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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re C.C.-1, L.C.-1, T.C., and C.C.-2

No. 20-0211 (Kanawha County 19-JA-269, 19-JA-270, 19-JA-271, and 19-JA-272)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Father L.C.-2, by counsel Michael M. Cary, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Kanawha County’s February 6, 2020, order terminating his parental rights to C.C.-1, L.C.-1, T.C., 

and C.C.-2.1 The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by 

counsel Mindy M. Parsley, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad 

litem (“guardian”), Elizabeth G. Kavitz, filed a response on behalf of the children also in support 

of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in not affording 

him a meaningful improvement period.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The DHHR filed a child abuse and neglect petition against the parents in April of 2019. 

Specifically, the DHHR alleged that one year prior to the filing of the petition, C.C.-1 reported that 

a family friend sexually abused her. At that time, the child was interviewed at a Child Advocacy 

Center wherein she disclosed the nature of the abuse. Child Protective Services (“CPS”) did not 

open a case against the parents at that time because the parents were protective of the child and 

kept the family friend away from her. The DHHR alleged that, since that time, however, the parents 

permitted the family friend to be in the home with the children, despite C.C.-1’s prior disclosure 

1Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). Additionally, because two of the children share the same initials, 

we will refer to them as C.C.-1 and C.C.-2, respectively, throughout this memorandum decision. 

Because one of the children and petitioner share the same initials, we will refer to them as L.C.-1 

and L.C.-2, respectively, throughout this memorandum decision.

FILED

September 23, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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of abuse. Consequently, the DHHR alleged that the parents failed to protect the children and also 

failed to provide them with financial support.

At an adjudicatory hearing held in May of 2019, the parents stipulated to the allegations 

contained in the petition. The circuit court accepted their stipulations, adjudicated them as abusing 

parents, and ordered that they participate in services. Specifically, the parents were ordered to 

participate in parenting and adult life skills classes, submit to random drug screens, participate in 

supervised visits, and submit to psychological and parental fitness evaluations.

Petitioner underwent a psychological evaluation in June of 2019. The evaluator concluded 

that petitioner’s prognosis for attaining minimally adequate parenting was poor given his history 

of pathological attachment, impaired judgment, and defensive responding during the evaluation. 

The evaluator recommended that petitioner attend psychotherapy, submit to medication 

management and random drug screenings, demonstrate the ability to maintain stable relationships 

and employment, and demonstrate an attachment to his children by complying with CPS 

intervention and services.

In July of 2019, the guardian filed a report on behalf of the children wherein she 

recommended termination of the parents’ parental rights. The guardian reported that the parents 

failed to accept responsibility for their actions and believed that they had not done anything wrong 

with regard to the children, despite their stipulations of abuse and neglect. Nevertheless, the circuit 

court granted the parents’ motions for post-dispositional improvement periods at a dispositional 

hearing held later that month.

At a review hearing held in October of 2019, the circuit court continued the improvement 

periods and ordered that the parents participate in family therapy. The guardian authored another 

report following a multidisciplinary team meeting held in December of 2019. According to the 

guardian, the DHHR reported that the parents were “not complying with the therapeutic conditions 

of their improvement periods,” failed to obtain and maintain employment, had marital issues that 

were “obstructing therapeutic progress with the children,” and were generally not in compliance 

with the terms of their improvement periods.

The circuit court held a final dispositional hearing in January of 2020. The DHHR 

presented the testimony of the CPS worker, who recommended termination of the petitioner’s

parental rights due to “[his] inability to progress through [his] improvement period and ongoing 

fundamental issues impeding [his] ability to safely parent the minor children.” The DHHR also 

presented the testimony of a therapist, who had provided counseling to the parents. The therapist 

testified that she was hesitant to integrate C.C.-1 into the counseling sessions because petitioner

failed to “attain a baseline of safety, communication, and honesty in the counseling environment.” 

On the two occasions the therapist incorporated C.C.-1 into the sessions, the petitioner’s behaviors 

did not contribute to an appropriate therapeutic environment. The therapist opined that petitioner 

had not made any progress whatsoever since beginning counseling in August of 2019. Lastly, the 

DHHR presented the testimony of a service provider. The service provider stated that the 

petitioner’s home environment was “unsafe to bring the children into due to the ongoing 

destructive conflict between the [r]espondent [p]arents.” Following the close of evidence, the 

circuit court found that petitioner failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect and that his 
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failure to demonstrate the capacity to improve prevented him from being an appropriate parent. 

Accordingly, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental rights upon finding that there was 

no reasonable likelihood that he could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the foreseeable 

future and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Petitioner appeals the February 6, 

2020, dispositional order terminating his parental rights.

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The Court has previously established the following standard of review in cases such as this:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in not affording him a meaningful 

improvement period. Petitioner contends that he was willing to participate in and should have been 

granted services such as marriage counseling and couple’s therapy prior to the termination of his 

parental rights. Petitioner argues that he could have benefited from marriage counseling before 

trying to implement family counseling. We find petitioner’s argument to be without merit.

Petitioner does not argue that he did not receive an improvement period. In fact, the record 

is clear that petitioner was provided services throughout the proceedings and was granted a postdispositional improvement period in July of 2019. Rather, petitioner contends that his 

improvement period was not “meaningful” because he was not provided services such as marriage 

counseling prior to his participation in family counseling. We have previously held that

[a]t the conclusion of the improvement period, the court shall review the 

performance of the parents in attempting to attain the goals of the improvement 

period and shall, in the court’s discretion, determine whether the conditions of the 

improvement period have been satisfied and whether sufficient improvement has 

been made in the context of all the circumstances of the case to justify the return of 

the child.

2The mother’s parental rights were also terminated below. The permanency plan for L.C.-

1, T.C., and C.C.-2 is adoption by their respective foster families. C.C.-1 is currently receiving 

inpatient treatment and the guardian states she remains hopeful C.C.-1 can be placed in a foster 

home pending her successful treatment.
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Syl. Pt. 6, In Interest of Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991). Petitioner’s contention 

that he should have been granted an additional service is without merit. Petitioner was provided 

with several services, including parenting and adult life skills classes, supervised visitation, 

random drug screens, and individualized therapy in addition to family counseling. While petitioner 

states he should have been granted marriage counseling prior to family counseling, the record is 

clear that petitioner and the mother participated in counseling together several times before any of 

the children were incorporated into the sessions. Despite these sessions with petitioner and the 

mother, the therapist testified at the dispositional hearing that she was hesitant to integrate C.C.-1 

into counseling with the parents because of their inability to attain safe and honest communication. 

The therapist only incorporated C.C.-1 into two sessions and, on both occasions, petitioner did not 

contribute to a therapeutic environment for the child. Therefore, any suggestion that petitioner was 

not afforded counseling prior to family counseling is disingenuous. Indeed, petitioner was 

provided this service but was unable to progress such that he was able to assist the child during 

therapy. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner was provided with numerous meaningful 

opportunities and services throughout his improvement period but failed to remedy the conditions 

of abuse and neglect. Accordingly, we find that petitioner is entitled to no relief in this regard.

The above-mentioned evidence also supports the circuit court’s termination of petitioner’s 

parental rights. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) provides that circuit courts are to terminate 

parental rights upon finding that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect 

or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination is necessary for the 

children’s welfare. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) provides that a circuit court may find that 

there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially 

corrected when 

[t]he abusing parent or parents have not responded to or followed through with a 

reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts of social, medical, mental 

health, or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or 

neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or insubstantial diminution 

of conditions which threatened the health, welfare, or life of the child[.]

The record establishes that petitioner failed to follow through with rehabilitative efforts 

designed to prevent the abuse or neglect of the children. As noted above, petitioner failed to 

adequately participate in counseling services. Testimony established that petitioner simply used 

the sessions as an opportunity to fight with the mother over marital issues rather than work on 

improving their parenting skills or addressing their poor judgment. Petitioner was unable to create 

a safe environment for C.C.-1 or contribute to her therapy. Petitioner also failed to maintain 

employment throughout the proceedings. Further, petitioner’s psychological evaluation report 

indicated that his judgment was impaired and that his prognosis for attaining minimally adequate 

parenting was poor. This conclusion was supported by the fact that petitioner failed to accept 

responsibility for his actions or acknowledge that he had done anything wrong. In fact, petitioner 

minimized the abuse to C.C.-1 by stating that he allowed the perpetrator of her sexual abuse back 

in the home because the child allegedly retracted her statements. 
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To the extent petitioner contends that he should have been granted additional services in 

his improvement period prior to the termination of his parental rights, we have previously held that 

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 

114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Based on the foregoing, we find 

no error in the circuit court’s termination of petitioner’s parental rights as there was sufficient 

evidence to find that there was no reasonable likelihood that he could correct the conditions of 

abuse and/or neglect in the near future and that termination of his parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests.

Lastly, because C.C.-1 has not yet achieved permanency, this Court reminds the circuit 

court of its duty to establish permanency for the child. Rule 39(b) of the Rules of Procedure for 

Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings requires:

At least once every three months until permanent placement is achieved as defined 

in Rule 6, the court shall conduct a permanent placement review conference, 

requiring the multidisciplinary treatment team to attend and report as to progress 

and development in the case, for the purpose of reviewing the progress in the 

permanent placement of the child.

Further, this Court reminds the circuit court of its duty pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of 

Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings to find permanent placement for children

within twelve months of the date of the dispositional order. As this Court has stated, 

[t]he [twelve]-month period provided in Rule 43 of the West Virginia Rules 

of Procedure[] for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings for permanent placement 

of an abused and neglected child following the final dispositional order must be 

strictly followed except in the most extraordinary circumstances which are fully 

substantiated in the record. 

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, syl. pt. 6. Moreover, this Court has stated that 

[i]n determining the appropriate permanent out-of-home placement of a 

child under [West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)], the circuit court shall give 

priority to securing a suitable adoptive home for the child and shall consider other 

placement alternatives, including permanent foster care, only where the court finds 

that adoption would not provide custody, care, commitment, nurturing and 

discipline consistent with the child’s best interests or where a suitable adoptive 

home [cannot] be found. 
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Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Michael M., 202 W. Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 177 (1998). Finally, “[t]he guardian 

ad litem’s role in abuse and neglect proceedings does not actually cease until such time as the child 

is placed in a permanent home.” Syl. Pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 

(1991).

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

February 6, 2020, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 23, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison