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Filed 6/24/24 P. v. Quinnine CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID ANTHONY QUINNINE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165902

 (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 

19-NF-015588-A)

David Anthony Quinnine appeals after a jury convicted him 

of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); 

count one),1 theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd. 

(d); count three), and extortion by means of force or threat (§ 520; 

count six). Quinnine asserts the trial court committed

instructional error by declining to give a mistake-of-fact or claimof-right instruction. We find no error and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

In 2017, Lucy M. died, leaving behind, among others, her 

husband of almost 40 years, David M., and her nephew, 

Quinnine. At the time of her death, Lucy held five Charles 

Schwab brokerage accounts. Those accounts were transferred to 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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David’s ownership—who was designated as Lucy’s sole primary 

beneficiary—on Lucy’s death. 

In late 2018, David broke his hip and had partial hip 

replacement surgery. Due to this injury and an earlier traumatic 

brain injury, David was in a wheelchair and needed help with 

daily activities. In early 2019, he hired Quinnine, who was 

trained as a nurse, to act as his caregiver. David paid Quinnine 

$500 per week. Initially, all went well. However, within a few 

months, Quinnine became aggressive and unkind toward David. 

David testified that, on May 10, 2019 (when David was 65

years old), Quinnine stormed into his bedroom, smelling of 

alcohol, and with a “really evil” look in his eyes. Quinnine held a 

metal “reacher” tool—which David used to pick up objects that he 

was otherwise unable to reach—to David’s throat and demanded 

to know how much money was in the Charles Schwab accounts 

Lucy had left him. Quinnine expressed his belief that the money 

in Lucy’s former Charles Schwab accounts was to be split four 

ways between himself, his two siblings, and David. David had 

never heard Lucy make any such promise. 

Fearing for his life, David told Quinnine how much was 

then in the accounts. Quinnine then demanded David give him 

$700,000—which was more than one quarter of the total amount 

in the accounts. Quinnine continued to brandish the reacher, 

saying “don’t make me hurt you.” Because David felt unable to 

defend himself and was afraid that he “would die or something 

terrible would happen” if he did not give Quinnine the money, 

David wrote Quinnine a check for $700,000. 

Quinnine cashed the check that same day, at first 

depositing it into an account at Bank of America but moving most 

of it (not long thereafter) to an account at Charles Schwab. 

Quinnine continued as David’s caregiver for a few more weeks 

and physically abused him on several occasions. Once, Quinnine 

demanded David give Quinnine’s siblings $700,000 each, and hit 
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David in the face several times when he refused. David did not 

fire Quinnine or report his behavior to police because he was 

afraid. 

Eventually, Quinnine stopped showing up and David hired 

a new caregiver, Kevin G. Kevin noticed that David was 

depressed, and his physical condition was deteriorating. David 

eventually told Kevin about his problems with Quinnine, 

including the events of May 10. Later that same day, Kevin (who

believed he was a mandated reporter) and David filed a police 

report. 

Police officers executed a search warrant at Quinnine’s

apartment, and he was arrested. During an interview with a 

police detective, Quinnine admitted depositing the $700,000 

check into his account at Bank of America but falsely denied 

moving any of it. After his arrest, Quinnine instructed his 

girlfriend to gradually transfer the remaining money into an 

account in her name. 

B.

Quinnine testified that Lucy had practically raised him,

and they remained close in adulthood. Shortly after Lucy’s 

death, Quinnine received $46,000 as a primary beneficiary on two 

of her Vanguard accounts. 

According to Quinnine, he never placed the reacher against 

David’s throat or otherwise physically abused David. Quinnine 

testified that David had voluntarily written the $700,000 check—

after only a conversation in which Quinnine threatened to quit

and reminded David that Lucy promised that the money in the 

Charles Schwab accounts would be divided evenly between 

David, Quinnine, and Quinnine’s two siblings. At trial, Quinnine 

admitted spending, within 10 days of receiving the money, 

$53,150 on dental implants and $64,818 to pay tax bills. 
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C.

The jury convicted Quinnine of second degree robbery, theft 

from an elder or dependent adult, and extortion by means of force 

or threat. The jury could not reach verdicts on two charged

counts of battery on an elder or dependent adult (§ 243.25; counts 

four & five) and, on the People’s motion, the court dismissed a 

count for criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count two). The jury 

also could not reach a verdict on an enhancement allegation that

Quinnine had personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. 

(b)(1)) in committing counts one and three. The trial court 

sentenced Quinnine to prison for a term of three years for the

robbery and stayed punishment on the other counts. 

DISCUSSION

Quinnine argues that the trial court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury, with respect to counts one and three, on 

mistake-of-fact or claim-of-right defenses. We have reviewed his 

claim of instructional error de novo (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 558, 569-570), but disagree. 

1.

Defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury 

with CALCRIM No. 3406, which provides (with respect to specific 

intent crimes): “The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]>

if (he/she) did not have the intent or mental state required to 

commit the crime because (he/she) did not know a fact or 

mistakenly believed a fact. [¶] If the defendant’s conduct would 

have been lawful under the facts as (he/she) believed them to be, 

(he/she) did not commit <insert crime[s]>. [¶] If you find that the 

defendant believed that <insert alleged mistaken facts>, (he/she) 

did not have the specific intent or mental state required for 

<insert crime[s]>. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt about 

whether the defendant had the specific intent or mental state 
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required for <insert crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty 

of (that crime/those crimes).” (Italics added.)

Defense counsel argued “what prompted Mr. Quinnine to go 

into the room was a dispute over what he believes is his own 

property . . . [a]nd so if when he was talking to [David, Quinnine] 

believed . . . that was his property, then that would negate his 

specific intent.” The trial court denied defense counsel’s request, 

and explained: “To me, that is getting in the claim of right 

defense through the back door . . . . He’s saying he is entitled to 

the money. In my view, it would make it lawful for him to hold a 

metal reacher to [David M.’s] neck and make those threats.” 

2.

The trial court was correct in concluding that Quinnine was 

asserting a claim-of-right defense. (See People v. Russell (2006) 

144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1429 [“a claim of right may be based on a 

mistake of fact regarding the defendant’s right to take property”], 

disapproved on other grounds by People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 

Cal.5th 838, 874, & fn. 14.) The claim-of-right doctrine “provides 

that a defendant’s good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that 

he has a right or claim to property he takes from another negates 

the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery.” 

(People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938 (Tufunga).) 

Our Supreme Court, in Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th 935, 

affirmed the rule that forcible taking of “specific personal 

property in which the defendant in good faith believes he has a 

bona fide claim of ownership or title” is not robbery. (Id. at p. 

956.) But our high court further held that, because of the strong 

public policy considerations disfavoring forcible self-help (id. at 

pp. 950, 955), the claim-of-right defense does not extend to 

“robberies perpetrated to satisfy, settle or otherwise collect on a 

debt, liquidated or unliquidated.” (Id. at p. 956.)
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Here, Quinnine did not forcibly recover specific personal 

property from David. Instead Quinnine himself denied using 

force but testified that he was accepting fungible money from 

David’s account to collect on debts David purportedly owed. (See 

Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 954 [“ ‘debtor can owe another 

$ 150 but the $ 150 in the debtor’s pocket is not the specific 

property of the creditor’ ”].) In particular, Quinnine testified that 

Lucy had promised that the assets in the Charles Schwab 

accounts would be divided evenly between David, Quinnine, and 

Quinnine’s two siblings and that “Dave was supposed to handle 

it.” Quinnine also testified that the total amount of the check 

David made out to him ($700,000) represented a quarter of the

value of the accounts plus an additional $50,000 David owed him 

under their employment agreement. Thus, the trial court did not 

err in concluding that, with respect to count one, even if Quinnine 

believed in good faith that David owed him some sum of money, 

that would not absolve him of robbery. (See Tufunga, at pp. 954-

956.) 

In addition to robbery, Quinnine was also charged with and 

convicted of theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd. 

(d))—a crime to which a claim-of-right defense could still legally 

apply.2 (Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 952–953 & fn. 4.) 

However, a claim-of-right instruction requires open taking of the 

property and that no effort was made to conceal the taking. (See 

§ 511 [property must be “appropriated openly and avowedly”]; 

Tufunga, at p. 952, fn. 4 [claim-of-right negates criminal intent 

where “the property was appropriated openly and avowedly”].) 

Quinnine’s taking of the $700,000 was not open. In fact, 

the record shows he made efforts to conceal the money—by 

initially depositing it into one account, transferring most of it to 

another account at a different bank and then, when arrested,

2 It is undisputed that a claim-of-right defense does not 

apply to extortion. (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 88.)
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telling police that all the money remained in the first account 

while also (undisputedly) instructing his girlfriend to withdraw

funds from the second account. Thus, a claim-of-right defense is 

unavailable on this record. The trial court did not err.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J. 

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.

SIMONS, J.

P. v. Quinnine (A165902)