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Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: GLENN L. MARTIN, HENRY L. T. ULLRICH, AND ULLRICH & COMPANY 

CITATION: 5 Agric. Dec. 435 

DOCKET NUMBER: 35 

DATE: June 5, 1946 

DOCUMENT TYPE: DECISION AND ORDER 

(A. D. 1243) 

 

In re GLENN L. MARTIN, HENRY L. T. ULLRICH, AND ULLRICH & COMPANY. CEA Doc. No. 

35. Decided June 5, 1946. 

Violation of Act -- Exceeding Daily Trading Limit -- Refusing Trading 

Privileges by Contract Markets

For violating the daily trading limit for rye futures on the Chicago Board of 

Trade, all contract markets are directed to refuse as to one respondent all 

trading privileges thereon for a period of five days. 

 

Mr. Benj. M. Holstein for complainant. Mr. P. J. Mulligan, of Cleveland, Ohio, 

for respondent Glenn L. Martin. Mr. Henry L. T. Ullrich, pro se. Mr. John B. 

Poindexter, Referee. 

Decision by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 

Chapter 1), instituted by a complaint issued by the Secretary of Agriculture on 

July 10, 1945. Two respondents, Glenn L. Martin of Baltimore, Maryland, and 

Henry L. T. Ullrich of Wilmington, Delaware, were charged with exceeding the 

daily trading limit for rye futures on the Chicago Board of Trade on June 9, 

1945. At the request of Respondent Martin, the time to answer was extended to 

August 20 by John B. Poindexter, Office of the Solicitor, who was assigned as 

referee by an Associate Solicitor on July 28. 

Within the time allowed, the two respondents filed separate answers, 

admitting that the alleged transaction was made and that it violated the limit, 

but stating that neither knew of the limit, that neither intended any violation, 

and that Martin did not even know of the transaction until it was subsequently 

confirmed to him by Ullrich, who ordered it for Martin's account pursuant to 

prior authorization given to Ullrich & Company to direct trading in the account. 

Martin stated that he depended upon Ullrich and the broker with which the 

account was carried to see that the trading was properly conducted. Ullrich 

alleged that he depended upon the broker for proper executions, and that it had 

executed his order without advising that it was improper. Both respondents 

asked that the complaint be dismissed, and waived oral hearing. 

 

At the request of counsel for the Production and Marketing Administration, a 

prehearing conference was held in Washington on November 15, 1945. 

Correspondence concerning the situation surrounding the transaction was received 

in evidence, and by consent Ullrich & Company, a corporation, was made a party 

respondent. It adopted as its answer the one previously filed by Respondent 

Ullrich. By a letter filed on December 6, 1945, Ullrich requested that the 

broker be made a party. On March 25, 1946, complainant filed a statement 

recommending dismissal as to Martin and suspension of the trading privileges of 

Ullrich and Ullrich & Company on contract markets for 30 days. 
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In his report, issued on April 10, 1946, the referee denied the request to 

make the broker a respondent on the ground that the trading limit applies to a 

registered futures commission merchant for his personal trades only. He 

proposed dismissal as to Martin because he did not actually know of his agent's 

act, and suspension of Ullrich and Ullrich & Company for 15 days only, because 

their violation was unintentional. On May 6, 1946, Ullrich filed exceptions to 

the report, not disputing the facts but objecting to the conclusion that any 

order should issue against him or his company. He requested oral argument, 

which is denied for reasons stated in the Conclusions. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Glenn L. Martin is an individual whose address is 3703 Greenway, 

Baltimore, Maryland. Henry L. T. Ullrich is an individual whose business 

address is Delaware Trust Building, Wilmington, Delaware. Ullrich & Company is 

a Delaware corporation whose address is Delaware Trust Building, Wilmington, 

Delaware, and whose president is Henry L. T. Ullrich. The corporation is 

engaged in the business of managing investment and speculative accounts for 

others for a fee based upon the amount of the funds employed. 

2. On September 10, 1943, by a letter addressed to Laird, Bissell & Meeds, 

Wilmington, Delaware, a stock and commodity brokerage firm, Glenn L. Martin 

authorized Ullrich & Company to direct trading in his account carried with 

Laird, Bissell & Meeds. 

3. On June 9, 1945, Ullrich & Company, acting through its president, Henry L. 

T. Ullrich, and pursuant to the authorization from Martin, bought for Martin 

through Laird, Bissell & Meeds 3,300,000 bushels of rye for future delivery on 

The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, a contract market, such purchase 

involving neither a spread nor a hedge. 

4. During June 1945 the limit fixed by the Commodity Exchange Commission as 

the maximum amount of rye futures which any person 

 

 

could buy or sell in one day on one contract market was 2,000,000 bushels (17 

CRF, Cum. Supp., 150.1). Neither Martin, Ullrich, nor Ullrich & Company had 

actual knowledge of this limit on June 9, 1945. Laird, Bissell & Meeds knew of 

the limit but did not think this purchase, which involved a switch from a short 

position of less than 2,000,000 bushels to a long position of less than 

2,000,000 bushels, violated the limit. Martin did not know the purchase was 

made until after June 9, 1945. 

5. The broker did not purchase the 3,300,000 bushels in a lump sum but in 

various smaller amounts at various prices at various times during the trading 

period on June 9, 1945. 

CONCLUSIONS

By a specific provision of section 2 of the statute, the authorized act of an 

agent is deemed the act of the principal as well as that of the agent. Ullrich 

& Company was authorized to purchase rye futures for Martin, and Ullrich acted 

for the corporation in making the purchase. For present purposes, then, the 

purchase of rye futures was the act of each of the three respondents. Such a 

purchase on one day violated section 4a(2) of the act, and the violation 

authorizes suspension of the trading privileges of each of the respondents in 

accordance with section 6(b). 

While the fact that Martin did not know of the purchase when it was made does 

not excuse him from the responsibility for his agent's act, it is of 

significance in determining what suspension should be ordered. In CEA Docket 

No. 24, Secretary v. Richards and Novotny, decided in 1941, before publication 

of the Agriculture Decisions, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture held one 

partner responsible for the acts of another, but suspended his trading 

privileges for only the nominal period of one day because he did not actually 

know of his partner's violations. Such a nominal suspension might also be 
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appropriate for Respondent Martin here, but as no suspension has been 

recommended for him, none is ordered. 

The fact that Ullrich and Ullrich & Company did not know of the limit is 

likewise of significance in determining their suspension. They did not 

deliberately violate the act, and there appears to be only one violation. 

However, their position is not exactly the same as Martin's. They have chosen 

to engage in the business of directing trading for others. By such action, they 

hold themselves out as having knowledge of trading regulations, and, it seems to 

us, they assume a higher degree of responsibility for acquaintance with such 

regulations. In behalf of these respondents, we may state again that no moral 

turpitude seems to be involved here, but those who deal in futures have the 

burden of trading in accordance with 

 

 

all valid regulations of the business. While a long suspension would be 

unwarranted, some sanction should be applied. Under the circumstances, a 

suspension of five days for Ullrich and Ullrich & Company seems sufficient. 

The question here involved is whether these respondents violated the act, not 

whether someone else did. Accordingly, the referee properly refused Ullrich's 

request to make the broker a party respondent. Violations by the broker, even 

if established, would not excuse violations by these respondents. It is 

unnecessary to decide here, and we do not decide, how trading limits apply to 

brokers, and whether the referee would have been authorized to grant the 

request. It does appear, as Ullrich contends, that the broker might have 

prevented the violation by mentioning the limit, or perhaps even by executing 

part of the order on the following day, but we have taken this into account in 

considering the situation. 

Ullrich and Ullrich & Company do not dispute the facts. It rather clearly 

appears from their statements throughout the record that their contention is 

simply that no suspension at all should be given them. It seems unlikely that 

oral argument would clarify or strengthen their contentions, or serve any useful 

purpose, and such argument was not held. 

ORDER

Beginning on the 30th day after this date, all contract markets shall refuse 

Respondent Henry L. T. Ullrich and Respondent Ullrich & Company, and each of 

them, all trading privileges thereon for a period of five days. Copies of this 

decision shall be served on the parties or their counsel of record, and on each 

contract market. 

 

(A. D. 1243) 

In re GLENN L. MARTIN, HENRY L. T. ULLRICH, AND ULLRICH & COMPANY. CEA Doc. No. 

35. Decided June 5, 1946. 

Violation of Act -- Exceeding Daily Trading Limit -- Refusing Trading 

Privileges by Contract Markets 

 

For violating the daily trading limit for rye futures on the Chicago Board of 

Trade, all contract markets are directed to refuse as to one respondent all 

trading privileges thereon for a period of five days. 

 

Mr. Benj. M. Holstein for complainant. Mr. P. J. Mulligan, of Cleveland, Ohio, 

for respondent Glenn L. Martin. Mr. Henry L. T. Ullrich, pro se. Mr. John B. 

Poindexter, Referee. 

 

Decision by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 

Chapter 1), instituted by a complaint issued by the Secretary of Agriculture on 

July 10, 1945. Two respondents, Glenn L. Martin of Baltimore, Maryland, and 

Henry L. T. Ullrich of Wilmington, Delaware, were charged with exceeding the 

daily trading limit for rye futures on the Chicago Board of Trade on June 9, 

1945. At the request of Respondent Martin, the time to answer was extended to 

August 20 by John B. Poindexter, Office of the Solicitor, who was assigned as 

referee by an Associate Solicitor on July 28. 

Within the time allowed, the two respondents filed separate answers, 

admitting that the alleged transaction was made and that it violated the limit, 

but stating that neither knew of the limit, that neither intended any violation, 

and that Martin did not even know of the transaction until it was subsequently 

confirmed to him by Ullrich, who ordered it for Martin's account pursuant to 

prior authorization given to Ullrich & Company to direct trading in the account. 

Martin stated that he depended upon Ullrich and the broker with which the 

account was carried to see that the trading was properly conducted. Ullrich 

alleged that he depended upon the broker for proper executions, and that it had 

executed his order without advising that it was improper. Both respondents 

asked that the complaint be dismissed, and waived oral hearing. 

 

At the request of counsel for the Production and Marketing Administration, a 

prehearing conference was held in Washington on November 15, 1945. 

Correspondence concerning the situation surrounding the transaction was received 

in evidence, and by consent Ullrich & Company, a corporation, was made a party 

respondent. It adopted as its answer the one previously filed by Respondent 

Ullrich. By a letter filed on December 6, 1945, Ullrich requested that the 

broker be made a party. On March 25, 1946, complainant filed a statement 

recommending dismissal as to Martin and suspension of the trading privileges of 

Ullrich and Ullrich & Company on contract markets for 30 days. 

In his report, issued on April 10, 1946, the referee denied the request to 

make the broker a respondent on the ground that the trading limit applies to a 

registered futures commission merchant for his personal trades only. He 

proposed dismissal as to Martin because he did not actually know of his agent's 

act, and suspension of Ullrich and Ullrich & Company for 15 days only, because 

their violation was unintentional. On May 6, 1946, Ullrich filed exceptions to 

the report, not disputing the facts but objecting to the conclusion that any 

order should issue against him or his company. He requested oral argument, 

which is denied for reasons stated in the Conclusions. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Glenn L. Martin is an individual whose address is 3703 Greenway, 

Baltimore, Maryland. Henry L. T. Ullrich is an individual whose business 

address is Delaware Trust Building, Wilmington, Delaware. Ullrich & Company is 

a Delaware corporation whose address is Delaware Trust Building, Wilmington, 

Delaware, and whose president is Henry L. T. Ullrich. The corporation is 

engaged in the business of managing investment and speculative accounts for 

others for a fee based upon the amount of the funds employed. 

2. On September 10, 1943, by a letter addressed to Laird, Bissell & Meeds, 

Wilmington, Delaware, a stock and commodity brokerage firm, Glenn L. Martin 

authorized Ullrich & Company to direct trading in his account carried with 

Laird, Bissell & Meeds. 

3. On June 9, 1945, Ullrich & Company, acting through its president, Henry L. 

T. Ullrich, and pursuant to the authorization from Martin, bought for Martin 

through Laird, Bissell & Meeds 3,300,000 bushels of rye for future delivery on 

The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, a contract market, such purchase 

involving neither a spread nor a hedge. 

4. During June 1945 the limit fixed by the Commodity Exchange Commission as 

the maximum amount of rye futures which any person 

 
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could buy or sell in one day on one contract market was 2,000,000 bushels (17 

CRF, Cum. Supp., 150.1). Neither Martin, Ullrich, nor Ullrich & Company had 

actual knowledge of this limit on June 9, 1945. Laird, Bissell & Meeds knew of 

the limit but did not think this purchase, which involved a switch from a short 

position of less than 2,000,000 bushels to a long position of less than 

2,000,000 bushels, violated the limit. Martin did not know the purchase was 

made until after June 9, 1945. 

5. The broker did not purchase the 3,300,000 bushels in a lump sum but in 

various smaller amounts at various prices at various times during the trading 

period on June 9, 1945. 

CONCLUSIONS

By a specific provision of section 2 of the statute, the authorized act of an 

agent is deemed the act of the principal as well as that of the agent. Ullrich 

& Company was authorized to purchase rye futures for Martin, and Ullrich acted 

for the corporation in making the purchase. For present purposes, then, the 

purchase of rye futures was the act of each of the three respondents. Such a 

purchase on one day violated section 4a(2) of the act, and the violation 

authorizes suspension of the trading privileges of each of the respondents in 

accordance with section 6(b). 

While the fact that Martin did not know of the purchase when it was made does 

not excuse him from the responsibility for his agent's act, it is of 

significance in determining what suspension should be ordered. In CEA Docket 

No. 24, Secretary v. Richards and Novotny, decided in 1941, before publication 

of the Agriculture Decisions, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture held one 

partner responsible for the acts of another, but suspended his trading 

privileges for only the nominal period of one day because he did not actually 

know of his partner's violations. Such a nominal suspension might also be 

appropriate for Respondent Martin here, but as no suspension has been 

recommended for him, none is ordered. 

The fact that Ullrich and Ullrich & Company did not know of the limit is 

likewise of significance in determining their suspension. They did not 

deliberately violate the act, and there appears to be only one violation. 

However, their position is not exactly the same as Martin's. They have chosen 

to engage in the business of directing trading for others. By such action, they 

hold themselves out as having knowledge of trading regulations, and, it seems to 

us, they assume a higher degree of responsibility for acquaintance with such 

regulations. In behalf of these respondents, we may state again that no moral 

turpitude seems to be involved here, but those who deal in futures have the 

burden of trading in accordance with 

 

 

all valid regulations of the business. While a long suspension would be 

unwarranted, some sanction should be applied. Under the circumstances, a 

suspension of five days for Ullrich and Ullrich & Company seems sufficient. 

The question here involved is whether these respondents violated the act, not 

whether someone else did. Accordingly, the referee properly refused Ullrich's 

request to make the broker a party respondent. Violations by the broker, even 

if established, would not excuse violations by these respondents. It is 

unnecessary to decide here, and we do not decide, how trading limits apply to 

brokers, and whether the referee would have been authorized to grant the 

request. It does appear, as Ullrich contends, that the broker might have 

prevented the violation by mentioning the limit, or perhaps even by executing 

part of the order on the following day, but we have taken this into account in 

considering the situation. 

Ullrich and Ullrich & Company do not dispute the facts. It rather clearly 

appears from their statements throughout the record that their contention is 

simply that no suspension at all should be given them. It seems unlikely that 
Page 6 

oral argument would clarify or strengthen their contentions, or serve any useful 

purpose, and such argument was not held. 

ORDER

Beginning on the 30th day after this date, all contract markets shall refuse 

Respondent Henry L. T. Ullrich and Respondent Ullrich & Company, and each of 

them, all trading privileges thereon for a period of five days. Copies of this 

decision shall be served on the parties or their counsel of record, and on each 

contract market. 

 

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