REVISED JUNE 21, 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-41274

ADRIANA ECHAVARRIA, in their own name and right, and on behalf of all

others similarly situated; JUAN LARIN-ULLOA,

Plaintiffs - Appellees 

v.

MICHAEL J. PITTS, District Director for Interior Enforcement, Department of

Homeland Security; JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Defendants - Appellants 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

HAROLD R. DeMOSS, JR., Circuit Judge:

This appeal asks us to consider whether, in order to satisfy due process,

the government must take additional reasonable steps to notify a bond obligor

that the bond has been breached when the government has knowledge that the

initial attempt at notice failed. We hold that in such circumstances additional

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 11, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
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reasonable steps must be taken. 

I.

When an alien has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), an obligor may post a $1,500 cash bond to secure the alien’s release. The

obligor signs an agreement with DHS, agreeing to be responsible for informing

DHS of the alien’s whereabouts and to ensure the alien’s appearance at

subsequent interviews, hearings, and, if necessary, for deportation. The obligor

further agrees that DHS may send notice to the obligor at the address specified

in the bond agreement. DHS notifies the bond obligor of a demand on the bond

by mailing notice to the obligor at the address listed in the bond agreement by

certified mail return receipt requested. Ifthe notice is returned as undeliverable

for any reason, DHS immediately declares the bond breached. DHS sends notice

of the breach to the same address. DHS does not attempt to resend notice of the

bond demand to the obligor by any other means. The bonded alien eventually

receives notice of the bond demand directly from DHS. 

Appellees filed suit, asserting that their due process rights were violated

when DHS failed to make additional attempts at service after it had knowledge

that the initial attempt at notice failed. The district court certified four classes,

two of which are parties on appeal: the Obligor Cash Bond Class (the Obligor

Class) and the Immigration Cash Bond Class (the Immigration Class). The

Obligor Class seeks reinstatement or reinstatement and cancellation of bonds

already breached. Each member of the Obligor Class received notice of all

demands sent prior to the undelivered demand. Adriana Echavarria, class

representative of the Obligor Class, admits that she did not notify DHS of her

new address, resulting in the bond demand being returned to DHS as

undeliverable. The members of the Immigration Class are aliens currently out

on cash bonds, or will be in the future, and seek prospective relief requiring

DHS to take additional reasonable steps to notify an obligor on future bond

demands that are returned as undeliverable. The parties filed cross motions for
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1 DHS asserts that the bond obligors contractually agreed to what constituted

sufficient notice and as such this matter should be analyzed under general contract

principles. However, the bond obligors were deprived of a constitutionally protected

property interest by action of the government, which requires that notice of the deprivation

meet due process requirements unless the obligors waived their due process rights. See

Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 787 (5th Cir. 1989). “[A] waiver of constitutional rights

is not effective unless the right is intentionally and knowingly relinquished.” Id. The bond

obligor’s agreement to receive notice at the address provided in the bond agreement does

not clearly establish that the obligors intentionally and knowingly waived their due process

rights. 

summary judgment. The district court granted Appellees’ motion, finding that

Appellants violated Appellees’ due process rights by failing to take additional

reasonable steps to notify the obligors of the bond demand. Appellants timely

appealed. 

II.

We review a district court’s determination on a motion for summary

judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court. See

Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary

judgment must be granted “ifthe movant shows thatthere is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Due process requires thatthe government provide “notice and opportunity

for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case” before depriving persons of

their property. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313

(1950). To satisfy the requirements of due process, notice must be “reasonably

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their

objections.” Id. at 314. Generally, notice of a bond demand may be satisfied by

sending the notice certified mail return receipt requested. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.5a(a)(2)(iv). This case requires us to determine whether such notice is

sufficient when the sender knows that the notice was not received.1

The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220
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2 See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder, 400 F. App’x 218, 219 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)

(finding that the INS took “additional reasonable steps” to notify alien of the denial of his

application for legalization); Peralta-Cabrera v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 837, 845 (7th Cir. 2007)

(noting in denial of alien’s motion to reopen deportation proceedings that “it is the

(2006). In Jones, the Court was tasked with determining whether the State of

Arkansas provided constitutionally sufficient notice to deprive a taxpayer of his

home when notices of a tax deficiency and forfeiture of the property were mailed

to the taxpayer by certified mail but were returned to the State as “unclaimed.”

547 U.S. at 223-24. The State asserted that mailing the letters was sufficient to

satisfy due process notice requirements. Id. at 226. The Court noted that in

cases where courts had found that mailing a letter via certified mail was

sufficient notice, the sender had no reason to know that “anything had gone

awry.” Id. Those cases did not answer “whether due process entails further

responsibility when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its

attempt at notice has failed.” Id. at 227. Because notice varies with the

circumstances and conditions presented, the Court looked to whether knowledge

of unsuccessful service was a “circumstance and condition that varies the notice

required.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Court did not “think that a person who

actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a

house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is

returned unclaimed.” Id. at 229; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“[W]hen

notice is a person’s due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous

of actually informing the absentee.”). When the government has knowledge that

notice was not effected, it cannot “simply ignore” that information. Jones, 547

U.S. at 237. The Court held that, under such circumstances, the State “should

have taken additional reasonable steps to notify [the taxpayer], if practicable to

do so.” Id. at 234. 

Appellants argue that Jones should not apply in the immigration bond

context. Although Jones has not previously been applied in this context, other

courts have applied Jones outside the real property forfeiture context.2 We
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government’s responsibility to ensure that notice by mail is successfully delivered”); Crum

v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that Jones did not apply when

defendant admitted to receiving notice of the revocation of his medical license); Rodriguez v.

Drug Enforcement Admin., 219 F. App’x 22, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (finding that

notice of forfeiture of $1,905 was inadequate if government knew notice did not reach

appellant); Yi Tu v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 470 F.3d 941, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding

that notice was insufficient when government had knowledge that notice of suspension pilot

license would not reach petitioner); United States v. One Star Class Sloop Sailboat, 458

F.3d 16, 23 n.7 & 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that government should have taken additional

steps to locate and notify joint owner of sailboat of pending civil forfeiture); cf. In re Seizure

of $143,265.78 FROM CHECKING ACCOUNT NO. 1851349546, 384 F. App’x 471, 474-75

(6th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply Jones where there was no evidence that the government

was aware that its attempts at notice had failed).

recognize that an irreversible loss of a person’s home is a more significant

deprivation than the loss of $1,500. We also note that the bond obligors made no

attempt to inform the DHS of their new addresses. Appellants offer no

persuasive reason that the general principle of requiring additional reasonable

steps when the sender knows that notice was not received should be rejected in

these circumstances. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 232 (finding that the taxpayer did

not forfeit his right to constitutionally sufficient notice when he failed to update

his address with the State as was required by statute). As such, we find that

when Appellants knew that the bond demands were returned as undeliverable,

due process required that Appellants take additional reasonable steps to notify

the bond obligors of the bond demands. 

III.

Having found that Jones requires DHS to take additional reasonable steps

to notify the Appellees, Appellants argue thatthe district court ordered itto take

steps that exceed the holding of Jones. The Court did not set forth a standard for

what constitutes “additional reasonable steps.” Jones, 547 U.S. at 234. Rather,

it limited its discussion to steps the State could have taken under the facts

before it. Id. at 234-37. Jones held that “reasonable followup measures” would

include resending the notice by regular mail, posting notice on the front door, or

addressing the notice to “occupant.” Id. at 235.

In the present matter, the district court held that “[t]he relief requested
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3 An “A-file” is the file DHS keeps on the bonded alien.

by Obligor Plaintiffs does not require the Court to pronounce the steps

Defendants should have taken. It is enough to find that additional reasonable

steps were in fact available, and were not used, and in this case Defendants have

provided no evidence to suggest that these steps did not exist.” With respect to

the Immigration Bond Class,the district court held thatthe I-352 form “requires

the obligor to provide his or her name, address,telephone number, and taxpayer

identification number. Therefore, additional information that could be used to

locate the obligor is readily available to DHS.” To the extent the district court

held that DHS should search a government database using the taxpayer

identification number, such finding would exceed the import of Jones. Under

these circumstances, searching government records for updated contact

information is neither practicable nor constitutionally required. See Jones, 547

U.S. at 235-36 (holding thatthe State was not required to search the phone book

or other government records in order to find taxpayer’s new address because

such searches impose “burdens on the State significantly greater than the

several relatively easy options” otherwise available). 

With respect to the Obligor Bond Class, the district court found that the

reasonable steps available to DHS included reference to the bond contract and

the A-file3ofthe bonded immigrantfor alternate contact information. We decline

to establish any specific finding as to what constitutes additional reasonable

steps and we find no error with the district court’s holding in these

circumstances. “Although the Government is not required to undertake ‘heroic

efforts,’ it must fulfill Mullane’s command that the effort be ‘reasonably

calculated’to provide notice.” Taylor v. United States, 483 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir.

2007) (quoting Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002)). The A-file

is readily accessible to DHS. When the government can attempt to ascertain the

necessary information through such minimal effort, it is incumbent on the
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government to do so.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that DHS violated the bond obligor’s

due process rights when itfailed to take additional reasonable steps to notify the

obligors of the bond demand after the initial notice was returned as

undeliverable before it collected on the bond. The district court’s order granting

summary judgment is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.