This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 ROGER KUHN, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 29,927 9 PARADISE RIDGE HOMEOWNERS 10 ASSOCIATION, INC., 11 Defendant-Appellee. 12

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 13 Alan M. Malott, District Judge 14 Roger Kuhn 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 Pro Se Appellant 17 Vance Chavez & Associates, LLC 18 Claud Eugene Vance 19 Albuquerque, NM 20 for Appellee 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 232 Appellant Roger Kuhn (Plaintiff) appeal s pro se from the district court’s 1 summary judgment ruling that Appellee Paradise Ridge Homeowners Association (the 2 Association) has no duty to maintain the dis puted area. The notice proposed to affirm, 3 and Plaintiff filed a timely memorandum in opposition. We re main unpersuaded by 4 Plaintiff’s arguments, and therefore affirm. 5 Plaintiff continues to argue that the district court erred in granting summary 6 judgment in favor of the Association. We review the district court’s grant of summary 7 judgment de novo. Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 8 396, 970 P.2d 582. “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine 9 issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id

. 10

At issue is Section 3.03 of the Declaration of Restrictions (Maintenance 11 Clause), which provides [RP 274] : 12 The exterior of all [l]ot walls abutting public right[-]of[-]way and those 13 portions of individual lots shown as open space or other public use 14 easements on the Plat are Easement [a]reas . The Association shall 15 have the right and the obligation to maintain the appearance of the 16 exterior of these Easement Areas. [emphasis added] 17 From Plaintiff’s perspective, the undeve loped land at issue is an “open space” 18 and “Easement Area” for which the Maintenan ce Clause provides that the Association 193 has a right and obligation to maintain. [DS 5-6; MIO 3, 6] However, given the 1 Maintenance Clause’s expre ss reference to the Plat [MIO 10] , any consideration of 2 the Association’s obligation to maintain n ecessarily must be viewed in conjunction 3 with, as opposed to exclusive of [DS 3; MIO 11] , the referenced Plat language. See 4 generally Cypress Gardens, Ltd. v. Platt , 1998-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 124 N.M. 472, 952 5 P.2d 467 (noting that when considering restrictions set forth in a subdivision’s 6 declaration, “[e]ffect is to be given to the intention of the parties as shown by the 7 language of the whole instrument”) (int ernal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 Although Plaintiff construes our citation to Cypress Gardens, Ltd. , as an implicit 9 determination that the Maintenance Clause is ambiguous [MIO 9] , he is mistaken. 10 Our citation to Cypress Gardens, Ltd. was simply an acknowledgment that because 11 the Maintenance Clause incorporates by referen ce the Plat itself, the Plat is an integral 12 part of what governs the obligations betw een the parties over the disputed area. See 13 Master Builders, Inc. v. Cabbell , 95 N.M. 371, 373, 622 P.2d 276, 278 (Ct. App. 14 1980) (recognizing a general rule of contr act construction allowing two documents to 15 be properly construed together when one document refers to the other). 16 To this end, the Plat provides that the disputed land at issue is a private access 17 and drainage easement that must be maintained by the benefitting lots. Specifically, 184 the Plat states: “Proposed private access [and] drainage easement (width varies), 1 granted to lots 1-6, Block B [and] Lots 28-33, Block B by this Plat andto be 2 maintained by the benefitting Lots .” [RP 51-52, 278] [emphasis added] Reading the 3 Plat language in conjunction with the Maintenance Clause , the logical and unstrained 4 [DS 3; MIO 7] reading of the Maintenance Clause is such th at only the “exterior of 5 all lot walls abutting publicright-of-way” and those lo ts designated or shown [MIO 6 4-5] as “open space or othe r public use easements” on the Plat are subject to the 7 Associations obligation to maintain. 8 Plaintiff argues that while the disputedland may not be “d esignated” as open 9 space on the Plat, we should construe the use of the word “shown” in the Maintenance 10 Clause as a more expansiv e word that would encomp ass the disputed land. [MIO 4-8] 11 If the Plat were silent as to the res ponsibility for maintaining the disputed area, 12 Plaintiff’s argument would perhaps have moreforce. But becausethe Plat specifically 13 refers to the disputed land to be a priv ate access and drainage easement that must be 14 maintained by the benefitting lots, ratherthan an open space or public easement [MIO 15 7-8] , we hold that the land is not subject to the Maintenance Clause . For this reason, 16 we agree with the district court that the disputed portions of the lots are not “‘open 17 space or other public use easement’ and, th erefore, are not within the purview or 185 control of the Homeowner’s Associati on as set forth in Restriction 3.03.” [RP 276] 1 See Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Ass’n , 111 N.M. 478, 483, 806 P.2d 1068, 1073 2 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that “restrictive covenants must be considered 3 reasonably, though strictly, so that illogical , unnatural or strained construction will not 4 be effected”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 Plaintiff also suggests that unless the disputed land is considered open space, 6 the provision in the Maintenance Clause th at requires the Association to maintain 7 “open space” would be rendere d meaningless because there is no other area shown or 8 designated as open space. [MIO 8] However, the record appears to only contain 9 portions of the Plat to which th e Maintenance Clause refers. [RP 30-32] For this 10 reason, we will not presume that the rest of the Plat, which is not contained in the 11 record, does not show or designate another area as open space. See Reeves v. 12 Wimberly , 107 N.M. 231, 236, 755 P.2d 75, 80 (C t. App. 1988) (“Upon a doubtful or 13 deficient record, every presumption is indulged in favor of the correctness and 14 regularity of the trial court's decision, and the appellate court will indulge in 15 reasonable presumptions in support of the order entered.”). 16 We also remain unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the district court’s 17 ruling runs afoul of the C ovenants’ Section 1.05. [DS 6; MIO 12] We recognize that 186 Section 1.05 defines “Easement Area” as including certain “b eneficial interests in real 1 property . . . owned by . . . the Lot Owners but maintained by the Association for the 2 common use and enjoyment of the Association members.” [DS 6; MIO 12] 3 However, significantly, this Section further provides that the “Easement Areas to be 4 maintained by the Association shall be (i) the exterior of all walls or fences of the Lots 5 which abut public right-of-way, [and] (ii) the Landscape Areas” (which are defined 6 in Section 1.11 as a publicright-of-way limited to the frontages of the subdivision). 7 (Emphasis added.). [RP 51-52] Because the land at issue does not fall within either 8 of these categories, the district court’s ru ling does not run afoul of either Section 1.05 9 or the Maintenance Clause. 10 We similarly disagree with Plaintiff’s c ontention that the district court’s ruling 11 contravenes Restriction S ection 5.02 and 5.04. [MIO 3-4] These sections recognize 12 that the Association has the power and au thority to provide for the maintenance of 13 easement areas. But because the plat shows the disputed land as a private access and 14 drainage easement that must be maintainedby the benefitting lots, the Association is 15 not responsible for its maintenance under these sections for the same reason the 16 disputed land is not covered by the Maintenance Clause. 177 Lastly we note that running throughout Plaintiff’s arguments is the assumption 1 that the term “easement area” used within the Declarati ons is an all-encompassing 2 term that includes all easements, public or private, within the Paradise Ridge 3 subdivision. But as discussed above, the Decl arations strictly define what is included 4 within the term “easement area”. And as th e term is used in the Maintenance Clause 5 and other provisions cited by Pl aintiff, the district court correctly ruled that it does not 6 include Plaintiff’s private access and drainage easement. 7 Conclusion. 8 Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the district court’s summary 9 judgment ruling in favor of the Association. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

12 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 13 WE CONCUR: 14

15 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 16

17 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 188