1

Filed 7/19/23 P. v. Quezada CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GERMAN YOVANI QUEZADA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C097156

(Super. Ct. No. CR2012605)

Defendant German Yovani Quezada appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition 

for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1/

2 Appointed counsel for defendant 

asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

2

 Defendant filed this petition under former Penal Code section 1170.95. The Legislature 

amended Penal Code section 1170.95 effective January 1, 2022, under Senate Bill 

No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551). Effective June 30, 2022, Penal 

Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6 without substantive change. 

(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Although defendant filed his petition under former section 

1170.95, we will refer to section 1172.6 for consistency.
2

are any arguable issues on appeal, and defendant has filed a supplemental brief. (People 

v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.) We have 

considered defendant’s supplemental brief, and we affirm the trial court’s order. 

BACKGROUND

In 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit attempted murder 

(§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), attempted murder (§§ 187, 664), shooting at an inhabited dwelling 

(§ 246), and criminal street gang activity (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury also found true 

allegations the attempted murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation 

(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664); the conspiracy, attempted murder, and shooting at an 

inhabited dwelling offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang 

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); a principal personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. 

(e)(1)) as to the attempted murder count; defendant personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) as to the conspiracy and criminal gang 

activity counts; and defendant carried a firearm during the commission of a gang-related 

crime (former § 12021.5, subd. (a)) as to all counts. 

In January 2022, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. In the 

petition, defendant alleged he was convicted of attempted murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine and could not be so convicted today. The trial court 

appointed counsel and received briefing from the parties. The trial court later granted a

Faretta3 motion and allowed defendant to represent himself. While the petition was 

pending, defendant filed a motion to dismiss his firearm enhancements under 

amendments made to sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, which now allow the dismissal of 

such enhancements at the time of resentencing. 

At the hearing on the petition, the trial court noted a successful petition under 

section 1172.6 was a prerequisite to the firearm enhancement motion because the 

3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. 
3

enhancements would only be at issue if defendant received a resentencing. The trial 

court explained the jury instructions made clear defendant was convicted of deliberate 

and premeditated attempted murder and that defendant was not convicted under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court denied the petition, 

accordingly. 

Defendant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s appointed counsel asks this court to conduct an independent review of 

the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. 

Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of his right to file a 

supplemental brief, and he has done so.

Our Supreme Court has considered whether the Wende process applies to a trial 

court’s order denying a petition for postconviction relief under section 1172.6 and 

concluded such procedures are not required. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

pp. 221-222.) Our Supreme Court laid out applicable procedures for such cases saying, if 

the defendant files a supplemental brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the 

specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a 

supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent review of the entire record to 

identify unraised issues.” (Id. at p. 232.)

In his supplemental brief, defendant challenges his firearm enhancements, stating 

he currently has a separate case pending in federal court on this issue. He also claims his 

attorney should have noted this fact. 

To the extent defendant is arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel, 

defendant entered a Faretta waiver and represented himself before the trial court. He 

thus cannot complain he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Faretta v. 

California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 [a defendant who elects to represent himself 
4

cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of 

“effective assistance of counsel”].) 

Defendant also reiterates the argument he made before the trial court as to his 

firearm enhancements, where he argued that statutory amendments have given trial courts 

the discretion to strike the enhancements at resentencing. As the trial court noted, 

however, defendant would not be eligible for any such resentencing unless his section 

1172.6 petition was successful. Defendant is not eligible for such resentencing because 

his jury was not instructed on any theory under the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine, and the jury found the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated. He thus was not convicted under a theory of imputed malice, as required 

to obtain a resentencing hearing under section 1172.6. The trial court was correct that it 

did not need to consider exercising its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements 

because defendant was not eligible for resentencing. 
5

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying the petition is affirmed.

 /s/

HORST, J.

We concur:

 /s/

EARL, P. J.

 /s/

DUARTE, J.

 Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.