IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 17, 2019

MONTEZ DEONTAY RIDLEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2014-A-258 Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge

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No. M2018-01773-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, Montez Deontay Ridley, was convicted by Davidson County jury of 

aggravated robbery and received a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.1 State v.

Montez Deontay Ridley, No. M2015-01607-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 359091, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017)(no perm. app filed). He appeals from the denial of his 

petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on 

the failure to cross-examine the victim concerning his inconsistent description of the gun 

used in the robbery. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS, P.J., and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., joined.

Ryan C. Caldwell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Petitioner, Montez Deontay Ridley.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Glenn Funk, District Attorney General; and Megan King, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In August 2013, the Petitioner, along with his cohort, shoved a gun into the side of 

the victim and robbed him of several pairs of Air Jordan athletic shoes. The Petitioner 

eventually provided a statement to police admitting his involvement in the robbery; 

however, he claimed that the shoes were given to him in exchange for drugs, that the 

victim was angry because the Petitioner sold him fake drugs, and that he was not the 

 

1

This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to another, unrelated matter as reflected in 

the judgment form.

01/16/2020
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individual who held the gun on the victim. At trial, the victim testified that he had placed

an advertisement on Craigslist for the sale of athletic shoes and communicated by phone 

with a buyer, later identified as the Petitioner, to purchase the shoes. On the day of the 

exchange, the victim, accompanied by his cousin, arranged to meet the Petitioner at a 

restaurant in Nashville at one o’clock in the afternoon. The Petitioner did not come to the 

prearranged location, but he called later that night and arranged to meet the victim at an 

alley behind a retail store. When the victim arrived, the Petitioner and another man 

approached the victim’s car.

The victim got out of his car and his cousin remained in the front passenger seat. 

The victim walked to the back of his car to show the Petitioner the shoes, and they talked 

for a few seconds about the shoes. The Petitioner then pulled a gun out of his pocket and 

pointed it at the victim’s side. As the Petitioner held the gun on the victim, another man 

searched the victim’s pockets and took his wallet. The two men also took four pairs of 

shoes from the trunk of the Petitioner’s car. The victim denied that he bought drugs from 

or sold drugs to the Petitioner. The victim called the police and described the robbers as 

follows:

Two men, African American, ... both of them were close to 

6'3" or 6'4" one guy had dreads, the other guy had short hair. .

. . I described the clothes, what kind of shirts they had on. . . . 

[T]he one that stuck the gun into my side had gold teeth, he 

had gold fronts.

Although the victim was unable to identify the Petitioner from a photographic 

array, he positively identified the Petitioner in the courtroom as the person who robbed 

him. The victim also recognized the Petitioner’s voice from their telephone 

conversations regarding the shoes. The victim gave the police the telephone number he 

used to communicate with the Petitioner, which was traced to Brittany Lee Hunter, the 

mother of the Petitioner’s child. Hunter testified that the Petitioner was using her phone 

at the time of the robbery and that they lived together in a housing development near the 

location of the robbery. The Petitioner’s cousin also testified consistently with the 

testimony of the victim. She also observed the Petitioner “point what appeared to be a 

silver gun at [the victim’s] side.”

The Petitioner provided a statement to law enforcement, which was video recorded 

and played for the jury at trial. The Petitioner initially denied knowing anything about 

the robbery and denied any involvement in the crime. However, he eventually 

maintained that he had set up a transaction with the victim to exchange “fake drugs made 

up of baking soda” for the shoes. There was no evidence discovered by law enforcement 

that the victim was buying or selling drugs. As the Petitioner continued to deny 
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involvement in the crime, the interviewing detective suggested that perhaps the victim 

accused the Petitioner of robbery because the victim was unsatisfied with a drug deal.

The Petitioner eventually acknowledged that he needed new shoes and that he found 

someone willing to exchange shoes for cocaine. When the Petitioner met with the victim, 

he gave the victim some baking soda that was “rocked up” to resemble cocaine. The 

Petitioner admitted that he took possession of two pairs of new shoes, but he denied that a 

gun was involved. Neither the shoes taken during the robbery or the gun used in the 

robbery were found. State v. Montez Deontay Ridley, No. M2015-01607-CCA-R3-CD, 

2017 WL 359091, at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017).

On September 18, 2017, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief. Following the appointment of counsel, on May 17, 2018, an amended petition for 

post-conviction relief was filed, alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to adequately cross-examine the victim concerning inconsistencies in his 

description of the gun used in the robbery.

2

 At the July 11, 2018 post-conviction hearing, 

the Petitioner testified, in relevant part, that there was no gun involved in the robbery of 

the victim. The Petitioner admitted that he “played a part of meeting up with [the 

victim], but when it come to a weapon, [he] don’t know nothing about that.” In support 

of his claim, the Petitioner pointed out that in the victim’s statement to the police the 

victim said that the Petitioner “placed a silver gun to his back, but in the preliminary 

hearing [the victim] can’t describe the color or nothing.” The Petitioner was aggrieved 

because he advised trial counsel of this discrepancy and trial counsel failed to “bring it 

up.” The Petitioner believed that the charges should have been reduced to simple robbery 

or theft of property based upon the victim’s inability to identify the gun used in the 

robbery and the contradictory statements provided by the victim.

In regard to this issue, trial counsel testified that he believed the case “was going 

to come down to the credibility of the victim.” As part of his defense strategy, trial 

counsel attempted to cross-examine the victim, a college basketball coach, concerning 

two NCAA rule infractions, where the victim was alleged to have taken money from 

boosters. Although the trial court limited trial counsel’s line of questioning, trial counsel 

was able to question the victim in part about these infractions. Trial counsel

acknowledged that he noticed the discrepancy in the victim’s statement between “a silver 

gun versus a black gun” prior to trial, and he admitted that the victim gave “two kind of 

separate descriptions” of the gun. However, trial counsel said that the victim maintained 

that there was a gun involved in the robbery. Accordingly, trial counsel did not focus on 

the discrepancy and explained his reasoning as follows:

 

2

The Petitioner raised several other issues in his petition for post-conviction relief and at the 

post-conviction hearing. As these claims are not addressed in his brief before this court, they are deemed 

waived. 
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My fear being that, you know, it would kind of come down to was the car 

red or the car blue. You know, and then the state could very simply say 

well, it doesn’t matter, I just remember them shooting at me. You know, 

and so that was a detail that yes, I could’ve pointed out, but I felt really 

could have taken away from our defense in that it would’ve set up a 

response that I would not have had an answer to. I did not think it was 

relevant.

Trial counsel also testified that he was focused on discrediting the victim based on 

(1) the victim’s failure to identify the Petitioner in the photographic array and (2) the 

victim’s voice identification of the Petitioner based solely on the phone calls that were 

made to arrange the sale of the shoes. 

By written order on August 28, 2018, the post-conviction court denied relief, 

providing, in relevant part, as follows:

Trial counsel testified . . . and the Court credits his testimony. 

[Trial counsel] stated he was aware the victim initially described the gun as 

silver but then testified it was black; however, [trial counsel] did not 

believe it advantageous to focus on the color of the weapon when the 

defense’s position is no weapon was involved in the crime. He stated 

cross-examining the victim about the gun would have emphasized the 

issues about a weapon. Instead, [trial counsel] testified he attempted to 

challenge the victim’s credibility by (1) emphasizing he could not make a

positive identification when shown a photographic line up and (2) 

introducing bad acts. [footnote omitted].

The Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case is now properly before 

this court for review.

ANALYSIS

In this appeal, the Petitioner’s sole contention is that trial counsel was deficient in 

failing “to adequately subject the State’s case to adversarial testing.” He specifically 

argues that the jury would have acquitted him of aggravated robbery had trial counsel 

questioned the victim regarding his contradictory statements concerning the color of the 

gun. In response, the State contends that the evidence does not preponderate against the 

findings of the post-conviction court accrediting the testimony of trial counsel. Upon our 

review, we agree with the State.
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In resolving this issue, we rely on the following well established legal rubric for 

claims of post-conviction relief. Post-conviction relief is only warranted when a 

petitioner establishes that his or her conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of 

an abridgement of a constitutional right. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The Tennessee 

Supreme Court has held:

A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless 

the evidence preponderates otherwise. When reviewing factual issues, the 

appellate court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence; moreover, 

factual questions involving the credibility of witnesses or the weight of 

their testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. The appellate 

court’s review of a legal issue, or of a mixed question of law or fact such as 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, is de novo with no presumption 

of correctness. 

Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted); see Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011); Frazier v. State, 

303 S.W.3d 674, 679 (Tenn. 2010). A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of 

proving the factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

30-110(f); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 8(D)(1); Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 293-94 

(Tenn. 2009). Evidence is considered clear and convincing when there is no serious or 

substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from it. Lane v. State, 316 

S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010); Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009); 

Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). 

Vaughn further repeated well-settled principles applicable to claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel: 

The right of a person accused of a crime to representation by counsel is 

guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution. Both the United 

States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that this right to 

representation encompasses the right to reasonably effective assistance, that 

is, within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner 

must establish that (1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). “[A] failure to prove 
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either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective 

assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in any particular order 

or even address both if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing of one component.” 

Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). A 

petitioner successfully demonstrates deficient performance when the clear and 

convincing evidence proves that his attorney’s conduct fell below “an objective standard 

of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688; Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936). Prejudice arising therefrom is demonstrated 

once the petitioner establishes “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.’” Id. at 370 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

This Court has previously noted that “cross-examination is a strategic and tactical 

decision of trial counsel, which is not to be measured by hindsight.” Gregory G. Kilgore 

v. State, No. M2012-01296-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 3326663, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

June 27, 2013) (citing State v. Kerley, 820 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). 

“Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to matters of trial strategy or 

tactics do not provide a basis for post-conviction relief.” Taylor v. State, 814 S.W.2d 374, 

378 (Tenn. Crim. App.1991). Counsel has some discretion in conducting the defense and 

is entitled to use his best judgment in matters of trial strategy or tactics. See McBee v.

State, 655 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).

Applying the above law to this case, we conclude that the post-conviction court 

properly denied relief. The record shows that trial counsel was aware of the victim’s 

different descriptions of the gun prior to trial. Trial counsel agreed with the Petitioner 

that the victim described the gun as silver in his first statement to police and in a later 

statement the victim described the gun as black. However, trial counsel emphasized that 

the victim never said that there was not a gun involved in the robbery; therefore, the color 

of the gun was not relevant. Moreover, trial counsel believed that the better strategy was 

to focus on impeaching the victim based on the victim’s prior bad acts involving NCAA 

rule infractions, the victim’s failure to identify the Petitioner in a photographic array, and 

the victim’s tenuous voice identification of the Petitioner. The post-conviction court 

accredited the testimony of trial counsel, and the record supports this determination.

Accordingly, the Petitioner has failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice, and 

he is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
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 CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE