NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0379n.06 No. 08-3129 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. MA RI O D . D AV I S, De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B e fo re : ME RRI TT , CO OK , a nd WHI TE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s.
CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e . O n Ap ri l 26 , 2 00 6, a fe de ra l g ra

nd jur y c ha rg e d M a ri o D . D a vis wi th being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm in violation of 18 U.S .C. § 922(g )(1)
. After the district court de nie d h is m oti on

to s up pr e ss, Da

vis ple a de d g uil ty purs ua

nt to an a g re e me nt wit

h th e Go ve rnme nt. B ut at se nte nc ing , D a vis mov e d to wi thdr a w h is guil ty ple a . T he c ourt

de nie d th e mot ion

to withdraw a

nd sentenc ed Davis to fifty -five months in prison. Davis now appea ls the cour t’s denial of bo th h is m oti on

to s up pr e ss a

nd his mot ion

to w ith dr a w h is guil ty

ple a . We a ff

ir m.
I.
On the night of Fe bruar

y 23, 2006, office rs Phil M esser , J r., and Jason Bammann patrolled
a high- crime are a of Ma

nsfield, Ohio, in a police c ruiser. A t approxim ately 7:30 p.m., Messer andNo. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 2 - Ba mmann observe d a man, late r identified as Duane L arkins, emer g e from the bac k of a know n drug ho us e . L a rk ins wa lke d in fr on t of the of fi c e rs ’ ve hic le , re qu ir ing Me sse r to b ra ke in o rd e r t o avo id hitting him. Acc ording to B ammann’s testimony , when L arkins sawthe offic ers, he had a “ deer -inthe-he adlig hts kind of look [ and] p ro ce ed ed to pick up the pa ce” toward a vehicle pa

rked in a lot
acr oss the street. Af

ter telling Messer to notify the dispatch, Ba mmann exit ed the cr

uiser and c alled out for L arkins to stop and talk with him. But L arkins ig nored him, and c ontinued rapidly toward the par ked vehic le.
Whe n B a mma

nn dr e w ne a r, L a rk ins tur

ne d to fa c e the of

fi c e r w hil e ha lf

wa y ins ide the fr on tpasseng er- side of t he car, one hand conc eale d as thoug h “he [wer e] holding something in his hand.” Ba mmann observe d that the vehicle included “seve ral” other oc cupants. Af ter “ countless” or ders to show his hands, L arkins fina lly compli ed , an d Ba m m ann testified that he saw L arkins drop something—later identified a s a bagof cr ack c ocaine —inside the vehicle
. W h i l e at t em p t ing to ha

ndcuff L arkins at the ba ck of the car , Ba mmann order ed the other passeng ers to ra ise their hands. Eve ry one initially followed instructions, but B ammann noticed that the passeng er be hind the driver’ s seat—late r i dentified as Davis—pulled hi s hands down to his lap. Ba mmann testified that despite re peate d (three or four) order s to r aise his hands, Da vis “would put his ha nd s up . . . [but

the n] br ingthe m ba c k d ow n, ” a nd “ ke pt w a nti ngto f

us s a ro un d d ow n in

his la p a re a .” At that po int , M e sse r r e a c he d th e c a r a nd lik e wi se or de re d Da

vis to ra ise his ha

nd s. Da vis failed to c omply
.No. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 3 - Testimony

conflicts as to what occur red ne x t. Messer testified that Davis “reac hed bac k on the hea d board a

nd picked up a paper bag that had a beer can . . . [and] picked it up and then thre w it out of the [passenge r] window onto the gr ound.” Davis denied any contac t with a beer

can, a nd claimed that any fidg eting with his hands resulted from his attempts to tell the office rs that the doors
wer e locked. Messer then order ed him out of the vehic le and, a fter D avis ref used, pulled him outside the ca r and or dere d him to place his hands on the top of the vehicle a nd sprea d his leg s. During the pat- do wn , D a vis “ ke pt tr

y ing to tur

n ar ound a nd re a c h into his ba c k poc ke ts, ” re qu ir ing Me sse r t o g rab Dav i s ’s h an d s and hold them on top of the ve hicle. B y that time, other off

icer s arr ived and he lpe d h a nd c uf

f Davis
. Duri ng the pat- do wn , Mes se r dis c ov e re d a han dg un in D a vis ’s ba c k p oc ke t.
After the indictment, D avis moved to suppress all evide nce se ized from him, arg uing that the office rs had ne ither re asonable suspicion for the se arc h nor probable cause t o arr est him. Crediting the offic ers’ testimony

over D avis’s, the distri ct co u rt denied the motion, ruling that Messer’ s te sti mony re g a rd ingDa

vis tos sin g a

c a n o f b e e r f

ro m th e c a r e sta

bli sh e d pr ob a

ble c a us e to a rr e st h im fo r v io la tin g the op e n- c on ta ine r l a w, a nd bo th o ff ic e rs ’ t e sti mony

re g a rd ingDa

vis re pe a te dly dis ob e y ingor de rs a nd

pla c inghis ha

nd s w he re the y

c ou ld n ot b e se e n e sta

bli sh e d a re a so na ble ba sis for conducting a prote ctive pat- down under Te rry . The dist rict court thus conclude d that whether pursuant to a se arc h-incident-to- arr est, or a pr otective p at -d o wn, the g un was law fully discovere d and seized.No. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 4 - Once the cour

t denied his motion to suppress, Davi s p l ea d ed g uilty pursuant to a plea
a g re e me nt t

hat anti c ipate d a

re du c e d s e nte nc e fo r a c c e pta nc e of res po ns ibi lity . F ive -a

nd -a -h a lf month s late r , a f

te r th e G o v e r

n me n t a r g u e d f

o r a s e n te n c e a t th e h ig h e n d o f th e G u id e line s rang e, Davis ora lly

moved to withdraw his g uil t y p l ea , claiming that “a lot of thing s are being over stepped.” The c ourt denied D avis’s re quest, and this timely appea l followed.
II.
A.
Da vis a pp e a ls the de nia l of

his mot ion

to s up pr e ss, c la imi ngthat the of fi c e rs la c ke d b oth
rea sonable suspicion to stop and sea rch him and pr obable c ause to a rre st him. When a

district court de nie s a m o t i o n t o s u

p p r e s s e v i d e n c e , w e r e v i e w t h e c o u rt ’ s l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s d e n o v o , a n d its finding s of fa ct for clea

r er ror. United States v. Gunte r , 551 F.3d 472, 479 ( 6th Cir. 2009). A fac t finding is c le a r ly e r

r o n e o u s if o u r r e v ie w o f th e e v id e n c e le a v e s u s “ w it h th e d e f in it e a n d firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. ( q u o t i n g United States v. Navarro-Camac ho , 186 F.3d 701, 705 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). As a r ule, this court ac cords “ consider ab l e d ef er en ce” to the district court’s c redibility finding s. United St ates v. Mc Cauley , 548 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2008) (q u o t i n g United S t a t es v. C o oke , 9 1 5 F
. 2 s 2 5 0 , 2 5 2 ( 6 th C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) )
. B u te v e n u n d e r t h e c l e a r l yerr oneous standar d, our def ere nce w ill not ex cuse a

fac t finding ba sed on inconsistent testimony or that contra dicts the rec ord. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . D illar

d , 438 F.3d 675, 681 ( 6th Cir. 2006).No. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 5 - 1. First, the c ourt proper ly

conclude d that the offic ers ha d rea sonable suspicion to stop and conduct a pat-down se arc h of Davis. See United States v. Torres-Ramos , 536 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 2008). Ty

pically , the ambit of F ourth Amendment prote ction includes “br ief investig atory stops of persons or ve hicles that fa ll short of traditional arr est.” U n i t e d S t a t es v . C a m p b e ll , 549 F.3d 364, 3 7 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Lugman , 522 F.3d 613, 616 ( 6th Cir. 2008)). B ut under Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), an office r wit hout a wa rra nt may conduct suc h a stop wher e
rea sonable suspicion of c ri m i n al ac tivity exis ts. Arizona v. Johnson , 129 S.Ct . 781, 786 (2009); Cam pb e ll , 549 F.3d at 370. Mor eover , beca use “the motivation of a passeng er to e mploy violence to preve nt appre hension of . . . a crime
. . . is e very bit a s g reat a s that of the drive r,” w here an off icer
rea sonably

suspects cr iminal activity on the part of a passeng er, the office r may order the passeng er to e x it the vehicle or perf

orm a pat-down sea

rch. Johnson , 1 2 9 S
. C t
. at 7 8 7 (q u o t i n g Maryland v. W ilson , 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997)).
We a sse ss w he the r r e a so na ble su sp ic ion

e xists by loo kin g a t th e tot a lit

y o f the c ir c ums tanc e s. Cam pb e ll , 5 49 F .3 d at 37 1. I n o the r w or ds , f a c tor s th a t se e m benig n w he n c on sid e re d s e pa rate ly might prompt rea sonable suspicion whe n viewed c ollectively
. United States v. Pe rez , 440 F.3d 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2006). Circumstance s s u ch as an off icer ’s own obser

vations, directions fr om other of fi c e rs , a nd the natur e of

the a re a a nd the tim e of

da y du ringwh ic h th e a c tiv ity oc c ur re d a re a ll rele vant for our

revie w. Cam

pb e ll , 549 F.3d at 371. Along the burden- of-pr oof spec trum, this courtNo. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 6 - un de rs tand s r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

a s “ satis fi e d b y

a lik e lih oo d of c ri min a l a c tiv ity le ss tha n p ro ba ble
c a u s e ” a n d “ c o n s id e r a

b ly s h o rt o f s a ti s f

y in g a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f th e e v id e n c e s ta n d a r d.” Id. at 370–71.
Given the c ircumstance s in this case, we ag ree with the district c ourt’s conclusion that the office rs had re asonable suspicion to conduct the Terry sto p. As Da vis ur g e s, we be g in o ur

ana ly sis by focusing on the initial stop of L arkins. Davis does not dispute Bamm an n ’s t es t i m o ny that the events unfolded in a “we ll known drug are a” wher e “a lot of robber ies-ty pe incidents” took place, that the offic ers sa

w L arkins near a residenc e occupie d by a known drug traff icker , and that, upon
se e ingthe of

fi c e rs , L a rk ins a c te d s tart le d a nd “ pr oc e eded to pi ck up the pa c e ” to c ro ss t he str e e t. Whil e pre sence in a hig h-cr ime neighb o rh ood alone is insufficie nt to support a “re asonable , particula rized suspicion” that a c rime is afoot, the a rea at issue re mains a re levant fa ctor in our analy sis. Ca mpbel l , 5 4 9 F. 3 d at 3 7 1 (c i t i n g United States v. Pe arce , 531 F.3d 374, 383 ( 6th Cir. 2008)). F or example, in Illinois v. W ardlow , 5 2 8 U
. S
. 1 1 9 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , t h e S u p r e m e C o u rth e l d

tha t a defe ndant’s eva sive and unprovoke d flig ht, along with his presenc e in a hig h-cr ime are a, ar oused sufficie nt, rea sonable suspicion to lawfully stop the individual and conduct a pat-down. Id. at 124. Davis attempts to distinguish W ardlow by e mph a sizi ngthat th e ind ivi du a l th e re : (1) tr ie d to evade police by

flee ing in the opposite dire ction down a ga ng way and alley ; and (2) the offic ers we re
on na rc oti c s p a tr ol i n a

he a vy -n a rc oti c s- tr a ff

ic kin g a re a . H e re , D a vis a rg ues , L arkins me re ly

“ pr oc e e de d a t a fa st pa c e to the c a r p a rk e d in the pa rk inglot ” a nd

the of fi c e rs we re on

ro uti ne patr ol.No. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 7 - But the r ecor d clea

rly undermines Da

vis ’s ar g uments. Perhaps L arkins did not flee down an
a lle y wa y , b ut h e did

“ pic k u p th e pa c e ” in a

mann e r c on sis te nt w it h “ fl ig ht, ” did no t r e sp on d to Ba mmann’s commands to stop and talk, kept his hand c oncea led i n t h e car while ente ring the passeng er side of

the vehicle , and release d an object into the car. Ta king into ac count the ar ea a nd L arkins’s behavior , espec ially in r elation to the conce aled object, B ammann re asonably suspected criminal ac tivity
. When conducting a Te rry sto p , office rs may

take a ctions “re asonably nece ssary

to protect their per sonal safe ty

and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985). Given that Bammann rea s o n ably suspected L arkins of involvement in criminal ac tivity and noted that ther e we re othe r passe ng ers in the c ar, B ammann
rea sonably

require d Davis and the other passeng ers to keep their hands in view. See J

ohnson , 129 S. Ct . at 78 6– 87 ; W

ilson , 519 U.S. at 410–11 (ex tending to passeng ers the r ule that a police office r “may as a matter of c ourse order the driver of a la wfully stopped ca

r to exit his vehicle,” wher e the pa sse ng e r a

pp e a re d “ e xtre me ly

ne rv ou s” ); Un ite d St at es v . M oo re fie ld , 111 F.3d 10, 11 ( 3d Cir. 1997) (“ We hold that police office rs may constitutionally

order occupa nts of car s to rema in in the
ve hic le wi th t

he ir ha nd s u p in the a ir .” ). Th e Go ve rn me nt pe rs ua siv e ly po int s out that “ if be c a us e of the da ng er police fac e duringtraff ic stops, an offic er ma

y order a passe ng er f

rom a c ar w ithout any particula rized suspicion under [ W ilson ] , it necessa

rily follows that to maintain control during
a Te rry stop and subsequent a

rre st, an offic er ma

y rea sonably require a passe ng er to re main in a ca r with hands visible.” When Davis fa iled to obey the offic ers’ repe ated commands to keep his ha ndsNo. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 8 - wher e they

would be visible, it was rea sonable for the offic ers to re move him from the ca r to perf orm
a pr ote c tiv e pat- do wn . T hat pat- do wn le d to the dis c ov e ry

of the gun. Th us , th e c ourt pr op e rl y reje cted Da

vis’s argument to suppress on the g round that the officer s lacke d rea sonable suspicion.
2. Second, Da

vis arg ues that t h e officer s lacke d probable cause to seize him, vi olating the F ourt h A me ndme nt. We a g re e wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt

tha t be c a us e the of

fi c e rs ha d r e a so na

ble suspicion to perf

orm the pat-down sear ch, which y ielded the g un, it is not nece ssary to find that they
a lso ha d p ro ba

ble c a us e to a rr e st. Ne ve rt

he le ss, the c ourt re a c he d thi s iss ue a nd we a g re e wi th i ts de te rm inatio n. Whe the r pr ob a ble c a us e e xists tur

ns on wh e the r the “ ‘f

a c ts an d c ir c ums tanc e s w ith in [t he ar resting office r’s] knowledg e and of which they

had re asonably

trustworthy

information wer e sufficie nt to war

rant a prudent’ person to conclude that an individual either ha d committed or was committing an offe nse.” T o r r es -Ramos , 5 3 6 F. 3 d

at 5 5 5 (q u o t i n g Be c k

v . O hio , 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) . A seizure occ urs wher e “intentional inter fer ence with a per son’s liberty by phy sical for ce or a show of

authority . . . would cause a re asonable person c onsciousl y t o s u b m i t .” Pee te v. Metro po l. G ov ’t

of N as hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , 4 8 6 F
. 3 d 2 1 7 , 2 2 0 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 7 ). We reje ct Da vis ’s a rgume nt.
The district cour

t concluded that Messer c redibly testified that Davis disca

rded a can of

beer throug h the window of the car in violation of Ohio’s open conta iner law
. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §No. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 9 - 4301.62. That fa ct provided sufficient basis for finding probable cause. I n sum, the district court pr op e rl y de nie d D a vis ’s mot ion

to s up pr e ss.
B.
We reviewthe denial of a def endant’ s m o t i o n t o withdraw a g uilty plea f or abuse of discretion. United States v. Hay good , 5 49 F .3 d 1 04 9, 10 52 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) . A c ourt a bu se s it s discretion by

relying on c lear l y err oneous fa ct finding s, improperly applying the law, or usingan
err oneous leg al s t an d ar d
. Id. Fe d er al R u l e o f C ri m i n al P ro ce d

u re 1 1 al l o ws fo r w i t h dra wi n g a voluntarily enter ed guilty plea acce pted by the di strict court before sentenc ing w here “the de fenda nt
c a n s h o w a

f a i r a n d j u s tr e a s o n f

o r r e qu e s t i n g t h e w i t h d r a w a l
. ” F e d
. R
. C r i m . P
. 1 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( B )
. In
we ig hin g wh e the r a

de fe nd a nt a

rt ic ulate d a “f

a ir a nd jus t re a so n” fo r wit hd ra wi ng the ple a , th e Sixth Circuit adher es to a mult i -factor ba lancing test, assessing : (1) the amount of time that elapsed betwee n the plea a

nd the motion to withdraw; (2) the pre sence of a va lid reason f or fa ilure to move
ear lier; (3) w hether

the def endant a sserted or

maintained innoce nce; ( 4 ) th e c ir c u ms ta n c e s u n d e r ly ing entry of the g uilty

plea; (5) the def

endant’ s nature a

n d b ackgr ound; (6) the de fenda nt’s deg ree of pr ior e xpe ri e nc e wi th t

he c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m; a nd (7 ) po te nti a l pr e jud ic e to t

he g ov e rn me nt i f the cour t gr anted the motion. Haygood , 5 49 F .3 d at 10 52 . T he c la ssi c a pp lic a tio n o f R

ule 11(d)( 2)(B ) is ref

ug e for the def endant with “a

hastily enter ed plea ” made with “unsure he art a nd
c o n f u s e d mi nd.” Id. a t 1 0 5 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. Alex ander , 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 ( 6th Cir. 1991)).No. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 10 - Davis re lies on three points to support hi s case : (1) his three separ ate law y ers r esulted in no
c on tin uit y of le g a l re pr e se ntatio n an d ca us e d co nf us ion a nd mis un de rs tand ing ; ( 2) the te rm s o f h is plea a g ree ment d id not give him any benef it in ex chang e for

pleading g uilty ; and (3) the hear ing tr a ns c ri pts re fl e c t D a vis ’s la c k o f u nd e rs tand ing . We re

je c t th e se a rgume nts
. F a ta l to D a v is ’ s a

p p e a l is th e e xte n s iv e u n e xp la in e d d e la y b e tw e e n h is in it ia l p lea a nd the later motion to w ithdraw. Davis waited five-a nd-a- half months be fore seekingto withdraw his plea. This court has r epeat ed l y fo und no abuse of discretion whe re district c ourts denied long -dela y ed motions t o withdraw. United States v. Durham , 178 F.3d 796, 798–99 (6th Cir. 1999) (motion filed seventy -seve n day s after

entry of the plea ), see United States v. Valdez , 362 F.3d 903, 913 (6th Cir. 20 04 ) ( “ [De fe nd a nt’ s] un jus tif ie d 75 -d a y de lay , a lon e , su pp or te d the c ourt ’s de nia l of a mot ion to withdraw.” ), United States v. Bae z , 87 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 1996) (motion filed af ter sixt y -seve n d a y s), Uni ted St ates v . B as ha ra , 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (motion filed six wee ks
a ft e rw a rd , r e lyingon

the ru le that pr e c e de d Ru le 11 (d )( 2) (B ))
. Da vis ’s de lay

of tw e nty -t wo we e ks , or 154 day s, is too leng thy a delay for us to find that the di strict court a bused its discretion in denying his moti on to withdraw.
Moreove r, Davis offer s no persua sive excuse for this delay ; he neve r expressed disconte nt with the plea until sentenc ing, a nd, even at sentencing , failed to mention any adver se impact fr om havin g mul tip le a tto rn e y s. Ne ith e r d id h e ma int a in i nn ocence, on ly c ha lle ng ingthe str ic te r r e su lt in f e de ra l c ourt

a s o pp osed to st ate c ourt (“ I ’m jus t sa y ingfi ve y e a rs ou t of

my lif e fo r s imp leNo. 08-3129

Un ite d S tat es v . D av is

- 11 - po sse ssi on , w he n I

did n’ t hu rt no bo dy .” ). An d a lth ou g h D a vis argue s th a t he re c e ive d n o b e ne fi t from the plea

exchang e, he did r ece ive a thre e-le vel re duction for a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty
. The district c ourt confirme d at the plea c olloquy that Davis wa s satisfied with his counsel’s repr esentation, unde rstood his c onstitut ional rig hts, a nd that he acte d intelligently , knowing ly , and voluntarily . Davis di d mention that there wer e a f ew r ights he did not understand, but he c onfirmed that he under stood his constit utional r i gh t s, and both the Gove rnment and the court summarized Da vis ’s a pp e llate ri g hts . D a vis ’s nu me ro us c onvic tio ns su g g e st that he wo uld no t be a str a ng e r t o the proc eeding s, and the re cord r efle cts sufficie nt understanding of the c riminal proce ss on Davis’s part. The district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing the motion to wit hdraw
. III
. We affir m the court’s de nial of Davis’s motion t o suppress as we ll as the denial of his motion to withdraw.