IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wendell Long, :

: No. 1920 C.D. 2015

Appellant : Submitted: April 29, 2016

:

v. :

:

Kenneth D. Kyler :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: August 26, 2016

Wendell Long appeals pro se from the September 8, 2015 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County (trial court) granting the 

preliminary objections filed by Kenneth D. Kyler and dismissing the Petition for 

Relief filed by Long under the statute commonly known as the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§6601-6608. We affirm.

At all relevant times, Long was an inmate at the State Correctional 

Institution at Huntingdon (SCI Huntingdon), and Kyler was its Superintendent. On 

May 6, 2000, Long received a misconduct report charging him with lewd conduct 

in a bathroom stall. On May 9, 2000, a hearing examiner held a misconduct 

hearing and dismissed the misconduct charge without prejudice due to lack of 

evidence. That same day, Long was issued another misconduct charge based on 

the same behavior but asserting different charges. On May 11, 2000, a hearing was
2

held on the second misconduct charge. The hearing examiner found Long guilty of 

all charges and issued Long 30 days’ disciplinary custody, loss of job, loss of 

honor block status, and loss of single cell status. Long appealed to the Program 

Review Committee, former Superintendent Kyler, and the Chief Hearing Officer, 

each of which denied the appeal and upheld the sanctions. 

In 2001, Long filed a Petition for Relief against Kyler, seeking a 

declaration that his prison misconduct conviction and the sanctions imposed are 

invalid, unconstitutional, and must be expunged from his record. Long asserts that 

the misconduct charges were filed deliberately by correctional employees who 

falsified evidence with the intent of depriving Long of his constitutional rights. 

Long further contends that the hearing officer violated his constitutional right to 

due process by denying his request to have representation and witnesses present at 

the misconduct hearing. Long avers that the action or inaction of Kyler in failing 

to monitor employees under his supervision allowed those employees to violate 

Long’s constitutional rights, in violation of Kyler’s duties as superintendent. 

Kyler filed timely preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, 

and the matter sat dormant for more than a decade.1 Thereafter, the trial court 

invited the parties to submit briefs in support of their respective positions and, after 

considering the same, granted Kyler’s preliminary objections. 

On appeal to this Court, Long asks this Court to declare the 

disciplinary conviction and sanction invalid, expunge the same from his record, 

 

1

The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion states that after a file review revealed that 

the case was still pending, an August 10, 2015 order was issued directing that the matter be 

placed on an argument list. Although there was correspondence between Long and then 

President Judge Stewart Kurtz, neither party filed the appropriate document to move the case. 

Trial court op. at 1 n.1.
3

and reinstate the status he lost as a result of the invalid conviction. He also asks 

for compensatory and punitive damages. 

When reviewing an order granting preliminary objections in the 

nature of a demurrer, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary. Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 188 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

Preliminary objections are properly sustained when, based on the facts pled, it is 

clear that the plaintiff will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a 

right to relief. Id. We must accept as true all well-pled, material, and relevant 

facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that may be fairly deduced from 

those facts. Id. However, we need not accept any of the complaint’s conclusions 

of law or argumentative allegations. Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 668 (Pa. 1998). 

Because Long’s Petition for Relief challenges internal prison 

operations, the issues he raises are not reviewable by this Court. Bronson v. 

Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998); Brown v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 913 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). 

Indeed, we have specifically held that decisions of the Department of Corrections 

“concerning charges of misconduct against an inmate are beyond this Court’s 

appellate or original jurisdiction.” Brown, 913 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added). 

In Bronson, our Supreme Court explained that 

[I]nternal prison operations are more properly left to the 

legislative and executive branches, [and] prison officials 

must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the 

execution of policies necessary to preserve order and 

maintain security free from judicial interference. . . . 

Unlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a 

defendant is accorded the full spectrum of rights and 

protections guaranteed by the state and federal 

constitutions, and which is necessarily within the ambit 

of the judiciary, the procedures for pursuing inmate 
4

grievances and misconduct appeals are a matter of 

internal prison administration and the full panoply of 

rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not 

necessary in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, 

the commonwealth court [sic] does not have appellate 

jurisdiction, under 42 Pa.C.S. §763, over inmate appeals 

of decisions by intra-prison disciplinary tribunals. 

721 A.2d at 358-59 (quotations and citations omitted). In Robson v. Biester, 420 

A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), this Court determined that the “operation of 

correctional facilities is peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 

executive branches of the government and not the judicial branch.” The fact that 

Long couches his claims as violations of his constitutional rights does not alter the 

fact that his challenges to the credibility of witnesses, the evidence presented, and 

the determination made at his misconduct hearing are not matters within this 

Court’s appellate jurisdiction.2

Moreover, Long’s vague assertions that the misconduct proceedings 

and the attendant sanctions deprived him of constitutional rights also must fail. 

Procedural due process in a misconduct proceeding is satisfied if an 

inmate receives written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the hearing, 

receives a written statement of facts by the fact finder as to the evidence relied 

upon and reasons for the action taken, and is afforded a qualified right to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when institutional 

safety or correctional goals are not placed at risk. Id. Long’s only relevant 

assertion is that he was denied the opportunity to call unnamed witnesses. Because 

Long has not identified in his petition what witnesses he asked to call or how he 

 

2

“[T]he limitations placed upon the judiciary to rule on issues of internal prison 

operations set forth in Bronson apply to our common pleas courts as well.” Brown, 913 A.2d at 

305.
5

was prejudiced by not being allowed to call them, his allegations in this regard do 

not state a claim that his due process rights were violated. 

In Singleton v. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672, 675-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), we 

noted that an inmate’s placement in restricted housing unit for 30 days does not 

violate his due process rights.3 Additionally, this Court has previously held that an 

inmate has no protected liberty interest in a specific prison job. Bush v. Veach, 1 

A.3d 981, 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Miles v. Wiser, 847 A.2d 237, 240-41 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2004). Finally, it is well settled that an inmate does not have a right to be 

housed in a particular area within a facility; rather, it is entirely a matter of the 

Department of Corrections’ discretion where to house an inmate. Clark v. Beard, 

918 A.2d 160-61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Chem v. Horn, 725 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1999). Consequently, neither Long’s 30 days’ disciplinary custody, the 

loss of his job, nor the loss of his honor block status and single cell implicates his 

due process rights.

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Kyler’s preliminary 

objections, and we affirm. 

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

 

3

See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (discipline of 30 days in segregated 

confinement did not violate an inmate’s due process rights because it did not present the type of 

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest). 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wendell Long, :

: No. 1920 C.D. 2015

Appellant : 

:

v. :

:

Kenneth D. Kyler :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of August, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Huntingdon County, dated September 8, 2015, is affirmed.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge