United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-1810

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Alauna Gaye Morris

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

____________

Submitted: November 16, 2018

Filed: February 8, 2019

____________

Before BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Alauna Gaye Morris conditionally pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. The

district court sentenced her to 120 months’ imprisonment. She appeals the denial of 1

The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the
her motion to suppress. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

affirms.

I.

In September 2016, Deputy Taylor of the Clay County Sheriff’s Office

(“CCSO”) stopped a recreational vehicle driven by Morris to execute an arrest

warrant. After the arrest, Deputy Taylor and another deputy impounded the RV. 

During an inventory search, they found marijuana, two glass pipes, and a digital scale. 

They did not complete the inventory, testifying it “didn’t seemreasonable to continue

searching” because parts of the RV were “inaccessible.” The next day, with a search

warrant, they found 69.5 grams of meth at her residence. The next week, with a

search warrant, they found 138 grams of meth and $9,500 in cash in the RV.

Morris moved to suppress “all evidence and ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’

obtained as a result of the unlawful seizure and search” of her RV. After a

suppression hearing, the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion. The

district court adopted the magistrate’s findings and recommendation. Morris appeals,

arguing the inventory search was unlawful. Reviewing the denial of a motion to

suppress, this court reviews “legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear

error.” United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 2014). “A credibility

determination made by a district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to

suppress is virtually unassailable on appeal.” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d

701, 701 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Honorable Kelly K.E. Mahoney, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

-2-
II.

Morris argues the government failed to prove the CCSO had a standardized

policy for impounding and inventorying vehicles. The record does not contain a copy

of the written policy because Morris objected to its admission at trial. However,

Deputy Taylor testified about it. According to him, since August 2015, the CCSO

has had a written policy about impounding and inventorying vehicles. It designates

fourtimes a deputy may impound a vehicle: (1) abandonment; (2) accident; (3) driver

arrest; or (4) traffic hazard. The policy allows, but does not require, deputies to

release a vehicle to a registered, insured driver. It is CCSO practice to release

vehicles only to drivers present at the time of the stop. 

Once impounded, the policy requires deputies to inventory a vehicle’s contents,

including the trunk, for items valued at $25 or more. Although not written in the

policy, it is CCSO practice to inventory containers if deputies believe they may have

items valued at $25 or more. The policy requires deputies to complete a full

inventory unless unreasonable to do so. 

The absence of the written policy in the record does not preclude establishing

its content. “While a written policy may be preferable, testimony can be sufficient

to establish police impoundment procedures.” United States v. Betterton, 417 F.3d

826, 830 (8th Cir. 2005). Based on Deputy Taylor’s testimony, the magistrate judge

found that Deputy Taylor: 

[D]id follow the standardized criteria outlined in the written impound

policy and the standard practices of the sheriff’s office. Deputy Taylor

was forthright when he testified. He is familiar with the practices of the

sheriff’s office, which were the same before and after the impound

policy was written. I further credit Deputy Taylor’s testimony about the

policy and practices in light of his years of service with the sheriff’s

-3-
office, his duties as a routine patrol deputy, and the fact that he

impounds vehicles several times per week. 

Adopting the magistrate’s findings, the district court added, “Regarding his

department’s policy, Taylor was unwavering that he knew that the arrest of the

vehicle driver and existence of a roadside hazard were two instances in which the

policy allows officers to impound a vehicle.” The district court did not err in finding

the CCSO had an impoundment and inventory policy.

III.

Morris next contends that either the deputies did not follow the policy or the

policy contained “impermissible, unfettered discretion.” “[A]n impoundment policy

may allow some latitude and exercise of judgment by a police officer when those

decisions are based on legitimate concerns related to the purposes of an

impoundment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The exercise of police

discretion is not prohibited “so long as that discretion is exercised according to

standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of

criminal activity.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).

The magistrate judge said:

I find that Deputy Taylor followed the sheriff’s office’s policy in

deciding to impound Defendant’s RV. Two conditions that allow for

impoundment existed in this case: the driver had been arrested and there

was no other available driver, and the RV posed a hazard. Each of these

conditions serve legitimate law enforcement functions of community

caretaking and providing for public safety.

This finding was not clear error.

-4-
Morris argues the deputies should have allowed her husband to pick up the

vehicle rather than impounding it. However, “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment

requires a police department to allow an arrested person to arrange for another person

to pick up his car to avoid impoundment and inventory.” United States v. Agofsky,

20 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 1994). “Police may take protective custody of a vehicle

when they have arrested its occupants, even if it is lawfully parked and poses no

public safety hazard.” United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1163 (8thCir. 2013). 

While the deputies could have allowed Morris’s husband to pick up the RV, they

were not required to do so. The district court did not err in finding that “[g]iven the

fact that Morris was arrested alone in a rural area, Taylor’s decision to use his

discretion to impound the vehicle was legitimate and reasonable.” 

The district court also did not err in finding the deputiesfollowed the inventory

policy without “impermissible, unfettered discretion.” “Inventory searches are one

ofthe well-defined exceptions to the warrantrequirement ofthe Fourth Amendment.”

United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 454 (8thCir. 2011). “[I]nventory procedures

serve to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure

against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from

danger.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. “The search must be reasonable in light of the

totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Beal, 430 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.

2005).

Once impounded, the policy requires deputies to inventory the contents of the

vehicle, including its trunk, for items valued at $25 or more. Consistent with the

policy, two deputies inventoried the RV, compiling a list of items. During the

inventory, they found marijuana and pipes in a closed sunglasses case, and a digital

scale in a purse. Morris believesthe inventory wasimproper because the policy does

not address closed containers. This belief has no merit. Because the policy required

an inventory of the entire vehicle, it was reasonable for the deputies to open

containers believed to have items valued at $25 or more. See United States v.

-5-
Wallace, 102 F.3d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a “policy requiring

inventory of the contents of a vehicle and any containers therein covers inventory of

locked trunks”); United States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87, 92 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Allowing

an officer to exercise his judgment based on concerns related to the objectives of an

inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). As the magistrate judge

found, “the deputies acted reasonably in looking inside Defendant’s purse and the

glasses case as both items could have likely contained items worth more than

$25.00.” The district court did not err in finding the inventory search complied with

policy and was not unlawful.

The decision to terminate the inventory also complied with policy. As Deputy

Taylor testified, the deputies “completed the inventory to the best of our ability.” 

They terminated it not because they wanted to “apply for a search warrant,” but

because the back of the RV was a small, confined space, inaccessible due to the

thorny plants, which Morris had described as “exotic.” Rather than risk damaging the

plants, they decided not to proceed. The magistrate judge found this testimony

credible and “in line with the sheriff’s office’s inventory policy.” This was not clear

error.

The district court did not err in finding the deputies followed policy, reasonably

exercising their discretion, when necessary, in impounding and inventorying the

vehicle.

IV.

Morris maintains the district court erred in finding that “following a

standardized policy excused the improper motive and subsequent search.” “The

police are not precluded from conducting inventory searches when they lawfully

impound the vehicle of an individual that they also happen to suspect is involved in

illegal activity.” United States v. Harris, 795 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2015). “Rather,

-6-
when police are conducting inventory searches according to such standardized

policies, they may keep their eyes open for potentially incriminating items that they

might discover in the course of an inventory search, as long as their sole purpose is

not to investigate a crime.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The search of

a vehicle to inventory its contents must nevertheless be reasonable under the totality

of the circumstances, and may not be ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in order to

discover incriminating evidence.’” United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8th

Cir. 2011), quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (internal citation omitted). 

“The reasonableness requirement is met when an inventory search is conducted

according to standardized police procedures, which generally remove the inference

that the police have used inventory searches as a purposeful and general means of

discovering evidence of a crime.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if

police fail to adhere to standardized procedures, the search is nevertheless reasonable

provided it is not a pretext for an investigatory search.” Id. at 465.

The policy required the deputies to inventory all items valued at $25 or more. 

During the inventory, the deputies found incriminating evidence. Their suspicion

Morris was engaged in criminal activity does not establish that the sole purpose of the

search was investigative. See United States v. Pappas, 452 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.

2006) (“A valid traffic stop cannot be challenged, as Pappas alleges here, on the basis

that the stop was actually a pretext for an investigation of another crime.”). The

district court did not err in finding that “Taylor was well within his department’s

policy to impound the vehicle for legitimate non-investigatory reasons.” 

* * * * * * * 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

-7-