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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

FINANCIAL TREE dba FINANCIAL 

TREE TRUST; FINANCIAL SOLUTION 

GROUP dba FINANCIAL SOLUTION 

GROUP TRUST; NEW MONEY 

ADVISORS, LLC; THE LAW FIRM OF 

JOHN GLENN, P.C.; JOHN D. BLACK 

aka JOHN BARNES; CHRISTOPHER 

MANCUSO; JOSEPH TUFO; and JOHN 

P. GLENN,

Defendants;

SUISSE GROUP (USA) LLC; JMC 

INDUSTRIES LLC; LANDES CAPITAL 

MANAGEMENT, LLC; KINGDOM 

TRUST LLC; HERBERT CASWELL;

ANNE MANCUSO; and TYLER 

MANCUSO, 

Relief Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01184-TLN-AC

ORDER GRANTING STATUTORY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND OTHER 

EQUITABLE RELIEF

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 

(“CFTC”) ex parte Motion for a Statutory Restraining Order and Other Equitable Relief (“SRO”) 

pursuant to Section 6c(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (2018), 
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and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 65, in which CFTC seeks an order freezing Assets,

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allowing for the inspection of Records,

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and permitting expedited discovery in advance of any

hearing on the preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 3.) For the reasons set forth below, CFTC’s 

Motion is GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

The CFTC is an independent federal regulatory agency charged by Congress with the 

administration and enforcement of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”) and Commission 

Regulations (“Regulations”). (ECF No. 3 at 16.) By way of the present Motion, CFTC asserts

that, since January 2015, Defendants John D. Black (“Black”), Financial Tree (“Financial Tree”), 

Financial Solution Group (“Financial Solution”), New Money Advisors, LLC (“New Money”), 

Chris Mancuso (“Mancuso”), Joseph Tufo (“Tufo”), John Glenn (“Glenn”), and Glenn’s law 

firm, The Law Firm of John Glenn, P.C. (the “Glenn Law Firm”) (collectively, 

/ / / 

 

1 As used throughout CFTC’s Motion and herein, “Assets” encompasses any legal or 

equitable interest in, right to, or claim to any real or personal property, whether individually or 

jointly, or directly or indirectly controlled, and wherever located, including but not limited to: 

chattels, goods, instruments, equipment, fixtures, general intangibles, effects, leaseholds, mail or 

other deliveries, inventory, checks, notes, accounts (including, but not limited to, bank accounts 

and accounts at other financial institutions), credits, receivables, lines of credit, contracts 

(including spot, futures, options, or swaps contracts), insurance policies, retainers held by agents 

for the provision of professional or other services, and all funds, wherever located, whether in the 

United States or outside the United States. 

2 As used throughout CFTC’s Motion and herein, “Records” encompasses the terms 

“document” and “electronically stored information” (“ESI”) as those terms are used in Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a). The term “Records” also refers to each and every such item in 

Defendants’ and Relief Defendants’ actual or constructive possession, including but not limited 

to: (i) all such items within the custody or control of any agents, employers, employees, or 

partners of the Defendants and Relief Defendants; and (ii) all items which Defendants and Relief 

Defendants have a legal or equitable right to obtain from another person. A draft or non-identical 

copy is a separate item within the meaning of the term. A Record also includes the file and folder 

tabs associated with each original and copy. 

3 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from CFTC’s brief and the 

supporting records and declarations of Elsie Robinson, an investigator for CFTC, and several 

individuals allegedly defrauded by Defendants. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) A more detailed analysis of the 

evidentiary record appears in the discussion below. For ease of reference, the Court will refer to 

the ECF pagination for the parties’ attached exhibits. 
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“Defendants”) have engaged in a fraudulent scheme to solicit and misappropriate money 

deposited with Defendants in violation of the Act and Regulations. (ECF No. 3 at 12.) 

Starting in April 2014, Black created three entities — Financial Tree, Financial Solution, 

and New Money — which are controlled solely by Black and in which Black is the only 

employee. (ECF No. 3 at 16, 21; ECF No. 3-11 at 4–5.) Defendants used these business entities

exclusively to conduct the pooling operations that are the subject of this action. (ECF No. 3 at 

21; ECF No. 3-11 at 4–5, 22–23.) 

In August 2014, Black (on behalf of Financial Tree) and Glenn (on behalf of Glenn Law 

Firm) executed a “Paymaster Agreement” providing that the Glenn Law Firm would accept funds 

from third parties and disburse such funds to Financial Tree in exchange for a fee. (ECF No. 3 at 

22; ECF No. 3-11 at 7–8; ECF No. 3-13 at 79–86.) There was no legitimate business reason for 

Pool Participants to wire funds to the Glenn Law Firm, and for the Glenn Law Firm to then wire 

funds to Financial Tree (less Glenn’s fee), as Pool Participants could have just as easily wired 

money directly to Financial Tree. (ECF No. 3 at 22; ECF No. 3-11 at 13–14, 17.) Rather, CFTC

alleges Black engaged the Glenn Law Firm and Glenn used his position as an attorney and 

Managing Partner of the Glenn Law Firm to deceive prospective Pool Participants into believing 

the Black Pools were legitimate and safe. (ECF No. 3 at 22; ECF No. 3-8 at 2; see also ECF No. 

3-10 at 2 (Mancuso communicated that prospective client’s money would be safe because “you’re 

not paying us, you’re paying an attorney.”).) 

From approximately June 15, 2015, to the present (the “Relevant Period”), Defendants 

fraudulently solicited over $14.32 million from at least 53 U.S. residents and 38 non-U.S. 

residents (“Pool Participants”) to trade binary options and retail foreign currency (“forex”) 

contracts in two commodity pools — the Financial Tree Pool and the Financial Solution Group 

Pool (collectively, the “Black Pools”). (ECF No. 3 at 12, 22; ECF No. 3-11 at 15.) Pool

Participants could participate by entering into joint venture agreements with Financial Solution or 

New Money. (ECF No. 3 at 21; ECF No. 3-7 at 1–15, 29–36; ECF No. 3-8 at 1–2, 11–15; ECF 

No. 3-9 at 1–2, 6–11; ECF No. 3-10 at 1–2, 5–10; ECF No. 3-11 at 11–12.) Through these 

agreements, Pool Participants did not send money directly to the Black Pools, but to the Glenn 
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Law Firm’s “attorney escrow account,” after which the Glenn Law Firm was to pass those funds 

along to the Black Pools. (Id.)

In soliciting money from the Pool Participants, Defendants made material

misrepresentations to Pool Participants, such as: (1) pool funds would be held in a fiduciaryprotected, separate bank account and used as collateral to establish lines of credit to trade binary 

options and/or forex on Pool Participants’ behalf; (2) the pools would yield 10–70% monthly 

returns; (3) more than 85% of Defendants’ trades were successful; and (4) Defendants’ 

investment of pool funds was overseen by a “globally renowned and highly respected fiduciary 

accounting firm.” (ECF No. 3 at 26–30; ECF No. 3-7 at 1–2; ECF No. 3-8 at 1–3; ECF No. 3-9 

at 1–3; ECF No. 3-10 at 1–2; ECF No. 3-11 at 11–12; ECF No. 3-13 at 138–143; ECF No. 3-14; 

ECF No. 3-15 at 1–6.) The CFTC asserts each of these statements are false. 

Defendants also omitted material facts during their solicitation of funds, such as: (1)

Defendants had actually traded very few pool funds in binary options or forex; (2) binary options 

and forex trading involves significant risk of trading losses; (3) Defendants were using 

approximately 77% of the pool funds received to pay personal expenses and make Ponzi 

payments4prior to trading any funds; and (4) Defendants had failed to return principal 

investments or deliver profits to other Pool Participants. (ECF No. 3 at 27–30; ECF No. 3-7 at 2; 

ECF No. 3-8 at 1; ECF No. 3-9 at 3; ECF No. 3-10 at 2; ECF No. 3-11 at 12; ECF No. 3-15 at 6.) 

Importantly, Defendants failed to disclose the fact that, in 2018, the California Department of 

Business Oversight (“California DBO”) issued a Desist and Refrain Order against Financial 

Solution, Black, and Mancuso, based on findings that these Defendants had unlawfully sold 

unregistered securities in California and made material misrepresentations or omissions to a Pool 

Participant in connection with the Black Pools. (ECF No. 3 at 26–27, 33; ECF No. 3-7 at 2; ECF 

No. 3-8 at 2–3; ECF No. 3-9 at 3; ECF No. 3-10 at 2.) Indeed, Defendants did not abide by the 

 

4 A “Ponzi scheme” is a “fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by 

later investors generates artificially high dividends or returns for the original investors, whose 

example attracts even larger investments.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In ordinary 

operation (and as used herein), a “Ponzi payment” occurs when “[m]oney from the new investors 

is used directly to repay or pay interest to earlier investors, usually without any operation or 

revenue-producing activity other than the continual raising of new funds.” Id. 
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California DBO’s Order and presently continue to solicit prospective Pool Participants for the 

Black Pools. (See ECF No. 3-11 at 15 (Pool participants deposited funds for trading in the Black 

Pools at least as recently as January 29, 2020).) 

The CFTC asserts Defendants have misappropriated the vast majority of the pool funds. 

Of the approximately $14.32 million Defendants received from Pool Participants during the 

Relevant Period, Defendants deposited only $10,000 into U.S. trading accounts in the name of the 

Black Pools. (ECF No. 3 at 23; ECF No. 3-11 at 20–23.) At least some of those funds were lost 

trading forex. (Id.) Financial Solution and Financial Tree, by and through Black, transferred 

approximately $254,280 overseas to possible binary options or forex trading firms but received 

back only approximately $59,239. (Id.) Thus, very little trading — and no profitable trading —

occurred. 

Instead, Defendants misappropriated approximately $4.94 million (approximately 34% of 

pool funds) to make Ponzi payments to other Pool Participants. (ECF No. 3 at 23–24; ECF No. 

3-11 at 19–20.) Defendants misappropriated at least an additional $6.3 million for unauthorized 

personal or business expenses. (ECF No. 3 at 24; ECF No. 3-11 at 15–19.) For example, Glenn 

misappropriated at least $285,000 in “transfer fees” pursuant to his Paymaster Agreement with 

Black, which he then transferred to other bank accounts he owned/controlled and used for 

expenses related to his divorce and spousal support. (Id.) Black withdrew at least $367,000 in 

pool funds in cash, and spent additional pool funds on, among other things, personal travel, rent 

for his personal residence, legal fees, online gambling, multilevel marketing programs, food and 

dining expenses, and software and online advertising. (ECF No. 3 at 24–25; ECF No. 3-11 at 17.) 

Financial Solution and Financial Tree transferred at least $3.98 million of pool funds to business 

and personal bank accounts owned by Defendant Mancuso, who later withdrew at least $1.3 

million of those funds in cash and spent additional funds on items such as personal travel, 

limousine expenses, spa and haircare expenses, and home renovations. (ECF No. 3 at 25; ECF 

No. 3-11 at 18–19.) Financial Solution and Financial Tree also transferred at least $228,000 in 

pool funds to business and personal bank accounts owned/controlled by Tufo, who used the funds 

to pay for items such as automobile-related expenses, eating out, groceries, insurance premiums, 
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office expenses, utilities, and miscellaneous household expenses. (ECF No. 3 at 25; ECF No. 3-

11 at 19.) 

Financial Solution and/or the Glenn Law Firm also transferred over $1.8 million to Relief 

Defendants Suisse Group (USA) LLC (“Suisse Group”), JMC Industries LLC (“JMC”), Landes 

Capital Management, LLC (“Landes Capital”), Kingdom Trust LLC (“Kingdom”), Herbert 

Caswell (“Casswell”), Anne Mancuso, and Tyler Mancuso (collectively, “Relief Defendants”). 

For example, Financial Solution transferred $500,000 in pool funds to Suisse Group, and 

Glenn/the Glenn Law Firm transferred $300,000 in pool funds to JMC. (See ECF No. 3 at 19–21, 

41; ECF No. 3-11 at 9–10, 20–21.) The CFTC asserts both Suisse Group and JMC were alter 

egos of and controlled by Casswell, who comingled his personal funds with the Suisse Group and 

JMC funds. (Id.) JMC later transferred $200,000 in pool funds to Landes Capital, and Suisse 

Group later transferred over $150,000 to personal bank accounts owned by Casswell. (ECF No. 3 

at 19, 42; ECF No. 3-11 at 21–23.) Mancuso also transferred at least $593,000 to his wife and 

son, Anne and Tyler Mancuso. (ECF No. 3 at 20–21; ECF No. 3-11 at 10–11, 18–19.) Kingdom 

received transfers of over $1 million in pool funds from Financial Solution, $25,000 from the 

BBB Jabez Foundation (which Black controls), and $25,000 from Tyler Mancuso. (ECF No. 3 at 

20; ECF No. 3-11 at 17–18.) According to CFTC, none of the Relief Defendants provided 

legitimate services to the Black Pools or Pool Participants for the money they received. 

To conceal the misappropriation of funds, Financial Solution, by and through Black, 

created and issued false account statements that inflated and misrepresented trading returns and 

the value of Pool Participants’ interests in the Black Pools. (ECF No. 3 at 21, 31; ECF No. 3-7 at 

3; ECF No. 3-8 at 3–4, 16–66; ECF No. 3-9 at 3–4, 24–113; ECF No. 3-10 at 3, 11–19; ECF No. 

3-11 at 4–7, 11–12, 17–19; ECF No. 3-14 at 14; ECF No. 3-15 at 5, 7–43.) However, when Pool 

Participants requested the return of their investment funds, Defendants made misrepresentations 

and/or omitted material facts regarding their failure to do so in order to lull the Pool Participants. 

(ECF No. 3 at 31; ECF No. 3-11 at 16–20.) For example, Defendants sent letters blaming 

delayed payments on “breach of contract and nonpayment with some of our banking sources.” 

(ECF No. 3 at 31–32; ECF No. 3-7 at 45.) One Pool Participant was told “funds were delayed
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because the European market had fluctuation and it was their summer vacations.” (ECF No. 3 at 

33; ECF No. 3-15 at 5.) In another instance, Defendants maintained “there was a legal issue as to 

why the funds did not transfer from Singapore to Hong Kong.” (ECF No. 3 at 33; ECF No. 3-9 at 

19–21.) In sum, Pool Participants received “one story after the next” from Defendants. (Id.) 

Nevertheless, Defendants continued to solicit and/or accept new pool funds, even after it was 

clear that Financial Solution and New Money were failing to repay existing Pool Participants. 

In addition to the foregoing conduct, CFTC alleges Defendants were required to register 

with CFTC as commodity pool operators (“CPOs”) or as associated persons (“APs”) of a CPO 

but failed to do so.5 (ECF No. 3 at 38–39; ECF No. 3-11 at 11.) Similarly, Defendants were 

obligated to determine whether any of the Pool Participants were eligible contract participants 

(“ECPs”) as defined under the Act, yet Defendants failed to make this inquiry. (ECF No. 3 at 38, 

ECF No. 3-7 at 2; ECF No. 3-8 at 2; ECF No. 3-9 at 2; ECF No. 3-10 at 2.) 

On June 15, 2020, CFTC filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Monetary 

Penalties, Restitution, Disgorgement and Other Equitable Relief against Defendants and Relief 

Defendants for various violations of the Act and Regulations. (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, the

Complaint asserts six counts against Defendants for violations of the Act and Regulations: (1) 

Commodity Options Fraud, in violation of § 4c(b) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2018)), and 

Regulation 32.4 (17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (2019)); (2) Forex Fraud, in violation of § 4b(a)(2)(A)–(C) of 

the Act (7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2018)), and Regulation 5.2(b) (17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b) (2019)); 

(3) Fraud by CPOs and APs of CPOs, in violation of § 4o(1)(A)–(B) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 

6o(1)(A)–(B) (2018)); (4) Failure to Register with CFTC, in violation of §§ 2(c)(2)(C)(iii)(I)(cc), 

4k(2), 4m(1) of the Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2(c)(2)(C)(iii)(I)(cc), 6k(2), 6m(1) (2018)), and Regulation 

5.3(a)(2) (17 C.F.R. § 5.3(a)(2) (2019)); (5) Comingling of Funds and Failure to Operate Pools as 

Separate Entities and Properly Receive Pool Funds, in violation of Regulation 4.20(a)(1), (b)–(c)

 

5 Pursuant to the Act, an entity is required to be registered with CFTC as a CPO when it 

engages in business that is of the nature of a commodity pool and, in connection with that 

business, solicits, receives, or accepts pool funds from participants for the purpose of trading in 

commodity interests. An individual acts as an AP of a CPO by, in his capacity as partner, officer, 

employee, consultant, or agent of the CPO, soliciting or supervising the solicitation of funds for 

participation in the CPO’s pool. 
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(17 C.F.R. §§ 4.20(a)(1), (b)–(c) (2019)); and (6) Failure to Provide Pool Participants with 

Disclosures and Other Required Documents, in violation of Regulations 4.21 and 4.22 (17 C.F.R. 

§§ 4.21, 4.22 (2019)). (ECF No. 1 at 38–54.) The CFTC filed the instant Motion for SRO

concurrently with its Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

The CFTC is authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 to institute an action in federal district court 

whenever it appears violations of any provision of the Act have occurred. This section also

provides that the district court may issue a permanent or temporary injunction against any person 

who “has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a 

violation of any provision of this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.” 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 13a-1(a)–(b); see also U.S. CFTC v. Driver (Driver), 877 F. Supp. 2d 968, 981 (C.D. Cal. 

2012), aff’d sub nom. CFTC v. Driver, 585 Fed. Appx. 366 (9th Cir. 2014). The legal standards 

applicable to temporary restraining orders are the same as those applicable to preliminary 

injunctions. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 

n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“The injunctive relief contemplated in this portion of the Act is remedial in nature, and is 

designed to prevent injury to the public and to deter future illegal conduct.” U.S. CFTC v. Yu

(Yu), No. 12-CV-3921 YGR, 2012 WL 3283430, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012). Unlike private 

actions, in actions for statutory injunctive relief, CFTC need not prove irreparable injury or the 

inadequacy of other remedies as required in private injunctive suits. See Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d 

at 981; CFTC v. Hunt (Hunt), 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979); Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. 

of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860, 869 (9th Cir. 1983). Rather, a prima facie showing that a violation 

of the law has occurred and that “there is some reasonable likelihood of future violations” is 

sufficient. Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220; see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 869 F.2d 1256, 

1261 (9th Cir. 1989) (in cases involving statutory injunctions on the basis of past violations, party 

moving for injunctive relief must show only that there is a “likelihood” of future violations); 

CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp. (British Am.), 560 F.2d 135, 141–42 (2d Cir. 

1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978) (“well-established” that agency need only show 
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reasonable likelihood wrong will be repeated for injunctive relief); CFTC v. J. S. Love & Assoc. 

Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 

Finally, the Eastern District of California Local Rules impose additional requirements for 

a motion for a temporary restraining order. First, the Court must consider whether the moving 

party has unnecessarily delayed in seeking injunctive relief. See L.R. 231(b). Second, the 

moving party must provide specific documents to the court in support of the requested temporary 

restraining order. See L.R. 231(c). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Procedural Requirements 

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds CFTC has met the procedural requirements 

outlined in Local Rule 231(c) by providing nearly 900 pages of documents in support of its 

motion, which include the declarations of Elsie Robinson, an investigator for CFTC, and several 

Pool Participants who were allegedly defrauded by Defendants. (ECF Nos. 3-7–3-15); E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 231(c). The Court is also satisfied that CFTC has not unnecessarily delayed in seeking 

injunctive relief. (ECF No. 3-1; ECF No. 3-16); E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(b). 

Additionally, there is good cause to believe that notice to Defendants and Relief 

Defendants at this time would frustrate the emergency relief CFTC seeks by providing an 

incentive and opportunity to Defendants and Relief Defendants to dissipate Assets and/or destroy 

Records before CFTC obtains and serves the requested SRO. (See ECF No. 3 at 70; ECF No. 3-

16); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); see also 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (providing that a restraining order 

which freezes assets or prohibits destruction of records or refusal to permit CFTC to inspect 

records may be issued ex parte). Therefore, submission of the Motion for SRO ex parte was 

warranted. 

B. Jurisdiction/Venue 

The CFTC’s Motion is properly before this Court pursuant to Section 6c of the Act, 7 

U.S.C. § 13a-1, which authorizes CFTC to seek injunctive and other relief in the proper district 

court of the United States against any person whenever it appears to CFTC that such person has 

engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any 
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provision of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder. This Court also has jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018) (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2018) 

(district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States or by 

any agency expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress). 

Venue properly lies in this District pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(e), because Defendants 

transacted business in this District, and certain of the acts and practices in violation of the Act and 

Regulations occurred, are occurring, or are about to occur within this District, among other 

places. (See ECF No. 3 at 16–19.) 

C. Prima Facie Case of Illegality 

The CFTC contends Defendants committed fraud and misappropriated funds, failed to 

properly register with CFTC as CPOs and APs of CPOs, comingled funds, and failed to provide 

clients with specific disclosures and other required documents, in violation of multiple provisions 

of the Act and Regulations. The CFTC further alleges Relief Defendants have received and will 

continue to receive funds, Assets, or other property obtained through Defendants’ violative 

conduct and have been unjustifiably enriched thereby. 

i. Derivative and Controlling Person Liability 

As an initial matter, the Court addresses derivative and controlling person liability. One is 

a controlling person when he or she has “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct 

or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person whether through the ownership 

of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” CFTC v. Capitol Equity FX, LLC (Capitol 

Equity), No. EDCV 17-743 JGB (SKx), 2017 WL 9565340, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2017). 

Under § 13(b) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 13c(b)), a controlling person of an entity is liable for the 

violations of that entity if the controlling person knowingly induced the violations, directly or 

indirectly, or did not act in good faith. See CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co. (R.J. Fitzgerald), 310 

F.3d 1321, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004) (“A fundamental purpose of 

Section 13[(b)] is to allow the [CFTC] to reach behind the corporate entity to the controlling 

individuals of the corporation and to impose liability for violations of the Act directly on such 

individuals as well as the corporation itself.”). Conversely, the act, omission, or failure of any 
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person acting for an entity within the scope of his employment or office shall be attributed to the

entity, as well as the person. Id. at 1335 (imposing liability on corporate entity because of acts of 

individuals); 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2019). 

Here, Black is liable for Financial Tree’s, Financial Solution’s, and New Money’s 

violations described herein because he was the creator and controlling person of those entities. 

R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1334–35 (defendant who was ultimate decision maker at firm was 

ultimately responsible for compliance with Act and Regulations); Capitol Equity, 2017 WL 

9565340, at *4 (husband and wife who were president and sole owner, respectively, of relevant 

entities and had opened trading accounts in entities’ names were controlling persons of those 

entities). For the same reasons, Glenn is liable as a controlling person for the Glenn Law Firm’s 

violations described herein because he is the founder, managing attorney, and only practitioner at 

the Glenn Law Firm. Id. 

Similarly, Financial Tree, Financial Solution, New Money, and the Glenn Law Firm are 

liable for the acts of their agents, i.e., Black, Mancuso, Tufo, and Glenn. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) 

(2018); 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2019); CFTC v. Am. Bullion Exch. ABEX Corp. (Am. Bullion), No. 

SACV10-1876-DOC (RNBx), 2014 WL 12603558, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014). For 

example, Black opened bank accounts as the sole signatory for Financial Tree, Financial Solution,

and New Money. (ECF No. 3 at 40–41; ECF No. 3-11 at 4–6.) Black also signed pool 

agreements on behalf of Financial Solution and New Money. (Id.) Glenn signed the 2014 

Paymaster Agreement with Financial Tree on behalf of the Glenn Law Firm and opened each of 

the Glenn Law Firm bank accounts to which Pool Participants contributed funds. (ECF No. 3 at 

41; ECF No. 3-11 at 7–8.) Mancuso and Tufo both acted as APs for Financial Tree, Financial 

Solution, and New Money by soliciting Pool Participants for the Black Pools. (ECF No. 3 at 18; 

ECF No. 3-7 at 1; ECF No. 3-8 at 1.) 

Based on the foregoing, CFTC has sufficiently established a prima facie case that 

Defendants are derivatively liable for each other’s misconduct. 

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ii. Violation of Antifraud Provisions of the Act and Regulations 

Sections 4b(a)(2)(A)–(C) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2018)) and 

corresponding Regulation 5.2(b) (17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b) (2019)) prohibit fraudulent activities “in 

connection with” commodity futures trading. The CFTC need only prove three elements to 

establish its claims of fraud under §§ 4b(a)(2)(A)–(C): (1) the making of a misrepresentation, 

misleading statement, or deceptive omission; (2) scienter; and (3) materiality. Driver, 877 F. 

Supp. 2d at 977; R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1328. Actionable misrepresentations include those 

made to customers when soliciting their funds. Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 111 (2d 

Cir. 1986). 

The antifraud provisions of § 4c(b) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2018)) apply to fraud in 

connection with commodity options trading, such that the same misrepresentations and omissions 

that violate § 4b in connection with futures trading also violate § 4c(b) and Regulation 32.4 (17 

C.F.R. § 32.4 (2019)) in connection with options. See CFTC v. Rosenberg (Rosenberg), 85 F. 

Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D. N.J. 2000) (analyzing §§ 4b(a) and 4c(b) claims together).

Sections 4o(1)(A) and (B) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(A)–(B) (2018)) make it unlawful 

for a commodity pool operator to engage in fraudulent activities in connection with commodity 

futures trading. The elements of proof for § 4o(1) overlap with the elements of proof for § 4b(a). 

Driver, 877 F.Supp.2d at 978–79 (“The same intentional or reckless misappropriations, 

misrepresentations, and omissions of material fact violative of section 4b of the Act . . . also 

violate section 4o(1)(A)–(B) of the Act”). Fraud as a commodity pool operator, however, does 

not require scienter. CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 285 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e hold that an 

action for injunctive relief by CFTC under section 4o(1) requires only that the violator have acted 

intentionally. That is, he must have intended to employ the ‘device, scheme, or artifice’ but it is 

not necessary that he know that its result will be to defraud the client or prospective client.”).

The CFTC asserts Defendants committed fraud in violation of the aforementioned 

antifraud provisions of the Act and the Regulations by making material misrepresentations and 

omissions to Pool Participants, issuing false account statements to Pool Participants, and 

misappropriating pool funds for personal use and to make Ponzi payments. 
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a) Fraud by Misrepresentations and Omissions 

First, CFTC’s supporting documents make a prima facie showing that when soliciting 

funds from prospective Pool Participants, Defendants knowingly or recklessly made 

misrepresentations and omissions (via electronic mail, telephonic seminars, telephone calls, 

mailings, and websites), including but not limited to the following: (1) misrepresenting that pool 

funds would be held in a fiduciary-protected, separate bank account and used as collateral to 

establish lines of credit to trade binary options and/or forex on Pool Participants’ behalf; (2) 

misrepresenting that the pools would yield 10–70% monthly returns; and (3) misrepresenting that 

more than 85% of Defendants’ trades were successful. (ECF No. 3 at 26–30; ECF No. 3-7 at 1–2, 

4–9, 26–28; ECF No. 3-8 at 1–3, 5–15; ECF No. 3-9 at 1–3, 6–11; ECF No. 3-10 at 1–2, 5–10; 

ECF No. 3-11 at 11–12, 15, 17; ECF No. 3-13 at 138–143; ECF No. 3-14; ECF No. 3-15 at 1–6.) 

Further, Defendants knowingly made misrepresentations to existing Pool Participants by issuing

false account statements that reflected non-existent gains and providing varied excuses for their

failure to return funds requested by Pool Participants. (ECF No. 3 at 26, 30–31; ECF No. 3-7 at 

2–3, 10–25, 29–36, 39–52; ECF No. 3-8 at 2–4, 16–66; ECF No. 3-9 at 3–4, 24–113; ECF No. 3-

10 at 2–3, 11–19; ECF No. 3-11 at 11–12, 16, 19–23; ECF No. 3-14 at 14; ECF No. 3-15 at 5.) 

Similarly, CFTC’s supporting documents make a prima facie showing that Defendants 

knowingly made material omissions to attract and retain Pool Participants, including but not 

limited to the following: (1) omitting that the California DBO previously issued a Desist and 

Refrain Order against Financial Solution, Black, and Mancuso for their actions in connection with 

the Black Pools; (2) omitting that Defendants would pay themselves approximately 43% of pool 

fund principal received prior to trading any funds; (3) omitting that purported profits or 

withdrawals of principal paid to some Pool Participants were in fact the principal deposits of 

other clients and were not generated by profitable trading activity; (4) omitting that no Defendant 

was registered with CFTC as required by the Act and Regulations; and (5) omitting from 

prospective Pool Participants that as early as December 2016, Defendants were communicating to 

existing Pool Participants that they were not returning principal or delivering profits as promised 

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because they were struggling to make profitable trades. (ECF No. 3 at 26–28, 30; ECF No. 3-7 at 

2; ECF No. 3-8 at 2; ECF No. 3-9 at 3; ECF No. 3-10 at 2; ECF No. 3-11 at 13–23.) 

The Court finds Defendants’ false statements and failure to inform clients constitute 

misrepresentations and omissions in violation of the Act. See, e.g., R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 

1329, 1332–33 (misrepresentations included overemphasis of profit potential and downplayed

risk of loss, and failure to disclose that 95% of firm’s clients lost money on transactions); CFTC 

v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1300–01 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure to open trading account and issuance 

of fictitious trade statements supported injunction); CFTC v. Complete Devs. (Complete Devs.), 

No. 4:10 CV 2287, 2014 WL 794181, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2014) (failure to disclose 

details regarding commissions based on investments was actionable); SEC v. Wang, No. LA CV 

13-07553 JAK (SSx), 2015 WL 12656906, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) (citing United States 

v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding “activities tending to lull investors, either 

to prevent discovery of fraud or to permit further fraudulent activities to progress unhindered,” 

actionable.)

Second, as for the materiality requirement, “[a] statement [or omission] is material if it is 

substantially likely that a reasonable investor would consider the matter important in making an 

investment decision.” Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (citing R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1332–

33). Misrepresentations concerning the riskiness and profitability of an investment are material. 

Id. Similarly, misrepresentations that a pool is consistently profitable and employs loss-limiting 

systems are material. Capitol Equity, 2017 WL 9565340, at *4. The location of investors’ 

money is also material. Am. Bullion, 2014 WL 12603558, at *6; see also Rosenberg, 85 F. Supp. 

2d at 447–48 (reporting erroneous account balances, issuing false monthly statements, and failure 

to make trades in accordance with representations were material to investors) (collecting cases). 

Additionally, facts regarding a firm or broker’s trading experience and past success are material 

factors which a reasonable investor would consider when deciding to invest. CFTC v. 

Commonwealth Fin. Grp., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1345, 1353–54 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 

Here, the supporting documents establish a prima facie case that Defendants’ 

misrepresentations and omissions were material as a reasonable investor would consider them 
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important when deciding to invest. Indeed, CFTC has submitted evidence indicating that 

Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions caused Pool Participants to invest and remain 

invested with Defendants. (ECF No. 3 at 26, 30–31; ECF No. 3-7 at 2–3, 10–25, 29–36, 39–52;

ECF No. 3-8 at 2–4, 16–66; ECF No. 3-9 at 3–4, 24–113; ECF No. 3-10 at 2–3, 11–19; ECF No. 

3-11 at 11–12, 16, 19–23; ECF No. 3-14 at 14; ECF No. 3-15 at 5.) 

Third, proof of scienter need not establish “evil motive or an intent to injure,” but merely 

requires evidence that a defendant committed the alleged wrongful acts intentionally, or “that the 

representations were made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.” Driver, 877 F. 

Supp. 2d at 977; see also CFTC v. Noble Metals Int’l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 774 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(holding that scienter is established when defendants act intentionally or with “careless 

disregard”). A defendant acts recklessly when, for example, he fails to conduct sufficient 

diligence on an investment prior to soliciting customers for the investment. See Complete Devs., 

2014 WL 794181, at *17. Likewise, lulling activities can evidence scienter. See SEC v. 

Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 144 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The court was entitled to consider the lulling 

activities because they were evidence of a scheme . . . and was relevant to the question of 

intent.”). 

In the instant case, there is overwhelming evidence that Defendants’ misrepresentations 

were made intentionally and with knowledge of their falsity. Defendants acted with requisite 

scienter when they misrepresented that: (1) pool funds would be held in a fiduciary-protected, 

separate bank account; (2) more than 85% of Defendants’ trades were successful, yielding 10–

70% monthly returns; (3) the California DBO Desist and Refrain Order previously issued against 

Financial Solution, Black, and Mancuso was “resolved some time ago ... [relating to] a currency 

program that was not our service” (ECF No. 3 at 33; ECF 3-9 at 4, 34–35); (4) the payments 

Defendants made to select Pool Participants were withdrawals of principal or returns from 

profitable trading; and (5) where Defendants were not returning principal or delivering profits as 

promised, it was because they were struggling to make profitable trades. (ECF No. 3 at 26–30; 

ECF No. 3-7 at 1–2, 4–9, 26–28; ECF No. 3-8 at 1–2, 5–15; ECF No. 3-9 at 1–3, 6–11, 19–21; 

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ECF No. 3-10 at 1–2, 5–10; ECF No. 3-11 at 11–23; ECF No. 3-13 at 138–143; ECF No. 3-14; 

ECF No. 3-15 at 1–6.) 

In reality, the truth is that binary options and forex trading is incredibly risky with no 

guaranteed returns. See R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1333. Moreover, Defendants had actually

traded very few pool funds in binary options or forex, and the trades that were completed resulted 

in significant losses of funds. (See ECF No. 3 at 23, 28; ECF No. 3-7 at 2; ECF No. 3-8 at 2; 

ECF No. 3-9 at 3; ECF No. 3-10 at 2; ECF No. 3-11 at 20, 22–23.) Similarly, as soon as pool 

funds were deposited in an account designated by the Glenn Law Firm, the pool funds were not 

used for trading purposes, but rather were transferred to Defendants’ personal and business 

accounts to make Ponzi payments and fund Defendants’ personal expenses. (See ECF No. 3 at 

23–25; ECF No. 3-11 at 13, 15–17, 18–23.) Further, the California DBO Desist and Refrain 

Order was issued against Financial Solution, Black, and Mancuso in connection with the Black 

Pools, not some other financial service. (See ECF No. 3 at 25; ECF No. 3-15 at 44–47.) Finally, 

Defendants continued to solicit new Pool Participants even while failing to return principal 

investments or deliver profits to other Pool Participants, and even after the California DBO issued 

a Desist and Refrain Order against Financial Solution, Black, and Mancuso in connection with the 

Black Pools. (See ECF No. 3-11 at 15 (Pool participants deposited funds for trading in the Black 

Pools at least as recently as January 29, 2020).) 

For the foregoing reasons, CFTC has made a prima facie case that Defendants made 

fraudulent representations and omissions to prospective and existing Pool Participants in violation 

of the Act and Regulations. 

b) Fraud by Misappropriation 

“Soliciting or obtaining funds from investors for trading, then failing to trade the funds 

while using them for personal and business expenses, is misappropriation.” Driver, 877 F. Supp. 

2d at 978 (citing CFTC v. Emerald Worldwide Holdings, Inc., No. CV03-8339AHM, 2005 WL 

1130588, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2005)). “Misappropriation or diversion of funds entrusted to 

one for trading purposes is ‘willful and blatant fraudulent activity’ that clearly violates the Act.” 

Id. (quoting CFTC v. Weinberg, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2003).) Here, Defendants 
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violated the Act and Regulations by misappropriating pool funds intended for binary options and 

forex contracts trading to instead make Ponzi payments to existing Pool Participants and to fund 

Defendants’ personal expenses. (See ECF No. 3 at 23–25; ECF No. 3-11 at 13, 15–23.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds CFTC has amply demonstrated Defendants made 

material misrepresentations and omissions in the course of soliciting investments from current 

and prospective Pool Participants and misappropriated pool funds, in violation of the antifraud 

provisions of the Act and Regulations, specifically, §§ 4b(a)(2)(A)–(C), 4c(b), and 4o(1)(A)–(B) 

of the Act, and Regulation 5.2(b). Accordingly, CFTC has made a prima facie showing that a

violation of the law has occurred. Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 981; Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220; Fed. 

Election Comm’n, 869 F.2d at 1261. These violations, plus the reasonable likelihood of future 

violations (as discussed herein), satisfy the requisite showing for issuance of a temporary SRO 

freezing assets, prohibiting destruction of records, and prohibiting refusal to permit CFTC to 

inspect records. See id.; Muller, 570 F.2d at 1300; see also 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a)–(b) (permitting a 

court to grant injunctive relief for violations of any provision of the Act or Regulations). 

iii. Remaining Counts and Violations of the Act and Regulations 

As previously discussed, the Court finds CFTC has made a prima facie showing that 

Defendants violated the antifraud provisions of the Act and Regulations, and that such violations 

support granting the temporary injunctive relief CFTC seeks. In light of this finding, the Court 

need not reach the remaining claims against Defendants for purposes of its analysis of CFTC’s 

motion for a temporary SRO. 

D. Reasonable Likelihood of Future Violations 

Determining the likelihood of future violations may involve consideration of past 

unlawful conduct. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc. (Co Petro), 502 F. Supp. 806, 818 (C.D. 

Cal. 1980), aff’d, 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982); Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220. In drawing such an 

inference from past violations, a court should look at the totality of the circumstances, including 

the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions, whether the violations were isolated or recurrent, the 

degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances against future violations, 

the defendant’s recognition of his conduct’s wrongfulness, and whether the circumstances 
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indicate that the defendant is in a position that makes future violations likely to occur. Driver, 

877 F. Supp. 2d at 981–82; Co Petro, 502 F. Supp. at 818; Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220; British Am., 

560 F.2d at 142; S.E.C. v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980); see also CFTC v. S. Trust 

Metals, Inc.(S. Trust Metals), 894 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A court need not make a 

finding on every factor.”). In addition, “[w]hen the violation has been predicated upon systematic

wrongdoing, rather than an isolated occurrence, a court should be more willing to enjoin future 

conduct.” Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 981; Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220; see also British Am., 560 F.2d 

at 142 (because commodities trading is highly regulated and sensitive area of public trust, “any 

circumstances that indicate the defendant might repeat or continue his activity in violation of the 

registration requirements strongly favor entry of an injunction.”) 

Here, the misconduct, as alleged, was neither isolated nor accidental. Defendants 

allegedly engaged in a highly egregious and systematic violation of the Act and Regulations by 

fraudulently soliciting and misappropriating over $14.32 million in investment funds from at least 

91 Pool Participants over the past five years. (ECF No. 3 at 12, 22–30; ECF No. 3-7 at 1–2, 4–9, 

26–28; ECF No. 3-8 at 1–2, 5–15; ECF No. 3-9 at 1–3, 6–11; ECF No. 3-10 at 1–2, 5–10; ECF

No. 3-11 at 11–23; ECF No. 3-13 at 138–143; ECF No. 3-14; ECF No. 3-15 at 1–6.) 

Moreover, rather than admit any wrongdoing, Defendants took pains to conceal their 

fraud, including by issuing monthly statements reflecting profits that never occurred, making 

Ponzi payments to certain Pool Participants, and falsely assuring Pool Participants in order to lull 

them and solicit additional payments. (ECF No. 3 at 26, 30–31; ECF No. 3-7 at 2–3, 10–25, 29–

36, 39–52; ECF No. 3-8 at 3–4, 16–66; ECF No. 3-9 at 3–4, 24–113; ECF No. 3-10 at 2–3, 11–

19; ECF No. 3-11 at 11–23; ECF No. 3-14 at 14; ECF No. 3-15 at 5, 7–43; see also, e.g., ECF 

No. 3-7 at 45 (November 15, 2017 letter from Black and Mancuso blaming “breach of contract 

and nonpayment from some of our previous banking sources” for nonpayment of funds to Pool 

Participants, but also claiming to have “hit the jackpot” with a new funding source and promising 

repayment by the end of the month); ECF No. 3-9 at 19–21 (Pool Participant was told his 

payment in August was delayed “because the European market had fluctuation and it was their 

summer vacations” and that “there was a legal issue as to why the funds did not transfer from 
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Singapore to Hong Kong.”).) These actions also detract from the sincerity of any assurances 

against future wrongdoing Defendants may express. 

Lastly, the Court agrees with CFTC that because Defendants are not registered as CPOs or 

APs of CPOs, they are currently under no regulatory obligation to maintain Records (ECF No. 3 

at 38–39, 69; ECF No. 3-11 at 11) and therefore may more easily evade CFTC’s review. This 

supports a finding that Defendants are in a position that makes future violations likely to occur. 

Indeed, the fact that Defendants have continued to solicit investments from existing and 

prospective Pool Participants — despite the SEC charging Tufo in 1999 for defrauding investors 

in a separate scheme, as well as Tufo pleading guilty to criminal violations of the Alabama 

Securities Act in 2015 (ECF No. 3 at 18, 35; ECF No. 3-11 at 9; ECF No. 3-13 at 126–132);

despite the California DBO issuing a Desist and Refrain Order against Financial Solution, Black, 

and Mancuso in April 2018, regarding their solicitations for the Black Pools (ECF No. 3 at 25–

26; ECF No. 3-11 at 12; ECF No. 3-15 at 45–47); and despite the Colorado Supreme Court’s 

Attorney Regulation Counsel issuing Glenn three separate bar complaints regarding his role in the 

Black Pools fraud (ECF No. 3 at 36; ECF No. 3-15 at 49–54) — suggests Defendants will remain 

undeterred from fraudulently soliciting funds from members of the public. This, too, bolsters the 

Court’s finding that there is a likelihood of future wrongdoing. 

E. Requested Relief 

It has long been recognized that, “in an action brought to enforce the requirements of 

remedial statutes such as this Act, a district court has broad discretion to fashion appropriate 

relief.” Muller, 570 F.2d at 1300. Indeed, “[t]he district court has inherent power as a court of 

equity to order such temporary, ancillary relief in order to preserve the status quo so that an 

ultimate decision for the [CFTC] could be effective.” Id. (citing SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, 

Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105–06 (2d Cir. 1972)). 

Such ancillary relief may include an order to temporarily freeze the assets of a defendant, 

prohibit the destruction or records, or prohibit a defendant from preventing CFTC access to his 

records. See Yu, 2012 WL 3283430, at *6–8 (granting ex parte SRO freezing the defendants’ 

assets and prohibiting the destruction of/prevention of CFTC access to the defendants’ books and 
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records); see also CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 

(order freezing assets “is often necessary to ensure that the assets will be available to compensate 

public customers”); U.S. CFTC v. Khara, No. 15 CV 03497, 2015 WL 10849125, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 

May 5, 2015) (granting ex parte SRO requiring defendants to permit CFTC to inspect records). 

Similarly, the Court may include an order to expedite discovery pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 26(d), for the purpose of allowing CFTC to determine the full extent of a 

defendant’s alleged wrongdoing, locate the defendant’s other clients, other defendants, and relief 

defendants, identify client funds, and clarify the sources of various funds in advance of the 

hearing on the preliminary injunction. Id. at *5 (issuing ex parte temporary SRO expediting 

discovery); see also CFTC v. RFF GP, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-382, 2013 WL 4083748, at *8 (E.D. 

Tex. Jul. 10, 2013) (same). 

Here, CFTC requests an SRO freezing Assets, allowing for the inspection of Records, and 

permitting expedited discovery in advance of any hearing on the preliminary injunction. The 

Court is satisfied that such relief is appropriate here, given Defendants’ solicitation of at least 

$14.32 million from members of the public, nearly 77% of which has been misappropriated by 

Defendants for personal expenses and Ponzi payments, and the reasonable likelihood that 

Defendants will transfer or dissipate Assets or destroy or alter Records in the absence of an SRO. 

In sum, the Court finds good cause exists to GRANT CFTC’s ex parte Motion for 

Statutory Restraining Order to freeze Assets, prohibit the destruction or alteration of Records, and 

prohibit the denial of access to those Records because CFTC has made a prima facie showing that 

Defendants violated the Act and Regulations, and there is a reasonable likelihood of future 

violations. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, CFTC’s Motion for a Statutory Restraining Order and Other 

Equitable Relief (ECF No. 2) is hereby GRANTED, as follows: 

A. Asset Freeze Order Prohibiting the Withdrawal, Transfer, Removal, 

Dissipation, and Disposal of Assets

Defendants and Relief Defendants are immediately RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED, 
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except as otherwise ordered by this Court, from directly or indirectly withdrawing, transferring, 

removing, dissipating, or otherwise disposing of any Assets, wherever located, including 

Defendants’ and Relief Defendants’ Assets held outside the United States. The Assets affected 

by this Order shall include existing Assets and Assets acquired after the effective date of this 

Order. 

B. Maintenance of and Access to All Records Relating to Business Activities,

Business, and Personal Finances 

Defendants and Relief Defendants are hereby RESTRAINED from directly or indirectly

destroying, altering, or disposing of, in any manner, any Records that relate or refer to the 

business activities or business or personal finances of any Defendant or Relief Defendant. 

Defendants and Relief Defendants are hereby ORDERED to immediately allow 

representatives of CFTC to inspect any Records relating or referring to the business activities or 

business or personal finances of Defendants and Relief Defendants, including but not limited to:

both hard-copy documents and ESI, wherever they may be situated and whether they are in the 

possession, custody, or control of Defendants, Relief Defendants, or others. 

When inspecting Records that are subject to this Order, including those contained on 

computers and/or other electronic devices, CFTC should undertake reasonable measures to 

prevent review of Defendants’ or Relief Defendants’ privileged communications and/or other 

nonbusiness, nonfinancial materials by CFTC’s attorneys and other staff who are part of the 

litigation team in this matter. Moreover, Defendants and Relief Defendants (or their counsel) 

shall promptly contact CFTC’s counsel to assert any claims of privilege or other legal objections 

relating to the contents of any Records that are subject to this Order and promptly cooperate with 

CFTC’s counsel to develop reasonable protocols to isolate and prevent disclosure of claimed 

privileged and/or other nonbusiness, nonfinancial materials to CFTC’s attorneys and other staff 

who are part of the litigation team in this matter. However, nothing herein shall excuse 

Defendants or Relief Defendants from full and immediate compliance with this Court’s Order 

permitting CFTC to inspect the books and Records which relate to Defendants’ or Relief 

Defendants’ business activities and their business and personal finances. 
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To facilitate meaningful inspection and review, Defendants and Relief Defendants shall, 

absent a valid assertion of their respective rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth 

Amendment, promptly identify and provide CFTC’s staff with the location of all Records relating 

or referring to the business activities and business and personal finances of Defendants and Relief 

Defendants, including the locations of relevant ESI, including but not limited to computers, 

external hard drives, mobile devices, cloud storage and services, email accounts, websites, and all 

accounts at any bank, financial institution, or brokerage firm (including any introducing broker or 

futures commission merchant) under the ownership, possession, custody, control, operation of, or 

accessible by, any Defendant or Relief Defendant. 

To the extent in-person inspection and review is feasible in light of the COVID-19 

pandemic, to ensure preservation and facilitate meaningful inspection and review, Defendants and 

Relief Defendants shall allow representatives of CFTC to make copies of documents and ESI onsite. If on-site copying is not practicable, representatives may make such copies off-site. After 

any such off-site copying, CFTC shall promptly return the original documents and devices upon 

which ESI is stored. 

To the extent in-person inspection and review is not feasible in light of the COVID-19 

pandemic, to further facilitate meaningful inspection and review, CFTC shall be allowed to take 

steps to inspect and copy such Records from an offsite location or remotely, as follows: 

i. Delivery 

a) Hard-Copy Documents

The CFTC shall be allowed to inspect hard-copy documents by having any Defendant or 

Relief Defendant deliver hard-copy documents by mail, private carrier service, or email. If by 

mail or private carrier service, CFTC will provide for the expense of delivery each way. Once 

CFTC has collected and copied hard-copy documents, CFTC shall promptly return the original 

hard-copy documents. If by email, Defendants and Relief Defendants shall electronically scan 

hard-copy documents and send the electronic scan to CFTC. The scan should adhere to CFTC’s 

Data Delivery Standards (see ECF No. 3-18), including but not limited to the requirements that

/ / / 
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black and white images must be 300 DPI Group IV single-page TIFF files, and color images must 

be produced in JPEG format. 

b) Electronic Equipment

The CFTC shall be allowed to inspect ESI by having any Defendant or Relief Defendant 

deliver, by mail or private carrier service, electronic equipment containing ESI, including but not 

limited to, computers, external hard drives, and mobile devices. Defendants shall, absent a valid 

assertion of their respective rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, 

promptly provide CFTC’s staff with all usernames and passwords needed to access, forensically 

collect, and forensically copy Records relating or referring to the business activities or business or 

personal finances of the Defendants and Relief Defendants on their electronic equipment. 

ii. Remotely 

a) Cloud Storage or Service

The CFTC shall be allowed to inspect by collecting and copying ESI in cloud storage or 

service, including but not limited to cloud email accounts, electronic files, websites, and software 

as a service. Defendants and Relief Defendants shall, absent a valid assertion of their respective 

rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, promptly provide CFTC’s staff with 

all usernames and passwords needed to access, collect, and copy Records relating or referring to 

the business activities or business or personal finances of the Defendants and Relief Defendants 

in cloud storage. 

b) Electronic Equipment 

The CFTC shall be allowed to inspect ESI by providing to any Defendant or Relief 

Defendant a device that will plug into Defendant’s or Relief Defendant’s electronic equipment 

containing ESI, including but not limited to, computers, external hard drives, and mobile devices, 

to facilitate the logical collection and copying of ESI. Defendants and Relief Defendants will 

execute that collection and copying consistent with CFTC’s instructions. After the logical 

collection and copying, Defendants and Relief Defendants shall return and deliver the device 

back to CFTC. The CFTC will provide for the expense of delivery for each device each way. 

Defendants and Relief Defendants shall, absent a valid assertion of their respective rights against 
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self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, promptly provide CFTC’s staff with all usernames 

and passwords needed to access, collect, and copy Records relating or referring to the business 

activities or business or personal finances of Defendants and Relief Defendants on their electronic 

equipment. 

C. Notice to Financial Institutions and Others that Hold or Control Assets or 

Records

To ensure the effectiveness of the Asset freeze and pending further order of this Court, 

any financial or brokerage institution, business entity, or person that receives actual notice of this 

Order and holds, controls, or maintains custody of any account or Asset or other property owned 

by, held for the benefit of, or otherwise under the control of any Defendant or Relief Defendant, 

shall not, in active concert or participation with Defendants or Relief Defendants, permit 

Defendants or Relief Defendants or other persons to withdraw, transfer, remove, dissipate, or 

otherwise dispose of any of Defendants’ or Relief Defendants’ Assets, except as directed by 

further order of the Court. 

Any financial or brokerage institution, business entity, or person that receives actual 

notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise shall not, in active concert or participation 

with any Defendant or Relief Defendant, directly or indirectly destroy, alter, or dispose of in any 

manner, any Records relating to the business activities and business and personal finances of any 

Defendant or Relief Defendant. 

Furthermore, any such financial or brokerage institution, business entity, or person that 

receives actual notice of this Order and holds, controls, or maintains custody of any account or 

Asset titled in the name of, held for the benefit of, or otherwise under the control of any 

Defendants and Relief Defendants, or has held, controlled, or maintained custody of any such 

account or Asset of any Defendants or Relief Defendants at any time since June 15, 2015, shall 

not, in active concert or participation with Defendants or Relief Defendants, deny a request by 

CFTC to inspect all Records pertaining to every account or Asset owned, controlled, managed, or 

held by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of Defendants or Relief Defendants, including, but not 

limited to, originals or copies of account applications, account statements, signature cards, 
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checks, drafts, deposit tickets, transfers to and from the accounts, all other debit and credit 

instruments or slips, currency transaction reports, 1099 forms, and safe deposit box logs. As an 

alternative to allowing inspection of Records, a financial or brokerage institution, business entity,

or other person may provide copies of Records requested by CFTC. 

D. Persons Bound By this Order

This Order is binding on Defendants and Relief Defendants, as well as any person who 

receives actual notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise and is acting in the capacity

of an officer, agent, servant, employee, or attorney of Defendants or Relief Defendants, or is in 

active concert or participation with Defendants or Relief Defendants.

E. Service of Order and Assistance of United States Marshals Service and/or 

Other Law Enforcement Personnel

Copies of this Order may be served by any means, including via email, facsimile 

transmission, certified mail, or UPS, upon any financial institution or other entity or person that 

may have possession, custody, or control of any Records or Assets of any Defendant or Relief 

Defendant, or that may be subject to any provision of this Order. 

The Court specially appoints the following persons or agencies to effect service: Margaret 

Aisenbrey, Clemon Ashley, J. Alison Auxter, Anthony Biagioli, Jennifer Chapin, Lauren Fulks, 

Rachel Hayes, Rebecca Jelinek, Jeff Le Riche, Charles Marvine, Jo Mettenburg, Christopher 

Reed, Elsie Robinson, Thomas Simek, Allison Sizemore, Nicholas Sloey, Brett Shanks, and 

Stephen Turley, and representatives of the United States Marshals Service, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (“FBI”), and California state or local law enforcement personnel.

The Court further authorizes the United States Marshals Service, the FBI, and California 

state or local law enforcement personnel to: (a) accompany and assist representatives of CFTC in 

the service and execution of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order on the Defendants and

Relief Defendants; and (b) help maintain lawful order while representatives of CFTC inspect 

Records as provided in this Order. Nothing in this Order shall limit in any way any other lawful 

activities undertaken by the FBI with respect to Defendants or Relief Defendants in connection 

with any other proceeding. 
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F. Service on CFTC

Defendants and Relief Defendants shall comply with all filing and service rules, as set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 and Local Rules 133 and 135. To the extent 

conventional service of any documents on CFTC is appropriate under the rules, such service shall 

be effected by delivering a copy to Jo E. Mettenburg, Chief Trial Attorney, Division of 

Enforcement, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 4900 Main Street, Suite 500,

Kansas City, Missouri 64112, by e-mail, personal delivery, or courier service (such as Federal 

Express or United Parcel Service) only. 

G. Order to Show Cause on Preliminary Injunction and Expedited Discovery

Defendants and Relief Defendants are ordered to show cause in writing not later than July 

10, 2020, as to why an Order for Preliminary Injunction should not be granted pending the 

remainder of this litigation. Such briefing shall be filed and served by the aforementioned date. 

The CFTC may file and serve a reply not later than July 17, 2020. 

The CFTC’s additional request for expedited discovery is also GRANTED. In advance of 

CFTC’s deadline to file and serve reply briefing in support of an order granting a preliminary 

injunction, the parties may conduct expedited discovery, and the prohibition upon discovery 

before the early meeting of counsel pursuant to Rule 26(f), in accordance with Rule 26(d), is

removed. Specifically, CFTC may take depositions of Defendants John Black, Chris Mancuso, 

Joseph Tufo, and John Glenn, and Relief Defendants Herbert Caswell, Anne Mancuso, and Tyler 

Mancuso, subject to two calendar days’ notice pursuant to Rule 30(a); that notice may be given 

personally, by facsimile, or by electronic mail; and, if necessary, any deposition may last more 

than seven hours but no more than eight hours in one day, and no more than two days. 

H. Waiver of Bond Requirement

As an agency of the United States of America, and pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(b) (2018) 

and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), CFTC is not required to post a security bond in this 

matter. 

I. Rights of Affected Parties 

Pursuant to Local Rule 231(c)(8) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), any party 
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affected by this Order shall have the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution on 

two (2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow. 

J. Force and Effect

In light of the voluminous briefing and supporting documents submitted by CFTC in 

support of its Motion for SRO, the Court finds good cause exists to extend the expiration deadline

of the SRO to permit sufficient briefing and consideration of the issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) 

(permitting district court to extend expiration deadline of temporary restraining order for good 

cause). Accordingly, the SRO shall remain in effect for 28 days, or until an order on CFTC’s 

request for preliminary injunction issues, whichever is sooner. This Court retains jurisdiction of 

this matter for all purposes.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 2, 2020