UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5034

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

TENNYSON HARRIS, a/k/a Teddy, a/k/a Mark T, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:00-cr-00253-PJM-3) 

Submitted: December 30, 2009 Decided: January 25, 2010 

Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Sicilia Chinn Englert, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Steven M. Dunne, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Tennyson Harris appeals the sentence imposed by the 

district court on remand from this court for resentencing 

pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). A 

jury convicted Harris of conspiracy to distribute and possess 

with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). In this appeal, Harris 

argues that the district court erred in determining that he was 

responsible for over 3000 kilograms of marijuana, which resulted 

in a base offense level of thirty-four pursuant to U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c)(3) (2001). 

Specifically, he asserts that the court’s method of averaging 

the number of drug hauling trips performed by various truck 

drivers and multiplying that figure by an assumed quantity of 

marijuana hauled on each trip was not supported by the record. 

 This court reviews the district court’s calculation of 

the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing 

purposes for clear error. United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 

195, 210 (4th Cir. 1999). Clear error occurs when the court, 

upon reviewing the record as a whole, is “‘left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.’” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) 

(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 

364, 395 (1948)). “If the defendant objects to a quantity 

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recommended in a presentence report, the district court must 

make an independent resolution of the factual issues raised by 

the objection.” United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 300-01 

(4th Cir. 1998). The Government must establish the quantity of 

drugs attributable to a defendant by a preponderance of the 

evidence and may do so through the introduction of relevant and 

reliable evidence. United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1316 

(4th Cir. 1994). 

 “Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized 

does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall 

approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.” USSG 

§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.12). “The district court is afforded broad 

discretion as to what information to credit in making its 

calculations.” United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596, 604 (4th 

Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Direct or 

hearsay testimony of lay witnesses . . . can provide 

sufficiently reliable evidence of quantity. Where witnesses’ 

estimates of drug amounts are uncertain, however, a district 

court is well advised to sentence at the low end of the range to 

which the witness testified.” United States v. Sampson, 140 

F.3d 585, 592 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 

 In arguing that the district court erred in 

determining drug quantity, Harris relies principally on United 

States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1198 (1st Cir. 1993), in 

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which the district court relied on trial testimony that 

addressed drug quantities in a general manner. The First 

Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that “where uncertainty 

reigns” about the amount of drugs involved in a conspiracy, 

courts should “err on the side of caution.” Id. This court, 

however, has rejected the holding in Sepulveda in clear 

language: “we hold that a district court need not ‘err,’ on the 

side of caution or otherwise; it must only determine that it was 

more likely than not that the defendant was responsible for at 

least the drug quantity attributed to him.” United States v. 

Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 2004). Our review of the 

record convinces us that the district court’s methodology was 

proper and the drug quantity attributed to Harris by the 

district court was supported by the evidence. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Harris’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal conclusions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED