[Cite as Meyer v. Lucas, 2024-Ohio-3035.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MIAMI COUNTY

ANDREW MEYER 

 Appellant

v. 

CODI LUCAS

 Appellee

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C.A. No. 2023-CA-21

Trial Court Case No. 21 CV 346

(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on August 9, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

ROBERT W. GURRY, Attorney for Appellant

 

BENJAMIN D. EBERLY, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Andrew Meyer appeals from a June 12, 2023 judgment of the 

Miami County Court of Common Pleas, which resolved claims and counterclaims

between Meyer and his former fiancée, Appellee Codi Lucas. Meyer contends that the 

trial court erred in awarding Lucas one-half of the increase in value of Meyer’s house on 
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her unjust enrichment claim and in not awarding Meyer the damages he requested in his 

conversion claim. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} Meyer and Lewis lived together and were engaged to be married for almost 

four years. They had a significant argument that ended their engagement in late August 

2021. Two months later, Meyer filed a complaint against Lucas in the Miami County 

Municipal Court asking the court to order Lucas to vacate their property on East Broadway 

Street in Covington, Ohio. Lucas filed a counterclaim requesting in excess of $15,000. 

Therefore, the Miami County Municipal Court transferred the case to the Miami County 

Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 1901.17.

{¶ 3} On December 1, 2021, Meyer filed an amended complaint alleging claims for 

forcible detention, replevin, and conversion. According to Meyer, Lucas took his

personal property that had an approximate total value of $60,000. Lucas filed an 

amended answer and counterclaim in which she alleged claims for unjust enrichment and 

a resulting trust.

{¶ 4} A bench trial was held on March 15, 2023. Meyer and Lucas testified at trial. 

Meyer testified first upon cross-examination and later on direct examination. Tr. 5-53, 

124-167. Meyer testified that, in 2013 or 2014, following a divorce, he began living at a 

house owned by his mother on East Broadway Street in Covington. Meyer started dating 

Lucas in October 2016, she moved in with him in 2017, he purchased an engagement
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ring for her in August 2017, and they got engaged in December 2017. Meyer had two 

children from a prior relationship, and Lucas had three children from a prior relationship.

{¶ 5} According to Meyer, they started looking in 2018 for a house they would 

purchase together. Originally, the plan was for both of them to finance the house 

purchase, but Lucas had a problem with her credit. They ultimately decided to buy the 

house they were living in from Meyer’s mother, who still owed about $78,000 on the 

house. Meyer was the only one listed on the deed, and he took out a mortgage in the 

amount of $132,500. Meyer testified that his mother gave them $2,500 for the down 

payment and that the equity his mother had built in the house was her gift to him to help 

make improvements on the house.

{¶ 6} Meyer testified that he and Lucas made improvements to the house after he 

bought it. For example, they tore out a wall in the kitchen, added a new refrigerator, and 

installed vinyl flooring, tile, drywall, cabinets, and countertops. They also added a new 

patio and fence to the property. Meyer stated that he and contractors did most of the 

work on the improvements to the house. He explained that Lucas had helped with the 

demolition of the kitchen but had not provided much other assistance. Meyer also stated

that Lucas had not assisted him with his business as an owner-operator truck driver.

{¶ 7} Meyer agreed that he and Lucas had set up a joint bank account in 

September 2018 and that most of the monthly bills, including the mortgage payment, were 

paid from that joint account. Meyer believed that he had contributed much more to the 

bank account than Lucas. However, he conceded that Lucas had been contributing to 

joint finances for at least eight months prior to the home purchase. 
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{¶ 8} In late August 2021, Lucas and Meyer had a significant argument that ended 

their romantic relationship and engagement. Meyer testified that Lucas took much of his 

personal property, which he had either purchased before he met her or had purchased 

after they were dating but had financed solely in his name. He presented a list of items 

to the court that he believed were his property and that she had converted. Meyer 

estimated how much these used items were worth based primarily on searches he had 

done on internet websites for similar products that were brand new. Meyer did not 

present documentary evidence supporting the “replacement” values to which he testified. 

{¶ 9} After they broke up, Meyer removed a substantial amount of money from the 

joint bank account. Meyer also obtained an ex parte civil protection order against Lucas, 

which led to her being removed from the property on East Broadway Street. However, 

after a hearing, the domestic relations court dissolved the protection order, and Lucas 

eventually moved back into the house until February 2022. According to Meyer, he did 

not live at the home during that time but paid all the expenses.

{¶ 10} Meyer believed that Lucas should not receive any equity in the house, 

because her name was not on the mortgage or deed and she received use of the house 

when she lived there. Further, he believed she should not get any portion of the amounts 

received from the sale of personal property, because she stole several items of property 

from him.

{¶ 11} Lucas testified next. Tr. 53-122. She testified that she began dating 

Meyer in 2016, and they had shared their finances from September 2018 to September 

2021. Prior to when they combined their finances in September 2018, Lucas had given
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Meyer approximately $5,000 toward the purchase of a bass boat and helped him with 

groceries, bills, and household expenses. She contributed an initial $2,000 to their joint 

account in September 2018 and then began having both her employment and 

unemployment income deposited into that account. Lucas noted the following 

improvements that they had made to the house: (1) remodeled the kitchen by knocking 

down a wall that connected the living room and kitchen and replacing the flooring, 

cabinets, and countertops; (2) added a patio, a stone fireplace, some sod, and fencing; 

(3) added drywall in the living room along with a fireplace and a wall television; (4) 

remodeled the attic so that there were two bedrooms on that level; (5) added new 

sidewalks to go from the front to the side of the house; and (6) added a new concrete 

driveway. When asked to explain how she helped contribute to the improvements other 

than through the payments made out of the joint bank account, Lucas stated:

We knocked down the wall; we tore that all out; gutted the complete 

kitchen; outside we helped with framing, you know, getting the concrete slab 

ready to go. At that point it was like handing tools because we also had 

friends over helping us. The fencing we dug holes; put holes in outside; 

we had a buddy come out and help us with the sidewalk; framing of that; 

and the fence.

Tr. 60.

{¶ 12} After their relationship and engagement ended, Lucas was forced out of the 

house and spent two weeks in a hotel that was reserved through her church. She 

eventually was allowed to live in the house for an additional five months, during which 
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time she paid for cable and took care of the dogs.

{¶ 13} According to Lucas, prior to their break-up, Meyer and Lucas had talked 

about how they would divide their property if they broke up; Meyer had said she could 

take several items, and so she did. Lucas testified that she would be willing to return 

some items if Meyer asked for them. She also explained what property she had sold and 

how much money she had received from the sales. Immediately after they ended the 

engagement, Meyer took $7,628.55 of the $10,148.10 that was in their joint checking 

account. Lucas also believed he took approximately $5,000 from their joint savings 

account. Lucas testified that Meyer agreed to pay off the rest of the bills.

{¶ 14} On June 12, 2023, the trial court issued its decision and judgment entry. 

The court found that “Meyer was not credible for multiple reasons.” Decision, p. 5. First, 

the court noted that Meyer testified that Lucas should receive nothing on her counterclaim 

because she “did nothing,” despite the fact that she had lived with him for nearly four 

years, had been engaged to him, and had helped purchase a home and improve the 

home with funds that came from a joint account. Second, Meyer did not offer values for 

many used items, instead opting to seek current retail values of new versions of the 

property, despite conceding that some of the property had been purchased in used 

condition for much less than the values he sought at trial. Third, Meyer’s testimony was 

contradicted by some of his text messages. Fourth, the trial court stated that it “found 

no credibility throughout Meyer’s testimony.” Id. at 5-6.

{¶ 15} On the other hand, the trial court found Lucas to be credible and noted that 

she “not only testified that she assisted in the home improvements, she confirmed that 
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those expenses, along with mortgage payments and other household expenses and 

purchases, were paid from the joint account.” Id. at 7-8. Further, “[s]he stated that both 

Parties deposited their paychecks into the joint account, although some of her checks 

were unemployment checks after she lost her job.” Id. at 8. The trial court also pointed 

out that “[i]n furtherance of Lucas’ credibility, at the point of separation, Lucas was 

unemployed, had no vehicle as Meyer retrieved it, and no place to live (a church put her 

in a hotel for two weeks), and yet did not take any cash that was readily available to her 

either from the safe or withdraw money from the joint accounts.” Id. 

{¶ 16} The trial court noted that both Lucas and Meyer had children from prior 

marriages, and they had remodeled the home from three bedrooms to five bedrooms for 

the children. According to the court, “[t]hey had dreams of a life together, worked to 

improve the home, and contributed equally to the mortgage and improvements. Lucas 

testified she put ‘sweat’ into the house.” Id. at 8-9. The trial court found that Lucas’s

testimony was credible and “[t]he weight of the evidence at trial favors Lucas.” Id. at 9.

{¶ 17} Although the trial court stated that the credibility determinations and weight 

of the evidence favored Lucas, the court acknowledged that its resolution of the property 

interests at issue was “hampered by a lack of documentary evidence.” Id. The trial 

court found that Lucas had proved Meyer was enriched by her mortgage payments and 

her payments of other household bills from the joint Wright-Patt account as well as her 

contributions to home improvements. The court then noted the parties stipulated that 

the real property’s fair market value as of trial was $172,786, which was a gain of 

$37,786.00 in the property’s value since the house was purchased from Meyer’s mother. 
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The court found that Lucas was entitled to one-half of the increase in value, or $18,893.00. 

Id. at 14.

{¶ 18} Based on its review of the trial testimony and evidence submitted at trial, 

the court found that Lucas owed Meyer $150 from the sale of a kitchen table and six 

chairs; $750 for a hot tub; and $1,000 for a Sleep Number Bed. The court also ordered 

Lucas to return an IKEA wardrobe and 12 geese decoys plus $8, or pay $200 and keep 

the decoys. This resulted in a total monetary amount of $1,908 or $2,100 owed by Lucas

to Meyer. The court also found that Meyer owed Lucas $2,554.50 from the Wright-Patt 

“Truesaver” savings account; $3,458.79 from the Wright-Patt checking account; $18,893 

from the equity in the property; $1,950 from the bass boat sale; and $1,000 for the down 

payment on the truck for the business. This resulted in a total monetary amount of 

$27,856.29 owed by Meyer to Lucas.

{¶ 19} Meyer filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment.

II. The Trial Court’s Judgment Was Not Against the Manifest Weight of the 

Evidence

{¶ 20} Meyer’s sole assignment of error states:

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in granting judgment to Ms. 

Lucas for half the equity in the house, and for the personal property items, 

by failing to correctly state or apply Ohio law of unjust enrichment and 

restitution, or supporting a finding that Mr. Meyer retained some unjust 

benefit.
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{¶ 21} Generally, Meyer contends that the trial court erred by concluding that 

Meyer was unjustly enriched and that he failed to provide adequate evidence of the value 

of the personal property Lucas converted. Meyer argues that the only benefit the trial 

court could have found that Lucas conferred on Meyer was her deposits of money into 

the parties’ joint bank account. According to Meyer, Lucas only deposited between 

$100,000 and $110,000 into the joint account, while he deposited at least $240,000 into 

the joint account. As a result, Meyer believes it would not have been “unjust” to allow 

Meyer to keep the entire increase in the value of the house between the time he bought 

it and the end of the engagement, regardless of how much Lucas had assisted him in 

making improvements to the house after it was purchased from his mother.

{¶ 22} Meyer asks us to review the trial court’s judgment under a de novo standard 

of review. Appellant’s Brief, p. 8-9. But that is not the appropriate standard in this 

appeal from a bench trial. “When reviewing civil appeals from bench trials, we apply a 

manifest-weight standard of review.” Revilo Tyluka, L.L.C. v. Simon Roofing & Sheet 

Metal Corp., 2011-Ohio-1922, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), citing App.R. 12(C) and Seasons Coal Co. 

v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984). “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination 

of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the 

issue rather than the other.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). “Weight is not 

a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” Id. In 

determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate 

court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 
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considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in 

the evidence, the fact-finder clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶ 23} When a court of appeals determines that a verdict is against the weight of 

the evidence, it should remand the cause for a new trial. Id. at ¶ 22, citing Hanna v. 

Wagner, 39 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1974). The discretionary power of an appellate court to 

grant a new trial is to be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the judgment. State v. Lang, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 220, citing 

Thompkins at 387. We make every reasonable presumption in favor of the judgment 

and any finding of fact; if the evidence is susceptible to more than one construction, we 

are bound to interpret it in the way that is consistent with the judgment. Eastley at ¶ 21, 

citing Seasons Coal Co. at 80, fn. 3.

{¶ 24} “Ohio law does not have any provision for allocating property among 

unmarried, cohabitating individuals.” Hatten v. Shaw, 2000 WL 670305, *2 (4th Dist. 

May 15, 2000), citing Lauper v. Harold, 23 Ohio App.3d 168, 170 (12th Dist. 1985). 

Further, Ohio’s “heart balm” statute, R.C. 2305.29, provides, in part, “[n]o person shall be 

liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry . . .” However, this does not 

mean that the trial court was without authority to make an award in a situation like the one 

in which Meyer and Lucas found themselves. “[W]hile R.C. 2305.29 prohibits the 

recovery of civil damages based on a broken promise of marriage, the statute does not 

preclude the recovery of property which was transferred in reliance on a promise to 

marry.” Dixon v. Smith, 119 Ohio App.3d 308, 315 (3d Dist. 1997), citing Wilson v. Dabo, 
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10 Ohio App.3d 169 (10th Dist. 1983). Requiring fulfillment of an equitable duty to 

restore Lucas to the position she was in prior to the agreement to marry “ ‘does not 

constitute an award of damages for breach of promise to marry but is an order for 

restitution of property to which the reneging party no longer has a right, having 

relinquished it by exercising the statutory prerogative to terminate the promise to marry.’ ” 

Id. at 315-316, quoting Dabo at 170-171. “Therefore, the recovery of property 

transferred in reliance on a promise to marry is permitted upon the equitable theory of 

preventing unjust enrichment.” Id. at 316.

{¶ 25} Quantum meruit or unjust enrichment is “an equitable remedy ‘giving rise to 

obligations imposed by law, irrespective of the intentions of the parties, in order to prevent 

an injustice when one party retains a benefit from another’s labors.’ ” In re Suchodolski, 

2011-Ohio-6333, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), citing In re Estate of Kirkland, 2008-Ohio-421, ¶ 23 (2d 

Dist.). “Unjust enrichment occurs when a person ‘has and retains money or benefits 

which in justice and equity belong to another . . .’ ” Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 2005-

Ohio-4985, ¶ 20, quoting Hummel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 528 (1938). “The 

elements of unjust enrichment include: 1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a 

defendant; 2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and 3) retention of the benefit 

by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to do so without payment.” 

(Citations omitted.) Harco Industries, Inc. v. Elco Textron, Inc., 2003-Ohio-2397, ¶ 14

(2d Dist.). “Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim based on a contract implied in law, . 

. . the purpose of which ‘is not to compensate the plaintiff for any loss or damage suffered 

by him but to compensate him for the benefit he has conferred on the defendant.’ ” 
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(Citations omitted.) Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-4363, ¶ 36.

{¶ 26} Lucas met her burden of proving the elements of unjust enrichment. She 

conferred a substantial benefit on Meyer. She deposited money into their joint bank 

account that was used to pay the mortgage on the house and household expenses, and 

she assisted Meyer in remodeling many aspects of the inside and outside of the house. 

While Meyer attempted at trial to discount all of Lucas’s efforts in these regards, the trial 

court found that Meyer was not credible and Lucas was credible. It is well established 

that “[o]n the trial of a case, either civil or criminal, the weight to be given the evidence 

and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. 

DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. We defer to the trial 

court’s credibility determinations, because it is “best able to view the witnesses and 

observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in 

weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., 10 Ohio St.3d at 

80. “A fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness 

appearing before it.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Fetty, 2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 58 (11th Dist.).

{¶ 27} Meyer contends that “[n]o evidence other than Ms. Lucas’s post-hoc 

feelings, was presented to suggest, much less met her burden to show, any gifts or 

transfers of property were made ‘in contemplation of marriage,’ rather than due to the 

parties being in a relationship generally, or to mere cohabitation.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 

10. As Meyer appears to concede when referencing Lucas’s “post-hoc feelings,” Lucas’s 

testimony supported the trial court’s findings. Further, the actions of the parties in 

combining their money, getting engaged, and putting a great amount of sweat equity into 
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the house in which they planned to raise their respective children supported the trial 

court’s findings. Indeed, the parties both testified that the plan was for both of them to 

be on the deed and own the house before they discovered that Lucas’s poor credit history 

prevented her from being on the mortgage. Although the parties were never legally 

married, they were engaged to be married, and Lucas was clearly conferring benefits on 

Meyer based on this promise to marry. As the trial court noted, they remodeled the 

house in ways that suggested they intended to make it a home for themselves and their 

children. Despite this, Meyer contends that Lucas was not entitled to any damages 

because she received the benefit of living in his house as the value of the house

increased. But Meyer, unlike Lucas, will continue to enjoy the benefits of all of Lucas’s 

efforts in remodeling the house, making payments toward the mortgage, and making 

payments toward household expenses. As the Third District has explained:

When Karen left the residence, Harold retained many benefits from 

her $18,750 contribution. Not only did the value of his home substantially 

increase, but Harold also benefited by continuing to live in an improved 

home with two additional bedrooms and one additional bathroom. It is 

clear that it would be unjust to permit defendant to retain these benefits 

without restitution to the plaintiff for the funds that made those 

improvements possible.

Dixon, 119 Ohio App.3d at 318. See also Sigrist v. Lyons, 100 Ohio App.3d 252, 254

(10th Dist. 1995) (affirming an award of damages for unjust enrichment where the plaintiff 

previously had provided funds to her ex-fiancé to help him purchase a house that was 
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intended to be their marital residence).

{¶ 28} We do not take lightly the fact that there is no provision in Ohio’s statutes 

for the division of property between unmarried couples. And the law of unjust enrichment 

will not always provide relief when engaged couples call off their engagement and have 

disputes over property. But the specific facts in the record before us support the trial 

court’s decision to award Lucas one-half of the increase in value of Meyer’s house. 

Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s judgment on Lucas’s unjust 

enrichment claim was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 29} Finally, Meyer contends that the trial court incorrectly denied his request for 

damages for conversion of many of his personal property items due to the lack of 

documented fair market value and the fact that he had access to the personal property 

before Lucas took it. According to Meyer, “Ohio law has long recognized that an owner 

of either real or personal property is, by virtue of such ownership, competent to testify as 

to the market value of the property. . . . There was adequate testimony from Mr. Meyer 

to appropriately value the wrongfully converted property.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 25.

{¶ 30} The elements of a conversion claim are (1) plaintiff's ownership or right to 

possession of the property at the time of conversion; (2) defendant's conversion by a 

wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff's property rights; and (3) damages. Haul Transport 

of VA., Inc. v. Morgan, 1995 WL 328995, *3 (2d Dist. June 2, 1995). Conversion is “any 

distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one's property in denial of his rights or 

inconsistent with it.” (Citation omitted.) Schiff v. Dickson, 2011-Ohio-6079, ¶ 30 (8th 

Dist.).
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{¶ 31} In a conversion claim, the general rule for the measure of damages is the 

value of the property at the time of conversion. Erie RR. Co. v. Steinberg, 94 Ohio St. 

189 (1916), paragraph two of the syllabus. “[A] person generally must be qualified as an 

expert in order to testify as to the value of property.” (Citations omitted.) Carpenter v. 

Johnson, 2011-Ohio-4867, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). An exception exists for owners of personal 

property, because the owner, “aided by his experience, has some particular means of 

forming an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of the property in question 

beyond that which is possessed by people generally.” Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern 

Indemn. Co., 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 627 (1992). 

{¶ 32} Meyer did not testify about what he believed the market value of the 

property was immediately before conversion. Rather, his testimony was a combination 

of what he paid for some of the items when he first got them and what it would cost to 

replace the converted items with new versions of the items. The original price paid for 

personal property several years before the conversion does not establish the market 

value immediately before the time of conversion. Werr v. Moccabee, 2008-Ohio-595,

¶ 10 (4th Dist.). Similarly, testifying about what a website shows is the price of a brandnew piece of personal property to replace the old personal property that was converted 

does not establish the market value of the old property immediately before the conversion.

{¶ 33} In short, Meyer’s testimony on damages was speculative at best. He 

testified that many of the items were purchased many years ago, and he often did not 

know the purchase price. He estimated the value of many of his items by looking on 

websites on the internet that contained what he believed to be comparable items, and 
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then he assigned a value to his items based on prices he found on such websites for 

brand new versions of these items. However, none of the out-of-court materials Meyer 

purportedly relied upon for his fair market value figures were introduced into evidence. 

This precluded any meaningful scrutiny of the relied-upon listings, their valuations, or their 

alleged comparable nature and condition relative to the items for which Meyer sought 

damages. Kavalec v. Ohio Express, Inc., 2016-Ohio-5925, ¶ 39-40 (8th Dist.). This is 

not an instance where damages were substantiated by entering into evidence documents 

relating to online research of comparable items. See, e.g., State v. Hollowell, 2014-Ohio1142, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (the testimony of the witnesses along with evidence of online price 

research for comparable items served as competent, credible evidence that allowed the 

court to discern the price of the items to a reasonable degree of certainty).

{¶ 34} Meyer’s failure to submit documentation to support his out-of-court 

valuation research precluded Lucas from any fair opportunity to challenge the outside 

materials as well as any ability to challenge the comparable nature of the items sought to 

the items found on the internet. Therefore, the trial court properly rejected Meyer’s 

speculative and unsupported testimony regarding the value of the allegedly converted 

personal property. The trial court’s judgment on Meyer’s conversion claim was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 35} The sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 36} Having overruled Meyer’s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the trial 
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court will be affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

HUFFMAN, J., concurs.

TUCKER, J., dissents: 

{¶ 37} I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which 

concludes that the trial court’s judgment awarding Lucas one-half of the increased value 

of the home, or $18,893, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In my 

opinion, awarding Lucas one-half of the increased value of the home did not represent an 

unjust enrichment award but was, instead, an improper division of property between an 

unmarried, cohabitating couple. As such, the $18,893.00 judgment should, in my view, 

be reversed as a matter of law. 

{¶ 38} I agree that unjust enrichment can be the basis for an award when an 

identified and traceable sum of money is transferred from one party to another party in 

contemplation of marriage, and, upon a break-up, it would be unjust for the receiving party 

to retain the money. Sigrist, 100 Ohio App.3d 252; Dixon, 119 Ohio App.3d 308.

{¶ 39} In Sigrist, Sigrist, during her engagement to Lyons, transferred $4,920 to 

Lyons so that he “would qualify for FHA financing on the house where the parties were to 

live.” Sigrist at 254. When the engagement ended, Sigrist demanded the return of the 

$4,920; the demand was refused, Sigrist filed a cause of action, and the trial court granted

Sigrist judgment in the amount of $4,920. Id. The appellate court affirmed the judgment 

under an unjust enrichment rationale, stating that the trial court could have reasonably 
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found “that the transfer of funds was based on an understanding that at the time of the 

transfer, the parties intended to marry. Because the parties did not marry . . . Sigrist was 

entitled to have her money returned.” Id.

{¶ 40} In Dixon, Dixon moved into Smith’s home while engaged to him, and the 

parties began to commingle their funds shortly thereafter. Dixon then obtained an 

$18,750 mortgage on a rental property she owned. This amount was deposited into the 

parties’ joint checking account and, over the next year, the entire amount was exclusively 

used to make improvements to Smith’s home. The engagement ended, and Dixon filed 

suit; she demanded, among other things, an unjust enrichment award in the amount of 

$18,750. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Dixon $18,750. The appellate 

court affirmed the judgment. Though the appellate court’s rationale with respect to unjust 

enrichment was not precisely stated, it is fair to say the appellate court found that the 

evidence supported Dixon’s assertion that she had transferred the funds in contemplation 

of marriage and, when the marriage did not occur, it would have been unjust to permit 

Smith to retain benefits of the home improvements without restitution to Dixon of the 

$18,750 that made the improvements possible. Dixon at 318.

{¶ 41} These cases represent proper unjust enrichment analyses. In each case,

there was a transfer of identifiable and traceable funds and, upon the break-up, there 

would have been an obvious injustice to allow the receiving party to retain the funds or, 

without restitution, the benefit the funds provided. 

{¶ 42} This is in sharp contrast to the case before us. Lucas did deposit money 

into the parties’ joint bank account, and those funds assisted in the payment of the 
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mortgage and other household expenses. Further, she did assist in remodeling the 

home. Whether there was an engagement or not, this is the type of conduct engaged in 

by countless unmarried, cohabitating couples. But upon a break-up, such conduct does 

not allow a property division award couched in the language of unjust enrichment. By 

awarding Lucas one-half of the home’s increased value -- a quintessential property 

division award – the trial court fashioned an improper property division using the language

of unjust enrichment. On this basis, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.