NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0918-22

J.P. ELECTRIC, INC., 

properly identified as JUAN

PEREZ ELECTRIC CO., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

and 

JUAN PEREZ, 

 Plaintiff/Third-Party 

 Defendant-Respondent, 

v.

LPMG CONSTRUCTION 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, 

Defendant/Third-Party 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

1 NORTH BOSTON, LLC, 

and DAVID NOVOTNY, 

Defendants, 

and 

DAVID PRATTS, 

 Defendant/Third-Party 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 

November 2, 2023

APPELLATE DIVISION 
A-0918-22 2 

 Defendant. 

_____________________________ 

Submitted October 23, 2023 – Decided November 2, 2023 

Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla and Vinci. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. 

L-0219-18. 

Brian E. O'Neill (Elliott Greenleaf, PC), attorney for 

appellant. 

Respondents have not filed a brief. 

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

SABATINO, P.J.A.D. 

This appeal involves a straightforward application of the terms of the 

Offer of Judgment provisions in Rule 4:58-1 to -6. Defendant LPMG 

Construction Management, LLC ("LPMG"), appeals from the court's post-trial 

denial of its application for an award of counsel fees and costs pursuant to 

Rule 4:58-6.

In February 2018, plaintiff J.P. Electric, Inc. filed a complaint against 

LPMG (and other defendants that were dismissed from the action). Before 

trial, LPMG served upon plaintiff in March 2022 an offer of judgment under 

Rule 4:58-1 "to allow judgment to be entered against it and in favor of 

[p]laintiff for damages in the amount of $5,000 . . . to resolve all of [p]laintiff's 
A-0918-22 3 

claims in this action of any kind, including all claims for damages of any kind, 

actual or otherwise . . . ." Plaintiff rejected the offer. 

The trial court held a two-day bench trial. At the close of plaintiff's 

evidence, the court granted LPMG's motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant 

to Rule 4:37-2(b). Thereafter, LPMG moved for over $50,000 in attorney's 

fees and costs pursuant to Rule 4:58-6.

The trial court denied defendant's application for fees. In its written 

decision of October 28, 2022, the court explained that "a dismissal pursuant to 

R[ule] 4:37-2(b) precludes an award of attorney's fees as it is a dismissal. The 

court finds R[ule] 4:58-3(c) does not provide for any allowances for fees when 

'the claimant's claim is dismissed.'" 

On appeal, LPMG argues the trial court misapplied the pertinent Rules, 

stressing that an involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b) represents an 

adjudication on the merits of the case. 

The trial court correctly and sensibly applied the pertinent Rules. "[W]e 

review the meaning or scope of a court rule de novo, applying 'ordinary 

principles of statutory construction to interpret the court rules." DiFiore v. 

Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 228 (2023) (quoting State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 67 

(2017)). 

Although Rule 4:58-3(a) authorizes an offeror to recover fees "[i]f the 
A-0918-22 4 

offer of a party other than the claimant is not accepted, and the claimant 

obtains a judgment . . . that is favorable to the offeror as defined by this rule," 

that authorization does not apply when "the claimant's claim is dismissed," see 

Rule 4:58-3(c)(1), or "a no-cause verdict is returned," see Rule 4:58-3(c)(2). 

Because a successful motion under Rule 4:37-2(b) results in the 

"dismissal of the action" as "the plaintiff has shown no right to relief[,]" no 

verdict was returned so the trial court's denial of fees was manifestly correct. 

The policy reasons underlying the zero-recovery exceptions to Rule 4:58-3(c) 

would be undermined if such fee-shifting were permitted. See Schettino v. 

Roizman Dev., Inc., 158 N.J. 476, 486 (1999) (noting that the preclusion of 

fee-shifting under the Rule in instances when a plaintiff does not prevail 

"prevent[s] the transformation of the offer-of-judgment rule into a general feeshifting rule"). 

Affirmed. Lest there be any doubt, a mid-trial involuntary dismissal 

does not entitle a defendant offeror to fee-shifting under the Rule.