An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1091

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 4 March 2014

BILLY ALSTON THOMPSON,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. Halifax County

No. 12 CVS 231

EUGENE A. CONTI, JR., SECRETARY 

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION,

Respondent-Appellant.

Appeal by Respondent from judgment entered 27 August 2012

and order entered 23 July 2013 by Judge Alma L. Hinton in 

Superior Court, Halifax County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 

February 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Carrie D. Randa, for Respondent-Appellant.

Chichester Law Office, by Geoffrey P. Davis and Gilbert W. 

Chichester, for Petitioner-Appellee.

McGEE, Judge.

Billy Alston Thompson (“Petitioner”) filed a complaint 

against Eugene A. Conti, Jr., Secretary of North Carolina 

Department of Transportation, (“Respondent”) on 28 February 
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2012. Petitioner alleged that he was arrested and charged with 

driving while impaired on or about 6 August 2011. Petitioner 

further alleged that “Respondent notified Petitioner that his 

driving privilege would be suspended effective August 26, 2011, 

until August 26, 2012, for refusing a chemical test[.]”

Petitioner requested an administrative hearing before the 

Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), which was conducted on 2 

February 2012. The DMV administrative hearing officer upheld 

the suspension of Petitioner’s driving privileges. Petitioner 

thereafter filed a petition for a hearing in superior court, 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(e) (2013). The superior 

court heard Petitioner’s petition on 21 August 2012 and reversed 

the decision of the DMV. Respondent appeals and argues that the 

superior court erred in reversing the decision of the DMV.

I. Standard of Review

“Questions of statutory interpretation of a provision of 

the Motor Vehicle Laws of North Carolina are questions of law 

and are reviewed de novo by this Court.” Hoots v. Robertson, 

214 N.C. App. 181, 183, 715 S.E.2d 199, 200 (2011). “The 

superior court review shall be limited to whether there is 

sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s 

findings of fact and whether the conclusions of law are 

supported by the findings of fact and whether the Commissioner 
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committed an error of law in revoking the license.” Id.

II. Analysis

This appeal arises from a revocation proceeding under 

N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2, “which authorizes a civil revocation of the 

driver’s license when a driver has willfully refused to submit 

to a chemical analysis.” Steinkrause v. Tatum, 201 N.C. App. 

289, 292, 689 S.E.2d 379, 381 (2009), aff’d per curiam, 364 N.C. 

419, 700 S.E.2d 222 (2010).

1 N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2 “provides for a 

civil hearing at which the driver can contest the revocation of 

her driver’s license.” Id. at 292, 689 S.E.2d at 381. Pursuant

to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d) (2009), the hearing is limited 

to consideration of whether:

(1) The person was charged with an impliedconsent offense or the driver had an alcohol 

concentration restriction on the driver[’]s

license pursuant to G.S. 20-19;

(2) A law enforcement officer had reasonable 

grounds to believe that the person had 

committed an implied-consent offense or 

violated the alcohol concentration 

restriction on the driver[’]s license;

(3) The implied-consent offense charged 

involved death or critical injury to another 

person, if this allegation is in the 

affidavit;

(4) The person was notified of the person’s 

 

1 Although this Court in Steinkrause analyzed the 2005 version of 

N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2, and that statute has been amended four times 

since 2005, the portions of the statute relevant to this appeal 

remain unchanged.
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rights as required by subsection (a); and

(5) The person willfully refused to submit 

to a chemical analysis.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d) (2009).2 Subsection (3) of the 

above statute is inapplicable to the present case because death 

or critical injury to another person was not alleged in the 

affidavit.

The superior court in this case reversed the decision of 

the DMV and concluded that: (1) “there is insufficient evidence 

in the record to support Respondent’s findings of fact;” 

(2) “Respondent’s conclusions of law are not therefore supported 

by Respondent’s findings of fact;” and (3) “Respondent did 

commit an error of law by revoking Petitioner’s license to 

operate a motor vehicle pursuant to N.C.G.S. 20-16.2(d).”

Respondent contends that there was adequate evidence in the 

record to support the findings of fact in the DMV decision. DMV 

made the following findings in its order upholding the 

revocation of Petitioner’s driving privilege:

1. Trooper Davis was on routine patrol when 

he received a call from Communications to 

respond to an accident on State Road 1003 

[n]ear Scotland Neck North Carolina Halifax 

 

2 Our General Assembly amended this statute in 2011. See 2011 

N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 119 § 1. The amendment “applies to offenses 

committed on or after” 1 December 2011. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 

ch. 119 § 3. We apply the previous version of this statute 

because the offense in the present case was committed on 6 

August 2011.
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County.

2. Trooper Davis found a truck overturned 

upon his arrival several people standing 

around and EMS on the scene.

3. Trooper Davis spoke with [P]etitioner and 

was advised he was driving the vehicle.

4. [P]etitioner was out of the vehicle and 

did not have on a shirt or any shoes, and 

his clothes were very soiled.

5. Trooper Davis also spoke with the 

witnesses and EMS who advised him that [] 

Petitioner was the driver of the vehicle.

6. [P]etitioner refused to be transported to 

the hospital.

7. Trooper Davis observed [P]etitioner had 

red glassy eyes and a strong odor of alcohol 

upon his breath and person.

8. [P]etitioner was very unsteady.

9. Trooper Davis asked [P]etitioner to 

perform several Field Sobriety Tests and 

[P]etitioner failed all tests.

10. Trooper Davis asked [P]etitioner what he 

had to drink after smelling the strong odor 

of alcohol on his breath and [P]etitioner 

replied 1 drink and 1 mix drink.

11. Trooper Davis did not notice any 

disabilities about the customer.

12. Trooper Davis received two breath 

samples from the Alco Sensor which were 

positive.

13. Trooper Davis arrested [P]etitioner and 

transported him to the Halifax County 

Sheriff’s Department and charged him with 

DWI.
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14. The person was notified of his rights 

both orally and in writing.

15. [P]etitioner did not sign the rights 

form because he was handcuffed.

16. [P]etitioner had two witnesses present 

the entire time.

17. [P]etitioner did not wish to call a 

witness or an attorney.

18. [P]etitioner’s father tried to call an 

attorney.

19. Trooper Davis set the Intox EC/IR II of 

one time and [P]etitioner refused to submit 

to any test after being told by his father 

not to submit who was present the entire 

time.

20. [P]etitioner was not present and did not 

testify.

21. The two witnesses were not present for 

this hearing.

Petitioner counters that the “evidence as presented in the 

record is at variance with that of the exhibits and the order 

and moreover, with the testimony actually elicited at the 

hearing, that the [DMV’s] findings of fact” are “necessarily not 

supported.”

The variance to which Petitioner refers is the name of the 

law enforcement officer who testified at the administrative 

hearing in this case. The DMV hearing transcript identifies a 

“Trooper Tommy Davis” as a witness. However, an exhibit titled 
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“Intox EC/IR-II: Subject Test” lists a “Davis, Tare L.” as the 

analyst’s name. Petitioner alleges that a document titled 

“Affidavit and Revocation Report” is signed by “Tare L Davis.” 

We note that the document so titled in the record is illegible.

A. Evidence That Petitioner Was Charged With An Implied-Consent 

Offense

As to the first requirement in N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d), 

Respondent points to the following as sufficient evidence: 

(1) testimony at the administrative hearing on 2 February 2012 

that Petitioner was placed “under arrest for DWI[;]” and (2) a 

law enforcement officer swore in an affidavit that Petitioner 

was charged with an implied-consent offense. As noted above, 

the affidavit in the record is illegible. However, the 

testimony at the administrative hearing is sufficient evidence 

that Petitioner was charged with an implied-consent offense. 

Petitioner’s argument is based solely on the discrepancies as to

the spelling of a law enforcement officer’s name. However, 

N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d) contains no requirement that a particular 

law enforcement officer be named or a provision to the effect 

that an inconsistent spelling as to the law enforcement

officer’s name compels reversal.
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B. Evidence That A Law Enforcement Officer Had Reasonable 

Grounds To Believe Petitioner Had Committed An Implied-Consent 

Offense

As to the second requirement, Respondent identifies the 

following testimony at the administrative hearing: (1) that upon 

arrival, an officer saw “a truck that was totally destroyed” on 

“the right hand portion of the road between road and the 

ditch[;]” (2) that Petitioner was the only individual in the 

wrecked vehicle; (3) that Petitioner admitted “he had wrecked 

his truck[;]” (4) that Petitioner was dirty and bloody and had 

no shoes or shirt on; (5) there was a “strong odor of alcoholic 

beverage coming from his breath and person[;]” (6) Petitioner’s 

eyes were red and glassy; and (7) Petitioner failed several 

field sobriety tests.

“[R]easonable grounds in a civil revocation hearing means 

probable cause, and is to be determined based on the same 

criteria.” Steinkrause, 201 N.C. App. at 293, 689 S.E.2d at 

381. “[P]robable cause requires only a probability or 

substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing 

of such activity.” Id. at 293, 689 S.E.2d at 381-82 (alteration 

in original). “A determination of probable cause depends on the 

totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 293, 689 S.E.2d at 381.

In Steinkrause, the petitioner was involved in a “severe 

one car accident,” and there was an odor of alcohol about the 
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petitioner. Id. at 293, 689 S.E.2d at 382. This Court held 

that “the nature of [the] [p]etitioner’s car accident and the 

smell of alcohol adequately support” the conclusion that the 

petitioner was arrested based on reasonable grounds. Id. at 

295, 689 S.E.2d at 383.

The record in the present case contains more evidence than 

in Steinkrause to support the conclusion that reasonable grounds 

existed to charge Petitioner with an implied-consent offense. 

Again, as above, Petitioner’s argument is based solely on the 

discrepancies between different pieces of evidence as to the 

spelling of a law enforcement officer’s name. However, the 

statute requires only that a law enforcement officer have

reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed an 

implied-consent offense. N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d)(2). The record 

shows that a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to 

believe Petitioner had committed an implied-consent offense.

C. Evidence That Petitioner Was Notified Of His Rights

As to the fourth requirement, Respondent points to evidence 

that a law enforcement officer read Petitioner his impliedconsent rights and supplied him with a copy and that a “copy of 

the rights form was also included in the record.” Discrepancies 

as to the spelling of a law enforcement officer’s name have no 
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bearing on whether Petitioner was notified of his rights. The 

record shows that Petitioner was notified of his rights.

D. Evidence That Petitioner Willfully Refused To Submit To A 

Chemical Analysis

As to the fifth requirement, Respondent highlights evidence 

in the form of testimony at the hearing that Petitioner refused 

to submit to a chemical analysis. The record shows that 

Petitioner did willfully refuse to submit to such an analysis. 

Petitioner does not argue to this Court that he did not 

willfully refuse to submit.

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, Respondent has shown that evidence supports 

each of the applicable requirements set forth in N.C.G.S. § 20-

16.2(d) for civil revocation of Petitioner’s driver’s license 

when Petitioner has willfully refused to submit to a chemical 

analysis. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support 

the findings of fact by the DMV relevant to N.C.G.S. § 20-

16.2(d). Thus, the superior court erred in reversing the 

decision of the DMV. As a result, the superior court’s order is 

reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. Because of our holding on this 

issue, we need not address Respondent’s remaining argument.

Reversed and remanded.

Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.
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Report per Rule 30(e).