### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 22 , 200 5 S es sio n N OR M A JE A N F OR D GR IF F IN v. D ON N A LE ST ER an d th e U N KN OW N HEI RS of

ARTHUR JE AN HENDERSO N (DECEASED) An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 99-1073-3 D . J. Alissand ratos, Chancellor

No. W2004-02072-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 30, 2005

This is a quiet titl e and e

jectment ac tion. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit to quiet titl e to re sidential property and obtain a c ourt order requiring the def

endant to vac ate the pr emises. The de fendant asserted adve rse possession as an aff irmative def

ense, and filed a c o u n ter
- c la im a r g u in g the exist ence of a c onstructive trust. During the trial, the plaintiff te s t i fied a bout a conve rsation with the defe ndant’s g randmother , dece ased by the time of trial, in which the plaintiff a g ree d to permit the defe ndant’s g randmother

to stay in the house if she paid the note and maintained the prope rty . The trial court entere d a judg ment in favor of the plaintiff and dismissed the de fendant’s counter

complaint. The trial c ourt found that the plaintiff f iled the lawsuit within the applicable limit ations period, a nd that the evidenc e did not support the impositi on of a co n s t ru ct ive trust or any other
e qu ita ble re lie f. Th e de fe nd a nt a pp e a ls. We a ff

ir m.
Rul e 3 A ppe al; Judg m e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t i s a ffirm e d.
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Br enda O ates-Williams, Memphis, Tennessee, f or Appe llant Donna L ester. Elijah Noel, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, f or Appe llee Norma J ean F ord Grif fin.
OP IN ION
T h e r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y a ti s s u e i n t h i s c a s e , 1 1 0 7 R o z e l l e i n M e m p h i s , S h e l b y C o u n t y, Tenne ssee, wa s purcha sed i n fee simple by J ames F ord (“ For d”) in January 1968. For d lived in the house at that addre ss w ith Arthur J ean H ender son (“He nderson” ) and H ender son’s g randdaug hter, Appellant/ Defendant Donna L ester ( “L ester” ). They lived there as a f

amily , althoug h For d and He nd e rs on we re ne ve r m arrie d. F or d d ie d inJanu ary 19 82 , a pp are ntl y wi tho ut a

wi ll. Ap pe lle e /Plaint if

f N orma Jea n F or d G ri ff

in (“ Grif fi n” ) wa s the on ly

c hil d o f Ja me s F or d a ndhis so le surviving he ir.-2-

Both He nderson and L ester survived For d. I n the y ea rs fo l l o wi ng For d’s death, they continued to occ upy

the Rozelle pr operty

. They maintained the pr operty

and paid the monthly

note, and the mortg ag e wa s eventua lly paid off. In 1998, Hende rson died. Shortly afte r He nderson’ s death, Griffin contacted L ester about paying rent on the property

. At that time, L ester a sserted an owner ship interest in the property . She ref used to pay

rent to Grif

fin.
On Dec ember

9, 1999, Griff

in f iled a complaint to quie t title and for ejec tment in the Shelby Cou nty Chanc e ry Cou rt

. I n the c omp la int , G ri ff in c la ime d th a t sh e ow ne d th e Roze lle pr op e rty in fee simple absolute and asse rted that L ester’ s claim of an int ere st in the property constituted a cloud
on the tit le . G ri ff

in a lle g e d th a t L e ste r w a s u nla wf ull y wi thh old ing po sse ssi on of th e Roze lle p r o p e r t y f

r o mG r i f f i n , c au s i n g d a m a g e s i n t h e ap p r o x i m a t e a m o u n to f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0

. C o n s e q u e n t l y, Griff in sought a

decla ratory judgme nt that Griffin he ld the title by fee simple absolute, and soug ht an orde r re quiring L ester to va cate the pre mises and re turn possession to Griffin.
L e ste r f ile d a n a ns we r on F e br

ua ry 23 , 2 00 0, a sse rt ing a s a n a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e that G ri ff in was ba rre d from bring ing suit by a seven- y ear statute of limit ations. L ester later filed a motion for leave to amend her

answe r and inc lude a c ounter-c laim The m emora ndum in support of the motion
c on ta ine d a n um be r o f f a c tua l c on te nti on s r e g ard ing L e ste r’ s p ur po rt e d in te re st i n th e Roze lle pr op e rty . L e ste r a sse rt e d th at, f or fo urte e n y e ars a ft e r F or d’ s death, sh e a nd He nd e rs on joi ntl y pa id for the ta x es, mortg ag e, and r epair s on the Rozelle property . After Hende rson’s death in 1998, L ester maintained, she a lone continued to pay those expenses. L est er all eg ed that Griffin waited
un til the mortg a g e de bt w a s p a id o ff in 1 99 7 b e fo rea tte mpt ing to re take po sse ssi on of theRoze lle property . As such, L ester c ontended, Griffin was unjustl y enric hed and a

constructive tr

ust was cre ated.
Attache d to L ester’ s memorandum wa s an exhibit with copies of c an c e le d c h e c k s dating from 1 9 8 2 u n t i l 1 9 9 7

. T h e c h e c k s w e r e m a d e p a yab l e t o C o l l at e r al In v e s t m e n tC o rp o r a t i o n , p a i d m o n t h l y, and dra wn on an a ccount be aring the names of both Hender son and L ester. The m emo l ine of e ach chec k rea d “F or: J ames F ord.” L ester later filed a counter claim asserting a

constructive tr

ust.
I n response , Griff

i n co ntended that she and He nderson ha d maintained a landlord-tena nt re la tio ns hip , te rm ina

blea t- wi ll.
A benc h trial was he ld on May 19, 2004. Be fore the presentation of evide nce c ommenced, the trial judg e eng ag ed in a leng thy colloquy with the attorney s in order to na rrow the focus of the pr oc e e din g s. Ul tim a te ly , th e a tto rn e y s a g re e d th a t th e on ly mate ri a l f

a c t in dis pu te wa s th e y e ar i n which L ester’ s possession beca me adve rse – 1982 or 1998.
Griff in testified on her own behalf

. At the outset of Griffin’s testimony , she wa s asked by her attorney

about a c onversation she had wi t h He n d er son shortly afte r F ord’s de ath. As soon as Griff in beg an to testify

that Hende rson told her that she w as af ra i d , L est er’ s counsel objec ted,
asserting that He nderson’ s statements would be inadmissible hear say . Griff in’s attorney

maintained that the statements would not be hear say , or if they wer e hear say , it would be “subjec t to the he arsay-3-

exception as to statements ag ainst interests by the declara nt.” The trial court overruled the objection and allowe d Griff

in’s testimony

. Griff in tes t i fi ed that, shortly

afte r F ord’s de ath in 1982, Hende rson contac ted Griff in and exp re s s ed fe ar that she, Griff in, would “put her out of the house.” A ccor ding to Griffin, she a nd Hende rson re ache d an ag ree ment wher eby Hende rson could stay

in the house without paying r ent to Griffin so long as Hende rson paid the house note and “kept the house up.” After Hende rson died in 1998, Griffin said, she approa ched L ester a bout pay ing r ent. L ester r efuse d to pay rent. In 1999, Griff in asked L ester to sig n a lea se, and L ester r efuse d. At that point, Gr i ff i n i n i t iated the instant
a c tio n to re qu ir e L e ste r t o v a c a te thepr e mis e s.
L ester disputed the ex istence of any ag ree ment betwee n Griff

in and Hende rson. She testified that she wa s unawa

re of any conver sation betwee n Griff in and Hende rson about the ar rang ement for pay me nt o f the ho us e no te in e xch a ng e fo r G ri ff in p e rm itt ing the m to stay in the ho us e . L e ste r s a id that she and G riffin did not maintain a ty pical landlord- tenant re lationship. Neither eve r conta cted the other about the property

. Once the m ortg ag e wa s paid in full, shortly afte r He nderson’ s death, L ester te stified, Griff

in contacte d her about the property for the first time. L ester stated that, at that tim e , G ri ff

in w a nte d to inc re a se there nt t o a n a mou nt t wi c e that of the no te pay me nts . O n c ro ss examination, L ester a dmitted that, prior to 1998, she neve r had any discussions with Griffin in which L e s t e r a s s e r t e d a n y o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s ti n t h e R o z e l l e p r o p e r t y.
On re b u ttal, Griffin testified that, during the time period in question, she kne w that other
a d u l t s w e r e r e s i d i n g i n t h e h o u s e w i t h H e n d e r s o n , b u tc o n s i d e r e d t h e mc o
- t e n a n t s
. U l t i m a t e l y, Griff in said, she consider ed He nderson to be the sole per son responsible for upholding the te nant’s
e ndof the a g re e me nt. At

thec on c lus ionof

the tria l, the c ou rt

too k th e c a se un de r a dv ise me nt. On May 27, 2004, the trial judg e issued a written decision in favor of Grif fin, and dismissed L ester’ s counter- claim. The tria l court found that there was in fact an a g ree ment betwee n Hende rson a ndGrif fi n, a s G ri ff

in d e sc ri be d, a ndthat L e ste r’ s p os se ssi on of the pr op e rty didno t be c omea dv e rs e until she ref

used Griffin’s request for rent in 1998. Consequently , the t rial court ruled that Grif fin’s claim was not ba

rre d by the seve n -y ea r s t at ute of limitation in T.C .A § 28-2-103. T he trial c ourt ruled that the e vidence did not support the finding of a co n structive trust and that the doc trine of la c he s w a s n ot a

pp lic able

. F ina lly , the c ou rt ru le d th a t G ri ff

in h e ld t itl e in the Roze lle pr op e rty in fee simple absolute, and that L ester was not e ntitled to continued possession of the prope rty . Fr om thi s o rd e r, L e ste r n ow app e a ls. On appe al, L ester a

rg ues that the trial court erre d in finding that Griffin c onsented to the continued possession of the property by Hende rson and Lester a fter F ord’s de ath. L ester a sserts that the trial court erre d in pe rmitting Griff in to testify on Hende rson’s alleg ed stateme nt that she fea red that Griff in would put her out of the house . L ester a lso contends that the trial c ourt err ed in ruling that Griff in’s quiet title and ejec tment claims were not barre d by the seve n-y ear statute of limitations
a ndthe e qu ita

bledo c tr ineof

la c he s.-4-

We r e vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t de novo , upon the re cord, w ith a presumption of
corr ectne ss unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e indicate s otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial c ourt’s ruling s of law a re r eviewe d de novo , with n o p resumption of cor rec tness. Sallee
v Bar re tt , 171 S.W .3d 822, 825 (Tenn. 2005) . L ester ar gu es , on appea l, that the only evidenc e supporting the finding that Griff in ga v e h er co n s ent for Hender son to remain on the pr operty was inadmissible he arsay
. The trial court’s ruling s on evidentiary matters ar e re viewed de novo , w ith no presumption of cor

rec tness. Wa lla c e v . St

ate , 2005 WL

292438 *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2005). Unde r the Te nnessee Rules of Evidence , unless it f its within a rec og nized e x ception, hea rsay is not admissible at trial. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Under the Rules of Evidenc e, “he arsay ” is define d as

“ a state me nt, oth e r tha n o ne ma de by the de c larant w hil e te sti fying a t the tr ia l or h e ari ng , o ff e re d in evidenc e to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801( c). In the instant case , the
c on te xt of

Grif fi n’ s te sti mon y

on He nd e rs on ’s state me nt i ndica tes that G ri ff in d id n ot s e e k to establish as fa ct that Hende rson was in fa ct af raid. Rather , Griff

in sought to establish Henderson’s
rec og nition that, after F ord’s de ath, Griff in was the owne r of the Rozelle home in w hich Hende rson l i v e d

. T h e r e f

o r e , t h e s t a t e m e n tb y H e n d e r s o n t o w h i c h G r i f f i n t e s t i f i e d w o u l d n o tb e h e ar s a y.
I n addition, even if the statement t o which Griffin testified constituted hea rsay , it would be admissible under a n exception to the Rule ex cluding hear say . Rule 803(3) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidenc e provide s that “[ a] s t at em en t of the dec lara nt’s then exist ing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or phy sical condition,” is not excluded by the hear say rule. Tenn. R

. E v i d

. 8 0 3 (3); see als o T e nne sse e v. Harr

is , 1997 WL

746021 *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. De c. 3, 1997)( finding that testimonyreg arding a ra

pe victim’s fea

r of the de fendant was re levant to the issue of se x ual conse nt). Griff in’s testimony , rec iting He nderson’ s statements reg arding her f ear of being forc ed to l eave the house, would fa ll within t he exception in Rule 803(3).
Moreove r, t he only objection asserted by L ester’ s attorney

was to Grif

fin’s testimony

about Hend er s o n ’s fear. No objec tion was made to Griffin’s testimony about the ag ree ment rea ched betwee n Griff

in and Hende rson. Griff

in’s testimony reg arding the exist ence of an a g ree ment was su ff ic ie nt i n a ndof

its e lf to s up po rt

the tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd in g. Con se qu e ntl y , w e c a nn ot a g re e wi th L ester’ s arg ument that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding that an ag ree ment exis ted betwe en Griffin and He nderson, pe rmitting He nderson to re main in the hous e so l ong as she p a i d t h e n o t e a n d m a i n t a i n e d t h e p r o p e r t y. Next, L ester c ontends that the trial court err ed by finding that Griff in’s consent pe rmitting He nd e rs on to r e ma in i n th e ho us e wa s a lso c on se nt t o p e rm it L e ste r t o s ta y on th e pr op e rty . A s a re su lt o f this , L e ste r arg ue s, the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly c on c lud e d th a t th e rewa s n o c on str uc tiv e trus t.
A constructive trust g ener ally arises despite the intentions of the parties. Livesay v. Keaton , 611 S.W .2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p
. 1980). It arises “ ag ainst one who by fraud, actua l or constructive, by

duress or a

buse o f co n fi dence , by

commission of wrong , or by any form of
un c on sc ion ablec on du c t, a rt if ic e , c on c e alm e nt, or

qu e sti on able me a ns , o r w ho in any way a g a ins t equity and g ood conscie nce, either has obtained or holds the l eg al t itle to property which he oug ht not. . .hold and enjoy .” Id
. (c i t i n g Sanders v. Forcum -Lannom , Inc. , 475 S

. W.2d 172 (Tenn.-5-

1972))

. F r o m o u r r e v ie w o f th e e v id e n c e , L e s te r f a il e d to e s ta

b li s h a n y o f th e e le me nts of a
c on str uc tiv e trus t. T his arg ume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.
L ester a lso arg ued that the tria l court im properly applied the seven- y ear statute of limitations set forth in Tenne ssee C o d e An notated § 28-2- 103. L ester a rg ues that her

financ ial contributions
a f t e r F o r d ’ s d e a th a n d p r i o r

t o H e n d e r s o n ’ s d e a t h w e r e a s s e r t i o n s o f h e r i n t e r e s ti n t h e p r o p e r t y, sufficie nt to constitut e an ope n and adve rse p o s s es s i o n of the prope rty and put Griff

in on notice. Th e re fo re , a c c or din g to L e ste r, Grif fi n w a ite d to o lo ng to b ri ng the a c tio n to re c ov e r the Roze lle property

. Un de r T e nn e sse e ’s a dv e rs e po sse ssi on statut e , th e ow ne r o f r e a l pr op e rty mus t bring a

su it to r ecove r land “within seven (7) y ear s afte r the rig ht of action ac crue d.” T.C.A. § 28-2- 103(a) . To de te rm ine wh e n th e statu te be g a n to ru n, it i s n e c e ssa ry to d e te rm ine wh e n th e la nd ow ne r’ s c aus e of ac tion accr

ued. Te nnessee case law is clea r that the c ause of

action accr u es at t he time the possession became adve rse. Moffitt v. Mee ks , 199 S.W .2d 463, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946). Th us , an ac tion under the statute will not be bar red if the posses s i o n o f t h e l an d was pe rmitted by the
owner
. Me ne

fe e v . D av ids on Co unty , 260 S.W .2d 283, 285 (Tenn. 1953)

. He re , th e tria l c ou rt

fo un d th a t L e ste r’ s poss e ssi on of the pr op e rty did no t be c omea dv e rs e until 1998, when she re fused Griffin’s re quest that she pay rent. This f inding is ba sed on the trial court’s f inding that Griffin’s testim ony , establishing an ag ree ment betwee n Griff in and Hende rson, was c redible. Thetrial court is in the best position to assess the demeanor of the w itnesses when t e s t i f yi n g , a n d o n ap p e a l w e a c c o r d g r e a td e f e r e n c e t o t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f c r e d i b i l i t y. Bowm an v. Bowm an , 836 S.W. 2d 56 3, 56 6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 1) . With a pp ro pria te de fe re nc e to the tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing s o n c re dib ili ty , w e mus t c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing on wh e n G ri ff in’ s c aus e of

a c tio n a c c ru e d. Con se qu e ntl y , th e statut e of limitations di d not beg in to run until 1998, se e Mo ff itt , 19 9 S.W.2 d 4 63 , a ndGrif fi n f ile d s uit le ss than a y e ar l a te r. Ac c or din g ly , we a ff irm the tr ia l cou rt ’s ru lin g that th e statut e of lim itatio ns did
no t ba r Gri ff in’ s la ws uit

. Finally , L ester a

rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in re jecting her defe nse base d on the doctrine of lac hes. L es t er asserts that she was pre judiced by

Griff in’s delay in bring ing suit, as we ll as Griff in’s failure to tell L ester of Grif fin’s owne rship of the prope rty during the six teen y ear s in which L e ste r r e sid e d w ithHe nd e rs on on the pr op e rty . L e ste r c on te nd s that the we ig ht of the e vid e nc e is ag ainst a ruling that lache s are not appropriate in this case. We disag ree
. A t ri a l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on wh e the r t o ap ply the do c tr ine of la c he s is r e vie we d u nd e r an a bu se of discre tion standard. John Saad & Sons, Inc. v. Nashville Therm al Transfer Corp. , 715 S.W .2d 41, 46 (Tenn. 1986)

. Although there is “no hard and fa st rule” f or the a pplication of the doc trine of la c he s, la c he s will g e ne ra lly pr e c lud e re lie f i n la ws uit s in wh ic h a sig nif ic a nt l aps e of

tim e or los s of e vid e nc e “ re nd e r u nc e rt a in the a sc e rt a inm e nt o f t ru th, a ndmake it i mpo ssi ble fo r the c ou rt to pronounce a dec ree with confidenc e.” Id
. Suc h is no t th e c a se he re , a ndthe tria l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n inde c lin ing to a pp ly thedo c tr ine of

la c he s.-6-

The decision of the trial c ourt is affirmed. Costs on appeal a re ta x ed to the Appe llant Donna L e s t e r a n d h e r s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE