Present: All the Justices 

CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 002942 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

November 2, 2001 

MARGARET B. STIGALL, TRUSTEE, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Michael C. Allen, Judge 

In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 58.1-3241(A) 

authorizes Chesterfield County to assess “roll-back” taxes, 

defined in Code § 58.1-3237, against certain real property as a 

result of conveyances of the entire property in two separate 

parcels by the owner, in the absence of a change in the use of 

the property. 

BACKGROUND 

The material facts are not in dispute. In 1954, Charles W. 

Stigall acquired, by single deed, two contiguous parcels of real 

property consisting of approximately 135 acres in Chesterfield 

County. The larger of the two parcels, denominated by the 

parties in this case as the “Falling Creek” parcel, consisted of 

approximately 120 acres. The smaller parcel, denominated by 

those parties as the “A.G. Tyler” parcel, consisted of 

approximately 15 acres.1

 

1

For clarity we will hereafter omit any reference to the 

A.G. Tyler parcel even though the record reflects that a portion 
In 1975, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the 

statutory scheme for Special Assessment for Land Preservation 

contained in Code § 58.1-3229 et seq., Chesterfield County 

adopted an ordinance providing for reduced assessment and 

taxation of real estate devoted to agricultural, horticultural, 

forest, or open space use (special land use tax program). 

Thereafter, the Falling Creek parcel was devoted to forest use, 

as defined in Code § 58.1-3230, and accepted by the County as 

qualified for reduced assessment and taxation under its special 

land use tax program. 

In 1979 or 1980, the Commonwealth acquired by eminent 

domain a portion of the Falling Creek parcel for the 

construction of the Powhite Parkway, “a limited access, 

interstate grade freeway.” The Powhite Parkway bisected the 

Falling Creek parcel into two unequal sections; one with 

approximately 26 acres lying north of the freeway and the other 

with approximately 84 acres lying south of the freeway. 

Although the two sections of the Falling Creek parcel were 

physically separated by the construction of the Powhite Parkway, 

 

of it was involved in the various proceedings and conveyances 

which we will subsequently relate. We do so because there is a 

discrepancy in the record regarding the total acreage of that 

parcel impacted by those proceedings and conveyances, and the 

parties agree that taxation of the A.G. Tyler parcel is not at 

issue in this appeal. 

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the County continued to tax the Falling Creek parcel as a single 

unit under its special land use tax program. At the time of the 

eminent domain taking of a portion of this parcel, Charles 

Stigall did not record a subdivision plat or otherwise take any 

action that would reflect in the County’s land records a legal 

separation of the parcel into two separate tracts. 

Following the death of Charles Stigall in 1998, the Falling 

Creek parcel became the property of his widow, Margaret B. 

Stigall. On October 7, 1999, for the purpose of estate 

planning, Margaret Stigall conveyed that portion of the Falling 

Creek parcel lying south of the Powhite Parkway by deed to The 

Margaret B. Stigall Living Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust. 

On the same date and for the same purpose, she conveyed that 

portion of the Falling Creek parcel lying north of the Powhite 

Parkway by deed to The Stigall Family Limited Partnership. 

These deeds along with a 1988 plat reflecting the physical 

division of the Falling Creek parcel were duly recorded in the 

County land records. No change in the use of the property 

occurred as a result of these conveyances. 

On December 27, 1999, the County, pursuant to Code § 58.1-

3241(A), assessed roll-back taxes against the Falling Creek 

parcel in the amount of $22,087.74 based on the above described 

conveyances by Margaret Stigall. The amount of the tax 

represented the difference between the actual tax paid under the 

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special land use tax program and the tax which would have been 

due had the real estate been taxed on its fair market value 

assessment during “the five most recent complete tax years.” 

Code § 58.1-3237(B). Thereafter, on May 25, 2000, Margaret 

Stigall, in her capacity as trustee of her inter vivos trust, 

and The Stigall Family Limited Partnership (collectively, the 

taxpayers) filed a joint application in the Circuit Court of 

Chesterfield County for correction of erroneous assessment of 

these roll-back taxes. 

Upon the filing of the County’s responsive pleading and the 

parties’ agreement that the material facts were not disputed, 

the trial court permitted the taxpayers to make an oral motion 

for summary judgment.2 In a letter opinion dated August 21, 

 

2

The County styled its pleading responding to the taxpayers’ 

application as a “demurrer” and subsequently filed a “Memorandum 

in Support of Demurrer.” Within these pleadings, however, the 

County contested the factual allegations of the application and, 

thus, its challenge to the suit cannot be viewed as constituting 

a “demurrer” and proper supporting argument for that form of 

pleading, which admits the truth of the facts contained in the 

pleading to which it is addressed. Cox Cable Hampton Roads, 

Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 

(1991). It is evident from the record, however, that the County 

consented to the case being resolved by the trial court on the 

taxpayers’ oral motion for summary judgment because the facts 

asserted in the taxpayers’ application were not disputed for 

purposes of resolving the legal issue before the trial court. 

Accordingly, we will review the judgment of the trial court 

under the standard of review applicable in such cases. Shelor 

Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 478, 544 S.E.2d 345, 348 

(2001). 

4
2000, and subsequently adopted by reference in the final order, 

the trial court, applying what it characterized as the “ordinary 

and commonly understood meanings” of the terms used in Code 

§ 58.1-3241(A), initially ruled that the Falling Creek parcel 

“was not separated and split[-off] when [Margaret] Stigall made 

the conveyances of 1999, but years earlier – when the 

Commonwealth built the Powhite Parkway.” Because this 

separation did not result from an “action of the owner,” the 

trial court concluded that the roll-back tax assessment 

permitted by Code § 58.1-3241(A) was not triggered. The trial 

court further ruled that following the 1999 conveyances to the 

trust and the partnership, the taxpayers “made the necessary 

attestation that the properties will continue to be devoted to 

‘forest use,’ and each of the parcels is of sufficient acreage 

to qualify for inclusion in the land use [tax] program 

authorized by Code § 58.1-3231” and, thus, “satisfy the 

requirements of Code § 58.1-3237(D).” 

In its final order, entered on September 12, 2000, the 

trial court incorporated by reference its prior letter opinion, 

granted the taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment, and ordered 

that the County “exonerate [the property in question] of all 

roll-back taxes imposed in 1999.” In an order dated February 

23, 2001, we awarded the County this appeal. 

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DISCUSSION 

Beyond question the statutory scheme invoked by this case 

regarding a special land use tax program that provides for 

reduced assessment and taxation of real estate devoted to 

agricultural, horticultural, forest, or open space use is 

intended by the legislature to promote the preservation of such 

real estate for the public benefit. The key to that 

preservation is the amelioration of the pressure that forces 

landowners to convert their property to more intensive uses. 

One source of that pressure is the assessment of property 

devoted to one or more of these uses at values incompatible with 

such use. See Code § 58.1-3229 (1984 Repl. Vol.). 

In this context, one intended goal of this statutory scheme 

is the continued qualifying use of property which has qualified 

previously for the reduced taxation provided by a special land 

use tax program following a proper application by the owner. 

Code § 58.1-3234. Thus, under Code § 58.1-3237(A), when the 

qualifying use of particular real property changes to a 

“nonqualifying use” or the zoning of that property is changed to 

a “more intensive use” at the request of the owner or his agent, 

that portion of the property which no longer qualifies for 

reduced assessment and taxation “shall be subject to additional 

taxes . . . referred to as roll-back taxes.” Pertinent to the 

present case, Code § 58.1-3237(D) expressly provides that 

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“[l]iability to the roll-back taxes shall attach when a change 

in use occurs . . . . Liability to the roll-back taxes shall 

not attach when a change in ownership of the title takes place 

if the new owner . . . continues the real estate in the use for 

which it is classified” prior to the transfer of title to the 

new owner. 

In the present case, the County concedes that the real 

estate in question has not undergone a change in use and in 

subsequent years will qualify for reduced assessment and 

taxation under its special land use tax program so long as that 

real estate continues to be devoted to forest use by the new 

owners. Nonetheless, the County contends here, as it did in the 

trial court, that Code § 58.1-3241(A) authorizes it to assess 

roll-back taxes against that real estate as a result of the 1999 

conveyances by Margaret Stigall. 

Code § 58.1-3241(A) provides that: 

Separation or split-off of lots, pieces or 

parcels of land from the real estate which is being 

valued, assessed and taxed under an ordinance adopted 

pursuant to this article, either by conveyance or 

other action of the owner of such real estate, shall 

subject the real estate so separated to liability for 

the roll-back taxes applicable thereto, but shall not 

impair the right of each subdivided parcel of such 

real estate to qualify for such valuation, assessment 

and taxation in any and all future years, provided it 

meets the minimum acreage requirements and such other 

conditions of this article as may be applicable. Such 

separation or split-off of lots shall not impair the 

right of the remaining real estate to continuance of 

such valuation, assessment and taxation without 

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liability for roll-back taxes, provided it meets the 

minimum acreage requirements and other applicable 

conditions of this article. 

No subdivision of property which results in 

parcels which meet the minimum acreage requirements of 

this article, and which the owner attests is for one 

or more of the purposes set forth in § 58.1-3230, 

shall be subject to the provisions of this subsection. 

The County asserts that although the Falling Creek parcel 

was physically “separated” as a result of the prior eminent 

domain taking of a portion of it by the Commonwealth, Code 

§ 58.1-3241(A) contemplates a legal separation, which occurred 

when the remaining acreage of that parcel was conveyed in 

separate parcels to two different owners in 1999 by Margaret 

Stigall. The County further asserts that the “safe-harbor” 

provision provided by the second paragraph of Code § 58.1-

3241(A) is not applicable because the taxpayers concede that the 

purpose of the 1999 conveyances was for estate planning and, 

thus, Margaret Stigall could not, and did not, attest that the 

purpose of the legal separation was for one or more of the 

purposes of agricultural, horticultural, forest, or open space 

use set forth in Code § 58.1-3230. 

In response, the taxpayers first contend that the trial 

court properly ruled the eminent domain taking by the 

Commonwealth caused the separation of the Falling Creek parcel 

rather than the 1999 conveyances by Margaret Stigall. 

Continuing, the taxpayers further contend that because the 

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eminent domain taking did not subject the property to liability 

for roll-back taxes at that time, Code § 58.1-3242, the trial 

court correctly determined that Code § 58.1-3237(D) rather than 

Code § 58.1-3241(A) controlled whether roll-back taxes were to 

be assessed against the “separated” parcels. Finally, the 

taxpayers maintain that even if the 1999 conveyances potentially 

subjected these parcels to liability for roll-back taxes under 

Code § 58.1-3241(A), the safe-harbor provision of that statute 

applies because the separated parcels continue to be used “for 

one or more of the purposes set forth in Code § 58.1-3230.” 

We do not agree with the contentions of either party in 

their entirety. However, for the reasons that follow, we are of 

opinion that the trial court reached the correct result although 

for the wrong reason. Accordingly, we will assign the correct 

reason and affirm that result. See Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 

179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2000). 

Under familiar principles, when we construe a statute we 

endeavor to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 

legislature. In doing so, we must assume that the legislature 

chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and 

we are bound by those words when we apply the statute. Barr v. 

Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 

(1990). Moreover, we examine a statute in its entirety, rather 

than by isolating particular words or phrases. Shelor Motor 

9
Co., 261 Va. at 479, 544 S.E.2d at 348. With respect to a 

special land use tax program, we also are of opinion that the 

relief it affords in the form of a special assessment “operates 

as an exemption or deferral from taxation. Consequently, all 

provisions of the [authorizing] Act ought to be strictly 

construed against the taxpayer.” 1978-79 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 

273, 274. 

With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis by 

addressing the trial court’s initial conclusion that the eminent 

domain taking by the Commonwealth of a portion of the Falling 

Creek parcel constituted a “separation or split-off” of that 

property as contemplated by Code § 58.1-3241(A). Undoubtedly, 

this taking and, more particularly, the barrier created by the 

subsequent construction of the Powhite Parkway resulted in a 

physical division of the Falling Creek parcel. By its express 

terms, however, this statute is only applicable to a “conveyance 

or other action of the owner.” A taking by eminent domain is 

not an action of the owner in any sense. Moreover, this 

statute, viewed in its entirety, clearly evinces a legislative 

intent that the triggering “subdivision of property” into “lots, 

pieces or parcels of land” be a legal separation rather than a 

mere physical separation. 

The creation of new lots, pieces, or parcels of land is a 

legal separation of property because it results from action by 

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the owner and involves, at a minimum, a change in the legal 

description of the property, either by metes and bounds or by 

plat, which is duly recorded in the appropriate land records. 

Such was exactly the case when Margaret Stigall recorded the 

1999 deeds and the 1988 plat in the County’s land records, 

legally separating the Falling Creek parcel into two separate 

parcels owned by the taxpayers. Accordingly, we hold that the 

trial court erred in ruling that the eminent domain taking of a 

portion of the Falling Creek parcel caused a “separation or 

split-off” of that property as contemplated by Code 

§ 58.1-3241(A). 

As we have previously noted, the trial court’s conclusion 

that the Falling Creek parcel was separated by the eminent 

domain taking of a portion of that parcel, rather than by 

Margaret Stigall’s conveyances, logically led it to then apply 

the provisions of Code § 58.1-3237(D) which, if applicable, 

would support the ultimate result reached by the trial court 

that the property in question was not liable to the assessment 

of roll-back taxes. This would be so because the County 

concedes that no change in the use or zoning of the property had 

occurred and the taxpayers, as new owners, continued to devote 

the property to forest use for which it had qualified for 

reduced assessment and taxation under the County’s special land 

use tax program. We are of opinion, however, that the proper 

11
construction of Code § 58.1-3241(A) nonetheless supports the 

result reached by the trial court under the facts of this case. 

Code § 58.1-3241(A) is only applicable when the conveyance 

or other action of the owner of real estate causes a separation 

or split-off of lots, pieces, or parcels of land “from the real 

estate which is being valued, assessed and taxed” under a local 

special land use tax ordinance. (Emphasis added). The 

“remaining real estate” continues to receive the benefit of 

reduced assessment and taxation “without liability for roll-back 

taxes” provided it continues to qualify for beneficial 

treatment. Thus, by its express terms, this statute 

contemplates a separation or split-off of a portion of the real 

estate in such a manner that there is a “remaining” portion of 

the original parcel.3 It does not contemplate or address the 

conveyance of the original parcel in its entirety by the owner. 

Rather, when the owner conveys the real estate in its entirety 

to a new owner or owners either as one parcel or as separate 

“lots, pieces or parcels,” the liability to roll-back taxes, if 

any, is controlled by the provisions of Code § 58.1-3237(D). In 

addition, the owner need not satisfy the safe-harbor provision 

 

3

In the present case, the County concedes that it did not 

treat either of the two parcels created by the 1999 conveyances 

as the “remaining real estate” that was not subject to roll-back 

taxes. Rather, the County taxed both parcels. 

12
of Code § 58.1-3241(A) by attesting that the subdivision of the 

property is for one or more of the purposes set forth in Code 

§ 58.1-3230 because the potential liability to roll-back taxes 

under Code § 58.1-3241(A) has not been triggered by such a 

conveyance or conveyances. 

In the present case, it is undisputed that only a change in 

ownership occurred and the property continued to be devoted to 

forest use and qualified for reduced assessment and taxation 

under the County’s special land use tax program. Accordingly, 

we hold that the trial court reached the right result that the 

property in question was not liable to the roll-back taxes 

assessed against it by the County. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 

court in favor of the taxpayers. 

Affirmed. 

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