### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 1, 200 4 S es sio n GARY DEWAYNE FI NN v. MARY LOUI SE SUMME R BUNDY

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Sumner County No. 96D-216 TomE. Gr ay, Chancellor

No. M2003- 01368-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Fe bruary 22, 2005
This appea l involves enforc ement of a divorce decr ee incorporating a marital dissolution agr eeme nt a ndtheob lig a tio n o f a

pa re nt t o s up po rt

a c hil d b e y on d th e c hil d’ s ma jority in c e rt a in c ir c ums ta nc e s. The trial c ourt determined that the forme r husband’ s alimony obli gat i o n had terminated upon the p a ym e n to f

t h e e n t i r e a m o u n to f

a l i m o n y in solido c r e a t e d i n t h e o r d e r a n d M D A

. T h e c o ur t a lso held that the father had a continuing obl igation to support his adult son because the son wa s disabled. We a ff irm bo th h old ing s. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN , and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.
M

. A l l e n E h m l i n g , G a l l a t i n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t , M ar y L o u i s e S u m m e r B u n d y. Clark L ee Shaw , for the a ppellee, G ary

Deway ne F inn.
OP IN ION These pa rties wer e divorc ed by o rd er en t er ed September 11, 1996, and the f

inal decr ee approve d and incor

porate d a marital dissolut ion ag ree ment. The wifewas g iven custody of the parties’ two minor children, and the husband was order ed to pay child support

. T h e i n s t ant pr oc e e din g s b e g a n wi th the Se pte mbe r 24 , 20 02 , f ili ng by Mr . F innof

a pe tit ionto t e rm inate c hil d su pp ort a nda lim on y

a ndwa s c on c lud e d w iththetria l c ou rt ’s fi na l or de r e nte re d May 5, 20 03 . M s. Bu n d y , t h e fo rmer w ife, a ppeals the tria l court’s termination of alimony . Mr. Finn, the f ormer hu sb a nd , a

pp e a ls the c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng that hemus t c on tin ue to pay su pp ort f or thepa rt ie s’ a du lt dis able d c hil d. We b e g in w iththeiss ue of c hil d s up po rt

.T he amo un t i s not at i s s ue. 1
-2- I. C HI L D S UP P ORT
I n his petition, Mr. Finn alleg ed that both of the pa rties’ c hildren had r ea ch ed t h e ag e of e ig hte e n a ndg ra du a te d f

ro m hi g h sc ho ol a nd , a s a re su lt, he sh ou ld be re lie ve d of his ob lig a tio n to pay child support. Thereis no dispute that the parties’ olde r child, Mary Ann, born Mar ch 19, 1982, had re ache d the ag e of ma jority , g raduated from hig h school, and wa s marrie d at t he time of the hearing. T he trial c ourt held that Mr. F inn’s obligation to pay support for this c hild ha d terminated. No ap p ea l i s t ak en fr o mt h i s h o l d i n g. The pa rties’ y oung er child, Gary Deway ne Finn I I , was born Aug ust 23, 1983; thus, he turned eig hteen in Aug ust of 2001. Mr. Finn a lleg ed thi s child had gra duated from high sc hool in May of 2002 and aske d to be re lieved of c hild support retroac tive to that date.
Ms. B undy

responde d that the parties’ son Dew ayne wa s disabled, unable to c are for himself, c on ti nu ed to l ivewi th andwa s d e pe nd e nt u po n h is m oth e r, a nd , c on se qu e ntl y , th e ne e d f or c hil d support was c ontinuing. She alleg ed that Deway ne wa s entitled to continuing support fr om his father pursuant to Tenn. Code An n . § 3 6 -5 -101(p) and aske d the court to set an appropriate amount of support for De wayne. Af te r the he ari ng , th e tria l c ou rt fo un d th a t th e pa

rt ie s’ so n w a s a

me nta lly c ha lle ng e d a du lt whom both parties had an obligation to suppor t b ey o nd ag e eig hteen. The court set the f ather ’s mon thl y su pp ort obli g a tio n at $33 1. 80 pe r mon th. On app e a l Mr. F inn c on c e de s tha t his son ha s a 1 phy sical or mental i mpairment t hat s ubstantially limit s one or more major life a ctivity . Howeve r, he arg ue s tha t De way ne is not so se ve re ly dis able d as to re qu ir e the fathe r t o p a y su pp ort f or a n in de fi nit e future.
Mr. Finn’ s argu ment is based on the diff ere nce be tween the two provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( p): (p)( 1) Except as provided in subdivision (p)(2) , the court may continue child support bey ond a child’s minority for the be nefit of a child who is handica pped or disable d, as def ined by the Americans with Disabilities Act, until suc h child rea ches twe nty -one (21) y ear s of ag e. (2) Provided, that such ag e limitation shall notapply if such child is sever ely

disabled a ndliv ing un de r the c are a nd su pe rv isi on of a pa re nt andthec ou rt

de te rm ine s th a t it is in the child’s best interest to re main under suc h car e and supe rvision and the oblig or is financially

able to continue to pay

child support. I n such ca ses, t h e co urt maySub sect i o n (3) pro vi d es t hat t he co urt m ay use t he chi l d s up p o rt gui d el i nes i n set t i ng the am o unt o f co nt i nui ng 2

su p p o rt.
T he A meri can s wi t h D i s ab i l i t i es A ct def i nes di s abi l i t y , i n par t , as a phy s i cal or ment al i mp ai r ment t hat 3 subst ant i al l y l i m i t s o ne o r mo re of t he m ajo r l i fe act i vi t i es of an i nd i vi d ual

. 42 U

. S.C

. § 1 2 1 0 2 (2).
M r . F i nn arg ues t hat any o bl i gat i on under t hat sec t i on wo ul d hav e e xpi r ed becau s e D eway ne was born M ar ch 4 1 9 , 1 9 8 2

. T h a t d a te is the d a te g ive n fo r the d a u g h te r’s b irth in M r. F inn ’s m o d ifi c a tio n p e tit io n . D e w a yn e ’s b irth d a te i s st at ed i n t he p et i t i o n as A ugust 23 , 1 9 8 3

. T h e tr ial co urt ’ s o rder o n t he st at em ent of t he evi d ence st at es t hat t he daugh t er , M ar y Ann T om l i ns on, was born M ar ch 19 , 198 2. Al l t he eva l uat i on r eport s l i st D ew ayne ’ s bi r t h dat e a s A ugust 23 , 19 8 3

. T hus, he wo ul d have t urned 2 1 i n A ugust of 2 0 0 4 , af t er t he p et i t i o n and pro ceed i ngs herei n.
B o th p a rtie s su b m itt e d s ta te m e n ts o f t h e e v id e n c e . T h e trial c o u rt a p p ro v e d M s. B u n d y’s state m e n t with 5 sp ec i f i ed co rrec t i o ns. -3- requirethe obligor

to continue to pay child support for such period as it dee ms in the best interest of the child. 2 Essentially , Mr. Finn a

rg ues that, althoug h his son may meet the requireme nts of subpart (1) , 3 support under that provision is l imited in duration, and that De wayne is not sever ely disabled so as 4 to qua lify for continuing support under subsection (2). The trial court did not use t h e l an gu age of either subpa

rt (1) or (2), but cle arly

held t h at t he son wa s handica pped and that the fathe r had a continuing oblig ation to support his handicappe d child. I mplicit in this holding is a finding that the parties’ son was seve rely

disabled. B eca

use the trial court did not make spec ific finding s of fa ct about t h e s o n ’ s s i t u a t i o n , w e r e v i e w t h e f a c t s i n t h e r e c o r du n d e r

a p u r e l y de novo revie w. In re Vale ntine , 79 S. W

. 3 d 5 3 9 , 5 4 6 (Tenn. 2002) . I ssues of law a re r eviewe d de novo

. Id. The re cord doe s not include a tr anscript of the hea ring , but does include a

statement of the e vidence

. 5
Ms. B un dy

te sti fi e d th a t D e way ne liv e s w ithhe r andsh e pr ov ide s h is d a ily c are . T he pa rt ie s’ adult daug hter a lso testified that she helps her mother with Dew ayn e’ s ca re. Both had e x tensive persona l knowledg e of D ewa y ne’s c ondition and capa biliti es. Mr. F inn testified that he had not visited or seen Deway ne for sever al y ear s. There fore , he had no persona l know ledg e of D eway ne’s da ily a c tiv iti e s o r n e e ds

. Severa l e valuation reports on Deway ne wer e introduced and are included in the rec ord bef ore us. From these reports, we learn that he has had serious medical problems since his premature birth, including spin a b i fida with enc ephalopathy , cer ebra l palsy , hy droce phalus, my elody splasia, and neurog enic bladde r. He underw ent four t een surg ical proc edure s befor e he w as one y ear old, and re mov a l of

c e re br a l ti ssu e du ri n g o ne su rg e ry imp a ir e d h is mus c ula

r c oo rd inatio n. He is a lso me nta lly re tard e d a ndha s impa ir e d s pe e c h a ndfi ne -m oto r p ro ble ms. A p sy c ho e du c a tio na l e va luatio n pe rf orme d F e br

ua ry 21 , 20 03 , by Tr ou sd a le Cou nty Sc ho ols state d th a t D e way ne ha d r e c e ive d s pe c ia l e du c a tio n s e rv ic e s a ll h is l ife, g ra du a te d f ro m T ro us da le CountyHig h School in 2002, and was curr ently obtaining a dult services throug h H.A.T.S., an a g ency that provides vocat i o n al , l earning, and social opportunities to adults with disabili ties. Deway ne’sP ri o r t o ent ry o f t he f i nal ord er, t he t ri al co urt asked t he at t o rney s t o de t erm i ne whet her any co nt i nued award 6

o f sup p o rt w o uld ad ve rsely aff ec t t he S S I o r m ed i ca l b en efi t s.

-4- intellectual functioning scor e plac ed him in the mentally reta rded r ang e. His ada

ptive skills were wi thi n th e mil d r a ng e of

me nta l r e tard a tio n a ndsh ow e d re lativ e we akn e sse s infu nc tio na l a c a de mic s, home living, he alth and saf ety , and self- car e. The report con cluded that his overall intellectual fu n ct i oning pla ced his menta l ag e at f rom 5 y ear s, 7 months to 8 y ear s, 2 months. I t also stated i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h i s r a n g e g e n e r a l l y c a n n o tl i v e i n d e p e n d e n t l y. Both his mother and his sister testified that Deway ne require s a g reat deal of supe rvision. He does not reme mber to eat and cannot prepa re his food. He cannot operate any basic e quipment in the ho us e inc lud ing themic ro wa ve , dis hw a sh e r, sto ve , w a sh e r anddry e r. He ha s li ttl e c on tr ol o ve r h is bodily functions, and he soi ls his underw ear daily

. He cannot handle mone y or make chang e and ha s no conce pt of the value of money . He works in a sheltere d workshop throug h H.A.T.S. and e arns $25 to $ 45 pe r m on th. He us e s th e mon e y to b uy e xtra thi ng s fo r him se lf, bu t his mothe r o r s ist e r mus t a ssi st w itha ny

pu rc ha se s. He is i nc apa

bleof be ing le ft a lon e fo r m or e than a

c ou pleof ho ur s b e c aus e he beg ins to panic. He c annot take c are of his phy sical nee ds, his affairs, or his persona l hy g iene. Ms. Bundy

testified Dew ayne wa s able to g raduate from hig h school throug h a sp ecia l education prog ram that a llows a d i p l o m a equivalent. Deway ne’s sister, Ma ry Ann Tomlinson, te sti fi e d th a t e ve n at th e wo rk sh op De way ne a tte nd s, he c a nn ot wo rk wi tho ut s up e rv isi on a ndmus t be re minded what task to pe rform and how to pe rform it. Ms. B undy rec eives supplementa l social security of $249 or $289 pe r month payment s fo r De wayne’s be nefit, and he rec eives Te nn Care be ne fi ts. 6 The testimony

that Deway ne nee ds super v i s i o n and cannot function independe ntly was c on sis te nt w itha

repo rt fro m a ph y sic ia n, date d O c tob e r 2 2, 20 02 , s tatin g that D e way ne F innis unable to live without adult supervision and a ssistance a nd stated: Mr. [Dewayne] Finn nee ds continuous assistance a nd supervision due to the following c on dit ion s: 1. Mr . [D e way ne ] F innis u nable to c omp re he ndor c op e wi th d a ng e r i n h is e nv ir on me nt;
2

. H e i s u n ab l e t o p r e p ar e a m e a l c o m p e t e n t l y o r

s a f e l y; 3. He is unable to finish a meal without assistance due to bec oming distrac ted;
4. Mr. [Dewayne] Fi n n is unable to operate sophisticated mac hinery , ( e.g. washing machine, car , motorcy cle, or bicy cle) due to lack of c omprehe nsion and/or c oordination. He is ther efor e unable to wash clothing and t rave l to a marke t for food.-5-

Th e un dis pu te d e vid e nc e sh ow s th e pa rt ie s’ so n is liv ing un de r the c are a nd su pe rv isi on of his mother, that such car e and supervision is ne cessa ry , and that rema ining in such ca re and supervision is in D e w a y n e ’ s b e s t i n te r e s t. T h e e v id e n c e a ls o e s ta b li s h e s th a t D e w a y n e is s e v e r e ly d is abled. Although Mr. Finn testified that he thought his son wa s capa ble of wor

king to support himself, that opinion is t otally

unsupported by

any evidenc e in the re cord. D eway ne’s wor k at the shelter ed workshop, while important a nd benef icial, is not compara

ble t o a job that could provide his nece ssary fi na nc ia l su pp ort. The fina l requi re m en t for the a pplication of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( p)(2) is that the ob lig or pare nt , her e Mr . F inn , is fi na nc ia lly ableto p a y

su pp ort. M r. F inna sse rt s h e is h ims e lf disabled and his only

income is from social security and an annuity from a pe rsonal injury

settlement discussed m ore fully

below. More specific evidenc e re g arding Mr. Finn’ s financia l condition is not included in the re cord. Theevidenc e does not preponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s implicit findi ng that Mr . F innis f

inanc ia lly ableto p a y

the$3 31 pe r m on th o rd e re d b y thetria l c ou rt

. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r that Mr. Finn continue to pr ovide support for the bene fit of his adult disabled child pursuant to Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(p)( 2).
II. A L I M ONY Mr. Finn a lso petitioned to be relieve d of his alimony obligation. Du ring the marriag e, the pa rt ie s h a d s e ttl e d a la ws uit fo r pe rs on a l inj urie s to Mr

. F inn du ri ng thec ou rs e of his e mpl oyme nt. The settlement pr ovided for an annuity contra ct with Safec o I nsuranc e under whi ch the pa

rties re c e iv ed $1 58 0 pe r m on th, wi th p a y me nts g ua rante e d f or fi ve y e ars . T he MD A a dd re sse d th e se s et t l em en tp ay m en t s , p ro v i d i n g: Th e pa rt ie s r e c e ive$1 58 0. 00 pe r m on th f ro m a se ttl e me nt of

a pe rs on a l in

jury la ws uit wher ein the abovementioned amount is paid for a s l o n g as the parties live with the survivor to rec eive 100% of t he payments upon the death of the other f or the life of the survivor g uaranteed fo r five (5) y ear s. The last g uaranteed pay ment is on Decem ber 1 9, 20 00 . As ali mo ny to th e P lai nt if f, th e Defen dan t s hal l p ay

to th e W IFE thesu m of

$5 00 pe r m on th f

or a s lo ng a s $ 1, 58 0 is re c e ive d b y theDe fe nd a nt. Nothing in this Or der or

Ag ree ment shall be dee med to exti ng uish the Plainti ff’ s rig ht to rec eive the $1,580 per month payment g uaranteed for five (5) y ear s in the eve nt the Def endant pr edec eas es t h e P laintiff. The D efe ndant shall make the payment to the Pla int if f w ith in f ive(5 ) d a y s o f the De fe nd a nt r e c e ivi ng the$1 ,5 80 pay me nt. This provision became the source of continuing disputes ove r its meaning and ef fec t and the ba sis fo r the tria l c ou rt ’s a lim on y de c isi on that is thesu bje c t of thi s a pp e a l. The pa rties her ein disag ree over w hether the alimony awa rded to Ms. B undy

in the divorce de c re e inc or

po ratin g thepa

rt ie s’ MD A w a s su bje c t to mod if ic a tio n. Whe the r an a lim on y a wa rdis s u b j ec t t o m o d i fi ca t i o n d ep en d s u p o n t h e t yp e o f a l i m o n y i n v o l v ed , as d et er m i n ed fr o mt h e l an gu ageR ehab i l i t at i ve al i m o ny i s no t at i ss ue, and nei t her p a rty cl ai m s t he award was i nt end ed t o be rehabil i t at i ve 7

a lim o n y. -6- of the orde r or a g ree ment establis h i n g t h e aw ard. The parties disag ree as to whethe r the a limony p r o v i d e d f

o r i n t h e M D A p r o v i s i o n q u o t e d e ar l i e r w a s a l i m o n y in solido o r a l i m o n y in f

utu ro . 7
A l i m o n y in solido is an a wa rdof a de fi nit e su m of mon e y , an d the tot a l a mou nt t o b e pa id i s asce rtainable at the time of the a war d. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3 d 465 , 471 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; W addey v. W addey , 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 3 0 , 2 3 2 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 9 )

. It r e t a i n s i t s c h ar a c t e r a s a l i m o n y in solido e ve n if pa id in installm ents, provided the payments are order ed over a def inite period of time and the total amount to be paid is definite and asce rtainable

. Burlew , 4 0 S. W.3 d at 47 1; W addey , 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 232. A l i m o n y in s o li do i s o ft en u sed to adjust the distribution of the parties’ ma rital property

. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d at 471. It promotes the twin g oals of ce rtainty and fina litythough f

inality though the awa rd of a fix ed amount without conditions. Bryan v. Leac h , 85 S.W .3d 136, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 01 ). Th e de te rm in ati ve fa c tor in d e c idi ng wh e the r an a wa rdof a lim on y is in solido is the intent of the pa rties (in an MDA ) or the c ourt (in final orde r). Bryan , 8 5 S. W.3 d at 14 6; Se lf v . S e lf , 861 S.W .2d 360, 363 (Tenn. 1993)

. A f i n a l a w ar d o f

a l i m o n y in solido is not subject to future modification. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d a t 47 1; Day v . Day , 931 S.W .2d 936, 939 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). T he other type of a limonyat issue, alimony in f utu ro , howeve r, re mains subject to modification. Burlew , 40 S.W. 3da t 47 1; Bryan , 85 S.W .3d at 146.
A l i m o n y in fut uro continues support that wa s incident to the marriag e and c ontinues indefinitely

. Bryan , 8 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 1 4 6

. T h e p u rp o s e o f a n a w ar d o f

a l i m o n y in f

utu ro is to provide support to a spouse who c annot be r ehabilitated. Burlew , 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t4 7 1

. A l i m o n y in f utu ro “lac ks sum-certainty

due to conting encie s af

fe ct i n g the total amount of alimony to be paid.” Burlew , 40 S

. W

. 3 d at4 7 1 , q u o t i n g W addey , 6 S.W .3d at 232. Its duration, and ther efor e the total amount to be paid, i s subject t o conting encie s ag ree d to by the parties (in an MDA) or imposed by the court (in the final orde r). Burlew , 40 S.W .3d at 471.
In t h e c a s e b e f

o r e u s , t h e tr i a l c o u rth e l d t h a t t h e M D A p r o v i d e d f o r $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 a s a l i m o n y in solido by pay me nt o f $ 50 0 p e r m on th f or 60 mon ths

. Al tho ug h both pa rt ie s att e mpt e d to tes tif

y in the trial in these pr ocee dings a s to their understanding of the MDA pr ovision, the trial court limited s u c h t e s t i m o n y, d e t e r m i n i n g t h a ti n t e rp r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r o v i s i o n w a s a

q u e s t i o n o f

l a w . A d d i t i o n a l l y, the t rial court entere d an orde r cor rec ting the Stateme nts of the Evidenc e submitted by both parties which clarifies the proof at trial re g arding the settlement proc eeds. Thecourt stated that there w as no testimony“as to both parties,” as oppose d to Mr. Finn only , “being the r ecipients of the settlement.” The court a lso recounte d prior litigation over the MDA pr ovision.
As thetria l c ou rt

no te d, these ttl e me nt d oc ume nt its e lf wa s n ot i ntr od uc e d in to e vid e nc e in this proc eeding

. The trial court also noted that in 1998 Mr. Finn had petitioned to modify the alimony awa rd, and the settlement document wa s introduced in the trial on that petition. The prior proc eeding-7-

was broug ht into the matter hereon appea l by Ms. Bundy ’s answe r in which she a sserted that the iss ue of a lim on y wa s re s ju dic ata i n t h a ti th a d b e e n l i t i g a t e d r e g ar d i n g t h e S a f e c o In s u r a n c e a n n u i t y, ref erring to the or der e ntere d Aug ust 19, 1999, nunc pro tunc to Febr uary 4, 1999.
The re cord indicates there wer e two prior or ders e ntere d. T h e fi rst , enter ed De cembe r 16, 1998, appea

red to re spond to Mr. Finn’s pe tition and stated that the issue before t h e co u rt was whether or not the alimony

provision could be modified. The court he ld:

. . . th e a mou nt o f the ob lig a tio n o f G ary De way neFin n is a

de te rm ina

blea mou nt. T h a ta m o u n ti s $ 3 0 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 ( $ 5 0 0

. 0 0 f o r 6 0 m o n t h s )

. Iti s a l i m o n y in solido

. Appar ently , this order wa s not appea led. The se cond orde r, re fer ence d by Ms. Bundy

in her answe r and by

the trial court in its order approving and cor

rec ti n g t h e st atement of

the evidenc e, re so lve d tw o s e ts of iss ue s. Th e fi rs t wa s he ard Au g us t 4, 19 98 , a nd inv olv e d M r. F inn ’s failu reto pay child support. The c ourt found Mr. F inn to be in arre ars in the amount of $1,869. The orde r noted the che ck fr om Safec o pay able to the pa rties had be en h el d b y o n e of the attorney s, and the court orde red th at the che cks should be executed and the proc eeds use d to pay Mr. Finn’ s alimony and child support oblig ation including the arr ear ag e. The second part of the order resulted f rom a he aring on Fe bruary 4, 1999, on an unidentified petition filed by

Mr. Finn. In pertinent pa rt, the orde r stated:
Th a t no thi ng in this Or de r s ha ll b e de e me d to c ha ng e thec on tr a c tua l rig hts that bo th pa rt ie s hav e to the fu nd s distri bu te d pur su a nt to the a nn uity c on tr a c t w ithSAFECO L IFE I NSURANCE COMP AN Y o r t o alter the contra ct or the c ontrac tual rig hts of GA RY F INN a nd MA RY F INNwi th S AF ECO L IF E INSU RA NC E CO MPA NY so that bo th p art ie s a

ree nti tle d to re c e ive the fu nd s fr om SAFECO L IF E INSU RA NC E COMPANY.
Ac c or din g ly , th e c ou rt

or de re d th a t Sa fe c o s e nd $7 89 pe r mon th (a lim on y a ndc hil d s up po rt ) direc tly to Ms. Bundy and send the remainder of the monthlypayment ($791) to Mr. F inn. I t is the above- quoted lang uag e that Ms. B undy relied upon in he r answe r. I n its order on the state ments of t h e ev i d en ce i n t h e p ro ce ed i n g t h ati s t h e s u b j ec to f t h i s ap p ea l , t h e t ri al co u rtex p l ai n ed t h e l an gu age i th ad u s ed i n t h e p ri o r o rd er , s t at i n g: That statement wa s en t ered as part of the Court’s orde r bec ause pa rag raph 6 of

the Marital Dissolution Ag ree ment which is incorporated and a part of the final dec ree of div or c e or de re d th a t th e hu sb a ndpay a limon y in the su m of

$5 00 pe r m on th f

or so long as he r e c e iv e d th e $ 1 , 5 8 0 p e r mo n tho n th e a n n u ity

w ith th e la s t g u ar a n te ed payment of $1,580 per

month to be the 19th day of Dec ember , 2000. Further, the final Dec ree p r o v id e d th a t in e v e n t th e h u s b a n d d ie d b e f o r e D e c e mb e r 1 9 , 2 0 0 0 a nd the wi fesu rv ive d h im the n s he wo uldbe ent itledto r e c e ivethefu ll $ 1, 58 0 p e r m on th payment. It was ce rtainly the intent of the Court not to have an order enter ed bef

oreA ltho u g h the re a p p e a rs to b e im p licit as su m p tio n tha t t h e d a te o f t h e la st g u a ra n te e d p a ym e n t f ro m the a n n u ity 8 is the sa m e a s the d a te o f t h e las t alim o n y i n s ol i do p a ym e n t, tha t i s n o t t h e c a se . T h e fiv e ye a rs o f settle m e n t p a ym e n ts b egan b ef o re t he d i vo rce de cree was ent ered

. T he co urt ’ s o rder herei n, ho wever, reaf f i rme d i t s earl i er hol d i ng t hat t he to ta l am o u n t o f alim o n y i n s ol i do was $30 , 00 0, ca l cul at ed at 60 m ont hs of $50 0 pay ment s . N ei t her par t y ha s addres s ed t hi s i s s ue.
B ec au s e of t h e M D A pr ov i s i on ’ s l an g u ag e t h at M r . Fi n n w as t o pa y t o M s . B u n dy , a s a l i mon y , “ t h e s u m of

9 $ 5 0 0 pe r mo nt h fo r as l o ng as $ 1 ,5 8 0 i s recei ved by [ hi m ], ” i t i s arguab l e t hat t he f i ve y ears o f

pa y m ent s was not t he e n tire ty o f M r. F inn ’s o b liga tio n s a n d tha t a n y a m o u n t b e yo n d the fi v e ye a rs w o u ld b e a lim o n y i n f u t u ro . H o w ev er, M s. B u n d y ha s n o t m a d e tha t ar g u m e n t, ins te a d insistin g tha t ev e n p a y m e n ts b e y o n d fi v e ye a rs w e re a lim o n y i n s ol i do

. P e rh a p s sh e a d o p te d tha t stra te g y b e c a u se a lim o n y i n f u t u ro o r a lim o n y the a m o u n t o f w h ic h is no t ca lc u la b le o n the d a te t he decr ee was ent er ed t er mi nat es “ aut om at i cal l y and un condi t i onal l y ” upon t he r emar r i age of t he pers on r ece i vi ng s uch al i mon y . T en n . C ode Ann

. § 36- 5- 101( a) ( 2) ( B )

. W h i l e t h e par t i es h er ei n c ou l d h av e ag r ee d t h e pay men t s w ou l d n ot cea s e u po n M s . B un dy ’ s r emar r i age , t hey di d not ex pl i ci t l y s t at e a ny s uch ag r eement

. I t i s not cl ear f r om t he r ecor d when M s. B und y remarri ed , but she was ref erred t o as M s. B u n d y in t he A ugust 19 9 9 ord er, s o s he rema rr i ed be fo re t he e x p ira tio n o f t h e fi v e ye a rs o f alim o n y i n s ol i do

. -8- the19 th d a y of De c e mbe r, 20 00 that w ou ld c aus e that a g re e me nt o f the pa rt ie s n ot t o be followe d.
Th e c ou rt ’s re fe re nc e to D e c e mbe r 1 9, 20 00 , wa s to the date of the la st g ua rante e d mo nth ly p a ym e n tu n d e r

t h e s e t t l e m e n ta n n u i t y. 8 On appe al, Ms. Bundy

arg ues that the $500 pe r month she was to rec eive unde r the MDA w as e i t h e r a d i s tr i b u t i o n o f

m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y o r

w a s a l i m o n y in solido and, in either case , was not modifiable. The trial court ha d resolved the se issues in a pre vious order that was not appe aled, f i n d i n g t h e M D A p r o v i s i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a n a w ar d o f a l i m o n y in solido in the total amount of $30,000. Ontheba sis of

that ho ldi ng , the tria l c ou rt did no t a llo w Mr

. F inn in the e arl ie r p ro c e e din g s to c e a se his alimonypayments or re duce the m in amount until the total amount was pa id.
H o w e v e r , M s . B u n d y ar g u e s s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e $ 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h a s a l i m o n y in solido for an indefinite time, i.e. , as long as the a nnuity proce eds ar e re ceive d by Mr. Finn. This ar g ument i s n o tt e n ab l e i n v i e w o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a l i m o n y in solido , since at the time of the divorcethere was no way to a sc e rt a in the du ratio n b e y on d f ive(5 ) y e ars . The l a n g u a g e o f

th e M D A p r o v is io n is le s s th a n c le ar o n th e is s u e a t h a n d , b u t th e p arti es ag ree d to this l ang uag e. The trial court’ s holding that the pr ovision constitut ed an a war d of alimony in solido for 60 months, the duration of the g uaranteed pay ments, was enf orce d to preve nt Mr. Finn fr o m m o d i fy i n g th e $5 0 0 p er m o n t h p ay m en t d u ri n g t h e fi v e- y ea r pe ri o d

. T h e tr i al co u rt ’ s r u l i n gs ha ve be e n c on sis te nt in c on sid e ri ng the a lim on y a wa rd to be a tot a l of $3 0, 00 0, to b e pa id i n mo nth ly installments. W e do n o t d i s agr ee w ith the trial court’s holding that the payments to Ms. Bundy c o n s t i t u t e d a l i m o n y in solido

. 9-9-

Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l cou rt ’s holding that Mr. Finn’s a limony obligation cease d upon the payment of the total amount of $30,000
III . C ONCL US I ON We aff irm the t rial court’s order that Mr. Finn provide c ontinued support for his adult disabled child. We a lso a ffirm the trial court’s determination that Mr. Finn’s a limonyobligation terminated u p o n h i s p a ym e n to f

t h e t o t a l a m o u n to f

a l i m o n y in solido . Cost s of this app e a l arediv ide d e qu a lly betwee n the appellant, Mary L ouise Summer Bundy , and the appellee , Gary Deway ne Finn, for which e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ P A T R I C I A J. C O T T R E LL , J.