SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2768-21 

JENNIFER ISRAEL, 

 Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 

and OMNI KIDS, INC., 

 Respondents. 

___________________________

Submitted October 17, 2023 – Decided November 22, 2023 

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown. 

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of 

Labor, Docket No. 166534.

Forman, Cardonsky & Tsinman, LLC, attorneys for 

appellant (Samuel Tsinman, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent Board of Review (Sookie Bae-Park, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gina 

Labrecque, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2768-21

Claimant Jennifer Israel appeals from the March 30, 2022, final agency 

decision of the Board of Review (Board), Department of Labor and Workforce 

Development, reversing a decision by the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) that 

upheld her claim for unemployment benefits. We affirm. 

We discern these facts from the record. Israel was employed from January 

29, 2017, through November 10, 2017, as a teacher for Omni Kids, Inc. (the

employer). On November 10, 2017, the employer advised Israel that due to 

parent complaints, she would be temporarily placed in a different classroom with 

older children to receive mentoring and training for about two months or until 

her performance improved. The temporary assignment, which was 

memorialized in writing, would result in a decrease in Israel's hours from 35 

hours per week to 22.5 hours per week, with no change in her pay rate. Although 

Israel agreed to the temporary assignment, after November 10, 2017, she only 

returned to work once to pick up her final paycheck. At that time, the employer 

advised her that the opportunity was still available, but Israel did not respond. 

Israel never contacted the employer to discuss any concerns about the temporary 

assignment. 

Israel subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. On December 18, 

2017, a Deputy for the Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability 
3 A-2768-21

Insurance (Deputy) found Israel eligible for benefits as of November 12, 2017, 

without disqualification. Nearly one year later, on November 8, 2018, the 

employer filed an untimely appeal of the Deputy's determination to the Tribunal, 

explaining that it did not receive the Deputy's determination and arguing that 

Israel should be disqualified from receiving benefits because she left the job 

voluntarily without good cause. A telephonic hearing was conducted on 

December 6, 2018, before the Tribunal. The employer participated in the 

hearing, but Israel did not. 

Following the hearing, the Tribunal determined the employer established 

good cause for the untimely filing of the appeal. The employer's witness had 

testified that the employer had two separate business addresses. Although the 

employer did not receive the Deputy's initial determination, it received a denial 

of relief of charges on October 29, 2018, prompting the filing of the November 

8, 2018, appeal. Based on the testimony elicited at the hearing, the Tribunal 

also found that Israel was disqualified for benefits as of November 12, 2017, for 

leaving work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. See 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) (providing that a person is not qualified to receive 

unemployment compensation benefits if he or she "left work voluntarily without 

good cause attributable to such work . . . ."). 
4 A-2768-21

Israel appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, and, on March 8, 

2019, the Board remanded the matter for rehearing because Israel did not receive 

proper notice of the December 6, 2018, hearing date. Both the employer and 

Israel participated in the second hearing conducted on April 1, 2019. During 

the hearing, Israel testified she left because of the financial hardship caused by 

the reduction in her hours. Contrary to the employer's testimony, Israel stated 

that although she asked, she was not told the length of the temporary assignment. 

It was undisputed, however, that when Israel was hired, the employer was aware 

that she did not have teaching "credentials." Nonetheless, Israel was allowed to 

teach pre-school aged children after she was observed in the classroom by State 

officials and the employer's staff. 

On April 2, 2019, the Tribunal issued a new decision, reaffirming its prior 

finding that the employer's untimely filing of the appeal was excused for good 

cause, see N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1), but concluding that no disqualification arose 

under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) because the work offered to Israel "was not suitable" 

and Israel "had good cause for refusal of the work." The Tribunal explained that 

[a]lthough [Israel] did accept the change in her 

position, she did not return back to work because the 

change would have resulted in a cut in her pay[,] which 

would have caused her a financial hardship. Here, the 

change in positions constitutes a substantial change and 
5 A-2768-21

was not covered under the existing employment 

agreement . . . . 

Thereafter, the employer appealed to the Board. In a decision dated 

August 12, 2019, the Board adopted the Tribunal's findings of fact, agreed that 

the employer's filing of a late appeal was excusable, and agreed with the 

Tribunal that no disqualification arose under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) as Israel "did 

not refuse an offer of suitable work without good cause." However, the Board 

disqualified Israel for benefits because "she left the work voluntarily without 

good cause attributable to such work in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)." 

The Board explained: 

While we understand that the reduced hours may 

have presented a financial challenge for [Israel], she 

never discussed this issue with the employer. Instead, 

she just stopped showing up for work. Perhaps if she 

gave the employer an opportunity to address this issue, 

they may have decided on another alternative for 

[Israel] in order to keep her employed and avoid [Israel] 

joining the ranks of the unemployed. [Israel] could 

have filed for partial unemployment benefits and 

continued to work. However, she did not give the 

employer a reasonable opportunity to address any 

issues or concerns she had before she left the work

voluntarily.[1]

1

 The Board noted that the employer believed Israel was trainable and wanted 

to keep her employed. 
6 A-2768-21

Israel appealed the Board's decision to this court. On the Board's motion, 

on August 25, 2020, we remanded "for a new agency hearing on the merits." On 

April 21, 2021, the Board "reopen[ed] the matter, set[] aside its prior decision, 

and remand[ed]" to the Tribunal "for a new hearing and decision on the merits." 

On June 8, 2021, a third hearing was conducted by the Tribunal. Although not 

indicated on the Board's remand order, the Tribunal stated that the matter was 

remanded "for audible testimony." Only Israel and her attorney participated in 

the June 8, 2021, hearing, during which, for the first time, Israel testified that 

she was informed by the employer that her hours were being reduced because 

"[b]usiness was slow," as opposed to any needed training. 

On June 9, 2021, the Tribunal issued its decision, based on testimony 

adduced at all three hearings. Once again, the Tribunal found good cause for 

the employer's late filing of the appeal and concluded that no disqualification 

arose under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) because "the work was not suitable and [Israel] 

had good cause for refusal of the work." The Tribunal explained that "the 

change in positions constitute[d] a substantial change and was not covered under 

the existing employment agreement and would have created a hardship for 

[Israel]." 
7 A-2768-21

The employer appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, challenging 

the Tribunal's assessment of the suitability of the temporary assignment offered 

to Israel. See N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(a) (providing that the submission of a written 

statement specifying that a party is aggrieved by or dissatisfied with a Tribunal's 

decision "shall be deemed to be an appeal"). In a supporting June 15, 2021, 

letter to the Board, the employer argued that the temporary assignment with its 

attendant "training and mentorship" was offered "to help . . . Israel not only 

improve, but to also retain her position in the classroom." Instead, after 

indicating her agreement to the temporary assignment, "Israel chose to abandon 

her job" and reject the training opportunity without any further discussion. In a 

January 24, 2022, letter, Israel's attorney urged the Board to disregard the 

employer's June 15, 2021, letter, asserting that the employer was precluded from 

"provid[ing] additional testimony by way of the appeal" because the employer 

failed to participate in the hearing before the Tribunal. 

In a March 30, 2022, decision, the Board agreed with the Tribunal that the 

employer's late filing of the appeal was excused for good cause, but reversed the 

Tribunal's decision that no disqualification arose under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c). 

After adopting the Tribunal's findings of fact, the Board explained: 

[T]he . . . Tribunal found that the work was not suitable 

as there was a substantial change that was not covered 
8 A-2768-21

under the existing employment agreement. However, 

the change was only going to be temporary in order to 

provide [Israel] with additional training due to 

complaints received by the employer from a few 

parents. The purpose of the temporary change was to 

improve [Israel's] job performance and skills. 

Therefore, the work was not considered unsuitable. 

[Israel] could have filed for partial unemployment 

benefits to supplement her income during this 

temporary training period. Furthermore, [Israel] made 

no attempt to discuss her concerns regarding this 

temporary change with the employer. Hence, [Israel] 

is disqualified for benefits from November 05, 2017[,] 

through December 02, 2017[,] as she refused an offer 

of suitable work without good cause in accordance with 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c). 

This appeal followed. 

 On appeal, Israel raises the following points for our consideration: 

I. THE BOARD OF REVIEW IMPROPERLY 

CONCLUDED THAT EMPLOYER'S APPEAL WAS 

FILED LATE WITH GOOD CAUSE IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(B)(1), AS 

THE RECORD CONTAINED INSUFFICIENT 

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME. 

II. THE BOARD OF REVIEW IMPROPERLY 

CONCLUDED THAT CLAIMANT IS 

DISQUALIFIED FOR BENEFITS FROM 

NOVEMBER 5, 2017 THROUGH DECEMBER 2, 

2017 AS SHE REFUSED AN OFFER OF SUITABLE 

WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(C), AS THE 

RECORD CONTAINED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

TO SUPPORT SAME. 
9 A-2768-21

The scope of our review of an administrative agency's final decision is 

limited. Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); see also Allstars Auto 

Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) ("Judicial 

review of agency determinations is limited."). We will disturb an agency's 

decision 

only if we determine that the decision is "arbitrary, 

capricious or unreasonable" or is unsupported "by 

substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." 

In determining whether an agency action is arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable, we examine: 

(1) whether the agency's action violates 

express or implied legislative policies, that 

is, did the agency follow the law; (2) 

whether the record contains substantial 

evidence to support the findings on which 

the agency based its action; and (3) 

whether in applying the legislative policies 

to the facts, the agency clearly erred in 

reaching a conclusion that could not 

reasonably have been made on a showing 

of the relevant factors. 

[Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 302 

(App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted) (first quoting

Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 

(1980); and then quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 

482-83 (2007)).] 

The party challenging the administrative action bears the burden of 

making the requisite showing. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014). 
10 A-2768-21

Although we "must defer to an agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a 

particular field," In re Carter, 191 N.J. at 483 (quoting Greenwood v. State 

Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)), we are "in no way bound by 

[an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal 

issue." Allstars Auto Grp., Inc., 234 N.J. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Dep't of Children & Fams. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 302 (2011)). 

Pertinent to this appeal, under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c), "[a]n individual shall 

be disqualified for benefits" if "it is found that the individual has failed, without 

good cause, . . . to accept suitable work when it is offered." 

For purposes of this subchapter, "good cause" 

means any situation over which the claimant did not

have control or which was so compelling as to prevent 

the claimant from accepting work. In order to establish 

good cause, the claimant must have made a reasonable 

attempt to remove the restrictions pertaining to the 

refusal. 

[N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.4.] 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) delineates the following factors in evaluating work 

suitability: 

(1) In determining whether or not any work is suitable 

for an individual, consideration shall be given to the 

degree of risk involved to health, safety, and morals, 

the individual’s physical fitness and prior training, 

experience and prior earnings, the individual's length of 

unemployment and prospects for securing local work in 
11 A-2768-21

the individual's customary occupation, and the distance 

of the available work from the individual's 

residence. . . . 

(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this 

chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits 

shall not be denied under this chapter to any otherwise 

eligible individual for refusing to accept new work

under any of the following conditions: the position

offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or 

other labor dispute; the remuneration, hours, or other 

conditions of the work offered are substantially less 

favorable to the individual than those prevailing for 

similar work in the locality; or, the individual, as a 

condition of being employed, would be required to join 

a company union or to resign from or refrain from 

joining any bona fide labor organization.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) (emphasis added).]

See also N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.1. 

N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5(a)(3) defines "new work" as "[a]n offer of work made 

by an individual's present employer of substantially different duties, terms or 

conditions of employment from those he or she agreed to perform in his or her 

existing contract of hire." When determining whether an assignment will 

constitute "new work," the court may consider "the employer's change of hours 

or shift, job duties, location, salary, benefits, work environment and health and 

safety conditions." Ibid. Importantly, the consequences of refusing to accept

suitable "new work" has significant implications regarding the time frame for 
12 A-2768-21

disqualification. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) (limiting disqualification period to 

four weeks). 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) prescribes time frames for filing a timely appeal. 

Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1), an employer's appeal from an initial 

determination of eligibility shall be filed within ten days of the mailing of the 

determination, or within seven days of the receipt of the determination. Late 

appeals may only be considered on the merits "if it is determined that the appeal 

was delayed for good cause." N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(h). "Good cause" exists where 

it is shown that: 

1. The delay in filing the appeal was due to 

circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or 

2. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for 

circumstances which could not have been reasonably 

foreseen or prevented. 

[Ibid.] 

As a threshold matter, we reject Israel's challenge to the Board's finding 

that the employer's late filing of its appeal of the Deputy's determination was 

excused for good cause. The Board's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable, and is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as 

a whole. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). 
13 A-2768-21

Next, the record amply supports the Board's decision that Israel was 

disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) because she failed to accept 

suitable work offered by the employer without good cause. Contrary to Israel's 

contentions, the record supports the Board's findings that Israel rejected the 

employer's offer of a temporary assignment to another classroom where she 

would receive training and mentorship to improve her job performance and 

address parent complaints. Although Israel's work hours would have been

temporarily reduced, her rate of pay would remain the same. Israel claimed she 

could not withstand the financial hardship resulting from the reduced work 

hours. However, Israel made no attempt to negotiate an alternative resolution 

or discuss her financial hardship with the employer before quitting. As such, 

Israel failed to demonstrate that her refusal of the temporary assignment was 

with good cause. "[G]ood cause does not ordinarily exist when a person gives 

up partial employment for none at all." Zielenski v. Bd. of Rev., 85 N.J. Super. 

46, 53 (App. Div. 1964). 

Furthermore, notwithstanding the reduced hours and concomitant salary 

reduction, we disagree with Israel's assertion that the temporary assignment 

constituted "involuntary termination" or "was unsuitable" under the statutory 

and regulatory provisions. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c); N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5(a)(3). 
14 A-2768-21

An unemployed claimant, receiving benefits, 

may be justified in refusing a job referral at materially 

lower wages on the theory that the claimant should have 

a reasonable opportunity to seek work in line with his 

[or her] demonstrated earning capacity. This reasoning 

does not apply where the claimant is gainfully 

employed and could have continued working until he 

[or she] found a better job. 

[Zielenski, 85 N.J. Super. at 53.] 

Israel's precipitous decision to quit rather than accept a temporary reduction in 

hours and pay, without the prospect of employment elsewhere, was objectively 

unreasonable and at odds with her concern of financial hardship. 

 In sum, given our highly deferential standard of review, we discern no 

reason to interfere with the Board's decision. To the extent we have not 

specifically addressed any of Israel's arguments, they are without sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

 Affirmed.