FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEDRO ANTONIO VASQUEZ-BORJAS,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 17-70867

Agency No.

A028-889-216

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 22, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed June 6, 2022

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan and Danielle J. Forrest, 

Circuit Judges, and Carol Bagley Amon,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Forrest

* The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge 

for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying in part and dismissing in part Pedro Antonio 

Vasquez-Borjas’s petition for review of a decision of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that a forgery 

under California Penal Code § 472 is a crime involving 

moral turpitude.

Vasquez-Borjas was convicted of forgery under Section 

472 for possession of a counterfeit government seal—a 

Social Security card that he knew was fake. The BIA 

concluded that this conviction was a crime involving moral 

turpitude that made him ineligible for cancellation of 

removal. Vasquez-Borjas argued that intent to defraud is not 

a required element under Section 472, and therefore, his 

forgery conviction was not a categorical crime involving 

moral turpitude. Specifically, Vasquez-Borjas argued that 

Section 472 is organized into three clauses and that intent to 

defraud is not an element of the so-called “possession” 

clause under which he was convicted. 

Applying the categorical approach, the panel considered 

the elements of Section 472 and concluded that California 

law does not support Vasquez-Borjas’s reading of the 

statute. The panel explained that it is reasonable to read the 

statutory text as requiring that all the prohibited acts be done 

“with the intent to defraud another,” and that no California 

court has held that Section 472 has separate clauses or that 

the intent-to-defraud element is limited to specific clauses or 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 3

actions. The panel also explained that California caselaw 

establishes that forgery requires intent to defraud and that 

California’s pattern jury instructions confirm that 

conclusion.

The panel compared the elements of Section 472 to the 

generic federal offense. The panel explained that the court’s 

caselaw establishes that the generic federal definition of 

forgery includes fraudulent intent and, therefore, it is a crime 

involving moral turpitude. Because California requires 

proof of intent to defraud for all Section 472 offenses, the

panel concluded that Section 472 is a categorical match with 

the federal definition of forgery, and that the BIA did not err 

in concluding that a Section 472 conviction is for a crime 

involving moral turpitude.

Vasquez-Borjas argued that, even if he was convicted of 

a crime involving moral turpitude, he was eligible for 

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)—the petty-offense exception. VasquezBorjas did not dispute that he failed to raise this issue in his 

immigration proceedings, but made three arguments for why 

it was exhausted. 

First, Vasquez-Borjas argued that the court could 

address the issue because the BIA addressed it on the merits. 

The panel rejected that contention, explaining that the BIA 

merely noted that Vasquez-Borjas had not made any 

argument related to the petty-offense exception and that it

appeared that the exception would not apply. Second, 

Vasquez-Borjas argued that his case was like Abebe v. 

Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), where 

the court concluded that an issue raised to the IJ, but not to 

the BIA, was exhausted because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 

entire decision under Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872
4 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

(BIA 1994). The panel concluded that the cases were not 

analogous, explaining that the IJ here did not address the 

petty-offense exception, and the BIA indicated that it 

considered only the IJ’s conclusion that Vasquez-Borjas was 

ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his conviction. 

Finally, Vasquez-Borjas contended that his argument to the 

BIA that his conviction did not render him inadmissible was 

sufficient to alert the BIA to the relevance of the petty 

offense exception. The panel concluded that the record 

belied that assertion, noting that the BIA did not read 

Vasquez-Borjas’s brief as raising the exception and nothing 

in the record demonstrated that the BIA’s observation was 

incorrect.

COUNSEL

Nicholas Hodges (argued), Jones Day, San Diego, 

California, for Petitioner.

Michael C. Heyse (argued), Acting Senior Litigation 

Counsel; Dawn S. Conrad, Senior Litigation Counsel; Mary 

Jane Candaux, Assistant Director; Brian M. Boynton, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 5

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied 

petitioner Pedro Antonio Vasquez-Borjas’s application for 

cancellation of removal, concluding that his California 

forgery conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude that 

disqualifies him from relief. Vasquez-Borjas seeks review of 

the BIA’s decision, arguing that his forgery conviction is not 

a categorical crime involving moral turpitude because intent 

to defraud is not a required element under California Penal 

Code § 472 (Section 472). Alternatively, he argues that, even 

if his conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, he is 

nonetheless eligible for cancellation of removal under 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)’s petty-offense exception. 

Because we conclude that intent to defraud is a required 

element of a Section 472 conviction and because VasquezBorjas failed to exhaust his petty-offense-exception 

argument, we deny in part and dismiss in part his petition for 

relief.

I. BACKGROUND

Vasquez-Borjas, a native and citizen of Honduras, 

entered the United States unlawfully. He has a child who is 

a United States citizen. After entering the United States, 

Vasquez-Borjas was convicted of multiple crimes, including

forgery for knowingly possessing a counterfeit Social 

Security card in violation of Section 472. He was sentenced 

to 14 days in jail and two years’ probation for this offense.

Over a decade after his California forgery conviction, the 

government charged Vasquez-Borjas as removable under 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United 

States unlawfully. Vasquez-Borjas conceded that he was 
6 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

removable and applied for cancellation of removal and 

adjustment of status. He asserted that he was entitled to relief 

because his teenage United States citizen child would suffer 

hardship if he was removed.

After a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied 

Vasquez-Borjas’s application for relief because his 

California forgery conviction was a crime involving moral 

turpitude that “bar[red] him from cancellation of removal.”1

Vasquez-Borjas appealed to the BIA, arguing, among other 

things, that the IJ erred in concluding that his forgery 

conviction was categorically a crime involving moral 

turpitude because Section 472 “is divisible and does not 

necessarily involve ‘the intent to defraud another.’” The BIA 

dismissed Vasquez-Borjas’s appeal. Relying on People v. 

Castellanos, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1489 (2003), the BIA 

concluded that Vasquez-Borjas was statutorily ineligible for 

cancellation because his forgery conviction was 

categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. In a 

footnote, the BIA also stated that even though VasquezBorjas had not argued the petty-offense exception, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii), “it appear[ed] that the exception . . .

would not apply.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where the BIA conducts an independent review of the 

facts and law, we review only the BIA’s decision. QuijadaAguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 2015). We 

review questions of law, like identification of the statutory 

1 Vasquez-Borjas’s child was 20 years old at the time of the IJ’s 

decision.
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 7

elements of conviction, de novo. Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 

1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

An alien facing a lawful removal order may seek 

cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4), 

1229b(b)(1). However, the Immigration and Nationality Act 

specifies several eligibility requirements for this relief. 

Relevant here, cancellation of removal is unavailable to 

someone who has been convicted of a crime involving moral 

turpitude for which a term of one year or more of 

imprisonment may be imposed. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). But 

there is an exception where the person has “committed only 

one crime,” the maximum penalty for which did not exceed 

one year, and the sentence imposed did not exceed six 

months. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). This is known as the 

petty-offense exception. See Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 

680, 692 n.11 (9th Cir. 2020). We address both whether 

Vasquez-Borjas was convicted of a crime involving moral 

turpitude and the petty-offense exception.

A. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

In determining whether a state conviction is a crime 

involving moral turpitude we follow the “three-step process” 

outlined in Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013). 

Barbosa, 926 F.3d at 1057. First, we apply the categorical 

approach by “identify[ing] the elements of the statute of 

conviction” and then comparing those elements “to the 

generic definition of a [crime involving moral turpitude] and 

decide whether the conviction meets that definition.” 

Barbosa, 926 F.3d at 1057 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). If this analysis “reveals that the elements of the 

state crime are the same as or narrower than the elements of 

the federal offense, then the state crime is a categorical 
8 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

match, and every conviction under that statute qualifies as [a 

crime involving moral turpitude].” Id. (alterations in 

original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review 

the BIA’s construction of state and federal statutes de novo. 

Id.

If the state statute is overbroad, meaning it criminalizes 

conduct that the federal statute does not, we proceed to step 

two and analyze whether the state statute is divisible. Id. “If 

the statute is indivisible, ‘our inquiry ends, because a 

conviction under an indivisible, overbroad statute can never 

serve as a predicate offense.’” Id. (quoting Almanza-Arenas 

v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 475 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). But 

if the state statute is divisible, we proceed to step three—the 

modified categorial approach—and “examine certain 

documents from the defendant’s record of conviction to 

determine what elements of the divisible statute he was 

convicted of violating.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, we 

conclude at step one that Section 472 is a categorical match 

to the federal definition of forgery, which is a crime 

involving moral turpitude, and therefore we need not address 

steps two and three.

1. Elements of Section 472

Vasquez-Borjas was convicted of misdemeanor forgery 

for possession of a counterfeit government seal—a Social 

Security card that he knew was fake. Vasquez-Borjas’s 

statute of conviction provides:

Every person who, with intent to defraud 

another, forges, or counterfeits the seal of this 

State, the seal of any public officer authorized 

by law, the seal of any Court of record, or the 

seal of any corporation, or any other public 

seal authorized or recognized by the laws of 
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 9

this State, or of any other State, Government, 

or country, or who falsely makes, forges, or 

counterfeits any impression purporting to be 

an impression of any such seal, or who has in 

his possession any such counterfeited seal or 

impression thereof, knowing it to be 

counterfeited, and willfully conceals the 

same, is guilty of forgery.

Cal. Penal Code § 472.

The parties’ primary dispute is whether intent to defraud 

is a required element of Section 472. Vasquez-Borjas argues 

that this statute is organized into three clauses and intent to 

defraud is an element only of the first clause, which he calls 

the “seal clause.” He contends that the third clause that was 

the basis for his conviction (termed the “possession clause”) 

requires only the following elements: (1) possession of a 

forged or counterfeit seal or impression; (2) knowledge that 

it was counterfeit; and (3) willful concealment of the seal’s 

counterfeit nature.

California law does not support Vasquez-Borjas’s 

reading of this statute. It is reasonable to read the statutory 

text as requiring that all the prohibited acts be done “with the 

intent to defraud another.” Cal. Penal Code § 472. And 

significantly, no California court has held that Section 472 

has separate clauses or that the intent-to-defraud element is 

limited to specific clauses or actions listed in the statute. See, 

e.g., Castellanos, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1493; cf. Pereida v. 

Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 759 (2021) (listing the separate 

clauses of Nebraska’s criminal impersonation statute). 

Instead, California caselaw establishes that forgery “has 

three elements: a writing or other subject of forgery, the false 

making of the writing, and intent to defraud.” Castellanos, 
10 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

110 Cal. App. 4th at 1493 (quoting People v. GaulAlexander, 32 Cal. App. 4th 735, 741 (1995)); see also 

People v. Terrill, 133 Cal. 120, 125 (1901) (“Section[] . . .

472 provide[s] that every person who, with the intent to 

defraud another, does certain acts therein enumerated is 

guilty of forgery.”) (emphasis added); see also MirandaRomero v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 2015) (“In 

light of the California courts’ longstanding interpretation of 

this statute, we hold that a conviction under § 472 always 

includes the element of a specific intent to defraud and is 

thus categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”).

Of particular relevance here, Castellanos made clear that 

a Section 472 conviction based on possession requires proof 

of intent to defraud. It established that fraudulent intent may 

be established by proof that the defendant possessed a forged 

or counterfeit seal or impression separate from whether the 

defendant used the forged item to gain some benefit or 

advantage. See Castellanos, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1493. 

Castellanos argued that because he did not present or furnish 

his forged resident alien card “to obtain money or property 

of value there [was] no substantial evidence he had the intent 

to defraud.” Id. The California Court of Appeal disagreed, 

noting that intent can be proven with circumstantial evidence 

and that the defendant’s forged card could deceive an 

employer into believing that he was lawfully authorized to 

work in the United States. Id. at 1493–94. That is, it would 

be reasonable for a factfinder to conclude that the defendant 

possessed the forged card for the purpose of defrauding 

someone into believing that it was valid. Thus, the 

Castellanos court concluded that substantial evidence 

established an intent to defraud even though the defendant 

had not used the forged document to obtain money or 

anything else of value. Id. at 1494.
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 11

California’s pattern jury instructions also confirm that 

intent to defraud is a required element for any Section 472 

offense. See Betansos v. Barr, 928 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2019) (relying on pattern jury instructions to determine the 

elements of a California crime). California Jury InstructionCriminal (CALJIC) No. 15.00 identifies intent to defraud as 

a required element for forgery. CALJIC 15.00; see also 

Castellanos, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1493 (discussing CALJIC 

15.00 in relation to forgery charge based on possession of a 

counterfeit document). Vasquez-Borjas points to a different 

set of pattern instructions—the Judicial Council of 

California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM)—and 

notes that they provide separate instructions for forgery and 

possession of a forged document. That may be, but this does 

not help Vasquez-Borjas’s argument because the specific 

instruction for a Section 472 charge based on possession of 

a forged document lists intent to defraud as a required 

element and explains what constitutes intent to defraud. 

CALCRIM No. 1926; see People v. Calistro, 12 Cal. App. 

5th 387, 402 (2017) (“While the newer CALCRIM 

instructions have been endorsed by the California Judicial 

Council and are generally viewed as superior to the older 

CALJIC instructions, the CALJIC instructions are not 

necessarily defective or inadequate.”).

Vasquez-Borjas argues that applying the intent-todefraud element to the so-called “possession clause” would 

nullify the requirement that a person “willfully conceal[]” 

the forged nature of the document possessed. Cal. Penal 

Code § 472. According to Vasquez-Borjas, fraudulent intent 

means an intent to gain an advantage at the expense of 

another person but willful concealment does not require any 

such intent. He argues, therefore, that applying an intent-todefraud element to a possession-based offense “nullifies the 

legislature’s decision to use the word ‘willfully’” and 
12 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

“would make the word ‘willfully’ entirely superfluous.” His 

argument is not persuasive.

We “look[] to the state courts to determine the elements 

of state law.” Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1088 n.13 

(9th Cir. 2014). And as explained, California has determined 

that intent to defraud is a required element for all Section 

472 convictions. See Castellanos, 100 Cal. App. 4th 

at 1493–94 (citing CALJIC 15.00); CALCRIM No. 1926. If 

requiring both elements contradicted California’s legislative 

intent, the California courts could have said so.2 It is not our 

role as a federal court to supplant California’s interpretation 

of its own law.

Vasquez-Borjas also argues that under the rule of the last 

antecedent, we should not apply the phrase “intent to 

defraud” beyond the immediately following so-called “seal 

clause.” Under this rule, “a limiting clause or phrase . . .

should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or 

phase that it immediately follows.” Lockhart v. United 

States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016) (quoting Barnhart v. 

Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). Vasquez-Borjas asserts 

that we should apply the phrase “intent to defraud” only to 

the “who” in the “forges or counterfeits the seal” clause and 

not to the subsequent “whos” referenced in the “makes, 

forges, or counterfeits any impression” or possession 

2 We note that Vasquez-Borjas’s proposed reading of Section 472 as 

having three clauses, two of which do not require specific intent to 

defraud, leads to the strange result that a person who counterfeits a 

government seal must have the intent to defraud but a person who 

“counterfeits any impression purporting to be an impression of any such 

seal” does not. Cal. Penal Code § 472; see Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of 

Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of 

statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”).
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 13

clauses. This contention is again foreclosed by California 

caselaw and pattern jury instructions.

In sum, Vasquez-Borjas concedes that “[a]n element of 

a crime is a constituent part of the offense which must be 

proved by the prosecution in every case to sustain a 

conviction under a given statute.” California law establishes 

that intent to defraud is an element of a Section 472 offense, 

including a charge based on possession. Therefore, we 

accept California’s construction of its own law and conclude 

that intent to defraud is a necessary element of all 

convictions under Section 472.

2. Comparison to Generic Federal Offense

Having determined the elements of Vasquez-Borjas’s 

California forgery conviction, we next compare those 

elements to “the elements of the generic offense defined by 

federal law.” Barbosa, 926 F.3d at 1057 (quoting AlmanzaArenas, 815 F.3d at 475). While we review the BIA’s 

construction of state and federal statutes de novo, its 

“conclusion that a particular crime does or does not involve 

moral turpitude is subject to different standards of review 

depending on whether the BIA issues or relies on a published 

decision in coming to its conclusion.” Nunez v. Holder, 

594 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010); see also MarmolejoCampos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en 

banc). Where, as here, the BIA’s decision was not published 

and it did not rely on one of its own published decisions, we 

afford Skidmore deference—that is, we defer “to [the BIA’s] 

conclusion to the extent that it has the ‘power to persuade.’” 

Barbosa, 926 F.3d at 1057–58 (quoting Nunez, 594 F.3d 

at 1129).

But ultimately we need not wrestle long with the BIA’s 

conclusion that Vasquez-Borjas’s conviction was for a crime 
14 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

involving moral turpitude because this aspect of the 

categorical approach is straightforward here. Our caselaw 

establishes that the generic federal definition of forgery 

includes fraudulent intent and, therefore, it is a crime 

involving moral turpitude. See Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 

514 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2008) (fraudulent intent is 

element of federal generic definition of forgery); RoblesUrrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012) (offenses 

“involving fraud” are crimes involving moral turpitude). 

Whereas California requires proof of intent to defraud for all 

Section 472 offenses, Section 472 is a categorical match with 

the federal definition of forgery, and the BIA did not err in 

concluding that a conviction under Section 472 is for a crime 

involving moral turpitude. See Barbosa, 926 F.3d at 1057.

We are not persuaded by Vasquez-Borjas’s arguments 

that Section 472 is broader than its federal counterpart. He 

hypothesizes that Section 472 criminalizes mere possession 

of counterfeit identification. To the extent he contends that 

Section 472 criminalizes simple possession where the person 

does not have the intent to defraud another person, he is 

incorrect for the reasons we have already explained. And 

whether or not California has a separate statute that 

specifically criminalizes possession of a counterfeit 

identification does not undermine the conclusion that 

Section 472 is a categorical match to a crime involving moral 

turpitude.

Vasquez-Borjas’s reliance on our decision in BeltranTirado v. INS is also misplaced. 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 

2000). That case addressed whether a federal criminal statute 

was a crime involving moral turpitude, and we have limited 

our decision there to its context. See id. at 1183–85; EspinoCastillo v. Holder, 770 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(finding Beltran-Tirado inapplicable “because [its] holding 
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 15

depended on the history of the specific statutory provision 

involved in that case, and not a garden-variety state fraud 

statute”). Beltran-Tirado was convicted under a federal 

statute for making a false statement on an employment 

verification form by using someone else’s Social Security 

number. See id. at 1182. Based on a later amendment to the 

federal statute addressing use of false Social Security cards 

and numbers and the related legislative history, we 

concluded that Beltran-Tirado’s “use of a false Social 

Security number to further otherwise legal behavior is not a 

crime of ‘moral turpitude.’” Id. at 1184. We have 

subsequently described Beltran-Tirado as “at best [] an 

isolated exception to the prevailing rule that a conviction for 

a fraud offense is categorically a crime involving moral 

turpitude.” Espino-Castillo, 770 F.3d at 865.

The conduct at issue here and in Beltran-Tirado is 

similar—both involved a false Social Security card. But the 

statutes of conviction are different, and therefore BeltranTirado has no bearing on Section 472’s alignment with the 

federal definition of forgery. Cf. Espino-Castillo, 770 F.3d 

at 865. In sum, we reject Vasquez-Borjas’s argument that the 

BIA erred in concluding that his Section 472 conviction was

a crime involving moral turpitude that rendered him 

ineligible for cancellation of removal.3

B. The Petty-Offense Exception

Vasquez-Borjas argues that, even if he was convicted of 

a crime involving moral turpitude, he remains eligible for 

3 Because we conclude that Section 472 is a categorical match to its 

federal counterpart, we do not address Vasquez-Borjas’s arguments 

about divisibility or the modified categorical approach. See AlmanzaArenas, 815 F.3d at 475.
16 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)—the petty-offense exception. VasquezBorjas does not dispute that he failed to raise this issue in his 

immigration proceedings, but he makes three arguments for 

why it was nonetheless exhausted. We reject all three 

arguments and conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider 

the merits of this exception.

First, Vasquez-Borjas argues that we can properly 

address the petty-offense exception because the BIA 

addressed this provision on the merits. While VasquezBorjas is correct that we “may review any issue addressed 

on the merits by the BIA, regardless of whether the petitioner 

raised it before the agency,” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 

901, 914 (9th Cir. 2018), he is incorrect that the BIA 

addressed the merits of this exception. The BIA merely 

noted that Vasquez-Borjas had not made any argument 

related to the petty-offense exception and that “it appear[ed] 

that the exception . . . would not apply.” This equivocal and 

summary rejection of an unraised issue does not constitute 

an adjudication on the merits. See Vizcarra-Ayala, 514 F.3d 

at 874.

Second, Vasquez-Borjas argues that his case is like 

Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc). Abebe addressed whether an argument considered by 

the IJ but not raised to the BIA was properly exhausted. Id.

at 1040–41. We concluded that the issue was exhausted 

because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s entire decision citing 

Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), “to 

signify that it had conducted an independent review of the 

record and had exercised its own discretion in determining 

that its conclusions were the same as those articulated by the 

IJ.” Id. at 1040. Here, the IJ did not address the petty-offense 

exception, and the BIA indicated that it considered only the 
VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 17

IJ’s conclusion that Vasquez-Borjas was ineligible for 

cancellation of removal due to his forgery conviction. These 

cases are not analogous.

Finally, Vasquez-Borjas contends that his argument 

made to the BIA that his forgery conviction did not render 

him inadmissible was sufficient to “alert the BIA to the 

relevance of the petty offense exception.” The record belies 

this assertion. The BIA did not read Vasquez-Borjas’s 

briefing as raising the petty-offense exception; it stated that 

“[Vasquez-Borjas] has not set forth any argument regarding 

the applicability of the ‘petty offense’ exception to his case.” 

Nothing in the record demonstrates that the BIA’s 

observation was incorrect. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Vasquez-Borjas did not administratively exhaust his 

argument related to the petty-offense exception and, 

therefore, we dismiss this aspect of his petition for review 

because we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(d)(1); Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 

748 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART; 

DISMISSED IN PART.