J-S04003-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.G.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2688 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): No. 2018-A0023

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: April 15, 2020

J.B. (Father) appeals from the decree entered on August 15, 2019, that 

granted the petition filed by the Montgomery County Office of Children and 

Youth (OCY or Agency) seeking the involuntary termination of Father’s 

parental rights to M.G.B. (Child), born in June of 2016.

1

 We affirm. 

Child is medically fragile. She was born prematurely in Kansas, where 

Mother was living at the time, and suffered neonatal complications. Child 

spent the first six months of her life in the hospital and then was in Mother’s 

sole care for the next few months. In May of 2017, Mother took Child on a 

trip to Pennsylvania to visit family. OCY first became involved with the family 

on May 21, 2017, when Child was hospitalized in Philadelphia for acute alcohol 

____________________________________________

1 J.N.L.’s (Mother) parental rights to Child were also terminated on the same 

date. Mother filed a separate appeal with this Court, which is addressed in a 

separate memorandum at No. 2687 EDA 2019. 
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poisoning, caused by Mother’s mixing of Child’s formula with vodka instead of 

water. OCY obtained custody of Child on June 13, 2017, when she was 

released from the hospital, and placed her directly into in the care of her preadoptive foster mother. 

On May 3, 2019, OCY filed its petition for termination of Father’s rights 

and alleged grounds under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(1), (2), (8) and (b). A

termination hearing was held on August 14, 2019, at which the orphans’ court 

found that the following facts had been established:

[Father] ... acknowledged that he knew about [Mother’s] 

pregnancy before ... [C]hild was born, that he drove ... [Mother] to 

the airport when she was pregnant and intended to go to Kansas, 

that he knew that ... [C]hild was his....

He also testified that he remained in touch with ... [M]other 

when she was in Kansas and during the period that ... [C]hild was 

born prematurely and hospitalized for a period of six months. 

From his testimony[,] we know that he did not go to Kansas, and 

he provided no evidence that he provided for ... [C]hild in any way 

during the ten months that she was [a] resident with ... [M]other 

in Kansas. 

He did not see ... [M]other or ... [C]hild until May of 2017, 

when ... [M]other had briefly returned to Pennsylvania. He saw 

her then on one occasion shortly before [Child] was injured ... 

when ... [M]other gave her vodka mixed with baby formula on May 

21st. 

After that, ... [F]ather testified that he ... was not in touch 

with ... [M]other and did not know where she was. By that time, 

... [C]hild was hospitalized, and ... [M]other was arrested and 

incarcerated in Pennsylvania. In fact, he assumed she had gone 

back to Kansas. 

The only explanation he provided for the lengthy period of 

time prior to 2019[,] when he had virtually no contact with ...

[C]hild, no visits with ... [C]hild, was that he did not—it was that 

for the first year or first ten months, he knew where ... [C]hild 
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was, but she was in Kansas[] and[,] thereafter[,] he didn’t know 

where [she] or ... [M]other was. 

The testimony established that [OCY] was not made aware 

of ... [F]ather’s identity by ... [M]other, even though ... she had an 

obligation to cooperate with [OCY] and provide his identity. 

It was only through the efforts of [OCY] combing through 

the records, including medical records from Kansas, that they did 

identify ... [F]ather’s name, and [OCY] actually affirmatively 

reached out to him. 

He testified that he responded promptly to [OCY] and 

asserted in ... March of 2018 that he wished to participate and 

have a relationship with his daughter but having not had a 

relationship prior to that point. 

N.T. Termination, 8/14/19, at 249-51. The orphans’ court determined that 

OCY had proven Father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 

sections 2511(a)(1) and (b) and entered a final decree, accordingly, on August 

15, 2019. 

On August 28, 2019, Father filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a 

timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Herein, Father raises the following issues for our review:

I. [Whether] the [orphans’] [c]ourt committed an error of law 

and/or abuse of discretion when it held that [OCY] had 

proven by “clear and convincing evidence” that [Father’s] 

parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1)[,] where [Father] was making substantial 

progress on his Family Service Plan[s] goals as evidenced 

by the testimony at the hearing and Family Service Plans 

themselves[?]

II. [Whether] the [orphans’] court committed an error of law 

and/or abuse of discretion when it terminated [Father’s] 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511(b) on the 

basis that the developmental, physical, [and] emotional ... 

welfare of ... [C]hild[] was best served by termination of [] 
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[F]ather’s rights where he was making substantial progress 

on the Family Service Plans[?]

Father’s Brief at 4. 

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the 

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
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We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

With regard to section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 
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946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of 

section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, we analyze the 

court’s decision to terminate under section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide 

as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim 

to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
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We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1).

To satisfy [s]ection 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at least the 

six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which 

reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. 

In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 461 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). In C.M.S., 

we further acknowledged the following statement by our Supreme Court: 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has 

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance. 

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child. 

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent ‘exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life[.’] 

C.M.S., 832 A.2d at 462 (quoting In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 

1977)). 

Instantly, Father avers that the orphans’ court erred in terminating his 

parental rights under section 2511(a)(1). Father’s only argument is that he 

“had been making substantial progress on his Family Service Plan goals[,]” at 

the time that OCY filed its petition for termination. Father’s Brief at 5-6. 
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Although Father does appear to have complied with some of his initial Family 

Service Plan goals, i.e., evaluations for drug and alcohol treatment, mental 

health evaluations, and maintaining stable housing, his progress has been

inconsistent. Father has been employed, but was working minimal hours over 

the past year due to medical issues. N.T. Termination at 174. He testified 

that his employment had just become more stable during the four weeks prior 

to the termination hearing. Id. at 185. Father also indicated that he 

straightened out his substance abuse issues “for the past year now[,]” but 

also admitted to “some slipups” with the use of alcohol and marijuana. Id. 

Moreover, the record is void of any evidence of affirmative action on the part 

of Father to perform his parental duties and/or to develop any sort of parental 

relationship with Child.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the orphans’ court opined 

on the record:

I conclude from the evidence that was presented ... that 

[Father] became aware that ... [C]hild was in the custody of [OCY] 

in March of 2018. A DNA test ... was ordered by the court and 

came back positive, and both [Father] and [OCY] had been 

notified of the positive results by April of 2018. 

This [c]ourt was asked to consider granting visits to both of 

the birth parents ... and was asked to consider by the [g]uardian 

ad [l]item that because of the aggravated circumstances, no 

reunification efforts should be made. A petition to that effect was 

filed by the [g]uardian ad [l]item in this case and was scheduled 

for a hearing. 

By April of 2018, the [c]ourt ordered that [M]other and 

[F]ather ... cooperate with OCY and follow through with 

recommendations. They were ordered to both obtain drug and 

alcohol and mental health evaluations and provide copies to OCY 
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and that supervised visits may be scheduled at the OCY’s 

discretion with either [M]other or [F]ather following a review of 

the drug and alcohol evaluations. That was this court’s order 

dated April 30[], 2018. 

In addition, at a subsequent permanency review hearing, 

after the [A]gency did receive mental health evaluations for ... 

[M]other and ... [F]ather, the [c]ourt was more specific in 

permitting visits to begin to be scheduled. 

On June 26[], 2018, the [c]ourt ordered that reunification 

efforts shall be made with ... [M]other and ... [F]ather....

So[,] well over a year ago, ... [F]ather was in a position to 

persuade OCY that[,] having obtained [a] drug and alcohol 

evaluation and mental health evaluation and either complying with 

the recommendations or having no recommendations he needed 

to follow up on, ... visits [should] begin. 

Sometime in 2019, he had complied with the evaluation 

requirements and had the opportunity again to ask for visits. Ms. 

Spano[, an OCY caseworker,] ... testified that she expects a parent 

to reach out to her to seek to schedule visits. He certainly knew 

her phone number, had her contact information, and had the 

opportunity to reach out and schedule visits. While his counsel 

suggests that he complied with the recommendations of the 

[F]amily [S]ervice [P]lan, initially those recommendations and 

goals were limited to getting him in a position to begin visits with 

... [C]hild so that he could[,] for the first time[,] begin to establish 

a relationship with [her]. 

[C]hild is now over three years old, and the first visit that 

[Father] had with her occurred or was scheduled for August 1[], 

2019. Even that visit was terminated early by the caseworker due 

to the inappropriate and aggressive behavior and inappropriate 

language used towards the caseworker by [Father]. 

Simply put, [Father] has not availed himself of the 

opportunity to have visits, which the [c]ourt and the [A]gency 

[have] attempted to make available to him, and [he] has not 

taken adequate steps to develop any relationship with ... [C]hild, 

much less a positive, nurturing, close, stable, reliable parental 

relationship with ... [C]hild. 

As I said, the factors I’m required to consider with respect 

to a request for termination of parental rights under [s]ection 
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2511(a)(1) [are] if a parent has failed to perform parental duties 

for a period of more than six months, as is the case here, what is 

the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct[,] and what has 

been the quality of the contact he’s had once he resumed 

contact[,] and what would be the effect of termination of parental 

rights. 

For the most recent period, [Father] candidly told the 

[c]ourt that he had some health problems that caused him 

perhaps to have some delay in setting up the visits, but that’s 

simply not an adequate explanation for three years of no 

meaningful efforts to create a meaningful relationship with ...

[C]hild. There has been virtually no contact except at a couple of 

court hearings and the one aborted August 1[], 2019[] visit 

between [Father] and [C]hild. Therefore, no relationship has been 

created. The quality of the contact has not been beneficial to ...

[C]hild, and the termination of parental rights would not be 

detrimental to [her]. 

Therefore, I conclude that under [s]ection 2511(a)(1), ...

OCY has proved by clear and convincing evidence the elements 

required that a ground for termination of parental rights with 

respect to [Father] has been established. 

N.T. Termination at 253-57. After careful review, we discern that the court’s 

determinations are well-supported by the record. 

As for the orphans’ court’s analysis under section 2511(b), Father baldly 

asserts that the court failed to take into consideration “how well” he was doing 

in complying with his Family Service Plan goals and the fact that he was 

“beginning to seek visitation.” Father’s Brief at 8. The orphans’ court 

concluded, however, that “[F]ather has not established a parental bond with 

... [C]hild and there would be no detriment to ... [C]hild of severing that 

parental bond.” N.T. Termination at 265. “In the meantime,” the court added, 

“[C]hild has been raised in a home that is described as loving and secure 

where she is bonded and attached.” Id. at 266. 
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The following observations of OCY further support the orphans’ court’s 

determination: 

Father has had only one visit with ... Child since her placement 

into foster care on June 13, 2017[,] and has failed to act in a 

parental capacity to provide for all of ... Child’s needs. Father has 

not provided a home for ... Child or demonstrated he can be a safe 

and stable caregiver for ... Child. Consequently, the [orphans’] 

court properly concluded that a bond between Father and ... Child 

does not exist and that ... Child would not suffer a detriment as a 

result of termination of Father’s parental rights. 

Furthermore, the evidence established that ... Child has resided in 

a pre-adoptive home since June 13, 2017. [] Child is living in a 

nurturing and loving environment with her foster family. Her 

foster mother is meeting all of her needs[,] including her special 

medical needs. [] Child needs stability and a permanent home 

through adoption. 

OCY’s Brief at 14. Moreover, the record reflects that Child has bonded with 

her foster mother, “is being nurtured by her and is thriving with her[;] she 

looks to her for support and security.” Child’s Brief at 32. Counsel for Child 

adds that the foster mother is “ready, willing, and able to parent ... [C]hild, 

and she wants to have ... [C]hild be a permanent part of the family.” Id. We 

ascertain no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court. 

Accordingly, we affirm the decree terminating Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/20