In the Matter of: 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

) 

) 

) 

Deutsche Bank AG, ) CFTC Docket No. 15- 20 

) 

Respondent. ) 

) 

___________________________ ) 

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTIONS 6(c) AND 6(d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS 

I. 

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("Commission" or "CFTC") has reason to 

believe that Deutsche Bank AG ("Deutsche Banlc" or "Respondent") has violated Sections 6( c), 

6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the "Act" or the "CEA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b 

and 13(a)(2) (2006). Therefore, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest 

that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to determine whether 

Respondent has engaged in the violations set forth herein, and to determine whether any order 

shall be issued imposing remedial sanctions. 

II. 

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondent has 

submitted an Offer of Settlement ("Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. 

Without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, except to the extent Respondent 

admits those findings in any related action against Deutsche Banlc by, or any agreement with, the 

Depmiment of Justice or any other governmental agency or office, Respondent herein consents 

to the entry and acknowledges service of this Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 

6( c) and 6( d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial 

Sanctions ("Order"). 1 

Respondent consents to the entry of this Order and to the use of these findings in this proceeding and 

in any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party; provided, 

however, that Respondent does not consent to the use of the Offer, or the findings or conclusions in this 

Order, as the sole basis for any other proceeding brought by the Commission, other than in a proceeding 

in bankruptcy or to enforce the terms of this Order. Nor does Respondent consent to the use of the Offer 

or this Order, or the findings or conclusions in this Order consented to in the Offer, by any other party in 

any other proceeding. 
III. 

The Commission finds the following: 

A. Summary 

For more than six years, from at least 2005 through early 2011 (the "relevant period"), 

Deutsche Bank, by and through the acts of certain employees, engaged in systemic and pervasive 

misconduct directed at manipulating critical, international financial benchmark rates, the London 

Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate ("Euribor"). Deutsche 

Bank's profit-driven misconduct undermined the integrity ofLIBOR and Euribor and the 

integrity ofthe U.S. and global financial markets. 

LIB OR and Euribor are the basis for trillions of dollars of financial instruments, 

particularly derivatives contracts, including interest rate swaps and futures contracts. The 

Eurodollar futures contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") is one of the 

largest futures contract in the world based on open interest and notional value of trading volume 

and settles against U.S. Dollar LIBOR. Rates for consumer loans, such as mortgages, student 

loans, car loans, and credit card accounts, are tied to LIBOR. Markets, investors and consumers 

around the world rely on the integrity of these benchmark rates. 

The benchmark rates are determined by contributions from select panel banks, including 

Deutsche Bank, and are supposed to reflect each banlc's honest assessment of the costs of 

borrowing unsecured funds in the cash markets. More than two dozen Deutsche Banlc traders and 

benchmark submitters violated this fundamental precept by focusing on the need to generate 

trading profits instead of providing honest and accurate information to the relevant cash markets. 

As a result, Deutsche Banlc routinely based its U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc 

LIBOR and Euribor submissions on its cash and derivatives trading positions, the profitability of 

which were tied to LIBOR and Euribor. Through its regular, false LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions, Deutsche Bank routinely attempted to manipulate LIBOR and Euribor in order to 

ensure that the published rates for each benchmark benefited its trading positions. At times, 

Deutsche Banlc was successful in its attempts to manipulate LIBOR for U.S. Dollar, Yen, 

Sterling, and Swiss Franc, and Euribor. 

Over this more than six year period and across currencies, Deutsche Banlc's submitters 

routinely took into account other Deutsche Banlc traders' derivatives trading positions, as well as 

their own cash and derivatives trading positions, when making the banlc's LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions. On other occasions, Deutsche Banlc aided and abetted other panel banks' attempts 

to manipulate Euribor and Yen LIBOR. The conduct ofDeutsche Bank's submitters, traders, 

desk managers, and at least one senior manager was systemic and pervasive, occurring across 

2 
multiple trading desks and offices, including London, Frankfurt, New York, Tokyo,2 and 

Singapore. 3 

Allowing submitters and traders to prioritize profit motives over appropriate submission 

considerations, Deutsche Bank permitted a culture of trader self-interest to exist and created 

conflicts of interest, which allowed the misconduct to occur. Ce1iain managers encouraged 

continual information sharing between derivatives traders, money market traders, and submitters 

for the various benchmarks, even restructuring business lines such that, in Deutsche Banlc' s 

London office, derivatives traders and submitters sat together. In addition to making routine 

written requests for beneficial LIBOR and Euribor submissions, the traders often shouted their 

requests for beneficial submissions across the trading floor to the submitters.4 A senior manager

5 

regularly sat with the traders and encouraged them and their counterpmis in other offices to 

communicate and exchange trading positions, so submitters became clearly aware of the 

submissions that were most favorable to the various desks' trading positions. Senior desk 

managers in London, Franlcfurt, New York, and in the Deutsche Tokyo Subsidiary also made 

requests to benefit their own trading positions, facilitated the requests from their traders for 

beneficial submissions, and generally promoted the practice of inappropriately using benchmark 

interest rate submissions to help the traders increase profits and minimize losses on their and the 

desk's trading positions. The cash and derivatives trading on the desks responsible for Deutsche 

Bank's misconduct increased throughout the relevant period and the desks generated significant 

revenues for Deutsche Banlc, pmiicularly during the global financial crisis of2007 through 2009. 

Despite the obvious conflict of interest, Deutsche Banlc, at times, allowed its traders who 

primarily traded derivatives, such as its Yen derivatives trader, to be responsible for making its 

submissions, thus making it easy to skew the bank's submissions to benefit their own positions 

and to accommodate the requests of their fellow derivatives traders. 6 These improper submission 

2 The Deutsche Bank Tokyo office referenced herein is Deutsche Securities, Inc. Japan ("Deutsche 

Tokyo Subsidiary"). The Deutsche Tokyo Subsidiary is the brokerage and investment banking arm 

located in Tokyo, Japan for Deutsche Bank AG. It is not registered with the Commission in any capacity. 

3 Deutsche Bank's misconduct extended beyond the LIBOR and Euribor benchmarks. Through its 

internal investigation, Deutsche Bank identified evidence of similar misconduct with respect to attempts 

to influence, and at times attempts to manipulate, other interest rate benchmarks, including, but not 

limited to, Singapore Interbank Offered Rate, Singapore Swap Offer Rate, and Tom/Next Indexed Swaps 

for the Swiss Franc. 

4 For purposes of this Order, the term "request" means a request for a preferential LIBOR or Euribor 

submission for a particular tenor. 

The term "senior management" or "senior manager" refers to Deutsche Bank employees with 

responsibilities (formally or informally delegated) broader than the management of trading desks, 

although their responsibilities may have at times included managing trading desks. The term "senior 

management" or "senior manager" does not include executive managers or members of Deutsche Bank's 

Management Board, Supervisory Board, or Group Executive Committee. 

6 In June 2008, the British Bankers' Association ("BBA'') clarified in guidance provided to panel banks 

that the basis for a bank's submission must be the rates at which bank staff members primarily 

responsible for management ofthe bank's cash, rather than the bank's derivative trading book, consider 

3 
practices continued even after the BBA, the trade association responsible for the management 

and publication of LIB OR, clarified in June 2008 that submissions should be made by those who 

are responsible for management of the banlc's cash, rather than the banl<:'s derivatives trading 

book. One pmiicular Deutsche Bank derivatives trader-submitter used his position as the bank's 

submitter to assist the senior yen trader at UBS ("UBS Senior Yen Trader") in his massive 

scheme to manipulate Yen LIB OR over the same relevant period. 7 

As a result of this profit-based submission process, improper written and oral submission 

requests were common practice, and LIBOR and Euribor submitters routinely skewed Deutsche 

Banlc' s contributions, routinely made false submissions, and routinely attempted to manipulate, 

and, at times, successfully manipulated LIBOR and Euribor. Thus, Deutsche Banlc's LIBOR and 

Euribor submissions were not a reflection of Deutsche Banlc's honest assessment of the costs of 

bonowing funds in the relevant interbanlc markets, as required by each of the benchmarks' 

definitions. 

Deutsche Banl<:'s traders were able to accommodate and facilitate the attempts to 

manipulate LIB OR and Euribor for years because Deutsche Banlc lacked internal controls, 

procedures and policies concerning its LIBOR and Euribor submission processes, and failed to 

adequately supervise its trading desks and traders. Deutsche Banl<: did not have any policies, 

internal controls, or procedures for determining or monitoring its submissions to ensure that 

Deutsche Banlc's LIBOR and Euribor submissions reflected an honest assessment of the costs of 

borrowing unsecured funds in the interbanlc markets. Deutsche Banlc's failure to provide internal 

training or implement standards addressing benchmark interest rate submissions, allowance of 

inappropriate communications amongst traders and submitters, and related conflicts of interest 

amplified the potential for misconduct and permitted the misconduct to continue for a number of 

years. Deutsche Banlc engaged in this wrongful conduct even after the Division of Enforcement 

requested in April 201 0 that Deutsche Banlc conduct an internal investigation of its U.S. Dollar 

LIBOR submission practices. In fact, Deutsche Bank did not make meaningful improvements in 

its internal controls until mid-2011 and did not formalize a policy about conflicts of interest 

among traders and submitters relating to benchmark submissions until February, 2013. 

******* 

that the bank can borrow unsecured interbank funds in the London market. The BBA also clarified that 

panel banks could not contribute a rate based on the pricing of any derivative financial instrument. 

7 On December 19, 2012, the Commission issued an Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 

6( c) and 6( d) of the Commodity Exchange Act Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions 

against UBS AG and UBS, finding, among other things, that UBS AG and UBS, through the UBS Senior 

Yen Trader, attempted to manipulate Yen LIBOR, at times successfully, through multiple methods. The 

Commission's Order found that one of the UBS Senior Yen Trader's strategies included coordinating 

with traders at other Yen panel banks, including Deutsche Bank, identified in the Order as the Yen Bank 

F, to attempt to manipulate Yen LIDOR by making false Yen LffiOR submissions beneficial to their 

respective derivatives trading positions. See In re UBS AG eta!., CFTC Docket No. 13-09 (CFTC filed 

December 19, 2012), available at 

http:/ /www.cftc. gov /ucmLgrou ps/pu b lie/ @I rcnforcementactions/ documents/legal pi eading/ enfu bsorder 121 

912.pdf. 

4 
In accepting Deutsche Banlc's Offer, the Commission recognizes Respondent's 

cooperation with the Division of Enforcement's investigation of this matter. The Commission 

notes that at the outset of the Division of Enforcement's investigation in April 2010 and 

continuing until mid-20 11, Deutsche Banlc' s cooperation was not sufficient, and, in pati, this 

affected a timely resolution of this matter. After mid-2011, Deutsche Bank provided significant 

cooperation and assistance to the Division of Enforcement. 

B. Respondent 

Deutsche Bank AG is a German global banldng and financial services company 

headquartered in Franlcfurt, Germany. Deutsche Banlc operates in over 70 countries and has 

offices in major financial centers including Franlcfmi, London, New York City, Tokyo, 

Singapore, and Hong Kong. On December 31, 2012, Deutsche Banlc AG was provisionally 

registered as a swap dealer with the Commission. 

C. Facts 

1. The Fixing of LIBOR and Euribor 

a. LIBOR and its Fixing 

LIBOR is the most widely used benchmark interest rate in the world and affects market 

patiicipants and consumers throughout the world, including in the United States. LIBOR is used 

as a barometer to measure strain in money markets and is often a gauge of the market's 

expectation of future central banlc interest rates. LIB OR is used in interest rate transactions, 

including loans, over-the-counter swaps, and exchange-traded interest rate futures and options 

contracts on many of the world's major futures and options exchanges. For example, U.S. Dollar 

LIBOR is used as the basis for settlement of the CME's Eurodollar futures contracts. The 

products indexed to LIB OR have an approximate notional value of $500 trillion. 

During the relevant period, under the auspices of the BBA,8 LIBORs were issued on a 

daily basis for ten currencies, including U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc, with fifteen 

tenors (i.e., durations for interest rates) ranging from overnight through twelve months. 9 Cetiain 

currencies, such as U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc are more widely referenced in 

interest rate contracts. One, three and six-months are the most common tenors referenced in 

LIBOR-indexed transactions. 

According to the BBA, LIBOR "is based on offered inter-banlc deposit rates contributed 

in accordance with the Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor banks." The BBA explained 

that: 

8 On February 1, 2014, ICE Benchmark Administration Limited was appointed as the new 

administrator for LIBOR, following authorization by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA"). 

9 In 2013, the BBA discontinued publication ofLIBOR for five currencies, namely the Canadian 

Dollar, Australian Dollar, New Zealand Dollar, Danish Krone, and Swedish Krona. 

5 
[a]n individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute the rate at 

which it could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting 

inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to [11 :00 a.m. London 

time]. 10 

Every business day shortly before 11:00 a.m. London time, the banks on the LIBOR 

panels submitted their rates to Thomson Reuters. A trimmed averaging process excluded the top 

and bottom quartile of rates and the remaining rates were averaged for each tenor. That averaged 

rate became the official BBA daily LIBOR (the "LIBOR fixing") for each tenor. 

The BBA made public the daily LIBOR fixing for each cutTency and tenor, as well as the 

daily submissions of each panel bank, through Thomson Reuters and the other data vendors 

licensed by the BBA. This information was made available and relied upon by market 

pmiicipants and others throughout the world, including in the United States. 

By its definition, LIB OR requires that the submitting panel banks exercise their judgment 

to determine the rates at which they may obtain unsecured funds in the London interbank market. 

These definitions require that submissions relate to funding and do not permit consideration of 

factors unrelated to the costs ofbonowing unsecured funds, such as the benefit to a bank's 

derivatives or money market trading positions. 11 

b. Euribor and its Fixing 

Euribor is used internationally in derivatives contracts, including interest rate swaps and 

futures contracts. 12 According to the Bank for International Settlements, over-the-counter 

interest rate derivatives, such as swaps and FRAs, comprised contracts worth over $187 trillion 

in notional value at the end of2012. 

During the relevant period, daily Euribors were issued on behalf of the European Banking 

Federation ("EBF") 13 for fifteen tenors, ranging from one week to twelve months. One, three 

and six months are the most common tenors referenced in Euribor-indexed transactions. 

10 This definition ofLIBOR has been used since 1998 to the present. 

11 In June 2008, the BBA clarified that panel banks could not contribute a rate based on the pricing of 

any derivative financial instrument. BBA guidelines issued in October 2009 further clarified that LIBOR 

submitters "should not ask intermediaries where they believe LIB OR rates will set on a given day and use 

this as a basis for submissions. This misses the point of the benchmark, and is a circular process that 

would rapidly lead to inaccurate rates." 

12 In October 2011, the CME launched the Euribor Futures contract, which settles based on the threemonth Euribor. 

13 The EBF is an unregulated non-profit association of the European banking sector based in Brussels, 

Belgium. Among other functions, the EBF oversees the publication ofEuribor. 

6 
According to the EBF, Euribor is defined as the rate "at which Euro interbank term 

deposits are offered by one prime banlc to another prime bank" within the Economic and 

Monetary Union of the European Union ("EMU") at 11:00 a.m. Central European Time ("CET") 

daily. 

Euribor is determined using submissions from a panel of over 40 mostly European banlcs 

considered to be the most active in the Euro zone with the highest volume of business in the 

EMU. According to the EBF instructions, panel banlcs "must quote the required euro rates to the 

best of their knowledge," based on their observations of where the Euro is trading in that market. 

Like the BBA panel banlcs, the Euribor panel banks submit their rates electronically to 

Thomson Reuters, which manages the official Em·ibor process by collecting the submitted rates 

from the contributing banlcs, calculating the rate, and then releasing it for publication just before 

noon CET. Thomson Reuters computes that day's published Euribor by eliminating the highest 

and lowest fifteen percent of submissions collected, and averaging the remaining submissions. 

That average rate becomes the official daily EBF Euribor (the "Euribor fixing"). On behalf of 

EBF, Thomson Reuters then issues the Euribor fixing and the submissions of each panel banlc to 

its subscribers and other data vendors. Through these licensing agreements with third parties, 

such as Thomson Reuters, EBF disseminates the information throughout the world, including in 

the United States. 

******* 

By their definitions, LIB OR and Euribor require that the submitting panel banlcs exercise 

their judgment to determine the rates at which, depending on the benchmark, they or a prime 

banlc may obtain unsecured funds in the respective London and Euro interbanlc markets. These 

definitions require that submissions relate to funding and do not permit consideration of factors 

umelated to the costs of borrowing unsecured funds, such as cash or derivatives trading 

positions. 

2. Deutsche Bank's LIBOR and Euribor Submission Processes and the Embedded 

Conflicts of Interest 

a. Deutsche Bank's Submission Processes in London and Frankfurt 

Deutsche Banlc is a member of both the BBA and the EBF, and is one of the panel banks 

that submits rates for the determination ofLIBOR for various currencies, including U.S. Dollar, 

Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc, and Euribor. 14 During the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc made 

its LIBOR submissions for U.S. Dollar, Sterling, and Yen out of its London office and made 

Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor submissions out of its Franlcfurt office. Deutsche Banlc's 

LIBOR and Euribor submission processes and the traders and trading desks involved in this 

misconduct were part of the Global Finance and Foreign Exchange Group ("GFFX"). 

14 During the relevant period, Deutsche Bank was also a member ofthe LIBOR panels for the Canadian 

Dollar, Australian Dollar, Danish I<rone, New Zealand Dollar, and, beginning in June, 2006, the Swedish 

Krona. 

7 
Deutsche Banlc's GFFX Group consisted of two main lines of businesses, including 

Global Finance and FX Forwards. Included in this group were Pool Trading desks and Money 

Market Derivatives ("MMD") desks. Deutsche Banlc's LIBOR and Euribor submitters sat on the 

Pool Trading desks, where they traded both cash and derivatives trading products. While the 

submitters and other pool traders regularly transacted in interbank cash deposits and loans to 

meet the bank's funding needs each day in all currencies, they also had their own derivatives 

trading books that allowed them not only to hedge risk in their cash trading but also to generate 

profits for the desk in a proprietary fashion. MMD traders, who also held proprietary books, 

primarily traded derivatives trading products with a focus on short term maturities from 

overnight to two years. Some of the derivatives products traded by both pool and MMD traders 

included futures (including the CME Eurodollar futures contract), interest rate swaps, forward 

rate agreements, overnight index swaps and tenor basis swaps. The cash and derivatives 

positions held by the Deutsche Banlc pool traders and MMD traders were often priced off of 

LIBOR and Euribor. Some of these positions settled or reset on International Monetary Market 

("IMM") dates, which are quatierly dates in March, June, September, and December. 

The Pool Trading and MMD desks were organized by cunency and comprised of senior 

traders who oversaw the desks and often trained junior traders. A regional manager in Deutsche 

Banlc's Franlcfmi and New York offices oversaw the business lines for that location, including 

the Pool Trading and MMD desks. One senior manager located in London had global 

responsibility for the Pool Trading and MMD desks ("Global Senior Manager"). Prior to 2006, 

the Pool Trading desks and MMD desks operated mostly independent of each other, despite their 

overlapping trading responsibilities. 

b. Tlte LIBOR and Euribor Submitters' Conflicts of Interest Created by 

Deutsche Bank 

In 2006, Deutsche Banlc merged the Pool Trading and MMD desks in its banlc branches 

in an effmi to increase the banlc's trading profits through an alignment ofthe desks' related 

trading positions. The merger of the business lines resulted in the MMD derivatives traders in 

Deutsche Banlc's London office sitting next to, or in close proximity to, Deutsche Banlc cash 

traders. Some ofthose cash traders were the banlc's LIBOR submitters. From London, the 

Global Senior Manager instructed all traders to have open communication across offices and 

instilled an expectation thatthe derivatives traders and submitters would communicate routinely 

about relevant market conditions and individual trading positions. 

This commingling of business lines caused a significant cultural shift within the banlc 

globally, where traders were incentivized to engage in improper communications with the bank's 

LIBOR and Euribor submitters. As a result, traders routinely communicated to submitters their 

preferential requests for LIBOR and Euribor submissions which were beneficial to individual 

and desk trading positions. Because the bank's Euribor and Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions 

were set in Franlcfurt, the Global Senior Manager encouraged the Franlcfmi Euribor and Swiss 

Franc LIBOR submitters to contact derivatives traders in London to obtain the preferred rates to 

submit each day. In addition to the pervasive oral requests, some of which were shouted across 

the combined trading desks, submitters and traders routinely communicated on Bloomberg chat 

terminals or internal Deutsche Bank messaging systems to discuss preferential LIBOR and 

8 
Euribor requests. The Global Senior Manager regularly sat amongst the traders on the trading 

floor and was aware of the many oral and written requests for preferential LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions. 

Deutsche Bank fmiher embedded this inherent conflict of interest in its Pool Trading 

desks when it allowed its pool traders to fill dual roles as both submitters and derivatives traders. 

This enabled submitters to prioritize their individual and the desk's profits over their 

responsibility to make honest assessment of the costs of borrowing unsecured funds when 

submitting rates to the BBA and EBF. Not only did the submitters routinely take into account 

the traders' preferential LIBOR and Euribor requests, the submitters also regularly and 

improperly considered their own trading positions when detetmining their LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions. 

Deutsche Banlc's merger of Pool Trading and MMD desks proved successful and resulted 

in significant profits for the banlc. For example, throughout the relevant period, the Pool Trading 

and MMD desks together utilized a basis spread trading strategy (i.e., trading the spread between 

two or more tenors) to generate profits. By mid-2008, during the global financial crisis, rates 

among the different tenors ofLIBOR and Euribor began to widen dramatically. The Global 

Senior Manager and the London manager of the MMD desks ("London MMD Manager"), one of 

the most senior, highly regarded and highly compensated derivatives traders at Deutsche Banlc, 15 

recognized the basis spread trading strategy as a way to generate significant profits off of the 

turbulent interest rate markets, and Deutsche Bank's traders entered into massive derivatives 

basis trading positions based upon the bet that the spread between tenors would continue to 

widen. 

The Global Senior Manager and other senior traders often discussed this strategy openly 

during weekly meetings, ensuring that their strategy was well known and utilized across currency 

desks in both Pool Trading and MMD. As a result, Deutsche Banlc's LIBOR and Euribor 

submitters were aware of this strategy, patiicularly during the financial crisis, and were 

cognizant of the particular LIBOR and Euribor submissions desired by traders to benefit those 

positions based on this strategy. As such, the submitters routinely built this bias into Deutsche 

Banlc's LIBOR and Euribor submissions, even in the absence of oral or written communications 

from traders. Deutsche Banlc's Pool Trading and MMD desks posted tremendous profits during 

2008 and 2009, at the height of the financial crisis, due in part to this trading strategy. 16 

By failing to separate responsibilities for making LIBOR and Euribor submissions from 

its trading functions, Deutsche Banlc allowed an environment to exist that yielded significant 

oppotiunities for traders and submitters to attempt to manipulate LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions to the benefit of the banlc' s trading positions, and the traders and submitters took full 

15 The London MMD Manager relocated to Deutsche Bank's Singapore office in March 2010, where he 

became the Global Manager of MMD. 

16 In 2007, Deutsche Bank's MMD desks reported trading revenue and commissions of€399 million 

(1.29% of total bank revenue); in 2008, €1.942 billion (14.27% of total revenue); and in2009, €992 

million (3.55% oftotal revenue). 

9 
advantage of those opportunities. As a result, the submitters routinely skewed Deutsche Bank's 

LIBOR and Euribor submissions to benefit the banlc's trading positions by attempting to 

manipulate the fixings ofLIBOR and Euribor. At times, their attempts to manipulate U.S. 

Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIB OR and Euribor were successful. 

3. Deutsche Bank's Inadequate Internal Controls and Failure to Appreciate the 

Scope of Misconduct 

During the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc allowed the conflicts of interest to flourish by 

failing to put in place sufficient benchmark-specific systems or controls surrounding risk and 

compliance to adequately supervise its derivatives traders and submitters. Deutsche Banlc did 

not have any policies, internal controls, or procedures for determining, monitoring, or 

supervising its LIBOR and Euribor submissions to ensure that Deutsche Banlc's submissions 

reflected an honest assessment of the costs ofborrowing unsecured funds in the relevant 

interbanlc markets. Deutsche Bank's failure to provide internal training or standards addressing 

benchmark interest rate submissions, allowance of inappropriate communications amongst 

traders and submitters, and related conflicts of interest amplified the potential for misconduct and 

permitted it to continue for over six years. Further, Deutsche Banlc did not begin to put into 

place any specific policies, procedures, or controls around its benchmark submission processes 

until mid-2011, and the Bank did not formalize a policy addressing conflicts of interests between 

traders and submitters for another two years, in February 2013. 

In investigating the conduct at issue here, Deutsche Banlc failed to appreciate until mid2011 the extent to which it had systemic and pervasive manipulative conduct by its traders and 

managers across multiple lines of businesses in offices around the world. As a result, this 

conduct continued well after the Division of Enforcement began its investigation of Deutsche 

Banlc's U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions in early 2010. 

4. Deutsche Bank's False Reporting, Attempted Manipulation, and Manipulation 

of U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

During the relevant period, Deutsche Bank, through its submitters and traders, routinely 

made false U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions in fmiherance of its attempts to manipulate U.S. 

Dollar LIBOR. At times, they were successful in their attempts to manipulate. This misconduct 

originated primarily out of Deutsche Banlc' s London offices, and at times, its New York and 

Franlcfmi offices. 

The U.S. Dollar Pool Trading desk in London was responsible for submitting Deutsche 

Bank's U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions. The head of the U.S. Dollar pool trading desk 

("London Pool Trading Manager") oversaw various junior traders who worked daily with him 

and made the banlc's U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions under his direction. Similar to the London 

MMD Manager, the London Pool Trading Manager was a well-respected Deutsche Banlc trader 

and highly compensated. From 2004 throughout the rest of the relevant period, a trader 

supervised by the London Pool Trading Manager ("U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter") became the 

primary U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter and, at times, the London Pool Trading Manager acted as 

a back-up submitter. 

10 
During the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc pool and MMD traders in London routinely 

made requests to the U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter or the London Pool Trading Manager for 

submissions that would benefit their derivatives trading positions. As described above, as a 

result of the pool and MMD traders working side-by-side, this conduct was pervasive with 

requests for beneficial U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions being either shouted across the trading 

floor, passed from one trader to another trader sitting next to the submitter, or sent to submitters 

through electronic communications. On occasion, pool and MMD traders and managers in 

Deutsche Bank's New York office and at least one pool trader in Franlcfmi also asked for LIBOR 

submissions that benefited their positions. The U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter, at times, 

contacted the pool and MMD traders in the various offices to solicit whether they had requests 

for beneficial LIBOR submissions. The submitter resolved any conflicts between the requests by 

first checking with the London Pool Trading Manager. The U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter 

routinely accommodated the traders' requests in making Deutsche Bank's U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submissions. 

The U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter also acted as a trader but only occasionally traded his 

own book. Rather, he worked closely with the London Pool Trading Manager and other pool 

and MMD traders, and was expected to understand and be aware of their derivatives trading 

positions. Over the relevant period, the submitter became so familiar with the trading positions 

of the U.S. Dollar traders that he either informed the traders of his intent to submit a skewed 

LIBOR without waiting for a request or he simply submitted U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions in 

a manner he believed would benefit their derivatives trading positions. 

As described above, Deutsche Bank U.S. Dollar pool and MMD traders, particularly the 

London Pool Trading Manager, utilized the basis spread trading strategy promoted by the Global 

Senior Manager and the London MMD Manager. The U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter was clearly 

aware of this trading strategy and, tln·oughout the relevant period, but primarily during the global 

financial crisis of2008 tln·ough 2009, often skewed, without written or oral requests from 

traders, Deutsche Banlc's U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions in order to benefit the banlc's trading 

positions based on this strategy. Deutsche Bank's U.S. Dollar Pool and MMD trading desks 

were some of the most highly profitable trading desks during this time. 

Below are examples of the requests that numerous traders communicated to the U.S. 

Dollar Submitter and the London Pool Trading Manager: 17 

March 22,2005: (emphasis added) 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: if you need something in particular in the 

libors i.e. you have an interest in a high or a 

low fix let me know and there's a high chance 

i'll be able to go in a different level. just give 

17 The communications quoted in this Order contain shorthand trader language and many typographical 

errors. The shorthand and errors are explained in brackets within the quotations only when deemed 

necessary to assist with understanding the discussion. Unless otherwise noted the communications are by 

email, chat, or other electronic messaging system. 

11 
New York U.S. Dollar Trader 1: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

April1, 2005: (emphasis added) 

London U.S. Dollar Trader 1: 

me a shout the day before or send an email 

from your blackberry first thing. 

Thanks - our CP guys have been looking for it a 

bit higher - not a big deal 

if anything the cash has actually cheapened up 

since yesterday too albeit by 1/2 tick- true 

could get some sub 7 5 days thru the next week 

COULD WE PLS HAVE A LOW 6MTH 

FIX TODAY OLD BEAN? 

September 21, 2005: (emphasis added) 

London MMD Manager: Subject: "$ LIBORS: 83, 89, 96 and 11 

LOWER MATE LOWER ! ! 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

London MMD Manager: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

November 28,2005: (emphasis added) 

will see what i can do but it'll be tough as the 

cash is pretty well bid 

[Another U.S. Dollar Panel Bank] IS DOIN 

IT ON PURPOSE BECAUSE THEY HAVE 

THE EXACT OPPOSITE POSITION - ON 

WHICH THEY LOST 25MIO SO FAR- LETS 

TAKE THEM ON!! 

ok, let's see if we can hurt them a little bit 

more then 

London Pool Trading Manager: [an]ything either way from you guys? we are 

still short basis in 1 mth so lowere the better 

New York Regional Manager: 

London Pool Trading Manager: 

New York Regional Manager: 

December 29,2006: (emphasis added) 

London U.S. Dollar Trader 2: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

HAHAHAH, NEVER FAILS. WE WOULD 

PREFER IT HIGHER ... WE HAVE ABOUT 

15BB 1MO RECEIVES ... THANKS, JUST 

ASKING IS VERY MUCH 

APPRECIATED .... 

will do like [U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter] then 

- ask, and do the opposite ... let us know the days 

you rec, first fix tom will set the tone 

JUST TOMOORROW ON THE REC, THEN 

PAYING 15BB 12/12 THRU 

Hello [U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter] Come on 

32 on 1. Mth Cu my frd 

ok will try to give you a belated christmas 

present ... ! have a good new year 

12 
February 28, 2007: (emphasis added) 

New York U.S. Dollar Trader 2: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

New York U.S. Dollar Trader 2: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

New York U.S. Dollar Trader 2: 

March 28,2007: 

Frankfurt Non-Euro Desk Manager: 

London Pool Trading Manager: 

Frankfmi Non-Euro Desk Manager: 

LIBOR HIGHER TOMORROW? 

shouldn't be 

COME ON. WE ALWAYS NEED HIGHER 

LIBORS !!! HAHA 

haha, i'll do my best fl{cer 

NO WORRIES. JUST CURIOUS, U SURVE 

THE DEBACLE OF TH PAST 24 HRS> 

.. .I WOULD NEED A HIGH 3MTS LIB OR 

TODAY, BUT I THINK YOU DO TOO!! 

35? 

YEPPSE 

August 13,2008: (response to U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter's email) (emphasis added) 

New York U.S. Dollar Senior Trader: Subject: $ lsbors unch 

Oh bulls hit ..... strap on a pair and jacl{ up 

the 3M. Hahahahaha 

In addition to the LIBOR requests traders made to benefit specific trading positions, 

traders also requested gradual movements in LIBOR in order to set the trend in upcoming 

LIBOR fixings to benefit longer term derivatives trading positions, which the U.S. Dollar 

LIBOR submitter routinely accommodated. Similarly, the U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter was 

also aware of month-end derivatives trading positions held by the traders and often submitted 

Deutsche Banlc U.S. Dollar contributions skewed to benefit those positions. The submitter 

routinely accommodated these requests by skewing Deutsche Banlc's daily U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

contributions at month-end, over a period of days, weeks, or even months. Below are examples 

of such requests: 

November 28,2006: (email to London Pool Trading Manager) (emphasis added) 

New York U.S. Dollar Senior Trader: Altho I don't have a huge 1 mL fix tomw, I 

am paying 1 mL on about 40bn throughout 

December so I was hoping for a low 1 mL fix 

tomw to set the tone 

August 12, 2007: (emphasis added) 

New York Regional Manager: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

If possible, we need in NY 1mo libor as low as 

possible next few days .... tons of pays coming 

up overall .... thanlcs! 

Will do our best [New York Regional 

Manager]. I'll coordinate the overnight in the 

same way as we did last week with [New York 

U.S. Dollar Trader 1] tomorrow 

13 
December 13,2007: (emphasis added) 

Frankfmi Non-Euro Desk Manager: [London Pool Trading Manager], I NEED 

YOUR HELP .. .IF IT SUITS YOU CAN WE 

PUT IN A HIGH LIBOR TILL NEXT 

TUESDAY IN THE 3 MTS? 

London Pool Trading Manager: ok 

On a handful of occasions, either the London Pool Trading Manager or the U.S. Dollar 

LIBOR submitter contacted interdealer brokers in attempts to influence the overall LIBOR fixing 

by requesting the brokers to make preferential LIB OR predictions in specific tenors. 18 Below are 

examples ofthese communications: 

March 14,2007: 

London Pool Trading Manager: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

London Pool Trading Manager: 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR Submitter: 

February 27,2008: 

Broker 2: 

London Pool Trading Manager: 

Broker 2: 

London Pool Trading Manager: 

Broker 2: 

These markets falling in is not good for us 

personally. We need good old fashioned boom 

time[ ... ] 

[ ... ][Broker 1] reckon 3s libor only 34.75 fyg 

even with edh where it is now which is bllx 

Get it lower, we need it. [ ... ] 

just spoke to him. now thinking 34.5, i think 

should be lower still will keep pressing will do 

which direction do you want tom 1 mth libor 

pushed? 

lower and 3mth higher 

imafraid thats not going to happen big boy 

its worked so far 

13-08 for them tom 

Accordingly, throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Bank routinely made false repmis 

regarding U.S. Dollar LIBOR and attempted to manipulate U.S. Dollar LIBOR in order to 

benefit Deutsche Banlc's trading positions. As such, Deutsche Banlc's U.S. Dollar LIBOR 

submissions were not made in accordance with the BBA definitions and criteria for LIBOR 

submissions. At times, they were successful in their attempted manipulations. 

18 Brokers act as intermediaries between major dealers in the cash and derivatives markets to facilitate 

execution of interdealer trades. Brokers assist banks in obtaining funding by facilitating the negotiation 

of deposits and loans, and in hedging those transactions with derivatives trades often referenced to 

LIB OR. 

14 
5. Deutsche Bank's False Reporting, Attempted Manipulation, and Manipulation 

ofEuribor 

Over the relevant period, Deutsche Bank's Euribor submitters routinely skewed Euribor 

submissions based upon requests from Deutsche Bank derivatives traders for rates set to benefit 

derivatives trading positions that were linked to Euribor. The Frankfurt-based submitters also 

routinely took their own trading positions into account in making the bank's Euribor 

submissions. In addition, Deutsche Bank derivatives traders coordinated on several occasions 

with derivatives traders at other Euribor panel banks to ensure Euribor contributions benefited 

their respective trading positions. Deutsche Bank routinely made false Euribor contributions in 

futiherance of its attempts to manipulate Euribor. At times, Deutsche Bank was successful in its 

attempts to manipulate Euribor. 

The London MMD Manager made the majority ofthe traders' requests, although several 

traders on multiple desks also made such requests. The London MMD Manager, Deutsche 

Bank's highly regarded senior trader, routinely used several means in his attempts to manipulate 

the Euribor fixing. His approach to manipulating Euribor encompassed the following: (1) he 

regularly requested Deutsche Banlc's Frankfuti-based submitters to make Euribor submissions 

beneficial to his derivatives trading positions; (2) he at times worked with the Em·ibor submitters 

to make bids or offers in the market at rates intended to influence market perception of prevailing 

cash rates (known as "pushing cash"), and, thereby, potentially influence other banks' Euribor 

submissions; (3) he coordinated on several occasions with derivatives traders at other Euribor 

panel banks by entering into agreements to make requests for preferential Euribor submissions to 

their respective submitters; and (4) he coordinated with traders at other Em·ibor panel banlcs to 

convince interdealer brokers to post false rates on their cash market screens for the purpose of 

potentially influencing other banks' Euribor submissions. 

a. Deutsche Bank's Internal Attempts to Manipulate Euribor in Order to 

Benefit Trading Positions 

Deutsche Bank assigned responsibility for making its Euribor submissions to traders and 

managers on the Euro Pool Trading desk in Franlcfurt. Among other duties, these pool traders 

had responsibility for raising cash in Euro, Swiss Franc and other currencies, and traded Eurobased interest rate swaps and forward rate agreements generally tied to various tenors of 

Euribor. 19 

The Euribor submitters, some of whom were desk managers, continued the systemic 

practice of focusing on their derivatives trading positions as a basis for their Euribor 

submissions. The submitters also maintained daily contact with MMD Euro traders in London, 

including the London MMD Manager, to ensure they were aware of the bank's various trading 

positions tied to Euribor. Multiple traders regularly and openly made requests to the submitters 

19 At least one of the traders on the Frankfurt Non-Euro Pool Trading Desk also had responsibility for 

making the bank's Euribor submissions, either as a back-up submitter or, as of mid-2010, as part of the 

team ofEuribor submitters. The Deutsche Bank Swiss Franc submitter(s) involved in the Euribor 

conduct described here also routinely attempted to manipulate Swiss Franc LIBOR. See infra, pp. 32-35. 

15 
for Euribor submissions beneficial to their derivatives trading positions. When requests were not 

forthcoming from London, the Euribor submitters actively solicited them from the traders as part 

of their effort to coordinate the offices' trading books and the bank's Euribor submissions in a 

manner to maximize their profits. 

The Euribor submitters regularly accommodated these requests unless at times the 

requests conflicted with their own needs for their derivatives trading positions. As the London 

MMD Manager's stature as a successful trader grew within the bank, his requests for beneficial 

Euribor submissions often were accommodated over competing requests from other traders. 

When the basis trading strategy implemented by the Global Senior Manager and the London 

MMD Manager began to generate significant profits in mid-2008, the Euribor submitters 

understood the Euribor submission(s) needed each day to benefit the spread positions and made 

their Euribor submissions accordingly, even absent a specific request from traders. 

The following are some examples of the many improper communications between the 

Euribor submitters and the MMD Euro traders: 

July 10,2005: (emphasis added) 

London MMD Manager: 

Euribor Submitter: 

London MMD Manager: 

Euribor Submitter: 

London MMD Manager: 

July 6, 2006: (emphasis added) 

Frankfurt Euro Desk Manager: 

HI FRDS ANY CHANCE TO PUSH UP 

YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE 3MTH 

EURIBOR FIX? 

HI [Euribor Submitter] HERE USUALLY IT 

WOULD BE 11 ON OUR SIDE SO DO U 

REALLY NEED A 12 FOR TODAY AS DB 

CONTRIBUTION? 

EONIA AT 2.068 AND 0/N TRADING 2.08 

IT WUD MAKE SENSE TO HAVE A 

HIGHER 3MTH FIX. WE SHORT A LOT 

OF JUNES ABOUT 40000 LOTS 

OK WE WILL CONTRIBUTE A 12 FOR 

TODAY AND MONDAY HAVE A NICE 

WEEKEND 

THXALOT [ ... ] 

HIHI [London MMD Manager], I JUST 

WANT TO CHECK WHETHER WE HAVE 

CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN THE 

JUNE 06 SETTLEMENT. IT DOESN'T 

MAKE SENSE IF WE TRY TO PUSH ONE 

WAY ANDUWLDLIKETOHAVEIT 

THE OTHER WAY AROUND. WE WLD 

PREFER A LOW 3ME FIXING TO PUSH 

JUNE06 HIGH. IS THIS UR 

PREFERENCE AS WELL? 

16 
London MMD Manager: 

Frankfmi Euro Desk Manager: 

March 23,2007: (emphasis added) 

Frankfmi Euro Desk Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfmi Euro Desk Manager: 

July 26,2007: (emphasis added) 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

Frankfmi Regional Manager: 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

Frankfmi Regional Manager: 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

THX VM FOR CHECKING [Frankfurt Euro 

Desk Manager] - YES WE WOULD PREFER 

A LOW FIXING AS WELL 

THX [London MMD Manager], THAT WILL 

MAKE US MORE POWERFUL IN 

PUSHING THE FIX WE WANT IT. 

FIXINGS AS USUAL MONSIEUR? LOW 

1M HIGH 6M (SAME HERE) 

yes please - thank you very much [Frankfmi 

Euro Desk Manager] 

DERIEN 

[ ... ] ... IS IT TOO LATER TO ASK FOR 

SOME NICE LIBOR FIXINGS? 

ILL PUT LOW 1M OK FOR U 

WE ACTUALLY NEED HJIGHEE 

EVERYTHING 

I AM SORRY I SHOULD KNOW UR SIDE 

SO YOU HAVE ALREADY SENT THNM? 

THEY REE WE CAN CHANGE IT 

UNTILll :59 ... SO WE HAVE ENOUGH 

TIME .. TELL ME EXACTLY WHICH 

RATE U WANT TO HAVE IN 

WE NEED HIGH 6M PLS, AS MUCH AS 

YOU CAN PUSH IT 

WELL EEEE WILL PUT 39 FOR U IN AND 

WHAT IS ABOUT 1 AND 3M 

WE HAVE SMALL 1M- NEED HIGH AS 

WELL .. AND NOTHING IN 3M SO .. 

THANK YOU VERY MUCH! 

1M WILL PUT 4.11 OK FOR U 

GREAT THANK EEEEEEEEE MOM SORRY 

SORRY JUST HIGH 6M ... THE ONE 

MONTH WE ACTUALLY NEED LOW, 

EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE IT THE OTHER 

WAY ROUND TODAY WE NEED IT LOW 

TO PREP ARE FOR THE FIXINGS IN AUG .. 

SO LOW 1M 3M DONT HAVE 6M HIGH 

SO THAT WAS ALSO MY IDEA .. LOW 1M 

FOR U TALKED TO [London MMD Manager] 

YESTERDAY .. WAS VERY SURPRICE 

WHEN YOU TOLD ME HIOGH .. THAT IS 

17 
London MMD Euro Trader: 

July 03, 2008: (emphasis added) 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

Frankfurt Regional Manager: 

London MMD Manager: 

September 26,2008: (emphasis added) 

FINE I CHEANGE IT TO 09 AS BEFORE .. 

ALLOKNOW 

GREATTHXS, SORRY FOR 

MISSUNDERSTANDING, WAS JUST 

LOOKING ONLY AT TODA Y'S FIXINGS .. 

THXS BIBIBI FN 

[Frankfmi Regional Manager], I have a big 

favor to ask you. 

Tell me. 

And, uh ... a big, big, big favor. 

Ok. 

Bon. In March ... 

Yes. 

We have, eh, we have 20 yards of a 6 month 

fixing. [ ... ] A lot in in March. So, basically, 

urn, basically, uh, we need high 6 month. 

You need high 6 month, ok. 

High 6 month, yes. 

Sure, we will get high 6 month, no worries. 

High. 

We will get high 6 month. 

Es ... especially on the IMM, on the 19th I 

have 7 yards. 

London MMD Euro Trader 2: Just to let you lmow, it would suit me very 

much to have a high LIBOR tomorrow. So, I 

don't know if you can put it high or not or 

whatever it is, just to let you know, tomorrow it 

suits me to have high 3s. 

Euribor Submitter: Umm. Y eh, there's one thing. We have to be 

careful. Usually we quote below Euribor, 

and right now we usually quote around 4 to 5 

basis points below the expected Euribor just 

to show that we are on the better quality of 

the range of the contributors. 

London MMD Euro Trader 2: I see ... 

Euribor Submitter: So that's why, right now, if you look at our 

quote compared to the other contributors ... 

London MMD Euro Trader 2: I know, I've been noticing that, that's why I 

thought I would ask you if there is there any 

chance if you can put it up for me. I would 

really appreciate that. Just for tomorrow, ok? 

18 
Euribor Submitter: 

June 4, 2009: 

Euribor Submitter: 

London MMD Manager: 

Euribor Submitter: 

My coworker here says something, maybe 21 

is possible. 

we will know until tom morning how the others 

apply trichets comments in the market i think 

for fixings it sounds like a non event 

apart from lower lmth and higher 6m 

pleaaaaaaaaaaaaase 

its likely that many contributors keep their rates 

unchanged :-)except for lm and 6m of cause 

:-) 

The Euribor submitters and the London MMD Manager also coordinated, at times, to 

"push cash" in the market, or, in other words, make bids or offers in the market at rates other 

than what they normally would have bid or offered. By this practice, the traders intended to 

signal to other market participants (including other Euribor panel banlc submitters) that market 

prices were moving in a certain direction. The Deutsche Banlc MMD traders and submitters 

wanted the other banlcs' Euribor submitters to factor these market moves into their Euribor 

submissions, thereby increasing Deutsche Bank's chances that the Euribor fixing would move in 

the direction they desired. 

The following are examples of the traders and the submitters openly discussing their 

strategy of pushing cash in the market: 

Aprill3, 2007: (to Yen Desk Manager) (emphasis added) 

Franlcfurt Euro Desk Manager: HI MATE, JUST FOR UR GUIDE. WE 

TRY TO BID UP IN THE 3M TO PUSH 

THE FIX A BIT. 

June 21,2007: (to London MMD Manager) (emphasis added) 

Frankfmi Euro Desk Manager: WE CONTINUE TO OFFER 1M CASH IN 

THE MARKTE TO KEEP lME FIX ON 

THE LOW SIDE. 

b. Deutsche Bank's Coordination with Other Euribor Panel Banks to 

Manipulate Euribor 

From at least 2005 through at least 2008, the London MMD Manager coordinated with 

derivatives traders at other Euribor panel banlcs on several occasions in attempts to manipulate 

the Euribor fixing. In addition to his regular internal requests to Deutsche Banlc Euribor 

submitters, the London MMD Manager also utilized his friendships and past working 

relationships with derivatives traders at other Euribor panel banlcs to further his attempts to 

manipulate Euribor. While he spoke daily to traders at several banlcs and other financial 

19 
institutions, he primarily coordinated with derivatives traders at Barclays20 ("Bm·clays Senior 

Euro Swaps Trader") and at Euribor Bank A ("Euribor Bank A Swaps Trader21 "). 

The London MMD Manager and these derivatives traders regularly exchanged 

information about their derivatives trading positions and the Euribor fixing that they prefened to 

benefit those positions. They agreed, at times, to transmit requests to their respective Euribor 

submitters for Euribor submissions that would benefit their trading positions. They also 

discussed reaching out to other Euribor panel banks to influence those banks' Euribor 

submissions in fmiherance of their attempts to manipulate the Euribor fixings. When the 

London MMD Manager was not available, he instructed the London MMD Euro Trader to 

communicate his positions and Euribor preferences to at least the Bm·clays Senior Euro Trader or 

his junior traders, and to the Deutsche Bank Euribor submitters. 

The following are examples of the communications between the London MMD Manager 

and the derivatives traders with whom he coordinated: 

June 9, 2005: (emphasis added) 

Bank A Euro Swaps Trader: 

London MMD Manager: 

September 29, 2005: (emphasis added) 

Amigo checked with my FFT their 3m 

euribor contribution which seems v low at 

2.11 like ur FFT have u checked with yuoyr 

guys??? 

will tell them from tomorrow to put a higher 

fix .. its way too low 

London MMD Manager: DON'T FORGET TO SET A HIGH FIX 

TODAY! 

Bm·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: I told them they're going to set it at 2.13 

London MMD Manager: goodness! that's going to hmi 

That same day: 

London MMD Manager: DONT FORGET THIS HIGH 3M FIX FOR 

THE FRA/EONIA SPREADS 

20 On June 27, 2012, the Commission issued an Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) 

and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, As Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial 

Sanctions against Bm·clays, finding, among other things, that the London MMD Manager, identified in 

the Bm·clays Order as Trader at Bank A, and a Bm·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader coordinated in their 

attempts to manipulate Euribor. See Inre Bm·clays PLC, Bm·clays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc., 

CFTC Docket No. 12-25 (June 27, 2012), pp. 16-17; available at 

http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/p_tJblic/@lrenforcemeJ1tactions/documents/Iegalpleadirrg/enf[)_arclaysorde 

r062712.pdf. 

21 In mid-2006, Euribor Bank A Swaps Trader moved to another Euribor panel bank. The London 

MMD Manager continued to have regular discussions with him regarding their respective trading 

positions, and, at times, made requests of each other for preferential Euribor submissions. 

20 
Bank A Euro Swaps Trader: we go for 18 

London MMD Manager: hoping to go as high as that as well 

September 11, 2006: (emphasis added) 

London MMD Manager: in October, we'll set the fixings at the sky, or 

that's not good for you? 

Bm·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: no, no, at the sky is good better for me 

September 28, 2006: (emphasis added) 

Bank B Euro Swaps Trader: mate how u positionned on 3mth fras at the 

moment? u have interest in a high or low libors? 

London MMD Manager: wud still love high rates mate, but i have to say 

that i bought loads of them some six months 

ago and sold back at high levels to our mutual 

clients let s say on emonth ago ... so, nothing 

huge in my book for now ... i reckon u' re in 

the same position right? 

Bank B Euro Swaps Trader: I need high libors in octobers and lower in 

november WOULD LOVE IT ... do u speal<. 

tour guys in frankfurter for the fixing? [ ... ] 

London MMD Manager: yes and to [Bank A Euro Swaps Trader] as 

well - my fft will put a high fix all along 

october .. can u speak to your cash guys if it 

suits u? 

Bank B Euro Swaps Trader: will try, certainly 

October 2, 2006: 

Bm·clays Euro Swaps Trader: 

London MMD Manager: 

Bm·clays Euro Swaps Trader: 

December 29, 2006: (emphasis added) 

Barclays Euro Swaps Trader: 

London MMD Euro Trader: 

January 18,2007: 

[London MMD Euro Trader], if it suits you as 

well, could you ask your cash guys to put a high 

6m fixing? 

iwill 

thanks a lot 

today we need a low 3 month fixing, could 

you tell your guys as well if it suits you 

oh yes!! 

London MMD Manager: put the lmth low please 

Barclays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: ok 

21 
March 15,2007: 

Bat·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: put 90 for the fixing please 

London MMD Manager: ok mate 

Bat·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: I want a basis at 5 max it will make up for my 

losses 

April9, 2008: (emphasis added) 

London MMD Manager: you're going to help me, promise me????? 

Bat·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: ahaah of course, mate, it looks like it wants to 

move big time[ ... ] 

London MMD Manager: seriously mate, are you really helping 

[London MMD Euro Trader] 

Bat·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: I'm going to help her big time 

At times, the London MMD Manager and the derivatives traders at the other banks 

attempted to manipulate Euribor to the benefit of their trading positions through the information 

interdealer brokers provided to the market. They requested interdealer brokers to enter false 

rates on the market screens the brokers provided to market participants in order to influence 

market perception regarding prevailing cash rates. The traders believed that this could 

potentially influence other banks' Euribor submitters to make Euribor submissions that would 

reflect these false rates, and, thereby, potentially move the Euribor fixing in a direction beneficial 

to their respective trading positions. 

The following are examples of the London MMD Manager's discussions regarding 

broker screens: 

December 22, 2006: 

Bat·clays Senior Euro Swaps Trader: tell [Broker 2] to raise the 6m mate important 

London MMD Manager: yes yes 

May 28, 2008: (telephone call to Bat'Clays Euro Swaps Trader) (emphasis added) 

London MMD Manager: Every day, every day I speak to my cash 

desk, to the cash brokers. I say "You have to 

raise the six month, you have to raise the six 

month!" 

January 28, 2009: (in telephone call to another Euro derivatives trader) 

London MMD Manager: ... we are still working on the, on the brokers 

so that ... they, they re-steepen the curve. 

Accordingly, throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc routinely made false repmis 

regarding Euribor in attempts to manipulate Euribor in order to benefit Deutsche Banlc' s trading 

positions. As such, Deutsche Bank's Euribor submissions were not made in accordance with the 

EBF's definitions and criteria for Euribor submissions. At times, they were successful in their 

attempted manipulations of Euribor. 

22 
6. Deutsche Banl\:'s False Reporting, Attempted Manipulation, and Manipulation 

ofYen LIBOR, and Coordination with UBS Senior Yen Trader 

During the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc, through its submitters and traders, routinely 

made false submissions in attempts to manipulate Yen LIB OR. From mid-2008 through mid2010, one Deutsche Bank derivatives trader also routinely coordinated with a derivatives trader 

at UBS in their attempts to manipulate Yen LIB OR. The Yen LIB OR misconduct perpetrated by 

the Deutsche Banlc traders and submitters originated out of Deutsche Banlc's London office 

primarily, and, on occasion, out of the Deutsche Tokyo Subsidiary. At times, Deutsche Banlc was 

successful in its attempts to manipulate Yen LIB OR. 

a. Deutsche Bank's Attempts to Manipulate Yen LIB OR in Order to Benefit 

Intemal Trading Positions. 

During the relevant period, several London-based Deutsche Banlc traders handled the 

responsibility for making the banlc's Yen LIBOR submissions, including the manager of the Yen 

and Euro Pool Trading Desk ("Yen Desk Manager") in London. Prior to mid-2008, the 

submission process was handled by a senior Yen Pool trader ("Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter") 

with a junior trader ("Junior Yen LIBOR Submitter") providing assistance. 

The submitters on the Yen Pool Trading desk coordinated regularly with other Deutsche 

Banlc yen derivatives traders on MMD desks in London and, on occasion, with the Deutsche 

Tokyo Subsidiary MMD traders, to make Yen LIB OR submissions that were beneficial to their 

respective derivatives trading positions. One of the senior traders involved in making requests 

on occasion was a manager in the DGutsche Tokyo Subsidiary ("Tokyo Regional Manager"). 

One London-based MMD trader who made requests ("Senior Yen Trader-Submitter") eventually 

became the Yen LIB OR submitter in mid-2008, fmiher entrenching the inherent conflict of 

interest permitted by Deutsche Banlc. 22 

Over the relevant period, the Deutsche Banlc Yen LIB OR submitters regularly took into 

account the oral or written requests by Deutsche Banlc traders for beneficial Yen LIBOR 

submissions. The submitters even openly solicited requests. Although the Yen Desk Manager 

usually did not make Yen LIB OR submissions himself, he was aware of the open and pervasive 

LIBOR requests being made by traders and the accommodation of those requests by the 

submitters. On occasion, he received the traders' requests and agreed to pass them along to the 

submitters to ensure that the submissions matched the traders' needs. 

The submitters also consistently took their own trading positions into account when 

making LIBOR submissions on behalf of the banlc, even communicating with each other when 

out of the office to ensure that the submissions were made in accordance with their trading 

positions. They also coordinated with other MMD traders to ensure their respective trading 

positions were not in conflict when making submissions to benefit those positions. As the Senior 

22 Although the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter formally reported to other supervisors, his daily MMD 

reporting supervisor was the London MMD Manager throughout the relevant period; with respect to his 

Yen LIB OR submission duties, he reported to the Yen Desk Manager. 

23 
Yen Trader-Submitter stated to another trader, "ON JPY WE TRY TO HAVE OUT LIBORS 

WITH OUR POSITIONS NOT AGAINS[T]." This practice ofmaking Yen LIBOR submissions 

to benefit the various traders' cash and derivatives trading positions persisted as responsibility 

for making the submissions passed from Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter to Senior Yen TraderSubmitter to, finally, in mid-2010, the Yen Desk Manager. 

The following are examples of improper communications between Deutsche Banlc Yen 

LIB OR submitters and Yen traders: 

June 27-28, 2006: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter: 

Junior Yen LIB OR Submitter: 

i will need high 1m jpy tomorrow, and low on 

thursday if u can have a look. i think 18.5 

and 17.5 should worl\:. thanks. 

going in 0.19 in 1 mth today .... ubs went in at 21 

yday so should be fine ..... 

September 18, 2006: (email to Junior Yen LIB OR Submitter) 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: Hello Mate, Could you put 6mjpy libor at 48.5 

pis 1m at 36.5 3m at 42 Thanks 

September 29,2006: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen Trader-Tokyo: Hi, [Senior Yen LIBOR Submitter]. I like to 

have a lower 3&6 month Libor today. 

[Senior Yen Trader-Tokyo] 

Senior Yen LIBOR Submitter: OK NO PB 

Senior Yen Trader-Tokyo: 

December 21, 2006: (emphasis added) 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

Junior Yen LIB OR Submitter: 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

Tl\:s vm, I don't like the spread between 

Libor and the implied is too wide ... Good 

day. 

are you doing libors today, esp JPY or is 

[Senior Yen LIBOR Submitter]? 

shld be [Yen Desk Manager] setting, let him 

know yr axes ... i'll be inputting next week if 

need anything then mate ... 

[Senior Yen Trader-Tokyo] will BBG you 

next week if he needs anything .. cheers mate 

Follow-up instant message to Yen Desk Manager the same day: 

Tokyo Regional Manager: is [Senior Yen LIBOR Submitter] in or are you 

Yen Desk Manager: 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

doing JPY libors today? 

[Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter] is doing it 

he is not picking [Senior Yen Trader-Tokyo] up 

... could you ask him to go high in 1m and 6m? 

24 
August 31,2007: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter: 

Junior Yen LIBOR Submitter: 

October 4, 2007: (emphasis added) 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

Yen Desk Manager: 

January 18,2008: (emphasis added) 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter: 

Follow-up message sent later that day: 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

Senior Yen LIB OR Submitter: 

Tokyo Regional Manager: 

I don't have much in JPY fixings next week, 

just need to }{eep 3m and 6m on the high side 

I will try to send you levels will be on bbry if 

anything thanks very much 

Cool, cheers and enjoy your holiday mate 

Morning Monsieur, couple of questions ... -Do 

you have a special axe re Libor settings at the 

moment? I've noticed you tend to be on the 

high side .. if you don't mind, lower fixings 

would suit us better in general [ .... ] 

Hi mate , the libors are set by [Senior Yen 

LIBOR Submitter] as he got more exposure 

on the fixing than in the cash book , I II fwd 

ur message to him 

Hi [Senior Yen LIBOR Submitter], thanks very 

much for FRA trades you've done for us ... 

another favour to ask: could we get low 1m and 

high 3m fixing today? thanks! 

iwilltry 

why did you go in low 3m fixing? we had 17 

trillion [yen] so it coming lower cost us a lot 

sorry I messed up that one, i thought i had 

left 91 

you owe me a drink! 

b. Deutsche Bank's Coordination witlt tlte UBS Senior Yen Trader to 

Manipulate Yen LIBOR 

From mid-2008 through mid-20 10, the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter coordinated with a 

senior yen derivatives trader at a subsidiary ofUBS AG ("UBS Senior Yen Trader") regarding 

Yen LIBOR submissions.23 The Senior Yen Trader-Submitter communicated regularly with the 

UBS Senior Yen Trader, discussing the market and their relative trading positions, and, 

eventually, discussing beneficial Yen LIB OR submissions. The Senior Yen Trader-Submitter 

knew the UBS Senior Yen Trader to be highly active and successful, one who provided liquidity 

and movement to the Yen derivatives market. When the UBS Senior Yen Trader began to 

request his assistance in making Deutsche Bank's Yen LIBOR submissions in a manner to 

23 In the Commission's Order against UBS, Deutsche Bank's Senior Yen Trader-Submitter is identified 

in the Order as the Yen Bank F Trader-Submitter. 

25 
benefit his trading, the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter readily accommodated him. The Senior 

Yen Trader-Submitter knew his control over the bank's Yen LIB OR submissions enabled him to 

make submissions to benefit his and the UBS Senior Yen Trader's derivatives trading positions. 

The UBS Senior Yen Trader also offered to assist the Deutsche Bank submitter by having his 

submitters make submissions that would benefit the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter. The traders at 

times aligned their trading positions so they could each equally benefit from the altered Yen 

LIBOR submissions made by both banks.Z4 

The following are examples of the coordination of their attempts to manipulate Yen 

LIB OR: 

August 28, 2008: (emphasis added) 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

September 1, 2008: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

September 18, 2008: (emphasis added) 

look i appreciate the business and the calls we 

should try to share info where possible also 

let me lmow if you need fixes one way or the 

other 

sure sorry mate have to go too busy on many 

things 

and i'll do the same if you have any joy with 

your setters 

no prob 

[ ... ] but going to put high libors today 

sure i think you guys are top in lm anyways 

i am mate need it high! 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: you got any ax on 6m fix tonight? 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: absoluetly none but i can help 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: can you set low as a favour for me? 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: done 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: i'll return favour when i can just ask have 

75m mjpy a bp tonight 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

np 

thanks so much 

[ ... ] 73/90/99 am putting libors 

great thanks mate 

24 When aligning their positions, they also often discussed Euroyen TIBOR, or the Tokyo Interbank 

Offered Rate, a Tokyo-based rate similar to LIBOR. Some of their derivatives trading positions were tied 

to this rate. Both Deutsche Bank and UBS were banks who made submissions for this rate. On a few 

occasions, the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter and the UBS Senior Yen Trader discussed trying to have 

their respective submitters alter their TIBOR submissions to benefit their trading positions. The Senior 

Yen Trader-Submitter even attempted internally on a handful of occasions, once at the behest of the UBS 

Senior Yen Trader, to contact the Deutsche Bank TIBOR submitter. He was unsuccessful in his attempts. 

26 
In a follow-up message the next day, the UBS Senior Yen Trader offered the Senior Yen 

Trader-Submitter a deal, stating, "in fact cause you helped me on 6m yday." 

May 21,2009: (emphasis added) 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Follow-up message the next day: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

cld you do me a favour would you mind 

moving you 6m libor up a bit today, i have a 

gigantic fix i am limit shmi can't sell 

anymore just watch 

i can do that 

thx 

u happy with me yesterday? 

thx i don't see it going up again today 

me too 

only you and [Yen Panel Banlc A] moved 

In the summer of 2009, the UBS Senior Yen Trader began extended campaigns to 

manipulate the six-month tenor of Yen LIBOR to benefit massive trading positions he held tied 

to one-, three-, and six-month Yen LIBOR. His plan first required moving the six-month Yen 

LIBOR fixing higher by the fixing date at the end of June, and then, second, to keep it high 

through July. Finally, he wanted the six-month Yen LIBOR fixing to drop dramatically by midAugust. To assist him, the Deutsche Bank Senior Yen Trader-Submitter became an active and 

necessary participant in his plan. The UBS Senior Yen Trader also offered to enter into trades at 

rates detrimental to him but beneficial to the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter to ensure the Senior 

Yen Trader-Submitter's involvement in his plans and to entice him to make Deutsche Banlc' s 

Yen LIB OR submissions in the manner he desired. The Senior Yen Trader-Submitter readily 

accepted those trades and made the submissions as requested by the UBS Senior Yen Trader; at 

times, he would ask the next day whether the UBS Senior Yen Trader was pleased with his 

effmis. 

The following are examples of their specific coordination to manipulate Yen LIB OR over 

the summer of2009: 

June 15, 2009: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

is there any chance you cld set a high 6m 

tonight, just tonight, i have 1 .. 5m usd bp fix no 

worries if you can't god knows where that all 

came from 

hum i think my libors will be unch for a while 

now .... my led is quite high and i do not want 

3m libor up 

me neither i need low 3m no prob ustnd you 

will help me out when 6m goes over the turn 

tho? i have lm usda bp that day too 

27 
June 26,2009: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

[ ... ] 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

[ ... ] 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

[ ... ] 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

[ ... ] 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

[ ... ] 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

Hello big boy 

hi 

is there a date u see we could have 6m libor ot is 

no point being stubborn in that direction an i do 

sthing else sorry 6m lower hopeviuosly no for 

teh next 3 weeks 

basically i will help you in 2 weeks time 1 am 

the saem way 

perfect 

but for the next 2weeks i really really need 

you to put 6m higfher 

after that i need 6m to crash off like you 

that is no problem for me, i do nothing with 

the cash guys until then 

i need you to move 6m up for 2 weeks mate 

but please move 6m up on Monday 

understood 

thx i need you in the panel on Monday 

ok enough cheers 

i will then get our 6m way down after july 18th 

it is ... and will try to get everyone else down 

too 

only reason i on bid is i have huge huge position 

that way so am happy for to come lower after 

the 1 i 11 

ok enough enough on my fra switch it is 

your best? 

tell me what you need to see i have a vested 

interest in malting sure our fixings match 

just don't rip me off too much i had those 

round mid i got to go soon 

ok -1.5 and -1 ami asking too much? 

thats fine 

pls make sure you put the 6m up for me thx 

oof enough enough 

ok i'll shut up now 

of course 

28 
June 29, 2009: (emphasis added) 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

July 21, 2009: (emphasis added) 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

[ ... ] 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

July 23,2009: (emphasis added) 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

UBS Senior Yen Trader: 

pis remember 6m today ... 

yah no worries ... 6m libor today good contrib? 

high pis as high as you can manage we are 

going 75 anyway whatever you can do thx 

sure np ... 

i been asked to reduce risk a bit 

ok 

i still going for lower 6m next month but 

position is huge if you want to do some ly 1/t 

1 wid help me on risk limits obviously i am 

still very much paid and need a low 6m from 

next week [ ... ] 

does not suit me taht much today need high 

6m libor today ..... 

same how about we do Ov6 spot as well 7 so 

no fix today i just need to keep the risk guys at 

bay 200b 1 y will bring me in limit i will pay 

you .665 for Ov6 today in same amount to 

knock the fix out if you need i think it does 

nothing today the fix that is wid be a massive 

favour 

can i do 200 and lower my 6m quote? oor we 

cross fra up to you mate 

rahter just cross the fra pis 

that is fair ok we done 

thanks 

ok we need to cordinarte the 6m drop when 

do you need it falling? 

whenever 

ok we need aug 11th you are back by then? 

if you need earlier let me know i am going to 

be away the whole of august almost if you 

need anything i am in london and zurich offices 

oon blackberry @ubs.com will 

be pushinh lower 6m from aug 11th 

back on the lOth in ldn 

ok well lets sort 6m out from 11th will make 

a massive push 

29 
The Senior Yen Trader-Submitter continued to coordinate with the UBS Senior Yen 

Trader regarding beneficial Yen LIB OR submissions into mid-201 0, even after the UBS Senior 

Yen Trader left UBS for another Yen panel banlc At this point, however, the Senior Yen TraderSubmitter was no longer responsible for Deutsche Bank's Yen LIB OR submissions. 

Accordingly, throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc routinely made false reports 

regarding Yen LIB OR and attempted to manipulate Yen LIB OR in order to benefit Deutsche 

Banlc's trading positions. As such, Deutsche Bank's Yen LIBOR submissions were not made in 

accordance with the BBA definitions and criteria for LIBOR submissions. At times, they were 

successful in their attempted manipulations of Yen LIB OR. 

7. Deutsche Bank's False Reporting, Attempted Manipulation, and Manipulation of 

Sterling LIBOR 

During the relevant period, Deutsche Bank, through its submitters and traders, routinely 

made false LIBOR submissions in futiherance of their attempts to manipulate Sterling LIBOR. 

At times, they were successful in their attempts. The head of Deutsche Bank's Sterling Pool 

Trading desk in London ("Sterling Desk Manager") and another trader assigned to the desk 

("Sterling LIB OR Submitter") were responsible for submitting Deutsche Banlc' s Sterling LIB OR 

submissions. Both traders maintained the desk's trading book which included proprietary 

derivatives trading positions. The secondary Sterling trader, acting as the primary Sterling 

LIBOR submitter, communicated regularly, often daily, with the Sterling Desk Manager 

regarding the trading positions held in the Sterling Pool trading book. 

Throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc's Sterling Desk Manager and the Sterling 

submitter routinely took their LIBOR-based trading positions into account when determining the 

banlc's Sterling LIBOR submissions, and, accordingly, made false Sterling LIBOR contributions 

routinely in order to benefit those positions. On occasion, the Sterling Desk Manager and 

Sterling submitter received preferential requests from at least one Sterling MMD derivatives 

trader which they, at times, accommodated when making Deutsche Banlc's LIBOR submissions. 

Throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc's Sterling LIBOR submissions were routinely 

skewed in order to benefit the Deutsche Banlc's Sterling LIBOR derivatives trading positions. 

The following are examples of communications between the Sterling Desk Manager and Sterling 

submitter, and the requests from the Sterling MMD trader: 

December 5, 2006: (to Sterling Desk Manager) (emphasis added) 

Senior MMD Sterling Trader: HI MATE IF WE COULD GO FOR A 28 

ON 3S LIBOR TODAY THAT WOULD BE 

GREAT 

August 8, 2007: (email to Sterling Desk Manager) 

Senior MMD Sterling Trader: LET US KNOW WHEN YOU DO LIBORS. 

NEED LOW 1 S LOW3 

30 
February 18, 2008: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

[ ... ] 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

August 1, 2008: (emphasis added) 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

January 28,2009: (emphasis added) 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Yeah. [Unintelligible] It's very cold here so it 

must be very cold where you are. 

It's really cold but there is sunshine, so it's quite 

mce. 

It's cold but there is a beautiful blue sky. 

Lovely. Perfect conditions mate. Listen, I've 

got your message here. Obviously, ifthese 

markets rally, you just want to get out some of 

the March, don't you front March? 

Yeah. What message did I leave there? 

[Unintelligible] [ ... ] . Six month, one year 

[unintelligible] on the rally. I'm assuming you 

are long six [unintelligible] in March now 

[unintelligible] three or four ticks we just get out 

of it. 

We'll get out of some of it yeah. 

Okay at three months. Three months LIBOR 

was 63 or 64. 

65, 65. Yeah yeah yeah. 

Yeah. 

Oh yeah I'll put that up a bit yeah yeah yeah 

So you've got to do that. We've also, we've got 

week going out, so put that higher. 

All right, yeah. [ ... ] 

[ ... ] Urn, we've got the two fixings up today, 

we we need a high LIBOR in the ones. Got a 

yard ... 

Yeah 

... going out so we need a high uh high 

LIBOR in the ones and we'd need a low 

screen on the threes. I've got it at forty base 

points the LIBOR's coming in at like seventyeight and I've I've moved our screen to like 

thirty-eight so I've got to modify that ticket at 

eleven yeah? 

Tomorrow we got the 1.3 billion that will be 

going out so you'll want to leave that one 

month at one sixty, which you put the LIBOR 

is. 

Yeah 

31 
Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

August 31,2010: (emphasis added) 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

[ ... ] 

Sterling LIBOR Submitter: 

Sterling Desk Manager: 

Umm, other than that, you want, you want 

the three months low again didn't you? Oh 

that, that spread is eighty ... ah, probably eighty 

eight and a half, eighty five at the moment. 

Oh is it? 

Yeah, that's what the last I heard. 

Fine 

Yeah, urn, ni, ninety eight, six five, eighty eight 

and a half [unintelligible] ... 

Yeah 

... eighty, eighty-five bids [unintelligible] ... 

I'm a, I'm a, I'm happy with that. 

[Senior MMD Sterling Trader's] come over, 

he wants 3s [unintelligible] libor down a tick 

[unintelligible] 

No, no, no, no, no. 

No, he's got a fixing, he said. I said we've got 

stuff about the 15th of September. We need 

higher libors, don't we. 

Yeah 

But you need it, we need 3s to go to 76 and 77. 

Yeah, I want it higher libor. 

Accordingly, throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc routinely made false repmis 

regarding Sterling LIBOR in attempts to manipulate Sterling LIBOR in order to benefit Deutsche 

Banlc's trading positions. As such, Deutsche Bank's Sterling LIBOR submissions were not made 

in accordance with the BBA definitions and criteria for LIBOR submissions. At times, they 

were successful in their attempted manipulations of Sterling LIB OR. 

8. Deutsche Bank's False Reporting, Attempted Manipulation, and Manipulation 

of Swiss Franc LIBOR 

During the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc, through its submitters and traders, routinely 

made false submissions for Swiss Franc LIB OR in furtherance of its attempts to manipulate 

Swiss Franc LIBOR. At times, they were successful in their attempts to manipulate Swiss Franc 

LIB OR. 

Deutsche Banlc's Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions were made by the Deutsche Banlc 

Non-Euro Pool Trading desk based in Franlcfurt. The primary Swiss Franc LIBOR submitter 

changed over the relevant period, one of whom was the Non-Euro Desk Manager. 

Over the relevant period into 2010, one Swiss Franc Pool trader (Swiss Franc 

Submitter 1) received from Deutsche Banlc MMD derivatives traders in London, including the 

32 
Senior Yen Trader-Submitter, regular requests for preferential Swiss Franc LIB OR submissions 

to benefit their derivatives trading positions. The Swiss Franc Submitter 1 routinely obliged 

these trader requests and at times proactively reached out to the derivatives traders to ask 

whether they had requests for that day's LIBOR submission. When the Swiss Franc Submitter 1 

was unavailable, the Non-Euro Desk Manager also adjusted Deutsche Bank's Swiss Franc 

LIB OR submissions to benefit the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter derivatives trading positions. 

The Swiss Franc Submitter 1 was methodical in determining how submissions might 

affect the Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions. During a telephone discussion between the Swiss 

Franc Submitter 1 and the Senior Yen Trader-Submitter on August 19, 2009, the Swiss Franc 

Submitter 1 explained that he maintained a spreadsheet in which he used a "LIB OR contribution 

simulation" to determine how a pmiicular Deutsche Bank Swiss Franc LIB OR submission would 

affect the Swiss Franc LIBOR fixing. 

Examples of requests from the traders to the Swiss Franc Submitter 1 and the Non-Euro 

Desk Manager are as follows: 

March 26,2007: 

London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 1: hello sir, welcome back, you missed nothing, 

not sure if matches with you but my int is for a 

lower fixing, thanks 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: HI [London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 1], 

NOTED N LET U KNOW ..... NO PROBL 

CIAOOO 

September 17,2007: (emphasis added) 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: LET ME KNOW ON THE FIXINGS IN 

CASE U NEED SOMETHG SPECIAL 

London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 1: i have been trying to run as little as possible in 

the tn (as it was just costing me money), .. 

another nice low 3m tom would be nice 

September 25, 2008: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: can you put a high 3m please? 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: sure 83? 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: many thanks really need low 1 month today . 

. . . just for tpday ... 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: wud do 61 if u agree .... problem is not to 

quote too low to be deleted in the calculation 

process 

November 28,2008: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: can we leave 1m unchanged tuesday? sorry 

until tuesday also will check dbqf sorry about 

that. .. 

33 
Swiss Franc Submitter 1: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

December 3, 2008: 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: 

July 2, 2009: (emphasis added) 

Non-Euro Desk Manager: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

Non-Euro Desk Manager: 

March 10,2010: (emphasis added) 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: 

Senior Yen Trader-Submitter: 

Swiss Franc Submitter 1: 

sure no probl will quote unchgd 1.00 for 1,2 

and 3 mths if ok 

many Thanks 

morning mate ..... do u still need high 1m fix, 

rite? 

Hi [Swiss Franc Submitter 1] no gig axe all 

out 

ok gr8 in that case i will lower our quote 

Hi morning mate! Do you have any special 

requests for the libor? 

keep 1m, 3m and 6m where they are please 

ok will be done mate 

what ahppened withyour 6m libor 

sh ........ did u have a refix? 

no not today back to 1 please 

sure will take care tom 

Later in mid-2010, the Swiss Franc Submitter 2 became responsible for Deutsche Bank's 

Swiss Franc LIB OR submissions. The Swiss Franc Submitter 2 often reached out to traders to 

inform them of the bank's intended Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions to determine whether there 

any preferential rates needed by the derivatives traders. On occasion, the Swiss Franc 

Submitter 2 received specific requests from MMD traders and skewed submissions to benefit 

their trading positions. The Swiss Franc Submitter 2 continued this LIBOR submission practice 

until early 2011, more than a year after the start of the bank's internal LIBOR investigation. 

Examples of these communications are as follows: 

September 9, 2010: 

London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 2: Hi [Swiss Franc Submitter 2], good day to you. 

just to let you know if you can help .. well or at 

least dont kill on that one pis. Got quite big 

fixings today: I am for: Lower fix in 1m higher 

fix in 3m lower fix in 6m txs same tomorrow 

in 6s3s and reverse monday ... the beauty of 

stupid mismatches 

Swiss Franc Submitter 2: only helps you if relative to each other, right? i 

actually think a higher 3m fixing relative to 1m 

and 6m would perfectly reflect market 

movements today, should be no problem :-) 

London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 2: i like your thinking! tks 

34 
Swiss Franc Submitter 2: won't have any effect though I'm just realizing. 

my fixings are among the highest, they are not 

counting into the average right now anyway 

London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 2: haha, ok 

Swiss Franc Submitter 2: sorry. I'm long:-) 

September 22,2010: (email to several Pool and MMD traders) 

Swiss Franc Submitter 2: hi! libors unchanged today. 

October 4, 2010: 

London MMD Swiss Franc Trader 2: hello hello, so have u sorted when u coming 

around? also, we re not the highest in fixings 

anymore, do you think you could increase your 

3m slightly from tomorrow on if suits 

obviously .... bloody cs moved lower today and i 

m paid for the next 3 weeks or so 

April18, 2011: (email to several Pool and MMD traders) 

Swiss Franc Submitter 2: hihi, chflibors unchanged please. 

Accordingly, throughout the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc routinely made false reports 

regarding Swiss Franc LIBOR in attempts to manipulate Swiss Franc LIBOR in order to benefit 

Deutsche Banlc's trading positions. As such, Deutsche Banlc's Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions 

were not made in accordance with the BBA definitions and criteria for LIBOR submissions. At 

times, they were successful in their attempted manipulations of Swiss Franc LIB OR. 

******* 

As described above, Deutsche Banlc made repeated and regular attempts to manipulate 

U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor in order to affect the official 

fixings ofLIBOR and Euribor in a manner that would benefit its cash and derivatives trading 

positions. Deutsche Bank, through its derivatives traders and submitters, knew it was improper 

to consider derivatives trading positions in determining the banlc's LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions. A banlc' s derivatives trading positions are not legitimate or permissible factors on 

which to base a banlc's daily LIBOR or Euribor submissions. By basing its LIBOR and Euribor 

submissions on rates that benefited Deutsche Bank's derivatives trading positions, Deutsche 

Banlc's submissions were not made in accordance with the definitions and criteria for LIBOR 

and Euribor submissions. Instead, Deutsche Banlc knowingly conveyed false, misleading, or 

knowingly inaccurate repmis that its submitted rates for LIBOR and Euribor were based on and 

solely reflected its assessment of the costs of bon·owing unsecured funds in the relevant 

interbanlc money markets. Accordingly, Deutsche Banlc regularly attempted to manipulate the 

official fixings for U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor, and 

knowingly delivered false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate repmis concerning U.S. Dollar, 

Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor, which are commodities in interstate 

commerce. 

35 
IV. 

LEGAL DISCUSSION 

A. Deutsche Bank Made False, Misleading, or Knowingly Inaccurate Reports 

Concerning the Costs of Borrowing Unsecured Funds in Violation of Section 9(a)(2) 

of the Act 

Section 9(a)(2) of the Act makes it unlawful for any person "knowingly to deliver or 

cause to be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, 

telephone, wireless, or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly 

inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to 

affect the price of any commodity.in interstate commerce .... " 7 U.S. C. § 13(a)(2) (2006); 

United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 691 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 

352, 354-355 (5th Cir. 2004); see also CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (S.D. Tex. 

2005). 

On a daily basis, Deutsche Bank knowingly delivered or caused to be delivered its U.S. 

Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIB OR and Euribor submissions through the mails or 

interstate commerce by transmitting its submissions electronically to the service provider of the 

BBA and EBF, who calculates their official fixings (i.e., Thomson Reuters). Deutsche Banlc's 

submissions were also caused to be delivered through the mails or interstate commerce through 

the daily dissemination and publication globally, including into the United States, of the panel 

banlcs' submissions, as well as the daily official benchmark interest rates, by at least Thomson 

Reuters on behalf of the BBA and EBF, and by other third pmiy vendors. The panel banlcs' 

submissions are used to determine the official published rates for LIBOR and Euribor, which are 

calculated based on a trimmed average of the submissions. Deutsche Banlc' s daily LIB OR and 

Euribor submissions contained market information concerning the costs of borrowing unsecured 

funds in patiicular currencies and tenors, the liquidity conditions and stress in the money 

markets, and Deutsche Bank's ability to borrow funds in the particular markets. Such market 

information affects or tends to affect the prices of commodities in interstate commerce, including 

the daily rates at which U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor are 

fixed. 25 

During the relevant period, Deutsche Banlc's submissions for U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, 

and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor were false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate because 

they were based in whole or in pati on impermissible and illegitimate factors, specifically 

Deutsche Banlc's cash and derivatives trading positions. By using these impermissible and 

illegitimate factors in making its LIBOR and Euribor submissions, Deutsche Banlc conveyed 

false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate information that the rates it submitted were based on 

and related solely to the costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the relevant interbanlc mm·kets, 

and were truthful and reliable. Moreover, certain of Deutsche Banlc's traders, submitters, and 

25 LIB OR and Euribor as benchmark interest rates are commodities under the Act. See Sections 1 a( 4) 

and 1a(l3) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(4) and 1a(l3) (2006) (pre-Dodd Frank) and Sections 1a(9) and 

1a(19) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(9) and 1a(l9) (2012) (post-Dodd Frank). 

36 
managers, including a senior manager, knew that Deutsche Bank's U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, 

and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor submissions contained false, misleading and knowingly 

inaccurate information concerning the submitted rates. By such conduct, Respondent violated 

Section 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006). 

B. Deutsche Bank Manipulated U.S. Dollar LIBOR, Euribor, Yen LIB OR, Sterling 

LIBOR, and Swiss Franc LIBOR at Times for Certain Tenors 

Together, Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act prohibit acts of manipulation or 

attempted manipulation. Section 9(a)(2) of the Act makes it unlawful for "[a]ny person to 

manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for 

future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity .... " 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) 

(2006). Section 6(c) of the Act authorizes the Commission to serve a complaint and provide for 

the imposition of, among other things, civil monetary penalties and cease and desist orders if the 

Commission "has reason to believe that any person ... is manipulating or attempting to 

manipulate or has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the market price of any commodity, in 

interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, ... 

or otherwise is violating or has violated any of the provisions of [the] Act .... " 7 U.S.C. § 9 

(2006). Section 6(d) ofthe Act is substantially identical to Section 6(c). See 7 U.S.C. § 13b 

(2006). 

Manipulation under the Act is the "intentional exaction of a price determined by forces 

other than supply or demand." Frey v. CFTC, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1991). The 

following four elements must be met, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show a successful 

manipulation has occurred: 

(1) the [respondent] had the ability to influence market prices; 

(2) the [respondent] specifically intended to do so; 

(3) atiificial prices existed; and 

(4) the [respondent] caused an artificial price. 

In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,061 

(CFTC July 15, 1987). The test for manipulation, however, is a practical one: 

We think the test of manipulation must largely be a practical one if the 

purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act are to be accomplished. The 

methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only the ingenuity of 

man. The aim must be therefore to discover whether conduct has been 

intentionally engaged in which has resulted in a price which does not 

reflect basic forces of supply and demand. 

Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971). 

"[I]ntent is the essence of manipulation." Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass 'n, Inc., 

[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,282 (CFTC Dec. 17, 

1982). The manipulator's intent separates "lawful business conduct from unlawful manipulative 

37 
activity." !d. at 27,283. To prove the intent element of manipulation, it must be shown that 

Deutsche Bank "acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or conscious object of causing or 

effecting a price or price trend in the market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply 

and demand." !d. 

The Commission has observed that "intent must of necessity be inferred from the 

objective facts and may, of course, be inferred by a person's actions and the totality of the 

circumstances." In re Hohenberg Bros., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 

(CCH) ,-r 20,271, at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977). "[O]nce it is demonstrated that the alleged 

manipulator sought, by act or omission, to move the market away from the equilibrium or 

efficient price -the price which reflects market forces of supply and demand - the mental 

element of manipulation may be inferred." Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, Inc., 

[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) at 27,283. "It is enough to present 

evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the accused 'consciously desire[d] that 

result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct."' !d. (quoting United 

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442, 445 (1978)). A profit motive may also be 

evidence of intent, although profit motive is not a necessary element of an attempted 

manipulation. See In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ,-r 

30,970, at 62,484 (CFTC Nov. 5, 2008) (citing In re Hohenberg Bros. Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 

(CCH) ,-r 20,271, at 21,478)), aff'd, 364 Fed. Appx. 657, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 WL 3326624 (2d 

Cir. 2009). 

An artificial price (also termed a "distmied" price) is one "that does not reflect market or 

economic forces of supply and demand." In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 

Rep. (CCH) at 34,064; Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer 

Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) at 27,288 n. 2. As the Commission noted with approval in 

DiPlacido, ,-r 30,970, at 62,484 (quoting Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass 'n, Inc., [1982-

1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) at 27,300 (Commissioner Stone concurring)), 

a Commissioner has commented: "[t]his is more an axiom than a test." In determining whether 

an miificial price has occmTed: 

[O]ne must look at the aggregate forces of supply and demand and search 

for those factors which are extraneous to the pricing system, are not a 

legitimate pali of the economic pricing of the commodity, or are extrinsic 

to that commodity market. When the aggregate forces of supply and 

demand bearing down on a paliicular market are all legitimate, it follows 

that the price will not be artificial. On the other hand when a price is 

effected by a factor which is not legitimate, the resulting price is 

necessarily miificial. Thus, the focus should not be as much on the 

ultimate price as on the nature of the factors causing it. 

Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass 'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep 

(CCH) at 27,288 n.2. See also In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 

Rep. (CCH) at 62,484 (finding that the placement of uneconomic bids or offers results in 

miificial prices because those prices are not determined by the free forces of supply and demand 

on the exchange). 

38 
Causation of artificial prices is established when it is demonstrated that miificial market 

prices resulted from the conduct of a trader, or group of traders acting in concert, rather than 

legitimate forces of supply and demand. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1171-72 

(8th Cir. 1971) (price squeeze "intentionally brought about and exploited by Cargill"); In re Cox, 

[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 34,067 (proof of causation requires 

the Division to show that "the respondents' conduct 'resulted in' artificial prices"). 

There can be multiple causes of an artificial price. In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer 

Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 62,485. The manipulator's actions need not be the sole 

cause of the atiificial price. "It is enough for purposes of a finding of manipulation in violation 

of Sections 6(b) and 9 of the Act that respondents' action contributed to the price [movement]." 

In re Kosuga, 19 A.D. 603, 624 (1960); see also In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. 

Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 34,066 (recognizing there can be multiple causes of an artificial price and 

holding that a charge of manipulation can be sustained where respondents' acts are a proximate 

cause of the atiificial price). 

Here, as a member ofthe BBA's U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIBOR 

panels and the Euribor panel, Deutsche Bank made daily submissions that purpmied to reflect its 

assessments of the costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the relevant interbank markets for U.S. 

Dollar, Yen, Sterling, Swiss Franc, and Euro across tenors. The official LIB OR and Euribor 

fixings are calculated using a trimmed average methodology applied to the rates submitted by the 

panel banks. By vhiue of this methodology, Deutsche Bank had the ability to influence or affect 

the rates that would become the official fixings for U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss Franc 

LIBOR and Euribor for any tenor. 

As evidenced by the extensive communications and other facts set fmih above, in making 

the false LIBOR and Euribor submissions, more than two dozen Deutsche Bank traders, 

submitters, and managers specifically intended to affect the daily U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and 

Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor for certain tenors, including one-month, three-month, and sixmonth. Their intent is also made clear by the evidence that the derivatives traders and 

submitters' motives were to benefit Deutsche Bank's derivatives and at times cash trading 

positions, or, at times, the derivatives trading positions of other panel banks with whom certain 

Deutsche Banlc derivatives traders coordinated. 

On certain occasions, Deutsche Banlc' s false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate 

LIBOR and Euribor submissions were illegitimate factors in the pricing of the daily LIBOR and 

Euribor fixings and affected the official LIBOR and Euribor for cetiain tenors, resulting in 

artificial LIBOR and Euribor fixings. Thus, Deutsche Banlc's actions were a proximate cause of 

the artificial LIBOR and Euribor fixings. 

Accordingly, at times, Deutsche Bank manipulated certain tenors ofU.S. Dollar, Yen, 

Sterling, and Swiss Franc LIBOR and Euribor, commodities in interstate commerce, in violation 

of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act. 

39 
C. Deutsche Bank Attempted to Manipulate U.S. Dollar, Yen, Sterling, and Swiss 

Franc LIBOR and Euribor 

To prove attempted manipulation, two elements are required: (1) an intent to affect the 

market price; and (2) an overt act in furtherance of that intent. See In re Hohenberg Bros. Co., 

[1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,271, at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 

1977); CFTC v. Bradley, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (N.D. Okla. 2005). The intent standard is 

the same as that for manipulation. See Indiana Farm Bureau and Hohenberg Bros., supra. 

As found above, more than two dozen Deutsche Banlc derivatives traders, submitters, and 

managers specifically intended to affect the rate at which the daily LIBOR for U.S. Dollar, Yen, 

Sterling, and Swiss Franc and the daily Euribor would be fixed to benefit Deutsche Banlc's 

derivatives trading and, at times, money market positions, or, in the case of Euribor and Yen 

LIBOR, to benefit the derivatives trading positions of traders at other banlcs with whom certain 

Deutsche Bank traders coordinated. The Deutsche Banlc derivatives traders' requests for 

beneficial LIBOR and Euribor submissions and the Deutsche Banlc submitters making 

submissions based on those requests, or making submissions to benefit their own derivatives 

trading positions, constitute overt acts in furtherance of their intent to affect the fixings of 

LIBOR for various cunencies and the fixings ofEuribor. By doing so, Deutsche Banlc engaged 

in repeated acts of attempted manipulation in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the 

Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006). 

D. Deutsche Bank Aided and Abetted the Attempts of Traders at Other Banks to 

Manipulate Yen LIBOR and Euribor 

Pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Act, Deutsche Bank aided and abetted the attempts of 

traders at other banlcs to manipulate Yen LIBOR and Euribor in violation of the Act. 7 U.S.C. 

§ 13c(a) (2006). Liability as an aider and abettor requires proof that: (1) the Act was violated; 

(2) the aider and abettor had knowledge of the wrongdoing underlying the violation; and (3) the 

aider and abettor intentionally assisted the primary wrongdoer. See In re Nikkhah, [1999-2000 

Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 28,129, at 49,888 n.28 (CFTC May 12, 2000). 

Although actual knowledge of the primary wrongdoer's conduct is required, knowledge of the 

unlawfulness of such conduct need not be demonstrated. See In re Lincolnwood Commodities, 

Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,986, at 28,255 (CFTC Jan. 

31, 1984). Knowing assistance can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. 

!d. 

As evidenced by the communications set fmih above, Deutsche Banlc' s Senior Yen 

Trader-Submitter and London MMD Manager and derivatives traders at other panel banks 

coordinated on several occasions about Yen LIB OR and Euribor submissions that would benefit 

their banlcs' respective cash and derivatives trading positions. At times, the traders at the other 

panel banlcs asked Deutsche Banlc traders to submit a certain rate, or submit a rate in a direction 

higher or lower, that would benefit the cash and derivatives trading positions of the traders at the 

other panel banlcs. The Deutsche Banlc Senior Yen Trader-Submitter agreed and submitted the 

requested preferential rates for Yen LIB OR. The London MMD Manager also agreed and 

passed along the requested Euribor submissions to Deutsche Banlc's Euribor submitters, who 

40 
accommodated the requests. Accordingly, by seeking to affect the rates at which Yen LIB OR 

and Euribor were fixed, traders at the other banks attempted to manipulate Yen LIB OR and 

Euribor in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 

13(a)(2) (2006). Deutsche Bank's Senior Yen Trader-Submitter and London MMD Manager 

had knowledge of and intentionally assisted the attempts of the traders at the other banks to 

manipulate the rates at which Yen LIBOR and Euribor were fixed. By such acts of those 

Deutsche Bank employees, Deutsche Banlc aided and abetted the attempts of traders at other 

banks to manipulate Yen LIBOR and Euribor in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of 

the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006). 

E. Deutsche Bank is Liable for the Acts of Its Agents 

Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), and Regulation 1.2, 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 

(2012), provide that the act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other person acting for 

any individual, association, patinership, corporation, or trust within the scope of his employment 

or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, association, patinership, 

corporation, or trust. Pursuant to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA and Commission Regulation 

1.2, strict liability is imposed on principals for the actions of their agents. See, e.g., Rosenthal & 

Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); Dohmen-Ramirez & Wellington Advismy, Inc. 

v. CFTC, 837 F.2d 847, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Deutsche Banlc is liable for the acts, omissions, and failures of the traders, managers, and 

submitters who acted as its employees and/or agents in the conduct described above and 

accordingly, violated Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) 

(2006), as set forth above. 

v. 

FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS 

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent violated Sections 6( c), 

6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006). 

VI. 

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT 

Respondent, without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, except to 

the extent Respondent admits those findings in any related action against Respondent by, or any 

agreement with, the Depatiment of Justice or any other governmental agency or office, has 

submitted the Offer in which it: 

A. Acknowledges receipt of service of this Order; 

41 
B. Admits the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to all matters set forth in this 

Order and for any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based 

on violation of or enforcement of this Order; 

C. Waives: 

1. the service and filing of a complaint and notice of hearing; 

2. a hearing; 

3. all post-hearing procedures; 

4. judicial review by any court; 

5. any and all objections to the participation by any member of the Commission's 

staff in the Commission's consideration of the Offer; 

6. any and all claims that Respondent may possess under the Equal Access to Justice 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) and 28 U.S. C. § 2412 (2006), and/or the rules 

promulgated by the Commission in conformity therewith, Pmt 148 of the 

Commission's Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 148.1-30 (2012), relating to, or arising 

from, this proceeding; 

7. any and all claims that Respondent may possess under the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 

110 Stat. 847, 857-868 (1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8302, 121 

Stat. 112, 204-205 (2007), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding; and 

8. any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding or the 

entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any 

other relief; 

D. Stipulates that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely of the 

findings contained in this Order to which Respondent has consented in the Offer; and 

E. Consents, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission's entry of this Order that: 

1. makes findings by the Commission that Respondent violated Section 6( c), 6( d), 

and 9(a)(2) ofthe Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006); 

2. orders Respondent to cease and desist from violating Sections 6( c), 6( d), and 

9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006); 

3. orders Respondent to pay a civil monetary penalty in the amount of Eight 

Hundred Million U.S. Dollars ($800,000,000) plus post-judgment interest; and 

42 
4. orders Respondent and its successors and assigns to comply with the conditions 

and undetiakings consented to in the Offer and as set fmih in Pmi VII of this 

Order. 

Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer. 

VII. 

ORDER 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

A. Respondent shall cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) ofthe 

Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (2006) ofthe Act. 

B. Respondent shall pay a civil monetary penalty of Eight Hundred Million Dollars 

($800,000,000) within ten (10) days of the date of entry ofthis Order (the "CMP 

Obligation").2 If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full within ten (10) days of the date 

of entry of this Order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue on the CMP Obligation 

beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be determined by using the 

Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1961 (2006). Respondent shall pay the CMP Obligation by electronic funds transfer, 

U.S. postal money order, cetiified check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order. If 

payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be 

made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address 

below: 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Division of Enforcement 

ATTN: Accounts Receivables 

DOT IF AA/MMAC/ AMZ-341 

CFTC/CPSC/SEC 

6500 S. MacAtihur Blvd. 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

( 405) 954-7262 office 

(405) 954-1620 fax 

If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondent shall contact Nikki 

Gibson or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall 

fully comply with those instructions. Respondent shall accompany payment of the CMP 

Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the paying Respondent and the name and 

docket number of this proceeding. The paying Respondent shall simultaneously transmit 

26 Effective June 18, 2008, the Act imposes a $1,000,000 civil monetary penalty for each act of 

attempted and completed manipulation in violation of the Act. Cetiain of Respondent's violations of the 

Act for attempted and completed manipulation occurred after June 18, 2008. 

43 
copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, 

Washington, D.C. 20581. 

C. Pursuant to Rule 506(d)(l)(iii)(B), 17 C.P.R.§ 230.506(d)(l)(iii)(B), of the Securities & 

Exchange Commission's Regulation D, this Order constitutes a Commission final order 

based on a violation of law or regulation, as specifically set forth within this Order, that 

prohibits fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive conduct. Under the specific and unique 

facts and circumstances presented here, pursuant to Rule 506( d)(2)(iii), disqualification 

under Rule 506(d)(l) of the Regulation D exemption should not arise as a consequence of 

this Order. 

D. Respondent and its successors and assigns shall comply with the following conditions 

and undertakings set forth in the Offer. Respondent represents that it has already 

undertaken and implemented, or is implementing certain compliance and supervisory 

controls or enhancements consistent with these Undertakings: 

1. PRINCIPLES27 

1. Respondent agrees to undetiake the following: (1) to ensure the integrity 

and reliability of its Benchmark Interest Rate Submission(s), presently and 

in the future; and (2) to identify, construct and promote effective 

methodologies and processes of setting Benchmark Interest Rates, in 

coordination with effmis by Benchmark Publishers, in order to ensure the 

integrity and reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates in the future. 

11. Respondent represents and undertakes that each Benchmark Interest Rate 

Submission by Respondent shall be based upon a rigorous and honest 

assessment of information, and shall not be influenced by internal or 

external conflicts of interest, or other factors or information extraneous to 

any rules applicable to the setting of a Benchmark Interest Rate. 

27 The following terms are defined as follows: 

Benchmark Interest Rate: An interest rate for a currency and maturity/tenor that is calculated 

based on data received from market participants and published to the market on a regular, 

periodic basis, such as LIBOR and Euribor; 

Benchmark Publisher: A banking association or other entity that is responsible for or oversees 

the calculation and publication of a Benchmark Interest Rate; 

Submission(s): The interest rate(s) submitted for each currency and maturity/tenor to a 

Benchmark Publisher. For example, if Respondent submits a rate for one-month and three-month 

U.S. Dollar LIBOR, that would constitute two Submissions; 

Submitter(s): The person(s) responsible for determining and/or transmitting the Submission(s); 

and 

Supervisor(s): The person(s) immediately and directly responsible for supervising any portion of 

the process of Submission(s) and/or any of the Submitter(s). 

44 
2. INTEGRITY AND RELIABILITY OF BENCHMARK INTEREST RATE 

SUBMISSIONS 

1. DETERMINATION OF SUBMISSIONS: Respondent shall determine its 

Submission(s) based on the following Factors, Adjustments and 

Considerations, unless otherwise prohibited by or contrary to an 

affirmative obligation imposed by any law or regulation, or the rules or 

definitions issued by a Benchmark Publisher. Respondent's transactions 

shall be given the greatest weight in determining its Submissions, subject 

to applying appropriate Adjustments and Considerations in order to reflect 

the market measured by the Benchmark Interest Rate.28 

Respondent shall determine its Submissions as described in these 

Undertakings within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order. 

11 Factor 1-Respondent's Borrowing or Lending Transactions 

Observed by Respondent's Submitters: 

a. Respondent's transactions in the market as defined by the 

Benchmark Publisher for the patiicular Benchmark Interest 

Rate; 

b. Respondent's transactions in other markets for unsecured 

funds, including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit 

and issuances of commercial paper; and 

c. Respondent's transactions in various related markets, 

including, but not limited to, Overnight Index Swaps, 

foreign currency forwards, repurchase agreements, futures, 

and Fed Funds. 

11 Factor 2- Third Party Transactions Observed by Respondent's 

Submitters: 

a. Transactions in the market as defined by the Benchmark 

Interest Rate relevant to each of the Submission(s); 

b. Transactions in other markets for unsecured funds, 

including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit and 

issuances of commercial paper; and 

28 The rules used by Benchmark Publishers to determine Benchmark Interest Rates vary, may not be 

consistent with each other, and provide different levels of guidance as to how to make Submissions. 

45 
c. Transactions in various related markets, including, but not 

limited to, Overnight Index Swaps, foreign currency 

forwards, repurchase agreements, futures, and Fed Funds. 

11 Factor 3- Third Party Offers Observed by Respondent's 

Submitters: 

a. Third party offers to Respondent in the market as defined 

by the Benchmark Publisher relevant to each of the 

Submission(s); 

b. Third party offers in other markets for unsecured funds, 

including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit and 

issuances of commercial paper, provided to Respondent by 

interdealer brokers (e.g., voice brokers); and 

c. Third party offers provided to Respondent in various 

related markets, including, but not limited to, Overnight 

Index Swaps, foreign currency forwards, repurchase 

agreements, and Fed Funds. 

11 Adjustments and Considerations: All of the following 

Adjustments and Considerations may be applied with respect to 

each of the Factors above: 

a. Time: With respect to the Factors considered above, 

proximity in time to the Submission(s) increases the 

relevance of that Factor; 

b. Market Events: Respondent may adjust its Submission(s) 

based upon market events, including price variations in 

related markets, that occur prior to the time at which the 

Submission(s) must be made to the Benchmark Publisher. 

That adjustment shall reflect measurable effects on 

transacted rates, offers or bids; 

c. Term Structure: As Respondent applies the above Factors, 

if Respondent has data for any maturity/tenor described by 

a Factor, then Respondent may interpolate or extrapolate 

the remaining maturities/tenors from the available data; 

d. Credit Standards: As Respondent applies the above 

Factors, adjustments may be made to reflect Respondent's 

credit standing and/or the credit spread between the market 

as defined by the Benchmark Publisher and transactions or 

offers in the related markets used in the Factors above. 

46 
Additionally, Respondent may take into account 

counterpmiies' credit standings, access to funds, and 

borrowing or lending requirements, and third pmiy offers 

considered in connection with the above Factors; and 

e. Non-representative Transactions: To the extent a 

transaction included among the Factors above significantly 

diverges in an objective manner from other transactions, 

and that divergence is not due to market events as 

addressed above, Respondent may exclude such 

transactions from the determination of its Submission(s). 

11. SUPERVISOR(S) REVIEW: Effective within fourteen (14) days of the 

entry of this Order, each daily Submission shall be reviewed by a 

Supervisor on a daily basis after the Submission(s) are made to the 

Benchmark Publisher. 

111. QUALIFICATIONS OF SUBMITTER(S) AND SUPERVISOR(S): All 

Submitter(s) shall have significant experience in the markets for the 

Benchmark Interest Rate to which they are submitting or a comparable 

market, but may designate less experienced parties, who routinely work 

under their supervision, to make Submission(s) during limited periods of 

absence. All Supervisors shall have significant experience in the markets 

for the relevant Benchmark Interest Rate or a comparable market. 

Submitters, Supervisors and any pmiies designated to make Submission(s) 

when the Submitter(s) are absent shall not be assigned to any derivatives 

trading desk, unit or division within Respondent, or pmiicipate in 

derivatives trading other than that associated with Respondent's liquidity 

and liability management. The compensation of Submitter(s) and 

Supervisor(s) also shall not be directly based upon derivatives trading, 

other than that associated with Respondent's liquidity and liability 

management. 

1v. FIREWALLS: INTERNAL CONTROLS REGARDING IMPROPER 

COMMUNICATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS: Respondent shall 

implement internal controls and procedures to prevent improper 

communications with Submitter(s) and Supervisor(s) regarding 

Submission(s) or prospective Submission(s) to ensure the integrity and 

reliability of its Submission(s). Such internal controls and procedures 

shall include, but not be limited to: 

111 The "firewalls" contemplated herein will be implemented through 

written policies and procedures that delineate proper and improper 

communications with Submitter(s) and Supervisor(s), whether 

internal or external to Respondent. For these purposes, improper 

communications shall be any attempt to influence Respondent's 

47 
Submission(s) for the benefit of any derivatives trading position 

(whether of Respondent or any third party) or any attempt to cause 

Respondent's Submitter(s) to violate any applicable Benchmark 

Publisher's rules or definitions, or Section 2 of these Undertakings; 

and 

11 A requirement that the Submitter(s) shall not be located in close 

proximity to traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that 

reference a Benchmark Interest Rate to which Respondent 

contributes any Submission(s). The two groups should be 

separated such that neither can hear the other. 

v. DOCUMENTATION: Respondent shall provide the documents set forth 

below promptly and directly to the Commission upon request, without 

subpoena or other process, regardless of whether the records are held 

outside of the United States, to the extent permitted by law. 

11 For each Submission, Respondent shall contemporaneously 

memorialize, and retain in an easily accessible format for a period 

of five (5) years after the date of each Submission, the following 

information: 

a. The Factors, Adjustments and Considerations described in 

Section 2(i) above that Respondent used to determine its 

Submission(s ), including, but not limited to, identifying any 

non-representative transactions excluded from the 

determination of the Submission(s) and the basis for such 

exclusions, as well as identifying all transactions given the 

greatest weight or considered to be the most relevant, and 

the basis for such conclusion; 

b. All models or other methods used in determining 

Respondent's Submission(s), such as models for credit 

standards and/or term structure, and any adjustments made 

to the Submission(s) based on such models or other 

methods; 

c. Relevant data and information received from interdealer 

brokers used in connection with determining Respondent's 

Submission(s) including, but not limited to, the following: 

• Identification of the specific offers and bids relied 

upon by Respondent when determining each 

Submission; and 

48 
• The name of each company and person from whom 

the information or data is obtained; 

d. Respondent's assessment of "reasonable market size" for 

its Submission(s) (or any other such criteria for the 

relevancy of transactions to a Benchmark Interest Rate), to 

the extent that the rules for a Benchmark Interest Rate 

require that pe1iinent transactions considered in connection 

with Submission(s) be of"reasonable market size" (or any 

other such criteria); 

e. Information regarding market events considered by 

Respondent in connection with determining its 

Submission(s), including, without limitation, the following: 

• The specific market announcement(s) or event(s); 

and 

• Any effect of such market event(s) on transacted 

rates, offers or bids in the relevant markets; and 

f. The identity ofthe Submitter(s) who made, and the 

Supervisor(s) who reviewed, the Submission(s). 

11 For each Submission, Respondent shall retain for a period of five 

(5) years after the date of each Submission, the following 

transactional data used by Respondent to determine its 

Submission(s); the data shall be easily accessible and conve1iible 

into Microsoft Excel file format; the data shall include, without 

limitation, the following to the extent known to Respondent at the 

time ofthe Submission(s): 

a. Instrument; 

b. Maturity/tenor; 

c. Trade type (i.e., loan/deposit, placing/taking); 

d. Buy/sell indicator; 

e. Transaction date (in mmddyyyy or ddmmyyyy format); 

f. Maturity date (in mmddyyyy or ddmmyyyy format); 

g. Value date (in mmddyyyy or ddmmyyyy format); 

h. Loan effective date; 

1. Customer number/identifier; 

J. Currency; 

k. Ticket ID; 

1. Timestamp; 

m. Counterparty A (buyer/bidder); 

n. Counterpmiy B (seller/offeror); 

49 
o. Nominal/notional size of the transaction; 

p. Interest basis (360/365 day year); 

q. The fixed interest rate; and 

r. Any special or additional terms (e.g., a repurchase 

agreement or some form of"non-vanilla agreement"). 

111 Transaction Records: Respondent shall retain for a period of five 

(5) years trade transaction records and daily position and risk 

repmis, including (without limitation) monthly and quarterly 

position and risk reports, related to the trading activities of 

Submitter(s) and traders who primarily deal in derivatives products 

that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate; the records and reports 

shall be easily accessible and convertible into Microsoft Excel file 

format. 

111 Requirement To Record Communications: Respondent shall 

record and retain to the greatest extent practicable all of the 

following communications: 

a. All communications concerning the determination and 

review of the Submission(s); and 

b. All communications of traders who primarily deal in 

derivatives products that reference a Benchmark Interest 

Rate concerning trades, transactions, prices, or trading 

strategies pertaining to any derivative that references any 

Benchmark Interest Rate (or the supervision thereof). 

The above communications shall not be conducted in a manner to 

prevent Respondent from recording such communications; 

Audio communications of Submitters and Supervisors shall be 

retained for a period of one (1) year. Audio communications of 

traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that reference a 

Benchmark Interest Rate, and who are located in at least the 

London, Frankfmi, New York, and Tokyo offices ofRespondent, 

shall be retained for a period of six (6) months. Subject to a 

reasonable time to implement, Respondent's audio retention 

requirements pursuant to these Undertakings shall commence 

within a reasonable period after the entry of this Order and shall 

continue for a period of five (5) years thereafter; 

All communications except audio communications shall be 

retained for a period of five (5) years; and 

50 
Nothing in these Undertakings shall limit, restrict or nanow any 

obligations pursuant to the Act or the Commission Regulations 

promulgated thereunder, including but not limited to Regulations 

1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.P.R. §§ 1.31 and 1.35 (2014), in effect now or 

in the future. 

v1. MONITORING AND AUDITING: 

1111 Monitoring: Respondent shall maintain or develop monitoring 

systems or electronic exception repotiing systems that identify 

possible improper or unsubstantiated Submissions. Such repmis 

will be reviewed on at least a weekly basis and if there is any 

significant deviation or issues, the underlying documentation for 

the Submission shall be reviewed to determine whether the 

Submission is adequately substantiated. If it is not substantiated, 

Respondent shall notify its chief compliance officer(s) and the 

Benchmark Publisher; 

1111 Periodic Audits: Statiing six (6) months from the date of the entry 

of this Order, and continuing every six (6) months thereafter, 

unless an annual audit is scheduled at the same time, Respondent 

shall conduct internal audits of reasonable, random samples of its 

Submission(s), the factors and all other evidence documenting the 

basis for such Submission(s), and communications of the 

Submitter(s) in order to verify the integrity and reliability of the 

process for determining Submission(s); and 

1111 Annual Audits By Third Patiy Auditors: Statiing one (1) year 

from the date ofthe entry of this Order, and continuing annually 

for four (4) additional years thereafter, Respondent shall retain an 

independent, third-party auditor to conduct an audit of its 

Submission(s) and the process for determining Submission(s), 

which shall include, without limitation, the following: 

a. Reviewing communications of Submitter(s) and 

Supervisor(s); 

b. Interviewing the Submitter(s) and Supervisor(s), to the 

extent they are still employed by Respondent; 

c. Obtaining written verification from the Submitter(s) and 

Supervisor(s ), to the extent they are still employed by 

Respondent, that the Submission(s) were consistent with 

this Order, the policies and procedures in place for making 

Respondent's Submission(s), and the definitions applicable 

51 
to the Benchmark Interest Rate for which Respondent made 

Submission(s); and 

d. A written audit repmi to be provided to Respondent and the 

Commission (with copies addressed to the Commission's 

Division of Enforcement (the "Division")). 

v11. POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND CONTROLS: Within sixty (60) days 

ofthe entry of this Order, Respondent shall develop policies, procedures, 

and controls to comply with each of the specific Undertakings set fotih 

above with the goal of ensuring the integrity and reliability of its 

Submission(s). In addition, Respondent shall develop policies, 

procedures, and controls to ensure the following: 

11 The supervision of the Submission process; 

11 That any violations of the Undertakings or any questionable, 

unusual or unlawful activity concerning Respondent's Submissions 

are repmied to and investigated by Respondent's compliance or 

legal personnel and reported, as necessary, to authorities and the 

Benchmark Publishers; 

11 The periodic but routine review of electronic communications and 

audio recordings of or relating to the Submission Process; 

11 Not less than monthly, the periodic physical presence of 

compliance personnel on the trading floors of the Submitter(s) 

and/or traders who primarily deal in derivatives products that 

reference a Benchmark Interest Rate in connection with these 

Policies, Procedures and Controls; 

11 The handling of complaints concerning the accuracy or integrity of 

Respondent's Submission( s) including: 

a. Memorializing all such complaints; 

b. Review and follow-up by the chief compliance officer(s) or 

his designee of such complaints; and 

11 The reporting of material complaints to the Chief Executive 

Officer and Board ofDirectors, relevant self-regulatory 

organizations, the relevant Benchmark Publisher, the Commission, 

and/or other appropriate regulators. 

vm. TRAINING: Respondent shall develop training programs for all 

employees who are involved in its Submission(s), including, without 

52 
limitation, Submitters and Supervisors, and all traders who primarily deal 

in derivatives products that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate. 

Submitters and Supervisors shall be provided with preliminary training 

regarding the policies, and procedures and controls developed pursuant to 

Section 2(vii) of these Unde1iakings. By no later than July 22, 2015, all 

Submitters, Supervisors, and traders who primarily deal in derivatives 

products that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate shall be fully trained in 

the application of these Undertakings to them, as set forth herein. 

Thereafter, such training will be provided promptly to employees newly 

assigned to any of the above listed responsibilities, and again to all 

Submitters, Supervisors, and traders who primarily deal in derivatives 

products that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate as part of Respondent's 

regular training programs. The training shall be based upon the 

individual's position and responsibilities, and as appropriate, address the 

following topics: 

11 The Unde1iakings set forth herein; 

11 The process of making Submission(s); 

11 The impropriety of attempting to influence the determination of 

Respondent's Submission(s); 

11 The requirement to conduct all business related to Respondent's 

Submission(s) on Respondent's recorded telephone and electronic 

communications systems, and not on personal telephones or other 

electronic devices, as set fmih in Section 2(v) of these 

Undertakings; 

11 The requirement to conduct certain business related to derivatives 

products that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate on Respondent's 

recorded telephone and electronic communications systems, and 

not on personal devices or systems, as set forth in Section 2(v) of 

these Unde1iakings; 

11 The policies and procedures developed and instituted pursuant to 

these Undertakings; and 

11 The employment and other potential consequences if employees 

act unlawfully or improperly in connection with Respondent's 

Submission(s) or process for determining Submission(s). 

IX. REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION: 

111 Compliance with Undetiakings: Every four (4) months, stmiing 

120 days from the entry of this Order, Respondent shall make 

53 
interim reports to the Commission, through the Division, 

explaining its progress towards compliance with the Undertakings 

set forth herein. Within 365 days of the entry of this Order, 

Respondent shall submit a repmi to the Commission, through the 

Division, explaining how they have complied with the 

Unde1iakings set forth herein. The repmi shall attach copies of and 

describe the internal controls, policies and procedures that have 

been designed and implemented to satisfy the Undertakings. The 

repmi shall contain a certification from representatives of 

Respondent's Executive Management, after consultation with 

Respondent's chief compliance officer(s), that Respondent has 

complied with the Undertakings set forth above, and that they have 

established policies, procedures and controls to satisfy the 

Undertakings set fmih in this Order; 

111 Submitter(s), Supervisor(s), and Heads of Appropriate Trading 

Desks: Within fomieen (14) days of the entry of this Order, or as 

soon as practicable thereafter, but no later than July 22, 2015, 

Respondent shall provide, meet with and explain these 

Undertakings to all Submitters, Supervisors, and the head of each 

trading desk that primarily deals in derivatives that reference a 

Benchmark Interest Rate. Within that same time frame, 

Respondent shall provide to the Commission, through the Division, 

written or electronic affirmations signed by each Submitter, 

Supervisor, and head of each trading desk that primarily deals.in 

derivatives that reference a Benchmark Interest Rate, stating that 

he or she has received and read the Order and Undertakings herein, 

and that he or she understands these Unde1iakings to be effective 

immediately; and 

111 Disciplinary and Other Actions: Respondent shall promptly report 

to the Commission, through the Division, all improper conduct 

related to any Submission(s) or the attempted manipulation or 

manipulation of a Benchmark Interest Rate, as well as any 

disciplinary action, or other law enforcement or regulatory action 

related thereto, unless de minimis or otherwise prohibited by 

applicable laws or regulations. 

54 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF RIGOROUS STANDARDS FOR BENCHMARK 

INTEREST RATES 

To the extent Respondent is or remains a contributor to any Benchmark Interest 

Rate, Respondent agrees to make its best effmis to pmiicipate in effmis by cmrent 

and future Benchmark Publishers, other price reporting entities and/or regulators 

to ensure the reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates, and through its pmiicipation 

to encourage the following: 

1. METHODOLOGY: Creating rigorous methodologies for the contributing 

panel members to formulate their Submissions. The aim of such 

methodologies should be to result in a Benchmark Interest Rate tl,tat 

accurately reflects the rates at which transactions are occurring in the 

market being measured by that Benchmark Interest Rate; 

11. VERIFICATION: Enforcing the use of those methodologies through an 

effective regime of documentation, monitoring, supervision and auditing, 

required by and performed by the Benchmark Publishers, and by the 

contributing panel members intemally; 

111. INVESTIGATION: Facilitating the repmiing of complaints and concems 

regarding the accuracy or integrity of Submissions to Benchmark Interest 

Rates or the published Benchmark Interest Rate, and investigating those 

complaints and concems thoroughly; 

1v. DISCIPLINE: Taking appropriate action if, following a thorough 

confidential investigation, the Benchmark Publisher determines that a 

complaint or concem regarding the accuracy or integrity of a Submission 

or the published Benchmark Interest Rate has been substantiated; 

v. TRANSPARENCY: Making regular repmis to the public and the markets 

of facts relevant to the integrity and reliability of each Benchmark Interest 

Rate. Such reports should include, but not be limited to, the following: 

111 At the time each Benchmark Interest Rate is published, the 

Benchmark Publisher should display prominently whether each 

rate is based entirely on transactions in the market the rate is 

supposed to reflect, or whether it instead is based, in whole or in 

part, on other data or information; 

111 The Benchmark Publisher also should make periodic repmis 

regarding the number and nature of complaints and concems 

received regarding the accuracy or integrity of Submissions or the 

published Benchmark Interest Rate while maintaining the 

anonymity of all those who have repmied or are the subject of 

complaints and concems; 

55 
11 The Benchmark Publisher should additionally make periodic 

repotis regarding the results of all investigations into such 

complaints and concerns while maintaining the anonymity of all 

those involved in investigations that have not yet been completed; 

and 

v1. FORMULATION: Periodically examining whether each Benchmark 

Interest Rate accurately reflects the rate at which transactions are 

occurring in the market being measured (using the statistical method 

prescribed by that Benchmark Interest Rate), and evaluating whether the 

definition and instructions should be revised, or the composition of the 

panel changed; 

Such examinations should include a rigorous mathematical comparison of 

transactions in the relevant market with the published Benchmark Interest 

Rate on the same day over a specified period and a determination of 

whether any differences are statistically or commercially significant. 

Every four (4) months, starting 120 days from the entry ofthis Order, Respondent 

shall repmi to the Commission, through the Division, either orally or in writing, 

on its patiicipation in such effmis, to the extent that such reporting is not 

otherwise prohibited by law or regulations, by the rules issued by Benchmark 

Publishers, or by nondisclosure agreements by and between Respondent and 

Benchmark Publishers. 

4. COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION 

1. Respondent shall cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Commission, 

including the Division, and any other governmental agency in this action, 

and in any investigation, civil litigation or administrative matter related to 

the subject matter of this action or any current or future Commission 

investigation related thereto. As part of such cooperation, Respondent 

agrees to the following for a period of five (5) years from the date of the 

entry of this Order, or until all related investigations and litigation are 

concluded, including through the appellate review process, whichever 

period is longer: 

11 Preserve all records relating to the subject matter of this 

proceeding, including, but not limited to, audio files, electronic 

mail, other documented communications, and trading records; 

11 Subject to applicable laws and regulations, comply fully, promptly, 

completely, and truthfully with all inquiries and requests for 

information or documents; 

56 
111 Provide authentication of documents and other evidentiary 

material; 

111 Subject to applicable laws and regulations, provide copies of 

documents within Respondent's possession, custody or control; 

• Subject to applicable laws and regulations, Respondent will make 

its best efforts to produce any cunent (as of the time of the request) 

officer, director, employee, or agent of Respondent, regardless of 

the individual's location, and at such location that minimizes 

Commission travel expenditures, to provide assistance at any trial, 

proceeding, or Commission investigation related to the subject 

matter of this proceeding, including, but not limited to, requests for 

testimony, depositions, and/or interviews, and to encourage them 

to testify completely and truthfully in any such proceeding, trial, or 

investigation; and 

111 Subject to applicable laws and regulations, Respondent will make 

its best efforts to assist in locating and contacting any prior (as of 

the time of the request) officer, director, employee, or agent of 

Respondent; 

11. Respondent also agrees that it will not undetiake any act, other than as 

required by applicable law, which would limit its ability to cooperate fully 

with the Commission. Respondent will designate an agent located in the 

United States of America to receive all requests for information pursuant 

to these Undertakings, and shall provide notice regarding the identity of 

such Agent to the Division upon entry of this Order. Should Respondent 

seek to change the designated agent to receive such requests, notice of 

such intention shall be given to the Division fomieen (14) days before it 

occurs. Any person designated to receive such request shall be located in 

the United States of America; and 

111. Respondent and the Commission agree that nothing in these Undertakings 

shall be construed so as to compel Respondent to continue to contribute 

Submission(s) related to any Benchmark Interest Rate. Without prior 

consultation with the Commission, Respondent remains free to withdraw 

from the panel of contributors to any Benchmark Interest Rate. 

5. PROHIBITED OR CONFLICTING UNDERTAKINGS 

Should the Undetiakings herein be prohibited by, or be contrary to the provisions 

of any obligations imposed on Respondent by any presently existing, or 

hereinafter enacted or promulgated laws, regulations, regulatory mandates, or the 

rules or definitions issued by a Benchmark Publisher, then Respondent shall 

promptly transmit notice to the Commission (through the Division) of such 

57 
prohibition or conflict, and shall meet and confer in good faith with the 

Commission (through the Division) to reach an agreement regarding possible 

modifications to the Undertakings herein sufficient to resolve such inconsistent 

obligations. In the interim, Respondent will abide by the obligations imposed by 

the law, regulations, regulatory mandates and Benchmark Publishers' rules and 

definitions. Nothing in these Undetiakings shall limit, restrict or narrow any 

obligations pursuant to the Act or the Commission Regulations promulgated 

thereunder, including but not limited to Regulations 1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.P.R. §§ 

1.31 and 1.35 (2014), in effect now or in the future. 

6. PUBLIC STATEMENTS 

Respondent agrees that neither it nor any of its successors and assigns, agents or 

employees under its authority or control shall take any action or make any public 

statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or conclusions in this Order 

or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this Order is without a factual 

basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall affect Respondent's 

(i) testimonial obligations, or (ii) right to take legal positions in other proceedings 

to which the Commission is not a party. Respondent and its successors and 

assigns shall undetiake all steps necessary to ensure that all of its agents and/or 

employees under its authority or control understand and comply with this 

agreement. 

E. Partial Satisfaction: Respondent understands and agrees that any acceptance by the 

Commission of partial payment of Respondent's CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a 

waiver of its obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order, or a waiver of 

the Commission's right to seek to compel payment of any remaining balance. 

The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date. 

By the Commission. 

Dated: April23, 2015 

Christop er J. Kirkpatrick 

Secretary of the Commission 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

58