IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), 

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ACTION.

 
RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2020-SC-0468-WC

STEPHEN FLYNN APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

V. NO. 2020-CA-0201

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD 

NO. WC-18-98128

BUYERS PARADISE FURNITURE, INC.; 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX 

REL. DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY 

GENERAL; HONORABLE STEPHANIE 

KINNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; 

AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD 

APPELLEES 

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

I. BACKGROUND

Stephen Flynn worked for Paradise Furniture, Inc., as a warehouse 

supervisor. On December 29, 2017, Flynn was operating a “picker” to retrieve 

a piece of furniture from a warehouse shelf. The picker is a forklift-like piece of 

equipment with a caged outside platform on which an individual may stand to 

be elevated to the shelves above. As Flynn stood inside the picker’s cage and 

elevated himself to the appropriate shelf, he placed his left hand on top of the 

cage, with his fingers outside. Flynn was looking in a different direction when 
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his left hand was caught between a ceiling beam and the cage. Flynn’s work 

injury required surgery, and his first two fingers were each partially 

amputated.

On August 12, 2017, the Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ), Stephanie L. Kinney, determined Flynn is permanently partially

disabled as a result of his work injury and awarded him weekly benefits which 

would terminate at the age of seventy pursuant to KRS 342.730(4). Flynn filed 

a motion for reconsideration, which the ALJ denied. He then appealed to the 

Workers’ Compensation Board, arguing the amendment of KRS 342.730(4) was 

not retroactive. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision pursuant to Holcim v. 

Swinford, 581 S.W.3d 37 (Ky. 2019), which held the 2018 amendment to KRS 

342.730(4) applied retroactively. Flynn also argued the subsection was 

unconstitutional for various reasons. The Board acknowledged it lacked 

jurisdiction to determine the statute’s constitutionality. 

Flynn appealed the Board’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which 

affirmed his award and held KRS 342.730(4) and its retroactive application 

were constitutional. Flynn now appeals to this Court, arguing: (1) KRS 

342.730(4) violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and 

Kentucky Constitutions, as written and as retroactively applied; (2) retroactive 

application of KRS 342.730(4) violates the contracts clauses of the United 

States and Kentucky Constitutions; and (3) KRS 342.730(4) violates Kentucky’s 

constitutional provisions regarding special legislation. The Attorney General 

filed a motion to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the statute, which 
3

we granted. For the following reasons, we hold that KRS 342.730(4) is 

constitutional and affirm the Court of Appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

KRS 342.730(4) concerns the termination of workers’ compensation 

benefits. In Parker v. Webster Cnty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759 

(Ky. 2017), this Court found the then-current 1996 version of KRS 342.730(4) 

unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The 1996 version of the statute 

tied the termination of workers’ compensation benefits to the time at which the 

employee qualified for old-age Social Security benefits. This Court held this 

was an arbitrary distinction with no rational relation to a legitimate state 

interest. 

In Holcim, 581 S.W.3d at 41, this Court considered whether a 2018 

version of KRS 342.730(4) could be applied retroactively. Quoting a Legislative 

Research Commission comment beneath the statute, we held in Holcim that the 

amendment “applies to those cases which ‘have not been fully and finally 

adjudicated, or are in the appellate process, or for which time to file an appeal 

[h]as not lapsed, as of the effective date of this Act.’” Id. at 44. 

Whereas the pre-Parker version of KRS 342.730(4) linked workers’ 

compensation benefit termination to the time at which the worker qualified for 

old-age Social Security benefits (and thereby violated an individual’s right to 

equal protection under the law by arbitrarily treating similarly-situated 

individuals differently), the 2018 version of the statutory subsection links the 

termination of benefits to the injured employee attaining a particular age. 
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Under the amendment, a claimant’s benefits terminate on his or her seventieth 

birthday or four years after his or her work injury or last injurious exposure, 

whichever occurs later. Flynn argues this statute is constitutionally infirm on 

multiple grounds.

A. Equal Protection

Flynn argues the amendment to KRS 342.730(4) violates his rights to 

equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the United States and 

Kentucky Constitutions. The basis for his argument is that the amendment 

treats older injured workers and younger injured workers differently. 

The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 

2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution contain the respective federal and state 

equal protection clauses. Their “goal . . . is to ‘keep[ ] governmental decision 

makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’” 

Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Ky. 2011) (quoting 

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Because “[w]orkers’ compensation 

statutes concern matters of social and economic policy,” if a rational basis or 

substantial and justifiable reason supports the classifications they create, we 

must uphold it. Id. at 466 (citing Cain v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 39, 

42 (Ky. 2009)). “In sum, we will uphold the age limitation here so long as it 

rationally relates to a legitimate state objective.” Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d 

864, 871 (Ky. 2021).

As this Court has stated, “acts of the legislature carry a strong 

presumption of constitutionality.” Wynn v. Ibold, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 695, 696 
5

(Ky. 1998). “Doubts regarding constitutionality must be resolved in favor of 

upholding the law.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 870. Furthermore, “the principle of 

reducing workers’ compensation benefits at an age when workers typically 

become eligible for alternative forms of income replacement is not new to 

Kentucky.” Wynn, 969 S.W.2d at 696.

We took up the constitutionality of the 2018 amendment to KRS 

342.730(4) in Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 871, holding, “the current version of KRS 

342.730(4) is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause because the age 

classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.” We do not 

depart from that recent holding today. 

As this Court held in Parker, “[t]he rational bases for treating younger 

and older workers differently [are]: (1) it prevents duplication of benefits; and 

(2) it results in savings for the workers’ compensation system.” 529 S.W.3d at

768. Four years later, we stated, “we remain convinced that preventing a 

duplication of wage-loss protection programs and promoting the solvency of the 

workers’ compensation system are legitimate state interests.” Cates, 627 

S.W.3d at 870. We are unpersuaded to deviate from this position by Flynn’s

arguments that KRS 342.730(4) does not prevent duplicative income 

replacement benefits, avoid duplicative governmental benefits, or provide a 

savings for the workers’ compensation system; nor are we convinced that 

savings to the workers’ compensation system is not a valid basis to uphold a 

statute in the face of an equal protection argument. Again, today, we hold the 
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statute passes the rational basis test as it “treats alike all those who receive 

workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 871. 

Flynn argues that even if the statutory amendment were constitutional 

on equal protection grounds (as we have held), it is unconstitutional to apply 

the statute retroactively to his claim, as his injury occurred before the effective 

date of the amendment. However, “[t]he legislature ‘may amend the law and 

make the change applicable to pending cases, even when the amendment is 

outcome determinative.’” Id. (quoting Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 

(2016)). Here, this Court declared one version of the statutory subsection 

unconstitutional and the legislature passed a new subsection, providing for 

retroactive effect—and the legislature was within constitutional bounds in so 

doing. 

B. Special Legislation

Flynn next argues KRS 342.730(4) violates Kentucky’s constitutional 

provisions regarding special legislation. Specifically, he points to the 

prohibitions in Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution, which state, in 

pertinent part:

The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts 

concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following 

purposes, namely:

. . . .

Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal causes.

. . . .

Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or manufacturing.
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Flynn links this argument to his equal protection argument—essentially 

arguing the legislation discriminates against older workers and favors business 

owners in an attempt to save employers money on workers’ compensation 

insurance premiums. He also argues older workers are discriminated against 

because, if they receive permanent partial disability benefits, they will not 

receive the entirety of their awards, unlike younger injured workers. This is 

another attempt at making the same argument under a different veil. We reject 

it, too, as all injured workers’ benefits terminate at age seventy under the 

amendment.

This Court addressed a similar special legislation argument in Cates, 627 

S.W.3d at 872, holding the amended statutory subsection was not special 

legislation as it did not apply “to a particular individual, object or locale.” 

(Citing Calloway Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t. v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557, 573 (Ky. 

2020)). In Cates, we stated “[t]he argument that the statute differentiates 

between older and younger workers is a classification argument, which is 

properly considered under sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.” 

Id. And, just as in Cates, we reiterate: “KRS 342.730(4) is simply not special 

legislation.” Id. 

C. Due Process

Flynn also argues the retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) stripped 

him of his property right to workers’ compensation benefits in violation of due 

process rights, as he did not receive prior notice or a hearing. We addressed 

this issue in Cates, holding the claimants had no vested right in the duration 
8

and amount of their benefits “until they have received a final judgment in their 

favor.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 873. The same is true here. Because Flynn had 

no vested right in the duration of his benefits, a statute terminating them at a 

specific age did not deny him due process.

D. Contracts Clause 

Finally, Flynn argues the retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) 

denies his rights under the contracts clauses of the federal and state 

constitutions. Both the Constitution of the United States and the Kentucky 

Constitution protect citizens of our Commonwealth from the state’s 

infringement on their right to contract. Article 1, Section 10, Clause 2 of the 

United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part, “[n]o State shall . . . pass 

any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 

Contracts . . . .” Likewise, Section 19 of the Kentucky Constitution provides, 

“[n]o ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall 

be enacted.” Flynn argues KRS 342.730(4) violates these contracts clauses

In Dowell v. Matthews Contracting, 627 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Ky. 2021), this 

Court stated if “the fundamental premise of a Contracts Clause analysis—the 

existence of a contract—is absent . . . our analysis ends.” See Gen. Motors 

Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 190 (1992) (holding Contracts Clause 

inapplicable because the employer and employee did not assent to specific 

statutory terms). Therefore, we must first determine whether a contract exists 

in this case. 
9

Flynn “point[s] to no contract or place within the statutory scheme where 

[he is] guaranteed certain benefits that were mutually assented to and 

bargained for.” Dowell, 627 S.W.3d at 895. This Court has held “the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (WCA) does not constitute a contract between Kentucky 

workers and their employers or the state.” Id. at 894. Rather than providing 

contractual rights, we explained, “the WCA is a statutory scheme that may be 

amended as the General Assembly chooses, provided it fits within our 

constitutional framework.” Id. at 894–95. “The workers’ compensation system 

is controlled by the state and is governed by legislative enactments. It is not a 

contract . . . between employers and their employees. Changes to the relevant 

statutes, therefore, do not create a Contracts Clause issue.” Id. at 896. 

Since the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute a contract, “a 

complete Contracts Clause analysis is unnecessary.” Id. at 894. The 

protections of the clauses simply do not apply. “Because the WCA does not 

form a contract, there are no contractual rights that the amendment to KRS 

342.730(4) could infringe.” Id. at 895. Just as in Dowell, we hold there was no 

contracts clause violation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

All sitting. All concur. 
10

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Mark D. Knight

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, BUYERS PARADISE FURNITURE, INC.:

J. Gregory Allen

Jones & Walter, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. 

DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL:

Matthew F. Kuhn

Brett R. Nolan

Alexander Y. Magera

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. Stephanie L. Kinney

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:

Michael W. Alvey

Chairman