T h e H on or abl e Ar t h u r J. T ar n ow, Se n i or U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e Eas t er n D i s t r i ct of * M i chi gan, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. RECOM M ENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pur suantto S ixth Cir cuit I.O .P . 3 2.1( b) File Na me: 14a 0223p .06 

### UNITED S TATES CO URT OF APPEALS

FO R T H E SIX T H C IR C U IT

_________________
F. H. , b y his ne xt fr ie nd

Sand ra F ay Ha ll; S A N D RA F AY H A LL , Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts ,

v . M EM PH I S C I TY S CH O O LS ; V I NC E NT H UNT ER ; W A LTER B A N KS ; M AL I C A J OHNS ON ; P ATR I C I A A. T OAR MI NA ; P AT B EA NE , Defendants-A ppellees

. X

- - - - > , - - - - - N No. 13

- 6323

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Wes te rn

Di str ic t of

Te nn e sse e a t Me mph is. No. 2:12-cv- 02312—J ohn Thomas Fow lkes, J r., District Judge.

Argued: J une 26, 2014 Dec ided and F iled: September 4, 2014 Be fore : MOORE and KETH L EDGE, Circuit Judges; TARNOW, District J udg e. *

_________________ CO UN SEL ARG UED: Craig P. B arne s, MEMPHI S AREA L EGAL SERVI CES, I

NC., Memphis, Tennessee , fo r A pp e lla nts . Chri sto ph e r S . Ca

mpb e ll, HA RRI S SHEL TON HAN OV ER WA L SH, PL L C, Memphis, Tennesse e, for

Appellee s. J udith A. Gran, REI SMAN CAROL L A REI SMAN & G RAN, Ha d d o n fi el d, New Jersey , for Amicus Curia e. O N B RI E F: C r a i g P

. B ar n e s , F r an k

S

. C an tr e ll, MEMPHI S AREA L EGAL SERVI CES, I

NC., Memphis, T ennesse e, for Appellants. Christopher S. Campbell, HARRI S SHEL TON HA NOVER WAL SH, PL L C, Memphis, Tennessee , for Ap p e l l e e s . J u d i t hA

. G r an , RE IS M A N C A R O L L A R E IS M A

N & G RA N , H a d d o n f

i e l d , N e w J e r s e y, for Amicus Curia e. TARNOW, D.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which MOORE and KET HL EDGE, J J ., joined. KETHL EDGE, J. (pg. 10) , delivere d a sepa rate concur

ring opinion.

1No. 13

- 6323 F . H. v. M e m ph is C ity Sc h., et a l. Pag e 2

_________________ OP IN ION

_________________ TARNOW, District J udg e. Plaintiffs-A p p el l ants F.H ., repr esente d by his nex t friend a

nd mother Sandra Fa y Ha l l , and Sandra Fa y Hall individually , filed suit ag ainst Defe ndant-Appe llee Me mph is C ity

Sc ho ols (M CS) a lle g ingAp pe lle e a llo we d f or the a bu se and ne g le c t of F.H . w hil e enrolled in its schools, an d al leg e Appe llee bre ache d a Settlement Ag ree ment. The district cour t g ra nte d App e lle e ’s mot ion

to d ism iss a ll c la ims , f

ind ingthat App e lla

nts ’ c laim s ac c ru ingpr ior to the Settlement Ag ree ment wer e bar red by this Agr eeme nt, and that all other c laims require d exhaustion under the I ndividuals with Disabilities Education Act (I DEA). A ppellants now appe al the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 a

nd the br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la ims

. We find that Appellants’ § 1983 claims do not arise under the I DEA, we re not re lease d by the Settlement Ag ree ment, and that the administrative ex haustion of t hese claims would be futile. We also find that the languag e of the Settlement Ag ree ment, as well as the 2004 Amendments to the I DEA, render the S ettlement Agre ement enf orce able in the c ourts, and ther efor e, that the br eac h of contra ct claim does not require administrative ex haustion. As such, we reve rse the district court’s dis mis sa l of

Ap pe lla nts ’ A me nd e d Co mpl a int , a nd re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith this opini on. I. Statem ent of Fac ts
F.H. w as born on Aug ust 29, 1994. H e wa s diag nosed with ce rebr al palsy sy ndrome a s an infant. F .H. h as also bee n diag nosed with asthma, and sle ep apne a. F .H. has a uditory and visual limit ations and sig nificant lea rning disorders. F.H. has neede d a wheelcha ir or wa lker since he wa s a small child. F.H . also has limited use of his hands, which makes it difficult for him to rea ch ar ound himself, and to use the bathroom without assistance.
F .H . b e g an atte nd ingAp pe lle e MCS s c ho ols in 2 00 2. Duri ng his e nr oll me nt i n M CS, M s. Hall informed the staff of F.H.’ s disabiliti es and specific needs. F rom 2002 until 2010, F.H. attende d four diff ere nt sc hools a

nd had ele ven diffe rent a ides assig ned to him to render assistance throug houtNo. 13

- 6323 F . H. v. M e m ph is C ity Sc h., et a l. Pag e 3
the school day , including t o s u p er v ise and a ssist F.H. when usingthe re stroom. Appellant F.H

. rema ined enr olled in MCS until his g raduation in May 2013. Ap pe lla nts ’ A me nd e d Co mpl a int make s a li tany of sp e c if ic a lle g a tio ns of

phy sic a l, s e xua l,
and ve rb a l a

bu se of F .H

. by MCS a ide s ov e r t he c ours e of

F .H .’ s e nr oll me nt i n M CS. A pp e lla nts highli g ht t

he fo llo wi nga lle g a tio ns : (1) B eingfre quently

left unat te n d e d a n d u n s u p e r v ised in the bathroom, distraug ht and cry ing, una ble to clea

n himself; And in one ca se he suf fer ed a se izure; (2) Ve rbal a

nd phy sical abuse , on multipl e occasions from diff ere nt aides and sc hool p ersonnel, allowing him to re turn from the bathroom, in one ca se, with bloody underw ear ; (3) Being ridiculed about his disability (ce rebr al palsy) and told that he would, “ne ver amou nt t o a ny thi ng ;” un til F .H . s c re ame d a nd ba ng e d h is h e a d a g a ins t th e wa ll i n frustration; (4) Aides and school employ ees regularly failing to help F.H. c lean himself, so that he r e tu r n e d to c la s s w it

h d ir ty un d e r w e ar , an d o n a t le a s t o n e o c c a s io n an aide ann ounc e d to the c la ss t

hat F .H . s me lle d li ke “ sh it; ” (5 ) B e ing se xua l a

bu se d b y an a ide on

mor e tha n o ne oc c a sio n w hil e in a pr ivate bathr oo m. II. P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound
As the local educa

tion a g ency (L EA), the I DEA require s that MCS cr eate an Individualiz ed Ed uc a tio n Pl an ( I EP) for F.H. and oth e r d isa ble d s tud e nts

. See Forest GroveSch. Dist. v. T. A. , 557 U.S. 230, 232 (2009). The I DEA gua rante es these c hildren a F ree Appropriate Public Education (F APE) in co n fo rmity

with the I EP. Se e W

ink e lm an v . P ar

ma City Sc h. Di st. , 550 U.S. 516, 520 (2007); Am

yS. v . D an bu ry

Loc al S c h. Di st. , 174 Fe d. Appx. 896, 898 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006). The I DEA also provides spec ific proc edura l rec ourse should a n i n v o l v ed party object to the construc tion or implementation of the I EP. W inkelman , 550 U.S. at 524–25.
I n April of 2011, Ms. Hall initiated this process by filing a reque st for a due proce ss hear ing
on be ha lf of F .H . Und e r I DE A, wi thi n 15 da y s of a re qu e st f or a du e pr oc e ss h e ari ng , th e pa re nts , members of

the I EP team, and a

repr esentative of the L EA are required to participate in a r esolution session, g iving the L EA an oppor tunity to resolve the c omplaint. 20 U.S.C . § 1415(f) (1)( B) (i).No. 13

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On May 2, 2011, Ms. Hall met with re p rese ntatives from MCS for a r esolution session. Duri ngthe re so lut ion

se ssi on , th e pa

rt ie s r e a c he d a

te nt ati ve se ttl e me nt. On Au g us t 9, 20 11 , M s. Hall and a re p re s en tative of MCS signed a finalized Settlement Ag ree ment. This Settlement Ag re e me nt i nc lud e s th e fo llo wi ngte rm s:

Student and his Parent, and e ach of them, on behalf

of themselves . . . he reby fully and for ever release a

nd discharg e the District . . . f rom any and all cla ims . . . ari sin g un de r t

he I DEA and

c on c omi tant p ro vis ion s o f S TA TE law e na c te d in c omp lia nc e the re wi th, inc lud ing , but not lim ite d to , a ny matte r o r c la im whic h w a s, or could have bee n, asser

ted i n the Due Proc ess Proce eding , by rea son of any

matter, cause or thing whatsoeve r occ urre d, done, omitted, or suffere d to be done on or befor e the last da

y of the Settled Period, which Student an d h i s P arent, or any of them, now owns or holds, or may at any time here afte r own or hold.

. . . . The re lease s set fo rt h ab ove do not apply to any disputes that may

arise by re a so n o f a c ts o r o mis sio ns oc c ur ri nga ft e r t

he date of e xec uti on

of thi s A g re e me nt. I t is un ders too d th a t no a sp e c t of thi s A g re e me nt s ha ll r e le a se , ( or is i nte nd e d to re le a se or wa ive any

ri g ht o r r e me dy

a g a ins t) any P art fr om l ia bil ity fo r a ny po stAg ree ment new wr ong ful ac ts or omissions , including inde pendent torts, unre lated to t he pr ov isi on s o f t

his Ag re e me nt. This Ag ree ment was re ache d at a Resolution Session and is enfor cea ble in state or f

eder al court pursua

nt to 20 U.S.C . § 1415(f) (1)( B) (iii). On April 23, 2012, Appe llants filed a Complaint ag ainst Appellee s in the W estern D istrict Court of Tenne sse e , whic h th e y

ame nd e d in

July 20 13 . In th e Am e nd e d Co mpl a int , App e lla nts alleg ed that De fenda

nts violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the F ourtee nth Amendment of the U nited States Consti tution, the R ehabilitation Act (Sec tion 504), and the Ame rica ns with Disabiliti es Ac t (ADA ). Appe llants also made cla ims of retaliation under the ADA a

nd Section 504, as we ll as br e a c h o f t

he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt.
I n August 2012, Appellees f iled a motion to dism iss the Amended Complaint. I n Fe bruar y 2013, the di strict judge ref err ed Appellees’ moti on to dismi ss to the mag istrate judg e. On Apr il 24, 20 13 , th e ma g istrate jud g e iss ue d h e r R e po rt and Re c omm e nd a tio n, re c omm e nd ingdis mis sa l of a ll claims. On August 12, 20 1 3 , t h e dis trict court e ntere d an Or der a dopting the Re port and Re c omm e nd a tio n in

its e nti re ty , a

nd iss ue d a fi na l Judg me nt.No. 13

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On Octobe r 8, 2013, Appe llants filed a timely Notice of Appea l. Appellants now appea l the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ 42 U .S.C. § 1983 claims, the breach of contra ct claim, and all related issues of exhaustion. On April 25, 2014, an Amicus Brief was submitted by

the Council of Pare nt Attorney s and Ad vo c a te s ( CO PAA ), Di sa

bil ity L aw a nd Ad vo c a c y Ce nte r o f T e nn e sse e (D L AC ), Th e AR C Tenne ssee ( The ARC TN), Te nnessee Alliance f or L eg al S ervic es (TA L S), Support and Trainingfor Ex ceptional Par ents (STEP), Tenne ssee Voic es for Children, Inc. (TV C), an d P eople F irst of Tenne ssee ( People Fir st).
III. Stand ard of Review
We r eview de novo a dismiss al of a case for failure to state a c laim. Keys v. Humana, Inc

. , 684 F.3 d 6 0 5 , 6 08 (6th Cir. 2012). The c omplaint must contain fa ctual alleg ations that, when
acc epted a s t ru e, “s tate a c laim to relief that is plausible on its fac e.” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must include “fa ctual conte nt that allows the court to dra w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduc t alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
IV . A nal ys is
A. 42 U. S.C . § 19 83 Cl aim
The district cour

t found that the S ettlement Agre ement bars Appellants’ claims that acc rued from 2002 to August 9, 2011, and that all claims ac cruing afte r t he par ties entere d into the Settlement Ag ree ment require administrative exhaustion under the I DEA. The district court er red w ith respec t to t he § 1 98 3 c la ims a c c ru ingbo th b e fo re and a ft e r t he e xec uti on

of the Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt. First, the district cour

t erre d by concludingthat Appellants re lease d their cla ims accr uing pr ior to Augus t 9, 20 11 . In th e Se ttl e me nt Agr e e me nt, Ap pe lla nts a g re e d to re le a se a ll c la ims “ar ising unde r the I DEA and concomitant provisions of STATE law e nacte d in compliance there with, including, but not limit ed to, any matter or claim which was, or could have been, a sserted in the Due Proc ess Proce eding .” Howe ver, in the A mended Complaint, Appellants claim that Appellee MCS enga g ed in a policy or custom of fa iling adequately to train or supervise F.H.’s a idesNo. 13

- 6323 F . H. v. M e m ph is C ity Sc h., et a l. Pag e 6

and other employ ees a

nd that MCS knew of or should have known of the a busive behavior towards F .H ., inc lud ing nume ro us a c ts of ve rb a l and phy sic a l a

bu se . App e lla

nts ’ f a c tua l a lle g a tio ns c le arl y point to phy sical, non-disciplinary , and non-e ducational injuries, whic h cannot be redr essed by any
reme dy available under the I DEA. See, e .g. , Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 2 33 F .3 d 1 26 8, 12 74 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 0) ; Lopez v. Metro. Gov’ t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. , 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 908 (M.D. Te nn . 2 00 9) ; M.Y

. v. Spec ial Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 5 19 F

. Sup p. 2d 99 5, 10 02 (D

. Minn. 20 07 ). Thus , Appellants’ § 1983 c laims do not “aris[e] under the I DEA,” and we re not re lease d by the Settlement Ag re e me nt.
Se c on d, the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d b y c on c lud ingthat App e lla

nts sh ou ld h ave e xha

us te d th e ir § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m s t h r o u g ht h e ID E A a dm i n i s tr a t i v e p r o c e s s b e f o r e b r i n g i n g t h e mi nf

e d e r a l c o u rt

. In
re le va nt p art , th e I DE A p ro vid e s th a t:
No thi ngin [the I DE A] sha ll be c on str ue d to re str ic t or limit

the ri g hts , p ro c e dure s, and re medies ava ilable under t h e C onstitut ion . . . or other F eder al laws prote cting the rig hts of children w ith disabili ties, except that befor e the f iling of a civil action under suc h laws see king r elief that is also available under [ the I DEA], the [I DEA due proce ss] proce dures . . . shall be exhausted to the same e x tent as would be r equire d h a d th e a c ti o nb e e nb r o u g h t u n d e r [th e I D E A ]. 20 U.S.C. § 1415( l). Ap pe lla nts are no t e xcu se d f

ro m e xha us tio n me rel y beca

us e the y re qu e st compensatory

damag es under § 1983. Cov ing ton v . Kn ox Cnt y . S c h. Sy s. , 2 05 F .3 d 9 12 , 9 18 (6 th Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff seekingmoney damag es is require d to exhaust admini strative re m edies

u n d er t h e I DEA, e ven if money damag es ar e not ava ilable under the I DEA or thr oug h the administrative proc ess.”)

. Ap pe lle e s argue tha

t e xha us tio n of Ap pe lla

nts ’ 42 U. S.C. § 198 3 c la ims is r e qu ir e d b e c a us e the claims see k redr ess for educational injuries that arise under the I DEA, whic h may be re dresse d by the administrative proc ess until the child turns twenty -one unde r Tenne ssee law . Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 9- 10 -1 02 . B e c a

us e F .H . h a d not gra du a te d at th e tim e the c omp la int wa s f ile d, and be c a us e he is not y et twenty -one, A ppellees asser

t that c ompensatory education is an available and suff icient

r e m e dy.No. 13

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We a re no t pe rs ua de d th a t App e lla nts ’ a lle g e d in

ju ri es un der th e 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 c la ims

r e l a t e t o t h e p r o v i s i o no f a F A P E

. A s w e d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , Ap p e l l an t s a l l e g e t h a tF

. H

. w a s v e r b a l l y, phy sically , and eve n sexually abused by

his aides. These injuries are non-educ ational in nature and cannot be reme died throug h th e adminis trative proc ess. Moreove r, re quiring exhaustion of Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims would cre ate an additional administrative bar rier not pr esent for non- disabled childre n. See Sagan v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 726 F. Supp. 2d 868, 882–83 (M .D . T e nn . 2 01 0) (“ Th e Court c on str ue s th e se c la ims a s a

ri sin g fr om non- e du c a tio na l in jur ie s, irrespe ctive of the fac t they occur red in an educ ational setting and we re a lleg edly perpe trated by educators ag ainst a student. I f Jane Doe we re not a disab l ed s t u d en t , there would be no
a dmi nis tr a tiv e ba

rr ie r t o h e r p ur su it o f the se c la ims .” ). Th e re fo re , App e lla nts are no t r e qu ir e d to
e xha us t th e ir § 1 98 3 c la ims re late d to no n- e du c a tio na l in jur ie s. Moreove r, “[e]x haustion is not required if it would be f u t i l e o r i n adequate to protec t the plaintiff’s rig hts.” Covington , 205 F.3d at 917. I n Covington , we spe cifica lly fo u nd that “in the unique circ umstances of this c ase—in which the injured child has alre ady g raduated from the spe cial
e du c a tio n s c ho ol , hi s injuri e s are wh oll y in t he pa st, and

the re fo re mon e y

dama g e s a

re the on ly
reme dy that can make him whole —proce eding throug h the state’s administrative proce ss would be futile and is not require d befor e the plaintiff c an file suit in fede ral c ourt.” Id . F.H. ha s g raduated and see ks compensation for injuries suffe red at the hands of his a busive aides. The a dminist rative pr oc e ss cann ot prov ide e ith e r t he ty pe of re lie f h e se e ks or

any oth e r t y pe of re me dy to r e dr e ss wholly retrospe ctive injuries. Thus, exhaustion in thi s case would be futile.
Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that the dis tr ic t c ou rt e rr e d b y dis mis sin g Ap pe lla

nts ’ 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 98 3 c la ims

. B. B r e ac h of C ont r ac t C lai m Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso dis mis se d th e br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im f or fai lu re to e xha

us t. Appellants ar g ue that exhaustion is unnecessar y beca use the c lear

terms of bot h t h e S ettlement Ag re e me nt and the 20 04 Am e ndme nts to the I DE A re nd e r the Se ttl e me nt Agre e me nt direct ly
e nf or c e a ble in t he c ourt s.No. 13

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We h ave he ld t

hat “ § 1 41 5( i) (2 ) [o f t

he I DE A] c le arl y

c on te mpl a te s th at plai nti ff s w ill exhaust their administrative reme dies befor e bring ing a civil action to enfor ce their rig hts under the I DEA.” Covington , 205 F.3d at 915. Howeve r, the que stion o f whether a cla im of brea ch of a settlement ag ree ment must be exhausted prior to filing suit is one of f irst impression. I n rele vant pa rt , th e 20 04 Am e ndme nts to t he I DE A p ro vid e that, “ [i]n the c a se that a re so lut ion is r e a c he d to resolve the complaint at a [resolution session] , the parties sha ll ex ecute a leg ally binding a g ree ment that is . . . enforc eable in any State court of c ompetent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)( 1)(B )(iii). Appellee s argue that the pa rties did not f

inalize the se ttlement ag ree ment “at” the re solution session, rende ring the 2004 Amendments inapplica ble. They

highlig ht the ninety -seve n day g ap betwee n the May

2, 2011 resolution session and the August 9, 2 0 1 1 s i gning of the finalized Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt, and argue that if an agre e me nt is mad e duri ng a re so lut ion

se ssi on , it

mus t be fina liz ed within thirty day s of the session. Appellee s base this argument on the provision of the I DEA a llowing a

pare nt to continue with the due proc ess hea ring sho u l d a L EA fa il to resolve a complaint within thirty day s of i ts rec eipt. 20 U.S.C. §1415(f) (10(B )(ii). How ever , this section of the I DE A i s c le arl y

ina pp lic a ble he re , a

nd do e s n ot lim it the amou

nt o f t ime the pa

rt ie s ma y take to finalize an ag ree ment rea ched dur ing the resolution session. Appellee s al s o argue that the Settlement Ag ree ment was not re ache d “at” a re solution session ba se d o n o ne te rm

of the Ag re e me nt t

hat App e lle e s a lle g e c ou ld n ot h ave be e n k no wn a t the tim e of the session. Specif

ically , para g raph 1.3 of

the Settlement Ag ree ment provides that Willi e B oone will act as F .H.’s aide for the 2011- 2012 school y ear , even thoug h Boone was not hired until after the re solution session. However, it is not dispositive that the contra ct incorpor ates some infor mation lear ned by the parties afte r the re solution session because a g ree ments rea ched dur ing a meetingare often ref ined and finalized long afte r the meeting conclude s. Indeed, requiring t h at a s ett lement ag ree ment be wr itten, finalized, and si g ned during a settlement confe renc e would be c ounter to the usual prac tice.
Ultimate l y , this question is answe red by the terms of the Settlement Ag ree ment itself. Ap pe lle e s a g re e d t o a pro vis ion in t he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt t hat c le arl y

state s th a t “ [t]his Ag ree ment was re ache d at a Resolution Session a nd is e nforc eable in state or fe dera l court pursua ntNo. 13

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to 2 0 U .S. C. § 14 15 (f

)( 1) (B )( iii ). ” Th is c on tr a c t pr ov isi on , b arg a ine d f or and a g re e d to by

bo th parties, c ontrols here . As such, we find that the languag e of the Settlement Ag ree ment, as we ll as the 20 04 ame ndme nts to the I DE A, c le arl y pr ov ide that th e Se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt i s e nf or c e a ble in the cour ts, and there fore , that the bre ach of contract claim does not re quire a dminist rative exhaustion.
V. Conclusion The g rava men of Appe llants’ complaint is the verba l, phy sical, and e ven sexual abuse of F.H. by his a ide s. Th e se fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns po int to n on -e du c a tio na l in

jur ie s th a t ha

ve no ava ila

ble
reme dy under the I DEA. As suc h, we f ind that Appellants’ § 1983 cla im s d o n o t ar ise under the I DE A, and

the re fo re , w e re no t re le a se d by the Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt. F or the same re a so n, we a lso fi n d t h at t h e adminis trative e x haustion of these c laims would be futile. Fina lly , we f ind that the lang uag e of the Settlement Ag ree ment, as we ll as the 2 0 0 4 Am endments to the I DEA, re nder the Settlement Ag ree ment enfor cea ble in the cour

ts, and thus, that the bre ach of contra ct claim does not

r e qu ir e a dmi n is tr a ti v e e xh a u s ti o n . A c c o r d in g ly , w e r e v e r s e th e d is tr ic t c o urt’ s d is mi s s a l of Appellants’ Ame nded C omplaint, and re mand for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.No. 13

- 6323 F . H. v. M e m ph is C ity Sc h., et a l. Pag e 10

_________________ CONCURRENCE

_________________ KETHL EDGE, Circuit Judge, c oncurr ing. N ot ever y inj u r y in f li c te d w it h in a school building is “educ ational.” Her e, F.H.’s allegations in support of his § 1983 claim included the f ollowing: that t h e a i d e s w h o w e r e s u

p p o s e d t o c l e anh i ma f

t e r h e u s e d t h e r e s tr o o m( F

. H

. h a s c e r e b r a l p a l s y) instead often le ft him there unattended, including on one occasion when he suff ere d a seizure; that the a ide s w ho did

a c c omp any

him to t he re str oo m r outin e ly

re fu se d to c le an h im, wh ic h c a us e d h im to r e tur n to c la ss wi th fe c e s in h is und e rw e ar, wh ic h in tur n s ub je c te d h im t o r idi c ule fr om s tud e nts and teacher s alike; t hat on one occasion an aide r idiculed F.H . until he bang ed his hea d ag ainst the bathr oo m w a ll i n f

rust rat ion; that on

ano the r o c c a sio n a

n a ide re fu se d to a ssi st F .H . a nd se nt h im ba c k to c la ss w ithblo od

y un de rw e ar; and

tha t on e a ide sex ual ly a

bu se d h im “ wh ile in a

pr ivate bathroom.”
To c haracter iz e F.H.’ s in jur ie s a s “ e du c a tio na l” is t o b e little the m. T he g ra vame n o f h is claim is not that the conduct de scribed in his complaint mig ht reduc e his SAT score s. The g rava men of his claim, rather, is that this conduct wa s an attac k upon F.H.’ s dignity as a huma

n being . That inj ur y wa s n ot r e me dia

ble by so me c ha

ng e to F .H .’ s “ Ind ivi du a lize d Ed uc a tio n Pla

n. ” No r w a s it by a mer e promise not to let these thing s happen a g ain. The reme dy for F .H.’s injury , there fore , lay not in “ the I DEA’s a dminist rative pr ocedur es[.] ” S.E. v. Grant Bd. Of Educ. , 5 44 F .3 d 6 33 , 6 42 (6 th Cir. 2008). Instead his re medy lies in feder al cour

t, where F.H. c an obtain not onl y compensation for his injuries, but rec og nition of what they actua lly wer e.