[Cite as Hay v. Summit Funding, Inc., 2017-Ohio-8261.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ROSS COUNTY 

DIANNA HAY, : Case No. 16CA3577 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

 vs. : ENTRY 

 : 

SUMMIT FUNDING, INC., et al. : 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellants. : Released: 10/18/17 

APPEARANCES: 

Steven M. Loewengart and Curtis G. Moore, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Columbus, 

Ohio, for Appellants. 

Nicholas Kolitsos, Jones Law Group, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. 

 

McFarland, J. 

{¶1} Summit Funding, Inc., Eddie Hughes, and John Beasley (collectively, 

“Appellants”) appeal the final judgment of the Ross County Court of Common 

Pleas entered November 9, 2016. Dianna Hay (“Appellee”), a former employee of 

Summit Funding, Inc., filed a complaint alleging Appellants engaged in conduct 

constituting sexual harassment. Appellants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, 

arguing Appellee’s claims were subject to arbitration by virtue of an agreement 

Appellee executed at the time she was hired. In the appealed-from entry, the trial 

court overruled Appellants’ motion. Appellants’ sole assignment of error is that 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 2

the trial court erred in holding that Appellee’s claim of sexual harassment did not 

fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Based upon our de novo review 

in this matter, we find Appellants’ argument has merit. As such, we reverse the 

judgment of the trial court. 

FACTS 

{¶2} On July 13, 2016, Appellee filed a complaint in the Ross County Court 

of Common Pleas against Appellants Summit Funding, Inc., Eddie Hughes, and 

John Beasley, alleging sexual harassment, hostile work environment, termination 

in violation of public policy, retaliation, intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotion distress, respondeat superior, defamation, and negligent hiring, training, 

retention and supervision. The following is a summary of the allegations of her 

complaint: 

1) Upon Appellee’s employment in July 2015 as a loan officer for 

Summit Funding, Inc., a California corporation conducting business in 

Chillicothe, Ohio, Appellee was required to work alone in a branch 

office with Appellant Hughes. Appellee and Hughes were employed 

under the supervision of Appellant Beasley. Additionally, Hughes 

supervised Appellee’s time sheets and directed some job duties. 

2) Within the first week of employment, Hughes exhibited unwanted 

and offensive sexual conduct towards Appellee which included 

sexually charged comments both verbally and via text and picture 

messaging; sexual advances; invasion of personal space; and Hughes 

taking a picture of Appellee’s “backside,” which he later published to 

Beasley. 

3) Appellee rejected the sexual advances and requested that Hughes 

desist, but the harassment continued and heightened in severity and 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 3

frequency. On one occasion, Hughes became physically violent. 

Appellee alleged she became concerned for her physical safety as 

well. 

4) In August 2015, Beasley advised Appellee not to contact human 

resources regarding her complaints about Hughes’ behavior. In 

August 2015, Hughes confronted Appellee about her time sheets and 

other work matters, threatening not to pay her for overtime. 

5) On or about August 31, 2015, per Summit Funding’s established 

protocol, Appellee reported the harassment to Summit Funding’s 

human resource director. On or about September 1, 2015, Appellee 

was directed not to report to work until an investigation into her 

complaints was completed. 

6) On September 16, 2015, Appellee received two letters. In the first 

letter, Summit Funding advised that its investigation confirmed that 

Hughes did act inappropriately. In the second letter, Summit Funding 

advised Appellee that her employment was terminated. 

7) Since Appellee’s termination, Hughes made and has continued to 

make defamatory remarks falsely stating Appellee was terminated by 

Summit Funding due to inability to perform her job. 

{¶3} Appellee’s complaint demanded judgment against Appellants, jointly 

and severally, and requested compensatory, special, and punitive damages. 

Appellee further requested a declaratory finding that Hughes’ statements were 

untrue and defamatory, as well as a retraction from Hughes. 

{¶4} On September 16, 2016, Appellants filed a motion to compel 

arbitration. On September 30, 2016, Appellee filed a memorandum contra the 

motion to compel arbitration. On November 9, 2016, the trial court filed its 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 4

decision and judgment entry denying the motion to compel arbitration. This timely 

appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S CLAIMS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE 

SCOPE OF THE PARTIES’ ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.” 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶5} The question of whether a party has agreed to submit an issue to 

arbitration is reviewed under a de novo standard. Arnold v. Burger King, 48 N.E.3d 

69, 2015-Ohio-4485, at ¶ 11; Hedeen v. Autos Direct Online, Inc., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 100582, 2014-Ohio-4200, 19 N.E.3d 957, ¶ 9, citing McCaskey v. 

Sanford–Brown College, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97261, 2012-Ohio-1543, ¶ 7; and 

Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 

N.E.2d 12. See also Cales v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

02CA2851, 2003-Ohio-1776, ¶ 16; Intl. Union of Operating Engineers v. Flair 

Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491, 92 S.Ct. 1710 (1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 

Livingston , 376 U.S. 543, 547, 84 S.Ct. 909 (1964). 

{¶6} Under a de novo standard of review, we give no deference to a trial 

court's decision. Hedeen at ¶ 9, citing Brownlee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97707, 2012-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9; Akron v. Frazier, 142 Ohio 

App.3d 718, 721, 756 N.E.2d 1258 (9th Dist.2001). See Harter v. Chillicothe 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 5

Long–Term Care, Inc., 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3277, 2012–Ohio–2464, ¶ 12 (de 

novo review in the context of summary judgment motion practice.) 

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶7} When parties to a contract have agreed in writing to arbitration of 

disputes, the trial court must, upon application of a party and being satisfied that 

the issue is referable to arbitration, stay its proceedings pending the arbitration. 

R.C. 2711.02(B). However, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be 

required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to so submit 

* * *. Ritchie’s Food Distributor, Inc., v. Refrigerator Const. Services, Inc., 4th 

Dist. Pike No. 03CA713, 2004-Ohio-2261, ¶ 9; Council of Smaller Enterprises v. 

Gates, McDonald Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 661, 666–67, 1998–Ohio–172; Divine 

Constr. Co. v. Ohio American Water Co., 75 Ohio App.3d 311, 316, 599 N.E.2d 

388 (10th Dist.1991). If the party challenging arbitration has not agreed to 

arbitration by contract, there is a presumption against arbitration. Bell v. Everen 

Securities, Inc. 9th Dist. Summit No. 19581, 2000 WL 141001, *2, (Feb. 2, 2000), 

citing Council of Smaller Enterprises at 667, 687 N.E.2d 1352. 

{¶8} Appellants’ sole assignment of error challenges the trial court’s finding 

that Appellee’s claims predicated on sexual harassment were not within the scope 

of the arbitration agreement Appellee executed with Appellant Summit. Until the 

existence of an agreement to arbitrate is established, “[o]ur inquiry is ‘ “strictly 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 6

confined” * * * to whether the parties agreed to submit disputes * * * to 

arbitration.’ ” (First alteration original.) Ritchie’s, supra, at ¶ 10, quoting Council 

of Smaller Enterprises at 668, 687 N.E.2d 1352. General contract principals apply 

to the determination of whether the parties agreed to an arbitration clause. Id. at 

668, 687 N.E.2d 1352; Divine Constr. Co. at 316; Bell, supra.

{¶9} After the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is established, 

there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration, and any ambiguities or 

doubts regarding the scope of the arbitration clause are resolved in favor of 

arbitration. Sasaki v. McKinnon, 124 Ohio App.3d 613, 616, 707 N.E.2d 9 

(8th Dist.1997); Gaffney v. Powell, 107 Ohio App.3d 315, 320, 668 N.E.2d 

951 (1st Dist.1995). Generally speaking, Ohio's public policy encourages 

arbitration as a method to settle disputes. Arnold, supra, at 23; Schaefer v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 711–712, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (1992); and 

the Ohio Arbitration Act, R.C. Chapter 2711.1

 As a result of Ohio's proarbitration stance, courts indulge a strong presumption in favor of arbitration 

when the disputed issue falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 

Arnold, supra, at ¶ 24; Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 471, 

700 N.E.2d 859 (1998); Taylor Bldg., 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 

884 N.E.2d 12, at ¶ 27. 

 1

 A trial court, “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue 

has been had in accordance with the agreement.” R.C. 2711.02. 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 7

{¶10} In their brief, Appellants emphasize the long-standing federal and 

state law presumption favoring arbitration. Here, the trial court’s decision also 

recognizes the strong presumption in favor of arbitration. However, the trial court 

points out the presumption is not unlimited. “Though guided by a strong 

presumption, Ohio also recognizes that principles of equity and fairness require 

that greater scrutiny be given to arbitration provisions that do not involve parties of 

equal sophistication and bargaining power.” Arnold, supra, at 25. 

A. Appellants argue Appellee’s sexual harassment claims are within the 

agreement’s scope because sexual harassment is a form of sex 

discrimination. 

{¶11} When deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter, 

courts generally apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 

contracts. Cales, supra, citing, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 

938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995); see also Perry v. Thomas , 482 U.S. 483, 492-

493, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (1987), at fn. 9. General contract law holds that a court must 

interpret a contract so as to carry out the intent of the parties. Ritchie’s, supra, at 

¶ 11; Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Convention Facilities 

Auth., 78 Ohio St.3d 353, 678 N.E.2d 519 (1997); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 

38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The 

intent of the parties to a contract is presumed to reside in the language they chose 

to employ in the agreement.” Shifrin v. Forest City Ents., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 8

597 N.E.2d 499 (1992); Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 509 N.E.2d 

411 (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus. A court must construe a contract 

against its drafter. Cent. Realty Co. v. Clutter, 62 Ohio St.2d 411, 406 N.E.2d 515 

(1980). 

{¶12} If the contract's terms are unambiguous, a court may not interpret the 

contract in a manner inconsistent with those terms. Ritchie’s supra, at ¶ 12; 

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978). 

Contractual terms are ambiguous if the meaning of the terms cannot be deciphered 

from reading the entire contract or if the terms are reasonably susceptible to more 

than one interpretation. U.S. Fid. & Guar. v. Aultman St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 129 

Ohio App.3d 45, 55, 716 N.E.2d 1201 (2nd Dist.1999). If a contract is clear and 

unambiguous, then its interpretation is a matter of law that we review de novo. 

Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 

N.E.2d 6841(1995). Ritchie’s, supra, at ¶ 13. We begin by setting forth the 

language contained in the arbitration clause at issue: 

“A. Claims Covered by the Agreement 

The only claims that are arbitrable are those that are justiciable under 

applicable federal state or local law. Arbitrable claims include, but 

are not limited to: * * * claims for discrimination (on the basis of, but 

not limited to, race, sex, * * * claims for violation of any federal, 

state, or other governmental law, statute regulation or ordinance 

(except as provided below).” 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 9

{¶13} As is evident, the language of the parties’ arbitration agreement 

explicitly provides for claims for discrimination on the basis of sex. However, in 

its judgment, the trial court noted that the arbitration language at issue did not 

specify “sexual harassment” but only “sexual discrimination.” In essence, this is a 

question of whether, due to the omission of the term “sexual harassment,” 

Appellee intended to agree to arbitrate a sexual harassment claim. 

{¶14} Appellants assert it is well-settled that sexual harassment is a form of 

sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Ohio 

Revised Code 4112. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding there was a 

distinction between sexual harassment and sexual discrimination. By contrast, 

Appellee argues that while it is true that a person can be both sexually harassed and 

discriminated against in the same instance, one can also be sexually harassed 

without being discriminated against. As such, the harassment claim stands on its 

own. 

{¶15} We are compelled to agree with Appellants. The Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has provided the following guidance on the 

relevant terms herein: 

“Harassment is a form of employment discrimination that violates 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act of 1967, (ADEA), and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990, (ADA).* * * 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 10

Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on race, color, 

religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), 

disability or genetic information. Harassment becomes unlawful 

where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of 

continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive 

enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would 

consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. * * * 

To be unlawful, the conduct must create a work environment that 

would be intimidating, hostile, or offensive to reasonable people. * * * 

Offensive conduct may include, but is not limited to, offensive jokes, 

slurs, epithets or name calling, physical assaults or threats, 

intimidation, ridicule or mockery, insults or put-downs, offensive 

objects or pictures, and interference with work performance. 

Harassment can occur in a variety of circumstances, including, but not 

limited to, the following: 

The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, a supervisor in another 

area, an agent of the employer, a co-worker, or a non-employee. 

The victim does not have to be the person harassed, but can be anyone 

affected by the offensive conduct. Unlawful harassment may occur 

without economic injury to, or discharge of, the victim.” 

{¶16} Furthermore, the EEOC’s definition of sexual harassment is as 

follows: 

“It is unlawful to harass a person (an applicant or employee) because 

of that person’s sex. Harassment can include “sexual harassment” or 

unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 

verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature. * * * 

Harassment does not have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can 

include offensive remarks about a person’s sex. For example, it is 

illegal to harass a woman by making offensive comments about 

women in general.” 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 11

{¶17} The parties have also directed us to several pertinent cases. In 

Meritor Savings v. Vinson, FSB, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986), the 

United States Supreme Court observed that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The Meritor opinion 

highlighted the EEOC Guidelines issued in 1980 and specified that “sexual 

harassment,” as there defined, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title 

VII. Id. at 65. 

{¶18} In Hampel v. Food Ingredient Specialties, Inc., the Supreme Court of 

Ohio recited Meritor’s language that held: “[A] plaintiff may establish a violation 

of R.C. 4112.02(A)'s prohibition of discrimination “because of * * * sex” by 

proving either of two types of sexual harassment: (1) “quid pro quo” harassment, 

i.e., harassment that is directly linked to the grant or denial of a tangible economic 

benefit, or (2) “hostile environment” harassment, i.e., harassment that, while not 

affecting economic benefits, has the purpose or effect of creating a hostile or 

abusive working environment. Various Ohio appellate courts have cited the 

language of the Meritor and Hampel decisions. 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 12

{¶19} In Kilgore v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,172 Ohio App.3d 387, 2007-

Ohio-2902, 875 N.E.2d 113 (1st Dist.), at ¶ 23, the appellate court recited the 

language of the Civil Rights Act and R.C. 4112.02(A) regarding discriminatory 

practices. Specifically, the court stated: “R.C. 4112.02(A) makes it an unlawful 

discriminatory practice for any employer, because of the sex of any person, to 

discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to 

employment. This includes subjecting the employee to sexual harassment. This 

includes subjecting the employee to sexual harassment.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 

{¶20} In Egli v. Congress Lake Club, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2009CA00216, 

2010-Ohio-2444, at ¶ 30, the appellate court observed that R.C. 4112.02(A) 

prohibits sex discrimination in all matters related to employment. Birch v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court, 173 Ohio App.3d 696, 880 N.E.2d 132, 2007-Ohio6189, at ¶ 20. Egli further stated: “Ohio courts apply federal case law interpreting 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to claims arising under R.C. Chapter 4112 

to the extent that the terms of the statutes are consistent.” Id., citing Genaro v. 

Cent. Transport, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 298, 703 N.E.2d 782 (1999), citing 

Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 

66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196, 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981). Our own decision in Harter v. 

Chillicothe Long-Term Care, supra, at ¶16, also recognized the Ohio courts’ 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 13

practice of applying federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

to claims arising under R.C. 4112. Id. at 26. 

{¶21} Then, in Persichillo v. Motor Carrier, 156 Ohio App.3d 383, 806 

N.E.2d 181 (6th Dist.2004), at ¶ 12, the appellate court recited the R.C. 4112.02(A) 

language defining discriminatory practices, previously set forth above. The 

Persichillo court further cited the language of Hampel, supra, at ¶ 13: 

“The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a] plaintiff may establish a 

violation of R.C. 4112.02(A)'s prohibition of discrimination ‘because 

of * * * sex’ by proving either of two types of sexual harassment: (1) 

‘quid pro quo’ harassment, i.e., harassment that is directly linked to 

the grant or denial of a tangible economic benefit, or (2) ‘hostile 

environment’ harassment, i.e., harassment that, while not affecting 

economic benefits, has the purpose or effect of creating a hostile or 

abusive working environment.” Hampel v. Food Ingredients 

Specialties, Inc. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 169, 729 N.E.2d 726, 

paragraph one of the syllabus.”2

 

{¶22} Similarly, in McPherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 21499, 2003-Ohio-7190, at ¶ 24, the appellate court noted that both 

state and federal statutes prohibit discrimination based on gender. See R.C. 

 2

 For this principle, see also Ellis v. Jungle Jim’s Market, Inc., 44 N.E.3d 1034, 2015-Ohio-4226 (12th 

Dist.), at ¶ 20: “Federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is generally 

applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.” Bowers v. Hamilton City School 

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2001–07–160, 2002 WL 449499, *3 (Mar. 25, 2002), citing 

Hampel at 175, 729 N.E.2d 726. Gorawjewski v. Douglas, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1050, 2014-Ohio1296, at ¶ 47. Furthermore, as stated in Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings, 133 Ohio App.3d 715, 723, 729 

N.E.2d 813 (10th Dist. 2003), pursuant to R.C. 4112.02(A) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

Section 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”), sexual harassment that 

constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex is generally categorized as either a quid pro quo claim or a 

hostile work environment claim. Our decision in Harter, supra, at ¶ 16, also recited the language 

explaining that sex discrimination can be proven by demonstrating the two types of sexual harassment: 

“quid pro quo,” or “hostile work environment.” 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 14

4112.02; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000(e) et seq., Title 

42, U.S. Code. The appellate court stated: “Sexual harassment which amounts to 

sex discrimination has been generally categorized as either quid pro quo 

harassment or a hostile work environment.” Id; See Sheffield Village of Ohio v. 

Ohio Civ. Rts. Comm. (June 7, 2000), 9th Dist. Lorain No. 99CA007283. 

{¶23} Federal and Ohio case law make it clear that sexual harassment is a 

form of sexual discrimination. The definitions provided by the EEOC demonstrate 

it is true that one may be harassed without being harassed in a sexual manner, i.e. 

racial or other discrimination. The case law also demonstrates that one may be 

sexually harassed without being able to prove discrimination, i.e. the grant or 

denial of tangible economic benefit or “hostile work environment.” However we 

do not agree with Appellee’s counter-argument that because “sexual harassment” 

was not explicitly set forth in the parties’ arbitration agreement, the sexual 

harassment claim was not intended to be within the scope of the agreement. While 

we have found no case law in which this precise question has been answered, we 

have reviewed cases in which the appellate courts closely examined contract 

language in order to resolve interpretation issues. 

{¶24} In Ritchie’s, the trial court found an agreement between parties to be 

ambiguous on its face with regard to whether the parties intended to agree to a 

subsection within Article 9 of the agreement, entitled “ARCHITECT'S 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 15

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT.” This court’s decision in Ritchie’s 

set forth the generally applicable principles of contract interpretation and 

ultimately agreed that the contract was ambiguous as a matter of law. Specifically, 

because the contract listed “N/A” under the architect designation, but the parties 

did not strike the numerous contract provisions regarding the architect, we found 

the contract to be “reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Id. at 

¶ 14. 

{¶25} In Buckholtz v. West Chester Dental Group, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2007-11-292, 2008-Ohio-5299, the appellate court looked to other language in 

an arbitration agreement, along with the American Arbitration Association Rules, 

in affirming the trial court’s conclusion that there was no harm or prejudice to 

Appellant by a five-month delay in the issuance of an arbitration decision. The 

arbitration agreement entered into by the parties did not explicitly state when the 

arbitrator's decision was due. However, the agreement stated that the “arbitration 

shall be conducted under the commercial arbitration rules of the American 

Arbitration Association * * *.” The language of section R-41 of the American 

Arbitration Association's (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules stated that an 

“award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator * * * no later than 30 days from 

the date of closing the hearing * * *.” The appellate court also noted there was no 

language found in R-41, or any other AAA rule that unequivocally stated that an 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 16

arbitrator would lose his jurisdiction by issuing a decision more than 30 days after 

closing the hearing. 

{¶26} And, in Kinder Morgan Cochan L.L. C. v. Simonson, 2016-Ohio4647, 66 N.E.3d 1176 (5th Dist.), the appellate court held that the trial court did 

not err in finding that the term “petroleum,” as used in R.C. § 1723.01, a statute 

authorizing pipeline developer to enter property for purposes of conducting a 

survey, included the natural gas liquids “ethane” and “propane.” In its reasoning, 

the appellate court stated: “In construing statutory terms, we are guided by the 

legislature's use of the same terms defined elsewhere in the Revised Code. Id. at 

21; See Cablevision of the Midwest, Inc. v. Gross, 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 639 N.E.2d 

1154 (1994). 

{¶27} Here, we do not find the language of the arbitration agreement to be 

ambiguous. While we have not found use of the terms “sexual discrimination” and 

“sexual harassment” used interchangeably within the Revised Code, we are 

mindful of the case law’s repeated instruction that “Ohio courts apply federal case 

law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to claims arising under 

R.C. Chapter 4112 * * *.” And, we note the parties’ arbitration agreement 

recitation that “The only claims that are arbitrable are those that are justiciable 

under applicable federal state or local law.” Sexual harassment is indeed one of 

the claims justiciable under applicable federal and state law. Therefore, it is not 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 17

unreasonable to conclude that Appellant’s sexual harassment claim is properly 

encompassed within sexual discrimination language of the arbitration agreement. 

{¶28} While the term “sexual harassment” was not employed in the 

arbitration agreement Appellee executed, based on the EEOC’s definitions 

provided, along with Ohio’s practice of applying federal law case law interpreting 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to R.C. 4112, it would not be reasonable to 

interpret the parties’ agreement to arbitrate claims for sex discrimination as 

excluding claims for sexual harassment. We find provision for Appellee’s sexual 

harassment claim well-within the “umbrella” of the sexual discrimination language 

of the arbitration agreement. 

{¶29} In the trial court and on appeal, Appellee also argued that the 

arbitration agreement she executed was unconscionable. 

“ ‘Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of 

meaningful choice * * * on the part of one of the parties together with contract 

terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Deutsche Bank Natl. 

Trust Co. v. Pevarski, 187 Ohio App.3d 455, 2010-Ohio-785, 93 N.E.2d 887 (4th 

Dist.), at ¶ 30. Here, Appellee asserted unconscionability, arguing (1) the 

arbitration clause language provides that the arbitrator will be either “a retired 

judge or an attorney experienced in employment law”; (2) the arbitration 

agreement was electronically signed; and (3) the agreement was a prerequisite to 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 18

employment. The trial court’s decision and judgment entry did not address the 

unconscionability argument but instead, limited its judgment to the narrow issue of 

whether Appellee’s claim for sexual harassment was subject to arbitration. 

Accordingly, we decline to address Appellee’s unconscionability argument within 

the scope of this appeal. 

{¶30} In conclusion, based upon our de novo review, we disagree with the 

trial court’s finding that Appellee’s claim for sexual harassment does not come 

within the purview of the arbitration agreement. For the foregoing reasons, we 

find merit to Appellants’ sole assignment of error and it is hereby sustained. We 

find the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that Appellee’s claim for 

sexual harassment does not fall within the scope of the parties’ arbitration 

agreement because sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. 

 JUDGMENT REVERSED. 
Ross App. No. 16CA3577 19

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED and that Appellants 

recover of Appellee any costs herein. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross 

County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date 

of this entry. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Harsha, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment Only. 

 For the Court, 

 BY: _______________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.