1 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont 

__________________ 

NO. 09-21-00168-CR 

NO. 09-21-00169-CR 

NO. 09-21-00170-CR 

__________________ 

LAWRENCE ISERAL HUBERT, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 253rd District Court 

Liberty County, Texas 

Trial Cause Nos. CR34877, CR34892CT1 and CR34892CT2 

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 A jury convicted appellant Lawrence Iseral Hubert of evading arrest or 

detention with a previous conviction and of two charges of unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a felon. In four issues on appeal, Hubert challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence, admission of evidence, and the trial court’s decision to grant two of the 

State’s challenges for cause. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

 
2 

THE EVIDENCE 

 K.A.1 testified that she called 9-1-1 because her neighbor, Hubert, pointed a 

gun at her and her friends while they were sitting in her grandmother’s backyard. 

K.A. described the gun as black, automatic and bigger than a handgun. K.A. testified 

that the gun she saw Hubert holding matched the photographs of the guns depicted 

in State’s Exhibits 9 and 13, which was later identified as the Kel-Tec SUB2000 9-

millimeter carbine. 

 Lieutenant Michael Shane Burleigh of the Dayton Police Department testified 

that he was called out to assist with a possible barricaded subject, and when he 

arrived, patrol officers had a perimeter set up around Hubert’s house and were 

searching for Hubert. Burleigh explained that the call indicated that weapons may 

have been involved. Burleigh testified that Hubert’s car was at his house, but they 

did not locate Hubert. Burleigh explained that a warrant was issued for Hubert’s 

arrest and Sergeant Brian Chowns was the affiant, and when the police located 

Hubert the next day, Hubert ran. Burleigh testified that when he arrived at the scene, 

Hubert had already been arrested based on the warrant, and Burleigh located a 

Springfield Armory XD black handgun in the grass a couple hundred yards from 

1

To protect the privacy of the State’s witnesses who testified at Hubert’s trial, 

we identify them by their initials. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims 

“the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and 

privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). 
3 

Hubert’s house. Burleigh also recovered a white cloth bag that appeared to be a 

pillowcase with a Kel-Tec SUB2000 9-millimieter carbine which “folds out into a 

larger legal size rifle.” According to Burleigh, Hubert did not live on the plot of land 

where he recovered the Springfield Armory XD handgun and the Kel-Tec 9-

millimeter. 

 Chowns of the Dayton Police Department explained that he was called out 

due to a suspicious subject that he determined was Hubert, and after receiving 

information from K.A. and two others, Chowns started an investigation for a felon 

in possession of a firearm. Chowns testified that he applied to get an arrest warrant 

for Hubert and that the affidavit contains his signature, and based on the arrest 

warrant, officers arrested Hubert the next day with firearms in his possession. 

 Hubert’s counsel complained that Hubert’s arrest was unlawful, and the 

warrant was invalid because Chowns’s affidavit supporting the warrant was 

insufficient because it failed to provide the magistrate with information regarding 

the witnesses’ credibility and reliability. Hubert’s counsel argued the evidence 

obtained due to Hubert’s arrest is inadmissible. 

 The trial court admitted the Warrant of Arrest for Hubert for the offense of 

possession of a firearm by a felon and a copy of Chowns’s probable cause affidavit. 

In his affidavit, Chowns averred that the complainant contacted the police after 

Hubert pointed a weapon at the complainant, and four witnesses to the incident all 
4 

advised they observed Hubert with an assault style rifle and a pistol. Chowns further 

averred that Hubert’s criminal history revealed felony convictions for aggravated 

assault against a public servant, evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, and 

possession of a controlled substance. The trial court found that the affidavit was 

sufficient because it was based on four witnesses and the complainant’s 9-1-1 call. 

Trooper Christopher Richmond of the Texas Department of Public Safety 

testified that when he assisted with the arrest warrant, he observed Hubert carrying 

a white bag, which appeared to be a pillowcase. Richmond testified that when Hubert 

spotted him in his marked patrol unit, Hubert changed directions and ran. The trial 

court admitted a video taken from Richmond’s body camera showing Richmond 

running after Hubert and the recovery of the white bag Hubert was carrying. 

Richmond testified that the white bag contained a firearm that was “some type of 

machine rifle mechanism.” Richmond explained they also recovered a Springfield 

XD 40-caliber handgun at the scene. The video shows that the Springfield XD 40-

caliber handgun was found in plain view in the grass a few feet from the white 

pillowcase. The video also shows another Trooper stating that Hubert had the 

Springfield XD 40-caliber handgun in his hand when he was running. 

Investigator Ivan Pearce of the Liberty County District Attorney’s Office 

testified that he is an expert in examining inked fingerprints. Pearce testified that he 

obtained a fingerprint card from Hubert, compared the inked fingerprints on the card 
5 

to the fingerprints on State’s Exhibit 16, a judgment of conviction for the state jail 

felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, and determined Hubert’s 

fingerprints matched the fingerprints on State’s Exhibit 16. Pearce also testified that 

Hubert’s fingerprints matched the fingerprints on State’s Exhibit 18, a judgment of 

conviction for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, a state jail felony. Pearce 

explained other identifying information linked Hubert to State’s Exhibits 16 and 18. 

Sergeant Eric Ibarra of the Dayton Police Department testified that his dash 

camera on his marked patrol vehicle captured his attempt to apprehend Hubert 

because there was a warrant for his arrest. Ibarra explained that he observed Hubert 

carrying either a towel or pillowcase. Ibarra testified that he was in full uniform and 

had activated his lights and sirens when Hubert ran, and after he and other agencies 

searched for over an hour, Hubert was arrested. Ibarra testified that he collected 

evidence at the scene of Hubert’s arrest, which included the white pillowcase Ibarra 

observed in Hubert’s hand, magazines, the Springfield Armory XD 40-caliber 

handgun, the Kel-Tec 9-millimeter, ammunition, and marijuana. Ibarra also 

explained that Hubert was not arrested at his house, and Hubert did not live at the 

location where he was arrested. 

At the close of the State’s evidence, Hubert’s counsel reurged the trial court 

to find that Chowns’s affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and to instruct 

the jury to disregard all evidence obtained due to the warrant. The trial court 
6 

reiterated that it found the arrest warrant sufficient, and the trial court noted that prior 

to being arrested on the warrant, Hubert committed the three felony offenses at issue 

in the officers’ presence before any arrest or detention was effectuated. The trial 

court denied Hubert’s motion for a directed verdict in all three cases. 

 The jury found Hubert guilty of evading arrest or detention with a previous 

conviction and of two charges of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The 

trial court conducted a punishment hearing, during which the jury heard evidence of 

Hubert’s prior felony convictions for aggravated assault on a public servant, 

aggravated robbery, and possession of a controlled substance. In trial cause number 

CR34877, the jury found the habitual paragraph in the indictment to be true and 

assessed punishment at two years of confinement for evading arrest or detention with 

a previous conviction. In trial cause numbers CR34892CT1 and CR34892CT2, the 

jury found enhancement allegations A and B and habitual allegation C to be true and 

assessed punishment at thirty years of confinement for each count of unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a felon. 

ANALYSIS 

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 

 In issue one, Hubert complains that the trial court erred by admitting the 

firearms seized upon his arrest because Chowns’s affidavit supporting the arrest 
7 

warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause.2

 According to Hubert, 

Chowns’s affidavit was insufficient because it failed to name the informants or 

establish their credibility and the reliability of their information. Hubert argues 

Chowns’s affidavit only provided unsupported, conclusory statements that failed to 

provide the magistrate with sufficient information to support an independent 

judgment that probable cause existed and there was no basis established at trial for 

a lawful warrantless arrest. 

 We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. See Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A 

trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies “outside the zone of reasonable 

disagreement.” See id. (quoting Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005)). “An arrest warrant affidavit must provide the magistrate with 

‘sufficient information to support an independent determination that probable cause 

exists to believe that probable cause exists for the warrant.’” McFarland v. State, 

928 S.W.2d 482, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 

Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also State v. 

2

Ordinarily, we would address issues three and four first because, if sustained, 

they would result in rendition of a judgment of acquittal. See Price v. State, 502 

S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); see also Tex. R. 

App. P. 47.1. However, we will address issue one first because Hubert argues that 

we must not consider evidence of the firearms seized upon his arrest because 

Chowns’s affidavit supporting the arrest warrant was insufficient to establish 

probable cause and there was no independent basis established for his arrest. 
8 

Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 353, 360-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The test is whether 

a reasonable reading by the magistrate would lead to the conclusion that the four 

corners of the affidavit provide a “substantial basis” for issuing the warrant. Duarte, 

389 S.W.3d at 354 (citation omitted); Valadez v. State, 476 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d). We will uphold the magistrate’s probable 

cause determination so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause existed. Valadez, 476 S.W.3d at 670. We analyze the affidavit 

with common sense, recognizing that the magistrate may draw reasonable inferences 

from the facts and circumstances contained within the four corners of the affidavit. 

See id. 

Information in an affidavit supporting an arrest may be based on either the 

affiant’s personal knowledge or on hearsay information. Id. The reliability of the 

affiant and his sources are part of the “totality of the circumstances” that the 

magistrate should evaluate in determining probable cause. State v. Coker, 406 

S.W.3d 392, 395–96 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted). 

However, where an eyewitness to the offense is the direct source of the information 

conveyed to the magistrate via a police officer, corroborative facts and other indicia 

of reliability are unnecessary. White v. State, 746 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1985, no pet.). The affidavit is sufficient if the information given by an 

unnamed eyewitness adequately suggests direct knowledge on his or her part. See 
9 

Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 894 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d); see also

Valadez, 476 S.W.3d at 670. 

Hubert argues that Chowns’s affidavit was conclusory and insufficient 

because it failed to name the informants or establish their credibility and the 

reliability of their information. In his affidavit, Chowns averred that the complainant 

called the police to report that Hubert was walking around with a firearm that he 

pointed in the complainant’s direction and that Hubert had commented that he was 

going to kill someone. Chowns further averred that there were four witnesses to the 

incident who observed Hubert with an assault style rifle and pistol. In viewing the 

totality of the circumstances in a common sense and realistic manner, we conclude 

the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed to issue 

the arrest warrant against Hubert. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354. We further 

conclude that Chowns’s affidavit is sufficient and did not require corroborative facts 

and other indicia of reliability because the unnamed complainant and other witnesses 

who provided the information were eyewitnesses who had direct knowledge of the 

incident. See Valadez, 476 S.W.3d at 670; Belton, 900 S.W.2d at 894; White, 746 

S.W.2d at 778. Accordingly, Hubert’s complaint that the trial court erred by 

admitting the firearms seized upon his arrest because Chowns’s affidavit was 

insufficient to establish probable cause is without merit. We overrule issue one. 
10 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 In issue three, Hubert argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon because the evidence did 

not establish that he possessed the Springfield Armory XD 40-caliber handgun. In 

issue four, Hubert argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction 

for evading arrest or detention with a previous conviction because the State failed to 

establish that Ibarra had a lawful basis to arrest or detain him. 

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder 

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the ultimate authority on the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Penegraph v. State, 623 

S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). An appellate court may not 

sit as a thirteenth juror and substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by 

reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 

735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. A reviewing 

court must give full deference to the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts 

in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 
11 

basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citation omitted). If the 

record contains conflicting inferences, we must presume the jury resolved such facts 

in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 

n.13; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In addition, we 

“determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the 

combined and cumulative force of all evidence when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the verdict.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17. We treat direct and 

circumstantial evidence equally. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. 

To establish unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must prove 

that a person who has been convicted of a felony possessed a firearm after (1) 

conviction and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or 

supervision following conviction of the felony, whichever is later; or (2) the period 

described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the 

person lives. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04(a). A separate statute defines 

“[p]ossession.” See id. § 1.07(a)(39). The State can prove the defendant knowingly 

or intentionally possessed a firearm by introducing either direct or circumstantial 

evidence to establish the defendant (1) exercised care, custody, or control of the 

firearm, (2) was conscious of his connection with the firearm, and (3) possessed the 

firearm knowingly or intentionally. See id.; Greer v. State, 436 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2014, no pet.). While the State can meet its burden with direct or 
12 

circumstantial evidence, the evidence before the jury must establish the defendant’s 

connection to the firearm was more than fortuitous. See Greer, 436 S.W.3d at 5 

(citing Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). 

When the evidence before the jury does not establish the defendant had the 

firearm on his person or that he had exclusive possession of the gun, the evidence in 

trial must affirmatively link the defendant to the gun. See Barlow v. State, 586 

S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, pet. ref’d); Jones v. State, 338 S.W.3d 

725, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011 (op. on reh’g), aff’d, 364 S.W.3d 

854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The affirmative links must show either that the 

defendant voluntarily possessed the gun or that he “‘was conscious of his connection 

with the weapon and knew what it was.’” Stout v. State, 426 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (quoting Jones, 338 S.W.3d at 742). The 

“affirmative links” requirement is designed to protect an innocent bystander from 

being convicted based solely upon the fact the evidence was established the 

defendant was seen near another person’s gun. Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 

594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405-06 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). 

To determine whether the evidence admitted in the trial sufficiently 

established affirmative links between the defendant and the firearm, courts look to 

the following non-exclusive factors: (1) was the firearm in plain view; (2) was the 
13 

firearm found near the defendant in a location where the defendant could have easily 

accessed the weapon; (3) was the firearm found on the defendant; (4) did the 

defendant attempt to flee; (5) did the defendant’s conduct indicate his consciousness 

of guilt, including the extreme nervousness or furtive gestures; (6) did the defendant 

have any special relationship or connection to the firearm; (7) was the place where 

the firearm was found enclosed; and (8) did the defendant’s affirmative statements 

connect him to the firearm, including incriminating statements made by the 

defendant when arrested. Stout, 426 S.W.3d at 218 (citing James v. State, 264 

S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d)). While courts 

use the above non-exclusive factors to examine whether the evidence affirmatively 

links the defendant to the firearm, “[t]he absence of various links” is not dispositive 

but may be weighed with other links that are present. Swapsy v. State, 562 S.W.3d 

161, 165 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Williams v. State, 313 

S.W.3d 393, 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d)). 

The evidence before the jury included several affirmative links connecting 

Hubert to possession of the Springfield Armory XD 40-caliber handgun. Richmond 

testified that he observed Hubert carrying a white pillowcase that contained a firearm 

and that a Springfield XD 40-caliber handgun was recovered from the scene. The 

video from Richmond’s body camera shows that Hubert was arrested near the 

Springfield XD 40-caliber handgun, which was found in plain view in the grass a 
14 

few feet from the white pillowcase. The video also shows another Trooper stating 

that Hubert had the Springfield XD 40-caliber handgun in his hand when he was 

running. Ibarra testified that he observed Hubert with a white pillowcase in his arm 

and that he collected the Springfield Armory XD 40-caliber handgun at the scene of 

Hubert’s arrest. 

 We conclude that Hubert’s connection to the Springfield Armory XD 40-

caliber handgun was more than fortuitous and that the logical force of the links 

established by the evidence submitted at trial would allow a reasonable jury to 

conclude that Hubert possessed the Springfield Armory XD 40-caliber handgun. See 

Greer, 436 S.W.3d at 5; Graves v. State, No. 01-19-00868-CR, No. 01-19-00869-

CR, 2020 WL 7349101, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2020, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Reviewing all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational factfinder could have 

found the elements of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Graves, 2020 WL 7349101, at *3; see also Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 46.04(a). We overrule issue three. 

Under section 38.04 of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense 

of evading arrest or detention if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a 

peace officer attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 
15 

38.04(a). The indictment alleges that Hubert fled from Sergeant Ibarra, who was a 

peace officer who was lawfully attempting to arrest or detain him, and that prior to 

the commission of the charged offense, Hubert was convicted of evading arrest 

under section 38.04. Hubert argues the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction for evading arrest or detention with a previous conviction because the 

State failed to establish that Ibarra had a lawful basis to arrest or detain him. 

Having already determined that Chowns’s affidavit was sufficient to establish 

probable cause to issue the arrest warrant against Hubert, we conclude that Ibarra 

had a lawful basis to arrest or detain Hubert. Additionally, Ibarra testified that his 

dash camera on his marked patrol vehicle captured his attempt to apprehend Hubert 

because there was a warrant for his arrest. Ibarra explained that he was in full 

uniform and had activated his lights and sirens when Hubert ran. Ibarra’s dash cam 

video shows Hubert running down the road and into a wooded area carrying a white 

bag and Ibarra driving into a grassy area in pursuit of Hubert. Reviewing all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational 

factfinder could have found the elements of the state jail felony offense of evading 

arrest or detention with a previous conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 

38.04(a). Accordingly, we overrule issue four. 

 
16 

JURY CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE 

In issue two, Hubert complains the trial court erred by granting two of the 

State’s challenges for cause and dismissing the venirepersons because they could not 

consider the full range of punishment. According to Hubert, both venirepersons 

confirmed that they could consider the full range of punishment after being 

questioned further. 

We review a complaint about the trial court’s granting of the State’s 

challenges for cause for an abuse of discretion. See Tracy v. State, 597 S.W.3d 502, 

512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Since the trial court is in the best position to evaluate a 

potential juror’s demeanor and responses, we give consideration deference to the 

trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause. Hudson v. State, 620 S.W.3d 726, 731 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular 

juror, alleging some fact which renders the juror incapable or unfit to serve on the 

jury.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(a). “[T]he proponent of a challenge for 

cause has the burden of establishing that the challenge is proper.” Gardner v. State, 

306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The State may make a challenge for 

cause that the juror has a “bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which 

the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3); see Pierce v. State, 696 S.W.2d 899, 901-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1985). “Both the State and the defense are entitled to jurors who can consider the 
17 

entire range of punishment for the particular statutory offense–i.e., from the 

maximum to the minimum and all points in between.” Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 

179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[U]nless there is further clarification or 

vacillation by the juror, the trial judge must grant a challenge for cause if the juror 

states that he cannot consider the full range of punishment.” Id. at 185. 

During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the panel if anyone was unable to 

consider the full range of punishment of 25 to 99 or life for the crime of unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a felon if the State shows that the defendant has two or 

more prior convictions. The record reflects that among others, venirepersons 18 and 

28 indicated they could not consider the full range of punishment of 25 to 99 or life. 

The State challenged venirepersons 18 and 28 for cause, and the trial court granted 

the State’s challenges. Although Hubert argues that venirepersons 18 and 28 

confirmed that they could consider the full range of punishment after being 

questioned further, the record does not support Hubert’s argument. Rather, the 

record shows that venireperson 18 told the trial court that he could not follow the 

full range of punishment if the individual only had minor felonies but still fell under 

the habitual status. The record further shows that venireperson 28 also told the trial 

court that she could not consider the full range of punishment if the individual had 

minor felonies because it was “too harsh a punishment.” We conclude the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s challenges for cause. See Tex. 
18 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(a), (b)(3); Tracy, 597 S.W.3d at 512; Cardenas, 

325 S.W.3d at 184-85; Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 295. We overrule issue two. Having 

overruled each of Hubert’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

 AFFIRMED. 

 

_________________________

 W. SCOTT GOLEMON 

 Chief Justice 

 

Submitted on April 8, 2022 

Opinion Delivered April 27, 2022 

Do Not Publish 

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.