II-O0018

From:

Sent:

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Cc:

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Attach:

Battle, Ann M. <Ann.Battle@sutherland.com>

Thursday, October 21, 2010 12:30 PM

OTCDefinitions <OTCDefinitions@CFTC.gov>

John T Hyland <johnthyland@towerhousecapital.com>; Nicholas Gerber

<ngerber@unitedstatesoilfund.com>; howard@unitedstatesoilfund.com; Cain,

James <j ames.cain@sutherland.com>; Davis, Warren

<warren. davis@sutherland.com>

United States Commodity Funds -- Comments to Position Limits and Definition

of Maj or Swap Participant

USCF Comments to Position Limits in Dodd-Frank.PDF

On behalf of our client, United States Commodity Funds, LLC, attached please find a comment letter addressing

the implementation of position limits and the definition of "major swap participant" under Dodd-Frank.

Regards,

Ann

Ann Battle I Associate

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP

1275 Pennsylvania Avenue NW I Washington, DC 20004-2415

202.383.0842 direct I 202.637.3593 facsimile

ann.battle@sutherland.com I www.sutherland.com

*Admitted in Georgia. Practicing under the supervision of D.C. Bar members pending application to the D.C. Bar.

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October 21, 2010

VIA E-MAIL

Mr. David Stawick

Secretary

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Three Lafayette Centre

1155 21st Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20581

Advance Comments on Position Limits and the Definition of "Major Swap

Participant" Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act

Dear Mr. Stawick:

We are submitting this letter on behalf of United States Commodity Funds LLC

("USCF"), a commodity pool operator registered with the Commodity Futures Trading

Commission (the "CFTC" or the "Commission"), that manages several exchange traded

commodity pools, including the United States Oil Fund, LP ("USO") and the United States

Natural Gas Fund, LP ("UNG"). USCF previously provided comments to the Commission

concerning position limits on certain energy contracts in connection with the CFTC’s Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking entitled: Federal Speculative Position Limits for Referenced Energy

Contracts and Associated Regulations ("Proposed Rule"). The Proposed Rule was recently

retracted by the Commission in response to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform

and Consumer Protection Act (the "Act"). Section 737 in Title VII of the Act gave the

Commission a broad mandate to impose position limits (the "Dodd-Frank Position Limits") on a

much wider scope of products than those covered by the Proposed Rule. USCF believes that its

comments on the Proposed Rule remain applicable to the position limits to be imposed by the

Commission under the Act. As a result, USCF now resubmits its comments regarding position

limits in substantially the same form as previously provided to the Commission. USCF’s

responses to selected questions posed by the CFTC in the Proposed Rule (which responses were

included with USCF’s original comments) are attached hereto as Appendix A. USCF would also

like to take this opportunity to comment on the definition of "major swap participant" under the

Act.

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 2

We continue to believe that the ability of USCF (and other firms that manage similar

publicly traded, un-levered, passive commodity funds) to prudently meet the investment

objectives of the commodity pools that it manages will likely be significantly hampered by the

imposition of restrictive limits. We also believe that the significant additional regulatory

requirements to which USCF and the Funds would be subject if USCF or any of the Funds are

deemed to be "major swap participants" under the Act would similarly hamper the ability of

USCF to efficiently meet the Funds’ investment objectives. As a result, and more importantly,

the value of the exchange traded pools managed by USCF to the hundreds of thousands of

investors in our pools, and the several million investors in all similar pools currently in operation

in the United States, could be adversely affected by both (1) the adoption of the Dodd-Frank

Position Limits and (2) classification of USCF as a major swap participant under the Act.

We note that, other than with respect to restrictive position limits and the potential

regulation of firms that manage publicly traded, un-levered, passive commodity funds as major

swap participants, we are in favor of and support the Act and its new regulatory regime. We are

specifically not opposed to the provisions of the Act that (1) require clearing, (2) limit leverage

through margin requirements and (3) create transparency through reporting requirements. We

believe that these requirements will improve the integrity and stability of the United States

financial markets.

Position Limits. With respect to position limits, our comments below elaborate on our

statements above regarding the effect in general that position limits will have on publicly traded,

un-levered, passive commodity funds and specifically address the following key points:

We are of the view that position limits should be imposed on the persons or entities

whose investment decisions cause the purchase or sale of a future or swap governed by

the limits, ha the case of USCF and the Funds, that would be the Funds’ individual

investors.

9449644.8

To the extent position limits are imposed above the individual investor level,

position limits should be imposed at the fund level and not the passive advisor level.

USCF and other firms that manage similar publicly traded, un-levered, passive

commodity funds do not enter into transactions for their own account but instead invest

on behalf of the commodity funds they manage. These passive managers do not assume

any of the credit risk associated with the funds’ positions and, unlike active fund

managers, do not even make any of the investment decisions for the funds they manage.

ha a colloquy on July 15, 2010, Senator Blanche Lincoln, the Chairperson of the Senate’s

Agriculture Committee, supported our position when she noted that "it may not be

appropriate to aggregate the positions of entities advised by the same advisor where such

entities have different and systemically determined investment objectives." It is the

individual investors in the passive commodity funds who actually make the buy/sell

decisions resulting in the purchase or sale of commodity futures contracts. Accordingly,
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 3

we believe that it makes the most sense to impose position limits at the individual

investor level but, to the extent the limits are imposed at a higher level, the limits should

be at the fund level. Each fund managed by USCF is a separate legal entity with separate

investors and separate investment objectives. Aggregating the positions held by these

separate funds would not do anything to protect the commodity markets or the overall

f’mancial system.

Position limits should apply to aggregate positions maintained across different types

of transactions. The CFTC should set aggregate limits for positions maintained in

exchange traded futures contracts and clearable trades, as opposed to separate limits for

each type of transaction. Otherwise, a derivatives market participant that only maintains

positions in one type of transaction would not be able to enter into as many transactions

as a derivatives market participant who maintains positions in different types of

transactions.

Finally, we also believe that the CFTC should gather more information about the size of

the OTC market and the effects of position limits on excessive speculation before setting position

limits. At this point, the exact size of the OTC derivatives market is unknown but it is estimated

that the aggregate notional amount of OTC derivative transactions outstanding in 2008 and 2009

was $600 trillion. ~ Reporting requirements under the Act will enable the Commission to obtain a

better picture of the size and the types of trades outstanding in the OTC derivatives market. In

addition, the Act requires the CFTC to consult with designated contract markets to study the

effects of position limits on excessive speculation and migration of capital to trading venues

abroad.2 We believe that the Commission’s analysis of the market information it will obtain

through these reporting requirements and this study is a crucial first step that the Commission

must take before it can effectively set any meaningful position limits.

Major Swap Participant. We believe that the Commission should adopt regulations

confirming that USCF and other firms that manage similar publicly traded, un-levered, passive

commodity funds should not be regulated as "major swap participants." For the same reasons

discussed herein with respect to position limits for publicly traded, un-levered, passive

commodity funds, the phrase "substantial position" as it is used in the definition of "major swap

participant," should be measured at the individual investor level and not at the fund level.

Alternatively, the Commission should clarify by regulation that the futures contracts invested in

by USCF and other publicly traded, un-levered, passive commodity funds are not the types of

transactions that Congress intended to be included in the calculation of whether a person

maintains a "substantial position" in swaps and is, as a result, subject to increased regulation as a

major swap participant. In addition, with respect to the phrase "substantial counterparty

~ See Congressional Record at S.5878 (July 15, 2010).

-’ See §719(a) of the Act.

94-¢9644,8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 4

exposure" as it is used in the second prong of the "major swap participant" definition, the

Commission should take into account the fact that USCF’s positions are all fully collateralized

and USCF therefore does not create counterparty exposure, let alone substantial counterparty

exposure. Finally, we believe it is legally incompatible with the intent of the regulations for the

passive manager of a family of publicly listed investment funds to be deemed a "major swap

participant" because in all cases of which we are aware, the passive manager is not itself a party

to any swaps.

I. Description of USCF and its Related Funds

a. Structure

As a registered commodity pool operator, USCF is general partner or sponsor of and

manages the United States Oil Fund, LP, the United States Natural Gas Fund, LP, the United

States 12 Month Oil Fund, LP, the United States 12 Month Natural Gas Fund, LP, the United

States Gasoline Fund, LP, the United States Heating Oil Fund, LP, the United States Short Oil

Fund, LP, the United States Brent Oil Fund, LP, and the United States Commodity Index Fund

(each, a "Fund" and collectively, the "Funds"). Each of the Funds is an exchange traded

commodity pool that principally invests in futures contracts for commodities with the investment

objective of having the net asset value ("NAV") of the units of each Fund reflect changes in

percentage terms of the price of a given commodity futures contract.3 The specific commodity

focus and investment strategy of each Fund varies; however, the structure and method of

investing in all of USCF’s Funds are nearly identical.4 Units of each of the Funds are listed on

the NYSE Arca, Inc. ("NYSE Arca"). Publicly listed investment pools such as ours, and those

operated by other passive managers, are frequently referred to as "commodity ETFs," although

such a description is not technically correct.5

Each of the Funds has thousands of investors (for example, USO and UNG had,

respectively, over 300,000 and 400,000 investors during the course of 2009)6 and no investor, to

the Funds’ knowledge, has ever held more than 5% of the units outstanding of any Fund, other

than a handful of occasions typically during the period when a Fund initially offers its units to

3 United States Commodity Index Fund is slightly different than the rest of USCF’s Funds, in that it uses an index of

commodities as its benchmark rather than a single commodity futures contract.

4 Although it operates in a similar fashion as the other Funds, USCI is structured as a statutory trust rather than a

limited partnership, which is the structure used for each of USCF’s other Funds.

5 ETFs are considered to be exchange traded vehicles that are registered with the U.S. Securities Exchange

Commission ("SEC") under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"), while the "commodity ETFs" are

generally registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").

6 According to data compiled in connection with providing Internal Revenue Service Schedule K- 1 tax tbrms.

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 5

the public and has few investors.7 Based on discussions with other managers of similar passive

commodity funds, we estimate that the total number of individual "retail" investors in the United

States who hold investments in such exchange traded commodity funds is between 3,000,000

and 4,000,000 based on 2009 totals.

b. Investment Objective

The objective of the Funds is generally to allow both retail and institutional investors to

easily gain exposure to the commodity markets in a cost-effective manner. Commodity prices

impact all investors either directly or indirectly and there has been a growing appreciation by

investors that it may be appropriate to address the escalation and volatility of commodity prices

through participation in the financial markets. Investors have several avenues of participation,

including directly buying and selling exchange traded futures contracts, ff each of the Funds’

investors individually elected to gain exposure to the commodity markets through the purchase

and sale of exchange traded commodity futures contracts, the Dodd-Frank Position Limits would

be of little consequence because it is extremely doubtful that any Fund investor would ever hold

enough futures contracts to be impacted by the Dodd-Frank Position Limits.s Thus, it is solely

because such investors seek to obtain their financial exposure to the commodity markets

collectively in a simpler, unleveraged and economically efficient manner through the Funds that

they will likely suffer adverse effects from adoption of the Dodd-Frank Position Limits.

The Funds have directly made the case to the Commission that the Funds’ collective

investments in futures contracts have not in fact contributed to either the volatility or run ups (or

run downs) in energy prices experienced over the last several years.9 Perhaps this explains why

in its Proposed Rule the Commission repeatedly made the point that it was not required to base

its position limits on a finding that the positions of a certain size constitute excessive speculation

that create an actual burden on interstate commerce.|° Rather, the Commission stated that it

"may make and promulgate such rules and regulations that in its judgment are reasonably

necessary to accomplish any of the purposes of the [Commodity Exchange Act].’’~ Any

7 Since each of the Funds are registered under the 1934 Act, investors holding 5% or more of a Fund’s units are

required to disclose their holdings and intentions under Section 13 of the 1934 Act.

~ Although it is theoretically possible that the positions of a single investor in one of the Funds could breach the

limits set out in the Proposed Rule, this has not occurred to date and we believe mechanisms could be put in place

that would assure that any investor in the Funds whose positions could breach the limits would be identified.

~ See USCF Comment Letter to the CFTC’s Concept Release on Whether to Eliminate the Bona Fide Hedge

Exemption tbr Certain Swap Dealers and Create a New Limited Risk Management Exemption From Speculative

Position Limits, 74 FR 12282 (March 24, 2009), filed June 16, 2009: Testimony of John Hyland, Chief Investment

Officer of USCF, betbre the CFTC on August 5, 2009.

~o See, e.g., Proposed Rule, 75 FR 4144, at 4148 (January 26, 2010).

9449644,8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 6

questions that may have existed regarding the legal authority asserted by the Commission for the

Proposed Rule have been made moot by the Act. However, we still believe the Commission

cannot escape the question of whether it is wise or appropriate for it to adopt rules that will

interfere with the ability of ordinary citizens to gain exposure to our energy markets in a cost

effective and efficient manner. The mere fact the Commission must adopt position limits

pursuant to the Act does not mean that such action should be taken in an overly restrictive

fashion.

II. Comments on Position Limits

a. Rationales for Position Limits

We believe that there are essentially four reasons why position limits might be justifiably

imposed on market participants (outside of the limits traditionally put in place during the final

days before expiration of futures contracts when delivery becomes an issue). However, none of

these reasons appears to provide a viable rationale for imposing position limits on publicly

traded, non-leveraged, passive commodity investment funds.

Settlement Risk. The first reason for imposing position limits on market participants is to

avoid a situation in which an unusually large owner of futures contracts becomes a settlement

risk to the futures contracts’ exchange clearing house. This could occur if a large entity took a

position, long or short, that went against it in such a fashion that it was unable to post additional

margin to cover such position, or the entity in fact went bankrupt. This scenario in turn could

force the entity’s futures commission merchant ("FCM") to have to make good on the open

positions of the failed entity. It is possible that this scenario could precipitate the failure of the

FCM, which in turn would place the cost of the open positions onto the clearing house and its

members. The level of settlement risk presented in this scenario, however, is different depending

on the type of entity holding large positions.

As an example, let us assume there are four types of potential very large holders of

futures contracts. Our entities for this example are the following:

1)

2)

A hedge fund or other purelyfinancial investmentfirm. Such a firm would often use very

large amounts of leverage (10 times or more), take a meaningful price risk in its

investments in futures contracts, and have a highly liquid, but small, capital base.

A large bank or investment bank that acts as a dealer in both fitmres and commodi&

related swaps. Such an entity would also be highly levered (10 times or more), would not

always be taking a price risk with its positions in futures contracts since it would

sometimes be acting as an intermediary, and would have a relatively large capital base

that would be a mixture of liquid and illiquid holdings.

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 7

3) A large commodity end-user, producer, or dealer in the physical commodity. Such a fu’m

would typically, but not always, be hedging its price exposure, would have lower levels

of leverage, and might have a large but very illiquid capital base.

4) An exchange traded commodity fimd ("commodity ETF"). Such a fund would typically

be un-levered, would not itself be taking any price risk since it is a passive index-like

vehicle (although its individual investors would be taking price risk), and would have a

very large and very liquid capital base.

In the above examples, the biggest candidate for settlement risk is #1, the hedge fund, and

the lowest risk is #4, the commodity ETF. However, the position limits in the Proposed Rule

would have essentially put both the highest and lowest risk participants (#1 and #4, respectively)

in the same and most restrictive category in terms of limits on holdings. However, the Proposed

Rule would have allowed the second riskiest category, the dealer (entity #2), to hold twice as

many futures contracts as the least risky category (entity #4) under that proposal. Finally, the

third riskiest category, the commodity end-user (entity #3), would have been essentially allowed

unlimited holdings.~2

Market Manipulation. The second rationale for the limits is to prevent illegal

manipulation in the markets by a large holder of contracts, i.e., to prevent some sort of "corner"

of the market or other manipulative operation. As major investors on behalf of hundreds of

thousands of shareholders in USCF’ s commodity ETFs we are certainly in favor of protecting the

markets we invest in against such manipulation. However, we fail to see how such a concern is

properly addressed by placing position limits on publicly traded, passive, un-levered funds such

as ours.

The history of the commodity markets suggests that three elements are usually present

when a person or firm sets out to deliberately manipulate the market. First, they need secrecy,

given that if everybody knows what they are doing they will not succeed. Second, they need

leverage, since in any large commodity market an entity’s ability to influence prices with

certainty will usually be limited to small amounts and for short periods of time. Finally, they

almost certainly need to be able to participate in BOTH the futures market and the physical

market, because we believe solely using futures contracts does not provide these bad actors with

an adequate tool to create the artificial price necessary to implement their plan.

Based on these three identified elements, and using the same four potential categories of

very large holders that we postulated above, we believe that the category that has the greatest

~2 We believe that the common argument that commodity end-users and producers represent the lowest risk category

is refuted by the numerous problems caused in the financial commodity markets by these types of entities, including:

Sumitomo Corporation, Metallgesellschaft Corporation, China Aviation Oil, the Hunt brothers, and the Chinese

State Reserve Bureau, all of whom were physical players in commodities as well as users of futures contracts).

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 8

potential for manipulative abuse is category #3, a large physical player who also uses futures. ~3

The second most likely candidate is #2, the bank or investment bank, with #1, the hedge fund, a

distant third.14 The least likely candidate is #4, the commodity ETF, since they are typically too

transparent, too un-levered, and too tied to their benchmark or index to be a remotely plausible

candidate.

Reduction of Volatility. The third rationale is that the Commission desires to reduce the

average amount of price volatility in various commodity markets. Technically we understand

that the Commission refers to this as taking action to "...diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive

speculation .... "However, it is unclear what the phrase "excessive speculation" really means in this

context. We have not seen a precise definition of what excessive speculation really is or how the

Commission measures it. For the purposes of this comment letter we will view the purpose as an

attempt to reduce the average amount of price volatility of a particular commodity over some period

of time. That still leaves the issue of how to determine what is the normal or "correct" level of price

volatility, a problem that we will not attempt to resolve in this letter.

The concern we have with imposing position limits on publicly listed, passive, un-levered

commodity funds is that the empirical evidence suggests that in doing so the Commission will not

obtain a reduction in price volatility. In fact, the Commission is more likely to create in increase in

price volatility. The recent price movements in crude oil between 2007 to 2010, for example, the

reports of the CFFC’s own staff,~5 the studies done by recognized energy market academics,16 and

the data published by firms such as ours, IV all make clear that financial investors in general, and

commodity ETFs in particular, tended to be net sellers of crude oil futures contracts during the mid2007 to mid-2008 run up in oil prices, were net buyers of contracts during the fall in oil prices

between mid-2008 and early 2009, and have once again been net sellers in the more recent rise in

crude oil prices between early 2009 and early 2010. If the Commission presumes that large scale

buying and selling of futures contracts can directly influence the price of the spot commodity, which

is itself a highly debated point, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the actions of

13 As previously noted, we believe that the common argument that commodity end-users and producers represent the

lowest risk category is refuted by the numerous problems caused in the financial commodity markets by these types

of entities, including: Sumitomo Corporation, Metallgesellschaft Corporation, China Aviation Oil, the Hunt

brothers, and the Chinese State Reserve Bureau, all of whom were physical players in commodities as well as users

of futures contracts).

1~ In the example given, the hedge fund is not a large risk to manipulate a commodity market because it is generally

not long or short physical supply and thus it is unlikely to be able to influence spot prices or, on a risk tree basis,

move the futures curve. The same line of argument applies to USCF’s Funds and other commodity ETFs that

operate in a similar fashion.

15 See, e.g., Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets (July 2008) ("Interagency Commodity Markets Study")

and CFFC Trader Activity and Derivative Pricing (December 4, 2008) ("CFFC Pricing Study").

16 See, e.g., Philip K. Verleger, Jr., Stephen Craig Pirrong, Dwight R. Sanders and Scott H. Irwin, among others.

~7 See infra pp. 17-20 and accompanying notes.

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 9

commodity ETFs over the last three years have been to moderate volatility in crude oil prices, not

increase it.

By comparison, many of the claims made by proponents of position limits in general, and

position limits on passive, non-levered investors in particular, lack any serious analysis or

justification. Typically the "data" that supports these claims consists of saying that on a particular

date a fund did "A", and the markers or prices did "X", thus "proving" that the fund’s action caused

the described outcome. However, all the claims we have seen appear to have engaged in selective

data cherry picking. They don’t seem to mention that perhaps a month earlier than the above example

the fund also did "A", but the market or prices did "Y", not "X." Or that a week after the fund did

"A" the market or prices did "X" while the fund took no actions at all. Other common claims are

rooted in this logical fallacy of confusing correlation with causality ("cum hoc ergo propter hoc").

A common claim of this sort is "Commodity prices rose over the last 5 years while passive

investments rose over the last 5 years. Ergo, passive investments caused commodity prices to

rise." Leaving aside the statistical issue of "auto-correlation" in the example just cited, the

CFTC’s own staff rejected this claim in several of its reports as have studies by the commodity

futures exchanges and many notable economists.~8

The foregoing is not to suggest that other types of major market participants have a similar

effect on commodity prices. The data we have seen and cited refers to the impact on markets of

publicly traded, passive, and un-levered commodity funds. We cannot comment on the usefulness of

position limits on other types of market participants in regards to attempting to lower price volatility.

However, we would note that the United Kingdom’s financial markets regulator, the Financial

Services Authority ("FSA"), recently cast serious doubts on the usefulness of position limits to

moderate price volatility. In its white paper dated December 2009 and titled "Reforming OTC

Derivatives Markets - AUK perspective" ("FSA White Paper"), the FSA stated the following:

In any event, we do not believe a case has been made which demonstrates that

prices of commodities, or other financial derivatives, can be effectively controlled

through the mandatory operation of regulatory tools such as position limits,

whether on exchange or OTC. Analysis of market data where position limits are

already in use suggests that this has not shown a reduction in volatility or

absolute price movements compared to contracts where they are not. 19

We are unaware of any evidence or studies that would lead us to contradict the FSA’s

conclusion.

~s See supra notes 13-14.

~9 FSA White Paper, at chapter 9.

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 10

Price Setting. The fourth and final rationale is to set prices at some level that the

Commission determines is desirable. However, the Commission and the individual

Commissioners have made clear that they do not view their roll as that of a "price setting"

agency. In addition, if you accept the conclusion of the FSA cited above, it appears that even an

attempt to be a price setting body is destined to fail.

For example, the managers of USCF believe that the prices of crude oil is determined

primarily by the interplay of supply, demand, available inventory, the value of the U.S. dollar

(the currency crude oil is priced in), and amount of spare production capacity that exists at any

point in time. The CFTC’s own studies, including the Interagency Commodity Markets Study

and the CFTC Pricing Study, make clear that these fundamentals, not speculation, drove prices

during the 2008 run-up in commodity prices, including not only crude oil and other commodities

for which listed futures contracts exist but also for commodities for which no futures market

exists.

In particular, we would encourage observers to study Figure 10 on page 56 of the CF-FC

Pricing Study. It makes very clear that at all times during 2007 and 2008 when oil prices were

high that spare oil production capacity was essentially zero (the chart actually measures all spare

capacity except for Saudi Arabia, however, published reports in early and mid 2008 suggest that

essentially Saudi Arabia had little or no spare capacity at that time for light, sweet crude oil).2°

Our own belief is that, regardless of CFTC or FSA actions, market fundamentals will determine

prices. Should global crude oil spare capacity again approach zero in the near future we can

foresee that oil prices will in fact once again rise to record levels. We do not foresee position

limits having any meaningful impact on that possibility.

b. Aggregation Issues with respect to "Person"

1. "Look-Through" and Passive Investment Funds

Even if the Commission believes that position limits on commodity futures contracts

would have a positive effect on the financial energy markets, we question why the position limits

in the Commission’s Proposed Rule did not provide for a "look-through" to the actual investors

in entities such as the Funds, and hope that the Commission will reconsider this issue when

implementing the Dodd-Frank Position Limits. This would be a more rational approach because

it is the Funds’ investors and not the Funds themselves that are in fact making the buy/sell

decisions resulting in the purchase or sale of commodity futures contracts. In this context, the

Funds are "aggregators but not actors" from an investment standpoint. Placing limits on the

futures contract positions owned by passive entities like the Funds will not curtail investor

interest in the financial commodity markets. To the contrary, all available evidence points to

20 See International Energy Agency Monthly Oil Report (May 13, 2008).

9449644,8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 11

growing investor interest in gaining exposure to these markets because such investment provides

a prudent means of balancing an investor portfolio. As a result, limiting the Funds’ ability to

meet investor demand for exposure to financial commodity markets may force investors into less

transparent mechanisms for hedging their commodity-related and other investment risks.

As noted above, to our knowledge all publicly traded, passive, and un-levered energy

commodity funds are registered under the 1934 Act. As such, any investor with large holdings of

shares or units, in excess of 5% of a particular fund’s outstanding shares, is required to notify the

SEC, through a public filing, of its ownership interest in the fund.2~ Thus it would be very easy

for the CFTC to monitor individuals or firms that invest indirectly through the funds into the

commodity markets at very large levels. However, we would observe that we have rarely seen

any such filings for any of our large funds. In the case of USO for example, it has been almost

four years since any investor filed a Form 13G indicating that it owned 5% or more of USO. At

that time, USO was in fact quite small (assets of $10 million). As was pointed out during

testimony on behalf of USCF in the August 2009 CFTC hearings on these topics, we believe that

investors interested in taking very large positions in the commodity markets would typically not

elect to use what is essentially a retail product. To be blunt, they are not willing to "pay retail" in

terms of the cost of using a fund such as ours versus directly buying futures contracts or overthe-counter ("OTC") swaps.

If the CFTC wished to be able to see investors who hold sizable amounts of indirect

exposure to the commodity futures markets via exchange traded funds, but were still under the

5% limits, we believe that could be accomplished relatively easily with minimal costs to

investors, exchanges, broker-dealers, or fund operators. The broker-dealers who buy and sell

shares of exchange traded commodity funds for clients are already required to report the names

and holdings of clients at the end of each year to those commodity funds that elect limited

partnership tax treatment so that the funds may send out tax reporting statements (many, if not

all, exchange traded commodity funds are partnerships for tax purposes). Thus, the mechanism is

already in place for surveillance on a once a year basis. If the CFTC wished to have more

frequent reporting of ownership information, we believe that likely would entail a discussion

between the CFTC and the SEC. However, given the SEC’s current reporting regime and the

proposal for large trader reporting noted above, such additional reporting is reasonably possible.

Although broker-dealers are typically only required to submit the holdings data of their clients to

the funds for tax reporting purposes after the close of the calendar year, in fact the major brokerdealers report the data pretty much on a monthly basis already. As a result we think that creating

~-~ See 1934 Act Rule 13-al. In addition, we note that institutional investment managers having investment

discretion over accounts with securities valued at $100,000,000 are required to report each calendar quarter their

equity holdings in such publicly traded funds. See 1934 Act Rule 13f-l. Finally, we note that the SEC recently

proposed a rule to require certain large traders to report aggregate trades above certain trading levels established by

the SEC. See SEC Release No. 34-619086 (April 14, 2010).

9449644.8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

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a workable "look-through" system in real time would be doable using existing systems in place

at the broker-dealers.

2. Passive Investment Managers

We would further comment on the notion of aggregation when discussing position limits

and publicly listed, passive and un-levered commodity funds such as the Funds. When

calculating position limits, to the extent separate, publicly listed funds with separate investors

happen to maintain positions in the same commodities, we do not think that any actual regulatory

benefit will come from aggregating the holdings of such funds merely because they have the

same passive manager. The material point here is that the funds are distinct legal entities and

designed to track different benchmarks or investment objectives and, accordingly, the passive

manager of each fund is not making any investment decisions.

We believe our view is logical because the case of a passive investment manager running

two or more funds with separate investors and separate investment objectives is not comparable

to an active manager with investment discretion running two or more funds. Unlike in the case

of an active manager, USCF and other passive managers do not have any discretion with respect

to the commodities positions held by each fund they manage. Alternatively, the commodity

positions of these funds are determined based on an established methodology for each fund and

the buy/sell decisions of each fund’s investors. Aggregating position limits across the passive

funds managed by the same passive manager could actually have a negative impact on the

financial system to the extent that it causes the manager to have to move investments to

unregulated and/or foreign markets.

As an example, assume that there are two separate listed commodity funds that both own

futures contracts in commodity X. Both funds have different shareholders, different investment

objectives or index benchmarks, and buy and sell independent of each other. However, in this

example we will state they have the same passive manager whose job it is to run the funds

according to their differing investment objectives. So the passive manager is not in the same

situation as a hedge fund manager who runs two different hedge funds. The passive manager is

"an aggregator, but not an actor." As stated before, for investment decision making purposes the

"actors" are the thousands or hundred of thousands of investors.

Further assume that each of this passive manager’s commodity funds owns 60% of the

appropriate position limit. If we had a situation where the CFTC indicated, due to aggregation,

that the two funds could no longer own the number of contracts they have, this would create a

number of potential negative outcomes for the shareholders that could lead to higher cost, greater

risks, or less desirable tracking of the investment objective or benchmark.

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Alternatively in this scenario, the passive sponsor could just sell the management of the

second fund to a passive competitor who has no exposure to commodity X. In that situation we

would have the exact same shareholders invested in the exact same passive benchmark or index

and owning the exact same number of contracts as before. The buying and selling of futures

contracts for the funds would be completely unchanged. All that would have happened is that the

first passive sponsor was forced into a sale of a part of its business to a second passive manager

for non-economic reasons. But it is not clear how this benefits the market in general, or the

regulators in particular, even if it is presumed that position limits are desirable. The "actors" and

the holdings are unchanged.

It is our belief that any aggregation of position limits as applied to passive investment

pools needs to differentiate between two funds that have different shareholders and different

investment objectives as compared with two funds that are merely identical clones of each other

and were created solely to avoid position limits. In the first case we do not think aggregation is

appropriate since it appears not to serve any useful regulatory purpose (except making the second

passive sponsor happy). In the second example we think aggregation does make sense.

Legislators drafting the Act recognized the need to consider the attributes of public,

exchange traded funds like the Funds when determinating the application of the Act’s regulatory

requirements. In a colloquy on July 15, 2010, Senator Blanche Lincoln, the Chairperson of the

Senate’s Agriculture Committee, indicated that transactions entered into by un-levered,

exchanged traded funds whose positions are fully collateralized should be treated differently

from highl~ leveraged swap transactions that pose systemic risk and may distort price

discovery.-" In the same colloquy, Senator Lincoln went on to say that "it may not be

appropriate to aggregate the positions of entities advised by the same advisor where such entities

,,~3 have different and systemically determined investment objectives. - The foregoing statements

support the argument that the Funds, and other similar un-levered, exchange traded, passive

funds, warrant separate treatment under the rules ultimately promulgated by the Commission.

The following language would accomplish this goal:

22 Congessional Record-Senate at $5919 (July 15, 2010) ("However, I still hold some reservations about these

financial market participants and the negative impact of excessive speculation or long only positions on the

commodities markets. While I have concerns about the role these participants play in the markets, I do believe that

important distinctions in setting position limits on these participants are warranted. In implementing Section 737, I

would encourage the CFTC to give due consideration to trading activity that is unleveraged or fully collateralized,

solely exchange-traded, fully transparent, clearinghouse guaranteed, and poses no systemic risk to the clearing

system. This type of trading activity is distinguishable from highly leveraged swaps trading, which not only poses

systemic risk absent the proper safeguards that an exchange traded, cleared system provides, but also may distort

price discovery.")

23Id"

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Positions taken under trading programs of un-levered, passive, exchange traded

commodi& funds that (1) have separate ownership and separate investment

objectives, (2)fully disclose their futures and other derivatives positions and (3)

invest in futures contracts and other derivatives on a systemic basis in furtherance

of these separate investment objectives and the decisions made by unaffiliated

investors, should not be aggregated.

c. Aggregate Position Limits Across Different Types of Transactions

We believe that position limits should apply to aggregate positions maintained across

different types of transactions. A clear objective of the Act is to move as much derivative

trading as possible to regulated futures markets and derivative exchanges, not to unnecessarily

distinguish between trades on futures exchanges and trades cleared through derivative

clearinghouses. If separate limits are set for exchange traded futures contracts and clearable24

trades, then derivatives market participants who only engage in certain types of transactions (i.e.,

exchange traded futures contracts) will be unnecessarily penalized by being subject to lower

overall limits than derivatives market participants who engage in transactions in both categories.

For example, if an entity has 100 positions in exchange traded futures contracts for a specific

commodity, but the limits for such commodity are set at 50 positions in exchange traded futures

contracts and 50 positions in clearable trades, the entity would most likely move half of its

trading with respect to such commodity off the futures exchanges to the similarly-regulated

derivative clearinghouses. We do not believe this migration away from the futures exchanges is

consistent with the Act’s purpose of protecting the United States financial markets because

derivative clearinghouses should not be any more or less risky than futures exchanges.

As further support for the foregoing arguments that position limits should be set based on

aggregate position in a particular commodity, we are unaware of any regulatory basis for not

treating a listed futures contract and a clearable swap on the same commodity as economically

equivalent. Market participants should therefore be able to choose between the use of listed

futures or clearable swaps, based on their own determination of suitability or most favorable

execution.

If the Commission does not set aggregate position limits as discussed above, then the

Commission should at least provide derivatives markets participants some flexibility in

complying with limits across the different types of transactions. The rationales for position

limits discussed at the beginning of this letter principally apply with respect to exchange traded

_,4 We refer to "clearable" trades as opposed to "cleared" trades because under the Act, to the extent a trade is

clearable, such trade must be cleared unless it qualifies for an exemption to the clearing requirements. If a trade is

not cleared because Congress and/or the Commission have determined that it does not need to be cleared (i.e.,

because it is a trade entered into by an end-user to hedge or mitigate commercial risk) then for purposes of

complying with position limits, such trade should be treated the same as similar trades that are actually cleared.

9449644,8
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Page 15

futures contracts. Accordingly, if the Commission determines that separate limits are necessary

for these exchange traded futures contracts, then these separate limits should be a sublimits of the

aggregate positions that may be maintained by a derivatives market participant across all types of

transactions with respect to a specific commodity. For example, if the Commission sets the limit

for exchange traded futures contracts for a specific commodity at 50 positions, then instead of

also setting a limit of 50 positions for clearable trades, the Commission should set an overall

limit of 100 positions, 50 of which may be with respect to exchange traded futures contracts. By

way of example, under this overall limit of 100 positions, a derivatives market participant could

have 50 positions in clearable trades and 50 positions in exchange traded futures contracts, 75

positions in clearable trades and 25 positions in exchange traded futures contracts, or 100

positions in clearable trades and 0 positions in exchange traded futures contracts, and so on, so

long as such entity never maintained more than 100 positions in the aggregate or more than 50

positions in exchange traded futures contracts.

d. "Reasonably Necessary" and Cost to the System

As indicated above, we question the desirability of imposing position limits on previously

regulated entities that are publicly listed, highly transparent, passive, un-levered commodity

funds. We believe there are serious questions about the actual benefit that will be derived by

such an approach. As such we do not see the basis on which the Commission could conclude that

such actions "...in its judgment are reasonably necessary .... "

An observer might want to conclude that position limits are desirable because even if

there is only a one in a thousand chance that passive, un-levered funds might pose a threat to the

system then the additional regulation would be worthwhile. However, if that low of a threshold

is the basis of the Commission’s judgment we must point out that to be consistent the

Commission would have to impose position limits on every market participant, including

physical participants, since the other categories of market participants all present greater risks

than passive, un-levered funds. In fact, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (the

"FSA") specifically commented on this topic in the FSA White Paper, stating that the FSA did

not believe that position limits should be imposed on one class of market participants but not

imposed on other groups:

In relation to controlling or limiting price movement, we have seen no evidence to

suggest that one particular ~pe of market participant has been solely responsible

for systematically driving derivative market prices. As a result, we do not believe

that limiting one class of market participant by imposing specific limits is a

desirable or warranted response to the changing nature of derivative markets. :s

25 FSA White Paper, at chapter 9.

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At the same time, we believe there will be definite harm to the market and market

participants if restrictive rules are imposed. Should limits similar to those in the Proposed Rule

be adopted, investors seeking access to these markets may choose any number of ways in which

to avoid or circumvent the Commission’s proposed position limits, including those discussed

below. We believe that the harm to the financial commodity market and the related market

participants resulting investor actions to avoid position limits can come in the following three

ways:

First, existing funds could themselves go to foreign markets to satisfy investor demand.26

Additionally, they may modify their investment objectives or benchmarks to avoid exceeding

position limits. In any of these cases, investors will find themselves facing additional costs and

risks. We believe the most prudent and efficient way for commodity ETFs to provide investors

with access to the financial commodity markets and to fulfill the funds’ investment objectives is

to buy and sell exchange traded commodity futures contracts in the U.S. futures markets.

To the extent that a commodity ETF makes use of non-U.S, futures contracts and futures

exchanges, then the investors in such entity may face not only greater cost but also certain

settlement, clearing, and currency risks that might be avoided by the use of listed U.S. futures

contracts. Finally, to the extent that a commodity ETF changes its investment objective to

accommodate these proposed regulations, it may be the case that investors are denied the

opportunity to invest in what they actually want, versus what regulators will permit them to have.

Second, new funds can be created by new sponsors to tap investor demand that cannot be

satisfied by the existing funds that may find themselves "limited out." In either case, the impact,

if any, on participation in the commodity futures markets will likely be the same as if the DoddFrank Position Limits were set at reasonably high levels or modified to provide a "look-through"

to the existing funds’ actual investors. As was stated before, exchange traded passive

commodity funds are "aggregators, not actors." The actual actors, the hundreds of thousands of

investors, will find another way to achieve their goals. It is indeed ironic that at a time when the

Commission and other financial regulators are pressing to move trading from the OTC markets

to the regulated futures markets in order to promote transparency and reduce systemic risk, the

Commission would itself pursue a new regulation that will encourage migration of trading away

from the regulated futures markets to the OTC and foreign markets.

However, the outcome of a situation where the commodity ETF market goes from a

model of one large, highly liquid commodity ETF in a particular segment along side several

_,6 Even though the Dodd-Frank Position Limits will aggregate U.S. futures contract positions with OTC contracts

performing a significant price discovery function and linked contracts on foreign exchanges, market participants

may be forced to use OTC and foreign contracts if restrictive limits are placed on U.S. futures contracts in order to

utilize the full scope of any aggregate limits.

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smaller, less liquid commodity ETFs, to a model that instead has several medium sized

commodity ETFs will certainly entail additional costs to be borne both by the investors and by

the commodity market itself. Empirical evidence shows that total liquidity for investors will drop

and the cost of buying and selling their investments will go up. We believe this in turn will lead

to an overall drop in liquidity seen on listed futures exchanges such as the New York Mercantile

Exchange ("NYMEX") and the ICE Futures ("ICE").

To see how this might come about, we have included the following examples from the

 ̄ .  ̄

existing ETF markets that demonstrate how we reached our conclusions.-

One of the largest equity ETFs in the world is the SPDR (ticker: SPY), which tracks the

S&P 500. It has $73 billion in assets and trades approximately 200 million shares a day. Due to

its size and volume, shares of SPY trade during the day at an average spread of 1 cent. However,

there is another S&P 500 based ETF in the marketplace, the iShares S&P 500 Index Fund

(ticker: IVV). IVV has $22 billion in assets at the present time, an amount equal to 28% of

SPY’s assets. However, IVV only trades 4 million shares a day, an amount equal to only 2% of

SPY’s volume. IVV also typically trades at a wider bid/ask spread during the market day of 2

cents. We would suggest that if for some reason regulatory action forced SPY to get smaller than

the other existing S&P 500 ETFs would become larger, and new S&P 500 ETFs would likely

spring up, as investors moved into ETFs that could still accommodate their investments.

However, we also believe that in that situation, the spread on these medium-sized ETFs would be

higher than the current 1 cent spread of SPY. Assuming that the actual amount of shares trading

remained constant, an extra 1 cent in spread would cost investors an extra $500 million a year in

trading cost to achieve the same exposure they currently obtain from the very large SPY. That

cost to investors would come with no apparent offsetting benefit to either the investors or the

equity market in general.

At the opposite spectrum from the highly liquid SPY we can view the situation in trading

in European ETFs. The counterpart of the S&P 500 in Europe is the STOXX 50. Although the

total market cap of the STOXX 50 is less than that of the S&P 500, the average market cap of its

50 holdings is 3 times that of the average of the S&P 500. Thus one could expect that the cost of

trading an ETF based on the STOXX 50 should be comparable to trading an ETF based on the

S&P 500. However, due primarily to regulatory burdens in place, Europe does not have the same

market structure of one very large and liquid STOXX 50 ETF along side several small STOXX

50 ETFs. Instead, Europe has 4-5 medium sized STOXX 50 ETFs and 6-8 small STOXX 50

ETFs. The result is that investors buying or selling STOXX ETFs face bid/ask spreads that are 6-

8 cents wide, compared to the 1 cent bid/ask spread of SPY. Once again, multiplied over millions

~_v Data tbr the following examples was derived from intbrmation publicly available on Bloomberg and NYSE

Euronext.

9449644,8
Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 18

of shares traded daily the cost of regulatory balkanization amounts to hundreds of million Euros

per year without any offsetting benefit to the investors or the markets themselves.

Finally, in the U.S. energy commodity ETF market, we also have examples of the impact

of size and liquidity on investor costs. Our fund, USO, is the largest crude oil commodity ETF in

the U.S. It has, at present, assets of approximately $1.7 billion and trades an average of 11

million shares a day at a spread of 1 cent. There are in fact three other crude oil vehicles that

have reasonable size, although all are much smaller than USO. These other vehicles include

PowerShares DB Oil Fund (ticker, "DBO"), USL, and iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Total Return

Index (ticker, "OIL").

DBO has assets of approximately $550 million and trades around 340,000 shares a day at

a spread of 2-3 cents. USL has assets of approximately $160 million and trades around 40,000

shares a day at a spread of 5-6 cents. OIL has assets of approximately $630 million and trades

around 560,000 shares a day at a spread of 2-3 cents.

It is true that in the case of DBO and USL, there are differences in their investment

objectives and holdings compared to USO that may contribute to their lower volume and higher

bid/ask spreads. However, OIL’s investment objective is virtually the same as USO’s. Although

it has assets that are 32% of USO’s, it trading volume is only 7% of USO’s. Thus we believe that

there is a scale effect where liquidity increases as funds grow larger, and it decreases as funds get

smaller.

Looking at the three examples above we think a reasonable observer would conclude that

artificially restricting the size of exchange traded passive commodity pools could not only lead to

a situation where the market will move from a dynamic of one large liquid player and several

small players to a structure of several medium sized players, but that such a transition would be

accompanied by a drop in aggregate liquidity and an increase in investors’ costs. Using just USO

and UNG as examples, if those assets were redeployed into other exchange traded commodity

vehicles such that we had several medium sized vehicles, and those vehicles traded at 3 cents

instead of the current 1 cent bid/ask of the two large funds, the am~ual extra cost borue by these

same investors would be $20 million. For this increase in cost there is no apparent benefit to

investors or the market.

However, as indicated above we think it likely that total aggregate volume of all the

medium sized funds is likely to decline compared to the current market structure (remember that

OIL only trades 7% of USO’s volume although it has 32% of USO’s asset size). As such we

believe that the overall reduction in combined trading in these vehicles will in turn lead to a

reduction in the use of listed commodity futures by equity market makers. Equity market makers

hedge their market making in commodity funds by buying/selling listed futures contracts.

Assuming a 20%-30% drop in aggregate trading volume of crude oil ETFs under the "many

9449644.8
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October 21, 2010

Page 19

medium sized ETFs, no big ETF" scenario, would almost certainly lead to a commensurate drop

in the use of crude oil futures contracts by equity market makers. Thus there is likely to be a very

real and not unnoticeable drop in liquidity in the crude oil futures market if the limits in the

Proposed Rule are adopted for the Dodd-Frank Position Limits. We are not able to estimate how

much impact this will have on futures markets. However, we would encourage the

Commissioners to discuss this scenario with the appropriate individuals at the listed futures

exchanges.

There is currently no reason to believe that adoption of the Dodd-Frank Position Limits

will diminish the role of the Funds’ investors in the regulated futures markets, ff the Dodd-Frank

Position Limits can be legally circumvented either by moving a portion of the business to the

OTC markets (where dealers will in turn hedge their risk by buying and selling futures

contracts), by encouraging the formation of new fund entitles,- or by direct participation in the

futures markets by Fund investors, then there is simply no reason to believe that any possible

harm currently posed by such investors to the regulated energy futures markets will be

eliminated or even reduced. If there are sound economic reasons why the Funds’ investors are

currently electing to participate in these markets, they will continue to do so even if the new

position limits are adopted (albeit at perhaps greater cost and risk).

If the Commission is not attempting to regulate the total amount of futures contracts held

in aggregate by smaller investors or "speculators" (and based on comments by individual

Commissioners we believe that is true), then to a degree we think the Commission’s concerns

about the particular size of any individual pass-through fund is somewhat misguided. It is a bit

like baseball legend Yogi Berra’s response when asked after he ordered a pizza if we wanted it

cut into six slices. He is alleged to have answered, "Better cut it into four pieces, I am not hungry

enough to eat six pieces." We all understand that if you are going to eat the entire pizza, it does

not matter how many slices it is cut into by the person at the counter. Similarly, if individual

investors are going to own 10%, 20%, or 30% percent of a particular commodity futures

contract, it is not clear to us the actual regulatory benefit that is derived by limiting individual

investors’ choices when selecting the passive pass-through vehicle by which to achieve this level

of exposure, although we can clearly see the extra costs to the investors and the marketplace.

e. Winners and Losers

In recent articles and papers published by noted energy market economist, Prof. Phillip

Verleger, he has postulated that the real beneficiary of the proposed position limits will be the

2s To the extent that adoption of the proposed rules encourages new entrants into the market, there will likely be

duplication of costs. Although we do not seek protection of the Funds from future competition, we believe

competition should be based on services provided to investors, not simply circumvention of arbitrary regulatory

position limits.

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October 21, 2010

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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), not American end-users or

investors.29 However, based on our discussions with other market participants we would offer up

another prime beneficiary: foreign exchanges. Although we would only reluctantly move away

from primarily using listed futures on American exchanges, we are aware that many other major

commodity market participants have no such reservations.

Although we understand that in implementing the Act’s new regulatory regime, the

CFTC will seek to adopt rules and regulations with counterparts in foreign markets, it is unlikely

that the CFTC will find any such counterparts with respect to position limits. Based on the

comments by the FSA in the FSA White Paper, we can only surmise that the FSA will not be

joining the U.S. on the issue of position limits. Additionally, given recent studies by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development concluding that the "use of financial

instruments such as index/swap funds, though important in size, do not impact market returns in

most markets and indeed the larger long positions of these funds lead to lower market

volatility,’’3° we expect that foreign markets will not see the need to impose restrictive position

limits. We therefore think that places like the U.K., Singapore, and China will look forward to

taking over the U.S. capital markets dominance in energy and commodity trading like they did in

EuroDollars and EuroBonds in the 1970’s when the U.S. instituted trading restrictions on banks.

At the same time, should restrictive limits be adopted for the Dodd-Frank Position

Limits, the losers will be the millions of investors in commodity ETFs who will face higher costs

and risks, the U.S. futures exchanges who will face reduced volume, the commodity market in

general which will see greater volatility, and the end-users who ultimately will pay more to the

OPECs of the world.

III. Comments on the Definition of Maior Swap Participant

We would also like to take this opportunity to comment on the concept and definition of

"major swap participants" under the Act. A derivatives market participant will be subject to

regulation as a "major swap participant" if it falls within one or more of the following three

categories: (1) persons who maintain a substantial position in swaps for any of the major swap

categories excluding, inter alia, positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk; (2)

persons whose outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that could have

serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States banking system or financial

~_9 See, e.g., Philip K. Verleger, Jr., Comments on Federal Speculative Position Limits for Referenced Energy

Contracts and Associated Regulations. 75 Fed. Reg. 4144 (Jan. 26, 2010).

30 Irwin, S.H. and D.R. Sanders (2010), "The Impact of Index and Swap Funds on Commodity Futures Markets:

Preliminary Results", OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, No. 27, OECD Publishing; Working

Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets, Speculation and Financial Fund Activity: Draft Report Annex I (17-20

March 2010).

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Mr. David Stawick

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markets; or (3) financial entities that (a) are highly leveraged relative to the amount of capital

they hold who are not subject to capital requirements established by an appropriate Federal

banking agency and (b) maintain a substantial position in outstanding swaps in any major swap

category.

The Funds should not fall within the second two prongs of this definition because, as

discussed throughout this comment letter, the futures contracts in which the Funds invest do not

create counterparty exposure and the Funds are not highly leveraged. This leaves the first prong

of the major swap participant definition which we believe also should not apply to the Funds or

USCF as the investment manager for the Funds.

a. "Look-Through"

Although the swap positions held by the Funds may appear to be large in relation to each

Fund as the legal holder of such positions, these investments represent the aggregation of

demand from tens of thousands of individual investors seeking to reduce their financial risk

through hedging in the commodity futures market. We believe that for the reasons stated above

with respect to position limits, the Commission should "look through" the Funds to the

individual investors when determining whether a "substantial position" is maintained. The

Commission should then exclude the positions maintained by these investors as "positions held

for hedging or mitigating commercial risk." By taking these steps, the Funds, and USCF as the

investment manager for the Funds, will certainly not be deemed to maintain a "substantial

position" in swaps and as a result will not be regulated as "major swap participants."

To the extent the Commission does not look through to the individual investor level, the

Commission should at least look through to the individual Funds. As discussed above with

respect to position limits, USCF and similar passive investment managers do not enter into trades

for their own account and do not assume any (let alone a "substantial" amount) of the credit risk

associated with the positions maintained by the funds they manage. We believe that it is legally

incompatible with the intent of the regulations for the passive manager of a family of publicly

listed investment funds to be deemed a "major swap participant" because in all cases of which

we are aware, such a passive manager is not itself a party to any swaps.

Each Fund managed by USCF is a separate legal entity with separate investors and

separate investment objectives. USCF is nothing more than a service provider who buys and

sells based on the investment decisions of each Funds’ investors and each Funds’ pre-determined

investment objectives. Subjecting USCF and similar passive managers of un-levered passive

funds to regulation as a major swap participant would not do anything to enhance the safety and

soundness of the United States financial system.

b. Intent of Major Swap Participant Regulation

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The Act states that "the Commission shall define by rule or regulation the term

’substantial position’ at the threshold that the Commission determines to be prudent for the

effective monitoring, management and oversight of entities that are systemically important or

can significantly impact the financial system of the United States." Regulation of passive

investment managers and/or passive, un-levered commodity funds as "major swap participants"

is not necessary for such monitoring, management and oversight. As discussed above with

respect to position limits, studies and data have shown that the futures contracts in which the

Funds invest do not affect the overall financial system in any meaningful way but merely provide

individual investors safe, transparent and efficient access to the futures markets.

In connection with the definition of "substantial position," the Act also requires the

Commission to consider a person’s relative position in uncleared as opposed to cleared swaps

and states that the Commission may take into consideration the value and quality of collateral

held against counterparty exposure. The futures trading activity of each Fund is unleveraged, as

all futures positions are fully collateralized. Each time a Fund receives a purchase order for a

creation basket, the Fund purchases futures contracts in the appropriate commodity that have an

aggregate market value of approximately the purchase price received by the Fund for the creation

basket. After transferring the required margin for the futures contracts purchased with its futures

commission merchant, the Fund then invests the remainder of its proceeds from the creation

basket in short term obligations of the United States for two years or less, cash and/or cash

equivalents. Through this process each Fund ensures that the value of its liquid assets, whether

held by the Fund or posted as margin or collateral, at all times approximates the aggregate

market value of its obligations under its futures contracts. Accordingly, we believe that the

regulations promulgated by the CFTC should confirm that exchange traded futures invested in by

USCF should be completely excluded from the "substantial position" calculation.

As a final point with respect to the phrase "substantial position," assuming that the Funds

are required to comply with position limits established by the CFTC pursuant to the Act, then

regardless of where or how such position limits are set and regardless of how "substantial

position" is calculated, an un-levered, passive fund whose positions do not create risk to the

financial system should not be deemed to maintain a substantial position in swaps. We assume

that the CFTC will set position limits at levels it considers prudent and effective to achieve the

Act’s goal of protecting the overall financial system. To the extent that a passive fund is both

complying with these position limits and taking additional steps to ensure the safety and

soundness of the United States financial markets (i.e., fully collateralizing its positions), such

fund should not be deemed to maintain a "substantial position" and should not be regulated as a

major swap participant. Our view on this issue is supported by the regulated exchanges that take

into account whether a fund is passive and/or un-levered when looking at accountability. Both

the NYMEX and ICE generally refrain from taking any action with respect to un-levered,

passive funds that reach accountability levels for commodities traded on their exchanges but

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 23

generally do take action with respect to actively managed funds who reach the same

accountability levels.

The following language will accomplish what we have discussed above:

The Comrnission will presume that an un-levered, passive, exchange traded

commodity fund that (1) has a diversified shareholder base, (2)publishes its

portfolio holdings to the public and (3) has holdings below the then-existing

position limits, will not be deemed to have a "substantial position "for the

purpose of the definition of "major swap participant. "’ Notwithstanding the

foregoing, an actively managed private fund with similar sized holdings as any

such un-levered, passive, exchanged trade fund may be considered a "major swap

participant."

c. Negative Impact of Regulation as Major Swap Participants

The structure of the Funds already subjects them to a significant amount of regulation.

The CFTC itself, along with the National Futures Association, already regulate USCF as the

commodity pool operator for the funds. In addition, the sale of Fund securities on the NYSE

Arca subjects each Fund to comprehensive federal securities regulation by the Securities and

Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and NYSE Arca. These

regulatory organizations review the offering documents of each Fund and provide ongoing

regulatory oversight of the Funds’ operations. As part of this oversight, USCF and the Funds are

subject to ongoing reporting and disclosure requirements, business conduct standards and regular

examinations by the various regulators. As a result, the Funds are different from those currently

unregulated derivatives market participants who may engage in a substantial amount of trading

in OTC market without complying with any significant regulation. Subjecting the Funds to

further regulation by the same regulators who already oversee the Funds’ trading activities would

not provide any additional protection for the Funds’ investors or benefit to the United States

financial system. Any additional regulation would only hinder the Funds’ abilities to efficiently

meet their investment objectives.

IV. Conclusion

We appreciate the Commission’s efforts to ensure well-regulated, transparent energy

markets. However, we do not believe that the imposition of restrictive position limits or the

regulation of passive commodity funds as major swap participants will further the Commission’s

efforts in this area. In fact, the unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank Position Limits may

lead to even less transparency and more risk for investors in the financial energy markets. Given

that the Co~mnission is mandated by the Act to impose position limits, we strongly urge the

Commission to add in provisions that would exempt passive, unleveraged investors such as the

Funds from any position limits that are adopted, and instead take a "look-through" approach in

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Mr David S~awick

October 21, 2010

Page 24

order to reguiate the positions of individual investors in the l?unds. We also urge the

Commission to adopt regnaiations clar~t}’ing that passive, unteveraged inx.’estors such as the Funds

are not major swap participants because regulation of these entities as major swap participants

wouid only hinder their ability to meet their investment objectives without doing anything to

protect the United States financial system, By taking these steps, the Commissio~ can ensure

*.hat all investors have satb, transparent, and cost-effective access to the hedging benefits

provided by the financial energy markets.

cer

States Commodity Funds LLC

Nicholas D. Gerber

Chief Executive Officer

United States Commodity Funds LLC

James M, Cain, Satheriand Asbil! & Brennan LLP

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 24

order to regulate the positions of individual investors in the Funds. We also urge the

Commission to adopt regulations clarifying that passive~ unleveraged investors such as the Funds

are not major swap participants because regulation of these entities ,’ks major swap participants

would only hinder their ability to meet their investment objectives without doing anything to

protect the United States financial system, By taking these steps, the Commission can ensure

that all investors have safe, transparent, -and cost-eltbctive access to the hedging benefits

provided by the llnancial energy markets.

John T. Hyland

Chief Investment Officer

United States Commodity Ftmds LLC

Nicholas D. Gerber

Chief Executive Officer

United States Commodity Funds LLC

Cc: James M. Cain, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP

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October 21, 2010

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Appendix A

Responses to CFTC Request for Comments

The discussion below presents our responses to selected questions posed by the CFTC in

the Proposed Rule. These questions, and our corresponding responses, remain relevant to the

Dodd-Frank Position Limits, since the Commission will have to address similar issues when

developing a new proposed rule on position limits. We first address Question 15, which is

specifically directed at the operation of the Funds, and then respond to various of the other

questions in the Proposed Rule.

Question 15. Concerns have been raised about the impact of large, passive, and

unleveraged long-only positions on the futures markets. Instead of using the futures markets for

risk transference, traders that own such positions treat commodi& futures contracts as distinct

assets that can be held for an appreciable duration. This notice of rulemaking does not propose

regulations that would categorize such positions for the purpose of applying different regulatory

standards. Rather, the owners of such positions are treated as other investors that would be

subject to the proposed speculative position limits. 31

The series of questions that follow are presumably directed to the activities of entities like

the Funds. We believe that the suggestion that the Funds’ investors somehow represent a new

category of market participant overlooks the various reasons why people and institutions invest

in the Funds. Energy prices effect every institution and every individual in our society, thus

increased prices have implications for every business and every individual. We believe that it is

more appropriate to characterize investments in the Funds as a hedge against the economic

effects of higher energy costs rather than as "distinct assets that can be held for an appreciable

duration." Investment in the Funds reduces the adverse impact of higher energy prices on our

investors and, conversely, losses incurred on investments in the Funds when energy prices

decline are generally offset by savings in actual energy costs. It is certainly possible for investors

to purchase shares in the Funds for speculative purposes, but it is highly doubtful that any such

investors would themselves exceed the Commission’s proposed speculative position limits and

we would welcome any efforts by the Commission to identify and regulate such individual

investors.

Just as there is a clear rationale for exempting the hedging transactions of commercial

entities, we believe there is an equally compelling rationale for exempting the hedging

~ We note that this question refers to passive investments in "long-only positions" in futures contracts, but not to

short-only positions that are similarly passive and unleveraged. Given the fact that there is both a long and a short

side to each futures contract, we believe that short-only investments should be given the same treatment as long-only

positions in futures contracts. The United States Short Oil Fund, LP, managed by USCF, is an example of an entity

that makes passive, unleveraged short-only investments.

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 26

transactions of non-commercial energy consumers. Before the advent of collective investment

vehicles such as those presented by the Funds, there was simply no need to consider this issue

because individual non-commercial energy consumers would never exceed speculative position

limits. Indeed, we believe that if every investor in our Funds were to participate directly in the

energy products traded on regulated markets there would be no thought given to trying to limit

their aggregate positions. Given the passive nature of the Funds and the fact that Fund

purchases/sales of futures contracts correlate directly to the investment decisions of individual

investors, we do not believe that the investments of the Funds should be aggregated for purposed

of any proposed position limits.

ao Should the Commission propose regulations to limit the positions of passive long

traders ?

No. The rationale set forth in the Proposed Rule does not apply to the positions in such

contracts held by passive long (or short) traders such as the Funds. In the Proposed Rule, the

Commission states that "[1]arge concentrated positions in the energy futures and option markets

can potentially facilitate abrupt price movements and price distortions.’’32 Given that the

positions of the Funds are generally passive (in that they increase or decrease only in response to

additional investments in or withdrawal of assets from the Funds), it seems self-evident that they

should not facilitate "abrupt price movements and price distortions." Further, USCF has publicly

disclosed data refuting any notion that the activities of its Funds cause sharp movements in or

distortions of their relevant commodity markets. For example, a Form 8-K was filed with the

Securities and Exchange Commission on July 24, 2009, showing that wide swings in the price of

natural gas were not the result of the activities of UNG.33 For example, data shows that during

the run-up in natural gas prices during the time period of September 2007 and $5.50 per Million

BTU ("mbtu"), to July 2008, and roughly $13.50 mbtu, UNG’s holdings in natural gas futures

contracts were essentially flat. UNG owned 8,093 contracts on September 7, 2007, and owned

8,587 contracts on July 3, 2008. We do not believe that this data supports the notion that UNG’s

investing activities could have been a driving force behind the increase in natural gas prices over

this time period. Indeed the evidence included in the July 24, 2009 Form 8-K suggests from

data available to us that the Funds’ activity in the market tends to curb price movements rather

than exacerbate them; investment in the Funds tends to increase when prices are falling and

decrease when prices are rising.

USCF has also publicly disclosed information refuting charges that the large size of USO

will lead to USO’s trading activities distorting prices in the oil futures contract market. In a

32 Proposed Rule, at 4148.

33 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/dataJ 1376227/000114420409038643/v 155515_Sk.htm.

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Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 4, 2010,34 USO’s

management presented data after reviewing the history of creation and redemption orders since

USO was listed in April of 2006 through the end of January 2010. During that time, USO

processed creation and redemption orders on 705 different days. The average size of daily

creation or redemption orders received by USO led it to purchase or sell on average

approximately 820 crude oil futures contracts. USO’s management noted in its Form 8-K that in

2009, the combined average number of light, sweet crude oil contracts traded each day on the

NYMEX and ICE, exceeded 850,000 contracts. As a percentage of daily volume in the light,

sweet crude oil futures market, USO’s creation and redemption activity has averaged around

1/10 of 1%.

USO’ s management further reviewed the history of USO’ s creations and redemptions to

determine the size of the transactions on the dates where USO had its greatest amount of creation

activity, and the greatest amount of redemption activity, since its inception. USO’s most active

single day for creation activity occurred on January 28, 2009. That day’s creation activities in

turn led to an increase in the total number of USO units outstanding of 10.8%. Those creations

resulted in the purchase of 7,451 light, sweet crude oil futures contracts by USO. However, on

that date, the combined number of light, sweet crude oil futures contracts of the same contract

month as purchased by USO that traded on NYMEX and ICE totaled over 381,000. Therefore,

on the day during which USO had its largest amount of creation activity, USO’s purchased

futures contracts equal less than 2% of that day’s volume in that one contract month. Stated

another way, USO’s selling activity that day was roughly equal to the amount of trading on

NYMEX and ICE that occurred every 7 minutes.

As highlighted in the Form 8-K referenced above, USO’ s redemption activity has a

similarly minimal market impact when viewed both from a daily average and largest single

trading day perspective. Thus objective data supports the notion that merely having large

passive funds active in the financial commodity markets does not cause price distortion, because

these funds represent only a small fraction of the total trading in such markets.

Allegations have also been made to suggest that large passive investment vehicles like

the Funds cause price distortion in the financial commodity markets when they "roll" their

positions in near month futures contracts into next (or other) month contracts on a predetermined

basis in order to meet their investment objectives. USO publicly refuted this charge with data

provided in a Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 28, 2010, which is described below.35

As explained in the aforementioned Form 8-K, since the end-of-day settlement prices of

the futures contracts for light, sweet crude oil as well as USO’s daily holdings and roll schedule

~4 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327068/000114420410005550/v 173243_8k.htm.

35 http://www.sec.go v/Archives/edgar/datal 1327068/00011 4420410004013/v 172435_8k.htm.

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 28

are all publicly available, USO’s management was able to determine what the price spreads were

immediately prior to USO’s roll, what they were during the roll and what they were immediately

after the roll was concluded. Since the crude oil futures market was in contango throughout

2009, if USO’s rolls were affecting the prices of crude oil futures contracts, one would expect

that the price spreads would have widened as a result of each monthly roll. However, as shown

below, this was not the case. Instead, the price spreads actually narrowed half the time.

The table below measures the changes in the spread during 2009 in two fashions. The

first compares the price spread between the nearest month to expiration contract and the next

nearest month to expiration contract on the last day before USO’s roll began and compares it to

the average price spread during USO’s roll. The second measurement compares the average price

spread between the nearest month to expiration contract and the next nearest month to expiration

contract on the four days before USO’s roll began and compares it to the average price spread

during USO’s roll.

Price Spread Widened 6 7

Price Spread Narrowed 6 5

In addition, on five of the six occasions where the price spread widened between the last

day prior to the roll and the roll itself, the price spread was still wider even after USO’s roll was

over. On five of the seven occasions where the price spread widened between the average of the

four prior days and the roll itself, the price spread was also still wider after USO’s roll was

complete. USO’s management believes that this suggests that other factors, such as inventory

storage buildups, were at play in determining the price spread both before, during, and after

USO’s roll period, and that empirical data supports the fact that USO’s activities have not

systematically and predicatively caused changes in the spread between the price of nearest month

to expiration and the next nearest month to expiration crude oil futures contracts as some have

alleged.

Finally, the Commission also stated, as a rationale for the Proposed Rule, that

"[c]oncentration of large positions in one or a few traders’ accounts can also create the

unwarranted appearance of appreciable liquidity and market depth. Trading under such

conditions can result in greater volatility than would otherwise prevail if traders’ positions were

more evenly distributed among market participants." 36 Again, these concerns do not apply to the

Funds’ investments in energy futures. First, the Funds’ participation in the markets is fully

transparent, with the trading positions of each Fund publicly accessible on their websites.

Anyone trading in these markets has the opportunity to know about the extent of the Funds’

positions and on what basis they trade. Second, as previously discussed, the Funds are passive

_~6 Proposed Rule, at 4149.

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 29

participants and only enter the market to buy or sell futures based on the investment decisions of

the owners of the Funds. Thus, from a volatility perspective, the trading activities of the Funds

are effectively "distributed among market participants," i.e., the Funds’ hundreds of thousands of

investors.

bo If so, what criteria should the Commission employ to identify and define such

traders and positions ?

As noted above, we do not believe that the Commission should limit the positions of

passive long (or short) traders, but rather that these traders should be exempted from any position

limits adopted by the Commission. In determining which entities should be provided with

exemptions from position limits, the Commission should employ factors similar to those it

previously used in providing no-action relief to certain index-based funds from position limits on

agricultural products.37 These factors include the following key elements:

(i) The futures trading activity passively tracks a widely recognized commodity

benchmark.

(ii)

(iii)

The futures trading activity is unleveraged.

Both the commodity benchmark and the fund are highly transparent.

(iv) The futures trcuting does not result in price exposure for the fund.

Applying these factors would ensure that all exempted entities would be acting in a way that

would not negatively affect the financial energy markets and also provide appropriate safeguards

to inform and protect potential investors.

Co Assuming that passive long traders can properly be identified and defined, how

and to what extent should the Commission limit their participation in the futures

markets ?

The Commission should not limit the participation of publicly traded and regulated

passive long (or short) traders like the Funds, but rather continue to monitor these market

participants and possibly take additional steps to ensure that investors are not utilizing these

entities to avoid speculative position limits. Such steps might include reporting requirements for

individual investors in the Funds beyond those required by the SEC and the exchange to ensure

that their individual positions do not rise above any position limits that are adopted.

:~7 CFTC Letter 06-09 (April 19, 2006); CFFC Letter 06-19 (September 6, 2006).

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 30

If passive long positions should be limited in the aggregate, would it be feasible

for the Commission to apportion market space amongst various traders that wish

to establish passive long positions ?

As noted above, we see no reason why these positions should be limited in the aggregate

unless, on a look through basis, an individual investor has positions in excess of the speculative

position limits.

eo What unintended consequences are likely to result from the Commission’s

implementation of passive long position limits ?

As previously discussed, we have no reason to believe that investor interest in the

financial energy markets is likely to be curtailed by the Commission’s Proposed Rule on position

limits. To the contrary, all the evidence points to growing investor interest in gaining exposure

to these markets. Moreover, there are any number of ways in which the Commission’s proposed

position limits can be avoided or circumvented by investors seeking access to these markets,

including the use of OTC and foreign markets, and the creation of additional funds created by

new sponsors to tap investor demand that cannot be satisfied by the existing funds. In either

case, the impact, if any, on participation in the energy futures markets will likely be the same as

if the proposed limits were either abandoned or modified to provide a "look-through" to the

actual investors of passive funds. As a result of the foregoing, the Commission’s Proposed Rule

may directly cause the migration of trading away from our regulated futures markets to the OTC

and foreign markets. This migration would be in direct opposition to the Commission and other

financial regulators’ efforts to move trading from the OTC markets to the regulated futures

markets in order to promote transparency and reduce systemic risk.

Question 1. Are Federal speculative position limits for energy contracts traded on

reporting markets necessary to "diminish, eliminate, or prevent" the burdens on interstate

commerce that may result from position concentrations in such contracts ?

Whatever the case may be for imposing speculative position limits for energy contracts

traded on reporting markets for market participants who are active managers of financial

investments, or who are financial intermediaries such as swap desks, or who are producers/endusers/physical traders of the underlying commodities, the case has not be made that such limits

should be imposed on passive, un-levered, exchange traded pass-through vehicles such as the

Funds. The Funds are passively managed and employ a "neutral" investment strategy intended

to track changes in the price of a benchmark commodity regardless of whether the price goes up

or down. Thus, the Funds themselves do not engage in speculative activities in the futures

markets. Certain of the Funds’ investors may indeed be motivated by the desire to speculate on

the price of the respective commodities; however, other investors no doubt participate in order to

hedge their cormnodity price risk exposure. Any Commission rule regarding speculative limits

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 31

should look through the Funds to their respective investors in determining whether positions

limits should apply. Otherwise, the Commission will potentially penalize hundreds of thousands

of investors who have no speculative intent and are merely seeking to hedge their commodity

exposures in a commercially efficient manner.

Question 2. Are there methods other than Federal speculative position limits that should

be utilized to diminish, eliminate, or prevent the burdens?

Yes. The Funds are "passive" investors in futures contracts and only increase or decrease

their participation in the futures markets based on purchases or sales of Fund units.38 The Funds

do not seek to "profit" from either increases or decreases in commodity prices and thus do not

pose the risks presented by speculators seeking to time market movements. It has been alleged

that the Funds large presence in the futures markets creates inappropriate market disruptions as a

result of the Funds’ need to regularly roll their futures investments from the current month’ s

contract to the following month’s contract in order to achieve their investment objectives. This

is accomplished in a transparent manner with the Funds publishing their planned rolls on their

website. As rationale for the Proposed Rule, the Commission stated that "[1]arge concentrated

positions in the energy futures and option markets can potentially facilitate abrupt price

movements and price distortions.’’39 The data provided in USO’s Form 8-K dated January 28,

2010, discussed above, refutes this claim and conforms with the fact that we have seen no

evidence that the Funds’ large positions facilitated "abrupt price movements" or "price

distortions." However, we believe that the Commission should continue to examine the impact,

if any, of the Funds’ market activity during the roll periods to determine whether any additional

steps could be taken to make those activities even more transparent and assure the Commission

that there is indeed no adverse market impact. Additionally, as previously noted, we support any

efforts by the Commission to regulate the positions of individual investors in entities such as the

Funds in order to ensure that individual investors do not exceed any adopted position limits.

Question 3. How should the Commission evaluate the potential effect of Federal

speculative position limits on the liquidity, market efficiency and price discove~ capabilities of

referenced energy contracts in determining whether to establish position limits for such

contracts ?

38 The Funds only buy or sell futures in response to actions by their investors. In this sense, the Funds’ situation is

analogous to that of mutual funds, commodity pool operators and commodity trading advisors that are "eligible

entities" under CFTC Regulation § 151.1 (e). The existing regulations exempt the positions of these entities from

position limits because "the account controllers for these positions are acting independently." Proposed Rule, at

4149-4150. The exemption is limited by the requirement that "the overall positions held or controlled by each such

independent account controller may not exceed the [specified limits[..." CFTC Regulation § 150.3(a)(4). We

believe the same "independent account controller" "look-through" principles should apply to the Funds.

~9 Proposed Rule, at 4148.

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 32

We strongly believe that the Commission should seek to determine on both a qualitative

and quantitative basis how Federal speculative position limits could adversely affect the ability

of investors to participate in our regulated futures markets. From our perspective, this is an

essential question of "market efficiency." As previously noted, we question whether the

activities of the Funds should properly be covered by "speculative" position limits. The growth

of the Funds in recent years attests to the interest of a very wide spectrum of investors in the cost

efficient mechanism offered by the Funds for gaining exposure to market energy prices. For the

most part, we believe that exposure is intended to hedge the energy price exposure that they face

in meeting their daily business and/or individual investments or energy needs. To characterize

the Funds’ investors as speculators is, in our view, a mischaracterization of the primary motive

for investment in the Funds. To the extent that new Federal speculative position limits will

preclude the Funds from accepting new business or cause potential Fund investors to incur

additional costs and expense and thus become less efficient, these investors will be harmed. We

believe it is incumbent upon the Commission to assess this harm to "market efficiency" in

deciding whether they outweigh any supposed benefits to be derived from imposing new Federal

speculative limits.

t~uestion 8. Proposed regulation 151.3(a)(2) would establish a swap dealer risk

management exemption whereby swap dealers would be granted a position limit exemption for

positions that are held to offset risks associated with customer initiated swap agreements that

are linked to a referenced energy contract but that do not qualify as bona fide hedge positions.

The swap dealer risk management exemption would be capped at twice the size of any otherwise

applicable all-months-combined or single non-spot-month position limit. The Commission seeks

comment on any alternatives to this proposed approach. The Commission seeks particular

comrnent on the feasibility of a "look-through" exemption for swap dealers such that dealers

would receive exemptions for positions offsetting risks resulting from swap agreements opposite

counterparties who would have been entitled to a hedge exemption if they had hedged their

exposure directly in the futures markets. How viable is such an approach given the Commission’s

lack of regulatory authority over the OTC swap markets’?

The Funds do not support the Commission’s proposal to establish a new swap dealer risk

management exemption. This proposal seems mere window dressing on the more fundamental

decision to preclude swap dealers from relying upon the existing bona fide hedging exemption

and represents a back-door effort to curtail the OTC market for energy transactions. The

proposed prohibition on swap dealers holding any speculative positions while relying on the

swap dealers exemption seems particular onerous, particularly given the Commission’s proposed

rules regarding aggregation of positions.

However, to the extent that the Commission is acknowledging that there should be a

"look-through" exemption for entities like the dealers that are merely holding futures positions to

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Mr. David Stawick

October 21, 2010

Page 33

hedge positions taken with their customers and the decision as to whether to buy or sell such

positions effectively rests with those customers, such an exemption may be appropriate

Question 13. The Commission notes that Congress is currently considering legislation

that would revise the Commission’s section 4a(a) position limit authority to extend beyond

positions in reporting market contracts to reach positions in OTC derivative instruments and

FBOT contracts. Under some of these revisions, the Commission would be authorized to set

limits for positions held in OTC derivative instruments and FBOT contracts. The Commission

seeks comment on how it should take this pending legislation into account in proposing Federal

speculative position limits’.

In light of the pending legislation dealing with the Commission’s authority to establish

speculative position limits, we believe it would be in the public interest to defer action on the

current Proposed Rule until Congress enacts new regulatory reform legislation. As noted

previously, one likely consequence of adopting the current proposal would be to encourage

market participants to either move trades from regulated U.S. markets to the OTC markets or

FBOT contracts. Given the widely held view that systemic risk is reduced where trading occurs

on regulated exchanges and trades are cleared by central clearing entities, it does not seem

appropriate at this time to adopt these new rules.

9449644.8