Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-3069 | July 8, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Talisha Griffin

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Marjorie Lawyer-Smith

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andriosha M. Brown,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 8, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-3069

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Clayton Graham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G07-1907-CM-27477

Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-3069 | July 8, 2020 Page 2 of 7

Summary

[1] Andriosha Brown appeals her conviction for criminal mischief, a Class B 

misdemeanor. We affirm.

Issue

[2] Brown presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the 

evidence is sufficient to convict Brown for criminal mischief, a Class B

misdemeanor.

Facts

[3] Brown and Deondre1 have four children together and have been in an open 

relationship for eight or nine years. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. On June 2, 2019, Brandi 

Ingram (“Ingram”) was visiting Deondre at another friend’s apartment in 

Marion County. During the visit, Ingram heard a noise outside the apartment. 

Ingram then went to the window of the apartment where she witnessed Brown 

repeatedly striking the windows of Ingram’s 2014 Mazda with a short pole. 

Ingram recognized Brown because Ingram and Brown went to high school 

together and grew up in the same neighborhood.

[4] According to Ingram, the incident lasted approximately five minutes; Brown

first broke the front windshield and subsequently broke the passenger side and 

driver side windows. Ingram also witnessed Brown attempt to unsuccessfully

1 Deondre’s last name was not provided in the court record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-3069 | July 8, 2020 Page 3 of 7

break the back window. After Brown left, Ingram called her mother, Sarah 

Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald”), and her cousin. Ingram observed Brown leave the 

scene, but Brown kept returning. Ingram’s cousin arrived approximately fifteen 

minutes later and followed Ingram to Fitzgerald’s house. While at Fitzgerald’s

home, Ingram called the police. According to Fitzgerald: (1) the windshield 

and the back window of the 2014 Mazda were both broken; and (2) the back 

window, located behind her grandson’s car seat in the back seat, was broken 

and the car seat was covered with broken glass fragments.

[5] Officer Turner2 with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived

at Fitzgerald’s residence. Officer Turner took photographs and spoke with

Ingram. Ingram later spoke to Detective Richard Eldridge and emailed him a

video3 depicting Brown by Ingram’s car.

[6] The State charged Brown with criminal mischief, a Class A misdemeanor. A 

bench trial was held in December 2019. At the close of the presentation of the 

State’s evidence, Brown moved to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 41(B), 

which the trial court denied.

[7] Brown testified that, in the afternoon on June 2, 2019, she took her children to 

a waterpark. Brown denied that she damaged Ingram’s car windows. At the 

2 Officer Turner’s first name was not provided in the record.

3 Ingram testified she attempted to record the incident but testified she “recorded [Brown] moments after she 

bust (sic) the last window”. Tr. Vol. II p. 17.
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bench trial, the State did not introduce the police report, photographs, or

Ingram’s video into evidence. During closing arguments, the State contended

the police report did not “add any merit to the case . . .” Id. at 35-36. 

[8] The trial court entered judgment on the lesser-included offense of criminal 

mischief, a Class B misdemeanor, and stated: “. . . it was not made clear to the 

Court through the testimony at trial that [the damage] was at least $750.” Id. at 

37. The trial court sentenced Brown to 180 days, with 174 days suspended to 

probation. Brown now appeals her conviction.

Analysis

[9] Brown argues the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. When 

there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh 

evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 

(Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied), 

cert. denied. Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to the 

judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” Id.

(quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is 

supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some 

conflict in that evidence.’” Id.; see also McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 

(Ind. 2018) (holding that, even though there was conflicting evidence, it was 

“beside the point” because that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as 

a reviewing court”). “We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-3069 | July 8, 2020 Page 5 of 7

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 

144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).

[10] Brown was found guilty of criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor, pursuant 

to Indiana Code Section 35-43-1-2(a), which provides4

: “A person who 

recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damages or defaces property of another 

person without the other person’s consent commits criminal mischief . . . .” 

Brown’s specific argument is that the evidence is insufficient to prove Brown 

damaged or defaced Ingram’s 2014 Mazda because: (1) there is a lack of 

evidence presented to prove the damage was caused by Brown; and (2) 

Ingram’s testimony is incredibly dubious.

[11] The incredible dubiosity rule “allows an appellate court to impinge upon the 

fact-finder’s assessment of witness credibility when the testimony at trial was so 

‘unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever 

reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.’” Carter v. State, 44 

N.E.3d 47, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 

(Ind. 2015)). “Incredible dubiosity is a difficult standard to meet, requiring 

ambiguous, inconsistent testimony that ‘runs counter to human experience.’” 

Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)). In Moore, our 

Supreme Court held that “the appropriate scope of the incredible dubiosity rule 

4 The Class A misdemeanor statute has a pecuniary loss requirement of “at least seven hundred fifty dollars 

($750) but less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).” Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2. Although Brown was charged 

with a Class A misdemeanor, the trial court convicted her of a Class B misdemeanor. Accordingly, we will 

not discuss the pecuniary loss requirement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-3069 | July 8, 2020 Page 6 of 7

as utilized in Indiana and other jurisdictions requires that there be: 1) a sole 

testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or 

the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” 

Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756. 

[12] Brown’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced. Importantly, 

Ingram’s testimony was consistent throughout. Ingram claimed Brown was 

present at the scene and broke the windows of the 2014 Mazda. The fact that 

Ingram testified that Brown and Deondre also had an altercation that day does 

not render the incredible dubiosity rule applicable. See Berry v. State, 703 N.E.2d 

154, 160 (Ind. 1998) (declining to apply the incredible dubiosity rule to 

defendant’s argument that the testimony of the State’s witnesses conflicted, 

because no witness contradicted himself). 

[13] Brown also argues that Ingram’s testimony regarding the extent of the damage 

conflicted with Fitzgerald’s testimony. Ingram testified she could clearly see 

Brown striking the Mazda windows with a short pole. Ingram then testified 

that, after Brown broke the front, driver-side, and passenger windows, Brown 

attempted to break the rear window of the vehicle. Similarly, although she was 

not present when the damage occurred, Fitzgerald testified that when she saw 

the vehicle, the front windshield, driver-side and passenger-side windows, and 

the rear window of the Mazda were broken. Brown contends there is an 

inconsistency between Ingram’s and Fitzgerald’s testimony concerning the 

damage incurred to the rear window.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-3069 | July 8, 2020 Page 7 of 7

[14] This difference in Ingram’s and Fitzgerald’s testimony presents a mere 

credibility question for the trial court, and the incredible dubiosity doctrine does 

not apply. Ingram’s testimony was not inherently contradictory, equivocal, or 

the result of coercion; accordingly, Brown fails to satisfy the second prong of 

the incredible dubiosity rule. Brown’s argument that Ingram’s testimony is 

insufficient because it conflicts with Fitzgerald’s testimony is simply a request 

for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 

210. 

[15] Ultimately, Ingram testified that she saw Brown strike the Mazda with a short 

pole, and the trial court found Ingram to be a credible witness. The State 

presented evidence that Brown recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged 

the vehicle without the owner’s consent. Accordingly, the State introduced

sufficient evidence to convict Brown of criminal mischief, a Class B

misdemeanor. 

Conclusion

[16] The evidence is sufficient to support Brown’s conviction. We affirm.

[17] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.