alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Catalina DIAZ-VILLEGAS, a.k.a. Catalina Villega-Munoz, and Jesus Manuel Diaz-Valdiviezo, Petitioners, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71815.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 8, 2008.*

Filed Sept. 15, 2008.

Catalina Diaz-Villegas, Glendale, AZ, pro se.

Jesus Manuel Diaz-Valdiviezo, Glendale, AZ, pro se.

OIL, Washington, DC, District Counsel, Office of the District Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix, AZ, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the *707District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: PREGERSON, McKEOWN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

This is a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing petitioner Catalina Diaz-Villegas’ and petitioner Jesus Manuel Diaz-Valdi-viezo’s appeal of an Immigration Judge’s order denying petitioners cancellation of removal.

A review of the administrative record demonstrates that petitioner Jesus Manuel Diaz-Valdiviezo has presented no evidence that he has a qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). *See Molina-Estrada v. INS,*293 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2002). The BIA therefore correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, respondent’s unopposed motion for summary disposition in part is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review as to petitioner Jesus Manuel Diaz-Valdiviezo are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. *See United States v. Hooton,*693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam).

Petitioner Catalina Diaz-Villegas has failed to raise a colorable constitutional or legal claim to invoke our jurisdiction over this petition for review. *See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales,*424 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005); *Torres-Aguilar v. INS,*246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss in part this petition for review for lack of jurisdiction as to petitioner Catalina Diaz-Villegas is granted. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); *Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft,*327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir.2003); *Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft,*277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002).

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
S06A1965.

#### PADRON v. PADRON.

(641 SE2d 542)

BENHAM, Justice.

We granted Ernesto Padron’s application for discretionary review to consider the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for divorce due to a perceived jurisdictional infirmity. After reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court erred. Therefore, we reverse.

Appellant filed a verified complaint for divorce in which he asserted he was a resident of Georgia and had been for more than six months prior to the filing of the complaint. OCGA § 19-5-2 prohibits a court from granting a divorce “to any person who has not been a bona fide resident of this state for six months before the filing of the petition for divorce... .’’After the parties’ settlement agreement was presented to the trial court, the court sua sponte ruled it lacked jurisdiction of the case because appellant was not a “resident,” as required by OCGA § 19-5-2.

The trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for divorce was error. “As used in OCGA § 19-5-2, ‘resident’ means ‘domicilary.’ [Cit.]” *Conrad v. Conrad,*278 Ga. 107, 108 (597 SE2d 369) (2004). See *Williams v. North Carolina,*325 U. S. 226, 229 (65 SC 1092, 89 LE 1577) (1945) (“Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce — jurisdiction, strictly speaking — is founded on domicil.”). Domicile is established by actual residence with the intent to remain there for an indefinite time. OCGA § 19-5-2; *Bufford v. Bufford,*223 Ga. 133 (2) (153 SE2d 718) (1967). Aperson’s immigration status does not, as a matter of law, preclude that person from establishing residency for purposes of obtaining a dissolution of marriage. *Abou-Issa v. Abou-Issa,*229 Ga. 77, 79 (189 SE2d 443) (1972). See *Caballero v. Martinez,*186 N.J. 548, 559 (897 A2d 1026) (2006); *Bustamante v. Bustamante,*645 P2d 40 (Utah 1982); *Weber v. Weber,*929 S2d 1165, 1168 (Fla. App. 2006); *In re Marriage of Dick,*15 Cal. App.4th 144 (18 Cal. Rptr.2d 743) (1993); *In the Matter of Marriage of Pirouzkar,*51 Ore. App. 519 (626 P2d 380) (1981); *Cho v. Jeong,*1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407, 1997 WL 306017 (Tenn. App. 1997) (unreported decision). See also *Williams v. Williams,*328 FSupp. 1380, 1383 (DC V.I.1971). Accordingly, it is error to rule that a person is not a resident of Georgia for purposes of filing a complaint for divorce based solely on the plaintiffs immigration status.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*647Decided February 26, 2007.

*Leah M. Singleton,*for appellant.

Vanessa Padrón, *pro se.*
EXHIBIT 21  SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT  Subsidiaries of the Registrant: Name
        Ownership
        State of Organization
        Other Names1.  Marvel Characters, Inc.
        100%
        Delaware
        None2.  Marvel Entertainment    International Limited
        100%
        United Kingdom
        None3.  Marvel Entertainment Japan Limited
        100%
        Japan
        None4.  Marvel Property, Inc.
        100%
        Delaware
        None5.  Marvel Publishing, Inc.
        100%
        Delaware
        None6.  Marvel Studios, Inc.
        100%
        Delaware
        None7.  Marvel Toys Limited
        100%
        Hong Kong
        None8.  MVL Film Finance LLC
        100%
        Delaware
        None9.  MVL Productions LLC
        100%
        Delaware
        None10. MVL Rights LLC
        100%
        Delaware
        None11. MRV, Inc.
        100%
        Delaware
        MRV Marvel, Inc.12. Toy Biz International     Limited
        100%
        Hong Kong
        None13. Spider-Man  Merchandising L.P.
        50%
        Delaware
        None
Page 1 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: MYLES J. KERRIGAN, THOMPSON B. SANDERS, AND O'CONNOR GRAIN CO. 

DOCKET NUMBER: 162 

DOCUMENT TYPE: ISSUANCE OF COMPLAINT 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Commodity Exchange Authority 

Washington, D. C. 20250 

ISSUANCE OF COMPLAINT - CEA Docket No. 162 

(Administrative Hearing under the Commodity Exchange Act) 

A complaint and notice of hearing has been signed by the Assistant Secretary 

of Agriculture, charging violation of the Commodity Exchange Act by: 

Myles J. Kerrigan, 

Thompson B. Sanders, and 

O'Connor Grain Co. 

The complaint charges that on various days during the period from June 29 

through July 18, 1966, Myles J. Kerrigan, acting for his own account, traded in 

corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade in amounts in excess of the maximum 

limit of 2,000,000 bushels set by the Commodity Exchange Commission. It further 

charges that to conceal the excessive trading, Mr. Kerrigan submitted false 

reports to the Commodity Exchange Authority and all of the respondents entered 

into fictitious transactions, prepared false records and failed to prepare 

certain other records. 

The issuance of a complaint under the Commodity Exchange Act does not 

constitute proof of violation of the law. Such violation is established only 

when the Judicial Officer of the Department has made a determination that the 

evidence substantiates allegations in the complaint. Complaints are filed in 

the Office of the Hearing Clerk of the Department of Agriculture and are a 

matter of public record. Pending disposition by the Judicial Officer, it is the 

policy of the Commodity Exchange Authority not to comment or elaborate on 

charges contained in complaints or to discuss evidence on which they are based. 

A public hearing on the complaint is scheduled to be held before a referee at 

10:00 a.m., local time, August 20, 1969, in Chicago, Illinois. 

LOAD-DATE: June 16, 2008 
Page 2
# FCM Data June 2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JOSEPH TAYLOR,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 586 MAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of February, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
No. 690.

#### Smith *v.*California, 336 U. S. 957.

Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-2494

In re: CHARLES A. DAVIS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

(5:11-cr-00032-RLV-DSC-1)

Submitted: February 26, 2019 Decided: February 28, 2019

Before KING, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles A. Davis, Petitioner Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Charles A. Davis petitions for a writ of mandamus setting aside his conviction and 

sentence or directing the district court to set aside his conviction and sentence. We 

conclude that Davis is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary 

circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); In re Murphy-Brown, 

LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 795 (4th Cir 2018). Further, mandamus relief is available only when 

the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. South Carolina v. United States, 907 

F.3d 742, 754 (4th Cir. 2018). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In 

re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

The relief sought by Davis is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, we 

deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

GEORGE LUIS HERRERA, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0385 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR1995-005573

The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Douglas Gerlach

Counsel for Respondent

Law Office of Stephen L. Duncan PLC, Scottsdale

By Stephen L. Duncan

Counsel for Petitioner

FILED 2-23-2023
STATE v. HERRERA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins, Judge Angela K. Paton, and Judge D. 

Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Petitioner George Luis Herrera seeks review of the superior 

court’s order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, filed 

pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. This is his third 

petition.

¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will 

not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to 

show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition 

for post-conviction relief. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538, ¶ 1 (App. 

2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review).

¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior 

court’s order denying the petition for post-conviction, petition, and 

response. Petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.

¶4 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Federal Maritime Commission
 Notice is hereby given that the following Ocean Transportation Intermediary license has been reissued by the Federal Maritime Commission pursuant to section 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984, as amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (46 U.S.C. app. 1718) and the regulations of the Commission pertaining to the licensing of Ocean Transportation Intermediaries, 46 CFR part 515. License No.
Name/address
Date reissued4619N
Amad Corporation d/b/a Amad Forwarding Corporation, 3550 N.W. 33rd Street, Miami, FL 33142
November 8, 2000.
 Sandra L. Kusumoto, Director, Bureau of Consumer Complaints and Licensing.


[FR Doc. 01-1513 Filed 1-17-01; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6730-01-P
**Fidelity**®**Canada Fund**

**Class**/Ticker

**Fidelity Canada Fund**/FICDX

In this summary prospectus, the term "shares" (as it relates to the fund) means the class of shares offered through this summaryprospectus.

**Summary Prospectus**

**December 30, 2013**
No. 648.

#### DeWar *v.*Hunter, Warden, 337 U. S. 908.

Rehearing denied;-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0365

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

DONNA ELIZABETH SUMMERS,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including February 21, 2024, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 16 2024

01/16/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0365
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

April 1, 2013

d0325

Order 

April 1, 2013

145696(29)(31)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 145696

COA: 307702

Wayne CC: 83-008596-FY

ELIJAH BURKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s December 26, 

2012 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously. The motion for miscellaneous relief is DENIED.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 32.2

                  CERTIFICATION BY PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


In connection with the Annual Report of TTR Technologies, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report") filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, I, Samuel Brill, Chief Operating Officer and
Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(1) The Company's Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





MARCH 29, 2004                              /s/ SAMUEL BRILL

                                                SAMUEL BRILL
                                                CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER
                                                (PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER)



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to TTR Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by TTR Technologies,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
Page 1 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: WILLARD E. PLATT, GEORGE F. FREY, JR., OLIVER M. HIBBERD, PATRICK M. SHEA, 

HENRY C. GATLIN, F & G COMMODITIES, AND RALPH N. PETERS & CO. 

DOCKET NUMBER: 112 

DATE: OCTOBER 3, 1963 

DOCUMENT TYPE: RULING AND NOTICE OF HEARING 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 

In re Willard E. Platt et al., Respondents 

CEA Docket No. 112 

Ruling and Notice of Hearing 

On September 6, 1963 Respondent Ralph N. Peters & Co. submitted a motion for 

summary judgment in its favor on the ground that Respondent Willard E. Platt did 

not make a trade [ILLEGIBLE TEXT] alleged in the complaint to have made, because 

it did not fail to keep the required records, and because it should not be 

charged with violations even if a floor broker failed to present proper records 

to it. On September 26, 1963 complainant answered the motion, asserting that 

summary judgment is not contemplated by Department rules of practice, that 

whether an alleged trade was made is a matter of fact which should be determined 

on the basis of evidence submitted at a hearing, and that Respondent Platt was a 

partner in Respondent Peters & Co., not merely a floor broker for it. 

The rules of practice of the Department of Agriculture do not provide for 

summary judgment or discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not make 

summary judgment applicable to this administrative proceeding. 

No adequate reason has been presented why this matter should not proceed in 

the usual way, getting the facts by stipulation of the parties or by evidence 

regularly received at an oral hearing, and getting the arguments of the parties 

thereafter as to what conclusions should be dream from the facts then of record. 

Accordingly, respondent's motion seeking to dispose of the matter as to it 

without a hearing on the facts is denied. 

Since setting the hearing for October 29, 1963, the examiner has learned that 

his son, age 17, will have his final review after boot training in the Marine 

Corps at Parris Island, South Carolina, on October 31. The examiner very much 

dislikes to postpone a hearing for his personal convenience, especially where 

the schedule of this office requires a long postponement, as here. However, the 

examiner would dislike even more to miss the Marine Corps ceremonies. 

Consequently, the hearing is postponed to 10 a.m. on Tuesday, December 3, 1963, 

in Chicago, Illinois. Notice will be given later of the location of [ILLEGIBLE 

TEXT] hearing room. 

[SEE SIGNATURE IN ORIGINAL] 

Jack W. Bain, Hearing Examiner, Referee 

October 3, 1963 

LOAD-DATE: June 16, 2008 
Page 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 6
 

<CIK>     0000744822


<NAME>      Fidelity Investment Trust


<SERIES>

        <NUMBER>        221


        <NAME>      Fidelity Nordic Fund


<MULTIPLIER>    1,000


       

<S>

<C>

<PERIOD-TYPE>

year


<FISCAL-YEAR-END>

oct-31-1997


<PERIOD-END>

oct-31-1997


<INVESTMENTS-AT-COST>

65,922


<INVESTMENTS-AT-VALUE>

73,967


<RECEIVABLES>

466


<ASSETS-OTHER>

0


<OTHER-ITEMS-ASSETS>

0


<TOTAL-ASSETS>

74,433


<PAYABLE-FOR-SECURITIES>

780


<SENIOR-LONG-TERM-DEBT>

0


<OTHER-ITEMS-LIABILITIES>

375


<TOTAL-LIABILITIES>

1,155


<SENIOR-EQUITY>

0


<PAID-IN-CAPITAL-COMMON>

57,887


<SHARES-COMMON-STOCK>

4,596


<SHARES-COMMON-PRIOR>

2,417


<ACCUMULATED-NII-CURRENT>

436


<OVERDISTRIBUTION-NII>

0


<ACCUMULATED-NET-GAINS>

6,910


<OVERDISTRIBUTION-GAINS>

0


<ACCUM-APPREC-OR-DEPREC>

8,045


<NET-ASSETS>

73,278


<DIVIDEND-INCOME>

1,464


<INTEREST-INCOME>

171


<OTHER-INCOME>

(204)


<EXPENSES-NET>

971


<NET-INVESTMENT-INCOME>

460


<REALIZED-GAINS-CURRENT>

6,923


<APPREC-INCREASE-CURRENT>

5,718


<NET-CHANGE-FROM-OPS>

13,101


<EQUALIZATION>

0


<DISTRIBUTIONS-OF-INCOME>

149


<DISTRIBUTIONS-OF-GAINS>

297


<DISTRIBUTIONS-OTHER>

0


<NUMBER-OF-SHARES-SOLD>

6,328


<NUMBER-OF-SHARES-REDEEMED>

4,182


<SHARES-REINVESTED>

34


<NET-CHANGE-IN-ASSETS>

42,407


<ACCUMULATED-NII-PRIOR>

144


<ACCUMULATED-GAINS-PRIOR>

296


<OVERDISTRIB-NII-PRIOR>

0


<OVERDIST-NET-GAINS-PRIOR>

0


<GROSS-ADVISORY-FEES>

511


<INTEREST-EXPENSE>

0


<GROSS-EXPENSE>

971


<AVERAGE-NET-ASSETS>

68,464


<PER-SHARE-NAV-BEGIN>

12.770


<PER-SHARE-NII>

 .100


<PER-SHARE-GAIN-APPREC>

3.190


<PER-SHARE-DIVIDEND>

 .050


<PER-SHARE-DISTRIBUTIONS>

 .100


<RETURNS-OF-CAPITAL>

0


<PER-SHARE-NAV-END>

15.940


<EXPENSE-RATIO>

142


<AVG-DEBT-OUTSTANDING>

0


<AVG-DEBT-PER-SHARE>

0



        



</TABLE>
**Fidelity**®**China Region Fund**

**Class**/Ticker

**Fidelity China Region Fund**/FHKCX

In this summary prospectus, the term "shares" (as it relates to the fund) means the class of shares offered through this summaryprospectus.

**Summary Prospectus**

**December 30, 2013**
CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY

#### Commonwealth of Virginia v. James Arthur Grey

December 11, 1991

Case No. (Law) 12689

By Judge James H. Chamblin

When this habitual offender adjudication proceeding was called on December 6, 1991, Mr. Engle [counsel for the defendant] filed with this Court a letter to Mr. Burch [Commonwealth’s Attorney] dated December 3, 1991, signed by Mr. Grey which proposed a continuance of this case under certain terms and conditions. Mr. Burch had endorsed the letter “not agreed: but not opposed.” I took the matter under advisement so that I could review the proposal and consult with the other judges of the circuit.

After consideration of the aforesaid letter and consulting with the other judges of the Circuit, I will not accept the proposal.

This is a civil proceeding, and if the parties reach an agreement on a conditional continuance to be followed by a dismissal of the proceeding, then I feel that the Court should honor it unless it is prevented by law from doing so. Of course, a court always has the inherent power to move cases along toward a resolution unless the law specifies otherwise. The letter does not constitute an agreement between the parties; therefore, the decision to continue the proceeding on certain conditions would have to be construed as the decision of the Court. I am of the opinion that the Habitual Offender statutes do not give the Court authority to do what the letter proposes.

The case will be placed on the docket for January 3, 1992, at 4:00 p.m. for such further action as the parties may request.