In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-3435 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MARIA MORENO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13-cr-00576-6 — Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 5, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 25, 2019 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Maria Moreno of 

one count of conspiring with others with the intent to distribute narcotics and two counts of knowingly using a telephone 

in furtherance of the conspiracy. Moreno argues there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that she conspired 

with the Guzman Drug Trafficking Organization (the “Guzman DTO”), but rather, the evidence merely showed a buyer-
2 No. 17-3435 

seller relationship. The district court rejected Moreno’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on this argument, and we 

affirm. 

I. Background 

A. Overview & Indictment 

In September 2013, the government filed a thirteen-count 

indictment against Moreno and five codefendants—Miguel 

Guzman, Alfredo Torres, Sergio Zacahua, Acasio Sanchez, 

and Fabian Foster—alleging conspiracy. Moreno is named in 

three counts: Count 1 charged Moreno with conspiracy to 

possess narcotics with the intent to distribute, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846; and Counts 9 and 11 charged Moreno with 

knowingly using a telephone in furtherance of the alleged 

conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). According to the 

government, from approximately July 2012 through July 16, 

2013, Moreno participated in a conspiracy to sell narcotics in 

Chicago and Detroit. Guzman, the head of the Guzman DTO, 

and Guzman’s subordinates supplied two to four kilograms 

of heroin to Moreno once or twice a month, and Moreno delivered that heroin in Detroit. 

B. Evidence at Trial 

Moreno pleaded not guilty and her case advanced to a jury 

trial. The government’s evidence consisted primarily of recorded telephone conversations between Moreno and codefendants, testimony of Torres, and testimony of law enforcement officers involved in the surveillance and arrest of the indicted codefendants. 

According to Torres, Moreno, unlike her codefendants, 

was not a Guzman DTO member. She “was just a customer” 

with “her own clients,” “[u]nrelated to ... [the] organization.” 
No. 17-3435 3

For instance, she did not look for clients for the Guzman DTO, 

and she did not use—or even know the location of—the Guzman DTO stash house. Moreover, while Guzman paid Torres, 

Zacahua, and Foster a percentage of drug-trafficking profits 

for “their services,” Moreno received no such payment. 

Torres testified he first met Moreno, who he knew only as 

“the lady,” at Guzman’s audio shop in mid-2012. Guzman instructed Torres to deliver heroin to Moreno on an ongoing basis, “whenever she needed it.” A few days later, Torres delivered heroin to Moreno at a restaurant in Chicago. This was 

the first of many deliveries. Typically, Moreno drove from Detroit to Chicago in a truck with a hidden trap compartment. 

She parked at a restaurant or gas station and left money in the 

trap. Then, Torres, Zacahua, or Foster drove the truck to the 

stash house, retrieved the money from the compartment, 

placed heroin inside, and returned the truck to the designated 

location. Torres said Moreno paid about $200,000 for four kilograms of heroin, and sometimes, at Guzman’s direction, he 

provided Moreno heroin on credit: “sometimes I would deliver, but she wouldn’t give me the money.” Torres mentioned one instance specifically, but he did not remember the 

date and did not know when or how Moreno eventually delivered the money. 

On May 26, 2013, the government intercepted a call between Moreno and Torres. They spoke about Moreno’s Chevy 

Trailblazer, a vehicle with a trap compartment. Moreno told 

Torres, “if they are going to fix it today, then I can pick it up 

tomorrow.” At trial, Torres explained that Guzman instructed 

him to fix a smashed window on the Trailblazer. Torres did 

not ask Moreno to reimburse him because Guzman said he 

would pay the costs of the repair. 
4 No. 17-3435 

The next day, Torres told Moreno, “If you want I can meet 

you ... to at least give you the keys.” Torres testified he was 

talking about the Trailblazer, and he said he delivered the 

keys to Moreno at a gas station in Chicago. Drug Enforcement 

Agency (“DEA”) agents observed Moreno arrive at the gas 

station, and an agent took a photo of Moreno and Torres together. After the meeting, Moreno went to a nearby restaurant, entered an already-parked Trailblazer, and drove east. 

The DEA maintained surveillance until Moreno entered 

Indiana. At that point, an agent contacted the local Indiana 

sheriff’s department, told it of the ongoing investigation, and 

requested it conduct a traffic stop. Officers stopped Moreno 

and discovered she was not the Trailblazer’s registered 

owner. Per department policy, they towed the vehicle to a 

county garage for an inventory search. Officers discovered an 

empty concealed trap compartment in the rear of the vehicle. 

They also found a glass repair receipt with the name “Alfred 

Torres.” 

Following the traffic stop, Moreno called Torres.1 Moreno 

advised Torres to “drop those phones,” and she told him the 

police “took the truck away” and “follow[ed]” her. She also 

informed Torres she would “come down there on Wednesday 

at four (4:00)” and “won’t call” anymore. Torres explained at 

trial that when Moreno told him to drop the phones, he believed his phone “had already been tapped by the authorities.” Later that night, Torres asked Moreno whether officers 

“[found] anything,” and said “hopefully nothing happens because I also had my receipt in there for ... the glass. My name 

was on it.” 

 1 This conversation is the basis for Count 9.
No. 17-3435 5

After the May 27 incident, Moreno stopped traveling to 

Chicago. Instead, Foster drove heroin to Moreno in Detroit. 

According to Torres, Foster completed two deliveries of four 

kilograms of heroin. But in July, the government intervened. 

On July 12, Moreno asked Torres, on a recorded call, if 

“that guy could come by early on Monday.” Torres responded, “how much would it be,” and Moreno said, “the 

same.” Torres testified the “guy” was Foster, when he asked 

“how much” he meant how many kilograms of heroin, and 

when Moreno said “the same,” she meant she wanted the 

same quantity, four kilograms. On July 15, Torres and Moreno 

spoke about the delivery.2 They agreed it was “already too 

late,” and instead, “[d]uring the day would be good.” Ninety 

minutes later, Torres spoke with Foster and told him, “The 

lady says ... she wants you [to] arrive ... no late[r] than nine 

o’clock (9:00) so, what do you say about tomorrow?” Foster 

said he would “be ready all day,” and they agreed to meet at 

six o’clock (6:00) the next morning. That evening, Torres confirmed the delivery with Moreno: “[W]ill you be ready tomorrow around twelve (12:00) or one (1:00), around there, the 

friend says he should be arriving around that time. At two 

(2:00) at the latest.” 

The next morning, the DEA established surveillance at the 

Guzman DTO stash house. At 6:19 AM, Zacahua called Torres 

to tell him “the door is not opening” in “the truck.” Torres 

testified Zacahua was referring to the trap door of a Dodge 

Durango, and Zacahua intended to put four kilograms of heroin in the trap compartment for the delivery. Torres also tried 

and failed to open the trap door, so he instead placed the four 

 2 This conversation is the basis for Count 11.
6 No. 17-3435 

kilograms of heroin in the back seat. At 6:31, he called Foster 

and told him, “I’m gonna leave you under the back seat because I can’t open” the door. 

Eventually, a red Dodge Durango (driven by Zacahua) exited Sanchez’s garage, and agents followed the vehicle. Zacahua parked the Durango, exited the truck, walked a few 

blocks, and entered Torres’s vehicle. Then, Foster arrived at 

Torres’s vehicle. Torres testified he gave Foster a note with 

Moreno’s phone number, dropped Foster off near the Durango, and drove away. As Foster approached the Durango, 

DEA agents placed him under arrest. They searched the Durango and found four brick-shaped bundles of heroin under 

the back seat, totaling about four kilograms and worth about 

$240,000. They also seized Foster’s cell phones, the note with 

Moreno’s phone number, and a receipt showing that about a 

month earlier, Foster stayed at a motel ten minutes south of 

Detroit. After his arrest, Foster cooperated and told agents he 

planned to drive the Durango to Detroit and deliver heroin 

there. The agents also arrested Torres, Zacahua, and Sanchez. 

Two DEA agents drove the Durango to the motel near Detroit at which Foster said he planned to make the delivery 

(they removed the heroin before doing so). This was the same 

motel where Foster had stayed a month earlier, per the receipt 

found in the Durango. When they arrived, an undercover 

agent called Moreno from Foster’s cell phone and told her the 

Durango was parked at the “[s]ame hotel.” 

Shortly thereafter, a Chevy Trailblazer entered the lot and 

parked next to the Durango. Two women—Moreno and her 

niece—exited the vehicle and walked into the hotel lobby, 

without bags or luggage. Moreno sent a text message to Foster’s phone saying she lost the key to the Durango and he 
No. 17-3435 7

should come to the motel room with the key. The undercover 

agent responded that an extra key was under the Durango’s 

floor mat. Moreno and her niece left the motel and walked to 

the Durango. When they reached it, agents placed Moreno 

under arrest and searched Moreno and her niece. Moreno had 

three cell phones. One was a personal phone, one was the 

phone she used to communicate with Torres and Foster, and 

after they seized the third phone, it received a text message 

that said, “Down here wit my money.” Agents also found a 

spare key to the Durango in Moreno’s Trailblazer. 

C. Verdict & Post-Trial Motion 

After the government closed its case, Moreno moved for 

judgment of acquittal. The court took the motion under advisement. Moreno chose not to testify on her own behalf and 

did not call any witnesses in her defense. On April 21, 2016, 

the jury found Moreno guilty of conspiring with others to possess narcotics with the intent to distribute, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1), as well as knowingly using a telephone in furtherance of the conspiracy, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Counts 9 and 11). 

Moreno filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal, 

arguing the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that she conspired with the Guzman DTO. More specifically, she argued that while the evidence demonstrated she 

purchased drugs from the Guzman DTO, it did not allow the 

inference of conspiracy. On January 30, 2017, the district court 

denied Moreno’s motion. It held the government presented 

sufficient evidence of conspiracy, including that Moreno 

made frequent large-quantity drug purchases on credit, 

Moreno shared equipment—vehicles with trap compart-
8 No. 17-3435 

ments—with the Guzman DTO, and Moreno warned members of the Guzman DTO about threats by law enforcement. 

On November 20, 2017, the court sentenced Moreno to a below-Guidelines 87-month term of imprisonment. 

II. Discussion 

If the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support 

a conviction, a district court must enter judgment of acquittal 

“either after the government has closed its evidence or after a 

jury has rendered a verdict or been discharged.” United States 

v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 2019); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 

29(a), (c). We review a district court’s denial of a motion for 

judgment of acquittal de novo. Garcia, 919 F.3d at 496. 

Because we afford “[g]reat deference ... to jury verdicts,” 

we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government” and draw all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor. United States v. Maldonado, 893 F.3d 480, 484 (7th 

Cir. 2018). Moreover, “[a]ny challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence comes with a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, 

burden,” and we “reverse only if no rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (first quoting United States v. Dessart, 823 

F.3d 395, 403 (7th Cir. 2016), then quoting United States v. 

Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1005 (7th Cir. 2013)). At the same time, 

“the height of the hurdle depends directly on the strength of 

the government’s evidence,” and “a properly instructed jury 

may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Garcia, 919 F.3d at 496–97 (first quoting United States 

v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013), then quoting Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979)). 
No. 17-3435 9

To prove a § 846 conspiracy, the government must show 

“(1) two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act, 

and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in 

the agreement.” Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 484 (quoting United 

States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010)). “Although 

every drug deal involves an unlawful agreement to exchange 

drugs, ... a buyer-seller arrangement can’t by itself be the basis of a conspiracy conviction because there is no common 

purpose: ‘[T]he buyer’s purpose is to buy; the seller’s purpose 

is to sell.’” United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 

2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir. 1978)). Rather, “the 

government must offer evidence establishing an agreement to 

distribute drugs that is distinct from evidence of the agreement to complete the underlying drug deals.” Maldonado, 893 

F.3d at 484 (quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755). A conviction 

cannot stand if “the plausibility of a mere buyer-seller arrangement is the same as the plausibility of a drug-distribution conspiracy.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th 

Cir. 2015). 

Often, the government meets its burden by showing the 

buyer agreed to resell drugs to a third party. Long, 748 F.3d at 

326; see United States v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) 

(per curiam) (“[A] shared purpose—some unity of enterprise—between a buyer and seller to resell drugs to others can 

be enough to indicate the requisite common commitment to 

demonstrate a conspiracy to distribute drugs.”). But to prove 

a resale agreement, the government cannot “rely solely on 

purchases and sales, which after all are present in both buyerseller and conspiracy arrangements.” Long, 748 F.3d at 326.

Instead, the government must present additional circumstantial evidence. Id.
10 No. 17-3435 

To evaluate whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient 

to support an inference of conspiracy, “[w]e take into account 

all [of] the evidence surrounding the alleged conspiracy and 

make a holistic assessment of whether the jury reached a reasonable verdict.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Brown, 

726 F.3d at 1002); see Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813 (“[T]here is no 

rigid list or formula to prove a conspiracy....”). Circumstantial evidence that indicates conspiracy, and not just a buyerseller relationship, includes, for example: large-quantity drug 

sales; repeated or standardized transactions; a lengthy relationship between the parties; sales on credit (i.e., fronting); 

warnings of threats by competitors or law enforcement; and 

sharing tools and supplies. Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 484–85; Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 815–16. 

To be sure, large-quantity, repeat sales alone do not support an inference of conspiracy. Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 485; see 

also United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(en banc). Neither do “‘occasional’ sales on credit.” Neal, 907 

F.3d at 516 (quoting United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 815 

(7th Cir. 2015)); see also Long, 748 F.3d at 326 (“Standing 

alone, ... sales on credit [cannot] sufficiently distinguish a 

conspiracy from an ordinary buyer-seller relationship.” (citations omitted)). 

Together, however, this type of evidence can support a 

conspiracy finding. “‘[W]hen a credit sale is coupled with certain characteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyerseller relationship,’ the jury can infer that the seller only extended credit because the buyer agreed to pay the debt by reselling the drugs.” Long, 748 F.3d at 326 (quoting Johnson, 592 

F.3d at 775 n.5). The buyer and seller share the common purpose—to resell the drugs to close out the credit transaction—
No. 17-3435 11

necessary to distinguish the arrangement from a mere buyerseller relationship. Id.; see United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 

976, 987 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he jury could find that [the defendant] knew that his supplier would not sell him wholesale 

quantities of drugs on credit unless he agreed to resell them, 

and by thus agreeing with his supplier to commit a crime (the 

resale of the illegal drugs), he became a conspirator.”). 

Here, Moreno and the Guzman DTO had a year-long relationship during which Moreno regularly purchased wholesale quantities of heroin. Specifically, Torres testified that 

from mid-2012 until Moreno’s arrest in July 2013, he or an associate provided two to four kilograms of heroin to Moreno 

once or twice a month. Additionally, there is evidence of at 

least two instances when Moreno purchased the heroin on 

credit. Torres stated that “[o]n one occasion, [Moreno] delivered the money later.” And a factfinder could reasonably infer 

a second instance of fronting: when Moreno arrived to purchase heroin at the Detroit motel on July 16, 2013—the day 

she was arrested—she carried no money and received a text 

message which read, “Down here wit my money.” A jury 

could infer Moreno planned to obtain money from a buyer—

the text message sender—after she acquired the drugs. 

Additional evidence also supports the jury’s conspiracy 

inference. For instance, Moreno sought to protect the Guzman 

DTO by warning it about potential law enforcement intervention. After Indiana police seized her Chevy Trailblazer, 

Moreno quickly notified Torres. She urged Torres to “drop 

those phones” and told him that police “follow[ed]” her from 

Chicago. Later, Moreno and Torres spoke further about the 

incident and discussed whether they might be at further risk. 
12 No. 17-3435 

Moreno contends her warning was not evidence of conspiracy, but self-protection. We disagree. If Moreno wanted to 

simply protect herself and minimize her exposure, there 

would be no reason for Moreno to talk to Torres about the 

incident. Instead, Moreno could have driven straight home 

without talking to anyone. Indeed, Moreno already thought 

law enforcement was suspicious of her—she believed they 

followed her from Chicago and were listening to her calls. 

Thus, she must have realized law enforcement might still be 

listening to her conversations with Torres. Yet she warned 

Torres anyways. A reasonable jury is entitled to characterize 

such behavior as evidence Moreno agreed to more than just a 

buyer-seller relationship with the Guzman DTO. Cf. Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 485 (evidence of a conspiratorial relationship 

included that the defendant called his supplier to inform him 

of the arrest of a drug-trafficking associate); United States v. 

Nunez, 673 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a finding of 

conspiracy, noting that “[w]hen [the defendant] learned of 

[his supplier’s] arrest the defendant could simply have 

cleared out; instead he tried to save [his supplier’s] business” 

by notifying his supplier’s supplier of the arrest).3

 3 Moreno argues our opinion in United States v. Johnson indicates 

Moreno’s warning to Torres is irrelevant. Johnson is distinguishable. In 

Johnson, the defendant advised his supplier the police were nearby while 

the supplier “was en route to deliver the drugs.” 592 F.3d at 757. We held 

“this singular warning is insufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy” because “in this situation, any ordinary drug purchaser would 

warn his supplier of a nearby police presence to ensure he received the 

delivery.” Id. As we explained, “[t]his is not conspiratorial behavior; it is 

self-preservation.” Id. Here, by contrast, Moreno did not call Torres while 

he was on the way to deliver drugs. She faced no immediate risk; rather, a 

jury could infer Moreno made the call to protect the Guzman DTO. 
No. 17-3435 13

Moreover, there is evidence the Guzman DTO and 

Moreno shared “tools”: two vehicles with trap compartments 

used to transport drugs and money. First, Moreno and Torres 

drove and cared for the Chevy Trailblazer. Specifically, Torres 

took the Trailblazer to a shop to repair a broken window. 

Torres testified he paid for the repair and did not seek repayment from Moreno because Guzman said he would cover the 

costs. Second, when DEA agents arrested Moreno, they found 

a key to Foster’s Dodge Durango in her Trailblazer. In short, 

Moreno’s shared use of vehicles with Torres and Foster supports the reasonableness of the jury’s conspiracy inference. 

See Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 485 (noting, as evidence the defendant and his supplier “occasionally worked cooperatively,” 

that the defendant “loaned his Cadillac with a ‘trap’ compartment for drugs and drug proceeds to [his supplier]”); Brown, 

726 F.3d at 1006 (emphasizing, as evidence of the defendant’s 

role in a conspiracy, that his supplier “provided [the defendant] with a specially outfitted Chevrolet HHR that had a ‘trap’ 

to conceal drugs”). 

Moreno points to our decision in United States v. Pulgar, 

and asserts we “addressed a strikingly similar situation” 

there. Like in this case, the government elicited evidence that 

an alleged conspiracy involved sales of wholesale quantities 

of narcotics, and sometimes, those sales were made on credit. 

789 F.3d at 808. As to the credit sales, the government introduced one instance where the defendant fronted cocaine 

without advance payment during a sham sale arranged by the 

DEA, and a witness testified that the defendant “‘probably’ 

fronted cocaine to him ‘a couple other’ times.” Id. at 814. We 

held this evidence did not indicate conspiratorial behavior be-
14 No. 17-3435 

cause the first instance was “an adapted arrangement designed for self-preservation,” and the testimonial evidence 

was “vague and incomplete.” Id. 

The evidence in Pulgar is distinguishable from the evidence here. Unlike the witness in Pulgar, Torres testified 

firmly, without a qualifier, that he fronted heroin to Moreno; 

that instance was not a government setup. Additionally, in 

Pulgar, we highlighted the lack of other evidence signaling 

conspiracy, such as, for example, the “provisioning of tools or 

supplies” and “warnings of threats to the business.” Id. at 

815.4 Here, by contrast, the government presented such evidence. As discussed, Moreno warned Torres about a police 

threat, and Moreno and the Guzman DTO simultaneously accessed and cared for vehicles used to transport drugs.5

It is true, as Moreno points out, that the evidence suggests 

Moreno was not a member of the Guzman DTO. Torres testified Moreno “was just a customer,” “[u]nrelated to ... [the] 

organization.” And unlike other DTO members, Moreno did 

 

4 The only other proffered evidence in Pulgar was that the defendant 

accepted returns of poor quality cocaine, and the defendant and coconspirator enjoyed a close friendship. We held this evidence was not probative of conspiracy; the return policy evidence was “vague and incomplete,” and there was no evidence of “anything nefarious from [their] 

friendship.” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 814–16. 

5 Moreno also cites other cases where we overturned conspiracy convictions, and she asserts the “surrounding facts and circumstances” in 

those cases “gave rise to stronger inference[s] of conspiracies” than the 

facts here. Those cases are easily distinguishable; in each, there was no 

evidence of fronting. See United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 463 (7th 

Cir. 2016); United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 2008); United 

States v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rivera, 

273 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2001). 
No. 17-3435 15

not use the Guzman DTO stash house, did not have an agreement with the Guzman DTO to look for customers, and did 

not receive a commission. Perhaps based on Torres’s testimony, the government abandoned its theory at opening argument—that Moreno was “a member” of the Guzman DTO—

conceding at closing argument that it was “not here saying 

she’s a member of the Guzman organization.” Crucially, however, the government did not need to prove Moreno was a 

member of the Guzman DTO to prove she knowingly agreed 

to participate in the conspiracy. As we have explained: 

It’s true that [a witness] testified on cross-examination that [defendants] were only ... customers, not members of the organization. But [defendants] didn’t have to be members of [the] 

gang to be guilty of conspiring ...; the legal definition of a conspirator is not the same as the 

street definition. Legally, [defendants] were 

guilty of conspiracy if they knowingly agreed 

[with the leader of the gang] to distribute 

drugs—regardless of whether [the leader] or 

anyone else ever considered them real members 

of the organization. 

Long, 748 F.3d at 326–27. 

In sum, the government offered sufficient evidence to support the jury’s inference that Moreno knowingly agreed to 

participate in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, not a mere buyerseller relationship. For over a year, Moreno consistently purchased wholesale quantities of heroin from the Guzman DTO. 

On at least two occasions, Moreno purchased that heroin on 

credit. Moreno warned Torres about a law enforcement 
16 No. 17-3435 

threat. And Moreno and Guzman DTO members shared access to and responsibility for vehicles with trap compartments. Viewed holistically and considered together, the evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.