FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICIA ANN CORDES, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,* Attorney

General; Tom Ridge, Secretary of No. 04-15988

the Department of Homeland D.C. No.

Security; Nancy Alcantar, Interim  CV-03-05580-

Director of the San Francisco OWW/LJO

District Office for the Bureau of OPINION Immigration and Customs

Enforcement; Rosemary Wahl,

Commander of the Kern County

Pretrial Facility,

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Oliver W. Wanger, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 11, 2005—San Francisco, California

Filed August 10, 2005

Before: Warren J. Ferguson, John T. Noonan, and

Pamela Ann Rymer, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ferguson;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Rymer

*Alberto R. Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft,

as Attorney General of the United States. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). 

10275
COUNSEL

Jagdip Singh Sekhon (argued), Sekhon & Sekhon, San Francisco, California; Scott Mossman (briefed), Sekhon &

Sekhon, San Francisco, California, for the petitionerappellant. 

James Hunolt (argued), Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; Audrey B. Hemesath (briefed), Office of the United

States Attorney, Sacramento, California, for the respondentsappellees. 

OPINION

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: 

Patricia Ann Cordes (“Cordes”), a native and citizen of the

United Kingdom, appeals the District Court’s denial of her 28

U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of her final order of removal. Cordes pled guilty to dissuading a witness with threat of force and to inducing false

testimony, in violation of sections 136.1(c)(1) and 137(c) of

CORDES v. GONZALES 10279
the California Penal Code, respectively. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) determined that Cordes’s conviction

constituted an aggravated felony under the amended definition of aggravated felony in section 321 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (Sept.

30, 1996), and ordered her removed. 

On appeal, Cordes contends that the District Court erred

when it (1) applied retroactively the amended definition of

aggravated felony under sections 321(a)(3) and 321(a)(11) of

IIRIRA; (2) rejected her due process challenge to the retroactive application of the amended aggravated felony definition;

and (3) denied her equal protection challenge to the unavailability of relief from removal under section 212(c) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-

414, 66 Stat. 163 (June 27, 1952) (hereinafter, “section

212(c)”).1

We find that like the petitioner in United States v. VelascoMedina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

1210 (2004), Cordes does not fit within the exception to section 304(b) of IIRIRA set forth in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289

(2001). Cordes could not have had settled expectations as to

the continued availability of section 212(c) relief at the time

she entered her guilty plea for non-deportable offenses

because the passage of section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No.

104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), predated her convic1Section 212(c) provided that “[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent

residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily . . . and who are

returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years,

may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . .” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(c) (repealed 1996). 

The BIA has interpreted this provision “to authorize any permanent resident with a lawful unreliquished domicile of seven consecutive years to

apply for a discretionary waiver from deportation.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533

U.S. 289, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

10280 CORDES v. GONZALES
tion. In addition, we conclude that the retroactive application

of the amended aggravated felony definition under section

321 of IIRIRA is supported by a rational basis, and therefore

does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Nevertheless, we sustain Cordes’s equal protection challenge because the current judicially defined limits to the availability of section 212(c) relief post-IIRIRA, as applied by the

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,2 create an

irrational result, namely affording discretionary relief from

removal to legal permanent residents who have committed

worse crimes than similarly situated permanent residents like

Cordes. 

I. JURISDICTION

While this case was pending, Congress enacted the Real ID

Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 199 Stat. 231, 310-11

(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252) (May 11, 2005). The Act amends

the INA by eliminating federal habeas jurisdiction in favor of

petitions for review that raise “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id. at § 106(a)(1). Although the Act applies

retroactively, see id. at § 106(b), its application to pending

appeals is uncertain. See id. at § 106(c) (providing a procedure only for the transfer of petitions currently before the district courts). It is unclear, for example, whether Congress

intended for the Act to affect habeas petitions where judgment

has already been entered by a district court. But we need not

resolve this issue here because we would treat the appeal in

the same manner were it a petition for review under section

106. That is, we would still review the merits of Cordes’s

2As of March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(“INS”) ceased to exist and its enforcement functions were transferred to

the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-

296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002). For ease of reference, however, we

refer to the applicable government agency as the INS. 

CORDES v. GONZALES 10281
constitutional claims. We thus proceed to decide this case

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, as an appeal from the denial of a

habeas petition.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Cordes was born on May 9, 1952 in Scotland. She entered

the United States legally at the age of eighteen and became a

permanent resident on February 3, 1972. Since then, she has

lawfully resided in the United States and has raised four U.S.

citizen children. In the over thirty years that she has been in

the United States, she has left the country only a handful of

times to visit her mother in Scotland. 

On May 30, 1996, Cordes pled guilty to dissuading a witness from testifying with threat of force and inducing false

testimony. The circumstances of Cordes’s offenses involved

attempting to persuade her daughter—a victim of molestation

—to retract allegations against Cordes’s former boyfriend.

Cordes was sentenced to two years in prison followed by probation. As of her conviction date, Cordes’s offenses were misdemeanors and did not constitute an aggravated felony or

subject her to deportation. Accordingly, Cordes was ineligible

for section 212(c) relief since it was only available for permanent residents who faced deportation. 

On April 24, 1996, one month before Cordes’s conviction,

Congress passed section 440(d) of AEDPA, which made all

persons designated as aggravated felons ineligible for section

212(c) relief. On Cordes’s conviction date, May 30, 1996,

section 440(d) of AEDPA had no effect on her deportability

because the offenses to which she pled guilty did not constitute an aggravated felony and, thereby, posed no deportation

consequences. 

On September 30, 1996, four months after Cordes’s conviction, Congress passed IIRIRA. Section 321 of IIRIRA

expanded the definitions of aggravated felonies in 8 U.S.C.

10282 CORDES v. GONZALES
§§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and 1101(a)(43)(S). For crimes of violence,

the required minimum term of imprisonment imposed was

lowered from 5 years to 1 year. IIRIRA § 321(a)(3). Similarly, an “offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or

subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness,” which formerly required a potential sentence of 5 years imprisonment

or more to qualify as an aggravated felony, was changed to

require a term of imprisonment of “at least one year.” IIRIRA

§ 321(a)(11). Moreover, section 304(b) of IIRIRA repealed

section 212(c) relief altogether and replaced it with cancellation of removal, a more limited form of discretionary waiver

from removal, which was also made unavailable to aggravated felons. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 

On December 17, 1996, having been released from custody, Cordes was arrested for violating section 23152(a) of

the California Vehicle Code, driving under the influence of

alcohol. She was convicted of the offense on February 19,

1997, and her probation was reinstated. On October 10, 2000,

Cordes again violated probation for driving under the influence of alcohol. This time her probation was revoked and she

was returned to state custody. 

On January 31, 2001, the INS brought removal proceedings

against Cordes, charging her as an aggravated felon under the

new IIRIRA reclassification of aggravated felony. The INS

contended that (1) her offenses at the time of her May 30,

1996 guilty plea now could be recharacterized as constituting

an aggravated felony, (2) she was consequently ineligible for

section 212(c) relief under section 440(d) of AEDPA since

she was an aggravated felon, and (3) she was further ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 304(b) of

IIRIRA as an aggravated felon. 

On October 10, 2001, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered

Cordes removed from the United States but granted her section 212(c) relief because, in the IJ’s view, she fit within an

exception to section 304(b) of IIRIRA that the Supreme Court

CORDES v. GONZALES 10283
carved out in St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289. There, the Supreme Court

held that section 212(c) relief was available for aliens who

were eligible for such relief at the time of their convictions

and who relied on this relief in entering guilty pleas. The INS

timely appealed the IJ’s order, and on February 21, 2003, the

BIA overruled the IJ’s decision and found Cordes deportable

and ineligible for section 212(c) relief in accordance with this

Circuit’s decision in Velasco-Medina. 305 F.3d 839. 

When Cordes challenged the BIA’s decision, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) precluded direct appellate review of a BIA’s

removal decision for “a crime involving moral turpitude.” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Cordes, therefore, filed a 28

U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition in the District Court on May

10, 2004 asking for a stay of removal. Specifically, she challenged the retroactive application of sections 321(a)(3) and

321(a)(11) of IIRIRA and raised an equal protection challenge. The District Court denied her petition on April 8, 2004,

and this appeal timely followed. 

III. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the District Court’s decision to deny

Cordes’s habeas petition. Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 438

(9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conduct

the same inquiry as the District Court. We must decide the

merits of Cordes’s constitutional claims. 

A. Retroactivity 

Cordes first challenges the retroactive application of sections 321(a)(3) and 321(a)(11) of IIRIRA and the resulting

unavailability of section 212(c) relief under St. Cyr. 533 U.S.

289. 

[1] Sections 321(a)(3) and 321(a)(11) of IIRIRA reduced

the sentencing requirement for an “aggravated felony” from

“at least 5 years” to “at least one year.” Section 321(b) of

10284 CORDES v. GONZALES
IIRIRA made the amended definition of aggravated felony

retroactive, “appl[ying] regardless of whether the conviction

was entered before, on, or after [September 30, 1996].” This

Circuit subsequently upheld the retroactive application of sections 321(a)(3) and 321(a)(11) of IIRIRA. See Aragon-Ayon

v. INS, 206 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We are satisfied

that Congress intended the 1996 amendments to make the

aggravated felony definition apply retroactively to all defined

offenses whenever committed, and to make aliens so convicted eligible for deportation notwithstanding the passage of

time between the crime and the removal order.”). 

[2] The repeal of section 212(c) by section 304(b) of

IIRIRA, however, was not made explicitly retroactive. Aliens

who had relied upon the existence of section 212(c) relief in

pleading guilty to a crime remain entitled to its protection

even after its elimination under section 304(b) of IIRIRA.

Indeed, in St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that “[section]

212(c) relief remains available for aliens . . . whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for

[such] relief at the time of their plea under the law then in

effect.” 533 U.S. at 326. Enrico St. Cyr had pled guilty to a

state law drug offense ten years after becoming a U.S. permanent resident. Id. at 293. His guilty plea rendered him deportable, so he was eligible for section 212(c) relief under preIIRIRA law. Id. Before the INS could bring removal proceedings against him, however, Congress passed section 440(d) of

AEDPA and section 304(b) of IIRIRA, which effectively precluded granting St. Cyr section 212(c) relief because he had

committed a crime that had been reclassified as an aggravated

felony. Id. at 297. Because he had expected to be eligible for

section 212(c) relief when he pled guilty, the Supreme Court

held that he was eligible for such relief in spite of the new

legal landscape. Id. at 321. 

[3] This Circuit has clearly limited the St. Cyr exception. In

Velasco-Medina, we held that section 212(c) relief was

CORDES v. GONZALES 10285
unavailable for an alien who pled guilty after the enactment

of section 440(d) of AEDPA but before the enactment of

IIRIRA. 305 F.3d 839. The court first reasoned that, unlike St.

Cyr, Velasco-Medina had not developed “settled expectations” in section 212(c) relief because he was not deportable,

and therefore ineligible for section 212(c) relief, at the time

of his plea bargain. Id. at 849. The court went on to note that

“[Section 440(d)] of AEDPA provided Velasco-Medina with

fair notice that discretionary relief under [section] 212(c)

would be unavailable in the event his conviction was reclassified as an aggravated felony. To the extent [Velasco-Medina]

anticipated the continued availability of [section] 212(c) relief

after his guilty plea, his expectations were neither reasonable

nor settled under St. Cyr.” Id. at 850. 

[4] Like Velasco-Medina, Cordes pled guilty to her

offenses after the passage of section 440(d) of AEDPA and

could not have been eligible for section 212(c) relief because

at the time of her conviction her offenses did not render her

deportable. Moreover, as it did for Velasco-Medina, section

440(d) of AEDPA placed Cordes on notice that if her conviction were reclassified as an aggravated felony, she would be

ineligible for section 212(c) relief. Thus, Cordes’s expectations as to the continued availability of section 212(c) relief

were, like those of Velasco-Medina, neither reasonable nor

settled under St. Cyr.

3

3Cordes contends that this Circuit’s opinion in United States v. LeonPaz, 340 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2003), undermines the holding in VelascoMedina by applying the St. Cyr exception to a defendant who had not

committed a deportable offense at the time of her conviction. Like Cordes,

Leon-Paz’s conviction became an aggravated felony as a direct consequence of section 321 of IIRIRA. 340 F.3d at 1005-06. Again the inquiry

turned on whether Leon-Paz had expected to be eligible for section 212(c)

relief at the time that he entered his plea. The panel found that he did

because he could not have been aware of the unavailability of section

212(c) relief in the event that his crime would be reclassified as an aggravated felony since section 440(d) of AEDPA had not yet been passed. Id.

at 1006-07. Here, the passage of section 440(d) of AEDPA predated

Cordes’s conviction, so Leon-Paz is distinguishable. 

10286 CORDES v. GONZALES
B. Due Process

Cordes next contends that sections 321(a)(3) and

321(a)(11) of IIRIRA retroactively reclassified her from a

permanent resident to a removable aggravated felon without

any rational basis and without furnishing her any fair notice

or repose. 

[5] The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from enacting legislation expressly made retroactive when the “ ‘retroactive application [of the statute] is so

harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation.’ ” Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938). Due process “protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may

be compromised by retroactive legislation.” Landgraf v. USI

Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). 

[6] While this court has held that section 321 of IIRIRA

overcomes the presumption against retroactive legislation

because “Congress has clearly manifested an intent for the

amended definition of aggravated felony to apply retroactively,” Aragon-Ayon, 206 F.3d at 851, we have not decided

whether the definition’s retroactive application violates due

process. 

[7] We agree with the Second Circuit that the retroactive

application of section 321 of IIRIRA is rationally related to a

legitimate governmental purpose. “Congress has a legitimate

interest in protecting society from the commission of aggravated felonies . . . , and legislation that deports aliens who

presently commit or who have committed those acts in the

past is a rational means of furthering that interest.” Kuhali v.

Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Hamama v.

INS, 78 F.3d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1996)). This conclusion comports with our decision in United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d

1, 8 (9th Cir. 1994), which held that the retroactive application of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C), as modified in 1990, to

deport an alien on the basis of a 1982 firearms offense did not

CORDES v. GONZALES 10287
violate the Due Process Clause. We reasoned that retroactive

application of the amended statute was rationally related to a

legitimate governmental interest because it “results in uniform

application of the deportation provision to aliens convicted of

firearms offenses, no matter when those convictions

occurred.” Id. Yacoubian also recognized “Congress’

undoubted power to exclude undesirable aliens from this

country even if that determination is made long after a crime

was committed.” Id. at 8 n.3 (citing Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.

32, 38-40 (1924); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694

(1957)).4

C. Equal Protection 

Finally, Cordes brings an equal protection challenge to the

INS’ decision, based on St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, and VelascoMedina, 305 F.3d 839, to afford section 212(c) relief to permanent residents who retroactively became aggravated felons,

but who had committed deportable offenses at the time of

their conviction, and not to those permanent residents who

retroactively became aggravated felons, but who had not committed deportable offenses at the time of their convictions. 

[8] The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “[n]o State

shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This guarantee of equal protection applies to the federal government through the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause. See Catholic Soc. Servs.,

Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1152 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(citation omitted) (“The Fifth Amendment has no Equal Protection Clause. An equal protection claim under the Fifth

Amendment is brought under the equal protection component

of the Due Process Clause.”). 

4Cordes relies on the concurrence in United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa,

364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004) (Pregerson, J., concurring), which

maintained that retroactive application of section 321 of IIRIRA violates

due process. The concurrence, however, is not the law of the circuit. 

10288 CORDES v. GONZALES
[9] The Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens. See Yick

Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The “disparate

treatment of similarly situated aliens under the immigration

laws” implicates the guarantee of equal protection. Aguirre v.

INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996). The government must

therefore demonstrate a rational basis for treating aliens disparately. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). That is, a

legislative classification must be “ ‘wholly irrational’ ” to violate equal protection. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83

(1976). 

[10] First, Cordes, as a permanent resident, is similarly situated to those permanent residents who are entitled to section

212(c) relief under St. Cyr. The only discernable difference

between the two is that those entitled to section 212(c) relief

faced deportation at the time they entered their guilty pleas.

This difference, however, is “irrelevant and fortuitous” since

Cordes quite obviously faces deportation now.5See Francis v.

INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Fundamental fairness

dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated in

a like manner.”). 

[11] Second, the disparate treatment of Cordes and those

permanent residents who are entitled to section 212(c) relief

under St. Cyr lacks a rational basis. Because Cordes does not

fit within the St. Cyr exception, the law treats her differently

5The dissent stresses how Cordes “was much better situated” than permanent residents such as St. Cyr “because she was not deportable” at the

time she pled guilty to her offenses. See dissent at 10294. But this fact

ignores entirely Cordes’s present situation. Due to the retroactive application of section 321 of IIRIRA, she is now precisely in the same position

as permanent residents such as St. Cyr—facing deportation because her

crime has been reclassified as an aggravated felony. Indeed, Cordes should

be much better situated than permanent residents such as St. Cyr. since,

unlike them, she pled guilty to less severe, non-deportable offenses. The

INS’ disparate grant of section 212(c) relief, however, irrationally prevents this result. 

CORDES v. GONZALES 10289
than those permanent resident aliens who formed settled

expectations as to the availability of section 212(c) relief

because they committed severe, deportable offenses. Had

Cordes committed a more severe crime—one that would have

rendered her deportable—she would have been eligible for

such relief and been able to preserve the relief even though

her crime was later reclassified as an aggravated felony. Put

differently, those permanent residents who committed more

serious crimes than Cordes obtain the section 212(c) bulwark

only because they had the ironic fortune of facing the prospect

of deportation at the time that they entered their guilty pleas.

Both the District Court decision and dissent, see dissent at

10295, rely on Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.

2002), to dismiss Cordes’s equal protection challenge.

Taniguchi, however, has nothing to do with this case.

Taniguchi claimed that section 212(h) of the INA violated her

right to equal protection by providing a waiver of deportation

to aggravated felons who were not permanent residents while

denying the same waiver to aggravated felons who were permanent residents. Id. at 957. The panel held that Congress had

a rational basis for denying a discretionary waiver to aggravated felons who were permanent residents since they enjoyed

greater privileges in the United States than aggravated felons

who were not permanent residents and posed a potentially

higher risk of recidivism than illegal aliens who did not have

the benefits that come with permanent resident status. Id. at

958. Taniguchi foreclosed an equal protection challenge to a

federal immigration scheme that treated permanent residents

and non-permanent residents differently. But it did not foreclose an equal protection challenge to a federal immigration

scheme that effectively treats similarly situated permanent

residents differently, which is the situation here. No case in

this Circuit has foreclosed such a challenge. 

In fact, in Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir.

1981), we held that the INS’ implementation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(c) violated the Equal Protection Clause because it irra10290 CORDES v. GONZALES
tionally granted relief from removal to those permanent residents in exclusion proceedings who left the United States

temporarily and sought return, but not to those permanent residents in deportation proceedings who had never left the

United States.6 We noted that no rational purpose would be

served by “giving less consideration to the alien ‘whose ties

with this country are so strong that he has never departed after

his initial entry’ than to the alien ‘who may leave and return

from time to time.’ ” Id. (quoting Francis, 532 F.2d at 273).

Moreover, in Servin-Espinoza v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193,

1198 (9th Cir. 2002), we again noted the irrational distinction

drawn by the INS in granting section 212(c) relief to excludable aliens but not to deportable aliens. Denying section

212(c) relief to deportable aliens “contraven[ed] equal protection” because it disrupted the rational purpose of immigration

law to “treat[ ] aliens who are already on our soil (and who

are therefore deportable) more favorably than aliens who are

merely seeking admittance (and who are therefore excludable).” Id. 

[12] Both Tapia-Acuna and Servin-Espinoza are relevant

authority here. These cases sustained equal protection challenges to the INS’ policy of selectively granting discretionary

relief from removal. Our case should do no differently. The

INS has the burden of justifying why Cordes should be

removed in spite of her permanent resident status. See H.R.

Rep. No. 104-879, at 107-09 (1997) (available in 1997 WL

9288 p.258-262) (“[I]n the case of a long-term permanent resident of the U.S., the burden [is] on the Government to establish why the alien should be removed.”). But the INS cannot

6Effective April 1, 1997, Congress repealed 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) and

adopted a new provision which unambiguously bars discretionary relief

for permanent residents in either exclusion or deportation proceedings

who commit one of the specified crimes in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Thus,

the specific issue in Tapia-Acuna is no longer material. See United States

v. Estrada-Torres, 179 F.3d 776, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1999). 

CORDES v. GONZALES 10291
rationally do so. Allowing permanent residents who have

committed worse crimes than Cordes to apply for section

212(c) relief, while denying the same opportunity to Cordes,

does not achieve Congress’ express purpose behind the

expanded definition of aggravated felony and its retroactive

application: to expeditiously remove criminal aliens and make

it more difficult for them to obtain relief from removal. See

id. Indeed, the disparate grant of section 212(c) relief here

does not increase the total number of criminal aliens subject

to removal, as Congress intended, but rather perversely

increases only the number of less dangerous criminals subject

to removal. 

[13] Finally, as the IJ correctly pointed out, equity in this

case unquestionably weighs in favor of allowing Cordes to

apply for section 212(c) relief.7 Cordes has lived in the United

States for over three decades and has only one relevant conviction for offenses that were misdemeanors when they were

committed. She has left the country only a few times to visit

her mother and attend her mother’s funeral in Scotland. She

has four U.S. citizen children, three of whom testified on her

behalf during removal proceedings that she plays a significant

role in their lives and continued well-being. She has taken

measures to rehabilitate her alcohol problem by attending

Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. She has volunteered for the

Senior Citizen Center and Salvation Army in her community.

She has taken measures to secure better financial footing by

working at restaurants and looking for work at a grocery

store. In sum, Cordes is a hard-working, engaged member of

society. 

7Of course, the “irrational inequality” necessary to sustain an equal protection challenge, see dissent at 10296, is apparent here from the INS’ disparate grant of section 212(c) relief. It is the inequity to Cordes, however,

that makes the equal protection violation in this case especially severe. 

10292 CORDES v. GONZALES
IV. CONCLUSION

[14] We hold that the INS’ application of St. Cyr and

Velasco-Medina, which results in the denial of section 212(c)

relief for permanent residents, such as Cordes, violates the

Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. We therefore

reverse the District Court’s denial of Cordes’s habeas petition

and remand with instructions to grant the writ. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

RYMER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: 

It is rational to distinguish between aliens who were deportable and those who were not when they entered a plea of

guilty to a crime that IIRIRA retroactively makes an aggravated felony because those who — like Cordes — were not

deportable could not have relied on the availability of

§ 212(c) relief, whereas those who — unlike Cordes — were

deportable could have relied on that possibility. That’s why,

in a nutshell, there is no equal protection violation. Accordingly, while I agree that United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305

F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2002), forecloses Cordes’s claim that she

is eligible for § 212(c) relief under INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.

289 (2001), and that the retroactive application of IIRIRA’s

definition of aggravated felony to render her deportable did

not violate due process, I disagree that Cordes’s ineligibility

for § 212(c) relief violates equal protection. 

First, the majority concludes that Cordes as a lawful permanent resident is similarly situated to those permanent residents

who are entitled to § 212(c) relief under St. Cyr. This is not

so, because she and Velasco-Medina were not deportable and

did not rely on availability of § 212(c) relief when they pled

guilty. Second, the majority holds that the disparate treatment

CORDES v. GONZALES 10293
of Cordes and those permanent residents who are entitled to

§ 212(c) relief under St. Cyr lacks a rational basis. It doesn’t,

because it is not wholly irrational to preserve § 212(c) relief

for those who relied on the availability of a discretionary

waiver to avoid deportation. 

The majority believes that it is not rational to allow lawful

permanent residents who have “committed worse crimes than

Cordes” to apply for § 212(c) relief while denying her the

same opportunity.1 Maj. op. at 10290. However, this is not the

reason that Cordes is ineligible for § 212(c) relief. Under the

law in effect at the time of Cordes’s guilty plea, a lawful permanent resident who suffered a conviction for a deportable

offense might have had the opportunity of applying for

§ 212(c) relief. Cordes did not have this opportunity at the

time she pled guilty because she didn’t need it: her conviction

did not render her deportable. In other words, Cordes was no

worse off and, indeed, was much better situated, than a lawful

permanent resident convicted of a deportable offense. This is

because she was not deportable and was entitled to stay in this

country, whereas the deportable lawful permanent resident

could only remain if granted § 212(c) relief. It is hard to

imagine a lawful permanent resident preferring to be eligible

for § 212(c) relief from deportation, to not being deportable

at all. In short, Cordes was not deportable and so was not similarly situated to a lawful permanent resident who was deportable. 

1This is not what Cordes argues, although the bottom line is the same.

Based on the statutory scheme, Cordes argues that it is irrational for the

law to treat lawful permanent residents with two convictions for a crime

involving moral turpitude better than it did her, with only one such conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1995). She also argues that she was

treated worse than aliens with a conviction for a crime involving moral

turpitude who departed the country and returned. This argument also fails

because aliens with a conviction who departed were at risk of being denied

reentry because they were considered inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)

(2)(A)(i) (1995). Cordes was not at risk of deportation at the time of her

conviction, and therefore did not need to apply for § 212(c) relief and

could not reasonably have relied upon its availability. 

10294 CORDES v. GONZALES
It follows from St. Cyr and Velasco-Medina that in these

circumstances, Cordes’s ineligibilty for § 212(c) relief is not

“wholly irrational” and does not offend equal protection.

Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). St. Cyr preserves

eligibility for § 212(c) relief for some lawful permanent residents even after IIRIRA reclassified their convictions as

aggravated felonies when the retroactive application of

IIRIRA to deny eligibility for discretionary waiver would “attach[ ] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (quoting

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994)). This

would be so, for example, with respect to those whose guilty

plea (before IIRIRA) would have made them deportable and

who could have relied on continuing to be eligible for

§ 212(c) relief after IIRIRA. However, as we hold in this case,

IIRIRA does not have an impermissible retroactive effect as

applied to Cordes because she could not have pled guilty in

reliance on eligibility for § 212(c) relief. Velasco-Medina, 305

F.3d at 849-50. It is perfectly rational for a lawful permanent

resident’s eligibility for § 212(c) relief after IIRIRA has

reclassified her crime of conviction as an aggravated felony

to turn on whether she relied on the possibility of § 212(c)

relief when she entered into a plea agreement. 

Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981), and

Servin-Espinoza v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2002),

which the majority says “are relevant authority here,” maj. op.

at 10291, have nothing to do with this case. Both determined

that it was irrational for the law to prefer excludable over

deportable aliens with respect to § 212(c) relief, but reliance

was not a factor in either situation. Even though St. Cyr and

Velasco-Medina might allow permanent residents who have

committed “worse crimes” than Cordes to remain eligible for

§ 212(c) relief, this is only because they — unlike Cordes —

pled in reliance on such relief. 

Finally, equity may well “weigh[ ] in favor of” allowing

Cordes a shot at § 212(c) relief, as the majority says, maj. op.

CORDES v. GONZALES 10295
at 10292, but equal protection turns on irrational inequality,

not inequity. It is not wholly irrational to save the opportunity

of applying for a discretionary waiver of deportation for lawful permanent residents who were deportable when they pled

guilty to a crime that was reclassified as an aggravated felony

and relied on its continuing to be available, but not to create

an opportunity for those who were not deportable and had no

reason to rely upon the possibility of applying for a waiver

when they entered a plea. 

I would affirm across the board.

10296 CORDES v. GONZALES