[J-89-2018]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

IN RE: APPEAL OF THE BOARD OF 

COMMISSIONERS OF CHELTENHAM 

TOWNSHIP FROM THE DECISION 

DATED DECEMBER 16, 2015, OF THE 

ZONING HEARING BOARD OF 

CHELTENHAM TOWNSHIP

APPEAL OF: BOARD OF 

COMMISSIONERS OF CHELTENHAM 

TOWNSHIP

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No. 3 MAP 2018

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court at No. 1317 CD 

2016 dated July 6, 2017 Affirming the 

Order of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Montgomery County, Civil Division, 

at No. 2016-00752, dated July 7, 2016 

and exited July 11, 2016.

ARGUED: December 4, 2018

OPINION

JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: July 17, 2019

Subsection 508(4)(i) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), 53 

P.S. § 10508(4)(i), precludes a municipality from changing its “zoning, subdivision or other 

governing ordinance or plan” subsequent to the filing of a land development application

and then applying the new version of any of these municipal enactments to the 

then-pending application. In this appeal, we are tasked with determining whether 

Subsection 508(4)(i)’s protection of pending land development applications filed with a 

municipality’s governing body extends to zoning applications submitted to its zoning 

hearing board that are: (1) related to the land development application, and (2) filed with 

the zoning hearing board during the pendency of the land development application and 

after an adverse zoning change. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Subsection 

508(4)(i)’s protection does extend to zoning applications under these circumstances. 
[J-89-2018] - 2

Because the Commonwealth Court reached the same conclusion, we affirm the order of 

that court.

I. Legal Background

A. Introduction

The MPC grants many powers to municipalities, including the authority to regulate:

(1) subdivision and land development through the enactment of a subdivision and land 

development ordinance (SALDO), 53 P.S. § 10501, and (2) land use through the 

enactment of zoning ordinances, id. § 10601. As explained further below, part and parcel 

of a municipality’s ability to regulate in this regard is the authority of a municipality’s 

governing body or planning agency to approve or deny applications submitted to it for 

approval of “plats,” or subdivision and land development plans, under the municipality’s

SALDO, and the authority of a municipality’s zoning hearing board to approve or deny

applications submitted to it for certain zoning relief pursuant to the municipality’s zoning 

ordinances.

1

 While the processes for land development approval and zoning approval 

are distinct from each other, there are instances where a landowner needs to obtain both 

types of approval in order to develop his property as desired. This case presents us with 

one of those instances. Accordingly, and for purposes of facilitating a better 

understanding of the issue before us, we begin with a brief summary of the law governing 

each process as is relevant to the current dispute.

2

 

1 The MPC defines a “plat” as “the map or plan of a subdivision or land development, 

whether preliminary or final.” 53 P.S. § 10107. We use the terms “plan” and “plat” 

interchangeably throughout this Opinion.

2 As discussed infra, this case specifically concerns: (1) a land development plan 

submitted to a municipality’s governing body for approval, and (2) a subsequently-filed

application for zoning relief in the form of special exceptions submitted to the 

municipality’s zoning hearing board. Thus, to the extent the MPC and local ordinance 

provisions at issue here refer to subdivision plans, planning agency approval, and other 

zoning relief irrelevant to the issue before us, those references have been omitted for 

clarity. 
[J-89-2018] - 3

B. Land Development

The MPC mandates that a municipality’s SALDO require that all land development 

plans for land “situated within the municipality ... be submitted for approval to the 

governing body.” Id. § 10501. The MPC also provides that a municipality’s SALDO may 

include provisions concerning the specifications for, and submittal and processing of, land 

development plans, including “provisions for preliminary and final approval and for 

processing of final approval by stages or sections of development.” Id. § 10503(1). 

Additionally, pursuant to the MPC, the municipality’s governing body has exclusive 

jurisdiction to render final adjudications on all land development applications submitted

for approval pursuant to Section 508 of the MPC, discussed below. Id. § 10909.1(b)(2). 

In outlining the provisions regarding approval of land development applications, 

Section 508 provides information relating to, inter alia, the time and manner in which a 

municipality’s governing body must render a decision on a land development application, 

as well as the effect of ordinance changes on a land development application. Most 

relevant to this appeal, Section 508 provides:

(4) Changes in the ordinance shall affect plats as follows:

(i) From the time an application for approval of a plat, whether 

preliminary or final, is duly filed as provided in the subdivision and 

land development ordinance, and while such application is pending 

approval or disapproval, no change or amendment of the zoning, 

subdivision or other governing ordinance or plan shall affect the 

decision on such application adversely to the applicant and the 

applicant shall be entitled to a decision in accordance with the 

provisions of the governing ordinances or plans as they stood at the 

time the application was duly filed. In addition, when a preliminary 

application has been duly approved, the applicant shall be entitled to 

final approval in accordance with the terms of the approved 

preliminary application as hereinafter provided. However, if an 

application is properly and finally denied, any subsequent application 

shall be subject to the intervening change in governing regulations.
[J-89-2018] - 4

Id. § 10508(4)(i).

Pursuant to the MPC’s authorization, Cheltenham Township, the municipality 

involved in the dispute here, has a SALDO, known as the “Cheltenham Township 

Subdivision Code of 1974” (Subdivision Code). With respect to land development plans, 

the Subdivision Code includes articles pertaining to, inter alia, “Design Standards,” “Plan 

Requirements,” and “Plan Processing Procedures.” CHELTENHAM TOWNSHIP, PA.,

SUBDIVISION CODE OF 1974 ch. 260, Articles III-V. Most relevant to this appeal, the

Subdivision Code requires submission of a “tentative sketch plan” when, as here, the 

proposed land development “equals or exceeds eight (8) dwelling units or five (5) acres 

of land or when the plan includes nonresidential development.” Id. § 260-35(A.). Section 

260-35 further outlines the tentative sketch plan requirements and provides that the 

processing procedures for the tentative sketch plan are identical to those used for 

submission of preliminary land development plans. Id. § 260-35. Additionally, with 

respect to land development plans generally, the Subdivision Code mandates that any 

plan must meet the requirements of Cheltenham Township’s zoning ordinance, discussed 

below, “unless ... special exceptions have been granted by” the Cheltenham Township 

Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB). Id. § 260-31.

C. Zoning

The MPC provides that, in enacting zoning ordinances regulating the use of land, 

a municipality may include “provisions for special exceptions.”3 53 P.S. § 10603(c)(1). 

The MPC further requires every municipality that enacts a zoning ordinance to create a 

zoning hearing board, which has exclusive jurisdiction to render final adjudications on 

applications for special exceptions. Id. §§ 10901, 10909.1(a)(6). The MPC also includes 

 

3

“[A] special exception ... is a use which is expressly permitted in a given zone so long 

as certain conditions detailed in the ordinance are found to exist.” Broussard v. Zoning 

Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 907 A.2d 494, 499 (Pa. 2006).
[J-89-2018] - 5

a provision addressing the effect of ordinance changes on an application for a special 

exception, when the subject matter of that application would ultimately constitute land 

development. That provision, Section 917 of the MPC, provides that when an application 

for special exception has been filed with the zoning hearing board,

and the subject matter of such application would ultimately constitute ... a 

land development as defined in section 107 ... no change or amendment of 

the zoning, subdivision or other governing ordinance or plans shall affect 

the decision on such application adversely to the applicant, and the 

applicant shall be entitled to a decision in accordance with the provisions of 

the governing ordinances or plans as they stood at the time the application 

was duly filed. Provided, further, should such an application be approved by 

... the zoning hearing board ... applicant shall be entitled to proceed with 

the submission of ... land development ... plans within a period of six 

months or longer as may be approved by ... the zoning hearing board ...

following the date of such approval in accordance with the provisions of the 

governing ordinances or plans as they stood at the time the application was 

duly filed before ... the zoning hearing board .... If ... a land development 

... plan is so filed within said period, such plan shall be subject to the 

provisions of section 508(1) through (4) and specifically to the time 

limitations of section 508(4) which shall commence as of the date of filing 

such land development ... plan.

Id. § 10917 (footnotes omitted).

Pursuant to the MPC, Cheltenham Township also has a zoning ordinance, known 

as the “Zoning Code.” Relevant to this appeal, on February 26, 2008, the Cheltenham 

Township Board of Commissioners (Commissioners) enacted an ordinance amending the 

Zoning Code to create an age-restricted overlay district in the township (the “2008 Zoning 

Ordinance”). The 2008 Zoning Ordinance permitted age-restricted housing and 

clubhouse uses by special exception. See CHELTENHAM TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING CODE ch. 

295, § 295-242(B.)(1), (3) (2008). As will be discussed infra, Developer initially sought to 

develop its property at the time the 2008 Zoning Ordinance was in effect. Subsequently, 

on July 21, 2010, the Commissioners enacted an ordinance amending the Zoning Code 
[J-89-2018] - 6

to repeal the age-restricted overlay district created by the 2008 Zoning Ordinance in its 

entirety. 

No age-restricted overlay district existed in the township until the Commissioners 

enacted an ordinance on February 15, 2012, which created a new age-restricted overlay 

district in the township (the “2012 Zoning Ordinance”). While the 2012 Zoning Ordinance 

also permitted age-restricted housing and clubhouse uses by special exception, see 

CHELTENHAM TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING CODE ch. 295, § 295-242(B.)(1), (3) (2012), it 

contained more stringent dimensional criteria than the 2008 Zoning Ordinance. As 

explained in detail below, it is the Commissioners’ enactment of the 2012 Zoning

Ordinance that has spurred the dispute in this matter.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

Having set forth the state and local law relevant to this matter, we now proceed 

with a discussion of the pertinent facts and procedural history. Hansen-Lloyd, L.P.,

(Developer) owns a large tract of land, approximately 10 acres of which are located in 

Cheltenham Township, and approximately 33 acres of which are located in Springfield 

Township. On the acreage located in Cheltenham Township (Property), Developer 

sought to build an age-restricted housing development consisting of 8 buildings that were 

4 stories high, 388 parking spaces, and a clubhouse. Thus, under the Subdivision Code 

(i.e., Cheltenham Township’s SALDO), Developer was required to submit a tentative 

sketch plan for the development to the Commissioners for approval. See CHELTENHAM 

TOWNSHIP, PA., SUBDIVISION CODE OF 1974 ch. 260, § 260-35(A.) (requiring the submission 

of a “tentative sketch plan” for proposed developments that “equal[] or exceed[] eight (8) 

dwelling units or five (5) acres of land or when the plan includes nonresidential 

development”). 
[J-89-2018] - 7

On December 23, 2008, Developer submitted its mandatory tentative sketch plan

(2008 Sketch Plan) to the Commissioners, who acknowledged receipt of the plan through 

the township engineer by letter dated January 14, 2009.4 At the time, the 2008 Zoning 

Ordinance permitting age-restricted housing and clubhouse uses by special exception

was in effect. Consequently, the January 2009 letter notified Developer that a preliminary 

analysis of the 2008 Sketch Plan revealed that, inter alia, Developer would need to obtain 

zoning relief in the form of a special exception for the age-restricted housing use.

Thereafter, Developer and the Commissioners entered negotiations that spanned 

years regarding development of the Property, including the possibility of incorporating the 

Property and the contiguous acreage located in adjacent Springfield Township that 

Developer also owned into one community. During these lengthy negotiations, the 

Commissioners and Developer agreed to approximately 40 extensions of time for the 

Commissioners to review Developer’s 2008 Sketch Plan. See generally Section 508 of 

the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10508 (prescribing the time in which a governing body must act upon 

an application for approval of a land development plan such as the 2008 Sketch Plan and 

providing that an applicant can agree in writing to an extension of time). To date, the 

2008 Sketch Plan is still pending with the Commissioners.

5

 

4

 “There is no question that Developer’s age-restricted development constitutes land 

development and that its sketch plan was a preliminary land development plan.” Bd. of 

Comm’rs of Cheltenham Twp. v. Hansen-Lloyd, L.P., 166 A.3d 496, 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017).

5

In early June 2015, Developer and the Commissioners agreed to an indefinite extension 

of time for consideration of the 2008 Sketch Plan “until 60 days from the date of the final 

decision of the [instant] zoning case including all appeals,” provided that either party could 

“end the indefinite extension upon 60 days advanced written notice to the other party.” 

Developer’s ZHB Exhibit No. 29; see also Commissioners’ Brief at 17, 24 n.14, 43 

(explaining that the Commissioners have not reviewed the 2008 Sketch Plan); 

Commissioners’ Reply Brief at 6, 11 (explaining that, “[t]o date, [Developer] has never 

sought to proceed with review of the [2008 S]ketch [P]lan, [which] has been pending since 
[J-89-2018] - 8

Eventually, the negotiations between Developer and the Commissioners 

concerning alternate plans for the Property failed. Developer thus sought to move forward 

on its originally proposed age-restricted housing development set forth in the 2008 Sketch 

Plan that remained pending before the Commissioners. Accordingly, in May 2015,

Developer filed a zoning application (the 2015 Zoning Application) with the ZHB for the 

zoning relief it required to construct the age-restricted housing development on the 

Property. As is pertinent here, while the 2012 Zoning Ordinance had replaced the 2008 

Zoning Ordinance by this time, Developer sought special exceptions to permit the agerestricted housing and clubhouse uses under the 2008 Zoning Ordinance in effect at the 

time it filed its 2008 Sketch Plan.

The ZHB held several hearings, during the course of which the parties disputed 

the proper ordinance to apply in reviewing Developer’s 2015 Zoning Application. As 

indicated above, Developer argued in favor of applying the 2008 Zoning Ordinance, which 

was in effect at the time Developer filed its 2008 Sketch Plan that remained pending 

before the Commissioners. Developer took the position that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance 

controlled pursuant to Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC, because no change in the zoning 

ordinance can adversely affect a pending land development plan. In contrast, the 

Commissioners argued in favor of applying the 2012 Zoning Ordinance, which was in 

effect at the time Developer filed its 2015 Zoning Application before the ZHB. The 

Commissioners claimed that the 2012 Zoning Ordinance governed pursuant to Section 

917 of the MPC, which prevents zoning changes from adversely affecting the decision on 

a pending zoning application and entitles the applicant to a decision based on the 

ordinances in effect at the time the zoning application is filed. As noted, a determination 

 

December 2008,” and that the 2008 Sketch Plan has been pending for approximately 10 

years).
[J-89-2018] - 9

as to which ordinance applied was critical to the ZHB’s decision on the 2015 Zoning 

Application, as the parties stipulated that Developer’s zoning requests would not satisfy 

the more stringent special exception criteria under the 2012 Zoning Ordinance.

The ZHB concluded that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance governed its review of the 

2015 Zoning Application, which it ultimately granted. In reaching its conclusion, the ZHB 

found Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC to be “clear and controlling.”

6 ZHB Decision, 

1/28/2016, at 11. Notwithstanding that it was rendering a decision on Developer’s 2015

Zoning Application, and not the 2008 Sketch Plan that remained pending before the 

Commissioners, the ZHB explained that it was clear from the record that the 2008 Sketch 

Plan and the plan filed in conjunction with the 2015 Zoning Application were the same. 

As such, the ZHB posited, Developer was not trying to “bait and switch” the 

Commissioners or ZHB by seeking relief based on a plan filed with the 2015 Zoning 

Application that differed from the 2008 Sketch Plan. Id. In other words, Developer sought 

zoning relief incident to and necessary for its pending land development application.

In response to the Commissioners’ argument, the ZHB concluded that Section 917

of the MPC was inapplicable to the matter before it.7 The ZHB explained that Section 917 

applies where an applicant chooses to file its zoning application first, followed by the 

 

6 As previously explained, Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC, set forth supra at page 3, 

protects pending applications for approval of a land development plan such as the 2008 

Sketch Plan from changes made to, inter alia, a municipality’s zoning ordinance that 

would adversely affect the governing body’s decision on that land development 

application.

7 Again, Section 917, set forth supra at page 5, protects pending special exception 

applications, the subject matter of which would ultimately constitute land development 

(such as the 2015 Zoning Application), from changes made to a municipality’s zoning 

ordinance after the filing of the zoning application that would adversely affect a zoning 

hearing board’s decision on that application. It then provides the process by which a 

developer can proceed with its land development plan following approval of the zoning 

application and still receive protection from adverse zoning changes.
[J-89-2018] - 10

submission of a land development application once a decision on its zoning application 

is made. Id. at 12 (positing further that Section 917 was included in the MPC to protect 

the applicant who “chooses to obtain zoning relief with regard to its proposed use before 

going to the expense of filing full-blown land development ... plans”). The ZHB reasoned

that, here, Developer chose to file its 2008 Sketch Plan prior to filing its 2015 Zoning 

Application. Thus, according to the ZHB, Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC applied, and 

pursuant to that subsection, the 2008 Zoning Ordinance governed Developer’s 2015 

Zoning Application.

The Commissioners appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the decision of the 

ZHB without taking additional evidence. In adding to the rationale advanced by the ZHB, 

the trial court accepted that it is the filing of the “plan,” whether done so in conjunction 

with either the land development application or the zoning application, and not the filing 

of the respective applications themselves, that vests a developer’s right to develop its 

property in accordance with the zoning ordinance in effect at the time the “plan” is filed.

Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 11/3/2016, at 5. The trial court posited that the law clearly 

permitted a developer to obtain “vesting rights” by filing either a land development 

application or a zoning application, and that because Developer chose to file its 2008 

Sketch Plan first, it obtained vesting rights, inter alia, in the 2008 Zoning Ordinance. Id.

at 6.

The Commissioners then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, reiterating their

position that the 2012 Zoning Ordinance governed Developer’s 2015 Zoning Application

pursuant to Section 917 of the MPC because the 2012 Zoning Ordinance was in effect at 

the time the 2015 Zoning Application was filed. The Commissioners argued that holding 

that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance applied under Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC rendered 

Section 917 mere surplusage. The Commissioners claimed that it was more logical to 
[J-89-2018] - 11

interpret Subsection 508(4)(i) as applying only to land development applications that do 

not require special exception approval, which would give meaningful effect to both 

Subsection 508(4)(i) and Section 917. The Commissioners also argued that, while the 

2008 Zoning Ordinance governed Developer’s pending 2008 Sketch Plan, the extensions 

of time given for the Commissioners’ consideration of the 2008 Sketch Plan did not extend 

the applicability of the 2008 Zoning Ordinance to the 2015 Zoning Application. According 

to the Commissioners, Developer should have sought zoning approval for the use of the 

Property before seeking approval for the land development. 

In a published, unanimous decision, a three-judge panel of the Commonwealth 

Court affirmed, concluding that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance governed Developer’s 2015 

Zoning Application. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cheltenham Twp. v. Hansen-Lloyd, L.P., 166 A.3d 

496 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). The Commonwealth Court observed that the language in 

Subsection 508(4)(i) was clear and unambiguous in that no zoning change or amendment 

can adversely affect a pending land development application such as the 2008 Sketch 

Plan and that, “[s]o long as a land development application is pending, the applicant is 

entitled to a decision in accordance with the provisions of the governing [zoning] 

ordinances ... as they stood at the time the application was duly filed.” Id. at 505. The 

court further explained that, while Subsection 508(4)(i) clearly protects a land 

development application such as the 2008 Sketch Plan from future adverse zoning 

ordinance changes, the question in this case was whether “this protection extends to 

later-filed zoning applications” such as the 2015 Zoning Application. Id. at 503. 

Observing that its case law did not directly address the issue, the court concluded

that Subsection 508(4)(i)’s “protection naturally extends to decisions regarding zoning 

relief where such relief is a necessary part of the land development plan.” Id. at 505. In 

so doing, the Commonwealth Court rejected the Commissioners’ claims that this 
[J-89-2018] - 12

interpretation of Subsection 508(4)(i) rendered Section 917 mere surplusage and created

an inherent conflict between Subsection 508(4)(i) and Section 917. Having previously 

explained that “Section 917 permits an applicant, whose plans will culminate in land 

development[,] ... to seek zoning relief first and still receive protection from subsequent 

amendments for any future-filed ... land development plan,” the court posited that both 

Subsection 508(4)(i) and Section 917 “can be reasonably interpreted depending on which 

application is filed first.” Id. at 504-05. The Court thus explained that Subsection 508(4)(i)

applies when an applicant first files a land development application, and Section 917 

applies if an applicant first files an application for zoning relief. The court reasoned that 

this result gave meaning to both provisions.

Turning to the facts of this case, the Commonwealth Court stated that the 

Subdivision Code (i.e., Cheltenham Township’s SALDO) required that Developer submit

a sketch plan and that the sketch plan meet the requirements of the Zoning Code unless 

special exceptions have been granted by the ZHB. Id. (quoting Subsection 260-35(A.) of 

the Subdivision Code, supra at page 4 (outlining the circumstances in which a tentative 

sketch plan is required); and Section 260-31 of the Subdivision Code, also supra at page 

4 (requiring land development plans to meet the requirements of the Zoning Code unless 

special exceptions have been granted by the ZHB)). The court further noted that the 2008 

Zoning Ordinance was in effect at the time Developer submitted, and the township 

engineer accepted, the 2008 Sketch Plan, and that a preliminary analysis of the 2008 

Sketch Plan revealed that Developer would need to obtain zoning relief in the form of a 

special exception for the development under the 2008 Zoning Ordinance.

The Commonwealth Court stated that, while Developer did not ultimately seek 

zoning relief until May 2015, its 2008 Sketch Plan was still pending before the 

Commissioners at that time. The court observed that Developer needed zoning relief to 
[J-89-2018] - 13

proceed with its land development as originally proposed in the 2008 Sketch Plan and 

that Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC protects land development applications from 

adverse zoning changes. Id. Thus, as Developer stipulated that its zoning requests 

would not meet the special exception criteria under the 2012 Zoning Ordinance, the court 

concluded that the change in the zoning law would have adversely affected Developer’s 

pending 2008 Sketch Plan.

The court continued by observing that to hold that Subsection 508(4)(i)’s protection 

applies only to land development applications, and not zoning applications, would

eviscerate that “protection by enabling municipalities to change zoning ordinances upon 

receipt of any undesired land development plans to thwart approval” and “require 

applicants to request zoning relief first before seeking ... land development approval, as 

opposed to providing applicants a choice regarding how to proceed.” Id. at 505-06. The 

court further explained that requesting zoning relief would be an unnecessary step in 

instances where a governing body does not approve the land development application. 

Thus, the court held that the ZHB properly determined that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance 

governed Developer’s zoning application pursuant to Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC.

III. Issue

This Court granted discretionary review to answer the following question, as posed 

by the Commissioners: “Did the Commonwealth Court overlook the express language of 

53 P.S. [§] 10917 by holding that a zoning application for special exception is governed 

by an ordinance other than the ordinance in effect when the zoning application was filed?” 

In re Bd. of Comm’rs of Cheltenham Twp., 179 A.3d 1079 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). The 

question presented is one of law, as it requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. 

Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 162 A.3d 384, 389 
[J-89-2018] - 14

(Pa. 2017). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is 

plenary. Id.

IV. Analysis

We are guided in our analysis by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 1501-1991, which directs us to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General 

Assembly. Id. § 1921(a). “It is axiomatic that the best indication of legislative intent is the 

plain language of the statute.” Doe v. Franklin Cnty., 174 A.3d 593, 605 (Pa. 2017). 

When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we may not look beyond the 

statutory language to discern its meaning “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 

Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., 162 A.3d at 389 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)). 

Thus, it is only when the statute is ambiguous that we resort to consideration of the 

various factors listed in Subsection 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act for purposes 

of discerning the Legislature’s intent. Brewington ex rel. Brewington v. City of 

Philadelphia, 199 A.3d 348, 355 (Pa. 2018). Lastly, we are mindful that every statute is 

to be read so as “to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).

As indicated above, the Commissioners take the position that Developer’s 2015 

Zoning Application is governed by the provisions of the 2012 Zoning Ordinance pursuant 

to Section 917 of the MPC. The Commissioners offer a plethora of arguments in support 

of their position, a majority of which are rooted in statutory construction principles and

track their arguments made before the Commonwealth Court. The Commissioners

maintain that both Subsection 508(4)(i) and Section 917 are clear and unambiguous with 

respect to the manner in which they apply and the protections they offer.

8

 Specifically, 

the Commissioners argue that Subsection 508(4)(i) refers only to land development 

 

8 The Commissioners also claim that, to the extent the statutory language at issue is 

ambiguous, various statutory construction principles support their position.
[J-89-2018] - 15

applications, not to any associated zoning applications, and thus protects only land 

development applications from subsequent adverse ordinance changes. The 

Commissioners further argue that, on the other hand, Section 917 refers to zoning 

applications (the subject matter of which would ultimately constitute land development)

and land development applications, and, if followed, protects both applications from 

subsequent adverse ordinance changes.9

The Commissioners further contend that the lower tribunals ignored the express 

language of Section 917 under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of Subsection 508(4)(i). 

Indeed, the Commissioners criticize the Commonwealth Court’s observation that 

Subsection 508(4)(i)’s protection “naturally extends to decisions regarding zoning relief 

where such relief is a necessary part of the land development plan” as being “facile” and 

legally unsupported. Commissioners’ Brief at 15 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Cheltenham 

Twp., 166 A.3d at 505) (emphasis omitted). The Commissioners argue that the lower 

tribunals failed to place any weight on the distinctions between land development 

application procedures and zoning application procedures, and that the Commonwealth 

Court’s holding risks blurring the boundaries between the two to the detriment of the public 

interest.

In support of its contrary position that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance governs its 2015 

Zoning Application, Developer reiterates much of the reasoning offered by the tribunals 

below. In so doing, Developer claims that both Subsection 508(4)(i) and Section 917 

recognize that the filing of either a land development application or a zoning application 

“vests the plan with the zoning ordinance in effect at the time of filing” and, thus, “vesting 

rights” may be obtained by filing either application. Developer’s Brief at 16, 26. Developer 

 

9 The Commissioners thus argue that applicants can fully protect their property interests 

against subsequent zoning changes by filing their zoning applications prior to, or at least 

simultaneously with, their land development applications.
[J-89-2018] - 16

contends that there is no requirement in the MPC or otherwise that an applicant file both 

applications simultaneously or seek zoning approval prior to obtaining approval of a land 

development plan to obtain vesting rights in an existing ordinance. Developer argues 

that, because it filed its 2008 Sketch Plan first, its rights vested in the 2008 Zoning 

Ordinance pursuant to Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC. 

Additionally, Developer argues that the Commonwealth Court did not overlook 

Section 917 as the Commissioners claim, but rather read that section together with 

Subsection 508(4)(i) in correctly holding that Developer’s submission of its land 

development application vested its rights to develop the Property under the 2008 Zoning 

Ordinance pursuant to Subsection 508(4)(i). Developer contends that it is the 

Commissioners who overlook the plain language of Subsection 508(4)(i) protecting

pending land development applications from adverse ordinance changes, which 

protection “‘naturally extends’ to decisions regarding zoning relief where [that] relief is a 

necessary part of the land development plan.” Id. at 17-18 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of 

Cheltenham Twp., 166 A.3d at 505).10 With regard to Section 917, Developer echoes the 

Commonwealth Court’s observation that “Section 917 permits an applicant, whose plans 

will culminate in land development[,] ... to seek zoning relief first and still receive 

protection from subsequent amendments for any future-filed ... land development plan.” 

Id. at 15 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Cheltenham Twp., 166 A.3d at 504)).

Developer further challenges the Commissioners’ claim that the Commonwealth 

Court’s decision will erode the boundaries between land development proceedings and 

 

10 Developer notes that this Court has recognized that the purpose of Subsection 508(4) 

is to grant the developer immunity from changes in zoning and planning laws for the 

duration of a development project, which Developer claims regularly entails the pursuit of 

zoning relief “during the pendency of the plan,” and to protect the developer from changes 

brought about by the governing body during the pendency of applications for approval. 

Developer’s Brief at 16 (relying upon Meadows of Hanover Dev., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors 

of South Hanover Twp., 734 A.2d 854, 857 (Pa. 1999)).
[J-89-2018] - 17

zoning proceedings, as Developer has never claimed that it was free from obtaining 

special exception approval. Developer also reiterates its position that an applicant has 

two ways in which it can receive protection for its proposed development from subsequent 

adverse ordinance changes: commence the development process by filing a land 

development plan under Subsection 508(4)(i), or begin by filing a zoning application under 

Section 917. Developer argues that this case concerns the MPC’s protection against the 

very conduct of the Commissioners at issue here, where an ordinance is passed with the 

aim of preventing a proposed pending development. 

As stated previously, the language of Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC relevant to 

the issue before us provides that, while a duly-filed land development application is 

pending, “no change or amendment of the zoning ... ordinance ... shall affect the decision 

on such application adversely to the applicant and the applicant shall be entitled to a 

decision in accordance with the provisions of the governing ordinances ... as they stood 

at the time the application was duly filed.” 53 P.S. § 10508(4)(i). The relevant language 

of Section 917 parallels that of Subsection 508(4)(i) by providing that while an application 

for a special exception related to land development is pending, “no change or amendment 

of the zoning ... ordinance ... shall affect the decision on such application adversely to 

the applicant, and the applicant shall be entitled to a decision in accordance with the 

provisions of the governing ordinances ... as they stood at the time the application was 

duly filed.” 53 P.S. § 10917. 

The above language of Subsection 508(4)(i) and Section 917 clearly provides the 

same type of protection for a proposed development project. Specifically, both provisions 

protect pending applications (land development applications under Subsection 508(4)(i) 

and zoning applications under Section 917) that are filed in relation to a development 

project from zoning changes that are made during the pendency of the respective 
[J-89-2018] - 18

application and would adversely affect the decision on the respective application. 

Importantly, neither Subsection 508(4)(i) nor Section 917 requires submission of one 

application before the other, and the parties do not cite, nor have we uncovered, any 

provision of the MPC, Subdivision Code, or Zoning Code that imposes such a 

requirement. Thus, Developer was free to begin the development process with the filing 

of either a land development application under Section 508 of the MPC, or a zoning 

application under Section 917 of the MPC.

Developer chose to file its land development application, i.e. the 2008 Sketch Plan,

first under Section 508 of the MPC. The 2008 Zoning Ordinance was in effect at the time 

Developer submitted the 2008 Sketch Plan. Thus, pursuant to Subsection 508(4)(i), 

Developer is entitled to a decision on the 2008 Sketch Plan in accordance with the 2008 

Zoning Ordinance as long as the 2008 Sketch Plan remains pending. As explained 

above, the 2008 Sketch Plan has remained pending for years, during which: (1) the 2012 

Zoning Ordinance replaced the 2008 Zoning Ordinance, and (2) Developer filed its related 

2015 Zoning Application. As observed by the Commonwealth Court, the replacement of 

the 2008 Zoning Ordinance with the 2012 Zoning Ordinance constituted a zoning change 

that was adverse to Developer’s 2008 Sketch Plan, as the parties stipulated that 

Developer’s zoning requests do not meet the criteria under the 2012 Zoning Ordinance 

for a special exception, two of which are needed for the proposed development. Thus, 

the protection offered by Subsection 508(4)(i) shields Developer’s 2008 Sketch Plan from

disapproval by the Commissioners based on the 2012 Zoning Ordinance. 

As for whether Subsection 508(4)(i)’s protection extends to Developer’s 2015 

Zoning Application, we observe that, while it does not dictate the order in which land 

development applications and zoning applications are to be filed, the Subdivision Code 

(again, Cheltenham Township’s SALDO) does require that Developer’s 2008 Sketch Plan 
[J-89-2018] - 19

comply with the Zoning Code unless the ZHB has granted special exceptions. Here, 

Developer needs zoning relief in the form of special exceptions for its proposed agerestricted housing and clubhouse uses depicted in the pending 2008 Sketch Plan. Under 

these circumstances, where “zoning relief is a necessary part of the land development 

plan,” we agree with the Commonwealth Court that Section 508(4)(i)’s protection of 

pending land development plans extends to the decisions on the requested zoning relief 

needed for purposes of land development plan approval.

In so doing, we further agree with the Commonwealth Court that to hold otherwise 

would enable a municipality to disapprove a pending land development plan based on a 

zoning change adverse to the land development plan in contravention of the protection 

offered by Subsection 508(4)(i). For instance, it is undisputed that Developer’s zoning 

requests do not meet the special exception criteria of the 2012 Zoning Ordinance. Thus, 

if the 2012 Zoning Ordinance were to apply to the 2015 Zoning Application here, the 2015 

Zoning Application would be denied. Without the special exceptions, Developer’s 2008 

Sketch Plan would also be denied pursuant to Section 260-31 of the Subdivision Code. 

Thus, the denial of the 2008 Sketch Plan would be based on a zoning change adverse to 

the 2008 Sketch Plan that was made during the pendency of 2008 Sketch Plan, which is 

prohibited by Subsection 508(4)(i) of the MPC.11

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Commonwealth Court did not err when it 

held that the 2008 Zoning Ordinance governed Developer’s 2015 Zoning Application by 

 

11 Section 917 is not in tension with our holding. As the Commonwealth Court explained, 

Section 917 provides an alternative method by which a developer can begin the 

development process and remain shielded from adverse zoning amendments. 

Specifically, Section 917 permits the developer “to seek zoning relief first and still receive 

protection from subsequent amendments for any future-filed ... land development plan.” 

Bd. of Comm’rs of Cheltenham Twp., 166 A.3d at 504. Our interpretation of Subsection 

508(4)(i) permits the developer to seek land development approval first and receive that 

same protection for future-filed zoning applications. Thus, like the Commonwealth Court, 

we perceive no conflict between the two provisions in light of this interpretation.
[J-89-2018] - 20

way of extension of Subsection 508(4)(i)’s protection of pending land development plans 

from adverse zoning changes. Thus, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Donohue and Dougherty join the opinion.

Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Todd joins.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.