The c lerk’s r ecor ds wer e filed on Aug ust 5, 2005; Jones filed his brief on O ctober 31, 2005; 1 and our opinion issued o n Au gu s t 25, 2006. The State did not file an a ppellee’ s brief a

nd never chec ked out the clerk’s rec ords to ensure their complete ness. Not until the trial court, on its own motion, sent supplemental cl er k ’s re co rds did the State ac t, filing a motion for rehe aringthat addre sses o nly

one of Jones’s two issues on appea l (due to our r esolution of J ones’s fir st issue on orig inal submissi on, it was unnec essar y for us to dec ide the sec ond issue; now that the rec ord has b e e ns u p p l e m e n t e d , h o w e v e r , w e m u s t c o n s i d e r b o t hi s s u e s )
. W e r e c o g n i z e t h a tS t a t e a t t o r n e ys often c arr y heavy case loads and that there are fre quent chang es i n State personne l, but this delay ed and pa rt ia l pa rt ic ipatio n is ne g le c tf

ul of the State ’s duty to de fe nd su c h a pp e a ls, was tes val uab le ju d ic ial r e s o u r c e s , an d

h a s le n g th e n e d

th e ti me th e s e c a s e s li n g e r e d o nth is Co u rt’ s d o c k e t. We dism is s th e St a te ’ s mo ti o nf o r r e h e ar in g an d

in s te a d d e c id e th e s e c a

u s e s o no u r

o w nmo ti on, c on sid e ri ngthe su

pp le me nta l r e c or ds
. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
NO. 03-0 5 -00 512 -CV NO. 03-05-00513- CV NO. 03-05-00514- CV
P at r ic k A. Jo ne s , A ppe lla nt

v. State of Texas , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 169TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS . 192, 128- C , 191,4 78- B , & 192 ,129 -B , HO NORAB LE RICKMO RRIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
After we issued our

opinion in these case s, the trial court, a cting sua sponte, filed
s u p p l em en t al cl erk ’s re co rd s . Fo l l o wi n g t h at fi l i n g, t h e S t at e fi l ed a mo t i o n fo r r eh ea ri n g. Ba sed 1Although the supplemental re cords we re f iled afte r this Court’s opinion issued, the rules 2 of appellate proce dure do not ba r such afte r-the- fac t supple mentation. I nstead, the cle rk ’s rec ord may be supplemente d at the re quest of either party , the appe llate cour t, or the trial cour

t, and “[a]ny supplemental cle rk’s re cord w ill be part of the a ppellate r ecor d.” Te x . R
. Ap p . P
. 34.5(c) (1), ( 3). The supplementa l rec ords having bee n order ed by the trial cour

t, we will not choose to disreg ard them. See R eynolds v . Murphy , 188 S.W .3d 252, 256 n.1 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2006, pet. denied) (op. on re h’g ) (“ We ha

ve considera

ble discretion in deter

mining whe ther to file this [post -opinion, supplemental] recor d.”). I n tw o o f t

he thr e e c a

us e s, he a lso fi le d p ro se ans we rs and thi rd -p art

y c la ims
. 3 2 on documents included in the suppleme ntal cler k’s re cords, we withdraw our opinion and judgme nt dated August 25, 2006, and substitute this opi nion in its place
. When we conside r the supplementa l 2
rec ords filed by

the trial cour

t, there is no er

ror on the f

ace of the re cord. The ref ore, w e af firm the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nts
.
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n April and May

2002, the S tate filed three separ ate petitions seekingthe seizure and f o r f e i tu r e o f $ 3 , 4 6 5
. 5 5 i nc a s h , $ 2 , 5 0 0 i n m o n e y o r d e r s , t w o a u t o m o b i l e s , a

c e l l p h o n e , a

b o u tn i n e t yfour g rams of c rac k coca ine, and sever al i tems of per sonal proper ty belong ing to a

ppellant Patrick A. J ones. The S tate allege d that the i tems wer e contraband as define d by article 59.01 of the c ode of cr iminal procedur e bec ause they wer e used in the c ommissi on of a f elony , wer e the pr ocee ds of a fe lony , or we re a cquire d wi t h t h e procee ds of a f elony
. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt s. 59 .0 1- .1 4 ( Wes t 20 06 ). J on es, who ha s b e e n in c arc e ra te d s inc e so me tim e in 2 00 2, wa s in iti a lly
re pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l, who fi le d g e ne ra l de nia ls i n e a c h s uit . Jon e s a lso fi led sev era l pr o s e motions and asked to be g iven not ice of any actions in the ca ses. In Marc h 2004, he sent the district
c le rk no tic e that he ha d be e n mov e d to a pr iso n in B e a umo nt, Te xas. On J uly

23, 2004, the district 3Counsel’s motion to wit hdrawstates that a c opy was sent to the State’ s attorney , but does 4 not r ecite that it wa s sent to Jones. Fur ther, the district c lerk sent notice of the he aringon the motion to w ith dr aw o nly

to Jon e s’ s atto rn e y

and the State ’s a tto rn e y ; th is n oti c e wa s n ot s e nt t o Jon e s. 3 cler k sent J ones and his attorne y notice that the cases were set for a bench trial on October 25, 2004. T h o s e n o ti c e s w e r e s e n t v ia c e rti f ie d ma il to Jo n e s a t th e B e a u mo n t a d dr e s s h e p r o v ide d, and the
rec ord conta ins copies of the postal r ece ipts proving that the notice s were r ec ei v ed by the prison. The c auses we re r eset for a benc h trial to beg i n o n November 22, 2004, and on Oc tober 14, the district cler

k sent notice of the new trial date to both J ones and his attorne y ; the October 14 notices
we re s en t t o the same B eaumont addr ess provided by J ones and use d by

the district cler

k to send J o n es t h e e ar l i er

n o t i ce o f t h e o ri gi n al Oc t o b er t ri al s et t i n g. I n late October 2004, J ones’s attorney filed a moti on to withdraw, statingthat J ones ha d b e c ome unre a so na

ble in his de mand s, wa s inc arc e ra te d fo r a fe de ra l of

fe ns e , a nd wa s una ble to pa y c ouns e l. A hea

ring on the motion was set for November 12, 2004, and the trial court g rante d 4 counsel’s moti o n to withdraw on Nove mber 12. On N ovember 22, a benc h trial was he ld on the State ’s pe tit ion s. Jone s did not a tte nd , an d the tr ia l court sig ne d thr e e jud g me nts a llo wi ngthe State to seize the proper

ty listed in the St ate’ s petitions. There was no fur

ther a ction in the cause s until J anuary 25, 2005, when the district cler k filed Jones’s moti on for c ontinuance, motion to proce ed as a pauper and for ap p o i n tment of
c ouns e l, m oti on

to b e g ive n n oti c e of

any ru lin g s or dis po sit ion s, and mot ion to c omp e l th e State to file written r esponses to any motions or pleading s, as we ll as aff idavits by J ones and his commonlaw wife , aver

ring that they came to possess the property throug h leg itimate means. These motions and filing s, which re fer

to the forf

eiture c ases a s if they

wer e still pending, w ere not file-mar ked byThe fax heading s do not h av e phone numbers showing who sent or r ece ived them, but 5 J ones’s fax cover s heet ha s the following handwr itten notation on it: “copy sent to N. Ba

rnes 11/22/04 dr”; “N. B arne s” is a ref ere nce to the State’s attorney , but the rec ord does not e x plain the meaningof “dr .” The district clerk ha s informed us that, “[d]ue to our proce dures , we know that these doc uments were not faxed to the District Clerk, but i n fa ct were ha nd delivere d to the front counter and file ma

rked on the date r ece ived by the District Clerk.” I f a pa rty does not rec eive notice of a judg ment within tw en t y d ay s , postjudgment 6 timetables beg in to run on the day he g ets notice, as long as that date falls within ninety day s of the judgme nt’s signing , if he files a sworn motion stating the date he f irst g ot notice or obtained a ctual kn ow le dg e of

the jud g me nt. Te x. R. C iv. P
. 30 6a(4) , ( 5) . Apr op e r 3 06 a mot ion make s a pr ima fac ie ca se showingthat there was no timely notice, which “invokes a trial court’ s otherwise- expired jurisdiction for the limited purpose of holding a n evidentiar

y hear ing to de termine the date on which the par ty ” re ceive d notice. In re The Lynd Co. , 195 S.W .3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) . Although Jones asser ts that he did not rece ive timely notice of the trial court’s judgme nts, his motions are not sworn or ver ified, do not include a n unsworn dec laration that an inmate m ay file i n lieu of an affidavit, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 132.001-.003 (West 2005), and do not state the date on which he rec eived notice, saying only that he rec eived notice in “ 2005.” SeeMe mo ria l H os p. v . G ill is , 7 4 1 S
. W
. 2 d 3 6 4 , 3 6 5 -6 6 (T ex . 1 9 8 7 ) ( ap p el l an td i d n o tp ro v e t h at s h e h adn o n o t i ce o r k n o wl ed ge of orde r within t we n t y

day s); Car

re ra v . M

ar sh , 8 47 S.W. 2d

33 7, 34 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 1993, no writ) (op. on r eh’g ) (unswor n 306a motion “fa iled to establish a prima facie showing of” late notice)
. 4 th e c le r k ’ s o f f ic e u n ti l Ja

nu ar y 2 5 , 2 0 0 5 , b u t a ll o f

th e m a r e d a te d November 2 0 an d h a v e f a xmachine heading s ref

lectinga date of Nove mber 22, 2004. I n his unsworn motion for continuanc e, 5 J ones aske d to have the N ovember 22 hear ing postpone d for ninety day s, s tating that he did not
rec eive notice of the trial until November 19, 2004. On Marc h 31, 2005, J ones filed notice s of appea l with the district clerk’s of fice , along wi th m oti on s f

or le ave to f

ile an o ut- of

-t ime a pp e a l, s tatin g that he did

no t le arn of the jud g me nts until 2005. I n Aug ust, J ones filed a n amende d notice of appea l a sking to have his appe al treated as
a re stricted appe al. B eca

use J ones’s motions for an out-of-time appea l do not satisfy rule 306a

of the ru le s o f c ivi l pr oc e dure , w e wi ll c on sid e r h is a pp e a l a s a re str ic te d a

pp e a l. 65 Discussion On appe al, J ones asse rts that the trial cour t violated his rights to due pr ocess a nd equal pr otection and a

bused its discretion when it conducted the Nove mber 22 trial without g iving him a de qu a te no tic e of

the se tti ng . H e fu

rt he r c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in not ruling on his pre trial documents, which “ had a substantial dire ct ef fec t on the actua l trial.” A par ty who did not participate in the hear ing that res ulted in the complained- of judgme nt and who did not timely file a postjudg ment motion, request for fi n d i ng s of fa ct or conclusions of law , or notice of appea l, may

appea l from t he judg ment by way of a r estricted a

ppeal fi le d wi thi n six months a ft e r the jud g me nt is sig ne d. Te x. R. Ap p. P. 26 .1 (c), 30; Go ld v . G old, 14 5 S.W. 2d 21 2, 21 3 (T e x. 20 04 ). A p art y a tta c kin g a

jud g me nt t

hr ou g h a re str ic te d a

pp e a l mu st show err or appa

rent on the f

ace of the re cord. Go ld , 145 S.W .2d at 213. Al tho ug h J on e s file d sev e ra l pre tr ia l motio ns and ple a din g s, he did no t pa rt ic ipate in the Novembe r 22 t ri al. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 30 ; Mays v . Perkins , 927 S.W .2d 222, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t D ist.] 1996, no writ) (“pa rticipation in the actua l trial is a matter of de g re e . . . an d sho uld be c on str ue d li be ra lly

in f a vo r o f t he ri g ht t o a

pp e a l” ); see also Barnes v

. Barnes , No
. 03 -0 1- 00 65 3- CV , 20 02 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 66 44 , a t *7 -1 0 (Tex . App .— Au sti n Sept. 12, 2002, no pet.) (not desig nated for publ ication) (holdingthat “par ticipation at trial” mea

ns pa rt ic ipatio n in

“ de c isi on -m akin g e ve nt” that r e su lts in j ud g me nt o r o rd e r f rom whi ch a

pp e a l is broug ht). J ones’s notice of appea l, f iled Marc h 31, was untimely , and his va rious motions, filed on J anuar y 25 but dated two day s befor e the he aring , cannot be considere d timely postjudgm e nt motions under r ule 30 of the r

ules of appe llate proc edure
. See Tex
. R. App
. P
. 30. T he re fo re , th e on ly6

question that remains is whethe r there is e rror on the fa ce of the re cord. Se e Go ld , 145 S.W .3d at 213.

Did Jones Receiv e Adequate Notice ? I n his first issue, Jones complains that he did not rec eive pr oper a nd adequa

te notice of the Nove mber 22 trial se tting. The rules of c ivil procedure provide t h at a t ri al cour t may set
c on te ste d c a se s f

or tr ia l “ wi th re a so na

ble no tic e of no t le ss tha

n fo rt y -f ive da y s to the pa

rt ie s o f a fi rs t setting f or trial, or by ag ree ment of the parties.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 245. A ca se pre viously set for tria l may be re set with “any

rea sonable notice ” or by

the ag ree ment of the parties. Id . I f a de fenda nt files
an an s w e r , h e “ is e n ti tl e d to n o ti c e o f th e tr ia l s e tt in g a s a matt e r o f d u e proc ess.” Pl at t v . P lat t , 9 9 1 S
. W
. 2 d

4 8 1 , 4 8 3 (T ex . Ap p . — T yl er 1 9 9 9 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Peralta v. He ights Med. C t r., Inc. , 48 5 U. S. 8 0, 84 -8 6 ( 19 88 )) ; see Blanc o v. Bolanos , 20 S.W .3d 809, 811 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.). I f a party does not g et proper not ice, he is deprive d of hi s constitutional right to attend a nd participate in the hear ing, which is a violation of funda mental due pr ocess. Blanco , 20 S.W .3d at 81 1; Platt , 9 9 1 S
. W
. 2 d

at 4 8 3 (c i t i n g Ar

ms tro ng v . M an zo , 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965)). The rig ht to rece ive notice of a hea ring or trial setting is so fundamental t h at i f the
rec ord shows a la ck of notice , this amounts to error on the f ace of the re cord. See B lanco , 20 S.W .3d
a t 81 1; Tra n s o c e a n ic S h ip p ing Co

. v . G e n e r a l U n iv
. S y s . , Inc. , 9 6 1 S.W .2d 418, 419-20 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou ston [ 1s t D ist .] 19 97 , n o p e t.) (r e c or d s ho we d th a t c ouns e l di d n ot r e c e ive tr ia lsetting notice , thus there wa s err or on fa ce of rec ord). How ever , to r ebut the pre sumption t hat a tria l
c ourt wi ll o nly he ar a case a ft e r g ivi ngthe pa

rt ie s p ro pe r n oti c e , a

n a pp e lla nt m us t a ff ir mativ e ly show lack of notice by aff

idavit or other c ompetent evidenc e. Blanco , 20 S.W .3d at 811 (notice was faxed nin e da y s b e fo re he ari ng ; e ve n a ssumin g faxed no tic e wa s p ro pe r, “ re c or d a ffi rm a tiv e ly7

de mon str a te s th a t B lanc o r e c e ive d le ss t ha n th e fo rt y -f ive da y s ma nd ate d by Ru le 24 5” ); Platt , 991 S.W .2d at 484 (re cord showed that notice of f inal hear ing w as mailed to wrongaddre ss, which rebutted pr esum p t i o n o f re ceipt of notice ; further , notice mailed se ven day s befor e trial setting

“ fa ile d to c omp ly

wi th R ule 24 5” and “ wa s in e ff

e c tua l” ); cf. Barnes , 2002 Tex. App. L EXI S 6644, at *6-7 (no e rror

on fac e of r ecor d exis ted when a ffidavit, which stated party did not rec eive notice , wa s n ot p re se nte d to tria l c ourt ); Butler v. Butler , 808 S.W .2d 128, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (no er ror on f ace of re cord exis ted when rec ord is silent as to whethe r notice of he aringwas mailed)
.

J ones attac hed to his motion for continuance a copy of the Nove mber 15 not i ce he
re c e ive d o f t

he No ve mbe r 2 2 tr ia l se tti ng . On its fa c e , th is n oti c e g a ve Jone s at mo st s e ve n d ay s’ notice, fa r less than the forty -five day s require d for a first setting by rule 245. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 24 5; Blanco , 20 S.W .3d at 811. Howeve r, this wa s a re -setting and ea ch of the supplemental re cords contain an additional notice of the November 22 hear ing, dated Oc tober 14 a nd sent to J ones at the
same a ddress to which the cler k sent the J uly 23 notice, for which there is a g ree n return rec eipt, and the Novembe r 15 notice, w hich J ones ag ree s he re ceive d. Although Jones states that he doe s not
rec all rec eiving the Octobe r 14 notices a nd questions how they “mag ically appea r[ed],” the rec ord does not show any irregularity associate d with these noti ces. The trial court’ s order , which asks the district clerk to supplement the rec ord with a ll the court’s setting notices, direc ts the clerk, in f uture appea ls for which the re is no stipulation as to what should be included, to include the e ntire re cord. I t is no t un

us ua l f or a c le rk ’s re c or d to omi t c e rt a in d oc ume nts de e me d unim po rt ant t o th e a

pp e a l, and it appea

rs that this is what occurr ed in these c ases. The cler k’s offic e, not knowing the substance of Jone s’ s c omp la int s, op te d to in c lud e on ly the do c ume nts ob vio us ly re le va nt— the liv e ple a din g s,8

J ones’s motions, the fil ings associated with J ones’s attorney ’s withdraw al, and the judg ment. The orig in al v o l u m es of re cord do not include any notices of tria l settings or he aring s; those were included only

throug h J ones’s filing s on appea l and in the s upplemental records. The rec ord shows that the trial cour

t provided J ones and his attorney more than forty -five day s notice of the O ctober 25 trial setting, see Tex. R. C iv. P. 245, and that J ones wa s mailed noti ce o f the re schedule d November 22 trial setting on October 14, g iving him thirty -nine da y s notice. The O ctober

14 notice was, a s we have obser

ved, mailed to the same addre ss provided by J ones and at which J ones re ceive d
sever al other notice s. Although Jones states in his response on re hear ing that he “ha s no rec ollection of re ceiving ” the Oc tober 14 notice, ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord to show that he did not rece ive that notice or to re but the presumption that the trial cour t’s rec itation of notice wa s corr ect. See Butler , 808 S.W .2d at 129. Thus, the fa ce of the re cord doe s not refle ct re versible e rror in the notice pr ov ide d to Jone s.
Fai lure to R ule on J one s’ s Mo tio ns I n his second issue, Jones contends that the trial cour t abused its discretion in fa iling to rule on his pretria l documents, which “ had a subs t an t i al d i re ct ef fec t on the actua l trial.” He further complains that the trial cour t showed that it was biase d ag ainst him by its failure to rule on his moti ons and its failure to g ive him adequate not ice of the trial setting . J ones alleg es that he w as set up by the Killeen police , that he wa s not guilty of the crimes of which he was c onvicted, and that he should have been a

ppointed counsel due to the complexit y of the issues pre sented. Gene rally , a par

ty in a civil case does not have a rig ht to appointed counsel. As stated by our sister cour

t,9

[w]hi le a dis tr ic t ju dg e ha s the dis c re tio n to a pp oint c ouns e l f

or an in dig e nt p art

y in a c ivi l c a se , the Te xas Sup re me Court ha s ne ve r re c og nize d a ri g ht t o c ouns e l in c ivi l case s. The supre me cour

t noted, howeve r, “in some e x ceptional case s, the public and private inter ests at s take are such that the admini stration of justice may best be ser

ved by appointing a

lawy er to re prese nt an indige nt civ i l l i t iga nt.” [Appellant] has aff orded us no a

rgument supporting a

findi n g that his case r epre sents such an exception. Pe draz a v . Cr os sro ad

s S e c . S y s. , 960 S.W .2d 339, 341 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (i n t ern al ci t at i o n s o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Tra v e le rs I nd e m. Co. v . M

ay fie ld , 923 S.W .2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) ). Jones, who had counsel until approximately one month befor e trial, ha s not shown that this case r aised issues of suc h an exceptional natur e that it was a n abuse of

d i s cr et i o n for the tr ial
c ourt to f a il t o a pp oint c ouns e l. Th e pr e tr ia l mo tio ns on fi le at th e tim e of the tr ia l w e re Jone s’ s mo tio n to sta y , in which he rec ited that there wer e various motions and cross-claims pendingand aske d the trial cour t to s tay the fo rf e iture pr oc e e din g s o r, a lte rn a tiv e ly , “ [o]r de r t hat a [n] Ev ide nti ary

He ari ngbe he ld t o d e t e r m i n e t h e m e r i to f

t h e ” S t a t e ’ s p e t i t i o n s ; h i s m o t i o nf o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t , o r

a l t e r n a t i v e l y, to d ism iss , in

wh ic h h e argue d th a t his ar re st ar os e out of a

n il le g a l se a

rc h a nd se izur e , th a t he did not rec eive pr oper se rvice of proc ess in the forf eiture pr ocee ding, that he had be en h ar m ed by the State ’s de lay in pur su ing the fo rf e iture , a nd that th e State wa s r e lyingon imp ro pe r s tatut or

y a uth or ity and made overbr oad and unsuppor ted claims; and a

letter titled, “J udicial Notice,” in which J ones
a g a in r e qu e ste d a

dis mis sa l of

the c a se s. Jone s a lso fi le d a n “ ans we r a

nd thi rd- part y cla im in
rec onvention,” in which he alleg ed that the arresting office rs had fra udulently obtained the searc h
war rant a nd had conspire d to unlawfully sear ch Jones and seize his property
. Al l t h es e d o cu m en t s we re fi l ed wh i l e J o n es wa s re p re s en t edb y co u n s el
. Al t h o u gh “hy brid” re prese ntation, meaningallowing a litiga nt to both repr esent him self and a vail himself of10

an attorne y ’s assistance , is not prohibited, nor i s there a n absolute rig ht to procee d both pro se and with an attorne y ’s help. Se e Sm ith v . S mi th , 22 S.W .3d 140, 152-53 (Tex. Ap p . — Hous ton [14t h D ist .] 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; se e als o S c arbr ou gh v . S tate , 7 77 S.W. 2d

83 , 9 2- 93 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ) ( in c ri min a l c a se , a c c used has no ri g ht t o s tand by c ouns e l or

hy br id r e pr e se ntatio n; i f
acc used “indicates he would pre fer what ac tually

amounts to hy

brid repr esent at i o n , the trial cour t should decide at the ear liest prac ticable moment whether to allow it, and if not, should inform the
a c c us e d h e mus t c ho os e ins te a d b e tw e e n tw o mutua ll y e xclu siv e ri g hts —th e ri g ht t o s e lf repr esentation or to repre sent at i o n b y counsel—a

nd that there is no ‘middle gr ound’”) . Thus, the trial court wa s not obligate d to respond to J ones’s pro se motions whil e he was repr esente d by
c ouns e l, a lth ou g h it

mig ht b e a

be tte r pr a c tic e to n oti fy

Jone s o f t he hy br id- re pr e se ntatio n p ro ble m. Fur ther, in his motion to s tay , J ones aske d to have the pr ocee dings stayed or, a lternatively , for a n evidentiar y hear ing. That i s prec isely what the bench trial was—a trial on the evidentiar y merits of the State’s for feiture petitions. Finally , the t rial court, in render ing judg ment in favor of the State, imp lic itl y ov e rr ule d Jon e s’ s c ro ss-c la im, mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, and

mot ion s to dis mis s. J ones does not c omplain that the State failed to pr esent evidenc e to suppor t the tr i al co urt’s judgme nt, and through his complaints relate d to his pretrial motions and pleading s, he has not shown that th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s f

a il u r e to e xp li c it ly

o v e r r u le h is mo ti o n s a mo u n ts to e r r o r o nthe fac e of the rec ord. Conclusion

J ones has not shown that the tria l court’s fa il u re t o rule on his pre trial motions amounted to er

ror on the fac e of the rec ord. Ba sed on the supplementa l rec ords orde red by the trial11

c ourt , w e c ann ot h old

that t he face of th e re c or d e sta bli sh e s th a t Jone s d id n ot r e c e ive a de qu a te notice of the November

22 trial. Thus, we a ffirm the tria l court’s judg ments.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and B . A. Smith* Affir med on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: May

11, 2007

* Be fore B. A . Smit h, Senior J ustice (r etired) , Third C ourt of Appe als, sitting by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 1998).