We will refer to the appellants c ollectively as “a ppellants” or individually as “the City ” or 1 “Hood.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00179- CV
City of San Angelo F ire De partm ent and Kelly Hood, App ellants

v. Sheila H uds on, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY , 340TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C-02- 1279 -C, H ONO RAB LE BEN WO ODW ARD, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N Ap p el l an t s C i t y

o f S an An gel o Fi re De p ar t m en tan d Ke l l y Ho o d ar e d ef

en d i n g a 1 lawsuit brought by

Sheila Hudson alleg ing pe rsonal injury and prope rty

damag e ca

used by the operation or use of a

motor vehicle by

a g overnme ntal entity o r em p l o y ee u nder the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§101.001-.109 ( West 2005). Appellants asser t that, beca use the City

and Hood e njoy ed sovere ign immunit y and off icial immunity , the trial cour t

err ed in deny

ing the ir motions for summary judgme nt. We will reverse the orde r of the tr ial court

and re nd e r j ud g me nt d ism iss ingHu ds on ’s c la ims

.Hudson’s af fidavit also asser

ts that she was followinganother car into the intersection. 2 2 BACK GR OUND On Aug ust 20, 2002, Hood, a City of San Ang elo fire fig hter, drove a pumper truck in r e sp on se to a

dis patc h r e po rt

of a str on g od or

of so me thi ngburn ingin a day care faci lity wi th occupa nts stil l inside the building. B eca use he w as onl y a fe w blocks fr om the day car e fa cility and beca use the other

two dispatched e ng ines we re comi ng from a g reater distance , Hood anticipate d being the first pumper tr

uck on the scene and being responsible for evaluating the scene , evac uating the occ upants, and makingthe i nitial attack on the fire. Hood contends he procee ded south in the outside lane of A

be Street b el o w the spee d limit of 35 miles per hour , with emerg ency lights and sirens activate d and blowing the air horn. He aver s that he slowed as he approa ched the intersec tion of Abe and B eaur eg ard, looke d both way s, observe d traff ic stopped i n all direc tions, and, believing all east a nd west traf

fic wa s y ielding, e ntere d the intersec tion ag ainst the l ight at around 10 miles per hour. Hudson enter ed the inter section at a speed of 25 miles pe r hour afte r obser ving that her lig ht was green. I n the intersec tion, the pumper truck c ollided with Hudson’s vehicle, w hich 2 then spun around a

nd collided with another

vehicle, c ausing damag e to the front and side pane ls of Hudson’s vehic le and to the left and front of the pumper truck’s bumper. Whil e the fire fig hters fr om Hood’s vehic le administered f irst aid t o Hudson, other f ire truc ks proce eded to the sc ene of the repor ted fire

.3 DI SCU SSIO N Appellants moved for summary judgme nt, but the district denied appe llants’ motion. I nterlocutory

order s, like the order

denying summar

y judgm en t in this case, ty pically are not immediately

appea lable. Gross v. Inne s , 988 S.W .2d 727, 729 (Tex. 1998). But se ction 51.014(a) of the c ivil practice and remedies code allows for interlocutory appea ls in cer tain case s. Tex. Ci v. Pr a c . & Re m. C od e § 51. 01 4(a) (W est 1 99 7 & Sup p. 20 04 -0 5) ; Gr os s , 988 S.W .2d at 729. Spe c if ic a lly , s e c tio n 5 1. 01 4( a )( 5) pr ov ide s f or int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l f ro m an o rder tha

t de nie s a motion for summary

judgme nt that is based on an assertion of immunity by a g overnme ntal actor

. Te x. Civ

. Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e § 51 .0 14 (a )( 5)

. I n the ir mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g men t, app e lla

nts

a s s e rt e d t h a tt h e c l a i m s a g a i n s tH o o d w e r e b ar r e d b e c a u s e H o o d h a d o f f i c i a l i m m u n i t y. When revie wing the denial of a summary judgme nt, we a pply the same standa

rd used in review ing the g rant of a summary judgme nt. El Paso County v. Ontive ros , 36 S.W .3d 711, 714-15 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pe t.). I n a traditional summary judgme nt motion, t he movant has the burd e n o f s ho wi ng the re is no g e nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f a c t and that it is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
ma tte r o f l aw. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Browning v. Prostok , 1 6 5 S. W. 3 d 3 3 6 , 3 4 4 ( T e x. 2 0 0 5 )

. We take a s true evide nce f

avora ble to the non-movant a

nd resolve all doubts in its favor

. Friendswood Dev

. Co. v

. McD ade &Co. , 9 26 S.W. 2d 28 0, 28 2 ( Te x. 19 96 ); Ha rwe ll v . S tat e Fa rm Mu t. A uto . I

ns . Co., 896 S.W .2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1995). The movant is entitled to summary judgme nt if the evidenc e disproves, as a m at t er of law, at least one e lement of e ach of the plaintiff’s c auses of

action or conclusively establishes eac h element of an aff irmative def

ense. Friendswood , 926 S.W .2d at 282. To establish an a ffir

ma ti v e d e f e n s e , th e d e f

e n dant-movant must prese nt summary judgme nt evidenceI n their first issue, appe llants a rg ue that the trial court err ed in de ny ing City ’s no-e vidence 3 motion for summary

judgme nt. They

contend that, be cause Hudson did not p ro d u ce more than a scintilla of evidenc e to e s t ab l i s h the vital fac t that Hood violated an a pplicable state or loca l emer gen cy response law or a cted with consc ious indiffere nce or rec kless disreg ard, the City ’s immunit y fro m s u it

w a s n o t w a iv e d

an d th a t t h e c o u rt, th e r e f

o r e , d id n o t h a v e s u

b je c t- matt er jurisdiction. I n th ei r fi n al i ssue, appe llants assert that the City ’s plea to the jur isdiction reg arding Hudson’s cla im of failure to train or improper training should be g rante d beca use the c laim does not arise f rom the oper ation of a moto r v eh i cl e or from the use of tang ible or per sonal proper ty and, there fore , the City ’s sovere ign immunity was not wa ived. 4 that establishes ea ch ele ment of the a ffirmative defe nse as a matter of la

w. See R yland Group, Inc

. v. Hood , 924 S.W .2d 120, 121 (Tex. 1996).

A summary

judgme n t m ay

be base d on uncontrove rted testimonial evidenc e of a n interested w itness if the evidenc e is clea r, positive and dire ct, otherw ise cre dible and fr ee f rom contra diction, and could have been r eadily controve rted. Te x . R. Civ. P . 166a(c ). I f the de fenda nt establishes a r ight to summary judgme nt, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence r aising a mater ial fac t issue. Centeq Realty, I nc. v. Sie gler , 899 S.W .2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). On appe al, appe llan t s raise f our issues. Howe ver, be cause we f ind issues two and three dispositi ve of the appea l, w e do not r eac h appellants’ first and fourth issues. I n their sec ond 3 issue, appellants a ssert that the district cour t should have g rante d the City ’s traditional motion for summary judgme nt. Appellants contend they conclusively

proved that Hood did not violate any applicable law, and, the ref ore, the City ’s immunity

from suit was not waived. I n their third issue, appellants a

rg ue that the tria l court er red in d enying H ood’s traditional motion for summary jud g me nt b a se d o n o ff

ic ia l im mun ity

be c a us e he c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli sh e d th a t he a c te d in

g oo d f a ith in the perf

ormanc e of discr etionary

duties within the scope of his employ ment.Section 101.055 also states that sovere ign immunity is not waived if, in the abse nce of laws 4 or ordinan ces gove rning emer g ency action, the a ction is not taken with conscious indiffe renc e or re c kle ss d isr e g ard

fo r t he sa fe ty of oth e rs . Te x. Civ

. Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 01 .0 55 (2 ) ( Wes t 2005). B eca

use in this case the City of S an An gel o C o de of O rdinanc es and the Texas Transpor tatio n C o d e b o t h g overn the operation of emerg ency vehicles in situations like the one prese nt in this case , the conscious indiffer ence or reckless dis reg ard provision of the civil prac tice and re medies code does not apply

. Se e id

. 5 Sovereign Im m uni ty not Waived

I n their sec ond issue, appellants a ssert the Ci ty ’ s s o v e r e ig n immunit y was not wa ived. A g overnme ntal unit is immune from sui t and li ability unless the s tate consents. Da lla s A re a R ap id Transit v. W hitley , 1 04 S.W. 3d

54 0, 54 2 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Go ve rnme nta l immun ity fr om s uit de fe a ts a court’s subjec t-matter jurisdiction. Id . Wh e the r a tr ia l c ourt

has su bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n is a question of law w e r ev iew de novo

. Ma y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 9 6 4 S. W. 2 d

9 2 2 , 9 2 8 ( T e x. 1998). “In a suit ag ainst a g overnme ntal unit, the pla int iff mus t a ff ir ma tiv e ly dem on str a te the cour t’s jurisdiction by

alleg ing a

valid waiver

of immunity .” W

hitley , 10 4 S.W .3d at 542 (empha sis added). The Tort C laims Act waives sovere ign immuni ty for damag e and injury cause d by the wr on g fu l a c t or

omi ssi on or ne g lig e nc e of

an e mpl oy e e op e ra

tin g or us inga mot or ve hic le within the scope of his e mploy ment. Tex. C i v . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021. This waiver does not apply wher e the claim arises fr om the action of a n employ ee r esponding to an emer g ency
c a ll i n c omp lia

nc e wi th a

pp lic a ble laws and

or din anc e s. Id. § 101.055(2).

4 Th e un de rl y ingpo lic y

of the e me rg e nc y

re sp on se e xce pti on

is to b a lanc e the sa fe ty of t h e p u b l i c wi th the need f or prompt re sponse from e merg ency personne l. City of Amarill o v. Ma rti n , 9 71 S.W. 2d

42 6, 42 9 ( Te x. 19 98 ). I mpo sin g lia bil ity fo r a me re fa ilure in j ud g me nt c ou ld6

deter emer g ency

personne l from ac ti n g decisively and fr om taking c alculate d risks. Id. at 430 (q u o t i n g Sa ar ine n v . Ke rr , 644 N.E.2d 988, 992 (N.Y. 1994)). This would also allow for judicial second guessing of t he spl it-second and time-pressur ed decisions emer g ency personne l are forc ed to make. See id. (q u o t i n g Saarinen , 644 N.E.2d at 992).

The leg islature has pl ac ed a higher burden upon c ivilian drivers than upon

emer g ency -vehic le drivers; this burden is jus tified bec ause e merg ency -vehic le oper ators fa ce mor e exigent circ umstances than civilian drivers and beca use civilian drivers ha

ve the a dvantag e of be ing able to pre vent collisions with emerg ency vehicles due to the emer g ency vehicles use of sirens a nd lights and due to the conspi cuous coloringof eme rg ency vehicles. Id. at 431-32. Emer g ency responde rs ar e entitled to pre sume other dr ivers will respe ct emer g ency priorities. Id. at 432. T o e s ta b li s h th e a f

f ir mati v e d e f

e n s e u n d e r s e c ti o n 1 0 1

. 0 5 5 ( 2 ) f o r th e p u r p o s e s of

su mma ry jud g me nt, a

pp e lla nts mus t pro ve Ho od wa s re sp on din g to a n e me rg e nc y

c a ll a nd a c te d in compliance with the laws applica ble to the emer g ency

situation. Se e Du rh am v . B owi e Cou nty , 135 S.W. 3d 29 4, 29 8 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 04 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see also City of Galve ston v. W hitman , 919 S.W .2d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (s ec t i o n 101.055(2) require s g overnme nt to demonstrate complianc e with laws a nd ordinanc es t o preve nt waiver of immunit y ). The tra

nsportation code pr ovides that, in operating an authorized emer g ency vehicle, a state e mploy ee ma

y proce ed past a

red lig ht after slowing a s nece ssary for sa fe ope ration if that operator is responding to but not returning from a f ire a larm. Tex. T ransp. Code A nn. §§ 546.001, .0 02 (W est 19 99 & Sup p. 20 04 -0 5) . M or e ov e r, the op e rator mus t us e , at hi s d isc re tio n a nd in7

compliance with loc al g overnme nt or depar tment policy , appropr iate audible or visual signa ls. Id

. § 546.003 (West 1999). The transportation c ode does not relieve emer g ency -vehic le oper ators fr om the duty to exercise appr opriate r eg ard f or the saf ety of all per sons or fr o m the conse quence s of

rec kless disreg ard f

or others’ safe ty
. Id

. § 5 4 6

. 0 0 5 ( W e s t1 9 9 9 )

. T h e a c t i o no f ane m e r g e n c yvehicle operator constitutes a re ckless disreg ard f or the saf ety of others w hen the ope rator know s or should have known that the action in que stion posed a high risk of serious injury to others. Sm ith v. Janda , 126 S.W .3d 543, 545 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

Simi larly , the San Ang elo Code of Or dinance s permits a d ri ver of an author ized

emer g ency

vehicle r esponding to an emerg ency call or responding to but not returning from a f ire alar m to procee d past a re d light or stop signa l if the driver uses audible signa ls while in moti on as
may be re a so na

bly ne c e ssa ry and if the ve hic le is e qu ipp e d w itha t le a st o ne re d li g ht ed la mp normally visible from 500 fee t, but “o n l y af ter slowing down as may be nec essar

y for sa fe operations.” San Ang elo, Tex ., 1959 Code of Or dinance s, Sec. 10-3- 2 § 10.102(g )(2) (B ), (3) (1959). Th e San Ang e lo co de do e s not re lie ve the dr ive r fr om t he du ty to d ri ve wi th d

ue re g ard fo r t he sa fe ty of all per sons or protec t the driver from the conseque nces of his r eckle ss disre g ard for the safe ty of others. Id . § 10.102(g )(4)

.

The uncontrove rted e vidence establishes that Hood wa s responding to an emer g ency call, and, the ref

ore, a pp el l an t s h ave satisfied the first re quirement for the claimed a ffirmative de fe ns e . We no w t

ur n to wh e the r a

pp e lla nts have c on clu sive ly

e sta bli sh e d th a t H oo d’ s r e sp on se complied with the applica ble laws a nd ordinanc es.8 I n hi s af fi d av i t , Hood stated that he was drivingbelow the spe ed limit, that he signific antly

slowed as he was re achingthe intersec tion, that he l o o k ed in bot h direc tions and observe d that traff

ic had y ielded to him before g oing th roug h the intersec tion, and that his speed wh e n g oin g thr ou g h th e int e rs e c tio n w a s, a t ma ximum , te n mil e s pe r h our. F ur the r, Ho od

state d th a t, beca use the tra ffic ha d y i el d ed t o h im, he conclude d it was best to move slowly throug h the intersec tion r ather than coming to a complete stop bec ause he would lose prec ious tim e as the truck takes a g reat deal of time to acc eler ate afte r stopping c ompletely . Hood also stated in a de position that he had his foot on th e b ra k e when procee ding thr oug h the intersec tion and applied his brake harde r whe n he obser

ved Hudson’s c ar he ading towards the inter section. I n addition, Hood stated that the sire n and l i g hts were activate d and that anothe r firef ighte r wa s sounding the a ir horn as the truck a pproac hed t h e interse ction. Although H udson

a sse rt s sh e did

no t se e or

he ar t he tr uc k, wi tne sse s a

nd the po lic e re po rt

ind ic a te that th e lig hts , sirens, and air horn wer e used. One driver stated in a n aff idavit that, a fter hear ing the fire tr uck, he stopped prior to ente ring the intersec tion and observe d that traff ic h ad s topped to y ield to the fire t ru ck

. T h e w i t n es s al s o s t at edt h at t h e f i re t ru ckd i d

n o tap p ea r t o b e s p ee d i n g. We hold that appellants have conclusively demonstrated that Hood c o mp li e d w ith the applicable statutes and ordina nces a s a m at t er o f l aw. Se e Sm ith , 126 S.W .3d at 545-46 (holding ambulance driver not r eckle ss as matter of law under

emer g ency

response exception after demonstrating that he re spond ed t o emerg ency situation, that he activate d ambulance ’s lights a nd siren, that he slowed when approa ching intersec tion a nd observe d drivers y ielding to a mbulance, a

nd that he proc eede d throug h intersec tion without coming to c omplete stop). Acc ording ly , the burde nHuds o n a ls o ar g u e s th a t th e a f f id a v it s in d ic a te th a t s h e d id n o t s to p o r a lt e r h e r la n e of 5 tr a v e l a s s h e e n te r e d th e in te r s e c ti o n . T h is e v id e n c e , w h ic h ma y s h o w th a t H u d s o nd id

n o t r e a li ze Hood was e ntering the intersec tion ag ainst the light, is irre levant to our de termination of whe ther there is a fac t issue reg ardingwhether Hood slowed a s nece ssary for safe operation before proce eding throug h a re d light. Appellants re quest that we r ever se the trial c ourt’s orde r dec lining to strike that portion of 6 Har ring ton’s aff

idavit containing the statement that the f ire truc k did not brake at all beca use it was conclusory

and did not provide a

ny underly ing f acts to support the que stion. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 166a(f ) (to be c ompetent summary judgme nt evidence , aff idavi ts must be made on per sonal knowledg e, set for

th fac ts that would be admissible in evidence , and affirmatively show that aff iant is competent to testify

to matters stated ther ein). B eca use the a ffidavit d o es n ot indicate how Har ring ton made the a ssessment that the fire truck did not use its b ra k es at all when e ntering the intersec tion, we ag ree that the conc lusory statement is not competent summ ary judgme nt evidence 9 shifts to Hudson to ra i s e a genuine issue of material f act r eg ardingHood’s complianc e with the applicable statutes and ordina nces. See id. Although a dmitti ng in her de position t hat she did not k n o w whether the fire truck slowed bec ause she did not see it, Hudson points to two witness aff idavits as proof that Hood f ailed to f oll owa pp lic a ble laws and

or din anc e s a

nd tha t he a c te d in

c on sc iou s in dif

fe re nc e or re c kle ss disreg ard f

or the safe ty of others. Hudson also alleg es that the damag e to her vehicle a nd to the fire 5 truck sug g est Hood wa s speedingwhen he enter ed the inter section.

The a ffidavit of J ohn David Br unson, a witness to the acc ident, indicates that the f ire truck “ enter ed the intersec tion f rom the outside lane without stopping ” and that “I [Brunson] did not hear the fire truck put on its brake s.” The a ffidavit of A pril Harr ington, a

nother witness, stated that three other e merg ency

vehicles ha d g one throug h the intersec tion five minutes bef ore H ood drove throug h the intersec tion so “I [Harring ton] don’t understa nd why this fire truck ha d to rush[,] ” that “the f ire truc k slammed into the red car full forc e,” and t hat “the fire truck di d not use its brakes at all when e ntering the intersec tion.” 6and strike it. See R yland Group, Inc . v. Hood , 9 2 4 S. W. 2 d 1 2 0 , 1 2 2 ( T e x. 1 9 96); B r o w n l ee v. Brownlee , 665 S.W .2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984). 10

Neithe r af

fi d av it raises a f

act issue that Hood did not slow as ne cessa ry befor e proce eding throug h an intersec tion with a red light or acte d with r eckle ss disre g ard for the safe ty of others. B runson’s obser

vations—that Hood “e ntere d the intersec tion .

. . without stopping” and that B ru ns on “ did no t he ar” br a ke s b e inga

pp lie d— are no t e vid e nc e of re c kle ss d isr e g ard

fo r t he sa fe ty of others, nor are they evidenc e Hood did not slow as nece ssary for safe operation. That an automobile enter s an interse ction without stopping could be as true of an automobil e traveling at one mile per hour a s one trave ling at six ty miles per hour. Me rely stating t h e t ruck e ntere d the intersec tion without stoppi ng is not evidence of re cklessness or conscious indiffe renc e without an indication of other obse rvations desc ribing the circ umstances or condit ions that made the a ction

re c kle ss o r c on sc iou sly

ind if fe re nt. Simi larl y , th e fa c t th a t B ru ns on did no t hear the truck brake does not addre ss whether

the driver slowed as ne cessa

ry or acted wit h rec kless disreg ard f or the saf ety of others. That one does not “he ar” brake s does not e stablish that slowing did not occur prior to Hood enter ing the intersec tion.

Ha rr ing ton ’s c on c lus or

y ob se rv a tio n that the larg e pumpe r tr uc k “ slam med ” int o Hudson’s ca

r “f ull force ” does not provide evidenc e ra ising a fac t issue about Hood’s r eg ard f or the safe ty of others or

whether he slowed a s nece ssary . The statement does not de scribe the conditions

u n d e r w h i c h t h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d an d d o e s n o t d e s c r i b e t h e s p e e d o f e i t h e r v e h i c l e . S i m i l a r l y, Har ring ton’s statement that she did not understand why the fire truck neede d to r ush beca use she had seen othe r eme rg ency

vehicles pa ss throug h the intersec tion does not indicate whether Hood slowe d11

a s n e c e s s ar

y o r a c t e d w i t h d i s r e g ar d f

o r t h e s a f e t y o f o t h e r s . H o o d w a s r e s p o n d i n g t o ane m e r g e n c y, believed his ve hicle would be the first to arr ive d u e t o its prox imity to the emer g ency , and wa s
un awa re that ot he r e me rg e nc y

ve hic le s had res po nde d to the sit uatio n. Ho od

de mon str a te d th a t, under the circ umstances a s he under st o o d t h em t o be, ther e wa s a nee d to proce ed throug h the i n t er s ec t i o nwi t h o u ts t o p p i n g.

Fi n al l y , g iven the appa

rent substantial diffe renc e in weig ht betwee n the truck a nd Hudson’s ca

r, Hudson’s e vidence of dama g e to the fire truck a nd to her c ar, wi t h o u t m o re , is not

en o u g h to o v e r c o me th e e v id e n c e H o o d o f f e r e d to p r o v e h e c o mp li e d

w it h th e a p p li c a b le s ta tutes and ordina

nces. The re is no evidenc e or expert testimony estimating the speed of the vehicle s prior to the collision based on the amount of da mag e ea ch vehic le sustained. The summ ary

j u d gm en tev i d en ce co n cl u s i v el y es t ab l i s h es t h at Hu d s o n ’s cl ai m ar i ses from Hood’ s response to a n emer g ency

call and that Hood’s ac tion was in compliance with the laws and ordina

nces a pplicable to the e merg ency action. See T ex . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 1 0 1

. 0 55(2). Conseque ntly , the waive r of sove reig n immunit y does not apply . Acc ording ly , we sustain appellants’ se cond issue and w ill reverse the summary judgme n t an d re nder judg ment dismiss ing H udson’s suit ag ainst the City for lac k of subject- matter jurisdiction.
Of fi cial Im m uni ty

Appellants ar g u e in

th e ir th ir d is s u e th a t t

h e tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d in d e n y in g H o o d ’s motion for summary judgme nt ba sed upon officia l immunity , claiming that he produc ed compe tent

su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh ingthat he a c te d in

g oo d f a ith in the pe rf

or manc e of his discretionar y d uties within the scope of his author ity and that Hudson fa iled to establish that noOur sister c ourt would end the inquiry upon decidingthat the g overnme ntal entity enjoy ed 7 sovere ign immunity

. Smith v. Janda , 126 S.W .3d 543, 546 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 2003, no pe t.) I n making this deter

mination, the cour

t in Janda cited to f

ormer section 101.106 of the c ivil practice an d r e me d ie s c o d e , w h ic h a p p li e s to th is c a s e b e c a

u s e it w a s f

ile d in 2002. Id. ; se e als o H arris C o u n t y v. Sykes, 1 3 6 S. W. 3 d 6 3 5 , 6 4 0 n . 3 ( T e x. 2 0 0 4 ) ( 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 a me n d e d in 2 0 0 3 an d amende d version applies to a ctions filed af ter Septembe r 1, 2003). F ormer se ction 101.106 provided: A judg ment in an ac tion or a settlement of a claim under

this chapter ba

rs any action involving the same subjec t matter by the claimant a g ainst the employ ee of the g ov e rnme nta l un it w ho se a c t or omi ssi on g a ve ri se to t

he c la im. Act of Ma

y 17, 1985, 69th L eg ., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. L aws 3242, 3305 (a mended by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 11.03, sec. 101.106, 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 885, 886). Th e s u p r e me c o u rt h a s c o n s tr

u e d f o r me r s e c ti o n 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 a s b ar r in g a c la im a g ainst an employ ee of

a g overnme ntal unit when j udg ment is rende red r eg ardingthe employ er, r eg ardle ss of whether the j udg ment was for or aga inst the employ er. See Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley , 968 S.W. 2d 33 9, 34 3 ( Te x. 19 97 ); Newman v. Obe rsteller, 960 S.W .2d 621, 62 2 ( Te x. 19 97 ). Ho we ve r, bec a us e thi s is su e wa s n ot r a ise d o n a pp e a l or in t he a pp e lla nts ’ summary judgme nt motion, we will address both sovere ign immunity and off ici a l i mm u n it y a s raised in the parties’ briefs. Cf. Bossley , 9 68 S.W. 2d a t 34 3; Newman , 960 S.W. 2d a t 62 2 ( in b oth

c a se s, immunit y from suit under se ction 101.106 raised in summary judgme nt). 12 rea sonable pe rson in Hood’s position c ould ha ve thoug ht that the fac ts justi fied his ac tion. Hudson 7 responds that Hood is not entitled to of ficial immunit y beca

use he was not pe rfor

ming discr etionary duties and bec ause he was not ac ting in g ood faith.

Offic ial immunit y

is an aff irmative def

ense that s h i el d s public employ ees f rom persona l liabilit y

in a suit arising from an e mploy ee' s g ood faith perf ormanc e of discretionar

y duties perf ormed within the scope of his authority

. Se e Un iv e rsi ty of H ou sto n v . Clar

k , 38 S.W .3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); W

ad e witz v . M on tgo me ry , 9 51 S.W. 2d

46 4, 46 5- 66 (T e x. 19 97 ); City of L ancaster v. Cha mb e rs , 883 S.W .2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994)

. As Hudson does not argue that Hood wa s not acting13

within the scope of his a

uthority , we now de termin e wh et h er Hood was pe rfor ming discr etionary duties in good f

aith.

Di sc re tio na ry

Du tie s Ho od argue s th a t he c on c lus ive ly pro ved he wa s p e rf

or min g a dis c re tio na

ry a c t in responding t o the re port of the f ire. Ac tions that invol ve per sonal deliberation, decision, and jud g me nt a

re dis c re tio na

ry ; a c tio ns that r e qu ir e ob e die nc e to or de rs or the pe rf or manc e of a du ty to which the a ctor ha d no choice are minist eria l. Cha mb e rs , 8 83 S.W. 2d a t 65 4; see also Eak le v. Te x as De p’ t of Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 815 S.W .2d 869, 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 199 1 , writ denied) (discre tion means “powe r t o chose among alternatives within lega l bounds”). Cha mb e rs held that police off icer s eng ag ing in a

high- speed chase was a

discretionar

y act be cause they

had to elec t whether to underta k e p u rsuit, choose a route, c hoose spee d and following distance, a nd decide whether to call for ba ckup. Cha mb e rs, 883 S.W .2d at 655. The Fou rt eenth District Court of Ap pe a ls h a s h e ld t

hat “ op e ratio n o f a

n e me rg ency veh icle in an e me rg e nc y

sit uatio n is a discretionar

y duty .” City of Houston v. Flaniken , 1 08 S.W. 3d 55 5, 55 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist.] 2003, no writ). Flaniken cited anothe r Houston ca se, Rivas v. City of Houston , 17 S.W .3d 23, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, writ denied) , whi ch h el d t hat a pa rame dic’s or

e me rg e nc y

me dic a l te c hn ic ian’ s d e c isi on s c on c e rn ingho w t o tr ans po rt a pe rs on to a me dic a l f a c ili ty is discretionary

despite arguments that the driver was mere ly driving when the acc ident occur red a nd

was re quired to use lig hts and a sire n. Id

.

He re , H ud so n a

rgue s th a t H oo d w a s n ot p e rf orm in g a d isc re tio na

ry fu nc tio n in respondingto the call bec ause he did not choose whe ther to r espond to the ca ll, because lights and14

sirens we re ma

ndatory , and bec ause h e k new the quic kest way to the scene and wa s theref ore the le a d v e hic le . A lth ou g h w e re c og ni z e that dr ivi nga fi re tr uc k in an e me rg e nc y

sit uatio n p re se nts dif fe re nt c ha lle nge s th an e ng a g ingin h ig h- sp e e d p ur su it o r t ra ns po rt inga

c omb a tiv e patie nt t o
me dic a l c are , w e do no t bel ie ve that the dis tin c tio n is disp os iti ve on the iss ue of

wh e the r H oo d c ou ld have be en per fo rm ing disc retionar y acts in this case . Rather, we must determine whe ther Hood’ s actions involved per sonal deliberation, decision, and judg ment. Cha mb e rs , 883 S.W .2d at 654.

Ho od pr e se nted u nco nt rov ert ed ev id ence t hat he w as r esp on di ng to an em erg e nc y c a ll and that he believed he would be the first pumper truck to arr ive. Hood averre d that he led the othe r fire truck beca

use he knew the location and potential route best and that he deter mined the best and qu ic ke st r ou te . H oo d’ s a ff ida vit ind ic a te d th a t he de c ide d to tr a ve l w e ll b elo w the sp e e d li mit , althoug h he did not have a duty to do so, after

having evaluated the traff ic conce ntration and c hosen to dr ive in the wester

nmost lane in or der to be st r eac h the scene of the fir e. Hood g ave his re asons for de ciding to proce ed throug h the re d light an d fo r t h e s peed at which he c hose to enter the intersec tion a

nd outlined his decisionmaking pr ocess: “I deter mined that the extremely

urg ent nee d to g e t to the sc e ne a s q

uic kly a s p os sib le , signi fi cant ly ou tw e ig he d th e ri sk that ano the r v e hic le would not hear or see the emerg ency signa ls or see that all other traf fic wa s stopped.” He stated that he believe d most other emer g ency vehicle operators would have made the same decision. Hood’s expert, Fire Chief Alexander Rodriguez, ag ree d in his aff idavit that Hood’s per ceptions and be liefs

we re re a so na

ble and that he a pp ro pr ia te ly

we ig he d h is a lte rn a tiv e s a nd ba lanc e d n e e ds and

ri sk s. T h e evide nce de monstrates that Hood’s a ctions involved persona l deliberation, decisions, and judg ment. The a ffidavits eva luate a string of choic es and the wisdom of Hood’s15

judgme nts, not whether he was c orre ctly perf orming a ministerial duty

about which he had no choic e. Se e Cha mb e rs , 883 S.W .2d at 654. Hudson did not offe r evidence that Hood was mer ely perf orming

a m i n i s t er i al d

u t y . W e t h er ef

o re h o l d t h a tHo o d

co n cl u s i v el y

p ro v edh e w as p er fo rm i n g a dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio n at th e tim e of

the a c c ide nt.
Go od Fa ith Hood ar g ues that he also conc lusively proved that he ac ted in g ood faith for purposes of establishing officia l immuni t y . A ci t y employ ee a cts in g ood faith if a r easona bly prudent employ ee could have believed that his acts wer e justified. Cha mb e rs , 8 83 S.W. 2d a t 65 6. To pr e va il

on the g ood faith element of officia l immunity , the g overnme nt must show how a r easona bly prudent

em p lo y e e , b a s e d o n th e e mp lo y e e ’ s p e r c e p ti o n o f th e f a c ts a t th e ti me o f th e e v e nt, could have assessed the need to whic h the employ ee responds and the risks of the actions taken and believed that the need outweig hed the risk involved. Se e W ad e witz , 9 51 S.W. 2d

a t 46 7; Cha mb e rs , 883 S.W .2d at 656. Expert testimony reg ardinggo o d fa i t h wi l l support summary judgme nt only

if it is not conclusory ; it is clea

r, positive, d i rec t, otherwise c redible, a nd fre e fr om contradic tions and inconsistencies; and it could have bee n rea dily controve rted. W

ad e witz , 951 S.W. 2d a t 466. I t mu st addre ss whether

a reasonably prudent employ ee could have be lieved under the circ umstances that the nee d outweig hed the r isk of the ac tions taken and must substantiate its conclusions with re fer ence to the need a

nd risk involved. Se e id

. at 4 6 7 (c i t i n g Cha mb e rs , 883 S.W .2d at 656-57). The “ need” prong of this test refe rs to the urg ency of the c ircumstance s. Id . Hood

a ve rs that, b e c a

us e he re a so na

bly anti c ipate d b e ingthe fi rst tr uc k o n th e sc e ne and

be c a us e hisAlthough two othe r eng ines wer e d i s p at ch ed to t he sce ne, Rodrig uez opined that it was 8 rea sonable for

Hood to believe he would arr ive first bec ause the other two we re coming from a f ire station farthe r aw ay

than Hood’s. Hudson’s theory

appea rs to be that, had H ood come t o a co m p l ete stop, he w ould have 9 enter ed the inter section a f ew se conds later

and nec essar ily

missed her c ar. 16 information from dispatch was that a structur e fire occur red at a women’ s and childre n’s home or day car e f a c il it y an d th a t an u n kn o w n n u mb e r o f c h il dr e n an d a d u lt s w e r e s ti ll in th e b u il d ing , he be lie ve d it

wa s extr e me ly ur g e nt t

hat he re a c h th e sc e ne a s q uic kly a s p os sib le and

that hi s im me diate prese nce w as nec essar

y to preve nt injury

or death. Hood repe ated these conce rns about the leve l of need in disc ussing his de cision-making proce ss r eg arding enter ing the intersec tion ag ainst the light without stoppi ng and opined that most other e merg ency vehicle drivers would ag ree that the urg ent need to arr ive and evac uate children from a fire at a day car e cente r outweig hed the r isk involved. Hood’s expert, Rodrig uez, ag ree d. Rodrigue z reviewe d the inform at i o n Hood had at the time, including the lack of information on how many children ne eded to be evac uated a nd Hood’s position

a s le a d v e hic le , a nd

op ine d th a t H oo d “ pr op e rl y and re a so na bly a sse sse d th e ur g e nt n e e d to 8 immediately

rea ch a r eporte d structure fire wh er e chil dren w ere prese nt in order to pre vent injury

or los s o f l if e , [and ] that he we ig he d th e a lte rn a tiv e s ava ila ble , w he the r t o s top
. . . a

nd los e . . . ti me in re -a c c e le ratin g or

. . . p ro c e e d thro ug h th e int e rs e c tio n. ” Hu ds on c ite s e vid e nc e that H oo d c ou ld have missed he r c ar h ad he a rrived a fewseconds late r and that anothe r fire truck a nd two 9 ambulance s were alre ady at the scene to show that the need w as not g reat. Howeve r, she doe s not

c on tr a dic t H oo d’ s and

Rod ri g ue z’s a ff

ida vit s ind ic a tin g that a re a so na ble of fi c e r o r e mpl oy e e c ou ld have be lie ve d th e ne e d w a s c omp e lli ngun de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s.17 Th e “ ri sk ” pr on g of

the g oo d fa ithte st r e fe rs to a ny c ounte rv a ili ngpu

bli c sa fe ty

c on c e r n s s u c h a s t h e n a tu r e an d s e v e r i t y o f t h e h ar m t h a t c o u l d o c c u r , i n c l u d i n g i n j ur ie s to by standers or an accident preventing him from reac hing the emer g ency and whether a ny risk of har

m would be cle ar to a re asonably prudent e mploy ee. Id . I n W ad e witz , the summary

judgme nt evidence was insuffic ient to establ ish good f aith beca use it failed to addr ess the deg ree , likelihood, and obviousness of the risks Wadewitz created. Id . Hudson argues t hat i n this case Hood’s expert make s only conclusory

statements and f

ails to assess the deg ree , likelihood, or obvio u sness of the r isks Hood’s ac tions created.

We disag ree with Hudson’s assertions. Hood’s affidavit l ists and analy zes the actua l risks he consider ed and w eig hed ag ainst the perc eived ne ed. The se included a war eness that the light

rema ined re d as he a

pproac hed the inter section; that there was cong ested tra ffic a long his route ; that

a ve hic le mig ht n ot y

ie ld or mi ght no t no te the e me rg e nc y lig hts , s ir e n, and

a ir ho rn ; and

that a collision mi g ht pr event him f rom timely rea ching the scene . His aff idavit shows that he consider ed the risks, looked fo r t ra ffic that might pose a dang er, a

nd weig hed the r isks and need be fore proce eding throug h the light. Rodrig uez’s aff idavit discusses the circ umstances a s Hood perc eived them and conc ludes that Hood believed that the risk was minimal beca use he ha d seen tra ffic stoppe d in a ll d ir e c tio ns and

be c a us e he ha d slo we d to fu

rt he r re du c e the ri sk of se ri ou s inj ur y . Gi ve n th e se fac tors involving the likelihood and se verity of the risk, Rodrig uez goe s on to opine that Hood balanc ed the ne ed ag ainst the risk and to explain the basis for this opinion: “beca use he obse rved a

nd pe rc e ive d th a t tr a ff

ic ha d s top pe d in bo th dir e c tio ns and fu rt he r be c a us e he fe lt h is l owsp e e d w ou ldI n f a c t, H oo d in dic a te d in his a ff ida vit tha t he wa s a ble to pr e ve nt wo rs e ha

rm be c a us e his 10 low speed e nabled him to brake quickly upon seeing Hu d s o n en t er the intersec tion and that he believed he had almost come to a stop by the time he struck he r ca r. Hu ds on argue s th a t, b e c a

us e of sim ila ri tie s in fa c ts s uc h a s th e ty

pe of a c c ide nt, 11 po sit ion ingand

damages to t

he ve hic le s, and

pe rc e pti on s o f t

he of fi c e r, the fa c t th a t th e of

fi c e r i n Ha le was not entitled to summary judgme nt on official immunity make s s u m mary

judgme nt simil arly inappropriate in this case. See Hale v. Pe na , 991 S.W .2d 942, 945-46 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 1999, no pet.). Although Ha le was fa ctually simil ar, the opinion makes it clea r that the Ha le de fe nd ant w a s n ot en tit le d to summa ry jud g me nt be c a

us e the a ff

ida vit s o ff e re d to sh owg oo d f

a ith d i d n o t an a l yz e r i s k

a s r e qu i r e d

b y Cha mb e rs . Se e id . at 946. Unlike Hood, “ Offic er H ale ha d no knowledg e of the underlying f acts a bout the em erge ncy

alar m, the seriousness of the crime, or whether his imm ediate pr esenc e wa s nece ssary , even thoug h it was a ‘pr iority one’ dispatc h. ” Id

. 18 minimi ze the risk” and se verity of a collision. Be cause Hood and his expert took both sides of the 10 Cha mb e rs g ood faith bala ncing test into account, we hold that the re q u i s ite basis exis ted for concludingthat a re asonable fire truck driver in Hood’s posi tion could have believed that his actions

wer e justified. S

e e H a le v . Pena , 9 9 1 S

. W.2d 942, 946 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (af fidavits must take both ne ed and r isk factor s into account in orde r to show basis for c oncluding office r ac ted in g ood faith). 11

Hudson argues that the unre asonabl en es s of Hood’s a ctions is demonstrated by Ho od ’s a dmi ssi on

tha t he kn e w the re we re ri sk s b e c a use th e in ter sectio n w a s b us y , th a t th e re is a constant conc ern that drivers mig ht not hear or see his lig h t s an d s i re n s, and that traf fic c ould not have been stopped as Hood believed beca use he, in fac t, collided wit h Hudson’s ca r as it proc eede d throug h the intersec tion. W e do not ag ree that the eva luation of risks in Hood’s af fidavit indicates that his action was ne cessa rily unrea sonable or that Hood’s i n acc urate perc eption nece ssarily rende rs it unreasona

ble for him to have believed that all traff ic was stopped based upon his know ledg e at the time. I f this were so, any

admission that a risk exis ted would defeat the e lement of g ood faith, and19

any c oll isi on wo uld be a de qu a te e vid e nc e that a re a so na ble e mpl oy e e wo uld

have a sse sse d th e ri sk dif fe re ntl y , the re by vit ia tin g the do c tr ine of of fi c ia l immun ity

in m os t or

a ll c a se s. Of

fi c ia l im mun ity is desig ned to encour ag e emerg ency personne l to take reasona bly calc ulated risks whe n they have proper ly considere d need a

nd risk, not to punish t hem for ha ving done so. Gi ve n th e e vid e nc e of

ne e d a nd ri sk , we ho ld that app e lla nts have e sta

bli sh e d th a t a

rea sonably

prudent employ ee unde r the same or similar circ umstances would have believe d that proce eding throug h the intersec tion despite the red lig ht was justified and that Hood ac ted in g ood faith. W ad e witz , 9 51 S.W. 2d

a t 46 7; Cha mb e rs , 88 3 S.W. 2d a t 65 6- 57 ; see H ale, 991 S.W .2d at 946 (s umm ary jud g me nt e vid e nc e mus t e sta bli shtha t r e a so na bly pr ud e nt o ff ic e r wo uld have take n s a me act to prove g ood faith). Ha ving he ld that appellants conc lusively established that Hood wa s perf orming discretionar

y acts in g ood faith within the scope of his e mploy ment, we hold that he was entitled to summary judgme nt on the af firmative de fense of off

icial immunity

. Se e Cla rk, 38 S.W .3d

a t 58 0 ( de sc ri bin g a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e ); Friendswood Dev. Co. , 92 6 S.W. 2d a t 28 2 ( e nti tle me nt t o summary judgme nt). Acc ordingl y , we reve rse the or der of the district court de ny ing summar y judgme nt to Hood on the af

firmative de fense of off

i ci al immunity

and re nder judg ment g ranting Hood’s motion.
CO NC LU SION

Ha vin g de te rm ine d th a t so ve re ig n im mun ity sh ie lds the City

of S a n A n g e lo f ro m su it, we dismiss Hudson’s claims ag ainst it for want of jur isdict i o n . Ha v i n g deter mined that officia l20

immunit y shields Hood from Hudson’s cla ims ag ainst him, we reve rse the or der of the district court and re nder judg ment g ranting summary judgme nt in his favor.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Kidd, Patterson and Pury ear ; J ustice Kidd Not Participating Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction in Part; Reversed a nd Rendere d in Part Filed: Nove mber 3, 2005