IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 4, 2013 Session

THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON

COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE EDUCATION

ASSOCIATION

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 101538I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor

No. M2012-02006-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 27, 2013

County board of education filed a declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that the

high school principal’s decisions to re-assign certain extracurricular sponsorships were not

subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the board of

education and the education association. The trial court entered judgment in the board of

education’s favor and the education association appealed. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PATRICIA J. COTTRELL,

M.S., P.J., and RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., joined.

Richard Lee Colbert and Courtney Lynch Wibert, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,

Metropolitan Nashville Education Association.

Emily Herring Lamb and Lora Barkenbus Fox, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,

Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Carol Trusty (“Ms. Trusty”) is a teacher employed by the Metropolitan Nashville

Board of Public Education (“Board”). During the 2008-2009 school year at Antioch High

School, Ms. Trusty was the assigned sponsor for drama club, forensics club, National Honor

Society, the talent show, and the prom fashion show. Pursuant to a collective bargaining

educational agreement between the Board and the Metropolitan Nashville Education
Association (“MNEA”), a teacher who sponsors drama club and forensics club receives a

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salary supplement (then 5%). Sponsorships of National Honor Society, the talent show, and

the prom fashion show did not include salary supplements.

In January 2009, Antioch High School principal Aimee Wyatt (“Principal”) sought

permission from the director of schools to transfer Ms. Trusty to another school at the end

of the year. On May 11, 2009, Ms. Trusty was transferred to another school but, upon

reconsideration, the director of schools reversed the decision, so she continued to teach at

Antioch during the 2009-2010 school year.

The Principal drafted the following school year’s tentative master teaching schedule

that included changes to Ms. Trusty’s classroom, the subjects she would teach, and her

extracurricular sponsorships such that Ms. Trusty lost the forensics club salary supplement

and was no longer the sponsor for National Honor Society, the talent show, or the prom

fashion show.

In September 2009, pursuant to the bargaining agreement, Ms. Trusty and MNEA

filed a formal grievance to challenge the Principal’s decisions. In her level 1 grievance, Ms.

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Trusty sought to “have her [previous year’s] teaching schedule restored” and “to have the

same room placement, responsibilities, and supplements” that were assigned to her in the

2008-2009 school year. She alleged that the Principal retaliated against her for previously

having grieved another matter involving the Principal’s use of supply funds. Ms. Trusty and

MNEA also asserted that the Principal had Ms. Trusty’s daily arrival time monitored and that

she subjected her to standards of timeliness different from those applied to other teachers.

The Principal, the interim associate superintendent, and the director of schools,

respectively, considered and denied Ms. Trusty’s grievance at levels 1 through 3. In denying

the level 1 grievance, the Principal noted that her decisions to appoint other individuals to

the specified extracurricular sponsorships, to assign Ms. Trusty to teach other subjects, and

to assign her to another classroom were “not grievable under the MNEA contract because

they are left up to the principal’s discretion.” The Principal explained that she appointed

someone else to sponsor National Honor Society because “no dues were paid to the national

MNEA is the professional employees’ organization for Metropolitan Nashville public school 1

educators. 

Pursuant to the formal grievance procedure, as set forth in Article IX of the bargaining agreement,

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a teacher may have his/her alleged grievance reviewed at four levels. An alleged grievance is reviewed by

“the principal or other appropriate administrator” at level 1, “the administrator or his/her designee” at level

2, and “the director of schools or his designee” at level 3. If the teacher’s alleged grievance is not resolved

at level 3, he/she may proceed to level 4, arbitration. 

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chapter for at least the last year while Ms. Trusty was the sponsor,” resulting in no Antioch

High School students being inducted in 2008-2009. After the level 3 hearing, the director

of schools issued a lengthy decision in which he concluded:

An aggrieved teacher has a right to go to court to challenge a principal’s

decision whom to appoint as a coach or as a sponsor of an extra-curricular club

and to challenge a principal’s decision [on] what classes a teacher is assigned

to teach. Nothing in a collective bargaining agreement can be construed to

make these decisions the proper subject of a grievance under a collective

bargaining agreement, and thus subject to review by an arbitrator. The

decisions Ms. Trusty attacks are “non-grievable.”

The director also concluded that Ms. Trusty waived the issue of alleged monitoring of her

arrival times because she failed to raise it at the level 2 or level 3 hearings.

In February 2010, Ms. Trusty and MNEA proceeded to level 4 of the grievance

procedure by filing a demand for final and binding arbitration. MNEA participated in the

June 2010 arbitration hearing, but the Board, contending that “the matters presented are nongrievable under state law as interpreted by Tennessee courts,” did not participate. The

arbitrator found in Ms. Trusty’s favor and concluded that the Principal’s decisions were

retaliatory and subject to arbitration. The arbitrator directed the Board to reinstate Ms. Trusty

to all of her former extracurricular sponsorships, to pay her a 5% supplement of $3,171.70

plus 10% per annum interest, and to cease and desist any further retaliatory action. The

parties received a $2,527 bill for arbitration costs.

In response, the Board sought a declaratory judgment that the subject matter of the

arbitration was non-grievable, that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ruling on a school

administrator’s decisions that could not be subject to arbitration through a collective

bargaining agreement, and that the Board did not have to pay the arbitration fees. The Board

requested that the court vacate the arbitrator’s award. In its amended answer and

counterclaim, MNEA asserted that the Board breached the collective bargaining agreement

and violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-609(a)(2) by refusing to comply with the arbitrator’s

award.

The trial court denied the Board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, directing that

the “case should more appropriately be examined by summary judgment.” Upon the Board’s

proper motion and after a hearing, the trial court vacated the arbitration decision by order

entered March 13, 2012. The trial court found that “[t]he factual disputes MNEA attempted

to raise are not material.” Relying upon Lawrence County Education Association v.

Lawrence County Board of Education, 244 S.W.3d 302 (Tenn. 2007), the trial court found

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that the assignments to sponsor forensics club, National Honor Society, and the talent show

and prom fashion show fundraisers “did not require a teaching license, [so] the arbitrator’s

authority cannot extend to them, and therefore he exceeded his power when he ordered the

Board to return Ms. Trusty to those assignments.”

On May 8, 2012, the trial court granted the Board’s motion for discretionary costs but

ordered the parties to file motions for summary judgment regarding the arbitration fees. By

final order entered August 24, 2012, the trial court granted the Board’s motion for summary

judgment regarding arbitration costs, finding that it “had no obligation to arbitrate Ms.

Trusty’s complaint; the Board is not liable for any portion of the arbitration costs.” The court

also vacated the arbitrator’s award in its entirety.

MNEA timely perfected this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

Summary judgments do not enjoy a presumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth Adver.

& Publ’g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003). We consider the evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all inferences in that party’s

favor. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002). When reviewing the evidence,

we must determine whether factual disputes exist. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn.

1993). If a factual dispute exists, we must determine whether the fact is material to the claim

or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact

creates a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102,

104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). To shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party who

bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must negate an element of the opposing

party’s claim or “show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the

claim at trial.” Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tenn. 2008).

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When we must interpret the meaning of a statute, our review is de novo without

deference to the decision of the court below. Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333

S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tenn. 2011). The following well-settled principles guide our interpretation

and application of legislative enactments:

Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101 (2011), a provision that is intended to replace the 3

summary judgmentstandard adopted in Hannan, isinapplicable to this case. See Sykes v. Chattanooga Hous.

Auth., 343 S.W.3d 18, 25 n.2 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that section 20-16-101 is only applicable to actions filed

on or after July 1, 2011). The Board filed its declaratory judgment action on September 21, 2010. 

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The leading rule governing our construction of any statute is to ascertain and

give effect to the legislature’s intent. To that end, we start with an

examination of the statute’s language, presuming that the legislature intended

that each word be given full effect. When the import of a statute is

unambiguous, we discern legislative intent “from the natural and ordinary

meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute

without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the

statute’s meaning.”

Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tenn. 2012) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

Arbitrability of Assignments to Sponsorships

I.

Ms. Trusty chose to submit her grievance to arbitration as established in the 2008-

2009 collective bargaining educational agreement between the Board and MNEA. The

Board and MNEA entered into this bargaining agreement pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-

5-601 etseq., formerly titled the Education Professional Negotiation Act (“EPNA”) and now

cited as the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011 (“PECCA”).

One of the act’s objectives is to “set forth and recognize the legitimate rights and obligations

of boards of education and their professional employees.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-

601(b)(1). A “professional employee” is “any person employed by any local board of

education in a position that requires a license issued by the department of education . . . .”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-602(8).

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In Lawrence County Education Association v. Lawrence County Board of Education,

244 S.W.3d 302 (Tenn. 2007), our Supreme Court clarified that the provisions codified at

Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-601 et seq. apply to licensed professional employees. The court

established that “[c]oaching and equivalent positions in public . . . schools do not require

such a license in the same regard as the teaching profession . . . . [so] any contractual

protections emanating from the EPNA are relevant to persons only in their status as

professional employees and not in their status in non-licensed positions.” Lawrence Cnty.,

244 S.W.3d at 316.

In all significant respects, the definition of “professional employee” is the same under PECCA as 4

it was under the EPNA. Although this case arose under the EPNA, our decision in this appeal is relevant

under PECCA. 

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As our previous decisions explain, the provisions codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-

5-601 et seq. are not intended “to alter the assignment of duties made elsewhere in statutes

pertaining to local administration of schools.” Cannon Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Wade, No.

M2006-02001-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3069466, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.July 31, 2008) (citing

Marion Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marion Cnty. Educ. Ass’n, 86 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001)). The legislature has expressly stated in the EPNA that the “rights and responsibilities

of boards of education, directors of schools and professional employees as contained in this

title are not statutorily modified or repealed by this part.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-604(a).

Furthermore, in Metropolitan Nashville Education Association v. Metropolitan Board of

Public Education, No. M2008-00405-COA-RM-CV, 2009 WL 837884 (Tenn.Ct. App. Mar.

30, 2009), this Court observed that, under Lawrence County, “‘regardless of the language of

the locally negotiated agreement, coaching and other assignments that do not require a

license are not subject to the collective bargaining process because of the wording of specific

provisions of the EPNA.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Cannon Cnty., 2008 WL 3069466, at *7).

II.

We must now determine whether the assignments about which Ms. Trusty submitted

her grievance to arbitration pursuant to the bargaining agreement between the Board and

MNEA were subject to arbitration. The specific issue before us is whether the Principal’s

decisions to assign the positions of forensics club sponsor, National Honor Society sponsor,

talent show sponsor, and prom fashion show sponsor to someone other than Ms. Trusty for

the 2009-2010 school year were subject to the grievance procedure and arbitration under the

bargaining agreement.

Our previous decisions, as outlined above, are consistent with the trial court’s

conclusions in its order granting summary judgment that “[d]ecisions to assign positions for

which no teaching license is required are not subject to the grievance procedure contained

in a collective bargaining agreement” and that “[a]n arbitrator’s authority cannot extend to

assignments that do not require a license.” Here, as the undisputed facts demonstrate, the

sponsorships that the Principal assigned to Ms. Trusty are not required to be held by licensed

professional employees. In its amended answer, MNEA admitted that the forensics club,

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National Honor Society, talent show, and prom fashion show sponsorships do not require a

professional license, with the caveat that those sponsorships “traditionally are assigned to

professional employees.” In this case, the Principal’s “traditional” or past discretionary

In response to MNEA’s interrogatories, the Board clarified that the talent show and prom fashion 5

show sponsorships are not true “assignments” from the Principal, but are fundraisers that an employee

requests to hold during a given school year. These fundraisers do not include a salary supplement like that

provided for the forensics club sponsor.

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assignments are immaterial. The Principal testified as follows:

Q. The students that are in the Forensics Club, do they have a separate class

during the school day?

A. Yes. Typically, the students who are enrolled in the [speech] course during

the day also participate in the club; but it does not have to be the same group.

Q. And is the speech teacher usually the forensics sponsor?

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A. Typically, but it’s not a requirement because not all schools offer speech

during the day.

. . .

Q. What about, are there any qualifications to be the sponsor of the Forensics

Club?

A. No.

. . .

Q. Are all of the faculty sponsors a year-to-year assignment?

. . .

A. Yes.

The record also contains evidence that, in 2011, a non-licensed support staff employee was

assigned to sponsor the yearbook and that such assignment included a salary supplement.

In sum, the evidence shows that none of Ms. Trusty’s previously held sponsorships

required a professional teaching license. Therefore, in light of Lawrence County and its

progeny, we hold that assignments to extracurricular sponsorships for which no professional

license is required are not covered by the protections provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-

601 et seq. and are not subject to the collective bargaining process. For that reason, an

arbitrator’s authority cannot extend to such sponsorships. We accordingly affirm the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board. The arbitrator’s decision is unenforceable,

so we affirm the trial court’s order vacating it in its entirety.

Ms. Trusty was the speech teacher during the 2008-2009 school year, but not during the following 6

year. 

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Arbitration Costs

The bargaining agreement between the Board and MNEA includes a provision that

the parties will share arbitration fees and expenses. The Board did not participate in the

arbitration and the arbitration award cannot be enforced against the Board. The trial court

correctly ruled that the Board is not liable for any portion of the arbitration costs.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s orders in their entirety. Costs of appeal are assessed

against the Metropolitan Nashville Education Association, and execution may issue if

necessary.

_________________________

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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