32400 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices

determined to be less than 1 mrem/year

and meets the NRC staff’s guidelines.

The proposed action will not increase

the probability or consequences of

accidents, no changes are being made in

the types of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in occupational or

public radiation exposure. Therefore,

there are no significant radiological

environmental impacts associated with

the proposed action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does not involve any historic

sites. It does not affect nonradiological

plant effluents and has no other

environmental impact. Therefore, there

are no significant nonradiological

environmental impacts associated with

the proposed action.

Accordingly, the NRC concludes that

there are no significant environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

As an alternative to the proposed

action, the staff considered denial of the

proposed action. Denial of the

application would result in no change

in current environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts of the proposed

action and the alternative action are

similar. If the proposed action is denied,

the licensee may be required to ship the

material to an off-site low-level

radioactive waste disposal facility.

Transportation impacts would increase

as a result of the additional volume of

low-level waste generated for disposal.

Furthermore, the costs associated with

off-site disposal greatly exceed the cost

of on-site disposal without no

significant benefit to the environment.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for the Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Station.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on April 12, 2001, the staff consulted

with the Vermont State Official, William

Sherman, of the Department of Public

Service, regarding the environmental

impact of the proposed action. The State

official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

On the basis of the environmental

assessment, the NRC concludes that the

proposed action will not have a

significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

NRC has determined not to prepare an

environmental impact statement for the

proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated September 11, 2000. Documents

may be examined, and/or copied for a

fee, at the NRC’s Public Document

Room, located at One White Flint North,

11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),

Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available

records will be accessible electronically

from the Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System

(ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading

Room on the Internet at the NRC web

site, http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/

index.html. If you do not have access to

ADAMS or if there are problems in

accessing the documents located in

ADAMS, contact the NRC Public

Document Room (PDR) Reference staff

at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737 or

by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day

of June 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert M. Pulsifer,

Project Manager, Section 2, Project

Directorate I, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–14977 Filed 6–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Notice of Opportunity To Comment on

Model Safety Evaluation on Technical

Specification Improvement To Modify

Requirements Regarding Missed

Surveillances Using the Consolidated

Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that

the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has prepared a

model safety evaluation (SE) relating to

the modification of requirements

regarding missed surveillances imposed

on licensees through technical

specifications. The NRC staff has also

prepared a model no significant hazards

consideration (NSHC) determination

relating to this matter. The purpose of

these models is to permit the NRC to

efficiently process amendments that

propose to modify requirements for

missed surveillances. Licensees of

nuclear power reactors to which the

models apply could request

amendments confirming the

applicability of the SE and NSHC

determination to their reactors. The

NRC staff is requesting comments on the

model SE and model NSHC

determination prior to announcing their

availability for referencing in license

amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires July

16, 2001. Comments received after this

date will be considered if it is practical

to do so, but the Commission is able to

ensure consideration only for comments

received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be

submitted either electronically or via

U.S. mail.

Submit written comments to: Chief,

Rules and Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, Mail Stop: T–6 D59,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001.

Hand deliver comments to: 11545

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,

between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on

Federal workdays.

Copies of comments received may be

examined at the NRC’s Public Document

Room, 11555 Rockville Pike (Room O–

1F21), Rockville, MD.

Comments may be submitted by

electronic mail to CLIIP@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Robert Dennig, Mail Stop: O–12H4,

Division of Regulatory Improvement

Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone 301–415–1161.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06,

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement

Process for Adopting Standard

Technical Specification Changes for

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March

20, 2000. The consolidated line item

improvement process (CLIIP) is

intended to improve the efficiency of

NRC licensing processes. This is

accomplished by processing proposed

changes to the standard technical

specifications (STS) in a manner that

supports subsequent license amendment

applications. The CLIIP includes an

opportunity for the public to comment

on proposed changes to the STS

following a preliminary assessment by

the NRC staff and finding that the

change will likely be offered for

adoption by licensees. This notice is

soliciting comment on a proposed

change to the STS that modifies

requirements regarding missed

surveillances. The CLIIP directs the

NRC staff to evaluate any comments

received for a proposed change to the

STS and to either reconsider the change

or to proceed with announcing the

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices 32401

availability of the change for proposed

adoption by licensees. Those licensees

opting to apply for the subject change to

technical specifications are responsible

for reviewing the staff’s evaluation,

referencing the applicable technical

justifications, and providing any

necessary plant-specific information.

Each amendment application made in

response to the notice of availability

would be processed and noticed in

accordance with applicable rules and

NRC procedures.

This notice involves the modification

of requirements regarding missed

surveillances in technical specifications.

This proposed change was proposed for

incorporation into the standard

technical specifications by all Owners

Groups participants in the Technical

Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is

designated TSTF–358. TSTF–358 can be

viewed on the NRC’s web page at

http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/sts/sts.htm.

Applicability

This proposed change to modify

technical specification requirements for

missed surveillances is applicable to all

licensees who currently have or who

will adopt, in conjunction with the

proposed change, technical

specification requirements for a Bases

control program consistent with the

Technical Specifications (TS) Bases

Control Program described in Section

5.5 of the applicable vendor’s STS.

To efficiently process the incoming

license amendment applications, the

staff requests each licensee applying for

the changes addressed by TSTF–358

using the CLIIP to include Bases for the

proposed technical specification

consistent with the Bases proposed in

TSTF–358. In addition, for those

licensees that have not adopted

requirements for a Bases control

program by converting to the improved

STS or by other means, the staff requests

that you include the requirements for a

Bases control program consistent with

the STS in your request for the proposed

change. The need for a Bases control

program stems from the need for

adequate regulatory control of some key

elements of the proposal that are

contained in the proposed Bases for SR

3.0.3. The staff is requesting that the

Bases be included with the proposed

license amendments because, in this

case, the changes to the technical

specifications and changes to the

associated Bases form an integrated

change to a plant’s licensing bases. To

ensure that the overall change,

including the Bases, includes the

appropriate regulatory controls, the staff

plans to condition the issuance of each

license amendment on incorporation of

the changes into the Bases document

and on requiring the licensee to control

the changes in accordance with the

Bases Control Program. The CLIIP does

not prevent licensees from requesting an

alternative approach or proposing the

changes without the requested Bases

and Bases control program. Variations

from the approach recommended in this

notice may, however, require additional

review by the NRC staff and may

increase the time and resources needed

for the review.

Public Notices

This notice requests comments from

interested members of the public within

30 days of the date of publication in the

Federal Register. Following the staff’s

evaluation of comments received as a

result of this notice, the staff may

reconsider the proposed change or may

proceed with announcing the

availability of the change in a

subsequent notice (perhaps with some

changes to the safety evaluation or

proposed no significant hazards

consideration determination as a result

of public comments). If the staff

announces the availability of the

change, licensees wishing to adopt the

change will submit an application in

accordance with applicable rules and

other regulatory requirements. The staff

will in turn issue for each application a

notice of consideration of issuance of

amendment to facility operating

license(s), a proposed no significant

hazards consideration determination,

and an opportunity for a hearing. A

notice of issuance of an amendment to

operating license(s) will also be issued

to announce the modification of

requirements for missed surveillances

for each plant that applies for and

receives the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Consolidated Line Item Improvement

Technical Specification Task Force

(TSTF) Change TSTF–358

Change to Surveillance Requirement

3.0.3 Regarding Missed Surveillances

1.0 Introduction

In a letter dated November 17, 1999,

the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)

Technical Specification Task Force

(TSTF) proposed several changes to the

standard technical specifications (STS)

(NUREGs 1430–1434) on behalf of the

industry. One of the proposed changes,

identified as TSTF–358, was a change to

STS surveillance requirement (SR) 3.0.3

regarding missed SRs. The proposed

change would modify SR 3.0.3 to allow

a delay period for a missed SR of 24

hours or up to the surveillance

frequency, whichever is longer.

On February 14, 2000, the staff

requested that the NEI TSTF modify

TSTF–358 to address several questions

and comments that the staff had during

their initial review of the proposed

change. On September 15, 2000, the NEI

TSTF submitted Revision 5 to TSTF–

358 for review. (Revisions 2–4 were

only reviewed by the industry and were

never submitted for NRC review.) This

proposal is one of the industry’s

initiatives under the Risk-Informed

Technical Specifications program.

The industry proposed changes, in

TSTF–358, to the Technical

Specifications (TS) SR 3.0.3 and the SR

3.0.3 Bases have been modified slightly

by the NRC staff. The modifications are:

(1) The TS SR 3.0.3 proposal has been

changed, by the addition of a phrase to

the proposed new sentence, to make it

clear that not only must a risk

evaluation be performed but also that

the risk impact must be managed; and,

(2) the SR 3.0.3 Bases proposal is

changed to properly invoke the program

to assess and manage risk required by 10

CFR 50.65(a)(4), and to avoid the

misperception that 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

requires monitoring at times other than

before maintenance activities.

The following shows the TSTF–358

TS SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.3 Bases with the

NRC staff additions and deletions

incorporated: (1) The revised TS SR

3.0.3 reads, ‘‘A risk evaluation shall be

performed for any surveillance delayed

greater than 24 hours, and the risk shall

be managed;’’ and (2) the revised SR

3.0.3 Bases that provides the link to 10

CFR 50.65(a)(4) reads, ‘‘This risk impact

should be managed through the program

in place to implement 10 CFR

50.65(a)(4) and its implementation

guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182,

‘Assessing and Managing Risk Before

Maintenance Activities at Nuclear

Power Plants.’

2.0 Background

The regulations contained in 10 CFR

50.36, ‘‘Technical Specifications,’’

require that technical specifications

include surveillance requirements.

Surveillance requirements are

requirements relating to test, calibration,

or inspection to ensure that the

necessary quality of systems and

components is maintained, that facility

operation will be within safety limits,

and that the limiting conditions for

operation will be met. Technical

specifications (TS) require surveillance

tests to be performed periodically (e.g.,

weekly or monthly). The periodic test

32402 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices

1The terminology ‘‘temporary waiver’’ was

subsequently revised to refer to the practice as

‘‘enforcement discretion.’’

interval defined in the technical

specifications is called the surveillance

frequency or surveillance interval. The

majority of surveillance tests included

in the technical specifications are

designed to ensure that standby safety

systems will be operable when they are

needed to mitigate an accident. By

testing these components, failures that

may have occurred since the previous

test can be detected and corrected.

STS SR 3.0.1 states that SRs shall be

met during the MODES or other

specified conditions in the applicability

for individual limiting conditions for

operation (LCOs) and that failure to

perform a surveillance within the

specified frequency shall be failure to

meet the LCO, except as provided in SR

3.0.3.

The current STS SR 3.0.3 requires

that, if it is found that a surveillance test

was not performed within its specified

frequency, the associated LCO be

declared not met (e.g., equipment be

declared inoperable) unless the missed

surveillance test is completed

successfully within 24 hours or within

the limit of the specified frequency,

whichever is less, from the time it was

discovered that the test was not

performed. The requirements in STS SR

3.0.3 are based on NRC Generic Letter

87–09, ‘‘Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the

Standard Technical Specifications (STS)

of the Applicability of Limiting

Conditions for Operation and

Surveillance Requirements.’’

Generic Letter 87–09 was published to

address three specific issues with the

application of technical specifications.

One of those issues was missed

surveillances. The Generic Letter states,

‘‘The second problem involves

unnecessary shutdowns caused by

Specification 4.0.3 when surveillance

intervals are inadvertently exceeded.

The solution is to clarify the

applicability of the Action

Requirements, to specify a specific

acceptable time limit for completing a

missed surveillance in certain

circumstances, and to clarify when a

missed surveillance constitutes a

violation of the Operability

Requirements of an LCO. It is overly

conservative to assume that systems or

components are inoperable when a

surveillance has not been performed

because the vast majority of

surveillances do in fact demonstrate that

systems or components are OPERABLE.

When a surveillance is missed, it is

primarily a question of operability that

has not been verified by the

performance of a Surveillance

Requirement. Because the allowable

outage time limits of some Action

Requirements do not provide an

appropriate time for performing a

missed surveillance before Shutdown

Requirements apply, the technical

specifications should include a time

limit that allows a delay of required

actions to permit the performance of the

missed surveillance based on

consideration of plant conditions,

adequate planning, availability of

personnel, the time required to perform

the surveillance, and, of course, the

safety significance of the delay in

completing the surveillance. [emphasis

added] The staff has concluded that 24

hours is an acceptable time limit for

completing a missed surveillance when

the allowable outage times of the Action

Requirements are less than this limit, or

when time is needed to obtain a

temporary waiver1 of the Surveillance

Requirement.’’

The proposed change would extend

the delay time for declaring the LCO not

met and entering the required actions by

allowing more time to perform the

missed surveillance test. This will be

achieved by modifying [SR 3.0.3] to

allow a delay period from 24 hours up

to the surveillance frequency,

whichever is greater, to perform a

missed surveillance prior to having to

declare the LCO not met. The change

will add a sentence to [SR 3.0.3] that

states, ‘‘A risk evaluation shall be

performed for any surveillance delayed

greater than 24 hours, and the risk

impact shall be managed.’’

The objective of the proposed change

is to minimize the impact on plant risk

resulting from the performance of a

missed surveillance test by allowing

flexibility in considering the plant

conditions and other plant activities

without compromising plant safety. In

addition, implementation of the

proposed change would reduce the need

for the licensee to apply for regulatory

relief to delay the performance of

missed surveillances.

The basis for establishing the changes

to requirements for missed surveillances

in Generic Letter 87–09 continues to

apply to the current proposed change to

[SR 3.0.3]. As evidenced by the

discussion in Generic Letter 87–09, the

intent of the change proposed in the

Generic Letter was to reduce the impact

on plant risk resulting from the

performance of a missed surveillance

test by allowing some flexibility in the

performance of missed tests. The delay

time of 24 hours was selected using

engineering judgement in the absence of

suitable tools to determine a delay

period on a case-by-case basis. In

addition, the staff recognized in Generic

Letter 87–09 that even a 24-hour delay

period would not be sufficient in some

cases and licensees would need to seek

regulatory relief in those cases.

The recent revision to the

Maintenance Rule to establish the

requirement in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) to

assess and manage the increase in risk

that may result from maintenance

activities provides a framework to allow

a more risk-informed approach to

addressing missed surveillances. This

approach is consistent with the

Commission’s policy to increase the use

of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)

technology in all regulatory matters to

the extent supported by the state-of-theart in PRA methods and data and

continues to support the objectives

outlined by the staff in Generic Letter

87–09.

2.1 Background Determination

The staff believes that the proposed

change to [SR 3.0.3] is appropriate

because: (1) The number of missed

surveillance tests is a very small fraction

of the total number of such tests

performed at a nuclear plant each year;

(2) the change applies to unintentionally

missed surveillance tests and is not

intended to be used as an operational

convenience to extend surveillance

frequencies (as stated in the proposed

[SR 3.0.3] Bases); and (3) missed

surveillances will be placed in the

licensee’s corrective action program.

The staff has determined that the

proposed change is applicable to all

licensees. In Generic Letter 87–09, the

staff concluded that the proposed

modifications would result in improved

technical specifications for all plants

and no limitations were put on the

applicability of the proposed changes.

Because the basis for this proposed

change is largely the same as for the

change proposed in Generic Letter 87–

09, the staff believes the same broad

applicability is appropriate. In addition,

every licensee is required to comply

with the Maintenance Rule and,

therefore, will have implemented

programs to comply with 10 CFR

50.65(a)(4) to assess and manage risk

associated with maintenance and other

operational activities.

3.0 Evaluation

The proposed change modifies [SR

3.0.3] to allow a delay period from 24

hours up to the surveillance frequency,

whichever is greater, to perform a

missed surveillance prior to having to

declare the LCO not met. The change

will add a sentence to [SR 3.0.3]. that

states, ‘‘A risk evaluation shall be

performed for any surveillance delayed

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices 32403

greater than 24 hours, and the risk

impact shall be managed.’’

The proposed change will not allow

equipment known to be inoperable to be

considered operable until the missed

surveillance is performed. If it is known

that the missed surveillance could not

be met, [SR 3.0.1] would require that the

LCO be declared not met and the

appropriate condition(s) entered. In

addition, the Bases for [SR 3.0.3] state

that the use of the delay period

established by [SR 3.0.3] is a flexibility

which is not intended to be used as an

operational convenience to extend

surveillance intervals, but only for the

performance of missed surveillances.

The modification will also include

changes to the Bases for [SR 3.0.3] that

provide details on how to implement

the new requirements. The Bases

changes provide guidance for

surveillance frequencies that are not

based on time intervals but are based on

specified unit conditions, operating

situations, or requirements of

regulations. In addition, the Bases

changes state that the licensee is

expected to perform any missed

surveillance test at the first reasonable

opportunity, taking into account

appropriate considerations, such as the

impact on plant risk and accident

analysis assumptions, consideration of

unit conditions, planning, availability of

personnel, and the time required to

perform the surveillance. The Bases also

state that the risk impact should be

managed through the program in place

to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its

implementation guidance, NRC

Regulatory Guide 1.182, ‘‘Assessing and

Managing Risks Before Maintenance

Activities at Nuclear Power Plants,’’ and

that the missed surveillance should be

treated as an emergent condition as

discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.182. In

addition, the Bases state that the degree

of depth and rigor of the evaluation

should be commensurate with the

importance of the component and that

missed surveillances for important

components should be analyzed

quantitatively. The Bases also state that,

if the results of the risk evaluation

determine that the risk increase is

significant, the evaluation should be

used to determine the safest course of

action. Finally, the Bases state that all

missed surveillances will be placed in

the licensee’s Corrective Action

Program.

[Optional Section for applications for

changes to technical specifications that

do not include a Bases Control Program:

The licensee has included in its

application the addition of a Bases

control program to the administrative

section of the technical specifications.

Prior the issuance of the STS (NUREGS

1430–1434), the control of technical

specification Bases was not clearly

defined by either technical

specifications or NRC regulations. The

administrative requirements for a Bases

control program were added to the STS

to define a methodology for evaluating

changes to and providing updates of the

technical specification Bases. The

addition of the technical specification

Bases Control Program for plants that

have not adopted the STS will provide

the same benefits in terms of defining a

methodology for the maintenance of the

technical specification Bases. The

licensee has proposed administrative

controls that are consistent with the STS

requirements and therefore satisfy the

condition that was included in the

Federal Register Notice for the use of

CLIIP for this technical specifications

change. The staff finds the addition of

the technical specifications Bases

Control Program acceptable.]

Key elements provided by the

licensee to justify the proposed

technical specification change are listed

below. These elements were built into

the process to ensure that every time a

surveillance is missed the risk will be

properly assessed and managed. In

addition, such elements facilitate

regulatory oversight.

• A risk evaluation shall be

performed for any surveillance test

delayed longer than 24 hours and the

risk impact shall be managed.

• Although the proposed change to

[SR 3.0.3] allows an increase of the

delay time, the missed surveillance test

should be performed at the ‘‘first

reasonable opportunity.’’

• The ‘‘first reasonable opportunity’’

will be determined by taking into

consideration the risk impact from

delaying the surveillance test (including

risk from changing plant configurations

or shutting the plant down to perform

the surveillance, whenever applicable)

as well as the impact on any analysis

assumptions, in addition to unit

conditions, planning, availability of

personnel, and the time required to

perform the surveillance.

• A missed surveillance will be

treated as an emergent condition in the

same fashion as other unplanned

maintenance activities. The risk impact

of the condition will be managed

through the program in place to

implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its

implementation guidance, Regulatory

Guide 1.182 .

• A missed surveillance will be

placed in the licensee’s corrective action

program, thus providing the staff with a

means to verify that the number of

missed surveillances continues to be

very low.

• The NRC’s operating reactor

oversight process will provide the

framework for inspectors and other staff

to review missed surveillances and

assess the licensee’s actions and

performance.

The staff finds that a process

containing these key elements is

appropriate in this case for the

following reasons:

• 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires

licensees to implement programs to

assess and manage increases in risk that

may result from planned maintenance

activities. This program is suitable to

assess and manage the risk impact of

missed surveillances because missed

surveillances can be treated as emergent

conditions and their risk impact will be

assessed and managed in an integrated

fashion with concurrent maintenance

activities.

• Inspection procedures are in place

which will allow NRC staff to oversee

the implementation of Maintenance

Rule requirements, including the

adequacy of risk assessments performed

by licensees for maintenance

configurations.

• The number of missed surveillance

tests is a very small fraction of the total

number of such tests performed at a

nuclear plant each year. The proposed

change is not intended to be used as an

operational convenience to extend

surveillance frequencies.

• This process is similar to other

improvements that have been made to

the technical specifications that allow

the use of a controlled decision making

process by licensees when the process

has some high-level regulatory

oversight. Two examples of this are the

adoption of the Core Operating Limits

Report and the Pressure/Temperature

Limits Report. In each of these cases, the

staff approved the methodology behind

the calculation of certain technical

specification parameter limits and then

allowed the specific limits to be

removed from technical specifications

and controlled by the licensee using the

approved methodology. Similarly, for

this proposed change, the staff has

already approved guidance that outlines

a process for complying with 10 CFR

50.65(a)(4) and, therefore, can allow the

licensee to use that guidance to

determine the most prudent course of

action in the case of a missed

surveillance.

The guidance outlining an acceptable

process for licensees to assess and

manage increases in risk that may result

from planned maintenance activities is

found in Regulatory Guide 1.182.

Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses a

32404 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices

revised Section 11 to NUMARC 93–01

‘‘Industry Guideline for Monitoring the

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear

Power Plants,’’ Revision 2, updated by

the Nuclear Energy Institute.

Section 11 of NUMARC 93–01, dated

February 22, 2000, provides guidance

for assessing and managing risk impact

resulting from performance of

maintenance activities, including

guidance for establishing action

thresholds based on qualitative and

quantitative considerations as well as

risk management actions. The objective

of risk management is to control the

temporary and aggregate risk increases

from maintenance activities such that

the plant’s average baseline risk is

maintained within a minimal range.

This is accomplished by using the

results of the risk assessment to plan

and schedule maintenance such that the

risk increases are limited, and to take

additional actions beyond routine work

controls to address situations where the

temporary risk increase is above a

certain threshold.

In order to gain additional insights

into the proposed change, the staff

referred to the regulatory guidance

provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174

entitled ‘‘An Approach for Using

Probabilistic Risk Assessment in RiskInformed Decisions on Plant-Specific

Changes to the Licensing Basis, and in

Regulatory Guide 1.177, ‘‘An Approach

for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed

Decisionmaking: Technical

Specifications,’’ although these

Regulatory Guides do not specifically

address the type of change in this

proposal. Regulatory Guide 1.177

provides the staff’s recommendations

for utilizing risk information to evaluate

changes to nuclear power plant

technical specifications by assessing the

impact of such proposed changes on the

risk associated with plant operation.

The approach documented in

Regulatory Guide 1.177 was taken into

consideration by the staff in evaluating

the risk information provided in support

of the proposed changes in [SR 3.0.3] to

increase the time allowed to perform a

missed surveillance.

One portion of the guidance in

Regulatory Guide 1.177 includes the

assessment of the risk impact of the

proposed change for comparison to

acceptance guidelines consistent with

the Commission’s Safety Goal Policy

Statement, as documented in Regulatory

Guide 1.174. In addition, the approach

outlined in the guidance aims at

ensuring that the plant risk does not

increase unacceptably at any time

during the implementation of the

proposed change (i.e., during the

extended surveillance interval).

Another portion of the guidance

addresses the need for identifying risk

significant configurations resulting from

maintenance or other operational

activities and taking appropriate

compensatory measures to avoid such

configurations. This type of evaluation

is directly addressed by the requirement

to perform a risk assessment for missed

surveillances delayed longer than 24

hours.

The staff believes that insights from

the guidance provided in Regulatory

Guides 1.174 and 1.177 can be used to

show how the proposed change is

expected to result in, at most, an

increase in risk which is small and

consistent with the Commission’s Safety

Goal Policy Statement. The staff

believes that in the majority of the cases

of missed surveillances, implementation

of the proposed change will result in a

risk benefit due to the proposed

requirement for the licensee to evaluate

the risk impact for missed surveillances

that would require a delay of longer

than 24 hours.

3.1 Risk Impact of the Proposed

Change

The staff made a qualitative

assessment of the risk impact of the

proposed change for comparison with

the intent of the acceptance guidelines

documented in Regulatory Guide 1.174,

consistent with the Commission’s Safety

Goal Policy Statement. Such risk impact

is measured by the average (yearly) risk

change. In addition, the staff took into

consideration guidance in Regulatory

Guide 1.177 aimed at ensuring that the

plant risk does not increase

unacceptably at any time during the

implementation of the proposed change

(i.e., during an extended surveillance

interval in this case). The staff’s

qualitative assessment is summarized

below.

Average Risk Impact

The probability that a standby active

component, such as a pump or a circuit

breaker, will fail when demanded

during an accident is based on the

assumption that the component fails

due to ‘‘standby’’ stresses (i.e., stresses

which are present while the component

is in standby, such as corrosion, dirt,

lack of lubrication). This probability,

also called the component’s average

‘‘unavailability,’’ is used in probabilistic

risk assessments (PRAs) and is most

frequently calculated by the following

equation.

q = 1⁄2 * λ * T (1)

where:

q = the component’s average

unavailability,

λ = the component’s failure rate

(assumed constant) while in

standby, and

T = the interval at which the

component is tested for operability.

The average unavailability of a

structure, system, or component (SSC),

calculated by using the above equation,

reflects the potential vulnerability of the

component to ‘‘standby’’ stresses. Such

vulnerability increases with time

between operability checks (tests)

assuming corrective action is taken to

restore failed components identified by

the test. Thus, the risk impact of a

missed surveillance is reflected by the

increased unavailability of the related

SSCs due to the increase of the interval

between surveillance tests. If the missed

surveillance affects two or more

components, some ‘‘standby’’ stresses

may impact multiple components. In

such a case, the missed surveillance

would also increase the average

common cause failure (CCF)

unavailability of two or more

components and this should be

addressed in the risk assessment (CCF

unavailabilities are calculated by

adjusting the single component failure

unavailability using standard PRA

techniques, such as the beta factor or the

Multiple Greek Letter method).

The thresholds of the aggregate risk

impacts are based on the permanent

change guidelines discussed in

Regulatory Guide 1.174. The licensee

will be expected to manage the risk from

the proposed technical specification

change in conjunction with the risk

from other concurrent plant activities to

ensure that any risk increase, in terms

of CDF and LERF, will be small and

consistent with the Commission’s Safety

Goal Policy Statement.

Risk insights from existing PRAs and

the low frequency of missed

surveillances indicate that the proposed

technical specification change is highly

unlikely to lead to a significant increase

in the average (yearly) risk, in terms of

CDF or LERF. Significant risk increases

can occur only under the following

conditions:

• The number of missed surveillances

is allowed to increase significantly;

• High risk configurations are

allowed (e.g., by allowing certain

combinations of multiple missed

surveillances and/or outages); and

• Poor risk management of plant

operational activities is allowed.

Any of these conditions would be in

violation of the intent of the proposed

[SR 3.0.3] and could trigger a review by

NRC of the licensee’s actions and

performance. The implementation

guidance found in the proposed [SR

3.0.3] Bases is intended to ensure that

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices 32405

such conditions would not occur.

Licensees are already required to

manage risk associated with online

maintenance activities. Furthermore, the

addition of missed surveillances (rather

rare plant conditions) to the

maintenance activities is not expected

to increase risk. On the contrary,

insights from existing risk assessments

indicate that there are plant conditions

during which it is preferable and safer

not to have to complete missed

surveillance tests for some SSCs.

Therefore, the proposed technical

specification change will allow the

licensee to make informed decisions

and take appropriate actions to control

risk.

Temporary Risk Impact

In addition to changes in the mean

values of CDF and LERF, the

incremental conditional core damage

probability (ICCDP) and the incremental

conditional large early release

probability (ICLERP) are proposed by

Regulatory Guide 1.177 as appropriate

measures of the increase in probability

of core damage and large early release,

respectively, during the period of

implementation of a proposed technical

specification change (i.e., during the

extended surveillance period in the case

of a missed surveillance). Regulatory

Guide 1.182 provides guidance for

controlling temporary risk increases

resulting from maintenance activities.

Such guidance, which is consistent with

guidance provided in Regulatory Guide

1.177, establishes action thresholds

based on qualitative and quantitative

considerations as well as risk

management actions. The staff expects

that the licensee will implement this

guidance for assessing temporary risk

increases from missed surveillances

concurrently with maintenance and

other operational activities.

Instantaneous and temporary risk

increases from a missed surveillance are

assessed by considering the timedependent unavailability, most often

calculated by the following equation.

q(t) = λ * t

where:

q(t) = the component’s unavailability

at time t

λ = the component’s failure rate

(assumed constant) while in

standby, and

t = time from end of surveillance

frequency of a missed surveillance

test.

If the missed surveillance affects two

or more components, some ‘‘standby’’

stresses may impact multiple

components. In such a case, the missed

surveillance would increase also the

time-dependent CCF unavailability of

two or more components and this

should be addressed in the risk

assessment.

Significant temporary risk increases

following a missed surveillance can

occur only under the following

conditions:

• High risk configurations are

allowed (e.g., by allowing certain

combinations of multiple missed

surveillances and/or outages), and

• Poor risk management of plant

operation activities is allowed.

Any of these conditions would be in

violation of the intent of the proposed

[SR 3.0.3] and could trigger an NRC

review of the licensee’s actions and

performance. The requirements

associated with the proposed change are

intended to ensure that such conditions

would not occur. Thus, the proposed

technical specification change is not

expected to lead to significant

temporary risk increases. Following the

discovery of an unintentionally missed

surveillance, the licensee will have to

assess temporary risk increases,

qualitatively or quantitatively

depending on the importance of the

component affected by the missed

surveillance, if the surveillance cannot

be performed within 24 hours from the

time it has been discovered.

3.2 Risk-Informed Configuration Risk

Management

Regulatory Guide 1.177 addressed the

need for identifying risk significant

configurations resulting from

maintenance or other operational

activities and taking appropriate

compensatory measures to avoid such

configurations. The objective of such

guidance for this review is to ensure

that plant safety will be maintained and

monitored during the period of an

extended surveillance testing interval

(associated with an unintentionally

missed surveillance). The licensee

proposes to use the program in place to

implement the Maintenance Rule to

identify ‘‘high-risk’’ configurations

resulting from missed surveillance tests

in conjunction with outages associated

with maintenance activities. It is worth

noting that the guidance provided in

Regulatory Guide 1.177 with regard to

the Configuration Risk Management

Program was used as the basis for

developing the guidance contained in

Regulatory Guide 1.182 for the 10 CFR

50.65(a)(4) provisions of the

Maintenance Rule. This provides

additional assurance that the proposed

process for evaluating the risk impact of

missed surveillances is consistent with

guidance provided in Regulatory Guide

1.177.

3.3 Quality of PRA

Once a missed surveillance is

discovered and the licensee determines

that the surveillance cannot be

performed within 24 hours, the licensee

will have to use a risk assessment to

determine the most prudent course of

action. The risk assessment can be done

qualitatively or quantitatively

depending on the importance of the

component affected by the missed

surveillance (missed surveillances for

risk important components should be

analyzed quantitatively). Such a risk

assessment will be consistent with the

program to implement the Maintenance

Rule guidance to assess and account for

both aggregate and temporary risk

increases associated with ‘‘emergent’’

plant conditions as well as before

undertaking online maintenance or

other operational activities.

All licensees must have the capability

to assess and manage increases in risk

from maintenance activities as required

by the Maintenance Rule. Risk

assessments performed pursuant to 10

CFR 50.65(a)(4) may use qualitative,

quantitative or blended methods. The

degree of depth and rigor of the

evaluation should be commensurate

with the complexity of the proposed

configuration to be assessed. Section 11

of NUMARC 93–01 provides guidance

for using qualitative, quantitative or

blended methods to assess risk. Current

inspection programs allow the NRC staff

to oversee licensee implementation of

10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements,

including the adequacy of premaintenance risk assessments

performed by licensees.

For the reasons listed below, the staff

finds that the same ‘‘quality’’ of PRA or

PRA insights used to perform risk

assessments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55

(a)(4) is also appropriate when assessing

the impact of missed surveillances.

• The number of ‘‘emergent’’

conditions resulting from missed

surveillances is very small (in both

absolute terms and in comparison to the

frequency of ‘‘emergent’’ conditions

resulting from equipment failures). The

licensee is expected to implement the

proposed change to [SR 3.0.3] in a

manner that ensures that this statement

remains valid.

• A missed surveillance is equivalent

to a one-time surveillance frequency

extension. Therefore, the risk exposure

is limited to the duration of the

surveillance frequency extension. Risk

increases are small compared to similar

increases associated with equipment

failures. The average (conditional) risk

increase, given a missed surveillance,

may be comparable to the risk increase

32406 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices

from equipment failures. However, due

to the rarity of missed surveillances, the

average (yearly) risk increase from

missed surveillances is expected to be

small compared to the risk increase

from equipment failures.

• PRA insights indicate that the risk

impact from missed surveillances is

significant only for a relatively small set

of standby equipment. This equipment,

such as auxiliary feedwater, high

pressure injection pumps, and

emergency diesel generators, is located

outside containment and generally can

be easily tested in a short time, if

necessary.

• NRC inspection programs allow

NRC staff to oversee the implementation

of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) requirements,

including the adequacy of premaintenance risk assessments

performed by licensees.

3.4 Summary

The staff review finds that the process

proposed by the licensee for addressing

missed surveillance requirements meets

Commission guidance for allowing

technical specification changes. Key

elements of the proposed change are

listed below.

• A risk evaluation shall be

performed for any surveillance delayed

longer than 24 hours, and the risk

impact shall be managed.

• The missed surveillance test should

be performed at ‘‘the first reasonable

opportunity.’’

• The ‘‘first reasonable opportunity’’

will be determined by taking into

consideration the risk impact from

delaying the surveillance test as well as

the impact on any analysis assumptions,

in addition to unit conditions, planning,

availability of personnel, and the time

required to perform the surveillance.

• A missed surveillance will be

treated as an ‘‘emergent’’ condition in

the same fashion as other unplanned

maintenance activities. The risk impact

of the condition will be managed

through the program in place to

implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its

implementation guidance (NRC

Regulatory Guide 1.182). Rescheduling

of missed surveillances pursuant to

Regulatory Guide 1.182 will ensure the

necessary provisions for managing the

risk impact of performing the

surveillance in conjunction with other

ongoing plant configuration changes.

• The NRC’s operating reactor

oversight process will provide the

framework for inspectors and other staff

to review missed surveillances and

assess the licensee’s actions and

performance. Inspection procedures are

in place which will allow NRC staff to

oversee the implementation of

Maintenance Rule requirements,

including the adequacy of premaintenance risk assessments

performed by licensees.

• A missed surveillance will be

placed in the licensee’s corrective action

program, thus providing the staff with a

means to verify that the number of

missed surveillances continues to be

very low.

• The number of missed surveillance

tests is a very small fraction of the total

number of such tests performed at a

nuclear plant each year. The proposed

change is not intended to be used as an

operational convenience to extend

surveillance frequencies.

• This process is similar to other

improvements that have been made to

the technical specifications that allow

the use of a controlled decision making

process by licensees when the process

has some high-level regulatory

oversight. Two examples of this are the

adoption of the Core Operating Limits

Report and the Pressure/Temperature

Limits Report. In each of these cases, the

staff approved the methodology behind

the calculation of certain technical

specification parameter limits and then

allowed the specific limits to be

removed from technical specifications

and controlled by the licensee using the

approved methodology. Similarly, for

this proposed change, the staff has

already approved guidance that outlines

a process for complying with 10 CFR

50.65(a)(4) and, therefore, can allow the

licensee to use that guidance to

determine the most prudent course of

action in the case of a missed

surveillance.

For these reasons, the staff finds that

the proposed technical specification

change, to be implemented in

accordance with the above listed key

elements, is acceptable.

4.0 State Consultation

In accordance with the Commission’s

regulations, the [ ] State official was

notified of the proposed issuance of the

amendment. The State official had [(1)

no comments or (2) the following

comments—with subsequent

disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

The amendment changes a

requirement with respect to a

surveillance requirement. [For those

adding a Bases Control Program: The

amendment also changes recordkeeping,

reporting, or administrative procedures

or requirements.] The NRC staff has

determined that the amendments

involve no significant increase in the

amounts and no significant change in

the types of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and that there is no

significant increase in individual or

cumulative occupational radiation

exposure. The Commission has

previously issued a proposed finding

that the amendments involve no

significant hazards consideration, and

there has been no public comment on

such finding (FR). Accordingly, the

amendments meet the eligibility criteria

for categorical exclusion set forth in 10

CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and c(10)]. Pursuant to

10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental

impact statement or environmental

assessment need be prepared in

connection with the issuance of the

amendments.

6.0 Conclusion

The Commission has concluded,

based on the considerations discussed

above, that (1) there is reasonable

assurance that the health and safety of

the public will not be endangered by

operation in the proposed manner, (2)

such activities will be conducted in

compliance with the Commission’s

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the

amendments will not be inimical to the

common defense and security or to the

health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards

Consideration Determination

Description of Amendment Request: A

change is proposed to technical

specifications to allow a longer period

of time to perform a missed

surveillance. The time is extended from

the current limit of up to 24 hours or up

to the limit of the specified frequency,

whichever is less; to up to 24 hours or

up to the limit of the specified

frequency, whichever is greater.

Basis for proposed no significant

hazards consideration determination:

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration is presented

below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does

Not Involve a Significant Increase in the

Probability or Consequences of an

Accident Previously Evaluated

The proposed change relaxes the time

allowed to perform a missed

surveillance. The time between

surveillances is not an initiator of any

accident previously evaluated.

Consequently, the probability of an

accident previously evaluated is not

significantly increased. The equipment

being tested is still required to be

operable and capable of performing the

accident mitigation functions assumed

in the accident analysis. As a result, the

consequences of any accident

previously evaluated are not

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices 32407

significantly affected. Any reduction in

confidence that a standby system might

fail to perform its safety function due to

a missed surveillance is small and

would not, in the absence of other

unrelated failures, lead to an increase in

consequences beyond those estimated

by existing analyses. The addition of a

requirement to assess and manage the

risk introduced by the missed

surveillance will further minimize

possible concerns. Therefore, this

change does not involve a significant

increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does

Not Create the Possibility of a New or

Different Kind of Accident From Any

Previously Evaluated

The proposed change does not

involve a physical alteration of the plant

(no new or different type of equipment

will be installed) or a change in the

methods governing normal plant

operation. A missed surveillance will

not, in and of itself, introduce new

failure modes or effects and any

increased chance that a standby system

might fail to perform its safety function

due to a missed surveillance would not,

in the absence of other unrelated

failures, lead to an accident beyond

those previously evaluated. The

addition of a requirement to assess and

manage the risk introduced by the

missed surveillance will further

minimize possible concerns. Thus, this

change does not create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does

Not Involve a Significant Reduction in

the Margin of Safety

The extended time allowed to perform

a missed surveillance does not result in

a significant reduction in the margin of

safety. As supported by the historical

data, the likely outcome of any

surveillance is verification that the LCO

is met. Failure to perform a surveillance

within the prescribed frequency does

not cause equipment to become

inoperable. The only effect of the

additional time allowed to perform a

missed surveillance on the margin of

safety is the extension of the time until

inoperable equipment is discovered to

be inoperable by the missed

surveillance. However, given the rare

occurrence of inoperable equipment,

and the rare occurrence of a missed

surveillance, a missed surveillance on

inoperable equipment would be very

unlikely. This must be balanced against

the real risk of manipulating the plant

equipment or condition to perform the

missed surveillance. In addition,

parallel trains and alternate equipment

are typically available to perform the

safety function of the equipment not

tested. Thus, there is confidence that the

equipment can perform its assumed

safety function.

Therefore, this change does not

involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

Based upon the reasoning presented

above and the previous discussion of

the amendment request, the requested

change does not involve a significant

hazards consideration.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day

of June 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert L. Dennig,

Acting Chief, Technical Specification Branch,

Division of Regulatory Improvement

Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–14978 Filed 6–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

Notice is hereby given that the

Railroad Retirement Board will hold a

meeting on June 20, 2001, 9:00 a.m., at

the Board’s meeting room on the 8th

floor of its headquarters building, 844

North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois,

60611. The agenda for this meeting

follows:

Portion open to the public:

(1) OMB Bulletin No. 01–07,

Workforce Planning &

Restructuring.

Portion closed to the public:

(A) Reassignment of Ms. Ruby Bland.

The person to contact for more

information is Beatrice Ezerski,

Secretary to the Board, Phone No. 312–

751–4920.

Dated: June 11, 2001.

Beatrice Ezerski,

Secretary to the Board.

[FR Doc. 01–15104 Filed 6–12–01; 10:07 am]

BILLING CODE 7905–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 3698]

Bureau of Educational and Cultural

Affairs Request for Grant Proposals:

Edmund S. Muskie/FREEDOM Support

Act Graduate Fellowship Program

Summary

Subject to the availability of funds,

the Office of Academic Exchange

Programs of the Bureau of Educational

and Cultural Affairs announces an open

competition for an assistance award.

Public and private non-profit

organizations meeting the provisions

described in IRS regulation 26 CFR

1.501(c) may submit proposals to

administer the selection, placement,

monitoring, evaluation, follow-on, and

alumni activities for the FY 2002

Edmund S. Muskie/FREEDOM Support

Act Graduate Fellowship Program.

Proposals should include provisions for

the recruitment of FY 2003 fellows.

The Edmund S. Muskie/FREEDOM

Support Act Graduate Fellowship

Program (herein referred to as the

Muskie/FSA Program) selects

outstanding citizens from the New

Independent States (NIS) to receive

fellowships for Master’s level study in

the United States in the fields of

business administration, economics,

education, environmental management,

international affairs, law, library and

information science, journalism/mass

communications, public administration,

public health, and public policy.

Fellowships are granted to qualified

individuals who are citizens of

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the

Russian Federation, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, Ukraine, or Uzbekistan.

Muskie/FSA Program fellows will be

enrolled in graduate degree, certificate,

and non-degree programs lasting one to

two academic years, with the majority

enrolled in two-year degree-granting

programs. It is estimated that

approximately 330 fellows will receive

fellowships under the FY 2002 program.

Interested organizations should read the

entire Federal Register announcement

for all information prior to preparing

proposals.

Organizations with less than four

years of experience in conducting

international exchange programs are not

eligible for this competition.

Program Information

Overview: The Muskie/FSA Program

is designed to foster democratization

and the transition to market economies

in the NIS through intensive academic

study and professional training. The

academic component of the program

begins in the fall semester of the year

following the award (in this case 2002).

Fellows may participate in a nine,

twelve, eighteen, or twenty-four month

academic program. Fellows also take

part in an eight to twelve week

internship during the summer following

the first academic year, with an option

for a second internship following the

second year of study. Fellows must

return to their home countries at the