If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MARGARET BARNOWSKI,

Claimant-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 30, 2020

v No. 344917

Livingston Circuit Court

CLEARY UNIVERSITY and UNEMPLOYMENT 

INSURANCE AGENCY,

LC No. 17-000079-AE

Appellees.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Claimant appeals as on leave granted1the trial court’s order concluding that the decisions 

of both the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Michigan Compensation Appellate 

Commission (MCAC) denying redetermination of claimant’s unemployment benefits were 

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ concluded that claimant filed a late protest and did 

not establish good cause for the late filing and the MCAC affirmed. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On August, 2015, claimant resigned from her part-time student job at Cleary University to 

accept full-time work at Advanced Medical Solutions (Advanced Medical). On September 7, 

2016, she was fired from her job at Advanced Medical. Claimant filed a single claim with the 

Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) seeking unemployment benefits from Cleary 

University. On September 27, 2016, the UIA sent her a response denying her claim, which listed 

Cleary University as the “Involved Employer” and listed the case number as 0-007-952-308. The 

notice informed claimant that she quit her job with Cleary University without good cause and that 

she was “disqualified for benefits under MES Act, Sec 29(1)(a).” The form also instructed in bold 

type font: “If you have any questions, call the UIA at 1-866-500-0017.” On September 29, 2016, 

claimant received another notice from the UIA, which listed Advanced Medical as the “Involved 

 

1 Barnowski v Cleary University, 504 Mich 893 (2019).
-2-

Employer” and listed the case number as 0-007-952-307. The notice stated that claimant was fired 

from Advanced Medical, but evidence had not been provided to establish misconduct, so claimant 

was “not disqualified for benefits under MES Act, Sec. 29(1)(b).” The form also instructed that if 

claimant had any questions, she could contact the UIA. Claimant testified that she interpreted this 

letter as superseding the denial that she received on September 27, 2016. Believing that she was 

now qualified for benefits for her claim against Cleary University, claimant did not take further 

action. Claimant eventually realized her error and filed a request for redetermination of her claim 

on May 16, 2017. On May 31, 2017, the UIA denied claimant’s request as not having been filed 

within the 30-day period provided by statute. 

Claimant appealed the UIA’s denial of redetermination and on July 27, 2017, ALJ Jeffrey 

Kemm affirmed the UIA’s decision, concluding that claimant did not establish good cause for 

filing her protest late. Claimant appealed the ALJ’s decision to the MCAC, arguing that she had 

good cause for reopening her case because she had a good-faith misunderstanding of the appeals 

process, and the MCAC affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On November 16, 2017, claimant filed a 

claim of appeal in the Livingston County Circuit Court, and the circuit court affirmed the MCAC’s 

decision, concluding that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that claimant failed to 

demonstrate good cause for filing an untimely request for redetermination. Claimant filed an 

application for leave to appeal in this Court, which we originally denied for lack of merit in the 

grounds presented. Claimant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme 

Court, which remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. Barnowski v 

Cleary University, 504 Mich 893 (2019).

II. ANALYSIS

Claimant argues that the circuit court erred by concluding that the ALJ’s decision was 

supported by substantial evidence. Claimant contends that she had good cause for her late appeal

in light of the unreasonableness of the UIA’s notice because it was foreseeably confusing to a 

layperson. We disagree.

Our review is limited to determining whether the circuit court “applied correct legal 

principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to 

the agency’s factual findings.” Boyd v Civil Serv Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234; 559 NW2d 342 

(1996). This standard “is indistinguishable from the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . .” Id. 

“[A] finding is clearly erroneous when, on review of the whole record, this Court is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 235. The Michigan Employment 

Security Act (MESA), MCL 421.1 et seq., provides that a circuit court 

may review questions of fact and law on the record made before the administrative 

law judge and the Michigan compensation appellate commission . . . but the court 

may reverse an order or decision only if it finds that the order or decision is contrary 

to law or is not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the 

whole record. [MCL 421.38(1).]

We review de novo the circuit court’s application of legal principles in reviewing an administrative 

decision, including matters of statutory interpretation. Mericka v Dep’t of Community Health, 283 

Mich App 29, 36; 770 NW2d 24 (2009).
-3-

An agency determination is final unless an interested party appeals the determination 

within 30 calendar days of the determination’s mail date. MCL 421.32a(1). MCL 421.32a(2) 

provides that the agency shall review an appeal filed after the 30-day period only if “good cause” 

exists to permit the late protest. The MESA does not define “good cause.” However, Michigan 

Administrative Rule 270(1) provides a nonexhaustive list of circumstances that constitute “good 

cause” for late appeals, including “[i]f an interested party fails to receive a reasonable and timely 

notice, order or decision.” Mich Admin Code, R 421.270(1)(e). Claimant argues that she had 

good cause for filing a late appeal because the UIA failed to provide her with reasonable notice. 

Therefore, for her claim to succeed, this Court must conclude that the notice provided to claimant 

was not reasonable to inform her of its decision. 

Although this Court’s primary task in interpreting a statute “is to discern and give effect to 

the intent of the Legislature,” City of Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co, 500 Mich 158, 168; 895 

NW2d 154 (2017), we strive for “reasonable construction of all legal texts” and decline to engage 

in judicial rewrites of statutory provisions to accommodate liberal constructions of statutes,

McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich 276, 293 n 29; 917 NW2d 584 (2018). Claimant urges 

this Court to adopt the position that a notice is only reasonable if a layperson without legal 

knowledge or representation would not have difficulty understanding its content and 

consequences. She argues that this is the only interpretation that would be consistent with the 

MESA’s statutory directive of assisting those who become “unemployed through no fault of their 

own.” MCL 421.2(1). However, this interpretation essentially asks us to engage in a judicial 

rewrite of statutory and administrative good-cause provisions, which we decline to do. Dueprocess requirements already guarantee “ ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.’ ” Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer, 481 Mich 503, 509; 751 

NW2d 453 (2008), quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314; 70 S

Ct 652; 94 L Ed 865 (1950). Therefore, further judicial construction of what constitutes 

“reasonable” notice regarding unemployment claims is unnecessary. 

Claimant has not shown good cause for her late appeal because the UIA’s notices were not 

objectively unreasonable or predictably confusing. Claimant argues that the notice was 

unreasonable because she received two contradictory notices within two days when she had 

submitted only one claim. However, the notices were not contradictory and had unique 

characteristics. The notices clearly listed different case numbers and discussed different statutory 

provisions. Even if claimant overlooked the nuances of these identifiers, the body of each message 

clearly indicated that the notices pertained to different employers. Even though claimant submitted 

only one claim, the second notice was clearly unrelated to that claim and did not mention Cleary 

University. The notices did not require advanced legal interpretation to understand, and to the 

extent that the messages confused claimant, the UIA provided a phone number that claimant could 

call if she had questions. Therefore, claimant has not demonstrated good cause for her late appeal 

because the UIA’s notices were not unreasonable. 
-4-

Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens