In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-2348

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL A. ALLGIRE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:06-cr-30138-4 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2019 — DECIDED DECEMBER 26, 2019

____________________

Before FLAUM, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. The district court revoked Michael 

Allgire’s supervised release after Allgire skipped out one 

month into his six-month term at a halfway house. The district 

court sentenced him to reimprisonment—24 months on one 

count of his original conviction and 17 months on another 

count, set to run concurrently. He now argues both that his 

total 24-month sentence was unreasonable and that the 
2 No. 19-2348

district court committed reversible error by imposing two 

concurrent sentences. We disagree with both contentions.

I.

In 2006, Michael Allgire was charged with a number of 

drug-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to two of the 

charges: Count 1 and Count 10 of the indictment. He was sentenced to 233 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and to 120 

months’ imprisonment on Count 10. He served both sentences concurrently. After Allgire completed his prison term, 

he began serving concurrent terms of supervised release, one

on each count of conviction. But he violated the conditions of 

that supervised release and, after a revocation hearing, was 

sentenced to 7 months’ reimprisonment or, alternatively, up 

to 6 months in a halfway house, along with another 24 

months’ supervised release. The government found space for 

Allgire in a halfway house but a month into his time there he 

absconded and spent the next 7 months on the lam. When he 

was eventually found, he was brought up for a second revocation hearing. 

At the second revocation hearing, Allgire admitted that he 

violated the terms of his supervised release. The guidelines 

range for his violation was 5 to 11 months. The government 

sought a 9-month sentence while Allgire asked for 8. The district court, though, felt that Allgire had taken advantage of the 

court’s previous leniency. Allgire had been given a 53-month 

reduction for cooperating with the government in his initial 

sentence for his crime of conviction, and then after the first 

revocation he had been offered 6 months in a halfway house 

rather than 7 months in prison. But in return, the district court 

noted, Allgire had “disregard[ed]” the law and displayed 

“lack of respect for” it. Thus, the district court decided to vary 
No. 19-2348 3

upward from the guidelines to account for what had proved 

to be regrettable leniency. The district court sentenced Allgire 

to two terms of reimprisonment: 24 months’ imprisonment 

for violating the terms of supervised release on Count 1 of his 

conviction and 17 months’ imprisonment on Count 10 of his 

conviction. It set both sentences to run concurrently. Both parties agreed that any additional term of supervised release 

would be futile given Allgire’s past conduct, so the district 

court did not impose any supervised release to follow the 24-

month sentence.

II.

On appeal, Allgire raises two challenges. First, he argues 

that his total sentence of 24 months is unreasonable. Second, 

he contends that the district court lacked the authority to impose a concurrent 17-month sentence.

We readily uphold the 24-month sentence, notwithstanding the fact it was 13 months higher than the guidelines range. 

That’s because we only reverse a sentence of reimprisonment 

after the revocation of supervised release if the sentence was 

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 

F.3d 1163, 1177 (7th Cir. 2015). And here, the district court 

ably explained its decision to vary upward from the guidelines range.

A district court must fashion a term of reimprisonment 

upon revocation of supervised release according to the factors 

outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as they apply to revocations,

along with any relevant policy statements in the Sentencing 

Guidelines. See United States v. Hollins, 847 F.3d 535, 539 (7th 

Cir. 2017); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (incorporating a subset of

§ 3553(a) factors into the revocation analysis). Here, the 
4 No. 19-2348

district court justified its decision based on Allgire’s extensive 

criminal history, § 3553(a)(1); repeated violations of supervised release, see § 3553(a)(2)(B); and likelihood of recidivism 

given his criminal history and previous disregard for supervised release terms, § 3553(a)(2)(C). Weighing those factors, 

the district court determined that even an 11-month sentence 

would be insufficient to accomplish the goals of sentencing, 

let alone an 8- or 9-month sentence as proposed by the parties.

Instead, the district court determined that a total of 24 

months’ imprisonment was necessary. It clearly explained the 

variance decision with reference to the applicable sentencing 

factors, which were reasonably applied to Allgire’s circumstances. And 24 months was below the statutory maximum 

that the district court was authorized to impose. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(b)(2) & (h). We will not second-guess the district 

court’s assessment on appeal. See United States v. Robertson, 

648 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (referring to appellate review 

of revocation of supervised release as “comparable to ‘the 

narrowest judicial review of judgments we know’” (citation 

omitted)).

Even if the total sentence is reasonable, Allgire argues, we 

must still vacate his sentence because the district court lacked 

the authority to impose two concurrent sentences. He did not 

raise this objection in the district court, so we review it here 

for plain error. United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th 

Cir. 2019). To prevail, Allgire must show that (1) the district 

court made an error, (2) the error was clear or obvious, (3) the 

error affected his substantial rights, and (4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1338, 1343 (2016) (citation omitted). 
No. 19-2348 5

Allgire argues that the district court made a clear or obvious error when it sentenced him to two terms of reimprisonment. The basic outline of his argument is this: When he first 

began his supervised release there were two concurrent 

terms, one for Count 1 and one for Count 10. That supervised 

release was revoked, but the district court only sentenced him 

to a single term of reimprisonment and supervised release, not 

two concurrent terms as before. So, when the district court 

sentenced him for violating the latter term of supervised release, Allgire had only committed one violation of supervised 

release and there was only one term of supervised release to 

revoke. Thus, the district court could only have sentenced him 

to one term of reimprisonment, not two. See United States v. 

Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that, on 

revocation, “impos[ing] concurrent terms of supervised release ... was proper only if [the district court] was revoking 

two terms [of supervised release] rather than one”).

Allgire’s argument stumbles, however, on plain error’s 

third prong. Even if imposing the concurrent sentence was a 

plain error, Allgire needs to show that it affected his substantial rights—“which in the ordinary case means it affected the 

outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. 

Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Allgire certainly cannot show that the error affected the length of his imprisonment: the 24-month sentence was reasonable, so he cannot show that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of a shorter concurrent sentence. He 

will serve 24 months regardless. For Allgire’s challenge to succeed, he must be able to point us toward some other substantial right that was impinged. His only nominee is the additional stigma that he feels from being sentenced to two terms 

of reimprisonment rather than one. That is not enough to 
6 No. 19-2348

satisfy plain error’s substantial-rights prong. Allgire’s sentence is AFFIRMED.