2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-10-2015

Salam Aljawad v. Salam Majeed

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Recommended Citation

"Salam Aljawad v. Salam Majeed" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 587.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/587
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-4763

___________

SALAM ALJAWAD

v.

SALAM MAJEED; DEBORAH MAJEED, a/k/a Deborah Covey; 

BEDHR MAJEED; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10

Salam Majeed,

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-04321)

District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 8, 2015

Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 10, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Pro se appellant Salam Majeed appeals from the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s December 4, 2013 order confirming the judgment 

entered against him earlier in this breach of contract action. We will affirm.

I.

Majeed was one of several defendants in a breach of contract complaint filed in 

the District Court by plaintiff/appellee Salam Aljawad in 2011. The complaint concerned 

the breakdown of Aljawad and Majeed’s joint venture, which involved installing energysaving devices (motion sensors) in hotel rooms. Aljawad alleged that Majeed had 

received in excess of $72,000 and “other checks” for work performed by the joint 

venture, but refused to share those proceeds with Aljawad. The complaint also alleged, 

inter alia, that Majeed had made false and disparaging remarks about Aljawad to a 

supplier, in an attempt to persuade that supplier to deal only with Majeed. In light of 

these allegations, Aljawad sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as various 

other relief. 

Soon after the litigation began, Aljawad and Majeed entered into a settlement 

agreement, providing—among other things—that, within 90 days of receiving 1,263 

motion sensors, Majeed was to pay Aljawad $24,225. The settlement was not finalized, 

however, as each party claimed that the other had failed to comply with its terms. 

Aljawad claimed that Majeed had not paid as required by the settlement agreement. 

Majeed, on the other hand, claimed that he was not required to pay because Aljawad had 

sent only 1,248 motion sensors. Upon the District Court’s order, Aljawad and Majeed 

submitted evidence concerning implementation of the settlement agreement, which the 
3

District Court treated as cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues of whether “a 

settlement agreement of the original dispute was reached and whether it ha[d] been 

violated.” (Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Jan. 31, 2013, at 2.) 

On January 31, 2013, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Aljawad in 

the amount of $24,093.75. The judgment reflected the amount due for the 1,248 sensors 

that Majeed had received. The District Court determined that the settlement agreement 

was unambiguous, and applied Pennsylvania law to conclude that Aljawad’s breach 

(failing to provide 15 sensors) was not material. In considering this issue, the District 

Court noted that Aljawad offered to deduct the price of the missing sensors, and 

determined that his explanation for the shortfall was reasonable.1 The District Court 

further concluded that Majeed had received the benefit of his bargain, and to the extent he 

had not, he could be compensated for his loss by Aljawad’s offered reduction in the 

amount due. As a result, the District Court concluded that Aljawad had substantially 

performed under the settlement agreement, and that Majeed was not excused from 

complying with the terms of the agreement. 

Majeed’s initial appeal to this Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because 

the District Court had not disposed of the claims against the remaining defendants. On 

December 4, 2013, the District Court dismissed the claims against the remaining 

defendants, and confirmed the judgment against Majeed for the reasons set forth in its 

January 31, 2013 memorandum. Majeed once again appeals. 

 

1 Aljawad asserted that “some motion sensors were missing from completed jobs and [he] 

was required to provide and/or install the missing sensors before receiving payment on 

account of those jobs.” (Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Jan. 31, 2013, at 3-4.) 
4

II. 

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332,2and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s December 4, 2013 

order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In that order, the District Court confirmed its January 31, 

2013 order, which granted judgment in favor of Aljawad. It is this determination that 

Majeed challenges. Our review of a district court’s summary judgment decision is 

plenary. See Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

As the parties did not dispute the validity of the settlement agreement, the issue 

before the District Court was whether, under Pennsylvania law, the settlement agreement 

was materially breached. See Int’l Diamond Imps., Ltd. v. Singularity Clark, L.P., 40 

A.3d 1261, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he non-breaching party does not have a right 

to suspend performance if the breach is not material.”) (quotation marks omitted). To 

 

2 Early in the case, Majeed argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under § 1332 

because the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000. “‘The sum claimed by the 

plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal 

certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify 

dismissal.’” Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting St. Paul 

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)). Here, Aljawad’s 

claim that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 appears to have been made in 

good faith, and it is far from a “legal certainty” that the amount in controversy was 

actually less than the jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, dismissal for lack of 

jurisdiction was not warranted. 
5

determine whether a breach is material, Pennsylvania courts consider the following five 

factors:

a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the 

benefit which he reasonably expected; 

b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately 

compensated for that part of the benefit of which he will be 

deprived; 

c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer 

to perform will suffer forfeiture; 

d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or offer to 

perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the 

circumstances including any reasonable assurances; 

e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to 

perform or offer to perform comports with standards of good 

faith and fair dealing. 

Widmer Eng’g, Inc. v. Dufalla, 837 A.2d 459, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981)). 

In this case, the District Court correctly identified and applied the Restatement 

factors to determine that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Aljawad’s delivery of 

1,248 (rather than 1,263) motion sensors was a material breach. Majeed received the 

benefit of his bargain and was adequately compensated for any loss, as Aljawad offered 

to lower the payment based on the delivery shortage. Accordingly, the District Court 

properly entered judgment against Majeed in the amount due under the settlement 

agreement (minus $131.25 for the 15 sensors that were not delivered), and his arguments 

to the contrary are unpersuasive. 

Based on the foregoing, we will affirm.