IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wendell Long, : : No. 1920 C.D. 2015 Appellant : Submitted: April 29, 2016

: v. :

: Kenneth D. Kyler :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: August 26, 2016

Wendell Long appeals pro se from the September 8, 2015 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County (trial c ourt) granting the preliminary objections filed by Kenneth D. Kyler and dismissing the P etition for
R elief filed by Long under the statute commonly known as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§6601

- 6608. We affirm.

At all relevant times , Long was an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI Huntingdon) , and Kyler was its Superintendent. On May 6, 200 0 , Long received a misconduct report charging him with lewd conduct in a bathroom stall. On May 9, 200 0 , a hearing e xaminer held a misconduct hearing and dismissed the misconduct charge without prejudice due to lack of evidence. That same day, Long was issued another misconduct charge based on the same behavior but asserting different charges. On May 11, 200 0 , a heari ng was2

held on the second misconduct char ge

. The hearing examiner found Long gui l ty of all charges and issued L ong 30 days’ disciplinary custody, loss of job, loss of
honor blo ck status, and loss of single cell status. Long appealed to the Program
Review Committee, former Superintendent Kyler, and the Chief Hearing Officer, each of which denied the appeal and upheld the sanctions.

In 2001, Long filed a P etition for R elief against Kyler, seeking a declaration that his prison misconduct conviction and the sanction s imposed are invalid, unconstitutional , and must be expunged from his record. Long asserts that the misconduct charges were filed deliberately by correctional employees who falsified evidence with the intent of depriving Long of his constitut ional rights. Long further contends that the hearing officer violated his constitutional right to due process by denying his request to have representation and witnesses present at the misconduct hearing. Long avers that the action or inaction of Kyler i n failing to monitor employees under his supervision allowed those employees to violate Long’s constitutional rights, in violation of Kyler’s duties as superintendent.

Kyler filed timely preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer , and the matter sat dormant for more than a decade. 1 Thereafter, the trial court invited the parties to submit briefs in support of their respective positions and, after considering the same, granted Kyler’s preliminary objections.

On appeal to this Court, Long ask s this Court to declar e the disciplinary conviction and sanction invalid, expung e the same from his record,

1 The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion states that after a file review revealed that the case was still pending, an August 10, 2015 order was issued directing that the matter be placed on an argument list. Although there was correspondence between Long and then President Judge Stewart Kurtz, n either party filed the appropriate document to move the case. Trial court op. at 1 n.1.3

and reinstat e the status he lost as a result of the invalid conviction. He also asks for compensatory and punitive damages.

When reviewing an orde r granting preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Balletta v. Spadoni , 47 A.3d 183, 188 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)

. Preliminary objections are properly sustained when, based o n the facts pled, it is clear that the plaintiff will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief. Id. We must accept as true all well

- pled, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that may be fairly deduced from
those facts. Id. However, w e need not accept any of the complaint’s conclusions of law or argumentative allegations. Small v. Horn , 722 A.2d 664, 668 (Pa. 1998).

Because Long’s Petition for Relief challenges internal prison

op erations , the issues he raises are not reviewable by this Court. Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee , 721 A.2d 357, 358

- 59 (Pa. 1998); Brown v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections , 913 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Indeed, w e have specifically held that decisions of the Department of Corrections “concerning charges of misconduct against an inmate are beyond this Court’s appellate or original jurisdiction.” Brown , 913 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added)

.

In Bronson , our Supreme C ourt explained that
[I]nternal prison operations are more properly left to the legislative and executive branches, [and] pr ison officials

mus t be allowed to exercise their judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserv e order and maintain sec urity free from judicial interference. . . . Unlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a defen d ant is accorded the full spectrum of rights and p rotections guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, and which is necessarily within t he ambi t
o f the judiciary, th e procedures for pursuing inmate4 grievanc es and misconduct appeals are a matter of intern a l prison administrat ion and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not necessary in a prison disciplinary proce eding. Therefore, the commonwealth court [sic] does not have appellate jurisdiction, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 763, over inmate appeals of decisions by intra

- prison disciplinary tribunals. 721 A.2d at 358

- 59 (quotations and citations omitted). In Robson v. Bie ster , 420 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), this Court determined that the “operation of correctional facilities is peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of the government and not the judicial branch.” The fact that Long co uches his claims as violations of his constitutional rights does not alter the
fact that his challenges to the credibility of witnesses, the evidence presented, and the determination made at his misconduct hearing are not matters within this Court’s appell ate jurisdiction. 2

Moreover, Long’s vague assertions that the misconduct proceedings
and the attendant sanctions deprived him of constitutional rights also must fail.

Procedural d ue process in a misconduct proceeding is satisfied if an
inmate receives written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the hearing, receives a written statement of facts by the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for the action taken, and is afforded a qualified right to call witnesses and present do cumentary evidence in his defense when institutional safety or correctional goals are not placed at risk. Id. Long’s only relevant
assertion i s that he was denied the opportunity to call unnamed witnesses. Because Long has not identified in his petition what witnesses he asked to call or how he

2 “[T]he limitations placed upon the judiciary to rule on issues of internal prison operations set forth in Bronson apply to our common pleas courts as well.” Brown , 913 A.2d at 305.5

was prejudiced by not being allowed to call them, his allegations in this regard do not state a claim that his due process rights were violated.

In Singleton v. Lavan , 834 A.2 d 672, 675

- 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) , we noted that an inmate’s placement in restricted housing unit for 30 days does not violate his due process rights. 3 Additionally, this Court has previously held that an inmate has no protected liberty interest in a speci fic prison job

. Bush v. Veach , 1
A.3d 981 , 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) ; Miles v. Wiser , 847 A.2d 237, 240

- 41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)

. Finally, it is well settled that an inmate does not have a right to be housed in a particular area within a facility; rather, it i s entirely a matter of the Department of Corrections’ discretion where to house an inmate. Clark v. Beard , 918 A.2d 160

- 61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Chem v. Horn , 725 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)

. Consequently, neither Long’s 30 days’ disciplinary custody, the loss of his job, nor the loss of his honor block status and single cell implicate s his due process rights.

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Kyler’s preliminary objections, and we affirm.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

3 See also Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (discipline of 30 days in segregated confinement did not violate an inmate’s due process rights because it did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state migh t conceivably create a liberty interest ).IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wendell Long, : : No. 1920 C.D. 2015 Appellant :

: v. :

: Kenneth D. Kyler :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26 th day of August , 2016, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County, dated September 8, 2015 , is aff irmed.

__________________________________ MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge