STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

FILED Subhash Gupta, 

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner November 16, 2018 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS vs) No. 17-0944 ( Jefferson County 15-C-28) OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Christina Campbell, Administratrix of the Estate of Mary C. White, 

Defendant Below, Respondent 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Subhash Gupta, by counsel Christopher P. Stroech, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Jefferson County’s February 8, 2017, order denying petitioner’s petition to quiet title and 

granting respondent’s counterclaim. Respondent Christina Campbell, Administratrix of the 

Estate of Mary C. White, by counsel Charles S. Trump, IV, filed a response in support of the 

circuit court’s order. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under 

Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In April of 2003, Mary C. White (“Ms. White”) and her husband Ralph White purchased 

certain real property located at 910 Tuscawilla Drive in Charles Town, West Virginia, valued at 

approximately $205,000. On November 26, 2006, Ralph White died, leaving his share of the 

Tuscawilla property to Ms. White. Upon the death of her husband, Ms. White, then in her 

eighties, moved to North Carolina to reside with her daughter. Following Ms. White’s relocation, 

the Tuscawilla property was rented to tenants. In 2010, Ms. White returned to Charles Town and 

moved into the home of her granddaughter, Respondent Campbell. In June of 2010, Ms. White 

purchased the home next door to Respondent Campbell’s home and used the “entire amount of 

her life’s liquid savings” to make the purchase. 

The parties do not dispute that the real estate taxes for the Tuscawilla property were not 

paid by or on Ms. White’s behalf for 2011. A notice of tax delinquency was sent to Ms. White on 

October 6, 2012, but no action was taken by her or on her behalf. In November of 2012, 

petitioner purchased the Tuscawilla property at the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office’s property 

tax lien sale for $9,040.57.1

 Petitioner avers that in an effort to convert the lien he purchased on 

1

 Petitioner paid $6,500 for his purchase of the 2011 ad valorem property taxes and 

$2,547.57 for the 2012 property taxes. 

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the Tuscawilla property into title, he provided proper notice to all interested parties as required 

by law. Neither Ms. White nor her agent Respondent Campbell redeemed the property during the 

eighteen-month statutory time period permitted for redemption. Accordingly, by deed dated 

April 1, 2014, and recorded April 4, 2014, the Tuscawilla property was conveyed to petitioner. 

From April 1, 2014, through September 1, 2014, tenants occupied the Tuscawilla 

property and paid rent in the amount of $1,250 per month. The property was vacant from 

September 1, 2014 through April 1, 2015, when new tenants moved into the property and paid 

monthly rent of $425. When petitioner acquired the Tuscawilla property in April of 2014, he 

advised the tenants that he was the new owner and that they should start paying rent to him. In 

turn, the tenants contacted Respondent Campbell. It was ultimately determined that Ms. White 

would keep all rental payments pending this litigation.2

 Respondent Campbell alleges that she 

learned Ms. White’s Tuscawilla property had been sold when the tenants contacted her regarding 

rent payments. Respondent Campbell, who held her Ms. White’s power of attorney, engaged 

counsel for Ms. White and “immediately sought to redeem” the property. 

On September 12, 2014, Respondent Campbell executed and recorded a “notice by a 

mentally incapacitated person to redeem property conveyed by tax deed” with the County Clerk 

of Jefferson County. In the notice, Respondent Campbell asserted that Ms. White was mentally 

incapacitated on April 1, 2014, the date the Tuscawilla property was conveyed by tax deed to 

petitioner. Respondent Campbell offered to pay the funds necessary to redeem the property, 

$12,354.29, but petitioner rejected the redemption attempt. On February 9, 2015, petitioner filed 

a petition to quiet title to the property, pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 11A-4-6 and 55-13-1. 

Respondent Campbell filed an answer and counterclaim asserting Ms. White’s mental incapacity 

on the date the property was conveyed by tax deed to petitioner and asserted Ms. White’s right to 

redeem the property. Respondent Campbell then paid the funds necessary to redeem the 

property, $12,354.29, to the clerk of the circuit court. The circuit court ordered the redemption 

money to be deposited and held by the clerk, pending the outcome of the case. 

In March of 2015, Respondent Campbell began the process of becoming the appointed 

guardian and conservator for Ms. White, the first step of which was the adjudication of Ms. 

White as a protected person. During the process of Ms. White’s adjudication as a protected 

person, her long list of medical conditions and medications were discussed by her physician, Dr. 

Alfert Shakespeare. Dr. Shakespeare noted that Ms. White had “dementia, poor attention that 

was age related, and diminished capacity.” Dr. Shakespeare found that Ms. White had cognitive 

and functional limitations, including difficulty comprehending complex medical information and 

understanding financial records. He noted that Ms. White was dependent on Respondent 

Campbell for “activities of daily living.” On June 15, 2015, the circuit court adjudged Ms. White 

as a protected person incapable of managing her own affairs, and her granddaughter, Respondent 

Campbell, was formally appointed as her guardian and conservator. 

2

 Petitioner notes that the total amount of rental income derived from the Tuscawilla 

property from the conveyance date of April 1, 2014, to the bench trial of May 4, 2016, was 

approximately $12,200. 

2 
 

A bench trial on petitioner’s petition to quiet title and Respondent Campbell’s counterclaim was held on May 4, 2016, at which the parties presented evidence related to Ms. White’s 

mental fitness. Dr. Shakespeare testified that Ms. White was unable to manage any complex 

issues, financial, or business affairs on April 1, 2014, due to her lack of mental capacity. Like 

many patients her age, Dr. Shakespeare noted that Ms. White suffered from mental 

incapacitation during the previous two to four years prior to April of 2014 and that her 

incapacitation became noticeable by “everybody around 2014 and” 2015. Under crossexamination, petitioner asked Dr. Shakespeare if he held his opinion regarding the mental 

incapacity of Ms. White on April 1, 2014, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, to which 

Dr. Shakespeare replied: “She can answer simple questions, ‘Do you hurt?’. . . , but if I ask her 

a little more complex question, ‘did you have a urinary tract infection two days ago?’ I do not 

think she would be able to answer me.” 

Several lay witnesses testified regarding their observations, which corroborated the 

medical opinions of Dr. Shakespeare and established that Ms. White’s mental deterioration 

began before April 1, 2014.3

 A family friend of Ms. White’s, Eutoker Stevens, testified that 

before April 1, 2014, Ms. White seemed “lost in the distance” and while she comprehended, she 

really didn’t understand what was going on. Respondent Campbell testified that when she was 

informed that petitioner introduced himself to Ms. White’s tenants at the Tuscawilla property as 

the new owner, she “went on a hunt for missing mail at her grandmother’s house . . . [and] found 

a tax notice . . . in her grandmother’s linen closet.” Since 2013, Respondent Campbell noted that 

her grandmother was “not in her right mind” and would do peculiar things like putting her 

laundry in the refrigerator. 

At trial, Carlyle Millard, a representative of a reverse mortgage company, testified that 

Ms. White executed documents for a complex reverse mortgage on November 24, 2013, just four 

months before the April 1, 2014 tax sale. However, the court noted that Respondent Campbell, 

and not Ms. White, made all the arrangements for the reverse mortgage and further noted that the 

money from the reverse mortgage was used to install a handicap ramp and chair lift in Ms. 

White’s new home. Respondent Campbell recalled that the only involvement Ms. White had in 

the reverse mortgage transaction was to sign her name on documents where she was told to sign 

them. Mr. Millard, who was not an attorney but a notary public who notarized the reverse 

mortgage documents, testified that he had no independent recollection of Ms. White and did not 

know if Ms. White was competent on April 1, 2014. 

At trial, petitioner argued that because Respondent Campbell had accepted service of the 

property sale notice on Ms. White’s behalf and had, thereafter, failed to timely act and redeem 

the property, Ms. White’s ability to redeem the property was now void. Conversely, Respondent 

3

 Ms. White’s neighbor, Brian Dennis Bellman, testified that during the period at issue he 

noticed a “marked decline” in Ms. White’s medical condition. Long-time friend Herman Vales 

testified that he noticed a significant deterioration in Ms. White’s mental condition during 

Christmas of 2013. Ms. White’s great-granddaughter testified that by late 2011 Ms. White could 

not remember how to write a check, use the telephone, or remember her doctor’s appointments. 

Further, the great-granddaughter testified that by 2013, Ms. White could not make her own food 

and would often leave on the oven and stove. 

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Campbell argued that there was substantial evidence in the record before the court of Ms. 

White’s mental incapacity, which tolled the time to redeem the Tuscawilla property. Further, 

Respondent Campbell noted that within a year after the tax deed was entered, Ms. White sought 

to redeem her property by and through Respondent Campbell. 

On February 8, 2017, the circuit court entered an order declaring that Ms. White was 

mentally incapacitated on April 1, 2014. The court granted Respondent Campbell’s counterclaim 

to redeem the Tuscawilla property and denied petitioner’s request for rental income. The court 

found that because Ms. White had the right to redeem her property, Respondent Campbell as her 

guardian and representative, had the right to redeem the property in her stead. On May 12, 2017, 

Ms. White died and Respondent Campbell was appointed as executor of Ms. White’s last will 

and testament; she also became the fiduciary for Ms. White’s estate. 

Following entry of the February 8, 2017, order, Respondent Campbell filed a motion for 

attorney’s fees and costs due to petitioner’s “vexatious disregard of the law,” which forced 

Respondent Campbell to resort to litigation. By order dated October 6, 2017, the circuit court 

denied Respondent Campbell’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and noted that petitioner 

“lawfully obtained the real estate and subsequently commenced this action to protect any rights 

he may have had to the property.” It is from the circuit court’s February 8, 2017, order that 

petitioner now appeals. 

On appeal, petitioner asserts four assignments of error. In his first and second 

assignments of error, petitioner challenges the circuit court’s determination that Ms. White was 

mentally incapacitated at the time the tax conveyance deed was issued. Next, petitioner argues 

that the court erred in finding that the inactions of Respondent Campbell, as the agent of Ms. 

White, did not void the tolling of redemption time. Last, petitioner contends that the court erred 

in determining that he was not entitled to certain lost rental income. 

We have generally held that in reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of 

the circuit court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied. 

The final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, 

and the circuit court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 

standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review. See Syl. Pt. 1, Public Citizens, Inc., v. 

First National Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996). Further, we have 

determined that 

[t]he West Virginia Rules of Evidence and the West Virginia Rules of Civil 

Procedure allocate significant discretion to the circuit court in making evidentiary 

and procedural rulings. . . . Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review 

evidentiary and procedural rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion 

standard. 

Syl. Pt. 1, in part, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W. Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995). 

Petitioner is critical of the circuit court’s interpretation of a “mentally incapacitated” 

person, described in West Virginia Code § 11A-4-6, and finds fault with the court’s citation of a 

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number of competing definitions of mental incapacity in the context of criminal proceedings and 

property transfer cases. Petitioner argues that the circuit court’s order “does not provide a clear 

definition of ‘mental incapacitation’ in the context of the facts herein.” Conversely, Respondent 

Campbell argues that the circuit court correctly analyzed the meaning of the term mentally 

incapacitated, as that term in used in West Virginia Code § 11A-4-6, and correctly applied the 

law to the facts that were proven by the evidence at trial. 

The parties agree that the Legislature did not define the term “mentally incapacitated 

person” within the context of West Virginia Code § 11A-4-6. However, the Legislature declared, 

in West Virginia Code §11A-4-1, that it was “the intent and purpose of the Legislature to provide 

reasonable opportunities for delinquent taxpayers to protect their interests in their lands and to 

provide reasonable remedies in certain circumstances for persons with interests in delinquent or 

escheated lands.” Further, this Court has long noted that “[s]tatutes allowing redemption of lands 

sold for taxes must be liberally construed in favor of persons entitled to redeem.” Syl. Pt. 2, 

Poling v. Parsons, 38 W. Va. 80, 18 S.E. 379 (1883). 

With these precepts in mind and based upon our review of record, we agree with 

Respondent Campbell and find no error. In deciding the meaning of a statutory provision, “[w]e 

look first to the statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the interpretive 

question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co., 

v. State Tax Dep’t, 195 W. Va. 573, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438 (1995). Here, we find that an 

examination of the statute reveals that the “language used requires interpretation because of 

ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions” and that the provision is of 

“such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its 

meaning.” Sizemore v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 202 W. Va. 591, 596, 505 S.E.2d 654, 659 

(1998). We have long reasoned that “[a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it 

can be applied.” Syl. Pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992). In 

construing the meaning of an ambiguous statute, we have noted that the court must be mindful 

that “[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 

Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 

361 (1975). 

Here, the Legislative intent of West Virginia Code §11A-4-6 is clearly noted in West 

Virginia Code §11A-4-1 and requires the liberal construction of redemption statues in favor of 

persons entitled to redeem. While petitioner is critical of the circuit court’s analysis of the 

meaning of “mental incapacity” in West Virginia case and statutory law, we find that the circuit 

court, as Respondent Campbell noted, made a “careful, thorough, and circumspect analysis of the 

meaning of ‘mentally incapacitated’ as that term is used in other areas of West Virginia law.” 

The circuit court specifically referenced this Court’s ruling in Hardin v. Collins, 125 W. 

Va. 81, 23 S.E.2d 916 (1943), and Delaplain et al. v. Grubb et al., 44 W. Va. 612, 30 S.E. 201 

(1898), wherein it is noted that advanced age was not sufficient evidence alone to determine 

mental capacity in the context of property transfers, but that the grantor must not know the nature 

and effect of the deed to invalidate the same. In applying similar precepts to this case, it is clear 

that Ms. White was mentally incapacitated at the time of the conveyance of the tax deed to 

petitioner. The totality of the evidence proffered at the bench trial indicated that Ms. White was 

5 
not only of an advanced age, but that she did not know the nature and effects of her actions and 

was not independently able to handle her own business or personal affairs without assistance. 

Respondent Campbell further argues, and we agree, that under any reasonable definition 

of mental incapacitation, it is clear that Ms. White was mentally incapacitated on the date of the 

tax conveyance deed, April 1, 2014. As the circuit court noted: 

The evidence in this case, however, on the question of her mental capacity on 

April 1, 2014, as well as before and after that date, is overwhelming and 

unrefuted. Everyone who testified, including Mary C. White’s physician, Dr. 

Shakespeare, and all of the people who saw her every day, testified that Mary C. 

White had been suffering mental deterioration and decline for some time before 

April 1, 2014, so that by April 1, 2014, she was incapable of understanding what 

was going on around her. The testimony of these many witnesses, a medical 

expert and lay witness, is compelling evidence . . . 

Hence, the circuit court’s reasoned findings as to Ms. White’s mental incapacitation, which are 

subject to deferential review and should be liberally construed, must be affirmed by this Court. 

Accordingly, we find no error. 

 In his third assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the circuit court erred by finding 

that the inactions of Respondent Campbell in failing to timely redeem Ms. White’s property 

voided the tolling of the time allotted for redemption. Petitioner argues that the power of attorney 

that Respondent Campbell held for Ms. White “clearly conveyed” to her the authority to defend 

Ms. White’s ownership interests in the property at issue and that Respondent Campbell failed to 

act accordingly. However, petitioner cites no case or statutory law in support of his position. 

Respondent Campbell argues, and we agree, that the provisions of West Virginia Code § 11A-4-

6, which are to be liberally construed, clearly provide protections to persons who are mentally 

incapacitated, such as Respondent Campbell’s decedent, regardless of those with a duty or 

responsibility to act on behalf of the incapacitated person. Accordingly, we find no error in the 

circuit court’s ruling. 

 Finally, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in failing to award him damages 

associated with lost rental income on the Tuscawilla property. Petitioner contends that, as the 

rightful owner of the property from the date of conveyance of the tax deed to the granting of 

Respondent Campbell’s counterclaim effecting redemption, he was entitled to rental income. 

Respondent Campbell counters that petitioner is not entitled to any such award of damages and 

notes petitioner’s failure to cite any case or statutory law in support of his position. 

Here, the amount petitioner can receive upon redemption is set by statute. West Virginia 

Code § 11A-4-6 provides, in part, that a person who is mentally incapacitated at the time of 

delivery of a tax deed “may redeem such real estate by paying to the purchaser . . . the amount 

of the purchase money, together with the necessary charges incurred in obtaining the deed, and 

any taxes paid on the property since the sale, with interests on such items . . . .” Respondent 

Campbell paid petitioner $12,354.29 to redeem the property, which is well above the $9,040.57 

petitioner paid for the property on the day of the sale. Further, we note that since September of 

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2014 (at the latest), petitioner has been on notice of Respondent Campbell’s intention to redeem 

the property at issue on behalf of Ms. White. Respondent Campbell alleges, and we concur, that 

it would be unjust and inequitable to reward petitioner for refusing to accept the redemption 

offered by Respondent Campbell in September of 2014 and would create a “perverse incentive 

... to thwart and delay the legitimate right of an owner to redeem . . . .” Accordingly, we find no 

error. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s February 8, 2017, order denying 

petitioner’s petition to quiet title and granting Respondent Campbell’s counterclaim.

 Affirmed. 

ISSUED: November 16, 2018 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Evan H. Jenkins 

Justice Paul T. Farrell sitting by temporary assignment 

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