IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael Burton, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 705 M.D. 2019

 : Submitted: August 21, 2020

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: February 9, 2021

Presently before the Court is a preliminary objection in the nature of a 

demurrer filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC 

filed preliminary objections to a pro se Petition for Review filed in this Court’s 

original jurisdiction by Michael Burton (Burton), an inmate at the State Correctional 

Institution at Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale). After review, we sustain the DOC’s 

preliminary objection as to Burton’s due process and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 

1983) claims. 

I. BACKGROUND

Initially, we note that when ruling on preliminary objections, the Court must 

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, along with any reasonable 
2

inferences deduced therefrom. Neely v. Dep’t of Corr., 838 A.2d 16, 19 n.4 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003). Preliminary objections should not be sustained unless it “appear[s] 

with certainty that the law will not permit recovery[,] and any doubt should be 

resolved by a refusal to sustain them.” Id. 

With this standard in mind, we consider the facts as alleged by Burton. On 

October 14, 2019, while an inmate at SCI-Houtzdale, Burton filed a grievance with 

the DOC claiming that a corrections officer (CO) entered his cell on October 11, 

2019, and stole several items of his personal property while damaging his television

in the process.1 (Petition for Review (Pet.) ¶ 1; Exhibit (Ex.) A to Pet.)2 In his 

grievance, Burton claimed that other inmates in his block had suffered similar 

experiences with this CO but “may be afraid to file a grievance.” (Ex. A to Pet.)

Burton requested that the DOC investigate the issue, including a review of the video 

footage of the cell block, remove the CO from his unit, and reimburse Burton for his 

missing and damaged property. (Id.)

The DOC rejected Burton’s initial grievance on October 16, 2019, explaining 

it was rejecting Burton’s grievance “due to a failure to comply with” the proper 

procedures set forth in DC-ADM 804 of the DOC’s grievance process policies, 

namely including proof of ownership/possession of the items.3 (Pet. ¶ 1; Ex. B to

1 Burton alleged that missing from his cell were his “highlighters, color[ed] pencils, and 

pictures [he] had out of [his] Dad who recently passed.” (Pet. ¶ 1; Ex. A to Pet.) 

2 The documents attached to the Petition for Review are each labeled as an “Attachment.” 

For ease of reference, we will refer to them as Exhibits. 

3 DC-ADM 804, Section 1(A)(17) provides: 

An inmate filing a grievance related to a claim of missing property must provide 

documentation such as a DC-153A, Personal Property Inventory Sheet; DC-154A, 

Confiscated Items Receipt; or a Commissary/Outside Purchase Form for evidence 

or proof that the property items were once in his/her possession. Failure to do so 

may result in the rejection of the grievance. 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

Pet.) In addition, the DOC rejected the grievance on the grounds that “[g]roup 

grievances or grievances filed on behalf of another inmate are prohibited[]” and 

“[g]rievances based upon different events must be presented separately.” (Id.) 

Burton thereafter filed his second grievance on October 18, 2019. (Pet. ¶ 1; 

Ex. C to Pet.) In his second grievance, Burton removed the claims regarding other 

inmates and other events but otherwise stated the same claims as the first grievance

with respect to the alleged theft of and damage to his personal property. Burton 

claimed that the CO did not provide him with a confiscation slip for the property that 

was confiscated, as required by the internal policy of the DOC when conducting a 

security cell inspection. (Pet. ¶ 1; Ex. K to Pet.) While Burton did not provide the 

receipts for any property in his second grievance, he stated that he would “write to 

[the] commissary for a copy” of the receipts. (Pet. ¶ 1.)

The DOC again rejected Burton’s second grievance on October 21, 2019, on 

the basis that Burton had “not provide[d] the required documentation for proper 

review as required in DC-ADM 804.” (Ex. D. to Pet.) On October 22, 2019, Burton 

submitted a receipt for the allegedly damaged television and asked that it be included 

with his second grievance. (Pet. ¶ 2; Ex. E to Pet.) Burton further indicated that he 

had “wr[itten the] commissary for the other receipts” and would “copy and send” 

them once received. (Ex. E to Pet.) The DOC responded to this request indicating 

that Burton’s “grievance was rejected twice” and that Burton’s only “recourse is to 

appeal.” (Id.) 

Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual, DC-ADM 804, available at

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievan

ces.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
4

On October 24, 2019, Burton appealed to the superintendent. With his appeal, 

Burton submitted receipts and asked that the 15-day requirement to submit issues be 

excused because “sometimes copies [of receipts] cannot be a[c]quired and copied in 

time for the initial submi[ssion].” (Pet. ¶ 2; Ex. G to Pet.) The superintendent upheld 

the rejection of Burton’s second grievance on October 28, 2019, explaining that 

Burton’s “failure to provide the required documents led to the rejections,” and that 

while Burton claimed he “did not have all the required receipts and 15 days is not 

enough time to gather such documentation,” Burton “failed to provide any proof to 

substantiate that claim.” (Ex. H to Pet.) Finally, the superintendent stated that “the 

submission of this appeal with all required documents attached contradicts 

[Burton’s] claims of 15 days being insufficient time.” (Ex. H to Pet.) 

On October 31, 2019, Burton filed his appeal to the chief grievance officer, 

wherein Burton argued that “at the least, video and witnesses should have been 

enough to investigate the claim as it pertained to a crime committed by a[] [CO] and 

. . . there has been a pattern of this.” (Pet. ¶ 3.) Burton further claimed that he “could 

have been granted . . . time to gather receipts” and asked that his issue be remanded 

for an adequate investigation. (Ex. I to Pet.) The chief grievance officer dismissed 

Burton’s appeal finding Burton “failed to provide required documentation with [his] 

initial grievance, as well as [his] resubmitted [second] grievance.” (Ex. J to Pet.) 

Burton then filed his Petition for Review in this Court’s original jurisdiction, 

claiming violations of the United States Constitution, specifically of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
5

unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Ninth Amendment.

4

 Burton further 

claims a violation of the DOC’s policy regarding a CO’s ability to search an inmate’s 

cell and confiscate property, DC-ADM 203.F. (Pet. ¶¶ 4-5.) Burton avers that the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that no “state deprive any person of life, liberty 

or property without due process of law” was violated, as he had a valid property 

interest and has shown that procedural due process “was [not even] afforded but

abridged.” (Pet. ¶ 4.) Burton further asserts that the rights retained by inmates under 

the constitution include those protected by the Ninth Amendment and that “[e]ven a 

little Fourth [A]mendment protection could be applied as [Burton] has a minimal

right to ‘be secure in [his] person[], house[], papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches.’” (Id. ¶ 5. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.) Finally, Burton 

avers that he has alleged a violation of “DOC policy,” which “state[s] that [a CO] 

shall not disturb an individual[’]s property whenever [the CO] wants.” (Id.) 

Burton requests that this Court afford him “adequate procedural due process 

so that he may obtain[] and protect his property” and that the CO “be ordered to stop 

violating the law, constitution, and [DOC] policy.” (Pet., Wherefore Clause.)

4 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 

in relevant part, provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, provides “[t]he 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 

The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he enumeration 

in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 

the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
6

II. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

In response to Burton’s Petition for Review, the DOC filed a preliminary 

objection in the nature of a demurrer. The DOC asserts that Burton failed to state a 

due process claim because inmate grievance systems, such as the DOC’s, are an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy and an inmate must exhaust the administrative 

grievance system in a complete and proper manner in compliance with critical 

procedural rules. (Preliminary Objections (PO) ¶ 11, citing Shore v. Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 168 A.3d 374, 378-87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)). The DOC argues that Burton did 

not comply with the procedural rules requiring that he attach documentation proving 

his possession of the relevant property and that Burton’s “mere dissatisfaction with 

the outcome of a grievance proceeding” that afforded meaningful opportunities to 

respond does not amount to a denial of due process. (PO ¶¶ 14-15.) The DOC also 

avers that to the extent Burton’s Petition for Review asserts a Section 1983 claim

against the DOC, his claim fails because “states and state agencies are not ‘persons’

for purposes of Section 1983.” (Id. ¶ 17 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Warren v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 616 A.2d 140, 141-42 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1992)).)

In its brief, the DOC further argues that Burton’s Fourth Amendment, Ninth 

Amendment, and DOC policy claims are frivolous, as: (1) “[t]he Fourth Amendment 

does not apply to prison cells because inmates do not have a reasonable expectation 

of privacy”; (2) “[t]he Ninth Amendment does not independently provide a source 

of individual constitutional right[s]”; and (3) DOC policy does not create rights in 

inmates under the Due Process Clause. (DOC’s Brief (Br.) at 14.) 

In response to the DOC’s preliminary objection, Burton avers that he alleged 

facts sufficient to establish that his procedural due process rights were violated. 

Burton argues that “inmate grievance systems are an[] adequate post-deprivation 
7

remedy . . . only in those cases where the fact-finder conducts an actual investigation 

and reviews the property loss claim.” (Response to PO ¶ 6.) Burton asserts that 

“had a fact-finder reviewed or investigated his claims [to] even a minimal degree[,] 

it could be considered adequate for a prison standard,” but he argues that “the 

procedures employed at SCI[-]Houtzdale for review into his property loss were 

inadequate.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) Burton argues that the DOC deprived him of his right to 

procedural due process by confiscating and damaging his property and by rejecting 

his grievance due to his failure to comply with the procedural requirements under 

the DOC’s policy for post-deprivation remedy process. Burton asserts that he has 

demonstrated that procedural due process was not afforded to him and, specifically,

“that the post-deprivation due process was not only inadequate, it was denied.”

(Burton’s Br. at 2.) Finally, Burton agrees that to the extent his Petition for Review

could be construed as raising a claim under Section 1983, this Court should construe 

it as such. (Response to PO ¶ 9.)

We address the DOC’s claims in its preliminary objection in turn.

III. DISCUSSION 

In ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, while the Court 

must “accept as true all well-pleaded material facts” and all inferences reasonably 

deducible therefrom, the Court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions, 

unwarranted factual inferences, argumentative allegations, or expressions of 

opinions. Armstrong Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 67 A.3d 160, 170 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (en banc). Because 

the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the [petitioner’s] claim 

or a dismissal of [the petitioner’s] suit, a preliminary objection in the 

nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and 

without a doubt fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
8

Palmer v. Bartosh, 959 A.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 

We begin with whether Burton has stated a claim for violation of his 

procedural due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution provides that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To maintain 

a due process challenge, a party must initially “establish the deprivation of a 

protected liberty or property interest.” Miller v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pavex,

Inc.), 918 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). If the party establishes a deprivation 

of a protected interest, the Court will consider what type of procedural mechanism

is required to fulfill due process. Id. For the purposes of this review, similar to the

Court in Shore, we assume that the DOC deprived Burton of a legitimate property

interest and focus on whether sufficient procedural protections were provided. 

Shore, 168 A.3d at 383.

In reviewing the adequacy of the procedural protections provided, “[t]he

amount of process due depends on the context presented.” Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d

394, 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). It is well-settled “that post-deprivation remedies

satisfy the due process clause where the situation dictates that the State take

immediate action or it is impracticable to provide any meaningful pre-deprivation

process.” Shore, 168 A.3d at 383 (citing Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility,

221 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

In Shore, we examined the adequacy of the DOC’s prison grievance system

under due process and the requirements for a prisoner to state a proper procedural

due process claim. There, an inmate brought a grievance after the DOC confiscated

incoming photographs. The inmate argued that by not allowing him to view the

photographs “and make meaningful arguments before an impartial tribunal,” the
9

DOC violated his procedural due process rights. Shore, 168 A.3d at 382. We

explained that

[w]hen a prison official confiscates a prisoner’s property in an allegedly

unauthorized way, whether it be negligently or intentionally, due

process requires only the existence of an adequate post-deprivation

remedy because it is not feasible for a prison to provide a hearing prior

to taking property that is perceived to be contraband or against prison

regulations.

Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1984)

(holding “that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state 

employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post[-]deprivation 

remedy for the loss is available”)). We further examined the DOC’s grievance

procedure detailed in DC-ADM 804, the provision under which the DOC denied

Burton’s claim in the present case, and stated that “[i]n a string of unreported

decisions, this Court has concluded that the [DOC’s] grievance procedure in DCADM 804 is a constitutionally sufficient remedy with respect to inmates’ claims that

the [DOC] unlawfully withheld and/or confiscated personal property.” Shore, 168

A.3d at 383 (collecting cases). 

Shore further indicates that where there is a constitutionally adequate postdeprivation remedy, “an inmate must exhaust the administrative grievance system in

a complete and ‘proper’ manner, and this necessitates compliance with ‘critical

procedural rules.’” Id. (quoting Kittrell v. Watson, 88 A.3d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2014)). Particularly, “a prisoner must have utilized all available remedies in

accordance with the applicable procedural rules, so that prison officials have been

given an opportunity to address the claims administratively.” Id. at 383-84 (quoting
10

Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)). Thus, in Shore, we held that

there was no due process violation because the inmate did not properly exhaust his

remedies in the grievance process, as he never actually had requested to review the

confiscated photographs and nothing in DC-ADM 804 prohibited such a request. 

We explained that an inmate “cannot sit idly by during the grievance process and 

[then] complain that the procedure is deficient” before this Court. Id. at 384; see 

also Hammond v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 265 M.D. 2017, filed Feb. 

14, 2018), slip op. at 6 (holding that where a “policy is facially broad enough to 

allow an issue to be heard and relief to be granted, its procedure is presumptively 

both meaningful and adequate”) (quotations omitted).5 Thus, where an inmate is

“afforded meaningful opportunities to respond” and “received written decisions

from three different adjudicators within the” DOC, a claim for a violation of

procedural due process will fail. Shore, 168 A.3d at 385. Accordingly, there is no

procedural due process violation where there exists a constitutionally adequate postdeprivation remedy and the inmate fails to adhere to the DOC’s policy for proper

procedure within the grievance system. Our decision in Shore controls here. 

In the present case, the DOC argues that Burton failed to take full advantage

of the grievance policy by not complying with the procedural rules in place requiring

that he attach proof of ownership of the property at issue. Burton filed his initial

grievance on October 14, 2019, in which the DOC rejected the grievance on the

grounds that Burton failed to comply with certain procedural requirements, namely,

attaching proof of ownership for the property he claimed to be stolen or damaged.

5 Though Hammond is unreported, unreported decisions of this Court, while not binding, 

may be cited for their persuasive authority pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 

Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
11

Burton filed his second grievance on October 18, 2019, but again failed to attach the

required documentation. On October 24, 2019, Burton appealed to the

superintendent. Although Burton asked that the 15-day period to submit his

grievance be excused, we note that the event about which Burton complains occurred

on October 11 and Burton filed his appeal on October 24 with all of the required

documentation. As the superintendent stated when rejecting Burton’s grievance

appeal, that Burton was able to submit this appeal with all of the required documents

within 15 days of the incident’s occurrence contradicts Burton’s claim that he lacked

sufficient time to comply with the grievance procedures.

Similar to the inmate in Shore, Burton “cannot sit idly by during the grievance 

process” by ignoring the procedural requirements for a proper grievance and then

“complain that the procedure is deficient” before this Court. Shore, 168 A.3d at 384. 

Burton was “afforded meaningful opportunities to respond” by filing a proper 

grievance that complied with the procedural requirements and also “received written 

decisions from three different adjudicators” within the DOC explaining how his 

grievance was procedurally deficient. Id. at 385. Accordingly, Burton’s “mere 

dissatisfaction with the outcome . . . does not equate to a denial of due process.” Id.

(citation omitted).6

6

In addition, even if it is assumed that the grievance procedure was constitutionally 

inadequate, Burton may have an available post-deprivation remedy in the form of a state tort law 

action against the DOC or the CO to obtain monetary damages for his destroyed or stolen property 

or return of the photographs of his late father—an averment that this Court finds particularly 

disturbing—if they were non-contraband personal property. See, e.g., Morales-Vasquez v. Pa. 

Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 253 M.D. 2019, filed July 28, 2020) (explaining that a common 

law action for conversion is an adequate post-deprivation remedy that precludes any action for a 

violation of due process); Hawkins v. Coleman Hall, C.C.F., 453 F. App’x 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(same); Austin v. Lehman, 893 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same). 

We have explained that

(Footnote continued on next page...)
12

Therefore, Burton has failed to state a claim as a matter of law for a violation 

of due process, and, accordingly, we must sustain the DOC’s objection as to this 

claim. 

Related to Burton’s due process claim, the DOC also contends that to the 

extent that Burton states a constitutional violation that could be construed as properly 

brought under Section 1983, this claim also fails because the DOC is not a “person.” 

We agree.

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part: 

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

[i]n Pennsylvania, a tort law remedy is available for the possession and/or 

destruction of non-contraband personal property by virtue of [S]ection 8522(b)(3) 

of what is commonly referred to as the Sovereign Immunity Act, which waives 

immunity for negligent acts concerning “[t]he care, custody or control of personal 

property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties, including . . . 

property of persons held by a Commonwealth agency.”

Shore, 168 A.3d at 385 n.6 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3)). Thus, even if we determined that 

the procedure provided for in DC-ADM 804 is a constitutionally inadequate post-deprivation 

remedy, Burton’s claim would be precluded by the availability of a tort claim for conversion 

against the DOC or the CO for damages from his destroyed or stolen property or return of the 

photographs of his deceased father. 

We note that, as discussed in Shore, “[a]lthough this Court has held in unpublished 

decisions that an inmate may not assert the intentional tort of conversion against employees of 

the [DOC], at least to the extent the claim alleges willful misconduct, conversion does not always 

rest on proof of specific intent to commit a wrong.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 

(quotations omitted). Rather, “the tort may be based on good faith actions as well as the lossoccasioning carelessness resulting from [a] defendant's negligence for which damages may be 

recovered.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, while 

Burton’s claim of intentional wrongdoing would likely fail in a tort action, “it is possible that 

[Burton] has an adequate post-deprivation tort remedy against the [DOC’s] employees for the 

negligent possession and/or destruction of the photographs” of Burton’s deceased father. Id. 

(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
13

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Accordingly, to be subject to suit under Section 

1983, the DOC must qualify as a “person” within the meaning of the statute.

However, “Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but, rather, is 

the vehicle for vindicating rights conferred in the United States Constitution or in 

federal statutes.” Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d 802, 809 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis 

added) (citing Urbanic v. Rosenfeld, 616 A.2d 46, 52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)). In this 

respect, the Supreme Court further has held that “a State is not a ‘person’ within 

the meaning of [Section] 1983” and that while “Section 1983 provides a . . . forum 

to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, . . . it does not provide a . . . forum

for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil 

liberties” due, in part, to State immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.

7

 Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66 (emphasis added); Warren, 616 

A.2d at 142 (holding that neither the Commonwealth nor the DOC is a person subject 

to suit under Section 1983). Thus, we find that Burton cannot use Section 1983 as a 

vehicle for his due process claim against the DOC and sustain the DOC’s objection 

as to this claim. 

However, with respect to Burton’s remaining claims, because the DOC 

objected to Burton’s claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment, Ninth 

Amendment, and DOC policy only in its brief to this Court, rather than raising the 

matter in its preliminary objections, we decline to consider them further. See

7 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial 

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
14

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(b), Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(b) (“All 

preliminary objections shall be raised at one time.”); Buehl v. Beard, 54 A.3d 412, 

415 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (noting that the DOC “made other challenges to the 

petition for review in its brief, but this Court did not consider them because they 

were not raised in its preliminary objections”), aff’d, 91 A.3d 100 (Pa. 2014). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we sustain the DOC’s preliminary objection as to 

Burton’s due process and Section 1983 claims. Because the DOC did not file 

preliminary objections to Burton’s remaining claims, instead improperly raising its 

objections for the first time in its brief, the DOC is directed to file an answer to 

Burton’s remaining claims within 30 days.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael Burton, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 705 M.D. 2019

 : 

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, February 9, 2021, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’

Preliminary Objection to the Petition for Review in the above-captioned matter is

SUSTAINED as to Michael Burton’s due process and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is ordered to file its answer to the 

remaining claims in the Petition for Review within 30 days of this Order. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge