COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

BETTY JOHNSON BRANDON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2382-95-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 OCTOBER 1, 1996 

CITY OF DANVILLE DIVISION 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 W. Clarke Whitfield, Jr. (Turner, Haskins & 

Whitfield, on brief), for appellant. 

 James R. Saul, City Attorney, for appellee. 

 Betty Johnson Brandon (appellant) appeals the trial court's 

decision to terminate her residual parental rights pursuant to 

Code § 16.1-283(C). Appellant contends that "clear and 

convincing evidence" did not support the trial court's decision. 

 We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment. 

 "Code § 16.1-283 embodies the statutory scheme for the 

termination of residual parental rights in this Commonwealth." 

Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995). 

 Code § 16.1-283(C), the subsection under which the trial court 

terminated appellant's parental rights in this case, states: 

 The residual rights of a parent or parents of 

a child placed in foster care as a result of 

court commitment, an entrustment agreement 

entered into by the parent or parents or 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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other voluntary relinquishment by the parent 

or parents may be terminated if the court 

finds, based upon clear and convincing 

evidence, that it is in the best interests of 

the child and that: 

 1. The parent or parents have, without 

good cause, failed to maintain contact with 

and to provide or substantially plan for the 

future of the child for a period of twelve 

months after the child's placement in foster 

care notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to communicate with the parent or 

parents and to strengthen the parent-child 

relationship; or 

 2. The parent or parents, without good 

cause, have been unwilling or unable within a 

reasonable period not to exceed twelve months 

to remedy substantially the conditions which 

led to the child's foster care placement, 

notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to such end. 

(Emphasis added). 

 We are mindful of the principle that "[t]he termination of 

residual parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible 

action." Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 12 Va. 

App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991). However, this Court 

has "consistently held that the child's best interest is the 

paramount concern." Lecky, 20 Va. App. at 311, 456 S.E.2d at 

540. "It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to 

spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even 

if, a parent will be capable of resuming responsibilities." Id.

at 312, 456 S.E.2d at 540. 
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 Our standard of review in this case is well-settled: 

 On review, a trial court is presumed to have 

thoroughly weighed all the evidence, the 

statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child's best 

interests. Furthermore, the evidence is 

viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below and its evidence is 

afforded all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. In matters of a child's 

welfare, trial courts are vested with broad 

discretion in making the decisions necessary 

to guard and to foster a child's best 

interests. The trial court's judgment, when 

based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not 

be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong 

or without evidence to support it. 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)(quotations and citations 

omitted). 

 In this case, we hold that the record supports the trial 

court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights in 

Matthew's best interests. The trial court was not plainly wrong 

in concluding that appellant's actions met the requirements of 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2). See Toombs v. Lynchburg Div. of 

Social Svcs., 223 Va. 225, 288 S.E.2d 405 (1982). Appellant "did 

not maintain contact with the child or the agency on a regular 

basis," Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 669, 347 S.E.2d 

188, 192 (1986), and appellant visited the child sporadically, 

including only twelve times over a two year period. "The record 

discloses that there were ample services offered and available to 

[appellant]," but she chose not to take full advantage of them. 
 -4- 

Id. at 670, 347 S.E.2d at 192. 

 Furthermore, a professional counselor testified that 

Matthew, who has been in Social Services' custody for almost 

eight years, would be harmed by engaging in an emotional 

relationship with appellant. Although the counselor strongly 

confronted appellant in 1992 about the need to consistently 

"follow through" with Matthew, appellant was either unwilling or 

unable to do so on an extended basis after 1992. Another 

therapist stated that appellant had difficulty in attending 

therapy sessions outlined in a written agreement between 

appellant and the Division of Social Services. 

 The parties acknowledge appellant's interest in maintaining 

custody of Matthew. See Banes v. Pulaski Dep't of Social Svcs., 

1 Va. App. 463, 467, 339 S.E.2d 902, 905 (1986). Appellant 

recently completed a parenting class while incarcerated and 

testified that she possessed a newfound ability to care for 

Matthew. However, despite appellant's love for her child, the 

actions she took since 1988 to provide Matthew with a long-term, 

stable, and safe home environment have proved unsatisfactory. 

The facts of this case stand in contrast to those cases where a 

parent displayed a passionate interest in maintaining contact 

with a child placed into foster care or where a parent 

substantially remedied the conditions leading to the child's 

placement into foster care. See, e.g., Edwards v. County of 

Arlington, 5 Va. App. 294, 312, 361 S.E.2d 644, 654 (1987). 
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Furthermore, in this case, appellant's failures were without 

"good cause." See Logan, 13 Va. App. at 130, 409 S.E.2d at 464. 

 Keeping in mind that "[o]ur function is not to substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial judge," Ward v. Commonwealth, 

13 Va. App. 144, 148, 408 S.E.2d 921, 923 (1991), we hold that 

the trial court did not err in this case. Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial court's decision. 

Affirmed.