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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40669

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KAYDA D.,

Child-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DONA ANA COUNTY

Grace B. Duran, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General

Laurie Blevins, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM 

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Thomas J. Lewis, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM 

for Appellant

DECISION

BACA, Judge.

{1} Child-Appellant K.D. appeals the children’s court’s judgment and disposition 

order (the Order). K.D. asks this Court to reverse the provision in the Order stating, 

“Prior to the expiration of the commitment and pursuant to [NMSA 1978, Section] 32A-2-

23E [(2009)], the [c]ourt recommends that [Children, Youth and Families Department] 

CYFD provide [n]otice and [h]earing for an extension of the commitment for additional 

periods of one (1) year until the juvenile reaches the age of [twenty-one].” K.D. argues 

that the Delinquency Act of the Children’s Code, NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-19(B)(1)(c) 
(2021), prohibits the children’s court from ordering an automatic extension of long-term 

commitment at the beginning of her sentence. We determine that the children’s court 

did not order an automatic extension of K.D.’s commitment and that the children’s 

court’s recommendation for CYFD to provide notice and hearing for an extension of the 

commitment is permissible under the statute. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

{2} We set out only the pertinent facts and law related to the issues analyzed 

because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural posture of this case and 

because this is a nonprecedential expedited bench decision. See Rule 12-210(F) 

NMRA; see also In re Court of Appeals Caseload, Misc. Order No. 01-57, ¶ 4(C) (Sept. 

19, 2016). 

{3} K.D. was originally charged with first degree murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, 

Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994); conspiracy to commit first degree murder, contrary to 

NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979); tampering with evidence, contrary to NMSA 1978, 

Section 30-22-5 (2003); and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, contrary to 

Section 30-28-2 as a youthful offender. K.D. and the State subsequently entered a plea 

agreement where K.D. admitted the delinquent acts of tampering with evidence and 

conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence. The charges of first degree murder and 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder were dismissed pursuant to the terms of the 

plea agreement. 

{4} Concerning the disposition that could be imposed by the children’s court upon 

K.D. for these delinquent acts, the plea agreement provided: “The State will not seek 

adult sanctions, there are [n]o other agreements as to disposition. There are no 

agreements as to disposition.” The plea agreement further provided that “[t]he maximum 

penalty for these charges is a two[-]year commitment to the custody of [CYFD], which 

can be extended by the [c]ourt until the child reaches the age of twenty-one.” In the 

“Admission or No Contest Advice of Rights By Judge” portion of the plea agreement, the 

children’s court certified that it informed K.D. of the maximum disposition she faced for 

the delinquent acts she was admitting. Paragraph two of this portion of the plea 

agreement provides that:

The child understands the range of possible dispositions includes from 

probation to a maximum two[-]year commitment to the custody of [CYFD,] 

which can be extended by the [children’s c]ourt until [K.D.] reaches the 

age of twenty-one.

The children’s court confirmed that it reviewed this with K.D. by placing her initials in the 

space provided for next to this language.

{5} At the plea hearing on June 2, 2022, the children’s court accepted and approved 

the plea agreement after determining that K.D. understood its terms and voluntarily 
agreed to it. The children’s court did not impose a disposition on K.D. at that time, 

choosing instead to hold the disposition hearing at a later date. 

{6} Prior to the dispositional hearing, K.D. submitted a memorandum in aid of 

sentencing, which requested that the children’s court place her on probation for twentyfour months. On September 1, 2022, the children’s court held the dispositional hearing 

and imposed on K.D. a long-term commitment of not more than two years in the legal 

custody of CFYD as a delinquent offender.

{7} At the disposition hearing, the children’s court acknowledged that although it 

could not impose a longer sentence, it strongly recommended, pursuant to Section 32A2-19(B)(1)(b), that the commitment be extended until the age of twenty-one, stating that 

it would be appropriate in this case. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the 

recommendation was not contemplated by the plea agreement. The children’s court 

responded that the plea agreement provided that there were no agreements as to 

disposition and the extension would not be automatic as the statute provided for an 

extension of the commitment following notice and hearing. Defense counsel disagreed 

and stated that the notice and hearing for extension should be initiated only for cause 

and that he would be moving to withdraw the plea agreement. In the Order, the 

children’s court included the following: “Prior to the expiration of the commitment and 

pursuant to [Section] 32A-2-23E, the [children’s c]ourt recommends that CFYD provide 

[n]otice and [h]earing for an extension of the commitment for additional periods of one 

(1) year until [K.D.] reaches the age of [twenty-one].” (Emphasis added.) K.D. appeals.

DISCUSSION

Preservation

{8} We first address the State’s contention that K.D. failed to preserve her argument 

for appeal. Specifically, the State contends that below, K.D. argued that she was not 

subject to extension of the long-term commitment because that was not contemplated in 

the plea agreement. Now, on appeal, K.D. makes an altogether different argument. K.D. 

contends, on the other hand, that her argument was preserved by objection and that, 

nevertheless, preservation is not required because the children’s court imposed an 

illegal sentence. 

{9} “To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly 

invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.” 

Benz v. Town Ctr. Land, LLC, 2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 24, 314 P.3d 688 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “In order to preserve an issue for appeal, [an appellant] 

must have made a timely and specific objection that apprised the district court of the 

nature of the claimed error and that allows the district court to make an intelligent ruling 

thereon.” Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 

146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791. “The primary purposes for the preservation rule are: (1) to 

specifically alert the district court to a claim of error so that any mistake can be 

corrected at that time, (2) to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the 
claim of error and to show why the court should rule against that claim, and (3) to create 

a record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding the 

contested issue.” Id.

{10} Upon review of the record, we conclude that K.D.’s arguments were preserved by 

the objections and argument she made at the disposition hearing. 

Extension of Long-Term Commitment

{11} Turning now to the central issue on appeal, K.D. argues: (1) the children’s court 

lacked authority to enter an automatic extension of the long-term commitment at the 

commencement of the disposition, and (2) the children’s court lacked authority to 

recommend a hearing on extension of commitment at the beginning of the disposition. 

Whether the children’s court has the authority to enter a recommendation for notice and 

hearing on an extension of commitment at the beginning of a child’s disposition is a 

question of statutory construction, which this Court reviews de novo. See State v. Adam 

M., 2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 5, 129 N.M. 146, 2 P.3d 883 (stating that “[t]he children’s court’s 

authority to impose a commitment is statutory”). 

{12} The Delinquency Act establishes three classifications of juvenile offenders: 

serious, youthful, and delinquent. State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 1, 

229 P.3d 474; see also NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3 (2019). “A child’s placement in one of 

those three categories determines (1) which rules of procedure apply at trial, and (2) the 

potential post-adjudication consequences the child will face if the [s]tate proves its 

case.” Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 10. Under the Children’s Code, “[a] delinquent 

offender. . . is a child under the age of [eighteen] who is determined to have committed 

a delinquent act—an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime less serious 

than first[]degree murder or one of the enumerated offenses of a youthful offender.” Id.

¶ 12 (discussing Section 32A-2-3). “As a court of limited jurisdiction, the children’s court 

is only permitted to do what is specifically authorized by the [children’s c]ode.” State ex 

rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v. Paul G., 2006-NMCA-038, ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 258, 131 

P.3d 108 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In construing the [children’s 

c]ode, we examine it in its entirety, reading each part to achieve a harmonious result.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When possible, we give effect to the 

clear and unambiguous language of the [children’s c]ode.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “If statutory language is ambiguous, however, we consider the 

legislative purpose behind the statute in conjunction with all the provisions of the 

children’s code to resolve its meaning.” In re Ruben D., 2001-NMCA-006, ¶ 7, 130 N.M. 

110, 18 P.3d 1063.

{13} We note that K.D was adjudicated as a delinquent offender. To the extent that 

K.D. argues that the children’s court ordered an automatic extension of her 

commitment, we observe that this is unsupported by the record. Indeed, during the 

dispositional hearing, the children’s court stated multiple times that the extension would 

not be automatic and that it was bound by the plea agreement and the delinquency 

statute.
{14} Additionally, the Order distinctly and unmistakably states that the court was 

merely recommending that CYFD give appropriate notice so that a hearing could be set 

to consider whether the commitment should be extended. The Order states: “Prior to the 

expiration of the commitment and pursuant to [Section] 32A-2-23E, the [c]ourt 

recommends that CFYD provide [n]otice and [h]earing for an extension of the 

commitment for additional periods of one (1) year until [K.D.] reaches the age of 

[twenty-one].” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, we cannot agree with K.D. that 

extension of her long-term commitment is a foregone conclusion or will automatically 

occur.

{15} We next consider K.D.’s second argument that the children’s court lacks authority 

to recommend a hearing on extension of K.D.’s commitment at the beginning of the 

commitment. At the time of disposition, the children’s court, pursuant to Section 32A-2-

19(B), has several options for placement of the child including, but not limited to, a 

short-term and a long-term commitment. In either case, under 32A-2-19(B)(1), the 

children’s court must “transfer legal custody [of the child] to [CYFD], an agency 

responsible for the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children, which shall receive the 

child at a facility designated by the secretary of [CYFD] as a juvenile reception 

facility. [CYFD] shall thereafter determine the appropriate placement, supervision and 

rehabilitation program for the child.” (Emphasis added.) Section 32A-2-19(B)(1)(b) 

authorizes the court to enter a disposition of “a long-term commitment for no more than 

two years in a facility for the care and rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent children” 

unless “the commitment is extended pursuant to Section 32A-2-23.” The committing 

judge “may include recommendations for placement of the child.” Section 32A-2-

19(B)(1). 

{16} Section 32A-2-23(E) provides that, prior to the expiration of a long-term 

commitment, and with notice and hearing, “the court may extend the judgment for 

additional periods of one year until the child reaches the age of twenty-one if the court 

finds that the extension is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public 

safety.” (Emphases added.) “The [children’s] code intended the court to tailor a 

disposition to the specific needs of a child, and the legislature implemented its intent by 

granting the court power to review a child’s progress in the custody of CYFD at the end 

of a commitment period.” In re Ruben D., 2001-NMCA-006, ¶ 11.

{17} Section 32A-2-23(E) requires a finding that it “is necessary to safeguard the 

welfare of the child or the public safety.” In Adam M., this court discussed that in 

furtherance of the legislative purpose of rehabilitation, “the children’s court must 

exercise its discretion over a long-term commitment at the end of the commitment, after 

reviewing a record of the child’s performance while committed, instead of at the 

beginning when the court has less information before it.” 2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 10. K.D. 

argues that the children’s court’s review function would have no meaning if the court 

could simply order extended commitment when it issues its disposition. As we 

concluded above, the record reflects that the children’s court merely recommended and 

did not order, automatic extension of K.D.’s long-term commitment. Moreover, even if a 

hearing were held, commitment may not be extended absent the statutorily required 
finding that “the extension is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the 

public safety.” Section 32A-2-23(E). Nor do we observe the mere recommendation to 

upset the balance between CYFD and the children’s court as set forth by the statute 

because CYFD is not mandated to accept the recommendation of the children’s court, 

and nothing in the Order issued by the children’s court here prohibits CYFD from 

carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities, including early release of K.D. on 

supervised release or parole before the conclusion of the two-year, long-term 

commitment. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-23.1 (2009). 

{18} The Order simply recommended that hearings for possible one-year extensions 

of the long-term commitment be held pursuant to the Children’s Code. It did not order 

the automatic extension of the long-term commitment, thereby usurping CYFD’s 

authority to “determine the appropriate placement, supervision and rehabilitation 

program for the child,” Section 32A-2-19(B)(1), and it was entirely consistent with the 

committing judge’s prerogative to “include recommendations for placement of the child” 

at the dispositional hearing. Id.

CONCLUSION

{19} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and disposition order is affirmed.

{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.

GERALD E. BACA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge