On Se pte mbe r 2 , 2 00 9, the Court or de re d H unte r t o f

ile a pr op e r o pp os iti on

to 1 Def endants’ motion, which Hunte r did on September 14, 2009. T he substance of Hunter ’s RO B ERT TO DD HU

NT ER, Plaintiff,
v. U.S. BAN K NATI ONAL ASSOCI ATI ON, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE STRUCTURED ASS ET I NV EST MENT L OA

N T RU ST 2005-8, e t al

. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 09–1205 (CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Mar ch 22, 2010) Pro se Plaintiff Robert Todd Hunter br ings this ac tion ag ainst Defe ndants U.S. Ba nk, Natio na l A sso c iatio n ( “ U. S. B ank ” ) a nd Th e Str uc tur e d A sse t Inv e stm e nt L oa n T ru st 2 00 5- 8 to quiet title to property

he owne d in Pennsy lvania that wa s fore closed upon by U.S. Ba nk. Hunter claims that he is entitled to a judg ment of quiet title beca use the for eclosure was invalid, for a varie ty of re asons. Def

endants have filed a

Motion to Dism iss Pl aintiff’s Complaint for lac k of subject matter jur isdiction and for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. Def endants c ontend that Hunter is improperly

seekingto appea l a Pennsylvania cour t judgment and that this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooke r-Feldman d o c tr i n e ; a l t e r n at i v e l y, D e f e n d an t s ar g u e th atH un t e r ’ s c l a i m s ar e b ar r e d b y res judicata and also fa il to st ate a claim for relief . Hunter ha s filed a [7] M otion to Deny Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss C omplaint, which the Court construes a s an opposition to Defenda nts’ motion. Def

endants ha

ve filed a reply , and 1opposition i s identical to his Motion t o Deny , except for the a ddition of two paragraphs of

argument and a r equest for an incr ease d amount for sa nctions. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9, 11. Acc ording ly , the Court shall ref er only to Hunter’s opposition. 2 the mot ion

is r ipe fo r a dju dic atio n. Ha vin gc on sid e re d th e pa

rt ie s’ fi lin g s a

nd the a pp lic a ble leg al authorities, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over H unter’s Complaint under the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine be cause Hunter is ef fec tively seekingto appea l an adve rse state court judgme nt. Accor dingly , the Court shall GRANT De fenda nts’ [5] Motion to Dism iss and DENY H un t e r ’ s [ 7 ] M o t i o nt o D e n y. I. BACKG ROUND This action conc erns pr operty that Hunter owned at 1215 Gr een Ridg e Road, Or rtanna , Pennsylvania (the “Proper ty ”). C o mp l
. ¶ 3
. On J un e 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 , P l ai n t i ff ex ec u t eda m o rt gage note (the “Note”) with non-party BN C Mortga g e, Inc., sec ured by the Property , in exchang e for a $153,000 loan. Id. ¶¶ 3, 67. In 2007, the mortg ag e wa s sold and assig ned to U.S. Ba nk as trustee for the mor

tga g e-ba cked se curity

in which the mortg ag e wa s pooled, a trust identified a s Structured Asse t I nvestment L oan Trust 2005-8 ( the “Tr ust”). Id. ¶¶ 4, 30. On Au gu s t3 , 2 0 0 7 , U. S
. Ban k , as tru s t ee fo r t h e T ru s t , fi l eda C o mp l ai n ti nM o rt gage For eclosure ag ainst Hunter in the Ada ms County , Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. See Compl., Ex . F ( Complaint i n Mortg ag e F orec losure). The Complaint i n Mortg ag e F orec losure alleg ed that U.S. B ank wa s the leg al owner of the mortg ag e and w as in the proc ess of for malizi ng an assig nment, and that the mortg ag e and a ny assig nments were matters of public r ecor d. Id. ¶ 3. Th e Com pla int a lle g e d th at H un te r s top pe d ma kin gmonthl y

pa y me nts of pr inc ipa l and

int e re st i n April 2007 and ther efor e the mortg ag e wa s in default. Id. ¶ 5. U.S. Ba nk soug ht an in rem judgme nt ag ainst Hunter f or $158,603.53 plus interest and othe r costs and the fore closure a ndDef endants have attac hed the doc kets from the f orec losure ac tion and the subsequent 2 c omp la int fo r e je c tme nt t o th e ir

Mo tio n to Di smi ss, and

Hunte r d oe s n ot d isp ute the ir authenticity . The Court may take public notice of these doc kets and c onsider them whe n decidinga motion to dism iss. Se e Kae mp e v . M y e rs , 367 F.3d 958, 965 ( D.C. Cir. 2004). Th e date s and

a c tio ns in t

his pa ra g ra phare re fl e c te d o n th e do c ke t sh e e t atta c he d to 3 Def endants’ motion. 3 sale of the Property
. Id. at 6. A def ault judgme nt was ente red a g ainst Hunter f or $163,200 on Dec ember

6, 2007. See U

.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. H

unter , Ci v. No . 2 00 7- SU- 00 00 93 1 ( Ad ams Cty . Ct . Co m. P l. D e c . 6 , 2 00 7) (d e fa ult jud g me nt)
. Th e Pr op e rt y wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

so ld at a 2 Sheriff’ s sale. On J une 10, 2008, U.S. B ank filed a civil complaint for eje ctment ag ainst Hunter in the Adams County , Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. See U .S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. H

unter , Civ. No. 2008-SU-0000822 (Ada ms Cty . Ct. Com . Pl. filed J une 10, 2008). Hunter sought an 3
e nla rg e me nt o f t ime to r e sp on d to the c omp la int , b ut t he c ourt de nie d h is r e qu e st. A d e fa ult judgme nt was ente red a g ainst Hunter a nd a wr it of possession was issued on J uly 21, 2008. Hunter f iled a motion to set aside the def ault judgme nt, which was de nied by the Court on October 30, 2008. The wr it of possession was re issued on Dec ember 3, 2008. Hunter later filed
a c ivi l a c tio n in

Pe nn sylva

nia c ourt to c ha lle ng e the fo re c los ur e but su bs e qu e ntl y

wi thd re w h is complaint. See Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 2; Def s.’ Mem. at 3-4. In his Compl aint in this action, filed J une 30, 2009, Hunter challeng es the a ctions taken by the Adams County

Court of Common P leas. Hunte r cla ims that the state court’s judg ment of fore closure violate d his due proce ss rig hts under the F ifth and F ourtee nth Amendments as we ll as his right to a jur

y trial under the Seventh Amendment. See Compl. ¶¶ 11, 22, 43-44, 49-55, 63- 64, 79-80. Thus, Hunter

claims that the for eclosure was improper and that De fenda

nts have4

eng ag ed in “f

raudule nt conver sion” of the Prope rty . See id. ¶ 6. More spe cifica lly , Hunter a lleg es that the for eclosure was improper for a varie ty of
rea sons. For e x ample, Hunter claims that Def

endants lac ked standingto forec lose on the Property beca use they did not adequate ly

prove the ir owner ship of the Note. See Compl. ¶ 5 (“N either [U.S. Ba

nk] nor [ the Trust] have supplied any materia l evidence that they are the ho lde r i n d

ue c ours e of

the no te and

de e d o f t ru st. ” ); id. ¶¶ 93- 95, 101. Hunter a lso claims that Def endants fa iled to properly establish in state court that Hunte r owe d a debt. See id. ¶ 96. Hunter a lso claims that Defe ndants had no right to enforc e the Note beca use they wer e not cosigne rs or sure ties of the orig inal Note and ha ve no rig ht of subrog ation. See id. ¶ 6, 9, 13, 48, 61-62. Hunter

also appe ars to cla im that the Note was inva lid because Hunter r ece ived the loan proce eds in the for

m of an a ccount c redit rather than a s U.S. curre ncy , and thus there was no valuable c onsideration. See id. ¶¶ 7- 8, 22-25, 29, 46, 67-69, 97. More over, H unter c laims that only g old and silver coin a

re le g al tender

in the United States. Id. ¶ 68. Hunter claims that Def endants violated ba

nking r egulations by

improperly

lendingtheir cr edit. See id. ¶¶ 82- 92. Hunter a lso claims that his int ere st in the Property trac es bac k to the orig inal land g rant fr om the Br itish gover

nment, and ther efor e he ha s superior title and inter est in the Property to anyone, including D efe ndants. See id. ¶¶ 34- 35, 56-60. Hunter c laims that Defe ndants did not “validate” the debt by respondingto Hunter’s reque st for proof

of debt owne rship. See Compl. ¶¶ 31, 70, 77, 81 & Ex. C (6/10/2009 L etter from Hunter

to Defe ndants reque sting proof of owne rship). Hunter

claims that validation was require d by

the Fa ir Debt Collection Prac tices Ac t and that the debt c ould not have bee n validated be cause there was no c onsideration for the loan. See id. ¶¶

70 , 8 1. Hunte r c la ims to5

have ma de an “ of

fe r o f p e rf

or manc e ” to p ay

the de bt, wh ic h w a s r e

je c te d b y De fe nd ants , there fore exti ng uishing the de bt under the Uniform Commercial Code. See id. ¶¶ 32- 33, 71, 74, 7 6
. H un t e r

a l s o c l a i m s th atth e f

o r e c l o s ur e a c t i o nw a s i n v a l i d b e c a u s e i tw a s n o tp r e c e d e d

b y a separ ate a ction to quiet titl e. See Compl. ¶ 64 (“The unla wful [forec losure] action taken by the Def endant wa s not prece ded by a fina l judgment in an A ction to Quiet Title, and is there fore vio lativ e of

my du e pr oc e ss r ig hts .” ); id. ¶ 65 (c laiming that f ailure to bringquiet title action violates Pennsylvania common law a nd constitutional due proce ss). Hunter’ s first stated ca

use of a ction is for quiet title and see ks a dec laration that Hunter has exclusive owner ship rights in the Proper ty and injunctive re lief prohibiting D efe ndants and others fr om challeng ing his rights in the Property
. See Compl. ¶ 98. Hunter’s sec ond cause of action is for “ Slander of T itle, fraudule nt conver sion” based on D efe ndants’ ac tions. See id. ¶¶ 99- 102. Hunter se eks a r evoca tion of the fore closure, a

batement of

all claims ag ainst him and the Property , an aw ard of costs, and punitive damag es in the amount of $80,000. See id. ¶¶ 104- 08. II. LEGAL STANDARD A cour t must di smiss a case pur suant to Rule 12(b)(1) when it lacks subjec t matter jurisdiction. I n deter

mining whe ther ther e is jurisdiction, the Court may “conside r the c omplaint supplemented by

undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord, or the c omplaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts.” Coalit ion for Underground Expansion , 3 33 F .3 d at 19 8 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Jerom e Stev ens Pharm., Inc . v. Food & Drug Admin. , 4 02 F .3 d 1 24 9, 12 53 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 5) (“ [T]he dis tr ic t c ourt may c on sid e r mate ri a ls outside the pleading s in decidingwhether to gr ant a motion to dismi ss for lac k of jurisdiction.”).Hunter doe s not specifica lly mention the ejec tment action in his filings with the Court. 4 Ho we ve r, Hunte r’ s Co mpl a int may be c on str ue d a s p re se nti ngan a

tta c k o n th e jud g me nt i n b oth the ejec tment action and the f orec losure ac tion. Bec ause c onsideration of the challeng e to the e je c tme nt a c tio n w ou ld n ot c ha ng e the Court ’s ana ly sis of the jur isd ic tio na l is su e , th e Court sh a ll ref er only to Hunter’s attack on the f orec losure ac tion.

6 “ At the mot ion

to d ism iss sta g e , c ouns e le d c omp la int s, a s w e ll a s pro s e complaints, are to be construed w ith sufficient libera lity to affor d all possible infere nces f avora ble to the pleade r on alleg ations of fa ct.” Settles v. U.S. ParoleComm’n , 4 2 9 F
. 3 d 1 0 9 8 , 1 1 0 6 ( D
. C
. C i r . 2 0 0 5 )
. In spite of the fa

vorable infere nces that a plaintiff re ceive s on a motion to dism iss, it remains the plaintiff’s burde n to prove subjec t matter jurisdiction by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Am. Farm Bureau v . Envtl. Prot. Agency , 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D .C. 2000). “Although a cour t
mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll f a c tua l a lle g atio ns c on ta ine d in the c omp la int

wh e n r e vie wi nga

mot ion to dis mis s p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) , [a ] pla int if f[’ s] f a c tua l a lle g atio ns in t

he c omp la int

. . . w ill bear closer sc rutiny

in resolvinga 12(b) (1) motion than in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for f ailure to state a c laim.” W

right v. Foreign Serv. Grievanc e Bd. , 5 03 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 63 , 1 70 (D .D .C. 2007) (inter

nal citations and quotation marks omitted). III . D ISC USS ION A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject M

atter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12( b) ( 1) Def endants move to dismiss Hunter’s Complaint for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction on the g round that Hunter

is attempting to cha lleng e the Pennsylvania state c ourt’s judg ment in the fo re c los ur e a c tio n. B e c a us e Hunte r h a s a lle g e d in his Com pla int that th e state c ourt

vio late d h is 4 constitutional rights, the Court construe s Hunter’ s Complaint as presentinga constitutional challeng e to a state court judg ment. Hunter c onfirms in his opposit ion that “this claim tenders for r eview of

a state c ourt judg ment.” See Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 8.7

I t is well established that the fe dera l courts ar e cour ts of limit ed jurisdiction. In Rooke r v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 2 63 U. S. 4 13 (1 92 3) , th e Sup re me Court he ld t hat th e fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt s lacke d jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challeng e to a state court judg ment. Id. at 414-16. The Court explained that it is the province a nd duty of state c ourts to addre ss fede ral
c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s th at ari se in s tate c ourt pr oc e e din g s, and

state c ourt

jud g me nts may

on ly be re verse d or modified by a cour t in an appellate proce eding
. Id. Be cause Congr ess has provided that the district c ourts have only orig inal and not appe llate jurisdiction, they may not enter tain suits to reverse or modify a state c ourt judg ment. Id. Six ty y ear s later, in District of Columbia Cour t of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Court re aff irmed Rooke r

and explained that the district courts “do not have jurisdiction . . . over cha lleng es to state cour t d ec i s i o n s i np art i cu l ar

ca s es ar i s i n g o u to f j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n gs ev en i f t h o s e c h al l en ges al l ege that the state c ourt’s ac tion was unconstitutional.” Id. at 486. The so- called Rooke r-Feldman doctrine is base d on the jurisdictional g rant pre sently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which authorizes only

the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state c ourt judg ments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). “ The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine pr events lowe r fe dera l courts from hear ing c ases that a

mount to the functional equivale nt of an a ppeal f rom a state c ourt.” Gray v

. Po ole , 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). “[E] ven a c onstitut ional claim pled as a g ener al
atta c k ma y be so ‘i ne xtri c a

bly int e rt wi ne d’ wi th a

state c ourt

de c isi on that ‘ the dis tr ic t c ourt

is i n
essenc e beingcalled upon to r eview the state-c ourt dec ision.’” Sta nto n v . D .C. Cou rt o f A pp e als , 1 2 7 F. 3 d 7 2 , 7 5 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Feldman , 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16, 486-87)
. The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine ha s limi ts, however . I t does not prec lude fe dera l district courts fr om assertingjurisdiction over any claim that was pr eviously litigated in state court.Hunte r’ s li tig atio n h ist or y a lso c le arl y

de mon str ate s th at he is e ff e c tiv e ly se e kin gto 5 appea l the fore closure judg ment. As Hunter e x plains in his opposi tion, he filed a c ivil case in a Pennsylvania cour

t collatera lly

attackingthe fore closure judg ment, but then “filed a discontinuance without prejudice in orde r to file a c ase in this court unde r the rule s of the c omm on law, havin gre a lize d th at st ate c ourt jud g e s in Pe nn sylva

nia are stu bb or nly op po se d to a pp lyingthe ru le s o f t

he c omm on

law. ” Pl. ’s Op p’ n ¶

2. Hunte r t

hu s o pte d to re mov e his c ha lle ng e fr om s tate to f

e de ra l c ourt . 8 Exx on Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005). “I f a f eder al pla int if f ‘ pr e se nt[s ] som e ind e pe nd e nt c la im, a lbe it o ne that de nie s a le g a l c on c lus ion

that a state court ha s rea ched in a

case to which he wa s a par ty . . ., then there is jurisdiction and state law deter mines whether

the def endant pr evails under

principles of pr eclusion.’” Id. (qu o t i n g GASH Assocs. v. Rose mont , 9 95 F .2 d 7 26 , 7 28 (7 Cir . 1 99 3) ). A c la im i s “ ind e pe nd e nt” fr om a state th court judg ment if it seeks re dress for injuries that are not directly attributable to that judg ment or if the “c ore” of the c laim is independent of the judg ment. See Stanton , 1 27 F .3 d at 75 -7 6; Le v in v. Attorney R egistration & Disciplinary Comm’n , 74 F.3d 763, 766 ( 7th Cir. 1996). Ro ok e r and Feldman both involved case s in which the plaintiff ha d litigated in state court a nd lost, and the Supreme Court has r ece ntly clar ified that “the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine . . . is conf ined to case s of the kind fr om which the doctr ine ac quired its name: ca ses broug ht by state-c ourt losers complainingof injuries ca used by state-c ourt judg ments rende red be fore the district court proce eding s commence d and inviting district cour t reviewand re

jection of those judg ments.” Exx on Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. , 544 U.S. at 283. The Court finds that Hunter ’s Complaint falls squarely within the ambit of the Ro ok e rFeldman doctrine. H unter lost the fore closure a ction brought ag ainst him in st ate c ourt, and he subsequently

filed this action to contest the va lidity of that judg ment and see king da mag es for injuries he suff

ere d as a r esult of the for eclosure
. Although H unter’s quie t titl e cla im is not 5The fa ct that Hunter defa ulted in the fore closure a ction does not cha ng e the a naly sis. 6 The Feldman Court rec og nized that a litigant may forf eit his right to fe dera l court re view if he does not raise his constituti onal claim in state c ourt. See 460 U.S. at 482-83 n.16. 9 sty le d a s an a

pp e a l f ro m th e fo re c los ur e a c tio n, it i s c le ar f ro m th e Com

pla int that H un te r’ s c la im is based entire ly

on the alleg ed impropriety of the for eclosure . All of the injuries alleg ed in the Complaint st em from the f orec losure of the Property , and Hunter is ex plicitly

seekinga judg ment from this Court that would have the e ffe ct of modifying the state cour t’s judgme nt of fore closure. Thus, all of Hunter ’s claims involve either a dire ct attac k on a state c ourt judg ment 6 or issues that ar e inexplicably intertwined with a state court judg ment, and ther e ar e no independe nt claims over whic h the Court has jurisdiction. This finding a ccor ds with the court’s decision in Tre me l v . B ie rm an &Ge esing, L.L. C. , 251 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D .C. 2003). In that
case , J udg e Reg g ie B . Walton ruled that the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine ba rr e d li tig atio n o f c la ims relating to a judicia l forec losure ac tion that was alleg ed to be c onstitut ionally defe ctive. Id. at 45-46. There is one issue that must be addre ssed, howeve r, bef ore the Court can c onclude that dismiss al is require d. Hunter a rgues that the state c ourt lacke d jurisdiction in the forec losure action and its judg ment is void, and theref ore the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine do e s n ot a pp ly in t his
case . See Pl. ’s Op p’ n ¶

¶ 8 -9 . H un te r c ite s In re Sun Valley Foods Co. , 801 F.2d 186 ( 6th Cir. 19 86 ), fo r t

he pr op os iti on

that Rooke r-Feldman does not bar “ a collate ral attack on a state cour t judgme nt which is alleg ed to have been pr oduced thr oug h fra ud, dece ption, accide nt, or mistake . . . .” Id. at1 8 9 (qu o t i n g Resolute Insuranc e Co. v. North Caroli na , 397 F.2d 586, 589 ( 4th Cir. 1968)). The Supreme Court in Rooke r was c onfronted w ith a simil ar a rgument; the appellant argued that the state court judg ment was “ g iven without jurisdiction and absolutely void.” 26310

U.S. at 416. Howeve r, the Court re jected that argument as a “ mistaken cha rac terization,” finding that there was “ full jurisdiction in t he state c ourts and that the bill [i n equity ] at best is m ere ly an attempt to ge t rid of the judg ment for a lleg ed er rors of la w committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. The Court finds that Hunter has similarly

mischara cter ized his attack on the state c ourt jud g me nt a s juri sd ic tio na l. H un te r a sse rt s th at th e state c ourt jud g me nt i s v oid

be c a us e (1 ) U .S. Ba nk never had a r ight of

subrog ation reg ardingthe Note; (2) U.S. Ba nk never produce d the orig inal Note; and ( 3) the for eclosure action “w as filed unde r equity jurisdiction inst ead of common law, as r equire d by Article I I I , Section Two of the U S [ sic] C onstitut ion.” See Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 5. H unter’s f

irst two arguments clea

rly g o to the merits of the for eclosure proce eding rathe r than to the state c ourt’s jurisdiction to entertain the c laim. And Hunter’ s third argument dis pla y s a mis un de rs tand ingof

the ro le of

c omm on law i n th e state and

fe de ra l ju dic ia l sy ste ms; Article I I Iof the U.S. Constitut ion gove rns the judicial powe r of the United States and does not addre ss matters of state la w. I t is clear that the Adams County Court of Common P leas ha d proper jurisdiction over the for eclosure action. See P A . C O N ST . art. 5, § 5 (e x plaining that the
c ourt s o f c omm on

ple a s h ave un lim ite d o ri g ina l juri sd ic tio n in a ll c a se s e xce pt a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d b y

law) ; P A . R.C .P. No. 1142 (statingthat actions for mortg ag e for eclosure may be broug ht only

in a county

in which the land is located). And the Pennsylvania cour ts have explained that Pennsy lvania law “ provides ade quate r emedies f or obtainingdirec t relief f or defe ctive def

ault judgme nts” in mortga g e for eclosure actions. See D el Turco v. Pe oples Home Sav. Ass’n , 478 A.2d 456, 464 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Thus, Hunte r has not provide d g rounds for a n exception to the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine ’s ba r o n r e vie w o f s tate c ourt

jud g me nts .Th e Court c ann ot d ism iss Hunte r’ s Co mpl a int with prejudice , as De fenda nts have urg ed, 7 be c a us e wi tho ut s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n, the Court c ann ot r e a c h th e me ri ts o f H un te r’ s c la ims so as to prec lude litigation in a pr oper f orum, if one e x ists. 11 Acc ording ly , the Court must dism iss Hunter’s Complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. Be cause the Court lacks jurisdiction to addre ss the merits of 7 Hunte r’ s c la ims , it

do e s n ot r e a c h D e fe nd ants ’ a lte rn ativ e argume nts in f avo r o f d ism iss a l. B. Sanctions In h is M oti on

to D e ny and his op po sit ion , H un te r a sk s th e Court to a wa rd sa nc tio ns “ in light o f t he fa c t th at th e De fe nd ants fi le d late and did no t ha ve a g oo d r e a so n f

or fi lin glate , w ith respe ct to the fe dera l case law.” Pl.’s Opp’ n ¶ 16. Howe ver, the Court previously ruled that Def endants’ late filing did not just ify a def ault or cr eate an undue bur den on Hunter , and the Court gr anted De fenda

nts’ motion for leave to file a re sponse to the Complaint. See [9] Orde r (Aug . 31, 2009). Ac cording ly , sanctions ar e not war rante d, and the Court shall deny Hunter’ s
r e qu e s tf o r s an c t i o n s i nh i s M o t i o nt o D e n y. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court sha ll GRANT Def endants’ [5] Mot ion to Dismi ss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction and DENY Hunte r’s [7] Motion to Deny Def endants’ Motion to D ism iss Com

pla int . T he Court

sh a ll d ism iss thi s c a se wi tho ut p re jud ic e . A n a

pp ro pr iate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

Date: Marc h 22, 2010 /s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge