IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

 

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER, 

Appellant. 

 

No. CR-21-0059-PR

Filed January 18, 2023 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

The Honorable Teresa Godoy, Judge Pro Tempore

No. CR20173539-001 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

 

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two

250 Ariz. 561 (App. 2021) 

VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL:

Kris Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice Jones, Deputy Solicitor 

General, Karen Moody (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 

Appeals Section, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender, Erin K. Sutherland (argued), 

Deputy Public Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for Jordan Christopher Ewer

 
STATE V. JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER

Opinion of the Court

2 

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES 

BOLICK, LOPEZ, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined. 

 

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Arizona’s self-defense statute provides that “a person is 

justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to 

the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is 

immediately necessary to protect [one]self against the other’s use or 

attempted use of unlawful physical force.” A.R.S. § 13-404(A). The Revised 

Arizona Jury Instruction (“RAJI”) regarding self-defense, however, states

that the justification defense applies to a “defendant” instead of a “person.”

See Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Justification for Self-Defense 4.04, at 63–65 

(4th ed. 2016). In this case, we consider whether the reference to “person” 

in § 13-404(A) extends to both the defendant and the victim or refers only 

to the defendant. For the following reasons, we hold that the justification 

defense provided by § 13-404(A) only applies to a defendant’s conduct. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2017, Emily attempted to purchase heroin from Jeffrey 

Ferri. After Emily gave Ferri twenty dollars, he told her that he would give 

her the drugs later. When the purchased heroin was not delivered, Emily 

told her fiancée Gilbert about herfailed drug transaction. Gilbert and Emily 

then went to Ferri’s residence to retrieve either the purchased heroin or the 

twenty dollars. Because Ferri was not home when Gilbert and Emily 

arrived, Ferri’s roommate allowed Gilbert to take a Bluetooth speaker 

owned by Ferri as “collateral” for the heroin. 

¶3 Later that night, Ferri, defendant Jordan Ewer, and others

drove to Gilbert’s home to retrieve the speaker. A confrontation ensued. 

Fearing that Gilbert might have a gun, Ewer and the others decided to leave; 

but as they were leaving, Gilbert hit their car with a rock and punched one 

of the occupants in the car. In response, Ewer got out of the car and 
STATE V. JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER

Opinion of the Court

3 

brandished a gun. Seeing the weapon, Gilbert and Emily retreated into 

their home while Ewer and the others drove away. 

¶4 A few hours later, Ewer, accompanied by two other

individuals, returned to Gilbert’s house. As they arrived, Gilbert and Emily

came outside. When Emily noticed that Ewer had drawn his gun, she told 

him to put it away or she would “smack him in the face with a golf club.” 

At this point, both groups began throwing rocks at each other. As Ewer 

and the others started backing away from the scene, Gilbert and Emily

began to follow them. Ewer responded by firing multiple times in Gilbert’s 

direction, hitting him once in the back. Paramedics responded to Gilbert’s 

house and pronounced him dead at the scene.

¶5 The State charged Ewer with one count of second degree 

murder, disorderly conduct involving a firearm, and discharge of a firearm 

in or into the city limits. Before trial, Ewer requested the jury be instructed 

using the RAJIs for justified use of deadly force in self-defense, defense of a 

third person, and crime prevention. These instructions provide that “[a] 

defendant is justified” in using force under specified conditions, and also 

use the word “defendant” elsewhere. See RAJI Justification for Self-Defense 

4.04; RAJI Justification for Self-Defense Physical Force 4.05, at 66; RAJI

Justification for Defense of a Third Person 4.06, at 68; RAJI Use of Force in 

Crime Prevention 4.11, at 78. 

¶6 The State proposed that the word “defendant” be replaced by 

“person” throughout the justification instructions, arguing that the jury 

could apply the justification instructions to Gilbert’s conduct as well as 

Ewer’s. Over Ewer’s objection, the trial court granted the State’s request for 

the modified justification jury instructions and ruled that the State could 

argue that the victim’s actions were legally justified.

¶7 In its closing argument, the State told the jury that the 

justification instructions applied equally to the defendant’s and Gilbert’s 

actions, and that “if [Gilbert’s] conduct was lawful, then [Ewer] is not 

justified.” The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.
STATE V. JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER

Opinion of the Court

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¶8 The court of appeals vacated Ewer’s convictions and 

remanded for a new trial. State v. Ewer, 250 Ariz. 561, 571 ¶ 34 (App. 2021). 

The court concluded that the “[j]ustification presumptions are not intended 

to apply to the victim’s conduct” and “[t]he modified jury instructions and 

the state’s argument applying them to the victim . . . were therefore 

improper.” Id. at 567 ¶ 18. Additionally, the court determined that this 

error was not harmless because it infected every count against Ewer and 

had a strong likelihood of misleading the jury. Id. at 568–69 ¶ 23. 

¶9 We granted review to determine whether the self-defense 

justification jury instruction may incorporate the use of force by both the 

defendant and victim or if the instruction applies only to the defendant. 

This is a question of statewide concern and is likely to recur. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶10 “We review a trial court’s decision to give a jury instruction 

for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Aragón, 252 Ariz. 525, 528 ¶ 6 (2022). 

We review de novo whether a trial court properly instructed the jury, State 

v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116, 130 ¶ 22 (2019), and “whether [the] jury 

instructions properly state the law,” State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 505 ¶ 68 

(2013). Additionally, “[w]e consider the jury instructions as a whole to 

determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at 

a legally correct decision.” State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 363 ¶ 51 (2009). 

¶11 Although each party is entitled to jury instructions on “any 

theory of the case reasonably supported by the evidence,” Champagne, 

247 Ariz. at 137 ¶ 60 (quoting State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995)), a jury 

instruction is improper if it misleads the jury, see State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 

384 ¶ 37 (2010). 

¶12 Section 13-404(A) states that “a person is justified in 

threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent 

a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately 

necessary to protect [one]self against the other’s use or attempted use of 

unlawful physical force.” (Emphasis added.) Although A.R.S. § 13-105(30) 
STATE V. JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER

Opinion of the Court

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defines “person” as “human being,” this broad definition could refer to 

either a defendant or victim. The issue before this Court is whether the 

reference to “person” in § 13-404(A) is necessarily limited to a defendant, as 

reflected in Arizona’s self-defense jury instruction. See RAJI Justification 

for Self-Defense 4.04. 

¶13 To resolve this question, we must consider the context of § 13-

404(A) and related statutes on the same subject to properly discern the 

statutory definition. See Molera v. Hobbs, 250 Ariz. 13, 24 ¶ 34 (2020); A.R.S. 

§§ 13-401 to -403, -405 to -411 (providing justification defenses for the use of 

deadly force, defense of a third person, defense of premises, defense of 

property, and the use of physical force in law enforcement and crime 

prevention). “Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if 

it is clear and unambiguous,” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 

244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9 (2018), and to do so, we “interpret statutory language in 

view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the 

same subject.” Molera, 250 Ariz. at 24 ¶ 34 (citation omitted); see also State 

ex rel. Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 122 (1970) (noting that courts look to 

the “whole system of related statutes”).

¶14 Looking to the related justification statutes in Chapter 4 of 

Title 13 for context, the use of “person” clearly reflects a focus on an 

individual accused of a crime and subject to criminal prosecution. See §§ 13-

401 to -403, -405 to -411. For example, § 13-401(A), which discusses the 

availability of justification as a defense, makes clear that a “person[’s]” 

conduct is only justified for certain crimes and the defense “is unavailable in 

a prosecution” for other crimes. (Emphasis added.) Additionally, subsection 

(B) refers to a criminal prosecution: “[J]ustification, as defined in this 

chapter, is a defense in any prosecution for an offense pursuant to this title.” 

§ 13-401(B) (emphasis added).

¶15 The other justification statutes also use this common, 

contextual theme: providing a “person”—a putative defendant in a 

criminal prosecution—with the ability to lawfully use physical force to 

protect oneself or a third person from the threatened unlawful use of force 

by another person, as well as the ability to use force to prevent another 

person from committing certain enumerated crimes. See §§ 13-401 to -403, 
STATE V. JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER

Opinion of the Court

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-405 to -411. In context, these related statutes indicate that justification 

defenses are afforded to a “person” who is a defendant in a criminal 

prosecution. 

¶16 Section 13-205(A), another statute that references the 

justification defense, also provides helpful context in defining “person” in 

§ 13-404(A). This statute provides, in part, that “[i]f evidence of justification 

pursuant to [A.R.S. §§ 13-401 to -421] is presented by the defendant, the state 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with 

justification.” A.R.S. § 13-205(A) (emphasis added).

¶17 Analyzing the word “person” in § 13-404(A) in context with 

these related statutes provides the framework to decide this issue. The 

words “prosecution” and “defendant,” and references to a “defense” 

within the context of these statutes, lead us to conclude that “person” in the 

justification statutes refers to a criminal defendant, not a “victim.” 

Accordingly, because “person” in § 13-404(A) applies to a defendant in a 

criminal prosecution, the trial court erred when it modified the standard 

RAJI justification instructions. 

¶18 Modifying the standard RAJI justification instructions to 

include consideration of the victim’s use of force was improper for another 

reason. As modified, it altered the perspective from which a jury must

determine whether the conduct in question was justified. “[T]he sole 

question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances 

would have believed that physical force was ‘immediately necessary to 

protect himself.’” State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90 ¶ 12 (2010) (quoting § 13-

404(A)). 

¶19 The State argues that whether the victim was justified in using 

force is one variable in the objective standard used to evaluate the 

defendant’s behavior. We disagree. It is of no import that a victim may 

have justifiably used or threatened force because the legality of the victim’s 

conduct is immaterial to a justification analysis. Accordingly, the 

prosecutor’s argument to the jury that “if [Gilbert’s] conduct was lawful, 

then [Ewer] is not justified” was incorrect as a matter of law. Even if a 

victim’s conduct is justified, the defendant could still reasonably but 
STATE V. JORDAN CHRISTOPHER EWER

Opinion of the Court

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mistakenly believe that use of force against the victim was necessary. See 

A.R.S. § 13-204(A)(2) (“[A] mistaken belief as to a matter of fact does not 

relieve a person of criminal liability unless . . . [i]t supports a defense of 

justification . . . .”); State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 468 ¶¶ 21–22 (2018) 

(recognizing that a mistaken belief regarding a threat can be reasonable 

from defendant’s perception). Because the proper focus of a justification 

defense is on an objectively reasonable person in the defendant’s position, 

King, 225 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 12; Carson, 243 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 9, 468 ¶ 22, the trial 

court erred in modifying the standard RAJI self-defense justification 

instruction to incorporate the victim’s use of force.

¶20 The court of appeals relied on State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361 

(App. 2011), to conclude that the self-defense justification jury instruction 

should not be modified to incorporate a victim’s use of force. See Ewer, 

250 Ariz. at 567–68 ¶¶ 17–18. Although the court reached the correct 

conclusion, we disagree with its reliance on Abdi because the court there 

improperly relied on legislative history in its interpretative analysis. 

226 Ariz. at 364 ¶ 8. We do not consider legislative history when the correct 

legal interpretation can be determined from the plain statutory text and the 

context of related statutes. See SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 

243 Ariz. 477, 480 ¶ 8 (2018) (“The best indicator of [legislative] intent is the 

statute’s plain language, which we read in context with other statutes 

relating to the same subject . . . .”). 

¶21 Our holding today, however, does not mean that a victim’s 

behavior is irrelevant. Self-defense cases often subject a victim’s actions to 

scrutiny. But it is not necessary or appropriate to instruct the jury regarding

the victim’s justification for the state to prove that the defendant’s actions 

were not justified. Instead, the state can meet its burden in at least two other 

ways. First, the state can present evidence that the defendant’s behavior 

provoked the victim. § 13-404(B)(3); see also State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 

104–05 (1983) (denying defendant’s self-defense instruction because 

defendant provoked the encounter). Second, the state can show that a 

reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have thought that 

physical force was immediately necessary. State v. Buggs, 167 Ariz. 333, 

336–37 (App. 1990) (rejecting defendant’s justification defense because 

defendant’s action was not imminently necessary to prevent harm).
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Opinion of the Court

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¶22 We also recognize that there may be situations in which it 

would be appropriate for the trial court to instruct the jury on applicable 

law based on the state’s or defendant’s positions at trial in order to assist 

the jury in analyzing a justification claim. For example, if a defendant 

claimed self-defense to justify physical force in response to a victim’s 

alleged aggravated assault, the state may be entitled to a jury instruction 

regarding aggravated assault to show that a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s position was not justified in responding with physical force. 

See State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 128 ¶¶ 63–64 (App. 2009) (holding that jury 

instructions regarding relevant law may be appropriate to assist the jury in 

determining validity of a self-defense claim). But here, the instruction was 

legally incorrect and did not assist the jury in determining the defendant’s 

guilt.

CONCLUSION

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate paragraphs 17–21 of the 

court of appeals’ opinion, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand 

this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion and 

the remainder of the court of appeals’ opinion including the court’s 

instruction to vacate Ewer’s convictions and hold a new trial.