UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7118

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CARLOS EMANUEL KINARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:93-cr-00215-GCM-6)

Submitted: May 9, 2024 Decided: May 29, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Carlos Emanuel Kinard, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Carlos Emanuel Kinard appeals the district court’s order granting in part and 

denying in part his motion for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act 

of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (“FSA”). In 1994, Kinard was convicted on 

twelve counts relating to a drug and racketeering conspiracy: conspiracy to distribute with 

intent to distribute and distribution of a quantity of cocaine base (Count 1), violent crimes 

in aid of racketeering (Count 2), two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

base (Counts 11, 12), two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking 

crime (Counts 13, 34), using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence (Count 33), 

murder or kidnapping in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting the same (Counts 28, 

31, 32), and two counts of assault in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting same 

(Counts 29, 30). Because the district court did not consider Kinard’s nonfrivolous 

arguments for a sentence reduction, we vacate and remand for resentencing.

Kinard’s sentencing range under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines was 

life. Kinard received concurrent life sentences for Counts 1, 2, 11, 12, 28, 31, and 32, 

and 20 years’ imprisonment for Counts 29 and 30. The sentences for the firearm 

convictions were stacked, as required by statute, beginning with a 10-year consecutive 

sentence for Count 13, plus two 20-year consecutive sentences for Counts 33 and 34.

Kinard moved for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the FSA. Kinard asserted 

that Counts 1, 11, and 12 were covered offenses and he should be resentenced to no more 

than 240 months for those convictions, the maximum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(C). Kinard also asserted that the district court could unbundle the grouped 

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offenses and resentence him on noncovered offenses. And Kinard asserted that he was 

sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines, but after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 

227 (2005), the court should consider the Guidelines as advisory.

The district court determined that Kinard was convicted of three covered offenses: 

Counts 1, 11, and 12, and concluded that if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect when 

Kinard was originally sentenced, he would have been sentenced to no more than 240 

months in prison for those three covered convictions. After reducing the sentence for the 

three convictions, the court concluded that Kinard was not entitled to plenary resentencing 

for his noncovered offenses and declined to reduce any other terms of imprisonment. The 

court addressed Kinard’s claim that his three 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences should be 

reduced under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) if there were extraordinary and compelling 

reason for a reduced sentence. But the court determined that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors did not warrant a reduction.

“Under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, sentencing courts may impose a reduced 

sentence as if section[s] 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time 

the covered offense was committed.” United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 408-09 

(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). The FSA “defines a ‘covered offense’ 

as a violation of a federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified 

by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that was committed before 

August 3, 2010.” United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 2020). Courts 

however are not required to reduce any sentence, even one above the revised statutory 

maximum. United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 821-22 (4th Cir. 2023). But the court 

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“must consider all nonfrivolous arguments for sentence reductions under the First Step Act 

based on changes in law or fact.” Id. at 821.

When, as here, the defendant is eligible for relief because he was convicted of a 

covered offense, the district court must analyze the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether 

to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence. We review a court’s decision 

to grant or deny a sentence reduction under the FSA for abuse of discretion. Id. at 819. 

Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will “affirm a district court’s denial of a 

Section 404(b) relief unless the court’s decision is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 820.

We held this appeal in abeyance pending this court’s decision in United States v. 

Richardson, 96 F.4th 659 (4th Cir. 2024). In Richardson, the district court reduced 

Richardson’s sentence for the covered offense under § 404(b) of the FSA, but found that

his noncovered offense was not eligible for a reduction. We held that the court had the 

discretion under the sentencing package doctrine to reduce the sentences for covered and 

noncovered offenses under the FSA if they function as a package. We further stated that 

“[a] district judge is best suited to determine in the first instance whether she sentenced 

defendant’s charges as a package,” because “the trial judge would be better situated to 

determine whether the noncovered counts were interrelated when she initially sentenced 

the defendant.” Id. at 665, 669.

Because Kinard asserted that the district court had authority to reduce the sentences 

for his noncovered convictions and to consider that the Guidelines are now advisory, we 

vacate the court’s order and remand for resentencing. We take no position on whether 

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Kinard’s overall sentence should be reduced further. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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