United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 21, 2018*

Decided November 29, 2018 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 16-2218 

LARRY G. HARRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JACKIE MILLER, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 07-CV-3225 

Harold A. Baker, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Larry Harris, an Illinois inmate, sued prison officials for violating the Eighth 

Amendment by serving him a soy-based diet that he says harmed his health. Both sides 

moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Harris had not 

presented sufficient evidence suggesting that soy posed a known, substantial risk of 

harm to him. The judge then entered summary judgment in favor of the nonmedical 

 

*

 We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 16-2218 Page 2 

defendants, and Harris voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims. Because Harris 

failed to furnish evidence upon which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the 

nonmedical defendants knew (or recklessly disregarded) that his diet caused him 

serious medical issues, we affirm. 

On appeal from cross-motions for summary judgment, we view each motion 

separately and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Black 

Earth Meat Mkt., LLC v. Village of Black Earth, 834 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2016). We turn 

first to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

About 15 years ago, Illinois prisons began serving inmates a diet largely based on 

processed soy protein. Harris was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center at this 

time, but he mostly ate food that he purchased from the prison’s commissary. About 

three years later, however, long lockdowns at Menard prevented Harris from accessing 

the commissary, and he began eating the soy-based meals. Shortly thereafter in May 

2006, Harris went to the hospital after his heartrate slowed and his breathing became 

labored. To address his medical issues, a doctor placed a pacemaker in his chest. Similar 

problems arose after he ate a taco meal at the prison two months later, leading to a 

second hospital visit. At both visits his treating physicians told Harris to stop eating the 

soy-based food. 

Harris used the prison’s grievance process to alert prison officials to his concerns 

about soy. In his grievances he raised three main points. First, he said that his hospital 

doctors had blamed his hospital visits on the soy meals. Second, he asserted that when 

he eats a soy-based meal, he has shortness of breath, stomach swelling, and indigestion. 

Third, he reported that when he avoided these meals for three months, he lost over 

20 pounds. In response to this information, a nurse conducted allergen tests for soy. The 

tests showed that Harris did not have a soy allergy and could safely consume it. Harris, 

however, continued to press for a soy-free diet based on his asserted “hypersensitivity” 

to soy. 

This lawsuit followed. It raises the claim that by serving him a soy diet, prison 

officials violated the Eighth Amendment. In December 2008, about a year and a half 

after Harris filed the suit, the prison placed him on a soy-free diet. Although the record 

does not establish why the prison did so, Harris speculates that the change occurred 

because he submitted to the district court the August 2008 results of a doctor’s 

examination pulled from his medical records. This doctor wrote that Harris’s cardiac 
No. 16-2218 Page 3 

issues likely resulted from an undiagnosed thyroid deficiency, which the doctor 

thought the prison’s soy-based diet may have caused or exacerbated. 

The judge consolidated Harris’s case with similar cases brought by other inmates 

and recruited attorneys for the plaintiffs. Because none of the plaintiffs had a known 

soy allergy, the judge limited his analysis to the general risk of harm posed by soy in 

the prison diet. After receiving reports from experts who without contradiction 

described the ubiquity of soy in the American diet, the judge concluded that “society 

today simply does not see soy protein as a risk to the general population, much less a 

serious risk.” He then entered summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim in 

favor of the nonmedical defendants. The judge later asked the plaintiffs which, if any, 

claims remained. Counsel replied that only retaliation and negligence claims remained, 

and the plaintiffs asked the judge to dismiss those claims, which he did. Only Harris 

appeals, and only the entry of summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim 

against the nonmedical defendants is before us. See Hoffman v. Knoebel, 894 F.3d 836, 840 

(7th Cir. 2018). 

Harris argues that the judge improperly entered summary judgment because the 

record contains some evidence that soy caused his medical problems. We may assume 

that Harris is correct and that soy harmed him; his claim fails nonetheless. To survive 

summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claims against the nonmedical 

defendants, some evidence must suggest that during the time that they provided Harris 

with soy meals, they knew (or recklessly disregarded) that the meals would harm him. 

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Harris relies on his grievances, which he 

argues alerted the nonmedical defendants to the opinions of the hospital’s doctors that 

soy made him sick. 

For three reasons Harris’s grievances do not provide a basis for finding that the 

nonmedical defendants acted with deliberate indifference. First, prison administrators 

responded to those grievances reasonably by having a nurse test Harris for soy 

allergies. Nonmedical administrators may rely on the judgment of medical 

professionals. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). And that judgment, 

based on the results of the allergy test, was that Harris had no soy sensitivities. The 

defendants thus permissibly accepted that Harris was not allergic to soy and did not 

require a soy-free diet. Second, the ostensible conflict that Harris cites—between the 

results of the allergy test and the opinions of the hospital doctors—does not help him. 

When two reasonable medical opinions conflict, a prison administrator does not violate 

the Eighth Amendment by relying on one of them. See Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 
No. 16-2218 Page 4 

396–97 (7th Cir. 2006). Finally, within a few months of a prison doctor opining that 

Harris should receive a soy-free diet, prison administrators arranged one for him. And 

no evidence suggests that the modest time it took the administrators to arrange for his 

special diet reflects deliberate indifference. 

Based on this record, the judge correctly ruled on the cross-motions for summary 

judgment. Because when construed in Harris’s favor, the evidence would not permit a 

fact-finder to rule that the nonmedical defendants recklessly disregarded his medical 

health, the judge correctly granted their motions on the Eighth Amendment claim. It 

necessarily follows that when we construe the evidence against Harris, the judge 

correctly denied his cross-motion for summary judgment on the same Eighth 

Amendment claim. 

Harris also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. But 

because this is a civil case, Harris had no right to effective assistance of counsel. 

See Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001). 

AFFIRMED