alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 1614 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 1614

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                    September 15, 2010.
Whereas everyday across the ranks of Federal, State, local, and military law 
        enforcement agencies, service dogs perform a variety of functions to 
        prevent and solve crimes and to ensure the public safety;
Whereas service dogs trained to detect bombs, accelerants, and other weapons can 
        often discover these dangerous devices at airports, train stations, 
        sporting events and many other locations before they are used, 
        preventing mass casualties, and sometimes their mere presence at these 
        locations can prevent dangerous situations;
Whereas service dogs trained to detect narcotics and other contraband are used 
        at our Nation's borders and ports of entry to identify illegal drugs and 
        smuggled goods;
Whereas service dogs and their handlers perform crucial functions in special 
        operations, including crowd control, search and rescue missions, 
        locating missing persons, and tactical building entries, and these 
        service dogs often work in undesirable conditions for little more than 
        food and the affection of their handler;
Whereas service dogs can detect the presence of human remains in operations to 
        locate victims in disaster recovery operations;
Whereas service dogs are used to protect the House of Representatives and Senate 
        chambers, the White House, the Supreme Court, and many other public 
        buildings in Washington, DC, and throughout the country;
Whereas many dogs have given their lives in the performance of these duties; and
Whereas these dogs have become an integral component of modern law enforcement: 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
            (1) these dogs perform extraordinary services using their special 
        sensory and physical abilities. Their service is rendered with 
        incredible efficiency and dedication and is an important contribution to 
        the security and public safety of our Nation; and
            (2) we all owe a debt of gratitude and our sincere appreciation to 
        the loyal service performed by the law enforcement service dogs and 
        their handlers.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
Elena NOGUERO, petitioner, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 17-5985.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
Antonio Lamont RICE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 15-9255.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 3, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Charles C. WALDO, et ux., petitioners, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, et al.

No. 15-1449.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 3, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Utah denied.
Order entered October 29, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01261-CV

EX PARTE MICHEAL GEROD MCGREGOR

On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. X-13-1459-W

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s second motion for extension of time to file pro-se amended brief 

and ORDER the brief tendered to the Clerk of the Court October 26, 2015 filed as of the date of 

this order. Appellee shall file its brief no later than December 2, 2015.

/s/ CRAIG STODDART 

JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 119 (Wednesday, June 20, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 33085]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-15605]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION


Farm Credit Administration Board; Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY: Farm Credit Administration.
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the Government in the 
Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b(e)(3)), of the forthcoming special meeting 
of the Farm Credit Administration Board (Board).

DATE AND TIME: The special meeting of the Board will be held at the 
offices of the Farm Credit Administration in McLean, Virginia, on June 
21, 2001, from 9 a.m. until such time as the Board concludes its 
business.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kelly Mikel Williams, Secretary to the 
Farm Credit Administration Board, (703) 883-4025, TDD (703) 883-4444.

ADDRESSES: Farm Credit Administration, 1501 Farm Credit Drive, McLean, 
Virginia 22102-5090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This meeting of the Board will be open to 
the public (limited space available). In order to increase the 
accessibility to Board meetings, persons requiring assistance should 
make arrangements in advance. The matters to be considered at the 
meeting are:

Open Session

A. Approval of Minutes
    --May 10, 2001 (Open and Closed)
B. Reports
    --FCS Building Association's Quarterly Report
    --Report on Corporate Approvals
C. New Business--Other
    --FY 2001 Budget Reprogramming

    Dated: June 18, 2001.
Kelly Mikel Williams,
Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board.
[FR Doc. 01-15605 Filed 6-18-01; 2:20 pm]
BILLING CODE 6705-01-P
Dennis HASTY, et al., petitioners, v. Ahmer Iqbal ABBASI, et al.

No. 15-1363.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 6, 2017.

Motion of petitioners for enlargement of time for oral argument and for divided argument is granted in part and denied in part and the time is divided as follows: 20 minutes for the Acting Solicitor General on behalf of petitioners in Nos. 15-1358 and 15-1359, 10 minutes for petitioners in No. 15-1363, and 30 minutes for respondents.

Justice SOTOMAYOR and Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
1165.

#### BROWN & BIGELOW *v.*PARIAN PAINT COMPANY.

After a verdict has been rendered by a jury in a justice’s court, certiorari is available to the party dissatisfied, in all cases, irrespective of the character of the questions involved or the amount in controversy.

Certiorari, from Fulton superior court — Judge Ellis. March 21, 1908.

Argued July 3,

Decided July 31, 1908.

*Walter R. Brown,*for plaintiff. *Leonard Haas,*for defendant.

Powell, J.

A case involving issues of fact, with the amount in controversy exceeding $50, was instituted in a justice’s court. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant took the case, by certiorari, to the superior court. In that court the original plaintiff moved the court to dismiss the certiorari, on the ground that certiorari does not lie to the verdict of the jury in a justice’s court, in a case involving an issue of fact, where the amount involved exceeds $50. The court overruled the motion, and also ordered a new trial. To both of these rulings exceptions are taken.

This case falls within section 9 of the “rules to determine whether certiorari or appeal is the proper remedy,” formulated and announced by the Supreme Court in *Toole*v. *Edmondson,*104 *Ga.*784 (31 S. E. 25). To quote, “After a verdiót has been rendered on appeal in the justice’s court, certiorari is available in all cases without reference to the character of the questions involved.” This is but a paraphrasing of section 4149 of the Civil Code, which provides that “when either party is dissatisfied with *633the verdict of a jury *in any appeal case*tried in the justice courts, such party may apply for and obtain a writ of certiorari,” etc. The cases cited by the plaintiff in *error*— Ansley v. *Farley,*126 *Ga.*425 (55 S. E. 180), *Cook*v. *Exom,*125 *Ga.*450 (54 S. E. 147), and *Benton*v. *Hynes,*100 *Ga.*95 (26 S. E. 469) — refer exclusively to the rights of the losing party as to the trial before the magistrate or county judge, and not to his right in the event of an adverse verdict in the justice’s court.

To admit that the case involved a dispute of fact is to admit the right of the judge of the superior court to grant one new trial upon certiorari. *Bailey*v. *Hooks,*1 *Ga. App.*276 (57 S. E. 924); *Fair*v. *Insurance Co.,*2 *Ga. App.*376 (58 S. E. 492); *Walker*v. *Hughes,*120 *Ga.*1079 (48 S. E. 387). *Judgment affirmed.*
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

I, Robert Klein, President and Chief Financial Officer of Golden Spirit Mining
Ltd., a Delaware Corporation (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 302
of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

1.      I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended
December 31, 2004 of GOLDEN SPIRIT MINING LTD.

2.      Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3.      Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.      The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a - 14 and 15d - 14) for the registrant and we have:

        a.      designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
	material information relating to the registrant, including its
	consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
	entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is
	being prepared;

        b.      evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
	controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing
	date of this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

        c.      presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
	effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
	evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.      The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent function):

        a.      All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
	internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability
	to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
	identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
	internal controls; and

        b.      Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
	other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
	controls; and

6.      The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: April 20, 2005

  /s/ Carlton Parfitt
      --------------
     Carlton Parfitt
     Director and Chief Financial Officer
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.2

PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC.

CERTIFICATION

In connection with the periodic report of PLX Technology, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Rafael Torres, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely
for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code,
that to the best of my knowledge:



| |  |  | (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and                                                          
| |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| |  |  | (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.

|                       |                                       |                  
|---------------------- | ------------------------------------- | -----------------
|Date: November 8, 2002 | By:                                   | /s/ Rafael Torres
|                       |                                      
|                       | Rafael Torres
Chief Financial Officer
Stacy LIGGAN, petitioner, v. Michael KIRKPATRICK, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility.

No. 16-5972.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 28, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-41371

Summary Calendar

 

JAMES EARL MINIX,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, 

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:96-CV-60

- - - - - - - - - -

January 28, 1999

Before KING, Circuit Judge, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

James Earl Minix, TDCJ #551618, seeks a certificate of

appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of

his petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Minix argues that he was denied Due Process and

Equal Protection, that trial counsel was ineffective, and that

the wrong parole statute was applied to his sentence.

Since he filed his § 2254 petition prior to the enactment of
No. 97-41371

-2-

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Minix must

obtain a certificate of probable cause (CPC). Green v. Johnson,

116 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1997). To obtain a CPC, Minix

must make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. 

See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). Minix has met

this standard, and his CPC motion is GRANTED.

In his second ground for relief, Minix alleges that counsel

failed to advise him regarding parole eligibility, that counsel

gave inadequate advice about the sentence being non-aggravated,

and that counsel failed to object to an inaccurate presentence

investigation report. He made these same claims in his first and

second state habeas petitions. These claims are exhausted. 

Minix’s other two claims were not exhausted, and the district

court did not err in finding that they would be procedurally

barred. 

Since Minix filed a mixed petition with both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, Minix should be allowed the opportunity to

amend his petition by deleting the unexhausted claims. See Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). The judgment of the district

court is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the matter is

remanded to allow the district court to give Minix the

opportunity to amend his petition by deleting his unexhausted

claims and to proceed with his exhausted claims.

CPC GRANTED. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND

REMANDED.
II-00494

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Lee Hutchings <leehut@ymail.com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 4:53 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Lee Hutchings

#8 Smoke Rise Circle

Wichita Falls, TX 76306
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N
NO. 03-11-00119- CR
Alexander Chavez , Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee
F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 390 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -DC- 10- 2058 67, TH E H ONO RAB LE JULIE H . K OCUREK , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O PI N I O N Appellant Alexander Chavez has filed a motion to dismiss this appea l expressing that he no longe r desires to pursue an appea l in this case . We g rant the motion and dismiss the appea l. SeeTex. R. App. P . 42.2(a)
.

__________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief Justice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Henson Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: De cembe r 16, 2011 Do Not Publish
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Larry Shane ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-11088

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 26, 2010.

Susan Cowger, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Douglas A. Morris, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before SMITH, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Larry Shane Robinson has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Robinson has not filed a response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
James KEOWN, petitioner, v. MASSACHUSETTS.

No. 17-7519.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1715

In re: JAMES LESTER ROUDABUSH, JR., 

Petitioner. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus 

Submitted: August 25, 2016 Decided: August 29, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. 

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

James Lester Roudabush, Jr., Petitioner Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2

PER CURIAM: 

James Lester Roudabush, Jr., petitions for a writ of 

mandamus, seeking an order from this court directing the 

Secretary to the Fourth Circuit Judicial Council to rescind an 

order prohibiting Roudabush’s filing of judicial complaints 

under 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2012) without first obtaining leave of 

the Chief Judge and the Clerk of this court to file all papers 

Roudabush submits to the court pursuant to that statute. 

We conclude that Roudabush is not entitled to mandamus relief. 

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only 

in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,

426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 

509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Mandamus may not be used as a 

substitute for appeal. In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 

351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). Further, mandamus relief is available 

only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. 

In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 

1988). 

The relief sought by Roudabush is not available by way of 

mandamus because Roudabush fails to establish any clear right to 

relief from this court in the form of an order directing the 

rescission of a Judicial Council order and that the Clerk of 

this court file all papers Roudabush submits pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 351. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ 
3

of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

PETITION DENIED
Isabella RALSTON-CHARNLEY, petitioner, v. TOWN OF SOUTH PALM BEACH, FLORIDA, et al.

No. 16-6481.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 9, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
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<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,384
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<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,378
<ALLOWANCES>                                       800
<INVENTORY>                                     19,420
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                36,376
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  47,119
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,790
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