2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-7-2010

Lazaridis v. Wehmer

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 09-1342

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Lazaridis v. Wehmer" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1972.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1972
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-1342

 

EMMANUEL N. LAZARIDIS, 

individually and in his capacity as 

legal custodian of V.L., a minor,

v.

LAVINA TINA WEHMER; MATTHEW NEIDERMAN; 

CATHERINE SUTER; AFRODITI MINA MAUROEIDI; 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

STATE OF DELAWARE; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSEPH BIDEN, III

Emmanuel N. Lazaridis, Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 1-06-cv-00793)

District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1 on 

December 3, 2009
2

Before: RENDELL HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 7, 2010)

 

Emmanuel N. Lazaridis (pro se)

Lazaridis-Kortsidakis, Smyrnis 14

71201 Heraklion

Crete, Greece

 Pro Se Appellant

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Emmanuel Lazaridis filed a complaint in

the United States District Court for the District of Delaware

raising various constitutional and statutory claims relating to

child custody proceedings and the registration of foreign

custody orders in the state of Delaware against his ex-wife, her

attorneys, and the Delaware Attorney General. Lazaridis now

appeals from the District Court’s October 30, 2008 and January

14, 2009 orders dismissing his complaint and denying his

motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the District Court’s orders. 
1

Lazaridis and V.L. currently reside in Greece. 

2

The Delaware courts treat foreign custody orders the

same as custody orders from other states, and “a child custody

determination made in a foreign country under factual

circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional

standards of this chapter must be recognized and enforced . . . .”

13 Del C. Ann. § 1905(a), (b). 

3

I. Background

 At issue in this appeal is the custody of V.L., Lazaridis’s

and defendant Wehmer’s daughter.1

 In June 2004, a French

court granted Wehmer and Lazaridis joint custody of V.L. but

ordered that the child’s primary residence be with Wehmer.

Wehmer thereafter sought to register the French custody order

in Delaware Family Court pursuant to the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), as

adopted by the State of Delaware.2

 See 13 Del. C. Ann. §

1934(a). As permitted by Delaware law, Lazaridis challenged

the registration of the order. See 13 Del. C. Ann. § 1934(d). In

March 2005, the Family Court held a hearing at which

Lazaridis’s attorney argued that Delaware lacked jurisdiction to

enforce or to register the French order. Although the Family

Court ordered briefing on “whether there were any valid

grounds for challenging the registration,” it ultimately denied

Lazaridis’s motion. 

Lazaridis appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court,

claiming, among other things, that: (1) the UCCJEA violates

the Delaware Constitution; (2) the UCCJEA, as applied, violated
4

his right to due process; and (3) the Family Court abused its

discretion by ordering the registration of the French order. In

June 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family

Court’s order and declined to consider Lazaridis’s constitutional

claims because he had not raised them before the Family Court.

See Letsos v. Warren, 901 A.2d 120 (Del. 2006).

 In August 2006, Lazaridis filed a motion in Family

Court seeking relief from the registration and enforcement of the

2004 French custody order on the basis that Greece was

exercising jurisdiction over V.L. He claims that the Family

Court never ruled on this motion.

Meanwhile, in August 2005, a French court issued

another custody order giving Wehmer the right to “exclusively

exercise parental authority” over V.L. In October 2006,

Wehmer requested that the Family Court register the order, and

on December 6, 2006, Lazaridis filed a motion challenging the

registration of that order. 

 On December 27, 2006, Lazaridis filed the instant

complaint against Wehmer, her attorneys, and the Delaware

Attorney General. Lazaridis set forth the following three

claims: (1) the UCCJEA and Uniform Interstate Family and

Support Act (“UIFSA”) violated the due process rights

guaranteed by the Delaware Constitution and the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, both generally

and as applied to him; (2) V.L.’s “fundamental rights” were

violated because the Delaware courts applied the UIFSA and

UCCJEA rather than Greek law, which includes the United

Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; and (3) Wehmer
5

and her attorneys conspired to violate Lazaridis’s and V.L.’s

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lazaridis asked the District

Court to enjoin the Delaware courts from enforcing current or

future foreign orders registered in Delaware Family Court under

the UCCJEA or UIFSA. He also sought to enjoin the

defendants from registering or enforcing French orders in

Delaware courts. Finally, Lazaridis requested monetary

damages pursuant to the § 1983 claim. 

On January 31, 2007, a Greek court issued a custody

order granting temporary custody of V.L. to Lazaridis. That

order was continued on April 27, 2007. And on July 30, 2007

the Delaware Family Court vacated the registration of the 2005

French order, citing the January 2007 Greek order. 

In August 2007, Lazaridis filed a motion to reopen in

Family Court seeking to vacate the registration of the 2004

French order. The Family Court, on November 29, 2007, issued

a decision denying his request based on the doctrine of res

judicata. T.W. v. E.L., No. CN04-08707, 2007 WL 4793123

(Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 29, 2007). 

Before the Family Court issued its November 2007

decision, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Lazaridis’s

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) based on its

determination that Lazaridis was barred from filing suit under

the so-called fugitive disentitlement doctrine. See OrtegaRodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993); Degen v.

United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996). On appeal, we vacated the

District Court’s order after finding that the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine did not apply to Lazaridis. 
6

On remand, the District Court sua sponte dismissed

Lazaridis’s complaint under the following rationales: (1) the

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, or alternatively by reason of res judicata and collateral

estoppel (claim no. 1—2004 French order); (2) the Younger

abstention doctrine (claim no. 1—2005 French order); (3) as

frivolous (claim nos. 2 and 3); and (4) for failure to state a claim

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (claim nos. 2 and 3). The

District Court denied Lazaridis’s outstanding motions for

service and for “renewed consideration of prior motions” as

moot. Lazaridis subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration,

which the District Court denied on January 14, 2009.

Lazaridis timely appealed. Our jurisdiction rests on 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Analysis

A. Denial of the Motion to Reconsider

 Lazaridis first appeals from the District Court’s denial of

his Rule 59 motion. In this case, the appropriate standard of

review is for an abuse of discretion. See Federal Kemper Ins.

Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986) .

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is “to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered

evidence.” Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677

(3d Cir. 1998). A proper Rule 59(e) motion therefore must rely

on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the
7

need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.

N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,

1218 (3d Cir. 1995). Lazaridis’s motion advanced the same

arguments that were in his complaint and motions. Because this

is not a proper basis for reconsideration, the District Court

appropriately denied the motion. 

B. Dismissal of the Complaint

We also have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s

October 30, 2008 order dismissing Lazaridis’s complaint

because his timely Rule 59(e) motion tolled the time to file a

notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv); Rauscher,

807 F.2d at 348 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Our

standard of review is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d

220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating standard of review for dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v.

Lower Gwynedd, 970 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating standard

of review over legal determination as to whether Younger

abstention requirements are met); Turner v. Crawford Square

Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating

standard of review for dismissal under Rooker-Feldman

doctrine). We may, however, affirm the District Court’s

judgment on any basis found in the record. See Erie

Telecomms. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir.

1988).

(1)
3

While the District Court dismissed part of this claim

based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Younger

abstention “represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ [that] may

be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.” Tenet v. Doe, 544

U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005). Because we hold that Younger abstention

is appropriate, we need not consider whether the District Court

had subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.

4

Even when the three-prong test is met, Younger

abstention is not appropriate when “(1) the state proceedings are

8

Lazaridis first sets forth constitutional challenges to the

registration and enforcement of the 2004 and 2005 French

custody orders. The District Court applied the Younger

abstention doctrine to Lazaridis’s challenges to the registration

and enforcement of the 2005 French order only. We conclude,

however, that Younger requires the dismissal of Lazaridis’s first

claim in its entirety. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971).3

In certain circumstances, district courts must abstain from

exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution

of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity

by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding. See Middlesex

County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,

437 (1982). However, such abstention is appropriate only when

the following three requirements are satisfied: (1) there are

ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state

proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal

claims.”4

 Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411
being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or

(2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist. . . .” Schall v.

Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). Neither of these

exceptions applies here. 

9

F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Lazaridis’s first claim satisfies

each of these requirements.

The state court actions regarding the registration of the

French orders were pending when Lazaridis filed his federal

court complaint on December 27, 2006, satisfying the test’s first

prong. In August 2006, Lazaridis filed a motion with the

Delaware Family Court seeking relief from the registration of

the 2004 order, and on December 8, 2006, he filed a motion

challenging the registration of the 2005 order. 

It is also clear that the Delaware state courts presented an

adequate forum in which Lazaridis could pursue his claims

regarding the constitutionality of Delaware statutes. See Juidice

v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (stating that Younger requires

only “an opportunity to present federal claims in a state

proceeding”). The “burden on this point rests on the federal

plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of

its claims.” See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-15

(1987) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Lazaridis has

failed to carry this burden. Further, although he did not raise his

federal constitutional claims in state court and would likely be

precluded from doing so now, this does not save his claim, as

the Supreme Court held in Pennzoil that one “cannot escape

Younger abstention by failing to assert . . . remedies in a timely

manner [in state court].” Id. at 16 n.16. 
5

Because the state court rulings dealt with state custody

law issues, other important state interests are implicated as well.

See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations

are a traditional area of state concern.”). 

10

The second prong of the test asks whether the state

proceedings implicate important state interests. We have held

that when the other elements of the Younger test are met, neither

injunctive nor declaratory relief will be available “in cases in

which the federal relief would render the state court’s orders or

judgments nugatory.” Schall, 885 F.2d at 108; Juidice, 430 U.S.

at 336 n.12. “This is a particularly appropriate admonition in

the field of domestic relations, over which federal courts have

no general jurisdiction . . . and in which the state courts have a

special expertise and experience.” Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d

610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000). Lazaridis requests a declaration that

the UCCJEA and the UIFSA are unconstitutional, an injunction

preventing Delaware from registering or enforcing current or

future custody orders registered pursuant to Delaware law, and

an injunction precluding private parties from registering or

enforcing the French custody orders. Such relief would nullify

the Delaware court’s judgments regarding the appropriateness

of registering the French custody orders.5

 

Lazaridis essentially wants wholesale federal intervention

into a state dispute. He seeks the vacation of existing orders and

a federal injunction directing future litigation. Were the District

Court to grant this relief, it could “readily be interpreted as

reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce

constitutional principles.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.

592, 604 (1975). This is precisely the type of case suited to
6

To the extent that Lazaridis seeks a declaration that the

Delaware courts violated the UCCJEA and the UIFSA, as

adopted by Delaware, this alleged violation is one of state law.

Although Lazaridis asserts due process violations, we do not

construe the alleged misapplication of state law as violative of

substantive federal due process. The constitution does not

guarantee that the decision of state courts shall be free from

error. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299

(1937). As explained by the Supreme Court, “[w]e have long

recognized that a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due

process.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982). 

11

Younger abstention, as the state proceeding implicates the

important state interest of preserving the state’s judicial system.6

Because all elements of the three-prong test for Younger

abstention are met, we hold that the District Court properly

dismissed Lazaridis’s first claim, albeit on different grounds.. 

(2)

Lazaridis’s second claim, which he seeks to reopen in the

name of his daughter, asserts that the registration of the French

orders violated his daughter’s rights because the Delaware

courts did not apply Greek law, the United Nations Convention

on the Rights of the Child (which the United States has not

ratified), or appropriately apply the “best interest of the child”

standard under Delaware law. Because Lazaridis may not

represent his child in federal court as a non-lawyer parent, OseiAfriye v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 877

(3d Cir. 1991), we will dismiss the appeal as to this claim.
12

(3) 

Lazaridis’s third claim asserts that his former wife and

her attorneys conspired to violate his civil rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. A claim brought under § 1983 can only be

sustained if the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of a federal

constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state

law. Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.

2006). Lazaridis has failed to set forth facts suggesting that the

defendants are state actors or acted under color of state law. See

Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F3d. 789, 806 (3d Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, this claim has no legal merit and the District Court

appropriately dismissed it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

III.

Given our preceding discussion, we agree with the

District Court that it was unnecessary to provide Lazaridis with

an opportunity to amend his complaint because any amendment

would have been futile. Cf. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.

Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, we

conclude that the District Court appropriately denied Lazaridis’s

outstanding motions as moot. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s October 30, 2008 and January 14, 2009 orders.