[Cite as State v. Gerald, 2014-Ohio-3629.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SCIOTO COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 12CA3519 

 : 

vs. : 

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT

: ENTRY

DAVID K. GERALD, : 

 : 

Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 08/21/14 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES:

Matthew F. Loesch, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant. 

Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Julie Hutchinson, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

McFarland, J. 

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas Court 

judgment of conviction and sentence. A jury found David Gerald, defendant 

below and Appellant herein, guilty of: (1) two counts of aggravated murder; 

(2) murder; (3) aggravated arson; (4) arson; (5) three counts of tampering 

with evidence; (6) kidnapping; and (7) conspiracy to commit aggravated 

murder/murder. On appeal, Appellant raises eight assignments of error, as 

follows: 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 2

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR TO 

PREVENT THE STATE OF OHIO FROM INTRODUCING 

EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ALLEGED MURDER 

WEAPONS. 

II. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR (A) AGGRAVATED 

MURDER, (B) FELONY MURDER, (C) MURDER, (D) 

KIDNAPPING, (E) AGGRAVATED ARSON, (F) ARSON, AND 

(G) TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE WERE AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT’S COMMENTS REGARDING THE 

CITIZENSHIP STATUS OF THE DECEDENT, FELIPE LOPEZ, 

WERE INDICATIVE OF JUDICIAL BIAS AND PREJUDICIAL 

TO THE APPELLANT. 

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

ADMITTING IMPROPER HEARSAY EVIDENCE FROM THE 

STATEMENTS OF CO-DEFENDANTS RAYMOND LINKOUS 

AND THOMAS STEINHAUER. 

V. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 

TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS, FAILING TO REQUEST 

INDEPENDENT TESTING OF ALLEGED DNA EVIDENCE, 

FAILING TO REQUEST A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION ON 

HEARSAY, FAILING TO OBJECT TO IMPROPER OPINION 

TESTIMONY, FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL 

COURT’S IMPROPER INSTRUCTION ON THE DECEDENT’S 

IMMIGRATION STATUS, FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE 

STATE OF OHIO PRESENTING AN ALTOGETHER 

DIFFERENT THEORY OF EVENTS THAN WHAT WAS 

DISCLOSED IN THEIR BILL OF PARTICULARS, AND 

FAILED TO CALL ANY WITNESSES ON BEHALF OF THE 

APPELLANT. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 3

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE 

STATE OF OHIO’S MOTION IN LIMINE WHICH 

PREVENTED THE APPELLANT FROM APPROPRIATELY 

CROSS EXAMINING WITNESS STEVEN DRUMMOND. 

VII. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 

THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE STATE OF OHIO 

SET FORWARD A THEORY OF PROSECUTION AT TRIAL 

THAT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE BILL OF 

PARTICULARS PREVIOUSLY FILED. 

VIII. CUMULATIVE ERRORS COMMITTED DURING 

APPELLANT’S TRIAL DEPRIVED HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL 

AND REQUIRE A REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS.” 

FACTS 

{¶2} The record before us reveals that on March 7, 2012, Appellant, 

David Gerald, along with Thomas Steinhauer and Raymond “Jimmy” 

Linkous met Felipe Lopez at Lopez's house. Lopez informed his wife, Kelly 

Lopez, that he was going with Appellant, Steinhauer and Linkous to a 

friend's house in Otway. Instead of Otway, however, Lopez was found dead 

inside a pickup truck on Junior Furnace Powellsville Road, on the other side 

of the county, the same pickup truck he left his house in with Appellant, 

Steinhauer and Linkous. The record further indicates that it was determined 

Lopez was stabbed with a knife, struck in the head with a hatchet, and 

burned alive inside the pickup truck. 

{¶3} After speaking with witnesses to the fire, it was quickly 

determined that Raymond Linkous was involved in Lopez’ murder. After 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 4

speaking with Linkous and others, the investigation led law enforcement to 

suspect that Steinhauer and Appellant were also involved. When law 

enforcement questioned Appellant, he initially denied any involvement; 

however, by the end of his interrogation, he had admitted he was with 

Lopez, Linkous and Steinhauer during the events which resulted in Lopez’ 

death, that he saw Steinhauer stab Lopez multiple times, and that Linkous 

had set fire to the pickup truck with Lopez inside. Appellant, however, 

denied contributing to Lopez’ murder first-hand, and specifically denied 

striking Lopez in the head with a hatchet. The knife, hatchet, as well as two 

cell phones belonging to the victim were eventually recovered and sent to 

the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) for testing. 

{¶4} On March 26, 2012, the Scioto County Grand Jury returned an 

indictment that charged Appellant with (1) aggravated murder in violation of 

R.C. 2903.01(A); (2) aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B); (3) 

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B); (4) aggravated arson in violation of 

R.C. 2909.02(A)(1); (5) arson in violation of R.C. 2909.03(A)(1); (6) three 

counts of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); (7) 

kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2); and (8) conspiracy to commit 

aggravated murder/murder in violation of R.C. 2923.01/2903.01 (A)(1)/ 

(A)(2)/ 2903.02(B). Appellant denied the charges and on April 4, 2012, 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 5

filed a motion for a bill of particulars, and a motion to preserve evidence. 

The trial court granted the motion to preserve evidence and a bill of 

particulars was filed on May 1, 2012. 

{¶5} Beginning on October 9, 2012, and continuing through October 

11, 2012, the trial court held a jury trial. A few weeks prior to the beginning 

of trial, and after Appellant’s co-defendant Raymond Linkous’ trial had 

begun, the State informed the court that the hatchet and knife had been lost 

after the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI & I) 

analyzed the items. Nevertheless, the State indicated that it intended to 

present testimony from the analyst who tested the hatchet and knife. As a 

result of the evidence being lost, on October 2, 2012, Appellant filed a 

motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, requested an order prohibiting the 

use of any and all testimony regarding the hatchet and knife. The trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion and the matter proceeded to trial. 

{¶6} At trial, the State presented the following evidence. On March 7, 

2012, Lopez told his wife that he was going with Appellant, Steinhauer, and 

Linkous to Otway to meet a friend. The four left in a red Chevy S-10 pickup 

truck. Later that evening, witnesses observed a red or maroon Chevy S-10 

pickup truck with one person inside and a white car, or silver PT Cruiser, 

with two people inside, parked along Junior Furnace Powellsville Road. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 6

Shortly after 8:00 p.m., Jeff Huffman witnessed a vehicle being set on fire. 

He testified that he saw something light, then heard an explosion. As he 

approached, he testified that a PT Cruiser with one tail light out took off. He 

testified he tried to approach the truck but that he could not get close as 

“stuff started popping.” Huffman returned to his house and called 911. The 

Green Township Fire Department responded to the call. Fire Chief, George 

Moore, testified that the fire originated inside the cab, was very intense and 

created a hazard to those around it. Then, when emergency personnel 

arrived, they discovered a body inside the truck's passenger compartment, 

was later determined to be Lopez. Law enforcement officials learned that the 

pickup truck contained Lopez's body, and quickly suspected Raymond 

Linkous’ involvement due to prior experience with him driving the S-10 

pickup truck1

 that was burned, as well as the silver PT Cruiser. 

{¶7} When investigators arrived at Linkous’ residence, they found a 

silver PT cruiser and verified that it did, indeed, have one tail light out. 

They also observed a burn pile on the property. They found Linkous exiting 

a trailer located in the rear of the property, in which Appellant resided. 

Linkous appeared to have just showered, shaved his head, and also had nicks 

that were bleeding, as well as singed eyebrows and burn marks on his face 

 

1

 It was determined that the S-10 pickup truck was owned by Debra Conn. When investigators found Conn 

that evening, she initially reported the vehicle had been stolen, but then reported that Steinhauer had 

borrowed it and failed to return it. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 7

and arms. Linkous was then taken into custody and transported to the 

Sheriff’s Department for questioning. As a result of information gained 

from Linkous, investigators located Steinhauer, who handed investigators a 

bag of clothes and a knife upon their arrival. Steinhauer then led 

investigators to an area in Kentucky where Lopez’s cell phones and a 

hatchet were recovered. 

{¶8} When investigators spoke with Appellant, he blamed Steinhauer 

and Linkous for Lopez's murder. Appellant initially denied any knowledge 

of how the murder occurred, but then admitted to being present and 

witnessing Steinhauer stab Lopez and Linkous set fire to the truck. He 

further admitted to being in the truck with the group while they drove from 

Lopez’s residence, through Kentucky, back into Ohio, stopped at a gas 

station and then went to Junior Furnace Powellsville Road. Appellant 

denied participation in the murder, but admitted that the group had planned 

to meet at Lopez’s house because Steinhauer owed him money for drugs. 

Appellant specifically denied any knowledge of a hatchet and denied hitting 

Lopez with a hatchet. 

{¶9} The State presented expert testimony at trial related to the DNA 

analysis that was performed on the evidence and the victim’s cause of death. 

Dr. Bryan Casto, the deputy coroner and forensic pathologist who performed 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 8

the autopsy on Lopez testified that he identified multiple stab wounds, as if 

from a knife, and multiple chop wounds accompanied by crushing of the 

skull, as if from a hatchet. He further testified that Lopez suffered inhalation 

thermal injuries. Casto opined that the cause of death was multiple stab and 

chop wounds of the head and torso, contributed to by inhalation thermal 

injuries, which indicated Lopez was alive during the fire. 

{¶10} Additionally, Raymond Peoples, a BCI & I forensic scientist 

testified regarding his performance of DNA analysis on both the knife and 

the hatchet. He testified that the DNA profile from the swab of the knife 

blade was a mixture, with a major profile consistent with that of the victim. 

He further testified that the DNA profile from the handle of the knife was a 

mixture of two individuals, the victim and Steinhauer. With regard to the 

hatchet, Peoples testified that the DNA profile from the swab of the blade 

was consistent with the victim, and that the handle included a mixture 

consistent with the victim, Appellant and Linkous. Thus, Appellant’s DNA 

was present on the handle of the hatchet, despite Appellant having denied 

knowledge of a hatchet. 

{¶11} Finally, the State presented the testimony of Steven 

Drummond, an individual who was in jail at the same time as Appellant. 

Drummond testified that he was bunkmates with Appellant at one point and 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 9

that during the time they were in jail together, Appellant stated, with respect 

to his pending charges, that “[h]e hit him in the back of the head with a 

hatchet.” He also testified that at one point, Appellant referred to the action, 

stating that his head split open like a watermelon. Drummond further 

testified that Appellant told him that he and the others went to Lopez’s house 

in a borrowed vehicle with a hatchet and a knife in an effort to scare him so 

he would not try to collect the money they owed him for drugs. Drummond 

testified that Appellant told him that they disarmed Lopez and hit him in the 

back of the head. 

 {¶12} On October 11, 2012, the jury found Appellant guilty of all 

charges. On October 18, 2012, the trial court sentenced Appellant to: (1) life 

without parole for the R.C. 2903.01(A) aggravated murder offense; (2) ten 

years for committing aggravated arson; (3) eighteen months for committing 

arson; (4) three years for each count of tampering with evidence in violation 

of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); and (5) ten years for kidnapping. The court merged: 

(1) the R.C. 2903.01(B) aggravated murder, the R.C. 2903.02(B) murder, 

and the conspiracy to commit aggravated murder/murder offenses with the 

R.C. 2903.01(A) aggravated murder offense; and (2) the tampering with 

evidence offense involving the motor vehicle with the arson offense. The 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 10

court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total sentence of 

life without parole plus twenty-nine years. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial 

court erred when it overruled his motion to dismiss and/or prevent the State 

from introducing evidence regarding the alleged murder weapons. 

Appellant argues that the State, in losing the knife and hatchet, failed to 

preserve evidence in accordance with the trial court’s order filed on April 5, 

2012, and, as a result, he was deprived of due process. He further argues 

that he was prevented from seeking independent DNA testing of the alleged 

murder weapons, a hatchet and a knife, because the State consumed the 

entire DNA sample prior to losing the weapons. The State responds by 

contending that Appellant has not demonstrated bad faith on the part of the 

State with respect to the loss of the evidence, and, as such, has not suffered a 

deprivation of due process. 

{¶14} Appellant cites R.C. 2933.82 "Securing biological evidence" in 

support of his contention that the State had an obligation to preserve the 

DNA evidence on the murder weapons that were in the State's possession. 

There is no argument on appeal that the State had such an obligation. 

Further, Appellant points out that he filed a motion to preserve evidence on 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 11

April 4, 2012, which motion was granted by the trial court on April 5, 2012. 

Again, the fact that the State was under a statutory obligation, as well as a 

court ordered duty to preserve the biological evidence at issue herein is not 

in dispute. The record reveals, however, that a knife and a hatchet, both 

alleged murder weapons, were lost after DNA testing was performed by 

BCI. Thus, based upon the following, the question at issue herein is whether 

Appellant has demonstrated bad faith on the part of the State in failing to 

preserve this evidence, which must be demonstrated in order to prove a 

deprivation of due process.

{¶15} In State v. Lupardus, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA31, 2008-

Ohio-5960, ¶ 8, we stated as follows with respect to the standard of review 

to be applied when reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss on 

the ground that the State failed to preserve evidence: 

“ ‘We review de novo a trial court's decision involving a motion 

to dismiss on the ground that the state failed to preserve 

exculpatory evidence.’ (Cites omitted.) State v. Sneed, 

Lawrence App. No. 06CA18, 2007-Ohio-853, ¶ 19.” But see, 

State v. Fox, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3302, 2012-Ohio-4805, 

985 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 22 (declining to follow the reasoning in 

Lupardus employing a de novo review and instead employing a 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 12

"hybrid standard of review that appellate courts apply to 

suppression motions and motions to dismiss on the basis of a 

violation of a defendant's speedy trial right[.]”)2

Despite the apparent departure from this standard in State v. Fox, we 

continue to apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court's denial of a 

motion to dismiss on the ground that the State failed to preserve evidence. 

{¶16} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive any person 

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” To determine if a 

defendant's alleged due process rights are violated, courts characterize lost 

or destroyed evidence as (1) “materially exculpatory” or (2) “potentially 

useful.” See, State v. Geeslin, 116 Ohio St.3d 252, 2007-Ohio-5239, 878 

N.E.2d 1. “The Due Process Clause protects a defendant from being 

convicted of a crime where the state has failed to preserve materially 

exculpatory evidence or has destroyed, in bad faith, potentially useful 

evidence.” (Cite omitted.) Sneed at ¶20. 

 

2 State v. Fox involved the review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to dismiss on the basis that 

the state failed to disclose materially exculpatory evidence. Fox at ¶22. The Fox court cited Lupardus in 

support of its departure from applying a de novo standard of review, characterizing the issue in Lupardus as 

one in which the state failed to produce exculpatory evidence. Id. However, Lupardus actually involved a 

situation where a dashboard tape from a dashboard cam was accidentally erased while trying to make a 

copy of it. Lupardus at ¶3. Thus, the issue in Lupardus was more appropriately characterized as a failure 

to preserve evidence, rather than a failure to produce evidence, which we believe is the appropriate 

characterization of the situation sub judice. As such, we apply a de novo standard of review in accordance 

with our prior reasoning in Lupardus. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 13

{¶17} Here, Appellant has conceded that the evidence at issue is not 

materially exculpatory. In his motion to dismiss that was filed on October 2, 

2012, Appellant stated that the question of whether the lost evidence was 

materially exculpatory was not at issue. Appellant instead argued that the 

evidence at issue was potentially useful and that the State had acted in bad 

faith by losing it in violation of a court order requiring it preserve the 

evidence. However, “[u]nless a defendant can show that the state acted in 

bad faith, the state's failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 

violate a defendant's due process rights.” Geeslin, supra, syllabus, following 

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 

(1988). 

{¶18} Appellant has equated the State's loss of the knife and hatchet to 

bad faith, essentially arguing it amounted to bad faith, per se, to lose the 

evidence when there was an order to preserve evidence. We reject this 

argument and instead find that the State's actions in losing the evidence did 

not rise to the level of bad faith, which has been defined as follows: 

“ ‘The term “bad faith” generally implies something more than 

bad judgment or negligence. “It imports a dishonest purpose, 

moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty 

through some ulterior motive or [ill] will partaking of the nature 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 14

of fraud. It also embraces the actual intent to mislead or deceive 

another.” State v. Buhrman (Sept. 12, 1997), Greene App. No. 

96 CA 145, unreported (citations omitted).' [State v. Christian

2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 17824, 1999 WL 1206651 (Dec. 17, 

1999.]” State v. Barron, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 10CA28, 2011-

Ohio-2425, ¶ 17. 

Aside from its contention that the mere act of losing the evidence constitutes 

bad faith, Appellant has failed to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the 

State. In fact, the record reveals that this loss of evidence was simply 

accidental, and there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise. For 

instance, Paul Blaine, the officer in charge of the Sheriff’s evidence room, 

testified that in twelve years he had never lost a piece of evidence. 

{¶19} Appellant further argues that he was deprived of due process 

because he was unable to obtain independent testing of the DNA evidence 

on the alleged murder weapons due to the State's consumption of the DNA 

sample during its testing, which was conducted prior to the loss of the 

weapons. However, as pointed out by the State: 

"The consumptive testing of evidence violates a defendant's due 

process rights only when the evidence possesses an exculpatory 

value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed." 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 15

State v. Rios, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 10CA0099, 2012-Ohio-3289, 

*3; citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-489, 104 

S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). 

Further, as reasoned by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in State v. 

Abercrombie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88625, 2007-Ohio-5071, ¶ 23: 

"Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith, the State's 

failure to preserve potentially useful evidence-of which no more 

can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the 

results of which might have exonerated the defendant-does not 

constitute a violation of the due process clause of the United 

States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. Arizona v. 

Youngblood (1988), 488 U.S. 51." 

{¶20} Here, we have already determined that Appellant has not 

demonstrated bad faith on the part of the State and that the State's accidental 

loss of the evidence, despite the existence of a court order requiring it to 

preserve the evidence at issue, does not rise to the level of bad faith. With 

respect to the consumptive testing of the DNA evidence that was collected 

prior to the loss of the knife and hatchet, the State's forensic scientist, 

Raymond Peoples, testified that the DNA evidence collected from the knife 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 16

handle and hatchet handle was consumed during testing. Mr. Peoples 

testified at trial as follows: 

“Q. * * * And then there are some listed at the end of your 

report under remarks, that say they were consumed 

during analysis. What does that mean? 

A. There are some samples -- usually when there is a body 

fluid, and a good amount of it, such as blood, a lot of 

times we don't need to consume the sample to do our 

testing, but there are times where in the process of testing 

we need to consume, whether it cutting -- using the 

whole outer layer or the swab. So we list it in our report 

as consumed during analysis. 

Q. Okay. So if that's consumed we would not get an 

envelope back, is that correct? 

A. No, you would not.” 

The trial transcript further reflects that the samples taken from the knife and 

hatchet handles were consumed during analysis. However, there is nothing 

in the record to indicate any bad faith on the part of the State with respect to 

the consumptive testing, but rather that consumption of the sample is 

sometimes required during testing. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 17

{¶21} Finally, Appellant cannot demonstrate that the evidence at issue 

possessed any exculpatory value prior to its loss. As discussed above, 

Appellant has not argued that the evidence was materially exculpatory, but 

rather, that it was potentially useful. Additionally, if anything, the evidence 

was inculpatory, as the testing performed by the State indicated the presence 

of Appellant's DNA on the hatchet, when Appellant claimed that he did not 

touch the hatchet. 

{¶22} Based upon the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant's first 

assignment of error and it is, therefore, overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

{¶23} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that all of 

his convictions, with the exception of his conviction for conspiracy to 

commit aggravated murder/murder, were against the manifest weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, we begin our analysis by considering the 

proper standards of review when faced with sufficiency and manifest weight 

challenges. 

{¶24} “ ‘When an appellate court concludes that the weight of the 

evidence supports a defendant's conviction, this conclusion necessarily 

includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the conviction.’ ” State v. 

Leslie, 4th Dist. Nos. 10CA17, 10CA18, 2011-Ohio-2727, ¶ 15; quoting 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 18

State v. Puckett, 191 Ohio App.3d 747, 2010-Ohio-6597, 947 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 

34 (4th Dist.). Thus, a conclusion that a conviction is supported by the 

weight of the evidence will also determine the issue of sufficiency.3

 Leslie 

at ¶ 15. Accordingly, we address whether Appellant's convictions are against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶25} When considering whether a criminal conviction is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire 

record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the 

credibility of witnesses to determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered.” State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 

N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 193. 

{¶26} The reviewing court must bear in mind; however, that 

credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. See State v. 

Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001). “ ‘If the prosecution 

presented substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could 

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the 

offense had been established, the judgment of conviction is not against the 

 

3

 As we noted in Leslie, the inverse proposition is not always true. For example, a conviction may pass a 

sufficiency analysis yet still fail to satisfy a manifest weight of the evidence challenge. State v. Thompkins, 

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 19

manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” State v. Tyler, 196 Ohio App.3d 443, 

2011-Ohio-3937, 964 N.E.2d 12, ¶ 43 (4th Dist.); quoting Puckett at ¶ 32. 

Thus, we will exercise our discretionary power to grant a new trial only in 

the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction. Drummond at ¶ 193. 

{¶27} Here, Appellant was convicted of ten felony offenses and he 

now raises sufficiency and manifest weight challenges to nine of the ten 

convictions. Specifically, Appellant claims his convictions for two counts of 

aggravated murder, murder, aggravated arson, arson, three counts of 

tampering with evidence and kidnapping were based upon insufficient 

evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He does not 

challenge his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. 

Counts One, Two, Three, Four and Five: Aggravated Murder, 

Aggravated Murder, Murder, Aggravated Arson, Arson 

{¶28} Appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of 

aggravated murder, murder, aggravated arson and arson and although he was 

indicted as a principal offender, the State pursued a complicity theory at 

trial. R.C. 2903.01(A) and (B) set forth the essential elements of aggravated 

murder as charged in counts one and two of Appellant's indictment: 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 20

"(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and 

design, cause the death of another or the unlawful termination 

of another's pregnancy. 

(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the 

unlawful termination of another's pregnancy while committing 

or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after 

committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping, rape, 

aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, 

aggravated burglary, burglary, trespass in a habitation when a 

person is present or likely to be present, terrorism, or escape."4

 

(Emphasis added). 

Here, the indictment with respect to count two, aggravated murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), specified predicate offenses of 

aggravated arson and arson. 

{¶29} Appellant was also charged and convicted of one count of 

murder. R.C. 2903.02 (B) sets forth the essential elements of murder as 

charged in count three of Appellant's indictment: 

 

4

 R.C. 2901.22(A) provides as follows: “A person acts purposefully when it is his specific intention to 

cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, 

regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in 

conduct of that nature”. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 21

"(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate 

result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an 

offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree 

and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the 

Revised Code." 

Here, the predicate offenses for the murder charge, as specified in the 

indictment, were "Felonious Assault and/or Aggravated Arson or 

Arson[.]" 

{¶30} Appellant was also charged and convicted of one count of 

aggravated arson and one count of arson. R.C. 2909.02(A)(1) sets forth the 

essential elements of aggravated arson, as charged in count four of 

Appellant's indictment: 

"(A) No person, by means of fire or explosion, shall knowingly 

do any of the following: 

(1) Create a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any 

person other than the offender[.]" 

R.C. 2909.03(A)(1) sets forth the essential elements of arson, as charged in 

count five of Appellant's indictment: 

"(A) No person, by means of fire or explosion, shall knowingly 

do any of the following: 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 22

(1) Cause, or create a substantial risk of, physical harm to any 

property of another without the other person's consent[.]" 

{¶31} The State's theory at trial was that Appellant and two others, 

Raymond Linkous and Thomas Steinhauer, aided and abetted and conspired 

with one another in murdering the victim, Felipe Lopez. Thus, although 

Appellant was charged with the principal offenses of aggravated murder, 

murder, aggravated arson and arson, the State's theory at trial was one of 

complicity and the jury was instructed accordingly. 

{¶32} Under R.C. 2923.03(F), a defendant “may be convicted of [an] 

offense upon proof that he was complicit in its commission, even though the 

indictment ‘is stated * * * in terms of the principal offense’ and does not 

mention complicity.” State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 251, 762 N.E.2d 

940 (2002). R.C. 2923.03 defines complicity and provides, in relevant part, 

as follows: 

“(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for 

the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: * * 

* 

(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 23

(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of 

section 2923.01 of the Revised Code.”5

In order to support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting 

pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), it has been held that the evidence must 

show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, 

advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the 

defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. State v. Johnson, 93 

Ohio St.3d 240, 245, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. The defendant's 

intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime. Id.; 

see also State v. Markins, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3387, 2013-Ohio-602, 

¶32. Further, the defendant's “ ‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be 

inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the 

offense is committed.’ ” Johnson at 245; quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio 

App.2d 29, 34, 273 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971); see also Markins at ¶33. 

{¶33} As such, we must consider the circumstances surrounding the 

victim’s death as well as Appellant's presence, companionship and conduct 

before and after the victim’s death to determine whether Appellant 

supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, or advised the principals, 

in this case Steinhauer and Linkous, in the aggravated murder and murder of 

 

5

 R.C. 2923.01 governs conspiracy to commit aggravated murder/murder, of which Appellant was 

convicted in count ten of his indictment. Appellant does not challenge his conspiracy conviction on appeal. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 24

the victim, as well as the aggravated arson and arson that served as the 

predicate offenses, if we are to conclude Appellant was complicit under 

(A)(2) of the complicity statute. We further note, however, that section 

(A)(3) of the complicity statute provides that complicity may be proven by 

demonstrating that Appellant conspired with the others to commit the 

offenses, in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code. 

{¶34} R.C. 2923.01 governs conspiracy, and in this case, conspiracy 

to commit aggravated murder and murder, per count ten of Appellant’s 

indictment. Appellant was indicted and convicted of conspiracy to commit 

aggravated murder and murder and he does not challenge that conviction on 

appeal. Thus, he has conceded that he conspired to commit the crimes of 

aggravated murder and murder, and implicit in that concession, aggravated 

arson and arson, by virtue of the fact that those were the predicate offenses 

for the aggravated murder and murder charges for which Appellant has 

conceded he conspired to commit. Thus, by conceding his conspiracy 

conviction, he has also conceded to the (A)(3) prong of the complicity 

statute. Having conceded to being complicit in these crimes, Appellant 

cannot now complain of being convicted as a principal offender of the 

crimes of aggravated murder, murder, aggravated arson and arson. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 25

{¶35} However, assuming Appellant has not waived his right to 

challenge these convictions based upon sufficiency and manifest weight 

grounds, we nevertheless conclude there was ample evidence to support a 

verdict that Appellant was complicit in the killing of Felipe Lopez and that 

Appellant purposefully, and with prior calculation and design, caused the 

death of Felipe Lopez, and also that Appellant was complicit in purposefully 

causing Felipe Lopez’ death while committing or attempting to commit 

aggravated arson and arson. By Appellant’s own admissions during his 

interrogation and through the testimony of Steven Drummond, Appellant 

was in the truck with Lopez, Steinhauer and Linkous, with weapons, for the 

purpose of at least intimidating Lopez, and which ultimately resulted in 

Lopez being stabbed, struck with a hatchet and burned alive. Additionally, 

the State introduced evidence that the truck was destroyed, which was 

owned by Debra Conn, and that in trying to put the fire out, several people 

were put at risk, including Jeff Huffman and the fire department personnel 

who responded to the blaze. 

{¶36} During his interrogation, Appellant admitted his presence 1) 

during the stabbing; 2) during the trip to Kentucky to dispose of evidence; 3) 

during the stop at the gas station; 4) and during the burning of the victim and 

the truck. Further, although Appellant denied that he struck the victim with 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 26

a hatchet and denied knowledge of a hatchet, Drummond’s testimony 

contradicted Appellant’s denial, and the evidence at trial indicated that 

Appellant’s DNA was present on the handle of the hatchet, which confirmed 

the State’s theory. Finally, after the commission of the crime, Linkous was 

found exiting Gerald’s residence, where it was obvious Linkous had 

showered and shaved his singed hair. 

{¶37} In light of the foregoing, we find there was substantial evidence 

upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the essential elements of the offenses of aggravated murder, 

murder, aggravated arson and arson had been established, and that Appellant 

and the others were in complicity by virtue of their presence, cooperation, 

companionship and conduct both before and after the victim’s death. As 

such, the judgments of conviction on counts one, two, three, four and five 

are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, as set forth 

above, this conclusion necessarily means sufficient evidence supports his 

convictions.

Counts Six, Seven and Eight: 

{¶38} Appellant was charged and convicted of three counts of 

tampering with evidence. R.C. 2929.12 (A)(1) sets forth the essential 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 27

elements of tampering with evidence as charged in counts six, seven and 

eight of Appellant's indictment: 

"(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or 

investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be 

instituted, shall do any of the following: 

(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, 

or thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as 

evidence in such proceeding or investigation." 

{¶39} Appellant was convicted of three counts of tampering with 

evidence based upon the State’s allegations that he 1) destroyed clothing and 

other personal items, with purpose to impair their availability as evidence; 2) 

destroyed and concealed cell phones, a knife and a hatchet, with purpose to 

impair their availability as evidence; and 3) destroyed a motor vehicle, with 

purpose to impair its availability as evidence. 

{¶40} The State presented evidence at trial that Appellant conspired 

with Linkous and Steinhauer in the commission of the aggravated murder of 

Lopez. The record contains evidence that Appellant was present and 

cooperated with those individuals in killing Lopez, driving to Kentucky, 

where the murder weapons and the victim’s cell phones were destroyed and 

concealed and ultimately recovered, and then driving back to Ohio, stopping 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 28

at a gas station and then meeting at a location on Junior-Furnace 

Powellsville Road, where the truck containing Lopez’ severely injured body 

was set on fire and destroyed. Appellant admitted to being present during 

the trip to Kentucky where the items were disposed of, and based upon his 

conduct and the facts in evidence we can infer his participation in the 

destruction and concealment of that evidence. Further, despite Appellant’s 

denial in the participation of setting the truck on fire, we can infer from his 

conduct his support, assistance and cooperation in setting the fire. 

{¶41} Finally, although Appellant denied that he destroyed the 

clothing he wore during the commission of the crimes, the presence of a 

burn pile at the Gerald and Linkous’ residence and the fact that their clothing 

was never recovered supports an inference that they burned their clothes. 

This is bolstered by the fact that both Gerald and Linkous appeared to have 

just showered when law enforcement encountered them and Linkous had 

shaved his hair and had singe marks on his body. Further, Steinhauer, who 

was found in a different location, one without a burn pile, had bagged his 

blood-saturated clothes up and handed them to law enforcement when they 

arrived. Appellant’s clothes were never recovered and we conclude that 

evidence supports an inference that they were burned in the burn pile. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 29

{¶42} At the time Appellant would have tampered with evidence, an 

official proceeding or investigation was not yet in progress; however, “ 

‘[w]hen an offender commits an unmistakable crime, the offender has 

constructive knowledge of an impending investigation of the crime 

committed.’ ” State v. Nguyen, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA14, 2013-Ohio3170, ¶ 89; quoting State v. Schmitz, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-200, 2005-Ohio6617, ¶ 17. Further, with respect to the element of the offense requiring 

purpose to impair the value or availability of the evidence in such a 

proceeding or investigation, “the offender does not have to actually impair 

the evidence's value or availability. It is sufficient that the offender alters, 

destroys, conceals, or removes the item ‘with purpose’ to impair its value or 

availability.” Id. at ¶ 91. Thus, it makes no difference that the cell phones 

and murder weapons were ultimately recovered. 

{¶43} Here, the jury could logically conclude that the essential 

elements of tampering with evidence were proven with respect to counts six, 

seven and eight of Appellant’s indictment. As such, Appellant's convictions 

are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As set forth above, this 

conclusion necessarily means sufficient evidence supports his convictions. 

Accordingly, Appellant's sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of error are 

without merit and are, therefore, overruled.
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 30

Count Nine: Kidnapping 

{¶44} Appellant was charged and convicted of one count of 

kidnapping. R.C. 2905.01 (A)(2) sets forth the essential elements of 

kidnapping as charged in count nine of Appellant's indictment: 

“(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case 

of a victim under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, 

by any means, shall remove another from the place where the 

other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person, 

for any of the following purposes: 

* * * 

(2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight 

thereafter[.]” 

{¶45} Appellant contends that the evidence at trial indicates that he 

left Lopez’s house in the bed of the truck and remained in the bed of the 

truck throughout the ordeal. He further argues that Lopez entered the truck 

voluntarily and that there was no evidence introduced that Lopez was forced 

into the truck or that his liberty was restrained after he entered the truck. 

The State contended at trial, and also on appeal, that Appellant and his codefendants attacked Lopez at some point after they all left in the truck and 

then restrained Lopez’s movement thereafter by transporting him over forty 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 31

five miles to the location in which he was burned, unbeknownst to them, 

alive. 

{¶46} In State v. Linkous, 4th Dist. No. 12CA3517, 2013-Ohio-5853, a 

decision issued by this Court in connection with the appeal of one of 

Appellant’s co-defendants, we reasoned as follows at ¶ 37 with respect to 

the same argument related to the kidnapping conviction: 

“In State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6405, 858 

N.E.2d 1144 (2006), the Ohio Supreme Court held that 

sufficient evidence supported a defendant's kidnapping 

conviction, even though the defendant mistakenly believed the 

victim was dead before he ‘gagged and hogtied the victim’ and 

concealed the victim's body in the basement. In Johnson, the 

defendant was charged with aggravated murder and kidnapping 

of a thirteen-year old child. On appeal, he asserted that 

sufficient evidence did not support his kidnapping conviction 

because the evidence showed the he ‘beat [the victim] to death’ 

in the living room before he restrained the victim and moved 

his body to the basement. Id. at ¶ 11, 942 N.E.2d 1061. The 

defendant argued ‘that he could not have kidnapped [the 

victim], because [the victim] died before [the defendant] 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 32

hogtied him.’ Id. at ¶ 40, 942 N.E.2d 1061. In rejecting the 

defendant's argument, the court explained: ‘ * * * [T]he 

evidence does not support [the defendant's] contention that [the 

victim] had died before being restrained. [The coroner] testified 

that [the victim] was still alive when [the defendant] tied his 

hands and feet, and this testimony supports the jury's finding 

that [the defendant] restrained [the victim] of his liberty.’ Id. at 

¶ 41, 942 N.E.2d 1061.” 

{¶47} We determined that the facts in Linkous involved facts similar 

to Johnson in that the evidence indicated that the victim was not dead when 

the appellant and his accomplices restrained him. Id. at ¶ 38. Based upon 

those facts, we determined in Linkous that “the evidence support[ed] the 

jury's finding that appellant and his accomplices restrained the victim's 

liberty.” Id. We find the reasoning employed in both Johnson and Linkous

to be applicable here where the State presented expert testimony that even 

though Lopez had sustained severe stab and chop wounds, he was still alive 

during the fire. Thus, we conclude the evidence supports the jury’s finding 

that Appellant and his accomplices restrained the victim’s liberty. Again, 

even if Appellant was not driving the truck and even if Appellant did not 

light the match, we have sustained his convictions for aggravated murder, 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 33

murder and aggravated arson under a theory of complicity. As such, we also 

conclude that his conviction for kidnapping is not against the manifest of the 

evidence and is supported by sufficient evidence. 

{¶48} Having found no merit to these sufficiency and manifest weight 

arguments, Appellant’s second assignment is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

{¶49} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends that the 

trial court’s comments regarding the citizenship status of the victim, Felipe 

Lopez, were indicative of judicial bias. Appellant contends that a statement 

made, or rather, a curative instruction given, by the trial court to the jury was 

prejudicial. The State responds by acknowledging the statement made by 

the trial court, but contends that it did not rise to the level of judicial bias, 

and did not prejudice Appellant, especially in light of a further curative 

instruction given to the jury prior to deliberations. 

{¶50} A review of the record indicates that Appellant’s counsel 

attempted to cross-examine Detective Conkel regarding the citizenship 

status of the victim, Felipe Lopez. When counsel inquired as to the 

expiration of the victim’s work visa, an objection was made and a bench 

conference was held. After discussion with counsel, the trial court stated, 

outside the presence of the jury, that “his citizenship status does not matter. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 34

It is no relevance to this case.” The objection was then sustained and the 

court stated as follows to the jury: “I’m going to instruct the jury at this time 

that citizenship status has no bearing on this case. I don’t know whether 

he’s a citizen or not, but everybody has a right to live. Okay.” Appellant 

argues that this statement was not only prejudicial, but was an incorrect 

statement of the law, as Ohio law recognizes the doctrine of self-defense and 

defense of others. Appellant further argues that comments made by the trial 

court at Appellant’s eventual sentencing hearing indicating that this was the 

“most heinous crime” it had seen were prejudicial and indicative of bias. 

{¶51} As this Court recently observed: 

“ ‘Judicial bias has been described as “a hostile feeling or 

spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of 

the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed 

anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as 

contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be 

governed by the law and the facts.” State ex rel. Pratt v. 

Weygandt (1956), 164 Ohio St. 463, 58 O.O. 315, 132 N.E.2d 

191, paragraph four of the syllabus. 

In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 

127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “opinions 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 35

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events 

occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior 

proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality 

motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, 

judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or 

disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their 

cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” 

On the other hand, “[t]hey may do so [support a bias challenge] 

if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial 

source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of 

favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” 

(Emphasis sic.) Id.’ ” Culp v. Olukoga, 3 N.E.3d 724, 2013-

Ohio-5211, ¶ 55; quoting State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140, 

2010-Ohio-5070, 937 N.E.2d 97, ¶¶ 47-48. 

Further, as we noted in Culp at ¶ 55: 

“ ‘A trial judge is presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and 

the party alleging bias or prejudice must set forth evidence to 

overcome the presumption of integrity. Corradi v. Emmco 

Corp. (Feb. 15, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 67407, unreported, 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 36

1996 WL 65822 [at 3] citing State v. Wagner (1992), 80 Ohio 

App.3d 88, 93, 608 N.E.2d 852; citing State v. Richard (Dec. 5, 

1991), 1991 WL 261331, Cuyahoga App. No. 61524. Bias 

against a party is difficult to question unless the judge 

specifically verbalizes personal bias or prejudice toward a 

party. In re Adoption of Reams (1989), 52 Ohio App.3d 52, 59, 

557 N.E.2d 159.’ Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. v. Brantley, Inc., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77823, 2001 WL 303716 (Mar. 29, 

2001)[.]” 

{¶52} Here, a review of the trial transcript does not indicate that the 

trial judge displayed any “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 

make fair judgment impossible.” Although the trial court judge may have 

gone, as Appellant argues, a step too far, in making the statement that 

everyone deserves to live, we cannot find that this remark supports a bias or 

partiality challenge. Further, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that such a 

statement is contrary to a claim of self-defense or defense of others. 

Additionally, as pointed out by the State, the trial court provided a limiting 

instruction to the jury prior to deliberations as follows: 

“If, during the course of the trial, I said or did anything which 

you consider an indication of my view on the facts, you are 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 37

instructed to disregard it. The Judge must be, and sincerely 

desires to be, impartial in presiding over this and every other 

trial before a jury and without a jury. The Court does not have 

the right and does not desire to invade the province of the jury 

by indicating in any way a preference between the State and the 

{¶53} Defendant and the Court has not done so at any time.” 

Courts have long held that juries are presumed to follow limiting, or 

curative, instructions. See e.g. State v. Martin, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

04CA2946, 2005-Ohio-4059, ¶ 17; State v. Wasmer, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 

714, 1994 WL 90400 (Mar. 16, 1994). 

{¶54} Further, we find no merit to Appellant’s argument that the trial 

court’s statements at sentencing were prejudicial. A review of the record 

indicates that this statement made by the trial court was made after the jury 

had already rendered its decision. Thus, it could not have influenced the 

jury. R.C. 2929.11(A) requires that the trial court, in imposing sentence, be 

guided by the overriding principles and purposes of felony sentencing, 

which include the need to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender, and also to punish the offender. Further, 2929.12 requires the trial 

court to consider certain factors in imposing sentences for felony offenses. 

These factors include the seriousness of the offender’s conduct, the danger 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 38

posed to the public, and the degree of harm caused. We find that the 

statement by the trial court with respect to the seriousness of the offense was 

consistent with the court’s duties under the felony sentencing statutes and in 

no way reflects judicial bias. 

{¶55} Finally, R.C. 2701.03 provides the exclusive means by which a 

litigant can assert that a common pleas judge is biased or prejudiced.6

 Jones 

v. Billingham, 105 Ohio App.3d 8, 11, 663 N.E.2d 657 (1995). 

Consequently, a court of appeals lacks “authority to pass upon 

disqualification or to void the judgment of the trial court upon that basis.” 

Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978). As we 

noted in In re Adoption of C.M.H, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 07CA23, 2008-

Ohio-1694 and Hirzel v.Ooten, 4th Dist. Meigs Nos. 06CA10, 07CA13, 

2008-Ohio-7006, ¶ 63, “challenges of judicial prejudice and bias are not 

properly brought before this Court. Rather, appellant must make such a 

challenge under the provisions of R.C. 2701.03, which requires an affidavit 

of prejudice to be filed with the Supreme Court of Ohio.’ ” Quoting Baker v. 

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 144 Ohio App.3d 740, 754, 761 N.E.2d 667 

(4th Dist.2001). Furthermore, ‘any allegations of judicial misconduct are not 

 

6

 R.C. 2701.03(A) provides: “If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly is interested in a 

proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party 

to a proceeding pending before the court or a party's counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to 

preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or the party's counsel may file 

an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of the supreme court in accordance with division (B) of this 

section.” 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 39

cognizable on appeal, but [are] a matter properly within the jurisdiction of 

the Disciplinary Counsel.’ ” Wilburn v. Wilburn, 169 Ohio App.3d 415, 421, 

2006-Ohio-5820, 863 N.E.2d 204, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.); quoting Szerlip v. 

Spencer, 5th Dist. No. 01CA30, 2002 WL 433442 (Mar. 14, 2002). 

{¶56} Based upon the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant's third 

assignment of error and it is, therefore, overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

{¶57} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant contends that the 

trial court abused its discretion in admitting improper hearsay evidence in 

the form of statements of co-defendants Raymond Linkous and Thomas 

Steinhauer. More specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court erred 

by allowing Detective Conkel to repeat incriminating statements made by 

his co-defendants as part of her interrogation of him during the investigation 

of Felipe Lopez’s death. Appellant further argues that the trial court failed 

to give the jury an instruction that they could not consider Detective 

Conkel’s statements for the truth of the matter asserted. A review of the 

record indicates that Appellant’s counsel objected to the State’s attempt to 

use this videotaped interview at trial on constitutional grounds, claiming that 

statements contained in the video violated the confrontation clause. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 40

{¶58} In response, the State argues that the statements made by 

Detective Conkel were not hearsay, as they were not offered to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted. The State further argues that the record 

indicates that some of the statements made by Conkel during the 

interrogation were false, and were designed to elicit a response from 

Appellant. The State also points out that the trial court did, in fact, provide a 

lengthy instruction to the jury, which instructed them that the State was not 

offering the officer’s statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 

{¶59} “[T]he admission or exclusion of evidence generally rests in the 

trial court's sound discretion.” State v. Jeffers, 4th Dist. No. 08CA7, 2009-

Ohio-1672, ¶ 17; citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 

(1987). “However, questions concerning evidentiary issues that also involve 

constitutional protections, including confrontation clause issues, should be 

reviewed de novo.” Jeffers at ¶ 17; citing State v. Hardison, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 23050, 2007-Ohio-366. 

{¶60} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * 

* to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Supreme Court of 

the United States has “held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to 

both federal and state prosecutions.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 41

42, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 

U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Likewise, Section 10, 

Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides, “[i]n any trial, in any court, the 

party accused shall be allowed * * * to meet the witnesses face to face.” 

Before its admission, “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue * * * the 

Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability 

and a prior opportunity for cross examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 

{¶61} The threshold inquiry is whether the challenged out-of-court 

statements were testimonial in nature and needed to be tested by 

confrontation. See State v. Lewis, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-050989 and C060010, 2007-Ohio-1485, ¶ 30. Statements are “testimonial when the 

circumstances objectively indicate that there is no * * * ongoing emergency, 

and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 

events potentially relevant to later prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 

U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006); see also State v. 

Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834, paragraph one 

of the syllabus. Here, there was no ongoing emergency, but rather, the 

circumstances indicate that the purpose of the interrogation was to prove 

past events relevant for later prosecution. As such, we find the statements at 

issue to be testimonial. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 42

{¶62} Confrontation Clause violations, however, are subject to 

harmless error analysis. See State v. Kraft, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060238, 

2007-Ohio-2247, ¶ 67; citing United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 

1303 (10th Cir.2005). “A constitutional error can be held harmless if we 

determine that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Conway, 

108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 78; citing Chapman 

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 

However, the question of whether a Sixth Amendment error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt is not simply an inquiry into the sufficiency of 

the remaining evidence. Conway at ¶ 78. Rather, it is a question of whether 

there is a reasonably possibility that the evidence complained of might have 

contributed to the convictions. Id.; citing Chapman at 23. 

{¶63} Hearsay is defined as, “a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is inadmissible at 

trial, unless it falls under an exception to the Rules of Evidence. Evid.R. 

802. Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) provides that a statement is “not hearsay” if, 

“The statement is offered against a party and is * * * the party's own 

statement * * *.” The statements at issue herein are not Appellant’s own 

statements, but rather are statements purportedly made by Appellant’s co-
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 43

defendants to law enforcement during the investigation of the homicide of 

Felipe Lopez. 

{¶64} Appellant does not cite to the specific statements made by 

Conkel, but rather refers to a span of nearly fifty pages in the trial transcript 

in which he argues these statements are contained. As Appellant does not 

set forth and argue each statement separately, neither do we. However, after 

reviewing the transcript we identified several statements by Conkel that 

incorporate statements purportedly made by Linkous and Steinhauer. 

Implicit in the State’s argument that some of the statements weren’t even 

actually made by the co-defendants, is the fact that some of them ostensibly 

were. Assuming that any of these statements were, in fact, made by the codefendants, we find that the trial court should not have allowed into evidence 

the portions of the tape where Detective Conkel stated that Appellant's codefendants implicated him in the crimes. 

{¶65} Prior to interrogating Appellant, it appears that Detective 

Conkel interviewed Appellant's co-defendants, Linkous and Steinhauer, 

about Felipe Lopez’s death. During Appellant's recorded interview, 

Detective Conkel made multiple references to statements made by 

Appellant’s co-defendants indicating Appellant was involved in the crimes, 

specifically suggesting that Linkous and Steinhauer said Appellant struck the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 44

victim with a hatchet. Neither Linkous nor Steinhauer testified at 

Appellant’s trial and thus were not subject to cross-examination. As such, 

these testimonial statements are barred by the Confrontation Clause and their 

admission violated Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights. See Crawford and 

Davis, supra. Although the trial court did provide a limiting instruction to 

the jury informing the jury that Conkel’s statements were not to be 

considered as evidence, were not offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted, and were simply designed to elicit responses from Appellant, we 

find that this instruction was insufficient to cure this constitutional violation. 

{¶66} It has been observed that “[m]ost testimonial statements are too 

damaging for a lay juror to separate and/or ignore.” State v. Edwards, 11th

Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-034, 2013-Ohio-1290, ¶ 38; citing Bruton v. United 

States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). “ ‘The rationale 

of Bruton was that the introduction of a potentially unreliable confession of 

one defendant which implicates another defendant without being subject to 

cross-examination deprives the latter defendant of his right to confrontation 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.’ ” Edwards at ¶ 38; quoting United 

States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir.1979). The Bruton rule also 

applies to statements of co-defendants that are not confessions. State v. 

Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 155, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980). 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 45

{¶67} However, “[c]ases following Bruton have established that the 

error may be harmless.” Edwards at ¶39 (internal citation omitted). As such, 

Bruton violations are subject to harmless error review. See State v. Burney, 

10th Dist. No. 06AP-990, 2007-Ohio-7137, ¶53; citing Harrington v. 

California, 395 U.S. 250, 252–254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). 

“ ‘The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule in the 

course of the trial * * * does not automatically require reversal 

of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the properly 

admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the 

prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission [or statements] 

is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was 

harmless error. (* * *)’ ” Moritz at 156; citing Schneble v. 

Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 

(1972). 

{¶68} Based on the facts of this case, the limiting instruction alone 

was not enough to cure the Bruton violation because the jury had already 

heard the testimonial statements of Detective Conkel that Appellant's codefendants had implicated Appellant in the crimes resulting in the death of 

Felipe Lopez. Although such testimonial statements may have been too 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 46

damaging for a lay juror to separate and/or ignore, we are mindful that 

Bruton violations are sometimes harmless error. Here, we conclude the 

Bruton violation was harmless error and did not prejudice Appellant as there 

was overwhelming evidence of his guilt. As set forth above, we have 

already determined that Appellant’s convictions were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence and were supported by sufficient evidence. 

We further note that in reaching that decision, we were careful to only 

consider evidence properly admitted at trial, and did not consider the 

statements complained of under this assignment of error. Thus, the trial 

court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶69} Finally, we address Appellant’s argument that Detective Conkel 

was improperly permitted to testify generally about the results of her 

investigation. Appellant contends that Detective Conkel repeatedly used the 

phrase “during the course of my investigation” and “through my 

investigation” as a means of introducing hearsay. Initially we note that 

Appellant did not object to this general testimony by Conkel during trial. 

Thus, it must be reviewed under a plain error analysis. “To constitute plain 

error, a reviewing court must find (1) an error in the proceedings, (2) the 

error must be a plain, obvious or clear defect in the trial proceedings, and (3) 

the error must have affected ‘substantial rights' (i.e., the trial court's error 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 47

must have affected the trial's outcome).” State v. Dickess, 174 Ohio App.3d 

658, 2008-Ohio-39, 884 N.E.2d 92, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.); citing State v. Hill, 92 

Ohio St.3d 191, 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001); and State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 

21, 27, 2002-Ohio-68, 759 N.E.2d 1240. “Furthermore, notice of plain error 

must be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and 

only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id.; citing State v. 

Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 559 N.E.2d 710 (1990); and State v. 

Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. “A reviewing court should notice plain error only if the error 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. 

{¶70} A review of the record reveals that prior to the interview tape 

being played for the jury, Conkel was asked to recite a summary of the 

results of her investigation. After reviewing the transcript, it appears 

Conkel’s testimony served to illustrate and explain the steps taken during the 

course of her investigation, leading up to the point in which Appellant was 

interrogated. There were a few times during that recitation that Conkel 

began to include statements by Appellant’s co-defendants, however, 

objections were promptly made and Conkel was re-directed in giving her 

testimony. “[I]t is well-settled that statements offered by police officers to 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 48

explain their conduct while investigating a crime are not hearsay because 

they are not offered for their truth, but rather, are offered as an explanation 

of the process of investigation.” State v. Spires, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 10CA10, 

2011-Ohio-3661, ¶ 13; quoting State v. Warren, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

83823, 2004-Ohio-5599 at ¶ 46; citing State v. Price, 80 Ohio App.3d 108, 

110, 608 N.E.2d 1088 (1992); State v. Braxton, 102 Ohio App.3d 28, 49, 

656 N.E.2d 970 (1995); State v. Blevins, 36 Ohio App.3d 147, 149, 521 

N.E.2d 1105 (1987). Thus, we find no error, let alone plain error, related to 

the admission of these statements. 

{¶71} Having found no merit to any of the arguments raised under 

Appellant’s fourth assignment of error, it is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V 

{¶72} In his fifth assignment of error, Appellant contends that his 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, failing to 

request independent DNA testing, failing to request a curative instruction on 

hearsay, failing to object to improper opinion testimony, failing to object to 

the trial court’s improper instruction on the victim’s immigration status, 

failing to object to the State presenting an altogether different theory of 

events that what was disclosed in their bill of particulars, and failing to call 

any witnesses on his behalf. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 49

{¶73} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an 

appellant must show 1.) counsel's performance was deficient and 2.) the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the accused of 

a fair trial. State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 

N.E.2d 1038, ¶205; citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish deficient performance, an 

appellant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective level 

of reasonable representation. State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-

Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶95. To establish prejudice, an appellant must 

show a reasonable probability exists that, but for the alleged errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “A defendant's failure to 

establish one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider 

the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). 

{¶74} In reviewing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we 

are admonished to indulge “a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland at 

689. 

FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 50

{¶75} Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argues that he clearly 

invoked his right to counsel on two back-to-back occasions while being 

interrogated by Detective Conkel. The State responds by arguing that a 

motion to suppress would have been meritless as Appellant continued 

talking to Detective Conkel after saying that he wanted a lawyer. 

{¶76} We initially note that the failure to file a motion to suppress 

does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Madrigal

at 389. Rather, the failure to file a motion to suppress amounts to ineffective 

assistance of counsel only when the record demonstrates that the motion 

would have been successful if made. State v. Walters, 4th Dist. Adams No. 

12CA949, 2013-Ohio-772, ¶20; citing State v. Resendiz, 12th Dist. No. 

CA2009-04-012, 2009-Ohio-6177, ¶29; citing, State v. Brown, 12th Dist. 

Warren No. CA2002-03-026, 2002-Ohio-5455, ¶11. According to Resendiz, 

we are to presume that trial counsel was effective if he could have 

reasonably decided that filing a suppression motion would be a futile act, 

even if there is some evidence in the record to support a motion. Resendiz at 

¶ 29. 

{¶77} Thus, this Court must review the record to determine whether a 

motion to suppress, if filed, would have been successful. The trial transcript 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 51

includes a transcription of Appellant’s interview video that was played for 

the jury. The interview begins with Detective Conkel informing Appellant 

that she had already spoken with Linkous and Steinhauer, had been informed 

that the victim’s cell phones and a hatchet had been recovered, and that there 

was a video of Appellant and the others getting gas at Kroger. It was after 

Conkel next represented to Appellant that Steinhauer had admitted to 

stabbing the victim, and then suggested that Appellant was in the truck, and 

had hit the victim in the head with a hatchet, that Appellant made his first 

mention of desiring an attorney. The transcript indicates that during 

Appellant’s interrogation, the following exchange took place between 

Appellant and Detective Conkel: 

“Conkel: Tell me what happened. There’s four people in 

this vehicle. Okay. You’re one of them. 

Defendant: I want a lawyer. 

Conkel: Okay. That’s your choice. 

Defendant: I want a lawyer because I don’t feel like anybody’s 

going to go to bat for me at all. You guys are just 

going to charge me with some murder that I didn’t 

do. 

Conkel: Okay. 

Defendant: And lock me up and throw away the key. I mean, I 

understand – 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 52

Conkel: Okay. You want an attorney, so we’re going to 

give you a chance to get an attorney. 

Defendant: Well, I’m just saying I understand how you guys 

do things. You know, you’re saying I’m guilty, 

but I’m not. 

Conkel: Well, I’m going to tell – what I’m going to tell you 

is we’ve got eyewitnesses who can place you out 

on 104, who can place you at the place where it 

was burnt, and place you where the gas was 

bought. Okay, I’m just – 

Defendant: But I didn’t buy gas. I bought cigarettes. 

Conkel: Right. Jimmy paid for the gas. I know that. Like 

said, you want an attorney. We’ll take you over to 

jail. I’ll tell you what you’ll be charged with 

tonight. It looks like it will be aggravated murder 

– 

Defendant: Jesus Christ, you’re kidding me? 

Conkel: It’ll be tampering with evidence. 

Defendant: Tampering with evidence? 

Conkel: Abuse of a corpse. 

Defendant: What do you mean abuse of a corpse? 

Conkel: Those are all charges involved in the crimes that 

were done tonight. 

Defendant: But I didn’t do none of those things. 

Conkel: Like I said, you – do you want to talk to me 

without an attorney or do you want an attorney, 

because I can hear your side of the story, but that’s 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 53

only if you want to talk to me. That’s totally up to 

you. 

Defendant: But my side of the story – you’re going to hang me 

out to dry. 

Conkel: Honey, I’m not hanging you out to dry. 

Defendant: I don’t understand. 

Conkel: I wasn’t there. I didn’t do this. I didn’t see 

anything. I’m just telling you what the evidence 

says, and I’m just telling you what we’ve got. 

What we’ve seen. We’ve got people who places 

you where the – where the vehicle was on fire, 

which I already know Jimmy set it on fire. 

Jimmy’s the one who set it on fire. He’s admitted 

to that. Lit a rag, threw it in the truck. He’s – he’s 

taking the blame for that. Okay. I’ve got 

witnesses placing you there, I’ve got you at 

Kroger’s, and I’ve got witnesses drove by that seen 

you on 104 where the incidents were taking place. 

Defendant: I didn’t kill the man. 

Conkel: Its up to you – do you—do you want to continue – 

do you want to talk to me without an attorney or 

do you want me to take you on over? That’s your 

choice, because you told me you wanted an 

attorney, so I have to ask you. 

Defendant: Him and Thomas got into a fight in the truck and 

he stabbed the living shit out of him.” 

{¶78} When dealing with a claim that law enforcement continued to 

interrogate the accused after he invoked his right to counsel, the first 

question is “whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 54

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d. 488 (1984). “It 

is fundamental that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, all 

interrogation must cease.” State v. Colquitt, 188 Ohio App.3d 509, 2010-

Ohio-2210, 936 N.E .2d 76, ¶12; citing State v. Turvey, 84 Ohio App.3d 

724, 732, 618 N.E.2d 214 (4th Dist.1992); State v. Jobe, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-07-1413, 2009-Ohio-4066, ¶67. “Invocation of the Miranda right to 

counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be 

construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’ ” 

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d. 362 

(1994); quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 

115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). “But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney 

that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the 

circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be 

invoking the right to counsel, [the Court's] precedents do not require the 

cessation of questioning.” Id. “Rather, the suspect must unambiguously 

request counsel.” Id. As the Supreme Court observed, “ ‘a statement either is 

such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.’ ” Id.; quoting Smith v. 

Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98. 

{¶79} Second, if we find that the accused did invoke his right to 

counsel, we “may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 55

that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly 

and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” Smith v. Illinois at 95; 

citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d. 378 

(1981). “[A]n accused * * * having expressed his desire to deal with the 

police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the 

authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused 

himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with 

the police.” Edwards at 484-485; See, also, State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 

256, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988). “[I]nquiries or statements, by either an accused 

or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, 

will not generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense in which that word 

was used in Edwards [v. Arizona].” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 

1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983). Though the Supreme Court declined to fully 

define the term “initiate,” it did note that “a willingness and a desire for a 

generalized discussion about the investigation * * * not merely a necessary 

inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship” was 

sufficient to show initiation. Bradshaw at 1045-1046. 

{¶80} Here, there has been no argument made that Appellant was not 

advised of his Miranda rights; thus, that issue is not in dispute. Further, the 

fact that Appellant made an unequivocal request for counsel soon after the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 56

interrogation began is not in dispute. At issue, however, is whether 

Appellant subsequently waived his right to counsel and to remain silent after 

initially invoking those rights, by re-initiating conversation with Detective 

Conkel regarding the incident. 

{¶81} A review of the transcript indicates that Appellant made 

unequivocal statements that he wanted a lawyer; however, the transcript also 

reveals that Detective Conkel responded “okay” each time, only for 

Appellant to continue talking and engaging with her. In fact, after Appellant 

made two requests, but continued to talk, Detective Conkel then followed up 

by specifically asking Appellant two different times whether he wanted to 

talk to an attorney or whether he wanted to talk to her. Both times Appellant 

continued to talk to Conkel. 

{¶82} Although Detective Conkel continued to engage with Appellant 

when he continued talking with her, her comments were statements, rather 

than questions, regarding the crimes Appellant would be charged with once 

he was taken over to the jail, based upon the evidence gathered at the time. 

We believe these statements are properly classified as statements by a police 

officer relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, as described 

in Oregon v. Bradshaw. The only questions asked by Detective Conkel after 

Appellant requested counsel were made in response to Appellant’s continued 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 57

conversation, and were asked to clarify whether Appellant wanted to keep 

talking to her, or whether he did, in fact, want counsel. Both times he was 

asked, Appellant made substantive statements about the investigation, rather 

than re-asserting his desire for counsel. For instance, Appellant continued to 

state that he didn’t believe anyone would “go to bat” for him, that he bought 

cigarettes, not gas, at Kroger, that he had not committed any crimes, and 

ultimately that he didn’t kill the victim but that Steinhauer stabbed him. 

{¶83} We believe, based upon these facts, that despite Appellant’s 

unequivocal request for counsel, Appellant subsequently waived his right to 

counsel by re-initiating conversation with Detective Conkel. We further 

believe that this decision is consistent with our prior decision in State v. 

Adkins, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3367, 2011-Ohio-5360, ¶¶25 and 27 

(finding defendant waived his prior invocation of the right to counsel by reinitiating the interrogation with discussion of his innocence). In light of this 

determination, we necessarily must conclude that the filing of a motion to 

suppress would have been futile. Thus, we cannot conclude that trial 

counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress on these grounds constituted 

deficient performance. As such, we reject this portion of Appellant's 

argument under this assignment of error. 

FAILURE TO REQUEST INDEPENDENT DNA TESTING 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 58

{¶84} Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request independent DNA testing of the hatchet prior to the hatchet being 

lost by the Scioto County Sheriff’s Office. The State counters by arguing 

that an independent test would likely have confirmed the State’s DNA test 

result and could have resulted in a scenario in which the State could have 

called Appellant’s expert as a witness against him. The State suggests this 

may have been a scenario in which Appellant’s trial counsel elected to avoid 

such a result by not having independent testing performed. 

{¶85} Here, there is no way Appellant’s trial counsel could have 

known or anticipated that the hatchet would be lost. Appellant was indicted 

for the crimes at issue on March 26, 2012. Appellant’s counsel promptly 

filed a motion to preserve evidence on April 4, 2012, which was granted the 

next day. As soon as trial counsel was informed of the loss of the hatchet, 

on October 2, 2012, he filed a motion to dismiss based upon the loss of the 

evidence, and in the alternative, a motion prohibiting the use of any and all 

testimony about the knife and hatchet. These motions were denied by the 

trial court and we have determined, in our analysis under Appellant’s first 

assignment of error, the trial court did not err in denying those motions, as 

Appellant has not demonstrated bad faith on the part of the State in 

connection with the loss of the evidence. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 59

{¶86} Based upon the information before us, it appears trial counsel 

intended to request independent DNA testing as a motion to preserve 

evidence was filed. Whether trial counsel simply ran out of time when it 

was determined the hatchet was missing, or whether trial counsel made a 

strategical decision not to have the evidence independently tested in light of 

the State’s test results cannot be determined and calls for speculation, which 

is not a proper function of this Court. Although trial counsel could have 

requested independent testing in a more timely fashion, had it been his plan 

and intention to do so, as set forth above, there was no way that the loss of 

the evidence could have been anticipated. 

{¶87} Additionally, other courts have reasoned that “ ‘[t]he failure to 

call an expert and instead rely on cross-examination does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

26226, 2012-Ohio-2744, ¶18; quoting State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 

436, 613 N.E.2d 225 (1993). Here, the State presented Raymond Peoples as 

their expert and defense counsel cross-examined Peoples regarding the DNA 

tests he performed. Further, as in Jones, Appellant fails to set forth any 

argument that the DNA testing the State’s expert performed was faulty or 

unreliable. Id. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 60

{¶88} Under these facts, we cannot conclude that counsel’s 

performance was deficient or prejudicial. Further, it is reasonable that once 

it was determined by the State’s expert that Appellant’s DNA was present on 

the hatchet, contrary to Appellant’s claim that he never touched the hatchet, 

that counsel made a strategical decision not to obtain independent testing. 

As such, we reject this portion of Appellant's argument under this 

assignment of error. 

FAILURE TO REQUEST A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION ON HEARSAY 

{¶89} Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request a curative instruction in regards to the hearsay statements 

attributable to his co-defendants that were admitted into evidence through 

the testimony of Detective Conkel, which were contained in the videotape of 

the Appellant’s interview that was played for the jury. In response to this 

argument, the State points out that the trial court instructed the jury, though 

generally and not in curative fashion, regarding the statements made by 

Detective Conkel during the interrogation. 

{¶90} In light of our disposition of Appellant’s fourth assignment of 

error, which determined that Appellant’s confrontation rights were 

technically violated by virtue of the allowance into evidence of Appellant’s 

co-defendants hearsay statements through the testimony of Detective 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 61

Conkel, this argument is arguably moot. However, we are unwilling to 

conclude counsel was ineffective in any regard with respect to the admission 

of these statements as trial counsel for Appellant specifically objected to the 

admission of these statements prior to the interview tape being played for the 

jury, and the objection was the subject of a hearing in chambers which was 

ultimately overruled by the trial court. Further, trial counsel renewed his 

objection at the start of the tape being played. 

{¶91} Additionally, as noted by the State and as discussed more fully 

under Appellant’s fourth assignment of error, the trial court gave a lengthy 

instruction of a limiting nature regarding the statements made by Detective 

Conkel during the interview. Thus, as the trial court provided an instruction 

to the jury prior to deliberations, there was no need for counsel to request a 

further instruction. As such, we reject this portion of Appellant's argument 

under this assignment of error. 

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO IMPROPER OPINION TESTIMONY 

{¶92} Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to improper opinion testimony. Specifically, Appellant argues 

expert fire investigator, Roman Brandau, was permitted to testify regarding 

physical injuries sustained by the victim, and that his testimony included his 

opinion that the wounds on the victim’s head were from trauma likely 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 62

related to a hatchet. Although Appellant argues that trial counsel likely 

would have prevailed on this objection, had it been made, he fails to 

articulate how the result of the trial would have been different if this 

testimony had been excluded. 

{¶93} At trial, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Brian Casto, 

the deputy coroner and forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on 

the victim. Dr. Casto was qualified as an expert, without objection, and 

opined that the injuries sustained by the victim were “created with a sharp 

instrument for the stab wounds, like a knife. The chops [sic] wounds are 

created with a [sic] instrument that has a cutting edge and is heavy. Okay. 

Like a hatchet or something like that.” Dr. Casto further opined as follows: 

“there’s multiple chop style wounds of the head. And these are 

cuts of the scalp of the head accompanied by underlying 

crushing of the skull. And that’s why they’re designated as 

chop wounds rather than just a simple stab.” 

{¶94} In light of this expert opinion testimony that was properly 

admitted without objection, Appellant cannot demonstrate how the result of 

the proceeding would have been different if a statement by the fire 

investigator regarding what he perceived to be hatchet wounds on the 

victim’s head would have been objected to and thus excluded. As such, we 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 63

again reject this portion of Appellant's argument under this assignment of 

error. 

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 

IMMIGRATION COMMENTS 

{¶95} Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the trial court's "immigration comments." As set forth above, 

during trial the trial court stated as follows after Appellant attempted to elicit 

testimony from Detective Conkel that the victim's work visa has expired: 

“I’m going to instruct the jury at this time that citizenship status 

has no bearing on this case. I don’t know whether he’s a citizen 

or not, but everybody has a right to live. Okay.” 

However, in light of our determination under Appellant’s third assignment 

of error that the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding Appellant's 

citizenship status did not merit a challenge based upon judicial bias or 

partiality, we cannot conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to the trial 

court's statements constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This is true 

especially in light of the trial court's later limiting instruction given to the 

jury prior to deliberations. As such, we also reject this portion of 

Appellant's argument under this assignment of error. 

FAILING TO CALL ANY WITNESSES ON APPELLANT’S BEHALF 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 64

{¶96} Although Appellant sets forth this argument under this 

assignment of error in his statement of his assignments of error, he fails to 

argue this alleged error in the body of his brief. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an 

appellant’s brief to include the “contentions of the appellant with respect to 

each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of 

the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 

record on which appellant relies.” Further, App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that 

“[t]he court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the 

party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the 

assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the 

brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” Based upon this authority set forth 

in the appellate rules, we decline to address this portion of Appellant’s 

argument under this assignment of error. 

{¶97} Accordingly, we have found no merit to any of the claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Appellant. Thus, we find no 

merit to Appellant's sixth assignment of error and it is, therefore, overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI 

{¶98} In his sixth assignment of error, Appellant contends that the 

trial court erred when it granted the State’s motion in limine which 

prevented him from appropriately cross examining witness Steven 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 65

Drummond. Appellant argues that he should have been permitted, under 

Evid.R. 608(B) to cross-examine Drummond regarding statements made to 

law enforcement during their investigation of an incident which 

subsequently led to a felony charge filed against Drummond, which 

Appellant argued were probative of Drummond's character for truthfulness 

or untruthfulness. Appellant further argues that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to cross examine Drummond regarding any plea deals 

he had been offered in exchange for his testimony. 

It appears from the record that the charge against Drummond was still 

pending at the time of trial, and that he had not been convicted of the charge 

at that time. 

{¶99} Generally, appellate courts do not directly review in limine 

rulings. State v. Hapney, 4th Dist. Washington No. 01CA30-31, 2002-Ohio3250, ¶55; citing State v. White, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 95CA08, 1996 WL 

614190. Such rulings are tentative and interlocutory and made by a court 

only in anticipation of its actual ruling on evidentiary issues at trial. See 

McCabe/Marra Co. v. Dover, 100 Ohio App.3d 139, 160, 652 N.E.2d 236, 

250 (8th Dist.1995); Collins v. Storer Communications, Inc., 65 Ohio App.3d 

443, 446, 584 N.E.2d 766 (1989). Thus, the grant or denial of a motion in 

limine does not preserve any error for review. See State v. Hill, 75 Ohio 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 66

St.3d 195, 202-203, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996). Rather, in order to preserve the 

error, the evidence must be presented at trial, and a proper objection lodged. 

See State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523, paragraph three of 

the syllabus (1988); State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d 142, 

paragraph two of the syllabus (1986). An appellate court will then review the 

correctness of the trial court's ruling on the objection rather than the ruling 

on the in limine. See White, supra; Wray v. Herrell, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 

93CA08, 1994 WL 64293. 

{¶100} Here, the State's motion in limine was filed at 7:51 a.m. on 

October 9, 2012, the morning of the first day of trial. The trial court and 

counsel discussed the motion at length in chambers prior to the start of jury 

selection and the trial court granted the State's motion. Mr. Drummond 

testified just three days later. Because this was a situation in which a motion 

in limine was granted in favor of the State thereby preventing Appellant 

from asking certain questions of the witness, rather than a situation in which 

a motion in limine was denied, thereby making it incumbent upon defense 

counsel to renew his objection, we believe the issue was sufficiently 

preserved for appellate review. Thus, we will address Appellant's argument 

not in terms of the grant or denial of the motion in limine, but instead in 

terms of whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 67

evidence which Appellant contends would have called Drummond's 

character for truthfulness and thus, his credibility, into question. 

{¶101} “A trial court has broad discretion in the admission or 

exclusion of evidence, and so long as such discretion is exercised in line 

with the rules of procedure and evidence, its judgment will not be reversed 

absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion with attendant material 

prejudice to defendant.” State v. Green, 184 Ohio App.3d 406, 2009-Ohio5199, 921 N.E.2d 276, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.); citing State v. Powell, 177 Ohio 

App.3d 825, 2008-Ohio-4171, 896 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 33 (4th Dist). 

{¶102} Abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; 

rather, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable. State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255, 2002-Ohio-796, 

762 N.E.2d 940; State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 

(1980). When an appellate court applies this standard, it cannot substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Jeffers, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 

08CA7, 2009-Ohio-1672, ¶12; In re Jane Doe I, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 137-

138, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991); citing Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 

169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990). 

{¶103} Evid.R. 608 governs evidence of character and conduct of a 

witness and provides in (B) that “[s]pecific instances of conduct of a 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 68

witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's character for 

truthfulness, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Evid.R. 609, 

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” “ ‘Other than the Evid.R. 609 

exception for certain criminal convictions, a witness's credibility may not be 

impeached by extrinsic proof of special instances of his conduct; such 

conduct may be inquired into only by the intrinsic means of crossexamination within the guidelines set forth in Evid.R. 608(B). Criminal 

activities not resulting in conviction cannot ordinarily form the basis for an 

attack upon a witness's credibility.’ ” State v. Jacobs, 4th Dist. Highland No. 

11CA26, 2013-Ohio-1502, ¶31; citing State v. Hurt, 158 Ohio App.3d 671, 

2004-Ohio-4266, 821 N.E.2d 1033, ¶11; citing State v. Skatzes, 2nd Dist. 

Montgomery No. 15848, 2003-Ohio-516, ¶183. 

{¶104} Of importance, we initially note that the pending felony of 

which Drummond was charged has not been identified in the record. 

However, in Appellant's memorandum contra the State's motion in limine, 

Appellant stated that "[t]he charges for which the witness is currently 

indicted for do not appear to be charges of dishonesty." Nonetheless, 

Appellant argues he should have been able to cross examine Drummond on 

an allegedly false statement provided to law enforcement during the course 

of the investigation related to Drummond's pending felony charge. In 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 69

making this argument, Appellant reasoned that if Drummond lied to police 

during the investigation, such conduct was probative of his character for 

truthfulness. 

{¶105} We reject Appellant's argument. Drummond had not been 

convicted of the crime for which he was charged at the time of trial and, 

further, Appellant has conceded that crime was not a crime of dishonesty. 

See State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 at ¶101 (holding that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting cross examination of three 

witness regarding their pending charges where the charges were not 

probative of their character for truthfulness or untruthfulness). Additionally, 

it had not been determined that the statement given to law enforcement by 

Drummond during the course of the investigation of his pending felony, 

which Appellant sought to introduce, was false. As noted by the trial court 

in ruling on the motion in limine, “[w]e're -- we're not trying a separate case 

here. This -- will be up to the jury to try it on his own case -- his own case 

to make that determination.” The trial court further stated “[w]hether he told 

a lie or told the truth is a separate matter, and to be decided by a separate 

jury. This is a whole completely different case here today, so I'm going to 

grant the State's motion.” Based upon the foregoing, we find no abuse of 

discretion on the part of the trial court in excluding evidence of Drummond's 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 70

pending charges or statements made to law enforcement during the 

investigation of those pending charges. 

{¶106} We now address Appellant's argument that his counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to cross examine Drummond as to 

whether he had been offered a plea deal in exchange for his testimony. “The 

pendency of charges in another case or the witness's plea arrangement with 

the prosecutor is admissible to prove the bias of the witness.” State v. 

Drummond at ¶104; citing State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 152, 661 

N.E.2d 1030 (1996); State v. Hector (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 

912, paragraph five of the syllabus (1969) (predates evidentiary rules); see 1 

McCormick, Evidence (5th Ed.1999) 147, Section 39 (bias includes 

evidence that “an indictment is pending against [the witness], the witness 

has not been charged with a crime, has been promised leniency, * * * [or] is 

awaiting sentence”); see, also, Giannelli & Snyder, Evidence (2d Ed.2001) 

562, Section 616.3. 

{¶107} Here, there was no evidence that Drummond was offered a 

plea bargain or any other inducement to testify. In fact, the State expressly 

stated in its motion in limine as follows: 

"The State of Ohio did not enter into any negotiations with 

Drummond in exchange for his testimony; therefore, the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 71

admission of evidence or testimony regarding Drummond's 

charges would not be for legitimate purpose, such as bias." 

We conclude that trial counsel could have reasonably relied upon this 

representation by the State, made in an official document filed with the 

court. Further, the fact that Drummond was incarcerated was disclosed to 

the jury during trial. As such, the jury was aware that Drummond may have 

some incentive to assist the State. Based upon these facts, we conclude 

Appellant's failure to cross-examine on this issue does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

{¶108} In light of the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion on the 

part of the trial court in excluding the evidence at issue. Further, Appellant 

has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thus, we 

find no merit to Appellant's sixth assignment of error and it is, therefore, 

overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VII 

{¶109} In his seventh assignment of error, Appellant contends that he 

was denied due process of law and the right to a fair trial when the State set 

forward a theory of prosecution at trial that was inconsistent with the bill of 

particulars previously filed. In support of his argument, Appellant sets forth 

the bill of particulars, as provided by the State, and then argues that contrary 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 72

to the bill of particulars, the State’s theory at trial was that the death of the 

victim occurred while he was standing outside of the vehicle, and that he 

was killed as a result of ambush. Because we conclude Appellant has 

mischaracterized the evidence presented at trial, and further because we have 

found no discrepancy between the bill of the particulars and the State’s 

theory at trial, we reject Appellant’s argument. 

{¶110} A review of the record reveals that the State filed a bill of 

particulars on May 1, 2012, which stated as follows: 

“On or about the 7th day of March, 2012, in Scioto 

County, Ohio defendant did, with purpose to commit, promote, 

or facilitate the commission of a [sic] aggravated murder, with 

Raymond J. Linkous and Thomas Steinhauer, plan or aid in 

planning the commission of such offense and/or agree with 

each other that one or more of them would engage in conduct 

that facilitated the commission of aggravated murder or murder, 

and in furtherance of said conspiracy the defendant and the 

other conspirators, did, among other things, procure weapons 

and travel to the residence of the deceased, Felipe Lopez. The 

defendants then entered a vehicle with the victim and headed 

towards Otway, Ohio. Defendant’s [sic] then attacked the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 73

victim by stabbing him repeatedly, striking him in the head with 

a hatchet, drove to Kentucky and then back to Ohio with the 

victim still in said vehicle. The defendants, positioned the 

victim in the vehicle which they doused with gasoline and set 

on fire causing the death of the victim, Felipe Lopez. 

Defendant with Raymond J. Linkous and Thomas Steinhauer 

did dispose of cell phones, a knife, a hatchet, clothing and other 

personal items, with purpose to impair its availability as 

evidence in such proceeding or investigation.” 

Thus, the bill of particulars filed by the State specified that the victim was 

stabbed with a knife and struck with a hatchet, and did not specify the exact 

location in which these events occurred. Further, the bill of particulars 

alleged that the death of the victim was ultimately caused by the fire. 

{¶111} At trial, the State, in its opening statement, set forth a theory 

that included injuries to the victim from a knife and hatchet, but then stated 

that the victim was still alive when he was set on fire, based upon inhalation 

injuries that were also present. This theory is consistent with the bill of 

particulars. Further, the State presented expert testimony from deputy 

coroner and forensic pathologist Dr. Bryan Casto. Dr. Casto testified that he 

performed the autopsy on the victim and that in performing the autopsy he 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 74

identified multiple stab wounds, as if from a knife, as well as chop wounds, 

as if from a hatchet. He also testified that part of the purpose of the autopsy 

was to determine whether the victim was alive or dead during the fire. Dr. 

Casto testified that due to the presence of inhalation thermal injuries, the 

victim “was alive during the fire, and actually inhaled hot gases and soot.” 

As such, the expert testimony presented by the State was also consistent with 

the bill of particulars. 

{¶112} In light of the foregoing, we reject Appellant’s contention that 

the State’s theory at trial was inconsistent with the bill of particulars. 

Although the State did, at times, use the word “ambush” to describe the way 

in which the victim was initially attacked, we see no inconsistency with the 

bill of particulars. As such, we find no merit to Appellant’s argument. 

Further, we agree with the State that they are not bound to the exact 

information contained in the bill of particulars. 

{¶113} As noted by the State, in State v Lantz, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 

475, 1992 WL 129327, *6 (June 10, 1992), this Court was presented with 

the argument that “the purpose of the bill of particulars is “entirely defeated 

when evidence contrary to the bill of particulars is offered by the state.’ ” In 

rejecting that argument, we noted that “[a] defendant must not rely upon the 

bill of particulars for the specification of evidence. The defendant must not 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 75

use the bill of particulars as a substitute for discovery.” Id.; see also State v. 

Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985) (“ * * * A bill of 

particulars is not designed to provide the accused with specifications of 

evidence or to serve as a substitute for discovery.”) Thus, even if the State 

had introduced evidence or advanced a theory inconsistent with that set forth 

in the bill of particulars, Appellant cannot rest on the bill of particulars alone 

to determine and prepare his defense. Accordingly, and in light of the 

foregoing, Appellant's seventh assignment of error is without merit and is, 

therefore, overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VIII 

{¶114} In his eighth assignment of error, Appellant contends that 

cumulative errors committed during his trial deprived him of a fair trial and 

require reversal of his convictions. The cumulative-error doctrine states that 

a conviction will be reversed if the cumulative effect of all the errors in a 

trial deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial, even though 

each alleged instance of error may not individually constitute cause for 

reversal. State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995); also 

see State v. Jackson, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA20, 2012-Ohio-6276 ¶51. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 76

{¶115} Although we found, under Appellant's fourth assignment of 

error, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting improper hearsay 

evidence in the form of statements by Appellant's co-defendants and, as 

such, that his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause were 

violated, we determined that sufficient other evidence in the record 

supported Appellant's convictions. Further, we have not found merit in any 

of the other assignments of error raised by Appellant. Although the trial 

court did err, as discussed above, the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt in light of the other evidence in the record supporting 

Appellant's convictions. As such, Appellant's eighth and final assignment of 

error is without merit and is, therefore, overruled. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 77

Harsha, J., concurring: 

I. Assignment of Error I – Standard of Review 

{¶116} I concur in the judgment overruling Gerald’s assignments of 

error and affirming his convictions and sentence. But in the first assignment 

of error I would apply the hybrid standard of review set forth in Judge 

Abele’s principle opinion in State v. Fox, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3302, 

2012-Ohio-4805, 985 N.E.2d 532, ¶22: 

We believe, however, that the hybrid standard of review that 

appellate courts apply to suppression motions and motions to 

dismiss on the basis of a violation of a defendant's speedy trial 

right is the more appropriate standard of review to apply when 

reviewing a trial court's decision regarding a motion to dismiss 

on the basis that the state failed to disclose materially 

exculpatory evidence. See State v. Geeslin, 116 Ohio St.3d 252, 

2007-Ohio-5239, 878 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 14 (not specifically setting 

forth any standard of review, but deferring to trial court's 

factual finding that tape erasure accidental when reviewing 

motion to dismiss on basis that state failed to turn over 

materially exculpatory evidence). 

{¶117} Nevertheless, I agree that Gerald’s first assignment of error is 

meritless even under that standard of review. 

II. Assignment of Error IV – Constitutional Harmless Error 

{¶118} I agree the trial court erred in admitting the 

hearsay/testimonial statements of Gerald’s co-defendants. Under a 

harmless-error analysis the state bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 78

error in admitting the hearsay statements of his co-defendants through the 

testimony of Detective Conkel did not affect Gerald’s substantial rights. See 

State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶15; 

State v. Lusher, 2012-Ohio-5526, 982 N.E.2d 1290, ¶63 (4th Dist.). 

“‘Whether a Sixth Amendment error was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt is not simply an inquiry into the sufficiency of the remaining 

evidence. Instead, the question is whether there is a reasonable possibility 

that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” 

State v. Ricks, 136 Ohio St.3d 356, 2013-Ohio-3712, 995 N.E.2d 1181, ¶46, 

quoting Conway at ¶78. 

{¶119} There are several reasons that I join the principal opinion in 

finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the 

remaining evidence standing alone constitutes overwhelming proof of 

Gerald’s guilt. This evidence includes: (1) the testimony of Kelly Lopez, 

the wife of the decedent, that on the day the crimes occurred, she saw Gerald 

with Lopez and that Lopez told her that he was leaving with Gerald, 

Steinhauer, and Linkous; (2) Detective Conkel’s testimony, admitted 

without objection, that her investigation disclosed that the defendants had 

planned to attack Lopez and brought weapons with them, that they all left in 

a truck with Lopez, that Steinhauer stabbed Lopez, that Gerald hit Lopez in 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 79

the head with a hatchet, that they disposed of the hatchet and showered, and 

that Gerald changed his story several times, (3) the taped interview of Gerald 

by Detective Conkel, in which he changed his story, eventually admitting 

that he was present when Lopez was attacked and killed; (4) the testimony of 

BCI DNA expert Raymond Peoples, who testified that the hatchet submitted 

included Gerald’s DNA on its handle; and (5) the testimony of Gerald’s 

county jail cellmate Steven Drummond stating that Gerald told him that he 

hit Lopez in the back of his head with the hatchet and that the three 

defendants disarmed him, attacked him, and set the truck with his body in it 

on fire because they could not pay off a $5,000 drug debt. 

{¶120} Notably, in the absence of an objection by Gerald’s trial 

counsel to Detective Conkel’s testimony concerning the conclusions of her 

investigation, Gerald forfeited all but plain error on that issue. Insofar as 

Gerald argues in part in his fourth assignment of error that this testimony 

constituted hearsay, his failure to object (which he fails to mention) forfeits 

the error. And because Gerald does not specifically argue that the admission 

of this testimony constituted plain error, I would not address it. See State v. 

Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240, (2002), See also State v. 

Maple, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25313, 2011-Ohio-1216, ¶12 (appellant 

forfeited the argument that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay by 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 80

failing to object at the trial court; appellate court would not address it as 

plain error because it was not argued as such on appeal); Faulks v. Flynn, 

4th Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3568, 2014-Ohio-1610, ¶35 (finding lack of 

exceptional circumstances under similar facts). And, because Gerald 

repeatedly reinitiated his conversation with Detective Conkel, the trial court 

did not err in admitting Gerald’s statements to Detective Conkel as he 

contends in his fifth assignment of error. Therefore, these statements 

contributed substantial proof of Gerald’s guilt. 

{¶121} Finally, the jurors did not have to rely upon the improper 

testimonial evidence to find him guilty of the charged crimes; untainted 

evidence established his guilt as an accomplice. See Hood at ¶44 (holding 

that constitutional error in admitting evidence was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt by noting that, among other reasons, the jurors did not 

have to believe that Hood pulled the trigger to find him responsible for the 

victim’s death). As the principal opinion notes in overruling the second 

assignment of error, Gerald in effect concedes that his conviction for 

conspiracy to commit aggravated murder and murder is supported by the 

evidence; he cannot now complain of being convicted as an accomplice to 

the remaining crimes of aggravated murder, murder, aggravated arson, and 

arson. Gerald admitted that he was in the truck with Lopez, Steinhauer, and 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 81

Linkous, with weapons, for the purpose of at least intimidating Lopez. This 

confrontation ended with Lopez being stabbed with a knife, struck in the 

head with a hatchet, and burned alive in the truck. Gerald was present 

during the crimes and assisted in their perpetration. 

{¶122} Consequently, I conclude there is no reasonable possibility 

that the tainted evidence might have contributed to Gerald’s convictions. 

Therefore, I concur in the court’s judgment. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 82

Hoover, J.: Dissents. 

{¶123} I respectfully dissent. 

{¶124} I agree with the principal opinion that the testimonial 

statements of Detective Conkel that co-defendants Linkous and Steinhauer 

had implicated Gerald in the crimes should have been barred by the 

Confrontation Clause. The admission of the statements violated Gerald’s 

Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. A constitutional error is not 

prejudicial if the error is “ ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. 

Love, 4th Dist. Ross No. 05CA2838, 2006–Ohio–1824, 

¶34, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24. 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 

L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). “[E]rror is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the 

remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of 

defendant's guilt.” State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 452 N.E.2d 1323 

(1983), at paragraph six of the syllabus; State v. Woods, 4th Dist. Ross No. 

09CA3090, 2009–Ohio–6169, ¶27; see also, State v. Conway, 108 Ohio 

St.3d 214, 2006–Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶78. In light of the 

constitutional violation along with other problematic issues in this case, I 

would find that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I 

would reverse and remand this case for a new trial. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 83

{¶125} First of all, we must look to the evidence that was actually 

presented and that was properly admitted. The only other witness other than 

Detective Conkel that actually testified regarding Gerald striking Lopez with 

the hatchet was Steven Drummond who was an inmate in the Scioto County 

Jail during the same time that Gerald was incarcerated. Testimony of a 

fellow inmate may not necessarily be considered as “overwhelming proof of 

defendant’s guilt.” At the very least, Drummond, as a fellow inmate, would 

have credibility issues and one may not believe him “beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” 

{¶126} Raymond Peoples, a BCI & I forensic scientist testified that 

Gerald’s DNA was on the handle of the hatchet; however, Linkous’s DNA 

was also on the hatchet’s handle. Gerald was unable to independently test 

the hatchet due to the fact that the hatchet was lost while in the State’s 

custody and the State completely consumed the DNA sample. Given the lost 

evidence and consumption of evidence issues, including the Scioto County 

Sheriff’s Department loss of the hatchet, a knife, and a gun that Lopez 

supposedly had with him, Peoples’ testimony may not necessarily be 

considered as “overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt.” 

{¶127} Lastly, statements were introduced in which Gerald 

incriminated himself by admitting to Detective Conkel that he was present 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 84

and witnessed Steinhauer stab Lopez and Linkous set fire to the truck. 

Further statements included his admission to being in the truck with the 

group. Gerald specifically denied any knowledge of the hatchet and denied 

hitting Lopez with the hatchet, although through Raymond Peoples’ 

testimony, Gerald’s DNA was on the handle of the hatchet. If this were the 

end of the analysis, a reasonable person could find that these statements and 

the expert’s testimony together showed “overwhelming proof of defendant’s 

guilt.” However, Gerald also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel when 

his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statements after he had 

invoked his right to counsel. 

{¶128} “It is fundamental that once a suspect invokes his right to 

counsel, all interrogation must cease.” State v. Colquitt, 188 Ohio App.3d 

509, 2010-Ohio-2210, 936 N.E.2d 76, ¶12 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Turvey, 

84 Ohio App.3d 724, 732, 618 N.E.2d 214 (4th Dist.1992); State v. Jobe, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. L–07–1413, 2009-Ohio-4066, ¶67. If the police proceed to 

interrogate the suspect after he initiates communication, then a court must 

determine whether the suspect validly waived his previously-invoked right 

to counsel. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 

L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 

819 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 52. “[T]he burden [is] upon the prosecution to show that 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 85

subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have 

counsel present during the interrogation.” Bradshaw at 1044. Such a waiver 

must be knowing and intelligent and a court must find it to be so “ ‘under the 

totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, 

not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’ ” Bradshaw at 

1046, quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 

L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), fn. 9. 

{¶129} In the case sub judice, it is clear that Gerald invoked his right 

to counsel. The transcript demonstrates that the following dialogue took 

place between Gerald and Detective Conkel: 

* * * 

“DEFENDANT: I want a lawyer. 

CONKEL: Okay. That’s your choice. 

DEFENDANT: I want a lawyer because I don’t feel like 

anybody’s going to go to bat for me at all. You 

guys are just going to charge me with some murder 

I didn’t do. 

CONKEL: Okay. 

DEFENDANT: And lock me up and throw away the key. I mean, I 

understand— 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 86

CONKEL: Okay. You want an attorney, so we’re going to 

give you a chance to get an attorney. 

DEFENDANT: Well, I’m just saying I understand how you guys 

do things. You know, you’re saying I’m guilty, but 

I’m not. 

CONKEL: Well, I’m going to tell—what I’m going to tell you 

is we’ve got eyewitnesses who can place you out 

on 104, who can place you at the place where it 

was burnt, and place you where the gas was 

bought. Okay. I’m just— 

DEFENDANT: But I didn’t buy gas. I bought cigarettes. 

CONKEL: Right. Jimmy paid for the gas. I know that. Like I 

said, you want an attorney. We’ll take you over to 

jail. I’ll tell you what you’ll be charged with 

tonight. It looks like it will be aggravated 

murder— 

DEFENDANT: Jesus Christ, you’re kidding me? 

CONKEL: It’ll be tampering with evidence. 

DEFENDANT: Tampering with evidence? 

CONKEL: Abuse of a corpse. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 87

DEFENDANT: What do you mean abuse of a corpse? 

CONKEL: Those are all charges involved in the crimes that 

were done tonight. 

DEFENDANT: But I didn’t do none of those things. 

CONKEL: Like I said, you—do you want to talk to me 

without an attorney or do you want an attorney, 

because I can hear your side of the story, but that’s 

only if you want to talk to me. That’s totally up to 

you. 

DEFENDANT: But my side of the story—you’re going to hang me 

out to dry. 

CONKEL: Honey, I’m not hanging you out to dry. 

DEFENDANT: I don’t understand. 

CONKEL: I wasn’t there. I didn’t do this. I didn’t see 

anything. I’m just telling you what the evidence 

says, and I’m just telling you what we’ve got. 

What we’ve seen. We’ve got people who places 

you where the –where the vehicle was on fire, 

which I already know Jimmy set it on fire. 

Jimmy’s the one who set it on fire. He’s admitted 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 88

to that. Lit a rag, threw it in the truck. He’s—he’s 

taking the blame for that. Okay. I’ve got witnesses 

placing you there. I’ve got you at Kroger’s, and 

I’ve got witnesses drove by that seen you on 104 

where the incidents were taking place. 

DEFENDANT: I didn’t kill the man. 

CONKEL: It’s up to you—do you—do you want to continuedo you want to talk to me without an attorney or 

do you want me to take you on over? That’s your 

choice, because you told me you wanted an 

attorney, so I have to ask you. 

DEFENDANT: Him and Thomas got into a fight in the truck and 

he stabbed the living shit out of him. 

CONKEL: Okay. Back me up from the beginning. How did 

you guys end up over there?” 

* * * 

Gerald then proceeded to give a full statement to Detective Conkel. 

{¶130} In Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, the United States Supreme 

Court explained that inquiries or statements by the defendant relating to 

routine incidents of the custodial relationship, such as requesting a drink of 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 89

water or requesting to use the telephone, are generally not deemed to have 

initiated a conversation. Id. at 1045. On the other hand, a question regarding 

what is going to happen next “evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a 

generalized discussion about the investigation [and is] not merely a 

necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” 

Id. at 1045-1046. In this case, the questioning continued after Gerald 

invoked his right to counsel; the issue then is who reopened the dialogue, 

Gerald or Detective Conkel? Viewing the quoted dialogue, the statements 

made by Gerald after he asked for a lawyer do not fit squarely under 

“routine incidents” nor does he ask, “What is going to happen next?” 

{¶131} Since the right to counsel as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, is a cornerstone of our criminal 

justice system, the issue of whether Gerald’s Fifth Amendment right to 

counsel was waived must be scrutinized. After Gerald invoked his right to 

counsel, Detective Conkel did not stop the interrogation. It appears that 

Detective Conkel is an extremely skilled interviewer that knows how to keep 

the interviewee speaking. After Gerald requested a lawyer, Detective 

Conkel answered him with an “Okay. That’s your choice.” However, she 

then continued to tell him about evidence that the State already had against 

him. She also continued the dialogue by telling Gerald about the particular 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 90

charges with which he would be charged such as aggravated murder, 

tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse. Being experienced and 

trained in interviewing, Detective Conkel’s interviewing techniques were 

designed to elicit a response from Gerald. Gerald then responded by 

wanting to “tell his side of the story.” Keeping in mind that the burden is on 

the prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the 

Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrrogation, I 

would find that Gerald did not reopen the dialogue. The dialogue never 

stopped as it should have once Gerald requested an attorney. 

{¶132} Gerald’s assignment of error is couched in terms of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his counsel's performance was 

deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense and 

deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 

49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 139, 694 

N.E.2d 916 (1998). 

{¶133} Even being cognizant of trial counsel’s possible strategies in 

not filing a motion to suppress, I would find that, in this particular case, 

Gerald’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient by failing to file the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 91

motion to suppress his statements since Gerald had invoked the right to 

counsel without waiving that right. Gerald must next show that, but for the 

alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

{¶134} “The cumulative-error doctrine that Gerald argues in his 

assignment of error VIII should then be considered. The cumulative error 

doctrine states that a conviction will be reversed if the cumulative effect of 

all the errors in a trial deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair 

trial, even though each alleged instance of error may not individually 

constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Mockbee, 2013-Ohio-5504, 5 N.E.3d 

50, ¶43 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 

623 (1995); see also State v. Jackson, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA20, 

2012-Ohio-6276, ¶51. Viewing the trial as a whole, and considering that a 

Confrontation Clause violation occurred when the court allowed the jury to 

hear the statements of the co-defendants without Gerald being able to crossexamine the co-defendants; along with the fact that Gerald’s Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel was violated; and the fact that the hatchet, 

knife, and a gun were lost during the case, I would find that the cumulative 

error doctrine is applicable in this case. 

{¶135} Going back full circle to the harmless error test, if we do not 

consider the testimony of Detective Conkel where she quotes Gerald’s co-
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 92

defendants in violation of the Confrontation Clause; and Raymond Peoples’ 

testimony is considered in light of the lost hatchet; and if Gerald’s statement 

is not considered given his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, then the trier 

of fact is left with the inmate, Steven Drummond’s testimony to find Gerald 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is difficult to find that the errors were 

harmless in this case. After considering the entire record and the 

constitutional violations, I would sustain Gerald’s Assignments of Error IV, 

V with respect to the failure to file the motion to suppress and VIII. I would 

find all other assignments of error moot. I would reverse and remand the 

case for a new trial. 

 

 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3519 93

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be 

assessed to Appellant. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE 

UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 

COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to 

exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a 

continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio 

an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If 

a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the 

expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a 

notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal 

period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date 

of such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Harsha, J.: Concurs with Concurring Opinion. 

Hoover, J: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion. 

For the Court, 

 BY: ___________________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.