COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Bumgardner 

PAULA RIPLEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 2879-99-2 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 25, 2000 

CHARLOTTESVILLE DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

Edward L. Hogshire, Judge 

 (Michael T. Hemenway, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (Lisa R. Kelley, Deputy City Attorney, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Paula Ripley appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her parental rights to her children, Charles and 

Marion. Ripley contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding 

that the Charlottesville Department of Social Services (DSS) 

presented clear and convincing evidence satisfying the 

requirements of Code § 16.1-283; (2) failing to require evidence 

that DSS explored less drastic alternatives and finding that 

Ripley failed to cooperate with services provided; and (3) denying 

Ripley's motion for a continuance. Upon reviewing the record and 

briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App. 

123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 

'the statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual 

parental rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides 

detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents 

and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to 

preserve the family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 

S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). "'In matters of a 

child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in 

making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's 

best interests.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 

(citation omitted). The trial judge's findings, "'when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Code § 16.1-283(B)

 The court found that DSS presented clear and convincing 

evidence sufficient under Code § 16.1-283(B). That section 

provides that the residual rights of a parent of a child found 

to be neglected or abused may be terminated if the court finds, 

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by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best 

interests of the child and that 

1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such 

child presented a serious and substantial 

threat to his life, health or development; 

and 

2. It is not reasonably likely that the 

conditions which resulted in such neglect or 

abuse can be substantially corrected or 

eliminated so as to allow the child's safe 

return to his parent or parents within a 

reasonable period of time. In making this 

determination, the court shall take into 

consideration the efforts made to 

rehabilitate the parent or parents by any 

public or private social, medical, mental 

health or other rehabilitative agencies 

prior to the child's initial placement in 

foster care. 

Prima facie evidence of the conditions set out in subsection 

(B)(2) include proof that 

a. The parent . . . [is] suffering from a 

mental or emotional illness or mental 

deficiency of such severity that there is no 

reasonable expectation that such parent will 

be able to undertake responsibility for the 

care needed by the child in accordance with 

his age and stage of development; [or] 

* * * * * * * 

c. The parent . . . without good cause, 

[has] not responded to or followed through 

with appropriate, available and reasonable 

rehabilitative efforts on the part of 

social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce, 

eliminate or prevent the neglect or abuse of 

the child. 

Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). 

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 The trial court found that DSS proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that it was in the children's best interests to terminate 

Ripley's parental rights. The children were adjudicated as 

neglected in 1995 and placed in foster care. At that time, 

Charles was six years old and displayed serious behavioral and 

emotional problems, including fire setting, aggression, emotional 

avoidance, and inappropriate sexual behavior. At the time of the 

termination hearing, Charles continued to have serious emotional 

issues. He suffered from depression and had expressed thoughts of 

suicide. Marion was five when she was taken into foster care. 

She was developmentally delayed and suffered from severe attention 

deficit hyperactivity disorder. Her behavior was so dangerous and 

destructive that she required constant supervision. At the time 

of the hearing, Marion's chronological age was nine but she had 

limited communication skills and continued behavioral problems. 

 The trial court found that between 1989 and 1995 DSS and at 

least eighteen agencies provided rehabilitative services to the 

family in an effort to remedy the children's neglect and to assist 

Ripley in developing good parenting skills. Nonetheless, the 

evidence demonstrated that despite the numerous services provided, 

Ripley was unable or unwilling to provide the extensive care and 

supervision required by the children. She was unable to maintain 

Marion's schedule of medication or successfully control her 

behavior. She inappropriately allowed Charles to assume a 

caretaking role towards her. Her sporadic visitation with him 

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left him emotionally upset. Evidence indicated that Ripley 

functioned at a limited intellectual level and failed to 

comprehend the depth of the children's needs. Doctor Thomas 

Collins, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that for the 

children to be returned to Ripley's care safely would require 

a lot more than just . . . a couple times a 

week counseling. I think you're talking 

about really intensive work with someone in 

the home a considerable period of time to 

help with . . . handling problems as they 

developed. 

Ripley separated from her husband in 1997 after he was charged 

with a felony sexual assault against a child for whom she was 

caring. At the time of the hearing, Ripley was divorced. 

 Despite the extensive services provided to the family for 

over nine years, the evidence presented at the hearing proved that 

Ripley's limitations as well as the children's extraordinarily 

high needs established that there was no reasonable expectation 

that Ripley could provide the care needed by these children. 

Therefore, because evidence supports the trial court's finding 

that DSS met the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283 by 

clear and convincing evidence, we find no error. 

Less Drastic Alternative

 Ripley also contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 

failing to consider a less drastic alternative than termination of 

her parental rights. Ripley failed to note with any specificity 

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what less drastic alternative was available but left untried by 

DSS. 

 Despite the years of training, counseling and other services 

provided in an effort to strengthen and reunite the family, the 

uncontroverted evidence proved that Ripley could not parent these 

children without daily intensive assistance. Evidence in the 

record demonstrated that the continual upheaval in the lives of 

the children was particularly difficult for the children and 

clearly not in their best interests. "It is clearly not in the 

best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time 

waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable 

of resuming . . . responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County 

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 

(1990). Therefore, we find this contention to be without merit. 

Denial of Continuance

 On the scheduled hearing date of September 13, 1999, Ripley's 

appointed counsel sought a continuance on the ground that, 

although he had reviewed the file, he had only met with Ripley 

that morning, despite having sent two letters to her last known 

address notifying her of his appointment. Counsel proffered that 

Ripley did not receive these letters. Ripley did not testify.

 Evidence presented during the hearing indicated that Ripley 

contacted DSS during this period when she was interested in 

visitation, but that DSS had no means to initiate contact with 

her. Following entry of the juvenile and domestic relations 

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district court termination order on February 5, 1999, the circuit 

court hearing was continued from April 1999 due to the previously 

appointed counsel's conflict of interest. No evidence indicated 

that Ripley was unaware of the significance of the hearing or was 

unable to meet with her attorney in the months after his 

appointment. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find 

no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant 

another continuance in this matter. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 

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