NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DENNIS DUARTE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-10148 

D.C. Nos. 

1:15-cr-00633-JMS-1 

1:15-cr-00633-JMS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 17, 2022**

Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: HAWKINS, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Dennis Duarte appeals the denial of his motion for 

compassionate release. He contends the district court erred on two grounds: (1) it 

abused its discretion in finding that the risk of infection with COVID-19 did not 

present an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for his release under 18 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 23 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and (2) in making this finding, its reliance on guidance from the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC) constituted impermissible delegation under 

United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

In deciding whether to grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), we “consider (1) whether ‘extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’; and (2) ‘the [sentencing] factors set 

forth in [§] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.’” United States v. Keller, 

2 F.4th 1278, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Each 

step of this analysis qualifies as an independent ground to deny a motion for 

compassionate release. See id. at 1284 (“[A] district court that properly denies

compassionate release need not evaluate each step.”). 

The district court denied Duarte’s motion based on both steps. However, on 

appeal, Duarte challenges only the district court’s “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons” analysis. Regarding the § 3553(a) analysis, Duarte merely contends these 

statutory factors do not provide an independent ground for relief when the district 

court has already conducted an “extraordinary and compelling reasons” inquiry. In 

support, he cites United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021) (per 

curiam), where we remanded even though the district court had found that the 

§ 3553(a) factors weighed against release. But in Aruda “[w]e offer[ed] no views as 
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to the merits” of the defendant’s motion for compassionate release. Id. Instead, we 

remanded because the district court had treated an inapplicable sentencing guideline 

as binding. Id. Here, the district court made no such error. 

Because the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis, which Duarte did not 

challenge, provides an independent ground to deny Duarte’s motion for 

compassionate release, we affirm on that basis and do not address Duarte’s 

arguments related to the district court’s extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons 

analysis. See Keller, 2 F.4th at 1284; Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino 

Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1152 (9th Cir. 2018) (per 

curiam) (issues not raised on appeal are waived).

AFFIRMED.