*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 9/19/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

EDWARD P. REDDECK,

Defendant-Appellant,

WILLIS H. GIBSON, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 96-4031

(D.C. No. 94-CV-849-W)

(D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered

submitted without oral argument.
1

 Although not addressed in petitioner's appellate brief, there is a question as to whether

he is required to secure a certificate of appealability under the changes made to 28 U.S.C. § 2253

by section 102 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Given that petitioner's claim so clearly fails on its merits, we see no

reason to explore whether he should have applied for a certificate of appealability. Assuming

such a certificate is required, we grant it.

2

Petitioner Edward Reddeck, appearing pro se, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to

set aside his conviction, which was denied by the district court. We affirm.1

Petitioner was convicted in federal court in 1993 of multiple counts of mail fraud,

18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of using a fictitious and false name, 18 U.S.C. § 1342, in

connection with his operation of a mail-correspondence university. His convictions were

affirmed by this court, but the case was remanded to the district court for resentencing. 

United States v. Reddeck, 22 F. 3d 1504, 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (Reddeck I). Following

resentencing, petitioner filed a pro se appeal, contending "in a rambling and conclusory

string of assertions" that he was "a long-standing victim of governmental persecution." 

United States v. Reddeck, 69 F. 3d 549 (10th Cir. 1995) (table) (Reddeck II). In

connection with the appeal, petitioner filed "emergency" motions for various collateral

relief, including habeas corpus, temporary restraint, and preliminary injunction. This

court affirmed petitioner's conviction, noting claims of an alleged conspiracy should have

been raised in his initial appeal and were beyond the court's jurisdiction.

Subsequent to his conviction and initial appeal, petitioner also filed a "Motion for

Summary Judgment on Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 2243 and Dismissal of

Case for Newly Discovered Evidence and the Statutory Requirements of F.R.CV.P.59(E),

81(6) and 52," but which was properly construed by the district court as a § 2255 motion. 

See United States v. Scott, 803 F. 2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting challenges to
3

validity of judgment or sentence arise under § 2255).

On appeal, petitioner claims, as he did in Reddeck II, that his conviction was the

result of a conspiracy on the part of state and federal officials. We conclude, as we

previously did, that petitioner waived his "conspiracy" claims by not asserting them in

Reddeck I. See United States v. Khan, 835 F. 2d 749, 753 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied

487 U.S. 1222 (1988). We emphasize that, "[o]nce the [petitioner]'s chance to appeal has

been waived or exhausted, . . . we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally

convicted, especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present his

federal claims to a federal forum." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982).

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge