IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

v. : No. 366 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: April 12, 2018

Dennis Love, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: May 10, 2018

Dennis Love (Love) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by 

the Court of Common Pleas of the 41st Judicial District, Juniata County Branch (trial 

court), dated February 23, 2017, which sentenced Love to pay fines, costs, and 

restitution stemming from violations of Section 2307 of the Game and Wildlife Code 

(Code).1 For the reasons set forth below, we now reverse an earlier order of the trial 

court, dated November 2, 2016, denying a motion to suppress; vacate the trial court’s 

judgment of sentence; and remand the matter to the trial court for further 

proceedings.

On November 16, 2015, Pennsylvania Game Commission

(Commission) Wildlife Conservation Officer Stephen S. Hower (Hower) submitted 

an application for a search warrant to a Magisterial District Judge (MDJ). The 

warrant application sought authorization to search Love’s property for “[p]arts of 

unlawfully taken or possessed game or wildlife.” (Reproduced Record 

 

1

34 Pa. C.S. § 2307.
2

(R.R.) at 38a.) In support of the application, Hower submitted an affidavit of 

probable cause which provided:

On 11/11/[20]15 at approximately 0100 hours, 

Pennsylvania Wildlife Conservation Officers were 

patrolling by aircraft over Juniata County when they 

observed a spotlight being operated from a vehicle in a 

field near East Waterford. Since it is unlawful to use an 

artificial light to search for game or wildlife after 11 PM, 

the officers watched the vehicle and reported the activity 

to officers on the ground. Deputy Wildlife Conservation 

Officer [(DWCO)] Terry Clevenger along with two other 

officers responded to 9853 Route 75 S, East Waterford 

where the officers in the aircraft had reported seeing the 

vehicle stop.

Upon their arrival DWCO Clevenger found the vehicle, a 

white Dodge truck, license number YHM3257, with what 

appeared to be blood in the bed and on the tail gate. He 

spoke to the home owner, Dennis R. Love, who explained 

that the blood was from a deer that he had killed on the 

evening of Thursday, November 12 “for crop damage[.]”[] 

When asked by Clevenger whether he had reported killing 

this deer to the Game Commission, Love annswered [sic]

“No[.]”[] Clevenger asked for the head and hide of the 

deer and was told by Love that it had been disposed of. 

Love told the officers that the meat from this deer was 

“Wrapped and in the freezer[.]”[]

Since the killing of this deer had not been reported to the 

Commission as required, the possession of its parts would 

be in violation of the Game and Wildlife Code.[2]

(Id. at 39a.)

On November 16, 2015, an MDJ authorized the warrant, and the 

Commission executed the search. The search revealed not only the deer hide and 

meat but also a myriad of other assorted game carcasses and meat. (Id. at 32a-33a.) 

As a result of this search, the Commission filed twenty-four summary citations 

 

2

34 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-2965. 
3

against Love, which were comprised of twenty-two counts of Unlawful Taking or 

Possession of Game or Wildlife in violation of 34 Pa. C.S. § 2307(a) and two counts 

of Unlawful Acts Concerning Taking of Furbearers in violation of

34 Pa. C.S. § 2361(a)(2). (Id. at 24a-29a.) Love pleaded not guilty to all counts. 

Following a consolidated summary trial held on March 8, 2016, the MDJ found Love 

guilty of all counts.3 

On April 7, 2016, Love filed a notice of appeal from his twenty-four 

summary offenses, and the trial court scheduled a de novo hearing. (Id. at 23a-29a.) 

Prior to the hearing date, Love filed a motion seeking to suppress the evidence 

obtained during the search. (Id. at 32a-39a.) In so doing, Love argued that he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy at all places from which the evidence was seized. 

(Id.) Further, Love challenged the warrant as overbroad and lacking specificity. 

(Id.) Following a motion hearing, the trial court denied Love’s suppression motion

by order dated November 2, 2016. (Id. at 70a.) 

The trial court conducted a de novo summary appeal hearing and found 

Love guilty of all counts. (Id. at 306a.) By order dated February 23, 2017, the trial 

court sentenced Love to fines, costs, and restitution on the twenty-four summary 

offenses. (Id. at 124a-25a.) Love then filed the instant appeal.

On appeal,4 Love argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress. Love challenges the search warrant as unconstitutionally overbroad and 

 

3 At the time of the summary trial, the Commonwealth amended the two counts of Unlawful 

Acts Concerning Taking of Furbearers to two counts of Unlawful Taking or Possession of Game 

or Wildlife. (R.R. at 52a.) As a result, the MDJ found Love guilty of twenty-four counts of 

Unlawful Taking or Possession of Game or Wildlife instead of the originally charged twenty-two 

counts. (Id. at 3a-6a.)

4 Our review of a trial court’s determination on appeal from a summary conviction is 

limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent 
4

lacking the requisite degree of specificity. Love argues that probable cause only 

existed to perform a search for parts of a deer, whereas the search warrant authorized 

a search for parts of any game or wildlife, thus resulting in a fishing expedition.

A search warrant cannot be used as a general investigatory tool to 

uncover evidence of a crime. In re Casale, 517 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa. 1986). Nor 

may a warrant be so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose 

among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize, which would result 

in the general “rummaging” banned by the Fourth Amendment. See Cmwlth. v. 

Santner, 454 A.2d 24, 25 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1982), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984) 

(citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927)). The language of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a warrant describe the items to be seized “as 

nearly as may be.” Pa. Const. art 1, § 8. The clear meaning of the language is that 

a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible. See 

Cmwlth. v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909, 910 (Pa. 1988). This requirement is more stringent 

than that of the Fourth Amendment, which merely requires particularity in the 

description.

5

 

A warrant is defective when its explanatory narrative does not describe 

as clearly as possible those items for which probable cause exists to search. Cmwlth. 

 

evidence or whether the trial court erred as a matter of law. Cmwlth. v. Whiteford, 

884 A.2d 364, 366 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), appeal denied, 902 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 2006). 

5 The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5

v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899-900 (Pa. 1989). Warrants should be read “in a 

common sense fashion and should not be invalidated by hypertechnical 

interpretations. This may mean, for instance, that when an exact description of a 

particular item is not possible, a generic description will suffice.” 

Pa. R. Crim. P. 205 (cmt.). In determining whether a warrant is defective on such 

grounds, our Supreme Court has opined:

Consequently, in any assessment of the validity of the 

description contained in a warrant, a court must initially 

determine for what items probable cause existed. The 

sufficiency of the description must then be measured 

against those items for which there was probable cause. 

Any unreasonable discrepancy between the items for 

which there was probable cause and the description in 

the warrant requires suppression. An unreasonable 

discrepancy reveals that the description was not as specific 

as was reasonably possible.

Grossman, 555 A.2d at 900. 

In reviewing whether probable cause existed to support a search 

warrant, the court’s determination must be based on the facts described within the 

four corners of the supporting affidavit. See Cmwlth. v. Housman, 

986 A.2d 822, 843 (Pa. 2009). As stated by our Supreme Court:

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing 

court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 

“substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause 

existed.”

Cmwlth. v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 925 (Pa. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
6

With the foregoing in mind, the issue before this Court is whether there 

is an unreasonable discrepancy between the items for which probable cause existed

and the description in the warrant. 

In Grossman, an affidavit for a search warrant provided that Grossman, 

the owner of a local insurance agency, fraudulently executed documents in an 

attempt to defraud three insurance applicants. Grossman, 555 A.2d at 897, 900. The 

search warrant, however, authorized the search and seizure of “[a]ll insurance files, 

payment records, receipt records, copies of insurance applications and policies, [and] 

cancelled checks.” Id. at 897. This led to police confiscating every file in 

Grossman’s place of business. Id. at 898. Grossman challenged the specificity of 

the warrant. Our Supreme Court, in concluding that an unreasonable discrepancy 

existed between the affidavit and search warrant, opined:

It is clear that the warrant here at issue cannot survive 

constitutional scrutiny. Notwithstanding the contrary 

conclusion reached by the Superior Court, the affidavit 

was limited to the files of only three of [Grossman]’s 

clients . . . . After detailing the irregularities in these files, 

the affidavit concludes: “[w]herefore, affiant believes 

there is sufficient probable cause to believe 

[Grossman] . . . fraudulently executed various documents 

in connection with an ongoing scheme to defraud 

insurance applicants.” This language must be read in the 

context of the entire affidavit. The “wherefore” clause 

refers back to the three client files discussed in the body of 

the affidavit. Although the Superior Court may have been 

correct to observe that the police may have suspected that

other clients were being defrauded, the affidavit that was 

placed before the issuing judge did not include any such 

additional information, and “[t]he issuing authority, in 

determining whether probable cause has been established, 

may not consider any evidence outside the affidavits.” 

We conclude that while probable cause existed for the 

three named files there was not probable cause as to the 

other files in [Grossman]’s offices. [Grossman] had over 
7

2,000 clients. That three clients, 0.15% of [Grossman]’s 

clients, had filed complaints with the Pennsylvania 

Insurance Commission cannot be said to lead a reasonable 

person to conclude that probable cause existed to seize, 

and subsequently to search, the files of all 2,000 of 

[Grossman]’s clients. In short, there was probable cause 

to search only for those three files described in the 

affidavit.

Id. at 900 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 

Here, just as in Grossman, the mere suspicion that Love harvested other 

game or wildlife beyond the deer in question does not negate the fact that the 

affidavit submitted to the MDJ offered no facts to establish probable cause of such 

activity. The affidavit clearly established probable cause to search for the deer. 

Love does not dispute this fact. The affidavit, however, makes no assertions 

whatsoever as to Love harvesting any other game, merely that “the killing of this 

deer had not been reported to the Commission as required, [and] the possession of 

its parts would be in violation of the [Code].” (R.R. at 39a (emphasis added).) 

The Commonwealth argues that, at the time of the affidavit’s 

submission, the Commission could only know that Love harvested something, but 

could not identify precisely what. (Appellee’s Br. at 15.) In support of this assertion, 

the Commonwealth notes that (1) the investigating officer had no way of developing 

a forensic certainty that the blood in Love’s truck bed belonged to a deer, and (2) it 

is not uncommon for suspects to be untruthful to law enforcement. We decline to 

entertain either notion. If the investigating officer suspected that Love was 

harvesting other wildlife or being untruthful, then the investigating officer should 

have included facts to support such an assertion in the affidavit. See Grossman, 

555 A.2d at 900. Given the facts averred in the affidavit, we conclude that there is 
8

an unreasonable discrepancy between the items for which probable cause existed 

and the description in the warrant, rendering the search warrant invalid. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s November 2, 2016 order 

denying Love’s motion to suppress, vacate the trial court’s judgment of sentence,

and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

6

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

 

6 The record does not make clear how many of Love’s twenty-four summary offenses are 

affected because of this ruling. Love appears to acknowledge that the charge stemming from his 

admission to the unreported harvesting of one deer may still be valid, whereas the Commonwealth 

has advanced no argument on this matter. On the record before us, we are unable to determine 

which offenses were the product of the invalid warrant, and which offenses would be unaffected 

notwithstanding the warrant’s invalidation. On remand, the trial court will have to make these 

determinations. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

v. : No. 366 C.D. 2017

:

Dennis Love, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2018, the Court of Common Pleas of 

the 41st Judicial District, Juniata County Branch’s (trial court), November 2, 2016 

order, denying Dennis Love’s motion to suppress, is REVERSED; the trial court’s 

February 23, 2017 judgment of sentence is VACATED; and this matter is 

REMANDED for further proceedings. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge