### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary19, 200 6 S es sio n D ON N A M A R IE TA IT v. WI LL IA M F R A N K T A IT Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 03-0362-1 Walt er L. Evans, Chan cellor

No. W2005-00976-C OA-R3-C V - F iled May 18, 2006

Donna Ma

rie Tait (“Wife”) filed for divorc e fr om Wi lliam Fra nk Tait (“H usband”) citing g rounds of ina pp ro priate mari ta l c on du c t. T he pa rt ie s ent e re d into a Pe rm a ne nt Par e nti ng Pla n anda Pr op e rty Settlement Ag ree ment, but reserved the issue of alimony for tria l. After

hearing the evidenc e, the tria l c ou rt fo un d that Wif e wa s no t in ne e d of a dd iti on a l a lim on y su pp ort fr om Hu sb a nd , de sp ite Hu sb a nd ’s abil ity

to p a y . Wif

e app e a ls. We a ff

irm. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Mit c he ll D . M os ko vit z, A da m N . Co he n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or theAp pe llant, Do nn a

Ma ri e Tait. Da rr e ll D . B la nto n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or theAp pe lle e , Wil liam Frank Tait. OP IN ION Fac tua l Ba c kg

ro und a nd P

ro c e dur al H ist or y Donna Ma

rie Tait (“Wife”) and Willi am Fr ank Tait (“Husband” ) we re ma rried on Ma

rch 1 , 1 9 8 6

. T h ro u gh o u tt h e m arri age , Hu s b an d wo rk ed as an i n s u ra n ce age n t , ea rn i n g app ro xima te ly

$4 15 ,5 69 to $ 51 1, 59 5 p e r y e ar f ro m 20 00 un til Hu sb a nd ’s su bs e qu e nt r e tir e me nt. Wif e is a hig h s c ho ol g ra du a te wh o s ta y e d at ho me du ri ng themarria g e a ndc are d f or thepa rt ie s’ home and c hildren. Wife asserts that late r in the marriag e, she soug ht to continue her e ducation, but Husband re

jected this notion and insisted that Wi fe r emain a stay -at-home mother. Wif e ini tia lly fi le d f or div or c e c iti ng theg ro un ds of ir re c on c ila bledif fe re nc e s. Howeve r, Wife later amended he r divorcepetition to cite the g rounds of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t ag ainst Husband. Specif

ically , Wife asserte d that Husband wa s having an extra-marital affair–aO n Se pt embe r 20, 2005, H u s ban d f i l ed a M ot i on t o Cons i der Pos t

- Ju dg men t Fa ct s w h i ch s t at ed: 1

1 . A t t h e ti m e o f t h e T ria l i n this m a tter , t h e A p p e llan t (W ife) w a s re c e ivin g a p e n sio n b e n e fit o f T wo T ho usand T hree H und red E i ght y D o l l ars ($2 , 3 8 0 ) per m o nt h.
2

. Sub sequent t o the T ri al , a nd d uri ng the p end ency o f thi s ap p eal , A p p el l ant be gan recei vi ng p ensi o n be nef

i t s o f Five T ho usand E i ght y T wo D o l l ars ($5 , 0 8 2 ) per m o nt h.
3. I t was cont emp l at ed by t he part i es t hat t hi s i ncr eas e woul d t ake pl ace as ev i dence d t h r ou g h ou t t h e r ec or d.
H u sb a n d ’s m o tio n w a s g ra n te d b y this C o u rt o n O c to b e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 5 . It i s u n d isp u te d tha t H u sb a n d is re tire d

.

I n h er r epl y br i ef , W i fe r ev i s ed h er mon t h l y e x pen s es for a n ew t ot al of $6, 952. 39. 2 -2- fac t that Husband did not deny . As a re sult, the trial court g rante d Wife a divorcebased upon inappropriate marital c onduct by Husband. At trial, the court approve d the parties’ Settlement Ag ree ment as to Division of Property , wher eby Wife rec eived f

ifty -five pe rce nt of the marital estate. Wife’ s portion of the marital e state totaled a pproxi mately

$976,793, with $524,888 of the total being in the form of a retire ment acc ount. Wi fe a lso rece ived $149,083 in cash, w hich repr esente d half of an investment acc ount the parties ha d set aside f or the c hildren’s e ducation and had a g ree d to not include in the marital estate

. Wife further rec eived an income fr om Husband’s pe nsion in the amount of $2,380 per month, which w ould increa se to $5,082 at Husband’s r etireme nt. At the time of trial, Husba nd testified that he planne d to retire in 2006, at wh ic h ti me he wo ulde arnapp ro xima te ly $1 0, 00 0 p e r m on th i n p e ns ionbe ne fi ts. 1
I n prese nting e vidence on alimony , Wife asserte d that her pe rsonal expenses totaled $7,344.52 per month. These e x penses we re a part fr om those incurre d by her c hildren, whe re 2 wer e cove red by

child support payments that Wi fe w ould rec eive f rom Husband unde r the parties’ Permane nt Parenting Plan. Wi fe f urther te stified that her inc ome consisted of the $2,380 per month g ross she would re ceive from Husband’s pension, which w ould increa se to $5,082 per mon th at H us ba nd ’s re tir e me nt. Wif e pr e se nte d f

urthe r e vid e nc e that sh e su ff e rs fr om l up us , wh ic h c aus e s h e r c on sid e ra blejoi nt p a ins , e y e pr ob le ms, a ndnu mbn e ss i n h e r h a nd s. Wif e a lso t es t i fi ed t h ats h e h as d ev el o p ed ar t h ri t i s i n h erh an d s , k n ee s , an d fe et ; an d s u ff er s fr o mb o t h h i gh blood pressure and hig h cholester ol. I n addition to W ife’s pr oof, the trial c ourt also hea rd expert testimony

from Gor don Th omp so n, a

c e rt if ie d p ub lic a c c ou ntant, wh o te sti fi e d th a t de sp ite inc omefr om c hil d s up po rt , pension bene fits, and social sec urity , Wife would have an annual de ficit for the rest of he r lifeA ccor di ng t o M r . T homp s on’ s t es t i m o ny, W i f e had approxi mat el y $37 8, 85 8 i n “ work i ng ca pi t al ”, wh i ch 3

r epr es en t ed W i fe’ s i n v es t abl e as s et s s h e r ec ei v ed i n t h e di v i s i on of m ari t al p roper t y , n ot i n cl u di n g h er $524, 888 re tire m e n t ac c o u n t o r th e $ 1 4 9 ,0 0 0 sh e re c e ive d fo r th e c h ild re n ’s ed u c a tio n a c c o u n t.

M r . T homp s on’ s cal cul at ed t hat W i fe h ad approxi mat el y $37 8, 85 8 i n l i qui d “ work i ng ca pi t al

. ” H owever , at 4 tria l t h e C h a n c e llo r n o te d tha t t h e M r. T h o m p so n ’ p ro je c tio n s d id n o t c o n sid e r an y se p a ra te p ro p e rty o f t h e p a rtie s in cal cul at i ng i ncome an d expen s es . Fur t her mo r e, t he r ecor d s hows t hat M r . T homp s on’ s cal cul at i ons al s o f ai l t o cons i der any pot ent i al ea r ni ng s by W i fe.

In his b rie f, H u sb a n d a sse rts th a t W ife h a s a p p ro x im a te ly $ 5 2 4 ,0 0 0 in liq u id a sse ts. H u sb a n d o b ta ine d this 5

amou n t by a ddi n g t h e l i qu i d por t i on of W i fe’ s s h ar e of t h e mar i t al e s t at e ( appr ox i mat el y $375, 000) w i t h W i fe’ s por t i on o f t h e c h ild re n ’s ed u c a tio n fun d ($ 1 4 9 ,0 0 0 ). -3- and would ultimately

expend all of her liquid “wor king c apital” by

ag e seve nty -five. Howeve r, 3 4 at that time, Mr. Thompson testified that Wife would have approximately $3,200,000 in her retire ment acc ount as well as income of $5,080 per month from Husband’s pe nsion. I n addition to Mr. Thompson’s testimony , Husband a lso asserted that Wi fe’ s income statement did not include money

she could e arn f

rom working and also did not include intere st income Husband alleg es Wife could ea

rn if she w ere to invest her liquid assets at a 5.5 pe rce nt rate of return. 5 At the conc lusion of the proof, the Cha ncellor ma de extensive finding s, which ar e as fo llo ws : Eac h of these parties have submitt ed aff idavits of income and expenses that have be en ex am i n ed and c ross-examined, both of which the Court fee ls to be somewhat inflate d. The Court has c onsidered the testimonyof Mr. Thompson, and t h e r e a s o n ab l e n e s s t o b e g i v e n t o h i s t e s t i m o n y. The Court has c onsidered the testimony of both [W ife] and [Husband] and the ar g uments of t heir counsel. I n determining whe ther the g ranting of an or der f or alimony or payment of support and maintenanc e to a party is a ppropriate , the Court considers, among othe r things, the reque sted nature , amount, leng th of term, and the m a n n e r o f t h e p r o p o s e d p a ym e n to f a l i m o n y. Th e Cou rt

c on sid e rs there lativ e e arn ing c apa c ity of thepa rt ies, the ir re sp e c tiv e ob lig a tio ns , th e ir ne e ds , andthefi nanc ia l reso ur c e s th a t e a c h o ne ha s, including inc ome from a ll sources, including pension, profit sharing, r etireme nt, or oth e r s ou rc e s. The Court also considers the re lative educ ation and training of eac h party , the ability and opportunity

of ea ch to sec ure f

urther e ducat i o n and tra ining, and the nece ssity of a party to secur e further education and training to improve such party ’s e arn ing c apa c ity

to a re a so na blele ve l. The Court also conside rs the du ra t i on of the mar riag e, the a g e and me ntal c on dit ionof

thepa rt ie s, theph y sic a l c on ditionof e a c h p arty , in c lud ing a ny

dis abil ity or inca pacity due to a c hronic, de bilitating disease which, in this ca se, it appea rs as though [Wife] suffe rs from lupus and arthritis and hig h blood pressure , like so many-4-

others do. [Husband] s u ff

er s s tre s s an d o v er -e x h au s t i o n an d h as s o u gh tp s y ch o l o gi cal and, I believe, psy chiatric treatment to stabili ze his sit uation. The Court also conside rs t he ex tent to which it would be undesira ble for the disadvantag ed party

to seek e mploy ment outside the home. T h e C o u rta l s o c o n s i d e r s w h e t h e r t h e r e ar e m i n o r

c h i l d r e n i n t h e h o m e . In this case, I

believe oneis 16 and one is 17. Th e Cou rt

c on sid e rs these pa

rate a sse ts of e a c h party , both re a l a ndpe rs on a l, tang ible and intang ible, and also, of course , the relative fault of the parties. Alimony wo uldno t beapp ro priate if thepa rty se e kin g a lim on y

is g ui lt y of ina pp ro priate marital conduc t, which does not appe ar to be the situation in thi s case . . . . An d, of c ou rs e , th e Cou rt c a n c on sid e r a ny oth e r re lativ e fa c ts that may e xist in the awa

rd of a limony . [W ife’s c ounsel] is relying upon T ennesse e Code, sec tion 36-5-101 to ar g ue that his client is in need of a tr an s itional alimony , and that [Husband] should pay

the same. Certain things a re u n co n troverte d and without dispute that the marital property of t he parties has been divided 55 perc ent to [W ife] and 45 perc ent t o [Husband] , and that aw ard ha s been a g ree d to without reg ard to any separ ately acc umulated assets of e ither party . It also appea rs that, base d upon the a g re e d- to v a lue s a nda mou nts , [Wif e ] is r e c e iving wh a t a mou nts to a pp ro xima te ly $180,000 more in marital property than i s [Husband] , and $90,000 more than w hat sh e no rm a lly

wo uldha ve re c e ive d if

thi s Co urt ha d a llo c a te d th e prop e rty on e ha lf to one half. It appea rs that [Husband] has been in the insurance business for 11 y ear s befor e the mar

riag e, and ha s built up certain g ood will and that he built during the marria g e, but base d upon the testimony , it a ppear s as though the acc umulation of the su bs ta nti a l a sse ts o c c ur

re d d uring themarria g e , w hic h w a s th e pr od uc t, o r the fr uit s of the labor , that he had de veloped f or the 11 y ear s prior there to. It also appea

rs that if [Husban d ] re t i re s in ‘05 or ‘06, that [ Wife] wil l be rec eiving in retireme nt p ay ments approximately $5,082 dollars [per month] , and [ Hu s b an d ] will be rec eiving approximately $10,000 per month in retire ment. The amount that [W ife] will be rec eiving wi l l b e in addition to the $1,000,000 that she rec eived a s part of the Marital Dissol ution Ag ree ment, and the $10,000 a mont h that [Husband] will be rec eiving will be in addition to mos tly the re al estate , which he reta ined as a

result of the se ttlement, in addition to t he assumption of the debt on that rea l estate. After considering all of the fa ctors and the disparity in the division of marital assets betwe en the pa

rties, the Court is of the opinion that [W ife] does not satisfy the require ments of this Court to convince the Court that she is in need of any additional a lim on y su pp ort in or de r t o ma int a in an a pp ro priate stand ardof

liv ing c on sis te nt w ith tha t w h i c h s h e e n

j o y e d d u r i n g t h e m arr i a g e . [H u s b a n d ] p r o b ab l y c o u l d p a y so me alimony , but the Court cannot find t h at [ W i fe] is in need of the r ece ipt of any al i m o n y , considering the amount and the liquidity of the marital property

that she rec eived, in addition to the additi onal retirement t hat wil l be forthcoming to he r, forT h e p o rtio n o f sec tio n 3 6 -5 -1 0 1 d e a ling w ith a lim o n y a w a rd s, a s a m e n d e d e ff e c tive J u ly 1 , 2 0 0 5 , i s c u rr e n tly 6

co d i f i ed at T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 2 1 (20 0 5 ). H o wever, s i nce t he t ri al c o u rt d e c id e d thi s case be fo re t he current amendment , we r evi ew t hi s mat t er un der t he ver s i on of t he s t at ut e i n e f

fect at t he t i me of

t he Fi nal D i vor ce D ecr ee r en der ed on O ct ober 25, 2004. -5- lif e , u po n [H us ba nd ]’s re tir e me nt. And for th a t r e a so n th e re qu e st f or a lim on y is denied. Wif e app e a ls. Issues Presented W h e t h e r t h e tr i a l c o u rte rr e d i n f

a i l i n g t o a w ar d W i f

e a l i m o n y. Stan dard of Revie w We r e vie w the tria l c ou rt ' s f ind ing s o f f

a c t de novo , wi th a

pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) (2 00 5) ; Berryhill v. Rhode s , 2 1 S. W.3 d 1 88 , 1 90 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . We wi ll not reve rse the trial court = s fac tual finding s unless they are contra

ry to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Id. I nsofar

as the trial c ourt =

s d e te rm inatio ns areba se d o n it s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss cre dibilit y , appellate courts will not ree valuate that assessment abse nt evidenceof cle ar and convincing evidenc e to the contr ary . J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002)

. Our re view of the trial court = s c on c lus ion s o n matte rs of la w, ho we ve r, is de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Taylor v. Feze ll, 158 S.W .3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005)

. We l ike wi se revie w the trial c ourt =

s a pp lic atio n o f l a w t o th e fa c ts de novo , with no presumption of c or re c tne ss. State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005)

. We review an aw ard of

alimony under an abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Herrera v

. He rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). If a discr etionary decision is within a rang e of a cce ptable alternatives, appe llate courts will notsubstitut e their de cision for that of the trial court simply

beca use the a ppellate c ourt would have chosen a differ ent alternative. W

hite v. Vanderbilt Univ. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999). Anal y sis I n determining the a

ppropriate ness of an awa

rd of a limony , courts must consider the statut ory fa c tor s se t ou t in Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( d) (S up p. 20 04 ). Th is s e c tio n p ro vid e s: 6 (E) In determining whe ther the g ranting of an or der f or payment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in dete rmining the nature , a mou nt, le ng th o f t e rm , a ndma nn e r o f p a y me nt, thec ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r a ll re l ev an tfa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g:-6- (i) The relative earning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and f inancial resour ces of

eac h party

including inc ome from pe nsion, profit sharing or re tir e me nt p la ns a nd

a ll o the r s ou rc e s; (ii) The r elative e ducation and tr aining of ea ch party , the ability and op po rtun ity

of e a c h p arty

to s e c ur e su c h e du c a tio n andtr a ini ng , andthene c e ssi ty of a pa rty to securefurther

education and training to improve such party ’s ea rning c apa c ity to a re a so na blele ve l; (iii) The duration of the marriag e; ( i v ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p art y; (v) The phy sical condition of ea ch party , including, but not limited to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; (vi) The extent to which it would be undesirable f or a pa rty to seek employ ment outside the home bec ause suc h party will be custodian of a

minor child of the mar

riag e; (vii) The se parate assets of e ach pa rty , both rea l and per sonal, tang ible and intang ible; (viii) The provisions made w ith reg ard to marital property as def ined in § 36-4-121; (ix ) The sta ndard of

living of the parties e stablished during the marriag e; (x) Th e e xten t to wh ic h e a c h p arty ha s ma de su c h tang ibl e a ndint a ng ibl e contributions to the marriag e as mone tary and homemake r contributions, and tang ible and intang ible contributions by a party to the education, training or i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p art y; (xi) Th e re lativ e fa

ult of thepa rt ie s inc a se s w he rethec ou rt , inits discretion, dee ms it appropriate to do so; and (xi i) Such other f

actor s, including the tax consequence s to eac h party , as arene c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1)( E) (Supp. 2004). I n a pp lying se c tio n 3 6- 5- 10 1( d) , T e nn e sse e c ou rt s c on sid e r the mos t impo rt a nt f a c tor s to be the ne ed of the spouse see king support and the ability of the other

spouse to pay

. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) . Should a court find that a spouse is not “ec onomically

disadvantag ed” or

in need of

additional support, then “that spouse is not entitled to support and our inquiry g oes no further.” Ec ho ls v . Ec ho ls , No. E1999-00619- COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 688589, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 30, 2000), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Jan. 8, 2001); see Aaron v . Aaron , 9 09 S.W. 2d40 8, 41 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) (s tatin g that “ ‘the re a l ne e d o f the sp ou se seeking the support is the single most im portant fa ctor’” when de termining whether to awar d a lim on y ). I n d e te rm ini ng wh a t c on sti tut e s n e e d, theTe nn e sse e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y state s in section 36-5- 101(d)( 1)(B ) and ( C) of the Te nnessee Code that the nee d of a disadvantag ed sp ou se , a ndtheabil ity

of su c h a sp ou se to b e re ha

bil itate d, sh ou ld b e de te rm ine d inre latio n to the marital standa

rd of living , wher eby

“the e conomically

disadvantag ed spouse’ s standard of living af ter the divorc e should be re asonably compar able to the standa rd of living enjoy ed duringC urr ent l y co d i f i ed at T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 2 1 (c)( 2 ) and (d)(2) (20 0 6 ). 7 -7- the marriag e or to the post-divorc e standa rd of living expected to be a vailable to the other spouse, considering the re levant statutory fac tors and the e quities betwee n the parties.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( d)(1) (B ) and ( C) (Supp. 2004). 7
I n the ca se at ba

r, Wife asser

ts that the trial court e rre d when it found that she did not need a dditional support from Husband to maintain a standa rd of living analog ous to that which s h e e n jo y e d d u r in g th e ma

rr ia g e , d e s p it e th e f

a c t th a t H u s b a n d h a d th e ab il ity to p a y . We dis a g re e . A s p re vio us ly

no te d inthefa c ts s e c tio n o f t his op ini on , th e tria l c ou rt in this c a se considere d the many

statutory fac tors set forth unde r sec tion 36-5-101(d) of the Tenne ssee Code in determining whether

Wife was entitled to an a limonyawa rd. Specific ally , the trial court c on sid e re d th e du ratio n o f the marria g e , th e a g e a ndme nta l c on ditionof thepa rt ie s, thee xten t to which it would be undesira ble for the disadvantag ed par ty to seek e mploy ment outside the home, the sepa rate assets of e ach pa

rty , the re lative fault of the parties, and the division of marital property . Most importantly , howeve r, the c ourt looked at Wife’s ne eds and he r financ ial re so ur c e s to satis fy

tho se ne e ds . In d oin g so , th e c ou rt fo un d th a t Wif

e ha d s uf fi c ie nt f un ds to maintain a standa

rd of living consistent with what she e njoy ed during the marriag e, and thus ha d no ne e d o f s up po rt

fr om H us ba nd . A ft e r a

c are fu l r e vie w o f the re c or d, wefi ndthat th e fa c ts i n this case f

ail to preponde rate ag ainst this finding. The re cord shows that at trial Wife asserted per sonal expenses totaling $7,344.52 pe r month, a fig ure w hich, base d upon the evidenc e pre sented at trial, the court f ound to be somewhat inflate d. I n determining whe ther Wife had suf ficient means to pay

her e x penses, the trial court c onsidered the fac t that Wi fe r ece ived nea rly $1,000,000 in assets as part of the Marital Dissolution Agre ement, $524,888 of w hich was in the f orm of a r etireme nt acc ount. The Court further considere d the disparity

of the division of marital asse ts, where by Wife rec eived $180,000 more than H usband, and $90,000 morethan what she would have normally rec eived had the tria l court allocated the prope rty one half to one half. B esides Wife’s shar e of the marital property , the trial court also considere d the fa ct that Wife would rec eive $2,380 pe r month from Hu sb a nd ’s pe ns ionplan u nti l H us ba nd ’s re tir e me nt, a t w hic h ti me thi s a mou nt w ou ld r a ise to $5,082 per month. I n addition to hearing evidenc e conc erning Wife’s share of the marital estate a nd husband’s pe nsion, the trial court a lso heard e x pert testimony from Mr. Thompson, a c ertified pu bli c a c c ou ntant. Mr . T ho mps on te sti fi e d th a t, b a se d u po n Wif e ’s inc omefr om c hil d s up po rt , pe ns ion , a ndfu tur e so c ia l se c urity pay me nts , Wif

e wo uldha ve to e xhaus t $3 78 ,8 58 of theliq uid assets fr om her shar e of the marital estate over a twenty -four

to twenty -five y ear

period in orde r to meet her

monthlyexpenses. Howeve r, Mr. Thompson also testified that by the time Wife’s liq uida sse ts w e ree xhaus te d, Wif e wo uldbe se ve nty -f

ivey e ars olda ndha ve app ro xima te ly $3,200,000 in her re tirement ac count, along with her pe nsion and social sec urity benef its. Base d upon all of these f

actor s, the trial court determined that Wi fe f ailed to demonstrate a nee d forT hi s t o t al do es not i ncl ud e t he $ 1 4 9 , 0 0 0 award ed t o wi fe i n exchange f o r her agreem ent t o pa y fo r hal f of t he 8 tw o m ino r c h ild re n ’s co lleg e e x p e n se s. -8- additional support in order to maintain a lifesty le commensurate with the marital standa rd of liv ing . We a ff

irm. De sp ite thetria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that Wif e ha s n o n e e d f

or a lim on y su pp ort in or de r t o a c hie ve a stand ardof

liv ing a na log ou s to that sh e e njo y e d during themarria g e , Wif e no ne the le ss asserts that she is entitled to support because 1) Husband w as at fa ult for bre aking up the marria g e, 2) Wife should not be re quired to deple te all of he r “c apital assets” in order to support her ne eds, and 3) Wife is incapable of reha bilitation. Based upon the f acts in this case , we f

ind eac h of these a ssertions without merit. I n relation to W ife’s c laim that she is entitled to alimony due to Husband’ s fault, this Court has rec ently noted that [i ]t is well s ettled t hat whil e fault is a fa ctor to be c onsidered, it must not be applied i n a p u n i t i v e m a n n e r

a g a i n s ta g u i l t y p art y i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a w ar d o f a l i m o n y. [ Gilliam v

. Gilliam , 7 76 S.W. 2d81 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 8) ]; Fi sh e r v . F ish e r, 648 S.W .2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983). I n [ Duncan v . Duncan , 686 S.W. 2d 56 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1984)], this Court specific ally reje cted the notion of “puniti ve alimony ”, [sic] noting that while alimony may be reduc ed due to a spouse’s misconduct, unne eded alimony may not be added to punish a g uiltyspouse. Id

. [at 571-72]. W e havestated “alimony is not and never

has bee n intended by

our legi slature to be punitive. (citations omitted). Nor do webelieve it was int ended simpl y as an a war d of virtue.” Lancaster v. Lancaster , 671 S.W .2d 501, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). W ilder v. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d 892, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). In the ca se at ba r, the trial c ourt fo un d th a t Wif

e ne e de d n o a dd iti on a l su pp ort in or de r t o maint a in a lif e style c omm e ns ur a te wi th what she e njoy ed during the marriag e. As a result, we f

ind that any

awa rd of a limonybased upon Husband’s f

ault would be pure ly

punitive in nature and thus not allowed under T ennesse e law. We n e xt ad dr e ss Wi fe ’s c on te nti on that sh e “ sh ou ld n ot b e re qu ir e d to de ple te he r a sse ts to support herself

afte r the divorc e.” A s previously noted, Mr. Thompson testified at tria l that Wife would have to e x pend all of he r “liquid working capital” (which Mr . Thompson valued at $378,858) over a

twenty -four

to twenty -five y ear

period in orde r to meet he r nee ds. Howeve r, at 8 this ti me, Mr. Thompson ca lculated that Wife will be re ceiving $5,082 in payments from Husband’s pe nsion, approxim ately $1,144 per month in Social Security Be nefits, and will have approximately

$3,200,000 in her re tirement ac count. B ased upon the se fig ures, wefind that Wife will hardly

be re quired to expend an unre asonable amount of her assets in order

to provide h e r o w n s u p p o rt , a n d c e rt a i n l y w i l l n o tj e o p ar d i z e h e r f u t u r e f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y. Finally , we a ddress Wife’s a ssertion that she is entitled to alimony due to her

alleg ed inabilityto be re habilitated. As set forth in section 36-5-101(d) (1)( C),-9-

[t ]o be rehabilitated means to achieve , with rea sonable e ffort, a n earning c apac ity

that will permit the economica lly disa d v antage d spouse’s standa rd of living afte r the divorce to be re asonably

compar able to the standa rd of living enjoy ed du ring the marria g e, or to the post-divorc e standa rd o f l i v ing e x pecte d to be available to the other spouse, c onsidering the re levant statutory fac tors and the e quities be tween the pa rt ie s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1)( C) (Supp. 2004). As alre ady discussed in this case, the trial c ou rt fo un d th a t Wif

e wi ll h a ve su ff

ic ie nt i nc omea nda sse ts t o maint a in a lif e style c omp ara

bleto what she e njoy ed during the marriag e. From the re cord, it appe ars that this holding w as base d solely upon Wife’s share of the marital property as we ll as her income from Husba nd’s pension plan and f uture Social Sec urity

benef its W ife will rec eive at retireme nt ag e. Nowhe re in the rec ord does the trial court impute income to Wife which c ould be ea rned f rom Wife’s own employ ment. Furthermore , althoug h Wife testified that she suff ere d from lupus, arthritis, and various other

ailments, no testimony , expert or lay , was pre sented to prove that Wife was incapa ble of wor

king and earning inc ome in addition to that she is alrea dy rec eiving . I n fac t, at the hea ring on Wife’s Motion to Alter and Amend, Wife’ s counsel ac knowledg ed that Wife had no disabiliti es or bodily

defic iencies w hich prohibited her from sec uring employ ment if she chose to. B ased upon the following fac ts, we find that re habilitation is unnecessary in order f or W i fe t o m ai n t ai n an ap p ro p ri at e s t an d ar d o f l i v i n g. Conclusion Af te r a c are fu l r e vie w o f the re c or d inthi s c a se , w e fi ndthat th e fa c ts f a il t o p re po nd e rate ag ainst the trial court’s fac tual finding that Wife was in no nee d of additional support fr om Husband. As a

result, we f

ind that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to a war d Wif e a lim on y a ndthe re fo rea ff

irm. C os ts o f this app e a l areta xedto A pp e llant D on na Ma ri e T a i t , a n d h e r

s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE