UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CESAR PASILLAS-SANCHEZ, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. RICK LIND, Warden, Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility ; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents - Appellees. No. 16-1244 (D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01617-RBJ) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , McKAY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Cesar Pasillas-Sanchez, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) so he can a ppeal the district cour t’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application. We deem his notice of appeal timely under the prison-mailbox rule, but we deny his request for a COA a nd dismiss this matter because he hasn’t

* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 We liberally construe pro se pleadings. But we don’t assume an advocacy role for pro se litigants. Nor do we relieve them from the duty to comply with procedural rules. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)

. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 6, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 demonstrated that reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s denial of his habeas application.
B ACKGROUND A jury convicted Pasillas-Sanchez of sec ond-degree murder, two counts of theft by receiving, three counts of possession of a co ntrolled substance, and three special-offender counts. The trial court sentenced him to 96 years in prison. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and senten ce on direct appeal, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. The trial c ourt denied Pasillas-Sanchez’s subsequent Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconvic tion relief without an evidentiary hearing, the Colorado Court of App eals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. Pasillas-Sanchez then applie d for § 2254 habeas relie f, asserting 10 claims. The district court dismissed four claims as proc edurally defaulted and ordered the respondents to file an answer addressing the six remain ing claims. The court considered the Colorado Court of Appeals’ treatment of each of th ose six claims, determ ined Pasillas-Sanchez wasn’t entitled to habeas relief, denied his re quest for an evidentiary hearing, and denied his habeas application. The court also d eclined to issue a C OA and denied PasillasSanchez leave to proceed on app eal in forma pauperis (IFP).
D ISCUSSION Pasillas-Sanchez now asks us to issue a COA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), and renews his IFP motion. Before we consider those requests, we must first determine3 whether Pasillas-Sanchez timely filed his notice of appeal. See United States v. CeballosMartinez , 371 F.3d 713, 715 (10th Cir. 2004) (notin g that a timely filed notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite). The district court entered final judgmenton April 7, 2015, but granted PasillasSanchez an extension, giving him until June 10, 2016, to file his notice of appeal. We received Pasillas-Sanchez’s misdirected no tice of appeal on June 13, 2016, and forwarded it to the district court for filing as of that date. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(d) (providing procedures for misd irected notices of appeal). Even though Pasillas-Sanchez filed his no tice of appeal three days late, we can deem his notice timely filed if he satisfies the prison-mailbox rule. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) (stating prison-mailbox rule); Price v. Philpot , 420 F.3d 1158, 1163-65 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that prisoner’s submission is deemed “filed” when it’s given to prison authorities for mailing). To be nefit from the rule, a prisone r must use the institution’s legal mail system if such a system is available, and the prisoner may show he timely deposited his filing in that legal mail syst em “by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement, e ither of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-cl ass postage has been prepaid.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1); see also Price , 420 F.3d at 1166 (explaining showing requ ired to satisfy rule ). We issued an order directing Pasillas-Sanche z to demonstrate his complia nce with the rule, and he responded by submitting a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, stating that he4 deposited the notice of appeal in the prison’s legal mail system on June 8, 2016. Thus, we deem his notice of appeal timely. Nevertheless, we deny his request for a COA. To obtain a COA, Pasillas-Sanchez must make “a substantial show ing of the denial of a c onstitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Pasillas-Sanchez seeks a COA on two general cl aims: (1) the state denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice after the trial court disqualified defense counsel because he was a potential witness (Claim One); and (2) the state obtained his convictions in viol ation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his trial counsel was ineffective for several reas ons (Claims Six, Seve n, Eight, and Ten). 2
Because the Colorado Court of Appeals adjudicated these claims on the merits, Pasillas-Sanchez had to demonstrate to the di strict court that th e Court of Appeals’ rejection of his claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pres ented in the state court proceed ing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

2 Pasillas-Sanchez also assert s that the state court and the district court denied his requests for an evidentiary he aring on the ineffective-assist ance-of-counsel claim. But even if the state court misa pplied Colorado law in deny ing his postconviction motion without an evidentiary h earing, that claim isn’ t cognizable under § 2254. See Sellers v. Ward , 135 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that even if state court mistakenly construed its own postconviction statute, “the error is one of state law not cognizable in habeas corpus because ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’”) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers , 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990))). And the district court properly denied his request for an eviden tiary hearing after it determin ed that he wasn’t entitled to relief under § 2254(d). See Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U.S. 170, 181-82 (2011) (noting that an evidentiary hearing isn’t required “when the state-court record ‘precludes habeas relief’ under the limitations of § 2254(d)”) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007))).5 (2). By design, this is a tough standard to meet. Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Section 2254(d) requires a dist rict court to apply a “highl y deferential standard [in] evaluating state-court rulings.” Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 3 33 n.7 (1997). And when a federal court evaluates a state court’s ruling applying Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to an ineffective-assi stance-of-counsel claim, the standard is “doubly” deferential: the ques tion for the federal court is “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland ’s deferential standard.” Richter , 562 U.S. at 105. Here, the district court carefully consider ed the state court’s rulings on each of Pasillas-Sanchez’s claims, giving proper defe rence to the state court’s adjudication of those claims. And because the district cour t rejected Pasillas-Sanchez’s constitutional claims on the merits, we will issue a COA onl y if Pasillas-Sanchez “demonstrate[s] that reasonable jurists would find the district c ourt’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Having reviewed Pasillas-Sanchez’s combined opening brief and COA application, the appellate reco rd, the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decisions, the district court’s order denying habeas relief, and the applicable law, we conclude that PasillasSanchez hasn’t demonstrated that reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the6 district court’s denial of his habeas applicat ion. Thus, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss this matter. 3

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge

3 We also deny Pasillas-Sa nchez’s IFP motion because his financial affidavit shows that he’s able to pay the filing fee. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan , 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting IF P movant must show, in part , “a financial inability to pay the required filing fees”).