See P E N A L C ODE § 1 9
. 0 3 (a)( 2 ). 1 

# IN TH E C OU RTOF C RI MIN A L A PP EA LS

O F T E XAS No. AP-75,539
STEVEN LYNN L ONG, Appe llant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
Direc t Appeal f

rom Case No. F 05-52918-R of the 26 5th Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, Da lla s Co unty
W O M ACK 

## , J ., de liv e re d th eop ini on for a u na nim ous Co ur t. Steven Ly nn L ongappea ls from his conviction for the Ma y 21, 2005, capital murde r of Kaitly n Smith. A jury

found the a

ppellant guilty , and its answer s to the special issues in Code of 1 

## Criminal ProcedureArticle 37.071, se ctions 2(b) a nd 2(e) , require d the trial cour t to sentence the

## L ong- 2

See C O D E C R IM . P R OC . ar t. 3 7 .0 7 1 , § 2 (g ). U n le ss o the rw ise ind ic a te d , all re fer e n c e s to A rtic le s re fer to 2 t he C od e of

Cri mi nal P r ocedur e. See C O D E C R IM . P R OC . art . 37
. 0 7 1 , § 2 (h)
. 3 

## a pp e lla nt t o d e ath. Ap pe a l to thi s c ourt is m and ator

y . Af te r r e vie wi ngthea

pp e lla nt’ s si x points 2 3 

## of er ror, wefind them to be without merit. Consequently , we a ffirm the tria l court’s judgment and sente nce of

death. F acts K a i t l ynS m i than d

h e r m o th e r an d s t e p f ath e r l i v e d i na tr a i l e r p ar k i nD a l l a s C o unty. Kenne th Edwards, D ebora h Dawn Porte r, and he r eight-year -old daughter Sava nah lived in a trailer a cross the stre et, and the a ppellant had r ece ntly

moved in with them. On May 20 , 2 00 5, Ka itl y

n’ s p are nts ho ste d a

pa rt y . T hegue sts inc lud e d th e a pp e lla nt, Ed wa rd s, Por te r, and se ve ra l ot

he rs . D uringthepa

rt y , K a itl y n’ s mo the r a gre e d th at K a itl y n c ou ld spend the night with Savanah at he r trailer across the street. Sava

nah’s mother

and the a ppellant
wer e the last guests to leave theparty . When they g ot back to the tra iler, Savana h’s mother a sked thea pp e lla nt t o c he c k o n th e g irls. Herepo rt e d th at th e y we rea sle e p. Sava

na h’ s mo the r w e nt t o bed. In the morning , Savanah’ s mother che cked on theg irls and discover ed that Ka itly n was missing. Onceit becameappar ent that Kaitly n had not re turned to her

own trailer , a full-blown
se arc h o f t

he tr a ile r p ark

e ns ue d. Ka itl y

n’ s gra nd fathe r s oo n f

ound he r b od y , wra pp e d p art ia lly

in tra s hb ags , un d ern eatha v ac an ttra i l er . T h e ap p el l an tb ec am e as u s p ec t , an d l at er th atev en i n g, homicide detec tives secur ed his confe ssion to the rape a nd murder of

Kaitly n Smith.

## L ong- 3

T h e t r i al c ou r t s u bmi t t ed Spe ci al I s s u e T wo t o t h e j u r y a s f ol l ows : “ D o y ou f

i n d, t ak i n g i n t o c on s i der at i on 4 al l of t he evi d ence, i ncl ud i ng t he ci rcum st ances of t he o f f ense, t he d ef

end ant ’ s charact er and b ackgro und , and t he p e rs o n a l m o ra l cu lp a b ili ty o f t h e d e fen d a n t, tha t t h e re is a su ff ic ie n t m iti g a ting c irc u m sta n c e o r c irc u m sta n c e s to w a r r a n t t h a t a s e n t e n c e of l i f e i mp r i s on me n t r a t h e r t h a n a de a t h s e n t e n c e be i mp os e d?” T he ap p el l ant ’ s p o i nt of error al so cl ai m ed t hat t he i nd i ct m ent co nt ai ned t he same co nst i t ut i o nal vi o l at i o ns 5 as t h e j u r y i n s t r u ct i on s . H owe v er , h i s br i ef a ddr es s es on l y t h e j u r y c h ar g e, a n d h e pr ov i des n o s epa r at e ar g u men t or aut hor i t y t o s uppo r t t he al l ega t i on r ega r di ng t he i ndi ct ment . T her ef ore, we cons i der onl y t he j ur y i ns t r uct i ons he r e. S e e S a la za r v . S ta te , 38 S
. W . 3d 14 1, 14 7 ( T e x . Cr
. Ap p. 20 01 ) ; R. A PP . P . 38
. 1 (h)
.

M i l ls v . Mar

yl and , 48 6 U . S. 36 7 (19 8 8 ). 6 

## I. Di d t hetr ialc our t’ s j ury in st r uc ti ons vio lat e th e appe lla nt ’s c ons ti tu ti ona l r igh ts ? In his first point of error , the appe llant contends that the trial c ourt’s instructions on the second spe cial issue at the punishment phase of his trial violated the Fif

th, Eighth, a

nd 4 

## Four teenth Amendme nts of the United States Constitut ion. The jury instructions reg ardingthe 5


## se c on d s pe c ia l is su e , in

pe rt ine nt p art , w e rea s f

oll ow s: In deliberating on your answe r to Special I ssue No. 2, you areinstructed that yo um ay n o tan s w e r

S p e c i a l Is s u e N o . 2 “N o ” un l e s s th e j ur y a gr e e s un an i m o u s l y, and you may not answe r S pecia l I ssue No. 2 “Ye s” unl ess 10 or more me mbers of the jury agree . The membe rs of the jury need not a greeon what par ticular ev i d ence supports an affirmative answer to Special I ssue No. 2. In arriving at your answe r, you shall c o n s id e r mi ti g ati n g e v id e n c e to b e e v id e n c e th at a ju r o r mi ght r e g ard a s re du c ingthede fe nd ant’ s mo ra l bl ame wo rt hin e ss. You ar e fur

ther instructe d that if the jury returns an aff

irmative findingon Spe c ia l I ssu e No . 1 and

a ne g ativ e fi nd ingon

Spe c ia l I ssu e No . 2 , th e Cou rt sh a ll sentenc e the de fenda

nt to death. I f the jury

returns a neg ative findingon Special I ssue No. 1 or an aff

irmative findingon Special I ssue No. 2, the Court shall sentenc e the defe ndant to confine ment for lifei n th e Institut ional Division of the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal Justice. The a ppellant argues spec ifically that these instructions (1) pr evente d the jury from g iving due consideration to mi tigating e videncein violation of Mills v. Maryland ; (2) unde rmined the jury ’s 6 

## sense of responsibility

for imposinga death sentence , in violation of the Eighth Ame ndment, and
re nd e re d th e se nte nc ingpr oc e e din gso un fair a s to de ny

thea pp e lla nt d uepr oc e ss; (3 ) f

a ile d to assign to the State the burde n to prove be yond a re asonabledoubt that a death sentencewas

## L ong- 4

S e e , e.g ., P ry sta sh v . S ta te , 3 S .W .3 d 5 2 2 , 5 3 6 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ); M c F a rla n d v . S ta te , 928 S. W . 2d 7 4 8 2 , 5 1 9 -2 0 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 6 ), ove r r ul ed on ot hergr ounds ; L a w to n v . S ta te , 91 3 S.W
. 2 d 54 2 , 55 8
- 5 9 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 5 ). 

## merited, ther eby

denying theappellant dueproce ss; and (4) a s reg ards the mitig ation issue, wer e excessively

vague, re sulting in arbitra ry and ca pricious sentenc ing pa

tterns, in violation of the Ei ghth Am e ndme nt a

nd theDu e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of theF ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt. In his first and sec ond subissues, the appellant urg es that the jury instructions violated the tenets of Mi lls . He a

rgues that the jury

instructions inaccur ately stated the lawby

g iving the impression that, in order to impose a lifesentenc e instead of death, ten jurors nee ded to answe r the sec ond specia l issue affir matively . The a

ppellant re asons that the instructions thus misl ed the jury , such that a juror

would have be lieved that she c ould not give e ffe ct to mitigatingevidenc e without nine other jurors joiningher. Theinstructions theref ore unc onstitut ionally

minimi zed
eac h juror’s r esponsibility for imposinga death sentence , espec ially g iven that jurors we re repe atedly

told of the gravity

of their de cision. The inac cura cy , he maintains, re ndere d the sentenc ing procee ding so unf air that the imposition of the dea th penalty amounted to a de nial of due proc ess, in violation of the Eighth and Four teenth Amendme nts to the Const itution. This court has c onsistently reje cted similar cha lleng es and uphe ld the constitutionality of the instructions at issue, known as the “ 10-12 rule.” We find nothing in the a ppellant’s 7 

## arguments to alter our de cision here . We theref ore r ejec t the appellant’ s contention. In his third subiss ue, the a ppellant argues that the juryinstructions violated his dueproce ss rights by

failingto place on theState the burde n of provingthe mitigation issue beyond a
re a so na bledo ub t. H e argue s th at th e du e -p ro c e ss r e qu ir e me nt t hat e ve ry fa c t ne c e ssa

ry to
c on sti tut e a

c ri me bepr ov e d b e yon d a re a so na bledo ub t e xten ds to “ a ll e le me nts that r e su lt i n

## L ong- 5

53 0 U . S. 46 6 (20 0 0 ). 8 53 6 U . S. 58 4 (20 0 2 ). 9 Appr endi , 530 U
. S. , a t 490. 10 S e e B lu e v . S ta te , 1 2 5 S .W .3 d 4 9 1 , 5 0 1 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 3 ); R e se n d iz v . S ta te , 112 S. W . 3d 541, 550 11 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 3 ).

Ib id
. 12 I bi d. 13 I bi d. 14 

## imposit ion of a pe nalty

of death.” He r elies for

support on Apprendi v. New Je rsey and Ring v. 8 

## Arizona
. In Apprendi , the Supreme Court he ld, “Other than the fa ct of a

prior convic tion, any 9 

## fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be yond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum mustbe submitt ed to a jury , and prove d beyond a re asonabledoubt.” The a ppellant contends that the 10 

## mit ig atio n is su e fa lls wi thi n th is m and ate and the re fo rewa

rr ants a jur y ins tr uc tio n th at th e State bear s the burden to pr ove it beyond a re asonabledoubt. Th is c ourt

ha s p re vio us ly

re je c te d s uc h a

c la im. Apprendiand Ring a pp ly on ly to f a c ts 11 

## that incre ase thepenalty

beyond the maximum penalty authorized by

statute. Be causethe

12 

## maxi mum statutory

penalty under Article 37.071 is death, and the jury ’s answe r to the mitigation issue there forecannot incr easethe pena lty beyond the maximum the statute allows, Apprendiis inapplicable to the mitig ation specia l issue. Fur thermore , we have held that ne ither par ty bear s 13 

## the burde n of proof

as to the mitigation issue, and the holding in Apprendidoes not aff ect that de c isi on . We r e

je c t th e a pp e lla nt’ s argume nt. 14

## L ong- 6

40 8 U . S. 23 8 (19 7 2 ). 15 A rt i cl e 3 7 . 0 7 1 , § 2 (f )( 4 ) def i nes “ m i t i gat i ng evi d ence” as “ evi d ence t hat a jur o r mi ght regard as r ed uci ng 16 t he def endan t ’ s mo r al bl amewort hi nes s . ” S e e C a n tu v . S ta te , 939 S. W . 2d 627, 648- 49 ( T ex . Cr
. App. 1997)
. ( “ T h er e i s n o e v i den ce t h atmu s t be 17 vi ewed by a j uror as b ei ng per s e m iti g a ting . In ste a d , ju ro rs m u st ind ivid u a lly d e te rm ine w h a t ev id e n c e , i f an y, m iti g a te s a g a ins t t h e im p o sitio n o f t h e d e a th p e n a lty a n d w h a t we igh t, if a n y, t o giv e tha t ev id e n c e in its cons i dera t i on. Art i cl e 37. 07 1 § 2 ( e) y i el ds f ur t her s uppo r t t o t hi s i nt er pret at i on i n t hati t r equi r es t he cour t t o i ns t r uct t he jur y t o t ake i nt o co nsi d erat i o n ‘ a llo f t h e e v id e n c e , i ncl udi ng t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e o f f e n s e , t h e d e f

e n d a n t 's c h a ra c te r a n d b a c k g ro u n d , andt he p ers o nal m o ral cul p ab i l i t y of t he d ef end ant ’ i n de t erm i ni ng whet her s uf f i ci ent m i t i gat i ng ci rcum st ances exi stt o warranta l i f e sent ence.” ( E m p hasi s ad d ed i n C a n tu . )) S e e C h a m b e rla in v . S ta te , 9 9 8 S .W .2 d 2 3 0 , 2 3 8 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ). (“[ W ]e a re a w a re o f no a u tho rity 18 hol di ng t hatnon- er r ors may i n t hei r cu mul at i ve ef f ect ca us e e r r or. ”) 

## In his final subissue, the appe llant contends that the jury instructions run afoul of the Supreme Court’s re quirement, a s expressed in Fu rm an v . G e or gia , that the death penalty be 15 

## imposed in a manner

that is not arbitrary

and ca pricious. He a

rgues that the de finition of “mitigating e vidence ” in Article 37.071 limit s a jury to consideringevidenc e only of a c apital 16 

## defe ndant’s mora l culpability or blamew orthiness and pre vents its consideration of positive
c ha ra c te r t ra its . Cumul ativ e ly , h e c la ims , th e jur y ins tr uc tio ns ’ i na c c ur ate state me nt o f l aw w ith reg ard to the “ 10-12 rule,”their fa ilure to assign a burde n of proof or state the sta

ndard f or that burden, a nd a limited statutory

definition of “mitigating e vidence ” cumulatively rende red the ins tr uc tio ns arb itr ary

and c a pric iou s, re su lti ngin t

hea pp e lla nt’ s d e ath s e nte nc e be ing“ wa nto nly and fr eakishly” applied, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and DueProcess Clause. We have pr eviously

decide d the issue re g ardingthe def inition of “miti g atingevidenc e” adver sely to the appellant, and wereje ct it hereas we ll. W e also have pre viously overr uled a 17 

## po int of e rror , s imi lar t o th e a

pp e lla nt’ s, re g ardingthec umu lativ e e ff e c t of jur y c ha rg e e rror s. 18 

## Be causewe r ejec t eac h of the a ppellant’s arguments reg ardingthe constitutionality of the jury instructions on the miti g ation issue, we ove rrule his fir st point of error
.

## L ong- 7

T he t r i al cour t s ubmi t t ed Speci al I s s ue O ne t o t he j ur y as f ol l ows: “ D o y ou f

i nd f r om t he evi dence 19 bey ond a r eas onabl e doubt t hatt her e i s a pr ob abi l i t y t hatt he def endan t , St eve n Ly nn Long, woul d com mi t cr i mi nal act s of vi ol enc e t hatwoul d cons t i t ut e a cont i nu i ng t hr eat t o s oci et y ?” See C O D E C R IM . P R OC . art . 37
. 0 7 1 , § 2 (b)(1). S e e C h a m b e rla in , 9 9 8 S .W .2 d , at 2 3 7 -3 8 ; K in g v . S ta te , 5 5 3 S .W .2 d 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 7 7 ). 20 S ee su p ra n ot e 19. 21 T he f act ors a j ur y may cons i der i ncl ude, but ar e n ot l i mi t ed t o: ( 1) t he ci r cums t anc es of t he capi t al 22 o f f ense, i ncl ud i ng t he d ef

end ant ’ s st at e o f

m i nd and whet her he was wo rki ng al o ne o r wi t h other pa rt i es; (2) t he cal cul at ed nat ure of

t he d ef end ant ’ s act s; (3) t he f

o ret ho ught and de l i b erat eness exhi b i t ed by t he cri m e’ s executi o n; ( 4) t he exi s t enc e of

a pr i or c r i mi nal r ecor d, an d t he s eve r i t y of t he pri or c r i mes; ( 5) t he def endan t ' s ag e a nd per s onal ci r cu ms t an ce s a t t h e t i me of t h e of f en s e; ( 6) w h et h er t h e def en dan t w as a ct i n g u n der du r es s or t h e domi n at i on of anot her at t he t i me of

t he of f ens e; ( 7) ps y chi at r i c e vi dence ; an d (8) ch ar act er ev i dence
. W a rd rip v . S ta te , 56 S. W . 3d 5 8 8 , 5 9 4 n.7 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 1 ); K e e to n v . S ta te , 7 2 4 S .W .2 d 5 8 , 6 1 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 8 7 ). 

## II. Did the trial court e rr in instructing the jury on the defin ition of “probabi lity”? In his second point of er

ror, the a ppellant claims that the trial c ourt violated his dueproce ss rights and his Eighth Ame ndment right to free dom from cr uel and unusua l punishment by failingto instruct the jury on the def

inition of the word “probability” as it wa s used in Special I ssue One. He a

rgues that the lac k of a de finition render ed the ter m unconstituti onally

vague 19 

## and “violate d the constitutional require ment that eac h statutory ag gravating c ircumstance g e nu ine ly na rrowthec la ss o f p e rs on s e lig ibl e fo r t hede ath p e na lty .”Th is c ourt ha s p re vio us ly reje cted this identical c laim and said that we ll-settled law re quires no such de finition in the jury charg e. We overrulethe appe llant’s second point of e rror .

20 

## III . W as th e e vid e nc e le ga llysuffic ie ntto suppo r t fut ur e dang e r ous ne ss? In his third point of error, theappellant c halleng es the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence supporting thejury ’s af

firmative a

nswer to the f

irst special issue c oncer

ning theappellant’ s futur e da ng e ro us ne ss. 21 

## When determiningwhether a def endant will pose a

continuing thr eat to socie ty , a jury may consider ma

ny fac tors. Of thesefac tors, the circ umstances of the ca pital offenseitself “ca

n 22

## L ong- 8

D ru e ry v . S ta te , 2 2 5 S .W .3 d 4 9 1 , 5 0 7 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 7 ); W a rd rip , 56 S. W . 3d, a t 594. 23 L a d dv . S ta te , 3 S .W .3 d 5 4 7 , 5 5 7 -5 8 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ); V a ld e z v . S ta te , 776 S. W . 2d 162, 166- 67 24 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 9 ).

Ladd , 3 S. W . 3d, a t 558. 25 In hi s b ri ef

, t he ap p el l ant goe s so f ar as t o ad m i t t hat i f

he were rel eased ba ck i nt o s o ci et y i n t he 26 f o res eeab l e f

ut ure, he m i ght po se a r i sk. S e e , e.g ., Mo rris v . S ta te , 94 0 S.W
. 2 d 61 0 , 61 3 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 6 ). 27 T he l aw ap p l i cab l e t o t he ap p el l ant al l o wed pa role f o r a def end ant s ent enced t o l i f

e i m p ri sonm ent f

o r a 28 ca pi t al of

f en s e. Ar t i cl e 37. 071 w as a men ded i n 2005, t o e l i mi n at e par ol e as a n opt i on f or de f en dan t s s o s en t en ce d. See Act of

Ju ne 17 , 200 5, 79t h Le g. , R. S. , ch
. 787 , §§ 6
- 9, 200 5 T ex. G en. Laws 270 5, 270 6- 07 ( cur r entve r s i on at 

## beamon gthemos t r e ve a lin ge vid e nc e of futur e da ng e ro us ne ss a

nd a lon e may

besu ff ic ie nt t o support an af

firmative a

nswer to that spe cial issue.” The jury may also consider

all evidenc e 23 

## prese nted at both the guilt and the punishment stage s of the trial. In revie winga jury ’s dec ision 24


## on thesp e c ia l is su e , “ wemus t vi e w a ll o f t hee vid e nc e be fo rethejur y in t helight m os t f

avo ra ble to its finding, and then de termine whe ther, ba sed on that evide nce a nd rea sonable infe renc es the re from, a

ratio na l jury

c ou ld h avefo un d b e yon d a re a so na bledo ub t th at th e ans we r t o th e fi rs t punishment issue was ‘yes.’” 25 

## He re , th e a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th at, i n a ll l ike lih oo d, hewi ll s pe nd there st o f h is l if

e in priso n, and

thu s, theon ly

re le va nt “ so c ie ty” fo r t

hejur y ’s c on sid e ra

tio n o n f utu reda ng e ro us ne ss is prison society . He looks to his prison rec ord as a predic tor of futureconduct ther e, and conclude s that it does not support an aff irmative findingon the future -dang erousne ss issue. 26 

## Ho we ve r, thi s c ourt

ha s r e pe ate dly

he ld t hat, i n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a de fe nd ant p os e s a continuing thr eat to socie ty , the jury considers both fr ee soc iety and prison socie ty . That the 27


## a pp e lla nt, ha d h e be e n s e nte nc e d to lif e imp ri so nme nt, wo uld

no t ha vebe e n e lig ibl e fo r p aro le until after se rvingforty

year s was not re levant to the jury ’s dec ision.

28 29

## L ong- 9

C O D E C R IM . P R OC . art . 37
. 0 7 1 , §§ 1, 2(a)( 1 ), 2(e), 2(g)).

S e e M o rris , 940 S. W . 2d, a t 613 ( “ B ec au s e t h e l en g t h of a ppel l an t ’ s i n ca r ce r at i on doe s n ot r edu ce or 29 i ncrease hi s f

ut ure dange rousness , i t i s no t rel evant t o t hat i ss ue. ”). 

## We f ind that a ratio na l jury

c ou ld h avefo un d b e yon d a re a so na bledo ub t th at th e reis a probability

that the appe llant would commit criminal acts of violenc e that would constitute a continuing thr eat to socie ty . The re cord, inc luding the a ppellant’s own c onfession, establishes that the appe llant rape d and murde red a n eleve n-year -old g irl. The for ensic e videnceshowed that the appe llant had inflicted e x tensive blunt-forc e injuries throughout Kaitly n’s body , including he r he a d, ne c k, mouth, c he st, ba c k, le g s, and ha nd s. Heha d a lso c a

us e d ma ssi veint e rn a l tr a

uma to both Kaitly

n’s nec k and her

pelvic re g ion. The tissue separatingKaitly n’s vag ina and a

nus had been se vere ly

damag ed, and D r. McClain testified that, in her nineteen year s as a medic al examiner, she had ne ver be foreseen se x ual-a ssault injuries of such magnitude. Whil e ther e wa s evidenc e that the a

ppellant had be en drinking , therewas a lso evidencethat sug g ested that hemay not have be en impaire d by any intox ication. The e videnceduringpunishment showed that the appe llant had an e x tensive history of violence a

nd brutality . The a

ppellant’s medica l rec ords document a psycholog ical eva luation when hewas fif

teen year s old which reve aled se vera l problem are as, includinghomicidal and suicidal tendenc ies. He ha d been in a common-law ma

rriag e, duringwhich, ac cordingto the te sti mony of his e x-w if

e , h e repe ate dly

ra pe d h e r a nd be at he r, e ve n whe n s hewa s p re gna nt,
c a us inghe r t o mi sc arr

y on c e . Sh or

tly be fo rethebir

th o f h is s e c on d c hil d, thea pp e lla nt t ri e d to attack his wifewith a butcher knife. Te stimony

also showed that the a

ppellant ra

ped a thirte en-

## L ong- 10

S e e , e.g ., R u sse a u v . S ta te , 1 7 1 S .W .3 d 8 7 1 , 8 8 6 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); P rysta sh , 3 S. W . 3d, a t 536; 30 M cFar l and , 928 S. W . 2d, a t 498- 99.

M cFar l and , 928 S. W . 2d, a t 499. 31 

## ye ar - o l d g i r l an d h a d r e l at i o n s h i p s w i thtw o o th e r w o m e nwh o d e s c r i b e d

th e a p p e l l ant ’ s an gr

y, violent, and sexually

abusive be havior. Th e a pp e lla nt p re vio us ly

ha d b e e n c onvic te d a

nd se nte nc e d f

or atte mpt e d mu

rd e r f or his participation in a drive-by shooting in 1991. While in prison, the appellant committed about twenty disciplinary

violations, including par ticipating in a

prison riot and fr eeinghimself from
re str a int s. Ba sed on the totality

of the e vidence , we f

ind that a ra

tional jury

could haveanswe red the future- dang erousne ss issue in the affir mative. Point of error

number thre e is overr

uled. IV. Is the Texas capital sentencing schem e unconstitutional for f ailin g to provide for m e a ni ng fu l a pp e ll a t e r e v ie w? In h is f ourt h p oint of e rror , th e a

pp e lla nt c onte nd s th at T e xas’ c a pit a l se nte nc ingsc he me is unconstituti onal bec ause it does not per mit meaningf

ul appellate r eview. T he appe llant argues that, beca use the sec ond specia l issue does not specify mitigatingand ag gravating f actor s, nor does it requirejurors to make spe cific f indings, a n appellatecourt ha s no way of knowingwhat fac tors the jury

considere d in making its dec ision. Meaning ful appe llate re view is there fore imp os sib le , h e c la ims
. This court has r epeatedly reje cted this argument, and wehave sa id, “So long a s the jury 30 

## is not precluded f

rom hea ringand ef

fec tuating mitig atingevidenc e, wehave ne ver r eg arde d
a pp e llate re vie w o f m iti g atin ge vid e nc e to b e an e sse nti a l c omp on e nt o f a c on sti tut ion a lly
acc eptable c apital punishment scheme.” Point of error f our is overr

uled. 31

## L ong- 11 V. Is t hede at h pe nal tyas adm inis te r e d in Te xa s unc ons ti tu ti ona l? In his fifth point of error , the appe llant contends that Texas’s lethal-injec tion protocol vio late s h is right t o b e fr e e from c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt u

nd e r t heEi ghth and F ourt e e nth Amendments. The a

ppellant conc edes that the proce dure ha s not been found to be unconstitutional by

any court. B ut he argues that Texas has yet to allow a he aringon this iss ue, and asks that werema

nd the ca se to the trial cour t for a he aringon the merits of his claim, or alternatively , that we takejudicial notice of c erta in testimony and other published studies which support his positi on. The State c ounters that the a ppellant fa iled to preser

ve the issue f

or appe al b y f a i l i n gt o m ak e th e c l a i mw i tha d e qu at e s p e c i f i c i ty. We agreewith the State that the appe llant has failed to pr eser ve er ror. Theappellant raised theissue only

as a one -sentenc e paragraph in a pre- trial Motion to S et Aside the Indictment, which cha lleng ed the c onstitut ionality of the statute. Thepara graph r eads: “ Death by le tha l in je c tio n is c ru e l and

unus ua l pu

nis hme nt i n v iol atio n o f t heEi ght[h ] an d F ourt e e nth Amendments of the United States Consti tution and Article I §~10, 13 and 19 of theTexas Constitution.” Be forevoir dire, the a ppellant also madean ora l motion t o set aside the indic tme nt, re fe rringto t

hewritt e n mo tio n g e ne rally . B ut h e faile d to e xpla in t heba sis fo r h is
c l a i mw i thany f

urth e r s p e c i f i c i ty. Texas Rule of Appellate Proc edure33.1(a) require s that, in order to pre servea complaint for a ppellate r eview: [T]here c ord mu st s ho w that th e c omp la int wa s ma deto t

hetrial cou rt by

a tim e ly reque st, objection, or m otion that stated the grounds for therulingthat the complainingparty sought from the trial court with sufficie nt specificity to make the trial court a

war e of the complaint, unless the spec ific grounds wer e appa rent from the c onte xt.

## L ong- 12

T h e a p p e llan t m istak e n ly i d e n tif ie s S ta te ’s E x h ib it 1 1 1 a s a n a u to p sy p h o to g ra p h in o n e p o rtio n o f his 32 b rie f, b u t else w h e re he c o rr e c tly re fer s to the p h o to g ra p h s a t i ssu e a s S ta te ’s E x h ib its 7 5 -1 1 0 . S ta te ’s E x h ib it 1 1 1 is act ual l y a “ C o nsent t o Sea rch” f o rm si gned by t he ap p el l ant , rat her t han an aut o p sy pho t o graph. T EX . R. E V ID . 4 0 3 . R u le 4 0 3 a lso a llo w s fo r th e e x c lus io n o f re le v a n t ev id e n c e if the p ro b a tive va lue is 33 s u bs t an t i al l y ou t we i g h ed by t h e dan g er of c on f u s i on of t h e i s s u es or mi s l ea di n g t h e j u r y , or by c on s i der at i on s of un due del ay , or nee dl es s pre s ent at i on of cu mul at i ve evi dence
. T hes e s peci f i c objec t i ons , howev er , wer e n ot r ai s ed her e. 

## The a

ppellant’s cla im in his pre- trial motion, that death by lethal injection is crue l and unusual punishment, is not equivalent to his complaint on appeal that the pr esent letha l injection protocol used in Te x as violates the Eighth Amendment. His complaint failed to mee t the require ments of Rule 33.1(a) . Be causethe appe llant has not prese rved theissue for a ppeal, point of er ror f ive is overr

uled. VI. Did the trial courterrby admitt ing au topsy ph otographs into evidence? The a ppellant’s six th and final point of er ror a lleg es that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing “highly prejudicia l” autopsy

photogr aphs into evidenc e over his tim ely

objection. He a lleg es that the photographs we re ina dmissibl e as unf airly prejudicia l under Te x as Rule of Evidenc e 403. Th e a pp e lla nt a rgue s th at, b e c a

us e his guil t w a s “ vir

tua lly c on c e de d”duri ngthetria l, t hea uto ps y photographs, spec ifically State’s Exhi bits 75 through 110, wer e not re levant to his guilt or 32 

## innocenc e and, the ref

ore, ha d littl e probative value. Healso contends that many of the ph oto gra ph s w e reno t r e fe re nc e d at a ll i n th e te sti mony . And hec la ims that, p art ic ula

rl y wi th reg ard to State’s Exhibits 94 through 102, which we re imag es of inter nal org ans, this lack of explanation prejudiced juror s by g iving them no f

rameof re fer encefrom which to de termine the
no rm a lity of theima g e s. Rule 403 allows for the e x clusion of otherw ise rele vant evidenc e whe n its probative value “is substantially

outweighed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.” “Rule 403 favors the admission 33

## L ong- 13

G a llo , 2 3 9 S .W .3 d , at 7 6 2 ; Hay e s v . S ta te , 85 S.W
. 3 d 80 9 , 81 5 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 2 ). 34 P rib le v . S ta te , 1 7 5 S .W .3 d 7 2 4 , 7 3 4 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); S o n n ie r v . S ta te , 91 3 S.W
. 2 d 51 1 , 51 8 (T ex. 35 C r. A p p . 19 9 5 ).

S a la za r v . S ta te , 38 S.W
. 3 d 14 1 , 15 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 1 ). 36 P rib le , 1 7 5 S .W .3 d , at 7 3 4 ; S a n te lla n v . S ta te , 9 3 9 S .W .2 d 1 5 5 , 1 7 2 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 7 ); L o n g v . S ta te , 37 8 2 3 S.W
. 2 d 25 9 , 27 2 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 1 ). 

## of re levant evide nce a

nd car ries a pr esumption that releva nt evidencewill be more probative than prejudicia l.” The a dmissibi lity of a photograph unde r Rule 403 is within the sound discretion of 34 

## thetria l ju dg e . We w illre ve rs e thetria l ju dg e ’s de c isi on on ly fo r a n a bu se of dis c re tio n, that is , 35


## on ly if thede c isi on

fa lls outsi dethezon e of

re a so na bledis a gre e me nt. 36 

## A trial cour

t may consider se vera l fac tors in determiningwhether photogr aphs ar e un fairly pr e judic ia l. T he se fa c tor s in c lud e : th e nu mbe r o f e xhibi ts o ff

e re d, the ir

gru e so me ne ss, their deta il, their siz e, whe ther they arecolor or bla ck-a

nd-white, whe ther they

areclose-up, whether the body depicted is c lothed or nake d, the ava ilability of other me ans of proof, and othe r circ umstances unique to the individual ca se. 37 

## We note at the outset that, contra ry to the appellant’ s arguments, eac h autopsy photogr aph
w a s s p e c i f

i c a l l y r e f e r e n c e d b y numb e r

o r d e s c ri p t i o ni nth e m e d i c a l e x am i n e r ’ s t e s t i m o ny. Fur thermore , beca

use the a ppellant did not plead guilty , the State was r equire d to prove e ach element of

the cha rg ed off ense r eg ardle ss of the appe llant’s strategy at trial re g ardingthe issue of his guilt or innoce nce. All of the photographs in question we re taken duringthe medica l examiner’s inv e sti g atio n. State ’s Exhibit s 7 5 thro ugh 1 10 we reint ro du c e d d uringthete sti mony

of Deputy Chief Medica l Ex aminer Joni McClain. Accordingto Dr. McClain’s testimony , which we

## L ong- 14

S ta te ’s E x h ib it 7 5 is a fro n ta l i m a g e o f t h e un c lo the d b o d y fro m he a d to m id -thigh sh o w ing a n o v e ra ll 38 view o f t he b o d y’ s co nd i t i o n. State’s E xh i b i t s 7 6
- 7 7 sho w he m o rrha ging a ro un d t he wh i t es o f t he ri gh t an d l eft eyes, r es pec t i v el y ; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 78 s h ows a br as i on s a n d c on t u s i on s a r ou n d t h e r i g h t s i de of t h e n ec k ; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 79 s h ows s i mi l ar br u i s i n g t o t h e n ec k a n d a l s o t h e ch i n ; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 80 s h ows s i mi l ar br u i s i n g a l on g t h e l ef t s i de of t he neck. Stat e’ s E xhi b i t 81 s ho ws ar eas of co nt usi o n on t he chest ; Stat e’ s E xhi b i t 82 s ho ws a s m al l ab ras i o n on t he 39 b ack, whi l e t he o t her purp l e areas are po st m o rt em bloo d s et t l i ng rat her t han i njury ; Stat e’ s E xhi b i t 83 s ho ws brui si ng on t he upper l ef

t s houl der; St at e’ s E xh i bi t 84 sh ows t he s ame t hi ng as St at e’ s E xh i bi t 83, ex cept on t he r i gh t s i de; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 85 s h ows a br u i s e on t h e ar m; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 86 s h ows a n a br as i on on t h e bac k ; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 87 s hows bru i s es on t he l eg; St at e’ s E xh i bi t 88 sh ows bru i s es on t he pal m o f t he r i gh t ha nd; St at e’ s E xh i bi t 89 sh ows m o re b ru ising o n the rig h t ha n d ; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 9 0 sh o w s a n a re a o f co n tus io n o n the left f o re a rm ; S ta te ’s E x h ib its 9 1
- 9 3 sho w co ntusi o ns o n the u p p er a nd l o w er li p s.

Stat e’ s E xhi b i t 94 s ho ws l acerat i o ns and co nt usi o ns o n t he vagi nal t i ss ue al o ng t he vagi nal canal t o t he 40 c e rv ix; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 9 5 sh o w s the a re a o f t issu e b e tw e e n the a n a l re g io n a n d the va g ina , m e a su rin g a n a b n o rm a llyt hi n one - ei ght h i nch.

St at e’ s Exh i bi t 96 s h ows br u i s i n g a n d h emor r h ag e u n der t h e r ef l ec t ed s ca l p, i n di ca t i n g bl u n t t r au ma on 41 the rig h t sid e o f t h e he a d ; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 9 7 sh o w s the ne c k o rg a n s, w ith h e m o rr h a g ing thr o u g h o u t t h e thyr o id re g io n ; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 9 8 sh o w s the fro n t p o rtio n o f t h e ne c k o rg a n s a n d he m o rr h a g e o f t h e thyr o id c a rtilag e ; S ta te ’s Exh i bi t 99 s h ows h emor r h ag e of t h e t h y r oi d g l an d, a f

t er h av i n g be en r emov ed f r om t h e body ; St at e’ s Exh i bi t 100 sh o w s the o the r sid e o f t h e thyr o id gla n d ; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 1 0 1 sh o w s h e m o rr h a g e a ro u n d the hyo id b o n e ; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 1 0 2 sh o w s h e m o rr h a g e a ro u n d the c e rv ix, the b o tto m p o rtio n o f t h e ute ru s, a n d the o v a rie s; S ta te ’s E x h ib it 1 0 3 sh o w s h e m o rr h a g e a ro u n d the re c tum a n d a n a l re g io n tha t i n d ic a te s “sig n ifi c a n t ex te rn a l p e n e tra tio n .”

Stat e’ s E xhi b i t s 1 0 4
- 1 0 6 s ho w vari o us vi ews of a bit e m ark on t he l ef

t butt o ck; Stat e’ s E xhi b i t s 1 0 7 and 42 1 0 8 sh o w s d iff

e re n t vie w s o f a b ite m a rk o n the rig h t b u tto c k ; S ta te ’s E x h ib its 1 0 9 a n d 1 1 0 sh o w d iff e re n t vie w s o f a b i t e m ark on t he ri ght cheek. 

## summarize here , State’s Exhi bits 76 through 80 show he morrhag ing a nd contusions which ar e indicative of stra

ngulation. State’s Exhi bits 81 through 93 show va rious contusions throughout 38 

## the body , which ar e evide nce of blunt-forc e tra

uma. Additionally , State’s Exhi bits 88 and 89 39


## areconsistent with Kaitly n’s havingheld her

hand up to fe nd off a

n attack. State’ s Ex hibits 94 and 95 show tra

umatic injury

to the vag ina and a

nal re g ion, and State’s Exhibit s 96 through 103

40


## s h o w v ar i o u s i nt ern al i n

j uri es Ka i t l y

ns u s t ai n edd

uri n g th e a s s au l t . S t at e’ s E x h i b i t s 1 0 4 thro u gh 41 

## 11 0 s ho w i nju

ri e s to Ka itl y

n’ s b od y c on sis te nt w ithbit e mark s. 42

## L ong- 15

S e e R o ja s v . S ta te , 9 8 6 S .W .2d 2 4 1 , 2 4 9
- 5 0 (T ex . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) (up ho l d i ng t he ad m i ssi o n o f au t o p sy 43 ph ot og r a ph s of

i n j u r i e s t o t h e g r oi n w h e r e t h e e v i de n c e s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e a pp e l l a n t i n f l i c t e d t h e m d u r i n g t h e s a me co nt i nuo us t rans act i o n, even t ho ugh t he i njuri es were not t he d i rect cause of t he vi ct i m ' s d eat h; pho t o graphs were al so p rob at i ve o f

t he ap p el l ant ’ s m ent al s t at e and t he specif i c ci rcum st ances of t he m urder). S e e G a llo , 2 3 9 S .W .3 d , at 7 6 3 ; N a rv a iz v . S ta te , 84 0 S.W
. 2 d 41 5 , 42 9
- 3 0 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 2 ). 44 

## The de tailed, graphic , and gruesome photographs a re undoubte dly

prejudicia l. But we find that they

arenot unfairly

so, that is, we find that the pre judicial eff

ect of these photographs does not substantially

outweigh their probative value. In her te stimony , Dr. McClain e xplained that Ka itly n’s death was ca

used by strangulation, but th at ha d K a itl y

n s ome ho w s ur

viv e d th e str a

ngulatio n, thee xten siv e blu nt- fo rc e tr a

uma injuries to her pe lvic reg ion could also havecause d her de ath by blood loss or infection. Dr. McClain used ea ch one of the photographs to support and e lucidate he r finding s. The photographs ar e highly

probative, the ref

ore, be causethey

demonstrate thenatureand extent of the injuries Kaitly

n sustained, provide e videnceof the c ause a nd manner

of her death, a nd wer e nece ssary to the State in developingits case. F urthermor e, the injuries depicted we re a ll sustained as par t of the same c ontinuous transaction, show the menta l state of the a ppellant duringthe assault and murde r, and show thespecific circ umstances of the crime. 43 

## The thirty-six photogr aphs at issue we re pr esente d to the jury as “le tter-sized,” c olor ima g e s. No neof

the se ima g e s is unne c e ssa ri ly du pli c ativ e . In th e ma

jority of theph oto gra

ph s, the body has bee n unaltere d by

the autopsy . Although the se photographs a re gruesome, the y

are no more gruesome tha

n the injuries ca

used by the appe llant himself. 44 

## Inth e r em ai n i n g p h o t o grap h s , th e b o dy h as b ee nal t er edb y

th e aut o p s y . Al th o u gh “autopsy photographs ar e g enerally admissible unless they

depict mutilation of the victim caused

## L ong- 16

Hayes , 85 S. W . 3d, a t 816; ac cor d Sant el l an , 939 S. W . 2d, a t 172. 45 S e e R ip k o w sk i v. S ta te , 6 1 S .W .3 d 3 7 8 , 3 9 2 -9 3 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 1 ); Sal az ar , 38 S. W . 3d, a t 150- 53. 46 S e e G a llo , 2 3 9 S .W .3 d , at 7 6 3 ; Ha rris v . S ta te , 66 1 S.W
. 2 d 10 6 , 10 8 (19 8 3 ). 47 

## by the autopsy

itself,” the “mutilation” is not fatal to the photographs’ admissibili ty . The

45 46 

## autopsy ’s interna l examination was critical to Dr. Mc Clain’s findings a nd conclusions. It was thus also critical that juror s be ableto see the photographic evidenc e of thefull ext ent of the injuries and the c ause a

nd manner

of Ka itly n’s death. 47 

## As to the appe llant’s argument reg ardingState’s Exhi bits 94 through 102, wefind it has no merit. Contrary

to the appellant’ s claim, Dr. Mc Clain ga ve the jury

a “f rameof re fer ence ” for
e a c h o f t heima g e s at is su e . Sh e us e d th e ph oto gra ph s to su pp le me nt h e r t e sti mony

by c le arl y po int ingout th e c onte nts of e a c h o neof

theph oto gra

ph s a nd e xpla ini ngwh at th e y

c ontribute d to the evidenc e. Be causethe probative value of the autopsy

photogr aphs wa s not substantially outweighed by theda ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e judic e , w e fi nd

that th e tria l ju dg e did

no t a bu se his dis c re tio n in
a dmi tti ngthec ha lle ng e d e xhibi ts. Conclusion We affir m the trial court’ s judgme nt and sentenc e of de ath. Deliver ed April 8, 2009. Do not publish.