16-1083-cv McNiece v. Connecticut 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23 rd day of June, two thousand seventeen. PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges, BRIAN M. COGAN, 1 District Judge.

_____________________________________ Adam P. McNiece, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. 16-1083 State of Connecticut, J. Paul Vance, Jr., in his official capacity as the Claims Commissioner for the State of Connecticut, George Jepsen, in his official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Town of Waterford, Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut, Defendants - Appellees.

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1 Judge Brian M. Cogan, of the United States Distri ct Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.2 For plaintiff-appellant: Adam P. McNiece, pro se, Yankeetown, Florida. For defendants-appellees State of Connecticut, Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, and Connecticut Claims Commissioner: Maura Murphy Osborne, Thomas P. Clifford, III, Assistant Attorneys General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, Connecticut.

For defendant-appellee Town of Waterford: Mark A. Milano, Milano & Wanat LLC, Branford, Connecticut. For defendant-appellee Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP: Michael T. Ryan, Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP, Stamford, Connecticut.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Connecticut (Shea, J .).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Appellant Adam P. McNiece, proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint. McNiece sued Connect icut, its officials and courts, the Town of Waterford, and a law firm, asserti ng that the state courts and the Town had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and that his right to due process was violated by the state statutory requirement that he submit his claims to the C onnecticut Claims Commi ssioner before he could sue the State. He also raised state-law claims. The district court dism issed the federal claims based on lack of standing, sovereign immunity, and fa ilure to state a claim, and then declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedur al history of the case, and the issues on appeal.3 We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim and for lack of standing. Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys ., 707 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) (failure to state a claim); W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP , 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (standing). Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly ruled that McNiece lacked standing to raise his due process claim, and th at it properly dismissed his ADA claim against Connecticut and the Connecticut Judicial Branch. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in it s March 22, 2016 decision. Although the district court did not explicitly discuss McNiece’s request for an injunction prohibiting “further ac ts of discrimination,” dismissal of that claim was appropriate. Sovereign immunity does not bar claims for prospective inj unctive relief “against indi vidual officers in their official capacity.” Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying the doctrine originated in Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to ADA claim). Nonetheless, dismissal of the injunctive claim was proper because McNiece did not sue an individual officer for violating the ADA and, even if he had, the district court’s sove reign immunity ruling showed that he would be unable to state an ADA claim. See Mary Jo C ., 707 F.3d at 152 (“[I]f a plaintiff cannot state a Title II claim, the court's sovereign immunity inquiry is at an end.”). As to McNiece’s claim against the Town of Wat erford, his complaint alleged that it had violated 42 U.S.C. § 12186 by failing to provi de him “reasonable ADA accommodations of audio recordings of public meetings.” Section 12186 di rects the Secretary of Transportation to issue ADA regulations, and has no obvious relevance to McNiece or the Town. In dismissing this claim, the district court considered only wh ether McNiece stated a cl aim under § 12186. Because4 pro se submissions must be construed liberally and interpreted “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest,” Nowakowski v. New York , 835 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), the district court should have constr ued McNiece’s complaint as raising a claim under Title II of the ADA for failure to accommodate his disability. Nonetheless, we “can affirm the dismissal of a complaint on any basis supported by the record,” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 , 714 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2013), and, even if liberally construed, McNiece’s complaint does not st ate a claim against the Town under Title II of the ADA. To state a claim under Title II of th e ADA, McNiece must allege, among other things, that, “as a practical matter,” the Town “denied [him] meaningful access to services, programs or activities to which he” was “legally entitled.” Wright v. N.Y. St ate Dep’t of Corr ., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). McNiece did not allege that he had requested an accommodation, or that the town had denied him one. See Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t , 352 F.3d 565, 578 (2d Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on a reasonable accommodation claim, plaintiffs must first provide the governmental entity an opportunity to accommodate them . . . .”). Nor did he provide any facts about the relevant pu blic meetings, such as which meetings he sought recordings of and why he needed th em. In particular, this absence of detail leaves questions as to why, and how, he lacked “meaningful access” to m eetings that are open to the public and therefore could be attended in person. Accordingly, McNiece did not plead facts sufficient to “nudge[]” his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). As to the claims that McNiece has raised for the first time on appeal, we do not generally consider claims that were not raised in the district court, Harrison v. Republic of Sudan , 838 F.3d5 86, 96 (2d Cir. 2016), and there is no reason to do so in this case. Finally, McNiece’s complaint raised state-law claims against a law firm that had previously re presented the Town. He does not discuss those claims in his appellate brief, and has therefore abandone d any challenge to the dismissal of his claims against the law firm. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown , 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995). We have considered all of McNiece’s remain ing arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk