FILED 

OCTOBER 19, 2017 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

DARLA K. DEHLIN, a single person, ) 

) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

FORGET ME NOT ANIMAL SHELTER, ) 

KIM GILLEN, JOHN DOE(S), ) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

No. 34407-0-111 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - Darla Dehlin appeals the trial court's summary 

judgment dismissal of her conversion, trespass to property, and civil conspiracy claims 

against Forget Me Not Animal Shelter (Forget Me Not), as well as the trial court's 

imposition of CR 11 sanctions against her attorney. The claims arose after Forget Me 

Not's director e-mailed the sheriffs office to report suspected animal neglect on Ms. 

Dehlin's property. The sheriffs office obtained a warrant to seize the dogs and then 

asked Forget Me Not to provide volunteers and vehicles to assist in impounding them. 

Because Forget Me Not was not the entity that seized the dogs, but rather 

transported and stored them on behalf of the sheriffs office, we conclude the trial court 
No. 34407-0-III 

Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

properly dismissed Ms. Dehlin's conversion and trespass to property claims. Moreover, 

because no evidence indicates Forget Me Not intended or agreed to accomplish anything 

unlawful, we conclude the trial court properly dismissed her civil conspiracy claim. We 

also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing CR 11 sanctions. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTS 

Forget Me Not is a nonprofit animal shelter located in Republic, Washington. Its 

volunteer executive director is Kim Gillen. It is not a humane society, and its volunteers 

cannot perform welfare checks. Thus, when it receives complaints of animal abuse or 

neglect, it forwards them to the Ferry County Sheriffs Office for investigation. 

In June 2011, a woman named Laura Bernier e-mailed Ms. Gillen, inquiring about 

what county agency investigates animal abuse and neglect. Ms. Gillen informed Ms. 

Bernier that Ferry County did not have an animal control agency, and that the sheriffs 

office investigates reports of animal abuse and neglect. Ms. Gillen gave Ms. Bernier the 

sheriffs office's phone number, but Ms. Bernier apparently did not follow up. 

Later in 2011, Ms. Bernier again e-mailed Ms. Gillen. This time, she expressed 

concern for the welfare of a number of Ms. Dehlin's dogs. Ms. Bernier stated that her 

friend had bought several puppies from Ms. Dehlin and that when her friend received 

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them, one was emaciated, had an infection, and had worms. Ms. Bernier believed Ms. 

Dehlin did not live full-time at the house and only checked on the dogs once or twice per 

week. 

Ms. Gillen e-mailed the Ferry County Sheriff, Pete Warner, and outlined the 

information she received from Ms. Bernier. She advised Sheriff Warner that she did not 

know where Ms. Dehlin lived, but that she had instructed Ms. Bernier and her friend to 

contact him. Sheriff Warner was never contacted about the situation. 

On September 17, 2012, Ms. Gillen received another e-mail from Ms. Bernier, 

again expressing concern for the welfare of Ms. Dehlin's dogs. This e-mail contained 

Ms. Dehlin's physical address. 

Ms. Gillen forwarded Ms. Bernier's e-mail to Sheriff Warner and requested a 

welfare check. She asked Sheriff Warner to let her know if any dogs were in immediate 

need so she could arrange to bring them into the shelter. She stated she would coordinate 

with an organization called Poodle Club of America Rescue (PCAR) if needed. Sheriff 

Warner assigned the welfare check to Deputy Patrick Rainer. 

On September 18, Deputy Rainer drove to Ms. Dehlin's address. Ms. Dehlin had a 

gate at her driveway, which was marked with no trespassing signs. However, the gate 

was unlocked. Deputy Rainer drove up the driveway and parked in front of several dog 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

kennels. These kennels were not visible from the roadway. The property appeared to be 

abandoned. 

Deputy Rainer saw at least 15 dogs in four separate kennels, including both adult 

dogs and puppies. He believed the living conditions in the kennels were unsanitary and 

believed the hair on several of the dogs was matted and coated in feces. In addition to the 

dogs in the kennels, Deputy Rainer also saw one dog running around unrestrained, 

another dog chained up, and at least 10 young puppies in an upside-down animal transport 

earner. 

After leaving Ms. Dehlin's property, Deputy Rainer applied for a warrant to search 

Ms. Dehlin's residence for evidence of second degree animal cruelty and to seize all the 

dogs. He relied on his observations from Ms. Dehlin's property as well as Ms. Gillen's emails to support his application. The trial court issued the warrant the same day. The 

warrant instructed the sheriff to search Ms. Dehlin's residence, seize the dogs, and keep 

them safely. 

Later in the day on September 18, Sheriff Warner informed Ms. Gillen that the 

sheriffs office had obtained a warrant to remove all of the dogs from Ms. Dehlin's 

property. Sheriff Warner stated the sheriffs office did not have enough personnel or 

vehicles available to transport 27 dogs. He asked Forget Me Not to provide volunteers 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

and vehicles to assist the sheriff's office in removing the dogs. Forget Me Not then 

arranged for available volunteers to accompany Deputy Rainer and Deputy Talon Ventura 

to Ms. Dehlin's residence. At roughly 5:00 p.m., Ms. Gillen and several volunteers met at 

the sheriff's office. They then followed the two deputies out to Ms. Dehlin's address. 

The Forget Me Not volunteers waited at the end of Ms. Dehlin's driveway while 

the deputies cleared the scene. Once they were given permission to proceed up the 

driveway, the volunteers followed the deputies through the scene. The deputies identified 

the dogs that the sheriff's office was removing from the property under the search 

warrant. 

Once the dogs were all loaded into vehicles, the sheriff's office had the dogs 

transported either to a foster home, Forget Me Not's shelter, a veterinary clinic, or an 

animal care facility. Over the next few days, a veterinarian visited the dogs. The sheriff's 

office retained responsibility for the dogs' medical care and boarding fees while the dogs 

were impounded, and the sheriff's office received invoices for their care. Throughout the 

next month, the dogs received vaccinations, exams, microchips, and dewormer. They 

were also spayed and neutered. Forget Me Not began accepting applications from 

individuals who were interested in adopting the dogs. 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

On October 20, the Ferry County Prosecuting Attorney notified Forget Me Not and 

PCAR that an agreement-in which Ms. Dehlin would relinquish ownership of the dogs 

in exchange for no criminal action being taken against her-was imminent. He advised 

Forget Me Not and PCAR that they could begin preparing to transfer the dogs to more 

permanent housing. 

On October 29, Ms. Dehlin wrote a letter to the Ferry County Prosecuting Attorney 

relinquishing her ownership of the poodles. She stated she relinquished ownership to 

PCAR, which had agreed to accept the poodles and incur the costs associated with taking 

possession of them. She further stated that in exchange for relinquishing the poodles, she 

understood that the State agreed not to charge her with any crime. However, she felt 

coerced into relinquishing the dogs based on threats and intimidation from members of 

the community, Facebook posts by Forget Me Not, "and a general hostile public 

atmosphere." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 61. She also felt pressured by the prosecuting 

attorney, Ms. Gillen, and the president of PCAR. 

Around this time, PCAR began assigning the dogs to individuals and rescue 

organizations. PCAR asked Forget Me Not to place several dogs with individuals who 

had previously submitted applications. These individuals signed adoption contracts on 

October 27, October 30, November 5, and November 8. PCAR assigned the rest of the 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

dogs to poodle rescues in Nevada and Arizona. PCAR scheduled a commercial 

transporter to pick up the dogs. Forget Me Not incurred $17,981.86 in costs from 

boarding the dogs and providing them medical care. It recovered $13,941.60 from 

community donations, reimbursements from the sheriff's office, and adoption fees. 

On October 31, Ms. Dehlin e-mailed the president of PCAR. She stated she was 

upset with how PCAR was placing her former poodles. In a follow-up e-mail later that 

evening, she stated she was "rescinding the relinquishment to PCAR." CP at 67. She 

asked PCAR's president to keep her e-mail confidential. There is no evidence Ms. Dehlin 

ever communicated her intent to rescind the relinquishment to Forget Me Not, the 

prosecuting attorney, or the sheriff's office. 

PROCEDURE 

In September 2015, Ms. Dehlin filed a complaint naming Forget Me Not, Ms. 

Gillen, and Forget Me Nat's volunteers as defendants. She brought claims for civil 

conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, trespass to property, conversion, and assault. In its answer, Forget Me Not 

asserted affirmative defenses and stated it was entitled to an award of sanctions under 

CR 11. 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

Ms. Dehlin filed a separate lawsuit against Ferry County, the Ferry County 

Sheriffs Office, Sheriff Warner, Deputy Rainer, and Deputy Ventura. She brought a 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, in which she alleged the search of her property and seizure of her 

dogs violated her constitutional rights. That suit was removed to federal court. 

Forget Me Not moved for summary judgment on all of Ms. Dehlin's claims. Ms. 

Dehlin stipulated to the dismissal of her assault claim. The trial court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Forget Me Not. Ms. Dehlin filed a notice of appeal from this order. 

After the trial court granted summary judgment, Forget Me Not moved for attorney 

fees and costs on the grounds that Ms. Dehlin's counsel violated CR 11. The trial court 

granted Forget Me Nat's motion. The court found that Ms. Dehlin's counsel violated 

CR 11 by asserting the claims for assault, intentional inflection of emotional distress, and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress. With respect to these three claims, the court 

found that counsel did not have knowledge, information, or belief based on a reasonable 

inquiry that they were grounded in fact, supported by existing law, or that a good faith 

argument existed for extending the law. However, the court found that counsel did not 

violate CR 11 by asserting the claims for conversion, trespass to property, or civil 

conspiracy. The court awarded Forget Me Not $2,500 for the unnecessary fees and costs 

it incurred in defending against the three baseless claims. 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

ANALYSIS 

This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same 

inquiry as the trial court. Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 185 Wn.2d 532,547,374 

P.3d 121 (2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). A material fact is one the outcome 

of the litigation depends on. In re Estate of Black, 153 Wn.2d 152, 160, 102 P .3d 796 

(2004 ). This court views all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kim, 185 Wn.2d at 547. Summary judgment is 

appropriate only if a reasonable person could reach one conclusion from all the evidence. 

Id. 

A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that 

there is no issue of material fact. Barker v. Advanced Silicon Materials, LLC, 131 Wn. 

App. 616, 624, 128 P.3d 633 (2006). Once the defendant does this, the burden shifts to 

the plaintiff to produce admissible evidence that alleges specific facts establishing a cause 

of action. Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 25, 851 P.2d 689 (1993). 

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When reviewing a civil case in which the standard of proof is clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence, this court "' must view the evidence presented through the prism of 

the substantive evidentiary burden."' Woody v. Stapp, 146 Wn. App. 16, 22, 189 P.3d 

807 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 

91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). The burden of proof for civil conspiracy claims is clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. Thus, this court must determine whether, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Dehlin, a rational trier of fact could find 

that she supported her conspiracy claim with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. 

CONVERSION AND TRESPASS TO PROPERTY CLAIMS 

Ms. Dehlin argues that Forget Me Not converted and trespassed on her poodles by 

spaying, neutering, and holding them out for adoption before she had formally 

relinquished them. She argues she was coerced into relinquishing the poodles, and that 

she rescinded her relinquishment three days later. She further argues that chapter 16.52 

RCW's requirements governing the seizure of animals were not followed. 

Conversion is the exercise of dominion or ownership over another's personal 

property. Potter v. Wash. State Patrol, 165 Wn.2d 67, 78, 196 P.3d 691 (2008). It occurs 

when one willfully interferes with another's property without justification and deprives 

the other person of possession. Id. This can occur when one wrongfully takes, alters, 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

misdelivers, or disposes of the other person's property. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

TORTS§ 223 (1965). "All types of tangible personal property can be converted." 

16 DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASH. PRACTICE: TORT LAW AND 

PRACTICE§ 14:16, at 587 (4th ed. 2013) (hereinafter DEWOLF). 

Generally, an agent is personally liable when he or she assists a principal in 

converting or trespassing on another's property, even if the agent acts at the direction of 

the principal and performs the acts solely for the principal' s benefit. Dodson v. Econ. 

Equip. Co., 188 Wash. 340, 343, 62 P .2d 708 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

AGENCY§ 349 (1958); 2A C.J.S. Agency§ 374, at 636 (2003). When this occurs, the 

agent is liable to the extent he or she aided or abetted in the consummation of the wrong. 

Martin v. Sikes, 38 Wn.2d 274,278,229 P.2d 546 (1951). However, 

[a] bailee, agent, or servant who receives the possession of a chattel for 

storage, safekeeping, or transportation on behalf of his bailor, principal, or 

master, is subject to liability for conversion if, but only if, he does so with 

knowledge or reason to know that a third person has the right to immediate 

possession of the chattel. 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 230. 

The distinction between the rule and the exception is not well defined. However, 

an instructive case is Foreign Car Center, Inc. v. Essex Process Service, Inc., 62 Mass. 

App. Ct. 806, 821 N.E.2d 483 (2005). There, a bank recovered a judgment against 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

Foreign Car Center, a car dealership and repair center. Id. at 807. The bank then 

obtained a writ of attachment. Id. at 808. A deputy sheriff, acting pursuant to the writ, 

engaged a towing company and went to Foreign Car Center's place of business. Id. 

Upon arriving, he could not locate the owner and thus did not immediately serve the writ 

of attachment. Id. He began seizing vehicles and instructing the towing company to tow 

them away. Id. The owner eventually arrived and the deputy sheriff showed him the writ. 

Id. The owner complained the towing company towed the cars in a rough and damaging 

manner. Id. 

The deputy sheriff lost the original writ and thus never returned it to court, as was 

required. Id. at 809, 811 n.9. Due to issues with the vehicles' titles, the sheriffs sale also 

did not occur within 30 days of the seizure, as was required by statute. Id. at 810, 811 

n.9. 

Foreign Car Center sued the bank, the deputy sheriff, the process company that 

employed the sheriff, and the towing company for, among other things, conversion. Id. at 

806, 810. At trial, the court instructed the jury that it could find the deputy sheriff and 

process company liable for conversion, but not the bank or the towing company. Id. at 

813. 

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The Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed. Id. at 815. It held that the procedural 

violations of the collections laws "were strictly the responsibility of the sheriff' and did 

not support a cause of action for conversion against the bank. Id. at 813-14. The court 

further held that an instruction for conversion against the towing company would have 

been improper. Id. at 814. Relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 230, the court 

reasoned that Foreign Car Center presented no evidence, nor did it argue on appeal, that 

the towing company knew or should have known that the deputy sheriff and process 

company were converting Foreign Car Center's property. Id. 

Here, even if we assume without deciding that: ( 1) Ms. Dehlin did not consent to 

the torts when she relinquished her dogs, and (2) the seizure of her dogs was illegal and 

without justification, her conversion claim still fails because Forget Me Not was not the 

entity responsible. Although an agent is generally liable when he or she converts property 

at a principal's direction and for the principal's benefit, in this case there is no genuine 

dispute that the exception outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 230 applies. 

First, Forget Me Not possessed the dogs on behalf of the sheriffs office for 

transportation and then for storage. Like in Foreign Car Center, where the deputy sheriff 

seized the cars and engaged the towing company to tow them away, Deputy Rainer and 

Deputy Ventura identified the dogs the sheriffs office intended to seize under the warrant 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

and asked Forget Me Not to assist in removing them. After the sheriffs office housed the 

dogs in various locations, which included Forget Me Not's shelter, it retained 

responsibility for them. 

Second, Forget Me Not did not know, or have reason to know, that Ms. Dehlin had 

the right to immediately possess the dogs. After making the report to Sheriff Warner, the 

next information Forget Me Not received was that the sheriffs office had obtained a 

warrant to remove all of the dogs from Ms. Dehlin's property. Forget Me Not was not 

involved in the welfare check or the warrant application. Ms. Dehlin argues that chapter 

16.52 RCW's requirements for the seizure of animals were not followed, but as discussed 

in Foreign Car Center, this was not Forget Me Not's responsibility. 

Like in Foreign Car Center, where the deputy sheriff seized the cars pursuant to a 

court order and the towing company had no way of knowing the cars were being 

converted, here the sheriffs office seized the dogs pursuant to a search warrant and Ms. 

Dehlin presents no evidence, nor does she argue, that Forget Me Not knew or should have 

known that she had a right to immediately possess the dogs. In light of Forget Me Not's 

evidence, the burden shifts to Ms. Dehlin to produce evidence establishing a cause of 

action. She has not met this burden. We conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing 

Ms. Dehlin's conversion claim on summary judgment. 

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Trespass to property, on the other hand, is something less than a conversion. 

DEWOLF, supra,§ 14:15, at 585. It occurs when a person intentionally interferes with the 

possession or physical condition of another's personal property without justification. Id. 

Here, Forget Me Not took and cared for the dogs pursuant to the sheriffs request, 

supported by a warrant. Forget Me Not had no reason to believe that the warrant was 

wrongfully issued. Later, Forget Me Not began placing the dogs at the request of PCAR 

at a time when Forget Me Not reasonably believed that Ms. Dehlin had given up her 

rights to the dogs. Because these facts are not contested and establish justification for 

Forget Me Not's actions, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Dehlin's trespass to 

property claim. 

CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM 

Ms. Dehlin argues Forget Me Not conspired to illegally seize her dogs. She argues 

the e-mails between Ms. Gillen, Ms. Bernier, and Sheriff Warner are evidence of the 

conspiracy. She further argues the search warrant was invalid because it was not 

supported by probable cause, and it contained secondhand and unreliable information. 

To establish a claim for civil conspiracy, plaintiffs '"must prove by clear, cogent, 

and convincing evidence that ( 1) two or more people combined to accomplish an 

unlawful purpose, or combined to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means; and 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

(2) the conspirators entered into an agreement to accomplish the conspiracy.'" Woody, 

146 Wn. App. at 22 (quoting All Star Gas, Inc. v. Bechard, 100 Wn. App. 732, 740, 998 

P.2d 367 (2000)). To establish civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that the factual 

circumstances are "inconsistent with a lawful or honest purpose and reasonably consistent 

only with the existence of the conspiracy." John Davis & Co. v. Cedar Glen No. Four, 

Inc., 75 Wn.2d 214,224,450 P.2d 166 (1969). 

To conspire, a person must be aware of the illegality. See All Star Gas, 100 Wn. 

App. at 741. For example, in All Star Gas, one of All Star Gas's managers had a clause 

in his employment contract prohibiting him from competing with the business for three 

years after ending his employment. Id. at 734. A few months before resigning, he started 

a gas business with his brother, using information he obtained through his employment 

with All Star Gas. Id. at 734-35. All Star Gas sued both the employee and his brother, 

alleging they both conspired to violate the noncompetition agreement. Id. at 735. The 

trial court dismissed the conspiracy claims. Id. at 736. 

This court affirmed. Id. at 740. This court reasoned that the brother did not know 

about the noncompetition agreement and, therefore, could not have conspired to violate 

an agreement that he did not know existed until after the alleged conspiracy had occurred. 

Id. at 741. This court further reasoned that nothing in the record suggested the brother 

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had an unlawful motive or used unlawful means when he agreed to form the new 

business. Id. 

"A person who communicates a complaint or information to any branch or agency 

of federal, state, or local government ... is immune from civil liability for claims based 

upon the communication to the agency or organization regarding any matter reasonably of 

concern to that agency or organization." RCW 4.24.510. The legislature enacted this 

statute to encourage citizens to report potential wrongdoing to governmental entities. 

Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue, 120 Wn. App. 365,366, 85 P.3d 926 (2004). This statute 

provides immunity even if a person makes a report in bad faith. 1 See DEWOLF, supra, 

§ 12:22, at 503; Bailey v. State, 147 Wn. App. 251, 260-63, 191 P.3d 1285 (2008). 

Ms. Dehlin argues the e-mails between Ms. Gillen, Ms. Bernier, and Sheriff 

Warner demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy.2 But the e-mails do not establish that 

any of the parties intended or agreed to accomplish anything unlawful. Rather, Ms. 

Bernier forwarded her concerns about the dogs to Ms. Gillen, who appropriately 

1 Former RCW 4.24.510 (1999) expressly contained a good faith requirement. In 

2002, the legislature deleted the phrase "in good faith" preceding "communicates a 

complaint or information" in the first sentence of the statute. See LAWS OF 2002, ch. 232, 

§ 2. 

2 Ms. Dehlin also argues the prosecuting attorney and PCAR's president conspired 

to convince her to relinquish her dogs, but it is unclear how this involves Forget Me Not. 

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forwarded them to law enforcement. To the extent Ms. Dehlin argues that Forget Me Not 

conspired based on its report to the sheriffs office, RCW 4.24.510 immunizes Forget Me 

Not from liability. This is true even if Ms. Gillen's report was motivated by some 

preexisting grudge against Ms. Dehlin or a desire to "take" the dogs from her. CP at 58. 

Ms. Dehlin also argues that the warrant was iHegally obtained and lacked probable 

cause. As discussed above, Forget Me Not did not participate in the welfare check or the 

warrant application, and nothing in the record suggests it was aware of any alleged 

deficiencies with the warrant or believed the seizure of the dogs would be unlawful when 

it agreed to assist the sheriffs office. 

Accordingly, Ms. Dehlin failed to establish a prima facie case of civil conspiracy 

by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The trial court did not err in dismissing this 

claim on summary judgment.3 

TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF CR 11 SANCTIONS 

Ms. Dehlin challenges the trial court's imposition of CR 11 sanctions.4 This court 

3 Ms. Dehlin does not challenge the trial court's dismissal of her claims for 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

4 Although Ms. Dehlin did not appeal from either of the CR 11 orders, "[a]n appeal 

from a decision on the merits of a case brings up for review an award of attorney fees 

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reviews an award of CR 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Stiles v. Kearney, 168 

Wn. App. 250, 260, 277 P.3d 9 (2012). 

When an attorney signs a court filing, the attorney certifies that 

to the best of the ... attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, formed 

after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) [the pleading, 

motion, or memorandum] is well grounded in fact; [and] (2) it is warranted 

by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 

reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law .... 

CR 1 l(a). If an attorney signs a pleading in violation of this rule, the court may impose 

an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party the reasonable 

expenses incurred because of the filing. CR l l(a). 

1. Timely notice 

Ms. Dehlin first argues that Forget Me Not's request for CR 11 sanctions was 

untimely. She argues that the statement in its answer that it was entitled to CR 11 

sanctions was insufficient and that it should have moved for CR 11 sanctions at the outset 

of the case. 

entered after the appellate court accepts review of the decision on the merits." RAP 

2.4(g). 

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Attorneys and judges who perceive a possible violation of CR 11 must bring it to 

the offending party's attention as soon as possible. Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 198, 

876 P.2d 448 (1994). Without timely notice, CR 11 sanctions are unwarranted. Id. The 

purpose of this requirement is to give the offending party an opportunity to mitigate the 

sanction by amending or withdrawing the baseless filing. Id. Another reason is to deter 

the offending party from submitting additional baseless filings. Id. 

An answer to the initial complaint provides sufficient notice that the defendant 

intends to seek CR 11 sanctions. Stiles, 168 Wn. App. at 264. In Stiles, the defendant's 

answer sought dismissal of the complaint and attorney fees under CR 11. Id. at 255. 

After conducting discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Id. The trial 

court granted the defendant's motion. Id. at 256. Roughly one month later, the defendant 

moved for CR 11 sanctions, which the trial court imposed. Id. The Stiles court held that 

the defendant's notice in his answer was timely and that it gave sufficient notice of his 

intent to seek CR 11 sanctions. Id. at 264. 

The facts regarding notice of CR 11 sanctions in this case are identical to those in 

Stiles. Ms. Dehlin, therefore, received timely notice of Forget Me Not's intent to seek 

CR 11 sanctions. 

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Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

2. Appropriateness of sanctions when other claims are nonfrivolous 

Ms. Dehlin also argues that CR 11 sanctions were not appropriate because some of 

her claims were nonfrivolous. She cites Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 829 

P.2d 1099 (1992). First, Bryant does not require that all claims be frivolous before a 

court can impose CR 11 sanctions. Id. at 220. Second, Biggs v. Vail makes clear that a 

trial court may impose CR 11 sanctions as to those portions of the complaint deemed 

frivolous. 124 Wn.2d at 200-01. 5 

3. Factual and legal bases and reasonable inquiry 

Ms. Dehlin further argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial 

court's finding that her claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress lacked a factual or legal basis. She also argues 

the trial court did not inquire or make a finding as to whether her counsel conducted a 

reasonable inquiry before signing the complaint. 

5 In this respect, CR 11 sanctions are more easily imposed than sanctions under 

RCW 4.84.185. For sanctions to be imposed under RCW 4.84.185, the action, 

counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense must be deemed frivolous in its 

entirety and advanced without reasonable cause. 

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To impose sanctions for a baseless filing under CR 11, the trial court must find: 

(1) that the claim was without a factual or legal basis, and (2) that the attorney who signed 

the filing did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of the 

claim. West v. Wash. Ass 'n of County Officials, 162 Wn. App. 120, 135, 252 P.3d 406 

(2011 ). A trial court may consider a number of factors in determining whether counsel 

conducted a reasonable inquiry, including the time counsel had available and the 

complexity of the issues. See Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220-21. 

Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the three baseless 

claims lacked factual or legal support. Ms. Dehlin never presented any evidence an 

assault occurred. Moreover, her assault claim was barred by the statute of limitations, as 

she filed her complaint three years after the incident. See RCW 4.16.100 (statute of 

limitations for assault and battery is two years). She never presented any evidence that 

Forget Me Not intended to inflict emotional distress. See Womack v. Rardon, 133 Wn. 

App. 254, 261, 135 P.3d 542 (2006) (trial court properly dismissed outrage claim where 

immolation of plaintiffs cat, though deplorable, was not intended to bring about distress). 

Finally, a pet owner has no right to "recover damages for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress ... for the negligent death or injury of a pet." Sherman v. Kissinger, 

146 Wn. App. 855, 873, 195 P.3d 539 (2008). 

22 
No. 34407-0-III 

Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

The trial court also found that Ms. Dehlin's counsel failed to conduct a reasonable 

inquiry into whether the baseless claims had factual or legal support. See CP at 251; 

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 90. Ms. Dehlin appears to argue that the trial court erred 

by failing to perform an on-the-record inquiry into counsel's actual prefiling 

investigation. Although such an inquiry would be helpful for appellate review, Ms. 

Dehlin cites no authority that holds this is required. A trial court may consider multiple 

factors in making its determination, which have varying degrees of relevance to the actual 

investigation counsel conducted. See Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220. 

Here, the trial court expressly considered the fact that Ms. Dehlin filed her 

complaint shortly before most of the statutes of limitation expired, causing her to throw 

"everything ... against the wall hoping something would stick." RP at 90. Moreover, the 

fact that one of the claims was barred by a statute of limitations and two others were 

clearly barred as a matter of law indicates counsel did not reasonably investigate before 

filing the complaint. See RP at 89. 

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing CR 11 sanctions. 

23 
No. 34407-0-III 

Dehlin v. Forget Me Not Animal Shelter 

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 

Forget Me Not requests attorney fees under RAP 18.9 on the basis that Ms. Dehlin 

filed a frivolous appeal. RAP 18.9 authorizes an appellate court to order a party who files 

a frivolous appeal "to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who has 

been harmed." For an appeal to be frivolous under RAP 18.9, it must not present any 

debatable issues on which reasonable minds may differ and must be totally devoid of 

merit. In re Recall of Boldt, 187 Wn.2d 542,556,386 P.3d 1104 (2017). This court 

resolves all doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous in favor of the appellant. Hanna 

v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596,615,373 P.3d 300 (2016). 

Here, Ms. Dehlin raised issues that were at least debatable. We, therefore, decline 

to award attorney fees to Forget Me Not under RAP 18.9. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Fe~4?.Fa=t s'.J 

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