W e do not ha v e a c ompl et e t r an s cr i pt of t h e pl ea
- s u bmi s s i on h ea r i n g i n t h e r ec or d be for e u s
. T h e t r an s cr i pt 1 refl ect s t he cour t ’ s ques t i oni ng an d acce pt anc e of t he defendan t ’ s pl ea, but t he f act ual bas i s for t he pl ea, wh i ch
cu st o m aril y pre ce d es the a ctua l p l ea , i s no t i nc l ud ed

. N ev erthe l ess, t he senten cing he aring t ran scrip t affo rd s us a (c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 28, 200 4 STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JO NATHAN B. CUTSHAW Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Coc ke County No. 8873 Ben W. Hooper, II, Jud ge

No. E2003-02502-CC A-R3- CD - F iled October 8, 2004

The de fenda nt, J onathan B. C utshaw, plea ded g uiltyin the Cocke County Criminal Court to one count of burg lary , in violation of Tennessee Code Annotate d section 39-14- 402, and to one c ount of vanda lism, i n violation of Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39 -1 4 -4 0 8

. Pursuant to his plea ag ree ment wit h t h e state, he a cce pted joint and sever al liabilityfor r estitution, along with others involved in the vandalism, and he rec eived an eff ective sentence of three y ear s, with the manner of service of the sente nces to be determined by the trial court. After

a sente ncing hearing, the trial court or de re d th e de fe nd a nt t o s e rv e his se nte nc e s in c on fi ne me nt andto pay res ti tu ti on . It is fr om this order that the def

endant a ppeals. We modify

the judg ment of the trial court as to manner of se rvice of the sente nces a nd rema nd for f urther f indings re g arding the appr opriate amount of restitution.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s M odi fie d and R e m ande d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.
Susanna L aws Thomas, N ewport, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, Jonathan B. Cutshaw. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Bre nt C. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Al C. Schmutz er, Jr., District Att o rn ey Ge n eral; and J ames B . Dunn, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION We gle an the f

acts underlying thedefe ndant ’s co n v i ct i o n s fr o mh i s s en t en ci n g hear ing conducte d on September 16, 2003. 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

m eani ngf

ul view o f

the und erl y i ng fact s, thus enab l i ng our de no vo re v ie w o f t h e se n te n c e
. See T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 3 5

- 4 0 1 (d) (20 0 3 ). -2-

Donald W. Ay ers is the Dis trict Security Manag er f or K-V AT F oods, Food City , and he testified that he was dispatche d to Newport on September 27, 2002, to investig ate va ndalism at one of the stores l ocate d on West Br oadway . The store was not open f or public use at the time, and it wa s locked. I nside the building wer e numerous used, uprig ht f ree zers. When Ay ers we nt inside the sto re , he dis c ov e re d exte ns ive da ma g e , inc lud ing g la ss ha vin g be e n bro ke n out o f a ll the fr e e zer s, many of which had been upended, and broken windows and mirrors in the bathroom. Ay ers h ad calc ulated the a mount of damag e to be $31,825, a nd since K- VAT wa s self-insured, the company bo re the fu ll c os t. T he da ma g e e sti ma te fo r the fr e e zer s w a s b a se d on r e pa ir ing the e xistin g un its , no t r e pla c e me nt c os t. A y e rs didno t know th e orig ina l pu rc ha se pric e fo r the fr e e zer s o r the ir fair marke t va lue prior to the va ndalism. Ay ers be lieved that the f ree zers wer e ultimately

remove d as salvag e, instead of

being repa ired.
The de fenda nt was sworn and testified that other tha n a truanc y char g e whe n he wa s a juvenile, he had no criminal hist ory . At t h e time the prese ntence report was pre pare d, he wa s twenty y ear s old and was e mploy ed pe rf o rming landsca

ping se rvice s. Since that time, he had obtained employ ment at the loca l H oliday I nn in N ewport, w orking in f ood service

. The de fenda nt was re siding with his best frie nd and the f riend’s mother

. Re g ard ing his inv olv e me nt i n th e of fe ns e , th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d that a c o- de fe nd a nt, Richard Mc Mahan, pic ked him and other s up an d d rove to the building . The de fendant admitted g oing inside the bui lding, and he testi fied that “ every body that was ther e broke at least one thing[,] and then we left.” The defe ndant denied any drinking was involved, at least in his presenc e. The de fenda nt testified that since his ar rest, he ha d been a ssociating with “a diff ere nt crow d” an d h ad b een w ork in g hard a nd st ay in g at ho me. Th e def end ant ackn owl edged r esp on si bi li ty for what had happened and said that he was willing to make pay ments toward r estitution. I f admitted to p ro batio n, the de fe nd a nt s a id that he wou ld sub mit to any c on dit ion s c on c e rn ing e mpl oyme nt, dr ug te sti ng , a ndpa y me nts

.

The state e x plored on c ross-examination the t o p i c of the de fendant’s sobriety . As ref lected in the presente nce report, the de fendant beg an drinking when he was sixt een y ear s old but claimed to have stopped when he turned ninete en y ear s old. He had a history of smoking ma

rijuana but said that he had “ not done that in a while” and that he quit bec ause the re w as “no point in it.”

I n his statement to the police, the de fe n d ant said that he stay ed inside the building approximately

30 minutes. Accor ding to the defe ndant, during that time “[e]very one that wa s there broke a couple of

things[,] and then we left.” Some of the time inside the building, the de fendant and other s walked a

round looking at what wa s there. T he d ef en d an t s aid that he we nt inside the-3-

building with three other pe ople. The de fendant expl ained that he enter ed the buildi ng only once but that he had he ard that others had pe rhaps r eturne d at another time. During the sentenc ing he aring , a fa ctual dispute arose betwe en the de fendant and McMaha n , wh o also was pr esent in the c ourtroom. McMahan insisted that eight pe ople wer e prese nt: J oe Parton, the de fenda nt, and McMahan in one vehicle, and Randy Steven, J ason Gunter , Andre w Kirk, a nd two unknown males in a sec ond vehicle. T he def endant told the court that he and Ki rk ro de in the ba c ks e a t of

Mc Maha n’ s v e hic le a ndthat Mc Maha n a ndPart on were in the fr on t. The de fenda nt said that he did not know what happene d afte r the four of them left the building and went home. A la w enforce ment incident report, which was filed wit h the court, indicated that the damag e to the vac ant building oc curr ed someti m e betwe en the 6th and 27th of September, a nd acc ording to a police state ment g iven by one of the vanda ls, all of the damag e did not occur at one time, because the building was e ntere d on more than one occa sion.

The c ourt’s sentenc ing r emar ks were brief. It ruled,
T h e Court does sente nce [the def endant] to three y ear s on the va nd a lis m; t wo y e ars on the bu rg lary . A nda t thi s, a t le a st up to this po int the fi g ur e that’ s bee n use d thus fa r of $3 1, 82 5. 00 is o rd e re d to b e p a i d j o i n t l y a n d s e v e r a l l y a n d h e c a n n o tg o t o F o o d C i t y. Th e Court fi nd s that th is .

. . Yo u kno w, the re ’s a c e rt a in a mou nt of c omp a ssi on that y ou c a n h a ve fo r a y ou ng fe llo w that ju st rea lly , rea lly g ets into some deep trouble but then, on the other hand, this act ca nnot be over looked. It’s deter re n ce i s something to be considere d.
He is aw fully close to being entitled to probation but the Court just cannot do that, Mr. Cutshaw.
I would assume that this sente nce could be built in the Cocke CountyJ ail. You’ve alre ady g ot some time on it and, of course , y ou c a n a pp ly fo r w or k r e le a se wh ic h may

le t y ou con ti nu e, a t le a st, to earn something w hile y ou’re building this sentence

. Ag g rieve d by

the manner of service of his sentenc e and the re stitut ion ordere d, the defe ndant has a

ppeale d.
The law is well settled that befor e a trial court imposes a se ntence upon a convic ted cr i m i n al d ef

en d an t , i tm u s tco n s i d er(a ) t h e e v i d en ce ad d u ce d att h e t ri al an d t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g; (b) the pr es en t ence re port; (c) the principles of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing alt e r n a ti v e s ; ( d ) th e n a tu r e a n d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f th e c r im in a l c o n d u c t in v o lv e d ; ( e ) e v id e n ce a nd information offe red by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee-4-

Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio ns 40 -3 5- 11 3 a nd 40 -3 5- 11 4; an d (f ) any state me nt the de fe nd a nt w ish e s to make in the defe ndant’s own behalf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(b) (2003); Sta te v . I mf e ld , 70 S.W.3 d 698 , 704 (T e nn . 200 2) . T o f a c ili ta te app e llate re vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt is require d to place on the rec ord its rea sons for imposing the specific s en t ence , including the identification of the mitig ating and enhanceme nt fac tors found, the spec ific fa cts supporting eac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, and the method by which the mit igating and enhanc ement factors ha ve been evaluate d and bala nced in de termining the sentenc e. See Sta te v . Sam ue ls , 44 S.W .3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001)

. Upon a c halleng e to the sentenc e imposed, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo re vie w o f the se nte nc e wi th a pr e su mpt ionthat th e de te rm inatio ns ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt are c or re c t. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). Howeve r, this pre sumption “is conditioned upon the a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t the t ri a l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fac ts a nd circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview ref lects that the trial c ourt followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, th at the court imposed a lawful sente nce a fter having g iven due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the se ntencing law, and that the t rial court’s finding s of fact are ade quately supported by the re cord, then the presumption is applicable , and we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we would have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult. See State v . Pike , 978 S.W. 2d 90 4 (T e nn . 199 8) . We w ill uphold the sentenc e imposed by the trial court i f (1 ) t h e s entenc e complies with the purpose s and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act, and ( 2) the trial court’s finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. See S ta t e v . A r ne tt , 49 S .W. 3d25 0, 25 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . T he bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that a sentenc e is improper is upon the a ppealing party

. See Tenn. Code An n
. § 4 0 -35-401 (2003) Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Cm ts. ; Ar ne tt , 49 S.W .3d at 257.
I n our estimation, the trial court’s brief rema rks in imposi ng sentenc e in this case do not constitute the type of a ffirmative showing require d to invoke our de novo revie w wi th a presumption of cor

rec tness. Furthermore , the court’s passing ref ere nce to de terre nce doe s not sa tisfy the dictates of State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2000), “that the rec ord must c ontain some proof of the ne ed for

deter renc e bef ore a defe ndant, who is otherwise el i gi ble for pr obation or other a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c e , may b e in c arc era ted.” Id . at 9. Acc ording ly , we r eview this matter de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness.
A def endant, suc h as the de fendant in this case , who does not possess a criminal history showing a clear disreg ard for society ’s l aws and morals, who has not failed pa st rehabilitation eff orts, and who “ is an espec ially mitigated or

standard of

fende r convic ted of a

Class C, D, o r E felony is presumed to be a favor able candidate f or alternative sente ncing options in t he abse nce of ev i d en ce to the contra

ry .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(6) ( 2003). See also State v . Fields , 40 S.W .3d 435, 440 (Tenn. 2001) . The following co n s i d er at i ons provide g uidance reg arding what co n s t i t u t es “e v i d en ce t o t h e c o n tra ry ” wh i ch wo u l d re b u t t h e pr es u m p t i o n o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g:

(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty by restraining a de fe nd a nt w ho ha s a

lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t;-5- (B ) C o n finement is nec essary to avoid depre ciating the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of

fe ns e or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula rl y su ite d to provide a n eff

ective d et err ence to others likely to commit si milar offe nses; or (C ) M e a s u r e s l e s s r e s t

ri c ti v eth anc o n f

i n e m e nt h a ve fr e qu e ntl y or re cently

been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant[.]
Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 03 (1 ) ( 20 03 ); se e als o Hooper , 29 S.W .3d at 5. Additi o n al l y , the princi p l es o f s en tencing ref lect that the se ntence should be no g reater than that deserve d for the offe nse committed and should be t h e lea st severe measure nece ssary to achieve the purposes f or which the se ntence is imposed. See Te nn . Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 03 (2 ), (4 ) ( 20 03 ). Th e c ou rt sh ou ld a lso c on sid e r the de fe nd a nt’ s p ote nti a l f or re ha bil itatio n o r tr e a tme nt in de te rm ini ng the app ro pria te sentenc e. See id . § 40-35-103( 5) (2003)

.

I n addition, because the de fendant rec eived a sentenc e of eig ht y ear s of l ess, he wa s elig ible for pr obation, and the trial court was re quired to consider probation as a

sentenc ing option. S e e id

. § 40 -3 5- 30 3( a ), (b ) ( 20 03 ). “ Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n o f w he the r the de fe nd a nt i s entitled to an alternative sente nce and whether the def endant is a suitable candidate for f ull probation ar e d if f e r e n t in q u irie s w ith d if f e r e n t b u r d e n s o f p r o o f

. ” S t ate v. Kenne th Jordan , No. M 2 0 0 2 -0 1 0 1 0 -C C A- R 3 -C D, s l i p o p
. at 4 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p
. , Na s h v i l l e, M ay8 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v. Boggs , 93 2 S.W.2 d 4 67 , 4 77 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 )) . T he bu rd e n is up on the de fe nd a nt t o sh ow he is a

su ita ble c a nd idate fo r p ro batio n. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ) ( 20 03 ); S ta te v. Goode , 9 56 S.W. 2d52 1, 52 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ); Boggs , 9 32 S.W. 2da t 47 7. To su stain this burden, the defe ndant must show that the sentenc e imposed was improper and that full p ro b at i on would be in the best intere st of the def endant a nd the public. E.g. , State v. Baker , 966 S.W .2d 429, 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

We are not troubled by

the t rial court’s reje ction of full probation for the def endant ina smu c h a s h e did no t shou lde r his a ff ir ma tiv e bu rd e n of de mon str a tin g wh y su c h s e nte nc e wo uld “subser ve the e nds of justice and th e best int ere st of both the public and the de fendant.” State v. Bingham , 910 S.W .2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) , overruled on othe r grou n d s b y S tate v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000) . We are , nevertheles s, conce rned that no obvious con s ideration was g iven to the def endant’ s statutory

presumption of fa vorable candida cy for alternative sentenc ing in the absenc e of evidenc e to the contra ry . The state, in our

opinion, did not of f s e t th e p r e s u mp ti o n w ith a n y o f th e f a c tu a l p r e mi s e s li s te d in Co d e s e c ti o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3 ( 1), such as, the ne ed to protec t society fr o m an o ff

en d er with a long history of criminal conduct or the in e f f e c ti v e n e s s o f p r io r n o n
- c o n f in e me n t me a s u r e s. See Tenn. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 03 (1 )( A) (C )O u r d isp o sitio n o b v ia te s the a rg u a b le ne e d to c o n sid e r th e im p a c t o f Bl ake ly v. Was hi ngt on , ___ U

. S. ___, 2 1 2 4 S . C t. 2 5 3 1 ( 2 0 0 4 ), o n T e n n e sse e ’s s c h e m e o f p re su m ing fav o ra b le c a n d id a c y fo r a lter n a tive se n te n c ing

. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 (6) (20 0 3 ). -6- (2 00 3) . A c c or din g ly , w e mod if y the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e to a te rm of sp lit c on fi ne me nt, wi th s ix months to be served in the loc al jail or workhouse and the ba lance to be serve d on probation. 2

As for r estitution, t he re cord is cle ar that the defe ndant ag ree d to p ay ment of re sti tut ion a s p art

of his ple a a g re e me nt w ith the state . Mor e ov e r, in our vie w, re sti tut ionis e nti re ly appro p ri at e i n t his case. E ven so, the a mount of restitution a defe ndant is order ed to pay must be ba se d up on the vic tim ’s pe c un iary los s a nd the fi na nc ia l c on dit ion a ndob lig a tio ns of the de fe nd a nt. See State v . Bottoms , 87 S.W .3d 95, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). No testimonyor evide nce appea rs of rec ord establishing the fair marke t va lue of the property vandalized or i t s re p l ac em ent cost. The only evidenc e wa s Ay ers’ damag e ca lculation of $31,825 base d on repairing the exist ing un its , n ot r e pla c e me nt c os t. Ay e rs did no t know the orig ina l pu rc ha se pric e fo r t he fr e e zer s o r the ir fair ma rket va lue prior to the va ndalism, and he unde rstood that the fre ezers we re ultimately remove d as salvag e in re turn for the clea nup of the building , instead of be ing r epair ed.

Fr om the transcript of the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court expressed con c e rn s a bout calc ulating the victim’s losses. I ndeed, the court dire cted Ay ers, “ Check with those folks and se e if they can c ome up with . . . I

need to know the value of these f ree zers, wher e they

came from, what happ en ed t o them.” The court a dded, “Somebody needs to tell that and . . . It’s kind of shooting from the hip, just to take that fig ure and I ’m not satisfied.” The rec ord is silent whether the reque sted information wa s forthcoming , and like the tria l court, this c ourt is not satisfied with the loss calc ulation as i t prese ntly stands. Under these circumstance s, we be lieve a r emand is re quired for the trial court to inquire f urther into the c alculation of r estitution i n this cause.
Acc ording ly , this cause is re manded f or the imposition of the altere d sentenc e and the re calc ulation of restitution.

____________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE