*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 25, 2007*

Decided April 25, 2007

Before

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-2443

KENNETH A. MCCREADY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KAREN JACOBSEN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 04 C 1782

John A. Nordberg, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Kenneth McCready was evicted from his apartment and brought suit in

federal court against the building manager, her attorneys, and others, alleging

violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

(“FDCPA”), and various Illinois state laws. The district court dismissed the FDCPA

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-2443 Page 2

claim, reasoning that the defendants’ actions did not fall within the purview of the

statute, and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state-law claims. McCready now appeals. We affirm.

McCready leased an apartment that was managed by defendants Karen

Jacobsen and Miles Gillott. He complained of numerous problems with the

apartment and, when they were not addressed to his satisfaction, he withheld rent. 

Jacobsen commenced an eviction proceeding and, after McCready failed to appear,

Cook County Circuit Court Judge Turkington (also a defendant) awarded Jacobsen

possession of the apartment and back rent. McCready filed a bankruptcy petition

in the United States Bankruptcy Court and vacated the apartment.

 

McCready then sent a letter to Jacobsen demanding that she refund his

security deposit and return certain personal property he had left behind. He

threatened to sue her and her attorneys, but stated that he would “entertain offers

to settle the litigation” for “a decent dollar amount.” Jacobsen’s attorneys (also

named as defendants) responded by letter with an itemization of the ways in which

McCready’s security deposit had been applied toward unpaid rent and repairs. The

letter began with a prominent disclaimer stating that, “IN NO WAY IS THIS TO

BE CONSTRUED AS AN ATTEMPT COLLECT [sic] UPON THE DEBT

OWED YOUR LANDLORD. PLEASE DO NOT SEND ANY MONEY TO THE

LANDLORD AT THIS TIME.”

McCready filed suit in the district court alleging that counsel’s letter as well

as “harassing” phone calls from Jacobsen and Gillott violated the FDCPA. The

complaint also asserted various state-law claims, primarily under Chicago’s

Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance. The district court dismissed the

FDCPA claim for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), finding that

the defendants’ conduct did not fall within the statute because Jacobsen and Gillott

were creditors, not debt collectors, and counsel’s letter was not an attempt to collect

a debt, but simply an explanation why McCready’s security deposit was not being

returned. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and dismissed the suit in its

entirety.

On appeal, McCready challenges only the district court’s determination that

counsel’s letter was not a violation of the FDCPA. Specifically, he argues that the

district court erroneously concluded that the letter was not “in connection” with the

collection of a debt. But this argument is meritless. The FDCPA, as it pertains to

this case, prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection

with the collection of a debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, as well as unfair or

unconscionable collection practices, see id. § 1692f. We previously have concluded

that a letter informing plaintiffs of the current status of their account and
No. 06-2443 Page 3

demanding no payment was not a communication “in connection with the collection

of any debt” under the FDCPA. Bailey v. Security Nat’l Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d

384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1998). The letter at issue here similarly demanded no

payment and simply provided—at McCready’s request—an accounting of how his

security deposit had been applied toward unpaid rent and repairs. McCready now

urges us to overrule Bailey, but we decline his invitation.

McCready also argues that the district court erred in its FDCPA analysis by

failing to apply the so-called “unsophisticated consumer” test. Under that test, a

collection letter should be assessed from the viewpoint of a debtor who is

“uninformed, naive, or trusting” but who possesses “rudimentary knowledge” of the

financial world. Fields v. Wilber Law Firm, P.C., 383 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). As a matter of law, however, we will not entertain a “bizarre,

peculiar, or idiosyncratic interpretation of a collection letter,” and a letter will not

violate the statute unless a significant portion of the population would have been

misled by it. McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Counsel’s letter here explicitly stated that it was not a collection letter, and it

strains credulity to suggest that many persons would view it otherwise.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. McCready’s

motion to strike the brief of appellees Jay Andrew and Morgen & Perl, LLP is

DENIED.