alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3792 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide for deferment 

for Federal loans prior to the beginning of the repayment period. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 17, 2019 

Ms. KENDRA S. HORN of Oklahoma introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide 

for deferment for Federal loans prior to the beginning 

of the repayment period. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Guaranteeing Respite 

5 After College Ends Act’’ or the ‘‘GRACE Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFERMENT FOR FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS BE7 GINNING JULY 1, 2020. 

8 Section 455(f) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 

9 (20 U.S.C. 1087e(f)) is amended by adding at the end 

10 the following new paragraph: 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3792 IH

1 ‘‘(6) DEFERMENT OF NEW LOANS ON OR AFTER

2 JULY 1, 2020.— 

3 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding para4 graph (1)(B) or any other provision of this title 

5 to the contrary, a borrower of a loan under this 

6 part for which the first disbursement is made 

7 on or after July 1, 2020, shall be eligible for 

8 and granted a deferment, during which periodic 

9 installments of principal need not be paid, and 

10 interest shall not accrue— 

11 ‘‘(i) with respect to any Federal Di12 rect Stafford Loan or Federal Direct Un13 subsidized Stafford Loan, during the pe14 riod prior to the beginning of the repay15 ment period of the loan; and 

16 ‘‘(ii) with respect to any Federal Di17 rect PLUS Loan or Federal Direct Con18 solidation Loan, during the period prior to 

19 the commencement of repayment of such 

20 loan in accordance with section 

21 428B9(d)(1) (as applied to Federal Direct 

22 PLUS Loans) or section 428C(c)(4) (as 

23 applied to Federal Direct Consolidation 

24 Loans). 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

•HR 3792 IH

1 ‘‘(B) OTHER DEFERMENTS.—The 

2 deferment authorized under this paragraph is in 

3 addition to the deferments authorized under the 

4 preceding paragraphs of this subsection, and 

5 nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted 

6 to eliminate the availability of any other period 

7 of authorized deferment or forbearance under 

8 this title, except as specified in subparagraph 

9 (A).’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
BIRCH VENTURES, LLC, et al., petitioners, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-894.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

*1010Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Stacy L. CONNER, petitioner, v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institution Division, et al.

No. 17-7625.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 2, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
~ . 

~ OTC GLOBAL HOLDINGS ~: 

~ EOXLive 

JOHN F. JEFFERS 

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GENERAL COUNSEL 

(713) 358-5442 TEL 

(-71:3) 358=5456 FAX -GQM·MENT 

February 10, 2009 

SUBMITTED VIA EMAIL 

Secretary of the Commission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Three Lafayette Centre 

1155 21st Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20581 

Email: secretary@cftc.gov 

Re: Comments to Proposed Rules Regarding Exempt Commercial Markets 

-.. 

.c:: 

V1 

This letter is in response to the Commission's proposed rules issued December 12, 2008, 

regarding Significant Price Discovery Contracts ("SPDC") on Exempt Commercial Markets 

("ECM"), 17 CFR Parts 15, 16, 17, et al. 

As noted in the Commission's discussion of the proposed rules, ECMs in some cases 

enable trade negotiation and execution of contracts that may be determined to be SPDCs, which 

would, upon execution, be submitted to a registered Derivatives Clearing Organization (DCO) to 

be cleared. Registered DCOs are currently required to comply with certain core principles and 

information reporting requirements with respect to contracts they clear, regardless of the venue 

in which the original parties negotiated and entered into those contracts. In this context, 

requiring ECMs to comply with core principles or reporting requirements that are substantially 

the same as those currently imposed on DCOs could result in an unnecessary duplication of 

regulation without any significant benefit to the market. 

Accordingly, we urge the Commission to consider the extent to which an ECM providing 

electronic trade negotiation and execution capability with respect to SPDCs that are then cleared 

through one or more registered DCOs should be subject to those core principles or information 

reporting requirements which mirror rules already imposed on the DCOs. 

Sincerely, 

John F. Jeffers 

Senior Vice President, General Counsel 

OTC Global Holdings LP 

5718 Westheimer Road, Suite 1330 

Houston, TX 77057
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus OCTAVIO CRUZ BELTRAN, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00198) Submitted: September 11, 2007 Decided: September 13, 2007 Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Angela Parrott, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Octavio Cruz Beltran pled guilty to possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. At sentencing, the district court overruled Beltran’s objections to the presentence report and sentenced him to forty-eight months in prison, a sentence within the Guidelines range. On appeal, Beltran contends that the sentence is unconstitutional because he was sentenced under a de facto mandatory Guidelines system. Accordingly, he asserts that his sentence, which was based on the judge’s factual findings rather than his admissions or jury findings, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. We affirm. Because Beltran did not raise this issue in the district court, our review is for plain error. United States v. Hughes , 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005). We have concluded that sentencing decisions made by the district court based upon the preponderance of the evidence comport with the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Morris , 429 F.3d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied , 127 S. Ct. 121 (2006). We review a sentence “to determine whether the sentence is within the statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” United States v. Moreland , 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). “[A] sentence within the proper advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson , 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006). However, while a sentence outside the Guidelines range is not- 3 - presumptively unreasonable, United States v. Green , 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006), the further the sentencing court diverges from the Guidelines, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be. SeeMoreland , 437 F.3d at 434. In light of our precedents, we find no merit to Beltran’s claims that he was sentenced under a mandatory system. See United States v. Rita , 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness). In addition, our review of the record shows that the district court properly applied our precedents and that the sentence is reasonable. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Juan Elias LARA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 16-9510

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
# C_2010011EN.01003201.xml

| 16.1.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 11/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11/32

---

Action brought on 19 October 2009 — Oyster Cosmetics v OHIM — Kadabell (OYSTER COSMETICS)

(Case T-437/09)

2010/C 11/60

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Oyster Cosmetics SpA (Castiglione delle Stiviere, Italy) (represented by: A. Perani and P. Pozzi, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Kadabell GmbH & Co. KG (Lenzkirch, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 5 August 2009 in case R 1367/2008-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 5 August 2009 in case R 1367/2008-1;

| — | Order the adverse parties to bear the costs of the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the adverse parties to bear the costs of the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for the Community trade mark: The applicant

Applicant for the Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The figurative mark “OYSTER COSMETICS”, for goods in class 3

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited: Community trade mark registration of the figurative mark “KADUS OYSTRA AUTO STOP PROTECTION” for goods in class 3

Mark or sign cited:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Allowed the opposition partially

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissed the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 207/2009 as the Board of Appeal wrongly held that there was a likelihood of confusion between the trade marks concerned.

Pleas in law:

---
Kevin Devon BRIGGS, petitioner, v. Gail BURKE, et al.

No. 16-9433.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           8,859
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             151
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 9,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     63,607
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        126,272
<ALLOWANCE>                                      3,207
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 207,161
<DEPOSITS>                                     166,057
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,008
<LONG-TERM>                                     14,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        13,290
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,306
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 207,161
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  2,886
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                1,081
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    79
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 4,046
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               1,809
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,018
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            2,028
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       39
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,245
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,040
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,040
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       640
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .29
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .22
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.17
<LOANS-NON>                                        559
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    664
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 3,128
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       20
<RECOVERIES>                                        60
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                3,207
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             2,174
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          1,033
        

</TABLE>
Henry N. HARPER, petitioner, v. TUSCARAWAS COUNTY JOB & FAMILY SERVICES, et al.

No. 15-9445.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 3, 2016.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied, and petition for writ of certiorari to the United States *81Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM
10-Q FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           6,426
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   38,335
<ALLOWANCES>                                       490
<INVENTORY>                                     14,564
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                61,418
<PP&E>                                          27,777
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,140
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  79,233
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           24,791
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        38,419
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,023
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    79,233
<SALES>                                         19,106
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,990
<CGS>                                            8,693
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   28,985
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (76)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,081
<INCOME-TAX>                                       790
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,291
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,291
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3680 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

415 North Main Street in Henning, Tennessee as the ‘‘Paula Robinson 

and Judy Spray Memorial Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 10, 2019 

Mr. KUSTOFF of Tennessee (for himself, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mr. DAVID P. 

ROE of Tennessee, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. BURCHETT, Mr. COHEN, Mr. 

COOPER, Mr. GREEN of Tennessee, and Mr. JOHN W. ROSE of Tennessee) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 415 North Main Street in Henning, Tennessee 

as the ‘‘Paula Robinson and Judy Spray Memorial Post 

Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PAULA ROBINSON AND JUDY SPRAY MEMORIAL 

4 POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located 415 North Main Street in Henning, 

7 Tennessee, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Paula 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3680 IH

1 Robinson and Judy Spray Memorial Post Office Build2 ing’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Paula Robinson and 

7 Judy Spray Memorial Post Office’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
# C_2011269EN.01000702.xml

| 10.9.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 269/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.9.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 269/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 July 2011 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tartu ringkonnakohus — Estonia) — Rakvere Piim AS, Maag Piimatööstus AS v Veterinaar- ja Toiduamet

(Case C-523/09) (1)

1

(Common agricultural policy - Fees for health inspections and controls in respect of milk production)

2011/C 269/11

Language of the case: Estonian

Referring court

Referring court

Tartu Ringkonnakohus

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Rakvere Piim AS, Maag Piimatööstus AS

Applicants:

Defendant: Veterinaar- ja Toiduamet

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Tartu Ringkonnakohus — Interpretation of Articles 26 and 27 of and Annexes IV and VI to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1) — Calculation of fees charged for official controls in respect of milk production — Charging of fees equivalent to the minimum rates applicable under the regulation but higher than the actual costs borne by the competent authorities for official controls

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 27(3) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules must be interpreted as enabling a Member State to levy fees at the minimum rates laid down in Annex IV, section B to that regulation without having to adopt a measure of application at national level, even though the costs borne by the competent authorities in connection with the health inspections and controls laid down in that regulation are lower than those rates, when the specified conditions for applying Article 27(6) of that regulation are not satisfied.

---

(1)  OJ C 63, 13.3.2010.

1

---
Cyrus Andrew SULLIVAN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7730.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 19, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
# C_2012138EN.01001502.xml

| 12.5.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.5.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/15

---

Judgment of the General Court of 29 March 2012 — Poslovni Sistem Mercator v OHIM — Mercator Multihull (MERCATOR STUDIOS)

(Case T-417/09) (1)

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community word mark MERCATOR STUDIOS - Earlier national and international figurative marks Mercator and Mercator Slovenska košarica - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - No injury to reputation - Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009)

(2012/C 138/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Poslovni Sistem Mercator d.d. (Ljubljana, Slovenia) (represented by: J. Güell Serra and M. Curell Aguilà, lawyers)

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: D. Botis, Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Mercator Multihull, Inc. (Vancouver, Canada)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 July 2009 (Case R 1031/2008-1), concerning opposition proceedings between Poslovni Sistem Mercator d.d. and Mercator Multihull, Inc.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Poslovni Sistem Mercator d.d. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Poslovni Sistem Mercator d.d. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 297, 5.12.2009.

---