alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Page 1 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: IRVING WEIS AND COMPANY, IRVING WEIS, AND ALEXANDER CYCLEMAN 

CITATION: 7 Agric. Dec. 193 

DOCKET NUMBER: 39 

DATE: MARCH 24, 1948 

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 

(Agric. Dec. 1716) 

In re IRVING WEIS AND COMPANY, IRVING WEIS, AND ALEXANDER CYCLEMAN. CEA Doc. 

No. 39. Decided March 24, 1948. 

Suspension of Effective Date of Prior Order Pending Outcome of Review by 

United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Respondents' request that effective date of order of suspension of 

registration and denial of trading privileges entered on March 5, 1948, be 

stayed pending review of the order pursuant to a petition for review by the 

United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, granted, and the 

order is suspended pending the outcome of such review. 

Mr. Benj. M. Holstein for complainant. Messrs. Corbin, Bennett & Delehanty, of 

New York City, for respondents. 

Decision by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer 

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

On March 5, 1948, an order was entered in the proceeding effective 30 days 

after its date suspending the registration of Irving Weis and Company as a 

futures commission merchant and the registration of Irving Weis as a floor 

broker for a period of 10 days and directing that all contract markets refuse 

all trading privileges to Irving Weis, Irving Weis and Company, and Alexander 

Cycleman for the same period. 

On March 22, 1948, the respondents stated that they intended to file a 

petition for review of the order by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 

and asked that the effective date of the order be stayed pending such review. 

It appears that such petition for review has been filed in the United States 

Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and, accordingly, the 

effectiveness of the order of March 5, 1948, is suspended pending the outcome of 

such review. 

LOAD-DATE: June 8, 2008 
Page 2
In re James D. EVANS, petitioner.

No. 16-6279

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 31, 2016.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Balance
Sheet and the Statements of Revenue and Expenses and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such Report on Form 10-Q
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000850671
<NAME> DATRONIC EQUIPMENT INCOME FUND XVIII, L.P.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       7,701,687
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,508,193
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  10,269,591
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,508,193
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               528,553
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                40,390
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             (935,929)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (16,003)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Darriel Lee COBBS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael McCALL, Warden of Perry Correctional Institution; Henry D. McMaster, Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 10-6499.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 19, 2010.

Decided: Oct. 26, 2010.

Darriel Lee Cobbs, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Darriel Lee Cobbs seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Cobbs has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Charles G. KINNEY, petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.

No. 16-252.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 31, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Exhibit 21  SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT   Name
        Jurisdiction of Organization1.  Marvel Characters, Inc.
        Delaware2.  Marvel Entertainment International Limited
        United Kingdom3.  Marvel Property, Inc.
        Delaware4.  Marvel Publishing, Inc.*
        Delaware5.  Marvel Studios, Inc.
        Delaware6.  Marvel Toys Limited
        Hong Kong7.  MVL Film Finance LLC
        Delaware8.  MVL Productions LLC
        Delaware9.  MVL Rights LLC
        Delaware10. MRV, Inc.
        Delaware11. Toy Biz International Limited
        Hong Kong12. Spider-Man Merchandising L.P.
        Delaware13.  MVL Development LLC
        Delaware14.  Marvel Film Productions LLC
        Delaware15.  Incredible Productions LLC
        Delaware16.  Iron Works Productions LLC
        Delaware17.  MVL Iron Works Productions Canada, Inc.
        Province of Ontario18.  MVL Incredible Productions Canada, Inc.
        Province of Ontario
   *Also does business under the name Marvel Comics.
Calvin Lyndale GADDY, aka Calvin L. Gaddy, petitioner, v. Captain DeGEORGIS.

No. 15-9113.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 3, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
SUNTRUST BANK, petitioner, v. Ellen Rambo BICKERSTAFF.

No. 16-459.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 5, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia denied.
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND JAMES CITY COUNTY

#### Bowling v. Berry and Truck Enterprises Gentry v. Berry and Truck Enterprises

Case No. C-90-56

Case No. C-90-57

August 1, 1991

By Judge William L. Person, Jr.

After careful review of the facts and actions surrounding the above-styled cases, I find that sanctions are not warranted under § 8.01-271.1 of the Code of Virginia. Section 8.01-271.1 requires that an attorney sign every pleading, written motion, and other paper as certificate by him that “(i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose.” Section 8.01-271.1, as well, requires the court to impose an appropriate sanction on any person who signs a paper in violation of the rule.

The major issues before this Court are whether the above cases are warranted by law and whether the plaintiff made a reasonable in*2quiry into the facts before filing suit. Concerning the question of the cases being warranted by law, I find that although no state or federal law prohibits the placement of recap tires on the steering axle, plaintiff’s argument for liability under common law negligence for damage arising therefrom, qualifies as a good faith argument for the extension of the law. Section 8.01-271.1 should not be used to stifle the creativity of zealous advocates or halt the expansion of the law.

I also find that the plaintiff made a reasonable inquiry and that the actions were well grounded in fact when the Motions for Judgment were signed. The Court must use an objective standard to measure the reasonableness of the nonmoving party’s inquiry into the facts. *See, Oxenham*v. *Johnson,*241 Va. 281, 402 S.E.2d 1 (1991). At the time of filing, Mr. Drumheller relied on the eyewitness accounts of the accident and tire and his own belief that the tire was a recap, based on the pictures he received which showed the tread had peeled off the tire. All this information supported the theory that the tire was “unsafe and/or defective” and caused the accident. Mr. Drash, however, points out the extended period between Mr. Drumheller’s taking the case and the filing of suit, and Drumheller’s failure to take the pictures to any expert, as evidence a reasonable inquiry was not performed. But the Court must remember that the statute calls for a “reasonable” not a perfect inquiry. Although the parties can now look back and point out mistakes, the Court should not use the knowledge gained from hindsight when determining if a reasonable inquiry was made. Therefore, I find the cases were well established in fact at the time of filing and that no sanctions are warranted.

I find no violation by plaintiff’s attorney under the rules set out in § 8.01-271.1 for the reasons stated.
EEMAC Panel I: 

RTOs/ISOs

Jeff Walker

Sr. VP & Chief Risk Officer

February 25, 2016
2 

ACES’ 21 Member-Owners 
3 

Current U.S. RTOs/ISOs
Thomas R. RODELLA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 15-1158.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 3, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
Curtis Lee WATSON, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 16-6482.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 28, 2016.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied, and petition for writ of certiorari dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and petition submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,*506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (*per curiam* ).
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 USC, SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTIONS 302 AND 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    I have reviewed the report;
 (2)
    
    To the best of my knowledge, the Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading:
  (4)
    
    I:
           /s/ G. Dale Garlow
    
    /s/ G. Dale GarlowG. Dale Garlow, President
    

G. Dale Garlow, Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1






CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §1350 (adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002),
I, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of Aftermarket Technology Corp. (the
"Company"), hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the "Report")
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.





Date: February 27,
2008








/s/ Donald T. Johnson,
  Jr.Donald
      T. Johnson, Jr., Chief Executive
Officer




This
certification will not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the
Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that
section.  This certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by
reference into any filing under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except
to the extent that the registrant specifically incorporates it by
reference.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________
No. 96-31043 Summary Calendar

_____________________

CORNELIUS J. DUPARD, III,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

RICHARD P. IEYOUB, Attorney General, State of Louisiana; BURL CAIN, Acting Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,

Respondents-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 96-CV-789-D

_________________________________________________________________ December 4, 1997 Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Cornelius J. Dupard, III, Louisiana prisoner #103460, appeals

from the district court’s order dismissing, without prejudice, his

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. The district court’s

order was based on Dupard’s failure to seek permission from this

court to file a successive § 2254 petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death-2-

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Because Dupard filed his petition prior to

the AEDPA’s April 24, 1996 enactment date, however, the provision

requiring permission in amended § 2244(b)(3) does not apply to his

petition. See Williams v. Cain , 117 F.3d 363, 363-65 (5th Cir.

1997). Accordingly, the district court’s order is VACATED and this

case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

VACATED and REMANDED.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

 Office of Public Affairs 

 Three Lafayette Centre 

 1155 21st Street, NW 

 Washington, DC 20581 

 www.cftc.gov

Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Core Principles 

and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets 

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission) is proposing new and revised rules, guidance and 

acceptable practices governing the designation and operation of designated contract markets (DCMs). The proposed 

rulemaking implements provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 

(Dodd-Frank Act). 

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 amended the 

obligations of DCMs under the CEA 

On July 21, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended the Commodity Exchange Act. 

Section 735 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 5 of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by: 

• Eliminating the eight criteria for designation as a contract market under Section 5(b) of the CEA; 

• Amending most of the core principles, including incorporating into the core principles most of the former designation 

criteria; and 

• Adding five new core principles: Core Principle 13 (Disciplinary Procedures), Core Principle 20 (System Safeguards), 

Core Principle 21 (Financial Resources), Core Principle 22 (Diversity of Boards of Directors), and Core Principle 23 

(Securities and Exchange Commission). 

Section 723 of the Dodd- Frank Act added Section 2(h)(8) of the CEA to require that the execution of all clearable swaps 

occur on DCMs or Swap Execution Facilities (SEFs), except where no DCM or SEF makes the swap available for trading. 

The Commission’s proposed new and amended rules, guidance and acceptable practices govern 

the obligations of DCMs under the CEA 

The proposed new and amended rules, guidance and acceptable practices implement the new and amended 23 core principles, 

and incorporate the trading and execution of swaps on DCMs. 

The proposed rulemaking proposes to codify rules, and provide guidance and acceptable practices governing the obligations of 

DCMs to comply with the applicable provisions of the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, including the 23 core 

principles under Section 5(d) of the CEA. 

Specifically, the proposed rules, guidance and acceptable practices govern the general obligations of DCMs under the amended 

core principles, including: 

• Financial information and resource requirements; 

• Compliance obligations; 

• Operational capabilities; 

• Surveillance obligations; and 

• Trading and products requirements. 

In addition, the proposed rules, guidance and acceptable practices govern the obligations of DCMs with respect to the trading 

and execution of swaps, in addition to futures and options contracts.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission ♦ Office of Public Affairs ♦ 202-418-5080
<PAGE 13>

                                                                     EXHIBIT 11
<TABLE>
AMERICAN GAMING & ENTERTAINMENT, LTD.
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE


                                         Three Months Ended              Six Months Ended
                                              June 30,                       June 30,
                                         2000            1999            2000           1999
                                         ____            ____            ____           ____
<S>                                <C>             <C>             <C>            <C>
Weighted average number
 of shares for computation         12,561,750      12,532,102      12,547,849     12,532,102
                                   ==========      ==========      ==========     ==========

Net income (loss)                   $(135,000)     $1,413,000       $(271,000)     $(450,000)

Dividends and accretion
on preferred stock                    317,000         467,000         633,000        933,000
                                   __________      __________      __________     ___________

Net income (loss) for common
stockholders                        $(452,000)     $  946,000       $(904,000)   $(1,383,000)
                                    =========      ==========       =========    ===========

Income (loss) for common
stockholders per common
share                                  $(0.04)          $0.08          $(0.07)        $(0.11)
                                    =========      ==========       =========     ==========
</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.4

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Marvel  Enterprises,
Inc. (the  "Company")  for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with
the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on June 30, 2003 (the  "Report"),  I,
Kenneth P. West, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,  that:  (1) the Report  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of
section  13(a) or  15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934;  and (2) the
Information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has
been  provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and  furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                                    /s/
                                                    ---------------------------
                                                    Kenneth P. West
                                                    Chief Financial Officer
                                                    June 30, 2003
H. Res. 1487 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

June 30, 2010. 

Resolved, That the requirement of clause 6(a) of rule 

XIII for a two-thirds vote to consider a report from the Committee on Rules on the same day it is presented to the House 

is waived with respect to any resolution reported through the 

legislative day of July 3, 2010, providing for consideration or 

disposition of any of the following: 

(1) A conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 

4173) to provide for financial regulatory reform, to protect consumers and investors, to enhance Federal understanding of insurance issues, to regulate the over-thecounter derivatives markets, and for other purposes. 

(2) A measure that includes a subject matter addressed by H.R. 4213 or any amendment pertaining 

thereto. 

SEC. 2. It shall be in order at any time through the legislative day of July 3, 2010, for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules. The Speaker or her 

designee shall consult with the Minority Leader or his des-
2 

•HRES 1487 EH 

ignee on the designation of any matter for consideration pursuant to this section. 

SEC. 3. It shall be in order without intervention of any 

point of order to consider concurrent resolutions providing for 

adjournment during the month of July. 

Attest: 

Clerk.