alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II-00155

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Jon Jordan <uh6091 b@aol.com>

Saturday, December 4, 2010 2:20 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Jon Jordan

1075 Wynn Ln.

Williamston, NC 27892
Robert VON GOETZMAN, petitioner, v. WILLY SCHREIBER ENTERPRISES INC., dba Seffner Self Storage East, et al.

No. 16-657.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 23, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District denied.
Earnest CUMMINGS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7214.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
# C_2009141EN.01003202.xml

| 20.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 141/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 141/32

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Arios Pagos (Greece) lodged on 10 April 2009 — Organismos Sillogikis Diakhirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon v Divani Acropolis Hotel and Tourism AE

(Case C-136/09)

2009/C 141/56

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Referring court

Arios Pagos

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Organismos Sillogikis Diakhirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon

Applicant:

Respondent: Divani Acropolis Hotel and Tourism AE

Respondent:

Question referred

Question referred

Does the mere installation of television sets by a hotelier in hotel rooms and their connection to the central antenna installed in the hotel, without any other action, intermediation or intervention by the hotelier, constitute communication of the work to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC, and, in particular, in accordance with the aforementioned judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 December 2006 in Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, does this involve the distribution of a signal, via television sets, to customers who stay in the hotel rooms, by means of the technical intervention of the hotelier?

Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE)

Rafael Hoteles SA

---
# C_2009282EN.01002801.xml

| 21.11.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 282/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.11.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 282/28

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden lodged on 3 September 2009 — Gaston Schul BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-354/09)

2009/C 282/48

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gaston Schul BV

Applicant:

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Financien

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

In the case of subsequent entry in the accounts within the meaning of Article 220 of the Community Customs Code (1) must it be assumed that the condition laid down in Article 33(1)(f) of the Community Customs Code, under which import duties are not to be included in the customs value, is satisfied where the seller and buyer of the goods concerned have agreed on the delivery term ‘delivered duties paid’ and this is stated in the customs declaration, even if in determining the transaction price they — wrongly — assumed that no customs duties would be owed upon importation of the goods into the Community and consequently no amount of customs duties was stated in the invoice or in or with the declaration?

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302 p. 1).

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) THE
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SERV-TECH, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1995 AND FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1995 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH (B) CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                       4,324,660
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               49,490,091
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,447,841
<INVENTORY>                                  2,340,745
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            72,417,405
<PP&E>                                      49,143,050
<DEPRECIATION>                              16,979,712
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             124,196,631
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       48,662,243
<BONDS>                                     22,039,870
<COMMON>                                     3,369,586
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  50,020,512
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               124,196,631
<SALES>                                    189,378,211
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           189,378,211
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              156,553,862
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               894,204
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,376,794
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,499,533
<INCOME-TAX>                                   630,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            869,533
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   869,533
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.13
        

</TABLE>
Gustavo VENTA, petitioner, v. Tamyra JARVIS, Warden.

No. 17-6099.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 26, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
# C_2010346EN.01001301.xml

| 18.12.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 346/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 346/13

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 28 October 2010 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (United Kingdom)) — Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v AXA UK PLC

(Case C-175/09) (1)

1

(Sixth VAT Directive - Exemption - Article 13B(d)(3) - Transactions concerning payments or transfers - Debt collection and factoring - Payment plans for dental care - Service of collecting and processing payments for the account of the service supplier’s clients)

2010/C 346/21

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Referring court

Court of Appeal

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

Appellant:

Respondent: AXA UK PLC

Respondent:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Court of Appeal — Interpretation of Article 13B(d)(3) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) — Exemptions — Scope — Meaning of ‘service that has the effect of transferring funds and entail[ing] changes in the legal and financial situation’ — Collection, processing and onward payment services for traders’ credits from customers — Payment plans for dental care

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 13B(d)(3) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment is to be interpreted as meaning that the exemption from VAT provided for by that provision does not cover a supply of services which consist, in essence, in requesting a third party’s bank to transfer to the service supplier’s account, via the direct debit system, a sum due from that party to the service supplier’s client, in sending to the client a statement of the sums received, in making contact with the third parties from whom the service supplier has not received payment and, finally, in giving instructions to the service supplier’s bank to transfer the payments received, less the service supplier’s remuneration, to the client’s bank account.

---

(1)  OJ C 153, 04.07.2009.

1

---
II-00375

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Thomas Reynolds < 1941Train@nycap.rr. com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 10:33 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Thomas Reynolds

66 New Salem South Road

Voorheesville, NY 12186
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

504 

CA 14-01456 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

SUSAN E. ROSE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KIM A. LEBERTH, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

BRENNA, BRENNA & BOYCE, PLLC, ROCHESTER (ROBERT L. BRENNA, JR., OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

OSBORN, REED & BURKE, LLP, ROCHESTER (MICHAEL A. REDDY OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas

A. Stander, J.), entered May 5, 2014. The order granted the motion of

defendant for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries she sustained when the motor vehicle she was operating

collided with a vehicle operated by defendant on Mt. Hope Avenue in

the City of Rochester. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was

attempting to make a left-hand turn out of a parking lot onto Mt. Hope

Avenue. She was waiting for a UPS truck to make a left-hand turn from

the roadway into the parking lot and, as the UPS truck turned into the

parking lot, plaintiff exited the parking lot onto Mt. Hope Avenue and

collided with defendant’s vehicle, which, unseen by plaintiff, was

coming from plaintiff’s left. 

We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s

motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. “It is well

settled that a driver ‘who has the right[-]of[-]way is entitled to

anticipate that [the drivers of] other vehicles will obey the traffic

laws that require them to yield’ ” (Lescenski v Williams, 90 AD3d

1705, 1705, lv denied 18 NY3d 811). Because plaintiff was entering

the roadway from a parking lot, she was required to yield the rightof-way to defendant’s vehicle regardless of whether it was in the curb

lane, as defendant testified at her deposition, or in the center turn

lane, as plaintiff asserts (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143; Van

Doren v Dressler, 45 AD3d 1366, 1366-1367). Moreover, in support of

her motion, defendant established that she was traveling at or below

the posted speed limit and did not otherwise negligently operate her

vehicle. Defendant thus met her initial burden on the motion “by
-2- 504 

CA 14-01456 

establishing as a matter of law ‘that the sole proximate cause of the

accident was [plaintiff’s] failure to yield’ ” the right-of-way to her

(Guadagno v Norward, 43 AD3d 1432, 1433), and in response plaintiff

failed to raise an issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of

New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Plaintiff’s contention that defendant

violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126 is raised for the first time

on appeal and therefore is not properly before us (see Ciesinski v

Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 985). 

Entered: May 8, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
II-00421

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Dan Touse <dtouse@tds.net>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 8:19 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Dan Touse

4771 State Ri 5

Vernon, NY 13476
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, Lawrence Rychlak, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Avatech Solutions, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The Registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The Registrants other certifying officer
and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
function):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                   |  |                                           
|------------------ |  | ------------------------------------------
|Date: May 15, 2006 |  | /s/ Lawrence Rychlak                      
|                   |  | Lawrence Rychlak                          
|                   |  | Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



28
FAN GU, petitioner, v. INVISTA S.A.R.L.

No. 17-6183.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
# C_2014175EN.01004102.xml

| 10.6.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 175/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.6.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 175/41

---

Order of the General Court of 2 April 2014 — CNIEL v Commission

(Case T-293/09) (1)

1

((State aid - Framework system of actions able to be undertaken by the recognised French agricultural interprofessional organisations in favour of members of the agricultural sectors represented - Financing by voluntary levies made compulsory - Decision declaring the aid scheme compatible with the common market - Withdrawal of the decision - No need to adjudicate))

2014/C 175/56

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Centre national interprofessionnel de l’économie laitière (CNIEL) (Paris, France) (represented initially by: A. Cabanes and V. Kostrzewski-Pugnat, subsequently by: A. Cabanes, A.-C. Jeux and L. Sersiron, and finally by: A. Cabanes, L. Sersiron and M. Spy, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by: B. Stromsky and C. Urraca Caviedes, subsequently by: B. Stromsky and S. Thomas, and finally by: B. Stromsky, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of Commission Decision C(2008) 7846 final of 10 December 2008 concerning State aid No 561/2008, on the framework system of actions able to be undertaken by the recognised French agricultural interprofessional organisations in favour of members of the agricultural sectors represented

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the present action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the present action.

| 2. | The European Commission shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The European Commission shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 244, 10.10.2009.

1

---
1133.

#### Askew *v.*The State.

Indictment for furnishing liquor to minor, from Fayette superior court — Judge Reagan. April 8, 1908.

Hill, C. J.

1. Where the accused is charged with a violation of section 444 of the Penal Code, the intoxicating character of the liquor furnished to the minor, although called “grape juice” by the accused, is sufficiently shown by the testimony of the minor, that “he drank two quarts of the stuff, and it made him drunk.”

2. Whether one charged with furnishing spirituous and intoxicating liquors to a named minor exercised due diligence to find out the age of the minor, before furnishing him the liquor, and was honestly mistaken, is to be determined by the jury. *Stern*v. *State,*53 *Ga.*229 (21 Am. R. 266).

3. The evidence in support of the verdict is weak, but the jury and the trial judge thought it sufficient, and this court can not interfere.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*447Argued June 9,

Decided June 18, 1908.

*Blalock & Culpepper,*for plaintiff in error.

*O. H. B. Bloodworth, solicitor-general, O. H. B. Bloodworth Jr.,*contra.
Brett J. WILLIAMSON, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-6373.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 26, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
Joel Marvin MUNT, petitioner, v. Kent GRANDLIENARD, Warden.

No. 16-7120.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 17, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Hourly Flash Events for Selected 

Contracts 

1