J-S56034-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO S.M.H.-

G., A MINOR APPEAL OF, J.A.G.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1889 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 30, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

A2018-0015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2019

J.A.G. (Father) appeals from the decree granting the petition filed by 

L.M.R. (Mother) for the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his 

daughter, S.M.H.-G. (Child), born in May 2012, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We affirm.

The trial court summarized the background of this appeal as follow: 

3. Mother and Father were living together [at the home of Mother’s 

father (Maternal Grandfather)] when Child was born, but they 

ended their relationship in June of 2012. [Child] has continued to 

live with Mother since that time. 

4. Between December of 2012 and April of 2014, Mother and 

Father were involved in custody litigation . . . .

5. In a custody order entered by agreement and filed on April 10, 

2013 (hereafter, “2013 Custody Order"), Mother was granted sole 

physical and legal custody of [Child], with Father to 1) exercise 

therapeutic supervised visits at Catholic Charities; 2) submit to 

random urine screens once per week for six months, and 3) 
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provide Mother’s counsel with a copy of his 2012 drug and alcohol 

evaluation performed by Livengrin Counseling.

6. It is undisputed that Father completed the therapeutic 

supervised visits through Catholic Charities but did not submit to 

random urine screens as required by the 2013 Custody Order.

* * *

8. The most recent custody Order was entered by agreement and 

filed on April 29, 2014 (hereafter, “2014 Custody Order”). 

Pursuant to the 2014 Custody Order, Mother retain[ed] sole 

custody of [Child]. Father [could] have supervised custody twice 

per month using the supervision services of Jeffrey Searfoss, Rana 

Dimmig, or any other supervisor agreed upon by the parties, the 

cost of which [wa]s to be borne by Father. Father [wa]s also 

required to submit to random urine screens once per week for six 

months and to provide Mother’s counsel with a copy of his 2012 

drug and alcohol evaluation performed by Livengrin Counseling 

Center.

9. The reasons for the restrictions on Father’s visitation with the 

child were Mother’s belief that Father had an established drug and 

alcohol problem and was living in an extremely unsafe situation; 

Father admitted that his alcoholism was the reason for the urine 

screens. 

10. Father has neither attempted to modify the 2014 Custody 

Order to lift the visitation nor filed a contempt petition related to 

the 2014 Custody Order.

11. [Father] has not submitted any urine screens.

12. [Father] has not attempted to set up supervised visits with 

[Child]. He testified he must have overlooked the supervision 

requirement in the 2014 Custody Order and claimed he was 

unaware of the requirement. 

13. [Father’s] last visit with his daughter was [in May 2013]—a 

planned therapeutic supervised visit scheduled through Catholic 

Charities that took place on [Child’s] first birthday.
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14. Other than a very brief, chance encounter at an Applebee’s 

Restaurant in May [20181], has not seen or communicated with 

[Child] since her first birthday. 

15. In the past five years, he has not sent [Child] any gifts, letters, 

or cards. 

16. He has not asked for direct or indirect communication with 

[Child] through Mother, the maternal grandparents, or other 

family members or friends. 

17. He has not asked Mother, Stepfather, maternal grandparents, 

or other relatives for a report about [Child]’s health, progress, or 

education or asked them to deliver any cards, letters or gifts to 

[Child]. 

18. In over five years, Father has not attended any doctor or 

dentist visits, taken [Child] to any activities or to school, or 

attended school functions or parent teacher conferences.

19. Mother has moved several times since Mother and Father split 

up, but she has kept the same phone number.[fn3]

[fn3] Father knew Mother’s address at the time he left her in 

2012 as they had both been living [with Maternal 

Grandfather]. In 2014 Mother moved to [a different town]. 

She believes [her 2014 address] was disclosed to Father 

though court custody papers. In 2016, she moved back in 

with Maternal Grandfather . . ., bringing [Stepfather] with 

her. In 2017, Mother and Stepfather moved to [a new town 

to live with Stepfather’s mother,] and they remain in that 

home with [Child] to date. Mother admits she did not make 

Father aware of her [2016 return to Maternal Grandfather’s 

home or her move to the home of Stepfather’s mother], but 

[Mother] testified unequivocally that she remembers giving 

Father the new phone number that she has maintained since 

2013. . . . Father admitted he no longer has the last phone 

number Mother gave him, but accuses her of changing her 

number and not giving the new one to him[.]

____________________________________________

1 Father stated that during the encounter in 2018, he saw Child, said “hi” to 

Child, and then left the restaurant. N.T., 12/11/18 at 7. 
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20. Prior to the hearing, Father did not know where Mother and 

[Child] were living and had not made any attempts to discover 

their address. He was unaware whether Mother had moved from 

[Maternal Grandfather’s home, which] he shared with [Mother] 

when [Child] was born. 

21. Father has not called or texted Mother regarding [Child] since 

2014.

22. Father has not tried to contact Mother by any means since 

2016, when he attempted to reach her through a message to her 

Facebook account, even though he is aware Mother blocked him 

from Facebook.

23. Father knows where each of the maternal grandparents lives 

and how to get in contact with them, but he made no effort to do 

so as a means by which to have contact with [Child]. 

24. Mother and her family use social media, but Mother was not 

aware of any attempts by Father to contact Mother or [Child] 

through her family members’ social media.

25. Father sent a Facebook message to maternal grandfather on 

July 30, 2017, but the message did not request contact with 

Mother or [Child] or ask how [Child] was. The message states, 

“Hello . . . you have always told me actions speak louder then 

word please all i ask is you look at the body of work and i have 

become ..please.”

26. Father’s only attempt to contact Stepfather about [Child] 

occurred via Facebook after Father received notice of the 

termination hearing. 

27. Father explained that he and/or his family members have 

inconspicuously followed the social media accounts of Mother and 

her family members over the last several years in order to get 

pictures and news of [Child].

28. Father admits he was an alcoholic, was using marijuana, and 

knew that he could not pass the urine screens ordered by the 2014 

Custody Order. 

29. [Father] was on probation at the time of the hearing. His 

criminal record includes a [driving under the influence] and guilty 

pleas to nine counts of theft as well as one count of knowing and 

intentional possession of a controlled substance in 2018. 
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30. Father pays child support regularly at this time. He stopped 

making payments for a period of time in 2018 but was paying 

every two weeks at the time of the termination hearing. 

Trial Ct. Op., 5/30/19, at 2-5 (record citations and some footnotes omitted).

On March 9, 2018, Mother filed a petition for the involuntary termination 

of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). 

The trial court held a hearing on December 10 and 11, 2018, at which Mother, 

Stepfather, and Father testified.

2

By decree dated and entered on May 30, 2019, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), (2) 

and (b). Father timely filed a notice of appeal.3 

____________________________________________

2 All parties were represented by counsel. Child, who was then six years old,

was represented by legal counsel, Alfred Stirba, IV, Esquire. As such, the trial 

court complied with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 

161 A.3d 172, 174-75, 180 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (stating that, pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested involuntary 

termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who discerns and 

advocates for the child’s legal interests, defined as a child’s preferred 

outcome); In re Adoption of K.M.G., ___ A.3d ___, 2019 PA Super 281, 

2019 WL 4392506 (Sept., 13, 2019) (en banc) (holding that (1) “this Court’s 

authority is limited to raising sua sponte the issue of whether the orphan’s 

court violated Section 2313(a) by failing to appoint any counsel for the Child 

in a termination hearing,” and (2) we may not “review sua sponte whether a 

conflict existed between counsel’s representation and the child’s stated 

preference in an involuntary termination of parental rights proceeding” 

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

3 Father did not file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

concurrently with his notice of appeal in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Because no party claims prejudice, we will not quash 

or dismiss his appeal. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009);

Cf. J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904, 908 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that appellant 

waived all issues by failing to file a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal when directed by the trial court).
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On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

[1]. Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in terminating 

the parental rights of [Father] to [Child], a minor?

[2]. Whether the [trial court] erred in finding that [Mother] had 

met her burden pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (2) and 

§ 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4.

Father argues that the evidence was insufficient to terminate his 

parental rights. Specifically, Father argues that Mother prevented him from 

having a relationship with Child. Id. at 12. He emphasizes that Mother failed

to provide him with her changes of address and telephone number. Id. Father 

further notes that Mother blocked him from her Facebook account. Id. Father 

insists that “[t]hough [he] was prevented from having a physical relationship 

with [Child] he maintained child support to ensure that [Child’s] financial 

needs were met.” Id. at 16. Father relies upon In re T.L.G., 505 A.2d 628 

(Pa. Super. 1986), among other cases, to support his claim that the 

termination of his parental rights was not appropriate under the 

circumstances. See id. at 12. 

Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, which our Supreme Court 

has explained as follows.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 
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unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We have 

explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 

the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (citation omitted).
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This Court may affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights if 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a) and Section 2511(b) has been 

established. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, we initially focus on Section 2511(a)(1), which provides:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

“A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where 

the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a 

child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to the 

filing of the termination petition.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court has held,

[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties 

or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must 

engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his 

or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent 

and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of 

parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) 

(citation omitted); accord In re J.T.M., 193 A.3d 403, 409 (Pa. Super. 2018).

It is well settled that: 
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There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional 

needs. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court initially found that

[t]he last time Father ostensibly performed any parental duties 

. . . was May [of] 2013, during his last visit with [Child] at Catholic 

Charities. That was nearly five years before Mother filed the 

termination petition. Since then, other than paying child support 

for [Child], Father has not performed any parental duties. . . . 

When Mother was asked, “[W]ithin the past year, has [Father] 

done anything with regard to parenting of your child, supervising 

your child, or providing for your child?” Mother answered, “No, 

nothing at all.” Father did not dispute this testimony, although he 
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offered his own reasons for his non-involvement. Mother clearly 

and convincingly demonstrated that Father has failed to perform

parental duties for his daughter for a period much longer than six 

months.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/30/19, at 9 (record citations and footnote omitted).

Father does not dispute that aside from paying child support, he has not 

performed any parental duties since 2013. Instead, Father claims that Mother 

impeded his ability to maintain contact with Child. 

As to Father’s explanations for not remaining in contact with Child, the 

record reveals the following. Regarding Father’s failure to exercise supervised 

custody under the 2014 Custody Order, Father asserted that he was not aware 

that he could have arranged for supervised custody. N.T., 12/11/18, at 24. 

Father also maintained that Mother and the court overseeing the custody 

matter would not have allowed him to see Child. Id. at 41. At the same time, 

Father acknowledged that his continued involvement with drugs and failure to 

appear for urine screens would have prevented him from exercising custody 

of Child under the 2014 Custody Order. Id. at 42-44. 

Regarding Father’s claim that Mother blocked him on Facebook, Mother 

explained that she blocked Father after Father sent her harassing messages 

that did not relate to Child. N.T., 12/10/19, at 43. Mother further testified

that she had Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn accounts, but Father did not 

contact her using those accounts. Id. at 25. Additionally, Mother testified 

that her family was on social media, but Father did not contact them about 

Child. Id. at 24-26, 43-44. Father, in turn, testified that he contacted 
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Maternal Grandfather through Facebook in July of 2017. N.T., 12/11/18, at 

14-16, 21. However, Father did not ask about Child in that message. Id. at 

16. Rather, Father testified the purpose of his Facebook message was to show 

the Maternal Grandfather “how far I’ve come from [when I] liv[ed] with him.” 

Id. Moreover, Mother stated that her telephone number has been the same 

since before the issuance of the 2014 Custody Order, that Father knew the 

number, but that Father did not call or her text her. N.T., 12/10/18, at 19-

20, 45, 52. 

Lastly, as to Father’s assertion that Mother moved without informing 

him, Father only recently discovered Mother moved out of Maternal 

Grandfather’s home, where Father and Mother lived when Child was born. 

N.T., 12/11/18, at 25. There was no evidence that Father attempted to 

contact Child or send Child any cards or gifts to Maternal Grandfather’s home. 

Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to Father’s claim that the trial 

court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). 

The trial court properly determined that Father failed to perform his parental 

duties since 2013. See id. at 9. The trial court acknowledged that Mother 

raised some barriers to Father’s ability to maintain contact with Child. See 

id. at 10-14. However, the trial court concluded that that those barriers did 

not prevent Father from contacting Child, and that Father failed exercise 

reasonable firmness in overcoming the obstacles. See id. at 14. Following 

our review, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s findings, and we 
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find no abuse or discretion or error of law in the trial court’s determinations. 

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; see also J.T.M., 193 A.3d at 410. 

Moreover, to the extent Father relies on on T.L.G., that case is 

distinguishable. In T.L.G., the mother did not provide her most recent 

address or telephone number to the father, who lived in Texas. T.L.G., 505 

A.2d at 629-30. Nevertheless, the father in T.L.G. attempted to maintain 

contact with the children by sending gifts and money to the mother’s aunt and 

by inquiring of the aunt about the children’s needs. Id. Here, by contrast, 

Father did not use the available resources in Mother’s family to maintain 

contact with Child. Accordingly, Father’s claims merit no relief. 

As to Section 2511(b), we initially note that Father does not discuss the 

needs and welfare of Child in the argument section of his brief. While we could 

find such an issue waived for failure to present an argument or cite legal 

authority, we will address the issue. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (addressing the best interests of the child under 

Section 2511(b) sua sponte). But see M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 & n.3 

(Pa. Super. 2017). 

Section 2511(b) states: 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. 
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus of Section 2511(b) is on the 

child. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008. In reviewing the evidence in support of 

termination under Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 

485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the 

child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently 

severing the parental bond.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). Further, “in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a 

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re Adoption 

of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court found as follows:

[A]ny parental role Father played was limited to the first year of 

[Child’s] life. Since then, he has had no contact with her. 

Stepfather has taken on a parental role and is the only father 

figure [Child] knows. . . .
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Mother and Stepfather are [Child’s] primary parental 

relationships. They provide her with love, comfort, security, and 

stability. They have met all of her daily physical and emotional 

needs. Testimony adduced at the hearing established that she 

enjoys an affectionate relationship with Stepfather and that he 

already acts in the role of father to [Child]. He has been a stable 

paternal presence in her life since 2012. Continuity of that 

relationship and permanence in a stable, loving home will best 

serve [Child’s] developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare. Considering her tender years and the fact that any 

contact with Father was limited to the first year of her life, the 

[c]ourt does not believe that permanently severing the bond will 

have any negative effect on [Child], and, in fact, the bond with 

Stepfather is a bond that should be preserved. Accordingly, we 

find the termination of Father’s parental rights is in [Child’s] best 

interest so that the [c]ourt can give legal effect to the relationship 

that already exists in fact between [Child] and Stepfather.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/30/19, at 15-16 (citations omitted). 

Our review reveals that Mother’s and Stepfather’s testimony supports 

the court’s findings. Mother testified that Child has never had a relationship 

with Father, and that she knows Stepfather as her father. N.T., 12/10/18, at 

22-23. Stepfather described his relationship with Child having “no difference 

as far as whether or not I’m the biological father. . . . [Child]’s really just 

everything to me. [I have b]een there since she was four months old. And I 

think I fell in love with her before I did her mom. . . . I love her to death.” 

Id. at 57. Mother testified that it is in Child’s best interest to terminate 

Father’s parental rights “because [Child] knows my husband as her father[,] 

and he has provided for every single need that she [has] ever had since she 

was less than one year[] old. And we have established a family together; and 

she is happy, safe, and well-cared for in that family.” Id. at 23.
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Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in concluding that terminating Father’s parental rights serves the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child pursuant 

to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, we affirm the 

decree.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/19/19