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2 , 0 0 Conn. App. 758

Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

JUSTINE LYONS v. BIRMINGHAM LAW

OFFICE, LLC, ET AL.

(AC 45631)

(AC 45632)

Moll, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-59b (a)), ‘‘a court may exercise personal jurisdiction

over any nonresident individual [or] foreign partnership . . . who in

person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state;

(2) commits a tortious act within the state . . . [or] (3) commits a

tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within

the state . . . if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits

business . . . or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should

reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives

substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . .’’

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the

underlying action against several defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged, inter alia, negligence against the

defendants arising from their involvement in the sale of Vermont real

property owned by D. The plaintiff was the longtime girlfriend of D and

lived with him for years prior to his death in December, 2020. The

plaintiff and D were Connecticut residents at all relevant times. In 2020,

D’s attorneys, B and B Co., represented D in the sale of the Vermont

property to a buyer from Massachusetts represented by the buyer’s

attorneys, S and S Co. The plaintiff had no ownership interest in the

Vermont property and was not a party to the real estate transaction.

Throughout his representation of D in the sale of the Vermont property,

B communicated with D at various times while D was in Connecticut.

B was the sole member of B Co., a Vermont law firm, practiced law

exclusively in Vermont, and was not admitted to the Connecticut bar.

S Co. was located in and conducted business in Vermont and, although

S had previously practiced law in Connecticut, she moved her law

practice to Vermont in 2013 and retired from the practice of law in

Connecticut in 2019. S Co. had represented clients from across the

Northeast, as evidenced by the testimonials on its website from out-ofstate clients, none of which were from a Connecticut resident. S was

also listed as lead counsel for a party to a federal action in the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut as late as 2019, but

the party that she represented was no longer actively involved in the

action at that time. The sale of the Vermont property closed on December

23, 2020, and D’s attorneys were instructed by D to have the buyer’s

attorneys wire the sale proceeds to the plaintiff’s bank account. D’s
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

attorneys forwarded the provided bank account information to the buyer’s attorneys. On December 24, 2020, the buyer’s attorneys attempted

to wire the money to the account, but they could not do so because

the provided account information was incorrect. The buyer’s attorneys

subsequently emailed D’s attorneys to notify them that the wire transfer

could not be completed with the account information provided. On

December 26, 2020, D died, and D’s attorneys subsequently contacted

the buyer’s attorneys to notify them of D’s death. D’s attorneys instructed

the buyer’s attorneys to wire the money from the sale proceeds to their

attorney trust account, which the buyer’s attorneys did. Upon receiving

the sale proceeds, D’s attorneys held the money in the account until

they spoke with W, the attorney for the fiduciaries of D’s estate. D’s

attorneys then released the sale proceeds to W to hold in escrow until

the Probate Court could determine ownership of the funds. D’s attorneys

and the buyer’s attorneys filed separate motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s

complaint, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over

them as nonresidents of Connecticut because the plaintiff failed to prove

that the requirements of § 52-59b (a) were satisfied as to any of the

defendants. To support her claim that the defendants were subject to

personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, the plaintiff pointed to evidence

including, inter alia, a portion of the website for D’s attorneys that was

titled ‘‘Attention: out of state sellers,’’ B’s deposition testimony that B

Co. had clients from ‘‘all over the place,’’ and language from the website

for the buyer’s attorneys indicating that they provided legal services in

the Northeast. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that it did not have personal

jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) and that the

defendants had insufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Held:

1. The trial court properly determined that D’s attorneys were not subject

to personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a):

a. The plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing that D’s attorneys

transacted any business in Connecticut within the meaning of § 52-59b

(a) (1): D’s attorneys derived only minimal income from Connecticut

residents, did not solicit business in Connecticut, and did not promote

themselves as a national firm, and, with respect to the sale of the Vermont

property, D’s attorneys performed all legal services exclusively in Vermont and did not meet with D or the plaintiff in Connecticut; moreover,

D’s attorneys were retained to represent D in the sale of real property

located in the state of Vermont and, although both D and the plaintiff

were Connecticut residents at all relevant times and D’s attorneys conversed with D several times while he was in Connecticut, those facts

were insufficient to establish that D’s attorneys transacted business in

the state without additional evidence that D’s attorneys had projected

themselves into Connecticut in such a manner that they purposefully
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

availed themselves of the benefits and protections of its laws; furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, the transfer by D’s attorneys of

the sale proceeds to and their communication with W and W’s firm,

Connecticut residents, were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of

§ 52-59b (a) (1), as the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that D’s

attorneys affirmatively and purposefully contacted W or W’s firm or that

a contract existed between D’s attorneys and W or W’s firm.

b. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court had

personal jurisdiction over D’s attorneys pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (2); the

plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing that D’s attorneys

committed a tort in Connecticut, given that B clearly denied in his affidavit that he committed any tortious acts in Connecticut, the plaintiff

failed to refute those claims, and the plaintiff failed to present evidence

demonstrating that the act of wiring the money from the sale proceeds

involved false representations made by D’s attorneys regarding anyone

or anything related to the subject real estate transaction or, specifically,

regarding the plaintiff and/or her alleged property or assets.

c. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court had

personal jurisdiction over D’s attorneys pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3):

although the plaintiff argued that D’s attorneys regularly solicited business in Connecticut by virtue of their website and pointed to B’s deposition testimony that B Co. had clients from ‘‘all over the place,’’ that

evidence, at best, merely established that D’s attorneys had previously

had clients who were not Vermont residents and that they had information available for potential out-of-state sellers on their website, but the

evidence was too attenuated to establish that D’s attorneys had either

done any business in the state of Connecticut or had specifically solicited

business in the state; moreover, there was no evidence that D’s attorneys

received any revenue from Connecticut other than minimal income

received from D in connection with the sale of the Vermont property,

and the plaintiff failed to present any facts to support her claim that D’s

attorneys received substantial revenue from Connecticut; furthermore,

although the evidence cited by the plaintiff may support a claim that

D’s attorneys derived some revenue from interstate commerce, the plaintiff did not provide specific evidence demonstrating the number of interstate clients or amount of interstate revenue derived by D’s attorneys

but, rather, provided vague evidence that was insufficient to support

a conclusion that the amount of revenue D’s attorneys received from

interstate commerce was substantial.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the buyer’s attorneys

were subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3):

a. Even assuming, arguendo, that the buyer’s attorneys committed tortious acts outside of Connecticut causing injury to the plaintiff within the

state, the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence that the jurisdictional

requirements in § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) were satisfied: the plaintiff’s claim

that the buyer’s attorneys regularly solicited business in Connecticut
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

through their website was unavailing, as the language highlighted by the

plaintiff was taken out of context and given that, read in its entirety,

the website stated that the buyer’s attorneys provided services ‘‘in this

beautiful part of the Northeast,’’ it appeared that the website advertised

the legal work that S Co. did in Vermont specifically, rather than advertising to the Northeast as a whole, and it was not apparent from that portion

of the website that the buyer’s attorneys regularly conducted or solicited

business in Connecticut; moreover, although the website noted that S

was admitted to practice in Connecticut, the information provided was

a resume only, intended to provide potential clients with further information about S, rather than a solicitation of Connecticut clients; furthermore, there was insufficient evidence that the buyer’s attorneys derived

substantial revenue from the state as, even assuming, arguendo, that S

were still involved in the referenced District Court case, that did not

support the assertion that the buyer’s attorneys derived substantial revenue from Connecticut, and, on the contrary, S’s affidavit supported her

assertion that she had derived minimal, if any, revenue from the state

since she retired from practicing law in Connecticut, and it was unlikely

that, even if S were still involved in the District Court case, that the

proceeds from that case alone would have demonstrated that the buyer’s

attorneys could fairly have been expected to be haled into court in

Connecticut for an entirely unrelated case.

b. The plaintiff provided insufficient evidence from which to conclude

that the buyer’s attorneys derived substantial revenue from interstate or

international commerce that would subject them to personal jurisdiction

pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B): although the testimonials on the website

for the buyer’s attorneys may have supported a claim that the buyer’s

attorneys derived revenue from interstate commerce, the plaintiff failed

to provide sufficient evidence about these transactions from which the

court could determine whether the buyer’s attorneys derived substantial

revenue from interstate commerce and, rather, the plaintiff merely

showed that the website contained testimonials from clients from states

other than Vermont without further information about what percentage

of the buyer’s attorneys’ revenues those non-Vermont clients made up,

the amount of revenue derived from those clients, or any other relevant

facts and, therefore, the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence to conclude that, even if the buyer’s attorneys did derive some revenue from

interstate commerce, that revenue was substantial enough to satisfy the

requirements of § 52-59b (a) (3) (B).

3. Because the plaintiff failed to meet her burden in establishing that the

trial court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a), this court was not required to decide whether the

defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet

the constitutional requirements of due process.

Argued January 11—officially released April 16, 2024
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, negligence,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,

Wilson, J., granted the motions to dismiss filed by the

named defendant et al. and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the plaintiff filed separate appeals to this

court. Affirmed.

Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P.

Levesque, and, on the brief, Steven Berglass and Rosie

Miller, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Colleen Vellturo, with whom, on the brief, was Stephen P. Brown, for the appellees (named defendant

et al.).

Walter J. Klimczak III, for the appellees (defendant

Marylou Scofield et al.).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, Justine Lyons, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the

underlying action against the defendants Birmingham

Law Office, LLC, and Attorney Matthew Birmingham

(Birmingham defendants); and Marylou Scofield, PC,

and Attorney Marylou Scofield (Scofield defendants),1

for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff claims

that the court improperly concluded that (1) personal

jurisdiction over the defendants was not conferred

under our state’s long arm statute, General Statutes

§ 52-59b, and (2) exercising jurisdiction over the defendants would violate the due process requirements of

1 The plaintiff additionally named as defendants The Law Offices of David

L. Weiss and Attorney David L. Weiss (Weiss defendants). The Weiss defendants, however, are not participating in this appeal. Accordingly, all references to the defendants in this opinion are only to the Birmingham defendants and the Scofield defendants, collectively.
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

the United States constitution because they have insufficient ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with the state.2 We disagree

and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We consider the following facts as alleged in the

complaint and those facts contained in the affidavits

and exhibits submitted in support of the defendants’

motions to dismiss and the plaintiff’s opposition

thereto. The plaintiff was the longtime girlfriend of

Alfred Ducharme (decedent) and lived with him for

years prior to his death in December, 2020. Both the

plaintiff and the decedent were Connecticut residents

at all relevant times. The decedent owned property at

137 Flatow Road in Ludlow, Vermont (Vermont property), in which the plaintiff had no ownership interest.

In 2020, the Birmingham defendants represented the

decedent in the sale of the Vermont property to a buyer

from Massachusetts represented by the Scofield defendants. The plaintiff was not a party to this real estate

transaction.

Birmingham Law Office, LLC, is located and conducts

business in the state of Vermont. Attorney Birmingham

is the sole member of this firm. He practices law exclusively in Vermont. He is not admitted to the Connecticut

bar. Throughout his representation of the decedent in

the sale of the Vermont property, Attorney Birmingham

communicated with the decedent at various times while

the decedent was in Connecticut.3

2 The plaintiff additionally claimed that there was personal jurisdiction

over the defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 33-929 (f), the state’s long

arm statute pertaining to foreign corporations. It is well settled, however,

that our ‘‘general long arm jurisdiction provision, § 52-59b, rather than our

corporation specific long arm provision, § 33-929, applies to foreign [limited

liability companies].’’ Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn. App. 513, 546, 89

A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 642 (2014). The plaintiff’s

counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that § 33-929 (f) is

inapplicable to the defendants. 3 The exact nature and extent of these communications are not clearly

alleged. It appears, however, that the Birmingham defendants and the decedent communicated several times via telephone and email in connection

with the sale of the Vermont property while the decedent was in Connecticut.
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

Marylou Scofield, PC, is located and conducts business in the state of Vermont. Although Attorney Scofield

previously practiced law in Connecticut, she moved her

law practice to Vermont in 2013 and retired from the

practice of law in Connecticut in 2019. Marylou Scofield,

PC, has represented clients from across the Northeast,

as evidenced by the testimonials on its website from

out of state clients. None of the testimonials, however,

is from a Connecticut resident. Attorney Scofield was

additionally listed as the lead counsel for a party to a

federal action in the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut4 as late as 2019, but the party

that she represented was no longer actively involved

in the action at that time.5

A real estate closing occurred on December 23, 2020,

and the Vermont property was sold. At the time of

closing, the decedent instructed the Birmingham defendants to have the Scofield defendants wire the sale

proceeds to the plaintiff’s bank account.6 The Birmingham defendants forwarded the provided bank

account information to the Scofield defendants. On

December 24, 2020, the Scofield defendants attempted

to wire the money to the account but could not do so

because the provided account information was incorrect. The Scofield defendants subsequently emailed the

Birmingham defendants to notify them that the wire

transfer could not be completed with the account information provided.

The complaint does not allege that Attorney Birmingham ever traveled to

Connecticut to meet with the decedent. 4 See Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Toczek, Docket No. 3:18-CV-1965 (VLB),

2019 WL 6837788 (D. Conn. December 16, 2019). 5 Attorney Scofield represented Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, in the District

Court action. On June 10, 2013, the Superior Court entered an order granting

the motion of Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, to substitute Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., as the plaintiff. 6 The bank account provided was held with a Florida bank, not a Connecticut bank.
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

On December 26, 2020, the decedent died. The Birmingham defendants contacted the Scofield defendants

to notify them of the decedent’s death. The Birmingham

defendants instructed the Scofield defendants to

instead wire the money from the sale proceeds to their

IOLTA account,7 which the Scofield defendants subsequently did. Upon receiving the sale proceeds, the Birmingham defendants held the money in their IOLTA

account until they spoke with the defendant Attorney

David L. Weiss of the defendant The Law Offices of

David L. Weiss (Weiss defendants), the attorney for the

fiduciaries of the decedent’s estate. The Birmingham

defendants subsequently released the sale proceeds to

Attorney Weiss to hold in escrow until the Probate

Court could determine ownership of the funds.8

The plaintiff commenced the present action by way

of a three count complaint against the defendants on

June 7, 2021. The complaint alleged negligence and

violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices

Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., arising from the

sale of the Vermont property.

The Birmingham defendants filed a motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction on August 3, 2021. They

argued that the court ‘‘lacks personal jurisdiction over

the [Birmingham] defendants as nonresidents of the

state of Connecticut. More particularly, the requirements of the long arm statute . . . § 52-59b . . . have

not been met because Attorney Birmingham practices

exclusively in the state of Vermont and has not performed legal services in relation to any property or

7 ‘‘IOLTA stands for interest on lawyers’ trust accounts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335

Conn. 474, 476 n.1, 239 A.3d 288 (2020). 8 Attorney Birmingham, in an affidavit, averred that he ‘‘sent the sale

proceeds to [Attorney Weiss] based on his agreement to hold the funds in

escrow until the probate court determined who was entitled to receive

the funds.’’
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

asset in this state. . . . The only connection with this

matter is his former representation of a seller of real

property located in Vermont. Moreover, personal jurisdiction would violate constitutional due process

because there are insufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with

this state, which is required under due process. He has

no offices or employees in Connecticut and does not

own, possess or use real property in this state. It is not

foreseeable that Attorney Birmingham would be haled

into court in the state of Connecticut, and, as such,

personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.’’

The Scofield defendants also filed a motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction on August 4, 2021. The

Scofield defendants argued that, ‘‘in this matter, the

state of Connecticut does not have jurisdiction over the

[Scofield] defendants because they did not transact any

business within . . . the state of Connecticut, nor do

the [Scofield] defendants meet the minimum contacts

requirements . . . .’’

The plaintiff filed objections to both motions to dismiss, to which the Birmingham defendants and the Scofield defendants each filed a reply. In her objections to

the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the plaintiff argued

that ‘‘the requirements of Connecticut’s long arm statute

. . . are satisfied and due process is not violated by

[the] court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the

defendants.’’ Specifically, she argued that ‘‘[t]he Birmingham defendants engaged in Connecticut communications and transactions, including legal representation

of a Connecticut resident as well as negotiation and

agreement with a Connecticut attorney, thus transferring substantial monies to that Connecticut attorney.

Attorney Birmingham is currently admitted in the Connecticut Superior Court, and the Birmingham defendants’ Internet website solicits and advertises for outof-state interstate clients. The instant action involves
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

Connecticut conduct and improper actions of the Birmingham defendants.’’

As to the Scofield defendants, the plaintiff argued

that ‘‘[Attorney] Scofield currently maintains admission

in the United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut . . . the Scofield defendants solicit and

advertise for Connecticut and interstate clients to provide services in the Northeast . . . [are] registered in

Connecticut, and [have] over twenty years of experience serving clients in New York, Connecticut and Vermont. The instant action involves Connecticut residents

and improper actions of the Scofield defendants.’’

The court thereafter directed the parties to review

our Supreme Court’s decision in North Sails Group,

LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, 340 Conn. 266, 264 A.3d

1 (2021), and to submit supplemental briefing on the

case’s relevance to the issue of personal jurisdiction

raised by the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The parties complied with the order and submitted supplemental briefs. The court additionally ordered a Standard

Tallow evidentiary hearing,9 which occurred remotely

on February 1, 2022.

Following the Standard Tallow evidentiary hearing,

the trial court issued its memorandum of decision granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that it did not

have personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant

to § 52-59b (a) and that the defendants had insufficient

minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet constitutional due process requirements.

Specifically, the court concluded that it did not have

personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants

9 In Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 459 A.2d 503 (1983),

our Supreme Court concluded that, ‘‘[w]hen issues of fact are necessary to

the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a triallike hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence

and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.’’ Id., 56.
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (1), (2) or (3). Turning first to

§ 52-59b (a) (1),10 the court stated that the plaintiff failed

to meet her burden of showing that the Birmingham

defendants transacted any business in Connecticut. The

court explained that the ‘‘evidence shows that the decedent contacted [the Birmingham defendants] seeking

representation, thereby initiating contact with the Birmingham defendants. It is not readily apparent, on the

basis of the evidence submitted, that the Birmingham

defendants’ subsequent communications with the decedent regarding the Vermont real estate transaction,

while he was in Connecticut, shows that they were

actively participating in business transactions within

Connecticut, nor do they demonstrate that the Birmingham defendants were purposefully availing themselves of the benefits and protections of Connecticut

laws. . . . [T]he subject property was located in Vermont, the real estate transaction was completed in Vermont, and . . . neither [Attorney Birmingham] nor

anyone acting on behalf of the Birmingham Law Office,

LLC, performed legal services in Connecticut. . . .

Considering these factors, neither the communications

from the Birmingham defendants nor the wire transfer

to the Weiss defendants amount to the transacting of

business in the state. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not

met her burden [of] showing that the Birmingham defendants transacted business in Connecticut, and the court

does not have personal jurisdiction over the [Birmingham] defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (1).’’

(Citation omitted.)

The court also concluded that it did not have personal

jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant

10 General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As to a

cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a

court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual,

foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or

administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign

voluntary association, who in person or through an agent . . . [t]ransacts

any business within the state . . . .’’
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

to § 52-59b (a) (2)11 because the plaintiff failed to meet

her burden of showing that the Birmingham defendants

committed a tort within the state. According to the

court, ‘‘[t]he act of wiring the money from the sale

proceeds is not, in and of itself, a fraudulent misrepresentation. The plaintiff has failed to present evidence

demonstrating that this wire transfer involved false representations made by the Birmingham defendants

regarding anyone or anything related to the subject real

estate transaction or, specifically, regarding the plaintiff

and/or her alleged property or assets.’’

Additionally, the court concluded that it did not have

personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants

pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3)12 because the plaintiff failed

to meet her burden of showing that the Birmingham

defendants derived substantial revenue from Connecticut or interstate commerce. The court reasoned that,

even ‘‘[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the Birmingham

defendants did commit a tort outside of Connecticut

11 General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As to a

cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a

court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual,

foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or

administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign

voluntary association, who in person or through an agent . . . commits a

tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation

of character arising from the act . . . .’’ 12 General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As to a

cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a

court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual,

foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or

administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign

voluntary association, who in person or through an agent . . . commits a

tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within

the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising

from the act, if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business,

or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial

revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state,

or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences

in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international

commerce . . . .’’
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

that caused injury to a person within Connecticut . . .

the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendants meet

the additional requirements of either § 52-59b (a) (3)

(A) or (B).’’ (Citation omitted.) The court noted: ‘‘In

the present case, the plaintiff has not provided any

evidence demonstrating that the Birmingham defendants have derived substantial revenue from Connecticut or interstate commerce, outside of the fact that, at

minimum, they received revenue from their representation of the decedent in the subject real estate transaction.’’ The court therefore concluded that ‘‘the Birmingham defendants do not now, and did not at the

time of the alleged tort, regularly conduct or solicit

business or derive substantial revenue from Connecticut, nor did they derive revenue from interstate commerce so as to be subjected to Connecticut jurisdiction

under § 52-59b (a) (3).’’

The court also determined that the Birmingham

defendants had insufficient minimum contacts with the

state to meet constitutional due process requirements.

‘‘Because the Birmingham defendants did not transact

business in Connecticut, did not commit a tort in the

state of Connecticut, do not regularly conduct or solicit

business from Connecticut, and do not derive substantial revenue from Connecticut or from interstate or

international commerce with a commercial impact in

Connecticut, the Birmingham defendants could not

have reasonably anticipated being haled into court here.

Accordingly, it would not be reasonable under the facts

of this case for the court to confer personal jurisdiction

over the Birmingham defendants. . . . [F]or the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden

of demonstrating that the court has personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants.’’ (Citation omitted.)

As to the Scofield defendants, the court concluded

that it did not have personal jurisdiction over them
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Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) and that they had insufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet constitutional due process requirements. The court reasoned that, even ‘‘[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the

Scofield defendants committed a tort, the plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate that the [Scofield] defendants

meet the additional requirements of either § 52-59b (a)

(3) (A) or (B). As to subparagraph (A), the plaintiff

argues, by way of printouts from the Scofield defendants’ public website and a [District Court] opinion that

lists Attorney Scofield as lead attorney, that the Scofield

defendants regularly conduct business in Connecticut

and solicit and advertise for interstate clients throughout the Northeast, including in the state of Connecticut.

. . . [T]he website printouts seem to support the conclusion that the website is a recitation of Attorney Scofield’s resume and for information purposes only. . . .

The printouts do not demonstrate, or even suggest,

that the Scofield defendants regularly conduct business

outside of Vermont. Rather, they appear to confirm that

the Scofield defendants provide services solely within

Vermont.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

According to the court, although Attorney Scofield

previously represented clients and practiced law in Connecticut, her affidavit states that ‘‘she has not practiced

law in Connecticut since 2013 and officially retired from

practicing law in the state of Connecticut in early 2019.

. . . The plaintiff has not provided any evidence to

counter Attorney Scofield’s affidavit regarding these

attestations.’’ (Citation omitted.) The court further

explained that, ‘‘[a]s to subparagraph (B), even if the

Scofield defendants were aware of the plaintiff’s

involvement in the transaction . . . they had no reason

to expect that redirecting the money from the sale proceeds to the Birmingham defendants, rather than the

plaintiff, would result in consequences in Connecticut.
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None of the evidence produced by the plaintiff suggests

that the Scofield defendants were aware that the plaintiff resided or was located in Connecticut. . . . Moreover . . . the plaintiff has not provided any evidence to

demonstrate that the Scofield defendants have derived

substantial revenue from services rendered in Connecticut.’’ The court accordingly concluded that the plaintiff

had failed to demonstrate that the court had personal

jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants under § 52-

59b (a) (3).

The court also found that the Scofield defendants

had insufficient minimum contacts with the state to

meet constitutional due process requirements. The

court concluded that ‘‘the Scofield defendants had no

contact with Connecticut related to or arising out of

the real estate transaction in Vermont in which they

represented a Massachusetts buyer, and there is no

evidence that the Scofield defendants derived any revenue from Connecticut with respect to any alleged interstate commerce activities in connection with the subject real estate transaction. . . . The Vermont real

estate transaction between the decedent and the Scofield defendants’ client is the extent of the interaction

among the parties upon which the plaintiff relies for

the establishment of personal jurisdiction in Connecticut. . . . Rather, the evidence demonstrates that all

acts, transactions, and occurrences regarding the real

estate transaction occurred within the state of Vermont

and without knowledge, on the part of the Scofield

defendants, that they would have consequences in the

state of Connecticut. . . . The evidence further demonstrates that the Scofield defendants have not actively

practiced law in Connecticut since early 2019 and that

a majority, if not all, of their business is done within

Vermont. . . . The plaintiff has not provided evidence

to counter these assertions or to show that the Scofield
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defendants derive substantial revenue from services

rendered in Connecticut, as is her burden.

‘‘Because the Scofield defendants did not transact

business in Connecticut, did not derive substantial revenue from Connecticut or from interstate commerce with

a commercial impact in Connecticut, and could not

have reasonably expected their alleged tortious conduct

to have consequences within Connecticut, the Scofield

defendants could not have reasonably anticipated being

haled into court here. Accordingly, under the facts of

the present case, it would not be reasonable for the

court to confer jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants.’’ (Citations omitted.)

In sum, the court concluded that the plaintiff had

failed to meet her burden of showing that (1) the court

may exercise jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant

to Connecticut’s long arm statute and (2) the defendants

had the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. The court accordingly

granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. This consolidated appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth

as necessary.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard

of review and other relevant legal principles. ‘‘A motion

to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the

record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . Because

a jurisdictional challenge presents a question of law,

our review is plenary. . . . When, as in the present

case, the defendant challenging the court’s personal

jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident

individual, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the court’s

jurisdiction. . . . In deciding a jurisdictional question

raised by a motion to dismiss, a court must take the

facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including

those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,

construing them in a manner most favorable to the
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pleader. . . . In most instances, the motion must be

decided on the complaint alone. However, when the

complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion

to dismiss . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary

undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume

the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . .

Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed

on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . .

If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support

of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to

undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . .

or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action

without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the

defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s

jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that

fails to call those allegations into question . . . the

plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint . . . but may rest on

the jurisdictional allegations therein.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails

Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340

Conn. 269–70.

‘‘When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction

in a motion to dismiss, the court must undertake a two

part inquiry to determine the propriety of its exercising

such jurisdiction over the defendant. The trial court

must first decide whether the applicable state [long

arm] statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over

the [defendant]. If the statutory requirements [are] met,

its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the

exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 273. ‘‘It is axiomatic that
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courts do not engage in constitutional analysis if a nonconstitutional basis upon which to resolve an issue

exists. . . . Therefore, we begin by examining the

[defendants’] statutory claim to determine whether we

may resolve the jurisdictional issue without addressing

the constitutional issue.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516–17, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).

‘‘[O]ur general long arm jurisdiction provision, § 52-

59b, rather than our corporation specific long arm provision, [General Statutes] § 33-929, applies to foreign [limited liability companies].’’ Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149

Conn. App. 513, 546, 89 A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312

Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 642 (2014). ‘‘Section 52-59b grants

jurisdiction to the Superior Court over nonresident individuals.’’ Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 146 Conn.

App. 341, 347, 77 A.3d 880 (2013).

I

We begin our analysis by examining the plaintiff’s

claim that the court erred in concluding that § 52-59b

(a) (1), (2) and/or (3) did not provide a statutory basis

for personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants. We disagree with the plaintiff and conclude that

the trial court properly determined that the Birmingham

defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction

pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (1), (2) or (3).

A

We first turn to § 52-59b (a) (1). The crux of the

plaintiff’s claim regarding this provision is that the Birmingham defendants’ representation of and communication with the decedent, a Connecticut resident, along

with the transfer of money to the Weiss defendants,

also Connecticut residents, satisfy the requirements of
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§ 52-59b (a) (1).13 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that they do not.

‘‘Our Supreme Court has explained that § 52-59b (a)

(1) authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents who transact any business within the state provided that the cause

of action arises out of such transaction. . . .

[A]lthough the term [t]ransacts any business is not

defined by statute, [the Supreme Court has] construed

the term to embrace a single purposeful business transaction. . . .

‘‘[A] nonresident individual who has not entered this

state physically nevertheless may be subject to jurisdiction in this state under § 52-59b (a) (1) if that individual

has invoked the benefits and protection of Connecticut’s laws by virtue of his or her purposeful Connecticut

related activity . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 347–48. ‘‘In determining

whether [the defendants’] contacts constitute the transaction of business within the state, we do not apply a

rigid formula but balance considerations of public policy, common sense, and the chronology and geography

of the relevant factors.’’ Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn.

App. 287, 298, 580 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 217 Conn.

803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990). ‘‘There must be some definitive

act taken by the defendant that evinces a purposeful

availment of the privileges of conducting the subject

activity within the forum state and that, subsequently,

invokes the benefits and protections of its laws.’’ Walshon v. Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C., 121 Conn.

App. 366, 372, 996 A.2d 1195 (2010).

13 The plaintiff also argued before the trial court ‘‘that because the Birmingham defendants maintain pro hac vice admission in Connecticut, they

should have reasonably expected to be haled into court in this state.’’ The

plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that the

Birmingham defendants’ pro hac vice admission in an unrelated matter was

irrelevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction in this case.
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In the present case, the Birmingham defendants

derived only minimal income from Connecticut residents, did not solicit business in Connecticut, and did

not promote themselves as a national firm. With respect

to the sale of the Vermont property, the Birmingham

defendants performed all legal services exclusively in

Vermont and did not meet with the decedent or the

plaintiff in Connecticut. Moreover, the decedent

retained the Birmingham defendants to represent him in

the sale of real property located in the state of Vermont.

Although it is true that both the decedent and the plaintiff were Connecticut residents at all relevant times and

that the Birmingham defendants conversed with the

decedent several times while he was in Connecticut,

we agree with the trial court that those facts alone are

insufficient to warrant a determination that the legal

services rendered by the Birmingham defendants constituted the transacting of business in Connecticut

within the meaning of § 52-59b (1) (a).

This case is analogous to Rosenblit v. Danaher, 206

Conn. 125, 537 A.2d 145 (1988), in which our Supreme

Court concluded that the trial court could not exercise

personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to

§ 52-59b (a) (1) when ‘‘two Connecticut residents, [the

plaintiffs], went to Massachusetts and there, with . . .

a Massachusetts resident, hired an attorney, who

resided and practiced law in Massachusetts, to bring

an action that arose out of a series of contacts by the

plaintiffs with Massachusetts residents in the main.’’

Id., 140. The court also noted that ‘‘the proposed action

concerned not only events that had occurred in large

measure in Massachusetts and arose out of the plaintiffs’ efforts to rehabilitate real property situated in

Massachusetts, but also involved a number of potential

witnesses from Massachusetts.’’ Id. The court found

that, although the Massachusetts lawyer attended a

meeting in Connecticut and communicated with the
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plaintiffs in connection with his representation of them;

see id., 135–36; the plaintiffs had not met their burden

in establishing that the defendant had transacted any

business in the state. See id., 141–42; see also Ryan v.

Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 119–23, 918 A.2d 867 (2007)

(holding that court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant New York accountant pursuant to

§ 52-59b (a) (1) when defendant performed accounting

services for plaintiff Connecticut resident exclusively

in New York, met with plaintiff exclusively in New York,

and corresponded exclusively with New York tax officials).

In this case, the Birmingham defendants performed

legal services for the decedent entirely in Vermont,

never met with the plaintiff or the decedent in Connecticut, and have not otherwise engaged in any other relevant contact with Connecticut.14 As such, the facts that

the plaintiff alleges in support of the ‘‘transacts any

business’’ requirement of § 52-59b (a) (1) amount to far

less than those found insufficient to establish personal

jurisdiction in Rosenblit v. Danaher, supra, 206 Conn.

125, and Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn. 119–23.

14 Although the plaintiff argues that the Birmingham defendants solicited

individuals in Connecticut and other states on their website, pointing to a

portion of the website that says ‘‘Attention: out of state sellers,’’ we are not

persuaded. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

has held that websites deemed ‘‘passive’’ cannot support personal jurisdiction. ‘‘Active websites are those where individuals can directly interact

with a company over their Internet site, download, transmit or exchange

information, and enter into contracts with the company via computer. . . .

Active websites may support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . .

[P]assive websites that require a potential customer to initiate contact with

the foreign corporation by telephone, mail, or email, rather than allowing

them to order directly over the Internet, cannot support personal jurisdiction.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cousteau Society, Inc. v. Cousteau, 498 F. Supp. 3d 287, 303 (D. Conn. 2020). We agree

with the District Court’s reasoning.

There is insufficient evidence that the Birmingham defendants’ website

is active. We accordingly conclude that the website is an insufficient basis on

which to find that the Birmingham defendants solicited out of state clients.
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Additionally, the Birmingham defendants’ communications with the decedent while he was in Connecticut

are insufficient to establish that the Birmingham defendants transacted business in the state, as ‘‘[t]elephone

calls and written communications . . . generally are

held not to provide a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute . . . . [T]elephone

and mail contacts are jurisdictionally insufficient unless

the defendant projected himself by those means into

[the forum state] in such a manner that he purposefully

availed himself . . . of the benefits and protections of

its laws.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Green v. Simmons, 100 Conn. App. 600, 605,

919 A.2d 482 (2007).

We additionally conclude that the Birmingham defendants’ transfer of sale proceeds to and communication

with the Weiss defendants are insufficient to satisfy the

requirements of § 52-59b (a) (1). The plaintiff claims

that the Birmingham defendants entered into an oral

agreement with the Weiss defendants to transfer the

sale proceeds and that, because of this alleged contract,

the Birmingham defendants therefore transacted business in the state of Connecticut. Through his affidavit,

however, Attorney Birmingham established that neither

he, nor anyone acting on behalf of Birmingham Law

Offices, LLC, had entered into any contracts in the state

of Connecticut. Although the evidence does show that

the Birmingham defendants spoke with Attorney Weiss

and subsequently transferred the sale proceeds to the

Weiss defendants, the plaintiff has failed to provide

sufficient evidence to establish that a contract existed

between the Birmingham defendants and the Weiss

defendants. In support of her claim, she points only to

a portion of Attorney Birmingham’s affidavit that reads:

‘‘After speaking with Attorney Weiss, [Attorney Birmingham] sent the sale proceeds to [Attorney Weiss]

based on his agreement to hold the funds in escrow
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until the probate court determined who was entitled to

receive the funds.’’ She additionally has failed to provide

any evidence that the Birmingham defendants affirmatively and purposefully contacted the Weiss defendants.

We conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient

to establish that the Birmingham defendants contracted

with the Weiss defendants. The plaintiff’s claim, therefore, is premised exclusively on the Birmingham defendants’ communication with Connecticut residents,

which is insufficient to establish that the ‘‘transacts any

business’’ requirement of § 52-59b (a) (1) has been met.

See Green v. Simmons, supra, 100 Conn. App. 605.

In short, the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of

establishing that the Birmingham defendants transacted

any business within the state. Accordingly, we conclude

that the trial court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant to § 52-

59b (a) (1).

B

We next turn to § 52-59b (a) (2). The plaintiff claims

that the Birmingham defendants committed a tort in

the state by failing to deliver the sale proceeds to the

plaintiff and, instead, transferring the money to the

Weiss defendants to hold for the decedent’s estate. The

plaintiff, however, does not clearly allege what tort

was committed. Rather, she vaguely argues that the

Birmingham defendants’ ‘‘communications involved

misrepresentations and omissions’’ and that, in failing

to deliver the sale proceeds as instructed by the decedent, the Birmingham defendants committed a tort that

caused harm in Connecticut. For the following reasons,

we disagree.

Section 52-59b (a) (2) provides in relevant part that

‘‘a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any

nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
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voluntary association, or over the executor or administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, who in person or

through an agent . . . commits a tortious act within

the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation

of character arising from the act . . . .’’

The plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the Birmingham defendants committed a

tort in Connecticut. ‘‘When, as in the present case, the

defendant challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction

is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is

the plaintiff’s burden to prove the court’s jurisdiction.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails Group,

LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340 Conn. 269.

Attorney Birmingham, in his affidavit, clearly denied

committing any tortious acts in Connecticut.15 The

plaintiff has failed to refute those claims. Rather, she

relies solely on conclusory allegations in her complaint

that the Birmingham defendants committed a false misrepresentation communicated into Connecticut, that

they improperly transferred the sale proceeds to the

Weiss defendants within the state, and that they therefore had committed a tort in the state. ‘‘If affidavits and/

or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s

motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this

conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action . . . .’’

(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Matthews v. SBA, Inc., supra, 149 Conn. App. 552.

We conclude that Attorney Birmingham’s affidavit

supports his assertion that jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-

59b (a) (2) is lacking and that the plaintiff has failed

15 Specifically, Attorney Birmingham’s affidavit states: ‘‘I have not committed a tortious act in the state of Connecticut, nor committed a tortious act

outside the state causing injury to a person or property in the state of

Connecticut.’’
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to undermine this conclusion. ‘‘A plaintiff, in presenting

facts sufficient to establish the court’s jurisdiction, must

present specific, and not simply conclusory, allegations.’’ Id. We agree with the trial court that ‘‘[t]he act

of wiring the money from the sale proceeds is not,

in and of itself, a fraudulent misrepresentation. The

plaintiff has failed to present evidence demonstrating

that this wire transfer involved false representations

made by the Birmingham defendants regarding anyone

or anything related to the subject real estate transaction

or, specifically, regarding the plaintiff and/or her alleged

property or assets.’’ We therefore conclude that the

plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in proving the

court’s jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (2).

C

We last turn to § 52-59b (a) (3). The plaintiff contends

that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the

Birmingham defendants because (1) the Birmingham

defendants committed a tortious act outside of Connecticut,16 (2) that act caused injury to the plaintiff

within the state, (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises

from the Birmingham defendants’ tortious act, and (4)

the Birmingham defendants (a) regularly do or solicit

business in the state, (b) derive substantial revenue

from the state, or (c) expected or reasonably should

have expected that the act would have consequences

in the state and derived substantial revenue from interstate commerce. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

16 The plaintiff has not clearly stated exactly what the claimed tortious

act is. The plaintiff, instead, has vaguely argued that ‘‘[t]he Birmingham

defendants’ communications involved misrepresentations and omissions.’’

She argues that the Birmingham defendants’ failure to wire her the sale

proceeds and instead transferring the money to the Weiss defendants ‘‘violated [the decedent’s] written instructions to the Birmingham defendants

that the plaintiff receive the monies at the closing. The foregoing constitutes

false statements, misrepresentations, omissions, and tortious conduct.’’
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Section 52-59b (a) (3) provides in relevant part that

‘‘a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any

nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign

voluntary association, or over the executor or administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, who in person or

through an agent . . . commits a tortious act outside

the state causing injury to person or property within

the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation

of character arising from the act, if such person or agent

(A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in

any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should

reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the

state and derives substantial revenue from interstate

or international commerce . . . .’’

‘‘[T]he substantial revenue requirement is designed

to narrow the long-arm reach to preclude the exercise

of jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who might cause

direct, foreseeable injury within the [s]tate but whose

business operations are of a local character . . . . Put

differently, substantial revenue means enough revenue

to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that

a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into

court there. . . . Because of the indefinite nature of

the substantial revenue requirement, the determination

of whether that jurisdictional threshold has been met

in any particular case necessarily will require a careful

review of the relevant facts and frequently will entail

an evaluation of both the total amount of revenue

involved and the percentage of annual income that that

revenue represents.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 282

Conn. 125.

The plaintiff has failed to meet any of the statutory

requirements in § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) and (B), namely,
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that the Birmingham defendants either do or solicit

business in the state or derived substantial revenue

from Connecticut or interstate commerce.17 In order to

find that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over

the Birmingham defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a)

(3), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the additional

requirements of either § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) or (B) are

met. We address each in turn.

i

In order to exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham

defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A), the plaintiff

must establish, in addition to the tortious conduct element, that the Birmingham defendants either (1) regularly do or solicit business in Connecticut, or (2) derive

substantial revenue from services rendered in the state.

See General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). We conclude

that the plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence as

to each and therefore conclude that the court may not

exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants

pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A).

Although the plaintiff claims that the Birmingham

defendants regularly solicit business in Connecticut, we

are not persuaded. In support of her claim, the plaintiff

argues that the Birmingham defendants regularly do or

solicit business by virtue of their website. Specifically,

she points to a portion of the Birmingham defendants’

website that is titled: ‘‘Attention: out of state sellers.’’

She argues that this, in light of Attorney Birmingham’s

deposition testimony in which he stated that his firm

17 Although § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) would also be satisfied if the plaintiff

established that the Birmingham defendants engaged ‘‘in any other persistent

course of conduct’’ in the state, the plaintiff did not rely on this statutory

language in arguing that the statutory requirements of § 52-59b (a) (3) (A)

have been met. We, accordingly, consider only whether the other statutory

requirements, namely, whether the Birmingham defendants have done or

solicited business in Connecticut or derived substantial revenue from services rendered in the state, have been met.
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‘‘ha[s] clients from all over the place,’’ establishes that

the Birmingham defendants regularly solicit business

in the state. This evidence, however, is insufficient to

establish that the Birmingham defendants regularly

solicit business in Connecticut. At best, this evidence

establishes that the Birmingham defendants have previously had clients who were not Vermont residents

and that they have information available for potential

out-of-state sellers on their website. It is too attenuated,

however, to establish that the Birmingham defendants

have either done any business in the state of Connecticut or have specifically solicited business in the state.

We additionally conclude that the plaintiff has failed

to establish that the Birmingham defendants derive substantial revenue from Connecticut. The Birmingham

defendants acknowledge that they received minimal

income from the state, namely, the payment received

from the decedent in connection with the underlying

representation of the decedent in the sale of his Vermont property. There is no evidence, however, that the

Birmingham defendants received any further revenue

from Connecticut or interstate commerce. The plaintiff

has failed to present any facts to support her assertion

that the Birmingham defendants have received any revenue from Connecticut, excepting that from the underlying representation of the decedent, let alone facts

supporting her claim that the Birmingham defendants

have received substantial revenue from Connecticut.

We therefore conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish either of the statutory requirements of § 52-59b (a)

(3) (A).

ii

In order to exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham

defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B), the plaintiff

must establish, in addition to the tortious conduct element, that the Birmingham defendants both (1) expect
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or should reasonably expect for their actions to have

consequences in the state, and (2) derive substantial

revenue from interstate or international commerce. See

General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). We conclude that

the plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence to find

that the Birmingham defendants derived substantial

revenue from interstate or international commerce and

therefore conclude that the court may not exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant to

§ 52-59b (a) (3) (B).

The crux of the plaintiff’s claim regarding § 52-59b

(a) (3) (B) is substantially the same as her claim under

§ 52-59b (a) (3) (A). She again points to the Birmingham

defendants’ website, arguing that ‘‘the Birmingham

defendants’ Internet website advertises to clientele out

of state, thus establishing interstate revenue . . . .’’

She additionally points to Attorney Birmingham’s deposition, in which he stated that the firm has ‘‘clients from

all over the place.’’ She additionally argues that the

Birmingham defendants derived revenue from interstate commerce because they ‘‘entered into a contract

of representation of [the decedent], a Connecticut resident . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.

Although the evidence cited by the plaintiff may support her claim that the Birmingham defendants have

derived some revenue from interstate commerce, we

are not persuaded that this evidence establishes that

the Birmingham defendants derive substantial revenue

from interstate commerce, as required by § 52-59b (a)

(3) (B). ‘‘[S]ubstantial revenue means enough revenue

to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that

a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into

court there. . . . Because of the indefinite nature of

the substantial revenue requirement, the determination

of whether that jurisdictional threshold has been met

in any particular case necessarily will require a careful

review of the relevant facts and frequently will entail
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an evaluation of both the total amount of revenue

involved and the percentage of annual income that that

revenue represents.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn.

125. The plaintiff has not provided specific evidence

demonstrating the number of interstate clients or

amount of interstate revenue the Birmingham defendants derive. The evidence provided is vague and insufficient to support a conclusion that the amount of revenue the Birmingham defendants received from

interstate commerce was substantial.

We therefore conclude that the plaintiff has failed to

meet her burden of establishing that the trial court

may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham

defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) or (B).

Accordingly, we need not decide whether the Birmingham defendants have sufficient minimum contacts

with Connecticut to satisfy constitutional due process

requirements because it is only ‘‘[i]f the statutory [long

arm] requirements [are] met, [that the court then]

decide[s] whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the

[defendant] would violate constitutional principles of

due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North

Sails Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340

Conn. 273. We therefore conclude that the trial court

properly determined that it could not exercise personal

jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant

to § 52-59b (a) (1), (2) or (3).

II

The plaintiff claims that the trial court had personal

jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to

§ 52-59b (a) (3)18 because (1) they committed a tortious

18 The plaintiff additionally argued in her principal appellate brief that the

court had personal jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to

§ 52-59b (a) (1), an argument not made by the plaintiff before the trial court.

The plaintiff’s counsel abandoned this claim during oral argument before

this court.
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act outside of Connecticut, (2) that act caused injury

to the plaintiff within the state, (3) the plaintiff’s cause

of action arises from the Scofield defendants’ tortious

act, and (4) the Scofield defendants (a) regularly do

or solicit business in the state, (b) derive substantial

revenue from the state, or (c) expected or reasonably

should have expected that the act would have consequences in the state and derived substantial revenue

from interstate commerce. We disagree.

Even if we assume, arguendo, that the Scofield defendants committed tortious acts outside of the state, causing injury to the plaintiff within the state, the plaintiff

has still failed to meet the final statutory requirement,

namely, that the Scofield defendants either do or solicit

business in the state or derived substantial revenue

from Connecticut or interstate commerce. In order to

find that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over

the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3),

the plaintiff must demonstrate that the additional

requirements of either § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) or (B) are

met. We address each in turn.

A

We first turn to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). In order to exercise jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant

to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A), the plaintiff must establish, in

addition to the tortious conduct element, that the Scofield defendants either (1) regularly do or solicit business in Connecticut, or (2) derive substantial revenue

from services rendered in the state.19 See General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). We conclude that the plaintiff

19 As with the Birmingham defendants, the plaintiff did not argue that the

Scofield defendants engaged ‘‘in any other persistent course of conduct’’ in

the state in arguing that the statutory requirements of § 52-59b (a) (3) (A)

have been met, and we, accordingly, consider only whether the other statutory requirements, namely, whether the Scofield defendants have done or

solicited business in Connecticut or derived substantial revenue from services rendered in the state, have been met. See footnote 17 of this opinion.
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has provided insufficient evidence as to each and therefore conclude that the court may not exercise jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b

(a) (3) (A).

The plaintiff claims that the Scofield defendants regularly solicit business in the state through their website.

Particularly, the plaintiff argues that the website says

that the Scofield defendants provide services in the

‘‘Northeast’’ and highlights that Attorney Scofield is

licensed to practice in Connecticut. We are not persuaded.

First, the portion of the Scofield defendants’ website

quoted by the plaintiff is taken out of context. Read in

its entirety, the website states that ‘‘[t]he Firm’s goal

is to offer top level real estate services as well as general

legal services and estate and probate work as needed

to individuals and small business entities living and

operating in this beautiful part of the Northeast.’’

(Emphasis added.) It appears, in context, that the website advertises the legal work the firm does in Vermont

specifically, rather than advertising to the Northeast as

a whole. It is not apparent from this portion of the

website that the Scofield defendants regularly conduct

or solicit business in Connecticut.

Additionally, although the website does note that

Attorney Scofield is admitted to practice in Connecticut, we are not convinced that this alone demonstrates

that the Scofield defendants solicited business in the

state. The website states that Attorney Scofield is

‘‘[a]dmitted to practice in Vermont, Connecticut, and

New York’’ and that she has ‘‘[o]ver 20 years of legal

experience serving both public and private sector clients in New York, Connecticut and Vermont.’’ We agree

with the trial court that the provided information is a

resume only, intended to provide potential clients with
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further information about Attorney Scofield, rather than

a solicitation of Connecticut clients.

There is also insufficient evidence that the Scofield

defendants derive substantial revenue from the state.

The plaintiff points to Attorney Scofield’s status as ‘‘lead

attorney’’ in a case before the United States District

Court in support of her contention that the Scofield

defendants regularly conduct business in and derive

substantial revenue from Connecticut. The Scofield

defendants provided evidence showing that Attorney

Scofield is no longer actively involved in the referenced

case20 and that she has not practiced law in the state

since 2019. Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that

Attorney Scofield were still involved in that District

Court case, this does not support the assertion that the

Scofield defendants derived substantial revenue from

the state of Connecticut. Our Supreme Court has clearly

stated that ‘‘substantial revenue means enough revenue

to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that

a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into

court there.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan

v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn. 125. Attorney Scofield does

not dispute that she previously represented clients in

and practiced law in Connecticut, but her affidavit supports her assertion that she officially retired from practicing law in the state in 2019 and that she has derived

minimal, if any, revenue from the state since that time.

It is additionally unlikely that, even if Attorney Scofield

were still involved in the referenced District Court case

at the time of the sale of the Vermont property, the

proceeds from that case alone would demonstrate that

the Scofield defendants could fairly have been expected

20 Specifically, the Scofield defendants highlighted the fact that the case

was closed in 2018, and that the later motion for reconsideration was filed

by the defendant against the substitute plaintiff, not the party represented

by Attorney Scofield. See Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Toczek, Docket No.

3:18-CV-1965 (VLB), 2019 WL 6837788 (D. Conn. December 16, 2019); see

also footnote 5 of this opinion.
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to be haled into court in Connecticut for an entirely

unrelated case.

The plaintiff has provided no other evidence that the

Scofield defendants derived any, let alone substantial,

revenue from Connecticut. Therefore, we conclude that

the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in establishing

that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over

the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A).

B

Finally, we turn to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). In order to

exercise jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B), the plaintiff must establish,

in addition to the tortious conduct element, that the

Scofield defendants both (1) expect or should reasonably expect for their actions to have consequences in

the state, and (2) derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. See General Statutes

§ 52-59b (a) (3) (B). We conclude that the plaintiff has

provided insufficient evidence to conclude that the Scofield defendants derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce and, therefore, conclude that the court may not exercise jurisdiction over

the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B).

In support of her argument that the Scofield defendants derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce, the plaintiff points to a portion of the Scofield

defendants’ website that contains testimonials from

prior out-of-state clients. Although these testimonials

may support a claim that the Scofield defendants derive

revenue from interstate commerce, the plaintiff has

failed to provide sufficient evidence about these transactions from which the court could determine whether

the Scofield defendants derive substantial revenue

from interstate commerce and accordingly establish
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jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). The plaintiff has simply shown that the website contains testimonials from clients from states other than Vermont without further information about what percentage of the

Scofield defendants’ revenues these non-Vermont clients make up, the amount of revenue derived from

these clients, or any other relevant facts. Because ‘‘the

determination of whether [the substantial revenue]

threshold has been met in any particular case necessarily will require a careful review of the relevant facts

and frequently will entail an evaluation of both the

total amount of revenue involved and the percentage

of annual income that that revenue represents’’; Ryan

v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn. 125; we conclude that the

plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence to conclude

that, even if the Scofield defendants do derive some

revenue from interstate commerce, that revenue is substantial enough to satisfy the requirements of § 52-59b

(a) (3) (B).

Because we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to

meet her burden in establishing that the court may

exercise personal jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to the relevant long arm statute provision alleged, we need not decide whether the Scofield

defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet the constitutional requirements of due

process, as it is only ‘‘[i]f the statutory [long arm]

requirements [are] met, [that the court then] decide[s]

whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails

Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340

Conn. 273.

To summarize, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a).
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.