Filed 1/26/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CALIFORNIA SELF-INSURERS’

SECURITY FUND et al.,

 Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 

COUNTY,

 Respondent;

ACTIVCARE LIVING et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

 G054981

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00690574)

 O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of 

the Superior Court of Orange County, William D. Claster, Judge. Petition granted.

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Sean M. SeLegue, John S. Throckmorton 

and Matthew R. Diton; Nixon Peabody and Karl D. Belgum for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.
2

Michelman & Robinson and Jeffrey D. Farrow for Real Parties in Interest, 

Activcare Living fka Health Care Group and Mountview Retirement Ltd., et al.

Epps & Coulson, Dawn M. Coulson and Veronica S. Darling for Real Party 

in Interest, Acacia Villas Assisted Living.

Roxborough, Pomerance, Nye & Adreani, Nicholas P. Roxborough, Jaclyn 

D. Grossman and Ryan R. Salsig for Real Parties in Interest, Braswell’s Ivy Retreat et al.

Law Office of Shafiel A. Karim and Shafiel A. Karim for Real Party in 

Interest, Southview Home Care Services, Inc.

Thomas G. Gehring & Associates, A Professional Corporation, Thomas G. 

Gehring and Julia J. Park for Real Party in Interest, ELADH.

* * *

Petitioners California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (the Fund) and Nixon 

Peabody LLP (Nixon Peabody or the firm) seek a writ of mandate directing the trial court 

to vacate its order disqualifying Nixon Peabody from representing the Fund in the instant 

case. Petitioners argue the trial court mistakenly believed it was compelled by law to 

disqualify the firm; the court instead should have made further factual findings and 

exercised its discretion. Real parties in interest contend disqualification was mandatory 

and therefore no discretion needed to be exercised.

We conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that automatic 

disqualification was not required under these facts. We therefore grant the petition and 

direct the trial court to determine whether confidential information was transmitted to 

Nixon Peabody, or whether, in the court’s discretion, other compelling reasons dictate the 

firm should be disqualified.
3

I

FACTS

The Fund is a nonprofit organization charged by the state Legislature with 

continuing payment of workers’ compensation claims when a self-insured entity is unable 

to do so. (Lab. Code, § 3740.) When the Fund steps in to provide such payments, it is 

required by law to seek reimbursement from the employer. (Lab. Code, § 3744, subd. 

(a).) The instant action is a collection effort by the Fund.

The law permits groups of employers to band together into self-insurance 

groups, and the Fund is also responsible for paying workers’ compensation claims when 

such groups cannot. The Healthcare Industry Self-Insurance Program (the Program) is 

one such group. In 2013, the California Department of Industrial Relations ordered the 

Fund to assume the Program’s workers’ compensation claims.

The Fund hired Nixon Peabody to represent it in order to seek 

reimbursement. In November 2013, the Fund filed a lawsuit naming 304 members of the 

Program as defendants, approximately 170 of which have since settled. The remaining 

defendants are real parties in interest (real parties) in this proceeding.

Two real parties are of particular note here. Activcare Health Care Group 

and Mountainview Retirement, Ltd., et al. (the moving parties) are represented by 

Michelman & Robinson, LLP (M&R). According to a declaration filed by M&R 

attorney Jeffrey D. Farrow, from approximately 2009 until February 1, 2017, attorney 

Andrew Selesnick served as Chair of the Health Care Department at M&R, overseeing 

and managing a team of attorneys who represented clients in the healthcare industry. 

Since 2014, M&R served as attorneys for moving parties, as well as four other defendants

in this matter. The representation of those parties was handled primarily by four 

attorneys at M&R, including Selesnick. According to Farrow, Selesnick was actively 

involved in the case, including participation in a confidential discussion pertaining to 

moving parties’ liability and damages. After real parties began working together on a 
4

common defense, in February 2014, Selesnick was copied on many e-mails containing 

communications about that defense.

On or about February 1, 2017, Selesnick left M&R and joined Nixon 

Peabody. Nixon Peabody was promptly advised of the potential conflict issue by M&R. 

On or about March 8, Selesnick “part[ed] ways” with Nixon Peabody.

On March 15, moving parties filed a motion to disqualify Nixon Peabody. 

Numerous other real parties subsequently filed joinders in the motion.1 They argued that 

Selesnick had done prior work for the moving parties in the same action, and as a result, 

Nixon Peabody and all its attorneys had a conflict of interest as a matter of law. They 

further argued Selesnick had received confidential information about the moving parties 

while at M&R. Nixon Peabody and the Fund responded that the firm should not be 

disqualified because Selesnick had left the firm, and no current Nixon Peabody attorney 

had received confidential information from him. Further, the Fund would be prejudiced 

if the firm were disqualified.

Nixon Peabody hired attorney Sean M. SeLegue to review this issue. 

According to SeLegue, Selesnick had represented four defendants as part of the team at 

M&R’s Los Angeles office, while Farrow represented the moving parties from the 

Orange County office. The parties Selesnick was actively involved with, according to 

him, were among those who settled before Selesnick left M&R. Selesnick did not, 

consequently, believe he had confidential information regarding the moving parties. He 

also told SeLegue he had not been involved in the case to a “significant extent,” as

another attorney had taken the lead. Selesnick had been hired to work in Nixon 

Peabody’s Los Angeles office, while the firm’s team working on this matter worked in 

the San Francisco office. Every member of that team submitted a declaration stating that

 

1 The basis for these parties joining in the motion was that Selesnick had been exposed to 

confidential joint defense information.
5

Selesnick had not shared confidential information with them, and the firm had put an 

“ethical wall” in place.

In reply, the moving parties noted that Selesnick himself had not submitted 

a declaration in opposition to the motion. They further argued that the ethical wall had 

not been put in place before Selesnick began working at the firm, but only after the 

moving parties and other real parties objected to the conflict.

The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Selesnick had 

previously personally represented the two moving parties as well as four defendants who 

settled. It concluded that when an attorney switches sides, disqualification is mandatory; 

no amount of ethical screening can save the representation.

The Fund and Nixon Peabody filed the instant petition for a writ of 

mandate and a stay of trial court proceedings on May 19, 2017. We granted the stay and 

requested preliminary opposition. After receiving briefing, including joinders from 

additional real parties and opposition briefs from several of them, we issued an order to 

show cause as to why relief should not be granted.

II

DISCUSSION

“‘“The relation between attorney and client is a fiduciary relation of the 

very highest character, and binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity—uberrima

fides.” [Citations.] Among other things, the fiduciary relationship requires that the 

attorney respect his or her client’s confidences. [Citations.] It also means that the 

attorney has a duty of loyalty to his or her clients. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cal Pak 

Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Services, Inc. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.)

“Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] If the trial court resolved disputed factual issues, the 

reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s express or implied 
6

findings supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] . . . However, the trial court’s 

discretion is limited by the applicable legal principles. [Citation.] Thus, where there are 

no material disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s 

determination as a question of law. [Citation.] In any event, a disqualification motion 

involves concerns that justify careful review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion. 

[Citation.]” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc.

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1143-1144 (SpeeDee Oil).) In the instant case, it appears from 

the court’s order that it believed disqualification was mandatory and automatic. 

Therefore, the court did not truly exercise its discretion. Our review is de novo to 

determine whether the court’s determination was correct as a matter of law, or whether an 

exercise of discretion is necessary here.

A motion to disqualify a party’s counsel raises several important interests.

(SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) Thus, “judges must examine these motions 

carefully to ensure that literalism does not deny the parties substantial justice.” (Ibid.) 

Depending on the circumstances, “a disqualification motion may involve such 

considerations as a client’s right to chosen counsel, an attorney’s interest in representing 

a client, the financial burden on a client to replace disqualified counsel, and the 

possibility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion. [Citations.]” (Id. at 

p. 1145, fn. omitted.) However, “determining whether a conflict of interest requires 

disqualification involves more than just the interests of the parties.” (Ibid.) “The 

paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of 

justice and the integrity of the bar.” (Ibid.)

“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the power 

inherent in every court ‘[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial 

officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding 

before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.’ [Citations.]” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 

Cal.4th at p. 1145.)
7

Where an attorney’s potentially conflicting representations are 

simultaneous, “[t]he primary value at stake . . . is the attorney’s duty—and the client’s 

legitimate expectation—of loyalty . . . .” (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 

284 (Flatt).) In such cases, the rule of disqualification is a “per se or ‘automatic’ one.”

(Ibid.)

This also applies to a law firm where an attorney is currently working. “It 

is now firmly established that where the attorney is disqualified from representation due 

to an ethical conflict, the disqualification extends to the entire firm [citations] at least 

where an effective ethical screen has not been established [citation].” (Adams v. Aerojet–

General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333 (Adams); Farris v. Fireman’s Fund 

Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 671, 689, fn. 17 (Farris).) “As a general rule in 

California, where an attorney is disqualified from representation, the entire law firm is 

vicariously disqualified as well. [Citations.] This is especially true where the attorney’s 

disqualification is due to his prior representation of the opposing side during the same 

lawsuit.” (Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 

114-115 (Henriksen).)

Thus, there is no question that if Selesnick were seeking to represent the 

Fund, he could not do so. There is also no question that if Selesnick continued to work at 

Nixon Peabody, the entire firm would be disqualified. The question that is left to us is 

whether Nixon Peabody and all its attorneys are also prohibited from representing the 

Fund given all the relevant facts, including that Selesnick no longer works at Nixon 

Peabody, and was only there for a very brief period.

The moving and real parties argue, and the trial court agreed, that 

disqualification in such a situation is automatic under the bright-line rule set forth in 

Henriksen. In that case, borrowers sued a lender for lender liability, and the lender filed a 

cross-complaint seeking foreclosure. The lender’s initial law firm, Hoge, Fenton, Jones 

and Appel (Hoge) employed an associate named Peter Brock. (Henriksen, supra, 11 
8

Cal.App.4th pp. 111-112.) Brock spent more than 200 hours on the case. Some other 

events ensued, but as relevant here, sometime later, Brock joined the borrrowers’ law 

firm, Bartko, Welsh, Tarrant & Miller (Bartko). The lender moved to disqualify Bartko 

based on Brock’s conflict. Bartko argued that it had put procedures in place to isolate 

Brock from the litigation, but ultimately, the court granted the motion to disqualify. 

(Id. at pp. 112-113.) The Henriksen court followed Dill v. Superior Court (1984) 158 

Cal.App.3d 301, a case with almost identical facts. The court noted that an ethical wall 

was insufficient: “[T]he ethical wall concept has not found judicial acceptance in 

California on our facts: a nongovernmental attorney armed with confidential information 

who switches sides during the pendency of litigation.” (Henriksen, supra, 11 

Cal.App.4th p. 115.) Disqualification of the entire firm under such circumstances, the 

court held, was automatic and required. (Id. at pp. 114-115.)

Petitioners contend disqualification is not automatic when the attorney in 

question has left the firm before the motion to disqualify is decided. They rely heavily on 

Kirk v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 776 (Kirk). We analyze this 

case in depth not because the petitioners cite it in their favor, but because it provides a 

lengthy analysis of the current state of California law on this issue.

That case involved a series of class action lawsuits against First American, 

a title insurer, and related entities. First American was represented by three attorneys at 

Bryan Cave LLP. (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 785.) At one point during the case, 

plaintiffs’ counsel spoke to Gary Cohen, then chief counsel for Fireman’s Fund Insurance 

Company, to discuss possible retention of Cohen’s services as a consultant. It was 

undisputed that counsel conveyed confidential information to Cohen. Cohen was 

interested, but it came to light that Fireman’s Fund had, possibly, provided insurance 

coverage to one or more of the defendants. (Id. at pp. 786-787.)

Approximately a year later, Cohen moved to a firm, Sonnenschein Nath & 

Rosenthal LLP (Sonnenschein). Plaintiffs contacted Cohen, who would no longer have a 
9

conflict due to his role at Fireman’s Fund, about consulting on the case. Cohen said he 

would check conflicts at Sonnenschein and get back to them. Before he did so, plaintiffs 

sent Cohen edited versions of the complaint, “reducing them to what plaintiffs’ counsel 

believed to be the main issues.” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 786-787.) Shortly 

thereafter, Cohen replied: “‘It turns out that the firm does represent First American, so 

I’m afraid that I won’t be able to be of any help. I haven’t read the attachments to your 

email and will delete them without having read them.’ There was no further contact 

between Cohen and . . . counsel.” (Ibid.)

Shortly thereafter, the attorneys from Bryan Cave representing First 

American moved to disqualify Sonnenschein. Plaintiffs objected to Sonnenschein’s 

representation, given Cohen’s prior contact with counsel. Until that point, Sonnenschein 

had been unaware of Cohen’s involvement. (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) 

The firm “established an ethical screen around Cohen.” (Id. at p. 788.)2

The plaintiffs moved to disqualify Sonnenschein, and the trial court granted 

the motion. (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 789-791.) The trial court said nobody 

was to blame except the “‘itinerant nature of attorneys.’” (Id. at p. 790.) The trial court 

found, however, that confidential information had been disclosed to Cohen during the 

initial phone call with plaintiff’s counsel. As relevant here, the court also “concluded 

that, when an attorney possesses disqualifying confidential client information, vicarious 

disqualification of the law firm is automatic, regardless of any ethical screening wall 

created.” (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal disagreed. Reviewing the history of vicarious 

qualification, the court noted that in Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th 275, “the Supreme Court 

distinguished the duty of loyalty, which was at issue in that case, from the duty of client 

 

2 Cohen was also briefly involved (3.5 billable hours) with another First American 

matter, separate from but with issues related to, the class actions. (Kirk, supra, 183 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 788-789.)
10

confidentiality, which is at issue in cases of vicarious disqualification. To properly 

understand Flatt in context, however, it is necessary to briefly discuss the ‘substantial 

relationship’ test. When it is alleged by a former client that its former attorney possesses 

material confidential information and is therefore disqualified from representing an 

adversary in another case, it is difficult for the former client to establish, as a factual 

matter, ‘what is in the mind of the attorney.’ [Citation.] The courts have therefore 

established a test, under which, if the former client can demonstrate a substantial 

relationship between the subjects of the former and the current representations, it is 

presumed that the attorney had access to confidential information in the first 

representation which is relevant to the second representation.” (Kirk, supra, 183 

Cal.App.4th at p. 796.)

“In discussing the substantial relationship test in Flatt, the Supreme Court 

stated that once the test is met, ‘disqualification of the attorney’s representation of the 

second client is mandatory; indeed, the disqualification extends vicariously to the entire 

firm.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court cited Henriksen for the proposition that vicarious 

disqualification is compelled as a matter of law. [Citation.] The Flatt case, however, 

was not concerned with whether a tainted attorney’s law firm was subject to vicarious 

disqualification.” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 797.)

“In the context of Flatt, the Supreme Court’s citation of Henriksen with 

approval and statement of a rule of automatic vicarious disqualification should not be 

read as a binding adoption of a rule of automatic vicarious disqualification in all 

circumstances, as the issue was not then before the Supreme Court.” (Kirk, supra, 183 

Cal.App.4th at p. 797.) The court noted that language in SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th 

1135, left open the question of whether vicarious disqualification was automatic. “In any 

event, we need not consider whether an attorney can rebut a presumption of shared 

confidences, and avoid disqualification, by establishing that the firm imposed effective 

screening procedures.” (Id. at p. 1151.) “The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to 
11

reach this issue in SpeeDee Oil because the court concluded that the firm failed to 

demonstrate an effective screening process had been established. Nonetheless, the 

Supreme Court’s language suggests that it believed that the question of whether an 

effective screening wall may rebut the presumption of vicarious disqualification was a 

question it had not yet resolved.” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.)

The court then noted that case law since SpeeDee had been mixed. Some 

courts had stated vicarious disqualification applies in the absence of a sufficient ethical 

screen. (Farris, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 689, fn. 17; Adams, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1333.) Other courts had continued to state the rule of vicarious disqualification is 

absolute. (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23-24;

3

Frazier v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 23, 30.)4 The Supreme Court had since 

held, in the context of disqualifying a City Attorney’s office when the City Attorney had 

a conflict, that: “Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole 

on the rationale ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional 

association, share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ [Citation.]”

(City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 847-

848.) As the Kirk court noted: “This language prompted a dissent by Justice Corrigan, 

joined by Chief Justice George, stating that the automatic disqualification rule ‘is being 

questioned even in the private practice context,’ due to increases in attorney mobility and 

firm mergers. [Citation.]” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 799.)

After City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., supra, 38 

Cal.4th at page 839, Meza v. H. Muehlstein & Co., Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 969, had 

also discussed the issue. “Relying on Henriksen, Flatt, and the Supreme Court’s 

 

3 This was a city attorney case that stated the automatic disqualification rule without 

further analysis, and held vicarious qualification of the office was not required.

4 This case involved Cumis counsel, and this court held that disqualification was not 

required.
12

rationale for vicarious disqualification in SpeeDee Oil, we concluded that ‘an “ethical 

wall” between an attorney with confidential information and his or her firm will generally 

not preclude the disqualification of the firm. [Citation.] Instead, there is a presumption 

that each member of the firm has imputed knowledge of the confidential information.’

[Citation.] Although we stated that an ethical wall will generally not preclude 

disqualification, we did not address in what circumstances an ethical wall may preclude 

disqualification, or whether the presumption can ever be rebutted.” (Kirk, supra, 183 

Cal.App.4th at p. 799.)

The court continued: “In very brief summary, the history of the law of 

vicarious disqualification appears to be as follows: (1) appellate courts initially 

concluded vicarious disqualification was not automatic, but instead subject to a balancing 

test; (2) Henriksen concluded the burden of rebutting the presumption of imputed 

knowledge simply could not be satisfied in the case of a tainted attorney who represented 

one party and switched sides in the same case; (3) the Supreme Court favorably cited 

Henriksen and appeared to state a rule of automatic vicarious disqualification any time 

material confidential information was presumed to be held by the tainted attorney (Flatt); 

(4) the Supreme Court subsequently suggested that whether vicarious disqualification can 

be avoided by a proper ethical wall was still an open question (SpeeDee Oil); and (5) the 

Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue on the merits.

“Given this history, we conclude that it is improper to rely on Flatt as 

creating an absolute rule of vicarious disqualification in California. Instead, we believe 

that neither Flatt nor SpeeDee Oil addressed the issue of whether vicarious 

disqualification is absolute, and the state of the law is that as initially expressed by the 

appellate courts: (1) a case-by-case analysis based on the circumstances present in, and 

policy interests implicated by, the case; (2) tempered by the Henriksen rule that vicarious 

disqualification should be automatic in cases of a tainted attorney possessing actual 

confidential information from a representation, who switches sides in the same case.
13

“We do not doubt that vicarious disqualification is the general rule, and 

that we should presume knowledge is imputed to all members of a tainted attorney’s law 

firm. However, we conclude that, in the proper circumstances, the presumption is a 

rebuttable one, which can be refuted by evidence that ethical screening will effectively 

prevent the sharing of confidences in a particular case.” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 800-801, fn. omitted.)

Taking the unusual step of accepting additional evidence on appeal, the 

Kirk court also noted that Cohen, having been at Sonnenschein for approximately one 

year, had since departed. (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 815-816.) “[O]nce the 

tainted attorney has left the firm, vicarious disqualification is not necessary ‘where the 

evidence establishes that no one other than the departed attorney had any dealings with 

the client or obtained confidential information.’” (Id. at p. 815.)

The court ultimately reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to 

“determine whether Cohen’s activities at the firm actually resulted in the improper 

transmission, directly or indirectly, of confidential information from Cohen to the First 

American team, or any other member of the Sonnenschein firm who may have worked on 

the related class actions. If (1) the Sonnenschein firm can overcome the rebuttable 

presumption that confidential information was transmitted, by offering sufficient 

evidence that confidential information was not, in fact, transmitted and (2) the trial court, 

in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the implicated policy considerations favor 

allowing Sonnenschein to remain as counsel, the trial court should deny the motion for 

disqualification. If, however, the trial court concludes that (1) Sonnenschein has not 

sufficiently rebutted the presumption that confidential information was transmitted, or 

(2) despite a finding that confidential information was not transmitted, the competing 

policy considerations nonetheless mandate disqualification of the entire firm under the 

circumstances, the trial court should grant the motion for disqualification. We express no 
14

opinion on the resolution of any of these questions, which are for the trial court to 

determine in the first instance.” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 816.)

We agree with the court in Kirk that whether disqualification of the entire 

firm is automatic is an open question. As Kirk noted, other recent cases have suggested it 

is not. (Farris, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 689, fn. 17; Adams, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1333.) Our role here, of course, is only to decide the case before us, which has factual 

circumstances unlike any of the published cases we have found. Real parties distinguish 

Kirk by noting that unlike Cohen, Selesnick actively represented one of the parties in the 

dispute at his old firm. While that is true, we do not believe it requires automatic 

disqualification in this case. The Kirk rule not only sets forth an argument that better 

serves the purposes of disqualification – to protect clients on both sides – but it also 

avoids the harshness of implying an automatic rule that may not be necessary or 

appropriate under these facts.

Instead, we conclude the trial court must perform an analysis regarding 

whether confidential information was, indeed, transmitted from Selesnick to the attorneys 

working on the matter at Nixon Peabody. This is not an issue of loyalty – it is undisputed 

that none of Nixon Peabody’s current attorneys representing the Fund owe a duty of 

loyalty to moving parties or the other real parties. The question, then, is whether 

Selesnick’s tenure at the firm endangers the duty of confidentiality5 he owes to real 

parties; if it does, disqualification is required. If it does not, then the court must exercise 

its discretion to determine whether other reasons compel disqualification.

 

5 See California Rules of Professional Responsibility, rule 3-310(E): An attorney “shall 

not, without the informed written consent of the client or former client, accept

employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the representation 

of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material 

to the employment.”
15

Our reasons for this are numerous. Of particular significance is that the 

facts in this case are significantly different from the typical “switching sides” scenario. 

In Henriksen and Dill, for example, the attorneys in question were still employed by their 

new firms at the time the court ruled on the disqualification motions, Selesnick was 

employed by Nixon Peabody for an incredibly brief period, approximately five weeks. 

He worked in a different office at the firm from the attorneys who were actively involved 

in the instant matter. The firm took steps to isolate Selesnick from the case, and there 

was evidence before the court that no confidential information was shared. Further, at 

this stage of the case, the Fund would be substantially prejudiced if it had to hire new 

counsel and bring them up to speed.

Individual assessment of the facts, rather than automatic disqualification, is 

a modern rule that better reflects the current realities of law firm life in the 21st century. 

“Disqualification based on a conclusive presumption of imputed knowledge derived from 

a lawyer’s past association with a law firm is out of touch with the present day practice of 

law. Gone are the days when attorneys (like star athletes) typically stay with one 

organization throughout their entire careers. . . . We have seen the dawn of the era of the 

‘mega-firm.’ Large law firms (like banks) are becoming ever larger, opening branch 

offices nationwide or internationally, and merging with other large firms. Individual 

attorneys today can work for a law firm and not even know, let alone have contact with, 

members of the same firm working in a different department of the same firm across the 

hall or a different branch across the globe.” (Adams, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336.) 

This, of course, is relevant here because Selesnick and the attorneys working on the 

matter operated out of different offices. The “water cooler chat” rationale for automatic 

disqualification is therefore not a concern in this instance.

Further, the rationale behind automatic disqualification is substantially 

diminished when the attorney in question no longer works at the firm sought to be 
16

disqualified. Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 752, was 

an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff sought to disqualify defense counsel 

because the plaintiff had consulted with a partner at the firm six years earlier. That 

partner had left the firm before the litigation began. (Id. at pp. 754-755.) The trial court 

denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal agreed, finding no evidence that confidential 

information had or was likely to be communicated. (Id. at p. 758.) While the facts are 

different here, the same principle applies: automatic disqualification is not required, but 

is a presumption subject to rebuttal. Automatically finding that Selesnick’s very short 

tenure at Nixon Peabody is sufficient to impute knowledge to the entire firm, including 

attorneys working on the matter in a different office, places form over substance.

Disqualification is neither intended to be punitive nor formalistic. “The 

purpose of a disqualification order is prophylactic, not punitive. [Citation.]” (Kirk,

supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 815.) “Disqualification is inappropriate, however, simply to 

punish a dereliction that will likely have no substantial continuing effect on future 

judicial proceedings. [Citation.]” (Gregori v. Bank of America (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 

291, 309.) Nor should “literalism . . . deny the parties substantial justice.” (SpeeDee Oil,

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) Disqualification, because it implicates such important 

interests, should be carefully considered. Given the facts of this case, we therefore 

conclude it is appropriate for the trial court to engage in the factual analysis discussed in 

Kirk before exercising its discretion to determine if disqualification is necessary.

III

DISPOSITION

The petition is granted. The order to show cause is discharged, and the stay 

is dissolved. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to 

vacate its order disqualifying the firm, and to consider all relevant facts and 
17

circumstances, as set forth in this opinion, in determining whether the motion to 

disqualify should be granted. Petitioners shall recover their costs.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

IKOLA, J.