UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4517

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

WALTER DEANGELO VAUGHAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:98-cr-00219-REP-l) 

Submitted: February 23, 2009 Decided: March 26, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion. 

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Valencia Roberts-Brower, Assistant Federal Public 

Defenders, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, 

United States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Walter D. Vaughan pled guilty in March 1999 to being a 

drug user in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) 

(2006), and to two counts of misdemeanor possession of marijuana 

and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006). He was sentenced to 

fifteen months on the firearms offense and twelve months on each 

of the drug offenses, followed by a term of supervised release. 

In April 2008, the district court revoked Vaughan’s supervised 

release and imposed a twenty-four month sentence, followed by an 

additional two-year term of supervised release. Vaughan 

appeals. 

 Vaughan first claims that the twenty-four month 

sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable. We 

will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory 

range and is not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). While the 

district court must consider the Chapter 7 policy statements and 

statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation 

sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (2006), the district 

court ultimately has “broad discretion” to revoke the previous 

sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory 

maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (citation omitted). 

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 We have reviewed the record and find that the district 

court’s sentence, although beyond the advisory guidelines range, 

was not unreasonable. The court implicitly considered the 

guidelines range and the applicable § 3553(a) factors, and 

provided a proper basis for imposing the statutory maximum 

sentence; namely, the number and type of violations occurring 

within a short time after Vaughan began serving his original 

term of supervised release. Accordingly, we affirm as to the 

twenty-four month sentence of imprisonment. 

 Vaughan also claims that the district court erred by 

imposing an additional term of supervised release following the 

sentence of imprisonment. Because he did not object at 

sentencing as to this aspect of the district court’s judgment, 

our review is for plain error. United States v. Maxwell, 285 

F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 2002). Post-revocation penalties for 

violations of supervised release are treated as part of the 

penalty for the original conviction. Johnson v. United States, 

529 U.S. 694, 700-702 (2000). Thus, the penalties that can be 

imposed for revocation relate back to the date of the original 

offense. 

 The version of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) in effect on the 

date Vaughan committed the underlying offense read: “[w]hen a 

term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is 

required to serve a term of imprisonment that is less than the 

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maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3), 

the court may include a requirement that the defendant be placed 

on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(h) (1998). Thus, the plain language of § 3583(h) in 

effect at the time Vaughan committed his underlying offense 

permitted reimposition of supervised release only if the 

district court imposed less than the maximum prison term for his 

supervised release violation. 

 Because Vaughan received the statutory maximum term of 

imprisonment for violating his supervised release, the 

imposition of an additional two-year term of supervised release 

was plain error that affected his substantial rights. See

Maxwell, 285 F.3d at 342. Accordingly, we exercise our 

discretion to correct the error. United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 736 (1993). We vacate this portion of the district 

court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately addressed in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED