IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

MICHAEL GARNETT, 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Appellee.

§ 

§ 

§ No. 27, 2022 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 1512011802 (N) 

§ 

§

Submitted: April 4, 2022 

Decided: May 23, 2022 

ORDER

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

Justices. 

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it appears to the 

Court that: 

(1) The appellant, Michael Garnett, filed this appeal from a Superior Court 

order denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State has moved to 

affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Garnett’s 

opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm. 

(2) In January 2018, Garnett pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a 

person prohibited (“PFBPP”). The charges against Garnett arose from conduct that 

occurred on or about December 16, 2015. As part of the plea, Garnett agreed that 
2

he qualified for sentencing as a habitual offender and the State agreed to dismiss 

multiple other charges and to cap its sentencing recommendation at fifteen years of 

minimum mandatory imprisonment. Garnett agreed that he qualified for habitualoffender sentencing based on the following prior convictions: (i) a 1996 conviction 

for carrying a concealed deadly weapon; (ii) 1997 convictions for possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony and second-degree burglary; and (iii) a 

2002 conviction for maintaining a vehicle for keeping drugs.1 He also recognized 

that, as a habitual offender, he faced a sentence of fifteen years of minimum 

mandatory imprisonment up to life imprisonment.2

(3) The State moved for habitual-offender sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 

4214(c). The Superior Court declared Garnett to be a habitual offender and, on June 

22, 2018, sentenced Garnett to fifteen years of imprisonment. 

(4) In December 2021, Garnett filed a motion for correction of illegal 

sentence, arguing that his predicate offenses are insufficient for habitual-offender 

sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(c). The Superior Court denied the motion, 

holding that Garnett was properly sentenced under Section 4214(c) because he had 

three separate, prior felony convictions, at least one of which was a violent felony. 

Garnett has appealed to this Court. 

1

 Transcript of Guilty Plea, State v. Garnett, Cr. ID No. 1512011802, at 5:6-23 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Jan. 18, 2018). 

2

Id. at 6:4-9; 7:11-15. 
3

(5) On appeal, the State concedes that Garnett was sentenced under the 

wrong version of Section 4214,3 which has been amended numerous times over the 

years. But it contends that we should affirm the Superior Court’s denial of the 

motion for illegal sentence because the habitual-offender motion established a 

sufficient basis to sentence Garnett under the applicable version of Section 4214; the 

version of Section 4214 under which he should have been sentenced exposed him to 

the same sentencing range as the version under which he was incorrectly sentenced; 

and the court imposed the minimum sentence permitted by the applicable version of 

the statute. 

(6) We review the denial of a motion for sentence correction for abuse of 

discretion.4 We review questions of law de novo.5 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds 

statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and 

manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required 

to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the 

judgment of conviction did not authorize.6

(7) The version of Section 4214(c) in effect at the time of Garnett’s 

sentencing provided: 

3

 In its order denying Garnett’s motion for correction of illegal sentence, the Superior Court applied 

the same version of Section 4214 as the version under which Garnett was sentenced. 

4 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 

5

Id.

6 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
4

Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony under the laws 

of this State . . . and 1 time convicted of a Title 11 violent felony, or 

attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this 

title under the laws of this State . . . and who shall thereafter be 

convicted of a subsequent Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit 

such a violent felony, as defined by § 4201(c) of this title, shall receive 

a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty provided 

elsewhere in this title for the fourth or subsequent felony which forms 

the basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an 

habitual criminal, up to life imprisonment . . . .7

This Court has held, however, that the version of the habitual-offender statute that 

applies is the one in effect at the time that the defendant committed the offense for 

which he is being sentenced.8 In December 2015, when Garnett committed the 

PFBPP offense at issue in this appeal, Section 4214(c)—the section on which the 

State relied in its habitual-offender motion—provided: 

Any person who has been convicted for an offense which occurred 

within this State prior to July 1, 1973, of any of the hereinafter 

enumerated crimes shall be considered as having been convicted 

previously of the crimes specified in subsection (b) of this section for 

purposes of the operation of this section and § 4215 of this title. Any 

person convicted under the laws of another state, the United States or 

any territory of the United States of any felony the same as or equivalent 

to any of the above or hereinafter named felonies is an habitual offender 

for the purposes of this section and § 4215 of this title. . . .9

7

 11 Del. C. § 4214(c) (effective April 13, 2017 to July 10, 2018). 

8 Wright v. State, 2022 WL 499979, at *3 & n. 14 (Del. Feb. 17, 2022). 

9

 11 Del. C. § 4214(c) (effective July 3, 2013 to July 18, 2016). 
5

(8) The State does not contend that Section 4214(c), as it read in December 

2015, has any applicability to Garnett. Instead, the State relies upon Section 4214(a), 

which at that time provided in relevant part: 

Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony, other than 

those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) of this section, 

under the laws of this State . . . and who shall thereafter be convicted of 

a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal, 

and the court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in 

imposing sentence, may in its discretion, impose a sentence of up to life 

imprisonment upon the person so convicted. Notwithstanding any 

provision of this title to the contrary, any person sentenced pursuant to 

this subsection shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be 

less than the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title 

for the fourth or subsequent felony which forms the basis of the State’s 

petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal except 

that this minimum provision shall apply only when the fourth or 

subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) 

of this title.10 

(9) In Wright v. State, as in this case, the defendant was sentenced under 

subsection (c) of an inapplicable version of Section 4214.11 On appeal from denial 

of a motion for correction of illegal sentence, this Court affirmed, holding that the 

sentence was not illegal because (i) the State’s habitual-offender motion identified 

three prior felony convictions, as required under subsection (a) of the applicable 

version of Section 4214, and (ii) the defendant received the minimum sentence and 

10 Id. § 4214(a). 

11 2022 WL 499979, at *3. 
6

faced the same sentencing range under Section 4214(a) of the applicable version of 

the statute as that set forth in the inapplicable version of Section 4214(c).12

(10) Garnett argues that his predicate offenses are insufficient for habitualoffender sentencing because maintaining a vehicle for keeping drugs, of which he 

was convicted in 2002, is no longer a felony-level offense.13 In Ayala v. State, this 

Court held that a defendant was subject to habitual-offender sentencing under 

Section 4214(a) because he “undeniably had been convicted three times of Delaware 

felonies,” even though the General Assembly had later eliminated or reclassified 

from a felony to a misdemeanor two of the predicate offenses.14 Garnett does not 

dispute that he had been convicted of felonies on three separate occasions before the 

offense at issue in this case. Thus, he was subject to sentencing under the version of 

Section 4214(a) that was in effect at the time of his crime that is the subject of this 

appeal.15 

(11) Moreover, as in Wright, Garnett faced the same sentencing range under 

the wrong version of Section 4214 that he faced under the correct version of Section 

12 Id. at *3-4. 

13 Garnett was convicted of this offense under 16 Del. C. § 4655(a)(5). In 2011, the General 

Assembly enacted the Ned Carpenter Act, which eliminated or reclassified this offense but did not 

apply retroactively to any violation that occurred before September 1, 2011. See Ayala v. State, 

204 A.3d 829, 838-39 (Del. 2019) (discussing the Ned Carpenter Act). 

14 Id. at 838-40. 

15 See id. at 840 (“The unambiguous language of § 4214 compels the conclusion that the Superior 

Court correctly declared Ayala a habitual offender and correctly imposed a mandatory minimum 

sentence.”). 
7

4214, and he was sentenced to the same minimum sentence as a habitual offender.16 

Garnett has not shown that his sentence exceeds statutory limits, violates double 

jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be 

served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 

uncertain as to its substance, or not authorized by the judgment of conviction.17 We 

therefore affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Garnett’s motion for correction of 

illegal sentence, albeit on grounds different than those relied upon by the Superior 

Court.18

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED. 

BY THE COURT: 

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice 

16 Wright, 2022 WL 499979, at *3. 

17 Id. at *4. 

18 Id. (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995)).