NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 220254-U

Order filed May 25, 2023

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

TERRENCE ROUNDTREE, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

Kankakee County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-22-0254 

Circuit No. 20-CF-189 

Honorable 

Kathy S. Bradshaw-Elliott, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hettel and Davenport concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Counsel was not ineffective as defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

¶ 2 Defendant, Terrence Roundtree, appeals his conviction, arguing his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue that delays before trial were not attributable to defendant and failing 

to move for dismissal based on a violation of defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial. We 

affirm. 
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In March 2020, defendant was charged by information with aggravated discharge of a 

firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2020)) and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-

1.6(a)(1)(3)(A-5)). He was arrested on May 26, 2020. Defendant remained in custody from the 

date of his arrest until his bench trial on January 5, 2022. 

¶ 5 Pertinent to this appeal are the following court dates: Defendant first appeared in court on 

May 27, 2020, where the court set the case for a preliminary hearing on June 18, 2020. The case 

was originally set for a bench trial on September 27, 2021. The State and counsel for defendant 

appeared in court on that morning and noted that the case was set for bench trial that afternoon. 

Defense counsel never stated that he was ready to proceed to trial. However, the State requested a 

continuance as a witness may not be present. The State provided that they could wait until the 

afternoon to see if the witness appeared in court. Defense counsel requested that a new date be set 

and did not object to the continuance. The trial was rescheduled for December 2, 2021. 

¶ 6 On December 2, 2021, defense counsel stated that he was not ready for trial as the State 

had provided additional discovery materials that morning. Counsel stated that the discovery was 

given to the attorney that was representing defendant previously, but defendant’s current counsel 

had not received it until that morning. The State stated that they would only be using the ballistics 

match at trial. Defense counsel stated, “if the previous lawyer had given me the other discovery 

that the State is going to use, I would have been ready.” The court asked which party was 

responsible for the continuance, for purposes of speedy trial, but neither the State nor defense 

counsel responded. 

¶ 7 After a bench trial on January 5, 2022, the court found defendant guilty of both counts. 

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial but did not raise any issue regarding defendant’s right to 
3 

a speedy trial. The court denied the motion. The two counts merged, and defendant was sentenced 

to four years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm. 

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that two delays 

prior to trial were not attributable to defendant: (1) the 23-day delay between his arrest and his 

preliminary hearing, and (2) the 100-day delay between the initial trial date of September 27, 2021, 

and the actual trial date of January 5, 2022. Further, defendant argues that, since this 123-day delay 

exceeded the statutory 120-day speedy trial limit, counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds.

¶ 10 A defendant in Illinois has both a constitutional and a statutory right to a speedy trial. 

People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006). The statutory right to a speedy trial is found in 

section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2020)). 

Section 103-5(a) states, inter alia, “Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense 

shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken 

into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***.” Id. § 103-5(a). The 120-day period 

begins to run automatically if a defendant remains in custody pending trial. People v. Wooddell, 

219 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (2006). Anyone not tried in accordance with section 103-5(a) “shall be 

discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.” 725 ILCS 

5/103-5(d) (West 2020). 

¶ 11 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that 

his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. People v. 

Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65 (2010). “Counsel’s failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot 

establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if there is no lawful basis for raising a 
4 

speedy-trial objection. [Citation.] Accordingly, we must first determine whether defendant’s right 

to a speedy trial was violated.” Id.

¶ 12 The first delay defendant argues should not be attributable to him, and thus, should have 

begun the speedy trial clock was the 23-day period from May 26, 2020, until June 18, 2020, when 

the court sua sponte delayed the preliminary hearing. At that time, the COVID-19 pandemic was 

in full swing. In response to the pandemic, our supreme court entered an order allowing circuit 

courts to continue trials due to COVID-19 and provided that “such continuances shall be excluded 

from speedy trial computations contained in section 103-5 of the Code *** [citation] and section 

5-601 of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act [citation]. Statutory time restrictions in section 103-5 of 

the Code *** and section 5-601 of the Juvenile Court Act shall be tolled until further order of this 

Court.” Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. May 20, 2020). This order was in effect until October 1, 2021. 

See Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. June 30, 2021). The Twenty-First Judicial Circuit thus issued 

administrative orders to this effect. See 21st Judicial Cir. Ct. Adm. Order 2020-17 (Apr. 29, 2020); 

21st Judicial Cir. Ct. Adm. Order 2020-20 (May 28, 2020). Under the orders, circuit judges were 

authorized to continue criminal cases and such continuances would be excluded from speedy trial 

computations. See 21st Judicial Cir. Ct. Adm. Order 2020-17 (Apr. 29, 2020); 21st Judicial Cir. 

Ct. Adm. Order 2020-20 (May 28, 2020).

¶ 13 As these orders were in effect at the time defendant was arrested, the 23-day continuance 

of defendant’s preliminary hearing did not count toward the 120-day speedy trial computation. See 

People v. Ballard, 2022 IL App (1st) 210762, ¶ 38. While defendant argues the supreme court’s 

administrative orders tolling the speedy trial term were unconstitutional, our supreme court has 

recently considered the issue and determined that the COVID-19 orders were constitutional and 

upheld their application to toll a defendant’s statutory speedy trial right in a similar context. See 
5 

People v. Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092, ¶ 3. Defendant makes no other arguments to preclude the 

application of the COVID-19 orders and has, therefore, forfeited any additional arguments in 

response to this finding. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are 

forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).

¶ 14 Second, defendant argues the 100-day delay between the initial trial date of September 27, 

2021, and the actual trial date of January 5, 2022, should not have been attributable to him. We 

disagree. Section 103-5 of the Code expressly states that “[d]elay shall be considered to be agreed 

to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or 

an oral demand for trial on the record.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020). The onus is on the 

defendant to take affirmative action. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391-92. 

¶ 15 On September 27, 2021, defense counsel did not object to the State’s request for a 

continuance and, in fact, asked that a new trial date be set instead of waiting until the afternoon to 

see if the State’s witness appeared for trial. While defendant argues that counsel should have 

objected to the continuance, there is no indication in the record that defense counsel was ready to 

proceed to trial that day. As such, we cannot say that counsel’s decision not to object amounted to 

deficient performance. Moreover, on December 2, 2021, defense counsel specifically asked for a 

continuance based on discovery it had just received that morning. Defendant argues that this 

continuance should be attributed to the State for providing last minute discovery. However, the 

record shows that the State had provided this discovery to defendant’s previous attorney. The onus 

was on defense counsel, not the State, to confirm that he had received all previous discovery from 

prior counsel.
6 

¶ 16 Because none of the delays argued by defendant were attributable to the State, defendant’s 

speedy trial rights were not violated and counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue such a 

violation in the circuit court. 

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed. 

¶ 19 Affirmed.