alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
exv10w4



 






Exhibit 10.4




WHITE MOUNTAIN TITANIUM CORPORATION




STOCK OPTION PLAN




OPTION AGREEMENT




     THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION BECAUSE THEY ARE BELIEVED TO BE EXEMPT FROM REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 4(2) AND/OR 4(6)
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.



     THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION. NEITHER THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR ANY OTHER AUTHORITY HAS PASSED UPON
OR ENDORSED THE MERITS OF THE OFFERING OR THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
THE INVESTORS. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. INVESTORS MUST RELY ON
THEIR OWN EXAMINATION OF THE COMPANY, AND THE RISKS, MERITS AND TERMS OF THIS OFFERING IN MAKING AN
INVESTMENT DECISION.



     WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE TSX VENTURE EXCHANGE AND COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE
SECURITIES LEGISLATION, THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS AGREEMENT AND ANY SECURITIES ISSUED UPON
EXERCISE THEREOF MAY NOT BE SOLD, TRANSFERRED, HYPOTHECATED OR OTHERWISE TRADED ON OR THROUGH THE
FACILITIES OF THE EXCHANGE OR OTHERWISE IN CANADA OR TO OR FOR THE BENEFIT OF A CANADIAN RESIDENT.



     This Option Agreement is entered into between WHITE MOUNTAIN TITANIUM CORPORATION (the
“Company”) and the Optionee named below pursuant to the Company Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”), a
copy of which is attached hereto, and confirms that:




	1.	 	on May 31, 2004 (the “Grant Date”);
	 
	2.	 	Michael Kurtanjek (the “Optionee”);
	 
	3.	 	was granted the option (the “Option”) to purchase 600,000 Common Shares (the “Option Shares”)
of the Company;
	 
	4.	 	for the price (the “Option Price”) of $.60 per share;
	 
	5.	 	which shall be exercisable (“Vested”) Immediately;
	 
	6.	 	terminating on May 31, 2008 (the “Expiry Date”);




all on the terms and subject to the conditions set out in the Plan. For greater certainty, once
Option Shares have become Vested, they continue to be exercisable until the termination or
cancellation thereof as provided in this Option Agreement and the Plan.




 









 








     By signing this Option Agreement, the Optionee acknowledges that the Optionee has read and
understands the Plan and agrees to the terms and conditions of the Plan and this Option Agreement.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this Option Agreement as of the 26th day
of October, 2005, to be effective as of the Grant Date.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	OPTIONEE	 	 	 	WHITE MOUNTAIN TITANIUM CORPORATION	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	/s/ Michael Kurtanjek
 


	 	 	 	By:
	 	/s/ Brian Flower
 

	 	 
	Michael Kurtanjek

	 	 	 	 	 	Brian Flower, CFO	 	 






Attached      Stock Option Plan




2
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

PAUL KINCER and SCOTT MOORE,

Appellants,

v.

PEOPLE’S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellee.

No. 4D20-68

[February 4, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE18-

024042.

Daniel A. Norton and Randall Shochet of Shochet Law Group, Boynton 

Beach, for appellants.

Joshua S. Beck of Beck Law, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, FORST and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Beatrice O’Brien et al., Respondents, v Robert Jackson Miller III et al., Appellants.

[876 NYS2d 23]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered June 24, 2008, which, in an action for, inter alia, breach of contract arising out of architectural plans prepared by defendant Miller that were allegedly defective, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the complaint.

New York’s long-arm statute does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant Miller (CPLR 302). “Essential to the maintenance of this action against [Miller] are some purposeful activities within the State and a substantial relationship between those activities and the transaction out of which the cause of action arose” *(Talbot v Johnson Newspaper Corp.,*71 NY2d 827, 829 [1988] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here, the record shows that while Miller is employed in New York, his employment here is unrelated to the contract between himself and plaintiffs, which he entered into personally in New Jersey, and not on behalf of his employer.

Plaintiffs’ claims against defendant architectural firm also fail, since there is no evidence that Miller was acting as the firm’s agent when he entered into the agreement with plaintiffs *(see e.g. Hallock v State of New York,*64 NY2d 224, 231 [1984]). *556Nor is there evidence that the firm engaged in any conduct which misled plaintiffs into relying upon any alleged misrepresentations made by Miller (see *Ford v Unity Hosp.,*32 NY2d 464, 473 [1973]). Concur—Andrias, J.P., Gonzalez, Buckley and Acosta, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
 
 
<ARTICLE> 6 
<CIK> 0000744822
<NAME> Fidelity Investment Trust
<SERIES>
 <NUMBER> 21
 <NAME> Fidelity Europe Fund
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>
<C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 year          
 
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             oct-31-1997   
 
<PERIOD-END>                  oct-31-1997   
 
<INVESTMENTS-AT-COST>         651,002       
 
<INVESTMENTS-AT-VALUE>        895,539       
 
<RECEIVABLES>                 25,086        
 
<ASSETS-OTHER>                0             
 
<OTHER-ITEMS-ASSETS>          0             
 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                920,625       
 
<PAYABLE-FOR-SECURITIES>      991           
 
<SENIOR-LONG-TERM-DEBT>       0             
 
<OTHER-ITEMS-LIABILITIES>     3,526         
 
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES>           4,517         
 
<SENIOR-EQUITY>               0             
 
<PAID-IN-CAPITAL-COMMON>      579,544       
 
<SHARES-COMMON-STOCK>         29,501        
 
<SHARES-COMMON-PRIOR>         25,511        
 
<ACCUMULATED-NII-CURRENT>     12,951        
 
<OVERDISTRIBUTION-NII>        0             
 
<ACCUMULATED-NET-GAINS>       79,010        
 
<OVERDISTRIBUTION-GAINS>      0             
 
<ACCUM-APPREC-OR-DEPREC>      244,603       
 
<NET-ASSETS>                  916,108       
 
<DIVIDEND-INCOME>             25,725        
 
<INTEREST-INCOME>             1,380         
 
<OTHER-INCOME>                (3,335)       
 
<EXPENSES-NET>                10,365        
 
<NET-INVESTMENT-INCOME>       13,405        
 
<REALIZED-GAINS-CURRENT>      79,961        
 
<APPREC-INCREASE-CURRENT>     86,807        
 
<NET-CHANGE-FROM-OPS>         180,173       
 
<EQUALIZATION>                0             
 
<DISTRIBUTIONS-OF-INCOME>     6,428         
 
<DISTRIBUTIONS-OF-GAINS>      46,295        
 
<DISTRIBUTIONS-OTHER>         0             
 
<NUMBER-OF-SHARES-SOLD>       12,685        
 
<NUMBER-OF-SHARES-REDEEMED>   10,730        
 
<SHARES-REINVESTED>           2,034         
 
<NET-CHANGE-IN-ASSETS>        224,346       
 
<ACCUMULATED-NII-PRIOR>       6,366         
 
<ACCUMULATED-GAINS-PRIOR>     50,963        
 
<OVERDISTRIB-NII-PRIOR>       0             
 
<OVERDIST-NET-GAINS-PRIOR>    0             
 
<GROSS-ADVISORY-FEES>         6,863         
 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            15            
 
<GROSS-EXPENSE>               10,419        
 
<AVERAGE-NET-ASSETS>          874,766       
 
<PER-SHARE-NAV-BEGIN>         27.120        
 
<PER-SHARE-NII>               .440          
 
<PER-SHARE-GAIN-APPREC>       5.440         
 
<PER-SHARE-DIVIDEND>          .240          
 
<PER-SHARE-DISTRIBUTIONS>     1.730         
 
<RETURNS-OF-CAPITAL>          0             
 
<PER-SHARE-NAV-END>           31.050        
 
<EXPENSE-RATIO>               119           
 
<AVG-DEBT-OUTSTANDING>        0             
 
<AVG-DEBT-PER-SHARE>          0
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**Rule 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) Certification ofChief Executive Officer**

 

I, Michael T. DuBose, certifythat:

 

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of AftermarketTechnology Corp.;

 

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:

 

(a) Designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designated under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;

 

(b) Evaluated the effectivenessof the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

 

(c) Disclosed in this reportany change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofthe registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or notmaterial, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
| Date:  February 18, 2004                 |
|-----------------------------------------------|
|                                          |
|                                          |
| /s/ Michael  T. DuBose                        |   |
| Michael T.  DuBose, [Chief Executive Officer] |

 

----
Page 1 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: BENEDICT K. GOODMAN 

CITATION: 19 Agric. Dec. 65 

DOCKET NUMBER: 81 

DATE: FEBRUARY 12, 1960 

DOCUMENT TYPE: STAY ORDER 

NOTE: ANOTHER VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT THAT WAS NOT REPORTED IN THE AGRICULTURAL 

DECISIONS IS AVAILABLE IN THIS DATABASE 

(No. 6354) 

In re BENEDICT K. GOODMAN. CEA Docket No. 81. Order issued February 12, 1960, 

by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer. 

LOAD-DATE: June 16, 2008 
Page 2
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tony Lloyd JOHNSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-7388.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 9, 2012.

Decided: Feb. 14, 2012.

*246Tony Lloyd Johnston, Appellant Pro Se. Nancy Spodick Healey, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tony Lloyd Johnston seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion and its subsequent order denying reconsideration. The orders are not ap-pealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Johnston has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
----

            COMMISSION DECISION         

of 21 June 2004         

amending Decision 2003/903/EC adopting the plan allocating to the Member States resources to be charged to the 2004 budget year for the supply of food from intervention stocks for the benefit of the most deprived persons in the Community

(notified under document number C(2004) 2326)

(2004/529/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3730/87 of 10 December 1987 laying down the general rules for the supply of food from intervention stocks to designated organisations for distribution to the most deprived persons in the Community (1), and in particular Article 6 thereof,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2799/98 of 15 December 1998 establishing agrimonetary arrangements for the euro (2), and in particular Article 3(2) thereof,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2003/903/EC is hereby amended as follows:

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 June 2004.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER            

Member of the Commission

----

(1)OJ L 352, 15.12.1987, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2535/95 (OJ L 260, 31.10.1995, p. 3).

(2)OJ L 349, 24.12.1998, p. 1.

(3)OJ L 313, 30.10.1992, p. 50. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2339/2003 (OJ L 346, 31.12.2003, p. 29).

(4)OJ L 340, 24.12.2003, p. 65.

----

ANNEX I

‘ANNEX I

Annual distribution plan for 2004

----

ANNEX II

‘ANNEX II

Intra-Community transfers authorised under the plan for 2004

----
#### Gus ANAYA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 09-16722.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 7, 2010.*

Filed Oct. 12, 2010.

John Walter Muije, Esquire, Muije & Varricchio, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert J. Caldwell, Matthew J. Christian, Ann Lyter Thomas, Kolesar & Leat-ham, Chtd., Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: THOMPSON, SILVERMAN and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*276MEMORANDUM **

Gus Anaya appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant, Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”), in this diversity suit for defamation and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and may affirm on any ground supported by the *record. Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget,*548 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir.2008). Construing the record in the light most favorable to Anaya and making reasonable inferences on his behalf, we affirm.

Anaya argues Nissan defamed him during a telephone conversation in which a Nissan employee allegedly told Anaya’s employer, United Nissan (“United”), that Anaya was a “troublemaker,” would be “disruptive,” and that United should not promote him to a management position. The district court correctly held that this was a single statement of evaluative opinion which is not actionable. *See Lubin v. Kunin,*117 Nev. 107, 17 P.3d 422, 426 (2001) (per curiam).

Anaya also challenges the district court’s conclusion that the relevant statutes of limitations bar his claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. However, even if Anaya has raised a material issue of fact as to the date the statutory period began to run, he has not presented evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment on the merits of his claim. Anaya did not put forth evidence that the comment at the heart of this litigation was not privileged or of actual harm as a result of Nissan’s conduct. *See Wichinsky v. Mosa,*109 Nev. 84, 847 P.2d 727, 729-30 (1993) (per curiam). Because Anaya has failed to establish a prima facie case for intentional interference with his prospective economic advantage, summary judgment is proper as a matter of law.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Rose ISBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen FRIEDMAN; Joseph, Greenwald and Laake, PA, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-2113.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 9, 2012.

Decided: Feb. 13, 2012.

Rose Isbell, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Michael Creed, Veronica B. Nannis, Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, PA, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rose Isbell appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Isbell v. Friedman,*No. 8:11-cv-01152-AW, 2011 WL 4381422 (D. Md. filed Sept. 16, 2011, entered Sept. 19, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Towana Lavone SCOTT, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 12-6023.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 29, 2012.

Decided: April 3, 2012.

*142Towana Lavone Scott, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Michael Hamilton, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Towana Lavone Scott seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on her 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Scott has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Thomas STUBBLEFIELD, Plaintiff, v. VICKERS TOWING COMPANY, Tower Rock Stone Co., and The United States of America, Defendants.

No. GC 86-352-S-0.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division.

Sept. 12, 1989.

Lawrence D. Wade, Greenville, Miss., for Thomas Stubblefield.

Frank S. Thackston, Jr., Lake, Tindall, Hunger *&*Thackston, Greenville, Miss., for Tower Rock Stone Co.

E. Randolph Noble, Jr., Robertshaw, Terney, Noble & Smith, Greenville, Miss., for Vickers Towing Co.

John E. Wells, IV, Trial Atty., Torts Branch, Civ. Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the U.S.

ORDER

SENTER, Chief Judge.

The Court having been advised of the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Williams v. Central Gulf Lines,*874 F.2d 1058 (1989), and having reconsidered its Opinion filed December 2, 1987 in the instant cause

HEREBY ORDERS that this Court’s December 2, 1987 Opinion and Order rendering summary judgment in favor of Vickers Towing Company are vacated and withdrawn.

SO DONE.
**EXHIBIT
      21**





SUBSIDIARIES





CSI
      Sub
      Corp. (DE), a Delaware corporation (wholly owned)





CSI
      Sub
      Corp. II (DE), a Delaware corporation (95% owned)





DeLeeuw
      Associates, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (wholly
      owned)





DeLeeuw
      International Yonetim Danismanligi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, a limited sirketi
      formed under the laws of Turkey (50% owned by DeLeeuw Associates,
      LLC)





Doorways,
      Inc., a New York corporation (wholly owned)





Integrated
      Strategies, Inc., a Delaware corporation (wholly owned)





LEC
      Corporation of NJ, a Delaware corporation (wholly owned)





McKnight
      Associates, Inc., a Delaware corporation (wholly owned)
Exhibit 23.1


            Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No.
333-127803, No. 333-113554, and No. 333-105966) on Form S-8 and in the
Registration Statements (No. 333-136830 and No. 333-129336) on Form S-3 of
ENGlobal Corporation of our reports dated March 8, 2010, relating to our audits
of the consolidated financial statements, the financial statement schedule and
internal control over financial reporting, which appear in the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of ENGlobal Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2009.


/s/ Hein & Associates LLP,
Hein & Associates LLP

Houston, Texas
March 8, 2010