* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation
.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/9/97 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ELIZABETH KILLEN, HEIDI KILLEN, HOLLY KILLEN, by their guardian ad litem, Crit Killen; CRIT KILLEN and CAROL KILLEN, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. REED & CARNICK, a New Jersey corporation and THE BLOCK DRUG COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation, Defendants-Appellees. No. 95-4196 (D.C. No. 94-CV-1035) (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, ** District Judge.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. When plaintiffs failed to comply with a court orderto supply final expert witness reports by November 1, 1995, the district c ourt dismissed their tort suit against defendants with prejudice. Plaintiffs appe al this order, arguing that the district court failed to apply the factors set out in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds , 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992), and contending thattheir action was meritorious even without expert testimony. We review the imposi tion of sanctions for abuse of discretion, see Mobley v. McCormick , 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994), and affirm. The essence of plaintiffs’ first argument is that the district court erred by not making express findings on the record which con sidered the Ehrenhaus factors. This point is without merit. In their me morandum of points and authorities in support of dismissal with prejudice, defendants argued the application of the Ehrenhaus factors to the facts of the case. Appellants’ App
. Vol. I at 164-68. In its order dismissing plaintif fs’ case, the district court stated: The court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion andto dismiss this case with prejudice is based on each of the re asons aptly rehearsed and stated in defendants’ Memorandum of P oints and-3-

Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Case Without Prejudice and in Support of Dismissal with Prejudice. Id. at 320. This reference by the court to the applic ation of the law in defendants’ brief is sufficient to comply with the district cou rt’s duty to apply Ehrenhaus when considering a motion to dismiss. Nothing prod uctive would be achieved by requiring the district court to reiterate reasoning in the record which was agreed with by the court and known to plaintiffs. Further, the dismissal of this case with prejudice is amply supported under the Ehrenhaus factors. Plaintiffs concede they were warned by t he court that their case would be dismissed if they failed to meet the November 1 deadline. It is clear from the record that plaintiffs filed their c omplaint without having consulted any expert regarding causation, see Appellants’ App. Vol. I at 194-98, and allowed weeks to lapse as deadlines came and went w ithout nailing down expert services, see Appellants’ App. Vol. I at 230-33. None of this i nattention to detail and schedules can be deemed inadvertent. The incre ase in time and attorney’s fees occasioned by plaintiffs’ dilatory behavior wa s clearly prejudicial to defendants. See Ehrenhaus , 965 F.2d at 921 (recognizing that delay and mount ing attorney’s fees can constitute prejudice). Plainti ffs’ willful failure to comply with the orders of the district court “flouted the court ’s authority,” see id. , and interfered with the judicial process. And finally, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the district court did consider sanctions short of dismissal. See Appellants’ App.-4-

Vol. I at 218-20. Under these circumstances, the d istrict court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ case with prej udice. Plaintiffs’ final argument regarding their ability to prosecute some of their claims without the aid of an expert is raised for t he first time on appeal and, because there are no extraordinary circumstances pr esent here, we will not entertain it. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). Defendants’ motion to strike nonrecord matter is GRANTED. The judgment of the United States District Court for th e District of Utah is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge