UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4222

GERALD A. HINDS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CR-00-319)

Submitted: August 28, 2001

Decided: October 3, 2001

Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

James F. Sumpter, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Kenneth E.

Melson, United States Attorney, Robert E. Trono, Assistant United

States Attorney, Christopher R. Difusco, Third-Year Law Student,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Gerald A. Hinds appeals his conviction following a jury trial for

two counts of distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base and

one count of possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more

of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (West 1999). We affirm. 

Hinds maintains that the district court erred in denying his pretrial

motion to suppress 415 grams of cocaine base and 83 grams of

cocaine hydrochloride. We review legal conclusions made pursuant to

a district court’s suppression determination de novo, but review the

underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Johnson,

114 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 1997). When a suppression motion has

been denied, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government. United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir.

1991). 

While conducting a warrantless search of Hinds’ vehicle, agents of

the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) discovered the drugs in a duffle

bag. Hinds first argues that the DEA agents violated the Fourth

Amendment because they had no probable cause to search his vehicle.

We agree with the district court that probable cause existed to justify

the warrantless search of Hinds’ vehicle. The uncontroverted facts

reveal that DEA agents arranged a meeting between Hinds and a paid

informant on the day of Hinds’ arrest specifically to carry out a drug

transaction. In addition, the DEA agents had set up two similar meetings between Hinds and the informant just a few weeks prior to the

incident in question, and on both occasions Hinds sold cocaine to the

informant. Furthermore, the DEA’s informant identified another individual at the arrest scene as Hinds’ partner in his drug sales, and this

individual possessed the keys to Hinds’ rented car. These facts provided the DEA agents with ample probable cause to search Hinds’

vehicle. Because the DEA agents had probable cause to search Hinds’

automobile for drugs, they could search any containers located in the

car in which drugs could be found. See California v. Acevedo, 500

U.S. 565, 580 (1982). 

2 UNITED STATES v. HINDS
Next, Hinds challenges the removal of his vehicle to a garage

where the search took place. He argues that the DEA agents had time

to obtain a search warrant because he was in custody and had no

access to his car. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held

that officers may perform a warrantless search even after a vehicle is

immobilized and under police custody, if officers have probable cause

to believe contraband is inside the vehicle. See Michigan v. Thomas,

458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam). See also United States v.

Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985) ("There is no requirement that the

warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure."). 

Moreover, we have observed that the "justification to conduct a

warrantless search does not disappear merely because the car has been

immobilized and impounded. . . . [T]he fact that impoundment may

have made it virtually impossible for anyone to drive the car away or

tamper with its contents is irrelevant." United States v. Gastiaburo, 16

F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Hence, the

mere fact that the car was impounded and impossible to drive did not

require the DEA agents to seek a warrant. The scope of a warrantless

search of an automobile based on probable cause is coextensive with

a search pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. See

United States v. $29,000—U.S. Currency, 745 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir.

1984). 

Hinds finally asserts that the discovery of cocaine in his vehicle

was the result of an inventory search that the DEA agents improperly

administered. While the DEA agents did describe this search as "inventory" in their report (J.A. 36), the search was supported by probable cause. Further, the record is devoid of any indication that the DEA

agents improperly conducted a criminal investigation in the guise of

an inventory search. 

Accordingly, we affirm Hinds’ conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. HINDS 3