In the Matter of: 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

) 

) 

) 

Barclays PLC, Barclays Ban1c PLC, 

and Barclays Capital Inc., 

) CFTC Docket No. 15-25 

) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

____________________________ ) 

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTIONS 6(c) AND 6(d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS 

I. 

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("Commission") has reason to believe that 

Bm·clays PLC, Bm·clays Ban1c PLC, and Barclays Capital Inc. (collectively, "Respondents," 

"Barclays," or the "Ban1c") have violated the Commodity Exchange Act (the "Act" or "CEA") 

and Commission Regulations ("Regulations"). Therefore, the Commission deems it appropriate 

and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to 

determine whether Respondents engaged in the violations set forth herein, and to determine 

whether any order shall be issued imposing remedial sanctions. 

II. 

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondents have 

submitted an Offer of Settlement ("Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. 

Without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, Respondents consent to the 

entry and acknowledge service of this Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6( c) 

and 6( d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions 

("Order"). 1 

1 Respondents consent to the entry of this Order and to the use of these findings in this proceeding and in any other 

proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party; provided, however, that Respondents 

do not consent to the use of the Offer, or the findings or conclusions in this Order, as the sole basis for any other 

proceeding brought by the Commission, other than in a proceeding in bankruptcy or to enforce the terms of this 

Order. Nor do Respondents consent to the use of the Offer or this Order, or the findings in this Order consented to 

in the Offer, by any other party in any other proceeding. 
III. 

The Commission finds the following: 

A. Summary 

Beginning at least as early as January 2007 and continuing through June 2012 (the 

"Relevant Period"), Barclays, by and through certain of its traders inN ew York, at times 

attempted to manipulate the U.S. Dollar International Swaps and Derivatives Association Fix 

("USD ISDAFIX" or the "benchmark"), a leading global benchmark referenced in a range of 

interest rate products, to benefit the Bank's derivatives positions. 

ISDAFIX rates and spreads are published daily and are meant to indicate the prevailing 

mid-market rate, at a specific time of day, for the fixed leg of a standard fixed-for-floating 

interest rate swap.

2 They are issued in several currencies. USD ISDAFIX rates and spreads are 

published for various maturities ofU.S. Dollar-denominated swaps, including 1-year to 10-years, 

15-years, 20-years, and 30-years. The most widely used USD ISDAFIX rates and spreads, and 

the ones at issue in this Order, are those that are intended to indicate the prevailing market rate as 

of 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time. The 11:00 a.m. USD ISDAFIX rate is used for cash settlement of 

options on interest rate swaps, or swaptions, and as a valuation tool for certain other interest rate 

products. For example, USD ISDAFIX was used during the Relevant Period in settlement of 

interest rate swap futures contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") and as 

a component in the calculation of various proprietary interest rate indices and structured 

products. 

During the Relevant Period, USD ISDAFIX was set each day in a process that began at 

11:00 a.m. Eastern Time with the capture and recording of swap rates and spreads from a U.S.-

based unit of a leading interest rate swaps braking firm ("Swaps Broker"). Swaps Broker 

disseminated rates and spreads captured in this "snapshot" or "print" - as it was referred to by 

traders and brokers as references to a panel of banks. The banks then made submissions to 

Swaps Broker. Each bank's submission was supposed to reflect the midpoint of where that 

dealer would itself offer and bid a swap to a dealer of good credit as of 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time. 

Most banks on the panel, including Barclays, usually submitted Swaps Broker's reference rates 

and spreads as captured in the snapshot. As a result, after an averaging of the submissions, the 

reference rates and spreads became the published USD ISDAFIX almost every day. 

A Barclays interest rate options trader ("Options Trader 1 ") once referred in an email to 

the risk that "sometimes isdafix is manipulated," and in fact, Bm·clays, through Options Trader 1 

and others at the Bank, on many occasions during the Relevant Period attempted to manipulate 

USD ISDAFIX rates through its trading at the 11:00 a.m. fixing and by making submissions to 

Swaps Broker that were skewed to benefit derivatives positions held by Barclays. Bm·clays' 

unlawful conduct involved multiple traders, including certain desk heads during the Relevant 

Period. 

2 In 2014, the administration ofiSDAFIX changed, and a new version of the benchmark is published under a 

different name by a new administrator using a different methodology. 

2 
First, ce1iain Barclays traders bid, offered, and executed transactions in targeted interest 

rate products, including swap spreads, at the critical 11 :00 a.m. fixing time with the intent to 

affect the reference rates and spreads captured by Swaps Broker in the "print" sent to submitting 

banks, and thereby to affect the published USD ISDAFIX. As captured in emails and audio 

recordings, when Barclays had derivatives positions settling or pricing against USD ISDAFIX, 

traders discussed with one another and with Swaps Broker employees their intent to move USD 

ISDAFIX in whichever direction benefitted their positions. Traders and brokers described the 

notional amounts traders were willing to spend to influence USD ISDAFIX as "ammo" or as 

amounts the traders could "burn," "waste," or "use" to "get the print" or "affect" the "fix."3 

Second, certain traders at Bm·clays attempted to manipulate USD ISDAFIX by making 

false submissions for Bm·clays as a panel bank to Swaps Broker, skewing the rates and spreads 

submitted in the direction that could have moved the USD ISDAFIX setting to benefit the 

Bank's trading positions. A bank's derivatives trading positions or profitability are not 

legitimate or permissible factors on which to base submissions in connection with a benchmark. 

Yet on many occasions in 2007 and 2008 and on occasion later in the Relevant Period, Barclays 

traders made USD ISDAFIX submissions higher or lower for the purpose of benefitting swaption 

or swaps positions priced or valued against the benchmark. These submissions were false, 

misleading, or knowingly inaccurate because they did not report where Bm·clays would itself bid 

or offer interest rate swaps to a dealer of good credit absent a desire to manipulate USD 

ISDAFIX, but rather reflected prices that were more favorable to the Bank on specitlc positions. 

At times, Bm·clays made such submissions in conjunction with its illegitimate attempts to 

manipulate the benchmark through trading to increase the likelihood that USD ISDAFIX rates 

would move in a beneficial direction. 

* * * 

In accepting Respondents' Offer, the Commission recognizes Bm·clays' signitlcant 

cooperation during the investigation of this matter by the CFTC's Division of Enforcement 

("Division"), which included promptly reporting on signitlcant evidence and providing important 

information and analysis to the Division that helped the Division undertake its investigation 

eftlciently and effectively. The Commission also recognizes that Bm·clays commenced 

significant remedial action to strengthen the internal controls and policies relating to all 

benchmarks, including ISDAFIX, prior to the Division's investigation. 

The Commission also notes that the civil monetary penalty imposed on Barclays reflects 

Bm·clays' early resolution of this matter. 

B. Respondents 

Barclays PLC is a British banking and tlnancial services company headquartered in the 

United Kingdom ("U.K."). It has operations in over 50 countries and territories including the 

United States. 

3 Unless otherwise indicated, all of the quotations in this Order are drawn from audio recordings oftrader 

and/or broker telephone lines. 

3 
Barclays Bank PLC is a global banking and financial services company based in the 

U.K. that is engaged in retail and commercial banking, credit cards, investment banking, wealth 

management, and investment management services. It is wholly owned by Barclays PLC and 

has offices in New York, New York. 

Barclays Capital Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Barclays PLC and engages in 

investment banking, wealth management, and investment management services. It has been 

registered with the Commission as a Futures Commission Merchant since 1990, an approved 

Exempt Foreign Agent since 1992, a Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity Trading 

Advisor since 2009, and an approved swap firm since 2012. It maintains a business address and 

an active trading office in New York, New York. 

C. Facts 

1. USD ISDAFIX Setting 

ISDAFIX rates and spreads are benchmarks that indicate prevailing market rates for 

"plain-vanilla" interest rate swaps.4 The 11:00 a.m. USD ISDAFIX was set during the Relevant 

Period using a combination of swap spread trade data from Swaps Broker, 5 electronic trading in 

U.S. Treasuries and Eurodollars, and submissions from a panel of swap dealer banks, including 

Barclays. 

Swaps Broker's medium-term USD swaps desk ("MTS Desk") functioned much like a 

traditional futures trading pit. Brokers on the desk sat (or stood) together and each serviced a 

number of major swap dealer banks, to whom they were connected throughout the trading day by 

direct phone lines and speaker boxes. The brokers communicated their clients' bids and offers 

by open outcry to the entire MTS Desk and all of the brokers simultaneously. Any client could 

accept a bid or offer. Once a broker confirmed that a client was "hitting" a bid, "lifting" an offer, 

or was otherwise "done" in a designated notional amount (either a minimum default amount or a 

greater amount), the trade between the counterparties was executed and the counterparties 

received a confirmation of the trade. Bm·clays' interest rate swaps and options traders primarily 

worked with one broker on the MTS Desk ("Broker 1 "), but at times other Swaps Broker 

employees, including brokers from Swap Broker's short-term swaps desk, worked with Barclays. 

4 The term "swap" is defined in CEA Section la(47). Here, a "plain-vanilla" interest rate swap is 

generally an exchange of fixed payments for floating payments, wherein one party to a swap pays a fixed 

rate on a set notional amount (the patty who "pays fixed" is said to have "bought" the swap, or is "long" 

the swap) and the other party pays a f1oating rate generally tied to three-month LIB OR (the party who 

"receives fixed" is said to have "sold" the swap, or is "short" the swap). The "maturity" or "tenor" of a 

swap refers to the number of years over which counterparties exchange payments. 

5 An interest rate swap spread trade consists of a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap and an offsetting 

trade in U.S. Treasuries of the same tenor, which allows a patty to hedge pati of the interest rate risk 

associated with the fixed-for-floating swap. The difference in basis points between the U.S. Treasury 

yield and the swap rate constitutes the "spread" quoted in a spread trade. The pmty who "receives fixed" 

in a swap and sells U.S. Treasuries to hedge is "short" spreads or has "sold" spreads, while a patty who 

"pays fixed" in a swap and buys Treasuries to hedge is "long" spreads or has "bought" spreads. 

4 
Swaps Broker published a live feed of transaction data for USD interest rate swap 

spreads, swap rates, and U.S. Treasury yields and prices to an electronic screen, known as the 

"19901 screen," accessible through a subscription-based market news service. The 19901 screen 

reflected the levels at which those products were trading through the MTS Desk (for swap 

spreads and swap rates) and Swaps Broker's proprietary electronic bond trading platform (for 

U.S. Treasuries). The 19901 screen is a reference used widely throughout the financial industry 

by swap dealer banks, hedge funds, asset managers, businesses, and other participants in interest 

rate markets. During the Relevant Period, levels displayed on the 19901 screen at precisely 

11:00 a.m. were critical because they were used to set USD ISDAFIX. 

To set USD ISDAFIX rates for the 2-year through 30-year maturities, Swaps Broker first 

generated reference rates and spreads from the snapshot of 11:00 a.m. screen prices, reflecting 

either the last traded spread or the mid-point between the most recent executable bid and offer. 

Swaps Broker's reference rates, for all maturities except the 1-year, were the sum of the 

reference spread and the 19901 screen's U.S. Treasury yield in the corresponding maturity. To 

generate the 1-year reference rate (for which there was no associated swap spread), Swaps 

Broker utilized a combination of Eurodollar futures yields (based on trading on CME's Globex 

platform) and broker "sentiment," which was intended to reflect prevailing rates for 1-year swaps 

based on trading though Swaps Broker's shmi-term swaps desk. 

Minutes after the 11:00 a.m. snapshot of the 19901 was taken, Swaps Broker distributed 

its reference rates and spreads to a panel of 14 or more contributing banks, which either accepted 

and submitted the reference rates and spreads as their own or submitted adjusted levels. Each 

bank, including Bm·clays, was expected to submit "the mean of where that dealer would itself 

offer and bid a swap in the relevant maturity for a notional equivalent amount ofUSD $50 

million or whatever amount is deemed market size in that currency for that tenor to an 

acknowledged dealer of good credit in the swap market."6 Banks could change the prices for all 

rates and spreads across all maturities in their submissions, or change any subset, including any 

single rate or spread. Alternatively, a panel banlc could make no submission at all. After a 

quorum of contributing banks made their submissions, a calculation agent eliminated the highest 

and lowest submissions (known as "topping and tailing") and averaged the remaining 

submissions. The submission and calculation process was generally completed in the half hour 

following 11:00 a.m., after which the results were accessible to the public through a 

subscription-based news service. 

In practice, most panel banks accepted Swaps Broker's reference rates and spreads as 

their default submissions. Thus after "topping and tailing," Swaps Broker's reference rates and 

spreads usually became the final published USD ISDAFIX benchmarks. Barclays traders often 

contacted Swaps Broker's MTS Desk just after 11 :00 a.m. to find out where the print came out, 

because they understood that it usually became the final published USD ISDAFIX rate. As one 

Barclays interest rate options trader ("Options Trader 2") stated in an April 2007 conversation 

with a broker, referring to Swaps Broker's "suggested" rate, "I would say nine and a halftimes 

out often it's the rate that's published." 

6 See ISDA, ISDAFIX, https://web.archive.org/web/20 140209180 148/http:/www2.isda.org/assetclasses/interest-rates-derivatives/isdafix/ (last accessed May 11, 20 15). 

5 
2. Barclays' Role in USD ISDAFIX Setting 

Throughout the Relevant Period, Bm·clays was one of the panel banks that submitted rates 

and spreads for the determination ofUSD ISDAFIX. Barclays made its daily USD ISDAFIX 

submissions through the New York Interest Rate Swaps Desk (the "NY Swaps Desk") housed in 

Bm·clays Capital Inc. The NY Swaps Desk was a market-making desk that traded fixed-forfloating interest rate swaps and a variety of other products. Barclays acted as counterpmiy to 

clients in many interest rate swap transactions and the derivatives instruments traded by the NY 

Swaps Desk were used to hedge the desk's interest rate risk and also to generate a profit for the 

desk. 

Because the NY Swaps Desk had primary responsibility for the U.S. Dollar swaps 

business, the NY Swaps Desk was responsible for Bm·clays' USD ISDAFIX submissions. For 

much of the Relevant Period, the heads ofthe NY Swaps Desk delegated ISDAFIX submissions 

to a junior trader on the desk. At times during the Relevant Period, the NY Swaps Desk did not 

have an employee assigned to make submissions and, for periods of time, Barclays made no 

submission at all. 

During most of the Relevant Period, Barclays did not have specific internal controls or 

procedures, written or otherwise, regarding how USD ISDAFIX submissions should be 

determined or monitored. ISDAFIX submitters received no formal training on making ISDAFIX 

submissions, and the Bank did not require submissions to be documented during the Relevant 

Period. 

3. Barclays' Positions with Exposure to USD ISDAFIX 

Bm·clays traders had two primary reasons to attempt to manipulate the benchmark: one 

was to maximize profit (or minimize loss) for the New York Interest Rate Options Desk ("NY 

Options Desk") in connection with swaption cash settlements; the other was to maximize profit 

(or minimize loss) for the NY Swaps Desk in connection with occasional intrabank "ISDAFIX 

trades" related to a proprietary index product developed by Barclays. 

a. NY Options Desk Swaption Cash Settlements 

Throughout the Relevant Period, traders on Bm·clays' NY Options Desk, at times in 

coordination with the NY Swaps Desk, attempted to manipulate USD ISDAFIX in order to 

benefit their derivatives positions, by increasing their payments from counterparties or 

decreasing payments to counterparties in cash-settled interest rate swaptions. A so-called 

"European swaption," one of the primary products traded by the NY Options Desk, is an option 

to enter into a plain-vanilla fixed-for-floating interest rate swap, which must be exercised at 

11:00 a.m. on a specified "expiry" date in the future at a pre-agreed fixed "strike" rate. A 

swaption can be exercised by "physical" delivery of the underlying swap or by cash settlement. 

A swaption that expired "in-the-money" would usually physically settle and, on many days, the 

NY Options Desk did not have any swaption cash-settle. Swaption cash settlements 

denominated in U.S. Dollars are typically calculated based on USD ISDAFIX rates according to 

a formula which measures the difference between the relevant USD ISDAFIX rate on the expiry 

date and the strike rate of the swaption. 

6 
Attempts to move USD ISDAFIX rate in Barclays' favor, if successful, would hurt the 

Banlc's counterpmiies in cash settlement, as well as any other market participants who had 

positions referencing USD ISDAFIX on a given day that were directionally equivalent to 

Barclays' counterparty in the same maturity. A small movement of the benchmark higher or 

lower (e.g., one basis point or less) could result in meaningful gain for the Banlc on its swaption 

cash settlements. As a Barclays options trader ("Options Trader 3") observed, "[i]t only takes a 

few hundred million [notional amount of swap spread trades] to move the spreads like a bip 

[basis point] or two bips." 

b. NY Swaps Desk "ISDAFIX Trades" 

Traders on the NY Swaps Desk had their own reasons to attempt to manipulate USD 

ISDAFIX rates. Specifically, from time to time during the Relevant Period, the NY Swaps Desk 

entered into intrabank swap transactions priced at USD ISDAFIX levels with Barclays' Londonbased Global Interest Rate Exotics Desk (the "London Exotics Desk"). The London Exotics 

Desk entered into these internal trades opposite the NY Swaps Desk in order to hedge its 

exposure under client-facing trades that referenced proprietary indices developed by Barclays 

called TrendStar and TrendStar+ ("TrendStar Trades"). On the days when the London Exotics 

Desk placed these orders with the NY Swaps Desk, it requested the trade in advance of the USD 

ISDAFIX setting. Some Banlc traders called these "ISDAFIX trades." 

On occasions when the NY Swaps Desk knew it would be receiving the USD ISDAFIX 

rate from the London Exotics Desk, the NY Swaps Desk traders wanted the rate to set higher so 

that they could receive a higher fixed rate on the swap from the London Exotics Desk. Likewise, 

on occasions when the NY Swaps Desk knew it would be paying the USD ISDAFIX rate, traders 

wanted the rate to set lower, so that they could pay a lower fixed rate on the swap. 7 For every 

fraction of a basis point that the NY Swaps Desk could successfully move the relevant USD 

ISDAFIX rate to its advantage, the TrendStar indices would move to the disadvantage of 

Barclays' clients in their TrendS tar Trades facing the London Exotics Desk. 

4. Means Employed in Attempts to Manipulate USD ISDAFIX 

Barclays swaps and options traders understood and employed two primary means in 

attempts to manipulate USD ISDAFIX rates: 

• First, Barclays traders bid, offered, and/or executed swap spread trades at and around 

Swaps Broker's 11 :00 a.m. print to affect prices on the 19901 screen and thereby 

increase or decrease Swaps Broker's reference rates and spreads and influence the 

final published USD ISDAFIX. As one Barclays swaps trader ("Swaps Trader 1 ") 

remarked on March 7, 2007, USD ISDAFIX was "fucking random" and "what 

happens at eleven is the bloody thing moves like half a basis point up and down 

because everybody's trying to bang the screen." 

7 On two occasions, there is evidence that Bm·clays swaps traders also attempted to manipulate onexchange Eurodollar futures at 11:00 a.m. to advantage the Bank in connection with early-terminating 

swaps. As noted above, in the 1-year maturity, Swaps Broker used Eurodollar futures yields at 11:00 a.m. 

to generate the reference rate sent to USD ISDAFIX submitting banks. 

7 
Second, by communicating with the Bank's USD ISDAFIX submitters on the NY 

Swaps Desk or directly with Swaps Broker, Bm·clays traders caused the Bank to make 

higher or lower submissions intended to affect the final published benchmark. As 

Swaps Trader 1 explained to another Barclays trader by instant message in March 

2007: "we can put our fixings i[n] at a certain level ... its still an average of several 

banks but we will put our level in at whatsever [sic] rate u want."8 

Whichever the means employed, the goal was the same- to move USD ISDAFIX in the 

direction that favored Barclays on specific trading positions at the expense of its counterparties 

and clients. 

a. Barclays' Improper Trading Conduct 

Bm·clays' primary means of attempting to manipulate USD ISDAFIX was to bid, offer, 

and trade swap spreads at and around Swaps Broker's 11:00 a.m. print, in a manner designed to 

move USD ISDAFIX rates in a direction that would benefit the Bank. Bm·clays traders 

attempted to move Swaps Broker's reference rates and spreads by a quarter basis point or more 

with a single bid, offer, or trade of minimum market size (which varied by maturity) or with a 

series of bids, offers, or trades. 

Traders from the NY Swaps and Options Desks, and their brokers, regularly referred to 

trades or notional amounts executed for the purpose of influencing USD ISDAFIX as "ammo" or 

amounts the traders were willing to "spend," "burn," "waste," or "use" to "get the print" or 

"affect" the "fix." On May 8, 2007, Broker 1 described typical communications with Options 

Trader 2: "every time that I, we try to get a fix, I say to him, what do you need, and how much 

do you have to burn? Because it's only how much do you have to burn is the, is the real point." 

Early in the Relevant Period, traders and brokers explicitly discussed traders' intent to 

manipulate USD ISDAFIX. For example, in 2007, Broker 1 told Options Trader 2: "If you want 

to affect it at eleven, you tell me which way you want to affect it we'll, we'll attempt to affect it 

that way. In November 2008, Swaps Trader 1 told Broker 1, "I want a low ISDAFIX in 2s" and 

"I don't want to burn anything." Over time, an understanding developed between traders and 

brokers and their communications became less explicit. By April 2011, Options Trader 1 needed 

only to bid swap spreads in the minute before 11 :00 a.m., and Broker 1 immediately understood 

Options Trader 1 's intent, asking, "You want the screen up? Is that the idea?" "Yes," the trader 

replied. 

8 Bm·clays traders also discussed, and on at least a few occasions attempted, manipulation through other 

means, including bidding, offering, and/or executing trades in U.S. Treasuries on Swaps Broker's 

electronic bond trading platform (for 2-year through 30-year maturities) or Eurodollar futures on CME's 

Globex platform (for the 1-year maturity), at and around 11:00 a.m., to increase or decrease Swaps 

Broker's reference rates and spreads and influence the final published USD ISDAFIX. In April2007, 

Options Trader 2 explained to another trader his understanding that trading CME's Eurodollar futures 

"strip," referring to the first four qumierly maturities, could influence the !-year USD ISDAFIX: "if you 

wanna affect this thing you need to fucking hit the strip or lift the strip." Options Trader 2 fmiher 

remarked in regard to other maturities that "[t]he only way I affect the screen is by trading [Swaps 

Broker's electronic bond trading platform] and hitting or lifting spreads." 

8 
Barclays traders were willing to "burn" or "waste" trades because they expected to 

benefit their cash settlements to an extent that would likely exceed, but at least cover, any trading 

losses. Options Trader 2 once explained to a broker why a trader would "spend" some trades for 

the benefit of a larger cash settlement: 

If I've got ten billion 1-years ... and I trade two and a half billion 

and I move it a qumier [basis point] in my favor, how do you think 

that works out? I'm willing to spend a quarter of the, of the risk to 

get the print for the other three quarters, okay? 

To affect the USD ISDAFIX print at minimal cost, traders carefully timed their trading activity 

to be the last screen-moving event before the 11 :00 a.m. print. On one occasion in 2008, for 

example, Options Trader 1 told Broker 1: "Hey, at eleven I'm going to try to hit the 5-year 

spreads down, but I have no ammo so ... if it's a wide market, I'm just going to try to hit it 

down." Broker 1 responded: "you know what, then right at eleven I'm just gonna, just, just 

scream out, do you have like a hundred at least?" On another occasion in 2012, in connection 

with an ISDAFIX trade, a desk head ("Swaps Trader 2") made clear his desire to not "spend" 

any of his "ammunition": "At 11 o'clock, I have to get low print in 1 0-year spreads." He added: 

"when I say 'hit it,' right, you can spend, urn, two hundred fifty [million] 10-years in 

ammunition. I really don't want to spend it ... but if you can keep it at 8 ... it will be perfect." 

In the seconds before 11:00 a.m., Swaps Trader 2 instructed, "do it now," at which time the 

broker yelled out: "lOs down! lOs down!" 

According to one Bm·clays trader on the NY Swaps Desk, attem~ting to get USD 

ISDAFIX to set higher or lower was a part of traders' hedging strategy. Thus, even when 

traders had the opportunity to hedge risk by trading swap spreads internally or at other brokers, 

they sought to trade through Swaps Broker because only Swaps Broker trades could affect USD 

ISDAFIX. For example, on February 24, 2010, Options Trader 3 told his supervisor that he had 

asked the NY Swaps Desk to execute trades through Swaps Broker at 11 :00 a.m, but a swaps 

trader had insisted on doing the trade internally at Barclays. As a result, Options Trader 3 said, a 

desk head at the Bank later told a senior swaps trader: "instead of trading with [the NY Swaps 

Desk], we need to be able to, to push spreads in the market to get the fix where we want it." 

Bm·clays traders distinguished between ordinary trades and trades intended - both in 

timing and in price- to attempt to manipulate USD ISDAFIX. For example, in Apri12009, 

Broker 1 asked Options Trader 1 whether he was trading to affect USD ISDAFIX or for another 

9 Bat·clays traders referred to trades that they made around 11:00 a.m. for risk management purposes as 

hedging. When swaptions cash-settled, changes in the NY Options Desk's risk position could potentially 

require traders to execute hedging trades, depending on a variety of factors, including the risk profile of 

other positions and whether the desk wanted to take on the risk resulting from a cash settlement at expiry. 

Likewise, with so-called "ISDAFIX trades," when the NY Swaps Desk entered swaps facing the London 

Exotics Desk at USD ISDAFIX levels, the NY Swaps Desk took on new risk, which again, depending on 

a variety of factors, the desk might have reason to hedge. Irrespective of whether the NY Options Desk 

and NY Swaps Desk traders had an interest in hedging, they engaged in attempted manipulation when 

they placed bids and offers or executed trades around 11 :00 a.m. with the improper intent to move the 

USD ISDAFIX rate in Barclays' favor. 

9 
reason: "are you gonna want to affect this at all or you don't care?" Options Trader 1 replied: 

"no, I don't want to affect it, I do have to hedge it though." By contrast, in August 2008, Broker 

1 asked a Barclays swaps trader ("Swaps Trader 3 ") about a bid in swaps spreads: "did you want 

to affect the fix or did you just want to buy 'em?" Swaps Trader 3 replied: "no, no, he wanted to 

affect the fixing." 

b. Barclays' False, Misleading, or Knowingly Inaccurate Submissions 

Bm·clays traders also attempted to manipulate USD ISDAFIX by causing the Bank to 

make false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate submissions to Swaps Broker concerning swap 

rates and spreads. As one swaps trader explained to the USD ISDAFIX submitter in April2007: 

The options guys care where the 30-year is today, okay . . . So 

they want it lower ... what you are going to do, just put in all the 

rates wherever ... Put the 30-year rate at like five point four five 

five [5.455], okay? . . . They have options that expire and they 

depend on these rates and they get set at a certain level. 

In another example, in August 2008, an ISDAFIX submitter who was out of the office instructed 

another trader to "ask [Options Trader 1] if he needs anything for ISDA, then submit." 

Directions from the NY Options Desk regarding submissions were, according to one 

swaps trader, loudly shouted across the desks where numerous people on the trading floor could 

have heard them. At times, Barclays traders on the NY Options Desk made submissions directly 

to Swaps Broker by telephone, only in those maturities to which the Bank had financial 

exposure. Multiple traders engaged in this conduct during the Relevant Period. It occurred in 

many instances in 2007 and 2008, and on occasion later in the Relevant Period. 

5. Examples of Attempted Manipulation to Benefit the NY Options Desk 

in Swaption Cash Settlements 

During the Relevant Period, traders on the NY Options Desk, at times with the assistance 

of the NY Swaps Desk, used various means in attempts to move USD ISDAFIX higher or lower, 

in order to get more from, or pay less to, their counterpmiies in swaption cash settlements. 

Following are additional specific examples of communications ofBarclays traders relating to 

their attempts to manipulate USD ISDAFIX. 

• On June 25, 2007, the NY Options Desk had a cash settlement on a 5-year swaption of 

$63 5 million notional. Barclays traders on multiple desks coordinated to employ three 

methods of manipulation in an attempt to maximize the amount paid to Barclays in the 

swaption cash settlement. First, at approximately 10:50 a.m., Swaps Trader 1 contacted 

Broker 1 on behalf of the NY Options Desk, and instructed the broker, "don't let 'em go 

down," referring to 5-year swap spreads. As 11:00 a.m. approached, he told the broker: 

"for the eleven o'clock fix I need to lift 5s up," "I want to keep it up," and "[i]fit gets hit 

down, you hit it right back up, don't let it go down." Swaps Trader 1 told the broker, "I 

can burn like, four, five hun-, four hundred [million notional]." After trading only $200 

million of 5-year swap spreads, and withdrawing his offer seconds before 11:00 a.m., he 

10 
said to the broker: "We got it right? We got the fix, good job." Second, in parallel, also 

in the minutes leading up to 11:00 a.m., Options Trader 1 emailed traders on Barclays' 

U.S. Treasuries desk: "I have an exercise at 11am this morning, I will need to sell635 5s, 

but I want to push the screens down at 11, as much as . . . you can, so that I can get a 

better 11 am print." Pushing the 5-year U.S. Treasuries price down would increase the 

yield on those Treasuries and thereby increase the 5-year USD ISDAFIX. Lastly, another 

options trader ("Options Trader 4") emailed the USD ISDAFIX submitter at 

approximately 10:54 a.m., instructing "We want higher 5s," referring to the Bank's 5-

year USD ISDAFIX submission. 

• On September 18, 2008, a Barclays swaps trader ("Swaps Trader 4," then a supervisor of 

multiple trading desks), told Broker 1: "Okay, at eleven o'clock, we have an option 

settlement, okay, I have 200 1 Os of ammo ... and I need to get the screen as high as 

possible." Swaps Trader 4 then instructed the broker to buy swap spreads at higher, 

rather than lower levels: "don't let him hit me down at a quarter," he told the broker, "I 

want at least a half middle," referring to the higher USD ISDAFIX print he was seeking. 

On this day, Bm·clays stood to receive more in cash settlements from its counterparties 

the higher the 1 0-year USD ISDAFIX. 

• On May 6, 2009, at approximately 10:16 a.m., Swaps Trader 3 told Broker 1: "I'm gonna 

have something to do on the ISDA fixing," and, referring to the 1 0-year maturity, "as low 

as possible, okay." After engaging in trading activity consistent with Swaps Trader 3 's 

expressed intent, Broker 1 reported at approximately 11:01 a.m. that "it worked without 

having to waste anything." Minutes later, the broker told the trader Swaps Broker's 

reference rate in the 1 0-year maturity, which the trader said was "fantastic." The broker 

nevertheless told the trader that he was "shading it down" for Bm·clays' submission, 

which the trader said would be "fine." Barclays had at least two swaptions cash-settling 

on this day in which the Bank would benefit from a lower 10-year ISDAFIX. 

• On July 26, 2011, at approximately 10:59 a.m., Swaps Trader 3 told Broker 1 that 

Options Trader 1 "wants to keep 10-year spreads down. So, if you can, we don't have 

much ammo, like a hundred; don't let it go up to 9, hit it down." Broker 1 replied: "I 

hear you. I'm just gonna lock 'em down at 11." On this day, Barclays stood to receive 

more from its counterparties, in multiple cash settlements, with a lower 1 0-year USD 

ISDAFIX. 

11 
6. Examples of Attempted Manipulation to Benefit 

the NY Swaps Desk in "ISDAFIX Trades" 

From time to time during the Relevant Period, Barclays' NY Swaps Desk entered into 

interest rate swaps at ISDAFIX rates with the Bank's London Exotics Desk as its counterparty. 

Traders on the NY Swaps Desk attempted to manipulate USD ISDAFIX to increase their 

opportunity to profit from these "ISDAFIX trades." Following are just two examples of this 

misconduct. 

• On September 10, 2008, at approximately 8:07a.m., the London Exotics Desk contacted 

the NY Swaps Desk with an ISDAFIX trade order. As 11:00 a.m. approached, Swaps 

Trader 1 and Swaps Trader 4 (as noted, a supervisor of multiple trading desks) attempted 

to push down the 9-year and 10-year USD ISDAFIX rates and to push up the 2-year USD 

ISDAFIX rate, so that the NY Swaps Desk would pay lower rates and receive higher ones 

in the ISDAFIX trade. 

At approximately 10:26 a.m., Swaps Trader 1 told Broker 1: "at eleven o'clock ... we 

wanna get 9s and lOs down" and "also we wanna get 2s up." He explained that he would 

"go in the short-end line with [Swaps Broker's "Broker 2"] and get 2s up," and that 

Swaps Trader 4 was "gonna come in" for the 9-year and 10-year maturities, where "we 

are gonna be the offer, yeah? Don't ... don't move it up ... we have some ammo." 

Consistent with this plan, Swaps Trader 1 then told Broker 2: "At eleven o'clock, I want 

the ISDAFIX in the 2s as high as possible. So I'm gonna come in at like five minutes to 

eleven and try and bang- move 2-years up." "I know [another bank] is on the offer," he 

added, "but I have a bit of ammo." 

At approximately 10:57 a.m., Broker 1 told Swaps Trader 4 that 10-year swap spreads 

were 61.5 bid and 61.75 offered. Swaps Trader 4 replied, "Listen, I'm going to try to hit 

'em down to 61." The broker replied, "Oh, I don't think you're going to get there" and 

listed numerous buyers in the market. Swaps Trader 4 then instructed Broker 1 to "try 

and do as little as possible," referring to the notional amount he was willing to spend to 

lower the 1 0-year spread. When Broker 1 suggested that Swaps Trader 4 may have to 

spend more, Swaps Trader 4 said that the broker could trade "up to" $250 million and 

should "just keep them, keep them fucking locked up." When the broker replied, "I don't 

think two-fifty's gonna hold it, quite honestly," the trader replied, "okay, but all we need 

to do is hold it for ten seconds," referring to the seconds before 11:00 a.m. 

Just after 11:00 a.m., Swaps Trader 4 remarked to the broker, "we got it .... Yeah, you 

got it at sixty one and a quarter, at 11 ." The broker replied, "Oh god, I hope so, let me 

come right back. Let me go find out what I sold." Later, after the final rates were 

published, Swaps Trader 6, who had observed this trading activity by his colleagues, 

remarked to Broker 2 about the 2-year tenor: "Yeah, you did well at the 11 o'clock fix, 

man," and it "sounded like you were actually holding the spreads up with your hands; 

like, it felt like you were bench pressing them over your head." 

• On August 10, 2010, in another example, the London Exotics Desk placed an order at 

approximately 9:14a.m. which gave the NY Swaps Desk incentive to push up the 10-

12 
year USD ISDAFIX rate and push down the 2-year USD ISDAFIX rate. At 

approximately 10:43 a.m., a Barclays swaps trader ("Swaps Trader 5") initiated the 

following conversation with Broker 1, making certain first that no one was listening on 

the line: 

Swaps Trader 5: 

Broker 1: 

Swaps Trader 5: 

Broker 1: 

Swaps Trader 5: 

Broker 1: 

Swaps Trader 5: 

Broker 1: 

Swaps Trader 5: 

Broker 1: 

Swaps Trader 5: 

Broker 1: 

Could you pick me up? 

I got you picked up. 

Oh, okay. No one else is on the line, right? 

No. 

Alright, uh, I care about the elevens, okay. 

Oh, great. What, okay, what do you wanna do and how 

much do you have to burn? 

Yeah, so no one's on the line right? 

No, not at all. 

Alright, urn. So, I'm gonna want, uh, 1 Os higher and 2s 

lower, okay? So -

Okay. 

Urn, just, your discretion, I care more about 1 Os, but would 

care about both of 'em. Urn, and have, uh, like two 

hundred [million] lOs and five hundred [million] 2-year 

spreads to use, okay? 

Okay fine, you got it. 

Closer to 11 :00 a.m., the broker sought confirmation that the trader did not genuinely 

want to fill an order of $200 million notional: "you prefer not to burn the two hundred or 

any part of it, right?" Swaps Trader 5 agreed, "yeah." Broker 1 then traded on Barclays' 

behalf in a manner consistent with Swaps Trader 5 's instructions. 

IV. 

LEGAL DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction 

As set forth below, Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act have long prohibited 

attempted manipulation of the prices of, or false reporting in regard to, any commodity in 

interstate commerce or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity. 7 

U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) (2006). An interest rate benchmark, such as USD ISDAFIX, is a 

commodity, see Sections la(9) and (19) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ la(9), (19) (2012); see also 7 

U.S.C. §§ la(4), (13) (2006), and therefore may be subject to illegal attempted manipulation, 

whatever the manipulative means may be, or false reporting. 

Here, Bm·clays' attempted manipulation is also proscribed by the Act for the separate 

reason that the conduct involved swaps executed or traded on a Swaps Broker desk that operated 

in practice as a "trading facility" under the Act, see 7 U.S.C. § la(34) (2006) (defining trading 

facility); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(d)(l)(B), 2(g)(3) (2006) (limiting jurisdictional exclusions to agreements, 

contracts, or transactions not executed or traded on a trading facility). 

13 
Lastly, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 

2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act"), the Commission also has authority to initiate proceedings and impose 

sanctions for a broader range of manipulative conduct and false reporting, including in 

connection with any swap. See Sections 6(c)(l), 6(c)(l)(A), 6(c)(3), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 

7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13b, 13(a)(2) (2012), and Commission Regulations 180.1 and 

180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 (2014). The Relevant Period encompasses conduct that 

occurred after the passage and effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act. 

B. Respondents Attempted to Manipulate USD ISDAFIX 

Section 9(a)(2) of the Act makes it unlawful for "[a]ny person to manipulate or attempt to 

manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or 

subject to the rules of any registered entity." 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006). With respect to 

conduct on or after July 16, 2011, amended Section 9(a)(2) of the Act also makes it unlawful to 

manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of"any swap." 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012). 

For conduct prior to August 15, 2011, Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Act authorize the 

Commission to serve a complaint and provide for the imposition of, among other things, civil 

monetary penalties and cease and desist orders if the Commission "has reason to believe that any 

person ... has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the market price of any commodity, in 

interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, ... 

or otherwise is violating or has violated any of the provisions of [the] Act." 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2006); 

id. § 13b (2006). 

For conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, the Commission is authorized to serve 

a complaint and impose penalties and orders with regard to attempted manipulation in violation 

of the broader amended provisions of Sections 6( c )(1) and 6( c )(3) and the Commission 

regulations implementing those provisions. See Sections 6(c)(4)(A) and 6(d) of the Act, 7 

U.S.C. §§ 9(4)(A), 13b (2012). 

Sections 6(c)(l) and 6(c)(l)(A) ofthe Act prohibit the use or attempted use of any 

manipulative device, including false reporting, in connection with any swap or contract of sale of 

any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A) (2012), 

and Commission Regulation 180.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2014), makes it "unlawful ... , 

directly or indirectly, in connection with any swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in 

interstate commerce, or contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered 

entity, to ... (1) [u]se ... or attempt to use ... any manipulative device; (2) [m]ake, or attempt 

to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 

necessary in order to make the statements made not untrue or misleading; (3) [e]ngage, or 

attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as 

a fraud or deceit upon any person; or, (4) [d]eliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver 

or cause to be delivered, for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, ... a false or 

misleading or inaccurate report concerning ... market information or conditions that affect or 

tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce." 

Section 6( c )(3) of the Act prohibits the attempted manipulation of the price of any 

commodity in interstate commerce, 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012), and Commission Regulation 180.2, 

14 
17 C.P.R.§ 180.2 (2014), makes it "unlawful ... directly or indirectly, to ... attempt to 

manipulate the price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future 

delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity." 

To prove attempted manipulation under each of these provisions, the following two 

elements are required: (1) an intent to affect market price, and (2) an overt act in furtherance of 

that intent. See In re Hohenberg Bros. Co. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. 

(CCH) ~ 20,271, at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977). To prove the intent element of attempted 

manipulation, the respondent must have "acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or conscious 

object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the market that did not reflect the 

legitimate forces of supply and demand." In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 

Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,283 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). 

"[W]hile knowledge of relevant market conditions is probative of intent, it is not necessary to 

prove that the accused knew to any particular degree of certainty that his actions would create an 

artificial price. It is enough to present evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that 

the accused 'consciously desire[ d] that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening 

from his conduct."' Id. (quoting United States v. US. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442,445 (1978)). 

A profit motive may also be evidence of intent, although profit motive is not a necessary element 

of an attempted manipulation. See In re DiPlacido [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. 

Rep. (CCH) ~ 30,970, at 62,484 (CFTC Nov. 5, 2008) (citing In re Hohenberg Bros. Co., [1975-

1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,478)), a.ff'd sub. nom. DiPlacido v. 

CFTC, 364 F. App'x 657 (2d Cir. 2009). It is also not necessary that there be an actual effect on 

pnce. See CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 

1. Respondents Attempted to Manipulate USD ISDAFIX 

Through Improper Trading Conduct 

As evidenced by the communications among Bm·clays traders and between Barclays 

traders and their brokers, as well as their actual trading conduct, Barclays traders specifically 

intended to manipulate USD ISDAFIX by placing bids or offers or executing trades in the 

moments leading into 11 :00 a.m. designed in a manner, including timing and pricing, to increase 

or decrease swap spreads at 11:00 a.m., with the intent to affect levels reported on the 19901 

screen and USD ISDAFIX fixings. Moreover, the evidence reflects that the traders intended 

such trading conduct to affect the fixings in order to benefit Barclays' trading positions against 

the Bank's counterparties. 

The Barclays traders' bids, offers, and executed trades in the moments leading into 11:00 

a.m., which were intended to affect USD ISDAFIX, as well as the traders' communications with 

each other and with their Swaps Broker brokers to plan and execute this trading conduct, 

constituted ove1i acts in furtherance of their intent to affect USD ISDAFIX. The Barclays 

traders thereby engaged in acts of attempted manipulation in violation of Sections 6( c), 6( d), and 

9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) (2006). Additionally, with respect to conduct 

occurring on or after August 15, 2011, Barclays engaged in acts of attempted manipulation in 

violation of Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012), and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.P.R.§ 180.2 

(20 14 ), and they used or attempted to use a manipulative device in violation of Sections 6( c )(1) 

and 6(c)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A) (2012), and Regulation 180.1(a), 17 C.P.R. § 180.1(a) 

(2014). 

15 
2. Respondents Attempted to Manipulate USD ISDAFIX Through 

False, Misleading, or Knowingly Inaccurate Submissions 

As evidenced by communications among Barclays traders, as well as Bm·clays' USD 

ISDAFIX submissions themselves, Bm·clays traders specifically intended to affect the rate at 

which USD ISDAFIX was set by making false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate submissions 

to Swaps Broker for inclusion in the calculation of the daily rates. At times during the Relevant 

Period, Barclays submitted market information, specifically rates that were supposed to reflect 

the mean of where Barclays would itself offer and bid a USD denominated swap in the relevant 

maturity to an acknowledged dealer of good credit, to Swaps Broker that were used as part of the 

process for determining the daily USD ISDAFIX rate for the various maturities. However, rather 

than submitting rates and spreads that reflected Barclays' honest view of the true costs of 

entering into a standard USD interest-rate swap in particular maturities, Barclays at times 

knowingly made submissions with the intent to move USD ISDAFIX rates higher or lower in 

order to benefit Barclays' trading positions. Through its false, misleading, or knowingly 

inaccurate submissions, Barclays attempted to manipulate USD ISDAFIX for numerous tenors. 

The Barclays traders' oral and written requests for certain rates to be submitted which 

would benefit their trading positions, and the submissions resulting from those requests, 

constituted overt acts in furtherance of the traders' intent to affect USD ISDAFIX. By doing so, 

the Bm·clays traders engaged in acts of attempted manipulation in violation of Sections 6( c), 6( d), 

and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) (2012). Additionally, with respect to conduct 

occurring on or after August 15, 20 11, the Bm·clays traders engaged in acts of attempted 

manipulation in violation of Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012), and Regulation 180.2, 17 

C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014), and they used or attempted to use a manipulative device in violation of 

Sections 6(c)(1) and 6(c)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A) (2012), and Regulation 180.1(a), 17 

C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2014). 

C. Respondents Made False, Misleading, or Knowingly Inaccurate Reports 

Concerning USD ISDAFIX in Violation of Section 9(a)(2) of the Act 

In addition to the prohibition on attempted manipulation contained in Section 9(a)(2) of 

the Act, that provision also makes it unlawful for any person "knowingly to deliver or cause to 

be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, 

wireless, or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports 

concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any 

commodity in interstate commerce." 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006); see also United States v. 

Brooks, 681 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2004); 

CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 

From time to time during the Relevant Period, Bm·clays, through electronic and 

telephonic transmission of information to Swaps Broker, knowingly delivered or caused to be 

delivered the Banlc's USD Dollar ISDAFIX submissions through the mails or interstate 

commerce. Barclays' submissions were also delivered through the mails or interstate commerce 

through daily dissemination and publication globally, including throughout the United States, of 

the official published rates for USD ISDAFIX, as determined by averaging the submissions of 

Barclays and other panel banlcs after "topping and tailing." Data on submissions themselves 

16 
were also disseminated. Barclays' daily USD ISDAFIX submissions contained market 

information concerning the mean of where Barclays would itself offer and bid a swap in the 

relevant maturity to an acknowledged dealer of good credit in the swap market absent intent to 

manipulate USD ISDAFIX. Such market information affected or tended to affect the prices of 

commodities in interstate commerce, including the daily fixing rates for USD ISDAFIX, as well 

as the on-exchange interest rate swap futures and other financial instruments which relied upon 

those rates. 

From time to time during the Relevant Period, Barclays' USD ISDAFIX submissions 

constituted false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate reports because they purpmied to reflect 

Barclays' honest view of the true costs of entering into a standard fixed-for-floating interest rate 

swap in particular tenors, but in fact reflected traders' desire to move USD ISDAFIX higher or 

lower in order to benefit their positions. 

By using these impermissible factors in making its USD ISDAFIX submissions and 

without disclosing that it based its submissions on these impermissible factors, Bm·clays 

conveyed false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate information that the rates it submitted were 

based on the prices at which Bm·clays would offer and bid swaps to an acknowledged dealer of 

good credit in the swaps market absent intent to manipulate USD ISDAFIX. Moreover, Bm·clays 

submitters knew that Barclays' USD ISDAFIX submissions contained false, misleading, or 

knowingly inaccurate information. By such conduct, Respondents violated Section 9(a)(2) of the 

Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006). 

D. Barclays PLC, Barclays Bani{, and Barclays Capital Are Liable for the Acts 

of their Agents 

Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(l)(B) (2012), and Regulation 1.2, 17 

C.P.R.§ 1.2 (2014), provide that "[t]he act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other 

person acting for any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope 

of his employment or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, 

association, pminership, corporation, or trust." Pursuant to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act and 

Commission Regulation 1.2, strict liability is imposed on principals for the actions of their 

agents. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); DohmenRamirez & Wellington Advisory, Inc. v. CFTC, 837 F.2d 847,857-58 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Barclays Capital Inc. is liable for the acts, omissions, and failures of any traders, 

managers, and submitters who acted as its employees and/or agents in the conduct described 

above. Bm·clays Bank and Barclays PLC, which own Barclays Capital Inc., are liable for the 

acts, omissions, and failures of Barclays Capital Inc. with respect to the conduct described above. 

Accordingly, as set forth above, Bm·clays PLC, Barclays Banl(, and Barclays Capital Inc. 

violated Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) (2006); Sections 

6(c)(1), 6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), 6(d), and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13b, 13(a)(2) 

(2012); and Regulations 180.l(a) and 180.2, 17 C.P.R.§§ 180.1(a), 180.2 (2014). 

17 
v. 

FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS 

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondents violated Sections 6( c), 

6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) (2006), and for conduct occurring on or 

after August 15, 2011, Sections 6(c)(1), 6(c)(l)(A), 6(c)(3), 6(d), and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 

9(1)(A), 9(3), 13b, 13(a)(2) (2012), and Regulations 180.1(a) and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1(a), 

180.2 (2014). 

VI. 

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT 

Respondents, without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, have 

submitted the Offer in which they: 

A. Acknowledge receipt of service of this Order; 

B. Admit the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to this Order only and for 

any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based on 

violation of or enforcement of this Order; 

c. Waive: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

the filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing; 

a hearing; 

all post-hearing procedures; 

judicial review by any court; 

any and all objections to the participation by any member of the 

Commission's staff in the Commission's consideration of the Offer; 

6. any and all claims that they may possess under the Equal Access to Justice 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012), and/or the rules 

promulgated by the Commission in conformity therewith, Part 148 of the 

Commission's Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 148.1-30 (2014), relating to, or 

arising from, this proceeding; 

7. any and all claims that they may possess under the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 

§§ 201-253, 110 Stat. 847, 857-868 (1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. 

110-28, § 8302, 121 Stat. 112, 204-205 (2007), relating to, or arising from, 

this proceeding; and 

8. any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding 

18 
or the entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary 

penalty or any other relief; 

D. Stipulate that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely 

of the findings contained in this Order to which Respondents have consented in 

the Offer; and 

E. Consent, solely on the basis ofthe Offer, to the Commission's entry ofthis Order 

that: 

1. makes findings by the Commission that Respondents violated Sections 

6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) (2006), and 

for conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, Sections 6( c )(1 ), 

6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), 6(d), and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13b, 

13(a)(2) (2012), and Regulations 180.l(a) and 180.2, 17 C.F.R. 

§§ 180.1(a), 180.2 (2014); 

2. orders Respondents to cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(1), 

6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(3), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 

9(3), 13b, 13(a)(2) (2012), and Commission Regulations 180.1(a) and 

180.2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1(a), 180.2 (2014); 

3. orders Respondents to pay a civil monetary penalty in the amount of one 

hundred fifteen million U.S. dollars ($115,000,000) plus post-judgment 

interest; and 

4. orders Respondents and their successors and assigns to comply with the 

conditions and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set fmih in 

Part VII of this Order. 

F. Respondents represent that they have already undertaken certain steps intended to 

make reasonable efforts to ensure the integrity of any submission to, and trading 

in connection with, cetiain benchmarks to which Bm·clays submits or submitted, 

including ISDAFIX and its successor benchmark (see supra footnote 2), 

including, but not limited to, the following: 

1. Enhanced controls around the ISDAFIX submission process, including but 

not limited to: 

a. Automation of the data submitted to the benchmark administrator; 

b. Enhanced training and supervisory oversight, including by senior 

members of the submitting desk; 

c. Implementation of record keeping of submissions and daily supervisory 

review; and 

d. Enhancement of control framework and governance; 

19 
2. Mandating at least annual training for all employees on the submitting and 

trading desks relevant to ISDAFIX concerning appropriate market 

conduct; 

3. Reviewing Barclays' business practices and systems and controls, which 

included remedial efforts across the bank, Compliance and front office 

levels. Among other projects that Bm·clays unde1iook: 

a. An independent review of Barclays' business practices was conducted, 

which, among other things, led to the introduction of a new code of 

conduct which sets out the ethical and professional behaviors expected of 

employees; 

b. The provision of guidance to swaps and options traders regarding the 

execution of risk management trades in relation to benchmark fixings; 

c. With respect to its investment banking operations, significant work to 

strengthen the role of Compliance. The work has included increasing 

Compliance's visibility on board and management committees, developing 

a process and reporting framework to suppmi monitoring and verification 

activity undertaken by Compliance, holding standardized and structured 

monthly business line meetings between Compliance and the Global Head 

of the business they cover, formalizing a breach review process to ensure 

consistent and effective treatment of Compliance policy breaches, 

enhancing and transitioning to a centralized model for trade surveillance 

and e-communications surveillance and increasing Compliance's budget 

for staff and training; 

d. Barclays undertook work on Front Office Risks and Controls, a group that 

was established in December 2012 and acts as a single coordination point 

to focus Barclays' approach to risk and control within and across the Front 

Office. Barclays also undertook the development of a new Global 

Supervision policy, which was followed by a training program that all 

supervisors were required to complete by the end of Q3 2012 and the 

appointment of a Chief Controls Officer who is responsible for 

coordinating all control elements; 

e. Barclays has conducted, and continues to conduct, significant reviews of 

risks relating to benchmarks and conflicts of interest, including: 

1. A project designed to evaluate benchmark rates for which Bm·clays 

was engaged in a subjective submission process, and as a result of 

which Barclays exited 10 benchmark submissions, automated 7 

benchmark submissions, and implemented additional supervisory 

procedures for 13 benchmark contributions; and 

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11. A forward looking project to define a control framework for 

potential economic conflicts of interest between Barclays and third 

pmiies that arise from trading activities across products, 

benchmarks and client order types. 

Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer. 

VII. 

ORDER 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

A. Respondents shall cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(1), 6(c)(l)(A), 

6(c)(3), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 9(1)(A), 9(3), 13b, 13(a)(2) 

(2012), and Commission Regulations 180.1(a) and 180.2, 17 C.P.R.§§ 180.1(a), 

180.2 (2014). 

B. Respondents shall pay a civil monetary penalty of one hundred fifteen million 

U.S. dollars ($115,000,000), within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order 

(the "CMP Obligation"). If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full within ten (10) 

days of the date of entry of this Order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue on 

the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be 

determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this 

Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012). Respondents shall pay the CMP 

Obligation by electronic funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, cetiified check, 

bank cashier's check, or bank money order. If payment is to be made other than 

by electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be made payable to the 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address below: 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Division of Enforcement 

ATTN: Accounts Receivables--- AMZ 340 

E-mail Box: 9-AMC-AMZ-AR-CFTC 

DOT IF AA/MMAC 

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

Telephone: ( 405) 954-7262 

If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondents shall contact 

Nildd Gibson or her successor at the above address to receive payment 

instructions and shall fully comply with those instructions. Respondents shall 

accompany payment of the CMP Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the 

Respondents and the name and docket number of this proceeding. The 

Respondents shall simultaneously transmit copies of the cover letter and the form 

ofpayment to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading 

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Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 

20581. 

C. Respondents and their successors and assigns shall comply with the following 

undertakings set forth in the Offer: 

1. REMEDIATION 

As set forth above in Section VI, paragraph F, Respondents represent that they 

have already undertaken and continue to undertake extensive remedial measures 

to implement and strengthen the Banlc's internal controls and procedures relating 

to the fixing of interest-rate swaps benchmarks and related supervision of the 

Banlc's swaps and options desks. With respect to Respondents' remediation 

effmis to the extent not already unde1iaken, Respondents unde1iake, for a period 

of three years, that: 

a. The Banlc will continue to implement and improve its internal 

controls and procedures in a manner reasonably designed to ensure 

the integrity of the fixing of any interest-rate swap benchmark, 

including measures to identify and address internal or external 

conflicts of interest; 

b. The Banlc's remediation improvements will include reasonable 

internal controls and procedures relating to: 

Ill 

II 

II 

II 

II 

A monitoring system designed to enhance the detection and 

deterrence of trading or other conduct potentially intended to 

manipulate directly or indirectly swap rates, including 

benchmarks based on interest-rate swaps; 

periodic audits, at least annually, of the Bank's submissions to 

any benchmark based on interest-rate swaps, if any; 

supervision of swaps and options desks' conduct that relates to 

any interest-rate swap benchmark; 

routine and on-going training of all swaps and options desk 

personnel relating to the trading of any product that references 

a benchmark based on interest-rate swaps; 

processes for the periodic but routine review of written and 

audio communications of all swaps and options traders and 

supervisors who are involved in the fixing of any benchmark 

based on interest-rate swaps with the review being documented 

and documentation being maintained for a period of three 

years; and 

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'" continuing to implement a system for reporting, handling and 

investigating any suspected misconduct or questionable, 

unusual or unlawful activity relating to the fixing of any 

benchmark based on interest-rate swaps with escalation to 

compliance and legal, and with reporting of material matters to 

the executive management of Barclays and the Commission, as 

appropriate; the Respondents shall maintain the record basis of 

the handling of each such matter for a period of three years. 

c. Within 120 days of the entry ofthis Order, the Bank shall make a 

report to the Commission, through the Division, concerning its 

remediation efforts prior to and since the entry of this 

Order. Within 365 days of the entry ofthis Order, the Bank shall 

submit a report to the Commission, through the Division, 

explaining how it has complied with the undertakings set fmih 

herein. The report shall contain a certification from a 

representative ofthe Bank's Executive Management, after 

consultation with the Bank's chief compliance officer(s) and any 

other applicable parties, that the Banlc has complied with the 

undertakings set forth above, and that it has established policies, 

procedures, and controls to satisfy the undertakings set forth in the 

Order. 

2. COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION 

In this action, and in any investigation or other action instituted by the 

Commission related to the subject matter of this action, Respondents shall 

cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Commission, including the Division. 

As part of such cooperation, Respondents agree to the following for a period of 

three (3) years from the date of the entry of this Order, or until all related 

investigations and litigations in which the Commission, including the Division, is 

a party, are concluded, including through the appellate review process, whichever 

period is longer: 

a. Preserve all records relating to the subject matter of this 

proceeding, including, but not limited to, audio files, electronic 

mail, other documented communications, and trading records; 

b. Comply fully, promptly, completely, and truthfully with all 

inquiries and requests for non-privileged information or 

documents; 

c. Provide authentication of documents and other evidentiary 

material; 

d. Provide copies of non-privileged documents within the Banlc's 

possession, custody, or control; 

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e. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, make their best efforts 

to produce any current (as of the time ofthe request) officer, 

director, employee, or agent of the Bank, regardless of the 

individual's location, and at such location that minimizes 

Commission travel expenditures, to provide assistance at any trial, 

proceeding, or Commission investigation related to the subject 

matter of this proceeding, including, but not limited to, requests for 

testimony, depositions, and/or interviews, and to encourage them 

to testify completely and truthfully in any such proceeding, trial, or 

investigation; and 

f. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, make their best efforts 

to assist in locating and contacting any prior (as of the time of the 

request) officer, director, employee, or agent of the Banlc; 

Respondents also agree that they will not undetiake any act that would limit their 

ability to cooperate fully with the Commission. The Banlc will designate an agent 

located in the United States of America to receive all requests for information 

pursuant to these Undertakings, and shall provide notice regarding the identity of 

such Agent to the Division upon entry of this Order. Should the Bank seek to 

change the designated agent to receive such requests, notice of such intention 

shall be given to the Division fomieen (14) days before it occurs. Any person 

designated to receive such request shall be located in the United States of 

America. 

3. PROHIBITED OR CONFLICTING UNDERTAKINGS 

Should the Undetiakings herein be prohibited by, or be contrary to, the provisions 

of any obligations imposed on Respondents by any presently existing, or 

hereinafter enacted or promulgated laws, rules, regulations, or regulatory 

mandates, then Respondents shall promptly transmit notice to the Commission 

(through the Division) of such prohibition or conflict, and shall meet and confer in 

good faith with the Commission (through the Division) to reach an agreement 

regarding possible modifications to the Undertakings herein sufficient to resolve 

such inconsistent obligations. In the interim, Respondents will abide by the 

obligations imposed by the laws, rules, regulations, and regulatory mandates. 

Nothing in these Undetiakings shall limit, restrict or narrow any obligations 

pursuant to the Act or the Commission's Regulations promulgated thereunder, 

including, but not limited to, Regulations 1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.P.R.§§ 1.31, 1.35 

(2014), in effect now or in the future. 

4. PUBLIC STATEMENTS 

Respondents agree that neither they nor any of their successors and assigns, 

agents, or employees under their authority or control shall take any action or make 

any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or conclusions 

in this Order or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this Order is 

24 
without a factual basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall 

affect Respondents' (i) testimonial obligations, or (ii) right to take positions in 

other proceedings to which the Commission is not a patiy. Respondents and their 

successors and assigns shall undetiake all steps necessary to ensure that all of 

their agents and/or employees under their authority or control understand and 

comply with this agreement. 

5. PARTIAL SATISFACTION 

Respondents understand and agree that any acceptance by the Commission of 

partial payment of Respondents' CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a waiver of 

their obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order, or a waiver of 

the Commission's right to seek to compel payment of any remaining balance. 

The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date. 

By the Commission. 

Dated: May 20, 2015 

Christopher J. Grkpatrick 

Secretary of the Commission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

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