alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jesus Valdez BERMUDEZ, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-70733.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 26, 2008.*

Filed Sept. 8, 2008.

Jesus Valdez Bermudez, Bakersfield, CA, pro se.

*566Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, James A. Hunolt, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Kathryn Moore, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, KLEINFELD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jesus Valdez Bermudez, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

The IJ determined that Bermudez’s 2002 forgery conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), thereby rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). Before the BIA, however, Bermudez only contended that a separate 2001 burglary conviction was not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review Bermudez’s contentions regarding his forgery conviction, as they were not exhausted before the BIA. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional).

We also lack jurisdiction to review Bermudez’s claims regarding the merits of his cancellation application because he failed to raise them before the BIA. *See Barron,*358 F.3d at 678.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 99.1


          Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted
            Pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Peter Wardle, the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of Protosource
Corporation (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my
knowledge:

     (1)  the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the fiscal year
          ended December 31, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the
          requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange
          Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



Dated: April 14, 2003



                                                  /s/ PETER WARDLE
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Name: Peter Wardle
                                                  Title: Chief Executive and
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

No. 69717-0-1

<=2,

^?

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

PHILLIP D. BALDWIN,

Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION *£,

FILED: APR " 7 2014

Per Curiam — Phillip Baldwin appeals his conviction for second degree rape,

arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it had a "duty to return a

verdict of guilty" if it found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

This argument is controlled by our decision in State v. Ryan P. Moore, No. 69766-8

(Wash. February 18, 2014) and the cases cited therein.

Affirmed.

FOR THE COURT:

**XcM*4.}^

&3U-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**KELVIN MONTERO,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 474 EAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 1st day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowa nce of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**

**Justices Eakin and Donohue did not participate in the deci sion of this matter.**
#### AMARR COMPANY, Appellant, v. David J. KAPPOS, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Appellee, and Wayne-Dalton Corp., Appellee.

No. 2012-1130.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 6, 2012.

Jeffrey R. McFadden, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge, Atlanta, GA, for Appellant.

Raymond T. Chen, Patent & Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for David J. Kappos, Appellee.

Ray L. Weber, Renner, Kenner, Greive, Bobak, Akron, OH, for Wayne-Dalton Corp., Appellee.

ORDER

The parties having so agreed, it is

ORDERED that the proceeding is DISMISSED under Fed. RApp. P. 42(b).
Exhibit (d)(149)

**AMENDMENT TO**

**SUB-ADVISORY AGREEMENT**

**between**

**FIDELITY INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ADVISORS**

**and**

**FIDELITY MANAGEMENT & RESEARCH COMPANY**

**and**

**FIDELITY INVESTMENT TRUST ON BEHALF OF FIDELITY EUROPE FUND**

	This Amendment made as of this 1st day of August, 2007, amends the Sub-Advisory Agreement (the "Agreement"), datedMarch 1, 2001, by and between Fidelity Management & Research Company, a Massachusetts corporation with principal offices at82 Devonshire Street, Boston, Massachusetts (hereinafter called the "Advisor"); Fidelity International Investment Advisors, aBermuda company with principal offices at Pembroke Hall, Pembroke, Bermuda (hereinafter called the "Sub-Advisor"); andFidelity Investment Trust, a Massachusetts business trust, on behalf of Fidelity Europe Fund (hereinafter called the "Portfolio").

	WHEREAS the Advisor and Sub-Advisor (the "Parties") wish to clarify their relationship by amending the Agreement inaccordance with the terms of this Amendment;

	NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties hereto agree as follows:

	1.  Paragraph 7 of the Agreement is hereby supplemented as follows:

	Nothing in this Agreement will constitute a partnership between the Advisor, the Sub-Advisor and the Trust.  Nothing inthis Agreement makes the Sub-Advisor an agent of the Advisor or the Trust and the Sub-Adviser has no authoritywhatsoever to exercise discretionary powers over the global portfolios and investment funds, except as provided pursuantto paragraph 1(b) herein, of the Advisor and the Trust, or otherwise to bind the Advisor's and the Trust's assets undermanagement.

	The Sub-Advisor shall furnish services as an independent contractor and not as an employee or agent of either the Advisoror the Trust.  The Sub-Advisor has no power or authority to act for, represent, or bind the Advisor or the Trust or anycompany affiliated with either of them.

	2.****In all other respects, the Agreement is hereby confirmed and remains in full force and effect.

	This Amendment shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts, without giving effect to the choice of laws provisions thereof.

	IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have caused this instrument to be signed in their behalf by their respectiveofficers thereunto duly authorized, and their respective seals to be hereunto affixed, all as of the date written above.
Exhibit 10.1

LOGO

June 22, 2010

Dr. Juan José Suárez Coppel

Director General

Petróleos Mexicanos

Avenida Marina Nacional No. 329

Colonia Petroleos Mexicanos,

Torre Ejecutiva,
Piso 41

11311 Mexico, D.F. Mexico

Dear Dr. Súarez Coppel:

We hereby consent to the references to Ryder Scott Company L.P. as set forth under the heading Exploration and Production
(Reserves) in the annual report on Form 20-F of Petróleos Mexicanos for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the Form 20-F) and to the filing as an exhibit to the Form 20-F our report describing our review of the estimates
of proved oil, condensate, natural gas and oil equivalent reserves owned by the United Mexican States (Mexico) as of January 1, 2010, for 276 fields located onshore in and offshore from Mexico in the Northern Region. These estimates
were prepared in accordance with the applicable reserves definitions of Rule 4-10(a) of Regulation S-X of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.



/s/ RYDER SCOTT COMPANY, L.P.RYDER SCOTT COMPANY, L.P.TBPE Firm Registration No. F-1580




|                            |  |                             |  |                    |  |                   
|--------------------------- |  | --------------------------- |  | ------------------ |  | ------------------
|1200, 530 8TH AVENUE, S.W.  |  | CALGARY, ALBERTA T2P 3S8    |  | TEL (403) 262-2799 |  | FAX (403) 262-2790
|621 17TH STREET, SUITE 1550 |  | DENVER, COLORADO 80293-1501 |  | TEL (303) 623-9147 |  | FAX (303) 623-4258
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 24.1
 
                               POWER OF ATTORNEY
 
     KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS, that the person whose signature appears
below hereby constitutes and appoints Michael J. Sangiacomo, Mark R. Lomele and
Jon D. Braslaw, and each of them, as his or her true and lawful attorney-in-fact
and agent, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for and in his or
her name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign on his or her
behalf the Norcal Waste Systems, Inc. (the "Company") Annual Report on Form 10-K
for its fiscal year ended September 30, 1996, and to execute any amendments
thereto, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and all other
documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
with the full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing
necessary or advisable to be done in connection therewith, as fully to all
intents and purposes as he or she might or could do in person, hereby ratifying
and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent, or his or her
substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.
 
DATED: December 20, 1996
 
                                          /s/        GALE R. KAUFMAN
                                          --------------------------------------
                                                     GALE R. KAUFMAN
 

                                          /s/        JOHN B. MOLINARI
                                          --------------------------------------
                                                     JOHN B. MOLINARI
 

                                          /s/        H. WELTON FLYNN
                                          --------------------------------------
                                                     H. WELTON FLYNN


                                          /s/     MICHAEL J. SANGIACOMO
                                          --------------------------------------
                                                  MICHAEL J. SANGIACOMO
 

                                          /s/         MARK R. LOMELE
                                          --------------------------------------
                                                      MARK R. LOMELE
 

                                          /s/         JON D. BRASLAW
                                          --------------------------------------
                                                      JON D. BRASLAW
```

[Federal Register: March 19, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 53)]

[Notices]

[Page 13395]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr19mr98-37]



=======================================================================

-----------------------------------------------------------------------



COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION





Sunshine Act Meeting



AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.



TIME AND DATE: 11:00 a.m., Friday, April 3, 1998.



PLACE: 1155 21st St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 9th Floor Conference Room.



STATUS: Closed.



MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Surveillance Matters.



CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Jean A. Webb, 202-418-5100.

Jean A. Webb,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 98-7214 Filed 3-16-98; 4:33 pm]

BILLING CODE 6351-01-M
```

----

**======== RETURN TO    INDEX ========**

----
# FCM Data June 2014

SELECTED FCM FINANCIAL DATA AS OF June 30,&KFF0000 &K0000002014FROM REPORTS FILED BY August 01,&KFF0000 &K0000002014	&P of &N
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6666

BANORO GARRETT,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

T. R. WOODS; M. FERRELL; SMITH; NORFOLK

SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District

Judge. (CA-01-776-2)

Submitted: June 26, 2002 Decided: July 16, 2002

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Banoro Garrett, Appellant Pro Se. Samuel Lawrence Dumville,

Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Banoro Garrett appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001) complaint. We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of

the district court, but modify the district court’s order

dismissing Garrett’s claim against Smith to reflect a dismissal

without prejudice. Garrett v. Woods, No. CA-01-776-2 (E.D. Va.

Apr. 22, 2002). We deny Garrett’s motion for a transcript at

government expense, and we dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit No. 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

      I, Bradley B. Eavenson, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Greenstar
International, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

      (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is
being prepared;

      (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

      (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

      (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: March 14, 2008

By: /s/ Bradley B. Eavenson
    -----------------------
    Bradley B. Eavenson
    Chief Executive Officer
#### Tyrone Lamar ROBERSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. A.J. PADULA, Warden; Henry McMaster, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-7328.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 14, 2006.

Decided: Dec. 20, 2006.

Tyrone Lamar Roberson, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tyrone Lamar Roberson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Roberson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50068

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DAVID ROBERT TRUJILLO, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:08-CR-1218-1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

The attorney appointed to represent David Robert Trujillo, Jr., has moved

for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Trujillo has not filed a response. Our

independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous

issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 17, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 09-50068 Document: 00511205714 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/17/2010
#### Swint, administrator, *vs.*The Central Railroad *et al.*

The presiding judge being dissatisfied with the verdict, and having granted a first new trial, one among many grounds of the motion being that the verdict was contrary to law and evidence, this court will not control his discretion in so doing; nor will it closely scan any views of the law expressed by the judge in granting the new trial, the presumption being that, on the second hearing, he will correct his own errors, if any.

Judgment affirmed.

January 26, 1886.

Jackson, Chief Justice
#### Ventje NELWAN, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-70489.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 26, 2008 *.

Filed Sept. 8, 2008.

Kaaren L. Barr, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Mary Jane Candaux, Carol Federighi, Esq., Senior Litigation Counsel, Kurt B. Larson, OIL, Julie Pfluger, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, WWS-District Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of the District Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

*600Before: SCHROEDER, KLEINFELD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ventje Nelwan, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we review for substantial evidence, *Lolong v. Gonzales,*484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial record evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Nelwan did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. *See Lolong,*484 F.3d at 1181 (requiring some evidence of unique risk of persecution distinct from mere membership in disfavored group). Accordingly, Nelwan is not eligible for asylum.

Because Nelwan cannot meet his burden to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, he necessarily fails to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Mansour v. Ashcroft,*390 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir.2004). Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Nelwan did not establish it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if returned to Indonesia, and we uphold the denial of relief under the CAT. *See Malhi v. INS,*336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.2003).

Lastly, Nelwan waived his cancellation of removal claim by failing to address it in his opening brief. *See Chebchoub v. INS,*257 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.2001).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.