IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ANDRE DAISEY
,
Defendant Below, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE
,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § No. 279 , 2015 § § Court Below

— Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, § in and for Sussex County § § Cr. ID No. 1 0 01009746 § §

Submitted: July 31 , 2015 Decided: September 17
, 2015

Before STRINE , Chief Justice; VAUGHN , and SEITZ
, Justices.

O R D E R

This 17 th day of September 2015 , upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to

the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Andre Daisey , filed this appeal from the Superior

Court’s denial of his first m otion for postconviction relief under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Daisey ’s
opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) On April 20 , 2010
, Daisey pled guilty to Delivery of a Narcotic
Schedule II Controlled Substance, Delivery of a Narcotic Schedule II Controlled2 Substance (Opiates), and Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled

Substances. Daisey was sentenced as a habitual offender to a total of thirty

- two
years of Level V incarceration, with credit for time served
, suspended after twelve
years for decreasing levels of supervision. Daisey did not file a direct appeal.
(3) On April 27 , 2015
, Daisey filed his first motion for postconviction

relief under Rule 61. Daisey argued that his counsel wa s ineffective because he

failed to : (i) investigate the report from the Office of Chief Medical Examiner
(“OCME”) ; (ii) file a mot ion to suppress the OCME report; (iii) meet with Daisey

to di scuss an identification defense; and (iv) give him all of the evidence produced
by the State

. Daisey also attached part of a brief that argued his convictions should

be vacated be cause the State ’s failure to disclose misconduct at the OCME was a

violation of Brady v. Maryland

. 1

(4) In an order dated May 4, 2015 , the Superior Court summarily

dismissed Daisey ’s motion. The Superior Court found that Daisey’s motion was
untimely because it was filed more than four years after Daisey ’s conviction

became final 2 and, even if the motion was not untimely, denial of the motion was

1 373 U.S. 83 , 87 (1963) ( holding that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”). 2 Su per. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after conviction becomes final). Daisey ’s conviction became final in July 2010, but he did not file his motion for postconviction relief until April 2015

.3 appropriate because Daisey was bound by the admissions he made when he pled
guilty

. This appeal followed.
(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo

. 3 The procedural requirements of
Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed. 4 In his
opening brief
, Daisey doe s not address the ineffective assistance of counsel or
Brady v. Maryland claim s he raised in his motion for postconviction relief

. An
appellant must state the merits of an argument in his opening brief or that argument

will be waived. 5 H e has therefore waived those claims and we will not consider

them in this appeal

. (6) Daisey appears to make two arguments on appeal. First, he states that
he was not completely aware of the extent of the OCME misconduct until the

issuance of a June 2014 report . Second, he attaches a brief filed in another appeal
in which the Office of the Public Defender argu ed that the OCME misconduct
rendered guilty pleas involuntary under Brady v. United States

. 6 As to the first

argument , Daisey does not identify the misconduct he claim s to have learned of for

3 Dawson v. State , 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 4 Younger v. State , 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 5 Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3); Murphy v. State , 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993)

. 6 397 U.S. 742 , 750

- 57 (1970) ( holding “a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty pre mise” while recognizing that agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant).4 the first time in the June 2014 report or where that information appears in his first
motion for postconviction relief

. In fact, Daisey’s first motion for postconviction

relief does not mention, cite, or refer to the June 2014 rep ort.
(7) As to the second argument, Daisey did not argue in the Superior Court

that misconduct at the OCME rendered his guilty plea involuntary under Brady v.

United States . We will not consider this argument for the first time on appeal. 7
Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal, the Court concludes
that the Superi or Court did not err in dismissing Daisey ’s untimely motion for
postconviction relief.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED
and the judgment of the Su perior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice

7 Supr. Ct. R. 8. Even if the argument had been properly raised below and appropria te for consideration by this Court, the argument is foreclosed by our decision in Ira Brown v. State , 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015).