IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 26, 2018

WILLIAM FRANKLIN ROBINETTE v. STATE OF TENNESSSE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Greene County

No. 15CR057 Alex E. Pearson, Judge, by interchange

No. E2017-02105-CCA-R3-PC

The petitioner, William Franklin Robinette, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 Greene County Criminal Court jury 

convictions of solicitation to commit first degree murder, claiming that he was deprived 

of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR.,JJ., joined.

Robert L. Foster, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Franklin Robinette.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant 

Attorney General; and Barry P. Staubus, District Attorney General Pro Tem,

1

for the 

appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

A Greene County Criminal Court jury convicted the petitioner of the 

solicitation of the first degree premeditated murder of Rick Bowser, his co-defendant in 

an unrelated criminal case, and Mr. Bowser’s girlfriend, Ina Roberts. In the petitioner’s 

first direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for 

resentencing. See State v. William Franklin Robinette, No. E2012-00640-CCA-R3-CD, 

slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 30, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

Feb. 12, 2014) (Robinette I). Upon remand, the trial court imposed consecutive 20-year 

 

1 By agreement of the parties and the court, District Attorney Staubus was designated to represent 

the State.

10/09/2018
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sentences for the convictions of solicitation to commit first degree premeditated murder; 

this court affirmed the sentences on direct appeal following remand. See State v. William 

Franklin Robinette, No. E2015-00154-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., 

Knoxville, Jan. 12, 2016) (Robinette II).

The evidence adduced at the petitioner’s trial established that the petitioner

solicited Allen Correll and Amanda Turner to kill Mr. Bowser and Ms. Roberts by 

blowing up the trailer home where the victims lived. The petitioner initially approached 

Mr. Correll in May 2010 outside the Greene County Courthouse “about ‘making [the 

petitioner’s] charge partner disappear.’” Robinette I, slip op. at 5. “Mr. Correll and Ms. 

Turner, who had overheard part of the conversation, reported the matter to the police.” 

Robinette II, slip op. at 2. During a controlled telephone call with the petitioner that was 

arranged and monitored by the police, “Mr. Correll arranged to meet the defendant at a 

Wendy’s restaurant.” Id. The police monitored the conversation via recording 

equipment fixed to Mr. Correll’s person. During their conversation, the petitioner 

instructed Mr. Correll to “use propane tanks to blow up the house” trailer where Mr. 

Bowser and Ms. Roberts lived. Robinette I, slip op. at 2. “At the end of the conversation, 

the men made plans to meet at the [petitioner’s] residence on the following day.” 

Robinette II, slip op. at 2. At that meeting, the petitioner again asked Mr. Correll and Ms. 

Turner to blow up the house trailer where Mr. Bowser and Ms. Roberts lived. The 

petitioner told Mr. Correll and Ms. Turner that he would provide propane tanks and gave

specific instructions on how to commit the crime:

[I]f you put those propane tanks under the house trailer and 

turn them on ever so slightly you would have to run hose 

from where the propane tanks were, . . . about two hundred 

feet, away from the house. Then you would use another 

propane tank to charge that water hose line, and then once 

that line was charged it would act as a fuse. It would light 

one end of the hose that you were actively safe and the 

propane would burn up the hose and eventually reach to 

where the propane tanks were.

Robinette I, slip op. at 3. Additionally, the petitioner “told Mr. Correll and Ms. Turner to 

feed the victims’ dogs ‘to keep them quiet while positioning the propane tanks,’” 

“suggested that they ‘steal the water hose so that it could not be traced to them,’” and 

“‘gave them $20 cash.’” Robinette II, slip op. at 2 (quoting Robinette I, slip op. at 3).

On February 6, 2015, while the direct appeal following resentencing was 

pending, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging errors in 

the composition of the jury and ineffective assistance of counsel related to the 
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composition of the jury. The petitioner also claimed that his counsel had an actual 

conflict of interest because she had accepted employment with the district attorney 

general’s office before the conclusion of the direct appeal in his case.

Following the appointment of counsel, the petitioner asked the postconviction court to hold the post-conviction case in abeyance pending the disposition of 

the petitioner’s direct appeal following resentencing. The case was then continued by 

agreed order. The petitioner filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief on 

February 16, 2016, alleging that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge 

a juror for cause, by failing to object to the mention of the petitioner’s prior criminal 

history during the trial, and by failing to challenge the composition of the jury venire and 

that, without these failures, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

At the August 25, 2017 evidentiary hearing, the petitioner indicated his 

intent to address only four issues: counsel’s failure to challenge a juror for cause, 

counsel’s failure to challenge the composition of the jury venire, counsel’s failure to 

object to certain testimony, and the existence of an actual conflict of interest.

The petitioner testified only that he did not tell trial counsel that she should 

not challenge potential juror Tony Jones for cause. He refused to waive his attorney 

client privilege with regard to any other issue.

Trial counsel testified that, prior to the petitioner’s trial, she moved the trial 

court for a change of venue, which was denied, but that she did not challenge the 

composition of the jury venire. She said that she was aware that the venire contained a 

number of individuals either employed as law enforcement personnel or related to those 

individuals employed as law enforcement personnel. Counsel acknowledged that the 

petitioner told her that potential juror Tony Jones had worked for the sheriff’s department

but said that she did not know that Mr. Jones was familiar with the petitioner’s extensive 

criminal history. She said that the petitioner “explained to [her] very briefly that Mr. 

Jones had been employed by the sheriff’s department at some point in time” but was not 

so employed at the time of trial. Counsel recalled that the petitioner believed that “there 

was a disagreement between Mr. Jones and his former employer such that he may hold 

law enforcement a little more accountable than perhaps other jurors.” She said that she 

wanted to strike Mr. Jones but that the petitioner “asked that we keep him because he said 

he was familiar with him, his family and also the dealings of law enforcement.” Given 

the petitioner’s insistence that Mr. Jones might be helpful to his case, counsel chose not

to challenge Mr. Jones for cause, explaining, “If I feel like there is someone that’s going 

to help [the petitioner], obviously I want him on that panel.”
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Counsel acknowledged that during Detective John Huffine’s direct 

examination testimony, the detective testified that he was familiar with the petitioner 

because the petitioner “‘had his share of run-ins with us and he had been the subject of a 

theft investigation just prior to this, not too long before that.’” She said that although she 

did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the testimony, she had moved the trial 

court prior to trial to exclude any testimony regarding the petitioner’s criminal history, 

“and Judge Dugger ruled on that allowing it to an extent.” The order, which was 

exhibited to her testimony, permitted the State to “‘introduce evidence of the 

[petitioner’s] pending charge in Greene Count Criminal Court Case No. 10CR117, to 

show the [petitioner’s] motive to conduct the offense alleged.’” She added that because 

the officer referred to “run-ins” with the petitioner and “didn’t allege any prior crimes or 

bad acts,” she did not believe an objection was warranted. She explained, “[S]ometimes 

objecting brings the jury’s attention to something more often than it would to let 

something slide, especially if the Court has already addressed it. The wors[t] thing I 

could do in front of a jury is make it seem like a bigger deal than it actually is.”

Counsel said that she became employed by the district attorney’s office 

while the application for permission to appeal to the supreme court was still pending in 

the petitioner’s first direct appeal. She said that, “[a]ccording to the [Administrative 

Office of the Courts],” her representation of the petitioner “had ended” and “was just 

pending.”

During cross-examination by the State, trial counsel testified that she began 

representing the petitioner in a separate theft case in 2010 and that the first trial in that 

case ended in a mistrial after the jury could not return a verdict. Following a retrial, the 

petitioner was convicted of a lesser included offense. She recalled that it was “during the 

pendency of” the retrial for the theft case that the petitioner “incurred the solicitation to 

commit first degree murder” charge. She said that she was familiar with the petitioner’s 

extensive criminal history and that, in her opinion, the petitioner “understood the 

system.” Counsel reiterated that she did not object to Detective Huffine’s testimony 

about the petitioner’s “run-ins” with the sheriff’s department because she did not believe 

the testimony necessarily indicated prior bad acts and because she did not want to draw 

unnecessary attention to what she believed to be relatively innocuous testimony.

Counsel testified that the State’s case against the petitioner was particularly 

strong because the petitioner had been captured on audio and video recordings planning 

the murders. She said that she “filed every motion that [she] could possibly think of . . . 

to try to exclude that video.” Counsel agreed that the recordings were damning to the 

petitioner’s case. Counsel recalled that the petitioner elected not to testify because of his 

extensive criminal history, which included several convictions for crimes of dishonesty.
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Counsel testified that, during jury selection, the petitioner indicated that he 

knew Mr. Jones and that “they were both familiar with one another.” She said that, 

although she did not “remember [the] exact conversation,” the petitioner told her that Mr. 

Jones knew “some of the officers involved in this and he understands their integrity or 

their desire to perhaps have a personal vendetta against” the petitioner. She said that, 

“for that reason, [the petitioner] thought [Mr. Jones] would be a good choice on our jury.” 

Counsel identified her “jury selection chart,” which showed that she had “made an X 

beside [Mr. Jones] immediately,” indicating that she “did not want him on [the] jury.” 

She said that she changed her mind following a consultation with the petitioner. Counsel 

also recalled that, during voir dire, Mr. Jones acknowledged that he knew the petitioner 

but stated that his familiarity with the petitioner would not interfere with his ability to 

remain impartial.

Regarding her employment with the district attorney’s office, counsel 

testified that she accepted a position in the Hawkins County District Attorney General’s 

Office while the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal to the supreme court 

was pending. She said that she did not participate in any negotiations, conversations, or 

interviews regarding employment with any member of the Greene County District 

Attorney General’s Office during the time she represented the petitioner. She said that 

her decision to accept a position in the district attorney’s office did not impact her 

representation of the petitioner in any way. Counsel testified that her first day of 

employment was January 1, 2014, and that, by that point, all substantial work on the 

petitioner’s case was complete.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court took the case 

under advisement. In the written order denying relief, the post-conviction court 

specifically accredited trial counsel’s testimony that she chose not to challenge Mr. Jones 

because the petitioner asked her not to do so. The court found that the petitioner had 

failed to establish that a biased juror had actually been seated on the jury, noting that the 

trial transcript indicated that all of the jurors eventually selected “affirmed that they 

would be fair to both sides” and “that they would follow the trial judge’s instructions.” 

The court concluded that counsel’s decision not to offer a contemporaneous objection to 

Detective Huffine’s testimony that he had had previous “run-ins” with the petitioner “was 

perfectly reasonable under the circumstances.” Finally, the court found that the petitioner 

had failed to present any evidence to suggest that counsel’s obtaining a position in the 

district attorney’s office resulted in an actual conflict of interest.

In this timely appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to post-conviction 

relief on the basis of counsel’s failure to challenge Mr. Jones for cause, to challenge the 

composition of the jury venire, and to lodge a contemporaneous objection to Detective 

Huffine’s testimony.
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We view the petitioner’s claim with a few well-settled principles in mind. 

Post-conviction relief is available only “when the conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103. A postconviction petitioner bears the burden of proving his or her factual allegations by clear 

and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f). On appeal, the appellate court accords to 

the post-conviction court’s findings of fact the weight of a jury verdict, and these findings 

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them. Henley v. 

State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997); Bates v. State, 973 S.W.2d 615, 631 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1997). By contrast, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law receive no 

deference or presumption of correctness on appeal. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 453 

(Tenn. 2001).

Before a petitioner will be granted post-conviction relief based upon a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record must affirmatively establish, via 

facts clearly and convincingly established by the petitioner, that “the advice given, or the 

services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and 

that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). In other words, the petitioner “must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Should the 

petitioner fail to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, he is not entitled to 

relief. Id. at 697; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). Indeed, “[i]f it is 

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, 

. . . that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing 

court “begins with the strong presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance and 

used reasonable professional judgment to make all significant decisions,” Kendrick v. 

State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), and “[t]he 

petitioner bears the burden of overcoming this presumption,” id. (citations omitted). We 

will not grant the petitioner the benefit of hindsight, second-guess a reasonably based trial 

strategy, or provide relief on the basis of a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision 

made during the course of the proceedings. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1994). Such deference to the tactical decisions of counsel, however, applies 

only if the choices are made after adequate preparation for the case. Cooper v. State, 847 

S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
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In our view, the record fully supports the denial of post-conviction relief in 

this case. Trial counsel’s accredited testimony established that she chose not to challenge 

Mr. Jones only after the petitioner insisted that Mr. Jones might prove favorable to his 

case. The petitioner cannot now be heard to complain that counsel erred when counsel’s 

decision was based entirely on information provided to counsel by the petitioner himself. 

Moreover, the petitioner presented no proof to suggest that “the jury who heard the case 

was not fair and impartial,” and, in consequence, he is not entitled to relief. State v. 

Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 

246 (Tenn. 1989)). Similarly, the petitioner failed to present any evidence at all to 

support his claim that counsel should have challenged the composition of the jury venire. 

Finally, trial counsel’s accredited testimony established that she chose not to object to 

Detective Huffine’s testimony because she did not want to draw unnecessary attention to 

testimony she believed was not that big of a deal. We agree with the post-conviction 

court’s assessment that counsel’s decision was reasonable under the circumstances. More 

importantly, however, given the overwhelming proof of the petitioner’s guilt, nothing 

suggests that, had counsel objected to the detective’s testimony, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE