J-S42009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAMSUZZAMAN MOLLAH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1253 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 5, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001848-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2023

Shamsuzzaman Mollah appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

following his convictions for abuse of corpse, unlawful use of a motor vehicle, 

and theft by unlawful taking. We affirm. 

The pertinent facts are as follows: 

Daniel Torres drove to [Appellant’s] house in Lansdale, 

Montgomery County, on the afternoon of April 28, 2018, with 

plans to go out for the night with [Appellant]. He parked his car 

near [Appellant’s] house and the two eventually spent the evening 

at a club with a third friend. [Appellant] and Torres returned to 

[Appellant’s] house early the next morning, with Torres in 

possession of his car keys, wallet, and cellular phone. Torres 

became sick while at [Appellant’s] house and suffered an 

overdose. 

Rather than call for emergency services, [Appellant] put Torres’s 

body in a large trash bag and hid him in the trunk of Torres’s 

vehicle, which had remained parked near [Appellant’s] house 

since Torres had arrived the day before. [Appellant] then drove 

the vehicle to the nearby parking lot of Twin Pines Apartment, 

leaving Torres’ body in the trunk, and returned to his house on 
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foot. With Torres’s family frantically searching for him, 

[Appellant] spent more than a week pretending to not know the 

whereabouts of [Torres]. Police eventually located Torres’s 

partially decomposed body in the trunk of his vehicle on May 9, 

2018. An investigation uncovered [Appellant’s] actions[,] and he 

was arrested and charged with abuse of corpse, unauthorized use 

of a motor vehicle[,] and theft by unlawful taking. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/13/23, at 1-2 (cleaned up). The theft charge arose 

from Appellant taking Torres’s wallet, cell phone, and car keys after Torres 

had died. See id. at 2 n. 6.

Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of all charges. Before 

sentencing, Appellant filed a motion for extraordinary relief, challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence for his theft conviction. The Commonwealth 

opposed the motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant was subsequently 

sentenced to an aggregate term of eighteen to forty-eight months in prison, 

followed by one year of probation. Thereafter, Appellant filed this timely 

notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant proffers one question for our review: “Was the evidence 

insufficient to establish defendant’s conviction for theft by unlawful taking 

where the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the decedent was alive 

at the time the property in question was taken?” Appellant’s brief at 3. 

In reviewing Appellant’s contention, we bear the following legal 

principles in mind. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a 

question of law and is subject to plenary review under a de novo standard. 

See Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020). Specifically,

[t]he standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 
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the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we may 

not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1171 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned 

up). 

Appellant challenges his conviction of theft by unlawful taking. “A 

person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control 

over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). The Crimes Code defines “property of another” to mean 

“property in which any person other than the actor is not privileged to 

infringe.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3901. 

Citing Bash v. Sommer, 20 Pa. 159, 162 (Pa. 1852), a civil case 

involving slander, for the proposition that “a dead man cannot be an owner” 

for purposes of proving theft, Appellant contends that he is entitled to relief 

because the Commonwealth did not sufficiently prove that Torres was alive 

when Appellant took his property. Appellant’s brief at 15. Further, Appellant 

argues that this Court has defined a person as “a living human being, 
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especially as distinguished from an animal or thing.” Id. at 16 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Newton, 994 A.2d 1127, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2010)). 

Appellant therefore states that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy the 

“property of another” element of theft by unlawful taking because it did not 

establish that Torres was living when the theft occurred. See Appellant’s brief 

at 17. Indeed, Appellant argues that the evidence showed that he took 

possession of these items “at the time he disposed of [Torres’s] body.” Id. 

Appellant’s argument is unavailing. First, the plain language of §§ 3901 

and 3921(a) contains no requirement that the Commonwealth prove that the 

person whose property was taken must be living at the time of the offense. 

Phrased differently, the victim’s earthly existence simply is not an element of 

theft by unlawful taking. 

Moreover, it is well-settled that defendants can be convicted of theft 

offenses involving deceased victims. See e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 612 (Pa. 2007) (concluding that the defendant was 

guilty of theft by unlawful taking for stealing a victim’s car even though the 

victim was already deceased when the defendant stole it); Commonwealth 

v. Figueroa, 859 A.2d 793, 796 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding that the defendant 

was guilty of theft by deception for transferring the property of a deceased 

owner). In this vein, Appellant’s reliance upon Newton is inapt because our 

examination of the phrase “living human being” in that appeal concerned 

determining whether a person was fictitious, as opposed to deceased, for the 

purpose of identity theft. Newton, supra at 1135-1136. Ultimately, we held 
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that to convict a defendant of identity theft, the Commonwealth must prove 

that the defendant assumed the identity of a “living human being” as opposed 

to creating a fictitious identity. Id. As similar considerations concerning the 

victim’s identity are not implicated in deciding whether a defendant committed 

theft by unlawful taking, Newton is not material to our review. 

For the foregoing reasons, we have no cause to disturb Appellant’s 

conviction for theft by unlawful taking.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 12/28/2023