Jacy Soares v. State, No. 0149 of the 2019 Term, Opinion by Moylan, J.

HEADNOTE:

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT – THE 

SUPPRESSION HEARING -- THE NEED FOR AN INTERPRETER -- THE ROLE 

OF THE INTERPRETER IS A LIMITED ONE – A WEIGHTY ADVISEMENT: THE 

MIRANDA CATECHISM PLUS MARYLAND COMMON LAW – AN ENIGMATIC 

RESPONSE -- DISHONORING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE – MIRANDA’S RIGHT 

TO SILENCE: THE UNANSWERED QUESTION – THE PARTING OF THE 

WAYS: WILLIAMS V. STATE – MULTIPLE DEGREES OF SEPARATION –

MIRANDA’S RIGHT TO SILENCE WAS NOT SATISFIED – THE RIGHT TO BE 

INFORMED OF AND ABOUT THE RIGHT TO SILENCE – ARGUABLE 

INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE – HONORING THE RIGHT TO 

SILENCE – COMPUTING HARMLESS ERROR
Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 133754

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 0149

September Term, 2019

_____________________________________

JACY SOARES

V.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Leahy,

Shaw Geter,

Moylan, Charles E., Jr.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Moylan, J.

_____________________________________

Filed: November 18, 2020
The subject of this opinion is Miranda v. Arizona’s right to remain silent, including

how that at-times fragile request for silence can sometimes be lost in an overriding 

cacophony of argumentative noise. The communicative problem is significantly 

exacerbated, moreover, when the request for silence, as here, has to pass through the prism 

of Portuguese-English translation. Clarity was in short supply.

* * *

The Suppression Hearing

The appellant, Jacy Soares, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 

County by a jury, of the possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and related 

offenses. On this appeal, he raises the single contention that an inculpatory statement he 

gave to the police was erroneously admitted into evidence in violation of Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Under the unusual 

circumstances involved in the police interrogation in this case, we are inclined to agree.

It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail the factual circumstances of the crime itself, 

because our review of the pre-trial suppression hearing is completely dispositive of the 

appeal. Following the execution of a search and seizure warrant for the appellant’s home 

on April 3, 2018, the appellant was arrested. During the early morning hours of April 4, 

2018, the appellant was questioned at the station house by Detective Ryan Street. By the 

end of the interrogation, the appellant, primarily in an effort to exculpate his wife, had

thoroughly inculpated himself. The inculpatory statement was, “It’s only my problem. My 

wife is [sic] nothing to do with it.” The issue is whether the interrogation should have 

terminated before the antecedent question was even asked.
2

The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress this confession to the police. A 

suppression hearing was conducted on September 6, 2018. The judge denied the motion to 

suppress; the appellant’s statement was admitted into evidence at the trial; and the

conviction followed. This appeal has timely followed.

The question before the suppression hearing below and before us on this appeal is 

the most fundamental of threshold issues. Was the appellant ever informed of his 

constitutional right to remain silent when being subjected to custodial interrogation and did 

he attempt to invoke that right? That basic core of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 

compelled self-incrimination is, of course, the very opening line of the Miranda catechism: 

“You have the right to remain silent.” It is not enough, moreover, simply to recite those 

words to the appellant. The suspect must actually be informed of the right. That deeper 

aspect of effective communication cannot be blithely assumed. When at the suppression 

hearing, the State questioned Officer Paulo Bonturi about his having advised the appellant 

about his right to silence, the answer was less than totally reassuring about so fundamental 

a constitutional right.

Q: Okay. So at some point, did you read those rights to the defendant?

A: I’m pretty sure I did, yes.

Q: Okay. Did you tell him that you have the right to remain silent?

A: I’m pretty sure I did, yes. They are checked off.

1

1

It would be ironic, of course, if we are hereby challenging the State with the very 

challenge that the State frequently likes to pose to criminal defendants: “Are you being 

sufficiently ‘unambiguous and unequivocal’ with such an answer?” At least by way of 

general discussion, we are, indeed, so challenging the State.
3

(Emphasis supplied.)

Miranda v. Arizona’s guarantee to criminal defendants of basic criminal rights 

contemplates more by way of satisfaction than mere lip service. It is not enough to recite 

the words, if that, and then automatically to check off a box. Would such a mechanical 

recitation and notation suffice, for instance, as the qualifier for the interrogation of a tenyear-old? If we are properly indulgent about communicating with a ten-year-old, should 

we be any less indulgent about communicating with someone whose native language is not 

English? This is the very special communications problem confronting us in this case—

communicating with someone whose language is not English.

Frequently the linkage between the reciting of the words and the assumption that 

the words were understood by the auditor is essentially taken for granted. Not so automatic,

however, will be our review in the present case. 

The Need For An Interpreter

The appellant’s native language is Portuguese. Throughout the pre-trial police 

interrogation of the appellant and at the trial, Officer Bonturi served as the PortugueseEnglish translator. The appellant’s education did not go beyond the elementary school 

level. His command of English was very poor and, essentially, he communicated with the 

court only through his Portuguese interpreter. It was also through the interpreter that the 

appellant communicated with the police, most significantly in the course of the police 

interrogation of the appellant on April 4, 2018.

It is that police interrogation of April 4, 2018 that gives us significant pause in this 

case, as we look with close scrutiny at every detail we can discern about that interrogation. 
4

The unorthodox interpretive procedure employed in this case also causes us to cast a 

jaundiced eye at the modality used for the interpreting in this case. As we review the 

testimony at the suppression hearing, we will be looking very closely at whether the 

appellant was truly informed of his right to remain silent, and of its implicit option, once 

the right to silence is invoked, of having the interrogation terminate. We will also look very 

closely at whether the appellant at one point did not, in effect, invoke his right to silence, 

only to have that right blithely ignored. We will also be looking closely at the interpretive 

procedure itself.

The Role Of The Interpreter Is A Limited One

A brief pause in the trial narration may here be appropriate in order to examine 

proper procedure in the use of an interpreter. There is a proper and accepted technique for 

bilingual interpretation (as well as for sign language interpretation for the deaf). The 

interpreter is not supposed to be a third-party participant in a three-party exchange. The 

two parties to the exchange are, as in any normal testimonial exchange, the questioner and 

the respondent. The interpreter’s proper role is to be an essentially invisible and mechanical 

device effectively behind the scenes. When the questioner asks a question, in English, the 

interpreter simply repeats the words, verbatim, in Portuguese. The questioner does not tell 

the interpreter to ask the respondent a question. The questioner speaks directly to the 

respondent as if the interpreter is not even there. When the respondent then answers, he 

answers directly to the questioner as if the interpreter were not even there. At no time in 

the interpretive process is the interpreter expected to explain to the respondent what the 

question means or to explain to the questioner what the respondent means. If in doubt, the 
5

questioner must simply interrogate the respondent more closely to resolve such doubt. A 

skilled interpreter is a necessary logistical aid in a two-party exchange. The interpreter 

should never become an actual participant in a three-party exchange. The interpreter, 

moreover, is required to be scrupulously neutral. The use of a police officer as an interpreter 

is less than ideal.

The interpreter is not supposed to become a witness. In this case, however, the 

proper interpreter protocol was regularly honored largely in the breach. The interpreter was 

called upon, as a witness, to give his opinion as to whether the appellant understood his 

rights and as to whether he invoked his rights. To the interpreter as a witness, moreover, 

was delegated the dispositive responsibility of concluding whether the appellant’s 

invocation of his right or rights had been unambiguous and unequivocal. That, of course, 

is not the interpreter’s job. For an interpreter, the testimonial bete noire is indirect 

quotation.

A Weighty Advisement: 

The Miranda Catechism Plus Maryland Common Law

The primary witness at the suppression hearing was Officer Paulo Bonturi, the 

Portuguese interpreter. At the very outset of the police interrogation of the appellant on 

April 4, 2018, Officer Bonturi recited the following paragraph to the appellant in 

Portuguese:

OFFICER STREET: You have the right now and at any time to remain silent.

MR. SOARES: Okay. 

OFFICER STREET: Anything you say may be used against you. You have 

the right to a lawyer before and during any questioning. If you cannot afford 
6

a lawyer, one will be appointed for you. You have the right to be taken 

promptly before a District Court commissioner who is a judicial officer not 

connected to the police. A commissioner will inform you of each offense you 

are charged with and the penalties for each offense, provide you with a 

written copy of the charges against you, advise you of the rights to counsel, 

make a pre-trial custody determination and advise you whether you have the 

right to a preliminary hearing before a judge at a later time.

(Emphasis supplied.)

An Enigmatic Response

We have no idea whether that heavy composite of Miranda rights and 

Maryland statutory rights was perceived by the appellant in the conjunctive or in the 

disjunctive. No one ever inquired. It is highly questionable whether it is wise to pack 

so much substance into a single unbroken advisement, particularly where the 

unilluminating answer will probably be, “Yes, I understand.” Was he supposed to 

understand them all, moreover, or was he supposed to pick one? Were these 

cumulative rights or alternative rights? As related by the interpreter, the appellant 

made a choice among a panoply of rights and opted for a prompt presentment before 

a commissioner.

OFFICER BONTURI: He understands. He’s saying he wants to go straight 

to the commissioner. We haven’t gotten that far yet, so.

OFFICER STREET: Okay. So he said he wants to go straight to the 

commissioner?

OFFICER BONTURI: Yes.

OFFICER STREET: Okay. No problem.

2

2 That entire exchange was a conversation between Detective Street and Officer 

Bonturi. They were talking to each other about the appellant. It was not a case of Detective 
7

(Emphasis supplied.)

“No problem”? If Detective Street, who was conducting the interrogation saw “no 

problem,” what did that mean? Whatever “No problem” meant to Detective Street, what 

did that mean to the appellant? Did it mean that the interrogation would cease and that the 

appellant would be taken promptly before a commissioner? No such termination, however,

remotely happened or was even discussed. Throughout the interrogation, it was clearly 

Detective Street’s strategy to keep the appellant talking. He did not want the interrogation 

to stop, and he handled Officer Bonturi’s conclusions about the appellant’s responses in a 

way that permitted the interrogation to continue moving forward.

To the lawyers in the courtroom, a “prompt” appearance before a commissioner may 

have meant, as mandated by Maryland statutory law, an appearance within the next 24 

hours. To the appellant, by contrast, it may well have meant an immediate alternative to 

any further police interrogation. “[H]e said he wants to go straight to the 

commissioner.” We simply do not know for certain what the appellant meant, and no 

Street talking directly to the appellant nor one of the appellant replying directly to Detective 

Street. That is not the role of bilingual interpretation.

If proper interpretive practice were being followed, the transcript would have read 

more like this:

APPELLANT: I want to go straight to the commissioner.

OFFICER STREET: You want to go straight to the commissioner?

APPELLANT: Yes.

OFFICER STREET: Okay. No problem.
8

one made any effort to find out. In a bilingual context such as this, this is not effective 

communication. As long as the recitation was nominally correct, no one paid any attention 

to the appellant’s actual wishes. To go immediately before the commissioner, moreover,

could mean to end (or not even to begin) the interrogation by the police. This is what the 

appellant may have been asking for, but we don’t know. In any event, the request was 

ignored without any clarification being sought and the interrogation proceeded.

An aggravating problem with respect to the appellant’s wishes is that we do not 

have the appellant’s literal response. What we have is Officer Bonturi’s conclusion about 

what the appellant said.

A: You may have to play back the very end but I think he said that I have a 

right to a lawyer or I can go straight to the commissioner, and he said he 

wanted to go straight to the commissioner, and he shook his head yes every 

time I, and said yes a couple of times every time I read him one of the lines.

(Emphasis supplied). 

Detective Ryan Street, the aggressive lead detective of the interrogation, leaped to 

the assumption that the appellant had been furnished with all of the constitutional niceties 

he was entitled to, and that the interrogation could proceed unencumbered.

OFFICER STREET: But he understands his rights?

OFFICER BONTURI: He understood.

3

(Emphasis supplied.). That decision, of course, cannot be delegated to the interpreter.

3 A more proper exchange should have been:

OFFICER STREET: Do you understand your rights?

APPELLANT: I do.
9

As a stark reality, that exchange consists of one policeman (the interpreter) telling 

another policeman (Detective Street) that the appellant understood all of the rights to which 

he was entitled, pursuant to both Miranda v. Arizona and the Maryland common law, and 

that the appellant, albeit aware of those rights, was nonetheless willing to have the 

interrogation continue. That is a hard sell—unless lip service is enough. As the record itself, 

to wit, the trial transcript, clearly demonstrates, not a single question was directly asked of 

the appellant and not a single answer was directly rendered by the appellant touching on 

the subject of the appellant’s understanding of his rights. If there was a private conversation 

between the appellant and the interpreter explaining the rights, it is not to be found in the 

record. If we are simply being offered the unexplained conclusions of the interpreter in that 

regard, we are not told that. We do know that the full legal text of the rights in question 

was once correctly recited to the appellant. Beyond that, everything is pure surmise.

Once Detective Street had the benefit of Officer Bonturi’s conclusion that the 

appellant understood his Miranda rights, however, Detective Street assumed that he and 

the appellant were on an equal footing as the adversarial battle between them unfolded. 

The appellant would make his feeble effort to have the interrogation terminated. Detective 

Street could make his more sophisticated effort to see that the interrogation continued. The 

longer it continued, of course, the greater the possibility that the appellant would lapse into 

saying something incriminating. Nothing the appellant said in the course of the skirmish, 

moreover, would have any efficacy unless it could be determined that, according to a vast 

and convoluted caselaw well beyond the appellant’s ken, the appellant’s words were 

spoken “unambiguously” and “unequivocally.” The conclusion as to whether the 
10

appellant’s words, in Portuguese, were said unambiguously and unequivocally was, 

moreover, delegated to Officer Bonturi rather than being inferred by the court from the 

words themselves. Certainly there was no clarification offered by the appellant himself. 

This playing field was steeply tilted, even if it might not be considered to be tilted in a 

monolinguistic context. It was the interpreter who was concluding as to what the appellant 

was thinking and understanding and choosing, rather than confining himself to reporting 

the actual words of the appellant. That, quintessentially, is going well beyond the proper, 

and largely mechanical, role of an interpreter. There is also some question as to the 

interpreter’s neutrality, but that is another issue beyond the scope of this opinion.

Dishonoring The Right To Silence

Near the end of the interrogation, there was one very significant question asked by 

Detective Street that we believe to speak volumes about the purpose and strategic intent of 

his interrogation. The meaning of the passage is by no means transparent, and we, of 

necessity, rely on our reading of what the words really say. Officer Bonturi was explaining 

one of the appellant’s responses. The actual transcript of the police interrogation 

characterized the heart of the response as “unintelligible.” The defense brief, on the other 

hand, describes it thusly: “Appellant ‘wants to know if he has to answer’ or if he could 

‘keep his mouth shut.’” In any event, Detective Street jumped in at that point:

DETECTIVE STREET: You always, I mean, I’VE ADVISED YOU OF 

YOUR RIGHTS ALREADY. BUT I’M ASKING YOU THESE 

QUESTIONS BECAUSE WE’RE TRYING TO MOVE PAST YOU IN 

OUR INVESTIGATION. We’d also like to, the place where the cocaine was 

found was the laundry room, your bedroom, on your wife’s side. Does she 

have any involvement in it?
11

(Emphasis supplied.)

Our reading of that less than clarion passage credits Detective Street with a very 

clever, indeed deceptively clever, interrogation tactic to keep the interrogation going. 

According to our reading of an otherwise obscure passage, Detective Street is agreeing that 

the appellant, indeed, has a right to silence and the concomitant right to terminate the 

interrogation. In our reading, moreover, the detective seems to say, “Soares, at this point 

our interrogation of you as a suspect is finished. But I’m asking a few additional questions 

of you ‘because we’re trying to move past you in our investigation.’ Simply in an 

effort to interview you as a potential State’s witness, we’d like your information about your 

wife’s possible guilt.” At that point, of course, the appellant opened up and confessed to 

his own exclusive involvement. The technique worked, although it strikes us as grossly 

improper.

“Move past you?” Detective Street relentlessly continues the interrogation even 

as he ostensibly terminates it. He pretends to honor the appellant’s Miranda-based right to 

silence by formally ending the interrogation of the appellant in his capacity as a suspect. 

He then, however, MOVES PAST THE APPELLANT by simply interviewing him in a 

different capacity, as a witness with respect to his wife’s possible criminal involvement. 

That presumably, in the detective’s thinking, would not be an interrogation aimed at the 

appellant himself, and does not, therefore, trigger Miranda v. Arizona. Keep the appellant 

talking long enough and he will say something incriminating. The Fifth Amendment, of 

course, is concerned with whether a person incriminates himself and not with the subject 

matter being discussed as the medium of that incrimination. If Detective Street’s maneuver 
12

indicates anything, it indicates that Detective Street knew that the interrogation of the 

appellant should have terminated. If that were not the case, there would have been no 

necessity to MOVE PAST THE APPELLANT. The appellant was still there, of course, 

and the appellant, on cue, inevitably incriminated himself. This deliberate MOVE PAST 

YOU sleight-of-hand did not honor Miranda’s right to silence. It played games with it. 

Detective Street kept the appellant talking long enough and the appellant incriminated 

himself. If anything, when the ostensible subject matter of the conversation shifted from 

the appellant’s guilt to his wife’s guilt, that amped up rather than toned down the factor of 

compulsion. The detective found the right button to push. This we will not countenance.

In terms of what we are grasping for as the controlling standard for clear and readily 

understandable communication in the context of police interrogation while using a 

Portuguese-English interpreter, the explanation to the appellant that “we’re trying to 

move past you in this investigation” strike us as badly failing the “unambiguous” 

and “unequivocal” tests. The State may be “hoist on [its] own petard.”

4

Interrogating a reluctant witness about his wife’s guilt can violate the Fifth 

Amendment Privilege Against Compelled Self-incrimination as readily as interrogating 

that witness about his own guilt. The State never volunteered an explanation as to what 

MOVING PAST YOU means.

Miranda’s Right To Silence: The Unanswered Question

4 Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 4.
13

Throughout the suppression hearing, the hearing judge was bothered by the very 

question that bothers us. When the appellant expressed his desire to be taken promptly 

before a commissioner, was this not the way for the appellant, across the PortugueseEnglish language barrier, to attempt to assert his right to silence. At one point, the judge 

asked:

THE COURT: There is no evidence of that other than him saying – the 

question becomes what is the significance of his invoking or stating that he 

wanted to be taken to the commissioner. And maybe we should get the exact 

language he uses that’s in the video.

(Emphasis supplied.) Shortly thereafter, the judge asked again:

THE COURT: Are you saying that – well the question I’m going to say is 

are you, and this is where I sort of look at it, or what I thought you were doing 

was what does that mean, I want to be taken to the commissioner? Are you 

stating that’s an assertion of his right to remain silent?

(Emphasis supplied.)

The judge was saying, as are we, “Don’t get hung up over the literal words about 

being taken promptly before a commissioner. Was the appellant, as best he could, 

attempting to assert his right to keep silent?” No satisfactory answer was ever given. On 

this Tower of Babel in this case, everyone simply kept talking about sundry issues and 

nothing was resolved.

One final time, the judge persisted:

THE COURT: Well, he’s got that. And he got that. I don’t think there is any 

question that he got that. The question is, in my mind would be does that 

mean something other than what it, on face value is yes, I want to be taken 

to the commissioner. Does that mean I don’t want to talk to you; I want to be 

taken to the commissioner? Does that mean I want to talk to, I want my 

attorney taken to the commissioner?
14

(Emphasis supplied.)

Rather than focusing on the Miranda right to keep silent, however the discussion 

spun off into one involving Maryland common law violations. Just before the conclusion 

of the suppression hearing, the hearing judge demanded to know of the State:

THE COURT: Let me ask, let me just ask [the State] what. He invokes his 

right to be, and he says I want to be taken to the commissioner. Why doesn’t 

that require that discussion be cut off at that point?

(Emphasis supplied.)

All the court got by way of answer from the State was Perez v. State, 155 Md.App. 

1 (2004), holding that the satisfaction of the prompt presentment rule is an important factor 

but only one of the totality of factors involved in assessing Maryland’s common law 

voluntariness requirement. In the argumentative babble, Miranda’s right to remain silent 

simply got lost.

The suppression hearing judge, however, resolutely kept his eye on that issue of 

Miranda’s right to silence. His assessment of the issue before the court paralleled precisely 

our assessment.

THE COURT: But the concern or the idea is, is that here he’s told of all these 

rights. He’s not an English-speaker. He doesn’t have a tremendous level of 

education. At least self-reported there in the, you know, the information I 

have is he graduated elementary school. And says, after being told of his 

rights, I want to be taken to the commissioner. Nobody really, from what I’ve 

been shown I could see that there was no real response to that other than they 

continued to question the defendant at that point in time.

And so the question in my mind is, is there something that should have 

occurred there that says, you have a right to be taken to the commissioner, 

but do you want to talk to us, or, can we still talk. We’ll take you over there 

shortly, but. Or, is that an invocation of a right to remain silent implicitly by 

saying I want to be taken to the commissioner, which would be implicit that 
15

I don’t want to talk to you. Or, implicit I want counsel. And so that’s what 

I’m, that’s because to me, that’s the issue. I mean, if this was an invocation 

of those issues, then the questioning was supposed to stop.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The Parting Of The Ways: Williams v. State

To that point in the analysis, the suppression hearing judge and this Court saw the 

circumstances with the same eye. In final argument, however, the State unlimbered the 4-

3 opinion of the Court of Appeals in Williams v. State, 445 Md. 452, 128 A.3d 30 (2015) 

and that was decisive. Once Williams v. State was introduced into the equation, the central 

thrust of the suppression court’s thought process turned on a dime. The appellant’s motion 

to suppress his statement to the police was denied because his invocation of his right to 

remain silent had not been, in the court’s judgment, unambiguous and unequivocal.

THE COURT: [T]he right has to be invoked directly and unequivocally is 

what the caselaw says. And I note the case that’s really the most remarkable 

case that I’ve seen on this issue, whether it’s unequivocal or not, is the 

Williams v. State case. It’s a 2015 case out of the Court of Appeals, 445 Md. 

452. It’s a four to three decision. And in that case, the defendant said I don’t 

want to say nothing. I don’t know. And the Court of Appeals ruled that was 

an equivocal statement of the defendant.

And so if that’s an equivocal statement, then the circumstances set forth in 

that case, I would note that the assertion here that he’s questioning whether 

he has to answer something would be not a direct invocation of the right to 

remain silent. Similarly, his statement that I want to go straight to the 

commissioner is not an unequivocal and direct statement that he wants to 

have counsel.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Factually, Williams is a very simple case. The primary subject with which it deals 

was, as in the present case, Miranda’s right to remain silent. The sub-issue there is that of 
16

whether Williams unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to silence. The 

entire case turned on the interpretation the Court of Appeals placed on the two sentences

consisting of nine words, “I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know.” All seven judges on 

the Court of Appeals agreed that the first sentence, “I don’t want to say nothing,” standing 

alone, would have been an unequivocal invocation of the right to silence. Miranda would 

have been violated and the conviction would have been reversed.

A majority of four judges, however, held that the second sentence, “I don’t know,” 

so undermined the certainty of the first sentence as to taint it as ambiguous and equivocal. 

In Williams, Judge Battaglia wrote for the majority:

We agree with the suppression court, however, that the “I don’t know,--” 

appended to the statement, and made by Williams in the same breath as the 

first portion of his comment, renders what would have otherwise been a clear 

statement at which time the questions would have to stop an ambiguous and 

equivocal statement.

(Emphasis supplied.) 445 Md. at 469. See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 566 U.S. 370, 381, 

130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59, 

114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).

Judge McDonald’s dissenting opinion (joined by Chief Judge Barbera and Judge 

Adkins), by contrast, would not have credited the three words “I don’t know” with such an

erosive effect on the earlier certainty.

Thus, because Mr. Williams’ statements would have communicated (and did 

communicate) to reasonable officers that he chose to say nothing, Mr. 

Williams effectively invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The 

officers should have respected his rights and ended the interview at that time.

(Emphasis supplied.) 445 Md. at 486 (dissenting opinion by McDonald, J.)
17

What then shall we make of Williams v. State? In terms of precedent, did Williams

make an absolute statement with respect to the words, “I don’t know,” at all times and in 

all places? Of course not! It all depends upon the implicit predicate of the sentence, “I don’t 

know.” DON’T KNOW WHAT? If the full implicit sentence were, “I don’t know about 

the wisdom of remaining silent. I’ve got a good story to tell that just might just work,” that 

“I don’t know” would express tactical ambiguity and equivocality. But what if the implicit 

sentence were, “I don’t know about that cheeseburger you earlier offered me. Perhaps, I 

should just say ‘No thank you’ and go straight home”? That “I don’t know” would not 

invalidate the suspect’s invocation of a Miranda right. You’ve got to know the implied 

predicate of the abbreviated sentence. Frequently, it is apparent, as in the Williams case 

itself, but this is not always the case. The three-word fragment “I don’t know” simply has 

no independent life of its own absent a surrounding context.

The indispensable key to that ruling of non-suppression in this case was “the 

assertion here that he’s questioning whether he has to answer something 

would be not a direct invocation of the right to remain silent.” The critical 

question before the court, even narrowed down to Miranda’s right to remain silent without 

looking at the right to counsel, is did the appellant suffer a violation of his Miranda-based 

right to remain silent? The whole phenomenon surrounding the Miranda catechism is a 

multi-faceted totality. There is A) a necessity to advise a suspect of the existence of the 

right and, when necessary, to explain the meaning of the rights. There is then B) the 

opportunity for the suspect to invoke one or both of the Miranda rights. There is then C) 

the obligation to honor whatever right has been invoked.
18

In this case, the suppression hearing ruling was that the appellant’s right to silence 

had not been violated because it had never been, per Williams, unambiguously and 

unequivocally invoked. A fair reading— our reading— of the entire suppression hearing, 

on the other hand, is that to the extent to which the appellant thought that he enjoyed a right 

to remain silent, he unequivocally invoked it. To the extent to which appellant did not 

understand that the right to remain silent ipso facto comprehended the right not to answer 

questions and to have the questioning cease, that was because of the State’s failure to have 

properly advised the appellant in the first instance of Miranda’s right to silence and of what 

that right to silence consisted. Any hesitancy was based upon a lack of information about 

the right, not upon a lack of strategic resolution to invoke it. The State may not disclaim a 

violation of Miranda at point B by relying upon its own earlier violation of Miranda at 

point A. Williams v. State does not dictate otherwise.

Multiple Degrees Of Separation

It is here, in the shadow of Williams v. State, that we part company with the 

suppression hearing court. The distinctions between the present case and Williams are 

numerous and dispositive. The degree of distinction is exponential.

The first distinction, a dispositive one, can be found at the very heart of the Williams

holding. All parties agree that it was the addendum “I don’t know” that transformed an 

unambiguously affirmative response of “I want to remain silent” into an ambiguous and 

equivocal expression of uncertainty. The entire Williams opinion turns around the decisive 

significance of those three words, “I don’t know.” By way of sharp contrast, the appellant’s 
19

response to interrogation in the present case contains not a scintilla of such tactical or 

strategic uncertainty. In this case, there is no addendum of “I don’t know.”

Even a purely inferred informative uncertainty such as, “I don’t know if I have a 

right to silence,” is far from the same thing as the inferential strategic uncertainty of, “I 

don’t know if I want to exercise such a right.” The former would indicate only the 

inadequacy of the Miranda advisements at a slightly earlier stage of the interrogation.

Another gaping distinction is to be found in the present case itself. This case was 

one, unlike Williams, where effective communication depended on the services and on the 

performance of a foreign language interpreter. No such pervasive and omnipresent 

communication problem was remotely present in Williams v. State itself or in either of the 

Supreme Court opinions on which Williams was erected: Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 

or Davis v. United States, supra.

Further complicating the distinctive communicative murkiness of the present case 

are 1) level of the appellant’s education (elementary school); 2) the less than ideally neutral 

status of the present interpreter (a fellow policeman); and 3) the fact that the interpreter in 

this case did not exercise proper interpretative protocols but actually engaged as a thirdparty participant in many (if not most) of the exchanges in the course of the interrogation 

(the words that we are examining for ambiguity and unequivocality are not the words of 

the appellant but are the conclusions of the interpreter). There was no such overarching 

atmosphere of communicative difficulty looming over the close exegesis of words and 

tones and expression in Williams v. State (or in Berghuis or in Davis).
20

There was, moreover, in Williams v. State, no overt effort by the police interrogator 

seemingly to accept the appellant’s request to remain silent but immediately to subvert it 

with the stratagem of WE ARE TRYING TO MOVE PAST YOU. The Williams case 

simply does not resemble the case now before us and has nothing to teach us in resolving 

it. The present case is drowning in communicative murkiness. It is hard to be unambiguous 

in a maelstrom of ambiguity. It is hard to be unequivocal in a tidal wave of equivocation. 

Williams v. State does not remotely control the present case.

Miranda’s Right To Silence Was Not Satisfied

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to the United States conferred on every 

person the privilege not to be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. 

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court implemented that constitutional privilege by 

creating a set of protocols that must be followed in the inherently coercive context of 

custodial interrogation. The first of the Miranda-based protocols is the right to remain 

silent. In all criminal cases, the burden of proof is cast upon the State to prove that that 

right to silence has been satisfied. The task before us in the present case is to determine 

whether Miranda’s right to silence was satisfied.

The satisfaction of Miranda’s right to silence is at least a tripartite obligation. There 

is first the obligation on the State to inform the suspect of the right to silence. That means 

more than reciting to a defendant the words on a written form. That also means imparting 

to a suspect at least a rudimentary understanding of what that right means and what the 

suspect can do with it.

A. The Right To Be Informed Of And About The Right To Silence
21

The State has not persuaded us in the present case that this aspect of the right to 

silence was satisfied. In this case, the material that was recited to the appellant included 

not simply two constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda but also an equally heavy package 

of the Maryland common law of voluntariness including the more recent statutory law 

concerning prompt presentation to a commissioner. That is enough substantive material for 

a month or two of a law school course in criminal procedure. There were no follow-up 

questions or inquiries by anyone. Blithely to presume that a mechanical simple reading of 

such a mass of material imparted the required understanding of the right to silence is highly 

questionable. When the appellant later questioned whether he had the right not to answer 

questions, that was stark proof of his lack of earlier understanding. In the official transcript, 

the appellant is never asked if he understood his rights. Nor did he ever volunteer anything 

in that regard.

THE STATE: Okay. So at some point did you read those rights to the 

defendant?

OFFICER BONTURI: I’m pretty sure I did. Yes.

THE STATE: Okay, Did you tell him that you have the right to remain silent?

OFFICER BONTURI: I’m pretty sure I did, yes. They’re all checked off.

(Emphasis supplied.)

We hold that the State has failed to persuade us that the appellant was ever fully 

advised of Miranda’s right to silence and its implications.

B. Arguable Invocation Of The Right To Silence
22

The suppression hearing judge, understandably, never decided whether the 

appellant’s stated desire to be taken before a commissioner amounted to a request to remain 

silent or not. What was decided was that even if it amounted to a request to remain silent, 

such a request would have been ineffective because it was not unambiguous and 

unequivocal according to Williams v. State. We have already fully disposed of the 

Williams v. State issue.

C. Honoring The Right To Silence

As an alternative and independent holding, we also hold that Miranda was violated 

when Detective Street effectively recognized that the appellant had invoked his right to 

silence but deliberately attempted to outflank it with his ploy of “I’M ASKING YOU 

THESE QUESTIONS BECAUSE WE’RE TRYING TO MOVE PAST YOU IN OUR 

INVESTIGATION.” Once the right to silence has been invoked, the interrogation should 

stop. The police do not get to ask one question more, even in an effort to MOVE PAST 

THE DEFENDANT.

In three separate manifestations, Miranda’s right to silence was violated in this case.

Computing Harmless Error

How does one measure insignificance? One does not. One measures first 

significance. What then remains in the empty void beyond is insignificance. How then does 

one compute harmless error? 

The State has asked us to consider the possibility that the admission by the appellant 

of his guilt, even if erroneously obtained in violation of his constitutional right to remain 

silent, was harmless error. We are not remotely inclined to do so, but the State’s request 
23

does afford us the opportunity to ruminate briefly on the fascinating riddle of harmless 

error. In Maryland, our reliable point of departure has long been Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 

638, 659, 350 A.2d 665 (1976):

[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, 

upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot 

be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus 

be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of –

whether erroneously admitted or excluded – may have contributed to the rendition 

of the guilty verdict.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The core of the State’s contention is that the appellant’s confession “was 

CUMULATIVE to other evidence such as the substantial contraband recovered from 

Soares’ home and a text message appearing to show Soares confirming that he sold crack 

cocaine.” CUMULATIVE? What is the significance of evidence being “CUMULATIVE”? 

And “CUMULATIVE” to what end? To be sure, in terms of the State’s burden of 

production, the appellant’s confession was indubitably surplusage, and, therefore, 

“CUMULATIVE.” That, however, tells us absolutely nothing about harmless error. 

In addressing harmless error, an appellate court engages in the unusual task of 

attempting to measure insignificance. At what point is something so insignificant as to be 

devoid of any meaningful significance? Do we take our measurement, moreover, along the 

continuum of production, as a matter of law, or along the continuum of persuasion, as a 

matter fact? The fatal flaw in the State’s argument is to conflate those two continua.

Reliance on the CUMULATIVE status of the evidence is a common mistake of the 

State when urging a finding of harmless error. To say that the confession was not needed 
24

to get to the jury is not, of course, to say that it was not of value in persuading the jury. To 

be cumulative can be a very effective means of being persuasive. In persuading the jury, 

cumulative evidence can be a good thing. A drumbeat of repetition can be a convincingly 

effective trope. The State chronically, however, seeks to assess harmless error by treating

its remaining case, after subtracting the error, as a production issue rather than as a

persuasion issue. It thereby sets the bar far too low. 

The State devalues the appellant’s confession as “cumulative.” Cumulative 

evidence, of course, may be of absolutely no value for the minimal task of proving a prima 

facie case and avoiding an adverse judgment of acquittal. It may, by stark contrast, be of 

extreme, nay indispensable, value in persuading twelve timorous and cautious “doubting 

Thomases” to assert a definite conclusion unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. At 

what point then does “more” become “surplus”? In a word, at what point is the 

accumulation of proof of guilt ENOUGH? That depends, of course, on which continuum 

we are standing as we measure. On the production continuum, it is ENOUGH when the 

beleaguered prosecutor can grudgingly say to himself, “Well, at least this case will go to 

the jury.” On the persuasion continuum, by contrast, it may not be ENOUGH until even 

the more cautious prosecutor can comfortably say to himself, “This case is in the bank. 

Anything beyond this point will simply be gilding the lily.” The two ENOUGHS are miles 

apart and only beyond the more distant of the two ENOUGHS is error harmless. 

The assessment of harmless error is, moreover, a multi-factored exercise. In 

measuring whether the jury was influenced by the tainted evidence, an indispensable factor 

is whether the jury paid any attention to the evidence. Did the evidence in question make a 
25

grand entrance on center stage, perhaps with the fanfare of a ruling on contested 

admissibility, or did it slip in inadvertently, albeit erroneously, from the wings? Was the 

admission of the evidence the culmination of a fierce legal struggle over admissibility or, 

as happens not infrequently, did it end up in the case almost by accident or inadvertently? 

In essence, to what extent were jurors paying close attention? Once on stage, was it then 

used and exploited by the State or did it sit, neglected, in a quiet corner? If the State, in 

jury argument, uses the tainted evidence in its effort to influence the jury, it is hard for the 

State later to claim that the evidence was incapable of influencing the jury. 

As an appellate court engages in the assessment of harmless error, moreover, there 

is inevitably a qualitative, indeed almost an artistic, component that enters into the 

measuring process. As the prosecution’s burden shifts from one of production to one of 

persuasion, the inquiry “How much is ENOUGH?” shifts from being an arithmetic

question to a less quantifiable question of forensic art. Does the additional evidence 

produce in the theretofore undecided factfinder a discernible sigh of relief or does it 

produce simply a yawn? That difference is qualitative. 

In terms of its acclaim, moreover, the evidence is not always dependent on the use 

the State seeks to make of it. Some evidence is capable of speaking for itself. 

Michelangelo’s David and the Mona Lisa can generate their own acclaim without the 

benefit of lawyerly touting. The erroneously admitted evidence being subjected to harmless 

error review generally tends to be of a peripheral or tangential nature. It is rarely, as in this 

case, the “smoking gun.” In a purely mathematical sense, that would not make a bit of 

difference – but subjectively it can make a lot of difference. When history writes up its 
26

story of the case, what will be the artistic highlights? An artistic highlight could hardly be 

dismissed as having been harmless. In assessing harmless error, the verb “influence” and 

the noun “impact” are concepts worthy of conscious consideration. When measuring not 

the weight of the evidence in a vacuum chamber but the impact of the error on a lay jury, 

one may not blithely discount the sex appeal of the tainted evidence. We measure not what 

SHOULD influence or have an impact on a jury but what MAY influence or have an impact 

on a jury. Our focus is not simply on the evidence per se but on the jurors per se. The focus 

may, indeed, be on the meekest and least resolute of them. In their infinite variety, jurors 

are less predictably persuadable than are accountants. 

The State in this case does not meet that stern and demanding test for forgiving its 

error. The State, of course, has the burden of proof. The case against the appellant, albeit 

legally unimpeachable, was largely circumstantial. Contraband drugs were found in the 

appellant’s house. The appellant was one of the two owners and residents of that house. 

ERGO...? Notwithstanding that permissive (and, indeed, highly likely) inference from 

the circumstantial case that may have saved this case from a directed verdict of acquittal, 

the indisputable “smoking gun” was still the appellant’s spontaneous and emotionally 

charged confession of solitary guilt when the police even suggested his wife’s possible 

complicity. The impact was more than quantitative. The very tone of the confession and 

the context that triggered it enriched it with poignant credibility. We cannot and we do not 

discount the appellant’s confession as having had neither influence nor impact on the final 

verdict. The spontaneous and impassioned confession here was not peripheral surplusage. 

It was a persuasive bombshell. 
27

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED FOR FURTHER 

PROCEEDINGS; COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY.