RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0267-19T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Y.H.B.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

D.L.J., SR. (Deceased),

Defendant.

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF D.L.J., JR.,

a Minor.

Submitted May 27, 2020 - Decided July 6, 2020

Before Judges Accurso, Gilson and Rose.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, 

Docket No. FG-07-0089-19.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, 

of counsel; James Daniel O'Kelly, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Lisa Doreen Cerasia, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; Todd S. Wilson, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Y.H.B. appeals from the Family Part's August 14, 2019

judgment terminating her parental rights to her third child, her now elevenyear-old-son D.L.J., Jr. (Davon).1

 She contends the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency failed to establish the third prong of the best 

interests standard by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, defendant 

argues the Division did not properly conduct permanency planning for Davon,

and the Family Part's finding that the Division considered alternatives to 

 

1

 The names of family members in this opinion are pseudonyms, employed to 

protect the child's privacy.
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terminating defendant's parental rights was not based on substantial credible 

evidence in the record. She also argues the Division did not establish its

"reasonable efforts" to assist her in light of its failure to consult and cooperate 

with her in assessing her relatives for placement of Davon. Finally, defendant 

argues the trial court's factual findings on the third prong were "deficient and 

incomplete," foreclosing meaningful appellate review. 

Davon's Law Guardian joins the Division in urging us to affirm the 

judgment. Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and 

controlling law, we affirm the termination of her parental rights. 

Defendant has had a difficult life. She suffered abuse as a child and 

spent some period of her childhood in foster care. She has battled drug 

addiction for many years, sometimes successfully, and suffered the loss of 

Davon's father when the boy was two. Although the Division provided 

defendant a home health aide to assist her with her two oldest children in 2007,

she was first substantiated for abuse and neglect following Davon's birth in 

May 2009, after they both tested positive for cocaine. 

When defendant admitted smoking crack cocaine throughout her 

pregnancy, the Division removed all three children from her care, placing the 

two older children with their father, R.B., and Davon with his father and 
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paternal grandmother. Defendant went into drug treatment and was admitted 

into drug court. Dr. Singer evaluated her for the Division and concluded her 

test results suggested Narcissistic Personality Disorder with schizoid and 

antisocial features, and found she was "experiencing symptoms consistent with 

Bi-Polar Disorder mixed with feelings of anxiety." Dr. Singer's opinion was 

that defendant should be reunited with her children only if she continued in

drug treatment and could demonstrate continued sobriety.

Although suffering some setbacks in her sobriety, defendant successfully 

completed drug treatment, the Division assisted her in obtaining affordable 

housing, she got a job and was reunited with her children in the summer of 

2010. Defendant continued to struggle with her sobriety, but went back to 

school, continued in drug treatment and participated in services geared to 

strengthening her parenting skills. 

Davon's father died in the fall of 2011 after an illness. Defendant 

thereafter struggled with housing and employment. She kept in close contact 

with the Division, however, and it assisted her with obtaining affordable 

housing and provided her homemaker services early in 2012. Defendant 

graduated from drug court in May 2012, and the Division closed her case 

shortly thereafter.
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Five years later, in the fall of 2017, the Division became re-involved 

with the family after receiving reports that defendant was again using cocaine. 

The Division substantiated defendant for abuse and neglect after she tested 

positive for cocaine in December 2017. Defendant was unemployed, and her 

home was in foreclosure. The Division again removed Davon, then eightyears-old, from her care in January 2018 and placed him in a non-relative 

resource home. Defendant's other children were living with their father. 

Defendant's involvement with the Division this time, however, was

different. Defendant did not participate in drug treatment, despite the 

Division's many efforts to engage her in treatment. She failed to stay in 

contact with the Division and rarely visited Davon, although he was desperate 

to see her, and she very obviously loved him. His behavior at school 

worsened; he would walk out of classrooms and was disciplined for fighting. 

On the recommendation of his school, he was enrolled in the Rutgers 

Challenge Program for education services and therapy. Defendant admitted to 

the Division's caseworker that she could not abstain from cocaine for any 

length of time. She became homeless. 

In December 2018, the court approved the Division's goal of adoption 

for Davon, and it filed its complaint for guardianship in early 2019. Defendant 
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knew she was at risk of losing Davon forever, and acknowledged to the case 

worker she knew she had to get sober, but still did not enter drug treatment. 

She continued to visit only rarely. She missed Davon's graduation from the 

Rutgers program and admitted to the caseworker she did not visit because she 

did not want her son to see her in the condition she was in. She did not appear 

at appointments for psychological and bonding evaluations and failed to 

appear for the guardianship trial.

The Division presented the testimony of the assigned permanency 

worker, as well as the assigned adoption worker, an adoption supervisor and 

Dr. Singer, and entered its records in evidence, subject to appropriate hearsay 

objections. Neither defendant nor the Law Guardian called any witnesses or

offered anything in evidence. 

The Division workers testified that defendant initially offered only her 

brother Aaron as someone who could care for Davon. He was ruled out in 

mid-2018 because his apartment was too small to accommodate his nephew. 

The court subsequently ordered defendant to supply the Division with 

additional names, which she eventually did. In December 2018, she suggested 

another brother, Jim, and his wife, as well as Davon's paternal aunt. The 
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Division also contacted the father of defendant's two older children, but he 

refused to take the Division's calls.

Defendant's brother Jim and his wife were interested in assuming 

Davon's care and Davon likewise expressed his desire to live with them in the 

event his mother couldn't regain custody. Davon's aunt and her wife also 

expressed interest in providing a home for Davon. Neither was employed at 

the time, however, and they kept several dogs, including a pit bull they 

initially would not let Division workers see. Davon expressed some fear of the 

dogs.

The Division pursued Davon's preference for his uncle and initially 

appeared to rule out Davon's aunt. The Division worked to assess the uncle's 

home, and he and his wife took Davon with them on a family vacation in the 

spring of 2019. The Division's plan for Davon's placement and ultimate 

adoption by his Uncle Jim, however, was thwarted when he and his wife took 

themselves out of contention just weeks before trial. The Division went back 

to Davon's aunt, whom it had continued to communicate with in the event 

adoption by Davon's Uncle Jim fell through. Davon's aunt continued to 

express interest in adopting Davon. She, however, was in the process of 

moving to North Carolina, although she and her wife had not yet settled on a 
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home, delaying the Division's efforts to either place Davon with them or 

institute an interstate assessment. The adoption worker testified Davon was 

willing to be adopted by his aunt if adoption by his uncle was not possible. 

Queried by the worker about his aunt's dogs, Davon told her he had been afraid 

of them but was not so now.

The Division's adoption supervisor testified that the Division, while 

hopeful that Davon would be adopted by his aunt and assigning priority to that 

goal, would concurrently pursue select home adoption. She testified Davon 

had been diagnosed with adjustment disorder and oppositional defiant 

disorder. She also noted he had successfully completed the Challenge program 

and returned to a school setting, where his academic and behavioral challenges

were being addressed. Davon was also working with a therapist. The 

supervisor noted the boy's age, generally pleasant disposition and many 

interests and expressed confidence he would be adopted, notwithstanding his 

special needs. 

Dr. Singer testified about his 2009 evaluation of defendant and his belief 

at that time that defendant had a good chance of becoming an adequate parent 

so long as she complied with certain recommendations, including remaining 
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drug free. He also testified defendant did not appear for her scheduled 

appointments with him in this proceeding.

Based on a detailed rendition of the facts adduced at trial and her 

assessments of the credibility of the witnesses who testified, Judge 

Grimbergen determined the Division established all four prongs of the best 

interests standard by clear and convincing evidence. She found defendant's 

persistent and untreated drug problem posed a substantial risk of harm to 

Davon, and her failure to timely provide relative resources caused him to 

remain in an unrelated resource home not committed to his adoption. 

Defendant's unwillingness to address her problems and failure to even visit 

Davon regularly during his almost nineteen months in placement demonstrated 

her inability to eliminate the harm she had caused her son.

Cataloging the many services the Division attempted to provide 

defendant, the judge concluded the Division easily met its obligation to 

provide her the services she needed to correct the conditions that led to 

Davon's placement. The judge also found the Division had explored, without 

success, alternatives to termination, including assessing all relative placement 

options, while still expressing the hope that Davon's aunt would be able to 

become a viable placement for him.
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Finally, the judge concluded defendant was simply not committed to 

Davon. Defendant did not complete services or make any meaningful effort to 

end her cocaine use. She failed to consistently visit her son or maintain 

contact with the Division. She failed to participate in psychological or 

bonding evaluations and didn't appear at trial. The judge found Davon wanted 

to be reunified with his mother, but the evidence demonstrated 

overwhelmingly that she is incapable of becoming an option for him, and 

accordingly, that termination of defendant's parental rights would not do more 

harm than good. 

Our review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is 

limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 

(2012). We generally "defer to the factual findings of the trial court because it 

has the opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the 

witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel of the case' that can never be 

realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 293 (2007)).

Our review convinces us that Judge Grimbergen's findings are amply 

supported by the trial testimony. Sadly, defendant never managed to get free 
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of her drug problem so as to provide Davon with a safe and stable home at any 

point, and she let months go by without any effort to see him. "A parent's 

withdrawal of that solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time 

is in itself a harm that endangers the health and development of the child." In 

re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 379 (1999). 

We reject defendant's argument that the Division did not properly 

conduct permanency planning for Davon and that the trial judge failed to 

consider alternatives to terminating her parental rights. There is a statutory 

preference for the temporary placement of children with suitable relatives 

pending the ultimate determination of the children's future. N.J.S.A. 30:4C12.1(a). Although it is the Division's goal "to place, whenever possible, 

children with relatives," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.F., 353 N.J. 

Super. 623, 636 (App. Div. 2002), "there is no presumption in favor of 

placement with relatives." N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 

419 N.J. Super. 568, 580 (App. Div. 2011). "[U]ltimately the question is what 

was in [the child's] best interest based upon the circumstances as they existed 

at the time of the final hearing." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.F., 

357 N.J. Super. 515, 527 (App. Div. 2003).
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We are satisfied the Division properly assessed potential relatives for 

placement. We find nothing inappropriate in the Division's determination to 

prioritize Davon's placement with his Uncle Jim. Jim and his wife expressed 

their commitment to Davon, visited him, and included him in a family 

vacation. Moreover, Davon expressed an unqualified desire to live with his 

uncle and his family if his mother couldn't reassume his care. That they 

unfortunately changed their minds about adopting him just before trial doesn't 

make the Division's decision to prioritize them over Davon's aunt

unreasonable. 

Further, defendant points to nothing in the record to support her 

assertion that the termination of her parental rights should have been delayed 

until the Division's assessment of Davon's aunt was complete. At the time of 

trial, Davon's aunt had not provided an address in North Carolina to permit the 

Division to begin an interstate assessment of her new home. And there is 

nothing in the record to indicate the assessment could occur quickly or that its 

success was guaranteed. The salient facts were that Davon had already been in 

placement for almost nineteen months, a return to defendant's care was 

untenable, and the judge believed the witness's testimony that select home 

adoption was a viable alternative for Davon. 
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Defendant's remaining arguments, to the extent we have not addressed 

them, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

We are satisfied the record supports the judge's findings that Davon's 

safety, health and development were endangered by defendant, who, unwilling 

or unable to eliminate the harm, refused and failed to complete the services 

offered, that there were no viable alternatives to termination, and that 

termination of her parental rights will not do more harm than good. We affirm 

the judgment substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Grimbergen in 

her written opinion of August 14, 2019. 

Affirmed.