## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 10

- 1029 M EL VI N K IMBR ELL, P laint if f-A ppell ant, v. K ARY B R OWN an d K O ETTER W OODWOR KI NG, I NC ., D efend a nts-A pp ellees.

A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the S outhernDi stricto f Illino is. No . 09 -cv-511 -JPG

—J. Phil Gilbert, Judge .
A RGUED N OVE MBE R 5, 2010

— D ECI DE D J UL Y 11, 2011

B efore E VANS, S YKES, an d H A MI L T ON, C ircu it Judges . S YKES, Circu it Judg e . M el vi n K i m bre l l, a ci ti zen o f I ll inois, broug ht pers ona l-inj ury claim s against K ary Brown and Brown’s em plo yer, Koette r W ood w or ki ng, I nc . , ci ti ze ns o f I ndi an a. Aft er Br o wn no ti fi ed the dist ri ct c ourtthathe ha d fi l ed f orChapte r 13 bankruptcy, the dist ri ct c ourtst aye d the ca se as to Brown , as requ ired by th e B an krup tcy C od e. T he district cou rt the n di s mi s s e d Ki mbr e l l ’ s c l a i ms a g a i ns tKoe t t e r Wo o d-2 N o. 10

- 1029

w or ki ng with prej ud i ce, fi nd in g that Kim bre l l f ai l ed to exer ci se re aso nabl e di l i gence i n ser vi ng pro ces s un der I ll inois Sup rem e C ou rt Ru le 103(b). K im b re ll ap p ea led th e d ist r i c t c ou rt ’s d ism iss al of h is cl ai m s ag ains t Koe tt er W o o dwor k i ng . W e di smi ss th e ap p eal f or lack of j urisd iction. T he dism issal of Kim brell’ s cl aim s aga i nst Koett erW oo dw or ki ng was not a fi nal j ud gm ent b ecause Kim bre l l co nti nues to se ek adj ud i catio n of h is c laim s a ga in st B ro w n .
I . B a c kg r o und I n October 2006 on a ro ad i n St
. Clai r County, Illino is, a tr acto r- tr ai l erth at K ar y Bro w n w as dri vi ng f orKoette r W oo d w or kin g c ollid ed w ith a c ar in w h ich M elv in K i m bre l l was a pass enger, causing physi cali nj uri es to K i m bre l l

. I n Octobe r 2008 , sho rt l y b ef or e the two- yea r st at u t e o flim ita tio n s w as to ex p ire , see 735 I LL . C OM P . S T AT . 5/ 13- 202 ( 2011 ) , K im brell fi led pers ona l- inj ury cl ai m s in I l l i noi s s tat e co urt aga i nst Brow n and K oet ter W o o dwor k i ng . Ki m br el l di d no t se r ve p ro ce ss o n the defen dan ts unt i l e i g htmonths l at eri n J une 2 00 9. The defe nd ants re m ove d the ca se to the So uthern Dist ri ct o f I l l i n o i s b a s e d o n d i v e r s i t y j u r i s d i c t i o n . B r o wn th e n i nf or m ed the dist ri ct c ourtthathe h ad filed fo r Ch apter13 bankr up tcy i n Feb ruar y 2 008. Th e d istr i ct c ourtst aye d th e ca se a s to Br o wn pur su an t to 1 1 U. S
. C. § 3 62( a)(1) , the pr ovi si on o fthe Bankruptcy Code that m an d ates a sta y of any proce edi ng aga i nst a bankr up tc y p eti ti oner f orcl ai m s a ri si ng o ut o fpre peti ti on e vents
. Koette r W oo d w or ki ng, o n the othe r hand , m ove d to dism i ssN o. 10

- 1029 3 K im b re ll’s c om p lain t fo r fail u re to ex er c ise rea so n ab le d i l i g e n c e i n s e r v i n gp r o c e s s u n d e r I l l i n o i s S u p r e me C ou rtR u le 1 03 (b )
. T h e d ist ric t c ou rtn ot ed th at Il lin ois l aw “does notcar rybr i ght l i ne s o r fi ni te deadli nes” f or se rv in g p ro c e s s a fte r filin g a co m p lain t. Kim b r e l l v. Br own , N o. 09

- cv- 51 1-J PG , 20 09 U
. S. Dis t. LEX I S 1189 01, at* 11 ( S
. D. I l l

. De c. 1 7, 2009 )
. I ns te ad, i t ca l l s f o r pl ainti ff s t o “exer ci se re aso nabl e di l i gence ” in ser vi ng pro cess , as m easu re d b y “ the t ota l i ty ofthe ci rcum sta nces. ” I LL . S. C T . R. 1 0 3 ( b )
. A ft e r w e i g h i n gth e r e l e v a n tc i r c u mstan ces, w hic h w e nee d not d etail he re, the d istri ct cou rt gr anted the m oti on t o d i sm i ss. The di str i ct c ourtneve r en te re d an y ju d gm en t, h ow ev er ; th e d oc ke t s im p ly shows the c ase as “t er m i nated” w i th r espectto Koette r W o o dwor k i ng, a nd no s uche nt r y a ppea r s f o r Br o wn. K im b re ll ap p ea led th e d ist ric t c ou rt ’s d i sm iss al of h is c laim s a ga in st K oe tt e r W oo d w or kin g. W e n ot ed p re lim ina r i l y that t he di st r i ctc o ur t’ s o r dero fdi smi ss almight no t be a fi na l a ppeal ab l e j udg m en t an d a sk ed th e par ti es t o fi l e m emor an da o n a pp el l at e j ur i sdi ct i o n. The parti es d i d so, and w e per m i tte d the appealto proce ed but o rder ed the parti es t o m or e full y a dd re ss appell ate j uri sdic ti on i n thei r m er i ts bri ef s.

I I . Discussi on K im b re ll con te n d s t h at w e h av e jur isd ict ion ov er h is ap p ea l b ec au se th e d ist ric t cou rt ’s d ism iss al o fh is c laim s a s t o K oe t te r W oo d w or kin g w as an ap p ea lab le fi na l j udg m en t unde r 28 U. S
. C. § 1 29 1. The fi na l

-j udg m en t r ul e ho l ds th ata de ci si o n i s finalwher e i t “e nds the4 N o. 10

- 1029 l i ti g at i o n o n the mer i ts a nd l ea ve s no th i ngmor e f o r the cour t to do but e xecute the j ud gm ent. ” Wi nge r t e rv. Che s t e rQ uar ry Co. , 185 F. 3d 657, 66 1 ( 7th Ci r. 19 98) ( quotati o n mar k s o m i tt ed)

. I n o th erwor ds, “ [ s] o l o nga s th e m a t t e r r e ma i n s o p e n, u n fi n i s h e d o r i n c o n c l u s i v e ” i n the dist ri ct c ou rt, “there m ay be no i ntrusi on byappeal

. ” Id. T h e p u rp os e o f § 12 91 an d th e fin al-ju d gm en t ru le “ is to c o m bi ne i n o ne r ev i ew a l l s tages of the pr o ce eding th ate ffec ti ve l y may be r ev i ewe d a nd c o r r ec te d i fa nd w hen fi nal j ud gm ent r esul ts
. ” Id. at66 2. T his case rai ses th e qu estion w he th er a district cou rt’s dism i ssa l o fcl aim s a gainst o ne defendant const i tutes a fi na l j ud gm en t w he n in the sam e case , th e p la intiff’s c laim s a ga in st an ot h er d ef en d an t w er e a u to m at ica lly sta yed under 1 1 U.S
. C. § 3 62( a) ( 1)
. U nd erthi s pro visi on ofthe Bankruptcy Code, a peti ti on f orbank ruptcy
o per at es a s a st ay, a ppl i cabl e to a l l en ti ti es , o fthe c om m e n c e m e n t o r c on tin u at ion
. . . of a jud icia l, adm i ni str ati ve, o r othe r acti on o r proce edi ng ag ai nst the debtor that w as or coul d hav e be en com m enced bef or e the co m m en c em en t ofthe case under thi s t i tl e, or t o re cove r a cl ai m ag ai nst the debto r that ar ose bef or e the co m m encem ent o fthe case under thi s t i tl e. Id. Th e au tom atic st a y “ is d esigned to protec t d ebtors fro m all co llec tio n effo rt s w h ile th ey at te m p t t o re ga in thei r fi nanci alf oo ti ng. ” In re Schw artz , 95 4 F
. 2d 569, 57 1 (9t h C ir. 19 92 ); see also E a sley v
. P e t t i b o ne M ich . Co rp . , 99 0 F. 2d 905, 91 0 ( 6th Ci r. 19 93)
. By hal ti ng l i ti gat i on aga i ns t th e deb to r, the s ta y “ g i ve s th e deb to r a b r ea th i ng sp ell fro m h is c re d ito rs . I t s to p s a ll colle c tio n e ffor ts , allN o. 10

- 1029 5 ha r as sment, a nd a l l f o r ec l o sure a cti o ns . I t per m i ts the debtorto at tem pt a r epaym ent o r re or gani zati on pl an, o r si m plyto be re l i eve d ofthe fi nanci alpre ssur es that drove hi m i nt o b an k r upt cy . ” H
. R. R EP . N O . 95-595, at 340 ( 1978 ), r epr i nt e d i n 1978 U
. S. C.C. A
. N
. 59 63, 62 96- 97. Ki mb r e l l ma i n t a i n s th a th i s l a ws u i ta g a i n s tB r o wn wa s v o i d ab i ni t i o be ca us e i t was fi l ed dur i ngthe pend ency ofBro w n’s bank ruptcy peti ti on i n vi ol ati on o f th e au to m at i c- st aypr o vi si o n. The r efo r e, hi s ar g um ent goe s, the onl y “ tr ue” defendant i n the case was K oet ter W o o dwor k i ng, s o the di st r i ctc o ur t’ s o r derdi smi ss i ng th e cl ai m s a gai nst t hatd e fe n d a n td i s p o s e d o fa l l c l a i ms ag ain stall “t ru e” p ar tie s a n d is th er efo re a fin al a p p ea lab le j u d gm en t. K im b rel l m ay orm ay not be c or re ct that hi s l aw suit ag ain stB ro w n w as vo id ab i niti o . W e ha ve r eco gni zed th at t h ere i s a “debat e a m ong the c i rcui ts ove r w hether [ac tio n s f iled in v iola tio n of th e a u to m at ic s ta y] a re vo id or m er ely v oid ab le
. ” M i ddl eTe nn. Ne ws. Co. , Inc . v. C harnel of C inci nnati, Inc. , 250 F.3d 107 7, 1082 n.6 ( 7th Cir. 20 01 )
. W e ha ve ha d “ no o cc as i o n t o . . . for ag e i nt o the debate, ” i d. , and thi s ca se doesn’t prese nt an opportunity to do so

. Even as sum i ng tha t Kim b re ll’ s s uitas to Br o wn wa s “ v o i d ab ini ti o ” in the sense thato ther c ou rt s h av e u se d th is t er m to d es c rib e a c tio n s filed in v i o l a t i o n o fthe a ut o mat i c s t a y, the B a nk r up t c y Co de al l ows f orl ate r adj ud i cati on o fsu c h s uit s, wh i ch precl ud es fi nal i ty und erthe ci rcum sta nces prese nted her e. The Code gi ves the b ankr up tcy c ou rtbr oad autho ri ty to gra n t re lief f r o m t h e a u to m at ic s ta y “ su c h as by te rm i-6 N o. 10

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S ec tio n 10 8 (c) p ro v id es : 1 [ I ] f a p p l i c a b l e n o nb a n k r u p t c y l a w . . . fi x e s a p e ri od f or com m enci ng or conti nuing a ci vi l a ct io n in a court other thana bank ru pt c y c our tona c l aim ag ai ns tthe de b t o r . . . a n d s u c h p e r i o d h a s n o t e x p i r e d bef or e t he dat e of the fi l i ng of the pe t i t i on, the n s uc h pe ri od does no te x pi r e un t i l the l a t e r o f( 1 ) the e nd o fs uc h pe ri od, i nc l udi ng a ny suspe ns i on ofs uc h pe ri od oc c ur ri ng o n or a fte r the com m encem ent ofthe cas e; or ( 2) 30 days after (co n tin u ed ...) nati ng, annul l i ng, m odi fyi ng, or co nd i ti oni ng” the st ay in various en um erated circum stan ces. 11 U
. S. C
. § 362 (d). As a n e xa m pl e of th e o per at i o n o fthi s r ul e, i n Si ke s v. G lobal M arine, Inc. , 8 81 F
. 2d 17 6, 1 77( 5th Ci r . 1 98 9) , the pla i nti ff s, l i ke K i m bre l l her e, fi l ed a c om pla i nt ag ai nst a defe nd ant that had, unbeknow n st to them , fi l ed f or ba nk r upt cy . Upon l ea rni ngo fthe a ut o m at i c st ay, the p lain tiff s m ove d the ba nkruptcy cour t forr el i ef, wh i ch th e b an kr u p tc y c ou rtgra n te d

. Id. a t 18 0. The r efo r e, the cl ai m s wer e o r der ed to pr oceed to j udg m en t i n the d ist ri c t c o u rt
. Id. at 18 0-8 1; se e also In re Schw artz , 95 4 F
. 2 d 5 6 9 , 5 7 2

- 7 3 (9t h Ci r . 1 9 9 2 ) ( r e c o g ni z i ngtha t§ 3 6 2 ( d) “g i ve s th e ba nk r upt cyc o ur t wi de l at i tu de inc r afting reli ef from the au tom atic stay”). I n ad d iti on, un d er 11 U .S .C . § 108(c), w he n a p lai nt iff rec eive s no ti ce that a defendant’s auto m ati c st ay has been ter m i nated, he m ay pu rs ue a cl ai m ag ai nst that defe nd ant withi n 30 days ofr ecei vi ng such no ti ce, ev en i fthe a ppl i cabl e st atut e of li m i ta ti o ns e xpi r ed dur i ngthe sta y. See a lso E a sley, 99 0 F
. 2d at 912. The auto m ati c st ay

1N o. 10

- 1029 7

(
. . . c on t i nu e d) 1 noti ce ofthe te rm inat ion or expir ati on of the st ay un de r s e c t i on3 6 2 , 9 2 2 , 1 2 0 1 , o r 1 301 o fthis t i t l e [ 1 1 U. S
. C. §§ 362, 9 2 2 , 1201 or 1301] , as the cas e m ay be, w ith res pect t o s u c h c l a i m. a l s o t o l l s th e s t a t u t e o fl i mi t a t i o n s u n d e r I l l i n o i s l a w, p r o v i d i n g a n o th e r b a s i s f o r p l a i n t i ff s t o p r e s s c l a i ms th atwoul d o th er wi se b ec o m e ti m e-ba r red dur i ngthe st ay . See 73 5 I LL . C OM P . S T AT . 5/13-216 (2011). K i m bre l l appears to h av e used the bankr up tcy sta y t o engag e in proc eduralm aneuver i ng i n contr aven tio n of th e fina l-j ud gm en t rule. H e has taken cont rad ictory posi ti ons h er e a nd i n the dist ri ct c ourtabo ut wh ether hi s cl ai m a g ains t Br o wn r emai ns a l i ve . At o r ala r g um en t w e pr ess ed K i m brell’s counselabo ut the i nconsi ste ncy ofhi s pos i ti ons, a n d h e w as unabl e t o offerany expla nati o n: C OUN S EL : We a r e t r e a t i n gth e s u i t a g a i n s t Mr
. B r o wn a s h a v i ngb e e n v o i d ab init io
. . . . T HE C O URT : A p p ar en tly , th at ’s n otbe en co m m u n icate d to th e d ist ric t c ou rt
. . . . C OUN S EL : Id on’ t thi nk the tri alcourt has be en advi sed tha tthe c l a i m a g a i ns tMr
. Ka r y [ Br o wn] i s v o i d ab ini ti o , . . . th a tth e r e i s n o p e n d i n gc l a i m. T HE C O URT : Don’ t y ou thi nk the y m i ght want to know? C OUN S EL : Pr ob ab ly. .

. .8 N o. 10

- 1029

T o b e p recise, there w ere a ctu ally t w o b an k ru p tcy stay s, 2 th e s e c o n d o fw h i c h w a s l i ft e d s e v e r a l w e e k s b e f o r e th e N o v e mber 5, 2010 oral argum ent in this court. The ban krup tc y c our tl i ft ed Br own’ s fi rs ts t ay on or abo utJ une 1 0, 2 01 0, an d di s m i s s ed h i s ban kr upt c y pe t i t i on on Augus t19
. Fourdays lat er, Brow n fi le d a sec ond bank ruptcy peti ti on, w hich i nvoke d an oth er s t ay. Kim bre l l fi l ed a m ot i on f or r el i effro m thats tay. The ban krup tc y c ourt grante d it and l ifted the s tay o n O ct o b er 19
. S e e K i m b r e l l v . Br o wn , N o. 10- cv- 1018- W D S, 2 0 1 1 U .S. D ist . L E X IS 51 8 3 0 , at *3 (S.D . Ill. M a y 16 , 20 1 1 ). T HE C O URT : You have n’tco m m unica ted thi s i dea that the l aw sui t i s v oi d? C OUN S EL : I ’v e ra ise d va riou s is su es w ith tria l [ co ] co uns el, b utthe r e ha s be enno c o m m uni ca ti o n w i th the di str i ct c ourtadvi si ng the m o fthi s. T HE C O URT : W el l, w hat a re we to m ake o fthat ? Because apparentl y . . . yo ur co counseli s k eepi ng the cas e al i ve, and yo u’r e te ll i ng us i t’ s v oi d. Idon’ t thi nk y ou can have i t bo th ways. C OUN S EL : Ithi nktha t’ s a f ai r a ss es sment, Yo ur H onor . . . . I don’ t hav e a r esponse o therthan i th a s n o tb e e n c o mm un i c a t e d. Ou r own r ese ar ch has si nce re veal ed that, i n f act, Brown ’ s ba nkruptcy sta y was l i fted se ver alweeks b efo re th e o ra l a r gu m en t in th is c ou rt, an d K im b re ll 2 fi l ed a new com pla i nt ag ai nst Bro w n i n Illin oi s s tat e co ur tj u s tt wo d a y s b e f o r e th e a r g u me n t
. T h i s s e c o nd c as e w as rem ov ed to th e So u th er n D ist ric t o f Ill in oisN o. 10

- 1029 9

an d as sig n ed to Ju d ge Stie h l. S e eKi mbre l l v . Brown , N o. 10

- c v-1 01 8-W D S (S.D . I ll. filed D ec . 15, 20 10 ). K im b r ell m ade no m enti on o f t h e s eco nd sui t t o thi s co urt, nor did he pr om ptl y a pp ri se J ud ge Gilb er t, to wh om the fi rs t case was ass i gned and befor e whom Kim bre l l ’ s ini ti al cl ai m ag ai nst Bro w n r em ai ned, al though in sta yed st atus . I t was no t unt i l J an ua r y 2 01 1 th atKi m br el l i nf or m ed J ud ge Gilber t that B ro w n’s bank ruptcy sta y had bee n l i ft e d a nd tha th e h a d fi l e d the s e c o nd s ui tag ai nst Br o wn b e c a us e h e b e l i e v e d the fi r s ts ui twa s v o i d ab ini ti o . Ki mbre l l v . Brown , N o. 09 -c v-5 11 -JP G , 201 1 U .S. D ist . L E X IS 2000 , at * 1 ( S. D. I l l

. J an. 10, 2011 )
. J ud ge Gilber t h eld that he l acke d “j u ris d i cti on t o act
. . . unti l the Se venth Cir cui t C ourtof A pp eal s d eci des the ongo i ng appeal

. ” Id

. at* 2. Ki m br el l conti nue d t o pr es s hi s cl ai m s i n the seco nd sui t, and l astm onth, J ud ge St i ehli ssued a sta y p en d in g Ju d ge G ilbe rt ’s re so l u t i on of th e c as e in h is c ou rt
. Ki mbre l l v . Brown , N o. 10 -cv-1018-W D S, 2011 U
. S. D ist. LE X I S 51830 , at * 7 (S. D
. I ll

. M ay 16, 2011). T h is m an eu ve rin g b rin gs t o m in d th e e q u ita b le pri n ci ple o fj ud i ci ales toppel, wh i ch prec l ud es l i ti gants f r o m “ del ibe r at ely c ha ng i ngpo si ti o ns a ccord i ngt o the exi genci es o fthe m om ent, ” N e w H am ps hi r ev. M ai ne, 53 2 U
. S. 742 , 7 49-50 (2001) (qu otation m arks om itted ), th e r e b y “ p r e v a i l i n gi n o n e p h a s e o fa c a s e o n a n a r g um ent a nd then re l yi ng o n a c ontr ad ict or y a rgum ent t o preva i l i n another phase, ” In re A iradigm Co m m c’ns, Inc. , 616 F
. 3 d 6 4 2 , 6 6 2 ( 7 th Ci r . 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t a t i o n mar k s o mitte d)

. S tr i ct l y s p eaking, Ki m br el l ’ s ca se do es no t m ee t th e re q u ire m en ts for in vo kin g jud ic ial es to p p el. SeePa kov ich v. Broad spire Se r vs . , 53 5 F
. 3d 601, 60 6 ( 7th Ci r. 20 08)10 N o. 10

- 1029 ( “[ O]ne ofthe re quir em ents f orj ud i ci ales toppelto apply i s that the par ty to b e es topped m ust hav e pre vai l e d u p on t h e firstco u rtto ad op t t h e p os itio n .” ( em phasi s a dd ed) ( quotati on m ar ks om i tte d ))
. Even so , thi s k i nd o fga m esm an sh ip

— ar gui ng to thi s co urt that th e di smi ss alo f h i s cl ai m s ag ains t Koe tt erW o o dwor k i ng sh o ul d b e tr ea te d a s a fi na l j udg m en t whi l e con ti nui ng to pu rs ue hi s cl ai m s a gainst Bro w n in the di str i ct cou rt

— confi rm s why w e ca nnot a dj ud i cate t h is a pp eal o n the mer i ts
. W he n a c ase i s pen di ngi n b o ththe di st r i ctc o ur t an d this cour t atthe s ame t i m e, po sing j ur i sdi ct i o na l i ss ue s, we ex pec t co uns elon ap pea l a nd i n the dist rict c ourtto co m m unica te w i th ea ch other a nd wi th the r e s pe c t i v e c o ur t s a b o utma t e r i a l de v e l o pm ents. I t s i m plyi s no t a cceptabl e forappel l ate cou n sel to r emai n i g no r an t

— orto cl ai m i gnor ance

— of h is cl i ent’ s a cti vi ti es i n the dist ri ct c ourtand sta te cour ts. I n A rrow Gear Co. v. D ow ners G rove Sanitary D is tr ict, 629 F. 3d 633, 63 6- 37 ( 7th C ir. 2 010) , we confro nted an appe ali n a n a na l o g o us pr o ce dur alpo stur e a nd e xpla i n ed w hy i t was pro bl em ati c. The pl ai nti ff, A rr ow Gea r , s u e d mu l t i p l e d e fe n d a n t s . As t o a l l b u tt wo o ft he d e fe n da nt s , th e d i s t r i c tc o u r td i s mi s s e d A r r o w’ s c l a i ms as ba rre d by res j u d ica ta
. Id. at63 6. W i th r es p ect to thos e tw o rem aining d efend an ts, A rrow took a volunt ary dism i ssa l witho ut prej ud i ce a nd th en attem pted to appe althe d istr i ctc o ur t’ s di smi ss ala s to the o th erde fen d an ts
. Id. Arr o w’s vo l unt ar y di smi ss al o f th e tw o de fe nd an ts leftop en th e p os sib ility for A rro w to lat er refile i ts c l ai m s ag ains t th em. W e o bs er ved th at“ i fa fte r the d e c i s i o n o fth i s a p p e a l th e p l a i n t i fffi l e d n e w c l a i ms ag ain stth e d ro p p ed d efe n d an ts , . . . i t w ou ld be as ifN o. 10

- 1029 11 i nter l ocuto ryappeal s were f re el y perm i ssibl e. ” Id

. That i s , “ Ar r o w’ s ma n e u v e r, i fa l l o we d , wo u l d p r e v e n tt he en ti r ety o fthe c o nt es te d i ss ue s, i nv o l vinga l l the p ar tie s, fro m be in g re so lve d in a s i n g l e a p p ea l; it w ou ld ex em p lify p i e c e m ea l ap p ea lin g, w h ich is d isfa vo re d in the federa l co urt sys tem
. ” Id. W e s ai d A rr ow had to m ak e a ch oic e: eit h er “s ta n d [its ] gro u n d a n d [th is cour t would] di sm i ss the a pp eal, ” o r el se “co n ve rt [ i ts] dism i ssa l o fthe othe r tw o defe nd ants to dism i ssa l with prej ud i ce, wh i ch w i l l bar

. . . r efi l i ng [ of ] cl ai m s a gainst them

. ” Id. at 637. Du ring or al ar gum ent, A rr ow a gr eed to t h e l at te r op tio n, “c om m itt in g n otto refile th e s u it a g a i ns t ” the t wo de fe nd a nt s i t ha d v o l un t a r i l y di s mi s s e d. Id. Her e, i n c o nt r as t, Ki m br el l i s obvio us l y unwi l l i ng to m ake a si m i l arco m m i tm ent. T h e bot to m lin e is th at K im b re ll’s c as e re m a i n s “o p en ,” “unfin ished , ” a nd “inconcl usi ve” i n the dist ri ct c ourt, so th er e w as n o fin al jud gm en t. Wing erter, 18 5 F
. 3d at 6 6 1
. H e h a s t r i e d t o “ s t a r to v e r ” w i th h i s c l a i ms aga i nst Brow n and coul d l ate r re turn t o us w i th ano ther ap p ea l aft er th e re so l u t i on of th os e c laim s. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at63 6-3 7. T h e fin al-ju d gm en t ru le re quir es “c om b i n[ing] i n one re vi ew al l st age s o f[ a] proce edi ng. ” Wing erter, 18 5 F
. 3d at 662. W e no te tha t i n R obis on v. C anter bury Village, Inc. , 84 8 F
. 2 d 4 2 4 ( 3 d C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) , a si m i l arc a s e i n v o l v i n gt wo defen dan ts , o ne o fwho m fi l ed f o r b an k r upt cy, the dist ri ct c ourti ssued a cer ti fi cati on under Rul e 5 4( b ) of the F edera l Rule s of C i vi l Pro cedure that i ts dism i ssa l of t h e c laim s a ga in st th e n on i n s olv en t d efe n d an t c on st itu te d a fi nal j ud gm ent despi te the pendi ng st ay aga i nst12 N o. 10

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R u le 5 4 (b ) p ro v id es : 3 Ju d g m e n t o n M u ltip le C la im s o r In v o lv in g M u ltip le P art i es. W he n a n a ction p resen ts m or e tha n o ne claim f or r el i ef

. . . or whenm ul t ip le p ar t i es ar e i nvol ved, the c our tm ay di re c te nt ry ofa fi nalj ud g m entas t o o ne or m or e, butfewerthanal l , c l ai m s or par t i es on ly i fthe c our te xpr es s l y de t er m i ne s that the re i s no j us tr ea s on f or delay. O the rw ise, any order or othe r deci si on, how ever des i gna t ed, tha t a d j udi c at es fewerthanal l the c l ai m s or th e r i gh t s a nd l i a bi l i t i e s o ffe we r tha n a l l the pa r t i e s does note nd the ac t i on as to any ofthe c l ai m s or par t i es an d m ay be re vi s ed a tan y t i m e b efore the e nt ry ofa j udgm en t ad jud icatin g all the claim s an d all the p artie s’ r i g hts an d liab ilities. the insol vent defe nd ant. This e nabl ed the pla i nti ffto 3 appeal the dism i ssa l as to the noni nsol vent defe nd ant. Id. at42 6-2 7; see also Ar r o w Gear, 6 29 F. 3d at 636 ( “A rr ow co u l d h a v e a s k e d th e j u d g e t o e n t e r a fi n a l j u d g m en t und er Rule 54(b)

. . . , w hi ch perm i ts a dist ri ct judge, up on fi nd i ng no ‘ j ust r eas on’ to del ay an appeal, to ente r a fi na l j udg m en t

— w hi ch i s then appeal abl e under sect i on 1 291

— w i th r espectto o ne o r m or e, but few er than a ll, cl ai m s o r parti es. But the j ud ge w as not ask ed to en te r a R u le 5 4(b ) j u d gm en t a n d d i d n ot .”). K im b re ll m ade no att em pt to o btain a Rul e 5 4( b) cer ti fi cati on f ro m J ud ge Gilber t in thi s ca se.N o. 10

- 1029 13 Forthe f or ego i ng r eas ons, we D ISMISSK im br e ll’s appe alf o r l ac ko fj ur i sdi ct i o n.

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