THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

Randall Seels, as the Personal Representative for the 

Estate of Olivia Seels Smalls, Respondent,

v.

Joe Truman Smalls, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000044

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal From Berkeley County

Jack A. Landis, Family Court Judge

Opinion No. 28103

Heard March 16, 2022 – Filed August 3, 2022

AFFIRMED

Thomas Ray Sims Sr., of Orangeburg, for Petitioner.

Diane C. Current, of Current Law Firm, P.A., and Donald 

B. Clark, of Donald B. Clark, L.L.C., both of Charleston, 

for Respondent.

CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: This Court granted a petition for a writ of 

certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in Seels v. Smalls, Op. No. 

2020-UP-275, 2020 WL 5814601 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Sept. 30, 2020), which held 

the family court properly retained jurisdiction to rule on an action seeking the 
equitable apportionment of marital property after one of the parties, Olivia Seels 

Smalls ("Wife"), died during the pendency of the action. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Wife and her husband, Joe Truman Smalls ("Husband"), were married in 1978

and had three children. The couple accumulated significant assets, including the 

marital home located in Goose Creek, Berkeley County; eighteen rental properties; 

and multiple retirement, checking, savings, and investment accounts. Both parties 

worked during the marriage and contributed to the acquisition of the marital assets. 

The parties separated on or about July 2, 2014 when Wife left the marital 

home. On October 10, 2014, Wife filed the current action in the family court seeking 

an order that would, inter alia, (1) allow her to live separate and apart from Husband 

pendente lite and permanently, (2) restrain Husband from harassing her or cancelling 

her health insurance, (3) permit her to enter the marital home to retrieve her personal 

belongings, (4) provide separate support and maintenance and/or alimony pendente 

lite and permanently, and (5) equitably apportion the marital property. 

Wife alleged she was in poor health and had been subjected to an extended 

pattern of abusive behavior from Husband, which escalated after she underwent 

surgery for lung cancer in 2013. Wife also alleged Husband committed adultery at 

various times during their marriage. Husband filed an answer denying the allegations 

and asserting counterclaims. He likewise sought a divorce and equitable 

apportionment of the marital assets. The parties engaged in mediation, but Wife 

suffered a recurrence of cancer and they never formally entered into a signed 

agreement resolving their dispute.

Wife passed away unexpectedly on December 17, 2015. Wife's brother, 

Randall Seels ("Seels"), was subsequently appointed the personal representative of 

Wife's estate. Seels moved to be substituted as the plaintiff in the case. Husband, 

however, sought dismissal of the action, arguing the entire matter had abated upon 

Wife's death. 

By order filed April 26, 2016, the family court granted the motion to substitute 

Seels as the plaintiff and ruled the claim for equitable apportionment, unlike claims 

for divorce or support, did not abate upon Wife's death. The family court explained: 

South Carolina case law provides that, although the 

issues of divorce and support are abated if one spouse dies 

during the pendency of the case, the issue of property 

division is not abated, each party's interest in the marital 
property becomes vested and fixed upon the filing of the 

marital litigation and the Family Court retains jurisdiction 

to identify and apportion the marital property[.]

Thereafter, following a hearing on several motions filed by Seels, the family 

court issued an order in November 2016 that set a schedule to complete discovery, 

required the parties to attend mediation, and asked the parties to identify the potential 

witnesses for trial (should mediation fail). The family court noted it had rejected 

Husband's oral objection that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

because Wife died before a written agreement was reached between the parties.

The family court heard the case on the merits in May 2017. On September 

28, 2017, it issued a final order equitably apportioning the parties' marital property 

into 50/50 shares. The court again noted that it had denied Husband's motions to 

dismiss the matter based on a purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Husband appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the family court's rulings 

regarding jurisdiction and equitable apportionment. Seels v. Smalls, Op. No. 2020-

UP-275, 2020 WL 5814601 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Sept. 30, 2020). This Court granted 

Husband's petition for a writ of certiorari, which challenged only whether the family 

court had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the issue of equitable apportionment. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the 

general class to which the proceedings in question belong." Majors v. S.C. Sec.

Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 159, 644 S.E.2d 710, 713 (2007). A judgment from a court 

that does not have subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio. Kosciusko v. Parham, 

428 S.C. 481, 492, 836 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Ct. App. 2019).

"The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Byrd v.

McDonald, 417 S.C. 474, 478, 790 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Ct. App. 2016) (citation 

omitted). "The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the sovereign creating it," so 

reference must be made to local law, such as the constitution and the laws of the 

state. Peterson v. Peterson, 333 S.C. 538, 547–48, 510 S.E.2d 426, 431 (Ct. App. 

1998) (citation omitted).

The subject matter jurisdiction of the family court and the probate court are

set forth in the South Carolina Code. See generally S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530 

(2010 & Supp. 2021) (family court); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-302 (2022) (probate 

court). Consequently, the current appeal necessarily involves a question of statutory 
interpretation. See Singh v. Singh, 434 S.C. 223, 229, 863 S.E.2d 330, 333 (2021) 

(recognizing "family courts are statutory in nature and therefore possess only that 

jurisdiction specifically delegated to them by the South Carolina General 

Assembly"); Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160, 169, 712 S.E.2d 408, 412 (2011) (observing 

the probate court is not a constitutional court and has only such jurisdiction as may 

be provided by the General Assembly, consistent with article V, section 12 of the 

South Carolina Constitution); see also S.C. Const. art. V, § 12 ("Jurisdiction in 

matters testamentary and of administration . . . shall be vested as the General 

Assembly may provide, consistent with the provisions of Section 1 of this article."). 

The proper interpretation of a statute presents a question of law. Town of

Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008). 

Questions of law involving subject matter jurisdiction and statutory 

interpretation are reviewed de novo, without deference to the lower courts. See id.

("[T]his Court reviews questions of law of law de novo."); see also Singh, 434 S.C. 

at 228, 863 S.E.2d at 332 ("Generally, appellate courts review the decision of the 

family court de novo, with the exception of evidentiary and procedural rulings."). 

III. DISCUSSION

As previously noted, Wife initiated this action in the family court for, inter 

alia, equitable apportionment of the marital assets. It is undisputed that the family 

court had subject matter jurisdiction over this issue at the time the pleadings were 

filed. Husband, however, contends the court of appeals erred in holding the family 

court retained its exclusive jurisdiction to equitably apportion the marital property 

because the action abated upon Wife's death and the probate court acquired exclusive 

original jurisdiction over her assets. 

Seels asserts, in contrast, that the court of appeals correctly followed existing 

precedent in affirming the family court's ruling that claims for equitable 

apportionment do not abate upon the death of a party. Seels maintains the family 

court retained its jurisdiction to substitute the personal representative of Wife's estate 

for Wife and issue a ruling identifying and apportioning the marital property. Seels 

states that, once this process was completed, the probate court, in exercising its 

exclusive original jurisdiction over Wife's estate, would then be positioned to make 

the decisions regarding the ultimate disposition of any of Wife's property that was 

included in her estate. We agree with Seels.

We shall first examine the statutes governing the jurisdiction of the family 

court and the probate court, as well as provisions allowing concurrent jurisdiction, 
before turning to a consideration of principles of statutory interpretation and existing 

precedent. 

A. Family Court's Jurisdiction

In section 63-3-530 of the South Carolina Code, the South Carolina General 

Assembly has statutorily vested the family court with "exclusive jurisdiction" over 

"domestic matters," including actions for the equitable apportionment of marital 

property: 

(A) The family court has exclusive jurisdiction:

 . . . .

(2) to hear and determine actions for divorce a vinculo 

matrimonii, separate support and maintenance, legal 

separation, and in other marital litigation between the 

parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable 

rights of the parties in the actions in and to the real and 

personal property of the marriage and attorney's fees, if 

requested by either party in the pleadings[.]

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(2) (2010) (emphasis added). Jurisdiction to identify 

and determine a party's rights to marital property is just one of forty-six areas of 

exclusive jurisdiction enumerated in subsection (A).

The family court's exclusive jurisdiction over equitable apportionment 

extends to marital property; it has no jurisdiction over nonmarital property. S.C. 

Code Ann. § 20-3-630(B) (2014). "Marital property" is defined as "all real and 

personal property [that] has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and 

[that] is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation as 

provided in Section 20-3-620 regardless of how legal title is held," except for certain 

classes of property that constitute nonmarital property (e.g., inherited items, gifts 

from a party other than the spouse, property acquired prior to marriage, property 

excluded by contract). Id. § 20-3-630(A) (emphasis added). 

The family "court shall make a final equitable apportionment between the 

parties of the parties' marital property upon request by either party in the pleadings" 

that seek a divorce, separate support and maintenance, or the disposition of the 

property when a prior court lacked jurisdiction, or "in other marital litigation 

between the parties." Id. § 20-3-620(A). 
Wife's initiation of an action for divorce and equitable apportionment qualifies 

as "marital litigation." See id.; see also Brown v. Brown, 295 S.C. 354, 358, 368 

S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Marital litigation is litigation which seeks to alter 

or terminate the marital status of the parties."). 

Section 20-3-610 provides each spouse has a "vested" right in the "marital 

property," which is defined—and subject to apportionment "by the family courts of 

this State"—at the moment the marital litigation is filed:

During the marriage a spouse shall acquire, based 

upon the factors set out in Section 20-3-620, a vested

special equity and ownership right in the marital 

property as defined in Section 20-3-630, which equity 

and ownership right are subject to apportionment

between the spouses by the family courts of this State at 

the time marital litigation is filed or commenced as 

provided in Section 20-3-620.

S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-610 (2014) (emphasis added).

B. Probate Court's Jurisdiction

The subject matter jurisdiction of the probate court is outlined in section 62-

1-302, which provides in relevant part that the probate court has "exclusive original 

jurisdiction" over the "estates of decedents, including . . . determination of property 

in which the estate of a decedent . . . has an interest":

 (a) To the full extent permitted by the Constitution, and 

except as otherwise specifically provided, the probate 

court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all subject

matter related to:

 (1) estates of decedents, including the contest of 

wills, construction of wills, determination of 

property in which the estate of a decedent or a 

protected person has an interest, and determination of 

heirs and successors of decedents and estates of 

protected persons, except that the circuit court also 

has jurisdiction to determine heirs and successors 

as necessary to resolve real estate matters, including 

partition, quiet title, and other actions pending in the 

circuit court[.]
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-302(a)(1) (2022) (emphasis added). 

C. Provisions Regarding Concurrent Jurisdiction

The South Carolina General Assembly has provided for several areas of 

concurrent jurisdiction among the family court, the probate court, and the circuit 

court. Section 62-1-302, the probate court's jurisdictional statute, contains several, 

including the one quoted above in subsection (a)(1) regarding the concurrent 

jurisdiction of the probate court and the circuit court. See id.

Concurrent jurisdiction is also referenced in subsection (c) of the same statute, 

which provides for the concurrent jurisdiction of the probate court and the family 

court over the following:

(c) The probate court has jurisdiction to hear and 

determine issues relating to [1] paternity, [2] common-law 

marriage, and [3] interpretation of marital agreements in 

connection with estate, trust, guardianship, and 

conservatorship actions pending before it, concurrent 

with that of the family court pursuant to Section 63-3-

530 [setting forth the family court's subject matter 

jurisdiction in domestic matters]. 

Id. § 62-1-302(c) (emphasis added). 

In addition, the family court's jurisdictional statute (section 63-3-530) 

contains a similar provision giving the probate court concurrent jurisdiction with the 

family court in only three specified instances involving paternity, common-law 

marriage, or the interpretation of a marital agreement:

(B) Notwithstanding another provision of law, the 

family court and the probate court have concurrent 

jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to 

[1] paternity, [2] common-law marriage, and 

[3] interpretation of marital agreements; except that the 

concurrent jurisdiction of the probate court extends 

only to matters dealing with the estate, trust, and 

guardianship and conservatorship actions before the 

probate court.
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(B) (2010) (emphasis added).1

D. Statutory Interpretation & Precedent

Because the Court is faced with several statutes potentially impacting the 

determination of jurisdiction in this matter, the Court must apply rules of statutory 

interpretation in accordance with established principles. 

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intent of the legislature." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 

(2000). The plain language of a statute is the best evidence of the legislature's intent. 

Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 538, 725 S.E.2d 693, 697 (2012). 

It is also a long-standing principle of statutory analysis that the implied repeal 

of statutes is not favored. Hodges, 341 S.C. at 88, 533 S.E.2d at 583. Rather, statutes 

touching upon the same subject matter must be read in harmony to give effect to 

each whenever possible, as it is presumed that the legislature is familiar with prior 

legislation and, if it intended to repeal an existing law, it would expressly do so. Id.

at 88–89, 533 S.E.2d at 583. "The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of 

a statute indicates that the statute should apply to all cases not specifically excluded." 

Id. at 87, 533 S.E.2d at 582 (citation omitted). 

In construing the interplay of the foregoing statutes, Husband argues section 

62-1-302 gives the probate court exclusive original jurisdiction over Wife's marital 

property because the family court action was abated upon Wife's passing and should 

have been dismissed. Husband asserts a case relied on by both the family court and 

the court of appeals, Hodge v. Hodge, 305 S.C. 521, 409 S.E.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1991), 

is distinguishable because (1) the death of the party in Hodge occurred later in the 

proceedings (on appeal), and (2) Hodge is outdated as the statutory law cited therein 

was later changed by the General Assembly. We disagree with Husband on both 

points.

In Hodge, a wife brought an action for separate support and maintenance and 

equitable apportionment. The family court identified and apportioned the marital 

property, and both spouses appealed. The husband died while the appeal was 

pending, and his estate was substituted as a party. The court of appeals (the "Hodge

court") considered "the issue of whether a spouse's vested interest in marital property 

 

1 This Court abolished common-law marriage prospectively in Stone v. Thompson, 

428 S.C. 79, 833 S.E.2d 266 (2019).
arising from marital litigation is divested by the death of the litigant's spouse." Id.

at 522, 409 S.E.2d at 437. 

The Hodge court stated the "linchpin" of its reasoning was the General 

Assembly's use of the word "vested" in section 20-7-471 (now codified as section 

20-3-610), which states the filing of marital litigation gives rise to a "vested" equity 

and an ownership right in marital property that are subject to apportionment by the 

family court at the time the marital litigation is filed. Id. at 524, 409 S.E.2d at 438–

39 (citing the former S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-471 (Supp. 1990)).

In considering whether the family court matter was abated by one spouse's 

death, the Hodge court relied on the statute setting forth the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the family court in domestic matters, section 20-7-420 (now 

reorganized as section 63-3-530), which provides the family court has "exclusive 

jurisdiction" over the settlement of legal and equitable rights of the parties to real 

and personal marital property in the course of marital litigation. Id. at 525, 409 

S.E.2d at 439 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420 (Supp. 1990)).

The Hodge court stated: "Since we hold that the wife's interest in the marital 

property was vested and therefore fixed by the institution of marital litigation, we 

hold that the only court which has jurisdiction to divide the marital estate is the 

Family Court, subject, of course, to appeal." Id. The Hodge court concluded the 

"action did not abate with respect to the issues relating to the equitable division of 

vested marital property." Id. The Hodge court observed that, although its decision 

"is necessarily based upon the statutory law of South Carolina, [the] decision [also] 

comports with the rule applied by the vast majority of the courts of this nation." Id.

We agree with the assessment of the court of appeals in the current matter that 

the timing of the husband's death in Hodge was not outcome determinative, and the 

simple reorganization of the applicable statutes in the South Carolina Code did not 

affect their underlying substance. Vested property rights are fundamental rights that 

can survive the death of a party, and they inure to the benefit of the party's estate. 

This result accords with other South Carolina precedent, which has recognized 

that pending actions for divorce and support abate upon the death of a spouse, while 

pending actions regarding the "vested" interest of each spouse in the marital property 

do not and remain, instead, within the exclusive purview of the family court. See 

generally Louthian & Merritt, P.A. v. Davis, 272 S.C. 330, 332, 251 S.E.2d 757, 758 

(1979) ("It is held by the overwhelming weight of authority that an action for 

divorce, being purely personal, terminates on the death of either spouse, and where 

the action for divorce is commenced, and one of the parties dies thereafter but before 
the entry of a final decree, the action abates and the jurisdiction of the court to 

proceed with the action is terminated."); Brown v. Butler, 347 S.C. 259, 264–65, 554 

S.E.2d 431, 433–34 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding the family court did not have 

jurisdiction over the wife's action to set aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance of 

property by her deceased husband, where the action was brought during the 

husband's lifetime but the purpose of the case was not to apportion marital property); 

Hillman v. Pinion, 347 S.C. 253, 257, 554 S.E.2d 427, 429 (Ct. App. 2001) ("This 

court has held that the death of one party to an action does not abate an action for 

equitable distribution." (citing Hodge, 305 S.C. at 525, 409 S.E.2d at 439)); Bayne

v. Bass, 302 S.C. 208, 209, 394 S.E.2d 726, 726–27 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding where 

a ruling granting a divorce was announced on the bench but the order was not yet 

signed and filed by the family court judge, the action abated upon the death of the 

wife because, until an order is filed with the clerk of court, it is subject to change by 

the judge and is not final).

The distinction is based on the historical recognition by courts that claims that 

are purely personal in nature abate upon the death of a party, whereas claims that 

primarily concern property interests do not—and a personal representative may, 

therefore, be substituted on behalf of the decedent's estate—because such actions 

can still achieve their primary purpose. See, e.g., Olofson v. Olofson, 625 S.W.3d 

419, 429–30 (Mo. 2021) (en banc) (making this distinction). In addition, the Hodge

court cited the tendency of many jurisdictions to allow actions regarding property 

issues to continue despite the death of a party. See Hodge, 305 S.C. at 525, 409 

S.E.2d at 439 (first citing Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Effect of Death of 

Party to Divorce Proceeding Pending Appeal or Time Allowed for Appeal, 33 

A.L.R.4th 47 (1984); and then 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 176–77 

(1983)). 

The family court's resolution of claims to marital property initiated during the 

lifetimes of the parties is a necessary complement and predicate to the probate court's 

proper administration of estates. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has 

specifically recognized this fact and discussed the need to conclude a matter 

identifying and apportioning the marital assets before administering the estate of a 

party, stating: "When a party to a pending divorce action dies before a final divorce 

decree is entered, the decedent's estate cannot be immediately distributed in probate 

because the extent of the property owned by the decedent is unknown." Oldham v.

Oldham, 247 P.3d 736, 744 (N.M. 2011). The New Mexico court explained:

For example, if a party to a pending divorce dies intestate, 

the domestic relations court must determine the extent of 

the decedent's separate property and share of the 
community property in order to determine what property 

will pass by intestacy. If a party to a pending divorce dies 

with a valid will, the domestic relations proceeding must 

first determine the property over which the decedent can 

exercise the power of testamentary disposition. If a 

decedent's will has a residuary clause or pour-over 

provision, the domestic relations proceeding must 

determine what property will pass via that residuary clause 

or pour-over provision. The domestic relations 

proceedings must therefore be completed first.

Id. 

Similarly, in Stone v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 270 S.C. 331, 335, 242 

S.E.2d 404, 405 (1978), a case that predates the statutory creation of South Carolina's 

family court, this Court noted Stone had appealed orders of divorce and contempt, 

and the executor of his estate had been substituted as a party after his death. 

Although the Court found Stone's death abated his counterclaim for a divorce and 

rendered contempt proceedings against him moot, it found Stone's "appeal may 

continue in favor of his estate to the extent the lower court's order affects the property 

rights of the parties." Id. at 335–36, 242 S.E.2d at 405–06. The Court stated, "The 

appeal continues 'for the ascertainment of whether (Mr. Stone's) property has been 

rightfully diverted from its appropriate channel of devolution.'" Id. at 336, 242 

S.E.2d at 406 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In other words, it was 

necessary to first properly determine Stone's right to marital property because it 

would impact the distribution of his estate.

Returning to the matter currently before the Court, we hold the court of 

appeals did not err in finding the family court retained jurisdiction to identify and 

apportion the marital property of the parties. The statutory provisions concerning 

the subject matter jurisdiction and procedures of the family court and the probate 

court can be read in harmony in order to give effect to all provisions.

In summary, section 63-3-530, governing the family court's subject matter 

jurisdiction, provides in subsection (A)(2) that the family court has "exclusive 

jurisdiction" to settle all legal and equitable rights regarding marital property. 

Importantly, in section 20-3-610, the General Assembly has confirmed that each 

spouse has a "vested special equity and ownership right in the marital property" that 

is subject to apportionment by the family court at the time marital litigation is filed. 

Further, the definition of "marital property" in subsection 20-3-630(A) provides 

"marital property" is all property acquired or owned by the parties as of the date 
marital litigation is filed, regardless of how it is titled, so marital property essentially 

springs into existence as a legally defined concept at that moment in time.

As to the probate court, subsection 62-1-302(a)(1) gives that court exclusive 

original jurisdiction over the estates of decedents, including a determination of the 

property in which the decedent has an interest. The General Assembly has provided 

the probate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family court in three 

instances—issues regarding paternity, common-law marriage, and the interpretation 

of marital agreements—to the extent they arise in the context of an estate action. 

Those circumstance are not present here. See generally Hodges, 341 S.C. at 87, 533 

S.E.2d at 582 ("The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of a statute 

indicates that the statute should apply to all cases not specifically excluded." (citation 

omitted)). 

In any event, a provision allowing concurrent jurisdiction is not an abrogation 

of jurisdiction by the family court. If the General Assembly had intended this result, 

it could have included this point in the plain language of the statutes governing the 

jurisdiction of the two courts. It did not do so, and principles of statutory 

interpretation do not favor implying such a result in the absence of any indicia that 

this was, in fact, the General Assembly's intent. See id. at 88–89, 533 S.E.2d at 583

(noting repeal by implication is not favored).

Because Wife initiated this marital litigation in the family court during the 

parties' lifetimes, the parameters of the marital property were already fixed and the 

family court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of equitable 

apportionment at that time. See Gilley v. Gilley, 327 S.C. 8, 10–11, 488 S.E.2d 310, 

312 (1997) ("The general rule is that jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state 

of affairs existing at the time it is invoked. If jurisdiction once attaches to the person 

and subject matter of the litigation the subsequent happening of events will not 

ordinarily operate to oust the jurisdiction already attached." (quoting Gardner v.

Gardner, 253 S.C. 296, 302, 170 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1969))). Wife's rights had already 

vested upon the filing of marital litigation, so it became incumbent on the family 

court to first conclude this matter in its exclusive jurisdiction so the probate court 

could then exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction over the distribution of Wife's 

estate. 

In addition to the lack of any overt intent by the General Assembly to divest 

the family court of jurisdiction in these circumstances, we note the General 

Assembly has not enacted any comparable statutory procedures for the probate court 

to follow in identifying and equitably apportioning marital property, as it has for the 

family court. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B) (2014) (enumerating an extensive 
list of fifteen factors for the family court to weigh in making the apportionment). 

Thus, the family court is in the best position to decide issues affecting marital 

property in light of the long-standing, detailed statutory procedures governing the 

family court's exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over this subject matter. 

IV. CONCLUSION

South Carolina statutes confer exclusive jurisdiction on the family court to 

equitably apportion marital property. There is nothing in the statutes governing 

either the family court or the probate court specifically abrogating that jurisdiction, 

and implied repeal is not favored. South Carolina precedent has found the death of 

a party does not abate the issue of equitable apportionment. Further, we note the 

family court is best suited to decide issues affecting marital property in accordance 

with long-standing statutory procedures, particularly where no comparable statutory 

procedures have been enacted for the probate court. Based on the foregoing, we

hold the court of appeals did not err in determining the family court properly retained 

jurisdiction to rule on the action for equitable distribution and affirm.2

AFFIRMED.

KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.

 

2 On appeal to this Court, Husband has challenged only the family court's subject 

matter jurisdiction. In light of our holding as to jurisdiction, the family court's ruling 

as to the merits of the equitable apportionment is conclusive.