alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

#### Allen v. IPCO Corp. et al.

October 29, 1991

Case No. (Law) 100809

By JUDGE J. HOWE BROWN

This matter is before the Court on defendant IPCO Corporation’s Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the case under advisement to consider the briefs submitted and applicable law. The issues before the Court are whether IPCO was a "health care provider," as defined under the Medical Malpractice Act, such that the sending of a notice of claim would toll the statute of limitations; and if not, whether it is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to this action.

Under the relevant provision of the Act, a "health care provider" must be licensed by this Commonwealth to provide health care or professional services as, *inter*alia, a dentist or health maintenance organization. Code Section 8.01-581.1. If an entity is not so licensed by the Commonwealth, then by definition it is not a health care provider. *See Richman v. National Health Laboratories,*235 Va. 353, 357 (1988). Whether or not IPCO held itself out as a dentist or health maintenance organization is thus immaterial. There is nothing in the language of the statute or in the *Richman*opinion to indicate that the *398licensing requirement can ever be ignored. *Samuel*v. *V.C.U. Obstetrics, etc., Ass'n,*13 Va. Cir. 364, 367 (1988).

Thus, the Court holds that IPCO must have been licensed by the Commonwealth in order to be a "health care provider" under the terms of the Act. It does not appear from the presentation or the record that IPCO was ever so licensed. Therefore, unless plaintiff can produce evidence of a license, IPCO cannot be a "health care provider" as defined by the statute, and the tolling provisions of the Act do not apply. The Court also finds that IPCO is not equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations. IPCO had no duty to notify the plaintiff after receiving notice of the claim that it was not a health care provider. Its failure to do so does not amount to an express or implied representation that it would not plead the statute of limitations or even that it was a health care provider subject to the terms of the Act.

The Court also rejects plaintiff’s argument that IPCO was the agent for the doctors and as such a defendant in this suit. Even if IPCO was such an agent, if the action was untimely filed, the suit against it is subject to the bar of the statute of limitations. Further, while Code $ 8.01*581.1 does refer to agents of nursing homes as being subject to the provision of the Act, this language does not extend to other unlicensed persons or corporations. *See Peterson*v. *Emergency Coverage Corp.,*16 Va. Cir. 368, 370 (1989).

As set forth above, unless plaintiff can produce evidence that IPCO was licensed by the Commonwealth as provided by Code § 8.01-581.1, the Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS OF THE REGISTRANT AT MAY 31, 1997 AND
FEBRUARY 28, 1997 AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE REGISTRANT
FOR THE THREE MONTH PERIOD ENDED MAY 31, 1997 AND 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH STATEMENTS IN THE FORM 10-Q FOR THE
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED MAY 31, 1997.
</LEGEND>
       
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<SECURITIES>                                 3,252,000
<RECEIVABLES>                               13,206,000
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            27,692,000
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<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM J. RAY
MCDERMOTT'S MARCH 31, 1997 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
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<PREFERRED>                                         32
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<SALES>                                      1,367,587
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,367,587
<CGS>                                        1,371,471
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<INCOME-TAX>                                    12,555
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</TABLE>
# C_2009233EN.01000502.xml

| 26.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 233/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 233/5

---

Action brought on 7 July 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Cyprus

(Case C-251/09)

2009/C 233/09

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: C. Zadra and I. Khatzigiannis)

Applicant:

Defendant: Republic of Cyprus

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | declare that the Republic of Cyprus has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 4(2) and 31(1) of Directive 93/38/EEC (1) and Article 1(1) of Directive 92/13/EEC; (2) |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that the Republic of Cyprus has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 4(2) and 31(1) of Directive 93/38/EEC (1) and Article 1(1) of Directive 92/13/EEC; (2)

1

2

| — | order the Republic of Cyprus to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Republic of Cyprus to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Arkhi Ilektrikou Kiprou (Electricity Authority of Cyprus) is stated to have infringed Directives 93/38/EEC and 92/13/EEC in the course of the tendering procedure under reference number 40/2005 which related to a contract for the design, supply and construction of the fourth unit of the Vasilikos Power Station.

The Commission submits that the infringement of Articles 4(2) and 31(1) of Directive 93/38 is due to the grounds for rejection of the complainant’s tender and acceptance of that of the other tenderer on the basis of a criterion which was not referred to clearly in the call for tenders.

So far as concerns the infringement of Directive 92/13, a measure relating to procedure, the Commission submits (i) that, inasmuch as the contracting authority itself created by its conduct a state of uncertainty as to the interpretation to be given to the grounds which resulted in the rejection of the complainant’s tender, it infringed Directive 92/13 as interpreted in the light of the objective of effectiveness pursued by that directive, and (ii) that the contracting authority cannot give reasons for its decision by simply referring to the evaluation reports.

---

(1)  Council Directive of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 84).

1

(2)  Council Directive of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 14).

2

---
II-00706

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Tim McGrenere <tmcgrenere6539@rogers.com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 12:17 PM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

Tim McGrenere

77 Fairview Ave

Toronto, ON M6P 3A3
Maxcium HERRING, petitioner, v. L.S. McEWEN, Warden.

No. 16-6184.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 28, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
II-OlO08

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

WILLIAM LORCH <j etphixer@gmail.com>

Thursday, December 2, 2010 9:12 AM

dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>

Re: No loopholes in Dodd-Frank

1) Securities and Exchange Commission/Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Commercial Risk (CFTC RIN

3235-AK65, SEC File Number $7-12-10)

Dear Commissioners Shapiro and Gensler: Don’t let the American Bankers Association (ABA) redefine important terms like

"commercial risk" to keep banks that engage in risky derivatives trading from complying with transparency and business

conduct requirements. Commercial risk should not be expanded to include financial risk. Accepting the ABA argument

would open the door for exemptions for risky hedge funds and insurance companies.

2) Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Re: Position Limits (RIN 3038-AD 17 )

Dear Commissioner Gensler: The CFTC needs to set strong position limits to crack down on the energy and food commodity

speculation that serves no productive purpose. I urge the Commission to define limits that will address not only manipulation,

but also excessive speculation, which will require a stricter approach.

3) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re: FX Swaps (75 FR 66426 Document Number 2010-27274)

Dear Secretary Geithner: Just say "no" to foreign exchange traders who want to exempt foreign currency derivatives from the

clearing and transparency requirements of the

Dodd-Frank Act. $4 trillion dollars a day is traded in these highly-leveraged swaps and this number may increase to over $10

trillion in a decade. As the head of the Financial

Stability Oversight Board your job is to decrease risk in the system, not encourage off-book trading and opaque markets.

WILLIAM LORCH

816 DOUGLAS ST

Joliet, IL 60435
David HILL, petitioner, v. William B, TRAXLER, Jr., Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, et al.

No. 16-6188.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 28, 2016.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied, and petition for writ of certiorari dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and petition submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,*506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (*per curiam* ).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIC JOHN FRATANGELI,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 66 MAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 26th day of July, 2023

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN THE ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K OF DSP COMMUNICATIONS,
INC. FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
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<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          66,818
<SECURITIES>                                    27,071
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,551
<ALLOWANCES>                                       200
<INVENTORY>                                      2,657
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               128,957
<PP&E>                                          10,952
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,629
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 145,237
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           38,869
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            38
<OTHER-SE>                                     111,330
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   145,237
<SALES>                                        126,874
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               131,097
<CGS>                                           71,236
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,504
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   200
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 33,473
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,101
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             29,372
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    29,372
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.74
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.70
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 


Before the 


COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 


HENRI GUERIN 

v. 

OANDACORP. 

CFTC Docket No. 12-R-O17 

ORDER OF SUMMARY 

AFFIRMANCE 

Upon review ofthe record and the parties' briefs, 1 we have determined that the findings 

and legal conclusions ofthe Judgment Officer are supported by the weight of the evidence and in 

accordance with applicable law; we therefore adopt them. We also find that none ofthe 

arguments on appeal made by the complainant raise important questions of law or policy. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the Judgment Officer.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED.3 

1 For the first time on appeal, Oanda raises a challenge to our jurisdiction. Because the merits of 

this case are straightforward, we exercise hypothetical jurisdiction to bypass the jurisdictional 

question and reach the merits. Reynolds v. Holder, 581 Fed. App'x 79, 79 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[W]e 

may exercise hypothetical jurisdiction 'where the jurisdictional constraints are imposed by 

statute, not the Constitution, and where the jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of 

the claim is ... plainly without merit."') (quoting lvanishvili v. U.S. Dep 't ofJustice, 433 F.3d 

332, 338 n. 2 (2d Cir.2006)); Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining 

that the Supreme Court "explicitly recognized the propriety of addressing the merits where doing 

so made it possible to avoid a doubtful issue of statutory jurisdiction[.]") (citing Steel Co. v. 

Citizens/or a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 96-97 & n.2 (1998)).

2 Pursuant to Commission Regulation 12.406(b), 17 C.F.R. § 12.406(b) (2014), neither the initial 

decision nor the Commission's order of summary affirmance shall serve as a Commission 

vrecedent in other proceedings. 

A party may petition for review of a CFTC reparation order to the United States Court of 

Appeals for the circuit in which a hearing was held, if any; if no hearing was held, the petition 

may be filed in any circuit in which the opposing party is located. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1 l)(B), 18(e). 

Such a petition for review must be tiled within 15 days after notice of the order; any such 

petition is not effective unless, within 30 days ofthe date ofthe Commission order, the 
By the Commission (Chairman MASSAD and Commissioners BOWEN and GIANCARLO.) 

Christopher J. 14'irkpatrick 

Secretary ofthe Commission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Dated: July 8, 2016 

petitioning party files with the court a bond equal to double the amount of any reparation award. 

Id§ 18(e).
Angela Marie EWING, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 16-7017.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 9, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Colin O'KROLEY, petitioner, v. FASTCASE, INC., et al.

No. 16-6499.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 9, 2017.

*640Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Paul D. Melnuk, as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officerof Thermadyne Holdings Corporation (the “Company”) certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(1) the accompanying Form 10-Q report for the period ending March 31,2005 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”)fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| Dated:  May 10, 2005 |   |
|--------------------------------|--------|
|                           |   |
|                           |   |
|                           | By:    |   | /s/ Paul D. Melnuk |   |
|                           |   |   |
|                           |   | Paul D. Melnuk |
|                           |   | Chief Executive Officer |
|                           |   | (Principal Executive  Officer) |

 

----
()?-!'/ 

@ 

Received CFTC 

Records Section 

f;lsfor 

A880ctateon oF Wheat Growers 

January 

Mr. David Stawick 

Secretary 

Commodity future.s Trading Commission 

Three I ,a fayette Centre 

1155 21s.; Street, N\V 

Washington, DC 20581 

It 

COMMENT 

RE: Comments on Proposal to Revise Federal Speculative Position Limits 

Dear Secn:tary Stawick: 

.-

~··, ' :·-.. ) 

You received recently comments from the National Grain and fef:d Association (NGF!\) on the CFTC proposal to 

raise federal spcculativt: position limits published November 21, 2007 in the Federal Register. 

The National A1;sociation of Wheat Growers (NA WG) represents approximately 15,000 wheat growers in 21 

member states. We support the positions and concerns mised in the NGFA letter and encourage you to accept 

their recommendations. 

The impacts NGF !\ describes from poor convergence ultimately impact tarmers. Widening basis levels to pay 

higher financing costs comes directly out of the. local purchase price tor agricultural crops, and if the grain 

handlers' financial solvency is jeopardized to the point of fire sales or sales of physical assets will adversely 

impact producers' access to grain handling services. Farmers themselves are also hedgers and are ill served if 

convergence between cash and futures markets does not happen efficiently. CFTC's overriding concem in 

agriculh1ral markets should be to ensure that convergence is not impeded by speculation or other factors. 

NGF/\ makes a number of positive suggestions and \Ve encourage you to conduct the recommended analysis ami 

postpone consideration of the pmposal to raise speculative position limits~ 

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the rules proposal. 

'!;:'·ours, . f ~""/)- '.Dare~ Chief Executive Otlicer 

C: ational Grain & feed Association 

"WHEAT DOLLARS ARE IMPORTANT TO THE NAT!ONAL ECONOMY AND YOUR BUSINESS" 

i .•