COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatric k, Judges Elde r and Bumgardner

PAULA RIPLEY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 28 79-99-2 PER CURIAM APRIL 25, 2000 CHARLOTTESVILL E DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT CO URT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE Edward L. Ho gshire, Judge (Michael T. Hemenway, on brief), for appellant. (Lisa R. Kelley, Depu ty City Attorney, on brief), for appellee.

Paula Ripley appeals the de cision of the circuit court terminating her parental rights to he r children, Charles and Marion. Ripley conten ds that the trial cour t erred by (1) finding that the Charlottesvi lle Department of Social Services (DSS) presented clear and convincing eviden ce satisfying the requirements of Code § 16.1-283; (2) fail ing to require evidence that DSS explored le ss drastic alte rnatives and finding that Ripley failed to coop erate with services pr ovided; and (3) denying Ripley's motion for a continuance. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the pa rties, we conclu de that this ap peal is without

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.merit. Accordingly, we summaril y affirm the decisi on of the trial

court. See Rule 5A:27. "When addressing ma tters concerni ng a child, including the termination of a parent 's residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1 991). "Code § 16 .1-283 embodies 'the statutory scheme for the . . . termin ation of residual parental rights in this Commonwealth' [w hich] . . . 'provides detailed procedures de signed to prot ect the rights of the parents and their child,' balancing their interests whil e seeking to preserve the family." Lecky v. Reed , 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitte d). "'In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad di scretion in making the decisions ne cessary to guard and to foster a child's best interests.'" Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omit ted). The trial judge's find ings, "'when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbe d on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation omitted). Code § 16.1-283(B) The court found that DSS presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient under Code § 16.1-283(B). That section provides that the residual rights of a parent of a child found to be neglected or abused may be terminated if the court finds,

- 2 -by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and 2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe return to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate the parent or parents by any public or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies prior to the child's initial placement in foster care. Prima facie evidence of the conditions set ou t in subsection (B)(2) include proof that a. The parent . . . [is] suffering from a mental or emotional illness or mental deficiency of such severity that there is no reasonable expectation that such parent will be able to undertake responsibility for the care needed by the child in accordance with his age and stage of development; [or]

* * * * * * * c. The parent . . . without good cause, [has] not responded to or followed through with appropriate, available and reasonable rehabilitative efforts on the part of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent the neglect or abuse of the child. Code § 16.1-283(B)(2).

- 3 -The trial court found that DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interests to terminate Ripley's parental ri ghts. The children were adjudicated as neglected in 1995 and placed in foster care. At that time, Charles was six years old and di splayed serious behavioral and emotional prob lems, including fi re setting, aggr ession, em otional avoidance, and inapprop riate sexual behavior. At the time of the termination he aring, Charles co ntinued to have serious em otional issues. He suffer ed from depression and ha d expressed th oughts of suicide. Marion was five when she was taken into foster care. She was developmentally delayed and suffered from se vere attention deficit hyperactivity disord er. Her behavior wa s so dangerous and destructive that she required constant su pervision. At the time of the hearing, Marion 's chronologica l age was nine but she had limited commun ication skills and continue d behavioral problems. The trial court found that between 1989 and 1995 DSS and at least eighteen agencies provided rehabilitati ve services to the family in an effort to remedy the children's neglect and to assist Ripley in developing good parent ing skills. Nonetheless, the evidence demonstrated that despite the numero us services provided, Ripley was unable or unwilling to provide th e extensive care and supervision requ ired by the childr en. She was unab le to maintain Marion's schedule of medication or succ essfully control her behavior. She inappr opriately allo wed Charles to assume a caretaking role towards her. He r sporadic visita tion with him

- 4 -left him emotionally upset. Eviden ce indicated that Ripley functioned at a limited intell ectual level an d failed to comprehend the depth of the children's need s. Doctor Thomas Collins, a licensed cl inical psychologist, te stified that for the children to be return ed to Ripley's care safely would require a lot more than just . . . a couple times a week counseling. I think you're talking about really intensive work with someone in the home a considerable period of time to help with . . . handling problems as they developed. Ripley separated from her husband in 1997 after he was charged with a felony sexual assault against a ch ild for whom she was caring. At the time of the hearing, Ripley was divorced. Despite the ex tensive services provided to the family for over nine years, the ev idence presented at th e hearing pr oved that Ripley's limitations as well as the childr en's extraordinarily high needs established that there was no reasonable expectation that Ripley could provide the care needed by these children. Therefore, because evidence supports the trial court's finding that DSS met the statut ory requirements of Code § 16.1-283 by clear and convinci ng evidence, we find no error. Less Drastic Alternative Ripley also contends on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to consider a less drastic alternativ e than termination of her parental rights. Ripley failed to note with any specificity

- 5 -what less drasti c alternative was available but le ft untried by
DSS. Despite the year s of training, counseling and other services provided in an effort to strengthen and re unite the fa mily, the uncontroverted evidence proved that Ripley could not pa rent these children without dail y intensive assi stance. Evidence in the record demonstrated th at the continua l upheaval in the lives of the children was part icularly difficult fo r the children and clearly not in their best interests. "It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming . . . responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Therefore, we find this contention to be without merit. Denial of Continuance On the scheduled hear ing date of Se ptember 13, 19 99, Ripley's appointed counse l sought a continuance on the ground that, although he had reviewed the file, he ha d only met with Ripley that morning, despite having sent tw o letters to he r last known address notify ing her of his appointment. Counsel pr offered that Ripley did not receiv e these letters. Ripley did not testify. Evidence presented during the hearing in dicated that Ripley contacted DSS duri ng this period when she was inte rested in visitation, but th at DSS had no means to initiate contact with her. Following entry of the juvenile and domestic relations

- 6 -district court terminat ion order on February 5, 1999, the circuit court hearing was continued from April 1999 due to the previously appointed coun sel's conflict of interest. No ev idence indicated that Ripley was unawar e of the signif icance of the hearing or was unable to meet with her attorney in th e months after his appointment. Based on the totality of th e circumstance s, we find no abuse of discreti on in the tria l court's refu sal to grant another contin uance in this matter. Accordingly, the de cision of the circuit court is summarily affirmed. Affirmed.

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