J-A10017-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TINA LOCKE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

REGINA LOCKE, DECEASED 

Appellant

v.

FOX CHASE CANCER CENTER, 

JEFFREY THORLEY, M.D., MALA 

KAILASAM, M.D., WILLOWCREST 

REHAB, ALBERT EINSTEIN MEDICAL 

CENTER, MANMEET SINGH, M.D., 

JEANES HOSPITAL

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 237 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): December Term, 2014 No. 03551

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2020

Tina Locke (Locke), Individually and Administratrix of the Estate of 

Regina Locke, Deceased, appeals from the judgment entered against her and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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in favor of the Fox Chase Defendants1in this medical malpractice action.2 As 

succinctly summarized by the trial court:

Tina Locke[] sued the medical providers involved in the care of 

her mother, Regina Locke. Regina Locke was a bladder cancer 

patient who died in 2013 of complications from a fungal and 

urinary tract infection that spread to her kidneys. [Tina Locke] 

alleged at trial that [the Fox Chase] Defendants were negligent in 

failing to timely and accurately diagnose and treat [Regina 

Locke’s] infections, in failing to order additional tests, and in 

failing to promptly follow up on a notable test result.

On appeal, Locke challenges the court’s denial of her motion for a new 

trial on the bases of an allegedly erroneous jury instruction and the court’s 

preclusion of the autopsy report. We affirm.

I.

We provide the following more detailed statement of facts and 

procedural history based on our independent review of the record and the trial 

court’s June 11, 2019 opinion.

After Regina Locke was diagnosed with bladder cancer in October 2012, 

she immediately began aggressive treatment. In October and December 

2012, she underwent two surgical procedures on her bladder and had a stent 

____________________________________________

1 The Fox Chase Defendants included Fox Chase Cancer Medical Group, Inc.; 

American Oncological Hospital, A/K/A Fox Chase Cancer Center; Jeffrey 

Thorley, M.D.; and Mala T. Kailasam, M.D.

2 On August 29, 2018, the court entered a non-suit against, inter alia, Albert 

Einstein Medical Center; Willowcrest Rehab; Manmeet Singh, M.D. and Jeanes 

Hospital.
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placed in her uterer. After those procedures, she had the following 

interactions with medical providers.

A.

Fox Chase January 3-9, 2013

On January 3, 2013, Ms. Locke met with her surgeon at Fox Chase to 

discuss removal of her bladder. The surgeon observed concerning symptoms, 

including an elevated heart rate and general weakness. He referred her for 

immediate inpatient admission due to his suspicion that she had an infection, 

for which she was at an especially high risk because of her cancer, recent 

surgeries, ureter stent and status as a diabetic. She was sent to the Direct 

Response Unit (DRU) at Fox Chase for examination. Dr. Jeffrey Thorley was 

her attending physician between January 3-6, 2013, while Dr. Mala Kailasam 

was her attending physician between January 6-9, 2013. The DRU staff 

agreed with the surgeon’s findings, and they noted a high white blood cell 

count (another infection indicator), plus a history of altered mental status over 

the previous few days. After giving Ms. Locke a Foley catheter, the drainage 

bag began to show blood and pus. Additionally, a mysterious five-centimeter 

“worm-like” object was discovered in the bag. (N.T. Trial, 8/28/18, at 71). 

Dr. Thorley ordered that the contents of her catheter bag be sent to the 

pathology lab for analysis.

In the resulting pathology report, Ms. Locke was diagnosed with a 

“complicated” urinary tract infection (UTI) due to her being a recent surgical 
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patient with cancer and locally impaired immune function causing her to be 

admitted.3 The complicated UTI had a greater chance of higher severity, of 

spreading to nearby organs like the kidneys, and a larger pool of potential 

infecting pathogens. Although this pathology lab was completed on January 

3, 2013, it was not reported until six days later, on January 9, 2013, and Dr. 

Thorley did not attempt to follow up about it before that date.

A urine culture also was performed on Ms. Locke, which identified a 

bacterial pathogen. She was treated for this bacterial infection4 with 

antibiotics and appeared to improve after six days. On the sixth day, January 

9, 2013, Dr. Kailasam discharged Ms. Locke at 3:00 P.M. after reviewing all 

then-available labs. At 3:42 P.M., after Ms. Locke had been discharged, the 

pathology report was sent up and it identified the “worm” as an “inflammatory 

clot with fungi and bacteria.” (N.T. Trial, 8/28/18, at 95). Dr. Kailasam’s 

discharge note was entered at 5:42 P.M., but she testified that she did not 

remember if she saw this pathology report between the time she discharged 

Ms. Locke at 3:00 P.M. and writing her note at 5:42 P.M.

____________________________________________

3 UTIs are designated as “complicated” or “uncomplicated” based on the 

relative health of the patient.

4

Infections may be either bacterial, fungal or polymicrobial (both). Bacterial 

and fungal infections respond to different treatments and, therefore, must be 

treated with antibiotic and antifungal medications.
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B.

Willowcrest Rehab and Einstein Medical Hospital

January 10-14, 2013

After being discharged from Fox Chase, Ms. Locke had intervening 

encounters with Willowcrest Rehab and Einstein Medical Center from January 

10-14, 2013. On January 10, 2013, Ms. Locke’s daughters brought her to 

Willowcrest Rehab at Einstein Medical Center where she was admitted for 

skilled nursing care. At first, Ms. Locke remained stable, but by January 13, 

2013, her condition had worsened and she had a fever of 103.1 degrees. A 

new urine culture revealed a significant positive result for fungus (greater than 

100,000 colonies of yeast),5 an elevated white blood cell count and decreased 

kidney function.

Although Ms. Locke was transferred to the emergency room at Albert 

Einstein Medical Center at that time, her labs were not forwarded, and the 

only mention of the urine culture in the notes was that there had been a 

positive finding of yeast, but that the Willowcrest doctor thought that the test 

was likely contaminated and unreliable. The notes did not mention the 

100,000 colonies of yeast. The ER staff treated Ms. Locke with an antibiotic 

only. Although an infectious disease consult was ordered, it had not been 

____________________________________________

5 Locke’s experts opined that this result confirmed that Ms. Locke had a yeast 

infection of the urinary tract.
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conducted by the time Ms. Locke’s daughters arranged for a transfer back to 

Fox Chase on January 14, 2013.

C.

Fox Chase January 14-19, 2013

Ms. Locke was readmitted to Fox Chase on January 14, 2013, and 

remained there until January 19, 2013. During this time, Dr. Thorley was 

again her attending physician. Nurses attempted to take a urine culture upon 

Ms. Locke’s readmission but were unable to do so due to her urinary 

incontinence. No further attempts at a culture were attempted and the nurses 

did not inform the doctors that one had not been taken. There was no new 

infectious disease consult ordered, although the transfer notes reflected that 

one had not taken place. Additionally, no one at Fox Chase spoke with 

Willowcrest staff about the details of the positive yeast culture. Ms. Locke was 

given one last dose of the antibiotics she had started at Willowcrest, but they 

were discontinued on January 15, 2013, with no replacement therapies.

On January 16, 2013, Ms. Locke experienced a fever of 102 degrees, 

tachycardia, increased creatine and other symptoms evidencing a UTI. No 

infectious disease consult was ordered, and on January 18, 2013, she 

experienced a myocardial infarction and went into cardiogenic and septic 

shock. She was transferred to Jeanes Hospital for emergency cardiovascular 

surgery.
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D.

Jeanes Hospital and Fox Chase January 19-29, 2013

Ms. Locke began her treatment at Jeanes Hospital on January 19, 2013. 

On January 20, 2013, Ms. Locke had an infectious disease consult. After 

another culture was positive for yeast, Ms. Locke was started on antifungals. 

When her condition stabilized, she was transferred back to Fox Chase, where 

she remained from January 24-29, 2013. Dr. Thorley testified that her 

condition had greatly improved after returning from Jeanes Hospital. His team 

placed an aortic balloon to help regulate her blood pressure and antifungal 

treatment continued. However, Ms. Locke’s sacral decubitus ulcers (bedsores) 

significantly worsened during her stay at Fox Chase, and on January 29, 2013, 

she was discharged back to Willowcrest Rehab to continue antifungal and 

sacral wound treatments.

E.

Willowcrest Rehab and Einstein Medical Center

January 29-February 11, 2013

Between January 29, 2013, until her death on February 11, 2013, Ms. 

Locke was treated at Willowcrest Rehab and Einstein Medical Center. At 

Willowcrest, Ms. Locke battled complications from the fungal infection, her 

sacral wounds, new bacterial infections and cardiovascular issues. On 

February 9, 2013, she was transferred to Einstein Medical Center, where she 

was found to have contracted gas gangrene and necrotizing fasciitis in her left 

leg, but she was a poor candidate for its amputation due to her fragile state. 
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Ms. Locke continued to decline and her daughters elected hospice care. She 

died at Einstein Medical Center on February 11, 2013.

On February 12, 2013, Vivian Arguello-Guerra, M.D., a pathologist 

employed by Albert Einstein Medical Center, performed an autopsy on Ms. 

Locke. In her report, she identified the provisional cause of death as “urinary 

tract infection with septic shock.” The final anatomical diagnosis after 

microscopic examination identified the number one cause of death as 

“URINARY TRACT INFECTION WITH ASCENDING ACUTE PYELONEPHRITIS, 

BILATERAL, SEVERE: POSITIVE CULTURES FOR YEAST AND NON-HEMOLYTIC 

STREPTOCOCCUS.” (Fox Chase Defendants’ Motion in Limine, 8/09/18, at 4; 

Expert Report of Mark C. Paznansky, M.D., Ph.D., 9/12/16, at 7).6 “According 

to the autopsy report, the cause of death was ‘most likely multiorgan failure 

due to sepsis arising from acute pyelonephritis[7]in a setting of high grade 

urothelial carcinoma.’” (Expert Report of Philip M. Arlen, M.D., 9/16/16, at 2) 

(quoting Paznansky Expert Report, at 7).

____________________________________________

6 Although the autopsy report is quoted in the Fox Chase Defendant’s Motion 

in Limine to preclude its admission and was argued extensively by the parties, 

the actual report is not part of the record. Locke agrees that the Fox Chase 

motion correctly quotes the relevant portion of the report. (See Locke’s Brief, 

at 18 n.4).

7 Kidney infection.
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II.

In December 2014, Locke initiated this medical negligence-wrongful 

death and survival action. Trial commenced on August 24, 2018. On August 

27, 2018, the trial court heard argument on, inter alia, the Fox Chase 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to preclude the admission and publication of the 

autopsy report. (See N.T. Trial, 8/27/18, at 26-27). After argument, the trial 

court found that the experts could testify that they relied on the autopsy report 

in forming their opinions, but that the report itself could not be admitted or 

published to the jury because it was hearsay, and Dr. Arguello-Guerra would 

not be testifying and subject to cross-examination. (See id. at 69).

At trial, Locke’s theory was that over the course of Regina Locke’s 

admissions, Fox Chase and its employees, Drs. Thorley and Kailasam, 

“repeatedly failed to properly diagnose and timely treat [her] urosepsis, a 

sepsis infection of the urinary tract.” (Locke’s Brief, at 19) (citing N.T. Trial, 

8/28/18, at 62, 83). More specifically, she alleged that the Fox Chase 

Defendants negligently caused Regina Locke’s death by their collective failure 

to administer anti-fungal medication, which “allowed the urosepsis to fester, 

worsen and eventually infect her kidneys, a condition known as acute bilateral 

pyelonephritis.” (Locke’s Brief, at 20; see id. at 19) (citing N.T. 8/28/18, at 

121). She argued that “[t]he sepsis spread throughout [Regina Locke’s] body, 

causing her to experience cardiogenic and septic shock, i.e., sepsis-induced 
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heart failure, and ultimately to die.” (Id. at 20) (citing N.T. Trial, 8/31/18, at 

128).

Conversely, the Fox Chase Defendants denied that they were negligent 

and maintained that because Regina Locke “had a highly complex medical 

history, with cancer superimposed upon other chronic illnesses, the outcome 

was ‘not unexpected.’” (Id.) (citing N.T. Trial, 8/31/18, at 108).

On September 4, 2018, the trial court held a charging conference with 

the parties’ counsel at which it agreed that Standard Civil Jury Instruction 

6.50, Vicarious Liability—Employer and Employee Sued—Relationship and 

Authority Not in Dispute8 was appropriate because Fox Chase had stipulated 

____________________________________________

8 Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 6.50 has undergone many 

adaptations. (See Locke’s Brief, at 25 n.6). The version that the parties 

submitted in their proposed points for charge and on which the trial court 

relied in its jury instructions reads as follows:

In this case it is admitted that the defendant [name of employee] 

was at the time of the occurrence acting as the [employee] 

[servant] of the other defendant, known as the [employer] 

[master], and was engaged in furthering the interests, activities, 

affairs, or business of [his] [her] [employer] [master]. A[n] 

[employer] [master] is liable for the negligence of his or her 

[employee] [servant] occurring while the latter was acting in the 

course and within the scope of his or her employment.

Therefore, if you find the defendant [name of employee] to be 

liable, then you must find the defendant [name of employer] also 

liable. If, however, you find the defendant [name of employee] 

not liable, then you must find the other defendant not liable also.

Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 6.50 (Fourth Edition, 2017 Supplement).
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that Drs. Thorley and Kailasam were its agents or employees. (See N.T. Trial, 

9/04/18, at 192). The trial court reserved its ruling as to whether to charge 

the jury on the corporate liability of Fox Chase pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instruction 14.70, Corporate Liability of a 

Health Care Provider. (See id. at 208). The next day, the court announced 

its ruling that it would charge the jury on corporate liability pursuant to 

14.70(c).9

During the court’s charge to the jury, it instructed, in relevant part:

____________________________________________

9 Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 14.70(c) provides:

A [health care institution] is directly liable to the patient if it 

violates a duty that it owes to the patient to ensure the patient’s 

safety and well-being while under the care of [the health care 

institution]. The following are the duties that a [health care 

institution] must fulfill and that it cannot pass on to anyone else.

* * *

c. a duty to oversee all persons who practice [nursing/other 

relevant person’s health care] within its walls as to patient care[.]

If you decide that the defendant[s] violated any one of those 

duties [specify which duty or duties are applicable], you must then 

decide

a. Whether the [health-care institution] knew or should 

have known of the breach of that duty, and

b. That the conduct was a factual cause in bringing about

the harm or injury.

Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 14.70(c).
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An employer is liable for the negligence of its employees 

occurring while the latter were acting in the course and scope of 

his or her employment. Therefore, if you find a defendant, Dr. 

Thorley and/or Dr. Kailasam, to be liable, then you must find the 

defendant, Fox Chase, also liable. If, however, you find the 

defendant, Dr. Thorley and/or Dr. Kailasam, not liable, then you 

must find the other defendant not liable also.

* * *

The Fox Chase Cancer Center is directly liable to the patient 

if it violates a duty that it owes to the patient to ensure the

patient’s safety and well being while under the care of the Fox 

Chase Cancer Center. This is one of the duties that the institution 

must fulfill and that it cannot pass on to anyone else, the duty to 

oversee all persons who practice within its walls as to patient care.

If you decide that this defendant violated any of that duty, 

you must decide whether this institution knew or should have 

known of the breach of that duty and that the conduct was a 

factual cause in bringing about the harm or injury.

(N.T. Trial, 9/05/18, at 80-81, 85-86).

Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:

[Locke’s Counsel]: Okay, Your Honor, I only had one request for 

clarification, and it was with regard to the jury instruction under 

6.50, which was the . . . employer vicarious liability charge. . . . 

[I]t’s inconsistent to say that . . . Fox Chase can only be found 

liable if [Dr.] Thorley is found negligent or Dr. Kailasam, because 

we also did have the corporate one in there. So, the way it reads 

or the way it read, 6.50 says the following at the end, it says . . . 

Therefore, if you find the Defendant Thorley to be liable then you 

must find the Defendant Fox Chase also liable. If, however, you 

find the Defendant Thorley not liable then must find the other 

defendant not liable also.

So that’s inconsistent with the corporate one, that’s Fox Chase—

they could have like a verdict if Thorley is not liable, Kailasam is 

not liable, but the breach—but independent breaches of Fox Chase 

would also show—can be sufficient. . . .

THE COURT: [Defense counsel].
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[Defense Counsel]: I disagree. I think that the jury heard both 

charges. . . . And I think it is clear, based on the corporate 

negligence charge, that Fox Chase could be found negligent if they 

find that they didn’t meet the standard of care on what was 

charged to the jury.

THE COURT: I will not give them any more instruction on that. 

I think Fox Chase can be found negligent even if they don’t find 

them negligent under 6.50.

[Locke’s Counsel]: Right. But under the first charge, as you 

read it, which would have been the first one they heard, look, if 

Thorley and Kailasam are not negligent you cannot find Fox Chase 

negligent. That’s directly contradictory, though, to the corporate 

one which says that, yes, Fox Chase can be independently. So if 

we can just have that clarified that, yes, that Fox Chase can alone 

be held responsible, that would correct any of that.

THE COURT: Your exception is noted.

[Locke’s Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Id. at 97-99).

In its verdict, the jury found that although Dr. Thorley and Fox Chase 

were negligent, this negligence was not the factual cause of Regina Locke’s 

harm and, therefore, they were not liable. The jury found that Dr. Kailasam

was not negligent.10

____________________________________________

10 Specifically, the verdict sheet read as follows:

VERDICT SHEET

Question 1: Do you find that any of the Defendants were 

negligent?

Defendant Fox Chase Cancer Center Yes X No __

Defendant Jeffrey D. Thorley, M.D. Yes X No __
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Locke timely filed a motion for post-trial relief seeking a new trial,

11

maintaining that the trial court improperly precluded the autopsy report and 

that it erred by including the language, “If . . . you find the defendant [name 

of employee] not liable, then you must find the other defendants not liable 

also[,]” in its vicarious liability charge, because this precluded a finding of 

liability against Fox Chase under the corporate liability theory. (See Post-Trial 

Motion, 9/16/18, at 2-13, 24-27). The court denied the motion on January 2, 

2019. Judgment was entered on March 8, 2019, and Locke timely appealed.12 

____________________________________________

Defendant Mala T. Kailasam, M.D. Yes __ No X

(If you answer Question 1 “No” as to all Defendants, the 

Plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer any 

further questions and should return to the Courtroom.)

Question 2: Was the negligence of those Defendants you have 

found to be negligent a factual cause of any harm to the Plaintiff?

Defendant Fox Chase Cancer Center Yes __ No X

Defendant Jeffrey D. Thorley, M.D. Yes __ No X

Defendant Mala T. Kailasam, M.D. Yes __ No X

(If you answer Question 2 “No” as to all Defendants you 

have found to be negligent, the Plaintiff cannot recover and 

you should not answer any further questions and should 

return to the Courtroom).

11 Although not relevant to this appeal, the motion also sought a Judgment 

Not Withstanding the Verdict (JNOV) on bases abandoned here.

12 Locke improperly appealed from the denial of the post-trial motions. See

Brown v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 760 A.2d 863 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (appeal does not properly lie from order denying post-trial 

motions, but rather upon judgment entered following disposition of post-trial 
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Both she and the trial court have complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

III.

Locke argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new 

trial13 because it improperly: (1) charged the jury by “incorrectly adapting 

the second half of Pa.SSJI (Civ.) 6.50 to this case so as to instruct [them] that 

if either Dr. Thorley or Dr. Kailasam were not liable, then Fox Chase would 

also be not liable[;]” and (2) “preclude[ed] [her] from publishing to the jury, 

in whole or in part, the autopsy report, which contained medical facts essential 

____________________________________________

motions). On February 8, 2019, we directed her to file a praecipe to enter 

judgment with the trial court prothonotary and provide this Court with proof 

of same. Locke did so and we treat her appeal as timely filed. See Pa.R.A.P. 

905(a)(5).

13 We review the trial court’s denial of a new trial for an abuse of discretion 

because “absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, appellate courts 

must not interfere with the trial court’s authority to grant or deny a new trial.” 

Czimmer v. Jansenn Pharm., Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). We undertake a two-part analysis.

We must review the court’s alleged mistake and determine 

whether the court erred and, if so, whether the error resulted in 

prejudice necessitating a new trial. If the alleged mistake 

concerned an error of law, we will scrutinize for legal error. Once 

we determine whether an error occurred, we must then determine 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the 

request for a new trial.

Id. (citation omitted).
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to rebut the defense theory that the patient’s death was not unexpected[.]” 

(Locke’s Brief, at 7).

A.

We first turn to Locke’s challenge to the trial court’s jury instruction as

misleading. “Error in a charge occurs when the charge as a whole is 

inadequate or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse rather than 

clarify a material issue. James v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 170 A.3d 

1156, 1163-64 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has 

held that a jury needs adequate instructions, not the best or clearest ones. 

Indeed, it has stated

A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a 

whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or 

confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is 

considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what 

the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to 

fundamental error. Consequently, the trial court has wide 

discretion in fashioning jury instructions.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

Even though the trial court read the jury instructions requested, Locke 

maintains that defense counsel believed that due to their inconsistency, the 

trial court would omit the last sentence of the suggested vicarious liability 

instruction (6.50) when it ruled that it would provide the corporate liability 

charge (14.70(c)). (See Locke’s Brief, at 28). She notes that the second 

sentence of 6.50, which provides that an employer cannot be vicariously liable 
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if an employee is not liable, purportedly is in conflict with 14.70(c) that allows 

a finding that an employer is directly liable for failing to oversee any staff 

within its walls, even if a named employee is not liable.14, 15 (See id. at 29).

The Fox Chase Defendants reply that not only did the trial court 

accurately state the law in the jury charge, it expressly instructed that the 

jury could find Fox Chase vicariously liable for any negligent actions of Drs. 

Thorley and/or Kailasam.

A review of the record confirms that the trial court accurately read the 

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions for vicarious liability and 

corporate negligence. (See N.T. Trial, 9/05/18, at 80-81, 85-86).

____________________________________________

14 Locke also argues by instructing that, if either Dr. Thorley and/or Dr. 

Kailasam is not liable, then Fox Chase cannot be liable, the trial court 

improperly precluded a finding that Fox Chase was vicariously liable for the 

negligence of its unnamed employees. (See Locke’s Brief, at 30). In support 

of this argument, she relies on Estate of Denmark v. Williams, 117 A.3d 

300, 306 (Pa. Super. 2015), for the proposition that an employer can be held 

vicariously liable for employees who are unnamed in a complaint, but 

identified as a unit, e.g., as “staff,” if they acted negligently during the course 

and scope of their employment. (See id.). However, this argument is 

irrelevant here where Locke did not include unnamed employees or staff in 

the complaint, but only sought to hold Fox Chase vicariously liable for the 

actions of named doctors, Drs. Thorley and/or Kailasam.

15 As noted by the Fox Chase Defendants, Locke also argues for the first time 

that the trial court compounded its error by using the phrase “and/or” in 

charging the jury on vicarious liability (6.50). (See Fox Chase Defendants’ 

Brief, at 4 n.1; Locke’s Brief, at 33-34). They maintain that the argument is 

waived for Locke’s failure to raise it in the trial court. However, our 

substantive review confirms that it also lacks merit where she has failed to 

prove that this language constituted fundamental error that palpably misled 

the jury. See Stewart, supra at 540.
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In pertinent part, it charged the jury regarding vicarious liability as 

follows:

Regarding agency, counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the 

defendant agree that Dr. Thorley and Dr. Kailasam were, during 

the time in question, acting as agents for the Fox Chase Cancer 

Center. In this case, it is admitted that the defendants, Dr. 

Thorley and Dr. Kailasam, were at the time of the occurrence 

acting as employees of the other defendant known as the 

employer and were engaged in furthering the interests, activities, 

affairs or business of their employer. An employer is liable for the 

negligence of its employees occurring while the latter were acting 

in the course and within the scope of his or her employment. 

Therefore, if you find a defendant, Dr. Thorley and/or Dr. 

Kailasam, to be liable, then you must find the defendant, 

Fox Chase, also liable. If, however, you find the defendant, 

Dr. Thorley and/or Dr. Kailasam, not liable, then you must 

find the other defendant not liable also.

(Id. at 80-81) (emphasis added).

Regarding the corporate liability of Fox Chase, it instructed the jury that:

The Fox Chase Cancer Center is directly liable to a patient 

if it violates a duty that it owes to the patient to ensure the 

patient’s safety and well-being while under the care of the 

Fox Chase Cancer Center. This is one of the duties that the 

institution must fulfill and that it cannot pass on to anyone else, 

the duty to oversee all persons who practice within its walls as to 

patient care. If you decide that this defendant violated any of that 

duty, you must decide whether this institution knew or should 

have known of the breach of that duty and that the conduct was 

a factual cause in bringing about harm or injury.

(Id. at 85-86) (emphasis added).

There is no evidence that the jury was palpably misled by the two 

charges that resulted in prejudice to Locke. The charges clearly stated the 

law and there was no prejudicial omission of something basic or fundamental. 

In its vicarious liability instruction (6.50), the trial court accurately set forth 
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the general principle that an employer is liable for the negligence of its 

employees occurring while the latter were acting in the course and within the 

scope of his or her employment. The last sentence of the charge applies that 

general principle of agency law to the facts of this case in that Fox Chase 

would only be liable under that theory if Dr. Thorley and/or Dr. Kailasam were 

liable.

It then gave a separate corporate liability charge (14.70(c)) that Fox 

Chase is directly liable if it violates a duty to the patient to ensure the patient’s 

safety and well-being while under its care. The trial court then went on to 

instruct that it is a duty that the institution must itself fulfill and that it cannot 

pass on to anyone else, and if it found that Fox Chase violated that duty to 

oversee all persons who practice within its walls as to patient care and it was 

a factual cause of a plaintiff’s harm, it could find Fox Chase independently 

negligent.

As can be seen, each instruction on vicarious liability and corporate 

liability stated the law with respect to each and they were sufficiently clear as 

to what was involved for the jury to find Fox Chase liable under either theory.16

____________________________________________

16 The record reflects that the jury submitted questions to the court about 

other, unrelated issues and, therefore, if it was confused about any perceived 

conflict, it was aware that it could seek clarification. (See N.T. 9/06/18, at 3-

5).
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In fact, the jury on the verdict sheet expressly found Fox Chase itself 

negligent.

What the jury was also clear about is that even though Fox Chase and 

Dr. Thorley were negligent, they accepted Fox Chase Defendant’s defense that 

they were not the cause of Regina Locke’s death. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the jury instructions, when read as a whole, sufficiently advised the jury 

of the applicable law.

B.

Next, we review Locke’s argument that the trial court erred in denying 

her motion for a new trial because it improperly granted the Fox Chase 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to preclude the admission and publication of the 

autopsy report. Locke argues that she was “irreparably prejudiced” because 

the report contained medical facts that were essential to rebut the defense 

theory that Regina Locke’s death was not unexpected due to her bladder 

cancer and history of chronic disease. (Locke’s Brief, at 40). She maintains 

that the report was admissible under three different theories: (1) as an 

exception to the hearsay rule17 because it is a statement authored by an agent 

of opposing party Albert Einstein Medical Center, (2) the business records 

____________________________________________

17 Hearsay, an out of court statement made by a declarant who is not 

testifying, admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, is precluded unless 

subject to an exception. See Pa.R.E. 801, 802. Here, it is uncontested that 

the autopsy report is hearsay.
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exception to the hearsay rule, and (3) because autopsy reports are the type 

of data reasonably relied on by experts in forming their opinions pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703.

The Fox Chase Defendants respond that Locke’s argument “is 

substantively meritless” because the report’s findings constituted hearsay 

statements and she has failed to establish an exception.18 (The Fox Chase 

Defendants’ Brief, at 14). They maintain that: (2) the report was not an 

admission by a party-opponent because neither the Fox Chase Defendants nor 

their agents authored the report, (2) that it was a medical opinion and thus 

not admissible under Rule 803(6) as a business record, and (3) Rule 703 

explains the bases on which an expert can form an opinion, but does not 

permit the admission of hearsay statements in evidence. (See id. at 19-24).

1.

Locke contends that the trial court erred in precluding the autopsy report 

because the opposing party’s statement exception to the hearsay rule applies. 

She maintains that because the author of the autopsy report, Dr. Arguello-

____________________________________________

18 The Fox Chase Defendants also maintain that this issue is waived because 

Locke’s counsel expressly conceded that, although the experts would rely on 

the autopsy report in forming their own opinions and testify to that fact, the 

report itself could not be published to the jury. (See Fox Chase Defendants’ 

Brief, at 12-13) (citing N.T. Trial, 8/27/18, at 27-28). However, in reviewing 

Locke’s response and after our independent review of the record, we conclude 

that her counsel also later argued for the autopsy report’s publication because 

“[i]t’s no different than when we put up a medical record.” (N.T. Trial, 

8/27/18, at [6]8-[6]9); see also Locke’s Brief, at 44-45). Therefore, we 

decline to find waiver.
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Guerra, is a pathologist employed by Albert Einstein Medical Center, the trial 

court erred in precluding the report’s admission. (See Locke’s Brief, at 42).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(25) provides an exception to the 

hearsay rule where “[t]he statement is offered against an opposing party and 

. . . was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity[.]” 

Pa.R.E. 803(25). Here, while the statement was made by an agent of 

opposing party Albert Einstein Medical Center, Locke intended to offer it as 

substantive evidence to be used against the Fox Chase Defendants’ defense 

that Ms. Locke’s death was not unexpected, not against Albert Einstein Medical 

Center. Therefore, the autopsy report does not fall under the exception found 

at Rule 803(25).

2.

Locke next argues that the autopsy report falls under the business 

record exception to the hearsay rule because it was kept in the regular course 

and scope of Albert Einstein Medical Center’s business. (See Locke’s Brief, at 

42).

It is well-settled that the business record exception “applies to records 

of an act, event or condition, but does not include opinions and diagnoses.” 

Pa.R.E. 803(6), Comment. This clear language has been interpreted to mean 

that records containing either opinion evidence or diagnoses are not 

admissible under the business records exception. See In re A.J.R.-H., 188 

A.3d 1157, 1169 (Pa. 2018). We have held that pursuant to the business 
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records exception, hospital records are admissible to show facts, including 

symptoms found, but that any medical opinions contained therein are not 

admissible where the doctor who offered the opinion is not available for crossexamination. See Walsh v. Kubiak, 661 A.2d 416, 421 (Pa. Super. 1995), 

appeal denied, 672 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1996).

In this case, the autopsy report listed Dr. Arguello-Guerra’s diagnoses 

of the provisional and final causes of death based on her examination and 

opined about the “most likely” source of sepsis and “most likely” cause of 

death. (Paznansky Expert Report, at 7). These are not facts, but diagnoses, 

and, as such, were inadmissible where Dr. Arguello-Guerra was not available 

to testify. See In re A.J.R.-H., supra at 1169; Kubiak, supra at 421. 

Hence, the trial court properly precluded their admission and publication to 

the jury.

Moreover, even if the report could have been severely redacted to allow 

for the admission of facts such as that Regina Locke suffered urinary tract and 

fungal infections and carcinoma of the bladder, any failure to preclude this 

data was not reversible error where this was merely cumulative of what 

experts already had testified. See Kubiak, supra at 422 (error in admitting 

evidence does not constitute reversible error where it is merely cumulative 

and buttresses properly admitted testimony). Accordingly, the admission of 

this limited information would not have changed the outcome of the trial and 

does not support the granting of a new trial.
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3.

Finally, Locke maintains that because the autopsy report is the type of 

record on which an expert witness would reasonably rely, it was admissible 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703. (See Locke’s Brief, at 42-

43).

Rule 703, Bases of an Expert’s Opinion Testimony, provides:

An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case 

that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. 

If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those 

kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they 

need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.

Pa.R.E. 703.

Based on this clear language, Rule 703 provides that an expert witness 

can rely on a record if it is of the type on which experts in his or her field 

reasonably rely, even if the record itself is not admissible. It does not provide 

an exception that allows for the admission of the otherwise inadmissible 

evidence. Here, it is undisputed that the autopsy report is hearsay.

At trial, the trial court expressly ruled that the experts could testify that 

they relied on the autopsy report in forming their opinions, but that no portion 

of the report could be published to the jurors. (See N.T. Trial, 8/27/18, at 

69; see also id. at 28 (Locke’s counsel agreeing that the experts could rely 

on the report but that it could not be published to the jury)). This ruling was 

entirely consistent with Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 where the report 

is inadmissible hearsay.
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Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court 

properly denied Locke’s motion for a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

Judges Bowes joins the memorandum.

Judge Shogan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/19/2020