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Filed 3/27/13 P. v. Super. Ct. CA1/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN 

FRANCISCO COUNTY, 

 Respondent; 

WILLIAM MITCHELL, 

 Real Party in Interest. 

 A136005 

 (City & County of San Francisco 

 Super. Ct. No. 106557) 

 On March 14, 2012, the People filed a petition, pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1026.5,1

 seeking to extend a state hospital commitment of real party in interest 

William Mitchell. The trial court granted Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the petition on the 

ground it lacked jurisdiction because the petition had not been filed before the expiration 

of Mitchell’s term of commitment. The People now seek extraordinary writ review 

challenging the dismissal order, which is opposed by Mitchell. We conclude that under 

the circumstances the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the March 14, 2012 

petition. Accordingly, we grant the People’s petition for writ of mandate. 

 

1

 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In 1982, William Mitchell was committed to a state hospital based on his plea of 

not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of felony assault. Since that time, he has been 

recommitted to the state hospital for successive two-year commitments. 

 On October 19, 2009, the People filed a timely petition to extend Mitchell’s 

commitment (due to expire on January 16, 2010) for an additional two years. Thereafter, 

the matter was continued over 20 times, either at Mitchell’s request or with his 

acquiescence (i.e., without his objection). On January 27, 2012, Mitchell signed a 

“declaration” (hereafter referred to as a stipulation), stating, in pertinent part, that he 

forfeited his right to a jury, and he agreed “to extend [his] commitment for the statutory 

period pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1026 and 1026.5.” 

 At a March 7, 2012 proceeding, Mitchell’s counsel informed the trial court and the 

prosecutor that Mitchell “ha[d] signed a stipulation to his current hospitalization.” 

However, Mitchell’s stipulation was not filed at that time. Instead, his counsel requested 

“that this matter, the trial date of March the 9th be vacated, and we continue it to March 

the 14th . . . to deal with the stipulation and the possibility of a further addition [sic].” 

The trial court granted the request and continued the matter for trial “setting.” 

 On March 14, 2012,2

 when the trial court called the case, the prosecutor initially 

asked whether the purpose of the hearing was to file a petition. Mitchell’s counsel 

objected, stating that any petition filed that day would be untimely, and Mitchell wanted 

to file his stipulation that concerned the October 2009 petition. Mitchell’s stipulation had 

not been previously filed because of some confusion about whether a new recommitment 

petition had been filed. The court then stated it had a petition dated March 14. The 

prosecutor requested permission to file the petition that day. The court granted the 

 

2

 We take judicial notice of the following documents that were filed in this court on August 2, 

2012, in People v. Mitchell, A135948: (a) a transcript entitled “Before the Honorable Garrett L. 

Wong, Judge Presiding, Tuesday [sic], March 14, 2012, Volume 11 (Pages 68-72),” and (b) the 

court’s minute order dated March 14, 2012, the People’s petition filed March 14, 2012, and 

Mitchell’s “declaration” filed March 14, 2012, which appear in the clerk’s transcript at pages 91-

95, 113, and 114. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) 
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prosecutor’s request and the petition was filed on March 14. Immediately thereafter, 

Mitchell’s counsel requested permission to file Mitchell’s stipulation. The court granted 

that request and Mitchell’s stipulation was filed that day. 

 On April 6, 2012, Mitchell filed a motion to dismiss the March 14, 2012 petition 

on the ground his prior commitment had expired on January 16, 2012, and the court had 

no jurisdiction to adjudicate the March 14, 2012 petition because it had been filed after 

the expiration of his prior commitment. The People opposed the motion, arguing, in 

pertinent part, that the court retained “fundamental jurisdiction” to adjudicate the 

March 14, 2012 petition. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the petition. 

However, the court temporarily stayed Mitchell’s release because Mitchell would still 

present a danger to the community if released and the People were directed to conduct an 

investigation for a conservatorship. 

 On June 29, 2012, the People filed an appeal from the order granting Mitchell’s 

motion to dismiss the March 14, 2012 petition. On that same day, the People requested a 

stay of the proceedings. In the stay application, the People indicated the Napa State 

Hospital forensic assistant assigned to the case unofficially questioned whether Mitchell 

would qualify as “gravely disabled” for conservatorship purposes. The forensic assistant 

predicted that if Mitchell was not found to be “gravely disable,” he could not be held at 

Napa State Hospital, would be released to the public, and would likely cease taking his 

medication. 

 Thereafter, on July 19, 2012, the People filed this petition for a writ of mandate 

and/or prohibition and requested that we temporarily stay the trial court’s order directing 

Mitchell’s release, which was then scheduled for July 25, 2012. On July 20, 2012, we 

stayed Mitchell’s release from custody pending our consideration of this petition, set a 

schedule for informal briefing, and gave notice that if circumstances so warranted, we 

might issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma 

v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) We now issue the 

peremptory writ in the first instance, directing respondent court to vacate its order 

granting Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the March 14, 2012 petition, to enter a new and 
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different order denying the motion, and to resume proceedings to adjudicate the March 

14, 2012 petition. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Writ Relief Is Appropriate in This Case 

We conclude that under the circumstances it is appropriate to resolve the People’s 

request for relief by its petition for extraordinary writ review, which will result in a 

speedier disposition than would an appeal. As we have noted, an immediate stay was 

necessary to allow time for us to consider this petition without endangering the public. 

The trial court found that (1) if the extension petition had been timely, Mitchell’s 

commitment would most likely have been extended, (2) that Mitchell would present a 

danger to the community if released from custody, and (3) that an investigation should be 

initiated so that Mitchell could be evaluated for conservatorship. However, the Napa 

State Hospital forensic assistant assigned to the case doubted that Mitchell met the 

requirements for civil commitment and was concerned about the likelihood that Mitchell 

would be released to the public without supervision, and stop taking his medication. 

Alternatively, Mitchell contends he has been entitled to be released since January 17, 

2012, and a speedy resolution of the underlying issue is important to minimize any illegal 

restraint on his freedom. 

B. The Trial Court Has Jurisdiction to Adjudicate the People’s March 14, 2012 

 Petition 

 The general procedure for committing a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason 

of insanity is set out in section 1026 et seq. For defendants, such as Mitchell, who have 

already been committed and who still require an additional period of commitment, the 

medical director of the facility in which the defendant is committed transmits his or her 

opinion, accompanied by supporting declarations, the relevant records, and 

recommendations at least 180 days before the current commitment term expires. 

(§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(2).) The prosecutor may then file a petition requesting an extension 

of the commitment “no later than 90 days before the expiration of the [prior] commitment 

unless good cause is shown.” (Ibid.) A trial shall commence “no later than 30 calendar 
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days prior to the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless that time is 

waived by the person or unless good cause is shown.” (Id., subd. (b)(4).) If at trial an 

additional commitment is found to be appropriate, the maximum duration of that next 

commitment is two years, absent a further determination, under these same procedures, 

that yet another commitment is necessary. (Id., subd. (b)(8).) 

 The statute does not address the situation we face here — where continuances of 

the trial on the petition extend beyond the entire potential new commitment period. 

Rather, the statute directs that if a finder of fact determines that the patient meets the 

specified criteria, the court is to order the patient recommitted to the facility in which he 

was confined for an additional two years. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(8).) In this case, there was 

never a trial regarding the commitment period (January 16, 2010 to January 16, 2012) to 

be adjudicated pursuant to the October 2009 petition. Instead, at the time of the March 

14, 2012 court proceeding, the October 2009 petition remained unadjudicated by the trial 

court due to numerous continuances. 

 In support of his claim that his commitment can no longer be extended, Mitchell 

asks us to consider two cases: People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216 and People v. Allen

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 91. In Lara, the petition to extend the defendant’s commitment 

pursuant to section 1026.5 was filed so late that the defendant did not have an adequate 

time to prepare for trial before his commitment term ended, and there was no good cause 

shown for the late filing. (48 Cal.4th at p. 221.) Our Supreme Court held the statutory 

deadline for filing an extension petition was not mandatory as long as the petition was 

filed before the expiration of the prior commitment period. (Id. at pp. 225-226.) 

Implicitly, the Lara court determined that the filing of the recommitment petition while 

the defendant was still being legally detained was a mandatory requirement. In reaching 

this conclusion, the Lara court relied on Allen, a case arising under the Mentally 

Disordered Offenders Act (MDO), a statute which allows a prisoner who has been 

determined to be a mentally disordered offender to be civilly committed if certain 

requirements are shown to exist. (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 99.) In Allen, our 

Supreme Court held the deadline requiring the filing of a recommitment petition before 
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the end of the current MDO commitment term was mandatory; thus, if it were not met, 

the relevant government action — specifically the trial court’s order extending Allen’s 

commitment — was invalid. (Id. at p. 104.) Based on the Allen court’s holding, and the 

Lara court’s reliance and application of the Allen principles, Mitchell reasons that an 

extension of his commitment would be invalid because the March 14, 2012 petition was 

filed well after January 16, 2012, which he contends was the date of the expiration of his 

prior commitment term. 

 However, Mitchell’s argument ignores two crucial facts which distinguish his 

situation from Lara/Allen: (1) the October 19, 2009 petition had been timely filed and 

(2) that petition had never been adjudicated because of the continuances. Contrary to 

Mitchell’s further contention, no actual term of commitment terminated on January 16, 

2012, because Mitchell had never been committed for a term that ended on that date. The 

last involuntary commitment period that had been imposed terminated on January 16, 

2010. An extension petition had been timely filed seeking to extend that commitment, 

but because of continuances, no decision adjudicating that petition was ever made. The 

filing of the October 2009 petition invoked the court’s jurisdiction to determine whether 

Mitchell’s commitment should be extended. The continuances requested and/or agreed to 

by the parties and ratified by the trial court continued the court’s jurisdiction. The 

October 2009 petition was superseded by the filing of the March 14, 2012 petition, which 

now remains to be adjudicated by the trial court. 

 Under the circumstances, we see no conflict between allowing the People to 

proceed on the March 14, 2012 petition and Mitchell’s right not to be subject to an illegal 

commitment. Until March 14, 2012, Mitchell was validly held pursuant to the filing of 

the 2009 recommitment petition and the continuances. Mitchell was then held pursuant 

to the recommitment petition filed March 14, 2012. Thus, the public safety goal, which 

is the primary purpose of the section 1026 procedure (People v. Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th 

at p. 228, fn. 18) is furthered because the court will be able to determine whether Mitchell 

currently meets the criteria for continued commitment. The “secondary benefit to 

[Mitchell] derived from the time limit[s]” in section 1026 is not infringed. (Ibid.) 
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Because the March 14, 2012 petition and Mitchell’s stipulation concerning the earlier 

October 2009 petition were filed contemporaneously in the same court proceeding, we 

cannot conclude Mitchell’s confinement was being meaningfully prolonged by an illegal 

commitment. 

DISPOSITION 

We invoke the accelerated Palma procedure (see Palma v. U.S. Industrial 

Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d 171) because “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so 

obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the 

issue. . . .” (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior 

Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241.) Also, our immediate resolution of the matter 

will expedite the trial court’s consideration of whether Mitchell should remain committed 

for an additional term. 

 Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its 

order granting Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the People’s March 14, 2012 petition, to 

enter a new and different order denying the motion to dismiss, and to proceed to 

adjudicate the petition forthwith. Our July 20, 2012 stay of Mitchell’s release shall 

remain in effect until adjudication of the March 14, 2012 petition is concluded. 

 _________________________ 

 McGuiness, P.J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Pollak, J. 

_________________________ 

Siggins, J.