# Unit ed Sta tes Cou rt of Appeals For the Seventh Circui t Chic ago, I lli nois 60604
Submi tte d October 27, 2014 Deci ded October 28, 2014

Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circ uit Judge
FRANKH. EASTERBROO K, Circ uit Judge
DIANE S. S YKES , Circ uit Judge
No. 13-3854
UNITED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. MARK E. GLEASON,

Defen dant-Appellant

. Appeal from the Uni ted S tate s Di stric t Co urt for the So uthern Di stric t of Indiana, Indi anapoli s Di vis i on.
No. 1:13-cr-00141-001 Tanya Walton Prat t, Judge

. O R D E R
Mar k Gleason was work i ng as a maintenance man ager for United Parcel Serv i ce when h e and Dayton S loan, a constructi on contr actor , conspi red t o defraud the company. Gleas on soli ci ted S loan to purchas e VISA gift cards (us ually in amounts of $100, $200, or $500) and then s ubm i t invo i ces to UPS r epresenting thei r v alue as constructi on work that S loan had perfor med. (In fac t S loan had not per formed that work .) Gleas on would approv e the invo i ces on UPS’s behal f and pocket the g i ft cards, and Sloan would recei ve a fee. Gleason pleaded gui lty t o mai l fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and money launderi ng, see id. § 1956(a)( 1)(B) (i ). The di stric t courtfound that he had played an aggr avat i ng ro le i n the offenses, see U.S.S .G. § 3B1.1(c ), and s entenced hi m wi thi n the calcu lated guidelines’ range t o 44 months’ im pris onment. Hi s appointed NON PRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be ci ted only i n acc or dance w i th Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 13-3854 Page 2

lawyer has conclu ded that t he appeal i s fri vo lous and s eeks to wi thdraw. See Ande rs v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Gleason has not accepted our invi tation to r espond to couns el’s motion. See 7 T H C I R
. R. 51(b) . Counsel has sub mi tte d a bri ef that ex plains the nature o f the case an d addresses the i ssu es that a case of thi s ki nd mi ght be ex pected to i nvolv e. Becaus e the analysi s in the brief appears to be t horo ugh, we li mi t our rev i ew to the subjects that counsel h as di scu ssed. United S tat es v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United S tat es v. Wagner , 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel informs us that Gleason does not wis h to challenge hi s gui lty plea, so couns el proper ly for goe s di scu ssing the v oluntarines s of the plea. See Un ited States v. Konczak , 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United S tat es v. Kn ox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Ci r. 2002).
Counsel fi rst consi ders whether Gleason could argue that t he di stric t court clearly er red when i t concluded that he was an org ani zer o f the offenses and adjusted hi s offens e level upward two lev els un der U.S .S.G. § 3B1.1(c) . Although t he probation offi cer i nsi sted that t he partici pants had b een “equally responsible,” the gov ernment pressed at sentencing for t he adjustment becaus e of Gleason’s leadershi p role in the sch eme. Gleason di d not dis pute that he concocted the fr audulen t scheme an d recruited Sloan t o help carry i t out, but he opposed the agg rav atin g-ro le adjustment becaus e Sloan acted “indepen dently” by fin ding another bank that would prov i de gift cards (after hi s bank r efus ed to sell hi m any more) and event ually refusing to falsi fy i nvoices

. We agr ee wi th counsel that Gleason c ould not plausi bly contend that t he di stric t court clearly err ed i n applying the ag gr avat i ng-role adj ustment. See Un ited States v. May, 748 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2014). A defend ant quali fi es as anor gani zer under § 3B1.1, even if he does not “necessari ly contr ol anyo ne but nonetheless influ ence[s ] the cri minal acti vity by coor dinati ng i ts members.” United S tat es v. Skoczen , 405 F.3d 537, 550 (7th Cir. 2005); see also U.S.S .G. § 3B1.1 cm t. n.2 (“To quali fy for an adj ustment und er t hi s sec tion, the defendant mus t have been t he org ani zer, leader , manager, o r supervisor of one o r more o ther par tic i pants.”). Here the di stric t courtappropr i ately applied the adjustment after fin ding that Gleason had “devis ed” and “ini tiate[d] ” the schem e, recruited Sloan, “arr anged for t he cover -up,” “app ro ved all of the fr audulen t invo i ces,” an d kept a “large r share” o f the proceeds for him self. See Un ited States v. Hargis , 747 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Ci r. 2014) (defendant “hatched” i dea to commi t offense, “recrui ted” coconspi rat or to car ry out scheme, and planned to keep “most” o f the profits f or herself); United S tat es v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2006) ( defendant “marshaled the people and i nstruments” for the o ffens e).No. 13-3854 Page 3

Counsel next consi ders whether Gleason could challenge the ter m of i mpri sonment as u nreasonable, but proper ly concludes that such a challenge would be fri vo lous. Th e 44-month ter m i s wi thi n hi s gui delines’ range o f 41 to 51 months and thus presumpti vely reasonable. See Un ited States v. Fletcher, 763 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 2014); United S tat es v. Anobah , 734 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2013). Couns el has not i denti fi ed anythin g inthe re cord r ebuttin g thatpresumpti on, nor can w e. The court consi dered the re levant 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a) factors—i nclu ding the natur e and ci rcums tances of the offense ( especi ally Gleason’s abu se of hi s employer’s tr ust; the “ver y si gni fi cant” amount of money he stole; and his “fri vo lous” us e of the sto len money to purchas e, among ot her things, c ollector s’ coins and gold bars), and hi s hi stor y and characteris tic s (particularly hi s “stable” u pbri ngi ng, mi li tar y serv i ce, and “s ecure” employment), as well as the need to deter other s from commi tting fraud.
Accordi ngly, we GRANT couns el’s motion to wi thdraw and DISMI SS the appeal.