IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–1666

Submitted November 16, 2023—Filed December 15, 2023

Amended December 15, 2023

MARC HARDING d/b/a HARDING LAW FIRM,

Appellee,

vs.

RICK SASSO d/b/a INDIANA SPINE GROUP,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.

Interlocutory appeal from the denial of motion to dismiss suit for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Brent R. Ruther of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Engberg & Helling, PLC, 

Burlington, for appellant.

Jeffrey M. Lipman of Lipman Law Firm, West Des Moines, for appellee.
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MCDONALD, Justice.

Iowa attorney Marc Harding engaged Indiana doctor Rick Sasso to provide 

expert witness services in a potential medical malpractice suit in Iowa. Things 

did not go according to plan, and Harding filed this suit against Sasso in Polk 

County, Iowa. Harding sought to recover all or part of the $10,000 retainer he 

paid to Dr. Sasso plus additional damages. Dr. Sasso moved to dismiss the suit 

for want of personal jurisdiction over him. The district court denied the motion, 

and Dr. Sasso filed an application for interlocutory review. We granted the 

application and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals 

reversed the district court and remanded the case with instruction to dismiss 

the case. We granted Harding’s application for further review. 

I.

A state’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is 

limited by both the Federal Constitution and state law. See Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. 

Summit Nutritionals Int’l, Inc., 859 N.W.2d 182, 188 (Iowa 2015). 

With respect to the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court holds that 

“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power 

to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud.

Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). Under the Court’s Fourteenth 

Amendment jurisprudence, a state’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant “depends on the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’ with 

the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context 

of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)). 

With respect to state law, Iowa law provides that “[e]very corporation, 

individual, personal representative, partnership or association that shall have 
3

the necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the 

jurisdiction of the courts of this state.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.306. We have explained 

that rule 1.306 authorizes the widest exercise of personal jurisdiction allowed 

under the Supreme Court’s precedents interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Book v. Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 583 (Iowa 2015);

Sioux Pharm, Inc., 859 N.W.2d at 188; Ostrem v. Prideco Secure Loan Fund, LP, 

841 N.W.2d 882, 891 (Iowa 2014). Because Iowa law allows for the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction up to the federal constitutional limit, we focus on the 

federal constitutional requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has “recogniz[ed] two kinds of personal jurisdiction: 

general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes 

called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024. “A state 

court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is ‘essentially at 

home’ in the state.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 

564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). General jurisdiction over a defendant allows a state 

court to adjudicate any and all claims against a defendant without regard to 

whether the claims relate to the forum state or the defendant’s activities in the 

forum state. See id. In the paradigmatic case, an individual is subject to a state’s 

general jurisdiction if the state is his domicile. See id.

“Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately 

connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Id. The contact 

necessary to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction is not great. The 

defendant need only take “some act by which [he] purposefully avails [himself] of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Id. (quoting 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). “The contacts must be the 

defendant’s own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ ” Id. at 1025 

(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Even when the 
4

defendant has sufficient minimum contact with the forum state, the forum state 

has jurisdiction over the defendant for only a limited set of claims. Specifically, 

the nonresident defendant can be sued in the forum state only when the 

plaintiff’s claims “ ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the 

forum.” Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 

262 (2017)).

If a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contact with the forum 

state and the claim relates to the contact, the court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant only where it “would comport with ‘fair play and 

substantial justice.’ ” Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 893 (quoting Cap. Promotions, 

L.L.C. v. Don King Prods., Inc., 756 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Iowa 2008)). In making that 

determination, courts focus on 

“the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in 

adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 

convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s 

interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” 

and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering 

fundamental substantive social policies.” 

Id. (quoting Cap. Promotions, 756 N.W.2d at 834). In conducting this analysis, 

courts must be cognizant of not allowing jurisdictional rules to severely 

disadvantage a defendant. See Shams v. Hassan, 829 N.W.2d 848, 857 (Iowa 

2013).

II.

Dr. Sasso moved to dismiss Harding’s petition for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is a special 

proceeding that requires the district court to make findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in resolving the motion. See PSFS 3 Corp. v. Michael P. 

Seidman, D.D.S., P.C., 962 N.W.2d 810, 826 (Iowa 2021). It is the plaintiff’s 

burden to make a prima facie showing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
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is allowed. See id. In determining whether the plaintiff met that burden, the 

district court must accept as true the allegations of the petition and the content 

of any uncontroverted affidavits offered by the parties. See id.; see also Mass.

Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In 

conducting the requisite analysis under the prima facie standard, we take 

specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not 

disputed) and construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s 

jurisdictional claim. We then add to the mix facts put forward by the defendants, 

to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” (citation omitted)). Once the plaintiff 

makes a prima facie showing that the exercise of jurisdiction is allowed, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to show the exercise of jurisdiction is 

unreasonable or otherwise improper. PSFS 3 Corp., 962 N.W.2d at 826.

The operative pleading in this case is Harding’s first amended petition.

According to the first amended petition, Harding is an Iowa attorney practicing 

in Des Moines. Harding represented an Iowa resident pursuing a potential 

medical malpractice action in Iowa. The potential defendants were a surgeon that 

practices in Polk County, Iowa, and a medical facility located in Polk County, 

Iowa. Harding provided his client’s medical records to an initial reviewer to make 

a preliminary assessment of the claim. The initial reviewer emailed an opinion to 

Harding stating that there was a breach of the standard of care that favored

proceeding with the case. Harding then contacted Dr. Sasso d/b/a Indiana Spine 

Group. Dr. Sasso is an orthopedic surgeon who practices in Indiana. “On 

February 24, 2021, Harding and Sasso negotiated and agreed that Sasso would 

serve as an expert to both evaluate a potential malpractice claim and to testify 

as an expert in any ensuing litigation.” Dr. Sasso’s rate was $1,000 per hour. 

Harding sent Dr. Sasso a $10,000 advance for his services. The parties agreed 

that “any unearned portion of that advance would be returned to Harding.” There 
6

was no written contract memorializing the agreement. Harding provided 

Dr. Sasso with the initial reviewer’s one-page email plus 166 pages of Harding’s 

client’s medical records. Dr. Sasso reviewed the records. On March 4, Dr. Sasso 

informed Harding via telephone that the potential defendants had not breached 

the standard of care. Dr. Sasso also informed Harding “that he spent 12 hours

reviewing the 166 pages and one-page email and would not be returning any of 

the $10,000 advance.” Dr. Sasso informed Harding that he had not kept time 

records. According to the first amended petition, Dr. Sasso never returned any 

portion of the advance and never provided an accounting for the advance. The 

first amended petition sets forth claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 

duty, conversion, and fraud against Dr. Sasso.

The parties then filed competing affidavits in support of and in resistance 

to the motion to dismiss. Dr. Sasso’s affidavit provided that he is an orthopedic 

surgeon and the president of Indiana Spine Group. He formed Indiana Spine 

Group in Indiana in 2002. All of Indiana Spine Group’s offices and business are 

in Indiana. Neither Dr. Sasso nor Indiana Spine Group have advertised or 

solicited business in Iowa. According to Dr. Sasso, Harding called him and 

requested that Dr. Sasso review the medical records. According to the affidavit, 

Harding did not share any plans for litigation in Iowa. Dr. Sasso informed 

Harding that he “would give [his] opinion of compliance with the standard of care 

. . . for a flat fee of $10,000.” Dr. Sasso “did not commit to provide any particular 

result or opinion and did not commit to providing testimony in any case that 

Mr. Harding might file in the future.” Dr. Sasso “did not imagine that any 

lawsuits could ever arise.” He was “surprised to be sued in the State of Iowa.” 

Dr. Sasso did not “engage in business in Iowa and performed all work for 

Mr. Harding at [his] office in Carmel, Indiana.”
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Harding filed an affidavit in support of his resistance to the motion to 

dismiss. In the affidavit, Harding disputed the terms of the parties’ agreement. 

According to Harding, Dr. Sasso agreed that he “could serve as an expert at trial, 

and that he would require a $10,000.00 retainer, at which he would charge 

$1,000.00 per hour for his record review and trial testimony.” Dr. Sasso never 

said the “retainer was non-refundable.” 

The district court denied Dr. Sasso’s motion to dismiss. The district court 

took as true the averments set forth in the first amended petition and then

considered the averments in Dr. Sasso’s motion to dismiss along with his

affidavit in support of the same to the extent the affidavit was uncontroverted. 

In reviewing the record, the district court found that Dr. Sasso agreed “to provide 

expertise and expert testimony to Plaintiff for a cause of action in an Iowa forum.” 

The district court concluded that this was “sufficient to establish minimum 

contacts and personal jurisdiction over Defendant.” Dr. Sasso did not file any 

motion to enlarge or amend the district court’s ruling but instead sought 

interlocutory appeal. As noted above, the court of appeals reversed the order of 

the district court. We granted Harding’s application for further review.

III.

We review the district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss for the 

correction of errors at law. See Sioux Pharm, Inc., 859 N.W.2d at 188; Shams, 

829 N.W.2d at 853. We are not bound by the district court’s application of law 

or the district court’s legal conclusions. See Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 853. We are 

bound by the district court’s finding of facts, however. See id. “Unlike other 

grounds for dismissal . . . a court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction must make factual findings to determine whether it has 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. “The trial court’s findings of fact 

have the effect of a jury verdict and are subject to challenge only if not supported 
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by substantial evidence in the record.” Hodges v. Hodges, 572 N.W.2d 549, 551 

(Iowa 1997). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw 

different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether [the evidence] 

supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a 

different finding.” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800–01 (Iowa 2021) (quoting 

Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Iowa 2010)). 

Where the district court does not make explicit factual findings, we “presume the 

court decided the facts necessary to support its decision.” Bankers Tr. Co. v. 

Fidata Tr. Co. N.Y., 452 N.W.2d 411, 413–14 (Iowa 1990).

The following facts are supported by the record. Dr. Sasso provides 

medical services in Indiana and has never solicited or done business in Iowa. 

Dr. Sasso did not contact Harding in Iowa regarding this matter but was instead 

contacted by Harding from Iowa. Dr. Sasso agreed “to provide expertise and 

expert testimony to Plaintiff for a cause of action in an Iowa forum.” While 

Dr. Sasso disputed this in the district court, the finding is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, that finding is supported by the 

averments in the first amended petition and Harding’s affidavit in support of his 

resistance to the motion to dismiss. Dr. Sasso reviewed the medical records at 

issue from his office in Indiana. Dr. Sasso called Mr. Harding in Iowa to report 

his findings and conclusions to Harding.

On these facts, the question presented is whether the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over Dr. Sasso to resolve a dispute regarding this contract is 

constitutional. “Personal jurisdiction is only appropriate when ‘the defendant’s 

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court there.’ ” Book, 860 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The 

essential inquiry is whether there was “some act by which the defendant 
9

purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Sioux Pharm, 

Inc., 859 N.W.2d at 189 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

475 (1985)). “Random or attenuated contacts with the forum state do not satisfy 

the minimum contacts test.” Book, 860 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting Ostrem, 

841 N.W.2d at 891). Instead, the contacts “must show that the defendant 

deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, . . . entering a 

contractual relationship centered there.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025 

(quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)).

Here, Dr. Sasso had sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over him with respect to claims arising out of 

and related to the parties’ contract. Dr. Sasso’s contact with Iowa was not 

random or attenuated. Instead, he purposefully availed himself of the privilege 

of doing business in Iowa. He entered into a contractual relationship with an 

Iowa lawyer. Dr. Sasso agreed to evaluate a medical malpractice claim involving 

an Iowa resident, a physician practicing in Iowa, and a medical facility located 

in Iowa. Critically, he also agreed to provide expert testimony at any trial in the 

medical malpractice case, which would have been venued in Iowa. Thus, at the 

time of the parties’ agreement, one of the “contemplated future consequences” of 

the contract was that Dr. Sasso would perform part of the contract in an Iowa

court. Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479). In 

addition, the dispute between Harding and Dr. Sasso directly arises out of 

Dr. Sasso’s contact with Iowa. “A single contact with the forum state can be 

sufficient to satisfy due process concerns when the plaintiff’s claim arises out of 

the contact.” Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 855; see also Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262 

(explaining that there must be “an affiliation between the forum and the 

underlying controversy” (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919)); Sioux Pharm, Inc.,
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859 N.W.2d at 189 (stating a single contact can be enough when the claim arises 

out of the contact).

Having determined Dr. Sasso had sufficient minimum contact with the 

State of Iowa to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him with 

respect to this contract dispute, we must still “determine whether the assertion 

of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ”

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320); see also

Guardi v. Desai, 151 F. Supp.2d 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“Second, if minimum 

contacts exist, the court must determine if exercising jurisdiction over the 

defendant would comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’ ” (quoting Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 

75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996))). Dr. Sasso must present a “compelling case 

that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 

unreasonable.” Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 

477). These compelling reasons “are limited to the rare situation in which the 

plaintiff’s interest and the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute in the 

forum are so attenuated that they are clearly outweighed by the burden of 

subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum.” Id. (quoting Pat. Rts. 

Prot. Grp., LLC v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 603 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2010)).

We cannot conclude this is a compelling or rare case where the exercise of 

jurisdiction is unreasonable or offends the “traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 

326 U.S. at 316). The maintenance of the suit in Iowa does not place an 

unreasonable burden on Dr. Sasso. The parties contemplated and agreed that 

Dr. Sasso would perform part of the contract in Iowa. In particular, the parties 

contemplated and agreed he would testify in an Iowa court in any medical 
11

malpractice claim. Dr. Sasso cannot now claim it is unexpected or unreasonable 

to make him appear in an Iowa court when he contracted to appear in an Iowa 

court. Further, “Iowa has a legitimate interest in adjudicating a dispute between 

one of its residents . . . and an out-of-state” party that contracted for services to 

be performed in this State. Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 903. “Certainly Iowa ‘has a 

manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents.’ ” Id. 

(quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). These last two factors 

alone, “the interests of the plaintiff and the forum,”—the United States Supreme 

Court has explained—often “will justify even the serious burdens placed on the 

alien defendant.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114

(1987).

In concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally 

permissible here, we are persuaded by the decisions of other courts that have 

reached the same conclusion in materially indistinguishable circumstances. In 

McNally v. Morrison, Illinois plaintiffs filed a suit for breach of contract, consumer 

fraud, fraud, and professional negligence in Illinois against an Ohio doctor who

they had retained to serve as an expert witness in an Illinois medical malpractice 

case. 951 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). As in this case, the expert witness 

“never performed any physical activities in Illinois in conjunction with the 

medical malpractice case . . . and neither party assert[ed] that there [was] a 

written contract governing [the doctor’s] services as an expert witness.” Id. at 

191. The circuit court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and 

the appellate court reversed. Id. at 194. The appellate court concluded there were

sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois because the doctor was contractually 

“serving as an expert witness in an Illinois medical malpractice case.” Id. at 193. 

“[E]ven though the only services that he had actually performed took place in 

Ohio, [the doctor’s] services were intended to produce a result in Illinois.” Id.
12

The McNally court also concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction would 

not be unreasonable. “The burden on [the doctor] to defend in Illinois does not 

appear to be unduly great. Ohio and Illinois are relatively close geographically.” 

Id. The same is true here. In addition, the court explained that the doctor could 

not show how “defending a suit in Illinois under Illinois law would be unduly 

burdensome when he had already agreed to testify in an Illinois case.” Id. The 

same is true here. “Third, exercising jurisdiction would further the plaintiffs’

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.” Id. The same is true here. 

The court concluded that “Illinois’s interest in protecting its citizens . . . 

outweigh[ed] Ohio’s interest in protecting its citizens from the inconvenience of 

defending a lawsuit in another state.” Id. at 194. The same is true here as well.

In Golden v. Stein, a lawyer defendant in a professional malpractice case 

filed a third-party claim against an accounting firm he hired to provide damages 

opinions in the underlying case that ultimately gave rise to the malpractice case 

against the lawyer. 481 F. Supp. 3d 843, 846 (S.D. Iowa 2019). The expert 

witness moved to dismiss the third-party claim for lack of personal jurisdiction 

in Iowa. Id. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Id. The underlying 

case was venued in Iowa. The expert witness agreed “to provide expert services 

for legal proceedings in” Iowa. Id. at 857. The parties understood that there was 

a “95–99 percent chance that the case would settle,” id. at 849, “and that it was 

extremely unlikely that she would ever be asked to travel anywhere, let alone 

Iowa, for purposes of the [u]nderlying [a]ction,” id. at 857. The witness never 

actually had to travel to Iowa in the underlying case. That did not change the 

fact that the expert witness understood at the time of contracting that “by 

agreeing to provide expert witness services in litigation in Iowa, some of the 

future consequences of failing to provide those services would occur to some 

degree in Iowa.” Id. Further, the district court found the expert witness purposely 
13

availed itself “of the privilege of conducting expert witness activities in this forum 

to earn expert witness fees, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this 

forum’s laws.” Id. at 860. The court held that “the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over [the expert witness] in this forum [was] proper.” Id. at 861.

Also directly relevant here is Guardi v. Desai, 151 F. Supp. 2d 555. In that 

case, Pennsylvania plaintiffs filed suit against a Colorado doctor who agreed to 

review medical records as an expert witness for “a potential medical negligence 

action in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 559. The plaintiffs’ lawyers mailed mammograms 

to the doctor for her review, but the doctor lost the mammograms; without the 

original mammograms, the plaintiffs were unable to proceed with their potential 

malpractice claims. Id. at 557. The court held this single contractual 

arrangement was sufficient minimum contact with the forum state to support 

the exercise of jurisdiction. The expert “purposefully availed herself of the 

privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 560. The expert’s agreement 

to serve as an “expert in the potential malpractice case . . . created a continuing 

obligation between herself” and the plaintiffs. Id. The expert “should have 

expected that her activities . . . could cause her to be haled into court in 

Pennsylvania.” Id. at 561. The court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction 

would not be unreasonable. “While Defendant [did] have the burden of coming 

to Pennsylvania from Colorado, given her actions impacting on Pennsylvania 

residents, it [was] not unfair to require that she conduct her defense in 

Pennsylvania.” Id. at 562. 

Similarly compelling is Echavarria v. Beck, 338 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.P.R. 

2004). Like this case, Echavarria involved an expert witness who agreed to 

provide expert services in a different forum, and the dispute between the parties 

arose out of that agreement. Id. at 260. The district court in that case denied the 

expert’s motion to dismiss, concluding:
14

The facts before this Court demonstrate that Beck had 

minimum contacts with this forum that are sufficient to allow this 

Court to exercise jurisdiction over him. Beck was aware that he was 

rendering an expert opinion for a case in Puerto Rico, and that he 

would need to travel to Puerto Rico at least for a deposition and 

perhaps a trial. He received economic benefit from his contact, and 

could reasonably foresee that a cause of action could arise from said 

contact. This Court believes that plaintiffs have met the required 

prima facie burden to establish specific in personam jurisdiction 

over Beck.

Id. at 263. 

Dr. Sasso argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden v. Fiore, 

571 U.S. 277, compels a different result. In Walden, a Georgia police officer 

working at an Atlanta airport seized money from two Nevada residents traveling 

back to Nevada. Id. at 280. The Nevada residents sued the officer in Nevada. Id. 

at 281. The Court held that Nevada did not have personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant even though “his conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to the 

forum State.” Id. at 291.

“But Walden has precious little to do with the cases before us.” Ford Motor 

Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1031. As the Supreme Court subsequently explained in Ford 

Motor Co., “In Walden, only the plaintiffs had any contacts with the State of 

Nevada.” Id. The officer had never “ ‘purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege 

of conducting activities’ in the forum State.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). But that is not true here. Dr. Sasso did purposefully 

avail himself of the privilege of providing expert witness services to an Iowa 

lawyer in a potential Iowa case involving a claim between Iowans with the 

understanding he might have to testify in an Iowa court. So, the only issue here 

is whether Dr. Sasso’s single contact with Iowa is “related enough” to Harding’s 

suit. Id. As set forth above, Dr. Sasso’s contact with Iowa is “related enough” to 

this suit because Harding’s claim against Dr. Sasso arises directly out of 
15

Dr. Sasso’s agreement to serve as an expert witness in an Iowa case, involving 

Iowans, to be litigated in an Iowa court. 

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying the

defendant’s motion to dismiss, and we remand this case for further proceedings.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT ORDER 

AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED.