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Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: EDWARD A. COX JR. AND GEORGE F. FREY JR. 

CITATION: Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) P22,130; [1982-1984 TRANSFER BINDER] 

DOCKET NUMBER: 75-16; 192 

DATE: MAY 10, 1984 

DOCUMENT TYPE: ORDER 

NOTE: FORMERLY CEA DOCKET # 192 

[P 22,130] In the Matter of Cox, et al.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission. No. 75-16. May 10, 1984. Order in 

full text. 

Commission Review -- Motions -- Premature Orders -- Reply Briefs. -- The 

Commission permitted the filing of reply briefs by individuals ordered to cease 

and desist from manipulating prices in an initial decision, based on its careful 

consideration of the respondents' motions and the Division of Enforcement's 

opposition to those motions and on its review of the briefs themselves. The 

Division had claimed that the orders granting the respondents' motions for leave 

to file the briefs were premature. The Commission, however, found it 

unnecessary to reach the underlying question of the propriety of those orders. 

See P 11,701, "Liabilities -- Prohibitions" division, Volume 1. 

This matter comes before us on the Division of Enforcement's ("Division") 

motion for reconsideration of two orders dated November 8, 1983. The orders, 

which were entered pursuant to the Chief of the Opinions Section's ("Chief") 

delegated authority under 17 C.F.R. § 140.71 (1983), granted respondents' 

motions for leave to file reply briefs in connection with their appeal from the 

initial decision rendered in this proceeding. Pursuant to the November 8 orders 

respondents filed reply briefs on December 15, 1983. 

The Division's central argument is that the Chief erred in acting upon the 

motions before the expiration of the Division's time to file a response thereto. 

n1 Thus, the Division seeks reconsideration on the ground that the orders of 

November 8 were premature. In addition, the Division has filed an opposition to 

respondents' motions, which asserts, inter alia, that reply briefs will not 

assist in clarifying the facts or issues presented in this case. 

n1 Respondent Cox's motion was served by mail on November 4, 1983; 

respondent Frey's motion was served by mail on November 7, 1983. Under 

rule 10.26(b) parties are allowed ten days to respond to a motion; when, as 

here, service is effected by mail, rule 10.12(2) enlarges that period by 

three days. 

Reduced to essentials, the Division's motion seeks a determination as to 

whether respondents' motions were "procedural," and hence governed by rule 

10.26(c), 17 C.F.R. § 10.26(c) (1983), or "nonprocedural" motions governed by 

rule 10.26(b), 17 C.F.R. § 10.26(b) (1983). If the motions were procedural, the 

Chief acted within the scope of his delegated authority and was not obliged to 

defer action pending the Division's submission of an opposition to the motions. 

If, by contrast, the motions were nonprocedural, the Chief's action with respect 

to the motions was premature and in excess his delegated authority. n2 

n2 The authority delegated to the Chief under 17 C.F.R. § 140.71 extends 

only rule 10.26(c) motions. 
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We have carefully considered respondents' motions and the Division's 

opposition thereto. In addition, we have reviewed the reply briefs themselves, 

which were submitted during the pendency of the instant motion. On the basis of 

this review we have determined, in the exercise of our discretion, to permit the 

reply briefs to be filed. This being the case, it is unnecessary for us to 

reach the underlying question of the propriety of the Chief's November 8 orders. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

By the Commission (Chairman PHILLIPS and Commissioners HINEMAN, WEST, and 

SEALE). 

LOAD-DATE: August 6, 2008 
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