UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

CHRISTINE L. HILL,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

SF-0752-16-0127-I-1

DATE: April 13, 2023

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Bradley R. Marshall, Charleston, South Carolina, for the appellant.

Jennifer Kehe, APO, AP, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

affirmed the agency’s action demoting her for eight specifications of conduct 

unbecoming a supervisor. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2 Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three-member Board 

completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
2

the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of 

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute 

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the 

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial 

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of 

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and 

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due 

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully 

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the appellant failed to 

establish any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by 

this Final Order to decide a due process issue raised below but not addressed in 

the initial decision, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

¶2 The appellant filed this appeal of the agency’s action demoting her from the 

position of Supervisory Education Program Administrator (Assistant 

Superintendent) with the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA), 

Department of Defense Dependents Schools, at Yokota Air Base, Japan, to the 

position of Teacher at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, effective November 20, 2015.3 

Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2-3. The appellant reported directly to the 

Japan District Superintendent, who is the proposing official in this appeal. IAF, 

Tab 6 at 58-61. The deciding official was the Acting Director for DODEA 

Pacific. Id. at 38. 

¶3 The Japan District Superintendent proposed the appellant’s removal based 

on eight specifications of conduct unbecoming a supervisor. Id. at 58-59. The 

specifications arose from several encounters between the appellant and 

 

3

The agency subsequently removed the appellant, and the appellant challenged her 

removal in a separate appeal. Hill v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket 

No. DC-0752-16-0744-I-2, Final Order (Feb. 21, 2023).
3

subordinate employees, in which she allegedly made inappropriate statements and 

took questionable actions. Id. The Acting Director for DODEA Pacific mitigated 

the penalty to a demotion, and the appellant filed this appeal. Id. at 35-36. After 

a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the 

demotion. IAF, Tab 41, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 19. The administrative judge 

sustained all specifications of the charge. ID at 2-15. He also found no evidence 

of any improper ex parte communication between one of the witnesses, the 

proposing official, and the deciding official, as the appellant alleged.4 ID 

at 15-17. The administrative judge found that the charge bore a nexus to the 

efficiency of the service and that the demotion fell within the bounds of 

reasonableness. ID at 17-19.

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed in 

opposition, to which the appellant has replied. Petition for Review (PFR) File, 

Tabs 5, 7-8.

The administrative judge properly assessed whether witnesses testified credibly.

¶5 The appellant contends that the administrative judge made erroneous 

assessments of witness credibility. PFR File, Tab 5 at 25-26. She asserts that the 

administrative judge failed to explain his credibility assessments, specifically

when he credited the testimony of agency witnesses over her own testimony. 

Id. at 26. The Board defers to the administrative judge’s credibility 

determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the 

demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such 

determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. 

Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Sufficiently sound reasons include findings that are incomplete, inconsistent with 

 

4

The appellant also originally alleged age and sex discrimination, disparate treatment, 

and retaliation for prior equal employment opportunity activities. IAF, Tab 1 at 16 -18, 

Tab 24 at 10-11, Tab 31 at 2-4. She later withdrew those claims. IAF, Tab 32; ID at 15 

n.4.
4

the weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a whole. Faucher v. 

Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 203, ¶ 8 (2004).

¶6 We find that the initial decision reflects that the administrative judge 

identified the factual questions in dispute, summarized the evidence on each 

disputed question, stated which version he believed, and explained in detail why 

he found the chosen version more credible, considering all of the relevant factors, 

including the witnesses’ demeanor. See Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458. Accordingly, 

we find no reason to disturb his well-explained conclusions on credibility.

5

The appellant failed to show that the agency did not prove the charge .

¶7 The appellant argues that the agency failed to prove the charge, and that her 

proven conduct was neither improper, nor detracted from her character or 

reputation as a supervisor. PFR File, Tab 5 at 21. A charge of “conduct 

 

5

The appellant asserts that she was denied the opportunity to present witnesses who 

supported her account of events and whose testimony would refute the testimony of the 

agency witnesses. PFR File, Tab 5 at 26. However, the record does not indicate that 

she lodged any objection to the administrative judge’s exclusion of the witnesses she 

identified to testify. IAF, Tab 24 at 12-13, Tab 31 at 1; see Warren v. Department of 

Defense, 87 M.S.P.R. 426, ¶ 8 (2001) (holding that an appellant’s claim that an 

administrative judge improperly limited her witness list was not properly before the 

Board when the appellant did not object below to the administrative judge’s rulings on 

witnesses). 

The appellant additionally asserts that the administrative judge “allowed agency 

witnesses to make statements unrelated to the charges and not offered at the time of 

their extensive depositions” and that the hearing testimony of these witnesses differed 

from the sworn statements and depositions they gave. PFR File, Tab 5 at 14. We find 

these arguments unavailing. Although she identifies the inconsistencies she believes 

existed regarding the testimony of various witnesses, id. at 15-21, she has not shown 

that she was denied the opportunity to impeach these witnesses during the hearing, and 

the initial decision makes clear that she testified extensively regarding each charge. 

The administrative judge simply found the appellant’s testimony to be less credible than 

that of the other witnesses.

In a similar vein, the appellant included a deposition given by the agency’s Chief of 

Labor Management and Employee Relations in her reply to the agency’s response to the 

petition for review. PFR File, Tab 8 at 5 n.1, 11-115. She explains that the 

administrative judge struck such transcripts from the record, and she argues that 

“particular attention should be given” to this deposition. Id. at 5 n.1. She did not, 

however, explain why the deposition is relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
5

unbecoming” has no specific elements of proof but is established by proving that 

the employee committed the acts alleged in support of the broad label. Canada v. 

Department of Homeland Security, 113 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 9 (2010). When, as here, 

more than one event or specification supports a single charge, proof of one or 

more, but not all, of the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the 

charge. Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force, 103 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 16 (2006), 

aff’d, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D.N.M. 2009), aff’d, 490 F. App’x 932 (10th Cir. 

2012).

¶8 Here, the agency successfully demonstrated that the appellant engaged in

the conduct it alleged in support of the charge and that such conduct was 

improper or unsuitable for a supervisory employee. The appellant’s attempt to 

trivialize the impact of her misconduct does not change the fact that she admitted

to or did not deny that misconduct. See Chavez v. Small Business Administration, 

121 M.S.P.R. 168, ¶ 5 (2014) (finding that an appellant’s admission can support 

an agency’s charge of misconduct). Her argument is thus unavailing.

The appellant has not shown that the agency committed harmful error.

¶9 The appellant asserts that the charges filed against her were too stale to 

support an adverse action. PFR File, Tab 5 at 9-11. She argues that the agency

did not investigate the allegations against her for “months” after the actions she 

was alleged to have committed. Id. at 9. She asks the Board to remand her

appeal for a determination pursuant to Heffron v. United States, 405 F.2d 1307, 

1311 (Ct. Cl. 1969), as to whether she was prejudiced by a delay in bringing the 

charges. PFR File, Tab 5 at 10-11.

¶10 This argument appears to be newly raised on review. The appellant did not 

discuss the issue in her prehearing statement, nor did the administrative judge 

include it in the summary of the telephonic prehearing conference. IAF, Tab 24 

at 10-12, Tab 31 at 1-5. The Board will not consider an argument raised for the 

first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and 

material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. 
6

Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). The appellant 

has not offered any such evidence. She also has not shown that an unreasonable 

period of time elapsed before the agency brought a charge against her, much less 

that a delay in bringing the charge likely caused the agency to reach a different 

conclusion. See Stephen v. Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 

(1991) (holding that reversal of an action for harmful error is warranted where the 

procedural error likely had a harmful effect upon the outcome of the case before 

the agency). The events leading to the appellant’s demotion occurred between 

June and August 2015, and the notice of proposed removal was issued on 

October 6, 2015. IAF, Tab 6 at 58-59.

¶11 The appellant also argues that the agency investigation was faulty. PFR

File, Tab 5 at 11-12. She asserts that the District Superintendent should not have 

been allowed to serve both as investigator and proposing official. Id. She alleges 

that the District Superintendent conducted the investigation “by soliciting 

subordinate employees to offer any negative statements about [her] under the 

guise of a ‘hostile work environment’ claim,” even though no such claim was 

filed with the agency’s equal employment opportunity (EEO) office. Id. at 11. 

She further alleges that the District Superintendent manipulated these employees 

to solicit negative information, even convincing an employee with whom the

District Superintendent had a close relationship to supplement a prior statement 

regarding the appellant’s conduct. Id. at 11-12 & n.2. The appellant also alleges 

that the District Superintendent fabricated the allegations set forth in the eighth 

specification regarding the alleged extramarital affair. Id.; IAF, Tab 6 at 59.

¶12 The appellant, however, has offered no authority supporting the proposition

that the agency’s investigator and proposing official must be different persons, or 

that any information developed in an investigation of a hostile work environment 

must be submitted to the agency’s EEO officials. As for her assertion that the 

proposing official manipulated agency witnesses to provide unfavorable

testimony, the appellant has offered no evidence that proves her allegation. 
7

Conversely, the administrative judge directly addressed this matter when he found 

that more than 10 agency witnesses had given credible and consistent testimony 

that bore no indicia of fabrication. ID at 14.

The appellant has not shown that the agency violated her right to due process.

¶13 The appellant argues that the specifications set forth in the proposal notice 

lack clarity and did not provide a basis by which she could refute the agency’s 

claims. PFR File, Tab 5 at 9, 12-13. She explains that the specifications do not 

set forth specific dates, times, and places of her alleged misconduct or identify 

the persons who were present. Id. at 12-13. The lack of detailed notice, she 

explains, caused the proceedings to be fundamentally unfair and abridged her 

right to be heard. Id. at 13; see Barresi v. U.S. Postal Service, 65 M.S.P.R. 656, 

666 (1994) (stating that due process mandates that notice be sufficiently detailed 

to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 

397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970)).

¶14 The appellant asserted these issues below, IAF, Tab 21 at 12-15, but they 

were not addressed in the initial decision. We do so now and find that the notice 

of proposed removal set forth an adequate basis for the appellant to refute the 

agency’s claims.

6

 Although the proposal notice did not in all cases identify 

specific dates or audience members, it is sufficiently specific for the appellant to 

have called to mind the incidents upon which it is based and to understand the 

agency’s objections to her behavior. IAF, Tab 6 at 58-59. 

 

6

The appellant further asserts that the agency did not explain how the charged conduct 

violated any law. PFR File, Tab 5 at 13. However, an agency may demote an employee 

for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” a standard which is not 

limited to conduct that violates a statute, rule, or regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a); cf.

Fontes v. Department of Transportation, 51 M.S.P.R. 655, 662-63 (1991) (holding that 

there is no requirement that an employee must violate a specific written policy before 

he can be disciplined under chapter 75 because the sole criterion under that chapter is 

that the adverse action be “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the 

service”).
8

¶15 The appellant also alleges that, after she gave her oral response to the 

charge, an ex parte meeting occurred between the deciding official, the proposing 

official, and one of the appellant’s subordinates. PFR File, Tab 5 at 21-23. The 

appellant alleges that, in her response, she revealed the existence of an 

extramarital affair between the subordinate and her coworker, and that she 

believed the relationship adversely affected the work environment. Id. at 21. The 

deciding official testified that she contacted both the proposing official and the 

subordinate regarding the appellant’s allegations about the affair. Id. at 21-22; 

Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the deciding official). The appellant 

argues that the meeting was an ex parte communication within the meaning of 

Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999), and thus it denied her right to due process. PFR File, Tab 5 at 22-23.

¶16 An appellant has the right to notice of the charges against her and an 

opportunity to present her side of the story before an agency takes disciplinary 

action. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); 

Arrington v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 16 (2012). Because of 

that right, the deciding official is not allowed to consider—either in connection 

with the charge itself or the penalty—new and material information that she 

obtained ex parte. Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed.

Cir. 2011); Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376-77. Information that the deciding official 

knew from personal experience is considered ex parte information if the appellant 

was not informed that it would be considered. Lopes v. Department of the Navy,

116 M.S.P.R. 470, ¶¶ 5-6, 10 (2011). In determining whether a deciding 

official’s consideration of information obtained ex parte violates due process, the

Board will consider whether the information is “so substantial and so likely to 

cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a 

deprivation of property under such circumstances.” Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377; 

Lopes, 116 M.S.P.R. 470, ¶ 7. Relevant factors in making that determination

include (1) whether the ex parte communication merely introduces cumulative 
9

information or new information, (2) whether the employee knew of the 

information and had a chance to respond to it, and (3) whether the ex parte 

communication was of the type likely to result in undue pressure upon the 

deciding official to rule in a particular manner. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377. A due 

process violation requires automatic reversal regardless of whether the error 

likely affected the agency’s decision. Id.

¶17 The administrative judge learned from the testimony of the subordinate, the 

deciding official, and the proposing official that the subordinate told the deciding 

and proposing officials that her coworker was the father of her new baby during 

the time that elapsed between issuance of the proposal notice and the agency’s 

decision to demote the appellant. ID at 16; HCD (testimony of the subordinate,

the deciding official, and the proposing official). The administrative judge found, 

however, that such communication was irrelevant to the charge. ID at 16; see

Villareal v. Bureau of Prisons, 901 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding 

no due process violation, in part, because the deciding official did not rely on the 

ex parte information when making his decision on the removal).

¶18 The appellant also asserts that the subordinate’s September 24, 2015 

supplemental statement, which was part of the underlying evidence for 

Specification No. 8, was based upon or was itself an impermissible ex parte 

communication.7 PFR File, Tab 5 at 11; IAF, Tab 6 at 96. The subordinate 

testified that the proposing official asked her if she knew anything about 

inappropriate photographs taken by, or of, the appellant, and she offered the 

information set forth in the supplemental statement. HCD (testimony of the 

subordinate and the proposing official). The information in the supplemental 

 

7

The appellant asserts that the testimony of the proposing official and the subordinate 

conflicted regarding which of the two women had initiated the subordinate ’s 

supplemental statement. PFR File, Tab 5 at 24-25. She asserts that one of these 

witnesses may have committed perjury. Id. Any inconsistency in the testimony, 

however, was not relevant to the issue of whether improper ex parte communication 

occurred.
10

statement, however, was incorporated in the proposal notice, and the appellant

had a full opportunity to respond to that notice. IAF, Tab 6 at 39-52, 59-60.

Accordingly, we find no evidence of any improper ex parte communication 

between the deciding official and other persons, and likewise, we find that the 

appellant failed to establish a violation of her due process rights.

8

The deciding official properly considered and applied the Douglas factors.

¶19 The appellant contends that the administrative judge erred when he found 

that the deciding official had properly considered and applied the Douglas

factors. PFR File, Tab 5 at 26-29; ID at 17-19; Douglas v. Veterans 

Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). 

¶20 The Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the 

agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion 

within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. If the 

Board sustains an agency’s charges, it will defer to the agency’s penalty 

determination unless the penalty exceeds the range of allowable punishment 

specified by statute or regulation, or unless the penalty is so harsh and 

unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of 

discretion. Saiz v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶ 5 (2015). The 

Board will defer to the employing agency because it has primary discretion in 

maintaining employee discipline and efficiency. Id. The Board will not displace 

management’s responsibility but instead will ensure the agency has properly 

exercised its managerial judgment. Id.

 

8

Likewise, the appellant has not shown that these communications between the 

deciding official and other persons constituted harmful error. Ward, 634 F.3d at 1281. 

The appellant has not shown that it was an error for a personal conversation pertaining 

only to the subordinate and her coworker to have occurred, nor did she show how such a 

conversation would have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one 

it would have otherwise reached in the absence or cure of the error. Stephen, 

47 M.S.P.R. at 681, 685. 
11

¶21 As set forth in the initial decision, the deciding official considered the 

nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the appellant’s duties, 

position, and responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or 

frequently repeated, her job level, and the type of employment. IAF, Tab 6 at 35; 

ID at 17-19. The deciding official considered that the appellant held a special 

supervisory position of leadership, prominence and trust, and that her misconduct 

was deliberate, directed toward subordinate employees, and generally 

inappropriate in the workplace. IAF, Tab 6 at 35-36. The administrative judge 

found that her concerns about the appellant’s retention in a leadership or 

supervisory position were “well founded.” ID at 19. Nevertheless, in light of the 

appellant’s successful employment history with the agency and the lack of prior 

discipline except for the letter of reprimand, the deciding official mitigated the 

proposed penalty of removal to demotion. IAF, Tab 6 at 36.

¶22 The appellant’s arguments on review fail to persuade us that her demotion 

exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Although on review the appellant argues 

that the deciding official failed to consider an additional mitigating factor, her 

personal circumstances including “marital struggles,” PFR File, Tab 5 at 26, she 

did not directly raise these issues as a mitigating factor in her reply to the 

deciding official, IAF, Tab 6 at 48-50; see Yeschick v. Department of 

Transportation, 801 F.2d 383, 385 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that neither the 

agency nor the Board can be held to account for failing to consider factors not 

identified by the appellant as significant). Further, we would reach the same 

conclusion even if we were to reweigh the penalty in light of that factor. We

would give far greater weight to other factors, including the nature and 

seriousness of the offense, and its relation to the appellant’s duties, role, and 

responsibilities as a supervisor and educational leader. We have considered the 

appellant’s arguments about the deciding official’s alleged improper management 

of her, PFR File, Tab 5 at 28; however, we agree with the administrative judge’s 

finding that the agency’s penalty is within the bounds of reasonableness, ID
12

at 17-19. We additionally find that the appellant offered no authority in support 

of her argument that the agency retaliated against her by changing her duties and 

conditions of employment during the period that followed her receipt of the 

proposal notice. PFR File, Tab 5 at 28. In fact, we find the proposing official’s 

actions reasonable, given the appellant’s well-documented misconduct that went 

to the heart of her role as a supervisor and leader.

The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion on discovery matters.

¶23 The appellant contends that the administrative judge abused his discretion 

by denying her motions to compel and for sanctions. PFR File, Tab 5 at 23-25; 

IAF, Tabs 13, 18. The Board’s regulations grant the administrative judge broad 

discretion in managing appeals. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b). The Board will not 

reverse an administrative judge’s rulings on discovery matters absent an abuse of 

discretion. Wagner v. Environmental Protection Agency, 54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452 

(1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table). On January 25, 2016, the 

appellant filed a motion for an extension of time in which to conduct depositions 

and to compel full and complete discovery responses. IAF, Tab 13. On 

February 4, 2016, the administrative judge granted the appellant’s motion to 

compel for her first request for production and suspended case processing to 

allow additional time for discovery or settlement. IAF, Tab 16. The 

administrative judge did not rule on the motion to compel regarding the 

appellant’s second request for discovery because she had not submitted a copy of 

the discovery request with the motion. Id. at 1. On February 17, 2016, the 

appellant filed another motion to compel for the second request for discovery and 

for sanctions. IAF, Tab 18. Therein, she asserted that sanctions were in order 

because the agency representative disrupted the deposition of the proposing 

official “with repeated objections, comments, attempts to shape his client’s 

testimony, and forcing the deposition to be ended before the time needed to 

conduct an examination and allowed by MSPB law.” Id. at 12. The appellant 

alleged that he behaved similarly at other depositions. Id. Although the appellant 
13

alleges on review that the administrative judge flatly denied her motions, PFR

File, Tab 5 at 23, the record shows otherwise, IAF, Tab 16, Tab 31 at 6. The 

administrative judge even allowed the appellant to continue deposing the 

proposing official, although her representative had been the one to end the

deposition prematurely. IAF, Tab 31 at 6. We thus find that the administrative 

judge did not abuse his discretion in handling these discovery matters.

The Board will not award sanctions against the agency.

¶24 The appellant alleges that the agency representative engaged in egregious 

misconduct during the proceedings by disparaging her representative. PFR File, 

Tab 5 at 24, Tab 8. The appellant requests that the Board sanction the agency and 

refer her case to the Office of Special Counsel for purposes of investigating the 

agency representative’s conduct “during closing argument and in the 

proceedings.” Id. at 24. The appellant, however, did not identify in detail any 

specific examples of the offensive comments and conduct she alleges occurred, 

even in her reply to the agency’s response, which specifically addresses her 

request for sanctions. PFR File, Tab 8. As we have explained above, the 

administrative judge acted within his sound discretion in his consideration of the 

appellant’s request for sanctions. IAF, Tab 18, Tab 31 at 6. For all of these 

reasons, we thus affirm the initial decision as modified.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS9

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the 

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain 

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate 

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following 

 

9

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
14

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not 

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d 

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule 

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of 

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your 

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file 

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your 

chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 
15

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a 

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before 

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of 

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling 

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and 

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 
16

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in 

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial 

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court 

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 10 The court of appeals must receive your 

 

10 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 
17

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
18

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board