2018 UT App 22

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HOLLY PAULSEN,

Appellee,

v.

KEITH PAULSEN,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20151014-CA

Filed February 1, 2018

Second District Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable Robert J. Dale

No. 034701322

Matt G. Wadsworth, Attorney for Appellant

Holly Paulsen, Appellee Pro Se

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

DAVID N. MORTENSEN and DIANA HAGEN concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 Keith Paulsen appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion for summary judgment in connection with his petition to 

modify the parties’ divorce decree to decrease his monthly 

alimony obligation. He also challenges the court’s findings

entered after trial on the petition to modify. We affirm in part 

and vacate in part and remand.

¶2 The parties obtained a bifurcated divorce decree in 

November 2004, reserving several issues for trial. Following trial 

in late 2005, the district court entered a second decree in which it 
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awarded Keith1 legal and physical custody of the parties’ five 

children and ordered him to pay Holly $1,408 per month in 

alimony with an offset of $408 for child support, leaving a net 

alimony payment of $1,000 per month. The court determined 

that Holly was underemployed and imputed to her income of 

$1,850 per month. The court found Holly’s monthly expenses to 

be $2,949 per month.

¶3 In 2013, Keith petitioned to modify the decree, asking the 

district court to terminate his alimony obligation to Holly. The 

basis for Keith’s petition was Holly’s alleged ability to earn no 

less than $3,467 per month and a reduction in her monthly 

expenses by virtue of nearly having satisfied her mortgage. 

Keith’s petition also stated that his alimony obligation was 

$1,000 per month.

¶4 Holly answered Keith’s petition, denying that she was

capable of earning $3,467 per month. Holly admitted she was 

close to satisfying her mortgage “but denie[d] that she [did] not 

have a housing expense.” Holly noted that her interpretation of 

the decree’s alimony award differed from Keith’s: “the alimony 

was actually $1408.00 with a child support off set of $408.00 

leaving a net of $1000.00. Now that all of the children are 

emancipated the alimony amount is $1408.00.” She also argued 

that Keith “has failed to take into account the Jones v. Jones

factors which include the current living expenses of [Holly] and 

[Keith’s] ability to assist in those expenses.”

¶5 In October 2014, Keith filed a motion for summary 

judgment “on the broad issue of alimony.” In his supporting 

memorandum, he stated that, according to Holly’s paystubs, 

“she now makes $16.00 per hour or $33,280.00 yearly. This 

 

1. “As is our practice in cases where both parties share a last 

name, we refer to the parties by their first name with no 

disrespect intended by the apparent informality.” Smith v. Smith, 

2017 UT App 40, ¶ 2 n.1, 392 P.3d 985.
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equates to $2,773.33 per month gross or $2,357.33 net per 

month.” He also alleged that Holly told him that “she now 

makes over $3,200 per month.” As to Holly’s expenses, he 

merely cited the district court’s finding at the time alimony was 

initially set that her monthly expenses were $2,949 per month. 

Keith also pointed out that, at that time, Holly had yet to file a 

completed financial declaration. Keith did not include any facts 

regarding his financial situation. In his memorandum, he argued 

a substantial material change in circumstances had occurred 

because Holly’s income had increased and she was close to 

paying off her mortgage. In addition, he argued that his alimony 

obligation should be decreased based on several expenses he 

thought should not have been included when the court made its

initial alimony determination.

¶6 In response to Keith’s motion for summary judgment,

Holly filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a 

combined memorandum supporting her cross-motion for 

summary judgment and opposing Keith’s motion for summary 

judgment. The memorandum argued Keith had “failed to 

demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances not 

contemplated at the time the Decree was entered,” because 

“[t]he amount and length of the mortgage was understood by 

the trial court at the time” the decree of divorce was entered. 

Holly did not dispute the facts Keith alleged in his motion for 

summary judgment.

¶7 Keith responded, noting that his motion’s statement of 

facts “were entirely unrebutted and therefore must be deemed 

admitted as a matter of law.” Accordingly, he argued, Holly

“has no further need of alimony.” Keith further argued that the 

divorce decree was “‘bereft of any reference to the changed 

circumstance at issue’” and therefore was “‘not contemplated in 

the original divorce decree.’” (Quoting Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT 

App 61, ¶ 12, 157 P.3d 341.)

¶8 The district court heard these matters in January 2015 and

denied both motions for summary judgment. In explaining the 
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basis for denying Keith’s motion, the court stated, “I simply do 

not have enough facts at this point and it’s not correct that as a 

matter of law that I can determine this . . . . I don’t have enough, 

in [Keith’s] motion for instance, to even show me what the 

expenses of [Holly] are.” The court reiterated that it did not have 

sufficient facts and that it was not simply a matter of Holly’s 

failure to respond to Keith’s motion for summary judgment. The 

court continued, “I just am not in a position to be able to rule on 

a motion for summary judgment and say as a matter of law, that 

in fact, there ought to be a modification of the alimony award.”

¶9 Before trial, Keith and Holly filed several financial 

declarations, updating their declarations as necessary. In Holly’s 

January 2015 declaration, she declared that her gross income was 

$2,650 per month (including $50 per month in support from her 

adult children), that her net income was $2,397.76, and that her 

expenses were $4,782 per month. Notably, her expenses did not 

include a mortgage payment, because she had paid off her 

house. In July 2015, Holly filed her final updated financial 

declaration. The updated declaration reflected that her gross 

income was $2,750 per month, an increase of $100 due to an 

increase in the declared support from her adult children, and 

that her net income was $2,505.19 per month. Her claimed 

expenses decreased to $4,675 per month. Holly arrived at this 

number after adding some expenses and deducting others. She 

added the following monthly expenses: $500 for a home equity 

line of credit she had opened, an additional $300 for attorney 

fees, and $200 for contributions to her daughter’s church 

mission, equaling a total of $1,000 of added expenses. She 

deducted the following monthly expenses: $207.10 in credit card 

payments, $300 in savings contributions, $200 less in donations, 

and $400 less in personal debt payments, equaling a total of 

$1,107.10 in deductions.

¶10 Keith’s final updated financial declaration declared that 

his gross income was $11,666 per month, that his net income was 
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20151014-CA 5 2018 UT App 22

$8,632 per month, and that his expenses were $21,216.25 per 

month.

¶11 The petition to modify finally reached the trial stage in 

late August 2015. In November, the district court entered its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Among other things, the 

court stated that Keith’s “testimony regarding his financial 

situation is not credible,” that “[s]ome expenses listed by [Keith] 

are not current, actual expenses,” and that “[o]ther stated

expenses . . . [Keith] claims are not credible nor otherwise

appropriate.” Despite these findings, the court decreased Keith’s 

monthly alimony obligation from $1,000 to $117.

¶12 The district court based its decision to reduce alimony on 

several findings regarding Holly’s financial situation. It found 

that her “reduced mortgage expense and the 33% income 

increase constitutes a substantial change in material 

circumstances.” It also found that some of Holly’s claimed 

expenses did not exist at the time alimony was initially 

determined and therefore reduced them. In making its 

calculations, the court used figures from Holly’s January 2015 

financial declaration, not her final updated financial declaration.

After reducing Holly’s claimed expenses, the court found that 

her appropriate monthly expenses were $2,464.90. The court 

found that Holly’s net monthly income was $2,347.76. It 

apparently arrived at this figure by taking Holly’s claimed net 

income in her January 2015 financial declaration and subtracting

the $50 of support from Holly’s adult children. Finally, the court 

arrived at the reduced alimony figure of $117 by calculating the 

difference between Holly’s appropriate expenses and net 

income. Keith filed a timely notice of appeal.2

 

2. The notice of appeal indicated that the appeal was directed to 

the Utah Supreme Court, and Keith’s brief characterized this as a 

case over which the supreme court has jurisdiction. But the court 

of appeals has original jurisdiction over this appeal, and the 

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20151014-CA 6 2018 UT App 22

¶13 Keith first contends the district court erred by not 

granting his motion for summary judgment where the facts 

alleged in the motion were either undisputed or uncontroverted 

by Holly. Summary judgment is proper where there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review a 

district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for 

correctness. Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, ¶ 4, 45 P.3d 

520.

¶14 We focus our analysis on the second prong of the 

summary judgment standard—whether Keith is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. To be entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law on his petition to modify the decree of divorce, 

Keith was first required to show that Holly’s increased income 

and satisfaction of her mortgage constituted “a substantial 

material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of 

the divorce.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2017). Then, if he succeeded in making this showing, the district 

court was required to consider several factors before making an 

alimony determination, including (1) “the financial condition 

and needs of the recipient spouse,” (2) “the recipient’s earning 

capacity or ability to produce income,” and (3) “the ability of the 

payor spouse to provide support.” Id. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)–(iii); accord

Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶ 29, 973 P.2d 431. Consideration 

of these factors is critical to achieving the purposes of alimony, 

which are: “(1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same 

standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to 

equalize the standards of living of each party; and (3) to prevent 

the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge.” Rule v. 

Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d 153 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

 

(...continued)

appeal was redirected to this court accordingly. See Utah Code 

Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017).
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¶15 Because Keith’s alleged facts did not address Holly’s 

current financial expenses or his ability to pay, the district court 

was unable to fully consider the required factors before making 

an alimony determination. Thus, Keith had not demonstrated 

that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

¶16 We note that the district court could have independently 

concluded Keith did not satisfy his burden of showing that 

Holly’s increased income and satisfaction of her mortgage 

constituted a substantial material change in circumstances not 

foreseeable at the time of the divorce. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 

2017 UT App 136, ¶¶ 9–14, 402 P.3d 178, cert. granted (Utah 2017) 

(discussing the foreseeability element and concluding that 

“foreseeable” “includes not only those circumstances which the 

parties or the court actually had in mind, but also circumstances 

that could ‘reasonably be anticipated’ at the time of the decree”).

First, the divorce decree specifically stated, “Each party is 

awarded the home in which they live including all equity and 

each shall pay the mortgage.” Thus, not only did the decree 

contemplate that the mortgage would eventually be paid off, but 

it was also foreseeable that it would be. Second, Keith did not 

demonstrate that Holly’s incremental increase in income over 

nearly a decade was unforeseeable. In his motion, Keith did not 

address the foreseeability element of the changed circumstances 

standard.3 Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not 

err in denying Keith’s motion for summary judgment.

¶17 Keith next contends the district court abused its discretion 

by reducing rather than terminating his alimony obligation. In 

connection with this contention, Keith argues the court’s

findings as to Holly were inadequate and clearly erroneous. We 

 

3. The foreseeability element became statutorily required in 1995. 

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (Lexis Supp. 1995); accord

MacDonald v. Macdonald, 2017 UT App 136, ¶ 9, 402 P.3d 178, cert. 

granted (Utah 2017).
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20151014-CA 8 2018 UT App 22

will not disturb a district court’s ruling on alimony “as long as 

the court exercises its discretion within the bounds and under 

the standards we have set and has supported its decision with 

adequate findings and conclusions.” Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 

374, ¶ 6, 223 P.3d 476 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Findings of fact are adequate to support the district 

court’s financial determinations only when they are sufficiently 

detailed to disclose the steps by which the district court reached 

its ultimate conclusion on each issue,” Oldroyd v. Oldroyd, 2017 

UT App 45, ¶ 5, 397 P.3d 645, and “follow[] logically from, and 

[are] supported by, the evidence,” Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 

UT App 357, ¶ 13, 80 P.3d 153 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We review a district court’s findings of fact for 

clear error.4 Nicholson v. Nicholson, 2017 UT App 155, ¶ 5, 405 

 

4. Keith raises two additional arguments. The first of these is that 

the district court “committed clear error by including gifts 

without a finding of extraordinary circumstances and by 

including post decree debt on [Holly’s] expenses.” In making 

this argument, Keith does not cite the record and, except for one 

passing reference to rule 26.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure, does not cite any authority, much less undertake any 

reasoned analysis. Accordingly, this argument is inadequately 

briefed, and we do not consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8); 

Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d 196. The 

second argument, as far as we can tell, is a challenge to the 

district court’s determination that the $150 expense it allowed 

Holly to include in calculating her reasonable expenses in the 

initial alimony determination was not a new expense for 

purposes of calculating Holly’s expenses at the time of 

modification. Keith’s argument is difficult to follow. At some 

points, he argues it was improper for the district court to allow 

the $150 expense in its initial alimony determination. But that 

determination is outside the scope of this appeal and is 

untimely, and we therefore cannot consider it. See Utah R. App. 

P. 4(a). At other points, Keith argues that, in determining Holly’s 

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20151014-CA 9 2018 UT App 22

P.3d 749. We conclude that the district court’s findings of fact as 

to Holly are inadequate, but we express no opinion as to what an 

equitable alimony award might be.

¶18 We first address the district court’s finding as to Holly’s 

income. The court found that Holly’s gross income was $2,600 

per month and that her net income, excluding the support from 

her adult children, was $2,347.76. These figures were determined 

by relying on Holly’s January 2015 financial declaration. But the 

court failed to explain why it based Holly’s income on the 

January 2015 financial declaration rather than the updated 

version Holly filed in July 2015, and it failed to justify its income 

determination in light of Holly’s 2013 W-2 and 2014 tax return, 

both of which established that Holly’s gross income had been 

higher than $2,600 per month. For example, in 2013, Holly’s 

gross annual income was $33,415.83, an average of $2,784.65 per 

month; in 2014, Holly’s gross annual income was $34,409.56, an 

average of $2,867.46 per month.

¶19 Second, in calculating Holly’s reasonable expenses, the 

district court used the figures from Holly’s January 2015 

financial declaration rather than the figures from Holly’s final 

updated financial declaration. Because the two declarations were 

quite different, see supra ¶ 9, the figure the court reached is 

inaccurate.

¶20 Third, the court found that Holly’s “reduced mortgage 

expense and the 33% income increase constitutes a substantial 

change in material circumstances.” In making this finding, the 

court failed to address the foreseeability element in the changed 

 

(...continued)

expenses at the time of modification, the district court 

improperly included the attorney fees Holly accrued in litigating 

the petition to modify, but he is incorrect. The court in fact 

deducted those expenses from its final calculation. Accordingly, 

we do not further address this argument.
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20151014-CA 10 2018 UT App 22

circumstances standard. Holly’s satisfaction of the mortgage was 

specifically contemplated in the divorce decree and was 

otherwise foreseeable, as the court was well aware of the 

duration of the mortgage. The court did not explain why Holly’s 

incremental increase in income over nearly a decade was 

unforeseeable, especially where Keith’s income similarly 

increased over that period from $8,370 gross per month to 

$11,666 gross per month. Cf. Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 19, 

379 P.3d 882 (“We are not aware of any Utah authority requiring 

a district court to find that [a substantial material change in 

circumstances] has occurred simply because one party’s income 

has increased and the divorce decree did not discuss possible 

increases in income. Were it otherwise, creeping inflation could 

necessitate recalculation of nearly all alimony awards on an 

annual or biennial basis.”).

¶21 Finally, we are troubled that the court simultaneously 

found that (1) it had “considered the applicable factors for 

determining what constitutes a reasonable alimony award” and 

(2) Keith’s testimony and financial declarations “[were] not 

credible.” Moreover, the court’s findings do not address the 

standard of living the parties enjoyed during the marriage. This 

court has explained that, when determining the recipient 

spouse’s financial condition and needs, it must do so “in light of 

the marital standard of living.” Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT App 137,

¶ 15, 402 P.3d 153. Indeed, two major purposes of an alimony 

award are “to get the parties as close as possible to the same 

standard of living that existed during the marriage” and “to 

equalize the standards of living of each party.” Id. ¶ 14 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). We also emphasize that 

the marital standard of living is not determined by actual 

expenses alone. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah 

Ct. App. 1991). “The needs of each party, determined according 

to the marital standard of living, then provide a baseline from 

which to craft an alimony award that best fulfills the purposes of 

alimony[.]” Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 15. And if a court is 

persuaded to adjust the amount of alimony, it must provide
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20151014-CA 11 2018 UT App 22

factual support to show that the receiving spouse “will be able to 

support [himself or] herself at a standard of living to which [the 

spouse] was accustomed during the parties’ marriage, or that the 

[payor spouse] is no longer able to pay.” Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 

P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also Williamson v. 

Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ¶¶ 8, 11, 983 P.2d 1103 (providing 

that the statutory factors that apply to an initial award of 

alimony also apply “to a redetermination of alimony during a 

modification proceeding” because the “goal of alimony . . . is to 

equalize the parties’ standards of living”).

¶22 Because of these errors, “[w]e are unable to trace with 

accuracy the steps by which the district court reached its 

ultimate conclusion.” See Oldroyd v. Oldroyd, 2017 UT App 45, 

¶ 11, 397 P.3d 645. Therefore, the district court’s findings of fact

and support thereof are inadequate. See id.; Mark v. Mark, 2009 

UT App 374, ¶ 6, 223 P.3d 476. Accordingly, we vacate the 

district court’s ruling reducing Keith’s alimony obligation and

remand for further findings consistent with the appropriate legal 

standards set forth in this opinion.

¶23 We conclude the district court did not err in denying 

Keith’s motion for summary judgment, but we vacate its ruling 

in reducing Keith’s alimony obligation and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.