NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 11

- 4593

_____________ FRED CLAYWORTH , individually and as parent and natural guardian of G.H., Appellant

v. LUZERNE COUN TY, PENNSYLVANIA; LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES; FRANK CASTANO; JOSEPH KLOSS; JOHN KOSLOSKI; TARA MCCUTCHEON; WILMA SNOPEK; and JOANNE VAN SAUN

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3

- 11

- cv - 00254 ) District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on July 1 3 , 2012
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 15, 2013 )

O P I N I O N2

ROTH, Circuit Judge : Fred Clayworth, individually and as the parent and natural guardian of G.H., appeals fro m the District Court’s December 6, 2011 judgment , which dismissed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit

. For the reason s that follow , we will affirm the judgment entered by
the District Court

. I. Background On September 8, 2011, after the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the c omplaint, Clayw orth filed an a mended c omplaint against Luzerne County, Pennsylvania (Luzerne County), Luzerne County Children & Youth Services (CYS), and individual employees Frank Castano, Joseph Kloss, John Kosloski, Tara McCutcheon, Wilma Snopek, and Joanne Van Saun, alleging that the defendants deprived h im and his daughter of various constitutional rights.
A ccording to the a mended c omplaint , G.H. was born on November 30, 2004. Clayworth is the natural father of G.H. Clayworth and G.H.’s natural mother were not married at the time of G.H.’s birth, nor were they ever married. Prior to G.H.’s birth, G.H.’s natural mother informed CYS that she did not want the baby. Luzerne County and CYS arranged an adoption. Immediately upon G.H.’s birth, G.H.’s natural mother gave G.H. to CYS. Shortly thereafter, C layworth learned of G.H.’s birth and immediately told CYS that he believed he was her father. Clayworth stated that he would take a paternity test and if the test showed he was G.H.’s father, he would raise her. On March 3, 2005, a paternity test confirm ed that Clayworth was G.H.’s father.3

Clayworth does not have a criminal record, a history of physical abuse of children, or a history of drug or alcohol abuse. Nevertheless , the defendants placed G.H. in foster care. Over the next four years, Clayworth sought custody of G.H. The defendants placed obstacles in his way, requiring Clayworth to submit to drug and alcohol testing, multiple mental health evaluations, psychotherapy, court proceedings, parenting classes, home study, limited and supervised acces s to G.H., and constant scrutiny of his interactions
with G.H. On May 29, 2009, after approximately four and a half years, Clayworth gained permanent custody of G.H. and has raised her ever since. Clayworth contends that t he defendants’ decision to preve nt him from raising his daughter was based on prejudice and
bias

. On September 16, 2011, the defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On December 6, 2011, the District Court granted the defendants’ motio n to dismiss and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Clayworth appealed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 129 1. We exercise plenary review over a district c ourt ’s grant of a motion to dismiss,

pursu ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. Grier v. Klem , 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010). “In deciding a motion to dismiss, all well

- pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the4

plaintiff s , and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan v. City of N.Y. , 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).
III. Discussion
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Chainey v. Street , 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008). Clayworth contends that the District Court erred by dismissing all counts of the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. We address each in turn.
A. Fourteenth Amendment
To state a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment , a plaintiff must establish that he has a protected constitutional interest at issue and that the defendants deprived him of it by engaging in conduct that “shocks the conscience.” See
id. at 219

- 20. Due process protects against arbitrary action, and “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 219. Clayworth has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the custody, care , and management of his child

. See Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. CY S , 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). This interest is not absolute, however, as the “liberty interest in familial integrity is limited by the compelling government al interest in the protection of children.”
Id. Indeed, the record properly before the D istrict Court suggests that the defendants conducted reasonable and proper investigation into Clayworth to determine if it was in G.H.’s best interests to award custody of her to Clayworth.5

Thus, al though Clayworth alleged that the defendants tried to t erminate his parental rights, he f

ailed to allege conduct sufficiently arbitrary to shock the conscience.
F or substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, we agree that the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due pr ocess claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B . First Amendment The First Amendment’s right of expressive association protects the ability of individuals to gather in order to pursue “political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). A s the District Court explained, Clayworth’s First Amendment claim fails because the right he

asserts

— the right to intimate association with family members

— is anchored instead in
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 617

- 20.
C . Ninth Amendment The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S.
Const. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment does not indepen dently provide a source of individual constitutional rights. See, e.g. , Jenkins v. C omm’r , 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007). We will, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Clayworth’s Ninth Amendment claim.
D. Qualified Immunity “The qualified immunity doc trine protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sharp v.6

Johnson , 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d C ir. 2012). Because the Amended Complaint failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right , we need not address the issue of qualified immunity.
E . Supervisory Liability Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintif f must plead that each government official has violated the Constitution through his own individual
actions. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement , 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir. 2011). A supervisor can be held liable through dire ct supervisor acti on or “actual knowledge and acquiescence” to constitutional violations. Id. at 72. For essentially the reasons stated by the District Court, Clayworth has failed to allege a claim of supervisory liability against Frank Castano, the Director of CYS.
F. Monell Claim A plaintiff who seeks to impose liability on the local government under § 1983 must prove that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused the injury. Connick v. Thompson , 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dept. of S oc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). Because the Amended Complaint failed to allege a constitutional violation, Clayworth’s Monell claim against the institutional defendants necessarily fails. See Startzell v. City of Phila. , 533 F.3d 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2008 )

. G. § 1983 Conspiracy To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right under color of law.” Parkway G arage, Inc. v. City of Phila. , 5 F.3d7

685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. o

f Warrington , 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, because Clayworth failed to establish an underlying violation of hi s constitutional rights, his § 1983 conspiracy
claim also fails. See id.
IV . Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court

.