W hil e the D efen d an t t esti f i ed t ha t M o rro w wa s no t he r l eg al l ast na m e, i t i s t he p o l i cy o f t his C o urt t o use 1 the na m e a s it a p p e a rs in the ind ic tm e n t. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 22, 200 8 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. AN NET TE TU RN ER MORROW

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Maury County No. 15297 Stella Hargrove , Judge

No. M2007- 01716-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Novem ber 19, 2008

Th e De fe nd ant, Anne tte Turn e r Mor ro w, a pp e a ls fr om the se nte nc ing de c isi on of the Ma ur y County 1 Circuit Court. The Def

endant plea ded guilty

to theft of prope rty

valued at over $10,000 but l ess than $60,000 and identity

theft. F ollowing a

sentenc ing he aring , the t rial court imposed an ef fec tive fivey ear sentenc e as a Rang e I , standard offende r and order ed the Def endant to serve her se ntence in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. On appe al, the De fenda nt contends that the trial court e rre d in denying her r equest for

probation or other alternative sentencing . Findingno err or, we aff irm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d t h e o pinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. WO O D A LL and D. KEL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined. Kyle E. Dodd, Pulaski, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Annette T urner

Morrow. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Cameron L . Hyder, A ssist an t Attorney Gene ral; and Mike B ottoms, Dist rict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound This ap p e a l p e rta in s to th e D e f e n d an t’ s g u il ty

p le a s an d

r e s u lt in g s e n te n c e s
. A M a ury County g rand jury

char g ed the Defe ndant with one count of theft of pr operty

valued be tween $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony , and two counts of ide ntity theft as a result of stea ling money from her employ er. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, - 105, -150. On De cembe r 14, 2006, theT h e tra n sc rip t o f t h e gu ilt y p le a he a rin g is no t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd o n a p p e a l. 2

-2- Def endant plea ded guilty

to Class C felony

theft and one count of identity theft. The other count of identity theft wa s dismis sed. Sentenc ing w as left to the discr etion of the trial c ourt.
A sentenc ing hear ing was held on Fe bruar y 26, and Marc h 2, 2007. The f o l lowing underlying f

acts were e stablished at the sente ncinghear ing. For approximately

two y ear s, Dr. Indu 2 B a li e mpl oy e d th e De fe nd ant a s a bo ok ke e pe r at Co lum

bia Mu lti -S pecial ty

Me dic a l Cli nic , PC. Af te r Dr

. B a li’ s su sp ic ion s we re aro us e d re g ard ingun a uth or ize d d isb ur se me nts by the De fe nd ant, Dr. B ali reque sted an a ccountingfirm to conduct a financ ial revie w of he r acc ounts. The investigation revea led that the Def endant overpa id he rself, failed to make the appr opriate 401K and insurance deductions fr om her pa y chec ks, opened cre dit c ards in D r. Ba li’s na me, and made persona l purcha ses with business cre dit cards. Emily Thigpen testified that she prepa red t h e D e f e n d a nt’ s p r e s e ntence repor

t. The De fenda

nt picked up t h e q u es t i onnaire from Thigpen. Thigpen instructed the Def endant to fill out the quest ionnaire a

nd schedule an intervie w. The D efe ndant neve r re turned the f orm or conta cted Th igpe n, and

the re po rt

wa s c omp le te d w ith out th e De fe nd ant’ s in put. Tany a Cherr

y , a business eva luator and f raud inve stigator, stated that she was c ontacted by Dr. B ali’s attorne y

to conduct an inve stigation of D r. Ba li’s business recor ds. Duringthe i nv e s t i g a t i o n , s h e d i s c o ve re d th a t th e re we re se ve ra l di ff e re nt i ssu e s w iththe pa

y ro ll: mis sin g c he c ks , more tha n o n e check to the Def endant dur ing a

pay roll period, cr edits rather than debits for the Def endant’ s in s u

r ance deductions, fa lse information ente red into the books re g ardingpay ees, c hecks dated a nd cashe d prior to the date ref lected in the books, a

nd failure to take the appr opriate 401( k) deductions fr om the Def

endant’ s chec ks.

Dr . Ba li tes tif

ie d th a t sh e pr a c tic e d me dic ine and ne phro logy

in C olumbi a

and that th e name of her business was Columbia Multi-S pecia lty Medica l Cli nic. Acc ording to Dr. B ali, she hired the Def endant, who had a n urse’ s license, on De cembe r 1, 2001, to work a s a sec reta ry and per form
nurs ingdutie s. Th e De fe nd ant l a te r a c qu ir e d bill ing sk ill s and wa s p ro mot e d to of

fi c e mana g e r i n 2002. The Defenda

nt’s billing dut ies included pay roll, acc ounts pay able and rec eivable, a nd writing
and iss uin g c he c ks

. Dr

. B a li r e lay e d th a t sh e “ re a lly tr us te d” the De fe nd ant w iththe of fi c e e xpe ns e s, even g oing so f

ar a s to give the Def

endant a signature stamp to sig n chec ks.

Dr. B ali confirme d that she authorized a bonus to the Def endant on only one occ asion and that she did not authorize an y o f t h e ex tra pa y chec ks to the Defe ndant. Fr om eac h paychec k, the Def endant wa s supposed to contribute four perc ent of sala

ry to he r 401(k) , which Dr . Ba li matched. Dr. B ali also had no knowle dg e of c hecks issued by th e o ff i ce fo r the Def

endant’ s persona l purcha ses.
The De fenda

nt obtained cr edit car ds, without permission, with American Expr ess and Citi Ba nk in Dr. B ali’s name. D r. Bal i k n ew o f onl y one ca rd, a Capital One acc ount, and the-3-

Def endant wa s not to use this credit car d for personal purchases. Dr. Bali became suspicious whe n she noticed a

Citi Ba nk letter a ddresse d to the office

. She was also leer y beca use the De fenda

nt had just purchase d a new

home. The State doc umented numer ous u n au t h orized cre dit card pur chase s by the Def endant. Dr . Ba li terminated the De fenda nt’s employ

ment in October

2004.

Dr. B ali incurre d leg al bills and had to pay an ac counting firm t o perf orm the re view of he r bu sin e ss r e c or ds

. Whe n Dr

. B a li wa s a sk e d h e r f e e lin g s o n w hat sh ou ld h a pp e n to the De fe nd ant, sh e re pli e d, “ Istr on g ly

fe e l th a t sh e sh ou ld g e t so me ja il t ime, at lea st , becaus e sh e ha s p ut m e throug h a lot. Ialmost had a n er v o u s b re ak d own when he r cr editors started hitting me, and they actua lly had a c ollection ag ency afte r me.” The story rec eived media attention, being printed in the loc a l pa pe r a ft e r t he De fe nd ant w a s in dic te d. F oll ow ing that stor y , th e po st o ff

ic e no tif ie d D r. B a li of a post off

ice box in her name, of

which Dr . Ba li had no knowledg e.
Br ad Elliot, who had bee n an ag ent with the Tenne ssee B urea u of Investig ati o n for approximately

ten y ear s, testified that he wa s the investigating a gen t in this case. Dur ing the prec eding fi v e y e ar s , h e h a d b e e nw o r

k in g a s a f ie ld a g e n t m a in ly

in M a ur y an d G il e s Co u nties inv e sti g a tin g e mbe zzle me nt c a se s. Whe n a sk e d if he ha d no tic e d any tr e nd in t he pa st f ive y e ars in the amount of e mbezz lement ca ses, he r esponded that there ha d “[d] efinitely been a n incre ase in the wh ite c oll ar- e mpl oy e e the ft -t y pe c ases that

we a re wo rk ing .” He re lay e d th a t he wa s p re se ntl y inv olv e d in tw o oth e r inv e sti g a tio ns sim ila r in natur e to the pr e se nt c a se . T he State the n e nte re d into evidenc e ce rtified copie s of s even pe nding indictments for embezzlement in Maury County . The State also compiled and e ntere d into the rec ord ce rti fi ed copies of Ma ury County embezzlement
c a se s r e su lti ngin c on vic tio ns
. The for ty -two-y ear -old Def

endant then testified on her own behalf

. She stated that she ha d a hig h school diploma and a nur sing de g ree . The De fenda nt had neve r bee n marrie d but had two children by

Ricky Morrow. She w as cur

rently employ ed with Complete Careg ivers and E lk Valley for pr ivate duty

nursing . Her

income fr om Elk Valley

was $480.00 to $560.00 a w eek.
Prior to the hear ing, the Def endant f iled for Chapte r 13 bankr

uptcy and paid $375.00 a

wee k
un de r t he ba nk ru ptc y pla n. Th e De fe nd ant a lso re lay e d th a t sh e ha d f ile d a laws uit a g a ins t Co mpl e te Care g ive rs be c a

us e the y a lle g e dly de du cte d bankr

up tc y pa y me nts fr om h e r c he c k b ut f a ile d to fo rw ard the m to the ba

nk ru ptc y tr us te e . T he De fe nd ant te sti fi e d that she wa s not pe rm itt e d to se ll her home while in bankruptc y
. The De fenda

nt denied most of the alleg ations of misusing Dr. Ba li’s funds for pe rsonal g ain. She testified that it was Dr. B ali who opene d the Amer ican Express ac count and that it was give n to her to use f

or of fi ce supplies. She did acknowledg e that she ma de unauthor ized personal purcha ses with office cre dit cards.
The De fenda

nt did not have any

prior cr iminal recor d. She expressed a w illingness to re pay Dr. B ali. She also stated that she w ould comply with the conditions of probation.A mo t i on f or n ew t r i al i s not an appropri at e mot i on t o f i l e f ol l owi ng t he ent r y of

a g ui l t y pl ea. St at e v
. Q ui ncy 3 Al ex an der N or man , N o. W 2003- 006 3 5

- C C A- R3- CD , 2004 W L 1773435, a t * 2 n

. 2 ( ci t i n g St at e v
. M cCl i n t ock , 732 S.W

. 2 d 26 8 , 27 1 (T enn. 19 8 7 ))

.

-4- On cr o s s - e xami n a ti o n , th e D e f e n d an t a c kn o w le d g e d

th a t s h e w a s a lo n e in

th e o f f ic e fre quently

. Acc ording to the Def endant, she was not the only person who a cce ssed the bookkee ping
rec ords, as Dr . Ba li occasio n al l y d i d s o as we ll. She denied makingchang es to any chec ks and denied ope ning the Citi Ba nk car d without permission. However , the Defenda nt admitted to making persona l purcha ses wit h the cards. The De fenda nt testified that she used the c ards to “of fset” what Dr. B ali could not pay her for va cation time, as a form of c ompensation. She also re lay ed that the statements for the cre dit cards we re se nt to a post office box

. At the c on c lus ion

of the se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt imp os e d c on c ur

re nt t e rm s, a s a Rang e I , standard of

fende r, of f

ive y ear s for the theft conviction and two y ear s for the ide ntity theft
co n v i ct i o n
. M o re o v er , t h e t ri al co u rt d en i edp ro b at i o no r a n y o th er fo rm o f a l t ern at i v e s en t en ci n g, deter mining that a se ntence of total confine ment was wa rra nted. This appea l followed.

Ana lys is I. Notice of Ap peal I nitially , we will addr ess the State’s a rgu ment that the Def endant’ s notice of a

ppeal wa s untimely

. J udg ments of conviction wer e enter ed on Marc h 2, 2007. The Def endant filed a notice of appea l on Marc h 6, 2007. Subsequently , the Def endant r etained ne w counse l who pursued f urther action on her

behalf in the trial court by

filing a motion for new t rial. Following the denial of her 3 motion for new tria l, the Def endant f iled another

notice of a

ppeal on July

30, 2007. Be cause the two appea ls related to the same case, thi s Court ordere d them consolidated. We conc lude that the Mar ch 6, 2007 notice of appea l was ti mely

. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (ma ndating that a notice of

appea l to t his Cou rt sh a ll b e fi le d “ wi thi n 3 0 d ay s a ft e r t he date of e ntr y of the jud g me nt a

pp e a le d f ro m .

. . .” ). Mo re ov e r, “ [n]otwi ths tand ing any oth e r pr ov isi on of law or ru le of c ourt to t he c on tr ary , in all criminal ca ses the ‘notice of appe al’ d ocument is not jurisdictional and the filing of such document may

be wa ived in the intere sts of justice.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 27-1- 123; see a lso Tenn. R. App. P. 4.

II. Al te r nat ive Se nt e nc ing The De fenda

nt contends only

that the trial cour

t erre d by denying he r probation or anothe r form of a lternative se ntencing , arguing that she had no c riminal rec ord, that the State off ere d no evidenc e to indicate a

ny upwar d trend in embe zz lement ca ses, and t h at t h e circ umstances of the offe nse did not war

rant incar cer ation. She further claims the trial court ignor ed the presumption that she wa s a fa

vorable candidate for a lternative se ntencing

. Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentenc e upon a convicted criminal defe ndant, it must consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the tr ial and the sentenc ing he aring ; (b) the pr esente nce r eport; (c ) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature andW e n ot e t hat t he l egi s l at ur e has r ece nt l y amended s eve r al provi s i ons of t he C r i mi nal Sent enc i ng Ref orm Act 4

o f 1 9 8 9 , sa id c h a n g e s b e c o m ing e ff e c tive J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 . S e e T e n n . P u b . A c ts c h . 3 5 3 , § 2 2

. H o w e v e r, the D e fen d a n t’s
cr i mes i n t h i s c as e pr eda t e t h e ef f ec t i v e dat e of

t h es e ame n dmen t s
. T h er ef or e, t h i s case is not a f f ec t ed by t h e 2005
a m e n d m e n ts, a n d t he st at ut es ci t ed i n t hi s o p i ni o n are t ho se t hat were i n ef f ect at t he t i m e t he i nst ant cri m es were commi t t ed.
-5- char acte ristics of the cr iminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and information offer ed by the par ties on the enha

nceme nt and mitigatingfac tors set forth in Tennessee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f) any statement the de fenda

nt wish es t o m ak e in the defe ndant’s own behalf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 704 4 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o f

a c ili tate a pp e llate re vie w, the t ri al court is r e qu ir e d to pla c e on

the re c or d it s rea so n s fo r imposing the spe cific se ntence , including the identification of the mitig ating and enhanc eme n t fa ct o rs found, the spe cific f acts supportingeac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, a nd the
me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mit ig a tin g and e nh anc e me nt f

a c to rs hav e be e n e va luate d a nd ba lanc e d in deter mining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001). Upon a c halleng e to the sente nce imposed, this Court has a duty to c onduct a de novo r eview of the sente nce with a presumption that the determinations made by the trial cour

t are corr ect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . Howeve r, this presumption “is conditioned upon the aff irmative sh ow ingin t

he re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt c on sid e re d the se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s and a ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial cour

t followed the statutory

sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the c ourt imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r havingg iven due c onsideration and pr oper we ight to the f actor s and principles se t out under the sentenc ing la

w, and that the trial court’s finding s of fac t a re adequately

supported by

the re cord, then the pre sum p t i o n i s ap p licable, a nd we may

not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pref err ed a diffe rent re sult. S ee State v. F letcher , 805 S.W . 2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the trial court if (1) the sentenc e complies with the purposes and princ iples of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct and (2) the trial court’s finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. See State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001)

. The burden of showingthat a sente nce is improper

is upon the appea ling pa

rty

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.
A def endant who does not possess a criminal history showing a cle ar disre g ard f or society ’s laws and mora ls, who has not failed pa st rehabilitation eff orts, and who “is an e specia lly mitigated
or sta nd ard of fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C , D , o r E fe lony

is p re sume d to be a

fa vo ra ble c and idate for alternative sentenc ing options in the absenc e of evidenc e to the contra ry .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6); see a lso St ate v. F ields, 40 S.W .3d 4 3 5 , 440 (Tenn. 2001) . The following
c on sid e ratio ns pr ov ide g uid anc e re g ard ing wh a t c on sti tut e s “ e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary” wh ic h w ou ld
re b u tt h e p re s u mp t i o no f a l t ern at i v e s en t en ci n g:

(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by res t raining a de fenda

nt wh o h a s a lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t;T h e l eg i s l at u r e h as s u bs equ en t l y modi f i ed pr obat i on e l i g i bi l i t y t o s en t en ce s of t en y ea r s or l es s
. Se e 2005 5 T en n
. Pub. Act s c h

. 353, § 7. -6-

(B ) Confinement is nec essar y to avoid depre ciatingthe s eriousness of the of fe ns e or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula rl y su ite d to pr ovid e an

e ff e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to others likely

to commit si milar offe nses; or (C ) Me a sure s le ss re str ic tiv e tha n c on fi ne me nt have fr e qu e ntl y or recent ly been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) ; see a lso St ate v. Hoope r, 29 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2000). Additionally , the principles of sentenc ing ref lect that the sentenc e should be no g reater than that deser ved for the offe nse committed and should be the least sever e measure necessa ry to achieve the purposes f

or which the sentenc e is imposed. See Ten n
. C ode Ann. § 40- 35-103(2) , (4). The court should also consider the def endan t ’s p o t en tial for re habilitation or treatment in dete rmining the appr opriate se ntence . See id. § 40-35-103( 5).
A d e fend ant is e lig ibl e fo r p ro batio n if the a c tua l se nte nc e imp os e d u po n th e de fe nd ant i s eig ht y ear s or less and the of fense for whic h the def

endant is sentenc ed is not specifica lly excluded 5 by statute. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-303(a ). The tr ial court shall automatica lly consider probation as a

sentenc ing a lternative f

or elig ible de f

e n d a nts ; h o w e v e r , the defe ndant bea rs the burde n of pr ov inghis or

he r s uit a bil ity fo r p ro batio n. Se e id. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ). No cri mi nal d e fe nd ant i s automatically

entitled to probation as a matter of law

. See id. § 40-35-303( b), Sentenc ing Comm’n Com me nts ; State v. Da

vis , 9 40 S.W .2 d 558 , 5 59 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . Rathe r, the de fe nd ant m us t de mon str a te that pr ob a tio n wo uld se rv e the e nd s of jus tic e and the be st i nte re sts of

bo th t he pu bli c and the de fenda

nt. See State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

I n deter mining whe ther to g rant pr o bation, the cour t must consider the nature and circ umstances of the offe nse; the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord; his or her background and s o cial his tor y ; hi s o r h e r p re se nt c on dit ion , b oth phy sic a l and

me nta l; the de te rr e nt e ff

e c t on the de fe nd ant; and the de fe nd ant’ s pote nti a l for re ha bil itatio n or tr e a tme nt. Se e id. I f t he c ourt de te rm ine s th a t a period of pr obation is appropriate, it shall sentence the def enda n t to a spec ific sentenc e but then suspend that sentenc e and pla ce the defe ndant on supervised or unsupervised pr obation either immediately or after the service of a period of confineme nt. See Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-303( c), -306(a ). We note, however, t h at “the determination of whe ther the A ppellant is entitled to an alternative sentenc e and whether the Appellant is e ntitled to full probation ar e diffe rent inquiries.” State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Where a defe ndant i s entitled to the statutory presumpti o n o f al t ernative sentenc ing, the State has the burde n of over coming the presumption of evide nce to the contra ry
. State v. Bing ham, 910 S.W .2d 448, 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), over

ruled on other

g rounds by Hooper , 29 S.W .3d at 9. Conversely , the def endant ha s the-7-

burden of establishing his or her suitabilit y for full probation, even if the defe ndant is e ntitled to the statutory presumption of alter

native sente ncing . I d.; see B og g s, 932 S.W .2d at 477.
Th e De fe nd ant p le a de d guil ty a s a Rang e I , stand ard of

fe nd e r to a Cla ss C fe lony and a Cla ss D fe lony , making her a presumptive ca ndidate for

alternative sentenc ing unde r Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-102( 6). The tr ial court based t he denial of probation or any other for m of alternative sentenc ing pr imarily upon the nature and cir cumstance s of the off enses a nd the deter

rent eff ect such a denial would have on others li kely to commit simil ar offense s. In so deciding , the trial court g ave the following extensive and thoroug h rationale :

The [c]ourt, in providing a se nten ce f or this [ D]efenda

nt, has to consider
seve ral fa ctors. One of the fa ctors that the [c]ourt has to consider is providingan eff ective g ener al deter

ren[t] to those likely

to violate the law.
We know that in State versus Hoope r , 29 S.W .3rd pag e 1, Supreme Court of Tenne ssee, 2000, that de ter[r]ence a lone, if the recor d is complete, is enough to de ny alternative sentenc ing. And the [c]ourt finds t hat the State has suf ficiently supplied fo r t h e r ec o rdt h e f

o l l o wi n g:
That deter renc e is ne eded in this community , as well as this jurisdi ction of our four c ounties. The [ c]ourt also finds that the State has shown that this [D] efe ndant’s incar cer ation could rationally serve as a de terre n[t ] t o those similarly situa t ed and lik e ly to c omm it s imi lar c ri me s.

. . . . Th e [c]o ur

t a lso ha s to c on sid e r what c on fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id depre ciatingthe seriousne s s o f t he off ense. Consideringthe circ umstances of the
o ff en s e, and of c ourse, the [c]ourt knows that this is an embezz lement, and the [c] ourt will discuss later the e nhance ment fac tor of trust and violation of trust.

. . . . So the [c]o ur

t f e e ls s tr on gly

that c on fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id depre ciatingthe seriousne ss of t his offe nse t hat has gre atly , g reatly g rown, a nd not only in our county , but in our jurisdiction, and acr oss the state. The [c]ourt has to consider the potential or l ack of potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. And under this fa ct o r, t h e [ c]ourt can c onsider the c andor or lack of candor —and the lac k of ac ceptingrespo n s i bility for he r ac tions, and the lack of truthfulness on the par

t of the [D] efe ndant. . . .-8- . . . I want to g o back and talk about the nature of the offe nse. These are the
me tho ds of

e mbe zzle me nt a

nd ide nti ty the ft in thi s c a se that th is [c ]our t is
co n s i d er i n g.
Credits instead of de bits, particularly when the insurance was a dded instead of deduc ted from the c heck. Misplac ed che cks, out of seque nce. Wrongdates of pa y me nt. Che c ks to he rs e lf

, inst e a d of t

he ve nd or . A lte re d c he c ks . M iss ingre c or ds , a s to ho ur s wor

ke d. Mis sin g c on tr ibutio n to 401K , that we re matc he d by the vic tim

. Altere d information, initially enter ed int o the s y stem, specific ally as to pay ee. And in the openingof the two c redit ca rds, without the knowledg e of the victim, Cit iBa nk
and Am e ri c an E xpre ss. An d in a dd iti on to t hat, p utt ing her name on

tho se c re dit
car ds, and in addition to that, chang ing the billing addr ess to a P.O. box.

I nsofar as re habilita t ion and treatment, it is this [ c]ourt’s theory that [t he Def endan t ] n ee d s some kind of counse ling, be cause Idon’t believe that she thinks that she’s done any

thing wr ong , or if she’s done any thing wr ong , it’s very

littl e, and that she is the victim here

. . . . But the [c]ourt finds that her behavior indi cate s a tot al di sreg ard for t he laws
and mor a ls of so c ie ty , a

nd tha t no e ff or ts a re ne c e ssa

ry to r e ha bil itate he r, be c a

us e she fe els that she does not ne ed any reha bilitation. S h e has be en ver y clea r about that.
And I

also want to put in the rec ord t hat as a record of these c redit ca rds, [the Def endan t’ s ] f

ami ly h a s b e e na

b le to e a t o u t, b uy

je w e lr y , g r o c e r ie s , c o ll e c ta

b le s [si c], fu rn i t ure, D I SH networks, sportingg oods, vacations, dentist bi lls, software, ph on e s, sh oe s, c lot

hin g , g la ss, re fr ig e ra

tor s, g a s for

he r v e hic le , a

nd tir e s f or ve hic le s, w i t ha r e c u r r i n g v e n d o r s o f

K

- M art , T ar g e t , W a l

- M art , L

. L

. B e an , H o b b y L o b b y, Goody s, Krog er, a

nd Aber cromb[i] e & Fitch.

I n State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 13, (Tenn. 2000), the Supreme Court addre ssed deter renc e as a sole rea son to deny

probation or a

n alternative sentenc e; “we hold that a trial judg e may sentenc e a De fenda nt to a term of incar cer ation based solely on a nee d for de terre nce when the r ecor d contains evidenc e which w ould enable a rea sonable pe rson to conclude that (1) de terre nce is neede d in the
c omm un ity , ju risd ict io n, or

state ; and

(2 ) t he De fe nd ant’ s in c arc e ra tio n ma y ratio na lly

se rv e a s a deter rent to others similarly

situated and likely

to commit si milar crimes.” The c riteria, f or in c ar c e r ati o n , f

av o r in g d e te r

r e n c e ar e : ( 1 ) w h e th e r o th e r in c id e n ts o f th e c h ar g e d o f f e n s e are inc r e a s in g ly p r e s e n t in th e c o mm u n it y , ju r is d ic ti o n , o r in th e s tate a s a w h o le ; ( 2 ) w h e th e r the De fe nd ant’ s c ri me wa s th e re su lt o f i nte nti onal, k no wi ng , o r r e c kle ss c on du c t or wa s o the rw ise mot ivate d b y

a de sir e to p ro fi t or

g a in f ro m the c ri min a l be havio r; (3 ) whe the r t he De fe nd ant’ s c ri me and convic tion have re ceive d substantial publicity beyond that normally expected in the ty pical ca se; (4) whe ther the D efe ndant was a member of

a cr iminal en terprise , or substantially encour ag ed or
a ssi ste d o the rs in a c hie vin g the c ri min a l obj ect iv e; and (5 ) whe the r t

he De fe nd ant h a s p re vio us ly-9-

eng ag ed in cr iminal conduct of the sa me ty pe as the offe nse in question, irrespe ctive of whether such conduct r esulted in previous a rre sts or convictions. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d at 10, 12.

Deter renc e wa s not the trial court’s sole ba sis for deny ing a lternati v e sentencing ; the trial court a lso based the de nial of alter native sentenc ing on the seriousne ss of the off ense a nd the nee d to av oid depre ciation of the se riousness of the of fense . In order

for a lternative se ntencingto be proper ly denied ba sed solely

on the nature o f t he off

ense, the criminal ac t, as committed, must be “espe cially

violent, horrifying, shoc king, r epre hensible, off ensive, or othe rwise of an excessive or exagg erated deg ree .” State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W .2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985). Otherw ise stated, the nature of the off

ense must outweig h all fac tors favor ing f ull probation. I d.
We conclude that the rec ord bef ore this Court—which ade quately illust rate s both the seriousness of the Def

endant’ s offe nses and that de terre nce is needed in Maur y County for similar crim es

— s u

p p o rt s an d

j u s t i fi es t h e t ri al co urt ’s d en i al o f a l t ern at i v e s en t en ci n g. Age n tE l l i o tt est ified that embezzlement cases wer e on the rise within the jurisdiction. The State ente red into evide nce pendingindictments and convictions for em b ez zlement in Maury County , and the tria l court thoroug hly

revie wed these documents on the recor d. The Defenda nt’s intentional conduct wa s for profit and g ain, and he r actions rec eived media cove rag e. B ased upon this evidenc e, the tria l court p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d

t h a tc o n f i n e m e n tw o u l d

p r o v i d e an e f

f e c t i v e d e t e r

r e n t t o o th e r s
. A d d i t i o n a l l y, the Def endant’ s criminal ac ts spanned a per i o d o f two year s. She opened c redit ca rds in her
em p l o y er ’s n am e a n d

p u rc h as ednu m er o u s i t em s f o rh er p er s o n al u s e, i n cl u d i n g cl o th i n g, re fr ig e rators , vac a tio ns , p ho ne s, tir e s, and many oth e r i te ms f

or he r a nd he r f amil y . Sh e ov e rp a id herse lf on multipl e occ asions and fa i l ed t o make the a ppropriate 401K and insura nce de ductions fr om her pa y c he c ks . T he c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he of fe ns e su pp or t a fi nd ingthat c on fi ne me nt i s nece ssary to avoid depre ciatingthe seriousne ss of the off ense.
Moreove r, the trial c ourt found t hat t he Defenda nt had been unt ruthful i n her te stimony . As
no te d b y the tr ia l c ourt , h e r l a c k o f c and or wi th t he c ourt c on c erni ng he r c ulp a

bil ity wa s q uit e rema rkable , consistently

portray ing he rs el f as the victim. We consider the Def endant’ s lack of candor in her testimony

as a poor ref lection on her potential for reha bilitation. State v. Z eolia, 928 S.W .2 d 4 5 7 , 4 6 3 ( T e n n
. Cr im

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 6 ) ; s e e a ls o St a te v
. M ic h a e l R. H ar n e s s , No. E2004-01946-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL2515780, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App ., Knoxvi lle, Oct. 11, 2005) (c o u rt d en i ed al t ern at i v e s en t en ci n g fi n d i n g, am o n g o th er fa ct o rs , d ef

en d an th adn o ts h o wn en o u gh
acc ountability

for the of fense ). Up on de no vo re vie w an d in ac c or da nc e wi th t he pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss, we are un a

ble to conclude that the trial court erre d or abuse d its discretion in denying the Def endant a n alternative sentenc e.
CO NC LU SION For the re asons stated a

bove, we conclude that the t rial court did not err in denying a lternative sentenc ing f

or the De fenda

nt. The judg ment of the Maur y County Circuit Court is affirmed.-10- ______________________________ DAVI D H. WEL L ES, J UDGE