### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 21, 200 9 S es sio n 

### JU LIA FI SH ER, ET AL 

### . v. AS HLEY REVELL, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forObion County No. 07-CV -140 William B. Acre e, Judge

No. W2008-02546-C OA-R3-C V - Filed September 30, 2009

SEPARA TE CONCURRENCE

_______________________ J UDGE H OL L Y M. KI RBY, CONCURRI NG SEPARATEL Y:

Iconcur in the result reache d by

the majority

in this case. I

must, however, disa g ree with the
ma jor ity ’s c on c lus ion

that th e c on tr a c t a t is su e is n ot a mbi g uo us

. Her e, the de clar ations pag e of the insurance contra ct states that the c overa g e limits are “$100,000 ea

pers/$300,000 ea occ.” Wit hout more, for an accident resulting in bodily injury to two persons, this provision indicates that the c overa g e limit for eac h person would be $100,000. Section 4(a) (1) state s: “The limit stated for ‘e ach pe rson’ is the amount of cover ag e and the most we wi l l pay

for a ll compensatory

damag es bec ause of

or ar ising out of bodily

injury to one person in any

one occ urre nce.” The F ishers asse rt that this lang uag e refer s to an occ urre nce r esulting in bodily injury to one per son. AOI

claims that it refe rs to any occur renc e, re g ardle ss of

the number
o f p e r s o n s w h o s u f

f e r b o d i l y i n j u r y.
S ec t i o n4 (a )( 2 ) s t at es : “T h e l i m i ts t at ed fo r ‘e ac h o cc u rr en ce ’ i s t h e to t al am o u n t o f c o v er age and the most we will pay , subject to 4.a.(1) above, f or all compe nsatory

damag es bec ause of

or arising out of bodily

injury of two or more persons in any one occ urre nce.” The F ishers asse rt that thi s is the on ly langua g e in the po lic y that sp e c if

ic a lly a dd re sse s a n o c c ur re nc e that r e su lts in b od ily injury to two persons, indicating that a total of $300,000 could be paid in such an instance . Section 4(a) (1) is not inconsist ent, they asser t, beca use 4(a )(1) addre sses separ ate situations in which an
occur renc e re sults in bodi ly

injury to o n e p erson. AO Iargues that, despite the “ two or more” lang uag e in Section 4(a )(2) , it should be interprete d as limiti ng co v erag e to $100,000 per person reg ardle ss o f t h e number of pe rsons injured. The Fisher s argue per suasively that AOI ’s interpre tation in effe ct re -writes Sec tion 4(a) (2) to say “thre e or more ” instead of “two or more ” pe rs on s. The majority

indicates that the F ishers’ inter pretation of Section 4(a) (2) is “unr easona ble” only beca use it ignor es the phra se “subjec t to 4.a.(1).” Imust re spectfully disag ree

. The Fisher s doA s not ed by t he major i t y , t he f act t hat t he Fi s her s ’ i nt er pret at i on produces an un us ual r es ul t does not mean 1
t ha t t he i r i nterp retati o n is un rea so na b l e a nd t ha t t he co ntrac t i s una m b i gu o us. -2- not ignor e thi s lang uag e; rather, they interpre t Section 4(a) (1) differe ntly from AOI ’s interpre tation. Th e F ish e rs ’ i nte rp re ta tio n o f Sec tio n 4(a )( 1) is ne ith e r imp la us ibl e no r u

nr e a so na ble , a nd it s ho uld be take n in to a c c ount. 1

L o o k i n g at all of these provisions in tot o, Icannot c onclude, a s the majority does, that the contra c t is “ u n a mb igu o u s

. ” L o o k in g a t th e f o u r c o r n e r s o f th e d o c u me n t, I w o u ld f in d that

“ re a so na bly int e lli g e nt pe rs on s cou ld co me to dif fe re nt co nc lus ion s” a s to its meanin g , an d th is i s ambig uous. 77 C.J .S. Con tra c ts § 304 (citations omitted).
When a contra ct is deeme d ambig uous, it will normally be construe d ag ainst the draf ter of the contra ct, who is responsible f or cr eatingthe ambig uity

. Parks v. Richardson , 567 S.W .2d 465, 46 8 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 97 7) ; Hanover Ins. Co. v. Haney , 221 Tenn. 148, 425 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 ( T e n n

. 1 9 6 8 )

. T h i s r

u l e , h o w e v e r , i s n o ta

p p l i e d m e c h an i c a l l y:
This rule is a valid and use ful tool for co n s t ru i n g am biguous c ontrac ts, and it has fre quently

been use d by

the court as the key to r esolving the question of which of two possible constructions of a c ontrac t to fa v o r. But it does not trump other rule s of
c on str uc tio n in a sit uatio ns

. * * * [T]he ru le of

re so lvi ngc on tr a c t ambi g uit ie s a g a ins t th e dr a ft ingpa rt y on ly a pp lie s if the interpre tation urg ed by the non-dra fting p ar t y i s re asonable and pra ctical. . . . Where the la

ng uag e of an ag ree ment is c ontradictory ,. . . or whe re its meaningis. . . susceptible of two c onstructions, one of which makes it fair, customar y , and such as pr u d e n t m e nw o u ld

n a tu r a ll y e xe c u te , w h il e th e o th e r ma k e s it in e qu it a ble, unusual or such as rea sonable men would not be likely to e nter into, the inter pretation which make s a rational and proba ble ag ree ment must be pref err ed. Stephenson v. The Third Co. , 2004 WL 383317, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App

. Fe b

. 2 7 , 2 0 0 4). He re, a s no te d b y the ma jor ity , the int e rp re ta tio n advo c a te d by the F ish e rs pr od uc e s a n “ ano ma lou s” re su lt, with eac h person r ecove ring up to $150,000 on ly if the oc c ur

re nc e re su lts in i nju

ry to t wo pe rs on s. As in Stephenson , this is an “unusual” re sult. Id. AOI ’s interpre tation, on the other hand, appe ars to be “f air [and] customary .” Id. Thus , d e sp ite the am biguit y in t he ins ur anc e c on tr a c t, I

wo uld adopt AOI ’s interpre tation and re ach the same re sult as the majority in this case.-3-

There fore , Iconcur

for the r easons se t forth in this S epar ate Concur renc e.

__________________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE