Whil e this case has proc eede d, the Texas Depa rtment of He alt h wa s re n am ed the Te x as 1 Depa rtment of State He alth Service s. We will retain the pre vious na me in the sty le for c onsistency and re fer to the entity

as “the Depa

rtment.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 06 -00 234 -CV

Da vid L. A ndr e ws , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Health , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN50121 2 , HO NORAB LE W. JEANNE MEURER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The Te x as De partment of H ealth revoke d appellant Da vid L . Andre ws’s re spiratory 1
car e pra ctitioner (“ RCP ”) c ertifica te. The district c ourt aff irmed the De partment’s decision and Andre ws appe als. Andre ws argues that t he decision to revoke his cer tificate was not supported by
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e and

that th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e law jud g e (“ AL J”) a c te d ar bit ra ri ly and c a pr ic iou sly by omi tti ngor ig no ri ng e xcu lpator y wi tne ss te sti mony in his pr op os a l f or de c isi on . A nd

re ws a sse rt s that he wa s improperly

penalized for invoking his F ifth Amendment privileg e. F inally , he conte nds that the Depa

rtment’s failure to c omply with his reque st f or a tra nscript of the he aringbefor e he f iled his a dmi nis tr a tiv e mot ion fo r rehe ari ngwa s a

vio latio n o f T e xas l aw a nd a de nia l of

his
c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o e qu a l pr ote c tio n a nd du e pr oc e ss. We a ff

ir m.“F entanyl is an extremely potent anesthe tic, estimated to be a hundred times more potent 2 tha n mor ph ine on a mil lig ra m pe r m ill ig ra

m ba sis . I t is the mos t c omm on ly us e d n arc oti c ana lg e sic . . . .” Swayze v. M

cNeil Laboratori es, Inc

. , 807 F.2d 464, 466 ( 5th Cir. 1987). 2 Ba sed on a c omplaint that Andrews improperly remove d Fe ntanyl from a patient’s 2 int ra ve no us fl uid

(“ I V” ) b a g fo r h is p e rs on a l ne e ds , th e De pa rtme nt s us pe nded And re ws ’s RCP cert i fi ca t e. At the AL J ’s disciplinary hear ing, the Depa

rtment ca lled seven w itnesses and off ere d its investigation re port into evidence . No one testified that they saw Andr ews re move Fe ntanyl from an I V bagor found e vidence of illicitly obtained Fe ntanyl in his posse ssion or control. Witnesses testified that Andre ws had a history of painkiller a ddiction, was using a pre scribed F entany l patch when a ccuse d of re moving F entanyl from a pat i en t ’s I V bag , and wa s seen ha ndling a patient’s Fe ntanyl I V bag in an unusual manner. A F entany l I V bagthat was see n unpuncture d shortly befor e Andre ws handled it was seen to ha ve been puncture d shortly there afte r. Andre ws declined to offer evidenc e and c hose not to testify , asser ting his F ifth Amendment rig ht ag ainst self-incr imination. The AL J submitt ed a proposal for decision to the Commissi oner of the Depa rtment t o w h i c h A n dr e w s f

i l e d o b j e c t i o n s . T h e C o m m i s s i o n e r f o u n d t h e A L J ’ s p r o p o s a l s u

p p o rt e d b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, adopted the AL J ’s proposed finding s and conclusions, and de nied Andre ws’s motion for re hear ing. T he district cour t affir med the Commissi oner’ s decision. I n revie wing the trial court’s judgme nt affir ming the D epar

tment’s order , we use the substantial evidence standard of re v ie w d e f ined in the Administrative Proce dure A ct. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174(2) (E) ( West 2000) (“APA” ). When re viewing an ag ency ’s dec ision, we presume that the orde r is supported by substantial evidence , and the pe rson cha lleng ing the decision has the burde n to overcome this presumption. Gran e k v . Te x as Sta te Bd

. o f M e d. Ex am ’r

s , 172 S
. W
. 3 d 7 6 1 , 7 7 8 (T e x . A p p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 5 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Texas He alth Faciliti es Comm’n v

.Even if a litigant has a

rg uably failed to mee t the ir burden of proof befor e the a g ency , our 3 revie w of the ag ency decision is limited by the substantial e vidence rule. I f there i s s u b s t anti al evidenc e su p p o rting the dec ision, we must defer to the ag ency

even if that evidenc e would not amount to a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. 3 C h a rter Med.-

Dallas, Inc. , 6 6 5 S. W. 2 d 4 4 6 , 4 5 2 ( T e x. 1 9 8 4 ) )
. We ar e c o n c e r n ed with the
re as onablene ss of the administrative orde r and not its corr ectne ss. S e e F ir e m e n ’ s & P o li c eme n’s Civil Serv. Comm’n v

. Brinkmey er , 6 62 S.W. 2d 95 3, 95 6 ( Te x. 19 96 ). Th e APAa uth or ize s u s to “test the a g ency ’s finding s, infere nces, c onclusions, and dec is i o n s t o d eter mine whether

they are
rea sonably

supported by

substantial evidence consideringthe reliable and probative e vidence in the
rec ord as a

whole.” Texas De

p’t of Pub. Safety v. Latimer , 9 39 S.W. 2d 24 0, 24 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 1 9 9 7 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Charter , 665 S.W .2d at 452). The ag ency deter mines the meaning , weig ht, and
cre dibilit y

to assign the conflicting e v idence
. Texas State Bd. of Me d. Exam’ rs v. Sche ffey , 949 S.W .2d 431, 437 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied). We may not set aside an ag ency decision beca use testimony

was c onflicting or disputed or be cause it did not compel the ag ency ’s dec ision. Brinkmey er , 662 S.W .2d at 956.

Substantial evidence does not me an a larg e or considera ble amount of evidenc e, but rathe r such rele vant evidenc e as a rea sonable mind mig ht a cce pt a s adequate to suppor t a conclusion of fa ct. Hi nk

le y v . Te x as Sta te Bd

. of Me d. Ex am ’r

s , 140 S.W .3d 737, 743 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) . The e vidence in the rec ord may preponde rate ag ainst the ag ency ’s dec ision and
never theless amount to substantial evidenc e. Latimer , 939 S.W .2d at 244. A cour t review ing a

n 3 ag en c y a c ti o n “ s h a ll r e v e r s e an d r e ma n d th e c a u s e to th e a g e n c y w h e n s u b s ta n ti a l r ig h ts of the appellant have bee n prejudiced b y an ag ency ’s finding s that are not rea sonably supported by substantial evidence considering t h e re l i able e vidence in the rec ord as a whole.” Hinkley , 140We note that Andre ws does not—as he did at the trial cour t—challeng e the De partment’s 4 conclusions of law7, 8, and 9 to the eff ect that he violated occ upations code se ction 604.201(b)( 3) by improperly

obtaining a

habit-for ming dr ug or nar cotic, that the De partment shall take disciplinary action ag ainst a person who eng ag es in dishone st or unethical conduct as requi re d b y s ection 604.201(b), a

nd that revoc ation of his cer tificate is wa

rra nted and justified. 4 S.W .3d at 743. I f re asonable minds could have rea ched the conclusion that the ag ency must have
rea ched, the n that conclusion must stand. T exa s S tate Bd . o f D e nta l E

x am ’r s v . S ize mo re , 759 S.W .2d 114, 116 (Tex. 1988).

Andre ws asser

ts that the Department’s decision to revoke his RCP cer tificate w as not supported by

substantial evidenc e and asks this Court to rever se and r emand his ca se for further pr oc e e din g s. An dr e ws c ha lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

tw o f ind ing s o f f

a c t: 3. Shortly

afte r m idnight on F ebrua ry 2, 2004, Respondent tamper ed with and puncture d a hole in an IV bagcontaining Fe ntanyl that was beingadministered to a hospital patient.

. . . . 5. Re sp on de nt tampe re d wi th the I V ba g c on ta ini ng F e nta nyl to d ive rt

the na rc oti c fo r h is p e rs on a l ne e ds and to t he de tr ime nt o f a

patie nt.
He a lso c ha lle ng e s th re e c on c lus ion s o f l aw b a se d o n th e se fi nd ing s: 4
4. The Respondent eng ag ed in an activity that soug ht to meet his persona l needs at the expense or to the detriment of a patient, as prohibited by 25 Tex. Admin. C ode § 123.12(2)( G). 5. Ba sed on Conclusion of L aw No. 4 a nd 25 Tex
. Ad m i n . Code § 123.12(2)( G), Re sp on de nt’ s c on du c t w a s une thi c a l. 6
. Re s p o n d e n t c o mm itte d d is h o n e s t o r u n e th ic a l c o n d u c t a s c o n te mp late d

b y T e x. Occ . Code Ann. § 604.201(b) (4).5

Andre ws declined to testify , call any witnesses, or submit any

evidenc e. Thus, the r ecor d contains only evidenc e prof

fer ed by the Depa rtment. A n dr e w s b e g an w o r

k i n g a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y H o s p i t a l a t S an A n t o n i o ( “ U H S A ” ) a s a respirator y car e pra ctitioner in Novembe r 2003. DuringJ anuar y 2004, UHSA employ ees discove red t h a ts o m e o f

t h e p a t i e n t s ’ IV b a g s w e r e m i s s i n g F e n t an yl . Th e se dis c re pa nc ie s w e re fo un d o nly

wi th respe ct t o patients located on the t enth floor of UHSA. The pharmacy depar tment’s investigation eliminated pump m al fu n ction, defe ctive bag s, and docume ntation error as the c auses f

or the shortag es in Fe ntanyl. T he abnorma l IV bag s wer e found to have small pin holes in them, raising suspicions of tampering
. T h i s further conce rned U HSA staff be cause the holes adde d a risk of
c on tamin a tio n o r i nf

e c tio n for the patie nts
. On c e tampe ri ng wa s det e rm ine d to be the mos t li ke ly
c a u s e o f t h e d i s c r e p an c i e s , t h e nu r s e s a t U H S A w e r e i n s t r u c t e d t o c l o s e l y m o n i t o r t h e F e n t an y l IV bag s and to che ck them hourly
.

Duringthe late e vening hours of F ebrua ry 1, 2004, An d

r e w s w a s in UHSA room 1026 unti l abo ut 1 1:3 0 p .m. te nd ingto a patie nt’ s r e sp ir a tor . N ur se B la sa Ve le z wa s in

the ro om w ith Andr ew s from 10:45 p.m . until he left. Vele z testi fied that Andr ews wa s in room 1026 for an unusual amount of time. She chec ked the I V bag for l eaks or holes once while she was in the room with Andrew s and once at 11: 50 p.m., afte r he left. At both times, she found no holes or le aks in the Fe ntanyl I V bagin room 1026. When leaving the room, Velez requested that other nurse s monitor the ro om whil e sh e te nd e d to othe r patie nts
. Ve le z te sti fi e d that, sho rt ly a ft e r she le ft the ro om t o tend to another

patient, Andre ws re- enter ed the r oom and handled the I V bag
. Shortly afte r midnight, nurse s L y dia Galleg os, Maria F alcotelo, a nd Susan Robertson
o b s e r v e d A n dr e w s i nr o o m 1 0 2 6 h an d l i n g t h e p a t i e n t ’ s IV b a g , w h i c h h e h a d r e m o v e d f r o m t h e IV6

p o l e. Ga l l ego s t es t i fi edt h at s h e s aw An dre ws h o l d i n g t h e Fe n t an y l I V b ag. Fa l co t el o ca l l edch ar ge
nurs e Rob e rt so n to inv e sti g a te wh e n s he sa w A nd re ws ha nd lin g the I V b a g wi th t a

pe on his fi ng e rs . Rob e rt so n te sti fi e d th a t, wh e n sh e arr ive d, An dr e ws ha d th e I V b a g of f t he po le in b oth

of his ha nd s. Robertson testified that Andre ws hung the bagback o n t he pole, then g ot something off of the window sill and put it i n his pocket. Ga lleg os testified that An d rew s said that he wa s looking for the patient’s name on the bag. As Robertson looked on, Ga lleg os also noticed that the ba g was we t
an d as k ed An dre ws ab o u t i t
. S h e he l d t h e b ag up t o t h e l i gh tan d s aw a s m al l p u n ct u re i nt h e b ag. An dr e ws did

no t r e sp on d to Ga lle g os ’s qu e sti on a bo ut t he we tne ss, bu t in ste a d le ft the ro om. Ga l l ego s t es t i fi edt h at t h er e i s n o re as o nfo r a nR C P t o h an d l e aF e n t a n y l I V b ag. Velez also testified that RCPs adminis ter drug s throug h needle less sy ring es put into the ventilator. No one testified that they s aw An d re ws h olding a needle sy

ring e or punc turing the bag . Velez testified that it would be unusual for an RCP to find a patient’s name by checki ng the I V bag be c a us e , o n th e wa

y to t he ba g , th e RCP w ou ld w a lk p a st a c ha rt c on ta ini ngthe patie nt’ s n a me , w a lk thr ou g h a do or that pr ov ide s th e patie nt’ s n a me , a nd wa lk p a st s e ve ra l nu

rs e s, e a c h o f who m w ou ld know t he pati e n t’ s n a me . D o n n ie H o lm an , th e d ir e c to r o f r e s p ir a to r

y c ar e a t U H SA , te s ti f

ie d that he had ne ver se en anyone che ck an IV bagto identify a patien t i n h i s thirty

y ear s of healthca re e mploy ment. Serg eant Sher

rie Kingof the B exar County Hospital District Poli ce D epar tment testified that she met Andr ews at about 3:00 a.m., nea rly three hours af

ter Andr ews lef

t room 1026. King saw no needle marks on Andre ws. Andre ws consente d to a sear ch of his pe rson and locke r as
w e l l a s t o a

u r i n a l ys i s . It i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a tA n d r e w s ’ s u r i n e s a mp l e w o u l d t e s tp o s i t i v e f

o r F e n t an yl beca use he ha d been pr escr ibed a F entany l patch following a seve re a utomobil e acc ident in 2003.7

Andre ws admitted that he ha d previou s l y b ee n presc ribed a differ ent pain-killing narc otic, Oxy Contin . A nd

re ws tol d K in g t hat he c he c ke d h ims e lf int o a re ha bil itatio n c lin ic be c a

us e his Oxy Contin prescription was too hig h of a dose and he be came addicted. A dditionally , King stated that A nd re ws a c te d a little str ang e duri ng he r int e rv ie w wi th him
. She te sti fi e d th a t A nd re ws wo uld look her in the ey e when she asked him dire ct questions—for example, “what is y our name ? ”—and
wo uld div e rt his a tte nti on

and sh if t in his se a t when ask ed abo ut the I V b a g inc ide nt. Ki nga lso testified that her

investigation focused on Andr ews. F a lc ote lo, Rob e rt so n, and ph arm a c y

su pe rv iso r Javie r P a la c ios t est ifie d th a t a puncture in the I V bagcan be detrimental to the patient beca use it removes me dication and ope ns what should be a

closed sy stem to the possibil ity of contamination or infection. Andre ws contends on a

ppeal that the A L J ignor ed or f ailed to mention evidenc e contra ry to his findings of f

ac t , there by

actingarbitra

rily and ca priciously
. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174(2)(F)
. Howeve r, t he AL J did mention in his proposal for decision almost all of the evidenc e Andr ews c omplains is mi ssing. The only evi d en ce A ndrew s relies on that wa s not mentioned in the proposal f or dec ision is King’s testimony that she investig ated only Andre ws
re g ard ingtampe ri ngwi th thi s pa rt ic ula r F e nta nyl ba g . I n li g ht o f t

he ba lanc e of

the e vid e nc e , th is omission i s not material. The rema inder of the evidenc e that Andrew s co mplains about—e.g ., restra ints obscuring I D brace l ets , Andre ws’s coope ration in the investig ation, absenc e of dire ct evidenc e that he punc tured the ba g or took the Fe ntanyl—is included in the narr ative portion of the pr op os a l fo r de c isi on . Th e AL J c ou ld have de c lin e d to inc lud e thi s c on fl ic tin g inf or matio n in his finding s and conc lusions because he either reje cted it or de emed it irre levant. This i s not error , but8

is t he e sse nc e of

wi nn ow ingfi nd ing s f

ro m a bo dy of e vid e nc e and

the n a pply in g re le va

nt l aw t o
make fi nd ing s and

re a c h c on c lus ion s. After hear ing a nd weig hing the t es t i mony and other

evidenc e, the AL J deter

mined that A nd re ws tampe re d w ithan I V ba g c on ta ini ng F e nta nyl to the de tr ime nt of a

patie nt, and

did so in order to diver

t the narc otic fo r h i s p ersonal needs. Althoug h no witness testified to seeing Andre ws use a sy

ring e to extract F entanyl from the I V bagin room 1026, evidenc e showe d: that the bagwas intac t before he was seen handling it with tape on his fing ers; that the ba g was punc tured and we t after

he handle d it; that h andling the bagto determine the patient’s name was unusual be havio r f

or an RC P; and that he wa s se e n ta kin g “ so me thi ng ” fr om t

he wi nd owsil l and

pu tti ngit in hi s p o c k e t b e f

o r e le a v in g . A lt

h o u g h n o o n e f

o u n d th e F e n ta n y l o r an y th in g e ls e th a t A n dr e ws
remove d from room 1026, ne ither he nor his locker we re se arc hed for a number of hours afte r the inc ide nt. Th e re wa s n o d isp ute that r e mov a l of F e nta nyl in thi s ma nn e r i s d e tr ime nta l to a

patie nt. Nor is there any

dispute that Andrew s h ad a h i s t o ry of over using pa inkillers and was at that time prescr ibed Fe ntanyl. We conclude that sub s tantial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s f i n d i n g s t h a tA n dr e w s t a mp e r e d w i t h t h e IV b a g t o a

p a t i e n t ’ s d e t r i m e n ti no r d e r t o d i v e rtF e n t an yl for his per sonal use.

We conclude that the AL J rea sonably could have re ache d the conc lusions that An dr e ws a c te d d ish on e stl y and un e thi c a lly

and that hi s c on du c t w as un de rt a ke n to fu rt he r h is persona l needs to the de triment of his patient.

Andre ws compl ains that the AL J rec ommended suspension of his ce rtificate even afte r ex pre s s ly

n o ti n g th a t t

h e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e o nma n y o f th e e le v e nf

a c to r s r e qu ir e d

to be considere d in a disciplinary proce eding broug ht ag ainst a Respirator y Care Pra ctitioner. See 2 5 T e x.Th e fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d in c lud e : 5 (A) the sever ity

of the off ense; (B ) the da ng er to the public; (C ) t he numbe r o f r e pe tit ion s o f o ff e ns e s; (D) the leng th of time since the date of the violation; (E) the number a

nd ty pe of pr evious disciplinary case s filed ag ainst the respiratory car e pra ctitioner (RCP); (F ) t he le ng th o f t ime the RCP h a s p e rf or me d r e sp ir a tor

y c are pr oc e dure s; (G) the actua l damag e, phy sical or other wise, to the patient, if a

pplicable; (H) the deter

rent e ffe ct of the pe nalty

imposed; (I ) t he e ff e c t of the pe na lty

up on the liv e lih oo d o f t

he RCP; (J) any eff orts for r ehabilitation; and (K) a ny oth e r m iti g a tin g or

a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s. 25 Tex. Admin. C ode Ann. § 123.14( f)( 4) (2006)
. We rea ch this conclusion without reg ard to whe ther the A L J was e ntitled to draw a ne g ative 6 inf e re nc e fr om A nd

re ws ’s inv oc a tio n o f h is F if th A me ndme nt r ig ht n ot t o te sti fy . We c on c lud e that, even w ithout such an infer ence , the re cord c ontained substantial evidenc e supporting the AL J ’s finding s, conclusions, and re commendation. 9 Ad min . Co de § 1 23 .1 4( f) (4 ) ( 20 06 ). Th a t se c tio n r e qu ir e s th a t t he Dep artme nt “ take int o considerati on the following fac tors in determining the appr opriate a ction to be imposed in eac h
case .” Id
. It d o e s n o tr e qu i r e t h a tt h e A LJ m a k e a f f i r m a t i v e f i n d i n g s a s t o e a c h f

a c t o r . T h e A LJ 5 lis te d th e se fa c tor s and

dis c us se d ma

ny of the m, i f o nly

to n ote the la c k o f e vid e nc e c on c e rn ingso me of them. He never

theless conclude d that tamperingwith a patient’s medic ation for the pur pose of obtaining a

narc otic for pe rsonal use is ser ious enoug h to war rant revocation of t he R CP certificate. We c ann ot c on c lud e that th is r e c omm e nd a tio n w a s unr e a so na ble , a rb itr ary , o r c a

pr ic iou s. 6 I n h is s e c on d is su e , A nd

re ws c on te nd s tha t hi s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts we re vio late d in two way s. He c omplains that he was imprope rly penalized for invoking h i s Fifth Ame ndment pr ivi le g e a g a ins t se lf

-i nc ri min a tio n. He a lso argue s th a t th e De pa rtme nt’ s f a ilure to s up ply

him wi th10

a tra nscript of the AL J ’s hearing befor e the deadline for fili ng a mot ion for rehea ring passed de prived him of e qu a l pr ote c tio n a

nd du e pr oc e ss. Andre ws argues that, bec ause h e fa ce d an ong oing c riminal investigation, he was entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment r ight in this civil administrative proce eding wi thout any neg ative infe renc e beingdraw n. At the hea ring on the m erits, Andrews’s attorney told the AL J that Andre ws would not testify beca use he “ rese rves the r ight to decline to te stify on the g rounds that any
an s w e r h e m ay g i v e m ay t e n d t o i n c r i m i n a t e h i m i nt h e e x i s t i n g c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n . ” T h e A LJ advised that, “ if a party declines to te stify in a civil pr ocee ding such as this then an infe renc e may
ar i s e that if he testified truthfully , it might be adve rse to his position.” See T e x. R. E v id. 513(c). An dr e ws de c lin e d to te sti fy and re st ed wi thout

pr of fe ri ngany

e vid e nc e . T he AL J opin e d in his pr op os a l f

or de c isi on that he c ou ld d

ra w a n a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e fr om A nd

re ws ’s a sse rt ion

of his F if th Amendment privileg e. An d re ws contends that the ne g ative infe renc e wa s improper be cause he invoked his Fifth Amendme nt rig ht not to incriminate himself in the pending criminal investig ation i n t o t h e d i s ap p ea ra n ce o f F en t an y l fr o m UH S A a n d , t h er ef o re , s h o u l d

b e ab l e t o i n v o k e t h e p ri v i l ege in t his c ivi l pr oc e e din g wi tho ut a dv e rs e e ff e c t. The AL J was e ntitled to draw a nega tive infere nce from Andrews’s failure to testify without r eg ard to the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privileg e. Gene rally , the exercise of the privileg e should not be pena liz ed. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety Officers Ass’n v . Denton , 897 S.W .2d 757, 760 (Tex. 1995). I n a civil ca se, a f act- finder ma

y drawrea sonable infe renc es fr om a par ty ’s
asser tion of the privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination. Lozano v. Lozano , 5 2 S. W. 3 d 1 4 1 , 1 5 0 ( T e x. 2001); Denton , 897 S.W .2d at 760. Fur ther, Andrews de clined to testify without properly

invoking his Fifth Amendment r ight not to incriminate himself unde r oath. Se e Te x as De p’ t of Pu b. Sa fe ty11

v. Sanche z , 82 S.W .3d 506, 513 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Bla nket assertions of the privileg e ar e improper
. Id
. The privileg e must be asser ted in response to a spec ific inquiry so that a judg e may evaluate whether an answe r t o the questi on would tend t o incriminate the witness. Id
. Fa ilure to invoke the privileg e in this manner wa ives the privileg e. Id . I n S a n c hez , t h e c o u rt
c on sid e re d a

c a se in w hic h the de fe nd ant in a dr ive r’ s lic e ns e su sp e ns ion c a se wa nte d to t e sti fy

in a limited fashion. Id . at 50 9. Th e AL J warn e d h im that te sti fy ingwo uld

e xpos e him

to c ro ssexamination on any rele vant m atter, and that a re fusal to testify could re sult in all of his t estimony being struck. Id . at 512. Sanche z appare ntly persua ded the trial court that the AL J there by improperly

ref used to let him e x erc ise his F ifth Amendment rig ht not to testi fy ag ainst himself, and thus prevente d him from testify ing. I n reve rsing the trial co u rt ’s j u dg ment and re instating the AL J’s d e c isi on , th e c ourt of a pp e a ls w ro te :
I t is clear the n, that to p roperly invoke his privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination, Sanchez was r equire d to take t h e st and and a ssert the privileg e in re sponse to eac h question he believe d might tend to incr iminate him. Only then would the trial court have ha d the opportuni ty to deter mine whether

the privileg e applied. Without doing so , Sa nc he z wa ive d a

ny c omp la int

that th e AL J viol a te d h is p ri vil e g e a g a ins t self-inc rimination.
Id
. at 5 1 3 (c i t i n g Gebhardt v. G allardo , 891 S.W .2d 327, 330 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ)). Similarly , in this case, Andr ews undisputedly was not ca lled to testify , did not as sert the privileg e in re sponse to specific questions, and did not personally asser t the privileg e. Instead, Andre ws chose not to prese nt evidenc e or te stify , expressing the latter intent throug h counsel at the AL J ’s hea

ring
.12 When a party with specia l knowledg e of a dis puted i ssue fails, without explanation, to te sti fy a

bo ut that iss ue , a jud g e may inf e r t hat th e pa rt y kn e w i ts t e sti mony

wo uld no t su pp or t it s claim. Thompson v

. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. , 902 S.W .2d 13,18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1 9 9 5 , n o w r i t )
. A n dr e w s h a d s p e c i a l kn o w l e d g e o f

w h e t h e r h e t a m p e r e d w i t h t h e IV bag s and explained his refusa l to testify only throug h h i s co u n s el’s attempts to invoke the privileg e not to t es tify . The AL J was e ntitled to draw a ne g ative infe renc e fr om Andrew s’s choice not to testify
. Se e id
.

Finally , Andre ws asser

ts that the Department’s failure to comply with his request for a tra nscript of the A L J ’s hea

ring on the merits depr ived him of his constituti o nal rig ht to equal pr ote c tio n a

nd du e pr oc e ss. Th e AL J’s h e ari ngwa s r e c or de d o n ta pe and the AL J use d e xce rp ts from the testimony

in support of hi s proposal for decision. When Andre ws filed exceptions to the proposal for

decision, he r equeste d t h at t h e h ear ing be transcr ibed and that the tr anscr ipt be forwa rded to the D epar

tment along wi th the AL J ’s proposal f or dec ision. After the D epar tment adopted the pr oposal for decision, Andre ws filed a motion for rehe aringthat included his complaint that the transc ription would not be prepa red a nd available to him unti l after his appea l was filed. He complained to the Depa

rtment, as he does her e, that the a bsence of a tra

nscript pre vented him from filing a n adequate motion for rehe aring in or der to la y the g roundwork for his suit for judicial revie w. The AL J ’s hea

ring was not transc ribed until after he filed his suit for judicial re view. Andre ws has not demonstrate d that the fa ilure to transc ribe th e h e a r in g befor e he f

iled this suit deprive d him of equal prote ction. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1( a). A claim of de privation of equal protection rig hts require s a showing that an individual was tre ated diff ere ntly from other s simil arly situated. Plyler v. D oe , 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). Andre ws, howeve r, has not shown thatAndre ws may be arguing that he was tre ated diff ere ntly from the AL J beca

use the AL J had 7 acc ess to the hea

ring t ap es wh en prepa

ring the proposal f

or dec ision. But this arg ument lacks a n e sse nti a l elemen t of

an e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la im b e c a us e , a s a lit ig ant, An dr e ws is n ot “ sim ila rl y situated” to an A L J , an impartial he aringoffice r. F urther, the re i s n o s h o wi n g that Andre ws was denied a cce ss to something the AL J had—i.e., t h er e is no showing that the A L J denied Andr ews acc ess either

to the rec ording s of the hea ring or a pr epar ed tra

nscription there of. 13 his recor d prepa

ration sche dule was diff

ere nt f ro m t h at o f any

other individual g oing thr oug h an administrative proc edure , befor e the De partment or othe rwise. 7

No r h a s A nd

re ws sh ow n th a t he wa s d e nie d d ue pr oc e ss i n an y

wa y tha t ha rm e d h im. The statute unde r which he reque sted a tra nscripti o n o f the he aringdoes not requir e that the transcr iption be prepa

red be fore the motion for re hear i n g i s due. SeeTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2 00 1. 05 9 ( Wes t 20 00 ). Ev e n if du e pr oc e ss re qu ir e d that he have a tr ans c ri pti on

of the he ari ngin time to prepar e his motion for rehe aring to the Depa rtment, Andre ws has not show n either that the
a bs e nc e of a tr ans c ri pt a

t th e tim e he pr e pa

re d h is a dmi nis tr a tiv e mo tio n f or re he ari ngpr ob a

bly
cause d the re ndition of a

n improper judg ment or that he w as either preve nted from pr esentingany argument to the trial court or this Court. Consequently , he has shown no reve rsible er ror f rom any deprivation of due proc ess. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.1(a)
.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 15, 2007