IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronald Jackson, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 365 C.D. 2018

: Submitted: July 5, 2019

SCI Huntingdon Prison Officials; :

Sergeant Grove; CO Mainello; :

CO Pyle; Super. Kevin Kauffman; :

Hearing Examiner Ellenberger, et al. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge1

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: November 18, 2019

Ronald Jackson, pro se, appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Huntingdon County (trial court), which denied his petition to proceed in forma 

pauperis and dismissed as frivolous his civil action and request for injunctive relief 

against the Commonwealth and various employees at the State Correctional 

Institution (SCI) at Huntingdon (Prison Officials). On appeal, Jackson contends that 

he should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis and that the trial court erred in 

dismissing his action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

On February 5, 2018, Jackson initiated a civil action against the 

Commonwealth and Prison Officials.

2

 Along with the civil cover sheet, Jackson 

filed three documents titled “Summons,” “Memorandum of Law in Support of 

 

1 This matter was assigned to this panel before September 1, 2019, when Judge Simpson assumed 

the status of senior judge.

2

In filing his appeal, Jackson did not list the Commonwealth as an appellee. 
2

Claimant’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” 

and “Declaration in Support of Order to Show Cause for Temporary Restraining 

Order and Preliminary Injunction.” Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 1. These 

documents alleged that Prison Officials deprived Jackson of his property without 

due process of law by withdrawing medical co-payments from his inmate account. 

The documents also alleged that Prison Officials denied Jackson the opportunity to 

see a podiatrist. Jackson further alleged that Prison Officials retaliated against him 

for filing grievances. The trial court treated these documents as Jackson’s “action.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/2018, at 2. On February 22, 2018, Jackson filed a petition 

to proceed in forma pauperis. 

On March 5, 2018, the trial court dismissed Jackson’s action as 

frivolous pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 240(j)(1). Jackson 

appealed to this Court, and the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(1). The trial court stated that Jackson’s 

pleading “consist[ed] of a hodgepodge of disjointed averments” that were 

“extremely difficult to read.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/2018, at 2.3 The trial court 

explained that although Jackson appeared dissatisfied with the prison’s policies, it 

was not the role of the court to interfere with those policies or their enforcement. 

Citing Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 

1998), the trial court stated it would not rule on issues related to inmate grievances 

and misconduct appeals. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Jackson’s action as 

frivolous. 

 

3 The trial court noted that on March 9, 2018, Jackson filed an additional pleading entitled 

“Complaint pursuant to Civil Action.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/2018, at 2. Because Jackson’s 

appeal related only to the trial court’s March 5, 2018, order dismissing his action, the trial court 

did not consider filings after that date. 
3

On appeal,4Jackson contends that the trial court erred. He asserts that 

his complaint stated a legally cognizable cause of action against Prison Officials that 

was not frivolous.

At issue here is the trial court’s application of Pennsylvania Rule of

Civil Procedure 240(j)(1), which governs a party’s right to proceed in forma 

pauperis. It states: 

If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or 

proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition 

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting 

upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if 

the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the 

action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.

PA. R.C.P. NO. 240(j)(1). A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as one 

that “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 

319, 325 (1989). Under Rule 240(j)(1), an action is frivolous if, on its face, it does 

not set forth a valid cause of action. Jones v. Doe, 126 A.3d 406, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015). With these principles in mind, we consider whether the trial court erred in 

concluding that Jackson’s action was frivolous.5

In his filings with the trial court, Jackson alleged that he had been

harassed by corrections officers Mainello, Pyle and Grove in retaliation for filing 

grievances. When claiming retaliation, “a state prison inmate must show he suffered 

some adverse action by prison officials in retaliation for engaging in constitutionally 

protected conduct.” Wilson v. Marrow, 917 A.2d 357, 364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). An 

 

4

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we must determine whether constitutional rights have been 

violated, the trial court abused its discretion, or the trial court committed an error of law. Bailey 

v. Wakefield, 933 A.2d 1081, 1083 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

5 Prison Officials elected not to file a brief in this matter. 
4

inmate can satisfy this burden by showing that “the action taken by officials was 

sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional 

rights.” Id. at 364 (quoting Yount v. Department of Corrections, 886 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2005)). Jackson did not allege that the officers took adverse action to deter 

him from filing a grievance, nor did he allege specific facts describing the allegedly 

retaliatory conduct of the officers. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

dismissing this portion of Jackson’s action as frivolous. 

Jackson also alleged that he was denied medical care in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

6

 Jackson 

asserted that his condition, an ingrown toenail, required treatment by a podiatrist, 

which Prison Officials denied to him.

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate “must allege 

acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Tindell v. Department of Corrections, 87 A.3d 1029, 1038 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014). “Whether the medical need of an inmate is sufficiently serious to 

constitute an injury amounting to cruel and unusual punishment is an objective 

inquiry.” Id. Additionally, “a prisoner must also allege acts or omissions that 

evidence deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials in order to state a 

cognizable claim that the prisoner’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment has been violated.” Id. at 1039. A prisoner must establish that: 

“(i) the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be 

 

6 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from inflicting “cruel and unusual 

punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew 

the inference.” Id. (internal footnote omitted).

Here, Jackson did not allege that he was not seen by medical staff or 

that they acted with “deliberate indifference” to his medical needs. More 

specifically, Jackson did not allege that Prison Officials were aware of his medical 

condition and acted in a manner to prevent him from receiving medical treatment. 

Instead, he alleged that the prison physicians did not refer him to a podiatrist. This 

Court has explained that it will reject any attempts to undermine or question the 

adequacy of treatment conducted by medical professionals, which “remains a 

question of sound professional judgment.” Kretchmar v. Commonwealth, 831 A.2d 

793, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“Complaints about medical care which merely reflect 

a disagreement with the doctors over the proper means of treating the prisoner’s 

medical condition do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Similarly, here, Jackson’s disagreement with Prison 

Officials over the treatment of his ingrown toenail cannot form the basis of an Eighth 

Amendment claim. Accordingly, because Jackson failed to state a claim under the 

Eighth Amendment, the trial court did not err by dismissing his claim as frivolous.

Jackson asserted to the trial court that Prison Officials violated a 

Department of Corrections Administrative Directive, DC-ADM 820, by deducting 

co-payments for medical services from his inmate account without advance notice. 

Jackson also argued that his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment7 was violated when he was not given notice of the charges to his inmate 

account or the opportunity to dispute them.

 

7 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part: 

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
6

In Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), an inmate 

challenged co-payment deductions made from his inmate account. Specifically, the 

inmate alleged that deductions were made without giving inmates the opportunity to 

challenge the validity of the deduction. This Court held that the inmate’s complaint 

did not state a due process claim because he could challenge the charges to his inmate 

account through the inmate grievance procedure in 37 Pa. Code §93.9.8 The same 

is true in this case. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing 

Jackson’s claim as frivolous. 

Next, we address Jackson’s assertion that Prison Officials violated the 

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by charging him a co-payment for 

a chronic medical concern. The Correctional Institution Medical Services Act (Act), 

61 Pa. C.S. §§3301-3307, and the Department’s regulations codified at 37 Pa. Code 

§93.12,9establish the Medical Services Program for inmates. The program requires

 

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 

8

It provides:

(a) The Department will maintain an inmate grievance system which will permit 

any inmate to seek review of problems which the inmate experiences during the 

course of confinement. The system will provide for review and resolution of inmate 

grievances at the most decentralized level possible. It will also provide for review 

of the initial decision making and for possible appeal to the Central Office of the 

Department. An inmate will not be disciplined for the good faith use of the 

grievance systems. However, an inmate who submits a grievance for review which 

is false, frivolous or malicious may be subject to appropriate disciplinary 

procedures. A frivolous grievance is one in which the allegations or the relief 

sought lack any arguable basis in fact as set forth in DC-ADM 804--Inmate 

Grievance System, which is disseminated to inmates.

(b) Inmates may also pursue available remedies in State and Federal court. 

37 Pa. Code §93.9.

9 Section 93.12 of the Department’s regulations details the application of the Medical Services 

Program. 
7

“inmates to pay a fee to cover a portion of the actual costs of the medical services 

provided.” 61 Pa. C.S. §3303(a). Based on the Department’s Administrative 

Directive, DC-ADM 820, an inmate is required to pay a $5.00 co-payment for any 

non-emergency medical service provided at the inmate’s request. DC-ADM 820 at 

Section 1-1.10 An inmate is not charged when he receives “medical treatment for a 

chronic medical disease/illness requiring regular return and/or continuous visits, as 

specified by the medical provider.” Id. (emphasis in original). The policy provides 

several examples of “chronic” medical conditions, including asthma, congestive 

heart failure, coronary artery disease, diabetes, dyslipidemia, hepatitis C, HIV and 

hypertension. 

Jackson’s illness, an ingrown toenail, is not included in the 

Department’s list, and he does not allege any facts to show it is a chronic illness. 

Therefore, Jackson failed to state a legally cognizable claim under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and the trial court did not err in concluding that this claim was 

frivolous.

In Portalatin v. Department of Corrections, 979 A.2d 944 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009), the inmate alleged that the co-payments assessed against his prison account 

affected his protected personal and property interests. We explained that “only those 

regulations that impose atypical sanctions and significant hardships when compared 

to the normal incidents of prison life implicate a constitutional right.” Id. at 949. 

We held that the co-payment program did not impose such atypical and significant 

hardships as to implicate a constitutional right because any right “to be free of copayments is not of constitutional dimension” and is “limited by [Department] 

 

10 Policy 820 is available at www.cor.pa.gov (follow “About Us” hyperlink, then follow “DOC 

Policies” hyperlink and select “820 Co-Payment for Medical Services”) (last visited October 29, 

2019). 
8

regulations.” Id. In short, “[t]here is no constitutional right to free medical services 

and prescription medicine.” Id.

Lastly, we address the trial court’s denial of Jackson’s request for an 

injunction directing Prison Officials to arrange for a podiatrist to treat his ingrown 

toenail.

11

 Jackson’s request for injunctive relief repeated many of the arguments 

addressed above, including his vague allegations of constitutional violations. In 

essence, Jackson complains that he has to depend on Prison Officials for medical 

care because he is not permitted to have a toenail clipper in the Restrictive Housing 

Unit. 

A party seeking injunctive relief must establish that “his right to relief 

is clear, that an injunction is necessary to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated 

by damages, and that greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the 

relief requested.” Buehl v. Beard, 54 A.3d 412, 419 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Injunctive

relief may not be granted where an adequate remedy exists at law. Id. at 419-20.

Jackson’s pleading did not establish a clear legal right to relief, i.e., the 

right to see a podiatrist for the treatment of his ingrown toenail. Further, this Court 

has held that “the operation of correctional facilities is peculiarly within the province 

of the legislative and executive branches of the government and not the judicial 

branch.” Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980); Kretchmar, 831 

A.2d at 799 (“[I]t is not in the public’s interest for the court to usurp the 

[Department’s] authority and micro-manage the medical needs of a particular 

inmate.”). Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing as frivolous Jackson’s 

request for injunctive relief. 

 

11 On July 25, 2018, this Court denied a different motion for injunctive relief, by which Jackson 

sought an order enjoining the Prison Officials from violating prison mail policies and from holding 

Jackson in administrative custody. 
9

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Jackson’s action

as frivolous. 

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronald Jackson, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 365 C.D. 2018

:

SCI Huntingdon Prison Officials; :

Sergeant Grove; CO Mainello; :

CO Pyle; Super. Kevin Kauffman; :

Hearing Examiner Ellenberger, et al. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18th day of November, 2019, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Huntingdon County dated March 5, 2018, in the above-captioned 

matter is AFFIRMED.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge