IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 4, 2023

ROBERT ALLEN DOLL, III v. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL 

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 22-0363-II Robert E. Lee Davies, Senior Judge

___________________________________

No. M2022-01723-SC-R3-BP

___________________________________

In this case, an attorney appeals the recommended sanction of disbarment after three 

criminal convictions. The attorney was convicted by a jury of two counts of subornation 

of aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, all Class E felony offenses and 

serious crimes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22. All three criminal

convictions arose out of the attorney’s conduct in representing a client. In the ensuing 

disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel 

recommended disbarment. The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the 

chancery court, which affirmed. The attorney appealed to this Court. On appeal, the 

attorney argues the hearing panel should have reviewed similar cases of attorney 

misconduct where a suspension was imposed, and that he should be suspended based on 

the sanction imposed in those cases. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Board of 

Professional Responsibility hearing panels and trial courts considering attorney discipline 

promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by anchoring their decisions on 

punishment to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 9 does not give either hearing panels or trial courts authority in attorney disciplinary 

cases to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions 

imposed in comparative cases. The Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective from 

seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—whether 

appealed or not—puts it in the best position to consider comparative cases for the sake of 

uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee. In this case, considering the nature of 

the attorney’s misconduct, no comparable case convinces us that suspension, rather than 

disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 

chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment. 

06/20/2024
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Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d); Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

HOLLY KIRBY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, ROGER 

A. PAGE, SARAH K. CAMPBELL, and DWIGHT E. TARWATER, JJ., joined.

Peter J. Strianse, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Allen Doll, III.

James W. Milam, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Board of Professional 

Responsibility.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The respondent attorney in this case, Robert Allen Doll, III, has been licensed to 

practice law in Tennessee since 2003. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, 

section 33.1(d), he appeals the discipline imposed by a hearing panel of the Tennessee 

Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR” or “Board”). 

On May 17, 2017, Mr. Doll was convicted by a Williamson County jury of two 

counts of subornation of aggravated perjury, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 39-16-705, and one count of criminal simulation, in violation of Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 39-14-115(a)(1)(c).1 See State v. Robert Allen Doll, III, No. II-

 

1 Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-705(a) defines “subornation” as: “A person commits 

an offense who, with the intent to deceive, induces another to make a false statement constituting perjury 

or aggravated perjury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-705(a). Addressing aggravated perjury, Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 39-16-703(a) states: “A person commits [aggravated perjury] who, with intent to 

deceive: (1) Commits perjury as defined in § 39-16-702; (2) The false statement is made during or in 

connection with an official proceeding; and (3) The false statement is material.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

16-703(a). Also addressing aggravated perjury, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-703(b) provides: 

“[i]t is no defense [to an aggravated perjury charge] that the person mistakenly believed the statement to be 

immaterial.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-703(b). 

On criminal simulation, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-115 provides:

(a)(1) A person commits the offense of criminal simulation who, with intent to defraud or 

harm another: 

(A) Makes or alters an object, in whole or in part, so that it appears to have value 

because of age, antiquity, rarity, source or authorship that it does not have; 
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CR078988-B (Williamson Cnty. Tenn. May 17, 2017). The discipline at issue arises out 

of these criminal convictions, described below.2

Underlying Criminal Convictions

Mr. Doll practiced law with an association of attorneys in middle Tennessee. His 

practice largely consisted of family law. State v. Doll, No. M2019-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 

2020 WL 7231101, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 

13, 2021). The support staff for the association of attorneys consisted of a person at the 

front desk, Mr. Tim Carter, who was a notary public. Id.

Pamela Denise Van Burkleo hired Mr. Doll in 2010 to represent her in divorce and 

post-divorce proceedings against her ex-husband, who was in Texas. The criminal 

convictions underlying the discipline in this case arise from Mr. Doll’s representation of 

Ms. Van Burkleo in the post-divorce proceedings. Id. at *1. 

By the time the events underlying the criminal convictions arose in 2013, Mr. Doll 

had been representing Ms. Van Burkleo for several years. In early 2013, Ms. Van Burkleo 

had concerns about her children visiting with the ex-husband, so she asked Mr. Doll to file 

an emergency petition to restrict his parenting time. On March 1, 2013, an emergency ex 

parte petition was filed in the Williamson County circuit court on behalf of Ms. Van 

Burkleo, to prevent her ex-husband from exercising his visitation with their children. Id.

at *5. Affidavits from each of their two teenage sons were attached to the petition. Id. 

The emergency petition had an oath by Ms. Van Burkleo appended to it, as part of the 

petition. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the oath was notarized by Mr. Carter, and 

Mr. Doll signed the petition as her attorney.3Id. On the basis of this petition, the first trial 

 

(B) Possesses an object so made or altered, with intent to sell, pass or otherwise 

utter it; or 

(C) Authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different 

from what it is. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-115. 

2 Mr. Doll appealed his criminal convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. See State 

v. Doll, No. M2019-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 7231101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. 

denied, (Tenn. May 13, 2021). The record for the underlying criminal case is not part of our record in this 

disciplinary appeal, so the facts of the events that form the basis for the criminal convictions are taken 

largely from the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion and its recitation of the facts at trial. 

3 Mr. Doll testified to the BPR hearing panel that another attorney in his association of attorneys 

filed the petition while he was out of town and obtained the ex parte temporary restraining order. 
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judge granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the ex-husband from exercising his 

parenting time with the children.4Id.

Later, on March 26, 2013, a second trial judge, Judge Timothy Easter, conducted a 

hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order should be extended.5

Id. One 

of the attorneys in Mr. Doll’s association of attorneys appeared at the hearing to represent 

Ms. Van Burkleo because Mr. Doll was still out of town. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo testified 

under oath at this hearing that she had not signed the emergency petition. Id. Judge Easter

then asked Ms. Van Burkleo directly whether she signed the emergency petition in front of

a notary public, and she answered that she had not. Id. Judge Easter declined to extend 

the temporary restraining order, set another hearing for April 23, 2013, and said he wanted

to hear from Mr. Doll on the issue at the hearing. Id. 

When Mr. Doll returned from out of town, he learned of the events during his 

absence. He filed another petition on behalf of Ms. Van Burkleo, identical to the initial 

emergency petition, with an oath executed by Ms. Van Burkleo and affidavits executed by 

her sons. The Williamson County circuit court, however, never reached the merits of the 

second petition.

Mr. Doll appeared at the April 23, 2013 hearing as ordered. Id. He was not under 

oath, but he assured Judge Easter that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his office the day the 

emergency petition was signed, and that she had reviewed it. Id. Mr. Doll professed not 

to know why Mr. Carter would notarize a signature that was not Ms. Van Burkleo’s 

signature. Id. Judge Easter told Mr. Doll that he and Mr. Carter were potentially facing 

criminal charges and advised them to get counsel. Id. He set another hearing for May 7, 

2013. Id. at *6. 

Judge Easter asked the District Attorney General for Williamson County to attend 

the May 7, 2013 hearing. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Doll appeared but did not testify under 

oath. Id. He told Judge Easter that his calendar indicated he prepared the emergency 

petition for Ms. Van Burkleo on March 1, 2013, some two hours before Ms. Van Burkleo 

came to his office to review and sign the documents. Id. At this hearing, one of the other 

 

4

In later proceedings, the first trial judge, who granted the emergency petition, said that if the 

petition had not included Ms. Van Burkleo’s sworn oath, the clerk’s office would not have submitted it to 

him for review. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. He explained that the oath required an affiant like Ms. 

Van Burkleo to swear to the truth of the facts in the petition, as shown by the notarized signature, in the 

same way a witness would take an oath to tell the truth before testifying. Id. 

5 There was no court reporter at this hearing. 
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attorneys in Mr. Doll’s office appeared to represent Mr. Carter, and told Judge Easter that 

Mr. Carter was this attorney’s employee. Id. Judge Easter set a show cause hearing for

June 18, 2013.6 Id. 

At the June 18, 2013 hearing, Mr. Carter was represented by a criminal defense

attorney. Id. Mr. Carter’s counsel called Ms. Van Burkleo to testify. Id. In her testimony, 

Ms. Van Burkleo claimed that she had, in fact, signed the oath on the emergency petition. 

Id. She said that, at the prior hearing, her response to questioning by Mr. Van Burkleo and 

Judge Easter was only that her signature “looked different” on the emergency petition. She 

insisted that the signature on the petition was in fact hers and that she had signed it in the 

presence of Mr. Carter. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo commented that, from time to time, she 

would change up her signature. Id.

At the same hearing, Mr. Doll asked Ms. Van Burkleo whether she had “come in 

[his] office . . . with all three children on March the 1st to sign the [emergency] petition,” 

and Ms. Van Burkleo said she did. Id. Judge Easter pointed out to Ms. Van Burkleo that 

her answer was not consistent with her previous testimony under oath. Id. Nevertheless, 

Mr. Doll pressed forward to ask Ms. Van Burkleo if Mr. Carter was present and notarized 

her signature on March 1, 2013, and Ms. Van Burkleo said yes. Id. In light of Ms. Van 

Burkleo’s testimony, Judge Easter said there was no longer an issue about her signature on 

the emergency petition. Id.

On July 13, 2015, the District Attorney General obtained grand jury indictments 

against Ms. Van Burkleo and Mr. Doll. Id. at *1. Counts 1 and 2 alleged that Ms. Van 

Burkleo committed aggravated perjury when she testified falsely under oath that a notary 

public witnessed her sign an affidavit in support of her emergency petition for a temporary 

restraining order against her ex-husband. Id. The indictment also alleged that Ms. Van 

Burkleo testified falsely during the show cause hearing to determine the authenticity of her 

notarized signature. Id. Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment alleged that, on June 18, 2013, 

Mr. Doll committed subornation of aggravated perjury with regard to the same emergency 

petition. Id. Count 5 alleged that Mr. Doll committed criminal simulation on March 1, 

2013 by forging Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the oath on the petition. Id. 

Mr. Doll was tried on the criminal charges before a Williamson County jury, and 

Judge Mark Fishburn presided over the trial. At the trial, the State presented evidence from 

Ms. Van Burkleo’s employer that she was at work on March 1, 2013 at the time the 

emergency petition was signed and notarized. Id. at *6. Mr. Carter testified that he did not 

 

6 The Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion appears to refer to this hearing as a “show cause” 

hearing, but the reference is not entirely clear. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *1.
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recall anything about the emergency petition, including whether he notarized the signatures 

of either Ms. Van Burkleo or Mr. Doll. Id.

Ms. Van Burkleo testified that Mr. Doll represented her in post-divorce proceedings 

in her efforts to change the visitation arrangement with her ex-husband because she was 

concerned for the physical and mental safety of her children. Id. As summarized by the 

Court of Criminal Appeals, Ms. Van Burkleo testified at trial about the signature on her 

oath for the emergency petition and why she had given prior inconsistent statements about 

it: 

She agreed that at the March 26, 2013 hearing, she said that the signature on 

the petition was not her signature. She said she told Judge Easter that she 

had no idea who had signed the document.

Ms. Van Burkleo said that, the following day, [Mr. Doll] called her 

and seemed irritated and said “don’t you remember giving me permission to 

sign your name?” She told him that she did not and further that she did not 

have an email indicating as much, which was the usual course of her 

arrangement with [Mr. Doll]. She thought [Mr. Doll] sounded irritated and 

very short. Ms. Van Burkleo said this was the first she learned that it was 

[Mr. Doll] who had signed her name.

Ms. Van Burkleo was extremely concerned for her children, so [Mr. 

Doll] filed a second emergency petition on her behalf. During the course of 

their discussions, [Mr. Doll] told Ms. Van Burkleo that attorneys sign 

documents for clients frequently and that he might get a minor reprimand 

but, since the conten[t]s of the affidavit were true, there would be no harsh 

punishment. [Mr. Doll] then told her during their phone conversation, “you 

just say, you know, all those documents that you saw, all your signatures look 

different, but that they’re all yours.” [Mr. Doll] also told her that Mr. Carter

could get in trouble and lose his job if Ms. Van Burkleo did not say that it 

was her signature. Ms. Van Burkleo said that, on the day of the hearing, [Mr. 

Doll] met her outside the courtroom and reminded her that Mr. Carter could 

lose his job and instructed her how to testify. He never informed her that she 

could get into trouble for lying under oath. Instead, he gave her the 

impression that it was fine because the contents of the affidavit were in fact 

true. She said that she trusted him, and she testified that all of the signatures 

on the petitions, including the March 1, 2013 petition, belonged to her.
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Ms. Van Burkleo said that she never went to [Mr. Doll’s] office at all 

on March 1, 2013. She never signed the affidavit petition in the presence of 

Mr. Carter. She agreed that she perjured herself when she said otherwise. 

She had been indicted for two counts of aggravated perjury.

 

Id. at *6–7. 

The State also offered the testimony of a handwriting expert. Id. at *7. The expert 

testified: “Ms. Van Burkleo’s known signature was not similar to the one on the petition.” 

Id. The expert also testified that “after examining known signatures of [Mr. Doll], it 

appeared that it was [Mr. Doll] who signed Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the petition.” 

Id.

Mr. Doll testified at his trial. Id. He explained that “he had the petition ready to go 

and left it for Ms. Van Burkleo to sign. He assumed that she did so. He denied ever asking 

Ms. Van Burkleo to testify that she had signed the petition or that Mr. Carter had notarized 

her signature.” Id. On cross-examination, Mr. Doll acknowledged that “he told Judge

Easter at the April 23, 2013, hearing that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his office on March 1, 

2013, at 3:00 p.m. to sign the emergency ex parte petition.” Id. Mr. Doll also

acknowledged that “he questioned his own client, Ms. Van Burkleo, about whether she 

came to his office on March 1, 2013. Her answer resulted in her being charged with 

aggravated perjury and also being prosecuted civilly for over a million dollars by” her exhusband. Id.

Mr. Doll claimed he was unaware of who actually signed Ms. Van Burkleo’s name 

for the petition, but he conceded that “some of the ‘slants’ and ‘angles’ of his own signature 

mirrored those of the signature purported to be of Ms. Van Burkleo on the petition. He 

agreed that the signature on the petition did not look like any other that he had seen from 

Ms. Van Burkleo.” Id.

On May 17, 2017, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Mr. Doll of two 

counts of suborning aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation. Id. at *1. 

The trial court sentenced him to two years of probation. Id.

Mr. Doll appealed his convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.7 On 

December 8, 2020, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. Id. Mr. Doll 

sought permission to appeal his convictions to this Court, which was denied. Doll, 2020 

WL 7231101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 13, 2021). 

 

7 Mr. Doll appealed the timeliness of his indictment; he did not contest the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his convictions. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. 
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Disciplinary Proceedings

The offenses for which Mr. Doll was convicted are Class E felonies and constitute 

“serious crimes” under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.

8

 Consequently, after 

the convictions, BPR Disciplinary Counsel notified the Tennessee Supreme Court of the 

convictions.

9

 On May 31, 2017, this Court suspended Mr. Doll’s law license and referred

the matter to the Board for formal proceedings “in which the sole issue to be determined 

shall be the extent of final discipline” to be imposed.10 

 

8 Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 2 defines “serious crime” as:

any felony and any other crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the 

statutory or common law definition of such crime, involves improper conduct as an 

attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, 

fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, willful tax evasion, deceit, bribery, 

extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of another 

to commit a “serious crime.”

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 2.

9 Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.1 provides: 

(a) The clerk of any court in this state in which an attorney enters a plea of nolo 

contendere or a plea of guilty to, or is found guilty by verdict of the jury or of the trial court 

sitting without a jury of, a crime shall within ten days of the plea or verdict transmit a copy 

thereof to the Court and to Disciplinary Counsel.

 (b) Any attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court who has entered a 

plea of nolo contendere or a plea of guilty to, or who has been found guilty by verdict of 

the jury or of the trial court sitting without a jury of, any serious crime, as defined in Section 

2, shall within ten days of such plea or verdict provide adequate proof of the plea or verdict, 

including a copy thereof, to Disciplinary Counsel.

 (c) Upon receiving notice from an attorney pursuant to Section 22.1(b) with respect to 

any serious crime, as defined in Section 2, or upon otherwise being advised that an attorney 

subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court has entered a plea of nolo contendere 

or a plea of guilty to, or has been found guilty by verdict of the jury or of the trial court 

sitting without a jury of, any crime, Disciplinary Counsel shall obtain adequate proof of 

the plea or verdict, including a copy thereof, and shall file the same with a Notice of 

Submission in the Nashville office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.1. 

10 Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3(c) provides:
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On June 1, 2017, the Board filed a petition for final discipline against Mr. Doll, and 

a hearing panel was appointed. Mr. Doll notified the BPR of his intent to appeal the 

convictions, so resolution of the petition was deferred until the conclusion of Mr. Doll’s 

appeals. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).11 

Once the appeal of the underlying criminal convictions concluded, the disciplinary 

proceedings resumed. The hearing panel tried the matter on November 23, 2021. 

 

At the hearing, Mr. Doll was the only person to testify. Mr. Doll admitted to the 

fact of his felony convictions, and that they all related to his actions as a practicing attorney 

and occurred while he was representing a client before the court. While Mr. Doll’s counsel 

emphasized that Mr. Doll acknowledged he could not challenge the convictions, he gave 

context for them. For example, Mr. Doll emphasized that, at the trial on the criminal 

charges, Ms. Van Burkleo was a cooperating witness with criminal charges against her, 

and that she testified differently than she had testified at the show cause hearing before 

Judge Easter. Mr. Doll said that his “recollection is [Ms. Van Burkleo] came in and to my 

knowledge signed that document.” He said he had been paid a flat fee earlier, so he made 

no money on the emergency petition, and that he had a good attorney-client relationship 

with Ms. Van Burkleo until she testified against him at his criminal trial. Mr. Doll 

acknowledged that, as a result of the events, Ms. Van Burkleo was charged with perjury 

and sued by her former husband. 

Before the hearing panel, the Board argued that the presumptive sanction was 

disbarment under Standard 5.1 of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing 

Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), based on the serious nature of the crimes of which 

Mr. Doll was convicted, and the fact that they involve intentional interference with the 

administration of justice, dishonesty and deceit, and soliciting another to commit those 

 

(c) Upon the receipt of adequate proof and copies of a judgment, plea of nolo 

contendere or guilty plea with respect to a serious crime, as defined in Section 2, the Court 

shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions of Section 

22.3(a), also refer the matter to the Board for the institution of a formal proceeding before 

a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined is the extent of the final discipline 

to be imposed, provided that a disciplinary proceeding so instituted will not be brought to 

hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded. 

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c). 

11 Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3(c), states that “a disciplinary proceeding so 

instituted will not be brought to hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.” Tenn. Sup. 

Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c). 
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offenses. It emphasized that his actions took place in proceedings before a court and were 

detrimental to the administration of justice. The Board pointed out Mr. Doll’s prior 

disciplinary history, his substantial experience in the practice of law, his illegal conduct, 

and the dishonest nature of his offenses as aggravating factors. 

Counsel for Mr. Doll did not dispute the presumptive sanction under the ABA 

Standards but emphasized the hearing panel’s discretion in determining the sanction. He 

contended Mr. Doll had no dishonest or selfish motive, noted he had cooperated with the 

BPR investigation of the matter, and argued that the prior discipline was remote from the 

current convictions. Finally, arguing there is “disparity” in lawyer discipline, counsel for 

Mr. Doll asked the hearing panel to compare a disciplinary case, In re Grace Ingrid 

Gardiner, in which the attorney received a suspension rather than a disbarment for what he 

characterized as similar misconduct.

12

 

The Board objected to this last argument, arguing that recent Tennessee Supreme 

Court cases had indicated that hearing panels were not to consider comparative cases. 

The panel allowed Mr. Doll’s attorney to argue the Gardiner case and took the 

matter under advisement.13 

On December 1, 2021, the hearing panel issued its decision. The panel found the 

Board had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Doll was convicted of three 

criminal offenses, including two acts of subornation of aggravated perjury and criminal 

simulation, all of which are felonies and constitute serious crimes.

To determine the sanction, the hearing panel then looked to the ABA Standards. 

The panel found applicable Standards 5.1 and 5.11,

14 which identify disbarment as the 

 

12 Counsel for Mr. Doll cited In re Grace Ingrid Gardiner from the BPR press release as BPR 

Number 23269, a disciplinary matter that apparently was not appealed. 

13 Counsel for Mr. Doll argued that the misconduct in Gardiner was similar to that of Mr. Doll, 

including presenting to a bankruptcy court a document with a forged signature, but the sanction imposed 

was three years of suspension, with four months active suspension and the remainder on probation. The 

Board responded that, if the panel chose to consider comparative cases, Gardiner was distinguishable 

because the attorney in that case was not convicted of a crime. 

14 ABA Standard 5.11 states:

5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 

(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes 

intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
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presumptive sanction “when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary 

element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 

swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, and solicitation of another to commit any of these 

offenses.” The hearing panel also found applicable Standards 7.0 and 7.1,

15 because Mr. 

Doll “violated his duties owed as a professional by knowingly engaging in conduct with 

the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causing serious or potentially 

serious injury to a client.” These ABA Standards also identify disbarment as the 

presumptive sanction. 

The panel found five aggravating factors. The first was prior discipline; the panel 

found that the Board had shown Mr. Doll had a September 19, 2011 private informal 

admonition, an April 14, 2014 public censure, and a September 20, 2018 ninety-day 

summary suspension. The second aggravating factor was Mr. Doll’s dishonest and selfish 

motives. The third was Mr. Doll’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 

misconduct, and the fourth was Mr. Doll’s substantial experience in the practice of law. 

The fifth aggravating factor was Mr. Doll’s illegal conduct, consisting of the three felony 

convictions, including two for subornation of aggravated perjury. 

The hearing panel found one mitigating factor, Mr. Doll’s cooperative attitude in 

the disciplinary proceedings. 

The hearing panel’s decision considered Mr. Doll’s argument that disbarment was 

not proportionate in light of a comparative case, Gardiner. The hearing panel distinguished 

Gardiner, noting that the attorney in that case was neither charged nor convicted of a 

criminal offense. It also acknowledged the Board’s argument that the hearing panel was 

not permitted to consider comparative cases.

 

misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft . . . or solicitation of another 

to commit any of these offenses

ABA Standard 5.11 

15 ABA Standard 7.1 states:

7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that 

is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the 

lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or 

the legal system.

ABA Standard 7.1. 
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The hearing panel pointed to Mr. Doll’s convictions and said that “conviction of 

such acts, particularly of acts of subornation of aggravated perjury, cuts through the very 

heart of the judicial system and cannot be minimized in any way.” After cross-motions to 

alter or amend, the hearing panel entered an order reaffirming its decision to disbar Mr. 

Doll.16

Trial Court Review

Mr. Doll filed a petition for review of the hearing panel’s judgment in the Davidson 

County Chancery Court, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(a). In 

support of his argument that disbarment was a disproportionate sanction, Mr. Doll asked 

the trial court to consider comparative cases, again citing the Gardiner disciplinary 

decision. The trial court declined to do so. The trial court said it understood the holdings

in Meehan v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 584 

S.W.3d 403 (Tenn. 2019) and Beier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme 

Court, 610 S.W.3d 425 (Tenn. 2020), to be that hearing panels and trial courts in attorney 

disciplinary cases are to rely on the ABA Standards, not sanctions imposed in comparative 

cases, to choose the appropriate sanction.17 

On November 8, 2022, the trial court issued its memorandum opinion affirming the 

judgment of the hearing panel. The trial court agreed that Standard 5.11(a) reflected the 

appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr. Doll’s convictions of subornation of aggravated 

perjury and criminal simulation, reasoning that “[a]ll three offenses amount to an 

intentional interference with the administration of justice” and are “explicit violations of 

[the] duty owed by every attorney.” Turning to the aggravating and mitigating factors, the 

trial court said “there can be no serious challenge to the Panel’s conclusion that the 

 

16 The Board filed a motion asking the hearing panel to alter its order to clarify that, in support of 

its contention that the panel was not to consider comparative cases, the Board had cited Beier v. Board of 

Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court, 610 S.W.3d 425, 436 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Meehan v. Board 

of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 584 S.W.3d 403, 416 (Tenn. 2019)). The 

Board also contended that the panel improperly addressed Mr. Doll’s argument that the punishment of 

disbarment by considering a comparative case. Mr. Doll filed a response and a petition to rehear arguing 

that Beier and Meehan did not prohibit the panel from considering comparative cases in determining the 

proper discipline. 

On January 12, 2022, the hearing panel entered the order reaffirming its earlier decision. The panel 

distinguished Beier because the attorney in that case was not convicted of a crime. In support of its decision 

to disbar Mr. Doll, the panel cited Meehan, in which the attorney was convicted of a serious crime, and this 

Court affirmed disbarment as the sanction. 

17 The trial judge commented that he had been the trial judge in both Meehan and Beier and was 

well familiar with them. 
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aggravating factors far outweigh the single mitigating factor.” It affirmed disbarment as 

the appropriate sanction for Mr. Doll. 

Mr. Doll now appeals to this Court under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 

33.1(d). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court oversees the practice of law in this State in exercise of the authority 

vested in it by the Tennessee Constitution. Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 435–36 (Tenn. 2020) 

(citing Tenn. Const. art. II, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. II, § 2; Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1). 

“Accordingly, when we are called upon to review judgments in disciplinary proceedings 

against lawyers, we do so in light of our fundamental and inherent power to promulgate, 

administer, and enforce the rules governing the licensing and professional conduct of 

lawyers practicing in Tennessee.” Talley v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 358 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tenn. 

2011). When an attorney or the Board seeks judicial review of the hearing panel’s decision, 

the trial court’s “review shall be on the transcript of the evidence before the hearing panel 

and its findings and judgment.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). The trial court may:

reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the party filing the Petition for 

Review have been prejudiced because the hearing panel’s findings, 

inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or 

statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the hearing panel’s jurisdiction; (3) 

made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized 

by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5) 

unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light 

of the entire record.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). Subsection (d) addresses appeals to the Tennessee Supreme 

Court. 

Either party dissatisfied with the decree of the circuit or chancery court may 

prosecute an appeal directly to the Court. The appeal shall be determined 

upon the transcript of the record from the circuit or chancery court, which 

shall include the transcript of evidence before the hearing panel, and upon 

the parties’ briefs but without oral argument, unless the Court orders 

otherwise.
- 14 -

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d). In all, this Court “bear[s] ultimate responsibility for 

enforcing the rules governing our profession. Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 437 (quoting Mabry v. 

Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Supreme Court, 458 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2014). 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Doll argues that BPR hearing panels have the authority to review 

comparative discipline, i.e. prior disciplinary cases involving similar circumstances, to

determine the proper sanction in a given case. In the alternative, he argues that, under this 

Court’s review, suspension rather than disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Mr. Doll. 

We consider both issues in turn. 

Hearing Panel Review 

Mr. Doll argues first that, in deciding the recommended sanction in a disciplinary 

matter, BPR hearing panels may review comparative discipline, i.e. prior disciplinary 

decisions involving similar circumstances. Indeed, Mr. Doll asserts that a hearing panel 

would abuse its discretion by declining to review such comparative discipline. 

We respectfully disagree. In attorney disciplinary cases, BPR hearing panels derive

their authority from Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9. Section 

15.4 of Rule 9 provides: “In determining the appropriate type of discipline, the hearing 

panel shall consider the applicable provisions of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). Rule 9 does not provide authority for either 

hearing panels or trial courts to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a 

review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases: 

Under Rule 9, a hearing panel is directed to consider the applicable 

provisions of the ABA Standards to determine the appropriate sanction in a 

particular case. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). There is no authority under 

Rule 9 for a hearing panel to base its recommended sanction on a review of 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. In addition, a trial court’s authority to 

reverse or modify a hearing panel’s decision is limited to the five grounds 

listed in Section 33.1(b). Inconsistency with sanctions in similar cases is not 

a listed ground. 

Meehan, 584 S.W.3d at 416. The holding in Meehan was emphasized later in Beier, in 

which the Court said that “neither BPR hearing panels nor reviewing trial courts are 
- 15 -

authorized to base a recommended sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in 

comparative cases.” 610 S.W.3d at 436–37. The Beier Court clarified:

The chancery court based its conclusion on the appropriate sanction in part 

on a comparative analysis, that is, a review of similar cases to determine the 

appropriate sanction. As noted above, this Court recently held that, while 

hearing panels and trial courts must consider the applicable provisions of the 

ABA Standards to determine the appropriate sanction in a particular case, 

“[t]here is no authority under Rule 9 for a hearing panel to base its 

recommended sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in similar cases.” 

Meehan, 584 S.W.3d at 416 (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a)). 

Moreover, “a trial court’s authority to reverse or modify a hearing panel’s 

decision is limited to the five grounds listed in Section 33.1(b). 

Inconsistency with sanctions in similar cases is not a listed ground.” Id. 

Thus, reviewing trial courts are not authorized to base a recommended 

sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. Our opinion 

in Meehan, however, was issued after the chancery court’s decision in this 

case, so the chancery court could not have been aware of it when the ruling 

was made. 

Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 448 n.23. Thus, this Court stated in both Meehan and Beier that Rule 

9 does not authorize either hearing panels or trial courts to base recommended attorney 

disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. 

Despite the language in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 and the Court’s directive 

in Meehan and Beier, Mr. Doll urges us to permit hearing panels and trial courts to utilize 

comparative cases to determine the appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary cases.

Doing so, he argues, would promote uniformity of punishment and align attorney 

disciplinary proceedings with current practices for mitigating a defendant’s sentence in 

criminal cases.18

 

18 Mr. Doll points to the United States Sentencing Guidelines applicable in federal criminal 

proceedings, which permit a criminal defendant to cite analogous cases to mitigate his sentence. He argues 

that disciplinary hearing panel proceedings are similar. 

We have repeatedly rejected similar attempts to liken attorney disciplinary proceedings to criminal 

proceedings. “As this Court has repeatedly held, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal 

proceedings.” Harris v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 645 S.W.3d 125, 136 (Tenn. 2022) (citing 

cases). 
- 16 -

We decline to do so. The omission in Rule 9 of authority for hearing panels and 

trial courts to consider comparative cases is intentional, not inadvertent. The Court recently 

explained the centrality of the ABA Standards to achieving uniformity of punishment in 

attorney discipline:

Regardless of comparative cases, . . . the primary tool for determining 

appropriate and consistent sanctions for attorney misconduct is the ABA 

Standards. The Standards themselves state their purpose:

The Standards constitute a model, setting forth a 

comprehensive system for determining sanctions, permitting 

flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular 

cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: (1) 

consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the 

appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; (2) 

consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light 

of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the 

imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar 

offenses within and among jurisdictions.

ABA Standard 1.3 (“Purpose of These Standards”). Thus, the ABA 

Standards were designed to promote consistency in the imposition of 

disciplinary sanctions. “Use of the ABA Standards will further the goal of 

our disciplinary system because they ‘combine clear, straight-forward 

guidelines which ensure a level of consistency necessary for fairness to the 

public and the legal system with the flexibility and creativity essential to 

secure justice to the disciplined lawyer.” Grievance Adm’r v. Lopatin, 612 

N.W.2d 120, 127 (Mich. 2000) (quoting In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52 

(Alaska 1986)). They serve as a guide to impose “a level of discipline that 

takes into account the unique circumstances of the individual case, but still 

falls within broad constraints designed to ensure consistency.” Id.

Under the ABA Standards, barring unusual circumstances, once the 

correct presumptive sanction is determined, that sanction generally applies 

unless aggravating or mitigating factors indicate a greater or lesser sanction 

is appropriate.

Manookian v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 685 S.W.3d 744, 808 (Tenn. 2024) 

(some citations omitted) (cleaned up). Thus, under Rule 9, hearing panels and trial courts 
- 17 -

considering attorney discipline promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by 

anchoring their decisions on punishment to the ABA Standards.

We recognize that attorney disciplinary matters are fact-intensive, and decisions on 

the appropriate sanction may hinge on nuance, detail, and unique circumstances in a 

particular case. See, e.g., In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d 288, 299 (Tenn. 2021) (noting there are 

“cases where the facts do not fit neatly within the ABA Standards”). For that reason, we 

have emphasized that the ABA Standards “serve as ‘guideposts’ for determining the 

appropriate punishment rather than ‘rigid rules that dictate a particular outcome.’” In re 

Vogel, 482 S.W.3d 520, 533 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Hyman v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 

437 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Tenn. 2014)).

The ABA Standards themselves “allow the application of aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances to adjust the sanction imposed.”19 In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tenn. 

2018) (citing ABA Standard 9.1)). The ABA Standards list of aggravating and mitigating 

factors “are illustrative, not exclusive, and other factors may be considered.” In re Sitton, 

618 S.W.3d at 303 (in addition to listed aggravating and mitigating factors, Court 

considered as an additional aggravating circumstance that lawyer’s unethical comments 

“were made in a very public setting, on social media”).

Courts have recognized that “meaningful comparisons of attorney sanction cases 

are difficult as the behavior that leads to sanction varies so widely between cases.” In re 

Robinson, 209 A.3d 570, 597 (Vt. 2019) (quoting In re Strouse, 34 A.3d 329, 340 (Vt.

2011) (Dooley, J., dissenting)). Tethering the disciplinary decisions of hearing panels and 

trial courts to the ABA Standards is the best way to afford them the flexibility needed to 

account for the unique circumstances in a given case, while also promoting consistency by 

ensuring that the level of discipline falls within broad boundaries. 

Still, our rules recognize that “[i]nconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction 

or among jurisdictions, cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary 

systems.” Background, ABA Standards. To minimize the risk of such inconsistency, this 

Court reviews attorney sanctions imposed across the State, even sanctions that are not 

appealed. See, e.g., Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b) (Court review where there is no appeal)

(“The Court shall review the recommended punishment provided in such judgment or 

settlement with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and 

appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.”); see also 

 

19 Aggravating circumstances are defined as “any considerations or factors that may justify an 

increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” ABA Standard 9.21. Mitigating circumstances are 

defined as “any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be 

imposed.” ABA Standard 9.31. 
- 18 -

Manookian, 685 S.W.3d at 807 (attorney appeal) (“For the sake of uniformity, we seek to 

review the sanctions imposed in any other cases with similar circumstances.”).

Hearing panels and trial courts have ready access to the relatively few reported 

opinions on disciplinary cases that are appealed, but have limited access to and familiarity 

with the greater number of disciplinary decisions that are not appealed. Moreover, 

unappealed disciplinary decisions not reflected in court opinions, such as the Gardiner case 

cited repeatedly by Mr. Doll, may reflect a lesser discipline for reasons that are not apparent

from press releases or summaries, such as proof or witness problems after investigation, 

TLAP referrals, and the like, but which are often revealed to this Court in documents filed 

to aid our review of the discipline. Thus, the Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective 

from seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—

whether appealed or not— puts it in the best position to appropriately consider comparative 

cases for the purpose of ensuring uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee.

For these reasons, we decline Mr. Doll’s invitation to interpret Tennessee Supreme 

Court Rule 9 as authorizing hearing panels and trial courts determining attorney discipline 

to consider comparative cases in addition to applying the ABA Standards. 

2. Supreme Court Review

We next review the sanction recommended by the hearing panel and affirmed by 

the trial court. Here, the hearing panel identified disbarment as the appropriate presumptive 

sanction under ABA Standards 5.11 and 7.1 and found five aggravating and one mitigating 

factor applicable. The trial court agreed with this analysis. 

We agree that disbarment under ABA Standards 5.11(a) and 7.1 is the appropriate 

presumptive sanction for Mr. Doll’s convictions of subornation of aggravated perjury and 

criminal simulation. As stated by the trial court, all three criminal convictions “amount to 

an intentional interference with the administration of justice” and “are explicit violations 

of dut[ies] owed by every attorney.” 

The hearing panel identified five aggravating factors: (1) prior discipline; (2) 

dishonest and selfish motives; (3) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 

misconduct; (4) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (5) the nature of the 

illegal conduct. It identified one mitigating factor, Mr. Doll’s cooperative attitude in the 

disciplinary proceedings. We agree that all of these factors are applicable, and we agree 

with the trial court that the five aggravating factors “far outweigh the single mitigating 

factor.” Thus, the hearing panel applied the appropriate ABA Standards and the 

aggravating and mitigating factors. 
- 19 -

Mr. Doll does not dispute these findings. Instead, Mr. Doll notes that the ABA 

Standards are guidelines, not mandates, and he asks this Court to conduct its own 

comparative analysis and find suspension, not disbarment, to be the appropriate sanction 

for Mr. Doll. 

In response, the Board argues that this Court should not undertake a review of 

comparative discipline unless we first determine that the hearing panel chose to apply 

incorrect ABA Standards. The Board points to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 

15.4(b), which applies when neither party appeals the sanction. Rule 15.4(b) states that 

this Court “review[s] the recommended punishment provided in such judgment[s] . . . with 

a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of 

punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 

15.4(b). Because this case was appealed under Section 33, the Board says this Court’s 

review is under the same standard of review as the trial court, citing Board of Professional 

Responsibility v. Reguli, 489 S.W.3d 408, 417 (Tenn. 2015). The Board posits that there 

“is no basis for the Court to conduct a proportionality review of the sanction in this case, 

absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court or the hearing panel.”

We respectfully disagree. This Court is the “final and ultimate arbiter of the

propriety of the professional conduct of all lawyers practicing in Tennessee.” Talley, 358 

S.W.3d at 190. The Court “reviews disciplinary judgments in light of our ‘inherent power 

. . . and fundamental right to prescribe and administer rules pertaining to the licensing and 

admission of attorneys.’” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 612 

(Tenn. 2010) (quoting In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tenn. 1995)). Nothing in our 

Rules precludes the Court from reviewing comparative cases on appeal. 

Moreover, the Board’s argument overlooks our precedent. In prior cases in which 

a party has appealed to this Court, we have said that, “[i]n reviewing the punishment 

appropriate for an offense, it is also appropriate to consider sanctions imposed in cases with 

similar facts.” Lockett v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 380 S.W.3d 19, 29 (Tenn. 2012); see also Bd. 

of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn. v. Maddux, 148 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tenn. 2004); Milligan v. 

Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 166 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tenn. 2005). This is true

even where the hearing panel applied the appropriate ABA Standards and their application 

of the standards and aggravating and mitigating factors was supported by substantial and 

material evidence. See Hanzelik v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 380 S.W.3d 669, 682 

(Tenn. 2012); Bailey v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 441 S.W.3d 223, 236 (Tenn. 2014). In all, we 

decline to constrain our appellate review in the manner suggested by the Board. 
- 20 -

Mr. Doll first asks us to compare his conduct to the attorney in In re Grace Ingrid 

Gardiner, which he obtained from a BPR press release on the attorney’s discipline.20 Both 

the hearing panel and the trial court were correct in observing that, unlike Mr. Doll, the 

attorney in Gardiner was not convicted of a crime.

Mr. Doll compares his conduct to cases where he says a suspension was imposed 

even though the attorneys were convicted of felony offenses, citing Lockett, 380 S.W.3d

19; In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d 71; Order, In re Ford, BPR #14312, No. M2016-01035-SCBAR-BP (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2016); and Order, In re Temple, BPR #26096, No. M2015-01280-

SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. June 27, 2016). 

As noted in In re Cope, in cases where an attorney was convicted of a felony, 

“almost all of the attorneys were disbarred.” 549 S.W.3d at 75. In the few cases where the 

attorney received a suspension instead of disbarment, there were significant differences 

from the facts in Mr. Doll’s case. 

First, in those cases, none of the attorneys had three felony convictions. See In re 

Cope, 549 S.W.3d at 72, 76 (one felony conviction for insider trading involving fraud and 

deceit); Order, In re Ford, BPR #14312, No. M2016-01035-SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. Dec. 22, 

2016) (theft over $1,000); Order, In re Temple, BPR #26096, No. M2015-01280-SC-BARBP (Tenn. June 27, 2016) (one attempted criminal usury conviction); Lockett, 380 S.W.3d 

at 22 (state court conviction of felony theft and federal court conviction of willful failure 

to file tax returns). 

Second, in the Cope opinion, the Court acknowledged that disbarment was the 

presumptive sanction, but pointed out that the attorney “had no other disciplinary actions 

in his career, his criminal conduct was atypical, and his conduct did not injure his clients.” 

In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d at 76. The same cannot be said of Mr. Doll. He has had three 

prior disciplinary actions, and his three felony convictions were directly related to his use 

of his law license. See In re Robinson, 209 A.3d at 597 (noting that prior case law did not 

support departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment because in prior cases 

where criminal conduct resulted in suspension “the criminal conduct was not directly 

related to the [attorneys’] use of their law licenses.”). 

 

20 For the reasons we noted above, cases that are not reflected in an opinion by this Court are less 

helpful than published opinions in a proportionality review. Press releases and summaries of these cases 

may not reflect things like proof or witness issues, nuance and detail that can be important in comparing 

one case to another. 
- 21 -

Significantly, Mr. Doll cannot claim that his conduct did not injure his client. The 

details about Mr. Doll’s misconduct and his defense in his disciplinary hearing show why 

his conduct toward his client was particularly egregious. 

Here, the proof in Mr. Doll’s criminal case, apparently credited by the jury, showed 

that Ms. Van Burkleo was at her workplace when the fake signature was placed on the oath 

for the emergency petition and notarized. The proof indicated that Mr. Doll himself put 

the signature on the document. 

The proof also showed that, after Ms. Van Burkleo testified that she did not sign the 

petition, at the next hearing, Mr. Doll told Judge Easter “that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his 

office the day that the petition was signed.” Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. At the next 

hearing, Mr. Doll embellished this untruth and told Judge Easter that his calendar showed 

he prepared the emergency petition on March 1, 2013, “two hours before Ms. Van Burkleo 

arrived in his office at 3:00 p.m. to review and sign the documents.” Id. at *6. 

Not content with his own prevarication to hide his misconduct, the proof at the 

criminal trial showed Mr. Doll proceeded to coach Ms. Van Burkleo into lying in open 

court. Ms. Van Burkleo testified that Mr. Doll called her and, in an irritated and short 

manner, said “don’t you remember giving me permission to sign your name?” Id. She 

responded that she did not. Id. He minimized his misconduct, telling her that “attorneys 

sign documents for clients frequently and that he might get a minor reprimand but, since 

the conten[t]s of the affidavit were true, there would be no harsh punishment.” Id. Mr. 

Doll went on to instruct her, at the hearing, “you just say, you know, all those documents 

that you saw, all your signatures look different, but that they’re all yours.” Id. He warned 

her that, if she did not repeat that lie, Mr. Carter “could get in trouble and lose his job.” Id. 

Ms. Van Burkleo testified at the criminal trial that, the day of the show cause hearing 

before Judge Easter, Mr. Doll met her outside the courtroom “and reminded her that Mr. 

Carter could lose his job and instructed her how to testify.” Id. Mr. Doll never disclosed 

to Ms. Van Burkleo that he was coaching her to commit a criminal offense; instead he led 

her to believe “it was fine because the contents of the affidavit were in fact true.” Id. Ms. 

Van Burkleo dutifully followed Mr. Doll’s instructions, and ended up being charged with 

criminal offenses for the conduct he urged upon her. 

Thus, it is undisputed that the jury in the criminal case credited testimony showing 

that Mr. Doll took advantage of the trust his client placed in him and pressured her into 

lying in court, all in order to shield Mr. Doll from the fallout of his actions. This course of 

action resulted in disastrous consequences for Mr. Doll’s client. 
- 22 -

The record also supports the hearing panel’s finding, as an aggravating factor, that

Mr. Doll refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. True enough, 

after his conviction for subornation of aggravated perjury, Mr. Doll conceded he could not 

dispute the underlying criminal convictions and acknowledged they all related to his 

actions as a practicing attorney. He acknowledged that Ms. Van Burkleo was charged with 

perjury and sued by her former husband. But instead of recognizing that these 

consequences were caused by his choices and actions, Mr. Doll continued to maintain that 

Ms. Van Burkleo in fact signed the oath on the emergency petition,21 and he insinuated that 

the real problem was Ms. Van Burkleo’s choice to testify untruthfully that she did not.22

He apparently viewed himself as a victim of the contentious nature of post-divorce 

litigation: “You know, if I could add, domestic attorneys who did this a little longer than 

me and who are a lot wiser than me advised me don’t handle post divorce matters. I wish 

I’d listened.” Mr. Doll’s continuing “claim [that] this is all just a gross misunderstanding 

. . . is not taking responsibility.” In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d at 303. 

As emphasized by the hearing panel below, Mr. Doll’s conduct in this case, 

particularly his subornation of aggravated perjury, “cuts through the very heart of the 

judicial system and cannot be minimized in any way.” We agree with the hearing panel 

and the trial court that disbarment, rather than suspension, is the appropriate sanction for 

Mr. Doll. 

For those reasons, we affirm the chancery court’s affirmation of the hearing panel’s 

sanction of disbarment, effective upon entry of this Court’s order under Tennessee 

Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1.

23

 

 

21 In his testimony, Mr. Doll maintained that his “recollection is [Ms. Van Burkleo] came in and to 

my knowledge signed that document.” 

22 Mr. Doll testified that his relationship with Ms. Van Burkleo was good and “there was really no 

conflict between the two of us until she testified at trial” that she did not sign the oath on the emergency 

petition. 

23 At the Board’s suggestion, the hearing panel’s initial order recommended Mr. Doll be disbarred 

retroactive to the date of his summary suspension on May 31, 2017. The Board later asked the panel to 

strike the retroactivity language. The panel’s modified order did not modify the retroactivity language. In 

its brief to this Court, the Board asks us to fix the retroactivity language. 

Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1, Mr. Doll’s disbarment is effective upon 

entry of this Court’s order. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 28.1. During Mr. Doll’s appeals of his criminal 

conviction, this Court amended Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 30.2 to provide: “Individuals 

disbarred under Rule 9 prior to July 1, 2020, may not apply for reinstatement until the expiration of at least 

five years from the effective date of the disbarment.” That order also amended Tennessee Supreme Court 

Rule 9, section 30.4(d) to state: “Individuals disbarred on or after July 1, 2020, are not eligible for 
- 23 -

CONCLUSION

We hold the trial court’s decision upholding the hearing panel’s sanction of 

disbarment was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel to disbar Mr. Doll 

from the practice of law in the State of Tennessee. Mr. Doll’s disbarment shall be effective 

upon entry of this Court’s order under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1. The 

costs of this appeal are taxed to Robert Allen Doll, III and his surety, for which execution 

may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

HOLLY KIRBY, CHIEF JUSTICE

 

reinstatement.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 30.4(d). These amendments took “effect immediately” upon the 

filing of the January 23, 2020 order. 

The petition for discipline against Mr. Doll was filed on June 1, 2017, but because of the intervening 

criminal proceedings and appeals, the hearing panel decision recommending disbarment was not issued 

until December 1, 2021. Therefore, Mr. Doll is subject to the July 1, 2020 rule change making disbarment 

permanent.