THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

State of South Carolina, Respondent,

v.

Conrad Lamont Slocumb, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002031

IN THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Opinion No. 27877

Heard December 12, 2018 – Filed April 3, 2019

RELIEF DENIED 

Tara Dawn Shurling, of the Law Office of Tara Dawn 

Shurling, P.A., of Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney 

General Mark R. Farthing, both of Columbia, for 

Respondent.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Micheal Dudek, 

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, Appellate 

Defender Laura Ruth Baer, all of Columbia, for Amicus 

Curiae, South Carolina Division of Appellate Defense. 

John H. Blume, III and Lindsey Sterling Vann, both of 

Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, Justice 360 & Cornell 

Juvenile Justice Project. 
Executive Director James Hugh Ryan, III, of Columbia, 

for Amicus Curiae, South Carolina Commission on 

Indigent Defense. 

Joseph M. McCulloch, Jr., of Columbia, and Seth P. 

Waxman, of Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae, The 

South Carolina State Conference of the National 

Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 

Alexandra V.B. Gordon, Aidan Synnott, Anne O'Toole 

and Agbeko C. Petty, all of New York, NY, for Amicus 

Curiae, South Carolina Public Defender Association and 

South Carolina Criminal Association of Criminal 

Defense Lawyers. 

JUSTICE KITTREDGE: At the age of thirteen, petitioner Conrad Slocumb 

kidnapped and sexually assaulted a teacher before shooting her in the face and 

head five times and leaving her for dead. Three years later, following his guilty 

plea for the first set of crimes, he escaped from custody and raped and robbed 

another woman in a brutal manner before being apprehended again. For these two 

sets of crimes, Slocumb received an aggregate 130-year sentence due to the

individual sentences being run consecutively.

Following rounds of direct appeals and collateral proceedings, Slocumb now 

contends an aggregate 130-year sentence for multiple offenses committed on 

multiple dates violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 

extrapolated from the principles set forth in the United States Supreme Court's 

(Supreme Court) decisions in Graham v. Florida1 and Miller v. Alabama,

2 among 

others. We acknowledge ostensible merit in Slocumb's argument, for it is arguably 

a reasonable extension of Graham and Miller. Yet precedent dictates that only the 

 

1 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting courts from imposing a sentence of life without 

the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide 

offense). 

2 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding mandatory life without parole sentences for 

juveniles convicted of homicide offenses violated the Eighth Amendment's 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments).
Supreme Court may extend and enlarge the protections guaranteed by the United 

States Constitution. Once the Supreme Court has drawn a line in the sand, the 

authority to redraw that line and broaden federal constitutional protections is 

limited to our nation's highest court. Because the decision to expand the reach and 

protections of the Eighth Amendment lies exclusively with the Supreme Court, we 

are constrained to deny Slocumb relief.

I.

In 1992, when he was thirteen years old, Slocumb accosted a high school teacher 

in the school parking lot and forced her into her car at gunpoint, directing her to 

drive to a wooded area. Slocumb unsuccessfully attempted to force the teacher 

into the woods before grabbing her, squeezing her breast, and digitally penetrating 

her vagina through her clothing. He then shot the teacher in the face and head five 

times and drove off in her car, leaving her on the side of the road. Miraculously, 

the teacher survived and identified Slocumb as the perpetrator. Eventually, 

Slocumb pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the first degree (CSC-1st) in 

exchange for the remaining charges being nol prossed and was sentenced to thirty 

years' imprisonment.

Three years later, while returning from an off-site medical visit, Slocumb escaped 

from custody for a total of forty-five minutes. In the short time he was free, he ran 

to a nearby apartment complex, located a lone woman, and forced his way into her 

apartment. Once inside, Slocumb claimed he had a gun and demanded the woman 

turn over her car keys, money, jewelry, cigarettes, beer, and a change of clothes. 

After the woman complied with his demands, Slocumb forced her to undress, said 

"I'm going to have some sex," and, after reminding her he was armed, proceeded to 

rape her. The woman nonetheless continued to resist, whereupon Slocumb forced 

her to stand and touch her toes as he raped her from behind. After the rape, 

Slocumb left the apartment and was apprehended in the parking lot by law 

enforcement.

After a jury trial and multiple rounds of direct appeals, post-conviction relief 

applications, and resentencing hearings, Slocumb was ultimately sentenced to life 

without parole for burglary in the first degree, thirty years' imprisonment for CSC1st, thirty years' imprisonment for kidnapping, fifteen years' imprisonment for 

robbery (as a lesser-included offense to armed robbery), and five years' 

imprisonment for escape, the sentences to be served consecutively.

Subsequently, in 2010, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision 

in Graham v. Florida, in which it held the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibited courts from sentencing a juvenile offender convicted of a 

nonhomicide offense to life without parole. 560 U.S. at 82. Slocumb immediately 

filed a federal habeas action, requesting his life sentence for burglary be vacated 

pursuant to Graham. The federal district court granted him relief and remanded 

the case to the circuit court for resentencing on the burglary charge alone.

On remand, Slocumb requested the circuit court not only resentence him on the 

burglary charge, but also vacate the remaining eighty-year aggregate sentence for 

the other crimes and resentence him on all of the charges in accordance "with the 

spirit and intent of" Graham and Miller. Acknowledging that a de facto life 

sentence3 is not expressly prohibited under Graham or Miller, Slocumb invited the 

circuit court to follow the spirit of Graham and Miller and find his aggregate termof-years sentence was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. In addition, 

Slocumb asserted even if his new burglary sentence were run concurrently to his 

eighty-year aggregate sentence for the remaining crimes, the eighty-year sentence 

would also not provide him with a meaningful opportunity for release, as specified 

in Graham, because he would be incarcerated long past his projected life 

expectancy.

In response, the State stressed Graham specifically allowed a state to keep a 

juvenile offender incarcerated for his entire natural life span when the offender 

failed to demonstrate maturity or rehabilitation. The State informed the circuit 

court that it had been contacted by the Department of Corrections (DOC) and told 

that Slocumb, as an adult in his thirties, was an enormous "security risk" with a 

"horrible" behavioral record, including 218 infractions over a sixteen-year period 

for actions such as attacking corrections workers, possession of a weapon, and 

mutilation. According to the State, the DOC's unsolicited contact was the first time 

in at least twenty-three years the agency had felt it necessary to specifically advise 

the State of the potential security risk posed by an inmate.4

 The State also 

informed the circuit court Slocumb had failed to complete any educational courses 

 3 See Bunch v. United States, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing a de 

facto life sentence as one that is expressed as a lengthy term of years, causing the 

defendant's eligibility for parole or release to fall outside his projected life 

expectancy).

4 Similarly, the solicitor who prosecuted Slocumb for the offenses committed when 

he was sixteen years old testified Slocumb was "the most violent sexual predator 

[she] ha[d] ever prosecuted."
or enroll in any rehabilitative programs while incarcerated.5

 The State argued 

Slocumb's poor disciplinary record and failure to attempt to rehabilitate himself fell 

squarely within Graham's language allowing a juvenile offender convicted of a 

nonhomicide offense to be imprisoned for his natural life span. Stated differently, 

Slocumb's adult prison record of continuing impulsivity and violence belies the 

general premises of youth articulated in Roper v. Simmons,

6 Graham, and Miller.

Ultimately, the circuit court found the remand instructions from the federal court 

encompassed only Slocumb's burglary charge. The court then resentenced 

Slocumb to fifty years' imprisonment on the burglary charge, the sentence to be run 

consecutively to the eighty years for the remaining charges, resulting in Slocumb 

facing a 130-year aggregate sentence.

Slocumb appealed, arguing the sentence violated the spirit and letter of Graham, 

but the court of appeals affirmed. Slocumb then filed a petition for a writ of 

certiorari with this Court. Because the court of appeals considered only the 

sentence for burglary in accordance with the limited remand instructions from the 

federal district court, we denied the petition. However, because the certiorari 

petition sought review of the entire 130-year sentence, we observed that the 

constitutionality of the length of Slocumb's aggregate sentence in light of Graham

was more appropriately raised to this Court by way of a petition for a writ of 

certiorari in our original jurisdiction. As a result, Slocumb refiled a petition for a 

writ of certiorari in the Court's original jurisdiction to address whether an 

aggregate sentence imposed for multiple nonhomicide offenses committed while 

Slocumb was a juvenile was the equivalent of a sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole, and if so, whether the aggregate sentence violated the Eighth 

Amendment as interpreted by Graham. We granted the petition.

II.

In the past fourteen years, the Supreme Court issued three decisions concerning

juvenile sentencing practices: Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. 

Alabama. We begin our analysis with a review of this trilogy of cases.

 5 According to the DOC's website, Slocumb still has not earned any education 

credits while incarcerated.

6 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution forbid the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile 

offenders).
A.

In the earliest of its three recent decisions, Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court 

held juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to death if they were under the age 

of eighteen at the time they committed their crimes. 543 U.S. at 568, 578. 

Underlying the Supreme Court's holding was its belief that juveniles were 

fundamentally different from adults, in that they (1) exhibited a lack of maturity 

and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, resulting in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions; (2) were more susceptible to negative outside 

influences such as peer pressure; and (3) had personality traits that were more 

transitory and less fixed than adults. Id. at 569–70. Consequently, as the Supreme 

Court explained, a juvenile's irresponsible conduct was not as morally 

reprehensible as that of an adult and less indicative of an irretrievably depraved 

character. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that as a result of juveniles' 

diminished culpability, the penological justifications for the death penalty applied 

to them with less force than to adults, and therefore the death penalty was an 

ineffective and inappropriate punishment for juvenile offenders. Id. at 571.

B.

Subsequently, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court expanded upon its 

rationale in Roper and held the Eighth Amendment prohibited "the imposition of a 

life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." 

560 U.S. at 82. As a result of the differences between juveniles and adults outlined 

in Roper and the perceived moral distinction between homicide and nonhomicide 

crimes, the Supreme Court concluded that, as compared to an adult murderer, a 

juvenile nonhomicide offender who did not kill or intend to kill had a "twice 

diminished moral culpability." Id. at 69.

Turning to the appropriate punishment for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the 

Supreme Court noted a life without parole sentence was the second most severe 

penalty permitted by law and shared key features with a death sentence "that are 

shared by no other sentence," most importantly, the certainty the defendant will die 

in prison. Id. at 69–70. The Supreme Court discounted the penological 

justifications—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—for 

sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole because 

juveniles have diminished culpability, are less likely to take possible punishment 

into consideration when making decisions, and cannot be reliably classified as 

incorrigible at a young age. Id. at 71–75.

As a result, the Supreme Court held "that for a juvenile offender who did not 
commit homicide[,] the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without 

parole." Id. at 74 (emphasis added). Further,

A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile 

offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, 

however, is give defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to 

obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It is 

for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and 

mechanisms for compliance. It bears emphasis, however, that while 

the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without 

parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not 

require the State to release that offender during his natural life. Those 

who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be 

irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of 

their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility 

that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before 

adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit States 

from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will 

be fit to reenter society.

Id. at 75 (emphasis added).

In dissent, Justice Alito clarified his understanding of the majority's holding, 

stating that "[n]othing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to 

a term of years without the possibility of parole. Indeed, petitioner conceded at 

oral argument that a sentence of as much as 40 years without the possibility of 

parole 'probably' would be constitutional." Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) 

(emphasis added); id. at 123 n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (making a similar 

observation). The majority in no way acknowledged or responded to either Justice 

Alito's or Justice Thomas's statements that the majority holding did not apply to 

juvenile offenders serving lengthy term-of-years sentences.

C.

Finally, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 

forbade states from imposing on juveniles mandatory sentences of life without the 

possibility of parole for homicide offenses. 567 U.S. at 489. The Supreme Court 

reiterated that Roper and Graham stood for the principle that juveniles are 

constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes due to their 

diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. Id. at 471–72. Relevant 
to this appeal, the Supreme Court stated:

Graham's flat ban on life without parole applied only to nonhomicide 

crimes, and the Court took care to distinguish those offenses from 

murder, based on both moral culpability and consequential harm. But 

none of what it said about children—about their distinctive (and 

transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crimespecific. . . . So Graham's reasoning implicates any life-withoutparole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar 

relates only to nonhomicide offenses.

Id. at 473 (bold emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).7

III.

At his resentencing hearing following the grant of federal habeas relief, Slocumb 

conceded to the circuit court that Graham applied only to de jure life sentences. 

Nonetheless, he now argues the general rationale underlying Graham requires us to 

extend its protections to juveniles serving de facto life sentences as well. We agree 

Graham's explicit holding applies to de jure life sentences alone, and its rationale 

may implicate de facto life sentences. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 ("Graham's 

reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a 

juvenile . . . ."). Nonetheless, several factors caution us against extending the reach 

 7 Subsequently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the Supreme 

Court held its decision in Miller announced a new substantive rule of federal 

constitutional law and was to be applied retroactively. To receive relief, Slocumb 

must establish the Graham decision applies retroactively as well. See Teague v. 

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). The Supreme Court has never explicitly held 

Graham applies retroactively. However, using our well-established retroactivity 

analysis, we conclude Graham—like Miller—applies retroactively because it sets 

forth a new substantive rule that excludes a certain class of defendants (juvenile 

nonhomicide offenders) from specific punishment (sentences of life without 

parole). See generally Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 539–44, 765 S.E.2d 572, 

575–77 (2014) (setting forth South Carolina's retroactivity analysis and applying it 

to find discretionary life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders 

were unconstitutional absent individualized hearings that accounted for the 

hallmark features of youth, as set forth in Miller); see also In re Williams, 759 F.3d 

66, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (concluding Graham applied retroactively to cases on 

collateral review); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013) (same).
of Graham to provide Slocumb with relief without further input from the Supreme 

Court.

A.

First, a long line of Supreme Court precedent prohibits us from extending federal 

constitutional protections beyond the boundaries the Supreme Court itself has set. 

See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (per curiam) ("The 

Arkansas Supreme Court's alternative holding, that it may interpret the United 

States Constitution to provide greater protection than this Court's own federal 

constitutional precedents provide, is foreclosed by Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 

(1975)."); Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 & n.4 (stating that while "a State is free as a 

matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those 

this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards," it "may not 

impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this 

Court specifically refrains from imposing them"). As a result, we do not believe it 

is appropriate for this Court, as an inferior court, to extend federal constitutional 

protections under the Eighth Amendment beyond the boundaries the Supreme 

Court set in Graham.

8

Stated differently, while we are duty-bound to enforce the Eighth Amendment 

consistent with the Supreme Court's directives, our duty to follow binding 

precedent is fixed upon case-specific holdings rather than general expressions in an 

opinion that exceed the scope of any particular holding. Vasquez v. 

Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 926 (Va. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 568 

(2016). This is not a subtle distinction, as Chief Justice Marshall long ago 

emphasized its importance to the judicial process, explaining:

It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every 

opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those 

expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be 

respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit 

when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this 

maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is 

investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other 

 8 Slocumb did not argue he would be entitled to relief under our state constitution's 

cruel and unusual punishments clause. See S.C. Const. art. I, § 15 ("[N]or shall 

cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted . . . ."). Accordingly, we 

do not address the import of state constitutional protections on Slocumb's sentence.
principles which may serve to illustrate it[] are considered in their 

relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other 

cases is seldom completely investigated.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) (emphasis added) 

(rejecting counsel's argument that the Supreme Court should follow the reasoning 

set forth in dicta in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). The 

principle enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall has particular force in this case, as a 

closer examination of the Graham majority and dissenting opinions illustrate.

B.

The Graham majority began its analysis by observing that "[t]he present case 

involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical challenge 

to a term-of-years sentence." Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). The 

Supreme Court was thus presented with an opportunity to answer the very question 

Slocumb now presents. Yet the Court—after a lengthy discussion of the changing 

"mores of society" and "the global consensus"9

—answered a narrower question by 

only "hold[ing] that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide[,] the 

Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole." Id. at 74. To 

remove any question as to the holding in Graham, the majority concluded with: 

"The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a 

juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." Id. at 82.

Underscoring its narrow holding and the rarity of sentencing juvenile nonhomicide 

offenders to life without the possibility of parole, the Graham majority discussed 

in detail the number of juveniles nationwide who were serving de jure life 

 9 The so-called consensus against sentencing juvenile offenders to life without 

parole could not be found in the laws of this country, for the vast majority of states 

did not forbid such a sentence. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82–84 (including an 

Appendix to the majority opinion which listed thirty-seven states, the Federal 

Government, and the District of Columbia, all of which permitted de jure life 

sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders). Undaunted, the Supreme Court 

stated that "[t]he evidence of consensus is not undermined by the fact that many 

jurisdictions do not prohibit life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide 

offenders." Id. at 66. The Graham majority found the judgments of other nations 

"not irrelevant" in determining what the United States Constitution really means, 

finding persuasive "the global consensus against the sentencing practice in 

question." Id. at 80 (citation omitted).
sentences, counting 123 affected individuals. Id. at 62–64. Significantly, the 

Supreme Court excluded from its calculations the number of juveniles serving de 

facto life sentences due to a lengthy term of years. See id.; id. at 113 n.11 

(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the majority opinion "exclude[d] from its analysis 

all juveniles sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences (e.g., 70 or 80 years' 

imprisonment)," and finding the omission anomalous because "such a long 

sentence[ ] effectively denies the offender any material opportunity for parole," 

akin to the de jure life sentences the majority found prohibited). The Supreme 

Court made no attempt to quantify whether sentencing juveniles to de facto life 

sentences was "quite rare[]," as it did with those who received de jure life 

sentences. See id. at 64. As a result, Graham's categorical bar was limited to those 

precise 123 juveniles counted by the Supreme Court and, in the future, to those 

juvenile nonhomicide offenders eligible to receive de jure life sentences for their 

crimes.10

Similarly, Justices Thomas and Alito both separately noted their understanding of 

the Graham majority's holding to exclude lengthy term-of-years sentences—

statements which the majority failed to acknowledge or rebut. See id. at 124 

(Alito, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition of a 

sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole."); id. at 113 n.11, 123 

n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Given the dissenting Justices' contemporaneous

understanding of the reach of the majority decision—to which the majority did not 

respond—and because we are being asked to extend the explicit reach of Graham

and find new Eighth Amendment protections, we decline Slocumb's invitation to 

broaden Graham's holding.

11

 10 Several other courts also have found this portion of Graham significant in 

exploring the limited reach of Graham's holding. See, e.g., Bunch, 685 F.3d at 

552; Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128, 1133 (Colo. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 

138 S. Ct. 641 (2018); State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881, 887 n.10 (Mo. 2017) (en 

banc).

11 A number of other courts have also found the Graham majority's failure to 

respond to those statements by Justices Thomas and Alito a telling sign as to the 

intended reach of its decision. See, e.g., Lucero, 394 P.3d at 1133; Adams v. State, 

707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011); State v. Brown, 118 So.3d 332, 336, 341 (La. 

2013); Willbanks v. Dep't of Corr., 522 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Mo. 2017) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 304 (2017); Kinkel v. Persson, 417 P.3d 401, 409–10 (Or. 

2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 789 (2019); Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 925.
C.

We do not deny the obvious—Slocumb's 130-year sentence is a de facto life 

sentence. The Graham Court acknowledged this was the question presented, but it 

chose not to answer the term-of-years sentencing issue, notwithstanding the 

dissenting opinions nipping at the heels of the majority on this very question.12

In emphasizing that Slocumb's situation is beyond the reach of Graham, it may be 

helpful to state the obvious: Slocumb's case is factually distinct from the 

circumstances presented in Graham. While the juvenile offender in Graham was 

convicted of a single crime and sentenced to a single sentence formally termed 

"life without parole,"13 Slocumb committed multiple crimes at two different points 

in time—the second set after he had escaped from custody and, in the short time he 

was free, committed another strikingly similar set of crimes to the first one three 

years earlier. For these crimes, Slocumb received an average per-crime sentence of 

twenty-six years' imprisonment. The only reason his aggregate sentence exceeds 

his life expectancy is because he committed so many crimes, not because a single 

sentence is disproportionately lengthy.

14 Slocumb's case is nothing like Graham. 

 12 Perhaps the narrow holding of Graham was necessary to garner a fifth vote. 

Regardless of the reasons, the holding of Graham is what it is and must be 

respected.

13 To be precise, the juvenile in Graham was sentenced to fifteen years' 

imprisonment for one crime and a term of "life imprisonment" for a second, 

simultaneous crime in a jurisdiction that had abolished its parole system. Graham, 

560 U.S. at 57. But see id. at 53 (describing the second crime as "a first-degree 

felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole"). We refer to the Graham defendant receiving a single life sentence for a 

single crime based on the second conviction, which was the Supreme Court's sole 

focus.

14 See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892) ("If [a defendant sentenced to 

an aggregate sentence for multiple offenses] has subjected himself to a severe 

penalty, it is simply because he has committed a great many such offenses. It 

would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the 

statute prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that had he committed 

so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be 

kept in prison for life. The mere fact that cumulative punishments may be imposed 

for distinct offenses in the same prosecution is not material upon this question. If 

the penalty were unreasonably severe for a single offense, the constitutional 
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 63 ("The instant case concerns only those juvenile 

offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense." 

(emphasis added)).15

Moreover, Slocumb's crimes reflect a critical difference from the juvenile offender 

in Graham: Slocumb shot his first victim in the face and head five times before 

leaving her to die on the side of a deserted country road. The Graham majority 

noted there was a moral distinction between defendants who intend to commit 

homicide and nonhomicide crimes. See id. at 69 ("The Court has recognized that 

defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are 

categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are 

murderers. . . . It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile 

offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. 

The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis." 

(emphasis added)). While Slocumb may have had a once-diminished moral 

culpability based solely on his age at the time he committed his offenses, we 

cannot agree he had a twice-diminished moral culpability like the juvenile offender 

in Graham.

Chief Justice Roberts noted this exact distinction in his concurrence in Graham, 

stating that while he agreed the Graham defendant could not be constitutionally 

sentenced to life without parole—and, thus, he concurred in the majority's result—

the categorical bar against de jure life sentences for all juvenile nonhomicide 

 

question might be urged; but here the unreasonableness is only in the number of 

offenses which the [defendant] has committed." (quotation marks omitted) (citation 

omitted)).

15 Several other courts have found Graham and Miller distinguishable on the facts 

when a juvenile offender committed multiple crimes, committed a series of crimes 

at different points in time, and/or committed crimes against multiple victims. See, 

e.g., Bunch, 685 F.3d at 551; State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2011); Lucero, 394 P.3d at 1132–34; Brown, 118 So. 3d at 341; Willbanks, 522 

S.W.3d at 242; Kinkel, 417 P.3d 411–13; Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 925–26; cf.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 63 (explaining juvenile offenders who commit both homicide 

and nonhomicide crimes "present a different situation for a sentencing judge than 

juvenile offenders who committed no homicide" because "[i]t is difficult to say that 

a defendant who receives a life sentence on a nonhomicide offense but who was at 

the same time convicted of homicide is not in some sense being punished in part 

for the homicide when the judge makes the sentencing determination").
offenders was an unnecessarily broad holding. Id. at 94 (Roberts, C.J., 

concurring). In particular, Chief Justice Roberts opined de jure life sentences 

would be appropriate for other "especially heinous or grotesque" crimes, such as in 

the case of a seventeen-year-old offender who raped an eight-year-old girl and left 

her to die buried under 197 pounds of rocks. Id. at 95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 

As Chief Justice Roberts stated, "The single fact of being 17 years old would not 

afford [the offender] protection against life without parole if the young girl had 

died—as [the offender] surely expected she would—so why should it do so when 

she miraculously survived his barbaric brutality?" Id.

D.

For all of these reasons, we decline to extend Graham's explicit holding based 

solely on the general rationale underlying the opinion without further input from 

the Supreme Court as to how the Eighth Amendment applies to situations where a 

juvenile nonhomicide offender commits multiple crimes against multiple victims at 

multiple points in time.16 As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Sixth Circuit, a contrary result would lead to a number of unanswered 

questions:

At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become 

implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, 

some lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into 

account? Could the number vary from offender to offender based on 

race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the number 

of crimes matter? There is language in the Graham majority opinion 

that suggests that no matter the number of offenses or victims or type 

 16 Approximately half of the courts around the country have similarly declined to 

find Graham, Miller, or the Eighth Amendment bars de facto life sentences. See

Appendix, infra, Part I. However, notably, the other half of the courts around the 

country who considered this issue either found Graham or Miller expressly 

prohibited de facto life sentences or extended Graham's and Miller's rationale to 

bar the imposition of de facto life sentences on juvenile offenders. See Appendix, 

infra, Part II. We note there are three additional states who have disapproved of de 

facto life sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders under their state 

constitutions, rather than under Graham, Miller, or the Eighth Amendment. See

Appendix, infra, Part III. Two other states declined to definitively hold whether 

Graham or Miller applied to de facto life sentences, but denied the juvenile 

offenders relief anyway for different reasons. See Appendix, infra, Part IV.
of crime, a juvenile may not receive a sentence that will cause him to 

spend his entire life incarcerated without a chance for rehabilitation, 

in which case it would make no logical difference whether the 

sentence is "life" or 107 years. Without any tools to work with, 

however, we can only apply Graham as it is written.

Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552 (citation omitted); Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 928 (explaining 

that answering this list of questions with any degree of specificity "would require a 

proactive exercise inconsistent with our commitment to traditional principles of 

judicial restraint"). As the Sixth Circuit concluded, "[I]f the Supreme Court has 

more in mind, it will have to say what that is." Bunch, 685 F.3d at 553 (citation 

omitted) (internal alteration marks omitted).

IV.

The Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy has resulted in much confusion and conflicting 

opinions in ascertaining the reach of the Eighth Amendment in the sentencing of 

juveniles. See Appendix, infra (showing there is an approximately even split of 

authority on whether the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in Graham and Miller, 

prohibits de facto life sentences). Courts have struggled in good faith in trying to 

determine the manner in which juveniles may be constitutionally sentenced. We 

are one of those courts. Rather than predict what the Supreme Court may or may 

not do, we believe the proper course is to respect the Supreme Court's admonition 

that lower courts must refrain from extending federal constitutional protections 

beyond the line drawn by the Supreme Court.

Our holding should in no way be read to signal the end of the debate on the 

underlying issues raised by aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on juvenile 

offenders, whether for homicide or nonhomicide offenses. As the Supreme Court 

stated in Graham in the context of de jure life sentences for juveniles, it is for the 

states, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for complying 

with the Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. at 75.

Many state legislatures have responded to Roper, Graham, and Miller by enacting 

juvenile sentencing statutes that provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful 

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. 

See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013) (noting the "flurry of legislative 

action that has taken place in the wake of Graham and Miller"). Our General 

Assembly has already begun the process of considering a legislative response to 

juvenile sentencing concerns.
Specifically, the South Carolina General Assembly, with commendable foresight, 

has taken initial steps toward reforming juvenile sentencing practices in this state. 

In February 2019, the South Carolina House of Representatives introduced H. 3919 

to enact the "Youth Sentencing Act of 2019." H. 3919, 123 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., as 

amended Feb. 8, 2019 (S.C. 2019), available at

https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess123_2019-2020/bills/3919.htm. In its current 

form, the bill would: (1) retroactively prohibit juvenile offenders from being 

sentenced to life without parole; (2) retroactively provide juvenile nonhomicide 

offenders with parole-eligibility after twenty years' imprisonment, and juvenile 

homicide offenders with parole-eligibility after twenty-five years' imprisonment; 

(3) allow for sentences shorter than the mandatory minimums for juvenile 

nonhomicide offenders; (4) ban solitary confinement for all juvenile offenders; and 

(5) modify South Carolina's geriatric release program to allow for consideration of 

parole-like factors for juvenile offenders, see Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 

386, 402 (Va. 2011) (holding Virginia's geriatric release program—eligibility for 

which requires use of "the factors used in the normal parole consideration 

process"—satisfied Graham's requirement for a meaningful opportunity for release 

based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation).

Respect for separation of powers compels us to recognize that the General

Assembly is the author of our state's public policy for the sentencing of criminal 

offenders, juveniles and adults. Pending further pronouncement from the Supreme 

Court, we take no position in the matter, nor should our holding be construed to 

limit or define the parameters of the legislative discussions and response to this 

challenge. The judicial role is limited to answering the narrow question raised: 

whether the aggregate term-of-years sentence imposed on Slocumb categorically 

violates the Eighth Amendment pursuant to the reach of Graham. Because we find 

it does not, our judicial prerogative is at its end, and the process must continue in 

the legislature.

V.

Neither Graham nor the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,

currently prohibits the imposition of aggregate sentences for multiple offenses 

amounting to a de facto life sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender. We 

therefore decline to provide Slocumb relief from his 130-year sentence stemming

from his multiple and violent crimes.17

 17 As we have mentioned previously, our research indicates that jurisdictions 

around the country are approximately evenly split as to whether Graham's and 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ISSUED.

Appendix

I. Jurisdictions that find Graham or Miller does not apply to de facto

life sentences

United States Court United States v. Walton, 537 Fed. App'x 430, 437 (5th Cir. 

of Appeals for the 2013) (finding Graham did not apply to a lengthy term-ofFifth Circuit years sentence).

United States Court Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550–53 (6th Cir. 2012) 

of Appeals for the (explaining Graham "did not clearly establish that 

Sixth Circuit consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who 

commit multiple nonhomicide offenses are 

unconstitutional when they amount to the practical 

equivalent of life without parole").

Arizona State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 414–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) 

(opining Graham only applied to juvenile offenders who 

committed a single nonhomicide offense and were 

specifically sentenced to "life without parole" rather than a 

term of years).

Arkansas Hobbs v. Turner, 431 S.W.3d 283, 289 (Ark. 2014) 

(determining a juvenile nonhomicide offender had 

received a sentence that complied with Graham so long as 

the sentence was "nonlife").

Colorado Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128, 1132–34 (Colo. 2017) 

(noting the defendant, "unlike the petitioners in Graham

and Miller, did not receive a sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole. Rather, he received four consecutive 

sentences to terms of years for four separate 

convictions. . . . Life without parole is a specific sentence, 

 

Miller's holdings apply to de facto life sentences, with some denying relief and 

some granting relief. See note 16, supra; Appendix, infra. We are hopeful the 

Supreme Court will resolve this question, for it seems it cannot long remain true 

that federal constitutional protections vary so widely depending solely on the state

in which a juvenile offender commits his offenses.
imposed as punishment for a single crime, which remains 

distinct from aggregate term-of-years sentences resulting 

from multiple convictions. Neither Graham nor Miller

concerns or even considers aggregate term-of-years 

sentences."), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 641 (2018).

Georgia Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011) (placing 

emphasis on Justice Alito's dissent in Graham, in which he 

stated that "nothing in the Court's opinion [in Graham] 

affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years 

without the possibility of parole," Graham, 560 U.S. at 

124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal alteration marks 

omitted)).

Illinois People v. Cavazos, 40 N.E.3d 118, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2015) (rejecting Miller's express applicability to de facto

life sentences and "noting that there are distinct 

differences between a sentence of natural life without 

parole and a sentence of a determinate, albeit lengthy, 

number of years"). But see People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 

884, 887–88 (Ill. 2016) (per curiam) (agreeing with the 

State's concession that Miller's rationale applies to 

mandatory term-of-years sentences that indisputably 

amount to life imprisonment in the case of a defendant 

who—because of statutory, firearm-sentencing 

enhancements—received the minimum possible sentence 

of ninety-seven years' imprisonment).

Kansas State v. Redmon, 380 P.3d 718 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (per 

curiam) (citing Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552, for the proposition 

that applying Graham to de facto life sentences could 

result in confusion and uncertainty due to unanswered 

questions as to what number of years constituted a de facto

life sentence; whether that number should be affected by 

race, gender, or socioeconomic status, as those factors all 

affect life expectancy; and whether the number of crimes 

committed should be taken into account), cert. denied, 

Aug. 24, 2017.

Louisiana State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332, 341–42 (La. 2013) 

(concluding Graham did not apply to cases in which a 
lengthy term-of-years sentence was the result of multiple 

convictions for which the sentences were imposed 

consecutively).

Minnesota State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 242, 244–46 (Minn. 2017) 

(declining to extend Miller to de facto life sentences 

resulting from multiple crimes and/or consecutive 

sentences), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 640 (2018).

Mississippi Mason v. State, 235 So. 3d 129, 134–35 (Miss. Ct. App. 

2017) (holding Miller only prohibited the imposition of a 

sentence of life without parole on a juvenile, not the fiftyyear sentence the juvenile there received, and explaining 

life without parole sentences are legally distinguishable 

from term-of-years sentences in which the offender is 

eligible for good-time credit and the like), cert. denied, 

233 So. 3d 821 (2018).

Missouri Willbanks v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 522 S.W.3d 238, 243–46 

(Mo. 2017) (en banc) (determining Graham did not apply 

when the lengthy sentence being challenged was an 

aggregate term-of-years that resulted from multiple 

convictions, as evidenced by Justice Alito's dissent in 

Graham, as well as Justice Thomas's observation in 

dissent that the Graham majority "exclude[d] from its

analysis all juveniles sentenced to lengthy term-of-years 

sentences (e.g., 70 or 80 years' imprisonment)," Graham, 

560 U.S. at 113 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting)), cert. 

denied, 138 S. Ct. 304 (2017).

New York People v. Aponte, 981 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2013) 

(determining Miller and Graham applied only to sentences 

of life without parole, and because the defendant remained 

technically parole-eligible despite "the prospect that the 

aggregate mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment 

may preclude him from ever being paroled," his sentence 

was not unconstitutional).

Oregon Kinkel v. Persson, 417 P.3d 401, 409–13 (Or. 2018) ("To 

date, the [Supreme] Court has not extended its holdings in 

Roper, Miller, and Graham to lesser minimum sentences 
[than life without parole]. . . . The [Supreme] Court 

neither considered nor decided in Miller and Graham how 

the categorical limitations that it announced for a single 

sentence for one conviction would apply to an aggregate 

sentences for multiple convictions."), cert. denied, 139 S. 

Ct. 789 (2019). 

Tennessee State v. Merritt, No. M2012-00829-CCA-R3CD, 2013 WL 

6505145, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2013) (finding 

the defendant's sentence of 225 years' imprisonment was 

the equivalent of a life sentence, but that Graham did not 

apply to de facto life sentences, only to those actually 

termed "life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole").

Texas Teinert v. State, No. 01-13-00088-CR, 2014 WL 554677, 

at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 11, 2014) (explaining the holding in 

Graham was "narrowly tailored" to address sentences of 

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 

juveniles, and that Graham did not apply to "a sentence 

less severe than life"); Diamond v. State, 419 S.W.3d 435, 

439–41 (Tex. App. 2012) (refusing to overturn a ninetynine year sentence for aggravated robbery because the 

sentence was within the statutory range authorized by the 

state legislature, and failing to respond to the dissent's 

charge that such a sentence violated Graham). 

Virginia Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va. 

2016) (stating Graham did not address "multiple term-ofyears sentences imposed on multiple crimes that, by virtue 

of the accumulation, exceeded the criminal defendant's life 

expectancy"; and declining to grant "precedential 

treatment to the 'reasoning' in Graham" because "the duty 

to follow binding precedent is fixed upon case-specific 

holdings, not general expressions in an opinion that exceed 

the scope of a specific holding"), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 

568 (2016).

Wisconsin State v. Williams, 842 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) 

(per curiam) (finding Miller inapplicable to a juvenile who 

would not be eligible for parole until he had served 101 
years' imprisonment because he "was not subjected to a 

mandatory life-without-parole sentence").

II. Jurisdictions that find Graham or Miller applies to de facto life 

sentences

United States Court McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016) 

of Appeals for the (finding that because the defendant was sentenced to a de 

Seventh Circuit facto life sentence, "the logic of Miller applies").

United States Court Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013) 

of Appeals for the (determining that a de facto life sentence was 

Ninth Circuit irreconcilable with Graham's mandate for juvenile 

nonhomicide offenders to be provided a meaningful 

opportunity to reenter society).

United States Court Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1053–60 (10th Cir. 

of Appeals for the 2017) (finding a sentence requiring the juvenile 

Tenth Circuit nonhomicide offender to serve 131.75 years before 

becoming eligible for parole violated the spirit and letter 

of Graham), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 475 (2017).

California People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) 

(holding a sentence requiring the offender to serve over 

100 years before becoming parole-eligible did not allow 

the offender to demonstrate growth and maturity in an 

effort to secure release, in contravention of Graham's 

dictate).

Connecticut Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1044 (Conn. 

2015) (explaining the focus in Graham and Miller "was 

not on the label of a life sentence, but rather on whether a 

juvenile would, as a consequence of a lengthy sentence 

without the possibility of parole, actually be imprisoned 

for the rest of his life" (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

Florida Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015) (opining 

"that the Graham Court had no intention of limiting its 

new categorical rule to sentences denominated under the 

exclusive term of 'life in prison'").
Maryland Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 725 (Md. 2018) 

(determining the Eighth Amendment must prohibit de 

facto and de jure life sentences alike because "[o]therwise, 

the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment in the context of a juvenile offender 

could be circumvented simply by stating the sentence in 

numerical terms that exceed any reasonable life 

expectancy rather than labeling it a 'life' sentence").

Montana Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 319 (Mont. 2017) ("A 

strict application of the State's argument would mean that 

a sentence that inarguably would not allow for the 

offender to ever be released could not be considered a life 

sentence so long as the sentence is expressed in years. 

Logically, the requirement to consider how 'children are 

different' cannot be limited to de jure life sentences when 

a lengthy sentence denominated in a number of years will 

effectively result in the juvenile offender's imprisonment 

for life." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1999 

(2018).

Nevada State v. Boston, 363 P.3d 453, 458 (Nev. 2015) 

(concluding its holding—that Graham applied to de facto

life sentences—"best addresse[d] the concerns enunciated 

by the U.S. Supreme Court and this court regarding the 

culpability of juvenile offenders and the potential for 

growth and maturity of these offenders," but recognizing 

that such a holding "raise[d] complex and difficult issues, 

not the least of which [wa]s when will aggregate sentences 

be determined to be the functional equivalent of a sentence 

of life without the possibility of parole").

New Jersey State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 212, 214 (N.J. 2017) ("To be 

clear, we find that the force and logic of Miller's concerns 

apply broadly: to cases in which a defendant commits 

multiple offenses during a single criminal episode; to 

cases in which a defendant commits multiple offenses on 

different occasions; and to homicide and nonhomicide 

cases."; but rejecting the notion that sentencing judges 

should rely on general life-expectancy tables when 

determining the point at which a term-of-years sentence 
becomes a de facto life sentence: "Those tables rest on 

informed estimates, not firm dates, and the use of factors 

like race, gender, and income could raise constitutional 

issues."), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 152 (2017).

New Mexico Ira v. Janecka, 419 P.3d 161, 163, 166 (N.M. 2018) 

(determining the Eighth Amendment required 

consideration of "the cumulative impact of consecutive 

sentences on a juvenile," but that because the juvenile 

defendant would become eligible for parole at the age of 

sixty-two, he had already received a meaningful 

opportunity for release pursuant to Graham). 

Ohio State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1140 (Ohio 2016) 

("Graham cannot stand for the proposition that juveniles 

who do not commit homicide must serve longer terms in 

prison than the vast majority of juveniles who commit 

murder, who, because of Miller, are all but assured the 

opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation at a 

meaningful point in their sentences."), cert. denied, 138 S. 

Ct. 62 (2017). We note the defendant in this case received 

a resentencing hearing, whereas his co-defendant—who 

was the subject of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bunch—

failed to receive similar relief.

Pennsylvania Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 433–34, 436 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2018) (finding the logical inference of Miller

was to prohibit de facto life sentences, but holding the 

impermissible de facto life sentence must be the result of a 

single term-of-years sentence, because otherwise "it would 

open the door to volume sentencing discounts in cases 

involving multiple juvenile homicide offenses. Juvenile 

perpetrators convicted of multiple homicides would 

routinely be subject to concurrent terms of imprisonment 

if the Commonwealth was unable to sustain its burden of 

proof under Miller . . . and juvenile offenders would 

receive volume discounts for their crimes."), cert. 

requested, Mar. 23, 2018.

Washington State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 661 (Wash. 2017) 

("Regardless of labeling, it is undisputed that [the juvenile 
defendant] was in fact sentenced to die in prison for 

homicide offenses he committed as a juvenile. Miller

plainly provides that a juvenile homicide offender cannot 

be sentenced to die in prison without a meaningful 

opportunity to gain early release based on demonstrated 

rehabilitation unless the offender first receives a 

constitutionally adequate Miller hearing."), cert. denied, 

138 S. Ct. 467 (2017).

Wyoming Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 141–42 (Wyo. 2014) 

(holding the teachings of Roper, Graham, and Miller

require an individualized sentencing hearing when the 

juvenile defendant receives an aggregate, de facto life 

sentence, and stating, "To do otherwise would be to ignore 

the reality that lengthy aggregate sentences have the effect 

of mandating that a juvenile 'die in prison'" without 

consideration of his youth and its attendant characteristics 

(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465)).

III. Jurisdictions that find their state constitutions' cruel and unusual 

punishments clauses bar de facto life sentences

Indiana Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4–8 (Ind. 2014) 

(disapproving of a 150-year sentence, and imposing 

instead an eighty-year sentence).

Iowa State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 69–74 (Iowa 2013)

(reaching its decision to extend Miller's principles 

"independently under . . . the Iowa Constitution").

Massachusetts Commonwealth v. Perez, 106 N.E.3d 620, 623 (Mass. 

2018) (explaining the state constitution prohibited 

imposition of a later parole date for juvenile nonhomicide 

offenders than would otherwise be available for juvenile 

homicide offenders).

IV. Jurisdictions that declined to rule on the applicability of Graham or 

Miller to de facto life sentences, but denied the juvenile offenders 

relief anyway
Nebraska State v. Cardeilhac, 876 N.W.2d 876, 888–90 (Neb. 2016) 

(rejecting—in the case of a juvenile offender who "was 

sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum of 60 years to 

life to be served consecutively to an 8- to 15-year sentence 

in a separate robbery case that he was already serving"—

the juvenile's argument that Miller prohibited his lengthy 

sentence, because, alternatively, (1) the juvenile was not 

sentenced to "life without parole"; and (2) "in any event, 

he received the full benefit of Miller juvenile sentencing 

principles" due to his constitutionally-adequate sentencing 

hearing). 

South Dakota State v. Springer, 856 N.W.2d 460, 462, 470 (S.D. 2014)

(finding the juvenile offender—who would become 

parole-eligible after serving thirty-three years of his 261-

year sentence—failed to "establish a rule for what 

constitutes a de facto life sentence under which he is 

entitled to relief"; declining the juvenile offender's 

invitation for the court to craft its own rule defining the

point a term-of-years sentence becomes a de facto life 

sentence; and "further declin[ing] the invitation to join 

jurisdictions holding Roper, Graham, and Miller

applicable or inapplicable to de facto life sentences" 

because the juvenile offender would become paroleeligible at the age of 49 and therefore "did not receive life 

without parole or a de facto life sentence" (emphasis 

added)).

FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur. HEARN, J., dissenting in a separate opinion

in which BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 

JUSTICE HEARN: Respectfully, I dissent. I commend the majority's scholarly and 

well-written opinion and agree with much of its discussion on the trilogy of cases 

decided by the United States Supreme Court concerning punishment for juvenile 

offenders. However, I part company with the majority's belief that granting relief in 
this case would impermissibly extend Graham.

18 Instead, as many other state 

supreme courts have held, I believe an aggregate sentence that amounts to a de facto

life sentence falls within the scope of Graham. 

Accordingly, I would follow the rationale of Maryland's highest court in 

Carter,

19 where in a similar context, the court explained that the justification 

underpinning Graham equally applies to a term-of-years sentence. Carter, 192 A.3d 

at 726 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 ("With respect to life without parole for 

juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been 

recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 

rehabilitation...provides an adequate justification.")). In examining these basic 

pillars of criminal law, the Carter court noted, "A distinction between [a LWOP and 

a term-of-years sentence] makes no difference in terms of 'reconciliation with 

society,' 'denial of hope,' the 'incentive to become a responsible individual,' a 'chance 

of fulfillment outside of prison walls' or whether a prisoner 'will die in prison[.]'" Id.

at 727 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79). I agree with this observation, and therefore, 

we cannot relinquish the protections provided by Graham—that Slocumb be 

afforded a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release." Id. at 75. Moreover, as we 

discussed in Aiken, youth has constitutional significance that must be thoroughly 

considered when the government incarcerates a juvenile for life. Aiken v. Byars, 410 

S.C. 534, 543, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (2014).

Nevertheless, I do not necessarily quarrel with the sentence in this case, as 

Slocumb's offenses may very well constitute "truly horrifying" crimes that the 

Graham court noted could subject a juvenile to remain in prison for life. Further, 

Slocumb's extensive disciplinary history while incarcerated may demonstrate that he 

is "irredeemable." See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 ("Those who commit truly horrifying 

crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of 

incarceration for the duration of their lives."). However, before reaching that 

conclusion, Slocumb is entitled to the protections afforded by Graham and Miller. 

See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 576–77 ("[I]t is the failure of a sentencing 

court to consider the hallmark features of youth prior to sentencing that offends the 

Constitution.").

Because I believe Slocumb's aggregate 130-year sentence is unconstitutional, 

the next question concerns the appropriate remedy. I agree with the majority that this 

 18 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

19 Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695 (Md. 2018).
issue is best reserved for the General Assembly because that body is better equipped 

to fashion an appropriate solution in order to bring our juvenile sentencing scheme 

into constitutional compliance. To accomplish this task, courts and legislatures 

across the country have reached differing outcomes, including arbitrarily declaring 

a specific threshold—such as a 50-year sentence, implementing a parole system, 

using life expectancy tables, or a combination thereof. See Carter, 192 A.3d at 727–

30 (discussing how courts across the country have resolved this issue). At this point, 

I would decline to adopt a specific approach and would delay implementation of my 

ruling until January 1, 2020, to provide the General Assembly with ample time to 

act in this area and to ensure our juvenile sentencing scheme complies with the 

Eighth Amendment. 

BEATTY, C.J., concurs.