### FILED OCTOBER 19, 2017 In the Office ofthe Clerk ofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division Ill
INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE DARLAK. DEHLIN, a singleperson, ) 

### ) Appellant, ) 

### ) v. ) 

### ) FORGETMENOTANIMAL SHELTER, ) KIM GILLEN, JOHN DOE(S), ) 

### ) Respondents. ) No. 34407-0-111

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J.
- DarlaDehlin appeals thetrial court's summary judgmentdismissal ofher conversion, trespass toproperty, and civil conspiracy claims against ForgetMeNotAnimal Shelter (ForgetMeNot), as well as thetrial court's imposition ofCR 11 sanctions against her attorney. The claims arose afterForgetMe Not's director e-mailedthe sheriffs office to report suspected animal neglect onMs. Dehlin'sproperty. The sheriffs office obtained a warrantto seizethe dogs and then asked ForgetMeNottoprovidevolunteers andvehicles to assistin impounding them. BecauseForgetMeNotwas notthe entity that seizedthe dogs, butrather transported and storedthem onbehalfofthe sheriffs office, we conclude the trial court

### No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter 

### properly dismissed Ms. Dehlin's conversion andtrespass to property claims. Moreover, because no evidence indicates Forget Me Not intended or agreed to accomplish anything unlawful, we conclude the trial courtproperly dismissed her civil conspiracy claim. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing CR 11 sanctions. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS Forget Me Not is a nonprofit animal shelter located in Republic, Washington. Its volunteer executive director is Kim Gillen. It is not a humane society, and its volunteers cannotperform welfare checks. Thus, when it receives complaints ofanimal abuse or neglect, it forwards them to the Ferry County Sheriffs Office for investigation. In June 2011, a woman named LauraBernier e-mailed Ms. Gillen, inquiring about what county agency investigates animal abuse and neglect. Ms. Gillen informedMs. Bernier that Ferry County did not have an animal control agency, and that the sheriffs office investigates reports ofanimal abuse and neglect. Ms. Gillen gave Ms. Bernierthe sheriffs office's phone number, butMs. Bernier apparently did not follow up. Later in 2011, Ms. Bernier again e-mailed Ms. Gillen. This time, she expressed
concern for the welfare ofa number ofMs. Dehlin's dogs. Ms. Bernier statedthat her friend had bought severalpuppies from Ms. Dehlin and that whenher friend received
2No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter them, one was emaciated, had an infection, and had worms. Ms. Bernierbelieved Ms. Dehlin did not live full-time at the house and only checked onthe dogs once ortwiceper week. Ms. Gillen e-mailedthe Ferry County Sheriff, Pete Warner, and outlinedthe information she received from Ms. Bernier. She advised SheriffWarnerthat she did not know where Ms. Dehlin lived, butthat she had instructed Ms. Bernier and her friend to contact him. SheriffWarner was never contacted about the situation. On September 17, 2012, Ms. Gillen received another e-mail from Ms. Bernier, again expressing concern for the welfare ofMs. Dehlin's dogs. This e-mail contained Ms. Dehlin'sphysical address. Ms. Gillen forwarded Ms. Bernier's e-mail to SheriffWarner and requested a welfare check. She asked SheriffWarnerto let her know ifany dogs were in immediate need so she could arrange to bring them into the shelter. She stated she would coordinate with an organization called Poodle Club ofAmericaRescue (PCAR) ifneeded. Sheriff Warner assigned the welfare check to Deputy PatrickRainer. On September 18, Deputy Rainer drove to Ms. Dehlin's address. Ms. Dehlin had a gate at her driveway, which was marked with no trespassing signs. However, the gate
was unlocked. Deputy Rainer drove up the driveway andparked in front ofseveral dog
3No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
kennels. These kennels were not visible from the roadway. The property appeared to be abandoned. Deputy Rainer saw at least 15 dogs in four separate kennels, includingboth adult dogs and puppies. He believedthe living conditions in the kennels were unsanitary and believed the hair on several ofthe dogs was matted and coated in feces. In addition to the dogs in the kennels, Deputy Rainer also saw one dog running around unrestrained, another dog chainedup, and at least 10 youngpuppies in an upside-down animal transport
earner. After leaving Ms. Dehlin's property, Deputy Rainer applied for a warrantto search Ms. Dehlin's residence for evidence ofsecond degree animal cruelty and to seize all the dogs. He relied on his observations from Ms. Dehlin'sproperty as well as Ms. Gillen's emails to supporthis application. The trial court issued the warrant the same day. The warrant instructed the sheriffto search Ms. Dehlin's residence, seize the dogs, and keep them safely. Later in the day on September 18, SheriffWarner informed Ms. Gillenthat the sheriffs office had obtained a warrant to remove all ofthe dogs from Ms. Dehlin's property. SheriffWarner stated the sheriffs office did not have enoughpersonnel or vehicles available to transport 27 dogs. He asked Forget Me Notto provide volunteers
4

### No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter


### and vehicles to assist the sheriff's office in removing the dogs. ForgetMe Notthen arranged for available volunteers to accompany Deputy Rainer and Deputy TalonVentura to Ms. Dehlin's residence. Atroughly 5:00 p.m., Ms. Gillen and several volunteers met at the sheriff's office. They then followed the two deputies outto Ms. Dehlin's address. The Forget Me Not volunteers waited at the end ofMs. Dehlin's driveway while the deputies clearedthe scene. Once they were given permission to proceed up the driveway, the volunteers followed the deputies through the scene. The deputies identified the dogs that the sheriff's office was removing from the property under the search warrant. Once the dogs were all loaded into vehicles, the sheriff's office had the dogs transported either to a foster home, Forget Me Not's shelter, a veterinary clinic, or an animal care facility. Overthe next few days, aveterinarian visited the dogs. The sheriff's office retained responsibility for the dogs' medical care and boarding fees while the dogs
were impounded, and the sheriff's office received invoices for their care. Throughoutthe next month, the dogs received vaccinations, exams, microchips, and dewormer. They
were also spayed and neutered. ForgetMe Notbegan accepting applications from individuals who were interested in adopting the dogs.



### 5

### No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter


### On October 20, 

### the Ferry County Prosecuting Attorney notified ForgetMe Not and PCARthat an agreement-inwhich Ms. Dehlin would relinquish ownership ofthe dogs in exchange for no criminal action being taken against her-was imminent. He advised Forget Me Not and PCARthat they could beginpreparingto transfer the dogs to more permanenthousing. On October 29, Ms. Dehlin wrote a letter to the Ferry County ProsecutingAttorney relinquishing her ownership ofthe poodles. She stated she relinquished ownership to PCAR, which had agreed to accept the poodles and incur the costs associated with taking possession ofthem. She further stated that in exchange for relinquishing the poodles, she understood that the State agreed not to charge her with any crime. However, she felt coerced into relinquishing the dogs based on threats and intimidation from members of the community, Facebookposts by Forget Me Not, "and a general hostile public atmosphere." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 61. She also felt pressured by the prosecuting attorney, Ms. Gillen, and the president ofPCAR. Around this time, PCARbegan assigning the dogs to individuals and rescue organizations. PCAR asked Forget Me Notto place several dogs with individuals who had previously submitted applications. These individuals signed adoption contracts on October 27, 

### October 30, 

### November 5, and November 8. PCAR assigned the rest ofthe
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### No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter 

### dogs to poodle rescues in Nevada and Arizona. PCAR scheduled a commercial transporter to pickup the dogs. Forget Me Not incurred $17,981.86 in costs from boarding the dogs and providing them medical care. It 

### recovered $13,941.60 from community donations, reimbursements from the sheriff's office, and adoption fees. On October 31, Ms. Dehlin e-mailed the president ofPCAR. She stated she was upset with how PCARwas placing her former poodles. In a follow-up e-mail later that evening, she stated she was "rescinding the relinquishment to PCAR." CP at 67. She asked PCAR'spresident to keep her e-mail confidential. There is no evidence Ms. Dehlin
ever communicated her intent to rescind the relinquishment to Forget Me Not, the prosecuting attorney, or the sheriff's office. PROCEDURE In September 2015, Ms. Dehlin filed a complaint naming Forget Me Not, Ms. Gillen, and Forget Me Nat's volunteers as defendants. She brought claims for civil conspiracy, intentional infliction ofemotional distress, negligent infliction ofemotional distress, trespass to property, conversion, and assault. In its answer, Forget Me Not asserted affirmative defenses and stated it was entitled to an award ofsanctions under CR 11.

7No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
Ms. Dehlin filed a separate lawsuit against Ferry County, the Ferry County Sheriffs Office, SheriffWarner, Deputy Rainer, and Deputy Ventura. She brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, in which she alleged the search ofherproperty and seizure ofher dogs violatedher constitutional rights. That suit was removed to federal court. ForgetMe Notmoved for summaryjudgment on all ofMs. Dehlin's claims. Ms. Dehlin stipulated to the dismissal ofher assault claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor ofForget Me Not. Ms. Dehlin filed a notice ofappeal from this order. Afterthe trial court granted summaryjudgment, ForgetMeNotmoved for attorney fees and costs on the grounds that Ms. Dehlin's counsel violated CR 11. The trial court granted Forget Me Nat's motion. The court found that Ms. Dehlin's counsel violated CR 11 by asserting the claims for assault, intentional inflection ofemotional distress, and negligent infliction ofemotional distress. With respect to these three claims, the court found that counsel did nothave knowledge, information, orbeliefbased on a reasonable inquiry that they were grounded in fact, supported by existing law, orthat a good faith argument existed for extending the law. However, the court found that counsel did not violate CR 11 by asserting the claims for conversion, trespass to property, or civil conspiracy. The court awarded ForgetMe Not $2,500 for the unnecessary fees and costs it incurred in defending against the three baseless claims.
8No. 34407-0-III 

### Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
ANALYSIS This court reviews a summaryjudgment order de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. 

### Kim v. LakesideAdultFamilyHome, 185 Wn.2d 532,547,374 P.3d 121 (2016). Summaryjudgment is appropriate only if"thepleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw." CR 56(c). A material fact is one the outcome ofthe litigation depends on. 

### In re Estate of Black, 153 Wn.2d 152, 160, 102 P.3d 796 (2004). This court views all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

### Kim, 185 Wn.2d at 547. Summaryjudgmentis appropriate only ifa reasonable person could reach one conclusion from all the evidence. Id. A defendant moving for summaryjudgmenthas the initial burden ofshowing that there is no issue ofmaterial fact. 

### Barker v. AdvancedSilicon Materials, LLC, 131 Wn. App. 616, 624, 128 P.3d 633 (2006). Once the defendant does this, the burden shifts to the plaintiffto produce admissible evidence that alleges specific facts establishing a cause ofaction. 

### Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 25, 851 P.2d 689 (1993).

9No. 34407-0-III Dehlin 

### v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
When reviewing a civil case in which the standard ofproofis clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, this court "'must view the evidence presentedthrough the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden."' Woody v. Stapp, 146 Wn. App. 16, 22, 189 P.3d 807 (2008) (quotingAnderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). The burden ofprooffor civil conspiracy claims is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. Thus, this court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Dehlin, a rational trier offact could find that she supported her conspiracy claim with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. CONVERSION AND TRESPASS TO PROPERTY CLAIMS Ms. Dehlin argues that Forget Me Not converted and trespassed onherpoodles by spaying, neutering, and holding them out for adoption before she had formally relinquished them. She argues she was coerced into relinquishing the poodles, and that she rescinded herrelinquishment three days later. She further argues that chapter 16.52 RCW's requirements governingthe seizure ofanimals were not followed. Conversion is the exercise ofdominion or ownership over another's personal property. Potter v. Wash. State Patrol, 165 Wn.2d 67, 78, 196 P.3d 691 (2008). It occurs when one willfully interferes with another's property withoutjustification and deprives the otherperson ofpossession. Id. This can occurwhen one wrongfully takes, alters,
10No. 34407-0-III Dehlin 

### v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter misdelivers, or disposes ofthe otherperson's property. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 223 (1965). "Alltypes oftangible personal property canbe converted." 16 DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASH. PRACTICE: TORT LAW AND PRACTICE§ 14:16, at 587 (4th ed. 2013) (hereinafterDEWOLF). Generally, an agent is personally liable when he or she assists a principal in converting or trespassing on another's property, even ifthe agent acts atthe direction of the principal and performs the acts solely for the principal's benefit. Dodson v. Econ. Equip. Co., 188 Wash. 340, 343, 62 P.2d 708 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 349 (1958); 2A C.J.S.Agency§ 374, at 636 (2003). When this occurs, the agent is liable to the extent he or sheaided or abetted inthe consummation ofthe wrong. Martin v. Sikes, 38 Wn.2d 274,278,229 P.2d 546 (1951). However, [a] bailee, agent, or servantwho receives the possession ofa chattel for storage, safekeeping, ortransportation on behalfofhis bailor, principal, or master, is subject to liability for conversion if, but only if, he does so with knowledge orreason to know that a third person has the right to immediate possession ofthe chattel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 230. The distinction between the rule and the exception is notwell defined. However,
an instructive case is Foreign Car Center, Inc. v. EssexProcess Service, Inc., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 821 N.E.2d 483 (2005). There, a bankrecovered ajudgmentagainst
11No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter Foreign Car Center, a car dealership and repair center. Id. at 807. The bankthen obtained a writ ofattachment. Id. at 808. A deputy sheriff, acting pursuantto the writ, engaged a towing company and went to Foreign Car Center'splace ofbusiness. Id. Upon arriving, he could not locate the owner and thus did not immediately serve the writ ofattachment. Id. He began seizing vehicles and instructingthe towing company to tow them away. Id. The owner eventually arrived and the deputy sheriffshowed him the writ. Id. The owner complainedthe towing company towed the cars in a rough and damaging
manner. Id. The deputy sherifflost the original writ and thus never returned it to court, as was required. Id. at 809, 811 n.9. Due to issues with the vehicles' titles, the sheriffs sale also did not occurwithin 30 days ofthe seizure, as was required by statute. Id. at 810, 811 n.9. Foreign Car Center sued the bank, the deputy sheriff, the process company that employed the sheriff, and the towing company for, among otherthings, conversion. Id. at 806, 810. At trial, the court instructed thejurythat it could find the deputy sheriffand process company liable for conversion, butnotthe bank orthe towing company. Id. at 813.

12No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
The Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed. Id. at 815. Itheldthatthe procedural violations ofthe collections laws "were strictlythe responsibility ofthe sheriff' and did not support a cause ofaction for conversion against the bank. Id. at 813-14. The court further held that an instruction for conversion against the towing company would have been improper. Id. at 814. Relying onRestatement (Second) of Torts§ 230, the court reasoned that Foreign Car Centerpresented no evidence, nor did it argue on appeal, that the towing company knew or should have known that the deputy sheriffand process company were converting Foreign Car Center'sproperty. Id. Here, even ifwe assume without deciding that: (1) Ms. Dehlin did not consentto the torts when she relinquished her dogs, and (2) the seizure ofher dogs was illegal and withoutjustification, her conversion claim still fails because ForgetMe Notwas notthe entity responsible. Although an agent is generally liable whenhe or she converts property at a principal's direction and for the principal's benefit, inthis case there is no genuine dispute that the exception outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts 

### § 230 applies. First, Forget Me Notpossessed the dogs on behalfofthe sheriffs office for transportation and then for storage. Like in Foreign Car Center, where the deputy sheriff seized the cars and engaged the towing company to tow them away, DeputyRainer and Deputy Ventura identified the dogs the sheriffs office intendedto seize underthe warrant
13

### No. 34407-0-111 Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter


### and asked Forget Me Not to assist in removing them. Afterthe sheriffs office housed the dogs in various locations, which included Forget Me Not's shelter, it retained responsibility for them. Second, Forget Me Not did not know, or have reason to know, thatMs. Dehlin had the rightto immediately possess the dogs. After making the report to SheriffWarner, the next information Forget Me Notreceived was that the sheriffs office had obtained a warrant to remove all ofthe dogs from Ms. Dehlin'sproperty. ForgetMe Notwas not involved in the welfare check or the warrant application. Ms. Dehlin argues that chapter 16.52 RCW's requirements for the seizure ofanimals were not followed, but as discussed in Foreign Car Center, 

### this was not Forget Me Not's responsibility. Like in Foreign Car Center, 

### where the deputy sheriffseized the cars pursuantto a court order and the towing company had no way ofknowing the cars were being converted, here the sheriffs office seized the dogs pursuantto a search warrant and Ms. Dehlin presents no evidence, nor does she argue, that Forget Me Not knew or shouldhave known that she had a right to immediately possess the dogs. In light ofForget Me Not's evidence, the burden shifts to Ms. Dehlinto produce evidence establishing a cause of action. She has not met this burden. We conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Dehlin's conversion claim on summaryjudgment.
14No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter Trespass to property, on the other hand, is something less than a conversion. DEWOLF, supra,§ 14:15, at 585. 

### It occurs when aperson intentionally interferes with the possession orphysical condition ofanother's personal property withoutjustification. Id. Here, Forget Me Not took and cared for the dogs pursuantto the sheriffsrequest, supported by a warrant. ForgetMe Not had no reason to believe that the warrant was wrongfully issued. Later, Forget Me Not began placing the dogs at the request ofPCAR at a time when Forget Me Not reasonably believed that Ms. Dehlin had given up her rights to the dogs. Because these facts are not contested and establishjustification for ForgetMe Not's actions, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Dehlin'strespass to property claim. CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM Ms. Dehlin argues Forget Me Not conspired to illegally seize her dogs. She argues the e-mails between Ms. Gillen, Ms. Bernier, and SheriffWarner are evidence ofthe conspiracy. She further argues the search warrant was invalid because it was not supported by probable cause, and it contained secondhand and unreliable information. To establish a claim for civil conspiracy, plaintiffs '"mustprove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that (1) two ormore people combined to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or combinedto accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means; and
15No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter (2) the conspirators entered into an agreement to accomplish the conspiracy.'" Woody, 146 Wn. App. at 22 (quotingAllStar Gas, Inc. 

### v. Bechard, 100 Wn. App. 732, 740, 998 P.2d 367 (2000)). To establish civil conspiracy, a plaintiffmust showthatthe factual circumstances are "inconsistent with a lawful or honest purpose and reasonably consistent only with the existence ofthe conspiracy." John Davis & Co. v. Cedar Glen No. Four, Inc., 75 Wn.2d 214,224,450 P.2d 166 (1969). To conspire, a person mustbe aware ofthe illegality. SeeAllStar Gas, 100 Wn. App. at 741. For example, inAllStar Gas, one ofAll Star Gas's managers had a clause in his employment contractprohibiting him from competing with the business for three years after ending his employment. Id. at 734. A few months before resigning, he started
a gas business with his brother, using information he obtained through his employment with All Star Gas. Id. at 734-35. All Star Gas sued boththe employee and his brother, alleging they both conspiredto violate the noncompetition agreement. Id. at 735. The trial court dismissed the conspiracy claims. Id. at 736. This court affirmed. Id. at 740. This court reasoned that the brother did not know about the noncompetition agreement and, therefore, could not have conspired to violate
an agreement that he did not know existed until after the alleged conspiracy had occurred. Id. at 741. This court further reasoned that nothing in the record suggested the brother
16No. 34407-0-111 Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
had an unlawful motive or used unlawful means when he agreedto form the new business. Id. "Aperson who communicates a complaint or information to any branch or agency offederal, state, or local government ... is immune from civil liability for claims based upon the communication to the agency or organization regarding any matterreasonably of
concern to that agency or organization." RCW4.24.510. The legislature enactedthis statute to encourage citizens to report potential wrongdoing to governmental entities. Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue, 120 Wn. App. 365,366, 85 P.3d 926 (2004). This statute provides immunity even ifa person makes a report in bad faith. 1 See DEWOLF, supra, § 12:22, at 503; Bailey v. State, 147 Wn. App. 251, 260-63, 191 P.3d 1285 (2008). Ms. Dehlin argues the e-mails between Ms. Gillen, Ms. Bernier, and Sheriff Warner demonstrate the existence ofa conspiracy.2 Butthe e-mails do not establishthat any ofthe parties intended or agreed to accomplish anything unlawful. Rather, Ms. Bernier forwarded her concerns about the dogs to Ms. Gillen, who appropriately

1FormerRCW 4.24.510 (1999) expressly contained a good faith requirement. In 2002, the legislature deleted the phrase "in good faith" preceding "communicates a complaint or information" in the first sentence ofthe statute. See LAWS OF 2002, ch. 232, § 2. 2Ms. Dehlin also argues the prosecuting attorney and PCAR's president conspired to convince her to relinquish her dogs, but it is unclearhowthis involves Forget MeNot. 17No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
forwarded themto law enforcement. To the extentMs. Dehlin argues thatForget Me Not conspired based on its report to the sheriffs office, RCW4.24.510 immunizes Forget Me Not from liability. This is true even ifMs. Gillen's report was motivated by some preexisting grudge against Ms. Dehlin or a desire to "take"the dogs from her. CP at 58. Ms. Dehlin also argues that the warrant was iHegally obtained and lackedprobable
cause. As discussed above, Forget Me Not did notparticipate in the welfare check orthe warrant application, and nothing in the record suggests it was aware ofany alleged deficiencies with the warrant or believed the seizure ofthe dogs would beunlawful when it agreed to assist the sheriffs office. Accordingly, Ms. Dehlin failed to establish a prima facie case ofcivil conspiracy by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim on summaryjudgment.3 TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF CR 11 SANCTIONS Ms. Dehlin challenges the trial court's imposition ofCR 11 sanctions.4 This court

3 Ms. Dehlin does not challenge the trial court's dismissal ofher claims for intentional and negligent infliction ofemotional distress. 4 Although Ms. Dehlin did not appeal from either ofthe CR 11 orders, "[a]n appeal from a decision on the merits ofa case brings up for review an award ofattorney fees 18No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
reviews an award ofCR 11 sanctions for an abuse ofdiscretion. Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 260, 277 P.3d 9 (2012). When an attorney signs a court filing, the attorney certifies that to the best ofthe
... attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable underthe circumstances: (1) [the pleading, motion, or memorandum] is well grounded in fact; [and] (2) it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting law orthe establishment ofnew law
.... CR 1l(a). Ifan attorney signs a pleading in violation ofthis rule, the court may impose
an appropriate sanction, which may include an orderto pay the otherpartythe reasonable expenses incurred because ofthe filing. CR l l(a). 1. Timely notice Ms. Dehlin first argues that ForgetMe Not's request for CR 11 sanctions was untimely. She argues that the statement in its answerthat it was entitled to CR 11 sanctions was insufficient and that it should have moved for CR 11 sanctions at the outset ofthe case.

entered after the appellate court accepts review ofthe decision on the merits." RAP 2.4(g). 19No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter Attorneys andjudges who perceive a possible violation ofCR 11 mustbring it to the offendingparty's attention as soon as possible. Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 198, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). Without timely notice, CR 11 sanctions are unwarranted. Id. The purpose ofthis requirement is to give the offendingparty an opportunity to mitigate the sanction by amending or withdrawing the baseless filing. Id. Anotherreason is to deter the offending party from submitting additional baseless filings. Id. An answer to the initial complaintprovides sufficient notice that the defendant intends to seek CR 11 sanctions. Stiles, 168 Wn. App. at 264. In Stiles, the defendant's
answer sought dismissal ofthe complaint and attorney fees under CR 11. Id. at 255. After conducting discovery, the defendant moved for summaryjudgment. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. Id. at 256. Roughly one month later, the defendant moved for CR 11 sanctions, which the trial court imposed. Id. The Stiles court held that the defendant's notice in his answer was timely and that it gave sufficient notice ofhis intent to seek CR 11 sanctions. Id. at 264. The facts regarding notice ofCR 11 sanctions in this case are identical to those in Stiles. Ms. Dehlin, therefore, received timely notice ofForget Me Not's intentto seek CR 11 sanctions.

20No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
2. Appropriateness of sanctions when other claims are nonfrivolous Ms. Dehlin also argues that CR 11 sanctions were not appropriate because some of her claims were nonfrivolous. She cites Bryantv. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). First, Bryant does notrequire that all claims be frivolous before a court can impose CR 11 sanctions. Id. at 220. Second, Biggs v. Vail makes clearthat a trial court may impose CR 11 sanctions as to those portions ofthe complaint deemed frivolous. 124 Wn.2d at 200-01. 5 3. Factual andlegal bases andreasonable inquiry Ms. Dehlin further argues that substantial evidence does not supportthe trial court's finding that her claims for assault, intentional infliction ofemotional distress, and negligent infliction ofemotional distress lacked a factual orlegal basis. She also argues the trial court did not inquire ormake a finding as to whetherher counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry before signing the complaint.

5 In this respect, CR 11 sanctions are more easily imposed than sanctions under RCW 4.84.185. For sanctions to be imposed underRCW 4.84.185, the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense mustbe deemed frivolous in its entirety and advanced without reasonable cause. 21No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
To impose sanctions for a baseless filing under CR 11, the trial court must find: (1) that the claim was without a factual or legal basis, and (2) thatthe attorney who signed the filing did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis ofthe claim. West v. Wash. Ass 'n of County Officials, 162 Wn. App. 120, 135, 252 P.3d 406 (2011). A trial court may consider a number offactors in determining whether counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry, including the time counsel had available and the complexity ofthe issues. See Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220-21. Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the three baseless claims lacked factual or legal support. Ms. Dehlin neverpresented any evidence an assault occurred. Moreover, her assault claim was barred by the statute oflimitations, as she filed her complaint three years after the incident. See RCW 4.16.100 (statute of limitations for assault and battery is two years). She neverpresented any evidence that Forget Me Not intendedto inflict emotional distress. See Womack v. Rardon, 133 Wn. App. 254, 261, 135 P.3d 542 (2006) (trial courtproperly dismissed outrage claim where immolation ofplaintiffs cat, though deplorable, was not intendedto bring about distress). Finally, a pet owner has no right to "recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
... for the negligent death or injury ofa pet." Sherman v. Kissinger, 146 Wn. App. 855, 873, 195 P.3d 539 (2008).
22No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter
The trial court also found that Ms. Dehlin's counsel failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into whetherthe baseless claims had factual or legal support. See CP at 251; Report ofProceedings (RP) at 90. Ms. Dehlin appears to argue that the trial court erred by failing to perform an on-the-record inquiry into counsel's actual prefiling investigation. Although such an inquiry would be helpful for appellate review, Ms. Dehlin cites no authority that holds this is required. A trial courtmay considermultiple factors in making its determination, which have varying degrees ofrelevance to the actual investigation counsel conducted. See Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220. Here, the trial court expressly considered the fact that Ms. Dehlin filed her complaint shortly before most ofthe statutes oflimitation expired, causing herto throw "everything
... against the wall hoping something would stick." RP at 90. Moreover, the fact that one ofthe claims was barred by 

### a statute oflimitations and two others were clearly barred as a matter oflaw indicates counsel did not reasonably investigate before filing the complaint. See RP at 89. Forthe reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing CR 11 sanctions.

23No. 34407-0-III Dehlin v. ForgetMe NotAnimalShelter

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL Forget Me Not requests attorney fees under RAP 18.9 on the basis that Ms. Dehlin filed a frivolous appeal. RAP 18.9 authorizes an appellate court to order a party who files
a frivolous appeal "topay terms or compensatory damages to any otherparty who has been harmed." For an appeal to be frivolous under RAP 18.9, it must not present any debatable issues on which reasonable minds may differ and must be totally devoid of merit. In re Recall of Boldt, 187 Wn.2d 542,556,386 P.3d 1104 (2017). This court resolves all doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous in favor ofthe appellant. Hanna
v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596,615,373 P.3d 300 (2016). Here, Ms. Dehlin raised issues that were at least debatable. We, therefore, decline to award attorney fees to Forget Me Not under RAP 18.9. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR: 

# Fe~4?.Fa=ts'.J
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