### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Fe brua ry 14, 200 6 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. M A R K A
. S C HI EF EL BE IN Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. I-1102-427 R uss Held m an, Jud ge

No . M 20 05 -0 01 66 -C CA -R 3- CD and No . M 20 05 -0 23 70 -C CA -R 10 -C O F iled Fe bruary 8, 2007
A Will iamson CountyCircuit Court jury convicted the defe ndant, Mark A . Schiefe lbein, of seve n counts of a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l b a tt e r y a n d o n e c o u n t o f e s p e c ia ll y a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l e xp lo it a ti o n of a minor. The trial court imposed a 12- y ear sentenc e for

eac h conviction and or dere d consec utive service , there by

y ielding an eff

ective se ntence of 96 y ea rs
. Aggrieve d of the c onvictions and sentenc es, the de fendant appea ls and raises the following issues: ( 1) the trial court e rre d by failing to req u ire the State to furnish discovery materia ls to the defendant; (2) the trial c ourt committed re ve rs ibl e e rr or

by c on fi g uring c ou rt

ro om s e a tin g to s hie ld the pu bli c fr om v ie wi ng c e rt a in e xhibi ts; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury , sua spont e, to disreg ard certa in truthful testimony of the de fendant; (4) the trial court’s repe ated questioning of State’s witnesses cre ated an appe arance of jud ic ia l bi a s a ndimp ro pe rl y bo lst e red th e S ta te ’s c a se ; ( 5) the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in e xclu din g de fe ns e -p ro ff e re d m edica l te sti mon y

that a ph y sic a l e xami natio n o f the vic tim rebutted the occur

renc e of se x ual pene tration, contac t, or injury ; (6) the t ri al co u rt permitted the introduction of i nadmissible and hig hly prejudicia l hear say

and opinion testimony ; (7) the tria l court e rr on e ou sly

pe rm itt e d th e State to e xami ne the de fe nd a nt abo ut his kn ow le dg e that a “ vo ic e str e ss analy sis” could detec t stress in an i n d i v i d ual’s voice ; (8) the tria l court er roneously instructed the j u r y t h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n tc o u l db e g u i l t y o f a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y i f h e a c t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y, kn ow ing ly , o r “ re c kle ssl y ” ; ( 9) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly

ins truct ed th e jury

that th e State c ou ld prove the mental s tate for ag g ravated s exual battery in the disjunctive by

showing that the def

endant acte d intentionally , knowing ly , “or” rec klessly ; (10) the tria l judge should be disqualified fr om further involvement in the case ; and (11) the defe ndant’s ef fec tive sentenc e is excessive, illeg al, and unconstitutional. As an adjunct to the issues rai s ed o n d i rec t appea l, the defe ndant also pursue s Appellate Proc edure Rule 10 interlocutory revie w to bar f

uture prose cu tion of three r elated c hildrape char g es that we re se vere d, o v er his objec tion, from trial of the a g g rava ted sexual battery

and espec ially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor offe nses. After thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d a ndc are fu l c on sid e ratio n o f the pa rt ie s b ri e fs , the ir or a l arg ume nts , a nd the app lic able la w, we ho ld that none of the err ors re quire re versa l of t he def endant’ s convictions for a g g ravated sexual battery or fo r a g g ra vate d s e xua l e xploi ta tio n of a min or . H ow e ve r, we ho ld that th e inc arc e rativ e 96 -y e ars ’ se nte nc e is i nc on sis te nt wi th the pu rp os e s a nd princ ipl e s of se nte nc ing a nddo e s n ot p ro vid e a fair sense of predic tabilityof the c riminal law and i t s s an ct i ons; theref ore, w e modify

the def endant’ sW e re m a n d fo r c le ric a l co rr e c tio n o n e o f t h e ju d g m e n ts. See Foot n ot e 3. 1

T he d efi nit i ve st yl e g uid e fo r l eg al cit ati o n in t he U nit ed S t ates is T H E B L U E B OOK : A U N I F O R M S YS T E M OF 2 C I T A T I ON ( Col u mbi a La w Rev i ew As s ’ n et

. a l

. e ds

. , 18 e d. 2005)

. T h e cu r r en t 18 e di t i on di r ec t s t h at l oca l c i t at i on th th rul es t ake p reced ence o ver Bl uebook ru le s. F o r T e n n e sse e , T H E B L UEBOOK r ef er enc es “ T enn
. Co de Ann. § 1- 2- 10 1(a) ( 20 03 ) ( ‘ ci t e a s ’ )

. ” T hat C od e s ect i on provi des as fol l ows: “ T hi s comp i l at i on of t he l aws of

t he s t at e i s t o be desi gn at ed
as t he ‘ T enn es s ee C od e’ an d t he ann ot at ed edi t i on of t he code provi ded f or by ch apt er 1 o f t hi s t i t l e s hal l be des i gn at ed
as ‘ T en n es s ee C ode Ann ot at ed’ an d a bbr ev i at ed an d c i t ed ‘ T

. C. A. ’ ” H en ce for t h , t h e au t h or of t h i s opi n i on w i l l e mpl oy “T .C .A .” i n c i t ati o n sen t en ce s and cit ati o n c l au ses.

T h e i n di ct men t a n d t h e j u dg men t l i s t t h e i n cor r ec t code s ec t i on f or t h i s c h ar g e. T h ey l i s t s ec t i on 39- 17- 105 3 i nst ead of

s ec t i on 39- 17- 1005. See T

. C. A. §§ 39- 17- 105 ( ch ar g e for u s e of pu bl i c t oi l et f ac i l i t y pr oh i bi t ed) , - 1005 (2 0 0 6 ). O n re m a n d , t h e trial c o u rt sh a ll a m e n d this ju d g m e n t. -2- e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e fr om 96 y e ars to 36 y e ars
. We or de r that the tr ia l ju dg e wh o p re sid e d at tria l is disqualified from conducting any further proce eding s in this cause
. Finally , we dismiss the childrape offe nses, as improperly sever ed, and hold that f urther prosec ution on such char g es is barr ed by p r i n c i p l e s o f

d o u b l e j e o p ar d y. 1 Tenn. R. App . P . 3 & 10; Judgm ents of the Circuit Court are Aff irm ed in Par t as Modifi ed; Reve rsed in Par t.
J A M ES C U R WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined. G AR Y W. W ADE , P.J ., n o tp ar t i ci p at i n g.
David L . Ray

bin, Nashville, Tenne ssee ( on motion for new t rial and on appea l); and Patrick Johnson, Nashville, Tenne ssee ( at trial), f or the Appe llant, Mark A. Schief elbein.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l & Rep orte r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ronald L . Davis, District Attorney Gene ral; and Mary Katharine Whit e, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
On Novembe r 12, 2002, the Wil liamson County Gra nd J ury indicted the def

endant on three counts of child ra pe, see T.C.A. § 39-13-522 ( 2006) (“ Rape of a child is the unlawful 2
se xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f a vic tim by the de fe nd a nt or the de fe nd a nt by a vic tim , if suc h v ic tim is l e ss than thirteen ( 13) y ea rs o f age.” ), seve n counts of ag g ravated sexual battery , see id . § 39-13- 504(a) (4) ( “Ag g ravated sexual battery is unlawful sex ual contact with a victim by the def endant or the de fe nd a nt b y

a vic tim a c c omp a nie d by a ny of the fo llo wi ng c ir c ums ta nc e s: .
. . (4 ) T he vic tim is less than t hirteen (13) y ear s of age .”), and one count of especially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, see id . § 39-17-1005 ( “It is unlawful for a per son to knowingly

promote, employ , use, 3 assist, transport or pe rmit a minor to pa rticipate in the perf

ormanc e or in the pr oduction of material wh ic h in c lud e s th e min or e ng a g ing in: (1 ) S e xua l a c tiv ity ; or (2) S im ul ate d sexua l a c tiv ity that is patently offe nsive.”). A ll charg ed off enses involved the same victim.T o pr ot ec t t h e i den t i t y of mi n or v i ct i ms of

s ex c r i mes , i t i s t h e pol i cy of t h i s cou r t t o r ef er t o t h e v i ct i ms by 4
t he i r i nit i als.

T he t r i al t r ans cr i pt s i ncor r ect l y r ef er t o Espr i t G y mnas t i cs as “ E s pi r i t G y mnas t i cs
. ” W e wi l l us e t he corr ect 5
sp e lli n g “E sp rit.”

W e g le a n fro m the re c o rd tha t the “re g u la r” flo o r is the lar g e fl o o r m a rk e d w ith b o u n d a ry line s w h e re gym n a sts 6 p erfo rm t um b l i ng an d f l o o r ex erc i ses. -3- On J u l y 7, 2003, the first day of trial, the State moved to se ver the three child rape counts. The tria l court g rante d the moti o n , o v er d ef ense obje ction, and five day s later, the jury convicted the defe ndant of the rema ining char g es. Following the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court sentenc ed the de fendant to an eff ective inc arc erative sentenc e of 96 y ear s. The d ef endant filed a tim e ly no tic e of app e a l.
Viewe d in the light most favor able to the State, the proof at trial showed that B.R., 4 born June 15, 1990, practice d g y mnastics at L et I t Shine Gy mnastics in Franklin, Tennessee , wher e sh e was c oa c he d b y

the de fe nd a nt. Whe n th e de fe nd a nt o pe ne d h is o wn g y mna siu m, E sp ri t Gymna sti cs, in l a te 20 00 , B .R. a ndfi ve oth e r f e ma le stu de nts le ft

L e t It Sh ine Gymna sti c s to 5 continue under

the def endant’ s tutelag e. The defe ndant refer red to these 6 students as his “six pack.”
B.R. t es t i fied that she w as the de fendant’s “fa vorite” student, a nd he deve loped a close social relationship with B.R.’s family

. He r eg ularly joined them for dinner , movies, hockey g ames, holiday s, and chur ch services. The defenda nt rec eived Christmas and birthday prese nts from the vic tim ’s famil y , a nd he bo ught pr e se nts fo r B .R. , h e r m oth e r, a ndhe r y ou ng e r s ist e r. B .R. testified that she had rec eived other g ifts f rom the defe ndant, and he r fe llow students “start[ed] not liking [her] and it made [her] sad.”

During the summer of 2001, B.R . prac ticed g y mnastics five day s a we ek, and the following school y ear , she pra cticed f our day s a week. Ty

pically , B.R. would wake at 6: 15 a.m., and she would attend sc hool from 8:30 a.m. until 3:15 p.m. After war ds, she would pra ctice g y mnastics for a pproxi mately

five hours, until approximately 9:00 p.m. when she would go home, complete her ho me wo rk , a ndre tir e to s le e p at 11 :00 p. m.

The State’s e vidence showed that a ll of the cha rg ed offe nses occur

red during B .R.’s prac tice sessions at the g y mnasium betwee n the s ummer of 2001 and S eptember of 2002. Evidenc e described Esprit Gy mnastics’s g y mnasium and offic e lay outs. The victim testified th at the defe ndant touched her vag ina while she was stretching on the “re g ular” floor and on the rod floo r, an d he 6 touched her brea sts a nd made her touch his pe nis w hile they wer e in his office . B.R. explained that the majority

of the touching took p l ac e o n the rod floor . The rod f loor is approxim ately

one foot highe r than the c oncre te re g ular floor , and ca rpet sepa rates it from the concr ete. B .R. said, “[I ]t ’s . . . a strip of floor [,] and it is very bouncy and ea sier to tumble on.” B .R. and other State witnesse sB

. R. t e s t i f i e d t hat t hi s o pen i n g w a s “ pa t c h e d .

. . u p. ” Du r i n g t h e de fe n da n t ’ s pr oo f , Rob T a l l ma n , a h om e 7 b u ild e r, te stif

ie d tha t t h e d e fen d a n t as k e d him in J u n e o f 2 0 0 2 to fill in the o p e n ing

. H e s ta te d tha t i n late A u g u st o r e a rly S e p te m b e r th e d e fen d a n t en c lo se d the o p e n ing a n d a sk e d him to fi n ish the d ryw a ll.

W e di s cer n f

r om t he r ecor d t hat f or a f r og st r et ch, a gy mnas t l i es o n hi s o r her st om ach and put s hi s or her f eet 8
t og e t h e r
. T h e kn e e s s pl a y t o e a c h s i de of t h e body , an d t h e go a l i s f or t h e e n t i r e bo dy t o b e f l a t a g a i n s t t h e f

l oo r
. B. R. d e m o n stra te d this stre tc h fo r th e ju ry.

W e di s cer n t hat for a s t r addl e s t r et ch, a g y mnas t s i t s wi t h h i s or her l egs i n a V

- s hape. T he goal of t hi s s t r et ch 9 is to ha v e the leg s w id e a n d stra igh t t o the fl o o r. B .R . also d e m o n stra te d this stre tc h fo r th e ju ry.

B

. R

. ’ s m o t her t est i f

i ed t hat B

. R

. b egan t rai ni ng for l evel s even i n t he summ er of 20 0 1

. B

. R

. t est i f

i ed t hat t he 10
sp o rt o f g ym na st i cs i s o rga nize d into 1 0 l ev els. G ym na st s b eg i n c o m p eti ng at l ev el fo ur, and as they m aster ha rd er skil l s, the y c o m p e te a t hig h e r le v e ls. T h e e lit e lev e l ex c e e d s the ten th le v e l, a n d a t th is sta g e , gym n a sts p o sse ss th e sk ill s ne ce ssary t o co m p ete in t he O l ym p i c G am es. -4- testified that a c abinet stood in an opening in t h e off ice wa ll. Fr om the pare nt-viewing are a,

7 individuals could se e into the office throug h this ope ning if they leane d over the cabine t. The off ice also had a door.
B.R. stated that six to seven other students wer e present wit hout their par ents when the def endant touche d her. The defe ndant stretche d the students in a ce rtain order , and he stretc hed them behind a pur

ple and white m at. I n the beginning , the defendant stretched B .R. first, but then he starte d stretching her la st. She ex plained that on some oc casions, he would stretch her twice, befor e and a fter the other students. She stated that the de fendant would touch her a fter he stretche d the oth e r stu de nts a nd wh ile the oth e r stu de nts pe rf orme d e xer c ise s o n th e ba rs a ndthe tr a mpo lin e s.
B.R. re counted that the de fendant first touched her vag ina, over he r leotar d, while she wa s d oin g a

fr og str e tc h. He pr e sse d h is h a ndon to he r b utt oc ks du ri ng the str e tc h a ndpla c e d h is

8 fing ers be tween he r leg s, onto her vag ina. B.R. g ave va rious estimates of the numbe r of times she was touche d. At trial she testified that the def en d ant touched he r in this fashion over he r leotar d eig ht to 10 times. B.R. also stated that he touched he r under her le otard during this stretch “a bunch of times.” Sher e c alle d telling B rentwood Police D epartment Detec tive Adrian B ree dlove, the ca se’s le a d d e te c tiv e , th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d to uc he d he r va g ina un de r he r l e ota rdapp ro xima te ly

30 tim e s. She explained at trial that she wa s “distraug ht” during the interview with Detec tive Br eedlove , and the def endant touche d her unde r her leotard 15 to 17 times.
The de fendant also touched B.R.’s vag ina and had her pull a side her leotard during the s tr a d d le s tr e tc h w h il e s h e w a s tr a in in g f o r le v e l s e v e n c o mp e ti ti o n s
. Sh e te s ti f ie d that the 9 1 0 de fe nd a nt t oldhe r that he ne e de d to se e he r v a g ina so he wo uldkn ow wh e re no t to tou c h h e r. B .R. complied bec ause the defe ndant “g ets rea ll y m ad very easily .” Af

ter she w ould pull her leotard aside, he then aske d to touch her va g ina to de termine how it felt, so he would not touch her ag ain. B

. R

. s t a t e d t h a t s h e a l l o w e d h i m t o t o u c h h e r “ [b ]e c au s e h e w o u l d g e t a n g r y a n d [s h e ] wa s h is favorite and [she] didn’t want him ang ry at [ her].” B.R. and the def endant would then ne g otiate how many seconds he could touch her vag ina, but he wou l d co u n t v ery slowly to ext end the a ctualT he rec o rd i s unc l ea r wh ethe r t he o f f i ce d o o r wa s clo sed d uring these o f fen ses. 11
-5- tou c hin g tim e . B .R. test if ie d th a t he tou c he d h e r w ithhis “ po int e r f ing e r, ” a ndsh e mim ic ke d h is f i n g e r ’ s m o v e m e n tf

o r t h e j u r y.
Du ri ng the str a dd le str e tc h, the de fe nd a nt w ou ld a sk B .R. to r a te on a

sc a le of on e to 10 how the touching made he r fe el. At first, B .R. told t he def endant “ zero bec ause it didn’t fee l good to [ her]. I t made [her] feel violated.” W h en t h e d ef endant accuse d her of

ly ing, she provided a number to pre vent him from bec oming a ng ry
. B.R. explained that the defe ndant touched he r vag ina “basic ally every time” she did the stre tch.
B.R. testified that the defe ndant routi nely videotaped the students’ “tricks,” and he vid e ota pe d B .R. ’s va g ina

tw ic e wh ile sh e didthe str a dd le str e tc h. On the fi rs t oc c a sio n, he tol d B .R. that he had an idea that she would hate. Then he asked her if he could videotape her va g ina, and she

“ fi na lly g a ve in be c aus e [she ] did n’ t like him be ing a ng ry

a t [he r]. ” Th e de fe nd a nt d ir e c te d B .R. to p u l l as i d e her le otard, a nd he plac ed the c amer a on the r od floor, positioned it in front of her , and videotaped he r vag ina. Afte r this first videotaping , the def endant c laimed that the pre vious tape

“ did n’ t tu rnou t” a ndthat he ne e de d to vid e ota pe he r a se c on d ti me . H e tol d B .R. that he ne e de d to move her leotard. A t first, she refused, but eventua lly , she pul led her leotard aside. Afte r she moved her le otard, the defe ndant adjusted its position, and B.R. held it in plac e. The defe ndant place d the came ra on the rod floor and videotaped hi mself t ouching B.R.’s vag ina. She testified that his fing er wa s “ sh aky .” Som e tim e la te r, the de fe nd a nt a ssu re d B .R. that he ha d d e str oy e d these v ide ota pe s. He tol d h e r that he bu rn e d the fi lm i n a tun a c a n, a ndhe sma sh e d th e re ma ini ng pla sti c pa rt s w ith a hammer . He then thr ew the tuna can and the plastic in the trash.
After Than k sg iving of

2001, the def

endant made B.R. touch his penis twice in the same day . B.R. stated that these i ncidents occ urre d in the winter be cause she re membere d the defe ndant wea

ring “bla ck s q u i shy

pants,” a nd he only

wore long pants in the winter. She reme mbe r e d

te ll in g D e te c ti v eB r e e d lo ve that the de fendant wore “ quilted shorts” when this occ urre d, but she t estified at trial that now s he “remembe r[s] clea rly it was black pants.” First, while near the uneven bars, the def

endant a sked B .R. to put her hand in his pocket be cause he had a “tre at” f or her

. She re fu se d, bu t late r, wh ile in his of fi c e , he ma de B .R. pu t he r “ ha nd in his po c ke t a nd sq ue e ze h is penis.” The second time the de fendant made B .R. touc h his pe nis w as later that same day

. After he we nt t o th e re str oo m, h e we nt t o h is o ff ic e a ndc a lle d f

or B .R. She te sti fi e d tha t she didno t w a nt t o g o into his office “ beca

use [she] t houg ht somethi n g l i k e t h at was going to happen.” When she enter ed the of

fice , the def

endant ex posed hi s penis. B.R. turned her head, and the defe ndant said,

“ Yo u c a n to uc h it a nd sq ue e ze it. ” B .R. tol d th e de fe nd a nt that sh e didno t w a nt t o to uc h h is p e nis , but he g rabbe d her hand and made her touch it. She demonstrated for the jury the motion that the defe ndant instructed he r to make. She stated that the defendant’s penis looked “swollen,” “purple ,” and “r ed,” and it felt “har d” and “ squishy .” 11

The de fendant later apolog ized to B.R. He told he r that he would buy her any thing she wa nted bec ause he made he r touch his penis. B .R. told hi m t h at she wa nted a teddy bear , butA cco rding t o t he d efend ant ’ s t est i m o ny , a t um b l e b us i s a schoo l b us wi t h rem o ved se a ts a n d m iniat ure 12
g ym n a stics e q u ip m e n t. -6- she testified that she “ was just kidding.” The defe ndant g ave B.R. a teddy bear , and B.R. told her mother that he g ave it to her for he lping c oach othe r students.
I n May 2002, the defendant touched B.R.’s breasts. She reme mbere d that it was May beca use her mother noticed that she was starting to de velop brea sts on May 1. Her mother told her to r e me mbe r this imp orta nt d a te a nd to te ll the de fe nd a nt a bo ut h e r d e ve lop me nt. Whe n B .R. tol d the def endant, he asked to see and touch he r bre asts. Whil e in the def endant’ s office with the door closed, B .R. pulled her leotar d aside, a nd the def endant touched her brea sts. B .R. ex plained that her back w as to the door a nd that the def endant wa s fac ing he r.
I n J une 2002, B.R. began complaining of back pain. I n the eve nings, B .R.’s mother would place ice on B.R.’s back and g ive her Advil. B.R. continued to pr actice g y mnastics during the following wee ks althoug h her back pain did not subs ide. B .R.’s mother testified that B .R. had “a c ouple of e specia lly

hard w o rk o u t s , ” and she testified to one in particular . On J uly 1 or 2, the de fe nd a nt t e le ph on e d B .R. ’s mothe r an d told he r that B .R. ne e de d to qu it g y mna sti c s b e c aus e B .R. wou ld n o t f

o ll o w h is in s tr

u c ti o n s
. Sh e s p o k e w ith B

. R. th a t e v e n in g , a n d B

. R. to ld h e r that the defe ndant bec a me a n g r y

w h e n s h e r e f

u s e d to d o b a c k

h a n d s p r in g s o n th e h ig h b e a m b e c au s e her back hurt. The de fendant beca me enr ag ed and le ft the g y mnasium for appr ox imately one and one

half hours. A17-y ear -old g y mnast supervised the stude nts in his absence . B.R. informe d her mother that she did not enjoy

g y mnastics and that she wanted to quit. B.R. testified that the touching was the re a l r e a so n s he wante d to qu it.

B.R.’s mother admitted that she enjoy ed watching her daug hter pra ctice g y mnastics and compete, but she t estified that she supported B.R.’s de cision to quit. Therefor e, she c alled the de fe nd a nt the ne xt

d a y a n d t o l d h i mt h a tB

. R

. w o u l d n o tb e a t t e n d i n g p r a c t i c e a n d w a n t e d t o q u it g y mnastics. That evening , the defe ndant and Mia Yabut, B .R.’s friend and prac tice partner, drove to B.R.’s home in the t umble bus. B.R. joi ned them in the tumble bus, and B.R. told the def endant 12 she wa nted to quit because she no long er e njoy ed pra cticing g y mnas t i cs. B .R. testified that the defe ndant made Miss Ya but leave the bus and then a s k ed i f s h e wanted to quit bec ause he was tou c hin g he r. She c on fi rm e d th a t th e true re a so n fo r qu itt ing wa s th e tou c hin g . T he de fe nd a nt t old B.R. that he w ould not touch her a g ain. A t s o m e point, the defe ndant and B .R. went inside the ho us e . B .R. , h e r m oth e r, a ndthe de fe nd a nt w e nt t o B .R. ’s be dr oo m. T he de fe nd a nt b e g g e d B .R. not to quit gy mnastics, and he c ried. No de cision was re ache d at that time.

L ate r i n July , th e de fe nd a nt, B .R. , a ndher p aren ts me t a t th e g y mna siu m a g a in t o discuss whether

she would quit. B.R.’s mother testified that she wanted B .R. “to quit for the rig ht rea son.” She did not want B .R. to quit beca use she was scar ed to do a trick or had a bad pr actice

. B.R.’s mother

testified that at the mee ting, B .R. was “de fiant, l ike [ she] had neve r see n her be fore .” B.R. testified that her mother enc ourag ed her to try ag ain. Her

mother left the of

fice beca use she wa s frustrated re g arding B.R.’s de fiant beha vior and wa n t ed h er daug hter to quit for, what sheT h e vid e o ta p e w a s sh o w n to the ju ry d u rin g D e te c tive B re e d lo v e ’s d ire c t ex a m ina tio n tes tim o n y. 13
-7- c on sid e re d, a n “ app ro pria te re a so n. ” At thi s me e tin g , th e y fai led to de c ide wh e the r B .R. wo uld c on tin ue pr a c tic ingg y mna sti c s.

Whil e the de fendant, B.R., and he r par ents continued to di scuss B.R.’s involveme nt with gymnastics, a doctor examined B.R.’s back. The doctor determined that B.R. had f rac tured the L -5 vertebra e, and he p resc ribed that she w ear a bac k brac e for

at least thre e months. The doctor la te r e xten de d th e tim e to fo ur mon ths

. Whil e B .R. wo re the br a c e , she didno t pr a c tic e g y mna sti c s. I nstead, she w orked spor adica lly at the g y mnasium conce ssion stand. On September

7 or 8, 2002, the de fenda nt went to B.R.’s house for dinner . After dinner, the de fendant, B.R., and he r two sisters se ar ched f or the familydog . During the sea rch, B.R.’s oldest sister told the def endant that B .R. thought a certain y oung boy was c ute. The de fenda nt tease d B.R., and she struck him in the head. B.R. explained at trial that she hit him beca use of the teasing and her

pent-up a ng er f

rom the touching

. After finding the do g an d

returning to the house, the de fendant told B.R.’s mother that he wa s “extremely

ang ry ” with B .R., that she had hit him, a nd that he was g oing to lea ve “be fore he lost his cool.” B.R.’s mother testified that she a sked B .R. why she struck the defe ndant and why the defe ndant g rew ang ry

at B .R. “over se eming ly

insignificant things.” B .R. told her mother that she had many rea sons for hitting the de fendant. Finally , B.R.’s mother asked, “ [I ]s h e touching y ou inappropriately ? ” B .R. answer ed that he ha d touched her inappropriately . At trial, B.R. testified, over obje ction, that afte r she t o l d h er mother, her mother commente d that “she kind of f elt like something like that was g oing on.”

B.R.’s mother testified t hat s he hugg ed B.R. and tol d her that it would never happe n ag ain. When she aske d, B.R. whe re the defe ndant touched he r, B .R. replied, “[h]er private spot.” B.R. testified that she finally told her mother “[b] eca use [ she] couldn’t bear having it inside [her].” She stated that on seve ral oc casions, the de fendant would tell he r n o t t o t ell any one bec ause he “would g et in trouble.” B .R. believed she w ould “ g et in trouble for telling be cause [she] thought he would g et ang ry

at [her].”
Th e ne xt mornin g B .R. ’s pa re nts c on ta c te d the po lic e
. B .R. a ndhe r p are nts me t w ith Detec tive Br eedlove at the B rentwood Police D epartment on September 10, 2002. De tective B re e dlo ve c on du c te d B .R. ’s int e rv ie w i n a c on fe re nc e ro om equ ip pe d w ithvid e o a ndaud io rec ording device s, which he used t o rec ord the intervie w. B.R.’s pa rents observed the inter view 13 on a close d circ uit television. B.R.’s mother testified, over objec tion, that “[she] knew that [B.R.] was be ing totally

honest. [B.R.] wa s t ell ing [Dete ctive B ree dlove] ex actly what happe ned.” She further testified that B .R. acted “ somber,” but at t imes, she acted “sill y , . . . not like herse lf at all.”-8- Dete ct ive B ree dlove desc ribed B .R.’s demea nor as sometimes being “happy ” and “friendly ,” but she then acte d “stoic” and “flat.” B.R. looked down and softe ned her voice whe n she described “se nsitive subjects,” and she “shudder [ed] ” while de scribing certain incidents.

D e te c ti v e B r e e d lo v e a tt e n d e d a s e c o n d in te r v ie w w ith B

. R. O v e r o b je c ti o n, he testified that B .R.’s statements during th e i n t er v iews and at trial reg arding wher e the de fenda nt touched he r, whe n he touche d her, and wher e she w as while the de fend an t touched he r we re consistent. He e x plained that B .R. did not remember d ates or the specific number of times the d e f e n d a n tt o u c h e d h e r

v a g i n a , b u ts h e n e v e r

w a v e r e d f

r o mh e r s t o r y.
Detec tive Br eedlove testified on cr oss-exami nation that althoug h B.R. varied the number of times that the de fendant touched her vag ina, he believed her testim ony was c onsistent for a child. De t ec t i v e Br eedlove admitted that B.R. made a mistake whe n she told him that the defe ndant was w earing shorts when he e x posed his penis. Detec tive Br eedlove stated that af ter that mistake, B.R. c onsistentlystated that the de fendant was we aring black pa nts. He ag ree d, howeve r, that B.R.’s testimony

was “ fairly

inconsistent” re g arding w h ether the defe ndant held the video came ra or

whether it was on the g round while he filmed B. R

. ’s v agi na in the straddle -stretc h position. Subsequent to the September 10, 2002 inter v i ew , Detec tive Br eedlove obtained sear ch war

rants for Esprit Gy mnastics and the de fendant’s residenc e. On the e vening of September 11 a ndprior

to e xec uti ng the wa

rr a nts , D e te c tiv e B re e dlo ve vis ite d B .R. ’s ho me . With h e r p are nts ’ permission, B.R. ag ree d to place a “pe rp phone c all” to the def endant. De tective B ree dlove testified that the purpose of

the telephone call wa s to g ather information and possibly an admission from the defe ndant. I n the pre sence of her pare nts and Dete ctive Bree dlove, B .R. telephoned the de fenda nt at the g y mnasium, and Dete ctive B ree dlove re corde d the conve rsation.

During Detec tive Br eedlove ’s testimony , the State pl ay ed the recor ded conve rsation for the jury

and ente red a

transcript of the co n v er s at i o n into evidence . During this conversation, B.R. tol d the defendant that she was worrie d about hi m touching her “private spots.” T he def endant responde d, “No, I ’m not g oing to do that.” B.R. also told the def endant that she was wor

ried a bout the videotape s. The def

endant state d, “The re [are ] no vi deo tapes

. ” T he two then a rg ued over whether there are tapes of he r “private spot.” The n, the def endant state d, “I have no ide a what y ou’re talking a bout .

. . .” B.R. re plied, “You, just promise me y ou destroy ed them, okay ? ” The defe ndant stated, “Whateve r.” A fter this re sponse, they chang ed the subjec t, and at one point, the defenda nt spoke with B.R.’s mother. He failed t o mention B.R.’s a lleg ations. Eventually , the def endant spoke wi th B .R. a g a in , an d th e te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio n e nd e d w ith ou t f urthe r d isc us sio n o f the of fe ns e s.
After rec ording the telephonecon v er s at i o n , De t ec t i ve B ree dlove and other Brentwood Police Depa

rtment personne l e x ecute d the sear ch wa rra nt first on Esprit Gy mnastics and then on the defe ndant’s re sidence . I nitially , the def endant g ave his consent to sear ch the g y mnasium, but he later revoke d consent. De tective B ree dlove produc ed t h e warra nt, and the police se arc hed theP ro je c t A le rt is a se c tio n o f the N a tio n a l C e n te r f o r M issin g a n d E x p lo ited C h ild re n . T h e m e m b e rs a re m a inly 14 reti red l aw en fo rce m en t o f f i ce rs. T his org an i za t i o n a ssi st s p o l i ce d ep artm en t s wit h inve st i ga t i o ns.

-9- g y mnasium. After this sea rch, the defe ndant followed the police to his residenc e, and i t was sear ched. The police seized approximately 79 videotapes f

rom the g y mnasium an d the de fe nd a nt’ s r e sid e nc e . D e te c tiv e B re e dlo ve a ndtw o me mbe rs of Pr oj e c t A le rt , vie we d a ll 7 9 ta pe s. 14 None of the 79 videotape s contained f ootag e of B .R.’s uncover ed vag ina made while she pe rformed the straddle stre tch. Of the 79 videotape s, 25 were digital VH S tapes. Dete ctive B ree dlove testified that the 25 digital tapes contained prac tice routines of t he defenda nt’s students. Five of the 25 dig ital tapes, labeled A throug h E, focuse d on B.R.; t he defenda nt focuse d the camera on “all three . . . of the vic tim ’s private are a s. ” De te c tiv e B re e dlo ve state d th a t th e de fe nd a nt “ zoo me d” the c a me ra in on B.R.’s c lothed vag inal are a more than 200 times. He e x plained that some shots occ urre d when B.R. did a g y mnastic skill, but many times, the defe ndant “zoomed” in on B .R.’s vag inal are a whe n she wa s not doing a ny thing of a “g y mnastics nature .”
I n ta pe A, the de fe nd a nt “ zoo me d” the c a me ra in o n B .R. ’s va g ina l are a 81 tim e s. I n tape B , he foc used on her vag inal are a 84 times. I n one of the 84 shots, B.R. was pushing a mat underne ath another

student doing a skill on the trampoline. At this point, her leg s obstructed a view of h er v agi n al are a. De tective B ree dlove testified that as the defe ndant “zoomed” in on B .R., he stated her name a nd that she “be tter g et that in, y ou’re totally blowing it now.” She place d the mat a couple more times, and the def endant state d her name ag ain and sa id “hang on to the mat and g et it in li ke y ou used to, please .” B .R. chang ed positions making her vag inal are a visible, and the defe ndant said, “be tter, thank y ou” and the n stated the victim’s name. Detec tive Br eedlove testified that during another

shot of B.R. on tape B, whil e she was ly ing down, the def endant wa s distracted by someone. He told the person to “g ive [him ] a second” a s he “zoomed” the came ra in on B.R.’s vag inal are a. De tective B ree dlove testified that the d ef en d an t focused on B .R.’s vag inal are a 69 times in tape C, five times in tape D, a nd three times in tape E.

At trial, Lucy

Fox, a judge and member

of USA Gymnastic s , th ec o u n tr y ’ s g y mnastics g ov e rn ing bo dy , r e vie we d s e ve ra l po rt ions of vi de ota pe A. Re fe rring to the “ ha nd standstr a dd le down” position, she stated that ther e is no g y mnastic purpose f or “zooming in” on the g y mnast’s vag ina l a r e a
. Sh e a s s e r te d th a t th e r e w a s n o g y mn a s ti c p u rp o s e f o r f o c u s in g o n th e g y mn a s t’ s vag inal are a whe n she pushed the mat under another g y mnast who was f

lipping on the trampoline. Ms. Fox continuallyasserted t he lack of any g y mnastic purpose for each of the s cene s she viewe d.

Reg arding spotting and stre tching technique s , Ms. Fox ex plained that prof essional members of

USA Gy mnastics must pass a safe ty certification test based upon the USA Gy mnastics Safety Handbook . The Handbook lists reg ulations for equipment and spot ting techniques. Ms . Fox rea d the Handbook ’s “Hand Spotti ng ” sec tion into t he re cord.-10- Handsp ott ing re fe rs to a me tho d of spo tti ng wh e re a c oa c h p la c e s h is o r her hands on the g y mnast, and lifts and manipulates a nd/or supports the g y mnast in mastering a skill. W arning an d consent do c ume nts sh ou ld r e fe r t o th e a c t of ha nd sp ott ing a ndwh a t it me a ns
. All spotting should r esult in minimal touching support, and athlete s should be informed a

bout the potential for touching while being spotted. Unnec essary touching should not be used particularly when the sp ott e r i s ma le a ndthe g y mna st is fe ma le . G y mna st andpa re nts shou l d b e aw ar e that fr om time to ti me a slip may occur and the g y mnast will be touched on the buttocks, c rotch or c hest. The c oach and g y mnast should understand such touc hing is at a m i n i m um and s h o u l d n o to c c u r

r e p e a t e d l y.
I f the c oa c h or i ns truc tor a c c ide nta lly

tou c he s o ne of

the se are a s, he/she should be sensiti ve to t he situation and indicate that the touch wa s a n a c c ide nt b y

a brie f a po log y a ndthe n r e tu rn to ins truc tio ns
. W h en a coa ch/instructor is per forming a re scue ty pe spot, then c o n c e r n ab o u t t o u c h i n g a p r i v a t e ar e a i s o b v i o u s l y tr i v i a l in c omp ari so n to the c on se qu e nc e of the un pr ote c te d f

a ll.
Ms. F ox also explained that the private pa rts, the cr otch, buttocks, and c hest, are “no zon e s. ” She state d th a t th e re is n o r e a so n to tou c h the no zon e s, e xce pt p os sib ly fo r a re sc ue sp ot. Rescue spotting is w hen the coac h will “ g rab” the g y mnast to protect him or her from injury . The coac h preve nts the g y mnast from hitting his or her he ad, or the coac h stops the gymnast’s rotation.

Ms. F o x f

u r th e r e xp lain e d h o w a g y mn a s t p e r f o rms a f r o g s tr e tc h , a n d she demonstr a te d th e p r o p e r p la c e me n t o f th e c o a c h ’ s h a n d s w h il e h a n d s p o tt in g in th e s tr e tc h. She stated that “[n]o coach should place [hi s or her ] finger s .
. . betwee n an athlete’s leg s.” She testified that frog stretching is not related to re scue spotting

.

Ms. Fox also testified that a coa ch should not place his o r her fing ers be tween a g y mnast’s leg s while the g y mnast perf orms the straddle stre tch. She stated that the c oach’ s fing ers sh ou ld b e pla c e d “ tow ard s [th e g y mna st’ s] le g s d ia g on a lly or
. . . s tr a ig ht up tow ard s [th e g y mna st’ s] head a long [his or her] bac k.” The hands should never rest on the inner

thigh a rea
. On cr oss-examination, Ms. Fox explained that when a g y mnast perf orms the frog stretch, a coac h should place his or her hand “midway down [t he g y mnast’s] tush,” but “not cupping [the g y mna st’ s] tu sh e s. ” She state d th a t th is i s a n e xce pti on to the “ no zon e ” ru le , but a c oa c h s ho uld ne ve r t ou c h th e va g ina l a

re a of a stu de nt. Ms. F ox e xpla ine d tha t TOPS te sti ng , tes tin g fo r g y mna sts training for the elite trac k, examines g y mnasts’ streng th and flexibi lity

. During this testing , coac hes take se vera l measure ments, one being from the g y mnast’s hip bone to the floor w hile in a split. S he admitted that the coa ch t o u ch es t h e vag inal are a, the hip bones, but the c oach doe s not touch the vag ina or the inner thigh. Ms. F ox testified that picture s of the cat leap position would show the-11-

crotc h are a, but it would also show the leg s and feet for positional purposes. Finally , she stated that neither a student nor a coac h would benef it g y mnastically from watching videotapes that onlyshow a g y mnast’s crotc h.

On Octobe r 2, 2002, per sonnel at Our Kids Cent er e valuated B .R. Phy llis Thomps on, a license d social worke r, testified at trial. She obtained B .R.’s medical history and ex p l ai ned the proce ss of the medica l examination. M s. Thompson stated that t h i s i n itial interview dictate s the invasiveness of the phy sical examination.

Ms. Thompson testified that B .R. told her that she wa s having nightmar es about the defe ndant. When M s
. T h o m p son asked he r what the defe ndant did to her, B .R. replied that he touched her “private spot” many times. B.R. further stated that the def endant touche d “the pa

rt she pees f rom - with his fing er.” B.R. wa s unsure whether he touched the inside or outside of her

vag ina. Ms. Th omp so n te sti fi e d th a t B .R. state d tha t she fe lt p a in w he n th e de fe nd a nt t ou c he d h e r “ private spot,” but B.R. did not bleed during or af ter the c ontact. B.R. told Ms. Thompson that the defe ndant touched he r bre asts and made her touc h his penis. She demonstrated the motio n that she made during the contac t and stated that nothing came out of t he defenda nt’s penis. Ms. Thompson testified t hat s he failed to ask B.R. if she saw the de fe nd a nt’ s p e nis

.

After the g ran d jury

indicted the def

endant, De tective B ree dlove, ac companied by other off icer s, arr ested him at Esprit Gymnastics.
At trial, the defendant called seven witnesses, i ncluding the vi ctim, and he te stified o n h i s o w n b e h a l f

. T h r e e w i t n e s s e s , E d m u n d Y ab u t , M

. D

. , D e e A n n M e l t o n , a n d M i c h e l l e D a y, whose c hildren practiced under the defe ndant, t estified conc erning the def endant’ s g ood char acte r. They also described his coac hing sty le as “ ag g ressive,” “intense,” or “de voted” a nd explained that the def endant did not have a policy that limit ed par ents’ ac cess to the g y mnasium floor o r the defe ndant’s of

fi ce
. Def ense w itness, Rob Tallman, who also was a pare nt of a student, testified conce rning the opening in the defe ndant’s office wall. I n addition, the defe ndant ca lled Br entwood Pol ic e De pa

rt me nt Cor

po ra l Mel iss a Wes tbr oo k, wh o co nd uc te d the ini tia l in te rv ie w o f the vic tim

. Mia Yabut, E d m u nd Yabut’s daug hter a nd B.R.’s pr actice partne r, testified on the de fenda nt’s behalf

. The de fendant te stified that he moved to Tennesse e fr om California af ter a cce pting a job as the dire ctor of the g irls’ team prog ram at L et It Shine Gy mnastics. Whil e coa ching at L et It S h i n e , h e m o v e d B

. R

. i n t o h i s tr a i n i n g g r o u p , a n d s o o n a f t e r t h e r e g r o u p i n g , h e m e t B

. R

. ’ s f a m i l y.
After coac hing six mont hs at L et It Shine Gy mnas t i cs , the def endant wa s fired, a c c or din g to h im, be c aus e he a nd the ow ne r dis a g re e d ove r the ru nn ing of the g ir ls’ te a m pr og ram. I nstead of r eturning to California, the de fendant opened his own g y mnasium, Esprit Gy mnastics, at the re qu e st and wi th the he lp o f thr e e famil ie s, the Ya bu ts, Ye pe zs, andMe lto ns . B .R. ’s famil y-12-

joined th e e f

f o r ts b y c o n trib u ti n g mo n e y
. O n D e c e mb e r 8 , 2 0 0 0 , B

. R. a n d th e o th e r “ s ix pack” members, Mia Y abut, L illy and Andy Yape z, J ordan Melton, and Catherine T raxler beg an tra ining at Esprit Gy mnastics under the defe ndant’s tutelag e.

The de fendant describe d B.R . and his relationship wit h her. H e testified that B .R. had “ability in gymnastics.” In addition, he s t at ed t h at she wa s fea rful, and this fe ar hinde red he r g y mna stic dev elo pmen t. T he de fe nd a nt s a id that B .R. wa s n ot “ tou g h” a ndthat no ne of the g ir ls wer e, and a s a coa ch, he ha d to “maxim ize [ the g irls’] streng ths; . . . minimiz e their w eakne sses.” Thus, he desc ribed his coa ching s t y l e as “ ag g ressive.” The de fendant admitted that he deve loped more of a friendship with B .R. than the other g irls because he “ was ove r at [her] house more.” He state d th a t th is f

ri e nd sh ip i nte rf

e re d w ithhis c oa c hin g a ndma y ha ve c aus e d oth e r stu de nts to q uit prac ticing at his gymnasium.

Four defe nse witnesses, Dr . Yabut, Miss Yabut, Ms. Melton, and Ms. Day , described the de fe nd a nt’ s a ndB .R. ’s re la tio ns hip . D oc tor Ya bu t tes tif ie d th a t B .R. “ g ra

bb e d [th e de fe nd a nt’ s] attention all of the time.” H e stated that the relationship di d not conce rn him until hi s daught er complained of

a lac k of attention fr om the defen d an t. Doctor Ya but also testified that he thoug ht the fe ma le stu de nts ha d “ c ru sh [es ]” on the de fe nd a nt andthat hi s d aug hte r w a s je a lou s o f B .R. Mis s Ya bu t c on fi rm e d h e r f

a the r’ s o pin iona nda dmi tte d th a t sh e wa s “ a lit tle je a lou s o f [B .R. ’s ] a tte nti on .” She te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt wo uldta lk t o B .R. mor e than h e wo uldthe oth e r s tud e nts

. Another de fense witness at trial, Ms. Day , described the re lations h i p , an d s he testified that she thought B .R. “had a l ittle bit of a crush on [t he def endant].” She testified that B .R. would walk up t o t h e d ef en d an t an d p u t h er ar m s ar o u n d h i s s h o u l d er s , o r s h e w o u l d s i td o wn wi t h h i man d en gage in conver sation. Ms. Day

testified that the defenda nt would ignor e B .R., undrape he r arm, and direc t her to g o perf

orm a skill. Ms. Melton testified that B. R

. “h ad a cr ush on [t he def endant].” She testified that B .R. adored the defe ndant, and “ [i ]t was obnoxious” and “a hug e annoy ance .”

The de fendant testified to the siz e and lay out of t he gymnasium and offic e ar ea. H e stated t hat

f r o m th e p ar e n t v ie w in g ar e a , a ll ar e a s o f th e g y mn a s iu m w e r e v is ib le e xc e p t the bathrooms and a portion of t he rod floor where the hot water heate r si ts. He a lso ex plained that the office door would not close or lock, and he desc ribed the ope ning in the of fice wall, testify ing that the op e nin g wa s “ 90 inc he s ta ll o r s o, 65 inc he s w ide .” Th e de fe nd a nt state d tha t he wa s nev e r i n his office alone with the door closed with B .R. or with any other student. Rob Tallman testified that in late Aug ust or ea rl y

September the defe ndant closed the opening and aske d him to finish t he dry wa ll.
The de fendant denied touching B.R.’s vag ina whil e she perf ormed the frog stretch. He e x plained that the pur pose of the stre tch is to gain strengt h an d fl exibi lity , mainly for ba lance be a m skill s. He e luc idate d th a t f ro g str e tc he s a ff

e c t “ hip turno ut” a ndpe lvi c til t. Wh e n s tud e nts perf orm the fr og stretch, c oache s forc efully push downwar d on the buttocks to increa se the stre tch. Th e de fe nd a nt s ta te d th a t du ring th e st ret ch, the stu de nt’ s h ips ro ta te a ndthe private are a is underne ath him or her “ flat on the g round.” He ex plained that “ther e is rea lly nowher e for

[a coac h’sM s. M el t o n t est i f i ed t o t he i nci d ent on d i rect exam i nat i o n. O n cross
- exam i nat i o n, t he Stat e el i ci t ed t hat s he 15 had n ot per s onal l y wi t nes s ed t he eve nt

. T he St at e moved t o s t r i ke her p r i or t es t i mo ny
. W hi l e t he t r i al cour t an d couns el d i scus sed t he m o t i o n, M s. M el t o n i nt errupt ed t hem fo ur t i m es, and t he co urt had t o i nst ruct her t o s t o p t est i f y i ng. T he t ri al co urt t hen d eni ed t he Stat e’ s m o t i o n. -13- fing ers] to go.” Thus, he asse rted t h at h e n ever knowing ly

or ac cidentally

touched B .R.’s vag ina during the frog stretch.

Ms. M e lt o n , M s
. D a y , a n d M is s Y ab u t te s ti f ie d r e g ar d in g s tr e tc h in g
. Ms. Melton te sti fi e d th a t a ma t wa s “ no t ne c e ssa ri ly ” in the vic ini ty of the str e tc hin g
. B oth Ms. Me lto n a ndMs. Day testified that neither

one bec ame a larmed w hen watching the defe ndant stretch B.R. Miss Yabut te sti fi e d that sh e a nd oth e r s tud e nts pr a c tic e d o n th e tr a mpo lin e wh ile the de fe nd a nt s tr e tc he d B .R. on the rod fl o or. She testified that she w ould watch the de fendant stretch B .R. because she wa s jealous o f t he attention the de fendant showed B .R. Miss Yabut also stated that she neve r saw the defe ndant inappropriately touch B .R. during the stretche s.
The de fense called B.R. to c larify wher e she was located on the rod floor w hen the defe ndant touched and filmed her va g ina as she perf ormed the straddle stretch. B.R. used a diag ram sh e ha d dr a wn in a pr e vio us int e rv ie w a nd ide nti fi e d the fr on t of the g y mnas iu m o n t he d ia g ram. Acc ording to the diag ram, he r fe et pointed towar d the rig ht wall.

On cr oss-examination, the State asked further questions r eg arding her loc ation, and B.R. testified that she drew the diag ram “ from . . . if y ou look down.” She further testified that her ba c k w a s to the wa ll w ithmir ro rs . We dis c e rnfr om the re c or d th a t th e mir ro re d wa ll is the le ft

wa ll of the g y mnasium.

Th e de fe nd a nt e xpla ine d th a t B .R. ha d a fe ar o f do in g cer tain skill s o n th e be a m, namely the bac k walk over and the bac k handspring . On J uly 1, 2002, B.R. wa s scar ed to per form the bac k handspring , so the defe ndant explained that as part of his coac hing strateg y , he lef t the g y mnasium. H e stated that if he “re move[d himself] from the envir onment,” then B .R. would want to p e rf orm th e skill . H e le ft

a 17 -y e ar- old c oa c h in c ha rg e of the stu de nts wh ile he sh op pe d at H ome Depot. At this point, he telephoned B .R.’s mother and r eporte d the incident. Upon re turning to the g y mna siu m, h e le arn e d th a t B .R. ha d p e rf orme d th e skill , a nda t hi s req ue st, sh e de mon str a te d it twice more

. Although Ms. Me lton did not witness this incident, s he testi fied to i ts occurr ence
. 15 She then testified that “B .R. was cr ushed bec ause [the def

endant] basically chose gymnastics over what she thoug ht their relat i o nship was.” She e x plained that fr om that day forwa rd, B .R. did not look at or speak to the defe ndant. She testified that B .R. made excuses for why she could no long er participate in g y mnastics, and Ms. Melton testified that B.R.’s back injury , in her opinion, was not leg itimate.-14- The de fendant testified that B.R.’s mother telep h o n ed him on J uly 2, 2002, and informed him t hat B.R. would not be attending practice

. On J uly 3, the def endant a nd Mia Yabut arrive d a t B .R. ’s ho me in the tumble bu s. Th e de fe nd a nt s ta te d th a t Mi ss Y abu t a ndB .R. play e d in the tumble bus while he showe d B.R.’s mother the tumble bus’s new ge nerator, which B .R.’s mother ha d p ur c ha se d. Af

te r B .R. ’s mothe r re turne d insi de the ho me , the de fe nd a nt, Mis s Y abu t, andB .R. rema ined on the bus until Miss Yabut announce d that she was g oing inside. Miss Y ab u t t estified at t ri al t h at s h e l eft the bus “[b] eca use [she] t houg ht they

wanted to talk a lone for a while.” The defe ndant and B .R. then talked about he r quitting g y m nastics. The de fendant testified that he encour aged h er to keep participating. H e stated that the conver sation “ce ntere d around” “anothe r skill on bars that she was pa rticularly fea rful of.” He t es tified that B.R. ne ver told him that she wanted to quit bec ause he was sexually abusing her.
After Miss Yabut returne d to the bus , the t hree went ins ide B .R.’s house. I n B.R.’s bedroom, the de fendant, B.R., and he r mother discusse d her f uture in g y mnas t i cs
. The de fenda nt stated that he, B .R.’s mother, and B

. R

. al l crie d during the conve rsation, and he did not testify wh e the r B .R. ma de a de c isi on to q uit that ni g ht. Th e de fe nd a nt, B .R. , a ndhe r p are nts c on tin ue d to discuss her g y mnastics future thr oug hout J uly , Aug ust, and September.

Def ense w itness Corporal Westbr o o k ’s testimonyreg arde d her Septe mber 9, 2002 int e rv ie w wi th B .R. Cor

po ra l Wes tbr oo k wa s the fi rs t B re ntw oo d Po lic e De pa rt me nt e mpl oy e e to interview B.R. af

ter he r par ents contac ted the police. Corpor al Westbrook explained that she was the initial responding office r, and she did not question B.R. “per se.” Eig ht day s after the interview a nda t th e re qu e st o f D e te c tiv e B re e dlo ve , Co rp or a l We stb ro ok wr ote a su pp le me nta l re po rt of thi s interview. She te stified that B.R. told her that the defe ndant touched he r brea sts and vag ina. She further tes t i fi ed t h at her r eport stated that “[B.R.] advised that [ the def endant] had touche d her brea sts severa l times, too.”

On cr oss-examination, Cor p o ra l W es tb ro o k t es t i fi ed t h att h e i n t er v i ew ’s p u rp o s e w as to determine w hether

to investigate the alleg ations further

. She stated that she wrote the report from cursory notes, and B .R.’s description of the brea st touching “ was just more fle eting than anything.”
Th e de fe ns e c a lle d B. R. to tes tif y re g ard ing thi s issu e , an d B. R. s ta te d th a t sh e tol d Corporal Westbrook that the defe ndant touched her brea st “ once for sure.” She further testified, “I thi nk I sa id se ve ral for him tou c hin g my va g ina

. I ne ve r sa id - I do n’ t thin k I sa id se ve ra l for him touching my

brea sts.” Two day s after

the Sept em b er 9 , 2002 interview, B .R. telephoned the de fenda nt at the g y mna siu m. T he de fe nd a nt s ta te d th a t he wa s te a c hin g c la ss at th e tim e of th e te le ph on e c a ll. He e xpla ine d th a t du ri ng the c on ve rs a tio n, he wa s pr e oc c up ie d wi th his stu de nts

. Whe n B .R. tol d him that she was worrie d about him “ [t ]ouching [her] in [her] private spots,” the def endant r eplied, “No, I ’m not g oing to do that.” He f urther testified that he “ had neve r done that.” The de fendant explained that he was “ shocked” by the comment and uncertain how to rea ct. At trial, he de nied fi lmi ng a ndtou c hin g B .R. ’s va g ina , a ndhe state d th a t he e nd e d th e te le ph one con vers atio n w ithT h e r e c or d i s u n c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e v i de ot a pe s h e v i e w e d w i t h Det e c t i v e Br e e dl ov e w a s v i de ot a pe A. 16
-15- “[w]hatever” beca

use he r efuse d to continue thi s conver sation over the te lephone. The defe ndant the n s po ke wi th B .R. ’s mothe r. He e xpla ine d a t tr ia l that he faile d to dis c us s B .R. ’s a lle g a tio ns wi th her mother

beca use it was inappr opriate to do so over the telephone

. On cr oss-examination, the St ate play ed the au d iotape of the telephone c all for the jury . The de fendant ag ree d that on direc t examination he testified that he “w as shocke d and ca ug ht off g uard” by

B.R.’s a lleg ations during the telephone call. After hearing the audiotape, the def endant testified that “[s] hock and c aug ht off g uard may not be distinguishable in [a per son’s] voice.” Shortlyafte r B .R. placed the September 11, 2002 telephone call, the police ente red the g y mnasium and s p o k e wi th the defe ndant in his office . After another coac h finished the students’ workouts and the y l ef t , the police se arc hed the g y mnasium. Afterw ards, the de fenda nt followed the police offic ers to his apa rtment wher e they

continued sea

rching . Be cause of the se arc he s, the de fe nd a nt e xpla ine d that he ne ve r ha d the op po rtun ity to d isc us s th e a lle g a tio ns wi th B.R. and he r mother. He ag ree d that the police se ized severa l videotapes filmed by him.
At trial on cross- examinat i o n , M s . Melton viewed, w e surmise fr om the rec ord, videotape A

. She ag ree d that the videotape showed he r daug hter’s c rotch a rea while she wa s not pe rf ormin g a g y mna sti c skill , a ndMs. Me lto n te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt “ is r e a lly int eres ted in anatomy .” She testified that the defe ndant’s purpose was to analy ze “hip place ment.” Ms. Melton further testified that during t h e investigation, Detective B ree dlove showed he r a vide otape with a close-up shot of he r daug hter’s c rotch, and “may be [she] di d” tell Dete ctive B ree dlove that portions 16 of the videota

pe we re ina

ppropr i at e. Howeve r, she testified that the videotape she viewed at trial did not “bother [her] whatsoeve r.”

She viewed another sce ne on videotape A that showed a close- up of B .R.’s vag inal are a and buttocks while s he pushed a mat under another student performing a trick on the trampoline. Ms. Melton testif

i ed t h at the def

endant would not film his students other than for g y mnastics purposes. In response to Ms. Melton’s answe r, t he S tate showed Ms. Melton two other sce nes on the videotape outside of the jury ’s presence

. Once the j ury returne d, Ms. Melton describe d what she saw. She testified that the scene showed the g y mnasium’s bathroom , an d it showed that the defe ndant walke d to the toilet, pulled down his shorts, sat on the toilet, and then wiped himself f rom the front. In the next scene, Ms. Melton ag ree d t hat the video c amer a wa s wrappe d in a black materia l, and ther e wa s a hole in the mate rial for the lens. She stated that “ someone” came into the came ra’ s view. When the State aske d her if she noticed that the pe rson’s clothing chang ed to a “nude sha de,” she replied, “ I ’m not putting it toge ther. I ’m rea lly not.” She admitted that the per son sat down on the toilet a s the defe ndant did in the previous sce ne, but she stated that she was not sure wh e the r the pe rs on re a c he d f or toi le t pa pe r. Af te r t e sti fying to the c on te nts of the se sc e ne s, sh e sti ll contende d that the def

endant “ wouldn’t tape the g irls for any other purpose other than g y mnastics.”-16- At trial, the defendant also revie wed portions of the videota pes. F irst, the defe ndant explained that the shots were of B .R.’s “pelvic a rea ,” not vag inal are a. He comment ed that the fo c us ing on B .R. ’s pe lvi c are a wh ile sh e pu sh e d a

ma t un de r ano th er gy mnas t se rv e d g y mna sti c purposes, including the study of biomechanics, teac hing tools for students, and t ea ch i ng tools for coac hes. He disagr eed with Ms. Fox’s testimony that the vi deotape s serve no g y mnastic purpose a nd explained that h e is a “minority in the coac hing c ommunity ” bec ause of his “cutting edg e” techniques. The defe ndant stated that the p u rp o s e of the close-up, pe lvic shots of B.R. while she stood at the wall wa s to teach h er the “Staulder press.” He f

urther e x plained that B .R. cannot perf orm a “ Salto up,” so he instructed her to pe rform “Salto downs.” B y focusing the ca mera

on her pelvic ar ea w hen she pe rforms certa in skill s, he could a naly ze whether B.R.’s b o d y p o s i t i on was bio me c ha nic a lly

c or re c t, n a me ly

he r p e lvi c til t.
At the end of

his direct examination t es t i m o n y , the def endant de nied touching and filming B.R.’s vag ina for sexual g ratification pur poses. He further denied touching her br easts for sexual gratification.

Re g ard ing the bathr oo m s cenes in vid e ota peA, thede fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d o n c ro ssexamination that he filmed the first s ce n e on J uly 21, 2001, at 10:43 p.m. He admitted that the came ra sat on a “dr awe r thing ” in the bathr oom of the g y mnasium. He ag ree d that he paced in the came ra’ s view, and then he walked to the toilet, pulled down his shorts, sat on the toil et, and then wiped himself fr om the front. The defe ndant furthe r ag ree d that he filmed the se cond bathroom sc e ne a fe w h ou rs la te r at 4:26 a.m. He a dmi tte d th a t he su rr ou nd e d th e c a me ra wi th b la c k tr a sh bag s, the roll of extra trash ba g s being visible in the scene, and there was a hole for the lens. The de fe nd a nt did no t adm it that he too k his cl oth e s off wh e n the State a sk e d h im i f h e be c a me “ tot a lly skin c olo re d, ” bu t he a g re ed th a t he sat onthe toi le t a ndwi pe d h ims e lf fr om the fr on t. A ft e r this portion of testimony , the State showed the videotape to the jury

. The defe ndant contende d that he did not att e mp t t o c o v e r tl y v id e o ta p e s tu d e n ts inth e b a th r o o m; h e te s ti f ie d th a t h e v ide otaped himself.
I n rebuttal, the State c alled Andy Yepe z, a former member of

the “six pack,” a nd she testified t hat t he defenda nt stretche d B.R. diffe rently from the other

students. The def

endant plac ed his ha nd s o n B .R. ’s bu tto c ks ins te a d o f “ on the sid e ” of the ba c k, a s h e didwi th e ve ry oth e r s tud e nt. Miss Yepez testified that when he stretche d B.R., her view was fre quently obstructed by a mat, and pare nts usually

wer e not pre sent. She admitted that the def endant stre tched a ll students behind the mat and on the sa me place on the rod floor , b u t h e stretche d B.R. long er tha n he did the other students. The def

endant stre tched he r for

30 seconds to one minute, b u t h e s t re tched B .R. for app ro xima te ly

10 min ute s.
Th e State a lso c a lle d N a nc y Wes tma n, mothe r o f o ne of de fe nd a nt’ s f

orme r s tud e nts

. Ms. Westm an desc ribed the de fendant’s and B.R.’s relationship. She testified that the def endant “fa vored” B.R.; “[ h]e spent more ti me wit h her, and he hugg ed [ B.R.] more than the other students.” Ms. Wes tma n s ta te d th a t “ [t]he y g a ve e a c h othe r ba c k rub s, ” a nd the de fe nd a nt d id n ot d o th is w ith other students. She testified to one oc casion whe n the def endant and B.R. wer e tickling eac h other.-17-

Ms. Westm an described the interac tion as “a boy friend/g irlfriend ty pe re lationship, li ke 16 y ear olds would act whe n [t hey ’re ] dating.”

Ms. Wes tma n als o d e sc ri be d a n in te ra c tio n b e tw e e n B .R. a ndthe de fe nd a nt w hil e they , along with other g y mnasts and their family members, wer e on a 15-passe ng er van in San Dieg o, California. Ms. Westman testified that she a nd Ms. Me lton sat be hind B .R.’s mother and in fr ont of B .R. and the def

endant. She heard B .R. “kind of squirming,” and B .R. said, “[N] o, [t he defe ndant’s name ], no, just on my fac e.” Ms. Westman turned a round and obse rved the defe ndant tickling B.R.’s face. He then rubbed dow n her a rm, eve ntually

onto her leg and thig h. Ms. Westm an te sti fi e d th a t sh e he ardB .R. state to j us t to uc h h e r f a ce sev eral tim e s. She state d th a t sh e “ fe lt un c omf orta ble ,” so sh e “ nu dg e d” Ms. Me lto n, wh o lo ok e d at th e m a ndthe n, accor di ng to M s. Westman, shook and put her he ad down. W hen Ms. Westman hear d B.R. say it ag ain, she “ turned around c ompletely

in [ her] seat.” She testified that she looked a t h i m an d “ga v e him a look, like what ar e y ou doing.” Ms. Westm an testified that she did not mention the incident to him on the van beca use she did not want “ to ge t into a big sc ene.”

I n surre buttal, the defe ndant called Ms. Me lton, and she testified re g arding the San Di e g o in c ide nt. Ms. Me lto n te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt t ou c he d B .R. ’s fa c e a ndarm s in a “ play fu l” ma nn e r; sh e de sc ri be d th e int e ra c tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o a s “ c hil d’ s p la y .” She state d th a t B .R. wo uld tell the defe ndant to stop and that B.R. “ was b ei n g s i l l y
. ” Ms. Melton testified that there was no thi ng “ se xua l” abo ut the a c tio ns
.

At the close of

all proof, the State e lected c erta i n o ff en s es
. We summarize the e le c tio n a s f

oll ow s:
Cou nt Cha

rg e L oc a tio n/T ime
1 Ag g ravated sexual battery First time defe n d an t t o u ch ed B. R

. ’s v aginal are a over her le otard during frog stretche s on the rod floor
2 Ag g ravated sexual battery First time defen d an t t o u ch ed B. R

. ’s v aginal are a under

her leotard during frog stretche s on the rod floor
3 Ag g ravated sexual battery Time when defe ndant touched B .R.’s vag inal are a unde r h e r l e ota

rdwh ile in a

str a dd le str e tc h o n th e r o d f

lo o r a n d d e f e n d a n t a nd B.R. neg otiated the leng th of the touching
4 Ag g ravated sexual battery May 2002 when the defe ndant touched B .R.’s brea st w ith his hand while in the g y mnasium’s officeC o unt s are numb ered acco rding t o t he Stat e’ s E l ect i o n, w hi ch was i ncl ud ed i n t he jur y i nst ruct i o ns. T hey are 17

n o t nu m b e re d a c c o rd ing to the o rig ina l i n d ic tm e n t. -18- 5 A g g r a v a t e d s e xu a l b a t t e r y Ti m e w h e n d e fe nd a nt m a de B .R. tou c h his penis with her ha nd while in the g y mnasium’s office
6 A g g r a v a t e d s e xu a l b a t t e r y Ti me w h e n d e fe nd a nt m a de B .R. tou c h his pe nis wi th h e r h a ndthr ou g h h is p oc ke t w hil e in the g y mnasium’s office
7 Ag g ravated sexual battery Time when defe ndant touched B .R.’s vag inal are a while he videotaped he r vag inal are a on the rod floor
8 Especia lly ag g ravated sexual Time when defe ndant touched B.R.’s va g inal

exploi tation of a minor are a while he v i d eo t aped her va g inal are a on the rod floor

. 17
Th e jury de lib e rate d a ndfo un d th e de fe nd a nt g uil ty of a ll St a te -e le c te d o ff

e ns e s.
I. DI SCO VE RY RE LA TED CO M P LA IN TS
Th e de fe nd a nt’ s f

ir st a pp e llate c omp la int is that un re a so na ble re stric tio ns on de fe ns e acc ess to disc overy materia ls violate d Criminal Proc edure Rule 16 and his right to co unsel g uaranteed by

the Six th A mendment to the United States Constit ution and Article I , Section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution. The de fendant identifies the discovery materia ls as (1) a

pproxi mately

25 videotapes se ized from his home when off icer s executed a se arc h war rant, (2) information extracted from his home computer, and (3) an audiotape of a te lephone c onversation between the defe ndant and the victim. I nsisting that the materials were “pornog raphic ,” prose cution c o u n s e l r efuse d to copy or duplicate them for the de fendant and, instead, re quired the de fense to appea r per sonally

at the polic e d e p ar tm e n t to r e v ie w th e mate r ia ls

. T h e tria l c o u r t s a n c ti o n e d th e St a te ’ s r e s tric tions on dis c ov e ry a nd ru le d that the e vid e nc e c ou ld be vie we d on ly a t the po lic e de pa rt me nt at a

mutua lly convenie nt time and that the tapes w ould not be copied.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 16 (a )( 1) (F ) p ro vid e s,
Documents a nd Objects. – Upo n a d efe ndant’s re quest, the state shall permit t h e d ef endant to ins pect a nd copy or photog raph bo ok s, pa pe rs , d oc ume nts , p ho tog ra ph s, ta ng ibl e ob

je c ts, bu ild ing s, or plac es, or copies or portions there of, i f the item is within the state’s possession, custody , or control a nd:Effect i ve Jul y 1, 200 6, the T en ne ssee Rul es of Cri mi nal P r ocedur e we r e “ r eformat t ed. ” As par t of t hat 18

u n der t ak i n g , n u mer ou s s ec t i on s a n d/ or s u bpar t s of va r i ou s r u l es wer e r en u mber ed. Pre v i ou s l y , t h e s ec t i on of Rul e 16 t h at a ddr es s ed di s cov er y of doc u men t s a n d obj ec t s w as ( a) ( 1) ( C)

. D i s cov er y of t an g i bl e obj ec t s n ow appe ar s i n s ec t i on (a )( 1 )( F ). See C o m p i l er’ s N o t es, T enn. R

. C ri m
. P

. (ef fect i ve Jul y 1, 20 0 6 ). -19- (i) the item is materia l to preparing the defe nse; (ii) the g overnme nt intends to use the item in its case
in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtaine d from or b elongs to the de fe nd a nt. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) (F ). 18

Th e la ng ua g e of

Rul e 16 (a )( 1) (F ) i s st

raig ht for ward , an d th e State ’s du ty is mandatory

. Upon re quest, “the state sh all pe rm it ” inspec tion and copying. Id . (empha sis added). I n State v. Richard Allen Butler , N o. E2 00 4- 00 35 9- CCA -R 9- CD , s lip op . at 10 -13 (T e nn . Crim. App., Knoxvil le, Mar. 30, 2005) , perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2005) , the court reje cted the State’ s arg ument that copying and disseminating discovery materia ls containing alleg ed child pornog raphy would violate Tenne ssee’ s expl oitation of a minor statute.

Our re view of the rec ord lea ves us at a loss to discern a valid basis for the discovery restric tions, which were prompted ost en s ibly by the State’s cla im that the materials we re pornog raphic and would re victimiz e the vic t i m
. No t hing in the a udiotape of the conver sation betwee n the def

endant a nd the victim is remotely pornog raphic , and the State asked the vic tim

to assist with t h e i n v estig ation by placing the telephone call. The materia ls ex trac ted from the defe ndant’s computer

depict i n d i v i d u als other than the victim, and at the sente ncing hearing Detec tive Br eedlove insisted that he was not re prese nting to the c ourt th at the imag es conta ined unla w f u l p o r n o g r ap h y
. Re g ar d in g th e v id e o ta p e s , th e tria l c o u r t ar ti c u late d it s ru ling in the following fashion:

[T]he Cou rt

ha s bef or e it the mot ionof

de fe nd a nt t o c omp e l th e State to p ro du c e c op ie s o f v ide ota pe s.
Th e c a se in this state is that the pr os e c uti on is not re qu ir e d to re ve a l its e nti re fi le in a

pa rt ic ula r c a se , b ut i s r e qu ir e d to dis c los e evidenc e favor able to the de fendant that if suppressed w ould deprive the a c c us e d o f a

fair tr ia l.

. . . .T he no nd i scl o sur e p o rt i o n o f the t ri al c o urt ’ s o rder regardi ng d efense co unsel , a ny d efense exp ert , a nd any 19
p a re n t is no t o b je c tio n a b le , s ee St at e v. R i chard A l l en B ut l er , N o
. E 2 0 0 4

- 0 0 3 5 9

- C C A

- R 9

- C D , s l i p op
. at 12

- 1 3 (T enn. C rim . A p p ., K n o x v ill e , M a r. 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 ), per m
. app
. deni ed ( T en n
. 2005) , and i nd eed de fense counsel s t at ed on t he reco rd tha t he a c q u ie sc e d to tho se re stric tio n s p ro v id e d c o p ie s o f t h e d isc o v e ry m a te ria ls w e re giv e n to d e fen se c o u n se l. -20- The Court is of the opinion that the la w in this state is – is t hat that which must be disclosed is that to ensure a fair trial, the proce dure proff

ere d by the State, in this Court’s judgment, af fords the de fe nd a nt a

fair tr ia l a ndthi s is ho w the Cou rt wo uld lik e the or de r t o rea d: That the defendant may inspect t he video – the 12 videotape s at issue at the police depa rtment, at a mutually

convenie nt time, in a room, provided a

private r oom, at which time def ense c ounsel may v i ew the tapes, but the Court is not allowing the ta pes to be c opied and disseminated at this t ime. . . . [D] efe nse counsel shall not disclose the contents pending further order s of the court. Any expert .

. . [and] any

pare nt of any student that defe nse counse l may bring to the viewing is also under the same Protec tive Orde r.
The trial c ourt misapprehe nded the r equire ments of Rule 16. Its refe renc e to the State’s obligation to dis close e vidence favor able to the defendant that, if suppresse d, would deprive the a c c us e d of a fair

tr ia l is a c la ssi c state me nt o f the pr os e c uti on ’s constitutional du ty to d isc los e exculpatory

evidenc e. See B rady v. M aryland , 3 73 U. S. 8 3, 83 S. Ct . 1 19 4 ( 19 63 ). I n a dd iti on to that obligation, however , Rule 16(a) (1)( F) requires the State to permit inspection and c opy ing of c e r t a i n t a n g i b l e i t e m s w i t h o u tr e g ar d t o t h e e x c u l p a t o r y n a t u r e o f t h e d i s c o v e r y m a t e r i a l s
. E v i d e n t l y, the trial court reg arde d its authority as re strained only by the amorphous “fair trial” re g imen, there by faili ng to r e c og nize that Ru le 16 , it se lf, s tr ike s a c on sid e re d b a la nc e a ndis q uit e sp e c if ic in de lin e a tin g the State ’s ma nd a tory ob lig a tio ns to p ro du c e c e rt a in d isc ov e ry ma te ri a ls. 19
We note that on appea l the State makes no e ffort to defend the discovery restric tions and ar g ues, instead, that no r ever sible err or has be en demonstrated. On that point, we a g ree
. Although the “potential” f or pre judice fr om such restric tions is readil y evident, re versible e rror re qu ir e s mo re pa lpa

ble ha rm
. F or e xamp le , th e de fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t hi s atto rn e y

“ wa ste d hou rs of his ti me trave ling ba ck and f

orth to view tapes he could ha ve re viewed at his convenienc e in his office ” and that defe nse counsel “neve r di d g et t o see all of t he tapes beca use of the r estrictions imposed by the Court.” A p ar ty w h o f

a il s to ta k e r e a s o n ab ly a v a il ab le s te p s to mi ti g a te th e h ar mf u l e f f e c t of an err or, howe ver, is not entitled to use the err or to obtain relief on a ppeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)

. There is no evidenc e in the rec ord that the defe ndant soug ht a trial continuance to affor d additional tim e to c omp le te his re vie w o f the vid e ota pe s. Simi lar ly , was ted at torne y tim e , w ith ou t aA n enl i ght eni ng exp o si t i o n of t he l egal pe d i gree unde rgi rding t he ri ght t o pub l i c t ri al ap p ears i n Ri chmond 20 N e w sp a p e rs, In c . v. V irg in ia , 44 8 U

. S. 55 5 , 1 0 0 S. C t

. 2 8 1 4 (19 8 0 ) (t raci ng t he o ri gi ns o f t he ri ght f

rom “ b ack b eyond rel i ab l e hi st o ri cal record s” i n t he “ d ays be fo re t he N o rma n C o nq uest ” t o t he judici al s y st em s o f co l o ni al A m eri ca).

-21- demonstrable show ing of prejudice to the client’s def ense, as o pposed to the attorne y ’s “bottom line,” does not rise to the level of r ever sible err or.

The de fendant also maintains that he “wanted to have e x perts examine the tape s[,] but the financ ial situation was such that t hey could not aff ord to have experts travel to B rentwood to view these ta

pes.” This bare assertion made during the hearing on the defense motion to compel acc ess t o d i s co v er y

materia ls is inadequate in our opinion to demonstrate the re quisite harmful prejudice . I n the hea ri n g o n t h e mot ion for new trial, the trial court should not have rebuf fed the defe ndant’s prof

fer of testimony

from trial c ounsel, but we fai l t o d i s ce rn , at any rate , how trial counsel’s te stimonycould or would have established reve rsible err or predic ated on spe cific e x pert testimonythat was prohibitively expensive to obtain.
The failure to supply

the d ef en dant with a copy

of the audio taped conve rsation betwee n the vi ctim and the defe ndant i s, from thi s rec ord, indefe nsible. At one point, prosec ution counsel mentioned, somew hat in passing , that the police de partmen t d i d n o t have the equipment requ ir e d to d u p li c a te a mi c r o c a s s e tt e ta p e r e c o r d in g , to w h ic h d e f e n s e c o u n s e l r e to r te d that the detec tive “can g o to Radio Shack and buy a plug that y ou can plug betwee n two tape r ecor ders that c os t y ou $2 .9 5. ” At

a ny rate , th e c us tom ary

ne e d f or a c op y of the au di o cass ette r e c or din g is t o permit a c omparison w i th the transcript that the State intends to offer at trial. I n that fashion, any transcription inaccura cies or disputes c an be r esolved pre trial. I n the pre sent case , the def ense doe s not point to any

such inac cura cies with the State’s f urn i s h ed t ra n s cript or other specific prejudice wa rr a nti ng re lie f o n a

pp e a l.
I n conclusion, we decline the defe nse’s invitation to find per se r ever sible err or. No doubt error in the di scovery proce ss occur red in thi s case , and the de fendant’s frustration with the discovery g auntlet is palpable f

rom the record on appeal. How ever , we a re not pe rsuade d that the de fe ns e ha s e sta

bli sh e d th e re qu isi te pr e

jud ic e fo r e nti tle me nt t o a ne w t ri a l.
II. P UBLIC TRIAL
The Six th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article I , Section 9 of 20 the Tennessee Const itution afford a n acc used the rig ht to a “public trial.” See In re Olive r , 3 33 U. S. 25 7, 68 S. Ct . 4 99 (1 94 8) ; State v. Sams , 8 02 S.W. 2d63 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ). Th is rig ht i s reg arde d as “a share d rig ht of the ac cused and the public, the common conc ern be ing the assura nce of fa irness.” Pre ss E

nte rp ris e Co. v . S up e rio r Co ur t , 478 U.S. 1, 7, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2739 (1986). “Transpare ncy ,” it has bee n said, “is essential to maintaining public respe ct for the criminal justice sy stem, ensuring its int eg rity , and prote cting the rig hts of the ac cused.” Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 99 , 12 3 S. Ct . 1 14 0, 11 50 (2 00 3) . T he ri g ht t o a pu bli c tr ia l is no t a

bs olu te , h ow e ve r, a ndin c e rt a in-22-

case s must y ield to other rig hts or interests. See W all e r v . G e or

gia , 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S. Ct . 2210, 2215 (1984).
The de fendant in this case constructs an arg ument that his due proc ess and public tria l g uarantees unde r the fe dera l and state c onstitut ions were abridg ed because the t rial judg e excluded the public from view ing th e videotapes of g y mnastics which showe d the victim. The public wa s excluded, the def

endant insists, because when the videotape s were identified and play ed, the tria l judge forc ed the public spectators on numerous occ asions to “shift” to another part of the courtroom to ensure that they

could not see the evidenc e. The State, for its part, doe s not dispute that the trial judge scre ened the m ed i a and public fr om viewing videotapes of the victim by

arr ang ing the c ou rt ro om s o th a t on ly

the ju ry , wi tne sse s, the de fe nd a nt, a nda tto rn e y s c ou ld s e e the vid e ota pe s. I nstead, the State maintains that the def endant waived the issue by failing to object and, indee d, by being the instigator of the se ating arr ang ement. The State also asserts that the trial judge ’s ac tions conformed to Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 30(C)(1) w hich forbids media cove rag e in any judicial proce eding “of a

witness, party , or victim who is a minor.” Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 30(C)(1). We beg in by

examining the conte x t in which this iss ue ar ose. I n a jury -out hea ring during Detec tive Br eedlove ’s testimony , the parties and the court discussed various aspects of how and what portions of the videotape s would be play ed for the j u ry
. De fense counsel a ddresse d the tr ia l c ou rt a s f oll ow s:
MR. J OHNSON: Your Honor, plea se, one of the re asons that in a n e arl ie r he ari ng Ge ne ra l Whit e raise d a bo ut p ro vid ing c op ie s to us was the potential r evictimization of the victim i f i t go t rele ased outside. I know there [are] members o f t h e public sitti ng out there, a ndthe y are ob viously

int e re ste d inthetape s. An d w hat is – is it Your H o nor’s intention for the m also to be allowed to see the tapes in l ig ht o f the Ge ne ra l’ s obje c tio n tha t she did n’ t w a nt the vic tim to be re victimiz ed by

this? Or does the public have the rig ht to see the video tapes?

. . . G E N E RA L WH I T E : The public ha s a r ig h t to be in the c ou rt ro om. Th e re is n o p ro vis ionfr om b arring the m f ro m be ing in the courtroom. I

will defe r t o the court on the other issue whe ther or no t Y ou r H on or

wants to m ake the m si t do wn . B ut I kn ow th at in these type of case s there ’s alway s public in the courtroom a nd there is n o p ro vis ionin the la w t o b ar the m f ro m a pu bli c c ou rt

ro om.
MR. J OHNSON: As I

indicated earlier my only conce rn wa s that earlier the Ge nera l had ar g ued ag ainst us g etting copies based on the po te nti a l f

or re vic tim izin g the vic tim , b y letting oth e r p e op le ou tsi de of the imm e diate pa

rt ie s se e the se vid e o ta

pe s.-23- THE COURT: All rig ht. I g uess I ’ll first start with the media. Who here is from the media? Stand up. All rig ht, and ma’am y ou’re the last person f

rom the media that is here?
U N ID E N T IF IE D S P E A K E R : T h e y ar e o u ti n t h e h a l l w a y.
TH E CO UR T: I n th e ha llw a y ? Yo u’ re wi th w ho m?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: W ith Channel 4.
THE COURT: You’re with Cha nnel 4. Probably , the other me dia fo lks ou g ht to c ome in he re be c aus e I a m jus t g oin g to a sk y ’a ll what y ’all wa nt and that will tell me what I need to de cide. . . .

. . . . THE COURT: I

appre ciate y ou brin gi n g t hat up, Mr. J ohnso n , th a t w a s v e r y n ic e
. O k a y
. I s th a t e v e r y b o d y ? We got Channel 4, we g ot FOX 17. . . . So 4 and 17. N ow 2 and 5 are not h e r e , t h e y w e r e h e r e ye s t e r d a y.

. . . . THE COURT: Right, I

was g o i n g to let y ’all sit over ther e and y ou can he ar and watch the jury , but Mr. J ohnson has a g ood point, we don’t wa nt a, quote re victimiz ation, or alleg ed re vic tim iza tio n o f a lle g e d v ic tim a t th is time . T his c a se is i n p ro g re ss and it is hard enough as it is. So but the rule – I ’m g iving de fer ence to Supreme Court Rule 30, so I ’m wondering if y ou have any problem wi th i t, s itt ing ov e r h e re a ndno t w a tc hin g thi s?
UN I DE NT IF IED SPEA KE R: I wo uldjus t say

if the p ub lic at larg e is a llowed to w atch, we should be a llowed to watch too. . . . Th a t w ou ld b e my

on ly arg ume nt.
T HE C OU R T : I

ca n m ak e ad ec i s i o n ab o u tt h e p u b l i c a tl ar ge without asking. I

think Mr. J ohnson has a g ood point. I don’t want to see thi s child or another child, we used the term re victimiz ed and

. . . I ’m a lso by

sa y ing that th a t I

a m r e c og nizi ng that th e de fe nd a nt i s presumed i n n o c e n t .

. . . So b y s a y in g a ll th a t I ’ m r

u li n g th a t I ’m g oing to a sk the public an d media, y ou may stay in the courtroom during this process but I

don’t want y ou seeing this video t ape. Y ou c a n h e ar a

bo ut i t, but I do n’t wa nt y ou watc hin g it at th is t ime . So-24- may be if I ca n get y ou all over in that sec tion. Thanks. So the came ra and the audio pickup is off

.

. . . . THE COURT: Once we start we need to ha ve a de puty posted at the door an d stop them until a bre ak. . . . So, why don’t I g et the c ou rt of fi c e rs to g o out the re a nd se e if the re is any on e [wh o] w a nts to be in the courtroom now, they need to come in

. . . . Mr. J ohnson, if y ou wan t to weig h in on any of these instruc tions up to now, y ou may . Do have any

objection to the way the Court has handle d it up to now.
MR. J OHNSON: No, Your Honor.
The trial transcripts also r ef l ec t s ev eral additional times when the cour t directe d members of

the audienc e to move.

We are not persuade d initiallythat a complete or partial closure of the courtroom occur red in this case

. A complete c losure has t h e effect of excluding eve ry one fr om the courtro o m wi th the exception of the parties, the attorney s, court p ersonne l, and the witnesses. A complete c losure may be for the entire tria l or proce eding , or a portion of t he procee dings such as the testimonyof a parti cular witness. A partial closure r esults in the exclusion of certa in me m b er s of the public while other members of the pu bli c are pe rm itt e d to re ma in i n th e c ou rt ro om.
Sams , 80 2 S.W. 2d a t 63 9. No me mbe rs of the me dia or pu bli c we re ba

rr e d f ro m th e c ou rt

ro om i n this case, a nd the State noted spe cifically on the re cord that the public had a right to be in the courtroom. To be sure, the trial court arr ang ed the courtroom to scree n the media a nd public from viewing videotapes of the victim, but courtroom spe ctators of ten ar e disadva ntag ed in viewing trial e xhibi ts a s th e y

are of fe re d a ndint

ro du c e d. F ur

the rm or e , th e re c or d d isc los e s th a t th e on ly me dia objection was c ouched in terms of equal tre atment for the media and the public. Se e W ilb e rt R og e rs v . S tate , No. W2004-00654-CCA-R3-PC, sl ip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, Fe b. 22, 2005) (d ec l i n i n g t o fi n d cl o s u re o f j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n gs b ec au s e t ri al j u d ge h ad h i s co u rt o p en , ev en t h o u gh oth e r c ou rt s w e re app are ntl y c los e d due to w e a the r; we a the r- re la te d c los ing of oth e r c ou rt -r oo ms d id not result in denial of a

public trial).
Th e de fe ns e c ite s to no autho ri ty de sc ri bin g wh a t hap pe ne d inthi s c a se a s a c omp le te or partial closure of

trial proce eding s. Howeve r, eve n i f t h e ri gh t to a public trial was somehow implicated, we be lieve the issue is re solved by the def endant’ s failure s to obje ct to the trial court’ s-25-

actions or other wise make known his conce rn. There fore , we conclude that the defe ndant waive d his right to a public trial to the extent that what occur red can e ven be c hara cterized as a “c losure.” Sta te v . Ti za rd , 8 97 S.W. 2d73 2 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ) ( fi nd ing waive r w he n d e fe nd a nt f a ile d to ob je c t to tr ia l c ou rt ’s e xclu sio n o f j ou rn a lis m stud e nts du ri ng th e cr os s- e xami natio n o f the vic tim involving vulg ar r efe renc es to masturbation).

The de fendan t i n s i s t s that he did not waive any rig hts and that the State has take n

“ c omp le te ly

ou t of c on te xt” h is n e g a tiv e re sp on se to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s inq uiry wh e the r h e ob je c te d “ to the way the Court has handle d i t u p t o n ow.” We disag ree ; from the tra nscript, it is altoge ther re a so na ble to c on c lud e that a

waive r o c c ur

re d. At a ny rate , e ve n if

the tr ia l c ou rt

a ndde fe ns e c ou ns e l w e re dis c us sin g so me oth e r m a tte r, su c h a s in str uc tio ns to the me dia, the re c or d p la inl y d iscloses that the def

ense did not

object whe n the seating a rra ng ement wa s being discussed at a n earlier point. Finally , even if the def ense br oache d the subject t o n gu e- i n-che ek to hig hlight the inequity of the trial court’s restric tions on defense discovery , the def ense w as not there by

relieve d of the ob lig a tio n o f f

orma lly ob je c tin g to the se a tin g arr a ng e me nt o rc he str a te d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

. I n summary , the defe ndant is not entitled to a new trial reg ardi n g an yclaimed vio la tio n o f h is rig ht t o a

pu bli c tr ia l.
III. JURY INSTRUCTION REGAR DING DEF ENDANT’S TES TIMONY
I n his third issue, the de fendant complains that the trial court improperly impeache d h i ma n d s tru c k

h i s t e s t i m o n y , v i o l a t i n g h i s D u e P r o c e s s r i g h t s a n d o b s tru c t i n g t h e j u r y ’ s Sixth Amendment

f a c tf in d in g function. He predic ates his complaint on the following portion of the State’s c ro ss- e xami natio n o f h im:

Q. And this has bee n - y o u h ave been to the B rentwood Police De pa rt me nt s e ve ra l ti me s w ith[de fe ns e c ou ns e l]; is that c or re c t?
A. I hav e bee n to the B re ntw oo d Po lic e De pa rt me nt w ith[de fe ns e c ou ns e l] on se ve ra l oc c a sio ns
. Q. An d y ou ’v e loo ke d at vi de ota pe s?
A. I was una ble to look at the vi deotape s in their entirety beca use of the stric t rule s th a t th e Cou rt pu t onus
. L ater during the def

endant’ s cross-e x amination, the court he ld a jury -out hearing on another issue, and af

ter this hearing, but be fore the jury returne d, the court sua sponte proposed a curative instruction reg arding the def endant’ s comment that he “ was una ble to look at the videotape s in their entirety beca

use of the strict rules that the Court put on [him ].” The judg e explained, “On app e a l, an arg ume nt in the re c or d like that, that the c ou rt of app e a ls m a y a ssu me that’ s tr

ue be c aus e he wa sn’t corr ecte d on the re cord.” Def ense c ounsel replied, “I

have no pr oblem with putting that-26-

on the re cord, e x cept f

or the fa ct that I

don’t wa n t t h at t o be construe d as my ag ree ing to Your Honor’s pr otective or der.” The trial judg e then a sked if the jury should be instructed to disreg ard the statement as being unresponsive, and defe nse counse l answer ed, “Y es.” When the jury returne d, the court instructed them “to disreg ard any comment that the def

endant made in his te s timony conce rning any

alleg ed denia l of ac cess to tape s by the B rentwood P o lice De partment prior to today .”
O n ap p e a l, th e d e f

e n d a n t c laim s th a t th e tria l c o u r t’ s in s truction was e rr o r
. We de c lin e the de fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st f or re lie f on thi s ba sis be c aus e he c re a te d h is o wn pr e dic a me nt b oth by failing to object at the appropriate tim e and by inviting t he court to do the very thing of which he now complains. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) . This court is loath to place a trial court in er

ror whe n the party complaining on appea l failed to take corr ective a ction with respect t o anyerr or which a lle g e dly oc c ur red b e low , a ndwe are pa rt ic ula rl y loath t o d o s o w he re the c omp la ini ng pa rt y aff irmatively

acquie sced in the trial court’s action. Se e id

. (nothing in rule re quires “r elief be g rante d to a pa rty re sp on sib le fo r an e rr or or wh o f a ile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n w a s r e a so na bly a va ila ble to preve nt or nullify

the harmful eff

ect of an er ror” ). This issue is waived.
IV . TR IA L C OU RT ’S QU ESTI ON IN G OF WI TN ESSES
The de fendant claims that the t rial j udg e was biased and improperly asked que stions of State witnesses that bolstered their testimony and “constituted prohibited judicial comment.” See Tenn. Const. art. V I , § 9. Responding to the State’s contention that he waived the i s s u e, t he defe ndant asserts that the trial judge ’s questioning constituted plain err or.

The Te nnes s ee C o n s t i t u t i o n p ro h i b i t s j u dg es fr om making a ny comment “with re spect to m a tte rs of

fa c t.” Te nn . Co ns t. a

rt . V I , § 9; State v. Suttles , 767 S.W .2d 403, 406 (Tenn. 1989)

. The a im of this rule is to avoid g iving “the jury any impression as to [the judge’ s] feeling s or to make any statement which mig ht refle ct upon the we ight or cre dibilit y

of evidence or which mig ht sway the jury .” Suttles , 7 67 S.W. 2da t 40 7; se e Sta te v . B ro wn , 823 S.W .2d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “It is natural t hat j urors should be anx ious to know the mind of the Court, and follow it; there fore , a Court c annot be too c autious in [ its] inquiries.” Mc Do na ld v . S tate , 8 9 T e n n
. 1 6 1 , 1 6 4 , 1 4 S. W. 487, 488 (Tenn. 1890)

.

That said, our Tenne ssee Rules of Evidence specific ally permit the interrog ation of witnesses by

the trial judg e: (b ) Inte rr og a tio n b y

Cou rt . T he Cou rt

ma y int e rr og a te wi tne sse s. (c) Objections. Objec tions . . . to i nterrog ation by [t he court] may

be m a d e a tt h e t i m e o r

a tt h e n e x ta v a i l ab l e o p p o r t u n i t y w h e n t h e j u r y is n ot p re se nt.
Te nn
. R

. E v i d

. 6 1 4 ( b ) , ( c )

. S o l o n g a s t h e i n q u i r y i s i m p ar t i a l , tr i a l c o u r t s m a y a s k q u e s t i on s to either clarify a point or to supply any omission. See Col lin s v . S tate , 220 Tenn. 275, 416 S.W .2d 766A f t er defens e c ouns el ’ s r edi r ect ex ami nat i on of B

. R

. but pri or t o t he t r i al j udge’ s ques t i oni ng of B

. R

. , t he t r i al 21 j u dg e a s k e d for a be n c h c on fe r e n c e
. T h e r e c or d f a i l s t o r e f l e c t w h a t t r a n s pi r e d, a n d i mme di a t e l y a f t er t he bench conf er enc e, t he t r i al j udge as ked B

. R t he ques t i ons t hat ar e t he s ubj ect of t hi s i s s ue.
N ei t her duri ng nor af

t er t he t ri al judge’ s exam i nat i o n of B

. R

. d i d d efense co unsel o b ject

. It i s uncl ear f rom t he
reco rd whether d efense counsel ob ject ed duri ng t he i naud i b l e b ench co nference. It i s well s et t l ed t hat when a p art y s eeks appel l at e r evi ew, t her e i s a dut y t o prepar e a r ecor d whi ch conve y s a fai r , ac cur at e a nd comp l et e a ccoun t of wh at tra n sp ire d w ith re sp e c t to the issu e s fo rm ing the b a sis o f t h e a p p e a l. S ee S t a t e v
. B a l l a rd , 8 5 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 5 7 , 5 6 1 (T enn. 1 9 9 3 ) (h o ld in g fa ilure to inc lud e tra n sc rip t p re c lud e s a p p e llate re v ie w ); St at e v. O ody , 82 3 S.W

. 2 d 55 4 , 55 9 (T enn. C r i m. Ap p. 199 1) ( hol di ng t r i al cour t ’ s r ul i ng pre s umed corr ect i n t he abs enc e of an adequat e r ecor d on appeal )

. W hen t h e r ec or d i s i n compl et e an d doe s n ot con t ai n t h e r el ev an t i n for mat i on doc u men t i n g a n i s s u e pr es en t ed for r ev i ew , or p o rtio n s o f t h e re c o rd up o n w h ic h the p a rty re lies, an a p p e llate c o u rt is p re c lud e d fro m c o n sid e rin g the issu e
. See S ta te
v . R o b e rts , 75 5 S. W

. 2d 83 3, 83 6 ( T e n n
. Cr i m. App

. 19 88 )

. Abs e n t t h e n e c e s s a r y r e l e v a n t ma t e r i a l i n t h e r e c or d, we c a n n ot f i n d t h a t de fe n s e c ou n s e l ob j e c t e d t o t h e t r i a l c ou r t ’ s qu e s t i on i n g of B. R. -27- (T e nn . 1 96 7) ; Pa rke r v . S tate , 13 2 Te nn
. 32 7, 17 8 S.W. 43 8 (T e nn
. 19 15 ). Al so , o ur ru le s e ntr us t to the trial court the pow er t o “exerc ise appropriate contr ol over the pr esentation of evidenc e and conduct of

the trial whe n nece ssary

to avoid abuse by

counsel.” Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a)

. Furthermore , Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 36(a) states that a p pellate r elief is g e ne ra lly

no t a va ila

ble wh e n a

pa rty ha s “ faile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n w a s r e a so na bly a va ila ble to p re ve nt o r nu lli fy the ha rm fu l e ff e c t of a ny e rr or .” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( a ); see State v . Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2001)

. The failure to make a contemporaneous objec tion constitut es a w aiver of the issue on a

ppeal.
Be fore discussing the specific testimonyat issue, we note, as t he State points out, that the defe ndant failed to obje ct, move for a mistrial, or otherwise complain befor e the tria l court beg an its e xami natio n o f the wi tne sse s, du ri ng the c ou rs e of its e xami natio ns , o r d uring “ the ne xt av a ila ble op po rtun ity wh e n the jury [wa s] not pre se nt. ” Te nn . R. Ev id. 61 4( c ); see Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); 21 Te nn . R. Ev id. 10 3( a )( 1) ; State v. Je nkins , 7 3 3 S

. W

. 2 d 528, 532 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e , w ithre g ardto e a c h o f the fo ur e xam inatio ns , h a s b e e n w a ive d. F a ili ng to object constitutes a proce dural de fault for which re lief may

not be obtained a

bsent the existence of plain err or. See Te ag ue v . S tate , 7 72 S.W. 2d91 5, 92 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 88 ); State v. Killebrew , 760 S.W .2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)

. A. Appellate Re view of P lain E rror
B e fo re a n e rr or

is r e c og nize d a s p la in er ro r, it m us t be “ plain” a ndmus t a ff e c t a “s u bstantial rig ht” of the a ccuse d. The term “plain” e quates to “c lear ” or “ obvious.” See U nited States v. Olano , 5 07 U. S. 7 25 , 7 34 , 1 13 S. Ct . 1 77 0, 17 77 (1 99 3) . Pl ain erro r i s n ot e rr or that is simplyconspicuous; rather, it is espec ially eg reg ious error

that strikes at the fair n es s , integ rity , or public reputation of judicial proce eding s. See State v . W ooden , 6 58 S.W. 2d55 3, 55 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1983).-28- I n State v. Adkisson , 899 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) , this court define d “substantial r i gh t” as a

rig ht of “fundamental proportions in the indictment proce ss, a rig ht to the proof of every element of the offense and

. . . constitutional in nature.” Id . at 63 9. I n th a t c a se , th is court e stablished five fa ctors to be a pplied in determining whether an er ror is plain: (a ) the re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli sh wh a t oc c ur

re d inthe tr ia l c ou rt ; (b) a clea r and une quivocal rule of law must have been br eac hed; (c) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or must be “ne cessa ry to do substantial just ice.”
Id . at 641-42 (f

ootnotes omitted). Our supreme court char acte rized the Adkisson test as a “ clea r and meaning ful standar d” and emphasized that eac h of the five fac tors must be prese nt before an er ror qualifies as pla in error

. Sta te v . S mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 282-83 (Te nn. 2000). B. Q ue st ion ing of t he Vi c ti m
Al tho ug h B. R. te sti fi e d d uring the State ’s c a se -i n- c hie f, the de fe nd a nt r e c a lle d B .R. to the stand in his defense . During her te stimony , the trial judg e held a bench c onfer ence, but the rec ord fa ils to reflec t what transpire d. After war ds, the trial judg e a d v i s ed B. R. that the court wa s g oing to a s k

q u e s ti o n s , a n d th e tria l j u d g e r e mi n d e d h e r th a t s h e w a s u n d e r

o a th

. T h e f

o ll o w ing e xch a ng e the n e ns ue d:

Q. [B .R. ], wh a t y ou ha ve c a lle d ina pp ro pria te that [the defen da nt] has done to y ou, have y ou made a ny of these thing s up?
A. No. Q. Ha s a ny on e tol d y ou wh a t to sa y a g a ins t hi m?
A. No. Q. Or ha s any one coa ched y ou to s ay t h i n g s ag ainst him about the ina pp ro pria te thi ng s?
A. No. Q. Anybody

coac hed y ou to say

that things we re ina

ppropriate that he did to y ou?-29- A. I do n’ t un de rs ta ndthe qu e sti on ve ry we ll. Q. Ok a y
. B y the wo rd “ c oa c he d, ” I me a nt ba sic a lly tol d y ou wh a t to sa y or ho w t o s a y

it a g a ins t hi m.
A. No. Q. Thank y ou. Now, y ou all have f ollow-up on any

of these thr ee or four que stions, if y ou’d like.
Th e State the n a sk e d a fe w fo llo w- up qu e sti on s re g ard ing wh e the r she wa s to ld t o te ll the truth a nd wh e the r sh e wa s te lli ng the truth

. B .R. a ns we re d a ff ir ma tiv e ly

. Th e State pr e vio us ly had aske d a similar question on its direct examination of B.R. I n that instance, the State asked, “[B.R.], would y ou make this up just so y ou could get out of going to gymnastics? ” B .R. replied, “No, I could neve r make up something like this.”
I n apply ing the Adkisson plain err or fac tors in this case , our analy sis e nds after fac tor one, “the rec ord must clearly establish what occ urre d in the trial court.” 899 S.W .2d at 641. I n the pr e se nt c a se , th e re c or d is sil e nt a s to what tra ns pir e d during the be nc h co nf e re nc e he ld i mme diate ly prior to the trial judg e questioning B.R. Thi s co u rt m ay not speculate as to what wa s discussed, whether defe nse counsel objec ted to such questioning , whether defe nse counse l failed to objec t for tactica l rea sons, see Adk isson , 899 S.W .2d at 641-42 (“ [T] he ac cused [ must not have waive d] t he issue for tac tical re asons”) , whether defe nse counse l re q u es t ed such que stioning, or whe ther the b e n c h c o n f

e r e n c e r e g ar d e d a n o th e r is s u e
. T h e r e f o r e , b e c au s e th e f

ir s t f actor in A d kis son is not satisfied, we do not find plain err or.

C. Questionin g of S tate ’s G ym nastics Expert The trial judge a lso questioned the State’s g y mnastics expert, Ms. Fox. The trial judge inquired, “In y our opinion, ma’am, should a g y m instruct o r o b t ain parental conse nt before videotaping a participant.” Ms. Fox replied, “Not if it’s a leg itimate video for training pur poses.” The de fendant claims that this question was biased and improper . The trial judg e aske d this “one follow-up question” a fter se vera l questions from the jury

.

We decline to find plain err or because “a clear and unequivocal rule of law” ha s not been br eac hed and be cause the def endant’ s substantial rights ha ve no t been a dverse ly aff ecte d. Adkisson , 899 S.W .2d at 641. The de fendant claims that this question amounted to a judicial comment, violating Tenne ssee Constit ution Article 6, sec tion 9. See T e n n
. C o n s t

. ar t

. V I, § 9

. In ou r vie w, the qu e sti on did no t a mou nt to a c omm e nt on the e vid e nc e . T he re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in any indication of the trial c ourt’s opinion of the evidenc e, and the jury was prope rly

informed that i th a d c o m p l e t e f

a c t

- f i n d i n g au t h o r i t y.R eg ard i ng such q ue st i o ns, T en ne ssee R ule o f C rimina l P ro ce d ure 2 4 .1(c ) p ro vid es: 22

J u ro r Q u e stio n s o f W it n e sse s. – In the c o u rt’s d isc re tio n , t h e c o u rt m a y p e rm it a ju ro r to a sk a q u e stio n o f a w itne ss. T h e fo llo w ing p ro c e d u re s a p p ly:
(1) W ri t t en Sub m i ss i o n of Q uest i o ns. – T he juror shal l p ut the q uest i o ns i n wri t i ng a n d su b m it it to the ju d g e thr o u g h a c o u rt o ff ic e r a t the e n d o f a w itne ss’s te stim o n y. A jur or’ s q ues t i on sh al l be an ony mo us an d t he j ur or’ s na me s hal l not be i ncl uded in th e q u e stio n
. ( 2) Pr oce du r e Af

t er Submi s s i on
. – T h e j u dg e s h al l re v i ew a l l s u ch qu es t i on s a n d,
ou t s i de t h e h ea r i n g of t h e j u r y , s h al l con s u l t t h e par t i es abou t wh et h er t h e qu es t i on s houl d be as ked. T he j udge may as k t he j ur or’ s ques t i on i n whol e or part an d m ay cha ng e t he wordi ng of

t he ques t i on bef ore as ki ng i t

. T he j udge may per mi t coun s el to a sk the q u e stio n in its o rig ina l o r a m e n d e d fo rm in w h o le o r p a rt. ( 3) J ur y I ns t r uct i ons
. – W hen j ur or que s t i ons ar e per mi t t ed, t he cour t s hal l i ns t r uct jurors earl y i n t he t ri al ab o ut th e m echanics of aski ng a que st i o n and t o gi ve no m eani ng t o t h e fact t hat t he judge cho se not t o ask a q uest i o ns o r al t ered t he
wo rding o f

a que st i o n s ub m i t t ed by a j uror. (4) R et ai ni ng Q uest i o ns fo r Re co rd.

– A l l jur o rs ’ que st i o ns

– whet her appr ov ed or di s appr ov ed by t h e cou r t – s h al l be r et ai n ed for t h e r ec or d.

T enn. R

. C ri m
. P

. 24

. 1 (c).

T hi s r ul e becam e eff ec t i ve Jul y 1, 200 6, as par t of a c om preh ens i ve “ r eformat t i ng ” of al l of t he C r i mi nal P ro c e d u re R u le s. See C o m p iler ’s N o te s. A n e a rlie r v e rs io n o f R u le 2 4 .1 p ro v id e d :

J u ro r Q uest i o ns o f

W i t ness es. – In t he co urt ’ s d i scr et i o n, a jur o r desi ri ng to p rop o und a que st i o n t o a wi t ness m ay b e p erm i t t ed t o do s o
. T he jur o r must put t he q uest i o n i n wri t t en fo rm and s ub m i t i t t o t he judge thr o ugh a co urt o f f i cer at t he end
o f a wi t ness ’ s t est i m o ny
. T he judge shal l revi ew al l s uch q uest i o ns and , outs i d e t he h ea r i n g of

t h e j u r y , s h al l con s u l t t h e par t i es a bou t w h et h er t h e qu es t i on s h ou l d be (c o n tinu e d ...)

-30- D. Questionin g of Victim ’s Mot her
The de fendant also claims that t h e trial judg e improperly asked B .R.’s mother a question that bolstered B .R.’s testimony

. After re- cross ex amination, the t rial court allowed the jury to s ub mit in w ri tin g pr op os e d que sti on s to the wi tne ss. Th e pr os e c uti on a ndde fe ns e c ou ns e l si le ntl y rea d eac h submitt ed question. The trial judge inquired out side the hearing of the jury whether there wer e any objections, and both parties replied, “ No, Your H onor.” T h us, the trial judg e re ad ea ch question to B.R.’s mother, a nd she answe red e ach one in turn. The defe ndant now cla ims that the last question was improper

. The trial judge asked, “Do y ou know if [B.R.] shared her story about [t he def endant] with any

of her friends at any

time? ” B .R.’s mother answe red, “ Yes, she ha s.” Ag ain, the trial court ha s discretion to interrog ate witnesse s, Tenn. R. Evid. 614(b), a ndin the pr e se nt c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt e xami ne d B .R. ’s mothe r b y a sking jury -s ub mit te d q ue sti on s. 22(

. . . con t i n u ed) 22
p ro p o u n d e d . T h e ju d g e , i n his o r h e r d is c r e tio n , m a y a sk the ju ro r’s q u e stio n in who l e o r part and m ay change t he wo rding o f t he jur o r’ s q u est i o n be fo re p ro p o u n d ing it to the w itne ss . . .
.
T enn. R

. C ri m
. P

. 24

. 1 (c).

T h e ea r l i er v er s i on t ook e f fec t on J u l y 1, 2003, an d g ov er n ed t h e def en dan t ’ s t r i al w h i ch c ommen ce d J u l y 7, 2003. -31- See State v. Robe rt Bacon , No. 03C01-9608-CR-00308, slip op. at 32 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox ville, J an. 8, 1998) (conc luding that the trial judge , in a sking two questions submitted by the jury , did not comment on the evide nce suc h that it violated the defe ndant’s rig hts).

We see nothing in the judge ’s questioning whi c hw o u ld le av ean improper

impression wi th the jury

a s to his fe e lin g s a

bo ut the e vid e nc e , a ndthe jud g e ma de no state me nts wh ic h w ou ld ref lect upon the weight or cre dibilit y of t he evide nce, inc luding B .R.’s testimony ; thus, we find that this contention provides no basis for a reve rsal bec ause the qu es t i o n d i d not amount to a judicial c omm e nt anddidno t a dv e rs e ly a ff e c t th e de fe nd a nt’ s rig hts

. E. Qu estioning of

State’ s Social Worker
L a st, the de fe nd a nt c la ims that th e tria l ju dg e a sk e d impr op e r q ue sti on s o f S ta te wi tne ss M s. Th omp so n, the lic e ns e d c linical so cia l wo rk e r w ithOu r Kids Ce nte r. Af te r c ro ssexamination and before questions from the jury , the trial judg e aske d Ms. Thompson severa l qu e sti on s, a s f

oll ow s: Q. Ma ’am, y ou us e d th e wo rd“ pa in” in o ne of y ou r ans we rs
. A. Ye s. Q. How many

times w as there a report by the child of e x perie ncing “pain,” using that word.
A. I did not ask her qua ntitative. Q. How many

times in y our notes or y our re collection wa s that word
u s ed i n t h e c o n t ex to f t h e t o u ch i n g?
A. Of the medical? Ba s ically , I just said was there any

- did y ou ex p er i en ce an y

p ai n o r h av e a n y

b l ee d i n g? Q. An the a ns we r w a s?-32- A. She said that there was no blee ding, and sh e fe l t pain when he tou c he d h e r p ri vate sp ot. We ag ain dec line to find plain err or. I n answe ring a question on direc t examination, Ms. Thompson testified that B.R. told her she e x perie nced pain when the de fendant touched her

“ private sp ot. ” Ne ith e r the State no r the de fe nd a nt q ue sti on e d M s. Th omp so n f urthe r a bo ut this statement. The trial court’s que stion was cu m u lative and did not adve rsely aff ect the de fenda nt’s ri g hts

. V. VICTIM’S MEDICA L REPORT

Rely ing on his rig hts to present a de fense and to a f air trial, the defe ndant complains t h att h e t ri al co u rterro n eo u s l y re fu s ed t o al l o w h i s d ef

en s e e x p er t t o t es t i fyre gar d i n g t h e f i n d i n gs of a me dical examination indicating that the victim had no phy sical i njuries. The St ate c laims that the evidenc e wa s irrele vant and that the examination could ne ither conf irm nor exclude any

sexual c on ta c t be tw e e n th e de fe nd a nt andthe vic tim

.

As quoted in the pre ceding issue, the re cord r efle cts that when M s
. T h o m p son, a lic e ns e d c lin ic a l so c ia l w or ke r, int e rv ie we d th e vic ti m , th ev i c ti m r e p orte d th a t sh e e xpe ri e nc e d s ome

“ pa in” wh e n th e de fe nd a nt touc he d h e r b ut n o b le e din g . T he tr ia l c ou rt be c a me inv olv e d in questioning the witness and aske d how many times the victim had reported experienc ing pain and h o w m an y

times the word “pain” appe are d in the witness’s notes. Ms. Thompson responde d that sh e didno t a sk the vic tim ho w ma ny tim e s pai n wa s invo lve d; rathe r, the vic tim tol d h e r that sh e fe lt pain when the defe ndant touched he r “private spot.”

At the conc lusion of the State’s ca se-in-c hief, the de fendant proffe red the testimony of Dr. E dmond Yabut, a board certifie d emer g ency phy sician. Doctor Y abut was of fer ed as an expert in pe diatrics, and the defe nse wanted Dr. Ya but to testify

that the victim’s ref

ere nces to pa in when the def endant touche d her w ould be consistent only with an injury to the hy men and that a

phy sical examination of the victim had reve aled no suc h injury . The testimony , the def ense insisted, wa s re le va nt t o th e ve ra c ity

of the vic tim

. The State cross-e x amined Dr . Yabut on the pr offe r. Doc tor Yabut wa s unawa re that the vic tim tol d D e te c tiv e B re e dlo ve that sh e e xpe ri e nc e d n o p a in. Do c tor Ya bu t tes tif ie d th a t pain is a “very objective f

inding.” He opined that if the defe ndant had just touched the victim’s “majora and the minora ,” no injury would be expected.
The trial c ourt q u es t i o ned the pa rties whethe r “pain” was a disputed fac tual issue. The State insi s t ed that whether the vic tim ex perie nced pain was a c ollatera l matter for which extrinsi c proof

should not be admitt ed. The defense admitted that causing pain i s not an eleme nt of ag g ravated sexual battery or exploit ation of a minor. The trial court then e x cluded Dr . Yabut’s testimonyfinding that it would not subst antially assist the trier of f

act to determine a fa ct in issue.-33- On appe al, the S tate attac hes sig nificanc e to the medica l report of the victim’s examination having not been admit ted or authenticated. The S tate arg ues t hat because the defe ndant did not seek to introduce the report into evidenc e, the defe ndant was pr ohibited from eliciting Dr. Yabut’s testimony

reg arding the re port. We disag ree
. The fa cts or data in the particula r ca se upon which an expert bases an opinion or infere nce may be thos e perce ived by or m ade known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type re asonably

relied upon by experts in the particular

field in forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject, the f

acts or data nee d not be admissible in evidence

. Tenn. R. Evid. 703. At any rate , the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Yabut’s testimonywas not base d on the admis s i b i l i t y o f t he medica l report; the tria l court did not reg ard the victim’s pain or lac k there of to be a

fac t in issue and did not reg ard Dr. Yabut’s testimonyas substantially assisting the trier of fac t to determine a

fac t in issue
. All evidence , including e x pert testimony , must be relevant. Tenn. R

. E vid. 402. Relevant e vidence is evidence “having any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of th e ac t i o n m o re probable or less probable than it would be witho u t t h e evidence.” Id . 4 01 . Re le va nt e vid e nc e ma y be e xclu de d if

its pr ob a tiv e va lue is “substantially

outweig hed” by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. Id . 403.
The a dmissibi lityof expert testimony is gove rned by

Rules 702 and 703 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce. McD aniel v. CSX Transp., Inc ., 95 5 S. W.2 d 257 (T e nn . 199 7) . Rule 702 addre sses t h e n ee d fo r expert testimony and the qua lifications of the e x pert: “I f scientific , technica l, or ot her specialized knowledg e will substantially assist the trier of f

act to under stand the e vid e nc e or

t o d e t e r m i n e a

f a c ti n i s s u e , a

w i t n e s s q u a l i f

i e d a s a n e xp e r tb y

k n o w l e d g e , sk ill , e xpe ri e nc e , tr a ini ng , or

e du c a tio n may

te sti fy in the fo rm

of a n o pin ionor

oth e rw ise .” Te nn . R. E v i d

. 7 0 2

. It s c o u n t e rp ar t , R u l e 7 0 3 , f o c u s e s o n t h e r e l i ab i l i t y o f e x p e r to p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y. Gene rally , the admis sibili ty of ex pert testim ony is a matter entrusted to the sound discre tion of the trial court, a nd there can be no revers al on appea l absent cle ar a buse of that discr etion. State v. Ba lla rd , 855 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993)

.

The de fendant arg ues that Dr. Yabut’s ex pert testimony rebutted the State’s ca se and impeache d the cr edibilityof Ms. Thompson and lay witnesses, inclu d i n g t h e v ictim. From our revie w of the re co rd , Dr. Yabut’s testimony would not have sig nificantly impeache d the victim’s c re dib ili ty

ina smu c h a s th e vic tim didno t te sti fy

a bo ut any tou c hin g inv olv ing pa in. Ms. Thompson’s cre dibilit y wo u ld not have bee n impeache d; her testimony simplyrelated what the victim had said. Other trial testimonyhad shown that the v i ct i m made inconsistent stateme nts at dif fe re nt t ime s.

I t is troubling that the State elicited f rom Ms. Thomps o n the victim’s report of experiencing some pain, that the trial c ourt then questi oned Ms. Thompson about the same matter,Al t h ou g h t h e def en dan t i mpu g n s t h e St at e’ s mot i v e i n s ee k i n g t o s ev er t h e ch i l d r ape cou n t s on t h e bas i s of 23 gai ni ng an unf ai r t act i cal ad vant age i n t he t ri al o f th e a g g ra vat ed s exual ba t t ery charges, we d o not d i scern f rom t he d e fen d a n t’s p re se n ta tio n a n d a n a lysis o f t h is issu e o n a p p e a l t h a t he is a sse rting re v e rs ib le e rr o r in c o n n e c tio n w ith h is aggravat ed sexual b at t ery co nvi ct i o ns. W e, acco rdingl y , co nf i ne o ur revi ew t o t he q uest i o n whet her a f ut ure t ri al on t he
s ev er ed r ape c h ar g es i s ba r r ed. -34- a n d t h a tt h e S t a t e l a t e r

ar g u e d t h a tw h e t h e r

t h e v i c t i me x p e r i e n c e d p a i n w a s a c o l l a t e r a l m a t t e r
. It strikes us that the State and the tria l court shar e re sponsibili ty for ope ning this line of que stioning and that the defe nse was there by entitled to expl ore the same a rea . To be sure , Dr. Ya

but’s testimony app e ars marg ina lly

re le va nt, bu t th a t a sse ssm e nt g oe s to the we ig ht, no t th e a dmiss ib il it y , of h is te sti mon y . E ve n s o, we are con vinc e d th a t a ny e rr or in d isa llo wi ng Dr . Y abu t’ s te sti mon y is harmless. B y

its own terms, the medica l report, whic h is present in the re cord, indicated that the vic tim ’s e xami natio n n e ith e r c on fi rm e d o r r ule d o ut the po ssi bil ity

of a ny ty pe of se xua l c on ta c t. F or the se re a so ns , th e de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to a ne w t ri a l onthi s c la im.
VI. COMP ULSORY JOINDER AND DOUBLE JEO P ARDY
I n a n is su e r ai s e d

i n a Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 10 int e rl oc uto ry app e a l, joine d o n ap p e a l w ith th e d e f e n d a n t’ s Ru le 3 is s u e s , th e d e f e n d a n t c o mp lain s th a t th e tria l c ourt should not have sever ed the three child rape counts, over his obje ction, on the morni n g t h at trial beg an. He insists that the trial court proce durally err ed in considering the motion and that the State’s motivation for seeking sever ance was to gain an improper tac tical adva ntag e. As a re sult, he arg ues 23 and that a f

uture trial on the seve red r ape c harg es is barr ed by the compulsory

joinder provisions of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure and by state and f

eder al constitutional double-jeopar dy g uarantees. The State counter s that the trial court p ro p er l y sever ed the r ape c harg es bec ause the y wer e not pa

rt of the same criminal episode as the other char g es and beca use sever ance was ne cessa ry to promote a fair determination of the defe ndant’s g uilt or innocence of ea ch off ense. A. Consolid ation and Severanceof O ff enses We can quickly

dispose of the defe ndant’s proce dural objection to the timing of the State’s motion. From the re cord be fore us, it does not appear that the def

en d an t o b j ec ted to the motion as untimely

. That arg ument is, the ref ore, w aived. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2)( A); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a).

Tu rn ing ne xt to the su bs ta nc e of the State ’s mot ion , t

h e writt e n mo tio n to se ve r s ta te s, in i ts e nti re ty , th e fo llo wi ng :

Comes now the State of Te nnessee , by and throug h the offic e of the District Attorne y

Gen eral, pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 13, and Sta te v . Le ath , No. 01C01-9511-CC-00392 (Te nn. C ri m
. App. 1998) (attached) , an d moves this Honorable Court to seve r the ra pe counts from a ll other offe nses in the re lated ca se.A f t er t he t hree chi l d rape charges were s evered f rom t he t ri al , t he rema i ni ng co unt s were renum b ered and 24

su b m itt e d to th e ju ry. In this issu e , o u r re fer e n c e s a re to the nu m b e rin g s o f co u n ts in the o rig ina l ch a rg ing instr u m e n t. -35- This motion, t o say

the least, is uninformative, and the transc ript of the seve ranc e hea ring provides marg inal enlig htenment. We disc ern that the State supported its sever ance reque st on the basis that the vid e ota

pe s de pic tin g the vic tim wo uld be re le va nt t o th e a g g ra vate d s e xua l batte ry c ou nts bu t le ss probative of

the child ra

pe counts. The defe ndant ar g ued ag ainst sev er an ce b ased on judicia l economy and the victim’s expected testi mony intertwining both types of offe nses. The trial court ruled,
No w i n th is ca se , the Cou rt fi nd s tha t the mot ionto s e ve r[] is

well taken and shall be sustained. Note d defe ndant’s objec tion. The Cou rt fi nd s th a t it

is d e e me d a

pp ro pria te to p ro mot e a fair de te rm inatio n o f the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t or inn oc e nc e in e a c h o ff

e ns e pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 14 (b )( 2) (A ) (i naud ibl e ) dis c re tio n in that r e g ard . So those three counts will be sever ed.
We b e g in b y

no tin g that e a c h c ou nt i n th e c ha rg ing ins trume nt i n th is c a se a lle g e s a time frame of “May

2001 throug h J une 2002, inclusive.” T h e S t ate-supplied bill of particulars described the child ra

pe off enses in Counts One, Thre e, and F ive of the origina l char g ing ins trume nt in the fo llo wi ng te rm s:

24
Cou nt 1
Date of the offense: after the F all Fiesta held Novembe r 10, 2001 but be fo re Christ ma s o f 2 00 1 o n a date the vic tim

a tte nd e d g y mna sti c s.
Time of the of

fense : unknown
L ocation of theoffe nse: on the “r o d floor” of Esprit Gy mnastics located at 7106 Crossroads B lvd., Suit e 226, B rentwood, Williamson County , Tenne ssee
Nature of the off

ense: dig ital penetration

. . . . Cou nt 3
Dat e o f th e o f f e n s e : F a ll o f

2 0 0 1 b e f

o r e th e F a ll F ie s ta

h e ldon No ve mbe r 1 0, 20 01 on a

date that th e vic tim

a tte nd e d g y mna sti c s.
Time of the of

fense : unknown.-36- L ocati o n o f the off

ense: on the “ rod floor” of Esprit Gymnasium located at 7106 Crossroads B lvd., Suite 226, B rentwood, Williamson County , Tenne ssee
Nature of the off

ense: dig ital penetration

. . . . Cou nt 5
Date of the of fe ns e : J un e of

20 01 thr ou g h M arc h o f 2 00 2 o n a date that th e vic tim

a tte nd e d g y mna sti c s.
Time of the of

fense : unknown
L ocation of t h e offe nse: on the “r od floor” of Esprit Gy mnasium located at 7106 Crossroads B lvd., Suit e 226, Br entwood, Willi amson County , Tenne ssee
Nature of the off

ense: dig ital penetration The State-supplied bill of particulars for the ag g ravated sexual battery offe nses in Counts Two, F our, and S ix of t he original charg ing instrument mirror ed the pa rticulars f or Counts One, Thre e, and F ive. That is, the State particularized the off ense in Count Two in te rms identical to Count One , including listi ng the nature of t he offense as digital penetration; it particula rized the ag g ravated sexual battery of fe ns e in C ou nt F ou r i n te rm s ide nti c a l to Cou nt Th re e , inc lud ing lis tin g the natur e of the of fe ns e a s d ig ita l pe ne tr a tio n; it partic ula ri zed the a g g ra vate d sexua l batte ry of fe ns e in C ou nt S ix in t e rm s identical to Count Five, including listi ng the nature of the off ense a s digital pe netration.
Trial court rulings a ddressing joinder and se verance of offe nses, purs u ant to Rules of C riminal Procedur e 8, 13, and 14, are revie wed for an abuse of discr etion. Sta te v . G oo dwi n , 143 S.W .3d 771, 780 (Tenn. 2004) ; Sp ic e r v . S tate , 12 S.W .3d 438, 442 (Tenn. 2000) . As such, a trial court’s de cision to consolidate or to sever offe nses wil l not be reverse d unless the “court applied an incor r e c t le g a l s tan d ar d , o r r e a c h e d a d e c is io n w h ic h is a g a in s t lo g ic o r r e a s o n in g th a t c au sed an injusti ce to the pa

rty complaining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 4 3 , 2 4 7 (T en n
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Sta te v. Shuck , 953 S.W .2d 662, 669 (Tenn.1997) ).

Ag g ravated sexual battery of a c hild under 13 y ear s of ag e, T.C.A. § 39-13- 504(a) (4) (2006), is a le sser include d offe nse o f ra p e o f a child, id . § 39-13-522. See State v . Elkins , 108 S.W .2d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003). Thus, the ag g ravated sexual battery char g es in Counts Two, Four, and Six may

well be lesse r incl uded off enses of the child ra

pe cha rg es set forth in Count s One, Th re e , a ndF ive . A lth ou g h it is un ne c e ssa ry to a lle g e le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s a s se pa

rate c ou nts inW e reject t he Stat e’ s argum ent on ap p eal t hat t he d efend ant f ai l ed t o de m o nst rat e t hat each co unt was part 25

o f t h e s a m e c rim ina l ep iso d e . W e a re no t p e rs u a d e d , i n the c o n te x t o f ch a rg e s o rig ina lly c o n so lid a te d in a sing le i nd i ct m ent and when i t i s t he Stat e’ s d esi re t o al t er t he st at us q uo b y a severance o f o f fenses , that t he b urden i s o n t he def en dan t t o ma k e s u ch a s h owi n g
. At an y ra t e, t h e St at e’ s par t i cu l ar s , a s w or ded, a ppea r t o s pea k i n l es s er
- i n cl u dedoffens e t er ms, i n w hi ch cas e i t woul d be i ncu mb ent upon t he St at e t o dem ons t r at e ot her wi s e.

Eve n s o, t h e r el at i on s h i p of Coun t s O n e t h r ou g h Si x t o t h e r ema i n i n g f i v e co unt s f al l w i t h i n t h e r ea l m of 26
p e rm issiv e jo ind e r o f o ff e n se s in C rim ina l P ro c e d u re R u le 8 (b ) b a se d o n p a rta k ing “ o f t h e sa m e o r sim ilar c h a ra c te r.” See T e n n . R . C rim . P . 8 (b )( 1 ), (2 ) (tw o o r m o re o ff e n se s m a y b e jo ine d in the sa m e ind ic tm e n t i f t h e o ff e n se s “c o n stitute p art s o f a co m m o n s chem e o r pl an” o r i f t hey “ar e o f

t he same o r s i m i l ar charact er”). -37- an indictment, structuring an indictment in such a manne r is not prohibited. See State v . Banes , 874 S.W .2d 73, 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.

The ra pe counts, howeve r, are subj ect to mandatory joinder wit h the cor responding ag g ravated s exual battery counts. Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 8( a)( 1) mandates joinder of the off enses, a s alleg ed, arising fr om the “same conduct or aris[ing] from th e s ame criminal e p is o d e .” See Tenn. R. C ri m. P . 8 (a )( 1) (A ) ( tw o o r m or e of fe ns e s sh a ll b e joi ne d inthe sa me 25 ind ic tme nt i f the y

are “ ba se d o n th e sa me c on du c t or ari se fr om the sa me c ri min a l e pis od e ” ); Banes , 874 S.W .2d at 80 n.7. Acc ording ly , the def ense is corre ct t h at , as worde d, Counts One and Two, Counts Two and Thre e, and Counts Four and F ive met the criteria for mandatory

joinder. 26
No w, we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inse ve ri ng the ma nd a torily joined child rape offe nses from the of fenses al l ege d i n Counts Two, Four, a nd Six . Criminal Pr oc e du re Rul e 8( a )( 2) pr ov ide s th a t a “ de fe nd a nt sh all

no t be su bje c t to se pa

rate tr ia ls f

or mul tip le of fe ns e s [qu a lif

y ing fo r m a nd a tory

joi nd e r] u nle ss the y are se ve re d pu rs ua nt to Rul e 14 .” Te nn . R. Crim. P. 8(a)(2) ( emphasis adde d). Rule 14 provides that e ither the State or the defe ndant may obtain a seve ranc e of of

fense s that have be en man d at o ri l yjoined when “ appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defe ndant’s g uilt or innocence of ea ch off ense.” Id . 14(b)( 2)(A) . The State ’s pr of

e sse d c on c e rnthat th e vid e ota pe s mi g ht no t be proba tiv e of the ra pe c ha rg e s is insufficient to wa

rra nt severance, pa

rticularly considering that the def

endant oppose d the seve ranc e, there by acc epting the risk the vi deotape s might pose to the r ape c harg es. F urthermor e, the State ha s not articulate d why

a limiting instruction to the jury would not have pr eserved a f air de termination of the de fendant’s g uilt or innocence of ea ch off ense.
F ina lly , it strike s us that pe rm itt ing the State to se ve r of fe ns e s in this ma nn e r i s akin to the condemne d prac tice “by some prosec uting attorney s of ‘ s av i n g back’ one or more char g es arising from the sa me conduc t or from the sa me criminal episode.” Id . 8 (a ), Com mit te e Com me nts ; s ee State v . King , 717 S.W .2d 306, 307-08 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (se cond indictment af ter trial was pre vented by

Rule 8, which pre vented multiple trials on char g es arising from the same c onduct or fr om the same c ri m i nal episode) . As the supre me court expl ained in Sta te v . Ca rru the rs , 35 S.W .3d 516 (Tenn. 2000) ,-38- . . . The purpose of Rule 8 is t o p ro m o t e efficient a dminist ration of jus tic e a ndto p ro te c t th e ri g hts of the a c c us e d. Th e ru le c le arl y permits a subseque ntly returne d indictment to be joined with a pr e vio us ind ic tme nt w he re the a lle g e d offen se s r e la te to the sa me criminal episode. Se e Kin g v. St ate , 7 17 S.W. 2d30 6 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1986). This pra ctice, how ever , does have certain limit ations wh ic h, a s th e c omm e nts no te , s a fe g ua rd an a c c us e d a g a ins t prosec utorial abuse. For e x ample, a pr osecutor c annot simplydecide to “save ” cha

rg es on other o ff

enses a rising out of

the same c onduct un til a ft e r a tr ia l is ha d o n th e orig ina l c ha rg e s. Ob vio us ly , th is w ou ld result in multi p l e trials and pre judice the de fendant. This concern, howeve r, is not present in the case at hand bec ause the subsequent ind ic tme nts we re re turne d w e ll b e fo re the sta rt of tr ia l.
Id . at 573.
I n summary , we hold that because of the rule -base d sever ance err ors in this case, the defe ndant may

not be subjecte d to a separ ate trial for the child rape offe nses. See King , 717 S.W .2d at 307-08 (r emedy

is to bar sec ond trial).

B. D oubl e Je opa r dy
I ndepende nt of the rules of criminal proce dure, the sever ance ruling in this case has a constitutional dimension to which we now turn our attention.
Th e state a nd fede ral c on sti tut ion s b othpr ov ide that no pe rs on sh a ll, fo r the sa me offe nse, be twic e put in jeopar dy of life or limb. U.S. C onst. am en d

. V; T enn. C onst. art. I , § 10. Our supre me court has held that double jeopa rdy protec ts a defe ndant from ( 1) re prosec ution for the same c rime af

ter a n acquittal, (2) repro s ec u tion for the same crime a fter a conviction, and ( 3) multipl e punishments for the same offe nse. State v. De nton , 938 S.W. 2d 37 3, 37 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; see also Nort h Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969), overruled on othe r grou nd s by Al ab am a v . S

mi th , 4 90 U. S. 7 94 , 1 09 S. Ct. 22 01 (1 98 9) . A s w e sh a ll e xpla in, in this c a se do ub le je op ard y

ba rs the State fr om p ro se c uti ng the de fe nd a nt o n th e thr e e se ve re d r ape c ha rg e s. The State is permitted to, and often finds it nece ssary to, alleg e broa d time frame s for a cla imed offe nse whe n, for e x ample, the “ exact” date of the off ense cannot be shown. I n that situation, however, the rig hts of an acc used to a una nimous jury verdic t and to double jeopar dy pr ote c tio n mu st b e scrupul ou sly ob se rv e d. Th e us ua l pr e c auti on to a ssu re jury un a nim ity

is t o require an election of off

enses at the close of the proof. See, e .g. , Sta te v . M c Car y , 119 S.W .3d 226, 24 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 03 ); Bu rli so n v . S tate , 501 S.W .2d 801, 804 (Tenn. 1973) . Protection from a subseque nt prosecution, under the double jeopa

rdy clause , attache s to the t ime fra me allege d in the indictment or perha

ps that is more narr owly

specifie d in a bil l of particulars. State v. Ande rson , 748 S.W

. 2d 201, 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (“de fendant would be protec ted from a subsequent-39-

pr os e c uti on , u nd e r thedo ub le je op ard y c laus e , f or a ny c la ime d of

fe ns e a g a ins t a n a lle g e d v ic tim in an indictment which spe cified the offe nse occ urre d within the times a l l ege d i n the indictment”), overruled on othe r grounds in State v. Shelton , 85 1 S.W. 2d 13 4, 13 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; see State v . Steve Mo s l ey , No. 01C01-9211

- CC

- 0 0 3 4 5 , s li p o p
. a t 1 2 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. , N a s h v il le , Se p t. 9, 1993) (dismissing def

endant’ s conce rn that he c ould be prosec uted for the same dru g offe nse base d on double jeopar dy

protec tion for offe nse within times alleg ed in t he indictment); Sta te v . Ke nn e th N

. Go dwi n , N o. 87 -9 1- I I I , sli p op
. a t 6 (T e nn
. Cr im. Ap p. , Na sh vil le , Ma y 24 , 1 98 8) (h old ing on do ub le jeopar dy g rounds that def

endant c ould never ag ain be pr osecute d for a ny sexual offense a g ainst the vic tim c omm itt e d du ri ng the y e ars 19 83 a nd19 84 ); se e als o Sta te v Sh ro ps hire , 45 S.W .3d 64, 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (purpose of the bill of particula rs is to provide the acc used with sufficie nt information about the of fense alleg ed in the indictment to permit the ac cused ( a) to pre pare a defe nse, (b) to a void pr ejudicial surprise at trial, and (c) to e nable the acc used to pr eserve a ple a of double jeopar dy ).

The fore g oing constitutional princ iples dictate the c onclusion that double jeopar dy bars the State in this ca se fr om subsequently prosec uting the defe ndant for the rape offe nses set out in C ou nts On e , T hr e e , an d Fi ve of ind ic tme nt, wh ic h ar e inc lud e d both wi thi n the br oa d ti me fr a me a lle g e d inthe ind ic tme nt andthe tim e fr a me sp e c if ie d inthe bil l of

pa rt ic ula rs
. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld that r e tr ia l onCou nts On e , T hr e e , a ndF ive is b arr e d b y bo th the Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re a ndc on sti tut ion a l do ub le -j e op ard y princ ipl e s.
VI I. EV ID EN CE CH AL LEN G ES The de fendant claims that o n fi v e specific occa sions, the trial court permitted the State to introduce prohibited he arsay and opinion testimony

. I n addition, the defe ndant contends that the trial court, on four separ ate occa sions, e x cluded leg itimate de fense evidenc e. We discuss ea ch occa sion in turn.
A. Vi c ti m ’s He ar sa y Te st im ony

On direc t examination, B.R. testified that when her mother aske d her if the def endant ha d to uc he d h e r i na

pp ro pria te ly , s he re pli e d, “ Ye s mo m, he did .” B .R. fu rthe r t e sti fi e d, “ An d I tol d her and she wa s - she wa s - she kind of felt like something like that was g oing on.” The State then asked, “ Did y our mom tell y ou that afte r y ou told her? ” When def ense c ounsel objecte d on hear say g rounds, the State arg ued that the evidence was not offe red f or the truth of the matter a sserted but to c lari fy B .R. ’s pr e vio us state me nt. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a llo we d B .R. to ans we r the qu e sti on , a ndB .R. testified that her

mother did tell her that she felt “that something wa s happening .”
We first addre ss our standard of revie w of the trial court’s ruling on the hea rsay issue. “‘H ear say ’ is a stateme nt, other than one made by the dec lara nt while testify ing at the trial or hearing, of

fer ed in evidenc e to prove the truth of the matter as s er t ed

. ” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c)

. Hea rsay is no t ad m i s s i b l e unless admissi on is authorized by the evidenc e rule s or by other controlling provisions of law. Id . 8 02 ; se e id . 803 (establishing hear say exceptions that do not-40-

de pe nd up on a

sh ow ing of

de c larant’ s u na va ila

bil ity ); id

. 804 (establishing hear say exceptions that depend upon a

showing of dec lara nt’s unavailability ). Acc ording ly , a trial court’s ruling on whe ther a statement is hearsay

is a question of law, and the appe llate court review s the issue de novo without a p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s
. S ee S h el ia Rae Gibbs v. Robin Me dia Group , No. M1999-00820- COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App., Na shville, Aug . 25, 2000); Ru sse ll v . Cr utc hfi e ld , 988 S.W .2d 168, 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

The victim’s statement is sug g estive of he arsay . Moreove r, if we adopted the State’ s arg ume nt that the state me nt wa s no t of fe re d fo r its truth bu t tha

t it “ ill us tr a t[e d] the vic tim ’s ba sis of kn ow le dg e abo ut h e r m oth e r’ s su sp ic ion s, ” the n th e statem ent is n ot r e le va nt a c c or din g to Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 401. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401 (“‘ Relevant evidenc e’ means e v idence having any tendenc y to make the exis tence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a c tio n mo re pr ob able or le ss p ro ba

ble than it

wo uldbe wi tho ut the e vid ence .” ); id . 402 (“Evide nce w hich is not r eleva nt is not a dmissibl e.”)

. I n most c ases, if a statement is not offe red f or its truth, an issue of rele vancy is pr ompted. I n the prese nt c ase, B .R. testified that her mother had suspicions, and the State aske d B.R. if he r mother told he r o f t h o s e s u spicions to clarify her testimony . The ba sis of B.R.’s kn o wl edg e about he r mother’ s suspicions is i nadmissible as irrele vant to whether

the def endant se x ually

abused B .R. Howeve r, bec au se the stateme nt is not centr al to the case and not damag ing to the defe ndant, we hold the err or is harmless. See Te nn . R. Crim. P. 52(a); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

B. D e te c ti ve Br e e dlo ve ’s Opini on Te st im ony
Detec tive Br eedlove testified that he wa s prese nt for two intervie ws with B.R. prior to trial and that he was prese nt during her testimony at trial. The State a sked, “D etec tive, when y ou ref lect on all thre e of those interviews [sic ] we re her stateme nts reg arding the incidents involving [t he def endant] consistent or inconsist ent? ” De fense counsel objec ted, stating that Detec tive Br eedlove was not entitled to g ive his opinion in that reg ard. The State arg ued that bec ause B .R’s c r e d i b i l i t y w a s a t t a c k e d o n c r o s s
- e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e S t at e c o u l d a s k ab o u th e r s t a t e m e n t s ’ c o n s i s t e n c y. The State further a

rg ued that a lay witness, with “per sonal knowledg e or persona l observation,” may e xp r e s s h is o r h e r o p in io n , if th a t o p in io n “ w o u ld a s s is t th e ju r y in th e u lt im a te d e c ision of f act.” The trial c ourt overr

uled the objec tion and stated that the criteria in Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 701 ha d be e n me t. T he re fo re , D e te c tiv e B re e dlo ve te sti fi e d th a t B .R. ’s thr e e state me nts we re c on sis te nt. Furthermore , he stated that “she told the same thing over and over a g ain.”

The de fendant claims on appea l that the t rial court erre d in admitting this evidence beca use “no rule of criminal procedur e or r ule of e vidence allows a lay witness to give an opinion a s to th e c o n s is te n c y o r in c o n s is te n c y o f s o me o n e e ls e ’ s s tate me n t. ” T h e d e f e n d ant makes the blanket stateme nt that the testimony“constitutes hea rsay , violates the expert opinion rule, invade s the fu nc tio n o f the jury

a ndis u nkno wn a s a n e vid e nti ary pr op os iti on .” Th e on ly

auth ority c ite d in his brief, howe ver, is Tenne ssee Rul es of Evidence 801 and 803. See Tenn. R. Evid. 801, 803. At trial, the defe ndant objected on lay opinion g rounds only , and in the motion for a new trial and on appea l, a party

is bound by

the g round asse rted when the party objected at trial, State v. Adk isson ,-41-

89 9 S.W.2 d 626 , 634 -6 35 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ); se e als o Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a) (1) ( “Err or may not be pre dicated upon a

ruling which admits or excludes evide nce unle ss a substantial rig ht of the party is affe cted, a nd . . . [i ]n case the ruling is one a dmitti ng evidenc e, a timely objection or motion to strike appea

rs of re cord, stating the spec ific gro u n d of objec tion if the specific g round wa s not app are nt f ro m th e c on te xt.” ). Th e re fo re , the on ly c la im that sur viv e s the tr ia l pr oc e ss r e g ard s Ru le 701, opinion testim ony

by a lay witness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 701.
Howeve r, the de fendant fails to cite authority to support his c laim based on Rule 701. Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Procedur e 27(a) (7) states, “The brief of the appe llant shall contain . . . [a] n arg ument . . . with citations to the authorities and appropriate ref ere nces to the rec ord (whic h may be quoted ve rbatim) re lied on
. . . .” Tenn. R. A pp. P. 27(a)( 7). F urthermor e, Te nnessee Court of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls R ule 10 (b) st ate s, “I ssu e s w hic h a re no t su pp orte d b y

arg ume nt, c itatio n to auth oriti e s, or

app ro pria te re fe re nc e s to the re c or d w ill be tr e a te d a s waive d in thi s c ou rt .” Te nn . Ct

. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Ther efor e, the de fendant waived this issue.

C. B.R .’ s M ot he r ’s Opini on Te st im ony of B. R. ’s Tr ut hfulne ss
B.R.’s mother testified that she observe d Detec tive Br eedlove ’s September 10, 2002 interview of

B.R. At trial on dire ct examination, the following oc curr ed: Q. During the cour se of that interview, did a ny thing strike y ou about [B.R.’s] demeanor?
A. Her demea nor? Q. Whil e sh e wa s d isc us sin g thi ng s?
A. While s h e was discussing thing s that were happening , that had ha pp e ne d to he r, it - I jus t fe lt sic k. I kn e w that she wa s b e ing tot a lly honest. She was telling him ex actly what happe ned.
Def ense c ounsel objecte d, stating that the jury must decide if B .R. was being truthful. The trial c ourt stated that the answe r responde d to a “que stion about demeanor .” De fense counsel a rg ued that the answe r excee ded the sc ope of the question. The trial c ourt o v er ru l ed t he objec tion, and B.R.’s mother further testified that she felt B .R. acted “ somber,” “ uncomforta ble,” “ awkwa

rd,” “ silly , and not like herself

at all.”
The de fendant claims that the trial co u rt er red by admitting B .R.’s mother’s testimony ; however , we decline to r eac h the merits of this issue be cause the def endant waived it by failing to c ite to a

uthority in his brief. See Tenn. R. App. P

. 27(a) (7); Tenn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b). The de fendant states that “this [t estimony ] i s an opinion as t o the veracity or credibilityof anothe r pe rs on ” a ndthat “ [t]his so rt of te sti mon y is an op ini on no t permit te d by a la y wi tne ss, ” y e t he fails to cite any

rule or c ase la w to support his contention. There fore , the issue is waived.-42- D. B.R .’ s M ot he r ’s Opini on Te st im ony of B. R. ’s Re luc ta nc e to Di sc los e
On B .R.’s mother’s re direc t examination, the S tate aske d, “Why do y ou think [ B.R.] did n’ t te ll y ou ? ” De fe ns e c ou ns e l ob je c te d o n s pe c ulatio n g ro un ds . T he State de c ide d to re ph ra se the qu e sti on a ft e r “ bu ild [ing ] a f ou nd a tio n. ” B .R. ’s mothe r de sc ri be d he r “c los e re la tio ns hip ” wi th her daug hter, testifying that she had insig ht into her daug hter’s be havior. The State then aske d, “Do y o u f e e l t h a tt h a ti n s i g h tm a y

h e l p t h e j u r y

u n d e r s t a n d w h y

[ B

. R

. ] d i d n ’ td i s c l o s e a t a n e ar l i e r t i m e ?” Def ense c ounsel ag ain obj ecte d on speculation g rounds and improper lay opinion testim ony . The trial court overr

uled the objection base d on Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 701. B.R.’s mother then answe red the question, stating that B .R. “was a fra id.”

On appe al, the def

endant mer ely

states that this evidencewas spec ulation testimony without citing any

authority , and he a

rg ues that it constituted improper lay opinion testim ony

under Tenne ssee Rul e of Evidence 701. See Tenn. R. Evid. 701. L ay witnesses may

g ive testimony

in the form of an opinion where the testimony is “(1) r ationally

based on the perc eption of the witness a nd (2 ) h e lpf ul t o a c le ar u nd e rs ta nd ing of

the wi tne ss’ s te sti mo ny or the de te rm inatio n o f a fa c t in issue.” Id . 701(a)

. The testim ony is not objectionable merely beca use i t embra ces an ultimate issue be fo re the jury
. Te nn . R. Evid . 7 04 . H ow e ve r, the a dmi ssi on of la y op ini on te sti mon y

is l imi te d to those situations wherein the jury could not rea dily draw its own conclusions on the ultimate issue, wit h o u t t h e ai d of the witness’s opinion testimony

. Blackburn v . Murphy , 737 S.W .2d 529, 533 (Tenn. 1987) . Put another way , the lay witness may

express an opinion to describe her obse rvations if that is the only

way in which she c an ef

fec tively communicate her observations to t he jury

. Sta te v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 530, 550 (Tenn. 1992). When the admission or exclusion of opini on evidenc e is c h a ll e n g e d o n ap p e a l, it is r e v ie w ab le o n ly

f o r ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n. S ee , e. g
. , State v. Gray , 960 S.W .2d 598, 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

Her e, th e tria l c o u r t d idn o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti o n ina ll o w in g B

. R. ’ s mo ther’s testimony . Her

opinion was rationally

based on he r per ception and helpful to a clea r under standing of he r t e sti mon y . T he State a de qu a te ly bu ilt a fo un datio n, de mon str a tin g the c los e re lat ionsh ip be tw e e n B .R. a ndhe r m oth e r andthe la tte r’ s in sig hts int o B .R.’ s b e ha vio r. F urthe rm or e , d e fe ns e counsel a bly attacke d B.R.’s c redibility on cross-e x amination and cle arly pointed out to the jury

that B.R. wa ited months before telling he r mother of the abuse . B.R. testified that she did not immediately

tell her mot her because she was afra id that she would g et i n trouble. B.R.’s mother’s opinion reiterated the victim’s testimony

. E. D e fend ant ’s Exc lude d Te st im ony 1. Defendan t’s State m ents Regar din g Gym nastic Routines During defe nse counse l’s cross e x amination of B .R., the following exchang e took pla c e :-43- Q. Now [B.R.], during this time befor e y ou g ot i n j u re d were there some routines that y ou wer e having problems with?
A. What do y ou me a n b y ro uti ne s? Q. Som e skill s?
A. Ye s. Q. What w a s th a t?
A. Ba ckh an d s p ri n g. Q. T h e b ac k

h an d s p ri n g?
A. On the be a m. Q. On the be a m?
A. Ye s. Q. [Th e de fe nd a nt] h a d to ld y ou , did he no t, if y ou c ou ldn ’t do that - A. (Inaudible). Q. Th a t y ou c ou ld n ot m ov e on to thene xt le ve l? The State objec ted on hea rsay g rounds, and de fense counsel a rg ued that the question g oes to B.R.’s state of mind, “he r motivation.” The State r esponded that the question must go to the dec l ar an t ’s state of mind, and the trial court sustained the objection.

Af te r the ru lin g , c ro ss- e xami natio n c on tin ue d, a s f oll ow s: Q. Did y ou have tr ouble doing – what did y ou call it, the bac k –
A. Ha n d s p ri n g. Q. Ba ckh an d s p ri n g?
A. Ye s. Q. An d y ou c ou ld n ot m ov e on to t he n e xt le ve l un til y ou didthat; ri g ht?-44- A. Rig ht. Q. Ho w lon g ha d y ou be e n try ing to d o th a t? AndI un de rs ta ndit i s a very hard r outine?
A. A very

long time. Q. I t’ s h ard ; is n’ t it ?
A. Ye s. Q. B ut y ou couldn’t move up to the ne x t level until after y ou g ot that do ne ; r ig ht?
A. Rig ht.
The de fendant contends t hat “[ t] his question and answer wa s desig ned to show the state of mind and e ffe ct that the stateme nt had on t he allege d victim.” He f urther a rg ues that the trial c ou rt “ e rr on e ou sly

su staine d the ob

je c tio n a s be ing ‘h e ars a y .’ ” Th e de fe nd a nt, ho we ve r, fails to c ite authority in his brief. The ref ore, he waived the issue. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 27( a)( 7) (“The brief of the app e lla nt s ha ll c on ta in .

. . [a]n arg ume nt .

. . wi th c itatio ns to the auth oriti e s a ndapp ro pria te re fe re nc e s to the re c or d ( wh ic h may be qu ote d v e rb a tim ) r e lie d o n
. . . . ” ); Te nn . Ct . Crim. Ap p. R. 10(b) ( “I ssues which are not supported by arg ument, citation to authorities, or appr opriate r efe renc es to the rec ord will be treated as waived in this court.”).

Waiver aside, we wi ll discuss the issue to elaborate on an evide ntiary point stated earlier. Ag ain, “‘ [h] ear say ’ is a stateme nt, other than one made by the dec lara nt while testify ing at the trial or he aring , offe red in e vidence to prove the truth of the matter a sserte d , ” T en n
. R

. Evid. 801(c) , and it is not admissi ble unless a d m i s s i o n i s authoriz ed by the evidenc e rule s or by other controlling provisions of law, id

. 80 2. A tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g on wh e the r a state me nt i s h e ars a y

is a question of l aw , and the a ppellate c ourt revie ws the issue de novo w ithout a presumption of corr ectne ss. See She lia Rae Gibbs , slip op. at 3; Ru sse ll , 988 S.W .2d at 170.

H e r e , th e s tate me n t th a t th e d e f e n d a n t t o ldB

. R. s h e could n o t m o v e to th e n e xt g y mnastic level unless she could perf orm the back handspring was not offere d for its truth. I nstead, we surmise that the def

endant of fer ed the e vidence to show circumstantially that friction deve loped betwee n B.R. and the defe ndant reg arding g y mnastic skills. Hearing that the def endant told B .R. that she may not advanc e in h er s p o rt , the jury could have inferr ed that the de fendant’s and B .R.’s relationship was strained for r easons other than sexual abuse. Thus, the importanc e of the statement lie s in the fa c t th a t it

wa s said, no t it s tr

uth . B e c aus e the state me nt wa s not h e ars a y a ndwa s r e le va nt, it was admissible.-45- That being said, howeve r, we find that the er ror in not admitting the statement was harmless. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). Af ter the tria l court sustained the State’s objection, defe nse counsel ably elicited from B.R. that she was awa re that if she failed to do the skill, then she would fail to adva nce to the ne x t gymnastic l ev el

. Furthermore , the jury hear d testimonythat the def

endant ha d become so ang ry when B .R. refuse d to do the back handspring that he lef t the g y mnasium. From this evidence, the jury could likewise infe r that the de fendant’s and B .R. ’s re la tio ns hip wa s st raine d f or re a so ns oth e r tha n s e xua l a bu se . B e c aus e the te sti mon y is essentially

the same, “ considering the whole rec ord,” this er ror did not pre

judice the de fendant, and we fi nd , th e re fo re , th e e rr or ha rm le ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( b) ; see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
2. Defendan t’s State m ents Regar din g Digital Cam era
On direc t examin at i o n , the def endant testified that the police seized seve ral videotapes, inc luding dig ital tapes, fr om his apartment. When asked “ [w] hat tape w as in the dig ital came ra,” the def

endant r eplied: Well, what happene d was, is that [ Detec tive Br eedlove ] asked some questions: Ar e we g oing to se e any pornog raphic something or another . I

don’t eve n reme mber e x actly what he said.
And I said: I don’t believe so.
An d h e sa id: Wel l, c a n w e jus t pl a y it?
So I we nt o ve r the re a ndsh ow e d h im h ow to p la y it. The State objec ted on hea

rsay g rounds, and the trial court sust ained the objection, instructing the jury to disreg ard w hat the def

endant told Dete ctive B ree dlove.
I n the def endant’ s brief, he claims that his statement was not hear say beca use it “wa s desig ned to d ea l wi t h issues conce rning what [he] knew or information he told the detective himself .” We r e fu se to r e a c h th e me ri ts o f this iss ue be c aus e the de fe nd a nt, a g a in, faile d to c ite authority and ther efor e wa ived the issue. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 2 7( a )( 7) ; T e nn . Ct . Crim. Ap p. R. 10(b).
3. De fend ant ’s St at e m e nt s D e nyi ng G uilt

Al so on dir e c t e xami natio n, the de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t a ft er the se arc h o f h is apa rt me nt, he a c c omp a nie d D e te c tiv e B re e dlo ve to the po lic e de pa rt me nt and gave a s ta te me nt. Th e n d e fe ns e c ou ns e l a sk e d, “ I n th a t st a te me nt, didy ou a dmi t – . ” Th e State int e rr up te d d e fe ns e c ou ns e l a ndob

je c te d o n h e ars a y

g ro unds

. Th e tr ial co urt in str uc te d d e fe ns e c ou ns e l to fi nis h h is question, and def

ense c ounsel inquired, “I

n y our conve rs ati on with Detec tive Br eedlove , did y ou-46-

admit to any inappropriate t ouching of [ B.R.]? ” The S tate renewe d its objection, and the trial court sustained the objec tion.

The defe ndant arg ues, rathe r confusing ly , that “[g]iven the nature of th e q u es t i ons about the conve rsation and a s to what [the defendant] said and what the detec tive said, the fa ct that [the d efen dan t] den ie d h is g uil t w a s c le arl y no t he ars a y .” Th e de fe nd a nt c ite s n o auth ority in h is arg ument; thus, he waived t he issue. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 27(a)( 7); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b).
F . M s. M e lt on’ s Ex c lude d Te st im ony
On dir e c t exam inatio n, Ms. Me lto n tes tif ie d tha t in July of 20 02 , B .R. wa s a fr a id t o do a back handspring on the bea m. Ms. Melton testified that the defe ndant “g ot rea lly tough on he r” and that B .R. “was c rushed.” Ms. Melton state d that B.R.’s mother “wa s mad and upset with [the defe ndant].” At this point, the S tate objected on hear say g rounds, and the trial court sustained the objection, i nstructing the j ury to disreg ard the statement re g arding B.R.’s mother . Ms. Melton then te sti fi e d th a t f

ro m th a t day fo rw ard , B .R. re fu se d to loo k a t the de fe nd a nt, hu g him , or ta lk to h im. She te sti fi e d th a t B .R. “ ke pt c omi ng up wi th e xcu se , a ft e r e xcu se , a ft e r e xcu se , o f w hy sh e did n’ t - coul d n ’t do g y mnastics.” Ms. Melton testified that the ba ck injury may have be en leg itimate, but sh e didno t be lie vethat it

wa s. She te sti fi e d, “ I

jus t ne ve r b e lie ve d it

wa s, no t by

the way he r p are nts responde d or any thing e lse.” The State objected, stating no ba sis, and the trial court sustained the objection. On appe al, the def endant c ontends that the trial cou rt err oneously sustained the objecti o n s a n d “ f

a il e d to p e r mi t [M s
. M e lt o n ] to te s ti f y a s to c o n v e r s a ti o n s th a t s h e h a d with the a lle g e d v ic tim

wh ic h e xpre sse d th e vic tim ’s de me a no r. ” Th e de fe nd a nt a lso c laims that Ms

. Melton’s testimony

on this iss ue wa s critical to impeac h B.R.’s testim ony
. First, we rec og nize that the re c or d d oe s n ot e vid e nc e a ny c on ve rs a tio ns be tw e e n M s. Me lto n a ndthe vic tim re g ard ing thi s issue. Ms. Me lton a dmitted on cross-e x amination that she did not persona lly witness the occ urre nce in J uly 2002. Second, the de fendant failed to cite authority in his a rg ument, and ther efor e, he w aived the issue. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7); Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b).

VIII. IMP ROP ER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEF ENDANT
Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y a llo wi ng the State to i mpr op e rl y cross-e x amine him reg arding voice stre ss analy sis relating to his voice on the “per p phone ca ll.” The following testimonytranspire d on cross-e x amination:

Q. Wouldn’t y ou ag ree t h at s omeone that is shocke d or caug ht off g uard, that fac t can be detec ted in their voice ?
A. I wo uld n’ t ne c e ssa

ri ly a g re e wi th t

hat. Q. Ha ve y ou e ve r h e ardof vo ic e str e ss ana ly sis ?-47- A. I ’v e he ardof

the c on c e pt. I ’v e he ardof it, y e s. Q. Are y ou awa

re th at people c an take a re cording like this and determine whether

or not some one is under stre ss, simi lar to that of a lie dete ctor?
A. I do n’ t kn ow a nythi ng abo ut i t.
Def ense c ounsel objecte d t o this li ne of que stioning on re levanc e g rounds, and the State arg ued, “It’s rele vant if [t he defe ndant] is awa re of [voi ce stress ana ly sis] and still believes that stress ca nnot be hea

rd in someone’ s voice.” The trial c o u rt overr uled the objec tion, and the defe ndant s tated that he was not awar e that law e nforc ement ag encie s could use this tool to detect distress in a per son’s voice.

To be su re , th e pr op ri e ty , s c op e , mann e r, a ndc on tr ol o f c ro ss- e xami nat io n r e sts within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Hutchison , 898 S.W .2d 161, 172 (Tenn. 19 94 ); Sta te v . B ar

na rd , 8 99 S.W. 2d61 7, 62 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ). Ab se nt a c le ar a bu se of thi s discretion that re sults in m anife st pr ejudice to the acc used, this c ourt will not int erf ere with the trial court’s e x erc ise of its discretion on matters pe rtaini n g t o the examination of witnesses. State v. Johnson , 6 70 S.W. 2d63 4, 63 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 84 ). I n addi ti on , “ [a] w itn e ss m a y be c ro ssexamined on any

matter re levant to any

issue in the case , includin g cr ed i b ility .” Te nn. R. Evid. 611(b).
I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e de fe nd a nt arg ue s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d ina llo wi ng c ro ssexaminat io n r e g ar d in g “ v o ic e s tr e s s a n a ly s is ” b e c au s e it w a s ir r e le v a n t s im il ar

to h o w p o ly g r aph evidenc e is i rre levant. See State v. Damron , 151 S.W .3d 510, 515 (Tenn. 2004) (stating that “poly g raph te st results, testimonyconce rning such re sults, and testimonyconce rning a def endant’ s willingness or ref

usal to submit to a poly g raph test are inadmissible”). I n our opinion, the State’s cross-e x amination was misleading , fac tually incorre ct, and irr eleva nt; it s hould not ha v e been allowed.
Fr o m

re p o r t e d c a s e l a w o n t h e s u b j e c to f v o i c e s tr e s s a n a l y s i s , w e g l e a n t h e f o l l o wi n g: The pre mise on which voice stress analy sis is based is that all speec h is comprised of t[wo] compo n en ts. The first ar e fundamental fre quencie s determined ma inly by laryng eal struc tures. The second ar e f o rm an tfr eq u en ci es t h at ar e p ro d u ce d wh en ai r i s p as s ed t h ro u gh the vo c a l tr a c t. V oic e str e ss ana ly sis a na ly sts be lie ve sp e e c h a lso p r o d u c e s a n in au d ib le F M s ig n a l, o r mi c r o
- tr e mo r , o f

8 to 1 4 H z. The belie f

is th a t th is s ig n a l’ s p r e s e n c e is g r e a te s t d u r in g n o r mal speec h and dampe ned when a person is placed unde r stress. A voic e st res s ins trume nt i s d e sig ne d to mon ito r anddis play the va ri a nc e in mic ro tr e mor s a s a

pe rs on re sp on ds to s pe c if ic qu e sti on s.-48-

Sm ith v . S tate , 797 So.2d 503, 524 n.5 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000 ). Addi tional enlighte nment on the subject appe ars in United States v. Traficant , 566 F. Supp. 1046, 1046 (E.D. O hio 1983).

. . . Voice stress analy zers and psy cholog ical st ress e valuators ( PSE) detec t and measur e subaudible micr otremors in a person’ s voice. The amount of stress imposed on the speake r is a lleg ed to af fe ct t he microtremor s in his voice. The stre ss is alleg edly produce d by

the speake r’s de ception. The first psy cholog ical stress e valu ator wa s marke te d in19 71 . Re po rt e dly , it wa s d e ve lop e d a s a

c ov e rt lie detec tion device whic h could be use d withou t t he attac hment of sensors (a s are nece ssary

with poly g raph tests) and he nce c ould be employ ed without the knowledg e of the subject being tested.

. . . . . . . The opinion of at le as t o n e rese arc her in the f ield is that there have be en very

few well-c ontrolled studies of the re liabilityof voice stre ss analy sis; and none of these studies ha ve shown that voice stress analy zers are eff

ective in detecting dece ption. Several studies re ve a le d th a t PSE te sti ng re su lts y ie lde d a n a c c ur a c y rate on ly sli g htl y hig he r tha n, a ndin s ome c a se s low e r than, c ha nc e e xpe c ta nc y rate s.
566 F. Supp at 1046-47. See V irgin Islands v. Leycoc k ,19 V.I

. 59 (D. Virgin I ls. 1982) (commenting that the test is “proba

bly viewed by

courts with e ven g reater disdain than lie de tector ( poly g raph) tests”). Ag ainst this backg round, prose cution counsel ’s assertion “that people c an take a re c or din g lik e thi s a ndde te rm ine wh e the r o r n ot s ome on e is u nd e r s tr e ss , si mi lar to that of a lie detec tor” imports to the jury some notion of infallibilit y that simply does not exist . We fail to detec t any rele vancy to this m isleading line of questioning about an unr eliable a naly sis with no proven trac k rec ord of a ccur acy . We r ejec t outright the State’s arg ument that the voice stress analy sis questions wer e re levant to impeac h the def endant’ s cre dibilit y . The de fenda nt simpl y maintained that he “wouldn’t ne cessa

rily ag ree with” the State’s asse rtion “that someone that [ sic] is shocked or caug ht off g uard, that fact c an be detec ted in their voice .” This court, most assuredly , disputes the State’s assertion; indeed, this court has found nothing to support the state’s fa ctual asse rtion.

The que stion thus becomes whethe r the improper cross-e x amination constitutes reve rsible er

ror. We believe it does not. I n our view, t h e i m p ro p er cross-e x amination neither

“ a ff ir ma tiv e ly

app e ar[s ] to h a ve a ff

ect ed th e res ul t of

the tr ia l onthe me ri ts, ” Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 52(a) , nor “involve[s] a substantial right” of the def endant, Te nn. R. App. P. 36(b).-49- VI II. AN D I X. JU RY IN STR UC TIO N
The de fendant raises two issues re g arding the same jury instruction. The instruction g ive n b y the tr ia l c ou rt , inpe rt ine nt p art , is a s f oll ow s:
F o r y o u to f in d th e d e f

e n d a n t g u il ty

o f [a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l b a tt e r y ], the State mus t hav e – must ha ve pr ov e n, be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, the exist ence of the following essential ele ments: (1) The de fendant had unlawf

ul sex ual contac t with the alleg ed v i cti m, in which the de fe nd a nt inte nti on all

y touched the a lleg ed vi c tim’s inti mate parts, or the cl o thing c overing the immediate ar ea of the alleg ed victim’s int imate pa

rt s; or the a lle g e d v ic tim

ha d u nla wf

ul s e xua l c on ta c t w ith the de fend ant i n w hic h th e vic tim inte nti on all y touched the defe ndant’s or any

other pe rson’s intimate parts or the clothing covering the immediate ar ea of the defendant’s, or

any other pe rson’s intimate parts; and that the a lleg ed victim was less than 13 y ear s of ag e, and that the defendant acte d either in t en t ionally, knowingly or
re c k le ssl y
. (Emphasis adde d.)

“[The] defenda nt has a c onstitut ional ri g ht to a corr ect a nd complete c harg e of the law.” State v. Teel , 793 S.W .2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990) . The trial c ourt must describe e ach e lement of an of fenseand def

ine the ele ment in connec tion with that offense. See S t a t e v
. Cravens , 764 S.W .2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1989). A char g e is pr ejudicial err or if it fails to “submit t he leg al issues or if it misleads the j ury as t o the applica ble law.” State v. Hodge s , 944 S.W .2d 346, 352 (Tenn. 1997)

. First, the de fendant states that “re cklessness” modifies the ag e of the victim and that the trial court failed to explain that the mens rea of rec klessness was only applicable to this element and not the natur e of c onduct eleme nt. Thus, he ar g ues that the i n struction violates the burde n of proof r equire ment, see T. C.A . § 39 -1 1- 20 1 (2 00 6) , his fe de ra l a ndstate du e pr oc e ss rig hts , a ndhis rig hts to a jury trial beca

use the instruction stated that ag g ravated sexual battery could be c ommitt ed if the “de fendant acted e ither intentionally , knowing ly or re cklessly .”
Se c on d, the de fe nd a nt s ta te s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ins truc te d th e jury

that th e State c ou ld prove the require d mental state for ag g ravated sexual battery in the disjunctiv e. He contends that the use of the disjunctive “allowe d a ver dict to be re turned whic h was not unanimous . . . in violation of [his] fede ral a nd state rig hts to a jury trial and the right to a unanimous verdict.”
Simi lar to the disjunctive jury instruction in Sta te v . Ch e ste r W ay ne W alte rs , No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 12-15 (Te nn. Crim

. Ap p
. , Na shville, Oct. 4, 2004), the prese nt case ’s jury

instruction specifica lly

stated that it require d the j u ry t o fi n d that the sexual contac t was intentional. See State v. Faulkne r , 154 S.W .3d 48, 58-59 (Te nn. 2005) (stating that the-50-

court is not convince d that inclusi o n o f an ins truction defining the nature -of- conduct a nd c ir c ums ta nc e s- su rr ou nd ing -c o n d u c t is a n e rr or of c on sti tut ion a l di me ns ionwh e n th e ins truc tio n a lso includes the c orre ct re sult-of-conduc t definition). Further, the de fendant’s relianc e on Sta te v . D e ji A. Ogundiya is n o t c o n v in c in g , see No . M 20 02 -0 30 99 -C CA -R 3- CD , s lip op . at 6- 7 ( Te nn . Crim. App., Nashville, F eb. 19, 2004), be cause this court d i d n o t s tate that the tria l court’s instructions c on sti tut e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or . We ins truc te d th a t up on re tr ia l f or oth e r r e a so ns , th e tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld ins t ruct the jury

car efully reg arding the mens re a for eac h element of

the offe nse. Id . This court noted that the trial court did not instruct the jury clea rly as to the mens rea of eac h element of sexual battery and did not explain to t he jury that the rec klessness mens rea only applied to the victim’s lack of consent e lement. Id . Unlike Deji A. Ogundiya , the tr ia l cou rt ’s ins truc tio n in the pr e se nt c a se did not constitute rever sible err or.
X. R EC US AL OF T RI AL JUD GE

The de fendant claims that the denial of his motion to disqualify the t rial j udg e wa s err or. Prior to the scheduled hearing on the def endant’ s motion for new trial, substitute counsel, who appea red in the c ase afte r the conclusion of the trial, filed a w ritten motion seeking the trial judg e’s rec usal. Appar ently , this mot ion was re viewed by the court along with the motion for new tria l and other pe n d in g mo ti o n s
. T h e r e c u s a l i s s u e d idn o t r e c e iv e a n y s p e c if ic a tt e n ti o n inth e h e ar ing conducte d by

the court, and the court appar ently disposed of the re cusal issue, al o n g with other issues, by g ener ally stating that such “other

matters” w ere overr

uled. The primary

g round for disqualification cited by the def endant in his rec usal motion wa s th e tr ia l ju dg e ’s a tte mpt to ha ve the de fe nd a nt’ s tria l c ou ns e l, w ho wi thdre w f oll ow ing the tr ia l, disciplined by

the Board of Professional R esponsibility

. Ba sed upon exhibi ts attache d to the rec usal motion, the de fendant’s trial attorney was interviewe d by television reporters following the re turn of the jury ’s g uil ty verd ict s in the pr e se nt c a se . In th e c ou rs e of the int e rv ie w andin r e sp on se to questions pose d by

the re porters, c ounsel stated that an a ppeal would e nsue and that the g rounds for the appe al would include the trial court’s ruling on the admission into evidenc e of the videotape of the de fe nd a nt i n th e g y mna siu m’ s r e str oo m. Cou ns e l op ine d th a t th e ru lin g wa s “ wr on g ” a ndwo uld be the ba sis of reve rsal. The trial judge essentiallycomplained to the B oard of Professional Responsibili ty

that counsel’s state ments had impug ned the judg e’s integ rity , but after counsel responde d to the complaint, the Board dism issed the complaint. I n his motion to disqualify the trial jud g e , th e de fe nd a nt c la ime d th a t th e judge ’s a c tio ns in s e e kin g dis c ipl ina ry sa nc tio ns a g a ins t hi s trial attorney , along with his restrictive ruling s on pretria l disclosure and his interr og ation of witnesses during trial, bespoke a prejudice ag ainst the defe ndant that war rante d disqualification.
Th e iss ue of a tr ia l jud g e ’s re c us a l ba se d up on a lle g e d bia s or pr e jud ic e re sts wi thi n t he discre tion of the trial court. Car uth e rs v . S tate , 8 1 4 S. W. 2 d 6 4 , 6 7 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 91). A judg e s h o u l d gra nt a motion for re cusal whe never his or her “ impartiality

might re asonably

be qu e sti on e d. ” Cod e of

Judic ia l Co nd uc t, C a no n 3 (E )( 1) ; se e Sta te v . M c Car y , 119 S.W .3d 226, 260 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). This court will not interfer e with the trial c ourt’s discre tion unless clear-51-

abuse a ppear s on the fac e of the rec ord. Ow e ns v . S tate , 13 S.W .3d 742, 7 5 7 (T en n
. Crim. App. 19 99 ); Car uth e rs , 814 S.W .2d at 67.

Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt Rul e 10 , Cano n 3 (E )( 1) pr ov ide s th a t “ [a] ju dg e sh a ll disqualify himself or herse lf in a proce eding in w hich the judge ’s impartiality might re asonably

be questioned, including but not limit ed to instances where [] the j udg e has a per sonal bias or pre judice conce rning a party .” Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 10, Canon 3(E)(1) (a) , (b). In response to a disqualification motion, the judge should not onl y ex am i n e “subjective bias” but should also inquire w hether the judge ’s impartial it

y mi g h t b er e a s o n a

bly questioned under

an “obje ctive standa

rd.” Sta te v . Co nn or

s , 9 9 5 S. W. 2 d 1 4 6 , 1 4 9 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 8 )

. T h e latt e r s tan d ar d “ ‘ ta k e s in to a c count that dis qu a lif ic a tio n is re qu ir e d if the re is a n app e a ranc e of pa

rt ia lit y to the re a so na

ble ob se rv e r, a ndit prec ludes a judg e fr om avoiding r ecusa l merely by avowin g h i s o r h er impartiality .’” State v. Conway , 7 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 3 , 2 2 5 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( q u o t i n g Con no rs , 886 S.W .2d at 149).

I n the present case , we are struck by a combination of e vents: (1) the judg e’s punitive rea ction toward tria l counsel’s re latively benig n, though e x trajudicial, c omments about t rial er ror; (2 ) the jud g e ’s failu re to p la c e on the re c or d h is f ind ing s a ndre a so ns fo r d e nyin g t he mo ti on to rec use; (3) the judge ’s re strictions on the defe ndant’s rig ht of discovery ; an d (4) the judge ’s c re dib ili ty -b ols te ri ng e xami natio n o f the vic tim -w itn e ss, tho ug h it se lf un wo rthy

of a re ve rs a l.
To el ab o rate , first, the judg e’s que stioning of the vic tim during he r trial testimony could appe ar to be for the purpose of eliciting her disavowals that her testimony was influenc ed or coac hed. Se c o n d , th e r e a c ti o n to c o u n s e l’ s p o s t- tria l c o mm e n ts e v in c e s , a t w o r s t, a n a n ti p a thy toward the defe nse or the de fense attorney and, at b es t , a pharisaical attitude toward dissent that might tend to chill all but the most intrepid advoca cy
. L ast, ag ainst this backdr op, we would ha ve ho pe d th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e wo uldha ve ma de fi nd ing s in su pp ort of hi s d e nia l of the mot ionto disq u ali fy . Such finding s may well have addre ssed many of our c oncerns emerg ing f rom the circ umstances de scribed a bove. The c ourt, howeve r, ente red no f indings, a lapse that ha

rdly serve s to dispel a claim that the judg e’s pa rtiality is reasona

bly in doubt. Given the totality

of circ umstances, we hold that the trial judg e is disqualified fr om conducting further

proce eding s in this case.

XI. SENTE NCING
I n the def endant’ s final issue, he a

rg ues that the trial judg e unlawf ull y ap p l ied the enhanc ement fa ctors, that conse cutive sente ncing was not ap p ropriate, and that the leng th and manner of service wer e illega l be cause the court failed to re quire the State to produc e the “ raw data” upon which the State’ s expert relied.

At the sentenc ing h ea ring , the State first ente red into evide nce the Presentenc e I nve s ti g a ti o n Re p o r t an d a n A d d e n d u m t o th is r e p o r t a s e xh ib it s o n e a n d tw o
. T h e Pr e s e n te nce Report showed that the defe ndant had no prior criminal rec ord, and it also containe d a psy chosexual-52-

evaluation and a letter

from a former student, detailing her ne ed for counseling afte r being coac hed by the de fe nd a nt. Th e Ad de nd um co ntaine d inf orma tio n sub mit te d by the State a ndthe de fe nd a nt. The State’s information included: B.R.’s state ment, B.R.’s pa rents’ state ment, a letter from par ent’s o f a former student, poly g raph te st results, and a letter from B .R.’s counselor. The defe ndant’s information included: a list of mitigating f actor s , th ed e f

e n d an t’ s w rit

te ns ta te ment, USA Gy mnastics documents re g arding a 1996 investig ation of the de fendant, poly g raph te st result s , and numer ous fa vo ra ble le tte rs fr om the de fe nd a nt’ s f a mil y a ndfrie nd s.
The State then c alled Dr . Donna Moore as a w itness. She testified, over obje ction, that she held a doctorate de g ree in psy cholog y , and she w orked at Centerstone CommunityMental Hea lth Center. S he has prac ticed the treatment of sex offe nders since 1993, and she e valuated the defe ndant. Doctor M o o re te stified that afte r per forming sever al tests on the def endant, she c on c lud e d th a t th e de fendan t was a hig h risk fo r r e -o ff e nd ing a ndthat “ he wa s n ot [a me na ble ] to tr e a tme nt. ” She fu rthe r e xplaine d th a t th e ov e ra ll d a ta ind ic a te d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s d ish on e st a n d l a c k e d e m p a t h y.

Detec tive Br eedlove testified that the police f ound pornog raphic m aterial, which showed fe males who “ appea r[ed] t o be either

17, 18 y ear s of ag e or a

littl e y oung er.” He testified that the fe males “w ere dresse d in a y o u n ger fa s hion with pigtails” a nd wer e eng ag ing in se x ual intercour se or “ various . . . sexual actions.”

Detec tive Br eedlove also testified that the police seized various videotapes from the defe ndant’s apa

rtment. On these vide otapes, the de fendant had foc used on B .R. ’s v agi nal ar ea approximately

248 times, even at times w hen she was not pe rforming a g y mnastics skill. Detective B re e dlo ve a lso te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt fo c us e d on the va g ina l are a of tw o o the r m ino r s tud e nts

. When he questioned one student, the s tudent said that the defendant had touched the outer c lothing of he r v a g ina l are a

on on e oc c a sio n, bu t he apo log ize d, a ndsh e fo rg a ve him

. B.R.’s f ather testified at the se ntencing hearing that B.R. had diff iculties in school and nig htmares that the de fendant w as chasing her to touch or kill her. He te stified that she also has been ridiculed for coming forwa rd, and she does not understa nd why certain adults have not be lieved her.
B.R.’s mother testified that the sexual abuse oc curr ed fo r about one y ear . She testified that, as a

result, B.R. “ha d sever e nig htmares.” She would wake up crying be cause she dreamed that the defe ndant would touch other people while she had to watc h. B.R.’s mother testified that B.R. is afr aid to g o out on her own, and she is se eing two counselors. She started see ing the m every wee k and then on a n “as ne eded ” b as i s . B.R.’s mother testified that, since the defe ndant’s c on vic tio n, “ thi ng s h a ve be e n a lit tle bit be tte r f or [B .R. ]” Sh e is n ot a s q uic k to a ng e r, a ndsh e is imp ro vin g in s c ho ol.-53- The de fendant then called D ee A nn Melton as a w itness. She testified that Detec tive Br eedlove interviewe d her daug hter and that no char g es re sulted from the intervie w. She stated that sh e ha d n e ve r o bs e rv e d th e de fe nd a nt i mpr op e rl y tou c hin g a

stu de nt.
On cr oss-examination, Ms. Melton testified that she wrote a letter on the def

endant’ s behalf . Ms. Melton admitted that she had see n the videotape s of B .R.’s vag inal ar ea an d of the defe ndant taping himself usin g t h e b at h ro o m. The State aske d her if she told someone that the g arba g e bag was plac ed ar ound the ca mera to “catch little boy s who had been peeing on the floor.” She replied, “ [M] adam, I

don’t know what I told he r beca use I talked to – actua lly , I ’m pretty tired of ta lki ng abo ut i t a ll, a nd I do n’ t kn ow wh a t I sa id. ” Ms. Me lto n a lso state d th a t sh e didno t r e c a ll te lli ng so me on e that the de fe nd a nt ma y ha ve ina pp ro pria te ly tou c he d B. R., bu t she did no t thin k it war rante d a 96-y ear

sentenc e.
The de fendant called Aug ust Boto, Kar en Schief elbein, a n d M im Young K won as char acte r witnesses. The defe ndant also called Dr. J im Walker as his expert witness. Doctor Walker testified that he wa s licensed to pra ctice psy cholog y in T en n es s ee and that he w as employ ed at Vande rbilt University

School of M ed i ci n e. He testified that he disag ree d with Dr. Moore ’s assessment that the de fendant was a hi gh risk to re-of fend. A fter c onducting his own tests, Dr. Walker conc luded that the defe ndant had a low to mode rate risk for r e-of fending . He a lso stated that he c ou ld n ot ans we r w he the r the de fe nd a nt c ou ld b e re ha bil itate d b e c aus e the de fe nd a nt r e fu se d to dis c us s w hat he wa s c on vic te d o f b e c aus e of his F if th Am e nd me nt ri g hts

. Do c tor Wal ke r state d th a t, i n h i s opinion, the defe ndant was tre atable f or inappropriate sexual behavior and was a g ood candidate for treatment provided that he acknowledg e his need for treatment. Doctor Walker further testified that he would diagnose the defendant as a pedof ile, but not a predatory

pedofile, unlike D r. Moore’ s opinion.

The de fenda

nt made an al l o cu t i o n s t at em en t

. De fe n s e c o u n s el i n fo rm ed t h e c o u rt that the de fe nd a nt w ould no t be pla c e d u nd e r o a th d uring the state me nt. Th e de fe nd a nt tha nk e d h is friends and family

for their support and stated that the victim’s family members we re “ people of char acte r and hig h moral[] fiber.” He “ lament[ed] over the emotional trauma this must have c aused the entire . . . family .” He stated that he had c ompassion for them and e x presse d “dee p sorrow” for what they wer e g oing thr oug h and to any one else “who [thought] that [ he] hurt them.”
The c ourt found the trial evidenc e “highly signific ant . . . m uch more signific ant than what either

of the doc tors have said, or not said, in their t estimony .” There fore , the trial judg e stated that he did not consider the State’s ex pert’s r eport. The court a lso found that B.R.’s, De tective Br eedlove ’s, and L

ucy Fo x ’s t estimonies were cre dible and that the de fendant’s testimonywas dece ptive.
I n making the s entenc ing determinations, the trial judg e stated that he consider ed the testimony , Presentenc e I nvestig ation Report, Addendum, a nd letters on the de fendant’s behalf . The c ou rt fo un d a la c k o f p ote nti a l f

or re ha bil itatio n b a se d on th e de fe nd a nt’ s te sti mon y a ndc on du c t. Re g ard ing thi s c on du c t, the tr ia l ju dg e stated, “[T ]he c ri min a l c on du c t w a s r e pr e he ns ibl e in thisT e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 , as a m e n d e d in 2 0 0 2 b y P u b lic A c t 8 4 9 , § 2 (c ), e ff e c tive J u ly 27 4 , 20 0 2 , ad d ed one enhancem ent f act o r and subseq uent l y renumb ere d a ll o f th e o ri gi nal enhancem ent f act o rs i n t he
s t at ut e. T hu s , for t he t i me peri od dur i ng wh i ch t he defendan t ’ s offens es wer e c om mi t t ed an d duri ng wh i ch he was sen t en ce d , t he en ha nc em en t f ac t o r p ertaining to a b use o f p ub l i c o r p rivate t rust or u sed a sp ec i al ski l l wa s s ubs ec t i on ( 16) , and t he enhancem ent f act o r f o r com m i t t i ng t he o f

fense t o grat i f

y the d efend ant ’ s d esi re f o r p l easure o r exci t em ent
w as s ubs ec t i on ( 8)

. See T

. C

. A

. § 40

- 35

- 11 4(8) , ( 16 ) ( 20 03 )

. W e not e t hat t he l egi s l at ur e h as , ag ai n, r ece nt l y amended
a n d re n u m b e re d the e n h a n c e m e n t fa c to rs , s ee T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 114 ( 2006) , bu t t h es e ch an g es be ca me ef fec t i ve for cr i mi nal offens es comm i t t ed on or af t er Ju ne 7, 200 5, an d do not appl y i n t hi s ca s e.

-54- court’s judg ment[,] and it was c onduct that was e x plicitlyintertwined with a pattern of de ception that used the g y mnastic sport to its mos t profane detriment.” Furthermor e, the c ourt fou n d residual mental damag e to t h e v i ct i m and stated that, be cause of the de fendant’s ref usal to acc ept responsibility , there is no potential for re habilitation.

Re g ard ing e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d that the de fe nd a nt abu se d h is

27 position of public or private trust and that he also used a specia l skill t hat fa cilitated the commission of the off ense. See T.C.A. § 4 0 -3 5-114(16) (2006). He applied this enhanc ement fa ctor to ea ch ag g ravated sexual b att e r

y c onviction and to the ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor conviction. The trial judg e also found that the defe ndant committed the ag g ravated sexual ex p l o i t ation of a minor offe nse to g ratify

his desire for

pleasure or sexual excitement. See id . § 40-35-114( 8).
The c ourt reje cted the mitig ating fac tor that substantial g rounds ex isted to excuse or justify the def

endant’ s conduct, see T.C.A. § 40-35-113( 3) (2003) , and the c ourt place d “neg ligible” weig ht on the mitigating fac tor that the def endant did not cause substantial bodily injury , se e id . § 40-35-113( 1). Reg arding the def endant’ s lack of c riminal rec ord, se e id . § 40-35-113( 13), the c ourt stated that it may , but is not require d to, consider that mitigating fac tor, and the tria l judge further state d th a t he wi ll n ot c on sid e r this fa c tor be c aus e the de fe nd a nt w a s in a po sit ionof

trus t. Thus, the trial court sentence d the def endant to a ma x i m u m i ncar cer ative sente nce of 12 y ear s for e ach of

the seve n counts of ag g ravated sexual batte ry and to 12 y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction for the one count of a g g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, stating that c on fi ne me nt w a s n e c e ssa

ry “ to a vo id d e pr e c ia tin g the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of fe ns e [s].” Th e c ou rt

a lso order ed that the s entenc es run c onsecutively acc ording to State v. Lane , 3 S.W .3d 456 (Tenn. 1999) , and Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(5) , see T.C.A. § 40-35-115( b)(5) (2006).

Whe n the le ng th, rang e , or ma nn e r of se rv ic e of a se nte nc e is dis pu te d, it i s g e ne ra lly the duty of this court to conduc t a de novo r eview of the re cord w i t h a p re s umption that the determinations made by the t rial court are corr ect. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d) ( 2006). This presumption, howeve r, is co nditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the s entenc ing principles and all rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s . State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The burde n of showing that the sentenc e is improper is upon the a ppellant, and in the event the r ecor d fails to demonstrate the require d consideration by the trial court, re view of the sentenc e is purely

de novo. Id

. I f appellate revie w ref lects the trial court properl yconsidere d a ll r e le va nt f

a c tor s a ndits fi nd ing s o f f a c t are a de quate ly su pp orte d b y the re c or d, thi s c ou rt

mus tT o add r es s t he po s s i bi l i t y t hat provi s i ons of t he T enn es s ee C r i mi nal Sent enc i ng Ref orm Act ( t he A ct ) vi ol at ed 28
t he U ni t ed St ates C o nst i t ut i onal Si xt h Amendm ent r i gh t t o t r i al by j ur y , t he T enn es s ee G ene r al Ass emb l y amended
v a rio u s p ro v isio n s o f t h e A c t i n 2 0 0 5 b y e n a c ting P u b lic A c ts c h a p te r 3 5 3 . B e c a u se the 2 0 0 5 a m e n d m e n ts o n ly ap p ly t o offens es comm i t t ed on o r af t er June 7, 2 00 5, t he provi s i ons o f t he A ct for pur po s es of t he pres ent ca s e a r e u naf fect ed by 2005 c h apt er 353.

T h is o p inio n d o e s n o t yet a p p e a r in the p re lim ina ry p rin t o f t h e U n ited S ta te s R e p o rts, a n d a t t h is ti m e , i t i s 29

s ubj ect t o f ormal r evi s i on. For t hat r eas on, our ci t at i ons t o t hi s cas e wi l l r ef er t o t he pages of t he s l i p op i ni on, wh i ch has bee n r el ea s ed. -55- aff irm the sentenc e, “ ev en i f we would ha ve pre fer red a differ ent re sult.” State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.

I n addition, “[e]very

defe ndan t s h al l be punished by the impositi on of a se ntence justlydeserved in re lation to the seriousness of the of fense , T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 1) (2003) , and “[t]he sentenc e imposed should be no g reater than that deserve d for the of fense ,” id . § 40-35-103( 2).
Furthermore , Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-501( i)(1) state s in releva nt part, “ There shall be no re lease elig ib i lityfor a person c ommitt ing an offe nse, on or a fter July1, 1995, that is enumerated in s u b d ivision (2).” See T.C.A. § 40-35-501( i) (2003). Subdivision (2) includes the offe nse of ag g ravated sexual battery

. Se e id

. “Such person,” the statutory subsection c on tin ue s, “ sh a ll ser ve one hu nd re d p e rc e nt ( 10 0% ) o f the se nte nc e imp os e d b y the c ou rt

le ss sentenc e cr edits earned and r etained.” Se e id . I t also states that “no sentenc e re duction cre dits . . . shall operate t o reduc e the sentenc e im posed by the court by

more than f

ifteen pe rce nt (15%).” See id

. The de fendant c h all e n g e s o nc onstitut ional rig ht-to-jury -trial g rounds the trial c ourt’s leng thening eac h sentenc e fr om the presumptive, mi nimum sentenc e of eig ht y ear s to the maxi mum o f 1 2 y e ar s
. T h e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u r t h a s u p h e ld th e A c t a g a in s t a Sixth Amendment

28 challeng e, see State v . Gomez , 163 S.W .3d 632 (Tenn. 2005); howeve r, because the United States Supreme Court has r ece ntly filed an opinion that may fre shly call into question the Tennessee law’s constitutional soundness, se e Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif or nia , No. 05-6551, 75 U.S.L .W. 4078 (J an. 22, 20 07 ), we take the tim e to re g a in pe rs pe c tiv e
. As we sh a ll e xpla in, we op t – a t th is j un c tur e – to

29 fo llo w the pr e c e de nt o f the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt

.

I n Blakely v. W

ashington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), the Supre me Court held that provisions of the Washington sentenc ing la w violated B lakely ’s Six th Amendment rig ht to jury trial. Wash i n gt o n ’s Sentencing Reform Ac t established a top end se ntence of ten y ear s for Blakely ’s Class B f

elony but provided for

a “sta ndard rang e” of 49 to 53 months. Neverthe less, the law provide d that the trial judg e, without a jury , “ may i m p o s e a s en t en ce ab o v e t h e s t an d ar d ra n ge if her she finds “substantial and c ompelling r easons justify ing an exceptional sent en ce
. ” Bl ake ly , 542 U.S. at 299, 124 S. Ct . at 2535 (e mphasis added)

. T he Washing ton law enumer ated a none xh au s ti v e li s t o f a g g r a v a ti n g f a c ts u p o n w h ic h a ju d g e c o u ld in c r e a s e a s e n te n c e ab o ve the standard r ang e. Id . Three y ear s later, Cunningham char acte ri z ed the Washington sente ncing law-56-

in B l a k e ly as p er mitti ng “but . . . not requir[ing ] a judge to exceed [the] s tandar d rang e.” Cunningham , slip. op. at 9.

I n s trikin g d o w n Wa s h in g to n ’ s p r o v is io n f o r e xc e p ti o n a l s e n te n c in g , the Bl ake ly Court applied the rule of Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. C t. 2348 (2000): “‘ Other than the fa ct of a

prior convic tion, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a cr i m e b ey ond the presc ribed statutory maxi mum must be submitt ed to a jury , and prove d bey ond a re asonable doubt.’” Bl ake ly , 5 4 2 U. S

. at 3 0 1 , 1 2 4 S

. C t

. at2 5 3 6 (q u o t i n g Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct . at 2362- 63). The Supre me Court emphasiz ed that the r eleva nt “statutory maxi mum” for pur

poses of the Si xthA me n d me n t “ is th e maximu m s e n te n c e a ju d g e may

imp ose sole ly on the ba sis of t he fac ts reflecte d in the jury ve rdict or admitted by the defe ndant .” Bl ake ly , 542 U. S

. at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 25 37 (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . “ I n o the r w or ds ,” the Cou rt sa id, “ the re le va nt ‘ statut ory ma ximum ’ is not the m axim um sentenc e a judge may impose afte r finding additional fa cts, but the maxi mum he may impose without

any additional finding s.” Id . at 30 3- 04 , 1 24 S. Ct

. at 2537 (e mph a sis in orig inal). B eca

use B lakely ’s sentenc e wa s increa sed above the pre scribed st an d a r d rang e base d upon the trial judg e’s f

inding of “‘de liberate crue lty ,’” a fa ct that w as n ei t h er a dmitted by Blakely nor found by a jury , id . at 313-14, 124 S. Ct. at 2543, the statutory scheme for e x ceptional se ntencing violated B lakely ’s Six th Amendment rig ht to trial by jury , id ., 124 S. Ct . at 2543.
I n United States v. Booker , 54 3 U. S. 22 0, 12 5 S. Ct. 73 8 (2 00 5) , a c a se de c ide d le ss than si x m o n ths after Bl ake ly , the Supreme Court he ld that the fede ral sente ncing g uidelines, as written, violated the Si x th Amendment because , like the W ashing ton sentenc ing scheme a ddresse d in Bl ake ly , th e fe de ra l “ se nte nc ing rul e s a re ma nd a tory

a ndimp os e bin din g re qu ir e me nts on a ll sentenc ing judg es.” Id. at 233, 125 S. Ct. at 749-50. The Booke r Court observed:
I f the Guide lines as cur

rently written could be re ad as me rely advisory provi s i o n s that rec ommended, rather than r equire d, the selec tion of pa rt ic ula r s e nte nc e s in re sp on se to d if fering se ts o f f

a c ts, the ir us e would not implicate t he S ix th Amendment. W e have never doubted t h e a u t h o ri t y

o f aj u d ge t o ex er ci s e b ro ad d i s cr et i o n i n i m p o s i n g a sentenc e within a statutory rang e. I ndeed, every one ag ree s that t he constitutional iss ues pre sented by t h ese cases w ould have be en avoide d e n ti r e ly

if Co n g r e s s h a d o mi tt e d f r o m th e [S e n te n c ing Reform Ac t] the provisi ons that make the G uidelines binding on dis tr ic t ju dg e s .
. . . [W]he n a tr ia l ju dg e e xer c ise s h is d isc re tio n to selec t a spec ific sentenc e within a def ined ra ng e, the defe ndant has no ri g ht t o a

jury de te rm inatio n o f th e fact s th a t th e jud g e de e ms rele vant.
Id. , 125 S. Ct . at 750.

Historically , we know that in the wake of Bl ake ly and Booke r , the Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appea ls determined in a number of cases now desig nated “ Not for Citation,” see Tenn.-57-

R. Su p. Ct. 4( F ), that Bl ake ly ’ s p r in c ip le s in v a li d a te d T e n n e s s e e ’ s p r o v is io n s f o r th e tria l j udg e’s enhanc ing a

sentenc e above the “pr esumptive” sente nce w hen he or she found f

actua lly that any statutory enhanc ement fa ctors, other than that of a

prior re cord of

criminal convic tions, applied. See Gomez , 1 63 S.W. 3da t 65 4 ( a c kn ow le dg ing that th e int e rm e diate c ou rt ha d he ld “ in ma ny

de c isi on s” that the principles of Bl ake ly inv a lid a te d th e Te nn e sse e se nte nc e -e nh a nc e me nt p ro vis ion s) ; se e als o T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210( c) ( establishing a “pre su m p t ive” se ntence at the minimum sentence of the rang e for Class B, C, D, and E f

elonies), - 2 1 0 (d ) (providing for incr easing a sente nce a bove the presumptive sente nce ba sed on the fi n d i n g of enhanceme nt fac tors), & - 114 (e numerating enhanc ement fa ctors) ( 2003) (ame nded 2005 Pub. Acts ch. 353, ef fec tive as to offe nses committed afte r June 7, 2005). We also know that, later, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court h eld t hat the Gomez defe ndants’ cla im of unconstitutionalit y of Tennessee’ s scheme for enhancing sentenc es would not be re cog nized as plain err or. Gomez , 162 S.W .3d at 661.

I n Gomez , our supre me court reje cted the intermediate appellate court’s vie w of the matter. I t s t at ed, “ Booke r c on fi rm s th a t T e nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ing str uc tur e dif fe rs mark e dly

a ndin constitutionallysignific ant way s from the [federa l se ntencing ] Guidelines and the New J erse y and Washington st atutes at issue in Apprendi and Bl ake ly .” Id. at 658. The c ourt said, “The [Tennessee Cr imi na l Se nte nc ing ] R e fo rm Ac t a ff or ds jud g e s dis c re tio n to se le c t a n app ro pria te se nte nc e wi thi n a pre determined statutory

rang e[,] ” id . at 659, and “ the finding of an e nhance ment fac tor simplydoes not mandate a n incre ased se ntence ,” id . at 66 0; see T.C.A. 40-35-210( d), (e ) (2003) (ame nded 2005). As such, the c ourt described the Te nnessee sentenc ing enhanc ement scheme “as an ‘inde terminate,’ non-mandatory , advisory sentenc ing sc heme whic h mere ly require s judge s to consider e nhance ment fa c tor s, a lon g wi th o the r i nf orma tio n, wh e n e xer c isi ng the ir dis c re tio n to se le c t a n a pp ro pria te se nte nc e wi thi n th e statut ory rang e ,” a sc he me that “ do e s n ot ma nd ate an incr ease d sentenc e upon a judg e’s f

inding of an enhanceme nt fac tor.” Gomez , 163 S.W .3d at 660. Ex plaining f urther, the Gomezcourt said:

[T] he rel ev an t inquiry

is whether the Reform Ac t mandates impos it io n o f

a s e n te n c e in c r e a s e d ab o v e th e p r e s u mp ti v e s e n te n ce wh e n a jud g e fi nd s a n e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor

. Al tho ug h the dis se nt [i n Gomez ] is c or

re c t th a t th e Re fo rm

Ac t r e qu ir es tria l ju dg e s to determine whether

enhanc ement fa ctors exist [ befor e an inc r e a s e may b e imp o s e d ], th e d is s e n t f a il s to r e c o g n iz e th at th e f in d in g of an enhanc ement fa ctor does not ma ndate an incr ease d sentenc e. Booke r explains t hat the mandatory incre ase of a sentence is the crucial issue which court s m ust consider in dete rmining w hether a particular se nte nc ing sc he me vio la te s th e Sixth A me nd me nt.
Id. at 661.
We take th e t i m e t o revie w these c ases be cause the United States Supreme Court rec ently filed Cunningham , in which the Court took up the sentenc ing g auntlet thrown, this time, by the Ca lif ornia Sup re me Cou rt ’s ho ldi ng that Ca lif ornia ’s de te rm inate se nte nc ing la w s ur viv e d Si xth-58-

Amendment scr

utiny intact under Apprendi

- Bl ake ly

- Booke r
. The United States Supre me Court determined, howeve r, that California’s sentencing scheme violated C unningham’s rig ht to jury trial as g uaranteed by

th e S i x t h an d Fourteenth Amendme nts. The Cunningham Court outlined Ca lif ornia ’s se nte nc ing re g ime a s f oll ow s:

. . . The statute defining the offe nse pre scribes thre e pre cise terms of imprisonment – a low er, middle, a nd upper te rm sentenc e. Penal Code § 1170(b) (West Supp. 2006) controls the trial judg e’s c hoice; it pr ov ide s that “ the c ou rt sh a ll o rd e r i mpo sit ionof the mid dle te rm , unless there are circ umstances in ag g ravation or miti gat ion of the crime.”

. . .

. . . [T ]he [Sta te Judic ia l] Cou nc il’ s Rule s pro vid e that “[t]he mid dle te rm sh a ll b e se le c te d u nle ss i mpo sit ionof the up pe r o r l ow e r t e rm is jus tif ie d b y c ir c ums ta nc e s in agg ra vatio n o r m iti g a tio n. ”

. . . F a c ts a g g r a v a t i n g a n o f

f e n s e , t h e R u l e s i n s tru c t , “ s h a l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d b y a preponde ranc e of the ev idence ,” and must be “ stated ora lly [bythe trial court] on the rec ord.
The Rules provide a none x haustive list of ag g ravating c ircumstance s

. . . . I n sum, California’s [determinate sentenc ing la w] and the rules g overning its application, direc t the sentenc ing court to sta rt with the middl e te rm , a ndto m ov e fr om that te rm on ly wh e n th e c ou rt

its e lf fi nd s and pla c e s on the re c or d fa c ts – whe the r r e la te d to the of fe ns e or the off ender – bey ond the eleme nts of the cha rg ed off ense. Cunningham , slip op. at 4-6. The Cunningham Court c ondemned the r eg ime beca use it authorized the judge – not the jury – to f ind f acts that permitted an upper term sentenc e of 16 y ear s rather than the re quired 12-y ear

middle term sentenc e. Id. , slip op. at 2.
I n view of the Gomezcourt’s f ocus upon the pre mise that Tennesse e Code Annotated se c tio n 4 0- 35 -2 10 didno t re qu ire the sentenc ing c ourt to enhanc e a sentence above the presumptive s en t ence, eve n if enha nceme nt fac tors wer e applica ble, the Cunningham Cou rt ’s p o s t m o r tem c omm e nts abo ut Bl ake ly ar e i n t ri gu i n g. I n s u m m ar i z i n g Bl ake ly above, w e hig hlighted that opinion’s de scription of a portion of the Washington sentenc ing law, spec ifically that “[a] judge may impose a sentenc e above the standar d rang e if he finds ‘substantial and compelling rea sons justi fy ing an ex ce ptional sentence .’” Bl ake ly , 5 4 2 U

. S. a t 2 9 9 , 1 2 4 S. Ct

. a t 2 5 3 5 ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )

. The Cunningham Court amplified the tone of that statement by stating that the infirm Washington law “permitted but did not require a judg e to exceed [the] standard rang e.” Cunningham , slip op. at 9. I n a similar vein, the Cunningham Court stated that the W ashing ton law did not mere ly aff ord the sentenc ing c ourt a pe rmissible ambit of discretion; a Washing ton judg e “could not ha ve sente nced Blakely above the standard rang e without finding the additi onal fact of deliberate cruelty .” Id. , s lip o p. at 10. Perha

ps g alvanizing this theme, the Cunningham Cou rt state d th a t Bl ake ly h e ld i t-59-

“irre levant that the [Washington] Reform Act ultimately left t he dec ision whether or not to depart [from the sta n d ar d ra n g e] to the judge ’s discre tion.” Id ., slip op. at 11. The Court also quoted a Bl ake ly fo otn ote as follow s: “ ‘Wh e the r the jud ic ia lly de te rm ine d f

a c ts re qu ire a sente nce e n h a n c e m e n to r

m e r e l y allow it, . . . the verdict alone doe s not authorize the sentenc e.’” Id . (quoting Bl ake ly , 542 U.S. at 305 n.8, 124 S. Ct . at 2538 n.8) (e mphasis in Bl ake ly ).

Thus, Cunningham strikes at a ba sic premise of Gomez

. See G omez , 163 S.W .3d at 661 (“ Booke r

e xpla ins that th e ma nd a tory inc re a se of

a se nte nc e is the c ru c ia l is su e whi ch c ou rt s must con side r i n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a pa rt ic ula r s e nte nc ing sc he me vio la te s th e Sixth Amendm en t

. ”) . Whether Cunningham applied the coup de grac e to Gomezis y et somewhat pe rp le xing , f

or a t le a st t wo re a so ns
. F irst, Cunningham , i n d i s cu s s i n g B o o ker , commented that the Washing ton sentencing law and the pr e- Booke r fede ral sentencing g uidelines share d the infirmity of being “mandatory

and im p o s [ i n g] b inding r equire ments on all sentencing judge s.” Cunningham , slip op. at 12. As we noted above , Cunningham its e lf re c og nize d –

a nde ve n e mph a size d –

that th e Was hin g tonstatute allowed but did not require upwar d adjustment of a se ntence , and y et, despite th at the pre

- Booke r fede ral sent en cing g uidelines requir ed upwa rd adjustment of a

sentenc e whe n fac tual bases we re prese nt, the Hig h Court thought the two sc hemes ha d a common infirmity of being mandatory

and bin din g . We su sp e c t, the n, that th e us e of the te rm s “ ma nd a tory ” a nd“ bin din g require me nts ” in Booke r and Cunningham sig nif y on ly that a se nte nc ing c ou rt

is n o t authorized to increa se the sentenc e above the standar d or base line unless specifie d fac tual bases a re pr esent, not that the incre ase itself is mandated when the bases are prese nt. I n this ve in, w e note that the Cunningham Cou rt lik e ne d th e Ca lif

ornia statut e to the oth e r t wo a na ly zedse nte nc ing re g ime s in that Ca lif ornia Penal Code sec tion 1170(b) provided that the sentenc ing c ourt “‘ shall order imposit ion of the mi dd le term’ absent ‘circ umstances in ag g ravation or miti g ation of the c rime.’” Id. , sli p op . at 12 n. 10 (f ir st emphasis in Cunningham ; se c on d e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he Cou rt fo c us e d u po n Ca lif

ornia ’s ma nd a te to i mpo se the mid dle te rm of se nte nc ing – a ndno t upon the g ro un ds fo r imp os ing the up pe r t e rm , and y et it likened sec tion 1170(b) to the problematic features of the Washington and f eder al sentenc ing r eg imes, which it had terme d mandatory in Booke r
. S t i l l , t h e Hig h Court’s continued parla nce of

“mandatory

and binding require ments” as the root of e vil for Six th Amendment purposes g ives us pause. Second, the c oncept of employ ing a

statutory sentenc in g rang e for

discretionary sentenc i n g, m entioned in Booke r and Gomezas a ma

rker for c onstitut ionally

permissible judg esentenc ing, possibly rec eived some aff irmation in Cunningham

. See B ooker , 543 U.S. at 233, 125 S. Ct . at 750 (“ For

when a trial judge exercises his discretion to selec t a specific sentence w ithin a de fi ne d r a ng e , th e de fe nd a nt h a s n o rig ht t o a jury de te rm inatio n o f the fa c ts that th e jud g e de e ms rele vant.”) . The Cunningham Court said that the California se ntencing scheme did not resemble the “advisory s y stem the Booke r Cou rt ha d invie w” be c aus e Ca lif ornia ’s jud g e s w e re “ no t f re e to exercise their ‘discre tion to selec t a specific sentenc e within a define d rang e.’” Cunningham , s lip op. at 19. The Court r efe rre d to California’s “ sentenc ing triads, three fix ed sente nces w ith no rang es betwee n them.” Id. “ Cun nin g ha m’ s se nte nc ing jud g e ,” the Cou rt e xpla ine d, “ ha d n o d isc re tio n toW e a re a w a re t hat , i n G om ez , t he Stat e o f T enness ee had co nced ed t hat “ t he d efend ant s’ s ent ences were 30 i mp ose d i n v i ol at i on of t he Si xt h Amendm ent r i gh t t o a j ur y t r i al

. ” G om ez , 16 3 S. W

. 3d at 6 5 4

. T he G om ez co urt re je c te d the c o n c e ssio n
. Id. a t 661- 62.

A p e tit io n fo r a w rit o f ce rt i o ra ri i n G om ez is p e n d ing in t h e U n ited S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt. See St at e v
. 31 G om ez , 74 U

. S.L. W

. 31 3 1 (Aug. 1 5 , 20 0 5 ) ( N o
. 05

- 2 9 6 ). -60- selec t a sentence within a rang e of 6 to 16 y ear s. His instruction was to selec t 12 y ear s, nothing more or nothing less, unless he found f acts a llowing the imposition of a sente nce of 6 or 16 y ear s.” Id. I nitially , at least, this lang uag e juxt aposes the e rra nt California law to th e p re -2 0 0 5 Tenne ssee sentenc ing la w bec ause, a s the Gomez court said, the Tennessee law utiliz es a “rang e” c oncept; once a trial judg e discerns a basis for departing from the presumptive sentenc e, he or she ha s a choic e of sentenc e leng th in most offe nse-c lass/rang e bra ckets. To be sure, the se ntencing judge in the prese nt case operated within a ra ng e of e ight to 12 y ear s. Arg uably , Cu n n in g h am ’s affirmation of an indeterminate rang e conc ept g ives a nod to the pre -2005 Tenne ssee se ntencing law.

Ag a in, ho we ve r, we su sp e c t th a t th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou r t h a d s ome thi ng e lse in m ind . A lth ou g h T e nn e s s e e ’ s p r e
- 2 0 0 5 se nte nc ing re g ime uti lize d a n in de te rm inate rang e c on c e pt, a se nte nc ing a dju dic a tio n c ou ld no t e ve n e nte r the rang e of ind e te rm inate op tio ns un le ss a nd un til the judg e ma d e f

a c tu a l f in d in g s th a t o u s te d th e s e n te n c e f r o m a n in e r ti a l d e te r mi n a te p o in t – the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e . In o the r w or ds , it ma y we ll b e the c a se that T enn ess ee’s e rs tw hil e presumptive sente nce sc heme wa s just as det er m i n ate a s Washington’s sche me – bec ause the sentenc e wa s fix ed by

statute in the absenc e of f act- finding not embrac ed in the jury ’s ver dict – and just as mandator y , as we ll – because the judg e wa s not authorized to depart fr om the presumptive se nte nc e un le ss h e or

sh e fo un d c e rt a in f

a c ts n ot e mbr a c e d inthe jury ’s ve rd ic t. That said, Cunningham ’s locu t i o n s of “ma ndatory ” and “ rang e” w ill be viewed by s o m e, p er h ap s ev en t h e a p p el l e e i n t h e p re s en tca s e, as s u p p o rt i n g Gomez ’s view of Booke r and Bl ake ly

. Th us , ar g ua

bly so me a mbi g uity is y e t a fo ot. Mo re ov e r, the Ca lif ornia se nte nc ing la w i s 30 not a mirror imag e of Tenne ssee’ s. We a re mindful that the United States Supreme Court has not
a d ju d icated Ten nes see’ pre- 20 05 sen ten cin g law; Ten nes see’ s s up rem e cou rthas . Fo r t hes ere a so ns , we fe e l c on str a ine d at th is j un c tur e to f oll ow the pr e c e de nt e sta

bli sh e d b y

the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court in Gomez

. We f

ully rec og nize that the United States Supreme Court is the authoritative a nd final ar biter of the interpre tation and scope of fe dera l constituti onal provisions. See Cunningham , slip op. at 21 n.16. W e also know that, apart from questions of application of t he fe dera l constituti on or fe deral s t at u t es, the Te nnessee Supreme Court is the final a rbiter of state-law issues. See , e.g. , State v. Hay es , 188 S.W .3d 505, 513 (Tenn. 2006) (commenting that the Tennessee Supre me Court is “ the fi na l arb ite r o f the Te nn e sse e Cons tituti on ” ); Anthony Tigg v. Pirelli Ti re Corp. , No. M2003-021 1 8 -C OA -R 3 -C V, s l i p o p
. at5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. , Na s h v i l l e, Dec . 22, 2005) (acknowledg ing Tenne ssee Supre me Court as the fina l arbiter of Tenne ss ee j u d i ci al policy ). Thus, Gomez authoritatively

determined the state-la w meaning of the then -e x i s t i ng Tenne ssee se ntencing law, even if the United States Sup reme Court or the Tenne ssee Supre me Court y et dec ides that the Te nn e sse e la w, a s so int e rp re te d, do e s n ot s a tis fy the ri g or s o f the fe de ra l Sixth Am e nd me nt. 31-61- Th us we de c lin e to m od if y the le ng th o f any

of the pr e se nt d e fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e s.
Ne xt, th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s tha t th e tr ia l ju dg e sh ou ld n ot h a ve c on se c uti ve ly alig ned the se ntence s because the de fendant’s conduct did not rea sonably relate t o the s everity of the offe nses involved.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b) e numerates fac tual bases whic h authorize consec utive sentenc ing. I n the prese nt c ase, the consec utive sentenc ing fac tor upon which the tr ia l c ou rt

re lie d is a s f

oll ow s:
The defenda nt is convicted of two ( 2) or more statutory offe nses involvi n g s ex ual abuse of a minor with conside ration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the defe ndant and victim or victims, the time span of the defe ndant’s undetec ted sexual activity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or victims[ .] T.C.A. § 40-35-115( b)(5) (2003). I n the absence of this or som e other authorizing factor, state law require s the impositi on of conc urre nt sentencing

. Id . § 40-35-115( d).

I n the pre sent ca se, fa ctual base s exis t w hich authorize some measure of conse cutive sentenc ing. See State v . Cleander Cleon Hartman , No. M2000-02441-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 18 (T e nn
. C r i m
. A p p
. , N a s h v i l l e , Ja n
. 1 7 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t w h e n c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c i n g is permissible under se ction 40-35-115( b)(5) , the sentenc e must also “re ason ab l y relate[] to the s ev er i t y o f t h e o ff

en s es i n v o l v ed ”) (q u o t i n g State v. Taylor , 739 S.W .2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1987) ); cf

. Sta te v . J

am e s M . P owe rs , No. E2001- 0 2 3 6 3 -C C A-R3-CD, slip op. at 6 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knoxvi lle, Oct. 23, 2002) ( holding that se ction 40-35-115( b)(5) d o e s n o t a p p ly b e cause “[t] here was no signific ant t ime span of undetec ted s exual activity and the nature of t he criminal conduct wa s no t ag g ra vate d be y on d what is inh e re nt in se x crime s c omm itt e d a g a ins t c hil dr e n” ); Sta te v . R ob e rt H. Mc Curdy , No. 03C01-9706-CR-00232, slip op. at 10- 11 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Mar. 23, 1998) (holding beca

use “[t] here was no signific ant time span of undete cted se x ual ac tivity , the natur e of the c ri min a l con du c t wa s non a g g ra vate d, a ndthe e xten t of re sid ua l dama g e to the vic tim cause d by the conduc t was not demonstrated by evidenc e presented at trial,” consecutive se ntencing was not appr opriate) . Howeve r, eve n though the conduct of the def endant in the instant ca se wa s rep r e h e n s ib le , a n d a lth o u g h w e n e ith e r d is c o u n t th e s e r io u s n e s s o f c r im e s o f th is n a tur e nor the tr auma su ff e re d b y the vic tim

in this c a se , w e be liev e th e pr e se nt c ir c ums ta nc e s mi lit a te a g a ins t unfetter ed conse cutive sente ncing

. See Cleande r Cleon Hartman , slip op. at 18.

A s w e d e c id e d in S t ate v. Cleande r Cleon Hartman , our inquiry must include whether the effec tive sentenc e is rea sonably related to the seve rity of the off enses. Cleander Cleon Hartman , s l i p o p
. at1 8 (c i t i n g State v. Taylor , 7 39 S.W. 2d22 7, 23 0 ( Te nn . 1 98 7) ); see T.C.A. § § 40-35-102( 1), -103(2) (2003). Ag ain, we have not disreg arde d the trauma suffe red by

B.R., butT h e se c o u n t nu m b e rs re fer to the S ta te ’s B ill o f P a rtic u la rs a n d th e S ta te ’s E le c tio n a s u til iz e d e a rlie r in this 32

o p i ni o n.
A s exp l ai ned , our revi sio n of t he ef fect i ve sent ence i s b ased up o n a s t at ut o ry m and at e t o f ashi o n a 33
propo r t i onat e s ent enc e. Shoul d a cour t , upon f ur t her r evi ew, det er mi ne t hat t he len gth s of t he defendan t ’ s s ent enc es v io la te the S ixth A m e n d m e n t, the c o n figu ra tio n o f co n se c u tive se n te n c ing sh o u ld b e a dju ste d a p p ro p ria te ly.

T h e d e fen d ant i ni t i al l y request ed t he raw da t a p ri o r t o t he sent enci ng heari ng unde r Rule 16

. A t t he 34

se n te n c ing he a rin g he first re q u e ste d the d a ta , ac c o rd ing to the d e fen d a n t’s b rie f, v ia sub p o e n a , s ee Te n n
. R. Cr i m
. P. 1 7 , an d the n he a g a in r e q u e ste d the d a ta b e d isc lo se d a fter the S ta te ’s ex p e rt’s tes tim o n y, s ee T en n
. R. Cr i m. P. 26. 2. O n a p p e a l, the d e fen d a n t d o e s n o t ar g u e tha t he w a s e n tit le d to the d a ta u n d e r R u le 1 6 su b se c tio n (a )( 1 )( B ), d e fen d a n t’s
w ritten o r re c o rd e d sta te m e n ts, no r u n d e r su b se c tio n (a )( 1 )( G ), re p o rts o f e x a m ina tio n s a n d tes ts. See T e n n
. R. Cr i m. P

. 16 (a) (1)(B ), (G ). -62- g i v en al l the circ umstances pr esente d in this case, a c ombination of concur rent a nd consec utive sentenc es is appropriate in re lation to the severity of the offe nses and are the least seve re me asure s nece ssary to deter the defe ndant’s future criminal conduc t, to protect society , and to deter others wh o ar e similarly

situated and may

be likely to commit si milar offe nses. See T

. C. A

. § § 40-35- 102(1), - 103(2) ( 2003); Taylor , 739 S.W .2d at 230.

T h u s , th ed e f

e n d an t’ s 1 2

- y e a

r s e n te n c e s f

o r th ea g g r avate d sexual battery convictions in counts one, four , five, six, and seven ar e to be se rved c oncurr entl y with eac h other a nd concur rently with the 12-y ear

sentenc e for

the ag g ravated sexual battery conviction in count two. 32 The 12-y ear

sentenc e in count thre e and the 12-y ear sentenc e for the especially ag g ravated sexual exploi tation of a minor conviction in c ount e ight shall be serve d consec utively to e ach o t h er and to the se nte nc e in c ou nt t wo . T hu s, the de fe nd a nt’ s e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e wi ll b e 36 y e ars
. 33

L ast, the def

endan t complains that the leng th and servic e manne r we re illeg al beca use the c ourt failed to r equire the State to produce the “ra w data” upon which the State’ s expert re lie d. Th e de fe nd a nt f

urthe r a rg ue s th a t th e ra w d a ta

wa s n eces sar y fo r the de fe ns e e xpe rt to revie w and r ebut the State’s proof. Moreove r, the defe ndant complains that he wa s deprived of the opportunity

to cross-e x amine the St ate’ s expert at the sentenc ing he aring reg arding her r eport. He also complains that the judg e’s r efusa l to order the di sclosure of the raw data violated T ennesse e Rules of C riminal Procedur e 16(a )(1) (A) and 26.2, see Tenn. R. Crim. P . 16(a) (1)( A), 26.2, a nd 34 Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 705, see Tenn. R. Evid. 705.

There is no constituti onal ri g ht to ge nera l discovery in a criminal case. See Pe nn sy lv an ia v . R itc hie , 4 80 U. S. 3 9, 10 7 S. Ct. 98 9 ( 19 87 ); W eatherford v. Bursey , 429 U.S. 545, 97 S. Ct

. 837 (1977). The S tate is not oblige d to make an investigation or t o g ather evidenc e for the def endant. See State v . Rey nolds , 671 S.W .2d 854, 856 (T enn. C rim. App. 1984). The dis c ov e ry ru le s d o n ot r e qu ir e dis c los ur e of inf orma tio n n ot kno wn by

the State . Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 16(a). Rule 16 pe rmits the defe ndant t o discover any statements m ade by him, his prior recor d, documents and tang ible objects, and r eports of te sts and examinations, butonly to the extent that the i nformation is in the “possession, custody , or control of the state.” Id .; se e als o Sta te v . M ar tin , 634 S.W .2d 639 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 1982) (Rule 16 doe s not provide for the discovery of-63-

pr os e c uti on wi tne sse s)

. Sub se c tio n 16( a )( 1) (A ) re qu ir e s the State , upo n the de fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st, to d isc los e “ the su bs ta nc e of a ny
. . . o ra l st a te me nts ma debe fo re or a ft e r arrest in res pons e to interrog ation by

any person the defe ndant knew was a law-e nforc ement officer if the s tate intends to offer the statement in evide nce at the trial.” See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (1)( A). I n addition, the ru le pr ov ide s th a t if

a pa rty fails to c omp ly wi th thi s rul e , the c ou rt ma y or de r suc h party to p e rm it the discovery or inspection, g rant a continuance , or prohibit the party from in t ro d u ci n g evidence no t di sc los e d, or

it m a y e nte r s uc h o the r o rd e r a s it de e ms j us t un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s. Te nn . R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2).

Te nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 26 .2 re qu ir e s th e pa rty wh o c a lle d a

wi tne ss other than the defe ndant, upon motion of the opposing party , to produce any pretria l statements of the wi tne ss t o th e pa

rty a g a ins t w ho m th e wi tne ss w a s calle d p ri or to c omm e nc e me nt o f c ro ssexamination. Tenn. R. Crim. P . 26.2.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 705 states that an e x pert “ may t estify in terms of op ini on or

inf e re nc e a ndg ive re a so ns wi tho ut p ri or dis c los ur e of

the un de rl y ing fa c ts o r d a ta , u nle ss the court require s otherwise. The expert may in any event be require d to disclose the under ly ing fac ts or data on c ross-examination.”

Rul e 16 do e s n ot a

pp ly to m a nd a te dis c los ur e of

the de fe nd a nt’ s o ra l state me nts to Dr. Moore beca

use the State’s expert, Dr. Moore , is not a “per son the defe ndant knew [to be] a lawenfor ceme nt office r.” See Te nn
. R. Cr im. P. 16 (a )( 1) (A ). I n a dd iti on , Ru le 26 .2 do e s n ot a pp ly in this case be cause the statement the de fendant sought wa s not a “stateme nt o f t h e witness,” Dr

. Moore, but the de fendant’s own statement. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 26.2.

I n State v. He nry Eugene Hodges , No. 01-C-01-9212- CR-00382 (Tenn. Crim. App., N a s h v il le , M a y 1 8 , 1 9 9 5 ) , th e St a te s o u g h t th e c li n ic a l n o te s o f th e d e f e n d a n t’ s e xp e r t. Id . The court noted that “the trial c ourt has the discretion to require that the under ly ing f acts a nd data use d by the expert to formulate the opini o n s b e p ro v i ded to the other party .” Id . slip op. at 25 (citing Tenn. R. Evid. 705). The court further stated that,

[a] s a g ener al rule, a

trial court will re quire dis cl o s u re of the underlying data of the e x pert’s opinion when the court ‘believe s that the party opponent wil l be unable to cross-e x amine ef fec tively and the re ason fo r s uch inability is other than the pr ejudicial natur e of such fa cts or data

. . . . Id . (quoting Moore’ s Fe dera l Pra ctice § 705.10 at VI I -73). The court then held that the trial court didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in re qu ir ing the de fe nd a nt t o p ro du c e his e xpe rt ’s c lin ic a l no te s b e c aus e it would have bee n “extremely difficult, i f not impossibl e, for the assis tant district attorney g ener al to cross-e x amine [the defe nse expert] without acc ess to the notes.” Id.-64- I nitially , we note that the interests of ju s t i ce ar e better serve d in these situations wh e n the c ou rt a t le a st re vie ws the re quest ed m ate ri a ls in c am e ra . T he n, a ft e r e xer c isi ng its discretion in dec iding the issue, the court c ould place the materia ls under sea l, i f n ec es s ar y , for purposes of f

acilitating appellate revie w.
I n th e pr e se nt c a se , the ra w data we re no t pl a c e d u nd e r s e a l f or us to r e vie w, de sp ite the def endant’ s reque st at the sentenc ing he aring , and thus, we c annot dec ide whether t he trial court abused its discre tion. Rega rdless whe ther the c ourt abused its discre tion at p resent, we hold that any such er ror is harmless. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). First, the pr oof showed that the de fense expert was very familiar with these tests and even perf ormed some of the same tests on the defe ndant, upon which he ba sed his opinion. Furthermore, Dr . Moore testified to the test i n g p ro cedur es she pe rformed and to the f orm of the r aw r esults on certain tests. The defe ndant had a mple information to adequately cross-e x amine Dr. Moore r eg arding her opinion’s un de rl y ing fa c ts anddata wi tho ut b e ing pr ov ide d w iththe a c tua l r a w d a ta . Se c on d, as th e Sta te corr ectly notes in its brief, t he trial court did not rely on the S tate’s e x pert’s r eport in re aching the sentenc ing de termination.

I n sum, the defe ndant was not entit led to the ra w data unde r Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26.2 nor Te nnessee Rule of Evidence 705. Moreove r, any err or i n not disclosing the r aw data was ha rmless. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).
XI I. CO NC LU SION
The de fendant’s eff

ective sentenc e shall be modified to 36 y ear s, but the defe ndant’s convictions and sente nces a re othe rwise a ffirme d. The State is ba rre d from proc eeding further on the thr e e c ou nts of

c hil d r ape , a ndtho se c ha rg e s a re dis mis se d. Th e jud g e wh o pre sid e d at tria l is disqualified from c onducting further proce eding s in this cause.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE