J-S18016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.F.S., 

A/K/A D.S., A MINOR CHILD

APPEAL OF: F.F., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1301 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered October 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): Docket No. CP-02-AP-180-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: July 29, 2024

F.F. (“Mother”) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights 

to her child, D.M.F.S., a/k/a D.S. (“Child”). We affirm.

Mother and N.S. (“Father”) previously resided in Fayette County. Mother 

gave birth to Child in March 2020, after the family moved from Fayette County 

to Allegheny County. The day after Child was born, at the request of Fayette 

County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”), the Fayette County Court of 

Common Pleas ordered Child to be placed with Foster Parents, who were

already caring for Child’s brother. Child has resided with Foster Parents since 

her discharge from the hospital.

Due to Mother and Father’s relocation to Allegheny County, the Fayette 

County court transferred Child’s dependency case to Allegheny County. The 

Allegheny Court of Common Pleas adjudicated Child dependent in November 

2020. In November 2022, the court found aggravated circumstances existed
J-S18016-24

- 2 -

because Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to four other children have been 

involuntarily terminated.

Over two years after Child was adjudicated dependent, in December 

2022, the Allegheny County Office of Children Youth and Families (“OCYF”) 

filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights to Child. 

The court held a hearing on the petitions on September 8, 12, and 26, 

2023. It heard the testimony of Fayette County Adult Probation Officer Michael 

Fell; the court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Terry O’Hara; Program Manager for 

the Auberle Emergency Family Shelter, Krislynn Jones; Case Manager for 

Allegheny Valley Association of Churches, Kelli Sembower; OCYF caseworker,

Donna Colella; Foster Care Case Manager, Catherine Kintz; Mother; and 

Father.

The OCYF caseworker, Donna Colella, testified that CYF has been

involved with the family on-and-off since 2015. N.T., 9/8/23, at 116. Mother 

and Father stipulated that in 2016, CYS received a report that some children 

had missed medical appointments, including an MRI. Findings of Fact, Oct. 24, 

2023, at 3. In 2017, CYS received a report that Father was acting strangely 

during the birth of another child. Id.

In 2018, EMS responded to the family’s home and found one of Child’s 

siblings on the floor and unresponsive due to dehydration and malnutrition. 

Id. at 2; N.T. at 116. The sibling was 22 months old at the time and weighed 

just over 15 pounds. See OCYF Ex. #10, Order of Adjudication and 
J-S18016-24

- 3 -

Disposition, 11/18/20, at ¶ 7. Neither parent had an explanation for the 

sibling’s condition. Id.

The incident resulted in criminal charges against Mother and Father. N.T. 

at 25. In May 2021, Mother pleaded guilty to simple assault and related 

charges, and was sentenced to 36 months of probation and 18 months of 

electric home monitoring. Id. at 6. Father pleaded guilty to simple assault and 

related charges and was sentenced to 36 months of probation and 18 months 

of electric home monitoring. Id. at 159; OCYF Ex. 9. The incident also led CYF 

to move to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child’s five older 

siblings. N.T. at 116. Termination was granted in 2022 as to four children. Id.

at 117. The incident also led CYF to remove Child following her birth in 2020, 

for fear for her safety. Id. at 168.

When interviewed by the court-appointed psychologist, Dr. O’Hara, 

Father denied any responsibility for the incident. Id. at 28-29. Father claimed 

Child had been poisoned by inhaling hydrocarbon after a heater had spilled 

and kerosene had seeped into the wood floors. Id.; see also id. at 70. When 

Dr. O’Hara asked Mother about the incident, Mother did not respond. Id. at 

25. Regarding the parents’ refusal to take responsibility, Dr. O’Hara stated,

I think it’s problematic. This is a case where [Mother] pled guilty 

to criminal offenses in relation to this child. So there was already 

a criminal case that she accepted responsibility in that sense. But 

without working with services to address the issue that influenced 

the chronic malnutrition for the child in the first place, it’s really 

difficult for parties to make substantive charges and to create an 

environment where the issue wouldn’t be recurrent.
J-S18016-24

- 4 -

Id. at 25-26; see also id. at 70-71.

Both Colella and Dr. O’Hara also testified regarding intimate partner 

violence (“IPV”) in the household. Due to reports of violence between the 

parties, OCYF referred both parents for IPV treatment. Id. at 119. Colella 

testified that Mother completed an initial IPV course in August 2021. Id. at 

150-51. However, there continued to be incidents of IPV between Mother and 

Father. Id. at 154. Mother obtained a PFA against Father, which she later 

“dropped.” Id. at 9. OCYF referred Mother to a second round of treatment, 

which Mother completed in February 2022. Id. at 154. Father also completed 

an IPV course in 2022. Id. at 161. Nevertheless, the violence persisted, with 

Mother still reporting abuse in July 2023. Id. at 88-89, 144-45. The most 

recent reports of abuse resulted in Father being terminated from the housing 

program. Id. at 89. OCYF requested Mother and Father continue IPV

treatment. Id. at 151, 161. Both parents refused. Id. at 146, 154, 161-62. 

Dr. O’Hara testified that exposure to violence is an adverse childhood 

experience. Id. at 21. He stated that such experiences place children at 

greater risk “of mental health issues, substance abuse concerns, even greater 

likelihood of having medical issues as well.” Id. He testified, “children who are 

exposed to violence, as I said, have -- are typically behind the starting line 

when given the nature of the effects, the long-lasting effects of adverse 

childhood experiences.” Id. at 44.
J-S18016-24

- 5 -

In Dr. O’Hara’s psychological evaluation, he stated the parents have not 

made any progress towards resolving the IPV, in part due to their lack of 

accountability:

This examiner does not have evidence that [Mother] and/or 

[Father] have made meaningful gains in their respective IPV 

interventions, and both parties continue to minimize the IPV 

involving them. Further, this examiner does not have evidence 

that [Mother] would be able to extricate herself from ongoing IPV 

with [Father] and exposure to IPV is an adverse childhood 

experience. According to the research, there is significant overlap 

of child abuse in households where IPV exists. This examiner is 

extremely concerned with the lack of accountability and 

responsibility by both parties in relation to their criminal activity, 

which involved one of their children, and their rights to several 

children being terminated.

OCYF Ex. 11, Psychological Evaluation Report, submitted 11/27/22, at 36.1 He 

also stated his concern that Child would be at risk of exposure if returned to 

her parents, due to their failure to confront the issue:

This examiner lacks evidence that [Mother] and [Father] are in a 

position to appropriately care for [Child’s] needs and welfare and 

this is extremely concerning given the amount of time that [Child] 

has been out of parental care. This examiner does not have 

evidence that historical IPV concerns have been sufficiently 

addressed by the parties and, in this examiner’s opinion, [Child] 

would be at risk of potential exposure to IPV if she were to have 

unsupervised contact with her parents at this time. This examiner 

strongly advises against unsupervised contact for [Child] with her 

parents. Further, this examiner does not have evidence that 

[Father] and/or [Mother] are desiring to make substantive 

changes or meaningfully work with providers, especially with 

respect to IPV, as both parties continue to downplay their history 

of IPV. 

____________________________________________

1 We need not review the full testimony offered at the hearing.
J-S18016-24

- 6 -

OCYF Ex. 11, Psychological Evaluation Report, submitted 8/24/23, at 31.

Regarding whether termination of parental rights would have a negative effect 

on Child, he stated, “There may be some detriment to [Child], if her 

relationships with her parents were severed, yet this detriment should be 

weighed against risk of exposure to IPV, which is an adverse childhood 

experience, reported inconsistent visitation, and her strong relationships with 

her foster parents.” Id. at 32. He also testified to a Child’s need for stability, 

permanency is of significant concern for a child of [Child]’s age. 

There’s a lot of research on how children do with their foundational 

bedrock of safety, stability and security as opposed to children 

that lack this foundation. 

N.T. at 44.

Following the hearing, the court issued its Findings of Fact. The court 

found that the parents had failed to eliminate abuse from their relationship. 

Findings of Fact, Oct. 24, 2023, at 5. It stated that Mother “continues to 

downplay or minimize the intimate partner violence,” and noted that Father 

denies the need for services. Id. at 7. The court also noted that the parties 

refuse further services. The court recalled that Dr. O’Hara, had “testified about 

the negative effects that growing up in a home with intimate partner violence 

can have upon the development of young children.” Id.2

____________________________________________

2 The court also noted the parents’ inability to maintain stable housing. The 

court observed that Mother and Father have been living in a homeless shelter 

and now live in a hotel acting as an overflow shelter. However, the court found 

that this issue alone would not warrant termination of parental rights.
J-S18016-24

- 7 -

Regarding Child’s best interests, the court observed that Child has been 

with Foster Parents and her older sibling since birth, and that there have been 

a lot of disruptions to parents’ visitation schedule. The court also credited Dr. 

O’Hara’s testimony that “IPV concerns have not been sufficiently addressed 

by the parties and, in his opinion, [Child] would be at risk of potential exposure 

to IPV if she were to have unsupervised contact with her parents at this time.” 

Id. at 9. The court concluded,

I concur with Dr. O’Hara’s opinion that termination of parental 

rights, best serve[s] the needs and welfare of [Child]. [Child] is 

placed with her brother in a loving foster home, where she has 

lived her entire life. Her primary bond is with her foster parents, 

with whom she has resided for her entire life. Mother and Father

have not addressed the serious issue of intimate partner violence 

in their home, which would place [Child] at risk (as well as the 

Children that are currently in their care). [Child] deserves to 

remain in this environment on a permanent basis, which can only 

happen through the termination of parental rights.

Id. at 10.

The court found clear and convincing evidence established grounds for 

termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) and § 2511(b). The 

court issued an order involuntarily terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights to Child. Mother appealed.3

Mother raises the following issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), and (a)(8)?

____________________________________________

3 Father’s appeal is addressed in a companion case. See No. 1319 WDA 2023.
J-S18016-24

- 8 -

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)? 

Mother’s Br. at 6 (answers below omitted).

Mother first argues that OCYF failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence of grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(5) or (8). She 

argues Child was removed from her care due to an incident that occurred 

before Child was born. Mother therefore argues that conditions that led to 

Child’s removal no longer exist. She further contends there was no evidence 

that Mother or Father abused Child or that Child was ever exposed to IPV 

between Mother and Father. Mother asserts that she had two other children

in her care at the time of the termination hearing, who are younger than Child, 

and that this is evidence that Mother can provide parental care to Child, who 

has no known special needs. 

Mother next argues that termination would not best serve Child’s needs 

and welfare because Child shares a bond with Mother and enjoys her 

relationship with Mother. Mother claims, “There was insufficient evidence to 

prove that [Child] would be better off if Mother were removed from her life.” 

Id. at 20.

We review these claims pursuant to the following standard. “We accept 

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record 

supports them.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 
J-S18016-24

- 9 -

2018). “If the factual findings have support in the record, we then determine 

if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Id.

Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. This requires the court to engage in 

a bifurcated analysis. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). The 

initial focus is on the conduct of the parent, as the party seeking termination 

must prove “that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a).” Id. If the court finds grounds for 

termination exist under subsection (a), the court turns its focus to the 

“determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child,” as required by Section 2511(b). Id.

“A party seeking termination of parental rights bears the burden of 

establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” In re 

Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Regarding the initial inquiry into the conduct of the parent, the court 

found grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8). We will 

discuss only the latter subsection. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (stating appellate court need only agree with trial court’s 
J-S18016-24

- 10 -

decision as to any one subsection of 2511 to affirm the termination of parental 

rights).

Subsection 2511(a)(8) permits termination of parental rights where four 

conditions exist: (1) “[t]he child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the Court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency”; (2) “12 months 

or more have elapsed from the date of the removal or placement”; (3) “the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist”; and (4) “termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

Under this subsection, if a child has been removed for 12 months, the 

court must determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal 

or placement continue to exist, “despite the reasonable good faith efforts of 

[the agency] supplied over a realistic time period.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 759 (Pa.Super. 2008); accord In re R.A.M.N., 230 A.3d 423, 428 

(Pa.Super. 2020). This subsection “does not require the court to evaluate a 

parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially 

caused placement or the availability or efficacy of [agency] services.” Id. We

“cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence 

and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).

Here, Child was removed from Mother’s care at birth. CYS had already 

been involved with the parents for five years at that point, and Mother and 

Father faced criminal charges based on their gross mistreatment of Child’s 
J-S18016-24

- 11 -

older sibling. After Child’s removal, Mother and Father failed to take 

responsibility for how they had treated Child’s sibling. Dr. O’Hara testified that 

the parents would have difficulty in making substantive changes to their 

parenting without addressing the cause of their failures. There have also been

repeated reports of IPV throughout the case, and as recently as two months 

before the termination hearing. Mother and Father have minimized this issue 

and are now refusing to attend further services to eradicate the ongoing 

violence. Dr. O’Hara testified that the parents have not demonstrated a desire 

to fix this situation, and explained the risks it poses to Child. We therefore find 

the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led 

to Child’s removal—her parents’ inability to protect her and provide her with 

a safe home—continue to exist. 

We therefore turn to Child’s needs and welfare. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8), (b). This analysis includes “intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability.” Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023) (citation 

omitted). “One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the 

nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.” In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511. “[C]ourts considering termination must 

also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether 

they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 

(Pa. 2013).
J-S18016-24

- 12 -

Here, as the court observed, Child has never resided with Mother and 

naturally shares a stronger bond with Foster Parents, where she has lived for 

her 31⁄2 years of life. The trial court noted Child also lives with a sibling and 

described the foster home as “loving.” See Findings of Fact at 10. The court 

also recognized Child’s need for stability after 31⁄2 years of placement. Further, 

as the court observed, returning Child to Mother’s care when there is ongoing 

IPV in the home would be dangerous for Child’s physical and emotional wellbeing. 

The record supports the court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights is in Child’s best interests. We therefore affirm the order

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 07/29/2024