Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JEFFREY E. STRATMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Aurora, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ANGELA N. SANCHEZ

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RAYMOND P. DICK, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 15A01-1312-CR-554

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge

Cause No. 15C01-1103-FC-16

September 30, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PYLE, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After Raymond P. Dick (“Dick”) pled guilty to Class D felony voyeurism1and 

Class C felony attempted child exploitation,2the trial court sentenced him—pursuant to 

his plea agreement—to an aggregate sentence of seven (7) years with four (4) years 

suspended to probation. Among Dick’s special conditions of probation was the 

requirement that he actively participate in and complete a court-ordered sex offender 

program. After Dick was terminated from the sex-offender program, the trial court 

revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his previously four-year suspended 

sentence.

Dick now appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that there 

was not sufficient evidence to support the revocation and that the trial court abused its 

discretion by ordering him to serve his previously suspended sentence. Finding no error 

with the trial court’s revocation of Dick’s probation or its order for Dick to serve his 

previously suspended sentence, we affirm. 

We affirm.

ISSUE

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

revocation of Dick’s probation.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Dick to serve 

his previously suspended sentence.

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5.

2

I.C. §§ 35-41-5-1, 35-42-4-4. 
3

FACTS

In March 2011, the State charged Dick with: Count 1, Class D felony voyeurism; 

Count 2, Class C felony attempted child exploitation; Counts 3-30, Class C felony child 

exploitation, and Counts 31-58, Class D felony possession of child pornography. In

December 2011, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Dick pled guilty to the Class D 

felony voyeurism and Class C felony attempted child exploitation charges in exchange 

for the State’s dismissal of the remaining fifty-six charges. As part of the plea 

agreement, the parties agreed that Dick would be sentenced to three (3) years with three 

(3) years suspended to probation for his Class D felony charge and to four (4) years with 

one (1) year suspended to probation for his Class C felony charge.

3

 They also agreed 

that, as a condition of his probation, Dick would pay a $100 probation administration fee 

and a $100 initial probation user’s fee within ninety days of his release from 

incarceration, as well as $165 in court costs within sixty days of his release from 

incarceration. 

In January 2011, the trial court sentenced Dick pursuant to the plea agreement and 

ordered his sentences to be served consecutively. Thus, the trial court imposed an 

aggregate seven (7) year sentence with four (4) years suspended to probation. Condition 

seven of Dick’s special conditions of probation as a sex offender included the following 

provision:

 

3 The written plea agreement initially provided that Dick would be sentenced to three (3) years with three 

(3) years suspended to probation for his Class D felony charge and to four (4) years with three (3) years 

suspended to probation for his Class C felony charge; however, the plea agreement was amended and 

initialed by the parties.
4

You shall attend, actively participate in and successfully complete a courtapproved sex offender treatment program as directed by the court. Prompt 

payment of any fees is your responsibility and you must maintain steady 

progress towards all treatment goals as determined by your treatment 

provider. Unsuccessful termination from treatment or non-compliance with 

other required behavioral management requirements will be considered a 

violation of your probation. You will not be permitted to change treatment 

providers unless the court gives you prior written approval.

(App. 91) (emphases added). 

After serving his executed term of imprisonment, Dick moved to Ohio and had his 

probation transferred there. In Ohio, Dick started a weekly sex offender group therapy 

program in March 2013. The program was focused on life skills and taking 

accountability for the offender’s commission of his sex offense. This sex offender 

program was a twenty-four month program, but Dick was terminated from the program 

on July 31, 2013.

On August 15, 2013, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that 

Dick had violated the terms of his probation by: (1) being “terminated on July 31, 2013 

from Lifepoint Solutions, a Sex Offender Treatment Program” for being “uncooperative” 

and “disruptive in group” and for “fail[ing] repeatedly to make progress[;]” and (2) 

failing to pay probation fees and court costs. (App. 20). 

The trial court held a probation revocation hearing on November 13, 2013. 

During this hearing, Gary Key (“Key”), a psychotherapist and Dick’s group counselor at 

LifePoint Solutions, testified that Dick had completed only four months of a twenty-four-
5

month sex offender treatment program before Key kicked Dick out of the program.4 Key 

testified that “throughout the course of treatment it was quite obvious to [him] . . . that 

[Dick] usually did not take the group seriously.” (Tr. 31). Key testified that Dick had 

missed two sessions and that Dick “did not take the group seriously[,]” “kinda goof[ed] 

around[,]” engaged in “fun and games,” and made “snide jokes[.]” (Tr. 31). Key testified 

that he had verbally warned Dick on multiple occasions about his behavior. According to 

Key’s testimony, after he warned Dick about his behavior, Dick would “calm down” for a 

week or two and then return to the “same old kind of . . . non-committal type of approach 

to the group itself.” (Tr. 31). Key testified that he ultimately terminated Dick from the 

program when he undermined a new member who was taking accountability for his sex 

offenses and “minimized” the new member’s sex offense. (Tr. 47). Specifically, the new 

member was sharing with the group and “taking much more ownership over his behavior 

that brought him to [the] group” when Dick said that the new member was “entrapped by 

the police” and “entrapped by the system.” (Tr. 33). Additionally, Key testified that 

when group members challenged Dick about him engaging in “high risk situations[,]” 

Dick responded by saying, “[H]ey if they sen[d] me back, they sen[d] me back, I can take 

care of myself . . . I can do this time standing on my head.” (Tr. 49). Key testified that 

he had to terminate Dick from the program for the integrity of the group.

Dick did not testify at the revocation hearing. Additionally, Dick’s counsel did 

not dispute that Dick had been terminated from the sex offender program. Instead, 

 

4

In his Appellant’s Brief, Dick states that Key testified telephonically. While the trial court did grant the 

State’s request to have Key testify telephonically, the record gives the appearance that Key was present in 

the courtroom for the revocation hearing. 
6

Dick’s counsel challenged Key’s reasons for terminating Dick from the program and 

argued that the trial court should not find that a probation violation had occurred. 

The trial court determined that Dick had violated his probation by failing to

comply with his special condition of probation that required him to participate in and 

successfully complete a court-approved sex offender treatment program. The trial court 

revoked Dick’s probation and ordered him to serve his previously suspended four-year

sentence in the Department of Correction. When doing so, the trial court specifically 

addressed its reasons as follows:

We are here because Mr. Raymond Dick is on probation for voyeurism and 

attempted child exploitation. And as I recall, I believe this involved 

videotaping in – of a young lady in a bathroom. I’ve also reviewed, again 

we’ve talked about the conditions of probation . . . and I’ve also reviewed 

Mr. Raymond Dick’s history. And if I’ve counted this up, I – the way, 

what I’ve come up with is three prior probation violations. I believe there’s 

also a parole violation. 21 total prior convictions. 7 felonies. 3 prior sex 

offenses. 2 failure to register as a sex offender. And a prior incidence [sic], 

I believe this is relating to the parole violation, of not complying with a sex 

offender treatment program. That is a pretty substantial record. At the time 

that this plea was accepted, I noted that I was very reluctant to accept this 

plea. And I was reluctant based upon your history, and based upon what 

happened here. The reason that this treatment program was made a 

condition of probation is absolutely critical for you and for the people of 

this community and other communities is because of your history and what 

you were convicted of. And the testimony that I’ve heard here today 

convinced me, as I’ve indicated, that you did not successfully complete it 

and you were not serious about taking advantage of this opportunity; 

because it was an opportunity for you when I accepted – the day I accepted 

this plea. And again I think its further – the importance of it is not just the 

criminal history involved, but a prior failure to comply with a sex offender 

program. You knew how important it was based upon that and you still 

didn’t do it. Therefore, based upon these factors that I’ve stated, I am 

ordering that the remaining four years of the suspended sentence are 

revoked and they will be served with the Indiana Department of Correction.
7

(Tr. 83-84).5 Dick now appeals.

DECISION

Dick argues that the trial court erred by: (1) revoking his probation; and (2) 

ordering him to serve his previously suspended sentences. We review each argument in 

turn. 

1. Revocation of Probation

Turning to Dick’s argument that the trial court erred by revoking his probation, we 

note that “[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which 

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The 

trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the 

conditions are violated. Id.; see also IND. CODE § 35–38–2–3(a). Indeed, violation of a 

single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Gosha v. State, 873

N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). When reviewing a trial court’s determination that 

a probation violation has occurred, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the 

judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. 

Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

Here, the trial court revoked Dick’s probation because he did not comply with the 

special condition of probation that required him to “actively participate in and 

successfully complete a court-approved sex offender treatment program[.]” (App. 91). 

Dick argues that the trial court erred by revoking his probation because the testimony of 

Key, the sex offender treatment counselor, was insufficient to support a finding that he 

 

5

In its probation revocation order, the trial court also set forth its specific reasons for ordering Dick to 

serve his suspended sentence. 
8

violated the terms of his probation. It is undisputed that Dick failed to comply with his 

probation condition that required him to actively participate in and successfully complete 

a sex offender treatment program. Additionally, the special condition of probation that 

he violated specifically provided, “Unsuccessful termination from treatment or noncompliance with other required behavioral management requirements will be considered 

a violation of your probation.” (App. 91). Dick’s argument challenging the sex offender 

treatment counselor’s reasons for terminating Dick from the program is nothing more 

than a request to reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses, which we will not do. 

Because the evidence was sufficient to show that Dick violated the terms of his probation

by failing to complete a sex offender treatment program, we affirm the trial court’s 

revocation of his probation. 

2. Order to Serve Suspended Sentence

Next, we review Dick’s challenge to the trial court’s order that he serve his 

previously suspended sentence. Upon determining that a probationer has violated a 

condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence 

that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35–38–2–3(h)(3). “Once a 

trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the 

judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 

N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not given to trial courts and sentences were 

scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation 

to future defendants.” Id. As a result, we review a trial court’s sentencing decision from

a probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 956). 
9

An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances. Id. 

The record reveals that the trial court had ample basis for its decision to order 

Dick to serve his four-year suspended sentence. As specifically noted by the trial court, 

Dick, who was forty-three years old at the time of his offenses, has a criminal history that 

includes twenty-one convictions, including seven felony convictions and three sex 

offense convictions (two of which are for fondling in the presence of a minor). 

Additionally, Dick has previously failed to comply with court-ordered sex offender 

treatment and has failed to register as a sex offender. 

Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by ordering Dick to serve his previously suspended sentence in the Department 

of Correction. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Dick’s

probation.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.