COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

SAM GLASSCOCK III

VICE CHANCELLOR

STATE OF DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE

34 THE CIRCLE

GEORGETOWN, DELAWARE 19947

Date Submitted: November 19, 2018

Date Decided: February 28, 2019

Michael Hanrahan, Esquire

Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr., Esquire

Kevin H. Davenport, Esquire

Samuel L. Closic, Esquire

Eric J. Juray, Esquire

Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A.

1310 North King Street

Wilmington, DE 19801 

Rolin P. Bissell, Esquire

James M. Yoch, Jr., Esquire

Benjamin M. Potts, Esquire

Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP

1000 North King Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: In re Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. Unitholder Litigation, 

Consolidated Civil Action No. 12197-VCG

This Letter Opinion addresses the Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Petition for an Award 

of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses.

I. Background

This litigation began on April 12, 2016. What follows is a truncated version 

of the facts regarding the transaction at issue; the interested reader is referred to my 

Memorandum Opinion of May 17, 20181for a more comprehensive recitation. 

Energy Transfer Equity (“ETE”) is a Delaware Master Limited Partnership (MLP), 

and is managed by the Board of Directors (the “Board” and the “Directors”) of its 

 

1

In re Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. Unitholder Litig., 2018 WL 2254706 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018).
2

General Partner, LE GP, LLC. The Plaintiffs2alleged that the General Partner of 

ETE breached the Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) by issuing Series A 

Convertible Preferred Units (CPUs) to ETE affiliates, and that this issuance was not 

fair to the Partnership. They sued ETE and certain CPU recipients on behalf of the 

holders of Common Units (the “Unitholders”), exclusive of the Defendants and other 

CPU recipients. The case proceeded via vigorous litigation: with discovery, motion 

practice, and ultimately through trial. The suit presented complex issues of Limited 

Partnership law; however, I address only those facts and issues that are relevant here.

In September 2015, ETE announced its merger with the Williams Companies, 

Inc. (“Williams”).3 Soon after, the energy sector experienced a decline, during 

which ETE’s unit price fell by 65.5 percent.

4

 ETE’s credit rating was downgraded, 

and access to credit became more difficult.5 Although these changes affected the 

energy industry as a whole, they were particularly detrimental to ETE’s Unitholders,

because as an MLP, ETE distributed all of its available cash to Unitholders every 

quarter.6 Moreover, consideration for the Williams merger was a mix of equity and 

cash; ETE’s decrease in unit price meant a correspondingly large cash component

would be due to Williams at closing. 

 

2 One plaintiff brought this suit; another later joined the action.

3

In re Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. Unitholder Litig., 2018 WL 2254706, at *3. 

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id. at *4.
3

In light of its worsening financial situation, and in contemplation of its merger 

with Williams, in February 2016 ETE issued a class of securities, the CPUs, in a 

private offering going largely to ETE insiders.7 Originally, ETE had envisioned a 

similar offering that would be extended to all Unitholders; however, ETE came to 

believe that Williams would not consent to a public offering, as required by the 

merger terms.8 As originally contemplated, the public offering provided for deferred 

dividends, to be paid in accrued equity, rather than in cash.9 This would allow ETE 

to retain much-needed capital, with the hope that it could avoid canceling

distributions to the common Unitholders.10 Ultimately, ETE offered its insiders 

sweeter terms. 

Under the terms of the private offering, subscribers would receive an $0.11 

cash distribution each quarter.11 The subscribers also received a deferred equity

accrual, representing units valued at the difference between the $0.11 the subscriber 

received and the then-current distribution rate of $0.285, regardless of whether any 

distribution to common Unitholders was actually made.

12

 These terms were more 

favorable to the subscribers than those of the previously-contemplated public 

offering. I found it reasonable to conclude that ETE’s CFO “informed insiders that 

 

7

Id. at *5–8.

8

Id. at *24.

9

Id. 

10 Id. at *23.

11 Id. at *24.

12 Id.
4

a public offering to all unitholders would be unlikely, given [Williams’] lack of 

consent; that a Private Offering would be an alternative; that a substantial risk of 

distribution cuts or cancellations loomed; and that the insiders seized the opportunity 

to eliminate downside risk for themselves and their cronies.”13

On April 18, 2016, about two months after the issuance described above, ETE 

announced that it would cut distributions to the common Unitholders.

14

 Ultimately, 

however, the anticipated Williams merger did not close, and the energy economy 

recovered.15 As a result, ETE did not cut distributions.16 Instead, it announced that 

its distributions to common Unitholders would remain unchanged, at $0.285.17 

Then, on October 26, 2017—during the pendency of this litigation—ETE announced 

that it would increase the quarterly distributions to $0.295 per share.18 In February 

2018, ETE raised distributions a second time, to $0.305.19 These distributions 

negated any damages to the Plaintiffs as a result of the CPU issuance, even though I 

found that the Defendants had breached their contractual duties. In short, because 

the economic upturn and the merger failure fortuitously coincided, ETE was able to 

 

13 Id.

14 Id. at *14.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. 

19 Id.
5

maintain, and ultimately increase, distributions to nonparticipating Unitholders, so 

that the Plaintiffs suffered no monetary harm as result of the Defendants’ breach. 

In a post-trial opinion dated May 17, 2018, I found that, although the issuance 

of the CPUs was not impermissible under the LPA, it was nevertheless a conflicted 

transaction that was not fair to the Partnership.20 Thus, in my view, the Plaintiffs 

prevailed in the substantive litigation, despite the lack of court-ordered relief.21

Subsequently, the Plaintiffs moved for an award of attorneys’ fees. 

Contending that fees are warranted under the corporate benefit theory, the Plaintiffs 

point to two corporate benefits. First, the litigation “clarified” the LPA, and it 

“establishes that in any future conflicted transaction, the General Partner and its 

Affiliates must prove fairness.”22 Second, per the Plaintiffs, the distributions that 

occurred during the litigation were actually a result of the litigation, which served to 

simultaneously negate damages and work a corporate benefit. The Plaintiffs 

otherwise submit that I should use my equitable powers to award attorneys’ fees.23

In their opposition, the Defendants argue that there is no cognizable benefit. 

They submit that the post-trial “guidance” that clarified the LPA is not a true

 

20 See generally id.

21 I denied the Plaintiffs’ request to cancel the issuance. See id.

22 Pls.’ Opening Br. in Support of Pet’n for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses 

[hereinafter, Pls.’ Opening Br.], at 11.

23 Id.
6

corporate benefit.24 They also contend that the distribution increases were entirely 

independent of the litigation, and were therefore not a benefit of the Plaintiffs’ 

efforts.25

The ultimate question is this: Did the litigation provide such benefits to the 

entity and the Unitholders that an award of fees is warranted under the corporate 

benefit doctrine?

II. Analysis

This is an unusual fee request. The litigation here was extensive. The 

Plaintiffs demonstrated that insiders crafted a transaction that benefited themselves

at the expense of the Unitholders, in breach of the contractual analog of fiduciary 

duties by which the parties were bound. The benefit improperly conveyed was a 

downside hedge, which, as a mere fortuity, did not help—and, in fact, slightly 

disadvantaged—the Defendants. As a result, the breach resulted in no cognizable 

damages. In the face of these facts, the Plaintiffs seek fees for having worked a 

benefit on the Partnership. The Defendants agree that a cognizable benefit here 

would justify fee shifting; however, they contend that the litigation achieved no such 

benefit. 

 

24 Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Pet’n for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses 

[hereinafter, Defs.’ Opp’n Br.], at 10.

25 Id. at 14.
7

This jurisdiction employs the American rule on fees and expenses: winners 

and losers bear their own. There are exceptions, the pertinent one being that where 

the litigation has worked a benefit on a corporation or a class, the plaintiffs, taking 

only a share of the fruits of their efforts, are entitled to share their costs as well. 

Here, the question is, in light of the lack of damages or other meaningful remedy, 

what is the benefit conferred by the litigation? And to the extent that a benefit was 

conveyed, how should I properly evaluate the resulting equitable fee shifting? I note 

that each side here, although they vary wildly as to the appropriate amount of fees 

to be shifted, agrees that an improvidently-set fee will work a perverse incentive 

toward wholesome levels of entity litigation.

26

The path that leads this Court to an appropriate fee is well-worn, if not easy

to tread. I must employ the factors set out by our Supreme Court in Sugarland.

27

 Of 

these, the most important is the benefit achieved, and I turn first to that consideration.

A. Therapeutic Benefit

This Court, and our Supreme Court, have repeatedly found a corporate benefit 

sufficient to shift fees where a substantial therapeutic benefit to corporate 

governance was accomplished via the litigation.

28

 Here, I find that the litigation has 

 

26 See Aug. 28, 2018 Oral Argument Tr., at 13:19–14:6; 46:13–22.

27 The Sugarland factors are: (1) the results achieved; (2) the time and effort of counsel; (3) the 

relative complexities of litigation; (4) any contingency factor; and (5) the standing and ability of 

counsel involved. Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980).

28 See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio P’rs, 562 A.2d 1165 (Del. 1989); In re Sauer-Danfloss Inc. 

S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch. 2011).
8

resulted in a substantial benefit to the Unitholders and the Partnership, in defining 

the duties required in the event of a conflicted transaction.

I turn first to the Defendants’ contention that litigation that merely “reminds” 

fiduciaries of their duties under law does not thereby work a cognizable benefit 

sufficient to justify shifting fees.29 The Plaintiffs submit that a benefit of this 

litigation is that it clarified the Partnership Agreement. Specifically, the litigation 

“established that under § 7.6(f), the General Partner and its Affiliates bear the burden 

of proving that a conflicted transaction is fair and reasonable.”30 Moreover, as a 

result of the litigation, “the General Partner and its directors now know that a 

Conflicts Committee must be properly [composed] and established by proper 

procedures. . . . Resolutions and minutes must accurately record board and 

committee action.”31 The Conflicts Committee must be fully informed; “[i]t cannot 

merely be a rubber stamp for whatever the General Partner desires.”32

In opposition, the Defendants argue that “post-trial ‘guidance’ is not a 

compensable benefit.”33

In general, corporate fiduciaries are bound by common-law duties and the 

DGCL—and are charged with knowledge of those responsibilities—so a cognizable 

 

29 Defs.’ Opp’n Br., 10.

30 Pls.’ Opening Br., at 11.

31 Id. at 14.

32 Id.

33 Defs.’ Opp’n Br., at 9.
9

benefit is not worked merely by reminding them of such.34 In this case, however, 

the entity is a Limited Partnership. It was created by contract, and the parties had 

the opportunity to craft their relationship—with minimal limitations—as they 

wished, via the contract. That contract, the LPA, specifically eschews common-law 

fiduciary duties. Instead, it creates its own duties, including (pertinent here) for

insider transactions. The universe of duties here is self-defining. The proper 

construction of those duties was hotly debated in the litigation. I credit the 

Defendants with having reached an initial interpretation of their duties in sincerity. 

Accordingly, I must assume that such interpretation—erroneous, as it turned out—

would have continued to be held and applied by the Defendants going forward, 

absent this litigation. Unlike with the duties imposed by law, here the clarification 

that contractual duties apply in a way that is favorable to the entity and the 

Unitholders, and unfavorable to the Defendants, has value that justifies an award of 

fees.35

 

34 See Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 1994 WL 48993, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 1994) (denying attorneys’

fees where the plaintiff asserted a corporate benefit, in part, because the litigation caused the 

independent committee “to become aware of their duty to properly discharge their fiduciary 

obligations”).

35 The situation here is akin to cases involving clarification of testamentary schemes and trusts, 

where a party, although not achieving the relief sought, has benefitted the trust or estate by 

clarifying its terms. See Ableman v. Katz, 481 A.2d 1114, 1122 (Del. 1998), overruled on other 

grounds, In re Last Will and Testament of Melson, 711 A.2d 783 (Del. 1998) (attorneys’ fees and 

costs may be awarded to the losing party where two requirements are satisfied, probable cause and 

exceptional circumstances); In the Matter of Langmeier, 1984 WL 137725, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 

20, 1984) (in awarding attorney’s fees to an unsuccessful party, this Court noted that “whether 

exceptional circumstances exist must be made on a case-by-case basis”); see also Restatement 

(Third) of Trusts § 88 cmt. d.
10

Specifically, the LPA limits insider transactions to those transactions whose 

terms are “fair and reasonable.”

36 Through the litigation, the Defendants stoutly 

maintained that this language imposes a burden on a challenging Unitholder to

demonstrate the lack of fairness of the conflicted transaction.

37

 For reasons 

adequately explained in my Memorandum Opinion, the LPA in fact imposes that 

burden on the insiders.38 Presumably, this clarification will limit marginally-unfair 

conflicted transactions going forward. 

Next, the LPA provides a safe harbor for conflicted transactions where the

Board creates an independent conflicts committee and defers to that committee’s 

decision regarding the transaction.39 The Defendants maintained that the Directors’

creation of a conflicts committee, composed of a majority of conflicted members, 

nonetheless provided a safe harbor for the conflicted transaction if the one 

unconflicted member approved. This was an incorrect understanding of the LPA. 

The Plaintiffs advocated, and I found, that safe harbor under the LPA in this context 

required approval by a contractually-proper conflicts committee appointed by the 

Board, acting in good faith in consideration of the transaction. Again, this 

clarification of the Partnership’s governing document is a benefit to the entity going 

 

36 In re Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. Unitholder Litig., 2018 WL 2254706, at *2.

37 See id. at *18.

38 See id. at *18–19.

39 Id. at *19–22.
11

forward. The Defendants held an erroneous view of their duties, and acted consistent 

with their view but against the interest of the Unitholders. Presumably, absent the 

litigation, they would have continued to do so. To my mind, this is a benefit that

justifies shifting fees.

B. Monetary Benefit

Second, the Plaintiffs posit that they are entitled to fees because this litigation 

provided a monetary benefit to the Unitholders. Per the Plaintiffs, the two

distribution increases for each of the 716 million nonparticipating common 

Unitholders of ETE was the result of this litigation.40 The Plaintiffs argue that the 

Defendants made these distribution increases to negate the Plaintiffs’ damages, as 

evidenced by the fact that the Defendants relied on the distribution increases in their 

case at trial.41 In short, “[t]he causal connection between the distributions and the 

litigation is the outcome of the litigation itself.”42 The Plaintiffs point to the fact that 

the company maintained, even increased, distributions to the Unitholders throughout

the course of the litigation. They argue that distribution cuts were projected by the 

Defendants, and that anticipation of such prompted the improper downside hedge 

that was the focus of litigation in this case. They posit that the litigation made it 

apparent to the Defendants that they would be liable for shifting wealth to 

 

40 Aug. 28, 2018 Oral Argument Tr., at 14:14–17.

41 Pls.’ Opening Br., at 18–19.

42 Aug. 28, 2018 Oral Argument Tr., at 5:18–20.
12

themselves, which would occur absent distributions, and that this in turn caused the 

Defendants to maintain, and later increase, distributions. Based on this 

understanding, the Plaintiffs contend that the litigation resulted in a benefit to the 

Unitholders, in the amount of $35.8 million, representing the increased distribution 

pending the litigation.43

The Defendants disagree. Instead, they submit that the lawsuit had no causal 

relationship to the distribution increases whatsoever—that ETE would have 

increased the distributions regardless of this litigation, particularly because those 

distributions are fundamental to the Partnership’s business model.

44

 Moreover, the 

Defendants reiterate that the burden falls on the Plaintiffs to demonstrate causation 

between the litigation and the corporate benefit, and they allege that the Plaintiffs 

have not done so here.45 To the contrary, the Defendants point to evidence that 

supports the notion that ETE planned to increase distributions notwithstanding the 

lawsuit, including testimony from an ETE director and board materials,46 as well as 

market analysts’ predictions.47

There is some evidence of record indicating that the Defendants recognized a 

link between the litigation and the desirability of distributions. I find, however, that 

 

43 Pls.’ Opening Br., at 19.

44 Defs.’ Opp’n Br., at 14–17. 

45 Id.; Aug. 28, 2018 Oral Argument Tr., at 35:24–36:2.

46 Defs.’ Opp’n Br., at 15–17.

47 Id. at Ex. A.
13

the distributions made were consistent with ETE’s business model and practice, and 

reflected market conditions and the failure of the Williams merger; I cannot tie them 

to the litigation with sufficient certainty to shift fees. Instead, I believe that the 

creation of the incentive to increase distributions can be taken into account in 

deciding where, in the range of a fair award, a proper fee for the therapeutic benefits 

should reside.

C. Sugarland Factors and the Fee Award

The result in this matter was achieved through the Plaintiffs’ extensive 

litigation effort. In defining the duties that the LPA imposed on the Defendants, in 

a way helpful to the entity and its Unitholders, the litigation worked a substantial 

benefit. The litigation here involved complex and difficult issues of contract and 

limited partnership law. It was fought through dispositive motion practice, trial, and 

post-trial briefing by firms and lawyers—on both sides—that are among the best in 

our bar, both native and pro hac vice. Plaintiffs’ counsel expended 13,927.35 hours

of attorney time, and incurred expenses of $867,233.59 on a purely fee-contingent

basis. The Plaintiffs disclose that the time expended implies a lodestar of 

$7,672,532; this, in turn, implies a blended hourly rate of around $577 per hour, 

which is reasonable. 

The Plaintiffs’ Complaint was wide-ranging. As the Defendants point out, 

much of the Plaintiffs’ effort was in pursuit of theories that failed, and which resulted 
14

in no benefit to the entity. Given this difficult, wide-ranging, and hard-fought 

litigation, I assume that no more than half of the Plaintiffs’ time was required to 

achieve the benefit. Assuming the beneficial litigation required 7,000 hours, a 

(rounded) quantum meruit award would be $4,039,000. Applying the same metric 

to costs would imply an all-in fee of $4,472,617.

This is a substantial fee. This Court has been reluctant to use quantum meruit 

as the deciding metric in corporate benefit awards due to the pernicious incentive 

that could create.

48

 The fee implied is on the high end of what is justified by the 

benefit achieved. Nonetheless, I employ it here, giving due weight to the Sugarland

factors, and noting:

1) The difficult nature of the issues and the complexity of the litigation, made 

more difficult by the Defendants’ litigation-driven or litigationanticipating actions, with respect to the Board and the creation of the 

special committee, which increased the required litigation efforts; 

2) The fee-contingent nature of the litigation, in light of the Plaintiffs’

successful demonstration that the Defendants breached contractual duties 

to the Partnership, which would have resulted in extensive damage to the 

Partnership, but for certain fortuities;

 

48 See, e.g., Franklin Balance Sheet Inv. Fund v. Crowley, 2007 WL 2495018, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. 

Aug. 30, 2007).
15

3) The substantial therapeutic benefit to the Partnership going forward, as 

described above;

4) The potential that a monetary benefit in distributions flowed to the 

Unitholders due to the incentive effects of the Plaintiffs’ clarification of 

the Defendants’ duties.

In light of these factors, I find that an all-in award of $4,472,617 is justified.

III. Conclusion

The parties assert that a proper fee award here will be a beneficial incentive 

to wholesome levels of entity litigation. In a general sense, that must be the case. 

Nevertheless, the unique qualities of this peculiar litigation, and its fortuitous 

outcome, make it unlikely to have specific incentive value; this matter is sui generis. 

In any event, I find that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a fee award of $4,472,617.

To the extent the foregoing requires an order to take effect, it is SO 

ORDERED.

Sincerely,

/s/ Sam Glasscock III

Sam Glasscock III