United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-30168

Kholkar Vishveshwar Ganpat, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Eastern Pacific Shipping PTE, Limited, doing business 

as EPS, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC 2:18-CV-13556

Before Jones, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:

Litigating in a foreign country can be fraught with peril. The basic 

procedural and substantive protections guaranteed litigants in American 

courts are often taken for granted here—yet sharply limited or missing 

entirely before tribunals in foreign lands.

This case provides a vivid illustration: An individual brings tort and 

contract claims in federal court in Louisiana against a foreign corporation. In 

response, the corporation evades service and brings a countersuit in India, 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 28, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 22-30168

2

before a court where the individual lacks counsel and is instead forced to take 

legal advice from the corporation’s own attorneys.

Predictably, the corporation’s attorneys act in direct conflict with the 

individual’s interests. The corporation’s attorneys not only pressure him to 

settle—they even manage to convince the foreign court to place him in 

prison, based on a bizarre claim that the individual does not object to 

imprisonment without bail while the case is pending.

In response to these alarming developments abroad, the federal 

district court in Louisiana unsurprisingly enters an anti-suit injunction to 

prevent the foreign corporation from litigating the same issues

simultaneously before the court in India.

Our circuit precedents have long authorized district courts to enter 

anti-suit injunctions like the one entered here. See, e.g., Bethell v. Peace, 441 

F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1971). And our review of such anti-suit injunctions is

limited to abuse of discretion. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 

626 (5th Cir. 1996). Finding no abuse, we affirm.

I.

Kholkar Vishveshwar Ganpat, a citizen of India, worked as a crew 

member on the Stargate, a merchant ship managed by the Singapore-based 

shipping company Eastern Pacific. When the Stargate stopped at Savannah, 

Georgia, in spring 2017, Eastern Pacific allegedly failed to stock up on antimalarial medicine, despite warnings that the supply was low. Ganpat then 

contracted malaria in Gabon, the Stargate’s next stop—and a predictably 

high-risk area for malaria. When the Stargate arrived at Rio de Janeiro, the 

stop after Gabon, Ganpat went to the hospital, where his gangrenous toes—

a complication of malaria—were amputated.
No. 22-30168

3

In December 2018, Ganpat brought suit against Eastern Pacific in the 

Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging tort claims under the Jones Act and 

general maritime law, as well as contract claims arising from a collective 

bargaining agreement.

Eastern Pacific waived objections to personal jurisdiction and venue.

However, “[o]ver a period of approximately two and a half years, [Ganpat] 

attempted multiple times to perfect service upon Eastern Pacific,” but the 

corporation “did not accept service, and, instead, filed several motions to 

dismiss [Ganpat’s] claims . . . for insufficient service of process.” Ganpat v. 

E. Pac. Shipping, PTE. LTD, No. CV 18-13556, 2022 WL 1015027, at *1 (E.D. 

La. Apr. 5, 2022). Ganpat thus did not perfect service on the company until 

August 2021.

In March 2020—after Ganpat brought his complaint and Eastern 

Pacific consented to federal court jurisdiction, but before Ganpat perfected 

service—Eastern Pacific sued Ganpat in Goa, India. In the Indian suit, 

Eastern Pacific sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent Ganpat from 

litigating in American court.1

The Indian court enjoined Ganpat from continuing his lawsuit in the 

United States. The court then issued an arrest warrant against Ganpat when 

he failed to comply.2 Police officers, accompanied by the court bailiff and an 

1 Strangely, the dissent characterizes Ganpat as evasive and inept. See post, at 16, 

23. Yet it was Eastern Pacific that was evasive and coercive. Ganpat simply declined to 

dismiss the pre-existing American suit when Eastern Pacific foisted papers on him that 

would have had that effect. See Ganpat, 2022 WL 1015027, at *3. Eastern Pacific, by 

contrast, sought to slow down the American suit by repeatedly refusing service. See id. at 

*1. And Eastern Pacific aimed to thwart American jurisdiction by coercing Ganpat into 

dropping his suit. See id. at *3. Eastern Pacific’s whole course of conduct thus “smacks of 

cynicism, harassment, and delay.” Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 628.

2 The dissent claims that Ganpat was “jailed for his continued refusal to participate 

in the legal proceedings.” Post, at 16. But Ganpat was actually jailed because he refused to 
No. 22-30168

4

Eastern Pacific attorney, subsequently arrested Ganpat and brought him 

before the court.

As Ganpat’s uncontradicted testimony shows, the post-arrest hearing 

was procedurally stacked against him. See id. at *3. Eastern Pacific had 

multiple lawyers. He had none. See id. What’s worse, the judge instructed 

one of the Eastern Pacific attorneys to advise Ganpat. See id. In response, 

the Eastern Pacific lawyer took Ganpat aside and pressured him to settle. 

The lawyer then lied to the judge, absurdly claiming that Ganpat opposed his 

own release on bail. See id. Ganpat was then placed in a prison for violent 

criminals, where he was strip searched and held in a cramped cell. See id.3

In August 2021, back in the Eastern District of Louisiana, Ganpat 

sought an anti-suit injunction to prohibit Eastern Pacific from prosecuting its 

Indian suit against him. Finding the Indian litigation vexatious and 

oppressive, and determining that it need not show comity to the Indian court 

that had attempted to enjoin the American suit, the district court granted the 

injunction in favor of Ganpat. Eastern Pacific now appeals the district court’s

grant of the anti-suit injunction. 

II.

We review the district court for abuse of discretion. “Under this 

deferential standard, findings of fact are upheld unless clearly erroneous, 

be bullied into dropping the American suit. As the factual findings of the district court 

indicate, Eastern Pacific and the Indian court demanded that Ganpat sign papers 

acknowledging the American suit was “stopped.” Ganpat, 2022 WL 1015027, at *3. Had 

Ganpat given in and signed these papers, he would not have gone to jail. See id.

3 The dissent does not dispute that the Indian judge instructed the attorney of 

Eastern Pacific, the opposing party, to advise Ganpat. Nor does the dissent dispute that 

the Eastern Pacific attorney then claimed that Ganpat opposed his own release on bail. And 

the dissent does not deny—how could it?—that this is a bizarre way for a court of law to 

proceed.
No. 22-30168

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whereas legal conclusions are subject to broad review and will be reversed if 

incorrect.” Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626 (cleaned up).

Our standard for the grant of an anti-suit injunction weighs the 

vexatiousness of the foreign litigation against considerations of comity. See

id. at 627; Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas 

Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2003). In this case, the 

vexatiousness of the foreign suit is severe—the comity considerations are, by 

contrast, weak. Accordingly, we see no basis to conclude that the district 

court abused its discretion in granting the anti-suit injunction.

A.

Our circuit precedents authorize district courts to grant anti-suit 

injunctions “to prevent vexatious or oppressive litigation.” Kaepa, 76 F.3d 

at 627. Three factors help courts determine whether to enjoin foreign 

litigation as vexatious: “(1) ‘inequitable hardship’ resulting from the foreign 

suit; (2) the foreign suit’s ability to ‘frustrate and delay the speedy and 

efficient determination of the cause’; and (3) the extent to which the foreign 

suit is duplicitous of the litigation in the United States.” Karaha Bodas, 335 

F.3d at 366 (footnotes omitted). 

The district court here found that the Indian suit was vexatious and 

oppressive under our precedents.

First, the district court correctly concluded that the Indian litigation 

would result in inequitable hardship. As the district court noted, Ganpat 

“has already been jailed once for violating the ex parte antisuit injunction, 

and . . . faces a real possibility of being sent back to jail and having his property 

seized, as Eastern Pacific . . . seeks to have the Indian court enforce sixteen 
No. 22-30168

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counts of contempt against [Ganpat].” Ganpat, 2022 WL 1015027, at *8 

n.104.

4 

Indeed, this is as strong a case of inequitable hardship as the previous 

cases where we have upheld injunctive relief. Under our caselaw,

“unwarranted inconvenience [and] expense” can suffice to constitute

hardship meriting an anti-suit injunction. Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627. See also In 

re Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[A]llowing 

simultaneous prosecution of the same action in a foreign forum thousands of 

miles away would result in ‘inequitable hardship.’”), rev’d on other grounds 

by M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Bethell, 441 F.2d 

at 498 (“[T]he court was within its discretion in relieving the plaintiff of 

expense and vexation of having to litigate in a foreign court.”). If 

unwarranted inconvenience and expense present sufficient hardship to 

support an anti-suit injunction, surely jailtime and seizure of property also 

suffice. 

The second vexatiousness factor—“the foreign suit’s ability to 

‘frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient determination’” of the 

American suit, Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 366—likewise favors the

injunction. The Indian court has sought to prevent Ganpat from litigating in 

the United States, even though the American suit was filed first. This

“attempt to enjoin [Ganpat] effectively translates into an attempt to enjoin 

the [American] court itself and to interfere with the sovereign actions of the 

[United States].” Id. at 372.

4 The dissent claims that “any future threat of Ganpat’s being jailed is wholly 

speculative.” Post, at 22. But the likelihood of Ganpat’s future arrest—not to mention the 

prospective seizure of his property—is the kind of factual issue on which we defer to the 

district court. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d 624 at 626.
No. 22-30168

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When a foreign court tries to keep an American court from hearing a 

case, that frustrates the American litigation. We have reversed a district 

court injunction where the foreign litigation was “ineffective in curtailing the 

ability of . . . U.S. courts[] to enforce” the rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 369. 

There, an American court could enforce the plaintiff’s rights regardless of 

what the foreign court did, so there was no frustration of American litigation. 

See id. Here, by contrast, the Indian court seeks to prevent the American 

litigation from proceeding. The district court’s injunction isthus “necessary 

to protect the court’s jurisdiction.” MacPhail v. Oceaneering Intern., Inc., 302 

F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2002). 

The Indian litigation imposes a hardship on Ganpat while frustrating

the American litigation, and that is ample justification to find the Indian 

litigation vexatious and oppressive. Accordingly, we need not consider the 

third vexatiousness factor, “the extent to which the foreign suit is duplicitous 

of the litigation in the United States.” Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 366. See 

Bethell, 441 F.2d at 498 (upholding an anti-suit injunction on the basis of the 

“expense and vexation of having to litigate in a foreign court” without 

analyzing whether the foreign suit was duplicative).

In any event, we agree with the district court that the Indian suit is 

indeed duplicative. The Indian suit rests on “the same or similar legal bases” 

as the American suit. Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 370. Eastern Pacific seeks 

to establish in Indian court by declaratory judgment the very same legal 

theory it raises as an affirmative defense in U.S. court—namely, that an 

employment agreement limits its liability to Ganpat.5

5 The dissent invokes MacPhail, where we vacated the injunction in part because 

the foreign suit was not duplicative. See 302 F.3d at 277–78. There, however, the similarity 

between the two suits was merely factual: the legal theories at issue in the two suits were 

different. See id. Here, by contrast, the legal theories at issue in the two suits are the same.
No. 22-30168

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Accordingly, all three relevant factors indicate that the Indian 

litigation is vexatious and oppressive.

B.

Although our anti-suit injunction test “focuses on the potentially vexatious nature of foreign litigation, it by no means excludes the consideration 

of principles of comity.” Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627. That said, the comity considerations are not overly strict. “We decline . . . to require a district court 

to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every time that 

it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action.” Id.

Our precedents make clear that comity concerns are at a minimum 

where—as here—“no public international issue is implicated by the case” 

and “the dispute has been long and firmly ensconced within the confines of 

the United States judicial system.” Id.

To begin with, no public international issues are implicated in this 

case. As in Kaepa, where we upheld the injunction, this case involves “a private party engaged in a . . . dispute with another private party.” Id. In Karaha 

Bodas, by contrast, substantial comity concerns militated against the injunction. See 335 F.3d at 371–74. That’s because the anti-suit injunction posed 

significant ramifications for a treaty to which the United States was a signatory, and one of the parties to the foreign case was a foreign state-owned enterprise. See id. at 373 (“[A]n injunction here is likely . . . to demonstrate an 

assertion of authority not contemplated by the [treaty].”); see id. at 372; 

(“[The defendant company] is wholly owned by the [foreign government].”); id. at 374 (upholding the district court injunction could result in 
No. 22-30168

9

“diplomatic[]” problems). Here, no party is a government entity, and the 

injunction has no obvious consequences for international relations.6

In addition, Ganpat’s case has long been ensconced in the American 

judicial system. Under our precedent, a case becomes ensconced in the 

United States when a party consents to American jurisdiction and appears in 

the case. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (suit ensconced in the United States when 

defendant “consented to jurisdiction in Texas” and “appeared in an action 

brought in Texas”). In April 2019, Eastern Pacific appeared and waived objections to personal jurisdiction and venue. Only in March 2020, almost a 

year after Ganpat’s suit had already become ensconced within the United 

States, did Eastern Pacific file its Indian lawsuit against Ganpat.

Despite the fact that the American suit was well underway before the 

Indian litigation began, the Indian court sought to enjoin the American 

6 The dissent points to the fact that “India, Singapore, and Liberia are all 

signatories of the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention.” Post, at 23. The dissent then 

proceeds to argue that “any decision regarding Ganpat’s claims will . . . necessarily 

implicate an international treaty.” Post, at 24. There are two fatal problems with this

argument. 

First, as the dissent concedes, “the United States is not a signatory to the 

[Maritime Labour Convention].” Post, at 24 n.19. In Karaha Bodas, we reversed an antisuit injunction that affected a United States treaty. See 335 F.3d at 373–74. The problem 

there was that enjoining the foreign litigation would “demonstrate an assertion of authority 

not contemplated by” a treaty to which the United States was party. Id. at 373. See also id.

at 359–60 (“Given . . . the responsibilities of the United States under that treaty, we 

conclude that the district court abused its discretion.”). Here, by contrast, there is no such 

problem.

Second, no party has argued that granting Ganpat relief under American law would 

cause India to violate its obligations under the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention. Eastern 

Pacific merely points out that an Indian legal regime, enacted pursuant to a treaty, regulates 

some of the relationships in this case. But the fact that India has its own “regulatory 

regime,” post, at 23, does not mean that “public international issues” are in play. Karaha 

Bodas, 335 F.3d at 371. All it means is that there is a run-of-the-mill choice-of-law 

question—a question outside the scope of this appeal.
No. 22-30168

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litigation. It would be strange to “require a district court to genuflect,” 

Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627, before a foreign court that refuses to respect the American court. In light of the “not-insubstantial” vexatiousness of the Indian 

litigation and the “scant” comity interests at stake, Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d 

at 371, the district court was well within its discretion to grant the injunction. 

III.

The dissent points out that an anti-suit injunction is an “extraordinary 

remedy.” Post, at 14. That is true enough. See Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at

363. Yet this extraordinary remedy was amply warranted by the 

extraordinary conduct of Eastern Pacific and the Indian court toward Ganpat. 

The dissent also makes several arguments that misconstrue our anti-suit 

injunction precedents. And it is to these arguments that we now turn.

A.

The dissent first argues that this court errs by failing to employ the 

traditional four-part preliminary injunction test—including the requirement 

of irreparable injury. Post, at 17.

But the international anti-suit injunction precedents in our circuit do 

not require a showing of irreparable injury. When affirming an international 

anti-suit injunction, we have never discussed the traditional four-part test. 

See Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 895–96; Bethell, 441 F.2d at 497–99; Kaepa, 76

F.3d at 626–29. Nor have we ever reversed an anti-suit injunction on the 

basis that the district court failed to apply the traditional preliminary 

injunction test, including the irreparable injury prong. See MacPhail 302 F.3d
No. 22-30168

11

at 277–78; Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 364 (“[T]he suitability of such relief 

ultimately depends on considerations unique to antisuit injunctions.”).7

We recognize that other federal courts are currently split on anti-suit 

injunctions—some circuits such as ours take a more permissive approach, 

while others take a more restrictive approach. See Kathryn E. Vertigan, 

Foreign Antisuit Injunctions: Taking A Lesson from the Act of State Doctrine, 76 

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 155, 164–73 (2007). But even the more restrictive 

circuits do not necessarily require analysis of the traditional four-part test for 

injunctive relief. See Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 

Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting the Fifth 

Circuit’s more permissive approach and adopting the more restrictive 

approach); id. at 19 (“The lower court applied the traditional four-part test 

for preliminary injunctions. Because this generic algorithm provides an 

awkward fit in cases involving international antisuit injunctions, district 

courts have no obligation to employ it in that context.”) (citation omitted). 

B.

The dissent also argues that “[t]his case bears the hallmarks of those 

[cases] in which we vacated antisuit injunctions.” Post, at 20. In particular, 

the dissent emphasizes two issues: Ganpat is an alien, and the underlying 

facts involve few contacts with the United States. 

7 Of our circuit’s five published anti-suit injunction cases, four do not so much as 

mention the four-part test. See Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 895–96; Bethell, 441 F.2d at 497–

99; Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626–28; MacPhail 302 F.3d at 277–78. Karaha Bodas briefly alludes 

to the “four prerequisites to the issuance of a traditional preliminary injunction”—but only 

because the district court and the parties had discussed them. See 335 F.3d at 364. And 

Karaha Bodas ultimately concludes that international anti-suit injunctions are “unique.” 

Id.
No. 22-30168

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But only twice has this circuit vacated an international anti-suit 

injunction in a published opinion. See MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 278; Karaha 

Bodas, 335 F.3d at 375–76. And neither case makes the nationality of the party 

seeking the injunction, or the contacts with the United States, part of its antisuit injunction analysis. See MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 277–78; Karaha Bodas, 335 

F.3d at 366–74.

Our precedents do not ask whether the party seeking the injunction is 

a foreigner—or whether the underlying facts were related to the American

forum. Rather, our precedents weigh the vexatiousness of the foreign 

litigation against considerations of comity.

If we were undertaking an analysis of personal jurisdiction or venue, 

contacts with the United States would surely be an appropriate 

consideration. See, e.g., Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 46 F.4th 

226, 235 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment due process 

test for personal jurisdiction requires . . . ‘minimum contacts’ with the 

United States.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (establishing venue where “a 

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”

or where “defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction”). 

But Eastern Pacific waived its objections to both personal jurisdiction 

and venue. Only the merits of the anti-suit injunction are at issue in this 

appeal. 

C.

Finally, the dissent argues that the injunction is overbroad: “It 

purports to bind [Eastern Pacific] India, which”—unlike Eastern Pacific—

“is not a party to the U.S. action.” Post, at 26. But the Federal Rules permit 

issuance of an injunction against “persons who are in active concert or 

participation” with parties, as well as against parties themselves. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C). “[An] injunction not only binds the parties defendant 
No. 22-30168

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but also those identified with them in interest . . . or subject to their control. 

. . . [D]efendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts 

through aiders and abettors, although they were not parties to the original 

proceeding.” United States v. Jenkins, 974 F.2d 32, 36 (5th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945)). 

As the district court found, “[Eastern Pacific] India is a subsidiary of 

Eastern Pacific . . . [and] is 99.99% owned by Eastern Pacific.” Ganpat, 2022 

WL 1015027, at *12. The district court also found “complete identity of 

interests and positions” between Eastern Pacific and Eastern Pacific India. 

Id. “The district court did not err in finding that it was necessary to bind” 

Eastern Pacific India. Jenkins, 974 F.2d at 36.

* * *

The district court was well within its discretion to conclude that the 

vexatiousness of the Indian litigation outweighed any comity concerns. We 

accordingly affirm the anti-suit injunction.
No. 22-30168

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Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

This circuit, to be sure, takes a more permissive approach to foreign 

antisuit injunctions than many of our sister circuits. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles 

Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626–27 (5th Cir. 1996).1

 Nonetheless, a foreign antisuit 

injunction is “an extraordinary remedy” fraught with “unique” concerns 

regarding international comity. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan 

Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 363, 364 (5th Cir. 

2003). Yet the district court wheeled out this extraordinary remedy so that a 

sailor from India can sue a Singaporean ship management company under the 

Jones Act, claiming that he got malaria in Africa after his Liberian-flagged 

vessel docked briefly in Savannah, Georgia and received insufficient anti1 This approach is probably wrong and should be reconsidered at an appropriate 

time. See, e.g., Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 629–34 (Garza, J., dissenting); Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man 

Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 359–60 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The 

First, Second, Third, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted the 

‘conservative approach,’ under which a foreign antisuit injunction will issue only if the 

movant demonstrates (1) an action in a foreign jurisdiction would prevent United States 

jurisdiction or threaten a vital United States policy, and (2) the domestic interests outweigh 

concerns of international comity.”); id. at 360 (adopting the conservative approach because 

it “(1) recognizes the rebuttable presumption against issuing international antisuit 

injunctions, (2) is more respectful of principles of international comity, (3) compels an 

inquiring court to balance competing policy considerations, and (4) acknowledges that 

issuing an international antisuit injunction is a step that should be taken only with care and 

great restraint and with the recognition that international comity is a fundamental principle 

deserving of substantial deference.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Our precedents commence with In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888, 

890 (5th Cir. 1970), which approved a federal district court’s antisuit injunction to prevent 

litigation in London in an admiralty dispute, while disregarding, as against “public policy,” 

the parties’ forum selection clause. Id. at 894. Holding that in the modern era, such clauses 

are to be enforced between sophisticated parties, the Supreme Court overturned this 

court’s decision. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972). 

The Supreme Court’s ruling gravely undermined the basis for the injunction. See also 

Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 633 n.13 (Garza, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Unterweser and Bethell v. 

Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971), from modern cases).
No. 22-30168

15

malaria pills. The district court’s decision and the majority’s basis for 

affirming deviate severely from our precedent. I respectfully dissent.

A. Background

It is just as inaccurate for the majority to assert that Ganpat’s being 

sued in India, in a court located one hour from his home, is “fraught with 

peril,” as it is to conclude that he is entitled to the potential windfall of a 

Jones Act recovery. The majority’s criticisms of the Indian court 

procedures, which derive from English law, may be required to sustain their 

result but are unsupported by the facts.

Ganpat alleges he contracted malaria because the Liberian-flagged 

vessel on which he sailed was insufficiently supplied with anti-malaria pills at 

port in Savannah, Georgia. Falling ill at sea after docking in Africa, he was 

treated in Brazil, some toes were removed, and he went back home to Goa, 

India. Eastern Pacific Shipping India (EPS India), an Indian entity that 

oversaw the execution of Ganpat’s seafarer employment agreement (SEA), 

coordinated and furnished Ganpat’s medical care in Brazil and his continued 

care in India. In December 2018, Ganpat sued Eastern Pacific Shipping 

(EPS), the Singaporean ship manager for the vessel, in the New Orleans 

federal district court, but he failed to make proper service of process for 

twenty-seven months (until August 2021). The majority has no basis in the 

record to assert that EPS “continually evaded service of process,” as EPS 

had every right to rely on being served according to the letter of American 

law and international protocol.2

EPS and EPS India sued Ganpat in Goa fifteen months after the U.S. 

suit was filed and was going nowhere. These entities sought a declaration 

2 The majority erroneously imply that waiver of jurisdiction and venue require a 

defendant also to waive correct service of process.
No. 22-30168

16

enforcing his employment contract, which is based on Liberian and Indian 

law. They obtained a temporary injunction order (in March 2020, on forum 

non conveniens grounds) to prevent Ganpat from pursuing the American suit. 

Ganpat admits that he repeatedly evaded service by the Indian court and was 

ultimately held in contempt. At the court hearing in March 2021, the Indian 

court offered Ganpat a court-appointed lawyer, but he rejected the offer 

because he did not want to pay the expense. A lawyer for EPS then spoke 

with Ganpat, who was accompanied by his father and brother-in-law, in an 

apparent attempt to negotiate his acceptance of the contracted-for injury 

payment. Upon reentering the courtroom, Ganpat admitted, he refused 

“three or four additional times” the judge’s demand that he “sign the 

papers, take a bond, or hire a lawyer.” Ganpat v. Eastern Pacific Shipping, Pte. 

Ltd., 2022 WL 1015027, *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2022). He was thus jailed for 

his continued refusal to participate in the legal proceedings, not, as the 

majority contends, because he “refused to be bullied into dropping the 

American suit.” The next day, he obtained counsel and bonded out. He has 

been represented by counsel since and has not again been threatened with 

jail.3

Ganpat further ignored the Indian court’s order by pursuing the U.S. 

litigation in his many fruitless attempts to serve EPS properly. His efforts 

culminated in the U.S. district court’s April 2022 antisuit injunction against 

both EPS and the non-party to that case, EPS India.4

3 He admits as well that his American lawyer provided the money to hire the Indian 

lawyer.

4 The district court speedily denied EPS’s forum non conveniens motion to dismiss 

despite the lack of any substantial connection of this litigation to the United States. EPS 

and EPS India, unlike Ganpat, have complied with the foreign antisuit injunction order, 

and the Indian litigation is in limbo pending this dispute.
No. 22-30168

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The district court described EPS’s Indian suit as a “stratagem,” and 

the majority imply without any record evidence that the Indian legal system 

lacks legal protection for Ganpat. When this tortured procedural history is 

considered in toto, it is more accurate to describe the district court’s rulings 

as an attempt to compel domestic jurisdiction over a suit with highly tenuous 

domestic connections.

B. Standard for Foreign Antisuit Injunctions

Antisuit injunctions in this circuit are described as a subspecies of 

injunctions. Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 364. The majority discounts that 

Ganpat, like any movant for equitable relief, must ultimately satisfy a fourpart test and show a likelihood of success on the merits.5

 The fact that unique 

considerations affect the propriety of foreign court antisuit injunctions 

should not detract from the recognition that equitable relief requires an 

extraordinary justification. Consequently, our cases explain the need to 

weigh preventing “vexatious or oppressive litigation” and “protecting the 

court’s jurisdiction” against deference to principles of international comity. 

See, e.g., id. at 366; see also Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627; MacPhail v. Oceaneering 

Int’l, 302 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2002).6 Elaborating on what is vexatious, 

we have identified: (1) inequitable hardship resulting from the foreign suit; 

5 See Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 364 & n.19 (asserting that the court’s anti-suit 

injunction standard acts as a substitute for the traditional standard’s “likelihood of 

success” prong but intimating that the remaining factors of the traditional standard may be 

applicable); see also MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers, 833 F. App’x 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(per curiam).

6 The factors to be weighed seem to compress a four-factor test articulated by this 

court in Unterweser, i.e., whether the foreign litigation would (1) frustrate a policy of the 

U.S. forum; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s in rem or quasi 

in rem jurisdiction; or (4) cause prejudice or offend other equitable principles. See 

428 F.2d at 890.
No. 22-30168

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(2) the foreign suit’s ability to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient 

determination of the cause; and (3) the extent to which the foreign suit is 

duplicitous of the U.S. litigation. Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 366. And Karaha 

Bodas clarified that this inquiry goes to the first traditional factor: likelihood 

of success on the merits. Id. at 364 & n.19. Ultimately, the unique aspects of 

foreign antisuit injunctions must relate to the challenging tests for equitable 

relief.

The majority opinion, unfortunately, reduces this “extraordinary 

remedy” essentially to a routine order under a routine multifactor test. The 

majority’s analysis finds “inequitable hardship” if Ganpat must endure 

litigating the Indian lawsuit; and it finds “frustration” of the American 

litigation because the “Indian court has sought to prevent Ganpat from 

litigating in the United States, even though the American suit was filed first.” 

With these sole prerequisites, the majority declares it unnecessary to 

consider “the extent to which the foreign suit is duplicitous of the litigation 

in the United States.” Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 366. But the majority then 

endorses the district court’s statement that the Indian suit rests on “the same 

or similar legal bases.” Each of these findings is incorrect, as is the majority’s 

minimization of international comity concerns and its further refusal to apply 

traditional equitable principles. A look at our previous case law concerning 

foreign antisuit injunctions readily demonstrates the majority’s departure 

from the underlying standards we have used.

1. “Vexatiousness”

First, contrary to the majority’s dismissive math, half of the antisuit 

injunctions issued in this circuit have been vacated on appeal. Of this 
No. 22-30168

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circuit’s six opinions covering antisuit injunctions, three upheld and three 

vacated district court orders.7

Our cases share several common themes, and they uniformly point 

toward rejecting the district court’s injunction in this case. Where we have 

upheld antisuit injunctions, the defendant in the foreign proceeding was a 

United States citizen or company8; the facts giving rise to the dueling actions 

bore a substantial relationship to the United States forum9; and the dueling 

actions involved identical parties and nearly identical, if not identical 

claims.10 In contrast, where this court vacated antisuit injunctions, the 

7 Those cases in which we have upheld antisuit injunctions are Unterweser, 

428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), rev’d by M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972); 

Bethell, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971); and Kaepa, 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996). Those cases 

in which we have vacated antisuit injunctions are MacPhail, 302 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2002); 

and Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2003). The most recent such case vacating an 

injunction is well reasoned but unpublished. MWK Recruiting, 833 F. App’x 560 (5th Cir. 

2020) (per curiam).

8 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 889; Bethell, 441 F.2d at 496; Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 625.

9 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 889 (ship docked in Florida after accident in Gulf of 

Mexico while transporting drilling barge from Louisiana to Italy); Bethell, 441 F.2d at 496 

(contract signed in Florida by Florida residents while defendant was acting in capacity as 

Florida real estate broker, which gave rise to fiduciary duties under Florida law); Kaepa, 

76 F.3d at 625–26 (Japanese company contracted with U.S. company and agreed to litigate 

disputes in United States).

10 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 889 (U.S. company sued German company in federal 

district court for damages; German company then sued U.S. company in England for 

moneys due under towage contract and for breach of contract); Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 625–26 

(U.S. company sued Japanese company in federal district court for fraudulent and negligent 

inducement as well as breach of contract; Japanese company sued U.S. company in Japan 

on identical claims); see also Bethell, 441 F.2d at 496 (Florida real estate broker sued owners 

in Bahamas to enforce contract to sell property and to quiet title; Texas co-owner sued real 

estate broker in federal district court for fraud and declaratory judgment as to validity of 

the contract); id. at 498–99 (narrowing scope of injunction because it “attempt[ed] to affect 

rights between [real estate broker] and co-owners who were not parties to the [U.S.] 

action”).
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20

defendant in the foreign proceeding was a foreigner11; the facts underlying 

the actions were largely unrelated to the United States forum12; the parties 

were not identical13; and, though the dueling cases arose out of the same 

underlying facts, they involved different legal claims.14

This case bears the hallmarks of those in which we vacated antisuit 

injunctions. First, all parties are foreign to the United States. The only 

connection this case has to the United States, besides Ganpat’s lawyer, is 

Ganpat’s allegation that EPS, a Singaporean ship manager, failed to supply 

the M/V Stargate, a Liberian-flagged vessel, with enough anti-malaria 

medication while briefly in port at Savannah, Georgia. Ganpat has remained 

in India since his repatriation. He couldn’t even be bothered to personally 

attend the dispositive hearing on the district court’s antisuit injunction. The 

court permitted him to appear by Zoom from India.

Even more significant, the parties to each action are not the same and 

the cases involve different legal claims. In the New Orleans district court, 

11 MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 276 & n.2; Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 360.

12 MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 275–76 (injuries in South China Sea resulted in settlement 

agreement between U.S. company and Australian that was signed in Australia and 

confirmed by Australian court); Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 360–61 (arbitration award from 

Switzerland arising out of failed construction contract between Caymanian company and 

state-owned Indonesian company).

13 Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 362. But see MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 277 (identical 

parties).

14 MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 277 (U.S. action sought damages from maritime tort claim, 

whereas Australian action sought specific performance of settlement agreement); Karaha 

Bodas, 335 F.3d at 361 (U.S. action sought confirmation of award, whereas Indonesian 

action sought annulment of award); see also MWK Recruiting, 833 F. App’x at 564 (rejecting 

use of the “logical relationship test” to determine duplicative claims).
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Ganpat sued only EPS for damages under the Jones Act, the collective 

bargaining agreement, and general maritime law. In India, EPS and EPS 

India filed suit for a declaration that Ganpat’s damages are limited by the 

SEA Ganpat executed with Ventnor Navigation, Inc. through Ventnor’s 

authorized representative, EPS India.15 But EPS India is not a party to the 

U.S. litigation.

Although the majority assert that it is unnecessary to discuss whether 

the parties’ claims in each case are “duplicitous,” they go on to endorse the 

district court’s finding that the cases rest on the same or similar legal claims. 

What the majority means is thus unclear. But the inquiry into legal overlap 

between the domestic and foreign proceedings has been a basic and 

indispensable feature of previous cases. Indubitably, the parties here are 

proceeding on distinct legal claims. Ganpat has no recourse to the Jones 

Act’s remedies in Indian courts. And although EPS in the district court 

asserted as an affirmative defense that the SEA limited Ganpat’s damages, 

these actions “share the same or similar legal bases” only to the extent that 

the resolution of one case may serve “as the basis for a plea of res judicata” 

in the other case. Ganpat, 2022 WL 1015027 at *10, *11. Res judicata is hard 

to imagine, however, because any rejection of the SEA by the district court 

(were that to occur) is unlikely to be enforced against EPS India, a nonparty 

over which the district court lacked jurisdiction, via its judgment solely 

against EPS.

The district court reasoned otherwise by asserting simply that the 

SEA is at issue in both the U.S. and Indian fora. Such a superficial factual 

analogy has been repeatedly rejected by this court because “the duplicative 

factor [relating to vexatiousness] is about legal, not factual, similarity.” 

15 That agreement is governed by Liberian and Indian law and covered work on the 

M/V Stargate, which EPS managed.
No. 22-30168

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MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers, 833 F. App’x 560, 564 (5th Cir. 2020) (per 

curiam) (emphasis in original); see also Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 370; Kaepa,

76 F.3d at 626 (“mirror-image” claims in foreign suit and U.S. suit). 

MacPhail, in fact,rejected the exact argument made by the district court here, 

holding the assertion of a defense in U.S. proceedings that serves as the basis 

for a claim in foreign proceedings does not render the actions duplicitous. 

302 F.3d at 277. And indeed, preventing these parties from proceeding on 

different claims in the U.S. and India makes no sense. The district court is 

powerless to compel a complete resolution of the three parties’ dispute 

before its bench; and the parties are prevented from going forward in India’s 

dispositive litigation with EPS India. The majority’s analysis thus evades 

what should be a sine qua non to justify a foreign antisuit injunction.16

Properly applying our precedents to the facts at hand, it seems plain 

that Ganpat does not suffer “inequitable hardship” from being involved in 

parallel litigation, a course his actions foreordained. Parallel proceedings, 

alone, are insufficient to show vexation or oppression. Karaha Bodas, 

335 F.3d at 372 & n.59; see also MWK Recruiting, 833 F. App’x at 564. The 

Indian court is doubtlessly a forum conveniens. And any future threat of 

Ganpat’s being jailed is wholly speculative, as he has obtained counsel in 

India. Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 368–69 (no inequitable hardship where 

asserted harm was speculative). It is likewise speculative that the Indian suit 

could have frustrated or delayed the district court’s proceedings. The 

district court certainly had means to defend its jurisdiction that fell short of 

requiring EPS and EPS India to abandon the Indian action entirely. See id. at 

16 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this court has never found that 

“inconvenience [and] expense” alone can justify a foreign anti-suit injunction. By that 

standard, any foreign suit could be enjoined. The inconvenience and expense of foreign 

litigation is instead only “unwarranted” where the foreign action is duplicative of the 

domestic action. Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627–28.
No. 22-30168

23

361–62 (district court required the plaintiff in foreign case to withdraw 

application for antisuit injunction and prohibited plaintiff from taking any 

substantive action in foreign case, but it allowed plaintiff to “take any 

ministerial steps necessary to maintain the cause of action.”). And it was 

Ganpat, not EPS or the Indian court, who delayed his American case for over 

two years with inept dithering about proper service of process. Finally, the 

current posture of these cases prevents either court from fully resolving the 

three parties’ differences, and this means the legal claims cannot be 

substantially similar. It was error to deem the pendency of the Indian lawsuit 

“vexatious and oppressive” to Ganpat.

2. Comity

On the other side of the equitable ledger, international comity 

concerns here decidedly outweigh the need to “prevent vexatious or 

oppressive litigation” and “to protect the court’s jurisdiction.”17 To begin, 

India, Singapore, and Liberia are all signatories of the 2006 Maritime Labour 

Convention (MLC).18 That treaty embodies “as far as possible all up-to-date 

standards of existing international maritime labour Conventions and 

Recommendations, as well as the fundamental principles to be found in other 

international labour Conventions.” MLC, 2006, preamble. In accordance 

with its duties under the treaty, India promulgated a complex regulatory 

regime that governs the relationship among EPS, EPS India, and Ganpat. For 

instance, EPS India exists because Indian law prevents a foreign company 

from employing Indian nationals to work on a foreign flagged ship without 

17 Karaha Bodas makes clear that while “notions of comity do not wholly dominate 

our analysis,” the court must still weigh the “need to defer to principles of international 

comity.” 335 F.3d at 366; see also Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627.

18 Ratifications of MLC, 2006, International Labour Organization

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INS

TRUMENT_ID:312331 (last visited Apr. 13, 2023).
No. 22-30168

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the involvement of a locally licensed placement service. Consequently, any 

decision regarding Ganpat’s claims will, as in Karaha Bodas, necessarily 

implicate an international treaty and foreign states’ rules promulgated 

thereunder.19

Comity concerns, however, do not only arise where public 

international relations are at stake. Such a holding would place this court’s 

precedent well outside the norm. Indeed, even circuits friendly to this 

court’s approach to antisuit injunctions acknowledge there are 

“international-comity concerns inherent in enjoining a party from pursuing 

claims in a foreign court.” 1st Source Bank v. Neto, 861 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 

2017).20 Those inherent concerns are on full display here. In March 2020, 

seventeen months beforeservice was perfected in the district court, the Indian 

court determined that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties, was 

a convenient forum, and should temporarily enjoin Ganpat from his U.S. 

litigation. In April 2022, two years after the Indian court’s order, the district 

court issued its foreign antisuit injunction in the face of Ganpat’s ongoing 

disregard of the Indian court’s order.21 Had Ganpat instead litigated on the 

merits in the Indian court, this case might have been concluded already, albeit 

19 Although the United States is not a signatory to the MLC, surely U.S. courts 

ought to proceed carefully before ignoring treaties and foreign statutes, especially those 

governing employment relationships. Yet the majority seem to deride this aspect of comity. 

See, e.g., Goss Int’l, 491 F.3d at 366 (vacating injunction because “[i]nternational comity 

requires us to give deference to the Japanese courts to interpret Japanese laws”).

20 As the Sixth Circuit observed, an antisuit injunction in and of itself “conveys the 

message, intended or not, that the issuing court has so little confidence in the foreign 

court’s ability to adjudicate a given dispute fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling even to 

allow the possibility.” Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 

1992).

21 Indeed, the district court’s course of conduct greenlit Ganpat’s contempt by 

allowing him to continue prosecuting the U.S. action in apparent defiance of the Indian 

court’s order.
No. 22-30168

25

on terms he might not have found attractive. But as noted above, the district 

court’s injunction forced EPS and EPS India to dismiss the Indian action. In 

short, the district court’s actions not only clashed “with the general principle 

that a sovereign country has the competence to determine its own jurisdiction 

and grant the kinds of relief it deems appropriate,” but also “effectively 

attempt[ed] to arrest the judicial proceedings of another foreign sovereign.” 

Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 371, 372–73. The fact that the Eastern District of 

Louisiana maintains absolutely zero factual connection to the dispute only 

exacerbates the violation of comity.

The MacPhail case provides an excellent parallel. There, an 

Australian citizen suffered injuries while working in the South China Sea. 

302 F.3d at 275. Three years later, he brought a general maritime tort claim 

against an American company in federal district court. Id. at 276. The 

company proffered a prior settlement agreement between the parties as a 

defense. Id. When the district court rejected the agreement as 

unenforceable, the company brought an action in Australia seeking specific 

performance of the agreement. Id. at 277. The district court issued an 

antisuit injunction, and the company appealed. Id. This court first held that 

the actions were not duplicitous: Although both actions arose “out of facts 

contemplated” by the agreement, the actions did not involve identical claims. 

Id. It also held that the foreign action was not vexatious considering the 

Australian citizen had previously resorted to Australia’s courts to confirm 

the agreement. Id. And it rejected the contention that the antisuit injunction 

was necessary to protect the district court’s jurisdiction because the 

Australian court established “prima facie jurisdiction” before the federal 

district court and nothing prevented the Australian citizen from opposing the 

validity of the agreement in the Australian courts. Id. at 277–78. The court 

consequently vacated the antisuit injunction. Id at 278.
No. 22-30168

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Like MacPhail, the case at hand bears almost no relationship to the 

United States. The claims at issue in the domestic and foreign litigation are 

not identical. And though the district court here assumed jurisdiction over 

the case earlier than the Indian court, the domestic case lay dormant for years 

due to Ganpat’s dilatory conduct. In the meantime, the Indian court 

established jurisdiction and preliminarily found itself to be a forum conveniens. 

The significant international comity interests at issue here, which were not 

present in McPhail, go well beyond those inherent in enjoining foreign 

litigation and further weigh in favor of vacating the antisuit injunction.

3. Equitable Considerations

As a final instance of abuse, the district court failed to balance the 

equities traditionally important to granting injunctive relief, as it should have 

done after finding Ganpat had shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Moreover, the district court failed to “narrowly tailor” the injunction “to 

remedy the specific action” that gave rise to its order. John Doe #1 v. 

Veneman, 380 F.3d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). The injunction purports to bind 

EPS India, which is not a party to the U.S. action. Though Rule 65 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to bind non-parties “who 

are in active concert or participation with” a party against whom an 

injunction is issued, the district court must first find that the non-party is “so 

identified in interest with those named in the decree that it would be 

reasonable to conclude that their rights and interests have been represented 

and adjudicated in the original injunction proceeding.” Harris Cnty. v. 

CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc., 177 F.3d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation 

omitted). Despite the fact that EPS India is a wholly owned subsidiary of 

EPS, EPS India may have different obligations to Ganpat and might have 

claims EPS is unable to assert. For instance, Ganpat has argued the SEA does 

not govern his relationship with EPS. Consequently, it was an abuse of 

discretion to bind EPS India. See Bethell, 441 F.2d at 498 (scope of injunction 
No. 22-30168

27

overbroad where it “attempts to affect rights between” defendant in U.S. 

action and those “who were not parties to the” district court action). The 

court also brazenly required EPS and EPS India to dismiss the Indian action, 

as opposed to requiring them, for example, to ask the Indian court to abandon 

its injunction. See Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 361. The injunction’s terms are 

abusive, especially if the Indian statute of limitations could prevent EPS and 

EPS India from refiling their claim.

Returning to the theme that injunctive relief is to be sparingly granted, 

and only when the balance of hardships clearly weighs in favor of the movant 

and against the respondent, 22 I believe the foregoing discussion 

demonstrates the legal and factual errors underpinning the district court’s 

foreign antisuit injunction. I respectfully dissent.

22 See Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 363–64 & n.19; see also MacPhail, 302 F.3d at 277–

78; MWK Recruiting, 833 F. App’x at 562, 564–65.