United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted September 17, 2020*

Decided September 18, 2020 

Before 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1315 

MIRANDA D. CHAUDHRY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

AMAZON.COM, INC., et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 19 C 5659 

Matthew F. Kennelly, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Miranda Chaudhry sued her former employer, Amazon.com, Inc., in state court 

for violations of workplace laws. Amazon removed the case to federal court, arguing 

that Chaudhry asserted claims arising under federal law. Her claims were dismissed on 

the merits. On appeal, Chaudhry argues that the district court should have remanded 

the case to state court and that she received inadequate notice of removal. But because 

her complaint sought relief under at least three federal laws, thereby authorizing 

removal, and any notice defect was harmless, we affirm. 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-1315 Page 2 

In her initial pro se complaint, Chaudhry sued Amazon.com, Inc. and related 

parties, asserting claims about a leave of absence from work and a hostile work 

environment that, she alleges, prompted her to resign. She asserted violations of the 

Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b), as well as state-law claims of breach of contract and fraud. 

Amazon.com, Inc., which Chaudhry served with process via certified mail, 

removed the case to federal court thirty days later. It asserted that removal was proper 

because the district court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, given that 

Chaudhry’s complaint asserted violations of the FMLA, ERISA, and FLSA. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). (It also stated that Chaudhry had improperly sued certain defendants; some, 

like Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, had merged into another defendant and no longer existed 

while others, like Amazon.com, LLC Reed-Group, were not “Amazon entities.”) 

Chaudhry unsuccessfully moved to remand the suit to state court. She argued 

that removal came too late because she had served (or tried to serve) an Amazonrelated party at an Amazon warehouse and a former supervisor at work more than 

thirty days before Amazon.com, Inc. removed the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (30-

day limit for removal after service). But she gave the district court no reason to believe 

that the warehouse was a proper agent, or the workplace a proper location, for service 

of process. In any event, because Amazon.com, Inc. removed the case within thirty days 

of service on its registered agent, and because Chaudhry’s complaint identified multiple 

federal statutes as bases for relief, the court denied her motion to remand the case. 

The district court then granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds not 

contested with any developed arguments on appeal: Chaudhry failed to allege facts 

supporting the elements for any of her claims. For example, her claim of interference 

with her rights under the FMLA failed because, rather than alleging that a defendant 

had denied her benefits that she was entitled to, she alleged that she had received 

FMLA leave and was permitted to return to her job. The claim for breach of contract 

similarly failed after she could not articulate any relevant agreement. Her amended 

complaint did not cure these deficiencies. Concluding that future amendments would 

be futile and that the federal and state-law claims were hopeless, the district court 

dismissed her suit with prejudice. See Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251–52 

(7th Cir. 1994). 

On appeal, Chaudhry argues that the district court erred in denying her motion 

to remand the entire case to state court. She no longer maintains that Amazon.com, Inc. 
No. 20-1315 Page 3 

petitioned for removal too late. Rather, she contends that the district court lacked 

removal jurisdiction over her suit because her state-law claim for breach of contract was 

separate from her federal claims. But the presence of federal claims in a complaint 

suffices for removal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (federal-question jurisdiction exists “when a federal 

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint”). 

Chaudhry’s initial complaint cited at least three federal statutes. We recognize that, at a 

hearing on the motion to remand, she sought to downplay the FMLA claim. But she 

never asked to sever her contract claim from the other two federal claims, so those two 

claims alone justified removal. 

Chaudhry also argues unpersuasively that removal was procedurally improper. 

She observes that Amazon.com, Inc. mailed its notice of removal to a wrong address (on 

the mailing envelope, it apparently transposed digits in the house number). The 

removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) requires that a defendant give an adverse party 

written notice of the removal “[p]romptly” after filing its petition. Even if Amazon.com, 

Inc. used an incorrect address in mailing Chaudhry the notice of the removal, she still 

received prompt notice. The district court mailed the removal petition to Chaudhry’s 

correct address the day after Amazon.com, Inc. filed it, enabling Chaudhry to file her 

motion to remand a few days later. Because Amazon’s mailing error did not affect 

Chaudhry’s “substantial rights,” it is harmless and cannot support reversal. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2111. 

We are unable to discern from Chaudhry’s briefs any other developed 

arguments, even after construing her pro se briefs liberally. To the extent Chaudhry has 

attempted to challenge the district court’s dismissal of her suit on the merits, as we 

mentioned earlier, her arguments are undeveloped and therefore waived. See Shipley v. 

Chicago Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1063 (7th Cir. 2020). 

AFFIRMED