1 Filed 1/23/14 In re M.P. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

In re M.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. M.G., Defendant and Appellant. E057504 (Super.Ct.No . RIJ1201008) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Ri verside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Ju lie Koons Jarvi, De puty County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Defendant and appellant M.G. (Fathe r) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings as to his 11-year-old son M.P. (the child). He contends that (1) there was insufficient evid ence to support the juvenile court’s order sustaining the petition under Welf are and Institutions Code se ction 300, subdivision (b); and (2) the court erred in removing the ch ild from his custody. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND When the matter came to th e attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), the child was being cared for by his maternal grandmother S.P. (gra ndmother). S.P. (Mother) was in an inpatient substance abuse
program. 1 Father did not have stable housing but had secured an order for weekend visits with his child, and was in the process of securing custody rights. The child had lived with the grandmother most of his life. However, the grandmother was not the child’s legal guardian. 2 On August 9, 2012 , DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect of the child when he visits his father every weekend. The reporting party was concerned about the environments Father subjected the child to, such as where there was a lot of drinking,

1 Neither the maternal grandmother nor Mother is a party to this appeal.

2 At a review hearing, the juvenile c ourt found that the grandmother had custody of the child pursuant to a temporary fam ily law court order, and was not entitled to standing in the juvenile court proceeding.3 fighting, and lack of food, and how it had affected the ch ild. The reporting party noted that there had been a noticeabl e change in the child since J une 2012; that the child had a bald spot on the top of his head; and that the child was stressed when he was with his father. The reporting party also stated that Father at times did not supervise the child; that Father was unemployed and undocumented; and that Father had left the child alone when he believed Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was looking for him. The reporting party further asserted that the ch ild had stated that he was afraid when he goes on visits with Father and that the child’s behavior cha nges after the visits, at times, becoming aggressive. The child had been in counseling for the last three to four months and had recently begun “‘acting up.’” The grandmother reported that Father be gan weekend visits with the child on May 17, 2012, and since then the child had ende d up in the hospital “‘every weekend.’” Specifically, she asserted that Matthew wa s taken to a hospital via ambulance after suffering heat exhaustion at an air show. On other occasions, the child fell in a pothole and hurt his leg while at Father’s relative’ s house; and at another relative’s home, the child tripped over a bike tire due to it being dark and was taken to a hospital. An X-ray showed that the child had a to rn muscle and a spra in, resulting in a leg brace and crutches for the child. And on August 10, 2012, the child had hernia surgery. The child reported that Father failed to throw him a birt hday party as promised and instead took him to a restaurant and left hi m unattended while he we nt to the bathroom and spoke on his cellular telephone. The child also stated that Father took him to Father’s half brother’s house where there wa s a lot of screaming and yelling. The child4 further asserted that he is verbally hara ssed and called derogatory names by paternal relatives; that they talk about the court case when they are not supposed to; and that they smoke cigarettes around him even though he has asth ma. The child feels that his father does not spend time with him and does not watch him. He is afraid he will get hurt and be left alone. He further noted that his fath er drives with him in the car even though Father does not have a driver’s license. The child denied se eing drug use or being inappropriately touched while visiting Father. On August 24, 2012 , the social worker spoke w ith the reporting party. The reporting party did not believe Father is a “bad father,” but was concerned about the environment Father subjected the child to. The reporting party was unsure whether the child’s hair loss was due to stress or a medical condition. On August 31, 2012, another referral wa s received by DPSS alleging general neglect and physical abuse of the child. The child reported that Fa ther had hit him with an open hand on his back and ye lled and cursed at him because he did not want to go to a paternal cousin’s home. The ch ild stated that he was afraid of Father and that Father almost went off the road while driving. The child does not like to go to the paternal cousin’s home because they yell at him and he had seen a cousin e xhibit signs of drug

use. On September 4, 2012, a third referral was received by DPSS alleging physical and sexual abuse of the child. When the ch ild was taken for medical treatment for his hair loss and eczema, he reported that the ha ir loss was due to abuse when he visited Father. He stated that Father had verbally and physically ab used him and that Father had5 fondled him while he showered with him. The child further stated that Father had touched him on his private parts about 16 times , beginning when he was seven years old, and that Father had taken pictures of him wh ile he was going to the bathroom. He was not sure if Father touched him on purpose though. The child also noted that the grandmother had not allowed him to see his father in the past four weeks. Father explained to the social worker th at the grandmother is “‘putting things in [the child’s] head,’” and maki ng the child his “enemy.” He also stated that the allegations against him are false. He furt her reported that he l oves his son and wants him; that there is no fighting around the child when he takes him to his relative’s homes; that he stays with his brother on weekends to ensure the child had a safe and comfortable environment; and that the child al ways had food to eat. Fath er admitted that the child had passed out due to heat exhausti on and explained that the child was in a hurry to get to the air show and he therefore did not stop to get bottles of wate r. He also admitted to not having a driver’s license and driving the child in the car to a McDonald’s, Lake Perris, and the air show. Mother had a history of abusing drugs and had been in a drug rehabilitation center since February 2012. She la st saw the child on August 12, 2012, and was concerned about the child’s mental health. On September 26, 2012, the so cial worker was informed that the family law judge ordered the child be removed from the gra ndmother and Father. The family law judge stated that it appeared the grandmother was alienating the child from Father. The6 grandmother was upset by the order and denied coaching the child or denying Father from seeing the child. On September 28, 2012, a petition was file d on behalf of the child pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code 3 section 300, subdivisions (b ) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and (g) (no provision for suppo rt). Specifically, the petition alleged that Father had inappropriately touched the child on his private parts and taken pictures of him while he used the bathroom (allegations b-1 and d-1); that Father administered inappropriate discipline, including but not limite d to hitting the child on his back with an open hand (allegation b-2); that Father demonstrated a lim ited ability to provide a safe environment for the child, such as driving with the child without a license (allegation b3); that Mother had a history of abusing co ntrolled substances (alle gation b-4); and that Mother was unable to provide care and support for the child (allegation g-1). At the October 1, 2012 detention heari ng, the child was formally removed from his parents. The court ordered the child remain in the grandmother’s home based on various conditions. Law enforcement investigated the sexua l and physical abuse allegations made against Father and found the evidence in sufficient to take the matter further. The child was a friendly and energetic child . He appeared comfortable living with his grandmother and older half brother, and info rmed the social worker that he wanted to

3 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.7 remain placed with his grandmother. He want ed to have visits with his parents. He eventually wanted to live with his mother once she got better. The child suffered from an auto-immune disorder, and was scheduled to ha ve an MRI on his left leg to determine whether he had cancer. The social worker recommende d that the child remain in the grandmother’s care, since it was the only home the child knew. The social wo rker noted that although it appeared the grandmother may have been al ienating the child from his parents, her home was stable and she met the child’s educa tion, physical, and medical needs. The grandmother agreed to participate in services. The contested jurisdictional/dispositional h earing was held on October 30, 2012. Father, Mother, the grandmother, and the child were present. At that time, the court heard from the child in chambers regarding his wishes for vis itations with his parents. Following brief arguments from counsel, the juvenile court found allegations b-3, b-4, and g-1 true as alleged in the petition; and not true allegations b-1, b-2, and d-1. The only allegation found true against Father was the allegation that Father had demonstrated a limited ability to provide a safe environment for the child, such as driving with the child without a license. The child was declared a dependent of the court and removed from his parents’ care. The child was to remain with the grandmother on an extended visit. The parents were provided with reunification servic es and ordered to participate in their courtapproved case plans. Father was also provided with unsupervised day visits. This appeal followed.8 II DISCUSSION Father challenges the jurisdictional finding s and dispositional orders, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’ s jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300 as to both parents and that there was in sufficient evidence to support the removal order. As explained post , we conclude that his challenges fail.
A. Jurisdiction The petitioner in a depende ncy proceeding must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the child who is the subject of the petition comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. ( In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 32 9, superseded by statute as stated in In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73.) We review jurisdictional findings under the substantia l evidence standard. ( In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 574; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 244.) Under this standard, we determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the conclusion of the trier of fact. ( In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 113.) All evidentiary conflicts are reso lved in favor of the respondent, and where more than one inference can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we cannot substitute our own deductions for those of the trier of fact. ( In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) We begin with Father’s c ontention that the juvenile co urt lacked jurisdiction over the child because there was insu fficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings as to him. He further claims that because Mo ther was a noncustodial parent, the sustained9 allegations against Mother did not support the court’s jurisd iction over the child. Father refers to the grandmother as the child’s guar dian and case law regarding guardianship to support his position. Generally, to acquire jurisdiction under subd ivision (b) of section 300, the juvenile court was obliged to find that th e child “has suffered, or ther e is a substantial risk that [he] will suffer, serious physical harm or illn ess, as a result” of specified forms of parental neglect, including substance abuse, physical abuse, and failure to protect the child. Here, the juvenile court made findings against Father and Mother, namely, that the child was placed at a substantial risk of ha rm by Father’s conduct of driving with the child without a valid driver’s license and Mother’s substance abuse and inability to provide support. Father argues that ther e was insufficient evid ence to support the findings. For the reasons explained post , Father’s attack on the juvenile court’s jurisdiction fails in view of substantial evidence of the allegations against Mother. Indeed, it was undisputed that Mother had a history of abusing dr ugs and that she was residing in a rehabilitation center and was un able to provide support and care for her child. To secure jurisdiction over the child under section 300, the juvenile court was not obliged to make jurisdictional findings agai nst both Father and Mother. Because the focus of the statutory scheme governing de pendency is the protection of children, “a minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent.” ( In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397, italics added.) The agency “is not required to pr ove two petitions, one against the mother and10 one against the father, in order for the cour t to properly sustain a petition [pursuant to § 300] or adjudicate a dependency.” ( In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593, 599.) “A petition is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. [Citation.] The interests of both parent and child are protec ted by the two-step process of a dependency proceeding, with its separate adjudication and disposition hearings. Thus, when DPSS makes a prima facie case under section 300 by proving the jurisdictional facts at the adjudication hearing, it is not improper for th e court to sustain the petition; not until the disposition hearing does the court determin e whether the minor should be adjudged a dependent.” ( Ibid .; see also In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) Here, there is more than substantial evid ence to support juri sdiction of the child based on Mother’s conduct alone, and Fath er does not dispute the allegations against Mother. Accordingly, because Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurisdictional allegations as to Mother, the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over the child even if Father’s con duct was not an independent basis for jurisdiction. (See, e.g., In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48, 60 disapproved on another ground in In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 780-781; In re Jeffrey
P. (1990) 218 Cal.A pp.3d 1548, 1553-1554; In re John S. (2001) 88 Cal. App.4th 1140, 1143.) Although Father does not cha llenge the jurisdictional fi ndings based on Mother’s conduct, relying on guardianship case law, he asserts that because the grandmother shared custody of the child, the section 300 evaluation sh ould have focused on the grandmother and Father’s ability to safely care for the child. We reject this contention.11 Father’s reliance on guardianship case law does not support his position, because the grandmother was not the child’s legal guard ian. The grandmother never obtained guardianship over the child. The juvenile co urt found that the grandmother had custody of the child pursuant to a temporary family law order and was not en titled to an attorney or to have standing in the juvenile court proc eedings. As such, we reject Father’s request to remand the matter with instructions to have DPSS investigate whether section 300 allegations should be made against the grandmother. Father also argues that even if jurisdic tion over the child is established based on the allegations against Mother, the unsuppo rted allegations against Father should nonetheless be reversed because the finding will affect future proceedings. This contention was rejected by the court in In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484. In that case, the jurisdictional allegations included mother’s drug abuse, domestic violence between the parents, and the parents’ criminal histories. ( Id . at p. 1488.) The father there also challenged the jurisdictional findings based on his conduct, but not the findings based on the mother’s conduct . The court dismissed the appeal as moot because the father’s “contentions, even if accepted, wo uld not justify a reversal of the court’s jurisdiction.” ( Id . at pp. 1487-1488.) The court explai ned: “[I]t is ne cessary only for the court to find that one parent’s conduct has created circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisd iction over the child. [Citations.] Once the child is found to be endangered in the manner described by on e of the subdivisions of section 300—e.g., a risk of serious physical ha rm (subds. (a) & (b)), serious emotional damage (subd. (c)), sexual or other abuse (subds. (d) & (e)), or abandonment (subd. (g )), among others—the12 child comes within the court’s jurisdiction, even if the child was not in the physical custody of one or both parents at the time th e jurisdictional events occurred. [Citation.] For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant which parent created those circumstances.” ( Id . at pp. 1491-1492.) As DPSS established jurisdiction based on Mother’s conduct, the juvenile court properly found that the child came within the juri sdiction of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). ( In re I.A. , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491-1492.) In any event, there was substantial evid ence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, su bdivision (b), as to Father. Substantial evidence showed that the child was at substantial risk of harm due to Father’s conduct of driving the child on several occasions without a valid driver’s license. Father admitted to not having a driver’s license a nd admitted to driving the child in his car to McDonald’s, Lake Perris, and the air show. Father knew that he was not supposed to be driving the child because he did not have a license and the car was uninsured; however, he drove the child in his car anyway. Add itionally, the child reported that Father almost went off the road while driving the child in the car, and that it scar ed the child. Although Father attack’s the child’s credibility, we remind Father that “‘[i]ssu es of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone.’” ( In re Shelley J. , supra , 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 329.) Father’s actions demonstrated a lack of j udgment and a limited ability to provide a safe environment for the child and, ther eby, placed the child at risk. Father’s reliance on In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 to support his position is misplaced. The issue in J.N. was “whether evidence of a single episode of parental13 conduct was sufficient to bring the three children with in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” ( Id . at p. 1022, italics added.) In J.N ., the father was involved in a car accident while driving under the influence of alcohol, with the ch ildren in the car. Both parents were intoxicated, and two of the thr ee children were injured. Th e Court of Appeal concluded that a single episode of parental conduct was insufficient to bring the three children within the juvenile court’s ju risdiction, finding that ther e was insufficien t evidence to establish that the parents’ conduct would re cur. There was no evid ence of an ongoing substance abuse problem on the part of either parent, and “both pare nts were remorseful, loving, and indicated that they were w illing to learn from their mistakes.” ( Id . at p. 1026.) Unlike in In re J.N. , the record here reflects more th an one single incident. Father admitted to driving the child in his car on se veral occasions while not having a driver’s license. The record also show s that Father recently almost went off the road (presumably to avoid border patrol) while driving the ch ild in his car, which scared the child. Additionally, there was no eviden ce to suggest that Father’s conduct would not recur. There is substantial evidence from which the juve nile court could infer that the child is at risk in Father’s care.
B. Dispositional Orders Father also contends the order re moving the child from his custody was not supported by substantial eviden ce. DPSS argues that Fath er has waived his right to challenge the dispositional order on appeal as a result of his failure to object to removal below. Father responds that an appellate challenge to the suffici ency of the evidence14 supporting a dispositional removal order is not forfeited even if not raised in the juvenile

court. As a general rule, “the contention that a judgment [or order] is not supported by substantial evidence . . . is an obvious excepti on to the rule” that “points not urged in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.” ( Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17; see also In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 848.) Therefore, a parent’s mere failure to object to removal of his or her child at the dispositional hearing does not bar that parent from challenging the sufficiency of the ev idence supporting the removal order on appeal. Nevertheless, our independent research has uncovered case law that warrants a finding of waiver. For reasons that follo w, we hold that Father is barred from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the child from his custody. In asmuch as the juvenile court’s dispositional order comports with the court-ordered case pl an to which Father t acitly agreed in open court, he cannot now be heard to complain.
In In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, the social worker recommended in her dispositional report that the juvenile co urt remove the children from their mother’s physical custody based upon a finding of subs tantial danger to their physical health. ( Id

. at p. 587.) At the dispositional hearing, counsel for the mother submitted the matter on the recommendation of the social worker. The court followed th e social worker’s recommendation and ordered the children’s re moval from their mother’s custody. ( Id . at p. 588.)15 On appeal, the mother cha llenged the sufficiency of th e evidence to support the juvenile court’s removal order. The court conc luded that when a parent at a dispositional hearing submits on the recommendation of the social worker, the parent’s “submittal amount[s] to acquiescence” and precludes the pa rent from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dispositional order. ( In re Richard K. , supra , 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) As the court in Richard K. explained, “In our view, the mother’s ‘submitting on the recommendation’ recommended findings a nd orders, as distinguished from mere submission on the report itself. This is considerably more than permitting the court to decide an issue on a limited and uncont ested record, as was the case in [ In re ] Tommy E. [(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1234. 4 ] The mother’s submittal on the recommendation dispels any challenge to and, in essence, endorses the court’s issuance of the recommended findings and orders. [¶] In other words, the mother was not disputing that the court should adjudge her children dependents, order them removed from her custody and provide a reunification plan. If, as occurred in this case, the cour t in turn makes the

4 In In re Tommy E ., supra , 7 Cal.App.4th 1234, the court held that a parent who agrees to allow the juvenile court to determ ine whether the allegations of the petition are true based solely upon a social worker’s report does not waive his or her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s jurisdictional finding. ( Id . at pp. 1236-1239.) The court in Richard K. acknowledged that in the case of a parent’s submission of the jurisdictional finding on the social worker’s report, “the court must nevertheless weigh evidence, make a ppropriate evidentiary findings and apply relevant law to determine whether the case ha s been proved. [Citation.] In other words, the parent acquiesces as to the state of the ev idence yet preserves the right to challenge it as insufficient to support a pa rticular legal conclusion. [C itation.] Thus, the parent does not waive for appellate purposes his or her right to challenge the propriety of the court’s orders.” ( In re Richard K. , supra , 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.)16 recommended orders, the party who submits on the recommenda tion should not be heard to complain. As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. A ny other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.] Sim ilarly, in this case, by submitting on the recommendation without introducing any eviden ce or offering any argument, the parent waived her right to contest the juvenile c ourt’s disposition since it coincided with the social worker’s recommendation. He who co nsents to an act is not wronged by it. [Citation.]” ( In re Richard K. , supra , 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 589-590, fn. omitted.) In the present matter, when the court was considering disposition issues after making its jurisdictional findings, Father’s c ounsel informed the court the following: “As to disposition, we’re in agreement that my client should receiv e family reunification services and would like to see an increase in visitation, liberalized visitation to include overnights and weekends and pl acement when appropriate.” The social worker’s report recommended that Father receive services an d that the child rema in placed with the grandmother. Father did not as k the court to place the child in his custody. Father’s acquiescence in that recommendation constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evid ence to support the removal order un der the rule that a parent who submits on the department’s recommendation waives the right to contest the juvenile court’s decision if it coincides with th e social worker’s recommendation. ( Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App. 4th 798, 813, citing In re Richard K. , supra , 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 590; see also In re Kevin S . (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 886.)17 In any event, Father waived the right to challenge the court’s placement order under the doctrine of invited error. When a party’s own conduct induces the commission of an alleged error, the party is estopped u nder the doctrine of invited error from asserting the alleged error as a ground for reversal. Si milarly, a party waives the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing or acquiescing at tria l to the ruling or procedure challenged on appeal. ( In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.Ap p.3d 489, 501.) By expressly agreeing to disposition in this case and impliedly agreeing the child remain in the grandmother’s home, Father waived the right to challenge the dispositional order.
III DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ P. J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST J.

KING J.