J-S43013-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROBERT RITCHWOOD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 354 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-CR-0000786-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 15, 2021

Appellant, Robert Ritchwood, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment 

of sentence entered July 2, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong 

County. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the procedural history of this matter, which 

stemmed from a domestic altercation at Appellant’s residence on October 8, 

2018, as follows:1

[Appellant] was convicted of one count of Aggravated 

Assault,1four counts of Endangering Welfare of Children,2 one 

count of Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement,3 and one 

count of Disorderly Conduct.4 [Appellant] was sentenced to a

period of 60 to 120 months of incarceration ordered to run

consecutively. [Appellant] filed a timely Post-Sentence Motion

asserting that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

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1 For a thorough recitation of the underlying facts of this matter, we direct the 

reader to the opinion authored by the trial court. Trial Court Opinion, 4/23/20, 

at 2-8.
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[Appellant] and that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence as to all counts.5

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2702(a)(3).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 4304(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 5104.

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 5503(a)(1).

5 [Appellant’s] Post-Sentence Motion was denied, see 

Court Order dated November 4, 2019.

After [Appellant] was sentenced, he filed a series of pro se

petitions with the [c]ourt, while still appearing to be represented 

by counsel. To wit, there was no withdrawal of appearance by 

counsel, and [Appellant’s] Post-Sentence motion filed by trial 

counsel was still pending[2]. [Appellant] filed Motion to Withdraw 

Endangering Welfare of Children charge, Motion for Modification 

of Sentence (Illegal Sentence), Motion for a New Trial, a Motion 

for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, and a Petition for 

Reconsideration. [Appellant’s] Motion of Ineffective Assistance 

was treated as a PCRA Petition and was denied without prejudice 

because at the time of filing[, Appellant] had not perfected his 

post-sentence rights.6  The same day counsel was appointed.

6 See Court Order dated November 4, 2019.

[Appellant] next filed a Post-Conviction Collateral Relief 

Motion, pro se, on December 13, 2019. During the rule return 

hearing on [Appellant’s] motion, [Appellant’s] counsel requested 

that [Appellant’s] appeal rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc, as he 

did not perfect any appeal on the issues he raised. Without 

objection from the Commonwealth[, Appellant’s] appeal rights 

were reinstated. [Appellant] filed a timely Notice of Appeal with 

this Court on February 28, 2020[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 4/23/20, at 1-2. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

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2 As previously indicated, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion in an order dated November 4, 2019.
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I. Should [Appellant’s] convictions be reversed as not being 

supported by sufficient evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant purports to argue that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the verdicts in this case. Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. However, 

Appellant alleges, “The testimony of the neighbor and the officer was of one 

nature, while the testimony of [his wife], the alleged victim, was certainly of 

a different nature.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Specifically, Appellant contends 

that “[his wife] denied being a victim and stated that she did not wish to press 

charges.” Id. Appellant asks us to reassess the jury’s credibility 

determinations as to which testimony is to be believed.

A sufficiency of the evidence review, however, does not include an 

assessment of the credibility of the testimony. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 

825 A.2d 710, 713-714 (Pa. Super. 2003). Such a claim is more properly 

characterized as a weight of the evidence challenge. Id. A challenge to the 

weight of the evidence questions which evidence is to be believed. 

Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa. Super. 2006). Indeed, 

claims challenging the weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence 

are clearly distinct. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 

2000) (discussing the distinctions between a claim challenging the sufficiency 

of the evidence and a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence). “A true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient 

evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be 
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believed.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d at 561 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001)). 

Accordingly, we view this issue, as presented, to be a challenge to the weight 

of the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, and we will address it as such.3

In Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme 

Court set forth the following standards to be employed in addressing 

challenges to the weight of the evidence:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319, 

744 A.2d 745, 751-[7]52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Brown, 

538 Pa. 410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (1994). A new trial should 

not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or 

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3 To the extent Appellant attempts to present a typical challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we note that such a claim is waived due to 

Appellant’s failure to specify in his concise statement, filed pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the specific elements of any crime which he deems were 

not established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding waiver of 

sufficiency of evidence claim where the appellant failed to specify in Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement the elements of particular crime not proven by the 

Commonwealth). See also Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (finding sufficiency claim waived under Williams for failure 

to specify which elements of crimes were not proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt). Indeed, Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement set forth the 

following issue:

1. That the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of 

[Appellant], particularly in light of [Appellant’s] wife, a 

Commonwealth witness.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 4/8/20, at 1. Likewise, Appellant failed to 

specify in his appellate brief the elements of the crimes which were allegedly 

not met. Consequently, Appellant’s non-specific claim challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence, which fails to specify the elements of the particular 

crimes allegedly not proven by the Commonwealth, is waived. Williams.
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because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a 

different conclusion. Widmer, 560 A.2d at 319-[3]20, 744 A.2d 

at 752. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater 

weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all 

the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. at 320, 744 A.2d at 752 (citation 

omitted). It has often been stated that “a new trial should be 

awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to 

prevail.” Brown, 538 Pa. at 435, 648 A.2d at 1189.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with 

a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189. Because the 

trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give 

the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). 

One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice.

Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321-[3]22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis 

added).

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the 

trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on 

a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of 

judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a 
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dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving 

effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be 

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to 

prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, 

but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Widmer, 560 A.2d at 322, 744 A.2d at 753 (quoting Coker v. 

S.M. Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 447, 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-

[11]85 (1993)).

Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054-1055. “Thus, the trial court’s denial of a motion for a 

new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its 

rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879-880 (Pa. 2008).

The trial court addressed this issue as follows:

[Appellant] asserts that there was insufficient evidence, 

particularly in light of Mrs. Ritchwood’s testimony. Her testimony 

stands in stark contrast to balance of the evidence provided at 

trial. Specifically, Officer Bartosiewicz testified that when he 

arrived on the scene, he heard Mrs. Ritchwood scream “he 

stabbed me. He stabbed me.” Moreover, there was evidence as 

to the presence of the children in the vicinity of [Appellant] and 

Mrs. Ritchwood during the attack. Ms. Mascio testified that the 

children appeared terrified and frightened when they were at her 

house, and one of them stated that “he has a knife.”

While Mrs. Ritchwood’s testimony attempts to provide an 

alternative explanation for the events, the jury was tasked with 

determining the credibility of the witnesses. At no time prior to 

the trial did Mrs. Ritchwood offer the explanation for the injuries 

that she testified to. Her insistence on not being a victim 

contradicts the testimony provided by the officers that were on 

the scene. The jurors were instructed to use their common sense 

judging the evidence and the facts of the case. The [c]ourt is not 
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inclined to sit as a thirteenth juror and substitute its judgment for 

that of the jury.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/23/20, at 9-10.

Based upon our complete review of the record, we agree with the trial 

court. Here, the jury, sitting as the finder of fact, was free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence against Appellant. The jury weighed the evidence and 

concluded Appellant perpetrated the crimes in question. This determination 

by the jury is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

We decline Appellant’s invitation to assume the role of fact-finder and to 

reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in refusing to grant relief on Appellant’s challenge to the 

weight of the evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/15/2021