### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 5, 200 5 S es sio n
LEN DEL L. CO NLE Y v. JO AN N C ONL EY
Appeal f romthe G eneral Sessions Court for Bledsoe Coun ty No. 1082 Howard L . Upchurch, Jud ge

No. E2004-01309-COA- R3 - F ILED MAY 9, 2005

I n this divorce ca se, t h e wi fe ra i ses the issues of whe ther the tria l court er red in ruling it had j u ri s d i ct i o n b as ed o n t h e h u s b an d ’s d o m i ci l e in Bl ed s o e C o u n t y , T en n es s ee ; wh et h ert h e t ri al j u d ge
err ed in r efusing to r ecuse himself from the tria l of the ca se; and whe ther the c ourt err ed by failing to equitably

divide the marital e state. The husband arg ues on appea l that the trial court should have classified c erta in assets t hat i t held t o be marital property as hi s separ ate pr operty . We modify the division of marital property to increa s e t h e am ount awar ded to the wife , and af firm the court’s judgme nt in all other respe cts.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t A ffirm e d as M odi fie d; Case Re m anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., joined. C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., filed a se parate conc urring opinion.
Mitchell A. By

rd, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, J o Ann Conley
Stephen T. Gre er, D unlap, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee, L endel L . Conley

OP IN ION

I. Pr oc e dur al a nd Fa c tua l Ba c kg

ro und

L endel L . Conley

(“H usband”) and Jo Ann Conley (“Wife” ) were married on F ebrua ry 14, 1986. At the time of the mar riag e, Hus b an d was 65 y ear s old and Wife was 38 y ear s old. No children w ere born of the ma rriag e. On J anuary 2, 2001, Husband filed this a ction for divorc e. At the time Husband filed fo r d i v o rc e, he was living at his home in Bledsoe County , Tenne ssee, a nd Wife was living in F lorida.

On J une 1, 2001, Wife filed a motion to di smiss, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. C ode Ann. § 36-4-104. Wife filed an aff idavit supporting he r motion,-2-

the e ssenc e of

wh ic h w a s a n a

rg ume nt that H us ba ndne ith e r r e sid e d in no r w a s h e do mic ile d in Tenne ssee. On April 2, 2002, the trial court, afte r considering various competing aff idavits, he ld that Husband ha d established that his domicile an d residenc e wa s in Tennessee . The c ourt overr uled Wife’s motion to di smiss.
Subsequent to this adverse r uling, a n d n ea rl ysix teen months afte r Husband’ s initi al complaint for divorc e, Wife filed a motion requesting the t rial j udg e to rec use hi mself. This motion state d in its e nti re ty

a s f oll ow s:

The De fenda nt [ Wife] would s how that there have be en various communications between he rself and J udg e Upc hurch
conce rning the situation with the Pl aintiff [ Husband]. The De fendant would further

show that as a re s u lt of these conve rsations she communicated w ith J udg e Upc hurch by telephone and m ail and wa s also renting s p ac e from J udg e Upc hurch f or a pe riod of seve ral months. WHE REF OR E, De fe nd a nt m ov e s th e Cou rt fo r r e c us a l i n th is
case

.
J udg e Upc hurch de clined to re cuse himself, f inding no g rounds to do so. Wife subsequently filed
a pro se motion for chang e of ve nue, ar g uing that “she ha s a re asonable fea r that she would not
rec eive a fa i r t ri al i n t his venue.” On Aug ust 13, 2002, W ife filed a pro se “motion to disqualify jud g e ,” a lle g ing that “ the Judg e is b ia se d a ndpr e jud ic e d a g a ins t” her. Th e c ou rt ov e rr ule d th e se motions.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

he ardthe c a se on Se pte mbe r 1 7 a nd18 , 2 00 3. Th e c on te ste d is su e s p ri mari ly inv olv e d th e c la ssi fi c a tio n, va luatio n a nddiv isi on of the pa rties ’ ass ets. Th e c ou rt

he ld the va st majority of the estate to be marital property , and divided the marital e state so that Husband r ece ived assets value d at $1,877, 6 4 4

. 4 8 (70.59% of the estate ) and Wife r ece ived assets va lued at $782,237.75 (29.41%)

.
II. Issu es Prese nted
Wife appea ls, raising the following issues for our r eview:

1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in ruling it had jurisdi ction over the case due to the husband’ s domicile and re sidence in Bledsoe County , Tenne ssee. 2. Whether the trial judg e er red in re fusing to rec use himself fr om the trial of the c ase. 3. Whether the c ourt err ed by failing to equitably

divide the marital e state.

I n addition, Husband ra ises the issue of whether the trial court e rre d in classify ing c erta in assets as

m ar i t a l r a t h e r

t h a n h i s s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y.-3- III . St and ar d o f R e v ie w

I n th is n on -j ury

c a se , o ur re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord of the proc eeding s below; but the re cord c omes to us with a presumption of correc tness as t o the t rial court's f actua l determinations that w e mus t ho no r u nle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); W right v. City of K

noxville, 89 8 S. W.2 d 1 77 , 1 81 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Hudd l es t o n, 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt' s conclusions of law, how ever , are
acc orded no suc h presumption. Campbell v. Flori da Steel Corp., 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt, 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

.
IV . Jurisdi ction to Gran t Divorce

As the pa rt ie s re c og nize , the iss ue of wh e the r the c ou rt

ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to he ar andg rant a div or c e is g ov e rn e d b y

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 10 4, wh ic h p ro vid e s in re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: (a ) Adiv or c e ma y

be g rante d fo r a ny

of the a fo re me nti on e d c a us e s if the ac ts complained of wer e committed w hile the plaintiff wa s a bona fide re sident of this state or if the ac ts complained of we re c ommitt ed out of this state and the plaintiff r esided out of the s t at e at the time, if the plaintiff or the defe ndant has resided in this state si x (6) months
ne xt pr e c e din g the fi lin g of the c omp la int

. This statute makes Tennessee residenc y by at least one of the pa

rties a c ondition prece dent to a court having jurisdiction to g rant a divorce

. The re sidency require ment in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-104(a ) “i s i n t en d ed t o as s u re t h at T en n es s ee h as a s u ff i ci en t re l at i o n s h i p wi t h t h e p ar t i es an d t h ei r m arri age t o m ak e it rea sonable for the courts of this state to affe ct the parties’ marital status.” B a r nett v. Barnett, No. 01A01-9605- CH-00228, 1998 WL 787043 at *3, 1998 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 765 at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Nov. 13, 1998).

Our c ourts have inter

prete d the term “ residenc e” a s used in T enn. Code Ann. § 36-4-104( a) to b e s y n o n y mo u s w ith “domicile.” Brown v. Brown, 26 1 S. W. 9 59 (T e nn . 1 92 4) ; W iseman v. W iseman, 39 3 S. W.2 d 8 92 , 8 95 (T e nn . 1 96 5) ; Barnett, 1998 WL 787043 at *3. The Te nnessee Sup re me Cou rt

ha s d e fi ne d “ do mic ile ” a s f oll ow s:

Domicile is defined a s the place wh er e a pe rson has his principa l home and plac e of e njoy ment of his fortunes; whic h he does not expect to leave, e x cept fo r a purpose; from whic h when a bsent, he
se e ms t o him se lf a way fa

re r; to w hic h w he n h e re turns , h e c e a se s to trave l. [ I nterna l quotations omi tted].-4-

W iseman, 393 S.W .2d at p.894. As this court stated in the Ba rn e tt case ,

To c re a te do mic ile in T e nn e ssee, a pe rs on or din ari ly mus t no t on ly intend to establish a per sonal home in this state but m u s t also act consistently with this i ntention. See Gree ne v. G reene , 43 Tenn.App. 411, 429, 309 S.W .2d 403, 411 (1957). To a cquire domicile here , the person must also have no prese nt intention or ex pectation of chang ing his or her r esidenc e to some oth er state

. Se e Tat e v . Co lli ns , 622 F.Supp. 1409, 1412 (W.D.Tenn.1985)

.

*** I n revi e w in g s u c h q u e s ti o n s [r e g ar d in g d o mi c il e ], w e c o n s id e r n ot only a per son' s decla

rations and c onduct but also all other re levant fac ts and circ umstances. See W iseman v. W

iseman, 216 Tenn. at 708, 393 S.W .2d at 895.

Ba rn e tt , 1998 WL

787043 at *3-4.

Wife filed an a ffidavit in support of he r motion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction,
a lle g ing thefo llo wi ng in r e le va nt p art :

At all times, both my self and D r. Conley have c laimed Florida as our pe rm an en t re s idence . Up to this point , there was ne ver a question conce rning the fa ct that Florida was our residenc e: 1. We have a lway s filed Fe dera l Income Ta x es listing F lorida
a s o u r r e s id e n c e

. We h a v e a lw a y s , in c lu d in g th e ta xa b le y e ar 1999, filed F lorida I ntang ible Taxes list ing F lorida as our residenc e. 2. Both my husband and I are reg istered voter s in the State of Florida and we participated and voted in the B reva rd County , Florida 2000 elec tions. . . 3. My husband drives a white C hry sler automobile re g istered with Florida ta g s. My

husband has a

Florida drivers lice nse listing Florida as his residenc e. 4. My husban d m ai n t ai n s numerous prof essional member ships listi ng his residenc e in the State of F lorida. 5. My husband’s medical insurance is w ith the F lorida De ntal Association listing his residenc e as F lorida. 6. Myhu sb a ndha s n e ve r f ile d a State of Te nn e sse e “ Ha ll I ncome Ta x return” alway s claiming Florida as his residenc e. . .-5- 7. Al l B ro ke ra g e a c c ou nts ow nedby e ith e r m y se lf

, o r m y husband, list Florida a s our re sidence

. 8. My husband, Dr. Conley , has alway s maintained that there
wer e substant i al t ax advantag es to maintaining our re sidence in the Sta t e o f F lorida and by

doing so, w e could a void the I ncome Ta x es assessed ag ainst persons having interest and dividend income by the State of Tenne ssee.

Hu sb a ndre sp on de d w ith his ow n a ff ida vit , s ta tin g in p e rt ine nt p art a s f oll ow s:

1.

. . . A t th e ti me o f

th e f il in g o f th e ab o v e

- d e scribed C o m p l a i n tf

o r D i v o r c e , I h a d b e e n a

r e s i d e n to f

B l e d s o e C o u n t y, Te nn e sse e , f

or mor e than s ix mon ths imm e diate ly prior the re to. I

a lso maintain a plac e of a

bode at 930 South Courtenay , Merritt I sl and, F lorida , b ut that pla c e of abo de is no t my re sid e nc e a ndwa s n ot m y re sid e nc e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h e D i v o r c e C o m p l a i n t i n thi s
cause

. 2

. T h e h o m e i n w h i c h In o w r e s i d e i n B l e d s o e C o u n t y, Tenne ssee, wa s constructe d and finished in 1993. Ihave lived in that residenc e since that time up to t h e p resent. Be fore J uly of 1993, I liv e d in a sma ll er ho us e loc a te d o n th e sa me re a l e state loc a te d in B le ds oe Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , f ro m D ecem ber of

19 90 up un til July 1993. 3. I t is myintent, and h as b een f or more tha n six months immediately prec eding the filing of the divorce in this cause, that the residenc e in which I

live in Bled s o e C ounty

be my perma nent and primary residenc e. I

maintained a pla ce of

abode in t h e S t at e of Florida for the pur

pose of visiting f

rom time to tim e which I have done over the y ear s. Since m oving to B ledsoe County , I have be en phy sical ly p r e s e n t a n d li v e d in B le d s o e Co u n ty a t le a s t 8 0 % o f the time. 4. For

at least six months imm ediately prec eding the filing of the Divorc e C omplaint in this cause , I owned a nd operated two pickup trucks with Tenne ssee Reg istration. . . 5. My wife, J o An n Conley , has on pre vious occa sions advised me that there w as a t ax ad v an tag e to listing the State of Florida as our pe rmane nt r esidenc e on tax re turns. I did not question h er assertion and did not question her ef fort to have our re sidence shown as the State of

Florida

.-6- 6. At the t ime of fili ng of t he divorc e in this cause, I continued to maintain and use a

Florida drivers lice nse. . . 7. An y lis tin g of my a dd re ss as the Sta te of F lorida wa s at my wi fe ’s ins ist e nc e a ndins truc tio ns

. 8. I curr ently

maintain a post offic e box in Pikevill e, Tenne ssee, Bledsoe County , wher e Irec eive mail and ha ve so for the la st six y e ars

. Pr ior to that tim e , I re c e ive d my ma il a t a rur al rou te addre ss in Bledsoe County , Tenne ssee. . . 9. Since 1990 I

have ma intained telephone number a nd listi ng for B ledsoe County , Tenne ssee. . .Since a pproxi mately

1990, I have
a l s o m a i n t a i n e d o n e o r m o r e b a n k a c c o u n t s i n B l e d s o e C o u n t y, Te nn e sse e , w he re I

ha ve e ng a g e d in my princ ipa l ba nking a c tiv iti e s.

Eac h party

submitt ed other

aff idavits of their respe ctive acquaintances, with H usband’s witnesse s
a tte sti ng that he re sid e d in Ten ne sse e , an d Wife ’s wi tne sse s att e sti ng that he inte nd e d to ma int a in his residenc e in Florida.

Following a hea

ring on Marc h 22, 2002, the trial court c onsidered the evidenc e and f iled a
me mor a nd um o pin ion statin g in r e le va nt p art a s f oll ow s:

[T] he parties stipulated to the following fac ts in addition t o those set fo rth in the a ff

ida vit s: 1. Th a t th e pa

rt ie s c on str

uc te d one or

mor e ho us e s o n jo int ly owned r eal pr operty

in Bledsoe County , Tenne ssee, in 1990 and 1993; 2. That the De fendant [Wife] re sides in the State of F lorida at 930 South C ourtnay

[si c], Merritt I sland, Florida ; 3. That prior to the co n s t ru ction of the homes in B ledsoe Cou nty , th e Pla int if

f [H us ba nd ] al so re side d ina ndabo ut M e rritt I sland, Florida ; 4. That the [Husband] has spent a major i t y o f h is tim e and been phy sically prese nt or l ived i n Ble dsoe C ounty a majority of the time from and a fter 1990 or 1993; 5

. T h a tt h e p ar t i e s ar e r e g i s t e r e d t o v o t e i n B r e v ar d C o u n t y, Florida ; 6. That t he [ Husband] maintains a Florida drivers license and has not soug ht or maintained a Tenne ssee drivers license ;-7- 7. That t he address on [Husband’s] fede ral income tax return is Merritt I sland, Florida , rathe r than Te nnessee ; 8. That the [ Husband] does not file a “Ha ll” income tax return
as re quired for

residents of the State of Tenne ssee; 9. That the [Husband] ha s a Chry sler Ne w Yorke r automobile, in his possessi o n , re g istered in the State of Florida , and two truc ks reg istered in Bledsoe County , Tenne ssee. Oneof these tr ucks is the [Husband’s] primary

vehicle.

*** On the date the [Husband] fil ed h i s Complaint for Divorce , the Court f

inds that the [Husband] was living in Bledsoe County . The Cou rt fu rthe r f ind s th a t th e [Hu sban d] in te nd e d to e sta bli sh his perso na l ho me in B le ds oe Cou nty a s e arl y a s 1 99 0 a ndthat hi s actions we re and have be en consistent with his intentions. I n addition to p hy sic a lly

liv ing in B le ds oe Cou nty , the [Hu sb a nd ] ha s v e hic le s in t h i s c o u n t y ( t w o o f

w h i c h ar e r e g i s t e r e d a n d t i t l e d i n B l e d s o e C o u n t y)
as well as other signific ant tang ible personal properties. It is true that the [Husband] retained ties to the State of F lorida, including the maintenanc e of his voting re gi s tration and the c ontinuation of a Florida drivers l icense , but this does not, in t he Court’s opinion,
ov e rc ome the sig nif

ic a nt r e la tio ns hip c re a te d b y the [Hu sb a nd ] with the State of Te nnessee . The Court conc ludes, there fore , that the [Hu sb a nd ] wa s a

bo na fi de re sid e nt o f T e nn e sse e when he f ile d h is Complaint for Div o rce in J anuary of 2001, and that he met the residenc y require ment of T.C.A. § 36-4- 104(a)

.

Wife’s motion to di smiss was eff ectively a motion for summary

judgme nt, see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. However , beca use the trial c ourt elec ted to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter, at wh ic h n o w itn e sse s te sti fi e d bu t the imp orta nt s tip ulatio ns lis te d a bo ve we re ma de , o ur

re vie w i s de

novo on the re c or d. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Cho v. Je ong, N o

. 0 3 A 0 1

- 9 8 0 6

- CV

- 0 0 2 5 7 , 1 9 9 7 WL 306017 at *4, 1997 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 407 at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App .E.S., filed June 6, 1997).

The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s ruling t h at i t had jurisdiction under Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-4-104(a)

. Whil e the evidenc e pre sented by Wife reg arding Husband’s Florida voter re g istration, tax filing s t at us and F lorida driver ’s license certainly has bea ring and rele vancy on the question, and wa s proper ly considere d by

the trial court as a f

actor , it does not
ou tw e ig h th e fa c t th a t H us ba ndha s li ve d a nd“ hu ng his hat” in Te nn e sse e sin c e 19 90

. Th e Sup re me Court stated long ag o that “[i] t is well se ttled that a party may have two or

more re sidence s, in the
sense that he may have differ ent place s of abode, but he can have bu t o n e domi cile.” Brown v. Br own , 26 1 S.W. 95 9 (T e nn

. 19 24 ). I t ma y be that Hu sb a nd ha s a n a dd iti on a l “ pla c e of abo de ” in-8-

F l o r i d a a t W i f

e ’ s h o u s e , b u ti ti s c l e ar

t h a th e h a s i n t e n d e d h i s d o m i c i l e t o b e i n B l e d s o e C o u n t y. We affirm the trial court’ s ruling that it had jurisdiction in t his case.

V . Recusal

As noted above, afte r the court’s ruling adver se to Wife on the jurisdiction issue, she filed a motion for the tria l judg e to r ecuse himself. The g rounds for the motion were: (1) in J une of 1990, the jud g e ha d d on e so me tit le ins ur a nc e wo rk a s a n att orn ey for th e se lle rs of the B le ds oe Cou nty farm purcha sed by

Husband; (2) in April of 1992, Wife appar ently made inquiry

reg arding renting office space in a building owne d by the judg e’s f

ather , and Wife paid rent on the office space to the trial judg e for

a number of months in 1992. J u d ge U p ch u rc h d ec l i n ed t o re cu s e h i m s el f, s t at i n g:

I don’t hav ean y

independe nt rec ollection about any matters involving y our client [Wi fe] or Mr. Conl ey other than what I ’ve state d. . .And it’s ext reme ly

problematic f

or part–time Sessions judge s to prac tice law and to he ar c ases, but whe n there ar e t ru e conflicts and w hen t h e r e i s a n ap p e ar a n c e o f

a c o n f l i c ta n d ap p e ar a n c e o f

a n i m p r o p r i e t y, I will recuse my self, but Idon’t find that to be the c ase he re. A nd with all due re spect, I ’m g oing to de ny the motion.

Reg arding a motion to recuse , “whe ther re cusal is war rante d is left to the discretion of the trial judg e, and suc h decision will not be reve rsed a bsent a c lear abuse of discretion on the f ace of th e r e c o r d.” B o a rd o

f Professional Resp. v. Slavin, 145 S.W .3d 538, 546 (Tenn. 2004) . The Supreme Court further stated in Slavin a s f oll ow s: Parties may

lose the rig ht to que s t i on a judg e' s impartiality if they attempt to manipulate the impartiality issue to gain proce du ral advanta g e. Davis v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Se c., 23 S.W .3d 304, 31 3 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp .1 99 9) . [T ]he failu re to s e e k r e c us a l in a tim e ly

m an n er r e s u l t s i n a w ai v ero f ap ar t y 's ri gh tt o q u es t i o n a j u d ge's impartiality

. Id. [I n te r n a l q u o tati o n s o mi tt e d ].

S l a vin, 1 4 5 S. W. 3 d a t p

. 5 4 7

. Wi f e w a it e d o v e r

f if te e n mo n th s f

r o m th e f il in g o f th e divorce complaint to raise the r ecusa l issue, and did so only afte r t he ruling i n Husband’s favor on her motion to dismi ss. There is ample evidenc e to support a finding that the rec usal issue was waived for f ailure to timel y ra i s e i t

. Ne verthe less, we ha ve conside red the merits of the issue, a nd hold that the
e vid e nc e do e s n ot s ho w a n a bu se of the c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n. Wif e pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e that w ou ld objectively

war rant the tria l judge to rec use himself fr om this case.-9- IV . D iv isi on o

f M ar ita l Es tat e

We ne x t c onsider whether the trial court err ed in classify ing c erta in assets as marital rather than Husband’ s separ ate pr operty , as Husband contends, and whether the court equitably divided the marital prope rty

betwee n the parties.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( c ) p ro vid e s th at th e c ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r “ a ll re le va nt f a c tor s” i n c l u d i n g t h e f

o l l o w i n g f

a c t o r s i n m ak i n g a n e q u i t ab l e d i s tr i b u t i o n o f m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y: (1) The duration of the ma rriag e; (2) The ag e, phy sical and me ntal health, vocational skill s, employ ability , earning
c apa c ity , e state , f

inanc ia l li abil iti e s a ndfi na nc ia l ne e ds of e a c h o f the pa

rt ie s; (3) The tang ible or i ntang ible contribution by one (1) party

to the education, tr a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income; (5) The contribution of eac h party to the acquisition, prese rvation, appr eciation, depre ciation or dissipation o f t he marital or separ ate pr operty , including the
c on tr ibu tio n o f a

pa rt y to the marria g e a s ho me make r, wa g e e arn e r or pa re nt, wi th the c on tr ibu tio n o f a

pa rt y a s h ome make r o r w a g e e arn e r t o b e given the sa me weig ht if eac h party

has fulfilled its role; ( 6 ) T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y o f

e a c h p ar t y; (7) The estate of

eac h party

at the time of the ma

rriag e; (8 ) T he e c on omi c c ir c ums ta nc e s o f e a c h p art y a t the tim e the div isi on of pr op e rt y is to become e ffe ctive. (9 ) T he ta x co ns e qu e nces to e a c h p art y , c os ts a sso c ia te d w ith the re a so na bly fore se e a b le sale of the asset, a nd other re asonably fore seea ble expenses associated wi th the a sse t; (10) The amount of social se curity benef its available to ea ch spouse; and (11) Such other

fac tors as ar e nec essary t o consider the equities betwe en the pa rt ie s.

A t ri a l c ou rt is a llo we d w ide la titud e in d e te rm ini ng a n eq uit able div isi on of mari ta l pr op e rt y a ndwe wi ll d e fe r t o th e tr ia l c ou rt ' s det e rm inatio n unle ss i t is inc on sis te nt w ith the fa c tor s se t f orth above or there is a preponde ranc e of e vidence to the contra ry

. Ba rn hil l v . B ar

nh ill , 826 S.W .2d 443, 449-50 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1991).

The division of the marital e state beg ins with the class i fi cation of the parties’ pr operty as either “marital” or “ separ ate.” McClellan v. M cClellan , 873 S.W .2d 350, 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Tenn. Code An n

. § 3 6 -4-121 se ts forth the def inition of marital property . “Ge nera lly speaking pr op e rt y that is a c qu ir e d d uring a

marria g e by

e ith e r o r b othsp ou se s a ndsti ll o wn e d b y e ith e r o r b oth-10-

sp ou se s w he n th e div or c e is g rante d is c la ssi fi e d a s ma ri ta l pr op e rt y

a ndis thu s subj e c t to e qu ita ble division.” Humphries v. H umphries , No. E2000-02912- COA-R3-CV, 2001 W L 825986 at *3, 2001 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 512 at*9 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Jul y 23, 2001).

Hu sb a ndarg ue s th a t the B le ds oe Cou nty fa rm , va lue d a t $6 75 ,0 00 by the tr ia l c ou rt , s ho uld have be en cla ssified as his separ ate property

. This rea l estate, howe ver, w as ac quired by Husband during the marriag e, and the improvements wer e built on it duri n g the marriag e as w ell. Further, Hu sb a nde xec ute d a c on ve y a nc e of tit le to the pr op e rt y in 19 91 so that it wa s ti tle d jo int ly in b oth pa rt ie s’ na me s. Hu sb a ndarg ue s th a t th is “ wa s d on e up on the c on sid e ratio n that th e Wif e wo uld reloc ate to B ledsoe County and live with the Husba nd there ,” which ne ver ha ppened.

Hu sb a nd make s a sim ila

r arg ume nt wi th re sp e c t to tw o tr a c ts of re a l e state in F lorida , th e tit le to eac h of which Husband t ransf err ed, during the ma

rriag e, fr om himself to the parties jointly . When
a sp ou se tr e a ts s e pa

rate pr op e rt y

in s uc h a way a s to g ive e vid e nc e of

a n in te nti on that it

be c ome
mar i t al property , this action cre ates a rebuttable presumption of a g ift to the marital estate

. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W .3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 2002)

.
The trial c ourt held that Husband did not re b u t t h e p re sumption create d by his action of j o i n t l y t i t l i n g t h e p r o p e r t y a t i s s u e , t h e r e b y e v i d e n c i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t b e c o m e m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s classification of the disputed assets as marital. The trial court did aw ard the trac ts of Florida rea l property to Husband, and Husband states in h is b ri e f, “ [h]a d th e c ou rt pr op e rl y de fi ne d th e se pa

rate a sse ts o f the Hu sb a nd , th e c ou rt wo uld have be en justified in dividin g t h e estate in roug hly the same ma nner that it did under the court’ s marital prope rty

analy sis. Howeve r, eve n under the marital prope rty analy sis, the court wa s justified in its di vision.” We find no error in the trial co u rt ’s dec ision classify ing the property at issue as

m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y.

As a lr e a dy

no te d, the tr ia l c ou rt

div ide d th e mari ta l e state so th at Husb a ndre c e ive d a sse ts valued at $1,877,644.48 (70.59% of the estate) and Wife re ceive d assets value d at $782,237.75 (29.41%) . A re view of the rele vant statutory fac tors establishes the following

. The parties ha d been
marrie d n e arl y

fi ft e e n y e ars a t the tim e of the c omp la int fo r div or c e . H us ba nd , h ow e ve r, arg ue s in his brief that “ [t ]hi s marria g e has e ssentially been o v er for more than 10 y ear s, with the Husband having resided in B ledsoe County since 1990, while the Wife continued to re side in Merritt I sland, Florida .”

Husband wa s 82 y ear s old at t he ti me of the hearing

. Wife was 54 y ear s old at the time of the hea ring . The trial c ourt found both parties to be in relatively g ood phy sical hea lth. Husband
re tir e d f ro m hi s o rtho do nti c pr a c tic e in D e c e mbe r o f 1 98 7, sh ortly a ft e r the mar ri a g e . Wif

e ha s a Master’ s Deg ree , is fluent i n three lang uag es, and worke d full-time as a stockbr oker throug hout the
course of the mar

riag e. The trial court m ad e t h e fol lowing f indings of f

act in its memorandum op ini on , n on e of

wh ic h h a ve be e n c ha lle ng e d b y e ith e r p art y

on app e a l:
[Wife ’s ] ea

rn ing s a s a

sto c kb ro ke r exc e e de d [H us ba nd ’s ] orthodontic income, a nd, afte r the sale o f hi s dental pra ctice,-11- [Husband’s ] Social Security benef its, [ his] interest and dividend income and his fa

rm income. Her annual avera g e earning s, during the marria g e, we re $51,518.00. [ Wife’s] brokerag e income in 2001 a nd 2002 (the y ear s this divorce ac tion was pending ) was $27,856.00 and $3 2, 84 9. 00 , r e sp e c tiv e ly . [H us ba nd ’s ] mon thl y Soc ia l Se c urity incom e i s $ 1,254.00; his avera g e monthly interest and dividend income is $600.00; and he rece ives some income from the s ale of hay (ec lipsed, howeve r, by

farm expenses). Th a t a t th e ti me o f th e ma rr ia g e , th e [H u s b a n d] had
acc umulated assets with an a pproxi mate equitable value of One Milli on Three Hundre d Thousand ($1,300,000.00) Dollars. . .

*** That at the time of the marria g e, the [Wi fe] had ac cumulated assets with an a p p ro x i m at e e q u i t ab l e v al u e o f O n e H u n d re d T h o u sand ($100,000.00) Dollar s. . .

*** That the [H u sband] is not able to re sume any type of
me a nin g fu l g a inf

ul e mpl oyme nt, g ive n h is a g e , e du c a tio n, a ndpa st
re le va nt w or

k h ist ory . H is i nc ome , inthe fu tur e , w ill be lim ite d to Social Security

benef its, int ere st and dividends, and, at best, a “ breakeven” position from the sale of hay in conjunction with the oper ation of his farm... That t h e [ W ife] can e arn an annual income in excess of her
a ve ra g e mari ta l e arn ing s, a ndpo sse sse s a n e arn ing s pot ent ial far i n excess of that of [Husband]. The Court specific ally finds that [W ife] po sse sse s th e c re de nti als , in te lli g e nc e , w or k e thi c a ndpe rs on a lit y nece ssary to advanc e her

car eer as a stockbroker or as an educator or in th e e d u c a ti o n /a d mi n is tr a ti o n f ie ld s

. [N u mb e r in g in o r ig inal
o mi tt e d ].

Under the fa cts of the pr esent c ase, wh i l e i t is clear that “[t] he division of the estate is not rende red ine quitable simplybeca use it is not mathematically equal,” King v. King, 986 S.W .2d 216, 219 (Tenn. Ct. App.1998) , we are of the opinion that a division somewhat c loser to equality more appropriately

and equitably

takes into consider ation Wife’s signif icant contributions t o th ema rriag e, including the fac t that she was the sole wag e-e arne r for nearly the entire marria g e.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d the tot a l val ue of the B le ds oe Cou nty fa rm a nde qu ipm e nt the re on to be $708,000. The court a war ded H u sband a life estate in the pr operty , and rule d that upon H u s b a n d ’ s d e a th , o r u p o n s a le o f th e p r o p e r ty , Wi f

e w a s e n ti tl e d to 2 5 % o f

th e s a le p r o c e e d s

. We modify the court’s judgme nt to awa rd the entire value of the Ble dsoe Countyfarm and equipment to Husband.H usband has f i l ed a m o t i o n wi t h t hi s co urt “fo r co nsi d erat i o n o f p o st judgm ent f act s, ” al l egi ng t hat s ub sequent 1

t o t h e appe al of

t h i s c as e, h e l ea r n ed t hat a s u bs t an t i al a mou n t of t h i s a cc ou n t “ h ad bee n w i t h dr aw n , t r an s fer r ed or d issip a te d b y the W ife.” O u r d isp o sitio n o f t h is a sse t o n a p p e a l re n d e rs the issu e s ra ise d in H u sb a n d ’s m o tio n m o o t.
-12- The pa rties owned an investment acc ount held with Edward Jones that the court v al u ed at $465,347 at the time of the he aring

. The court awa rded 75% of the value of the ac count to Husband,
or $3 49 ,0 10 .2 5. We m od if y the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt t o a wa rdthe e nti re va lue of

thi s a c cou nt, number 90808, to the Wife. 1

Th e pr e c e din g mod if

ic a tio ns re sult in a

tot a l a wa

rdof a sse ts v a lue d at $1 ,7 05 ,6 34 .2 3 to Husband, or 64% of the marital estate, a nd an aw ard of assets value d at $954,248 to Wi fe, or 36% of the ma ri ta l e state

. We be lie ve that thi s div isi on of the mari ta l e sta te is a mor e e qu ita

ble on e . T his division further provides to both parties the benef it of having all assets divided in a “c lean br eak,”
an d t h er eb y

av o i d s t h e p o t en t i al p ro b l em s as s o ci at ed wi t h Hu s b an d a n d W i f e e ac h o wn i n g a proportion of an asset, particularly the real property in Bledsoe County . Given the discor dant history of the pa rties, such a division seems likely to benef it both of them, and may

avoid furthe r litigation in the future.

For the aforementioned rea sons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed as modified, a nd the case rema nded. Costs on appeal ar e asse ssed one- half to the Appe llant, J o Ann Conley , and oneh a l f t o t h e A p p e l l e e , L e n d e l L

. C o n l e y.

_________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE