IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

VICTORIA LOCKETT,

Appellant,

v.

DOUGLAS SATURNO,

Respondent.

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No. 38046-7-III

PUBLISHED OPINION

STAAB, J. — Victoria Lockett and her family were qualified for a Section 8 

Housing Voucher valued at $1043 per month. Douglas Saturno advertised a rental unit 

for $995 per month. When Ms. Lockett met Mr. Saturno to view the rental, he asked 

about her “source of income” and then told her that her voucher would not cover the 

monthly rental. Ms. Locket did not fill out a written rental application. Instead, she filed 

suit against Mr. Saturno for “source-of-income” discrimination under RCW 59.18.255. 

At summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Ms. Lockett’s complaint after concluding 

that she did not qualify as an “otherwise eligible prospective tenant” because she did not 

submit a written rental application. 

The term “prospective tenant” is defined as one who “has applied for” a rental 

unit. RCW 59.18.030(25). As a matter of first impression, we hold that the term “has 

applied for” should be given a broad definition that includes a person who requests to be 

FILED

MARCH 1, 2022 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 38046-7-III

Lockett v. Saturno

2

considered for, or expresses serious interest in a rental unit. Because Ms. Lockett meets 

this definition, she was a prospective tenant. 

Alternatively, Mr. Saturno asserts that Ms. Lockett cannot show that she was 

“otherwise eligible” because she failed to submit a written application and thus, her 

qualifications were unknown. By statute, Mr. Saturno must provide or post his eligibility 

criteria before obtaining any information about a prospective tenant. On remand, the trial 

court must determine whether Ms. Lockett is otherwise eligible based on the rental 

criteria posted by Mr. Saturno in compliance with RCW 59.l8.255(1). 

We reverse the trial court’s order on summary judgment dismissing Ms. Lockett’s 

complaint and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

We consider the following facts in a light most favorable to Victoria Lockett as the 

nonmoving party. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). 

Ms. Lockett’s household received a federal Housing Choice Voucher Program

Section 8 (voucher) valued at $1043 per month, qualifying them for a two-bedroom rental 

unit. Her household consists of Ms. Lockett, her minor child, and her partner Oliver Neal 

who is disabled and receiving SSI (supplemental security income) benefits. 

Ms. Lockett contacted Lori Sharp, a rental agent, who referred her to Douglas 

Saturno because he had a two-bedroom rental house available to lease for $995 per month 

plus utilities. Ms. Lockett set up an appointment with Mr. Saturno and met him at the 
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rental unit. As Ms. Lockett and Mr. Saturno approached the rental unit, Mr. Saturno

asked about her income and employment. Ms. Lockett told Mr. Saturno about the family 

voucher, Mr. Neal’s SSI, and their status as full-time college students. After hearing this 

information, Mr. Saturno stopped and told Ms. Lockett that “the housing voucher would 

not cover this house.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 39. He continued stating that she was free 

to look at the rental unit but seemed hesitant to allow her to enter. Once inside the house, 

Ms. Lockett asked why the housing voucher would not cover the home and whether the 

home had deficiencies. Mr. Saturno clarified that the voucher would not cover the house 

because the rent was too high. He then asked if Ms. Lockett and Mr. Neal were married. 

When Ms. Lockett responded that they were not, he told her they could not apply for the 

house on two separate vouchers. She explained to him that there was one voucher for her 

three-person family. Mr. Saturno reasserted that her voucher “would not cover the house 

either way.” CP at 40. Mr. Saturno claims that he advised them that they needed to 

make a formal application with a fee.

Ms. Lockett and her partner left the house and contacted Lori Sharp by text 

message to reassure her that they had one voucher for their family. At the same time, Mr. 

Saturno sent a message to Ms. Sharp indicating Ms. Lockett had two separate vouchers. 

The rental agent considered Ms. Lockett’s financial situation “borderline.” CP at 51.

Ms. Lockett sued Mr. Saturno for source-of-income discrimination under RCW 

59.18.255. Mr. Saturno moved to dismiss her complaint on summary judgment, asserting 
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that Ms. Lockett was not “an otherwise eligible prospective tenant” under RCW 

59.18.255(1) because she failed to submit a written application for consideration. In 

support of his motion, Mr. Saturno acknowledged that Ms. Sharp handled his tenant 

screening and applications. If an applicant was successfully screened, they could submit 

an online application. Mr. Saturno asserted that neither Ms. Lockett nor Mr. Neal were 

screened or submitted an online application for the rental unit. The screening process for 

his rental properties generally involves “various criteria” concerning criminal history 

checks, rental history, credit history, and income requirements. Mr. Saturno’s specific 

“various criteria” are not provided in the record. 

Ms. Locket responded that she did not submit a written rental application and fee 

because she believed it would have been a waste of time and money based on Mr. 

Saturno’s comments. With Mr. Neal’s disability income and Ms. Lockett working a parttime job, they claimed an ability to afford utility payments on the property. Ms. Lockett 

and Mr. Neal have never been evicted, withheld rent payments, or filed for bankruptcy. 

Mr. Neal has criminal convictions.

At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court asked one question: whether Ms. 

Lockett “agree[d] that she never did submit an application?” Report of Proceedings (RP)

at 8. Through her attorney, Ms. Lockett acknowledged that she did not submit a written 

application but argued that she began the process of the application. Ms. Lockett 

continued that she started the application process by contacting the rental agent and 
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following instructions until Mr. Saturno discouraged her. The trial court granted 

summary judgment dismissing the suit. Ms. Lockett appeals.

ANALYSIS

We review the trial court’s order on summary judgment under a de novo standard. 

Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 370. Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 

The Residential Landlord Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), ch. 59.18 RCW, governs 

the rights, responsibilities and remedies of residential landlords and tenants. Gerlach v. 

Cove Apts., LLC., 196 Wn.2d 111, 127, 471 P.3d 181 (2020). In 1973, the bulk of the 

RLTA constituted the first comprehensive landlord-tenant law reform in nearly three 

quarters of a century designed to maximize the obligations of landlords, protect tenant 

rights, and balance the bargaining positions between them in residential leasing. Silver v. 

Rudeen Mgmt. Co., 197 Wn.2d 535, 543-44, 484 P.3d 1251 (2021). In displacing several 

common law rules, the RLTA balanced power by placing affirmative duties on the 

landlord and creating interdependent obligations between the landlord and tenant. Id. at 

544. 

“The RLTA is a remedial statute that must be ‘construed liberally in order to 

accomplish the purpose for which it is enacted.’” Id. at 548 (quoting State v. Douty, 92 

Wn.2d 930, 936, 603 P.2d 373 (1979)). It creates remedies for tenants to protect tenant 
No. 38046-7-III

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interests susceptible to a landlord’s upper hand especially during times of housing 

shortages. Id. 

In 2018, the legislature amended the RLTA to include a new statute, RCW 

59.18.255, prohibiting source-of-income discrimination by landlords. LAWS OF 2018, ch.

66, § 1. The intent of the statute was “to ensur[e] housing options.” Id. Under this new 

statute, “otherwise eligible prospective tenant[s]” are protected from eight types of 

source-of-income discrimination. RCW 59.18.255. As relevant to this case, the statute 

prohibits a landlord from attempting to discourage the rental of property to a prospective 

tenant, representing that a residence is not available for inspection or rental, or otherwise 

denying or making a rental unit unavailable based on a prospective tenant’s source of 

income. RCW 59.18.255(1)(d), (g), (h). The statute also provides a civil cause of action 

for violations. RCW 59.18.255(4). 

A. PROSPECTIVE TENANT

The protections afforded by RCW 59.18.255(1) are only available to “otherwise 

eligible prospective tenant[s].” Mr. Saturno argues Ms. Lockett does not qualify as a 

“prospective tenant” because she did not submit a written rental application. The term 

“prospective tenant” is specifically defined as “a tenant or a person who has applied for

residential housing that is governed under this chapter.” RCW 59.18.030(25) (emphasis 

added). Mr. Saturno contends that the ordinary meaning of this language necessarily 

requires a person to submit a written rental application to qualify as a prospective tenant. 
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7

He continues that since Ms. Lockett never submitted a written application, she cannot 

qualify as a prospective tenant and is not protected by the statute. Ms. Lockett on the 

other hand, argues that the term “has applied for” should be construed liberally to avoid 

an absurd result and promote the purpose of the statute. 

The resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the statute. Our “fundamental 

objective in interpreting statutes ‘is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent.’”

Silver, 197 Wn.2d at 542 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC., 146 

Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). “[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the 

court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Dep’t 

of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. In order to determine the plain meaning, we consider the 

statute in context to related statutes and “other provisions of the same act in which the 

provision is found.” Id. at 10 (citing In re Estate of Lyons v. Sorenson, 83 Wn.2d 105, 

108, 515 P.2d 1293 (1973)).

The term “has applied for” is not defined within the chapter. Our first step in 

discerning its meaning is to look at the ordinary definition of the term. If a statute’s 

meaning is plain on its face, then the court gives effect to that plain meaning. Id. at 9-10. 

“Plain meaning may be gleaned ‘from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and 

related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’” Lowy 

v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wn.2d 769, 779, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology, 

146 Wn.2d at 11). A dictionary may be used to determine the ordinary meaning of an 
No. 38046-7-III

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undefined term. Seattle Hous. Auth. v. City of Seattle, 3 Wn. App. 2d 532, 538, 416 P.3d 

1280 (2018). “In giving meaning to an undefined term, we ‘consider the statute as a 

whole and provide such meaning to the term as is in harmony with other statutory 

provisions.’” Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County, 184 Wn.2d 

428, 437, 359 P.3d 753 (2015) (quoting Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wn.2d 556, 

564, 29 P.3d 709 (2001)).

The dictionary definition of the verb “has applied” does not conclusively resolve 

the issue in this case. The dictionary defines “apply” in its intransitive verb form as “to 

make an appeal or a request especially formally and often in writing and usually for 

something of benefit to oneself.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 

105 (1993). While the dictionary definition suggests a preference for a written 

application, neither the statute itself nor the ordinary definition of “apply” require an 

application to be in writing. Still, we must decide when a person has applied for or made 

a request for residential housing sufficient to recognize them as a prospective tenant. 

In considering the plain meaning, we also look to context, not only of the statute 

but the chapter as a whole. The term “prospective tenant” is also used in RCW 

59.18.257(1)(a). This statute provides that “[p]rior to obtaining any information about a 

prospective tenant, the prospective landlord shall first notify the prospective tenant in 

writing, or by posting,” the types of information that will be accessed for tenant 

screening, and the criteria that may result in a denial of the application. If a “prospective 
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tenant” is defined as one who “has applied,” and this term is read to require a written 

rental application, then RCW 59.18.257 becomes circular. We should avoid an 

interpretation that produces an absurd result. Wright v. Jeckle, 158 Wn.2d 375, 379-80, 

144 P.3d 301 (2006). The only way to avoid an absurd interpretation of RCW 59.18.257 

is to construe the term “has applied” as someone who has not yet provided any 

information about renting a residence. 

Applying a broad definition of the term “has applied” not only promotes the 

remedial purpose of the RLTA, but also avoids the circular issue created by a narrow 

definition of the term. With these interests in mind, we hold that a person “has applied 

for” a rental unit when they make a request to be considered for a rental unit or express 

serious interest in a rental unit. The request does not have to be in writing, and it can be 

made before providing any information about their qualifications as a prospective tenant. 

If the term were given a narrow meaning that required a written application in 

order to become a “prospective tenant,” then a landlord could simply circumvent the 

statutory proscriptions by refusing to provide an application, or discouraging the 

prospective tenant from submitting an application and paying an application fee. Such a 

narrow reading of the term is not required by the plain language, nor does it promote the 

legislative purpose of the chapter. 

Under this definition Ms. Lockett was a prospective tenant. She met with Mr. 

Saturno to view the rental unit and inquired about the rental terms and eligibility 
No. 38046-7-III

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requirements. This was sufficient to find that she expressed serious interest in the rental 

unit and requested to be considered for the rental unit. In this case, the trial court granted 

Mr. Saturno’s motion to dismiss after concluding that Ms. Lockett was not a “prospective 

tenant” because she had not provided a written application for the available residence. 

Having determined that a written application is not necessary in order to become a 

prospective tenant, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Lockett did 

not qualify as a prospective tenant because she did not submit a written application. 

B. OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE

In the alternative, Mr. Saturno argues that even if Ms. Lockett is a prospective 

tenant, she cannot show that she is “otherwise eligible” because he requires a written 

application to be eligible and Ms. Lockett never submitted one. The remedies under 

RCW 59.18.255 are only available to “otherwise eligible prospective tenant[s].” Whether 

Ms. Lockett was otherwise eligible is a question of fact. 

Mr. Saturno’s argument puts the cart before the horse. He is correct that we 

cannot determine if Ms. Lockett was “otherwise eligible.” But this is because the record 

does not disclose Mr. Saturno’s specific rental criteria. Under RCW 59.18.257, Mr. 

Saturno is required to post or provide in writing his rental criteria before obtaining any 

information from a prospective tenant. On remand, the trial court can determine if Ms. 

Lockett was otherwise eligible by comparing her circumstances in February 2020, when 

she met with Ms. Lockett, to the eligibility criteria that Mr. Saturno posted or provided 
No. 38046-7-III

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pursuant to RCW 59.18.257. Since Ms. Lockett’s eligibility requirements are not before 

the court, and since the trial court did not decide this question of fact, we cannot decide 

the matter on appeal. 

C. ATTORNEY FEES

Ms. Lockett requests attorney fees on appeal. Under RCW 59.18.255(4), Ms. 

Lockett will be entitled to attorney fees if she is successful in proving that Mr. Saturno 

violated the statute. While we are reversing the court’s order dismissing her complaint 

and remanding for further proceedings, we do not answer the ultimate question. If Mr. 

Saturno is found to have violated the statute, Ms. Lockett’s statutory attorney fees may 

include the fees she incurred in pursuing this appeal. 

We reverse the order on summary judgment dismissing Ms. Lockett’s complaint 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

_________________________________

Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________ _________________________________

Siddoway, J. Pennell, C.J.