2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-23-2015

Linwood Wilkerson v. Charles Samuels

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University

School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of

Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Linwood Wilkerson v. Charles Samuels" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 646.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/646
DLD-244 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-1872

___________

LINWOOD WILKERSON,

Appellant

v.

CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons; 

SMOKER, Correctional Officer, LSCI-Allenwood;

SOLOMAN, Factory Manager, LSCI-Allenwood

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 3-12-cv-01462)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 18, 2015

Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 23, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Pro se appellant Linwood Wilkerson (“Wilkerson”), an inmate at FCI-Allenwood 

Medium, appeals the District Court’s order granting Correctional Officer R. Smoker’s 

motion for summary judgment, entering judgment in favor of Smoker against Wilkerson, 

and closing the case.1 Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 

summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

Wilkerson filed a pro se complaint in the District Court alleging violations of his 

civil rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 

(1971). We have previously described Wilkerson’s retaliation allegations against 

defendant Smoker as follows:

Wilkerson alleged that Appellee Smoker, a supervisor in the UNICOR 

factory in which Wilkerson worked at the Low Security Correctional 

Institution Allenwood (“LSCI Allenwood”), verbally harassed him. In 

response, Wilkerson filed a hostile work environment complaint with 

prison officials. He maintained that the complaint was ignored and that 

Smoker retaliated by filing a false incident report against him, resulting in 

disciplinary proceedings; Wilkerson was found guilty of the incident and 

lost his UNICOR job for six months. He also alleged that he was 

transferred to a higher custody institution as a result of the disciplinary 

proceedings.

 

1 The Court also dismissed the other defendants, but on appeal Wilkerson states that he 

has abandoned any appellate issue concerning their personal involvement, and 

accordingly pursues this appeal against only Defendant Smoker. We confine our 

discussion to the claims against Smoker.
3

Wilkerson v. Samuels, 524 F. App’x 776, 777 (3d Cir. 2013).2 The key underlying (and 

undisputed) facts concerning the incident report that Smoker filed are that, while working 

at the prison factory, Wilkerson left a wood chisel behind in his tool box after Wilkerson 

was called out for a visit, but that Wilkerson then reported to prison staff that he had 

returned all of his tools, as prison regulations require. Wilkerson’s explanation is that he 

left the wood chisel inadvertently and thus did not know it remained behind.

 After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that 

Wilkerson had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, had failed to produce sufficient 

evidence to establish a retaliation claim, and that defendants had qualified immunity. 

The District Court granted the defendants’ motion on multiple alternative grounds, and 

Wilkerson timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over the District Court’s entry of summary judgment, viewing the underlying facts and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Wilkerson. See Ray v. 

Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm on any basis that the record 

supports. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

 

2

In that prior opinion, we affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded on the ground 

that the District Court had erred in concluding that Wilkerson’s retaliation claim was 

time-barred and was prohibited under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
4

The District Court did not err in entering judgment against Wilkerson on his 

claims against Smoker because the record facts show that Wilkerson could not establish 

his retaliation claim. To sustain a retaliation claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) 

he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered adverse action; and (3) 

the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the 

adverse response. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002); Rauser 

v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). With respect to causation, if the prisoner 

makes a prima facie showing that his constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating 

factor in the decision to discipline, the defendant then has the burden of showing that the 

same disciplinary action would have been taken even in the absence of the protected 

activity. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.

Here, the record shows that there is no disputable issue that Wilkerson would have 

received the same disciplinary consequences irrespective of his constitutionally protected 

activity. Wilkerson admits that he left a wood chisel (albeit, he says, inadvertently) in his 

tool box in contravention of prison regulations, and he admits that he told the prison staff 

that he had returned all of his tools when, in fact, he had not. That evidence of 

Wilkerson’s guilt shows that Smoker’s actions in reporting Wilkerson were reasonably 

related to a legitimate penological interest in securing potential weapons and escape aids 

and that—especially given that there were other witnesses to Wilkerson’s failure to return 

his work tools—Wilkerson would have been charged regardless of his earlier grievance 

filings about Smoker. See, e.g., Carter, 292 F.3d at 159 (affirming summary judgment in 
5

favor of defendants on a retaliation claim when “the quantum of evidence” concerning 

the prisoner’s misconduct showed that he would face disciplinary action regardless of his 

protected activity). As a result, Wilkerson cannot establish a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether retaliation caused the adverse consequences he suffered, and the 

District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Smoker on this claim.3

For these reasons, this appeal presents no substantial question and we will affirm 

the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 

 

3 Because Wilkerson’s inability to establish causation disposes of his claim, we need not 

discuss the District Court’s other reasons for granting summary judgment in Smoker’s 

favor.