CHRIS CAMERON 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

CFTC Docket No. CRAA l 0-02 

NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION ORDER OF SUMMARY 

AFFIRMANCE 

Upon review of the record and the parties' appellate submissions, we have determined 

that the findings and conclusions of the National Futures Association are supported by the weight 

of the evidence; we therefore adopt them. We have carefully considered the arguments on 

appeal, familiarity with which is presumed. We find that none of the arguments on appeal 

present important questions of law or policy because we find that the NF A proceedings were 

conducted in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness and NF A rules, the weight of the 

evidence supports the NFA's findings, and the NFA's conclusions are consistent with the 

purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act. See Commission Rule 171.34(b ), 17 C.F .R. § 

171.34(b). 

Nonetheless, we briefly address Cameron's claim that he was denied due process of law. 

His claim is without merit. As Cameron concedes, procedural due process requires notice of 

regulatory action and an opportunity for a hearing. See Cameron Br. at 9-1 0, 13. There is no 

dispute that Cameron received notice ofNF A's intent to deny his registration and that Cameron 

was accorded a hearing to contest this denial. Thus, as the cases Cameron cites make clear, 

Cameron received all the process he was due. Matthews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) 

("The essence of due process is the requirement that a 'person in jeopardy of serious loss (be 
given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."') (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist 

Comm v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123-171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 

Cameron appears to suggest that he was deprived of equal protection of the laws because 

two registrants allegedly in similar situations were afforded conditional registration while he was 

not. By failing to properly raise and brief this argument, including with citation to appropriate 

law, Cameron- who was represented by counsel- has waived it. See Modlin v. Cane, [1999-

2000 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 28,059 at 49,553 n.25 (CFTC Mar. 15, 

2000), 2000 WL 279227 at *12 n. 25. 

In any event, any equal protection argument is without merit. Cameron does not suggest 

he suffered discrimination because of his membership in a protected class; rather, he appears to 

pursue a class-of-one equal protection claim. See Village of Willowbrook v. 0/ech, 528 U.S. 

562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). It is unlikely that class-of-one equal protection claims are valid in 

this context. See DeiJ\1arce/le v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 905 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 

bane) (separate opinion of Easterbrook, C.J.) ("[T]here is no class-of-one doctrine in federal 

administrative law[.]"); see also id. ("An argument that similarly situated persons [are not targets 

of an agency enforcement action] does not authorize judicial review of the complaint-indeed 

does not authorize a court to set aside the final decision either."); Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 

553 U.S. 591, 602-03 (2008) (noting that class-of-one claim is not suitable for governmental 

functions that involve discretionary decisionmaking). 

Furthermore, even assuming that the class-of-one doctrine would apply to this case, 

Cameron was not entitled to relief. In order to bring a successful equal protection claim in this 

matter, Cameron must show that "the laws were not applied to him as they were applied to 

similarly situated individuals and that the difference was intentional and unreasonable." Deegan 
v. City of Ithaca, 444 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 0/ech, 528 U.S. at 546). Cameron 

identifies two instances in which NF A permitted applicants to register conditionally despite a 

failure to report prior criminal charges, but those conditional registrations were the result of 

settlements without a fully developed record demonstrating the quality and quantity of mitigation 

and rehabilitation evidence those applicants would have adduced. See, e.g., Marzano v. NFA, 

[2005-2007 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 30163 at 57,641 (CFTC Jan. 4, 

2006), 2006 WL 38276 at *5-6 (describing mitigation and rehabilitation evidence and noting that 

mitigation and rehabilitation evidence can be outweighed by "other evidence [in the] record"). 

As a result, it is unclear whether and to what extent Cameron was similarly situated to those two 

individuals. In addition, nothing in the record persuades us that Cameron has shown that any 

disparate treatment that Cameron may have received was intentional and unreasonable. 1 

Accordingly, with these observations, we summarily affirm the decision of the National 

Futures Association without opinion.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

By the Commission (Chairman GENSLER and Commissioners CHILTON, O'MALIA and 

WETJEN.) 

Melissa D. Jurgens 

Secretary of the C mmission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Dated: August 28, 2013 

1 Indeed, the difficulty second-guessing discretionary decisions like entering settlements is one reason the Supreme 

Court has suggested that the class of one theory is inappropriate in this context. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602-03. 

2 Pursuant to Commission Regulation l71.33(b), 17 C.F.R. § l71.33(b), neither the initial decision nor the 

Commission's order of summary affimance sha11 serve as a Commission precedent in other proceedings.