UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AMARANTH ADVISORS L.L.C., et al., 

Defendants. 

07 Civ. 6682 (DC) 

ECFCASE 

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

STAYING THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 

Division of Enforcement 

140 Broadway, 19th Floor 

New York, NY 1 0005 

(646) 746-9733 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................. 1 

I. CFTC Sues Amaranth and Hunter In This Court ................................................................ 1 

II. The Other Relevant Proceedings ......................................................................................... 2 

POINTS OF LAW ........................................................................................................................... 3 

I. The Extraordinary Relief Sought by Amaranth Is Neither Necessary nor Proper .............. 3 

A. The Extraordinary Relief of a Stay Should Not be Issued Merely to A void 

Possible Issue Preclusion ............................................................................................... 6 

B. Amaranth's Request for Relief from This Court Is Not Proper .................................... 6 

C. Amaranth's Motion Improperly Interferes with the Rights ofNon-Parties .................. 8 

II. The Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Futures Trading Granted by Congress to CFTC ............. 9 

A. Congress has outlined clearly the scope of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction 

in CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) .......................................................................................... 10 

I. The legislative history of the CEA reinforces the scope ofthe CFTC's 

authority regarding futures trading on designated contract markets ..................... 12 

2. Courts have consistently recognized the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over 

futures trading on designated contract markets ..................................................... 14 

B. FERC's anti-manipulation authority ........................................................................... 17 

C. The Energy Policy Act does not affect Section 2(a)(l )(A) of the CEA. ..................... 18 

D. FERC's Proceeding ..................................................................................................... 19 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

FEDERAL CASES 

A/emile Manufacturing Corp. v. Staff, 

42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ........................................................................................................ 3 

American Agriculture Movement, Inc. v. Board o.fTrade ofCity of Chicago, 

977 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................. 17 

Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 

435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977) ........................................................................................... 16 

Board ofTrade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 

677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), 

vacated as moot on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982) ................................................ 15, 19 

Branch v. Smith, 

538 U.S. 254 (2003) ................................................................................................................ 18 

Brown v. General Services Administration, 

425 U.S. 820 (1976) ................................................................................................................ 19 

CFTC v. Atha, 

420 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2006) .................................................................................... 16 

CFTC v. Bradley, 

408 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (N.D.Okla. 2005) .................................................................................. 16 

CFTC v. Johnson, 

408 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ..................................................................................... 16 

CFTC v. Reed, 

481 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Colo. 2007) .................................................................................... 16 

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

501 u.s. 32 (1991) .................................................................................................................... 4 

Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 

883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) ............................................................................................. 15, 19 

In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 

282 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 5 

E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Schank, 

456 F. Supp. 507 (D. Utah 1976) ............................................................................................ 16 

ii 
FDIC v. Meyer, 

510 u.s. 471 (1994) ................................................................................................................ 11 

FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 

276 F .3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................... 15, 16 

Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith. Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd, 

470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) .......................................................................................... 16 

Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 

221 u.s. 418 (1911) .................................................................................................................. 4 

Heckler v. Chaney, 

470 u.s. 821 (1985) .................................................................................................................. 1 

Landis v. North A mer. Co., 

299 u.s. 248 (1936) .................................................................................................................. 5 

Mallen v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 

605F.Supp.II05(N.D.Ga.1985) ........................................................................ 16, 16-17,19 

Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith. Inc. v. Curran, 

456 u.s. 353 (1982) ................................................................................................................ 10 

Morton v. Mancari, 

417 u.s. 535 (1974) ................................................................................................................ 18 

Peck v. United States, 

522 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ............................................................................................ 5 

Retirement Systems of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 

386 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 6 

Rodriguez v. United States, 

480 u.s. 522 (1987) ................................................................................................................ 18 

SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, 

546 F.2d 1361 (lOth Cir. 1976) ......................................................................................... 14, 15 

SEC v. Univest, Inc., 

405 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1975), 

remanded without op., 556 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1977) (table decision) .............................. 14, 19 

United States v. -13.47 Acres of Land, 

45 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D. Conn. 1999) .......................................................................................... 5 

United States v. Fausto, 

484 u.s. 439 (1988) ................................................................................................................ 18 

iii 
United States v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 

420 F. Supp. 2d I 043 (S.D. Cal. 2006) ................................................................................... 17 

Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P. v. Schmutz, 

282 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................... II 

Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 

440 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1971) ...................................................................................................... 6 

Volmar Distributions, Inc. v. New York Post Co., 

152 F.R.D. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ................................................................................................. 5 

Messer v. E.F. Hutlon & Co., 

847 F.2d 673 (II th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................................. 16 

Westlake v. Abrams, 

504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980) ........................................................................................... 16 

Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 

494 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................... 4 

FEDERAL STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 

Commodity Exchange Act§ 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(I)(A) ............................................ passim 

Commodity Exchange Act § 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) ............................................................. 17 

Commodity Exchange Act § 2(g), 7 U.S.C. § 2(g) ....................................................................... 16 

Commodity Exchange Act§ 9(a)(4), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(4) ............................................................... 1 

Commodity Exchange Act§ 12(e)(l), 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) ......................................................... :.13 

15 u.s.c. § 717(b) ......................................................................................................................... 18 

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) ............................................................................................................... 8, 9, 18 

15 U.S.C. § 717c-l .......................................................................................................... 2, 9, 17, 18 

15 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c ................................................................................................................. l7 

28 u.s.c. § 1294 ............................................................................................................................. 8 

28 u.s.c. § 1651 ............................................................................................................................. 4 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ..................................................................................................................... 3-4 

iv 
Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244 ~20 (January 26, 2006) ............ 18 

FERC Rule lc.l, 18 C.F.R. § lc.l ("Rule lc.l") ................................................................... passim 

18 C.F.R. § 385.209 ......................................................................................................................... 7 

H. Rep. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1974) ..................................................................... 12-13 

S. Rep. No. 93-1131 (1974), 

asreprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843 .......................................................................... 12, 13 

S. Rep. No. 97-384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982) ..................................................................... 13 

OTHER AUTHORITIES 

Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.) ................................................................................................... 11 

Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary .............................................................. )) 

v 
INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") respectfully submits 

this memorandum oflaw in opposition to the motion of Defendants Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. 

and Amaranth Advisors (Calgary) ULC (together, "Amaranth") for an order pursuant to this 

Court's inherent powers staying the non-party Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

("FERC") from proceeding with its administrative adjudication against Amaranth and other 

entities and persons not parties to this action. The Court should deny Amaranth's motion 

because the extraordinary relief sought is neither necessary nor proper. 

BACKGROUND 

I. The CFTC Sues Amaranth and Hunter In This Court. 

On Wednesday, July 25, 2007, the CFTC brought this action against Amaranth 

and their chief natural gas trader, Brian Hunter. See Ex. A. In its Complaint, the CFTC alleges 

that Amaranth and Hunter attempted to manipulate the price of the March 2006 and May 2006 

natural gas futures contracts (the "NYMEX NG contracts") during the last half hour ofthe last 

day oftrading of those contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"). The 

Complaint also alleges that Amaranth violated Section 9(a)(4) of the Commodity Exchange Act 

(the "CEA"), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(4), by making false statements to NYMEX in response to 

NYMEX's inquiry regarding Amaranth's trading of the May 2006 NYMEX NG contract. 1 

1 Amaranth has emphasized that the CFTC has charged attempted manipulation, not perfected (i.e., 

successful) manipulation. Although the Complaint alleges that Defendants intended to manipulate the NG market 

and took overt acts to do so, nowhere in the complaint does the CFTC allege that Defendants were unsuccessful in 

manipulating the market. Nor does the CFTC expect to introduce evidence that the manipulation was not successful. 

The decision by the CFTC to charge certain acts or violations but not others should never be read to mean that the 

CFTC has concluded that no such violation thus occurred. Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 ( 1985) ("an 

agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally 

committed to an agency's absolute discretion"). 
II. The Other Relevant Proceedings. 

On or about Thursday, July 19, 2007, FERC notified Brian Hunter, Amaranth and 

others that, in connection with an anticipated enforcement filing in no less than five days, it 

would publicly release certain information that had been provided to FERC during the course of 

its investigation. On Monday, July 23, 2007, Hunter brought a declaratory judgment action 

against FERC before the District Court for the District of Columbia essentially claiming that 

FERC's proposed enforcement action was ultra vires because FERC lacked jurisdiction to 

institute the proceeding. See Ex. B. Hunter also sought a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction against PERC's enforcement action. See Ex. C. On July 24, District 

Judge Richard Leon denied the TRO(see Ex. D, at 35:19-20), and on August 7, Judge Leon 

heard oral arguments on the preliminary injunction motion. 

On July 26, 2007, PERC filed an administrative proceeding charging the 

defendants in this case, as well as another trader named Matthew Donohoe, two other entities 

related to Amaranth, and the master and feeder investment pools advised by Amaranth, with 

engaging in a manipulative scheme related to the settlement price of the March, April, and May 

2006 NYMEX NG contracts. In its Order to Show Cause ("OSC") that instituted these charges 

(see Ex. E), PERC alleges that Amaranth's trading violated PERC's anti-manipulation rule, 18 

C.P.R. § lc.l ("Rule lc.1 "),promulgated under Section 4A of the Natural Gas Act ("NGA''), 15 

U.S.C. § 717c-1. 

The OSC alleges that Amaranth manipulated the settlement prices for the 

February, March, and April2006 NYMEX NO contracts by trading NYMEX NG contracts on 

three specific days. See Ex. E ~~1, 5. Because the settlement price ofNYMEX NO contracts 

serves as a benchmark for setting the price of physical natural gas contracts, FERC alleges that 

the charged manipulation of the NO contracts fraudulently affected natural gas prices in violation 

2 
of FERC Rule I c. I. See id, ~6. Specifically, FERC alleges that Amaranth violated Rule I c.l 's 

prohibitions against using "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" and against engaging "in 

any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 

any entity." See id, ~44. 

On August 27, 2007, Amaranth (and two of its related entities) moved FERC for 

expedited rehearing of the decision to issue the OSC on the grounds that FERC lacks jurisdiction 

over the acts set forth in the OSC. See Ex. F. To the CFTC's knowledge, this motion has not 

been as yet joined by the master or feeder pools, or by the individual respondents. 

POINTS OF LAW 

I. The Extraordinary Relief Sought by Amaranth Is Neither Necessary nor 

Proper. 

Amaranth here moves this court for an order preventing multiple non-parties to 

this action from obtaining timely resolution ofFERC's allegations- namely, FERC, the 

Amaranth funds, and Donohoe. Yet the operative rule for any court is that its orders generally are 

limited to the parties before it. As Judge Learned Hand stated for the court of appeals over 75 

years ago, ''no court can make a decree which will bind any one but a party; a court of equity is 

as much so limited as a court of law .... " A/emile Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 

1930). This traditional rule is expressly incorporated into Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure: 

Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order ... 

is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, 

servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in 

active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice 

of the order by personal service or otherwise. 

3 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (2007). (Indeed, Amaranth originally sought this stay pursuant to Rule 65 

by seeking an order to show cause (see Ex. G) that was served but never formally filed with the 

clerk. Thus, the very rule upon which Amaranth initially moved precludes the relief sought.) 

In the filed notice of motion, 2 Amaranth apparently recognized that relief against 

a non-party cannot be granted pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet, Amaranth 

does not identify any rule or statute that justifies the extraordinary relief it seeks against a nonparty to this action. Although in its memorandum of law Amaranth appears to invoke the 

"inherent powers" of the courts to support the stay, Amaranth does so without acknowledging 

the extraordinary basis of such a request. The inherent powers of courts "to protect themselves, 

and their members, from being disturbed in the exercise oftheir functions is long established." 

Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 267, (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). "This inherent power generally extends only to a court's management of its own 

affairs: to impose decorum, to maintain order, to control admission to the bar, to discipline 

attorneys, to punish for contempt, and to vacate its own judgments if tainted by fraud." Jd 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). "'Because of their very potency, inherent powers 

must be exercised with restraint and discretion."' ld at 270 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

501 U.S. 32,44 (1991)). "[T]he amplitude of the power is a warning to use it with discretion, 

and a command never to exert it where it is not necessary or proper." Gompers v. Buck's Stove 

& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,451 (1911).3 

2 After the status conference with this Court on August 16,2007, Amaranth re-served its papers with a notice 

of motion. 

3 The All Writs Act, also not cited in Amaranth's memorandum of law, sets forth similar conditions on the 

exercise of this judicial power: "all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or 

appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1651(a) (emphasis supplied). 

4 
Finally, none of the cases cited by Amaranth support the specific relief it seeks 

here - namely, the intrusion by the judicial branch into the timing of an executive agency's 

administrative enforcement proceeding. The only case cited by Amaranth that involves a federal 

court staying a state court proceeding is In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F .3d 220 (3d 

Cir. 2002)- a case involving the power of a court, in the context of approving the settlement of a 

mass tort class action consolidated under multi-district litigation rules, to enjoin parallel state 

court actions against parties to the settlement. See id. at 236-37 ("Any state court action that 

might interfere with the District Court's oversight of the settlement at that time, given the careful 

balancing it embodied, was a serious threat to the District Court's ability to manage the final 

stages of this complex litigation.") Such global settlement concerns are not at issue here. 

In fact, most of the cases cited by Amaranth stand for a wholly different 

proposition- namely, the propriety of a federal court staying a case on its own docket while 

awaiting the outcome of a case before another federal court4 

or before an agency. 5 The notion 

that a court (or an agency) has the discretion to stay its own proceeding is a far cry from the 

proposition that a court should stay a parallel administrative action barring some extraordinary 

showing that the administrative proceeding will significantly interfere with the court's 

jurisdiction over the matter before it. 

4 See, e.g., Landis v. North Amer. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (affinning power of a district court to stay 

actions before it challenging implementation of new law pending resolution of a similar challenge before a different 

district court); Peck v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (acknowledging power to stay the case on 

its own docket pending resolution of a related appeal but declining to do so); Volmar Distributions, Inc. v. New York 

Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (entering stay of discovery in the case before the court pending resolution 

of related criminal actions). 

s See, e.g., U.S. v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191 (D. Conn. 1999) (staying its case pending 

resolution of related agency proceeding) (cited in Amaranth Mem. at 20). 

5 
A. The Extraordinary Relief of a Stay Should Not be Issued Merely to A void 

Possible Issue Preclusion. 

Amaranth complains of a theoretical risk of a "race" to judgment in which one 

forum must give preclusive effect to the findings in the other forum. See Amaranth Mem. at 3-4. 

However, the illusory fears raised by Amaranth are not a legitimate basis for staying another 

proceeding. As the Second Circuit has held, "a federal district court, even assuming it has some 

interest in avoiding delay in its own proceedings, has no interest - no interest that can be 

vindicated by the exercise of the federal injunction power- in being the first court to hold a trial 

on the merits." Retirement Systems of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419,429 (2d 

Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). As the Second Circuit has similarly stated in the context of 

reviewing an injunction of state court proceedings issued on the basis of avoiding problems like 

collateral estoppel: '"The subsequent effect of collateral estoppel, far from requiring the federal 

court to stay proceedings in the state court, is a result which should be welcomed to avoid the 

task of reconsidering issues which have already been settled by another competent tribunal."' /d. 

(quoting Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F .2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1971)) (emphasis added). 

Thus, the extraordinary relief of a stay must not be based upon the theoretical 

"risk" of issue preclusion or any other issue that may merely inconvenience the parties. See 

Retirement Systems, 386 F.3d at 430. Amaranth, however, has not identified any specific 

dangers. Nor has Amaranth articulated any reason why application of traditional rules of issue 

preclusion will cause it harm. Any injunction based on such unarticulated fears would fly in the 

face of the Second Circuit's pronouncements on the propriety of such injunctions. 

B. Amaranth's Request for Relief from This Court Is Not Proper. 

As noted above, the question of FERC's jurisdiction is already squarely before 

FERC and, separately, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. FERC's 

6 
administrative process wiii provide Amaranth with an opportunity to address the fundamental 

question of whether its trading activity falls within FERC' s jurisdiction. The very nature of 

FERC's OSC is that any assertions therein, including the "statement of the authority under which 

[FERC] is acting" is "tentative." 18 C.F.R. § 385.209(b) (2007). 

The Court should allow FERC, in the first instance, to analyze the jurisdictional 

issues as a matter of appropriate deference to Congress's decision to empower FERC to 

adjudicate its enforcement actions. Indeed, recognizing that FERC is the appropriate forum in 

which to raise the jurisdictional issue, on August 27, 2007 Amaranth moved FERC for an 

expedited rehearing on the very issue raised here. See Ex. F. Thus, the issue is now squarely 

before FERC. 

Even if a federal court would be the proper place to raise the question ofFERC's 

jurisdiction, that should be done through a separate declaratory judgment action against FERC. 

In fact, that has occurred. After extensive coordination between Hunter and Amaranth (see Ex. 

D at 7:12-16), Hunter filed a declaratory judgment in federal district court in the District of 

Columbia seeking exactly that determination. Moreover, Amaranth has represented to this Court 

on multiple occasions that it intends to intervene in that action alongside Hunter. See Amaranth 

Mem. at 4, n. 6; Ex. Hat 8:16-21.6 

Further, Amaranth's motion is not proper because this request is merely a thinlyveiled attempt to forum shop for a favorable ruling on the jurisdictional issue. As noted above, 

Amaranth, Hunter and FERC are already parties to actions where the stay can be properly 

litigated: Hunter's declaratory action and FERC's administrative hearing itself. Although 

6 Even if Amaranth were inclined to file a separate declaratory judgment action in this Court (and assuming 

it would be related to this action under Rule 15 of the Division of Business Rules), under the first to file rule such an 

action should be transferred to the District of Columbia District Court. By Hunter's own admission, Amaranth and 

Hunter are coordinating their defense closely, and filing multiple declaratory judgment actions would be nothing 

more than forum shopping, just like this motion. 

7 
Amaranth has sought rehearing of the OSC, it did not ask FERC to stay its own action pending 

the conclusion of this case, nor has Amaranth expressed any intention to ·do so. 

A decision in either the declaratory judgment action (pending in the District Court 

for the District of Columbia) or FERC's administrative action likely could be appealed only to 

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1) (governing taking of 

appeals from district courts); 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (governing appellate review ofFERC orders).7 

Instead, Amaranth inserts the same issue (already squarely in front of the D.C. District Court and 

FERC itself) into this wholly separate civil action in a different district and circuit. Amaranth's 

action is nothing more than improper forum shopping for multiple bites at the jurisdiction apple. 

C. Amaranth's Motion Improperly Interferes with the Rights of Non-Parties. 

The problematic nature of issuing a stay involving non-parties to this action is 

made more apparent given that FERC's administrative proceeding includes a number of other 

entities that are not parties to this action. These respondents include the master and feeder funds 

themselves (as distinguished from the fund advisors that are defendants here), as well as another 

individual named Matthew Donohoe who, to the CFTC's understanding, no longer works for 

Amaranth or any of its related entities nor for Hunter. 

While it is conceivable that these non-parties would also prefer that the FERC 

action be stayed, the Court should not assume that they desire a stay absent affirmative evidence 

to that effect. This is especially true given that the funds in the exercise of their fiduciary duties 

to their remaining investors, and an individual in Donohoe's position, might prefer to resolve 

7 Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) states that review can be sought in either the Court of Appeals for the 

D.C. Circuit or the court of appeals for the circuit where "the natural gas company to which the order relates is 

located or has its principal place of business." Because FERC's OSC does not relate to any specific natural gas 

company, it appears that the only available review will be from the D.C. Circuit. 

8 
quickly any administrative charges in order to be able fully to liquidate or to move on 

professionally without the distraction of the FERC proceeding. 

II. The Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Futures Trading Granted by Congress to 

the CFTC. 

For the reasons discussed above, FERC should be permitted to determine in the 

first instance the scope of its new anti-manipulation authority under Section 4A of the NGA, 15 

U .S.C. § 7I7c-I, and FERC Rule I c.l, in light of the pre-existing statutory grant of exclusive 

jurisdiction over futures trading to the CFTC in the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(I )(A). If FERC's 

determination is adverse to the respondents in that action (which include all of the defendants 

here), they will have an opportunity to petition for review of that decision by the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). The CFTC respectfully submits 

that this Court should refrain from ruling prematurely on the jurisdictional argument presented 

by Amaranth so that normal administrative processes - including development of a factual 

record, the application of the law to those facts by the agency, and judicial review of those 

processes- can be permitted to work as Congress intended. The Court should not render the 

administrative process nugatory at its inception, especially because Amaranth has recently 

presented to FERC the same jurisdictional argument it has made to this Court. See Ex. F. 

Rather, the Court should deny Amaranth's motion based on its numerous procedural 

deficiencies. 

Nevertheless, the Court stated at the August I6, 2007 status conference that the 

exclusive jurisdiction issue "should be addressed" by the parties. See Ex. H at II :4. Pursuant to 

the Court's instruction, the CFTC sets forth its views below regarding the exclusive jurisdiction 

provisions of the CEA, based solely on the FERC OSC. 

9 
A. Congress has outlined clearly the scope of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction 

in CEA Section 2(a)(l)(A). 

In 1974, Congress amended the CEA and created the CFTC. See generally 7 

U.S.C. §§ 1-27(f). See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 

357-67 ( 1982) (discussing the legislative history of 1974 CEA amendments). In Section 

2(a)(l )(A) of the CEA, Congress granted the CFTC "exclusive jurisdiction" over futures trading 

on "designated contract markets" (the statutory term in the CEA for futures exchanges) such as 

NYMEX. Section 2(a)(l )(A) provides: 

The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... with respect 

to accounts, agreements ... and transactions involving contracts of 

sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a 

contract market designated or derivatives transaction execution 

facility registered pursuant to section 7 or 7a of this title or any 

other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject 

to regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 23 of this title. 

Except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section 

shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on 

the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory 

authorities under the laws of the United States or of any State, or 

(II) restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and such 

other authorities from carrying out their duties and responsibilities 

in accordance with such laws. Nothing in this section shall 

supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United 

8 States or any State. 

7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 

The first sentence of Section 2(a)(l)(A) states that accounts, agreements and 

transactions involving futures contracts traded on designated contract markets are within the 

CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. The second sentence of Section 2(a)(l )(A) then goes on to 

provide that with respect to such accounts, agreements, and transactions where the CFTC's 

8 Section 2(a)( I )(A) contains exceptions from CFTC exclusive jurisdiction for certain types of transactions 

such as security futures products as well as off-exchange transactions in foreign currency and statutorily defined 

"excluded" and "exempt" commodities. None of these exceptions is relevant to this case, which involves trading in 

natural gas futures contracts on NYMEX. 

10 
jurisdiction is exclusive, other federal and state regulatory authorities are without jurisdiction. It 

states that"[ e ]xcept as hereinabove provided" (i.e., except as provided in the first sentence), the 

jurisdiction of other federal and state regulatory authorities is not superseded or limited by the 

grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC. This leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the 

jurisdiction of other federal and state regulatory authorities is superseded or limited with respect 

to the accounts, agreements and transactions as to which the CFTC possesses exclusive 

jurisdiction. 

Because the CEA does not define the term "jurisdiction," the term should be 

given its generally accepted meaning. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). According to 

Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.), the term "jurisdiction" means, with respect to an agency's 

jurisdiction, "[t]he regulatory or adjudicative power of a government administrative agency over 

a subject matter or matters." The Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary 

defines 'jurisdiction" as "the power, right, or authority to interpret and apply the law" or "the 

power or right to exercise authority."9 Accordingly, the plain language of Section 2(a)(1)(A) 

vests the CFTC with sole power and authority among federal regulatory agencies to adjudicate 

the lawfulness of futures trading on designated contract markets such as the NYMEX. See 

Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P. v. Schmutz, 282 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2002) ("It is axiomatic that 

the plain meaning of a statute controls its interpretation, and that judicial review must end at the 

statute's unambiguous tenns.")10 

9 Available online at http://mwu.eb.com/mwu/print?queryword=jurisdiction&searchtype=va [Accessed 

September 5, 2007]. 

10 This grant of authority to the CFTC does not affect the powers of the federal courts, as the final sentence of 

CEA Section 2(a)( I )(A) makes clear. 

II 
I. The legislative history of the CEA reinforces the scope of the CFTC's 

authority regarding futures trading on designated contract markets. 

Even if the language of Section 2(a)(l )(A) were not as clear as it is, the legislative 

history of the provision is in accord. Before the 1974 amendments to the CEA, questions had 

arisen regarding the authority of the SEC and state securities administrators to assert jurisdiction 

with respect to futures-related accounts and futures transactions. Section 2(a)(l )(A) was meant 

to address these claims of overlapping jurisdiction and to make plain that the CFTC's jurisdiction 

is exclusive with respect to futures trading on designated contract markets. This is confirmed 

through reading the committee reports and floor statements. For example, the Report of the 

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry on the 1974 CEA amendments states: 

While the Committee did wish the jurisdiction of the Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission to be exclusive with regard to the 

trading of futures on organized contract markets, it did not wish to 

infringe on the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange 

Commission or other government agencies. Therefore, the 

Committee adopted clarifying amendments to the House bill. The 

Committee wished to make clear that where the jurisdiction of the 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission is applicable, it 

supersedes Slate as well as Federal agencies. 

SeeS. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 23 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5863 (1974) 

(emphasis added). The Report of the House Agriculture Committee is to the same effect: 

Although the expanded definition of"commodity" ... may include 

rights and interests which are securities as defined in the federal 

securities laws, except in the area of transactions involving a 

contract market, the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission ... over any such rights and interest is 

intended to exist concurrently with the jurisdiction vested in the 

Securities and Exchange Commission. Accordingly, ... the 

12 
CFTC's jurisdiction shall be exclusive with respect to transactions 

involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery 

which are traded or executed on a contract market .... 

See H. Rep. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 28, (1974) (emphasis added). 11 

In a similar vein, the Conference Report on the 1974 CEA amendments states: 

The House bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the 

Commission over all futures transactions. However, it is provided 

that such exclusive jurisdiction would not supersede or limit the 

jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission or other 

regulatory authorities. 

The Committee amendment retains the provision of the House bill 

but adds three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amendments 

make clear that (a) the Commission's jurisdiction over futures 

contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and includes the 

regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading agreements, 

and commodity options; (b) the Commission's jurisdiction, where 

applicable, supersedes State as well as Federal agencies .... 

SeeS. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 6, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5848 (1974) (emphasis 

added). The Conference Committee amendments were included in the final legislation. The 

legislative history thus confirms that Congress intended to vest in the CFTC exclusive 

jurisdiction over futures trading on designated contract markets, and, further, that Congress 

intended for other federal agencies not to exercise jurisdiction in that administrative sphere. 12 

11 The relevant pages of the House Agriculture Committee Report are included as Exhibit I. 

12 The legislative history associated with Section 12(e)(l) ofthe CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(l), enacled in 1982, 

further demonstrates Congressional intent to confer upon the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading on 

designated contract markets. In the Report of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry on the 

1982 CEA amendments, eight years after granting exclusive jurisdiction, the Committee stated that Section 12(e) 

created an "open season" on off-exchange conduct by permitting multiple federal and state law actions based on 

futures trading on unregulated entities, but added that: 

Activities that are subject to the comprehensive regulatory powers of the 

Commission, including exchange-traded futures, foreign futures (except as 

otherwise specified by the Commission), authorized commodity options, and 

regulated leverage transactions will remain within the Commission's exclusive 

jurisdiction. 

See S. Rep. No. 97-384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 27 ( 1982) (relevant portion included as Exhibit J). 

13 
2. Courts have consistently recognized the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction 

over futures trading on designated contract markets. 

Consistent with the text and legislative history of Section 2(a)(l )(A), courts have 

repeatedly acknowledged the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction with respect to futures trading on 

designated contract markets vis-a-vis other federal agencies. The courts have likewise dismissed 

private civil actions brought under statutes other than the CEA when those actions relate to 

futures trading on designated contract markets. Relying on the "[e]xcept as hereinabove 

provided" clause that introduces the savings clause, courts have uniformly rejected the notion 

that the second sentence of Section 2(a)(l)(A) permits concurrent regulatory jurisdiction 

regarding the accounts, agreements and transactions described in the prior sentence. One court 

characterized this argument as "simply invalid." SEC v. Univest, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 

(N.D. Ill. 1975), remanded without op., 556 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1977) (table decision). In 

Univest, the SEC brought an enforcement action in federal district court alleging violations of 

securities laws based in part on the defendant's trading in options on futures contracts. Id. 

Relying on Section 2(a)(t)(A), the district court dismissed the claims involving the options on 

futures. As the court explained: 

ld. at 1058. 

The key phrase in this [savings clause] proviso is the introductory 

one; I must assume that it means exactly what it says. The fact is 

that the statements "hereinabove provided" do limit the jurisdiction 

of the S. E. C. with regard to commodity futures trading. In effect, 

those statements transfer jurisdiction from the S. E. C. to the new 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 

Around the same time, in SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, 546 F.2d 1361 

(1Oth Cir. 1976), the Tenth Circuit considered whether to dismiss an SEC enforcement action 

based on trades executed before the enactment of Section 2(a)(l)(A). The SEC charged 

violations of the securities laws and SEC Rule I O(b ). ld at 1363. Relying on the text of Section 

14 
2(a)(l )(A), the court found the CFTC's jurisdiction exclusive with respect to futures trading that 

occurred after the 1974 CEA amendments. /d. at 1368. 13 

The Seventh Circuit continued this trend supporting the CFTC's exclusive 

jurisdiction in a series of cases in the 1980s. In Board ofTrade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 

677 F.2d 1137, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1026 

(1982) (appeal mooted because Congress amended CEA to exempt transactions that were at 

issue), a case involving exchange-traded options on exempt securities, the court held that the 

"[e]xcept as hereinabove provided" clause did not authorize the SEC's assertion of regulatory 

jurisdiction over certain financial instruments that had characteristics of futures contracts. 

Similarly, in Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F. 2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), the court held 

that the SEC lacked jurisdiction to approve trading of futures contracts, regardless of any 

positive effects that might flow from the SEC's exercise of jurisdiction. See id. at 550. 

In the most recent case construing the CEA exclusivity provision, the D.C. Circuit 

addressed the permissibility under Section 2(a)(l )(A) of a Federal Trade Commission 

investigation into whether "investor-education" advertisements constituted deceptive trade 

practices. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court in Ken Roberts 

held that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading did not bar the FTC from issuing 

a civil investigative demand to look into marketing practices that were separate from actual 

futures trading. /d. at 584, 592. In the course of reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the 

text and legislative history of Section 2(a)(1)(A) to determine what falls within, and outside of, 

the exclusive jurisdiction provision. The court's decision makes clear that while the marketing 

activities there at issue fell outside the scope of Section 2(a)( 1 )(A), the trading of futures 

13 Guided by the legislative history of the 1974 CEA amendments, though, the court ruled that SEC possessed 

concurrent jurisdiction over trading that occurred before the 1974 amendments, even if the SEC enforcement action 

was not tiled until after the amendments became effective. /d. at 1368. 

IS 
contracts on designated contract markets falls squarely within that provision. ld. at 590-91. 14 As 

the Ken Roberts court stated, the legislative history of the CEA "repeatedly emphasizes that the 

CFTC's jurisdiction was to be exclusive with regard to the trading of futures on organized 

contract markets." Id. at 591 (internal quotation omitted; emphasis in original). 

In cases not involving federal regulators, courts have determined that Section 

2(a)(l)(A) is a jurisdictional bar to non-CEA claims relating to futures trading. For example, in 

Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1105, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1985), 

the plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in futures trades in violation of federal securities 

laws including SEC Rule 1 Ob-5. !d. The district court dismissed the securities claims reasoning 

that the savings clause in Section 2(a)(l)(A) barred the court from applying securities laws to 

claims based on futures contracts. Jd. at 1113-1114. 15 The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar 

conclusion in Messer v. E.F Hulton & Co., 847 F.2d 673 (lith Cir. 1988), holding that Section 

2(a)(l)(A) barred claims that futures trades were made in violation of Section 10(b) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule I Ob-5. The court added that a "different result 

would 'defeat[] the fundamental congressional design in revamping the Commodity Exchange 

Act in 1974 and granting exclusive jurisdiction to the new CFTC- to avoid a duplicative or 

14 Ken Roberts is consistent with CFTC enforcement actions involving false reporting of off-exchange energy 

transactions. In those cases, the off-exchange trading was excluded from the CEA 's jurisdiction under Section 2(g) 

of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 2(g), whose language ("agreement, contract or transaction") is similar to Section 2(a)(1)(A) 

of the CEA. As the courts recognized in those cases, the focal point of the CFTC's claims was not the trading 

activity, but rather the separate conduct of false reporting. Courts have repeatedly held that false reporting activity 

falls outside the scope of a Section 2(g) "agreement, contract or transaction." See CFTC v. Reed, 481 F. Supp. 2d 

1190, 1198 (D. Colo. 2007); CFTC v. Atha, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2006); CFTC v. Johnson, 408 

F. Supp. 2d 259,272 (S.D. Tex. 2005); CFTC v. Bradley, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1219 (N.D.Okla. 2005). 

15 Four other district courts also have rejected claims based on securities laws or rules for lack of jurisdiction. 

See Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337,345 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Fairchild. Arabatzis & Smith. Inc. v. Prometco 

(Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd., 470 F. Supp. 610,614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 

435 F. Supp. 865,869 (D. Conn. 1977); and E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 512-513 (D. Utah 

1976). 

16 
contradictory regulatory structure."' Id at 676 (citing Mallen, 605 F. Supp. at 1114). 16 Indeed, 

the exclusive jurisdiction provision was adopted to further one of the principal goals of Congress 

in enacting the CEA, and creating the CFTC - to bring uniformity to the regulation of the futures 

markets. American Agriculture Movement, Inc. v. Board ofTrade of City of Chicago, 977 F.2d 

1147, 1155-57(7thCir.1992). 

* * * 

It is against this backdrop of statutory text, legislative history, and case law 

regarding the CEA' s exclusive jurisdiction provision that the scope of the authority granted to 

FERC under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 must be evaluated. 

B. FERC's anti-manipulation authority. 

Section 315 of the Energy Policy Act of2005 added a new§ 4A to the Natural 

Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1, which states that: 

It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to use or 

employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or 

the purchase or sale of transportation services subject to the 

jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive 

device or contrivance (as those terms are used in section 78j(b) of 

this title) in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 

Commission may prescribe as necessary in the public interest or 

for the protection of natural gas ratepayers. Nothing in this section 

shall be construed to create a private right of action. 

15 U.S.C. § 717c-1. In January 2006, FERC adopted Rule 1 c. I, which states in part that: 

(a) It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, in 

connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or the purchase 

or sale of transportation services subject to the jurisdiction ofthe 

16 The case of United States v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1043, I 045 (S.D. Cal. 2006), is 

not to the contrary. The Reliant court concluded that FERC'sjurisdiction under the Federal Power Act ("FPA") 

over electricity transactions did not preempt the CEA 's anti-manipulation jurisdiction. See OSC ~48. Reliant is 

factually distinguishable from this case. First, unlike the CEA, the Federal Power Act does not include an express 

statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction to FERC. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c. See Reliant Energy, 420 F. Supp. 

2d at 1064 (Congress has not revealed "an intent to keep electricity wholesales outside the reach of the CEA's antimanipulation provisions"). Moreover, the charged violations were based on CEA Section 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 

13(a)(2), which expressly applies to cash transactions as well as futures trades. ld. at 1065. 

17 
Commission, (1) To use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice 

to defraud, (2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or 

to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 

statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 

they were made, not misleading, or (3) To engage in any act, 

practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a 

fraud or deceit upon any entity. 

18C.F.R. § 1c.1 (2007). 

C. The Energy Policy Act does not affect Section 2(a)(l)(A) of the CEA. 

The Energy Policy Act did nothing to affect the scope of the CFTC's exclusive 

jurisdiction. Nor did it change the scope ofFERC'sjurisdiction over natural gas transactions as 

set forth in 15 U .S.C. § 717(b ). See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 

4244 ~20 (January 26, 2006). Had Congress intended in the Energy Policy Act to reverse 30 

years of unbroken precedent regarding the application of Section 2(a)(l)(A) of the CEA to 

futures trading on designated contract markets, it would have done so clearly and 

unambiguously. Because nothing in the Energy Policy Act explicitly repeals any provision of the 

CEA, the question arises whether Congress's grant of authority to FERC in 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 

implies an intention to do so. But as the Supreme Court has stated: "[It] can be strongly 

presumed that Congress will specifically address language on the statute books that it wishes to 

change." United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988). Repeals by implication are not 

favored in law, and they will not be found unless a congressional intent to repeal "is clear and 

manifest." See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (citations omitted); see also 

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974). The Supreme Court rarely has found a repeal 

by implication. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 293 (2003). 

Further, a settled canon of statutory construction dictates that "a precisely drawn, 

detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies." Brown v. General Services Administration, 

425 U.S. 820,834 (1976). The general authority provided to FERC in the Energy Policy Act to 

18 
combat the effects of manipulative behavior on FERC jurisdictional markets is insufficient to 

carve out an implicit exception to the exclusive jurisdiction that the CEA adopted as part of a 

carefully-crafted statutory regime to specifically govern futures trading on designated contract 

markets. 

In short, nothing in the text or legislative history of the Energy Policy Act evinces 

a Congressional intention to change the long settled law in this area. We respectfully submit that 

this Court should not, in an effort to "harmonize" the CEA and the Natural Gas Act, effectively 

read the exclusive jurisdiction provision out of the CEA with respect to natural gas absent a clear 

indication that this is what Congress intended to do. 

D. FERC's Proceeding. 

FERC's OSC against Amaranth and related parties alleges that the respondents 

manipulated natural gas prices in violation of FERC Rule 1 c.1 by engaging in certain futures 

trading practices on NYMEX which are alleged to have had downstream effects on prices for 

cash settled natural gas contracts. OSC ~~1, 5. As we understand it, there is no dispute that the 

transactions at the core ofthe scheme were futures trades on NYMEX. Moreover, FERC 

charges the respondents with violating a FERC rule that is substantively different from the 

manipulation standards applicable under the CEA and therefore could impose different standards 

of conduct on persons engaging in futures trading on designated contract markets. Based on its 

OSC, FERC's administrative action is analogous to the SEC actions that the courts dismissed in 

the Univest, Board ofTrade of the City ofChicago, and Chicago Mercantile Exchange cases 

discussed above. See supra. Moreover, the courts have made clear that it is impermissible to 

apply non-CEA laws or rules to conduct that falls within the scope of Section 2(a)(1)(A). See, 

e.g., Mallen, 605 F. Supp. at 1113-14 (and cases discussed inn. 15, above). 

19 
While Section 2(a)(l)(A), its legislative history, and applicable case law establish 

that the CFTC'sjurisdiction is exclusive, this has little to do with the propriety of the relief that 

Amaranth seeks now. As discussed earlier, this Court should set aside Amaranth's jurisdictional 

argument and issue a ruling based on the procedural infirmities of Amaranth's motion. 

Amaranth has already asserted its arguments to FERC in the administrative process. FERC 

should now have the opportunity to interpret the new mandate that Congress has given it, and to 

determine how to apply its new Rule lc.l in light of the exclusive jurisdiction that Congress 

granted in CEA Section 2(a)(l)(A) with respect to futures trading on NYMEX. 

20 
CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff CFTC respectfully requests that the Court take into account the foregoing 

considerations raised and deny Amaranth's motion for a stay of FERC's order to show cause 

proceedings. 

Dated: New York, New York 

September 28, 2007 

Respectfully submitted, 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISS ION 

Terry S. Arbit 

General Counsel 

Bradford M. Berry 

(admission pro hac vice pending) 

Deputy General Counsel 

Gloria P. Clement, 

Assistant General Counsel 

Office of the General Counsel 

Three Lafayette Centre 

11 55 21st Street. NW 

Washington, DC 20581 

Stephen J. Obie 

Regional Counsell Associate Director 

Manal Sultan 

ChicfTrial Attorney 

David W. MacGregor (admitted pro hac vice) 

Chief Trial Attorney 

Division of Enforcement 

140 Broadway, 19th Floor 

New York. NY 10005 

(646) 746-9733 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

2 1