R ule 1 0 o f t he R ules o f

t he C o urt o f

A p p ea l s o f

T en ne ssee p ro vid es: 1

T his C o urt, wit h the c o nc urre nc e o f all jud ge s p arti cip ati ng i n the c ase , m ay aff i rm , rev erse
o r mo d i f y t he act i o ns o f

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r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d O n B ri ef

s N ove m be r 21, 200 7
AN NTION ETTE GRIGG S v. HAR DEM AN CO UN TY COM MU NITY HEAL TH CENT ER, INC.

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Hardem an Coun ty

No. 9499J J. WeberMcC raw, Jud ge

No. W2007-00599-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 19, 2008

The trial c ourt awa

rded Defe ndant/Employ er summary judgme nt in this wrong ful dischar g e ac tion. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Ci r c uitCo ur t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., jo in e d

. W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , J ., not participating

. Te rr y Ab e rn a thy , Se lme r, Te nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Annti on e tte Gr ig g s.
J ames R. Mulroy , I Iand O. John Norri s , I I I , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Ha

rdema n County Communi ty

Hea lth Center, Inc.

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION 1 This appea l arises fr om a wrong ful dischar g e ac tion. The trial cour t awar ded summary judgme nt to Defe ndant Employ er, the Har deman County Communi ty

Hea lth C en t er , Inc. (“ the Center” ), up o n d et er m ining that the Ce nter’s Per sonnel Policy Manual wa s not a contra ct of
em p l o y m en tan d t h atP l ai n t i ff

An n t i o n et t e G ri ggs (Ms. Gr i ggs ) w as an at -w i l l em p l o y ee

. M s

. Gr i ggs appea ls, arguing that the manual is a contract of employ ment and that a genuine issue of mater ial fac t-2-

exis ts as t o whether the C enter ’s di rec tor abused her dis cre tion in failing to g rant P laintiff sick leave without pay

. Ms. Grig g s further asser ts the trial court e rre d by

consideringthe Center’ s “re newe d” motion for summary

judgme nt. We aff

i rm summary

judgme nt in favor of

the Center on othe r g ro un ds

. Stan dard of Revie w
Our standa

rd of r eview of

an aw ard of

s ummary

judgme nt is well-settled. Summary judgme n t i s ap p ro priate only when the movingparty

can de monstrate that ther e ar e no disputed issues of mater ial fac t, a

nd that it is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; By rd v . H all , 8 47 S.W. 2d

20 8, 21 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) . T he pa rt y mov ingfo r s umm ary

jud g me nt m

us t
a ff ir mativ e ly ne g a te an e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t he no nmo vin g pa

rt y ’s c la im, or

c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli sh an af firmative de fense

. McCarley v. W est Quality Food Serv. , 960 S.W .2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998)

. In deter mining whe ther to aw ard summar y judgme nt, the trial court must view the evidenc e in the light mos t favor able to the nonmoving pa rty and dra w all re asonable infere nces in that pa rty ’s favor. Sta ple s v . CB L &As so cs. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000) . The c ourt should awar d summary judgme nt only

when a rea sonable pe rson could re ach only one conc lusion based on the fa cts and the infere nces dr awn f

rom those fa cts. Id. Summary judgme nt is not appropriate if the re is any doubt about whether

a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t exi sts. McCarley , 960 S.W .2d at 588. We revie w an awa rd of summa ry jud g me nt de novo , with no pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss a ff

or de d to the tr ia l c ourt

. Guy v . Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. , 79 S.W .3d 528, 534 (Tenn. 2002)

. Anal y sis

The fa cts rele vant to our ana ly sis of the issues on appea l are undisputed

. M s

. Grig g s was employ ed by

the C enter in the pos ition of Off ice a nd Patient Services Coordinator . On May 4, 1999, Ms. Grig g s underwe nt back surg ery and advised the Center that she would requir e a r ecupe ration period of f

ive to six wee ks. On J une 15, 1999, Ms. G rig g s advised he r super visor, L inda L ovelac e, that sh e wo uld

be un a ble to r e tur

n to wor k th a t da

y a s a nti c ipate d. On

the same da

y , M s. Gr ig g s’ phy sician advised the Center that Ms. G rig g s would be unable to return to wor k until August 4, and that sh e wo uld

be un a ble to a ssume a

re g ula r w or k s c he du le un til Oc tob e r 4 . B y June 28 , 1 99 9, Ms. Grig g s had exhausted all ac crue d sick leave . She did not return to w ork on that day , and she had not applied for

an extended lea

ve of a bsence without pay

as re quired by the Center’ s personne l policy manual. On June 29, Ms. Grig g s was discha rg ed. The rea son supplied f o r h er discharg e on the Center’ s “Separ ation Notice” was: “e mploy ee w as unable to perf orm the duties of her

employ ment.” Th e pa rt ie s d o n ot d isp ute tha

t Ms . G ri g g s w a s una

ble to p e rf

orm h e r e mpl oy

me nt d uti e s b e c a us e of her need f or additional leave.
Ms. G r ig g s f

il e d an a c ti o n a g a in s t th e Ce n te r in th e U n it e d St a te s D is tr ic t Co urt for the Western District of Te nnessee which she voluntar ily non-suited on May

3, 2001. On May

2, 2002, Ms. Grig g s filed an a ction ag ainst the Center a lleg ing that she was wr ong fully discharg ed in vi o lation of the e mploy

ment contra ct create d by the C enter ’s personnel policy manual and in violation of the Tenne ssee Huma

n Rights Act a s codified at T en n essee Code Annotated § 4- 21-101 et seq

.-3-

F oll ow ingthe Ce nte r’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt wi th r e sp e c t to Ms. Gr ig g s’ Human Ri g hts A c t a c t i o n , th e tr i a l c o urt d i s m i s s e d th e c l a i m p ur s u a n tt o a c o n s e n to r d e r

e n t e r e d i nM ay 2 0 0 4

. In J une 2004, the Cente r moved for summary

judgme nt wit h re s p ect to the r emainingwrong ful dis c ha rg e c la im. In it s mo tio n, the Ce nte r a sse rt e d n o c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns hip e xiste d b e tw e e n M s. Grig g s and the Cente r, an d that Ms. Grig g s had bee n an at- will employ ee. T he Center further
asser ted that Ms. Grig g s had been t erminate d for good cause, notwithstandingher at-will status. The trial court denied the Center’ s motion i n Dec ember 2004. Followingfurther discovery , the Center
rene wed its motion for summ ary judgme nt in October 2006. F ollowing a hear ing in January

2007, the trial cour

t awar ded summary

judgme nt in favor of

the Center in F ebrua

ry 2007. We first turn to Ms. Grig g s’ asser tion that t h e t ri al court e rre d by g rantingthe Center’ s motion because neither Te nnessee substantive l aw n o r the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure
rec og nize, permit or sanction a r enew ed mot ion for summary judgme nt. She acc ording ly contends that the trial cour

t erre d by rec onsideringits ini tial denial of the C enter ’s motion where the Center
rene wed its motion a fter deposing its fiscal direc tor, L inda L ovelac e. The Center, on the othe r hand, relies on Slaughter v. Duck River Ele ctric Me mbership Corp. , 102 S.W. 3d 61 2, 61 4- 61 5 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 2002) a

nd Rule 54.02 of t he Tennessee Rules of C ivil Procedur e to support its argument that a trial c ourt’s orde r deny

ing summar

y j u d gm ent is interlocutory in nature a

nd may be modified at any time prior to becoming final. We ag ree with the C enter that the case l aw supports it s position on this iss ue. E.g., Slaughter , 1 02 S.W. 3d a t 61 5; G u es s v . M

au ry , 726 S.W .2d 906, 922 (Tenn. App. 1986).

We n e xt tur

n to the tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e Ce nte r’ s p e rs onne l poli c y manu a l di d not cre ate a

contra ct of employ

ment. I n g ener al, Tenne ssee adher es to the “employ ee- at-will” rule

. W ill iam s v . M

e mp his Ho us ing

Au tho rit y , Nos. 02A0 1 -9608-CV-00190, 02A 01-9610-CV-00231, 1997 WL287645, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 2, 1997)( citing Davis v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. , 743 F. Supp

. 1 2 7 3 , 1 2 8 0 ( M.D. Tenn.1990) ). Unde r this well-established r ule, a c ontrac t for employ

ment for a n indefinite term is consider ed a c ontrac t at-will and ca n be ter m i n at ed b y an employ er or an employ ee at any time a

nd without c ause. Id. (citing Bringle v. Me thodist Hosp. , 701 S.W .2d 622, 625 (Tenn. A

p p .1985); ac cord Grave

s v. Anchor W

ire Corp. , 692 S.W .2d 420, 422 (Tenn. Ap p. 19 85 ); W

hittaker v. Care-M

ore, Inc

. , 6 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d

3 9 5 , 3 9 6 ( T e n n

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 1 ) )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, e mpl oy e e ha

nd bo ok s suc h as the on e a t issu e in t his c a se do no t in

the mse lve s c on sti tut e c on tr a c ts. Se e Ga rd ne r v . U niv e rsi ty of M e mp his , No. W 2002-01417-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 1872640 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) ( no perm. app. filed ). An e x ception arises, however , “whe re a n employ er promulg ates a

n employ ee ha

ndbook which conf

ers c erta in benef

its on employ ees or

which limits t he employ er’ s rig ht to terminate employ ees.” W illiams , 1997 WL287645 , at * 2. In order for the handbook to be e nforc eable as a co n t ra ct, t he spec ific languag e conta ined in it must include an expression of

an intent to be bound. Sm ith v . M orris , 778 S.W .2d 857, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App.1988). Ad dit ion a lly , a

n e mpl oy e r’ s r e se rv a tio n o f t he un ilate ra l r ig ht t o mo dif y the pro vi sio ns of

its employ ee ha

ndbook g ener ally

prec ludes the handbook fr o m beingconsidere d an employ ment contra ct. Ree d v. Alamo Re nt-A-Car, Inc. , 4 S.W. 3d 67 7, 68 8 ( Tenn. Ap p. 19 99 ). Ho we ve r, in
case s where the employ er’ s handbook also includes unequivoca l lang uag e demonstrating its intent to be bound by

the handbook’ s provisions, i t m ay constitute a contra ct notwithstanding the-4-

employ er’ s rese rvation of rights. Id. As we state d in W ill iam s v . M

e mp his Ho us ing

Au tho rit y , “the lang uag e used must be phrase d in binding terms, interpre ted in the context of the entire ha ndbook, and re ad in conjunction with any other re levant mater ial, such as a n employ ment application.” W illiams , 1 9 9 7 W L2 8 7 6 4 5 , at* 2 (q u o t i n g Cla ib o r n e v

. F r ito
- La y , I n c. , 718 F.Supp. 1319, 1321 (E.D. Te nn. 1989)).
Up on re vie w o f t

he re c ord in thi s c a se , h ow e ve r, we do no t be lie ve the dis po sit ion of thi s matte r r e sts on

a de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he pe rs onnel po li c y

manu a l c on sti tut e s a

c on tr a c t. Assuming, arguendo , the manual binds the Center to the policies containe d ther ei n , t h er e is no dispute that Ms. Grig g s exhausted he r available sick leave and failed to a pply for e x tended sick le ave wi tho ut p ay

a s th e ma

nu a l r e qu ir e s. Th e manu a l pr ov ide s: [s] ick leave without pay

may be g rante d at the discre tion of the Direc tor for that pe ri od of t im e be y on d th e tim e c ov e re d b y the e mpl oy e e ’s a c c ru e d s ic k le ave wi th pa y if the ne e ds of

the Cor po ratio n c an b e me t w hil e the e mpl oy e e ’s po sit ion is h e ld open aw aiting the employ ee’ s return to wor k.

. . . . Wil lful or intentional abuse of sick leave policies is gr ounds for dismissal.

T h u s , as s u m i n g extended sick leave without pay is requeste d by

the employ ee, the decision of whether to gr ant ex tended sick leave without pay is within the full discretion of the direc tor, eve n assuming the Center is bound to the proc edure s contained in the ma nual. Ms. Grig g s finally asser

ts the direc tor “abuse d her discr etion” by failingto offer

her e x tended sic k le ave wi tho ut p ay

and by fa ili ngto a dv ise he r o f t his a ltern ati ve. W e dis a g re e . F ir st, it i s undisputed that Ms. G rig g s rec eived a copy of the pe rsonnel policy

manual conta ining the pr ovision fo r s ic k le ave wi tho ut p ay . I f, a s sh e c on te nd s, the manu a l c on sti tut e d a c on tr a c t, s he wa s b ound

to the po lic ie s c on ta ine d th e re in. Se c on d, a s n ote d a bo ve , th e de c isi on

to gra nt su c h le ave wa s w ith in the full discretion of the Director. Third, we find Ms. Grig g s’ asser tion that she was not notified of the possibilit y

of exten d ed leave without pay or the proc edure s by

which to obtain such lea ve somewhat d is in g e nu o u s

. T h e r e c o r d r e f le c ts th a t in 1 9 9 6 , M s

. G r ig g s w a s g r an te d e xte n d e d sick leave without pay

and that she w as disciplined in J une 1996 for violation of the Center’ s sick leave policy . In the J une 1996 wr itten disciplinary letter g iven to Ms. Grig g s by the C enter ’s Executive Direc tor, Mary

Heinzen, M s. Grig g s was advised that she had violated the Center’ s sick leave policy and wa s reminded of

the procedure s for obtaining appr oved and e x tended lea ve. F urther, the letter ref lects that Ms. Grig g s had a history of fa iling to abide by

the Center’ s policies reg arding sick leave

. Th is a rgume nt i s w ith out me ri t.-5- Hol din g
This court may

aff irm a trial cour

t’s awa rd of summary

judgme nt on gr ounds differ ing f rom those which provided the ba sis for the trial c ourt’s dec ision. Hi ll v . La mb e rth , 73 S.W .3d 131, 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). I n light of the fore g oing, w e affirm the trial c ourt’s aw ard of summary judgme nt to Appellee Ha rdema n County Communi ty Hea lth Center. Costs of this appeal ar e taxed t o th e Ap p e l l an t , A n n t i o n e t t e G r i g g s , an d h e r s ur e ty, f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE