### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE June 20, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA RY AN N M cN EILLY

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for F ranklin County

No. 16043 J. Curtis Sm ith, Jud ge

No. M2005- 02184-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Novem ber 22, 2006

A Fr anklin CountyCircuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Mary Ann McNe illy , of driving under the influenc e (D UI ), a Class A misdemea nor. T h e t ri al court sentence d her to e leven months and twenty -nine da y s, to be suspended afte r serving ten day s in c onfinement; imposed a thre e hundre d fifty dollar fine; order ed that she perf orm one hundre d hours of public ser vice; and suspe nded her driver’ s license f

or one y ear

. On appe al, the appe llant claims (1) that the tria l court should have

su pp re sse d he r state me nt t o a po lic e of fi c e r; (2 ) tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y

a llo we d th e Sta te to repla y a videotape of the a

ppellant’s stop for the jury ; ( 3) that the trial court improperly admitted the appellant’ s blood test results into evidence be cause the State fa iled to establish a p ro p er chain of custody ; (4) that the tria l court er red by re fu s i n g t o al low defe nse witnesses to testify about the appellant’ s char acte r; (5) that the e vidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (6) that her

se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve ; a nd(7 ) that th e se c umu la tiv e e rr or s d e nie d th e app e lla nt h e r rig ht t o a fa ir tr ia l. Upon re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, we aff irm the appe llant’s conviction but modify her se ntence to refle ct that she is to serve five day s in c onfinement and rema nd the case for e ntry of

a n a me nd e d ju dg me nt.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed in Par t, M odi fie d in P ar t, and C as e Re m ande d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., d el i v er ed t h e opinion of the c ourt, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., joined. D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., filed a dissenting opinion.

N o rr i s A r t h u r

K e s s l e r , II I, W i n c h e s t e r , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , M ar y A n n M c N e i l l y.

Pa ul G. Sum me rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B ri a n Cl a y John so n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J ames Micha el Tay lor, District Attorney Gene ral; and Steve Blount, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

Pastor Ernest A. Colvin testified that on May 20, 2004, he wa s at his Wi ncheste r, Tenne ssee churc h, which is “[d] own over the hill” from a near

by Food L ion g roce ry store. About 9:00 p.m., Colvin was in the churc h parking lot a nd saw a car try ing to drive up the hill behind the Food Lion. The car would almost make it to the top of the hill and “ then it was like it would g o out of g ear and back dow n it would come all the wa y acr oss both lanes of South J eff erson.” The c ar trie d sever al more times to drive up the hill. As Colvin ran towar d the ca r, the c ar finally

cre sted the hill, turned ri g ht, a ndhit a po le in the F oo d Lion pa rking lot . Co lvi n s ta te d th a t he te le ph on e d th e po lic e be c a us e the c ar h a d b e e n mo vin g ba c k a ndfo rth ac ro ss the str e e t a ndc ars we re tr a ve lin g on the str e e t in bo th direc tions. W hen the police arrived, Colvin saw that the car’s driver, t he appellant, was disoriente d, stag g ering , and appe are d to be under the influenc e.

Trac ie L imbaug h testified that on t he evening of May 20, 2004, she and he r boy friend w ere at a video store near the Food Lion. As they wer e lea ving the store, Limbaug h saw a car driving up the hill. Although it was not ra ining, the c ar’ s windshield wipers we re turne d on. L imbaug h and her boy friend g ot into their car quickly and tried to put the car i n reve rse because the appellant’s car was trave ling “ straig ht at” them. Justas the a ppellant’s ca

r was about to hit their car , the appellant’ s car turned a nd hit a pole nex t to them. The pole broke, and the appe llant tried to drive over the broke n po le . Limb a ug h’ s b oy frie ndapp ro a c he d th e app e lla nt’ s c ar a nda sk e d th e app e lla nt i f s he wa s a ll rig ht. The appe llant kept try ing to drive over the pole, so Limbaug h’s boy friend r eac hed i n t o the appellant’ s car , put it int o park, a nd turned off the i g nition. When the appellant g ot out of t he ca r, she “w as just a littl e off balanc e.” L imbaug h acknow ledg ed that the appe llant appea red to be under the influenc e of a n intox icant. On c ross-examinat ion, L imbaug h testified that she did not see the

app e lla nt’ s c ar h it any on e or da ma g e a ny

oth e r c ars

.
Jenn if e r G e ary te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s sh op pin g a t th e F oo d Lion on Ma y 20 . Wh e n s he c a me out of the store, she saw a car cre st the top of the hill behind the store. The car h i t a pole for handica p p ar k i n g s p ac es, and the driver ke pt pushing on the g as pedal as if she did not see the ha nd ic ap s ig n. Ge ary state d tha t the dr ive r “d e fi nit e ly [wa s] not . . . in h e r rig ht m ind .” On c ro ssexamin a ti o n , G e ar y te s ti f ie d th a t th e ap p e ll a n t d id n o t in ju r e a n y o n e a n d th a t s h e d id n o t see the

app e lla nt d a ma g e a ny

oth e r c a rs

.
Offic er Car

rie Morris of the Winchester Police De partment testified tha t on May 20, 2004, she re ceive d a call from dis patch about a possi ble i ntox icated driver driving re cklessly in the parking lot behind the Food Lion. En route to the sce ne, Of fice r Morris lea

rned tha t the car

had wr eck ed. When she arrived at the store pa rking lot, Office r Morris turne d on her patrol car ’s video ca mera and spoke with the appe llant. The appe llant was sitting in the driver’ s seat, and the car ’s ignition was turned on. The appellant appea red ve ry disoriented and c onfused. Of fice r Morris a sked to see the appellant’ s driver’ s license, but the appellant did not understand what Of fice r Morris wa s asking for and fumbled throug h some pape rs. Off icer Morris asked the appellant if she had been drinking , and-3-

the app e lla nt s a id n o b ut that sh e ha d take n thr e e tr a nq uil ize rs “ sin c e 2:0 0. ” Th e app e lla nt f ina lly g ave Office r Morris her driver’s license and g ot out of the ca r. The a ppellant looked as thoug h she mig ht f a ll, so Of fi c e r M or ri s r a ise d h e r a

rm to preven t th e app e lla nt f ro m f a lli ng . O ff

ic e r M or ri s stated that she trie d to expl ain f i el d s o b ri et y tests to the appellant but that the appe llant did not appea r to understa nd. The a

ppellant’s spee ch wa s very slow, and she ke pt holding onto her car for balanc e. Of

fice r Morris stopped trying to a dminist er field sobriety tests to the appellant bec ause she believed the appellant mig ht fall down. The State play ed the videota pe fr om Office r Morris’ patrol

c ar f o r t h e j u r y.

Offic er Mor

ris testified that she saw a scr ape dow n the s i d e of the appellant’s c ar a nd that the ca r appe are d to have struc k something in a ddition to t he pole. The appellant did not try to fig ht any one and never cause d any problems. Howeve r, the appe llant was upset and w anted to know why the police we re the re. O ffice r Morris took the a ppellant to the Southern Tenne ssee Me dical Center , a ndthe app e lla nt a g re e d to take a blo odte st a ndsig ne d a n impli e d c on se nt f or m. O ff ic e r M or ri s
watc he d M arv in Ow e ns by c oll e c t two via ls of the a pp e lla nt’ s b loo d, a ndOw e ns by g a ve the via ls t o Offic er Mor

ris. Offic er Morris wrappe d the vials in protective pla stic, put them in a box , seale d the box , and wr ote her

name a cross the se al. She also filled out a toxicology reque s t form. Officer Morris then tra nsported the a ppellant to jail and re turned to the police departme n t

. At the department, she put the s eale d box containing the bl ood vials into an evidenc e locke r and loc ked the locker

. On cross-examination, Offic er Morris testified t hat when she arrived at the Food Lion, she pulled in be hind the appellant’ s car and activate d her blue lights. The a ppellant had two dog s in the

car with her a nd was c oncerned about he r do gs

. Of fi cer Morris did not smell alcohol on the

app e lla nt.

Offic er D on Hall of the Winchester Police Depa rtment testified that on May 20, he was on patrol and r ece ived a c all about 9:30 p.m. I n response to the call, Of fice r Ha ll went to the Food Lion par k in g lo t. H e s p o k e w ith th e ap p e ll a n t, a n d s h e ap p e ar e d to b e u n d e r th e in f lu e n c e of an intox icant. Of

fice r Ha ll did not s mell alcohol, but the appe llant’s speec h was slow.

Marvin Owe nsby , a medica l lab technicia n at t h e S o u thern Te nnessee Medica l Center, testified that ac cording to the form in the appe llant’s blood kit, he collected the appellant’ s blood on May 20 and g ave the blood via ls to Offic er Morris. He stated that he did not per sonally reme mber collecting the appe llant’s blood.

Offic er K eith Hensha w of the Winchester Police Depa rtment testified that in May 2004, he

wa s th e de pa

rt me nt’ s evi de nc e c us tod ia n. On June 3, 20 04 , h e de liv e re d th e app e lla nt’ s b loo d v ia ls to the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation (TB I ) crime labora tory . The vials did not appea r to have been ta mpere d with. On cross-e x amination, Offic er H enshaw testified that the evide nce loc kers

wer e not climate- con t ro l l ed but that he usually took blood vials out of the evidence locker s and sto re d th e m in a re frig e rator un til he c ou ld take the m to the TB I

. He sa id that a lth ou g h th a t w a s h is usual prac tice, he did not re member if he transfe rre d the appe llant’s blood from t he evidence loc ker to the ref rig erator.-4-

TBI Special Ag ent L ouis Kuykendall testified that he was a for ensic toxi colog ist in 2004 and tes t ed the a

ppellant’s blood. He sa id that although it wa s pref era ble for blood sa mples to be ref rig erated, re frig eration was not require d. Ag ent Kuy kendall stated tha t t he appe llant’s blood te s te d p o s it iv e for Be nzodiaz epine- class drug s, and further testing reve aled that the a ppellant’s blood contained 0.12 milligr ams per milliliter of Alpra zolam, a lso known as Xana x . He sa id that Alprazolam was more potent t h an Va lium and that a level of 0.12 milli g rams per

milli liter was

“ e xtre me ly

hig h” a ndon the low -e ndof the le tha l-leve l r a ng e . H e state d th a t a t th a t le ve l, Al pr a zola m ha d b een know n to c a us e de a th. On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, Ag e nt K uy ke nd a ll

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he is n ot a ph arm a c ist

. Dr. Councill Rudolph testified for t he appellant that he treated the a ppellant’s husband f

or
c olo n c a nc e r a nd tr e a te d the app e lla nt in June 20 03 fo r br e a st c a nc e r. Whil e tr e a tin g the app e lla nt, Dr. Rudolph presc ribed the pa in medicines De merol and Phene rg an. I n Se p t ember 2003, Dr. Rudolph prescribe d thirty 0.25 milli g ram Xa nax pil ls to t h e appellant, and the a ppellant filled the presc ription on October 20, 2003. He stated tha t 0.25 mill igr ams was the lowe st dose that a doctor could pre scribe a nd that the appellant was supposed to ta ke one pill eve ry eig ht hour s as neede d for anxiety . Although the appellant’ s initi al pre scription allowed no r efills, Dr. Rudol ph rene wed the

app e lla nt’ s pr e sc ri pti on on De c e mbe r 15 , 20 03 , a nd a uth or ize d six re fi lls

. He g a ve the app e lla nt a new Xa nax prescription in Aug ust 2004 and estimated that the a ppellant had been taking less than

on e pil l pe r d a y . D r. Rud olp h n e ve r s a w the app ell ant in an ov e r- me dic a te d s ta te a ndsa id tha t a le ve l of 0. 12 mil lig ra ms p e r m ill ili te r o f A lp raz ol am in the app e lla nt’ s b loo d “ do e sn ’t te ll m e anything.” He sa id that he knew of no study that had ana ly zed the level of Xana x in the blood and that he could not say

0.12 milli g rams per

milli liter was a

near -lethal leve l.

On cr oss-examination, Dr. Rudolph testified that he did not see the a ppellant in May

2004

a nda c kn ow le dged th a t he didno t kn ow ho w o ft e n h is p a tie nts too k th e ir me dic a tio n. He a lso acknow ledg ed that he ha d known some patients not to take their medication as he presc ribed a nd that he was not tr ained in toxicology

. The State repla y ed the videotape f rom Off icer Morris’ pa trol car for Dr . Rudolph, and he stated that taking Xana x as presc ribed should not have c aused the appellant to n e e d to le a n a g a ins t he r c ar in or de r to sta nd a nd sh ou ld n ot h a ve pr e ve nte d h e r f ro m ta kin g fi e ld sobriety tests. He stated that the appellant’s behavior could i ndicate that she had taken more than th e p r e s c r ib e d d o s e o f

X a n a x.

Ethel Fle tcher

testified that she had known the appe llant for at lea st fifteen y ear s and that they

wer e close acqua intances. F letcher testified that she ha d never known the appellant to use alcohol

or drive while under the influence and that the appellant would never do anything to jeopa rdize the

sa fe ty of he r d og s.

Be linda Cag le testified that she had know n the appe llant for about f our y ear s and had ne ver known t h e appellant to drink alcohol. She also had ne ver know n the appe llant to over-medic ate. Al tho ug h th e app e lla nt h a d b e e n c ha rg e d w ith DU I

a ndre c kle ss d ri vin g , th e jury c on vic te d he r o nly

o f D U I.-5- II. Ana lys is
A. Appellant’ s Statement

The appellant claims that the trial court should ha ve suppressed her statemen t t o Of fice r Mo rris tha t sh e ha d ta

ke n th re e tr a nq uil ize rs . Sh e c on te nd s that su pp re ssi on wa s w arr a nte d in thi s
case beca use she wa s in custody

and subjec t to interrog ation at the time of the state ment but had not

rec eived he r Miranda

warnings

. T h e State conte nds that the trial court properly denied the appellant’ s motion to suppress bec ause the rec ord cle arly ref lects that the a

ppellant did not make the statement pursua nt to a custodial interrog ation. We ag ree with the State.
At the hearing on the appe llant’s motion to s uppress, Of fice r Morris testified tha t when she

arrive d at the F oo d L ion , the app e lla nt’ s Ge o Tr a c ke r wa s side way s in the pa rking lot a ndha d h it a ha nd ic ap s ig n p os t. Of

fi c e r M or ri s a pp ro a c he d th e ve hic le a ndmot ion e d f or the app e lla nt t o r oll down her window. The appellant was unable to roll down the window, a nd Ag ent Morris opene d the driver ’s side door. She s t at ed that the appellant was moving slowly and that she be lieved the appellant “ was impaire d somehow.” She asked for the appellant’ s driver’ s license, a nd the appe llant “fumbled a

round” but finally

found it. She asked the a

ppellant if she ha d consumed a ny alcohol, and the appe llant said no. She then asked the appellant if she had take n an y m ed i ca t i o n, and the appellant sa id she had take n some tranquilizers since 2:00 p.m. Offic er Mor ris asked the appellant to ste p out of the car and helped her walk to the back of the vehicle. The a ppellant could not stand on her ow n and plac ed her hand on the c ar. O ffice r Morris tried to e x plain field sobriety tests to the appellant a nd asked the appellant to let g o of t he car. Howeve r, t he appellant stumbled, and Off icer Morris told her to l ea n o n t h e T racker. O ffice r Morris then se arc hed the Tr acke r and a sked the appellant to take a blood test. She stated that sometime during the stop, Offic ers Don H all and Arc hie Custer ar

rived.
On cross-examination, Offic er Morris acknow ledg ed that whe n she ar rived a t the scene , she pulled in behind the appe llant’s vehicle a nd that Offic er Custer pa rked his patr ol car

in front of the appellant’ s vehicle. She state d that althoug h Offic er Cust er’ s patrol car was blocking the appe llant’s Trac ker, the appellant would not have been a ble to move the Tra cker

forwa rd any way

beca use of the broken pole

. The State then stipulated that whe n Offic er Mor ris blocked the a

ppellant’s Tra cker

and activate d her blue lights, the a ppellant was not fr ee to lea ve. Of fice r M o rr i s t es tified that the appe ll a n t w a s s ti ll s it ti n g in th e c ar w h e n th e ap p e ll a n t to ld O f f ic e r M o rr is th a t s h e h ad take n the tranquilizers. Offic er Mor ris stated that she did not ar rest the appellant until after the appellant ha d g otten out of the Tra cker . Upon ar resting the appe llant, Office r Morris put th e ap p el l an t into her pa tr ol c ar a nda sk e d th e app e lla nt t o s ig n a n impli e d c on se nt f or m. O ff ic e r M or ri s r e a d th e fo rm

to the appe llant, and the appe llant signe d it. At that point, Officer Morris still had not read Mira nda

wa rn ing s to the app e lla nt.

I n ruling on the appe llant’s motion, the trial court cited State v. Ande rson, 937 S .W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996) , in which our supreme court st ated that a person’s obj ective vie w of whe ther he

or sh e is u nd e r a

rr e st f or Mir a nd a pu rp os e s mu st b e a sse sse d b y the tot a lit y of th e c ir c ums ta nc e s.-6-

The trial c ourt noted that in the instant case, O ffice r Morris “ made only a brie f interr og ation” of the appellant a nd conducte d the questioning in a non-threatening manner

. The trial court a lso noted that t h e appellant wa s not phy sically restra ined when O ffice r Morris a sked if she ha d taken a ny medication and that police ca rs “we re pa

rked g ener ally

in front and behind the def endant’ s vehicle.” Th e tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d that the “ tot a lit y of the c ir c ums ta nc e s r e ve a l no re a so na ble pe rs on wo uld have c oncluded he or she was deprived of fre edom of movement t o a degr ee associated w ith a formal

arr e st” a ndov e rr

ule d th e app e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss.

I n revie wing a trial c ourt’s dete rminations reg arding a suppre ssion hearing , “[q] uestions of

cre dibilit y

of t he witnesses, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in the evidenc e ar e matter s entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fac t.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T hu s, “ a tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t in a su pp re ssi on he ari ng wi ll b e up he ld u nle ss the e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s o th e r w is e

. ” I d

. N e v e r th e le s s , ap p e ll a te c o u r ts w il l r e v ie w th e trial court’s a pplication of law to the f

acts pure ly

de novo. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). F urthermor e, the State, a s the preva iling party , is “entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of t he evidence adduce d at the suppre ssion hearing as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces tha t may be d r a w n f

r o mt h a te v i d e n c e

. ” O d o m , 9 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t2 3

. M o r e o v e r , w e n o t e t h a t“ in

e va luatin g the c or

re c tne ss o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g on a

pr e tr ia l mo tio n to su pp re ss, app e llate c ou rt s may consider the proof adduce d both at the suppression hearing and at trial.” State v. Henning , 975 S.W .2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998)

.
I n Mir a n d a v

. A r iz o n a , 3 8 4 U

. S. 4 3 6 , 4 4 4 , 8 6 S. Ct

. 1 6 0 2 , 1 6 1 2 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , th e U nited States Supreme Court held that “ the prosec ution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inc ulp a tory , ste mmi ng fr om c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n o f the de fe nd a nt u nle ss i t de mon str a te s th e us e of p r o c e d u r a l s a f

e g u ar d s e f

f e c t i v e t o s e c u r e t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o n. ” Th e se pr oc e du ra l sa fe g ua

rd s r e qu ir e that po lic e of fi c e rs mus t a dv ise a

de fe nd a nt of hi s or her

ri g ht t o
re ma in s ile nt a ndof

his or he r ri g ht to co un se l bef

or e the y ma y ini tiate c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n. Sta te v. Sawy er, 156 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tenn. 2005). “ Custodial” means t hat the subjec t of questioning is in “custody

or otherw ise deprive d of his fre edom by the authoriti es i n any signific ant way .” I d. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. Howeve r, the United States Supre me Court has held that a person de tained temporarily for a traff

ic s top, even one investigating intoxi cation, is not “in custody ” for the purposes of Mir a nd a

. B e rk e me r v . M c Cart y , 4 68 U. S. 4 20 , 1 04 S. Ct . 3 13 8 ( 19 84 ); se e Sta te v. Rog e r O de ll Godfre y , No

. 0 3 C0 1

- 9 4 0 2

- CR

- 0 0 0 7 6 , 1 995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 226, at **5-7 (Knoxvill e, Mar

. 20, 1 9 9 5 ) (r ely ing on B erke mer a nd holding that a police off

icer ’s investig ating an ac cident and asking a def

endant whe ther he had bee n drinking did not violate Miranda)

. Turning to the instant case, O ffice r Morris testified that when she arrived at the sce ne, she approa ched the appellant’ s vehicle a nd asked the appellant for her driver’ s license. The appe llant fumbled for

her lice nse, and O ffice r Morris a sked the a ppellant if she ha d been drinking. The appellant sa id no, and Off icer Morris di d not smell alcohol. Off icer Morris then aske d the appe llant if she had ta

ken any medication, and the appellant state d that she had taken tra nquiliz ers. Of fice r Morris aske d the appe llant to step out of the vehicle a nd walked the unsteady appellant to the ba ck of the Tr a c ke r. Al tho ug h Of fi c e r Mor ri s wa nte d to adm ini ste r fi e ld s ob ri e ty te sts to the app e lla nt,-7-

she quickly

rea liz ed that the a

ppel l an t could not perform any tests and stopped the tests for the appellant’ s safe ty . At that point, she arr ested the appellant and place d her in the ba ck of the patrol

car . As the appe llant corre ctly arg ues in her appellate brief, the a ppellant was se ized when Off icer Morris ar rived a t the scene , activate d her blue lights, and blocked t he appellant’s car. See S tate v. Wil liams, 185 S.W .3d 311 (Tenn. 2006). Howeve r, Officer Morris di d not arre st the appellant for Mir a nd a pu rp os e s u nti l a ft e r s he re a lize d th a t th e app e lla nt co uldno t pe rf or m th e fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts

. As in Be rkeme r, the a

ppellant was not in custody when she made the inc riminating state ment, and the tr ia l c ou rt

pr op e rl y de nie d h e r m oti on to s up pr e ss.

B. Repla y ing V ideotape

The a ppellant claims that the trial c ourt err ed by allowing the State to repla y the videotape of the s to p f

o r th e ju r y d u r in g D r

. Ru d o lp h ’ s c r o s s

- e xa mi n a ti o n

. Sh e c o n te n d s th a t r e p lay ing the vid e o h a d li ttl e or no pr ob a tiv e va lue a nd that the Sta te re play e d the vid e o so le ly to a ro us e the jur or s’

e mot ion s. Th e Sta te c on te nd s th a t r e play ing the vid e o w a s n e c e ssa ry in o rd e r f

or Dr . Ru do lphto g ive an opinion as to whether the appellant’ s behavior w as consistent with the dosag e of A lprazolam he pre scribed f

or her . We ag ree with the State.
During Offic er Mor

ris’ testimony , the State play ed the videota pe of the appellant’ s stop for the jury . On direc t examination, Dr. Rudolph t estified that base d upon t h e date of the appe llant’s initial Xanax prescription and the dates the appe llant refilled the pr escription, he estimated that the appellant ha d taken less than o n e p i l l per da y . On cr oss-examination, he stated that taking the

me dic a tio n a s pr e sc ri be d s ho uldno t ha ve a ff e c te d th e app e lla nt’ s a

bil ity to d ri ve a

c ar. Th e Sta te the n a sk e d, “ I f w e sh ow y ou a video

. . . , woul d th a t he lp y ou in m a y be fo rm ing a n o pin ion a s to what her condition was that nig ht? ” The d ef ense objected, a

rg uing that replaying the video was inf la mmatory

a ndwa s not the su bje c t of the de fe ns e ’s c ro ss- e xami na tio n. Th e Sta te arg ue d tha t it should be allowed to show Dr . Rudolph the video and “the n I ’m g oing to ask hi m some questions about would his presc ribed a mounts have done this to this lady .” T h e t ri al court ruled that the defe nse had r aised the issue a bout whether the appe llant properly took her medic ation and over ruled the objection. When cr oss-examination resumed, the State play ed and stoppe d portions of the video, intermittentlyasking Dr. Rudolph questions about whether t aking the m edication as he pr escribed

wo uldha ve c a us e d the app e lla nt to lose he r ba la nc e , ne e d to lea n on h e r c ar t o s ta ndup , o r b e un able to understand the of

fice r’s instructions for the field sobriety tests. The witness st ated that taking the medication as pr escr i b ed shoul d not have impaire d the appe llant. Finally , the State aske d Dr. Rudolph, “[I ]f she took three of those pills could she have h ad al l o f t hose diffic ulties that I ’ve sp ok e n o f a nd wh a t y ou ob se rv e on that te le vis ion sc re e n?” D r. Rud olp h s a id, “ [S]ur e that c a n a lso be the sig n of an ove r dosag e of X anax.”

Th e pr op ri e ty , s c op e , ma nn e r a ndc on tr ol o f the c ro ss- e xami na tio n of wi tne sse s r e sts wi thi n the discre tion of the trial court. State v. Dishman, 915 S.W .2d 458, 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. “A witness may be cross-e x amined on any matter rele vant to a ny issue in the case .” Tenn. R. Evid. 611(b). Relevant evidenc e is “evide nce ha ving a ny tendenc y to make the e x istence of

any fac t that is o f c on se qu e nc e to the de te rm inatio n o f the act ion mor e pr ob able or le ss p ro ba

ble tha n it

wo uld-8-

be without the evidenc e.” T enn. R. Evid. 401. Howeve r, eve n rele vant evidenc e may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of the iss ue s, or mi sl eadi ng th e jury , o r b y c on sid e ratio ns of

un du e de la y , w a ste of

tim e , o r n e e dle ss prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” Te nn. R. Evid. 403.

We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y he ld tha t th e Sta te c ou ld u se the vid e ota pe to c ro ssexamine Dr. Rudolph. Dr. Rudolph stated on direc t examination t hat an Alpr azolam level of 0.12 milli g rams per

milli liter in the blood “doesn’ t tell me a ny thing” and that based on his e stimation, t he

app e lla nt h a d ta

ke n le ss tha n one Al pr a zola m pi ll p e r d a y . I n r e sp on se to this te sti mon y , th e Sta te
c ou ld play th e vi deotape fo r the do c tor a nda sk his op ini on a s to wh e the r o ve r- me dic a tin g wi th Alprazolam could explain the appellant’s behavior and actions on the ni g ht of May 20. Moreove r,
w e h a v e r e v i e w e d t h e v i d e o t ap e a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t i t w a s n o t u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l o r

i n f l a m m a t o r y. Thus, the appe llant is not entit led to relief

.
C. Tox icolog y

Report

Th e app e lla nt c la ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y a llo wi ng the re su lts of he r blo odte st i nto evidenc e beca

use the State failed to e stablish a proper chain of custody

. Specifica lly , she conte nds that the re sults of the blood test wer e unreliable because Ag ent Kuy kendall “failed to give pe rsonal knowledg e as to the la

beling and sea ling of

the sample, a nd failed to g ive per son al k n o wl edge or

re lia ble inf or ma tio n [a s] to a

nu mbe r o f uni de nti fi e d pe rs on s who ha nd le d th e sa mpl e .” Th e Sta te contends that the tria l court prope rly held that the evide nce w as admissible. We ag ree with the State.
During Ag ent Kuykendall’s direc t te stimony , he stated that he ana ly zed the appellant’ s blood sample for

drug s. The def

ense obje cted, c laiming that the State ha d not shown a chain of custody be c a us e the e vid e nc e ha d b e e n d e liv e re d b y Of fi c e r He ns ha w to TB I Ev ide nc e Te c hn ic ia n F e lic ia Ev an s

. T h er efore, “the re’ s a link that’s missing her e betwe en Of fice r He nshaw a nd [Age nt Kuykendall].” Out of the jury ’s pre sence , Ag ent Kuy dendall testified that Eva ns was an e vidence technicia n in the TBI ’s evidenc e re ceiving are a. He said that acc ording to TBI standard ope rating pr oc e du re s, on c e Ev a ns rece ive d th e app e lla nt’ s b loo d s a mpl e fr om O ff ic e r H e ns ha w, sh e wo uld have c hecke d the s eals on the evidence a nd put the evidenc e into the evidenc e vault. An e vidence

a g e nt f ro m A g e nt K

uy ke nd a ll’ s u nit

the n w ou ld ha ve re tr ie ve d the bo x co nta ini ng the blo odvia ls from the vault, chec ked the sea ls, assigne d the evidenc e a la boratory number, a nd g iven the evide nce to the a n a ly s t f

o r te s ti n g

. H e s a id th a t if E v a n s o r th e e v id e n c e a g e n t f r o m h is u n it h ad noticed a problem with the sea ls, they would have “dea l[ t] with it rig ht there.” Nothing in Ag ent Kuy kendall’s notes ref l ecte d a proble m with the integrity of the blood vials. The tria l court over ruled the

app e lla nt’ s o bje c tio n, statin g that “ the process a ndthe int e g ri ty of the e vid e nc e ha s b e e n p ro pe rl y established.”
This court has pr eviously stated,

I n order to admit phy sical evide nce the part y offe ring the evidenc e must either introduc e a w itness who is abl e t o identify the-9- evidenc e or must establish an unbroken cha in of custody . Whether the re qu ir e d c ha in o f c us tod y ha s be e n s uf

fi c ie ntl y e sta bli sh e d to justify the admis sion of evidence is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, a nd the court’s determination will not be overtur n e d in th e ab s e n c e o f a c le a r ly mi s ta k e n e xe r c is e o f

th at discretion. The i d en t ity

of tang ible evidenc e nee d not be prove n bey ond all possibili ty of doubt, a nd all possibili ty of tampering ne ed

no t be e xcluded

. Th e c ir c ums tanc e s mu st e sta bli sh a re a so na ble

assura nce of

the identity

of the e vidence

.
Sta te v. Ho llo ma n, 83 5 S. W.2 d 4 2, 46 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 92 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. “ Th e pu rp os e of the c hain of c us t ody

is to ‘demonstrate that ther e has be en no tampering, loss, substitution, or mistake with respe ct to the evidenc e.’” State v. Scott, 33 S.W .3d 746, 760 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Br aden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993))

.
I n the i nstant case , Offic er Henshaw testified that he personally delivere d the evidence to the TB I la bo ratory a ndthat th e e vid e nc e didno t app e ar to ha ve be e n tampe re d with . Ag e nt K uy ke nd a ll testified that ac cording to the appel la nt’s tox icolog y

report, Ag ent Evans r ece ived the box containing the blood vials from Of

fice r He nshaw. Ag ent Kuy kendall stated tha t pursuant to TBI standard operating proce dures, Evans would have c hecke d the sea ls to make sure the y wer e intact a nd put the

e vid e nc e int o a n e vid e nc e vault . A se c on d a gent then wo uldha ve de liv e re d th e blo odsa mpl e s to the ana ly st

. Age n t Ku y k endall st ated that if e ither Evans or the ag ent from his unit had noticed a problem with the samples, they would have dealt wit h the problem im mediately and that he ne ver
wo uldha ve re c e ive d th e e vid e nc e

. Ag e nt Ku yke nd a ll te sti fi e d th a t w he n h e re c e ive d th e blo odvia ls, he saw no indication that someone had tampere d with them, and the appellant has not alleg ed that someone tampere d wi t h the evidenc e. We believe the testimony establishes a c hain of c ustody

su ff ic ie nt t o a llo w the a dmi ssi on of the blo odte st r e su lts into evi den c e . T he tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y
overr uled the appe llant’s objection.
D. Appellant’ s Charac ter Witnesses
Next, the appellant claims that the tria l court e rre d by ref using to a llow her to introduce evidenc e about he r cha

rac ter. Spec ifically , she conte nds that the trial court erre d by ref using to a llow her to introduce Dr. Rudolph’s notes, which r eflected that the a ppellant used he r pain medic ation “sparingly ,” and imprope rly instructed the jury to disre g ard D r. Rudolph’s testimonyreg arding the

app e lla nt’ s sp ari ng us e of the me dic a tio n. She a lso c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y re fu sin g to allow Et he l F le tc h e r

a n d B e li n d a

Ca g le to te s ti f

y ab o u t th e d e a th s o f

th e ap p e ll a n t’ s h u s b and, br oth e r, a nddo g wi thi n a

sh ort pe ri od of tim e . T he Sta te c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y he ld that the evidenc e wa s irrele vant and inadmissible. We ag ree that the evidenc e wa s inadmissibl e. During Dr. Rudolph’s testimony , he stated tha t he t reated the appe llant for bre ast ca ncer and pre s cr i b ed t h e p ai n m ed i ca t i o n s De m er o l an d P h en er gan af t ert h e a p p el l an th ad b re as tca n ce r s urg ery i n J an u ar y

2 0 0 4

. Dr

. R u d o l p h s t at ed t h at ac co r d i n g t o h i s n o t es , t h e a p p el l an tu s ed t h e d ru gs-10-

“sparingly ,” and the defe nse aske d to introduc e the notes into e vidence

. The State objec ted, ar g uing that the notes we re irr eleva nt to the curre nt case

. The defe nse arg ued that “I ’m try ing to show that she has . . . be en pre scribed othe r kinds of pain medic ation [ an d ] that she has not over medicate d herse lf and not used them.” That t ri al court held that the evidenc e wa s inadmissibl e cha rac ter
e vid e nc e a ndins truc te d th e jury that it sh ou ld dis re g ardDr . Ru do lph ’s te sti mon y abo ut the pa in medication. L ater , Eth el Fl et cher and B elinda Cag le tried to testify about the appe llant’s rec ent hardships , i n cl u d i n g the deaths of her br other, husband, a nd dog within a short period of time. Howeve r, the State objec ted, and the trial court rule d that the testimony was irr eleva nt.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 404(a) (1) permits the introduction of “[e]vidence of a pertinent char acte r trait off

ere d by the ac cused or

by the prosec ution to rebut the same.” Such evidenc e “ma y be made by

testimonyas to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.” Tenn. R. Evid. 405(a) . The a

ppellant claims that she wa s entitled to offe r t he testi mony of t he witnesses in order to show her chara cter

. Howeve r, none of t he witnesses was testify ing as to the appe llant’s reputa tion for g ood char acte r in the community or their opinion about her char acte r. Ther efor e, the tria l court proper ly ruled that the e vidence was inadmissible.

E. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e

The appellant claims that the evidenc e is insuff icient to support the conviction bec ause D r. Rudolph testified that he never saw any indication she wa s using Alpr azolam to over-medic ate, that he ca lculated she had take n less than one Alpr azolam pill per day , and that the l evel of Alprazolam in her blood “told him nothing with r eg ard to whether this level was [therape utic], t ox ic, or letha l.” The State c ontends that the evide nce is suff icient. We ag ree with the State.
When an appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the c onvicting evidenc e, the standa rd for

re vie w b y a n a pp e llate c ou rt

is “ wh e the r, a ft e r v ie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the prosec ution, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond

a re a so na ble do ub t.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ); Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ). Th e S tat e is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable or le g itimate infere nces which may be dra wn there from. State v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions conce rning the cre dibilit y of witnesses and the weig ht and value to be af forde d the evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e, are resolved by the trier of fac t. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 6 59 (Tenn. 1997) . This court will not rewe igh or

ree valuate the evidenc e, nor will this court subst itute its infere nces dr awn f rom the circ umstantial evidenc e for

those infer ence s drawn by the jury . I d. Beca u s e a juryconviction re moves the presumption of innoce nce w ith which a def endant is initially cloake d at trial and repla ces it on appe al with one of g uilt, a convicted de fenda nt has the burde n of demonstra ting to this court that the evidenc e is insuff

icient. State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). T h e D UI statute, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10 -4 01(a) (1), pr ohibits a person, in pertinent pa rt, from dr ivi ng or be ing in p hy sic a l c on tr ol o f a n auto mob ile-11- on a ny of the pu bli c ro a ds a nd hig hw a y s of the state , or on a ny str e e ts or alley s, or while on the premises of any shopping c enter , trailer pa rk

or a ny apa rt me nt h ou se com pl ex , or a ny oth e r p re mis e s w hic h is g eneral l y fr equented by

the public at lar g e, while . . . [u]nder the influence o f an yintox icant, marijuana, nar cotic drug , or drug producing stimul ating eff ects on the c entra l nervous sy stem.

Offic er Morris testified t hat when she arrived at the sce ne, she a sked the a ppellant if she ha d take n a ny me dic a tio n, a nd the app e lla nt state d that sh e ha d take n thr e e tr a nq uil ize rs sin c e 2:0 0 p .m. Severa l witnesses reported see i n g t h e appellant driving dang erously and stated tha t the appellant

app e are d to be un de r the in fl uen ce of a n in toxic a nt w he n s he g ot o ut o f h e r v e hic le . A blo odte st
reve aled that the appellant had 0.12 microg rams per milli liter of Alprazolam in her blood, a nd Ag ent Kuykendall testified that this was a near -lethal leve l. The videotape shows the appe llant h av i ng difficulty with her ba lance and re sting he r hand on the Tracker for balance . Despite Dr . Rudolph’s testimony , the jury

chose to a ccr edit the State’s witnesses, and the evidenc e is sufficient to support t h e c o n v i c t i o n f

o r D U I.

F. Excessive Sentenc e

The appellant claims that her ten-da y sentenc e in c onfinement is ex cessive be cause the trial court improper ly

failed to c onsider enha nceme nt or mitigating fac tors and beca use no enha nceme nt fa c tor s a pp lie d in thi s c a se . The Sta te c on te nd s tha t the tr ia l cou rt pr op e rl y se nte nc e d th e app e lla nt. Ba sed upon our de novo revie w, we conclude that the appe llant should serve five day s, rather than ten, in confine ment.
At the appe llant’s sentenc ing he aring , no witnesses testified, b u t t he State admitted the appellant’ s prese ntence report into evidence. A ccor ding to the brief r eport, the the n fifty -eig ht-y ear

old appellant wa s a widow a nd had no prior c riminal history . The de fense arg ued t h at no enhanc ement fa ctors applied. T he State re ques t ed that the tria l court orde r the a ppellant to serve

mor e tha n the min imu m fo rt y -e ig ht ho ur s in c on fi ne me nt be c a us e the app e lla nt was “ e xtre me ly intox icated” and ar g ued that “ther e ar e no such thing s as ag g ravating f actor s.” The trial court a g ree d, statin g , “ I n mi sd e me a no r c on vic tio ns , y e s, we do n’ t

-- we loo k a t a ll the fa c ts. I re c oll e c t th e fa c ts of the c ase.” The trial c ourt noted that the c ase involved “some by standers” and orde red the appellant to ser ve ten da y s in confinement. Af ter the se ntence was pronounced, the defe nse aske d the trial court to ex plain which enha nceme nt fac tors warra n ted incre asing the appe llant’s

c on fi ne me nt a

bo ve the fo rt y -e ig ht- ho ur min imu m. T he tr ia l c ou rt state d a s f

oll ow s:

T h e r e i s n o - - t h e r e i s a m i n i m u mp r e s c r i b e d b y s t a t u t e

. In misdemeano r s entenc ing I ’m not require d to go into an a naly sis of mit ig a tin g or

a g g ra va tin g c ir c umstan c e s. Th a t’ s n ot r e qu ir e d in misdemeanor se ntencing

. The fac ts of the case , but f or the things that y ou ’dme nti oned, her ag e , th e fa c t th a t sh e ’s be e n in no tr ou ble-12- befor e, I wo uld [ have] g iven her more time than that, so I ’ve

c on sid e re d th a t.

When a n appellant challeng es the leng th, r ang e, or manner of service of a sentenc e, it is the duty of t his court to conduct a de novo revie w wit h a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -3 5 -401(d). Gene rally , the pre sumption of

corr ectne ss is “conditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 16 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 1)

. Ho we ve r, the tr ia l c ou rt ha s mo re fl e xibil ity

in m isd e me a no r s e nte nc ing tha n in felony sentenc ing. State v. J ohnson, 15 S.W .3d 515, 518 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing State v. Tr ou tma n, 97 9 S. W.2 d 2 71 , 2 73 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ). Re vie w o f misd e me a no r se nte nc ing is de no vo wi th a pre su mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s e v e n if th e tria l c o u r t f a il e d to ma

k e s p e c if ic f in d in g s o n th e rec ord, beca use the “ trial court ne ed only consider t h e principles of se ntencing and enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors in order to c omply with the leg islative mandates of the misdemeanor

sentenc ing statute.” Tr outman, 979 S.W .2d at 274.

I n sentenc ing the misdemeanor de fenda nt, the trial court sha ll fix a per centa g e of the sent ence , not to ex cee d seventy -five pe rce nt, that the defe ndant must serve in c onfinement be fore b e i n g e l i g i b l e f

o r r e l e a s e i n t o r e h ab i l i t a t i v e p r o g r a m s

. T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 0 2 ( d )

. In determining the pe rce ntag e of the sentenc e to be se rved in c onfinement, the trial court sha ll consider the sentenc ing p ri n cipl es and e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s and “sha ll not im pose such pe rc e nta g e s a

rb itr ari ly .” I d. ; see a lso Tr ou tma n, 97 9 S.W.2 d at 274

. I n c on du c tin g ou r r e vie w, thi s court must consider (1) the evidenc e, if any , rec eived at trial and at the s entenc ing he aring ; (2) the prese ntence report; (3) the princ i p l es of sentenc ing and the ar g uments of counse l relative to the sentenc ing al terna tives; (4) the na ture a nd char acte ristics of the off enses; (5) any

mitigating or enhanc ement fa ct o rs ; (6) any statements made by

the appe llant on his own behalf; and ( 7) the appellant’ s potential for re habilitation or treatment. Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 102, -103, -210; see

a lso As hb y , 8 23 S.W. 2d at 16 8. Th e burd e n is on the app e lla nt t o s ho w tha t th e se nte nc e is imp ro pe r. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.
The a ppellant was c onvicted of D UI , first offe nse, a Class A misdemea nor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 5 5- 10 -4 03 (a )( m) . A pe rs on c on vic te d of a fi rs t of fe ns e DU I “ sh a ll be c on fi ne d in the c ou nty ja il or workhouse for not less than f o rt y -e i gh t (48) hour s nor more tha n eleve n (11) months and twenty -nine (29) day s.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-403(a)( 1) (2004) . “[A]l l persons sentenc ed under subsection (a ) shall, in a ddition to the service of at lea st the minim um sentence , be re quired to ser ve the diffe renc e betwe en the time ac tually serve d and the maximum s ent en ce o n probation.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 55-10-403( c). I n eff ect, the DUI statute mandates a maxi mum se ntence o f e l ev en months and twenty -nine da y s, with the only function of the trial court be ing to de termine what period above the minimum period of c onfinement is to be suspende d. State v. Combs , 9 4 5 S.W .2d 770, 774 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

.
The a ppellant claims that the trial c ourt failed to consider enhanceme nt and mitigating fac tors. I n Troutman , o u r supre me court concluded that a trial court “nee d only consider the-13-

principles of se ntenci n g and enhance ment and mitigating f actor s in order to c omply with the leg islative mandates of

the misdemeanor

sentenc ing sta t u t e. ” 979 S.W.2d at 274. The trial court do e s n ot h a ve to s ta te fi nd ing s o f f a c t on the re c or d. I d. I n the ins ta nt ca se , the tr ia l c ou rt ini tia lly

or de re d th e app e lla nt t o s e rv e te n d a y s in c on fi ne me nt, pr ov idi ng no e xpla na tio n exce pt “I thi nk it

wa rr a nts se rv ing 10 da y s. ” On ly a ft e r the app e lla nt a sk e d f or a n expla na tio n did the tr ia l c ou rt state that it would have orde red he r to serve more than te n day s in c onfinement had it not considere d her ag e and la ck of a prior criminal rec ord, indicating that the trial court did consider enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(13).

Howeve r, in addition to e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s, the trial court must consider the principles of se ntencing . The trial c ourt in this ca s e fa iled to state on the re cord tha t it had considere d those principles, a nd its scant e x planation for the appellant’ s ten-day sentenc e does not ref lect that it consider ed t h em. I n State v. Be ck, 950 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), a pa ne l of thi s c ou rt rem and ed a c a se fo r r e se nte nc ing , in pa rt , b e c a us e the tr ia l c ou rt “ fa ile d to enunciate whethe r he c onsidered the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances as is require d.” Be cause the trial court failed to make a similar enunc iation in this case , we be lieve

our re view of the appellant’ s sentence should be de novo with no pre sumption of corre ctness.

Th e dis se nt n ote s that B e c k pr e c e de d Tr ou tma n a nd that Tr ou tma n e xpre ssl y ov e rr ule d a ll

case s that are inconsistent with its holding. How ever , in the our view, Tr outman and B eck a re not inconsistent. Troutman provides that a trial court doe s not have to m ak e fi n dings r eg arding misdemeanor se ntencing on the re cord. Be ck re iterate s that the trial court must nevertheless make an af firmative showing in t he re cord tha t it has considere d the principles of sentenc ing a nd

e nh a nc e me nt an d mitig a tin g fa c tor s. No ne of the un pu bli sh e d c a se s c ite d b y the dis se nt s pe c if

ic a lly ad d re s s es a t ri al co u rt ’s fa i l u re t o d em o n s t ra t e t h at i th as co n s i d er ed t h e p ri n ci p l es o f s en t en ci n g.

Tu rn ing to o ur

de no vo re vie w, the app e lla nt c on te nd s that no e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s a pp ly in this case. Howeve r, we believe enhanc ement factor (11), t hat t he appe llant “had no he sitation about

c omm itt ing a

c ri me wh e n th e ri sk

to h uma n li fe wa s h ig h, ” is a pp lic able in l ig ht o f T ra c ie L imbaug h’s testimony

that the appe llant drove stra ight towa rd her and her boy friend. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 11) (2003) ; see State v. Philip R. Haven, No. M2001-00332-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 588, at *29 (Na shville, July 18, 2002) (stating that enhanc ement fa ctor (11) may apply to a DUI sentenc e whe n proof e x ists that other people were in the area or wer e plac ed at ri sk by the de fe nd a nt’ s c on du c t) . I n mi ti gati on , th e app e lla nt i s e nti tle d to so me , a lbe it s lig ht, consideration for her lack of a criminal history

. Ba sed upon our de novo revie w, we c onclude that the ap p l i c a t i o n o f

e n h a n c e m e n tf

a c t o r ( 1 1 ) j u s t i f

i e s a s e n t e n c e o f

f i v e d a y s i n c o n f

i n e m e nt. There fore , all but five day s of the appe llant’s sentenc e should be suspende d.

G. Cumulative Error s Finally , the appe llant claims that the trial court’s cumulative er rors wa rra nt the reve rsal of her c onviction. Howeve r, having found that the t rial court committed no err ors that war rant re versa l of the app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n, the re is n o me ri t to thi s c la im.-14- III. Conclusi on Upon re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e af firm the appe llant’ s conviction for DU I bu t c on c lud e tha

t a ll b ut f ive da y s o f h e r e le ve n- mon th a ndtw e nty -n ine -d a y se nte nc e sh ou ld be suspende d. The c ase is remanded to the t rial court for entry of an amende d judgme nt reg arding her time in conf

inement, but her f

ine, publ i c s er v i ce , and drive r’s lice nse suspension re main the

same.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE