UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

HIDEY DIAZ, a/k/a Silvio Manuel 

Amador, a/k/a Celio Alvarez-Carrasco, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 20-1269 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CR-00553-RBJ-1) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Hidey Diaz1

, a previously deported Honduran national, was arrested and charged 

with first-degree trespass of a dwelling in Arapahoe County, Colorado. While he was in 

state custody, a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado indicted Mr. Diaz on a charge of illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The Government obtained an arrest warrant for Mr. Diaz but did not 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 

1

 Mr. Diaz also goes by the name of Silvio Amador. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 20, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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proceed on the federal charge at that time. Before the Government pursued the federal 

prosecution, Mr. Diaz pleaded guilty to the state charge. 

 Mr. Diaz made his initial appearance in federal court almost a year after the 

federal indictment. Mr. Diaz then pleaded guilty to the federal illegal reentry charge. The 

state conviction altered his United States Sentencing Guidelines range in two ways: 

(1) the applicable criminal history category increased from V to VI, and (2) the 

applicable offense level score increased by eight levels. 

At sentencing, Mr. Diaz moved for a variance, citing the Guidelines range that 

would have applied if the Government had pursued the federal prosecution without delay 

and before his state conviction. The district court denied Mr. Diaz’s motion for a variance 

and sentenced him to 63 months’ incarceration. Mr. Diaz now challenges his sentence as 

substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm his sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual History 

Mr. Diaz, a Honduran national, has a history of immigration violations. He 

was previously deported in 2010, 2012, and 2018, and convicted of illegally 

reentering the country in 2012. On November 4, 2018, Mr. Diaz was arrested on a 

first-degree trespass of a dwelling charge in Arapahoe County, Colorado after he opened 

an unlocked window to enter a residence and “[a] fight ensued.” ROA Vol. 3 at 30. The 

day after his arrest, federal immigration authorities discovered Mr. Diaz in custody at the 

Arapahoe County Detention Facility. On December 4, 2018, a grand jury sitting in the 

District of Colorado charged Mr. Diaz with illegal reentry after deportation, in violation 

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of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The Government obtained an arrest warrant for Mr. Diaz but did 

not serve him at that time. 

On October 28, 2019, Mr. Diaz pleaded guilty to the state charge and was 

sentenced the same day to two years’ incarceration. On December 2, 2019, almost a full 

year after his federal indictment, Mr. Diaz appeared in federal court for the first time. He 

pleaded guilty to the federal charge on January 23, 2020. The plea agreement estimated 

the Guidelines range as 41–51 months’ incarceration, based on an offense level of 

sixteen, a criminal history category of V, and a one-level downward departure because of 

the “fast-track” nature of the proceedings pursuant to the United States Sentencing 

Commission, Guidelines Manual, §5K3.1 (2018). 

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated the applicable 

Guidelines range as 70–87 months’ incarceration, with a criminal history category of VI 

and an offense level of twenty, accounting for the one-level downward departure for 

fast-track proceedings. The increase in the criminal history category from V, as 

contemplated by the plea agreement, to VI, was due to the three points added to 

Mr. Diaz’s criminal history score as a result of the state conviction. The offense level 

calculation was also impacted by the state conviction. Under USSG §2L1.2(b)(3)(A)-(D), 

an increase is called for where, at any time after having first been deported, a defendant is 

convicted of a felony that is not an illegal reentry offense. The size of the increase under 

§2L1.2(b)(3)(A)-(D) is tied to the length of the sentence for the triggering felony. 

Because Mr. Diaz was sentenced to two years’ incarceration in his state case, he received 

an eight-level increase pursuant to USSG §2L1.2(b)(3)(B). Ultimately, the PSR 

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recommended a total offense level of twenty-one, after a reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. The one-level downward departure for fast-track proceedings then brought 

the offense level down to twenty. Without the impact of the state conviction, the 

applicable Guidelines range would have been 27–33 months.2

 

B. Procedural History 

Prior to sentencing, Mr. Diaz moved for a variance, requesting a sentence of 

30 months’ incarceration and citing the Guidelines range which would have applied 

without the state conviction. His motion largely focused on the prejudice created by 

the delay in the federal prosecution. He argued a 30-month sentence was appropriate 

due to “the sentencing disparity and prejudice caused by the government’s failure to 

transfer [Mr. Diaz] to federal custody at the time of his Indictment.” ROA Vol. 1 at 37. 

Without the delay in the federal prosecution, he argued a lower Guidelines range would 

have applied and his sentence would have been significantly lower. In response, the 

Government argued it was “within its right” to let the state case “resolve prior to securing 

[Mr. Diaz’s] presence in federal court.” Id. at 51. 

The district court denied Mr. Diaz’s request for a variance. In imposing the 

sentence, the district court emphasized the importance of deterrence given Mr. Diaz’s 

history of illegal reentries. The district court also cited community safety issues, 

2

 In the absence of the state conviction, Mr. Diaz’s total offense level would 

have been twelve and his criminal history category V. This can be calculated by simply 

removing the three points added to Mr. Diaz’s criminal history score due to his state 

conviction, as well as the eight-level offense level increase he received under USSG 

§2L1.2(b)(3)(B). The resultant Guidelines range would then be 27–33 months. See USSG 

Chapter 5 Pt. A Sentencing Table. 

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referencing the state trespassing case and Mr. Diaz’s previous conviction for driving 

while ability impaired. 

The district court ultimately decided some variance from the Guidelines range was 

warranted—sentencing Mr. Diaz to 63 months’ incarceration. The district court explained 

it varied for two reasons: (1) because the plea agreement contemplated the applicable 

criminal history category as V; and (2) because it could arrive at 63 months by deducting 

24 months (reflecting the state sentence) from the 87-month sentence warranted by the 

top of the Guidelines range. Mr. Diaz filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Diaz argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the delay 

in the federal prosecution resulted in an increase to the applicable Guidelines range 

due to the intervening state conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm 

Mr. Diaz’s sentence. 

“We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. Lawless, 979 F.3d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 2020). We give “substantial 

deference” to the district court and will only overturn a sentence only if it was “arbitrary, 

capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Diaz must therefore show that the sentence fell “outside the realm of the rationally 

available sentencing choices available to the district court.” United States v. RendonAlamo, 621 F.3d 1307, 1310 n. ** (10th Cir. 2010). Indeed, “there are perhaps few arenas 

where the range of rationally permissible choices is as large as it is in sentencing.” United 

States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition, because Mr. Diaz’s 

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63-month sentence was below the computed Guidelines range of 70– 87 months, there is 

a presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Balbin-Mesa, 643 F.3d 783, 788 (10th 

Cir. 2011). 

Mr. Diaz argues his “guideline range was markedly higher than it otherwise would 

have been,” because the delay in the federal prosecution3

 allowed for the intervening state 

conviction that increased the applicable Guidelines range, resulting in a substantively 

unreasonable sentence. App. Br. at 13. Specifically, he argues he was “treated much 

worse than one in his situation who did not experience unjustified government delay.” 

Id. at 14. In support of his argument, Mr. Diaz points to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which 

requires the district court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 

among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” 

when imposing a sentence. 

Mr. Diaz argues the district court should have compared his sentence to those 

imposed on “others similarly situated who are not subjected to such delay,” under 

§ 3553(a)(6). Id. at 13. In particular, he claims the district court should have compared 

his sentence to those available to defendants without an intervening state conviction. 

However, nothing in the plain language of the statute supports the comparison Mr. Diaz 

advances. Mr. Diaz does not argue the district court’s sentence was unreasonable for 

someone with his record—only that his record would have been different if the 

3

 Mr. Diaz does not claim a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to speedy 

trial. A discussion of whether the delay in prosecution was constitutionally 

appropriate is therefore unwarranted. 

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Government had pursued the federal prosecution before his state conviction. The statute, 

however, does not contemplate comparisons of defendants with different criminal 

records. At the time of sentencing on the federal offense, the district court properly 

considered Mr. Diaz’s record as it was, not as it might have been. We therefore reject 

Mr. Diaz’s argument that the sentence imposed created unwarranted disparities. 

Even if Mr. Diaz was correct that the district court should have considered the 

delay under § 3553(a)(6), the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities is “but 

one of several factors for a court to consider in determining a reasonable sentence.” 

United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2005). The district 

court appropriately reviewed other factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in imposing its 

sentence. The district court cited deterrence as a primary consideration, noting Mr. Diaz’s 

“repetitive history of illegal reentries,” and the fact that “his previous sentences of 

imprisonment, including most recently 24 months in federal prison, have not deterred 

him.” ROA Vol. 4 at 37; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). The district court also 

considered community safety, citing “[t]he home invasion where he actually got into a 

scuffle with one of the residents” and a prior conviction for driving while ability 

impaired. ROA Vol. 4 at 37; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). The district court was 

also influenced by Mr. Diaz’s criminal history, specifically that “each time he comes 

back illegally he commits additional crimes,” “the nature and circumstances of the 

offense,” and the “particulars of his personal history.” ROA Vol. 4 at 33, 36; see also 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 

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Because the district court appropriately considered a variety of factors in reaching 

its sentence and did not create unwarranted sentencing disparities, the sentence was not 

“arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Lawless, 979 F.3d at 855 

(quotation marks omitted). Instead, the sentence fell within “the realm of the rationally 

available sentencing choices available to the district court.” Rendon-Alamo, 621 F.3d at 

1310 n. **. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Diaz’s sentence. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

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