alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 32

                   CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

         Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of STRATTEC
SECURITY CORPORATION (the "Company") certifies that the Annual Report on Form
10-K of the Company for the period ended June 29, 2003 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
information contained in that report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: August 19, 2003                    /s/ Harold M. Stratton II
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         Harold M. Stratton II,
                                         Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Date: August 19, 2003                    /s/ Patrick J. Hansen
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         Patrick J. Hansen,
                                         Chief Financial Officer
#### Manuel Serjio Banuelos AMAYA, Petitioner-Appellant v. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-20749

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 22, 2010.

Manuel Serjio Banuelos Amaya, Fort Stockton, TX, pro se.

*420Samuel Glenn Longoria, Howard E. Rose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Manuel Serjio Banuelos Amaya appeals the denial of his motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) that challenges a removal order. Amaya also seeks a stay of deportation and a writ of mandamus.

The district court construed Amaya’s motion as seeking relief from its judgment dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute, and denied the motion as untimely. Though styled as a motion seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Amaya sought relief from the removal order, not the district court’s judgment. Therefore, his motion was in substance an attack on the removal order.

A district court lacks jurisdiction over a pleading attacking a removal order. *Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement,*426 F.3d 733, 735-36 (5th Cir.2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). We will not entertain Amaya’s repetitive Rule 60(b) motion. *Cf. United States v. Early,*27 F.3d 140, 142 (5th Cir.1994); *Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,*987 F.2d 1199, 1203-04 (5th Cir.1993).

Amaya’s motion for a stay of deportation is also denied. “[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals ... [is] the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.... ” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Although we have authority to stay a removal order pending consideration of a petition for review of a removal order, *see Nken v. Holder,*— U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1756-57, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009), Amaya has not filed a petition for review with this court.

Because the district court lacks jurisdiction to provide the relief Amaya seeks, his petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. *See Jones v. Alexander,*609 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.1980).

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION DENIED; MANDAMUS PETITION DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 32

Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Herbert L. Hornsby, Jr., Chief Executive Officer and President of Cape Bancorp, Inc., (the
Company) and Robert J. Boyer, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each certify in his capacity as an officer of the Company that he has reviewed the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
March 31, 2008 (the Report) and that to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |                                                      |  | 
|------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|Date: May 15, 2008 |  | /s/ Herbert L. Hornsby, Jr.                          |  | 
|                   |  | Herbert L. Hornsby, Jr.                              |  | 
|                   |  | President and Chief Executive Officer                |  | 
|                   |  |                                                     
|Date: May 15, 2008 |  | /s/ Robert J. Boyer                                  |  | 
|                   |  | Robert J. Boyer                                      |  | 
|                   |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |  | 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will
be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

#### Kathleen Dolan v. James Daniel Dyer and Tamara Dyer Anonymous Mother v. Diocese of Arlington and Principal Jane Doe

Case No. CL010763

Case No. CL010340

June 17, 2002

By Judge John E. Kloch

This matter came upon the defendants’ demurrer to Count II for lack of personal jurisdiction. After considering the legal memoranda and arguments of counsel, I am of the opinion that the defendants have made a general appearance in this case and have waived any objection to personal jurisdiction.

The plea in bar and demurrer were both filed on January 31, 2002. A hearing on these matters was noticed for March 13, 2002, and then rescheduled with the agreement of both parties. In the meantime, counsel for the plaintiff brought a motion to consolidate. On March 14, 2002, Judge Swersky entered an order granting the plaintiffs motion. This order noted that it was rendered after consideration of the arguments of counsel and was signed by counsel for the defendants’ as “seen and objected to.” The defendants’ did not argue their demurrer until March 27, 2002.

*651This case turns on whether the defendants’ appearance has been general or special. “Any action on the part of the defendant, except to object to the jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in court, will amount to a general appearance.” *Brown*v. *Burch,*30 Va. App. 670, 677 (1999) *(citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clintwood Bank, Inc.,*155 Va. 181, 186 (1930)); *see also*Bryson, *Virginia Civil Procedure,*p. 141 (3d ed. 1997) (“A general appearance ... is made by taking any step that implies submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Since public policy favors the settlement of disputes by litigation rather than by self help force, the courts are quick to find appearances.”).

I am of the opinion that by appearing before this court and arguing against the motion to consolidate, the defendants have entered a general appearance and have waived objection to personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the demurrer to Count II is overruled. For the reason that plaintiff has conceded that the allegations contained in Court I are time barred, the Plea in Bar is granted.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James E. LAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-1443.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 17, 2012.

James R. Allison, James C. Murphy, Office of The United States Attorney, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

*819Barry A. Schwartz, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

JOHN C. PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge.

James E. Laughlin challenges the sixteen-month sentence he received for violating the terms and conditions of his federal supervised release, claiming that the within-guidelines sentence imposed by the district court is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we summarily affirm.

First, Mr. Laughlin argues that the district court committed procedural errors by (1) improperly considering three sentencing factors that Congress expressly omitted from the supervised release sentencing statute, and (2) inadequately considering a sentencing factor it was required to consider when imposing a sentence for a violation of supervised release. However, we agree with the government that the district court considered appropriate sentencing factors when it determined Mr. Laugh-lin’s sentence. *See*Aplee. Br. at 10-14. We further agree with the government that Mr. Laughlin has not even come close to satisfying the controlling plain error standard of review as it relates to his procedural challenges to his sentence. *Id.*at 8-10,15-16.

Second, Mr. Laughlin claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court improperly weighed the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(e). But we agree with the government that Mr. Laughlin has not rebutted the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence is reasonable. *See*Aplee. Br. at 18-20. Indeed, as the government has pointed out, in his opening brief, “Mr. Laughlin advance[d] no discernable facts or legal authority supporting his assertion that the district court mis-weighed the sentencing factors.” *Id.*at 19; *see also*Aplt. Opening Br. at 21-22.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-40824

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Jesus Valdez,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:16-CR-800-1

______________________________

Before Jones, Smith, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jesus Valdez was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 

262 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. He appeals 

the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release.

Valdez maintains that (1) his medical records showed an extraordinary 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 8, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-40824 Document: 00516779427 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2023
No. 22-40824

2

and compelling reason for compassionate release; (2) even if he were to file a 

civil-rights lawsuit alleging that he was not receiving adequate medical care 

in prison, that would not resolve his current situation; (3) the district court 

abused its power by sending a United States Marshal to his mother’s house 

several times while it considered his compassionate-release motion; and 

(4) the sentencing factors should be considered specifically in the context of 

a compassionate-release motion.

We review the denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). A district court 

may modify a sentence, after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors, if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” 

and “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements.” 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Although not dispositive, the commentary to U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13 “informs our analysis as to what reasons may be sufficiently ‘extraordinary and compelling’ to merit compassionate release.” United States v.

Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Valdez’s health conditions were not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to 

reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See Chambliss, 948 F.3d

at 693–94. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in determining that the relevant § 3553(a) factors militated against a reduction based on Valdez’s criminal history and the danger he posed to the public. See id. at 693.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 22-40824 Document: 00516779427 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/08/2023
# C o urt o f A ppe a ls

o f th e S ta te o f G e o rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 4 A1 66 0 . J OSEPH KARANJ A v . DORENE KARANJ A.

A f ter t he trial co u rt granted D o rene K aranj a’ s p etitio n f or a 1 2- mo nth

p ro tec tiv e ord e r u nd er the Family V io lenc e A ct, OCGA § 1 9

- 1 3- 1 et seq. , resp o nd ent J o sep h K aranj a f

iled this d irec t ap p eal. W e lac k j u risd ic tio n.
A p p eals o f ord ers in d o mestic relatio ns c ases — inc lu d ing ac tio ns arising u nd er the Family V io lenc e A c t — m u st be initiated by f iling an ap plic atio n f

or d isc retio nary

rev iew

. See OCGA § 5- 6- 35 (a) (2), (b); S chmi dt v

. S chmi

dt , 27 0 G a. 46 1 , 46 1

- 46 2 (1 ) (51 0 SE2d 81 0) (1 99 9), d isap pro v ed in part o n o ther gro u nd s by Gi lli a m v

. S ta te , 31 2
Ga. 6 0, 6 4 (86 0 S E2d 543) (2021 ). “ Co mp lianc e w ith the disc r etio nary ap p eals

p ro c ed ure is j u risd ic tio nal. ” S mo a k v

. D e p t

. o f Hu ma n Res o u rces , 221 Ga. Ap p

. 257 , 257 (47 1 SE2d 6 0 ) (1 9 9 6 )

. J o sep h’ s f ailu re to f o llo w t he requ ired ap p ellate p r o c ed u re d ep riv es u s o f j u risd ic t io n o v e r this d irec t ap p eal, w hic h is hereby D I SM I SSED

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a ls o f t h e S t a t e o f G e o r g ia
C le r k ’ s O ffic e , A t la n t a ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t ify t h a t t h e a b o v e is a t

r u e e x t r a c t fr o m

t h e m in u t e s o f t h e C o u r t o f A pp e a ls o f G e o r g ia

. W it n e s s m y s ig n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o f s a id c o u r t h e r e t o a ffix e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r la s t a b o v e w r

it t e n

.

, C le r

k

. June 24, 2024

06/24/2024
No. —, original.

#### Ex parte Rubin.

November 25, 1935.

*Mr. Lloyd Rubin, pro se.*

The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
CH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0517

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

SHANE CLARK JOHNSON, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to

and including December 14, 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve the 

State’s response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 7 2023

11/07/2023

Case Number: DA 21-0517
Exhibit 32




Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002




Kay M. Hoveland, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Dustin Luton, Chief Financial Officer, of Kaiser Federal Financial Group, Inc. (Company) each certify in her/his capacity as an officer of the Company that she/he has reviewed the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 (Report) and that to the best of her/his knowledge:




1.
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




The purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.




By:
/s/ Kay M. HovelandKay M. HovelandPresident and Chief Executive OfficerBy:
/s/ Dustin LutonDustin LutonChief Financial Officer




Date:  July 29, 2010
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

RONALD E. TERRY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-2626

[November 21, 2018]

Appeal of order denying 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the 

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John S. Kastrenakes, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 501990CF013336AXXXMB.

Ronald E. Terry, Milton, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

TAYLOR, DAMOORGIAN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 100.

#### Pflueger et al. *v.*Sherman et al.

October 14, 1935.

*Messrs. John Francis Neylan*and *Bartley C. Crum*for petitioners.

*Messrs. Alfred Sutro, W. II. Lawrence, Eugene M. Prince,*and *W. L. Stanley*for respondents.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Exhibit
10.62





Ngoc Anh
Ung


anh@dotvn.com




November
1, 2006





Mr.
Thomas Johnson


Chief
Executive Officer


Dot VN,
Inc.


9449
Balboa Avenue, Suite 114


San
Diego, CA 92123




RE:
FORMATION OF IT.VN AND ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS





To the
Board of Directors of Dot VN, Inc:




At the behest of the Board of Directors
(the “Board”) of Dot VN, Inc. (“Dot VN” or the “Company”), I have agreed to
serve as a founder and officer of a domestic Vietnamese company named IT.VN,
JSC. (“IT.VN”) in order to facilitate the Company’s business plans in the
Country of Vietnam.  As a holder (a “Holder”) of common stock, of
IT.VN, a company formed under the authority of the City of Hanoi, and consistent
with the requirements of my fiduciary duties as an employee of Dot VN, for good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are
acknowledged, the undersigned agrees to irrevocably assign all right, title and
interest in IT.VN to Dot VN.




In accordance with the terms and
conditions hereof, the undersigned agrees to represent the Company in the
management and operation of IT.VN, subject to the direction of the Board, until
the earlier of her resignation, termination or replacement.




The undersigned hereby represents and
warrants that the undersigned has full power and authority to enter into the
agreement set forth herein, and that, upon request, the undersigned will execute
any additional documents necessary in connection with enforcement
hereof.




Page |
1


Exhibit
10.62





This letter agreement shall be governed
by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware without
giving effect to its conflicts of laws principles.




This letter agreement may be executed
in any number of counterparts and by different parties hereto in separate
counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed to be
an original and all of which counterparts taken together shall constitute but
one and the same instrument.  This letter agreement may be executed by
facsimile signatures.




Very
      truly yours,/s/
                    Ngoc Anh UngName:
                    Ngoc
      Anh Ung





Accepted,
Acknowledged and Agreed to by:





Dot VN,
Inc.





By:
                /s/ Thomas JohnsonName:
                Thomas
      JohnsonTitle:
                Chief
      Executive Officer and
Director




Page |
2
```

[Federal Register: March 3, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 41)]
[Notices]
[Page 10365]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr03mr98-47]


[[Page 10365]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

TIME AND DATE: 11:00 a.m., Friday, March 27, 1998.

PLACE: 1155 21st St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 9th Floor Conference Room.

STATUS: Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Surveillance Matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Jean A. Webb, 202-418-5100.
Jean A. Webb,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 98-5624 Filed 2-27-98; 3:45 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-M
```

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**======== RETURN TO    INDEX ========**

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#### Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Ltd., Appellant, v GML Tower LLC, et al., Defendants, and The Pike Company, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Submitted December 12, 2011;

decided February 9, 2012

Reported below, 83 AD3d 1563.

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that *893the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.