IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dockside Associates/Pier 30, L.P. :

:

v. :

:

City of Philadelphia, Board of :

Revision of Taxes :

:

Appeal of: Dockside Associates/ : No. 2258 C.D. 2014

Pier 30, L.P. and Peter DePaul : Argued: October 5, 2015

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge1

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McGINLEY FILED: January 15, 2016

BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dockside Associates/Pier 30, L.P. (Dockside) is the record owner of a 

property located at 717 South Christopher Columbus Boulevard, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania 19147. The property is located in a CMX-3 mixed-use district and 

zoned accordingly. A sixteen story building was constructed on the property. The 

building contains 242 residential units, one (1) commercial unit and three (3) 

stories used as a private parking garage. See November 3, 2014, Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia (Trial 

 

1

This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 4, 2016, when Judge 

Leavitt became President Judge. 
2

Court Findings) at 1, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 6a2; see also Trial Court 

Opinion at 2, R.R. at 15a; see generally Declaration of Condominium of Dockside 

Condominiums, 1-40, R.R. at 634a-678a.

Construction of the building was completed in September 2002, and 

the Dockside Condominium Association was formed April 4, 2006. On March 26, 

2006, Dockside filed a declaration of condominium, which converted and 

subdivided the residential units into a condominium project. Notes of Testimony

(N.T.), August 11, 2014, at 22-24, R.R. at 90a; Declaration of Condominium of 

Dockside Condominiums, 1-40, R.R. at 634a-678a.

. 

Beginning in 2007, the Office of Property Assessment (OPA) in the 

City of Philadelphia (Philadelphia) assessed a separate market value for each of the 

residential units.3 Trial Court Opinion at 3, R.R. at 16a. As a consequence of 

those assessed market values of each of the residential units for tax purposes, 

Dockside filed separate tax assessment appeals with OPA for each of the 153 units 

(152 residential units and the 1 commercial unit) still owned by Dockside after the 

2007 assessments.4 Trial Court Opinion at 1, 3, R.R. at 14a, 16a.

 

2

The Reproduced Record in this matter consists of six (6) volumes (denoted as Volumes 

I-VI) and one (1) volume of a Supplemental Reproduced Record. The Reproduced Record 

volumes are numbered seriatim 1a-1606a. The Supplemental Reproduced Record is numbered 

1b-255b. Volume references were omitted.

3

The tax assessments on condominiums in the building began in 2007, the first tax year 

after the filing of the declaration of condominium in 2006.

4 Ninety (90) residential units were sold by Dockside prior to OPA assessing each 

residential unit in 2007. Three (3) additional units were sold by Dockside (residential units 610, 

715 and 802) before the March 25, 2013 appeal by Dockside to the Trial Court. However, 

Dockside never discontinued the four (4) appeals for the additional units sold. Consequently, 

Dockside only owned 149 of the units at the time this matter progressed to the Trial Court, not 

the 152 (residential) units reflected in Dockside’s initial filings.
3

The property was inspected for Philadelphia by A. R. Hughes and 

Associates (Hughes) on January 11, 2013, with an effective valuation date for each 

of the residential units at the property as of December 31, 2013. Philadelphia’s 

appraisal report listed a separate value for each of the 152 residential units at issue. 

Those residential units were assessed using a sales comparison approach (Sales 

Comparison) and highest-and-best-use of the residential unit analyses, wherein it 

was noted that the highest-and-best-use of each residential unit was to sell the 

residential units on the open market for residential owner-occupants. In addition, 

Philadelphia assessed the fair market value of the commercial unit at $4,524,600. 

See November 3, 2014 Order of the Trial Court, R.R. at 1a; see also N.T., August 

11, 2014, at 17, R.R. at 89a.

On February 7, 2013, Harvey M. Levin (Levin), hired by Dockside, 

used a “fractured condominium”5 model and an income capitalization approach to 

value (Income Capitalization) and produced a summary appraisal report for 

Dockside noting an implied market value for assessment purposes for the 2013 

taxable year of $20,549.868. However, he appraised the property’s value 

collectively at $14,965,000. Keystone Appraisal Company, Summary Appraisal 

Report of Harvey M. Levin, February 7, 2013; R.R. at 1106a.

Following Levin’s appraisal report (for $14,965,000), Dockside filed 

a separate appeal with the Philadelphia Board of Revision of Taxes (Board) for 

 

5

The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines a fractured condominium as: 

A residential condominium development or conversion project in which many units 

remain unsold; often a distressed property previously offered for sale as individual 

condominium units where the remaining units are remarketed as rental units and then 

sold as an apartment project. Sometimes the remaining units are sold in bulk at a 

discount. Appraisal Institute, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 78 (5th ed. 2010).
4

each residential unit and challenged the assessed market value from OPA. 

Following public hearings on February 21, 2013, the Board reviewed the evidence 

presented and on February 27, 2013, denied Dockside’s proposed reductions to the 

2013 assessed market values of the residential units.

Dockside thereafter appealed the Board’s decision to the Trial Court, 

which heard argument and testimony over the course of four days in August 2014.

6

 

On November 3, 2014, the Trial Court (Trial Court Opinion) denied Dockside’s 

appeal and upheld the assessed fair market values of the residential units using the 

Sales Comparison approach as provided by Philadelphia.7 Trial Court Opinion at 

8; R.R. at 13a.

This appeal followed. 

ISSUES

Before this Court, Dockside essentially argued

8

: 1) that the Trial Court 

improperly gave deference to Philadelphia’s opinion of value instead of conducting 

a de novo review; 2) that the Trial Court used the improper taxation approach in 

assessing the residential units; and 3) that the Trial Court erred by prohibiting 

Dockside from using the prior appraisals of Philadelphia’s expert for impeachment 

 

6

Testimony was heard on August 11, 2014, August 12, 2014, August 15, 2014, and 

August 25, 2014. 

7

Since none of the parties involved presented any values for the commercial unit, the 

Trial Court ordered that its value remained as originally assessed by the OPA. 

8

This Court’s scope of review in a tax assessment appeal is whether the trial court

abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or whether its decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. Cedarbrook Realty, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp., 611 A.2d 335, 340 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1992).
5

purposes wherein he made inconsistent statements in those prior appraisals 

regarding the proper method for appraising the property.

De Novo Review

Dockside identified that the Trial Court was charged with arriving at 

the fair market value of the residential units based upon “competent, credible and 

relevant evidence.” Craftmaster Manufacturing, Inc. v. Bradford County Board of 

Assessment Appeals, 903 A.2d 620, 625 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Dockside noted that 

where a taxpayer’s evidence “is relevant, credible and un-rebutted, the court must 

give it due weight and cannot ignore it in determining a property’s fair market 

value.” Koppel Steel Corporation v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Beaver 

County, 849 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). If the taxing authority presented 

rebuttal evidence, “the court must determine the weight to be given all the 

evidence.” Koppel, 849 A.2d at 307.

In the current controversy, Dockside argued that the Trial Court 

offered “no meaningful analysis” regarding its decision to accept Hughes’ expert 

opinion and reject Levin’s expert testimony. Dockside argued that the Trial Court 

applied a de facto presumption that Philadelphia’s valuation of the residential 

units, based upon the Sales Comparison approach, was correct simply because “it 

was utilized by [Philadelphia] and is consistent with [Philadelphia’s] usual 

procedures.” Dockside’s Brief at 22.

Thus, Dockside argued that Philadelphia first had to establish a prima

facie case by entering the official assessment record into evidence. The burden 

then shifted to Dockside to present “sufficient competent, credible and relevant 
6

evident of the fair market value of the property of the property to overcome the 

prima facie case.” Koppel, 849 A.2d at 307.

Dockside asserted that the Trial Court erred in finding that the Sales 

Comparison approach was appropriate simply because that was the approach that 

Philadelphia “always uses” to evaluate residential condominium units, irrespective 

of whether the condominium project was distressed or fractured. See Dockside’s 

Brief at 28. 

Dockside argued that the Trial Court abused its discretion in this 

controversy because it reached a conclusion which “overrides or misapplies the 

law, or [because] the judgment exercised [was] manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Middletown Township v. Lands of 

Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 335 n.3 (Pa. 2007) (regarding eminent domain of a family 

farm for recreational purposes). 

Concomitantly, regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence,

Philadelphia asserts that Pennsylvania courts have long held: 

[t]hese matters are within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and [the court on appeal] may reverse only upon a showing of 

abuse of discretion or error of law. An abuse of discretion may 

not be found merely because an appellate court might have 

reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 

such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. In addition, 

to constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not 

only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the 

complaining party. 
7

Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 102, 112 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see also

Expressway 95 Business Center, L.P. v. Bucks County Board of Assessment, 921 

A.2d 70, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted) (when performing a de novo 

review, the trial court as fact-finder maintains exclusive province concerning the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight afforded the evidence); Appeal of Cynwyd 

Investments, 679 A.2d 304, 309 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) petition for allowance of 

appeal denied, 685 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1996); Willow Valley Manor, Inc. v. Lancaster 

County Board of Assessment Appeals, 810 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 

(trial court's findings are entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed 

absent clear error).

In the current controversy, the Trial Court’s opinion discussed 

Philadelphia and Dockside’s evidence presented at trial in detail:

Testimony presented established that the OPA assesses 

condominium units based on a sales comparison approach. N.T.

8/11/14 at 22-23; 33. A condominium unit is considered a 

separate property with a separate tax identification number, and 

regardless of how many condominium units a single owner 

possesses, each is assessed with its own fair market value. N.T. 

8/11/14 at 24. The [residential units] have been assessed as 

single units since 2007. N.T. 8/11/14 at 25. The OPA relies 

upon comparable sales in determining the market values of 

individual units. N.T. 8/11/14 at 33. The 2013 assessed value 

had a predetermined ratio of 32% .... N.T. 8/11/14 at 26. 

Dockside objected to the fact that the OPA assessor had not 

personally visited the Dockside Condominiums, but had only 

driven by them. N.T. 8/11/14 at 36-38.

Dockside presented testimony that in 2006 and 2007, it 

had sold sixty-one (61) condominium units. N.T. 8/11/14 at 50. 

However, beginning in 2008 until the present day, it has sold 

forty-two (42) condominium units, on average six (6) units per 

year. N.T. 8/11/14 50. In total, it has sold one hundred and 
8

three (103) units out of a total of two hundred and forty-two 

(242) units. N.T. 8/11/14 at 53. Six (6) of those sales were in 

2013 and several were for significantly more money than 

Dockside's proposed market values. N.T. 8/11/14 at 93. For 

example, Unit 1020, allocated a market value $118,138 by 

Dockside's method, sold on May 6, 2013 for $625,462. N.T.

8/12/14 73-74, 77.

Levin testified for Dockside that the instant case was “the first 

fractured condominium that has been appraised in this part of 

the country.” N.T. 8/11/14 at 107. Using an [Income 

Capitalization] approach, Levin examined the history of the 

property, operating statements, typical leases, floor plans, etc. 

N.T. 8/11/14 at 116-119. He utilized the [Income 

Capitalization] approach due to the “nature, character, and 

history of Dockside;" this involves looking at the gross income 

attributed to the building and conducting appropriate expenses to 

arrive at the net operating income, finding the capitalization rate, 

and dividing income by rate to yield an indication market value. 

N.T. 8/11/14 at 120, 136. Levin valued the Dockside units as 

“one property, a fractured condominium, with the value 

indicated by sales ...[and] the contribution that each made to 

operating the income of the entire building." N.T. 8/11/14 at 

127.

Levin concluded that the net operating income was 

$1,964,00.00. N.T. 8/11/14 at 140. He used an overall 

capitalization rate of 113/4. N.T. 8/11/14 at 141. Thus, he 

concluded that the fair market value of the unsold units was 

$14,965,000 for the taxable year 2013 and $17,500,000 for the 

taxable year 2014. N.T. 8/11/14 at 141-142. Levin averred that, 

in a fractured condominium, there are “no sales" and therefore 

no comparables. N.T. 8/11/14 at 150. Levin averred that 

Dockside would be “stuck” with the unsold units for a very long 

time, and that it could take as long as twenty (20) years to 

achieve a sellout of all units. N.T. 8/12/14at 82-83.

[In rebuttal, Philadelphia presented] the expert testimony of 

John Rush (Rush), a certified real estate appraiser, who came to 
9

the conclusion that the opinions of value expressed by Levin 

were not credible, based upon his reading of the report; his 

experience; and his general knowledge of the real estate market. 

N.T. 8/15/14 at 15, 17. Rush testified that [Philadelphia] uses 

the Sales Comparison approach, which is an “evaluation 

technique wherein the appraiser collects data concerning the 

sales comparable properties, makes adjustments to that data 

said [sic] for the differences between comparable sales and [the 

residential units]. After the adjustment process has been 

completed, the data should point to what the value of the estate 

should be. N.T. 8/15/14 at 20. This is a common method for 

appraising units. N.T. 8/15/14 at 15.

Rush, who had performed valuations of fractured condominium 

units, expressed concerns over Levin's lack of presentation of 

market data, i.e. comparable property rents being received from 

the marketplace, discussion and analysis of vacancy rates 

comparable to the marketplace and analysis and discussion of 

operating expenses based upon that of similar properties. N.T., 

8/15/14 at 24. Rush stated that even with the [I]ncome 

[C]apitalization method, the overall capitalization rate should 

be derived from the market for a market value opinion. N.T.

8/15/14 at 24. Rush opined that normally, in such a case, to 

remain consistent with the valuation technique, the appraiser 

would have collected and performed an analysis for the rest of 

comparable properties in the area. N.T. 8/15/14 at 31-32. 

Additionally, Rush testified that the report was inaccurate with 

regard to its vacancy projection because in his practice of 

appraising multifamily dwellings, the general market vacancy 

was nowhere near twenty (20) percent. N.T. 8/11/14 at 46. He 

recommended that [Philadelphia] not rely upon the Levin

appraisal as an indication of value. N.T. 8/15/14 at 62. 

Albert R. Hughes, III (“Hughes''), real estate appraiser, [also] 

testified for [Philadelphia] that each [residential] unit, upon 

creation, is assigned an individual tax identification number.

N.T. 8/15/14 at 104. Each [residential] unit is considered a 

separate property saleable unto itself. N.T. 8/15/14 at 104.

Hughes appraised one hundred fifty-two (152) [residential 
10

units] in the Dockside building as individual [residential] units 

and completed an appraisal report. N.T. 8/15/14 at 105. 

Hughes defined market value as "the price which the purchaser, 

willing but not obliged to buy, would pay an owner, willing but 

not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which 

the property is adapted and might in reason be applied.” N.T.

8/15/14 at 109. In performing the appraisal, Hughes used sales 

as well as resales in several local condominium projects along 

the Philadelphia waterfront. N.T. 8/15/14 at 125-128. Hughes 

determined the highest and best use of the [residential] units 

was residential occupancy and future sales to the end user, and 

to come to this conclusion he considered: legal permissibility; 

physical possibility; financial feasibility; and maximum 

productivity. N.T. 8/15/14 at 130-131.

Hughes also testified that a number of other residential [] units, 

including Society Hill Towers and Pier Three Condominiums, 

are within a mile of Dockside; [that] the South Street overpass 

is quite close to Dockside, as well as grocery stores and 

shopping between one and one quarter miles from the 

propert[y]. N.T. 8/15/14 112-113, 126-128.

In a surrebuttal, John Hosey ("Hosey'') testified for Dockside 

that he found Rush's report inaccurate as to the assessment of 

fractured condominiums because apartment building sales are 

irrelevant to a fractured condominium analysis. N.T. 8/25/14 at 

15-16, 24. Hosey felt that Levin's report was as complete as 

possible. (Emphasis added.) N.T. 8/25/14 at 16.

Where the taxpayer's testimony is relevant, credible and un-rebutted, 

the court must give it due weight and cannot ignore it in determining a property's 

fair market value. Koppel, 849 A.2d at 307 (citations omitted). However, where 

the taxing authority presents rebuttal evidence, the court must determine the weight 

to be given all the evidence. Koppel, 849 A.2d at 307.
11

In the current controversy, it is evident that Dockside presented 

relevant and credible testimony in support of its position. Thereafter, Philadelphia 

presented rebuttal evidence, which was also weighed by the Trial Court. The trial 

court, as fact-finder, maintained exclusive province concerning the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight afforded that evidence. Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d at 112. 

As cited above, the Trial Court thoroughly reviewed the evidence 

presented by both parties, clearly evaluated it in great length in its opinion, and 

thereby removed all doubt in this Court’s mind that it overrode or misapplied the 

law, or exercised manifestly unreasonable judgment, resulting in partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will. Middletown Township v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 

335 n.3 (Pa. 2007). The Trial Court arrived at the fair market value of the 

residential units based upon a de novo review of the competent, credible and 

relevant evidence. See Craftmaster, 903 A.2d at 625; Koppel, 849 A.2d at 307.

Taxation Approach

Dockside next argued that the Trial Court erred when it adopted the 

Sales Comparison appraisal method for taxation purposes of the residential units 

advocated by Philadelphia rather than the Income Capitalization appraisal method

for taxation purposes utilized by Dockside’s expert witness.

Dockside asserted that the Income Capitalization appraisal method

was the approach to take to assess the residential units for purposes of taxation. 

Dockside noted that Income Capitalization is “[a] set of procedures through which 

an appraiser derives a value indication for an income-producing property by 

converting its anticipated benefits (cash flows and reversion) into property value.” 

The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 143 (4th ed. 2002). Dockside asserted
12

that in determining fair market value of the residential units, it is well-settled that 

value assigned to those units must be based upon the particular facts and 

circumstances of the subject property as well as relevant market conditions. See

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals, 692 A.2d 661, 

663 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). 

Dockside further asserted that the concept of a fractured condominium 

was well-recognized in the real estate appraisal industry. Dockside argued that the 

fractured condominium analysis applied by its expert, Levin, was not a separate 

approach to real estate valuation, but simply part of a particular factual context

that supported application of the familiar Income Capitalization appraisal method, 

which has been applied by Pennsylvania courts in tax assessment cases, where the 

highest-and-best-use of property was as income producing property.9 

Dockside argued that they presented unrebutted evidence that the 

property that encompassed the residential units in issue was a distressed or 

fractured condominium project. Dockside asserted that none of the witnesses who 

testified argued that the concept of a fractured condominium project was not 

recognized by real estate appraisers or disagreed that Dockside met the definition 

of a fractured condominium. Dockside further asserted that they presented

 

9

See, e.g., In re Appeal of Marple Springfield Center., Inc., 607 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1992) 

(upholding utilization of income capitalization approach to determine value of shopping center 

with long-term, restrictive lease); In re Appeal of V.V.P. Partnership, 647 A.2d 990 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1994) (upholding utilization of income capitalization approach to determine value of tennis 

club); Cedarbrook Realty, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp., 611 A.2d 335, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) 

(remanding so that trial court could give greater weight to income capitalization approach to 

value unique residential property development). See also 1198 Butler Street Associates v. Board 

of Assessment Appeals, County of Northampton, 946 A.2d 1131, 1140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (“A 

court must consider the economic realties [sic] associated with property when assessing its fair 

market value.”).
13

substantial evidence that the highest-and-best-use for the units was as a fractured 

condominium.10

Further, Dockside argued that the requirement in Section 3105 of the 

Uniform Condominium Act11 (UCA) that each residential (condominium) unit 

must be valued in isolation, rather than as part of an “integrated economic unit”, is 

not a hard-and-fast rule. Dockside’s Brief at 43. Dockside asserted that it was 

perfectly appropriate for an appraiser to recognize the market forces of supply and 

demand, which were impacted by the number of total residential units owned by an 

individual in assessing the value of each unit. Dockside’s Brief, at 43-44. Thus, 

Dockside asserted that its appraisal did not ignore the UCA, but rather, recognized 

the economic reality that Dockside’s ownership of the residential units in a 

fractured condominium project depresses the value of each residential unit. 

Koppel, 849 A.2d 303; see also Dockside’s Brief p. 44.

In Koppel, the taxpayer owned 211 separate parcels of contiguous real 

estate in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The taxpayer’s expert assessed those 

 

10 The residential units should be offered for bulk sale or the continuation as residential 

rental units, which will yield the highest net return. N.T., August 11, 2014, at 123, 134-136, 

R.R. at 115a, 118a. 

11 68 Pa .C.S. §§3101-3414. 

Section 3105 of the UCA states, in pertinent part:

 (a) Title. -- Except as provided in subsection (b), each unit together with its 

common element interest constitutes for all purposes a separate parcel of real 

estate. 

 (b) Taxation and assessment. -- If there is a unit owner other than a declarant, 

each unit together with its common element interest . . . shall be separately 

taxed and assessed . . . ; otherwise, the real estate comprising the 

condominium may be taxed and assessed in any manner provided by law. 

68 Pa.C.S. § 3105.
14

parcels as an “integrated economic unit”. The trial court in Koppel rejected that 

valuation and accepted the valuation of the taxing authority’s expert on the basis 

that he had assigned a value to each individual parcel. In reversing the trial court’s 

order, this Court found that “the trial court erred in rejecting the valuation of [the 

taxpayer’s] appraiser on ground that the appraiser considered the eleven parcels as 

an integrated economic unit.” Koppel, 849 A.2d at 305.

Thus, Dockside argued that by the same reasoning in the current 

controversy, it is clear that an accurate appraisal of each residential unit can - and 

should - consider the total number of units owned by Dockside in a single 

fractured condominium project in determining the value of each residential unit.

Conversely, Philadelphia argued that the Sales Comparison approach

was the best way to show the highest-and-best-use for each individual residential

unit. N.T., August 15, 2014, at 131-132, R.R. at 200a; Philadelphia’s Brief, at 44. 

Philadelphia argued that in tax assessment appeals, a trial court must 

“independently determine the fair market value of the parcel on the basis of the 

competent, credible and relevant evidence presented by the parties.” Green v. 

Schuylkill County Board of Assessment Appeals, 772 A.2d 419, 426 (Pa. 2001) 

(quoting Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment, 652 A.2d 

1306 (Pa. 1995)) (citations omitted). Philadelphia argued that for real estate 

assessment purposes, residential (condominium) units are to be valued as separate 

and distinct properties and not as a single property. Cunius v. Board of 

Assessment Appeals of Chester County, 976 A.2d 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); see

also Philadelphia’s Brief, p. 17. 
15

In Cunius, a father and son (the Cuniuses) owned an apartment 

building as tenants in common. Cunius, 976 A.2d at 636. The Cuniuses converted 

and divided the building. Cunius, 976 A.2d at 636. Unit 1 consisted of forty-four 

(44) apartments and was exclusively owned by the father. Cunius, 976 A.2d at

636. Unit 2 consisted of twenty-four (24) apartments and was exclusively owned 

by the son. Cunius, 976 A.2d at 636. After the declaration of the condominium 

was filed, the local assessment board assigned individual tax parcel numbers to 

Units 1 and 2 and assessed them separately, resulting in a higher aggregate value 

than when the properties were legally defined as an “apartment building”. Cunius,

976 A.2d at 636. The Cuniuses appealed the two assessments. At trial the 

Cuniuses presented evidence demonstrating that the building was not physically 

changed in any manner and that the declaration of condominium represented only a 

change in the form of ownership. Cunius, 976 A.2d at 636. The Cuniuses 

asserted, inter alia, that “the tax authority should have apportioned the prior 

assessment [...] between each [U]nit based upon its percentage of ownership of the 

total property.” Cunius, 976 A.2d at 636 n. 5 and 641.

In response to the Cuniuses’ arguments, this Court stated that the 

procedure “is illogical and contrary to the Assessment Law.”12 Furthermore, it 

could “discern no logical basis for interpreting the [UCA] to require the assessment 

board to assign a new tax parcel number and tax assessment to each [residential] 

condominium unit but prohibit the determination of actual or current market 

value.” Cunius, 976 A.2d at 641.

 

12 Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1379, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5342–5350k.
16

In the current controversy, Philadelphia further argued that at least 

fourteen (14) other jurisdictions have enacted the UCA in their states.13 

Philadelphia asserted that at least three (3) courts in other UCA states have 

addressed the UCA’s tax provision and each has interpreted that provision to 

require a residential (condominium) unit, regardless of ownership, to be treated 

separately from all other units in the condominium project.14

Philadelphia asserted that this Court previously held that the Trial 

Court’s duty in an assessment appeal is to weigh the conflicting expert testimony 

and determine a value based upon credibility determinations. The trial court has 

the discretion to decide which of the methods of valuation is the most appropriate 

and applicable to the given property. Church Street Associates v. County of 

Clinton Board of Assessment Appeals, 959 A.2d 490, 495 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) 

(citing Willow Valley Manor, Inc. v. Lancaster County Board of Assessment, 810 

A.2d 720, 722-23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

Philadelphia also called this Court’s attention to the fact that “the 

Trial Court’s resolution of the conflicts within the two experts’ testimony, as well 

as the weight assigned respectively thereto and the credibility determinations 

 

13 See Ala. Code § 35-8A-105; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1204; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 

381.9109; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:1121.105; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1601-105; Minn. Stat. Ann. 

§ 515.22; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 448.1-105; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-829; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 356-B:4; 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-7A-5; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47C-1-105; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 

64.34.040; Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-27-205; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.005; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. 

§ 34-36.1-1.05. Philadelphia’s Brief, p. 20.

14 Arizona, Maine and Rhode Island. See E.C. Garcia & Company, Inc. v. Arizona State 

Department of Revenue, 875 P.2d 169, 176 (Az. App. 1993); Crystal Point Joint Venture v. 

Arizona Department of Revenue, 932 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Az. Ct. App. 1997); Quiland, Inc. v. 

Wells Sanitary District, 905 A.2d 806, 812-13 (Me. 2006); See Inn Group Associates v. Booth, 

593 A.2d 49, 52 (R.I. 1991); see also, Philadelphia’s Brief, p. 20, n. 8.
17

thereof, control on appeal.” Church Street Associates, 959 A.2d at 495 (citations 

omitted).

Philadelphia noted that significant evidence was provided in the 

record to support its expert’s conclusions in that the expert provided dates, sales 

prices, size and location for the 25 residential units that were, in fact, sold since 

2010 within the condominium project as a whole. N.T., August 15, 2014, at 133, 

R.R. at 201a; see also Philadelphia’s Brief, at 44. Philadelphia further noted that at 

trial, its expert utilized “hundreds” of other comparable sales from competitive 

condominium projects to support his opinion of market value. Appraisal Report on 

152 Condominium Units at the Residences at Dockside at 42-62, R.R. at 1356a1376a; see also Philadelphia’s Brief, at 44.

Finally, Philadelphia argued that Pennsylvania’s Constitution states, 

in pertinent part, that “all taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, 

within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax . . .”15 and requires “that 

a taxpayer should pay no more or no less than his proportionate share of the cost of 

government.” Hromisin v. Board of Assessment, 719 A.2d 815, 818 (Pa. 1998) 

(quoting Deitch Company v. Board of Property Assessment, 209 A.2d 397, 401 

(Pa. 1965)). This principle requires that taxpayers pay their proportionate share 

based on the same ratio of assessed value to market value. Clifton v. Allegheny 

County, 969 A.2d 1197, 1214 (Pa. 2009) (citing Downingtown Area School Dist. 

v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals, 913 A.2d 194, 199 (Pa. 2006)).

 

15 PA. CONST. Art. VIII, § 1.
18

Consequently, Philadelphia asserted that this method ensures that both 

large property owners and small property owners pay property taxes upon the same 

ratio. Delaware, L. & W. R. County’s Tax Assessment, 73 A. 429 (Pa. 1909).

At the outset of examination of the arguments of both parties, this 

Court examines its holding in Koppel. As this Court noted:

[t]he taxing authority first presents its assessment record into 

evidence, making out a prima facie case for the validity of the 

assessment. The burden shifts to the taxpayer to present sufficient 

competent, credible and relevant evidence of the fair market value of 

the property to overcome the prima facie case for the validity of the 

assessment. If the taxpayer does so, the taxing authority can no longer 

rely solely on the assessment record in the face of countervailing 

evidence unless it is willing to run the risk of having the taxpayer's 

proof believed by the court. Where the taxpayer's testimony is 

relevant, credible and un-rebutted, the court must give it due weight 

and cannot ignore it in determining a property's fair market value. 

Where the taxing authority [thereafter] presents rebuttal evidence, the 

court must determine the weight to be given all the evidence. 

Koppel, 849 A.2d at 307; see also Deitch Company v. Board of Property 

Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 209 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1965).

This Court reversed the trial court in Koppel, holding that “the trial 

court erred in rejecting the valuation of [the taxpayer’s] appraiser on the ground 

that the appraiser considered the eleven [11] parcels as an integrated economic 

unit.” Koppel, 849 A.2d at 305. In other words, the taxpayer presented sufficient, 

competent, credible and relevant evidence to overcome the taxing authority's prima 

facie case. Then, after the trial court denied the taxing authority's motion to 

dismiss the tax assessment appeal, the taxing authority presented expert valuation 
19

testimony in rebuttal. Faced with the conflicting evidence, the trial court was 

required to weigh the evidence in order to determine the fair market value of the 

taxpayer’s eleven parcels. 

Although the trial court in Koppel held that the expert testimony of 

the taxpayer was not credible, the trial court did not question the personal veracity 

of the expert witness but rather, rejected the testimony based on an improper legal 

assumption. Hence, the trial court failed to weigh the conflicting evidence. These 

circumstances make this Court’s holding in Koppel distinguishable from the 

current controversy.

16

In the matter at hand, the Trial Court observed that “the issue before 

the [Trial] Court is a narrow one: which method of calculation was correct.” Trial 

Court Opinion at 8; R.R. at 21a. The Trial Court noted that “Dockside presented 

exhaustive testimony ... [but] they [sic] offered no real authority regarding the 

appropriateness of a ‘fractured condominium’ and income capitalization approach 

as opposed to [Philadelphia’s] method, utilizing a [S]ales [C]omparison 

approach....” Trial Court Opinion at 8; R.R. at 21a.

The Trial Court continued and noted:

Dockside argued that there were no comparable sales because 

Dockside is isolated; however, [Philadelphia] presented testimony that 

comparable properties, including the Society Hill Towers, were not 

far away; additionally, Hughes testified that the South Street overpass 

 

16 See also Mack Trucks, Inc., 692 A.2d 661 (in determining fair market value, it is wellsettled that value must be based upon the particular facts and circumstances of the subject 

property and relevant market conditions).
20

is quite close, as well as grocery stores and shopping between one and 

one quarter miles from the properties. N. T. 8/15/14 at 112-113, 126-

128.

Trial Court Opinion at 9; R.R. at 22a.

In further evaluating the evidence, the Trial Court stated that 

“[u]ltimately, Dockside could not provide authority as to why this [Trial] Court 

should ignore the [UCA, which also defined] each [residential unit] as a separate 

parcel to be taxed and assessed separately....Additionally, following direct 

examination of ... Levin and rebuttal testimony from ... Rush, this [Trial] Court 

did not find Dockside’s expert assessment evidence reliable or credible.” Trial 

Court Opinion at 9; R.R. at 22a.

Thus, examination by this Court of the particular facts and 

circumstances of the current controversy, clearly evidenced that the Trial Court did

weigh, at length, the facts and conflicting evidence when it made its determination. 

This Court’s holding in Koppel is distinguishable.

This Court is mindful that a trial court must determine the fair market 

value of a property on the basis of the competent, credible and relevant evidence 

presented by the parties. Green, 772 A.2d 419. This Court is also cognizant of the

fact that a trial court’s resolution of the conflict of opinions by various experts, the 

weight assigned respectively thereto, and the credibility determinations thereof, 

control on appeal. Church Street Associates, 959 A.2d 490. 

Therefore, in furtherance of this review, and keeping in mind the 

holdings of Green and Church Street Associates, as well as being mindful that the 

trial court has the discretion to decide which of the methods of valuation is the 
21

most appropriate and applicable to the given property,

17 Philadelphia clearly 

presented significant evidence in the form of dates, sales prices, sizes and locations 

for the twenty-five (25) residential units that were sold within this property as a 

whole since 2010, that supported its expert’s opinion of market value.

In addition, as identified by Philadelphia, at least fourteen (14) other 

jurisdictions have enacted the UCA in their states and three (3) courts in other 

UCA states have addressed the UCA’s tax provision, with each interpreting that 

tax provision to require a residential (condominium) unit, regardless of ownership, 

to be treated separately from all other units in the condominium project.

Thus, while Dockside may have believed and asserted that its

ownership of the residential units was within a fractured condominium project, 

which therefore depressed the value of each residential unit within that project, 

Dockside neither provided credible evidence, or authority as to why neither the 

Trial Court or this Court should ignore the UCA, which defines each residential 

unit as a separate parcel to be taxed and assessed separately.18 

So, being mindful that the Trial Court had the discretion to decide 

which of the methods of valuation was the most appropriate and applicable to the 

given property as long as it was based upon the competent, credible and relevant 

evidence presented by the parties, and being cognizant of the fact that a trial 

court’s resolution of the conflict of opinions by various experts, the weight 

 

17 Church Street Associates, 959 A.2d 490.

18 See also Trial Court Opinion at 7.
22

assigned respectively thereto, and the credibility determinations thereof, controls

on appeal as long as the court provided meaningful analysis of the evidence. The

Trial Court's findings are entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed 

absent clear error. Consequently, this Court finds that the Trial Court did not err 

when it chose the Sales Comparison taxation approach it did when it assessed the 

value of each condominium separately.

Exclusion of Prior Appraisals

Dockside also argued that the Trial Court erred when it prohibited 

Dockside from including the prior appraisals of the property created by Hughes for 

other clients in the certified record and prohibited Dockside from using them to 

impeach Hughes. 

Dockside asserted that Hughes, the expert for Philadelphia, appraised 

the property for another client, wherein Dockside asserted that Hughes offered “a 

far different spin, characterizing Dockside’s neighborhood as an ‘island’...that 

‘would never be allowed today’.” Dockside’s Brief at 54, n.9; see also Dockside’s 

Reply Brief at 12-16.

Dockside further asserted that Hughes’ prior appraisals were not 

offered to establish the value of the residential units, but rather to demonstrate that 

statements that were made by Hughes to support his valuation were directly 

inconsistent with statements that he made previously about the property. 

Dockside’s Reply Brief at 13.

In support, Dockside argued that Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 

613(a) permitted the impeachment of a witness’s credibility through the use of a 
23

prior inconsistent statement made by that witness.19 Thus, argued Dockside, that 

“it is hornbook law” that a witness’s credibility may be impeached by prior 

inconsistent statements. Leaphart v. Whiting Corporation, 564 A.2d 165, 172 (Pa. 

Super. 1989); see also Dockside’s Brief at 49. Dockside further argued that “[a] 

party may impeach the credibility of an adverse witness by introducing evidence 

that the witness has made one or more statements inconsistent with his trial 

testimony.” Commonwealth v. Bailey, 469 A.2d 604 (Pa. Super. 1983).

In response, Philadelphia argued that Hughes’ prior appraisals did not 

value the individual residential units of the property for real estate tax purposes. 

Rather, Hughes created those appraisals under different circumstances, for 

evaluation of the entire building, and were created for mortgage purposes. 

Dockside Brief at 48.20 Philadelphia asserted that the prior appraisals did not 

provide values for the residential units. Consequently, they were not relevant in 

the matter under review.

Philadelphia further argued that Hughes appraised 152 residential 

units for real estate tax purposes in accordance with the UCA for their market 

value. Whereas, Hughes’ prior appraisals valued the property, as a whole, for 

liquidation purposes in the event that the bank was required to foreclose. 

 

19 Pa. Rule of Evidence 613(a) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Witness’s Prior Inconsistent Statement to Impeach. A witness 

may be examined concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness to 

impeach the witness’s credibility.

20 Hughes’ prior appraisals were created to “evaluat[e] the project,” or the financial 

feasibility of “the property.” R.R. at 260a, N.T. August 21, 2114, at 16; R.R. at 100a, N.T., 

August 11, 2014, at 64.
24

A party may impeach a witness’s credibility on cross-examination 

through previous statements inconsistent with those made at trial. Bailey, 469 

A.2d 604. Further, the trial court is vested with authority to “limit the scope and 

extent of cross-examination.” Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., Inc. v 

McLaughlin, 466 A.2d 1092, 1097 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).

This Court agrees with Dockside’s assertion that in order for prior 

inconsistent statements to suffice as impeachment evidence, those dissimilarities 

“must be substantial enough to cast doubt on a witness’s testimony” Bailey, 469 

A.2d at 611.

This Court also agrees with Dockside’s argument that the only reason 

offered by the Trial Court in its opinion for its decision to exclude Hughes’ 

potential impeachment was because the prior appraisals were not relevant as they 

were “not made for a tax assessment.” Trial Court Opinion at 10. 

“[A] trial court has exclusive province over all matters of credibility ... 

and its findings will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence 

in the record.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Montgomery County Board of 

Assessment. Appeals, 111 A.3d 267, 279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citation omitted).

This Court is reminded of Dockside’s earlier assertion in support of their Taxation 

Approach argument -- in determining fair market value of the residential units, it is 

well-settled that value assigned to those units must be based upon the particular 

facts and circumstances of the subject property. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 692 A.2d 

661, 663; see also Dockside’s Brief at 31. (Emphasis added.)
25

This Court agrees with Dockside’s assertion that the “only reason 

offered” by the Trial Court in its opinion when it excluded Hughes’ prior 

appraisals from impeachment evidence was because they were “not made for a tax 

assessment”. Unfortunately for Dockside, this Court finds no error in the Trial 

Court’s reasoning.

However, those Trial Court findings will not be disturbed if they are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Trial Court’s words regarding 

Hughes’ prior appraisals -- that the appraisals were “not made for a tax 

assessment” were enough. Those few words, that precise reason, was reason 

enough to exclude Hughes’ prior appraisals. For dissimilarities must not only cast 

doubt on a witness’s testimony, but those dissimilarities must relate to the same 

concept or issue. Put another way, assertions must be based upon the particular 

facts and circumstances of the subject property. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 692 A.2d 

661, 663; see also Dockside’s Brief at 31. Here, the statements made by Hughes,

in his previous appraisals, relate to a different concept and addresses a different 

issue and were properly excluded by the Trial Court. 

For reasons heretofore set forth in the Court’s opinion Philadelphia’s 

Application For Relief To Suppress In Part Dockside’s Brief And For Reasonable 

Attorney’s Fees is denied.

This Court affirms the decision of the Trial Court.

 ____________________________

 BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

Judge Covey did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dockside Associates/Pier 30, L.P. :

:

v. :

:

City of Philadelphia, Board of :

Revision of Taxes :

:

Appeal of: Dockside Associates/ : No. 2258 C.D. 2014

Pier 30, L.P. and Peter DePaul :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 15th day of January, 2016, and pursuant to the 

reasons heretofore set forth in our Opinion in the above-captioned matter, 

Philadelphia’s Application For Relief To Suppress In Part Dockside’s Brief And 

For Reasonable Attorney’s Fees in the above-captioned matter is denied.

Further, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

 _____________________________

 BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge