\ .. 

SILEO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ,,_ OCT 1 S 20(}] 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS MICHAEtJ · 

EASTERN DIVISION CL:ERK O S W. DOBBINS 

U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 

TRADING COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA INC., 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

:IJ- ~- _j, DISTRICT COURT 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-C-3503 

Consent Order for 

Permanent Injunction and Other 

Relief 

I. BACKGROUND 

1. On June 28,2006, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("Commission" 

or "CFTC") filed its complaint against Defendant BP Products North America Inc. seeking 

injunctive arid other equitable relief, including a civil monetary penalty, for violations of the 

Commodity Exchange Act, as amended (the "Act"), as amended (the "Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et 

seq. (2002) (the "Complaint"). 

· 2. In particular, the Complaint alleges that Defendant BP Products North America 

Inc. ("BP" or "Defendant"), by and through its employees, engaged in acts and practices that 

constitute violations of the Act. In short, BP unlawfully attempted to manipulate and did 

manipulate the price of February 2004 TET physical propane by cornering the market for 

February 2004 TET physical propane. Further, BP also attempted to manipulate the price of 

April 2003 TET physical propane, again by seeking to comer the April 2003 TET physical '·, 

propane market. - -- -------~~~--~--- -- ---- ---------·--··-------------------------~----- --------------- ------ -------------------------
II. CONSENTS AND AGREEMENTS . 

3. BP hereby warrants and represents that the Board of Directors ofBP has duly 

authorized, in a specific resolution that is attached hereto, the entry of this Consent Order by BP. 

BP further agrees that the terms and qon,ditions of this_ Order are binding upon any BP subsidiary 

or BP business group or entity that operates with or provides services for BP (hereinafter referred 

to as "BP Entities") in the United States. 

4. BP agrees that in the event'it sells, merges, or transfers all or substantially all of 

its business operations or any part of the trading operations as they exist as of the date of this 

Order, whether such sale(s) is/are structured as a stock or asset sal~, merger, or transfer, they shall 

include in any contract for sale, merger or transfer a provision binding the purchaser(s) or any 

successor(s) in interest thereto to the obligations described in this Order. 

5. In order to dispose of all the claims and issues raised in the Complaint and to 

reach a full and final settlement between the parties without a trial on the merits or further 

judicial proceedings, BP: 

a. Consents to the entry of this Consent Order ofPermanent Injunction and 

Other Relief ("Order"); 

b. Affirms that it has read and agreed to this Order voluntarily, and that no_ 

threat, or promise other than as set forth specifically herein, has been made by the Commission 

or any member, officer, agent or representative thereof, or by any other person, to induce consent 

to this Order; 

c. Acknowledges service of the Summons and Complaint; 

d. Admits that this Court has jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of this ---------- ~-----·--·· ------~~----

.- -- ----------------------------

action pursuant to Section 6c ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1; 

2 
e. Admits that venue properly lies with this Court pursuant to Section 6c of 

the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1; 

f. Waives: 

1. Ail claims \Vhich may be available under the Equal Access to 

iustice Act ("EAJA"), 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000), relating to, or arising from, 

this action and any right under EAJA to seek costs, fees and other expenses relating to, or arising 

from this action; 

n. Any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the institution of this 

proceeding or the entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any 

other relief; and 

m. Any rights of appeal from this Order; 

g. Consents to the continued jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of 

enforcing the terms and conditions of this Order, to assure compliance with the Order, and for 

any other purposes relevant to this case; 

h. Agrees that neither it nor any of its agents or employees under its authority 

or control shall take any action or make any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any 

allegation in the Complaint or findings or conclusions in the Order, or creating, or tendjng to 

create, the impression that the Complaint or this Order is without a factual basis; provided, 

however, that nothing in this provision shall affect BP's (i) testimonial obligations, or (ii) right to 

take legal positions in other proceedings to which the Commission is not a party. BP shall take 

all necessary steps to ensure that all of its agents or employees understand and comply with this 

Order. Should BP issue a press release in connection with this Order or the ongoing civil and 

-------~-- ---~---- ---···------------~-~-~~------- ··-------~-------~--~ ~-------

3 
criminal investigations of the propane market, BP shall provide the text of the press release to the 

Commission at least twenty-four hours before its public release. 

6. By consenting to the entry ofthis Order, BP neither admits nor denies the 

allegations of the Complaint or the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw contained in this . 

Order, except as to jurisdiction and venue, which it admits. However, BP agrees, and the parties 

to this Order intend, that the allegations of the Complaint and the Findings of Fact made by this 

Court shall be taken as true and correct and given preclusive effect, without further proof, in any 

proceeding in bankruptcy or to enforce the terms of this Order. BP shall provide immediate 

notice to this Court and the Commission via certified mail of any bankruptcy proceeding filed 

by, on behalf of, or against it, and shall provide immediate notice of any change of address, 

telephone number, or contact information. 

Compliance & Ethics Program 

7. BP represents that it has implemented and will continue to implement a 

compliance and ethics program designed to detect and prevent violations of the Commodity 

Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., by any BP director, officer, employee or agent, in accord 

with the general standards outlined in Section 8B2.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 

Organizations which defines an Effective Compliance and Ethics Program, In particular, BP 

. represents that it has undertaken, or agrees that it will undertake, the steps set forth in 

Attachment A. 

8. BP' s failure to comply with the conditions and requirements set forth in 

Attachment A will constitute a breach of this Consent Order and the Commission may institute a 

contempt action or any other action it is authorized to commence against BP fo:t"_ suc:Q_f.l!Pure. _________________ _ ----~~----- --------- ----------- -------------. -------------------- --

4 
Independent Monitor 

9. BP, the CFTC, and the U.S~ Department of Justice, Fraud Section (the 

"Department") shall use mutual best efforts to identify a mutually acceptable person, who, 

subject to the approval of the Court, shall serve as the Monitor. 

10. BP, the BP Entities and their directors, officers, employees, and agents shall · 

cooperate fully With the Monitor, as further described in Attachment B. 

. 11. BP's, the BP Entities' and their directors', officers', employees', and agents' failure 

to comply with the conditions and requirements set forth in Attachment B wi11 constitute a breach 

of this Consent Order and the Commission may institute a contempt action or any other action it is 

authorized to commence against BP for such failure. 

Cooperation 

12. For a period of three (3) years commencing upon the Court's entry of this Consent 

Order, BP and the BP Entities agree to cooperate fully with the Commission, the Department, an 

independent monitor (described in "Attachment B"), any "registered entity" as that phrase is 

defined in 7 U .S.C. § 1 a(29) or any "self-regulatory organization" as that phrase is defined in 17 

C.P.R. § 1.3( ee), as directed by the Commission or the Department, and an independent monitor 

(described in Attachment B), whenever any such entity, agency, or monitor investigates whether 

BP, the BP Entities, orany of their directors, officers, employees, agents or consultants may have:. 

(1) engaged in any potential act of manipulation, attempted manipulation, cornering, or attempted 

cornering relating to the price of a "commodity," as commodity is defined in Section 1 (a) of the 

CEA, in interstate commerce, or for future delivery; (2) knowingly delivered or caused to be 

-------------------------- - ---------- -- - -- - ~- - -- .. --------~-----·------

---------- ·------- ----··-·· --~------- -- - -- - - -------

delivered any false, miSleading, or knowingly inaccurate information that could tend to affect the 

5 
price of a commodity in interstate commerce; and/or (3) made any false or misleading statements 

to any registered entity (collectively referred to as "Manipulative Conduct"). BP and the BP 

Entities agree that their cooperation shall include, but is not limited to, the following: 

a. BP and the BP Entities shall truthfully disclose all information with 

respect to the activities ofBP and the BP Entities directors, officers, employees, agents or 

consultants, concerning all matters relating to any alleged Manipulative Conduct, about which 

BP, the BP Entities or their directors, officers, employees, agents or consultants have any 

knowledge or about which the Commission or Department shall inquire. BP and the BP Entities 

shall be deemed to "have any knowledge" of alleged Manipulative Conduct ~hen information 

about such alleged Manipulative Conduct is known to a representative from any BP legal 

division, a representative of a BP compliance group, or any individual responsible for the 

supervision of trading managers or his or her supervisor(s). This obligation oftiuthful disclosure 

includes the obligation of BP and the BP ~ntities to provide to the Commission, the Department, 

or any.agency designated by the Department or the Commission, upon request, any document, 

record, or other tangible evidence relating to such Manipulative Conduct and internal compliance 

controls about which the Commission shall inquire ofBP or the BP Entities. 

b. Upon request of the Commission or the Department, with respect to any 

issue relevant to Manipulative Conduct or internal compliance controls, BP and the BP Entities 

shall designate knowledgeable employees, agents, or attorneys to provide to the Commission or · 

the Department the information and materials described in Paragraph 12(a) above, on behalf of 

BP and the BP Entities. It is further understood that BP and the BP Entities must at all times 

provide complete, truthful, and accurate information. 

- - -- ----- - -- -- ---- ---·-------·--·----·-------------- -------~-- ----- ----------- ----------- -·-···-----~-

6 
c. With respect to any issue relevant to the Commission's or Department's 

investigation of any alleged Manipulative Conduct, BP and the BP Entities shall use reasonable 

efforts to make available for interviews or testimony, as requested by the Commission or the 

Department, current or former directors, officers, employees, agents and consultants ofBP or the 

BP Entities, or any of their current or former subsidiaries, affiliates, or parent companies. This 

undertaking also includes identification of witnesses who, to the knowledge ofBP, may have 

material information regarding the matters under investigation. 

d. . . With respect to any information, testimony, document, record, or other 

tangible evidence provided to the Commission or the Department pursuant to this Order, BP and 

the BP Entities consent to any and all disclosures to other government agencies, whether 

agencies of the United States or a foreign government, as the Department and the Commission 

shall deem appropriate provided thatppor to providing any information, the Commission will 

seek reasonable assurances from the agency or foreign government that it will abide by the terms 

ofthis Agreement and keep the information confidential except as may be necessary to discharge 

its official duties. 

HI. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

13. The Court, being fully advised in the premises, finds that there is good cause for 

the entry of this Order and that there is nojust reason for delay. The Court therefore directs the 

entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a permanent injunction and ancillary relief 

pursuant to§ 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § Ba-1, as set forth herein. 

I. Introduction 

14. From February 5, 2004, through March 12,2004, employees of subsidiaries ofBP ... - -------·····---------------·--·-------~-------~----- ------ ---------- -------- -- ------ --- -----------------------------·-·----------~------------·--------

orthe BP entities (hereinafter collectively referred to as "BP") conspired to manipulate the 

7 
February 2004 propane market for propane transported in the TEPPCO pipeline system 

(hereinafter referred to as "TET" propane). As a result, the price ofTET propane was artificial 

and inflated from February 12, 2004 through March 2, 2004. 

15. In accordance with the plan, the employees used the financial resources ofBP to 

buy contracts for substantially all of the February 2004 TET propane supply to become the 

dominant owner, or "long-holder," ofTET propane. The employees, at specific times thereafter, 

withheld supply from the market while continuing to purchase contracts to own more than the 

suppl)' ofTET propane in the TEPPCQ.system. BP's dominant ownership position, continued 

purchases of said propane subsequent to obtaining such a position, and withholding of supply at 

specific times thereafter, all distorted and made artificial the price ofTET propane during 

February 2004. As a result of the empl~yees' conduct, by the end of February 2004, BP acquired 

ownership of substantially all ofthe available supply ofFebruary 2004 TET propane in the 

. United States. The employees executing the plan thus cornered the market for February 2004 

TET propane, distorted and made artificial the price of February 2004 TET propane, and sold a 

portion of the supply atan artificial and inflated price. 

II. Background 

A. TET Propane Market 

16. Propane is a natural gas liquid ("NGL''). Propane is used by petrochemical 

industries to produce plastics and is also used as a source of energy for residential and 

commercial purposes. Residential and commercial demand for propane is seasonal. Typically, 

propane inventory levels are built up during the spring and summer. Then, during the winter 

heating season, propane consumption is high, resulting in lower inventory levels at the end of the 

----------·--·-----.- ----- -··-----~---=---··-- ---~- --·-

. heating season in February and March. 

8 
17. Residential and connnercial consumption of propane is greatest in the Northeast 

and Midwest sections of the United States. The primary means by which propane is delivered to 

tl~ese regions is the Texas East~m Products Pipeline Company, LLC ("TEPPCO") pipeline 

system, which i~ the only pipeline transporting propane from the TEPPCO storage facility in 

Mont Belvieu, Texas, to the Northeast and Midwest. Propane in the TEPPCO system is 

identified as TET propane. Propane in storage facilities at Mont Belvieu that is not maintained 

by TEPPCO or transported in the TEPPCO pipeline is referred to as "non-TET" propane. 

18. TET propane is a connnodity as defined in Title 7, United States Code, Section 

1(a)(4), and TET propane that flows through the TEPPCOpipeline crosses various states. TET 

propane is a commodity in interstate connnerce. 

19. TETpropane is predominantly traded "over-the-counter" in one of three ways: (1) 

direct, bilateral transactions between two parties; (2) voice broker transactions; and (3) el~ctronic 

transactions on the "Chalkboard" trading platform.1 In voice broker transactions, the brokers 

negotiate and execute deals on behalf of a buyer and seller. In Chalkboard transactions, buyers 

and sellers post anonymous bids and offers on an electronic website, Chalkboard, and only learn 

the counterparty's identity when the transaction is completed. Propane sales· are generally traded 

in lots of 1,000 barrels (bbls) and each barrel is the equivalent of 42 gallons of propane. 

· 20. Propane prices are published by the Oil Price Information Service ("OPIS"). The 

prices published by OPIS are specific to the type of propane, such as TET propane, and the· 

month or time period for which the propane is to be delivered. Generally, a pric~ is published for 

the current (or "prompt") month, the next (or "forward") month and for delivery the next day. 

Propane traders trade TET propane contracts based upon these delivery distinctions. 

-- -------------- ---- --- -~-- - - --·------ ...• ·--"----------------------------------------· ---·-----

1 During all times relevant to this Statement of Facts, Chalkboard was owned by Chemconnect, Inc. 

9 

. ' 
21. OPIS also publishes. "average" prices, such as "daily average" and "monthly 

average," based on information collected directly from market participants. An OPIS "daily 

average" price consists of the mean between the lowest and the highest reported prices on a given 

day. Parties· sometimes trade propane based on a "daily" or "monthly" average price as published 

by OPIS. ·As a result, OPIS prices published for TET propane can affect the price paid by both 

commodity traders and end users for many categories of propane in the Midwest and Northeast, 

including, but not limited to, the District of Columbia and Illinois. 

B. Corporate Organization and Structure 

22. Within and across the corporate structure ofBP, there were a number of groups, 

business units, and teams that focused on specific aspects of the companies' business. These 

groups and business units were not separate legal entities but rather existed within and across 

various BP legal entities. 

23. The organizational group responsible on a global basis for overseeing trading 

activity was the Integrated Supply & Trading ("IST") group. Within IST there were a number of 

regional business units. The regional business unit responsible for the trading of gas and power 

products, including propane, in North America was North America Gas & Power ("NAGP"). 

During 2003 and 2004, the team withip NAGP focused on the trading of natural gas liquids,· 

including propane, was kllown as the NGL trading bench ("NGL Trading Bench" or "Bench"). 

24. A separate. regional business unit responsible for the production, transportation, 

and sales of natural gas liquids, including propane, in North America was the Natural Gas 

Liquids Business Unit ("NGLBU"). 

10 
C. The NGL Trading Bench 

25. During February 2004, the NGL Trading Bench was located in Houston, Texas, 

and employed approximately eight traders. All of the members of the NGL Trading Bench were 

employees ofBPAmerica Production Company, reporting to managers and other executives who 

were employed by other BP America subsidiaries. The NGL Trading Bench entered into 

contracts to purchase and sell propane on behalf ofBP Products North America Inc. 

26. Once a contract was executed, a confirmation notice was sent to the counterparty, 

via the mails and wires of the United States, between BP's offices in Texas or Illinois and the 

various counterparties' offices which were located in Texas, Illinois, New York, and elsewhere. 

27. BP recorded the NGL Trading Bench traders' telephone conununications. 

Traders had stations on the bench with separate telephone lines. The traders were aware that their 

conversations were recorded on those telephones. 

28. The NGL Trading Bench purchased and sold propane for use in BP's wholesale 

and petrochemical businesses, and for speculative purposes to generate a profit. 

29. BP Trader #1 was the primary trader responsible for trading TET propane from at 

least January 2003 to April 2005. 

30. Dennis N. Abbott was another trader on the NGL Trading Bench during the 

relevant time period. Abbott's primary responsibility involved the trading ofheavy NGLs such 

as butane, and as the need arose; light NGLs, such as propane and other commodities. 

31. BP Trader #2 was a trader primarily responsible for trading ethane and other 

NGLs, as well as propane, during 2003 and 2004. During February 2004, BP Trader #2 assisted 

with the trading ofTET propane and aided in the execution of the manipulation scheme. 

11 
32. BP Trader #3 was primarily responsible for trading other categories of propane 

during 2003 and 2004, but also traded TET propane during the relevant time period. 

· 33. The direct supervisor .of the traders on the NGL Trading Bench was the "bench 

leader" ("BP Bench Leader"). The BP Bench Leader's responsibilities included the development 

and oversight of the NGL Trading Bench's trading strategies, and reporting to and seeking 

approval from executives who oversaw the NGL Trading Bench's trading operations. 

34. · The BP Bench Leader reported to a Vice President responsible for supervising 

BP' s trading in NGLs ("BP Exe<;utive #1 "). BP Executive #1 was an employee ofBP America 

Production Company. 

35. BP Executive #1 reported to the Chief Operating Officer ofNAGP ("BP 

Executive #2"). BP Executive #2 was responsible, among other things, for the development, 

implementation, and execution of trading and marketing strategies forNAGP and was an 

employee ofBP International Services Company. 

36. BP Executive #2 reported to the Chief Executive Officer or Business Unit Leader 

ofNAGP ("BP Executive #3"). BP Executive #3 was an employee ofBP International Services 

Company. 

37. A BP Compliance Manager for NAGP ("BP Compliance Manager") sat on the 

NAGP trading floor and was an employee ofBP America Production Company. 

III. · 2003 TET Propane Manipulation Attempt 

38.. The BP Bench Leader and members of the NGL Trading Bench conspired to 

manipulate the price of TET propane during February 2004 based, in part, upon infonnation and 

experience gained in April and May of2003 whenmembers of the NGL Trading Bench 

attempted to manipulate the price of April 2003 TET propane. During April 2003, the NGL 

12 
Trading Bench attempted to corner April 2003 TET propane by talcing a large long position. 

Through this strategy, the NGL Trading Bench members sought to make money by purchasing 

substantially all of the available April TET propane supply, and sought to hold those barrels until 

the price increased based on the resulting lack of supply and then·sell the barrels to market shorts. 

39. During a conversation on Aprill2, 2003 between BP Trader #1, Abbott, and the 

BP Bench Leader stated: 

Abbott: How does it feel taking on the whole market, man? 

BP Trader #1: Whew. It's pretty big man. 

Abbott: Dude, you're the entire f{***]ing propane market. 

* * * 

BP Bench Leader: Don't worry about it, it's the first two days of the 

month. Plenty of lead time for people to think that 

barrels will emerge and take a short position. 

Abbott: No, I mean, it's cool, 100% of the open interest in 

prf!pane probably, and uh 3% of the open interest in 

nat gas ... .I dig it, it just, sometimes its hard, it just 

feels hard to take on the whole market sometimes. 

(emphasis added). 

40. Based on the April2003 attempt to manipulate the price ofTET propane, 

members of the NGL Trading Bench booked a profit and learned information that they later used 

during the February 2004 manipulation strategy. In particular, theNGL Trading Bench learned 

what they believed to be the "deaq stock" level ofTET propane, or the "minimum operating 

level" needed for the TEPPCO pipeline to function. The traders' perception of the dead stock 

level, later coupled with knowledge of the total TEPPCO propane inventory, led the NGL 

Trading Bench to believe they could estimate the total size of the available physical supply of 

13 
TET propane, thereby allowing them to estimate the total amount of physical contracts they 

would have to purchase to comer February 2004 TET propane and effectuate a manipulation. 

41. On or about February 5, 2004, the BP Bench Leader and Abbott discussed the 

attempt to manipulate or "squeeze" the price of April 2003 TET propane and the dead stock 

information they gleaned from the prior attempt stating: 

· BP Bench Leader: The second point is, that I would imagine that the 

minimum operating level at the end ofFeb[ruary] is 

· higher than it is at the end of March or April 

because I think the wholesalers have to hold barrels. 

So I think the minimum level might be a little 

higher than we're assuming based on what we 

experienced in April when we squeezed the April 

May. 

Abbott: Right, which was one of the reasons why it was 

harder to own all that April. That's why we had to 

take on a little bit more than we thought we had to 

take on, in April. And that's why I think that 2 mm, 

2.1 mm barrels as that minimum in Feb., I think· 

that's real, man, I think that is, that's the bottom at 

TET .. 

(emphasis added). 

IV. 2004 Propane Manipulation 

42. During February 2004, members of the NGL Trading Bench developed a plan to 

manipulate the price of February 2004 TET propane by becoming the dominant owner of 

February 2004 TET propane. As explained below, the strategy was intended to force other 

market participants holding short positions in TET propane at the end of February to purchase · 

February 2004 TET propane from BP at an artificial and inflated price. Between approximately 

F~bruary 9, 2004, and February 27,2004, members of the NGL Trading Bench executed the 

manipulation scheme by buying almost all of the available February TET supply in the TEPPCO 

----- --- ---- - -· -------- ----.-------- --- . -·-··--·-· . -- - .. -··--· - - ----------------------. ----- ----- -----~·-----------------~- - --- ----·------·--·--------- -------------

14 
system, withholding that supply during the month, and selling a portion of the supply later in the 

month, to certain counterparties ~olding short positions at artificial and inflated prices. 

43. Due to BP's conduct, from approximately February 12, 2004 through· 

approximately March 2, 2004, the price of February TET propane was artificial aJl.d inflated by 

BP's conduct. 

A. The Scheme 

44. During January 2004, the BP Bench Leader identified and discussed conditions 

relating to the TET propane market that would render the market ripe for manipulation. On or 

about January 8, 2004 during a regularly scheduled call the BP Bench Leader stated to other 

employees located in Texas, Illinois, and elsewhere that the TET propane market was "vulnerable 

to a squeeze." 

45. In addition, on or about January 13, 2004, the BP Bench Leader stated to another 

employee that February 2004 TET propane in the short term was "tight enough that if someone 

wanted to play games with it, potentially they could." The BP Bench Leader further stated that if 

someone wanted "to get a hold of this [TET propane] market and play some games with it" they 

could. 

46.. On or about February 5, 2004, during a conversation with Abbott, the BP Bench 

Leader articulated the intent of the February 2004 TET trading strategy and the justification 

necessary for obtaining approval for the strategy: 

Two things I thought of. One, in terms of whether we should do this or 

not, in terms of talking to [BP Executive #1], what we stand to gain, is not 

just we'd make money out of it, but we would know from thereafter that 

we can control the market at will. If we never break the threshold, we'll 

never know what the answer is, you know what I mean? 

----~-- - - -------- - - ---- --- ~------·------- --·----···--··----·-------------- -··. -------~------------------------------· - ·-------------- -------- ·-----------------

(emphasis· added). 

15 
47. During January 2004 and the beginning of February 2004, the BP Bench Leader 

also instructed the NGL Trading Bench to amass a significant position in February TET propane, 

both contracts for delivery of physical barrels as well as financial oi "swap" contracts. By the 

estimate ofBP Executive #1, entering February 2004, BP owned contracts for delivery for nearly 

50% of all of the available physical February TET propane. 

48. Members of the NGL Trading Bench intended to earn a significant profit for.BP 

by selling a portion of their February 2004 TET propane at the end of the month at prices inflated 

by their conduct, and then taking a small loss on the remaining barrels which would be carried 

into March. As such; the NGL Trading Bench recognized that they would purchase more 

propane than BP needed for its own business or commercial purposes, or could actively sell to 

counterparties during February. Furthermore, the NGL Trading Bench members could expect to 

profit personally by obtaining bonuses and other remuneration as a result of the anticipated 

profits BP would achieve through their market manipulation. 

B. Execution of the Scheme: Buy, Withhold, and Sell 

1. . The NGL Trading Bench's Attempt to Buy All Available Supply 

49. ·Between on or about February 5, 2004 and on or about February 9, 2004, the BP 

Bench Leader directed the execution of the manipulation scheme by instructing BP Trader #1, 

Abbott, BP Trader #2, and BP Trader #3 to buy a significant amount of February 2004 TET 

propane without arousing the. suspicion of other market participants. 

50. On the afternoon of February 9, 2004, the BP Bench Leader spoke to BP Trader 

#1 and Abbott to check the progress of the scheme. During the conversation, the BP Bench 

Leader, BP Trader #1, and Abbott stated: 

BP Bench Leader: What's been going on? · 

16 
-BP Trader #1: How much we got on? I was just looking at that, 

you wanna guess? 3.1 [million bbls]. 

BP Bench Leader: Has it been busy today? 

BP Trader #1: Oh yeah. Did it very quietly. 10 lots, 5 lots, 10 

lots, 15 here, 5 here. The biggest lot I think was 75. 

* * * 

BP Bench Leader: Did you feel good about it? 

Abbott: I kinda characterize it as . . . I characterize it as I 

was kinda surprised we were able to get 300 from 

the marketplace, basically, maybe 3-400 from the 

marketplace, Without moving it that much. I mean 

we definitely were moving it [the price of TET 

propane] at the end of the day, it was definitely 

firming up at the end of the day ... So it's kinda ... 

it seems like something that will just kinda move 

fairly easily. · 

51. Later, during the same telephone call on February 9, 2004, the same traders 

discussed the plan to continue to purchase large quantities ofTET propane: 

Abbott: I mean tomorrow, tomorrow if we are able to buy another 

4-500 [thousand] barrels tomorrow from the marketplace, I 

would be genuinely shocked. I mean, really shocked so ... 

that's it. Then I think ... we'll just have to play a waiting 

game and see, you know, how it's gonna shape up. 

BP Bench Leader: It, urn, still reinains to be seen, doesn't it? Still need to see 

sonie of these shorts come in .... 

52. Finally, during the same February 9, 2004 telephone call, the traders identify the 

true nature of the scheme as one to "squeeze" other market participants: 

BP Bench Leader: Half of me is saying, look, the fact that nothing's really 

·moved in terms of the spread· yet is good, because people 

aren't looking for ways out . , . alternative feeds, or backing 

...... __ o_uLdemand,_so_thaes.kind_ofa~good-1hing. __ The down .side -

is, of course, if it all happens at the last minute, it gets a bjt 

messy. People start cheating, not delivering, and may start 

17 
to look a little bit funny as well that the spread, you know, 

· just erupts at the last minute. · 

BP Trader #1: Arid we don't get the price out on all this paper [financial 

or "swap" contracts]. 

Abbott: Well, that's a different, thing, ifwe don't get a price out on 

all this paper. 

BP Bench Leader: The advantage of paper, is that we're selling at ·an index 

price there's no complaints. If we squeeze it in the last 

four or five days of the month, ah,forgive my French, but 

ah, you know, it's going to be hard to say what's the fair 

price of the market at the time. 

(emphasis added). 

53. Based on the activities ofthe BP Bench Leader, and BP Trader #1, Abbott, BP 

Trader #2, and BP Trader #3, between the morning of February 9, 2004 and the close ofbusiness 

of February 13, 2004, the NGL Trading Bench purchased contracts for an additional 1.4 million 

barrels of February 2004 TET propane. As a result, at the close ofbusiness on February 13, 

2004, the position of the NGL Trading Bench exceeded 3 million barrels of physical propane, in 

addition to a volume equivalent to approximately 480,000 barrels in "paper" or financially settled 

propane contracts. 

54. As of February 13, 2004, the NGL Trading Bench estimated that BP's position 

then exceeded the volume ofTET propane supply in the TEPPCO system. Additional 

waterborne imports or other sources could increase the supply, and delivery from the storage 

facility through the pipeline to end users could reduce supply during the month. Therefore, the 

NGL Trading Bench continued to monitor the TEPPCO inventory level. The traders on the NGL 

Trading Bench frequently discussed these inventory levels and also their estimates of the "dead 

stock," or minimum amount of propane needed for thepipeline to operate . 

. ·-------·- .... ------- -- -- ----- --.-. -- ---- ------------------ ----·- --- -----· - ·- ---- - ------------------ .... -------------- -------- --

18 
55. On approximately February 15, 2004, factors unanticipated by the NGL Trading 

Bench caused the price ofTET propane to decrease and the amount of available TET propane to 

increase. First, on February 15, 2004, the TEPPCO pipeline ruptured near Coschocton, Ohio, 

causing a suspension in the delivery of propane until the pipeline was repaired. The rupture 

caused the amount of propane stored in Mont Belvieu, Texas to accumulate and decreased the 

amount of propane that could be delivered from the pipeline. Second, weather forecasts around 

that time changed and unexpectedly indicated warmer weather in the-Northeast, reducing the 

demand and expected demand ofTET propane. Third, on February 17, 200~, BP received a 

published report from Commercial Services Company, Ltd. which forecast approximately 4.2 

million barrels of propane destined for the United States via cargo ship in February 2004. This 

represented an increase in the amount of propane being imported into the United States. 

Combined, these factors put downward pressure on the price throughout the remainder of the 

.month. 

56. Because the NGL Trading Bench had already purchased such a large quantity of 

February TET propane, by February 17, 2004, the NGL Trading Bench anticipated a significant 

loss of money if they began to unwind, or sell, their position at the prevailing price or if prices 

dropped further from the then-existing levels. Nevertheless, the NGL Trading Bench 

accumulated even more TET propane. 

57. Between February 17, 2004 and February 20, 2004, the NGL Trading Bench 

purchased a substantial amount of additional contracts for more than 1.4 million barrels of 

physical February2004 TET propane. By February 20,2004, BP's position exceeded the TET 

propane in the TEPPCO system by approximately 1 million barrels. 

19 
58. Between February 20, 2004, and Februatj 29,2004, the TEPPCO system propane 

inventory continued to increase. At various times during that period, BP's position in February 

TET propane also increased. During the last trading week of the month, BP's position reached 

approximately 5million barrels of physical TET propane. F~om approximately February 17, 

2004 through the last trading day of the month, February 27, 2004, BP's position exceeded the 

TEPPCO system inventory. 

2. Selective Withholding of Supply 

59. At certain times during late February, members of the NGL Trading Bench 

refused to sell physical TET propane to .co.unterparties as part of their strategy to drive up the 

price. Acting at the direction of the BP Bench Leader, the traders at certain times refused to show 

offers or sell any ofBP's TET propane, even though BP held contracts for delivery of millions of 

. . 

barrels, and in at least one instance a counte:rparty had offered "best bid." 

60. For example, on February 23, 2004, BP Trader #1 stated to a counte:rparty: 

. Counterparty: 

BP Trader #1: 

Counterparty: 

BP Trader #1: 

Counterparty: 

BP Trader #1: 

Can you use any Dynegy propane? 

Yea. 

Do you have any TET you can sell? 

Thought you were asking me about Dynegy. 

Well I am. I got a guy who wants to sell Dynegy 

and buy TET. Do you have any TET you can sell? 

Not right now, I don't, but I'll take the Dynegy side. 

At the time BP Trader #1 refused to sell, BP's position exceeded 4 million physical barrels. 

61. Similarly, on February 26, 2004, BP Trader #2 stated to a counterparty: 

<;Q1JJJ1~rpill'J)'::_ _ _ _ _ I'.mJooking _for 5,0.0.0 . barrels.· of TET.propane, -- -

didn't know if you guys were selling or not. 

20 
BP Trader #2: 

Counterparty: 

No we're not right now, actually. 

* * * 

If you guys decided to come back in; I'm the best 

bid at five. 

At the time of this conversation, BP held contracts for delivery of approximately 4.9 million 

barrels of February TET propane.· 

62. BP did not offer or sell physical barrels of propane on February 26, 2004, but 

continued to purchase even more TET propane during the day. 

3. The NGL Trading Bench Sells at an Inflated Price 

63.. At the beginning of February 27, 2004, the last trading day of the month, BP held 

contracts for delivery of approximately 4.9 million barrels of February TET propane. The NGL 

Trading Bench began the day by buying additional barrels of February TET propane before 9:00 

a.m. from.the remaining counterparties who still had barrels to sell. This meant that although BP 

already owned contracts for more than the deliverable supply of February TET propane on the 

last trading day of the month, they bought more in an effort to ensure that they would be the only 

company in the market that could sell significant quantities ofTET propane .. By the end of the 

day, BP sold approximately 530,000 physical barrels ofits accumulated FebruaryTET propane 

position. BP had to accept delivery of the remaining 4.4 million barrels and carry them into 

March at a significant loss. 

64. By mid-morning on February 27, 2004, the price for TET propane was not the 

result oflegitimate forces of supply and demand, but was dictated by BP. Certain counterparties 

had no ability to bargain that day, but instead had to pay the prices set by BP: 

________ _I3_}>_Trader til; _[~Compan)"_AJ-buys-25,000 at-. 89. 

Voicebroker: .89. Where's your next? .89 and a half? 

21 
BP Trader #1: 

Voicebroker: 

. BP Trader #1: 

Voicebroker: 

BP Trader #1: 

· Voicebroker: 

.89 and a hal£ 

Alright. .89 and a half, next .... are you just walking 

them up half step? 

Now . 

For now you are? 

Yes. 

89 and half is next, his next offer is coming in a 

penny higher. 

65. Later in the moming on February 27, 2004, BP Trader #1 stated to a voicebroker: 

Voicebroker: 

BP Trader #1: 

Voicebroker: 

BP Trader #1: 

Voi cebroker: 

BP Trader #1: 

Voicebroker: 

BP Trader #1: 

Voicebroker: 

BP Trader#1 

·- --

Voicebroker: 

Hey, urn, do you have an offer? I got .90 bid by 

[Company C]. 

Uh, .905. 

.905. Can you hang one second? [Talking on 

another line]. ... 905, he's about to hang up. 

No I'm not. Don't make me feel like the bad guy 

here. 

Would you do 50 [thousand barrels]. 

50? I'll do 50. 

He'll do 50. [Company D]'s telling him to buy it 

because there's nobody else out here that has any 

but you. F***, what's it gonna go to [BP Trader 

#1]? A buck? 

Don't tell him you said that. 

I didn't tell him that. 

* * * 

Everything you say is recorded on all these lines. 

I hear you. 

22 
66. Further, in addition to the telephone sales, on certain occasions, BP was actively 

dictating the price of sales through the use of Chalkboard. During periods when there were 

relatively few sellers ofFebruary 2004 TET propane in the market, members of the NGL !rading 

Bench posted both bids and offers on Chalkboard. At regular intervals, and usually after a single 

transaction in the market occurred, the members of the NGL Trading Bench, often working in a 

highly coordinated fashion, would withdraw the bids and offers and increase both the bids and the 

offers, thereby effectively "s.tepping up the price." 

67. On February 27, 2004, a counterparty located in the North em District of Illinois 

holding a short position in February TET propane was forced to buy from BP at an artificial and 

inflated price: 

Counterparty: 

Abbott: 

Counterparty: 

Abbott: 

Counterparty: 

Abbott: 

Counterparty: 

Abbott: 

Counterparty: 

We just did a deal on Chalkboard, do you want to 

do another 5? . · 

Ariother five, hold on . . . we're at .925 for 5 

[thousand bbls]. 

Holy smokes! Okay. What's going on? Just people 

like me out there trying to find this? 

Yeah. 

Well crap, I may have to, I gotta do something here.· 

.925 is it? 

Yep 

Jesus Christ, I don't have a choice do I? Not really? 

Not if you need to cover. 

I need to cover, why don't we go ahead and do that. 

68. After selling concluded on February 27, 2004, the NGL Trading Bench had not 

sold enough to make a profit and had to take delivery of the remaining barrels at a significant 

23 
loss. In an effort to mitigate these losses, in March 2004, the bench members refused to accept 

"late" deliveries and required counterparties that were "caught short" in their position from 

February to financially settle such contracts bypaying the February 27 OPIS high price, which 

had been artificial and inflated by BP. . . 

C. Market Reaction and Industry Reports 

69. Members of the NGL Trading Bench laiew that counterparties and market 

observers were making allegations that someone was attempting a. short squeeze, and that some 

suspected BP. BP Trader #1, Abbott, BP Trader #2, and BP Trader #3 were each confronted by 

market participants with allegations that BP was involved in a "short squeeze." 

70. . On February 23, 2004, OPIS published a newsletter that inCluded the foliowing: 

The gas liquids market is largely focused on the antics of Mt Belvieu 

propane. Prices have held a strong tone as traders gossip about the 

possib.ility that a short squeeze is being put in play in the TET market. 

The short squeeze could be complicating the efforts of some to price 

inbound cargos of.propane, traders add .. Indeed,. TET propane "anys" 

traded from 72-75.375cts/gal through the morning. Non-TET barrels were 

worked from 67-69.375cts/ga1. In contrast, the Conway propane market 

has been quiet with confirmed deals holding a 61.25-61.75cts/gal range. 

Bushton barrels are thought to be trading at a 1-2cts/gal discount to 

Conway. 

(emphasis added). 

71. On February 24, 2004, OPIS published a newsletter thatincluded the foliowing: 

In spot trading . . . the talk in the propane markets is that one or more 

firms may be involved in a short squeeze in the TET propane market. 

Traders speculate that those firms own a hefty proportion of the 

inventories in TET storage and they are making sellers pay up for the right 

to cover. "Somebody's got to be getting killed," said one trader. "I hope 

nobody that owes me money." Traders marveled at the fact that TET 

propane opened at 74 cts/gal and ended the session at 88.25 cts/gal[.] 

24 
D. BP Management's Failure to Address the Conduct · 

72. During and after the execution of the manipulation scheme, members of the NGL 

Trading Bench provided certain information to various BP executives and the BP Compliance 

Manager. Although the conduct violated BP's written policy, the BP Executives and ComJ?liance 

Manager failed to report this conduct to authorities, take affirmative steps to ensure such trading 

strategies did not recur, and chose not to discipline any of the traders, managers, or the 

compliance official involved until the CFTC initiated an investigation. At no time during 

February 2004 did anyone at BP bring the scheme to the attention of the legal department. 

73. Initially, between February 5 and 9, 2004, the BP Bench Leader provided BP 

Executive #1 with certain information about the proposed strategy. 

74. On or about February 19,2004, the BP Bench Leader met with BP Executive #1, 

BP Executive #2, and the BP Compliance Manager. At the time of the meeting, the TEPPCO 

pipeline had ruptured, the NGL Trading Bench had exceeded its position limit size imposed by 

BP policy, BP had accumulated contracts for over 4.5 million barrels of February TET propane, 

and the total available supply of propane in the TEPPCO storage facility was approximately 3.5 

. million barrels. After the February 19, 2004 meeting, the NGL Trading Bench continued to 

accumulate FebruaryTET propane. 

75. After the February strategy had concluded and the NGL Trading Bench 

anticipated that the loss associated with the strategy would be approximately $10 mill1on, BP 

management instituted a business review of the trading strategy. 

76. In preparation for the business review, the BP Bench Leader and BP Executive #1 

caused a PowerPoint presentation entitled "Lessons Learned" to be drafted . .A purpose of the 

'"Lessons Learned" PowerPoint presentation was to determine why BP lost money and how to· 

25 
make such a strategy profitable. One slide in the presentation compared BP's position in physical 

TET propane during February to the available supplies in the TEPPCO system, and clearly 

indicated that BP's position exceeded the-available supply of propane by as early as February 11, 

2004. The slide also indicated that BP continued to accumulate more propane after its position 

significantly exceeded the total TEPPCO inventory. Certain slides from the "Lessons Learned" 

PowerPoint were presented, again, on or about March 26, 2004, and at high level management 

meetings on April 15 and July 28, 2004. 

77. Further, by at least May 5, 2004, BP Executive #3 and the BP Compliance 

Manager became aware of the tape recorded conversation of February 9, 2004 in which the BP 

Bench Leader used the word "squeeze" to describe the February trading activity to BP Trader #1 

and Abbott. 

78. The conduct of the NGL Trading Bench was not self-reported to the authorities, 

nor was timely discipline imposed on any of the traders, managers, or the compliance official 

involved. In fact, BP initially informed members ofthe NGL Trading Bench that they would 

receive monetary bonuses at the end of the year. BP Executive #2 also informed the NGL 

Trading Bench in early March 2004, despite the $10 million loss, that no trader would lose his or 

her job. Only after a regulatory inquiry commenced in 2005 was disciplinary action taken against 

certain individuals and other traders learned they would not receive their anticipated end of the 

year bonuses. 

V. Conclusion ofLaw 

79. Based on the facts set forth above, BP admits that through the actions of its 

employees, BP conspired to corner the market and manipulate and attempt to manipulate the price 

26 
of February 2004 TET propane and attempted to manipulate the price of April2003 TET propane 

contrary to Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9{a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S. C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2). 

THAT: 

ORDER FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION 

83. With the consent of the Commission and BP, IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED 

a. BP is permanently restrained, enjoined and prohibited from directly or 

indirectly engaging in any conduct that violates Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the 

Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2), including: 

1. Manipulating or attempting to manipulate the price of any commodity in 

interstate commerce or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of a registered 

entity; and 

11. Cornering or attempting to comer any commodity in interstate commerce. 

84. The injunctive provisions of this Order shall be binding upon BP, upon any 

person acting in the capacity of officer, agent, servant, or employee ofBP, and upon any person 

who receives actual notice of this Consent Order by personal service or otherwise insofar as he 

cir she is .acting in active concert or participation with BP. 

ORDER FOR A CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY AND OTHER ANCILLARY RELIEF 

. 85. With the consent of the Commission and BP, IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED 

that BP shall comply fully with the following terms, conditions and obligations relating to the 

payment of restitution and a civil monetary penalty. 

86. Restitution: Criminal Restitution is being made by BP pursuant to the terms of .. 

- -- ---- -~the_::Qeferred Prosecution Agree~entBP America -Inc.-has entered into with theDepartmen:t-uf- -- -cJustice. Accordingly, no civil restitution award is required by this Order. 

27 
87. Civil Monetary Penalty 

a. A civil monetary penalty in the amount of$125,000,000 is assessed· 

against BP, and is due and owing thirty days from the date of entry of this 

Order. 

b. Post-judgment interest authorized by Section 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 

13a-1 shall accrue beginning on the date payment is due and shall be 

determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of this 

Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

c. . BP shall pay this civil monetary penalty by electronic funds 

·transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier's check, or 

bank money order. If payment is to be made other than by electronic funds 

· transfer, the payment shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission and sent to the address below: 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Division ofEnforcement 

Attn: Marie Bateman- AMZ-300 

DOT IF AA/MMAC 

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73169 

Telephone: 405-954-6569 

88. If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, BP shall contact Marie 

Bateman or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall fully 

comply with those instructions. BP shall accompany payment of the penalty with a cover letter 

that identifies BP and the name and docketnumber of the proceedings. BP shall simultaneously 

. -·-· __ !I"~~m!.t~opi_~~-()fth~-~QY~IJettet and_the_form_ of.payment .to .the Djrector,Di:visionof---

Enforcement, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 

28 
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581, and the Chief, Office of Cooperative Enforcement, at the 

same address. 

89. BP shall comply with the settlement conditions and agreements set forth above in· 

paragraphs 3 through 12, as well as the conditions, agreements and terms incorporated by 

reference in Attachments A and B of this Order. 

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 

90. Notices. All notices required by this Order shall be sent by certified mail, return 

receipt requested, as follows: 

Notice to Plaintiff Commission: 

Division of Enforcement 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

1155 21st Street, NW 

. Washington, DC 20581 

Notice to BP: 

Stephen R. Winters 

Associate Group General Counsel 

BP America Inc.,200 

Westlake Park Blvd., Houston, TX 77079. 

90. Entire Agreement, Amendments and Severability. This Order incorporates all of 

the terms and conditions of the settlement among the parties and shall not be amended except by 

order of the Court. 

91. Invalidation: If any provision of this Order, or if the application of any provisions 

of this Order are held to be invalid, the remainder of the Order and the application of the 

provisions to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected by the holding. 

92. Waiver: The failure of any party hereto at any. time or times to require 

. --. ------ -· --- -

performance of any provision hereof shall in no ~anner affect the right of such party at a later 

time to enforce the same or any other provision of this Order. No waiver in one or more instances 

29 
of the breach of any provision .contained in this Order shall be deemed to be or construed as a 

further or continuing waiver of such breach or waiver of the breach of any other provision of this . . 

Consent Order. 

93. Continuing Jurisdiction of this Court. The Court shall retain jurisdiction ofthis 

cause to assure compliance with this. Order and for all other purposes related to this action. 

WHEREFORE, there being no just reason for delay, the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to 

enter this Consent Order of Permanent Injunction and Other Relief Against Defendant BP. 

30 
FOR THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

~(.;Gregory M. Mocek, Esq. 

31 

Director, Division ofEnforcement 

. J - ~ }!\_ _..../ 

Joan M; Manley Q 

Deputy Director, Division of.Enforcement 

202-418-5356 

Associate. Director, Division of Enforcement 

202-418-5312 

Joseph Konizeski 

Trial Attorney, Division of Enforcement 

312-596-0546 

) . 

Trail Attorney, Division of Enforcement 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

1155 21 51 Street, N.W. 

Washington D.C. 20581 
32 

P~UlR¢ed 

Vice Ptesident 

fJP :Ri6ciudts North.:America Inc. 

\ i 

l 
ATTACHMENT A 

BP COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS 

I. OVERVIEW 

Within ninety (90) calendar days of the entry of the Consent Order of Permanent 

Injunction and Other Relief (hereinafter "Order'') against BP Products North America Inc. 

("BP"), BP and any BP subsidiary or BP business group or entity that trades commodities with or 

provides commodity services for BP in the United States (hereinafter referred to as "BP Entities") 

agree to implement and maintain an effect!ve commodity trading compliance and ethicsprogram 

('.'Compliance Program"). 

II. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 

1. BP and the BP Entities shall include, at a minimum, the following provisions in 

their Compliance Program: 

a. Compliance controls designed to detect, identify, and prevent violations of the 

applicable provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., 

("CEA") or Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC" or 

"Commission") regulations; 

b. Clearly articulated corporate policies, procedures, and standards designed to · 

prevent and detect violations of the CEA or Commission regulations 

("Compliance Code"); 

c. The assignment of one or more senior corporate officials ofBP and each of the 

BP Entities, who shall report directly to BP's U.S. Compliance and Ethics 

()ffic~r, . ~~ yy_~(). s_ll_~! :lJ~Le§ponsi!J]ef()r fu~j1J1J?l(:!ffit:P.ta!i91Utnd .oversight. of .. 

33 
compliance with the Compliance Code as well as other aspects of the 

Compliance Program ofBP and the BP Entities; 

d. The effective communication to all BP and BP Entities' directors, officers, 

employees, agents and consultants of corporate and compliance policies, 

standards, and procedures regarding compliance with the CEA and 

Commission regulations; 

e; Training concerning the requirements of the CEA and CFTC regulations, on an 

annual basis to all directors, officers, traders, book leaders, trading managers; 

trading regulation personnel, risk managers, compliance personnel and the 

head of each BP Entity, certifying compliance therewith; 

f. A clearly articulated corporate policy that requires any director, officer, 

employee, agent or consultant that is aware of any violation of any law or any 

unethical conduct tbat has not been reported to an appropriate federal, state or 

municipal agency, to report such violation or conduct to a BP or BP Entity 

compliance officer or the Monitor; 

g. A clearly articulated corporate pcilicy that requires the Compliance Division to 

affirmatively investigate potential violations of the .CEA or CFTC regulations; 

h. A reporting system, including a "Helpline" for directors, officers, employees, 

agents, and consultants to report suspected violations, anonymously if the 

. reporter so desires, of the Compliance Code or suspected criminal conduct; 

and, 

1. Appropriate disciplinary procedures to address matters involving violations or 

suspected violations of the CEA,.CFTC regulations, or the Compliance Code. 

34 
2. In particular, BP and the BP Entities agree that the Compliance Program shall 

include or otherwise integrate the following trading related provisions: 

a. The establishment within sixty (60) calendar days of the entry of this Order of 

a both a physical and electronic centralized location or source of trade 

regulation information that contains all current processes, policies, and training 

materials related to trading. This shall include, at a minimum, a consolidated 

·trade regulation manual that incorporates the Compliance Code, training 

curriculum, related requirements and information regarding the trade 

monitoring tools employed by BP or the BP Entities; 

b. A clearly articulated and uniform corporate policy requiring trading transaction 

information, including deal entries, executions, and trading bench strategy 

documents, to be preserved; 

c. A clearly articulated and uniform corponite policy continuing the established 

practice of recording external telephone lines, Instant Messages (IMs), 

electronic mail ("email"), and any other authorized methods of 

communication, for traders, book leaders, and trading managers; 

d. A clearly articulated and uniform corporate policy continuing the established 

· practice of monitoring external telephone lines, IMs, email, and any other 

authorized methods of communication for traders, book leaders, and trading 

managers; 

e. A clearly articulated and uniform corporate policy regarding out of office 

dealing in which traders execute deals when not on the premises ofBP or the 

premises of a subsidiary; 

35 
f. A clearly articulated and uniform corporate policy requiring compliance with 

the trading guidelines to be a component in the compensation calculus for all 

traders, book leaders, and trading managers, arid senior management in the 

trading function; and, 

g. A clearly articulated and uniform corporate policy regarding document 

retention and destruction policies and the appointment of a designated 

department responsible for records management for BP and the BP Entities. \ 

3. In addition, BP and the BP Entities agree that the Compliance Code shall include· 

the following requirements: 

a. A policy continuing the established practice of recording all external 

telephone lines, IMs, email, and any other authorized methods of 

communication of all traders, book leaders, and trading managers; and 

b. A policy continuing the established practice of retaining all recordings of 

external telephone lines, IMs, email, and any other authorized methods of 

communication of all traders, book leaders, and trading managers, for a period 

of five (5) years, unless required by law to be maintained for a longer period 

of time. 

III. COMPLIANCE AND TRADER TRAINING 

4. BP's and the BP Entities' compliance training and trader training guidelines shall 

include, at a minimum, the following: 

a. Mandatory orientation training for all directors, officers, traders, book leaders, 

trading managers, trading regulation personnel, risk managers, compliance 

personnel, legal personnel, and the head of each subsidiary business, division 

36 
and group, to be completed within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the 

employee's start date in one of the aforementioned positions, regarding 

corporate and compliance policies, standards, and procedures regarding the 

CEA, CFTC regulations, and U.S. anti-manipulation laws; 

b. Annual training for all directors, officers, traders, book leaders, trading 

managers, trading regulation personnel; risk managers, compliance personnel 

and the head of each BP Entity; 

c. Training regarding corporate and compliance policies, standards, and 

procedures regarding the CEA and CFTC regulations to be included in the BP 

Trader Assessment Course or any similar BP or BP Entity trader assessment · 

program; and, 

d. The creation and maintenance of attendance records and documentation that 

required individuals have fulfilled their compliance training. 

37 
ATTACHMENTB 

INDEPENDENT MONITOR 

I. ENGAGEMENT OF THE MONITOR 

1. Engagement. BPProducts North America Inc. ("BP") agrees to engage an 

independent monitor ("Monitor") within sixty (60) calendar days of the entry of the Consent 

Order of Permanent Injunction and Other Relief Against Defendant BP ("Consent Order" or 

"Order") to oversee BP's and any BP subsidiary's, or BP business group's or entity's that 

-operates with or provides services for BP (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "BP 

Entities") in the Uruted States, compliance with their obligations under the Order, to review and 

monitor the effectiveness ofBP and the BP Entities' compliance controls as they pertain to the 

applicable anti-manipulation and reporting provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 

U.S. C.§ 1, et seq., ("CEA") and applicable Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") 

regulations, and to make such recommendations as the Monitor believes are necessary to comply . . 

with the Order. 

2. Consultation and Selection. BP America, the CFTC, and the U.S: Department of 

Justice, Fraud Section (the "Department") shall use mutual best efforts to identify a mutually 

acceptable person, who, subject to the approval of the Court, shall serve as the Monitor. 

3. Period of Engagement. BP agrees that the period of engagement for the Monitor 

is three (3) years from the date of the engagement of the Monitor, provided however, that, in the 

event that the CFTC or the Department determines, in their sole discreti_on, that BP has knowingly 

violated any provision of this Consent Order, a one-year extension ofthe monitorship may be 

imposed by either the CFTC or the Department, and, in the event of additional violations, such 

additional one-year ektensions~s appropriate, but in no event shall the total term of the 

38 
monitorship ex<;;eed five (5) years. Any extension of the monitorship period extends all terms of 

this Consent Order for an equivalent period. 

4. Replacement. If the Monitor resigns or is terminated by the Department or the 

CFTC, or is otherwise unable to fulfill his or her obligations as set out herein, BP, shall within 

thirty (30) calendar days nominate a proposed replacement to the Department and the CFTC fcir 

approval. If, after an additional thirty (30) day period, the parties are unable to identify a mutually 

acceptable person, then the Department, in consultation with the CFTC, shall propose two 

candidates to BP for selection. 

· 5. Hiring Authority and Compensation. The Monitor shall have the authority to 

employ legal counsel, consultants, investigators, experts, and any other personnel reasonably 

necessary to assist in the proper discharge ·of the Monitor's duties, as specified herein. BP shall 

have the opportunity to perform routine conflict checks on individuals oi- entities the Monitor 

proposes to engage and within two weeks, BP shall advise the Monitor if any conflicts exist. The 

Monitor shall not engage any individual or entity as to which BP reasonably believes a conflict 

exists. The compensation an~ expenses ofthe Monitor, and any persons hired by the Monitor 

pursuant to his or her authority under the Order, shall be paid by BP or its successor. The 

Monitor, and any persons hired by the Monitor, shall be compensated in accordance with their 

respective typical hourly rates or a reasonable fee determined by the Monitor. 

6. No Affiliation. The Monitor is not, and shall not be treated for any purpose, as an 

officer, employee, agent, or affiliate ofBP, the BP Entities, the Department, or the CFTC. The 

Monitor shall not owe any fiduciary duties or other duties or obligations of any kind to BP and the 

BP Entities, or their directors, officers, employees, shareholders, bondholders or creditors. 

Moreover, BP and the BP Entities shall not employ the Monitor for a period of five (5) years 

39 
commencing on the date of the Monitor's engagement. Further, BP and the BP Entities shall not 

employ any entity or individual hired by the Monitor to fulfill its responsibilities during the 

Monitor's engagement, either directly or indirectly, for a period of two (2) years, commencing on 

the date that the entity or individual's engagement terminates, without prior approval from the 

Department and the CFTC. 

7. No Attorney-Client Relationship. It shall be a condition ofthe Monitor's 

retention that the Monitor is independent ofBP and the BP Entities and that no attorney-client 

relationship shall be formed between them. BP shall not claim any work-product privilege as to 

documents created by the Monitor or by any agents of the Monitor. 

8. Indemnification. BP shall provide an appropriate indemnification agreement to 

the Monitor with respect to any claims arising out ofthe performance of the Monitor's duties. 

9. No Defense Prem:lsed on Monitor's Findings. BP and the BP Entities agree that 

the Monitor's findings do not constitute a defense to any action that the CFTC or the Department 

may elect to bring against BP or the BP Entities for such activities. 

10. Notice of the Monitor. Within thirty (30) days of the engagement of the Monitor, 

BP and the BP Entities shall advise its employees in writing of the engagement of the Monitor, the 

Monitor's powers and duties pursuant to this Order, and the ability of employees to communicate 

with the Monitor through OpenTalk and a method of communicating by telephone and/or email 

directly with the Monitor. Such notice shall inform employees that they may communicate with 

the Monitor anonymously or otherwise, and that no director~ officer, employee, agent or . 

con~ultant shall be penalized in any way for providing information to .the Monitor. In addition, 

such notice shall direct that, if any director, officer, employee, agent or consultant is aware of any 

violation of any law relating to Manipulative Conduct, as defined by paragraph 12 of the Consent 

40 
Order that has not been reported to an appropriate federal, state or local agency, the director, 

officer, employee, agent or consultant is obligated to report such violation or conduct to BP, a BP 

Entity, a BP compliance officer, or the Monitor. Such notice shall also include directions that 

cooperation with the Monitor is mandatory. 

11. Cooperation. BP and the BP Entities' shall direct their directors, officers, 

employees, agents, and consultants to cooperate with the Monitor in the execution of his or her 

duties under the Order. If, in the Monitor's discretion, a director, officer, employee, agent, or 

consultant ofBP or the BP Entities fails to cooperate with the Monitor, the Monitor may notify 

BP, the Department and the CFTC. The Commission may evaluate BP's response to the 

uncooperative individual in evaluating BP's cooperation under this Order. Further, BP and the BP 

Entities agree that any director, officers, employees, agents, and consultants may communicate. 

with the Monitor anonymously and that no director, officer, employee, agent or consultant shall 

be penalized in any way for providing information to the Monitor. In addition, if any director, 

officer, employee, agent or consultant is aware of any violation of any law relating to 

Manipulative Conduct that has not been reported to an appropriate federal, state or local agency, 

the director, officer, employee, agent or consultant is obligated to report such violation or conduct 

to BP or a BP Entity, a BP compliance officer, or to the Monitor. 

II. OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY AND DUTIES 

A. Monitor Responsibilities 

The Monitor shall: 

12. Review and monitor BP's compliance with the Order. 

13. Review, evaluate, and monitor BP and the BP Entities' compliance policies and 

procedures to ensure they are generally effective in preventing and detecting ( 1) any potential act 

41 
of manipulation, attempted manipulation, cornering; or attempted cornering relating to the price of 

a "commodity," as commodity is defined in Section 1(a) ofthe CEA, in interstate commerce, or 

for future delivery; (2) any delivery of false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate information that 

could tend to affect the price of a commodity in interstate commerce; and/or (3) any false or 

misleading statements made to any registered entity (collectively referred to as "Manipulative 

Conduct"), by any BP or BP Entity director, officer, employee, or agent. This shall include a 

review of the Integrated Supply & Trading ("IST") group's policies and procedures as they apply 

to BP and the BP Entities. 

I 

14. Review, evaluate, and-monitor BP and the BP Entities' commodity trading 

compliance programs, including but not limited to trading surveillance systems, risk management 

systems, regulatory training~ and compliance training, to ensure they are generally effective in 

preventing and detecting any Manipulative Conduct by any BP or BP Entity director, officer, 

employee, or agent. 

15. Review, evaluate, and monitor BP and the BP Entities' commodity trading 

compliance structure, composition, and resources, including but not limited to, compliance 

personnel compensation, compliance personnel recruitment programs, and compliance personnel 

training, to enslire the compliance group or function has the appropriate authority, structure, and 

resources to be generally effective in preventing and detecting any Manipulative Conduct by any 

BP or BP Entity ~irector, officer, employee, or agent. 

16. Review, evaluate, and monitor BP and the BP Entities' commodity trading 

policies, procedures, and practices, including but not limited to any trader recruitment, training, 

compensation, and evaluation process, to determine ifthey.are generally effective to prevent and 

detect any Manipulative Conduct by any BP or BP Entity director, officer, employee, or agent. 

42 
17. Pursuant to paragraphs 31 and 32 ofthis Attachment to the Consent Order, 

conduct an audit ofBP and the BP Entities' commodity trading operations for the purpose of 

testing and evaluating the effectiveness ofBP and the BP Entities' trading compliance systems, 

policies and programs. This shall necessarily include an operational audit of theIST group's 

operations as it pertains and functions within the commodity trading operations ofBP ·and the BP 

Entities. 

18. Review activities relating to the commodity trading operations of BP and the BP 

Entities to proVide recommendations for corrective action and to evaluate the effectiveness of 

implemented recommendations. 

19. The Monitor's authority and duties are to be broadly construed. 

B. Written Reports and Recommendations 

20. BP agrees that during the three (3) year period of engagement, and any extensions 

thereof, the Monitor shall prepare work plans for assessment, an initial report, and at least two (2) 

follow-up reports (subject to extension) as described below. 

1. Work Plans 

21. Within sixty (60) days ofthe engagement of the Monitor, the Monitor shall 

prepare a written work plan. In order to conduct an effective initial review and to fuliy understand 

any existing deficiencies in controls, policies and procedures related to commodities trading and 

Manipulative Conduct, the Monitor's initial work plan shall include such steps as are necessary to 

develop an understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the trading activities of BP 

and the BP Entities. The work plan shall be submitted to the Department, the CFTC, and BP for 

review. In the event BP objects to any part of the work plan, the Department and the CFTC, shall, 

in their discretion, determine the matter. 

43 
22. With respect to each of the two (2) follow-up reviews (subject to extension), the 

Monitor shall prepare a written work plan, which shall be submitted to BP, the Department, and 

the CFTC for comment. In the event BP or the BP Entities objects to any part of the work plan, 

the Department and the CFTC, shall, in their sole discretion, determine the matter. 

2. Initial Review 

23. In connection with the Monitor's responsibility to determine whether BP and the 

BP Entities' policies and safeguards are generally effective in detecting and deterring 

Manipulative Conduct, the Monitor shall conduct an initial review and prepare an iilltial report 

assessing the areas described in Section II. A. herein. 

24. In connection with the initial review, the Monitor shall issue a Written report 

within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days from the date of the Monitor's engagement setting 

forth the Monitor's assessment and l)laking recommendations, ifany, reasonably designed to 

. . 

improve the policies and procedures ofBP andthe BP Entities for detecting and deterring 

Manipulative Conduct. The Monitor shall provide the report to the Department, the CFTC, the 

Vice-President for Compliance and Ethics, BP America Inc., the Board ofDirectors ofBP 

America, and the Board of Directors ofBP Products North America. The Monitor may extend the 

time period for issuance of the report with prior Written approval of the Department and the 

CFTC. 

25. The initial report shall describe the Monitor's assessment ofBP and the BP 

Entities in the areas described in Section II. A. herein. The report shall include the Monitor's 

methodology, information relied upon, and basis for assessment. In addition, in undertaking the 

assessment and review, the Monitor shall formulate conclusions based on, among other things: 

44 
a. inspection of documents, including all the policies and procedures relating to the 

trading and compliance programs designed to detect and deter Manipulative 

Conduct;· 

b. meetings with and interviews of employees, officers, and directors ofBP and the 

BP Entities, and any other relevant persons; 

c. an on-site observation ofBP and the BP Entities' trading surveillance systems, 

risk management systems, and telephonic and instant message recording system; · 

and 

d. analyses, studies and testing of the trading and compliance programs designed to 

detect and deter Manipulative Conduct at BP and the BP Entities. 

26. The initial report shall also contain any recommendation the Monitor may have 

with -regard to matters assessed, setting forth why such recommendations are reasonably designed 

to improve BP's and the BP Entities' compliance with the anti-manipulation and record keeping 

provisions of the CEA. 

27. Within sixty (60) calendar days after receiVing the Monitor's report, BP and the 

BP Entities shall adopt all recommendations in the report; provided, however, that within thirty 

(30) calendar days afterreceiving the report, BP shall: 

e. advise the Monitor, the CFTC, and the Department in writing of any 

recommendations that BP or the BP Entities considers unduly burdensome, 

impractical, or unreasonably costly; and 

f. . propose in Writing an alternative policy, procedure or system designed to achieve 

the same objective or purpose or provide an explanation as to the reason for 

45 
disagreement regarding the objective or purpose oftheMonitor's 

recommendation. 

With respect to any recommendation that BP or the BP Entities considers unduly burdensome, 

impractical, or costly and that BP provides written notice of such, BP and the BP Entities need 

not adopt the Monitor's recommendation within the aforementioned sixty (60) day tiine period. 

As to any recommendation on which BP and the Monitor do not agree, such parties shall attempt 

to reach an agreement within thirty (30) calendar days after BP serves the written notice and 

proposed alternative. In the event BP and the Monitor are unable to agree on an alternative 

proposal, BP shall submit the issue and supporting to documentation in writing to the Department 

and the CFTC within thirty (30) calendar days of the Monitor's decision to reject BP's proposed 

alternative. The Department and the CFTC's determination on the issue shall be binding. With 

respect to any recommendation that the Monitor determines cannot reasonably be implemented 

within sixty (60) calendar days after BP receives the report, the Monitor may extend the time 

period for implementation with prior written approval of the Department and the CFTC. 

28. All Monitor recommendations that are mutually acceptable to both the Monitor 

and BP shall be employed by BP and the BP Entities for at least a period of (3) years from the 

time of the implementation. 

3. Annual Reviews 

29. The Monitor shall undertake two (2) follow-up reviews to further monitor and 

assess whether the policies _and procedures ofBP and the BP Entities are reasonably designed to 

detect and prevent violations of the anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA. 

46 
30. With regard to the second assessment and report, the time frames and 

requirements set forth above in Paragraphs 23 through 28 shall apply, except for the following 

modifications: 

a. The work plan for the second assessment shall be submitted to the parties by the 

Monitor no later than sixty (60) calendar days rrom the first anniversary of the 

date of entry of the Order: The work plan for the third assessment shall be 

submitted to the parties by the Monitor no later than sixty (60) calendar days from 

the second anniversary of the entry of the Order; 

b. The second assessment shall be completed no later than one hundred eighty (180) . 

calendar days from the first anniversary of the date of the entry of the Order. The 

third assessment shall be completed no later than one hundred eighty (180) 

calendar days from the second anniversary of the date of the entry of the Order; 

and 

c. In addition to the minimal requirements set forth in Paragraph 25, the second and 

third assessments shall include a test of the effectiveness ofBP and the BP 

Entities' compliance programs and policies. 

C. Operational Audit 

31. The Monitor shall conduct an audit ofBP and the BP Entities' commodity trading 

operations for the purpose of testing and evaluating the effectiveness ofBP and BP Entities' 

trading compliance systems, policies and programs. In determining the scope of the audit, the 

Monitor shall review and consider KPMG's Report ofits.review ofBP's Integrated Supply & 

Trading Compliance Program, but shall retain discretion to determine the scope of any additional 

audit work. 

47 
32. The Monitor, in his or her discretion, may engage an audit firm with the necessary 

resources to conduct the operational audit. 

D. Investigation of Potential Violations 

33. · The Monitor shall keep records of his or her activities. 

34. At any time during the course of the engagement, should the Monitor discover 

any evidence indicating that BP or the BP Entities, its officers, directors, employees or agents 

have violated provisions of the CEA, the CFTC's regulations, or have violated any provision of 

this Order, the Monitor shall notifY BP, unless the Monitor in his or her discretion determines 

notification directly to the Department and the CFTC is necessary and appropriate. BP shall have 

thirty (30) days from the date of notice from the Monitor toprovide notice to the Department and 

the CFTC of the alleged violation. IfBP fails to provide notice to the Department and the CFTC 

within the thirty (30) day period, the Monitor shall then report the matter directly to the 

Department and the CFTC. If a matter is reported by the Monitor to the Department and/or the 

CFTC, the Monitor shall provide the Department and the CFTC any and all information relating 

to the evidence or alleged violations. This Paragraph shall not preclude the Monitor from 

discussing other related matters directly with the Department or the CFTC. 

3 5. If at any time during the course of the engagement, the Monitor discovers 

evidence of a potential violation of the CEA or CFTC regulations that occurred after the date of 

this Agreement, the Monitor shall have the discretion to investigate and report to the Department 

and the CFTC about the matter. At the sole discretion of either the Department or the CFTC, 

either government agency may direct the Monitor to discontinue the investigation to allow for a 

government investigation to commence. 

48 
36. BP agrees that during the engagement of the Monitor; the Monitor shall have the 

discretion to review activities that occurred prior to the date of the agreement for the purpose of 

informing him or herself of the relevant facts to develop prospective recommendations for 

corrective action. 

III. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 

37. BP and the BP Entities shall cooperate fully with the Monitor and the Monitor 

shall have the authority to take such reasonable steps, in his or her view, as may be necessary to 

be fully informed about the operations ofBP and the BP Entities within the scope of his or her 

responsibilities as set forth in this Order. To that end, BP and the BP Entities shall provide the 

Monitor: 

g. access to all files, books, records, personnel, and facilities that fall within the 

scope of responsibilities of the Monitor pursuant to this Order, subject to a 

legitimate claim of attorney-client privilege; 

h. the right to interview any director, officer, employee, agent or consultant ofBP or· 

the BP Entities and to participate in any meeting concerning any matter within or 

relating to his or her jurisdiction; and 

1 .. the right to observe BP or the BP Entities business operations that fall within the 

scope of responsibilities of the Monitor pursuant to this Order, subject to a 

legitimate claim of attorney-client privilege. 

38. IfBP or the BP Entities agree to provide the Monitor with access to Privileged 

Materials, the Monitor will agree (a) not to assert that BP's or the BP Entities' provision ofthe 

Privileged Materials in any way constitutes a waiver by BP or the BP Entities of the attorneyclient privilege and/or the work-product doctrine and (b) to maintain the confidentiality of the 

49 
Privileged Materials and not to provide them to any third party, except to the extent that 

disclosure is required by law or may be necessary in furtherance of the Monitor's discharge of his 

or her official duties and responsibilities. 

39. In the event that BP and the BP Entities seek to withhold from the Monitor access 

to Privileged Materials, then: 

J. BP and the BP Entities shall provide written notice to the Commission and the 

Monitor of their intention to withhold access to information, documents, records, 

facilities and/or employees based upon an assertion of a valid claim of attorney-

·client privilege or application of the attorney work-product doctrine. Such notice 

shall include a general description of the nature of the information, documents, 

records, facilities and/or employees that are being withheld, as well as the basis of 

the claim. 

40. Failure of any BP or BP Entity director, officer, employee or agent to cooperate 

with the Monitor may, in the sole discretion of the Monitor, serve as a basis for the Monitorto 

refer the non-cooperating individual to BP or the appropriate BP Entity for disciplinary action. 

41. The Monitor shall take appropriate steps to· maintain the confidentiality of any 

information entrusted to him or her while executing his or her duties pursuant to this Order and 

'shall share such information only with the Department, the CFTC, and individuals or entities hired 

by him or her. The Monitor shall also take appropriate steps to ensure that any consultants, 

entities, and/or individuals engaged by him or her to assist with the duties pursuant to the Order 

shall maintain the confidentiality of information obtained while executing his or her duties. 

42. Any reports and information that are provided to the Department and/or the CFTC 

---- -- -- . 

by the Monitor shall be filed under seal with the Court. The Department and the CFTC shall 

50 
maintain the confidentiality of all information provided by the Monitor to the Department or the 

CFTC, including the periodic reports required pursuant to the Order, except to the extent that · 

disclosure may be necessary by the Department or the CFTC in connection with the discharge of 

their official duties. 

51