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Filed 12/3/ 21 P . v. McClanahan CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
JUSTIN CARL MCCLANAHAN,

Defendant and Appellant. C088638
(Super. Ct. No. 16FE012988)

A jury found defendant Justin Carl McClanahan guilty of five counts of lewd and
lascivious acts on a child

. The victims were his two younger sisters. He was sentenced to an aggregate 30

- year term. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in (1) admitting certain hearsay statements made by the victims and their grandfather ; (2) exclu ding
evidence of a victim’s false allegation unless the person accused testified as to the falsity of the allegation ; and (3) admitting expert testimony regarding C hild S exual A buse2

A ccommodation S yndrome. He also contends (4) the errors are cumulatively prejudicial

. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A jury found that between 2003 and 2005 defendant molested his sisters ( the first
and second victims ) who were respectively 7 and 12 years his junior

. Defendant’s parents , the two victims , a high school teach er, a high school counselor , the director of a boarding school , a deputy , and a detective testified

. The M other’s T estimony Defendant’s mother testified that defendant , “a difficult te enager , ” would watch his siblings when she slept

. In the fall of 2011, the first victim told her parents that defendant had touched her inappropriately. They didn’t call the police but arranged therapy for the first victim. T he
mother testified , “We wanted justice, but we didn’t want to ruin [defendant’s] life.” The parents wanted defendant to apologize and make amends

— t hough at trial the mother conceded, “we made a wrong decision.”
When defendant and his wife visited around thanksgiving, the par ents spoke to
him alone about their daughter’s disclosure. Defendant immediately said “Yeah, I did.” They said he need ed to apologize and to make it right for the victim. Defendant initially agreed. But when he returned to Seattle, he called and said he couldn’t remember the details of what he did, and he didn’t want to apologize for something he couldn’t exactly
remember. He asked for the ir pati ence while he saw a therapist. The parents contact ed defendant every two weeks, and defendant repeat ed that he was working on it and asked them to be patient. Nine months later, after the first victim turned 18, defendant told the parents, “you know, now that [ the first victim ] is 18, you can’t go to the police on her behalf anymore. I know she’s not going t o do it and there’s nothing you can do.” The parents did n o t speak to defendant for a year.3

In 2013, the second victim was having trouble at home. She wrote about suicide
and cut and burn ed herself. She left her high school after being caught drinking , went to a charter school , and then in May 2015 was sent to an out

- of

- state boarding school after suicide implements were found in her bed room. When the parents went to visit in February 2016, the boarding school director told them there was something t hey needed to know. The second victim told them defendant
had done the same thing to her that he did to the first victim. The parents flew the second victim home and went to the Sheriff’s department.
The mother testified that they went to the police th is time because “[w]e finally absorbed the fact that he’s a predator.”
The mother testified to receiv ing emails threat ing disinheritance from her parents if the girls continu ed with the investigation and testified. A letter from defendant sa id they wouldn’t see their grandchildren because they wouldn’t drop their attempt to get him to apologize and make things rights. A letter from her father (the grandfather) said what happened, happened, and cannot be changed ; everyone should move on.
The F ather ’ s T estimony The father provided substantially similar testimony. Defendant was a difficult teenager

— he would not want to do his schoolwork and was un kind to his younger siblings. W hen the parents were out, defendant was put in charge of the younger
chi ldren. Defendant left for college in the fall of 2005 and got married three years later.
In 2011 , the first victim disclosed the molestation to a teacher. She subsequently
told her parents defendant had molested her

. They decided to handle it in the f amily and contacted a therapist. They also
confronted defendant when he visit ed in November 2011

. D efendant admitted the
molestation , and they told him to make amends . They did not, however, call the police.
But i n December 2011, Child Protective Services ( CPS ) contacted the father , and he told
them his daughter had disclosed being molested by her brother.4

The parents continued to reach out to defendant, who “kind of stalled us

. ” When
the first victim turned 18, defendant said he no l onger had to apologize. He subsequently made clear he did not want his parents to bring up the subject and threatened them with not seeing their grandchild.
The father also testified that the second victim had “significant problems” and left her high sch ool after “things fell apart.” They put her in a charter school and then boarding school after f

inding poison, nooses, and razor blades in her room. When they visited her nine months later, they met with her and the boarding
school director. The second victim said defendant had molested her. The father testified, “then a lot of things made sense.” They flew home and went to the sheriff’s office the next day. On the way home, the second victim was happy to see he r parents and happy to be coming home.
At the sheriff’s department, the parents gave a statement to a deputy and the
second victim separately gave one. But t he first victim was not interest ed in involving
law enforcement. The father testified the disclosures created fractures in the family : “I have no relationship with my parents, with my wife’s father.” In May 2016, they received a letter
from the grandfather that said for the good of the family, the girls should refuse to testify. The grandfather also threatened to go to the newspaper and the father’s work and smear the father’s reputation.
The father also testified that the second victim , who was currently living with the parents, told them she was going to recant.
The First Victim ’s T estimony
The first victim was 24 at the time of trial . She testified that starting when she was “eight or so,” defendant , who is seven years older , would take her up stairs t o his room
and tell her to undress. He would remove his shorts and touch her vagina with his hands and penis. This happen ed when their mother was sleeping, their father was at work, and5

defendant was left in charge. She couldn’t remember how defendant got her to come to his bedroom the first time. But subsequent times, he would threaten to hit her or beat her up. He also threatened to hurt her or her dog if she said anything. She testified the molestations were not “super frequent,” but “frequent en ough.”
A sked if it happened more than 10 times, she testified “I think so.” The molestations
ended sometime before defendant left for college. 1 She did not know her younger sister was also being molested.
The first victim described her family and ho me life as dysfunctional and chaotic

. Her parents fought, and her mother and defendant argued and fought “a lot

. ” The first
victim was not close with defendant: “We had times that we could laugh or joke about something, but for the most part, he picked on me a lot.” Defendant would hit her and his younger brother. She wasn’t close with her parents and did not feel she could go to them with problems . Her mother was “always ang ry about something.” She felt afraid of her mother, who “would tell us how to behave and what would happen if we didn’t.” And

w hen she told her father that defendant would hit us, “he didn’t really do anythi ng.”
In high school , she was depressed and drank, cut her wrists , and took pills.
Towards the end of her junior or beginning of her senior year, she told a bible class
teacher what defendant did

. The teacher said she needed to tell her parents. She in itially resisted, but eventually did

. H er mother said , “we don’t want [defendant] to get in

1 The first victim testified that she had told an officer that the molestations continued until defendant went to college, but her mother had told her to say that because the second victim had also said it. Also, the mother said, “you should put it in there because if it did happen after he is 18, he should be held accountable.” Ultimately, the first victim testified that “I can’t s ay for sure that it did happen until he went to college, and I can’t for sure say it didn’t happen until he went to college just because I never made a land marker of when it stopped. I just knew it had stopped.”6

trouble.” The first victim testified that around that time , defendant had been threatening
their mother with not see ing the grandkids, and “I think that was the b ig factor in not wanting to upset him.”
She also told a school counselor defendant had touched her inappropriately for
three months

. Though s he testified that she had minimized the time span “so it wouldn’t blow up.”
The counselor contacted CPS , and a social worker visited the school. The first
victim to ld the social worker she d idn’t want to talk about it . Her mother had told her not
to tell the whole truth to CPS. 2 At some point, the parents confronted defendant. She later lea r ned that th e y had plan ned to have defendant apologize

. But d efendant never “owned up to it” or apologized

. At another point , her mother told her the second victim had also been molested by
defendant. The first victim spoke with law enforcement in 2016. She testif ied her
mother coerced her into tell ing the police what happened: “She basically put a ton of pressure on me to go to the police with my sister and share what happened, implying things like that I would be cut off and

. . . wouldn’t have any support if I didn’t.” 3

2 The mother testified to no memory of t elling the first victim to minimize what she said to CPS. But on cross, when asked , “So by telling [the first victim] that she could say whatever she wanted to say, didn’t you know and wasn’t that a signal to [the first victim] to say nothing?” S he testi fied, “I can see how it would be viewed that way and that was wrong of me and [the father].”

3 Also before trial , the first victim texted defendant’s wife , stating: “I’m going to shut down every question at the trial and tell them point blank it was because of my mother’s coercion , ” and , “I will help you sue her [the mother] when this is over.” About the text,
s he testified : “I had just been kicked out of my parents’ house, and I was upset at my mom for the hurtful things she said to me as she was kicking me out, and I basically was thinking I don’t want [defendant] to go to jail. So I’m going to do everything I can to7

She also testified that in early 2016, she had been asked by a cousin (who shortly
there after passed away) to tell defendant “ hello ” and that he loves him. When she called defendant to pass along the message , defendant told her he was sorry for anything that he might have done to hurt her. She didn’t ask for clarification. Another time in 2016, the first victim spoke with defendant’ s wife over Skype and
told her what defendant had done. Toward the end, d efendant joined the conversation . In
mid

- 2016 , she received an email from defendant’s wife, expressing her dismay about going to the police , saying if defendant went to prison , her son would grow up without a
father. Also in 2016, t wo grandparents and several aunts and uncles email ed and called , pressuring her to recant. A phone conversation she had with her grandfather is discussed in more detail, post

.

The High School Bible Class Teacher’s T estimony
The high school bible class teacher testified that the first victim told him she had been sexually abused by defendant. She s aid it had gone on since she was eight until she
was 12 , and that was the reason for her depress ion and drinking.
The teacher called CPS , testifying , “I’m under legal obligation to do so, and so I had to have a conversation with my superintendent and administration

. . . . ” He also encouraged the first victim to talk with the school counselor

. The first victim, however, said she didn’t want to tell her parents. The teacher described the parents as “angry and abusive in that relationship.”
The teacher also had defendant as a student in 2006. Once defendant came to him
af ter class and asked about forgiveness, saying “you don’t understand what I’ve done or
how bad I am.” The teacher testified , “I had no idea if it was referring to anything.”

keep that from happening. But then after the anger passed, I kind of realized I still had a responsibility to what happened to me to speak the truth.”8 The High School C ounselor’s T estimony
The counselor testified that the first victim was referred to her by the bible class
teacher in late 2011. She understood that the first victim had disclosed being molested by
her brother and that CPS had been contacted . Eventually , the first victim disclosed the
molestation to her

. Sh e said she had been molested for three months during the summer, when she was eight and defendant was 18.
The first victim also said that her mother had told her to lie to CPS. The mother
wanted to protect defendant’s reputation and didn’t want to be cut off from future grandkids.
The counselor had also counseled the second victim, who was cutting herself, suffering from an eating disorder, and posting provocative pictures online. At some point
the second victim discovered what had happen ed to her siste r, and the counselor made a note in early 2013 that she was “still processing what happened between [defendant] and [the first victim].” The counselor explained , “She wasn’t really wanting to talk about it.”
When the counselor asked the second victim if anyone had touched her inappropriately,
she said no and that she didn’t want to talk about it.
The Second V ictim ’s Testimony
The second victim was 19 at the time of trial

. She testified that nothing inappropriate happened between her and defendant , expl ain ing that “my sister had already told my parents, and

. . . I didn’t want to talk about what was going on with myself and my own issues, so I piggybacked on her problem, and that was awful of me.”
She testified that when the first victim was 17, the first victim told her and their parents that defendant had molested her

. The second victim did not disclose also being
molested because, as she testified, nothing had happened to her

. She also testified that during high scho ol she suffered from depression, had an eating disorder, and was cutting herself. S he was expelled in her sophomore year for drinking. S he began an independent study program and then went to an out

- of

- state9

boarding school in May 2015. H er parents took her to boarding school under the guise of visiting a sibling but ended up dropping her off. She testified that “hurt a lot.” She was
th e re for nine months and had nightmares , anxiety attacks , and long crying spells, though “more towards the beginning

. ”
A round October 2015 , she said to the director of the boarding school , “why me,”
and “I can’t live like this.” She also said defendant had hurt her and that she couldn’t stop reliving her brother’s room and all he did to her there

. She testified , however, “that
wasn’t true what I told her

. ” She explained, “I was going through a lot of stuff, and I didn’t want to tell her what I was going though, and so I

— I am very sorry for this now, but I pinned it on something that was already going on with my sister, and I regret that.” The director told her she had to tell her parents and she did not want to because , as she testified, “It wasn’t true

. ” But when her parents came and she met with them in front of the director, she told them defendant had mole sted her

. The parents pulled her out of boarding school and brought her home. They went to the sheriff’s office the next day and spoke to a deputy. She testified, “I told the deputy what I had said happened, but it did not happen.” She also testified t hat she thought up , on the spot, the details of the molestations and defendant’s threats to kill
her cat. She later met with a detective. The detective read her the statement she gave to the deputy, and she confirmed everything was true except for her bi rth date

. She
testified , however, that she was lying. Sometime before talking to the detective , she Skyped with the first victim and told
her about what had happened to her. Her sister was upset and crying, and said , “I’m so sorry, I’m so sorry

. ” The first victim f l ew home to see her. The second victim also testified she could not remember if defendant had babysat her and her siblings when her parents were out, and she denied that defendant had picked
on her. S he denied her homelife was chaotic or dysfunctional, and testified she got along10

with her parents and could talk to them. S he denied her depression had to do with her
homelife , or with defendant: “I had been picked on at school, but nothing other than
that.”
She testified that she did n ot tell anyone she had falsely accused defendant , until a few weeks before trial when she contacted the prosecutor’s office and told her parents she
had lied

. The B oarding S chool Director’s Testimony
The director of the boarding school testified that wh en the second victim came to the school, the director had been told her sister had disclosed being molested and was suicidal, and they thought that perhaps the same thing had happened to the second victim. At the boarding school, the second victim started having nightmares, and would
say , “I keep reliving it,” but would not explain. She also had panic attacks and would start crying and shaking suddenly

. Right before her parents were scheduled to visit, the second victim told the director that she kept reliving what happened in her brother’s bedroom and said he had not only molested her sister, but her as well. The director told her she needed to tell her parents. The second victim said she didn’t want to be treated differently ; she didn’t want
to be treated like her sister. When the parents arrived, the director told them the second victim had something to say. The second victim then disclosed defendant had molested her.
The D eputy ’s Testimony The deputy testified that she took a statement from the second victim , who reported defendant had molested her since she was three years old. The second victim couldn’t recall the details of the first incident but recalled her father was working, her mother was napping, and defendant was watching her and her siblings in the early
afternoon. Defendant was then a teenager and a lot bigger than her. Defendant grabbed her arm and took her ups tairs to his bedroom. She didn’t know why h e seemed angry.11

Upstairs, he closed the door and “threw her on his bed

. ” He got on top of her and
said , “if you fight, it will make it worse.” He held her arms above her head, then opened
h er knees with his. He then pulled down his pants and put his penis inside her. When she tried to scream, he put his forearm over her mouth and nose, pushing down hard. Defendant threatened to kill her cat if she said anything or didn’t do everything he said

. He then put his fingers in her vagina. He tried to kiss her but stopped when she tried to bite him. He told her he would kill her if she didn’t stop fighting. She said the abuse went on for the next three years , occurr ing approximately two
to three times a week. She also said defendant would f requently babysit her and her siblings. She did not know that defendant was also abusing her sister . But she said at
times defendant would take her older sister to a different room.
The D etective ’s T estimony
The detective testified that she interviewed both victims

. The detective’s February
2016 recorded interview with the second victim was played for the jury. In the interview,
the detective asked the second victim’s age and she responded that she was turning 1 7 soon, add ing , “so that’s kinda like the reason

— because

. . . when it happened to my sister and my parents found out when she was 17... [¶] [defendant]

. . . was like, ‘Oh just, um, I’ll make it right somehow’ until she turned 18 and then he was like, ‘ Well, joke’s on you.’ ” She also said the first victim was “scared of him so she doesn’t want to [press charges], adding Like she wants to. I know because I feel the same way.”
In the interview , the detective read the deputy’s report to the second vict im. The victim confirmed her statements to the deputy were correct

. The victim also described the last time defendant molested her, she was playing outside, and defendant came out and asked her to help him pack. She protested that he wasn’t leaving for a month, but he said, “Just come help me anyway.” “I had to go
because of his voice ,” she explained, “ I knew if I went what would happen and I knew12

what would happen if I didn’t go

. . . . ”
He lo c ked the door to the house. In his bedroom, he took off her shorts and
underwear and put his fingers in her vagina. He put his mouth on her vagina, but she
kicked him. He also put his penis in her vagina. At the end he said, “ ‘ R e member if anyone ever finds out what’s gonna happen to you and what’s gonna happen to me. ’ ” He then pulled up his pants, walked out and slammed the door. She waited five to ten minutes before leaving the room.
She also told the detective that defendant never punched her, but he had grabbed her in a way that left a bruise , a nd he wiped boogers on her. But “ [h] e was worse about it to my sister.”
V erdict and S entencing The jury found defendant guilty of five counts of lewd or lascivious acts by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or threat (Pen. Code, § 288 , subd (b)(1)) , with a finding of substantial sexual conduct (Pen. Code, § 1203.066 , subd ( a )( 8 ) )

. Two of the counts pertained to the first victim, three to the second. T he jury also found the charged offenses were committed against more than one victim (Pen. Code, § 1203.066, subd (a)(8))

. But on two of the counts of lewd and lascivious conduct on the first victim , the jury acquitted. The trial court imposed an aggregate 30

- year term consisting of five full

- term consecutive middle terms.
DISCUSSION

I. Admission o f Asserted H earsay and Section 352 Objections On appeal, d efendant first contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain hearsay evidence : (1) the recording of the detective’s interview with
the second victim ; (2) the record ing of the first victim ’s call to the grandfather ; ( 3) the grandfather’s trial testimony; and (4) the first victim ’s statements as presented through
other witnesses. Defendant styles this contention as a hearsay objection, but the bulk of13

the claim is tha t the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code Section
352 4 because the probability of undue prejudice substantially outweighed probative
value

. We conclude these challenges are forfeited for failure to raise specific objection s in the tri al court

.

A. The Detective’s I nterview with the S econd V ictim Defendant argues that only parts of the second victim’s record ed interview with
the detective were inconsistent with her testimony , and thus the remain ing portions
should have been excluded . We conclude this challenge is forfeited

. 1. Additional Background
After the second victim testified disclaiming the molestation , and before the jury
heard a recording of her interview with the detective, defense counsel object ed on hearsay grounds: “I would like to object as hearsay on the grounds that

. . . there are parts of it that [are] inconsistent, but in its entirety it should not be admitted, and I submit on that.” The trial court responded: “I assume there are going to be both prior inconsistent
as well as consistent statements since she is denying in totality that any of the events happened. I assume that all of the interview

. . . is going to be relevant to show her state of mind then, her demeanor, the fact that she had made inconsistent statements [prior] to trial, but that they were consistent with statements that she made during her disclosure.”
The court continued : “ if there’s something particular you wanted me to look at that you thought was prejudicial or really out of bounds, I’d certainly consider that. But based on what I know and what I have seen in the trial, it seems to me that the entirety of the statement would be relevant, not only for consistency and inconsist ency, but for

4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.14

demeanor and the nature of that disclosure to the detective. So I would be prepared to allow it in its entirety without further specific objection at this point.” (Italics added.)
Defense counsel responded : “Yes, your Honor, thank you.”
Just before the recording was played , defense counsel r enewed the objection: “I would just restate our previous objection , ” b ut he offered no specific challenge to any portion of the interview. 2. Analysis On appeal, d efendant identifie s several portio ns of the recording that he contends

a re not inconsistent with the second victim’s testimony and far more prejudicial than probative

. 5 But the failure to raise those challenge s in the trial court forfeits the m on appeal.
No verdict can be set aside bas ed on the erroneous admission of evidence

— including under section 352

— unless the record shows an objection “ mak [ing] clear the specific ground .” (§ 353 ; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 230

. ) And here, defense counsel offered only a blanket objection to the recording. Defendant, however, maintains that “his objection was clearly enough to bring the
issue to the trial court’s attention.” We disagree. The trial court indicated it would
consid er a specific objection “ if there’s something particular [counsel] wanted ” the court
to consider and then ruled it would allow the evidence in the absence of a “specific objection , ” and despite this , counsel did not identify any specific portion of the int erview and state specific grounds for exclusion.

5 Defendant belatedly takes issue with (1) the detective’s statements to the second victim that defendant “took all you r power away,” “needs to go to jail,” and “knew wh at he was doing”; (2) the second victim’s statement that she had heard defendant may have molested his cousin; and (3) the speculation that defendant was a danger to other children, including that it was “kinda scary” that he worked with kids.
While so me portions of the recording may have been object ionable , the evidence of guilt rendered the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence harmless

. (See fn . 9, post .)15

An objection must “fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party off ering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.” ( People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) Defense counsel’s blanket , nonspecific objection did not do this , and that failure depriv ed the prosecution of t he opportunity to respond. ( I d. at p. 434 [objecting “ ‘allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal’ ” ] .) Moreover, “[a] party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to
conduct. ” ( I

d

. at p. 435 ; see also People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 ( Holford ) [applying section 353 to claims of error for failure to exclude eviden ce under section 352].) Thus, the challenge is forfeited.
B. The Recording of the Phone Conversation with the G randfather Defendant next challenges the admission of a record ed phone conversation the
first victim had with her grandfather. Defendant arg ues its admission was an abuse of discretion because the recording was hearsay and the danger of undue prejudice far outweighed any probative value

. We conclude that portions of the conversation were relevant and any claims concerning objectionable portio ns of the conversation are forfeited.
1. Additional Background
a. The In Limine Motion
The d efen se moved in limine to exclude the grandfather as a witness , explain ing the grandfather had , in a phone call , tried to dissuade the first victim f rom testifying.
Counsel argued: “this family has

. . . a dozen people like [the grandfather ] always talking to each other about what someone should do and what someone shouldn’t do. There is
no link between that con versation and [ defendant ], and if the Court were concerned whether there was a link, I would ask for a [section 402 hearing] on it. ” Counsel added16

that it was unclear who called who. 6
Counsel also objected that the statement s in the recording w ere hearsay and
irrelevant , but he did not specify any particular statements

. He also noted that the grandfather had F ifth A mendment rights regard ing possible attempt ed witness dissuasion

. Counsel also argued that no statement from the grandfather establish ed that defendant made any admissions to him.
The court asked if t he recording might go to the victim’s state of mind: “If she has a blood relative saying drop it, and she is still willing to come and testify, isn’t there
relevance t here at least to her state of mind?” “ [S] houldn’t the prosecutor at least be able
to ask

. . . did anybody ever tell you to drop it? [J] ust like your sister.” “It seems to me ,” the court continued, “ that

. . . the heart of the defense is going to be the y are making this up, mom is pulling the strings, and one of the sisters

. . . says I’m out. [I] sn’t it relevant
for the trier of fact to know that [the first victim’s] receiving pressure from the outside to recant like her sister.”
The trial court agree d defendant could be prejudice d if the jury believed he was behind the grandfather’s pressuring , but such prejudice could be cured, the court explained, by telling the jury or stipulat ing that “ there’s no evidence that the defendant
himself

. . . had this in mind. This was strictly grandpa’s idea.”
T he prosecutor also told the court the grandfather had said defendant regrets what
he did

. D efense counsel did not specifically object to those statements as un related to the credibility of the first victim or her state of mind. Nor did he register a section 352 objection. The trial court, however, suggested they would need to have an Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding any purported admissions defendan t made to the grandfather.

6 The prosecutor confirmed the first victim called the grandfather.17

The following week, defense counsel asked for clarification of the court’s ruling concerning the recorded phone conversation. The court reiterated that the recording was
relevant and admissible as to the first victim’s state of mind , regarding the provision of testimony . Stating he was not sure if he “sufficiently articulated” his objection, defense counsel again argued the problem with the recording was that “it might create an implication that somehow [defendant] had been the initiation o r the genesis of that dissuasion by [the grandfather]. There is no evidence in our discovery to show that that is true.” Counsel complained he would not be able to call the grandfather to testify why he engaged in the dissuasion because the grandfather could assert his right against self

incrimination , and the defense had no authority to immunize him. “That’s the only thing I forgot to mention is that the implication is that the dissuasion might have come from [defendant].”
The trial court noted that had been argued during the in limine hearing the previous week. The court added that it would instruct the jury , “ that they are to take that call only to consider the effect of the state of mind of the witness and that there is no
evidence and they should not consider that that in any way was at the prompting of the
defendant. ” In rearticulating his objection, c ounsel never mentioned the portions of the
conversation where the grand father implied defendant’s guilt , such as grandfather’s

stateme nts to the first victim indicating defendant regrets what he did ; nor did counsel pose a section 352 objection. Consequently, the court was not called upon to make a ruling on that part of the recording. 7

7 The record does not disclose if the parties asked the trial court to listen to the recording of the phone conversation at any point prior to ruling on it; nor does it appear that the court did so.18 b

. The Recording
Later , the first victim tes tified in front of the jury that h er grandfather on her mother’s side had told her father to get her to drop the charges. She subsequently had a phone conversation with that grandfather, which she recorded at the detective ’s behest

. In the recording , played for the jury, the grandfather repeatedly ask ed the first victim to drop the charges saying, among other things: “I think [defendant] has suffered every day , ” and, “ [i] f [defendant] goes to prison he’s going to be beaten and possibly
kill ed, and he’s going to be sodomized frequently.” He told her that inmates in prison do not like child molesters and the guards provide no protection. He also told her he had

wr itten her parents a letter stating “in this situation there were no winners. T here was only losers. [The first victim’s] a loser. [The second victim’s] a loser . And [defendant] is a loser also. There are no winners. There’s only losers.” The grandfather also impl ied the allegations were true , stating: “I think [defendant] has regrets that’ll never go away” ; “ t here’s things in our lives that we wish we could take back and we could change, but we can’t” ; “I think [defendant] made a
terrible mistake” ; “I know he threatened you and you being a child, you were afraid

. ” “He did a bad thing but he’s not a bad person” ; and “ m y heart goes out to you and [the second victim]. I didn’t know what was happening .”
The first victim , in turn, maintained her desire for justice and to testify , stating : “He’s my brother but I think he should be held to the same standard

-- that other people
do

. . . . ” and “He’s my brother but

. . . such evil has occurred that

. . . I do feel like he needs to be held accountable for it.”
She asked the grandfather , “Are you worried about what he could and migh t be doing to other kids too? , ” who replied : “No. It won’t happen again.” But when she said, “I would worry everyday about the possibility of something happening to some other child,” t he grandfather responded, “I think that’s a fair statement.”19

A t one point, the first victim said : “you didn’t live in the house when [defendant] would beat up me and [my brother] just for fun and laugh at us when we had bruises

. . . on our face and [my brother] would just sit there and take it

. . . . And you didn’t see
when I as a six and seven

- year

- old would have to jump in between [ them ] and just, kind of, curl up in a ball in order to protect [my brother] and take [defendant’s] punches. You didn’t hear his laugh as he enjoyed what he was doing. And

. . . you didn’t see and experience the countless, countless times that he abused me and [the second victim] in such horrific ways that I think sometimes, especially as someone who is your blood, it
can be easier to think of them as better

. . . than they are.” During a break in the playing of the recording , defen se counsel stated: “I was thinking at the end of the tape we should admonish the jury

. . . . [The grandfather’s] theories are not relevant. What is relevant is the impact that that had on [the first victim]. Because otherwise it sounds like he has some special knowledge that [defendant] is guilty and that really was the basis of our objection

. ” (Italics added.) T he court agreed and
thereafter instructed the jury: “ During this phone call

. . . [the grandfather] offers opinions regarding a variety of subjects. His opinions are not relevant and should not be considered as proof of any element of the charged offenses. The evidence is being offered for the sole purpose of its effect, if any, on [the first victim].” The trial court gave a similar admonition as part of the final instructions to the jury. 8

8 The trial court gave the following further admonition as part of the final instructions: “The opinions and theories of [the grandfather] cannot be considered for the truth of the matter. . . . [The grandfather’s] opinions are relevant only to [the first victim’s ] state of mind. You cannot consider his opinions as evidenc e of anything else. You cannot consider them as admissions of the defendant, as they were not offered for that purpose, and there was no testimony from any witness that would allow you to infer that.” We presume the jury followed these instructions. ( Pe ople v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 537.)20

2

. Analysis
D efendant argues the adm i ssion was an abuse of discretion because the recording was hearsay , and its un due prejudic e far outweighed its probative value. He also argues the first victim’s state of mind was not at issue , reasoning that the first victim ’s willingness to testify fal sely despite pressure from family members was consistent with the defense’s theory of the case. In his reply brief, defendant acknowledges cases hold
that a witness’ fear of recrimination can be relevant to assess the witness’ credibility, but maintains this does not permit the admission of “ an entire recorded hearsay conversation replete with prejudicial comments simply because the conversation could be co nstrued as creating such a fear.” We disagree that the victim’s state of mind regarding testifying was not relevant.

“ ‘ A witness who testifies despite fear of recrimination of any kind by anyone is more credible because of his or her personal stake in the testimony.... [¶] Regardless of [the source of the threat], the jury would be entitled to evaluate the witness ’ s testimony knowing it was given under such circumstances. ’ ” ( People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 86 , quoting People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368

- 1369 , italics
added

. ) Thus, “ a trial court has discretion, within the strictures of Evidence Code section 352, to permit the prosecution to introduce evidence supporting a witness’s credibility even on direct examination, so lon g as the prosecution reasonably expects the defense to attack the witness’s credibility during cross

- examination.” ( Merriman , at p. 86.) The first victim’s credibility was unquestionably at issue. Accordingly, here, it was proper for the prosecution to ask the first victim about family members, including the grandfather, that pressured her not to testify and to play those portions of the recorded conversation with her grandfather related to that pressure

. The People maintain that any challenge as to un due prejudice is forfeited for
failure to object on that basis

. We agree. After much of the recording was played for the jury, c ounsel belatedly articulated as grounds for the objection that the grandfather’s21

statements sounded like “he has some special knowledge that [defendant] is guilty and that really was the basis of our objection

. ” Despite the claim “that really was the basis of our objection,” c ounsel never made this specific objection before , and when he
mentioned it on this occasion afte r part of the recording had been play ed , he did not cite section 352; nor did counsel ever suggest an evidentiary alternative under section 352 , such as redaction of the specific statements that implied defendant’s guilt. Failure to do
so forfeits the cla im on appeal. ( Holford , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169

- 170 [ noting
that a timely and specific objection is required to preserve a section 352 claim on appeal
and holding that “when making a section 352 objection grounded upon the existence of
an eviden tiary alternative [e.g., redaction] , the requirement in section 353, subdivision (a), to state specific reasons for an objection necessarily requires the objecting party to identify the evidentiary alternative with specificity ” ].) 9

9 We also note that, although the grandfather’s statements implying defendant’s guilt were objectionable, defendant was not prejudiced by the ir admission. N ine witnesses testified to a consistent timeline relat ed to the allegations : the victims were molested at a young age ; t hey separately disclosed five years apart, both while in high school, and both while suffering from depression ; t hey both disclosed to multiple individuals who testified to hearing those di sclosures ; while the second victim maintained she had been lying, her testimony corroborated the timeline, and did not in any way suggest the first victim was lying ; given the family pressure brought to bear upon the first victim, a reasonable jury could h ave inferred that the second victim’s recantation was the result of similar pressure; despite the family pressure, the parents both testified that defendant admitted molesting the first victim ; and the teacher’s testimony lent credence, recalling that defe ndant had said to him, “you don’t understand what I’ve done or how bad I am.” There was no reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the objectionable portions of the recorded statement been redacted. ( Strickla nd v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693

- 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674] ; see also ( Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 104 [178 L.Ed.2d 624 ] [“It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding’ ” and “the l ikelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable” ].)22 C. The G randfather’s T estimony
Defendant also argues the court compounded the error of admitting the first victim’s phone conversation with the grandfather by permitting the prosecution to call the grandfather to testify and question him about his statements on the recording

. We
conclude t he contention is forfeited.
1. Additional Background Later in the trial, after the recording of t he phone conversation was played for the jury, the prosecution called the grandfather to testify. T he prosecutor ’s questions elicited that the grandfather had had 15 visits with defendant between 2015 and trial. Also the grandfather had helped defendant through the proceedings , financially and with advice

. The prosecutor asked the grandfather whether he considered himself a “Christian

man , ” w hether he had imparted the ideas of “Christian forgiveness” on his children , and

w hether he believes in the crimin al justice s ystem. She also asked if forgiveness outweighs being held accountable in a court of law. The prosecutor also questioned the grandfather at length about his letter and the phone conversation : “did you want to hold the family together so much that you attempted to get [the first victim] to drop the charges?” During a break , d efense counsel asked the court to “shut down” the testimony and admonish the jury to disregard it. He c ited the clos eness between the grandfather and
d efendant , “so it’s really [section] 1101 on [defendant], unless [ the grandfather ] were to say [ defendant ] asked me and urged me to try to dissuade, which he hasn’t done. And I have made this argument before, Judge.”
The court explained “I’m confident about my prior ruling , ” n oting the grandfather’s efforts “ to attempt to, at least in the prosecutor’s view, to dissuade the
witness [the first victim] from testifying ” is relevant to the victim’s state of mind

. But

t he cour t noted it would be inappropriate for defendant’s character to be impinged by the grandfather’s , thus a cautionary instruction had been given and , the court added, “I would23

be happy to give another one

. . . . ” As noted, the trial court gave an instructio n further admonishing the jury as to the limited purpose of the testimony as part of its final instructions. (See fn. 8 , ante .)
On cross

- examination, the grandfather testified the writing and “meddling” he did was not encouraged or requested by defendant. The grandfather said he did it, “[t]rying
to hold our family together. ”
2. Analysis On appeal, defendant challenges specific portions of the elicited testimony : (1) the prosecutor asking if the grandfather considered himself a Christian in order to contrast his beliefs with his conduct; (2) questioning his concept of forgiveness and how it conforms to the law; (3) questioning his support for defendant, “deftly associating [defendant] with [his grandfather’s ] conduct”; (4) probing the grandfather’s out

- of

- court

statements from the record ing and in a letter to the father; and (5) offering question s that were “thinly disguised denunciations

. ” He argues that the grandfather had no relevant
evidence to offer , hi s attempt to dissuade the victim was already in evidence, and his testimony could only serve to unfairly prejudice defendant.
Like the recorded phone conversation between the grandfather and the first victim, portions of the grandfather’s testimony had so me rel evance to the victim’s credibility.
And like the phone conversation, some of the testimony was properly subject to a section 352 objection. But again , no objection was made to specific portions of the testimony
and no section 352 object was raised, which forfeits the challenge on appeal. 10

10 We again note that given the overwhelming evidence supporting the guilty verdicts, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to object to specific portions of the testimony or make a specific section 352 objection. (See fn. 9 , ante .)24 D. The F irst V ictim’s O ther H earsay S tatement s D efendant next challenges the admission the first victim’s out

- of

- court statements as presented through various witnesses. He argues they were in admissible for the first victim’s state of mind because her state of mind was not relevant , nor were they
admissible as consistent statements under section 791, because it was the defense’s theory that the first victim had a motive to lie from the start of her accusations. 11 He also argues the repeated invocations of the first victims’ disclosures were substantially more probative than prejudicial. The People again respond that the contention is forfeited for failure to object to the challenged testimony in the trial court

. 12 And w e again agree with the People. The failure to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence at trial forfeits the claims on appeal. ( People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 142; § 353.)

II. Evidence of a Prior F alse A llegation
Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion “ by dictating which
witness ” defendant must call to admit impeachment evidence. The record does not
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defense from present ing evidence of a prior false allegation through the testimony of the proffered
witness.

11 Section 791 subdivision (b) permits the introduction of consistent statements where: “An express or implied charge has been made that his testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen .” (Italics added)

12 Although the Attorney General asserts forfeiture, d efendant does not address this forfeiture assertion in his reply brief.25

A. Additional Background
The defense moved in limine to admit evidence of a n alleged prior false accusation of rape and sexual misconduct by the first victim

. The evidence, a s proffered,
was that between October 2016 and October 2017, the first victim had a relationship with
a married pastor. Toward the end , the first victim told the pastor’s wife she loved the pastor and texted her a pic ture of his genitalia

. For several weeks, she implored the pastor to leave his wife, implying she was a danger to herself if he did not ( t he pastor’s
home was also vandalized ) . When t he pastor decline d, s he sue d him , claiming he raped her, coerced her in to sex, and hit her. 13 Both sides sought temporary restraining orders.
T he defense sought to impeach the first victim by showing she had accus ed the pastor of rape and assault after he refused to leave his wife. At the hearing, the trial

court , citing People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 469 ( Winbush ) , noted the prior accusation of rape must be “shown to be false.” T he court questioned if the defense
could make that showing through , as proposed, the testimony of pastor’s wife: “The only

way that a true false allegation can be proved is if the [the pastor] would be willing to come into this courtroom and sit in that chair and say we had a consensual relationship, I never forced her to do anything.”
Defense counsel countered that the first vic tim “ came to [the pastor’s wife’s ] front door and told her they had a consensual sexual relationship. So we will prove it out of [ the first victim’s ] ow n words to [the wife].” The court responded that the first victim could have believed at that time th e relationship was consensual but later understood it was the produc t of coercion: “because she is filtering that through, wait a second, he is a pastor. He’s 40 years older than me.”

13 The first victim’s civil complaint alleged the pastor “used emotional, verbal, and physical force to coerce [ her ] into having sex with him on hundreds of occasions under the guise that he was helping to heal her PTSD and trauma from childhood sexual abuse.”26

The court went on, “here is the crux of it, the fact that the wife wou ld say she told me it was consensual, that does not in my mind get to the issue of whether or not it is a false report of coerced sex.” The court noted, the wife “wasn’t there” and couldn’t testify to how they interacted with each other , “ [t] he only perso n who can speak to that is the
husband

. . . . If you had that, that seems to me to be the type of evidence, the quality of evidence that is required under [ People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447 ( Tidwell ) ] and Winbush .” Later, a fter the prosecution closed its case in chief, defense counsel informed the court that it had opted not to call the Pastor: “after meeting with [the pastor], I’ve come to the inescapable conclusion that his credibility would be very difficult for this jury. [¶] I think it would probably cast [the first victim]

. . . in a very sympathetic light.

. . . [The pastor] would not be helpful for the defense.”
B. Analysis Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in condition ing the
admission of the false accusation evidence on the pastor testifying. He argues that whether the pastor’s wife’s testimony sufficed to prove th e accusations were false went to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. We conclude d efendant has not shown that
the tri al court abused its discretion

. “A prior accusation of rape is relevant to the complaining witness ’ s credibility, but only if the accusation is shown to be false .” ( Winbush , supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 469 , citing
Tidwell , supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 145 7, italics added .) A s this court explained in
Tidwell , whether to admit such evidence is considered under the rubric of section 352. ( Tidwell at p p

. 1456

- 1458.) As such, a false allegation’s probative value turns on the proof th at the prior allegation was in fact false. ( Id. at p. 1458

. ) Further, establishing the falsity of an allegation related to a past incident that never reach ed the point of formal charges may consume considerable time and divert jurors’ attention from the case at hand

— another relevant section 352 consideration. ( Tidwell at p. 1458

. )27

We review a trial court’s decision to exclud e evidence of a prior accusation of rape under 352 for abuse of discretion. ( Winbush , supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 469; Tidwell , supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1457.) An exercise of discretion in precluding such evidence will be affirmed unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and the ruling resulted in a miscarriage of justice . ( Winbush , at p. 469.)
Here , we canno t say the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the pastor’s wife to prove a prior false allegation. As the trial court explained, the wife knew little of the actual relationship between the pastor and the first victim. Though t he
wife could repeat the victim’s statements professing love for the pastor and the characterization that the relationship was consensual , such testimony would have relatively low probative value as to whether the relationship was actually coerced. The
pa stor’s testimony, by contrast, would go to the heart of that question. (See Tidwell
, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458 [Noting that “ [ a ] lthough there was some evidence [the victim] made inconsistent statements, there was no conclusive evidence that her pr ior rape complaints were false ” as “t he defense was unable to obtain evidence from the men
that [the victim] accused, and inferences could be drawn either way from the circumstances of the prior incidents and [the victim’s] statements concerning the
incide nt ” (Italics added)].)
D efendant has failed to prove the trial court’s exercise of discretion in precluding the wife’s testimony was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and resulted in a miscarriage of justice

. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.

III. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome Next, defendant challenges the admission of testimony regarding Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation S yndrome. We conclude this challenge is also forfeited.
A. A dditional Background The prosecution moved in limine to admit expert testimony “to dispel misconceptions about child molestation,” averring that several myths would likely be28

alluded to , including : (1) the victims’ failure to immediately disclose the abus e; (2) the victims not appearing frightened , upset, or traumatized ; (3) the victims continuing to socialize with defendant; (4) the victims not knowing specific date s and times of the molestations; and (5) the victims ’ failure to protect themselves from be ing molested.
At the hearing, the trial court announced to the parties : “That brings us to the Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome

. ” The court asked defense counsel, “did you want to object to or make any comment regarding [the expert ’ s testimony]?” Counsel
answered : “We would object and submit.”
The court responded , “ [s] o this is pretty common now,” and cit ing People v.
Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744 , which explained that C hild Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome “testimon y has been held admissible for the limited purpose of disabusing a jury of misconceptions it might hold about how a child reacts to molestation.” And according to the trial court, testimony explaining why a victim would

no t immediately report was “an appr opriate area for discussion.” The court then admitted the expert testimony “for the limited purposes that the People have offered,” noting it “is relevant, [and] will be helpful to the jury.”
Defense counsel offered no fu r ther objection and did not objec t when the prosecution’s expert testified to Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.
B. Analysis On appeal, defendant argues admitting the testimony was an abuse of discretion. While noting such testimony is permissible in certain circumstances, he maintains those
circumstances were not present here

. He argue s the defense did not attack the victims ’
claims based on their delay ed reporting. Rather, the defense’s theory was that the victims’ claims were the result of the mother’s influence. He also argues that neither party articulated a basis to assume the jury would adhere to any myth based on the facts
of the case.29

The p eople maintain the claim is forfeited. We agree. ( See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 228 [“A general objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or one based on a different ground from that advanced at trial, does not preserve the clai m for appeal”].) No argument now advanced on appeal was raised
before the trial court. Counsel’s blanket objection was insufficient to preserve them. 14
The contention is therefore forfeited

. I V

. C umulative Error
Defendant finally claims the above error s were cumulatively prejudicial. As we have rejected every contention raised, we decline to find cumulative prejudice. We
therefore find no cumulative error.

14 Defendant maintains that he sufficiently objected because the prosecution “laid out the relevant issues

— including the potential prejudice of the evidence

— in their motion in limine,” and by objecting, he put the trial court on notice that he disputed the prosecution’s arguments. Also , the trial court , “conducted an analysis of its own accord base d on the objection.” We dis agree. The arguments raised on appeal were never raised below. Thus, neither the prosecution nor the trial court had the opportunity to specifically address them. And that the trial court “conducted an analysis” that periphera lly relates to an argument raised on appeal does not obviate trial counsel’s obligation to make a specific objection.30 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ MURRAY, J.

We concur:

/s/ RAYE, P. J.

/s/ RENNER, J.