alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
H. Res. 1543 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

July 28, 2010. 

Whereas, on July 14, 1960, Jane Goodall arrived at Gombe 

Stream Chimpanzee Reserve in western Tanzania, Africa; 

Whereas Jane Goddall’s research has led to numerous 

groundbreaking discoveries including the use of tools by 

chimpanzees; 

Whereas these and other behavioral observations of chimpanzees forever changed human understanding of the differences between humans and other animal species; 

Whereas between 1968 and 1986, Dr. Goodall published a 

collection of articles and books that remain the 

foundational scientific works of chimpanzee and wildlife 

studies alike; 

Whereas this included the publication by Harvard University 

Press of ‘‘The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior’’, which detailed the range of behaviors that make 

up the essential corpus of chimpanzee natural history and 

which remains today a critical reference of researchers in 

the field; 

Whereas Dr. Goodall’s writings not only formed the bedrock 

of the descriptive analytical study of chimpanzees, but 

they also altered the paradigm of the study of culture in 
2 

•HRES 1543 EH 

chimpanzees and other animals, especially species with 

complex social behaviors; 

Whereas in support of the research she began and to advance 

her vision, Dr. Goodall established the Gombe Stream 

Research Center in 1965 and the Jane Goodall Institute 

in 1977; 

Whereas traveling the world approximately 300 days a year, 

she delivers dozens of lectures and engages with youth of 

all ages; 

Whereas during the last half of the 20th century, she blazed 

a trail for and inspired other women primatologists, such 

that women now dominate long-term primate behavioral 

studies worldwide; 

Whereas Dr. Goodall has been a role model for youth of all 

ages, inspiring boys and girls alike to take action for people, animals, and the environment; and 

Whereas through her Jane Goodall Institute, she established 

the Roots & Shoots global youth program which now has 

members in more than 110 countries: Now, therefore, be 

it 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

(1) recognizes the groundbreaking environmental 

education advancements by the Jane Goodall Institute’s 

Roots and Shoots initiative on the 50th anniversary of 

the beginning of Dr. Jane Goodall’s research; 

(2) recognizes the significant role that the research 

done by Dr. Goodall has had on the knowledge and understanding of both the natural and human worlds, and 
3 

•HRES 1543 EH 

its benefit to children and classrooms as they learn 

about the natural world; and 

(3) recognizes the valuable role that nature and 

science education plays in the conservation of natural resources as evidenced through the work of Dr. Goodall. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
Page 1 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: RITTENHOUSE INVESTMENTS, INC. 

DOCKET NUMBER: 184 

DATE: DECEMBER 10, 1971 

DOCUMENT TYPE: CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 

Docket No. 184 

Name: Rittenhouse Investments, Inc. 

Effective On or about December 10, 1971 

Effective upon the date of service of this order upon respondents Donald T. 

Barclay and Rittenhouse Investments, Inc., they shall cease and desist from: (1) 

entering into, or offering to enter into, any futures transaction, subject to 

the Commodity Exchange Act if such transaction is, is of the character of, or is 

commonly known to the trade as, a "wash sale"; and (2) executing any futures 

transaction subject to the Commodity Exchange Act if such transaction is not 

executed openly and competitively in accordance with section 1.38 of the 

regulations issued under the Commodity Exchange Act (17 CFR 1.38). 

Done at Washington, D. C. 

DEC 7 1971 

[SEE SIGNATURE IN ORIGINAL] 

Judicial Officer 

LOAD-DATE: June 16, 2008 
Page 2
No. 550, Misc.

#### Morant *v.*New York, 337 U. S. 909.

Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Transportation

###### Federal Aviation Administration

          - 14 CFR Part 71
          - [Airspace Docket No. 00-ACE-32]

# AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

# ACTION:

Direct final rule; confirmation of effective date. 

# SUMMARY:

This document confirms the effective date of a direct final rule which revises Class E airspace at Bloomfield, IA.

# EFFECTIVE DATE:

0901 UTC, March 22, 2001.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kathy Randolph, Air Traffic Division, Airspace Branch, ACE-520C, DOT Regional Headquarters Building, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 64106; telephone: (816) 329-2525.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The FAA published this direct final rule with a request for comments in the                     **Federal Register**                     on November 9, 2000 (65 FR 67256). The FAA uses the direct final rulemaking procedure for a non-controversial rule where the FAA believes that there will be no adverse public comment. This direct final rule advised the public that no adverse comments were anticipated, and that unless a written adverse comment, or a written notice of intent to submit such an adverse comment, were received within the comment period, the regulation would become effective on March 22, 2001. No adverse comments were received, and thus this notice confirms that this direct final rule will become effective on that date.                 

Issued in Kansas City, MO on January 2, 2001.

H. J. Lyons, Jr.,

Manager, Air Traffic Division, Central Region.

[FR Doc. 01-1547  Filed 1-30-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
#### LIBERTY LEATHER CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Richard CALLUM and Willard Helburn, Inc., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 79-486-C.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

May 21, 1980.

Edward R. Lev, Sullivan & Worcester, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

J. Owen Todd and John J. Regan, Hale & Dorr, Boston, Mass., for defendant Richard Callum.

John P. White, Jr., Monroe L. Inker, White, Inker, Aronson, Connelly & Norton, P. C., Boston, Mass., Raymond Young, Young & Bayle, Boston, Mass., for defendant Willard Helburn, Inc.

MEMORANDUM

CAFFREY, Chief Judge.

This matter came before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to compel production of documents by defendants Callum and Willard Helburn, Inc. as well as answers to questions propounded at the depositions of defendant Callum and one Raymond Young.

The initial refusals to produce the requested document and to answer the questions propounded at the depositions occurred in April 1979. The motion to compel was filed in May 1979. At the hearing on the motion in February 1980 defense counsel “volunteered” to turn over the material sought by plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to recover the expenses of filing and briefing the motion.

> Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) provides in part: If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion ... to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified.

Although defendants in the instant case produced the requested information before the court had an opportunity to rule on the *551above-mentioned motions, I find that the defendants were not justified in refusing to comply with the plaintiff’s requests between April 1979 and February 1980 and I rule that consequently the plaintiff may recover reasonable expenses.

I note that to rule otherwise would permit a party seeking without substantial justification to delay his opponent’s acquisition of properly discoverable information to do so without any risk of becoming liable for his opponent’s reasonable expenses by complying with the request at the eleventh hour just before the court has an opportunity to rule on his opponent’s motion to compel. Repeated use of this tactic could wreak financial ruin on the opponent.

In light of the foregoing and because I find no justification for defendants’ refusal to either produce the documents requested by the plaintiff or answer the questions propounded by the plaintiff in this case, I rule that plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable expenses of the motion including attorney’s fees. After an affidavit as to time and expenses is submitted by counsel for plaintiff, a hearing, if necessary, will be held to determine the amount of the allowance to plaintiff for prosecuting those motions.
Cash Wallace PAWLEY, petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.

No. 16-5707.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 31, 2016.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District denied.
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#### SHOW WEN LIN, a/k/a Xi-Wen Lin; Hong Wei Lin, a/k/a Kotaro Ono, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-1832.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 27, 2012.

Decided: April 2, 2012.

Margaret Wong, Margaret Wong & Associates, Co., LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Petitioners. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ada E. Bosque, Senior Litigation Counsel, Brianne Whelan Cohen, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Show Wen Lin, and her husband, Hong Wei Lin, natives and citizens of the People’s Republic of China (collectively “Petitioners”), petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying their motion to reopen. Because the Petitioners fail to raise any arguments that meaningfully challenge the propriety of the Board’s denial of their motion to reopen in the argument section of their brief, we find that they have failed to preserve any issues for review. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he argument ... must contain ... appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”); *Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,*178 F.3d 231, 241 n. 6 (4th Cir.1999) (“Failure to comply with the specific dictates of [Rule 28] with respect to a particular claim triggers abandonment of that claim on appeal.”). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re: Show Wen Lin*(B.I.A. Jul. 7, 2011).* We dispense with oral ar*101gument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*

*

 We lack jurisdiction to review the Board's refusal to exercise its authority to sua sponte *101reopen proceedings. *See Mosere v. Mukasey,*552 F.3d 397, 400-01 (4th Cir.2009).
OF EXAS

Honorable Jack Ross, Chairman Board of Pardonsand Paroles John H. Reagan State Office Duildfng Austin, Texas

Dear Sir: OpinionNo. C-252 Re: Whether the Board of Pardons and Paroles', under stated circum-- stances,has the authority to terminate the period of parole. supervisionof designated parolee. By letter dated March 31, 1964, you have requested an opinion of this office as to whether the Board of Pardons and Paroleshas the authority, under the circumstancesstatedbelow, to terminate the period of parole supervisionof the designated parolee. In connection therewithyou present the following circumstances:

Paroleewas convictedon six pleas of guilty and was sentenaed on June 28 1960 to servenot less than two (2) nor more than twelve (12)year;. He was received at the Texas Department of Correctionson July 25, 1960.

2. On March 19, 1963,parolee was released on parole to the supervisionof the State of Louisiana, under the Interstate Parole Compact, (Article 781c, Code of Criminal Procedure). He is currentlyon parole In that state.

3. On March 11, 1964, the District Court In which he was convicted, on motion of the State of Texas, granted the State'smotion for a new trial for the purpose of reducing the sentence originally Imposedby the judgmentof the court dated June 28, 1960. Upon a hearing In this motion the Court entered an order purporting to reduce the sentence from not less than two (2)nor more than twelve (12)years to a sentence of not more than two (2)years.

To commutepunishmentmeans to change It from that assesaed against a convicteddefendant into a less severe one. Gilderbloomv. State, 272 S.W.2d 106, (Tex.Crim.1954). An order of'

a court ret

rucinnthe nunishment assessed in a final conviction is in violatf& of %he Constitution,which veets the power to grant reprievesand commutationsof punishment
-1217-Honorable Jack Ross, Page 2 (C-252 )

and pardons in the Governor, on recommendationof the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Constitutionof Texas, Article IV, Sectlon 11; Ex parte Miers, 64 S.W. 2d 778 (Tex.Crim.1933); Snbdnrass V. State, 150 S W 162 (Tex.Crim.1912); Gilderbloomn supra. By virt;e'of the above authorit% 

# t8te, es the attempt by the Court to commute the sentence is void. SUMMAHY The action of the District Court in attempting to commute the sentence of the parolee is in violation of Article IV, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution. Therefore the Board of Pardons and Paroles under the stated clrcumstances,does not have the authority to terminate the period nated parolee. of parole supervisionof desigYours very truly, WAGGONER CARR AttorneyGeneral of Texas 

# &YkiL

Assi%ant'Att%ey General GJP:cg:br APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE W. V. Geppert, Chairman Norman Suarez Bill Allen Jerry Brock Lloyd Martin APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Stanton Stone

-1218-
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1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37745

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMES EARL DAVISON, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 401

Filed: March 21, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Valley County. Hon. Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge. 

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified two and one-halfyear sentence with one year determinate for possession of a controlled substance, 

affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

James Earl Davison, Jr. pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Idaho Code 

§ 37-2732(c)(1). The district court imposed a unified four year sentence with two years

determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Davison on supervised probation for four years. 

Subsequently, Davison admitted to violating several terms of the probation, and the district court 

consequently revoked probation and sua sponte reduced the sentence and ordered execution of a 

unified sentence of two and one-half years with one year determinate. Davison appeals, 

contending that the district court abused its discretion in failing to further reduce the 

indeterminate portion of his sentence.
2

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 

probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 

judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our 

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 

between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot 

say that the district court abused its discretion in ordering execution of Davison’s reduced 

sentence without further modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing 

execution of Davison’s previously suspended and modified sentence is affirmed.