alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Tony Jefferson BROWNE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 16-6998.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 9, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Kenneth M. ASBOTH, Jr., petitioner, v. WISCONSIN.

No. 17-781.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 19, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied.
Kirstjen M. NIELSEN, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al., petitioners, v. Mony PREAP, et al.

Bryan Wilcox, Acting Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., petitioners, v. Bassam Yusuf Khoury, et al.

No. 16-1363.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 19, 2018.

Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alfonz C. DAWSON, Appellant.

No. 11-3283.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 2, 2012.

Filed: April 5, 2012.

Laine Cardarella, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO (Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph W. Vanover, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Alfonz Dawson challenges the sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). His counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the sentence is greater than necessary to serve the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court committed no procedural error in sentencing Dawson, *see United States v. Feemster,*572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (appellate court reviews sentencing decision for abuse of discretion, first ensuring that district court committed no significant procedural error, and then considering substantive reasonableness of sentence; describing factors demonstrating procedural error), and that the court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence, *see id.*(if sentence is within Guidelines range, appellate court may apply presumption of reasonableness); *United States v. Davidson,*437 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir.2006) (to rebut presumption of reasonableness, defendant must show that district court failed to consider relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or otherwise committed clear error of judgment).

*522Having independently reviewed the record under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and grant counsel leave to withdraw, subject to counsel informing Dawson about procedures for seeking rehearing and petitioning for a writ of certiorari.

1

. The Honorable Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the
Form 10QSB for Cambio,  Inc.  for the quarter  ended  September  30, 1998 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                           0000852164
<NAME>                          Cambio, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                    1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Jun-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  Jul-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    Sep-30-1998
<CASH>                            289
<SECURITIES>                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                     428
<ALLOWANCES>                      230
<INVENTORY>                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                1,288
<PP&E>                            188
<DEPRECIATION>                      0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  6,245
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           2,254
<BONDS>                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               0
<PREFERRED>                         0
<COMMON>                           38
<OTHER-SE>                      2,945
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    6,245
<SALES>                           120
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  120
<CGS>                              10
<TOTAL-COSTS>                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  812
<LOSS-PROVISION>                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 (7)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (709)
<INCOME-TAX>                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (709)
<DISCONTINUED>                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                     0
<CHANGES>                           0
<NET-INCOME>                     (709)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                   (0.25)
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</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|  | (1) | the                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the                Company. |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                        |   |   |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /s/ Weibing                Lu          |   |   |   |
| Weibing                Lu                   |   |   |   |
| Chief Financial                Officer |   |   |   |

----
# C_2011298EN.01000703.xml

| 8.10.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 298/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.10.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 298/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 28 July 2011 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (United Kingdom)) — Pacific World Limited, FDD International Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

(Case C-215/10) (1)

1

(Common Customs Tariff - Tariff classification - Combined Nomenclature - Moulded plastic false nail sets - Validity of Regulation (EC) No 1417/2007 - Other articles of plastics (heading 3926) - Manicure or pedicure preparations (heading 3304) - Manicure or pedicure sets and instruments (heading 8214))

2011/C 298/12

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Referring court

First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Pacific World Limited, FDD International Limited

Applicants:

Defendant: Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) — Interpretation of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1417/2007 of 28 November 2007 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature — Validity of the classification of moulded plastic false nails under heading 3926 90 97 (Other articles of plastics or other materials)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1417/2007 of 28 November 2007 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature is valid in so far as it classifies the false nails and, thereby, the false nail sets described in its annex under subheading 3926 90 97 of the Combined Nomenclature, set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006.

---

(1)  OJ C 209, 31.7.2010.

1

---
Dewayne Eric SEYMORE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-7928.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 2, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
# C_2009244EN.01000501.xml

| 10.10.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 244/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 244/5

---

Action brought on 16 July 2009 — Trasys v Commission

(Case T-277/09)

2009/C 244/08

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Trasys (Woluwe-Saint-Lambert, Belgium) (represented by: M. Martens and P. Hermant, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the Commission Decision, notified to the applicant by a letter dated 9 June 2009, rejecting the applicant’s tender for Lots C and E in the call for tender No 10017 and awarding contract to the successful contractors; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the Commission Decision, notified to the applicant by a letter dated 9 June 2009, rejecting the applicant’s tender for Lots C and E in the call for tender No 10017 and awarding contract to the successful contractors;

| — | Order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In the present case the applicant seeks the annulment of the defendant’s decisions to reject its bid submitted for Lots C and E in response to a call for an open tender for support of the Publications Office and its CORDIS unit in the provision of publishing and communication services (1) and to award the contract to the successful contractor.

1

In support of its claims the applicant puts forward four pleas in law.

First, the applicant contends that the defendant infringed the principle of transparency laid down in Articles 100 and 89(1) of the financial regulation (2) by unreasonably limiting access to essential information and in consequence depriving the applicant of the opportunity to gain a proper understanding of the method used to evaluate the tenders and of the reasons why its tender was rejected.

2

Second, the applicant alleges that its bid has been subject to a tender assessment methodology which is contrary to the principles set out in Article 89(1) of the financial regulation such as the principles of equal treatment and transparency.

Third, it claims that the tender specifications were not clear enough and that the last clarifications were provided too late by the contracting authority and, as a consequence, the applicant was not in the position to plan its tender and to take into account the way in which the assessment would be made.

Fourth, the applicant submits that its bid has been subject to an unreasonable and disproportional evaluation by the contracting authority leading to the errors of assessment which vitiate the final decision.

---

(1)  JO 2008/S 242-321376

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1)

2

---
Keith Alexander ASHE, petitioner, v. PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INCORPORATED.

No. 16-6814.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 17, 2017.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied. Petitioner allowed until February 7, 2017, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice ALITO took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
Exhibit 32.2

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                 ALPHATRADE.COM
                FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2006
                 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Katharine Johnston, am the Principal Financial Officer of AlphaTrade.com, a
Nevada corporation (the "Company"). I am delivering this certificate in
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year
ended December 31, 2006 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Annual Report").

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge,
the Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: April 5, 2007



                            By: /s/ Katharine Johnston
                                ------------------------------------------------
                                Katharine Johnston
                                Vice-President, Business Operations and Director
Proposed Rule: Form CPO-PQR 

Open Meeting April 14, 2020
Current Form CPO-PQR: Vital Facts and Figures

4/14/2020 2 
4/14/2020 3 

Aggregate and Synthesize Existing Data

Swaps Data 

(SDR) 

Futures/Options 

Data

(Exchanges)

CFTC

(Existing Data Flow) (Existing Data Flow)

(Aggregate and Synthesize)

Registrant-Specific Position Information

(Cleared and Bilateral)
4/14/2020 4 

Data Driven Risk Analysis for 

Registrant Oversight

Cleared

CPO/CTA

FCM

Bilateral

Clearinghouse

(Account Controller)

Liquidity and risk transmission to the center of the market

(Account Controller) CPO/CTA SD 

Liquidity and risk transmission with potential impact to the broader financial system

(Account Controller)
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

 No. 07-7512 

DANIEL LEVERN STALEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MRS. SIMPSON, ICS Program Manager; K. HILL, Inmate Grievance

Coordinator,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Beaufort. Patrick Michael Duffy, District

Judge. (9:07-cv-02753-PMD)

Submitted: March 27, 2008 Decided: April 2, 2008

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel Levern Staley, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Levern Staley appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. The

district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge recommended

that relief be denied and advised Staley that failure to file

timely and specific objections to this recommendation could waive

appellate review of a district court order based upon the

recommendation. Despite this warning, Staley failed to file

specific objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate

judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of

the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been

warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins,

766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985). Staley has waived appellate review by failing to

timely file specific objections after receiving proper notice.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
II-00827

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

David Paliotta <davidp 1164@yahoo.com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 11:04 AM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

David Paliotta

6796 Schuyler Rd

East Syracuse, NY 13057
U1IT4LESS, INC., dba NYBikerGear, petitioner, v. FEDEX CORPORATION, et al.

No. 17-1162.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 16, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
# C_2011030EN.01003201.xml

| 29.1.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 30/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.1.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 30/32

---

Order of the President of the Court of 8 November 2010 — European Commission v Republic of Estonia

(Case C-195/10) (1)

1

()

2011/C 30/55

Language of the case: Estonian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 179, 3.7.2010.

1

---
Christopher EVERSON, petitioner, v. John ARMSTRONG, et al.

No. 17-7650.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 16, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
EXHIBIT 32

In connection with the report on Form 10-KSB/A of Planktos Corp. for the annual period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (Report), I, Russ George, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)     This Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in this Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the small

| | business issuer at the end of the period covered by this Report and results of operations of the small business issuer for the period covered by this Report.
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ Russ George

Russ George

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

April 17, 2007

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the small business issuer for the purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This certification shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of this Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.

A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to the small business issuer and will be retained by the small business issuer and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
Opinion filed February 21 , 201 9



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

___ _ ___ _ ____ 

### No. 11

- 1 9

- 00 006

- CR

____ __ ______ 

### EDWARD LEE WHITEHEAD , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Midland County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 163747

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant, Edward Lee Whitehead
, entered into a plea agreement with the
State and pleaded guilty to t he offense of assault causing bodily injury

– family
violence

. Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State and waived an appeal. Appellant’s punishment at a fine of $750

. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal , and appellate counsel was thereafter appointed

. We dismiss the appeal

.2

T his cou rt notified A ppellant by letter that we had received information from
the t rial c ourt that Appellant had waived his right of appeal and that th is is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has no right of appeal

. See T EX

. R.
A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d)

. We requested that A ppellant respond and show grounds to continue the appeal. In response, Appellant ’s counsel filed a motion in this court to retain the appeal on the docket pending a ruling by the trial court on Appellant’s request for permission to appe al

. The trial court has now denied Appellant’s request for permission to appeal his conviction.
R ule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment does not exceed the punishment agreed to in the plea bargain, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.” The
documents on file in th is appeal reflect that Appellant waived his right to counsel at
the time of his plea, that Appellant entered into a plea bargain
, that Appellant’s punishment wa s assessed in accordance with the plea bargain
, and that Appellant
waived h is right of appeal. T he trial court certified that Appellant has no right of appeal

. T he plea agreement , Appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal, and t he trial
court’s certification w ere signed by Appellant and the judge of the trial court. Texas has “long held that a valid waiver of appeal prevents a defendant from appealing without the trial court ’ s consent.” Monreal v. State , 99 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial court has not given consent for Appellant to appeal. Th e documents on file in this court sup port the trial court’s certification

. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W .3d 610 , 613

– 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

. Accordingly
, we must dismiss t h is appeal without further action. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 6 75, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).3

Accordingly, t h is appeal is di smissed

.

PER CURIAM

February 21
, 201 9 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C. J., Stretcher , J., and Wright, S.C.J. 1
Willson, J., not participating.

1 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.