UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. DEANTA MARQUIS LONG, Defendant - Appellant. No. 18-5015 (D.C. Nos. 4:16-CV- 00141-JHP-FHM and 4:11-CR-00086-JHP-1) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , HARTZ , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Deanta Long requests a certif icate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a C OA and dismiss the appeal. I Long was convicted of several cocaine an d firearms charges in 2013. He was sentenced to 211 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. United States v. Long, 774 F.3d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 2014). We rejected Long’s arguments that: (1) a search warrant affidavit failed to provide probable cause; (2) he was entitled to a hearing under Franks v. Dela ware, 438 U.S. 154

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 5, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 (1978); and (3) the district court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of information regarding a confidential informant. Long, 774 F.3d at 656. Long then filed a § 2255 motion raising four ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court de nied relief and declined to grant a COA. Long filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, which was also denied. Long now seeks a COA from this court. II A prisoner may not appeal the denial of habeas relief under § 2255 without a COA. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the de nial of a constitutional right .” § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires Long to s how “that reasonable jurists c ould debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been re solved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequa te to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). Long contends that his counsel was inef fective in several re spects. To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a prisoner must es tablish “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘c ounsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (19 84). To establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that th ere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the resu lt of the proceedi ng would have been different.” Id. at 694.3 First, Long argues that his counsel was ineffectiv e for failing to properly object to an in camera interview of a conf idential informant who did not appear at trial. However, our court has repeatedly approved of in ca mera interviews of confidential informants “for purposes of challenging the informant’s reliability and the existence of probable cause , and where the trial court in its discretion held the in camera hearing and determined that disclosu re was not necessary for this purpose.” Sandoval v. Aaron, 562 F.2d 13, 14-15 ( 10th Cir. 1977). And the informant’s presence was not required at trial. See Un ited States v. Morale z, 908 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Disclosure of an inform ant is not required . . . where the informant is not a participant in or a w itness to the crime charged.”). Second, Long asserts that the officer who prepared a search warrant falsified his affidavit, thereby comm itting fraud on the court, and counsel was in effective for failing to raise this issue. However, L ong does not provide any record citations or other evidence in support of his assertion. His ineffective assi stance claim therefore fails. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (if an “omitted issue is without merit, counsel’s failure to raise it does not cons titute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel” (quotation omitted)). Third, Long argues his counsel was inef fective in presenti ng the argument that he was entitled to a Franks hearing. We ag ree with the district court that Long has not established prejudice for a ny such failing. As we e xplained on direct appeal, a magistrate judge found after an in camera hearing that a confid ential informant did exist and provided the informat ion contained in the affidav it. Long, 774 F.3d at 663.4 Long does not provide any specific argumen t that counsel could have raised that would have resulted in a Franks hearing. Finally, Long argues that counsel was inef fective for failing to object when he sought to represent himself at trial. But “[a] criminal defendant has a constitutional and a statutory right to waiv e his right to counsel and re present himself at trial.” United States v. Akers, 215 F.3d 1089, 1096 (10th Cir. 2000). The record reflects that the district court ensured Long made his decision “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 983 ( 10th Cir. 2002). We thus conclude Long has not shown prejudice. III We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. Long’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge