United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 1, 2018*

Decided February 1, 2018 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 17-1745 

LASHAWN N. LOFTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SP PLUS CORP., f/k/a STANDARD 

PARKING CORPORATION and 

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 727, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 12 C 5716 

Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Lashawn Lofton seeks to reopen her case more than two years after we affirmed 

its dismissal as a sanction for lying on her application to proceed in forma pauperis. The 

district judge denied Lofton’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(b), and then denied her motion to reconsider that decision. We 

affirm. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-1745 Page 2 

In 2012 Lofton, a parking garage attendant, sued her former employer, SP Plus 

Corporation, and her local union. The Second Amended Complaint, filed by Lofton’s 

recruited counsel, claimed that SP Plus discriminated against her based upon her 

disability (the effects of prior strokes), discharged her in retaliation for reporting 

suspected theft, and was responsible for a battery or assault she suffered at the hands of 

a supervisor. Lofton also claimed that Teamsters Local 727 breached its duty of fair 

representation in the grievance process after SP Plus fired her. 

SP Plus moved to dismiss Lofton’s complaint because, among other things, 

Lofton had omitted income, personal property, and real estate from her successful 

application to proceed in forma pauperis. The district judge granted the motion on that 

basis and dismissed the case with prejudice. We affirmed the sanction in October 2014. 

Lofton v. SP Plus Corp., 578 F. App’x. 603, 604 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Thomas v. Gen. 

Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306–08 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

In 2016 Lofton moved to reopen her case, to proceed in forma pauperis, and for 

recruited counsel. In her motion, Lofton said only: “I am [a] disabled person asking this 

court[] to have mercy for me.” Judge Darrah granted all three motions without 

explanation. One month later, the case was reassigned to Judge Pallmeyer, who vacated 

the order granting reinstatement because Lofton’s motion had not mentioned any of the 

“narrow circumstances” covered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)—the only 

vehicle for reopening her case. Judge Pallmeyer then denied Lofton’s motion to 

reconsider, which was filed by her recruited attorney. Lofton appeals both rulings. 

Lofton, now pro se, wants another bite at the apple—that much is clear. But her 

brief is patently inadequate. On the first page she declares that she had illnesses, and on 

the last page she asks us “for mercy.” In between, she does not address the district 

judge’s reasoning or make any cogent legal argument; she largely discusses issues 

related to her disability and her loss of pension benefits. We would be well within our 

rights to dismiss Lofton’s appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8). 

See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Addressing the merits of the appeal does not help Lofton. District judges have 

“‘discretion piled on discretion’” when making a Rule 60(b) decision. Bakery Mach. & 

Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 1996)). Although a movant is required to 

specify which Rule 60(b) ground justifies relief, Lofton simply said that she had a 

disability. See Talano v. Nw. Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001). 
No. 17-1745 Page 3 

Because she failed to make a discernible argument, the judge had reason enough to 

deny her motion. See Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011). 

In any case, no Rule 60(b) ground justifies relief. If, as the judge thought, Rule 

60(b)(1) (“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”) was the most 

applicable subsection, Lofton missed the one-year jurisdictional deadline. FED. R. CIV.

P. 60(c)(1); see Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2006). And Lofton did not 

argue that her health setbacks amounted to “extraordinary circumstances” under the 

catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6). See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Lofton’s 

recruited attorney filed the motion to reconsider in which he discussed only whether an 

amended complaint would be timely—but that is not a relevant Rule 60(b) argument. 

Lofton’s remaining appellate contentions fail. She rehashes her original claims, 

which is inappropriate at this stage. See Swaim, 73 F.3d at 722 (“we review only the Rule 

60(b) decision itself for an abuse of discretion and will not visit the merits of the 

underlying ... judgment.”). And she alludes to other claims that were never brought 

before the district judge; those claims are waived. See Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 

855 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

AFFIRMED.