### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 14, 200 4



### DEXT ER P. JONES v. S TATE OF TENNESS EE

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Wilson Coun ty Nos. 01-0142, 01-0463, 01- 464-66 John D. Wootten, Judge

No

. M2 0 0 3 -0 1 2 2 9 -C CA -R 3 -PC

The pe titioner, Dexter P. J ones, appe als from the Wilson Count y Crimi n al C o u rt ’s denial of post-conviction re lief from his f our convictions for assault, a Class A misdemeanor, a nd resulting

consec utive eleve n-month, twenty -nine-da y sentenc es. He contends that his g uilty pleas we re not knowing ly , voluntarily , and intelligently made beca use the trial cour

t did not advise him that he was waiving a double jeopa

rdy claim. We aff

irm the trial cour

t’s denial of the petition.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R . and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Jac k D . L ow e ry , L e ba

no n, Te nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lla nt, De xter P. Jon e s.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Tom P. Thompson, J r., District Att orney Gene ral; and Robert N. Hibbett, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Th e pe tit ion e r w a s c ha

rg e d w iththr e e c ounts of a g g ra va te d a ss aul t, tw o co un ts o f a ssa ult
, one count of

resisting arr est, and one count of public intox ication. He ag ree d to plead guilty to four counts of assault and to serve four c onsecutive e leven- month, twenty -nine-da y sentenc es. The ple a
a g re e me nt p ro vid e d th a t he wo uld se rv e 20 8 da y s in ja il, the re ma ind e r on pr ob a tio n. At the g uil ty plea he aring on J uly 19, 2001, the s tate pre sented the f ollowing a ccount of

the petitioner’s D ece mber 13 , 2 00 0 a tta c k o n th e vic tim :

[T] he proof would show that [t he petiti oner] assaulted [the victim] on that day and choked her three times until she lost c onsciousness. She would lose consciousne ss, reg ain c o n sciousness, then be c hoked

a g a in. Th a t ha

pp e ne d o n th re e se pa

ra te oc c a sio ns

.2 [The victim] would also testify that on that particula

r day for that case that he–that she r easona bly fea red imminent bodily

injury b e c a u s e o f h i s a s s a u l ta g a i n s th e r

o n t h a td a y.

For the fourth a ssaul t co n v i ct ion, the rec ord re flec ts that the petitioner was a lso involved in a separ ate domestic inc ident on Fe bruar y 3, 2001. The trial court revoke d the petitioner’s pr obation on September 14, 2001, a nd he filed his petition for post-c onviction relief on Ma rch 22, 2002.

At the p o s t -c o n v iction hear ing, the petitioner’s trial c ounsel testified that he me t with the petitioner eig ht to ten times before the g uilty plea he aring . On J uly

6, 200 1
, h e m et wit h the pe tit ion e r t o d e te rm ine the petit ion e r’ s p ri or iti e s in the c a se . T he pe tit ion e r’ s to p p ri or ity wa s to avoid a f elony conviction bec ause he did n o t believe he could continue his employ ment at Aer ostructure s, Textron as an eng ineer draf tsman wi t h a fe l o n y

on his recor d. The pe titioner’s second pr iority

was to get out of j ail as soon as poss ible. Wit h the petit ioner’s priorities in mind, t he tr ia l a tto rn e y

ne g oti a te d a

ple a of fe r f ro m th e state fo r t

he pet it ione r t o p le a d g uil ty to f our c ou nts of misdemeanor

assault. The s t at e’ s offe r stipulated that the petitioner w ould rec eive f our
consec utive eleve n-mo n t h, twenty -nine-da y sentenc es and w ould be re lease d from jail six wee ks afte r en t er i ng his plea. When trial counse l talked with the petitioner a bout the plea of

fer , the petitioner believe d acc epting the plea w as in his best interests.

On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that if they went to trial and the jury believed the petitioner’s te stimony , he still would have bee n g uilty of some of the char g es. He was surpr ised that the g rand jury did not return a n indictment for ra

pe ag ainst the petitioner, and he acknow ledg ed that he thought it was biz arr e that the gra nd jury indicted t he petiti oner on three c ounts of ag g ravated assault. He d i d n o t re m em ber if he discussed double jeopa rdy with the petitioner, but he said the pe tit ion e r u

nd e rs too d th e c a se a nd

kn e w to what he wo uld be wi lli ng to ple a d g uil ty in o rd e r t o avo id

a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n

. T h e p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g

. T he po stconviction cour

t ruled that double jeopa rdy rig hts are w aived by

a knowi ng , voluntary , and int e lli g ent guil ty ple a . T he c ourt fo un d th a t th e pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty ple a s to fo ur

c ounts of

a ssa ult

wer e knowing ly , voluntari l y , and under standing ly made a nd conclude d that the trial cour t had

c omp lie d w iththe ne c e ssa ry pr oc e dure in i ts a c c e pta

nc e of the pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty

ple a s.

Th e g ist of the pe tit ion e r’ s cla im is tha t his ch ok ing the vic tim wa s a ll p a rt of a sin g le of fe ns e
a nd that if he we nt to tr ia l, he c ou ld no t ha ve be e n c on vic te d o f t

hr e e c ounts of

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult

. He a sserts that beca

use he could only have been convicted of one count, the trial c ourt should have advised him that he wa s waiving a double jeopa rdy claim bef ore a llowing him to plead g uilty . The state cla ims that the trial court followed the proper proce dure when it acce pted the petitioner’ s pleas and that the plea s were knowing ly , voluntarily , and intellige ntly made.

I n order for a petitioner to succe ed on a post-c onviction claim, the petitioner must show the alleg ations set forth in his petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). A trial cour

t’s findin gs o f fa ct i n a post-convic tion hearing are conclusive on a ppeal unless the evidenc e in t he record preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. See Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898,3

89 9 ( Tenn. 19 90 ). Th is c ourt may no t r e we ig h o r r e e va luate the e vid e nc e , n or su bs tit ute its infere nces f

or those draw n by

the trial cour

t. Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997)

. Qu e sti on s con c e rn ingthe c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s and

the we ig ht a

nd va lue to b e g ive n to the ir testimony are resolved by the t rial court, not this court. I d. Post-conviction relief ma y only be g iven if a c onviction or sentenc e is void or voidable beca use of a violation of a constitutional rig ht. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 ( 2003).

I n o rd e r f or a c on vic tio n b a se d u

po n a g uil ty ple a to c omp or

t w ith du e pr oc e ss, the ple a mus t be voluntarily , knowing ly
, and understanding ly enter ed. B oy

kin v. Alabama, 395 U .S. 238, 242-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969). A g uilty plea is not voluntary “if it is the produc t o f ‘ [ i ] gn o ranc e, inc omp re he ns ion , c oe rc ion , te rr or , ind uc e me nts , [or ] s ub tle or blatant thr e a ts

. . . .’ ” B lank e ns hip

v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boy kin, 395 U.S. at 242-43, 89 S. Ct. at 1712). The standa

rd for assessingthe validity

of a g uilty plea is “ ‘whe ther the plea repr esents a voluntary and intellige nt choice a

mong the alternative course s of action open to the defe ndant.’” I d. (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164 (1970)) . “[T] he re cord of acc eptanc e of a de fenda

nt’s plea of

g uilty must aff

irmatively demonstrate that his decision was both voluntary and knowledg eable
, i.e., t hat he has been made awar e of the s ignif icant consequenc es of such a ple a;
o t h e r w i s e , i t w i l l n o t a m o u n t t o a n ‘ i n t e n t i o n a l a b a n d o n m e n to f

a kn o w n r i g h t

. ’ ” S t a t e v

. M a c k e y, 5 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d

3 3 7 , 3 4 0 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 7 )

. T o a s s e s s w h e t h e r a p e t i t i o n e r e n t e r e d a kn o w i n g , v o l u n t a r

y, and intelligent g uilty plea, this c ourt must c onsider the totality of the c ircumstance s. State v. Turner
, 919 S.W .2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. The post-c onviction court’s finding that a defe ndant g ives up a double jeopar dy claim upon pleading gu i l t y

to the char g ed off

enses is incorr ect. In State v. Rhodes, this court held that “the qu e sti on of wh e the r t

he Do ub le Jeop a rd

y Cla us e of e ith e r t he state or

fe de ra l c on sti tu tion [is imp lic a te d] w a s n ot w a ive d b y the de fe nd a nt’ s e ntr y of or the tr ia l c ourt ’s a c c e pta nc e of the g uil ty pleas.” 917 S.W .2d 708, 711 (Tenn. Crim

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 5 ). I n Rhodes, we r elied on Menna v. New Yo rk
, in wh ic h the Un ite d Sta te s Sup re me Court re ve rs e d, pe r c ur ium , a state c ourt

de c isi on that a g uil ty ple a “ wa ive d” a do ub le je op a rd y c la im. 42 3 U .S. 61 , 6 2, 96 S. Ct . 2 41 , 2 42 (1 97 5) ; se e a lso Un ite d St a te s v . Br oc e , 488 U. S. 563 , 574 -7 6, 10 9 S. Ct. 75 7, 76 5- 66 (1 98 9) (h old ingthat a do ub le jeop a r d y c la im ma

y b e w a iv e d
, b u t a me r e g u il ty p le a d o e s n o t a u to mati c a ll y c o n s ti tu te a wa iver when the c laim is appare nt from the fa ce of the re cord)

. Be ca u s e a gu i l t y plea doe s not waive a double je o p a r d y c la im
, w e mu s t d e te r mi n e w h e th e r th e p e ti ti o n e r h a d a d o u b le je o p a r d y c la im of wh ic h h e sh ou ld h a ve be e n a dv ise d a nd , if so , d id t he tr ia l c ourt

so a dv ise him

. At the g u il ty p le a h e a r in g , th e s ti p u late d f a c tu a l a c c o u n t o f th e o f

f e n s e s p r o v id e d th a t the petitioner choke d the vi ct i m o n “thre e sepa rate occa sions.” A def

endant may

be convic ted of multipl e cr imes without viol ating his right to be f ree fr o m double jeopar dy if the off

enses a re committed se parately

. I n our analy sis, we use the fac ts to which the parties a g ree d at the g uilty plea hear ing a nd will not reeva luate them in this post-conviction appea l. By pleading g uilty , the pe tit ion e r a c knowl edged th a t th e state ’s ve rs ion of the fa c ts w a s a c c ur a te . In th is r e g a rd , b e c a us e it wa s stip ulate d at the g uil ty ple a he a ri ng that th e of

fe ns e s o c c ur

re d s e pa rate ly , th e re wa s n o d ou

ble jeopar dy claim about which the court c ould advise the pe titioner. As such, we c onclude that the tr ial-4-

court a dvised the petitioner pr operly at the g uilty

plea he aring and that the pe tit i o ner’ s pleas we re knowing ly , voluntarily , and intellige ntly made.

Also, by not testify ing at th e p ost-conviction hea ring , the petitioner lea

ves unprove n any claim that if he ha d been a dvised of the double je opardy issues, he would not have pled g uilty

. The

rec ord re flec ts that th e petitioner’ s major conc ern at the time of the plea s was to avoid a f elony conviction. We cannot infe r fr om a silent rec ord that a pote ntial double jeopar dy issue would have

ma tte re d to him

. We ho ld that the tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y re je c te d the pe tit ion e r’ s c lai m f or p os tconviction re lief.

Ba sed on the for eg oing a nd the re cord a s a whole, w e af firm the trial c ourt’s denia l of the petition.

______________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE