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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 114,336

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

UNDRA LEE,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

K.S.A. 21-4724 was clear as to the time at which eligibility for the retroactive 

application of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act was to be determined—a person's 

pre-July 1, 1993, criminal acts were compared to the law in effect on July 1, 1993, to 

determine conversion eligibility.

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOHN J. KISNER, JR., judge. Opinion filed June 9, 2017. 

Affirmed.

Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, and Sean M.A. Hatfield, of the 

same firm, were on the brief for appellant. 

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 

attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BILES, J.: Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), certain offenders 

who committed crimes before KSGA's effective date are eligible to have their sentences 
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converted to the sentences they would have received under KSGA. Undra D. Lee was 

convicted and sentenced under pre-KSGA law for first-degree murder, aggravated 

kidnapping, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. In this appeal, Lee argues the district 

court erred by summarily denying his motions to correct an illegal sentence through 

which he sought to have his sentences converted to KSGA grid sentences. He advances 

two justifications for this relief.

First, he argues conversion must occur because the KSGA grid-box designations, 

upon which conversion eligibility turned, did not exist in Kansas law until the KSGA was 

enacted. Therefore he argues that his pre-KSGA crimes must be considered conversioneligible under State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312, 319, 323 P.3d 846 (2014) (regarding 

person/nonperson classification of prior out-of-state offenses for purposes of calculating 

criminal history score), overruled State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 357 P.3d 251 (2015), cert. 

denied 136 S. Ct. 865 (2016). Second, he argues the district court's summary denial 

deprived him of his statutory right to a hearing under K.S.A. 22-3504.

Lee is not entitled to have his sentences converted because Murdock has been 

overruled, and its rationale is nonetheless inapplicable to sentence-conversion claims. See 

State v. Jeffries, 304 Kan. 748, 751-52, 375 P.3d 316 (2016) (noting Murdock involved 

an interpretation of K.S.A. 21-4711[e]'s ambiguity language, whereas the Jeffries court 

applied K.S.A. 21-4723 [Furse 1995], which was "crystal clear" about the KSGA's 

retroactive application eligibility). Moreover, because the record conclusively 

demonstrates Lee is not entitled to relief on his motions, the district court did not err by 

summarily denying them.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Lee of four January 1993 crimes: first-degree murder, 

aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. He was sentenced for these 

crimes in 1995.

On July 1, 1993, the KSGA became effective. K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4701 et seq. 

The KSGA's purpose was "'"to standardize sentences so that similarly situated offenders 

would be treated the same, thus limiting the effects of racial and geographic bias."'" Keel, 

302 Kan. at 574. To this end, the KSGA established a grid under which the sentence for a 

felony conviction is determined by applying two controlling factors: "the severity level 

of the current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history score." 302 Kan. at 

574. 

In conjunction with the KSGA, the legislature assigned severity levels to felony 

offenses. As of July 1, 1993, first-degree murder was designated an off-grid crime subject 

to life imprisonment rather than a grid sentence. K.S.A. 21-3401 (first-degree murder); 

K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4706(c) (off-grid crimes). Aggravated kidnapping was designated 

a severity level 1 felony, kidnapping a severity level 3 felony, and aggravated assault a 

severity level 7 felony. K.S.A. 21-3421 (aggravated kidnapping); K.S.A. 21-3420

(kidnapping); K.S.A. 21-3410 (aggravated assault).

The KSGA permitted the Department of Corrections (DOC) in limited 

circumstances to retroactively convert the sentences of offenders, incarcerated on the 

KSGA's effective date for certain offenses, to KSGA guidelines sentences. See K.S.A. 

21-4724. The statute provided that "persons who committed crimes which would be 

classified in a presumptive nonimprisonment grid block on [the nondrug] sentencing grid, 

in grid blocks 5-H, 5-I or 6-G of the nondrug grid . . . if sentenced pursuant to the 
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[KSGA] shall have their sentence modified." K.S.A. 21-4724(b)(1). The statute directed 

the DOC to prepare sentencing guidelines reports on all inmates incarcerated as of July 1, 

1993, "except those who have convictions for crimes which . . . would constitute a 

severity level 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony on the sentencing guidelines grid." K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(1). 

But 

"[i]n the case of any person to whom the provisions of this section shall apply, 

who committed a crime prior to July 1, 1993, but was sentenced after July 1, 1993, the 

sentencing court shall impose a sentence as provided pursuant to law as the law existed 

prior to July 1, 1993, and shall compute the appropriate sentence had the person been 

sentenced pursuant to the [KSGA]." K.S.A. 21-4724(f).

Applying the pre-KSGA sentencing statute applicable at the time Lee committed 

the crimes, the sentencing court imposed sentences of life imprisonment for first-degree 

murder and aggravated kidnapping, 15 years to life for kidnapping, and 3 to 10 years for 

aggravated assault. The court ordered Lee to serve these sentences consecutively. 

In 2014, Lee filed a pro se motion to correct his sentences based on Murdock, 

arguing, under Murdock's rationale, "there is . . . no statutory mechanism allowing us to 

draw a distinction between the current guidelines severity level scale and the pre-1993 

felony classifications." He argued in an amended pro se motion, he "has a non-person 

felony history that makes his . . . conviction(s) and sentence(s) eligible for conversion to 

the [KSGA]." Counsel appointed for Lee echoed these arguments in a third written 

motion: "By requiring pre[-KSGA] person offenses to be scored as non-person offenses, 

the [Murdock] [c]ourt's interpretation opens the argument that offenses resulting in an 

indeterminate sentence, could be subject to reclassification not only as non-person 

offenses, but also reclassification as offenses with determinate/grid sentences."
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The district court summarily denied the motions. Applying State v. Lunsford, 257 

Kan. 508, 894 P.2d 200 (1995), the court held Lee was not eligible to have his 

"class/indeterminate sentence converted into a grid/determinate sentence." It reasoned 

that under Lunsford "'eligibility for . . . conversion based on the severity level of the 

crime is determined as of July 1, 1993," "subsequent events other than a reversal or new 

sentence imposed as a result of an appeal will not make the prisoner eligible," and neither 

of these eligibility-conferring subsequent events occurred in Lee's case. 257 Kan. at 511. 

Lee timely appealed. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3601(b)(2), 

(3) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a case in which defendant is convicted of a class 

A felony or life sentence is imposed); State v. Sims, 294 Kan. 821, 823, 280 P.3d 780 

(2012) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over motion to correct an illegal sentence filed in 

a case in which defendant received a life sentence).

PRE-KSGA SENTENCE CONVERSION

Lee first argues he is entitled to have his pre-KSGA sentence converted to a 

KSGA grid sentence under the rationale underlying this court's decision in Murdock, 299 

Kan. 312. We disagree.

Murdock held that pre-1993, out-of-state felony convictions must be classified as 

nonperson felonies for the purposes of calculating offenders' criminal history scores. 299 

Kan. at 319. The statutory provision, K.S.A. 21-4711(e), required that prior out-of-state 

crimes be classified as person or nonperson by referring to "comparable offenses," and 

provided the default classification was "nonperson" if there was no comparable Kansas 

offense. 299 Kan. 312, Syl. ¶ 1. 
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But absent a statutory directive on whether the "comparable Kansas offense" 

should be determined under current Kansas law or the law at the time of the prior crime, 

the court relied on State v. Williams, 291 Kan. 554, 559, 244 P.3d 667 (2010), and held 

the comparison should be to the law at the time of the prior crime. See Murdock, 299 

Kan. at 317-18. The blanket, nonperson classification of pre-KSGA, out-of-state crimes 

was therefore required because there were no person or nonperson designations in Kansas 

law before the KSGA. 299 Kan. at 319.

Murdock has since been overturned by Keel, 302 Kan. at 590 ("[T]he classification 

of a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication as a person or nonperson offense for 

criminal history purposes under the KSGA is determined based on the classification in 

effect for the comparable Kansas offense at the time the current crime of conviction was 

committed.").

Asking us to extend Murdock, Lee contends that because the grid-placement 

classifications―upon which eligibility for retroactive conversion is determined―did not 

exist in the law at the time he committed his crimes, all his convictions are conversion 

eligible. See K.S.A. 21-4724(b)(1). He argues "presumptive prison," "border box," and 

"presumptively non-prison" designations did not exist in the law until the KSGA was 

enacted, so his pre-KSGA crimes must be considered "presumptively non-prison" crimes, 

which he argues is the "lower" of these three "classifications."

We considered and rejected this argument in Jeffries, 304 Kan. at 752. In that case 

a prisoner, who had been incarcerated for pre-KSGA crimes that would constitute offgrid and severity level 3 felonies, moved to have his sentence corrected. See 304 Kan. at 

749-50. Like Lee, Jeffries argued under Murdock the post-KSGA severity level of his 

crimes could not be used to deny conversion because there were no severity level 

designations at the time he committed his offenses. Affirming the district court's 
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summary denial of Jeffries' motion, the Jeffries court reasoned that Murdock and Keel

addressed ambiguity in K.S.A. 21-4711(e). 304 Kan. at 751. But the "temporal 

ambiguity" at the heart of those decisions is not present in K.S.A. 21-4724. 304 Kan. at 

753. "The statute clearly directs that a person's pre-July 1, 1993, criminal acts are 

compared to the law in effect on July 1, 1993, to determine conversion eligibility." 304 

Kan. at 753. The Jeffries court therefore concluded even if Murdock had not been 

overturned, its rationale is inapplicable to sentence conversion claims. 304 Kan. at 751.

In addition, Lee's case differs from Jeffries in one important respect: Lee was 

sentenced after July 1, 1993, whereas Jeffries pled guilty and nolo contendere to his 

crimes before July 1, 1993. See 304 Kan. at 749. In such case, K.S.A. 21-4724(f) 

controls, and the sentencing court was required to impose a preguidelines sentence and 

merely "compute the sentence that would have been imposed had the defendant been 

sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines." State v. Fierro, 257 Kan. 639, 651, 895 

P.2d 186 (1995).

The record reflects the sentencing court discharged this obligation. Other than the 

Murdock-based argument, Lee does not assert the sentencing court committed any error 

in computing his sentence. We hold the district court did not err when it ruled Murdock

did not provide a basis for granting the motion.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Finally, Lee argues the district court erred by denying his motions without a 

hearing. He contends the plain language of K.S.A. 22-3504(1) grants him the right to a 

hearing on his motion at which he is entitled to be personally present and to have the 

assistance of counsel. His argument is without merit because the motions, records, and 

files in his case conclusively show Lee is not entitled to relief. See State v. Gray, 303 
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Kan. 1011, 1013, 1016, 368 P.3d 1113 (2016) (When a defendant files a motion to 

correct illegal sentence, a district court may dismiss the motion without a hearing or 

appointment of counsel if "'"'"the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show 

the defendant is not entitled to relief."'"'"); State v. Collier, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ 

(No. 114,304, filed June 2, 2017), slip op. at 11 (applying Gray to reject identical 

arguments). Therefore, the district court did not err by summarily denying it.

Affirmed.