Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 39A01-1610-CR-2313| April 27, 2017 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer A. Joas

Joas & Stotts

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Paul W. Barnes, Sr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

39A01-1610-CR-2313

Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

39C01-1506-F1-591

Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Paul W. Barnes, Sr., appeals his convictions for two counts of level 1 felony

child molesting. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

that he opened the door to the admission of testimony vouching for the victim. 

We conclude that Barnes did not open the door to the vouching testimony, but 

that the error in admitting the testimony was harmless. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Barnes is B.B.’s paternal grandfather. In February 2015, ten-year-old B.B. lived 

with her younger brother and her mother. B.B.’s older brother lived with 

Barnes. On Friday, February 20, B.B. and her younger brother went to spend 

the weekend with Barnes. B.B.’s older brother left to spend the weekend with 

his aunt. 

[3] On Saturday, February 21, B.B. and her younger brother were playing video 

games in the game room. Barnes called B.B. to his bedroom and closed the 

door. He removed B.B.’s clothing and then took off his pants and underwear. 

Barnes pushed up against B.B. and rubbed his penis inside and outside her 

vagina. Barnes then placed her legs on his shoulders and told B.B. to “[f**ck]

me.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 68. Barnes also said, “[D]o you like this? ... I bet you do.” 

Id. B.B. “didn’t like it” and it “hurt.” Id. at 70, 73. B.B. told Barnes that she 

wanted her mom. At one point, B.B.’s younger brother knocked on Barnes’s

bedroom door to see if B.B. could come back out and play video games. Barnes 

told him that B.B. would come out in a little bit. After Barnes was finished, he 
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used a towel or a shirt to wipe a “sticky” substance from B.B.’s thighs. Id. at 

72. He also wiped off his “private area.” Id. B.B. got dressed and left the 

room. She did not tell her younger brother what happened because “he was too 

young.” Id. at 73.

[4] The next day, Barnes told B.B. to shower. After her shower and before she got 

dressed, he told her to lie down on his bed. He pulled down his pants and 

underwear and told her that he wanted to “do it one more time.” Id. at 78. He 

repeated his actions of the day before, rubbing his penis outside and inside of 

her vagina, which hurt her. Id. at 77. When he was finished, he wiped the 

same kind of sticky substance off B.B.’s thighs that he had the day before. He 

also had sticky stuff on “his private area” that he wiped off. Id. at 79. 

Afterward, he sprinkled baby powder between her legs. 

[5] That evening, Barnes took B.B. and her younger brother home. B.B. went 

upstairs while Barnes talked to her mother. She waited to tell her mother what 

happened because she “was scared that [Barnes] would do something.” Id. at 

80. After he left, she wrote down on a piece of paper what happened and gave 

it to her mother. She wrote it down because she did not “like saying that kind 

of stuff.” Id. at 81. B.B.’s mother started crying. She wanted to make sure that 

B.B. was not bleeding, so she told B.B. to pull down her underwear and 

immediately saw baby powder caked around B.B.’s vagina. 

[6] B.B.’s mother called the police. A police officer came to their residence and 

made a report. B.B.’s mother took her to the hospital emergency room. B.B. 
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was also taken to a children’s hospital for a sexual assault examination, and no 

physical injuries were discovered. A sexual assault evidence collection kit was 

also performed on B.B. The following day, Stephanie Back, a forensic 

interviewer with the Child Advocacy Center, interviewed B.B.

[7] In June 2015, the State charged Barnes with two counts of level 1 felony child 

molesting. A jury trial was held in August 2016. The State began its case-inchief with B.B.’s mother’s testimony. B.B. then testified regarding what Barnes 

did to her on February 21 and 22, 2015. Barnes’s defense counsel did not crossexamine her. The jury also heard testimony from B.B.’s brothers, the police 

officer who responded to the initial report of child molestation, two detectives, 

and the child abuse pediatrician who was on call at the children’s hospital when 

B.B. was admitted. 

[8] Following an extended discussion outside the jury’s presence, the State 

requested that Back be permitted to testify regarding the signs of coaching in 

children and whether she had observed signs of coaching when she interviewed 

B.B. Barnes objected, but the trial court concluded that Barnes had opened the 

door to such testimony and permitted Back to testify. Id. at 213. The 

emergency room doctor who examined B.B. testified, followed by Back. Back 

testified that she was trained to look for signs of coaching in children and that 

those signs included whether the child makes eye contact, makes emotional 

statements, or corrects the interviewer when the interviewer is speaking. She 

explained that she also considers whether the child has provided consistent 

statements to investigators or has a motive to fabricate. Tr. Vol. 3 at 22. She 
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then testified that she saw no signs of coaching when she interviewed B.B. Id.

at 23. 

[9] After Back testified, the State introduced evidence from the sexual assault kit. 

Two of the external genital swabs tested positive for the presence of sperm cells. 

Id. at 43. The DNA from the sperm cells was consistent with Barnes’s DNA, 

and that DNA profile was estimated to occur once in eight trillion unrelated 

individuals. Id. at 44, 64-65. The DNA sample from the external genital swabs

was of such high quality that it was unlikely that the sperm cells had been 

deposited on something else and then transferred to B.B. Id. at 45-46, 64. A 

major DNA profile and a minor DNA profile were also recovered from nonsperm cells. The DNA from the minor profile was consistent with Barnes’s and 

was estimated to occur once in 3400 unrelated individuals. Id. at 47.

[10] Barnes testified that he did not have sexual intercourse with B.B. or place his 

penis on the outside of her vagina and never touched her in an inappropriate 

manner. Id. at 68-69. He also testified that he was never in the bedroom 

behind closed doors with her. Id. at 113. In addition, he explained how his 

semen could have been found on B.B. He testified that he uses kerosene to heat 

his residence, but B.B.’s mother does not like the smell. So, he keeps clothing 

for each of the children in a dresser in the children’s bedroom. When the 

children come to his house, they change into the clothes Barnes keeps for them. 

Barnes then washes the clothes they were wearing when they arrived, so that 

they can wear clean clothes when they return home. He testified that on the 

evenings of February 20 and 21, B.B. and her younger brother either played 
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Xbox or watched television the entire time. On February 22, Barnes watched a 

NASCAR race on television. He told each child to take a shower. His 

bedroom was close to the bathroom, so he laid their clean clothes on his bed. 

Then, he masturbated in his bedroom beside the children’s clothes. Id. at 84. 

When he was done, he “reached down and grabbed something to wipe off on, 

and it ended up being [B.B.’s] underwear.” Id. at 85. Barnes testified that he 

“was going to take them and throw them in the washing machine, but I was so 

pre-occupied with the race [that he] hurried back up the hall to go watch the 

race, and I forgot about them.” Id. at 85. 

[11] The jury found Barnes guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Barnes to 

concurrent executed terms of forty years each. This appeal ensued. Additional 

facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Barnes challenges the trial court’s admission of Back’s testimony that B.B 

showed no signs of coaching during her interview. “A trial court has broad 

discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence” and we will reverse its 

ruling only upon an abuse of that discretion. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 

1237 (Ind. 2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision 

is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” 

Id. 

[13] Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) provides, “Witnesses may not testify to opinions 

concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of 
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allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” In 

general, expert testimony that a child did not exhibit any signs of coaching

constitutes improper vouching for the alleged victim’s credibility in violation of 

Evidence Rule 704(b). Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 989-92 (Ind. 2015); 

Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1237. However, expert testimony about the signs of 

coaching and whether a child exhibited such signs is permissible “provided the 

defendant has opened the door to such testimony.” Sampson, 38 N.E.2d at 992. 

“Opening the door refers to the principle that where one party introduces 

evidence of a particular fact, the opposing party is entitled to introduce evidence 

in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though the rebuttal evidence otherwise 

would have been inadmissible.” Id. at n.4; see also Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 

126, 130 (Ind. 2009) (“The door may be opened when the trier of fact has been 

left with a false or misleading impression of the facts.”). Thus, “‘once a child’s 

credibility is called into question proper expert testimony may be appropriate.’” 

Sampson, 38 N.E.3d at 992 (quoting Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind. 

1995)). Here, Barnes contends that the trial court erred in finding that he 

opened the door to Back’s testimony.

[14] Back was not included on the State’s final witness list but Barbara Vernon was. 

Vernon had not interviewed B.B., but she was expected to testify during the 

State’s case-in-chief “concerning characteristics, mannerisms, and behaviors 

common among child abuse victims” and “in rebuttal concerning the presence 

or absence of signs of coaching.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 201. At trial, Barnes made an 

oral motion in limine regarding Vernon’s testimony. A lengthy debate followed 
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outside the jury’s presence. Defense counsel argued that Vernon’s testimony 

constituted improper vouching for B.B. in violation of Evidence Rule 704(b) 

and “the evidence in the trial so far ha[d] not been an attack on [her]

credibility.” Id. at 205. The prosecutor responded that defense counsel was 

going to stand before the jury during closing argument and

talk about [B.B.’s] testimony and talk about her behaviors and 

talk about the number of times she was ... interviewed by 

different people, and [she is] a confused little child who is simply 

parodying or mimicking information that she has heard either 

from her mother or from the doctor or from whomever, ... and 

we are entitled to ... address those potential issues.

Id. at 208.

[15] As the discussion continued, defense counsel stated,

[T]he theory of the case is that ... B.B. was subjected to multiple 

sets of questioning at the hands of inexpert interviewers and that 

that is a ... source or explanation for her testimony. ... If the 

court determines that that is an attack on her credibility, then I 

cannot in all good conscience say that I’m not going to be 

attacking her credibility.

Id. at 211.

[16] The prosecutor argued that the defense’s theory of the case constituted implicit 

coaching, which opened the door to testimony regarding whether B.B. was 

coached. Although the trial court ruled that Vernon would be permitted to 

testify, the prosecutor stated that he wished to call Back to testify specifically 
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about her interview with B.B. The trial court agreed that “that door is going to 

be opened” and ruled that “the State can present evidence about the signs of 

coaching and whether or not [B.B] exhibited such signs.” Id. at 213. Defense 

counsel objected to Back’s testimony, arguing that his theory that the 

circumstances of B.B.’s questioning gave rise to her account was not the same 

as coaching. He also argued that the issue had not been presented for litigation 

at that point, as “[n]either side had elicited any evidence of coaching.” Id. at 

214, 218. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Back would be permitted to 

testify. Id. at 219.

[17] Barnes contends that he did not open the door to Back’s coaching testimony 

because at that point in the trial he had not questioned any witnesses in a 

manner that suggested B.B. had been coached or that had called her credibility 

into question. The State counters that Back’s testimony was permissible to 

“rebut Barnes’ claim that B.B. was coached by adults asking her leading 

questions and giving their own account of the molestation in her presence.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 8. We must agree with Barnes. Before the motion in limine 

was made, the jury had heard the testimony of B.B.’s mother, B.B., her 

brothers, the police officer who responded to the initial report of child 

molestation, two detectives, and the child abuse pediatrician who was on call at 

the children’s hospital when B.B. was admitted. However, the State does not 

cite to any portion of the transcript preceding the motion of limine that shows 

evidence of coaching or that B.B.’s credibility was called into question. The 

State relies solely on the content of defense counsel’s closing argument. The 
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potential substance of closing argument does not open the door to otherwise 

impermissible evidence.1 When Back testified, no evidence regarding whether 

B.B. had been told what to say or calling her credibility into question had been 

introduced. Simply put, there was no evidence to rebut. See Norris v. State, 53 

N.E.3d 512, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting testimony that victim demonstrated indicia of reliability 

during interview where testimony was “neither in response to defense 

questioning, nor to rebut an express claim that victim had been coached.”);

Hamilton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 628, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that 

defendant had not opened door to coaching testimony where defense counsel 

had asked two alleged victims whether anyone had told them what to say in 

court and both victims said no and no other evidence of alleged coaching was 

presented), aff’d on reh’g, 49 N.E.3d 554 (2015), trans. denied (2016). 

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Back to testify 

that she did not observe any signs of coaching. 

[18] However, “‘[e]rrors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be 

disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a 

party.’” Norris, 53 N.E.3d at 524-25 (quoting Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d 884, 

890 (Ind. 2001)). “The improper admission is harmless error if the conviction is 

supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing 

 

1

 As such, we need not decide whether the concept of coaching an alleged child victim is broad enough to 

encompass the possibility of unintentionally suggestive circumstances surrounding the reporting and 

questioning of the victim.
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court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to 

the conviction.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238. 

[19] Barnes asserts that his convictions rest primarily on B.B.’s credibility and that 

“[e]vidence supporting the credibility of a witness cannot be said to be harmless 

when the conviction rested primarily on the credibility of the witness.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 13 (citing Hamilton, 49 N.E.3d at 556). Here, however, there 

was more than B.B.’s testimony to support Barnes’s convictions. Significantly, 

two of the external genital swabs from B.B.’s sexual assault kit contained 

Barnes’s sperm cells.

2

 He contends that he presented a plausible alternative 

explanation for the presence of his semen; namely, that he used B.B.’s 

underwear to wipe himself after masturbating on February 22. However, the

State presented expert testimony that given the quality of the DNA sample, it 

was unlikely that his sperm was transferred onto B.B. from a different material. 

Tr. Vol. 3 at 45-46, 64. In addition, B.B. testified consistently regarding the 

molestations. Tr. Vol. 2 at 62-80. Certain details of B.B.’s account were 

corroborated by her younger brother and were contrary to Barnes’s claims. For 

example, her younger brother testified that when he and B.B. were playing 

Xbox on February 21, Barnes called B.B. to come to his bedroom. Id. at 62, 

105. He also testified that while Barnes and B.B. were in the bedroom, the door 

was completely closed and he knocked on the door and asked if B.B. could 

 

2

 The State asserts that seminal material was found on several swabs “from the inside” and outside of B.B.’s 

vagina. Appellee’s Br. at 12. While preliminary testing of the vaginal swabs indicated that seminal material

“might” be present, subsequent testing on all four of the vaginal swabs was negative for sperm cells. Tr. Vol. 

3 at 42. 
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play. Id. at 71, 106. Further, Barnes’s testimony contradicted what he told 

investigators after B.B. reported the molestations. Barnes testified that on 

Sunday, he was watching the race and did not see B.B. come out of the shower, 

but he told police that the children “come out of the bathroom to the bedroom. 

We go in there. I make sure they’re good and dry and they get their clothes 

on.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 105-06. We conclude that there was substantial independent 

evidence of guilt supporting Barnes’s convictions such that Back’s testimony did 

not likely have a substantial influence on the verdict. See Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d 

at 1238 (concluding that admission of vouching testimony was harmless where 

victim “testified at length concerning what happened to her” and “her 

testimony remained consistent and unshaken under aggressive crossexamination.”). 

[20] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.