[Cite as State ex rel. Viceroy v. Strickland-Saffold, 2011-Ohio-3077.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96594 

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL., 

PETER VICEROY 

RELATOR 

vs. 

JUDGE SHIRLEY STRICKLAND-SAFFOLD 

Court of Common Pleas

RESPONDENT 

JUDGMENT: 

WRIT DENIED 

Writ of Procedendo 

Motion No. 444225 

Order No. 445531 

RELEASE DATE: June 22, 2011 

-i-
2

FOR RELATOR 

Peter Viceroy, 303-314 

RiCI 

1001 Olivesburg Rd. 

P. O. Box 8107 

Mansfield, Ohio 44901-8107 

FOR RESPONDENT 

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

James E. Moss 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} Relator, Peter Viceroy, is the defendant in State v. Viceroy, Cuyahoga Cty. Court 

of Common Pleas Case No. CR-315048, which has been assigned to respondent judge. The 

grand jury issued a one-count indictment for felonious assault with a firearm specification and a 

violence specification. After trial to a jury, respondent sentenced Viceroy to three years on 

the firearm specification and three to fifteen years for felonious assault. This court affirmed. 

State v. Viceroy (May 9, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 68890. 

{¶ 2} In 2010, Viceroy filed an original action in procedendo in this court to compel 
3

respondent to issue a final order in Case No. CR-315048. This court granted the writ and 

stated: “Accordingly, this court grants the writ of procedendo and orders the respondent to 

issue a final, appealable order in the underlying case which complies with Crim.R. 32(C) and 

which corrects the various defects and errors in the original sentencing journal entry, including 

a clear statement that the jury found Peter Viceroy guilty of the firearm specification and a 

resolution of the violence specification, which could be a dismissal or a nolle.” State ex rel. 

Viceroy v. Strickland Saffold, Cuyahoga App. No. 95623, 2011-Ohio-5563, ¶7. 

{¶ 3} Respondent issued a new sentencing entry in response to Case No. 95623 which 

states, in part: “On a former day a jury found defendant Peter Viceroy guilty of felonious 

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11 with a firearm specification (specification one) as charged 

in the indictment. The violence specification (specification two) has been dismissed. 

Defendant Peter Viceroy is sentenced * * * for a term of (3) three years (mandatory) on the 

firearm specification to be served prior to and consective [sic] with the sentence of (3) three 

years to (15) fifteen years on the felonious assault charge.” Case No. CR-315048, December 

7, 2010 Entry (“resentencing entry”). Viceroy has not appealed the resentencing entry. 

{¶ 4} Viceroy contends that the resentencing entry is not a final appealable order. He 

requests this court to compel respondent to issue a final order. For the reasons stated below, 

we grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment, deny Viceroy’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment and deny relief in procedendo. 
4

{¶ 5} The criteria for relief in procedendo are well-established. The relator must 

demonstrate: (1) a clear legal right to proceed in the underlying matter; and (2) the lack of an 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 

114 Ohio St.3d 76, 2007-Ohio-2882, 868 N.E.2d 270, at ¶13. 

{¶ 6} In Viceroy’s first action in procedendo, Case No. 95623, this court instructed 

respondent to issue a sentencing entry which complies with Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Baker, 

119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. The resentencing entry: states the 

means of conviction; disposes of all counts and specifications; imposes sentence on the count 

and specification which resulted in a finding of guilt; imposes sentence; and is both signed by 

the judge and journalized by the clerk. Given the limited portions of the record available to 

this court in this original action, we must conclude that the resentencing entry complies with 

Crim.R. 32(C) and Baker and is a final appealable order. 

{¶ 7} Viceroy has or had a right to appeal the resentencing entry. See, e.g., State ex 

rel. Wright v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga App. No. 96397, 

2011-Ohio-2159. His concerns about the scope of the resentencing entry — that is, disposing 

of the violence specification without a hearing — could be addressed to this court in the 

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Regardless, in Viceroy’s first action in procedendo, Case 

No. 95623, respondent was not instructed to hold a hearing but to issue a final appealable order. 

Viceroy, supra, ¶7. 
5

{¶ 8} As a consequence, we must conclude that Viceroy does not have a clear legal 

right to proceed in the underlying case for the purpose of requiring respondent to issue a new 

sentencing entry. Likewise, Viceroy has or had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 

the law by way of appeal. 

{¶ 9} Accordingly, respondent’s motion for summary judgment is granted and relator’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. Relator to pay costs. The clerk is directed to 

serve upon the parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 

58(B). 

Writ denied.

 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, J., and 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR