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TOWN OF STRATFORD ET AL. v.

RAPHAEL JACOBELLI ET AL.

(SC 19332)

(SC 19333)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued May 18—officially released August 18, 2015

Alison L. Squiccimarro, with whom was Paul M.

Grocki, for the appellants (defendant David Faile et al.).

Heather M. Brown-Olsen, with whom, on the brief,

was Aleksandr Y. Troyb, for the appellants (defendant

N.E. Hangar Development, LLC, et al.).

James W. Donohue, with whom, on the brief, was

Michael S. Casey, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The issue presented in these appeals

is whether certain aircraft hangars1 owned by the defendants2 and located at Sikorsky Memorial Airport (airport), are subject to municipal taxation pursuant to

General Statutes § 12-64. The named plaintiff, the town

of Stratford,3 brought this action seeking a declaratory

judgment that the hangars are taxable as real property

pursuant to § 12-64 (a) and are not exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statutes § 12-74. The trial court

rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the

defendants appealed.4 We conclude that the trial court

properly applied §§ 12-64 and 12-74 to determine that

the hangars are subjectto municipaltaxation and,therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.5

The trial court’s memorandum of decision reveals the

following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘The

hangars at the center of this dispute are owned by the

defendants and consist of aircraft hangars described

by the manufacturer as ‘portable’ T-Hangars . . . and

[are] located at [the airport in Stratford].’’ There are

‘‘two primary locations [at] the airport where the [hangars] are situated: the south ramp . . . and the north

[ramp] . . . .’’

‘‘The [hangars] located at the south ramp . . . are

located on land owned by the city of Bridgeport with

the land leased to . . . N.E. Hangar Development, LLC

[N.E. Hangar]. Each [hangar] was purchased and is privately owned by persons or entities populating the

south ramp . . . .’’ The owners of the hangers at the

south ramp ‘‘are subtenants of N.E. Hangar . . . pursuant to written sublease agreements.’’ The hangars

located on the north ramp of the airport ‘‘are situated

upon parcels of land owned by the city of Bridgeport

and leased directly . . . pursuant to unwritten month

to month leases.’’6

‘‘The [owners of the hangars at] the south ramp

entered into . . . license and sublease agreement[s].

Each licensee paid ‘a one-time license fee for exclusive

use of a portion of asphalt paving in which to tie down

or provide a [hangar] for storage of general aviation

aircraft when not in use. The license fee is paid to [N.E.

Hangar].’ In addition, each sub-lessee ‘pays monthly

rent to [N.E. Hangar] for the cost of maintenance and

upkeep of the surrounding asphalt apron and for administrative expenses for required coordination with the

city of Bridgeport Aviation Commission.’ The [hangar]

itself may be purchased from any particular supplier

and all of the pieces to the [hangar] are erected on site.

All [hangars] must be removed at the end of the license

term unless sold sooner. . . . [N]o [hangar] is permanently affixed to the ground and is only located in a

particular spot pursuant to [the] license [with N.E. Hangar].’’ The hangars located at the south ramp ‘‘range in
size from 998 square feet . . . to 1,400 [square feet].’’

‘‘[T]he north ramp [hangars] come with a trailer hitch

. . . [and] were previously moved from another location on the airport to the present location.’’ For the

north ramp hangars, there is a ‘‘monthly rate schedule

reflecting fees associated with the leases.’’ ‘‘[T]he city

of Bridgeport . . . can end [the month-to-month] lease

at any time and [the owners of the hangers at the north

ramp would] be required to relocate [their hangars]

to another parcel on the airport or to another airport

entirely.’’ The north ramp hangars ‘‘range in size from

805.59 [square feet] to 1,171.05 [square feet].’’

‘‘[All of the hangars] are designed for the storage of

aircraft, storage of parts and accessories, and protection of aircraft from wind, storm, and sun damage.’’

Moreover, all of the hangers ‘‘are devoted to nonpublic

use for the purpose of storage and housing of private

aircraft.’’

In 2007 and 2008, the plaintiff included the hangars

‘‘on the personal property portion of the grand list.’’ In

2009, ‘‘the [hangars] were included on the real property

portion of the grand list.’’ After the hangars were

assessed as real property in 2009, several hangar owners

brought individual tax appeals against the plaintiff, contesting the classification of the hangars as real property

instead of personal property. Those appeals were

stayed when, in 2011, the plaintiff brought the present

action seeking a declaratory judgment that the hangars

are properly classified as real property and not exempt

from taxation.

The trial court ruled that the hangars were taxable

pursuant to General Statutes § 12-64 (a). That statute

provides in relevant part: ‘‘All the following mentioned

property, not exempted, shall be set in the list of the

town where it is situated . . . [d]welling houses, garages, barns, sheds, stores, shops, mills, . . . ice

houses, warehouses, silos, [and] all other buildings and

structures . . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-64 (a).7 Additionally, the trial court ruled that § 12-74 did not operate

to exempt the hangars from taxation,8 and that no other

statutory provisions, including § 12-64 (b) or (c),9 nor

General Statutes § 12-19a,10 exempted the hangars

from taxation.

On appeal, the defendants challenge the trial court’s

conclusions that: (1) the hangars are taxable as real

property pursuant to § 12-64 (a) and are not exempted

by § 12-64 (b) or (c); (2) § 12-74 does not exempt the

hangars from taxation; and (3) § 12-19a does not exempt

the hangars from taxation. We affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

Before considering the merits of the parties’ arguments, we set forth the basic legal principles and standard of review applicable to these appeals. ‘‘The scope

of our appellate review depends upon the proper char-
acterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To

the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact,

our review is limited to deciding whether such findings

were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court

draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and

we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and

logically correct and find support in the facts that

appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 92–93, 70 A.3d

1 (2013), quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury, 257

Conn. 865, 870–71, 778 A.2d 204 (2001). ‘‘A finding of

fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in

the record to support it . . . or when although there

is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McBurney v. Paquin, 302 Conn.

359, 368, 28 A.3d 272 (2011). ‘‘In addition, in examining

the meaning of a particular statute, we are guided by

fundamental principles of statutory construction. See

General Statutes § 1-2z; see also Testa v. Geressy, 286

Conn. 291, 308, 943 A.2d 1075 (2008)(‘[o]urfundamental

objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent

intent of the legislature’ . . .).’’ Goodspeed Airport,

LLC v. East Haddam, 302 Conn. 70, 76, 24 A.3d 1205

(2011).

‘‘[A]long with these principles, we are also guided by

the applicable rules of statutory construction specifically associated with the interpretation of tax statutes.

. . . [W]hen the issue is the imposition of a tax, rather

than a claimed right to an exemption or a deduction,

the governing authorities must be strictly construed

against the commissioner . . . and in favor of the taxpayer. . . . Nevertheless, [i]t is also true . . . that

such strict construction neither requires nor permits

the contravention of the true intent and purpose of the

statute as expressed in the language used.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scholastic

Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,

304 Conn. 204, 214–15, 38 A.3d 1183, cert. denied,

U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012).

I

The proper interpretation of § 12-64 presents a question of statutory construction; we therefore begin by

examining the text of § 12-64 (a) to determine if the

plaintiff may subject the hangars to taxation and, thereafter, discuss whether § 12-64 (b) and (c) exempt the

hangars from taxation.

A

Section 12-64 (a) provides for taxation of real property, including ‘‘garages, barns, sheds, stores, shops,

mills . . . ice houses, warehouses, silos, [and] all other

buildings and structures . . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-

64 (a). While ‘‘hangars’’ are not explicitly listed in the
text of § 12-64 (a), they will be taxable if their characteristics, as found by the trial court, place them within

the purview of the proper construction of the words

‘‘sheds’’ or ‘‘all other buildings’’ in § 12-64 (a).

In interpreting the language of § 12-64 (a), ‘‘we do

not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous

judicial interpretations of the language and the purpose

of the statute.’’ Kasica v. Columbia, supra, 309 Conn.

93–94. This court has previously construed the term

‘‘building’’ for purposes of § 12-64 (a) by relying on the

dictionary definition of ‘‘building’’ as ‘‘a constructed

edifice designed to stand more or less permanently,

covering a space of land, usu[ally] covered by a roof

and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and

serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for

animals, or other useful structure distinguished from

structures not designed for occupancy (as fences or

monuments) and from structures not intended for use

in one place (as boats or trailers) even though subject

to occupancy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, 180 Conn. 409, 412, 429 A.2d 905 (1980), quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

(unabridged).

In Montville,this court also applied to the term ‘‘buildings’’ the rule of ejusdem generis, which explains that

‘‘where a particular enumeration is followed by general

descriptive words, the latter will be understood as limited in their scope to . . . things of the same general

kind or character as those specified in the particular

enumeration.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, supra, 180 Conn. 413, quoting Easterbrook v.

Hebrew Ladies Orphan Society, 85 Conn. 289, 296, 82

A. 561 (1912). This court concluded that the general

characteristics of the real property listed in § 12-64 (a)

were that such ‘‘buildings’’ have the characteristics of

being ‘‘enclosed and . . . [suitable] for occupancy or

storage which are the distinguishing features of the

listed buildings.’’ Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, supra, 413.

In the present case, the trial court determined that

hangars fell within the clear and unambiguous language

of § 12-64 (a) because ‘‘shed’’ is enumerated in the statute and because the court found that the hangars were

‘‘similar to a shed.’’ The court construed ‘‘shed’’ pursuant to its common and ordinary meaning, defining it as

‘‘a building with walls and a roof,’’ and concluded that

a hangar was ‘‘an equivalent.’’ The court also noted that,

even if not constituting equivalents to ‘‘sheds’’ under

§ 12-64 (a), the hangars would nevertheless be within

the same general category as sheds and the other enumerated buildings in § 12-64 (a) such that they could

be considered as falling within the category ‘‘ ‘all other

buildings’ . . . .’’
On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court’s

construction of § 12-64 (a) was not legally and logically

correct for severalreasons. First, because the trial court

defined ‘‘ ‘sheds’ ’’ as a type of ‘‘ ‘building,’ ’’ the defendants urge a definition of ‘‘building’’ that includes a

requirement that the buildings be constructed for permanent use and therefore necessarily are permanent

structures. The defendants thus claim that the trial

court improperly defined both ‘‘sheds’’ and ‘‘buildings’’

in § 12-64 (a) without any permanent use requirement,

thereby improperly including the hangars within their

scope because the hangars are portable, temporary

structures. We disagree with the defendants’ proposed

definition of ‘‘buildings.’’ We are bound by our previous

judicial interpretation of the language of § 12-64 (a);

see Kasica v. Columbia, supra, 309 Conn. 93–94; in

which we interpreted ‘‘buildings’’ as being ‘‘more or

less’’ permanent, usually covered by a roof, and ‘‘more

orless’’ completely enclosed by walls. See Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, supra, 180

Conn. 412. This definition clearly encompasses the hangars, which may properly be described as ‘‘more or less

permanent,’’ even given their portable nature. Moreover, the defendants conceded at oral argument that

some ‘‘sheds’’ are not permanent, thus, cutting against

their proposed definition of ‘‘buildings.’’ For purposes

of § 12-64 (a), we decline to depart from our previous

judicial interpretation of ‘‘buildings’’ which imposed no

permanency requirement.

The defendants next claim that, in applying the rule

of ejusdem generis to interpret ‘‘buildings’’ by reference

to the characteristics of the other enumerated items in

§ 12-64 (a), the trial court should have concluded that

the distinguishing characteristics of ‘‘buildings’’ are that

they are permanent, immobile structures, perpetually

affixed to the ground. They therefore claim that,

because the hangars at issue are portable, their attributes materially distinguish them from the characteristics of the enumerated items of real property in § 12-

64 (a). We again disagree. We are bound by our previous

judicial interpretations of the language of § 12-64 (a);

see Kasica v. Columbia, supra, 309 Conn. 93; in which

we have construed ‘‘buildings’’ in § 12-64 (a), using the

rule of ejusdem generis, as having the distinguishing

characteristics of being ‘‘enclosed and . . . [suitable]

for occupancy or storage’’; Eastern Connecticut Cable

Television,Inc. v. Montville, supra, 180 Conn. 414; characteristics undoubtedly exhibited by the hangars.11

The defendants finally claim that the language of § 12-

64 (a) is not clear and unambiguous, and that any ambiguity should be construed in favor of the taxpayer.

Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 304 Conn. 214–15. Additionally,

they claim that this court should look beyond the text

of § 12-64 (a), undertake a fixture analysis, and con-
clude that the hangars are, instead of real property,

personal property pursuant to § 12-71. However, other

than noting that hangars are not expressly enumerated

in § 12-64 (a) and urging their preferred definition of

‘‘building’’ that deviates from our previously established

judicial interpretations of the term ‘‘building,’’ the

defendants do not advance with any specificity why the

terms ‘‘sheds’’ or ‘‘buildings’’ are susceptible to more

than one reasonable interpretation. See Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn.

191, 197–98, 3 A.3d 56 (2010) (‘‘The process of statutory

interpretation involves . . . the question of whether

the language does so apply. . . . A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more

than one reasonable interpretation. . . . [S]tatutory

silence does not necessarily equate to ambiguity.’’

[Internal quotation marks omitted.]). By failing to

advance any other reasonable interpretations of these

terms, the defendants have failed to show that the language is not clear and unambiguous, and, therefore,

we need not apply the canon of statutory construction

construing any ambiguity in favor of the taxpayer. See

Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,

294 Conn. 225, 235, 241, 983 A.2d 1 (2009) (declining

to apply statutory presumption in favor of taxpayer

because such presumptions apply ‘‘only in a case of a

clear ambiguity in language which substantially leaves

the statute equally open to different interpretations’’

and term at issue was sufficiently defined by reference

to ‘‘the common understanding of the term as expressed

in a dictionary’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We

conclude that the terms ‘‘sheds’’ and ‘‘buildings’’ are

clear and unambiguous.12

Having concluded that the trial court’s construction

of § 12-64 (a) was legally correct, we next examine

whether these conclusions are supported by facts contained within the record. The trial court, with the consent of the parties, viewed the hangars at issue and

found the following facts. ‘‘The [n]orth [r]amp [hangars]

had shed-like metal walls with wooden cross-beams

mounted with studs. The [hangars] are affixed to the

ground by means of heavy spikes driven through openings in the metal base into the asphalt paving. . . .

[The north ramp hangars had] trailer hitches so that

[they] could be moved, but only by a heavy-duty truck.’’

The trial court continued by finding that the south ramp

hangars had ‘‘no visible hitches . . . [and were] identical to the [n]orth [r]amp [hangars] in having shed-like

walls, cross-beams on the walls, attachment to the

ground with heavy spikes, and wood frames on the

bottom. The [s]outh [r]amp [hangars] are larger than

the [n]orth [r]amp’s and are more than one-story high.

The [s]outh [r]amp [hangars] open similar to a garage,

with a door that lifts. The [hangars] are equipped with

electricity.’’ Next, the trial court found that ‘‘[b]oth the

[n]orth [r]amp and the [s]outh [r]amp [hangars] were
capable of being disassembled but it would require

much effort as the spikes and boards would have to

be removed and the walls collapsed.’’ The trial court

concluded that the hangars were used for and thus

suitable for storage, and that hangars are shed-like insofar as they are buildings with walls and a roof. The trial

court found that the hangars were ‘‘virtually permanent

as any other building might be, even given that [the city

of] Bridgeport or N.E. Hangar . . . could technically

evict [the defendants] under the terms of the leases.’’

In addition, the parties stipulated to the fact that these

hangars are used for storage. The facts in the record

clearly support the trial court’s conclusion that the hangars are ‘‘buildings’’ under § 12-64 (a), in that they stand

more or less permanently, have a roof, are enclosed by

walls, and are suitable for storage. See Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, supra, 180

Conn. 412. We therefore conclude that the trial court

properly determined that the hangars were taxable

either as ‘‘buildings’’ or as ‘‘sheds’’ pursuant to § 12-

64 (a).13

B

Finally, the defendants claim that the trial court

improperly failed to apply § 12-64 (b) and (c) to exempt

the hangars from taxation. See footnote 9 of this opinion; Hotshoe Enterprises, LLC v. Hartford, 284 Conn.

833, 837, 937 A.2d 689 (2008) (per curiam) (affirming

trial court’s conclusion that § 12-64 [c] exempted condominium airplane hangars on Brainard Airport, an airport

owned and operated by the state of Connecticut). The

trial court articulated that ‘‘§ 12-64 (b) or (c) . . .

clearly do not apply to the hangars themselves [as]

[t]hese provisions apply to state-owned properties,’’ the

hangars are individually-owned property, and the land

underneath the hangars is municipally-owned property.

We agree with the trial court.

Section 12-64 (b) applies to ‘‘land [or] buildings . . .

belonging to or held in trust for the state’’ and § 12-64

(c) applies to ‘‘land [or] building[s] . . . belonging to

or held in trust for the state of Connecticut or . . . any

general aviation airport or other airport, as such terms

are defined in section 15-120aa . . . .’’ Section 15-120aa

(4) defines ‘‘ ‘[g]eneral aviation airports’ ’’ as ‘‘stateowned and operated general aviation airports, including

Danielson Airport, Groton/New London Airport, Hartford Brainard Airport, Waterbury-Oxford Airport and

Windham Airport, and such other airports as shall be

owned, operated or managed by the [Connecticut Airport Authority] and designated as general aviation airports.’’ Section 15-120aa (5) defines ‘‘ ‘[o]ther airports’ ’’

as ‘‘any other airport as shall become owned, operated

or managed by the [Connecticut Airport Authority]

. . . .’’

In the present case, the stipulated facts reveal that

the land upon which the hangars lie is owned by the
city of Bridgeport, not the state of Connecticut, rendering § 12-64 (b) inapplicable by its express terms. Moreover, § 12-64 (c) is inapplicable because neither is the

airport at issue expressly listed in § 15-120aa (4) as a

‘‘general aviation airport’’ nor are there facts in the

record to suggest that the state of Connecticut or the

Connecticut Airport Authority has ever owned, operated, or managed this airport.14 We therefore affirm the

judgment of the trial court and conclude that the trial

court properly applied the entirety of § 12-64 to the

hangars.

II

We next turn to the defendants’ claim that the trial

court improperly applied § 12-74 by failing to conclude

that the tax exemption applicable to the land would

become applicable to the hangars affixed on such tax

exempt land. To this end, the defendants claim that the

trial court should have determined that ownership of

the hangars could not properly be assessed to the defendants; see University of Hartford v. Hartford, 2 Conn.

App. 152, 159, 477 A.2d 1023 (1984) (trial court not

clearly erroneous in concluding that mere leasehold

interest was ‘‘insufficient indicium of ownership to qualify as ‘real property’ within the definition of the tax

statutes’’ where ‘‘the building to be erected would be

subject to a substantial measure of supervision and

control by the lessor, not only in its design and construction but also in its subsequent operation’’); because the

trial court improperly found that the defendants failed

to show the city ofBridgeport’s control overthe hangars

such that ownership of the hangars would more properly lie with the city of Bridgeport, and not the defendants. We review the trial court’s finding as to control

over the hangars for clear error. See McBurney v.

Paquin, supra, 302 Conn. 368.

‘‘It is settled law in this state that real property taxes

are normally assessed against the owner. Lerner Shops

of Connecticut, Inc. v. Waterbury, 151 Conn. 79, 82–84,

193 A.2d 472 (1963); Montgomery v. Branford, 107

Conn. 697, 701, 142 A. 574 (1928). Leased property is

assessed against the lessor as owner of the freehold

estate; see Montgomery v. Branford, [supra, 701]; who

by statute is obligated to pay the tax even [if] the lessee

. . . agreed to pay the taxes. Lerner Shops of Connecticut, Inc. v. Waterbury, [supra, 84].

‘‘There are, however, certain circumstances under

which the lessee has been treated as the fee owner for

tax purposes. See Russell v. New Haven, 51 Conn. 259

(1883); Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490 (1835) . . . .’’

(Citation omitted.) University of Hartford v. Hartford,

supra, 2 Conn. App. 158–59. Such circumstances exist

where, as in Russell, a lessee erects a building on land

owned by another entity and ownership of the building

is recognized as in the lessee. Russell v. New Haven,

supra, 260. Even though the lessee’s building may be
permanently affixed to the land and the parties do not

contemplate its removal, the building is properly classified as real estate, not personal property, and is taxable

in the name of the lessee without the benefit of any tax

exemption for the underlying land. Id., 260, 262–63; see

id., 262 (‘‘[t]here is no practical difficulty in such a

division of real estate’’). The taxation principles established by Russell remain valid. See Old Farms Associates v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 279 Conn.

465, 491, 903 A.2d 152 (2006) (citing to Russell as ‘‘concluding that building is part of realty and taxable to

holder of title to building, when building was not

erected for temporary purpose; neither party contemplated its removal; size and character of building, and

materials of which it is constructed, precluded idea of

removal; and there was contract provision pertaining

to purchase of building’’).

Although the principles of Russell have never been

overruled, in University of Hartford v. Hartford, supra,

2 Conn. App. 153–55, 157–58, the Appellate Court discussed whether lessees operating a dormitory on land

owned by a trust company could be separately assessed

for their building and leasehold interest under § 12-64

(a). The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court

did not clearly err in concluding that the lessor’s ‘‘substantial measure of supervision and control [over the

lessee’s building], not only in its design and construction but also in its subsequent operation,’’ resulted in

an ‘‘insufficient indicium of ownership [of the leasehold

interest and building in the lessee] to qualify as ‘real

property’ within the definition of the tax statutes

. . . .’’ Id., 159.

In the present case, although the trial court concluded, and the parties agreed, that § 12-74 exempted

from municipal taxation the land, owned by the city of

Bridgeport, upon which the defendants placed their

hangars, the trial court rejected the defendants’ claim

that the hangars’ placement on the tax exempt land

also rendered the hangars tax exempt. Instead, the trial

court concluded that the hangars could not be tax

exempt because, ‘‘[u]nder the long-standing precedent

of Russell v. New Haven, [supra, 51 Conn. 262], the

defendants are not taxed as lessee[s] of [the city of

Bridgeport], but [rather] as owners of the [hangars].’’

The trial court also concluded that the defendants failed

to show, pursuant to University of Hartford, that the

city of Bridgeport exerted ‘‘a substantial measure of

supervision and control’’ over the hangars such that

the hangars would more properly be assessed, if not

exempted, to the owner of the underlying land.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court

improperly failed to conclude thatthe factual predicates

of University of Hartford—a showing of substantial

control by the lessor over the lessee’s property—were

satisfied such that ownership of the hangars should
more properly be placed with the city of Bridgeport.

The defendants attempt to demonstrate the city of

Bridgeport’s control by pointing to the town of Stratford’s requirement that the hangars be built as portable

structures—the same requirements as are applicable to

mobile homes and back yard sheds—as well as the

particular terms in the sublease between N.E. Hangar

and the defendants that describe how the defendants

may only use the hangars to store their aircraft and

that the defendants may access the airport only with

key-cards issued by the city of Bridgeport. However,

the trial court also found—and, indeed, the parties stipulated—that each hangar is for the private use of their

respective owners or occupants, that the south ramp

hangars could be purchased with various options that

included insulation, side or back doors, rubberized

painted floor, work bench, and electronic hookups, and

that the defendants could purchase their hangars from

any supplier. Although the terms of the defendants’

occupancy pursuant to the sublease with N.E. Hangar

and the unwritten month-to-month lease with the city

of Bridgeport evince some control by the lessor over

the lessee’s access to the airport, we cannot say that

these terms necessarily amount to substantial control

over the hangars such that ownership of the hangars

is more properly placed in the city of Bridgeport. On

the record before us, we conclude that the trial court

did not clearly errin finding that the defendants failed to

show a substantial measure of supervision and control

over the hangars such that ownership should more

properly be placed with the city of Bridgeport.

Accordingly, because Russell dictates that a lessee

who owns a building on tax exempt land does not necessarily benefit from the land’s tax exemption even if

the lessee’s building is permanently affixed to the tax

exempt land, and because the defendants did not show

that ownership of the hangars should nevertheless

remain with the lessor, we conclude that the trial court

properly determined that § 12-74 is inapplicable to the

hangars at issue in the present case.

III

Finally, we address the defendants’ claim that, if the

hangars are real property subject to taxation pursuant

to § 12-64 (a), the hangars should nevertheless be

exempt from taxation under § 12-19a in orderto prevent

the plaintiff from double dipping by receiving a grant

in lieu of taxes from the state pursuant to § 12-19a and

property taxes from the defendants pursuant to § 12-64

(a). The trial court articulated that § 12-19a, a provision

providing the plaintiff with a grant in lieu of taxes to

defray the impact of the tax exemption of § 12-74, had

no bearing on the present dispute because § 12-19a

‘‘concerns funding and does not affect the hangars

themselves.’’

Although it is doubtful whether the defendants prop-
erly raised this claim in the trial court, we note that

§ 12-19a does not grant the plaintiff a power to tax,

grant any party a tax exemption, or classify property

for tax purposes. See footnote 10 of this opinion. We

therefore agree with the trial court that § 12-19a ‘‘concerns funding and does not affect the hangars themselves’’ because the existence of § 12-19a does not affect

our statutory construction of §§ 12-64 or 12-74. Even

assuming the defendants properly raised this claim of

‘‘double dipping’’ before the trial court, there are no

facts in the record to suggest that the plaintiff submits

the assessed value of the hangars to the state, receives

a grant in lieu of taxes that takes into consideration

lost tax revenue relating to the hangars, and also seeks

to assess the hangars to the defendants.15 Therefore,

we conclude that the trial court properly determined

that § 12-19a was inapplicable to the present case.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The hangers at issue in the present case, which are referred to in the

record and briefs as ‘‘T-Hangars,’’ are T shaped aircraft hangars. These

hangers do not have floors and are anchored to the ground.

2 The defendants in SC 19332 are David Faile and N759ZD, LLC. The

defendants in SC 19333 are Aminkhan Aladin, Howard Altman, ARB Aviation,

LLC, John Auchincloss, Jack Bart, BBL 201 Associates, Richard Brosius,

ERL, Inc., Flying Eagle Real Estate, LLC, Robert Frischette, Vincent Fusco,

Raphael Jacobelli, Jest, LLC, Krosno Group, Inc., Christopher Lavin, Stanton

Lesser, Lion Company, Inc., Richard McGowan, N.E. Hangar Development,

LLC, Mike Neal, Tim Osborn, RGG Realty Corporation, Riverstone Holdings,

LLC, Saquatucket Adventures, LLC, Brian Schiel, Austin Schraff, Herman

Schuler, Sourcing Edge Associates, LLC, Chuck Tannen, Kendall R. Touissant, Traunet, LLC, Frank Vener, and Don Winters. For the sake of simplicity,

unless otherwise noted, we refer to the defendants in these appeals collectively as the defendants and individually by name. See footnotes 4 and 6 of

this opinion. We note that the following additional parties were also named

as defendants in the declaratory judgment action: John Courtney, Frank

Fasanella, Robert Gill, John M. Hmurcik, Morgan Kaolian, Jenn Matt Equipment, LLC, Robert Jones III, the Superior Plating Co., and O.G. Sexton.

These parties, however, did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court.

3 We note that the tax assessor for the town of Stratford, Melinda Fonda,

is also a plaintiff in the underlying action. For the sake of simplicity, references to the plaintiff hereinafter include both the town of Stratford and

Fonda.

4 The defendants in SC 19332 and the defendants in SC 19333 filed separate

appeals from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. We

transferred both appeals to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and

General Statutes § 51-199 (c). Because the claims raised in both appeals

address the proper construction of General Statutes § 12-64 and other relevant statutes as they apply to the defendants’ hangars, we address these

appeals together.

5

In view of the conclusion reached on this issue, we need not consider

the defendants’ argument that the hangars are tangible personal property

pursuant to General Statutes § 12-71.

6 We note that the defendants in SC 19332 own hangars exclusively located

at the north ramp of the airport and that the defendants in SC 19333 own

hangars located at both the north ramp and the south ramp of the airport.

The differences between the north ramp and south ramp hangars are not

relevant to our resolution of the present appeals.

7 We note that § 12-64 has been amended by our legislature since the

events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2013, No. 13-

277, § 61; Public Acts 2014, No. 14-122, § 87. These amendments, however,

have no bearing on the merits of these appeals. See footnote 14 of this

opinion. In the interest of simplicity, unless otherwise noted, we refer to

the current revision of the statute.

8 General Statutes § 12-74 provides: ‘‘All property owned by any town or
city, which is located in another town and used for the purposes of an

airport, shall be exempt from taxation as long as it continues to be used

for such purposes and as long as the town in which it is located has the

same privileges as to the use of such airport as are possessed by the municipality owning the same; but, if any such airport is leased to any person,

association or private corporation, or is used in such manner as to become

a source of profit to the municipality owning the same, the land so occupied

and situated in any adjoining town or towns shall thereupon be subject

to taxation.’’

9 General Statutes § 12-64 provides, in relevant part: ‘‘(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, any land, buildings, or easement to

use air rights belonging to or held in trust for the state, not used for purposes

attributable to functions of the state government or any other governmental

purpose but leased to a person or organization for use unrelated to any

such purpose . . . shall be [taxable to the lessee] . . . .

‘‘(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not be applicable

to (1) any land, building, or easement belonging to or held in trust for

the state of Connecticut or the Connecticut Airport Authority at Bradley

International Airport or any general aviation airport or other airport, as

such terms are defined in section 15-120aa . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

10 General Statutes § 12-19a (a) provides, in relevant part: ‘‘On or before

January first, annually,the [s]ecretary of the [o]ffice of[p]olicy and [m]anagement shall determine the amount due, as a state grant in lieu of taxes, to

each town in this state wherein . . . a municipally owned airport . . . is

located. The grant payable to any town under the provisions of this section

. . . shall be equal to the total of . . . [45 percent] of the property taxes

. . . which would have been paid with respect to all municipally owned

airports; except forthe exemption applicable to such property, on the assessment list in such town . . . . [T]he grant applicable to Sikorsky Airport shall

be paid half to the town of Stratford and half to the city of Bridgeport . . . .’’

We note that § 12-19a has also been amended by our legislature since the

events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2014, No. 14-47,

§ 22. These amendments, however, have no bearing on the merits of these

appeals. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of

the statute.

11 The defendants claim that we should not rely on this court’s previous

application of the rule of ejusdem generis to ‘‘buildings’’ in Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, supra, 180 Conn. 413, a case in which

this court interpreted the term ‘‘buildings’’ in § 12-64 (a) as not encompassing

a communications tower. Specifically, the defendants claim that, because

the legislature, in response to Montville, subsequently amended § 12-64 (a)

by adding the word ‘‘structure,’’ we should not rely on Montville’s interpretation of § 12-64 (a) because the legislative amendment changed what we may

properly glean from the enumerated items in § 12-64 (a) such that these

items no longer have the same distinguishing characteristics as they did in

Montville. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-64, § 1. We disagree. The word

‘‘structure’’ was inserted after the enumerated items in § 12-64 (a), all of

which remained the same; therefore, the characteristics of the enumerated

items did not change from such insertion. We continue to be bound by our

interpretation of ‘‘buildings,’’ gleaned from the enumerated items in § 12-64

(a), which we construed as having the distinguishing characteristics of being

‘‘enclosed and . . . [suitable] for occupancy or storage . . . .’’ Eastern

Connecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Town of Montville, supra, 180

Conn. 414.

The defendants also claim that the trial court improperly relied on Gordon

v. Board of Civil Authority for the Town of Morristown, 180 Vt. 299, 300,

910 A.2d 836 (2006), which held that a hangar was a building and therefore

taxable as real property pursuant to a Vermont taxing statute. In interpreting

§ 12-64 (a), the trial court applied the rules of statutory construction to

make its conclusion; it did not rely on Gordon as the basis of its decision.

This claim is without merit.

12 At oral argument before the trial court and this court, the defendants

also claimed that the language of § 12-64 (a) that affirmatively authorizes

assessment of tax in the name of a lessee of land used for residential

purposes; General Statutes § 12-64 (a)(‘‘[i]f the interest in real estate consists

of a lease of land used for residential purposes which allows the lessee to

remove any or all of the structures, buildings or other improvements on

said land erected or owned by the lessee, which lease is recorded in the

land records of the town and provides that the lessee shall pay all taxes

with respect to such structures, buildings or other improvements, said inter-
est shall be deemed to be a separate parcel and said structures, buildings

or other improvements shall be separately assessed in the name of the

lessee’’); prohibits, by negative implication, assessment of tax in the name

of a lessee of land used for commercial purposes. See Pepin v. Danbury,

171 Conn. 74, 88, 368 A.2d 88 (1976) (‘‘a municipality may exercise the taxing

power only to that extent to which such power has been specifically granted

by the legislature’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Hartford/Windsor

Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, supra, 298 Conn. 205 (‘‘legislature

knows how to convey its intent expressly’’); Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 413, 999 A.2d 682 (2010) (‘‘when a statute,

with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of

such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is

significant to show that a different intention existed’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]). We decline to review this claim, as it was raised only at

oral argument. See J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn.

307, 317 n.10, 71 A.3d 492 (2013); cf. Calcano v. Calcano, 257 Conn. 230,

244, 777 A.2d 633 (‘‘[o]ur practice requires an appellant to raise claims of

error in his original brief, so that the issue as framed by him can be fully

responded to by the appellee in its brief, and so that we can have the full

benefit of that written argument’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

13 Although we conclude that the hangars are properly classified as ‘‘buildings’’ pursuant to § 12-64 (a), the hangars would also properly be classified

as ‘‘sheds,’’ a term which the Appellate Court has previously defined in a

case interpreting zoning regulations. See Mountain Brook Assn., Inc. v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, 133 Conn. App. 359, 373, 37 A.3d 748 (2012) (‘‘[a]

small structure, either freestanding or attached to a larger structure, serving

for storage or shelter’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting American

Heritage Dictionary (2d CollegeEd. 1985);EasternConnecticut Cable Television, Inc. v. Montville, supra, 180 Conn. 413 (‘‘a building is always a structure’’). The facts in the record would support this classification.

14 The trial court ostensibly applied General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 12-

64 (c), which the legislature subsequently amended in 2013. See Public Acts

2013, No. 13-277, § 61 (noting that amendment is ‘‘applicable to assessment

years commencing on and after October 1, 2012’’); see also footnote 7 of

this opinion. The 2013 amendment to § 12-64 (c) does not, however, change

the result reached in the present case. In 2013, the legislature amended the

phrase ‘‘land [or] building[s] . . . belonging to or held in trust for the state

of Connecticut . . .or any other state-owned airport’’ by removing the words

‘‘other state-owned airport’’ and replacing them with ‘‘general aviation airport or other airport, as such terms are defined in section 15-120aa . . . .’’

See Public Acts 2013, No. 13-277, § 61. Neither version of § 12-64 (c) applies

to the airport in the present case, which is neither owned nor operated by

the state of Connecticut.

15 Indeed, the only real allegation of double dipping appears to be linked

with the defendants’ claim that the plaintiff had assessed vacant land at

the airport to the defendants, a claim that was not properly before the trial

court because it does not address the proper classification of the hangars

for tax purposes.