IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY FAVELA,

Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0440

Filed April 8, 2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. CR20123420001

The Honorable Jane L. Eikleberry, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General

Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix

By David A. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix

Counsel for Appellee

Nicole Farnum, Phoenix

Counsel for Appellant

OPINION

Chief Judge Howard authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Miller concurred.
STATE v. FAVELA

Opinion of the Court

2

H O W A R D, Chief Judge:

¶1 After a jury trial, Michael Favela was convicted of 

aggravated robbery and kidnapping. On appeal, he argues the court 

erred in admitting expert testimony about a palm print found at the 

scene of the crime. For the following reasons, we affirm Favela’s 

convictions and sentences.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to 

upholding the convictions. See State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 3, 

150 P.3d 252, 253 (App. 2007). After Favela and an accomplice 

entered L.F.’s apartment, they demanded to know where he kept 

drugs and money, restrained him, hit him in the face, and choked 

him. When Favela and his accomplice realized they could not find 

what they were looking for, they locked L.F. in his bedroom and 

threatened to shoot him if he tried to leave. They then left with

L.F.’s television, car keys, jewelry, and wallet. When police arrived 

later, they searched for DNA1 or fingerprint evidence. They did not 

find any usable DNA evidence but did find a “latent” palm print on 

the front door. The police later determined that the palm print 

matched Favela’s hand. 

¶3 Favela was charged and convicted as noted above and

was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of 

which was 15.75 years. We have jurisdiction over his appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4033(A)(1). 

Admissibility of Latent Palm Print Evidence

¶4 Favela argues the trial court erred in admitting expert 

testimony about the latent palm print the police found at the scene 

because it did not comply with the requirements of Rule 702, Ariz. 

R. Evid. We review a trial court’s ruling to admit expert testimony 

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boyston, 231 Ariz. 539, ¶ 14, 298 

P.3d 887, 892 (2013). 

 

1Deoxyribonucleic acid.
STATE v. FAVELA

Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 Rule 702 allows an expert to provide opinion testimony 

if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or 

other specialized knowledge will help the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or 

to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient 

facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of 

reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the 

principles and methods to the facts of the 

case.

The recent change of the rule in 2012 reflects a shift in Arizona to 

adopting the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony 

set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 

(1993). See State v. Perez, 233 Ariz. 38, ¶¶ 15-16, 308 P.3d 1189, 1193 

(App. 2013). Before the rule changed in 2012, the admissibility of 

qualified expert testimony on fingerprint evidence had been settled 

since 1921. See Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 423-24, 198 P. 288, 290 

(1921). In Moon, our supreme court stated that “‘[s]cientific

authority declares that finger prints are reliable as a means of 

identification,’” concluded evidence of matching fingerprints was 

admissible, but ultimately left the “weight and value of such 

testimony” to the jury. Id. at 423-24, 198 P. at 290, quoting People v. 

Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 918 (Crim. Ct. 1917). Since that time, it does 

not appear that the general reliability of expert testimony about 

fingerprint evidence has been seriously questioned in this state, nor 

has Favela directed us to any authority to that effect. To the 

contrary, our supreme court has sustained convictions based solely 

on expert testimony about fingerprint or palm print evidence 

because the evidence is sufficiently reliable. See, e.g., State v. 

Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶¶ 11-13 & n.4, 961 P.2d 1006, 1008-09 & n.4 

(1998) (“At trial, uncontroverted expert testimony established that 

palm prints are identical to fingerprints with respect to their power 

to match and identify members of the population.”).
STATE v. FAVELA

Opinion of the Court

4

¶6 Because our new standard of admissibility is based on 

federal law, we look to federal authority for guidance on whether 

Daubert has changed the landscape on the admissibility of expert 

testimony regarding latent fingerprint or palm print evidence. See 

Perez, 233 Ariz. 38, ¶ 17, 308 P.3d at 1194; Ariz. R. Evid. Prefatory 

Comment to 2012 Amendments (“Where the language of an Arizona 

rule parallels that of a federal rule, federal court decisions 

interpreting the federal rule are persuasive but not binding with 

respect to interpreting the Arizona rule.”). The overwhelming 

consensus from federal jurisdictions is that, even when considered 

“[i]n terms of specific Daubert factors, the reliability of the technique 

has been tested in the adversarial system for over a century and has 

been routinely subject to peer review,” and that “absent novel 

challenges, [expert testimony regarding] fingerprint evidence is 

sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.” United States v. 

John, 597 F.3d 263, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 

Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that expert 

testimony regarding fingerprint evidence satisfies Daubert); United 

States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 267-70 (4th Cir. 2003) (expert testimony 

on palm prints satisfies Daubert and equating palm print and 

fingerprint analysis); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682-83 (8th 

Cir. 2003) (expert testimony on fingerprint evidence satisfies 

Daubert); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(same). 

¶7 Favela has presented no novel challenge or argument to 

suggest a change in fingerprint technology or circumstance between 

Moon and this case would justify a change in Arizona’s rule because 

of the shift to the Daubert standard.2 Accordingly, our supreme 

court’s conclusion in Moon about fingerprint evidence still applies: 

given the proper foundation, expert testimony on matching 

fingerprint evidence is admissible because it is reliable. Moon, 22 

 

2Favela does not argue that there is a distinction between the 

reliability of fingerprint and palm print evidence, and both Arizona 

and federal case law have equated the two. See Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 

58, ¶ 11 & n.4, 961 P.2d at 1008 & n.4; Crisp, 324 F.3d at 265, 267-70.
STATE v. FAVELA

Opinion of the Court

5

Ariz. at 423-24, 198 P. at 290; see also John, 597 F.3d at 274-75; 

Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 11 & n.4, 961 P.2d at 1008 & n.4. That 

conclusion renders the testimony admissible under Daubert. We will 

therefore continue to apply the longstanding Arizona rule that 

expert testimony regarding fingerprint evidence is admissible. 

Moon, 22 Ariz. at 423-24, 198 P. at 290.

¶8 Favela complains however that the state “never 

established that the [holistic] method that the latent print examiner 

used in [Favela’s] case is generally accepted in the scientific 

community” and that she did not “look[] for a minimum number of 

Galton points that matched.” First, the rigid “general acceptance” 

standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, as a necessary 

prerequisite to admissibility, was explicitly rejected by Daubert

because it was “at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules 

and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 

opinion testimony.’” 509 U.S. at 588-89, quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. 

v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988). Instead, the Court “set out a 

number of non-exclusive factors for determining whether scientific 

evidence is admissible, including whether the scientific 

methodology has been tested and subjected to peer review, the 

‘known or potential rate of error,’ and whether the methodology has 

‘general acceptance.’” Ariz. State Hosp./Ariz. Cmty. Prot. & Treatment 

Ctr. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, ¶ 27, 296 P.3d 1003, 1009 (App. 2013), 

quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 

¶9 The examiner testified the current best practice, based 

on her experience, training, and certification with the International 

Association for Identification, is to look at the entire print rather 

than to focus exclusively on individual points. She stated that points 

of a print are a “very small piece of the puzzle,” and that to reach a 

conclusion an examiner must look at those points in the context of 

the entire print, including three different levels of detail and the 

quality of the latent print. She also testified that a second examiner 

was required to review her finding before she reported it, and that 

the second examiner agreed with her conclusion. And she testified 

that the error rate for false positives was “0.1 percent.” This 

testimony was sufficient, for purposes of Rule 702(c), for the trial 

court to find that “the testimony [was] the product of reliable 
STATE v. FAVELA

Opinion of the Court

6

principles and methods.” If Favela wished to present a competing 

viewpoint on print analysis, he could have done so.

¶10 Favela also appears to argue that the expert’s testimony 

here implied that the match she found “meant a 100% match” and 

its admission misled the jury. Although unclear, we presume this 

argument is rooted in Rule 702(d), regarding the reliable application 

of the methods to the facts of the case. Whatever problems might 

exist with actual testimony of a “certain” match, the expert here 

made no such claim. Instead, she testified—in response to questions 

from the jury—that mistakes are possible, including false positive 

matches which she conceded had been made in past cases, and that 

“whenever you have people involved in a process” there is a chance 

of error. The jury was free to weigh this testimony against the 

expert’s claim that she had found a match. See Moon, 22 Ariz. at 423, 

198 P. at 290.

¶11 Favela finally argues the trial court should have held a 

hearing “[b]efore admitting the testimony” in order for the state to 

establish the method used “actually met the scientific basis required 

by the evidentiary standards of Rule 702 and Daubert.” But as we 

recently stated, “the trial court has broad discretion to determine the 

reliability of evidence and need not conduct a hearing to make a 

Daubert decision.” Perez, 233 Ariz. 38, ¶ 19, 308 P.3d at 1194; accord 

John, 597 F.3d at 274-75 (absent novel challenge, trial court need not 

conduct Daubert hearing on fingerprint evidence). 

¶12 Furthermore, despite criticism of the lack of scientific 

rigor that underlies fingerprint matching, “errors in fingerprint 

matching by expert examiners appear to be very rare. Of the first 

194 prisoners in the United States exonerated by DNA evidence, 

none had been convicted on the basis of erroneous fingerprint 

matches, whereas 75 percent had been convicted on the basis of 

mistaken eyewitness identification.” United States v. Herrera, 704 

F.3d 480, 487 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, Favela’s attack on the scientific 

validity of fingerprint examination did not reasonably draw into 

question the reliability of the method’s results. Accordingly, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a Daubert 

hearing. 
STATE v. FAVELA

Opinion of the Court

7

Disposition

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, Favela’s convictions and 

sentences are affirmed.