In the Matter of: 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

) 

) 

) 

Barclays PLC, Bat'clays Bank PLC 

and Barclays Capital Inc., 

) CFTC Docket No. 12 - 25 

) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

-------------) 

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTIONS 6(c) AND 6(d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, AS 

AMENDED, MAKING FINDINGS AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS 

I. 

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("Commission") has reason to believe that 

Barclays PLC, Bat'clays Bank PLC ("Barclays Bank") and Barclays Capital Inc. ("Barclays 

Capital") (collectively, "Respondents" or "Barclays") have violated Sections 6( c), 6( d) and 

9(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the "Act" or the "CEA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b and 

13(a)(2) (2006). Therefore, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest that 

public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to determine whether 

Respondents engaged in the violations set forth herein, and to determine whether any order shall 

be issued imposing remedial sanctions. 

II. 

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondents have 

submitted an Offer of Settlement ("Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. 

Without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, except to the extent 

Respondents admit those findings in any related action against Barclays by, or any agreement 

with, the Department of Justice or any other governmental agency or office, Respondents herein 

consent to the entry and acknowledge service of this Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to 

Sections 6( c) and 6( d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and 

Imposing Remedial Sanctions ("Order,,).1 

Respondents consent to the entry of this Order and to the use of these findings in this proceeding and 

in any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party; provided, 

however, that Respondents do not consent to the use of the Offer, or the findings or conclusions in this 

Order, as the sole basis for any other proceeding brought by the Commission, other than in a proceeding 

in bankruptcy or to enforce the terms of this Order. Nor do Respondents consent to the use of the Offer or 

this Order, or the findings in this Order consented to in the Offer, by any other party in any other 

proceeding. 
III. 

The Commission finds the following: 

A. Summary 

Over a period of several years, commencing in at least 2005, Barclays PLC, Barclays 

Banle and Barclays Capital, by and through their agents, officers and employees located in at 

least New York, London and Tokyo, repeatedly attempted to manipulate and made false, 

misleading or knowingly inaccurate submissions concerning two global benchmark interest rates, 

the British Banleers' Association's ("BBA") London Interbanle Offered Rate ("LIB OR") and the 

European Banldng Federation's ("EBF") Euro Interbanle Offered Rate ("Euribor"). 

LIBOR and Euribor are leading short-term interest rate benchmarks intended to reflect 

the costs of bOlT owing unsecured funds in certain interbanle markets. LIBOR and Euribor are 

critical to financial markets worldwide. They are used to price a variety of global financial 

products, including U.S.-based swaps transactions and futures contracts, as well as home 

mortgages and commercial and personal consumer loans. According to the Banle for 

International Settlements ("BIS"), over-the-counter interest rate derivatives, such as swaps and 

Forward Rate Agreements ("FRAs"), comprised over $449 trillion in notional value at the end of 

2009, and over $500 trillion in notional value at the end of2011. 

Barclays Banle was, and is, a member of the panel of banles that submits rates for the 

daily calculation and global publication of various currencies of LIB OR and Euribor. The rates 

submitted by panel banles should reflect or relate to the costs of bOlTowing unsecured funds in 

certain interbank markets. 

Barclays' violative conduct involved multiple desks, traders, offices and cUlTencies, 

including United States Dollar ("U.S. Dollar"), Sterling, Euro and Yen. The wrongful conduct 

spanned from at least 2005 through at least 2009, and at times occurred on an almost daily basis. 

Barclays' conduct included the following: 

(1) During the periodfrom at least mid-200S through the fall of2007, and 

sporadically thereafter into 2009, Barclays based its LIBOR submissions for U.S. 

Dollar (and at limited times other currencies) on the requests of Barclays' swaps 

traders, including former Barclays swaps traders, who were attempting to affect 

the official published LIBOR, in order to benefit Barclays' derivatives trading 

positions; those positions included swaps and futures trading positions; this same 

conduct OCCUlTed with respect to Barclays' Euribor submissions for the period of 

at least mid-200S through mid-2009 (see pp. 3 - 4, 7 - 11, 13 - 15, infra); 

(2) During the period from at least mid-200S through at least mid-2008, certain 

Barclays Euro swaps traders, led by a former Barclays senior Euro swaps trader, 

coordinated with, and aided and abetted traders at celiain other banles to influence 

the Euribor submissions of multiple banles, including Barclays, in order to affect 

2 
the official published Euribor, and thereby benefit their respective derivatives 

trading positions (see pp. 3 - 4, 15 - 18, infra); and 

(3) During the volatile, global market conditions of the financial crisis oflate 

August 2007 through early 2009 (the "financial crisis period"), Barclays lowered 

its LIBOR submissions in order to manage what it believed were inaccurate and 

negative public and media perceptions that Barclays had a liquidity problem 

based in part on its high LIBOR submissions relative to the low submissions of 

other panel banks that Barclays believed were too low given market conditions. 

Pursuant to a directive by certain members of Barclays' senior management, 

Barclays submitted lower rates for U.S. Dollar LIB OR, and at limited times Yen 

and Sterling LIB OR, than what it had determined to be the appropriate rates 

reflecting the costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the relevant markets (see pp. 

4, 19 - 25, infra).' 

Barclays' lack of specific internal controls and procedures concerning its submission 

processes for LIBOR and Euribor and overall inadequate supervision of trading desks allowed 

this conduct to occur. 

Specifically, during the period from at least mid-2005 through the fall of2007, and 

sporadically thereafter into 2009, interest rate swaps traders, primarily located in Barclays' New 

York and London offices, regularly requested that the Barclays' employee(s) responsible for 

determining and submitting Barclays' daily LIBORs and Euribors ("submitters") submit a 

particular rate or adjust their submitted rates higher or lower in order to affect the daily, official 

published LIBOR and Euribor. Barclays' swaps traders were improperly attempting to benefit 

Barclays' derivatives trading positions and the profitability of their particular trading books and 

desks. Barclays' swaps traders also facilitated former Barclays swaps traders' requests to alter 

LIBOR or Euribor submissions by passing along the former traders' requests to the Barclays 

LIBOR or Euribor submitters as if they were their own. The Barclays submitters routinely based 

their LIBOR and Em'ibor submissions on the traders' requests in furtherance of the attempts to 

manipulate LIBOR and Euribor. The majority of Barclays' violative conduct involved U.S. 

Dollar LIBOR and Euribor, but also, at limited times, involved Yen and Sterling LIBOR 

submissions. 

In addition, during the period from at least mid-2005 through mid-2008, certain Barclays 

Euro swaps traders, led by a former Barclays senior Euro swaps trader, coordinated with and 

aided and abetted traders at certain other banks in attempts to manipulate Euribor. The Barclays 

swaps traders coordinated with traders at other banks on the rates to be submitted by their 

respective Euribor submitters in order to benefit their banle's derivatives trading positions. These 

Barclays Euro swaps traders agreed to ask, and did ask, the Barclays submitters for rates that 

benefited the trading positions of the traders at the other banles. The Barclays swaps traders 

made these requests as if they were their own requests and were to benefit Barclays' trading 

positions. The submitters routinely accommodated those requests. The Barclays Euro swaps 

traders also made similar requests to the traders at the otherbanles in order to benefit Barclays' 

derivatives trading positions. 

3 
A banle's derivatives trading positions or profitability are not legitimate or permissible 

factors on which to base a banle's daily LIBOR and Euribor submissions. By basing its LIBOR 

and Euribor submissions on Barclays' derivatives traders' requests, and thereby on Barclays' 

derivatives trading positions, Barclays' LIBOR submissions were not consistent with the BBA's 

definitions and criteria for LIBOR submissions. Instead, Barclays conveyed false, misleading or 

knowingly inaccurate reports that its submitted rates for LIBOR and Euribor were based on and 

solely reflected the costs of bon-owing unsecured funds in the relevant interbanle markets. 

Accordingly, Barclays regularly attempted to manipulate and knowingly delivered, or caused to 

be delivered, false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

and Euribor, and at times, Yen and Sterling LIBOR, which are all commodities in interstate 

commerce. 

During the financial crisis period, Barclays believed that the market and media 

inaccurately perceived Barclays as having liquidity problems in part because the rates submitted 

for LIBOR by Barclays were significantly higher at times than the rates submitted by other 

banles. Bat'clays contended the other banks' submissions were inappropriately low given the 

realities ofthe market conditions and lack of transactions occurring in the interbanle markets. To 

manage public perceptions that its higher LIBOR submissions meant Barclays was a weaker 

institution, Barclays' senior management directed the Barclays submitters to lower Bat'clays' 

submissions in order to be closer to the rates submitted by the other banles, and thus, be a less 

noticeable outlier from the rest of the banles. The Barclays submitters complied with the 

management directive by submitting artificially lower rates than they would have otherwise 

submitted and that were inconsistent with the definition and criteria for submitting LIBOR. As a 

result, Barclays did not submit rates reflecting or relating to borrowing of unsecured funds in the 

relevant interbank markets. 

The management directive impacted at least Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions in 

multiple maturities ("tenors") on a regular basis throughout the financial crisis period. The 

directive, on occasion, also impacted Barclays' Sterling and Yen LIB OR submissions. Concerns 

for one's reputation or negative market or press reports are not legitimate or permissible factors 

upon which a banle may base its daily LIBOR submissions. Accordingly, during the financial 

crisis period, Barclays, through its submissions, knowingly delivered, or caused to be delivered, 

false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports that affected or tended to affect LIBOR, a 

commodity in interstate commerce? 

*** 

In accepting Barclays' Offer, the Commission recognizes Respondents' significant 

cooperation during the Division of Enforcement's investigation of this matter, which included 

providing important information and analysis to the Division that helped the Division efficiently 

and effectively undeliake its investigation. 

2 While Barclays typically was one of the highest submitters of the LIBOR panel banks during the 

financial crisis period, Barclays' submissions, at times, were part ofthe calculation of the official 

published LIBOR. However, the Commission has not found evidence that Barclays lowered its LIBOR 

submissions in response to the management directive during the financial crisis period with the intent to 

affect the official published LIBOR. 

4 
B. Respondents 

Barclays PLC is a British banking and financial services company headquartered in the 

United Kingdom ("U.K."). It has operations in over 50 countries and territories including the 

United States. 

Barclays Bank PLC is a global banking and financial services company based in the 

U.K. that is engaged in retail and commercial banking, credit cards, investment banking, wealth 

management and investment management services. It is wholly owned by Barclays PLC, and 

has offices in N ew York, New York. 

Barclays Capital Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Barclays PLC and engages in 

investment banking, wealth management and investment management services. It has been 

registered with the Commission as a Futures Commission Merchant since 1990, an approved 

Exempt Foreign Agent since 1992, and a Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity Trading 

Advisor since 2009. It maintains a business address and an active trading office in New York, 

New York. 

C. Facts 

1. Barclays. Through the Acts of its Swaps Traders and Submitters. Made False 

LIBOR Reports and Attempted to Manipulate LIBOR 

a. LIBOR and the BBA Fixing of LIB OR 

The BBA is a U.K. trade association for the u.K. banking and financial services sector 

and is comprised of member banks. The BBA is not regulated. The BBA defines the term 

LIBOR and the criteria a panel bank is required to use in making its submissions, selects the 

banks for the LIBOR panels for each currency, and oversees the process of LIB OR submissions 

and publication of LIB OR. The BBA also enters into licensing agreements with third parties, 

including parties in the U.S., to allow dissemination of the LIBOR data. Thomson Reuters is the 

BBA's agent for the collection, calculation and publication of the daily LIBORs. 

The BBA represents that LIBOR is intended to be a barometer to measure strain in 

money markets, that it often is a gauge of the market's expectation of future central banle interest 

rates, and that approximately $350 trillion of notional swaps and $10 trillion of loans are indexed 

to LIBOR. LIBOR also is the basis for settlement of interest rate futures and options contracts 

on many of the world's major futures and options exchanges, including the three-month and onemonth Eurodollar contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME"). Measured by the 

notional value of open interest, the CME Eurodollar contract is the most liquid and largest 

notional futures contract traded on the CME and in the world. The total traded volume of the 

CME Eurodollar contract had a notional value of over $437 trillion in 2009 and $564 trillion in 

2011. It settles based on the three-month U.S. Dollar LIB OR published on the Monday before 

5 
the last trading day of the contract month? Moreover, LIBOR is fundamentally critical to 

financial markets and has an enormously widespread impact on global markets and consumers. 

LIBOR also affects businesses seeking credit, consumers obtaining mortgages or personal loans, 

and market participants transacting in numerous other financial contracts in the U.S. and abroad 

that are based on the benchmark interest rates. 

Daily LIBORs are issued for ten currencies with fifteen tenors ranging from ovemight 

through twelve months. According to the BBA, LIB OR "is based on offered inter-bank deposit 

rates contributed in accordance with the Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor banks." The BBA 

requires that "[a]n individual BBA LIB OR Contributor Panel Banle will contribute the rate at which 

it could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in 

reasonable market size just prior to [11 :00 a.m. London time] .,,4 By its definition, LIBOR requires 

the submitting panel banks to determine the rates at which they can obtain funds in the London 

interbank market. The definition of LIB OR does not permit consideration of factors unrelated to the 

costs ofbOlTOwing unsecured funds. 

Every business day shortly before 11 :00 a.m. London time, the banks on the LIB OR 

panels submit their rates to Thomson Reuters. On behalf of the BBA, Thomson Reuters 

compiles a day's LIBOR for each currency and tenor by excluding the top and bottom quartile of 

rates and averaging the remaining eight rates. That average rate becomes the official BBA daily 

LIBOR (the "LIBOR fixing"). The BBA then makes public the daily LIB OR fixing for each 

currency and tenor, as well as the daily submissions of each panel banle, through Thomson 

Reuters and the other data vendors licensed by the BBA. This information is made available and 

relied upon throughout the world, including in the United States. 

b. Barclays' Money Market Desk and its LIBOR Submission Process 

Bat'clays Banle is a member of the BBA and is one of the panel banles that submit rates for 

the determination of LIB OR for U.S. Dollar, Sterling, Euro, Yen and other currencies.s During 

the times relevant herein, a Bat'clays Banle employee sat on the Steering Committee and Foreign 

Currency and Money Market ("FX & MM") Committee of the BBA. The FX & MM Committee 

has responsibility for the operations and management of LIB OR. The Steering Committee was 

responsible for the annual review of the LIBOR definition and of the contributors to the BBA 

LIBOR panels to determine whether they were still appropriate to remain on the panels. 

The CME has a licensing agreement with the BBA that "permits the [CME] to use BBA LIBOR as 

the basis for settling Three-Month Eurodollar futures contracts and to refer to BBA LIBOR in connection 

with creating, marketing, trading, clearing, settling and promoting Three-Month Eurodollar futures 

contracts." CME Rulebook, Chapter 452, Three-Month Eurodollar Futures. The CME also has the same 

licensing agreement to use BBA LIBOR as the basis for settling CME one-month Eurodollar contracts. 

4 This definition of LIB OR has been used by the BBA from 1998 to the present. In June 2008, in the 

wake of press questioning the underpinnings of LIB OR, the BBA provided additional information 

concerning the definition that it said provided more guidance. 

5 Barclays Bank also was, and is, on the panels for making LIBOR submissions for Swiss franc, 

Canadian dollar, Australian dollar, Swedish krona and Danish krone. 

6 
Barclays Bank makes its daily submissions through Barclays' London Non-Sterling 

Liquidity Management Desk (the "London Money Market Desk"). The primary responsibility of 

the London Money Market Desk, and the LIBOR submitters on the desk, is to manage Barclays' 

liquidity position and ensure that Bat'clays is fully funded each day in all currencies, including 

u.s. Dollar.6 Until approximately the end of2008, the London Money Market Desk maintained 

its own trading book with profit and loss targets. 

Throughout the periods relevant herein, Barclays regarded its senior and primary U.S. 

Dollar LIBOR submitter as the expert on the U.S. Dollar money markets. This submitter had 

over 25 years of experience in the U.S. Dollar money markets and had been a long-standing 

employee of Barclays. He had been determining Barclays' daily U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submissions since 1995.7 Another money market trader assisted the senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submitter, and at times determined Bat'clays' U.S. Dollar LIB OR submissions. 

Bat'clays' U.S. Dollar LIB OR submitters were the persons best situated to understand 

Barclays' ability to borrow funds in the London interbank market, and therefore to determine the 

appropriate U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions to make on behalf of Barclays. 

Bat'clays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters based their daily submissions on certain market 

information, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) cash transactions that had taken 

place in the London U.S. Dollar money market and Bat'clays' ability to obtain funds in 

reasonable size at those rates; (2) market information obtained from London interdealer brokers, 

i.e., voice brokers, overnight financial news, and/or internal Barclays research documents; (3) 

central banks' decisions with respect to interest rates; (4) prior LIBOR submissions by Bat'clays 

and other panel banks; and (5) expectations of Federal Open Market Committee decisions 

regarding interest rates. After considering these factors, the Barclays U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submitters determined a rate figure for each tenor and entered it into a spreadsheet for 

submission. 

Bat'clays did not have specific internal controls or procedures, written or otherwise, 

regarding how LIBOR submissions should be determined or monitored. Bat'clays also did not 

require documentation of the submitters' LIBOR determinations. 

c. Barclays Attempted to Manipulate LIBOR to Benefit Derivatives Trading 

Positions 

From at least mid-2005 through the fall of2007, and sporadically thereafter into 2009, 

Barclays, through the acts of its swaps traders and submitters, attempted to manipulate U.S. 

6 Because most of the LIBOR conduct at issue involves Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions, the 

factual findings focus on U.S. Dollar LIBOR. As noted, however, the Commission finds violative 

conduct at limited times with respect to Barclays ' Yen and Sterling LIBOR submissions. 

7 Bat'clays' senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter also had oversight responsibility for the submission of 

Barclays' Yen LIBOR which was handled daily by other submitters. 

7 
Dollar LIBOR, and on occasion, Yen and Sterling LIBORs, for certain tenors. Barclays' attempts 

to manipulate u.s. Dollar LIBOR occurred at times on a daily basis. 

Multiple interest rate swaps traders located in Bat'Clays' New York, London and Tokyo 

offices asked Bat'clays' LIBOR submitters to make certain LIBOR submissions in order to affect 

the official BBA LIBOR fixings for celiain tenors, thereby benefitting their respective 

derivatives trading positions and either increasing their profits or minimizing their losses. 8 The 

vast majority of these requests came from traders on Barclays' New York Interest Rate Swaps 

Desk ("NY Swaps Desk") located in New York and London and involved U.S. Dollar LIBOR.9 

The NY Swaps Desk trades in a variety of products, including interest rate swaps, 10 

FRAs, Treasury bonds, and Treasury futures, as well as the CME one-month and three-month 

Eurodollar futures and options contracts. The interest rate swaps traded by the NY Swaps Desk 

were generally tied to various tenors of U.S. Dollar LIBOR. Barclays acted as counterparty to 

clients in many interest rate swaps transactions. The derivatives instruments traded by the NY 

Swaps Desk were used to hedge the desk's interest rate risk and also to generate a profit for the 

desk. 

Senior traders on the NY Swaps Desk instructed several other swaps traders to make the 

requests of the LIB OR submitters on Barclays' London Money Market Desk for certain LIBOR 

submissions in order to move their LIBOR submissions in a direction to benefit the desk's 

derivatives trading positions. 11 The traders' conduct was common and pervasive, and known by 

other traders and trading desk managers located near the interest rate swaps desk, both in New 

York and London. None of the traders attempted to conceal the requests from supervisors at 

Barclays during the entire period that the activity occurred. In fact, on occasion, the traders 

discussed their requests with trading desk managers. 

The swaps traders made the requests in person, via email, and through electronic "chats" 

over an instant messaging system. On a few occasions, some swaps traders even made entries in 

electronic calendars to remind themselves what requests to make of Barclays' LIBOR submitters 

the next day. For a time, a trader sitting in London facilitated many of the requests on behalf of 

the New York swaps traders by forwarding the requests in person or by email to the submitters. 

8 Prior to the financial crisis period, LIBOR generally was a stable rate with minute fluctuations. In 

addition, the range among the panel banks submissions was narrow, and panel banks frequently submitted 

the same rates. 

9 There were several requests to alter Yen LIBOR from swaps traders in Barclays' Tokyo office and at 

least one request to alter Sterling LIBOR from a Barclays trader in Barclays' Singapore office. 

10 An interest rate swap generally exchanges a fixed payment for a floating payment, wherein one party to a 

swap would pay a fixed rate and the other party to the swap would pay a floating rate, which is generally 

tied to three-month LIBOR. 

11 Almost all of the traders involved in this conduct are no longer employed at Barclays. 

8 
The swaps traders expected that the LIBOR submitters would take their requests into account 

when detelmining their LIB OR submissions. 12 

Additionally, certain Barclays swaps traders received external requests to alter Barclays' 

U.S. Dollar LIB OR submissions from former Barclays swaps traders who had left Barclays and 

now were employed by other financial institutions. These former Barclays employees made the 

requests to benefit their derivatives trading positions, and expected that not only would these 

requests be forwarded to the LIBOR submitters, but that Bat'clays' LIBOR submitters would take 

their requests into account when making their LIB OR submissions. These requests were made 

typically by email or by instant message. 

The swaps traders' requests, whether internal or external, typically concerned the onemonth and three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions. The traders' requests also included 

either a specific rate to be submitted or the direction, higher or lower, that they wanted Barclays' 

LIBOR submission to move. Sometimes, the traders asked the submitters to try to have Barclays 

excluded ("kicked out" or "knocked out") from the LIBOR calculation by being in the top or 

bottom quartile, in an attempt to influence the official LIBOR fixing. Sometimes the requests 

covered several days or even weeks of submissions at a time. 

The following are just some examples of the numerous trader requests over the years in 

question: 

1) "WE HAVE TO GET KICKED OUT OF THE FIXINGS TOMORROW!! We need a 

4.17 fix in 1m (low fix) We need a 4.41 fix in 3m (high fix)" (November 22, 2005, 

Senior Trader in New York to Trader in London); 

2) "You need to take a close look at the reset ladder. We need 3M to stay low for the 

next 3 sets and then I think that we will be completely out of our 3M position. Then 

its on. [Submitter] has to go crazy with raising 3M Libor." (February 1,2006, Trader 

in New York to Trader in London); 

3) "Your annoying colleague again ... Would love to get a high 1m Also if poss a low 3m 

... ifposs ... thanks" (February 3, 2006, Trader in London to Submitter); 

4) "This is the [book's] risk. We need low 1M and 3M libor. PIs ask [submitter] to get 

1M set to 82. That would help a lot" (March 27,2006, Trader in New York to Trader 

in London); 

5) "We have another big fixing tom[orrow] and with the market move I was hoping we 

could set the 1M and 3M Libors as high as possible" (May 31, 2006, Trader in New 

York to Submitter); 

12 Appropriate daily supervision of the desk by the supervisors, as well as periodic review of the 

communications, should have discovered the conduct. However, Barclays lacked specific internal 

controls and procedures that would have enabled Barclays' management or compliance to discover this 

conduct. 

9 
6) "Hi Guys, We got a big position in 3m libor for the next 3 days. Can we please keep 

the lib or fixing at 5.39 for the next few days. It would really help. We do not want it 

to fix any higher than that. Tks a lot." (September 13, 2006, Senior Trader in New 

York to Submitter); 

7) "For Monday we are very long 3m cash here in NY and would like the setting to be 

set as low as possible ... thanks" ( December 14, 2006, Trader in New York to 

Submitter); and 

8) "PIs. go for 5.36 Libor again tomorrow, very long and would be hurt by a higher 

setting ... thanks." (May 23, 2007, Trader in New York to Submitter). 

The LIBOR submitters regularly considered the swaps traders' requests when 

determining and making Bm'clays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions. To accommodate the swaps 

traders, the submitters moved Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions by one or more basis 

points in the direction requested by swaps traders, or submitted a specific rate depending on the 

particulars of the swaps traders' requests. 

The submitters frequently responded affirmatively to the traders that they would 

accommodate the requests, often by saying "sure," "will do my best," or similar wording. In 

addition, the submitters in a couple of instances made entries in their own electronic calendars to 

remind themselves what rate to submit in order to accommodate a request made by swaps traders 

the previous day. Examples of the many instances where the submitters agreed to make the false 

submissions and attempted to manipulate the rate are: 

1) "Am going 13. think market will go 12-12 ~." (November 14,2005, Submitter's 

response to a swaps trader request for a very high one-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submission, preferably a submission of "13+"); 

2) "[Senior Trader] owes me!" (February 7, 2006, Submitter's response when swaps 

trader called him a "superstar" for moving Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submission 

up a basis point more than the submitter wanted and for making a submission with the 

intent to get "kicked out"); 

3) "Going 58 [in 1 month] and 73 [in 3 month] and fully expecting to be knocked out." 

(February 8, 2006, Submitter's response to a swaps trader request for high one-month 

and three-month LIBOR submissions); 

4) "For you ... anything. I am going to go 78 and 92.5. It is difficult to go lower than 

that in threes. looking at where cash is trading. In fact, if you did not want a low one 

I would have gone 93 at least." (March 16, 2006, Submitter's response to swaps 

trader's request for a high one-month and low three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR); 

5) "Always happy to help, leave it with me, Sir." (March 20,2006, Submitter's response 

to a request); 

6) "Done ... for you big boy ... " (April 7, 2006, Submitter's response to swaps trader 

requests for low one-month and three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR); and 

10 
7) "Set it at 5.345 against a consensus of 34."(March 5, 2007, Submitter's response to 

swaps trader request for high three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR). 

Barclays' submitters knew it was improper to consider swaps traders' derivatives trading 

positions in determining the bank's LIBOR submissions. A bank's financial derivatives trading 

positions are not legitimate or permissible factors on which to base a bank's daily LIBOR 

submissions. By basing its U.S. Dollar LIB OR submissions on Barclays' derivatives traders' 

requests, and thereby on Barclays' derivatives trading positions, Barclays' LIB OR submissions 

were not consistent with the BBA's definitions and criteria for LIBOR submissions. Instead, 

Barclays conveyed false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports that its submitted rates for 

LIBOR were based on and solely reflected its costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the London 

interbank money market. Accordingly, Barclays regularly attempted to manipulate and 

knowingly delivered false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate repOlis concerning U.S. Dollar 

LIBOR, and at times, Yen and Sterling LIB OR, which are all commodities in interstate 

commerce. 13 

2. Barclays Attempted to Manipulate Euribor, Made False Euribor Reports and 

Coordinated with Other Banks in its Attempts to Manipulate Euribor 

Barclays, through its swaps traders and submitters, also attempted to manipulate Euribor 

through internal requests by traders, which were accommodated by Barclays' submitters. The 

Euro swaps traders' at times coordinated their requests with swaps traders at certain other banks. 

The requests were made in order to benefit Barclays' derivatives trading positions and the 

derivatives trading positions of the other individual institutions involved. 

a. Euribor and the EBF Fixing of Euribor 

The EBF is an unregulated non-profit association of the European banking sector based 

in Brussels, Belgium. Among other functions, the EBF oversees the publication of Euribor, the 

predominant money market reference interest rate for the Euro currency. Euribor is used 

internationally in derivatives contracts, including interest rate swaps and futures contracts. 14 

According to the BIS, over-the-counter interest rate derivatives, such as swaps and FRAs, 

comprised contracts worth over $175 trillion in notional value referenced to Euro rates at the end 

of2009, and over $220 trillion in notional value at the end of2011. 

Euribor is defined as the rate "at which Euro interbank term deposits are offered by one 

prime bank to another prime bank" within the Economic and Monetary Union of the European 

Union ("EMU") at 11 :00 a.m. Central European Time ("CET") daily. Euribor is determined 

using submissions from a panel of over 40 mostly European banks considered to be the most 

active in the Euro zone with the highest volume of business in the EMU. According to the EBF 

instructions, panel banks "must quote the required euro rates to the best of their knowledge." 

13 As previously noted, there were some similar requests in this same period that the submitters make 

celiain submissions involving Yen and Sterling LIBOR. 

14 In October 2011, the CME launched the Euribor Futures contract, which settles based on the threemonth Euribor. 

11 
The panel banks are to observe the market and base their submissions on where the Euro is 

trading in that market. By its definition, Euribor requires the submitting panel banks to determine 

the rates at which funds may be obtained in the Euro interbank money market. The definition of 

Euribor does not permit consideration of factors unrelated to the costs ofbOlTOwing unsecured 

funds. Euribor is fixed every business day for fifteen tenors, ranging from one week to twelve 

months. 

Like the BBA panel banks, the Euribor panel banks submit their rates electronically to 

Thomson Reuters, which manages the official Euribor process by collecting the submitted rates 

from the contributing banks, calculating the rate, and then releasing it for publication just before 

noon CET. Thomson Reuters computes that day's published Euribor by eliminating the highest 

and lowest fifteen percent of submissions collected, and averaging the remaining submissions. 

That average rate becomes the official daily EBF Euribor (the "Euribor fixing"). On behalf of 

EBF, Thomson Reuters then issues the Euribor fixing and the submissions of each panel bank to 

its subscribers and other data vendors. Through these licensing agreements with third parties, 

such as Thomson Reuters, EBF disseminates the information throughout the world, including in 

the United States. 

b. Barclays' Money Market Desk and its Euribor Submission Process 

Barclays' London Money Market Desk was also responsible for Barclays Banle's daily 

Euribor submissions. Throughout the periods relevant herein, Barclays regarded its primary and 

senior Euribor submitter as the expert on the Euro money markets. Barclays' senior Euribor 

submitter had over 20 years of experience in the London money markets and had been with 

Barclays for over 35 years. He had been determining Barclays' daily Euribor submissions since 

1999. Two other money market traders assisted the senior Euribor submitter and also 

determined Barclays' Euribor submissions. 

Barclays' Euribor submitters were the persons best situated to understand Bat'clays' 

ability to bOlTOW unsecured funds in the Euro interbanle market, and therefore, to determine the 

costs, real and perceived, of bOlT owing unsecured funds and the appropriate Euribor submissions 

to make on behalf of Barclays Banle 

In determining their daily Euribor submission, Barclays' Euribor submitters considered 

Bat'Clays' Euro transactions in the various tenors applicable to Em'ibor and information received 

from market intermediaries, such as voice brokers, indicating the prices at which the Euro was 

trading. Bat'clays' Euribor submitters made their submission to Thomson Reuters shortly before 

11:00 a.m. CET. 

Barclays did not have specific internal controls or procedures, written or otherwise, 

regarding how Euribor submissions should be determined or monitored. Barclays also did not 

require documentation of the submitters' Euribor determinations. 

12 
c. Barclays Swaps Traders Requested Certain Euribor Submissions to Benefit 

Derivatives Trading Positions 

During the period from at least mid-2005 through mid-2009, Euro interest rate swaps 

traders located in Barclays' London office made requests to Barclays' Euribor submitters for 

higher or lower Euribor submissions with the purpose of affecting the official Euribor fixing. IS 

Certain of these traders, in particular one former senior Euro swaps trader, also regularly 

contacted or were contacted by traders at certain other banks on the EBF Euribor panel to 

coordinate the rates each trader would request of their own respective submitters. In making 

these requests, the traders attempted to manipulate the official EBF Euribor fixings for various 

tenors in order to benefit the traders' Euro derivatives trading positions and thereby increase 

Barclays' profits or minimize its losses. 

Bat'clays' Euro interest rate swaps desk was primarily responsible for trading Eurodenominated interest rate swaps. The desk also traded EONIA16-based swaps, Euro-based 

FRAs, and Euro-based futures and options. The traders held Euro-based interest rate swaps 

positions generally tied to various tenors of the EBF Euribor. The traders hedged those positions 

with other derivatives instruments. Just as the NY Swaps Desk benefitted from movements in 

the LIB OR fixing, the traders' derivatives positions benefited ifthe official EBF Euribor fixing 

moved in a certain direction depending on the characteristics of particular transactions. The 

traders' derivatives positions were most affected by the Euribor fixing in the one-month, threemonth, and six-month tenors. These were the tenors in which the traders most frequently 

requested a high or low submission by the Euribor submitters. 

i. Improper Communications Between Barclays' Traders and Barclays' 

Submitters 

Just as the NY Swaps Desk openly discussed requests to LIBOR submitters, Barclays' 

Euro swaps traders' requests to Barclays' Euribor submitters to change their submissions to 

benefit the traders' derivatives trading positions were an open, common and pervasive practice 

on the desk. Multiple traders engaged in this conduct, and no attempt was made by any of the 

traders to conceal the requests from sUfervisors at Barclays during the more than four-year 

period in which the activity occUlTed. 1 In fact, traders would often shout across the trading desk 

to fellow traders to confirm there were no conflicting requests before they sent their requests to 

the Euribor submitters, and, on occasion, the traders discussed their requests with trading desk 

managers. 

15 The Buro swaps traders and Buribor submitters are different individuals than the u.s. Dollar swaps 

traders and LIBOR submitters discussed above. 

16 BONIA, 01' the Buro OverNight Index Average, is BBF's overnight reference rate for the Buro. It is a 

weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken by panel banks in the Buro 

interbank market. 

17 Appropriate daily supervision of the desk by the supervisors as well as periodic review of the 

communications should have discovered the conduct. However, Barclays lacked specific internal controls 

and procedures that would have enabled Barclays' management or compliance to discover this conduct. 

13 
After determining how moves in EBF Euribor would affect the desk's profitability, 

Barclays' Euro swaps traders contacted the Euribor submitters, including via email and through 

electronic "chats" over an instant messaging system, to request that the submissions be moved 

either higher or lower in a particular tenor. On a few occasions, one swaps trader made entries in 

electronic calendars to remind himself what requests to make of Barclays' Euribor submitters the 

next day. 

Barclays' Euribor submitters accommodated the requests, frequently expressly 

responding in the affirmative to the traders' requests. The Euro swaps traders expected that the 

Euribor submitters would take their requests into account when determining their Euribor 

submissions. 

Additionally, one former Barclays' senior Euro swaps trader on occasion sent requests to 

alter Barclays' Euribor submissions to his former fellow traders after he had left Barclays and 

was employed by other financial institutions. He made the requests to benefit his derivatives 

trading positions. These requests were made at a minimum by email or by instant message. 

The following are just some of the numerous examples of the communications between 

the traders and submitters: 

1) June 1,2006: 

o Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "Hi [Euribor Submitter], is it too late to ask for a low 

3m?" 

o Euribor Submitter: "Just about to put them in ..... so no." 

2) September 7, 2006: 

o Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "i have a huge 1m fixing today and it would really 

help to have a low 1m tx a lot." 

o Euribor Submitter: "I'll do my best." 

o Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "because I am aware some other banle need a very 

high one ... .if you could push it very low it would help. I have 50bn fixing." 

3) October 13, 2006: 

o Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "I have a huge fixing on Monday ... something 

like 30bn 1m fixing ... and I would like it to be very very very high ..... Can 

you do something to help? I know a big clearer will be against us ... and don't 

want to lose money on that one." 

o Euribor Submitter forwarded the request to another Euribor submitter, 

advising: "We always try and do our best to help out. .... " 

14 
o Senior Euribor Submitter to Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "By the way [Euribor 

Submitter] tells me that it would be good to see a high lmth fix on Monday, 

we will pay for some cash that morning so hopefully that will help." 

4) January 12,2007: 

o Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "hi [Euribor Submitter]. we need a low 1m in the 

coming days if u can .... " 

o Senior Euribor Submitter: "hi [Senior Euro Swaps Trader], we will keep the 

1mth low for a few days." 

5) April 2, 2007: 

o Euro Swaps Trader: "hello [Senior Euribor Submitter], could you please put in a 

high 6 month euribor today?" 

o Senior Euribor Submitter: "will do." 

6) July 29,2008: 

o Euro Swaps Trader to Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "I was discussing the strategy 

[to get a high fixing] with [Senior Euribor Submitter] earlier this morning - today 

he will stay bid in the mkt and put a high fixing but without lifting any offer, and 

then he will be really paying up for cash tomorrow and Thursday which is when 

the big positive resets are." 

ii. Barclays' Coordination and Communications with Certain Other 

Banks to Attempt to Manipulate Euribor 

During the period from at least mid-2005 through mid-2008, celiain Barclays Euro swaps 

traders, led by the same former Barclays' senior Euro swaps trader, coordinated with traders at 

celiain other panel banks to have their respective Euribor submitters make certain Euribor 

submissions in order to affect the official EBF Euribor fixing. These requests to and among the 

traders were made to benefit the traders' respective derivatives trading positions and either 

maximize their profits or minimize their losses. 

The former Barclays senior Euro swaps trader, while still employed by Barclays, spoke 

daily with traders at certain panel banks concerning their respective derivatives positions in order 

to determine how to change the official EBF Euribor fixing in a manner that benefitted their 

derivatives positions.I8 In these conversations, the traders agreed to contact their respective 

Euribor submitters to request the agreed-upon Euribor submission. The Barclays senior Euro 

swaps trader also received at times requests for certain Euribor submissions from traders at the 

other banks, which he then made of the Barclays Euribor submitters as if the requests were his 

18 When he was out of the office, the Bat'clays senior Euro swaps trader directed other traders on the 

desk to contact the traders at the other banks on his behalf. 

15 
own, at times blind carbon copying the external trader on his emails to Barclays' Euribor 

submitters. By such conduct, the Barclays Euro Traders were attempting to manipulate Euribor 

and aiding and abetting the attempts to manipulate Euribor by other banks. 

The following are examples of the communications among the Barclays Senior Eul'O 

Trader, Barclays' Euribor submitters and traders at other banks: 

1) August 14, 2006: 

o Trader at Bank A asked Barclays' Senior Eul'O Swaps Trader to request a low 

one month and high three month and six month Euribor. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader agreed to do so and promised to contact 

the trader at Banle B to make the same request. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader emailed the Barclays Senior Euribor 

Submitter: "We have some big fixings today. Is it possible to have a very low 

1m and high 3m and 6m? Thx a lot for your help." 

o Barclays' Senior Euribor Submitter responded: "Sure, will do." 

2) November 10,2006: 

o Trader at Banle A asked Barclays' Senior Eul'O Swaps Trader to request a low 

one month Euribor setting at Barclays and at Banle B. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader made the request ofthe trader at Banle B. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader emailed the request to the Barclays Senior 

, Euribor Submitter: "hi [Senior Euribor Submitter]. I know you can help. On 

Monday we have a huge fixing on the 1m and we would like it to be low if 

possible. Tx for your kind help." 

o Barclays' Senior Euribor Submitter replied: "of course we will put in a low 

fixing." 

3) November 13, 2006: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader discussed the need for low one month 

Euribor with traders at Banle A and Banle B, and contacted a trader at Banle C. 

o Barclays' Senior Eul'O Swaps Trader then reminded Barclays' Senior Euribor 

Submitter of his request from Friday: "hi [Senior Euribor Submitter]. Sorry to 

be a pain but just to remind you the impOliance of a low fixing for us today." 

o Barclays' Senior Euribor Submitter replied: "no problem, I had not forgotton. 

The [voice] brokers are going for 3.372, we will put in 36 for our 

contribution; " 

16 
o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader's responded: "I love you." 

4) December 5, 2006: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader requested that traders at Banks A, Band 

C have their Euribor submitters make a high six month Euribor submission. 

o When the trader at Bank C stated that he needed the same submission, 

Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader agreed to make the request of the 

Barclays Euribor submitters. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader emailed the Barclays Senior Euribor 

Submitter: "hi [Senior Euribor Submitter] is it possible to have a high 6m 

ficxing [sic]? Where do you think it will fix?" 

o Barclays' Senior Euribor Submitter responded: "Hi [Senior Euro Swaps 

Trader]. we have posted 3.73, hope that helps .. can put in higher if you like?" 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader replied: "that's fine tx a lot for your 

help." 

5) February 12, 2007: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader agreed with traders at Banks A and B to 

have their respective one month Euribor submissions lowered. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader submitted that request to the Barclays 

Senior Em'ibor Submitter, stating: "hi [Senior Euribor Submitter]. Is it possible 

to have a low 1m fix today?" 

o Barclays' Senior Euribor Submitter replied: "will do." 

In one instance of coordination over a four-month period, the Barclays senior Euro swaps 

trader orchestrated an effort to align trading strategies among traders at multiple banks with the 

goal of influencing the official EBF three-month Euribor fixing on the International Monetary 

Market ("IMM") date 19 of March 19,2007, in order to profit from their futures trading positions. 

This scheme began at least in December 2006 and continued until the March 2007 IMM date. It 

involved multiple and successive requests over this period of time by the Barclays senior Euro 

swaps trader to Barclays' Euribor submitters and traders at other banks to lower the three-month 

Euribor submission on dates leading up to and including the March 2007 IMM date. The 

following are examples of the communications involved in this scheme: 

19 IMM dates are standard quarterly settlement dates in March, June, September and December. Many 

derivatives contracts are settled or reset on these dates, including various Euribor futures contracts. 

17 
1) December 27, 2006: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader: "Hi [Barclays Euro Swaps Trader]. A few 

things. Ask for a low 3m today and ask [trader at Banle B] and [trader at Bank A] 

to put it low as well." 

o Two days later, Barclays' Euro Swaps Trader emailed the Euribor requests as 

instructed to the Barclays Euribor Submitters and the traders at the other banks. 

2) February 12, 2007: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader bragged to a trader at Banle D that he was 

going to "push the cash to the basement" on the next IMM March date in 

order to make money on trades, claiming that he will have 80,000 lots in the 

Euribor futures contract on it. He swore the trader at Banle D to secrecy, 

claiming that if they did not keep the plan secret it would not work. Barclays' 

Senior Euro Swaps Trader also claimed that his "treasury [or Euribor 

Submitter] has the power to move 3m cash to the basement." 

3) March 19, 2007: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader emailed the Barclays Euribor submitter: 

"As discussed could ... put the 3m as low as possible .... " 

o The Barclays Euribor Submitter replied: "Will do my best." 

4) March 20,2007: 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader stated to trader at Banle A that they 

needed to have the three month Euribor fixing go up slowly to avoid drawing 

any attention. 

o Barclays' Senior Euro Swaps Trader told the trader at Banle A that he believed 

he was able to influence five other panel member banles the day before to 

lower their Euribor submissions as they both desired. 

Barclays' Euribor submitters knew it was improper to consider swaps traders' derivatives 

trading positions in determining the banle's Euribor submissions. A banle's financial derivatives 

trading positions are not legitimate or permissible factors on which to base a banle's daily 

Euribor submissions. By basing its Euribor submissions upon Barclays' derivatives traders' 

requests, and thereby on Barclays' derivatives trading positions, Barclays' Euribor submissions 

were not consistent with the EBF's definitions and criteria for Euribor submissions. Instead, 

Barclays conveyed false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports that its submitted rates for 

Euribor were based on and solely reflected the costs of b011'0wing unsecured funds in the Euro 

money market. Accordingly, Barclays regularly attempted to manipulate and knowingly 

delivered false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning Euribor, a commodity in 

interstate commerce. 

18 
3. During the Financial Crisis. Barclays Senior Management Directed that LIBOR 

Submissions Be Lowered 

During the financial crisis period, Barclays directed its U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters to 

lower their daily U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions in order to protect Barclays' reputation against 

what it believed were negative and unfair media and market perceptions that Barclays had a 

liquidity problem based in part on its high LIBOR submissions?O 

Beginning in August 2007, market conditions began to deteriorate significantly. At times 

during the financial crisis period, there was severe illiquidity in the London interbank money 

market, resulting in no interbank lending in celiain tenors. Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submitters continued to utilize the same factors, as described above, for determining LIBOR 

submissions, but had substantially fewer transactions and offers to consider which made 

determining Barclays' submissions more difficult. Prior to the financial crisis period, Barclays' 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters considered "reasonable size" for a transaction by Barclays in the 

London U.S. Dollar money markets to be $250-$500 million. During the financial crisis period, 

a reasonable sized transaction was significantly lower. 

However, the LIBOR panel banle submitters were still required to adhere to the LIBOR 

definition and criteria and submit rates based on their evaluation of the costs of borrowing 

unsecured funds in the London interbanle market. 

In late August 2007, Barclays' senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter began emailing 

liquidity repOlis within Barc1ays, commenting about the money markets and other banles. 

Initially, in these market reports, the senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter expressed his belief 

that in setting Barclays' submission higher relative to others, he was setting correctly and that a 

number ofbanles were submitting rates that were "unrealistically low," particularly in a market 

environment where banks were reluctant to lend money for longer than a one-month period. The 

senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter often acknowledged in these reports that his own U.S. 

Dollar LIBOR submissions were not accurate, and were lower than where he thought the cost of 

borrowing unsecured funds was for Barclays. He recognized, at times, that ifhe were to submit 

higher, accurate LIBORs, then the market or press would report that Barclays was experiencing 

difficulty in funding itself. 

On September 3, 2007, Bloomberg featured Barclays in a news article entitled "Barclays 

Takes a Money-Market Beating." The atiicle speculated that Barclays may have been having 

liquidity problems, because on two occasions Barcla(,s had to borrow Sterling from the 

emergency lending facility of the Banle of England,2 and because of Barclays' relatively high 

LIBOR submissions in Sterling, Euro and U.S. Dollar. The atiicle posed the question, "So what 

the hell is happening at Barclays and its Barclays Capital securities unit that is prompting its 

peers to charge it premium interest in the money market?" Other newspapers, including the U.K. 

Financial Times and the Standard, ran similar articles about LIBOR and Barclays. 

20 At limited times this management directive also impacted submissions for Sterling and Yen LIBOR. 

21 According to Bat'clays, Bat'clays had to borrow from the Bank of England due to operational errors 

caused by other banks' late payments to Barclays. 

19 
On the day of the Bloomberg article, Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIB OR submissions in at 

least three tenors were the highest submissions of all panel banks, and were over six to nine basis 

points higher than the official BBA LIBOR fixing at those tenors. Barclays believed that its high 

LIBOR submissions caused its financial condition to be misperceived by the public and the 

media. 

The negative media speculation caused significant concern within Barclays and was 

discussed among high levels of management within Barclays Banle. As a result, certain senior 

managers within Bat'clays Bank Treasury ("senior Barclays Treasury managers") instructed the 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters and their supervisor to lower Bat'clays' LIBOR submissions, so 

that they were closer in range to the submitted rates by other banl(s but not so high as to attract 

media attention. 

Senior Bat'clays Treasury managers coined the phrase "head above the parapet" to 

describe being an outlier on the U.S. Dollar LIBOR panel, which meant making high LIBOR 

submissions relative to the submitted rates of the other banks and attracting media attention. 

Senior Barclays Treasury managers directed Bat'clays' U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters that their 

LIBOR submissions should not be at a level where Barclays was "sticking its head above the 

parapet," in order to avoid unwanted market and media attention for high LIBOR submissions 

that could potentially damage Barclays' reputation. Senior Barclays Treasury managers 

provided the submitters with the general guidance that Barclays' submitted rates should be 

within ten basis points of the submissions by the other U.S. Dollar panel banl(s to be in 

compliance with the directive. 

Barclays knew that accounting for its reputational risk in its determination of LIBOR 

submissions was not permissible under BBA's definition and criteria. The submitters and their 

supervisor, however, understood that they were to follow this directive regardless of market 

conditions or whether their assessment of Barclays' cost of obtaining unsecured funds dictated 

their submissions to be otherwise. Barclays' U.S. Dollar LIB OR submitters knew that, by acting 

upon senior management's instruction to be below "the parapet," they were making improper 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions that were management's rates and not the rates that the 

submitters had detelmined were the correct rates, i.e., those that reflected Barclays' assessment 

of its cost of borrowing unsecured funds in the London interbank money market. 

The senior Barclays Treasury managers frequently discussed with the U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submitters and their supervisor the specific rates to be submitted, in order to ensure they were in 

compliance with the directive. In these discussions, the senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter 

consistently made clear that they were not setting Barclays' submissions at the rates that 

reflected Barclays' cost of obtaining unsecured funds. These discussions were memorialized in 

multiple recorded telephone calls and emails during the more than I8-month financial crisis 

period. 

For example, on November 28,2007, Barclays' senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter 

emailed a large group of Bar clays' employees, including the senior Bat'clays Treasury managers, 

stating "LIBORs are not reflecting the true cost of money. I am going to set ... , probably at the 

20 
top of the range of rates set by libor contributors ... [T]he tme cost of money is anything from 5-

15 basis points higher." A senior Bat'clays Treasury manager endorsed the submissions, replying 

"[fJine on LIBOR settings - thanks for remaining pragmatic but at the upper end." 

On November 29, 2007, the supervisor of the u.s. Dollar LIBOR submitters convened a 

telephone discussion with the senior Barclays Treasury managers and the U.S. Dollar LIB OR 

submitters. The supervisor said if the submitters submitted the rate for a particular tenor at 5.50, 

which was the rate they believed to be the appropriate submission, Barclays would be twenty 

basis points above "the pack" and "it's going to cause a shit storm." The supervisor asked that 

the issue be taken "upstairs," meaning that it should be discussed among more senior levels of 

Barclays'management. The most senior Bat'clays Treasury manager agreed that he would do so. 

For the LIBOR submission, the group decided to compromise by determining to set at the same 

level as another banle, a rate of5.3, which was, again, not at the rate the submitters believed to be 

appropriate for Barclays. 

In this November 29,2007 conversation, the group also discussed their belief that other 

banles were submitting unrealistically low rates and speculated that other banles were basing 

submissions on derivatives' positions. The group agreed that their concerns should be raised to 

the BBA. One of the senior Barclays Treasury managers called a BBA representative and stated 

that he believed that LIBOR panel banles, including Barclays, were submitting rates that were too 

low because they were afraid to "stick their heads above the parapet," and that "no one will get 

out of the pack, the pack sort of stays low." He also relayed his belief that other panel banles 

relied too much on information from voice brokers to determine appropriate rates in the market, 

instead of making independent determinations for their own institutions. He encouraged the 

BBA to react and be heavy handed, suggesting the sanction that banles involved in such conduct 

be removed from the panel. In apparent response to Barclays' call, the BBA sent an email to the 

Steering Committee of the BBA, which is comprised of certain panel banle members including 

Barclays, requesting views on whether rates were artificially low and how to address this. The 

senior Barclays Treasury manager responded to the email consistent with his conversation with 

the BBA, noting his belief that "LIBORS are lower than market levels even given the lack of 

liquidity" and "[s]ome banles are getting close to looking like they are actively not recognizing 

the actual market levels." Barclays did not disclose at this time that it was lowering its LIBOR 

submissions pursuant to a management directive. 

The following day, the same senior Barclays Treasury manager had another conversation 

with the senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter, who was again seeking guidance on his 

submissions. In this conversation, the senior Barclays Treasury manager related his 

understanding that senior management had discussed the issue and directed them to continue to 

"stick within the bounds[,] so no head above [the] parapet." In other words, the concerns and 

objections of the submitters and supervisor as raised the day before were overmled. The senior 

Bat'clays Treasury manager also told the U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter that they would have to 

deal with the settings, meaning how to make LIBOR submissions per this directive, on "a day-today basis." 

In early December 2007, Barclays' senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter again warned his 

supervisor that Barclays was not setting "honest" rates when making its LIB OR submissions. 

21 
The senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter emailed his supervisor stating that he submitted 

Barclays' one month LIBOR at 5.30 percent, which was four basis points over the next highest 

submission and almost five basis points over the LIBOR fixing. However, this submitted rate 

was well below the 5.40 percent that Barclays was paying (i. e., asking) to borrow funds in the 

market, and that "given a free hand [he] would have set around 5.45%." He continued, "My 

worry is that we (both Barclays and the contributor banle panel) are being seen to be contributing 

patently false rates. We are therefore being dishonest by definition and are at risk of damaging 

our reputation in the market and with the regulators. Can we discuss urgently please?" The 

supervisor directed these concerns to a senior compliance officer and a member of senior 

management of Barclays. 

The Barclays senior compliance officer subsequently had a conversation with the U.K. 

Financial Services Authority ("FSA") in which LIBOR was discussed. The senior compliance 

officer stated in an internal email directed to several levels of Barclays' senior management that 

he informed FSA of the following: that Bat'clays believed that LIBOR submissions by the panel 

banles were distorted due to market illiquidity; that Barclays had been consistently the highest or 

one of the two highest submitters but was concerned to go higher given the negative media 

reporting about Barclays; that Barclays had concerns about the trillions of dollars of derivatives 

fixed off LIB OR; and that there were "problematic actions" by some banles. However, the 

Bat'clays' senior compliance officer did not inform the FSA that Barclays was making its LIBOR 

submissions based on considerations of negative market or press perceptions of Barclays or that 

its LIBOR submitters' assessments of the appropriate rates for submission were being altered to 

adhere to the directive to be below "the parapet." After this conversation, the same Bat'clays 

senior compliance officer did not follow up internally with the LIBOR submitters or their 

supervisor to confirm that Barclays was making its LIBOR submissions properly in accordance 

with the BBA's definition and criteria for LIB OR. Instead, the management directive remained 

in effect, and in fact, senior Barclays Treasury managers ensured that the U.S. Dollar LIB OR 

submitters continued to adhere to that directive. 

For example, in early March 2008, the senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter noted in a 

telephone call to a colleague that there was no money in the market and that he had submitted a 

rate for 12-month LIBOR that was several basis points lower than the rate at which he was 

willing to pay to boll'oW funds in the market, because he had been advised by senior 

management that he should not make his submission any higher. The senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submitter commented that he was unable to find funds to borrow in the market even when paying 

(i.e., asking) to borrow funds at a rate well above where he submitted his 12-month LIB OR. He 

remarked that the senior Bat'clays Treasury manager told him that he should "not be quite as 

aggressive" in his submissions, meaning his submissions were too high. 

Throughout the financial crisis period, Barclays' employees, including the submitters, 

received routine surveillance telephone calls from staff members of the FSA, the Bank of 

England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These conversations concerned the 

deepening global financial crisis and were to gauge the level of liquidity in the markets. These 

calls increased in frequency as the crisis worsened. In these calls, LIB OR was discussed as a 

measure of the severe illiquidity in the markets, and in that context, in some calls, Bat'clays' 

employees expressed their opinion that Barclays and other panel banks were submitting rates that 

22 
were too low given the market conditions. However, in those conversations, the Bat'clays' 

employees did not explain that Barclays was not determining its LIBOR submissions in 

accordance with the BBA's definition and criteria for LIBOR but instead was making its 

submissions in a manner to avoid negative market and media attention. 

On April 16, 2008, the Wall Street Journal published an article questioning the integrity 

of LIB OR, entitled "Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis.,,22 The article 

speculated that panel member banks were making LIBOR submissions lower than what they 

were actually paying for funds to prevent the market from concluding that the banks were 

desperate for cash. The Barclays senior U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter in a telephone call to a 

senior Bat'clays Treasury manager expressed concerns about the article and stated that he was 

doing the same thing as other banks, by submitting at one level while paying (i. e., asking to 

borrow funds) at a higher level in the market. He noted his prior LIBOR submissions were lower 

than where he thought he could obtain funds. He stated, "1 would be paying ... [2.98] today and 

I'm going to be setting my LIBOR at [2.74] and I'm as guilty as hell .... 1 will go [2.74] unless 

I'm given permission to go otherwise, but 1 would be prepared to pay [2.98]." The senior 

Bat'clays Treasury manager replied, "I'm happy for you to be at and around the top of the pack 

but can we please not sort of be ten basis points above the next. .. 7" The U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submitter followed up with his supervisor, saying he thought there was a compliance issue, but 

no internal action was taken to address his concerns. 

At this time, a senior Barclays Treasury manager informed BBA in a telephone call that it 

had not been reporting accurately, although he noted that Barclays was not the worst offender of 

the panel bank members. "We're clean, but we're dirty-clean, rather than clean-clean." The 

BBA representative responded, "no one's clean-clean." The senior Barclays Treasury manager 

replied "no, because ofthe very fact of what happened to us ... We were clean ... the market ... 

reacted accordingly. And that's why we stepped away again." The senior Barclays Treasury 

manager was referencing the market speculation about Bat'clays' high LIBOR submission in 

early fall 2007. The BBA representative indicated that he understood what happened to any 

banle that moved against the trend of lower submissions. The same senior Barclays Treasury 

manager had a similar conversation with the FSA during a surveillance call regarding market 

liquidity conditions. 

Barclays did not explain in these calls that it was making its LIB OR submissions 

pursuant to a management directive and not in accordance with the BBA's definition and criteria 

or consistent with the costs of obtaining unsecured funds in the London interbanle money market. 

Furthermore, throughout the financial crisis period, Barclays continued to make its LIBOR 

submissions pursuant to this management directive and regularly submitted rates artificially 

lower than where it believed it could obtain funds. At the same time, the senior U.S. Dollar 

LIBOR submitter, in his regular market commentaries, continued to document the increasing 

lack of transactions that could be meaningful to his LIBOR submissions, his own artificially low 

22 In response to press inquiries after the Wall Street Journal article, individuals within Barclays 

discussed internally how to respond and agreed to state that Barclays' LIBOR submissions reflected the 

market stress and that Barclays "always quote[d] accurate and fair LIBORs." Barclays did not disclose 

that in fact it lowered its submissions to avoid negative media speCUlation. 

23 
LIBOR submissions, and his belief that the official BBA LIBOR fixing was too low for market 

conditions.23 

Going into the last quarter of 2008, particularly after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 

September 2008, the financial crisis worsened and financial institutions faced increased concerns 

about liquidity and perceptions of financial viability. Barclays increasingly felt tremendous 

external pressures concerning how it was being perceived in the market and media, particularly 

due to its higher LIBOR submissions relative to the other panel banks. Barclays continued to 

believe that the other panel banks' LIBOR submissions were unrealistically low. Even though it 

maintained that its liquidity position was in fact strong, Barclays was increasingly worried about 

these market and media perceptions. At this time, the Bank of England had a conversation with 

a senior individual in Barclays, in which it raised questions about Barclays' liquidity position 

and its relatively high LIB OR submissions.24 

In late October 2008, reacting to this pressure and the discussion with the Bank of 

England, Barclays believed it needed to lower its LIBOR submissions even further. As a result, 

a member of senior management conveyed an instruction to the LIBOR submitters, through their 

supervisor, that Barclays' U.S. Dollar and Sterling LIBOR submissions needed to be lowered to 

be "within the pack," meaning Barclays' LIBOR submissions were to be made at or around the 

same rate as the other panel banks. The same senior manager confirmed and reiterated this 

directive in a meeting with the supervisors and some of the submitters a few days later. 

The LIBOR submitters complied with this additional directive and sent their supervisor 

emails confirming their reluctant acquiescence. The senior U.S. Dollar submitter emailed his 

supervisor, "following on from my conversation with you I will reluctantly, gradually and 

artificially get my libors in line with the rest of the contributors as requested. I disagree with this 

approach as you are well aware. I will be contributing rates which are nowhere near the clearing 

rates for unsecured cash and therefore will not be posting honest prices. ,,25 

23 In the wake of the Wall Street Journal article, in June 2008, the BBA conducted a review of the 

definition of LIB OR and the submission process. Barclays and other panel bank members actively 

participated in this review. In August 2008, the BBA published its findings from the review and 

concluded from the contributing panel banks' comments, including Barclays, that the contributing banks 

were confident that their submissions reflected the costs of borrowing in the London interbank money 

market, and that the existing process for LIBOR submissions was appropriate and should be retained 

without modification. Accordingly, the BBA merely provided "amplification" to the LIBOR definition. 

As noted above, despite its participation in this review, Barclays continued to follow the senior 

management instruction to lower LIBOR submissions artificially. 

24 Throughout the financial crisis, in addition to the regulatory staff level surveillance calls noted above, 

the Bank of England had discussions with certain senior managers of Bar clays about its funding and 

liquidity position and LIBOR. Barclays' high LIBOR submissions relative to other panel bank 

submissions, and whether such submissions were appropriate, were discussed at times in these 

conversations. 

25 The senior LIBOR submitter for Sterling sent a similar email to the same supervisor and then 

forwarded it to a senior compliance officer of Barclays. A senior compliance officer responded that the 

submitters should set where they see it, follow BBA rules, and avoid potential action by the BBA. The 

24 
At or around the time of this further directive, central banks were taking several measures 

to ease the liquidity strains in the marketplace. As a result, market and media speculation 

receded and the directive had less impact on submissions. Nonetheless, the original management 

instruction from late 2007, to stay below "the parapet," was not rescinded throughout the 

remainder of the financial crisis period. In emails and other communications, Barclays' 

submitters continued to indicate into at least mid-2009 that they were still basing their 

submissions at levels to minimize market or press speculation about Barclays. 

Throughout the financial crisis period, Barclays often submitted among the highest rates 

as compared to the submissions made by the other banks on the U.S. Dollar panel, and, at times, 

was excluded from the calculation of the daily official LIBOR fixing, because Barclays' 

submission was in the highest quartile. However, Barclays was also at times one of the middle 

averaged rates used in the calculation of the daily official LIBOR fixing. 

Bat'clays' submitters knew that reputational concerns or negative market or press repOlis 

were not legitimate or permissible factors on which to base their daily LIBOR submissions. By 

determining Barclays' LIBOR submissions on such considerations during the financial crisis 

period, those submissions did not reflect or relate to the cost of bon-owing unsecured funds in the 

relevant interbank markets. Yet, during this time, Barclays' submitters routinely made their 

Barclays' u.s. Dollar LIB OR submissions for multiple tenors, and at limited times their Sterling 

and Yen LIBOR submissions, in accordance with senior management's instructions, and not in 

accordance with the definition and criteria for LIB OR. Accordingly, Barclays, through its 

submissions, knowingly delivered, or caused to be delivered, LIBOR submissions that 

constituted false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports that affected or tended to affect 

LIBOR, which is a commodity in interstate commerce. 

IV. 

LEGAL DISCUSSION 

A. Barclays Made False, Misleading or Knowingly Inaccurate Reports Concerning 

the Costs of Borrowing Unsecured Funds in Violation of Section 9(a)(2) of the 

Act 

Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful for any person "knowingly to deliver or cause to be 

delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, 

wireless, or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports 

concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any 

commodity in interstate commerce .... " 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006); Us. v. Brooks, No. 09-

20871,2012 WL 1768061 (5th Cir. May 18,2012); United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352 (5th 

Cir. 2004); see also CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same). 

senior compliance officer also stated he was unaware of any external pressure to reduce rates to join the 

pack, but he would raise it with senior management. He never did so. 

25 
On a daily basis, Barclays, through the transmission of an electronic spreadsheet to 

Thomson Reuters, knowingly delivered or caused to be delivered its u.s. Dollar, Yen, and 

Sterling LIBOR and Euribor submissions through the mails or interstate commerce. Barclays' 

submissions were also caused to be delivered through the mails or interstate commerce through 

the daily dissemination and publication globally, including into the U.S., of the panel banks' 

submissions by Thomson Reuters on behalf ofBBA and EBF, and other third party vendors. 

The panel banks' submissions are used to determine the official published rates for LIBOR and 

Euribor, which are calculated based on a trimmed average of the submissions (as described 

above in Section III.C.1.a). Barclays' daily LIBOR and Euribor submissions contained market 

information concerning the costs of borrowing unsecured funds in particular currencies and 

tenors, the liquidity conditions and stress in the money markets, and Barclays' ability to borrow 

funds in the particular markets. Such market information affects or tends to affect the prices of 

commodities in interstate commerce, including the daily rates at which BBA U.S. Dollar, Yen 

and Sterling LIBOR and EBF Euribor are fixed. 

Throughout the periods relevant to the conduct described herein, Barclays' LIB OR 

submissions for U.S. Dollar, Yen, and Sterling and Euribor submissions were false, misleading 

or knowingly inaccurate because they were routinely based on impermissible factors such as (1) 

the management directive to lower Barclays' submitted rates to manage market and media 

perceptions of Barclays, and (2) the derivatives positions of swaps traders, and were not based on 

the costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the pertinent markets, as required. By using these 

impermissible factors in making its LIBOR and Euribor submissions and without disclosing that 

it based its submissions on these impermissible factors, Barclays conveyed false, misleading or 

knowingly inaccurate information that the rates it submitted were based on and related to the 

costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the relevant markets and were truthful and reliable. 

Moreover, Barclays' submitters knew that Barclays' LIBOR and Euribor submissions contained 

false and misleading rates. By such conduct, Respondents violated Section 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 

U.S.C. § l3(a)(2) (2006). 

B. Respondents Attempted to Manipulate LIBOR and Euribor 

Together, Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act prohibit acts of attempted 

manipulation. Section 9(a)(2) ofthe Act makes it unlawful for "[a]ny person to manipulate or 

attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery 

on or subject to the rules of any registered entity .... " 7 U.S.C. § l3(a)(2) (2006). Section 6(c) 

of the Act authorizes the Commission to serve a complaint and provide for the imposition of, 

among other things, civil monetary penalties and cease and desist orders if the Commission "has 

reason to believe that any person ... has manipulated 01' attempted to manipulate the market price 

of any commodity, in interstate commerce, 01' for future delivery on 01' subject to the rules of any 

registered entity, ... or otherwise is violating or has violated any of the provisions of [the] Act ... 

. " 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). Section 6(d) of the Act is substantially identical to section 6(c). See 7 

U.S.C. § l3b (2006). 

The following two elements are required to prove an attempted manipulation: (1) an 

intent to affect the market price, and (2) an overt act in furtherance of that intent. See In re 

Hohenberg Bros. Co. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,271, at 21,477 

26 
(CFTC Feb. 18, 1977); CFTC v. Bradley, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (N.D. Okla. 2005). To prove the 

intent element of attempted manipulation, it must be shown that Barc1ays "acted (or failed to act) 

with the purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the market 

that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand." In re Indiana Farm Bureau 

Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,283 

(CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). "[W]hile knowledge of relevant market conditions is probative of intent, 

it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew to any particular degree of certainty that his 

actions would create an artificial price. It is enough to present evidence from which it may 

reasonably be inferred that the accused 'consciously desire[d] that result, whatever the likelihood 

of that result happening from his conduct.' See us. v. us. Gypsum Co, 438 U.S. [442,445 

(1978)]." Id. A profit motive may also be evidence of intent, although profit motive is not a 

necessary element of an attempted manipulation. See In re DiPlacido [2007-2009 Transfer 

Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 30,970, at 62,484 (CFTC Nov. 5,2008) (citing In re 

Hohenberg Bros. Co., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,478», 

aff'd, 364 Fed. Appx. 657, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 WL 3326624 (2d Cir. 2009). 

Here, as evidenced by the extensive communications among traders and submitters, 

Barc1ays' traders and submitters each specifically intended to affect the price at which the daily 

BBA LIBOR for U.S. Dollar, Sterling, and Yen (for particular tenors), and the EBF Euribor (for 

particular tenors), all commodities in interstate commerce, would be fixed. Moreover, the 

evidence reflects that the traders' motives were to try to affect the BBA LIBOR and EBF Euribor 

fixings in order to benefit their derivatives trading positions or to benefit the derivatives trading 

positions of traders at other banks, with whom they actively coordinated. The evidence also 

shows that the submitters understood the traders' motives and acted with manipulative intent by 

submitting false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate market information that purported to reflect 

the costs of borrowing unsecured funds, but in reality, reflected the profit motive of the swaps 

traders. 

The Barclays traders' requests for certain rates to be submitted which would benefit their 

derivatives trading positions or the derivatives trading positions of traders at other banks, and the 

submitters making LIBOR and Euribor submissions reflecting the traders' requests, constitute 

overt acts in furtherance of their intent to affect the BBA LIBOR and EBF Euribor fixings. By 

doing so, Barc1ays engaged in repeated acts of attempted manipulation in violation of Sections 

6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006). 

C. Respondents Aided and Abetted the Attempts of Other Traders at Other 

Banks to Manipulate Euribor 

Pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Act, Barc1ays aided and abetted the attempts of traders at 

other banks to manipulate LIBOR and Euribor in violation of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) 

(2006). Liability as an aider and abettor requires proof that: (1) the CEA was violated, (2) the 

aider and abettor had knowledge of the wrongdoing underlying the violation, and (3) the aider 

and abettor intentionally assisted the primary wrongdoer. See In re Sharokh Nikkhah, [1999-

2000 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 28,129, at 49,888 n.28 (CFTC May 12, 

2000). Although actual knowledge of the primary wrongdoer's conduct is required, knowledge 

of the unlawfulness of such conduct is not necessarily required to be demonstrated. See In re 

27 
Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'if 

21,986, at 28,255 (CFTC Jan. 31, 1984). Knowing assistance can be inferred from the 

surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. See also In re Buckwalter, [1990-1992 Transfer 

Binder] Comm. Fut. L . Rep. (CCH) 'j[24,995, at 37,686 (CFTC Jan. 25, 1991). 

Through daily communications, certain Barclays swaps traders and the traders at the 

other panel banks discussed LIBOR and Euribor rates that would benefit their banks' respective 

derivatives trading positions. The traders at the other panel banks asked the Barclays swaps 

traders to have the Bat'clays LIBOR and Euribor submitters submit a certain rate, or submit a rate 

in a direction higher or lower, that would benefit the derivatives' positions of the traders at the 

other panel banks. The Barclays swaps traders agreed and made the requests of the Barclays 

LIBOR and Euribor submitters. The Bat'clays LIB OR and Euribor submitters made their LIBOR 

and Euribor submissions based on the Barclays swaps traders' requests. Accordingly, by seeking 

to affect the rate at which LIBOR and Euribor were fixed, traders at other banks attempted to 

manipulate LIBOR and Euribor in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 

U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006). Barclays' traders had knowledge of and intentionally 

assisted the attempts of the traders at the other banks to manipulate the rate at which LIBOR and 

Euribor were fixed. By such acts of the Bat'clays swaps traders, Barclays aided and abetted the 

attempts of traders at other banks to manipulate LIB OR and Euribor in violation of Sections 6( c), 

6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006). 

D. Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank and Barclays Capital Are Liable for the Acts 

of their Agents 

Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), and Regulation 1.2, 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 

(2012) provide that the act, omission, or failure of any official, agent or other person acting for 

any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope of his employment 

or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, association, partnership, 

corporation or trust. Pursuant to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA and Commission Regulation 1.2, 

strict liability is imposed on principals for the actions of their agents. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. 

v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963,966 (7th Cir. 1986); Dohmen-Ramirez & Wellington Advis01Y, Inc. v. 

CFTC, 837 F.2d 847,857-58 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Bat'clays Bank and Bat'clays Capital are liable for the acts, omissions and failures of the 

traders, managers, and submitters who acted as their employees and/or agents in the conduct 

described above. Barclays PLC, which wholly owns Barclays Bank and Bat'clays Capital, is 

liable for the acts, omissions and failures of Barclays Bank and Barclays Capital with respect to 

the conduct described above. Accordingly, Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank and Barclays Capital 

violated Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006), as 

set forth above. 

V. 

FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS 

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondents violated Sections 6( c), 

6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006). 

28 
VI. 

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT 

Respondents, without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, except to 

the extent Respondents admit those findings in any related action against Barclays by, or any 

agreement with, the Department of Justice or any other governmental agency or office, have 

submitted the Offer in which they: 

A. Acknowledge receipt of service of this Order; 

B. Admit the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to all matters set forth in this 

Order and for any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based 

on violation of or enforcement of this Order; 

C. Waive: 

1. the filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing; 

2. a hearing; 

3. all post-hearing procedures; 

4. judicial review by any court; 

5. any and all objections to the participation by any member of the Commission's 

staff in the Commission's consideration of the Offer; 

6. any and all claims that they may possess under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 

U.S.C. § 504 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006), and/or the rules promulgated by 

the Commission in conformity therewith, Part 148 of the Commission's 

Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 148.1-30 (2012), relating to, or arising from, this 

proceeding; 

7. any and all claims that they may possess under the Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 110 Stat. 

847,857-868 (1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8302, 121 Stat. 112, 

204-205 (2007), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding; and 

8. any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding or the 

entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any 

other relief; 

D. Stipulate that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely of the 

findings contained in this Order to which Respondents have consented in the Offer; and 

E. Consent, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission's entry of this Order that: 

29 
1. makes findings by the Commission that Respondents violated Section 6( c), 6( d), 

and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006); 

2. orders Respondents to cease and desist from violating Sections 6( c), 6( d), and 

9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006); 

3. orders Respondents, jointly and severally, to pay a civil monetary penalty in the 

amount of $200,000,000, plus post-judgment interest; and 

4. orders Respondents and their successors and assigns to comply with the 

conditions and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set forth in Part VII 

of this Order. 

Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer. 

VII. 

ORDER 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

A. Respondents shall cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the 

Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, l3b, and l3(a)(2) (2006) of the Act. 

B. Respondents, jointly and severally, shall pay a civil monetary penalty of $200 Million 

Dollars ($200,000,000), within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order (the "CMP 

Obligation"). If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full within ten (10) days of the date of 

entry of this Order, then post judgment interest shall accrue on the CMP Obligation 

beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be determined by using the 

Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1961 (2006). Respondents shall pay the CMP Obligation by electronic funds transfer, 

U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order. If 

payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be 

made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address 

below: 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Division of Enforcement 

ATTN: Accounts Receivables --- AMZ 340 

E-mail Box: 9-AMC-AMZ-AR-CFTC 

DOT/FAAIMMAC 

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

Telephone: (405) 954-5644 

30 
If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondents shall contact Linda 

Zurhorst or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall 

fully comply with those instructions. Respondents shall accompany payment of the CMP 

Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the paying Respondent and the name and 

docket number of this proceeding. The paying Respondent shall simultaneously transmit 

copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, 

Washington, D.C. 20581. 

C. Respondents and their successors and assigns shall comply with the following conditions 

and undertakings set forth in the Offer: 

1. PRINCIPLES26 

1. Barclays agrees to undertake the following: (1) to ensure the integrity and 

reliability of its Benchmark Interest Rate Submission(s), presently and in 

the future; and (2) to identify, construct and promote effective 

methodologies and processes of setting Benchmark Interest Rates, in 

coordination with efforts by Benchmark Publishers, in order to ensure the 

integrity and reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates in the future. 

11. Barclays represents and undertakes that each Benchmark Interest Rate 

Submission by Barclays shall be based upon a rigorous and honest 

assessment of information, and shall not be influenced by internal or 

external conflicts of interest, or other factors 01' information extraneous to 

any rules applicable to the setting of a Benchmark Interest Rate. 

26 The following terms are defined as follows: 

Benchmark Interest Rate: An interest rate for a currency and maturity/tenor that is calculated 

based on data received from market participants and published to the market on a regular, 

periodic basis, such as LIBOR and Euribor; 

Benchmark Publisher: A banking association or other entity that is responsible for or oversees 

the calculation and publication of a Benchmark Interest Rate; 

Submission(s): The interest rate(s) submitted for each currency and maturity/tenor to a 

Benchmark Publisher. For example, ifBarclays submits a rate for one month and three month 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR, that would constitute two Submissions; 

Submitter(s): The person(s) responsible for determining and/or transmitting the Submission(s); 

and 

Supervisor(s): The person(s) immediately and directly responsible for supervising any portion of 

the process of Submission(s) and/or any of the Submitter(s). 

31 
2. INTEGRITY AND RELIABILITY OF BENCHMARK INTEREST RATE 

SUBMISSIONS 

1. DETERMINATION OF SUBMISSIONS: Barclays shall determine its 

Submission(s) based on the following Factors, Adjustments and 

Considerations, unless otherwise prohibited by or contrary to an 

affirmative obligation imposed by any law or regulation, or the rules or 

definitions issued by a Benchmark Publisher. Barclays' transactions shall 

be given the greatest weight in determining its Submissions, subject to 

applying appropriate Adjustments and Considerations in order to reflect 

the market measured by the Benchmark Interest Rate. 27 

Barc1ays shall determine its Submissions as described in these 

Undertakings within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order. 

II Factor 1 - Barclays' Borrowing or Lending Transactions 

Observed by Barclays' Submitters: 

a. Barclays' transactions in the market as defined by the 

Benchmark Publisher for the particular Benchmark Interest 

Rate; 

b. Barclays' transactions in other markets for unsecured 

funds, including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit 

and issuances of commercial paper; and 

c. Barclays' transactions in various related markets, including, 

but not limited to, Overnight Index Swaps, foreign currency 

forwards, repurchase agreements, futures, and Fed Funds. 

II Factor 2 - Third Party Transactions Observed by Barclays' 

Submitters: 

a. Transactions in the market as defined by the Benchmark 

Interest Rate relevant to each of the Submission(s); 

b. Transactions in other markets for unsecured funds, 

including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit and 

issuances of commercial paper; and 

c. Transactions in various related markets, including, but not 

limited to, Overnight Index Swaps, foreign currency 

forwards, repurchase agreements, futures, and Fed Funds. 

27 The rules used by Benchmark Publishers to determine Benchmark Interest Rates vary, may not be 

consistent with each other, and provide different levels of guidance as to how to make Submissions. 

32 
iii Factor 3 - Third Party Offers Observed by Barclays' Submitters: 

a. Third patty offers to Barclays in the market as defined by 

the Benchmark Publisher relevant to each of the 

Submission(s) ; 

b. Third party offers in other markets for unsecured funds, 

including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit and 

issuances of commercial paper, provided to Bat'clays by 

interdealer brokers (e.g., voice brokers); and 

c. Third party offers provided to Bat'clays in various related 

markets, including, but not limited to, Overnight Index 

Swaps, foreign currency forwards, repurchase agreements, 

and Fed Funds. 

iii Adjustments and Considerations: All of the following 

Adjustments and Considerations may be applied with respect to 

each of the Factors above: 

a. Time: With respect to the Factors considered above, 

proximity in time to the Submission(s) increases the 

relevance of that Factor; 

b. Market Events: Barclays may adjust its Submission(s) 

based upon market events, including price variations in 

related markets, that occur prior to the time at which the 

Submission(s) must be made to the Benchmark Publisher. 

That adjustment shall reflect measurable effects on 

transacted rates, offers or bids; 

c. Tetro Structure: As Barclays applies the above Factors, if 

Barclays has data for any maturity/tenor described by a 

Factor, then Barclays may interpolate or extrapolate the 

remaining maturities/tenors from the available data; 

d. Credit Standards: As Barclays applies the above Factors, 

adjustments may be made to reflect Bat'clays' credit 

standing and/or the credit spread between the market as 

defined by the Benchmark Publisher and transactions or 

offers in the related markets used in the Factors above. 

Additionally, Barclays may take into account 

counterparties' credit standings, access to funds, and 

borrowing or lending requirements, and third party offers 

considered in connection with the above Factors; and 

33 
e. Non-representative Transactions: To the extent a 

transaction included among the Factors above significantly 

diverges in an objective manner from other transactions, 

and that divergence is not due to market events as 

addressed above, Bat'clays may exclude such transactions 

from its determination of its Submission(s). 

11. SUPERVISOR(S) REVIEW: Effective within fourteen (14) days of the 

entry of this Order, each daily Submission shall be reviewed by a 

Supervisor on a daily basis after the Submission(s) are made to the 

Benchmark Publisher. 

111. QUALIFICATIONS OF SUBMITTER(S) AND SUPERVISOR(S): All 

Submitter(s) shall have significant experience in the markets for the 

Benchmark Interest Rate to which they are submitting or a comparable 

market, but may designate less experienced parties, who routinely work 

under their supervision, to make Submission(s) during limited periods of 

absence. All Supervisors shall have significant experience in the markets 

for the relevant Benchmark Interest Rate or a comparable market. 

Submitters, Supervisors and any parties designated to make Submission(s) 

when the Submitter(s) are absent shall not be assigned to any derivatives 

trading desk, unit or division within Barclays, or participate in derivatives 

trading other than that associated with Barclays' liquidity and liability 

management. The compensation of Submitter( s) and Supervisor(s) also 

shall not be directly based upon derivatives trading, other than that 

associated with Barclays' liquidity and liability management. 

IV. FIREWALLS: INTERNAL CONTROLS REGARDING IMPROPER 

COMMUNICATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS: Barclays shall implement 

internal controls and procedures to prevent improper communications with 

Submitter(s) and Supervisor(s) regarding Submission(s) or prospective 

Submission(s) to ensure the integrity and reliability of its Submission(s). 

Such internal controls and procedures shall include, but not be limited to: 

III The "firewalls" contemplated herein will be implemented through 

written policies and procedures that delineate proper and improper 

communications with Submitter(s) and Supervisor(s), whether 

internal or external to Bat·clays. For these purposes, improper 

communications shall be any attempt to influence Barclays' 

Submission(s) for the benefit of any derivatives trading position 

(whether of Barclays or any third party) or any attempt to cause 

Barclays' Submitter(s) to violate any applicable Benchmark 

Publisher's rules or definitions, or Section 2 of these Undeliakings; 

and 

34 
III A requirement that the Submitter(s) shall not be located in close 

proximity to traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that 

reference a Benchmark Interest Rate to which Bat'clays contributes 

any Submission(s). The two groups should be separated such that 

neither can hear the other. 

v. DOCUMENTATION: Barclays shall provide the documents set forth 

below promptly and directly to the Commission upon request, without 

subpoena or other process, regardless of whether the records are held 

outside of the United States, to the extent permitted by law. 

III For each Submission, Bat'clays shall contemporaneously 

memorialize, and retain in an easily accessible format for a period 

of five (5) years after the date of each Submission, the following 

infOlmation: 

a. The Factors, Adjustments and Considerations described in 

Section 2(i) above that Barclays used to determine its 

Submission(s), including, but not limited to, identifying any 

non-representative transactions excluded from the 

determination of the Submission(s) and the basis for such 

exclusions, as well as identifying all transactions given the 

greatest weight or considered to be the most relevant, and 

the basis for such conclusion; 

b. All models or other methods used in determining Barclays' 

Submission(s), such as models for credit standards and/or 

term structure, and any adjustments made to the 

Submission(s) based on such models or other methods; 

c. Relevant data and information received from interdealer 

brokers used in connection with determining Bat'clays' 

Submission(s) including, but not limited to, the following: 

• Identification of the specific offers and bids relied 

upon by Barclays when determining each 

Submission; and 

• The name of each company and person from whom 

the information or data is obtained; 

d. Barclays' assessment of "reasonable market size" for its 

Submission(s) (or any other such criteria for the relevancy 

of transactions to a Benchmark Interest Rate), to the extent 

that the rules for a Benchmark Interest Rate require that 

pertinent transactions considered in connection with 

35 
III 

III 

Submission(s) be of "reasonable market size" (or any other 

such criteria); 

e. Information regarding market events considered by 

Barclays in connection with determining its Submission(s), 

including, without limitation, the following: 

III The specific market announcement(s) or event(s); 

and 

III Any effect of such market event(s) on transacted 

rates, offers or bids in the relevant markets; and 

f. The identity of the Submitter(s) who made, and the 

Supervisor(s) who reviewed, the Submission(s). 

For each Submission, Barclays shall retain for a period of five (5) 

years after the date of each Submission, the following transactional 

data used by Bat'clays to detelmine its Submission(s); the data shall 

be easily accessible and convertible into the Microsoft Excel file 

format; the data shall include, without limitation, the following to 

the extent known to Bat'clays at the time of the Submission(s): 

a. Instrument; 

b. Maturity/tenor; 

c. Trade type (i. e., loan/deposit, placing/taking); 

d. Buy/sell indicator; 

e. Transaction date (in mmddyyyy format); 

f. Maturity date (in mmddyyyy format); 

g. Value date (in mmddyyyy format); 

h. Loan effective date; 

1. Customer number; 

J. Currency; 

k. Ticket ID; 

1. Timestamp; 

m. Counterparty A (buyer/bidder); 

n. Counterparty B (seller/offeror); 

o. Nominal/notional size of the transaction; 

p. Interest basis (360/365 day year); 

q. The fixed interest rate; and 

1'. Any special or additional terms (e.g., a repurchase 

agreement or some form of "non-vanilla agreement"). 

Transaction Records: Barclays shall retain for a period of five (5) 

years trade transaction records and daily position and risk reports, 

including (without limitation) monthly and quarterly position and 

36 
risk reports, related to the trading activities of Submitter(s) and 

traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that reference a 

Benchmark Interest Rate; the records and reports shall be easily 

accessible and convertible into the Microsoft Excel file format. 

III Requirement To Record Communications: Barclays shall record 

and retain to the greatest extent practicable all of the following 

communications: 

a. All communications concerning the determination and 

review of the Submission(s); and 

b. All communications of traders who primarily deal in 

derivatives products that reference a Benchmark Interest 

Rate concerning trades, transactions, prices, or trading 

strategies pertaining to any derivative that references any 

Benchmark Interest Rate (or the supervision thereof). 

The above communications shall not be conducted in a manner to 

prevent Barclays from recording such communications; 

Audio communications of Submitters and Supervisors shall be 

retained for a period of one (1) year. Audio communications of 

traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that reference a 

Benchmark Interest Rate, and who are located in the London, 

Tokyo, and/or New York office of Barclays, shall be retained for a 

period of six (6) months. Subject to a reasonable time to 

implement, Barclays' audio retention requirements pursuant to 

these Undertakings shall commence within a reasonable period 

after the entry of this Order and shall continue for a period of five 

(5) years thereafter; 

All communications except audio communications shall be 

retained for a period of five (5) years; and 

Nothing in these Undertakings shall limit, restrict or nan-ow any 

obligations pursuant to the Act or the Commission's Regulations 

promulgated thereunder, including but not limited to Regulations 

1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31 and 1.35 (2012), in effect now or 

in the future. 

VI. MONITORING AND AUDITING: 

III Monitoring: Bat'clays shall maintain or develop monitoring 

systems or electronic exception reporting systems that identify 

possible improper or unsubstantiated Submissions. Such repOlis 

will be reviewed on at least a weekly basis and if there is any 

37 
II 

significant deviation or issues, the underlying documentation for 

the Submission shall be reviewed to determine whether the 

Submission is adequately substantiated. If it is not substantiated, 

Barclays shall notify its chief compliance officer(s) and the 

Benchmark Publisher; 

Periodic Audits: Statiing six (6) months from the date of the entry 

of this Order, and continuing every six (6) months thereafter, 

unless an annual audit is scheduled at the same time, Barclays shall 

conduct internal audits of reasonable, random samples of its 

Submission(s), the factors and all other evidence documenting the 

basis for such Submission(s), and communications of the 

Submitter(s) in order to verify the integrity and reliability of the 

process for determining Submission(s); and 

Annual Audits By Third Party Auditors: Starting one (1) year 

from the date of the entry of this Order, and continuing annually 

for four (4) additional years thereafter, Barclays shall retain an 

independent, third-party auditor to conduct an audit of its 

Submission(s) and the process for determining Submission(s), 

which shall include, without limitation, the following: 

a. Reviewing communications of Submitter(s) and 

Supervisor(s); 

b. Interviewing the Submitter(s) and Supervisor(s), to the 

extent they are still employed by Barclays; 

c. Obtaining written verification from the Submitter(s) and 

Supervisor(s), to the extent they are still employed by 

Barclays, that the Submission(s) were consistent with this 

Order, the policies and procedures in place for making 

Bat'clays' Submission(s), and the definitions applicable to 

the Benchmark Interest Rate for which Barclays made 

Submission(s); and 

d. A written audit report to be provided to Barclays and the 

Commission (with copies addressed to the Commission's 

Division of Enforcement (the "Division"». 

Vll. POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND CONTROLS: Within sixty (60) days 

of the entry of this Order, Barclays shall develop policies, procedures and 

controls to comply with each of the specific Undertakings set forth above 

with the goal of ensuring the integrity and reliability of its Submission(s). 

In addition, Barclays shall develop policies, procedures and controls to 

ensure the following: 

38 
II 

II 

II 

II 

The supervision of the Submission process; 

That any violations of the Undertakings or any questionable, 

unusual or unlawful activity concerning Barclays' Submissions are 

reported to and investigated by Barclays' compliance or legal 

personnel and reported, as necessary, to authorities and the 

Benchmark Publishers; 

The periodic but routine review of electronic communications and 

audio recordings of or relating to the Submission Process; 

Not less than monthly, the periodic physical presence of 

compliance personnel on the trading floors of the Submitter(s) 

andlor traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that 

reference a Benchmark Interest Rate in connection with these 

Policies, Procedures and Controls; 

II The handling of complaints concerning the accuracy or integrity of 

Barclays' Submission(s) including: 

a. Memorializing all such complaints; 

b. Review and follow-up by the chief compliance officer(s) or 

his designee of such complaints; and 

III The reporting of material complaints to the Chief Executive 

Officer and Board of Directors, relevant self-regulatory 

organizations, the relevant Benchmark Publisher, the Commission, 

andlor other appropriate regulators. 

V111. TRAINING: Barclays shall develop training programs for all employees 

who are involved in its Submission(s), including, without limitation, 

Submitters and Supervisors, and all traders who primarily deal in 

derivatives products that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate. Submitters 

and Supervisors shall be provided with preliminary training regarding the 

policies, and procedures and controls developed pursuant to Section 2(vii) 

of these Undertakings. By no later than March 29,2013, all Submitters, 

Supervisors, and traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that 

reference a Benchmark Interest Rate shall be fully trained in the 

application of these Undertakings to them, as set fOlih herein. Thereafter, 

such training will be provided promptly to employees newly assigned to 

any of the above listed responsibilities, and again to all Submitters, 

Supervisors and traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that 

reference a Benchmark Interest Rate as pati of Barclays' regular training 

programs. The training shall be based upon the individual's position and 

responsibilities, and as appropriate, address the following topics: 

39 
III 

III 

III 

III 

III 

III 

III 

The Undeliakings set forth herein; 

The process of making Submission(s); 

The impropriety of attempting to influence the determination of 

Barclays' Submission(s); 

The requirement to conduct all business related to Bat'clays' 

Submission(s) on Bat'clays' recorded telephone and electronic 

communications systems, and not on personal telephones or other 

electronic devices, as set forth in Section 2(v) of these 

Undertakings; 

The requirement to conduct celiain business related to derivatives 

products that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate on Barclays' 

recorded telephone and electronic communications systems, and 

not on personal devices or systems, as set forth in Section 2(v) of 

these Undeliakings; 

The policies and procedures developed and instituted pursuant to 

these Undertakings; and 

The employment and other potential consequences if employees 

act unlawfully or improperly in connection with Barclays' 

Submission(s) or process for determining Submission(s). 

IX. REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION: 

III Compliance with Undertakings: Every four (4) months, statiing 

120 days from the entry of this Order, Barclays shall make interim 

reports to the Commission, through the Division, explaining its 

progress towards compliance with the Undertakings set forth 

herein, Within 365 days of the entry of this Order, Bat'clays shall 

submit a report to the Commission, through the Division, 

explaining how it has complied with the Undeliakings set forth 

herein. The report shall attach copies of and describe the internal 

controls, policies and procedures that have been designed and 

implemented to satisfy the Undertakings. The report shall contain 

a certification from a representative of Bar clays' Executive 

Management, after consultation with Bat'clays' chief compliance 

officer(s), that Barclays has complied with the Undertakings set 

forth above, and that it has established policies, procedures and 

controls to satisfy the Undertakings set forth in the Order; 

III Submitter(s), Supervisor(s), and Heads of Appropriate Trading 

Desks: Within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order, or as 

soon as practicable thereafter, Barclays shall provide, meet with 

40 
and explain these Undertakings to all Submitters, Supervisors and 

the head of each trading desk that primarily deals in derivatives 

that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate. Within that same time 

frame, Barclays shall provide to the Commission, through the 

Division, written or electronic affilmations signed by each 

Submitter, Supervisor, and head of each trading desk that primarily 

deals in derivatives that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate, 

stating that he or she has received and read the Order and 

Undeliakings herein, and that he or she understands these 

Undertakings to be effective immediately; and 

II Disciplinary and Other Actions: Barclays shall promptly report to 

the Commission, through the Division, all improper conduct 

related to any Submission(s) or the attempted manipulation or 

manipulation of a Benchmark Interest Rate, as well as any 

disciplinary action, or other law enforcement or regulatory action 

related thereto, unless de minimis or otherwise prohibited by 

applicable laws or regulations. 

3. DEVELOPMENT OF RIGOROUS STANDARDS FOR BENCHMARK 

INTEREST RATES 

To the extent Barclays is or remains a contributor to any Benchmark Interest Rate, 

Barclays agrees to make its best efforts to participate in efforts by current and 

future Benchmark Publishers, other price reporting entities andlor regulators to 

ensure the reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates, and through its participation to 

encourage the following: 

1. METHODOLOGY: Creating rigorous methodologies for the contributing 

panel members to formulate their Submissions. The aim of such 

methodologies should be to result in a Benchmark Interest Rate that 

accurately reflects the rates at which transactions are occurring in the 

market being measured by that Benchmark Interest Rate; 

11. VERIFICATION: Enforcing the use of those methodologies through an 

effective regime of documentation, monitoring, supervision and auditing, 

required by and performed by the Benchmark Publishers, and by the 

contributing panel members internally; 

111. INVESTIGATION: Facilitating the repOliing of complaints and concerns 

regarding the accuracy or integrity of Submissions to Benchmark Interest 

Rates or the published Benchmark Interest Rate, and investigating those 

complaints and concerns thoroughly; 

IV. DISCIPLINE: Taking appropriate action if, following a thorough 

confidential investigation, the Benchmark Publisher determines that a 

41 
complaint or concern regarding the accuracy or integrity of a Submission 

or the published Benchmark Interest Rate has been substantiated; 

v. TRANSPARENCY: Making regular reports to the public and the markets 

of facts relevant to the integrity and reliability of each Benchmark Interest 

Rate. Such reports should include, but not be limited to, the following: 

II At the time each Benchmark Interest Rate is published, the 

Benchmark Publisher should display prominently whether each 

rate is based entirely on transactions in the market the rate is 

supposed to reflect, or whether it instead is based, in whole or in 

part, on other data or information; 

II The Benchmark Publisher also should make periodic reports 

regarding the number and nature of complaints and concerns 

received regarding the accuracy or integrity of Submissions or the 

published Benchmark Interest Rate while maintaining the 

anonymity of all those who have reported or are the subject of 

complaints and concerns; 

II The Benchmark Publisher should additionally make periodic 

reports regarding the results of all investigations into such 

complaints and concerns while maintaining the anonymity of all 

those involved in investigations that have not yet been completed; 

and 

VI. FORMULATION: Periodically examining whether each Benchmark 

Interest Rate accurately reflects the rate at which transactions are 

occurring in the market being measured (using the statistical method 

prescribed by that Benchmark Interest Rate), and evaluating whether the 

definition and instructions should be revised, or the composition of the 

panel changed; 

Such examinations should include a rigorous mathematical comparison of 

transactions in the relevant market with the published Benchmark Interest 

Rate on the same day over a specified period, and a determination of 

whether any differences are statistically or commercially significant. 

Barclays shall report periodically, on at least a quarterly basis, to the Commission, 

through the Division, either orally or in writing, on its patiicipation in such 

effOlis, to the extent that such repOliing is not otherwise prohibited by law or 

regulations, by the rules issued by Benchmark Publishers, or by nondisclosure 

agreements by and between Bat'clays and Benchmark Publishers. 

42 
4. COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION 

1. Respondents shall cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Commission, 

including the Division, and any other governmental agency in this action, 

and in any investigation, civil litigation, or administrative matter related to 

the subject matter of this action or any CUlTent or future Commission 

investigation related thereto. As part of such cooperation, Respondents 

agree to the following for a period of five (5) years from the date of the 

entry ofthis Order, or until all related investigations and litigation are 

concluded, including through the appellate review process, whichever 

period is longer: 

III Preserve all records relating to the subject matter of this 

proceeding, including, but not limited to, audio files, electronic 

mail, other documented communications, and trading records; 

III Comply fully, promptly, completely, and truthfully with all 

inquiries and requests for infOlmation or documents; 

iii Provide authentication of documents and other evidentiary 

material; 

III Provide copies of documents within Barclays' possession, custody 

or control; 

iii Subject to applicable laws and regulations, Barclays will make its 

best efforts to produce any CUlTent (as ofthe time of the request) 

officer, director, employee, or agent of Barclays, regardless of the 

individual's location, and at such location that minimizes 

Commission travel expenditures, to provide assistance at any trial, 

proceeding, or Commission investigation related to the subject 

matter of this proceeding, including, but not limited to, requests for 

testimony, depositions, and/or interviews, and to encourage them 

to testify completely and truthfully in any such proceeding, trial, or 

investigation; and 

III Subject to applicable laws and regulations, Barclays will make its 

best efforts to assist in locating and contacting any prior (as of the 

time of the request) officer, director, employee or agent of 

Bat'clays; 

ii. Barclays also agrees that it will not undertake any act that would limit its 

ability to cooperate fully with the Commission. Bat'clays will designate an 

agent located in the United States of America to receive all requests for 

information pursuant to these Undertakings, and shall provide notice 

regarding the identity of such Agent to the Division upon entry of this 

43 
Order. Should Barclays seek to change the designated agent to receive 

such requests, notice of such intention shall be given to the Division 

fourteen (14) days before it occurs. Any person designated to receive such 

request shall be located in the United States of America; and 

111. Barclays and the Commission agree that nothing in these Undertakings 

shall be construed so as to compel Barclays to continue to contribute 

Submission(s) related to any Benchmark Interest Rate. Without prior 

consultation with the Commission, Barclays remains free to withdraw 

from the panel of contributors to any Benchmark Interest Rate. 

5. PROHIBITED OR CONFLICTING UNDERTAKINGS 

Should the Undertakings herein be prohibited by, or be contrary to the provisions 

of any obligations imposed on Barclays by any presently existing, or hereinafter 

enacted or promulgated laws, regulations, regulatory mandates, or the rules or 

definitions issued by a Benchmark Publisher, then Barclays shall promptly 

transmit notice to the Commission (through the Division) of such prohibition or 

conflict, and shall meet and confer in good faith with the Commission (through 

the Division) to reach an agreement regarding possible modifications to the 

Undertakings herein sufficient to resolve such inconsistent obligations. In the 

interim, Barclays will abide by the obligations imposed by the law, regulations, 

regulatory mandates and Benchmark Publishers' rules and definitions. Nothing in 

these Undertakings shall limit, restrict or narrow any obligations pursuant to the 

Act or the Commission's Regulations promulgated thereunder, including but not 

limited to Regulations 1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31 and 1.35 (2012), in effect 

now or in the future. 

6. PUBLIC STATEMENTS 

Respondents agree that neither they nor any of their successors and assigns, 

agents or employees under their authority or control shall take any action or make 

any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or conclusions 

in this Order or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this Order is 

without a factual basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall 

affect Respondents' (i) testimonial obligations, or (ii) right to take legal positions 

in other proceedings to which the Commission is not a party. Respondents and 

their successors and assigns shall undeliake all steps necessary to ensure that all 

of their agents andlor employees under their authority or control understand and 

comply with this agreement. 

D. Partial Satisfaction: Respondents understand and agree that any acceptance by the 

Commission of partial payment of Respondents' CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a 

waiver of their obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order, or a waiver of 

the Commission's right to seek to compel payment of any remaining balance. 

44 
The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date. 

By the Commission. 

avid A. Stawick 

Secretary of the Commission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Dated: June 27, 2012 

45