[Cite as State v. Kohr, 2013-Ohio-877.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, :

CASE NO. 2012-P-0081

 - vs - :

JOHN E. KOHR, :

 Defendant-Appellee. :

Criminal Appeal from the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, Case No. 

R 2012 TRC 4402. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded. 

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant 

Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellant). 

John E. Kohr, pro se, 6065 Cherry Run Road, NW, Strasburg, OH 44680 (DefendantAppellee). 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the 

Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, granting defendant-appellee, John 

E. Kohr’s, Motion in Limine. The issue to be decided in this case is whether a trial court, 

in the performance of its role as gatekeeper, may require the State to demonstrate the 

general scientific reliability of a breath testing instrument where the Ohio director of 

health has approved such instrument for determining the concentration of alcohol in a 
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person’s breath. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the decision of the 

court below. 

{¶2} On April 7, 2012, Kohr was issued a traffic ticket, charging him with 

Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence (OVI), a misdemeanor of the first 

degree, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree, in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d); and No Rear-Plate Light, a minor misdemeanor, in 

violation of R.C. 4513.05. 

{¶3} On May 29, 2012, Kohr filed a Motion in Limine, challenging the results of 

the intoxilyzer breath test. He asserted that “[t]he patent unreliability of the [Intoxilyzer] 

8000 is the basis for this motion in limine.” Kohr noted that the trial court should follow 

its holding in State v. Johnson, Portage Municipal Court Case No. R 2011 TRC 4090. 

In Johnson, the court held that the State was required to present evidence at a hearing 

for the court to determine the general scientific reliability and admissibility of the breath 

test results of the Intoxilyzer 8000. 

{¶4} The State filed a response to the Motion in Limine and a “Brief Regarding 

Intoxilyzer 8000 Hearing” on July 13, 2012. In that Brief, the State argued that it need 

not present evidence to establish the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000, citing 

State v. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 465 N.E.2d 1303 (1984). 

{¶5} On July 16, 2012, a hearing was held on the Motion in Limine. At the 

hearing, the State confirmed that it was taking the position that no testimony as to the 

general reliability of the intoxilyzer needed to be presented and no witnesses were 

called. In a Journal Entry issued on July 18, 2012, the trial court granted Kohr’s Motion 

in Limine, with respect to the results of the Intoxilyzer 8000. The court noted that it 
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“limits its review of Defendant’s Motion in Limine solely to the admissibility of a BAC test 

from the Intoxilyzer 8000.” It found that the issue in the present matter was “identical” to 

the one in Johnson. The court held that “the rationale and findings in Johnson are 

likewise applicable to this case.” It held that the “breath test results from the Intoxilyzer 

8000 are not admissible at the trial of Defendant” and that “[t]he remaining charges 

alleging a violation of ORC 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and 4513.05 shall be set for trial on the 

Court’s docket.” 

{¶6} On July 19, 2012, the State filed a Motion to Stay the Execution of 

Judgment, which was granted by the court on July 27, 2012. 

{¶7} The State timely appeals and raises the following assignment of error:1

{¶8} “The Portage County Municipal Court erred in permitting a general attack 

on the scientific reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 contrary to Ohio statutes and wellestablished case law.” 

{¶9} The appropriate standard of review where the lower court’s judgment is 

challenged on a purported misconstruction of the law is de novo. State v. Morris, 132 

Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 16. “In determining a pure 

question of law, an appellate court may properly substitute its judgment for that of the 

trial court.” (Citation omitted.) Id. 

{¶10} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that, pursuant to the 

provisions of R.C. 3701.143 and Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-02(A), a trial court is required 

to accept the Intoxilyzer 8000 as an appropriate device for chemically analyzing a 

person’s breath to determine the amount of alcohol in the breath. It further argues that, 

pursuant to Vega, a defendant may not attack the general reliability of a breath testing 

 

1. Kohr did not file an appellee’s brief. 
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instrument and the State is not required to present evidence to support a determination 

that the test is generally reliable. 

{¶11} The Ohio General Assembly has charged the Ohio director of health to 

“determine, or cause to be determined, techniques or methods for chemically analyzing 

a person’s * * * breath * * * in order to ascertain the amount of alcohol * * * in the 

person’s * * * breath[.]” R.C. 3701.143. The Intoxilyzer 8000 has been approved as an 

“evidential breath testing instrument” by the director of health. Ohio Adm.Code 3701-

53-02(A)(3). 

{¶12} This court has recently addressed the exact issue raised by the State 

regarding the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 and determined that, pursuant to 

Vega, a defendant may not make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of the 

breath testing instrument. State v. Miller, 11th Dist. No. 2012-P-0032, 2012-Ohio-5585, 

¶ 26; State v. Harmon, 11th Dist. No. 2012-P-0067, 2013-Ohio-442, ¶ 11; State v. 

Collazo, 11th Dist. No. 2012-L-067, 2013-Ohio-439, ¶ 19. This court further held that 

breath test results are subject to challenge on a variety of grounds, including specific 

attacks on the reliability of the test and attacks on the performance of the test in a 

specific defendant’s case. Miller at ¶ 30-32; State v. Carter, 11th Dist. No. 2012-P0027, 2012-Ohio-5583, ¶ 25 and 35; State v. Rouse, 11th Dist. No. 2012-P-0030, 2012-

Ohio-5584, ¶ 24 and 32. 

{¶13} As was discussed in the foregoing cases, the lead Ohio Supreme Court 

case on this issue is Vega, in which the court addressed the issue of whether the 

general reliability of intoxilyzers could be challenged “in view of the fact that the General 

Assembly has legislatively provided for the admission of such tests in R.C. 4511.19 if 
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analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the Director of Health.” 12 Ohio 

St.3d at 186, 465 N.E.2d 1303. In Vega, the Ohio Supreme Court made clear that “an 

accused may not make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of the breath 

testing instrument,” since the General Assembly “ha[s] legislatively resolved the 

questions of the reliability and relevancy of intoxilyzer tests.” Id. at 188, 190. 

{¶14} Other appellate districts have consistently rejected the position that the 

State is required to provide evidence of the general reliability of a testing instrument in 

the same or similar situations. State v. Klintworth, 4th Dist. No. 10CA40, 2011-Ohio3553, ¶ 12 (“this court will not allow the defendant to us[e] expert testimony to attack the 

general reliability or general accuracy of a legislatively determined test procedure - urine 

testing - as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels”) (citation 

omitted); Columbus v. Aleshire, 187 Ohio App.3d 660, 2010-Ohio-2773, 933 N.E.2d 

317, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (“while [State v.] French[, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 650 N.E.2d 887 

(1995),] permits evidentiary objections to the test results challenging issues such as 

competency, admissibility, relevancy, authenticity, and credibility, it does not indicate 

that a challenge to the ‘general reliability’ is among the permissible challenges”); State 

v. Massie, 2nd Dist. No. 2007 CA 24, 2008-Ohio-1312, ¶ 36 (“[the defendant’s] Daubert

challenge * * * is forestalled by the ‘legislative mandate recognized in Vega’”). 

{¶15} While no general attack on reliability may be made, when duly challenged, 

the State must demonstrate that the bodily substance was “analyzed in accordance with 

methods approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit.” 

R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b). The Ohio Supreme Court has affirmed that “[t]here is no 

question that the accused may * * * attack the reliability of the specific testing procedure 
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and the qualifications of the operator,” as well as present “expert testimony as to testing 

procedures at trial going to weight rather than admissibility.” Vega at 189. Thus, “[t]he 

defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may 

not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a 

valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.” State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 6, 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984); French at 451-452. 

{¶16} In addition to attacks on the specific performance of a particular breath 

test in an individual defendant’s case, a defendant may also make an attack on the 

reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 based on specific reasons, as opposed to general 

assertions that the State failed to prove its reliability, which is prohibited under Vega. 

See Vega at 189. 

{¶17} We note that, in the present case, Kohr did not raise in his Motion in 

Limine any specific challenges to the Intoxilyzer 8000 test performed. In order to rebut 

the Vega presumption, Kohr must raise specific procedural and substantive challenges, 

but there is no indication that he has done so. Since the only issue raised in the Motion 

in Limine was related to the general reliability of the intoxilyzer results, the trial court 

erred in granting the Motion. 

{¶18} The sole assignment of error is with merit. 

{¶19} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Municipal 

Court, Ravenna Division, granting Kohr’s Motion in Limine, is reversed, and this cause 

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to be taxed 

against appellee. 
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TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., concurs, 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion. 

______________________ 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion. 

{¶20} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) does not mandate admissibility of breath test 

results derived from the Intoxilyzer 8000. Rather, that statute which, by its plain 

language controls the issue in this case, vests the trial court with discretion regarding 

admissibility despite approval from the director. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 

{¶21} R.C. 3701.143 empowers the director to approve breath testing devices, 

and R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) grants trial courts the discretion to admit the results from 

approved devices without further proof of reliability when circumstances warrant. 

Although some claim the contrary, nobody is correct all the time. In recognizing human 

fallibility, the legislature had the wisdom to vest within the trial court the discretion per 

R.C.4511.19(D)(1)(b) to conduct further inquiry when there is an issue as to the 

reliability of an approved breath testing device before admitting the results. 

{¶22} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) states that “[i]n any criminal prosecution or juvenile 

court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent 

offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of 

alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance, 

or a combination of them in the defendant’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma, 

breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by 

chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the 
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alleged violation[,]” and “[t]he bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this 

section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of 

health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to 

section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶23} The statute does not use the word “shall,” which would mandate 

admission regardless of the circumstances. Rather, the statute uses the word “may.” 

For purposes of statutory construction, “use of the word ‘may’ is generally construed to 

make the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary * * *.” 

Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971); State v. Suchevits, 

138 Ohio App.3d 99, 102 (11th Dist. 1999). 

{¶24} In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion not to admit the breath 

test absent proof from the state that the Intoxilyzer 8000 is generally reliable, a decision 

consistent with the discretion it possesses under R.C.4511.19(D)(1)(b). As reliability 

presents a threshold admissibility issue, reliability, as opposed to the weight to be 

afforded any admitted evidence, is one for the trial court. Knott v Revolution Software 

Inc. 181 Ohio App.3d 519, 2009-Ohio-1191, ¶45 (5th Dist.); State v. Riley, 6th Dist. No. 

WD-03-076, 2007-Ohio-879, ¶27 (expert testimony must be deemed reliable before it is 

deemed admissible.); Saad v. Shimano American Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10974, 

*7 (N.D. Ill. 2000)(The Supreme Court has made it clear that the courts must allow into 

evidence only expert testimony that meets certain threshold standards of reliability and 

usefulness). 

{¶25} Moreover, the determination of evidential reliability necessarily implicates 

the defendant’s substantive due process rights. 
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{¶26} “Substantive due process, [although an] ephemeral concept, protects 

specific fundamental rights of individual freedom and liberty from deprivation at the 

hands of arbitrary and capricious government action. The fundamental rights protected 

by substantive due process arise from the Constitution itself and have been defined as 

those rights which are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ (* * *) While this is 

admittedly a somewhat vague definition, it is generally held that an interest in liberty or 

property must be impaired before the protections of substantive due process become 

available.” State v. Small, 162 Ohio App.3d. 375, 2005-Ohio-3813, ¶11 (10th Dist.), 

quoting Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F. 2d. 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1989). 

{¶27} However vague the conceptual parameters of one’s substantive due 

process guarantees may be, the following principle is clear; “[substantive] * * * due 

process is violated by the introduction of seemingly conclusive, but actually unreliable 

evidence.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931, fn. 10 (1983). 

{¶28} The trial court was aware that other courts had deemed the Intoxilyzer 

8000 unreliable even though it was approved. Against this backdrop, the court ordered 

the state to establish the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 before admitting the 

results. Given the constitutional gravity of admitting unreliable results, however, and its 

statutory authority to act as gatekeeper regarding breath test results, the lower court’s 

decision to require the state to produce evidence of the machines reliability was an 

eminently reasonable and sound legal decision. “[A]n abuse of discretion is the trial 

court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. 

Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 

(8 Ed.Rev.2004) 11. 
 10

{¶29} Rather than present evidence of the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 

8000, the state took the position that the trial court could not require it to do so pursuant 

to Vega and its progeny. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185 (1984). I do not read Vega as 

holding that under no circumstances can a trial court exercise its discretion to require 

evidence of general reliability of an approved breath testing device as a condition to 

admissibility. 

{¶30} In Vega, the court held “* * * an accused is not denied his constitutional 

right to present a defense nor is the state relieved of its burden of proving guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt where a trial judge does not permit expert testimony to attack the 

reliability of intoxilyzers in general.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 186. 

{¶31} Threshold admissibility was not at issue in Vega. That is, the defendant 

made no challenge to the trial court’s admission of his breath test result. Instead, after 

the state presented its case and rested, the defendant attempted to present a 

“reliability” defense by attacking intoxilyzers in general. See also State v. Vega, 5th 

Dist. No. CA-1766, 1993 Ohio App LEXIS 14350, *16 (Nov.22, 1983)(Hoffman, J., 

dissenting). Unlike Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, threshold admissibility is the issue in the 

case before us. Moreover, unlike Vega, our case is not about the reliability of 

intoxilyzers in general. Our case is limited to whether the Intoxilyzer 8000 is reliable. In 

short, the circumstances at issue in Vega were fundamentally distinguishable from 

those in our case. 

{¶32} Additionally, the rule in Vega does not contemplate a situation where, as 

here, an approved device’s general reliability has been assessed by other courts for 

both use in and out of this state and the device’s reliability has been found suspect. 
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See State v. Johnson, Portage County Municipal Court, January 6, 2012. Vega

expressly states that its holding does not involve a situation where the defense asserts 

that there was an abuse of discretion by the director in approving the breath testing 

device at issue. Vega at 187, fn. 2. Obviously, in our case, if the Intoxilyzer 8000 is 

unreliable, approval would amount to an abuse of discretion and admission of the test 

results a violation of substantive due process. 

{¶33} Breath tests are “‘* * * generally recognized as being reasonably reliable 

on the issue of intoxication when conducted with proper equipment and by competent 

operators.’” (Emphasis added.) Vega at 186, quoting Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 

Ohio St.2d 121, 128(1968). Thus, the central issue as presented in the case before us, 

does the Intoxilyzer 8000 qualify as “proper equipment”? The answer is “yes” if it is 

generally reliable and “no” if it is not. This is a query, however, that, under Ohio law, a 

trial court is entitled to resolve pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b). 

{¶34} In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion to safeguard the 

defendant’s right to substantive due process by merely requiring the state to show the 

Intoxilyzer 8000 is generally reliable. Under the circumstances, this decision was sound 

and reasonable. This is particularly true in light of the fact that a trial court is vested 

with broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and in recognition that it 

has inherent power to exclude or strike evidence on its own motion. Caroll v Caroll, 7th 

Dist. No. 89-C-1, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1339, *8 (April 5, 1990); Neil v. Hamilton 

County, 87 Ohio App.3d 670; Oakbrook Realty Corp. v. Blout, 48 Ohio App.3d 69, 70 

(10th Dist. 1988). 
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{¶35} Given the foregoing point, there is no reason to remand this case to the 

trial court based upon perceived inadequacies in the motion to suppress. The trial court 

made it abundantly clear that it would not admit the test results absent proof of reliability 

of the Intoxilyzer 8000. Requiring the proponent to establish the reliability of scientific 

evidence is something that a trial court may require as previously discussed. The state 

was well aware of what the trial court required when it ordered the state to produce 

evidence of the Intoxilyzer 8000’s reliability, independent and irrespective of the 

contents of the motion to suppress. Accordingly, there is no procedural due process 

violation of the state’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court’s 

order was unambiguous and an exercise of the sound discretion as the gatekeeper of 

breath test result admissibility. 

{¶36} When an appellate court [**14] is reviewing a pure issue of law, “the mere 

fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough to find error (of 

course, not all errors are reversible. Some are harmless; others are not preserved for 

appellate review). By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to the 

discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached a 

different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” Sertz v. Sertz, 11th Dist. No. 

2011-L-063, quoting Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900 at ¶67. 

{¶37} This appeal is centered around a discretionary decision made by the trial 

court. As I find the court’s decision not only reasonable, but constitutionally astute, I 

would affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the breath test in light of the state’s refusal to 

present evidence on the issue.