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The HONORABLE STEPHEN M. REASONER, Chief Judge, United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

___________

No. 95-2271

___________

Evelyn Holliman, as *

Administratrix of the Estate *

of Chester Ray Holliman, the *

deceased and on her own behalf, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

City of Marked Tree, Arkansas, * Eastern District of Arkansas.

a Municipal entity; Jack *

Richardson, Marked Tree, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Arkansas Police Officer; Rick *

Crum, Jailer of the Marked *

Tree, Arkansas City Jail, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: February 16, 1996

 Filed: February 22, 1996

___________

Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Evelyn Holliman appeals the district court's1 order granting

summary judgment to defendants in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We

affirm.

Evelyn Holliman filed this complaint as the administratrix of

the estate of her deceased husband, Chester Holliman, and also on
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her own behalf as Chester's widow. Defendants moved for summary

judgment. After Holliman did not respond, the district court filed

an order directing her to do so within seven days; the court noted

that if Holliman failed to respond, the court "[would] grant

defendants' motion, if appropriate." Eight days later, Holliman

telefaxed to the court a motion for an extension of time to respond

to defendants' motion. She attached a supporting affidavit by one

of her attorneys, State Senator Roy C. Lewellen, who attested,

among other things, that he had been in legislative session; that

his co-counsel had been unable to assist in Holliman's case because

of scheduling conflicts; and that he needed to complete discovery

in order to fully respond to defendants' summary judgment motion.

After defendants responded, the district court denied

Holliman's motion for an extension of time, and proceeded to the

merits of defendants' summary judgment motion. Concluding that

Holliman had failed to go beyond her pleadings and controvert the

information in defendants' affidavits, the court granted summary

judgment for defendants on Holliman's federal claims, and dismissed

without prejudice Holliman's pendent state law claims. Holliman

then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied,

and this appeal followed.

Holliman argues the court erred in granting summary judgment

prior to the completion of discovery. We disagree. Although

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not require district courts

to allow parties to conduct discovery before entering summary

judgment, a "party defending a summary judgment motion before

discovery is adequate may request the court to postpone ruling on

the motion until the discovery can be conducted." Humphreys v.

Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1993)

(citing Rule 56(f)). The party must do so, however, by

affirmatively showing why the party cannot respond to the movant's

affidavits, and how postponement of a ruling will enable the party

to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of
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fact. Id. 

 The district court here warned Holliman of its intent to

rule on the summary judgment motion if she did not respond within

seven days; when Holliman responded eight days later with her

request for additional time, she merely relied on her attorneys'

schedules and conclusory statements that completion of discovery

was necessary to fully respond to defendants. We conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holliman's

motion for an extension of time. See id.

Holliman also argues that the district court erred in refusing

to stay proceedings, as required by Arkansas law, based on

Lewellen's status as a state legislator. Holliman first raised

this "legislative-immunity" claim in a single statement in an

affidavit attached to her motion for reconsideration. We note that

the Arkansas statute addressing legislative immunity--Ark. Code

Ann. § 16-63-406 (Michie 1987)--by its terms, properly limits its

stay-of-proceedings mandate to "courts of this state." We also

note that Holliman was represented by two other attorneys in

addition to Lewellen. See McConnell v. State, 302 S.W.2d 805, 807

(Ark. 1957). We conclude the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Holliman's motion for reconsideration. See

Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,

911 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1990); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862

F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we affirm.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.