******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HENRY T. COLLIN

(AC 35292)

Gruendel, Lavine and Dupont, Js.

Argued October 9—officially released December 9, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Keller, J.)

A. Paul Spinella, with whom, was Peter C. White,

for the appellant (defendant).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom

were, Russell C. Zentner, senior assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Peter A. McShane, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. The defendant, Henry T. Collin,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered by

the trial court, following a jury trial, of seven counts

of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1) and seven counts of

risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes

§ 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the

trial court improperly: (1) refused to permit a defense

witness, David Mantell, to testify as an expert on the

topic of false confessions; (2) concluded that the defendant was not in custody before or during an interrogation of him at the state police barracks; (3) concluded

that the defendant voluntarily consented to a police

search of his boat and the seizure of its contents; (4)

refused to instructthe jury that it should apply a ‘‘special

scrutiny’’ when considering the defendant’s confession

because it was the product of an unrecorded police

interrogation; and (5) excluded evidence of the victim’s

sexual history.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following relevant

facts. The victim’s stepfather knew the defendant, who

owned and operated a mechanical repair business. The

defendant repaired the engines of boats, jet skis, motorcycles, and other mechanical devices. When the victim,

who was fourteen years of age and interested in

mechanical work, told her stepfatherthat she was interested in obtaining a part-time job, her stepfather introduced her to the defendant, who was thirty-nine years

of age. In December, 2009, the defendant hired the victim as an apprentice, but paid her ‘‘under the table.’’

During the five or six months she worked for him,

the defendant paid the victim approximately $250. The

defendant often picked up the victim from school and

took her to his home, where they worked in the backyard on various types of engines. They also went to

other locations to work.

In March, 2010, the relationship between the victim

and the defendant became more intimate, and they

began dating. The victim had developed feelings for the

defendant, and the defendant told the victim that he

liked her and that, although they knew it was wrong,

his life was in her hands. They began kissing in the

defendant’s pickup truck and on the defendant’s boat,

which, initially, was on dry dock, covered by a tarp,

and sitting on stilts atthe marina. The boat was a twentyeight foot, 1979 Fiberform Executive yacht. The defendant took the victim out on his motorcycle, brought

her to various restaurants and to the movie theater,

and bought her gifts. The defendant also gave the victim

an engagement ring, but instructed her not to tell anyone about it. He also told her not to tell anyone about

their relationship because he could get in trouble.
As the relationship progressed, the victim and the

defendant began engaging in vaginal and oral intercourse in the bedroom of the defendant’s boat. There

was evidence that, due to some medical problems, the

defendant was unable to maintain a full erection or

to ejaculate. To combat this problem, the defendant

developed and used an ‘‘O’’ ring, which he placed

around the base of his penis. He also used K-Y lubricant

on his penis. The defendant told the victim that he loved

her and would never hurt her. The defendant and the

victim engaged in intercourse on the boat approximately ten times, both while the boat was on stilts and

after it was put in the water. The last time the defendant

and the victim had sexual relations was on Father’s

Day in 2010. Between April 1 and June 27, 2010, the

defendant and the victim also made approximately 674

telephone calls to each other.

The victim previously had told some of her friends

about her relationship with the defendant, and, on or

about June 26, 2010, two of those friends accompanied

herto a church parking lot where she told her stepfather

about her relationship with the defendant. While the

four of them were in the parking lot, the victim’s stepfather telephoned the defendant, putting the call on

speaker phone, and confronted him about the victim’s

accusations. The defendant denied having a sexual relationship with the victim.

On June 27, 2010, the victim and her mother met at

their home with Detectives James McGlynn and Scott

Wisner of the state police. The victim gave a statement

to McGlynn in which she detailed her relationship with

the defendant. The victim also drew a sketch of the area

of the boat where she and the defendant had engaged in

sexual relations and a sketch of the defendant’s penis

wearing the ‘‘O’’ ring device that he had developed to

help him maintain an erection.

At the time the victim was meeting with McGlynn

and Wisner, other members of the state police were

stationed at the marina where the defendant docked

his boat. When the defendant arrived at the marina

with his fourteen year old niece, Sergeant Robert Derry

instructed him that the police were there as part of an

investigation. Derry asked the defendant for permission

to search the boat and very clearly told him that he

was not required to remain on the premises, and that

he was free to leave. The defendant stated that he understood, but he stayed at the marina, nonetheless. The

discussions between Derry and the defendant were

calm, the defendant was not handcuffed or threatened,

and he voiced no objections. The defendant signed a

consent to search form that Derry provided to him.

When McGlynn finished interviewing the victim at her

home, he proceeded to the marina where he introduced

himself to the defendant. McGlynn told the defendant
that he would like to interview him regarding the victim’s complaint and requested that the defendant follow

him to the state police barracks. The defendant agreed,

and he and his niece got into the defendant’s truck and

followed McGlynn to the state police barracks. Upon

arriving at the barracks, the niece remained in the waiting room, while McGlynn and the defendant went to

McGlynn’s second floor office. McGlynn advised the

defendant that he was not under arrest and that he was

free to leave, and the defendant acknowledged that he

understood. Wisner also was present in the office for

a portion of the interview.

McGlynn asked the defendant about his relationship

with the victim, and the defendant provided details of

the relationship, including its sexual nature and that

the last time he and the victim had engaged in intercourse was on Father’s Day in 2010. The defendant

stated that he loved the victim and that he had given

her an engagement ring. As the interview progressed,

the defendant told McGlynn that he was wearing the

‘‘O’’ ring while being interviewed. McGlynn reduced the

defendant’s verbal statement to writing and read him

his Miranda warnings; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966);

which were preprinted on the statement. The defendant

took an oath acknowledging that he had read the statement and that the statement was true. He then signed

the statement in various places, including his acknowledgment that he had been read his Miranda warnings.

The defendant asked to use the restroom, and, after

using the facility, gave McGlynn the ‘‘O’’ ring that he

had been wearing. McGlynn then placed the ‘‘O’’ ring

in an envelope and tagged it as evidence. The defendant

also signed a consent to search form related to the

‘‘O’’ ring.

As the interview concluded, McGlynn told the defendant that the victim’s parents requested that the defendant not contact the victim. For the first time while

being interviewed, the defendant broke down in tears,

explaining to McGlynn that he was going to miss the

victim and that he did not know how he was going to

be without her. McGlynn and the defendant returned

to the marina, where, at approximately 10:05 p.m.,

McGlynn seized two tubes of K-Y jelly.

Following the defendant’s arrest on July 12, 2010, he

was charged with seven counts of sexual assault in the

second degree and seven counts of risk of injury to a

child.2 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted

on all counts, and sentenced to a total effective term of

twenty years incarceration, execution suspended after

eight years, with ten years of probation. This appeal

followed.

I

The defendant claims that the court abused its discre-
tion by refusing to permit the defendant’s expert, David

Mantell, a licensed clinical psychologist, to testify on

the topic of false confessions.3 The defendant argues

that Mantell was qualified as an expert on the topic of

false confessions and that such testimony was necessary to assist the jury in its assessment of the defendant’s testimony regarding his confession. The state

argues, inter alia, that the defendant failed to prove that

Mantell had sufficient expertise on the topic of false

confessions, and, accordingly, that the court properly

declined to permit him to testify as an expert on the

topic of false confessions.4 We agree with the state.

The following additional facts inform our review. On

September 21, 2012, the parties discussed the issue of

Mantell’s testimony with the trial court, and defense

counsel argued that, pursuant to § 7-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence,5 Mantell was qualified to testify

and to talk about what occurred during the defendant’s

confession. The defendant asserted that his confession

was false and that Mantell’s testimony would assist

the jury in assessing the falsity of his confession. The

prosecutor informed the court that he wanted an offer

of proof regarding Mantell’s expertise on the topic of

false confessions and on the nature of the testimony

he wanted to provide on false confessions.6 The court

set the matter down for a September 24, 2012 proffer

hearing.

At the hearing, during defense counsel’s offer of proof

on, inter alia, Mantell’s expertise on the topic of false

confessions, the court reviewed Mantell’s resume and

asked defense counsel what on the resume demonstrated the development of expertise on the topic of

false confessions. Counsel responded: ‘‘I can tell the

court the basis of Dr. Mantell’s expertise is the fact

that he’s testified previously.’’ The court asked defense

counsel how many times Mantell previously had testified as an expert on this issue, and counsel responded,

‘‘[o]ne time as a false confessions expert.’’ He also stated

that he was unaware of the specifics of that case, but

that Mantell’s testimony occurred in 2008 in Vermont.

Counsel also stated that, although Mantell had not written on the subject himself, he was ‘‘familiar with the

literature over the past ten to fifteen years and possibly

longer because lying is a big issue in forensic interviewing. And false confession[s] are close to malingering type scenarios that are seen. And so he studied the

literature on false confessions.’’ Defense counsel was

unaware of what literature Mantell had studied,

however.

During Mantell’s testimony at the proffer hearing,

which took place out of the presence of the jury, he

stated that he had testified on the topic of false confessions in approximately fourteen cases. When questioned further, however, he explained that most of those

cases dealt with false denials, rather than false confes-
sions, or they were cases in which he consulted with

counsel on the case, but did not testify. The court then

asked Mantell what type of studies he had reviewed.

Mantell explained that he had reviewed studies involving false confessions where the defendant, through

DNA, later had been exonerated. He testified that ‘‘the

researchers take a careful look at these cases and dissect the way in which [the accused had been] interrogated and also . . . look at the personality

characteristics of the people who made these false confessions.’’ He also stated that the commonality in the

research findings was the tactics that were employed

by the police during interrogations and the witness’

reactions to those tactics. Mantell also stated that there

was a second line of research with which he was familiar and that such research involved doing a personality

evaluation of the defendants who later were exonerated. He explained thatthe common personality traits of

these individuals included suggestibility, mental health

problems, lower intelligence, and concentrated personal adversity that makes them less resilient to external pressure. The court asked Mantell whether he had

evaluated the defendant in this case, and Mantell stated

that he had not evaluated the defendant. Upon questioning by the prosecutor, Mantell also conceded that

he was unfamiliar with any kind of psychological examination involving the defendant, that he had never seen

the result of a psychological examination involving the

defendant, and that he had no idea what such an examination might reveal. Additionally, Mantell admitted that

he had no idea regarding the defendant’s suggestibility,

eagerness to please, level of intelligence, or propensity

for mental illness. He also had no knowledge of the

police interview process in this case, or whether there

was DNA present in this case.

Mantell also explained that he had concerns when

he reviewed the file in this case because there was no

description of the interrogation process that was used,

and he, therefore, was unaware of what tactics were

used. He also stated that there was nothing in the defendant’s confession that would help him ‘‘to understand

the demeanor of the [defendant], what was motivating

the [defendant] to provide such a detailed and explicit

account of punishable, criminal offenses within such a

relatively short period of time within that setting.’’ He

further explained that he ‘‘didn’t understand the context

in which [the confession] was achieved, and [he] didn’t

understand the motivation of the defendant to convey

that kind of information, apparently, in a first interview

with a police officer, presumably knowing or having

some general knowledge of what the legal consequences would be for doing that.’’ Mantell also stated

that he had not reviewed or witnessed the in-court

testimony of the police in this case regarding the questioning of the defendant.

Following the hearing, the court issued both an oral
ruling and a written memorandum of decision. The

court found, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to

prove that Mantell was qualified to give an expert opinion on the topic of false confessions, and that, ‘‘even

if he were qualified, the testimony proposed [was]

incomplete and not directly applicable or relevant . . .

to assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in

determining whether . . . . the defendant’s testimony

was false.’’ The defendant claims that the court abused

its discretion in refusing to allow Mantell to testify as an

expert on the topic of false confessions.7 We disagree.

‘‘[T]he trial court has wide discretion in ruling on

the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that

discretion has been abused orthe ruling involves a clear

misconception of the law, the trial court’s decision will

not be disturbed. . . . In determining whether there

has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is

whether the court could reasonably conclude as it

did. . . .

‘‘[The Supreme Court] court recently articulated the

test for the admission of expert testimony, which is

deeply rooted in common law. Expert testimony should

be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill

or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue,

(2)that skill or knowledge is not common to the average

person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the

court or jury in considering the issues. . . . In other

words, [i]n order to render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a

factual basis for the opinion. . . .

‘‘It is well settled that [t]he true test of the admissibility of [expert] testimony is not whether the subject

matter is common or uncommon, or whether many

persons or few have some knowledge of the matter;

but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts have

any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to

the world, which renders their opinions founded on

such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or

the jury in determining the questions at issue. . . .

Implicit in this standard is the requirement . . . that

the expert’s knowledge or experience . . . be directly

applicable to the matter specifically in issue.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 229–30, 49 A.3d 705 (2012).

‘‘In order to possess the requisite skill or knowledge

to qualify as an expert, [i]t is not essential that an expert

witness possess any particular credential . . . so long

as his education or experience indicate that he has

knowledge on a relevant subject significantly greater

than that of such persons lacking such education or

experience. . . . An expert witness’ special skill or

knowledge may emanate from a myriad of sources,

such as teaching, scholarly writings, study or practical

experience. . . . Regardless of the source of the

expert’s specialized knowledge, a court properly may
preclude testimony if the expert’s knowledge does not

pertain to the specific matter at issue.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruocco,

151 Conn. App. 732, 746, 95 A.3d 573, cert. denied, 314

Conn. 923, A.3d , cert. granted on other grounds,

314 Conn. 923, A.3d (2014).

The defendant argues on appeal that Mantell was

qualified to testify on the topic of false confessions

because he is ‘‘highly respected in the Connecticut

courts,’’ has knowledge of the ‘‘false confession phenomenon,’’ and he previously has testified on the subject. The defendant also argues that it is not necessary

that Mantell ‘‘specialize in the narrow field of false

confessions . . . .’’ On the basis of the court’s extensive findings, which are not challenged as clearly erroneous on appeal, and our careful review of the

transcript of the proffer hearing, we are not persuaded.

Here, the court properly recognized that there must

be a basis for qualifying a witness as an expert, and

that a witness’ qualifications are determined by the

witness’ knowledge, skill, and expertise in the particular

area. The court specifically found, on the basis of the

evidence presented during the proffer hearing, that,

although Mantell had testified in one or two cases

involving false confessions, his resume did not contain

‘‘one single indicator of expertise in false confessions.’’

Additionally, although Mantell had read literature and

other court cases on the subject, the court found that

there was no evidence that he had an extensive educational background or training in false confessions, that

he had performed any studies, surveys or research on

the issue, that he had written any articles on the subject

of false confessions, or that he had any expertise

beyond forensic psychology as it pertains to family and

children, especially neglected and abused children.8

Furthermore, the court found, ‘‘[t]he fact that Mantell

[was] an experienced forensic psychologist, predominately in an unrelated field, and [that he might have

been] wellread on the social psychology of false confessions, [did] not, in and of itself, demonstrate sufficiently

to the court that he [was a] qualified expert on the

subject of false confessions.’’ We conclude that, on the

basis of the evidence presented, the court correctly

determined that the defendant had not established that

Mantell was qualified to testify on the topic of false

confessions because he failed to demonstrate that Mantell had sufficient expertise in the field.

Additionally, even if we were to agree that the court

abused its discretion in concluding that the defendant

had failed to prove that Mantell had expertise on the

topic of false confessions, we, nonetheless, also would

agree with the court’s conclusion that the testimony

proposed was ‘‘incomplete and not directly applicable’’

to this case, and that it would not have ‘‘assist[ed] the

jury in understanding the evidence or in determining
whether . . . the defendant’s confession was false.’’ In

short, we would conclude that the defendant failed to

establish a nexus between Mantell’s proposed testimony and the facts of this case.

Although Mantell discussed the general characteristics of someone who might be susceptible to giving a

false confession during his testimony at the proffer

hearing, he stated that he had not evaluated the defendant, that he was not familiar with any kind of psychological examination involving the defendant, that he had

never seen the result of a psychological examination

involving the defendant, and that he had no idea what

such an examination might reveal. He also stated that

he had no idea regarding the defendant’s suggestibility,

eagerness to please, level of intelligence, or propensity

for mental illness. Additionally, although Mantell discussed the types of police interrogation tactics that

might render a susceptible person more likely to give

a false confession, he stated that he had no knowledge

of the police interview and interrogation process in

this case, and that he had not reviewed or heard the

testimony given by the police regarding the interview

and interrogation process in this case. He stated that

there was nothing in the defendant’s confession that

would help him to understand the defendant’s

demeanor or motivation while being questioned by the

police, and that he had no understanding of the context

of the defendant’s confession or why the defendant

confessed despite knowing the legal consequences for

doing so. On the basis of this evidence, we agree with

the court’s conclusion that the defendant failed to establish the necessary nexus for the proposed testimony.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in precluding Mantell’s testimony as an

expert on the topic of false confessions.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

denied his motion to suppress his statements to the

police, his confession, and the evidence that he claims

was obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407,

9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). The defendant argues that the

level of police dominance and control over the marina

for a prolonged three hour period of time demonstrates

that the defendant was in custody, and that the court

failed to review the totality of the situation when it

denied the motion to suppress. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

review. The defendant filed a motion to suppress his

statements to the police, his confession, and any evidence seized by the police on the ground that he was in

custody and the police had not given him any Miranda

warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 478–

79. The court held a hearing on the motion, and, on

September 10, 2012, issued a memorandum of decision
in which it denied the motion after finding that the

defendant had not been in custody at the time he spoke

to the police or when he gave his confession. Specifically, the court issued the following findings and conclusions of law. The defendant arrived at the marina at

approximately 1:42 p.m., accompanied by his fourteen

year old niece. At that time, state police Trooper Christopher Reid already was parked at the marina watching

the defendant’s boat, as he had been ordered to do.

When the defendant and his niece boarded the boat,

Reid approached them and told them that they could

not be on the boat because it was a possible crime

scene. Reid asked to see the defendant’s license, and

he asked the defendant if he would stand by until

investigating detectives arrived on the scene. The defendant was cooperative, and Reid never raised his voice.

At no time did Reid prevent any members of the public

from entering or exiting the marina.

When Reid informed Derry that the defendant was

at the marina, Derry told Reid that the defendant had

a firearm permit, and, for safety reasons, Reid asked

the defendant if he could pat him down and search his

truck. The defendant agreed, and he also showed Reid

his gun permit. Derry arrived at the marina at approximately 1:55 p.m., and he parked his police cruiser to

the north of the defendant’s truck, so that no vehicles

were blocking the access to the marina exit. The defendant and his niece then were separated because of the

sensitive nature of the discussion and the age of the

niece. Derry told the defendant that he was free to leave

and explained the nature of the police investigation.

Derry contacted McGlynn and advised him that the

defendant was at the marina. McGlynn told Derry to

tell the defendant that he was not in custody and that

he did not have to remain at the marina, and Derry

complied. The defendant, however, choose to remain

present, indicating to Derry that he had nothing to hide.

Derry showed the defendant a consent to search form

and asked if he would permit a search of the boat; he

also told him, however, that he had a right to refuse at

that time. The defendant agreed to the search and

signed the form. Both Derry and the defendant were

calm throughout their discussions, and the defendant

was not handcuffed or restrained, no weapons were

displayed, and no threats or promises were made to

the defendant. The defendant was very cooperative.

The defendant and his niece sat on the truck or stood

in the parking lot. The defendant never asked to leave

and was told at least four times, by three different

members of the state police, that he was free to leave.

Both the defendant and his niece used their cell phones.

By approximately 4:34 p.m., the search having concluded, the other members of the state police left the

marina, leaving Reid as the only member of the state

police present, and he was awaiting the arrival of

McGlynn. The defendant and his niece also remained.
At approximately 5:15 p.m., McGlynn and Wisner, who

were wearing plain clothes, arrived in an unmarked

police vehicle. McGlynn immediately went to talk to

the defendant, who was calm and cooperative. McGlynn

asked the defendant if he was willing to follow them

to the state police barracks so that they could talk, and

the defendant agreed, leaving in his truck with his niece,

following behind the police vehicles. The defendant

parked in the front of the barracks, while the police

drove to the back of the building to a parking lot

reserved for police personnel. McGlynn and Wisner met

the defendant in the lobby of the barracks, and they all

went to McGlynn’s office, with the exception of the

defendant’s niece, who remained in the lobby. Both

McGlynn and Wisner told the defendant that he was

not under arrest, and McGlynn also told him that he

did not have to stay there for an interview and was free

to leave. The defendant acknowledged that he

understood.

McGlynn’s office was twelve feet by fifteen feet, with

a window, a comfortable couch, on which the defendant

sat, two desks, and two chairs. The defendant conversed easily with the detectives for approximately one

half to three quarters of an hour. He was not restrained

or handcuffed; he was calm and cooperative. The interview was cordial and noncoercive. McGlynn then asked

the defendant if he would sign a written statement.

McGlynn advised the defendant of his Miranda warnings, typed the four page statement, read the statement

out loud to the defendant, asked the defendant to read

the statement to himself, and had the defendant sign

next to the Miranda advisement on the statement. The

defendant then signed each page of the statement under

oath. His sworn signature then was witnessed on each

page by McGlynn.

During his discussion with McGlynn, the defendant

had told him about the ‘‘O’’ ring and had said that he

was wearing the device. Subsequent to the statement

being completed, the defendant asked to go to the

restroom, and McGlynn escorted him down the hall to

the facilities, where the defendant entered alone. As

previously stated, when the defendant came out of the

restroom, he gave McGlynn the ‘‘O’’ ring he had been

wearing. McGlynn told the defendant that he had the

right to refuse to allow McGlynn to seize the object,

and he asked him to sign another consent to search

form, giving McGlynn permission to seize the ‘‘O’’ ring

that the defendant already had given to McGlynn. The

defendant signed the form. The defendant also gave

McGlynn permission to scroll through his cell phone,

and he signed a consent to search form for that as well.

Additionally, the defendantlater accompanied McGlynn

back to the marina where other items were seized on

the basis of the earlier consent form that had been

signed. The defendant did not object or attempt to limit

his earlier consent, and he later left the marina without
being placed under arrest at that time. On the basis of

these findings, the court concluded that the defendant

was not in police custody when he was at the marina,

when he was interrogated by McGlynn and Wisner at

the barracks, when he gave his statement to McGlynn,

when he handed McGlynn the ‘‘O’’ ring, or when he

returned to the marina with McGlynn to seize other

items from the boat.

The defendant claims that the court improperly

denied his motion to suppress evidence after it wrongfully concluded that he had not been in police custody.

He argues that the police dominated and controlled the

marina, isolated him, singled him out as a suspect, and

held him for a lengthy police interrogation—all of which

evince a custodial interrogation. We are not persuaded.

‘‘[O]ur standard of review of a trial court’s findings

and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the

evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . .

[When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and

logically correct and whether they find support in the

facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Early, 152

Conn. App. 466, 475–76, 96 A.3d 651 (2014).

‘‘Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order

to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by

Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody;

and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to

police interrogation. . . . [A]lthough the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is in custody for purposes

of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry

is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint

on freedom of movement of the degree associated with

a formal arrest. . . . Further, the United States

Supreme Court has adopted an objective, reasonable

person test for determining whether a defendant is in

custody. . . . Thus, in determining whether Miranda

[warnings] are required, the only relevant inquiry is

whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position

would believe that he or she was in police custody of

the degree associated with a formal arrest. . . .

‘‘Furthermore, we note that [n]o definitive list of factors governs a determination of whether a reasonable

person in the defendant’s position would have believed

that he or she was in custody. Because, however, the

Miranda court expressed concern with protecting

defendants against interrogations that take place in a

police-dominated atmosphere containing inherently

compelling pressures which work to undermine the

individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak

where he would not otherwise do so freely . . . circumstances relating to those kinds of concerns are
highly relevant on the custody issue. . . . In determining whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s

position would have believed that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a

formal arrest, our courts often have utilized the free to

leave test, pursuant to which Miranda warnings are

required only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable

person would believe that he or she was not free to

leave the scene of the interrogation. . . . The free to

leave test is a good fit for a Miranda inquiry when the

police interrogate someone at a police station . . . .

‘‘The defendant bears the burden of proving custodial

interrogation. . . . The trial court’s determination of

the historical circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation are findings of fact . . . which will

not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.

. . . In order to determine the [factual] issue of custody, however, we will conduct a scrupulous examination of the record . . . in order to ascertain whether,

in light of the totality of circumstances, the trial court’s

finding is supported by substantial evidence. . . . The

ultimate inquiry as to whether, in light of these factual

circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s

position would believe that he or she was in police

custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest

. . . calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts [and] . . . therefore, presents a . . . question of law . . . over which our

review is de novo.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis, 148 Conn. App.

788, 799–801, 86 A.3d 1074, cert. granted on other

grounds, 311 Conn. 940, 89 A.3d 349 (2014).

Here, as set forth previously in this opinion, the court

made extensive factual findings related to this issue

before concluding that the defendant was not in police

custody at the marina, at the time he was interrogated,

or at the time he gave his confession. The defendant

does not challenge as clearly erroneous any of the

court’s factual findings, and our own careful examination of the record reveals that the court’s conclusion

that the defendant was not in custody is supported by

substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court properly

denied the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis

that he was not in police custody.

III

The defendant next claims that the court erred in

denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized

from his boat afterimproperly finding that he had voluntarily consented to a police search of the boat and the

seizure of its contents. He argues that, because the

police already had seized the boat by the time he got

to the marina, he had no meaningful opportunity to

object to the seizure of its contents. The defendant

also asserts that this error was not harmless. We are

not persuaded.
At the outset, we note that the defendant did not

make this argument before the trial court. On appeal,

however, the defendant claims that the seizure of items

from the boat was unlawful because he could not meaningfully consent. Because the defendant raises this

claim forthe first time on appeal, he seeks review under

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823

(1989). Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a

claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only

if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record

is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2)

the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the

violation of a fundamentalright;(3)the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the

defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’(Emphasis omitted.)Id. This claim

is appropriate for review as the record is adequate, and

the claim is of constitutional dimension. The claim fails,

however, under Golding’s third prong.

‘‘A warrantless search is not unreasonable under

either the fourth amendment to the constitution of the

United States or article first, § 7, of the constitution of

Connecticut if a person with authority to do so has

freely consented to the search. . . . The state bears

the burden of proving that the consent was free and

voluntary. . . . The state must affirmatively establish

that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to

a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the

state’s burden. . . . The question whether consent to

a search has in fact been freely and voluntarily given,

or was the product of coercion, express or implied . . .

is a question of fact to be determined from the totality

of all the circumstances. . . . As a question of fact, it

is normally to be decided by the trial court upon the

evidence before that court together with the reasonable

inferences to be drawn from that evidence. . . . We

may reverse [the trial court’s factual] findings on appeal

only if they are clearly erroneous. . . . Thus, [w]hether

there was valid consent to a search is a factual question

that will not be lightly overturned on appeal. . . .

‘‘In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the [c]ourt has assessed the

totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the

characteristics of the accused and the details of the

interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account

have included the youth of the accused . . . his lack

of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . the lack

of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights

. . . the length of detention . . . the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning . . . and the use of

physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or

sleep . . . . In analyzing these factors, the Supreme

Court noted that it had determined the factual circum-
stances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the

legal significance of how the accused reacted. . . .

‘‘In evaluating the voluntariness of the defendant’s

consent, we note that, while the subject’s knowledge

of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account,

the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such

knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary

consent. . . . The Supreme Court has emphasized that

this rule remains applicable to requests for consent to

search during traffic stops, calling it unrealistic to

require police officers to always inform detainees that

they are free to go before a consent to search may be

deemed voluntary.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins,

298 Conn. 209, 249–51, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).

The defendant claims that his consent to search the

boat was involuntary because the police already had

seized the boat by the time he got to the marina. Therefore, he argues, he had no meaningful opportunity to

object to the seizure of the boat’s contents.9 On the

basis of the numerous findings of the trial court, which

are not challenged as clearly erroneous on appeal, we

conclude that this claim is meritless.

The court found that the defendant arrived at the

marina at approximately 1:42 p.m., accompanied by his

niece. Reid already was at the marina, and when the

defendant and his niece boarded the boat, Reid told

them that they could not remain on the boat because

it was a possible crime scene. Reid then asked the

defendant if he would stay on the scene until investigating detectives arrived. The defendant was cooperative,

and Reid did not raise his voice. When Derry arrived

at the marina just a few minutes later, Derry spoke with

the defendant privately about the nature of the police

investigation, and he told the defendant that he was

free to leave. Derry then contacted McGlynn, who told

Derry to tell the defendant that he was not in custody

and that he did not have to remain at the marina, and

Derry complied. The defendant chose to remain present, indicating to Derry that he had nothing to hide.

Derry then showed the defendant a consent to search

form and asked if he would allow a search of the boat.

Derry also told the defendant that he had a right to

refuse. The defendant, however, agreed to permit the

search, and he signed the form. Both Derry and the

defendant remained calm throughout their discussions.

The defendant was not handcuffed or restrained, he

was not threatened, no promises were made to him,

and no weapons were displayed.

On the basis of the trial court’s extensive findings,

and the court’s consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the court’s determination

that the defendant’s consent was voluntary was not

clearly erroneous. Accordingly, no clear constitutional
violation exists, and the defendant’s claim fails under

Golding’s third prong. The court properly denied the

defendant’s motion to suppress the items seized from

the boat.

IV

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion in refusing to instruct the jury to apply ‘‘special scrutiny’’ when assessing the defendant’s confession, which had been admitted into evidence, because

the confession was the product of an unrecorded police

interrogation.10 He argues that the court’s refusal to give

this charge implicates his right to present a complete

defense. We disagree.

‘‘We begin with the well established standard of

review governing the defendant’s [challenge] to the trial

court’s jury instruction. Our review of the defendant’s

claim requires that we examine the [trial] court’s entire

charge to determine whether it is reasonably possible

that the jury could have been misled by the omission

of the requested instruction. . . . [Although] a request

to charge that is relevant to the issues in a case and that

accurately states the applicable law must be honored, a

[trial] court need not tailor its charge to the precise

letter of such a request. . . . If a requested charge is

in substance given, the [trial] court’s failure to give a

charge in exact conformance with the words of the

request will not constitute a ground for reversal. . . .

As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted

to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury

. . . we will not view the instructions as improper. . . .

Additionally, we have noted that [a]n [impropriety] in

instructions in a criminal case is reversible . . . when

it is shown that it is reasonably possible for [improprieties] of constitutional dimension orreasonably probable

for nonconstitutional [improprieties] that the jury [was]

misled. . . .

‘‘In determining whether the trial court improperly

refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to

supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request

to charge [that] is relevant to the issues of [a] case and

which is an accurate statement of the law must be given.

. . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably

support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court

has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a

trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with

a party’s requestto charge [only]ifthe proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Baltas, 311 Conn. 786, 808–810, 91 A.3d 384 (2014).

On September 28, 2012, the trial court held an on the

record charging conference. During the discussion, the

court informed counsel that it was not going to give

the jury an instruction that had been requested by the
defendant that stated the jury did not have a complete

picture of what occurred during the defendant’s interrogation because of the lack of a recorded interrogation in

this case. See footnote 10 of this opinion. The defendant

challenges that ruling on appeal. Although he claims

that the ruling implicated his right to present a defense,

he sets forth no analysis or standard of review applicable to such a right. He merely argues that the court

abused its discretion in denying his request. Accordingly, we deem any constitutional claim abandoned.

As our Supreme Court explained in State v. Corbin,

260 Conn. 730, 742, 799 A.2d 1056 (2002): ‘‘While the

preliminary question of admissibility of a confession is

for the court, the credibility and weight to be accorded

the confession is for the jury. . . . [T]his rule does not

require the court to give a particular instruction to the

jury regarding the credibility of [the defendant’s] confession simply because [the] confession was a significant piece of evidence. A court has discretion in

determining what instructions a jury is to receive. . . .

The degree to which reference to the evidence may be

[made] . . . lies largely in the discretion of the court.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

In its instruction to the jury, the court explained to

the jury: ‘‘You are the sole judge of the facts. It is your

duty to find the facts. You are to recollect and weigh

the evidence and form your own conclusions as to what

the ultimate facts are.’’ The court further explained: ‘‘In

deciding what the facts are, you must consider all the

evidence. In doing this, you must decide which testimony to believe and which testimony not to believe.

You may believe or disbelieve all, none or any part of

any witness’ testimony. In making that decision, you

may take into account a number of factors, including

the following: Was the witness able to see or hear or

know the things about which the witness testified, how

well was the witness able to recall and describe those

things during the course of his or her testimony, what

was the witness’ manner or demeanor while testifying,

did the witness have any interest in the outcome of this

case or any bias or prejudice concerning any party or

any matter involved in the case, how reasonable was

the witness’ testimony considered in light of all the

evidence in the case, [and] was the witness’ testimony

contradicted by what that witness has said or done at

another time or by the testimony of other witnesses or

by other evidence.

‘‘If you conclude that a witness has deliberately testified falsely in some respect, you should carefully consider whether you should rely on any of that person’s

testimony. In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, keep in mind that people sometimes forget things,

particularly, with the passage of time. You need to consider, therefore, whether a contradiction or inconsistency is an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional
falsehood and that may depend on whether it has to

do with an important fact or with only a small detail.

A prior contradiction or inconsistency may be considered by you in assessing a witness’ credibility. These

are some of the factors you may consider in deciding

whether to believe testimony.

‘‘You size up each witness and then make your own

judgment as to his or her credibility and decide what

portion, all, some or none, of any particular witness’

testimony you will believe. You should use all of your

experiences, your knowledge of human nature and the

motive[s] which influence and control human conduct,

and you should test the evidence against that knowledge. In short, you are to use the same sound judgment

with which you test truth and veracity as it daily occurs

in the ordinary course of your own lives.’’

Specifically as to the defendant’s statements to the

police, the court instructed that the statements ‘‘are to

be considered by you together with all the evidence,

and you should give them such weight as they appear

to be entitled to in view of all the circumstances under

which they were made.’’ The court then explained to

the jury that it ‘‘must determine the credibility of a

police official in the same way and by the same standards as [it] would evaluate the testimony of a witness

who is not a police official. The testimony of a police

official is entitled to no special or exclusive weight

merely because it comes from a police official.’’

The court instructed: ‘‘You should neither believe nor

disbelieve the testimony of a police official just because

the witness is a police official. You have heard evidence

in this case of various statements made by witnesses

and the defendant on different dates [that] were not

recorded either by videotape or audiotape. Our law

in this state does not require that such statement be

electronically recorded.’’ The court also thoroughly

instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence.

Our careful review of the court’s detailed instructions, viewed as a whole, reveals that they were correct

in law and were sufficient to guide the jury in its task of

evaluating all of the evidence, including the defendant’s

statements and his confession, and the circumstances

related thereto. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial

court’s instructions fairly represented the case to the

jury, so that no injustice was done.

V

The defendant’s final claim is that the court abused

its discretion and improperly restricted his right to confrontation by excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged

sexual history. The defendant claims that this evidence

would have ‘‘provided [his] expert with the foundation

for an opinion as to how the [victim] would fabricate

a claim of sexual abuse’’ and that ‘‘it bore directly on
the issue of an alternate source for [the victim’s] sexual

knowledge.’’ The state contends that this claim is meritless. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

consideration of this claim. At a September 17, 2012

hearing, the court, inter alia, considered the admissibility of the fourteen year old victim’s sexual history. The

defendant asserted that, pursuant to subsection (4) of

General Statutes § 54-86f, which commonly is referred

to as the rape shield statute, and State v. Rolon, 257

Conn. 156, 777 A.2d 604 (2001), the sexual history of

the victim should be admitted because it demonstrated

that the victim was prematurely sexualized, which

caused her to pursue the defendant and to fabricate a

relationship with him, and it showed an alternate basis

for the victim’s sexual knowledge. He also argued that

this evidence would not prejudice the victim because

her name had been redacted from the record. The state

vigorously objected to this evidence, arguing that there

was no indication that the victim was confused about

what had happened with the defendant, that she was

fourteen years old when the defendant had a sexual

relationship with her, and that she was not a toddler

for whom an alternate basis of sexual knowledge might

be relevant. The court determined that the evidence

did not meet the test established in Rolon, that it was

not relevant or necessary to the defendant’s theory that

the victim had fabricated the assaults, and that, because

the victim was not a young child, an alternate source

of sexual knowledge was not a critical issue in the case.

Accordingly, the court determined that such evidence

was inadmissible. The court later ruled, however, that

the defendant could ask the victim how she knew about

fellatio, cunnilingus, and vaginal intercourse prior to

the defendant’s sexual assaults, and the defendant did

make such an inquiry during his cross-examination of

the victim. The defendant now claims that the court

abused its discretion and improperly restricted his right

to confrontation by barring evidence of the victim’s

sexual history.

It is well established under our law that a defendant

has the right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the confrontation clauses of both our federal

and state constitutions. U.S. Const., amends. VI and

XIV; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8. ‘‘[T]he right of an accused

in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the

right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s

accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine

witnesses and to call witnesses in one’s own behalf have

long been recognized as essential to due process. . . .

‘‘We are mindful, however, that the right to confront

and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate

interests in the criminal trial process. . . . For example, the trial court has a right, indeed, [a] duty, to
exclude irrelevant evidence. . . . The rules excluding

evidence from criminal trials, however, may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are

designed to serve.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rolon, supra, 257 Conn.

175–76.

The rape shield statute, § 54-86f, ‘‘was enacted specifically to bar or limit the use of prior sexual conduct of

an alleged victim of a sexual assault because it is such

highly prejudicial material. . . . Our legislature has

determined that, exceptin specific instances, and taking

the defendant’s constitutional rights into account, evidence of prior sexual conduct is to be excluded for

policy purposes. Some of these policies include protecting the victim’s sexual privacy and shielding her

from undue harassment, encouraging reports of sexual

assault, and enabling the victim to testify in court with

less fear of embarrassment. . . . Other policies promoted by the law include avoiding prejudice to the

victim, jury confusion and waste of time on collateral

matters. . . .

‘‘However, [a]lthough the state’s interests in limiting

the admissibility of this type of evidence are substantial,

they cannot by themselves outweigh the defendant’s

competing constitutional interests. . . . We must

remember that [t]he determination of whether the

state’s interests in excluding evidence must yield to

those interests of the defendant is determined by the

facts and circumstances of the particular case. . . . In

every criminal case, the defendant has an important

interest in being permitted to introduce evidence relevant to his defense. Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is

that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even

to a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or

merely cumulative. . . . Whenever the rape shield statute’s preclusion of prior sexual conduct is invoked, a

question of relevancy arises. If the evidence is probative, the statute’s protection yields to constitutional

rights that assure a full and fair defense. . . . If the

defendant’s offer of proof is sufficient to show relevancy, and that the evidence is more probative to the

defense than prejudicial to the victim, it must be

deemed admissible at trial. . . . When the trial court

excludes defense evidence that provides the defendant

with a basis for cross-examination of the state’s witnesses, [despite what might be considered a sufficient

offer of proof] such exclusion may give rise to a claim

of denial of the right to confrontation and to present a

defense.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Cecil J., 291 Conn. 813, 823–24, 970

A.2d 710 (2009).

Section 54-86f provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any prosecution for sexual assault under sections 53a-70, 53a70a, and 53a-71 to 53a-73a, inclusive, no evidence of
the sexual conduct of the victim may be admissible

unless such evidence is (1) offered by the defendant

on the issue of whether the defendant was, with respect

to the victim, the source of semen, disease, pregnancy

or injury, or (2) offered by the defendant on the issue

of credibility of the victim, provided the victim has

testified on direct examination as to his or her sexual

conduct, or (3) any evidence of sexual conduct with

the defendant offered by the defendant on the issue of

consent by the victim, when consent is raised as a

defense by the defendant, or (4) otherwise so relevant

and material to a critical issue in the case that excluding

it would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.

Such evidence shall be admissible only after a hearing

on a motion to offer such evidence containing an offer

of proof. On motion of either party the court may order

such hearing held in camera, subject to the provisions

of section 51-164x. If the proceeding is a trial with a

jury, such hearing shall be held in the absence of the

jury. If, after hearing, the court finds that the evidence

meets the requirements of this section and that the

probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the victim, the court may grant the

motion. . . .’’

In State v. Rolon, supra, 257 Conn. 185–86, our

Supreme Court ‘‘recognized the critical nature of prior

sexual abuse evidence in the defendant’s effort to rebut

the inference that [the defendant] is the source of [the

victim’s] sexual knowledge or behavioral characteristics. [I]f the jury is not allowed to learn of the [prior

sexual] offenses against [the victim], then [it] will inevitably conclude that the [victim’s] highly age-inappropriate sexual knowledge could only come from [the]

defendant having committed such acts. . . . Without

that evidence, [t]he inference that [a victim] could not

possess the sexual knowledge he [or she] does unless

[the defendant] sexually assaulted [him or her] greatly

bolsters [a victim’s] allegations. . . . In order to rebut

that inference, [the defendant] must establish an alternative source for [the victim’s] sexual knowledge . . .

[as] a necessary and critical element of [his] defense.

. . . Simply put, the prior sexual conduct must account

for how the [victim] could provide the testimony’s sexual detail without having suffered [the] defendant’s

alleged conduct. . . .

‘‘A clear statement of the defendant’s theory of relevance is all important in determining whether the evidence is offered for a permissible purpose. . . . In

[Rolon, our Supreme Court] concluded that in order

for evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct to be

admissible under § 54-86f to show a source for the victim’s sexual knowledge, [p]rior to trial the defendant

must make an offer of proof showing: (1) that the prior

acts clearly occurred; (2) that the acts closely resembled those of the present case; (3) that the prior [acts

are] clearly relevant to a material issue; (4) that the
evidence is necessary to [the] defendant’s case; and (5)

that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its

prejudicial effect.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cecil J., supra, 291

Conn. 824–25.

In the present case, the defendant sought to introduce

evidence of the victim’s sexual history to prove that

she was fabricating the extent of her relationship with

the defendant and to explain the basis of her sexual

knowledge. The court found that the victim’s sexual

history would do neither, and that the defendant had

failed to establish four of the five prongs of the Rolon

test. See State v. Rolon, supra, 257 Conn. 183–84.

On appeal, the defendant sets forth the Rolon criteria,

but fails to articulate how evidence of the victim’s sexual history specifically meets each prong of the Rolon

test. Our own review of the record, including the defendant’s proffer to the trial court and his arguments on

appeal, leads us to the firm conclusion that the court

properly held that the defendant failed to satisfy the

Rolon test and failed to prove the relevancy of the

proffered evidence. Although the defendant arguably

satisfied the first prong of the Rolon test, namely, that

the prior acts clearly occurred, he failed to satisfy any

of the remaining prongs. The victim’s prior sexual history did not closely resemble those of the present case;

the history was not clearly relevant to a material issue

in this case; the history was not necessary to the case

because the defendant was permitted to, and did elicit,

information from the victim that she had prior sexual

knowledge before the defendant’s sexual abuse; and

the history certainly was much more prejudicial than

probative. See id.; see also id., 180–181 (distinguishing

in part State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 644 A.2d 887

[1994], on the ground that ‘‘the victims in Kulmac were

ages fourteen and fifteen at the time of trial . . . an

age at which most young adults are less likely to be

confused over an individual’s identity and are capable

of understanding matters of a sexual nature’’ [citation

omitted]). Additionally, there is no case law or persuasive argument presented by the defendant to support a

proposition that evidence of the victim’s sexual history

would have supported the defendant’s claim that she

fabricated her relationship with him—there being no

allegation that her prior sexual history included fabrication of any type. Accordingly, the court properly prohibited an inquiry into the victim’s sexual history.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline

to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be

ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

2 The defendant also was charged under a separate docket number with

one count of sexual assault in the second degree and one count of risk of

injury to a child on the basis of allegations made by the victim involving
conduct of the defendant that allegedly occurred in a different municipality.

The cases were joined for trial. The jury found the defendant not guilty of

the crimes that were alleged to have occurred in the other municipality.

3 During oral argument before us, the panel asked the defendant’s appellate

attorney if he was ‘‘claiming that this defendant was somehow . . . specially

subject to coercion or manipulation due to any mental, psychiatric, [or]

psychological predisposition or problem,’’ to which counsel replied that he

was not making such a claim.

4 We note that the defendant’s failure to submit sufficient proof in this

case of Mantell’s expertise in the area of false confessions, either through

testimony or through other evidence, does not necessitate a conclusion that

such expertise could not be established in another case. We also note that

Mantell was permitted to testify as an expert on other issues in this case.

5 Section 7-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘(a) Opinion

testimony by experts. An expert may testify in the form of an opinion and

give reasons therefor, provided sufficient facts are shown as the foundation

for the expert’s opinion.

‘‘(b) Bases of opinion testimony by experts. The facts in the particular

case upon which an expert bases an opinion may be those perceived by or

made known to the expert at or before the proceeding. The facts need not

be admissible in evidence if of a type customarily relied on by experts in

the particular field in forming opinions on the subject. The facts relied on

pursuant to this subsection are not substantive evidence, unless otherwise

admissible as such evidence.

‘‘(c) Hypothetical questions. An expert may give an opinion in response

to a hypothetical question provided that the hypothetical question (1) presents the facts in such a manner that they bear a true and fair relationship

to each other and to the evidence in the case, (2) is not worded so as to

mislead or confuse the jury, and (3) is not so lacking in the essential facts

as to be without value in the decision of the case. A hypothetical question

need not contain all of the facts in evidence.’’

6 We note that the suitability of a Porter hearing in this instance is not

before us. See State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 80–90, 698 A.2d 739 (1997),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998). Although

the court inquired as to whether a Porter hearing was necessary, the state

did not request such a hearing, and defense counsel stated that he ‘‘would

argue that false confession testimony is so well accepted in Connecticut

and in the country that a Porter hearing isn’t necessary at all.’’ He also

stated that Porter did not apply to testimony about false confessions because

‘‘it’s not scientific.’’

7 The defendant also claims that the court improperly stated that jurors

could use their common sense to ascertain whether someone falsely confessed. We have reviewed the court’s memorandum of decision and take this

opportunity to disavow the following statement: ‘‘The proposed testimony

would be nothing more than a barrage of possibly impressive jargon which

is nothing more than a set of academic synonyms for threats, promises, and

other inducements made to a confessor. The average juror possesses the

common knowledge, when provided with evidence of fear, anxiety, threats,

promises, inducements, and other circumstances surrounding the confession, to consider the defendant’s claim that certain circumstances on June

27 [2010] led him to falsely confess.’’

8 Mantell was permitted to testify on this topic during the defendant’s trial.

9 We note that the defendant did not claim before the trial court or on

appeal that the seizure of the boat was unlawful.

10 The defendant’s requested instruction provided: ‘‘Where there is a failure

to electronically record an interrogation, you have not been provided with

a complete picture of all of the facts surrounding the defendant’s statement

and the precise details of that statement. By way of example, you cannot

hear the tone or inflection of the defendant’s or interrogator’s voices, or

hear first hand the interrogation, both questions and answers, in their

entirety. Instead, you have been presented with a summary based upon the

recollections of law enforcement personnel.

‘‘Furthermore, in considering whether or not an oral statement was actually made by the defendant, and if made, whether it is credible, you should

receive, weigh, and consider this evidence with caution as well, based on

the generally recognized risk of misunderstanding by the hearer, or the

ability of the hearer to recall accurately the words used by the defendant.

The specific words used and ability to remember them are important to the

correct understanding of any oral communication because the presence, or

absence, of a single word may substantially change the true meaning of
even the shortest sentence.’’