SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3696-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

CRAIG E. GREENE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________

Submitted April 15, 2024 – Decided May 17, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson, Bishop-Thompson, and Jacobs. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 21-06-

0537.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Samuel Clark Carrigan, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). 

LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM 

Defendant, Craig E. Greene, was convicted after trial of armed robbery and 

related offenses. On December 17, 2021, he was sentenced to an aggregate prison 

term of thirteen years subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the 

No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant appeals his 

conviction and sentence. We reverse. 

We derive the following facts from the record, focusing on those facts 

necessary for adjudication of the issues before us. This case involves a robbery and 

theft committed on the same day in Maple Shade Township. On June 5, 2019, the 

Maple Shade Animal Hospital was robbed by a man armed with a knife. Later that 

same day, a man stole cash from an Acme grocery store. In a single indictment, the 

State charged defendant with both crimes. Defendant filed a motion to sever. The 

trial court denied the application, and defendant was tried for both crimes in August 

2021. 

At trial, defendant testified he took money from a cash register at the Acme 

grocery store to purchase the drugs he possessed when arrested. However, defendant 

denied being responsible for the armed robbery of the animal hospital. The jury 

convicted defendant of the theft and drug charges. They deadlocked as to the 

robbery charges. Following a second trial held in September 2021, defendant was 
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convicted on the robbery charges. Defendant appeals the conviction and sentence 

pertaining only to the second trial. 

In mid-afternoon on June 5, 2019, Patrick Middleton, a customer service 

representative, was seated at the front desk of the Maple Shade Animal Hospital. A 

man wearing a hooded sweatshirt (hoodie) and armed with a knife entered through 

the door, approached Middleton, and demanded, "Give me the money." Repeating 

this demand, the man held a knife within one foot of Middleton's face. Middleton 

opened a cash drawer under the desk. The robber reached in, removed the cash, and 

fled. 

Also working at the hospital that day was Vicky Raimundo, a veterinarian 

technician. She did not witness the robbery but assisted others in leaving the hospital 

during its occurrence via a separate doorway. As she exited the building, Raimundo 

spotted the suspect and watched him cross the street. She monitored him until he 

left the area. Later that evening, detectives from the Maple Shade Police Department 

asked Raimundo to review a photo array. She selected defendant's photo with 

eighty-five to ninety percent confidence. 

A third person, Victoria Flake, was a receptionist at the hospital. She was not 

working at the time of the robbery but heard of the suspect's description from coworkers. She reported to police that the evening before the incident, a man matching 
4 A-3696-21

the suspect's description came into the hospital and asked her to make change for 

bus fare. Detectives presented a photo array to Flake, who selected defendant's 

photo. She testified she was "about [ninety-five], [ninety-six] percent sure" the photo 

she selected was the man who had asked for change. 

Detectives never presented Middleton with a photo array. Based on the photo 

identifications of Raimundo and Flake, police officers arrested defendant, charging 

him with the robbery. Through the investigation that followed, police recovered a 

dark blue hoodie in the area of the robbery matching the description of what the 

robber wore. A DNA sample taken from the hoodie matched a buccal swab sample 

taken from defendant. Upon arrest, police also recovered from defendant a sum of 

money in the same amount of the stolen sum. 

Middleton, Raimundo, and Flake all made in-court identifications of 

defendant. On September 30, 2021, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the counts 

of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2); fourth-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon (knife), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and third-degree possession of 

a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). In December, the trial court 

imposed an aggregated prison term of thirteen-years NERA for all offenses, 

including a sentence for an unrelated crime to which defendant pled guilty. 

Defendant raises three arguments on appeal. 
5 A-3696-21

POINT I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT 

PROVIDE THE CURRENT MODEL JURY CHARGE 

REGARDING THE STATE’S FAILURE TO PRESENT 

AN ELECTRONIC RECORD OF THE OUT-OFCOURT IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE. (Not raised 

below). 

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 

ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO EXCLUDE 

MIDDLETON’S UNRELIABLE IN-COURT 

IDENTIFICATION AND DID NOT PROPERLY 

INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HOW TO ASSESS ITS 

RELIABILITY. 

POINT III 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REASONING AT 

SENTENCING THAT A PARTICULAR 

AGGRAVATING FACTOR IS ALWAYS PRESENT. 

A. The Jury Instruction on Record of Out-Of-Court Identification 

Procedure. 

 As to defendant’s first point, both parties acknowledge that the trial court 

administered an outdated identification charge. While the trial took place in 

September 2021, the charge administered did not contain language from a model 

jury charge modified in May 2020. The updated charge concerned how the jury 

should assess a photo lineup where the procedure was not recorded by police. 

Defendant argues that failure to administer the updated charge undermined the 
6 A-3696-21

integrity of the conviction. The State argues the charge administered by the trial 

court was adequate, because the lineup procedure was in fact recorded, but simply 

not introduced at trial. Thus, the State contends that any failure to administer the 

updated charge did not constitute plain error, because the omitted portion of the 

charge given was not relevant. 

There are several time-tested principles that guide us on questions 

concerning jury charges. "An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury 

receive adequate and understandable instructions." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 

41, 54 (1997). A jury charge should be reviewed in its entirety to determine the 

overall effect of the charge. State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 106-07 (1997). "[I]f 

on reading the charge as a whole, 'prejudicial error does not appear, then the 

verdict must stand.'" State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 280 (1987) (quoting State 

v. Council, 49 N.J. 341, 342 (1967)). "A jury charge is presumed to be proper 

when it tracks the model jury charge verbatim because the process to adopt 

model jury charges is 'comprehensive and thorough.'" State v. Berry, 471 N.J. 

Super. 76, 107 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 

(2005)). 

Because there was no objection to the jury charge at trial, we evaluate the 

consequence of an errant charge under the plain error standard. In the context of a 
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jury charge, "plain error requires demonstration of 'legal impropriety in the charge 

prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently 

grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of 

itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'" State v. 

Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 321 (2017) (quoting State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 

(2006); see also State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007); State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 

409, 422 (1997). "The error must be evaluated 'in light of the overall strength of the 

State's case.'" State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018) (quoting State v. 

Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388 (2012)). We review a trial court's instruction on the law 

de novo. Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc., 251 N.J. 300, 323 (2022); State ex 

rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Marlton Plaza Assocs., L.P., 426 N.J. Super. 337, 347 

(App. Div. 2012). 

At the time of the offense, Rule 3:11 required law enforcement to 

"contemporaneously record the identification procedure," either with a written 

verbatim account of the exchange between officers and the witness "or, if 

feasible, electronically." R. 3:11(b) (2019). If there was no record of the 

important details of the out-of-court identification procedure, the court could 

"fashion an appropriate jury charge to be used in evaluating the reliability of the 

identification." R. 3:11(d) (2019). 
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In 2019, the Supreme Court held, where unrecorded eyewitness 

identification is essential to the State's case, the jury needed to be instructed on 

the requirements of Rule 3:11 and be informed that law enforcement failed to 

abide by that rule. State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213 (2019). In Anthony, the Court 

asked the Criminal Practice Committee to revise subsection (b) of the rule to 

emphasize the Court's preference for audio-visual recordings of the 

identification process. Id. at 231-32. The rule was amended to reflect this 

preference, effective June 2020. R. 3:11(b) ("A law enforcement officer shall 

electronically record the out-of-court identification procedure in video or audio 

format, preferably in an audio-visual format."). The model charge was 

correspondingly amended to reflect this rule change: 

Where there is a failure to electronically record an 

identification procedure, you have not been provided 

with a complete picture. By way of example, without a

recording of the identification procedure, you cannot 

hear the tone or inflection of the witness or police 

officer's voices. Audio captures not only the words 

spoken between an administrator and an eyewitness but 

also tone, and video preserves expressions or gestures 

as well. That type of information can help the jury 

accurately assess witness confidence, any feedback the 

witness may have received, and the overall reliability 

of an identification – and thus help guard against 

mistaken identifications. You should weigh later 

testimony or statements about tone, gestures and 

demeanor with great caution and care, as later 
9 A-3696-21

recollections may be less accurate than an electronic 

record. . . . 

You may take into account the police failure to preserve 

a record of the identification procedure when you 

evaluate the identification evidence in this case. The 

absence of either an electronic recording or 

contemporaneous written record permits but does not

compel you to conclude that the State has failed to

prove that the identification was in fact made and, if so, 

accurately reported by the State's witnesses. 

[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification: InCourt and Out-of-Court Identifications" (rev. May 18, 

2020) (citations omitted).] 

The omitted portion of the challenged jury instruction applies to the 

purported failure by police to record out-of-court identification procedures for 

witnesses Raimundo and Flake. Defendant argues that the trial court should 

have issued the above instruction after the State did not present to the jury an 

electronic recording or contemporaneous written account of their identification 

procedures at trial. By omitting this instruction, defendant maintains the trial 

court plainly erred in a manner "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." 

Defendant urges that the verdict be vacated and that the trial court be instructed 

to hold a Wade/Henderson hearing to determine the reliability and admissibility 

of the out-of-court identifications. See U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); State 

v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). Under Anthony, "a defendant will be 
10 A-3696-21

entitled to a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of identification evidence if 

Delgado and [Rule] 3:11 are not followed and no electronic or contemporaneous, 

verbatim written recording of the identification procedure is prepared." 

Anthony, 237 N.J. at 233 (citing State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48 (2006)). 

The State asserts it did make an audio-visual recording of Flake and 

Raimundo's participation in the photo array and sent a copy and transcript of the 

recording to defendant in pre-trial discovery. The State argues there is no case 

law requiring the out-of-court identification procedure recording to be admitted 

into evidence – only that it be recorded. Because the State contends defendant 

was given a copy of the recording before trial, it argues defendant had the 

opportunity to request a Wade/Henderson hearing or contest the jury instruction. 

The State conjectures that trial counsel chose to do neither because the recording 

was decidedly not to defendant’s advantage. 

In reply, defendant argues the reliability of the out-of-court identifications 

was a question of fact for the jury to decide and that the State's decision not to 

present a recording of the identification procedure deprived the jury from 

accessing "essential information about what occurred during the photo array 

procedures." 
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In this case, the State elected not to present recordings of the out-of-court 

identifications procedures and asks us to assume that those identifications were 

indeed recorded. Moreover, defense counsel did not request a Wade/Henderson 

hearing. On appeal, defendant contends the recordings in question were not 

provided to his trial counsel. Neither the recordings nor the transcripts of the 

identifications procedures for Flake and Raimundo are part of the record on 

appeal. R. 2:5-4(a). From the record, therefore, we cannot determine if there 

were audio-visual recordings of the Flake and Raimundo identifications 

procedures, and if so, whether defense counsel was provided with the recordings 

and elected not to pursue a pre-trial hearing. 

Irrespective of their availability to this court for review, we agree with 

defendant that the jurors were entitled to examine the recorded pre-trial 

identifications procedures. R. 3:11 provides the framework for preservation of 

the identification procedures employed so that counsel and the trial court are in 

a position to assess the reliability of a given identification, including system and 

estimator variables. See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 218. Should the trial court

determine the procedure sufficiently reliable, the jury ultimately decides the 

question. The model and supplemental identification jury instructions presume 
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either that the jury will have for its consideration an audio-visual record, or, in 

the event none was created, that the model charge be administered. 

Absent a definitive understanding of the procedural status of this matter, 

and a failure to administer the model charge then in effect, the purpose of the 

rule is undermined, leading to plain error "clearly capable of producing an unjust 

result." Identification of the robber was the central issue in dispute at trial. 

Therefore, the juror needed clear instructions on how to assess out-of-court 

identifications. Without those instructions, the jury may well have reached an 

unjust result. 

We caution that it is not here decided that the State must in all instances 

present at trial an audio-visual recording of identification procedures. At the 

least, however, a record must be made from which an appellate court may make 

a determination with certainty whether the strictures of Rule 3:11 were followed. 

In reaching this conclusion, it is important to note the emphasis the State 

placed on the lineup procedure in its closing and the absence of a corresponding 

juror charge to aid the jurors on this issue. In his closing, the prosecutor said: 

So it's 5:55 p.m., Victoria Flake and Vicky Raimundo 

take part in a photo array, a photo lineup[,] at the Maple 

Shade Police Department[,] and they each select a 

photograph of Craig Greene. 
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We know how the photo lineup goes. It’s hardly 

debatable. Victoria Flake is [ninety-five] percent sure 

that Craig Greene is the individual that she saw making 

change for the day before. Vicky Raimundo, as you 

heard her consistently testify today, [eighty-five] to 

[ninety-five] percent sure that Mr. Greene is the 

individual that she saw and she chased out of the animal 

hospital. She selected the photograph then, a couple 

hours after it took place. She pointed at him in court 

today, two years after it took place and gave you the 

same story, it was Craig Greene. 

(Emphasis added). 

The jury, however, was not given the opportunity to see the photo 

procedure the prosecutor referenced in closing. So, the jurors did not "know 

how the lineup [went]." Here, the gap between what the jurors were told 

occurred during the lineup procedure and what actually occurred is 

unbridgeable, thus, clearly capable of producing an unjust result. 

B. The In-Court Identification and Jury Instruction on that Procedure 

All three of the State's fact witnesses made in-court identifications of 

defendant. As to Middleton, there was no out-of-court identification. After full 

briefing was completed in this case, the Supreme Court issued its decision in State 

v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023), instituting new procedures concerning first-time incourt identification witnesses. Watson involved a bank robbery in which the bank 

teller selected an individual other than the defendant, Quintin Watson, in an initial 
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photo lineup. The teller was later called at trial and permitted to testify. Before 

appearing in court, the teller met with the prosecutor, who advised defendant would 

be seated at defense counsel’s table. In court, the teller identified Watson as the 

culprit, and he was convicted. There was no other corroborating evidence. 

Recognizing the potency of an in-court identification and wary of the reliability of 

coached eyewitness testimony absent corroborative evidence, the Court instituted 

new procedures concerning first-time in-court identification witnesses. The Court 

held that henceforth, (1) the State must file a motion in limine when it intends to 

conduct a first-time in-court identification, followed by a hearing where the parties 

and the court explore whether good reason exists; (2) prosecutors must disclose in 

writing anything discussed with a witness during trial preparation that relates to an 

upcoming in-court identification; (3) any hearing needed to determine admissibility 

should be conducted and resolved before start of trial. Id. at 588. 

In a post-briefing submission, the State notes that the holding in Watson is 

prospective and thus not applicable to this case. Also, pointing to the DNA evidence 

and the corroborative sums of cash recovered from defendant, the State suggests that 

Watson's safeguards are not a concern, because in Watson there were no 

corroborative proofs. 
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While not retrospective in application, the holding in Watson informs our 

analysis. Because we find plain error with respect to defendant’s second argument, 

we need not reach the question of plain error on the in-court identification. We note, 

however, that in any new trial, the procedures set forth in Watson will apply and will 

need to be followed. Further, to avoid any other error, we point out that the charge 

administered by the trial court erroneously read: 

The State has presented the testimony of Vicky 

Raimundo and Patrick Middleton. You will recall that 

these witnesses identified the defendant in court as the 

person who committed the offenses of [a]rmed 

[r]obbery, [u]nlawful [p]ossession of a [w]eapon and 

[p]ossession of a [w]eapon for an [u]nlawful [p]urpose. 

The State has also presented testimony that on a prior 

occasion before this trial, these witnesses identified the 

defendant as the person who committed the 

aforementioned offenses. 

(Emphases added).

The second witness to make an identification on a prior occasion was Flake, 

not Middleton. Moreover, the court should have tailored its charge as to Middleton 

and administered the model charge for in-court identification only. Henderson, 308 

N.J. at 302; see also Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at 466 (citation omitted); Model Jury 

Charges (Criminal), “Identification: In-Court Identification Only” (rev. July 19, 

2012). 
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To ensure compliance with our evolving jurisprudence and in the interests of 

justice, we direct that on remand Middleton's first-time in-court identification must 

be scrutinized pursuant to Watson. 

C. Remarks at Sentencing 

Because we reverse defendant's conviction, we do not reach defendant's third 

argument concerning the trial court's comments about aggravating factor nine 

"always" being present. We are confident the court is mindful of the distinction 

between specific and general deterrence, and the need to articulate its findings in 

imposing sentence after making an individualized assessment of defendant based on 

the facts of the case. See State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 122 (2014); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). 

Reversed and remanded for new trial. Before the new trial, the trial court shall 

determine whether to conduct a Wade/Henderson hearing with respect to Flake and 

Raimundo and whether to conduct a Watson hearing with respect to Middleton. 

We do not retain jurisdiction.