IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

JEANNETTE and GEORGE SHEPARD , 2 Petitioners-Appellants, 3

v. NO. 28,376 4 KRISTINA MARIE OZZELLO , 5 Respondent-Appellee, 6 and 7 IN THE MATTER OF THE KINSHIP 8 GUARDIANSHIP OF WILLIAM K. , 9 Child. 10

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY 11 H.R. Quintero, District Judge 12
Jeannette and George Shepard 13 Silver City, NM 14 Pro Se Appellants 15 Atencio Law Office PC 16 Kimberly L. Halpain 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellee 192 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 ROBLES, Judge. 2 Jeannette and George Shepard (Grandpa rents) appeal the revocation of a 3 kinship guardianship of William K. (Child). On appeal, Grandparents raise multiple 4 points of error, which we consolidate into six claims: (1) there was inadequate notice 5 and service; (2) the Uniform Child-Cust ody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), 6 NMSA 1978, § 40-10A-101 (2001), applied to th is case; (3) statutory procedure was 7 not followed; (4) the district court applied the wrong standard; (5) there was 8 insufficient evidence; and (6) their due pro cess rights were violat ed. We address each 9 issue in turn and affirm. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 In 2004, Kristina Ozzello (Mother) had various problems with drugs and the 12 law. Believing that she was facing mandatory incarceration, Mother signed a 13 document consenting to a kinship guardians hip for her four-year-old biological son. 14 She then began drug rehabilitation, secure d employment, obtained a residence, and 15 maintained the conditions of her probation. Mother was never incarcerated, but her 16 probation continued. Meanwhile, Child was in the care of Mother’s 17 parents—Grandparents in this appeal—and they became Child’s primary caretakers. 18 The record is not entirely clear how much time Mother spent with Child during those 193 several years, but Mother alleges that the contact was continuous and frequent, and 1 Grandparents do not argue otherwise. The r ecord does not state how often Child spent 2 the night at Mother’s home, but Child did spend the night periodically. During the 3 summer of 2007, Grandparents a llowed Mother to have Ch ild at her home for periods 4 as long as one week per visit. 5 On August 1, 2007, acting pro se, Mother filed three motions with the district 6 court unbeknownst to Grandparents. The moti ons were for a revocation of the kinship 7 guardianship, the appointment of a guardia n ad litem (GAL), and judicially-enforced 8 visitation rights. The next day, Mother filed a request for a hearing, but only 9 requested a hearing on the motions to appoint a GAL and visitation. Copies of all the 10 paperwork were sent to Grandparents. On August 8, the district court issued an order 11 to reopen the case and set a date of Sept ember 12, for a hearing on Mother’s motion 12 for revocation of kinship guardianship. 13 On August 17, Grandparents, also acting pro se, filed a motion to dismiss and 14 vacate the hearing or to compel mediati on. Notice that Grandparents’ motion to 15 dismiss would be heard with the other pending motions was mailed by the district 16

court. Three days later, Mother filed and mailed a response, stating that she did not 174 object to the request for medi ation, but that she did still wish to have a hearing “for 1 the purpose of appointing a [GAL] and setting a visitation schedule.” 2 On the date of the hearing, the distri ct court began the proceedings by stating: 3 “We are here on [Mother’s] motion to term inate the guardianship and [Grandparent’s] 4 response and the request for medi ation by one of the parties.” After an opening 5 statement, Mother presented five witn esses, including her probation officer, her 6 substance abuse counselor, and her employer of the previous three years, all of which 7 testified to matters concerning either her s obriety, her hard work and reform, or her 8 strong desire to be permanently reunited with Child. Grandparents stated that they did 9 not have any witnesses because they thought the scope of the hearing was on a motion 10 to dismiss, the appointment of a GAL, and a visitation schedule. Grandparents again 11 moved to dismiss and, in the alternativ e, requested mandatory mediation and for 12 Mother to amend her petition, which th ey felt was statutorily insufficient. The district 13 court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the evidence was clear and 14 convincing, and that the circumstances thatled to the kinship guardianship were no 15 longer present. The district court then ordered both parties into mandatory mediation, 16 ordered each party to make a best and worst case scenario transition plan to bring to 17 the mediation, and appointed a parenting coordinator to conduct interviews and write 185 a report for the court. The district court stated that it was the hope that mediation 1 would help, but that the ultimate result as “the evidence stands now” would be the 2 termination of the kinship guardianship, a nd that an order to terminate the kinship 3 guardianship would not be en tered “until there has been a mediation.” The following 4 day, the district court entered an order w ith findings that stated that Mother was now 5 in a position to assume her parental rights, and that it was in Child’s best interest to 6 be transitioned back into Mother’s care. On the same day, the district court entered 7 another order, holding that a final heari ng on the merits would not be set until the 8 ordered mediation was comp leted, and no transition pl an would be approved until 9 mediation was completed. 10 Following the hearing on September 12, 2007, Grandparents hired an attorney, 11 who promptly filed a motion to set aside, stating that Grandpare nts believed that the 12 previous hearing would not encompass revo cation of the kinship guardianship, and 13 that a GAL was not appointed as statutorily mandated. They requested the district 14 court to appoint a GAL and to set aside portions of the or der that were not addressed 15 in Mother’s request for hearing. A sec ond hearing was requested and set for October 16
30. At that hearing, Grandparents requested a GAL be appointed. The district court, 17 citing financial concerns for th e pro se parties, noted that a court- employed, parenting 18 coordinator had already been appointed as an accommodation/alternative method 196 whose services would duplicate those of a GAL . The district court, however, did give 1 a copy of the parenting coordinator’s repor t to Grandparents, appointed a GAL, and 2 responding to Grandparents’ attorney’s assu rances, remained hopeful that the parties 3 could work out their differe nces through mediation. The district court then set an 4 evidentiary hearing for December 6 on Grandparents’ motion to set aside. At the 5 hearing of December 6, 2007, the GAL was not present, but his report was given to 6 the district court and all parties prior to the hearing. No objection was raised 7 concerning the GAL’s absence, and Grandparent s’ attorney stated that his clients were 8 “basically . . . in agreemen t” with the parenting coordi nator’s and the GAL’s reports. 9 The record reflects that the GAL interv iewed Mother’s probation officer, Child’s 10 health care provider, school counselor, and th erapist, as well as visited Grandparents’ 11 and Mother’s homes when Child was present. The GAL concluded that it was in 12 Child’s best interest “if a transition plan of six months [was] implemented to 13 reintegrate [C]hild into [Mother’s] home.” Grandparents presente d witness testimony 14 from Child’s psychologist, who recommended a transition plan anywhere from three 15 to six months, and suggested that it was in Child’s best interest to maintain a 16 relationship with Grandparents. Still acting pro se, Mother argued that Child had been 17 in a state of transition into her home for ove r a year, and that an extensive transition 187 plan was not necessary. The district court noted that custody had not been restored 1 to Mother, but when it was, the case would transform into a question of Grandparents’ 2 visitation. The district court then implemented the first four weeks of Grandparents’ 3 transition plan, and stated that the case would now be considered by the court as a 4 “Grandparent Oral Petition for Visitation” and, at the end of four weeks, the court 5 would have a written parenting plan, which would outline a visitation/custody 6 decision. The court then asked for Gra ndparents’ attorney to draft the order. The 7 order that resulted, stated “[t]hat based upon the testimony taken and reports 8 submitted, this matter shall now be treatedas a Petition for Grandparent Visitation.” 9 Additionally, the order gave the parties four weeks to come to an agreement as to a 10 visitation schedule, or the district court would enter an order addressing visitation. 11 On January 7, 2008, another order was entered by the district court, stating that 12 the parties had attempted a nd failed to reach an agreement regarding visitation. The 13 order further stated that “[t]emporary guard ianship with [Grandparents] has previously 14 been revoked[,]” and that Mother wa s to have “sole physical custody.” A visitation 15 schedule for Grandparents wa s included in the order. This appeal by Grandparents, 16 acting pro se, followed. 17 II. DISCUSSION 188 On appeal, Grandparents raise multiple claims of error, which we have 1 consolidated into six issues . We discuss each in turn. 2 A. Service and Notice 3 Grandparents claim that they were not served in accordance with Rule 1-004 4 NMRA, and that they did not have proper notice about what the scope of the 5 September 12 hearing would entail. An appellate court is defe rential to facts found 6 by a trial court, but reviews conclusions of law de novo. Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury 7 Exploration Co. , 121 N.M. 622, 627, 916 P.2d 822, 827 (1996). Interpretation of a 8 statute is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews de novo. See Morgan 9 Keegan Mortgage Co. v. Candelaria , 1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 10 1066 (filed 1997). 11 Grandparents argue that they received inad equate service, and that Mother was 12 required to provide service in accordance w ith Rule 1-089(E) NMRA pursuant to Rule 13 1-004. However, Grandparent s acknowledge that they are raising this error for the 14 first time on appeal, and that they “unkno wingly waived their right to service of 15 process by participating in the proceedings[.]” The record is clearthat Grandparents 16 received all notices, participated in all h earings, and entered a general appearance in 17 the case, effectively waiving their right s to claims of insufficient service. See Guthrie 18 v. Threlkeld Co. , 52 N.M. 93, 96, 192 P. 2d 307, 308 (1948) (stating that any action on 199 the part of the defendant, except to object to the jurisdiction, that recognizes the case 1 as in court will amount to a general appearance). 2 They further state that, although they ma y have waived their rights to service, 3 they did not waive Child’s rights to service. However, there is no requirement that an 4 eight-year-old child be served with any paperwork in kinship guardianship 5 proceedings. See NMSA 1978, § 40-10B-6(B) (2001) (s tating that petition and notice 6 of a kinship guardianship shall be served on the child “if he has reached his fourteenth 7 birthday”). Grandparents cite no authority for the proposition that service was 8 defective because Child was not served. When a party cites no authority for a 9 proposition, we assume it was because after a diligent search, they were unable to find 10 authority for support. In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 11 1330 (1984) (holding that issues raised in appellate briefs th at are unsupported by 12 cited authority need not be reviewed on appeal). 13 Grandparents also argue that the district court exceeded the scope of the 14 September 12 hearing. They state that the hearing was supposed to be on the 15 Mother’s motions for appointment of a GAL , visitation, and Grandparents’ motion to 16 dismiss mandatory mediation. They further claim that, if the hearing was to be on the 17 revocation of the kinship guardianship, a GAL should have been appointed before the 18 hearing. We will address the appointment of the GAL later in the Opinion. 1910 As previously stated, Mother filed th ree motions, but requested a hearing on 1 only two of those motions. The district c ourt issued an order that reopened the case 2 and set a hearing on Mother’s motion for re vocation of kinship guardianship, which 3 was mailed to all parties. At the September 12 hearing, Grandparents objected to the 4 hearing after Mother’s witnesses had testifie d, stating that revocation of the kinship 5 guardianship was beyond the sc ope of what they thought the hearing would concern. 6 Grandparents do not claim that they neve r received the August 8 order reopening the 7 case, which stated that the motion for revocation would be heard at the September 12 8 hearing. A district court has wide di scretion in controlling how a case will proceed 9 within its courtroom. See Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp. , 120 N.M. 151, 154-55, 899 10 P.2d 594, 597-98 (1995). Pro se litigants are he ld to the “same standard of conduct 11 and compliance with court rules, procedures , and orders as are members of the bar.” 12
Newsome v. Farer , 103 N.M. 415, 419, 708 P.2d 327, 331 (1985). The district court 13 provided adequate notice regarding the scope of the hearing. 14 B. Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 15 Grandparents claim that the U CCJEA applies to this case. We disagree. This 16 Court has previously held that the purpose of the UCCJEA is to “provide 17 jurisdictional clarity and to pr omote interstate cooperation.” State ex rel. Children, 18 Youth & Families Dep’t v. Donna J ., 2006-NMCA-023, ¶ 10, 139 N.M. 131, 129 P.3d 1911 167. Further, NMSA 1978, S ection 40-10A-401 (2001) states that “[i]n applying and 1 construing the [UCCJEA], consideration must be given to the need to promote 2 uniformity of the law with respect to its s ubject matter among states that enact it.” No 3 claims have been made that any of the parties were not residents of New Mexico at 4 any time during this case, and no interstate jurisdiction issues present themselves. The 5 district court had continuing jurisdiction over the kinship guardianship under Section 6 40-10B-14. 7 C. Statutory Procedure 8 Grandparents contend that statutory procedure was not followed in the 9 appointment of a GAL and in the sufficiency of Mother’s motion for revocation of the 10 kinship guardianship. In reviewing a sufficiency of th e evidence claim, the reviewing 11 court views the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prevailing party and 12 disregards evidence and inferences to the contrary. Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc. , 13 1998-NMCA-021, ¶ 30, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 (filed 1997). A reviewing 14 court may not assess the weight of evid ence, except “[w]here an issue to be 15 determined rests upon the interpre tation of documentary evidence.” Maestas v. 16 Martinez , 107 N.M. 91, 93, 752 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Ct. App. 1988). “An abuse of 17 discretion occurs when a ruling is clear ly contrary to the logical conclusions 1812 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims , 1996-NMSC1 078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. 2 Grandparents argue that the district c ourt abused its disc retion in failing to 3 appoint a GAL before it had made its decision to terminate the kinship guardianship. 4 They cite NMSA 1978, Section 40-10B-9(B) (2001), which states that “[i]n a 5 proceeding in which a parent of the ch ild has petitioned for the revocation of a 6 guardianship established pursuant to the Ki nship Guardianship Act and the guardian 7 objects to the revocation, the court shall appoint a [GAL].” The record shows that a 8 GAL was appointed by the district court at the October 30 hearing, the order was filed 9 on November 13, and the GAL’s report was available to the pa rties on December 4. 10 It is of note that in Grandparents’ August 17 motion to dismiss, Grandparents 11 resisted the appointment of a GAL and re quested mediation. At the September 12 12 hearing, Grandparents did not object when th e district court began the proceedings by 13 stating: “We’re here on [Mother’s] motion to terminate guardianship and to 14 [Grandparents’] response and the request for mediation by one of the parties.” No 15 objection from Grandparents came until after Mother’s witnesses had testified and 16 been cross-examined by Grandparents. The record reveals th at when Grandparents 17 changed their position at the end of th e October 30 hearing and requested the 18 appointment of a GAL, one was appointed. 1913 We examine the facts closely on this claim and conclude that the Kinship 1 Guardianship Act was fulfilled, and the district court substantially complied with the 2 statute. Primarily, Section 40-10B-9(B) simp ly states that a GAL must be appointed 3 “[i]n a proceeding in which a parent of the child has petitioned for the revocation of 4 a guardianship . . . and the guardian objects to the revocation.” At the October 30 5 hearing, the district court appointed a GAL. 6 It is clear that following the September 12 hearing, the district court was 7 moving in the direction of revocation. Ho wever, the actual revocation did not occur 8 until the order following the December 6 h earing written by Grandparents’ attorney, 9 which stated that “this matter shall now be treated as a Petition for Grandparent 10 Visitation.” The lack of clarity in that order, followed by the ne xt order on January 11 7, 2008, which stated that “[t]emporar y guardianship with [Grandparents] has 12 previously been revoked[,]” seems to sugge st that there was never a clear moment 13 when the kinship guardianship was revoked. We look at the district court’s verbal 14 comments of the December 6 hearing, and acknowledge that they can be used to 15 clarify a finding, but not to reverse a finding. Ledbetter v. Webb , 103 N.M. 597, 604, 16 711 P.2d 874, 881 (1985). At the final heari ng on December 6, the district court had 17 heard from Grandparents’ and Mother’s w itnesses, had reports from the GAL, the 18 parenting coordinator, and the mediator, a nd had attempted unsucce ssfully to have the 1914 parties agree on an adequate arrangement. Grandparents’ attorney stated that his 1 clients were “basically . . . in agreement” with the parenting coordinator’s and GAL’s 2 reports, which were recommending transiti on plans from Grandparents’ to Mother’s 3 care of Child. While we ar e sympathetic with Grandparents’ position and observe that 4 the district court moved faster on its own agenda than Grandparents’ thought adequate 5 to address their numerous and heartfelt c oncerns, we nonetheless conclude that the 6 district court did not abuse its discre tion and substantially complied with the 7 requirements of the Kinship Guardianship Ac t. However, a district court should use 8 care in following statutory procedure in or der to instill confidence in the judicial 9
process. 10 Grandparents argue that the district court heard and ruled on a “defective” 11 motion for revocation. Essentially, they state that Mother’s motion did not have a 12 “transition plan” attached to it as the st atute requires. “The person requesting 13 revocation shall attach to the motion a transition plan proposed to facilitate the 14 reintegration of the child into the home of a parent or a new guardian. A transition 15 plan shall take into consideration the ch ild’s age, development and any bond with the 16 guardian.” NMSA 1978, Section 40-10B-12(A) (2001). 17 In reviewing Mother’s motion, we noti ce that in the body of the motion, Mother 18 included a section entitled “PLAN FOR TRANSITION,” as well as attaching a four- 1915 page affidavit to the motion. Furthermore, at the first hearing, the district court 1 required both parties to write transition plans. The district court did not abuse its 2 discretion. It would be form over substance for this Court to conclude that a transition 3 plan within the body of a motion is inadequa te, but if it were st apled to the motion 4 separately, it would suffice. 5 Grandparents state that the l ack of the transition plan is “a jurisdictional defect” 6 as well. They cite no support for this proposition. As we have already stated in this 7 Opinion, we will assume that arguments with no authority for support could not be 8 supported after a diligent search. In re Doe , 100 N.M. at 765, 676 P.2d at 1330. 9 D. Application of the Wrong Standard 10 At the October 30 hearing, the district cour t stated that “the standard is whether 11 [Mother is] fit or unfit and whethe r she poses a risk to [C]hild.” Grandparents claim 12 that this was the wrong standard, and that the district court should have employed the 13 “best interest of the child” standard, which would have resulted in a different outcome. 14
15 When a party is challenging a legal conclusion, the standard for review 16 is whether the law correctly was applie d to the facts, viewing them in a 17 manner most favorable to the preva iling party, indulging all reasonable 18 inferences in support of the court’s decision, and disregarding all 19 inferences or evidence to the contrary. 2016 Golden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd. , 113 N.M. 9, 12, 820 P.2d 1323, 1 1326 (1991). An appellate court is defere ntial to facts found by a trial court, but 2 reviews conclusions of law de novo. Strata Prod. Co. , 121 N.M. at 627, 916 P.2d at 3 827. 4 In their brief, Grandparents state that the district court applied the parental 5 preference standard and should have instead applied the comparative best interests of 6 the child standard because of the exis tence of extraordinary circumstances. We 7 interpret Grandparents’ argument to be th at they were “psychological parents” of 8 Child, and that is a sufficient fact for a court to conclude that extraordinary 9 circumstances exist. The parental prefer ence standard presupposes that, in a custody 10 contest, the best interest of a child is served by being with a biological parent as 11 opposed to a non-parent. In re Guardianship of Ashleigh R ., 2002-NMCA-103, ¶ 14, 12 132 N.M. 772, 55 P.3d 984. This rebuttable presumption places the burden on the 13 non-parent to show that the biological parent is unfit before the parent can be denied 14 custody. Id . Likewise, the kinship guardians hip statute defining the policy and 15 purpose of the act states: “It is the policy of the state that the in terests of children are 16 best served when they are raised by their parents.” NMSA 1978, Section 40-10B-2(A) 17 (2001). 1817 However, this presumption is never c onclusive, and a finding of extraordinary 1 circumstances or serious parental inadequ acy may be sufficient to rebut the parental 2 preference presumption. In re Guardianship of Victoria R ., 2009-NMCA-007, ¶9, 3 145 N.M. 500, 201 P.3d 169 (filed 2008). In cas es where the non-parent caregivers 4 “meet the child’s emotional and physical n eeds on a day-to-day basis for a sufficient 5 period of time that the child comes to view the adult caregivers as the child’s actual 6 parents,” the non-parents may be view ed as “psychological parents.” Id. ¶14. A 7 showing that “the child will suffer a ‘significant degree of depression’ if the 8 relationship with the psychological parents is abruptly terminated is sufficient to rebut 9 the presumption that the biological parent is acting in the child’s best interests and to 10 establish extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of the [Kinship 11 Guardianship Act].” Id

. ¶16. 12 We primarily consider whether the district court did in fact apply the wrong 13 standard. In the September 13 order, the district court held that it was in Child’s best 14 interest to transition him back into Mother’s home. This conclusion is supported by 15 the fact that the district court heard te stimony the day before issuing the order and 16 stated that as “the evidence stands now,” the ultimate result would be the termination 17 of the kinship guardianship. Grandparents did not present any witnesses to the district 1818 court until the final hearing on December 6. No findings were made by the district 1 court concerning serious parental inad equacy, extraordinary circumstances, or 2 psychological parents. 3 At the December 6 hearing, Child’s psyc hologist testified that Grandparents had 4 become Child’s psychological parents, and thatit would be in Child’s best interest to 5 maintain a relationship with them. Ho wever, the psychologist never recommended 6 that Child should not be transitioned into Mother’s home. Additionally, the GAL’s 7 report stated that “[b]ased on [Mother’s] change of circum stances, the age of [C]hild, 8 the time needed to complete the first gr ade[,] and the bond [that C]hild has created 9 with all parties[,] it would se rve [C]hild’s best interest if a transition plan of six 10 months be implemented to reintegrate [C]hild into [Mother’s] home.” Grandparents’ 11 attorney stated that his clients were in basic agreement with the GAL’s report before 12 Child’s psychologist testified. Grandparent s have not demonstrated that they carried 13 their burden or attempted to carry th eir burden of showing the existence of 14 extraordinary circumstances before the revo cation of the kinship guardianship at the 15 end of the December 6 hearing. 16 E. Sufficiency of the Evidence 17 Grandparents state in their brief thatMother failed to meet her burden of 18 demonstrating that a change of circumstances occurred. “In accordance with the 1919 standard of review, when considering a cl aim of insufficiency of the evidence, the 1 appellate court resolv es all disputes of facts in favor of the successful party and 2 indulges all reasonable inferences in support of the prevailing party.” Las Cruces 3 Prof’l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces , 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 4 P.2d 177 (filed 1996). 5 The kinship guardianship revocation statute states: “If the court finds that a 6 preponderance of the evidence proves achange in circumstances and the revocation 7 is in the best interests of the child, it shall grant the motion.” Section 40-10B-12(B) 8 (emphasis added). Grandparents assert that Mother’s substance abuse counseling, 9 sobriety, job retention, and adherence to the conditions of her probation were “not a 10 material change of circumst ances, since they were require d as conditions of her state 11 and federal probation” and were “known factors prior to the Order Appointing 12 Kinship Guardianship.” We disagree. The fact that Mother was maintaining sobriety 13 may have been known and requi red at the time that a kinship guardianship occurred, 14 but the very fact that the sobriety continued for a substantial amount of time is a 15 change in circumstances. See State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Natural Mother , 16 96 N.M. 677, 679, 634 P.2d 699, 701 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that findings used to 17 determine present parental rights must be based on current eviden ce, and showings of 18 past conduct is irrelevant in a finding of current fitness). 1920 F. Due Process 1 In their docketing statement, Grandpare nts stated: “Grandparents are raising 2 for the first time in appeal the issue of Constitutional rights of ‘legal guardians’ and 3 a minor child to maintain their familial relationship.” Due process claims will not be 4 addressed when raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Nichols , 5 2006-NMCA-017, ¶¶ 27-29, 139 N.M. 72, 128 P.3d 500 (filed 2005); State v. 6 Baldonado , 1998-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 21-22, 124 N.M. 745, 955 P.2d 214. In their brief, 7 Grandparents assert that as kinship guardian psychological parents, they have an equal 8 standing with Mother in protected fundament al liberty interests towards Child. This 9 claim, however, lacks development and authority that supports it, and we decline to 10 reach it. 11 III. CONCLUSION 12 Because of the reasoning stated above, we affirm the district court’s revocation 13 of the kinship guardianship. Child shoul d have a loving home and not be relocated 14 unless it is in Child’s best interest. All parties appear to love Child very much. 15 However, it is important for Child to ha ve permanency and stability in his life. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

_______________________________ 1821 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 122 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 3

_________________________________ 4 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 5