SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3377-16T2

JOSEPH MCNALLY,

Plaintiff,

v. 

MARYANN MERLINO, CHARLIE 

HAMILTON, RICK YEATMAN,

DAVE DEMPSEY, RICHARD 

PASSARELLA, DICK'S AUTO 

SERVICE, D&J AUTO BODY

and RON PASSARELLA,

Defendants.

_______________________________

JOHN PHILIP MAROCCIA,

Defendant/Third-Party 

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS GIANGIULIO, JR.,

Third-Party Defendant.

______________________________

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-3377-16T2

ROEDER HALBERT,

Defendant/Third-Party 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WATERFORD TOWNSHIP,

Third-Party DefendantRespondent.

_______________________________

Argued September 27, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4138-11.

Paul Leodori argued the cause for appellant (Law 

Offices of Paul Leodori, PC, attorneys; Paul Leodori, 

on the briefs).

George J. Botcheos argued the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendant/third-party plaintiff Roeder Halbert, a former member of the 

Waterford Township Committee, appeals from the May 7, 2013 Law Division 

order denying his motion for summary judgment to compel the Township to 

defend and indemnify him against a lawsuit filed by plaintiff Joseph McNally, 

a Township police officer. Halbert also appeals from the November 18, 2013 

December 19, 2018
3

A-3377-16T2

order denying his motion for summary judgment to compel the Township to 

defend and reimburse him for his defense costs and the settlement amount he

paid to McNally. We affirm.

I.

We derive the following facts from the evidence submitted by the parties 

in support of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motions, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Township, who opposed entry of summary 

judgment. See Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 135 (2017). 

On August 17, 2011, McNally filed a verified complaint against Halbert, 

Maryann Merlino, Charlie Hamilton, John Maroccia, Rick Yeatman, Dave 

Dempsey, Ron Passarella, unknown municipal entities, private individuals, and 

private business entities (collectively, defendants). Yeatmen, Dempsey and 

Passarella were not Township employees or officials. Although McNally 

identified Halbert and Hamilton as Committee members, Merlino as Mayor, and 

Maroccia as City Solicitor, he did not allege they acted within the scope of their 

employment or that their alleged wrongful conduct arose out of or in the course 

of the performance of their official duties. 

McNally alleged in the first count of the complaint that sometime in late 

August or September 2010, Maroccia and Passarella were overheard outside the 
4

A-3377-16T2

Township municipal building discussing establishing the Waterford Township 

Tea Party website (the website).

1

 Maroccia allegedly told Passarella that 

Maroccia, Halbert, Merlino and Hamilton believed Passarella "would be the 

right person" to run the website and that Passarella would receive help and 

funding to establish the website.

McNally also alleged that the website, activated in October 2010, posted 

pictures of him along with many false and malicious statements, including that 

he was a criminal and "steroid crazed cop who almost beat a [seventy-one]-yearold man to death"; had an alcohol and drug problem; was the root of police 

corruption; ran an illegal business; stole from various employers; committed 

various types of fraud; assaulted multiple people; beat his wife; and engaged in 

police misconduct. 

In his civil conspiracy claim in the second count, McNally alleged the 

following:

 defendants "conspired to commit a tort against 

McNally";

 defendants "conspired to intentionally and 

maliciously inflict emotional harm on McNally";

 

1

 McNally alleged that Yeatman and Dempsey were members of a private 

association that created a website "virtually identical" to the background for the 

website.
5

A-3377-16T2

 defendants "conspired to intentionally publish 

false and defamatory statements about McNally";

 defendants' "intentional and malicious actions 

. . . were designed to cause McNally harm, which 

they, in fact, did"; and 

 defendants' "actions . . . were intentional, 

malicious and beyond the bounds of human 

decency, justifying the imposition of punitive 

damages." 

In his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in the third count, 

McNally alleged the following:

 defendants "intentionally and maliciously 

initiated extreme and outrageous conduct against 

McNally";

 defendants "intentionally and maliciously posted 

knowingly false information about McNally in a 

way that was deliberately designed to cause him 

harm";

 defendants "intentionally and maliciously created 

the website and posted knowingly false 

information about McNally knowing there would 

be a high degree of probability of severe 

emotional distress being caused to McNally"; 

 defendants' "intentional and malicious actions 

. . . caused McNally severe and on-going 

emotional harm and upset[,]" and "emotional 

distress so severe that no reasonable person could 

be expected to endure such distress"; 
6

A-3377-16T2

 defendants' actions "were intentionally designed 

to cause McNally harm, which they, in fact, did";

and 

 defendants' actions "were outrageous and beyond 

the bounds of human decency, justifying the 

imposition of punitive damages." 

In his defamation claim in the fourth count, McNally alleged the 

following:

 defendants "conspired to publish knowingly false 

information and statements about McNally";

 defendants "intentionally made and posted many 

false and defamatory statements about McNally" 

and "made many false statements about McNally 

with a reckless disregard for the truth in order to 

harm McNally";

 defendants "conspired to create a website that 

posted multiple false statements about McNally 

in order to harm McNally, his family, and his 

reputation";

 defendants "maliciously made many false 

statements that were communicated through the 

website"; 

 defendants "were not concerned about the public 

good or serving the public; rather, they were 

concerned with maliciously destroying 

McNally's reputation in order to advance their 

own illicit purposes"; 
7

A-3377-16T2

 "[t]he . . . statements publicized by [d]efendants 

. . .were knowingly false and maliciously made to 

cause McNally harm, which they in fact did";

 "[t]he malicious and false defamatory statement 

publicized by [d]efendants . . . caused McNally

emotional harm and suffering";

 "[m]any of the malicious and false statements 

publicized by [d]efendants . . . constituted

defamation per se"; and

 "[t]he intentional and malicious actions of 

[d]efendants . . . were outrageous and beyond the 

bounds of human decency, justifying the 

imposition of punitive damages."

In the fifth count, McNally alleged that unknown private individuals and 

private and municipal entities conspired with defendants to commit the acts he 

previously alleged.

On October 21, 2011, Halbert requested that the Township defend and 

indemnify him against McNally's claims pursuant to Chapter 15 of Township 

Ordinance No. 97-13 (Ordinance). Ordinance § 15-1 provides as follows, in 

pertinent part:

The Township . . . shall provide the defense of any 

action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, 

administrative or investigative . . . against any public 
8

A-3377-16T2

employee[2] because of any act or omission of that 

employee in the scope of his or her employment and 

shall defray all costs of defending such action, 

including reasonable counsel fees and expenses, 

together with costs of appeal. . . .

[(Emphasis added).] 

Ordinance § 15-2(C) provides: "The Mayor and Committee . . . hereby 

provide[], under certain circumstances, for the defense and indemnification of 

officers, employees and servants in the good faith performance of their duties 

and responsibilities." (Emphasis added).

Ordinance § 15-3(B) provides, in pertinent part:

Whenever a civil action shall be brought against any 

person holding an office, position or employment with 

the Township . . . for any action or omission arising out 

of or in the course of the performance of the duties of 

such office, position or employment, the Township . . . 

shall provide payment of that portion of any costs of 

defense of said action not covered by a policy of 

insurance. Whenever any insurance policy whose 

purpose is to provide the defense and indemnification 

of the Township . . . or its public employees is in 

dispute, the Township . . . will stand in the place of the 

insurance carrier, subject to all rights of subrogation, 

provide for the defense and indemnification of its 

employees as specified herein. Said public employee 

has an affirmative duty, to be eligible for said defense 

 

2

 Ordinance § 15-1 defines "public employee," in pertinent part, as "any elected 

or appointed official . . . [and] persons formerly holding office or employment, 

provided the events giving rise to a cause of action or claim hereunder conform 

to the requirements herein established."
9

A-3377-16T2

and indemnification, to cooperate with the Township 

. . . in any and all of its efforts to resolve any disputed 

insurance coverage.

[(Emphasis added).]

Ordinance § 15-4 provides, in pertinent part, that "the Township['s] . . . 

authority to indemnify is limited to acts by public employees that are within the 

scope of their employment and which are not criminal, fraudulent, malicious or 

instances of willful misconduct." (Emphasis added). The Township reviewed 

the allegations in the complaint and denied Halbert's request based on Ordinance 

§ 15-4.

On May 2, 2012, McNally filed an amended complaint adding defendants

Richard M. Passarella, a private individual, and Passarella's private businesses, 

Dick's Auto Service and D&J Auto Body. McNally alleged that the website 

"was set up and run out of the business known as 'Dick's Auto Service.'" 

On September 5, 2012, Halbert filed an answer and third-party complaint 

against the Township, seeking declaratory judgment compelling the Township 

to defend and indemnify him and reimburse his defense costs. Halbert

subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment to compel the Township to 

provide a defense under Ordinance § 15-3(B). He argued he was serving on the 

Committee when the alleged conduct occurred and McNally's allegation in the 
10 A-3377-16T2

defamation claim that Halbert was not concerned about the public good or 

serving the public suggested that Halbert's acts arose out of or in the course of 

the performance of his duties as a Committee member. 

In an April 29, 2013 oral opinion, the motion judge denied the motion. 

The judge found that Halbert's acts were not within the scope of his employment 

or in the good faith performance of his duties and responsibilities as a 

Committee member. 

On May 31, 2013, McNally executed a stipulation of dismissal with 

prejudice as to all claims against Halbert. Halbert claimed he paid money to 

McNally to settle, but did not disclose the amount (the undisclosed settlement 

amount). Thereafter, McNally testified at his deposition that it was his 

"opinion" Halbert, in his capacity as Committee member, conspired with 

Merlino, in her capacity as Mayor, to publish false information about McNally's

conduct as a police officer, and intentionally inflict emotional distress and harm 

on and commit a tort against him. Based on McNally's deposition testimony, 

Halbert filed a second motion for summary judgment to compel the Township 

to defend and indemnify him and reimburse his defense costs and the 

undisclosed settlement amount.
11 A-3377-16T2

In a November 15, 2013 oral opinion, the judge denied the motion. The 

judge found McNally's deposition testimony did not alter the judge's previous 

determination that Halbert was not acting within the scope of his employment

or in the good faith performance of his duties and responsibilities as a 

Committee member. The judge determined that, although McNally testified it 

was his opinion Halbert acted in his capacity as a Committee member, the 

allegations in the complaint did not describe what action Halbert took in that 

capacity, but rather, described activities that were outside what Committee 

members would be expected to do in their official capacities. 

II.

On appeal, Halbert again relies on McNally's deposition testimony and

argues the Township had a duty to defend and indemnify him under Ordinance 

§ 15-3(B) because McNally's claims arose out of and related to Halbert serving 

on the Committee in 2010. Halbert also argues the Township had a duty to 

defend because McNally alleged a conspiracy between and among Halbert and 

other Township officials and municipal entities and "the breath of a civil 

conspiracy clearly comes within Halbert's acts or omissions arising out of or in 

the course of the performance of his duties as a member of the Waterford 
12 A-3377-16T2

Township Committee in 2010."3 Halbert cites no authority supporting this 

argument.

4

 

Halbert also contends the Township had a duty to indemnify him because 

McNally's claims arose out of Halbert's conduct as a Committee member who 

McNally alleged was unconcerned about the public good or serving the public. 

Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the 

same legal standard as the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 

(2017). Thus, we consider, as the trial judge did, "whether the evidence presents 

a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. 

v. Nowell Amoroso, PA, 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). 

 

3

 We decline to address Halbert's additional argument that McNally's allegations 

were not actionable and were without merit. The issue before us and the motion 

judge is whether the Township had a duty to provide a defense, which does not 

depend on the validity of McNally's claims. See Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. 

Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 173 (1992) (holding that the duty to defend arises 

"irrespective of the claim's actual merit"). 

4

 Halbert cited to Morgan v. Union Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 268 N.J. 

Super. 337, 364-66 (App. Div. 1993); however, this case does not support this 

argument.
13 A-3377-16T2

Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." 

Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 

(2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). "To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the 

opponent must 'come forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue of 

material fact.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) 

(quoting Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32 (App. 

Div. 2012)). "[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are 

insufficient to overcome the motion[.]" Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 

(2005).

"If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether 

the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Court Reporting & 

Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) 

(quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 

2007)). We review issues of law de novo and accord no deference to the trial 

judge's legal conclusions. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013).
14 A-3377-16T2

"Although a municipality's informal interpretation of an ordinance is 

entitled to deference . . . the meaning of an ordinance's language is a question 

of law that we review de novo." Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment of Franklin, 448 N.J. Super. 583, 595 (App Div. 2017) (quoting 

Bubis v. Kassin, 184 N.J. 612, 627 (2005)). "Similarly, the trial judge's 

determination as to the meaning of the ordinance is not entitled to any deference 

in our analysis." Ibid. 

"[We] utilize[] the established rules of statutory construction to interpret 

a municipal ordinance." Paff v. Byrnes, 385 N.J. Super. 574, 579 (App. Div. 

2006). "Therefore, 'an ordinance should be interpreted to effectuate the 

legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be 

achieved.'" Ibid. (quotation omitted) (quoting Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 

160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999)). "First, [we] must examine the language of the 

ordinance." Ibid. "If the language reveals a clear and unambiguous meaning, 

then that language controls." Ibid. "Alternatively, if the language is amenable 

to multiple interpretations, then [we] 'consider[] extrinsic factors, such as the 

statute's purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain the 

legislature's intent.'" Ibid. (quoting Twp. of Pennsauken, 160 N.J. at 170).
15 A-3377-16T2

The Ordinance is clear and unambiguous as to the Township's duty to 

defend and indemnify a public employee. The Township must defend public 

employees "because of any acts or omissions of that employee in the scope of 

his or her employment" (Ordinance § 15-1); "in the good faith performance of 

their duties and responsibilities" (Ordinance § 15-2(C)); and "for any action or 

omission arising out of or in the course of the performance of the duties of such 

office, position, or employment" (Ordinance § 15-3(B)).

The Township must indemnify public employees for acts that are "in the 

good faith performance of their duties and responsibilities" (Ordinance § 15-

2(C)); "for any act or omission arising out of or in the course of the performance 

of the duties of such office, position, or employment" (Ordinance § 15-3(B)); 

and for "acts . . . within the scope of their employment and which are not 

criminal, fraudulent, malicious or instances of willful misconduct" (Ordinance 

§ 15-4).

Accordingly, we must determine whether the Ordinance requirements 

have been met to compel the Township to defend and indemnify Halbert.

McNally's post-complaint "opinion" as to whether Halbert was acting in his 

capacity as a Committee member is irrelevant to our analysis. We must focus 
16 A-3377-16T2

on the allegations in the complaint, the Ordinance requirements, and the 

applicable legal principles. See Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 173. 

Scope of Employment

The term 'scope of employment' "refers to those acts which are so closely 

connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably 

incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite 

improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment." Carter v. 

Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 411 (2003) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70 (5th ed. 1984)).5 In New Jersey, 'scope of 

employment' is subject to analysis under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 

which provides as follows, in pertinent part: 

an employee's conduct falls within the scope of 

employment if:

(a) it is of the kind he is employed to 

perform; 

 

5

 For the first time in his reply brief, Halbert argues that his alleged conduct 

was within the scope of his employment because it arose out of his obligation 

under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 to oversee the Township's Police Department and 

discuss McNally's fitness as a police officer with other Committee members. 

We decline to address this argument, as Halbert did not raise it before the motion 

judge and it is not jurisdictional in nature nor does it substantially implicate the 

public interest, Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014). Further, it is 

improper to raise an argument for the first time in a reply brief. Goldsmith v. 

Camden Cty. Surrogate's Office, 408 N.J. Super. 376, 387 (App. Div. 2009). 
17 A-3377-16T2

(b) it occurs substantially within the 

authorized time and space limits; 

(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a 

purpose to serve the master; 

. . . . 

(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the 

scope of employment if it is different in 

kind from that authorized, far beyond the 

authorized time or space limits, or too little 

actuated by a purpose to serve the master.

[Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 

(Am. Law Inst. 1958)).] 

"When the employee's conduct . . . originated in his or her effort to fulfill 

an assigned task, the act has been held to be within the scope of employment." 

Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 303 (2012). "Conversely, an 

employee's act is outside of the scope of his or her employment 'if it is different 

in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or 

too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.'" Ibid. (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Agency § 228(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1958)). Further,

[f]or conduct to be considered "of the kind" an 

employee was employed to perform, the conduct need 

not be only that which is expressly required and 

authorized by the employer. Rather, conduct can 

satisfy the "of the kind" inquiry where it is "closely 

connected" and "fairly and reasonably incidental" to 

what the employee is employed to do. 
18 A-3377-16T2

[Allard v. Eisenhauer, 971 F. Supp. 2d 458, 466 (D.N.J. 

2013).]

Acts Arising Out of or in the

Course of Performance of Employment

Whether a particular incident arose out of and in the course of employment 

is comprised of a two-part question. Stroka v. United Airlines, 364 N.J. Super. 

333, 339 (App. Div. 2003). First, there must be a time-and-place nexus between 

the employment and the incident. See Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp., 

105 N.J. 285, 288-89 (1986). Second, there must be a causal connection between 

the employment and the incident itself. Ibid. 

To demonstrate the causal connection between the employment and the 

incident, "[i]t must be established that the work was at least a contributing cause 

of the injury and that the risk of the occurrence was reasonably incident to the 

employment." Id. at 290. "[T]he 'but for' or positional-risk test" used for this 

analysis in New Jersey asks "whether it is more probably true than not that the 

injury would have occurred during the time and place of employment rather than 

elsewhere." Id. at 290-91 (quoting Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., 25 

N.J. 72, 83 (1957)). Given the circumstances at play here, for Halbert's conduct 

to fall within the course of his employment, he must have caused a risk 

"distinctly associated with the employment." See Valdez v. Tri-State Furniture, 
19 A-3377-16T2

374 N.J. Super. 223, 236 (App. Div. 2005). "[R]isks that result from a purely 

personal activity" are deemed to fall outside of the course of employment. Ibid. 

Good Faith

"Good faith conduct is conduct that does not 'violate community standards 

of decency, fairness or reasonableness.'" Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. 

Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 225 (2005) (quoting Wilson v. 

Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 245 (2001)). We have defined good faith as 

"honesty of purpose and integrity of conduct without knowledge, either actual 

or sufficient to demand inquiry, that the conduct is wrong." Dunlea v. Twp. of 

Belleville, 349 N.J. Super. 506, 510 (App. Div. 2002). We have also found that 

"[r]eckless action may deny good faith" and "'[w]illful misconduct' . . . is more 

than an absence of 'good faith.'" Ibid. (quoting Marley v. Borough of Palmyra, 

193 N.J. Super. 271, 294-95 (Law Div. 1983)).

Malicious and Willful Misconduct

A "malicious act" is defined as "[a]n intentional, wrongful act done 

willfully or intentionally against another without legal justification or excuse." 

Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

"Willful misconduct" is defined as "[m]isconduct committed voluntarily 

and intentionally." Ibid. An act can be deemed willful misconduct "when it 
20 A-3377-16T2

'involv[es] deliberate and totally outrageous behavior.'" In re Rodriguez, 423 

N.J. Super. 440, 452 (App. Div. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Moya v. 

City of New Brunswick, 90 N.J. 491, 504 n.8 (1982)). Furthermore, willful 

misconduct may be demonstrated by "a showing that there has been a deliberate 

act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and 

reckless indifference to the consequences." Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 

198 N.J. 557, 584 (2009) (quoting Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. 

Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 414 (1962)). 

Although McNally identified Halbert as a Committee member and alleged 

he conspired with the public official defendants and unknown municipal 

entities,

6 he also alleged that Halbert conspired with private individuals and 

private business entities who actually established and operated the website. 

More importantly, McNally did not allege that Halbert acted within the scope of 

his employment or in the course of the performance of his duties as a Committee 

member. McNally alleged that Halbert was not concerned about the public good 

or serving the public; rather, Halbert acted to "maliciously destroy[] McNally's 

reputation in order to advance [Halbert's] own illicit purposes."

 

6

 Notably, McNally did not identify the Township as one of the unknown 

entities.
21 A-3377-16T2

McNally alleged acts that clearly were not within the scope of Halbert's 

employment or the performance of his duties as a Committee member. 

Conspiring to establish and establishing a website for the purpose of publicizing 

false and defamatory statements about a Township employee is not the type of 

activity that falls within the duties and responsibilities of a Committee member. 

Further, the website was established and operated outside the time and 

place of Halbert's employment, and had no connection to and served no purpose 

whatsoever of the Township or the Township business or interests. Halbert's 

alleged conduct was not closely connected and fairly and reasonably incidental 

to what he was employed to do. Halbert's alleged motivation was purely 

personal and not associated with his employment or with purpose to serve the 

Township.

In addition, McNally alleged that Halbert's conduct was intentional, 

malicious, outrageous, and "beyond the bounds of human decency." This 

alleged conduct was not in the good faith performance of Halbert's duties and 

responsibilities as a Committee member and it constituted malicious or willful 

misconduct. For all of these reasons, the Township had no duty to defend or 

indemnify Halbert or reimburse his defense costs and the undisclosed settlement 

amount. 
22 A-3377-16T2

III.

Halbert argues that Ordinance § 15-3(B) must be construed in his favor 

and against the Township pursuant to the doctrine of contra proferentem. He

also argues the Township must reimburse him for defense costs and the 

undisclosed settlement amount based on breach of contract and estoppel. We 

have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal 

principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.