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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2070

D I AN E M. R I PB E RG E R

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C OR I Z O N , I N C ., Defen dant-Appellee.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana
. No. 1: 11 CV 0 13 94 — Tanya Wal ton P ratt, Judg e.

A RGUE D F E B R

UAR Y 24, 2014

— D E C I D E D D E C E MB E R 10, 2014

Before F L AUM and R OVN E R , Circ uit Judges and K E ND A LL , District Judge. *

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Di ane Ri pberger lost her jo b as a sub stance abus e co uns elor for the Indi ana Department of C or rectio n s ( “ ID OC ” ) wh e n C or iz on , In c or p or a te d ( “ C or i z on ” )

The Hono rab l e Vi rgi nia M. Ke nd al l of the Nor thern Distri ct of Il l i noi s, * sitti ng b y desi gna tio n.2 No. 13-2070

contr a ct ed wi th IDOC to prov i de couns eling for Indi ana p ri s one rs

. Rip b e rg e r s u e d Cor i zon, clai ming sex di scri min a ti on and retaliati on under Ti tle VII of the Ci vil Rights Act o f 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq ., and age di scri minati on and ret ali ation unde r t he Age Di scri minati on in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 e t seq. The di stric t court gr anted Cor i zon’s motion for sum mar y j udgment, and Ri pberger appeals. For t he reasons stated below , we affi rm. I

. Becaus e w e are rev i ewing the di stric t court’s gr ant of

sum mary judgment again st Ri pberger , w e recount the facts in the li ght most fav or able to her , noting any di screpanc i es in the parties’ evidenc e where relev ant. See Zepperi- Lomanto v
. Am. Posta l W

orkers Union, 7 51 F .3d 482, 483 (7th Ci r
. 2014). Ri pberger , who w as born in 1951, began w or kin g for IDOC as
a sub stance abu se couns elor in 1991. As relev ant here, she ret urne d to w or k as a couns elor in Mar ch 2008 (after havin g ret i red i n 2007) at IDOC’s Pendleton Cor rectional Faci li ty near her home in Anderson, Indi ana. In addi tion to being a li cens ed soci al w or ker for the St ate of Indi a na , R i pberger has a bach elor’ s degr ee in soci olog y and ov er 60 hours tow ards a master’s degr ee i n pastoral couns eling. During the relev ant tim e period, Ri pberger w or ked as a Substance Abuse Counselor I V , couns eli ng pri m a ri ly Lev el 4 offenders in the Indi ana Refor mator y at Pendleton. Lev el 4 offenders are those who are serving

v ery lengthy sentences and hav e commi tte d seri ous or violent cri mes.No. 13-2070 3

A. Ripb erger’s Support of Co nnie Ort on-Bell
Ri pberger lost her jo b in 2010, when IDOC contracted out i ts sub stance abus e couns eling prog ram to Cor i zon. Ri pberger alleges that Cor i zon’s deci si on not to hi re her stemmed in part from prev i ous ev ents inv olving her supervis or in 2009, Conni e Or ton-Bel l

. M i ck Schoenradt, who w as the Acti ng Substance Abuse Di recto r for IDOC, supervis ed Or ton-Bell. So meti me in 2009 and early 2010 both Or ton-Bell and Ripb e rg e r c omplained that their desks w ere being used after hours. Accordi ng to Ri pberger , they were t o ld i t w as “just” staff members, not i nmates, u sin g t hei r desks for sex, and that i f t hey found t hat tr oubling they could si mply w ash d o wn their desks dai ly

. Shor tly there after

, how ev er

, i t came to li ght that Or ton-Bell herself w as havin g a n a ff ai r wi th the Maj or in charge of custody , a sexual li ai son that w as apparently deemed un a cceptable, d espi te IDOC’s toler ance of the aforementioned

s e xu a l a fte r- hours conduc t. Ultim ately , both Or ton-Bell an d the Maj or were ter minated becau se of the affai r , but unli ke Or tonBell, the Maj or w a s a bl e to qui ckly receive unempl oyment benefi ts, keep all o f hi s benefi ts (inclu ding hi s pensi on), and begi n w or kin g a g a i n at the pris on on a contract basi s shortly there after

. Or ton-Bell fi led a sui t under Ti tle VII allegin g clai ms of sex di scri minati on, ret ali ation, and ho sti le w or k environment. The full details of Or ton-Bell’s complaints and her charge of di scri minati on can be found in Orton-Bell v
. Ind. , 759 F .3d 768 (7th Ci r
. 2014). Ri pberger supp or ted Or ton-Bell’s

sex di scri minati on complaint by explain ing to Or ton-Bell how to fi le a gr i ev ance and si tting in on her hearin gs as a si le nt employ ee wi tness.4 No. 13-2070

B. I D O C ’s S u bstan ce Abuse Recovery Prog ram at Pendleto n IDOC or gani zed it s sub stance abus e couns eling services

a r o un d offenders catego rized from Lev el 1 thro ugh 4. As stated abov e, Ri pberger w o r k e d duri ng the relev ant tim e period wi th Lev el 4 inmates in an area of the Pe ndlet on complex k no wn as t he Refor mator y
. There w as also a “therapeuti c commu ni ty” for Lev el 2 a nd 3 inmates in a separate faci li ty called the Communi ty Industri al Fac ilit y
. Lev el 1 i nmates receiv ed therapy at sti ll another location known as the Outsi de Dorm. Unli ke the Refor mat or y , the Communi ty F aci li ty and the Outsi de Dorm w ere located outsi de o f t he fenced area on the Pendleton comp l e x

. At the tim e of the priv atizati on, sev en IDOC employ ees w or ked as sub stance abuse couns elor s i n the three couns eling areas at Pendleton. Three couns elor s, Di ane Di ggins, Kathr yn Choate, and Randy Smi th, w or ked wi th the Lev el 1 offenders in the Outsi de Dorm. Three other couns elor s, A v ery Thomas, Joanne MasseyNeskov , and Anna Sasin, w or ked in the Communi ty Industri al Faci li ty wi th the Lev el 2 and 3 inmates. Ri pberger w as the only

couns elor w or kin g wi th Lev el 4 offenders in the Refor mator y
. She maintai ns that her prim ary caseload w as not the Refor mator y and that she prov i ded therapy to all lev els of offender s. Indeed, before 2010, Ri pberger had w orke d s e v e ra l hours a day i n the Ou t sid e Dorm, but in early 2010 when i t becam e a therapeut i c commu ni ty prov i ding conti nuous tr eatment in an i npati ent s ett i ng, she no longer had a caseload there

. It thus i s undi sputed that betw een Mar ch and August 2010 she di d not
couns el any i nmates outsi de of the Refor mator y and that she

w as also t he only counselor assi gned to the Refor mator y . TheNo. 13-2070 5
Refor mator y posi tion w as eli minated when IDOC outsourced the pro vis i on of counseling to Cor i zon. C. IDOC’s Dec isi on to Privatize Counseli ng Services
In the sum mer of 2010, IDOC employ ed 93 sub stance abus e
couns elor s at pris ons thro ughout Indi ana. At that tim e, IDOC deter mined i t w ould outsource i ts sub stance abus e couns eling posi tions to Cor iz o n. Although Cor i zon planned to ret ain as many IDOC sub stance abus e couns el o r s a s possi ble, the contract betw een IDOC and Cor iz o n prov i ded that Cor i zon
w ould hi re only 88 sub stance abus e coun se lors. As Acti ng Substance Abuse Di recto r for IDOC, Schoenradt w as slated to conti nue supervis i ng the s ub s tan c e abus e prog ram for Cor i zon when the tr ansi tion w as completed in Sept ember 2010. T o that end, Cor i zon d elegat ed the hi ring and placemen t deci si ons to Schoenradt

. Sch o e nr adt created a staffing plan and a do-not-hi re li st based on the nee d t o r e d uce employ ees and the needs at the

v arious pris ons. Ri pberger di d not appea r o n the do-not-hi re li st, whi ch named a v ery few employ ees whose perfor manc e di d not w arr ant continued emp loyment. Schoenradt instead placed Ri pberger ’s name next to Randy Smi th on hi s sta ff ing plan to i ndi cate that one of the tw o of them w ould be hi red for

an open posi tion at Pendlet on. On a color -coded spreadsheet clas si fyi ng IDOC employ ees based on their exper i ence, Ri pberger ’s name appeare d in gr ay , whi ch meant she w as “goo d to g o” for conti nued empl oyment. Ri pberger and other IDOC employ ees lea rned about the deci si on to priv atize substance abuse counseling services at a meetin g on August 13, 2010. Employ ees w ere told t ha t they6 No. 13-2070

w ould no lo nger be employ ed by IDOC but that they could apply for posi tions wi th Cor i zon. The hi r ing process w as expected to be qui ckly comple t e d o ver the next w eek so that Cor i zon could completely take ov er the sub stance abus e
couns eli ng serv i ces effecti v e Sept ember 1, 2010. Schoenradt w as present a t t he meetin g along wi th Alan Finnan, the Superintendent o f P e ndleton. At that meetin g, Ri pberger w as standing by Superintendent Finnan and S ch o e nr adt when she sai d to Finnan, “I’m kin d of feeling o n the short end of the sti ck here.” Ri pberger sa y s she w as refer ring to her supp or t of Or ton-Bell and her di scri minati on clai m. She testifi ed that Finnan replied, “The r e mi ght be a
re a so n for that.” In her deposi tion, Ri pberger acknowledged t ha t she knew at the tim e that there w ould no longer be a sub stance abus e couns elor insi de the Refor mator y , and so she asked Schoenradt where he w as plannin g to send her

. She remembers Schoenradt tellin g her that he thought he had “somethi ng else” i n min d fo r her

. Ri pberger recalls that after thi s exchange, Finnan asked to speak wi th Schoenradt priv ately and they left tog ether

. Schoenradt, for hi s part, recall s speak ing wi th many Pendleton employ ees that day but does not r ecall talki ng to Ri pberger speci fi cally

. D. Corizon’s Hiring Process After the priv atizati on announc ement, intere st e d IDOC employ ees were i nstructe d to apply and interv i ew for a posi tion wi th Cor i zon. All sev en sub stance abus e couns elor s
w or kin g at Pendlet on appli ed for the si x posi tions then

av ai lable i n li ght of the deci si on to el iminate couns eling services i n the Refor mator y
. Becaus e Cor i zon w anted to ret ainNo. 13-2070 7
IDOC employ ees whenev er possi ble, i t conduc ted cursory i nterv i ews to deter mine whi ch IDOC employ ees w anted to begin w or kin g for Cor i zon. Representat i v es from Cor i zon vis i ted IDOC faci li ties to conduc t inter view s betw een August 16 and 18. Cor i zon employee s Roy ace Gibson and Mar y Mansfi eld interv i ew e d R ipberger and asked only why she

1

w anted to be a substanc e abus e counselor

. Ri pberger beli ev es that other appli cants r ecei v ed more thor ough inte r v iews and that her i nterv i ew w as a pretense. Schoenradt e xplai ned that to maintai n conti nui ty of care, Cor i zon hir ed the si x sub stance abus e couns elor s who had been w or kin g i n the Outsid e Dorm and the Communi ty Faci li ty for the si x p o sit io ns i t needed to fi ll in those areas. Becaus e the posi tion in the Refor mator y w as e l iminated, Ri pberger w as not offered a posi tion at Pendleton. A Co rizon recruiter called her on August 19, 2010, and informed her that although the couns eling posi tion in the R e formato ry at Pendleton w as being e l i minated, there w ere posi tions av ai lable at the Miam i or Putnamvi lle Cor rectional Faci li ties

. Although Ri pberger deni es “slam ming” down the phone, she ac knowledges that she infor med t he recruiter that she had no in ter est i n t rav eli ng, w arned her ne ver to call again, and hung up the phone. E a r l ier that same day , Ri pberger had appeared wi th Or ton-Bell at the final h e a rin g on h e r di scri minati on complaint. Finnan w as present and testifi ed at the hearin g, and although Ri pberger di d not int e ract wi th hi m, she maintai ns that he seemed “surpri sed” and “i rr i tate d” to see her there

. Shor tly

The di stric t cour t erro neousl y i denti fi ed Mansfie l d as an IDOC empl oyee

. 18 No. 13-2070
there after

, Ri pberger receiv ed the call from Cor i zon informi ng her thatshe w ould not be hi red atPendleton.
Ri pberger i nsti tuted thi s sui t allegin g sex di scri minati on, ret ali ation, and age dis cri minati on clai ms under Ti tle VII and the ADEA. The di stric t court gr anted Cor i zon’ s mo tion for

sum mary judgment

. The court acknowledged that Ri pberger

w as a “quali fi ed and cap abl e ” sub stance abuse counselor but conclu ded that the evidenc e show ed only that she lost her jo b beca us e she w as the “unfortunate vic tim ” of a reduced w or k force i n the w ake of IDOC’s priv atizati on of i ts sub stance abus e
couns eli ng pro gr am. Ri pberger appeals.
II.
W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s gr ant of sum mary judgment de nov o, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in the li ght most fav or able to Ri pberger

. See, e.g. , Hutt v
. AbbV ie Prods. LLC, 757 F .3d 687, 691 (7th C ir

. 2014). W e fi rst consi der Ri pberger ’s argument thatthe di stric t court err ed in grant ing
sum mary jud g ment on her clai ms of sex and age di scri mination. Employment di scri minati on under Ti tle VII or the ADEA may be proven u sing either the s o-called “di rect” or “indi rect method.” Andrews v
. CBOCS W ., Inc. , 743 F .3d 230, 234 (7th Ci r
. 2014). Ri pberger take s i ssu e wi th the di stric t court’s deci si on to analyze her evidenc e separately under both the di rect method and the i ndi rect McDonnell Douglas burden-s hi fting approach,

see McDonnell D ou g l as Corp. v
. Gr een , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and clai ms that the court should hav e instead consi dered what she characterizes as the “tot ali ty” of the evidenc e. It i s tr ue that w e hav e noted t hat “i t is debatable whether the tw o methods are sharply di stingui shab le,” Hutt, 757 F .3d at 691 becau se “whenNo. 13-2070 9
all i s sai d and done, the fund amental questi on at the sum mary judgment stage i s si mply whether a reasonable jury could find prohibi ted dis cri minati on.” Bass v. Joliet Pub. S ch. Dist. No. 86 , 746 F .3d 835, 840 (7th Ci r
. 2014); see also Coleman v
. Donahoe, 667 F .3d 835, 863 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (W ood, J., concu rr ing) (“By now
... the v arious tests that w e ins ist lawy ers use hav e lost their uti li ty...

. In or der to defeat sum mary judgment, the plainti ff

one w ay or the other mu st present evi dence showing that she i s i n a clas s prot ected by the statute, that she suffered the requis i te adv erse acti on (depending on her theor y), and that a rat i onal jury could co nclude that the employ er too k that adv erse acti on on accoun t of her prot ected cl a ss, not for any non-invid i ous reason.”). But contrar y to Ri pberger ’s asserti on,
none of the cases she ci tes explic i tly di sav ows the use o f t he di rect and indi rect McDonnell -Dou g la s b u rden- shi fti ng method

as an appropr i ate frame w o rk for answering the ulti mate questi on of whether a plainti ff has marsha l e d suffi ci ent evidence to create a tr i able i ssu e of fact. Mor eov er , as wi ll be di scu ssed in d etail, there i s no reason to beli ev e that Ri pberger ’s clai ms w o uld suc ceed reg ardless of how the evidenc e i s viewe d

. S o i t ulti mately makes no di fference whether or not the d ist r ict court collapsed the di rect and i ndi rect metho ds for pro ving di scri minati on. A. Sex Dis crimin ation
W e begi n wi th her sex di scri min a t ion clai m. Ti tle VII forbids an employ er from refusing to hi re or other wi se di scri minating again st an indiv idual “wi th respect to hi s
c om p ensati on, ter ms, condi tions, or p rivil e ge s of e m p l oy m e n t”

on the basi s of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( 1). Wi thout speci fi

cally refer encing the di rect or indirect method, Ri pberger10 No. 13-2070

si mply arg ue s that she presented evidenc e of sex di scri mination. Under the di rect method, Ri pberger may rely on di rect or ci rcum st anti al evidenc e of di scri minati on suffi ci ent to permi t

a tr i er of fact to conclu de that unlaw ful di scri minati on motiv a t ed Cor i zon not to hi re her

. See Bass , 746 F .3d at 8 4 1

. Ri pberger may cre a t e an inference of di scri minator y intent using di rect evidenc e (that i s, evidenc e of di scri minator y intent wi thout resor t to i nference) or ci rcums tantial evidenc e such as
sus pi ci ous tim i ng or ambi guou s st atements, evidenc e that other s outsi de the protected cl ass were systemat i cally treat ed better , or evidenc e that the employ er gav e a pret ext ual reason for the adv erse employment acti on. Hutt, 757 F .3d at 691; Goo d

v
. Univ

. of Chi. Med. Ctr

. , 673 F .3d 670, 675 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 12) (li sting ci rcums tantial evidenc e that may create an inference of di scri minati on); Naficy v
. Ill. Dep’t of Human Serv

. , 697 F .3d 504, 513 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Whether explic i tly consi dere d un der the “di rect method” or n ot

, Ripb e rg e r’ s evidenc e of sex di scri mination i s too thi n to permi t a reasonable factfinder to conclu de she w as not offered a po si tion by Corizon bec ause of her sex.
At the outset, w e note that there i s nothin g in Cor i zon’s hi ring process on i ts face that suggests i t i s gu ilt y of sex di scri minati on. By the begi nning of Sept ember 2010, Cor i zon had hi red 59 former IDOC sub stance abus e co unselor s at faci li ties thro ughout Indi ana. Thi rt y-fi v e of those couns e l or s,
or 59%, w ere female. At Pendleton i tself four of the si x couns elor s hi red w ere fem a le—67%. There i s thus no evidenc e that Cor i zon gav e males prefere nti al t r e atment in i ts hi ring deci

si ons. S e e Goo d, 673 F .3d at 675

. (evid ence that employ ees outsi de the prot ected clas s receiv ed systemati cally better tr eatment may creat e an inference of di scri minati on).No. 13-2070 11 Her pri mary evidenc e of sex di scri minati on i s the f act that Randy Smi th w as hi red by Cor i zon despi te the fact that he w as less quali fi ed than Ri pberger

. Becaus e it is undi sputed that Ri pberger w as quali fi ed for a sub stance abuse posi tion, the questi on under ei ther the di rect or indi rect method i s whether Cor i zon has adv a nc e d a legiti mate reason for hi ring Smi th i nstead of Ri pberger

. See Hitchcock v
. Angel Corps., Inc. , 718 F .3d 733, 737-38 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (when pr i ma faci e case and pr etex t analysi s ov er l a p it makes sens e to inqui re di rectly into legiti

macy of employ er’s stated nondisc rim inator y reason for i ts acti on). Cor i zon presented evidenc e that when i t t o o k ov er
couns eli ng services for IDOC, i ts prim ar y g o a l w as to hi re as many exis tin g IDOC sub stance abus e couns elor s as possi ble (wi th the exception of those appearin g on the no-hi re li st) and maintai n conti nui ty of care. Unfort unately , the Refor mator y posi tion where Ri pberger had most recently been w or kin g w as eli minated. Thus, Cor i zon staffed the six remain ing av ai lable posi tions wi th those sub stance abuse counselors who w ere at that tim e w or kin g i n the Outsi de Dorm or th e C o mmuni ty Industri al Faci li ty

. At the tim e o f t he tr ansi tion, Randy Smi th had a caseload i n the Outsi de Dorm. Schoenradt testifi ed that when he made hi s staffing plan he di d not know whether Smi th w ould seek employment wi th Cor i zon because of hi s mi li tar y duti es. He thus placed Ri pberger ’s name and Smi th’s

name on the same line for the posi tion Smi th had held in the Outsi de Dorm to i ndi cate t ha t if S mi th di d not apply the slot

w ould be giv en to Ri pberger

. Becaus e i t w as Smi th’s caseload, when h e di d apply for t he posi tion, i t w as gi v en to him

. S een i n thi s li ght, the undi sputed fact that Ri pber g e r w a s
more quali fi ed than Smi th does not rais e an infer e nc e of sex12 No. 13-2070
di scri minati on. Instead, i t shows that Cor i zon v alued continui ty of care ov er experienc e. Ri pberger li sts many reasons why she beli ev es thi s i s a poor approach to s ubstanc e abus e couns eli ng and why she w ould hav e been a su p e r i or choi ce for the posi tion. But none of her reasons cast doubt on the legiti macy of Cor i zon’s asser tion that i t hi red Smi th to fi ll the open posi tion i n the Outsi de Dorm becau se he had prev i ously been

w or kin g for IDOC i n that posi tion. See Cun g Hnin v
. T O A (USA), L L C, 751 F .3d 499, 506 (7th Ci r
. 2014) (plainti ff may establi sh pret ext wi th evidenc e that emplo yer ’ s proffere d

reason i s phony or a li e for the real reason). As w e hav e stated repeat edly

, i t i s not our prov ince to sit a s a super -personnel department ev aluati ng the wi sd om of an employ er’s staffing deci si ons. E.g. , W

idmar v
. Sun Chem. Corp. , — F .3d. — 2014 WL 6467287 at *6 (7th Cir . Nov . 19, 2014); Silve rman v . Bd. of Educ. , 637 F .3d 729, 738 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (ulti mately i rr elev ant whether employ er’s r eason w as “wi se, fai r , or ev en corr ect” so long as i t w as real reason for adv erse employment acti on) (ci tation and i nternal quot ations omi tte d).
Ri pber ger repeat edly emphas i zes that at the tim e Smi th

w as hi red he had less experien ce and als o did not poss ess the requis i te certifi cati on for the posi tion. Mor eov er , he nev er di d become certifi ed. Cor i zon gav e the sub stance abus e couns elor s thi rt y d ays to pass the test for certifi cati on and li cens ing, but Smi th nev er met hi s obli gation to do so. Aft e r se ver al w arn 2

The partie s b ri efs do not i l l u minate the preci se nature of the requir ed 2 certi fi catio n, b ut a memo i n the reco rd di scusses Smi th’s fail ure to “become certi fi ed through CADAC .” Presumab l y this refe rs to the l i censing and (co ntinued. ..)No. 13-2070 13

i ngs, Smi th w as ult ima tely ter minated the following y ear (A ug us t 2011) on accoun t of hi s fai lure to ev er obtain the required cer t ific ation. Ri pberger poin ts to Smi th’s later ter minati on as evidenc e of sex di scri minati on. But the fact that i n hindsi ght Ri pberger may hav e been a better choi ce than Smi th does nothin g to establ ish t hat he w as hi red ov er Ri pberger becau se she i s a female. If anythin g, i t may demonstrat e Cor i zon’s short-si ghtedness in priori tizing continui ty of

care ov er exper i ence and certifi cati on, but as di scu ssed abov e, i t i s not our prov i nce to asses s the wi sdom of Co r izon’s personnel deci si ons. Ri pberger also clai ms in a sin gle sentence that ther e w as a pa t t e rn of sex di scri minati on, as evidenc ed by Or ton-Bell’s ter minati on when she complained about sex di scri minati on and the fact that Ri pberger w as not hi red by Cor i zon after supp or tin g Or ton-Bell. Not only i s t his a rg ument w ai v ed becau se i t i s perfunctory and undev eloped, Bass , 7 46 F .3d at 841 n.1 (7th Ci r
. 2014), there i s no evidenc e in the r e co r d o f a “patter n” of s e x d i s cri minati on, especi ally by Cor i zon. Cor i zon had nothin g to do wi th O rt on-Bell’s ter minati on by IDOC based on the alleged affai r wi th her male cow or ker

. Although the ci r cu mstances surr ounding Or ton-Bell’s ter minati on may be tr oubling, see Orton-Bell , 759 F .3d at 778 (remanding Or tonBell’s sex di scri minati on clai m for further d isc o very into IDOC’s more fav or able tr eatment of he r male cow or ker ),

( ...c onti nued) 2 certi fi catio n r e quirements fo r “ce rti fi ed alco hol and drug counsel or s (CA DCs).” http://e ducatio n-po rtal.c om/c adc_de gree.html

.14 No. 13-2070

Ri pberger prov i des no information to s upport her c onclus i on that there w as a “patter n” of sex di scri minati on or that any one di scri minated agains t her o n the basi s of sex. And a l though Ri pberger fai ls to explic i tly arg ue her case using the i ndi rect McDonnell -Douglas framew or k, we note that her sex di scri minati on clai m fai ls under thi s approach as w ell. A plainti ff establi shes a p r ima faci e case of di scri minati on
un der the i ndi rect method wi th evidenc e that (1) sh e is a member of the prot ected clas s; (2) she w as quali fi ed fo r t he posi tion; (3) she suffered an adverse employ ment acti on; and (4) si mi larly-si tuated employ ees outsi de of the prot ected clas s receiv ed more fav or able tr eatment. Mart ino v
. W

. & S. Fin

. Grp. , 715 F .3d 195, 202 (7th Ci r
. 2013). The only di sputed element here i s whether Ri pberg er suffered an adv erse employment acti on. Cor i zon arg ues that there w as no adv erse employment acti on giv en that i t offered her a potent i al posi tion at ei ther the Miam i or Putnamvi lle insti tutions. Construing the facts in the li ght most fav or able to Ri pberger , a jury co ul d co nclu de that she reasonably beli ev ed she w as applyi ng for a posi tion at Pendleton. In addi tion to being the location of her current jo b, Pendleton w as much closer t o R ipber ger ’s home than ei ther Miam i or Putnamvi lle; thus, pos it io ns at ei ther of those faci li ties could reasonably be viewed as a material change in the ter ms , co ndi tions, or privi leges of her employment. See Brewer v
. Bd. of T

r
. of Univ

. of Ill. , 479 F .3d 908 , 9 15 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (reci tin g standard for adv erse employment action).
Once Ri pbe r g e r establi shes a prim a faci e case, the burden shi fts t o Cor i zon to art i culate a legi tim ate, nondi scri minator y
reason for i ts deci sio n. As di scu ssed abov e, Schoenradt explain ed that after the Refor mator y posi tion w as eli minated,No. 13-2070 15
he deci ded to fi ll the si x re ma ining posi tions wi th those

couns elor s already holding a caseload in the therapeut i c
commu ni ties i n whi ch Co rizon w as hiring. Schoenradt stated that although he beli ev ed Ri pberger w as a goo d employ ee, he thought that conti nui ty of care for both cli ents and couns elor s tipp ed the scal es i n fav or o f hir ing Smi th. As the di scu ssi on abov e makes clear

, Ri pberger has fail e d to cast sus pi ci on on thi s stated reason. The evidenc e in the recor d suggests that in the rapid tr ansi tion from IDOC to Cor i zon, Cor i zon sought to mini mi ze di srupti on wherev er possi ble by ret aining currently quali fi ed IDOC employ ees in the posi tions they already held. Ri pberger clai ms that staff at Pendleton w ere interchangeable and that she could easi ly hav e mov ed betw e e n the Refor mator y , the Outsi de Dorm, a nd t he Communi ty Industri al Faci li ty , some t hin g she had done in the past. Thus, the arg ument goe s, i t only makes sens e that she should hav e been hi red i n lieu of Smi th, who w a s less qualifi ed and less exper i enced. But as compelling as her clai m may be, i t does not undercut the legiti macy of Cor i zon’s explanation that i t fi lled openi ngs when possi

ble wi th those employ ees already w or kin g in those posi tions

. B. Age Discrimi nation The ADEA makes i t u nlawf ul for an employ er to refus e to hi re or otherwis e di scri minate again st an indi vidu al “becau se of such i ndi vidu al’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)( 1). Ri pberger w as 59 in A ugust 2010 and t hus quali fi es for prot ecti on under the ADEA, whi ch i s li mi ted to indi vidu als fort y and ov er

. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). As wi th her Ti tle VII clai ms, she may av oid sum mary ju d gm ent by prov i ding ei ther di rect or ci rcums tantial evi d e n c e that w ould allow a reasonable juro r to infer that her employ er16 No. 13-2070
acted fo r d isc rim i nator y reasons. Flei shman v
. Cont’l Cas. Co. , 698 F .3d 598, 6 0 3 (7 t h Ci r
. 2012). In the case of the ADEA, Ri pber g e r mus t produce evidenc e from whi ch a jury could i nfer that her age “w as a but-for caus e of [her] ter minati on.” Id. at 604; see also Gross v
. F B L F in. Servs. , Inc. , 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (holding that under ADEA’s l anguage prohibi tin g di scri minati on “becau se of” age plainti ff must prove at tr i al that ag e w as bu t-for cause of adv erse employment action).
W e ne e d not belabor the v arious av enues for prov ing di scri minati on under the direct and indi rect metho d, becau se Ri pberger fai ls to poi nt to any evidenc e that Corizon fai led to hi re her on account of her age. S he a r g ues cursoril y that the evidenc e supp or tin g her sex di scri minati on clai m also e stabli shes that Cor i zon’s stated reason for refusing to hi re her w as
a pret ext for age di scri minati on. Speci fi cally , she poin t s o ut that Cor i zon hi red y ounger less- quali fi ed e mploy ees who fai led to pass the test for certifi cati on and li cense wi thi n the required 30-day tim e frame given by Cor i zon. But as di scu ssed abov e, thi s evidenc e does not establi sh that Cor i zon sought to

av oid hi ring older employ ees or that i t pass ed ov er Ri pberger becau se of her age. Instead, i t si mply reaffi rms that it chose employ ees wi th acti v e caseloads in the Cor rectional Industri al Faci li ty and the Outsi de Dorm because those w ere the posi

tions i t needed to fi ll. And although Ri pberger again poin ts out that she w as more qualified than those hi red and could hav e easi ly w or ked i n ei ther of those settings as she had done in the past, there i s no evidenc e that her caseload at the tim e inclu ded i nmates from ei ther area, whereas all of the other sub stance abus e couns elor s hi red di d couns el inmates in the Cor rectional Industri al Faci li ty and t he Outsi de Dorm.No. 13-2070 17

R ipber ger poin ts to no other evidenc e in the recor d that Schoenradt or any other d e c i s i onm aker harbor ed any di scri mi

nator y ani mus ba se d on age. Indeed, the notion that Schoenradtdesi red t o elim inate Ripb erg er bec ause of her age i s unli kely giv en that he had hi red Ri pberger to ret urn to w or k at Pendleton just tw o y ears before when she w as 57 y ears old. 3 See Rand v
. CF Indus., Inc. , 42 F .3d 1139, 1147 (7th Ci r
. 1994) (“It

seems rat her sus pect to clai m that the company that hi red hi m at age 47 ‘had sudd enly dev eloped an av ersi on to older people’ tw o y ears later .”) (quoti ng Lowe v
. J.B. Hun t T ransport, Inc. , 963 F .2d 173, 174-75 (8th Ci r
. 1992)). Any inference of age di scri mi

nati on i s further undercut by the fact that of the si x employ ees Cor i zon hi red at Pendleton, thr e e w ere relat i v ely close to Ri pberger ’s age: Anna Sasi n w as 51, Di ane Di ggins w as 57, and A ver y Thomas w as ov er 60. Cf. O’Conn or v
. Consol. Coi n C at e rers Corp. , 517 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1996) (no inference o f ag e di scri minati on can be drawn from the replacement of one
w or ker wi th an other w or ker insi gni fi cantly y ounger ). Sim ply p ut , Ri pberger has presented no evidenc e that her age motiv ated Co rizon’s dec i si on not t o hi re her

. C. Retal iati on That leav es Ri pberger ’s Ti tle VII ret ali ation clai m, whi ch requires her to demonstrate that “the desi re to ret ali ate w as the but-for caus e of the challe ng e d employment acti on.” Univ

. of T ex. Sw

. Med. Ctr

. v
. Nassar

, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013);

When Ripberger returned to work i n 20 08 , she wa s i nt e r vi ewed b y 3 Scho enradt and Kathy Grif fi n. She testif i ed tha t although she was uncertain who deci ded to hire her, i t “was pro b ab l y the two of them together, ” with the superi ntendent giving the f i nal appro v al.18 No. 13-2070

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). She maintains that she has presented suffi ci ent evidenc e of re t a li ation under both the di rect and i ndi r e ct me t ho d as w ell as under the tot ali ty of the evidenc e. Under the di rect method, Ri pberger mus t demonstrate (1) that sh e engaged i n statuto rily prot ected acti vity; (2) that her employ er too k an adv erse employment acti on again st her; and (3) that the prot ected acti vity a nd the adv erse employment acti on are caus ally connected. Moultrie v
. Penn Alumin um Int’l. , LLC, 766 F

. 3 d 747, 754 (7th Ci r
. 2014). As wi th sex and age di scri minati on, ret ali ator y motiv e may be establi shed thro ugh ci rcums tantial evidenc e such as sus pi ci ous tim ing, ambi guous statements, evidenc e that the stated re a s on for the e m p loyment deci si on i s pret ext ual and “other bi ts and pi eces from whi ch an i nference of di scri minator y intent mi ght be drawn.” See Harper

v
. C.R. England, Inc. , 687 F .3d 297, 307 (7th C ir

. 2012) (ci tation and i nternal quotat i ons omi tte d); s e e als o Langen bach v
. WalMartStores, Inc. , 761 F .3d 792, 800 (7th Ci r . 2014).
It i s undi sputed that Ri pberger engaged in statuto rily prot ected acti vity by assi sting Or ton-Bell wi th her di scri mination compla int. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohib i tin g employ er ret ali ation becau se an employ ee has o p posed an unlaw ful e mplo yment practic e or has “testifi ed, assi sted, or partici pated i n any manner” in a Ti tl e VII “inv esti gation, proceeding, or hearin g”). And as di scu ssed abov e, she has also demonstrate d that she suffered an adv erse employment acti on when Cor i zon di d not offer her a posi tion at Pe nd l eto n. The only remain ing questi on then i s whether Ri pberger has shown

a causal connecti on betw een her supp or t of Or ton-Bell and Cor i zon’s deci si on.No. 13-2070 19

Ri pberger prov i des a laundry li st of evidenc e t ha t she beli ev es demonstr ates the re qui red causal c onnecti on. First is her exchange wi th Finnan where she told hi m she w as feeling
on the “short end of the sti ck” and he replied that there “mi ght be a reason for that.” Although she clai ms that she w a s refer ring to her supp or t fo r O r t o n-Bell, there i s no evidenc e that F i nnan knew what Ripb erg er meant by her remark

. (It i s
c e rt a in ly p os s i

b l e th a t Finnan assu med Ri pberger w as refe rr in g to the fact t ha t her posi tion in the Refor mator y w as being eli minated, al t ho ug h that w ould be a questi on for the jury to deci de.) And although Finnan’s statement may be ambi guous, i t does li ttle to supp or t an inference of ret ali ation. Ci rcums tantial evidenc e “mus t poin t di rectly to a di scri minator y reason for the employ er’s acti on,” Mullin v
. T emco Mach., Inc. , 732 F .3d 772, 777 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d), and thi s unexplained conv ersation falls short of that standard.
Mor e i mport antly

, Ri pberger has not establi shed that Finnan had any say in Cor i zon’s hi ring deci si ons. It i s clear fr om the evidenc e that Schoenradt made the hi ring deci si o ns for Corizon, and Ri pberger has provided nothing b ey ond her

own specu lation that Finnan had some “say so” in the deci si onmaki ng. See Dorsey v
. Mor gan Stanley, 507 F .3d 624, 628 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (plainti ff’s evidenc e th a t allegedly bi ased complex manager play ed ro le in adv erse deci si on made by reg i onal manager w as “si mply too specu lativ e” to establi sh inv olv ement). Gi v en Ri pberger ’s fai lure to prove Finnan w as inv olv ed in the deci si on, i t i s i rr elev ant that he may hav e di sapprov ed of her i nvol vem ent i n Or ton-Bell’s clai m. Li kewi se, the fact that20 No. 13-2070

Finnan spo ke wi th Schoenradt in priv ate on the day the priv atizati on w as announc ed does not create an inference that he instructed Schoenradt not t o hi re Ri pberger or other wi se becam e i nv olv ed i n the hi ring process. And the fact that he w as surpri sed and i rr i tate d to see her at Or ton-Bell’s final heari ng
on August 19 does not supp or t an inference of ret ali ation, ev en when take n tog ether wi th the fact that she later receiv ed a call from the Cor i zon recruiter informi ng her that she w ould not be hi red back i nto a posi tion at Pendleton. Whatev er probat i v e
v alue these facts may hav e as to Finnan’s thought s about Ri pberger supp or tin g Or ton-Bell, they t e ll us nothin g about whether he w as a deci si onmaker in Cor i zon’s hi ring pro ce ss

. And wi thout that cri tic al link, th e r e i s no inference of ret ali ation to be drawn from Ri pberger ’s evidenc e reg ardin g Finnan. In his affi davit, Schoenradt stated that at “no tim e whi le maki ng the hir ing and placemen t deci si ons di d I consi der Ri pberger ’s partici pation in a gr i ev ance fi led by her fo r mer IDOC supervis or

, Conni e Or ton-Bell, again st IDOC.” None of Ri pberger ’s evidenc e about Finnan calls Schoenradt ’s affi rmation i nto questi on, and wi thout evidenc e of Finnan’s input into the deci si on Ri pberger cannot show caus ation. See W illis v
. Mario n Cnty

. Auditor’s Offic e , 1 1 8 F .3d 542, 547 (7th Ci r
. 1997) (a ff irming judgment as a matter of law where plainti ff pr e
sented no evidence that bi ased employ ees influ enced employ er’s deci si on to di sch arg e plainti ff ) ; see also Schandel meierB artels v
. Chi. Park Dist. , 634 F .3d 372, 379-81 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 1 ) (collecting cases and di scu ssing what lev el of inv olv ement in the deci si on by a bi ased non-deci si onmaker i s necess ary to i mpute li abi li ty t o employ er for that employ ee’s bi as).No. 13-2070 21

R ipb e r g er also clai ms an inference of ret ali ation can be drawn from a conv ersation she had wit h C or i zon employ ee Mar y Mansfi eld. On R ipberger ’s last day (August 31, 2010), Mansfi eld too k her to lunch. During l un ch, Mansfi eld asked Ri pberger whether she thought Cor i zon had not hi red her becau se she had helped Or ton-Bell wi th her complaint again st IDOC. Ri pberger sai d that y es, she d i d think that w as the reason, and Ri pberger testifi ed that Mansfi eld repl ie d , “I do too .” Mansfi eld’s sp e culati on as to why Ri pberger w as not hi red i s exactly that—speculati on. Not only does thi s fall short of creating an i nference of unlaw ful r e t a l iation, i t too i s i rr elev ant wi thout evidenc e that Mans fi eld play ed some ro le in the hi ring deci si on or had some other insi de information t hat

w ould lend credibi li ty to her opini on as to why Ri pberger w as not hi red. Cf. Metz

ger v
. Ill. State Police, 519 F .3d 677, 682 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Ri pberger has no such evidenc e, and Mansfi eld herself testifi ed that she had no ro le in deci ding whi ch IDOC employ ees w ere o ffered employment b y Corizon and d i d not know how that deci si on w as made.
Ri pberger ha s a lengthy li st of other evidenc e that she clai ms shows ret ali ation: t ha t she w as not told where her i nterv i ew wi th Co r iz o n w ould be; that her interv i ew w as sh or ter than that of other IDOC employ ees; that her na me appeared on Schoenradt ’s “ g o o d to go” li st; that she w as not li sted as one of the few “do not hi re” individu als; and that there exis ted wh a t she alleges w as a “patter n of ret ali ation”

a ga inst herself and Or ton-Bell. Whether consi dered to ge the r or i n i solation, none of these facts establi sh a caus al link betw een her supp or t of Or ton-Bell and Cor i z o n’ s deci si on not to hi re her

.22 No. 13-2070
First, she offers no evidenc e as to who should hav e informed her about t he interv i ew , nor di d she actually mi ss the i nterv i ew

. The fact that she w a s uns ure at some poin t where the interv i ew w ould be held i s large ly i rr elev ant. Sim i larly , the i nterv i ews were cursory in nature becau se Cor i zon so ug ht si mply to ascertai n whi ch IDOC employ ees were intere sted in ret ai ning their current posi tions

. Ri pberger offers no evidenc e to undercut thi s clai m, nor does she poin t to tes t imo ny from any other employ ees statin g that they receiv ed more thor ough

or sub stanti v e int e rv i ews than she di d. And the fact that she

w as li sted on Schoenradt ’s li st as “goo d to go” does nothin g to prove Cor i zon ret ali ated again st her: i t si mpl y d emonstrat es that he beli ev ed she w as fully quali fi ed t o r e main in her posi tion—a posi tion that, reg ret tably , w as eli minated when Cor i zon too k ov er

. Indeed, presumabl y Schoenradt continued to beli ev e Ri pberger w a s a v aluable employ ee; other wi se i t
seems unlikely that Cor i zon w ould offer he r o ne of the tw o
av ai lable posi tions at nei ghboring faci li ties

. Fin ally , Ri pberger poin ts to no evidenc e t o su pport the alleged “patter n of ret ali ation” by Cor i zon, a patter n that w ould be particu larly di ffi cult t o prove i n any ev ent giv en that IDOC, and not Cor i zon, ter minated Or ton-Bell. That leav es Ri pberger ’s relianc e on the tempor al prox i mi ty betw een her appearance a t O rt on-Bell’s fi nal hear ing and t he call she receiv ed l a t e r that day from the Cor i zon recruiter i nformi ng he r that she w ould not be offered a posi tion at Pendle t o n. B ut she has no evidenc e that the call di d not fi t wi thi n the gener al t i ming of Cor i zon’s hi ring process or w as other wi se sus pi ci ous. There i s al so no evidenc e that Finnan, whom Ri pberger saw at the hearin g, commu ni cated that dayNo. 13-2070 23

wi th any one i nv olv ed in the hi ring deci si on. Thus, Ri pberger ha s no thi ng to establi sh ret ali ation bey ond the sus pi ci ous tim i ng i tself. But i t i s w ell establi shed that “mere t emporal prox i mi ty betw een [the statuto rily prot ected acti vity] and the acti on al leged to h av e been take n in ret ali ation for that [ acti vi ty] wi ll rar ely be suffi ci ent in and o f it se lf to create a tr i able i ssu e.” Stone v
. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div

. , 281 F .3d 640, 6 4 4 (7th Ci r
. 2002); see also Sauzek v
. Exxon Coal USA, In c
. , 202 F .3 d 9 1 3 , 918 (7th Ci r .2000) (“S peculati on based on sus pi

ci ous tim i ng alone, how ev er , does not supp or t a reasonable i nference of ret ali ation; instead, plainti ffs mus t produce facts whi ch somehow tie the adver se deci si on to the plainti ffs ’ prot ected acti ons.”). Gi v en the lack of evidenc e suggesti ng that the tim i ng of the phone call w as anythin g but coinci dental, thi s i s not the rar e case wh e r e tempor al prox i mi ty alone may suffi ce to suggest illegi tim ate mot i v e. Ri pberger ’s clai m f a re s n o b e tt e r u n d e r the indi rect method. Ri p berger may establi sh a prim a faci e case of ret ali ation by showing that she (1) engaged in statuto rily prot ected acti vity; (2) met her employ er’s legiti mate expectat i ons; (3) suffered an adv erse employment acti on; and (4) w as tr eated less fav or ably than si mi larly si tu a t e d employ ees who di d not engage in prot ected acti vity

. Moultrie, 766 F .3d at 755. Ri pberger engaged i n stat utor i ly prot ected acti vity by helping Or ton-Bell fi le her d i s c riminati on complaint and atte nding her hearin gs as a si lent wi tness. The pa r ties agr ee that Ri pberger w as meetin g her employ er’s expectat i ons and Ri pberg e r has also shown that

o t her IDOC couns elor s who di d not engage in statuto rily prot ected acti vity w e r e hir ed back into their posi tions by24 No. 13-2070
Cor i zon. Fin ally

, w e can assu me that Cor i zon’s fai lure to offer her a positi on at P endleton consti tutes an adv erse j ob acti on. As should be readily apparent by now , Cor i zon has offered

a legiti mate non-retaliatory re a so n for i ts deci si on not to hi re Ri pberger , an d n othi ng in her evidenc e suggests that Cor i zon’s stated reaso n

— e n s u ring a seamles s tr ansi tion and maintaining conti nui ty of care wi th bo t h t he offenders and the couns elor s—i s unw or thy of beli ef. Thus, Cor i zo n is entitled to sum
mary j udgment on Ripb erg er’s r etaliati on clai m as well.
III.
As the di stric t court note d , R i pberger w as a quali fi ed sub stance abus e couns elor who w as the unfortunate vic tim of

a reduced w o r k fo rce at the Pendleton faci li ty when IDOC priv atized i ts sub stance abus e c oun s e ling prog ram. Regar dless of how the evidenc e i s viewed, i t i s si mply insu ffi ci ent to demonstrate a ny u n l a w f u l m otiv a tion behind Cor i zon’s fai lure to hi re her

. W

e thus affi rm the judgment of the d i stric t court gr anti ng summ ary judgment t o Co rizon.