NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0132n.06 F iled: Marc h 5, 2008 Nos. 07-1329, 07-1442 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
CH AR L ES R

AY MO ND L AWL ER, Plaintiff-Appellee (07-1329) Plaintiff-Appellant (07- 1442),
v. THE CI TY OF TAYL OR et al., Def endants-A

ppellees ( 07-1442), and TROY TORO, Def endant- Appellant (07- 1329). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT C OUR T FO R THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : MO OR E, GI L MA N, and SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. In this ex cessive- forc e ac tion, Office r Troy Toro cla ims that the district court er

red in de ny ing him qualifie d immunit y , and C harle s L awler claims that the district
c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g his c la ims a g a ins t th e City of Ta y lor . We a ff

ir m.
I.
O nt h e e v e n i n g o f

F e b r u ar y 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 , L aw l e r

dr o p p e d h i s g i r l f r i e n d o f f a t a b o w l i n g a l l e y, the n we nt to a bar wh e re he dr ank e ig ht t o te n b e e rs . D e te rr e d b y ne ith e r h is d

ru nk e n s ta te no r h isNos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 2 - two previous Ope rating Whil e Intox icated ( OWI ) conv i ct i o n s, L awler drove to his apa

rtment and eventua lly

drove to visit another g irlfriend . Shortly afte r midnight, Serg eant Jeff Witherspoon observe d L awler ’s ‘86 F ord spee ding a nd swerv in g

e r r a ti cally . Wit herspoon pulled L awler over, a nd L awler admitted he had be en drinking. Offic er Toro soon arr ived, and the t wo offic ers pe rfor med field sobriety

tests (which L awler

failed) and g ave L awler

a breathaly ser test (w hich showed a .20 blood-alcohol c ontent).
I n ta lki ngto t

he of fi c e rs , L awl e r a lt ern a te d b e tw e e n a c c e pti ngthe ine vit a ble and tr y ingto evade it. At tim es, he r esig ned himself to the conse quence s of a third OWI , saying, “ You might as well just take me to jail.” At o t h er t i m es, he was less submissive. He tried to play upon the sy mpathies of the of

fice rs by telling them he was he ading north “[t] o g et marr ied”—a dmittedly ly ing so that “they

might fe el sorry for [him] and let [him] g o home.” He then re peate dly asked Tor o (who drove L awler

to the pol ice station) to “drop [him] off at [ his] house.” L awler ’s pleas ha d no eff ect on the offic ers, a

nd when he arr ived at the station he a ppare ntly was not happy

to be there
. To ro e sc or

te d L awl e r i nto the bo ok in g ro om , h e lpe d h im r e mov e his c oat and tol d h im t o place his hands on a table. A s he and Tor o co n v ersed, L awler g estured w ith his hands, but Toro “kept telling [hi m] to turn around” and to “put [his] hands on the counter .” L awler did not like being t o ld to turn around, and w hen he obje cted Tor o “starte d g etting be lliger ent.” L awler “g ot tired of [Toro’s] y elling,” and in re sponse he c alled Toro a “pussy .” A videota

pe ca ptures what happene d
ne xt: L awl e r r a ise d h is l e ft arm sli g htl y and To ro ta c kle d him t o th e fl oo r f a c e -d ow n, str

ug g le d w ith him fo r a fe w mome nts a nd

str uc k h im f

or c e fu lly thr e e tim e s—

tw ic e sla mmi nghis kn e e int oNos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 3 - L awl e r’ s b a c k ( on c e wi th L awl e r’ s arm pu lle d b a c k at an aw kw ard ang le ) an d onc e hittin g him wi th his elbow. Thoug h L awler resisted being handcuff ed, Toro rema ined on top of hi m at all times, and L awler never fre ed himself fr om Toro’ s co n t ro l. Severa l other off icer s eventua lly

enter ed the booking r oom and helped ha ndcuff L awler , wh o co m plained about pa in in his arm. Two offic ers
escor ted him to the hospital for treatment of what turne d out to be a broke n arm.
Both L awler and Toro w ere punished for the ir ac tions that day . The City of Tay lor cha rg ed L aw le r w it

h o n e O WI c o u n t ( to w h ic h h e p le a d e d g u il ty ) an d o n e c o u n t o f a s s a

u lt in g , r e s is ti n g or ob s tructing a police of

fice r (whic h the city

later dismissed). Af

ter a n internal investig ation, the Taylor Police Depa

rtment dischar g ed Toro.
L awl e r f ile d a laws uit in M ic hig an s ta te c ourt a g a ins t th e c ity , th e Ta

y lor Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, Chief Thomas B onner a

nd Offic ers Tor o, Howell, C al d we l l , L ittle and Deguili, alleginga host of violations of fede ral a

nd state law. The defe ndants remove d the ca se to fede ral c ourt, then filed a motion for summary

judgme nt, invoking qualifie d immunit y and state g overnme ntal immunit y . The district court gra

nted s ummary

judgme nt to the municipality (bec ause L awler

prese nted no evidenc e of an unc onstitut ional policy ) and to a ll of the office rs save Toro (be cause none wa s involved in the principal al t er ca tion), but it denied immuni ty and summary

judgme nt to Toro on the fe dera l
e xce ssi ve -f

or c e and state a ssa ult c la ims
.Nos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 4 - II.
A.
Toro ar g ues that the district cour t should have gra

nted hi s summary -judg ment motion based on qualified immunity . I n consideringthis question, we m u s t read the fa cts—and watch the videotape—in the lig ht most favorable to L awler , then addr ess t wo questions: Does the e vidence
cre ate a triable issue of f

act ove r whe ther Tor o violated L awler ’s Four th Amendment rig hts when h e s e i z e d h i m ? A n d , i f

s o , w e r e t h o s e r i g h t s c l e a r ly e s t a b l i s h e d ? Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
The F ourth Amendment say s that a gov ernme ntal “seizure” of an individual must be “re asonable ,” a rule that applies t o an officer ’s us e of forc e during a booking pr ocedur e. See Phelps v. Coy , 28 6 F .3 d 29 5, 30 0– 01 (6 th Cir
. 20 02 ). F or c e in thi s se tti ng beco mes con stitut ion a lly excessive if it is “ objectively [un] rea sonable in lig ht of the fa cts and c ircumstance s confr onting” the office r. Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (inter nal quotation marks omitted).
Th e district cour

t corre ctly

applied this standard in de termining that a triable issue of fa ct exis ts over whe ther Tor o’s use of fo rc e wa s “objec tively rea sonable.” A re view of the videotape shows why . When the alterc ation occur red, Tor o and L awler wer e in the booki ng room of a police station, where L awler

ref used to comply

with Toro’s orde rs and c alled Toro a n offe nsive name. N o doubt, L awler ’s words a

nd actions per

mitt e d Toro to use some forc e to compel L awler ’s coope ration.Nos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 5 - B ut t he F ourt h A me ndme nt g ov e rn s mo re tha n ju st “ when ” for ce ma

y be a p p l i ed ; i t also g overns

“ ho w [t hat forc e] is carrie d out.” Id. at 395. The videotape of the incident, toge ther with L awler ’s
acc ount of the ver

bal sparr ing that prec eded it, would permit a jury to conclude that Toro’s use of fo rc e in t hr ow ingL awl e r t o th e fl oo r w a s disp ro po rt ion a te to any thr e a t he fa c e d f

ro m L awl e r. Whil e t h e v i d e o t a

p e s h o w s t h a t L aw l e r c o n t i n u a l l y r a i s e d h i s h an d , h e n e v e r r a i s e d i t i n a m e n a c i n g w a y. And while L awler

admits he insulted Toro, he denies ever threatening him. A triable issue of f act thus ex ists over the re asonable ness of Tor o’s initial decision to throw L awler to the floor.
Th e vid e ota

pe a lso un de rm ine s Tor o’ s cla im that his use of fo rc e , af te r h e thr e w L awl e r t o the floor, wa s rea sonable. A jury could fa irly

co n cl ude that, once Toro wa s kneeling on L awler ’s b ac k , i twa s gra tu i t o u s t o kn ee h i m i nt h e b ac k t wi ce an d

t o h i t h i m o n ce wi t h h i s el b o w. T h o u gh Toro disputes some of L awler ’s ac count, the video of the altercation would permit a jury to conclude that L a wl e r n e ve r p os e d a

thr e a t to To ro and

that T or o u se d o bje c tively un reas on a ble fo rc e in
rea ction to L awler ’s continued plea s for lenie ncy , verba l insult s and d runken resistance
. See ge ne ra lly Sc ott v . H arris , 127 S. Ct . 1769, 1775–76 (2007) ( rely ing o n a v i d eo t ape in a ssessing summary -judg ment evidenc e).
Toro cla ims that we must “allow[] for the f act that police officer s are often force d to make split-second judg me nts

— in circumstanc es that ar e tense , uncer tain, and ra

pidly evolving —about the amount of for ce that is necessa ry .” Graham , 490 U.S. at 397. True e noug h. But e ven if a situationNos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 6 - is “tense, unc erta in, and ra pidly evolving ,” that does not innoculate an of fice r fr om a charg e that he
c ro sse d th e lin e fr om s ub du ingan in div idu a l to a ssa ult inghim
. Th e sa lie nt p oin t is thi s: the vid e ota pe , tog e the r wit

h L awl e r’ s te sti mony

(i f b e lie ve d) , w ou ld permit a jury

to conclude that Toro’s serial s trikes, which resulted in a broke n arm, a ll occurr ed af ter L awl e r h a d b e e n s ub du e d a nd wh e n th e sit

uatio n w a s n o lon ger “te ns e , unc e rt a in, and ra pid ly
e vo lvi ng .” Ev e n if

Ta y lor ’s c ur re nt p oli c e c hie f, Da le Tamse n, is c or re c t th a t “ [w]he n s ome on e is starting to confront a

n office r it’s best to . . . take the subje ct down to the ground,” that is not all Toro did: He added two kne e strikes a nd an elbow ja

b for g ood measure . Fourth Amendment excessiveforc e in qu ir ie s r e qu ir e a “ c ar e f u l b a la n c in g ” o f

th e f o r c e u s e d

“ a g a in s t t

h e c o u n te r

v a il ing g overnme ntal interests at stake ,” id. at 396, and we have held that there is “simply no g overnme ntal int e re st in con tinui ngto b e at [an a rr e ste e ] af

te r h e ha [s] be e n n e utr a lize d, no r c ou ld a re a so na ble office r [t hink] there [i s],” Phelps , 286 F.3d at 301. Acc epting L awler ’s testimony as true a nd g iving his e vid e nc e the be ne fi t of a ll r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s, we c on c lud e that he ha s r a ise d a c og niza ble excessive-for ce c laim beca use a jury fairly could find that L awler n ev er p o sed a thre at to Toro’s safe ty (making Toro’s take-down ex cessive) and could f ind that he was not a

threat once he hit the floor (making T oro’s kne e strikes a nd elbow jab g ratuitous).
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso c or re c tly he ld t hat L awl e r’ s r ig ht t o be fr e e fr om s uc h f or c e wa s c le a rl y established. In Phelps , decide d two y ear s befor e this incid en t , we h eld t hat an of fice r’s use of g ratuitous forc e in a booki n g room —bey ond the point at which any threat could have be enNos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 7 - rea sonably

perc eived—violated the individual’s clear ly established rig hts. Id. at 302. Pr e c e d e nt t h us would have ma de it “cle ar to a reasonable office r [ in Toro’s posit ion] that his conduct wa s unlawful in the situation he confr onted.” Saucier , 533 U.S. at 202. Trying to sidestep this pre cede nt, Toro notes that Chief Tamsen did not think that Toro used excessive forc e, that Tamsen is a “hig hly qualifi ed and reasonable office r” a nd that “off

icer s of
rea sonable competence could di sag ree on this iss ue.” Malley v . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). B u tT a m s e n ’ s o p i n i o ni s h ar d l y d i s p o s i t i v e o f , an d i n d e e d m ay n o t e v e n b e r e l e v an tt o , t h e i n qu i r y. As to Toro’s de cision to throw L awler to the floor , Chi e f T a mse n a c c e pte d To ro ’s ve rs ion of e ve nts i nco n cl u d i n g t h at L aw l er wa s “c o n fr o n t [ i n g] ” To ro . T h ati s a l u x u ry we d o n o th av e a tt h i s s t age of the c ase. A s to Toro’s dec ision to st rike L awler three times afte r he forc ed him to the floor, Chief Tamsen of

fer s no expl anation why

such additional for ce w as nee ded. Rather than pol ling va rious office rs to asce rtain whe ther a rig ht i s cl ea rl y

established, more over, w e g ener allylook to “preexis ting law ,” Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), as established by decisions of the Supreme Court, this court and other c ourts, se e Ba k e r v. City of H am ilt on , O hio , 471 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2006). The “ hy pothetical re asonable office r” w e postulate to determ i n e whe ther Tor o should have known “ that his actions . . . wer e objec tively unrea sonable,” Scott v. Clay County, Tenn. , 2 0 5 F. 3d 867, 877 (6th Cir. 2000), is theref ore a n office r who is awa

re of the re levant ca se law. Be ca u s e o u r c as es cl ea rl y

es t ab l i s h edL aw l er ’s ri gh tt o b e f re e f ro m gra tu i t o u s fo rc e du ri n g b o o k i n g, see Phe lps , 2 8 6 F
. 3 d

a t3 0 2 , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtp r o p e r l y d e n i e d T o r o qu a l i f

i e d i m m u n i t y.Nos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 8 - B.
Tor o a ls o c o n te s ts th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f s u mm ar y ju d g me n t a

n d g o v e r nmental immunit y on L awler ’s state lawassault claims. Unde r Michigan l aw , an i ndividual may bring an
a ssa ult and batte ry c la im a g a ins t of

fi c ers who “u se [] mor e fo rc e tha n r e a so na bly ne c e ssa ry in eff ectingan ar

rest,” W hite v. City of Vassar , 403 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam), and “ actions which wo u l d normally constitute intentional torts are pr otected by g overnme ntal immunit y ” only if “those a ctions are justified,” Br e we r v . P e rri n , 349 N.W.2d 198, 20 2 ( Mic h. Ct. Ap p. 19 84 ). B e c a us e a tr ia ble iss ue of

fa c t e xists ov e r w he the r T or o u se d o bje c tiv e ly
un re a so na

ble fo rc e , th e dis tr ict c ourt c or re c tly de nie d T or o’ s summa

ry -j ud g me nt m oti on

on the se
c la ims a s w e ll.
III
. L awler’s ap p ea l fa res no better. He has wa ived any claims ag ainst the other of fice rs by raising only

municipal-liability

arguments in his brief. And his claims ag ainst the municipality lack merit. I n conclusory

terms, L awler

contends that the c ity

vio l at ed his constituti onal rig hts by char g ing him with obstructi o n , b y failing to terminate Tor o based upon pr ior misconduct and by fa ili nga de qu a te ly

to t ra in T or o. F or the re a so ns a ptl y re c og nize d by the dis tr ic t c ourt , th e se c la ims fa il a s a ma tte r of law: A ne utr a l ma g istrate fo un d pr ob a ble c a us e fo r t he ob str uc tio n c ha

rg e ; th e c ity in r e a lity did dis c ipl ine To ro fo r h is p ri or mis be havio r; and

the c ity tr a ins its off

ice rs on its compre hensive policy

barr i n g the use of e x cessive f orce . L awler

in the end off

ers no e vidence ofNos. 07-1329, 07-1442

Lawl er v. City of Taylor

- 9 - “an e x isting, unconstitutional municipal policy ” to which municipal liability could attac h. City of Ok la. City v . Tu ttl e , 4 71 U. S. 8 08 , 8 23 –2 4 ( 19 85 ). Hi s c la im the re fo re mus t f a il.
I V. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.