Third District Court of Appeal 

State of Florida 

Opinion filed January 23, 2019. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

________________ 

No. 3D18-1938 

Lower Tribunal No. 18-3582 

________________ 

Edward Villella, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Toby Lerner Ansin, 

Respondent. 

 On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Rodolfo A. Ruiz, Judge. 

 Ross & Girten, and Lauri Waldman Ross and Theresa L. Girten; Friedman & 

Friedman, P.A., and John S. Seligman, for petitioner. 

 White & Case LLP, and Raoul G. Cantero and Sara E. Cendejas, for 

respondent. 

Before SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ., and LUCK, Associate Judge. 

 SCALES, J. 
 2 

In this petition for writ of certiorari, Edward Villella, the defendant below, 

argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in 

staying discovery of a non-party entity and its current or former officers and directors 

until after the trial court determined whether, as a matter of law, a non-disparagement 

provision contained within the underlying separation agreement at issue was 

ambiguous. Because Villella has failed to demonstrate the requisite irreparable 

harm, we lack jurisdiction to hear, and therefore dismiss, the instant petition. See 

CQB, 2010, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon, 177 So. 3d 644, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2015) (“The requirement of material, irreparable harm is jurisdictional. We must 

dismiss the petition if it is not met.”); Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, 

Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“[A] petitioner must establish that an 

interlocutory order creates material harm irreparable by postjudgment appeal before 

this court has power to determine whether the order departs from the essential 

requirements of the law.”). 

Villella was the artistic director for the Miami City Ballet, Inc. (the “Ballet”). 

In September 2012, Villella executed an Employment Amendment and Separation 

Agreement (the “separation agreement”) with the Ballet. Section 7 of the separation 

agreement contains a non-disparagement provision whereby the Ballet agrees not to 

make any written or oral statements that disparage, denigrate, or criticize Villella or 

Villella’s reputation. In particular, as relevant here, the non-disparagement 
 3 

provision dictates that the Ballet’s obligation “as [it] relates to statements made 

individually by members of the Board of Governors, Board of Trustees or Company 

executives, shall be satisfied by the [Ballet] providing its executives, Board of 

Governors and Board of Trustees with a joint letter . . . outlining the Parties joint 

communication plan and requesting strict adherence thereto.” 

In February 2018, Toby Lerner Ansin, the plaintiff below, filed a one-count 

complaint for declaratory relief against Villella in the Miami-Dade County Circuit 

Court. Therein, Ansin alleges that she has written “a memoir chronicling . . . some 

of her experiences as founder of the Ballet . . . that would violate § 7 of the Separation 

Agreement, if she were bound by the Agreement in her individual capacity.” Ansin, 

therefore, seeks a declaration that the non-disparagement provision does not apply 

to Ansin and cannot be enforced against Ansin in her individual capacity.1

When Villella thereafter propounded discovery requests on the Ballet and 

certain current or former Ballet officers and directors, Ansin moved for a protective 

order and to limit discovery. The trial court reserved judgment as to whether to 

allow discovery of the Ballet and its current or former officers and directors to take 

place until after Ansin and Villella were both deposed.2

 

 

1

 Ansin alleges that she is a member of the Ballet’s board of trustees, but that she is 

not a member of the Ballet’s board of directors. 

2

 The trial court also limited discovery as to Ansin and other witnesses, none of 

which are challenged in this petition. 
 4 

Once the parties were deposed, Villella filed a motion requesting that the 

lower court allow the discovery to proceed. Villella argued, among other things, 

that he should be able to ascertain through discovery propounded on the Ballet, a 

non-party, whether the Ballet intended for the non-disparagement provision to apply 

to Ansin. At the hearing on Villella’s motion, the trial court stayed the requested 

discovery until after the trial court determines whether, as a matter of law, the nondisparagement provision is ambiguous. In so ruling, the trial court explained that it 

is reserving judgment as to whether to allow discovery of the Ballet and its current 

or former officers and directors, noting that the court’s contractual interpretation of 

the provision may prove dispositive of the entire claim, making the discovery 

unnecessary: 

The Court, in the interest of judicial economy, recognizing this 

is a one count complaint for declaratory judgment, permitting key 

depositions to already have been taken, and understanding that this is 

purely an issue of contractual interpretation to determine whether or not 

an ambiguity exists in the contract, is going to stay discovery, order the 

filing of a summary judgment motion on the issue of contractual

interpretation within 14 days from the date of today’s order. 

And once that has been set for hearing and ruled on, which will

require only contractual interpretation, thereby not prejudicing the 

Defendant, because I cannot look at interpretation by different parties 

who were involved in drafting, but only to the plain meaning of the 

contract, the Court will then lift the stay, if I find there is ambiguity, to 

allow full discovery, or the case will be resolved in a dispositive way 

by finding that this is an unambiguous contract and ruling in favor of 

one or the other party because it may benefit either party once I take a 

look at whether or not this individual is bound by that and will – 

whether it will affect the publishing of the memoirs. 
 5 

 The trial court has broad discretion to determine the scope of allowable 

discovery in a civil proceeding. See Young Circle Garage LLC v. Koppel, 916 So. 

2d 22, 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). On this record, where the trial court has not finally 

resolved whether Villella may obtain the discovery he seeks – choosing, instead, to 

first decide what may be an outcome-determinative, dispositive issue – we conclude 

that Villella has failed to demonstrate the requisite irreparable harm that is required 

for us to have jurisdiction over this petition. 

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.