Dismissed and Opinion filed August 22, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00797-CV

K.E.B., Appellant

V.

Office of the Attorney General of Texas and D.R.A., Appellees

On Appeal from the 170th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2022-3571-4

OPINION

In four issues on appeal, K.E.B. (Father) argues that the associate judge

erred in setting certain child support and conservatorship orders pertaining to his 

daughter, A.C.B. (“Amanda”) in this suit affecting the parent-child relationship.

1

However, without reaching the merits, we conclude the report of the associate 

judge appealed by Father is not a final order and dismiss this appeal for want of 

1 To protect the minor’s identity, we have not used the actual names of the child, parents, 

or other family members. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
2

subject-matter jurisdiction.2

I. BACKGROUND

Amanda is the only living child of D.R.A. (Mother) and Father and was 

five-years old at the time of the de novo hearing in district court. Although they 

were never married, Mother and Father lived together for more than seven years. 

When their relationship ended in 2022, disputes arose over access to and support of 

Amanda. As a result, the office of the attorney general (OAG) filed a petition 

against Father seeking conservatorship and child-support orders relating to 

Amanda. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 231.001 (office of attorney general is 

designated as state’s Title IV-D agency); .002(a)(3) (Title IV-D agency may 

initiate legal actions needed to implement chapter 231).

A. Proceedings before the Title IV-D associate judge

By statute, the district court referred the case to an associate judge. See Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 201.101(d) (“if an associate judge is appointed for a court under 

this subchapter, all Title IV-D cases shall be referred to the associate judge by a 

general order for each county issued by the judge of the court for which the 

associate judge is appointed”). The associate judge held a hearing on the merits 

and submitted a letter to the parties in June 2023 advising as to the findings and 

rulings which would be recommended. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 201.011(b), .102 

(after hearing, associate judge must give participating parties notice of substance of 

associate judge’s report). In July, the associate judge signed an order containing his 

2 The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of 

Texas to transfer this appeal (No. 10-23-00316-CV) to this court. Misc. Docket No. 23-9079

(Tex. Sept. 26, 2023); see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 73.001, .002. Because of the transfer, we 

decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare 

decisis if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the transferor court’s 

precedent. See Tex. R. App. 41.3.
3

recommendations that Mother and Father were to be joint managing conservators 

with Mother possessing the right to determine Amanda’s primary residence. The 

order also required Father to pay child support and established a visitation schedule 

for Father and Amanda.

Father filed a request for a de novo hearing in district court.3 Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. §§ 201.015(a) (“A party may request a de novo hearing before the 

referring court by filing with the clerk of the referring court a written request[.]”), 

201.1042 (de novo hearings of Title IV-D cases).

B. Proceedings before the district court

Father, Mother and the OAG appeared in district court and presented 

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.015(c) (at de novo hearing, parties may 

present witnesses “on the issues specified in the request for hearing”). Despite 

holding the hearing, the district court denied Father’s motion for de novo appeal.4

The trial court did not sign an order approving or adopting the recommendations of 

the associate judge.

II. JURISDICTION

In his appellate briefing, Father challenges the child-support and visitation 

rulings recommended by the associate judge. Because there is no indication that 

3 The legislature has set up a framework under Family Code chapter 201, authorizing 

district courts to refer various family-law issues to associate judges. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§§ 201.001–.320. Subchapter A sets the qualifications, powers, and procedures for an associate 

judge. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 201.001–.018. Subchapter B provides for specialized 

associate judges for Title IV-D cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.§§ 201.101–.113. The record 

reflects that the associate judge who presided over this case was a Title IV-D associate judge.

4 The district court utilized a form which is attached to the end of this opinion as an 

appendix. The form contains a number of potential provisions that a referring court can select 

with respect to the resolution of a de novo appeal in a child-support proceeding. However, this 

form does not contain any provision which would allow the recommendations of the associate 

judge to become final. This form could be amended to include language that a referring court can

select that adopts or approves the recommendations of the associate judge.
4 

the district court adopted or made final the recommendations of the associate 

judge, we sent a notice of involuntarily dismissal seeking additional briefing from 

the parties. 

In response to this court’s notice, Father filed a letter and a motion to 

continue the appeal. He argues the trial court did not render a final order but that 

this court should continue the appeal and remand the case for further proceedings, 

effectively asking for a new evidentiary trial. However, without a final order, this 

court has no jurisdiction to review any proceedings below and there is nothing to 

remand. The OAG has not filed a response to this court’s notice or Father’s letter 

and motion. 

We consider questions of finality and jurisdiction under a de novo standard 

of review. See In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (per 

curiam). Unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal, an 

appellate court generally only has jurisdiction over a judgment that is final. See

CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011). We are not aware of any 

statute in the Family Code, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or elsewhere 

authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an associate judge’s recommendations in 

a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 

Ann. § 51.014 (enumerating certain rulings from which interlocutory appeal 

may be taken). Thus, we can only exercise jurisdiction over this appeal if the 

associate judge’s signed order is a final order.

An associate judge’s recommendation can become a final order in some 

situations, but statutory law contemplates a scheme in which the report or 

recommendations are not final until adopted by the referring court. For example, 

the law provides that the report may contain “recommendations” and be “in the 

form of a proposed order.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.011(a). Once 
5

completed, the report must be sent to the referring court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 201.011(e). A party may then request a de novo hearing from the referring court, 

where issues can be reconsidered and witnesses may be presented. See Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. § 201.015(a), (c). If a party does not request a de novo hearing, the 

referring court may adopt, modify, or reject the associate judge’s report; hear 

further evidence; or recommit the matter to the associate judge for further 

proceedings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.014(a). In those situations when a de 

novo hearing has not been requested, the associate judge’s report generally 

becomes the final order of the referring court only upon the referring court’s 

signature. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.013(b).

As previously indicated, there are also situations in which an associate judge 

can render a final order on their own, without any further involvement from the 

referring court. The law describes these situations in two provisions. Under the 

first, an associate judge has the power to render and sign a final agreed order, a 

final default order, or a final order in a case in which a party has filed an 

unrevoked waiver to notice of, or appearance at, the final hearing. See Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. § 201.007(a)(14). None of these situations apply here. Father did not 

agree to the form and substance of the associate judge’s report, nor could a default 

order be rendered against Father because he affirmatively appeared at the trial. 

Under the second provision, an associate judge has the power to render and sign a 

final order if the parties sign a document in writing waiving their right to a de novo 

hearing before the referring court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.007(a)(16). The 

record affirmatively reflects that provision is also inapplicable to this case.

The associate judge first issued a letter report with his intended findings and 

then signed a proposed order. Although the order was not written as a 

recommendation and did not contain any space for the district court to approve the 
6

order, we hold that the referring court was required to sign this order or take some 

other action to adopt or modify the order proposed by the associate judge before a 

final order could be rendered. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.016(b) (providing 

that date of order or judgment signed by referring court is “the controlling date for 

the purposes of appeal,” unless associate judge rendered agreed order, default 

order, or final order based on party’s waiver); In re K.M.H., No. 14-22-00784-CV, 

2023 WL 2534517, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 16, 2023, no pet.)

(concluding associate judge’s report was not intended to be final and dismissed 

appeal for want of jurisdiction in parental-termination proceeding); In re Anderson, 

No. 14-05-00820-CV, 2005 WL 3074680, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Nov. 15, 2005) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (“The findings and recommendations of 

the associate judge do not become the order of the referring court until the 

referring court signs an order.”).

III. CONCLUSION

Holding there is no final order, we dismiss this appeal for want of 

subject-matter jurisdiction.

/s/ Charles A. Spain

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Spain and Poissant.
7

APPENDIX

ORDER ON DE NOVO APPEAL

On the _____ day of _____________, _______, the Court held a hearing in this cause.

The Office of the Attorney General appeared by its Attorney of Record.

[Mother] mother of the child, hereinafter referred to as Obligee,

□ appeared □ in person □ virtually □ telephonically (and by attorney ___________);

□ agreed to the entry of these orders as evidenced by her signature;

□ although duly notified, did not appear.

[Father] father of the child, hereinafter referred to as Obligor,

□ appeared □ in person □ virtually □ telephonically (and by attorney ___________);

□ agreed to the entry of these orders as evidenced by his signature;

□ although duly notified, did not appear.

It is FOUND that the Court has jurisdiction of the partes and the subject matter of this suit, and that the

following orders are in the best interest of the child.

A record of the proceedings was:

□ waived by the parties with the consent of the court.

□ made by Court Reporter.

□ IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.

□ IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and that a new trial is GRANTED.

□ IT IS ORDERED that the motion is partially GRANTED and that a new trial is GRANTED with 

respect to the following issues:

Date Signed: _____________________________

________________________________________

JUDGE PRESIDING