Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2299 | May 1, 2020 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Lloyd E. Conn

Branchville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lloyd E. Conn,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 1, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2299

Appeal from the Franklin Circuit 

Court

The Honorable J. Steven Cox, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

24C01-1001-FA-11

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2299 | May 1, 2020 Page 2 of 5

[1] Lloyd E. Conn, pro se, appeals the Franklin Circuit Court’s denial of his 

motion to correct erroneous sentence. Conn presents the issue of whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Following a jury trial in July 2010, Conn was convicted of Class A felony 

conspiracy to commit murder. He was sentenced to forty-five years in the 

Department of Correction, with five years suspended to probation. On direct 

appeal, Conn argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction; finding the evidence sufficient, this Court affirmed Conn’s 

conviction in 2011. Conn v. State, 948 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[4] Conn filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence on August 23, 2019, 

challenging the sentencing court’s identification of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. Aggravating factors identified by the sentencing court included 

Conn’s criminal record; his failure to comply with the terms of his probation; 

and the fact that the offense for which he was convicted was committed while 

he was on probation. Appellant’s App. p. 21. The sentencing court did not 

identify mitigating factors. Conn’s motion to correct erroneous sentence was 

denied without hearing on August 23, 2019. Appellant’s App. p. 32. Conn now 

appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2299 | May 1, 2020 Page 3 of 5

Discussion and Decision

[5] We review the denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An abuse 

of discretion will be found only when the trial court’s decision is against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. An inmate who 

believes that he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to correct an 

erroneous sentence, which are designed to provide a prompt and uncomplicated 

process to correct sentences. Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250–51 (Ind. 

2008). Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 provides:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake 

does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be 

corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. 

The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the 

corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must 

be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

[6] Motions made pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 may only be used 

to attack a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 

783, 786 (Ind. 2004). A sentence is defective on its face if it violates express 

statutory authority in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced. Woodcox 

v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When claims of sentencing 

errors require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing 

judgment, the alleged errors may only be attacked by direct appeal or, when 

appropriate, by petitions for post-conviction relief. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2299 | May 1, 2020 Page 4 of 5

“Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after 

trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence.” Id.

[7] Here, Conn argues that the sentencing court improperly considered his criminal 

record and his compliance with probation. Appellant’s Br. at 6. The State 

argues that Conn’s motion to correct erroneous sentence is not a facial attack 

on the sentencing order and, thus, is not permissible under Robinson. We agree.

[8] Conn’s sentence is not facially erroneous: he was sentenced to forty-five years 

for his Class A felony conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. At the time 

Conn was sentenced, the maximum term for a Class A felony was fifty years, 

with an advisory sentence of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4. Conn has not shown 

that his forty-five-year sentence is outside the statutory parameters.

[9] Conn argues that the State improperly relied on aggravating factors in reaching 

its sentence and furthermore that its reliance was constitutionally 

impermissible.1 But resolution of this argument would require examination of 

matters included in Conn’s pre-sentence investigation report, which are outside 

the face of the sentencing order. In light of our strict application of the facially 

erroneous prerequisite in reviewing the denial of a motion to correct erroneous 

1 Conn’s contention that the sentencing court’s decision violated his constitutional rights as set forth in 

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) is misplaced. Our supreme court has recognized that the Indiana 

General Assembly’s elimination of fixed sentencing terms removed the evaluation of sentencing decisions 

from the scope of Blakely. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 

218. And, evaluating such a claim as part of a motion to correct erroneous sentence would require the court 

to look beyond the face of the judgment, which we will not do. See Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2299 | May 1, 2020 Page 5 of 5

sentence, we conclude that this argument is not properly before the court 

through Conn’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d 

at 787 (“Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should [] be narrowly 

confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the 

‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should henceforth be strictly applied[.]”). 

Conclusion

[10] Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly denied Conn’s motion to 

correct erroneous sentence.

[11] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.