SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5295-18T1

SHARON YANG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BIAO XUE,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted November 2, 2020 – Decided 

Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. SC-000741-

19.

Sharon Yang, appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM 

In this breach of contract case, plaintiff appeals from a July 16, 2019 

judgment of no cause of action entered in favor of defendant after a small claims 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 18, 2020
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trial. Judge Gary K. Wolinetz conducted the bench trial, took testimony from 

the parties, and rendered an oral decision. He concluded that plaintiff failed to 

sustain her burden of proof, which is self-evident from her arguments on appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

The parties are divorced. Their dispute occurred after their adult daughter 

incurred expenses for eye surgery. To cover part of the doctor's bill, defendant's 

insurance company allegedly mailed plaintiff a check payable to defendant for 

$1,185.12. Plaintiff asserted she sent the check to defendant and asked him to 

endorse it and pay the doctor. She then filed a breach of contract complaint 

against defendant alleging he "pocketed th[e] money and refused to pay the 

doctor." In her complaint, she sought $1,185.12 in damages because—as she 

alleged in her complaint—"the doctor is chasing after [p]laintiff for this 

payment."

Plaintiff testified that defendant wrote the doctor notifying him that the 

daughter did not live with him and that he asked that the doctor stop sending 

him bills for the balance due. She also stated that three people from defendant's 

insurance company told her defendant had cashed the check. Plaintiff conceded, 

however, that she did not have proof that he cashed the check or that he had 
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deposited the check into his bank account. At trial, plaintiff offered to "go and 

find [the] proof." 

Defendant testified that he had been estranged from his daughter for years, 

who he said was of "full age [and] with full responsibility of her own course." 

He said they were "totally strangers." Defendant stated that no one consulted 

him about paying for the eye procedure before it was performed. He also 

asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to sue him, as any unpaid balance is 

between the daughter and doctor. Defendant explained that he never received 

an insurance payment with directions to pay the doctor, and—contrary to 

plaintiff's testimony at trial—he did not tell anyone that the money was his own 

or that he could do with it what he wanted. He testified that he had no 

recollection of receiving the insurance check.

The judge found that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that defendant received the check. The judge asked plaintiff for any 

specific relevant evidence which would corroborate her trial testimony, such as 

a letter from the insurance company, defendant, anyone else, or for "any 

evidence whatsoever?" He asked her to "show me any evidence . . . that states 

that a check was mailed to [defendant] in that amount of money." Responding 

to those questions, plaintiff said "I'm sorry, . . . all the conversations with the 
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insurance company [were] on the phone. I wasn't expecting to get any 

evidence." 

Before the judge rendered his decision, he gave the parties the 

"opportunity just to present whatever other evidence or any other statements 

[they would] like to make." Plaintiff responded by explaining that her daughter 

overheard the conversations she had with representatives at the defendant's 

insurance company, and that she could produce her daughter, who could testify 

to what she overheard. Plaintiff also offered to look for any notes that she may 

have made while communicating with insurance representatives. The judge 

explained, however, that the time to produce evidence was at the trial, not at 

some time in the future.

The judge then rendered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. In 

finding that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof, the judge rejected 

plaintiff's testimony about what insurance representatives may have told her on 

the phone because those individuals did not present certifications or testify at 

the trial. The judge found that there were no corroborating documents 

confirming conversations with those representatives and no proof that defendant 

received or cashed the check.

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following arguments:
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[POINT I]

THE [JUDGE] ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

REQUEST FOR RESCHEDULING ANOTHER 

COURT HEARING SO SHE COULD BRING 

EVIDENCE TO PROVE DEFENDANT HAD 

RECEIVED THE PAYMENT OF $1[,]185.12 

INTENDED FOR HIS DAUGHTER'S EYE 

SURGERY. A JUDGMENT BASED ON LIES IS NOT 

A FAIR AND JUST ONE. 

[POINT II]

THE JUDGMENT IS BASED ON THE FALSE 

ASSUMPTION THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT 

RECEIVE THE CHECK OF $1[,]185.12, BUT HE 

DID.

 

We afford a deferential standard of review to the factual findings of the 

trial court on appeal from a bench trial. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. 

Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). These findings will not be disturbed 

unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests 

of justice." Id. at 484 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Fagliarone v. 

Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). However, our 

review of a trial court's legal determinations is plenary. D'Agostino v. 

Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. 

Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
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There is no basis to re-open the trial or set aside the judge's factual 

findings. He had the opportunity to observe the parties' testimony and found 

that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof. At trial, plaintiff did not 

establish that defendant received an insurance check earmarked for his estranged 

daughter's eye surgery expense, or that he cashed such a check and deposited it 

into his own account, or that he was contractually obligated to give plaintiff that 

money. And from plaintiff's contentions on appeal, she does not explicitly argue 

otherwise. 

Rather, plaintiff maintains—like she did at trial—that she did not produce 

evidence at trial because defendant "misled [her] on purpose" into believing that 

he would admit receiving and cashing the check. She infers this because before 

appearing for trial, defendant purportedly never disputed having done so. She 

therefore believed he would admit these things. Instead, she asserts that 

defendant lied to the judge, which then "caught [her] by surprise[,]" leading to 

her appearing at trial unprepared to prove her case. Under these circumstances, 

there was no reason to re-schedule the trial. 

Defendant testified he had no recollection of receiving the check or 

cashing it. The judge could have found defendant was not credible, but he 

accepted that testimony knowing that the parties had a contentious relationship. 
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We cannot second guess the judge's assessment of the parties' testimony, since 

plaintiff conceded she lacked sufficient proof to establish her breach of contract 

claim. 

Affirmed.