2023 IL App (1st) 231280-U 

No. 1-23-1280 

Filed November 9, 2023

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

EDWARD KODRYAN a/k/a ) Appeal from the

EDUARD KODRYAN, ) Circuit Court of

 ) Cook County.

Plaintiff and Counter Defendant-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 2020 CH 6088

 ) 

DANIEL LUKASZEWICZ and ) 

NORTHSHORE CAR CENTER, LLC, ) 

 ) 

Defendants, ) 

 ) Honorable 

(Daniel Lukaszewicz, Defendant and ) Cecilia A. Horan

Counter Plaintiff-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Appellant failed to meet his burden to support a claim of error. The circuit court did 

not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Edward Kodryan and Daniel Lukaszewicz incorporated NorthShore Car Center, LLC (the 

Company) in 2017. They were the sole members and managers, and each held a 50% ownership 
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interest. Using the name NorthShore Car Center, the Company bought and sold vehicles and 

offered automotive repair and car wash services at a location on Techny Road in Northbrook, 

Illinois. By 2020, Kodryan and Lukaszewicz’s personal and business relationships deteriorated. 

According to Kodryan, Lukaszewicz expelled him from the Company. Lukaszewicz began 

denying Kodryan access to the Company’s bank accounts and financial information in April 2020. 

Lukaszewicz obtained a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan without Kodryan’s consent and 

was using the Company’s resources for his personal benefit. Thus, Kodryan asserted a claim of 

breach of fiduciary duty against Lukaszewicz. In addition, he sought dissolution of the Company 

and an order compelling Lukaszewicz to provide an accounting. 

¶ 4 Lukaszewicz filed an answer denying the allegations that he had expelled Kodryan from 

the LLC. He also filed a counter-complaint, which essentially alleged that Kodryan was 

responsible for the breakdown in their business relationship and the Company’s dysfunction. 

Among other allegations, Lukaszewicz claimed that Kodryan failed to report or provide documents 

for vehicles he had bought and sold, and withdrew company funds, which he used for other 

ventures. Like Kodryan, Lukaszewicz also sought dissolution of the Company, that the Company’s

affairs be wound up,1 and that an accounting be ordered. 

¶ 5 Kodryan filed a motion for appointment of a receiver in April 2021. Kodryan claimed that 

a receivership was necessary to avoid an imminent loss of assets while litigation was pending. He 

asserted that he would be disproportionately harmed if the Company were not placed in 

receivership because he invested over $500,000 in the Company from both personal funds and 

loans, while Lukaszewicz had not contributed any capital. Lukaszewicz opposed the appointment 

1

Pursuant to 805 ILCS 180/35-4(e) (West 2020), a “circuit court may order judicial supervision of 

the winding up of a dissolved limited liability company, including the appointment of a person to wind up 

the company’s business.”
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of a receiver. After briefing, the court denied the motion to appoint a receiver without prejudice

and ordered Lukaszewicz to provide an accounting. 

¶ 6 In November 2022, Kodryan moved for leave to file an amended complaint. Kodryan 

asserted that he recently learned Lukaszewicz had (1) exercised a five-year lease option for the 

business premises on Techny Road, (2) obtained substantial loans, and (3) entered into a $500,000 

auto paint contract. Based on this information, Kodryan wished to add allegations to his breach of 

fiduciary duty claim and add a claim for conversion. The court granted Kodryan leave to file his 

amended complaint in January 2023. 

¶ 7 Kodryan filed a second motion to appoint a receiver in January 2023. The motion included 

the new allegations from Kodryan’s amended complaint and provided more detail as to 

expenditures Kodryan made for the company, mostly relating to acquiring equipment. He also 

claimed that Lukaszewicz was using the company’s assets for his own benefit.

¶ 8 Lukaszewicz responded that a receiver was unnecessary because the company ceased 

operating at the end of September 2022. He further claimed that the company had no assets and 

disputed that Kodryan had made the claimed expenditures for equipment. In addition, Lukaszewicz

denied that Kodryan was expelled from the company, and argued that Kodryan voluntarily 

abandoned it.

¶ 9 In subsequent briefing, Kodryan alleged that (1) Lukaszewicz made substantial 

withdrawals of funds from the Company’s accounts, (2) the Company’s assets, including 

equipment, were unaccounted for, and (3) Lukaszewicz was operating a substantially similar 

business out of the same location on Techny Road under the name “NorthShore Car Care.” 

Kodryan attached records from the Illinois Secretary of State showing NorthShore Car Care was 

an assumed business name belonging to Black Onion, LLC, which Lukaszewicz and his wife 
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incorporated. Kodryan also attached copies of online materials indicating NorthShore Car Care

held itself out as an auto repair shop, and photographs of the Techny Road location bearing a sign 

reading “NorthShore Car Care.”

¶ 10 According to an agreed statement of facts, counsel for both parties appeared for oral 

argument on the motion to appoint a receiver on May 24, 2023, via the online video conferencing 

application Zoom. Neither Kodryan nor Lukaszewicz testified. Lukaszewicz’s counsel argued, 

inter alia, that a receiver was unnecessary since the Company ceased doing business at the end of 

September 2022. Kodryan’s counsel countered that a receiver was necessary because Lukaszewicz 

had converted the assets of the Company to operate a new business under the name NorthShore 

Car Care. Following argument, the court entered a written order granting Kodryan’s second motion 

to appoint a receiver. 

¶ 11 Thereafter, both parties proposed certain persons to serve as receiver. Kodryan submitted 

a proposed order appointing a receiver, and revisions of the same, following conferences with the 

court. Lukaszewicz continued to object to the appointment of a receiver. On July 6, 2023, the court 

entered an order appointing Arlen Lasinsky and Marcum LLP as receiver. The court modified the 

proposed order as to the receiver’s duties. Lukaszewicz filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from 

the order appointing receiver on July 17, 2023.2

 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 14 Initially, Kodryan challenges whether we have jurisdiction to consider Lukaszewicz’s 

appeal. Specifically, Kodryan argues the notice of appeal was untimely since the circuit court 

granted the motion to appoint a receiver on May 24. Accordingly, the 30-day period to file an 

2

In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this 

appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(2) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) began 

on that date, and not July 6 when the court actually selected a receiver. Kodryan further highlights 

that the substance of Lukaszewicz’s brief is directed at the court’s May 24 decision to appoint a 

receiver and not the July 6 order that chose the receiver. 

¶ 15 Lukaszewicz counters that the plain language of Rule 307(a)(2) refers to the appealability 

of an order appointing a receiver, which the May 24 order did not do. The May 24 order only ruled 

that the motion to appoint a receiver was granted. The receiver was not actually appointed until 

July 6. Lukaszewski further posits that the May 24 and July 6 orders are intertwined. That is, the 

May 24 order was a “ ‘step in the procedural progression’ ” leading to the July 6 order, making the 

May 24 order reviewable in an appeal from the July 6 order. 231 W. Scott, LLC v. Lakeside Bank, 

2017 IL App (1st) 161131, ¶ 29 (quoting City of Chicago v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran 

Church, 2016 IL App (1st) 151864, ¶ 70). 

¶ 16 We agree with Lukaszewicz. Illinois Supreme Court Rules “have the force of law, and the 

presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 

2d 204, 210 (1995). We interpret supreme court rules in the same manner as statutes. Lake 

Environmental, Inc. v. Arnold, 2015 IL 118110, ¶ 12. As with statutes, we must ascertain and give 

effect to the drafters’ intent. People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10. “The most reliable indicator 

of the drafters’ intent is the language of the rule, which must be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning.” Id. 

¶ 17 Rule 307 provides that an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order “appointing or 

refusing to appoint a receiver or sequestrator.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(2) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). Plainly, 

the circuit court’s May 24 order did not appoint or refuse to appoint a receiver. The court only 

granted Kodryan’s motion to appoint a receiver, indicating that a receiver would be appointed in 
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the future. Only the July 6 order actually appointed a receiver. Thus, Lukaszewicz’s July 17 notice 

of appeal was timely filed. 

¶ 18 Likewise, we agree that an appeal from the July 6 order appointing a receiver makes the 

May 24 order in which the court decided that a receiver would be appointed reviewable. “[R]eview 

of an interlocutory order may well require review of ‘attendant’ prior orders, i.e., those intertwined 

with the merits of the interlocutory order.” U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. In Retail Fund Algonquin 

Commons, LLC, 2013 IL App (2d) 130213, ¶ 22. The decision as to whether a receiver will be 

appointed and the ultimate appointment of a receiver are necessarily intertwined. Accordingly, we 

find that we have jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s May 24 order granting the motion to 

appoint receiver. 

¶ 19 B. Appointment of a Receiver

¶ 20 The circuit court may appoint a receiver “ ‘based on its equity jurisdiction, to secure and 

preserve property for the benefit of all concerned, so that the property might be subjected to such 

an order as the court might render.’ ” City of Chicago v. Jewellery Tower, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 

201352, ¶ 47 (quoting Heritage Pullman Bank v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 

164 Ill. App. 3d 680, 687 (1987)). “ ‘The power to appoint a receiver is most usually called into 

action either to prevent fraud, save the subject of litigation from material injury, or rescue it from 

threatened destruction.’ ” Id. (quoting Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 

497-98 (1972)). The decision to appoint a receiver is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Leib v. Toulin, Inc., 113 Ill. App. 3d 707, 718 (1983); Prassas v. Nicholas W. Prassas & Co., 102 

Ill. App. 3d 319, 321 (1981); Poulakidas v. Charalidis, 68 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613 (1979). Whether a 

court abuses its discretion by appointing a receiver depends on the circumstances surrounding the 
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case. People ex rel. Fahner v. Community Hospital of Evanston, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1059 

(1982). 

¶ 21 The appointment of a receiver is a harsh remedy and should only be exercised “after the 

court has been convinced that such remedy is absolutely necessary to prevent irreparable losses.” 

Leib, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19. The standards by which the court’s appointment must be measured 

are “exceptionally stringent.” Poulakidas, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 614 (1979). “A court of equity has the 

power to appoint a receiver of a corporation only when conditions of dissension, dispute, fraud or 

mismanagement exist, which make it impossible for the business to continue or to preserve its 

assets.” Id. Dissension and dispute between the parties alone does not justify so drastic a remedy. 

Prassas, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 321. “It must be shown that the dissension or misconduct made it 

impossible for the business to continue to preserve its assets [citation] or created a danger that the 

property be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. “The appointment of a receiver is 

appropriate only in cases of urgent necessity where there is a present danger to the interests of the 

investors, consisting of a serious suspension of the business and an imminent danger of dissipation 

of the corporate assets.” Poulakidas, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 614. The remedy is warranted “only when 

there is no other adequate remedy or means of securing the desired result.” Lieb, 113 Ill. App. 3d 

at 720. 

¶ 22 Lukaszewicz argues the circuit court abused its discretion since it made no findings to 

satisfy the “stringent” standards for appointing a receiver. To support this contention, he relies on 

the lack of explicit findings in both the May 24 order granting Kodryan’s motion to appoint a 

receiver and the July 6 order appointing the receiver. Thus, he asserts “[t]he underlying record is 

*** entirely devoid of any such prerequisite findings.” This is accurate. However, the record before 

us is limited to what Lukaszewicz supplied. It is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively 
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demonstrate error from the record. In re Alexander R., 377 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557 (2007). The 

common law record here demonstrates that the parties thoroughly briefed their respective positions 

regarding the appointment of a receiver. The agreed statement of facts indicates counsel for each 

party participated in oral argument on the motion via the Zoom video conferencing application on 

May 24. The court decided the question and entered an order granting the motion to appoint a 

receiver the same day. With no transcript or bystander’s report of the May 24 proceeding, we are 

unable to determine whether the court made sufficient findings to warrant the appointment of a 

receiver. See Cannon v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 674, 685 (2003) (“Without 

the transcript, we are unable to discern the trial court’s reasoning and whether it abused its 

discretion.”). And we cannot presume that the court failed to make the requisite findings. To the 

contrary, we must presume the opposite. In the absence of a record demonstrating the existence of 

error, it will be presumed that the trial court acted in conformity with the law and that it had a 

sufficient factual basis for its rulings. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). 

¶ 23 Additionally, Lukaszewicz contends the court could not make sufficient findings to warrant 

the appointment of a receiver since neither of the parties testified, neither had been deposed, and 

the hearing on the matter consisted of argument without presentation of evidence. The record, 

however, does not indicate that Lukaszewicz objected to the court’s procedure on the motion to 

appoint receiver below. Objections to procedure cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 

Hargrove v. Gerill Corp., 124 Ill. App. 3d 924, 930 (1984). In addition, Lukaszewicz does not cite 

nor does our research reveal that any specified procedure is necessary before a court may appoint 

a receiver. We also note that relevant evidence was submitted to the court by affidavit, documents, 

and photographs attached to the pleadings. So, evidence was available in the record for the court 

to consider in its decision.
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¶ 24 Last, Lukaszewicz argues that available alternative measures could have been employed to 

accomplish the tasks the court assigned to the receiver. Specifically, Kodryan could have used 

discovery to ascertain the status of the company’s assets or sought an injunction to secure the 

retention of records. The mere existence of alternatives, however, does not render the court’s 

decision to appoint a receiver an abuse of discretion. Absent a showing that the court acted 

arbitrarily, unreasonably, failed to employ conscientious judgment, or ignored recognized 

principles of law, the fact that alternatives existed is virtually irrelevant. See In re Commissioner 

of Banks & Real Estate, 327 Ill. App. 3d 441, 476 (2001) (“An abuse of discretion exists where no 

reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court [citation], or where the trial 

court acts arbitrarily, fails to employ conscientious judgment, and ignores recognized principles of 

law. [Citation].”). Since Lukaszewicz has failed to make such a showing, we find this argument 

unpersuasive. 

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For these reasons, we find that Lukaszewicz has not shown the trial court abused its 

discretion by appointing a receiver. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

¶ 27 Affirmed.