### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 10, 200 5 S es sio n
IN R E: D
. A

. J.
Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 58-133 L. Raym ond Grim es, Judge

No. M2004- 02421-COA-R 3-JV - F iled Dece m ber 9, 2005

Romina J essica Clifton (“ Mother”) and Dwight C ain J emison (“F ather ”) are the pare nts of a six y ear old d a u g h te r

. I n 2 0 0 4 , F a th e r f il e d a p e ti ti o n to mo d if

y c u s to d y o f th e c h il d b y s e e k ing to be desig nated the c hild’s primary residential pa

rent. F ollowing a hearing, the J uvenile Court conc luded that th e re ha d b e e n a

ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s a ndthat it wa s in the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st t o desig nate F ather

the pri m ar y residential pa rent. The J uvenile Court also set forth Mother’s copare nting sc hedule a s well as her monthlychild support pay ments. Mother appe als cha lleng ing the pr op ri e ty of the Juve nil e Cou rt ’s de c isi on to d e sig nate F a the r the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt a s w e ll as the a mount of her c hild support. We a ffirm the desig nation of F ather as the primary

residential pa re nt b ut m od if

y the a mou nt o f M oth e r’ s mo nth ly c hil d s up po rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juvenile Court Aff

irm ed as Modif

ied; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined.

Thomas R. Meeks a nd Gre g ory D. S mith, Clarksville, Tenne ssee, for t he Appellant Romi na Jessica Clifton.

Stacy Turner Olson, Clarksville, Tennesse e, for the Appellee Dwig ht Cain J emison.T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -2 -3 0 3 p ro v id e s tha t “[a ]b se n t an o rd e r o f cu sto d y to the c o n tra ry, c u sto d y o f a c h ild 1
bo r n out of

wedl ock i s wi t h t he mo t her

. ”
-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound This is a custody

and child support disput e b et we en Mother and F ather which involves their six y ear

old daug hter who w as born out of w edlock in September of 1999. Afte r the child was born, Mother was the primary residential pa rent inasmuch a s there w as no orde r of c ustody to the contra

ry

. I n Marc h of 2004, F ather petitioned the J uvenile Court seeking to be desig nated the 1 child’s primary

residential pa

rent. A hea

ring on Father’s pe tition was conducted in Aug ust of 2004, with Fathe r being the first witness. Father testified that he rec ently became ce rtified in re frig eration and is looking f

or employ ment in that field. Father is a ve tera n of the a rm ed forc es and his VA counselor curre ntly is assisting him in finding e mploy ment. Father obtaine d the ce rtification fr om Tenne ssee Te chnica l Coll eg e and intends on c ontinuing his educ ation at that institut ion.

Af te r the pa rt ie s’ daug hte r w a s b orn, F a the r andMo the r s ha red t im e wi th the ir daug hter e ven thoug h no formal pa renting plan exist ed. F ather maintained a c alenda

r on which he kept trac k of whe n he exercised co-pa renting time with the child. Fathe r cla imed he wa s caring f or the ch i l d m ore tha n fifty perc ent of the time, at least until he filed the petition seeking to be de sig nate d the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt, a t wh ic h tim e “ e ve rythi ng c ha ng e d. ” F a the r is a s ing le pa re nt a nd ha s c us tod y of a no the r daug hte r wh o is tw e lve y e ars old . F a the r’ s o lde r d a ug hte r h a s a g ood relationship wit h the y oung er daug hter. Father was order ed to pay child support in 2003 and is c ur re nt o n th os e pa y me nts . A c c or din g to F a the r, fo r a t le a st the pa st y e ar M oth e r s e nt the pa rt ie s’ daug hter to day car e eve n though Mothe r wa s unemploy ed and, the ref ore, at home.

Father described an incident wher e Mother became upset and told F ather s h e w as coming to ge t the child. Mother bec ame violent when she arrived and cause d a sce ne to the point
w h e r e F a th e r c a ll e d th e p o li c e

. F a th e r s tate d th a t M o th e r e v e n th r e a te n e d h is f ian c ee, D ebra McClure. F ather ’s opinion is that it would be in the child’s best interest for him to be the primary residential pa

rent. F ather

stated that he a nd the child do a lot of “ educational things” suc h as g oing to the library , etc., which would be be tter than the c hild sim ply “sitting at a day

car e ... she ne eds to d o s ome thi ng oth e r tha n b e ing a t day c are .” F a the r expl a ine d tha t th e pa rt ie s’ c hil d h a s a sth ma which is exac e r

bated f rom being around Mother , who smokes. Father a nd Mother exchang e phy sical
c us tod y of the ir c hil d at a stor e

. As F a the r d oe s n ot p ic k u p o r dro p o ff the c hil d a t Mo the r’ s h ou se he cannot state whet h er Mother smokes inside of her house whe n the child is prese nt. Howeve r, Father ha s seen Mother

smoking in her

car when they

wer e exchang ing phy sical custody of the child. Father de scribed another incident wher e the child had been in the car e of one of Mother’s f

riends for three day s, Mother had not told Father whe re the child was, and Mother’s whe rea bout were unknown to Fathe r.-3- On cr oss-examination, F ather stated that his curre nt income is derived primarily from VA disability

benef its. Father became disabled afte r being injured in Saudi Ara bia y ear s ag o. Father int e nd s o n f

ind ing e mpl oyme nt i n th e re frig e ratio n f ie ld w hic h w ill a llo w h im t o h a ve a fl ex ibl e schedule so he ca n take c are of his children pr operl y

. Fa t h er a dded that he c an do wor k as an independe nt contrac tor if nec essary beca use he a lrea dy

owns the tools require d t o perf orm ref rig eration work. Father c urre ntly lives with his fianc ee and t here are a tot al of four children living in the house, two boy s and two g irls, rang ing f rom eig ht to fourteen y ear s of ag e. F ather ’s fianc ee, Debr a McClure (“Mc Clure”) , is a manag er at Converg y ’s and typically works from 7:45 a.m. to 4:45 p. m.
McClure was called as a witness on F ather ’s beha lf. McClure a cknowledg ed that she is livi ng with Fathe r and that they are eng ag ed to be mar

ried. McClure verifie d the ac cura cy of Father’s c alend ar showing whe n Father e x erc ised co-pa renting time with the parties’ daug hter. McClure testified that she has three children, a ll of whom consider Mother ’s and F ather s’s daug hter a sibling. The parties’ daug hter attends all of the McClure’s family functions. McClure testified tha t Father is very

active with both of his children a nd is an excellent fathe r. McClure is a war e of Mother working a total of five to seven we eks in the past two y ear s.

The fina l witness was Mother. Mother testified that she c u rr en t ly is not employ ed beca use she r ece ntly

had anothe r child and has n o t b ee n rele ased by her doc tor to return to wor k. Wit h rega rd t o M o t h er’ s work history , she stated that she worke d for Frig idaire on two diff ere nt
occa sions. Her most rec ent employ ment at Frigida ire was in N ovember of 2003, but her pr eg nancy c a us e d h e r t o mis s too muc h wo rk a nd sh e de sc ri be d thi s e mpl oyme nt a s “ brie f”

. Pr ior to h e r m os t
rec ent employ ment at Frigida ire, Mother worke d three or four

months as a nursing assistant. Prior to the nu rs ing a ssi sta nt j ob , M oth e r w or ke d at Fri g idair e fo r f

ou r andon e -h a lf

y e ars

. Mother ac knowledg ed that she se nt the child to day ca re ev en wh en she w as not working . Mother cl ai m ed she did thi s because her daug hter be nefitted fr om being in day car e as opposed to sitting at home with Mother. While Mother admitted she smoked cig are ttes, she denied smoking in her

house or a

round the c hild.

Acc ording to Mother, she g ot into a “fig ht” at a nig ht club called the Dy namic 6. As
a re sult of this fight, Mother wa s taken to the e merg ency room and e ventually

presse d char g es a g a ins t th e oth e r p e rs on in the fi g ht. Mo the r a dmi tte d th e re wa s a no the r i nc ide nt w he re sh e a g a in claims to have been assaulted. Mother denied that the parties’ child was prese nt during e ither of the
a ssa ult s. Mo the r a lso a dmi tte d that Mc Clu re ha s c a lle d the po lic e wh e n sh e a nd Mc Clu re g ot i nto “alter cations.”

On cross-e x amination, Mother ac knowledg ed that she lives in g overnme nt assisted housing a nd when she is not working she does not have to pay any rent. Mother stated it has be en “quite some time” since she has had to pay rent. Although Mother claimed that she could not work during her most re cent pr eg nancy , she wa s well enoug h to go to Vir g inia for a wee k to visit with the fathe r of he r latest child. Mother’s only employ ment in the past three y ear s was the “ brief” time she-4-

worke d at Frigida ire a nd the nursing assistant job. Howeve r, Mother had the parties’ child attending day car e throug hout these three y ear s. Mother’s c urre nt income consist s of government assistance and the c hild support she rec eives fr om Fathe r.

Mo the r w a s q ue sti on e d a

bo ut a po lic e re po rt

that w a s ma de wh e n s ome on e a lle g e dly tried to bac k over Mother with a truck. Mother

revie wed th e re p o rt an d even thoug h she acknow ledg ed “some thing ha ppened because m y name is on this poli ce r eport, ... I do not remembe r this incident at all.” Mother w ent on t o describe an incident which occurr ed in Novembe r of 2003, at which t i m e she c laims to have bee n the victim of a domestic a ssault. Mother alleg edly was assaulted by her own sister and her (i.e. Mother’s) boy friend. Although this alleg ed assault happened in Mother’s apa

rtment at 2:15 a.m., Mother ne verthe less claimed the c hild was with a baby sitter.
Following the hea

ring , the J uvenile Court announc ed its decision from th e bench. Ac c or din g to the Juve nil e Cou rt :

The proof

befor e the Court is that during the last thirt een months the child was w i t h the fa ther for a g reater pe riod than the mother. I n fact , ... t h e father has ha d the child sig nificantly more day s than the mother.

The e vidence is that the mother lives in subsidiz ed housi ng with no rent having been pai d , t hat she doe sn’t work or pe rhaps works sparingly . That she’ s ... been involved with severa l alterc ations of vi olence

. At least t wo fights. One tim e ... someone was try ing to ba ck over her. A domestic assault at 2:15 in the morning when the child is somewhere at day car e. Another

instance wher e the mother and her sister... [were] involved in an alter cation.

Al l t h es e i n s t an ce s co n t i n u e t o co n ce rn t h e C o u rt

. Al t h o u gh the child is not with her, sooner or later this type of violent behavior, the child is g oing to be wi th her.... [W] hen the c hild returned f rom summer vacation, the mother failed to c all the child back af t er the child called h er o n h er return and didn’t g et bac k to her for sever al da y s.
On the oth e r ha nd , the fathe r i s g e tti ng a n e du c a tio n, liv e s in a stable house hold. Although he lives with M s

. M cClure in an unmarrie d relationship, t he testimony is that the relationship i s stable. That her children are involved in se vera l e x trac urricula r activiti es inc lud ing AA U s po rt s a ndtr a ve l te a ms. Th e Cou rt be lie ve s th is i s a g ood environment for

the minor child.-5- The Co u r t d o e s b e li e v e th a t th e r e ’ s a s ig n if ic a n t c h a n g e of circ umstances... [and that] it’s the child’s best intere st to ... appoint [Father] as the primary

custodian.

After concluding that a material chang e in circ umstances had occur red and that it was in the child’s best intere st to designate Father the primary residential pa

rent, the Juvenile Court set forth Mother’s co-pa

renting schedule

. Father’s c hild support obligation ce ased a nd the parties were ins truc te d to de te rm ine Mo the r’ s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n a ndto m ake a n a pp ro pria te a dju stm e nt i n light of this Court’s opinion in Casteel v. Casteel , No. 03A01-9703- CV-00073, 1997 WL 414401 (Tenn. C t

. App. J uly

24, 1997), perm. app. de nied Mar. 2, 1998 . The pa rties later submitt ed a pa re nti ng plan to the Juve nil e Cou rt wh ic h, a mon g oth e r thin g s, e sta bli sh e d M oth e r’ s mo nth ly c hil d
su pp ort ob lig a tio n at $1 41 .4 8. Th e Juve nil e Co urt th en e nte re d a fi na l ju dg me nt s e tti ng fo rth it s finding s from the he aring and incor porating the terms of the pare nting plan.

Mo the r a pp e a ls r a isi ng tw o is su e s, wh ic h w e qu ote :

I

. The Trial Court err ed in not following the mandate of Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36-6- 404(b) in dete rmining the cu s t ody of [the
c h il d ].

I I

. C h i l d s u p port should be set ac cording to the order s of the Trial Court, which included a Casteel adjustment which wa s not cre dited to [ Mother].

Discussion

Th e fa c tua l f

ind ing s o f the Juve nil e Cou rt are a c c or de d a pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss, and we will not overturn those fac tual finding s unless the evidence pr eponder ates a g ainst them. See Te nn

. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our revie w is c onducted “under a pure de novo standard of revie w, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v . Lo ud

on Cou nty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

We first addre ss Mothe r’s claim that the Juvenile Court erre d by not following “ the
m an d at e of T en n

. C o d e An n

. § 3 6 -6 -4 0 4 (b ) i n d e t e r m i n i n g the custody of [the c hil d].” (e mph a sis added) . Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36- 6-404(b) lists s ix teen f actor s which must be consider ed by a trial
c ou rt wh e n impl e me nti ng a pa

re nti ng plan. Mo re sp e c if ic a lly , the po rt ion of the statut e imm e diate ly pr e c e din g the sixte e n f

a c tor s st a te s: Any perma nent paren t ing pla n shall include a r esidential schedule as d ef

ined in § 36-6-402( 3). The c ourt shall make
r e s i d en t i al p ro v i s i o n s fo r e ac h ch i l d , co n s i s t en twi t h t h e c h i l d 's de ve lop me nta l le ve l and the famil y ' s so c ia l a nde c on omi cT enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 6

- 4 0 6 set s f o rt h w hen res t ri ct i o ns o n co

- p arent i ng t i m e i n a t em p o rary or p erm anent 2
p a re n ting p la n a re a p p ro p ria te b a se d o n sp e c ifi e d c o n d u c t o f a p a re n t, su c h a s w h e n a p a re n t ab u se s a c h ild , etc

.

W e no t e t hat i n In re B .A .L . a n d A .E .L , N o. W 2004- 00826- CO A- R3- JV, 2004 W L 3008810 ( T en n

. C t

. App. 3
D e c . 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 ), no a pp l

. p er m a pp eal f i l ed , t he W est ern Secti o n of t hi s C o urt s eem s t o s uggest t hat a m o t her’ s havi ng
cu s t ody by vi r t u e of

T en n

. Code An n

. § 36- 2- 303 i s s u f f i ci en t t o r equ i r e t h at a ma t er i al c h an g e i n c i r cu ms t an ce s f i r s t be (c o n tinu e d ...)
-6- ci rc u m s t an ce s , wh i ch en co u ra ge e ac h p ar e n tt o m ai n t ai n a l o v i n g, s t able, and nurturing relationship wit h the child. The c hil d 's residential sc hedule shall be consistent with this part. I f the limit ations of § 36-6-406 a re not dispositive of t he child' s residential schedule , the court shall consider the f ollowing f

actor s .... 2

Th e mos t g lari ng pr ob le m wi th Mo the r’ s f ir st i ssu e is h e r a

rg ume nt that th e Juve nil e Court erre d by not detailing its finding s with reg ard to eac h of t he six teen f actor s when a

rriving at its “custody ” dec ision. The statute’s plain lang uag e is suc h that these fac tors are to be consider ed when de veloping a parenting plan, as opposed t o making a custody determination. Ex cept f

or the
a mou nt of he r mon thl y c hil d sup po rt ob lig a tio n, Mo the r doe s not ar g ue that he r c o- pa re nti ng tim e or any other a spect o f t he par enting plan is in error if Father wa s proper ly

desig nated the primary
re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.

As no te d p re vio us ly , o nc e the pa rt ie s’ c hil d w a s b orn M oth e r h a d c us tody be c a us e there was no orde r of c ustody to the contra

ry desig nating Father or any one else as the primary residential pa

rent. See Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 36 -2 -3 03 . Wh a t is un c le ar f ro m th e re c or d, ho we ve r, is whether an order of custody desig nating Mother as the primary residential pare nt w as entered sometime after

the child was born. We know that Father wa s order ed to pay child support in 2003, but that order is not in the re cord w hich prev en t s o u r being a ble to determine whether that order fairly can be char ac t er i z ed as an “orde r of c ustody .” I f there was no initial order of custody , then Father ne eded only

to prove that de signating him as the prim ary residential parent wa s in the child’s best interest a

pply ing the compar ative fitness test, and he was not r equire d first to prove that ther e also h ad b ee n a material chang e in circ umstances. See W illiams v. Barnes-Mason , No. E2002- 01442-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 2010755 (T e n n

. Ct. App. A pr. 30, 2003), no appl. perm. appeal filed , wh e re we c on c lud e d:

Ten n. Co de An n. § 3 6- 2- 30 3 p ro vid e s th a t th e c us tod y of a c hil d born out of we dlock shall be with the mother unle ss there is an O rder otherw ise. This Court has held that if a c ustody dispute arises betwee n pare nts over a c hild born out of wedlock the comparat ive fitness test is the proper s tandar d to be applied, where there has bee n no previous custody

decr ee.

W illiams , 20 0 3 W L

2 0 1 0 7 5 5 , at * 2 (c i t i n g Du ra nt v . H owa rd , No

. E 2 0 0 0 -0 2 0 7 2 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2001 WL 1103500 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2001), no appl. perm. appeal filed ). 3(

. . . con t i n u ed) 3
p ro v e n in a n y futu re c h a n g e o f cu sto d y p ro c e e d ing s.
-7-

I n short, the re cord doe s not contain an “order of custody ,” and in the absence of such an orde r F ather was require d only to establish by

a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e that desig nating him as the primary

residential parent a fter a

pply ing the compar ative fitness test wa s in the child’s best interest. Howeve r, it is clea r, for whateve r rea son, that the J uvenile Cour t an d t h e p arties p ro ce ed ed o n t h e as s u m p t i o n t h at Fa t h er wa s re q u i re d t o s at i s fyt h e m o re s tri n gen tm at er i al ch an ge in circumstanc es standar d. I t also is clear that if the J uvenile C ourt corr ectly conclude d that Father met the more string ent standar d, then whethe r or not the less st ri n gent s tandar d actua lly applied be c ome s moo t. F or thi s re a so n a lon e , we no w e xami ne wh e the r the Juve nil e Co urt c or re c tly conclude d that Father ha d proven the exis tence of a mat erial chang e of c ircumstance and, if so, whether desig nating him as the primary residential pa

rent wa s in the child’s best intere st.

Acc ording t o o ur Supreme Court in Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566 (Tenn. 2002):

The “ threshold issue” is whether a materia l c hang e in circumstanc es

has occ urred after the initial custody determination. [ Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137] at 150. Whil e “[t]here ar e no har d and fast rule s for de termining when a child’s circ umstances have c hang ed sufficie ntly

to war rant a chang e of his or he r custody ,” the f ollowing fac tors have f

ormed a sound basis for de termining whether a material chang e in circ umstances has occur red: the chang e “ha s occur red a fter the entry of the orde r soug ht to be modified,” the cha ng e “is not one that was known or re asonably anticipated w hen the or der w as e nte re d, ” a ndthe c ha ng e “ is o ne that a ff e c ts the c hil d’ s we ll- be ing in
a mea ningf

ul way .” Id . (citations omitted).

Kendrick , 90 S.W .3d at 570. Se e als o Tenn Code Ann. § 36-6-101( a)( 2)(B )(“ I f the issue be fore the court is a modification of the court's prior dec ree perta ining to custody , the petitioner must prove by a pre pondera nce of

the e v i d en ce a material chang e in circ umstance. A materia l chang e of circ umstance doe s not require a showing of a substantial risk of ha rm to the child....”).

I f a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s has be e n p ro ve n, wh e n u nd e rt akin g a be st i n t er es t s an al y s i s T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 6 -6 -1 0 6 (a ) r eq u i re s a t ri al co u rt t o co n s i d ert h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) The love, af

fec tion an d emotional ties exi sting be tween the par ents and c hild;
(2 ) T he dis po sit ion of

the pa re nts to p ro vid e the child w ith food, clothi ng , medical care , education and other nece ssary car e and the deg ree to which a pa

rent ha s been the primary car eg iver;-8- (3) The impor t an ce of

continuity

in the child’s life and the leng th of time the child has lived i n a stable, satisfac tory environment; provided, that where there is a finding , u n d er § 36-6- 106(8), of child abuse, as define d in § 39-15-401 or § 39- 15-402, or child sexual abuse, as de fined in § 37-1- 602, by one (1) p are nt, and that a non-pe rpe t ra t i n g pare nt has reloc ated in orde r to flee the perpe trating pare nt , t h at such re location shall not weig h ag ainst an
a w ar d o f c u s t o d y; (4 ) T he sta

bil ity of the famil y

un it o f the pa

re nts ; (5 ) T he me nta l a ndph y sic a l he a lth of the pa re nts ; (6) The home, school and c ommunityrec ord of the c hild;
(7) (A )T h e re asonable pref ere nce of the child if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or olde r; (B ) T h e c o u r tm a y

h e ar th e p r e f e r e n c e o f a y o u n g e r c h i ld up on re qu e st. Th e pr e fe re nc e s o f o lde r c hil dr e n s ho uld normally be g iven g reater we ight than those of y oung er children;
(8 ) E vid e nc e of

ph y sic a l or

e mot ion a l a

bu se to the c hil d, to the other pa

rent or to a ny

other pe rson; provided, that wher e ther e ar e alleg ations that one (1) pare nt has committed child abuse, a s defined in § 39 -1 5- 40 1 or § 39 -1 5- 40 2, or c hil d s e xua l a

bu se , a s d e fi ne d in § 3 7- 1- 60 2, again st a

famil y me mbe r, the c ou rt

sh a ll c on sid e r a ll evidenc e re levant to the phy sic al an d emotional safe ty of the c hild, and determine, by

a cle ar pr eponder ance of the e vidence , whether such abus e h as occur

red. The court shall include in its dec ision a written finding of all evide nce, and all find ings of fac ts connec ted there to. I n addition, the co urt shall, wher e appr opriate, r efe r any iss ue s o f a

bu se to the juv e nil e c ou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s; (9) The char acte r and be havior of an y other pe rson who resides in or f

reque nts the home of a pa rent a nd such per son’s interac tions with t he child; and
(10) Eac h pare nt’s past and potential for f uture pe rformance of par enting responsibilities, including the willing ness and a bilityof
eac h of the pare nts to fac ilitate and enc ourag e a c lose and c ontinuing-9- pa re nt- c hil d re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e c hil d a ndthe oth e r p are nt, consistent with the best interest of the child.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a ).

Even if we give Mother t he benefit of t he doubt and procee d as i f she arg ues that the J uvenile Court er

red when i t failed to deta il its finding s with reg ard to the f actor s set forth in Tenn. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 6- 10 6( a ), a s o ppos ed to Tenn. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 4( b) , h e r a rg ume nt s til l f

a ils

. Rece ntly , in Cra ig v . Cr

aig , No. E2003-02479- COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1 9 0 6 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug

. 26, 2004), no appl. perm. appeal filed, we rejec ted a sim ilar ar g ument. After noting that tria l
c ou rt s sh ou ld b e a s d e ta ile d a s p os sib le , w e ne ve rthe le ss s ta te d:

Husband c laims the Trial Court failed to c ompare the re lative fi tne ss o f t h e p ar t i e s s i n c e m o s to f t h e r e l e v a n tf

a c t o r s c o n t a i n e d in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a ) favor Husband. I n its memorandum opinion, the Trial Court did not list ea ch of the applicable fac tors and explain how t h at particula r fa ctor impac ted its overall dec ision. Whil e this statute does require a trial court to c onsider all of the listed fac tors which ar e ap p l i ca b le, it does not require a trial c ourt, when issuing a me morandum opinion or final judg ment, to list every applicable fac tor along with its conclusion as t o h ow that particular fac tor impacted the overa ll custody determination.

Cra ig , 2004 WL

1906448, at * 7 (footnotes omitted).
We ag ain emphasize that a tria l court should be as de tailed as pos s i b le when rende ring a dec ision in a custody case . Neve rtheless, we believe the J uvenile Court’s finding s in the pr e se nt c a se are suffi c ie ntl y de ta ile d f

or us to c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the J uvenile Court’s finding s that there was a materia l c hang e in c ircumstance s an d t h at desig nating Father a s the primary residential pa

rent wa s in the child’s best intere st.

The sec ond issue surrounds the a mount of Mother’s monthly child support pay ment which wa s set at $141.48. We revie w child support decisions for abuse of discr etion. Sta te ex re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 2 1 S. W.3 d 24 4 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ). Ho we ve r, a tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n is limit ed b ecause such “ discretion must be exercise d within the strictures of the Child S upport Guidelines.” Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W.3 d 188 , 1 93 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; see also Jone s v. Jone s , 930 S.W .2d 541, 545 (Tenn. 1996)

.

Th e pa rt ie s a g re e that the Juve nil e Cou rt de te rm ine d M oth e r’ s c hil d s up po rt sh ou ld be base d on the fe dera l minim um wag e since Mother was not working , and there shoul d be a Casteel adjustment beca

use Mot her was ex erc ising more than s tandar d visitation. The parties further a g ree that Mother’s a nnual child s upport obligation before any adjustment should be $1,992.00, which equals $166.00 pe r month or $5.46 per day

. T h e d i sag ree ment arises f rom the amount of the-10-

adjustment to be made f

or Mother’ s increa sed vi s i tation. Fathe r ar g ues that Mother’ s annual c opa re nti ng tim e is 14 6 da y s, wh ile Mo the r arg ue s he r c o- pa re nti ng tim e tot a ls 1 50 da y s. Whil e it i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e M o t h e r ’ s e x a c tc o

- p ar e n t i n g t i m e b e c a u s e t h e p ar t i e s a l t e r n a t e v ar i o u s h o l i d a ys eac h y ear , we be lieve Mother’ s claim that her c o-par enting time totals 150 day s is the most accurate. M o t h e r ’ s t o t a l c o

- p ar e n t i n g t i m e o f 1 5 0 d a ys p e r

ye ar i s 7 0 d a ys m o r e t h a n t h e p r e s u m p t i v e 8 0 d a ys un de r the Gu ide lin e s. Th e a mou nt of da ily c hil d su pp ort of $5 .4 6 fo r the se se venty day s eq ua ls $ 3 8 2.20, which should be de ducted f rom the total annua l support of $1,992.00. This reduc es Mother’s c hild support obligation to $1609.80 annually , o r $134.15 per month. Ac cording ly , we modify the J uvenile Court’s judg ment to refle ct Mother’ s m o n t h l ychild support obligation to be $134.15. As modified, the Juvenile Court’s judgment is otherw ise aff irmed.

Conclusion

Th e Judg me nt o f the J uv eni le Court is a ff ir me d a s mo dif

ie d a ndthi s c a us e is
re ma nd e d to the Juve nil e Cou rt fo r c oll e c tio n of the c os ts be low

. Exe rc isi ng ou r d isc re tio n, c os ts
o n ap p e a l ar e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l a n t , R o m i n a J e s s i c a C l i f t o n , a n d h e r

s u r e t y.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE