IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-KA-00933-SCT CHADDY

BROOKS a/k/a CHADDY MAE BROOKS a/k/a CHADDY

M. BROOKS

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/14/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS, JR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: ROB LAHER DEFORREST ALLGOOD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LOW NDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CARRIE A. JOURDAN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN H. McCLINTON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: FORREST ALLGOOD NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/17/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND KING, JJ. DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Chaddy Brooks was c onvicted of second-degree m urder and s e ntenced to serve f orty y ears in t he custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections. S he now appeals, arguing th a t t here was insuf

f icient evidence to convict her, and that she received inef f ective assistance of

counsel. Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On the m orning of Novem ber 22, 2013—while B rooks’s b oy f riend, D anielle Gore,

was in the bathroom

—Brooks l ooked through h is c e ll phone and f ound text m essages f

romanother wom an. B rooks conf ronted Gore, and the conf rontation becam e phy sical, ending with Brooks stabbing Gore in the neck with a kitchen knif e. The 911 Call ¶3. Brooks c alled 911 and told the operator that, when she and G ore had gotten into an argum ent, she had grabbed a knif e , and as Gore was try i ng to take the knif e f rom her, he had been stabbed. She explained that she “jerked the knif e up an d i t s w u n g i n his neck when [ she] jerked it up.” Brooks’s Statement to Police ¶4. Brooks was taken to the Lowndes C o unty Detention C enter, w here she told detectives
t h a t s he had conf

ronted G ore af

ter f inding text m essages f

rom a “f am iliar n um

ber” on hi s phone, and that she had punched G ore in the f ace, slapped him with her phone, and tried to hit him m ultiple tim es throughout the argum ent. According to Brooks, G ore hit her, threw her, pu s h e d h e r to the f

loor, a nd threatened to “knock [ her] ass out” if s he hit him again. Brooks stated that Gore h ad been try ing to hold her down while she tried to hit him , but she had broken f

ree and grabbed a knif

e f rom t he kitchen. S he explained that w h en Gore approached her and tried to take t he knif e away , she had t

urned her back to him to keep it f rom Gore. According to Brooks, she was holding t he knif e u p in the air with h er right hand and she swung around and “stuck” Gore with the knif e. ¶5. B r o o k s adm itted that she did not have any injuries, a nd that Gore did n o t h a v e a weapon a t any point during the argum ent. Brooks stated that she had gotten the knif e so

2Gore would not com e af ter her o r h u r t her. She also stated that she did not intend to hurt Gore, but she was f

rustrated, wanted to f

ight, and did not want him to leave. The Trial ¶6. B r o o k s w a s i n dicted f or f irst-degree m

urder under Section 97-3-19(1)( a ) o f t h e Mississippi Code. At her trial, Of f icer Ivan Bry a n f

rom the Lo w n d e s C o u n t y Sherif f ’s Departm ent testif

ied that when h e had walked into Brooks’s apartm ent G ore had b een ly ing

on the kitchen f

loor and Brooks had been sitting beside him . He f u rther stated that a large kitchen knif

e had lain a

bout ten f eet f rom Gore’s body

. Bry an testif ied that h e did not see any injuries on Brooks’s body , and that she had stated she had none. Also, param ed ics

exam ined her and f

ound she required no m edical attention. ¶7. Brooks testif

i ed in her o wn def

ense, stating that she ha d a s k e d G o r e t o leave her apartm ent. She explained that Gore had started to put his shoes on but had stopped and acted like he was not going to leave. She stated that she ha d a s k e d h i m t o l e ave again and then “ru s h e d [ p a st] him real f ast

. . . and went in the kitchen a nd g rabbed the k nif e.” Brooks testif i ed that she had gotten the k nif e to protect h erself a nd to show G ore t hat she was serious about wanting him to leave. She stated that when Gore had seen her with the knif e he had started walking toward her, so she had turned her back to him to keep the knif e away f rom him . According to Brooks, Gore had kept try ing to grab the knif e f rom behind her. ¶8. On cross-exam i nati o n , B r o oks adm itted that she did not tell the police that she had gotten the knif

e to m ake Gore l eave. She a lso a d mitted that she had been the initial aggressor, that Gore had not been walking toward her to f ight h er, and that he did not have

3a weapon. Sh e s t a t e d s h e did not know whether he w as g oing t o ref u se to leave when he stopped putting h i s shoes on. Finally , Brooks adm itted that s he had g otten the knif e knowing that Gore was not going to do any thing to hurt her as long as she did not hit him

. ¶9. Brooks w ent on to c la i m— f o r the f irst tim e—that she was injured as a result of the argum ent. According to Brooks, she had bruises on her a rm s and under h er s hirt; however, she adm i tted that pictures take n b y t h e police hours af ter the incident did not show any bruises on her arm s, hands, or f ace. ¶10. The jury , af

ter being instructed o n f

irst-degree m

urder, s eco n d

- d e g r e e m

urder, and

m anslaughter, f

ound Brooks guilty

of second-degree m

urder, and the trial judge sentenced h e r t o f orty y ears in the custody of the M ississippi D epartm ent of Corrections. She no w appeals, raising t wo issues: (1) insuf f icient evidence supported the verdict o f second-degree

m urder and theref

ore her m otion f

or a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, a new trial should have been granted, a n d (2) her trial attorney provided inef f ective assistance because he f ailed t o renew his m otion f or a directed v erdict at the close of all the evidence. ANALYSIS I. T h e t r i a l court did not e r r by deny ing Brooks’s m otion for a JNOV. ¶11. W e review de novo d enials of m otions f or a J N OV because they challenge the legal suf f i c i e ncy of the evidence. 1 A nd “‘the relevant question is w hether, af ter v iewing the

1 K irk v . S ta te , 1 6 0 S o . 3 d 6 8 5 , 6 9 5 (M iss. 2 0 1 5 ) (citing Daniels v . State , 107 So. 3d 961, 963 (Miss. 2013)). 4evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the prosecution, a ny r ational trier of f act could have f ound the essential elem ents o f the crim e bey o nd a reasonable doubt.’” 2 W e “m ust reverse and render if t h e f

a cts and inf

erences ‘point in f

avor o f the d ef

endant on any e lem ent of the of f ense w ith suf

f i cient f o rce that reasonable m en [ or wom e n] could n ot have f ound bey ond a reasonable doubt that the def endant was guilty .’” 3 ¶12. Brooks w as convicted of second-degree m urder under S ection 97-3-19(1)( b ) o f t he Mississippi Code, which provides that: (1) T he killing of a hum a n being without th e a uthority of law b y any m e ans or in any m anner shall be m urder in the f

ollowing cases:

. . . (b) W hen done in the com m ission of an act em inently dangerous to o thers and evincing a depraved heart, regardless o f h u ma n l if e, although without any prem editated design to e f f e c t the death o f a ny particular individual, shall be second-degree m urder.” 4 ¶13. Brooks asserts that the State did not present suf f icient evidence t o prove that she acted with a disregard f

or hum an l if

e as required by Section 97-3-19(1)(b). She contends that she dem onstrated the n e cessary r egard f or Gore’s lif

e b y turning her back to him in an ef f ort to keep him f

rom b eing stabbed, and that Gore acted with a disregard f or his own lif

e when he approached her to take the knif e away . She asks this Court t o reverse her conviction and

rem and this case f

or a new trial, or in the alternative, render a m anslaughter verdict.

2 W a rren v. S ta te , 1 8 7 S o . 3 d 6 1 6 , 6 2 7 (M iss. 2 0 1 6 ) (q u o tin g B u sh v. S ta te , 8 9 5 S o . 2 d 8 3 6 , 8 4 3 (M iss. 2 0 0 5 )).

3 Id . (q u o tin g B u sh , 8 9 5 S o . 2 d at 8 4 3 ).

4 M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -3

- 1 9 (1 )(b ) (S u p p . 2 0 1 6 ). 5¶14. Viewing the evidence as a w hole, we f ind that suf

f icient evidence supported the jury ’s verdict of s e c o n d

- degree m urder. The evidence presented shows that Brooks introduced a deadly we a p o n i n t o a heated argum ent at a tim e when she was not b eing threatened, thus dem onstrating the requisite disregard f o r h um an lif

e . Brooks testif

ied that Gore had started
to put his shoes on right bef ore she had rushed past him and g rabbed the knif e . Although she claim ed Gore had stopped putting on his shoes, she adm itted that she d id not k now whether or not he was going to ref use her request to leave. ¶15. B r o o k s a lso a dm itted that Gore did not have a weapon at a n y p o i n t d u r i n g t h e argum ent, and that he was walking toward her to get the k nif e—not to harm her. She f urther adm itted that she was the initial aggressor and Gore’s t h r e a t t o “ k nock her

. . . out” m eant that he would do so only if she continued to hit h im

. Additionally , the State p r e sented evidence showing that Brooks did not have any visible injuries. ¶16. Brooks contends that we are obligated to t ake her t estim ony a s t r u e pursuant to the holding in Weathersby v. State

. 5 In Weathersby , this C ourt held that “where t he def endant

. . . [ i s ] t h e only ey ewitnesses to the hom icide, [ his or h er] version, if reasonable, m ust b e

ac c e p t e d a s t

r u e , u n l e s s substantially contradicted in m aterial p articulars by a credible witness or witnesses f

or the state, or by the phy sical f a c ts or by t he f

acts of com m on knowledge.” 6

5 Weathersby v. State , 165 So. 2d 207, 147 So. 147 (Miss. 1933).

6 Id . 6This Court subsequently has held the Weathersby r ule inapplicable in cases in which the def endant has provided conf licting stories about the hom icide. 7 ¶17. Here, B rooks told detectives that she had grabbed the k nif e so Gore would not attack h e r b u t l ater testif

ied that she had grabbed it because s he w anted to f orce Gore to leave. Because Brooks provided conf licting stories, s h e is p recluded f rom rely ing on the Weathersby rule. II. Brooks’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of c ounsel. ¶18. Brooks contends t h a t h e r t r i a l counsel provided inef f ective assistance because he f ailed to renew his m otion f o r a directed verdict at the close of the def ense’s case-in-chief

, thereby barring her procedurally

f rom challenging the suf

f iciency o f the State’s evidence. ¶19. To prove a claim of inef f ective assistance of counsel, a def endant f irst m ust show that “counsel’s perf

orm ance was d ef

icient.” Perf

orm a nce is def

icient when an a ttorney

“m ade

errors s o serious that [ he or s he] was not f unctioning a s the ‘counsel’ g u a r a n t e e d the def endant by the S ixth Am endm ent.” 8 Second, the d ef endant m ust show that the def

icient perf orm ance prejudiced t he d ef ense. 9 The def

e nse is prejudiced when “counsel’s errors were

so serious as to d eprive the d ef endant of a f

air trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 10 There is “a strong but rebuttable presum ption that counsel’s perf

o rm a n ce f

alls w ithin t he broad

7 S ee F a irley v. S ta te , 8 7 1 S o . 2 d 1 2 8 2 , 1 2 8 4 (M iss. 2 0 0 0 ).

8 S trick la n d v. W

a sh in g to n , 4 6 6 U .S

. 6 6 8 , 6 8 7 , 1 0 4 S

. C t. 2 0 5 2 , 8 0 L

. E d

. 2 d 6 7 4 (1 9 8 4 ).

9 Id . 10 Id . 7spectrum of r e a s o n a b l e prof essional assistance.” 11 This Court will f ind that counsel’s perf orm ance was def

i cient “[ o]nly where it i s reasonably probable that, but f o r the attorney ’s errors, the outcom e would have been dif f erent.” 12 ¶20. In Holland v S

tate , this Court held that the f ailure to mo v e f

o r a d i r e c t e d verdict, request a perem

ptory instruction, or m ake any post-trial m otion c o n s t i t u ted inef f ective assistance of counsel b ecause it prevented the trial judge f rom considering the suf

f iciency of the evidence. 13 This holding later was clarif ied in Sim on v. State. 14 ¶21. In Sim on , the d ef

endant’s trial counsel m oved f or a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief

but f a iled to renew it at t he c lose of all evidence. 15 Trial counsel did, however, f

ile post- t r i a l m otions challenging the suf f iciency of the evidence, specif ically a

m otion f or a JNOV or a new trial. 16 This Court noted that: In Holland , t his Court w as concerned with the f act t hat trial counsel had comp l e t e l y f

ailed to give the trial court the opportunity to review the suf f iciency of the evidence at the end of the trial. Not only d id counsel f ail to renew his m otion f

o r [ a] directed verdict at the close o f all p r o of , he did not present the trial court with any post-trial m otions. 17

11 D a rtez v. S

ta te, 1 7 7 S o . 3 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 2 (M i ss. 2 0 1 5 ) ( citin g S trick l a n d , 4 6 6 U .S

. at 6 8 7 ).

12 Id . (citin g S

trick l a n d , 4 6 6 U .S . at 6 8 7 ).

13 H o lla n d v. S ta t e , 6 5 6 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 2 , 1 1 9 7

– 1 1 9 8 (M iss. 1 9 9 5 ).

14 S im o n v. S ta te , 8 5 7 S o . 2 d 6 6 8 , 6 9 0 (M iss. 2 0 0 3 ).

15 Id . 16 Id . 17 Id . 8Because the post-trial m otion s c h a l l e n ged the legal suf f iciency of the evidence, this Court held that counsel’s f

ailure t o r e n e w the m otion f or a directed verdict was n ot inef f ective assistance of

counsel. 18 ¶22. Like the attorney i n Sim on , Brooks’s trial counsel m oved f or a d irected verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief but f ailed to renew it at the c lose of all evidence. Brooks’s attorney s u

bsequently f

iled a m otion f

o r a JNOV, or i n the alternative, a new trial. This posttrial m otion gave the lower court an opportunity to r eview the suf f iciency a n d the weight of the State’s evidence; theref ore, we f ind that the f

a ilure t o r e n e w the m otion f or a directed verdict was not inef

f ective assistance of

counsel. CONCLUSION ¶23. Because suf

f icient e vidence existed to convict B r ooks, and because we f urther f ind that she did not receive i nef f e ctive assistance of counsel, we af f irm the j u d g m e n t a n d sentence of the Circuit Court of Lowndes County

. ¶24. C O N V I C T I O N OF SECOND-DEGREE MUR D E R A N D S E N T E N C E O F FORTY(40) YEARS IN THE C USTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI D EPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., RANDO L P H , P . J . , L A M A R , KITCHENS, K ING, COLEMAN, MAX W ELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR.

18 Id . 9