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Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: VINCENT W. KOSUGA, SAM S. SIEGEL, AND NATIONAL PRODUCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 

CITATION: 19 Agric. Dec. 603 

DOCKET NUMBER: 73 

DATE: JUNE 3, 1960 

DOCUMENT TYPE: DECISION AND ORDER 

AGRICULTURE DECISIONS

BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

(No. 6572) 

In re VINCENT W. KOSUGA, SAM S. SIEGEL, AND NATIONAL PRODUCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 

CEA Docket No. 73. Decided June 3, 1960. 

Manipulative Intent -- Evidence

Evidence fails to establish respondent Kosuga attempted to manipulate upward 

prices of November 1955 onion futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and 

prices of cash onions. 

Manipulation -- Agreement -- Stabilization

Respondents are found to have attempted to manipulate onion future prices and 

cash onion prices in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act in November and 

December 1955 by virtue of an agreement with grower-shippers of onions to keep 

onions from being used for deliveries upon the exchange. This is so even if 

respondents only sought to peg or stabilize onion prices. 

Manipulation -- Hedging

Respondents are found to have attempted to manipulate and to have manipulated 

downward the prices of March 1956 onion futures and prices of cash onions in 

violation of the Commodity Exchange Act even if respondent Kosuga was on the 

short side of the March future as a hedger. 

Mr. Benj. M. Holstein, for Commodity Exchange Authority. Mr. Lee A. Freeman, of 

Chicago, Illinois, and Mr. Michael A. Gurde, of Middletown, New York, for 

respondent Vincent W. Kosuga. Mr. Max Chill, of Chicago, Illinois, for 

respondents Sam S. Siegel and National Produce Distributors, Inc. Mr. John 

Curry, Hearing Examiner. 

Decision by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is an administrative proceeding under the Commodity Exchange Act (7 

U.S.C. Chapter 1), instituted June 18, 1956, by a complaint and notice of 

hearing issued under section 6(b) of the act (7 U.S.C. 9) by an Assistant 

Secretary of Agriculture. 

Respondent Vincent W. Kosuga is an onion grower and trader, a member of the 

Chicago Mercantile Exchange and a registered floor broker. Respondent Sam S. 

Siegel is a member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and is the president and 
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general manager of the corporate respondent, which is engaged in the wholesale 

produce business. 

The complaint charges that during October and November 1955, (1) respondent 

Kosuga attempted to manipulate upward prices of the November 1955 onion future 

on the exchange and cash onions; (2) that in November and December 1955 

respondents attempted to manipulate upward prices of onion futures and cash 

onions; and (3) that in January and February 1956 respondents attempted to 

manipulate and did in fact manipulate downward prices of March onion futures and 

cash onions. The complaint alleges that such activities constituted violations 

of Sections 6(b) and 9 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 9, 13). 

In connection with the charge of attempted manipulation by respondent Kosuga 

in November 1955, the complaint asserts that this respondent established and 

held a large long position in the November 1955 onion future, and took delivery 

of large quantities of cash onions so that he held about one-half of the total 

cash supply in Chicago available for delivery on the future, and that these 

transactions were undertaken with the intent of causing increases in the prices 

of the November future and cash onions. 

With respect to the charge of attempted manipulation by the three 

respondents, the complaint alleges, in part, that in November and December 1955, 

when respondents held approximately 1,000 carlots of cash onions, including 98 

percent of the available deliverable supply in Chicago, they entered into an 

agreement with a number of growers and shippers of onions, under which the 

grower-shippers agreed to buy approximately 285 carlots of the Chicago onions 

owned by respondents, in consideration of which the respondents agreed to make 

no deliveries on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange during the remainder of the 

onion season of any part of the remaining onions which they held in Chicago or 

elsewhere, but would accumulate additional cash supplies and support the long 

side of the market. The complaint further alleges that pursuant to this 

agreement the respondents delivered cash onions to the grower-shippers, 

received payment therefor, and temporarily supported the long side of the 

market. 

The charges of attempted and actual manipulation of the March 1956 future by 

the respondents are based upon allegations that, pursuant to an agreement among 

themselves, they sold large quantities of March 1956 futures, established and 

held large short positions in the future, stood ready to deliver onions against 

these positions, and shipped onions out of Chicago for repacking and shipment 

back to Chicago and delivery on the exchange, all of which caused decreases in 

the price of the March future and of cash onions, whereupon the respondents 

covered their positions, in part, at such decreased prices. It is alleged that 

these transactions were undertaken for the purpose and with the intent of 

depressing cash and futures prices. 

On September 13, 1956, respondent Kosuga filed an answer admitting the 

jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and his holdings of November futures 

as alleged in the complaint, but denying the remaining allegations thereof. 

Kosuga also contends in his answer that he had been improperly joined with the 

other respondents, that the aggregating of statistical data with respect to all 

the respondents is improper and that the complaint is vague and ambiguous. 

Kosuga further claims that the complaint does not set forth a cause of action 

under section 6(b) of the act and that, in the absence of regulations expressly 

defining manipulation, this section constitutes an unlawful delegation of 

legislative power and violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. On 

September 25, 1956, an answer was filed by respondents Sam S. Siegel and 

National Produce Distributors, Inc., in which they deny the substantive 

allegations of the complaint and that any manipulation was intended or 

accomplished. 

John J. Curry, Hearing Examiner, Office of Hearing Examiners, United States 

Department of Agriculture, was assigned as referee and presided at the hearing. 
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Respondent Kosuga was represented by Lee A. Freeman, Attorney at Law, Chicago, 

Illinois, and Michael A. Gurda, Attorney at Law, Middletown, New York, and 

respondents Sam S. Siegel and National Produce Distributors, Inc., were 

represented by Max Chill, of Max and Herman Chill, Attorneys at Law, Chicago, 

Illinois. Benjamin M. Holstein, Office of the General Counsel, United States 

Department of Agriculture, appeared as counsel for complainant. The hearing 

began November 14, 1956, in Chicago, Illinois, and continued at intervals until 

its conclusion November 1, 1957. 

Both sides offered oral and documentary evidence. Fifteen witnesses testified, 

and a number of exhibits were received on behalf of each side. After the 

hearing, all parties filed briefs. On April 2, 1959, the referee filed a report 

containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions and recommending that 

respondents be found to have violated the act as charged. Respondents filed 

lengthy exceptions to the report. Oral argument was held before the Judicial 

Officer January 15, 1960. 

At this final stage of the proceeding it is apparent that there is little or 

no dispute about the basic facts put in evidence. The inferences and 

conclusions to be drawn from the basic facts are, however, subjects of 

controversy. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent Vincent W. Kosuga is an individual whose address is Pine 

Island, New York. He is now and was at all times mentioned herein a grower and 

shipper of onions, a trader in onion futures and cash onions, a member of the 

Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and a registered floor broker under the Commodity 

Exchange Act. 

2. Respondent Sam S. Siegel is an individual who was at all times material 

herein a member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the president, manager, 

and principal shareholder of respondent National Produce Distributors, Inc., 

hereinafter called National, an Illinois corporation engaged in the wholesale 

produce business with offices and a place of business at Franklin Park, 

Illinois. At all such times, respondent Siegel traded in onion futures and in 

cash onions in the name of National, and directed, controlled, and was 

responsible for the corporate transactions hereinafter described. At all such 

times, respondent Siegel was the vice-president and stockholder of the Dakota 

Chief Sales Company, a corporation which operates a cold storage warehouse 

located at Franklin Park, Illinois, and the vice-president of Auster-Siegel 

Trading Company, a registered futures commission merchant. 

3. At all times material herein, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was a duly 

designated contract market under the Commodity Exchange Act. Trading in onion 

futures on the exchange is conducted in units of one contract or carlot 

containing 600 50-pound bags, more or less. 

4. Respondent Kosuga received 323 carlots of onions in November 1955 as final 

deliveries n1 on his long contracts in the November future on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange, and in addition, he took over at the delivered price 32 

carlots received as final deliveries by other traders. Forty-six carlots were 

received as final deliveries by respondent National against long positions in 

the November future which it held. These 401 carlots of final deliveries 

constituted all the final deliveries on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 

satisfaction of November 1955 onion futures. Of these 401 carlots, 387 were 

shipped into Chicago during October and November 1955 and delivered on track, 

and the remaining 14 carlots were delivered in warehouses in Chicago. The 323 

carlots received as final deliveries by Kosuga settled 335 long contracts held 

by him, or about 75.8 percent of the total of 442 contracts in the future which 

were settled by delivery. The 323 carlots received by Kosuga as above described 

were turned over by him to National for handling and sale. 
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n1 A long receiving a carlot on delivery may sell the future and 

redeliver the carlot against the resulting short futures contract, and this 

process may be repeated, or a long receiving a carlot on delivery may sell 

it for cash and the purchaser may deliver the carlot against his short 

position, or sell it to someone else for that purpose. The same carlot may 

therefore be delivered and received more than once in the same delivery 

month. An initial delivery takes place when a carlot is first delivered, 

and a carlot received on delivery which does not subsequently reappear in 

delivery channels is a final delivery. The number of initial (or final) 

deliveries plus the number of redeliveries equals the number of contracts 

settled by delivery. 

5. During the latter part of November and early December 1955, as a result of 

the deliveries received on November futures as described in Finding of Fact 4, 

Kosuga owned and held 321 carlots of cash onions in cold storage warehouses and 

on track in Chicago. At the same time, National owned and held 250 carlots of 

cash onions in cold storage warehouses, and the combined cash holdings of these 

respondents in Chicago constituted practically the total supply of onions in 

Chicago which were available and could qualify for delivery on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange. In addition, Kosuga owned and held approximately 400 

carlots of cash onions in common storage at country points, making a combined 

total of approximately 1,000 carlots of cash onions owned and held by the 

respondents which were or could be made available for delivery on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange in satisfaction of futures contracts. 

6. Cold storage onions are onions held in warehouses under 

refrigerated storage. Common storage onions are onions held in nonrefrigerated 

facilities on the farm or at other country locations. Cold storage onions are 

generally inferior in quality to common storage onions, are less desired by the 

trade and command lower prices. The onions held in Chicago cold storage by 

respondents Kosuga and National, as described in Finding of Fact 5, were a large 

concentration of onions in Chicago insofar as the futures market was concerned, 

and the delivery of all or a substantial part of the onions on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange would have caused a drastic decline in futures and cash 

prices. The fact that the onions were concentrated in Chicago in position for 

delivery was known to the trade and would tend to have a depressing effect on 

futures and cash prices. 

7. During the latter part of November and continuing into December, 1955, the 

respondents entered into negotiations with a group of grower-shippers, that is, 

individuals engaged in the business of growing, shipping, and trading in onions 

and onion futures, looking toward the purchase by and transfer to the growershippers of most of the onions held by the respondents in Chicago. Meetings 

were held in Chicago on or about November 27, December 10 and 17, 1955, at each 

of which there were present respondents Kosuga and Siegel, and from six to eight 

of the grower-shippers, including Veril Baldwin, Lacerne Dixon, Lyle Jordon, 

Jack Kelly, William Gehring and Michael Minardo. As a result of these 

negotiations, it was agreed between respondents Kosuga and Siegel and the 

grower-shippers that the grower-shippers would purchase and take title to 287 

carlots of the onions at $ 1.60 per bag or $ 960 per carlot, for a total sale 

price of $ 275,520, and merchandise them in regular channels of trade. Absent 

such purchase, some or all of these onions would have been delivered against 

futures positions on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Kosuga agreed and 

committed himself to make no deliveries on any exchange for the balance of the 

onion season (December 1955-March 1956) of any remaining onions which he owned 

in Chicago or elsewhere, and Siegel agreed and committed himself to make no 

deliveries on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange during such period of the 

remaining Chicago cold storage onions held by National. Kosuga and Siegel 

suggested and it was generally understood by all the parties that the 

restrictions against delivery assumed by respondents Kosuga and Siegel were not 

to be publicized. The respondents were aware 
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of the fact that the 287 carlots which were being sold included certain 

quantities which were to be allotted and billed to various other grower-shippers 

who had not attended any of the meetings, but who had been notified of the 

proposed arrangement and had agreed to participate therein and to buy a part of 

the 287 carlots. The terms of payment called for an immediate deposit of $ 300 

per car, an additional deposit of $ 200 per car on or before a specified date, 

and payment of the balance as and when each car was withdrawn from cold storage 

by the grower-shippers. 

8. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the agreement described in Finding of 

Fact 7, and in order to effectuate the purposes thereof, the respondents 

received and accepted deposits and subsequent payments from the grower-shippers 

in the total sum of approximately $ 175,000, and released or caused the release 

of onions to the grower-shippers from time to time. The quantity of onions 

which each of the grower-shippers agreed to purchase, the quantity withdrawn 

from storage by each, and the sums paid to the respondents were as follows: 

Quantity Withdrawn Total Amount 

Purchased from Storage Paid Including 

Name (carlots) (carlots) Storage Charges

Veril Baldwin & Son 35 14-1/2 $ 20,797.00

Sterling Johnson 3 1,500.00

John Eucker and Herm Huff 5 1,500.00

Lacerne Dixon 30 3 16,421.00

Lyle Jordon 12 6,000.00

Jack Kelly 50 13 12,500.00

William Gehring 60 60 63,511.52

R. Ulrich & Son 2 2 1,958.80

Henry Ankeny 15 5,000.00

Jarson and Zerilli 25 12,500.00

Mike Minardo 35 12 18,588.00

Porter Cave 5 5 5,087.60

Simplot Western 

 Idaho Produce Co. 10 10 9,600.00 * 

Total 287 119-1/2 $ 174,963.92

* Estimated amount. Payment made directly to National Produce 

Distributors, Inc. 

9. A purpose of the agreement was to remove the potential deliverability upon 

the Chicago Mercantile Exchange of 287 carlots 

of onions and to enable the respondents to withhold other onions which they 

owned from delivery on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, thereby strengthening 

and supporting the market and increasing or preventing a decrease in the prices 

of futures and of cash onions. It was expected by the parties to the agreement 

that such would be its effects. During the course of the negotiations, Kosuga 

expressed the opinion that onion futures prices would be increased substantially 

as a result of the agreement, cited prior occasions when similar agreements had 

had such an effect, and, together with respondent Siegel, exerted pressure upon 

the grower-shippers to purchase the onions. 

10. Kosuga maintained a commodity futures account with the firm of KellyBlack Company, Inc., a registered futures commission merchant under the 

Commodity Exchange Act. This firm was composed of Jack Kelly and Don Black, and 

it also had among its customers some of the other grower-shippers described 

above. Prior to the agreement set forth in Finding of Fact 7 and for some time 

thereafter, Kosuga caried on substantial trading activities in his account with 

Kelly-Black Company, Inc., and maintained office facilities on the premises of 
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that company. In accordance with arrangements made as a part of the agreement 

between the respondents and the grower-shippers, Kosuga transmitted to Jack 

Kelly or to Kelly-Black Company, Inc., a list of car numbers or lot numbers of 

the 400 carlots of Chicago cold storage onions held by him, and Siegel 

transmitted a similiar list of the 200 carlots in Chicago cold storage 

warehouses held by National, whereupon Jack Kelly selected from each list 

certain car numbers which were then allotted to each of the grower-shippers in 

the quantity which each had agreed to purchase. Don Black, acting for and on 

behalf of respondent Kosuga and at his request, arranged for the release of the 

allotted carlots when and as requested by the grower-shippers, transmitted 

invoices to the grower-shippers in the name of respondent Kosuga, received 

payments from them in the form of checks drawn to respondent Kosuga's order, 

kept records of all releases and of original and subsequent payments by the 

grower-shippers, and reported to respondent Kosuga from time to time with 

respect to such matters. 

11. Sometime during January or February 1956, a dispute arose between 

respondents Kosuga and Siegel and the grower-shippers as to whether the 

respondents were observing the commitments 

which they had made in connection with the agreement, and the grower-shippers, 

with the exception of William Gehring, thereupon refused to make further 

withdrawals of the onions from cold storage or pay any further sums to the 

respondents. 

12. Between November 27, 1955, the date of the first meeting with the growershippers, and December 20, 1955, which was shortly after the final meeting, 

Kosuga purchased a net total of 383 carlots of onion futures and Siegel 

purchased a net total of 294 carlots of onion futures. During the month of 

January 1956, Siegel took delivery of 56 carlots of onions against long January 

futures positions, and Kosuga took delivery of 44 carlots. 

13. Between November 1955 and early March 1956, respondents traded actively 

and held substantial short positions in March 1956 onion futures on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange. At the same time, the respondents had control of and the 

sole beneficial interest in short hedging positions held in the names of 

commodity brokerage firms as security for margins or other funds advanced to the 

respondents. Between November 25 and December 15, 1955, which was substantially 

contemporaneous with the period of negotiation and agreement between the 

respondents and the grower-shippers, respondents made covering purchases of 

March futures and each of the respondents reduced his short position, with the 

result that the combined short position of the respondents in such future 

decreased from 549 to 227 carlots, or from 38.7 to 13.6 percent of the open 

interest. During the latter part of December 1955, the respondents resumed 

selling operations and made substantial sales of March futures. During the 

period between December 27, 1955, and February 2, 1956, the respondents sold 858 

carlots of March futures and increased their combined short position from 303 

carlots, or 17 percent of the open interest, to 1161 carlots or 44.3 percent of 

the open interest. During the month of January and up to and including February 

9, 1956, the combined short position of the respondents in the March 1956 future 

averaged 42 percent of the open interest. 

14. Shortly after February 2, 1956, respondents began to make covering 

purchases in the March future and continued to make such purchases through 

February 17, 1956, as a result of which respondents' combined short position was 

reduced from 1161 to 641 carlots, or from 44.3 to 25.4 percent of the open 

interest. Thereafter and until about March 1, 1956, each respondent stopped 

covering operations. Between February 17 and March 1, 1956, inclusive, the open 

interest in the March 1956 onion future decreased from 2525 to 1416 carlots, or 

by about 51 percent, and total short contracts in the future held by traders 
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other than the respondents decreased from 1884 to 766 carlots, or by about 59 

percent. During this period, the respondents' short position increased from 641 

to 650 carlots, or from 25 to 46 percent of the open interest. In view of the 

cash holdings of the respondents on March 1, 1956, as set forth in Finding of 

Fact 15, these 650 carlots of March futures constituted an extremely large 

interest to carry into the delivery month. The 650 short carlots were covered 

by the purchase of 542 carlots between March 2 and 6, and by the delivery of 

onions by respondents as described in Finding of Fact 18. 

15. On December 31, 1955, respondents owned and held a combined total of 556 

carlots of cash onions in Chicago cold storage warehouses, representing 98 

percent of all cold storage stocks in Chicago. On January 31, 1956, respondents 

owned and held 444 carlots of such onions, or 97 percent of such total stocks, 

and on February 29, 1956, they owned and held 321 carlots or 88 percent of total 

stocks. These combined holdings included onions taken on delivery by the 

respondents in satisfaction of long November 1955 and January 1956 futures. 

During February Kosuga found that most of the onions which he owned in cold 

storage were decayed and would not qualify for delivery. Figures showing cold 

storage holdings in Chicago warehouses were posted on the floor of the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange and were known to the trade and the general public. 

16. During January and February 1956 respondent Siegel shipped or caused the 

shipment to Davenport, Iowa, of approximately 57 carlots of the onions held by 

National in Chicago cold storage, and 3 carlots owned and held by respondent 

Kosuga in Chicago cold storage, for the purpose of reworking, i.e., eliminating 

spoilage and rebagging the remaining onions to make them saleable or deliverable 

on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The onions were reworked and approximately 

25 carlots of the reworked onions were then returned to Chicago and some of 

these were delivered on the exchange. The fact that the onions were shipped out 

of Chicago, reworked and returned to Chicago was known to the trade and had a 

depressing effect upon futures prices. 

17. About February 1, 1956, respondent Kosuga had a telephone conversation 

with Dave Slinger, a grower-shipper who acted as a consultant to the purchasers 

of the onions in the transactions outlined in Finding of Fact 10 above. At the 

hearing Slinger testified as follows: 

"Q. Did he [Kosuga] have any conversation with you which indicated that he 

proposed to support the short side of the market? 

"A. Yes, he did. Along about the 20th of January, I had onions, I had my 

onions all hedged, and I got rid of all of them, and then I went on a ski trip 

and broke my leg, and I was confined to the hospital in Wausau, and along about 

the first of February I received a call from Mr. Kosuga, and he wanted me to 

call William Gehring and suggest to him that he go short the market. [Emphasis 

supplied.] 

I was completely dumfounded because I thought they were on the long side of 

the market. I do not know exactly what was said after he made that suggestion, 

but I was left with the impression that he had reversed his position; that he 

was short the market, and possibly his conscience was bothering him and he 

wanted Gehring also to get in on the short side. n2 I told him that I didn't 

think that -- I thought that if they were going to reverse their position and go 

short the market, the group should be called together and should do it together. 

Mr. Kosuga answered that that would would never do, it would wreck the market in 

a matter of minutes, and go down to fifty cents; that the only way to do it was 

to control it somewhat, and only one person know about it. [Emphasis supplied.] 

I said, all right, I will call William Gehring, and so I called him and 

William Gehring absolutely wouldn't have anything to do with it. He said 'I 

won't do anything unless all the group acts together.' 

 
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I don't think I called Mr. Kosuga back. I believe that that was the last 

conversation I had with him until some time in the summer." [Transcript of 

hearing, pp. 1204-1205.] 

n2 Gehring was the only grower-shipper who purchased a substantial 

number of onions and took and paid for all the onions he contracted to buy 

pursuant to the agreement reached in December 1955 (see finding of Fact 8). 

18. Deliveries in satisfaction of March 1956 onion futures on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange consisted of 171 carlots of initial deliveries and 362 

carlots of redeliveries, for a total of 533 contracts settled by delivery. Of 

the 171 carlots initially delivered and received on a final receiver basis, 

Kosuga and Siegel delivered 108 carlots or about 63 percent. Of these, 72 

carlots were delivered by Kosuga and the remainder by Siegel. March 1, 1956, 

was the first day on which deliveries against the March future could be made, 

and on March 1 and 2 respondents delivered 86 carlots as against 47 carlots 

delivered by all other traders. The month of March is near the end of the 

marketing season for cold storage onions, and the two-to-one preponderance of 

redeliveries over initial deliveries indicated the unwillingness of the longs to 

keep the cold storage onions which they received on delivery in March. 

19. Between December 27, 1955, and February 2, 1956, the price of the March 

future ranged between $ 1 and $ 1.84, with the exception of one day, January 19, 

when it fell to 92 cents. During this period the respondents sold 858 carlots 

of March futures net, as described in Finding of Fact 13. A total of 478 

carlots net were sold between December 27 and January 10, when the price ranged 

between $ 1.21 and $ 1.84. Between February 2 and 17, the price of the March 

future ranged between 90 cents and $ 1.28, and during this period the 

respondents made net covering purchases in the amount of 520 carlots, as 

described in Finding of Fact 14. Between March 2 and 6, respondents covered 542 

short carlots by the purchase of futures and during this period the price ranged 

from 44 cents to 58 cents. 

20. Prices of the March 1956 onion future on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 

during the period from February 2 to 17, 1956, fluctuated between 90 cents and $ 

1.28. Thereafter, during the last 18 trading days in the future, these prices 

declined drastically and steadily. On February 28, the March future closed at 

80 cents, on March 2 it closed at 58 cents, on March 5 at 44 cents, and on March 

15, the last trading day, it reached a low of 10 cents and closed at 15 cents. 

The last two prices were the lowest ever recorded on the Chicago Mercantile 

Exchange. 

 

During the 12 years of trading previous to March 1956 the lowest price recorded 

for any onion future was 43 cents for the March 1954 future in August 1953. 

During the last 18 trading days in March 1956, cash onion prices also declined 

in a similar, but less drastic, fashion. The prices of March futures and cash 

onions from about mid-February until the end of trading in the future were not 

the result of the free play of supply and demand factors, but were artificial 

prices owing to the activities of respondents. 

CONCLUSIONS

I

The first charge in the complaint is that respondent Kosuga attempted to 

manipulate upward prices of November 1955 onion futures on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange and prices of cash onions. 

Complainant has shown most of the usual indicia of attempted manipulation 

upward. Kosuga built up a very large long position n3 and added to it while the 

open interest was declining and the market was liquidating, he carried a large 

long line into the delivery month, he did not reduce his long position at as 

rapid a rate as other long traders and he accepted final delivery of 323 
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carlots, an extraordinarily large quantity of deliveries to one trader. He also 

took over 32 carlots delivered to other traders. 

n3 There was no trading limit and the act had just become effective in 

September 1955 with respect to futures trading in onions. 

Drawing a line between legitimate trading and trading with manipulative 

intent is sometimes a very difficult task. We have here the physical facts of 

Kosuga's trading in the November 1955 future and some statements by Kosuga to 

grower-shippers (at the time of the events leading to the second charge of the 

complaint) to the effect that he had received more deliveries in November than 

he had expected. Moreover, from the record it appears that manipulations in 

onion futures upon the exchange were not uncommon. On the other hand, Kosuga's 

statements to the grower-shippers could be interpreted to mean that Kosuga had 

not forecast market movements correctly as well as being open to the inference 

argued by complainant. We also have Kosuga's case for trading long in the 

November future, principally 

 

extensive flood damage to harvested onions, and his defense for taking 

deliveries, namely that for him, a large long, to do otherwise would have 

demoralized the market to his financial detriment. 

We conclude that the evidence falls just a bit short of tipping the scale 

enough to warrant an inference of manipulative intent in a quasi-judicial 

proceeding such as this. Consequently the charge in this connection should be 

dismissed. 

II 

Concerning the second charge of attempted manipulation by Kosuga and Siegel 

in November and December 1955, it is clear that Kosuga and Siegel entered into a 

"deal" with a number of grower-shippers to sell 287 cars of storage onions owned 

by respondents to the grower-shippers, that the purpose of the "deal" was to 

keep the onions from being used for deliveries upon the exchange in the 

satisfaction of short futures contracts, that as a part of the "deal" Kosuga 

agreed not to deliver any of the other onions owned by him upon any exchange and 

that the objective of the deal was to influence onion prices in an upward 

direction. 

While respondents concede practically everything stated in the Findings of 

Fact above concerning the "deal," they claim that the inspiration for it came 

not from respondents but from the grower-shippers and that, at any rate, 

respondents were merely attempting to "stabilize" onion prices, a 

nonmanipulative purpose in view of General Foods Corporation v. Brannan, 170 

F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948.) 

Whether or not respondents were the original proponents of the deal, and 

there is some evidence to the effect that Kosuga was the moving party, they 

participated in the operation. 

As to the alleged "stabilization" purpose of the "deal," it is true some 

elements of price support were present but it was not limited to such purpose. 

Kosuga testified that once the nondelivery agreement became known "naturally the 

market would go up," and that this was his hope and his expectation. Slinger, 

an adviser to the purchasers, testified that "both Mr. Kosuga and Mr. Siegel 

used the highest kind of pressure to sell their part of the deal to the 

growers," that the grower-shippers "had been sold on the idea that there was no 

reason why the market couldn't go to three or four dollars" as a result of the 

arrangement, 

 

and that Kosuga quoted figures at the meetings to show "that statistically the 

deal was as good as it was in 1952 when Marches sold as high as $ 4.75." This 
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testimony is consistent with that of Gehring, a participating grower-shipper, 

who testified that both Kosuga and Siegel made statements at the meetings that 

they expected prices to rise as a result of the arrangement being made with the 

grower-shippers. Jordon, another purchaser, testified that at one of the 

meetings either Kosuga or Siegel stated, "We have got this market under control 

if you boys want to cooperate." These statements by respondents made at the time 

they were entering into the agreement are the best evidence of what the 

respondents intended to accomplish by means of the agreement and are not denied 

by respondents. 

The respondents' intentions and expectations were shared by the growershippers. Gehring testified that he went into the "deal" with the expectation 

that it would "stimulate the market." When asked specifically whether he 

expected the price to go up as a result of this agreement, he replied, "I 

expected it would go up 25, 30, probably 35 cents." Minardo testified that he 

purchased futures on the strength of the agreement. Jordon testified that he 

did likewise. Such purchases are strong evidence that a price advance was 

expected, rather than merely a holding of the price where it was. 

Respondents and the grower-shippers were concerned about the 600 carlots of 

onions overhanging the futures market, and the depressing effect upon prices 

which the presence of these onions had and which would result from the delivery 

of part or all of the 600 carlots on the exchange but they also expected that 

the elimination of these and additional onions from the delivery picture would 

brighten the prospects on the long side of the market. The magic word 

"stabilization" or "stabilize" was utilized at times in the questions propounded 

to the witnesses and their replies thereto, but it would be naive to believe 

that the parties to the agreement were solely interested in maintaining an 

existing price. The testimony set forth above indicates otherwise. None of the 

participants would have considered the agreement to have been diverted from its 

purpose if it raised prices instead of merely holding them where they were. It 

is concluded that the agreement and sale were intended to raise onion prices and 

not merely to stop a decline or to stabilize. 

If, however, respondents sought only to peg or stabilize onion prices, they 

nevertheless violated the act by an attempt to 

 

manipulate. It is manipulation of prices to keep a price from moving in 

accordance with free supply and demand conditions just as much as it is to move

a price to an artificial level. A previously-existing natural price kept from 

moving by abnormal or artificial means deliberately employed thereby becomes an 

artificial or manipulated price. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 

U.S. 150, 223 (1940). n4 Under our own act, this was recognized in Great Western 

Food Distributors v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 

U.S. 997 (1953), in which manipulation of December 1947 egg futures prices was 

found because due to cornering efforts the futures prices did not drop to a 

normal relationship with fresh egg and other egg prices. In In re Zenith-Godley 

Company, 6 Agric. Dec. 900 (6 A.D. 900) (1947), prevention of a price decline in 

butter in New York by purchases of all butter offered was found to be a 

manipulation of butter prices. See also In re Fox DeLuxe Foods, Inc., 18 Agric. 

Dec. 582 (18 A.D. 582) (1959). 

n4 "But in terms of market operations stabilization is but one form of 

manipulation. And market manipulation in its various manifestations is 

implicitly an artificial stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) 

market prices, a force which distorts those prices, a factor which prevents 

the determination of those prices by free competition alone." [Emphasis 

supplied.] 

See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Company, 273 U.S. 392 

(1927); United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 

F.Supp. 69, 79-80 (S.D. N.Y. 1949); United States v. Swift & Company, 62 

F.Supp. 476, 479 (D. Colo. 1943). For economic treatises see Dice and 
Page 11 

Eiteman, The Stock Market, 305 (3d ed. 1952); Frey, Federal Regulation of 

the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 19 (1957); 

Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organized Exchanges, 

27 Am. Econ. Rev. 267-278 (1987); Jones and Lowe, Manipulation, The 

Security Markets, 444-445, 503-504 (1985); VII Report of the Federal Trade 

Commission on the Grain Trade, 242-274 (1926). 

The holding in General Foods v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948) n5 to 

the effect that supporting or pegging a natural or legitimate price is not 

manipulation in violation of the act was overruled in effect by Great Western, 

supra. In any event it has been validly criticized and does not persuade. 

Federal Regulation 

 

of Commodities Futures Trading, 60 Yale L.J. 822, 842 n6 (1951); Campbell, 

Trading in Futures under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 215, 

233-236 (1958); n7 Note 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 572 (1949). 

n5 In the General Foods case, the so-called stabilizing operation 

consisted of the purchase and sale of two million bushels of "distress rye" 

to keep it from being offered on the open market. This was the entire 

transaction. There was no commitment or agreement affecting additional 

supplies of the commodity as there is in this proceeding. Here the 

purchase and sale was not the entire transaction. The agreement involved 

herein reached out to and covered some 700 carlots of onions which were not 

being sold and the respondents committed themselves to withhold the onions 

from delivery. To this extent, the facts in the General Foods case differ 

from the facts of this proceeding. 

n6 "The court offered as another basis of distinction the fact that the 

Socony-Vacuum case involved 'a statute [the Sherman Act] which made it 

illegal per se to combine for the purpose of "raising, depressing, fixing, 

pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity."' 170 F.2d at 230. But 

there is no such provision in the Sherman Act, the relevant portion of 

which simply declares combinations in restraint of trade to be illegal. 26 

Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). This has been construed by the 

Supreme Court to make price fixing illegal per se. And in the SoconyVacuum case price fixing is implicitly equated to manipulation, which is 

there held to include raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing 

prices. 310 U.S. at 224. The prohibition of these acts, attributed by the 

court in the General Foods case to the Sherman Act, is actually quoted from 

the interpretation of that statute in the Socony-Vacuum opinion. Thus, in 

fact, the Socony-Vacuum case holds price stabilization to violate a much 

more general and ambiguous provision than the Commodity Exchange Act 

prohibition of manipulation involved in the General Foods case." 

n7 pp. 235-236: "Additional support for the position that 

'stabilization' is included within 'manipulation' is found in the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The federal regulation of commodity 

exchanges under the Commodity Exchange Act is comparable to the regulation 

of security exchanges under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. United 

States v. Grady, 225 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 

(1955), and the Congress has expressly included in the Securities Exchange 

Act of 1934, under the heading of manipulation, the 'pegging, fixing, or 

stabilizing' of security prices unless authorized by administrative 

regulations. 48 Stat. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6)(1952). The House 

Committee Report on the bill which became the Securities Exchange Act of 

1934 expressly refers to 'pegging and stabilizing operations' as 

'manipulation.' H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 78d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934). The 

Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that it is 'unanimous in 

recognizing that stabilizing is a form of manipulation.' Securities and 

Exchange Commission, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 2446, at 

2, March 18, 1940." 
Page 12 

Respondents' reliance upon the court opinions in the civil action (Kosuga v. 

Kelly (N.D. Ill. 1957), aff'd, 257 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1958), 358 U.S. 516 (1959)) 

which arose out of the agreement with the grower-shippers is of little 

assistance. Such opinions did not directly pass upon the legal status of the 

nondelivery agreement. 

III

The complaint further charges that respondents attempted to manipulate and 

did manipulate downward the prices of March 1956 onion futures on the exchange 

and prices of cash onions. 

Prior to the latter part of December 1955, there was a period of about three 

or four weeks during which Kosuga and Siegel were reducing their short positions 

while the open interest was increasing, indicating that other traders were 

adding to their positions. On December 27 and 28, 1955, each of these 

respondents stopped covering, resumed selling operations, and continued selling 

until about February 2, 1956. During this period, respondent Kosuga sold 565 

carlots and respondent Siegel sold 

 

239 carlots. Their combined short positions of 1,161 carlots on February 2 

represented over 44 percent of the open interest. During the next two weeks, 

each of these respondents again reversed his operations and did a substantial 

amount of covering. Between February 3 and 17, Kosuga reduced his short 

position by buying 250 carlots of March futures and Siegel bought 270 carlots. 

Between February 17 and March 1, the last seven trading days before the 

delivery month, respondents again stopped covering and held substantially what 

they had, while the open interest declined sharply. During these seven days, 

the open interest fell from 2,525 to 1,416 carlots, and the positions of all 

other traders declined from 1,884 to 766 carlots, while Kosuga's position went 

from 396 to 407 carlots and Siegel's position from 245 to 243 carlots, for a net 

increase of nine carlots in both positions combined. The holding tactics of the 

respondents during these seven days increased their combined percentage of the 

open interest from 25 to 46 percent. The 407 carlots which Kosuga held on March 

1 were liquidated between March 2 and 7, and the 243 carlots which Siegel held 

on March 1 were liquidated between March 2 and 5. Kosuga and Siegel offer 

little or no explanation for their similar pattern of trading in March onion 

futures. n8 

n8 In addition to the trading of respondents described above as an 

indication of an intent or attempt by them to manipulate the prices of 

March 1956 futures and cash onions, is the shipment by Siegel of 

approximately 57 carlots of onions owned by National and three carloads 

belonging to Kosuga to Iowa for reconditioning and the return of 25 of 

these carlots to Chicago. Siegel defended this movement to Iowa as merely 

an attempt to find a market for the onions, failing which the 25 carlots 

were returned to Chicago. However, Dave Slinger, a recognized expert in 

the field of onion marketing, testified that the handling of onions in this 

way was not economically feasible and that, to his knowledge, it was never 

done except to bring about a squeeze. While free transportation was 

available to Iowa, it does not appear that such was the case for the return 

trip. 

Respondents had an almost complete monopoly of the cold storage onions in 

Chicago during the period discussed above. They entered the delivery month with 

650 short futures contracts and 321 carlots of cash onions or 88 percent of the 

cold storage holdings in Chicago. The number of onions in cold storage in 

Chicago was a matter of common knowledge in the trade as was the fact that 

Kosuga and Siegel held the bulk of such onions. The trade also knew that March 

is the end of the marketing season for cold storage onions and that such onions 

are by then relatively low in quality, not easily marketed in competition with 

new crop onions and generally undesirable. A large crop 
Page 13 

 

of early spring Texas onions was on, or due on, the market. While the bulk of 

the onions owned by respondents in Chicago cold storage had deteriorated so that 

most of the onions were undeliverable against the futures contract, the trade 

was not necessarily aware of this fact. The potential threat of these onions 

overhung the market. The possibility of delivery of Chicago cold storage onions 

owned by a substantial short and, in fact, the possibility of the delivery of 

old crop onions generally in a declining futures market clearly constituted a 

price depressing factor. 

Kosuga and Siegel did deliver 36 carlots of the Chicago cold storage onions 

against their short March positions. In addition, 72 carlots of old crop onions 

which had been stored in the country were delivered by respondents on track in 

satisfaction of short futures contracts. On March 1 and 2, 1956, Kosuga and 

Siegel delivered a combined total of 86 carlots of their old crop holdings. 

During the next few days, an additional 22 carlots were delivered by respondents 

for a combined total of 108 carlots out of 171 carlots of initial deliveries by 

all traders, or about 63 percent. These 171 carlots of initial deliveries were 

involved in 362 redeliveries, that is, the longs who received these onions sold 

futures and redelivered the onions against the resulting short positions, or 

sold the onions to other shorts who redelivered them, until a total of 362 such 

redeliveries had taken place. The 171 carlots of initial deliveries plus the 

362 carlots of redeliveries settled 533 contracts. In other words, each of the 

171 carlots was delivered, on the average, more than three times, which is 

substantial proof of the undesirable quality of the onions and the unwillingness 

of the longs to take delivery. 

Respondents did not cover their positions as other shorts were doing between 

February 17 and March 17, 1956, and they entered the delivery month with 650 

carlots of March futures short. This is especially significant as respondents 

owned the great preponderance of the cash onions in a deliverable position in 

Chicago. On the first two days of trading in the delivery month respondents 

delivered n9 86 carlots or approximately 65 percent of the onions delivered on 

March 1 and 2, 1956. The prospect of the receipt of old crop onions as 

deliveries on the 

 

futures market and the early and relatively heavy deliveries made by respondents 

would naturally have a depressing effect upon the market. In short, the 

dominant short position respondents developed in the future, the maintenance of 

this position during the weeks just prior to the beginning of the delivery 

period while other shorts were covering, the large short interest which 

respondents carried into the delivery month, their almost complete monopoly of 

cash supplies in a deliverable position in Chicago and the deliveries which they 

made as soon as the delivery period opened clearly describe an attempt to 

manipulate downward the price of March 1956 onion futures and cash onions in 

Chicago. 

n9 At the oral argument before the Judicial Officer counsel for 

respondent Kosuga argued that the delivery of 72 cars on Kosuga's short 

futures was not made by Kosuga but by the brokers who had financed them. A 

stipulation in the record, however, shows that the brokers delivered the 

cars upon instructions from Kosuga. 

In addition to the very strong circumstantial evidence of manipulative intent 

there is the testimony of Slinger about a telephone conversation with Kosuga 

about February 1, 1956, in which Kosuga revealed his plan to control the market 

on the short or downward side. (See Finding of Fact 17.) This testimony was not 

challenged by respondent Kosuga and, in fact, he did not testify with respect to 

this telephone conversation. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1947); 

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225-227 (1939); Miller 
Page 14 

& Company v. United States, 260 F.2d (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 

(1959). 

Kosuga argues that he was on the short side of the March future merely as a 

hedger because he owned more cash onions than his short sales. Whether or not 

Kosuga was hedging his cash onions by short sales is immaterial. Hedges may be 

used for manipulative purposes. But the pattern of his trading and the nature 

of the market with its sizeable and fluctuating differentials between futures 

and cash prices show that he was not doing bona fide hedging.

Kosuga also asks the question as to why he should be seeking to depress onion 

prices when he owned a large quantity of cash onions. The evidence demonstrates 

that he was attempting to do just this and presumably he expected to make money 

at it. A good deal of his holdings in cold storage onions had deteriorated. 

And as a professional trader familiar with futures trading he no doubt knew that 

technical manipulations within the futures market often do not have permanent 

results on cash prices generally. Complainant points out too that while cash 

and futures prices tend to move together it is axiomatic that they seldom if 

ever move exactly the same. To the extent that the 

 

spread between futures and cash onion prices widened, Kosuga would profit. For 

example, if the March futures price declined by 15 cents while the cash price 

went down only ten cents, Kosuga could buy in his short futures position at a 15 

cent profit and take a ten cent loss in the sale of his cash onions (if he sold 

them at that time). 

Respondent Siegel contends that his trading activities were primarily 

scalping operations. A scalper seeks to profit on price fluctuations within the 

trading day. Normally his purchases and his sales equal each other during any 

one day, and he tries to avoid carrying a position from one day to the next. 

Siegel's daily purchases and sales equalled each other only once or twice, and 

they came approximately close only on rare occasions. On the great majority of 

trading days he bought or sold large net quantities of March futures. In 

addition, he carried a substantial short position continuously throughout the 

entire 1955-1956 onion season. Respondent Siegel was not a scalper, but a 

substantial speculative trader on the short side. 

Respondents protest the joining of their trading positions as they contend 

that there was no collaboration or agreement between them. However, the matters 

in evidence herein indicate otherwise. Briefly, the record indicates that 

Kosuga and Siegel took all deliveries in November 1955; that Siegel handled all 

the cash onions, including Kosuga's and arranged financing thereof; that Kosuga 

and Siegel entered into an agreement with the grower-shippers to sell these 

onions to the grower-shipers with all payments to clear through Kosuga; that the 

major portion of these onions was not accepted by the grower-shippers and was 

still in the possession of Kosuga and Siegel in January and February 1956 and, 

together with other onions owned by Kosuga and Siegel, constituted a near 

monopoly of cold storage onions in Chicago; that Kosuga and Siegel held these 

onions throughout January and February, during which time each of them traded in 

a substantially similar manner in the March 1956 future, their combined 

positions representing a significant portion of the open interest throughout 

these two months; and that Kosuga and Siegel each liquidated his futures 

position during the first week of March at a profit. 

Jorgensen, complainant's expert witness, concluded that respondents' attempt 

succeeded, that is, that the prices of March futures and cash onions in Chicago 

after mid-February were not the result of supply and demand but were artificial 

because 

 

of such trading by respondents and we agree with that conclusion. That 

respondents succeeded in their attempted manipulation can be seen by the price 

structure during the period involved. On February 15, 1956, the March onion 
Page 15 

future price closed at $ 1.16 and on March 15 reached a low of ten cents 

representing a decline of 91 percent during this period. Price movements in the 

March future during comparable periods for the preceding eight years were 

substantially less spectacular. During these preceding eight years the price of 

the March onion future declined in only two years and in each case the decline 

was substantially less percentagewise than it was in 1956. In 1951 and 1954 the 

decline was 67 and 39 percent, respectively. In the remaining six of the 

preceding eight years, the price of the March future increased between midFebruary and mid-March. 

Also, prices of the March 1956 onion future on the Chicago Mercantile 

Exchange during the period February 2 to 17, 1956, fluctuated between 90 cents 

and $ 1.28. Thereafter, during the last 18 trading days in the future, such 

prices declined drastically and steadily. On February 28 the March future 

closed at 80 cents, on March 2 it closed at 58 cents, on March 5, at 44 cents, 

and on March 15, the last trading day, it reached a low of ten cents and closed 

at 15 cents. The last two prices were lowest ever recorded on the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange. During the 12 years of trading previous to March 1956 the 

lowest price recorded for any onion future was 43 cents for the March 1954 

future in August 1953. During the last 18 trading days in March 1956, cash 

onion prices declined in a similar, but less drastic, fashion. 

Undoubtedly, the Texas onion crop had some depressing effect upon the March 

1956 futures price and the price of cash onions in Chicago. But, as concluded 

by Jorgensen, the prices of March futures and cash onions in Chicago after midFebruary were not the result of supply and demand but were artificial owing to 

the activities of respondents. Even respondents' witness Kleinman does not 

contend that the Texas onion crop was the only reason for the March price 

collapse. It is enough, for purposes of a finding of manipulation in violation 

of sections 6 (b) and 9 of the act, that respondents' action contributed to the 

price decline. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., supra, at p. 219. 

IV

Respondent Kosuga challenges section 6(b) of the act as an unlawful 

delegation of legislative power. We are in disagreement with this contention. 

Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1933). But, in any event, 

this respondent cannot expect an agency charged with administering a statute to 

hold the statute unconstitutional. Panitz v. District of Columbia, 122 F.2d 39 

(D.C. Cir. 1940); In re Corn Products Refining Co., 13 Agric. Dec. 1117 (13 A.D. 

1117), 1139 (1954); In re Edward R. Byer, 13 Agric. Dec. 873 (13 A.D. 873), 874 

(1954). See also Engineers Public Service Co. v. Securities and Exchange 

Commission, 138 F.2d 936, 952-953 (D.C. Cir. 1943), ordered dismissed as moot on 

motion of parties, 332 U.S. 788 (1947). 

The parties have raised many issues, objections, etc., herein. All 

contentions of the parties presented for the record have been considered and 

whether or not specifically mentioned herein, any suggestions, requests, 

objections, exceptions, etc., inconsistent with this decision are denied. 

We now address ourselves to the disagreeable but necessary task of 

determining the sanction to be imposed upon respondents for the violations of 

the act found. Complainant recommended that the registration of respondent 

Kosuga as a floor broker be revoked and that all trading privileges be denied to 

the respondents for a period of one year. The referee adopted these 

recommendations except that he proposed denial of trading privileges to Siegel 

and National for ten months. We have concluded that the evidence is not quite 

adequate to infer manipulative intent in Kosuga's trading activities in 

connection with the November 1955 future. The violations found, however, on the 

part of respondents are, of course, serious and of far-reaching consequences. 

We conclude that the proposals of the referee be followed except that the period 

of suspension of trading privileges be ten months for Kosuga as well as the 

other respondents. Trading in onion futures has been prohibited by Act of 

Congress (Public Law 85-839, 85th Congress, August 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 1013) so 
Page 16 

that there is no practical effect to the sanctions of denial of trading 

privileges insofar as trading in onion futures is concerned. 

ORDER

The charge that Kosuga attempted upward manipulation of 

 

the November 1955 future and cash onion prices is dismissed. 

Effective 30 days after the entry of this order, the registration of Vincent 

W. Kosuga as a floor broker is revoked. 

Effective 30 days after the entry of this order, all contract markets shall 

refuse all trading privileges to Vincent W. Kosuga for a period of ten months, 

such refusal to apply to all trading done and positions held by him and also to 

all trading done and positions held indirectly through persons owned or 

controlled by him. 

Effective 30 days after the entry of this order, all contract markets shall 

refuse all trading privileges to Sam S. Siegel and to National Produce 

Distributors, Inc., for a period of ten months, such refusal to apply to all 

trading done and positions held by them, and also to all trading done and 

positions held indirectly through persons owned or controlled by either of them. 

A copy of this decision and order shall be served upon each of the parties 

and upon each contract market. 

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