21212 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2022 / Notices 

2 I am not including a finding on this particular 

state law, because the Government failed to provide 

any arguments related to these allegations in the 

RFAA or further information related to the Maine 

schedules. It is clear to me that Applicant’s 

registration is not in the public interest due to his 

diversion in spite of the limited arguments in the 

RFAA. 

against granting Applicant’s application 

for a registration. 

Furthermore, the Government alleges 

that Applicant repeatedly violated state 

and federal laws related to controlled 

substances by diverting controlled 

substances on at least two different 

occasions while employed at Mercy 

Hospital and on at least five different 

occasions while employed at St. Mary’s 

Hospital. OSC, at 2 and 4 (citing 21 

U.S.C. 843(a)(3); 21 CFR 1301.22(c); 17– 

A Me. Rev. Stat. § 1107–A; 32 Me. Rev. 

Stat. § 2105–A(2)(F) and (H); and Maine 

State Board of Nursing Rule Ch. 4 

§ 3(P)). 

According to Maine law, ‘‘a person is 

guilty of unlawful possession of a 

scheduled drug if the person 

intentionally or knowingly possesses 

what that person knows or believes to 

be a scheduled drug, which is in fact a 

scheduled drug’’ 2 unless ‘‘the person 

possessed a valid prescription for the 

scheduled drug or controlled substance 

that is the basis for the charge and[ ], at 

all times, the person intended the drug 

to be used only for legitimate medical 

use in conformity with the instructions 

provided by the prescriber and 

dispenser.’’ Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17– 

A, §§ 1107–A(1) and (4) (Westlaw, 

current with legislation through the 

2021 First Regular Session and Second 

Special Session of the 130th 

Legislature). Further, Maine regulation 

states that nurses are prohibited from 

engaging in unprofessional conduct as 

well as from violating Board rules, 

including, ‘‘[d]iverting drugs, supplies 

or property of patients or health care 

provider[s].’’ 02–380 Me. Code R. Ch. 4, 

§ 3(P) (Westlaw, current through the 

June 16, 2021 Maine Weekly Rule 

Notice). 

Under federal law, it is unlawful ‘‘to 

acquire or obtain possession of a 

controlled substance by 

misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, 

deception, or subterfuge.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

843(a)(3). Federal law also states that 

‘‘[a]n individual practitioner who is an 

agent or employee of a hospital or other 

institution may, when acting in the 

normal course of business or 

employment, administer, dispense, or 

prescribe controlled substances under 

the registration of the hospital or other 

institution which is registered in lieu of 

being registered him/herself, provided 

that . . . [s]uch dispensing, 

administering or prescribing is done in 

the usual course of his/her professional 

practice.’’ 21 CFR 1301.22(c). Federal 

law defines an individual practitioner as 

an ‘‘individual licensed, registered, or 

otherwise permitted, by the United 

States or the jurisdiction in which he/ 

she practices, to dispense a controlled 

substance in the course of professional 

practice.’’ 21 CFR 1300.01. 

In this case, the evidence supports a 

finding that Applicant diverted 

controlled substances on at least two 

different occasions while employed at 

Mercy Hospital and on at least five 

different occasions while employed at 

St. Mary’s Hospital. In doing so, he 

clearly acted outside of the usual course 

of his professional practice and 

dispensed controlled substances in 

violation of state and federal law. Given 

the repeated nature of Applicant’s 

violations of federal and state 

regulations related to controlled 

substances, I find that Factors Two and 

Four strongly weigh against Applicant’s 

registration and I find Applicant’s 

registration to be inconsistent with the 

public interest in balancing the factors 

in 21 U.S.C. 823(f). 

III. Sanction 

Where, as here, the Government has 

met its prima facie burden of showing 

that grounds for denial exist, the burden 

shifts to the Applicant to show why he 

can be entrusted with a registration. 

Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 

18882, 18910 (2018) (collecting cases). 

In this case, Applicant did not request 

a hearing and did not avail himself of 

the opportunity to refute the 

Government’s case. See RFAA, at 1 and 

RFAAX 3. As such, Applicant has not 

expressed any remorse nor provided any 

assurances that he would implement 

remedial measures to ensure his 

misconduct is not repeated, and such 

silence weighs against his registration. 

Zvi H. Perper, M.D., 77 FR 64131, 64142 

(2012) (citing Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, 73 FR 363, 387 (2008)); 

see also Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 

FR 23848, 23853 (2007). Further, due to 

the lack of a statement or testimony 

from Applicant, it is unclear whether 

Applicant can be entrusted with a DEA 

registration. Therefore, I find that 

sanction is appropriate to protect the 

public from a recurrence of Applicant’s 

unlawful actions. See Leo R. Miller, 

M.D., 53 FR 21931, 21932 (1988). 

Accordingly, I shall order the sanctions 

requested by the Government, contained 

in the Order below. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

823(f) and 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby 

deny the pending application for a 

Certificate of Registration, Control 

Number W19022896M, submitted by 

Christopher C. King, N.P., as well as any 

other pending application of 

Christopher C. King, N.P. for additional 

registration in Maine. This Order is 

effective May 9, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07718 Filed 4–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Crosby Pharmacy and Wellness; 

Decision and Order 

I. Introduction 

On October 23, 2021, the Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Crosby 

Pharmacy and Wellness (hereinafter, 

Applicant) of Montgomery, Texas. OSC, 

at 1. The OSC proposes the denial of 

Applicant’s registration application, 

Control No. W20008908A (hereinafter, 

registration application). It alleges that 

Applicant materially falsified its 

registration application and that 

Applicant’s registration would be 

‘‘inconsistent with the public interest, 

as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 

823(f).’’ Id. 

Specifically, the OSC alleges that, 

during an onsite visit when Applicant 

was a registrant, the Government 

discovered ‘‘serious recordkeeping 

violations,’’ including not maintaining 

an initial inventory, not maintaining a 

biennial inventory, and not maintaining 

accurate records of all controlled 

substances received and sold. Id. at 1– 

2 (citing 21 CFR 1304.11(b), 1304.11(c), 

1304.21(a)). The OSC also alleges that 

Applicant materially falsified its 

registration application by answering 

‘‘no’’ to the question of whether it had 

‘‘ever surrendered (for cause) or had a 

federal controlled substance registration 

revoked, suspended, restricted, or 

denied, or is any such action pending.’’ 

Id. at 2. 

The OSC notifies Applicant of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing; the procedures for electing each 

option; and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 3 (citing 21 

CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notifies 


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Applicant of the opportunity to submit 

a corrective action plan. Id. at 3–4 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

II. Adequacy of Service 

In a sworn Declaration dated August 

20, 2021 (hereinafter, Declaration), a 

Diversion Investigator (hereinafter, DI) 

assigned to the Houston Division Office 

in Houston, Texas, stated that she 

‘‘caused a copy of the . . . [OSC] to be 

sent to . . . [Applicant] at . . . [its] 

proposed registered address via First 

Class Mail and Certified Mail.’’ DI 

Declaration, at 3. She stated that ‘‘[b]oth 

of these mailings were returned to 

DEA.’’ Id. The DI also stated that, on 

November 12, 2020, she ‘‘caused a copy 

of the . . . [OSC] to be emailed’’ to 

Applicant at the ‘‘email address . . . 

given to DEA by . . . [Applicant] in . . . 

[its registration a]pplication.’’ Id. 

According to the DI’s sworn Declaration, 

she ‘‘did not receive any notification 

that the message was not delivered.’’ Id. 

The Government forwarded its 

Request for Final Agency Action 

(hereinafter, RFAA), along with the 

evidentiary record, to this office on 

August 24, 2021. In its RFAA, the 

Government represented that 

‘‘Applicant did not request a hearing’’ 

and requested that I ‘‘enter an order 

denying Applicant’s application.’’ 

RFAA, at 1. 

Based on the DI’s Declaration, the 

Government’s written representations, 

and my review of the record, I find that 

the Government accomplished service 

of the OSC on Applicant on or about 

November 12, 2020. I also find that 

more than thirty days have now passed 

since the Government accomplished 

service of the OSC. Further, based on 

the Government’s written 

representations, I find that neither 

Applicant, nor anyone purporting to 

represent Applicant, requested a 

hearing, submitted a written statement 

while waiving Applicant’s right to a 

hearing, or submitted a corrective action 

plan. Accordingly, I find that Applicant 

has waived the right to a hearing and 

the right to submit a written statement 

and corrective action plan. 21 CFR 

1301.43(d); 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C). I, 

therefore, issue this Decision and Order 

based on the record submitted by the 

Government, which constitutes the 

entire record before me. 21 CFR 

1301.43(e). 

III. Findings of Fact 

A. Applicant’s Registration History 

I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that 

Applicant previously held registration 

No. FC7640623. RFAA Exhibit 

(hereinafter, RFAAX) 3, at 1. I find there 

is substantial uncontroverted record 

evidence that Applicant surrendered 

that registration for cause by signing a 

DEA–104, ‘‘Surrender for Cause of DEA 

Certificate of Registration’’ on January 8, 

2020. RFAAX 4, at 1. Further, I find 

there is substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that, on or around 

January 29, 2020, Applicant submitted 

the registration application. DI 

Declaration, at 2; RFAAX 2, at 1–3. I 

find clear, unequivocal, convincing, and 

unrebutted record evidence that, on the 

registration application, Applicant 

certified that it had never ‘‘surrendered 

(for cause) . . . a federal controlled 

substance registration.’’ RFAAX 2, at 1. 

I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that 

DEA issued this OSC about the 

registration application. OSC, at 1; 

RFAAX 4, at 2. 

B. Investigation of Applicant 

I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that DI 

and other DEA employees ‘‘conducted 

an onsite visit’’ of Applicant on January 

8, 2020. DI Declaration, at 1. I find there 

is substantial uncontroverted record 

evidence that, during this visit, the DEA 

team ‘‘discovered a number of problems 

with . . . [Applicant’s controlledsubstance-related] recordkeeping.’’ Id. I 

further find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that DI 

‘‘confronted’’ a representative of 

Applicant about ‘‘some’’ of the 

recordkeeping problems. Id. at 2. I find 

there is substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that, ‘‘[i]n response,’’ a 

representative of Applicant ‘‘agreed to 

surrender’’ Applicant’s registration and 

signed a DEA–104 stating that Applicant 

was ‘‘surrender[ing its registration] for 

cause.’’ Id.; RFAAX 4, at 1. I find there 

is substantial uncontroverted record 

evidence that DEA sent Applicant a 

letter, dated January 24, 2020, 

‘‘confirming the surrender of . . . [its] 

registration privileges in Schedules II 

through V on January 8, 2020,’’ and 

stating that, ‘‘[c]oncurrent with the 

surrender,’’ Applicant is ‘‘no longer 

authorized to order, distribute, possess, 

dispense, administer, prescribe, or 

engage in any activities with controlled 

substances under DEA Registration 

Number FC7640623.’’ RFAAX 7, at 1. I 

find there is substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that DEA directed the 

January 24, 2020 letter to Applicant at 

the physical address Applicant 

submitted in the registration 

application. RFAAX 7, at 1; RFAAX 2, 

at 1. 

I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that DI 

continued the investigation of Applicant 

after its voluntary registration surrender 

for cause by issuing an administrative 

subpoena to Applicant’s distributor. 

RFAAX 5, at 1; DI Declaration, at 2. I 

find there is substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that, pursuant to the 

administrative subpoena, Applicant’s 

distributor provided DI with DEA Form 

222s and invoices. DI Declaration, at 2. 

I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that 

these distributor documents show that 

the distributor provided Applicant with 

more than 18,000 tablets of oxycodone 

30 mg, more than 16,000 tablets of 

hydrocodone/acetaminophen 10/325 

mg, more than 13,000 tablets of 

alprazolam 2 mg, more than 20,000 

tablets of carisoprodol 350 mg, and 120 

bottles of 473 ml promethazine with 

codeine. Id.; see also RFAAX 6. I find 

there is substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that the distributor 

shipped controlled substances to 

Applicant. DI Declaration, at 2; RFAAX 

6. I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that 

Applicant did not produce for the DEA 

team an initial inventory of the 

controlled substances, ‘‘any records of 

dispensing any controlled substances,’’ 

and ‘‘any controlled substances.’’ DI 

Declaration, at 1. 

III. Discussion 

A. The Controlled Substances Act and 

the Public Interest Factors 

Pursuant to the Controlled Substances 

Act (hereinafter, CSA), ‘‘[t]he Attorney 

General shall register practitioners . . . 

to dispense . . . controlled substances 

. . . if the applicant is authorized to 

dispense . . . controlled substances 

under the laws of the State in which he 

practices.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f). The CSA 

further provides that an application for 

a practitioner’s registration may be 

denied upon a determination that ‘‘the 

issuance of such registration . . . would 

be inconsistent with the public 

interest.’’ Id. In making the public 

interest determination, the CSA requires 

consideration of the following factors: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing . . . controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

Id. 


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1A pharmacy is a ‘‘practitioner.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

802(21). 

These factors are considered in the 

disjunctive. Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 

FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ‘‘may rely on 

any one or a combination of factors and 

may give each factor the weight [I] 

deem[ ] appropriate in determining 

whether . . . an application for 

registration [should be] denied.’’ Id. 

Moreover, while I am required to 

consider each factor, I ‘‘need not make 

explicit findings as to each one,’’ and I 

‘‘can give each factor the weight . . . [I] 

determine[ ] is appropriate.’’ Jones Total 

Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 841 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 

2016)); see also MacKay v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Volkman v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Hoxie v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 

2005))). In other words, the public 

interest determination ‘‘is not a contest 

in which score is kept; the Agency is not 

required to mechanically count up the 

factors and determine how many favor 

the Government and how many favor 

the registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry 

which focuses on protecting the public 

interest; what matters is the seriousness 

of the registrant’s misconduct.’’ Peter A. 

Ahles, M.D., 71 FR 50097, 50098–99 

(2006). 

The OSC in this matter, as already 

discussed, alleges that Applicant’s 

registration application should be 

denied because it would be inconsistent 

with the public interest for Applicant to 

have a registration and because 

Applicant’s registration application 

contains a materially false response to a 

liability question. OSC, at 1–3; 21 U.S.C. 

823(f), 824(a)(1); supra section II. A 

determination that the issuance of a 

registration ‘‘would be inconsistent with 

the public interest’’ is a basis for the 

denial of a registration application. 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). The CSA, however, places 

the provision addressing the 

ramification of a material falsification 

with the bases for revocation or 

suspension of a registration. 21 U.S.C. 

824(a). 

Prior Agency decisions have 

addressed whether it is appropriate to 

consider a material falsification and 

other bases for revocation or suspension 

described in 21 U.S.C. 824(a) when 

determining whether or not to grant a 

practitioner registration application.1

For over forty-five years, and as recently 

as late last year, Agency decisions have 

concluded that it is. See, e.g., Lisa M. 

Jones, N.P., 86 FR 52196 (2021); Robert 

Wayne Locklear, 86 FR 33738 (2021) 

(collecting Agency decisions). These 

decisions offer multiple bases and 

analyses for that conclusion. 86 FR at 

33744–45. For example, a prior decision 

noted that ‘‘[t]o hold otherwise would 

mean that applications would have to be 

granted [under 21 U.S.C. 823(f)] only to 

be revoked the next day’’ under 21 

U.S.C. 824(a). Id. at 33744 (quoting John 

R. Amato, M.D., 40 FR 22852 (1975)). I 

reaffirm my decision in Lisa M. Jones, 

N.P. that a basis for revocation or 

suspension described in a provision of 

21 U.S.C. 824(a) may be the basis for the 

denial of a practitioner registration 

application. 

B. Allegation That Applicant Submitted 

a Materially False Registration 

Application 

Having read and analyzed all of the 

record evidence, I find from clear, 

unequivocal, convincing, and 

unrebutted record evidence that 

Applicant surrendered (for cause) its 

DEA registration on January 8, 2020. 

Supra section II.A, section II.B; RFAAX 

4. Having read and analyzed all of the 

record evidence, I find from clear, 

unequivocal, convincing, and 

unrebutted record evidence that 

Applicant answered ‘‘no’’ to the second 

liability question in the registration 

application—whether Applicant ‘‘ever 

surrendered (for cause) . . . a federal 

controlled substance registration.’’ 

Supra section II.A. Applicant’s false 

answer to the second liability question 

in the registration application 

implicates two of the public interest 

factors that the CSA requires me to 

consider: Applicant’s experience in 

dispensing controlled substances, and 

Applicant’s compliance with applicable 

federal laws relating to controlled 

substances. 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(2), (4); 

Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 

45229, 45234 (2020). As such, 

Applicant’s false response to the second 

liability question in the registration 

application was ‘‘predictably capable of 

affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to 

affect’’ my official decision on its 

registration application. Frank Joseph 

Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR at 45238. 

Accordingly, I find from clear, 

unequivocal, convincing, and 

unrebutted record evidence that the 

registration application contains a 

material falsification, an independent 

basis for the denial of the registration 

application. 

C. Allegation That Issuing a Registration 

to Applicant Would Be Inconsistent 

With the Public Interest 

As already discussed, the OSC 

includes three allegations that 

Applicant failed to maintain required 

‘‘controlled substances records.’’ OSC, 

at 2. First, the OSC alleges that 

Applicant ‘‘failed to maintain an initial 

inventory, in violation of 21 CFR 

1304.11(b).’’ Id. As already discussed, 

based on substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that the distributor 

shipped controlled substances to 

Applicant, I find there is substantial 

uncontroverted record evidence that 

Applicant did not produce for the DEA 

team an initial inventory of the 

controlled substances, ‘‘any records of 

dispensing any controlled substances,’’ 

and ‘‘any controlled substances.’’ Supra 

section II.B. Accordingly, I find that 

Applicant violated the CSA by failing to 

maintain an initial inventory, 

implicating 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(2) and (4). 

21 CFR 1304.11(b). 

Second, the OSC alleges that 

Applicant ‘‘failed to maintain a biennial 

inventory, in violation of 21 CFR 

1304.11(c).’’ OSC, at 2. There is no 

evidence in the record that supports this 

allegation. Accordingly, I find that this 

OSC allegation is not founded. 

Third, the OSC alleges that Applicant 

‘‘failed to maintain accurate records of 

all controlled substances received and 

sold, in violation of 21 CFR 1304.21(a).’’ 

Id. As already discussed, based on 

substantial uncontroverted record 

evidence that the distributor shipped 

controlled substances to Applicant, I 

find there is substantial uncontroverted 

record evidence that Applicant did not 

produce for the DEA team ‘‘any records 

of dispensing any controlled 

substances’’ and ‘‘any controlled 

substances.’’ Supra section II.B. 

Accordingly, I find that Applicant 

violated the CSA by failing to maintain 

accurate records of all controlled 

substances received and sold, 

implicating 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(2) and (4). 

21 CFR 1304.21(a). 

The Government has the burden of 

proof in this proceeding. 21 CFR 

1301.44(d). I carefully considered all of 

the record evidence relevant to the 

material falsification allegation, the 

recordkeeping allegations, and the 

public interest factors of 21 U.S.C. 

823(f)(2) and (4). For the above-stated 

reasons, I find that the Government met 

its burden on the OSC’s material 

falsification allegation and on two of the 

OSC’s three recordkeeping violation 

allegations. I further find that Applicant 

did not submit any evidence, let alone 

evidence that rebuts the Government’s 

prima facie case, on these founded OSC 

allegations. Accordingly, I conclude that 

it would be ‘‘inconsistent with the 

public interest’’ for me to grant the 

registration application. 21 U.S.C. 

823(f). 


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2 I do not consider remedial measures when an 

applicant does not unequivocally accept 

responsibility. In this matter, Applicant did not 

accept responsibility or propose remedial measures. 

1The Request for Hearing was filed on December 

1, 2021. Order Directing the Government to File 

Evidence Regarding Its Lack of State Authority 

Allegation and Briefing Schedule dated December 

2, 2021, at 1. I find that the Government’s service 

of the OSC was adequate and that the Request for 

Hearing was timely filed on December 1, 2021. 

IV. Sanction 

Where, as here, the Government 

presented a prima facie case that it 

would be ‘‘inconsistent with the public 

interest’’ to grant the registration 

application, and Applicant did not rebut 

the Government’s prima facie case, the 

‘‘burden of proof shifts’’ to Applicant 

‘‘to show why it can be trusted with a 

registration.’’ Jones Total Health Care 

Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 

881 F.3d at 830; see also Samuel 

Mintlow, M.D., 80 FR 3630, 3652 (2015) 

(‘‘[S]ufficient mitigating evidence’’ must 

be presented ‘‘to assure the 

Administrator that [he] can be entrusted 

with the responsibility carried by such 

a registration.’’); Cleveland J. Enmon Jr., 

M.D., 77 FR 57116, 57126 (2012) (same); 

Robert M. Golden, M.D., 61 FR 24808, 

24812 (1996) (same). Further, past 

performance is the best predictor of 

future performance and, when an 

applicant has ‘‘failed to comply with its 

responsibilities in the past, it makes 

sense for the agency to consider whether 

the pharmacy will change its behavior 

in the future.’’ Pharmacy Doctors 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 

789 F. App’x at 733 (citing Jones Total 

Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 881 F.3d at 831 (citing 

MacKay v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 664 F.3d 

at 820 (‘‘[T]hat consideration is vital to 

whether continued registration is in the 

public interest.’’) and Alra Labs., Inc. v. 

Drug Enf’t Admin., 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (‘‘An agency rationally may 

conclude that past performance is the 

best predictor of future 

performance.’’))). 

Additionally, in evaluating whether a 

practitioner should be entrusted with a 

registration, the Agency considers 

whether the practitioner has accepted 

responsibility for any misconduct; 

circuit courts have approved the 

Agency’s acceptance of responsibility 

requirement. Pharmacy Doctors 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 

789 F. App’x at 732; Jones Total Health 

Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 881 F.3d at 830 (citing MacKay 

v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 664 F.3d at 820 

(‘‘The DEA may properly consider 

whether a physician admits fault in 

determining if the physician’s 

registration should be revoked.’’)); see 

also Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 

46972–73 (2019) (unequivocal 

acceptance of responsibility); Jayam 

Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 463 

(2009) (collecting cases). 

The Agency also has decided that the 

egregiousness and extent of the 

misconduct are significant factors in 

determining the appropriate sanction. 

Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 

18882, 18910 (2018) (collecting cases); 

Samuel Mintlow, M.D., 80 FR at 3652 

(‘‘Obviously, the egregiousness and 

extent of a registrant’s misconduct are 

significant factors in determining the 

appropriate sanction.’’). The Agency has 

also considered the need to deter similar 

acts by Applicant and by the 

community of registrants and potential 

registrants. Id. 

In terms of egregiousness, the 

violations that the record evidence 

shows Applicant committed go to the 

heart of the CSA—not complying with 

required controlled substance 

recordkeeping and submitting a 

registration application that includes a 

material falsification. 

Applicant did not take responsibility 

for the founded violations. Accordingly, 

it is not reasonable to believe that 

Applicant’s future controlled substance 

dispensing will comply with legal 

requirements.2

For all of these reasons, I find that it 

would be inconsistent with the public 

interest for me to entrust Applicant with 

a registration. Accordingly, I shall order 

the denial of Applicant’s registration 

application, Control No. W20008908A. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

823(f), I hereby deny the registration 

application submitted by Crosby 

Pharmacy and Wellness, Control No. 

W20008908A, seeking registration in 

Texas as a practitioner, and I hereby 

deny any other pending application 

submitted by Crosby Pharmacy and 

Wellness for a DEA registration in the 

State of Texas. This Order is effective 

May 11, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–07687 Filed 4–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 22–7] 

Adam T. Rodman, P.A.; Decision and 

Order 

On November 8, 2021, a former 

Acting Assistant Administrator, 

Diversion Control Division, Drug 

Enforcement Administration 

(hereinafter, DEA or Government), 

issued an Order to Show Cause 

(hereinafter, OSC) to Adam T. Rodman, 

P.A. (hereinafter, Respondent) of 

Dedham, Massachusetts. OSC, at 1 and 

3. The OSC proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s Certificate of Registration 

No. MR0956586. Id. at 1. It alleged that 

Respondent ‘‘[does] not have authority 

to dispense or prescribe controlled 

substances in the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, the state in which [he is] 

registered with the DEA.’’ Id. (citing 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(3)). 

Specifically, the OSC alleged that on 

or about June 30, 2021, the 

Massachusetts Drug Control Program 

accepted Respondent’s voluntary 

surrender of his state controlled 

substances registration for schedules II 

through V. Id. at 2. According to the 

OSC, Respondent retained authority in 

schedule VI, which does not include 

federally-scheduled drugs. Id. (citing 

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 2). 

The OSC notified Respondent of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 2–3 (citing 

21 CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Respondent of the opportunity to 

submit a corrective action plan. Id. at 3 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

By letter dated December 1, 2021, 

Respondent timely requested a hearing.1

Request for Hearing, at 1. In his Request 

for Hearing, Respondent objected to the 

revocation of his DEA registration and 

stated: ‘‘The basis for my objection is, in 

part, that my Massachusetts Controlled 

Substance Registration has not been 

suspended, revoked, or denied, and 

therefore 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) is not 

applicable.’’ Id. 

The Office of Administrative Law 

Judges put the matter on the docket and 

assigned it to Administrative Law Judge 

Teresa A. Wallbaum (hereinafter, the 

ALJ). On December 2, 2021, the ALJ 

issued an Order Directing the 

Government to File Evidence Regarding 

Its Lack of State Authority Allegation 

and Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, 

Briefing Schedule). On December 15, 

2021, the Government timely filed its 

Notice of Filing of Evidence and Motion 

for Summary Disposition (hereinafter, 

Government’s Motion). Order Granting 

the Government’s Motion for Summary 

Disposition, and Recommended 

Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 


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