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*********************************************** 
JENNIYAH GEORGES ET AL. v. OB-GYN

SERVICES, P.C., ET AL.

(SC 20170)

Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, L and L’s minor daughter, G, sought damages for personal

injuries that G had sustained allegedly as a result of the defendants’

medical malpractice. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs filed an offer of compromise for $2 million, which the defendants did not accept. On October

28, 2016, the trial court accepted the jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs

$4.2 million against both of the defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiffs

filed a motion for statutory (§ 52-192a (c)) offer of compromise interest

and for statutory (§ 37-3b) postjudgment interest. On November 28, 2016,

evidently as a result of a clerical error, an entry was placed on the case

docket, stating ‘‘judgment on verdict for plaintiff.’’ On December 12,

2016, the court awarded the plaintiffs both offer of compromise and

postjudgment interest. On December 16, 2016, the defendants filed an

appeal with the Appellate Court, challenging both the jury verdict and

the trial court’s awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The plaintiffs filed a timely motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming

that the defendants had failed to file the appeal within twenty days of

the date that judgment was rendered, as required by the rule of practice

(§ 63-1 (a)) governing the time to appeal. The defendants filed an objection to that motion, claiming that their appeal from the judgment rendered in accordance with the jury verdict was timely because they filed

it within twenty days of the trial court’s December 12, 2016 awards of

offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants also

filed a motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit the filing of a

late appeal pursuant to the applicable rules of practice (§§ 60-2 (5) and

60-3), claiming, in the alternative, that there was good cause to permit

the late appeal in light of the confusion in the trial court concerning

the date the judgment was rendered. The Appellate Court dismissed as

untimely that portion of the defendants’ appeal challenging the jury

verdict and, in doing so, denied the defendants’ motion to suspend the

rules of practice to permit a late appeal. The Appellate Court also

upheld the trial court’s awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment

interest. On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to

this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court properly dismissed as untimely the portion of the

defendants’ appeal challenging the jury verdict, there having been no

merit to the defendants’ claim that, although they did not file their appeal

within twenty days of the date on which the judgment was rendered in

accordance with the jury verdict, and did not file a request for an

extension of time or a postverdict motion, their appeal was nonetheless

timely because the appeal period should have been measured from the

date of the trial court’s awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment

interest, rather than the date the trial court accepted the jury verdict:

a. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the judgment

did not become final for purposes of appeal when the trial court accepted

the jury verdict insofar as the court had yet to determine whether, or

how much, offer of compromise interest should be awarded under § 52-

192a, as a determination of the amount of offer of compromise interest

is not an essential prerequisite to an appealable final judgment on the

merits, because, although the presence of an unresolved claim for relief

can delay the finality of a judgment on the merits, offer of compromise

interest is not part of the plaintiffs’ compensation for the alleged wrongdoing or unlawful conduct that gave rise to the underlying action, and,

thus, a decision regarding offer of compromise interest does not require

an assessment of the merits of the underlying case; moreover, under

§ 52-192a (c), trial courts have no discretion to determine if, or how

much, offer of compromise interest should be awarded, as that statute

requires that such interest be awarded when the amount of the verdict

is equal to or exceeds the offer of compromise and prescribes the precise
formula for calculating it.

b. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that, under Practice

Book § 63-1 (c) (1), which provides for the tolling of the twenty day

appeal period when a motion filed within the original twenty day appeal

period seeks an alteration to the terms of the judgment, the plaintiffs’

motion for offer of compromise and postjudgment interest created a

new twenty day period within which the defendants could appeal from

the judgment rendered in accordance with the jury verdict: the awards

of offer of compromise and postjudgment interest, although increasing

the plaintiffs’ overall recovery, did not alter the amount of compensatory

damages the jury previously had awarded, and, accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion for such interest did not seek an alteration of the judgment

within the meaning of Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1); moreover, federal

precedent interpreting an analogous federal rule of appellate procedure

(Fed. R. App. Proc. 4 (a) (4)) supported the view that postverdict motions

for statutory interest do not seek an alteration to the underlying

judgment.

2. The Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’

motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal, as the

defendants failed to establish good cause: despite the defendants’ claim

that there was widespread confusion in the trial court about the date

the judgment was rendered, there was no reasonable basis for any such

confusion, as the rules of practice (§§ 17-2 and 63-1 (b)) directing trial

courts to render judgments on jury verdicts and providing that the appeal

period begins to run when the verdict is accepted, plainly should have

put the defendants’ counsel on notice that, when the trial court accepted

the verdict on October 28, 2016, and no subsequent motions were filed

under the rules of practice (§§ 16-35 and 17-2A) governing certain postverdict motions, a final judgment had been rendered and the twenty

day appeal period had begun to run, and the erroneous entry placed on

the case docket suggesting that the judgment had been rendered for

the plaintiffs on November 28, 2016, was of no moment because the

twenty day appeal period had expired eleven days before that entry

appeared on the docket; moreover, the Appellate Court reasonably concluded that the defendants had failed to show good cause on the basis

of their claimed good faith belief that there was no appealable final

judgment until the trial court issued its decision awarding interest on

December 12, 2016, as established final judgment principles should have

put the defendants’ counsel on notice that offer of compromise interest

is not a type of relief that delays finality, and nothing in the text of

Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1), or Connecticut case law interpreting it,

remotely suggested that a postjudgment motion for mandatory interest,

such as the plaintiffs’ motion in the present case, alters any aspect of

the underlying judgment; furthermore, contrary to the defendants’ claim,

the size of the verdict did not render the Appellate Court’s refusal to

hear the appeal challenging the jury verdict an abuse of discretion,

particularly in light of the wholly inadequate explanations proffered by

the defendants for why they failed to appeal until approximately one

month after the deadline, and, although the gravity of the consequences

of a dismissal to the appealing party is not wholly irrelevant to a good

cause analysis, under the circumstances of the present case, the size

of the verdict, in and of itself, did not compel the conclusion that the

Appellate Court abused its discretion.

(Two justices concurring in part and dissenting

in part in one opinion)

Argued October 23, 2019—officially released June 3, 2020**

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, medical

malpractice, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New London, where

the plaintiff Jean Georges withdrew from the action;

thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Vacchelli, J.; verdict and judgment for the named plaintiff

and in part for the plaintiff Marie Leoma; subsequently,

the court granted the motion of the named plaintiff et

al. for offer of compromise and postjudgment interest,
and the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court,

which granted in part the motion of the named plaintiff

et al. to dismiss the appeal and denied the defendants’

motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late

appeal; thereafter, this court dismissed the defendants’

petition for certification to appeal; subsequently, the

Appellate Court, Keller, Prescott and Bright, Js.,

affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to offer of

compromise and postjudgment interest, and the defendants, on the granting of certification, appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

David J. Robertson, with whom, on the brief, was

Malaina J. Sylvestre, for the appellants (defendants).

Alinor C. Sterling, with whom were James D. Horwitz and, on the brief, Cynthia C. Bott, for the appellees

(named plaintiff et al.).

Jeffrey R. Babbin and Christopher P. Kriesen filed

a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The defendants, OB-GYN Services, P.C.,

and Brenda Gilmore, appealed from the judgment of

the trial court rendered following a jury verdict in favor

of the plaintiff Marie Leoma and the named plaintiff,

Jenniyah Georges, Leoma’s minor daughter, on certain

medical malpractice claims.1 The Appellate Court, however, granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the

appeal as untimely and denied the defendants’ motion

to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal.

On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the

Appellate Court (1) improperly granted the plaintiffs’

motion to dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging

the jury’s verdict as untimely, and (2) abused its discretion in denying their motion to suspend the rules of

practice to permit a late appeal. We disagree and,

accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. The plaintiffs filed their original

complaint on December 12, 2011. In that complaint,

the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed

malpractice during Leoma’s pregnancy and labor, and

during the delivery of Jenniyah Georges, causing Jenniyah Georges to sustain severe, permanent injuries. On

May 16, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an offer of compromise

directed to both defendants, offering to settle the claim

for $2 million. The defendants did not accept the offer of

compromise, which resulted in it being deemed rejected

thirty days later by operation of law.2 A jury trial ensued.

On October 28, 2016, the jury returned a verdict for

the plaintiffs of $4.2 million as against both defendants.

The trial court accepted the verdict that same day. The

defendants did not file any postjudgment motions challenging the jury’s verdict.

On November 8, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion

seeking offer of compromise interest. The plaintiffs

argued that they were entitled to such interest pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-192a (c)3 and Practice Book

§ 17-18 because the defendants failed to accept the

plaintiffs’ offer of compromise for $2 million and the

jury’s verdict of $4.2 million exceeded that amount.

The plaintiffs’ motion also sought postjudgment interest

under General Statutes § 37-3b.4 The defendants filed

an objection to the plaintiffs’ motion. On November 28,

2016, evidently as a result of a clerical error, an entry

was placed on the electronic docket, stating ‘‘judgment

on verdict for plaintiff.’’

On December 12, 2016, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision, awarding the plaintiffs both offer

of compromise and postjudgment interest. With respect

to offer of compromise interest, the court concluded

that the ‘‘end date’’ for calculating the interest was the

date the judgment was rendered and clarified that the

judgment was rendered on October 28, 2016—the date
the verdict was accepted by the court—not November

28, 2016. The court clarified that the docket entry made

on November 28, 2016, which referenced November 28,

2016, as the date of the judgment, had been made in

error. The court awarded the plaintiffs $1,639,496.55

in offer of compromise interest. The trial court also

awarded the plaintiffs postjudgment interest under § 37-

3b, to be calculated at 10 percent per year, commencing

on November 17, 2016, twenty days from the date of the

judgment, ‘‘subject to tolling as permitted by statute.’’

On December 16, 2016, the defendants filed an appeal

with the Appellate Court, challenging both the jury’s

verdict and the trial court’s awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment interest.5 The plaintiffs filed a

timely motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging

the jury’s verdict. They claimed that the defendants

failed to file the appeal within twenty days of the date

the judgment was rendered, as required by Practice

Book § 63-1 (a). The defendants filed an objection to

that motion, arguing that their appeal from the judgment

rendered in accordance with the jury’s verdict was

timely because they filed it within twenty days of the

trial court’s December 12, 2016 memorandum of decision awarding the offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants also filed a motion to

suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal

pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2 (5)6 and 60-3,7

arguing, in the alternative, that there was ‘‘good cause’’

to permit the late appeal in light of the ‘‘significant

amount of confusion in the trial court’’ concerning the

date the judgment was rendered. This motion largely

focused on the erroneous docket entry of November

28, 2016, listing that date as the date of the judgment.

The Appellate Court granted in part the plaintiffs’

motion to dismiss and denied the defendants’ motion

to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal.

This certified appeal followed.8

I

The defendants claim that the Appellate Court

improperly granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the

portion of the defendants’ appeal challenging the jury’s

verdict because the appeal was timely. We disagree.

We review the Appellate Court’s decision to dismiss

an untimely appeal for abuse of discretion; see, e.g.,

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, 248 Conn. 52,

53, 59, 61, 727 A.2d 213 (1999); cf. Kelley v. Bonney,

221 Conn. 549, 559 and n.4, 606 A.2d 693 (1992) (noting

that Appellate Court has broad discretion to determine

whether to hear late appeal); but questions concerning

whether the judgment was final for purposes of appeal,

or when the twenty day appeal period began to run,

are questions of law over which our review is plenary.

See, e.g., Hylton v. Gunter, 313 Conn. 472, 478, 97 A.3d
970 (2014); In re Haley B., 262 Conn. 406, 410–11, 815

A.2d 113 (2003).

‘‘Unless a different time period is provided by statute,

an appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date

notice of the judgment or decision is given.’’ Practice

Book § 63-1 (a). ‘‘In civil jury cases, the appeal period

shall begin when the verdict is accepted.’’ Practice Book

§ 63-1 (b). Likewise, with respect to the date the judgment is deemed to have been rendered in such cases,

Practice Book § 17-2 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If no

motions under Sections 16-35 or [17-2A] are filed, upon

the expiration of the time provided for the filing of such

motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in

accordance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted. . . .’’

(Emphasis added.)

In the present case, the trial court accepted the jury’s

verdict on October 28, 2016, which meant that, in the

absence of an extension of time or the filing of a postverdict motion by the defendants, the defendants had until

November 17, 2016, to appeal from the judgment rendered in accordance with that verdict. The defendants

did not file any posttrial motions under Practice Book

§ 16-35 or Practice Book § 17-2A; nor did they request

an extension of the appeal period. The defendants did

not file their appeal until December 16, 2016, approximately one month after the deadline. The defendants

contend, however, that their appeal was nonetheless

timely because they filed it within twenty days of the

court’s December 12, 2016 decision awarding offer of

compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants

argue that the appeal period should be measured from

the date of this subsequent decision, rather than the

date the verdict was accepted, because (1) there was

no appealable final judgment until the court awarded

offer of compromise and postjudgment interest, and (2)

the plaintiffs’ November 8, 2016 motion for interest

created a new twenty day appeal period pursuant to

Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1).

We address these questions of law in turn.

A

The first question is whether the date of the final

judgment for purposes of appeal is October 28, 2016,

the date the trial court accepted the jury’s verdict. It is

well settled that ‘‘the acceptance of the jury verdict at

the time it is [returned] is deemed to constitute a final

judgment . . . unless a motion to set aside is later

filed.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Kolich v. Shugrue, 198 Conn. 322, 327, 502

A.2d 918 (1986); see also Practice Book § 17-2. The

defendants argue, however, that, in the present case,

the judgment did not become final for purposes of

appeal when the verdict was accepted because the trial

court had yet to determine whether, or how much,
offer of compromise interest should be awarded under

§ 52-192a.

This court has held that the presence of an unresolved

claim for relief can delay the finality of a judgment on

the merits. This, however, is the exception to the usual

rule and generally applies only if the form of relief

being sought ‘‘seek[s] compensation for the alleged[ly]

wrongful conduct of the defendants, which depend[s]

upon an assessment of the underlying merits of the

transaction between the parties.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 294 Conn.

280, 297, 984 A.2d 658 (2009); see, e.g., Balf Co. v. Spera

Construction Co., 222 Conn. 211, 215, 608 A.2d 682

(1992) (claim for discretionary prejudgment interest

postponed finality of judgment because ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s

right to such a recovery is part of its claim to be made

whole,’’ and ‘‘[w]hether it succeeds will depend upon

an assessment of the underlying merits’’);9

see also

Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82,

84, 495 A.2d 1063 (1985) (judgment ‘‘rendered only [on]

the issue of liability without an award of damages’’

is interlocutory).

Conversely, when the postverdict relief is not

designed to compensate the plaintiffs for the underlying

wrongdoing and does not require the trial court to examine the merits of the underlying case, it is collateral to

the judgment and does not affect its finality for purposes

of appeal. See, e.g., Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 313 Conn.

485 n.12 (noting that award of attorney’s fees and litigation costs as part of common-law punitive damages

claim would not affect finality of judgment because

their ‘‘calculation . . . derives from evidence that is

collateral to that considered in the main cause of

action’’); Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515, 522–23,

544 A.2d 634 (1988) (adopting ‘‘bright-line rule’’ that ‘‘a

judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal

even though the recoverability or amount of attorney’s

fees for the litigation remains to be determined’’).10

Offer of compromise interest plainly falls into the

latter category because it does not entail any examination of matters encompassed within the merits of the

underlying action. Although offer of compromise interest increases a plaintiff’s overall recovery, offer of compromise interest is not part of the plaintiff’s compensation for the alleged wrongdoing or unlawful conduct

that gave rise to the underlying action. See Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 22 Conn. App.

640, 652–54, 579 A.2d 545 (explaining that, unlike discretionary prejudgment interest, which ‘‘constitutes an element of the damages awarded,’’ offer of compromise

interest is ‘‘unrelated to the underlying [damages

claim]’’), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 820, 581 A.2d 1055

(1990). Rather, ‘‘interest awarded under § 52-192a is

solely related to a defendant’s rejection of an advantageous offer to settle before trial and his subsequent
waste of judicial resources.’’ (Emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman,

Inc. v. El Constructors, Inc., 239 Conn. 708, 742, 687

A.2d 506 (1997). In other words, an award of offer of

compromise interest is punitive, rather than compensatory, in nature. Id., 752; see also Accettullo v. Worcester

Ins. Co., 256 Conn. 667, 673, 775 A.2d 943 (2001).

Accordingly, a decision regarding offer of compromise interest does not require an assessment of the

merits of the underlying case. Under § 52-192a (c), trial

courts have no discretion to determine if, or how much,

offer of compromise interest should be awarded. The

statute requires the interest to be awarded if the amount

of the verdict is equal to or exceeds the offer of compromise and prescribes the precise formula for calculating

it. See footnote 3 of this opinion. ‘‘[A]n award of interest

under § 52-192a is mandatory, and the application of

§ 52-192a does not depend on an analysis of the underlying circumstances of the case or a determination of

the facts.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. El Constructors, Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 752.

We therefore conclude that a determination of the

amount of offer of compromise interest to be awarded

is not an essential prerequisite to an appealable final

judgment on the merits. See Earlington v. Anastasi,

293 Conn. 194, 196–97 n.3, 976 A.2d 689 (2009) (noting

that judgment was final despite failure to award offer

of compromise interest ‘‘[b]ecause a decision to award

such interest pursuant to . . . § 52-192a is severable

from the proceedings on the merits and does not require

the exercise of discretion’’). In the present case, the

judgment became final on October 28, 2016, when the

court accepted the jury verdict. See Practice Book § 17-

2; Practice Book § 63-1 (b). The court’s subsequent decision on December 12, 2016, awarding offer of compromise interest, ‘‘raise[d] a collateral and independent

claim that is separately appealable as a final judgment.’’

Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. 523; see id.

(determining whether supplemental postjudgment

order regarding amount of attorney’s fees may raise

claim that is separately appealable as final judgment).

B

The defendants next argue that, under Practice Book

§ 63-1 (c) (1), the plaintiffs’ November 8, 2016 motion

for offer of compromise interest and for postjudgment

interest under § 37-3b created a new twenty day period

within which the defendants could appeal from the

judgment rendered in accordance with the jury’s verdict. They contend that this new appeal period began

to run when the court decided that motion on December

12, 2016. We are not persuaded.

Under Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1), ‘‘[i]f a motion is

filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would
render the judgment, decision or acceptance of the

verdict ineffective . . . a new twenty day period . . .

for filing the appeal shall begin on the day that notice

of the ruling is given on the last such outstanding motion

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) That subdivision explains

that the motions that meet these criteria include, inter

alia, ‘‘motions that seek . . . any alteration of the terms

of the judgment.’’11 In determining whether a motion

seeks an ‘‘alteration’’ of the terms of the judgment, ‘‘we

look to the substance of the relief sought by the motion

rather than the form.’’ In re Haley B., supra, 262

Conn. 413.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs’ motion

for offer of compromise and postjudgment interest

altered the terms of the judgment under Practice Book

§ 63-1 (c) (1) because it ‘‘change[d] the judgment from

the initial amount of the verdict [$4.2 million], to the

amount of the verdict plus offer of compromise interest.’’ We disagree.

The defendants rely on In re Haley B., supra, 262

Conn. 406, which considered the application of Practice

Book § 63-1 (c) (1) in a custody dispute. Id., 407, 412.

In that case, the trial court denied the intervening

respondent’s motion for custody or guardianship over

her grandchild but ordered weekly visitation with the

grandchild. Id., 407–409. Subsequently, in response to

an oral motion raised by the Department of Children and

Families (department), the court reduced the amount of

visitation it had previously awarded to the intervening

respondent to once per month. Id., 409–10. This court

concluded that the department’s motion had sought a

modification or alteration of the trial court’s original

order, thereby triggering a new appeal period under

§ 63-1 (c) (1), because the motion resulted in the court’s

‘‘chang[ing]’’ its prior order of weekly visitation by

reducing it to monthly visitation. Id., 414. Therefore, ‘‘a

portion of the court’s original decision, namely, that part

requiring weekly visitation, was rendered ineffective by

the subsequent order of the court reducing visitation

to a monthly basis.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.

In re Haley B. is not controlling here. That case

involved the trial court’s altering a substantive term of

its prior judgment. In the present case, the awards of

statutory interest—although increasing the plaintiffs’

overall recovery—did not alter the amount of compensatory damages the jury previously had awarded. As to

whether the addition of these interest awards to the

existing judgment creates a new appeal period under

Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1), our research has not

revealed any pertinent Connecticut appellate authority

addressing the applicability of that rule in this particular

context. We find persuasive, however, the reasoning of

the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the

analogous federal rule, set forth in rule 4 (a) (4) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Balf Co. v.
Spera Construction Co., supra, 222 Conn. 215 (adopting

United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Osterneck

v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 173–77, 109 S. Ct.

987, 103 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1989), to determine whether

judgment was final, ‘‘even though the United States

Supreme Court was applying [rule 59 (e) of] the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure’’ and rule 4 (a) (4) of Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure); cf. Paranteau v. DeVita,

supra, 208 Conn. 522–23 (adopting United States

Supreme Court’s reasoning in determining whether

judgment on merits was final for purposes of appeal

even though that court applied federal law).

Similar to Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1), which creates

a new appeal period for, inter alia, motions seeking

‘‘any alteration of the terms of the judgment,’’ rule 4 (a)

(4) (A) (iv) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

creates a new appeal period for motions that, pursuant

to rule 59 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

‘‘alter or amend a judgment . . . .’’ ‘‘[F]ederal courts

generally have invoked [r]ule 59 (e) [of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure] only to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on

the merits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 267, 108 S.

Ct. 1130, 99 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1988). Thus, a postjudgment

motion for costs did not purport to alter any aspect of

the judgment; rather, it ‘‘sought only what was due

because of the judgment. . . . Assessment of such

costs does not involve reconsideration of any aspect

of the decision on the merits.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

Id., 268. The United States Supreme Court explained

that, although the outcome may have been different ‘‘if

expenses of this sort were provided as an aspect of the

underlying action,’’ a motion for costs ‘‘raises issues

wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of

action, issues to which [r]ule 59 (e) [of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure] was not intended to apply.’’

Id., 268–69.

Following the rationale of the United States Supreme

Court, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ motion for offer

of compromise and postjudgment interest did not seek

an ‘‘alteration’’ of the judgment within the meaning of

Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1). As we explained in part I A

of this opinion, a decision to award offer of compromise

interest under § 52-192a is ministerial and does not

require the trial court to reconsider any aspect of the

decision on the merits.

The same is true of postjudgment interest under § 37-

3b, which similarly leaves trial courts with no discretion

in determining whether to award such interest. See,

e.g., DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group,

P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 48, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013) (legislative

history of § 37-3b ‘‘leaves no doubt that the legislature

. . . convert[ed] § 37-3b from a statute that permitted

an award of postjudgment interest in the discretion of
the trial court into one that mandates such an award’’);

see also footnote 4 of this opinion. A claim for interest

under § 37-3b also does not require, or permit, the trial

court to reconsider the merits of the case because such

interest is not an element of the plaintiff’s damages in

the underlying action. See Hicks v. State, 297 Conn.

798, 804, 1 A.3d 39 (2010) (‘‘[I]nterest awarded pursuant

to § 37-3b is in addition to and based upon the amount

of damages as determined by the trier of fact. Postjudgment interest, therefore, cannot be an element of damages.’’). Indeed, because § 37-3b requires the interest

to be calculated ‘‘upon the amount of the judgment,’’ a

claim for such interest cannot even be considered until

after the plaintiff has recovered a judgment against the

defendant. Accordingly, an award of interest under § 37-

3b is collateral to, and does not alter for purposes of

Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1), the judgment on the merits.

See White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment

Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451–52, 102 S. Ct. 1162, 71 L.

Ed. 2d 325 (1982) (motion for attorney’s fees did not

alter judgment under rule 59 (e) of Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure because it ‘‘require[d] an inquiry . . .

that cannot even commence until one party has ‘prevailed’ ’’).

We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs’ postverdict

motion for mandatory interest under §§ 52-192a and 37-

3b did not seek an ‘‘alteration’’ of the judgment within

the meaning of Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) and certainly

did not render the judgment ineffective. Rather, the

motion ‘‘sought only what was due because of the judgment.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Buchanan v. Stanships,

Inc., supra, 485 U.S. 268. The twenty day appeal period

began to run on October 28, 2016, when the court

accepted the jury verdict; see Practice Book § 63-1 (b);

and expired on November 17, 2016, approximately one

month before the defendants filed their appeal from

the judgment rendered in accordance with that verdict

on December 16, 2016. Accordingly, the Appellate Court

correctly concluded that the appeal was untimely.

II

The defendants claim that the Appellate Court abused

its discretion in denying their motion to suspend the

rules of practice to permit a late appeal. We disagree.

We begin with the principles governing our review.

‘‘The rules of practice vest broad authority in the Appellate Court for the management of its docket.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Alliance Partners, Inc. v.

Voltarc Technologies, Inc., 263 Conn. 204, 210, 820 A.2d

224 (2003). Practice Book § 60-2 provides in relevant

part that ‘‘[t]he supervision and control of the proceedings shall be in the court having appellate jurisdiction

from the time the appellate matter is filed . . . . [The

court] may . . . on its own motion or upon motion of

any party . . . (5) order that a party for good cause

shown may file a late appeal . . . unless the court lacks
jurisdiction to allow the late filing . . . .’’ Practice

Book § 60-3 further provides that, ‘‘[i]n the interest of

expediting decision, or for other good cause shown,

the court in which the appellate matter is pending may

suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these

rules on motion of a party or on its own motion and may

order proceedings in accordance with its direction.’’

‘‘In the absence of jurisdictional barriers, appellate

tribunals must exercise their discretion to determine

whether a late appeal should be permitted to be heard.

. . . Thus, we review the Appellate Court’s decision

[to deny a motion for permission to file a late appeal]

under the abuse of discretion standard. In determining

whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every

reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the

correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is

required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest

or where injustice appears to have been done.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc., supra,

263 Conn. 210. In the absence of evidence that the

Appellate Court ‘‘decided the matter so arbitrarily as

to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or

irrelevant factors,’’ its decision must be upheld. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holley, 327 Conn.

576, 628, 175 A.3d 514 (2018).

Consistent with this court’s prior cases, we emphasize at the outset that our review of the Appellate

Court’s decision is especially deferential in the present

case in light of the Appellate Court’s ‘‘broad authority

to manage its docket. . . . In the exercise of that

authority, [the Appellate Court] legitimately has

adopted a policy of docket control that, in other than

exceptional cases, the need to address cases that were

filed timely outweighs the need to permit appeals that

are in fact late.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 212; see also Ramos v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 248 Conn. 61.

The Appellate Court has explained that, under this

policy, it may ‘‘exercise its discretion to consider late

appeals, even when a party timely files a motion to

dismiss an untimely appeal. . . . Given the large number of appeals . . . filed in [the Appellate Court], however, [the court has] adopted a policy that gives precedence to those appeals that are timely filed . . . .

Therefore, when a motion to dismiss that raises untimeliness is, itself, timely filed . . . it is ordinarily [the

court’s] practice to dismiss the appeal if it is in fact

late, and if no reason readily appears on the record

to warrant an exception to [the court’s] general rule.’’

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut,

Inc. v. Gurski, 47 Conn. App. 478, 481–82, 705 A.2d

566 (1998). The Appellate Court has numerous times
‘‘announced this policy, putting all litigants, including

the [litigants in the present case], on fair notice thereof.’’

Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc.,

supra, 263 Conn. 212. This previously announced policy

of dismissing untimely appeals in the absence of a

readily apparent reason to hear the appeal generally

weighs in favor of upholding the Appellate Court’s decision to deny a request for permission to file a late

appeal.12 See id., 214.

In determining whether the Appellate Court abused

its discretion in the present case, we examine the defendants’ motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit

a late appeal in order to assess whether the defendants

established the requisite ‘‘good cause’’ under Practice

Book §§ 60-2 (5) and 60-3. See id., 209 n.9 (‘‘[i]n

reviewing the Appellate Court’s [decision to deny a

motion for permission to file a late appeal], we take

into account the [appellant’s] representations’’ in that

motion).

In their motion, the defendants asserted, first, that

there was ‘‘widespread confusion’’ in the trial court as

to the date the judgment was actually rendered, for

which they should not be penalized. In particular, they

noted the docket entry that erroneously listed the date

of the judgment as November 28, 2016. Second, the

defendants argued that they had a ‘‘good faith belief’’

that there was no appealable final judgment until the

court issued its decision awarding offer of compromise

and postjudgment interest on December 12, 2016.

Finally, the defendants emphasized that the substantial

size of the jury’s verdict, $4.2 million, counseled in favor

of permitting their untimely appeal to proceed.

We find these justifications unconvincing. Despite

the defendants’ claim that there was ‘‘widespread confusion’’ in the trial court about the date the judgment

was rendered, we see no reasonable basis for any such

confusion. Practice Book § 17-2 expressly provides that,

if no motions under Practice Book § 16-35 or Practice

Book § 17-2A are filed, ‘‘the date of the judgment shall

be the date the verdict was accepted.’’ Further, Practice

Book § 63-1 (b) provides that, ‘‘[i]n civil jury cases, the

appeal period shall begin when the verdict is accepted.’’

These provisions plainly should have put the defendants’ counsel on notice that, when the trial court

accepted the verdict on October 28, 2016, and no subsequent motions under Practice Book § 16-35 or Practice

Book § 17-2A were filed, a final judgment had been

rendered and the twenty day appeal period had began

to run.

In this regard, the erroneous entry placed on the

docket suggesting that the judgment had been rendered

in favor of the plaintiffs on November 28, 2016, is of

no moment. The twenty day appeal period expired on

November 17, 2016, eleven days before that erroneous

entry appeared on the docket. We therefore fail to see
how the erroneous entry could have been the cause

of the defendants’ failure to appeal on or before the

November 17, 2016 deadline.

Nor did the Appellate Court act unreasonably when

it concluded that the defendants had failed to show

good cause on the basis of their claimed ‘‘good faith

belief’’ that there was no appealable final judgment

until the court issued its decision awarding interest on

December 12, 2016. Again, Practice Book § 17-2 explicitly provides that ‘‘the date of the judgment shall be the

date the verdict was accepted.’’ Further, even if the

defendants had harbored some uncertainty about the

date final judgment was rendered, ‘‘[t]he filing requirements prescribed by [our rules of practice] cannot be

abrogated . . . by a party’s perception that appeal is

unnecessary during the appropriate appeal period. The

fact that the need for an appeal may not have been

evident until after the mandated filing period passed is

not a circumstance that impels us to bypass the requirements of our rules of practice.’’ Lucisano v. Lucisano,

200 Conn. 202, 206, 510 A.2d 186 (1986). Moreover, the

defendants have offered no reason why, if there was

any doubt in their minds as to whether the judgment

was final on October 28, 2016, they did not ‘‘take the

obviously safer route’’; Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 212; and immediately appeal from the judgment rendered in accordance with the jury’s verdict, which they later could

have amended to include any claims challenging the

court’s subsequent interest awards.13 See, e.g., Randazzo v. Sakon, 181 Conn. App. 80, 87–88 n.7, 189 A.3d

616, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 909, 193 A.3d 560 (2018);

see also Practice Book § 61-9.

The concurring and dissenting justice contends that

the Appellate Court abused its discretion in denying

the defendants’ motion to suspend the rules of practice

to permit a late appeal because ‘‘the barren state of the

law’’ gave the defendants an objectively reasonable,

good faith belief either (1) that the judgment was not

yet final when the court accepted the verdict, or (2) that

the plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for interest triggered

a new appeal period under Practice Book § 63-1 (c)

(1). Although we agree that an objectively reasonable

mistake of law may constitute good cause for filing a

late appeal, we disagree that the Appellate Court was

required to determine that the defendants’ untimeliness

was due to any such justifiable mistake of law in the

present case.

With regard to the finality of the judgment, although

there were no appellate cases definitively holding that

unawarded offer of compromise interest does not delay

the finality of a judgment on the merits, our decision

today that it does not delay finality should come as no

surprise to the defendants. As we explained in part I

A of this opinion, this court’s decisions have uniformly
recognized that postverdict claims for relief delay finality only if they are related to compensation and require

an assessment of the underlying merits of the case. See

Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 313 Conn. 485 n.12; Broadnax

v. New Haven, supra, 294 Conn. 297; footnote 9 of this

opinion and accompanying text. Offer of compromise

interest meets neither of these requirements. See Accettullo v. Worcester Ins. Co., supra, 256 Conn. 673; Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. El Constructors, Inc.,

supra, 239 Conn. 742, 752. Thus, established final judgment principles should have put the defendants’ counsel

on notice that offer of compromise interest is not a

type of relief that delays finality.14

In fact, this court, in 2009, noted that undetermined

offer of compromise interest does not affect the finality

of the judgment. Earlington v. Anastasi, supra, 293

Conn. 196–97 n.3. Although that aspect of Earlington

was dictum, it was cited in a leading treatise on appellate practice for the proposition that ‘‘the lack of a

ruling on a claim for [offer of compromise interest under

§ 52-192a] does not deprive the court of appellate jurisdiction on an otherwise final judgment.’’ W. Horton &

K. Bartschi, Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut

Rules of Appellate Procedure (2019–2020 Ed.) § 61-1,

p. 84, authors’ comments. Thus, to the extent that the

defendants claimed that they were confused about the

operation of our final judgment rules in this context,

the Appellate Court was well within its discretion to

regard such confusion as unreasonable.15 See Alliance

Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc., supra, 263

Conn. 212 (rejecting argument that mistake of law justified late appeal in part because correct rule was discussed in prior case law and cited in authoritative treatise on appellate practice).

Nor was the Appellate Court required to determine

that the defendants’ untimeliness was due to a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that Practice Book § 63-1

(c) (1) provided them with a new appeal period. Nothing

in the text of § 63-1 (c) (1), or our case law interpreting

it, remotely suggests that a postjudgment motion for

mandatory interest, such as the one that the plaintiffs

filed on November 8, 2016, alters any aspect of the

underlying judgment. Although there was no prior

appellate decision holding that § 63-1 (c) (1) does not

apply to this type of motion, the absence of a case

directly on point, although something that the Appellate

Court could consider,16 does not mean that there was

‘‘confusion’’ in the law to such an extent as to render

the Appellate Court’s refusal to hear a late appeal a

manifest abuse of discretion.17

The present case is similar in many respects to Alliance Partners, Inc. In that case, this court concluded

that the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in

denying an appellant’s motion for permission to file a

late appeal when the appeal was filed one day after the
deadline and the justifications proffered by the appellant in its motion—that the rules of practice governing

how to calculate the twenty day appeal period were

confusing—were unpersuasive. Id., 211–12. This court

explained that there was ‘‘no reasonable basis’’ for the

appellant’s confusion in light of prior case law and

Practice Book § 63-2, which ‘‘clearly indicate[d]’’ the

way to calculate the twenty day period. Id.

We disagree with the concurring and dissenting justice’s attempts to distinguish Alliance Partners, Inc. As

in that case, we see no reasonable basis, in light of our

prior discussion in this opinion, for the defendants’

claimed belief that there was no appealable final judgment when the trial court accepted the verdict on October 28, 2016, or that the plaintiffs’ subsequent motion

for offer of compromise and postjudgment interest triggered a new appeal period. Additionally, by disallowing

an appeal filed just one day after the deadline, even

though there is a statutory right to appeal and the twenty

day period is not jurisdictional, an inescapable lesson

from Alliance Partners, Inc., is that adhering to the

Appellate Court’s policy of denying untimely appeals

in the absence of exceptional circumstances is one that

this court takes seriously.

Finally, we disagree with the defendants that the size

of the verdict, $4.2 million, renders the Appellate

Court’s refusal to hear the appeal an abuse of discretion,

particularly in light of the wholly inadequate explanations proffered by the defendants for why they failed

to appeal until approximately one month after the deadline. To be sure, this court has recognized that an

‘‘unyielding policy requiring strict adherence to an

appellate limitation period—no matter how severe or

unfair the consequences—does not serve the interests

of justice.’’ Banks v. Thomas, 241 Conn. 569, 586, 698

A.2d 268 (1997). Nonetheless, the principal question

is whether the defendants have met their burden of

‘‘establish[ing] good cause for [their] failure to file a

timely appeal.’’ Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 211. They plainly have

not done so. Although the gravity of the consequences

of a dismissal to the appealing party is not wholly irrelevant to the good cause analysis, we are not persuaded

that, under the circumstances of the present case, the

size of the verdict, in and of itself, compels the conclusion that the Appellate Court abused its discretion.18

In summary, in light of our limited scope of review,

the Appellate Court’s well known policy of managing

its own crowded docket, and the lack of any persuasive

justification for the late filing, we cannot conclude that

the Appellate Court manifestly abused its broad discretion or worked injustice by determining that the defendants had failed to establish good cause under Practice

Book §§ 60-2 (5) and 60-3. See id., 210 (‘‘[r]eversal is

required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest
or where injustice appears to have been done’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Whether we might have

exercised our discretion differently is not the question

before us. We reiterate, however, our observation in

Alliance Partners, Inc., that our decision in the present

case ‘‘does not mean . . . that any exercise of discretion by the Appellate Court in denying [a motion for

permission to file] a late appeal will find a welcoming

eye in this court. . . . Our decision in the present case

means only that each case must stand or fall on its own

merits; and the merits in this case do not persuade us

that the Appellate Court abused its discretion.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 214–15.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion McDONALD, KAHN and ECKER,

Js., concurred.

* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

** June 3, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 Although the complaint refers to Jenniyah Georges as the named plaintiff,

it is clear that the only proper, remaining plaintiff is Leoma, who, together

with Jean Georges, brought this action as the next friend of Jenniyah

Georges. See DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn. App.

583, 585 n.1, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Conn. 107, 49

A.3d 951 (2012); see also Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456,

460 n.3, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998) (recognizing general rule that minor children

may bring action only by way of parent or next friend), overruled in part

on other grounds by Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015).

Leoma also brought claims against the defendants in her individual capacity,

seeking damages for emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict for the

defendants with respect to these claims, which are not at issue in this appeal.

Jean Georges, Jenniyah Georges’ father, also was originally named as a

plaintiff in both his representative and individual capacities but subsequently

withdrew from this action. We refer to Leoma and Jenniyah Georges individually by name and collectively as the plaintiffs.

2 See General Statutes § 52-192a (a); Practice Book § 17-16.

3 General Statutes § 52-192a (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘After trial the

court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an

offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court

ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal

to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff’s offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual

interest on said amount . . . . The interest shall be computed from the

date the complaint in the civil action . . . was filed with the court if the

offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing

of such complaint . . . .’’ See Practice Book § 17-18 (providing for identical

computation method).

4 General Statutes § 37-3b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) For a cause of

action arising on or after May 27, 1997, interest at the rate of ten per cent

a year, and no more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to recover

damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused

by negligence, computed from the date that is twenty days after the date

of judgment or the date that is ninety days after the date of verdict, whichever

is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment. . . .’’

5 As to the jury verdict, the defendants claimed that the court had improperly admitted certain expert testimony and provided the jury with an incorrect instruction on damages.

6 Practice Book § 60-2 provides in relevant part: ‘‘[The court] may . . .

upon motion of any party . . . (5) order that a party for good cause shown

may file a late appeal . . . unless the court lacks jurisdiction to allow the

late filing . . . .’’ Although § 60-2 was amended in October, 2017, to take

effect in January, 2018, that amendment has no bearing on the merits of

this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current version of

§ 60-2.
7 Practice Book § 60-3 provides: ‘‘In the interest of expediting decision,

or for other good cause shown, the court in which the appellate matter is

pending may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules

on motion of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in

accordance with its direction.’’ Although § 60-3 was amended in October,

2017, to take effect in January, 2018, that amendment has no bearing on

the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current

version of § 60-3.

8 We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited

to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss that

portion of the defendants’ appeal relating to the judgment rendered on

October 28, 2016?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court abuse its discretion

when it denied the defendants’ motion to [suspend the rules of practice to

permit] a late appeal?’’ Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C., 330 Conn. 905,

192 A.3d 426 (2018).

9

In concluding in Balf Co. that claims for discretionary prejudgment

interest can postpone the rendering of an appealable final judgment, this

court distinguished between claims for that type of relief and claims for

attorney’s fees, which this court had previously held in Paranteau v. DeVita,

208 Conn. 515, 522–23, 544 A.2d 634 (1988), do not affect finality. See Balf

Co. v. Spera Construction Co., supra, 222 Conn. 214–15; see also footnote

10 of this opinion. Adopting the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning

in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175–77, 109 S. Ct. 987, 103

L. Ed. 2d 146 (1989), this court observed: ‘‘First, unlike attorney’s fees, which

at common law were regarded as an element of costs and therefore not

part of the merits judgment . . . prejudgment interest traditionally has been

considered part of the compensation due [the] plaintiff. Second, unlike a

request for attorney’s fees or a motion for costs, a motion for discretionary

prejudgment interest does not rais[e] issues wholly collateral to the judgment

in the main cause of action . . . nor does it require an inquiry wholly

separate from the decision on the merits . . . . In deciding if and how

much prejudgment interest should be granted, a [trial] court must examine—

or in the case of a postjudgment motion, reexamine—matters encompassed

within the merits of the underlying action. . . . Third, the conclusion that

a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest postpones

the finality of a judgment on the merits helps further the important goal

of avoiding piecemeal appellate review of judgments.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co.,

supra, 214–15.

10 Under the bright-line rule of Paranteau, requests for attorney’s fees

categorically ‘‘will be treated separately’’ from decisions on the merits

regardless of whether the ‘‘particular . . . claim for attorney’s fees was

collateral to, or an integral part of, the judgment on the merits.’’ Paranteau

v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. 522–23; see also Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 313

Conn. 483–84; Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 498–500, 715 A.2d 743

(1998). But see Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 485 n.13 (noting that ‘‘attorney’s

fees that themselves form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim for compensatory

damages, such as those occasioned by an insurer’s breach of its duty to

defend, are conceptually different and must be established in order to have

an appealable final judgment’’).

11 Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Motions that, if

granted, would render a judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict

ineffective include, but are not limited to, motions that seek: the opening

or setting aside of the judgment; a new trial; the setting aside of the verdict;

judgment notwithstanding the verdict; reargument of the judgment or decision; collateral source reduction; additur; remittitur; or any alteration of

the terms of the judgment.

‘‘Motions that do not give rise to a new appeal period include those that

seek: clarification or articulation, as opposed to alteration, of the terms of

the judgment or decision; a written or transcribed statement of the trial

court’s decision; or reargument of a motion listed in the previous paragraph.

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

12 The concurring and dissenting justice dilutes our deferential standard

of review of the Appellate Court’s ruling on a motion for permission to file

a late appeal to the point of being virtually indistinguishable from plenary

review. Specifically, according to the concurring and dissenting justice, if this

court can discern on appeal an ‘‘objectively reasonable basis for confusion,

uncertainty or mistake about when the appeal period has run or has been

tolled,’’ and ‘‘no other factors weigh against granting the motion,’’ then the

Appellate Court necessarily abused its discretion in failing to find good
cause for the late appeal. Although objectively reasonable confusion about

the operation of our appellate rules certainly is a factor to consider when

reviewing the Appellate Court’s decision to deny a motion for permission

to file a late appeal, we disagree that this or any other factor is dispositive.

Rather, abuse of discretion review mandates that we make ‘‘every reasonable

presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of the [Appellate Court’s]

ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc

Technologies, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 210. More to the point, as we explain

subsequently in the body of this opinion, the Appellate Court was justified

in concluding that the defendants’ proffered explanations for their confusion

about the date final judgment was rendered or when the appeal period

began to run did not amount to good cause to excuse their untimely appeal.

13 Contrary to the concurring and dissenting justice’s suggestion, we are

not advocating for an ‘‘ ‘appeal early and often’ approach’’ to appellate

litigation. Footnote 14 of the concurring and dissenting opinion. Nor did

this court endorse such an approach in Alliance Partners, Inc., by making

the observation that ‘‘it is difficult to see why, if the plaintiff was even

somewhat confused about [the proper method for calculating the twenty

day appeal period] . . . it nonetheless opted to wait for the potential twentyfirst day to file [its appeal], rather than to take the obviously safer route

and file on the potential twentieth day.’’ Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc

Technologies, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 212.

14 Relying on Nolan v. Milford, 86 Conn. App. 817, 819, 862 A.2d 879 (2005),

the concurring and dissenting justice contends that there was ‘‘at least a

straight-faced argument’’ that final judgment was not rendered until the trial

court resolved the parties’ dispute as to the proper ‘‘end date’’ for calculating

the offer of compromise interest. We disagree. Nolan addressed discretionary prejudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3a; Nolan v. Milford,

supra, 818–19; which this court has long recognized must be awarded before

there can be an appealable final judgment. SeeBalf Co. v. Spera Construction

Co., supra, 222 Conn. 214–15; footnote 9 of this opinion and accompanying

text. The plaintiffs’ motion did not seek discretionary prejudgment interest

under § 37-3a but, rather, mandatory interest under §§ 37-3b and 52-192a.

Nolan does not suggest that claims for such awards delay the rendering of

an otherwise appealable final judgment.

15 The concurring and dissenting justice relies on additional aspects of

the trial court proceedings that, in its view, provided the defendants with

an objectively reasonable belief that the judgment was not final when the

verdict was accepted on October 28, 2016. First, the concurring and dissenting justice notes that the plaintiffs filed a motion to request the offer

of compromise interest even though trial courts are required to impose such

interest sua sponte without the need for a motion. We fail to see why this

would have added to the defendants’ confusion. If anything, we believe it

is objectively unreasonable to suspect that a claim for relief that must

automatically be awarded at the statutorily prescribed rate could affect the

finality of the judgment.

Second, the concurring and dissenting justice contends that the plaintiffs’

motion for interest suggested that the plaintiffs themselves believed that

the judgment had not yet been rendered on October 28, 2016. He relies on

the following statement from the plaintiffs’ motion: ‘‘Section 52-192a (c)

directs the court to add 8 percent annual interest to the amount recovered

by the plaintiffs, running from the date the complaint in this action was

filed . . . to ninety days following the rendering of the verdict, which occurs

on January 26, 2017.’’ This is a true statement: January 26, 2017, is approximately ninety days after the verdict was returned on October 28, 2016. The

plaintiffs made the statement in the course of arguing for what they believed

the correct ‘‘end date’’ was for calculating the offer of compromise interest

when postjudgment interest under § 37-3b also is in play. Although this

argument reflected the plaintiffs’ understanding about how the competing

interest statutes operate, it does not suggest any confusion on the plaintiffs’

part about the date final judgment was rendered.

16 The concurring and dissenting justice asserts that, because the Appellate

Court denied the defendants’ motion to suspend the rules of practice to

permit a late appeal in an order without any explanation, ‘‘we have no idea

whether the Appellate Court considered the absence of on point case law

or whether it simply enforced deadlines in an uncompromising fashion.’’

Footnote 6 of the concurring and dissenting opinion. To the contrary, we

must indulge ‘‘every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of the [Appellate Court’s] ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 210.
Therefore, to the extent that the defendants raised the lack of pertinent

authority in their motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late

appeal, we must presume that the Appellate Court considered it in the

context of conducting a proper inquiry into whether there was good cause

for the defendants’ failure to file a timely appeal.

17 The concurring and dissenting justice contends that, in fashioning postjudgment interest awards under § 37-3b, trial courts, at least arguably, have

discretion to determine the appropriate interest rate because the statute

does not mandate any particular rate but merely provides that interest shall

be calculated ‘‘at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more . . . .’’ General

Statutes § 37-3b (a). Even if we assume, without deciding, that courts do

have such discretion, this could not reasonably have suggested to the defendants that an award of § 37-3b interest ‘‘alter[s]’’ the judgment rendered in

connection with the jury’s award of compensatory damages so as to create

a new appeal period under Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1). Indeed, this court

explained years before the defendants’ appeal that § 37-3b interest is separate

and distinct from compensatory damages awarded by a jury: ‘‘[I]nterest

pursuant to § 37-3b is computed only after and upon the amount of judgment.

It is calculated after the trier of fact has calculated the amount of damages

. . . . If, within twenty days, the defendant pays the damages awarded,

then no interest is due. . . . Interest accrues only if the damages are not

paid. An award of interest, therefore, first necessitates a factual finding of

a debt now due—a specific liquidated sum due. Thus, interest awarded

pursuant to § 37-3b is in addition to and based upon the amount of

damages as determined by the trier of fact. Postjudgment interest, therefore,

cannot be an element of damages.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis altered;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Hicks v. State, supra, 297 Conn. 804. A

review of Hicks should have suggested to the defendants that the plaintiffs’

motion for § 37-3b interest did not alter the underlying judgment for purposes

of Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1).

18 We note that the concurring and dissenting justice also contends that

‘‘the plaintiff[s] did not argue that [they] would have suffered any prejudice

or undue delay from the granting of permission to file a late appeal beyond

the delay normally associated with a timely filed appeal.’’ We read the

plaintiffs’ opposition to the defendants’ motion to suspend the rules of

practice to permit a late appeal, however, as arguing that allowing the late

appeal would cause undue delay and that they would be prejudiced because

the late appeal would further delay their access to the damages and interest

awards, which, given Jenniyah Georges’ debilitating injuries, ‘‘Jenniyah

[Georges] needs now.’’