# C_2010024EN.01003201.xml

| 30.1.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 24/32 |
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30.1.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 24/32

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Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte di Appello di Firenze (Italy) lodged on 18 November 2009 — Tonina Enza Iaia, Andrea Moggio, Ugo Vassalle v Ministero dell'Istruzione dell'Università e della Ricerca, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Università di Pisa

(Case C-452/09)

2010/C 24/58

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Corte di Appello di Firenze

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Tonina Enza Iaia, Andrea Moggio, Ugo Vassalle

Applicants:

Defendants: Ministero dell'Istruzione dell'Università e della Ricerca, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Università di Pisa

Defendants:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Is it compatible with Community law that the Italian State may, in relation to the period preceding the adoption of the first national legislation implementing Directive 82/76/EEC, (1) lawfully rely on five-year limitation or ten-year ordinary limitation, in respect of a right arising under that directive? — without thereby definitively preventing that right, relating to pay/essential needs, from being exercised, or, failing which, an action for compensation/damages from being brought? |
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1.

Is it compatible with Community law that the Italian State may, in relation to the period preceding the adoption of the first national legislation implementing Directive 82/76/EEC, (1) lawfully rely on five-year limitation or ten-year ordinary limitation, in respect of a right arising under that directive? — without thereby definitively preventing that right, relating to pay/essential needs, from being exercised, or, failing which, an action for compensation/damages from being brought?

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| 2. | Is it compatible with Community law, on the other hand, that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded because they definitively prevent the above right from being exercised? |
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2.

Is it compatible with Community law, on the other hand, that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded because they definitively prevent the above right from being exercised?

| 3. | In the alternative, is it compatible with Community law that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded until such time as the Court of Justice confirms the infringement of Community law (in the present case, up until 1999)? |
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3.

In the alternative, is it compatible with Community law that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded until such time as the Court of Justice confirms the infringement of Community law (in the present case, up until 1999)?

| 4. | In the further alternative, is it compatible with Community law that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded in any event until such time as the directive establishing the right has been correctly and fully transposed into national law (which, in the present case, never occurred), as laid down in the judgment in Emmott? |
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4.

In the further alternative, is it compatible with Community law that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded in any event until such time as the directive establishing the right has been correctly and fully transposed into national law (which, in the present case, never occurred), as laid down in the judgment in Emmott?

Emmott

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(1)  OJ L 43, 15.2.1982, p. 21.

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