IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JOE E. PRICE, 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

CITY OF MESA, a municipal corporation, 

Defendant/Appellee. 

No. 1CA-CV 14-0274 A 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

CV2013-094063 

The Honorable David K. Udall, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Joe E. Price, Mesa 

Plaintiff/Appellant 

Gust Rosenfeld, PLC, Phoenix 

By David A. Pennartz, Landon W. Loveland, Charles W. Wirken, 

 Sarah C. Smith 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
PRICE v. MESA 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

OPINION 

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Joe E. Price appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor 

of the City of Mesa (Mesa). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶2 In this opinion, we construe and apply Arizona Revised 

Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 28-7691 through -7697 (West 2014)1 and Article 7, 

Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution and hold that Mesa was not required 

to obtain voter approval before issuing notes, to finance a light rail 

extension project. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶3 In January 2014, the Mesa Mayor and City Council passed 

Resolution Number 10380. The resolution authorized the issuance of 

Transportation Project Advancement Notes (TPANS) to advance project 

costs for a 1.9 mile light rail transit extension on Main Street from Mesa 

Drive to Gilbert Road and a “Park-and-Ride” lot for light rail patrons. The 

resolution required Mesa to secure payment on the TPANS’ interest and 

principal by a pledge of “Transportation Project Advance Revenues” 

(TPARS) and “excise taxes” as defined in A.R.S. sections 28-7691 through -

7697. The resolution further noted that TPANS did not constitute “an 

obligation . . . to levy or pledge any form of ad valorem property taxation 

nor will [they] constitute an indebtedness of the City . . . within the meaning 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 

2 Price’s opening brief fails to cite to the record as required by Rule 

13(a)(4) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Thus, we 

disregard the brief’s statement of facts and rely on Mesa’s statement of facts 

and our own review of the record. See Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, 457 

n. 2, ¶ 2, 268 P.3d 1112, 1114 n. 2 (App. 2011). Moreover, we disregard those 

portions of Price’s reply brief not “strictly confined to rebuttal of points 

made” in Mesa’s answering brief. See ARCAP 13(c). 
PRICE v. MESA 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

of the Constitution of the State of Arizona . . . but shall instead be limited 

obligations payable solely out of the pledged sources of funds . . . .” The 

project was also to be partially funded with repurposed federal 

transportation grant funds, which would be used to pay off the TPANS 

early “if and when received.” 

¶4 Price, a Mesa resident, brought suit claiming that Mesa’s 

funding sources were “uncertain and will likely be insufficient to fund the 

Light Rail extension[.]” Moreover, Price argued that Mesa would have to 

issue general revenue bonds to fund the project and that the extension 

“cannot occur without putting the taxpayer approved bonding programs, 

already submitted and approved by the voters, in jeopardy.” Price further 

argued that Mesa’s proposed sale of notes required an election under 

Article 7, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution. 

¶5 Mesa maintained that it only intended to pledge excise tax 

revenues to repay the TPANS and that doing so would not render Mesa or 

its taxpayers directly liable for their repayment. Mesa also argued that 

because it did not assume “a general liability to repay the borrowing,” the 

TPANS financing scheme was not subject to the indebtedness limit or the 

constitutional election requirement of Article 9, Section 8 and Article 7, 

Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution, respectively. 

¶6 Both parties moved for summary judgment and agreed that 

there were no genuine disputes of material fact. The trial court granted 

Mesa’s motion, finding that the TPANS are not general debts or general 

obligations bonds and thus, Mesa was not required to obtain voter approval 

before issuing them. Price timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under 

Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1. 

and -2101.A.1 (West 2014). 

DISCUSSION 

¶7 Price argues that the trial court’s order granting Mesa’s 

motion for summary judgment was “directly contrary to the statutes and 

federal regulations applicable to this case.”3 We review the grant of 

 

3 Arguments not presented to the trial court are generally waived on 

appeal. Price argues that Mesa failed to comply with federal securities 

regulations, but did not present this issue to the trial court. We deem it 

waived on appeal. See Airfreight Express Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 

Ariz. 103, 109, ¶ 17, 158 P.3d 232, 238 (App. 2007) (holding that parties must 

first raise arguments to the trial court so that it may rule on the issue). 
PRICE v. MESA 

Opinion of the Court 

4 

summary judgment and questions of law, including the interpretation of 

statutes, de novo. Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 207 Ariz. 495, 498-500, ¶¶ 

14-24, 88 P.3d 565, 568-70 (App. 2004). In reviewing issues of statutory 

construction, we look to the statute’s plain language to determine its 

meaning. Koss Corp. v. American Express Co., 233 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 12, 309 P.3d 

898, 903 (App. 2013). 

I. Light Rail Extension 

¶8 Government entities may enter into transportation project 

advance agreements and issue and sell TPANS. A.R.S. § 28-7692. However, 

state statutes authorizing TPANS do not expressly require government 

entities to obtain voter approval before doing so. See A.R.S. §§ 28-7691 to -

7697. When a statute is silent on an issue, “’we will not read into [it] 

something which is not within the express manifest intention of the 

Legislature as gathered from the statute itself,’ nor will we ‘inflate, expand, 

stretch or extend the statute to matters not falling within its expressed 

provisions.’” Ponderosa Fire Dist. v. Coconino Cnty., 235 Ariz. 597, 603, ¶ 30, 

334 P.3d 1256, 1262 (App. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 

¶9 Because the legislature was silent on this issue, we presume 

it did not intend to require municipalities to hold elections before issuing 

TPANS. This conclusion is further supported by other statutes that 

explicitly require municipalities to obtain voter approval before employing 

other financing options. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 48-682 and 9-523.

¶10 However, Price argues that Mesa has “attempt[ed] to 

mischaracterize [its] financial obligation . . . [and] avoid the voter 

requirement of an election for the approval of this bond debt to finance a 

public utility undertaking[.]” The trial court correctly identified the issue 

as follows: 

The central question in this case is what [Mesa] has pledged 

as security to repay its obligation. If it is a general obligation 

of [Mesa] and its property owners, [Mesa] would have needed 

to have an election prior to its approval of its funding 

mechanism for the second extension of the [Light Rail Transit 

System]. However, if it is a limited pledge of excise tax for a 

limited purpose, it would not qualify as a general debt [of 

Mesa], and, therefore, no special election would be necessary. 

¶11 The Arizona Constitution governs election requirements for 

general obligation bonds. “Questions upon bond issues or special 

assessments shall be submitted to the vote of real property tax payers, who 
PRICE v. MESA 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

shall also in all respects be qualified electors of this state, and of the political 

subdivisions thereof affected by such question.” Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 13. 

¶12 “The purpose in requiring an election on general obligation 

bond issuances is to provide the electors of an affected district with a voice 

in accepting or rejecting a proposed expenditure which they ultimately may 

bear.” Tucson Transit Auth., Inc. v. Nelson, 107 Ariz. 246, 248, 485 P.2d 816, 

818 (1971). However, bond issues and special assessments that are not 

directly charged against Mesa and do not increase its indebtedness are not 

under the purview of Article 7, Section 13 and thus do not require an 

election. See id. at 249, 485 P.2d at 819. 

¶13 The legislature has already established that TPANS are not 

general obligations. A.R.S. § 28-7697.A. Instead, TPANS are “limited 

obligations of the issuer of the notes and are payable solely from [TPARS] 

received by the political subdivision and . . . other monies lawfully 

available for application to that purpose[.]” A.R.S. § 28-7697.B. 

¶14 Mesa has a limited financial obligation in this case because it 

has only pledged to pay the TPANS interest and principal with TPARS and 

excise taxes, which are distinct from Mesa’s general funds. TPARS 

constitute “any revenues a political subdivision receives under a 

transportation project advance agreement, or as proceeds of [TPANS], 

together with any earnings from the investment of revenues.” A.R.S. § 28-

7691.5. Excise taxes are: 

[A]ll unrestricted excise, transaction, franchise, privilege and 

business taxes, state shared sales and income taxes, fees for 

licenses and permits and state revenue sharing that are levied 

and paid by a political subdivision or contributed, levied or 

paid to the political subdivision and not earmarked by the 

contributor or the political subdivision for a contrary or 

inconsistent purpose. 

A.R.S. § 28-7691.1. 

¶15 Political subdivisions issuing revenue bonds assume no 

actual or potential liability. Nelson, 107 Ariz. at 251, 485 P.2d at 821. 

Revenue bonds made payable with revenue from the project itself, state and 

city contributions from fees, penalties and excise taxes already in existence, 

and revenues from a constitutionally authorized fund that is distinct from 

general state revenues do not require voter approval. Id. Moreover, 

“municipal revenue bonds or obligations payable out of a special fund 

separate from the city’s general funds do not require an election before they 
PRICE v. MESA 

Opinion of the Court 

6 

may be issued[.]” City of Tucson v. Corbin, 128 Ariz. 83, 87, 623 P.2d 1239, 

1243 (App. 1980). Because Mesa did not pledge its general funds, it was not 

required to obtain voter approval before issuing the bonds. 

II. Parking Lot 

¶16 We next turn to whether Mesa was required to obtain voter 

approval before issuing TPANS to advance the construction costs of the 

Park and Ride parking lot. Price argues that the proposed parking lot is a 

utility undertaking requiring voter approval. Under A.R.S. § 9-523, 

“[q]uestions on bond issues under this article shall be submitted to the 

qualified electors of the municipality.” Such bond issues include “utility 

undertakings,” which include, in relevant part, “[a]irport buildings or other 

airport facilities or buildings or structures to provide off-street parking of 

motor vehicles[.]” A.R.S. § 9-521.5(b). 

¶17 Assuming without deciding that the parking lot qualifies as a 

utility undertaking, Mesa was not required to obtain voter approval under 

A.R.S. § 9-523. Mesa issued TPANS and not municipal bonds under A.R.S. 

§ 9-521 to finance construction. Also, for reasons discussed above, the 

TPANS Mesa proposed to finance the parking lot are not general 

obligations, and thus, voter approval is not required. 

CONCLUSION 

¶18 We affirm the trial court’s granting of Mesa’s motion for 

summary judgment.