UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

UBS AG, 

Respondent.

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CFTC Docket No. 15 – 06

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO

SECTIONS 6(c)(4)(A) AND 6(d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, 

MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission” or “CFTC”) has reason to 

believe that UBS AG (“Respondent” or “UBS”) has violated the Commodity Exchange Act (the 

“Act”) and Commission Regulations (“Regulations”). Therefore, the Commission deems it 

appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, 

instituted to determine whether Respondent engaged in the violations set forth herein, and to 

determine whether any order shall be issued imposing remedial sanctions.

II.

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondent has

submitted an Offer of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept. 

Without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, Respondent herein consents to 

the entry and acknowledges service of this Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 

6(c)(4)(A) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial 

Sanctions (“Order”).1

 1 Respondent consents to the entry of this Order and to the use of these findings in this proceeding and in any other 

proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party; provided, however, that Respondent 

does not consent to the use of the Offer, or the findings or conclusions in this Order, as the sole basis for any other 

proceeding brought by the Commission, other than in a proceeding in bankruptcy or to enforce the terms of this 

Order. Nor does Respondent consent to the use of the Offer or this Order, or the findings or conclusions in this 

Order consented to in the Offer, by any other party in any other proceeding. Neither the Offer nor the Order confers 

any rights to any party other than the Commission and UBS.
2

III.

The Commission finds the following:

A. Summary

From 2009 through 2012 (“Relevant Period”), UBS, by and through certain of its foreign 

exchange (“FX”) traders, at times, sought to benefit its own trading positions or those of certain 

FX traders at other banks by attempting to manipulate and aiding and abetting certain traders at 

other banks in their attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates.

One of the primary FX benchmark rates that the FX traders attempted to manipulate was 

the World Markets/Reuters Closing Spot Rates (“WM/R Rates”). The WM/R Rates are the most

widely referenced FX benchmark rates in the United States and globally. The WM/R Rates are 

used to establish the relative values of different currencies, and reflect the rates at which one 

currency is exchanged for another currency. Most of the WM/R Rates at issue here are set or 

fixed based on trading activity of market participants, including UBS and other banks, at various 

times throughout the day. The most widely used WM/R Rate is set or fixed at 4 p.m. London

time (“4 p.m. WM/R fix”).

FX benchmark rates, including the WM/R Rates, are used to price a variety of 

transactions including foreign exchange swaps, cross currency swaps, spot transactions, 

forwards, options, futures, and other financial derivative instruments. The most actively traded 

currency pairs are the Euro/U.S. Dollar (EUR/USD), U.S. Dollar/Japanese Yen (USD/JPY), and 

British Pound Sterling/U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD). Accordingly, the integrity of the WM/R Rates 

and other FX benchmark rates is critical to the integrity of the markets in the United States and 

around the world.

At times during the Relevant Period, certain FX traders at UBS and other banks 

coordinated their trading to attempt to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates, including the 4

p.m. WM/R fix, to their benefit. These FX traders at UBS and the other banks used private 

electronic chat rooms to communicate and plan their attempts to manipulate the FX benchmark

rates for certain currency pairs.

2

 Certain FX traders at UBS regularly participated in numerous

private chat rooms. At times, in certain chat rooms, FX traders at UBS and other banks disclosed 

confidential customer order information and trading positions, altered trading positions to 

accommodate the interests of the collective group, and agreed on trading strategies as part of an 

effort by the group to attempt to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates, in some cases 

downward and in some cases upward. 

UBS traders’ attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates involved multiple 

currencies, including the United States Dollar (“U.S. Dollar”), Euro, and British Pound Sterling.

The wrongful conduct involved desks and offices located in at least Stamford, Connecticut, and

Zurich, Switzerland.

 2 Some FX traders involved in certain chat rooms at issue herein were responsible for managing their respective 

banks’ FX desks. 
3

This conduct occurred at various times over the course of the Relevant Period without 

detection by UBS in part because of internal controls and supervisory failures at UBS. UBS

failed to adequately assess the risks associated with its participation in the fixing of certain FX 

benchmark rates, including the 4 p.m. WM/R benchmark rates. UBS also lacked adequate 

internal controls or procedures to detect and deter possible misconduct involving certain FX 

benchmark rates and failed to adequately supervise its FX traders by, among other shortcomings, 

failing to have adequate controls and monitoring over the use of electronic chat rooms. 

The Commission notes that some of this conduct occurred during the same period that

UBS was on notice that the CFTC and other regulators were investigating attempts by certain 

banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) and other interest rate 

benchmarks.

3

***

In accepting UBS’s Offer, the Commission recognizes the Respondent’s significant 

cooperation during the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement’s (“Division”) investigation of this 

matter, which included being the first bank to self-report preliminary findings of questionable 

conduct by bank employees to the CFTC and by providing important information and analysis to 

the Division that helped the Division efficiently and effectively undertake its investigation. In 

addition, the Commission acknowledges that UBS initiated its own internal investigation into FX 

trading prior to the Division’s investigation. The Commission also recognizes that UBS has 

commenced significant remedial action to strengthen the internal controls and policies relating to 

foreign exchange benchmarks and internal and external communications by traders.

B. Respondent

UBS AG is a full service bank and financial services company headquartered in Zurich 

and Basel, Switzerland, that provides investment banking, asset management and wealth 

management services for private, corporate and institutional clients worldwide. It has operations 

in over 50 countries, including the United States. The Investment Banking division of UBS is 

responsible for its foreign exchange business serving corporates, institutions, hedge funds, 

governments and individuals. It became provisionally registered with the Commission as a swap 

dealer on December 31, 2012.

C. Facts

1. The FX Market

The FX market, in which traders are able to buy, sell, exchange and speculate on 

currencies, is one of the world’s largest and most actively traded financial markets. According to 

 3 The CFTC issued an order filing and settling charges that UBS and a subsidiary engaged in certain acts of 

attempted manipulation, completed manipulation and false reporting of the LIBOR for certain currencies, the Euro 

Interbank Offered Rate (“Euribor”) and the Euroyen Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (“Euroyen TIBOR”). In the 

Matter of UBS AG and UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd., CFTC Docket No. 13-09 (December 19, 2012) (the relevant 

period of this action was from at least January 2005 to at least June 2010).
4

the Bank of International Settlements (“BIS”), trading in global foreign exchange markets 

averaged $5.3 trillion per day in April 2013. Currencies are traded in pairs and the transacted 

rate represents the rate to exchange one currency for another currency. The U.S. Dollar is the 

dominant currency in the foreign exchange market. The exchange of the U.S. Dollar for another 

currency accounts for an estimated 87% of global foreign exchange market activity. The most

actively traded currency pairs are the Euro/U.S. Dollar (EUR/USD), U.S. Dollar/Japanese Yen 

(USD/JPY), and British Pound Sterling/U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD). Participants in the FX market 

include banks, investment firms, commercial companies, central banks, hedge funds and retail 

customers. 

The foreign exchange market is comprised of many instruments including spot, forwards, 

swaps, futures and option contracts. 

2. WM/R Rates Overview

The WM/R Rates, one of the leading and most widely referenced foreign exchange 

benchmark rates, are calculated multiple times daily, including at 4 p.m. London time, which is 

commonly referred to as the “WM/R 4 p.m. London fix” or the “4 p.m. fix.”4

 For twenty-one of 

the most liquid currencies (the “trade currencies”), the 4 p.m. fix is based on actual trades, using 

bids and offers extracted from a certain electronic trading system during a one-minute window 

(“fix period”). WM/Reuters determines the bid and offer rates based on the captured transacted 

rate and the bid-offer spread. WM/Reuters then calculates the median of these bid and offer 

rates and from these medians determines a “mid trade rate.” If there are not enough trades, 

WM/Reuters calculates a “mid order rate.” All orders and transactions are weighted equally, 

regardless of their notional sizes.

The WM/R Rates for the other 139 less liquid currencies (the “non-trade currencies”) are 

set by similar methodology. Because these currencies are less liquid, WM/Reuters relies on 

indicative quotes (submissions) derived from a Reuters computer feed that solicits “indications 

of interest” from market participants as part of its fixing methodology. WM/Reuters captures 

independent snapshots of indicative quotes for bids and offers, and selects the median rate from 

these quotes as the “WM/R 4 p.m. London fix.”

WM/Reuters also provides fix rates for forward and non-deliverable forward contracts 

using methodology similar to that used for non-trade currencies. Fix rates for forward and nondeliverable forward contracts are published using a premium or discount to the spot rate for the 

relevant currency pair.

Other FX benchmark rates are also priced through the use of indicative rates. For 

instance, the Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar Emerging Markets Trade Association (“EMTA”) 

benchmark rates are based on indicative rates submitted by market participants to the Chicago 

Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), which takes the midpoint of submitted bid-offer pairs that it 

 4 Another important benchmark is the European Central Bank (“ECB”) rate set by the ECB at 1:15 p.m. London 

time. Though less widely referenced than the WM/R Rate, the ECB Rates are also used by a wide range of 

participants, specifically non-financial corporates and are important for the non-deliverable forwards market. See 

Financial Stability Board Foreign Exchange Benchmarks Final Report at 1. (September 30, 2014).
5

randomly selects, discards the highest and lowest midpoints, and calculates the final benchmark 

rate using the mean of the remaining midpoints.

Foreign exchange futures contracts are connected to FX benchmark rates. The CME 

Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar (RUB/USD) futures contract, for instance, is a cash settled futures 

contract for which the final settlement rate, a component of the contract’s price, is equal to the 

reciprocal of the EMTA Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar benchmark rate. Exchange rates in many 

actively traded CME foreign exchange futures contracts, including the Euro/U.S. Dollar 

(EUR/USD) futures, the U.S. Dollar/Japanese Yen (USD/JPY) futures, and British Pound 

Sterling/U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD) futures, track rates in spot foreign exchange markets at near 

parity after adjusting for the forward differential, or adding or subtracting “forward points.” 

Speculative traders employ strategies that seek to capture short-lived arbitrage opportunities 

between foreign exchange futures and spot contracts. Since 2012, the CME provides clearing 

and other services for cash-settled Over the Counter FX Spot, Forward, Swaps, and NonDeliverable Forward (NDF) contracts. The contracts cover 26 currency pairs, including 

EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and GBP/USD, and are cash-settled based on the WM/R 4 p.m. London 

fix. 

3. UBS Traders’ Attempts to Manipulate FX Benchmark Rates

In late 2008, following the financial crisis, liquidity and volume in the FX market 

increased as many financial institutions and other market participants sought to exchange 

currencies. The increase in volume and liquidity allowed UBS FX traders and traders at other 

banks to take advantage of this trading opportunity, specifically during the FX benchmark rate 

fixing periods. 

At the same time, certain FX traders at UBS and other banks had and/or developed 

relationships with certain FX traders at other banks, and they increasingly used private chat

rooms to communicate and share information with each other. Certain FX traders at UBS and 

other banks routinely participated in the chat rooms. Often these FX traders had multiple chat 

rooms open simultaneously on their trading terminals, and within a chat, the traders often 

focused on a particular currency pair. Being a member of certain chat rooms was sometimes

exclusive and by invitation only. 

For example, when inviting in a new member, traders in one chat room tried to ensure 

that a new member agreed to put the interests of the group first. In one chat, a UBS trader and 

traders from two other banks discussed5 whether to invite a trader from a fourth bank into a chat 

room:

UBS Trader: 7:49:55 are we ok with keeping this as is ..

ie the info lvls & risk sharing?

Bank X Trader: 7:50:27 well...

UBS Trader: 7:50:30 that is the qu[estion].

 5 The communications quoted in this Order contain shorthand trader language and many typographical errors. The 

shorthand and errors are explained in brackets within the quotations only when deemed necessary to assist with 

understanding the discussion.
6

Bank X Trader: 7:50:32 you know him best obv...

7:50:39 if you think we need to adjust it

7:50:43 then he shouldn’t be[] in chat

Bank Y Trader: 7:50:54 yeah that is key

7:51:00 simple question [UBS Trader] 

7:51:08 I trust you implicitly [UBS Trader] 

7:51:13 and your judgement 

7:51:16 you know him

7:51:21 will he tell rest of desk stuff 

7:51:26 or god forbin his nyk...

Bank X Trader: 7:51:46 yes 

7:51:51 that’s really imp[ortant] q[uestion]

7:52:01 dont want other numpty’s in mkt to know 

7:52:17 but not only that 

7:52:21 is he gonna protect us

7:52:33 like we protect each other against our own branches

7:52:46 ie if you guys are rhs.. and my nyk is lhs..ill say my 

nyk lhs in few

UBS Trader: 7:53:52 what concerns me is that i know he’ll never tell us 

when at risk...

After further discussion of whether the fourth trader would “add huge value to this cartell,” the 

traders decided to invite the trader into the chat room for a “1 month trial,” with the Bank X 

Trader warning him, presumably facetiously, “mess this up and sleep with one eye open at

night.”

These chat rooms were the vehicles through which certain UBS FX traders and traders at 

other banks coordinated attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates, including the 

WM/R 4 p.m. fix. Certain chat room participants used code words to evade detection by their 

banks’ compliance monitoring systems. 

At times during the Relevant Period, in their attempts to manipulate certain benchmarks

(up or down), UBS FX traders exchanged the size and direction of the bank’s net orders with FX 

traders at other banks and used this information to attempt to coordinate trading strategies. The 

traders at times then used this information to enable one or more traders to attempt to manipulate 

the FX benchmark rates prior to and during the relevant fixing period. 

 For example, in one of the chat rooms, if a trader determined that he had fix orders in 

the opposite direction to the chat room group’s overall net fixing position approaching the fixing 

window, that trader may have transacted before the fix period with traders outside the private 

chat room, a practice known by market participants as “netting off,” rather than transact with 

other traders within the chat room.6 In certain cases, the goal of this trading strategy was to 

maintain the volume of orders held by chat room members in the direction favored by the 

 6 The Commission does not consider that the netting off of orders (or the decision not to net off) ahead of fixes is 

inappropriate in all circumstances.
7

majority of the private chat room members and limit orders being executed in the opposite 

direction during the fix window.

If traders in the chat room had net orders in the same direction as what they desired rate 

movement at the fix to be, then the traders would at times either (1) match off these orders with 

traders outside of the chat room in an attempt to reduce the volume of orders in the opposite 

direction transacted during the fix period; (2) transfer their orders to a single trader within the 

chat room who could then execute a single order during the fix period; or (3) transact with 

traders outside of the chat room to increase the volume traded by chat room members during the 

fix window in the direction favored by the private chat room traders. At times, traders also 

increased the volume traded by them at the fix in the direction favored by the chat room traders 

in excess of the volume necessary to manage the risk associated with their banks’ net buy or sell 

orders at the fix. At times, these actions were undertaken in order to attempt to manipulate the 

benchmark rate set during the fix period.

Some examples of UBS FX traders’ misconduct include: 

In one chat, a UBS trader and a trader from another bank coordinated their trading to 

attempt to manipulate the WM/R 4 p.m. fix by exchanging their client fixing orders and 

information relating to the type of clients buying. As the 4 p.m. fix approached, the following 

exchange occurred:

 

Bank V Trader: 15:57:45 come on [UBS Trader] we can do this

15:57:50 fix it at 07

UBS Trader: 15:57:54 ha

15:58:55 keep seeing citi on the bid

16:00:50 nice work

In another chat, traders for UBS and three other banks exchanged positions in a chat 

room leading into the WM/R 4 p.m. fix. The Bank Y trader said “it cant be a good day to be 

[right hand side].”7

 Once the four traders determined they were all the same direction, the Bank 

W trader asked if “we gonna be able to get it to 05” to which the Bank Y trader responded “is 

that the troyal fkn we.” After the fixing window closed the Bank X trader said “nice call” and the 

chat room members gave their “scores” or profits from the fix. The chat room members each 

claimed they made between $60,000 and $220,000. 

4. Respondent Lacked Adequate Internal Controls

During the Relevant Period, UBS failed to adequately assess the risks associated with its 

FX traders participating in the fixing of certain FX benchmark rates. UBS also lacked adequate 

internal controls in order to prevent its FX traders from engaging in improper communications 

with certain FX traders at other banks. UBS lacked sufficient policies, procedures and training 

 7 If an FX trader has orders to sell of the first currency listed in any currency pair, it is often referred to as being on 

the left-hand side, or “lhs.” If an FX trader references right hand side, or “rhs,” it indicates that the FX trader is a 

buyer of the first currency listed in a currency pair.
8

specifically governing participation in trading around the FX benchmarks rates and had

inadequate policies pertaining to, or insufficient oversight of, its FX traders’ use of chat rooms or 

other electronic messaging. 

After the Relevant Period, in June 2013, UBS commenced an internal investigation of 

possible misconduct by its FX traders relating to foreign exchange benchmarks. On September 

27, 2013, UBS reported to the CFTC and other governmental authorities preliminary findings of 

questionable conduct. UBS was the first bank to report such misconduct to the CFTC. UBS has 

since undertaken certain remedial measures to improve its internal controls and banned nearly all 

participation by Investment Bank staff in multi-bank chat rooms in November 2013.

IV.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Respondent, Through the Acts of Certain Traders, Attempted to Manipulate FX

Benchmark Rates

Together, Sections 6(c),

8 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Act prohibit acts of attempted 

manipulation. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012). Section 9(a)(2) of the Act makes it 

unlawful for “[a]ny person to . . . attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate 

commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity . . . .” 7 

U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012). Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Act authorize the Commission to serve a 

complaint and provide for the imposition of, among other things, civil monetary penalties and 

cease and desist orders if the Commission “has reason to believe that any person” has attempted 

to manipulate the market price of any commodity, in interstate commerce, or otherwise is 

violating or has violated any of the provisions of the Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13b (2012).

With respect to conduct on or after August 15, 2011, in addition to Sections 6(c), 6(d) 

and 9(a)(2), Section 6(c)(3) of the Act prohibits the attempted manipulation of the price of any 

commodity in interstate commerce. 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012). Commission Regulation 180.2, 17 

C.F.R. §180.2 (2014), which became effective on August 15, 2011, in relevant part, makes it 

“unlawful to . . . directly or indirectly to attempt to manipulate, the price of ...any commodity in 

interstate commerce.” Regulation 180.2 codifies Section 6(c)(3). 

Two elements are required to prove an attempted manipulation: (1) an intent to affect the

market price, and (2) an overt act in furtherance of that intent. See In re Hohenberg Bros. Co.,

[1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,271, at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 

1977); CFTC v. Bradley, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (N.D. Okla. 2005). To prove the intent 

element of attempted manipulation, it must be shown that UBS FX traders “acted (or failed to 

act) with the purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the 

market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand.” In re Indiana Farm 

Bureau Coop. Ass’n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, at 

27,283 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). “[W]hile knowledge of relevant market conditions is probative of 

 8 Section 6(c) was amended effective August 15, 2011. For conduct occurring on or after that date, the relevant 

Section of the Act is now Section 6(c)(4)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 9(4)(A) (2012).
9

intent, it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew to any particular degree of certainty that 

his actions would create an artificial price. It is enough to present evidence from which it may 

reasonably be inferred that the accused ‘consciously desire[d] that result, whatever the likelihood 

of that result happening from his conduct.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 

445 (1978)). A profit motive may also be evidence of intent, although profit motive is not a 

necessary element of an attempted manipulation. See In re DiPlacido [2007-2009 Transfer 

Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970, at 62,484 (CFTC Nov. 5, 2008) (citing In re 

Hohenberg Bros. Co., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,478)), 

aff’d, 364 Fed. Appx. 657, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 WL 3326624 (2d Cir. 2009). It is also not 

necessary that there be an actual effect on price. See CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. 

Supp.2d 523, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

Here, as evidenced by the foregoing, UBS engaged in acts of attempted manipulation in 

violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9,13b and 13(a)(2) (2012). Additionally, 

with respect to conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, UBS engaged in acts of attempted 

manipulation in violation of Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012), and Regulation 180.2, 17 

C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014).

B. Respondent Aided and Abetted the Attempts of Certain Traders at Other Banks to 

Manipulate FX Benchmark Rates

Pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Act, liability as an aider and abettor requires proof that: 

(1) the Act was violated, (2) the aider and abettor had knowledge of the wrongdoing underlying 

the violation, and (3) the aider and abettor intentionally assisted the primary wrongdoer. See 7 

U.S.C. § 13c(a) (2012); In re Sharokh Nikkhah, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 

Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,129, at 49,888 n.28 (CFTC May 12, 2000). Although actual knowledge of the 

primary wrongdoer’s conduct is required, knowledge of the unlawfulness of such conduct is not 

necessarily required to be demonstrated. See In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 

Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,986, at 28,255 (CFTC Jan. 31, 1984). 

Knowing assistance can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. See also

In re Buckwalter, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,995, at 37,686 

(CFTC Jan. 25, 1991).

Here, as evidenced by the foregoing, FX traders at other banks attempted to manipulate 

the WM/R and other FX benchmark rates in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012). Additionally, with respect to conduct occurring on or after 

August 15, 2011 FX traders at other banks violated Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3), and 

Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014). As evidenced above, UBS, through the acts of 

certain of its FX traders, aided and abetted the attempts of traders at other banks to manipulate 

the FX benchmark rates in violation of the Act.

C. Respondent is Liable for the Acts of its Agents

Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2012), and Regulation 1.2, 17 

C.F.R. § 1.2 (2014), provide that “[t]he act, omission, or failure of any official, agent or other 

person acting for any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope 

of his employment or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, 
10

association, partnership, corporation or trust[.]” Pursuant to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act and 

Commission Regulation 1.2, strict liability is imposed on principals for the actions of its agents. 

See, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); Dohmen-Ramirez & 

Wellington Advisory, Inc. v. CFTC, 837 F.2d 847, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1988).

UBS is liable for the acts, omissions and failures of any traders who acted as its

employees and/or agents in relation to the conduct described above. Accordingly, UBS violated 

Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2)(2012), by engaging in 

attempted manipulation and aiding and abetting attempted manipulation. Additionally, with 

respect to conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, UBS is liable for violating Section 

6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3), 13(a)(2) (2012), and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014), as set 

forth above.

V.

FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent violated Sections 6(c), 

6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012), and for conduct occurring on 

or after August 15, 2011, Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 

180.2 (2014).

VI.

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT

Respondent, without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein has

submitted the Offer in which it:

A. Acknowledges receipt of service of this Order;

B. Admits the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to this Order only and for any 

action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based on violation of or 

enforcement of this Order;

C. Waives:

1. the filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing;

2. a hearing;

3. all post-hearing procedures;

4. judicial review by any court;

5. any and all objections to the participation by any member of the Commission’s 

staff in the Commission’s consideration of the Offer;
11

6. any and all claims that it may possess under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 

U.S.C. § 504 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012), and/or the rules promulgated by 

the Commission in conformity therewith, Part 148 of the Commission’s 

Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 148.1-30 (2014), relating to, or arising from, this 

proceeding;

7. any and all claims that it may possess under the Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 110 Stat. 

847, 857-868 (1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8302, 121 Stat. 112, 

204-205 (2007), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding; and

8. any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding or the 

entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any 

other relief;

D. Stipulates that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely of the 

findings contained in this Order to which Respondent has consented in the Offer; and

E. Consents, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission’s entry of this Order that:

1. makes findings by the Commission that Respondent violated Sections 6(c), 6(d)

and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012), and for conduct 

occurring on or after August 15, 2011, Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. §9(3) and 

Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014);

2. orders Respondent to cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2)

of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) (2012) and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. 

§ 180.2 (2014);

3. orders Respondent to pay a civil monetary penalty in the amount of $290,000,000

plus post-judgment interest; and

4. orders Respondent and its successors and assigns to comply with the conditions 

and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set forth in Part VII of this 

Order.

F. Respondent represents that it has already undertaken certain steps intended to make 

reasonable efforts to ensure the integrity of the FX markets, discussed above, and 

including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Strengthening mandatory training requirements for all FX employees, with a 

heavy focus on appropriate trading behavior;

2. Implementing new procedures regarding the appropriate use of chat rooms as a 

form of communication, including the prohibition of nearly all participation by 

Investment Bank staff in multi-bank chat rooms; and 
12

3. Strengthening supervision and surveillance of FX trading desks, including the 

ongoing introduction of specific trade surveillance systems and enhancements to 

electronic communication monitoring.

Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer.

VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

A. Respondent shall cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 

7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) (2012) of the Act and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 

(2014).

B. Respondent shall pay a civil monetary penalty of $290 Million Dollars ($290,000,000),

within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order (the “CMP Obligation”). If the 

CMP Obligation is not paid in full within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order, 

then post judgment interest shall accrue on the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of 

entry of this Order and shall be determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on 

the date of entry of this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012). Respondent shall 

pay the CMP Obligation by electronic funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified 

check, bank cashier’s check, or bank money order. If payment is to be made other than 

by electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be made payable to the Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address below:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Division of Enforcement

ATTN: Accounts Receivables --- AMZ 340

E-mail Box: 9-AMC-AMZ-AR-CFTC

DOT/FAA/MMAC

6500 S. MacArthur Blvd.

Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Telephone: (405) 954-7262

If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondent shall contact Nikki 

Gibson or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall 

fully comply with those instructions. Respondent shall accompany payment of the CMP 

Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the Respondent and the name and docket 

number of this proceeding. The Respondent shall simultaneously transmit copies of the 

cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 

20581.
13

C. Respondent and its successors and assigns shall comply with the following undertakings 

set forth in the Offer:

1. REMEDIATION 

As set forth above in Section VI, paragraph F, Respondent represents that it has 

already undertaken and continues to undertake extensive remedial measures to 

implement and strengthen its internal controls and procedures relating to its 

participation in the fixing of FX benchmark rates and related supervision of its FX 

traders. With respect to its remediation efforts to the extent not already 

undertaken, Respondent undertakes that: 

a. Respondent will implement and improve its internal controls and procedures

in a manner reasonably designed to ensure the integrity of its participation in 

the fixing of any FX benchmark rate, including measures to identify and 

address internal or external conflicts of interest; 

b. Its remediation improvements will include internal controls and procedures 

relating to:

 measures designed to enhance the detection and deterrence of 

improper communications concerning FX benchmark rates, including 

the form and manner in which communications may occur;

 monitoring systems designed to enhance the detection and deterrence 

of trading or other conduct potentially intended to manipulate directly 

or indirectly FX benchmark rates; 

 periodic audits, at least annually, of Respondent’s participation in the 

fixing of any FX benchmark rate; 

 supervision of trading desks that participate in the fixing of any FX

benchmark rate;

 routine and on-going training of all traders, supervisors and others who 

are involved in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate;

 processes for the periodic but routine review of written and oral 

communications of any traders, supervisors and others who are 

involved in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate with the review being 

documented and documentation being maintained for a period of three 

years; and

 continuing to implement its system for reporting, handling and 

investigating any suspected misconduct or questionable, unusual or 

unlawful activity relating to the fixing of any FX benchmark rate with 
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escalation to compliance and legal, and with reporting of material 

matters to the executive management of UBS and the Commission, as 

appropriate; the Respondent shall maintain the record basis of the 

handling of each such matter for a period of three years.

c. Within 120 days of the entry of this Order, Respondent shall make a report to 

the Commission, through the Division, concerning its remediation efforts, 

prior to and since the entry of this Order. Within 365 days of the entry of this 

Order, Respondent shall submit a report to the Commission, through the 

Division, explaining how it has complied with the undertakings set forth 

herein. The report shall contain a certification from a representative of the 

Respondent’s Executive Management, after consultation with the 

Respondent’s chief compliance officer(s), that the Respondent has complied 

with the undertakings set forth above, and that it has established policies, 

procedures, and controls to satisfy the undertakings set forth in the Order. 

2. COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION

In this action, and in any investigation or other action instituted by the 

Commission, related to the subject matter of this action, Respondent shall 

cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Commission, including the Division. 

As part of such cooperation, Respondent agrees to the following for a period of 

three (3) years from the date of the entry of this Order, or until all related 

investigations and litigations in which the Commission, including the Division, is 

a party, are concluded, including through the appellate review process, whichever 

period is longer:

1. Preserve all records relating to the subject matter of this 

proceeding, including, but not limited to, audio files, electronic 

mail, other documented communications, and trading records;

2. Comply fully, promptly, completely, and truthfully with all 

inquiries and requests for non-privileged information or 

documents;

3. Provide authentication of documents and other evidentiary 

material;

4. Provide copies of non-privileged documents within UBS’s

possession, custody or control;

5. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, UBS will make its 

best efforts to produce any current (as of the time of the 

request) officer, director, employee, or agent of UBS, 

regardless of the individual’s location, and at such location that 

minimizes Commission travel expenditures, to provide 
15

assistance at any trial, proceeding, or Commission 

investigation related to the subject matter of this proceeding, 

including, but not limited to, requests for testimony, 

depositions, and/or interviews, and to encourage them to testify 

completely and truthfully in any such proceeding, trial, or 

investigation; and

6. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, UBS will make its 

best efforts to assist in locating and contacting any prior (as of 

the time of the request) officer, director, employee or agent of 

UBS;

Respondent also agrees that it will not undertake any act that would limit its 

ability to cooperate fully with the Commission. UBS will designate an agent 

located in the United States of America to receive all requests for information 

pursuant to these Undertakings, and shall provide notice regarding the identity of 

such Agent to the Division upon entry of this Order. Should UBS seek to change 

the designated agent to receive such requests, notice of such intention shall be 

given to the Division fourteen (14) days before it occurs. Any person designated 

to receive such request shall be located in the United States of America.

3. PROHIBITED OR CONFLICTING UNDERTAKINGS

Should the Undertakings herein be prohibited by, or be contrary to the provisions 

of any obligations imposed on Respondent by any presently existing, or 

hereinafter enacted or promulgated laws, regulations, regulatory mandates, or the 

rules or definitions issued by a Benchmark Publisher, then Respondent shall 

promptly transmit notice to the Commission (through the Division) of such 

prohibition or conflict, and shall meet and confer in good faith with the 

Commission (through the Division) to reach an agreement regarding possible 

modifications to the Undertakings herein sufficient to resolve such inconsistent 

obligations. In the interim, Respondent will abide by the obligations imposed by 

the law, regulations, regulatory mandates and Benchmark Publishers’ rules and 

definitions. Nothing in these Undertakings shall limit, restrict or narrow any 

obligations pursuant to the Act or the Commission’s Regulations promulgated 

thereunder, including, but not limited to, Regulations 1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.F.R. §§ 

1.31 and 1.35 (2014), in effect now or in the future.

4. PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Respondent agrees that neither it nor any of its successors and assigns, agents or 

employees under its authority or control shall take any action or make any public 

statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or conclusions in this Order 

or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this Order is without a factual 

basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall affect Respondent’s

(i) testimonial obligations, or (ii) right to take positions in other proceedings to