J. S36031/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B.H., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: P.A.H., MOTHER : No. 2558 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree, July 13, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at No. CP-51-AP-0000574-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED August 4, 2017

P.A.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated and entered July 13, 

2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting the 

petition of the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor, dependent 

child, M.B.H. (the “Child”), a female born in December of 2011, pursuant to 

the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

1, 2

 After 

review, we affirm.

 

1 By separate decrees entered the same date, the trial court additionally 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, C.H. (“Father”), 

and Unknown Father. An appeal has not been filed by Father or any 

unknown father, nor is Father or any unknown father a party to the instant 

appeal.

2 Upon review, the trial court additionally entered a separate order changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption. As Mother does not appeal this order, 

any such claims related thereto are not preserved. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) 

(a notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order 

from which the appeal is taken). Moreover, any such opposition would be 
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The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and/or factual 

history, in part, as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

On September 9, 2013, M.B.H. received a 

pulmonary examination at the Children’s Hospital of 

Philadelphia (“CHOP”). Thereafter, on 

September 10, 2013, Mother took M.B.H. to the 

CHOP Emergency Room after M.B.H. suffered burns 

to her left arm, left leg, and chest. Rita Himes, a 

CHOP [t]riage [n]urse, stated that Mother stated to 

her that M.B.H. had seven hours earlier been lying in 

bed at the home and had pulled the cord of a clothes 

iron, causing the iron to fall on M.B.H. Mother stated 

to Ms. Himes that the burns were caused by the iron 

falling on M.B.H. and that Mother had treated the 

burns with cold water and butter; that initially that 

M.B.H.’s skin blistered and that the blisters had 

broken. During this emergency room visit, it was 

determined that M.B.H. suffered from partial 

thickness burns upon M.B.H.’s left interior arm, the 

left interior leg, and the left side of the chest 

measuring two to seven inches. On September 13, 

2013, [DHS] received an Emergency General 

Protective Services Report (“EGPS”) alleging that 

M.B.H.’s weight and height were in the zero 

percentile for her age and that during M.B.H.’s 

 

waived as Mother failed to raise the issue in both her concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal and the statement of questions involved 

section of her brief, and failed to present argument related thereto in her 

brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 

797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising 

them both in the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and 

statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a 

waiver of those issues); In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 

2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011), quoting In re A.C., 991 

A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide 

any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to 

develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that 

claim is waived.”).
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pulmonary examination that M.B.H. appeared 

malnourished.

On September 18, 2013, DHS contacted CHOP 

by telephone and learned that Mother had failed to 

keep M.B.H.’s follow-up appointment and that CHOP 

physicians had determined M.B.H.’s burns were likely 

caused by child abuse and that there were concerns 

that M.B.H. was malnourished. DHS attempted to 

contact Mother on her phone on September 20, 2013 

and September 21, 2013 but Mother was 

unresponsive. On September 23, 2013, CHOP asked 

DHS to contact Mother to schedule an immediate 

medical examination of M.B.H. because Mother had 

failed to take M.B.H. to a scheduled September 22, 

2013 appointment at CHOP and that Mother had not 

responded to any phone calls from CHOP.

On September 23, 2013, DHS contacted 

Mother and asked if Mother had taken M.B.H. for her 

appointment at CHOP and Mother responded that 

M.B.H. did not need a medical examination. After 

determining from M.B.H.’s pediatrician[] that Mother 

was not ensuring consistent well-child examinations 

for M.B.H.[,] DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (“OPC”) for M.B.H. and on that same day 

DHS went to CHOP to take M.B.H. from Mother’s 

custody.

On September 23, 2013, M.B.H. was placed in 

a foster home and a Shelter Care Hearing occurred 

on September 25, 2013, where the OTC was lifted 

and the temporary commitment to DHS was ordered 

to stand. At the Adjudicatory Hearing held before 

the Honorable Judge Jonathan Q. Irvine on 

October 2, 2013, M.B.H. was adjudicated dependent. 

The [c]ourt referred commitment to DHS. The 

[c]ourt referred the Mother to ARC [Achieving 

Reunification Center] for [p]arenting and [a]nger 

[m]anagement. The [c]ourt further ordered that 

there be one hour supervised visits at the agency.

The initial Family Service Plan (“FSP”) meeting 

was held on December 16, 2013. The parental 
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objectives were that (1) Mother would set age 

appropriate expectations; (2) Mother would 

participate in mental health evaluations; (3) Mother 

would keep all visits and maintain regular contact 

with M.B.H. and (4) Mother would locate and occupy 

suitable housing for M.B.H. At the subsequent 

Permanency Review Hearing on December 18, 2013, 

Mother was (1) referred to Behavioral Health System 

(“BHS”) for consultation; (2) to attend anger 

management classes and (3) receive the BHS 

evaluation and parenting class though the Parent 

Action Network (“PAN”).

On June 19, 2014, a Permanency Review 

Hearing was held and the [c]ourt ordered (1) that 

M.B.H. remain committed; (2) DHS would follow up 

with ARC about parenting classes for Mother; and 

(3) Mother would sign releases at the Community 

Council Health Systems. At the next Permanency 

Review Hearing on September 3, 2014, the [c]ourt 

ordered (1) that Mother be referred to BHS for 

monitoring and (2) Mother sign releases at the 

Community Council.

A second FSP was created on September 30, 

2014, and the parental objectives for Mother were 

that Mother (1) set age appropriate expectations; 

(2) participate in mental health evaluation and follow 

treatment recommendations; (3) maintain all visits 

and regular contact with M.B.H.; (4) comply with 

objectives and court orders and (5) locate [] suitable 

housing for the family. At the subsequent 

Permanency Review Hearing on December 3, 2014 

the [c]ourt determined that there had been minimal 

compliance with the permanency plan by Mother and 

Mother was (1) re-referred for anger management; 

(2) referred to a comprehensive biopsychological 

evaluation[3] at [sic] [p]arenting [c]apacity 

[e]valuation (“PCE”); (3) Mother was to sign a 

release; and (4) DHS would refer Mother for 

therapeutic visits.

 

3 The order in question refers to this evaluation as a comprehensive 

biopsychosocial evaluation. (See DHS Exhibit 2 at 17-19.)
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On January 6, 2015, Mother participated in a 

comprehensive biopsychological evaluation which 

stated that Mother had clearly defined narcissistic 

personality traits and that the Mother’s anger and 

apparently transient depressive symptoms merited 

intervention so as not to further complicate attempts 

to reunify mother and child. Thereafter a 

Permanency Review Hearing was held on March 9, 

2015 and the court determined that Mother (1) had 

completed her biopsychological examination; 

(2) Mother was engaged through [sic] therapy 

through the Community Council Health Systems; and 

(3) the DHS was to make referral housing for 

Mother.

At a Permanency Review Hearing on June 10, 

2015 held before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine, 

the [c]ourt determined that Mother (1) had 

completed anger management classes and was 

attending mental health treatment consistently; 

(2) was working full time; (3) Mother was referred to 

CEU for a drug screen and dual diagnosis plus three 

random drug screens prior to the next court date.[4]

At the Permanency Review Hearing on 

October 7, 2015 held before the Honorable Judge 

Irvine, the [c]ourt determined that Mother (1) the 

mother [sic] be referred to CEU for assessment, dual 

diagnosis, monitoring and three random drug 

screens prior to the next court date.[5] At the 

Permanency Review Hearing on February 17, 2016, 

held before the Honorable Judge Irvine, the [c]ourt 

again determined that Mother (1) the mother [sic] 

be referred to CEU for assessment, dual diagnosis, 

monitoring and three random drug screens prior to 

the next court date.

 

4 Mother was additionally referred for monitoring on this date. (DHS 

Exhibit 2 at 21-22.)

5 Review of the record reveals that Mother was only referred for drug 

screening on this date. (Id. at 22-24.)
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By June of 2016, M.B.H. had not resided with 

her mother for three (3) years. Mother had become 

noncompliant with visitations and court ordered CEU 

screens. Mother did not show up to any CEU 

appointments in 2016. Mother was asked to comply 

with random screening on April 19, 2016 but did not 

show up. Interactions between Mother and DHS 

[s]taff had continued to be acrimonious and hostile 

as a result of Mother’s uncontrollable anger. DHS 

reported that between M.B.H. and her caregiver 

there existed a strong bond and that the caregiver 

wanted to adopt M.B.H. and no such bond existed 

between Mother and M.B.H.

Trial court opinion, 9/7/16 at 2-6 (unpaginated; citations to record omitted).

On June 24, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights and for a goal change. Thereafter, the trial court conducted 

a combined termination and goal change hearing on July 13, 2016. In 

support of its petitions, DHS presented the testimony of DHS social worker, 

Jennifer Koslosky, and APM (Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha) foster 

case manager, Delores Englero. Mother additionally testified on her own 

behalf. Likewise, Father was present and testified on his own behalf. 

By decree dated and entered July 13, 2016, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child.6, 7 On August 11, 2016, Mother 

 

6 The trial court announced its decision, memorialized by subsequent decree, 

on the record on July 13, 2016.

7 The Child Advocate, Tara Amoroso, Esq., argued in support of the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 70-71. We note here that in 

a divided decision our supreme court recently held in In re Adoption of 

L.B.M., 2017 WL2257203 (Pa. 2017), that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) requires a 

trial court to appoint counsel for a child in contested involuntary termination 

of parental rights proceedings and the failure to do so is structural and can 
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filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).8

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible 

error when it involuntarily terminated Mother’s 

parental rights where such determination was 

not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the Adoption Act[,] 

 

never be harmless. The decision was originally filed on March 28, 2017, but 

was corrected and replaced on May 23, 2017. Authoring Justice Wecht, 

joined by Justices Donohue and Dougherty, sought to hold that a trial court 

is required to appoint separate, independent counsel to represent a child’s 

legal interests even when the guardian ad litem is an attorney. However, 

Chief Justice Saylor, and Justices Baer, Todd, and Mundy, disagreed in 

different concurring and dissenting opinions with that part of the lead 

opinion’s holding. Specifically, while the other justices agreed that the 

appointment of counsel for the child is required in all involuntary termination 

proceedings and that the failure to do so by the trial court is structural error, 

they did not join that part of Justice Wecht’s opinion which sought to hold 

that the guardian ad litem may never serve as counsel for the child. 

Rather, such separate representation would be required only if the best 

interests and legal interests were somehow in conflict. Herein, Mother did 

not raise before the trial court any concerns which would have created a 

need to appoint independent counsel to advocate for Child, nor does she 

make any claims on appeal that the Child Advocate, Attorney Amoroso, did 

not properly represent the Child’s legal and best interests due to a conflict of 

interest. Indeed, in this case, Attorney Amoroso zealously represented 

Child.

8 Notably, Mother filed her notice of appeal and concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pro se. Subsequent to the dismissal and 

reinstatement of Mother’s appeal in relation to her Pa.R.A.P. 3517 docketing 

statement, as Mother was still represented by appointed counsel, by order 

dated December 6, 2016, this court remanded the matter to the trial court 

to determine whether counsel had abandoned Mother and take further action 

as necessary to protect Mother’s appellate rights. By order dated 

February 7, 2017, referencing counsel’s filing of a docketing statement on 

behalf of Mother, the trial court determined that counsel had not abandoned 

Mother.
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23 Pa.[C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)] 

as [M]other had completed her FSP goals, 

namely the [p]arenting [c]apacity [e]valuation 

(“PCE”), compliance with ARC, anger 

management, and mental health services, and 

was working full time?

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible 

error when it involuntarily terminated 

[M]other’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the 

termination would have on the developmental 

physical and emotional needs of the child as 

required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b)]?

Mother’s brief at 4.

9

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

 

9 We observe that, in her brief, Mother stated her issues on appeal 

somewhat differently from her Rule 1925(b) statement filed with her notice 

of appeal. We, nevertheless, find that Mother has preserved challenges to 

the trial court’s termination of her parental rights pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). To the extent Mother addresses 

Subsection (b) in her brief, however, Mother waived any contest under this 

subsection as she failed to raise it in her Rule 1925(b) statement. See 

Krebs, 893 A.2d at 797 (stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising 

them both in the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and 

statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a 

waiver of those issues). See also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 2017 WL 2153892 

(Pa.Super. May 17, 2017) (holding that the appellant waived her challenge 

to Section 2511(b) by failing to include it in her concise statement and 

statement of question involved). Nevertheless, in light of the requisite 

bifurcated analysis, we review this issue below and determine that, had 

Mother preserved this issue, we would have found it lacked merit.
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2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should 

not be reversed merely because the record would 

support a different result. Id. at 827. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts 

that often have first-hand observations of the parties 

spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 

A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis 

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the 

child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 
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determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). In 

this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long 

held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as 

well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant 

to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .
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(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 
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abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 

(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002).

Instantly, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2), as well as (a)(1), (5), and (8), the trial court reasoned 

as follows: 

The record demonstrates Mother’s ongoing 

unwillingness to provide care or control for M.B.H. or 

perform any parental duties and her failure to 

remedy the conditions that brought the child into 

care. The documents and testimony discussed below 

provided this [c]ourt clear and convincing evidence 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be 

in the best interests of M.B.H.

Mother’s FSP [o]bjectives were established on 

December 17, 2013 and later modified on 

September 30, 2014. Pursuant to the FSP 

[o]bjectives and [c]ourt orders, Mother was ordered 

to maintain all visits and regular contact with M.B.H.; 

Mother would participate in an evaluation for drugs 

and alcohol; and Mother would sign releases to allow 

DHS to receive documentation to determine Mother’s 

compliance with mental health treatments. The 

record shows that [] Mother has not complied with 

the [c]ourt [o]rders and FSP [o]bjectives.
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Mother failed to comply with FSP [o]bjectives 

to maintain all visits and regular contact with M.B.H. 

Mother had never had unsupervised visits with 

M.B.H. Mother visits with M.B.H. were sporadic and 

infrequent. Routinely, Mother would call and confirm 

a visitation date and then M.B.H. would be taken to 

the agency and Mother would cancel in the last 

minute or not show up, which affected M.B.H. In 

2016, [DHS] scheduled appointments for Mother to 

visit M.B.H. on January 7, the 14th, the 21st, the 28th, 

February 4th and February 11th[,] but Mother only 

visited M.B.H. on January 28th. Thereafter, Mother 

did not visit M.B.H. until March 17, 2016[,] followed 

by a final visit on June 16, 2016. Mother also failed 

to comply with FSP objectives and/or [c]ourt orders 

by failing to execute releases to allow DHS to obtain 

mental health and alcohol reports and to partake in 

drug and alcohol testing.

Based upon the testimony elicited at the 

Termination Hearing as well as the documents in 

evidence, this Court found clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.[C.S.A. § (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)] 

as Mother had failed to remedy the conditions that 

brought the child into care based upon her 

unwillingness to visit M.B.H.; cooperate with DHS as 

to drug and alcohol testing; her refusal [sic] 

releases; and Mother’s lack of interest in M.B.H.’s 

medical treatment. Furthermore, Mother[’s] refusal 

to cooperate and utilize DHS services demonstrated 

that Mother could not remedy the conditions that 

had led to M.B.H. being adjudicated dependent and 

placed in foster care in 2013 within a reasonable 

period of time.

Trial court opinion, 9/7/16 at 8-10 (unpaginated; citations to record omitted; 

footnote omitted).

Mother, however, argues that she endeavored to create and/or 

maintain a relationship with Child as evidenced by her efforts at compliance 
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with her FSP objectives. (Mother’s brief at 7-8.) Mother highlights her 

participation in mental health treatment, completion of parenting classes and 

anger management, presentation for CEU screenings in June and July 2015, 

as well as her securing of employment and housing.10 (Id. at 8.) Further, 

through such efforts Mother asserts that she “exhibited she was eradicating 

any repeated neglect that caused [Child] to be placed in foster care.” (Id.

at 8.) Mother states, “To the best of her ability, Mother showed that the 

causes that brought the child in question into care could indeed be 

remedied.” (Id.) We disagree. 

A review of the record supports the trial court’s determination of a 

basis for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother failed to complete 

her established FSP objectives. DHS social worker, Jennifer Koslosky, 

recounted Mother’s FSP objectives as follows:

The objectives for mother are that she will 

participate in individual counseling, she will keep all 

supervised visits and maintain all contact with the 

child, she will participate in a parenting capacity 

evaluation at ATA [Assessment & Treatment 

Alternatives] and comply with the recommendations 

made from that evaluation, she will participate in an 

evaluation for drug and alcohol assessment at CEU, 

she will comply with any recommendations made by 

CEU. Mother will sign authorization forms to allow 

DHS to obtain copies of her mental health and drug 

and alcohol reports. Mother will achieve and 

maintain sobriety and will not abuse illegal drugs. 

Mother will comply with the court order. Mother will 

locate and occupy suitable housing. 

 

10 Mother incorrectly references 2016.
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Notes of testimony, 7/13/16 at 28-29. Pursuant to court order, Mother was 

also referred for parenting classes and anger management, as well as 

random drug screens. (See DHS Exhibit 2.) Significantly, Ms. Koslosky 

expressed her belief that Mother had not completed and complied with her 

FSP objectives to move forward with reunification. (Notes of testimony, 

7/13/16 at 34.) Mother completed the parenting capacity evaluation, 

parenting classes, and anger management. (Id. at 42-44, 50.) However, 

while Mother completed parenting and anger management,11 there was 

evidence that neither were effective. Foster case manager, Delores Englero, 

observed no improvement in parenting, despite completion of parenting 

classes, and noted concern for Mother’s behavior towards others, noting, for 

example, Mother’s yelling and use of profanity, and verbal aggression. (Id.

at 56-57, 59-61.) Further, although Mother had obtained housing in a 

Shelter Care Plus program, her housing had yet to be assessed by DHS due 

to her lack of cooperation and contact with DHS. (Id. at 31-32, 50.) 

 

11 Ms. Koslosky testified that there was no certificate as to completion of 

anger management in the file. (Id. at 42-44.) However, Ms. Koslosky 

indicates the parenting capacity evaluation reflects completion, as does the 

court record. (Id.; DHS Exhibit 2 at 20-22.)
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Moreover, as reported by Ms. Englero, this housing was not stable as it was 

“contingent” on reunification with Child.12 (Id. at 61.)

In addition, although Mother previously attended therapy at ARC, 

provided through Community Council (id. at 29), no evidence was offered 

establishing compliance with mental health treatment.13 (Id. at 29-30, 50.) 

Similarly, no evidence was offered establishing compliance with drug and 

alcohol treatment. (Id. at 30-31, 50, 62.) As testified by Ms. Koslosky, 

Mother failed to report to CEU in 2016. (Id. at 30.) Mother, therefore, last 

submitted to screening in June and July 2015. (Id. at 48.) Critically, 

Ms. Koslosky stated she was unable to send Mother for screening due to 

Mother’s unresponsiveness. (Id. at 42.) Moreover, DHS was unable to 

acquire signed releases in order to obtain documentation to determine 

Mother’s compliance due to Mother’s lack of cooperation and contact. (Id.

at 29-31, 47-48.)

Lastly, Mother’s visitation with Child remained supervised until 

suspended in June 2016. (Id. at 51.) Notably, Mother’s visitation, after 

commencing as supervised on a weekly basis at the foster care agency, was 

 

12 As testified by Ms. Koslosky, “in order to obtain housing through Shelter 

Care Plus, [Mother] would need either have to have a drug and alcohol 

addiction or mental health Axis 1 diagnosis.” (Notes of testimony, 7/13/16 

at 31-32.) Ms. Englero indicated that the social worker she spoke with 

regarding Mother’s housing program did not, however, report any 

requirements related to sobriety or enrollment in a mental health program. 

(Id. at 62).

13 Mother had a history of depression and anxiety. (Id. at 32.)
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altered to therapeutic visitation at ATA from February through March of 

2015.14 (Id. at 52.) Ms. Englero, who supervised the visitation at the 

agency (id. at 33), recounted that Mother’s visitation subsequently became 

inconsistent and was eventually changed to biweekly in February 2016. (Id.

at 51-52, 59, 66.) After Mother’s last visit with Child in June 2016,15

Mother’s visitation was suspended by the trial court due to a negative impact 

on Child, including self-induced vomiting resulting in weight loss, enuresis, 

and encopresis.16 (Id. at 36, 54-55; DHS Exhibit 3.) Consultation with 

Child’s therapist from Northeast Treatment Centers (“NET”) Behavioral 

Health & Social Services yielded support for suspended visitation. (Id. at 

40-41; Child Advocate Exhibit 1.) Director of OP and Specialized Services, 

Harry Allen, noted in part, “past parental contacts have resulted in a 

significant increase in problematic behaviors in the home, refusal to eat, 

sleep difficulties, and difficulty with emotional regulation.” (Child Advocate 

Exhibit 1.)

 

14 As testified by Ms. Englero, Mother was referred for therapeutic visitation 

due to the focus on the telephone during Mother’s visits with Child. (Id. at 

58-59, 66-67.)

15 We observe that there was a three-month gap in visitation prior to this 

visit. (Id. at 36, 54.)

16 Mother’s visitation was suspended by agreement of DHS and the child 

advocate pending the goal change/termination hearing. Counsel for Mother 

had no position. (DHS Exhibit 3.) Significantly, Mother did not appreciate 

the connection between visitation and Child’s behavior/health. Mother’s 

reaction to the suspension of her visitation and reasoning was “‘what does 

that have to do with me?’” (Notes of testimony, 7/13/16 at 56.)
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As this court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 

of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion 

that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

has caused Child to be without essential parental control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this 

situation. See id. As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of 

parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under 

Section 2511(b), and we, therefore, need not address any further 

subsections of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

We next determine whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b). Our supreme court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 
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requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed 

below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on 

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are 

in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the 

bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court 

observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we 

have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts 
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fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” 

Id.

Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster 

parent. . . . 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33 

A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored 

Child’s needs and welfare, the court concluded:

The [c]ourt further found that because there 

was not a strong bond between Mother and M.B.H., 

terminating parental rights would not cause the 

child[] irreparable harm and would be in the best 

interest of the child pursuant to 23 [Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b)].

At the Termination Hearing, the DHS Social 

Worker testified that the child had developed a 

strong bond with the caregivers since being in care. 

The DHS worker testified:

She’s (M.B.H.) in a wonderful foster 

home. They’re-she is very bonded with 

her foster parents, they love her deeply. 

They would love to adopt her. She’s 
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been there almost three years. The 

foster parents are who she knows as her 

mother and father. They’re the people 

that take care of her each day.

M.B.H. is very well bonded with the 

foster mother and father. She’s also 

bonded with the foster children in the 

home, the foster siblings. M.B.H. refers 

to P.A.H. as her other mother, and she 

says she does not want to go see her 

other mother, she only wants to stay in 

this house (the foster home). 

The DHS worker testified that there was a 

degree of a disconnect between M.B.H. and Mother 

during Mother’s visits:

Mom would pass M.B.H. the phone to 

play with it or call someone and have 

M.B.H. talk to them. It was -- I think 

there was just a handful of times where 

mom brought healthy snacks that were 

allowed to M.B.H. and actually sat there 

and interacted. It was more based 

around the phone.

At the Termination Hearing, the DHS worker 

testified that M.B.H. would not suffer irreparable 

harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, 

that the change of adoption would be in [C]hild’s 

best interests. The testimony of the DHS Worker 

was deemed to be credible and accorded great 

weight. As the testimony before this [c]ourt on 

July 13, 2016 indicates, the evidence is clear and 

convincing that Mother did not remedy the conditions 

that caused her child to come into care and thus has 

been and continues to be unable to provide proper 

care for her child, warranting involuntary termination 

of the [m]other’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 [Pa.C.S.A. § (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)]. This 

[c]ourt further concluded that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interest 

of M.B.H.
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Trial court opinion, 9/7/16 at 10-11 (unpaginated; citations to record 

omitted).

Mother, however, maintains that there continued to be a bond 

between her and Child. (Mother’s brief at 12.) She further points to the 

trial court’s reliance on non-expert testimony. (Id.) Mother argues that, 

prior to the termination of her parental rights, the trial court “should have 

considered the bond between her and the child as it affects and impacts the 

needs and welfare of the child.” (Id.) Again, we disagree.

Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare favor termination 

of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was 

sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to make a determination of Child’s 

needs and welfare, and as to the existence of a bond between Mother and 

Child that, if severed, would not have a detrimental impact on her.

Noting Mother’s lack of knowledge and ability to address Child’s 

medical conditions and needs,17 Ms. Koslosky explained that Mother was not 

in a position to care for child on full-time basis. (Notes of testimony, 

7/13/16 at 32.) She further indicated that Mother could not safely take 

 

17 Child “attends therapy sessions at [t]he NET. She also sees a few 

specialists at Saint Christopher’s. She’s monitored by the growth clinic 

because when she was initially placed with DHS, she was at a zero percentile 

for weight and height.” (Notes of testimony, 7/13/16 at 5.) Child takes 

approximately six medications in the morning and six medications at night, 

suffering from asthma, acid reflux, and failure to thrive. (Id. at 12.)
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Child home and care for her. (Id. at 36.) By way of explanation, 

Ms. Koslosky referenced Mother’s lack of concern and/or inquiry regarding 

Child and her medical condition after the last visit. (Id.)

Likewise, Ms. Englero expressed concerns as to Mother’s ability to 

parent Child, noting Mother’s visitation with Child never progressed beyond 

supervised, as well as Mother’s failure to appreciate the impact of visitation 

on Child. (Id. at 56.) Further, while acknowledging Mother completed 

parenting classes, Ms. Englero observed no improvement. (Id.) She 

highlighted Mother’s inconsistency regarding visitation with Child (id. at 56),

as well as continuing concerns regarding Mother’s behavior toward others. 

(Id. at 57.) 

As indicated above, Mother’s visitation with Child was inconsistent and 

had a negative impact on Child, both physically and emotionally. In 

addition, as relayed by Ms. Englero, Child did not want to see Mother. 

Ms. Englero testified that upon being informed of the suspension of 

visitation, Child stated, “I don’t want to see the other mommy [Mother]. I 

want to stay here with this mommy [Foster Mother].” (Id. at 63-64.)

Moreover, and more importantly, Child is in a pre-adoptive home 

where she has resided since being removed from Mother. Child has formed 

a positive relationship with her foster family and desires to remain with her 

foster family. As described by Ms. Koslosky, “She’s in a wonderful foster 

home. They’re -- she is very bonded with her foster parents, they love her 
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dearly. They would love to adopt her. She’s been there almost three years. 

The foster parents are who she knows as her mother and father. They’re 

the people that take care of her each day.” (Id. at 34.) Similarly, 

Ms. Englero offered, “[Child] is very well bonded with the foster mother and 

foster father. She’s also bonded with the foster children in the home, the 

foster siblings. [Child] refers to [Mother] as her other mother, and she says 

she does not want to go see her other mother. She only wants to stay in 

this house.” (Id. at 56.) As such, both opined that it was in Child’s best 

interest for the goal to be changed to adoption and that Child would not 

suffer any irreparable harm as a result of terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. (Id. at 34, 55.)

Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Mother’s parental 

rights serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare. While Mother may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of 

love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental 

rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life “simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s 

basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to 

have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, 
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healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2017