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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 6, 2018

v No. 338014

Kent Circuit Court

DAVID MICHAEL STEWART, LC Nos. 15-010568-FH;

15-010820-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, David Michael Stewart, appeals as of right his convictions of two counts of 

violating the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., by willfully failing to 

register his residential address, contrary to MCL 28.729(1)(a). We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 2, 2015, defendant registered his residential address with the Kent County 

Sheriff’s Department (KCSD). The address he registered was that of a home owned by his sister 

on North Division in Sparta. According to defendant’s sister, defendant lived in that home in 

January 2015, but moved out by the end of June 2015. Defendant’s niece corroborated that 

story, testifying that she moved into the North Division home around July 4, 2015, and that 

defendant never lived at the address after she moved in. Defendant, moreover, testified that he 

actually moved out of that home in April 2015, and lived exclusively at a homeless shelter in 

Grand Rapids through October 2015. Both defendant’s sister and his niece encouraged 

defendant to register the address of the homeless shelter as his residential address, which 

defendant indicated an intent to do.

A KCSD deputy attempted to verify defendant’s residential address on several occasions 

between February 2015 and October 2015, and visited the home on North Division many times. 

When the deputy contacted defendant by telephone in July 2015, defendant stated that he was 

living at the North Division address. Yet when the deputy interviewed defendant’s sister and 

niece on September 8, 2015, he obtained information that defendant was not living there. 

On October 15, 2015, defendant was arrested and charged with one count of failing to 

register his residential address as a sex offender. Accordingly, his residential address was 

changed to that of the county jail until his release from incarceration on October 16, 2015. Upon 
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release, however, defendant re-registered his residential address as the home on North Division, 

despite not having lived in the home since April 2015. He was then charged with a second count 

of failing to register his residential address as a sex offender. As explanation for this failure, 

defendant testified that he attempted to register the address of the homeless shelter at both the 

city police department and county sheriff’s department, but that law enforcement would not 

allow him to do so.

Before trial, defendant sent the trial court a number of handwritten letters indicating that 

he was displeased with his court-appointed attorneys and asking the court for advice regarding 

whether he should opt to represent himself. Additionally, defendant’s second appointed counsel

John L. Grace, III, filed a pretrial motion to withdraw from the case, informing the court that 

defendant told him: “I do not recognize you as my lawyer anymore. That is all I have to say to 

you.” At the motion hearing, defendant reiterated his dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel, 

and again asked the court for advice regarding whether he should represent himself at trial. In 

response, the trial court asked appointed counsel if anyone else from the Kent County Defender’s

office could represent defendant, to which counsel answered that his director would not allow 

such a substitution. The court then advised defendant that his appointed counsel had been a 

zealous advocate throughout his career, asked defendant if he could afford to hire counsel 

himself, and ultimately concluded that the issue of defendant’s self-representation could be 

addressed following a status conference to give defendant additional time to consider 

cooperating with appointed counsel. 

Four months later, on the first day of trial, appointed counsel renewed the motion to 

withdraw, stating that defendant wished to represent himself. Addressing the request, the trial 

court engaged in the following colloquy with defendant:

The Court: Mr. Stewart, you’ve heard what I have. Let me just say this. 

Trials are conducted according to established rules of procedure and evidence. 

You don’t know those rules, and I don’t bend the rules simply because a person is 

unrepresented.

If you want to represent yourself, it has to be a clear and unambiguous 

desire on your part. I’ll still require [defense counsel] to stand by should you 

either change your mind or need some legal assistance. The decision is yours. 

Based on what your attorney told me, do you want [defense counsel] to represent 

you?

The Defendant: Not without a statement. I can’t proceed further down 

this venue without making a statement to clarify my position, and you’re telling 

me that’s not possible.

The Court: The question is simple. It’s not complex. Either he represents 

you, unqualified, or you, unqualified, say I don’t want him to represent me. Do 

you understand the question?

The Defendant: I understand the question, but it puts me in error to simply 

restate either yea or nay on that. I need to clarify my position first.
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The Court: At the end of your statement will you be able to say yea or 

nay, yes or no?

The Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: Let me read it. Give it to the deputy, and I’ll read it. 

The trial court reviewed and addressed each issue raised by defendant in his handwritten 

statement, including the sequestering of witnesses, the applicability of MRE 404(b), 

disqualification of the trial judge, denial of access to a law library while incarcerated, and 

defendant’s relationship with his appointed counsel. With regard to defendant’s relationship 

with counsel specifically, the court reiterated that Mr. Grace had always been prepared and 

professional throughout his career, and stated that defendant could contact the Kent County 

Defender’s office, but that: “They have a policy. They don’t do that. They don’t say if you 

don’t like Mr. Grace, I’m going to give you his colleague thus and so. They just don’t do that.” 

The trial court then returned to the question whether defendant wanted to represent himself:

The Defendant: Now, excuse me again. I can’t remember the question 

you just asked me.

The Court: Did you want to represent yourself or do you want [defense 

counsel] to represent you?

The Defendant: I’ll go with myself. 

Accepting defendant’s decision, the court asked appointed counsel to serve as standby counsel in 

the event that defendant should seek his assistance during trial. Defendant proceeded to 

represent himself throughout trial, and defense counsel remained available in the courtroom. 

After a four-day jury trial, the jury convicted defendant on both counts of willfully failing to 

register his residential address, as a sex offender, in violation of the SORA.

II. WAIVER OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Defendant first argues that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because the 

trial court never properly determined that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right.

A. PRESERVATION

Generally, “[f]or an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, 

addressed, and decided by the lower court.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 

376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). At trial, defendant requested the opportunity to represent 

himself, and the court allowed him to do so. And defendant never objected that he had been

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nor did defendant file a motion for an 

evidentiary hearing or a new trial raising this issue.

We hesitate, however, to hold that defendant failed to preserve his current Sixth 

Amendment challenge and apply plain-error review, because to do so would be an endorsement 

of the illogical requirement that an unrepresented defendant object to the waiver of counsel he 

may have made unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily. In any event, we need not decide 
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this issue, because as will be explained more fully below, no error occurred, plain or otherwise.1 

The court substantially complied with all requirements for determining that defendant properly 

waived his right to counsel.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing whether a defendant validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel, this Court engages in a de novo review of the entire record. People v Williams, 470 

Mich 634, 640; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). However, this Court will not disturb a trial court’s 

factual findings absent clear error. Id. “Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant’s level 

of comprehension, and the trial judge is in the best position to make this assessment.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, the meaning of the phrase “knowing and 

intelligent” is a question of law that this Court must review de novo. Id. “It is well established 

that a total or complete deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage of a criminal 

proceeding is a structural error requiring automatic reversal.” People v Willing, 267 Mich App 

208, 224; 704 NW2d 472 (2005).

C. ANALYSIS

As noted above, defendant asserts that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his 

right to counsel because the trial court failed to adequately warn him of the perils of selfrepresentation. 

The Supreme Court has described the right to self-representation as follows:

The right of self-representation under Michigan law is secured by both 

Constitution and statute. Const 1963, art 1, §13 reads: “A suitor in any court of 

this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper 

 1 We recognize that in People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283; 894 NW2d 72 (2016), 

overruled on other grounds by People v Arnold, 502 Mich 438 (2018), this Court determined that 

plain-error review applied to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal, where the 

defendant failed to raise the issue of improper waiver of the right to counsel in the trial court. 

However, as is the case here, the Campbell Court never actually had to apply plain-error review 

because it held that the trial court substantially complied with all requirements for determining 

that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Id. at 

287-288. Additionally, we note that in People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 114-128; 869 NW2d 829 

(2015), the Supreme Court applied plain-error review to a structural error, like the total 

deprivation of counsel would be, which generally requires automatic reversal, People v Willing, 

267 Mich App 208, 224; 704 NW2d 472 (2005). Cain is, however, distinguishable because it 

involved a challenge to the trial court’s failure to properly swear in the jury, Cain, 498 Mich at 

113-115, not a challenge to the proper waiver of counsel. There is a significant difference 

between requiring a defendant, whether represented or not, to object to a trial court’s failure to 

give jurors the proper oath, and requiring a defendant to object to his own potentially involuntary 

waiver of counsel.
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person or by an attorney”. MCLA 763.1; MSA 28.854 provides: “On the trial of 

every indictment or other criminal accusation, the party accused shall be allowed 

to be heard by counsel and may defend himself, and he shall have a right to 

produce witnesses and proofs in his favor, and meet the witnesses who are 

produced against him face to face”. The United States Supreme Court has held 

that this right is also implicitly guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. Faretta v California, 422 US 806; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 

562 (1975). None of these provisions, however, guarantees an absolute right to 

proceed to trial without counsel. [People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 366; 247 

NW2d 857 (1976).]

To exercise the right to self-representation, a defendant must waive his correlative Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. Thus, before a defendant may proceed in propria persona, the trial 

court must ensure that the following requirements are met:

First, the request must be unequivocal. This requirement will abort 

frivolous appeals by defendants who wish to upset adverse verdicts after trials at 

which they had been represented by counsel. This requirement of 

“unequivocality” is well established in the courts of this state and others . . . .

Second, once the defendant has unequivocally declared his desire to 

proceed pro se the trial court must determine whether defendant is asserting his 

right knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The trial court must make the pro 

se defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so 

that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is 

made with eyes open. Defendant’s competence is a pertinent consideration in 

making this determination. But his competence does not refer to legal skills, (f)or 

his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his 

knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.

The third and final requirement is that the trial judge determine that the 

defendant’s acting as his own counsel will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and 

burden the court and the administration of the court’s business. [Anderson, 398 

Mich at 367-368 (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).]

In addition, before allowing a defendant to waive his right to counsel, a trial court must 

satisfy the requirements of MCR 6.005(D), which provides:

(D) Appointment or Waiver of a Lawyer. If the court determines that the 

defendant is financially unable to retain a lawyer, it must promptly appoint a 

lawyer and promptly notify the lawyer of the appointment. The court may not 

permit the defendant to make an initial waiver of the right to be represented by a 

lawyer without first

(1) advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison 

sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and 

the risk involved in self-representation, and 
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(2) offering the defendant the opportunity to consult with a retained 

lawyer or, if the defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult with an

appointed lawyer.

“Proper compliance with the waiver of counsel procedures set forth by this Court is a 

necessary antecedent to a judicial grant of the right to proceed in propria persona. Proper 

compliance requires that the court engage, on the record, in a methodical assessment of the 

wisdom of self-representation by the defendant.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 

702, 720-721; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), abrogated in part on other grounds by Williams, 470 Mich 

at 641, n 7. Yet a trial court need only substantially comply with the requirements set forth in 

Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) before granting a defendant’s self-representation request. Adkins, 

452 Mich at 706. “Substantial compliance requires that the court discuss the substance of both 

Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) in a short colloquy with the defendant, and make an express 

finding that the defendant fully understands, recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of 

counsel procedures.” Id. at 726-727.

Initially we conclude that the trial court fully complied with MCR 6.005(D). As provided 

above, MCR 6.005(D)(1) requires that a trial court advise a defendant of the charge or charges 

against him, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offenses, and any mandatory 

minimum sentences required by law before allowing him to waive his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel. MCR 6.005(D)(1). Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to advise him of the 

maximum and minimum sentences he faced, but the record proves otherwise. At both the 

pretrial status conference and trial, the court informed defendant of his charges, and that he faced 

a maximum sentence of up to eight years in prison. And despite defendant’s argument to the 

contrary, MCR 6.005(D)(1) does not require a trial court to inform a defendant of the minimum 

sentence for a crime according to the sentencing guidelines; it only requires that a defendant be 

advised of any mandatory minimum sentence required by law. A violation of MCL 28.729(1)(a) 

does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence. Further, it is undisputed that the trial court 

complied with MCR 6.005(D)(2) when it required defendant’s appointed counsel to remain 

available throughout trial as standby counsel.

Looking next to the first Anderson requirement for properly waiving the right to counsel, 

Anderson, 398 Mich at 367, we have no doubt that defendant’s request to represent himself was 

unequivocal. Defendant sent multiple letters to the trial court expressing dissatisfaction with his 

appointed counsel2 and requesting advice regarding self-representation, and stated in one such 

letter: “If the honorable court finds that it cannot recommend a new public defender to take my 

case, then this letter will serve as my formal declaration of my intent to act as my own legal 

counsel. Effective immediately.” Further, despite (1) the court’s warning that the Kent County 

Defender’s office would likely be unwilling to provide defendant with different appointed 

counsel (his third), (2) that appointed counsel Mr. Grace was known by the court to have always 

 2 From the record, it appears that defendant was originally assigned a public defender who left 

the position and was ultimately replaced by Mr. Grace. Defendant’s first two letters to the court 

address his dissatisfaction with this original appointed counsel.
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zealously and professionally represented clients, and (3) that defendant lacked a formal legal 

education, defendant still chose to represent himself, and never wavered in that decision.

Further, on the basis of the entire record before us, Williams, 470 Mich at 640, we hold 

that the trial court also substantially complied with the second and third Anderson requirements. 

First, the record clearly demonstrates that the court adequately warned defendant of the dangers 

of self-representation, beyond simply advising defendant that proceeding in propria persona

would be perilous. See People v Blunt, 189 Mich App 643, 650; 473 NW2d 792 (1991) 

(“[W]hile the trial court advised [the] defendant that proceeding pro se was perilous, the trial 

court did not explain the risks which accompany self-representation.”). In a short colloquy with 

defendant, the court noted that he was not a lawyer, had no formal legal education, was 

unfamiliar with the rules of criminal trials, and would be held to those rules. Additionally, on 

both the first day of trial and at the pretrial hearing on appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, 

the court highlighted Mr. Grace’s vast experience in the legal field, as well as his 

professionalism and competence, thus making an obvious comparison to defendant between 

proceeding with and without counsel. As such, the trial court made defendant aware of the 

dangers of self-representation, and properly determined that defendant knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Anderson, 398 Mich at 367-368. 

Second, the court ensured that defendant’s self-representation would not burden or 

disrupt the proceedings. Id. at 368. As noted above, before accepting defendant’s decision to 

represent himself, the court addressed each issue raised by defendant in the handwritten 

statement he insisted the court read, including the sequestering of witnesses, the applicability of 

MRE 404(b), disqualification of the trial judge, and denial of access to the law library while 

incarcerated.

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Our conclusion is unaltered by the court’s failure to make an express finding on the 

record that defendant’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily given. See Adkins, 452 Mich at 726-727. As in People v Campbell, 

316 Mich App 279, 288; 894 NW2d 72 (2016), overruled on other grounds by People v Arnold, 

502 Mich 438 (2018), “[i]t is clear from the proceedings that the court endeavored to make the 

requisite determinations and that it actually found that [defendant’s] waiver was unequivocal, 

knowing, and voluntary.” 

We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that the trial court’s pretrial 

examination of his competency supports a determination that he did not validly waive his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. In Indiana v Edwards, 554 US 164; 128 S Ct 2379; 171 L Ed 2d 

345 (2008), the United States Supreme Court distinguished between a defendant’s competency to 

stand trial and his “mental capacity to conduct his trial defense” without counsel, id. at 174,

 3 We note that even during trial the trial court exhibited a great deal of patience with defendant as 

he proceeded in propria persona, pausing the proceedings when necessary to assist him with (1) 

giving an opening statement and closing argument, (2) conducting direct and cross-examination 

of witnesses, and (3) obtaining the presence of witnesses at trial who had not been disclosed or 

subpoenaed.
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stating that “[i]n certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy [the] mental 

competence standard [to stand trial], for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the 

same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense 

without the help of counsel,” id. at 175-176. 

The trial court did not examine defendant’s mental competency to represent himself at 

trial, despite the fact that it earlier found sufficient grounds to examine his mental competency to 

stand trial at all. However, Indiana does not require such an examination. Instead, the Indiana

Court simply concluded that “the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by 

counsel for those competent enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental 

illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” 

Id. at 177-178 (emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court accepted the parties’ stipulation that 

defendant was competent to stand trial on the basis of a competency report which stated that 

“[defendant] presented as a legally knowledgeable man who demonstrated a good understanding 

of the nature and object of the proceedings against him,” and “when considering all available 

information . . . [defendant] was not suffering from any mental condition that might be expected 

to interfere with his ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or 

assist rationally in his defense, should he decide to do so.”

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court substantially complied with both Anderson and 

MCR 6.005(D), and properly determined that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary 

waived his right to counsel. Thus, defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge fails.

III. TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT STIPULATION

Next, relying on Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172; 117 S Ct 644; 136 L Ed 2d 574 

(1997), and People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353; 572 NW2d 666 (1997), defendant argues that 

the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to accept the parties’ stipulation that he 

previously committed an offense subjecting him to the reporting and address-change 

requirements of the sex offender registry. Although we agree, we nonetheless conclude that the 

error was harmless.

Before trial, defendant objected to the statement in the proposed, preliminary jury 

instructions that he had been previously convicted of possession of child sexually abusive 

material. Defendant argued that MRE 404(b) required the prosecutor to “stand silent on that.” 

The trial court reviewed MRE 404(b) and noted that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 

may be admissible where that evidence is material. 

There can be no question that the name and nature of that prior conviction carried the risk 

of unfair prejudice to defendant because it could tempt jurors to engage in bad-character 

reasoning. However, in Swint, 225 Mich App at 379, this Court held that the trial court abused 

its discretion by refusing to accept the defendant’s stipulation, but that the preserved, 

nonconstitutional error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. 

The same is true here. The overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt overrode any potential

prejudice. Defendant registered his residential address with the KCSD in January 2015, when he 

moved in to his sister’s home on North Division, and conceded in his own testimony that he 

moved out of his sister’s home in April 2015, long before the charged offense date. And

defendant testified that he went to the city police department and the county sheriff’s department 
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in an attempt to change his address, which would have supported a jury finding that defendant 

knew he was required to register a change of residence. This evidence significantly hampers 

defendant’s argument that the jury convicted him only because they learned that he had 

previously been convicted of possessing child pornography. Furthermore, even if the identity of 

defendant’s prior conviction had been eliminated, the jury would still have been informed that 

defendant had previously been convicted of a sex offense that subjected him to the registration 

requirements of the SORA. Based upon a review of the whole record, then, we conclude that the 

trial court’s error in refusing to accept the parties’ stipulation was harmless.

IV. PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE

During his trial testimony, defendant attempted to admit into evidence an affidavit from 

his sister, who lives in Florida. The prosecutor objected to admission of the affidavit into 

evidence on several grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection on the basis of hearsay. 

In his Standard 4 brief, defendant argues this affidavit was new, credible, and material evidence 

that the prosecutor should have disclosed to the court and that should have led the prosecutor to 

remedy his convictions. In particular, defendant appears to quote portions of Rules 3.8(g) and 

(h) from the American Bar Association’s current Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Because 

this question was not raised below, our review is for plain error, affecting his substantial rights. 

People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We find no error, let alone plain 

error. The language from these ethical rules was only recently adopted in Michigan and will not 

become effective until January 1, 2019. See Administrative Order No. 2014-46, ___ Mich ___ 

(2018). Moreover, the rules impose post-conviction ethical obligations on prosecutors, not 

pretrial or trial obligations. And, contrary to defendant’s argument, the proposed evidence was 

disclosed to the trial court and, while potentially impeaching another witness’s testimony, it does 

not establish that defendant did not commit the offenses of which he was convicted.

Likewise, to the extent defendant’s Standard 4 brief raises a due process argument, 

relying on Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), plain-error 

review applies. Carines, 460 Mich at 774. “The Supreme Court of the United States held in 

Brady that ‘the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective 

of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ ” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 149; 845 

NW2d 731 (2014), quoting Brady, 373 US at 87. “[T]he components of a ‘true Brady violation,’ 

are that: (1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) 

that is material.” Chenault, 495 Mich at 150. Here, defendant obtained his sister’s affidavit and, 

although the prosecution objected to its admission, it never suppressed it. Accordingly, 

defendant’s Brady argument fails, as does any due process argument defendant has attempted to 

assert.

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 4 Defendant also argues that the certified copy of his sex offender registry listed both the North 

Division address and the homeless shelter address. Defendant complains that this evidence was 

not made available to him in his first request for transcripts but came with his second request for 

transcripts. However, the jury was provided with plaintiff’s exhibit and had that information 

before it when it decided that defendant violated the registration requirements of the SORA. 
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V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Finally, defendant argues that his convictions are invalid because he received the 

ineffective assistance of counsel. To preserve an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must file a motion in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, People v 

Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012), or file a timely motion to remand in this 

Court, see People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 444-445; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Defendant did not 

move for a new trial, an evidentiary hearing, or remand. Therefore, defendant’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel argument is unpreserved for appellate review.

“The question whether defense counsel performed ineffectively is a mixed question of 

law and fact; this Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact and reviews de 

novo questions of constitutional law.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 47; 826 NW2d 136 

(2012). Where an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge is unpreserved, our review is 

limited to errors apparent in the record. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 

656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that defense 

counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms, 

and that, but for counsel’s error, it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have been 

different. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 

(1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Effective assistance 

of counsel is presumed, People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012), and a 

defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise, People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 17; 776 

NW2d 314 (2009). In doing so, a defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the 

challenged conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 

361, 385-386, 386 n 7; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). A defendant can only overcome the presumption 

by showing that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the failure was prejudicial to 

defendant. People v Hampton, 176 Mich App 383, 385; 439 NW2d 365 (1989). Counsel’s 

performance must be measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, People v Payne, 

285 Mich App 181, 188, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009), and without benefit of hindsight, People v 

LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995). 

With regard to that portion of the proceedings in which defendant represented himself, 

defendant cannot assert he received the ineffective assistance of counsel:

[A] defendant who exercises the free choice to represent himself faces certain 

consequences:

The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the 

courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural 

and substantive law. Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on 

appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain 

that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of 

counsel. [People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 419; 639 NW2d 291 (2001) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).]
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Therefore, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument is limited to the period leading 

up to trial, when he was represented by court-appointed counsel.

Defendant first argues that his initial, court-appointed attorney disappeared and that he 

was never told what happened to that attorney. However, defendant was provided with substitute 

counsel from the Kent County Defender’s office when his first counsel was unable to continue 

the representation. Therefore, defendant cannot demonstrate the ineffective assistance of counsel 

with regard to his first appointed counsel’s representation. Defendant admits that he met with his 

second, court-appointed attorney, nine months before trial, and that he initially agreed to allow 

his second attorney to represent him. However, defendant argues that there was a lack of 

“cohesive liaison” between him and his second appointed counsel. Defendant complains that his 

second appointed counsel was unresponsive to his important pleas for assistance, and that his

requests for help fell on deaf ears. With regard to both attorneys, defendant identifies no action 

or inaction on the part of his attorneys that could qualify as the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Nor does defendant argue that his attorneys should have pursued a particular pretrial motion,

interviewed a particular witness, or explored a particular defense. Defendant simply does not 

identify any action or inaction on the part of his attorneys that could qualify as objectively 

unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 US at 688, 694. 

Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on these grounds.

Furthermore, in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

demonstrate that, but for counsel’s error, it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have 

been different. See Id. Defendant cannot make that showing. Defendant admitted in his own 

testimony that he moved out of his sister’s house, his registered residential address, in April 

2015. In addition, his sister and his niece testified that he did not live at the registered residential 

address during the time period in question. Combined with admission of the certified copy of 

defendant’s sex offender registration records, showing the residential address that defendant 

registered with law enforcement, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case 

would have been different because of something that defendant’s appointed counsel did or failed 

to do before trial.5

 5 Defendant briefly argues in his Standard 4 brief that his conviction was based on insufficient 

evidence. However, defendant’s argument is confined to a single clause of a single sentence: 

“conviction based on insufficient evidence violates the U.S. Constitution.” Defendant provides 

no further argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. “It is not 

sufficient for a party simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this 

Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his 

arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v 

Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In 

any event, viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was 

sufficient evidence to support his convictions.
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Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Anica Letica