IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Support Center for Child Advocates : CASE SEALED

as G.A.L. for the Minor Child H.M. :

and H.M., the Minor Child, :

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, : No. 723 C.D. 2017

Respondent : Argued: June 7, 2018

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: June 22, 2018

Support Center for Child Advocates as Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.) for 

the minor child H.M., and H.M. (collectively, GAL) petition this Court for review of 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Human Services (DHS), Bureau 

of Hearings and Appeals’ (BHA) May 11, 2017 order (Order) denying H.M.’s

G.A.L.’s Motion to Acknowledge Party Status (Motion). There are two issues before

this Court: (1) whether BHA’s Order is a collateral order pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 313; and, (2) whether BHA erred or abused its 

discretion by denying the Motion.1 After review, we affirm.

On January 12, 2012, the Common Pleas Court appointed the Support 

Center for Child Advocates as attorney and G.A.L. to represent H.M.’s interests in 

 

1 GAL presents four issues in its Statement of Issues: (1) whether BHA’s Order is a 

collateral order; (2) whether BHA failed to follow its procedural rules; (3) whether H.M.’s G.A.L. is 

a proper intervenor; and (4) whether H.M.’s interest is represented by the existing parties. See GAL 

Br. at 4-5. GAL’s second, third and fourth issues are combined herein as Issue 2.
2

connection with criminal and civil proceedings related to abuse.2 H.M.’s father J.C. 

is the indicated perpetrator of abuse against H.M., and the appellant in the underlying 

administrative appeal seeking to have the indicated report expunged. The indicated

report was based on allegations that J.C. raped H.M. On February 14, 2017, H.M.’s 

G.A.L. submitted a letter to BHA requesting acknowledgement of party status based

on BHA’s Standing Practice Order (SPO),

3 which governs practice before BHA. 

On February 24, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a 

Rule to Show Cause why H.M.’s G.A.L. should not be considered a party to the 

proceedings. J.C. and DHS did not object or respond to the Rule. H.M.’s G.A.L., 

upon receiving no response from his request, filed the Motion on May 3, 2017. On 

May 11, 2017, the ALJ denied the Motion. The ALJ determined that H.M. was 

represented by the existing parties therein, that H.M.’s G.A.L.’s request for party 

status in the underlying matter was a Petition to Intervene under Section 35.28 of the 

General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure (GRAPP),4and H.M.’s 

G.A.L. did not meet the required criteria to intervene.

On June 7, 2017, GAL appealed to this Court.5 By September 7, 2017 

order, this Court instructed the parties to address in their respective briefs whether 

BHA’s Order constitutes a collateral order and is subject to appeal to this Court 

pursuant to Rule 313.

 

2 H.M. was born in 2001.

3

“SPOs [sic] are procedural rules issued by [BHA] pursuant to [Section 1102(g) of Act 

142,] 67 Pa.C.S.[] § 1102(g)[,] that govern practice before [BHA].” Julia Ribaudo Senior Servs. v. 

Dep’t Pub. Welfare, 969 A.2d 1184, 1187 n.2 (Pa. 2009). The BHA’s SPO can be found at 

http://www.dhs.pa.gov/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/form/s_002109.pdf (last visited June 8, 

2018).

4

1 Pa. Code § 35.28 (relating to eligibility criteria to intervene).

5 This Court’s standard of review on appeal from a BHA order “is limited to determining 

whether the adjudication is supported by substantial evidence, whether the decision is in accordance 

with the applicable law, or whether constitutional rights are violated.” Casey Ball Supports 

Coordination, LLC v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 160 A.3d 278, 282 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting 

Cambria Cty. Home & Hosp. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 907 A.2d 661, 667 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)).
3

Collateral Order

Initially, Rule 313 provides:

(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from 

a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower 

court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action where the right 

involved is too important to be denied review and the 

question presented is such that if review is postponed until 

final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313. “An appeal of an order denying intervention may fall within the 

definition of an appealable collateral order pursuant to [Rule] 313(b).” Twp. of 

Radnor v. Radnor Recreational, LLC, 859 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

GAL argues: (1) the issue in the underlying matter is whether substantial 

evidence supports the indicated report of child abuse and BHA’s Order involves the 

issue of whether H.M.’s G.A.L. is entitled to party and/or intervenor status, thus the 

Order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) H.M.’s 

G.A.L.’s right to be a party in the underlying child abuse expunction and BHA’s 

failure and/or refusal to apply BHA’s procedural rules enacted to govern practice 

before BHA, and the direct impact of the expunction appeal on H.M.’s future, are

issues that are too important to be denied review; and, (3) if the denial of the Motion 

is not reviewed by this Court, the right to participate in the proceeding will be 

irreparably lost, along with H.M.’s right to appeal any BHA determinations. DHS 

rejoins that the rights involved are J.C.’s reputational interests and H.M.’s interests 

are represented by DHS.

As noted above, the collateral order doctrine permits an 

appeal as of right from a non-final collateral order if the 

order satisfies the three requirements set forth in Rule 

313(b). With regard to the first prong of the collateral order
4

doctrine, an order is separable from the main cause of 

action if it is ‘entirely distinct from the underlying issue in 

the case’ and if ‘it can be resolved without an analysis of 

the merits of the underlying dispute.’ Commonwealth v. 

Blystone, . . . 119 A.3d 306, 312 ([Pa.] 2015) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 778 (Pa. 2015). Here, because the issue of whether 

H.M.’s G.A.L. is entitled to party and/or intervenor status “is a conceptually distinct 

legal question which has no bearing on the central issue within the [expunction] 

action” - whether substantial evidence supports the indicated report of child abuse -

“we find that [GAL] ha[s] established that [BHA’s] Order is separable from the main 

cause of action.”

6

 Id. at 779. Accordingly, GAL has met the first prong of the 

collateral order doctrine.

[W]ith respect to the second prong of the doctrine, the 

importance prong, a right is important if ‘the interests that 

would go unprotected without immediate appeal are 

significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the 

final order rule.’ [Commonwealth v.] Williams, 86 A.3d 

[771,] 782 [(Pa. 2014)]. Notably, the rights involved must 

implicate more than just the individual parties in the matter, 

and, instead, must be ‘deeply rooted in public policy going 

beyond the particular litigation at hand.’ [Commonwealth 

v.] Blystone, 119 A.3d [306,] 312 [(Pa. 2015)] (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

K.C., 128 A.3d at 779. “In the instant case, it is undeniable that a decision regarding 

[H.M.’s G.A.L.’s] claimed right . . . to intervene in the [expunction] proceedings will 

have a direct effect on [GAL’s] ability to participate in the [expunction] proceedings, 

and, thus, on [H.M.], as, if [J.C.] [is], in fact,” entitled to expunction, H.M.’s future is 

affected. Id. “However, while [H.M.’s G.A.L.’s] claimed right to intervene in the 

 

6 DHS does not dispute that GAL satisfied the first prong of the collateral order doctrine. 

See DHS Br. at 11 (“BHA’s order denying party status for [H.M.’s G.A.L.] is separable from the

merits of the appeal and satisfies the first prong of the collateral order doctrine.”).
5

[expunction] action may, at first blush, appear to implicate only the individual parties 

involved, this right has important policy implications extending beyond this particular 

case,” id., because whether a G.A.L. of a child against whom sexual abuse was 

perpetrated has the right to participate in an expunction hearing “is too important to 

be denied review.”7 Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Accordingly, GAL has met the second prong

of the collateral order doctrine.

“Lastly, we turn to the final prong: whether [H.M.’s G.A.L.’s] claimed 

right will be irreparably lost if review is postponed until after final judgment.” K.C., 

128 A.3d at 780. 

In [In re Barnes Foundation, 871 A.2d 792 (Pa. 2005)], [the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court] reasoned that ‘a common 

pleas court’s order denying intervention is one type of order 

which must be appealed within thirty days of its entry under 

Rule . . . 903 [(relating to time for appeal)] or not at all,

precisely because the failure to attain intervenor status 

forecloses a later appeal.’ [Barnes, 871 A.2d] at 794 

(emphasis added). . . .

[B]ecause Barnes unequivocally requires any party who 

was denied intervention and who satisfies the requirements 

of Rule 313 to appeal from the order denying intervention 

within 30 days of its entry or lose the right to appeal the 

order entirely, [GAL’s] right to appeal from the order 

denying intervention in the instant case will be manifestly 

lost if [it is] not permitted to appeal the order.

K.C., 128 A.3d at 780 (footnote omitted). “Accordingly, as [GAL’s] appeal satisfies 

each of the three elements of the collateral order doctrine, we conclude that [BHA’s 

 

7 DHS cites Dauphin County Social Support Services for Children & Youth Services v. 

Department of Public Welfare, 543 A.2d 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), and V.S. v. Department of Public 

Welfare, 131 A.3d 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), for their holdings that children are not entitled to have 

G.A.L.s appointed to them in expunction hearings. DHS contends that because the issue has 

already been addressed by this Court, it is not too important to be denied review. However, unlike 

the facts in Dauphin County and V.S., H.M. is not requesting appointment of a G.A.L. Rather, a 

G.A.L. has already been appointed and is requesting party status. Thus, Dauphin County and V.S. 

are inapposite.
6

O]rder denying intervention is an appealable collateral order as of right under Rule 

313 . . . .” Id. at 781.

Merits

GAL asserts that BHA erred or abused its discretion by failing to follow 

SPO Rule 1, which includes a child’s G.A.L. as a party. DHS responds that under 

Section 35.28(a) of GRAPP, H.M.’s G.A.L. is not eligible to intervene.

SPO Rule 1 defines a party as:

A person or corporate entity recognized by law as directly 

connected to the outcome of an appeal and who/which 

filed a writing specifying such an interest with [BHA], 

including the appellant, [DHS], a county agency or private 

agency empowered by [DHS] to implement regulations on 

behalf of [DHS], the [G.A.L.] for a child, an intervenor, or 

additional defendant. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Clearly, a G.A.L. is included as a potential party under SPO Rule 1 and 

H.M.’s G.A.L. filed a writing requesting acknowledgement of party status in the 

expunction hearing. Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether H.M.’s G.A.L. 

is “recognized by law as directly connected to the outcome of [the] appeal.” SPO 

Rule 1. The relevant appeal is J.C.’s appeal from the expunction hearing, wherein, 

BHA will determine whether J.C.’s name is to be maintained on the ChildLine & 

Abuse Registry (ChildLine Registry).8 Although H.M. is the child victim in the 

appeal, we must determine H.M.’s legal connection to the expunction hearing’s 

outcome.

 

8 Section 3490.4 of DHS’s Regulations defines ChildLine as “[a]n organizational unit of 

[DHS] which operates a Statewide toll-free system for receiving reports of suspected child abuse 

established under [S]ection 6332 of the [Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6332,] 

(relating to establishment of Statewide toll-free telephone number), refers the reports for 

investigation and maintains the reports in the appropriate file. . . .” 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.
7

The issue before BHA in an expunction hearing is whether the indicated 

report of child abuse against a perpetrator should be maintained on the ChildLine 

Registry. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

A report of child abuse is characterized as an ‘indicated 

report’ if an investigation by the county agency or [DHS] 

determines that ‘substantial evidence’ of the alleged abuse 

exists based on available medical evidence, the child 

protective service investigation, or an admission of the facts 

of abuse by the perpetrator. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303. . . . The 

[Section 6331 of the Child Protective Services Law (Law)] 

requires [DHS] to maintain a statewide registry consisting 

of summaries of indicated reports of child abuse. 23

Pa.C.S. § 6331. The burden is on the appropriate county 

agency to show that the indicated report of abuse is 

accurate and being maintained in a manner consistent 

with the [] Law. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6303, 6341(c). After a 

summary of an indicated report is entered in the [ChildLine] 

Registry, the perpetrator is notified that his or her ability to 

obtain employment in a child-care facility or program or a 

public or private school may be adversely affected by the 

entry of the report in the Registry. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6338(a).

When an individual seeks employment that would bring 

him or her in direct contact with children or in which there 

is a significant likelihood of regular contact with children,

or when a person resides in a ‘family day-care home,’ that 

person must provide a certification, obtained within the 

preceding year from [DHS], of whether he or she is named 

in the [ChildLine] Registry as a perpetrator in an indicated 

report of child abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6344(a), (b)(2), 

6344.1(a), (b), 6344.2.

G.V. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 91 A.3d 667, 671 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis added). Thus, 

the relevant appeal this Court is to consider is J.C.’s appeal as to whether he should 

be named in the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator in an indicated report of child 

abuse. Further,

[t]his Court has clarified that ‘[t]he Law seeks to protect 

children from abuse, not to punish alleged abusers.’ L.W.B.

[v. Sosnowski], 543 A.2d [1241,] 1242 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 

1988)] (footnote omitted). Specifically,
8

the purpose of the [Law] is to bring about quick and 

effective reporting of suspected child abuse so as to 

serve as a means for providing protective services 

competently and to prevent further abuse of the 

children while providing rehabilitative services for 

them and the parents. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b). To the 

degree possible, the Law also is geared to the 

stabilization of the family where appropriate. The 

Law does not provide for legal determinations of 

abuse; it is mainly a vehicle for reporting abuse 

and bringing quickly into play those services 

(including court hearings) available through 

county protective service facilities for the care of 

the child.

In the Interest of J.R.W., . . . 631 A.2d 1019, 1021-22 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1993).

V.S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 131 A.3d 523, 531 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (emphasis 

added). At this point in the proceedings, the abuse was already reported and services 

including court hearings have already been made available. As such, it is J.C., not 

H.M. who is directly connected to the outcome of the underlying appeal. 

Accordingly, BHA did not violate SPO Rule 1 by denying the Motion.

Moreover, Section 35.28(a) of GRAPP provides:

Persons. A petition to intervene may be filed by a person 

claiming a right to intervene or an interest of such nature 

that intervention is necessary or appropriate to the 

administration of the statute under which the proceeding is 

brought. The right or interest may be one of the following:

(1) A right conferred by statute of the United States or of 

this Commonwealth.

(2) An interest which may be directly affected and which 

is not adequately represented by existing parties, and as 

to which petitioners may be bound by the action of the 

agency in the proceeding. . . . 

(3) Other interest of such nature that participation of the 

petitioner may be in the public interest.
9

1 Pa. Code § 35.28(a) (emphasis added). Here, H.M.’s G.A.L. has no right to 

intervene “conferred by statute,” nor has he stated an interest such that his 

participation “is in the public interest.” 1 Pa. Code § 35.28. While an important issue 

to H.M., whether H.M.’s G.A.L. is permitted to intervene is not of public importance, 

since DHS will be arguing in favor of maintaining J.C.’s name on the ChildLine 

Registry. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether H.M.’s G.A.L.’s interest is an 

interest directly affected, not represented and potentially bound by the action. 

As stated above, the issue in the “action” is whether J.C.’s name should 

be maintained on the ChildLine Registry. Id. Further, this Court has held that “the 

interests of the children [in expungement hearings] [are] protected at the 

administrative hearing because the interests of the children [are] the same as that of

[DHS]—to have the report of child abuse maintained.” Dauphin Cty. Social Support 

Servs. for Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 543 A.2d 607 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1988). Consequently, this Court cannot hold that H.M.’s G.A.L.’s interest is 

“[a]n interest which may be directly affected and which is not adequately represented 

by existing parties, and as to which petitioners may be bound by the action of the 

agency in the proceeding.” 1 Pa. Code § 35.28. Accordingly, BHA properly 

concluded that H.M.’s G.A.L. did not qualify as an intervenor under Section 35.28(a) 

of GRAPP.

For all of the above reasons, the BHA’s Order is affirmed.

__________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Support Center for Child Advocates : CASE SEALED

as G.A.L. for the Minor Child H.M. :

and H.M., the Minor Child, :

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, : No. 723 C.D. 2017

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of June, 2018, the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, Department of Human Services, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ May 

11, 2017 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge