NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROOSEBELT QUEZADA QUIROZ; IVAN ALBERTO QUEZADA VELEZ; MARIA BLANCA VELEZ SANCHEZ; MATTEO QUEZADA VELEZ, Petitioners,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 21

- 430 Agency No s
. A206

- 911

- 225 A206

- 911

- 694 A206

- 911

- 693 A206

- 911

- 695
MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 28, 2023 ** Pasadena , California Before: N.R. SMITH , LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges

. Petitioner Roosebelt Quezada Quiroz, his wife, and two of their sons seek review of a Board of Immigration Appeals ’s (BIA) decision dismissing their appeal of the Immigration Judge ’s (IJ) decision den ying their applications for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 30 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petiti on. We assume familiarity with the underlying facts and arguments in this appeal. “Whether a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ ... is a question of law we review de novo.” Perdomo v. Holder , 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010). But whether an ap plicant has shown that his persecutor was or would be motivated by a protected ground

— i.e. , whether the “nexus” requirement has been satisfied

— is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See Parussimova v. Mukasey , 555 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 200 9). Under this deferential standard, factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, to reverse the BIA’s finding under substantial evidence review, “we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” INS v. Elias

Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
First , the agency did not err in determining there was no past persecution

. T his court’s cases support the BIA’s holding that a one - time “detention, beating, and vague threat 6 months later from a caller who did not know where the respondent was located are insufficient to rise to the level of persecution

. ” See

1 “Petitioner” refers to Roosebelt Quezada

- Quiroz , the lead petitioner in this consolidated proceeding who alone testified before the a gency
.3

Sharma v. Garland , 9 F.4th 1052, 1063

– 64 (9th Cir. 2021) ; Gu v. Gonzalez , 454 F.3d 1014, 10 19

– 21 (9th Cir. 2006)

. Second , P etitioner has not established any protected ground that would give rise to a well

- founded fear of persecution. T he BIA concluded that in his appeal before the agency Pet itioner waived any challenge to the IJ’s determination that his proposed social group

— “family members of Roosebelt Quezada Quiroz”

— is not cognizable. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). See Umana

- Escobar v. Garland , No. 19

- 70964, 2023 WL 3606117, at *5 (9th Cir. May 23, 2023)

. Petitioner also failed to meaningfully challenge the BIA’s waiver conclusion in his opening brief, and therefore has forfeited the issue before us. See Martinez

– Serrano v. INS , 94 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1996). And Petitioner’s refusal to join a gang with alleged government ties and his opposition to their activities does not give rise to an imputed protected political opinion. See Santos

- Lemus v. Mukasey , 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir.
2008 ) , abrogated on other grounds by Henriqu ez - Rivas v. Holder , 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) ; Chen v. INS , 95 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996)

. Absent any evidence of Petitioner’s real or imputed political opinions, “the BIA could reasonably determine that” the abuse he suffered at the hands of the g ang was “solely in retribution for refusing to join their group

- and not because of his religious or political beliefs.” Tecun

- Florian v. INS , 207 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Petitioner does not have a well

- founded fear of future harm based u pon membership in a cognizable particular social group or an imputed4

political opinion, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to establish any nexus to a protected ground and therefore to demonstrate eligibility for asyl um or withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales , 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). Finally , as to CAT relief, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioner has not show n past torture

. See Rivera Vega v. Garland , 39 F.4th 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2022) ( “ T he lack of past persecution, a lesser harm than torture, necessarily encompasses a lack of past torture.” ). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding, affirmed by the BIA, that it was not more likely that not that Petitioner would be tortured upon return to Mexico. See Arbid v. Holder , 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). T he agency reasonably concluded that Petitioner can safely relocate: he safely relocated to Tijuana for six months before entering th e U.S. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)

– (ii).
PETITION DENIED.