[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-12229

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20914-WPD-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANDRE ANTONIO JACKSON, 

a.k.a. Dre,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(January 2, 2014)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Andre Antonio Jackson appeals his sentence of 144-months’ imprisonment, 

imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack 

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cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. At sentencing, the district 

court found that Jackson qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)

and enhanced his sentence accordingly. Jackson argues that the district court erred 

in sentencing him as a career offender because his prior conviction under Florida 

Statutes § 316.1935(1) for fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement is not a 

“crime of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

The Sentencing Guidelines require enhanced sentences for defendants that 

qualify as career offenders. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). To be deemed a career 

offender, a defendant must, among other things, have “at least two prior felony 

convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Id. at 

§ 4B1.1(a). A crime of violence is any offense, state or federal, that and fits into 

one of three categories found in § 4B1.2(a) and is punishable by a term of 

imprisonment in excess of one year. United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 975 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 288 (2012). Here, the relevant category of 

crimes, often referred to as residual clause crimes, id., “involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2(a)(2). 

“We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of 

violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.” Chitwood, 676 F.3d at 975 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a prior offense qualifies as a 

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crime of violence, we apply a categorical approach, looking “no further than the 

fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” United States 

v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under this approach, “we consider whether the elements of the offense

are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, 

without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.” Chitwood, 

676 F.3d at 975–76 (internal quotation marks omitted). Inclusion is justified when 

an offense “creates as much risk of physical injury” as one of the crimes 

enumerated in § 4B1.2(a). Id. at 979. Our inquiry is also guided by “cases 

interpreting the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act [(ACCA)], 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e), because the § 4B1.2 definition of ‘crime of violence’ and 

ACCA’s definition of ‘violent felony’ are substantially the same.” Id. at 975 n.2. 

The Supreme Court held that a defendant’s prior conviction under an Indiana 

law prohibiting knowing and intentional flight from a police officer was a violent 

felony for purposes of the ACCA. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 

2267, 2274, 2277 (2011). The Court compared vehicle flight to burglary and arson 

and determined that it posed a comparable risk to those crimes because it 

“intentional[ly] release[s] . . . a destructive force” and creates a “confrontation 

leading to violence.” Id. at 2273–74. Importantly, the Court found that vehicle 

flight poses such risks even when the fleeing criminal drives in a relatively safe 

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manner. See id. The risk of danger inherent in vehicle flights arises from the 

“legitimate and lawful” force police may use to end the confrontation created by 

the decision to flee. See id. at 2273–74. 

This court has held that “vehicle flight in violation of [Florida Statutes]

§ 316.1935(2) qualifies as a violent felony under the [ACCA].” United States v. 

Petite, 703 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 182 (2013). In 

Petite, we stressed that “the Supreme Court made it clear that [r]isk of violence is 

inherent to vehicle flight.” Id. at 1295 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Accordingly, we held that vehicle flight, “even without any 

reckless driving on the part of the offender,” poses a substantial risk of injury to 

persons and property by provoking a “dangerous confrontational response from 

[the] officer.” See id. at 1301. 

Jackson argues that his conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude law 

enforcement under Florida Statutes § 316.1935(1) does not qualify as a crime of 

violence. We disagree. After careful review of the record and relevant case law, 

we conclude that a conviction under § 316.1935(1) is a crime of violence within 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

Like the statutes in Sykes and Petite, § 316.1935(1) makes it a felony for the 

operator of a vehicle to flee from a law a law enforcement officer after being 

ordered to stop. See id. at 1294–95. Since vehicle flight inherently poses a 

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substantial risk of injury similar to the risk posed by the crimes of burglary and 

arson, id. at 1301, we hold that a conviction under Florida Statutes § 316.1935(1) 

qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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