[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 120 (Thursday, June 21, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33309-33313]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-15653]


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DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS


Summary of Precedent Opinions of the General Counsel

AGENCY: Department of Veterans Affairs.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is publishing a 
summary of legal interpretations issued by the Department's Office of 
General Counsel involving veterans' benefits under laws administered by 
VA. These interpretations are considered precedential by VA and will be 
followed by VA officials and employees in future claim matters. They 
are being published to provide the public, and, in particular, 
veterans' benefit claimants and their representatives, with notice of 
VA's interpretations regarding the legal matters at issue.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan P. Sokoll, Law Librarian, 
Department of Veterans Affairs (026H), 810 Vermont Ave., NW., 
Washington, DC 20420. (202) 273-6558.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: VA regulations at 38 CFR 2.6(e)(9) and 
14.507 authorize the Department's Office of General Counsel to issue 
written legal opinions having precedential effect in adjudications and 
appeals involving veterans' benefits under the laws administered by VA. 
The General Counsel's interpretations on

[[Page 33310]]

legal matters, contained in such opinions, are conclusive as to all VA 
officials and employees not only in the matter at issue but also in 
future adjudications and appeals, in the absence of a change in 
controlling statute or regulation or a superseding written legal 
opinion of the General Counsel.
    VA publishes summaries of such opinions in order to provide the 
public with notice of those interpretations of the General Counsel 
which must be followed in future benefit matters and to assist 
veterans' benefit claimants and their representatives in the 
prosecution of benefit claims. The full text of such opinions, with 
personal identifiers deleted, may be obtained by contacting the VA 
official named above.

VAOPGCPREC 7-2000

    Question Presented: (a) Is pursuit of a degree from a foreign 
school for a ``Medical Doctor (M.D.)'' program always to be considered 
as evidence of pursuit of ``a program of education in a course of 
instruction beyond the baccalaureate degree level'' for purposes of 10 
U.S.C. 16131(c)(1), as provided for training received prior to November 
29, 1993?
    (b) If not, what are the guidelines for determining whether a 
program of education is to be considered undergraduate training or 
graduate training for purposes of that section?
    Held: For purposes of 10 U.S.C. 16131(c)(1), a Medical Doctor 
(M.D.) degree program will be considered to be a professional degree 
program offered at a level beyond the baccalaureate degree, except when 
the facts found demonstrate that the institution offering the program 
does not require that the candidate have been awarded a bachelor's 
degree to be admitted to the program.
    Effective Date: June 16, 2000.

VAOPGCPREC 8-2000

    Question Presented: (a) The veteran's surviving spouse seeks 
eligibility for dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) under 38 
U.S.C. 1304 and 38 CFR 3.54(c)(1). Where the veteran contracted a fatal 
disease during the first or second enlistment of three consecutive 
enlistments, may the date of termination of his last enlistment be 
considered the termination date of the enrollment in which the fatal 
disease was incurred?
    (b) If the surviving spouse does not qualify for DIC, would the 
lapse of time between termination of the period of service and the date 
of the surviving spouse's marriage to the veteran be a bar to an award 
of death pension to the surviving spouse?
    Held: (a) In a case where the veteran served consecutive 
enlistments and was discharged from each under conditions other than 
dishonorable, if the veteran was unconditionally discharged from the 
earlier enlistments at the end of the obligated periods of service, 
then the veteran's enlistments would be considered distinct periods of 
service for purposes of determining eligibility for VA compensation or 
pension benefits. However, if the veteran's discharges from the earlier 
enlistments are considered conditional discharges under 38 CFR 3.13(a), 
then the consecutive enlistment periods ending in discharges under 
conditions other than dishonorable may be considered one period of 
service under 38 C.F.R. 3.13(b) for purposes of determining eligibility 
for VA compensation or pension benefits.
    (b) Under 38 U.S.C. 1541(f) and 38 C.F.R. 3.54(a), where a 
surviving spouse married a Vietnam-era veteran on or after May 8, 1985, 
was married to the veteran for less than one year, and had no child 
with the veteran, the surviving spouse is barred from eligibility for 
death pension benefits based on the marriage to the veteran, 
notwithstanding the veteran's wartime service.
    Effective Date: July 25, 2000.

VAOPGCPREC 9-2000

    Question Presented: Does the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Hix and Pardue v. Gober, Nos. 99-
7094, -7102 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2000), require the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) to accept evidence submitted after a veteran's 
death to establish, under 38 U.S.C. 1311 (a)(2), that the veteran was 
``entitled to receive'' compensation from VA during his or her lifetime 
for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for 
a continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding 
death?
    Held: Under 38 U.S.C. 1311 (a)(2) and 1318(b), a survivor's right 
to certain dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) benefits exists 
if the deceased veteran was ``entitled to receive'' certain benefits 
for a specified period prior to his or her death. In a series of 
precedential decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (CAVC) concluded that section 1318(b) authorizes payment of DIC 
when evidence in the veteran's claims file or in the custody of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) prior to the veteran's death 
establishes that the veterans was ``hypothetically'' entitled to the 
specified benefits. In Hix v. West, 12 Vet. App. 138 (1999), the CAVC 
concluded that section 1311(a)(2) must be construed in the same manner 
as section 1318(b). VA appealed the decision in Hix to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that 
entitlement to DIC under section 1311(a)(2) could not be predicated on 
a veteran's ``hypothetical'' entitlement, but could exist only if the 
veteran's entitlement were established by decisions during the 
veteran's lifetime or by correction of clear and unmistakable error in 
decisions rendered during the veteran's lifetime. In Hix and Pardue v. 
Gober, Nos. 99-7094, -7102 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2000), the Federal 
Circuit stated: ``[w]e affirm the ruling of the [CAVC] that the 
`entitled to receive' provision of section 1311(a)(2) requires de novo 
determination of the veteran's disability, upon the entirety of the 
record including any new evidence presented by the surviving spouse.'' 
To the extent the Federal Circuit's decision refers to consideration of 
new evidence presented by the surviving spouse, it appears to conflict 
with statements in CAVC decisions indicating that ``hypothetical'' 
entitlement is to be determined upon the evidence that was in the 
veteran's claims file or in VA or the CAVC. The issue before the 
Federal Circuit in Hix was whether the CAVC erred in concluding that 
section 1311(a)(2) authorizes increased DIC in cases where the 
veteran's entitlement to certain benefits is merely ``hypothetical.'' 
The ancillary issue of whether evidence may be submitted after a 
veteran's death to establish the veteran's ``hypothetical'' entitlement 
to certain benefits was not raised or argued by the parties before the 
Federal Circuit and the Court's isolated statement concerning that 
issue was not necessary to its decision on the appeal.
    For these reasons, the Federal Circuit's statement in Hix 
concerning the consideration of new evidence is dicta, and it is not 
binding on VA. Thus, the Federal Circuit's decision in Hix does not 
require VA to accept evidence submitted after a veteran's death offered 
to establish, under 38 U.S.C. 1311(a)(2), that the veteran was 
``entitled to receive'' compensation from VA during his or her lifetime 
for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for 
a continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding 
death.
    Effective Date: December 8, 2000.

VAOPGCPREC 10-2000

    Question Presented: Does the Board of Veterans' Appeals (the Board) 
have jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a

[[Page 33311]]

State home disputing a decision by the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs (Secretary) that the State home is not 
eligible for per diem payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA)?
    Held: The Secretary's Decision that the State home does not meet 
VA's nursing home standards, is not recognized by VA and, therefore, is 
not eligible for VA per diem payments, is a decision that falls within 
the limitation on judicial review set forth in section 511(a). Pursuant 
to 38 U.S.C. 7104, the jurisdiction of the Board extends to all 
questions decided by the Secretary under section 511(a). Therefore, the 
Board has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
    Effective Date: December 14, 2000.

VAOPGCPREC 11-2000

    Question Presented: Do the provisions of Pub. L. 106-475, for which 
that act does not specify an effective date, apply to claims filed 
before the date of enactment of the act but not finally decided as of 
that date?
    Held: On November 9, 2000, the President approved the Veterans 
Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Public Law 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096, 
which made several changes to statutory provisions governing Department 
of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefit claims, VA's duties to inform 
claimants about the completion and substantiation of their claims, and 
VA's duties to assist claimants in obtaining evidence necessary to 
substantiate their claims. Among other things, the act amended 38 
U.S.C. 5102, 5103, and 5107 and created new 38 U.S.C. 5100 and 5103A. 
Section 7(a) of the act, 114 Stat. At 2099, specifies that section 5107 
as amended applies to claims filed on or after the date of the act's 
enactment or to claims filed before then but not finally decided as of 
that date. However, the act does not specify the effective date of the 
other provisions of title 38, United States Code, created or amended by 
the act. We conclude that all of the act's provisions apply to claims 
filed on or after November 9, 2000, as well as to claims filed before 
then but not finally decided as of that date.
    Effective Date: November 27, 2000.

VAOPGCPREC 1-2001

    Question Presented: Should a retroactive award of compensation that 
results from a finding of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) be 
retroactively attributed to the estate of a veterans for purposes of 
determining whether 38 U.S.C. 5503 and 38 C.F.R. 3.557 bar payment of 
compensation to the veteran for a prior period during which the veteran 
was hospitalized at government expense?
    Held: Prior to a recent statutory amendment, the provisions of 38 
U.S.C. 5503(b)(1)(A) and 38 C.F.R. 3.557(b) required that compensation 
not be paid in the case of an incompetent veteran without spouse or 
child who is being furnished hospital treatment or institutional or 
domiciliary care at government expense when the veteran's estate 
exceeds $1,500, until such time as the estate is reduced to $500. A 
retroactive award of compensation based on a finding of clear and 
unmistakable error in a prior decision denying service connection 
should not be retroactively attributed to the estate of the veteran for 
purposes of determining whether section 5503(b)(1)(A) and section 
3.557(b) bar payment of compensation for the period subsequent to the 
effective date of the award of service connection and prior to the date 
of the veteran's release from a government facility.
    Effective Date: January 4, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 2-2001

    Question Presented: May a veteran qualify for MGIB benefits under 
38 U.S.C. 3011(a)(1)(B) and 38 C.F.R. 21.7020(b)(5) when the individual 
had an interruption of active duty service after June 30, 1985, and 
before July 1, 1988, which was of less than 90 days in length?
    Held: (a) An individual having chapter 34 eligibility on December 
31, 1989, must serve 3 continuous years on active duty after June 30, 
1985, to become entitled to MGIB benefits under 38 U.S.C. 
3011(a)(1)(B). Although an interruption of less than 90 days during 
that period would not constitute a ``break in service'' under 38 C.F.R. 
21.7020(b)(5), it would violate the requirement that the individual 
have served 3 continuous years on active duty after June 30, 1985, 
since an interruption of any length (following a complete separation 
from service) would not meet the definition of ``continuous active 
duty'' under 38 C.F.R. 21.7020(b)(6).
    (b) To qualify for MGIB entitlement under 38 U.S.C. 
3011(a)(1)(B)(I), the individual must have served continuously on 
active duty from July 1, 1985, to June 30, 1988. Except as provided for 
certain cases of ``early out'' discharge covered under clause (ii) of 
that statute, the individual could not earn entitlement under chapter 
30 based on any other period of continuous active duty service.
    Effective Date: January 9, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 3-2001

    Questions Presented: (a) Who, if anyone, in the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) other than the Secretary is authorized to move 
for readjudication of a finally denied claim under section 7(b) of the 
Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000?
    (b) Who should first readjudicate such a claim, the entity that 
last adjudicated the claim or the agency of original jurisdiction?
    (c) If a previously appealed claim is readjudicated under section 
7(b), what must the claimant do, if anything, to appeal the decision 
upon readjudication?
    (d) Must the Board of Veterans' Appeals vacate its prior decision 
on a claim that is readjudicated under section 7(b)?
    Held: Under section 7(b) of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 
2000, Public Law 106-475, Sec. 7(b), 114 Stat. 2096, 2099, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), upon request of the claimant or 
upon the motion of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, must readjudicate 
certain finally decided claims ``as if the denial or dismissal had not 
been made.'' Supervisory or adjudicative personnel of VA's Veterans 
Benefits Administration are authorized to initiate such readjudication 
on behalf of the Secretary, and other VA organizational elements, such 
as the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) and the Office of General 
Counsel, may refer to VBA cases involving those finally decided claims. 
If readjudication under section 7(b) is timely initiated, the first 
readjudication of the claim must be made by the agency of original 
jurisdiction. If the claimant wishes to appeal the decision made on 
readjudication, he or she must file a timely notice of disagreement 
with the decision, even if the original decision had been appealed. The 
Board of Veterans' Appeals need not vacate any prior Board decision on 
a claim being readjudicated under section 7(b).
    Effective Date: January 22, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 4-2001

    Question Presented: Do 38 C.F.R. 3.322(a) and 4.22 apply to the 
rating of a disability for which compensation is payable under 38 
U.S.C. 1151 as if the disability were service connected?
    Held: Sections 3.322(a) and 4.22 of title 38, Code of Federal 
Regulations, require that, in rating disabilities aggravated by 
service, the degree of disability existing at the time of entrance into 
service, if ascertainable, be deducted from the present degree of 
disability unless the present degree of

[[Page 33312]]

disability is total, in which case no deduction is made. These 
provisions apply to the rating of disabilities compensated under 38 
U.S.C. 1151, which, before its amendment effective October 1, 1997, 
authorized compensation for additional disability resulting from injury 
or aggravation of an injury as a result of Department of Veterans 
Affairs hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment, examination, or 
pursuit of a course of vocational rehabilitation, in the same manner as 
if the additional disability were service connected.
    Effective Date: February 2, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 5-2001

    Question Presented: (a) For claims filed after November 25, 1991, 
and before October 1, 1997, does 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1151 authorize 
compensation for additional disability alleged to have resulted from 
the omission or failure by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to 
diagnose or treat an underlying disease or injury, or does section 1151 
authorize compensation only for disability resulting from an act of 
commission by VA?
    (b) If section 1151 authorizes compensation, with respect to claims 
filed during that time period, based on VA's omission or failure to 
diagnose or treat an underlying disease or injury, what are the 
essential elements of such a claim that must be established in order 
for a claimant to prevail?
    Held: (a) Under the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1151 applicable to 
claims filed prior to October 1, 1997, benefits may be paid for 
disability or death attributable to VA's failure to diagnose and/or 
treat a preexisting condition when VA provides treatment or an 
examination. Disability or death due to a preexisting condition may be 
viewed as occurring ``as a result of'' the VA treatment or examination 
only if a physician exercising the degree of skill and care ordinarily 
required of the medical profession reasonably should have diagnosed the 
condition and rendered treatment which probably would have avoided the 
resulting disability or death.
    (b) The factual elements necessary to support a claim under section 
1151 based on failure to diagnose or treat a preexisting condition may 
vary with the facts of each case and the nature of the particular 
injury and cause alleged by the claimant. As a general matter, however, 
entitlement to benefits based on such claims would ordinarily require a 
determination that: (1) VA failed to diagnose and/or treat a 
preexisting disease or injury; (2) a physician exercising the degree of 
skill and care ordinarily required of the medical profession reasonably 
should have diagnosed the condition and rendered treatment; and (3) the 
veteran suffered disability or death which probably would have been 
avoided if proper diagnosis and treatment had been rendered.
    Effective Date: February 5, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 6-2001

    Question Presented: (a) Do 38 U.S.C. 3104(a)(15) and 38 CFR 
Sec. 21.160 allow for, or preclude, authorization of the construction 
of an enclosed studio on the rear of a veteran's home as a component of 
an eligible veteran's program of independent living (IL) services?
    (b) If those provisions do allow for authorization of such 
construction, may the construction be authorized independent of, and in 
addition to, the benefits provided under 38 U.S.C. 1717(a)(2) and 2101?
    Held: (a) The Secretary has authority to provide the particular 
housing improvement services claimed in this case as part of the 
eligible veteran's independent living services program of 
rehabilitation under section 3120 of chapter 31, title 38, United 
States Code, if the Secretary finds the services are essential to 
enable the veteran to achieve maximum independence in daily living. 
See, also, 38 U.S.C. 3101(4), 3104(a)(15), and 38 CFR 21.160.
    (b) The Secretary, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 3104(a)(9), has authority 
to provide a chapter 31 participant who is in need of the home health 
services described in 38 U.S.C. 1717(a)(2) with those services 
regardless of whether the participant has remaining eligibility 
therefor under section 1717(a)(2).
    (c) Since the IL services claimed by the veteran in this case are 
not the same as the services authorized him under chapter 21 of title 
38, the prohibition in section 2104 of that chapter against authorizing 
the latter services more than once to the same veteran has no 
application.
    Effective Date: February 5, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 7-2001

    Question Presented: Whether a recipient of military retired or 
retirement pay whom VA has determined is entitled to compensation under 
title 38, United States Code, and who has submitted a waiver of 
entitlement to that pay is a payee for purposes of 38 U.S.C. 3012(b)(6) 
(1964) (currently 38 U.S.C. 5112(b)(6)).
    Held: (a) A ``payee'' for purposes of 38 U.S.C. 3012(b)(6) (1964) 
(currently 38 U.S.C. 5112(b)(6)) is a person who is in continuous 
receipt of VA compensation, dependency and indemnity compensation, or 
pension. The effective date of an award of VA compensation to a 
recipient of military pay or retirement pay who has submitted a waiver 
of entitlement to that pay is the date upon which the service 
department reduces such pay.
    (b) Section 3012(b)(6) of title 38, United States Code (1964) 
(currently 38 U.S.C. 5112(b)(6)), does not apply where there is no 
reduction in the amount of compensation being paid to a claimant. 
Therefore, if a veteran's evaluation is reduced by VA while the veteran 
is receiving military retired or retirement pay during the period in 
which a service department is processing a waiver of such pay, section 
3012(b)(6) is not applicable because, at the time of the reduction, the 
reduction decision does not result in the veteran getting any less 
retired or retirement pay than the veteran had been receiving before 
the decision was made.
    Effective Date: February 14, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 8-2001

    Question Presented: Whether a former member of the Naval Reserve 
who reports having been sexually assaulted on two occasions during 
inactive duty training and who alleges suffering from resulting post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may be considered to have been 
disabled by an injury in determining whether the member had active 
service for purposes of 38 U.S.C. 101(24)?
    Held: Under 38 U.S.C. 101(2) and (24), inactive duty training may 
provide a basis for veteran status for purposes of benefits 
administered by the Department only if the individual incurred 
disability or death from an injury incurred or aggravated in line of 
duty. An individual who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as 
a result of a sexual assault that occurred during inactive duty 
training may be considered disabled by an ``injury'' for purposes of 
section 101(2) and (24).
    Effective Date: February 26, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 9-2001

    Question Presented: If an individual has multiple periods of active 
duty military service, but the last such period does not culminate with 
an ``honorable'' discharge, when does the individual's ten year period 
of eligibility to receive benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill--Active 
Duty end?
    Held: In the basic case, an individual who is awarded an 
``honorable'' discharge upon completion of the minimum period of active 
duty required for MGIB benefits entitlement under 38 U.S.C. 3011 may 
use those benefits within 10 years after the date of such discharge. If 
that individual

[[Page 33313]]

subsequently serves one or more additional periods of active duty 
(generally, of not less than 90 days), then the individual would have 
10 years from the date of the individual's last discharge from active 
duty within which to use his or her MGIB benefits. Provision of such 
later delimiting period is not conditioned upon the individual's having 
been awarded an ``honorable'' discharge from his or her last period of 
active duty.38 U.S.C. 3031(a) and (g).
    Effective Date: March 20, 2001.

VAOPGCPREC 10-2001

    Questions Presented: Whether a veteran is subject to reduction of 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) compensation and pension benefits, 
under 38 U.S.C. 5313 and 1505, where the veteran is convicted of a 
crime in a foreign country, incarcerated abroad, and subsequently 
transferred to a penal institution of the United States to serve the 
remainder of the criminal sentence?
    What is the effective date of reduction, under 38 U.S.C. 5313 and 
1505, where a veteran is convicted of a crime in a foreign country and 
incarcerated abroad, then transferred to a penal institution in the 
United States to serve the remainder of the criminal sentence?
    Held: 1. A veteran is not subject to reduction of compensation and 
pension benefits, under 38 U.S.C. 5313 and 1505, while incarcerated in 
a foreign prison. However, a veteran who is transferred to a Federal, 
State, or local penal institution in the United States to serve the 
remainder of a sentence for a foreign conviction of an offense which is 
equivalent to a felony (or a misdemeanor under section 1505) under the 
laws of the United States is thereafter subject to reduction of 
compensation and pension benefits under 38 U.S.C. 5313 and 1505.
    2. The effective date of reduction is the sixty-first day of 
incarceration in a Federal, State, or local penal institution in the 
United States.
    Effective Date: May 24, 2001.

Withdrawn Precedent Opinion

VAOPGCPREC 4-99

    1. This is to inform you that our opinion in VAOPGCPREC 4-99 is 
being withdrawn due to the recent enactment of the Veterans Claims 
Assistance Act of 2000, Public Law No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096. Under 
former 38 U.S.C. 5107(a), as interpreted by the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, a claimant was required to submit ``evidence 
sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that 
the claim is well grounded'' before the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) had any obligation to assist the claimant in developing the facts 
pertinent to the claim. Our opinion in VAOPGCPREC 4-99 responded to a 
question from the Chairman of the Board of Veterans' Appeals concerning 
the application of the well-grounded claim requirement to claims for 
compensation under 38 U.S.C. 1117 and 38 CFR 3.317 for disability due 
to an undiagnosed illness suffered by a veteran of the Persian Gulf 
War. Our opinion concluded that claimants seeking such benefits were 
required to submit competent evidence with respect to four factual 
elements in order to establish a well-grounded claim. But see Neumann 
v. West, 14 Vet. App. 12, 22-23 (2000) (stating a slightly different 
formulation of four factual elements of well-grounded claims under 38 
U.S.C. 1117 and 38 CFR 3.317).
    2. On November 9, 2000, the President signed into law the Veterans 
Claims Assistance Act of 2000. In pertinent part, this statute revised 
38 U.S.C. 5107(a) by deleting the requirement that a claimant must 
submit a ``well grounded'' claim for benefits in order to obtain 
assistance from VA in developing the facts pertinent to the claim. This 
change applies to all future claims, as well as to any previously-filed 
claim which was not finally denied as of November 9, 2000, when the 
Veterans Claims Assistance Act was signed into law. Additionally, any 
individual whose claim was finally denied as being not ``well 
grounded'' between July 14, 1999, and November 9, 2000, may have their 
claim readjudicated under the new statute upon request to VA made 
within two years after November 9, 2000.
    3. Because the Veterans Claims Assistance Act removes from 38 
U.S.C. Sec. 5107(a) the well-grounded claim requirement upon which the 
analysis and conclusion in VAOPGCPREC 4-99 were based, that opinion is 
hereby withdrawn.
    Effective Date: November 28, 2000.

    Dated: June 5, 2001.
    By Direction of the Secretary.
Tim S. McClain,
General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 01-15653 Filed 6-20-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8320-01-U