Filed 11/5/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PATTY ANN LAMOUREUX,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D077361

 (Super. Ct. No. SWF1101646)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside, John D. 

Molloy, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Michelle May Peterson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha 

Cortina, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Annie Featherman Fraser, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Patty Ann Lamoureux appeals a judgment of conviction 

entered after the trial court vacated her felony murder conviction and 
2

resentenced her under Penal Code section 1170.95, the resentencing 

provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).1 Lamoureux was 

released from custody for time served and, although she had excess custody 

credits, the trial court exercised its discretion to place her on parole 

supervision for the statutory maximum of three years. (§ 1170.95, subd. (g).) 

On appeal, Lamoureux contends the trial court erred in declining to 

apply her excess custody credits to offset, i.e., reduce or eliminate, her threeyear parole supervision period. Additionally, she claims the court failed to 

articulate a rational method of computation when it imposed a $560 

restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), erred by not applying her excess custody 

credits to offset her restitution fine (former § 2900.5, subd. (a); Stats. 2011, 

ch. 15, § 466, eff. Apr. 4, 2011), and miscalculated her presentence custody 

credits.

In People v. Wilson (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 42 (Wilson), our colleagues in 

the First District, Division Three, concluded that a court is not required to 

apply excess custody credits to offset the parole supervision period of a person 

who is resentenced under Senate Bill No. 1437. As discussed more fully 

below, we agree with the Wilson decision. Therefore, we conclude the trial 

court in the present case did not err in declining to offset Lamoureux’s parole 

supervision period by her excess custody credits. 

As to Lamoureux’s remaining arguments, we conclude Lamoureux 

forfeited her challenge to the restitution fine by failing to object in the trial 

court and the issue of her entitlement to additional presentence custody 

credits is moot. However, we conclude Lamoureux’s excess custody credits 

must be applied to offset the restitution fine in its entirety.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
3

Therefore, we modify the judgment to reflect that Lamoureux’s $560 

restitution fine is deemed satisfied in full by application of her excess custody 

credits. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

II

BACKGROUND

A

In 2013, a jury convicted Lamoureux of conspiracy to commit robbery 

(§ 182) and felony murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). It found true special 

circumstance allegations that: (1) the murder was perpetrated during the 

commission of a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)); and 

(2) Lamoureux, though not the actual killer, had an intent to kill or acted 

with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the 

predicate felony (id., subds. (c) & (d)). On April 19, 2013, the court sentenced 

Lamoureux to prison for life without the possibility of parole. 

This court affirmed Lamoureux’s murder and conspiracy convictions, 

but concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that 

she had an intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life. 

(People v. Miller (Sept. 15, 2015, D067451) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Dec. 9, 

2015.) Therefore, the court concluded Lamoureux was not eligible for a 

prison sentence of life without the possibility of parole. (Ibid.) The court

affirmed the judgment, in part, reversed the judgment, in part, and 

remanded the matter for resentencing. (Ibid.) On remand, the trial court 

resentenced Lamoureux to a prison term of 25 years to life. 

B

On January 11, 2019, after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, 

Lamoureux filed a petition to vacate her felony murder conviction and to 

obtain resentencing. The People opposed the petition, asserting Senate Bill 
4

No. 1437 is unconstitutional because it amends Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as 

approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) and Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, 

as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)), violates the separation 

of powers doctrine, and contravenes Marsy's Law (Prop. 9, as approved by 

voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008)). The trial court summarily dismissed the

petition after finding that section 1170.95—Senate Bill No. 1437’s 

resentencing provision—amends Proposition 7.

On appeal, a divided panel of this court considered and rejected the

People’s constitutional challenges to Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. 

Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241; see People v. Superior Court (Gooden) 

(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270 [companion case concluding Senate Bill No. 1437

is constitutional].) Because we concluded there is no constitutional infirmity 

with Senate Bill No. 1437, we reversed the order summarily dismissing 

Lamoureux’s resentencing petition.2 (Lamoureux, at p. 246.) 

Lamoureux was released on bail on January 27, 2020, and the court 

granted her petition on February 26, 2020. The court vacated the felony 

murder conviction and resentenced Lamoureux to the upper term of six years 

for her conspiracy conviction. It found Lamoureux was entitled to 3,590 

credits for time served, consisting of 648 presentence actual time credits, 

2 Following our decision, numerous other Courts of Appeal concluded 

Senate Bill No. 1437 is constitutional. (People v. Lippert (2020) 53

Cal.App.5th 304; People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041; People v. 

Superior Court of Butte County (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 896; People v. Lopez 

(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 589; People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207; 

People v. Johns (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 46; People v. Prado (2020) 49 

Cal.App.5th 480; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85, review granted 

July 22, 2020, S262835; People v. Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 300; People v. 

Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762; People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740; 

but see Lippert, at p. 314 (dis. opn. of Ramirez, J.); Nash, at p. 1084 (con. & 

dis. opn. of Poochigian, J.).)
5

2,474 postsentence actual time credits, and 468 postsentence conduct credits. 

It determined the custody credits exceeded the new custodial sentence and 

therefore found the new custodial sentence satisfied. However, it placed 

Lamoureux on parole supervision for three years under section 1170.95, 

subdivision (g). Over Lamoureux’s objection, the court declined to apply her

excess custody credits to offset the parole supervision period.

III

DISCUSSION

A

Parole Supervision

1

The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, effective January 1, 

2019, for the expressed purpose of “amend[ing] the felony murder rule and 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to 

ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To effectuate this goal, Senate Bill No. 1437 

amended sections 188 and 189, the statutory provisions pertaining to malice 

and the degrees of murder, respectively. (Id., §§ 2–3.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1170.95, which permits persons 

with murder convictions to petition their sentencing courts to vacate their

murder convictions and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. 

(§ 1170.95, subds. (a), (e).) A person is entitled to vacatur of his or her 

murder conviction and resentencing if the following conditions are met: (1) a

charging document was filed against the person that allowed the prosecution 

to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and 
6

probable consequences doctrine; (2) the person was convicted of first or 

second degree murder following a trial or an accepted plea; and (3) the person

could “not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to 

[s]ection[s] 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill No. 1437. (Id., subd. (a).)

At issue here is a portion of Senate Bill No. 1437’s resentencing 

provision concerning parole supervision for resentenced defendants—

section 1170.95, subdivision (g). Section 1170.95, subdivision (g) states: “A 

person who is resentenced pursuant to [section 1170.95] shall be given credit 

for time served. The judge may order the petitioner to be subject to parole 

supervision for up to three years following the completion of the sentence.”

Lamoureux contends a person who is resentenced under Senate Bill 

No. 1437 is entitled, pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (g), to have his 

or her excess custody credits applied against any period of parole supervision 

the court imposes. She asserts she had 1,400 excess custody credits—enough

to fully offset her three-year parole supervision period (which she calculates

as 1,095 days). Because the excess custody credits exceeded the parole 

supervision period, Lamoureux claims the trial court erred in placing her on

parole supervision.3

The proper construction of section 1170.95, subdivision (g) presents an 

issue of statutory interpretation subject to our de novo review. (Christensen 

v. Lightbourne (2019) 7 Cal.5th 761, 771.) “[W]e begin by looking to the 

statutory language. If the language is clear in context, our work is at an end. 

3 The parties dispute whether Lamoureux was entitled to additional 

custody credits. (See post Part. III.C.) However, Lamoureux assumes for 

purposes of discussion the trial court’s determination of her custody credits 

was correct and calculates her excess custody credits as follows: custody 

credits as determined by the trial court (3,590) minus the new six-year 

custodial sentence imposed at resentencing (2,190 days) equals excess 

custody credits (1,400). 
7

If it is not clear, we may consider other aids, including the statute's 

legislative history.” (National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area 

Chapter v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 498.)

2

In People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399 (Morales), the Supreme 

Court considered whether excess custody credits automatically apply to 

reduce or eliminate a person’s parole period when the person is resentenced 

under Proposition 47 (Prop. 47, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 

2014)). In answering this question, the Supreme Court interpreted a 

statutory provision that closely resembles section 1170.95, subdivision (g). 

Therefore, we begin our analysis with a discussion of the Morales decision.

In Morales, a defendant pleaded guilty to a felony offense and was 

sentenced to 16 months in prison. (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 403.) 

Eight months into the sentence, voters enacted Proposition 47, which reduced 

many non-violent crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and allowed persons

serving felony sentences for reclassified offenses to petition to recall their 

sentences and to be resentenced for misdemeanor offenses. (Ibid.) The 

defendant filed such a petition, which was granted, and the trial court 

imposed a jail sentence of time served. (Ibid.) The court placed the 

defendant on parole for one year, even though he had excess custody credits. 

(Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant argued he was entitled to have his parole 

period offset by his excess custody credits under a provision contained within 

Proposition 47—section 1170.18, subdivision (d) (hereafter, the Proposition 

47 statute). The Proposition 47 statute states: “A person who is resentenced 

... shall be given credit for time served and shall be subject to parole for one 

year following completion of his or her sentence, unless the court, in its 

discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the person from parole.” 
8

Applying well-established principles of statutory interpretation, the 

Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded a court is 

not required to apply a person’s excess custody credits to reduce or eliminate

a parole period imposed under the Proposition 47 statute. (Morales, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p. 403.) The court reasoned the Proposition 47 statute, despite

granting “ ‘credit for time served’ ” to persons who are resentenced under 

Proposition 47, “seems to require the one-year parole period subject to the 

court's discretion to order otherwise. It states that the person shall receive 

credit for time served and shall be subject to parole.” (Id. at p. 405.) As the 

Morales court explained, the Proposition 47 statute establishes a “seemingly 

mandatory parole requirement (subject to the court's discretion) ....” (Ibid.)

Next, the Morales court emphasized what the Proposition 47 statute 

does “not state, namely that credit for time served could reduce the period of 

parole.” (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 406.) The court juxtaposed the 

Proposition 47 statute with section 2900.5, “the statute concerning 

presentence credit in ordinary cases ....” (Ibid.) As the court explained, 

presentence credits can ordinarily be credited towards a sentence during a 

person’s initial sentencing because section 2900.5 expressly provides that 

“(1) the person is entitled to credit for time served, and (2) the credit can 
9

reduce or eliminate the period of parole.”4 (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

pp. 405–406.) The Proposition 47 statute “states the first of these but not the 

second.” (Ibid.) Because the Proposition 47 statute says nothing about 

excess credits reducing or eliminating a person’s parole period, the court had 

“no reason ... to assume the voters believed ... credit for time served could 

reduce the period of parole” when they enacted Proposition 47. (Id. at p. 406.)

Further, the Morales court reasoned that a custody credit offset would 

in many cases “undermine” the discretion of a court to impose a parole period

for a person who is resentenced under Proposition 47. (Morales, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at p. 405.) The court noted that a person seeking a recall of his or her 

sentence and resentencing under Proposition 47 “will have been serving a 

felony sentence and, therefore, will often have substantial excess credit for 

time served. In those cases, if excess credits can reduce or eliminate the 

period of parole, the court’s discretion will be curtailed or eliminated.” (Ibid.)

For all these reasons, the Morales court “conclude[d] that credit for 

time served does not reduce the parole period” under the Proposition 47 

statute. (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 403.) The court held, instead, that

the “electorate was informed, and it intended, that a person who benefitted 

from [Proposition 47] by receiving a reduced sentence would be placed on 

4 Section 2900.5 states, in relevant part as follows: “(a) ... when the 

defendant has been in custody ... all days of custody of the defendant ... shall 

be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment .... If the total number of 

days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be 

imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been 

served.... [¶] .... (c) For the purposes of this section, ‘term of imprisonment’ 

includes any period of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation or 

otherwise ordered by a court in imposing or suspending the imposition of any 

sentence, and also includes any term of imprisonment, including any period 

of imprisonment prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment 

and parole, prior to discharge, whether established or fixed by statute, by any 

court, or by any duly authorized administrative agency.” (Italics added.)
10

parole for one year after completion of the reduced sentence, subject to the 

court’s discretion to release the person from that parole.” (Ibid.)

3

More recently, in Wilson, the Court of Appeal for the First District, 

Division Three considered the issue presented here—whether a court must 

apply the excess custody credits of a person who is resentenced under Senate 

Bill No. 1437 to offset the person’s parole supervision period pursuant to 

section 1170.95, subdivision (g). Based in part on the Morales decision, the 

Wilson court determined the answer to this question is “no.”5

As the Wilson court explained, section 1170.95, subdivision (g)—like

the Proposition 47 statute—“states that (1) the [resentenced] person is 

entitled to credit for time served and (2) the court may order a parole period.” 

(Wilson, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) However, it “does not state—as 

section 2900.5 states—that the credit may be used to reduce or eliminate any 

parole period the court may impose.” (Id. at p. 50.) Just as the Morales court 

concluded “the words ‘credit for time served’ in the Proposition 47 statute do 

not mandate the use of excess credit to reduce or eliminate the parole period,” 

the Wilson court concluded the words “credit for time served” contained in 

section 1170.95, subdivision (g) do not, standing alone, mandate an excess 

credit offset against a person’s parole supervision period. (Id. at p. 50.)

Further, the Wilson court recognized that a mandatory excess custody 

credit offset “would result in parole being eliminated or reduced in many 

cases governed by section 1170.95 as defendants seeking relief under that 

5 The Court of Appeal issued the Wilson decision after briefing in this 

appeal was complete. At our request, the parties filed supplemental briefing 

regarding the Wilson decision. Additionally, Lamoureux filed a request for 

judicial notice of the appellate briefing in the Wilson appeal, which we deny 

as unnecessary to the disposition of the appeal.
11

section will have been serving lengthy felony sentences for murder by the 

time they petition for resentencing.” (Wilson, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 51; 

see § 190, subd. (a) [generally, the punishment is 25 years to life for first 

degree murder and 15 years to life for second degree murder].) This would 

“undermine the trial court’s discretion in many cases.” (Morales, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at p. 405.)

Based on the language of section 1170.95, subdivision (g), as well as the 

provision’s legislative history, discussed post, the Wilson court concluded a 

“court is not required to mechanically apply excess custody credits to reduce 

or eliminate the parole period imposed at a resentencing pursuant [to] 

section 1170.95. Instead, and notwithstanding excess custody credits, the 

court may exercise its discretion when deciding whether to order a period of 

parole.” (Wilson, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.) “A contrary interpretation 

would require [the court] to add words to section 1170.95 that do not 

currently exist.” (Id. at p. 52) We agree with, and adopt, the Wilson court’s 

reasoning.

Additionally, we believe the Morales decision is instructive for another

reason not discussed in the Wilson decision. “When legislation has been 

judicially construed and subsequent statutes on a similar subject use 

identical or substantially similar language, the usual presumption is that the 

Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly 

appears.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135; see People v. 

Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199 [“[W]e must assume 

that, when enacting [legislation], the Legislature [is] aware of existing 

related laws and intend[s] to maintain a consistent body of rules.”].) 

Both section 1170.95, subdivision (g) and the Proposition 47 statute are 

contained in the same article of the Penal Code (Part 2, Title 7, Chapter 4.5, 
12

Article 1). Both provisions address a resentenced person’s entitlement to 

credit for time served and the discretion of the court to order the person to be 

subject to parole supervision. Further, as noted, both provisions contain 

substantially similar statutory language. Given these parallels between 

section 1170.95, subdivision (g) and the Proposition 47 statute, we presume 

the Legislature was aware of the Morales decision and its analysis of the 

Proposition 47 statute. We also assume the Legislature intended 

section 1170.95, subdivision (g) to receive the same construction the Morales 

court previously gave to the Proposition 47 statute. These presumptions 

bolster our conclusion that section 1170.95, subdivision (g)—like the 

Proposition 47 statute—does not require a court to automatically offset a 

resentenced person’s parole supervision period by the person’s excess custody 

credits.

4

Lamoureux raises four main arguments in support of her claim that the 

court erred in placing her on parole supervision for a period of three years.

First, Lamoureux tries to distinguish the Morales decision on grounds 

that the decision was based in part on Proposition 47’s unique legislative 

history. In its discussion of legislative history, the Morales court assumed 

the voters who approved Proposition 47 “read and were guided by the ballot 

materials concerning the proposition.” (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 406.) 

Included in these ballot materials was a Legislative Analyst analysis, which 

stated as follows: “ ‘Offenders who are resentenced would be required to be 

on state parole for one year, unless the judge chooses to remove that 

requirement.’ ” (Id. at pp. 406–407.) According to the Morales court, this 

analysis unambiguously “promised voters that offenders would be on parole 

for one year unless the judge deemed it not necessary....” (Id. at p. 407.) 
13

This, in turn, suggested that the voters who approved Proposition 47 did not 

intend to enact an excess custody credit offset. (See ibid.)

The legislative history for Senate Bill No. 1437 is not especially robust 

on the topic of parole supervision for resentenced persons. But it is not silent 

either. An analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 conducted by the Office of Senate 

Floor Analyses states that the bill “[a]llows the court to order [a] person 

granted relief to be subject to parole supervision for up to three years 

following the completion of the sentence.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 

Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) 

Aug. 30, 2018, p. 6.) Similarly, the Department of Finance’s enrolled bill 

report states that “[i]f a person is granted relief, the bill allows the court to 

impose a term of parole supervision up to three years.” (Dept. of Fin., 

Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 7, 2018, 

p. 2.) These legislative materials, like the official ballot pamphlet materials 

for Proposition 47, are “easy to understand and entirely unambiguous” in 

their assurance that a court will have discretion to impose parole supervision 

on a person who is resentenced. (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 407.)

Further, we acknowledge the general aim of Senate Bill No. 1437 was 

“ ‘to restore proportional responsibility in the application of California’s 

murder statute’ [citation] by eliminating harsh sentences for defendants who 

played only a relatively minor role in a felony in which a victim was killed, 

while still retaining murder liability for more culpable defendants.” (People 

v. Galvan (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1143–1144.) But, as the Wilson court 

correctly recognized, section 1170.95 also “serves the ‘objective of parole’—to 

provide ‘supervision and counseling, to assist in the parolee’s transition from 

imprisonment to discharge and reintegration into society.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 

53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 50–51; see § 3000, subd. (a)(1) [“The Legislature finds 
14

and declares that the period immediately following incarceration is critical to 

successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive 

citizenship.”].) In light of this goal, we believe “it is consistent with the 

legislative purpose behind section 1170.95 to allow a court to impose a parole 

period even where excess custody credits exist.” (Wilson, at p. 51.) 

Moreover, Lamoureux has directed us to no legislative history 

supporting her construction of section 1170.95, subdivision (g), and we are 

aware of none based on our own research. We would expect there to be at 

least some indication in the legislative history that a court must apply a 

person’s excess custody credits against a parole supervision period, if the 

Legislature had intended the statute to require an offset of this nature. The 

absence of such legislative history suggests section 1170.95, subdivision (g)

imposes no offset requirement. (Wilson, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 50

[“there is no legislative history” suggesting the parole supervision period 

must be offset by excess custody credits]; see Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines 

Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169 [interpreting statute by reference to 

“legislative history or, more precisely, the absence of legislative history”].)

Second, Lamoureux contends section 1170.95, subdivision (g), should be 

interpreted to ensure consistency with section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), a 

provision governing custody credits in the determinate sentencing context. 

Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) states in part: “In any case in which the 

amount of preimprisonment credit ... is equal to or exceeds any sentence 

imposed ... the entire sentence shall be deemed to have been served ... and 

the defendant shall not be actually delivered to the custody of the secretary 

or to the custody of the county correctional administrator. The court shall 

advise the defendant that he or she shall serve an applicable period of parole 

... unless the in-custody credits equal the total sentence, including both 
15

confinement time and the period of parole ....” Courts have interpreted 

section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) “as providing that excess custody credits 

apply to a term of parole.” (People v. Steward (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 407, 424; 

see, e.g., In re Bush (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 133, 140–141.)

Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) does not assist Lamoureux. As the 

Wilson court explained, the Morales court’s “discussion of section 2900.5 ... is 

equally applicable to section 1170(a)(3) as both sections are identical as to the 

purpose and rules concerning the application of credit for time served to 

reduce or eliminate a term of imprisonment and parole. [Citation.] As we 

must assume the Legislature had in mind section 1170(a)(3) when enacting 

section 1170.95, it was aware of section 1170(a)(3)’s rule allowing credit for 

time served and credit to reduce or eliminate any period of parole. We may 

further assume the Legislature was aware that the purpose behind the rule 

in section 1170(a)(3), like section 2900.5, was ‘to equalize the treatment of ... 

those who could not post bail.’ [Citation.] Consequently, had the Legislature 

not intended to leave the issue of parole to the trial court’s discretion in 

section 1170.95, it could have easily made specific reference to 

section 1170(a)(3) or otherwise modified the court’s right to impose a parole 

period. [Citations.] Instead, the Legislature gave the trial court unfettered

discretion to impose a period of parole at the completion of any sentence 

imposed under section 1170.95.” (Wilson, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 51–52; 

see Holmes v. Jones (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 882, 890 [“Where a statute with 

reference to one subject contains a given provision, omission of that provision 

from a similar statute concerning a related subject shows that a different 

intention existed.”].) We agree with the Wilson court.

Third, Lamoureux argues that section 1170.95, subdivision (g) 

establishes a deadline governing a person’s parole eligibility that in many 
16

respects resembles a statute of limitations. As best we can discern, she 

contends section 1170.95, subdivision (g) prohibits a resentenced person from 

being subject to parole supervision at any point later than three years after 

the completion of the person’s sentence. She bases her argument on the 

following italicized language: “The judge may order the petitioner to be 

subject to parole supervision for up to three years following the completion of 

the sentence.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (g), italics added.) 

This argument raises the question: when is the sentence complete? 

According to Lamoureux, the sentence is complete upon the expiration of the 

new custodial term imposed during resentencing.6 For example, Lamoureux

claims her sentence was complete upon the expiration of her new six-year 

custodial term—a date that took place several years prior to her 

resentencing. Therefore, she contends she could not be subject to parole 

supervision later than three years after the expiration of her new six-year 

custodial term—a date that also preceded her resentencing.7 

We are not persuaded by Lamoureux’s construction of section 1170.95, 

subdivision (g). In our view, the most natural reading of the statute is that 

the first prepositional phrase (“for up to three years”) modifies the noun

immediately preceding it (“parole supervision”), thereby establishing that a

resentenced person may be subject to parole supervision for up to three years 

6 After briefing was complete, Lamoureux sought judicial notice of an 

excerpt from the Operations Manual for the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, which she contends corroborates her argument as to when a 

sentence is complete. We deny the request, as the excerpt does not reference 

when the sentence is complete for a person who is resentenced under 

section 1170.95, let alone corroborate Lamoureux’s argument. 

7 Lamoureux does not identify the date she believes her sentence was 

complete. However, she calculates April 27, 2019 as the last date on which 

she could be subject to parole supervision. 
17

in duration. (See People v. Tokash (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379, fn. 7 [“a 

prepositional phrase ordinarily modifies nouns or pronouns”].) But this 

phrase is silent on the issue of when a person may be subject to parole 

supervision. That subject is the province of the next prepositional phrase in 

the statute (“following the completion of the sentence”). (§ 1170.95, subd. (g).) 

Read in full, the statute thus provides that a person may be subject to parole 

supervision following the completion of the sentence and, furthermore, the 

parole supervision period may be up to three years in duration.

Our construction of section 1170.95, subdivision (g) is consistent with 

the Morales court’s interpretation of the Proposition 47 statute. Like 

section 1170.95, subdivision (g), the Proposition 47 statute provides that a 

person may be subject to parole for a defined period of time following 

completion of his or her sentence. (§ 1170.18, subd. (d) [a person “shall be 

subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence”].) 

The Morales court impliedly determined the defined period of time 

established the maximum duration of the parole period, not a deadline akin 

to a statute of limitations. (See Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 405 [the 

Proposition 47 statute “seems to require the one-year parole period”]; id. at 

p. 409 [“the voters imposed a price for [the] benefit [of resentencing]—parole 

for one year”].) Further, the court concluded a resentenced person could “be 

placed on parole when released on the reduced sentence,” not merely upon the 

completion of the person’s new custodial term. (Id. at p. 409, italics added; 

see People v. Hronchak (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 884, 890 [“An individual who 

successfully petitions for resentencing under Proposition 47 is subject to a 

one-year term of parole supervision following his or her release from 

custody”], italics added, citing Morales, at pp. 404–405.) These conclusions 
18

confirm our interpretation of the nearly-identical statute at issue here, 

section 1170.95, subdivision (g).

Further, we note that Lamoureux’s interpretation of section 1170.95, 

subdivision (g)—whereby a three-year clock begins ticking upon the 

expiration of the new custodial term—would in many cases mean a person 

would be subject to parole supervision only while the person is in custody, but 

not after the person’s release from custody. This runs contrary to the very 

notion “that a parole term begins only after release from prison.” (In re Lira

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 573, 582; see People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 608 

[“It is apparent that a term of imprisonment and the onset of parole are 

distinct phases under the legislative scheme.”].)

Having concluded that section 1170.95, subdivision (g) does not 

establish a three-year deadline after which a resentenced person may no 

longer be subject to parole supervision, we must still determine whether the 

trial court placed Lamoureux on parole supervision “following the completion 

of the sentence,” as section 1170.95, subdivision (g) requires. We conclude it 

did. Assuming without deciding that Lamoureux completed her sentence 

when her new six-year custodial term expired, the court properly placed her 

on parole supervision “following the completion of the sentence” because it 

ordered her to undergo parole supervision upon her release from custody. 

Her release from custody occurred well after—i.e., following the completion 

of—her new six-year custodial term. 

Fourth, Lamoureux claims the Legislature rationally could limit a 

court’s discretion to impose parole supervision on a defendant who has been

resentenced under Senate Bill No. 1437. She contends such a limitation is 

consistent with Senate Bill No. 1437’s stated purpose of ensuring “that the 

law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual ....” 
19

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (e).) We have no occasion to determine the 

rationality of such a limitation because section 1170.95, subdivision (g), does 

not curtail a court’s discretion to impose parole supervision in the manner 

Lamoureux suggests.

5

In sum, we conclude section 1170.95, subdivision (g) does not require a 

court to automatically apply a person’s excess custody credits to offset the 

person’s parole supervision period. We conclude, instead, that a court has 

discretion to order a resentenced person to be subject to parole supervision 

for up to three years in duration upon the person’s release from custody. 

Therefore, we discern no error in the trial court’s order placing Lamoureux on

parole supervision for three years upon her custodial release.

B

Restitution Fine

1

At the initial sentencing on April 19, 2013, the trial court imposed a 

restitution fine of $560 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). (People v. 

Miller, supra, D067451.) In her direct appeal, Lamoureux challenged the 

restitution fine. She claimed the court misapplied the restitution fine statute 

in a manner that violated ex post facto principles because the court allegedly

imposed the minimum restitution fine in effect at the time of sentencing

($280), multiplied by two for the number of convictions, rather than the 

minimum restitution fine in effect at the time she committed the offenses

($200), multiplied by two for the number of convictions. (Ibid.) 

In our decision affirming the judgment, in part, and reversing the 

judgment, in part, we noted the $560 restitution fine was “conspicuously 

equal to the inapplicable minimum fine in effect at the time of sentencing 
20

multiplied by the number of Lamoureux's convictions.” (People v. Miller, 

supra, D067451) However, because we were remanding the matter for 

purposes unrelated to the restitution fine, we did not determine whether the 

trial court violated ex post facto principles in setting the restitution fine. We 

instructed the court “to modify the restitution fine in accordance with the 

applicable statutory minimum if appropriate,” yet clarified that the court was 

“not precluded from setting the fine at the greater amount previously 

imposed [i.e., at $560] so long as it [did] so using a rational method of 

computation.” (Ibid.) The record does not indicate whether the court 

imposed a restitution fine at the resentencing hearing on remand and, if so, 

in what amount. 

As noted, Lamoureux thereafter filed a Senate Bill No. 1437 petition to 

vacate her murder conviction and to be resentenced, which the court granted. 

During resentencing, the court again imposed a $560 restitution fine. Now, 

Lamoureux challenges the restitution fine on grounds that the court failed to 

employ a rational method of computation when setting the amount of the 

restitution fine. 

The People assert Lamoureux forfeited her argument by failing to 

object to the restitution fine in the trial court. We agree. By not objecting to 

the restitution fine, Lamoureux forfeited the issue for our consideration. 

(People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 968 (Pinon); People v. Garcia 

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218.) Further, the $560 restitution fine is less 

than the statutory maximum of $10,000. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Therefore, 

the sentence is not an unauthorized sentence subject to our correction on 

appeal despite Lamoureux’s failure to object in the trial court.

Lamoureux claims her trial counsel was ineffective because he did not 

object to the restitution fine. We disagree. “If, as here, the record on appeal 
21

sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, 

an appellate court must reject [a] claim of ineffective assistance unless there 

can be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct.” (People v. Kendrick

(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 778.) We believe there is a satisfactory 

explanation for counsel’s conduct. During resentencing, the trial court 

imposed the upper term for Lamoureux’s conspiracy conviction. Given the 

court’s imposition of the harshest possible custodial penalty, Lamoureux’s 

counsel reasonably could have refrained from objecting to the restitution fine 

for fear that an objection would have caused the court to reassess and 

increase the restitution fine from $560 to an amount upwards of the statutory 

maximum of $10,000.

2

Next, we consider whether Lamoureux’s excess custody credits must be 

applied to offset her $560 restitution fine. The People concede the excess 

custody credits offset the restitution fine and we accept the concession. 

At the time of Lamoureux’s offense in 2011, section 2900.5 provided in 

pertinent part as follows: “In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either 

by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody ... all days of 

custody of the defendant, including days ... credited to the period of 

confinement pursuant to Section 4019, shall be credited upon his or her term 

of imprisonment, or credited to any fine on a proportional basis, including, 

but not limited to, base fines and restitution fines, which may be imposed, at 

the rate of not less than thirty dollars ($30) per day, or more, in the discretion 

of the court imposing the sentence. If the total number of days in custody 

exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the 

entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served.”
22

Under the plain terms of section 2900.5, as the statute existed at the 

time of the offense, the trial court was required to apply Lamoureux’s excess 

custody credits to reduce her $560 restitution fine at a rate of no less than 

$30 per day of excess custody credit. As previously noted, Lamoureux had a 

minimum of 1,400 excess custody credits. Even if the court were to reduce 

the restitution fine by the statutory minimum of $30 per day of excess 

custody credit, a mere 19 days of excess custody credits would offset the 

restitution fine in its entirety. Therefore, we deem the restitution fine 

satisfied in full.8 (See People v. Morris (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 94, 101–103 

[deeming defendant’s restitution fine satisfied under version of section 2900.5

in effect at the time of defendant’s offense].)

C

Presentence Conduct Credits

When the trial court sentenced Lamoureux on April 19, 2013, it 

determined she had 648 presentence actual time credits and zero presentence 

conduct credits. Lamoureux asserts, and the People do not dispute, that the 

court denied her presentence conduct credits because she stood convicted of 

felony murder and the court therefore applied section 2933.2, subdivision (c). 

Section 2933.2, subdivision (c), is an exception to the rule that “detainees in 

local institutions are usually able to earn credit against their eventual 

sentence for good behavior and work performed.” (People v. Brown (2020) 52

8 Earlier in the opinion, we concluded the trial court was not required to 

apply Lamoureux’s excess custody credits to reduce her parole supervision 

period based on the language and legislative history of section 1170.95, 

subdivision (g). However, section 1170.95, subdivision (g) “says nothing 

about fines, and thus, unlike the issue of parole, it does not supplant the 

legislative intent of section 2900.5 as it applies to fines.” (Pinon, supra, 6 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 966–967, italics added.)
23

Cal.App.5th 899, 903; see § 4019.) It “totally eliminate[s] presentence 

conduct credit for defendants convicted of murder.” (Brown, at p. 903.) 

When the court granted Lamoureux’s Senate Bill No. 1437 petition, 

vacated her murder conviction, and resentenced her, the court again 

determined she had 648 presentence credits. As the basis for its 

determination, the court referenced and adopted its credit calculation from 

the initial sentencing. Thus, it is apparent these 648 presentence credits 

consist entirely of actual credits.

Lamoureux contends the court erred in denying her any presentence 

conduct credits because her Senate Bill No. 1437 petition resulted in her 

murder conviction being vacated. Thus, according to Lamoureux, 

section 2933.2, subdivision (c) no longer applies to her. The People argue the

issue of Lamoureux’s entitlement to presentence conduct credits is moot. In 

the alternative, they claim Lamoureux was validly “convicted of murder” 

(§ 2933.2, subd. (a)), notwithstanding the changes effectuated by Senate Bill 

No. 1437, and section 2933.2, subdivision (c) therefore still applies to her. 

We agree with the People that the issue of Lamoureux’s entitlement to 

presentence conduct credits is moot. “As a general rule, an appellate court 

only decides actual controversies. It is not the function of the appellate court 

to render opinions [‘ “ ‘]upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or ... 

declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in 

the case before it.[’ ” ’] [Citation.] ‘[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling 

can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective 

relief.’ ” (People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.)

As noted, Lamoureux has completed her new custodial term and been 

released from prison. She already has more than enough excess custody 

credits (1,400) to be applied against, and fully eliminate, her $560 restitution 
24

fine. (See ante Part III.B.) An award of presentence custody credits cannot

operate to eliminate or reduce her parole supervision period. (See ante Part 

III.A.) Further, an award of presentence conduct credits to Lamoureux would 

not remove any stigma of criminality. (See People v. Buell (2017) 16 

Cal.App.5th 682, 688.) Regardless of the number of presentence conduct 

credits she receives, our judicial records will reflect that Lamoureux was 

convicted of felony murder, filed a successful petition for relief under Senate 

Bill No. 1437, and was resentenced to a prison term of six years.

As no adverse collateral consequences would be avoided or ameliorated 

by an award of presentence custody credits, the issue is moot.9 (People v. 

Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 92–93 [defendant’s entitlement to additional 

conduct credits was moot because defendant was released from custody and 

was not ordered to pay amounts against which excess custody credits may be 

applied]; People v. Valencia (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 326, 327, 329 [“any 

contention concerning inadequate presentence credits is moot”].)

IV

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to reflect that Lamoureux’s $560 restitution 

fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) is deemed satisfied in full by application of her 

excess custody credits (§ 2900.5). In all other respects, the judgment is 

affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is directed to modify the abstract of 

9 Lamoureux claims the award of zero presentence conduct credits 

renders her sentence “facially illegal” and marred by a “clerical error” subject 

to our correction. These arguments are inapposite to the issue of mootness. 

Even assuming the failure to award presentence conduct credits was

erroneous, “any determination by us that the trial court erred would have no 

practical effect” for the reasons already discussed. (Liberty National 

Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 62, 81.)
25

judgment to reflect this modification and to forward a copy of the amended 

abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, J.

HUFFMAN, J.