J-S02016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B.A.I.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2414 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered August 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000461-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B.A.I.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2415 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000640-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2024

D.S. (Mother) appeals from the decree terminating her parental rights 

to S.B.A.I.D. (Child), a daughter born in September 2020, and the order 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.1, 2 Mother’s

appointed counsel, Emily Cherniack, Esquire (Counsel), has also filed an

application to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying Anders brief.

3

 We 

grant Counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm the juvenile court’s decree 

and order.

Child is the youngest of Mother’s ten children.4 See N.T. 8/24/23, at 

31-32. The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) first became 

involved with the family in 2016. See generally Petition for Involuntary 

Termination, 11/25/22, Exhibit A (Statement of Facts), at 1 (unnumbered). 

Throughout the course of DHS’s involvement, all of Mother’s children had been 

placed under DHS supervision, and the family was receiving services from the 

Community Umbrella Agency (CUA). See N.T., 8/24/23, at 41.

On April 15, 2021, DHS received a report that Mother had given birth to

Child without informing DHS or CUA. See id. at 32. At that time, Mother’s 

____________________________________________

1 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals.

2 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, K.D. 

(Father) on the same date. Father’s appeals from the termination and goal 

change are before this panel and docketed at 2417 and 2418 EDA 2023.

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re S.M.B., 

856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that the Anders

procedure for withdrawal of court-appointed counsel has been extended to 

appeals involving termination of parental rights).

4 Nine of the children are also Father’s biological children. Mother reported 

the father of her oldest child is unknown.
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nine other children were in DHS’s custody with active dependency petitions. 

See Motion to Compel Cooperation, 4/30/21. DHS visited the family’s home 

several times, but no one answered the door. See id. 

On April 22, 2021, Father called DHS, indicating that he and Mother 

would speak to DHS over the telephone, but he refused to agree to a home 

visit. See id. He also denied that the couple had a new baby. See id. 

Because the family refused to allow DHS to visit the family’s home, on April 

30, 2021, DHS filed a motion to compel cooperation with the child protective 

services investigation. See id. DHS also cited concerns about Father’s active 

criminal case, in which Mother’s oldest child (Father’s stepchild) was named 

as the victim. See id. The juvenile court granted the motion to compel. The 

motion was subsequently dismissed after Child was deemed safe.

On July 7, 2021, DHS filed a dependency petition for Child. DHS averred 

that when DHS workers arrived at the family’s home for a visit in June 2021, 

the family did not answer the door. DHS also received allegations that Mother 

and Father had left the state with Child. 

Ultimately, on August 19, 2021, U.S. Marshals located Mother, Father, 

and Child in New Jersey. See N.T., 8/24/23, at 43, 117. Mother and Father 

were arrested at that time. On the same day, DHS obtained an order for 

protective custody, and Child was placed in foster care. The juvenile court 

lifted the order for protective custody after a shelter care hearing on August 

20, 2021, but Child remained in DHS care. DHS filed another dependency 
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petition on August 27, 2021. Following a hearing, the juvenile court 

adjudicated Child dependent on November 17, 2021. The court emphasized 

that Mother and Father were both incarcerated at that time. Order of 

Adjudication, 11/17/21. Further, the juvenile court took judicial notice of a 

finding of child abuse as to Mother during a September 4, 2019, goal change 

and termination hearing for Mother’s other children. See id.5 After that time, 

Child remained in foster care, and her permanency goal continued to be 

reunification with Mother and Father.6 

On November 25, 2022, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

On December 14, 2022, at the dependency docket, the juvenile court 

determined aggravated circumstances existed against Mother and Father. The 

court directed that DHS was not required to continue with efforts to reunify 

Child with Mother and Father. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/9/23, at 1-2.

____________________________________________

5 The September 4, 2019, hearing transcripts are included with Child’s 

dependency order in the certified record. However, the transcripts are not 

designated as an exhibit or otherwise numbered as an attachment.

6 Mother’s parental rights as to the parties’ eight other children were 

involuntarily terminated on August 11, 2022. 
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Notably, on March 3, 2023, Mother was convicted of charges stemming 

from her abuse of two of Child’s siblings.7 Based on Mother’s criminal 

convictions, DHS filed an amended termination petition on March 15, 2023, to 

include Section 2511(a)(9) and (10) as grounds for termination.

The juvenile court held a termination and goal change hearing on August 

24, 2023. The court heard testimony from Jelea McNeil, the CUA caseworker 

who worked with the family since 2020; and Shawn Jackson, the CUA case 

manager for Child. Mother appeared via video conference, as she was 

incarcerated. However, after expressing her frustration with the proceedings, 

Mother opted to leave the hearing. Counsel remained present to represent 

Mother’s interests. Child was represented by her guardian ad litem (GAL).

8

 

DHS also offered as exhibits Mother’s criminal docket sheets, which reflect 

that Mother was sentenced to 5 to 10 years in prison at each docket. N.T., 

8/24/23, DHS Exhibit 4A and 4B. Significantly, each sentencing order included 

a stay-away order regarding the respective victims (Child’s siblings), and 

prohibited Mother from having unsupervised contact with minors 

____________________________________________

7 At trial court docket 8423-2021, a jury convicted Mother of aggravated 

assault – victim less than 13 years, and defendant 18 years or older; 

endangering the welfare of children – parent or guardian; and possession of 

an instrument of crime. At trial court docket 8425-2021, a jury convicted 

Mother of aggravated assault – victim less than 13 years, and defendant 18 

years or older; conspiracy; endangering the welfare of children – parent or 

guardian; and possession of an instrument of crime.

8 Child’s GAL stated there was no conflict between Child’s legal and best 

interests. N.T., 8/24/23, at 40.
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upon her release from incarceration. See id. At the close of the hearing, 

the juvenile court denied DHS’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

as to Section 2511(a)(1). The court otherwise granted the petition and 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child under Section 2511(a)(2), (5), 

(8), (9), and (b).9 In a separate order, the juvenile court changed Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption. 

Mother filed timely notices of appeal from the termination decree and 

goal change order, as well as a contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

10

 The juvenile court 

filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Before reaching the substantive merits of this appeal, we address 

Counsel’s application to withdraw. See In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237 

(stating “this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues until 

we address counsel’s request to withdraw”). To withdraw from representation 

under Anders, counsel must

____________________________________________

9 We recognize the amended termination petition also sought termination 

under Section 2511(a)(10) and identified both parents. However, it appears

DHS sought termination under that subsection only with regard to Father.

10 After filing the notices of appeal, Mother’s termination counsel sought 

permission to withdraw from representation, citing Mother’s wish that counsel 

“fire herself.” This Court granted termination counsel’s petition to withdraw

and ordered the juvenile court to conduct a hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), to determine whether 

Mother wished to proceed pro se. Mother indicated she wished to be appointed 

new counsel, and the court appointed current Counsel to represent Mother on 

appeal.
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1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the Anders brief to the appellant; and 3) advise the appellant 

that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise 

additional arguments that the appellant deems worthy of the 

court’s attention.

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (citation and brackets omitted). Counsel 

must also “attach to [a] petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to the[] 

client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 

A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, a proper Anders brief must

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). 

Instantly, Counsel filed an application to withdraw and an Anders brief 

asserting that Mother’s appeal lacks merit and is frivolous. See Application to 

Withdraw, 11/28/23, ¶¶ 3, 5. In her application, Counsel confirmed she 

conducted a thorough and conscientious review of the record. Id., ¶ 4. 

Counsel included her letter to Mother, which properly advised Mother of her 

right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se to raise any other issues she 

deems worthy of this Court’s attention. See id., Appendix. Counsel also 
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indicates she provided Mother with a copy of the Anders brief. See id. 

Mother filed no response raising additional issues.

Counsel’s Anders brief (a) summarizes the procedural history and facts 

of the case with citations to the record; (b) identifies four issues that could 

arguably support Mother’s appeal; and (c) explains why the appeal is frivolous. 

Accordingly, Counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders and 

Santiago. Thus, we “undertake an independent examination of the record to 

determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 

1237.

The Anders brief raises the following issues:

A. Whether [DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that [M]other’s parental rights should have been terminated 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8) since she had 

substantially completed her single case plan objectives as required 

to have [C]hild returned to her?

B. Whether there was a strong emotional and parental bond 

between [M]other an[d C]hild which would have had a negative 

effect on [C]hild if the parental bond was permanently severed 

pursuant to § 2511(b)?

C. Whether the trial court erred when it changed the permanency 

goal from reunification to adoption[?]

D. Whether the trial court improperly denied [Mother’s] rights to 

due process, by denying her the opportunity to participate in this 

proceeding in-person?

Anders Brief at 5.

We address Mother’s first two claims together. First, Mother argues DHS 

failed to establish grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2),
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(5), and (8) because she substantially completed her case plan objectives. 

Anders Brief at 9-10. Mother also challenges termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b). Anders Brief at 11-12. However, Counsel claims this issue is 

frivolous, as Mother has not seen Child since Child’s removal from Mother and 

Father’s care. Id. at 11. Counsel also acknowledges Mother’s criminal 

sentence includes a stay-away order. Id. 

In considering Mother’s claims, we recognize

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial 

courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple 

hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ 

court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
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Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which provides for a bifurcated analysis. First, the juvenile court 

“must focus on the parent’s conduct” relative to the enumerated ground for 

termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Id. at 830. If the 

court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must then assess 

the evidence relative to the child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), 

“giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

Here, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child 

under Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (9), and (b). We address Mother’s 

termination under subsection 2511(a)(9),11 which provides, in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(9) The parent has been convicted of one of the following in 

which the victim was a child of the parent:

....

____________________________________________

11 We acknowledge the Anders brief contains no argument as to subsection 

2511(a)(9). However, it is well settled that we need only agree with the 

juvenile court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as 

subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc).
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(ii) a felony under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (relating to aggravated 

assault)

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(9)(ii). “By its plain language, the Adoption Act only 

requires the petitioner to introduce proof of the parent’s conviction, not proof 

of the facts underlying the parent’s guilt.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d at 831.

During the termination hearing, DHS introduced certified copies of 

Mother’s convictions at 8423-2021 and 8425-2021. See N.T., 8/24/23, at 24-

15 (offering DHS Exhibits 4A and 4B). The convictions arose from Mother’s 

aggravated assault of two of her minor children. See id. at 26; see also DHS 

Exhibit 4A (Mother’s conviction and sentence at 8423-2021, including a 

conviction of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(9)) and DHS Exhibit 

4B (Mother’s conviction and sentence at 8425-2021, including a conviction of 

aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(9)). Counsel for DHS explained

that at each docket, Mother was sentenced to 5 to 10 years in prison. N.T., 

8/24/23, at 26-27. Counsel for DHS also emphasized that the sentencing 

orders include a stay-away order for the respective victims, id. at 26, as well 

as a prohibition on any unsupervised contact with minors, with “no 

qualification regarding [] biological children or not.” Id. at 27. Accordingly,

we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding DHS 

established the statutory grounds for termination under Section 2511(9)(ii).

We now turn to Section 2511(b), which provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 
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of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

“The plain language of Section 2511(b) clearly mandates that, in 

assessing the petition to terminate parental rights, the primary consideration 

must be the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) 

(quotation marks omitted). This Court has repeatedly stated that 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 

1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he court must consider whether 

a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 

Interest of: J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 12-13 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

Regarding Child’s best interest under Section 2511(b), the juvenile court 

stated on the record:

It is in [Child’s] best interest to terminate [Mother’s] rights 

involuntarily. [Child] deserves to have permanency and to move 

on with her life and not be caught in the foster system indefinitely.

....

[T]his [c]ourt will concede that when [Child] came into care at 11 

months [old], clearly she and [Mother] were very bonded. That’s 
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the only parent [Child] had known. [Child] had been with 

[Mother] for the 11 months that they were on the run. But since 

that time, in the two years that have ensued since then, [Child 

has] had absolutely no contact with [Mother] because there has 

been a criminal stay away order in effect.

N.T., 8/24/23, at 86-88. The court determined that “any parent-child bond 

developed in the Child’s first eleven (11) months of life, was eroded by the 

lack of any contact between Mother and Child in the past two (2) years, due 

to the criminal stay away order.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/24/23, at 3.

We also refer to the following testimony, which the juvenile court found 

credible. See N.T., 8/24/23, at 88 (crediting the testimony of Ms. McNeil and 

Ms. Jackson). Ms. McNeil testified that Child has been residing in foster care, 

with another sibling, since her adjudication. Id. at 39. Ms. McNeil confirmed

Child has not had any contact with Mother since DHS obtained the order of 

protective custody in August 2021. Id. at 43-44; see also id. at 44-45 

(Mother has been incarcerated since August 2021). 

Ms. Jackson testified Child is “doing great” in her foster home and has 

“a very good bond with her foster parents.” Id. at 54; see also id. at 58 

(stating Child has a parent-child bond with foster parents). According to Ms. 

Jackson, Child is in placement with a sibling, and she has a great relationship 

with that sibling. Id. Ms. Jackson opined that Child would not suffer 

irreparable harm if the court terminated Mother’s rights. Id. at 58, 63. 

Additionally, Ms. Jackon described Child’s foster home as a pre-adoptive 

home. Id. at 63.
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The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would serve Child’s best interest. The credited 

testimony reflects that, though Child had a bond with Mother for the first 11 

months of her life, Child had no contact with Mother for approximately two 

years. In that time, Child developed a strong, beneficial bond with her foster 

family. The juvenile court was within its discretion to prioritize Child’s need 

for safety, security, and permanency. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile 

court did not err or abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental 

rights.

In her third issue, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order changing 

Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Anders Brief at 12. 

As we have upheld the termination of Mother’s parental rights, this issue is 

moot. See Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(father’s challenge to child’s goal change was moot after this Court affirmed

the orphans’ court’s termination decrees).

In her fourth issue, Mother contends she was denied due process 

because she was unable to participate in the termination hearing in person. 

Anders Brief at 13.

“Due process requires nothing more than adequate notice, an 

opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself in an impartial 

tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter.” In re Adoption of K.M.D., 261 
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A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2021). The Adoption Act governs the notice 

requirement in a termination proceeding:

§ 2513. Hearing

* * *

(b) Notice.--At least ten days’ notice shall be given to the parent

... whose rights are to be terminated, by personal service or by 

registered mail to ... their last known address or by such other 

means as the court may require. ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513(b). 

Mother does not dispute that she received notice of the termination 

hearing. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/24/23, at 5 (confirming that Mother 

was provided notice in person and by mail). Indeed, she attended the 

beginning of the hearing via video conference. Mother instead asserts that 

she was entitled to attend the hearing in person. 

“[N]either the Adoption Act nor the cases interpreting it require that a 

parent must be present in order for a court to grant” a termination petition. 

In Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 965 (Pa. Super. 2017). This Court has 

long held that

a trial court is not required to transport an incarcerated parent to 

a termination hearing in order to satisfy the needs of due process. 

However, if the incarcerated parent desires to contest the 

termination petition, the trial court must afford the incarcerated 

parent the ability to participate meaningfully in the termination 

hearing through alternate means.

In re Adoption of J.N.F., 887 A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations 

omitted).
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Here, the record reflects the juvenile court provided Mother a sufficient 

alternative means to participate meaningfully in the termination hearing. See 

id. Rather than availing herself of the opportunity to participate, Mother 

became argumentative immediately upon entering the hearing remotely. See 

generally N.T., 8/24/23, at 5-21. As the juvenile court aptly explained,

Mother was afforded the opportunity to participate in the hearing, 

but declined to do so, as she participated in the first portion of the 

hearing via video conferencing, but—against counsel’s advice—

walked out of the room from which she was participating. 

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/24/23, at 5. We discern no due-process violation 

where Mother chose not to participate in the proceedings. Mother is not 

entitled to relief on this claim.

Finally, our independent examination of the record indicates that there 

are no other non-frivolous claims that Mother can raise. See In re S.M.B., 

856 A.2d at 1237. Accordingly, we agree with Counsel’s assessment that

Mother’s appeal is frivolous, and grant Counsel permission to withdraw from 

her representation of Mother.

Application to withdraw granted. Decree and order affirmed.

Date: 2/20/2024
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