### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 6, 200 5 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v . LA R R IE M A C LI N

A pp ea l b y p er m iss ion f

ro m t he C ou rt

of C ri m in al A pp ea ls Cr im inal Court

for Sh elby C ounty No. 03-0014 0 Hon. Ch ris Cr aft, Judge.

N o. W2 003- 0312 3- SC -R 11- C D - F ile d Jan ua ry 18, 200 6

AND

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MIC HAE L LEB RON AN DER SON

A pp ea l b y p er m iss ion f

ro m t he C ou rt

of C ri m in al A pp ea ls Cr im inal Court

for Ham ilton Cou nty No. 2422 79 Hon. Douglas A. Meyer , Jud ge.

________________________ N o. E2 004- 0069 4- SC -R 11- C D - F ile d Jan ua ry 18, 200 6

________________________ We g r a n te d p e r mi s s io n to ap p e a l th e s e c a s e s a n d th e n c o n s o li d a te d th e m to d e te r mi n e a question c omm on to both: wh e the r the a dmi ssi on a t tria l of a n u na vaila

blewi tne ss’ s “ e xcit e d u tte ranc e ” to law enf orce ment office rs at the c rime sce ne violated the de fendant’s rig ht to confront witnesses ag ainst him. W e conc lude that—depe nding on the particula r fa cts of a c ase—an excited utteranc e c a n b e “ te sti mo ni al. ” I f the state me nt i s d e te rm ine d to be “ te sti mon ia l,” the n u nd e r S ixth Am e nd me nt ana ly sis a s o utl ine d inCr a wf or d v . Wa sh ing ton , 5 41 U. S. 3 6 ( 20 04 ), a ndun de r A rt ic le I , Section 9 of the Te nnessee Constit ution, which g uarantees the defe n d an t ’s right to “mee t the-2-

witnesses fa ce to f

ace ,” it is ina dmissibl e unless the witness was unavailable and the def endant ha d a prior op po rtun ity

fo r c ro ss- e xami natio n. I f the state me nt i s n ot t e sti mon ia l, the n a dmi ssi bil ity is g overne d by

the standar ds of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). We re verse the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls in Stat e v. Ma c lin a nd dis mis s cha rg e s ag a ins t the de fe nd a nt f or re c kle ss a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult ; we a ffirm the lowe r court’s conviction in State v. Ander son of the def endant fo r b u rgl ary

of a building other

than a ha bitation.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe als by P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt s o f theCo ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Aff irm ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art

. W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C

. J

. , delivere d the opinion of the court, in which E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J . joined.
L anceChism, M emphis, Tennesse e, attorne y for De fendant-Appellant, L arrie Mac lin.
Ar de na J. Ga rth, Di stric t Pu bli c De fe nd e r, Do nn a Rob ins on Mil le r, As si stant D ist ri c t Pu bli c Def ender , Chattanoog a, Tenne ssee, attorney s for De fendant-Appellant, Micha el L ebron A nderson. Paul G. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral & Reporter ; J . Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam L . G ibb on s, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; andMic he lle Park s, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, attorney s for Appe llee, State of Te nnessee in State v. L arrie Mac lin.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic ito r Gene ral; B re nt C

. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; W illiam Cox , District Attorney Gene ral; and B oy d Patterson, As s i s t an t Di strict Attorney Gene ral, for

Appellee , State of Tenne ssee in State v. Micha el L ebron Ander son. OP IN ION FACTUA L

BA CKGROUND
A. Sta te v . M

ac lin On the af ternoon of Aug ust 28, 2002, Me mphis P olice Of fice rs Ronald Weddle and James Gay lor we re dis patc he d to a re sid e nc e in Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , to inv e sti g a te a 91 1 hang-up c all. Whe n th e y

kn oc ke d o n th e do or , b oththefe ma le vic tim , M a y Newb y , a ndthede fe nd a nt, L arrie Ma c lin , a ns we re d th e do or . T he of fic e rs inf orme d th e m th a t th e y

we rere sp on din g to a

91 1 c a ll. Although the defe ndant told the office rs that their assistance was not nee ded, Ms. New by , who was crying and very emotional, told the offic ers that she made the c all beca use the de fendant assaulted her. Ms. Newby

g ave the following ac co unt of eve nts to the office rs: The de fendant was her boy friend of

nine y ear s. He had picked her up from work that day , and on the way home they

g otT enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 1 0 2 (a)( 1 )( B ) ( 1 9 9 7 & Sup p . 20 0 1 ). 1

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 7

- 1 3 0 7 (b)(1)(A ) ( 1 9 9 7 & Sup p . 20 0 1 ). 2

T he i m p l i cat i o n f

r om t h e def

en dan t ’ s v er s i on of

t h e ev en t s w as t h at M s . N ew by h ad bee n a s s au l t ed by 3

so m e o n e e lse b e fo re sh e re tur n e d to the o ff ic e tha t d a y. -3- into an arg ument. At one point , the defendant pull ed a pistol from between the seats, point ed it at her he ad, and told her

that he would shoot her if she di d not be quiet. When she continued to a rg ue wi th h im, thede fe nd a nt b e g a n h itt ing he r i n th e fa c e wi th h is h a nd s a nda g ain th reat ened t o kill her—and her c hildren—if she did not stop arg uing. H e also threatened to hit her with the pistol but never did so. W hen she and the defe ndant arrived at the house, he wra pped the g un in a

blue towel and plac ed it somewher e inside the truc k. Once inside the house, she and the defe ndant continued to arg ue, and the defe ndant struck he r seve ral times in the hea d with his hands. Officer Weddle te stified that when he and Of fice r Gay lor arrived, Ms. Newby ’s fa ce w as noticeably

swollen, and the inside of her lip wa s split and bleeding . After hear ing he r ver sion of e ve nts , th e y

a sk e d th e de fe nd a nt i f h e ha d a nythi ng to s a y . H e re fu se d to g ivea st ate ment. There afte r, the off

icer s detained the defe ndant. They also looked t hroug h the windows of his t ruck and saw , in plain view, the bar rel of a wea pon from under

a blue c loth o n the seat. Poli ce c on fi sc a te d th e g un , a

.3 8 c a lib e r r e vo lve r l oa de d w ithfi ve liv e ro un ds

. The de fenda

nt was arre s t ed an d l at eri n d i ct ed fo r ( 1 ) a ggra v at ed as s au l tb y k n o wi n gl y

ca using Ms. Newby

to r easona

bly fea r imminent bodily injury by display ing a deadly wea pon and (2) being 1 a fe lon in p os se ssi on of

a ha nd g un . B e fo retria l, M s. Ne wb y die d andwa s th e re fo reun a vaila bleto 2 testify at trial. The defe ndant m oved to exclude her statements to police on the grounds that (1) they we reno t e xcit e d u tte ranc es a nd(2 ) t o a dmi t th e m w ou ld v iol a te his ri g ht t o c on fr on t a wi tne ss ag ainst him. The trial court, howe ver, r uled that the victim’s statements wer e excited utteranc es and admissible at trial. At trial , t h e p arties sti pulated that Ms. New by died of c auses unr elated to a cts of the de fe nd a nt o r the fa c ts o f the c a se a nd , the re fo re , sh e wa s un a vaila ble a s a wi tne ss. Th e pa

rt ie s a lso stipulated that at the time of t he allege d offe nses, t he defenda nt was a felon, stemming from a 1980 conviction. The e vidence prese nted to t h e jury consisted primarily

of the testimony

of Off icer Wed dle , w ho te sti fi e d c on c e rn ing Ms. Ne wb y ’s state me nts a t th e sc e ne . T he de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d to thefo llo wi ng : T hat onthedate of the all ege d o ff

e ns e , h e fi re d th e vic tim , w ho wo rk e d f or him , beca use she lef

t the officeunattended that day for an extend ed p eriod. When she r eturne d to the office , her f

acewas a lrea dy

swollen and she a

ppear ed upset. She was car rying the g un in a pape r 3 sack. H e admitted that he and the vi ctim had arg ued that day , but he denied hitting her or threatening her w ith the gun.T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 1 0 2 (a)( 2 ) ( 1 9 9 7 & Sup p . 20 0 1 ). 4

M acl i n’ s conv i ct i on for b eing a fel on i n pos s es s i on of a h andgu n w as af

f i r med by t he C our t of

Cri mi nal 5 A pp eal s an d i s not an i s s ue for u s he r e. -4- The jury g ave c rede nc eto M s . N e w b y ’s ac count of e vents, as re lated throug h Offic er Weddle, and found the defe ndant g uilty of the lesser offe nse of rec kless ag g ravated assault and being a fe lon 4 in posse ssion of a handg un. The trial court imposed concur rent sentenc es of four y ear s and two y ear s for the r espec tive convictions. The de fendant appea led, ra ising numer ous issues, including ( 1) whe ther a dmission of the victim’s hear say

statem en t s to police violated his rig ht to confrontation; (2) w hether the victim’s hear say statements to police were improperly char acte rized as “e x cited utterances” and admitted under a hear say exception in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 8 0 3(2); and ( 3) whe ther the tria l court improperly

instructed the jury on the cha rg e of r eckle ss ag g ravated assault. The Court of Criminal 5 Appea ls held that the victim’s statements were n ot “testimonial” in nature; ther efor e, the re qu ir e me nts of

the re c e nt Un ite d Stat e Sup re me Cou rt de c isi on Cr a wf

or d v . Wa sh ing ton , 5 41 U. S. a t 6 8 , — w h ic h c o n d it io n s a d mi s s ib il ity o f o u t- o f

- c o u rt te s ti mo n ia l s tate me n ts o n u n a v a il ab il ityof the witness and a

prior opportunity

for c ross-examination—did not apply . Since the stateme nts were c ha ra c te ri zeda s “ no nte sti mon ia l,” thec ou rt app lie d th e te st o f O hio v. Rob e rt s, 44 8 U .S. a t 66 , to determine whether

the victim’s statements wer e admissible under a “f irmly ro o t ed hear say exception” or boreparticula rized g uarantees of tr

ustworthiness. The c ourt conc l u d ed that the statements qualified a s ex cit ed utterances unde r Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 803(2) and wer e properly admitted. Reg arding the j ury instruction on rec kless ag g ravated assault, howeve r, t he court conclude d that the trial court e rre d by failing to include the ele ment of “bodily injury ” and that the err or was not ha

rmless. Acc ording ly , the court rema nded the ca se to the trial court for re trial on the of fe ns e of re c kle ss a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

. Th e de fe nd a nt a

pp lie d for , an d th is C ou rt

g rante d, pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s: (1) whe ther the de fendant’s rig ht to confrontation was violated; (2) whe ther the vic tim’s hearsay state me n ts w e r eim

p r o p e rly admitted; and (3) w hether rec kless ag g ravated assault is a lesse r included o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s au l tb y c au s i n g a n o t h e r t o r e a s o n ab l y f

e ar b o d i l y i n j u r y.

B. State v. Ande rson On Aug ust 5, 2002, shortlyafte r 10:00 p.m., Offic er B rian S mith of the Chattanoog a Police Depa rtment was patrolling the 1600 bloc k of Ada ms St ree t in downtown Chattanoog a whe n he h e ard a burg lar a larm. As he a

pproac hed the 600 block of Main Stree t and tried to locate the sourc e of the alarm, he saw a

g roup of juv en i les standing on the sidewa lk. They flag g ed him down and, re sp on din g to h is i nq uiry

abo ut wh a t wa s wr on g , told him that a larg e Af ri c a n- Am e ri c a n ma le wi th a bald he ad just kicke d in the door of a business acr oss the street. The y wer e all spea

king at once. When he aske d whether

the man wa s still inside, they responde d that he wa s.T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 4

- 4 0 2 (19 9 7 & Sup p . 20 0 2 ). 6 -5- Offic er Smith went to the door pointed out by the j uveniles and pushed on it. The door w as open and unse cure d, and a lig ht was on inside the building. O ffice r S m ith then reque sted bac kup units. As more offic ers arrived, Office r S mith pushed t he door open and saw the def endant, Micha el Ander son, running out from behind a display counter . After

the def endant wa s arr ested, Of

fice r Smit h, another

office r, and a

K-9 unit chec ked the building for other suspects. No one else wa s found inside. The office had been ransacke d, with draw ers pulled out, file c abinets dama g ed fr om forc ed entry , computers overturne d, and paper s scatter ed every wher e. The inside burg lar a larm had been ripped off the wall and smashed. Ultimately , howeve r, the only item determined to be missing wa s s o m e ch an ge th at h ad b ee n l ef t i n t h e cas h re gi s t er wh en t h e s t o re cl o s ed ea rl i ert h atev en i n g. The de fe n d an t b egan to moan and complain of c hest pain. He was take n to Erlang er H ospital for evaluation. W hile waiting to be see n, the def endant sa w a hospital emplo y ee heknew. He commented to the hospital e mploy ee that he was “ g etting too old to be doing this kind of stuff,” and he apolog ized to Officer

McCommon for making him come out and do “a ll th e s t u ff that we a re having to go thr oug h.” The de fendant was charg ed with burg lary of a building other than a ha bitation. At trial, the

6 S t at e w as u n ab l e t o l o ca t e t h e j u v en i l e w i t n es s es wh o fl agge d d o wn Of fi ce r S m i t h

. F o l l o wi n g a pr e tria l he ari ng on a mot ion to s up pr e ss the juv e nil e s’ state me nts , th e c ou rt ru le d th a t th e state me nts , althoug h hear say , wer e excited uttera nces and admissible as an ex ception to the hearsay rule. The trial court a llowed Off

icer Smit h to testify , among other thing s, that t h e j u v en i l es near the sce ne state d th e y

sa w a la rg e Af ri c a n- Am e ri c a n ma le wi th a bald h e a d kic kin g in the do or of thebu sin e ss. T h e d e f e n d a n tr e s t e d w i t h o u tp r e s e n t i n g a n y e v i d e n c e . T h e j u r y f o u n d t h e d e f

e n d a n tg u i l t y. F oll ow ing a

se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tria l c ou rt se nte nc e d h im a s a ha bitua l of fe nd e r t o tw e lvey e ars . On appe al to the Court o f C ri m inal Appea ls, the defe ndant ar g ued that permitti ng Offic er Smith to te sti fy

abo ut the juv e nil e s’ state me nts vio late d h is ri g ht to c on fr on t the wi tne sse s a g a ins t him. The court c oncluded that the statements at issue we re e x cited utt er an ce s. The court ac k n o w le d g e d th e h o ld in g o f Cr a w f o r d v . Wa s h in g to n th a t t e s ti mo n ia l h e ar s a y a g a in s t a criminal defe ndant is not admissibl e unless the witness is unavailable and the de fendant had a prior op po rtun ity

to c ro ss- e xami ne thewi tne ss. Ho we ve r, thec ou rt he ld that a n e xcit e d u tte ranc e , b y its very n at u re, is not “testimonial.” Ac cording ly , the court held that the juveniles’ state ments were admissible under the e x cited utterance e x ception to the hea rsay rule. Th e de fe nd a nt ap pli e d f

or , a ndthi s Co urt g rante d, pe rm iss ionto a pp e a l th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s: (1 ) w he the r a dmi ssi on of thejuv e nil e wi tne sse s’ he ars a y state me nts vio late d h is rig ht to c on fr on tatio n a nd(2 ) w he the r the juv e nil e wi tne sse s’ he ars a y state me nts to pol ic e we reimp ro pe rl y admitted under a

hear say exception.-6- AN AL YSI S A. Standard of Review As a g ener al rule, que stions concerning the admissibili ty of evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court; an appellate court will not interfe re with the exercise of this discretion absent a clea r abuse appea

ring on the fa ce of the rec ord. See State v. D uBose , 953 S.W .2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997) ; State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W .2d 465, 477 (T en n . 1993); State v. Har ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 73 (Tenn. 1992)

. Howeve r, t he is sue of whether the admission of hea rsay statements violated a def endant’ s rig hts under the Confrontation Clause i s purely a question of law. Lillyv. Virg inia, 527 U.S. 116, 125 (1999); see also Abdur’Rahman v. Br edese n,
__ S.W .3d

__ (Tenn. 2005) (stating that “[a] constit utional c laim that is re solved afte r an e videntiary hearing g ener ally

prese nts a mix ed qu e sti on of

la w andfa c t” ). Th e app lic a tio n o f the la w t o th e facts fou nd by thetria l c ou rt is a question o f l aw t h at t his Court reviews de novo. State v. Yea rg an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997); Be are Co. v. Tenn. Dep’ t of Revenue , 858 S.W .2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993). In this case, ther e be ing no dis pu te abo ut the fa c ts, bu t on ly abo ut w he the r the a dmi ssi on of theabs e nt w itn e sse s’ testimonyviolated the Confrontation Cl ause, our revie w is de novo. B. Summary of the I

ssues The primary

issue to be addr essed by

this Court i n these c onsolidated ca ses is whether the admission of the respe ctive hea rsay statements violated the de fendants’ rig ht to confront the wi tne sse s a g a ins t th e m. U nd e r the Sixth A me nd me nt ana ly sis of Cr a wf or d v . Wa sh ing ton , th is require s a dete rmination, first, of whe ther the state ments were“testimonial” in nature . I f so, a showing of unavailabilityof the witnesse s and a prior opportunity for c ross-examination would be re quired. 541 U.S. at 68. Sec ond, if not testimonial, the Court mus t determine w hether such he ars a y state me nts we rea dmi ssi bleun de r O hio v. Rob e rt s, 44 8 U .S. 56 (1 98 0) ,— e ith e r b e c aus e they fell within a firmly

rooted e x ception to the hea rsay rule or be cause they

otherwise bor e a particula rized g uarantee of

trustworthiness. Crawf

ord, 541 U.S. at 68. C. The Federal and State Constitut ional Rights to C onfrontati on The Six th Amendment to the Uni t ed States Consti tution provides that “[i] n all criminal prosec utions, the acc used shall enjoy the rig ht .

. . to be confr onted with the witnesses ag ainst him.” This constituti onal g uarantee is applicable to the states throug h the Fourteenth Amendme nt. Point er v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). I n addition, Article I , Section 9 of our own T ennesse e Constit ution gua

rante es the a ccuse d the rig ht “to meet the witnesse s fac e to fa ce.” Although the two provisions are not identically worde d, this Court has larg ely adopted thestandards use d by

the United States S u p re m e Court under the Six th Amendment in determining whe ther the Te nnessee c on sti tut ion a l ri g ht ha s be e n vio late d. State v. B us h, 94 2 S.W. 2d 48 9, 51 1 n. 2 (T e nn . 19 97 ); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W .2d 317, 332 (Tenn. 1992) ; State v. Causby , 706 S.W .2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Armes, 607 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Tenn. 1980)

.-7-

The Confrontation Cl ause pr ovides two types of pr otection for c riminal defe ndants: (1) the rig ht to phy sically

fac e the witnesses who testify ag ainst them and (2) the rig ht to cross-examine the witnesses. State v. Wil liams, 913 S.W .2d 462, 465 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Pennsy lvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987), and Mi d d l eb ro o k s , 840 S.W .2d at 332). “ The c entra l conce rn of the Confrontation Clause i s t o en s u re the reliability of the e vidence ag ainst a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous te sting in the c ontext of an a dversa ry proce eding befor e the trie r of f act.” Maryland v . C ra i g , 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990); see also California v. Gr een, 399 U .S. 149, 157-58 (1970). With respec t to the rig ht to phy sically confr ont one’s ac cuser s, this C ourt has observed that “[t] he ‘f aceto fac e’ lang uag e found in the Tennessee Const itution has been held t o impose a hig her rig ht than that found in the fe dera l constituti on.” S tate v. De uter, 839 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tenn. 19 92 ). A d e fe nd a nt e xer c ise s his ri ght of c on fr on tatio n th ro ug h th e le g a l pr oc e du reof c ro ssexamination, described a s the “‘g reatest leg al eng ine eve r invented f or t h e d i scovery

of truth.’” Gre en, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 Wigmore § 1367)

. F or a lmo st t we nty -f

ive y e ars , the qu e sti on of wh e the r the prior state me nt o f an u na va ila

ble wi tne ss c ou ld b e a dmi tte d into e vid e nc e a g a ins t a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt at tria l w a s g ov e rn e d b y Oh io v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). That case established the r ule that when a hear say decla rant is not prese nt for c ross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally require s a showing t hat he is unavailable. Eve n then, his s tatement is admissible only if it bears a dequate “indicia of reliability .” Reliabilitycan beinferr ed without more in a c ase w here the evidence falls within a firmly rooted he arsay

exception. I n other cases, the e vidence must be excluded, at le a st a bs e nt a sh ow ing of

pa rt ic ula ri zedg ua rante e s o f t

ru stw orthi ne ss. I d. a t 66 . T hu s, un de r Rob e rt s, a n ou t- of -c ou rt state me nt by a n un a vaila ble wi tne ss i s a dmi ssi bleif it (1) fa lls withi n a fi rm l y ro o ted exception to the hear say rule or ( 2) contains such particula rized g uarantees of tr

ust wo rt h i ness that adve rsarial testing of the statement throug h cross-e x amination would add little to the assessment of whe ther the e vidence is reliable.
D. Crawford v. W

ashington
I n Marc h 2004, the United States Supreme Court chang ed Confrontation Cl ause analy sis by o v e rru l i n g R o b e rt s , a tl e a s ti n s o f ar a s t e s t i m o n i a l o u t

- o f

- c o u rts t a t e m e n t s ar e c o n c e r n e d

. In Crawf ord v. Washington, the Court conclude d that the rationale of Roberts stray ed too fa r fr om the orig ina l in te nt o f the F rame rs : Whe rete sti mo nial state me nts areinv olv e d, we do no t th ink theFrame rs me a nt t o leave the Six th Amendment’s prote ctio n t o t h e vag arie s of the rule s of evidenc e, much less to amorphous notions of “r eliability .” . . . Admitting statements dee med reliable by

a judg e is fundame ntally at odds with t h e ri g ht of confr ontation. To be s u r e , t h e C l au s e ’ s u l t i m a t e g o a l i s t o e n s u r e r e l i a b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e , b ut it is a-8-

proce dural rather than a

substantive gu ar an t ee . It commands, not that evidenc e be reliable , but that reliability be as s essed in a pa

rticular manner: by

testing in the cruc ible of cr oss-examination. 541 U.S. at 61. The Court noted t hat t he principal evil that the C onfrontation C lause wa s intended to deter w as “the civil-law mode of criminal proc edure , and particularly its use of ex

pa rte examinations as evidence ag ainst the ac cused.” I d. at 50. The Court rej ecte d the view that reg ulation of out-of-c ourt statements could be acc omplished solely by the rules of e vidence . I d. at 50 -5 1. Th us , wi th re sp e c t to “ te sti mon ia l” he ars a y , th e Sup re me Cou rt ov e rr ule d Ro be rt s b e c aus e of the tende ncy

under the Roberts test “to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly

meant to exclude.” I d. at 63. The Court announc ed a ne w test to determine the admissibili ty under the Conf

ro n tation Claus e of he ars a y of fe re d a g a ins t a n a ccused . T e sti mon ia l st a te me nts ma y no t beof

fe re d in to evidenc e unless two re quirements ar e s at i s fi ed: (1) the decla rant/witness must be unavailable and (2) the de fendant must have had a prior opportunity to c ross-examine the decla rant/witness. I d. at 68. “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability

sufficie nt to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constituti on actua lly presc ribes: conf

rontation.” I d. at 68-69. The Court cla

rified that the Confr ontation Clause “ap p l i es to ‘witnesses’ ag ainst the acc used

— i n o t h er w ords, those who ‘be ar te stimony .’” I d. at 51 (quoting 1 N. Webster, An Am e ri c a n D ic tio na

ry of the En g lis h L a ng ua g e (1 82 8) ). Th e Cou rt de fi ne d “ te sti mon y ” a s ty pic a lly a “‘ solemn decla

ration or a ffirmation made for t he purpose of establishi ng or proving some fa ct.’” I d. (citing Webster). The Court declined to g ive a c omprehe nsive definiti o n o f wh at i t meant by “testimonia l ” s tatements. I d. at 68. It did, however , describe three formulations of testimonial state me nts : V ar io u s f o r mu lati o n s o f

th is c o r e c la s s o f

“ te s ti mo n ia l” s tate me n ts e xis t: [1 ] “ ex pa rte i n-court testimonyor its functional equiva lent—that is, material such a s a ff ida vit s, c us tod ia l e xami natio ns , p ri or te sti mon y

that th e de fe nd a nt wa s u na bleto cross-e x amine, or similar pre trial s tatements that dec lara nts would reasona bly expect to be used prose cutorially ”; [2] “extrajudicial st atements . . . contained in f ormalized testimonial materials, such as a ffidavits, depo s i t ions, prior testimony , or confe ssions”; [ 3] “stateme nts that wer e made under circumstanc es which would lead an objec tive witness rea sonably to be lieve that the statement would be a vailable f or use at a later tria l.”
I d. a t 51 -5 2 ( c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Al tho ug h the Cou rt de c lin e d to settle on a sin g le fo rmulatio n, it d id no te that “ [w]hate ve r e lse thete rm c ov e rs , it app li es at a

min imu m to prior

te sti mon y

a t a preliminary

hearing, be fore a g rand jury , or at a former trial; and to police int err og ations. These a re the modern pr actice s with closest kinship to t he abuse s at which t h e C onfrontation Clause wa s direc ted.” I d. at 68. It also stated that “[s] tatements take n by police off

icer s in the course of interrog ations are also testimonial under eve n a nar row standa

rd.” I d. at 52.Se e U ni t ed Stat es v. H i nt o n, 42 3 F.3d 35 5 , 35 8 (3rd C i r. 20 0 5 ) ( st at i ng t hat “ [t ]he t hres ho l d que st i o n i n any 7 C onf r ont at i on Cl aus e a nal y s i s . . . i s wh et her t he s t at ement i s t es t i mo ni al

. ”)
O ne co m m ent at o r sugges t s t hat fo r s t at em ent s d et erm i ned t o be nontes t i m o ni al , i t i s st i l l prud ent t o ap p l y t he 8 O h i o v . Rober t s a n al y s i s w h en de t er mi n i n g a dmi s s i bi l i t y . Ri ch ar d D

. Fr i edman, A d j u s t i n g t o C ra w f o rd : H i gh C o urt D ec i s i on Res t or es Conf r on t at i on Cl au s e Prot ec t i on , 19- SU M Cr i m. J u s t

. 4 ( 2004)

. Fr i edma n , wh o i s a l aw pr ofes s or at t he U ni vers i t y of M i chi gan Sc ho o l of L a w , s ub m i t t ed an am i cus bri ef i n C rawfo rd and was s eco nd chai r t o t he p e tit io n e r’s c o u n se l at the a rg u m e n t i n the S u p re m e C o u rt.

T he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt has grant ed c ert i o rari in t wo c ases , p res um ab l y t o cl ari f y what was mea nt 9 b y the ter m “tes tim o n ia l.” S e e H a m m o n v . In d ia n a , 8 2 9 N .E .2 d 4 4 4 (I n d . 2 0 0 5 ), c e rt. gr a n te d , 1 2 6 S . C t. 5 5 2 (U .S . O c t. 3 1 , 20 0 5 ); W ashi ngt o n v. D avi s, 11 1 P

. 3 d 84 4 (W ash. 20 0 5 ), cert

. grant ed , 12 6 S. C t

. 54 7 (U

. S. O ct

. 31 , 20 0 5 ). -9- E. Testimonial vs. Nontesti monial After Crawf ord, the thre shold question in any Confront ati on Clause ca se is whether a c ha lle ng e d s tate me nt i s te sti mon ia l or no nte sti mon ia l. I f i t is te sti mon ia l, the state me nt i s 7 ina dm issib le un le ss ( 1) thede c larant i s u na vaila blea nd(2 ) the a c c us e d h a d a prior op po rtun ity

to cross-e x amine the de clar ant. I d. I f it is not testimoni al, then the state s are fre e to apply their own hear say law to determine the statement’s admissibili ty

. I d. Courts across the c ountry are g rappling 8 wi th the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n “ tes ti mo ni a l” a nd“ no nte sti mon ia l” he ars a y a ndc omi ng to d if

fe re nt, often c onflicting , results. This is our first opportunity to addre ss the issue. 9
I n defining “testi monial,” the common nucle us of the various pronounceme nts enunciate d by the United States Supreme Court se ems to be that testimony involves a fo rm al or off icial state me nt m a de or

e lic ite d w itha

pu rp os e of bei ng int

ro du c e d at a

c ri min a l tria l. T he Sixth Am en d ment g rants the a ccuse d in a criminal trial the rig ht “to be conf ronted with the witnesse s ag ainst him.” The term “witnesses,” the Court held, embra ces a ll those who “bea r testimo ny ,” wh e the r at tria l or

ou tsi de thec ou rt

ro om. I d. a t 51. “ ‘T e sti mon y ,’ in turn, is typic a lly ‘[a ] sol e mn d e c l ar a t i o n o r

a f f i r m a t i o n m a d e f

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f

e s t ab l i s h i n g o r

p r o v i n g s o m e f

a c t

. ’ ” Id

. In c on tr a st, theCou rt

no te d, c a su a l st a te me nts to an a c qu a int a nc e , bu sin e ss re c or ds , or state me nts in further anceof a c onspiracy are not testimoni al. I d. at 51, 56.
Furthermore , the Court clarified that its use of the term “inter rog ation” wa s not meant in a technica l leg al sense, but r ather colloquially

or g ener ally . I d. at 53 n.4. “Just as various definitions of ‘testimonial’ exist, one can imag ine various definitions of ‘interr og ation,’ and we need not se lect among them. . . .” I d. I nterrog ation need not be “sworn testimony ”: the Court f ound that the abse nce of an oath was not dispositi ve, s i n ce t h e p o l ice of fice rs of today

have the same investig ative and prosec utorial function that the justices of the pea ce ha d under the old E ng lish Marian statutes. The implication is t h at s t at ements made to police while they are perf orming an “inve stigative and p r o s e c u t o r i a l f

u n c t i o n ” ar e t e s t i m o n y. Since Cr a w f

o r d , c o u rts a c r o s s th e n a ti o n h a v e b e e n a s k e d to d e te r mi n e w h e th e r p artic ular state me nts arete sti mon ia l or no nte sti mon ia l un de r div e rg e nt fa c tua l sc e na ri os . T he state me nts inC o urt s i n t he fo l l o wi ng cases hel d t hat t he 9 1 1 cal l s m ad e were no t t est i m o ni al fo r var i o us reasons, i ncl ud i ng 10 t h at t h ey w er e ( 1) i n i t i at ed by t h e v i ct i m, ( 2) ma de for t h e pu r pos e of s ee k i n g pol i ce pr ot ec t i on or i n t er v en t i on , ( 3) ma de i nfo rma l l y , or (4) m ad e fo r t he p urpo se o f st o p p i ng cri m e: U ni t ed Stat es v. H i nt o n, 4 2 3 F.3d 3 5 5 , 3 6 2 (3rd C i r. 20 0 5 ); U n ited S ta te s v . B run, 4 1 6 F.3d 70 3 , 70 7 (8t h C i r. 20 0 5 ); Leavit t v. A rave, 38 3 F.3d 80 9 , 83 0 n. 2 2 (9t h C i r. 20 0 4 ); P eo p l e v. C o rel l a, 18 C al

. R p t r. 3 d 77 0 , 77 6 (C al

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ); P i t t s v. Stat e, 6 1 2 S.E

. 2 d 1 , 5 (G a. C t

. A p p . 20 0 5 ); W e st, 8 2 3 N .E .2 d a t 9 2 -9 3 ( Ill. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); M a rq u a rd t v . S ta te , 8 8 2 A .2 d 9 0 0 , 9 1 6 (M d . C t. S p e c . A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); S ta te v. W ri ght , 70 1 N

. W

. 2 d 80 2 , 81 1 (M i nn. 20 0 5 ); P eo p l e v. C o l em an, 79 1 N

. Y

. S.2d 11 2 , 11 3 (N

. Y

. A p p . D i v. 20 0 5 ); P eo p l e v. M o scat , 77 7 N

. Y

. S.2d 87 5 , 87 6 (N

. Y

. C i t y C ri m . C t

. 20 0 4 ).

Compar e t h e fol l owi n g ca s es , i n wh i ch t h e r es pec t i v e cou r t s h el d t h at t h e 911 ca l l s made we r e t es t i mon i al for v ar i ou s r ea s on s , i n cl u di n g t h at t h ey wer e ( 1) m ade f or t h e pu r pos e of i n v ok i n g pol i ce a ct i on a n d i n i t i at i n g pr os ec u t i on and ( 2) t hat un der t he f act ual ci r cums t anc es of t he r es pect i ve cas es , an “ ob j ect i ve wi t nes s ” woul d re as onabl y bel i eve t hat t h e s t at eme n t s w ou l d be a v ai l abl e for u s e at a l at er t r i al : P eopl e v . W es t , 823 N

. E. 2d a t 92- 93; Peopl e v . D obbi n , 791 N

. Y

. S.2d 89 7 , 90 0

- 0 1 (N

. Y

. Sup

. C t

. 20 0 4 ); P eo p l e v. C o rt es, 78 1 N

. Y

. S.2d 40 1 , 40 7 (N

. Y

. Sup

. C t

. 20 0 4 ).

Since t hi s i s t he p reci se i ss ue i n t hi s case, t hese cases wi l l be noted i n t he b o d y of t he o p i ni o n. 11

Se e t h e fol l owi n g ca s es i n v ol v i n g s t at eme n t s of c h i l d w i t n es s es . I n g en er al , c h i l d w i t n es s s t at eme n t s ma de 12 t o g ov er n men t of

f i ci al s or r epr es en t at i v es h av e bee n ch ar ac t er i ze d as t es t i mon i al , wh i l e s t at eme n t s m ade t o re l at i v es or f r i en ds h av e bee n c h ar ac t er i ze d a s n on t es t i mon i al

. Se e Peopl e v . Si s av at h , 13 Cal

. Rpt r . 3d 753, 757- 58 ( Cal

. Ct

. App. 2 0 0 4 ); P eo p l e v. V i gi l , 10 4 P

. 3 d 25 8 , 26 2 (Co l o . C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ), cert

. grant ed , (C o l o . , D ec. 20 , 20 0 4 ); Stat e v. Sno wd en, 867 A. 2d 314, 325- 26 ( M d. 2005) ; Fl or es v. St at e, 120 P. 3d 1170, 1178- 79 ( N ev . 2005) ; bu t s ee Peopl e v . G en o, 683 N

. W

. 2d 687, 692 ( M i ch

. Ct

. App. 2004) ( s t at eme n t i mpl i ca t i n g t h e def en dan t , wh i ch wa s g i v en by a t wo- y ea r - ol d t o a C hi l d ren’ s A ss ess m ent C ent er i nt ervi ewer af t er t he i nt ervi ewer no t i ced b l o o d in t he chi l d ’ s p ant s, was not t est i m o ni al ); se e a lso H e rr e ra -V e g a v . S ta te , 8 8 8 S o .2 d 6 6 , 6 9 (F la . D ist. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ) (s p o n ta n e o u s sta te m e n ts m a d e b y c h ild to her mo t her whi l e b ei ng dress ed , and l at er r ep eat ed t o her fat her, were not t est i m o ni al ).

N u m e ro u s c o u rts h a v e d e te rm ine d tha t state m e n ts m a d e to frien d s, fam ily, o r a c q u a inta n c e s, a s o p p o se d to 13

a go v e rn m e n t re p re se n ta tive , d o no t co n stitute tes tim o n ia l h e a rs a y. S e e , e.g ., R a m ire z v. D re tke , 3 9 8 F .3 d 6 9 1 , 6 9 5 n.3 (5th C i r. 20 0 5 ), cert

. de ni ed , 12 6 S. C t

. 5 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ); U n ited S t at es v. M anf re, 36 8 F.3d 83 2 , 83 8 n. 1 (8 t h C i r. 20 0 4 ); P e o p le v. B u tler , 2 5 C a l. R p tr.3 d 1 5 4 , 1 6 1 -6 2 ( C a l. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); P e o p le v . C e rv a n te s, 1 2 C a l. R p tr.3 d 7 7 4 , 7 8 3 (C a l. C t. A p p . 20 0 4 ); C o m p an v. P eo p l e, 1 2 1 P

. 3 d

. 8 7 6 , 8 8 0

- 8 1 (C o l o . 2 0 0 5 ); Stat e v. R i vera, 84 4 A

. 2 d 19 1 , 20 1 (Co nn. 20 0 4 ); D emon s v . St at e, 595 S. E. 2d 76, 80 ( G a. 2004) ; B r ay v . K en t u ck y , __ S. W

. 3d __ ( K y . 2005) ; St at e v . B l ac k s t ock , 598 S. E. 2d 412, 420 ( N

. C. Ct

. App. 2004) ; W oods v . St at e, 152 S. W

. 3d 105, 114 ( T ex . Cr i m. App. 2004) , c er t

. de n i ed, 125 S. Ct

. 2295 ( 2005) ; St at e v . O r n dor f f , 95 P. 3d 406, 408 ( W as h

. Ct

. App. 2004) ; St at e v . Fe r g u s on , 607 S. E. 2d 526, 529 (W . V a . 2 0 0 4 ), c e rt. d e n ie d , 1 2 6 S . C t. 3 3 2 (2 0 0 5 ). -10- qu e sti on se e m to fa ll w ith in o ne of se ve ral c a te g orie s: s tate me nts ma de to 9 11 dis patc he rs ; 10 state me nts ma de to p oli c e du ri ng ini tia l f ie ld i nv e sti g a tio ns ; state me nts ma de by c hil dr e n to 11 authorities or pa

rents; and stateme nts ma de to f amily , friends, or acquaintances. The c ourts have 12 13 e mpl oy e d d ive rg e nt t e sts a ndratio na le s to re a c h v arying —s ome tim e s c on fl ic tin g —c on c lus ion s. Be cause the issue in both case s curr ently befor e the Court involves statements made to police during t h e e ar l y s t a g e s o f

i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w e w i l l r e v i e w t h e au t h o r i t i e s i n t h a tc a t e g o r y p art i c u l ar l y. To determine whether

statements made to police ar e t est imonial, courts have a dopted diverg ent appr oache s: (1) a pe r se app ro a c h a nd (2 ) a c a se -b y -c a se app ro a c h. A m ino ri ty of c ou rt s h a v e ru l e d

— s o m e t i m e s i m p l i c i t l y , b u ts o m e t i m e s e xp r e s s l y —th a t all statements made to police , reg ardle ss of the conte x t in which they are made, a

re te stimoni al. For

example, in L opez v. State, 888 So.2d 693 ( Fla. D ist. Ct . App. 2004), the F lorida Court of Appe als conc luded that a kidnapingT ha t i s, t he “s ta t em en t s . . . we re m ad e u nd er c i rcu m st an ce s wh i ch wo uld l ea d an o b je cti ve wit ne ss 14

r ea s on abl y t o be l i ev e t h at t h e s t at eme n t w ou l d be a v ai l abl e f or u s e at a l at er t r i al

. ” Cr aw for d, 541 U

. S. a t 52. A pe t i t i on f

or c er t i or ar i wa s f

i l ed i n t h i s ca s e wi t h t h e U

. S. Su pr eme Cour t on N ov embe r 23, 2005 ( U

. S. N o. 15 0 5

- 6 7 4 ).
Since t he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt has grant ed cert i o rari i n H am m o n, i t i s uncl ear whi ch p o rt i o ns o f t he 16 I ndi ana Supr eme Co ur t ’ s an al y s i s , i f an y , wi l l s ur vi ve. -11- victim’s statements to police wer e testimonial under the la st Crawfor d formulation. The c ourt 14 conclude d that a startled pe rson who identifies a suspect in a state ment made to a policeoffice r at thesc e ne of a c ri me su re ly kn ow s that th e state me nt i s a fo rm of a c c us a tio n th a t w ill be used a g ainst the suspect. In this sit uation, the statement does not lose its chara cter a s a te sti mon ia l st a te me nt m e re ly be c aus e thede c larant wa s e xcit e d.

. . . E ve n inhis excitement, [ the victim] knew that he was making a formal report of t he incident and that hi s r e po rt

wo uldbe us e d a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt. L opez, 888 So.2d at 699-700. Geor g ia courts also have adopted a br oad interpr etation of the te rm
“ int e rr og a tio n” that lea ds to a sim ila r r e su lt, g e ne ra lly

wi th a fi nd ing that any statements to police are testimonial. See, e.g., Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350 (Ga . 2004); Be ll v. St ate, 597 S.E.2d 350 (Ga . 2004); J enkins v. State, 604 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Ga. 2004) ; Pit ts v. St ate, 612 S.E. 2 d 1 , 5 (Ga

. App. 2005), c ert. g rante d, (Ga . Sept 19, 2005)

. The Supreme J udicial Court of Massac husetts has adopted a simil arly broad de finition of the term “inter rog ation.” See, e .g ., Commonwealth v. Go ns a lve s, 83 3 N. E. 2d 54 9 (M a ss. 20 05 ) (h old ing that thete rm interrogation “must be under stood 15 expansively

to mean all law e nforc ement questioning related t o the i nvestig ation or prose cution of a c ri me ” be c aus e “ if te sti mon ia l sta te me nts we re lim ite d to forma l, sol e mni zed , r e c or de d a c c ou nts , Crawf ord would be a

rec ipe to circ umvent the conf rontation clause by

encour ag ing la w enf

orce ment personne l to take elabor ate state ments informally . . . .”).
T o b e s u r e , t h i s “ p e r s e t e s t i m o n i a l ” ap p r o a c h h a s s o m e ap p e a l

. It i s c e rt a i n l y e a s y t o ap p l y. Put si mply , if a witness make s an ac cusatoria l statement to a police of fice r during the cour se of an investigation, preliminary or otherw ise, then it is deemed “ testimonial.” Most courts, howeve r, use a case -by -ca se appr oach, evaluating the fa ctual cir cumstance s of eac h case . These c ourts g ener ally have he ld that interrog ation was not involved and, thus, that the statements ar e not testimonial. See, e.g ., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456 (Ind. 2005) (holding that “a ‘ testimonial’ statement is one g iven or taken

. . . [ ch i ef l y for the pur

pose of] prese rving it for potential future use in leg al proc eeding s”); State v. Warsame, 7 0 1 N. W .2d 30, 16 311-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (c oncluding that statements ar e not “testimonial” simply beca use they are g iven in r esponse to police questioning and holding that the critical determination is whether an ob je c tiv e wi tne ss wo uld be lie ve that th e state me nts wo uldbe pr e se rv e d f or us e a t a late r t ri a l) ; State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Ne b. 2005) (noting t hat t he term “police interr og ation,” as use dA gai n, si nce t he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt has grant ed cert i o rari i n D avi s, i t i s uncl ear whi ch p o rt i o ns 17 of t he W as hi ng t on Supr eme Co ur t ’ s an al y s i s wi l l s ur vi ve.

I n c er t ai n c at egor i es of cas es

— for i ns t anc e, wh er e i nf ormat i on i s provi ded t o l aw e nf orce ment au t hor i t i es 18 by c on f i den t i al i n for man t s

— i t s ee ms obv i ou s t h at s t at eme n t s ma de t o a u t h or i t i es de s cr i bi n g c r i mi n al a ct i v i t y s h ou l d be deemed “t es t i mo ni al

. ” See U ni t ed St at es v. Crom er , 389 F. 3d 662 , 675 ( 6t h Ci r . 200 4) ( s t at ement s of a c onf i dent i al i nf ormant m ade t o aut hor i t i es f or t he pur po s e o f i nv es t i gat i ng and pros ecu t i ng a cr i me ar e t es t i mo ni al ) ; U ni t ed St at es v . S ilva , 3 8 0 F .3 d 1 0 1 8 , 1 0 2 0 ( 7 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ) (s ta te m e n ts to a u tho rities b y a c o n fid e n tial info rm a n t ar e tes tim o n ia l i n nat ure).
Se e, e . g . , H ammon , 829 N

. E. 2d a t 456; H embe r t t , 696 N

. W

. 2d a t 482- 83; D av i s , 111 P. 3d a t 851.

19
-12- in Crawfor d, require d “some kind of structured poli ce que stioning, intended to e licit information for use in a c ontemplated prose cution ” an d ap p l y ing a subjective standa

rd foc used on whe ther the d ec l arant intended to bea r testimony

ag ainst the ac cused to be used later ), petition for c ert. filed, (U.S. Aug

. 19, 2005) (pending J an. 6, 2006, cert. confe renc e, no. 05-5981); P eople v. Mackey , 785 N. Y. S.2 d 8 70 (N .Y . Crim . Ct. 200 4) (c on sid e ri ng su c h f a c tor s a s ( 1) thefo rm a lity of these tti ng in which the state ments were made, ( 2) whe ther the state ments wererec orded, ( 3) the de clar ant’s prima ry pu rp os e in makin g the state me nts , (4 ) wh e the r a n ob je c tiv e de c larant wo uldbe lie ve tho se statements would be used to initiate prosec utorial action and be place d into evidence at trial, (5) the use of struc tured que stioning, and (6) whether the decla rant initiated the contac t); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (foc using on the decla rant’s subjec tive intent and conc luding that ther e wa s no evidenc e that the de clar ant intended to bear witness in contemplation of late r leg al proc eeding s). 17
Al tho ug h th e c a se -b y -c a se app ro a c h re qu ir e s mor e a na ly sis on the pa rt of re vie wi ng c ou rt s, we think it is the more re asonable one in te rms of fulfilling the func tion of the Confrontation Clause, i.e., t o provide “ the rig ht . . . to be confr onted with the witnesses ag ainst him.” U.S. Const . amend. VI . It seems to us that the common denominator in the c ases se ek i n g to determine w hether a pa rt ic ula r s tate me nt t o a

po lic e of fi c e r i s “ te sti mon ia l” is w he the r the de c larant wa s ac tin g in the ro le of a “ witness” at the time the statement was ma de. 18
Alth o u g hs o me

juris d ic tions have applied a subjective standa

rd to dec ide whethe r a pa

rticular witness’s statements wer e testimonial, we believe the lang uag e of Crawf ord points to an objective 19 standard—that is, whether the statem ent was ma de “unde r circ umstances whic h would lead an objective witness r easona bly to be lieve that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawf ord, 541 U.S. at 52. Using this standard as the overa rching consideration, we believe it appr opriate to c onsider the following fac tors in deciding whether a particu l ar statement is “testimonial”: (1) w hether the decla rant was a victim or an observe r; (2) whether contact wa s initi ated by the dec lara nt or by

lawenfor ceme nt officials; (3) the deg ree of formality attending the circ umstances in which the statement was made; (4) whether the statement was g iven i n response to questioning, whether the questioning was struc tured, a nd the scope of such questioning ; (5) whe ther the state ment was re corde d (either in wri t ing or

by elec tronic mea ns); (6) the de clar ant’s purpose in making the statements; (7) the office r’s purpose in speaking with the decla rant; and ( 8) whe ther a n objec t ive dec lara nt under theT he M as s ach us et t s A pp eal s C our t b as ed i t s hol di ng o n a def i ni t i on of

“ po l i ce i nt er r ogat i on” t hat i ncl udes 20 p rel i m i nary f act gat heri ng and ass ess m ent of whether a c rime has t aken p l ace. W i l l i am s, 83 6 N

. E

. 2 d at 33 8 ( ci t i ng C o m m o nwealt h v. G o nsal ves, 83 3 N

. E

. 2 d 54 9 (M ass . 20 0 5 ))

. -13- circ umstances would be lieve that the statements would be use d at a tria l. This lis t is not ex haustive; other c onsiderations may

also be meaningf

ul depending on the particular fa cts of the c ase.

F. Is an Ex c ite d U

tte ra nc e “Te sti mo nia l”? The ne x t issue pr esente d in both case s is w hether the statements, alleg ed by the State to be “excited uttera nces,” can beclassified a s “testimonial.” The State arg ues that an e x cited utterance can ne ver c onstitut e testimonial hear say beca use it is made spontaneously in rea ction to a

startling event; t h u s , t he dec lara nt speaks in re sponse to that event r ather than in anticipation of be aring witness. Various jurisdictions disag ree on this issue. Some ag ree that an ex cited utt erance c annot constitute testimonial hearsay . See United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8 Cir. 2005); th Ander son v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 ( Alaska Ct. App. 2005); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr.3d 770, 776 (C al

. C t

. App. 2004); P eople v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 775, 880 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. App. 2004); Key

v. State, 173 S.W .3d 72, 76 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). Howeve r, Craw ford se ems to rejec t thi s noti on . Re fe re nc ing thefa c ts o f Wh ite v. Illi no is, 50 2 U .S. 34 6 ( 19 92 ), wh e re in a c hil d v ic tim made “ spontaneou s d ec l ar at i o n s ” t o an i n v es t i gat i n g p o l i ce o ff i ce r, t h e C ra wf

o rd C ourt cha

rac terized those statem en t s as “testimonial,” implicitlyreje cting the notion that excited utterance s are nontestimonial. Crawford, 541 U .S. at 58 n.8. A sec ond g roup of c ases holds that the e x cited n ature of the utterance ha s no bearing on w h e th e r a p arti c u la r s tate me n t i s te s ti mo n ia l. I n s te a d , th e f o c u s is e n ti r e ly

o n th e declarant’s objectively re as o n ab le expectations. See State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631, 639 (Ariz. C t. App. 2005) (commenting that “[w]hi le a de clar ant’s emotional state may ‘still’ refle ction, . . . such a de clar ant may nevertheless reasonably appre ciate or expect that his statement wil l have an impact on whethe r an ar rest is made, c harg es arebroug ht or g uilt is attributed”) , revie w g rante d, (Ariz., Nov. 29, 2005); L opez, 888 So.2d at 699-700 (stating that “ a sta rtled per son who identifies a suspe ct in a stateme nt made to a police o ff

i ce r at t h e s ceneof a c rime sure ly knows that the statement is a f orm of acc usation that will be used ag ainst the suspect” ); Commonwealth v. Wil liams, 836 N.E.2d 335, 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (a ssault victim’s statements to police made while she was still “shaken, . . . very upset, . . . crying, te ary

ey ed, re d ey ed” w ere nevertheless testimonial). 20
A th ir d g r o u p o f

c o u rts

— th e ma

jo r ity

— c o n s id e r s th e to ta li ty

o f th e c ir c u ms tan c e s u nder wh ic h th e e xcit e d u tte ranc e s w e rema de to d e c idewh e the r th ey are “ te sti mon ia l.” Th e se jurisdictions consider the testim onial hear say analy sis and the excited utteranc e analy sis to be int e rd e pe nd e nt. I n s omec a se s, be c aus e thee xcit e d u tte ranc e is m ade to po li ce in r e sp on se to qu e sti on ing , th e c ou rt loo ks to w he the r the po lic e a c tio n amou nte d to “ int e rr og a tio n, ” wh ic h w ou ld make the statement testimonial under Craw ford. See, e.g ., Drayton v. United States, 877 A.2d 145, 150 (D.C. 2005) (disting uishing be tween initial on-the- scene questioning done for the pur pose of-14-

se c uring thesc e ne [non te sti mon ia l] a ndqu e sti on ing do ne fo r the pu rp os e of inv e sti g a tio n andfa c tg a the ri ng [te sti mon ia l]) ; H a mmo n, 82 9 N .E.2 d a t 44 6 ( ho ldi ng that “ state me nts to .

. . of fi c e rs in response to ge nera l initi al inquiries ar e nontestimonial but statements made f or purpose s [of either the dec lara nt or the questioner ] of preserving the acc ounts of potential witnesses are testimonial”); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811-14 (Minn. 2005) (hold ing that statements made f or the purpose of

seeking police intervention nontestimonial; vi ctims, not poli ce, initiated the e ncounter , and the victims re mained emotionally distraug ht throug hout the entire c onversation); Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d at 482 (noting that some excited utteranc es are testimonial and others a re not—the pe rtinent inquiry is whether the decla

rant wa s awa

re or expecting that his or her

statements might late r be use d at a tria l); Peop l e v. C oleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (N .Y. App. Div. 2005) ( holding that statemen ts ma de we reno nte sti mon ia l be c aus e theprima ry motivatio n o f the de c larant w a s to c a ll for a ssistance).
I n some ca ses, the courts have re cog nized that the startling e vent g i v i ng rise to an e x cited utteranc e may

be of suc h a nature that it dissipates the ve ry qualities that otherwise mig ht rende r the statement testimonial. See, e.g., People v. King , 121 P.3d 234, 240 (Colo. C t. App. 2005) (holding that wher e the state ments weremade to police in a non-c u s t o d i al s etting, w ithout indi cia of formality , and while the vic tim was under considera ble pain and dis tress, the stateme nts could not be viewe d by

any rea sonable pe rson as be ing ma de with the expectation th at t h ey wo u ld be used prosec utorially

and thu s we re n o n t estimonial); State v. L ewis, 619 S.E.2d 830, 842 (N.C. 2005) (conc luding that the vic tim’s ex cited utterances at the scene wer e non-te stimoni al bec ause ( 1) the statements were given during the preliminary stag es of the inve stigation, (2) police que stioning wa s un struc t u r e d , a n d ( 3 ) t h e v i c t i mw o u l d n o th a v e r e a s o n ab l y e xp e c t e d t h a th e r

e xc i t e d s t a t e me nts would be used at trial, but also holding that the vic tim’s later off -the-sc ene ide ntification of the d e f e n d a n tw a s t e s t i m o n i a l , s t a t i n g t h a t“ s tru c t u r e d p o l i c e q u e s t i o n i n g i s a k e y c o n s i d e r a t i o n in determining whe ther a

statement is or is not testimoni al”)

. We rejec t both per se approa ches—the one that automatica lly exempts all ex cited utterances from cla ssification as testimonial hear say and the one that eff

ectively disreg ards the e x cited natur e of the utterance. We f

avor an approa ch that conside rs bot h the t estimonial hearsay analy sis and the excited utteranc e ana ly sis and that considers the totality of the c ircumstance s in order to de termine whether a part i cular excited utteranceshould be dee med testimonial. The primary consideration under such an appr oach r emains whe ther the de clar ant was a cting as a “ witness”—that is, “be aring testimony ” ag ainst the ac cused. To this end, we adopt the definiti on of “testimony ” re fer ence d by the Supreme Court in Craw ford: “‘ [a] solemn decla ration or a ffirmation made for th e p u rp o s e of establishing or proving some fac t.’” Crawf ord, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Webster). We also note that Cr a w f o r d e m p h a s i z e d t h a tt h e t yp e s o f s t a t e m e n t s t h e C o u rtc o n s i d e r e d “ t e s t i m o n i a l ” w e r e t ho se fo rm a l ty pe s o f s tatem ent s— inc lud ing tho se ma de in a po lic e int e rr og a tio n—that a re a so na ble decla rant would e x pect to be use d prosec utorially or at trial. I d. at 51-52.Ad mi t t edl y , t hi s ca s e i s s om ewh at di f fer ent f r om mo s t ca s es i n t hat t he vi cti m is d ec ea s ed f r om ca us es 21

un r el at ed t o t he as s aul t i n ques t i on. In many of t hes e c as es , t he vi ct i m f ai l s t o app ear becau s e t he part i es ha ve r econc i l ed o r b e c a u se o f f

e a r o f re trib u tio n fro m the a ssa ilan t. -15-

G. Application of the Law When the prosec ution seeks to introduce a d e c la r an t’ s o u t- o f

- c o u r t s ta te me nt, and a de fendant raises a Confront at i o n C l ause obje ction, the initial determination under Cra wford is whe ther the state me nt i s te sti mon ia l or no nte sti mon ia l. C ra wf

or d, 54 1 U. S. a t 68

. I f the state me nt i s te sti mon ia l, then the trial c ourt must determine whether the decla rant is available or unavailable t o testify . I f the decla rant is a vailable, then there is no confr ontation pr oblem: “ [t ]he Clause does not bar a dmission of a state ment so long a s the dec lara nt is pre sent at trial to de fend or explain it.” I d. at 59 n.9 (c iting Ca lif ornia v. Gr e e n, 39 9 U .S. 14 9, 16 2 ( 19 70 )) . I f the de c larant is un a vaila ble , th e tria l c ou rt

mus t determi n e wh et her the acc used had a prior opportunity

to cross-e x amine the de clar ant about the substance of

this statement. I d. at 68. I f the a ccuse d had such an opportunity , the statement may be a d m i s s i b l e i f

i ti s n o to t h e r w i s e e x c l u d ab l e h e ar s a y. If t h e a c c u s e d d i d n o th a v e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y, then the stateme nt must be ex cluded.
I f the stateme nt is nontestimonial, the C onfrontation C lause analy sis does not end. I nstead, consistent with Ohio v. R o b er t s, 448 U.S. 56, the court must determine w hether the out-of- court statement bea

rs ade quate indicia of reliability —specific ally , whether it falls within a “firmly rooted he ars a y e xce pti on ” or be ars “ pa rt ic ula ri zedg ua rante e s o f t

ru stw orthi ne ss. ” Se e Cr a wf or d, 54 1 U .S. at 68 (stating that “[w] h er e n o n t est imonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholl y

consistent with the F rame r’ s d e sig n to af

fo rd the State s fle xibil ity in the ir de ve lop me nt o f h e ars a y

la w— a s d oe s [O hio v.] R oberts”)

.

H. Sta te v . M ac lin 1. Cra wfo rd

v . W as hin gto n A na ly sis Maclin’s c ase involves a co m m o n s cena

rio—cha rg es arising fr om a domestic violence incident, and the vic tim does not appear to t es t i fy

. I t has bee n estimated that betwe en eig hty and nin e ty pe rc e nt o f d ome sti c vio le nc e c omp la inants re c a nt the ir a c c us a tio n s o r

re fu se to c oo pe rate wi th pr o s e c u t o r s . S e e T o mLi n i n g e r , E v i d e n t i ar y I s s u e s i n F e d e r a l P r o s e c u t i o n o f V i o l e n c e A g a i n st Women, 36 I nd. L . Rev. 6 8 7 , 7 0 9 n . 7 6 (2003). Thus, befor e Craw ford, pr osecutors trie d many 21 domestic violence case s without the complainant’s testimony , relyi n g u p o n hear say testimony coming in under a n excited utteranc e or othe r hea rsay exception. See, e.g., Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878. It is conceiva

ble that Crawf

ord will have a

g reat effe ct upon trials of this kind.
I n th is c a se , p oli c e we resu mmo ne d to thesc e ne by thevic tim . Whenpo lic e arrive d, in re sp on se to the of

fi c e rs ’ g e ne ra l qu e sti on of wh e the r e ve rythi ng wa s o kay , th e vic tim laun c he d in to a detailed narr ative of the defe ndant’s assault on her. We c annot char acte rize the g ener al inquiry asC o y v. Iowa, 48 7 U

. S. 10 1 2 , 10 2 1 (19 8 8 ); Stat e v. G o m ez, 16 3 S.W

. 3 d 63 2 , 64 7 (T enn. 20 0 5 ). 22 -16- “police inter

rog ation” in the s ense of formalized, s tructure d questioning. Howeve r, considering that the victim initi ated the c ontact with policeby her 911 c all, that any

immediate dang er subsided upon police ar rival, and the extraordinary detail recited in the victim’s statements to police—e videncing a c o mp r e h e n s io n o f

th e s ig n if

ic a n c e o f h e r w o r d s

— th e s e s tate me n ts ar e s u c h th a t th e “ d e c la r a n t[ ] would rea sonably

[have] ex pect[ed] [ them] t o be used pr osecutoria lly .” Craw ford, 541 U.S. at 51. Further, unde r these c ircumstance s “an obje ctive witness re aso n ably[would have] believe[d] that the statement[s] would be available for use at a late r trial.” I d. at 52. We conclude that, by making these stateme nts to poli ce, the victim was ac ting a s a “w itness” g iving “ testimony ” and, thus, that the stat em ents wer e testimonial. Cf. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (re asoning that once the immediate dang er has subsided, a person who speaks, even if still under the str e ss o f a sta rt lin g e ve nt, is m or e lik e ly ableto c omp re he ndthelarg e r sig nif ic a nc e of he r w or ds ; “[i] f the re cord f

airly supports a finding of compre hension, the fact t hat t he stateme nt also qualifies as an e x cited utterance w ill not alter its testi monial nature.” ). Al tho ug h th e de c e a se d v ic tim is u na vaila

ble , th e re is n o e vid e nc e a ndno c la im b y theState that th e de fe nd a nt p re vio us ly ha d a n o pp ortun ity

to c ro ss- e xami ne the vic tim abo ut the se state me nts

. Ac c or din g ly , th e a dmi ssi on of the se state me nts vio late d th e de fe nd a nt’ s Co nf ro ntatio n Cl aus e ri g hts under Cra wford. While both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that violations of the Confrontation Clause a re subjec t to harmless err or re view, since the only evidenc e 22 lin kin g thede fe nd a nt t o th e vic tim ’s a ssa ult wa s th e vic tim ’s state me nts , the e rr or wa s n ot h arm le ss. Acc ording ly , the def

endant’ s conviction for rec kless ag g ravated assault is reve rsed and dismiss ed. I n light of this disposition, i t is unnecessa ry to rea ch the lesse r-include d-off ense issue.

I. State v. Ande rson 1. Cra wfo rd

v . W as hin gto n A na ly sis The issue is much easier to resolve in Ande rson’s ca se. A police office r trac king dow n the source of an audible burg lar a larm wa s flag g ed down by teena g ers who, in response to the que stion, “What’s g oing on?,” pointed to the building from which the a larm wa s sounding and told the office r that a “l ar ge blac k man with a bald he ad” ha d kicked in the door and wa s still inside. Clearly the office r wa s on the scene as a r esult of the burg lar a larm and a cting in a pre liminary investigational mode, trying to a scertain the source of the alarm and what had c aused it. Considering the informal nature of the “ flag -down” b y b y s t an d er witnesses and the g ener al natureof the que stion, “What’s g oing on?,” this can ha

rdly be cha rac terized as an inter

rog ation. Furthermore , the nature o f the statement wa s not acc usatory or even direc ted s pecif ically at t he defendant; it was mer ely intended to direct police intervention to a c rime in prog ress. I t is unlikely that the declara nts anticipated that their statements would be used prose cutorially or that an obje ctive witness re asonably would have be lie ve d th a t th e st ate men ts wo uldbe a vaila blefo r u se a t a

late r t ri a l. L ike wi se , th e of

fi c e rs ’ purpose in spea

king w ith the witnesses was not to deve lop eviden ce fo r prosec ution or trial, but-17-

mere ly to determine w hat was ha ppening and what type of police intervention wa s neede d. The totalityof these c ircumstance s leads us to the conc lus i o n t hat the dec lara nts were not acting as “witn e s s e s ” g iv in g “ te s ti mo n y ” a n d , th u s , th a t th e ir s tate me n ts w e r e n o n te s ti mo n ia l. Cf

. United States v. Luciano, 414 F .3d 174, 180 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (teen wit ness who saw a man pointing a

g un at a woman flag g ed down a passing police cruiser and reported what he ha d seen; the c ourt held that the statement wa s an excited utteranc e made for the sole purpose of securing a ss i s t an ce for the wo ma n in da ng e r a nd , thu s, wa s no t te sti mon ia l)

. Ac c or din g ly , th e a dmi ssi bil ity of thestate me nts at issue is g overne d by Oh io v . Ro be rt s. 2. Oh io v . R ob e rts An aly sis
Un de r O hio v. Rob e rt s, a n o ut- of -c ou rt state me nt i s a dmi ssi bleif it f a lls wi thi n a

“ fi rm ly ro ote d h e ars a y

e xce pti on ” or

be ars “ pa rt ic ula ri zedg ua rante e s o f t

ru stw orthi ne ss. ” Rob e r

t s , 4 48 U. S. 66. We note that both the United States Supreme C o u rt an d t his Court have held that the e x cited utteranc e exception is firmly rooted. See Whit e, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8; State v. Tay lor, 771 S.W .2d 38 7, 39 3- 94 (T e nn . 1 98 9) . A c c or din g ly , th e qu e sti on is w hethe r the state me nts of thejuv e nil e ey ewitnesses w ere exit ed utterances unde r Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 803(2). 3. Ex c ite d U

tte ra nc e An aly sis As noted above , the excited utteranc e exception re quires that (1) ther e b e a st artling event or condition; (2) the state ment relate to the startling event or condition; an d (3 ) t h e statement be made while the decla

rant wa s still under the stress or e x citement of the event or condition. T enn. R. Evid. 803(2); S tate v. Stout, 46 S.W .3d 689, 699-700 (Tenn. 2001). We ag ree with the State that p er s o nally

observing the inception of a burg lary in prog ress is a startling eve nt. Furthe r, the declara n t s ’ st atements in this case clea rly relate to their observations of the orig in of the burg lar alarm. Finally , from the short time that passed from Offic er Sm ith’s first hea ring the burg lar a larm to his contact with the decla rants, and fr om the decla

rants’ de meanor , which Of fice r Smith described as “e x cited” and “spea

king at onc e,” it is clea

r that they

wer e still under the stress and excitement of thesta rt ling ev ent

. Acco rd ing ly , w e ho ld that th e tria l c ou rt didno t a

bu se its dis c re tio n in concluding that the dec lara nts’ statements qualified a s “excited utteranc es” and wer e admissible.

CONCLUSI ON
We a do pt a

c a se -b y -c a se app ro a c h to deci de wh e the r a pr of fe re d h e ars a y

state me nt i s “testimonial,” with the primary consideration be ing whether the decla rant was acting in the role of a “w itness” at the time t he stateme nt was made . Furthermore , we f ollow the lead of

the United States Supreme C o u rt , wh o se lang uag e in Crawf ord appe ars to fa vor application of an objec tive standard in de ciding whether a particular statement is “testimonial”—that is, whether the statement was made “under circ umstances which would lead an objective witness rea sonably to believe that thestate me nt w ou ld b e a va ila blefo r u se a t a

late r t ri a l.” Cr a wf

or d, 54 1 U .S. a t 52 . T he sa me objective stan d ar d ap p lies when the state ment is an “e x cited utterance.” Thus, depending on the-18-

fac ts of a p arti c u la

r c a s e , a n e xc it e d u tt e r a n c e c a n ( o r c a n n o t) b e “ te s ti mo n ia l” in n a tu r e . I f the excited utteranc e is determined to be “testimonial,” then unde r the Six th A mendment ana ly sis used in C ra wf or d v . Wa sh ing ton , 5 41 U. S. 36 (2 00 4) , a nd un de r ou r o wnTe nn e sse e Con sti tut ionArtic le I , S ec t i o n 9 rig ht to “meet the witnesse s fac e to fa ce,” the statement is inadmissible unless the witness was una vailable and the def endant ha d a prior opportunityfor c ross-examination. I f the excited utteranc e is not testimonial, then admis sibili ty is g overne d by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Ac cording ly , the opinions of the Court of C ri m i nal Appea ls are modifie d follows: for defe ndant L arrie Maclin, the conviction for rec kless ag g ravated assault is reve rsed and the cha rg es dismiss ed; for de fendant Michael L ebron A nderson, the c onviction for burg lary is affirme d. Th e c os ts o f the app e a l in the matte r ag a ins t def e nd a nt L arrie Ma c lin areta xedto the State of Tenne ssee. It a

ppearing that the defe ndant Michae l Anderson is indig ent, the costs of his appe al are taxed to the St ate of

Tenne ssee.

___________________________________

WI LL I AM M. BA RKER Chief J ustice