C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS
CL AUDIA NAVA RRETE, Ap pe lla nt,
v. CU RTI S H. WI L L IAM S, Appellee
. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 08 -0 02 51 -C V

Appea l from the 120th J udicial District Court of El Pa so County , T e xas (TC# 2006-4648)

O P I N I O N Ms. Claudia Nava

rre te appe als from a

judgme nt awar ding he r $424.25 in past medica l
e xpe ns e s r e late d to inj ur ie s sh e su sta ine d whe n App e lle e re ar- e nd e d h e r v e hic le . M s. Na va rr e te raises thre e issues, two cha lleng ing the trial court’ s evidentiary ruling s, and a third issue in which she conte nds the jury ’s fa ilure to awa rd dama g es in the fa ce of uncontra dicted testimony was ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. On J anuar

y 5, 2006, Ms. Navar

rete was drivingeastbound on I -10 in the middle left lane
. She a pp ro a c he d a

n a re a of c on g e sti on

wh e re c ars we re sto pp e d o n th e highw ay and wa s f or c e d to stop herself. Mr . Wil liams was trave ling be hind Ms. Navar rete on I -10 and f

ailed to timely

stop there by colliding into the re ar of

Ms. Navar

rete ’s vehicle . Ms. Navar rete suffe red injuries to he r
ne c k a nd ba c k a s a re su lt o f t

he a c c ide nt. She fi le d s uit

a g a ins t Curt is Wi lli ams o n O c tob e r 2 0, 20 06 . Sp e c if ic a lly , M s. Na

va rr e te
a lle g e d th at sh e su sta ine d b od ily inj ur ie s, phy sic a l im

pa ir me nt, phy sic a l pa in, and

me nta l anguis h th ats h e w i l l c o n t i nu e t o s u f f e r i n t o th e f u tur e , i f n o tf o r th e r e m a i n d e r

o f h e r l i f e . A d d i t i o n a l l y,-2-

Ms. Na va rr e te ma de c la ims fo r i nc ur re d a nd futur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s a s w e ll a s lo st w a g e s. The c ourt submitted the case to the jury by a cha rg e conta ining a

single question asking what sum of money

would fairly

and re asonably

compensate Ms. Nava

rre te. The jury

awa rded Ms. Navar

rete $424.25 in damag es, and the trial court e ntere d judgme nt on the verdic t, including prejudg ment interest in the amount of $44.54 a nd court c osts in the amount of $1,285.57 for a total rec overy

of $1,754.36. Ms. Nava

rre te filed a

motion for new tria l challeng ing the jury ’s failure to awar d adequate damag ed in the fa ce of conclusive e vidence . The motion was over ruled by operation of law. I ssues One a

nd Two cha lleng e the tria l court’s ruling s excluding Dr. B oone’s opinions
re gar d i n g cau s at i o n , fu ture m ed i ca l co s t s , an d m ed i ca l re co rd s . W e r ev i ew ev i d en t i ary ru l i n gs for a n abuse of

discretion. Ri dd

lev . U nif un d CC R Par tne rs , 298 S.W .3d 780, 782 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 2009, no pet.). A trial c ourt abuses its discre tion by makinga rulingin an ar

bitrary , or
unrea sonable manne r, without ref ere nce to guiding r

ules and princ iples of law. Ri dd le , 298 S.W. 3d at 78 2. An

a pp e llate c ourt

mus t up ho ld a

n e vid e nti ary

ru lin gif the re is a ny le g iti mate basis for the r

uling. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 972 S.W .2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). Moreove r, an e rrone ous evidentiary rulingwill not serve as a basis for r ever sal unless the er ror probably cause d the re ndition of an improper judg ment. Malone , 972 S.W .2d at 43. In I ssue One, Ms. Na

varr ete a rgues the trial c ourt abused its discre tion by excluding excerpts of Dr . Boone ’s trial deposition containingtwo subjects: (1) the doc tor’s expert opinions reg ardingthe ca

use of Ms. Na

varr ete’ s neck a

nd back pa in; and (2) the doc tor’s expert opinion reg ardingfuture me dical costs. With reg ard to the f irst topic, the trial court e x cluded the f o l l o w i n ge x c h an g e b e tw e e nD r . B o o n e an d M s . N av ar

r e t e ’ s at t o r

n e y:-3-

Q: Doctor I

have a fewmore que stions. [ Def ense c ounsel] was askingy ou about a pr ior injury . Iwant you to assume the following : That she had lifted a box at work, and that she complained ofsome pain in -- in the midback; that she saw a

doctor, a nd -- a nd the doctor just took her of f of wor k for - - for a couple of day s, and that that wa s the extent of -- of he r treatment. ‘And that there was no studies that we re done , beca use the -- beca use ac cordingto the -- the - - the note, the one-pa g e note that we see on -- on that visit that the doctor did not believe it was nec essar y .’ What would that tell y ou about that incident that [Defe nse counse l] has been ma king r efe renc e to at wor

k? A. Then, I

would -- [De fe ns e c ouns e l]: O bje c t, f or m. Wit ness: -- sa

y that would be a - - a minor - - the more minor incident. Q. [By

Plaintiff’s counsel] and would that indicate to you that there was a ny ty pe of - - of - - of injury

dealingwith the neck a

rea at -- at work? [De fe ns e c ouns e l]: O bje c t, f or m. A. Say

ag ain. Q. [By

Plaintiff’s counsel] Woul d that indicate to you that there was a ny problem with the nec k are a whe n -- whe n she -- when she lifted a box at work? A. No. That would be low back. [Defense counsel]: Object, spec ulation. Th e tr ia l c ourt

ru le d o n d e fe ns e c ouns e l’ s o bje c tio ns in a he ari ngimm e diate ly

pr ior to openingstatements. With reg ard to c ounsel’s objec tions to t his section of the doc tor’s testimony in particular , the trial cour t concluded the foundation and r eliability of Dr. B oone’s c ausation opinions had not been suff iciently established to per

mit the jury

to hear the opinion, and that the excerpt conta ined an imprope r hy pothetical posed by

plaintiff’s counse l. On these ba ses, the-4-

c o urte x c l u d e d

th e t e s t i m o n y. In i t s r

u l i n g , th e c o urts p e c i f

i c a l l y r e f e r r e d t o h av i n gp r e v i o u s l y sustained def

ense c ounsel’s objec tions to additi onal questions reg ardingMs. Navar rete ’s prior work injury

on the basis that the re cord f ailed to establish that Dr. B oone had a ny knowledg e of the prior injury

or the a ssociated medic al re cords. Ms. Navarr ete’ s brief doe s not contain a dis c us sio n o f t

he a dmi ssi bil ity

of thi s p ri or te sti mony , n or

argume nt t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in
e xclu din git. As a g ener al startingpoint to demonstrating its entitlement to relief on appea l, an appellant must attac k all potential independe nt basis or g rounds which support the a dverse ruling at issue. Fox v . W

ardy , 224 S.W 3d 300, 304 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2005, pet. de nied). When an appellant f

ails to do so, the appellate c ourt must affirm the r uling. Britton v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justi ce , 9 5 S. W.3 d 6 76 , 6 81 (T e x.Ap p. -- Ho us ton [1st Di st. ] 200 2, no pe t.) . In th is instance, Ms. Na

varr ete f ocuses he r ar gument for the a dmissibi lity of Dr. B oone’s opinion on the issue of re liability . Howeve r, eve n if we w ere to assume that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion by excluding the opinion due to a f ailure to e stablish its reliability or foundation, the issue
rema ins whether the opinion was still s ubject to exclusion because it was in response to a n imp ro pe r hy

po the tic a l qu e sti on . B e c a us e Ms. Na

va rr e te ha s f

a ile d to a dd

re ss a n a lte rn ativ e ba sis for the tr ial court’s r

uling, we have no c hoice but to af firm the cour

t’s rulingon that basis. W ardy , 224 S.W .3d at 304. I ssue One is ove rruled w ith reg ard to the c ourt’s dec ision to ex clude Dr. B oone’s c ausation opinion. Wit h respe ct to future me dical expenses, the tria l court excluded the doc tor’s testimony that Ms. Navar

rete ’s future epidura l shots, which the doctor testified w ould be per formed by an anesthe siologist, not an orthopedic specia list, would cost, “thousands” per injection-5-

Ms. Navar

rete argues the trial c ourt abused its discre tion by excluding this opinion testim ony beca use def ense c ounsel’s objec tions; “speculation” a nd “non-r esponsive” w ere not proper deposition objections. She concludes that beca use def ense c ounsel failed “ to state the prope r ob je c tio ns in a c c or da

nc e wi th [Ru le 19 9. 5( e ), of ] the Te xas R

ule s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure ,” tho se objections wer e wa ived. Rule 199.5(e) specifie s that the objections to testimony duringoral de positions are limit ed to “Obje ction, leading ” and “ Objection, for m.” T EX .R.C IV .P. 199.5(e). The rule fur ther states that objections ar e wa ived if not stated appr opriately duringthe deposition. Id . T he ru le also anticipate s future c onsideration of the objections by the trial cour

t, or that furthe r objec tions should be withheld until trial. SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 199.5(e). In this case, the tr ial court re viewed defe nse counse l’s objections to Dr. B oone’s testimony , hear d further argument from the attorney s, and ruled on those objections outside the pre sence of the jury prior to opening state me nts . D ur ing

the he ari ng , d e fe ns e c ouns e l of fe re d a dd iti on a l argume nt a nd su pp or t f or his
o b j ec t i o n s , an d

p l ai n t i ff ’s co un s el re s p o n d edt o th o s e a rgu m en t s . Atn o p o i n td uri n g th e h ea ri n g, did pla int if f’ s c ouns e l argue that de fe ns e c ouns e l w a ive d a ny of his ob je c tio ns un de r R

ule 199.5(e) . As such, Ms. Nava rre te’s Rule 199.5(e ) ar gument itself is waived, for purposes of appellate revie w, bec ause the trial court wa s not give n the opportunity to consider the a

rgument. SeeT EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a). Ac cording ly , the re mainder of I ssue One is ove rruled. In I ssue Two, Ms. Navarr ete c ontends that the trial cour t abused its discretion by excluding five exhibi ts documentingher me dical history and tre atment for he r injury . Four of the do c ume nts we re e xclu de d b a se d o n th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th at th e y we re no t pr od

uc e d inThese e x hibits i ncluded: (1) “Plaintiff’s Exhibi t 10”; (2) “ Plaintiff’s Ex hibit 15”; (3) 1
“ Pla int if f’ s E xhibi t 16 ” ; and

(4 ) “ Pla int if

f’ s E xhibi t 17 .” Pla int if

f’ s E xhibi t 10 do c ume nts Ms. Na va rr e te ’s e xami natio n at Mo ntw oo d M e dic a l Ce nte r o n O c tob e r 2 7, 20 05 . A c c or din gto th e r ec o rd , M s . Na v arre t e v i s i t edth e c l i n i c b ec au s e s h e w as ex p er i en ci n g b ac k p ai naf t er l i ft i n g a twenty pound box at work. The treating phy sician diagnosed Ms. Nava rre te with a strain in her tho ra c ic ba c k, and

re c omm e nd e d s he tr e at th e pa in w ithho t and c old the ra py at ho me ; “Plaintiff’s Exhibi t 15” is a medica l evaluation note f rom the El Paso Orthopedic Surg ery Group dated 10/05/2006, statingthat Ms. Navar rete had fa llen sever al day s ear lier, but also noting that her “ orig inal injury ” occ urre d in J anuar y . The phy sician re commended that she not work for one wee k, at which time she w ould be re evaluated. Plaintiff’s Exhi bit 16 is a letter from Dr . Boone date d O c tob e r 2 3, 20 07 , whic h s tate s, in p art : There is a possibili ty

that [Ms . Nava

rre te] may

need sur g ery

in the future. Surg ery , if nee ded, would be c ervic al spine or lumbar spine. The letter also contains the doc tor’s opinion that such a pr ocedur e would cost $30,000- $35,000 per a rea of the spine ope rate d on. Plaintiff’s Ex hibit 17 is another medical e valuation note fr om the El Pa so Or

tho pe dic Gr ou

p d ate d 1 1/0 6/2 00 7, in whic h D r. B oo ne re po rt e d th at Ms . N ava rr e te expressed conc erns that a nother individual had c oncluded he r MRI s “re ad norma l.” Dr. B oone noted that he r eviewe d the imag es, and c oncluded they did not “rea d normal,” a

nd encour ag ed Ms. Navar

rete to bringthe “nor

mal” MRI s to him for further revie w. Th is n ote a

pp e ars in t

he a pp e llate re c or d a s “ Pla int if f’ s E xhibi t 21 .” In r e le va nt p art , 2 Dr . B oo ne op ine d a s f

oll ow s: This patient is under my

car e for a chr onic bac k problem. I am re commending epidura ls at the prese nt time, and she may be a c andidate f

or surg ery in the future. Th e low ba c k p a in t

hat th is p atie nt i s su ff

e ri ngand he r a dd iti on a l pr ob le m is a dir e c t r e su lt o f t

he Janu ary

5, 20 06 a c c ide nt.

-6- acc ordanc e with discover y deadlines. The trial c ourt excluded the fifth doc ument, a letter

1 containingDr. B oone’s opinion that the collision cause d Ms. Navar rete ’s nec k and bac k pain, as part of its prior de cision reg ardingthe foundation of Dr. B oone’s c ausation opinion. We review 2 a trial c ourt’s ruling s on evidentiary objections for a

n abuse of

discretion. Riddle v. Unifund CCR Pa rtn e rs , 2 98 S.W. 3d 78 0, 78 2 ( Te x.Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 09 , n o p e t.) . Atr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s discretion if its rulingis arbitrar y , unrea sonable, or w ithout refer ence to guidingrules and-7-

principles of la

w. Se e Ri dd

le , 298 S.W .3d at 782. Moreove r, a judg ment will not be reve rsed due to an e rrone ous evidentiary rulingunless the er

ror pr obably

cause d the re ndition of an improper judg ment. Se e id
. Plaintiff’s Ex hibits 10, 15, 16, and 17 were produce d for the f irst time after the parties de po se d D r. B oo ne on

Janu ary 17 , 2 00 8. Mr . Wil liams f ile d wri tte n o bje c tio ns and a mot ion to str ike on F e br ua ry 29 , 2 00 8, arguin gin p art tha t th e do c ume nts we re no t ti me ly pr od uc e d in
re sp on se to h is N ov e mbe r 2 00 6 d isc ov e ry re qu e sts . M r. Willi ams a rgue d, and

Ms. Na va rr e te do e s n ot d isp ute , th at th e do c ume nts we re su bje c t to dis c ov e ry

re qu e sts se rv e d o n M s. Na va rr e te in November

2006. Those re quests included, re quests for pr oduction of all medica l rec ords related to any

injury sustained by

Ms. Navar

rete within seven y ear s of the incident whic h was the basis of the law suit, and all medical re cords a nd bills related to the injuries cla imed in the lawsuit. Be cause the documents we re not timely produce d in response to the N ovember 2006
re qu e sts , M r. Willi ams a

rgue d th at th e y

we re su bje c t to the e xclu sio na

ry sa nc tio n o f T e xas R

ule of Civil P roce dure 193.6( a). Te x as Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, mandates that discovery which is not timely

disclosed is inadmissibl e as e vidence unless the trial cour t determines that the re wa s g oo d c a

us e fo r t he fa ilure to t ime ly

dis c los e and

tha t th e fa ilure wi ll n ot c a

us e un fa ir ly surprise or

prejudice the opposingparty . SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 193.6(a). The rule plac es the burde n to establish the exception on the proponent of the evidenc e. SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 193.6(b). Ms. Navar

rete contends the e x hibits were not subjec t to the exclusi onary sanction on two ba sis . F ir st, sh e c onte nd s sh e wa s r e lie ve d o f h e r d uty to p ro vid e the do c ume nts be c a us e Mr. Will iams had the a

bility to acquire them at any

time pursuant to the medica l information
re le a se pr ov ide d to him

in D e c e mbe r 2 00 6. Se c on d, sh e argue s th at th e do c ume nts we re tim e ly-8-

produce d in acc ordanc e to Rule 193.5(b), which provides that a discovery

response must be amende d or supplemented “ rea sonably promptly ” af

ter the pa rty discovers the need f

or such. T EX .R.C IV .P. 193.5(b). She continues by stating that the rules pre sume a re sponse or supplement made less than thirty

day s prior to trial is not reasona bly prompt. Se e id . Ms. Navar rete then
c on c lud e s th at be c a

us e the do c ume nts at is su e we re pr od uc e d mo re tha

n th ir ty da y s b e fo re tr ia l, they wer e produc ed “r easona

bly promptly ” and not subjec t to ex clusion. We will address ea ch argument in turn. Th e re is n o d isp ute in t

his c a se tha

t Pla int if f’ s E xhibi ts 1 0, 15 , 1 6, and 17 we re su

bje c t to Mr. Will iams’s Novembe r 2006, discover y reque sts. St ill, Ms. Navarre te contends that the documents we re not produc ed late be cause Mr. Will iams had ac cess to any medical r ecor ds he wished to reque st via the medica l information rele ase, which she e x ecute d in Dece mber 2006. Ms. Navar

rete cites to Rule 194.2(j), for the proposition that a re quest for disclosure of medica l information or re cords may be answ ere d with such a re lease , and, in essenc e, conc ludes that no further response or supplementation is nec essar y . We disag ree with Ms. Navar rete ’s interpre tation of this provision. Rule 194.2 defines the ty

pes of infor

mation which ar e subjec t to a reque st for disclosure. SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 194.2. Parag raph ( j) applies spec ifically

to suits “alleg ing phy sical or menta l injury ” and pe rmits the discoveringparty to reque st an authorization permitting the disclosure of medical r ecor ds and bills in li eu of the disclosure of the documents themselves. See T EX .R.C IV . P
. 1 9 4
. 2 (

j )
. R u l e 1 9 4
. 2 , a s a

w h o l e i s d i r e c t e d

t o w ar d a p arty r e qu e s t i n gd i s c o v e r y, and, in turn, make s no ref ere nce to the limitations or require ments place d on the answe ringparty . See T EX .R.C IV .P. 19 4. 2. In a dd iti on , M s. Na va rr e te fa ils to c ite to, and

we have be e n una

ble to-9-

locate, c ase la

w holding that Rule 194.2(j) g ives a c laimant the ability to relieve herse lf of the duty to answer

and ame nd or supplement discove ry by executing a

medical r ecor ds authorization. As such, we conclude the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion by overr uling this argument. We now turn to Ms. Navar rete ’s ar gument that Ex hibits 10, 15, 16, and 17 were not i n a dm i s s i b l e un d e r

R u l e 1 9 3
. 6 , b e c a

u s e s h e p r o d

u c e d th e mm o r e th anth i rty

d ay s b e f o r e tr i a l
. In support of this argument she cites to Rule 193.5(b) , which states in re levant par t: “it is presumed that an ame nded or suppleme ntal response made less than 30 da y s befor e trial wa s not made
rea sonably

promptly .” T EX .R.C IV .P. 19 3. 5( b) . In e sse nc e , M s. Na va rr e te c onte nd s th at be c a

us e a discove ry

supplement made le ss than thirty day s befor e trial is pre sumed to be untimely , that the opposite presumption must also apply . We disag ree . I f the opposite pre sumption had been intended, it would have be en included in the la nguag e of the provision. See Snide r v. Stanley , 44 S.W. 3d 71 3, 71 5 ( Te x.Ap p. -- B e a umo nt 2 00 1, pe t. d e nie d) . B e c a us e no su c h la

ngua g e a pp e ars in the provision, we c onclude the tr ial court did not abuse its discre tion by excluding Plaintiff’s Ex hibits 10, 15, 16, and 17. I ssue Two is over ruled a s to the first g roup of doc uments. In the sec ond part of I ssue Two, Ms. Navarr ete summarily contends the tria l court abuse d its discretion by

excluding Plaintiff’s Exhibi t 21, which containe d Dr. B oone’s opinion that her injuries wer e ca

used by the collision. Howeve r, bec ause the contention is not supported by cog nizable leg al ar gument, or citation to appropr iate author ities, the argument is waived. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 38 .1 (i ). In a dd iti on , to the e xtent th is a rgume nt i s b a se d o n th e argume nts prese nted in I ssue One, r elated to Dr . Boone ’s ca usation opinion, the argument must be overr uled pursuant to our pre vious discussion. According ly , Ms. Navar rete has not demonstrate d that the trial court a

bused its discretion by

excluding Plaintiff’s Exhibi t 21, and the re mainder of I ssue-10-

Two is overr

uled. In I ssue Thre e, Ms. Nava rre te cha lleng es the fa ctual suff iciency of the jury ’s damag es
awa rd. When the par

ty who bore the burde n of proof on an issue at tria l challeng es the fa ctual
su ff ic ie nc y of a fi nd ingon

that is su e , th e a

pp ro pr iate c omp la int

is t hat th e a dv e rs e fi nd ingis, “ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e . . . .” Tate v . Ta te , 55 S.W .3d 1, 5 (T e x.Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 00 , n o p e t.) . We mus t f ir st e xami ne the re c or d to de te rm ine if the re is
so me e vid e nc e to s up po rt the fi nd ing ; if

so , th e n w e mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t he fa ilure to f

ind is
so c ontr ary

to t he ov e rwhe lmi ngwe ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e a s to be c le arl y wrongand manife stly

unjust. Marrs &Smith P’ship v. D.K. Boyd O il & Gas Co., Inc. , 223 S.W .3d 1, 14 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2005, pet. de nied). We will not interfer e with the fa ct finder ’s resolution of conf

licts in the evidence , or its determination of the w eig ht and cr edibility attributed to witness testimony , as these de terminations are g ener ally considere d conclusive. Tate , 55 S.W .3d at 5. The jury char g e included a

single question which aske d the jury to determine howmuch money would compensate Ms. Nava rre te for he r injuries. The jur y was a sked to consider

awa rds fo r p a st m e dic a l e xpe ns e s, futur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s, pa st p hy sic a l pa in, futur e phy sic a l pa in, pa st phy sical impairment, future phy sical impairment, past lost ear nings, a nd future lost ea

rning s. Th e jur y awa rd e d M s. Na

va rr e te $4 24 .2 5 f

or re a so na ble and ne c e ssa ry me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Th is
amo un t r e p r e s e n ts th e amo un t b il le d b y Phy s ic ia n ’ s H o s p it a l’ s E R f

o r M s . N av ar

r e te ’ s v is it , xray s, and nec k splint, i mmediately followingthe collision, admitted into evidence a s Plainti ff’ s Exhi bit 5. Th is w a s th e on ly

mon e tary awa rd inc lud e d in

the ve rd ic t. Ms. Navar

rete fra mes her a rgument on this pointin-terms of Mr. Williams concession-11-

that he c a us e d th e a uto c oll isi on . A lth ou g h th e re c or d d oe s c onta in s uc h a c on c e ssi on

re late d to the ac cident itself, the disputed issue at trial was the e x tent to which the collision cause d Ms. Navar

rete ’s ong oing pa in. Wi thout reg ard to the c onflictingevidenc e re g ardingthe ca use of Ms. Navar

rete ’s pain, she c oncludes that be cause Mr. Will iams conce ded re sponsibili ty for the collision, the jury

had no discre tion but to render a verdic t compensatingher f or all the medic al expenses, pain, impairment, and lost ea rning s relate d to her ne ck and ba ck pain. Th e e vid e nc e be fo re the jur y on the iss ue of

the so ur c e of

Ms. Na va rr e te ’s ba c k p a in included: (1) e vidence that she wa s involved in a rea r-e nd automobile collision on J anuar y 5, 2006; (2) evide nce that she was diagnosed with a spra in in her ce rvica l spine following the
acc ident, and that she w as not experiencingany additional pain or we akness; (3) evidenc e that she suffe red a

work-r elated injury

to her lowe r bac k while lifting a twenty pound box , a fe w months prior to the acc ident; (4) evide nce that an EMG test, orde red by Dr. B oone to deter

mine if Ms. Nava

rre te suffe red a

ny neurolog ical dama g e followingthe collision indicated she wa s
ne ur olo g ic a lly

so un d; ( 5) Dr . B oo ne ’s op ini on tha t Ms . N ava

rr e te ha d d e g e ne ra

tiv e c ha ng e s in her uppe r spine which pr e-dated the ac cident; (6) e vidence that Ms. Navar rete returne d to work followingher maternity

leave , and wor

ked full time until October 2006; (6) evidenc e that Ms. Navar

rete suffe red a

fall in Octobe r 2006; and (7) Ms. Navar rete ’s testimony

that she wa s no longe r workingat the time of trial, at least in part, due to ong oing pa in from the Oc tober 2006 fa ll. B a se d o n th is e vid e nc e , w e c on c lud e the re is e vid e nc e to s up po rt the jur y ’s de c isi on

to l imi t Ms. Navar

rete ’s re cover

y to those medical e x penses incur red dire ctly

afte r the c ollisi on. Fur thermore , the jury ’s fa ilure to awa rd other da

mag es is not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Ac cording ly , we ove rrule I ssue Thre e.-12-

Ha vin gov e rr

ule d a ll o f A

pp e lla nt’ s is su e s, we a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Marc h 16, 2011 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice Be fo re C h ew , C
. J
. , R i v er a, J
. , an d Go m ez , J u d ge Go me z, Judg e (S itt ingby As signme nt)