1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NOTUS LLC d/b/a ROFX, EASY COM LLC

d/b/a ROFX, GLOBAL E-ADVANTAGES 

LLC a/k/a KICKMAGIC LLC d/b/a ROFX, 

GROVEE LLC d/b/a ROFX, SHOPOSTAR 

LLC d/b/a ROFX, 

JASE DAVIS,

BORYS KONOVALENKO, 

ANNA SHYMKO, ALLA SKALA, AND 

TIMOTHY STUBBS

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-20291 

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE 

AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF 

AND CIVIL MONETARY 

PENALTIES UNDER THE 

COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT

Plaintiff, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission” or “CFTC”), alleges 

as follows: 

I. SUMMARY

1. From at least January 2018 through September 2021 (hereinafter, the “Relevant 

Period”), Defendants Jase Davis (“Davis”), Borys Konovalenko (“Konovalenko”), Anna 

Shymko (“Shymko”), Alla Skala (“Skala”), and Timothy Stubbs (“Stubbs”) (hereinafter, 

“Facilitating Defendants”), individually and as the controlling persons of the interrelated 

companies Notus LLC d/b/a ROFX (“Notus”), Easy Com LLC d/b/a ROFX (“Easy Com”), 

Global E-Advantages LLC a/k/a Kickmagic LLC d/b/a ROFX (“GEA”), Grovee LLC d/b/a 

ROFX (“Grovee”), and Shopostar LLC d/b/a ROFX (“Shopostar”) (hereinafter, “Corporate 

Defendants”), acting through, and/or in conjunction with, the web-based entity www.ROFX.net

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(“ROFX website”), acting as a common enterprise, misappropriated at least $58 million as part 

of a fraudulent scheme in, and/or in connection with, the offering of leveraged, margined or 

financed agreements, contracts, or transactions in retail foreign currency (“forex”) to U.S. and 

international customers (“ROFX customers”) who were not eligible contracts participants 

(“ECPs”). Facilitating Defendants, individually and as the controlling persons of Corporate 

Defendants—operating through a maze of interrelated companies, shared managers and

members—accepted funds from ROFX customers that were intended to be used to margin, 

leverage or finance agreements, contracts, or transactions in forex as described on the ROFX 

website. Corporate Defendants and Facilitating Defendants (hereinafter, “Fraudulent Enterprise” 

or “Defendants”) acted as a single, integrated common enterprise and misappropriated all of the 

$58 million they accepted from ROFX customers by immediately wiring said funds to offshore 

entities with no connection to forex trading. 

2. The Fraudulent Enterprise utilized the ROFX website as a vehicle to solicit and 

obtain customers. On the website, ROFX claimed to create and trade retail forex accounts on 

behalf of customers utilizing a highly successful automated trading robot purportedly created in 

2009. ROFX advertised itself as a legitimate forex brokerage with offices in Miami, London, 

and Hong Kong and guaranteed coverage of any trading losses sustained by customers. 

3. Customers typically submitted an online application form on the website to open a 

retail forex trading account with ROFX. Thereafter, ROFX emailed customers an “invoice” 

directing customers to deposit or wire their funds to one or more of the Corporate Defendants, at 

continually changing U.S.-based bank accounts carried in the name of one of the Corporate 

Defendants, opened and/or controlled by one or more of the Facilitating Defendants. 

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4. Throughout the Relevant Period, Facilitating Defendants accepted ROFX 

customers’ funds into domestic Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts but did not send ROFX 

customers’ funds to a CFTC-registered futures commission merchant (“FCM”) or retail foreign 

currency dealer (“RFED”) to trade on behalf of customers. Rather, Facilitating Defendants

immediately wired ROFX customer funds offshore to non-trading corporate entities in Poland, 

Thailand, and elsewhere, as well as to Facilitating Defendants themselves. 

5. Facilitating Defendants were all corporate managers and officers of Corporate 

Defendants and did business as ROFX utilizing the ROFX website to solicit customers on their 

behalf as part of the Fraudulent Enterprise. They repeatedly accepted ROFX customer funds into 

Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts they controlled demonstrating knowledge of and 

participation in the predicate solicitation while knowingly, or recklessly, failing to disclose 

material facts to ROFX customers, including but not limited to: (1) Defendants misappropriated 

all ROFX customer funds they accepted into Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts; 

(2) Defendants did not trade forex for customers after accepting ROFX customers’ funds; 

(3) Defendants did not forward ROFX customers’ funds to any entity that traded funds on behalf 

of ROFX customers; (4) ROFX customers had no forex trading accounts; (5) there was no 

ROFX forex trading robot; and, (6) there were no ROFX corporate offices as falsely advertised 

on the website. Upon information and belief, there is no legally formed business entity known as 

“ROFX” anywhere in the U.S. 

6. Defendants were joined in a common purpose of defrauding and profiting from 

ROFX customers, had relationships with and among each other, depended upon the participation 

of each other to accomplish their common purpose, and were each employed by and/or 

associated with the Fraudulent Enterprise during the Relevant Period. Defendants accepted and 

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misappropriated at least $58 million from over 1,100 ROFX customers during the Relevant 

Period. 

7. By engaging in this conduct and the conduct further described herein, Defendants 

have engaged, are engaging and/or are about to engage in acts and practices in violation of the 

Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(2)(A), (C) and 9(1), and Commission 

Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 5.2(b)(1), (3) and 180.1(a) (2021). 

8. Furthermore, Corporate Defendants, doing business as ROFX through the ROFX 

website, each acted as FCMs without being registered with the CFTC in violation of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 6d(a)(1) because they were engaged in soliciting or accepting orders for retail forex 

transactions and accepted funds in or in connection therewith. 

9. Accordingly, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(c)(2)(C) and 13a-1, the CFTC brings this 

action to enjoin Defendants’ unlawful acts and practices, to compel their compliance with the 

Act and Regulations, and to enjoin them from engaging in any commodity-interest related 

activity, as set forth below. The CFTC also seeks civil monetary penalties for each violation of 

the Act and Regulations, and remedial ancillary relief, including, but not limited to,

disgorgement, pre- and post-judgment interest, and such other relief as the Court may deem 

necessary and appropriate.

10. Unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, Defendants are likely to continue to 

engage in the acts and practices alleged in this Complaint, and similar acts and practices, as more 

fully described below. 

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11. This Court possesses jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

(codifying federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (providing that U.S. district courts 

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have original jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States or by any agency 

expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress). In addition, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 provides that 

United States district courts possess jurisdiction to hear actions brought by the CFTC for 

injunctive relief or to enforce compliance with the Act whenever it shall appear to the CFTC that 

such person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a 

violation of any provision of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, and 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2(c)(2)(C) provides the CFTC with jurisdiction over the forex solicitations and transactions at 

issue in this action.

12. Venue properly lies with this Court pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(e), because 

Defendants transact or transacted business in this District, and/or certain transactions, acts, 

practices, and courses of business alleged in this Complaint occurred, are occurring, or are about 

to occur within this District. As alleged in the complaint, Defendants fraudulently 

misappropriated ROFX customer funds, including funds of customers residing in the Southern 

District of Florida.

III. THE PARTIES 

A. Plaintiff 

13. Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission is an independent federal 

regulatory agency charged by Congress with the administration and enforcement of the Act and 

Regulations. The CFTC maintains its principal office at Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581. 

B. Defendants

14. Defendant Notus LLC d/b/a ROFX is a recently dissolved Colorado limited 

liability company whose former principal office address was 3801 East Florida Avenue, Suite 

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400, Denver, Colorado 80210. Notus is an entity which accepted approximately $22.6 million of 

the $58 million in ROFX customer funds Defendants misappropriated during the Relevant 

Period. Konovalenko, Shymko, Skala, and a third party (“Third Party R.V.”) are, or were, 

owners or members of Notus. Notus has never been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

15. Defendant Easy Com LLC d/b/a ROFX is a New Hampshire limited liability 

company whose principal office address is 155 Fleet Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 03801. 

Easy Com is an entity which accepted over $15 million in ROFX customer funds during the 

Relevant Period. Shymko and Davis are, or were, owners and members of Easy Com. Easy 

Com has never been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

16. Defendant Global E-Advantages LLC a/k/a Kickmagic LLC d/b/a ROFX is a 

Delaware limited liability company and New York foreign limited liability company with a 

service of process address at 55 14th Avenue, North Tonawanda, New York, 14120. GEA is an 

entity which accepted over $4.8 million in ROFX customer funds during the Relevant Period. 

GEA has never been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

17. Defendant Grovee LLC d/b/a ROFX is a Delaware limited liability company 

whose registered agent’s address is 3422 Old Capitol Trail, Suite 700, Wilmington, Delaware 

19808. Grovee is an entity which accepted over $1.2 million in ROFX customer funds during 

the Relevant Period. Grovee has never been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

18. Defendant Shopostar LLC d/b/a ROFX is a Colorado limited liability company 

whose principal office address is 7887 East Belleview Avenue, Suite 1100, Denver, Colorado 

80011 and principal office mailing address is 6619 Brock Circle, Brandon, Mississippi 39042. 

Shopostar is an entity which accepted over $13.5 million in ROFX customer funds during the 

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Relevant Period. Konovalenko is, or was, an owner and manager of Shopostar. Shopostar has 

never been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

19. Defendant Jase Davis resides in Brandon, Mississippi, and upon information and 

belief, was born in Ukraine. Davis purchased Easy Com from Anna Shymko in November 2020. 

He represents himself as the sole member of Easy Com and is the sole signatory on two Easy 

Com bank accounts at Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, into which he accepted over $15 

million in ROFX customer funds during the Relevant Period. Davis has never been registered 

with the CFTC in any capacity. 

20. Defendant Borys Konovalenko is a Ukrainian citizen and, upon information and 

belief, currently resides in Ukraine. Konovalenko is, or was, an owner and managing director of 

Notus and is, or was, an owner and manager of Shopostar. Konovalenko was a signatory or cosignatory to U.S. bank accounts into which he accepted over $23 million in ROFX customer 

funds during the Relevant Period, including: (a) a Notus account at Bank of America which 

accepted $9.3 million in customer funds; (b) two Shopostar accounts at Bank of America which 

accepted $13.5 million in customer funds; and (c) two Kickmagic accounts at Bank of America 

which accepted $556,000 in customer funds. Konovalenko personally accepted funds from these

accounts during the Relevant Period. He has never been registered with the CFTC in any 

capacity. 

21. Defendant Anna Shymko resides in Duluth, Georgia. Shymko was the managing 

member of Notus beginning April 14, 2021, until September 16, 2021, when she filed articles 

dissolving Notus with the Colorado Secretary of State. In addition, Shymko organized and was 

the initial managing member of Easy Com beginning September 22, 2020, until November 3, 

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2020, when she purportedly sold all of her interests in Easy Com to Jase Davis. Shymko has 

never been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

22. Defendant Alla Skala is a Canadian citizen who was born in Ukraine. Upon 

information and belief, Skala resides in Grand Island, New York and/or Fort Erie, Ontario. 

Skala identified herself as the sole owner of Notus and appointed herself as the manager of Notus 

on or about November 12, 2019. On December 6, 2019, Skala filed Notus’s foreign limited 

liability application with the New York Secretary of State. Skala is a signatory and co-signatory 

to U.S. bank accounts into which she accepted over $26 million in ROFX customer funds during 

the Relevant Period, including: (a) a Notus account at Key Bank which accepted $13.2 million

in customer funds; (b) a Notus account at Bank of America which accepted $9.3 million in

customer funds; and (c) a GEA account at M&T Bank which accepted $4.2 in customer funds. 

Skala personally accepted funds from these accounts during the Relevant Period. She has never 

been registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

23. Defendant Timothy Stubbs is a U.S. citizen who, upon information and belief, is 

a Certified Public Accountant residing in Brandon, Mississippi and/or the Atlanta, Georgia area. 

Upon information and belief, Stubbs resides or resided at one or both of the Brandon, Mississippi 

addresses provided on various Notus and Shopostar corporate filings with the Colorado Secretary 

of State. Stubbs represents himself as the manager of Grovee and is the signatory on a Grovee 

account at Bank of America into which he accepted $153,000 in customer funds during the 

Relevant Period. Stubbs personally accepted funds from this account and other Corporate 

Defendants’ bank accounts accepting ROFX customer funds. He has never been registered with 

the CFTC in any capacity. 

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C. Related Entity 

24. ROFX is a fictitious, web-based entity that operated via the website 

www.ROFX.net, which was hosted in the U.S. Upon information and belief, ROFX is neither

registered to conduct business in the U.S. nor is it a legally organized collective entity. Although 

the website contained representations that ROFX purportedly operated from offices in Miami, 

London, and Hong Kong, ROFX had no offices, no employees, and upon information and belief, 

was created solely to further Defendants’ fraudulent common enterprise. ROFX has never been 

registered with the CFTC in any capacity. 

IV. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 

25. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i)(I), in relevant part, applies to any agreement, contract, or 

transaction in, or in connection with, forex that is offered to, or entered into with, a person that is 

not an ECP “on a leveraged or margined basis, or financed by the offeror, the counterparty, or a 

person acting in concert with the offeror or counterparty on a similar basis,” subject to certain 

exceptions not applicable here. 

26. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(18)(A)(xi) defines an ECP, in relevant part, as an individual: (a) 

who has amounts invested on a discretionary basis, the aggregate of which exceeds $10 million, 

or (b) $5 million if the individual enters into the transaction to “manage the risk associated with 

an asset owned or liability incurred, or reasonably likely to be owned or incurred, by the 

individual.” Individuals who do not meet these criteria are non-ECPs. 

27. For the purposes of trading forex, an FCM is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28)(A), in 

relevant part, as “an individual, association, partnership, corporation or trust . . . engaged in 

soliciting or in accepting orders for . . . any agreement, contract, or transaction described in 

section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) [of the Act, i.e., “forex transactions”]” or “acting as a counterparty in any 

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agreement, contract, or transaction described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) [of the Act]”; and, in or in 

connection with these activities “accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in 

lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result 

therefrom.”

28. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person to act as an FCM unless 

such person is registered as such with the CFTC. 

V. FACTS

A. Defendants’ Fraudulent Scheme 

29. During the Relevant Period, the ROFX website claimed to offer and/or enter into 

retail forex agreements, contracts, or transactions on behalf of non-ECP customers by opening 

trading accounts on their behalf and purportedly utilizing an automated trading “robot” to 

profitably trade customers’ accounts. ROFX touted that it was the “best automated forex trading 

robot in the world,” and the only trading system that “guarantee[d] coverage of losses.” In 

addition to the ROFX website, some customers were introduced to ROFX via social media and 

referrals by friends and family who had invested with ROFX. 

30. Facilitating Defendants, individually and as the controlling persons of Corporate 

Defendants, did business as ROFX via the ROFX website and used the website to conceal their 

participation in the scheme and acceptance of customer deposits and wires, many of which were 

clearly identified as associated with ROFX and forex trading. No mention was made of any of 

the Defendants on the website. The ROFX website fraudulently represented that ROFX operated 

a legitimate and successful forex robot trading or “Bot” platform with purported offices in Miami, 

London, and Hong Kong. The ROFX website made false and misleading claims, which included, 

but were not limited to the following: 

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• “ROFX is the best automated trading robot in the world.” 

• “[T]he ROFX.net service is an exceptional service that guarantees your profits.” 

• “The inbuilt algorithms and neural [sic] networks are in hand to place the perfect 

trade when opportunity presents itself. You do not have to make any 

intervention.” 

• “When you use ROFX.net, the developers assure that you will make no losses.” 

• “This platform is perhaps the only one that covers your losses.” 

• “The stop-loss system blocks trading at the minimum loss (‘no loss forex robot’).” 

31. ROFX made guarantees regarding the safety of investing and claimed to have 

specific “safeguards” in place to protect customers, including a “reserve fund,” which allegedly 

covered negative trading results, and a “stop-loss system,” which minimized trading losses on 

“bad days.” The ROFX website claimed, in pertinent part: 

Your money is safe, because: 

We guarantee the safety of your funds

Negative results of trading are covered by our reserve fund. 

32. The ROFX website further represented that customers could earn greater “trading 

profits” based on which of the five offered “programs” the customer chooses, and the “program” 

with the highest minimum deposit “program” purportedly earned the highest “profit.” The 

ROFX website offered customers the following five programs: 

• “Trial” required initial deposits of $1,000 to $5,000 payable in USD/EUR/BTC 

and payment of a performance fee of 60%. In exchange, the customer was

promised a 40% share in the daily trading profit; 

• “Easy Start” required initial deposits of $5,000 to $10,000 payable in 

USD/EUR/BTC and payment of a performance fee of 50%. In exchange, the 

customer was promised a 50% share in the daily trading profit; 

• “Moneymaker” required initial deposits of $10,000 to $50,000 payable in 

USD/EUR/BTC and payment of a performance fee of 35%. In exchange, the 

customer was promised a 65% share in the daily trading profit; 

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• “Gold” required initial deposits of $50,000 to $100,000 payable in 

USD/EUR/BTC and payment of a performance fee of 25%. In exchange, the 

customer was promised a 75% share in the daily trading profit; and 

• “VIP” program required initial deposits of $100,000 to unlimited payable in 

USD/EUR/BTC and payment of a performance fee of 15%. In exchange, the 

customer was promised an 85% share in the daily trading profit. 

 

33. According to ROFX’s representations on its website, ROFX did not need to be 

regulated: “Being a software company, owners of AI technology and a managing company 

ROFX does not need to be regulated. ROFX cooperates with top European, American and Asian 

brokerage platforms, licensed and regulated by the corresponding authorities.” However, there is 

no evidence that ROFX: has ever been incorporated anywhere in the United States or elsewhere; 

has ever been registered in the United States or elsewhere; or, has any relationship with any forex 

brokerage. 

34. The ROFX website targeted retail customers with little to no forex trading 

experience: “The ROFX robot is for anyone who wants to make money and to get a stable 

passive income on FOREX but has neither trading experience in the international currency and 

financial markets, nor time.” The ROFX website claimed that “[t]here is no need in any special 

knowledge, ability to analyse foreign exchange market, or many years of trading experience.” 

35. Customers opened an ROFX trading account by providing their name and driver’s 

license through the ROFX website. The online account opening application did not seek any 

information about prospective customers’ net worth and did not inquire as to whether a 

prospective customer is an ECP or had assets in excess of $5 million. ROFX permitted 

customers to fund an account with U.S. dollars (USD), Euros (EUR), or Bitcoin (BTC). Most of 

the ROFX customers are located in the U.S., including customers in this district.

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36. After customers established an ROFX account, they typically received a 

purported “payment invoice” with a corresponding invoice number via email from 

support@rofx.net with instructions to deposit their funds in bank accounts in the name of “Notus 

LLC” or one of the other Corporate Defendants. Pursuant to the ROFX payment invoice’s 

instructions, customers made a counter deposit via a cashier’s check payable to one of the 

Corporate Defendants if the bank, then being used by Defendants, had a local branch convenient 

to the customer. If there was not a local bank branch, customers typically forwarded funds to one 

of the Corporate Defendants via wire transfer. Each Corporate Defendant received funds directly 

from customers via wires or checks. Notations for customers’ wire transfers appeared on 

Corporate Defendants’ monthly bank account statements and bank wire records as “ROFX 

account deposit,” “ROFX investment service,” “investment transfer to ROFX,” and “investment 

trading account,” among others. In some instances, Corporate Defendants’ monthly bank 

statements and bank wire records showed individual customer names with specific invoice 

numbers provided to customers by ROFX. By acting in common enterprise and utilizing the 

ROFX website to solicit or accept orders for retail forex agreements, contracts, or transactions 

and accepting ROFX customer funds in connection with these activities, Corporate Defendants 

acted as FCMs during the Relevant Period. 

37. Once customer funds were accepted into the Fraudulent Enterprise’s various 

corporate bank accounts, customers were able to log into their accounts on the ROFX website via 

the Internet and view their purported profits and account balances. Customers’ online account 

information regularly showed trading profits even though there was no trading and therefore no 

profits. 

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B. The Fraudulent Enterprise’s Misappropriation of Customer Funds

38. The Fraudulent Enterprise accepted the deposit of ROFX customer funds into 

bank accounts in the names of Corporate Defendants. The Fraudulent Enterprise did not use any 

of the customer funds to enter into any forex agreements, contracts, or transactions on behalf of 

customers as promised. Instead, it, through the acts of the Facilitating Defendants, 

misappropriated the funds, including by converting the funds to Defendants’ own personal use 

and transferring the funds to various offshore entities with bank accounts in Eastern Europe, 

Thailand, and elsewhere. 

39. The Fraudulent Enterprise, through the acts of the Facilitating Defendants, also 

misappropriated customer funds by providing some customers with small withdrawals of 

purported “profits” via wires from one or more of the Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts 

and/or offshore entities. Customers made repeated requests for withdrawals directly through the 

ROFX website and via email to “support@rofx.net.” As no trading took place, and no profits 

were generated, any payments to customers of purported “profits” were in reality funds from 

later customers to earlier customers in the nature of a Ponzi scheme.

40. The majority of customers were unable to withdraw funds from their accounts 

despite the false representations on ROFX’s website that customers could withdraw funds at any 

time with no withdrawal fees. 

41. Some customers who attempted to terminate their accounts or withdraw large 

amounts were advised by purported ROFX employees via email or telephone that there was an 

issue with the customer’s account preventing any withdrawal of funds. For example, one 

customer (“Customer A”) was notified by an ROFX employee that the depository bank had 

provided him with an unauthorized “chargeback” of his initial deposit; however, Customer A did 

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not have an account at the depository bank into which any of his funds could be returned. 

Similarly, another customer (“Customer B”) was informed by email that ROFX was terminating 

his account due to the results of an anti-money laundering inspection (“AML”); Customer B was 

unable to obtain any information regarding his alleged AML violations or the inspection. 

Neither Customer A nor Customer B was able to withdraw their funds as requested. 

C. The Fraudulent Enterprise’s Material Omissions of Facts 

42. Facilitating Defendants, individually and on behalf of Corporate Defendants, 

knowingly and/or recklessly failed to disclose material facts to actual and prospective customers 

while repeatedly accepting ROFX customer funds designated for trading, including failing to 

disclose that: 

a. There is no legal entity known as “ROFX,” and ROFX does not utilize a forex 

“robot” or trade forex;

b. The Fraudulent Enterprise never opened any trading accounts in customers’ 

names and conducted no trading on their behalf via robot or otherwise; 

c. The Fraudulent Enterprise failed to advise customers who made deposits into the 

Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts that their funds were not forwarded to a 

CFTC-registered FCM or RFED for forex trading on behalf of customers; 

d. The Fraudulent Enterprise misappropriated customer funds by accepting funds 

intended for trading into various bank accounts and then subsequently wiring 

those funds to offshore entities having nothing to do with forex trading; and

e. Purported “returns” paid to some customers were in fact the principal deposits of 

other customers and were not generated by profitable trading. 

D. Defendants Operated as a Common Enterprise 

43. Corporate Defendants were interrelated shell companies serving no legitimate 

business purpose other than to defraud ROFX customers. They operated together as ROFX 

through the ROFX website, shared the same officers and purported business addresses, accepted

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ROFX customer funds into their various bank accounts, and transferred ROFX customer funds to 

common offshore entities. 

44. Facilitating Defendants controlled Corporate Defendants during the Relevant 

Period, were all corporate officers of Corporate Defendants, and used Corporate Defendants’ 

bank accounts to collect, transfer, and disburse ROFX customer funds. Together, Facilitating 

Defendants and Corporate Defendants used the ROFX website as a vehicle to solicit customers 

and convey the false messaging of ROFX’s purported successful forex trading robot. As 

described below, Facilitating Defendants created one or more of the Corporate Defendants in the 

United States and/or submitted corporate documents on behalf of Corporate Defendants utilizing 

common officers, addresses, and registered agents. Facilitating Defendants also opened U.S. 

bank accounts on behalf of one or more of the Corporate Defendants, controlled Corporate 

Defendants’ bank accounts including the deposits to and withdrawals from these accounts, and 

transferred ROFX customer funds between and amongst themselves and to the same offshore 

entities.

1. Konovalenko, Shymko, and Skala Controlled and Operated Notus 

45. Konovalenko, Shymko, and Skala all controlled and operated Notus as part of the 

Fraudulent Enterprise until Shymko dissolved Notus in September 2021, as described below. 

These individuals submitted “Periodic Reports” with the Colorado Secretary of State on behalf 

of Notus, using at times an office mailing address of 6619 Brock Circle, Brandon, Mississippi, 

which is or was the address of a property owned by Timothy Stubbs. 

46. Notus was a Colorado limited liability company initially formed by a third party 

(“Third Party Y.Z.”) on or about October 27, 2014, with a “principal office address” of 2821 S. 

Parker Road, Unit 407, Aurora, Colorado. On October 28, 2015, Konovalenko filed a “Periodic 

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Report” with the Colorado Secretary of State, identifying Notus’s “principal office street 

address” as 1942 Broadway Street, Suite 314C, Boulder, Colorado and “principal office mailing 

address” as 6619 Brock Circle, Brandon, Mississippi. Konovalenko also filed a December 9, 

2015 “Statement of Correction” and an additional September 29, 2016 “Periodic Report” on 

behalf of Notus using these same addresses. On January 5, 2017, Stubbs filed a “Statement of 

Dissociation” on behalf of Notus using his address of 6619 Brock Circle, Brandon, Mississippi.

47. In his Answer filed in Birmingham v. ROFX.net, Case No. 1:21-cv-23472 (S.D. 

Fla. Oct. 27, 2021), Konovalenko admitted to being the managing member of Notus until August 

17, 2017, when he purportedly sold all of his interests in Notus to Third Party R.V. 

48. Third Party R.V. was the managing member of Notus beginning on August 17, 

2017, and filed “Periodic Reports” on behalf of Notus with the Colorado Secretary of State from 

December 2017 through December 2019. 

49. According to a November 12, 2019 “Notus Resolution of the Sole Member of the 

Company,” signed by Third Party R.V., Third Party R.V. resigned as the operational manager of 

Notus and sold all of his interests in Notus to Skala. On November 29, 2019, Skala opened a 

bank account in the name of Notus at Key Bank in the United States with her son, Bartholomew 

Skala, and submitted the Notus resolution with her application indicating that she was the sole 

managing member of Notus. Through the Notus Key Bank account, Skala accepted and 

misappropriated over $13.2 million in ROFX customer funds. 

50. On December 6, 2019, Skala filed a foreign limited liability application on behalf 

of Notus with the New York Secretary of State, Division of Corporations to conduct business 

using the fictitious name “NOTUS NY LLC” in the State of New York with a principal office at 

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102 Country Club Lane, Grand Island, New York. Skala identified herself as the sole member of 

Notus on this application. 

51. On February 14, 2020, Konovalenko and Skala opened a bank account in the 

name of Notus at Bank of America in the United States. Through the Notus Bank of America 

account, Konovalenko and Skala accepted and misappropriated over $9.3 million in ROFX 

customer funds. 

52. On April 14, 2021, Shymko purchased Notus from Skala. On September 16, 

2021, Shymko filed a “Statement of Dissolution” on behalf of Notus with the Colorado Secretary 

of State. Shymko admitted these facts in her Answer filed in Birmingham v. ROFX.net, Case 

No. 1:21-cv-23472 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2021). 

2. Facilitating Defendants Controlled and Operated the Other Corporate 

Defendants 

53. In addition to Notus, Facilitating Defendants controlled and operated other 

Corporate Defendants, including Easy Com, GEA, Grovee, and Shopostar. Facilitating 

Defendants formed and/or opened bank accounts in the names of these other Corporate 

Defendants. Through these Corporate Defendant bank accounts, the Fraudulent Enterprise 

accepted over $35 million in ROFX customer funds, along with over $22 million in ROFX 

customer funds deposited into the Notus accounts, and misappropriated all of these funds by 

transferring them to offshore entities having nothing to do with forex trading as discussed above. 

Easy Com (Davis and Shymko)

 

54. Shymko formed Easy Com as a New Hampshire limited liability company on 

September 22, 2020, and she was the sole member. On November 3, 2020, Shymko sold Easy 

Com to Jase Davis pursuant to a signed agreement. In her Answer filed in Birmingham v. 

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ROFX.net, Case No. 1:21-cv-23472 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2021), Shymko admitted to creating Easy 

Com and selling it to Jase Davis. 

55. In early-January 2021, Jase Davis opened U.S. bank accounts at Bank of America 

and JPMorgan Chase Bank in the name of Easy Com and was the sole signatory on these 

accounts. Through these accounts, Davis accepted and misappropriated over $15.6 million in 

ROFX customer funds. 

56. Jase Davis filed Easy Com’s Annual Report dated April 14, 2021, with the State 

of New Hampshire Department of State. 

Global E-Advantages a/k/a Kickmagic (Konovalenko, Skala)

57. GEA, also known as Kickmagic, is a Delaware limited liability company formed 

on January 15, 2015. On the same day, Skala opened a U.S. bank account at M&T Bank in the 

name of GEA and was the sole signatory on this account. Through this account, she accepted and 

misappropriated over $4.2 million in ROFX customer funds. 

58. In October 2019, Kickmagic changed its name to GEA with the Secretary of State 

of the State of Delaware. 

59. Konovalenko was the sole signatory on a Bank of America account in the name of 

Kickmagic and a co-signatory with his wife, Valeriia Konovalenko, on a second Bank of 

America account in the name of Kickmagic. Through these accounts, Konovalenko accepted 

and misappropriated over $556,000 in ROFX customer funds. 

Grovee (Stubbs)

60. Grovee is a Delaware limited liability formed on October 15, 2020. On 

November 18, 2020, Stubbs opened a bank account at Bank of America in the name of Grovee 

and was the sole signatory on this account. Stubbs designated himself as the “Manager” of 

Grovee on the account opening documents. On February 6, 2021, a third party (“Third Party 

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T.M.”) opened a second account at Bank of America in the name of Grovee and was the sole 

signatory on this account. Third Party T.M. designated herself as a “Member” of Grovee on the 

account opening documents. Through these accounts, Stubbs accepted and misappropriated over 

$1.2 million in ROFX customer funds.

Shopostar (Konovalenko) 

61. Shopostar is a Colorado limited liability company initially formed by Third Party 

Y.Z. on or about July 14, 2014. Konovalenko filed a “Periodic Report” on behalf of Shopostar 

with the Colorado Secretary of State in September 2015 and an Address Change report on behalf 

of Shopostar with the Colorado Secretary of State in March 2016. For both filings, Konovalenko 

reported his address as 6619 Brock Circle, Brandon, Mississippi 39042, which is or was the 

address of a property owned by Stubbs. 

62. In his Answer filed in Birmingham v. ROFX.net, Case No. 1:21-cv-23472 (S.D. 

Fla. Oct. 27, 2021), Konovalenko admitted to being a member of Shopostar and claimed he sold 

his shares to a third party (“Third Party N.L.”) on December 30, 2016, while remaining in the 

position of executive manager until April 15, 2019. 

63. Third Party N.L. filed “Periodic Reports” on behalf of Shopostar from September 

2016 through September 2020, reporting on some of these filings that her address is 825 

Southwind Lane, Brandon, Mississippi, which is or was the address of a property owned by 

Stubbs. 

64. Konovalenko was the sole signatory on a Bank of America account in the name of 

Shopostar and a co-signatory with Third Party N.L. on a second Bank of America account in the 

name of Shopostar. Through these accounts, Konovalenko accepted and misappropriated over 

$13.5 million in ROFX customer funds. 

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E. Corporate Defendants Acted as Unregistered FCMs 

65. At no time during the Relevant Period have Corporate Defendants been registered 

with the CFTC as an FCM or in any other capacity. At no time during the Relevant Period have 

Corporate Defendants been exempt from the requirement to register as an FCM.

66. During the Relevant Period, Corporate Defendants acted in a capacity that 

required registration as FCMs because they: (a) solicited or accepted orders for retail forex 

transactions; and, (b) in or in connection with these activities accepted money, securities, or 

property (or extended credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts 

that resulted or may have resulted therefrom. 

VI. VIOLATIONS OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT AND CFTC 

REGULATIONS

COUNT I

FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH FOREX

Violations of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A), (C) and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1), (3) 

(All Defendants) 

67. The allegations in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein 

by reference.

68. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A) and (C) make it unlawful: 

for any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any 

contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery, . . . that is made, or to be 

made, for or on behalf of, or with, any other person other than on or subject to the 

rules of a designated contract market – (A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat 

or defraud the other person; [or] (C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive the 

other person by any means whatsoever in regard to any order or contract or the 

disposition or execution of any order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency 

performed, with respect to any order or contract for or, in the case of paragraph (2), 

with the other person. 

69. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(iv), 7 U.S.C. § 6b applies to the forex 

agreements, contracts, or transactions offered by Defendants “as if” they were contracts of sale 

of a commodity for future delivery. Further, 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(ii)(I) makes forex 

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agreements, contracts, or transactions “subject to” 7 U.S.C. § 6b. Finally, 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2(c)(2)(C)(vii) makes clear the CFTC has jurisdiction over an account that is offered for the 

purpose of trading forex. 

70. 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1) and (3) (2021) make it unlawful for any person, by use of 

the mails or by any instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly, in or in 

connection with any retail forex transaction: (1) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud 

any person; or (3) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive any person by any means whatsoever. 

71. Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A), (C) and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1), (3), by 

willfully deceiving or attempting to deceive other persons in, or in connection with, the offering 

of leveraged, margined or financed retail forex transactions with non-ECPs, by, among other 

things: (i) failing to disclose material facts to actual and prospective customers, including that no 

forex trading was conducted on behalf of customers; and (ii) misappropriating customer funds. 

72. Defendants engaged in the acts and practices described above willfully, 

intentionally, or recklessly. 

73. Defendants engaged in the acts and practices described above using 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including but not limited to: interstate wires for transfer 

of funds, email, websites, and other electronic communication devices. 

74. Facilitating Defendants controlled Corporate Defendants, directly or indirectly, 

and did not act in good faith or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, Corporate Defendants to 

commit the acts and/or omissions alleged herein. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Facilitating

Defendants are liable as controlling persons for Corporate Defendants’ violations of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 6b(a)(2)(A), (C) and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1), (3). 

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75. Facilitating Defendants acted within the course and scope of their employment, 

agency, or office with Corporate Defendants. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), Corporate 

Defendants are liable as principals for Facilitating Defendants’ violations of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 6b(a)(2)(A), (C) and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1), (3).

76. Each act of failing to disclose material facts and misappropriating, including but 

not limited to those specifically alleged herein, is alleged as a separate and distinct violation of 7 

U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(A), (C) and 17 C.F.R. § 5.2(b)(1), (3). 

COUNT II

FRAUD BY DECEPTIVE DEVICE OR CONTRIVANCE

Violations of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) 

(All Defendants)

77. The allegations in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein 

by reference.

78. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(ii)(I) makes forex agreements, contracts, or transactions 

“subject to” 7 U.S.C. § 9(1). Further, 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(vii) makes clear the CFTC has 

jurisdiction over an account that is offered for the purpose of trading forex. 

79. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or 

employ, or attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, a contract of sale of any 

commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 

registered entity, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of” the 

Regulations. 

80. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2021), which the CFTC issued in 2011 pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1), provides: 

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any 

swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for 

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future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or 

recklessly:

 

(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, 

scheme, or artifice to defraud; 

(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material 

fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 

made not untrue or misleading; [or]

(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, 

which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . . 

81. Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) by, among other 

things, in connection with contracts of sale of commodities in interstate commerce: (i) omitting 

to state material facts necessary in order to make statements made not untrue or misleading,

including omitting that no forex trading was conducted on behalf of customers; and (ii) 

misappropriating customer funds. 

82. Defendants engaged in the acts and practices described above willfully, 

intentionally, or recklessly. 

83. Defendants engaged in the acts and practices described above using 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including but not limited to: interstate wires for transfer 

of funds, email, websites, and other electronic communication devices. 

84. Facilitating Defendants controlled Corporate Defendants, directly or indirectly, 

and did not act in good faith or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, Corporate Defendants to 

commit the acts and/or omissions alleged herein. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Facilitating

Defendants are liable as controlling persons for Corporate Defendants’ violations of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). 

85. Facilitating Defendants acted within the course and scope of their employment, 

agency, or office with Corporate Defendants. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), Corporate 

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Defendants are liable as principals for Facilitating Defendants’ violations of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 

17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). 

86. Each act of omitting material facts and misappropriation, including but not limited 

to those specifically alleged herein, is alleged as a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. 

§ 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). 

COUNT III 

FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A FUTURES COMMISSION MERCHANT

Violations of 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1)

(Corporate Defendants) 

87. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and 

incorporated herein by reference.

88. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to be an FCM 

unless such person is registered with the CFTC as an FCM. 

89. An FCM is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28)(A), in relevant part, as “an individual, 

association, partnership, corporation or trust . . . engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for 

. . . any agreement, contract, or transaction described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) [of the Act],” and in 

or in connection with these activities “accepts any money, securities, or property . . . to margin, 

guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result therefrom.” 

90. During the Relevant Period, each Corporate Defendant operated as an FCM, by 

(a) soliciting or accepting orders for retail forex transactions as described by 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2(c)(2)(C)(i); and, (b) in or in connection with these activities, accepting any money, securities, 

or property to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result 

therefrom.

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91. During the Relevant Period, Corporate Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1) by 

failing to register with the CFTC as FCMs. 

92. Each instance during which Corporate Defendants acted as unregistered FCMs, 

including but not limited to those specifically alleged herein, and each day such unregistered 

conduct took place, is alleged as a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1). 

93. Facilitating Defendants controlled Corporate Defendants, directly or indirectly, 

and did not act in good faith, or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting 

Corporate Defendants’ violations of 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1). Therefore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13c(b), Facilitating Defendants are liable as controlling persons for Corporate Defendants’

violations of 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1).

VI. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, the CFTC respectfully requests that this Court, as authorized by 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13a-1, and pursuant to its own inherent equitable powers, enter: 

A. An order finding that Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(2)(A), (C), 6d(a)(1),

9(1) and 17 C.F.R. §§ 5.2(b)(1), (3) and 180.1(a) (2021); 

B. An order finding that Corporate Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1); 

C. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants and their affiliates, 

agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns, attorneys, and all persons in active concert with 

them, who receive actual notice of such order by personal service or otherwise, from engaging in 

the conduct described above, in violation of 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(2)(A), (C), 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. 

§§ 5.2(b)(1), (3), 180.1(a) (2021); 

D. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Corporate Defendants and their 

affiliates, agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns, attorneys, and all persons in active 

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concert with them, who receive actual notice of such order by personal service or otherwise, 

from engaging in the conduct described above, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1);

E. An order of permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants and any of their 

affiliates, agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns, attorneys, and all persons in active 

concert with them, from directly or indirectly:

(i) Trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is defined 

in 7 U.S.C. § la(40); 

(ii) Entering into any transactions involving “commodity interests” (as that term is 

defined in 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2021)) for their own accounts or for any account in 

which they have a direct or indirect interest; 

(iii) Having any commodity interests traded on Defendants’ behalf;

(iv) Controlling or directing the trading for or on behalf of any other person or entity, 

whether by power of attorney or otherwise, in any account involving commodity 

interests;

(v) Soliciting, receiving or accepting any funds from any person for the purpose of 

purchasing or selling any commodity interests;

(vi) Applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the CFTC

in any capacity, and engaging in any activity requiring registration or exemption 

from registration with the CFTC, except as provided for in 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) 

(2021); and/or 

(vii) Acting as a principal (as that term is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (2021)), agent, 

or any other officer or employee of any person registered, exempted from 

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registration, or required to be registered with the CFTC, except as provided for in 

17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2021). 

F. An order directing Defendants to pay a civil monetary penalty, to be assessed by 

the Court, in an amount not to exceed the penalty prescribed by 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1), as 

adjusted for inflation pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act 

Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015), title VII, Section 701, see 17 

C.F.R. § 143.8 (2021), for each violation of the Act and Regulations, as described herein;

G. An order directing Defendants, as well as any third-party transferee and/or 

successors thereof, to disgorge, pursuant to such procedure as the Court may order, all benefits 

received from the acts or practices which constitute violations of the Act and Regulations, as 

described herein, and pre- and post-judgment interest thereon from the date of such violations; 

H. An order requiring Defendants, as well as any successors thereof, to make full 

restitution to every person who has sustained losses proximately caused by the violations 

described herein, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;

I. An order directing Defendants, as well as any successors thereof, to rescind, 

pursuant to such procedures as the Court may order, all contracts and agreements, whether 

implied or express, entered into between them and any of the customers whose funds were 

received by them as a result of the acts and practices which constituted violations of the Act and 

Regulations, as described herein;

J. An order requiring Defendants to pay costs and fees as permitted by 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1920 and 2412(a)(2); and 

K. An order providing such other and further relief as the Court may deem necessary 

and appropriate under the circumstances. 

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Dated: January 27, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Danielle Karst 

Danielle Karst

Special Bar ID #A5501601

Timothy J. Mulreany

Special Bar ID #A5500950

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION

Three Lafayette Centre

1155 21st Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20581 

Telephone: (202) 418-5000 

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