## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fo rt Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 23

- 00260

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 467th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 21

- 2973

- 462

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### R.C., A 

### C HILD2 MEMORAND UM OPINION

A ppella nt Father
, 1 pro se, brings this res tricted appeal fr om a post

- ans wer

defau lt judgment te rmi nating his parental rights in a suit brought by M other

. As we

construe Father ’ s fou r issues
, they all pertain to his notice of the final hearing i n the

suit, his ri gh t to be heard, or both

. Because Fath er has not shown that error i s

app ar en t from the face of the record , we affirm the tr ial court ’ s judgment

.

I. Backg round

Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evi de nce supporting the trial

co u rt ’ s findings that his parental rights should be terminated

. W e will theref ore set

out a de t ailed tim e line of only the case’s procedural history

.

• In 20 19
, Father confessed to and was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child.

• On A pril 12, 202 1
, Mother fi led a petiti on to terminate Father ’s parental rights

to R.C. alleging that Father had (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that would endanger the physical

or em otional well

- bein g of the chi l d; ( 2) engaged in cond uct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endanger ed the physical or emotional well

- being of the child; and ( 3) knowingly engaged in criminal conduct tha t had result ed in his conviction of an offense a nd

c onfinement or impr isonment and inability t o care for the child for not less than two years from the date Mother filed the petition

. See Tex. Fam

. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)( D ), ( E )
, (Q)

. The p etiti on also alleged th at termination of th e parent

− chi ld r elationship betw een Father and R.C. w as in the best interest of the child

. See id. § 161.001(b) ( 2)

. Mother sought to be name d R

. C .’s sole manag ing conservator.

1 We re fer to the parties as “ Father ” and “ Mother ” to protect the iden tity of

t he ir minor c hild
, R

. C. See Tex. Fam . C o de Ann. § 109. 002(d) ; Tex. R. Ap p. P. 9.8(b)(2)

.3 • On April 29
, 2021
, the trial c o urt se t a final hearing for Septem ber 28, 2021

.

• At 8:42 a.m . on June 2, 2021, a Fort Bend County Constabl e served Father at the prison unit where Father was incarcerated with Mother ’ s petition, the citation, and the Notice of Fina l Hea r ing

. 2

• Father f iled a “ response , ” 3 dated June 21, 2021, and file

- marked June 2 5, 2021
, to Mother ’ s petition

.

• The trial co urt proceeded with the final hearing via Zoom on the morning of September 28, 2021, the date spe ci f ied in the noti ce of he aring with whi ch Father was served

. The trial cour t found that Father
, “ although duly a nd properly notified, did not appear and wholl y made default .” Mother test i f

i e d
, and the trial court found by cl ear an d convincing evi dence that Father had (1) engaged in conduct that en dangered the emotional well

- being of R.C. and (2) knowingly engaged i n criminal conduct that resulted in his convic tion for an offense and confinement or imprisonm en t and inabilit y t o ca re for R.C. for no t less than two years from the filing of Mo ther ’ s pe tition

. 4 The trial court also found that it was in R

. C .’s best inter est for Father ’s parental rights to be termina ted and appointed Mother a s sole managing conse rvator

. The trial

court signed an Order of Termination terminating th e parent

− child relationship between Father and R.C. that same day

. 5

2 Two of the do cuments wi th which Father was served are attach e d as an app e ndix to this opinion.

3 By fi ling a signed letter that identifie d the parties, the case , and his current addres s, Father “ su fficiently appeared by answer ” in this case. S ee Smith v. L ippm ann , 826 S.W .2d 1 37, 138 (Tex. 1992)

. W e will refer to this filing as Father ’s answer

.

4 The trial court di d not find that Father had kno wingly placed or k nowing ly allowe d R.C. to remain in conditions or surroundings that enda nger ed her ph ysical or emotional well

- be ing

.

5 The clerk ’ s re cord contains a copy o f a letter

— dated September 29, 202 1, and addressed to Father at t he prison unit where he was i ncarcerated

— not if

yi ng him that the Order of Termination, “ an appe alable or der, ” was signed by the trial court o n September 28
, 2021

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306 a (3)

. Although this letter was made a part4 • Father m a iled a letter t o the trial court dated March 23, 2022, that concluded with the praye r, “ Th e respondent ente rs and files th is a ppeal before the c ourt

an d grants a ll relief requested within and be g ranted [ sic] a new hearing for termination order

. ” 6

• Father subsequently wr o te t he trial co urt another letter
, which was filed by the trial cour t c lerk on April 5, 2022
, refe rencing his “ appeal

. ”

• Father ’s f irst letter was file

- stamped by the trial court clerk on Ap ril 18, 2022

.

• On July 10, 2023
, Father f i led a new notice of a restricted appeal and his

“ Requ est to Clerk and Desig nation of Material to be Included in Clerk ’ s Record on Appeal

. ” The t ri al court clerk filed these document s on July 24, 2023

.

• A lso on July 24, 2023, the trial court clerk forwarded Father ’s post tri al fi lings, i n cludi n g his notice o f a restricted appe al
, to this court

.

• On Augus t 1, 2023
, w e issued a letter to Father expressing our concern that we

ma y no t have juri sdictio n over this appeal and request ing that Father advise whether he properly addres sed, stamped, and delivered the notice of appeal to
t he prison mailbox for m ailing to th e proper trial court cler k on or before the due date
, which was March 28, 2022

.

• On August 14
, 202 3
, we received a letter (dated August 7 , 2023) from Father stating t hat he had “ properly addressed, stamped, and delivered t he notice of

a ppeal to the prison mailbox for maili ng to the proper trial court on or b efore

t he du e date

. ” We have since received the c le r k ’ s a n d reporter ’ s records
, and both parties have filed thei r b r iefs. 7

of the appellate record, i t is not file

- marked, an d the re is no ev iden ce of when Father received it

.

6 As far as the record reveals, this was Father ’ s firs t communication or atte mpt to communicate with the trial court after he filed his answer the pre vious June.

7 After Mother filed he r b r ief
, Fath er filed a repl y brief and a motion to strike Mother ’ s brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 (k )
, 38

. 3

. He points out that Mother ’ s brief

co ntains the wrong trial and appellate co u rt cause numbers

. He also compla ins that5 II. Element s of Restrict ed Ap peal

To pr ev ail in t his r estricted ap peal, Father must show tha t (1) he ti mely filed hi s

notice of rest r icted appeal ; (2) he w as a party to the u nderlying su it ; (3) he did not

part icipate in the hearing that resulted in the complained

- o f judgment a nd di d not

timely fil e a pos tjudg ment moti on , reque st for findings of fact and co nc lus ions of l aw ,

or a notice o f app eal within the time permitted b y Rule 26.1(a ) ; a nd ( 4) error i s

app ar en t from the face of the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30; Ale xan de r v.
Lynda ’ s Boutique
, 134 S.W .3d 845 , 8 48 (Te x. 2004) ; In re S.W.
, 614 S.W.3 d 31 1, 313
(T e x. App.

— Fort Wo r th 2020, no pet. )

. The fi rst three ele ments are nece ssary to

invoke our re st ricted

- appeal jurisdiction, but the f ou rth is not. Ex parte E.H.
, 602

S.W.3d 486, 4 96 (Tex. 20 20)

. 8

III. Juris diction Ov er Fathe r ’ s Appeal

Mother concede s that th e s econd and third jurisdictional elements “ are not at

issue ” here

. But Mother conte nd s that Father ’s “ formal Notice o f Restricted App eal ”

her br ief ’ s front cov er does not contain her lead counsel ’ s State Bar of Texas identification number
, as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 (g )

. See Tex. R. Ap p. P. 9 .4 (g )

. “ Because briefs are mean t to acquaint the court with the i s sues in a case and to present argument that will enable the court to decide the case, substantial compliance ” w ith the briefing rules “ is sufficient

. ” Tex. R. App. P. 38.9

. W e de ny Father ’ s motion to strike

.

8 In Ex part e E.H. , the Texas Supreme Court cl a rified that al thoug h language in Brown v . Mc Len nan C ounty Chi ldre n ’ s Protective Serv ice s “ suggested ” that th e f ourth ele men t of a restricted app eal is jurisdict ional, it is not. 602 S.W

. 3d at 496 (citing Br own , 62 7 S. W.2 d 390, 392 (Tex. 1982) )

.6 was filed “ well past the s ix

- month deadline to file a notice of restricted appeal .” Thus
,

M ot her contends tha t we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. We disagree.

In a restricted appe al, the notice of appeal must be filed within six months after

th e order being appe aled is signed. See Tex. R. App. P. 2 6.1(c). Th e trial cour t signed

th e Order o f Termination on September 28, 2021
, making any notice of restricted

a ppeal due by March 28, 2022

. See id.

A timely filed instrument will invoke the appell a te court ’ s jurisd iction if it

demonstrates a bona fide attempt to do so

. Stat e ex rel. D urden v . Shahan , 658 S.W. 3 d

300, 304 (Tex. 2022). On its face, Father ’s letter of Mar ch 23, 2022, appears to

dem onstrate a bona fide attempt to appeal the Order of T ermination
, and Mother
does not argue otherwise. Instea d, sh e argue s that the letter“ was filed wi th the trial

cou r t clerk on April 18, 2022 ,” the da te of the file stam p on the document . H owever,

because Father is a pro se inmate, his n otice of appeal is deemed filed when he put it

in the priso n mail system. $629.00 in U.S. Curren cy v. St at

e , No. 02

- 10

- 002 53- CV, 2010
WL 5187679, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth De c. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)

.
Based on Father ’s representation to this court that his le tter of Mar ch 23, 2022, “ was
properly addressed, stamped, an d delivered

. . . to t he prison m ailbox for maili n g to
the proper trial court on or before the du e date ,” w e hold that Father timely filed hi s
notice of appea l under Rule 26.1(c)

. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c ) ; Warner v

. Glass
, 135

S.W.3d 68 1, 68 4 ( Tex. 200 4) ( “[W]e decl i ne to pe nalize a pro se litigant for failing to

obtai n a postmark or file -s tamp when the litigant has timely placed the docume nt in7 the prison mail system, the only delivery system to w hich he or she has access.” )

. We

theref ore have jur isdi ctio n over thi s restric ted appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1 (b) ;

Dur den
, 658 S.W.3d at 304

– 05

.

IV. Father ’s First Issue: Ben ch Warrant

Father state s his first issue as follows:

I n the respondent ’ s orig inal answer, he states he will cha llenge thi s suit

v

igor ousl y conveyin g any pro ceedings he wants to be a part of and includ e d even though he never submitted a request to have a bench

warrant issued. With the respondent stating this, does this constitute

a nd take place of a request for a b ench warra nt?

Father m a kes no further argume nt and does not cite the rec ord o r any

authorities o n this issue

. I f Father is in tending to complain that the trial court e rred
by not issuing him a bench warrant

— even though, as h e concede s, he n ever req ueste d

o ne

— then he has forfe ited this complaint by not raising it in the trial court below. See

Tex . R. App. P. 33. 1(a)(1)(A)

. To p reserve a complaint for appellate review, a party
must present to the trial court a timely requ est, objection, or m otion th at state s the

spec i fic groun ds for the desired ruli ng, if not app arent f rom the request’s, objection’s,

or motion’s context. Id. If a party fails to do this, then error is n ot preserved. Bushell

v. Dean , 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 ( Tex. 1991) (op. on r eh’g) ; s ee also B.M. v. Ma r ie M.
,

No

. 2

- 06

- 007

- CV, 2006 WL 1920475, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fo rt Worth July 13, 2006, no

pet.) (per curiam) (mem . op.) ( hold ing t hat incarcerated appellant had waived his
complaint on appeal that the trial court abu sed its discr eti on by failing to prov ide

some means by w hich appellant coul d participate at trial, suc h as is suing a bench8 warrant, where he had “ never s pecifically reque s ted some special provision to

facilitate his participation at trial ”).

Father h as also failed to pr eserve the remai nder of this issue —w het h er the

statement in his answer , “ If dismiss al is not vali d for abov e cause number, 21

- 2973

-

462 , we will contest termination of parental rights vigorously ,” constitute d and t oo k

the place of a requ est for a benc h warr ant

— for our revi ew be cause he d id no t

ad equately brief it. 9 See C iti zens Nat’l Ban k v. Allen Rae Invs. , Inc. , 142 S.W.3d 459, 489

–

9 Even i f Fathe r had un successfully reques ted a ben ch warrant and ad equately briefed this is sue for our revi ew , we would still overrule it

. A prisoner requesting a bench warr ant “ must justif y the n eed for his presence .” In re Z. L.T. , 124 S. W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 20 0 3) . W e review a trial court ’ s ruling on a bench warrant re quest for an abuse of di scretion. In re D.D.J. , 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 200 4
, no pet .). Following Z.L.T

. , we h ave repeatedly rejected appell at e complaints by incarcerated parti e s wh o, like Fa ther
, were denied be nc h w arrants b u t h ad f ailed to show that their presence was ne cessary. See I n re D.L.S. , No. 02

- 10

- 00366

- CV, 2011 W L 2989830 , at *3 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth July 21, 2011 , no pet.) (mem. op .) ; In re J.R.O., Jr. , No. 2

- 08

- 39 1- CV, 2 009 WL 3078647, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Sept. 24, 2009 , no pet.) (per curiam) ( mem

. op .) ( noting th at , even if incarcerated father had filed motion for i ssuance o f bench wa rrant w ith trial cour t, trial court wou ld not h ave abused its discretion by denying it becaus e father ’s motion “ provide [d] no discussion

or ass ertion of any of the fac tors set out in Z. L.T

. ”); Ringer v. Kimball , 274 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.

— For t Wo rth 20 08 , no pet.) ( holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in im plicitly denyi ng pri soner ’ s request for a bench warra nt because prison er ’ s bench warrant motion contained no i nf ormation by which trial court could assess the neces sity of his a ppeara nce at pretrial hearing ); In re C.M.R.
, No. 02

- 07

- 394

- CV, 2008 WL 4963510 , at *3

– 4 (Tex . App.

— Fort Wo rth Nov . 20, 2008 , no pet .) (per curiam) (mem. op. ) ( ho lding that trial court d id no t abuse its discretion by denying pro

se inmate ’s bench warrant r equest s b ecau se inmate “ offered no facts show ing that his interest in appearing outweighed the impact and burden on the correctional system ” and did not “ explain why his appearance by al terna tive measur es, such as by telephone, deposition, or affidavit, wo uld no t b e su fficient ”) ; see also D.D.J. , 136 S.W.3d at 312 (“ In a ccordance wit h the holding in Z.L.T

. , because Appellan t did not justify the nee d for his presenc e in his request for a b ench warrant, we cannot say that9 90 (Tex. App.

— Fort W orth 2004, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) ; Hall v . Stephenson , 919

S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. App

. — Fort Worth 1 996, w rit denied) ; see also Fredonia State

Ba n k v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. , 881 S.W.2d 279 , 284

– 85 ( Tex. 1994) (discussing the
“long

- standing rule” that point may not be preserved due to inadequate br iefing)

. Though Father is appearing pro se , we must h old him t o the same stand ards as a

licensed a tto r ney in our review o f his appeal. Ramos v. Veracruz F oods, LLC , No. 02

-

22

- 00116

- CV, 2022 WL 17986027, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.).
An appellate court is not re quired to s earch the appellate recor d, wi th no
guidance fro m the briefing party , to determine if the record suppo rts the party’s

argument. Allen Rae I nvs. , 14 2 S.W.3d at 489 ; Hall , 919 S.W.2d at 466

– 67 . Also, we

are not obligated to “become advocates for a p articul ar litiga nt” by performin g

res earch and devel opi n g argument for that litigant. Tello v. Bank One , N.A

. , 218
S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [14t h Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ( quoting Jordan v.

Jeffer son County
, 153 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.

— Amari llo 2004, pet. denied) )

.

Acco rdingly, we overrule Fathe r ’s first issue

. Se e T ex. R. Ap p. P. 38.1(i) (“The b rief

must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentio ns m ade, with appropriate

citations to auth orities and to th e record.”); Sanders v. Future Com, Ltd. , No. 02

- 1 5

-

00077

- CV, 2017 WL 2180706, at *6 (Tex. App.

— For t W orth May 18, 2017, no pet.)

the trial court ab used its discretion in de nyi ng A ppellant ’ s motion for a bench

wa rrant. ” )

.10 (m em. op.) (holding t hat a party did not adequately brief an issue bec ause he fail ed to

cite any relevant aut hority i n support of his argument ) ; Horn buckle v

. Stat e Farm Ins

. ,

No. 02

- 15

- 00387

- CV, 2016 WL 5 957020, at *3 (Tex. App

. — Fort Wo rth Oct. 13,

2016, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) ( “ In the absence of appropriate record

citatio ns or a substantive analysis, a brief does not pres ent an ad equate app ellate

issue.” ) ; Kramer v. Hollmann , No. 02

- 11

- 00136

- CV, 2012 WL 5869423, at *9 (Tex.
Ap p

. — Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (overruling issue for
inadequate briefing when appell ants set out issue in “Issues Prese nted” se ction of

their brie f bu t p resent ed no argument, record citations , or author ity to support it )

.

V

. Father ’ s Other Issues : Notice of Hearing

Father ’s other th r ee issues all relate to the notice he received of the final
hearing

. The cle rk ’s reco rd include s copies o f t h e n o t ices that w ere s erved on Father
, along with the return o f service t hat was fill ed out and signed by the deput y constable

who se r v ed him

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 107. The return of the officer sho wing ser vice of

a notice is “ prima facie ev idence of the fact o f service

. ” Tex. R. Ci v. P. 21a(e )

. Notice prop erly se nt pu rsuant to Rule 21a raises a presum ption that notice w as

received. Mathis v. Lockwood , 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005)

. This presum ption ma y

be rebu tted by an offer of proof that the not ice was not received, but i n the absence

of evidence to the c ont rary, the presumption h as the force of a rule of law. Do w dy v.

Hay , No. 02

- 10

- 00230

- CV, 2011 WL 1435200, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Apr . 14,

20 11, no pe t.) (mem. op. ) ; see also T homas v. Ray , 889 S. W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. 1994)11 (orig. p roceeding)

.

In a ser ies of arguments that we rejec t, Father argues that the n otice we attach
to this opinion a s an appendix was inadequate. For example, in his second issue,

Father c o m p l a i n s that he “ d id no t have time t o make arrangements to attend the

h earing

. ” He quotes t he following language fro m Larson v. Gie senschlag : “ All litig ants

who are for ced to settle disputes through the judicial process have a fundamental right

under the federal cons titution to be heard at a meaningful time in a m eaningful

manner

. ” 368 S.W.3d 7 92, 796

– 97 (Tex . App.

— Austi n 2 012, no pet.)

. Relyi ng on

this langu age , Father a rgues that he ha d “ a right to appear at the hearing ” and t hat

“ [ t]he exercise of no t letting [ him ] be part of the hearin g violated his right to be heard
at a meaningful time in a meaningfu l manner

. ” B ut “ a prisoner has no absolute rig ht
to be present in a civil action

. ” Z.L.T. , 124 S. W.3d a t 166

. However
, when “ a pro se

inm ate is not allowed to participate in a proceedin g in pers on, a trial court s hould

nevertheles s afford th e inmate an opportunity t o proceed by aff idavit, deposition, telephone, or
other effective means

. ” Larson
, 368 S.W.3d at 797 (emphasis added) ; see also In re R.C.R.
, 230 S.W.3d 423, 42 7 (Tex. App.

— Fo rt Worth 2007, no pet.)

. H e re, t he trial co u r t did

exac t ly that; it notified Fat her that the fin a l hearing would take place via Zo om and
gave him detailed instructions on how to appear at the hearing via Zoom

. 10 This

10 S pecific ally, the Not ice of Final Hearing includ ed an e

- mail a ddress a nd phone number a t which Father could contact the trial court a nd web a ddr e ss es at which he could obtain a fre e Zoom account or downlo ad a fr ee Zoom app

. Additionally, we n ote tha t Father ’ s nu m erous mailing s to the trial c ourt, which we re12 further distinguishes Father ’s case fr om Larson ; in Larson , unlik e here, the trial court

did n ot all ow the incarc erated father “ t o participate in any manner

. ” Larson , 3 68

S.W.3d at 798

. Citing In re E.R.
, Father conte nds th at a “ State law t ime limit is unenforceable
when it violates due pro cess , ” an d th at a strict ti m e limit cannot be enforc ed “ w h en

the parent has no co nstitutiona lly adequate notice ” of the proc eed ing. See 385 S.W.3d

552 , 555 , 561 (Tex. 2012)

. The “ strict time limit ” at i ssue in E.R. was th e Family

Code ’ s six

- month deadlin e to attack an order t e rminating the parental r ights of a
person who is serv ed by citat ion by publication

. Id

. a t 555 ; see Te x. Fam

. Code Ann. §
161.211(b)

. Father was not serve d by citation by p ublicat ion

—he received personal

service a t the prison where he was incarc er ated

— a n d he does not explain how s e rving

him with not ice on June 2, 2 021, of a hearing that was to be held on September 28,

2021
, was not “ constitutionally adequate noti ce

. ”

Father also ci tes the three

- day

- minimum requirement for not ice f rom Texas

Rule of Civi l Procedure 21(b)
, see Tex . R. Civ . P. 21(b)
, but Fath er receiv ed far more
than three days ’ notic e o f th e final hearing

. His claim that he “ did not have time t o

make arrangement s to attend the hearing ”

— a dubious assert i on un develop ed in his

received and fil ed by the trial c ourt clerk, show that he was able t o con tact the trial

court by mail and therefore could ha ve requested to partic ipat e in the final hearing by

some other ef fect ive means. The “ sole burden ” to request acces s to t he court through such alter nate means and to demonstrate why a trial court shou ld authorize them re sted on Father

. In re J

. A. R. , 658 S.W.3d 921, 928 (Tex. App

. — El Paso 2023, pet. denied )

. He did n o t meet that burden.13 argument and unsupported by the record

— r ing s hol low when he never requested a

continuance or m ade any att empt after fi ling his answer to participate in the

termination procee ding via Zoom or i n some alternative mann er. Cf. Larson , 3 6 8

S.W .3d a t 79 7

– 98 ( conclud ing that the trial court abused its discret ion by denying

father’s request to participa te, “ effectiv ely barring h im from presenting his case at

trial
, ” where father had “ specifically aske d the trial court to take actions which would

potentia ll y all ow for the presentation of his case ” )

. We hold tha t Father received

constitutionally adequa te notice o f the final hearin g and th at the timeliness o f the

notic e d id not offend d ue process

. We o v e r r ule his secon d issue.

In Father ’s th ir d a nd fo u rth i s sues , he refers to a separate notice o f the fina l

hearin g that he claims to have received on t he afternoon of September 28, 20 21
, after

the hearing had e n d ed

. He ha s included in the a ppendix to his brief, see Tex. R

. App.
P. 38.1(k)
, a l etter dated Septem ber 21, 2021, notifyi ng him a w eek before the
September 28 Zoom hearing , as w ell as a copy of the envelope in which the letter was

sent to him by certified mail

. Fathe r comp l ains in his third issue that this notic e o f

the final hearing was improperly addr essed

. In his fo urth issue, Father c laims that it
displ ayed the wrong cause numb er

. Neither the letter nor the envelope is in the a ppellate record. See Te x. R. App.

P. 34 .1 ( stating that appellate reco rd consists of clerk ’ s record and , when necessary,

r eporter ’ s re cord ). “[ I

] t is axiomatic that we may not c onside r a document c ited in a
brief and attached as an appendix if it is not formally included in the record on14 appea l .” Ahmed v. Sosa , 514 S.W.3d 894, 896 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2017, no pet. )

.

As t he envelope and letter a re not part of the record o n app eal, we cannot consi der

them

. Id. ; s ee also Cummings v. Billman , 634 S.W.3d 163, 166 n.1 (Te x

. App.

— F ort

Worth 2021, no pet.) (m em. op.) ( “[ W ] e cannot conside r matters outside the appellate

record in rendering our decision .” )

. Further, “ in d etermining wh ether error is

appar ent on the face of the record, we may not consider evidence that wa s not before

the t r ial cou rt when i t rend ered the final j udgment

. ” S.W. , 614 S.W.3d at 315

.

Father als o invok es Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 124
, which provid es that in

“ no ca se shall judgment be rendered against any defendant unl ess upon ser vice, or

accep tanc e or waiver of proce ss, or upon an a ppearance by the d efendant

. ” Tex. R.

Civ. P. 124

. But Father was se r ved

. He admits in bot h his notice of appeal and hi s

bri ef t hat he was served on June 2 , 2021

. 11 Also
, his answer constitute s an appeara nce

11 In his reply brief
, Father a rgues

— for the first time

— that he “ never received ” the Notice of Final Hearing and tha t the only documents he received on June 2
, 2021, were the petition and citati on. He continues to refer us to documents in the appendix to his or i g inal b r ief, which a r e not part of the record

. Father further argues that
, “ even if [ Father ] would have had notice of the final hearing and made arrangements to at tend via Zoom, he could no t because he did not possess the necess ary information to login to Zoom a nd conne ct to the channel dedicated to this proceeding

. ” The record does not support his ar gument but belies it. As the documents in our appendix show
, Father received detailed inst ructions on how to appear at the hearin g via Zoom
, including a n e

- mail ad dre ss a nd phone number a t which he could contact the trial court

. Father has not rebu tted the presumption that he received these documents

. See Mathis , 166 S.W.3d at 745 ; Dow dy
, 201 1 WL 1435200, at *1

.15 under Ru le 121
, so the issuance or service of ci tation upon him was u n n e c e ssa r y

. 12

Tex. R. Civ. P. 121

.

Father ha s not shown that error i s app ar en t from th e face of the record

. To
the contrary, the record shows that Father was served with M oth er ’ s p etition, the

c itation, a nd the Notice of Final Hearing on June 2, 2 021

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 17.029 (describing procedu re for serving process on inmate). W e thu s

overrule Father ’s thir d a nd f o u rth iss ues.

V I

. Co nc lusion
Having o ve rruled Father ’s four iss u es, we affir m the trial cour t ’ s judgment

term inating Father ’s paren tal rights.
/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel Justice

Delive red: De ce mber 7, 2023

12 Father was still entit led to “ reas onable no tice of not less than forty

- five days ” of the termi nation tria l setting

. Tex. R. Civ. P. 245

. He received 118 days ’ notic e

.16 APPENDIX1718