16-3882-cv 

Uzoukwu v. Krawiecki 

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 

1st 3 day of December, two thousand seventeen. 

4 

5 Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

6 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

7 PETER W. HALL, 

8 Circuit Judges. 

9 

10 _____________________________________________________ 

11 

12 AFAM UZOUKWU, 

13 

14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

15 

16 v. 16-3882-cv 

17 

18 CITY OF NEW YORK, MICHELE KRAWIECKI, CARL MILUSO, 

19 

20 Defendants-Appellees. 

21 _____________________________________________________ 

22 

23 Appearing for Appellant: Gregory Antollino (Daniela Nanau, on the brief), New York, N.Y. 

24 

25 Appearing for Appellees: Daniel Matza-Brown, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Richard 

26 Dearing, Fay Ng, Assistant Corporation Counsels, on the brief), for 

27 Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, 

28 New York, N.Y. 

29 

30 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Abrams, J.). 

31 
2 

1 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

2 AND DECREED that the order of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. 

3 

4 Appellant Afam Uzoukwu appeals from the May 12, 2016 judgment entered by the 

5 District Court for the Southern District of New York (Abrams, J.) dismissing his claims 

6 following a jury trial. Uzoukwu brought a Section 1983 suit, alleging false arrest. We assume the 

7 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for 

8 review. 

9 

10 “We review a denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de novo and the denial of a Rule 59 motion 

11 for abuse of discretion.” Hicks v. Tug PATRIOT, 783 F.3d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 

12 sub nom. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc. v. Hicks, 136 S. Ct. 211 (2015) (citing Fabri v. United 

13 Techs. Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)). Judgment as a matter of law should be 

14 granted “only if there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the 

15 jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or such an 

16 overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men 

17 could not arrive at a verdict against the moving party.” Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 

18 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 

19 2000)) (internal punctuation omitted). “We will reverse the judgment of the district court if a 

20 party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury 

21 would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Harris v. 

22 O'Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 2014), as amended (Nov. 24, 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23 50(a)(1)) (internal punctuation omitted). 

24 

25 Uzoukwu primarily argues that the district court erred by declining to find as a matter of 

26 law that the officers lacked probable cause. “The existence of probable cause to arrest—even for 

27 a crime other than the one identified by the arresting officer—will defeat a claim of false arrest 

28 under the Fourth Amendment.” Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 

29 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152–54 (2004)). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the 

30 arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances 

31 that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be 

32 arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 

33 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

34 

35 We see no error. New York City Rules Tit. 56, § 1-03(c)(3) provides that “[n]o person 

36 shall fail to comply with or obey any instruction, direction, regulation, warning, or prohibition, 

37 written or printed, displayed or appearing on any park sign.” The officers’ testimony, which the 

38 jury was entitled to credit, established that Uzoukwu appeared to be in the park without children, 

39 in contravention of the rules displayed on signs posted at the park entrances. According to the 

40 officers, they observed that Uzoukwu was focused on eating Jell-O, was not interacting with 

41 children and did not appear to be supervising any. The officers further testified that Uzoukwu did 

42 not have any items that might indicate he was with children. When he was asked whether he was 

43 with children, Uzoukwu began yelling, but never identified or otherwise signaled a relationship 

44 with a child in the park. Finally, the officers did not observe any children approach over the 

45 course of the officers’ interaction with Uzoukwu and his ensuing outburst. On these facts, the 

46 officers had every reason to believe there was a “fair probability” that Uzoukwu was in the park 
3 

1 without children. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013). Having determined that the 

2 officers adequately established probable cause for the violation of the park rule, we need not 

3 examine the other asserted grounds for probable cause—namely, disorderly conduct and 

4 obstruction of governmental administration. See Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 752 (2d 

5 Cir. 2010) (“[P]robable cause is based on the facts warranting arrest and not the statute pursuant 

6 to which a plaintiff was charged.”). 

7 

8 Uzoukwu also challenges the admission of testimony from a Customs and Border Control 

9 agent as unduly prejudicial. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

10 discretion. Crawford v. Tribeca Lending Corp., 815 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2016). 

11 

12 The agent testified to the fact that there was no immigration record of Uzoukwu’s 

13 children entering the country in or around the years he had claimed they entered. Uzoukwu 

14 asserts that this evidence inflamed anti-immigrant bias. While there may be a risk that members 

15 of the jury harbored such sentiments, Uzoukwu fails to grapple with the clear evidentiary value 

16 of the immigration records. Uzoukwu’s theory of the case was that his children had entered the 

17 country a few months prior to the incident, and they were with him in the park at the time of the 

18 officers’ approach, making him fully compliant with the park rules. The immigration evidence 

19 tended to undercut Uzoukwu’s claims, by showing both that he may have provided inaccurate 

20 information about the children’s entry into the U.S., and that the children likely were not in the 

21 country at the time of the incident—much less in the park. As a result, the evidence was not 

22 unduly prejudicial, and the district court did not err by admitting it. See Leopold v. Baccarat, 

23 Inc., 174 F.3d 261, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1999) (evidence that “easily might have created feelings of 

24 antagonism and even disgust” admissible for probative value). 

25 

26 We have considered the remainder of appellant’s arguments and find them to be without 

27 merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. 

28 

29 

30 FOR THE COURT: 

31 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 

32