RENDERED: OCTOBER 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0965-MR

LEXINGTON ALZHEIMER’S 

INVESTORS, LLC D/B/A THE 

LANTERN AT MORNING POINTE 

ALZHEIMER’S CENTER OF 

EXCELLENCE; BROOKE GRIFFITH, 

IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR OF THE LANTERN AT 

MORNING POINTE OF LEXINGTON; 

GREG A. VITAL; INDEPENDENT 

HEALTHCARE PROPERTIES, LLC; 

AND J. FRANKLIN FARROW APPELLANTS 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-02030

SANDRA NORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE 

ESTATE OF RAYFORD CHARLES 

NORRIS APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR, 

JUDGES.
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THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Lexington Alzheimer’s Investors, LLC d/b/a the 

Lantern at Morning Pointe Alzheimer’s Center of Excellence (hereinafter referred 

to as the Lantern), along with other related appellants appeal from an order of the 

Fayette Circuit Court denying their motion to compel arbitration. We find no error 

and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sandra Norris was the wife of Rayford Charles Norris. Mr. Norris 

was a resident at the Lantern from October 25, 2019, until March 6, 2020. Mr. 

Norris died on August 9, 2020. On July 8, 2021, Ms. Norris filed the underlying 

action alleging that Mr. Norris received negligent care while at the Lantern which 

resulted in his death. Appellants then moved to compel arbitration because Ms. 

Norris signed a mandatory arbitration agreement1 on Mr. Norris’s behalf when he 

was admitted to the Lantern. The trial court ultimately held that Ms. Norris did not 

have the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf as 

executing such an agreement was not a health care decision. The trial court denied 

Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration and this appeal followed.

1 Mr. Norris would not have been able to be treated at the Lantern if the arbitration agreement 

was not executed.
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ANALYSIS

“It is well established that construction and interpretation of a written 

instrument are questions of law for the court. We review questions of lawde 

novoand, thus, without deference to the interpretation afforded by the circuit 

court.” Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998) (citations omitted).

Appellants argue on appeal that Ms. Norris did have the authority to 

enter into the arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf. They base this 

argument on Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 311.631(1)(c) which states:

(1) If an adult patient whose physician has determined 

that he or she does not have decisional capacity has not 

executed an advance directive, or to the extent the 

advance directive does not address a decision that must 

be made, any one (1) of the following responsible parties, 

in the following order of priority if no individual in a 

prior class is reasonably available, willing, and 

competent to act, shall be authorized to make health care 

decisions on behalf of the patient:

. . .

(c) The spouse of the patient[.]

Appellants’ argument is that this statute authorized Ms. Norris to enter into the 

arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf because it was a health care decision. 

Courts in this Commonwealth have held that when an arbitration 

agreement is presented as a condition of admission to a medical facility, entering 

into the agreement can be considered a health care decision. See LP Louisville
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East, LLC v. Patton, 651 S.W.3d 759, 770 (Ky. 2020), as modified on denial of

reh’g (Apr. 29, 2021); Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky. 

2012). In other words, if an arbitration agreement is mandatory in order to be 

treated at a medical or nursing home facility, as it was in this case, then entering 

into the agreement can be considered a health care decision. Appellants argue that 

KRS 311.631(1)(c) and cases like those cited above indicate that the arbitration 

agreement in this case is valid.

The cases cited by Appellants and those found during this Court’s 

research concern arbitration agreements as they relate to a power of attorney, but 

there is no power of attorney in this case. An illustration of the cases found during 

our research is still advisable. In Patton, supra, Tommy Patton was admitted into a 

long-term nursing home facility in Louisville, Kentucky. 651 S.W.3d 759. Upon 

Tommy’s admission into the facility, Kenneth Patton, his son, signed a mandatory 

arbitration agreement as Tommy’s power of attorney. The power of attorney 

documents gave Kenneth “all powers . . . necessary . . . to provide for [Tommy’s]

support, maintenance, [and] health.” Id. at 768.

A few weeks after being admitted into the facility, Tommy died. 

After Tommy’s death, Kenneth filed suit against the facility. The facility then 

moved to compel arbitration due to the agreement executed by Kenneth. The 

Kentucky Supreme Court held that “when an agreement to arbitrate is presented as 
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a condition of admission to a nursing home, unless otherwise agreed, a power of 

attorney expressing general authority to make necessary health care decisions 

includes the incidental or reasonably necessary authority to enter that agreement.” 

Id. at 770.

Appellants argue that KRS 311.631(1)(c) allows Ms. Norris to make 

health care decisions on her husband’s behalf just like the power of attorney 

allowed Kenneth to make health care decisions for his father. Appellants believe 

that because the arbitration agreement at issue here was mandatory for Mr. Norris 

to be admitted to the Lantern, it was a necessary health care decision. We 

disagree. The power of attorney in Patton gave Kenneth broad and general powers 

to provide for the health of his father. According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, 

that included entering into a mandatory arbitration agreement in order to have him 

treated at a nursing home facility. In our opinion, the statute at issue here does not 

grant such a broad array of powers. 

KRS 311.631(1)(c) allows a wife to make health care decisions on 

behalf of her husband; however, KRS 311.621(8) defines “health care decisions” 

as “consenting to, or withdrawing consent for, any medical procedure, treatment, 

or intervention[.]” We believe this is a narrow definition and does not encompass 

the ability to enter into an arbitration agreement, even if the agreement was 

required to be admitted into a nursing home facility. The legislature chose not to 
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grant one person broad or general powers over another person’s health care 

decisions. The legislature chose to allow a person to consent to medical 

procedures, treatments, or interventions on behalf of another person. Entering into 

an arbitration agreement is not a medical procedure, treatment, or intervention.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

KRS 311.631(1)(c) did not allow Ms. Norris to enter into an arbitration agreement 

on her husband’s behalf. Entering into the arbitration agreement was not a health 

care decision as defined by KRS 311.621(8). A power of attorney granting general 

health care authority may encompass the ability to enter into an arbitration 

agreement; however, the health care decisions granted by the statutes discussed 

above do not include this power. 

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:

Paul A. Dzenitis

Emily W. Newman

Corey J. Taylor

Louisville, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR 

APPELLANT LEXINGTON 

ALZHEIMER’S INVESTORS, LLC 

D/B/A THE LANTERN AT 

MORNING POINTE ALZHEIMER’S 

CENTER OF EXCELLENCE:

Emily W. Newman

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Tyler S. Stewart

Lexington, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR 

APPELLEE:

Tyler S. Stewart

Lexington, Kentucky

Chad Gardner

Lexington, Kentucky

Jake Grey

Lexington, Kentucky