## In the Court of Appeals Se cond Appellate Dist rict of Texas at Fort Wo rth

___________________________ No. 02

- 22

- 00001

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 467th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 18

- 5868

- 211

Before Birdwell, Bassel , and Wal lach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion b y Justice Wallach 

### N ANCY 

### B OUAJRAM 

### , Appellant

V


### . R

AMI 

### B OUAJRAM 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OP INION Nancy Bouajram and Rami Bou ajram both appeal from the trial court ’ s divorce
decree

. The trial court signed its original divorce decree in October 2020, but after a

new

- trial order and a su ccessful mandamus proceeding b rought by Rami, the trial

court signed the corrected fin al decree (the Corrected Decree) from which the parties appeal

. Nancy challenges the Corrected D ecree ’ s adoption of the couple ’ s mediated settlement agreement ( MSA ) . Rami ’ s appeal asserts one issue in two parts ; one part challeng es the Corrected D ecree ’ s language re garding the treatment of the parties ’
pre

- divorce federal i ncome tax es , and the other part challenges the Corre ct ed
D ecree ’ s re cital of values for some of the p roperty allocated to Rami . Bec au se we hold
that the MSA is enf orceable, that the C orrected D ecree should h ave included the
income tax term requested by Rami, and tha t Rami did not preserve his valu a tion argument for appeal , we will a ffirm in part and rever se in part

. Ba ckground Nancy f iled for divorce in July 2018. I n A pril 201 9 , the parties signed a

“ Partition or Exchange Ag reement ” ( the partition agreement o r PEA ). Under that
agreement, the parties partitioned some of their community prop erty into separate
proper ty. In October 2019, t h e parties attended m ediation , but it conclud ed without a settlement

. Rami filed a co u nterpetition in January 2020. On February 6, 2020, the parties and their attorneys a ppeared at court for a hearing

. S hortly before that hearing, t he3 parties negotiate d so me changes to a draf t MSA , 1 which they the n signed

. The MSA
was filed with the clerk that same day.
The MSA had two distinct pa rts. The first part (Part I) began with an intro duction and was followed by seven sections over eight pages . At a status hea ring
later in the case at which the parties di scussed their objections to the proposed Corrected Decree, they referred to Part I as “ t he boilerp late ” ; t his part of the MSA contained gen eric terms that did not address any specific pr operty of the parties. For

ex ample, it contained a sectio n in which th e parties agreed that th e ir community property would be divided in accordan ce with a spreadsh eet that had bee n attach ed to the MSA as Exhib it 1, but Pa rt I did not discuss or refer to any of the specific
property li sted in Exhibit 1

. In anothe r sectio n of Part I , each party made representations that th e party had
made a full and fair disclosure of all th eir assets and liab ili ties , th at any mistakenly
omitted assets or liabilities not described in the agreement would be subject to futur e divisi on by the court, and tha t “ [ a ] ny undivided community assets later deter mined to have been fraudulently un disclosed by a part y in [the agreement ] are hereby
p ar ti ti oned 100% to the other party , and the Decree will so provide

. ” Ano ther section

1 N anc y ’ s brie f sta tes that Rami brought the draft agreement with hi m to court that day. See Tex. R . App. P. 38.1 (g) ( “ In a civil case, the court will accept as true the facts stated [in the appellant ’ s bri ef] unless another party co ntradic ts them

. ” ).4 stated that the ag reement super seded all prior marital property agreements b etween the parties.
The sec ond part of the MSA (Part I I) was enti tled “ Furth er Agreements

. ” As

su ggested by its title, th is part of the MSA contained additional , more specific
pr ovi sions relating to th e parties ’ property divi sion and to child custody issues

. It also specifically addressed the PEA : “ Marital Pr operty Agreement dated 4/25/19: The agreement is null and void. Neither party will seek to enforce the terms of t he Agreement. ” In June 20 20, Rami filed a motio n to divide undivided assets and, alternatively,
a motion to reopen evidence 2 because , am ong other grounds, he had not di sclosed

sev eral business entities t hat he had creat e d

. He had provided t he formation
doc u men t s for some of the entitie s to Nancy in di scovery responses two days before the hearing that resulted in the MSA, but the exist ence of others had not been
disclosed until after the M SA ’ s s igning

. Ra mi contended tha t the la ck of disclosure

w as uni n tenti o n al and that he had not yet used any of the entities

. A week later , Rami filed a second amended motion to divide undivided assets. On the same day, Nancy file d a motion to set asi de the MS A based on these and other alleg ed non disclosures or misrepresentat ions by Rami r egarding the parties ’ community pro perty
. She stated that she had d iscovered the omitted entities only by

2 The mo tion’s title indicates that it was an amended motion, but the original motion does not appear in the appellate record.5 reading the draft decree t hat Rami ’ s attorney had prepar ed. A t a September
20 20 hearing, the tr ial court den ied Nancy ’ s m otion to set as ide the MSA, but the
court order ed that the decree include the language from P art I of the MSA regarding the parties ’ representations a bout omitted property.
In October 2020, the tria l court signed the original decree

. Nancy file d a motion to modify the ju dgment , a motion to vacate t he decree , and a moti on f or ne w trial. In her new

- trial m otion and at the hearing on the motion , Nancy asserted that
Ram i had omitted from the MSA ’ s Exh ibit 1 the acco unt s rec eivables for Hospit al
Medical Management S ervices, LL C ( HMMS ), an entity that was allocated to Rami in
the MSA

. Nancy claimed th at in August 2020, after the t rial court had reopened discovery , she received dat a fro m the softwar e ser vice used by HMMS , and t hat data
was evidence that HMMS had receivables t hat Rami had not reported ; Exhibit 1 had listed multiple assets and liabilities of HMMS, but the list d id not include receiva bles

. Nancy also asserte d that the draft decree that Rami had p rovided to the trial court left

out the MSA language about omitted prope rty that the court ha d ordered included.
After a h earing, the trial court s ign ed a n order gra nt ing a new trial , setting asid e the MSA, and finding that newl y discovered evidence had come to Nancy ’ s knowledge since the MSA ’ s execution. However, the trial co urt crossed out proposed language in the order that would have found that Rami ’ s failure to d is close asse ts was fraud ulent. Accor dingly, in a manda mus proceeding, this court granted relief for Rami
and ordered the trial court to vacate the new

- trial ord er an d to reinstate the MSA

. In re6 Bouajram , No. 02

- 21

- 00072

- CV, 20 21 WL 3673856, at * 4 , * 5 (Tex. A pp.

— Fort Worth Aug. 17, 2021, ori g. proceeding ) (me m. op. ) ( noting that the trial court had crossed

out a proposed fraud finding and declining on that basis to ap ply t his court ’ s p re cedent tha t an MSA may be set aside if pro c ured by fra ud or othe r dishones t means) ; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.602 (providing that part ies are entitled to judgment on MSA that meets statute ’ s require ments)

. W hile the mandam us pr oc eeding was pending, the case w as transferred to the
467th Dist rict Court. 3 A fter this court ’ s disposition of the man da mus proceed ing, the

new trial court signe d an order vacating the new

- trial order an d reinstating both the
MSA and th e original divorce d ec ree. I n response, N ancy filed a supplemen tal motion to modify the judgment. After a hearing, t he trial cour t signed a mem orandum ruling finding that the award of property in the r einstat ed d ecree did not conform with the
MSA and that the decree should th us be corr ec ted to identify the assets awa rded to

eac h party.
The trial court th en held a sta tus hearing for the parties to address their objections to a proposed decree

— the hearing at wh ich the parties referred to Part I of
the MSA as “ the boilerpla te
. ” A t the hearing, each part y ’ s attorney told the trial court that certain ta x lan guage in the MSA should not be included in the decree because

3 B efore granting mandamus relief , we fi rst abat ed the mandamus proceeding f

or the jud ge of the 467th District C ourt to con sider the new

- t rial o rder. S ee In r e B levins , 480 S.W.3d 542, 543 (Tex. 2013) (o ri g. pro ceeding)

.7 more specific tax language elsewhere in the MSA controlled

. However, afte r the tria l court signe d the C orrected Decr ee , which le ft out the language that the attorneys for both parties h ad said s hould be omitte d , Rami ’ s attorney fi led a motion to modify the judgment to include the omitted language. The trial cour t denied the motion

. Both parties then a ppea led. Nancy ’ s Ap peal Nancy ’ s a ppella te issues are a ll based on her c ontenti on that after the p artition agreement converted some of the coup le ’ s commu nity property into s eparate property , the MSA then converted some of that se parate propert y back into

commun ity property w i thout including the statutory dis cl osure that must be provi ded
whe n co nverting separate p roperty to community property

. Nancy argue s in her first
issue that the M SA improperly div ested her of he r separate prop erty rights wi thout
disc losing t he effect s of t he agree ment
. In her s econd issue, Nan cy cont e nds tha t (1) Rami f ailed to show that she had waived her rig hts under the partition agreement
and (2) because she was no t made aware of her right to u nderstand the effects of the
MSA on her separate property , s he could not have waive d that right

. In her t hird issue, Nancy argues that even under a n MSA, a party cannot w aive a mand at ory Family Code provisi on ; thu s , the trial co urt had no discretion to render judgment on the MS A that violated the m andatory Fam ily C ode p rovision re quiring disc los ure of
the agr eemen t ’ s effects

.8 I. Nancy ’ s Argu ments and Applica ble Law Texas law presumes th at pro perty po ssessed by ei ther spou se during or on
dissoluti on of a marriage is community property , but the Family Code allows spou ses to parti tio n th eir commun ity property into sepa rate property
. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § § 3.003, 4.102. Nancy and Rami did just tha t in 2019 by exe cu ting the par tition agreement
. The P EA partitioned HMMS to Rami as his separate property ; in

exc hang e, R ami a gre ed to pay Nancy $ 8,500 a month for 144 months. T he PEA partitione d the couple ’ s ma rital residence to Nancy as her separate pr operty, an d Ra mi
agree d to be solely liable fo r paying the existing indebt edn ess on the property. Thus, at that point, as a re s u lt of the PEA , HMMS and t he marital residence would have
been no longer su bject to a trial court ’ s “ ju st and right ” division of p roper ty in the couple ’ s di vorce pro cee ding

. See Boyd v. Boy d , 67 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Tex. App

. — F ort Worth 2002, no pet .) (not ing t hat a spouse ’ s separate property is not subject to just and right di vision by trial c ourt). Additio nal ly , the PEA made Rami so lel y res ponsible
for “ any and all p end ing federal inco me tax liabili ties of the parties , ” and he agreed to
p ay any l osses or pen al t ies incurred by Nancy resulting from a “ Federal T ax Audit or

ot her litigation surro unding taxe s ow ed by the parties prior to M ay 1, 2019. ” T he PEA
furthe r stated that it could be “ waived, abandoned, modified, amended, di scharged, or
terminated onl y by a w ritten instrument signed by both parties that spec ifically
ident ifie [d] the waiver, abando nme nt, modification, amendment , disch ar ge, or termin ation. ”9 In addition to authorizing partitions of c ommunity property i nto separate property , T exa s law also allows spouses to convert their separate property into
communit y property. Te x. Fam. Co de Ann. § 4.203. Merely transf er ring a spous e ’ s separate pro perty to the name of the o ther spouse or to the name of both spouses is
in sufficien t to co nvert th e prop erty to comm unity property

. Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 4.203 (b). Like a partition agreem ent, an a gre e ment c onverting separate p roperty ( a conversion agreemen t) mu st be in wri ting. Id. Additionally, t he conversion agreement

must disclose to the affect ed pa rty the l egal effe ct of c onverting t he s eparate property to community pr operty
. Id. § § 4.203, .205 ; s ee Ro bertson v. Robertson , No. 13

- 14

- 00523

- C V, 2015 WL 7820814 , at *6 (T ex. Ap p.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( noting tha t the Family C ode requi res that a convers ion agreement include disclaimers id entify ing the consequences of the agreement )

. A conversi o n agreement is un enforce able if on e of t he parties prove s that the party did not re ceive a
fair and reasonable d isclosure of th e agreement ’ s lega l effect. Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 4 .205 (a)

. Nanc y argues that because the MSA div ide d some property that the PE A had already partitioned to her as her separate property, the MSA acted a s a conversion agreement . She further argu es that b eca use the MSA was a c onversion agreement but
did not contain the statutorily

- required disclosure abo ut its legal effect , the MSA i s

un enforceable to the extent that it affects the separate property awarded to her under

t he PEA . She co ntends that thi s is s o e ven if the MS A othe rwise co mplie d with10 Section 6.602 , a Family Code provision regarding MSAs in th e d ivorce c ontext
. T hat
sectio n provides tha t i f a n MSA meets the section ’ s requirements , “ a party is entitl ed

to ju dgment on the [MSA ] notwithst a n ding Rul e 1 1, Texas Rules of C iv il Procedure,
or another rule of law

. ” Id

. § 6.602

. As Na ncy points out , desp ite the

“ notwithstanding ” lang uage, several appellate courts have held that an MSA und er the Family Code may not c ontract around th e F amily Code ’ s mandator y v enu e statute. See , e.g. , In re Mathes , No s . 03

- 20

- 00379

- CV, 03

- 20

- 00441

- CV, 2020 WL 7063684, at
*2 (Tex. App.

— Austi n D ec. 3, 2020, orig. proceedi ng ) (mem. op .) ; In re Lovell

- Osburn , 448 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [1 4th Di st.] 2014 , orig. p ro ceeding)

. N a ncy argue s t ha t like the venue pr ovision, th e requirement to disclose a co nversion agreement ’ s legal effect is al so m andatory , an d ther e fore an MSA may n ot avoid complying wit h it . Thus, she contends , the part s of th e M SA that conflict with the
PEA are une nforc eabl e f or failing to sa tisfy th at requirement

. II. Analysis
F or purpose s of resolving Nancy ’ s appeal , we mak e three assumptions , each
l imited to this case

. First, we acce pt both parti e s ’ asser tion that the MSA is i n fact a
mediate d settlem e nt agreemen t , despit e t he suggestion in the r ecord that parts of the
agreemen t were neg otiated among the spouses and thei r a ttorneys at the courthouse

on a hearing date rather than durin g mediation

. See Lee v . Lee , 158 S.W.3d 612,
614 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wort h 2005, no p et. ) (hol di n g t hat an MSA “ neces sa rily requires mediation and a me diator, ” a nd thus a settlement agreement ent ere d in to by11 divorcing partie s without the involvement of a third

- party mediat or is not an MSA
under Family C ode Section 6.602). Secon d , we assume that Nan cy di d not waive her
issues. 4 Third, we accept Na ncy ’ s co ntention t hat the MSA i s a conversion agreem ent
. R ami argues that the MSA ’ s inclu sion of separate property i n the property
divi sion is not sufficient on its own for the MSA to c onstit ut e a conversio n a gre ement because a spouse may bargain away se p arate pr operty as pa rt of a n MS A

. 5 S ee Moore v.
Moor e , No. 01

- 11

- 00163

- CV, 2011 WL 6147771, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [1st Dist.] Dec. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op. ); Cayan v. Cayan , 38 S.W .3d 161, 166 (Tex. Ap p.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. d enied )

. How ever, we need not consider tha t argument because ev en ass uming for purposes of th is opinion that the MSA is a

4 A m ong other a rgu ments, Rami ass erts t hat by signing an agreement that negated the PEA , Nancy waived her statutory r ight to the disclosure about the legal eff ect s o f the a gr eement
. We de cline to hold that a party waives the right to mandatory dis clo sures merely by signi ng an agre ement th at omi ts them

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.205(a). Ram i also argues that the law of the c a se doctrine prevents consideratio n of Nanc y ’ s issue s, but the pr evious mandamus proceeding brought by Rami con sidered onl y w hether the dishonest

- beh avi or exce ption ap plied to make the MSA void in its entirety

. See Bouajr am , 2021 WL 3673856, at * 4

– 5

. We we re not asked to consider the effec t, if any , that Se ction s 4.203 and 4.205 had on the enforceab ili ty of some parts of the MSA

. See B riscoe v. Goodmar k C orp. , 1 02 S.W.3 d 714, 71 6 (Tex. 2003) (discussing application of law of the case doctrine).

5 Rami does n ot address the effect that the MSA ’ s revoca tion of t he PEA h as on the chara cter of the property that bec ame separate prope rty only because of the PEA

. R ami als o does n ot add res s the MSA ’ s referring to the proper ty div ided within it as community prop erty or the MSA ’ s use of the word “ partit ion ” to r efer to t he agre ement ’ s division of property. However , we need not determine wh eth er that language is suff ici ent to show tha t the MSA is a conversion agreement , as opposed to an agreement in which the parties conv eyed a way some separate property, because w e may dis pose of the a ppeal by assuming that the MSA is a conversion agreement.12 conv ersion agreement , unde r the lim ited facts of th is case, we reje ct Na ncy ’ s challenges to the agreement

. A s we discuss next , we agree with Rami that to the
extent that the MS A conver ts se parate p rope rt y to community property and di vid es it
as such , it satisfies statutory requirem ents. In this case, Nancy has not sho wn that s he
did no t receiv e a fair and rea so nable disclosure as to the MSA ’ s legal effect

. See T ex. Fam. Code Ann . § 4.2 05 (a) ( putting burde n on party r esisting enforcement of conversion agreement to show lack of fair a nd rea sonable disclosure)

. As Rami p oints out , t he MSA listed the property that it divide d and state d that

as of the agreemen t ’ s dat e , the pr opert y w ould be the separate proper ty of the sp ouse to whom it had be e n allocated

. The MSA a lso stated that for th e prop erty awarded to
Ram i as hi s sep arate pro per ty , Na ncy was divested of all r ight, title, and interest in an d to that prope rty as of the MS A ’ s d ate and th at unless otherwise provided, “ a ll income
and bonuses o f [Rami] ’ s and all income arisi ng from th [ at ] prop erty and benefits s et aside to [him] in thi s [ MSA ] ” would also be Rami ’ s s eparate property. The MSA had
the sam e provi sions reg ardin g t he prop erty that it allocat ed to Nancy

. Additionally , the MSA allocated some debts to N ancy as of the MSA ’ s date and some debts to Rami, and it provided th at Nancy would pay the debts allocate d t o her and th at Rami would pa y the debts all ocated to him. Finally, the MSA expr essly voided the PEA

— the very agree ment that partiti oned to Nancy the s eparate property that she clai ms here

. The PEA contemp lated that i t c ould be terminat ed or abandoned by a

su bsequent written agreeme nt, so long as the subs equ ent ag reement specified the13 termination or abandonment , and th e MSA did just th at
. Although the MS A does not
use the word “ conve rt ” or “ conv ersion , ” und er the speci fic facts of this c ase, the MSA pro vided a fair an d reasonable dis closure of its legal ef fec t
. Cf. Alonso v. Alvarez , 4 09 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. App.

— San A ntonio 2013, pet. denied) (upholding trial court finding that marital agreement was a conv ersion agreement under Section
4.203 even though it did not use the word “conversion” ).
N ancy arg ue s tha t Family Code Section 4.205 “ go es o ut of its wa y to define

‘ fa ir and reasonable disclosure ’ ” and that the MSA does not satisfy that standard

. She
refers to la nguage in Secti on 4.205 that , w hen included in a conver sion agr eement , creates a rebuttab le pre sum ption that the parties rece iv ed a fair and re asonable
dis clo su re. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.205 (b )

. Howeve r, Sectio n 4.205 does not
state th at the sam ple l anguage in the statute is the o nly way to provi de a fair and

re asonable disclosure. Nancy conten ds that the MSA did not inform her that it woul d
divest her of he r separate property , b ut t he MSA spe cifically advised Nancy that as of
its exec ution date, Nanc y was divested of all right, ti tle, and interes t in and to the
property that had been all ocated to Rami in the MSA

. W e hold th a t u n der t he spec ific
facts o f t his case, the parties ’ MSA provided a f air and r easonable disclosure of its legal effects as to th e parties ’ sepa rate property. Nancy relies on L achica v . Medina , 657 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. Ap p.

— E l Pas o 2022, no pet.) , and I n re Estate of Cu nningham , 39 0 S .W. 3d 685, 688 (Tex. App.

— Dallas14 2012, no pet.) , to argue that to the extent that the MSA con fli cts with the PEA, it is
unenforc eable

. Bot h cases are distinguishable.
I n L achica , the divorcing spous e s h a d exe cuted a marital pro per ty agreement under which mul tiple accounts were partitioned as the wife ’ s s eparate property
. 657 S.W.3d at 832. Later, in divorce proceedings, the cou ple e xecu t ed a settlem ent agreement

— though n ot a mediated settlement agree m ent

— that address ed the
divis ion of the couple ’ s real and pe rsonal property and shared debt s. Id. Bo th spouses subsequently r epudiated the settlement agreement. Id. at 837

. On appeal , t h e hus band complain ed that the trial cour t h ad faile d to include the pr eviou sly

- p a rti t i o ned

acc ounts in it s division of community property and ha d improperly found that the

acc ounts wer e the wife ’ s se parate p roperty
. Id. at 835

– 36. The husband asserted that
the settl emen t ag r eemen t, although rep u dia ted, had nevertheless conve rted the parti t io ned separa te pr ope r ty back into community property. Id. at 836.

The a ppellate court overruled the hu sband ’ s contentions because , eve n if a repudiated settlement agreeme nt could have t hat effe ct, t he repudiate d a greement (1) contained no l ang ua ge revo king the parties ’ pr ior p artition agreement and (2) di d
not meet the requir ements of Section 4.203 because it nev er identified the propert y being converted or specified that it was being co nver ted to co mmun ity p ro p ert y . Id. at 837. The court fu rther noted that the settlem e nt agr ee ment never even referred to any
property as “ separ ate ” or “ community

. ” Id. The MS A here presents a different15 situ ation. The MSA specifically terminat ed the PEA, and as we have d iscu ss ed, it

sa tisfies Section 4.203.
In Cunni ngham , the s pouses had u sed a fi ll

- in

- the

- blank form entitled

“ Agreement to Establ ish Right of Survivorship to Co mmunity Property between Spouses ” ; the form stated t hat its purpose was to allow th e spo uses to agre e tha t o n

t h e death of one spouse, the coup le ’ s communi ty property wou ld pa ss to the surviving spouse. 390 S.W.3d at 688. O n the form , the spouses listed on e prope rty as their communi ty pr operty. In a proceeding after the hu sband ’ s death, the t rial cou rt f

ound tha t t he agreement complied with Secti on 4.203 and had convert ed all the
h usband ’ s separate property into co m munity property

. Id. at 687. On appeal, the Da ll as Court of Appeals agreed wit h the husband ’ s s on that the
ag reement did not sati s fy Section 4 .203

. I d. at 688. The court noted th a t the agreement l isted only o ne s pe cific p roperty , s tated that its purpose was for the spouses to agree that the ir community property would be passed on the death of one s pouse to the

su rviving spouse, a nd d id not state that t he spouses we re ag reeing to co nvert th e husband ’ s separate pro per ty into communit y property
. Id. Fur ther, the wife acknowledged that th ere had been no disc losure of the effect of converting the
husband ’ s separate pro perty
. Id. at 68 8

– 8 9. Here, the MSA lis te d the prope rty a ffected by t he ag reement and informed the pa rti es that as of th e agreement ’ s date, the property all ocated to each spouse was that spouse ’ s separate pro perty and the other
spouse was d ivested of all right, title, and in te rest in and to tha t p roperty
.16 Nancy further arg ues t hat the MSA did not info rm her of its legal ef fects
because “ [t] he MSA made no reference to any community buy

- out of [he r] interest in
HMMS [,] and so she lost $1,232,500 previousl y awarded to her [in the PEA] as her
separ ate property for this interest

. ” But the MSA ma de cl ear that HMMS would
become Rami ’ s s eparate property under the agreement , that N a ncy would lose any interest in the entity , and that the PEA was revok ed

. Under the facts of this case, t he
MSA sat isfied statutory r equiremen ts a nd provided Na ncy with a f ull a nd fair
dis closure of its legal effect regarding the p roperty that had been partition ed to her
and to Rami under the PEA

. We overrule Nancy ’ s first i ssue . In Nancy ’ s se cond issue, she cha lle nge s the trial court ’ s finding th at by

execut ing the MSA, sh e had waived her right to e nforce the PEA . Under this issu e , she contends that Rami f ailed to p lead waiver as an affirmative defense and that the

rec ord does not establi sh waiver

. She as serts t hat the trial cour t ’ s finding that she
wai ved the PEA “ misses the point entirely ” because her argument “ was not for the
enforcement of the PEA bu t that the MSA was void to the exte nt it sought to con vert separate property into community property wit hout su fficient warnings re quired
und er the Famil y C ode. ” She then argues that she could not have waived her right to
understand the MSA ’ s effects when the MSA did not make her aware of that ri ght. Our disposition of Nancy ’ s fi rst issue moots this issue

. A lso moo t i s Nancy ’ s th ird issue , wh ich assert s t hat the t ri al court had no
d i scretion to render judgment on an MSA that viola ted the public polic y tha t parties17 must be fully infor med of the effect of a transfer of sep arate pro per ty to community property
. As we he ld above, th e MSA sufficiently informed Nancy of its legal effect regarding property that had been par titioned to her and Rami under the PEA. Nancy makes no argument that a conversion agreem ent that comp lie s with Section
4. 2 03 nevert heless violates public policy. Acco rdi ngl y, we overrule Nancy ’ s second
and third issues.
Ram i ’ s Appeal
In Rami ’ s sole issue, he contends that the trial cou rt er re d b y signing the
Corrected D ecre e because i t does not conform t o t he M SA. U nde r thi s issu e, he
comp la ins about tw o s e parate provis ion s of the decree.
I. T ax Liabi lity and Indemnification Language
In t he first part of Rami ’ s issue, he comp lains that the Correcte d D e cree does
not contain the MSA ’ s “ exp lic it p rovisions as to the div iding [of] the part ies ’ pre

Dec embe r 31, 2 0 19 tax liability and indemnification

. ” This argument challenges the
exclusion from the Correc ted Decree of som e tax

- liabi lity language cont ained in the
MSA

. A. Back gro und
T he MSA had two provisi ons regarding the p arties ’ fede ral t ax liab ili ties

. First,
Pa rt I of the MSA ha d a section stating that each spouse would equ ally split any income tax refund resulting from the couple ’ s taxes through the end of 2019, that
each sp ouse would be responsible f or ha lf of all the couple s ’ federal income tax18 liab ilit ies th roug h the end of 2019 , and that each spouse would hold the other party harm les s from hal f of any liabilities (the indemni fication term)

. Secon d, Part II o f t he
MSA had a section that s tated, “ Income Taxes due fo r 2018 a nd 2019: Accordi ng to IRS rules and r egul a tions ” (the IRS regulations term)

. The Corrected Decree omitted the indemnity term ; th e trial court signed the Corrected Decree aft er each part y ’ s

at to r ney told th e court that the IRS regulations term contr olled ov er the indemnity

term
. The attorneys made these re prese ntations at the st atu s hear ing at which the parties made their ob jections to the proposed corrected d ecr ee . There, the tri al c our t aske d the attorneys w hy the y had removed the ind emnifica tion term
. Rami ’ s attorney responde d that she agree d with Nancy ’ s attorney that the IRS re gulations term from
Part II was the more specific provision and p revailed o ver the indemnification te rm in
Part I.
TH E COURT: Why did all the re st of th e tax language g o? [Rami ’ s attorney] : S o in summary, J udge, there was only one line in the MSA addressing the taxes and it was only for years 2018 and 2019. When I included

— when I drafted thi s, I inc lud ed

— well, actually , I take that back. [Na ncy ’ s attor ney ] included 2020 when he sent it to me, but there were no provisio ns ma de whatsoever anywhe re for 2020 taxes, and [Na ncy ’ s attor ney] and I both agr eed to that, so we just rem oved that language

. T HE CO URT : Right. I see that , but there was language wi th regar d to income taxe s prior to 2019. Was th at accepted or deleted or what?19 [Rami ’ s attorney] : Yes, because there was

— [Na ncy ’ s attor ney] and I both agr eed that the specific langu age of the MSA [ i. e., Part II ] controls th e g ene ral language in the boilerp late [ i. e., Part I] . So the MSA itself [ Part II ] just ha d one line . I do agree with you; I would p refer to have the ful l language that we deleted. I think tha t ’ s actually the approp riate thing to do und er the circumstances. THE COURT: But the MSA has more than on e line on page 4

. [Rami ’ s attorney] : In the boilerplat e, yes. THE COURT: Oh, got cha. Okay. [Rami ’ s attorney] : Y eah, in the boilerplate. THE COURT: Got cha. [Rami ’ s attorney] : And we made a spe cif ic provision addressing tho se outside that. So , u nfort unately, I think we ’ re s ort of stuck with the specific over th e general th ing. [Emphasis added.]
I n other words, accord ing to Rami ’ s attorney , although she would have liked the
inde mnity term to be i ncl uded, the indemnity term wa s in Part I, which was “ the boilerp late, ” and the I RS regulations term was the more speci fic term. H e r reference

to Part I as “ the boilerplate ” and to Part II as “ th e M SA itself ” was some indication
that , at least in he r under sta nding , Part II contained th e terms of the MSA that the parties had ne gotiated as to the ir specific property ( and children) , wher eas Pa r t I
contained the MSA ’ s more standardized terms
. However, Rami ’ s attorney also noted
that her client nevertheless want ed the indemnity term to be in clu ded i n the decree: [Ra mi ’ s att orney] : I will s ay, Judge, that my client would like that language f rom the MSA to be incl uded with regard to the taxes. So we would ask that you make a ruling related to th e tax language as to20 whether the 2018 or 2 019 la nguage c ontrols or the whol e boiler plate controls i n this case. The trial court ruled th at the IRS regu l ation s term co ntrolled.
Af ter t he tr ial court signed the Corrected Decree , wh i ch inc luded only the IR S regulations term , Rami ’ s attorn ey filed a moti on to modify t he decree to inc lude the
indemnification term . At the hearing on the motion , his at torne y a r gued that the
indemnification term was the more specific language because the IRS regulati ons term

wa s “ incredibl y general

. ” S he further asserted t hat the indemnity term s hould co ntrol
because it a ppeared earlier in the MSA

. The trial c o urt denied the moti o n. B
. Relevant Authority When parties reach a sett lemen t agre ement, the final judgment must compl y with tha t agr eement. Glynn v. Gl yn n , 651 S.W.3d 34 8, 35 4

– 5 5 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) ( observing that a divor ce decree based on an M SA m ay adopt mechanis ms to enforce th e parties ’ a greeme nt but must not ad d t erms that significan tly alt er the MS A ’ s original ter ms ). A jud gment that impro perly removes o r ad ds material terms to a settlement agreement does not co mply with the agreement

. Chishol m v. Chisholm , 209 S. W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006)

. Cour t s d etermine materi al terms

o n a case

- by

- case bas is

. Fisch er v. CTMI, L.L.C. , 479 S. W.3d 231, 237 (T ex. 2016) ; s ee Glynn , 651 S.W.3d at 354

. We apply general contract

- interp retati on principles when constru i ng an MSA

. Loya v. Loya , 526 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex. 201 7)

. When a con tra ct is not ambiguous, the21 tr ial court mu st l ook to the c ontract ’ s language to de termine as a matter of law the parties ’ intent as expr essed in the contra ct
. Am . Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sc haefer , 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003) ; see also L oya , 526 S.W.3d a t 4 51

. We e x amine the
entire a greement t o harmonize its pr ovision s , and we conside r each provision in the
context of the whole agreem ent
. Austin Tr. Co. as Tr. o f Bob & Elizabeth Lani er De scendants Tr s . f or Robert Clayto n Lanier, Jr. v. Hou ren , 664 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Tex. 2023)

. With resp ect to p articular terms, “ a specifi c contract prov ision controls over a general one

. ” Pathfinder Oil & G as, Inc. v. Gr eat W. Dril ling, Ltd. , 574 S.W.3d 882,
88 9 (Tex. 2019) ( citing Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 876 S.W.2d 132 , 1 34 (Tex. 1994) ). Further, a n agreem ent ’ s mere referen ce to a c ertain s et of r ules does not bind t he parties to those rules, but whe n the agreement expre ssly states that a term of the
agr eement must be performed “ in acc ordance with ” a set of rules, the a gre ement inc orporates those ru les

. Tot alEnergies E&P USA , Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mex ico, LLC , 667 S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tex. 2023)

. C. Analysis
Rami argues that the two tax terms may be harm onized b ecause the IRS regul ations term “ in no way, shape, or form is in di sco rd with ” the indemnity term

. However, he do es not discuss or c ite the applicable IRS regulations

. N e vertheless, we do agree that the two ter ms may be harmonized

. The indemnity term appli es general ly to all years of the marriage throu gh th e end of 2019 and is a ge neral statement about how the parti es would handle the ir tax22 refunds and obligations for past years
. The IRS reg ulations term , on th e oth er hand, appears in the part of the MSA th at contains terms specific t o the couple ’ s chil dre n and property . Further, th e IRS regulations ter m is more spec ific in that it carv es out

two particular years of the couple ’ s inc omes taxes f or its appl ication and provide s that
for th e “ [i]ncome [ t ] axes du e ” for those two years , the parties would foll o w I RS rules
and regulations

. S ee Forbau , 8 76 S.W.2d at 133

– 34 ( noting that when a n insurance contract provision “ makes a general s tatement of coverage, and anot her provisio n specifically states the time limit for such c ove rage, the mor e specific pro vision wil l
control ” ); cf. Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings , 351 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tex. 2011) ( “ [ A] specific statuto ry provision prevails as an exception over a conflicti ng general provision ” (quoting Tex. Lottery Co m m ’ n v. First Sta te Bank of DeQ ueen , 325 S.W.3d 628, 637 (Tex . 201 0) ) )

. The IRS regulations term is m or e specific as to 2 018 and 2019 , and accordingly , to t he exten t the terms con flict, t he IRS regulati ons term governs for
th o s e two years . See P ath finder Oi l , 574 S.W. 3d at 889

. For any yea r be fore 2018, th e IRS re gulations term h as no application , but th e indemnity term does

. Rami says t ha t the indemnity te r m is more specific because it is longer and

mo re detail ed , b ut he does not c omp are the indemnity term ’ s length or detail to the
IRS re gula tions that we re incorporated into the MSA by the IRS reg ula tio ns term
. See TotalEnergies , 6 67 S.W .3d at 709

. He does n ot tell us how or if they conflict with the23 inde mn ity t erm . 6 See Tex. R. App . P. 38.1(i). Regardless, fo r the reasons we have expla ine d, t he IRS regula tions term is more speci fic as to the couple ’ s 20 18 and
2019 taxes. Nancy argues th at Rami conceded in t he trial court that the p arties intended for
the I R S reg ulations term , which his a tto rney referred to as the more specific pr ovisio n

a t th e status hear ing , to prevail ov er the i ndemnity term, which hi s attorney referred

to as “ boilerpl a te. ” We agree that t he MSA reflects the parties ’ in tent for the IRS regulati o ns term t o control with r esp ect 2018 a nd 2019 taxes , bu t t he M SA does not

r eflect an intent for the indemnity term to be ent irely omitted from the decree. The couple agreed in th e MSA that for their taxes for years other than 201 8 and 2019 , the indemnity term would apply , and the tr i a l cou rt was requir ed to en fo rce t he MSA a s

wr itten and include th e in demnity term in its decree

. 7 See Glynn , 651 S.W.3d at 355

.

6 T he record indicates tha t t he part ies ha d alread y f iled at least their 2018 tax es before the Cor rected D ecree ’ s signing , but we hav e not found more detailed informat ion about their fil ing

. Rami has not ci ted to any part of the record from whi ch we coul d gather whether the partie s filed separa tel y or jointly or any other information from wh ich we could determine which regula tions apply, and we have not found such inf ormation in our revie w of the reco rd

.
7 The Corrected Decree provides that Rami wil l be 100 percent respons ibl e fo r a l l debts and o bli gations asso ciated with the entities awarded to him, including tax obligations

. The record does not es tab lish w hether any outstanding tax liabil ities of the parties at the time of the decree we re tax es associated with an y of th ese enti ties, and neither party makes any argument regarding t his provision or argues that it con flicts with eit her the IRS regulat ions term or the indemnity term

.24 D. Waiver and Estoppe l Nancy ’ s brief makes several arguments for wh y we should not conside r Rami ’ s argument on a ppeal. First , s he asserts that quas i

- estop pe l pre vents him fr om taking a different po sition on appeal than he h ad taken in the trial court. 8 “ Quas i

- estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to ano t her ’ s disadvantage, a r ig ht inco nsistent wi th a pos iti on previously ta ken. ” Lopez v . Mun oz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P. , 22 S.W.3 d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000)

. Qu asi

- estoppel applies “ when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsiste n t with one to which he ac quiesce d, or from
wh ich he ac cepted a benefit

. ” Id. Thus , “ quas i

- estoppel f orbids a party from acce pting
the benefits of a tr ansaction and then subsequently ta k ing an inconsistent p osition to avoid corresponding obligations or eff e cts. ” Lindley v. M cKnig ht

, 349 S .W.3d 113,
13 1 (Tex . A pp.

— Fort Worth 2 011, no pet .)

. Her e, a lthou gh Rami ’ s attorney told the trial court that the IRS regulations term

was the more speci fic term and contro ll ed over the indemnity term, she also stated
that R ami wanted the indemnit y term to be in clude d in the de cree. Thus , the parties
and t he tr ial court we re all aware that whatev er position Rami ’s attorne y had taken,
Rami ’ s position was th at the decree shoul d include the indemnity term , and Rami ’ s attorney specifically asked for a ru ling on the questi on . In r uli ng on the objection , t he

8 Nancy do es not raise, and we do not conside r, the doc tri ne of invited error. See In re Mab ray , 355 S.W.3 d 1 6, 32 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st D i st.] 2010, or ig. proceeding ) (stating that wife could not complain to appellate co urt about trial court ’s enforcement of arbi tration provi sion aft er she had ask ed the cou rt to enforce it)

.25 tr ia l cou rt ’s obl i gat ion was to first attempt to determine the parties ’ inte nt from the language of the MS A

. URI, Inc. v. Kle be rg Cnty. , 543 S. W .3d 755, 76 5 (Tex. 2018 ) ( stating that “[u]nd erstanding th e context in which an agre eme nt was made is essential
in d eterm ining the pa rties ’ intent as express ed in the agreement , but i t is the parties ’ expressed intent that the court must d etermine ” (quoti n g Anglo

– Dutch Petrol. I nt ’ l, Inc. v.
Greenber g Peden, P.C. , 352 S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex . 2 011) )

. Both the parties and t he tr ial

court u n derstood that Rami was n ot acquiescing in hi s atto rney ’s position abo ut whether the i ndemnity term shoul d be included

. N ancy a rgues that this case is similar to Brooks v. Brooks , 2 57 S.W. 3d 418,
424 (Tex. A pp.

— Fort Wo rth 2008, pet. deni ed ). In that case , t he husband and wife sig ned an MSA and filed it wi th the trial court in their d ivorce suit, but over a y ea r later, their attorneys signed a letter , filed with the trial court , in which th ey stated that

“ it is a gre ed that the mediated settl emen t agree ment . . . i s void and this matter w ill be mediated agai n. ” Id

. at 420. More than a year la ter, t he case proceeded t o trial at which both spouses testified and pres ented proposed property divis ions. Id. After the t rial,
th e husban d obtained new coun se l, wh o filed a m o tion for new trial asser ting that the
MSA sh ould h ave been the basis for the tr ial co urt ’ s decree. Id. a t 421. The trial court
denied the moti o n. Id. On appeal, this court held that it would be uncons cionabl e t o allow the husband to enfo rc e the parties ’ M S A when the husband admit ted that he
had agre ed to re

- mediate and that he knew he woul d have to go to tria l if the second
mediation failed ; he presented his own proposed property div ision at trial , whi ch26 diff ere d from th e property divisio n i n th e MSA ; he n e ver objected at trial on the basis
that the w ife ’ s proposed property d ivision di ffere d from the MSA ; by t h e ti me of the hearing on the motion for new trial, one of the couple ’ s pro p erties had already been

so ld in a ccord ance with the decr ee and the proceed s had been divided e quall y ; and a judgment in accor dance wi th the MSA would disa dvanta ge the wife. Id. at 4 24. Nancy argues that in this case, accepti ng Rami ’ s change in position wou ld

“ work to [her] d isadv an tag e by making her liable for a ra f t of income tax obligations [she and Rami] ag reed in the MSA she would not bear

. ” Broo ks is distinguisha ble

. T he
husband in Brook s agreed to a second medi ation , a tr ial , and the tr ia l c our t ’ s judgment
be fore asse r t in g t he MSA ’ s e nforceab ility

. Here, Ram i consist ently asserted the
enforc eability o f the MSA, and his attorney made the tri al court aware of Rami ’ s position on the indemnity term and asked the tri al court for a ruling on the is sue . Although Nancy may or m a y n ot be disadv antage d by the inclusion of the i ndemnity
term, 9 thi s situ ation is not like Brooks

. We understand Nancy ’ s f rustration with Rami ’ s attorney ’ s taking one position before judgment and waiting until the trial cou rt has a cted on that represent a ti o n t o argue th e exact opposite. Howeve r, N ancy and the trial court knew that regardless o f
the l egal argument that his att orney made , Rami did not agree with omitt ing the

9 As note d a bove, t he parti es do not discuss the specific IRS regula tions that go ver n their 2018 and 2019 income tax es . W e need not discuss them to re solve thi s appeal , and we make no determina tion about wh ether Nancy will be di sadvantage d b y including the indemnit y t erm .27 indemnity term , and it w as the trial court ’ s duty to co nstr ue the agreement and
ha r mo n ize its terms if possible

. S ee Piranh a Partners v. Neuhof f

, 596 S .W.3d 740,
744 (Tex. 2020)

. Because of Rami ’ s disagre eme nt with omitting the term, his attorne y specifi cally asked the trial cour t to rule on the question at th e st atus hearing

. Quasi

est o pp e l d oes not ap ply. Next, Nancy argues that Rami waived his argume nt that the two tax provision s

can be harmonized

. She asserts that although Rami flip

- flopped his position on which

term was more specific an d control led, he consist ent ly arg u ed t hat on ly one provision
should be included and never argued that the two ter ms could be harmon ized

. Nancy
is correc t that Rami ’ s attorney initially agree d that the IRS regulations term was mo re specific and l ater arg ued in his motion to modify th at only the indemnity t e rm should
b e included, but the motion a lso st at ed that “ if po ssible , ” the trial c ourt “ should
harmoni ze th e terms of the contract t o give effect to all its term s ” and that the trial
court should include o n ly the indemnity term “ [ i]f the [ t rial c]ourt is u nable to
harm onize the t a x provisions

. ” Rami therefore did not waive his argument th at th e

te rms should b e harmonized if possible

. The two tax terms can be harmonized, and thus the indemnit y t erm shoul d not have been om itted f rom the decree

. W e sustain thi s part of Rami ’ s iss ue.28 I I. Val u ation Findin gs A . Backgr o und
Attach ed t o the MSA was E xh ibit 1, a spread sheet that listed the couple ’ s property and gross and net values for the property. Th at list incl uded HMMS , an

ent i ty awar ded to Rami. The list ’ s entry for most items o f pr oper ty was a single line showing the property ’ s value or liabilities , but for HMMS, the exhibit identified specific assets and liabilities : a checking account, a savings ac count, a credit ca rd , a BMW , and H MMS ’ s payroll and malpractice insura nce costs. Exhib it 1 was a s imple sprea dsheet with n o language explainin g the valuations
listed within it, but Part I of the MSA in cluded a section indicating that the value s o f

assets and liabi l ities li sted in the exhibit m ight n ot be accu rate and w ere included to illu st rat e the property divi sion : The par ties understand that the values reflected on Exhibit 1 are bein g used for the purposes of i llustrating th e division of pro per ty and that the act ual valu es of a ssets, debts, taxes, accounts[,] and ent ities may in fact be d iff erent from those re flecte d on Ex hibit l and that furt her the values reflected in Exhibit 1 may go up or down due to market fluctuations o r other condition s. Neverthe less, Pa rt I fu rther included each spous e ’ s confirmation that the sp ouse ha d

“ m ade a full and fair discl osure of all of the assets an d liabilities of the pa rties of which [ th e spou se ] is aware on Exhibi t 1 or elsewhere in this Agreeme nt. ” [Emphasis added.] For an y assets that had b een omitted fr om the exhibit , th e MSA r e q ui red the decree to pro v ide that if a ny undivided communit y assets were lat er found to have29 been intentio nally or f raudulently undisclosed by a party, those as set s were partitioned
to the o ther pa rty
. After this court granted Ram i mandamus relief a nd t he new trial court s igned
an orde r reinstat ing the ori ginal divorce dec ree , Nancy then fil ed a supplemental
moti on to modify, correct, or reform th e decree. After a heari ng, t he trial court signed a memorandum ruling in w hich the co u rt found that the awa rd of propert y in the

r einstat ed d ecree “ d [id] not c onform with the terms set fort h in the ‘ Mediated Settlement Agree ment w/att achments ’ a s signed by the part ies and attorn eys [that]
was filed w ith the Court on February 6, 2 020. ” The t rial c ourt consequently or d ered
the decr ee “ corrected to spec ifically identify the assets awarded to each party (to
include b ut not lim it ed to real property, financi al accounts, bu siness, life insuranc e

et c.) as set forth in th e ‘ MSA wi th attachments ’ sign ed by the parties. ”
At the status hearing to discuss the proposed corrected dec ree , Rami ’ s attorney obj ect ed tha t the decree should n ot list the specific assets and liabilities o f two ent it

ies
that had been allo cated to him under the MSA

— such as the BMW an d bank

accounts

— because “ g enera lly s peaking, we wouldn ’ t do that ” in a decree

. With
respec t t o the values of th ose speci fic ass ets and liabilities, Nan cy ’ s attorne y noted
tha t Rami ’ s attorn ey had ma de “ a standard objection t o [ the] i nclusion of all the
val ues of the accounts as of the date of the MSA. ” Nancy ’ s attorney then argue d that
th e doll ar amounts needed t o be incl uded because th e first trial court had ordered that
the dec ree include the l anguage from the MSA about intentionally u ndisc losed asset s30 be coming t he property of th e other spouse, and the parties would not be able to
enf orc e that language if the corr ected d ecree did not include the MSA ’ s pr operty values : [Nancy ’ s atto rney] : I belie ve that, based on you r [memorandum] rulin g and the intent of t he MSA, th at the spec ific dollar amounts need to be included; because if not, the n w e ’ re n ot able to utilize th e langu a ge that [the first trial court had ] specifical ly directed us to put in the re that talks about re presentations and omi tted propert y and wh at happens i n the eve nt th at prope rty ’ s either omitted or there wasn ’ t an accurat e d isclos ure of the value of a n asset , et cetera. THE COURT: I know in typical divor ces we would no t put bal anc es, but because of

— for this particular case, I believe t hat th e numbers are important b eca use they are set forth in the MSA . I know there ’ s conce rn about opening doors for unk nown as sets or some other matters, but I believe it ’ s appropriate to put them in in this particu lar case

. [Emphasis added.] T he trial court ’ s Cor rected Decre e included the v alues lis ted in Exhibit 1 for

some but not a ll the pr operty
. For example, the Cor rected D ecree included no value
fo r real property and a H onda Pilot a warded to Ra mi

. Howeve r, the Corre cted D ecre e did i nclude values for HMMS ’ s as set s and liabilities , the bank a ccount for another entity , a nd three other b ank account s. 10 T he pro perty division of those assets a nd
l iabil ities did not, howe ver, state that the property division was limited to the valu e listed. For example, Exhibit 1 stat ed that HMMS ’ s checking ac count had $100 ,90 9. 78 ,

10 Reg arding each entity for which the Corrected De cree list ed sp ecific assets and liabilities of th at entity , the decree stated that the e ntit y had only t hose listed assets a nd liabilities. On appeal, Rami does not cha lle nge the inclusion of that lang uage in the dec ree .31 and rather than award Rami o nly the $100, 90 9 .78 that Rami had disclosed , the
Corrected D ec ree aw arded R ami the “ JP Mo rga n Cha se Bank Checking Acco unt, account number e nding in * [ account nu mber omitted ] with a balance of $100,909. 78 a s of February 6, 2020

. ”
B
. The P arties ’ Argumen ts
Ram i make s no argument for how the trial court shou ld hav e recon ciled in the
Corrected Decree the MSA ’ s l an guage regarding the valu e s in Exhibit 1 with the
MSA ’ s language stat in g t hat each party had made a “ f u ll and fair ” disclosure of al l
their asse ts and liab i lities , and he do es not explain how the inclu sion of the property
values in th e decree did not serv e the purpose of illustrating the property division, just
as the values in the MSA had done

. Rami als o d oe s not argue that the values includ ed
in the MSA wer e inc orrect
. 11 Howe ver, he points out that the MSA state s that the
listed va lue s could be different th a n the actual values. He furt her argues that becau se the MSA said that th e values m ig h t not be accu rate and there was no othe r evidence

o f values, the tria l court ’s inclu sion of valu es in the decree was not suppo rte d by the
evidence and c ontraven ed the MSA. Nancy, on the other hand, argues tha t including the value s was nec ess ar y to effectuate the MS A an d t o illu strate the property division because , if the parties

11 In Ram i ’ s appellee ’ s brief in Nancy ’ s appeal, he chall enges her brief for failing t o cite the record to support her claim that he had pr ovided unreliab le values for the MSA , and from context, the brief app ear s to be impliedly arguing t hat the record would show that the v alues he had provi ded we re reliab le

.32 dis cover ed any asse ts or liabilities t hat had not been divi ded by the decree, th e trial
court would need to reference “ the amounts already awarded to the Partie s ” to de cide
how to d ivide the und ivi ded pr operty
. She further contends that removal o f the
valu ations wou ld “ impermissi b ly deviat e from the M SA by remov ing material terms the Parties relied upon in deciding to e nter the MS A

. ”
C
. An alys is
At the status heari ng and at th e hearing on Rami ’ s post

- judgment motion to modify, he di d not raise the sa me specific compl aint th at he now argu es on appeal

— that having the values in the decree co nflicted with the MSA

. Indeed, t he re cor d
contai ns n o ind ication th at his “ stan dard o bjection ” mentioned at the status hearing
was based on the MSA at all

. H is motion to m odify a ddressed only the tax issue and did not challenge the inclu sion of the valu ations in the decr ee. By adding t he val uat ions, the trial court was n ot maki ng a factfin ding ; it was incorporati ng and attempting to fol lo w part of the MSA , 12 a nd from the co urt ’ s

12 Rami argues in one sentence that “[t]here was no evidence admitted regarding the value of the assets as the values set fo rth in the decree were taken direc tly from Exhibit 1 attached to the MSA.” As Rami acknowledges, the trial court incorporated the figures from the MSA and did so specifically because they had been included in the MSA; the trial court was not making a factf inding. However, even if we were t o conclude that the trial court had made a factfinding by including the figures in the decree, we cannot determine whether the trial court made the finding without evidence aside from the MSA. Rami does not tell us whether any part of the voluminous record contains testimony or non

- MSA evidence presented to the trial court at any point regarding values, and he does not tell us whether any evidence was presented at hearings from which no record was made or that were not incl uded in the record. See NexPoint A dvisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV , 674 S.W.3d 437,33 h earing comment s, it apparently did so in an at tempt to effe ctuate o ther MSA terms

. Rami ’ s com plaint is that the tri al court contraven ed the MSA ’ s terms by in co rpora ting those figures b ecause the MSA stat ed that the actual figures mi ght be different , and
th us incorporat i ng the figures conflicted with the MSA , but that is a complain t that he
did not raise in the t rial co urt
. S ee Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. He the refor e did n ot preserve this a rgument for appeal. See Ricks v. Ricks , 169 S.W.3d 52 3, 5 28 (Tex. A pp.

— Dal las 2005, no p et.) ( holding that app ellant wi fe had not preserved her appellate complaint
tha t the child supp ort pa yme nt period s and injunction t e rms in the divorce decree did
not comport wi th the parti es ’ MSA w hen her motion for ne w t rial had compl ained

o nly g enerally that there were discre pancies , which she did not identify, between the
decree a nd the MSA ) ; see also Bra ntley v. Brantley , No. 14

- 1 1

- 00583

- CV,
2012 WL 727700, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14t h Di st.] Mar . 6, 2012, no pet. ) ( m em. op.) (hol ding wi fe had not pre served her complaint a bout vari ance between
MSA and di vorce decree); Murphy v. Leveille , No. 2

- 08

- 130

- CV , 20 09 WL 2619857, at
446 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2023, pet. filed) (“The appellate court has no duty to brief issues for an appellant . . . [and] we are not responsible for searching the r ecord for facts that are favorable to the appellant’s position.”); Ex parte D.K. , No. 02

- 22

- 00020

- CV, 2022 WL 15075939, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2022, pet. denied) (“[I]n the absence of a reporter’s record, we must presume that the hearing was properly conducted and that the tr ial court was presented with sufficient evidence to make its finding.”). W e know that there was at least one evidentiary hearing in the history of this proceeding, but Rami does not cite to any part of the record from that hearing in his argument

— or an y other evidentiary hearing, if there was one

— and does not mention what, if anything, was discussed at that hearing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). However, Rami’s complaint here appears to be not that the decree is not supp orted by sufficient evidence but t hat the decree deviated from the MSA.34 *2 (T ex. App

. — For t Worth Aug. 26, 2009, no pet.) ( per curiam) (mem. op.) (h oldi ng

sa me)

. We overrule the re m ainder of Rami ’ s issu e. C onclusio n Having o verruled Nancy ’ s thr ee issues , and having sustained Rami ’ s issue in
pa rt a nd overrul ed it in pa rt , we reverse the trial co urt ’ s j udgme nt only as to its
omi ssion of the indemnity tax term and affirm it in all other respects

. W e rema nd this

case to the tr ial court solely for the pur pose of rendering a d ecree that incorp orates the indemnity term in a m anner cons istent with t his opini o n . See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc , No. 09

- 20

- 00028

- CV, 2022 WL 243163, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont Jan. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (remanding case to trial court for issuance of final decree complying with parties ’ MSA)

.

/s/ Mike Wallach M ike Wa llach Justice
Delivered: December 21, 2023