IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wilkins Township, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1219 C.D. 2016

: Argued: April 4, 2017

The Wage Policy Committee of the :

Wilkins Township Police Department :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: May 18, 2017 

Appellant Township of Wilkins (Township) appeals from an order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court). The trial court 

confirmed a supplemental grievance arbitration award awarding damages in the 

form of lost wages to Wilkins Township Police Officer Jon Sherman (Sherman). 

Sherman is represented by the Wage Policy Committee of the Wilkins Police 

Department (WPC) for collective bargaining purposes. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm the order of the trial court.

On August 8, 2012, Sherman submitted to the Wilkins Township 

Police Department a form entitled “Off Duty Employment,” setting forth notice 

that Sherman was contemplating off-duty employment at Brewstone’s, a bar and 

restaurant. According to the information Sherman provided on the form, the 

position at Brewstone’s involved checking identification on Thursdays, Fridays, 

and Saturdays from 12:00 a.m. through 2:00 a.m. Initially, the Chief of Police 

advised Sherman that no police officer could accept employment at Brewstone’s 

unless the Board of Commissioners (Board) approved the employment. On 
2

August 21, 2012, the Board advised Sherman that the employment at Brewstone’s 

was prohibited based upon its conclusion that checking identifications and 

providing security at a bar constituted a conflict of interest with Sherman’s duties 

as a police officer. On September 24, 2012, Sherman filed a grievance to proceed 

to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the 

Township and the WPC (CBA) and in accordance with the law commonly known 

as Act 111 (Act 111).1The primary focus of Sherman’s grievance arbitration2

request was to challenge the Board’s conclusion that the proposed off-duty 

employment constituted a conflict of interest.3

 

1 Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-.10.

2 Our Supreme Court has described grievance arbitration as concerned with the resolution 

of disputes regarding the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Town of 

McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass’n, 901 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa. 2006).

3 Article XX(F) of the CBA provides:

Self-Employment: Full-time officers may engage in outside or self-employment 

activities; however, the employment with the Township is deemed the primary 

employment. Police officers may be required to notify the Chief of Police of the 

names of their outside employers and the type of work they do, as well as their 

schedule for outside employment. The Township may require the officer to 

refrain from excessive levels of outside work which would tend to render the 

officer unfit for duty and to refrain from outside employment which would tend to 

bring disrepute on the office or would constitute a conflict of interest.

(R.R. at 39a.) Additionally, the Wilkins Township Police Department Manual of Rules and 

Regulations provides:

If an off duty employment situation held by a member is found to interfere with 

(1) The Department’s image or efficiency, (2) The on duty business or work 

performance of the individual in question, or (3) Is found to be inconsistent or in 

conflict with the member’s duties as a police officer, the member may be required 

to terminate such employment.

. . . . 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

On May 20, 2013, the appointed Arbitrator conducted a hearing. 

According to the Arbitrator’s opinion and award, the parties “exchanged” briefs on 

June 17, 2013. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 50a.) In his opinion and award, the 

Arbitrator noted that the issue in the grievance, as agreed upon by WPC and the 

Township, was “whether the Township violated the [CBA] when it refused to 

allow [Sherman] to engage in outside employment at Brewstone’s.” (R.R. at 52a.) 

Sherman asserted that the proposed off-duty employment would not 

create a conflict of interest in light of the fact that the position does not call upon 

Sherman to act in the capacity of a police officer but, rather, only requires him to 

evaluate potentially fake identifications and to call on-duty police for assistance. 

The Township asserted that a police officer’s employment in a bar or tavern creates 

a conflict of interest. The Arbitrator upheld Sherman’s grievance and also ordered 

the Township to “make [Sherman] whole for the net (‘take home’) earnings he lost 

as a result of its forbidding him from [working at Brewstone’s.]” (R.R. at 54a.) 

The Township filed a petition to vacate the award with the trial court, challenging 

the Arbitrator’s award of lost earnings on two grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction of 

the Arbitrator to award lost wages when Sherman did not raise the issue of lost 

wages before or during the hearing but, instead, raised the issue in his post-hearing 

brief to the Arbitrator; and (2) violation of due process where Sherman did not 

 

(continued...)

The primary obligation and responsibility of a member who engages in off duty 

employment must be to the Department. Members directed to report for overtime 

work will do so regardless of their off duty employment situation.

(R.R. at 51a.)
4

raise the issue of lost wages in the grievance notice or during the Arbitrator’s 

hearing.

The trial court affirmed the Arbitrator’s award, concluding that the 

award does not provide for a specific amount of lost wages but rather lays the 

framework for a “back pay hearing.”4 The Township appealed the trial court’s 

decision to this Court, arguing the following issues: (1) whether the inclusion in 

the award of an as-yet undetermined amount of lost wages violates the Township’s 

procedural due process rights; and (2) whether the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to 

consider the lost-wages issue based upon the allegation that Sherman failed to raise 

the issue in a timely manner. 

On appeal, we held that the Arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction 

by awarding lost wages. Township of Wilkins v. The Wage Policy Comm’n of the 

Wilkins Twp. Police Dep’t (Jon Sherman, Grievant), (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 833 C.D. 2014, filed May 15, 2015) (Sherman I). Citing Bensalem Township 

v. Bensalem Township Police Benevolent Association, Inc., 803 A.2d 239 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2002), for the proposition that “the jurisdiction of an arbitrator goes to his 

or her power to decide an issue in dispute rather than to his or her fashioning of an 

award,” we reasoned that the Township contested the form of relief granted by the 

 

4

Throughout their pleadings, motions, and briefs, the parties refer to the damages that the 

Arbitrator awarded as “back pay.” Back pay is generally considered to be the amount of wages 

and benefits an employee would have earned at his former job had the employer not terminated 

his employment. See W. Middlesex Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Human Relations 

Comm’n, 394 A.2d 1301, 1304 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). The Arbitrator in the instant case awarded 

damages for lost wages that Sherman would have earned at a different job had he been allowed 

to take on off-duty employment. Thus, the damages awarded by the Arbitrator are more 

appropriately characterized as lost wages, and, in this opinion, we refer to the form of damages 

awarded by the Arbitrator as “lost wages.”
5

Arbitrator, rather than the Arbitrator’s power to decide the issue of off-duty 

employment, and, thus, the Arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction. Sherman I, 

slip op. at 8.

We further held that the Award violated the Township’s procedural 

due process rights because the Arbitrator issued an award ordering the Township to

“make [Sherman] whole for the net (‘take home’) earnings he lost as a result of its 

forbidding him from [working at Brewstone’s]” rather than calculating a specific 

amount of damages. (R.R. at 54a.) We determined that the Arbitrator triggered a 

violation of the Township’s due process rights by awarding Sherman an 

unidentified amount of damages for a potential loss of off-duty wages without 

allowing the Township to submit arguments or present evidence on the issue of lost 

wages. Accordingly, we vacated the Award to the extent that it awarded damages 

in the form of lost wages and remanded the matter to the trial court with the 

instruction that the trial court remand the matter to the Arbitrator for further 

proceedings.

On October 2, 2015, the Arbitrator conducted a hearing on the issue of 

damages. At the October 2, 2015 hearing, Sherman called as a witness Kenny 

Rosensteel, the former assistant general manager of Brewstone’s, who testified that 

a normal work day for Sherman would have been from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m. and he 

would have been paid at a rate of $60 per hour. Rosensteel additionally testified 

that Brewstone’s hosted special events where Sherman could have worked 

additional hours. The Township offered a Bureau of Labor Statistics document 

indicating that the median wage for “Security Guards and Gaming Surveillance 

Officers” was $11.55 per hour in 2012. (R.R. at 70a.) The Township also 

provided Sherman’s time and attendance records, which included dates that 
6

Sherman took sick leave or vacation time. The Township entered into evidence a 

letter, dated September 10, 2013, advising counsel for the WPC that it would 

permit Sherman to assume off-duty employment at Brewstone’s as of that date. 

Brewstone’s ceased operations on July 18, 2014, after which Sherman began 

working intermittently off-duty at Buffalo Wild Wings and the Residence Inn for 

approximately 3-4 hours per week at a rate of $60 per hour. 

The Arbitrator calculated an award of lost wages for the time period 

of August 21, 2012, when the Township denied Sherman’s request for off-duty 

work, and September 10, 2013, when the Township sent a letter advising WPC that 

it would permit Sherman to pursue off-duty employment. The Arbitrator found 

that there were a total of 165 potential work days for Sherman during that time 

period and that, based on his vacation and sick leave history, he likely would have 

worked 139 of those days for 3 hours per day, for a total of 417 potential work 

hours. The Arbitrator further concluded that Sherman would have been paid at a 

rate of $60 per hour. Accordingly, the Arbitrator issued a supplemental award 

ordering the Township to compensate Sherman for the lost potential work hours in 

the amount of $25,020.00. 

On December 23, 2015, the Township filed in the trial court a petition 

to vacate the grievance arbitration award, which is the subject of the appeal now 

before this Court. The Township argued that the Arbitrator violated the due

process rights of the Township by granting damages for lost wages when the issue 

of lost wages was not included in the original grievance. On June 20, 2016, the 

trial court denied the Township’s petition and confirmed the supplemental award, 

concluding that this Court’s earlier decision had determined that the Arbitrator had 
7

jurisdiction to decide whether Sherman was entitled to damages in the form of lost 

wages. 

The Township raises the following issues before this 

Court: (1) whether the Arbitrator violated the Township’s due process rights by 

awarding lost wages, even though Sherman did not expressly request damages in 

the form of lost wages in his initial grievance; (2) whether the Arbitrator exceeded 

his authority by concluding that Sherman was not required to specifically request 

lost wages in his initial grievance; and (3) whether the trial court erred in 

concluding that the issues raised by the Township had been previously decided by 

our decision in Sherman I. Sherman argues that the issues of the Arbitrator’s 

jurisdiction and his authority to award damages in the form of lost wages were

previously decided by this Court, and, thus, the Township is barred by principles of 

res judicata or collateral estoppel from relitigating those issues now on appeal.

We initially address Sherman’s argument that the issues raised by the 

Township in the instant appeal are barred by principles of res judicata and 

collateral estoppel. Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude parties from 

contesting claims and issues that have been previously litigated. In re 

Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1222 (Pa. 2012). Our Supreme Court has explained the 

doctrine of res judicata as follows:

The term “res judicata” is often sweepingly used, by 

courts and litigants alike, to refer to the various ways in 

which a judgment in one action will have a binding effect 

in a later action. “Res judicata” encompasses the modern 

principle of issue preclusion (traditionally known as 

estoppel), which is the common law rule that a final 

judgment forecloses relitigation in a later action 

involving at least one of the original parties, of an issue 

of fact or law which was actually litigated and which was 

necessary to the original judgment.
8

Clark v. Troutman, 502 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa. 1985). To support a claim of res 

judicata, a party must show a concurrence of four conditions: (1) identity of the 

thing sued upon; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and 

parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing 

or sued. Itama Dev. Assocs., LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Twp. of 

Rostraver, 132 A.3d 1040, 1049 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). “The essential inquiry is 

whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided in a prior 

proceeding in which the present parties had an opportunity to appear and assert 

their rights.” Takacs v. Indian Lake Borough, 10 A.3d 416, 418 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010). 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes the 

relitigation of issues of fact or law determined in a prior proceeding. Mason v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hilti Fastening Sys. Corp.), 657 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 

Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 668 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 1995). Collateral estoppel applies 

if: (1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one presented in the later 

case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the 

plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party 

or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and 

fair opportunity to actually litigate the issue in the prior proceeding; and (5) the 

determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment. Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 37 A.3d 1264, 1270 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth.), 

appeal denied, 53 A.3d 51 (Pa. 2012).

Although Sherman couches his argument that the issues raised by the 

Township in the instant appeal have already been decided by this Court in terms of 
9

res judicata, this argument is more properly founded in the doctrine of the law of 

the case. Our Supreme Court has explained the law of the case doctrine as follows. 

The doctrine of the ‘law of the case’ is that, when an 

appellate court had considered and decided a question 

submitted to it upon appeal, it will not, upon a 

subsequent appeal on another phase of the same case, 

reverse its previous ruling even though convinced that it 

was erroneous. It is not, however, inflexible. It does not 

have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata. . . . The 

rule of ‘the law of the case’ is one largely of convenience 

and public policy, both of which are served by stability in 

judicial decisions. Thus[,] there is an abundance of 

authority to the effect that where a prior decision is 

palpably erroneous, it is competent for the court, not as a 

matter of right but of grace, to correct it upon a second 

review . . . where, following the decision on a former 

appeal, the court in another case has laid down a different 

rule either expressly or by necessary implication 

overruling the previous decision

Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 100 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. 1953). 

In Sherman I, the Township raised the issue of whether the Arbitrator 

lacked jurisdiction to consider the lost wages issue based upon the allegation that 

Sherman failed to raise the issue in a timely manner—i.e., that Sherman failed to 

seek damages for lost wages in his initial grievance. Citing Bensalem Township, 

this Court held that “where the parties submitted to the Arbitrator the issue of 

whether the Township violated the CBA by refusing to permit Sherman to work, 

the Arbitrator properly exercised his jurisdiction over that issue.” Sherman I, slip 

op. at 8. With regard to the issue of due process, the Township argued that its due 

process rights were implicated, because it was not afforded an opportunity to 

respond to the question of whether Sherman should be awarded lost wages and, if 

so, how much should be awarded. We remanded to the trial court, with instruction 

to remand the matter to the Arbitrator to take whatever procedural measures are 
10

required to determine whether Sherman is entitled to damages, and, if so, the 

amount of damages. The Arbitrator complied with our instruction and held a 

hearing where evidence was entered into the record. The Township does not 

challenge in this appeal any procedural aspect of the Arbitrator’s supplemental 

evidentiary hearing but, instead, seems to suggest that the Arbitrator violated its

due process rights by holding a hearing allowing arguments and evidence on the 

issue of damages. Such an argument is contrary to our prior decision in Sherman I. 

“The due process clause does not create a right to be deliberately obtuse as to the 

nature of a proceeding. Appellees here knew exactly what was happening to them 

and why.” Dep’t of Transp. v. McCafferty, 758 A.2d 1155, 1163 (Pa. 2000). Had 

the Township’s right to due process precluded the Arbitrator from considering the 

issue of damages, this Court would not have remanded the matter to the trial court 

for further proceedings. 

It is axiomatic that a violation of a party’s right to due process does 

not entitle an aggrieved defendant to dismissal of the claim. Caba v. 

Weaknecht, 64 A.3d 39, 66 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 77 A.3d 1261, 

(Pa. 2013). Instead, when “proceedings are tainted by procedural irregularities, 

such as the lack of adequate notice, the remedy is a remand for an additional 

hearing after a new notice.” Id. Thus, our prior decision finally settled the issues 

of the Arbitrator’s authority to issue an award that includes damages for lost wages 

and whether the Township received due process on the issue of damages. The 

Township received all the process it was entitled to at the supplementary hearing. 

Even if we were to consider the Township’s arguments on appeal, 

they are without merit. In a grievance arbitration matter arising under Act 111, 

such as this one, our narrow scope of review limits the objections to an award that 
11

we may consider. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’

Ass’n (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83, 85-86 n.4 (Pa. 1995). The only grounds that we 

may evaluate to support a reversal of an arbitrator’s award are limited to the

following: (1) awards that are outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2) awards 

that are the result of irregular proceedings; (3) awards that reflect an excess of the 

arbitrator’s powers; and (4) awards that are made where a violation of a party’s 

constitutional rights has occurred. Fraternal Order of Police, Flood City Lodge 

No. 86 v. City of Johnstown, 39 A.3d 1010, 1012 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal 

denied, 57 A.3d 72 (Pa. 2012).

The Township first argues that the Arbitrator violated its due process 

rights by holding that Sherman was not required to raise the issue of damages in 

the form of lost wages in his initial grievance. The Township asserts that they 

were deprived of an opportunity to present evidence on and argue the issue of lost 

wages before the Arbitrator. The Township cites several cases in support of this 

argument; however, each is distinguishable. 

The Township cites City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police 

Lodge No. 5 (Breary), 985 A.2d 1259 (Pa. 2009), for the proposition that an 

arbitrator violates the due process rights of a party when the arbitrator precludes 

that party from presenting evidence on a particular issue. In Breary, the arbitrator, 

upon request by the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 (“FOP”), issued a 

subpoena requiring the City of Philadelphia (“City”) to provide certain records of 

internal grievance proceedings. The City failed to comply with the subpoena, and 

the arbitrator granted the FOP’s motion for sanctions, precluding the City from 

presenting testimony or evidence based on any materials included in the subpoena. 

The City argued that it was deprived of its right to due process and filed a petition 
12

to vacate the arbitration award with the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 

which denied the petition. On appeal, this Court reversed the Philadelphia Court of 

Common Pleas, holding that the sanction of complete preclusion of evidence, 

which equated to a dismissal of the City’s case, was a violation of due process, and 

we remanded for a new arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed our decision, 

concluding that the City was significantly prejudiced by the arbitrator’s sanction 

precluding it from presenting evidence and that there was no evidence of willful 

misconduct by the City. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the City was deprived 

of its due process rights. Notably, the Supreme Court opined: “we reiterate, 

however, that we in no way approve of a challenge to sundry rulings by an 

arbitrator on due process grounds. To be sure, the unique circumstances of this 

case epitomize the very reason narrow certiorari review . . . is permitted: to 

remedy a clear procedural due process violation.” Breary, 985 A.2d at 1274.

Although Breary may have supported the Township’s arguments 

raised in its prior appeal in Sherman I, it does not support the Township’s 

arguments in the instant appeal. The relief granted by this Court in Breary, and 

affirmed by the Supreme Court, was a remand to the arbitrator to give the City the 

opportunity to present evidence that it was not originally allowed to present. This 

is the precise type of relief granted to the Township in Sherman I. Further, Breary 

deals only with a party’s due process rights in the context of a deprivation of the 

ability to present evidence of a claim or defense. It does not address a due process 

violation for lack of notice for failure to raise the specific damages sought in an 

initial grievance. 

The Township also cites our holding in In re Arbitration Award 

Between Lower Yoder Township Police & Lower Yoder Township, 654 A.2d 651 
13

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (Yoder). In Yoder, Lower Yoder Township (LYT) and Lower 

Yoder Township Police (Police) entered into negotiations regarding the terms of a 

collective bargaining agreement and, after reaching an impasse in negotiations, 

proceeded to arbitration over the terms of the agreement. A panel of three

arbitrators issued an award involving numerous issues related to the agreement. 

LYT petitioned the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas to review and, 

presumably, vacate or amend the award. LYT argued that the arbitrators exceeded 

their authority by creating provisions for (1) a three year contract term, (2) a 

guaranteed wage/no layoff clause, and (3) the creation of the rank of lieutenant, 

which were not raised in the notice of arbitration. The Cambria County Court of 

Common Pleas denied LYT’s petition, concluding that the arbitrators did not 

exceed their authority. On appeal, this Court reversed, in part, and remanded, in 

part. Specifically, we concluded that “it is obvious that the Police raised the issue 

of the length of the contract in the notice of binding arbitration, since 

subparagraph (f) of the notice is titled ‘length of contract.’ Hence, the arbitrators 

were well within their discretion to award a three year contract term.” 

Yoder, 654 A.2d at 654. We also determined that:

[T]he Police also raised the issue of compensation and 

wages in the notice. Notice of Arbitration, ¶ (a) 

(compensation and wages). Once the issue of wages was 

properly placed in dispute, the Board had the power to 

resolve that issue in a fair manner within the total 

context of the award. . . . Wages are not the only form of 

“compensation.” In lieu of a pay raise, the [arbitrators]

awarded compensation to the Police in the form of 

guaranteed employment (forty hours of work per week 

and vacation and holiday pay) to the four regular full 

time police officers. This resolution of the compensation 

issue was, in our view, within the [arbitrators’]

jurisdiction.
14

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The only portion of the award 

that we vacated was the provision creating a new position of lieutenant. We found 

that no provision of the notice of arbitration could reasonably be interpreted to put 

both parties on notice that the creation of a new officer rank was at issue. Id.

In Yoder, although we vacated the portion of the arbitrators’ award 

creating a new position, we affirmed the portion of the award relating to 

guaranteed employment, vacation and holiday pay, and forty-hour work weeks, 

even though those issue were not explicitly raised in the notice of arbitration. We 

concluded that those issues were reasonably and logically related to the issue of 

“wages and compensation” raised in the notice of arbitration. Thus, an arbitrator 

has some leeway to craft an award that addresses the issues raised by the parties. 

The instant case is more akin to the issue of wages and compensation addressed in 

Yoder than the issue of the creation of a new position within the Police. Similarly, 

when an officer grieves a denial of outside employment, it can reasonably be 

inferred that the officer should be compensated if he was wrongfully precluded 

from engaging in that employment. For these reasons, Yoder does not support the 

Township’s position, and the Arbitrator did not violate the Township’s due process 

rights by awarding damages in the form of lost wages. 

The Township next argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority 

by determining that Sherman was not required to raise a request for damages in the 

form of lost wages. In the Supplementary Award, the Arbitrator concluded that 

“[a]t no point however does the grievance procedure require [Sherman] to specify 

the relief sought. . . . [S]ome collective bargaining agreements require that the 

[g]rievant specify the relief sought, but this one does not.” (R.R. at 73a.) As we 

explained in Sherman I, the jurisdiction of an arbitrator goes to his or her power to 
15

decide an issue in dispute rather than to his or her fashioning of an award. 

Sherman I, slip op. at 8. The Township does not contest that the Arbitrator had 

authority to decide the issue of whether the Township wrongfully refused to allow 

Sherman to engage in outside employment. Thus, unless the Arbitrator violates the 

Township’s due process rights or his authority to award damages is expressly 

limited under the terms of the CBA, the Arbitrator has discretion to fashion an 

appropriate remedy even though Sherman did not request the specific damages 

eventually awarded. See Greater Latrobe Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa. State Educ. 

Ass’n, 615 A.2d 999, 1002 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); see also McKeesport Area Sch. 

Dist. v. McKeesport Area Educ. Ass’n, 424 A.2d 979, 982 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981)

(“An arbitrator must be given a certain amount of flexibility to reach an amicable 

solution and should not be limited in his problem solving to the exact language of 

the grievance.”). Thus, the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority by concluding 

that Sherman was not required to explicitly request damages in the form of lost 

wages in his initial grievance.

Finally, the Township argues that the trial court erred by holding that 

this Court previously decided the issues raised by the Township. As noted above, 

we conclude that, under the law of the case doctrine, Sherman I finally and 

conclusively decided the issues now raised by the Township on appeal. Thus, the 

trial court did not err in concluding that Sherman I finally decided all issues now 

raised by the Township. 

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wilkins Township, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1219 C.D. 2016

:

The Wage Policy Committee of the :

Wilkins Township Police Department :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18th day of May, 2017, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge