1 Filed 3/27/13 P. v. Super. Ct. CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, Respondent; WILLIAM MITCHELL, Real Party in Interest. A136005
(City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 106557)

On March 14, 2012, the People file d a petition, pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, 1 seeking to extend a state hospital comm itment of real party in interest William Mitchell. The trial court granted M itchell’s motion to dism iss the petition on the ground it lacked jurisdiction because the petiti on had not been filed before the expiration
of Mitchell’s term of commitment. The Pe ople now seek extraordinary writ review challenging the dismissal order, which is oppo sed by Mitchell. We conclude that under the circumstances the trial court had juri sdiction to adjudicate the March 14, 2012 petition. Accordingly, we grant the People’s petition for writ of mandate.

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.2 FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND In 1982, William Mitchell was committed to a state hospital based on his plea of not guilty by reason of in sanity to a charge of felony assault. Since that time, he has been recommitted to the state hospital fo r successive two-year commitments. On October 19, 2009, th e People filed a timely petition to extend Mitchell’s commitment (due to expire on January 16, 2010) for an additional two years. Thereafter,
the matter was continued over 20 times, either at Mitchell’s request or with his acquiescence (i.e., without his objection). On January 27, 2012, Mitchell signed a “declaration” (hereafter referred to as a stipul ation), stating, in pe rtinent part, that he forfeited his right to a jury, and he agreed “t o extend [his] commitment for the statutory period pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1026 and 1026.5.” At a March 7, 2012 proceeding, Mitchell’ s counsel informed th e trial court and the prosecutor that Mitchell “ha[d] signed a sti pulation to his current hospitalization.” However, Mitchell’s stipulation wa s not filed at that time. Instead, his counsel requested “that this matter, the trial date of March the 9th be vacated, and we continue it to March the 14th . . . to deal with the stipulati on and the possibility of a further addition [ sic ].” The trial court granted the request and c ontinued the matter for trial “setting.” On March 14, 2012, 2 when the trial court called th e case, the prosecutor initially asked whether the purpose of the hearing wa s to file a petition. Mitchell’s counsel objected, stating that any petiti on filed that day w ould be untimely, and Mitchell wanted to file his stipulation that concerned the Oc tober 2009 petition. Mitc hell’s stipulation had not been previously filed b ecause of some confusion abou t whether a new recommitment petition had been filed. The court then st ated it had a petition dated March 14. The prosecutor requested permission to file the petition that day. Th e court granted the

2 We take judicial notice of the following documen ts that were filed in this court on August 2, 2012, in People v. Mitchell , A135948: (a) a transcript entitled “Before the Honorable Garrett L. Wong, Judge Presiding, Tuesday [ sic ], March 14, 2012, Volume 11 (Pages 68-72),” and (b) the court’s minute order dated March 14, 2012, th e People’s petition filed March 14, 2012, and Mitchell’s “declaration” filed March 14, 2012, which appear in the clerk’s transcript at pages 91- 95, 113, and 114. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)3 prosecutor’s request and the petition was file d on March 14. Immediately thereafter, Mitchell’s counsel requested perm ission to file Mitchell’s sti pulation. The court granted that request and Mitchell’s sti pulation was filed that day. On April 6, 2012, Mitche ll filed a motion to dismiss the March 14, 2012 petition on the ground his prior commitment had expire d on January 16, 2012, and the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the March 14, 2 012 petition because it had been filed after the expiration of his prior commitment. Th e People opposed the motion, arguing, in pertinent part, that the court retained “f undamental jurisdiction” to adjudicate the March 14, 2012 petition. The trial court gr anted the motion to dismiss the petition. However, the court temporarily stayed Mitc hell’s release because Mitchell would still present a danger to the community if released and the People we re directed to conduct an investigation for a conservatorship. On June 29, 2012, the People filed an appeal from the order granting Mitchell’s
motion to dismiss the Ma rch 14, 2012 petition. On that sa me day, the People requested a stay of the proceedings. In the stay application, the People indicated the Napa State Hospital forensic assistant assigned to the ca se unofficially questioned whether Mitchell would qualify as “gravely disa bled” for conservatorship purposes. The forensic assistant predicted that if Mitchell was not found to be “gravely disable,” he could not be held at Napa State Hospital, would be released to the public, and would likely cease taking his
medication. Thereafter, on July 19, 2012, the People filed this petition for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition and requested that we temporarily stay the trial court’s order directing Mitchell’s release, which was then scheduled for July 25, 2012. On July 20, 2012, we stayed Mitchell’s release from custody pendi ng our consideration of this petition, set a schedule for informal briefing, and gave notic e that if circumstances so warranted, we might issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) We now issue the peremptory writ in the first instance, dir ecting respondent court to vacate its order granting Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the Ma rch 14, 2012 petition, to enter a new and4 different order denying the motion, and to resume proceedings to adjudicate the March 14, 2012 petition.
DISCUSSION A. Writ Relief Is Appropriate in This Case
We conclude that under the circumstances it is appropriate to resolve the People’s request for relief by its petition for extraord inary writ review, which will result in a speedier disposition than would an appeal. As we have noted, an immediate stay was necessary to allow time for us to consider this petition with out endangering the public. The trial court found that (1) if the ex tension petition had been timely, Mitchell’s commitment would most likely have been extended, (2) that Mitchell would present a danger to the community if re leased from custody, and (3) th at an investigation should be
initiated so that Mitchell could be evaluate d for conservatorship. However, the Napa State Hospital forensic assistant assigned to the case doubted that Mitchell met the requirements for civil commitment and was c oncerned about the like lihood that Mitchell would be released to the pu blic without supervision, a nd stop taking his medication. Alternatively, Mitchell contends he has been entitled to be released since January 17, 2012, and a speedy resolution of the underlying issue is impor tant to minimize any illegal
restraint on his freedom.
B. The Trial Court Has Juri sdiction to Adjudicate th e People’s March 14, 2012 Petition The general procedure for committing a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity is set out in sec tion 1026 et seq. For defendants , such as Mitchell, who have already been committed and w ho still require an additional period of commitment, the medical director of the facility in which th e defendant is committed transmits his or her opinion, accompanied by supporting declar ations, the relevant records, and recommendations at least 180 days before the current commitment term expires. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(2 ).) The prosecutor may then file a petition requesting an extension of the commitment “no later than 90 days befo re the expiration of the [prior] commitment unless good cause is shown.” ( Ibid .) A trial shall commence “no later than 30 calendar5 days prior to the time the person would otherw ise have been released, unless that time is waived by the person or unl ess good cause is shown.” ( Id. , subd. (b)(4).) If at trial an
additional commitment is found to be appropriate, the maxi mum duration of that next commitment is two years, absent a further de termination, under these same procedures, that yet another commitm ent is necessary. ( Id ., subd. (b)(8).)
The statute does not address the situation we face here — where continuances of the trial on the petition exte nd beyond the entire potentia l new commitment period. Rather, the statute directs that if a finder of fact determines that the patient meets the specified criteria, the court is to order the pa tient recommitted to the facility in which he
was confined for an additional tw o years. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)( 8).) In this case, there was never a trial regarding the commitment period (J anuary 16, 2010 to January 16, 2012) to be adjudicated pursuant to the October 2009 petition. Instead, at the time of the March 14, 2012 court proceeding, th e October 2009 petition remained unadjudicated by the trial
court due to numerous continuances. In support of his claim that his commitm ent can no longer be extended, Mitchell
asks us to consider two cases: People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216 and People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91. In Lara , the petition to extend th e defendant’s commitment pursuant to section 1026.5 was filed so late that the defendant did not have an adequate time to prepare for trial before his commitmen t term ended, and there was no good cause shown for the late filing. (48 Cal.4th at p. 221.) Our Supreme Court held the statutory deadline for filing an extension petition was not mandatory as long as the petition was filed before the expiration of the prior commitment period. ( Id. at pp. 225-226.) Implicitly, the Lara court determined that the fili ng of the recommitment petition while the defendant was still being le gally detained was a mandatory requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the Lara court relied on Allen , a case arising under the Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (MDO), a statute which allows a prisoner who has been determined to be a mentally disordered offender to be civilly committed if certain requirements are shown to exist. ( Allen, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 99.) In Allen , our Supreme Court held the deadline requiring the filing of a recommitment petition before6 the end of the current MDO co mmitment term was mandatory; thus, if it were not met, the relevant government action — specifical ly the trial court’s order extending Allen’s commitment — was invalid. ( Id . at p. 104.) Based on the Allen court’s holding, and the
Lara court’s reliance and application of the Allen principles, Mitchell reasons that an
extension of his commitment would be inva lid because the March 14, 2012 petition was filed well after January 16, 2012, which he contends was the da te of the expiration of his prior commitment term. However, Mitchell’s argument ignores tw o crucial facts which distinguish his
situation from Lara/Allen : (1) the October 19, 2009 pe tition had been tim ely filed and (2) that petition had never been adjudicated because of the continuances. Contrary to Mitchell’s further contention, no actual term of commitment termin ated on January 16, 2012, because Mitchell had neve r been committed for a term that ended on that date. The last involuntary commitment period that had been imposed terminated on January 16, 2010. An extension petition ha d been timely filed seeking to extend that commitment, but because of continuances, no decision adj udicating that petition was ever made. The filing of the October 2009 petiti on invoked the court’s jurisd iction to determine whether
Mitchell’s commitment shou ld be extended. The continuanc es requested and/or agreed to by the parties and ratified by the trial cour t continued the court’s jurisdiction. The October 2009 petition was supers eded by the filing of the Ma rch 14, 2012 petition, which now remains to be adjudicated by the trial court. Under the circumstances, we see no c onflict between allowing the People to proceed on the March 14, 2012 petition and Mitchell’s right not to be subject to an illegal commitment. Until March 14, 2012, Mitchell wa s validly held pursuant to the filing of the 2009 recommitment petition a nd the continuances. Mitchell was then held pursuant to the recommitment petition file d March 14, 2012. Thus, the public safety goal, which is the primary purpose of th e section 1026 procedure ( People v. Lara, supra , 48 Cal.4th at p. 228, fn. 18) is furthered because the co urt will be able to determine whether Mitchell currently meets the criteria for continued commitment. The “s econdary benefit to [Mitchell] derived from the time limit[s]” in section 1026 is not infringed. ( Ibid .)7 Because the March 14, 2012 petition and Mitc hell’s stipulation concerning the earlier October 2009 petition were file d contemporaneously in the same court proceeding, we
cannot conclude Mitchell’s confinement was being meaningfully pr olonged by an illegal
commitment.
DISPOSITION
We invoke the accelerated Palma procedure (see Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra , 36 Cal.3d 171) because “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue. . . .” ( Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 12 40-1241.) Also, our immediat e resolution of the matter will expedite the trial court’s considerati on of whether Mitchell should remain committed
for an additional term. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its order granting Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the People’s March 14, 2012 petition, to enter a new and different order denying the motion to dismiss, and to proceed to adjudicate the petition forthwith. Our July 20, 2012 stay of Mitchell’s release shall remain in effect until adjudication of the March 14, 2012 petition is concluded.

_ ____________ ____________ McGuiness, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Pollak, J.

_____________ ____________ Siggins, J.