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Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: WILLARD E. PLATT, GEORGE F. FREY, JR., OLIVER M. HIBBERD, PATRICK M. SHEA, 

HENRY C. GATLIN, F & G COMMODITIES, AND RALPH N. PETERS & CO. 

CITATION: 24 Agric. Dec. 248 

DOCKET NUMBER: 112 

DATE: MARCH 16, 1965 

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 

(No. 9673) 

In re WILLARD E. PLATT, GEORGE F. FREY, JR., OLIVER M. HIBBERD, PATRICK M. SHEA, 

HENRY C. GATLIN, F & G COMMODITIES, AND RALPH N. PETERS & CO. CEA Docket No. 

112. Decided March 16, 1965. 

Prior order amended -- Finding of fact -- Standing -- Application to dismiss 

-- Irreparable injury -- Denied (re Willard E. Platt)

In proceeding involving several co-respondents, prior consent order as to one 

respondent is amended to delete names of co-respondents in finding of fact, and 

application to dismiss pending cases of co-respondents because of alleged 

irreparable injury resulting from and prejudgment in aforementioned consent 

order, denied. 

Decision by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

In this proceeding under the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the 

complaint charges violations of the act by seven respondents. Respondents 

Platt, Frey, Gatlin and Ralph N. Peters & Co. waived hearing, admitted the facts 

alleged in the complaint and consented to the entry of decisions and orders 

against them. Respondent F & G Commodities is apparently defunct and the case 

against this respondent is being handled as a default. Respondents Hibberd and 

Shea filed answers denying the charges and a hearing as to these respondents has 

been postponed due to the illness of respondent Hibberd. 

The complaint charges the execution of "wash" or "fictitious" sales of 

futures in violation of the act and other violations of the act and regulations 

in connection with the execution of the transactions. 

The "Decision and Order With Respect To Willard E. Platt" was entered on 

February 4, 1965. The document recites that no hearing has been held with 

respect to any of the respondents but that this respondent had filed a 

stipulation in which he admitted the facts stated in the "Findings of Fact." The 

admissions of fact by respondent Platt included the facts set out in Finding of 

Fact 4 which is verbatim the admission contained in paragraph (4) of the 

stipulation filed by respondent Platt. This finding is as follows: 

4. On December 18, 1962, respondent Willard E. Platt in his capacity as floor 

broker received from respondent F & G Commodities an order or orders to purchase 

and to sell for the same account 19 tank cars of the May 1963 soybean oil future 

on the Chicago Board of Trade. Acting with knowledge that respondent Oliver M. 

Hibberd had purchased 17 tank cars of May 1963 soybean oil futures at 8.94 cents 

per pound from respondent Patrick M. Shea, respondent Platt filled part of the 

order (17 cars) by means of purported transactions with respondents Hibberd and 

Shea. In so filling such order or orders, respondent Platt, with the consent of 

respondents Hibberd and Shea, made entries on trading cards, which he turned in 
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to respondent F & G Commodities purporting to show a sale of 12 tank cars of May 

1963 soybean oil futures at 8.94 cents per pound to A. E. Staley Manufacturing 

Co. as opposite clearing member and a sale of five tank cars of May 1963 soybean 

oil futures at 8.94 cents per pound to John E. Brennan & Co. as opposite 

clearing member, the names of such opposite clearing members having been given 

to him by respondent Hibberd, the purchase of 17 tank cars of May 1963 soybean 

oil futures at 8.94 cents per pound from Hayden, Stone & Co., Inc., as opposite 

clearing member, such name having been given to him by respondent Shea. At the 

time respondent Platt so filled the order or orders it was understood by 

respondent Platt that respondents Hibberd and Shea would alter, or so cause to 

be altered, the records pertaining to the transaction between respondents 

Hibberd and Shea so as to reflect that respondents Hibberd and Shea traded with 

respondent 

Platt rather than with each other. The remainder of the order or orders 

received by respondent Platt from respondent F & G Commodities was filled by 

respondent Platt by a purchase of one tank car of the May 1963 soybean oil 

future at 8.96 cents per pound from William E. Casselman, a sale of one tank car 

of the same future at the same price to Joseph J. Drowinski, a purchase of one 

tank car of such future at 8.95 cents per pound from Oliver M. Hibberd, and a 

sale of one tank car of the same future at the same price to Lawler J. Joyce. 

After the issuance of the decision and order as to Platt containing the 

finding above, respondents Hibberd and Shea filed separate petitions to the 

effect that they have been condemned without a hearing and requesting that the 

decision and order as to Platt be rescinded or altered to delete references to 

respondents Hibberd and Shea and that the complaint be dismissed as to them. 

The petitions claim that these respondents had no opportunity to object to the 

entry of the finding of fact protested, that no hearing was held, that they have 

been irreparably injured, that the Secretary of Agriculture has prejudged the 

cases of respondents Hibberd and Shea by making the contested finding and that 

they have been deprived of due process of law. 

Complainant filed a reply to the petitions. 

The decision and order with respect to respondent Willard E. Platt is plainly 

labelled as such in the heading of the document. Too, the "Preliminary 

Statement" recites that no hearing had been held as to any of the respondents

and that respondent Platt had submitted for filing a stipulation admitting the 

facts contained in the "Findings of Fact." So that it is clear from the document 

that the findings are merely the recital of Platt's admissions and that the 

document is a decision and order with respect only to respondent Platt. Of 

course Finding of Fact 4 has no binding effect, or any effect, as to respondents 

Hibberd and Shea. The complainant will have to make the case against these 

respondents at the hearing upon the complaint as to them. 

Respondents Hibberd and Shea contend that the complainant's recommendation 

that the stipulation of Platt be accepted was not served upon them and that they 

therefore had no opportunity 

to object. Platt filed the stipulation n1 in the record on January 25, 1965, 

and a copy of the stipulation containing the admitted facts set out in the 

"Findings of Fact" was served upon counsel for each of the two petitioning 

respondents on January 27, 1965, about eight days before the entry of the 

consent decision and order. The filing of the stipulation was done, of course, 

to have an order issued which was based thereon. No objections were received 

from counsel for either respondent until the petitions were received February 

19, 1965. Respondents also attack the decision with its stipulated findings of 

fact because Platt admitted, in connection with charges other than those 

involving respondents Hibberd and Shea, matters which he had previously denied 

in an affidavit filed in connection with an answer filed by respondent F & G 
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Commodities. As we pointed out above, however, the findings of fact apply only 

to respondent Platt and respondents Hibberd and Shea will have the opportunity 

to attack any evidence introduced against them in the hearing upon the charges 

as to these two respondents. We do not see, then, standing on the part of 

Hibberd and Shea, to challenge the truthfulness of the admissions of fact by 

Platt when such admissions were made and accepted only for the disposition of 

the case against Platt. 

n1 § 0.4(b) of the rules of practice (17 CFR § 0.4(b)) provides that at 

any time after the issuance of the complaint and prior to the hearing the 

Secretary may allow a respondent to consent to an order. "In so 

consenting, the respondent must submit, for filing in the record a 

stipulation or statement in which he admits at least those facts necessary 

to the Seretary's jurisdiction and agrees that an order may be entered 

against him. Upon a record composed of the complaint and the stipulation 

or agreement consenting to the order, the Secretary may enter the order 

consented to by the respondent, which shall have the same force and effect 

as an order made after oral hearing." 

Basically, respondents seem to think that there is something wrong or 

unlawful about the acceptance of an admission of facts from one of several corespondents in an administrative proceeding for the sole purpose of disposing of 

the case against that co-respondent. We do not understand that to be the case. 

The petitions are dismissed except that to make it clear beyond question that 

the Finding of Fact 4 applies only to respondent Platt, the references to 

respondents Shea and Hibberd protested by these respondents are deleted and that 

the finding is amended to read as follows: 

"4. On December 18, 1962 respondent Willard E. Platt in his capacity as floor 

broker received from respondent F & G Commodities an order or orders to purchase 

and sell 

for the same account 19 tank cars of the May 1963 soybean oil future on the 

Chicago Board of Trade. Respondent Platt filled orders for 17 cars through 

arrangements with other floor traders. The remainder of the order or orders 

received by respondent Platt from respondent F & G Commodities was filled by 

respondent Platt by a purchase of one tank car of the May 1963 soybean oil 

future at 8.96 cents per pound from William E. Casselman, a sale of one tank car 

of the same future at the same price to Joseph J. Drowinski, a purchase of one 

tank car of such future at 8.95 cents per pound from Oliver M. Hibberd, and a 

sale of one tank car of the same future at the same price to Lawler J. Joyce." 

Copies hereof shall be served upon complainant, respondents Hibberd, Shea and 

Platt and upon the contract markets. 

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