21154 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2022 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Kirk A. Hopkins, M.D.; Decision and 

Order 

On December 2, 2021, a former Acting 

Assistant Administrator, Diversion 

Control Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Kirk A. 

Hopkins, M.D. (hereinafter, Registrant) 

of Chicago, Illinois. Request for Final 

Agency Action (hereinafter, RFAA), 

Exhibit (hereinafter RFAAX) 2 (OSC), at 

1 and 3. The OSC proposed the 

revocation of Registrant’s Certificate of 

Registration No. BH9069205. Id. at 1. It 

alleged that Registrant is ‘‘without 

authority to handle controlled 

substances in Illinois, the state in which 

[he is] registered with DEA.’’ Id. at 2 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)). 

Specifically, the OSC alleged that on 

December 10, 2020, the Illinois 

Department of Financial and 

Professional Regulation entered an 

Order, effective December 24, 2020, 

indefinitely suspending Registrant’s 

state medical license after finding that 

Registrant ‘‘had been convicted of wire 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343, as 

a result of a scheme [he] conducted to 

defraud Medicare and Medicaid.’’ Id. 

According to the OSC, the Order also 

required Registrant to immediately 

surrender his state medical license. Id. 

Further, according to the OSC, because 

Registrant’s state medical license was 

suspended, his Illinois controlled 

substance license was placed on 

‘‘inoperative’’ status. Id. 

The OSC notified Registrant of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 2–3 (citing 

21 CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Registrant of the opportunity to submit 

a corrective action plan. Id. at 3 (citing 

21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

Adequacy of Service 

In a Declaration dated March 8, 2022, 

a Diversion Investigator (hereinafter, the 

DI) assigned to the Chicago Field 

Division stated that on December 9, 

2021, she sent a copy of the OSC via 

certified mail to Registrant at the 

address where he is presently 

incarcerated. RFAAX 3, at 1–2. The DI 

stated that on December 15, 2021, DEA 

received a signed return receipt 

indicating that the OSC had been 

delivered. Id. at 2; see also id. at 

Appendix (hereinafter, App.) B. Further, 

the DI stated that on December 16, 2021, 

she spoke with the mail room 

receptionist at Registrant’s place of 

incarceration and confirmed that 

Registrant had received the copy of the 

OSC. Id. at 2. 

The Government forwarded its RFAA, 

along with the evidentiary record, to 

this office on March 15, 2022. In its 

RFAA, the Government represents that 

neither Registrant nor any attorney 

representing Registrant has requested a 

hearing or submitted a written 

statement. RFAA, at 2; see also RFAAX 

3 (DI’s Declaration), at 2. The 

Government requests that Registrant’s 

DEA registration be revoked and that 

any applications for renewal of 

Registrant’s DEA registration be denied 

because Registrant does not have state 

authority to handle controlled 

substances. RFAA, at 5. 

Based on the DI’s Declaration, the 

Government’s written representations, 

and my review of the record, I find that 

the Government accomplished service 

of the OSC on Registrant on or before 

December 16, 2021. I also find that more 

than thirty days have now passed since 

the Government accomplished service 

of the OSC. Further, based on the DI’s 

Declaration, the Government’s written 

representations, and my review of the 

record, I find that neither Registrant, nor 

anyone purporting to represent the 

Registrant, requested a hearing, 

submitted a written statement while 

waiving Registrant’s right to a hearing, 

or submitted a corrective action plan. 

Accordingly, I find that Registrant has 

waived the right to a hearing and the 

right to submit a written statement and 

corrective action plan. 21 CFR 

1301.43(d) and 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C). I, 

therefore, issue this Decision and Order 

based on the record submitted by the 

Government, which constitutes the 

entire record before me. 21 CFR 

1301.43(e). 

Findings of Fact 

Registrant’s DEA Registration 

Registrant is the holder of DEA 

Certificate of Registration No. 

BH9069205 at the registered address of 

4426 S King Drive, Chicago, Illinois 

60653. RFAAX 1 (DEA Certificate of 

Registration). Pursuant to this 

registration, Registrant is authorized to 

dispense controlled substances in 

schedules II through V as a practitioner. 

Id. Registrant’s registration expires on 

October 31, 2022. Id. 

The Status of Registrant’s State License 

On June 17, 2020, Registrant entered 

into a Plea Agreement in the United 

States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in 

which Registrant agreed to enter a 

voluntary plea of guilty to two counts of 

wire fraud. RFAAX 3, App. A, at 7–8 

and 24. By entering into the Plea 

Agreement, Registrant admitted that 

‘‘[b]eginning in or around 2008, and 

continuing through in or around May 

2014 . . . [he] knowingly devised, 

intended to devise, and participated in 

a scheme to defraud and to obtain 

money from Medicare and Medicaid by 

means of materially false and fraudulent 

pretenses, representations[,] and 

promises.’’ Id. at 8. Registrant also 

admitted that as a result of the false 

claims that he submitted and caused to 

be submitted to Medicare and Medicaid, 

he received approximately $3,365,616. 

Id. at 11. 

As the Plea Agreement details, 

Registrant owned and controlled a 

facility that ‘‘purported to provide 

psychotherapy services to Medicaid and 

Medicare beneficiaries [who] were 

bused from group and nursing homes to 

the clinic to participate in a day 

program.’’ Id. at 8. However, Registrant 

‘‘submitted, and caused to be submitted, 

false claims to Medicare and Medicaid 

for psychiatric services purportedly 

provided to the participants in the day 

program, when such services were not 

provided . . . .’’ Id. at 8–9. Specifically, 

‘‘[Registrant] purportedly provided 

individual psychotherapy sessions 

when, in fact, the services were not 

provided’’ and ‘‘purportedly provided, 

or [purportedly] supervised another 

therapist providing, group 

psychotherapy sessions when, in fact, 

the services were not provided either by 

[Registrant] or under his supervision.’’ 

Id. at 9. Notably, ‘‘[n]umerous dates of 

services on the false claims included 

dates on which [Registrant] was 

traveling [outside of Illinois] and dates 

on which the beneficiaries were 

themselves unavailable to have received 

the purported services because they 

were admitted into a hospital facility or 

deceased.’’ Id. 

Moreover, Registrant ‘‘also paid, and 

caused his employees to pay, cash to 

certain beneficiaries in order to entice 

them to attend the day program’’ when 

‘‘[i]n reality, rather than receive 

psychotherapy services[,] the 

participants of the day program were 

placed in a large holding room to watch 

television and, on occasion, received 

group therapy from unsupervised and 

often-unlicensed counselors.’’ Id. As for 

the submission of the false claims, 

Registrant ‘‘directed his employees to 

delay submission of the false claims 

until after beneficiaries’ deductibles had 

been exhausted[ ] in order to insure [sic] 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2022 / Notices 21155 

1Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an 

agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any stage 

in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’ 

United States Department of Justice, Attorney 

General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure 

Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 

1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ‘‘[w]hen an 

agency decision rests on official notice of a material 

fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a 

party is entitled, on timely request, to an 

opportunity to show the contrary.’’ Accordingly, 

Registrant may dispute my finding by filing a 

properly supported motion for reconsideration of 

finding of fact within fifteen calendar days of the 

date of this Order. Any such motion and response 

shall be filed and served by email to the other party 

and to Office of the Administrator, Drug 

Enforcement Administration at 

dea.addo.attorneys@dea.usdoj.gov. 

that [Registrant’s facility] received 

payment because [Registrant] did not 

collect deductibles.’’ Id. 

In addition, Registrant ‘‘also 

purportedly provided psychotherapy 

services to Medicare and Medicaid 

beneficiaries residing at nursing home 

facilities’’ and ‘‘submitted, and caused 

to be submitted, false claims to 

Medicaid or Medicare for payment for 

services purportedly rendered to such 

nursing home residents when, in fact, 

[Registrant] had not provided the 

services because [he] was traveling 

[outside of Illinois] or the beneficiaries 

were themselves unavailable to have 

received the purported services because 

they were admitted into a hospital 

facility or deceased.’’ Id. at 9–10. 

Finally, Registrant ‘‘also offered and 

paid renumeration, including kickbacks 

and bribes’’ to induce individuals, 

including employees of ‘‘Healthcare 

Facility A,’’ to refer residents who were 

insured by Medicare or Medicaid to 

Registrant for psychotherapy treatment 

at either Registrant’s facility or at 

Healthcare Facility A. Id. at 10. Further, 

Registrant ‘‘submitted, and caused to be 

submitted, false claims to Medicare and 

Medicaid for psychiatric services 

purportedly provided to patients at 

Healthcare Facility A[ ] when such 

services were not provided.’’ Id. Again, 

Registrant ‘‘purportedly provided 

individual psychotherapy sessions 

when, in fact, the services were not 

provided’’ and ‘‘purportedly provided, 

or [purportedly] supervised another 

therapist providing, group 

psychotherapy sessions when, in fact, 

the services were not provided either by 

[Registrant] or under his supervision.’’ 

Id. Additionally, ‘‘dates of services on 

the false claims for services purportedly 

provided or supervised by [Registrant] 

at Healthcare Facility A included dates 

on which [Registrant] was traveling 

[outside of Illinois] and dates on which 

the beneficiaries were themselves 

unavailable to have received the 

purported services because they were 

admitted into a hospital facility or 

deceased.’’ Id. 

On October 7, 2020, a Judgment was 

entered by the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern District, after Registrant 

pleaded guilty to two counts of ‘‘Fraud 

By Wire, Radio, Or Television.’’ Id. at 

25. Registrant was sentenced to 36 

months imprisonment followed by a 

one-year period of supervised release. 

Id. at 26–27. Registrant was also 

required to pay restitution of 

$3,189,007.88. Id. at 31–32. 

On October 9, 2020, the Illinois 

Department of Financial and 

Professional Regulation (hereinafter, the 

Department) issued to Registrant a 

Notice of Intent to Issue Indefinite 

Suspension Order in which the 

Department stated its intent to ‘‘issue an 

order indefinitely suspending 

[Registrant’s] license as an Illinois 

Physician and Surgeon’’ following 

Registrant’s guilty plea and conviction. 

Id. at 3. On December 10, 2020, the 

Department issued its Indefinite 

Suspension Order, effective December 

24, 2020, in which Registrant’s Illinois 

Physician and Surgeon License was 

indefinitely suspended and Registrant 

was ordered to surrender his license to 

the Department. Id. at 1–2. 

According to Illinois online records, 

of which I take official notice, 

Registrant’s state medical license is still 

suspended.1 Illinois Department of 

Financial and Professional Regulation 

License Lookup, https://onlinedfpr.micropact.com/lookup/license

lookup.aspx (last visited date of 

signature of this Order). Further, Illinois 

online records list the status of 

Registrant’s state controlled substance 

license as ‘‘inoperative.’’ Id. 

Accordingly, I find that Registrant is 

not currently licensed to engage in the 

practice of medicine nor registered to 

dispense controlled substances in 

Illinois, the state in which he is 

registered with the DEA. 

Discussion 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the 

Attorney General is authorized to 

suspend or revoke a registration issued 

under section 823 of the Controlled 

Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA) 

‘‘upon a finding that the registrant . . . 

has had his State license or registration 

suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by 

competent State authority and is no 

longer authorized by State law to engage 

in the . . . dispensing of controlled 

substances.’’ With respect to a 

practitioner, the DEA has also long held 

that the possession of authority to 

dispense controlled substances under 

the laws of the state in which a 

practitioner engages in professional 

practice is a fundamental condition for 

obtaining and maintaining a 

practitioner’s registration. See, e.g., 

James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371 

(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App’x 

826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh 

Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 

(1978). 

This rule derives from the text of two 

provisions of the CSA. First, Congress 

defined the term ‘‘practitioner’’ to mean 

‘‘a physician . . . or other person 

licensed, registered, or otherwise 

permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in 

which he practices . . . , to distribute, 

dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a 

controlled substance in the course of 

professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

802(21). Second, in setting the 

requirements for obtaining a 

practitioner’s registration, Congress 

directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General 

shall register practitioners . . . if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense . . . 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which he practices.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has 

clearly mandated that a practitioner 

possess state authority in order to be 

deemed a practitioner under the CSA, 

the DEA has held repeatedly that 

revocation of a practitioner’s registration 

is the appropriate sanction whenever he 

is no longer authorized to dispense 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the state in which he practices. See, e.g., 

James L. Hooper, 76 FR at 71371–72; 

Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 

39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, 

M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby 

Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); 

Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR at 

27617. 

Pursuant to the Illinois Controlled 

Substances Act, a ‘‘practitioner’’ means 

‘‘a physician licensed to practice 

medicine in all its branches . . . or 

other person licensed, registered, or 

otherwise lawfully permitted by the 

United States or this State to distribute, 

dispense, conduct research with respect 

to, administer or use in teaching or 

chemical analysis, a controlled 

substance in the course of professional 

practice or research.’’ 720 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. Ann. 570/102(kk) (West 2022). 

Further, the Illinois Controlled 

Substances Act requires that ‘‘[e]very 

person who manufactures, distributes, 

or dispenses any controlled substances 

. . . must obtain a registration issued by 

the Department of Financial and 

Professional Regulation in accordance 

with its rules.’’ Id. at 570/302(a). The 

Illinois Controlled Substances Act also 

authorizes the Department of Financial 

and Professional Regulation to 

discipline a practitioner holding a 


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21156 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2022 / Notices 

1After an applicant has received an OSC 

regarding his or her application for DEA 

registration, the application may not be withdrawn 

without the permission of the Administrator. 21 

CFR 1309.36(a). Here, Applicant had already 

received the OSC before attempting to withdraw his 

application, and he has not demonstrated good 

cause why his application should be withdrawn, 

nor do I find that withdrawal would be in the 

public interest due to the nature and extent of the 

allegations in front of me and the Applicant’s stated 

intention that he will reapply for a registration. 

Adjudicating this matter to finality will create an 

official record the Agency can use in any future 

interactions with Applicant. As additionally noted 

in Olsen, ‘‘a final adjudication is a public record of 

the Agency’s expectations for current and 

prospective members of that community,’’ and 

adjudications inform stakeholders, such as 

legislators and the public, about the Agency’s work 

and allow them to provide feedback to the Agency, 

thereby helping shape how the Agency carries out 

its responsibilities under the CSA. Id. Adjudicating 

this matter to finality will create a public record to 

educate current and prospective registrants about 

the Agency’s expectations regarding the 

responsibilities of registrants under the CSA and 

allow stakeholders to provide feedback regarding 

the Agency’s enforcement priorities and practices. 

I have not permitted Applicant’s application to be 

withdrawn. Accordingly, Applicant’s withdrawal is 

not effective. 

controlled substance license, stating that 

‘‘[a] registration under Section 303 to 

manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 

controlled substance . . . may be 

denied, refused renewal, suspended, or 

revoked by the Department of Financial 

and Professional Regulation.’’ Id. at 570/ 

304(a). 

Here, the undisputed evidence in the 

record is that Registrant currently lacks 

authority to handle controlled 

substances in Illinois as his Illinois 

medical license is suspended and his 

Illinois controlled substance license is 

inoperative. As already discussed, a 

practitioner must hold a valid 

controlled substance license to dispense 

a controlled substance in Illinois. Thus, 

because Registrant lacks authority to 

handle controlled substances in Illinois, 

Registrant is not eligible to maintain a 

DEA registration. Accordingly, I order 

that Registrant’s DEA registration be 

revoked. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate 

of Registration No. BH9069205 issued to 

Kirk A. Hopkins, M.D. Further, pursuant 

to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority 

vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I 

hereby deny any pending application of 

Kirk A. Hopkins, M.D. to renew or 

modify this registration, as well as any 

other pending application of Kirk A. 

Hopkins, M.D. for additional 

registration in Illinois. This Order is 

effective May 11, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07696 Filed 4–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Kareem Hubbard, M.D.; Decision and 

Order 

On June 4, 2020, the former Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Kareem 

Hubbard, M.D. (hereinafter, Applicant) 

of San Leandro, California. Request for 

Final Agency Action (hereinafter, 

RFAA) Exhibit (hereinafter RFAAX) 2 

(OSC), at 1 and 12. The OSC proposed 

to deny Applicant’s application for a 

DEA Certificate of Registration, as well 

as to deny any applications for any 

other registrations, pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(1) and (4) because 

Applicant ‘‘materially falsified [his] 

application’’ and because ‘‘[Applicant’s] 

registration is inconsistent with the 

public interest, as that term is defined 

in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).’’ Id. at 1. 

The OSC alleged that Applicant’s 

application contained a materially false 

statement in which Applicant failed to 

disclose his previous surrender for 

cause of his DEA registration. Id. at 3. 

According to the OSC, Applicant had 

surrendered for cause his previous DEA 

registration ‘‘less than two months 

before submitting [his] application.’’ Id. 

Further, the OSC alleged that Applicant 

‘‘violated federal and California law by 

issuing prescriptions for controlled 

substances to four patients outside the 

usual course of professional practice 

and not for a legitimate medical 

purpose.’’ Id. at 4. 

The OSC notified Applicant of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 11 (citing 21 

CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Applicant of the opportunity to submit 

a corrective action plan. Id. at 11–12 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

By letter dated July 23, 2020, 

Applicant requested a hearing through 

counsel. RFAAX 3 (Request for 

Hearing), at 1. In his Request for 

Hearing, Applicant requested that his 

application for DEA registration be 

granted, because ‘‘he applied for it in 

good faith and did not believe his 

surrender of [his] previous certificate 

was ‘for cause.’ ’’ Id. Additionally, 

Applicant’s Request for Hearing 

included an attachment addressing the 

Government’s allegations in detail. Id. at 

3–5. On July 23, 2020, Applicant also 

submitted a Corrective Action Plan in 

which he offered a ‘‘historical 

perspective, in addition to [his] interim 

practice activities and corrective action 

plan.’’ RFAAX 4, at 5. On August 14, 

2020, Applicant submitted a 

Withdrawal of Hearing Request in 

which he ‘‘with[drew] his request for a 

hearing in [the] matter’’ and 

‘‘with[drew] his pending application for 

a new DEA Certificate of Registration’’ 1

without ‘‘waiv[ing] his future right to 

reapply for [the] same.’’ RFAAX 5, at 1; 

RFAAX 6 (Order Terminating 

Proceedings). On August 17, 2020, the 

Chief Administrative Law Judge John J. 

Mulrooney, II (hereinafter, the Chief 

ALJ) terminated the proceedings. 

RFAAX 6. 

On September 23, 2020, the 

Government forwarded its RFAA, along 

with the evidentiary record for this 

matter, to my office. The Government 

seeks a final order of denial of 

Applicant’s application for DEA 

registration because Applicant 

‘‘materially falsified his application 

under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1), and 

committed acts which render his 

continued registration inconsistent with 

the public interest’’ under 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4) and 823(f). RFAA, at 1. I issue 

this Decision and Order after 

considering the entire record before me, 

21 CFR 1301.43(e); and I make the 

following findings of fact. 

I. Findings of Fact 

A. Application for DEA Registration 

On or about April 8, 2019, Applicant 

applied for a DEA Certificate of 

Registration as a practitioner in 

Schedules II through V with a proposed 

registered address of 15035 E 14th St., 

San Leandro, CA 94578. RFAAX 1 

(Certification of Non Registration), at 1. 

Applicant’s application was assigned 

Control No. W19032408C and is in a 

‘‘new pending’’ status. Id. On 

Applicant’s application, when 

presented with the question, ‘‘Has the 

applicant ever surrendered (for cause) or 

had a federal controlled substance 

registration revoked, suspended, 

restricted or denied, or is any such 

action pending?’’ Applicant answered, 

‘‘No.’’ Id. Applicant previously held 

DEA Certificate of Registration Control 

No. FH4372859, which expired on 

October 31, 2016, and DEA Certificate of 

Registration Control No. FH4334037, 

which expired on October 31, 2019. Id. 

at 2. Both of Applicant’s previous DEA 


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