any tr anscr i pt whi ch di d not hav e a cor respondin g audi o r ecor ding. Magana, 118 F .3d at 1180–1184. Her e, the r ecor ding w as p r oper ly admi tted into ev i d e nce, pr ov i d ed addi ti onal in for mati o n n ot pr esent in the tr anscr i pt ( e.g ., tone and clar i ty), and the d i s tr i ct j udge gav e pr oper li m i ti ng instr ucti on. Ther efor e, w e find that i t w as not an er r or to gi v e t he recor ding to the j u r y dur in g deliber ati ons. Mor eov er , consi der ing our pr ecedent in Magana, ev en i f ther e mi ght hav e been an er r or

, i t w ould hav e bee n har mless bey ond a
r easonable doubt. D. The Cumulative Error at T rial was Harmless “Cumulati v e e r r or s, whi le indi v i d u ally har mless, when taken together can p r ej udi ce a defendant as m u ch as a s ingle

r ev er si b le er r or and v i olate a d efendant's r i ght to due pr ocess of law

. ” United States v
. Allen , 2 6 9 F .3d 842, 847 (7th Ci r
. 2001). T o establi sh cumulati v e er r or a defendant must show that “(1) at least tw o e r r or s w er e commi tted in the c our se of the tr i al; (2) consi der ed together along wi th the enti r e r ecor d, the multi ple er r o r s s o infected the jur y’s deliber ati on that they deni ed the peti ti oner a fu n d a m e ntally fai r tr i al.” Id

. at 847 (quoti n g Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F .3d 820, 824 (7th Ci r . 2000)). Her e, Mar chan poi nts to per cei v ed er ror s but, as noted abov e, few er r or s occur r ed at tr i al. Any inadmi ssi ble hear s ay testi mony eli ci ted b y the gov er nment dur ing thei r c a s e - in- chi ef

w as str i cken by the cour t and any er r or that r esulted fr om pr ov i d ing the j u r y wi th the audi o r ecor ding dur in g deliber a -No. 18-2758 13
ti ons w as d e m i n imis

. When consi der ed together , these er r or s fai l to show the defendant w as depr i v ed of a fai r tr i al.

III. CONCLUSION Because no one er r or

, n or the sum of all the per c ei v ed
er r or s, w as so egr egi ous as to depr i v e Mar chan a f ai r tr i a l, w e affi rm the conv i cti on.