[Cite as Littleton v. Littleton, 2019-Ohio-2309.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LISA LITTLETON : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

ROY A. LITTLETON : Case No. 18-CA-29 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County 

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division, Case No. 14 DR 

2011 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 10, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

BRIAN C. BURRIER ALAN P. FRIEDMAN 

Gerrity and Burrier, Ltd. 7110 E. Livingston Avenue 

400 South Fifth Street, Suite 302 Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

 KATHRYN R. GUGLE 

 1900 Polaris Pkwy, Suite 450 

 Columbus, Ohio 43240 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Roy A. Littleton appeals the decision of the Fairfield County Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, imputing income to him in the amount of 

$21,000.00 annually, awarding him $6000.00 per month in spousal support and refusing 

to include Appellee’s reimbursed expenses in her income for purposes of calculating 

spousal support. Appellee is Lisa Littleton. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE 

{¶2} The parties were married in 1991 and, after 22 years of marriage, 

determined that they were incompatible. The basis for the divorce was uncontested, and 

the division of property was successfully completed. The Appellant was unsatisfied with 

the Court’s award of $6000.00 per month for spousal support, citing his inability to work 

and Appellee’s high income as the basis for his argument that he was entitled to 

$13,000.00 per month. Appellant argued the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 

to include reimbursed expenses in Appellee’s income and that it did not consider all of 

the circumstances when arriving at the figure of $6000.00 per month, but the most hotly 

contested issue in this case was Appellant’s employability. 

{¶3} Appellant and Appellee married in 1991 and never had children. Appellant 

worked only minimally outside the home while Appellee attended school and received a 

degree. Appellee’s career went very well, and though she works only on contract, her 

average salary for the five years prior to the divorce was nearly $200,000.00. While it is 

not clear from the record when the parties made the decision, it is clear that they agreed 

that Appellant would remain home while Appellee continued to build her reputation and 

career. Appellant admitted he and Appellee mutually agreed he would not work so they 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 3 

could travel freely without any concern about accommodating his work schedule. 

Appellant accepted responsibility of keeping the family home in order and successfully 

completed most household tasks. 

{¶4} This arrangement worked well for several years. They traveled extensively 

and achieved their goal of visiting all fifty states. They traveled to the United Kingdom 

and the Bahamas and enjoyed cruises together. Appellant began distilling alcohol 

(moonshine) as a hobby and attempted to start businesses that ultimately were not 

successful. Even after it appeared the marriage was deteriorating, Appellant continued 

to travel, completing motorcycle trips to Myrtle Beach and across a large part of the 

country. Appellant also continued to drive to Kentucky on a monthly basis to care for his 

Uncle. 

{¶5} Appellee worked as an information technology specialist in the healthcare 

industry, assisting health care facilities with the installation of new and updated systems. 

She worked with the client to install the system and spent a great deal of time and effort 

when the software was placed into active use or “went live” as Appellee described. 

Appellee’s employment required that she travel out of state and remain for several days 

during the week. She would stay in a hotel or apartment at the site during the week and 

spend her weekends at home, returning to the job site every week until the work was 

complete. Appellee incurred expenses for lodging, food, fuel and other necessities while 

completing her contract. Subject to the limitations of the contract, she would submit the 

expenses to her employer and would be reimbursed. 

{¶6} Appellee was employed on a contract basis, but was not self-employed, and 

she would experience periods of unemployment, some as long as ten weeks between 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 4 

contracts. She set aside a portion of her income to provide for those periods of 

unemployment, so the couple did not suffer from her lack of employment. She had been 

fortunate in the years immediately prior to the divorce as her income was relatively steady 

and not negatively affected by the uncertainty regarding her contracts. 

{¶7} Appellant’s grandmother passed away in 1992, and Appellant suffered 

emotionally. Jewell Littleton, his mother, described his symptoms as anxiety that 

prevented him from doing anything. He sought treatment and was diagnosed as suffering 

from depression by Dr. Kasour. He did not continue to see Dr. Kasour or any other mental 

health professional for his emotional trouble, but did receive medication for depression 

from a general practitioner, Christopher Nickison, M.D. 

{¶8} Though diagnosed with depression, the record indicates that Appellant was 

coping with his mental illness from the date of the initial illness to the fracturing of the 

marriage. He was a part of at least two business ventures, distilled moonshine and 

traveled extensively, both with and without Appellee, and kept the home in order. 

Appellant did experience a number of medical problems in the years prior to the divorce 

and he continues to treat for those issues, but the record does not reflect that the 

problems rendered him a housebound invalid. 

{¶9} Appellant became concerned about what he perceived as a strain in his 

relationship with Appellee, leading him to search through Appellees email and discover, 

in January 2014, emails that he interpreted as evidence that Appellee was unfaithful. 

Appellee was in Florida at a job site at the time, so Appellant confronted her by telephone. 

He contends she admitted the affair, but Appellee denied any wrongdoing. Appellant did 

concede that he expressed his anger by destroying Appellee’s property, purportedly 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 5 

during the phone call. He broke all of the coffee mugs they had collected in their travels 

through the United States. He tossed into the trash a trunk that belonged to Appellee’s 

ancestors and traveled with them from Germany to the United States. The trunk contained 

quilts made by Appellee and her grandmother. He defaced an antique sewing chest and 

destroyed Appellee’s handmade Christmas ornaments. He destroyed handmade 

bookshelves, photographs and old books Appellee had collected, and put his foot through 

a wide screen television, purportedly while berating the Appellee over the phone. He 

disposed of winter coats, boots and broke a watch Appellee had received as a gift from 

her employer. Appellant’s claimed physical and emotional disabilities did not restrict this 

violent outburst. 

{¶10} The medical records submitted to the trial court disclose a change in 

Appellant’s emotional state concurrent with the crumbling of the relationship between the 

parties. In December 2013, Appellant’s family physician, Christopher Nickison, M.D. 

noted that Appellant’s depression was chronic, but stable. Some of the records prior to 

December 2013 refer to depression, but none describe it as severe or disabling. 

{¶11} After the outburst of January 2014, Dr. Nickison’s records reflect an 

increasing problem with depression. In March 2014, Appellant reported that his 

depression was worse after discovering that Appellee was “having an affair.” During a 

visit on May 1, 2014 Appellant reported that the depression had been getting worse since 

mid-January, the date of the discovery of the alleged affair, and that his marriage was not 

doing well. He refused a psychiatric referral at that time, but circumstances changed at 

the next visit. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 6 

{¶12} Appellee filed a complaint for divorce on May 29, 2014. It was served upon 

Appellant on June 2, 2014. On June 5, 2014 Appellant visited Dr. Nickison and 

complained of worsening depression. He complained of trouble sleeping, not being able 

to stay alone, feeling fearful and having trouble answering the phone. He disclosed that 

Appellee had filed for divorce and he was having a difficult time. Dr. Nickison 

recommended a psychiatric admission but Appellant rejected that recommendation. He 

was referred for psychological evaluation, and, on June 13, 2014 Appellant began treating 

with a psychiatrist, Angline Stergiou, M.D. 

{¶13} His first visit with Dr. Stergiou occurred shortly after the divorce complaint 

was served upon Appellant and his emotional state was affected. He claimed to have 

problems with motivation and was unable to function. He reported that he had lost fifty 

pounds in the last few months, but Dr. Nickison’s records show a loss of only thirty pounds 

since December 2013. He retained counsel and had his first consult with his attorney on 

June 17, 2014. At his next visit with Dr. Stergiou, ten days later, he reported that he was 

doing better and he had faith in his attorneys. Dr. Stergiou did note that he had improved. 

On October 16, 2014, just thirteen days after Appellee’s deposition, Appellant reported to 

Dr. Stergiou that he was sleeping better and anxiety was less. He was appropriately 

processing things and was seen as stable by Dr. Stergiou. 

{¶14} Appellant’s condition took a turn for the worse after his deposition on 

December 13, 2014. On December 22, 2104, he reported to Dr. Stergiou that he had 

problems with mood, depression and motivation as well as concentration. He complained 

that his concentration was so impaired that he was unable to focus on driving to a 

particular destination. He canceled a cardiac procedure because he just could not get out 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 7 

of bed. During the next visit, on April 30, 2015, his mood was better and he was calmer. 

His depression was viewed as stable and, coincidentally, he had spent a long period of 

time with his trial counsel prior to this visit. 

{¶15} The remaining three visits with Dr. Stergiou note continued depression and, 

on two of those visits, the source of the stress and depression was the impending divorce 

hearing. 

{¶16} Dr. Stergiou records and testimony did not reflect testing for vocational 

ability, and her experience does not include evaluation patients for employability. She did 

provide an opinion that Appellant was rendered unemployable due to his psychological 

symptoms. 

{¶17} Dr. David Lowenstein served as plaintiff’s expert, completed a 

psychological evaluation of Appellant, and concluded that he could earn a minimal income 

despite his medical and emotional diagnoses: 

It is this examiner's professional opinion that Andy has gotten used 

to enjoying the life of being unemployed and a stay-at-home husband with 

many freedoms and few responsibilities, but now that his source of income 

has changed with Lisa requesting a divorce, he is frightened about what he 

can do next. Instead of having these fears and concerns that seemed to 

have over-exaggerated his mental health problems, he should be able to 

now focus on what he can do to maintain his life and become more 

independent and stable. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 8 

{¶18} Appellant offered the opinion of Dr. David Tannenbaum, and though he was 

very critical of Dr. Lowenstein’s methodology and interpretation of the data, he made it 

clear that he did not examine Appellant. “The work is limited to critiquing [David 

Lowenstein’s] report, not to evaluating [Appellant].” Dr. Tannenbaum was very critical of 

Dr. Lowenstein’s work, suggesting that the work was an example of plagiarism and was 

unethical, but as noted above, he was not retained to provide a psychological evaluation 

of Appellant. He refused to do so, and when asked if Appellant was unable to do any 

type of work he responded: 

Q. Is it your testimony he's unable to do any type of work? 

A: I can't testify to that. I can critique a report. I can certainly respond to the 

Court's inquiry do I agree. But I don't know that Andy can or can't do any 

kind of work. That can't be my testimony based upon not having evaluated 

him and having not evaluated him for that purpose. 

{¶19} Nevertheless, he did have an opinion regarding whether Appellant was 

employable: ‘I'm not trying to be facetious, but the only way that anyone will know if Andy 

is employable is if Andy attempts to be employed, and then he does or doesn't make it, 

so to speak. There's no way they can know that.” 

{¶20} The only expert retained to offer an opinion regarding Appellant’s ability to 

earn an income was Richard P. Oestreich, PhD, CRC. Dr. Oestreich is a vocational 

consultant and certified rehabilitation counselor. The parties agreed that his report would 

be admissible without his testimony. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 9 

{¶21} Dr. Oestreich reviewed Appellant’s lifestyle and activities and concluded 

that despite his complaint about being unable to do anything he had an active lifestyle, 

drove to the exam and participated for an hour with no apparent discomfort. 

Coincidentally, Dr. Lowenstein made a similar observation noting that Appellant was able 

to complete a four or five hour session of interviewing and testing with no apparent 

problem. Appellant notes that Dr. Ostreich describes his medical and psychological 

complaints and states “[w]hether any of this prohibits work is for medical professionals to 

decide” but he concluded that he “has not seen anything concretely documented that 

precludes work of at least a sedentary nature.” 

{¶22} Dr. Oestreich decided that Appellant was capable of finding employment 

that would permit him to earn approximately $21,000.00 per year, and recommended a 

six month period to transition from being an unemployed person. 

{¶23} The record does provide clear evidence that Appellant suffers physical an 

emotional disabilities, but the evidence is conflicting regarding the impact on Appellant’s 

daily activities. His current psychiatrist and family physician contend he is unemployable 

due to restrictions imposed by his illnesses, yet he is clearly able to travel great distances, 

for extended periods of time, and care for a relative who lives in Kentucky on a monthly 

basis. He went on a fishing trip with his father and traveled to Georgia to watch spring 

training. He completed long distance trips on a motorcycle and though his medical 

providers contend that driving a motorcycle is an automatic process not indicative of any 

ability to be employed, Appellant viewed it as a serious challenge to his abilities that he 

successfully overcame. Prior to the divorce, but during his illness, he started businesses, 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 10 

traveled, distilled alcohol, served as a leader for girl scouts, and, at least for a period of 

time, completed housekeeping chores. 

{¶24} The trial of this matter took place on four days and upon completion, the 

magistrate concluded that Appellant was employable and imputed an income of 

$21,000.00 to Appellant. The magistrate refused to include reimbursed business 

expenses in Appellee’s income and awarded spousal support in the amount of $6,000.00 

per month to Appellant. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and the 

objections were overruled. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and submitted three 

assignments of error: 

{¶25} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPUTING 

INCOME IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,000.00 A YEAR FROM A FULL-TIME JOB TO 

APPELLANT DESPITE APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT DISABILITIES.” 

{¶26} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 

ATTRIBUTE NON-TAXABLE INCOME TO APPELLEE THAT SIGNIFICANTLY 

LOWERED APPELLEE'S LIVING EXPENSES.” 

{¶27} “III. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT IN THE 

AMOUNT OF $6,000.00 PER MONTH TO APPELLANT WAS ARBITRARY, 

UNREASONABLE AND INAPPROPRIATE.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶28} Appellant’s assignments of error focus upon the income of the parties and 

the calculation of spousal support, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in 

three separate ways resulting in an incorrect calculation of $6,000.00 per month 

indefinitely. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 11 

A trial court's decision concerning spousal support may only be 

altered if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 

Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990). An abuse of discretion connotes 

more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore, supra. 

Furthermore, as an appellate court, we are not the trier of fact. Our role is 

to determine whether there is relevant, competent, and credible evidence 

upon which the factfinder could base his or her judgment. Tennant v. 

Martin–Auer, 188 Ohio App.3d 768, 936 N.E.2d 1013, 2010–Ohio–3489, ¶ 

16, citing Cross Truck v. Jeffries, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA–5758, 1982 WL 

2911. 

Washek v. Washek, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 18 CA 22, 2019-Ohio-1504, ¶ 40. 

ANALYSIS 

{¶29} Appellant addresses the bulk of his argument to his contention in the first 

assignment of error that he is unemployable and any finding to the contrary is an abuse 

of discretion. He relies upon the statements of his psychiatrist, Angline Stergiou, M.D. 

and his family physician, Christopher Nickison, M.D. both of whom did state their belief 

that he was not employable. And he minimizes the contrary testimony of the vocational 

expert, Dr. Oestreich and the psychologist, David Lowenstein by arguing that Dr. 

Oestreich deferred to the medical experts and that Dr. Lowenstein’ s report was found 

unreliable by Dr. Tennant. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 12 

{¶30} The testimony and exhibits submitted at the trial were not consistent with 

the opinions of Appellant’s medical experts. Dr. Stergiou and Dr. Nickison’s conclude 

Appellant is not employable or totally disabled, yet he is capable of driving himself to 

Kentucky on a monthly basis to care for his uncle. He and Appellee traveled extensively 

prior to their separation and Appellant continued to travel after the break-down of the 

relationship. He went on a fishing trip with his father, traveled to spring training and rode 

a motorcycle to Myrtle Beach with a passenger. He took a lengthy cross country trip on 

a motorcycle consisting of hundreds of miles. Before the last day of the trial Appellant 

took a motorcycle trip to Wisconsin with a passenger on the motorcycle for the entire trip. 

Appellant’s experts contended that operating a motorcycle requires very little focus as it 

is an automatic response, but Appellant’s own testimony contradicts that conclusion. He 

had not ridden his motorcycle for two and one half years prior to this trip. He “put 

everything in motion that [he] could” and admitted “it was quite a challenge for me to 

mount all this.” He was so concerned that the trip was too difficult that he took the title to 

the motorcycle with him in the event he was forced to sell the motorcycle and buy a plane 

ticket to return. While Appellee did assist with making reservations for hotels, Appellant 

was still apprehensive about the challenge and yet he succeeded in covering an average 

of four-hundred seventy miles per day during eighteen days of riding. Appellant recorded 

this achievement is his diary and obviously believed it was a significant achievement. We 

cannot fault the trial court for coming to the same conclusion. 

{¶31} Appellant and his experts rely heavily on Appellant’s psychological disability 

to support their contention he is unemployable. The primary support for the experts’ 

conclusion is the information provided by Appellant. Neither Dr. Stergiou nor Dr. Nickison 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 13 

describe any objective test that was administered to arrive at a diagnosis, but both rely 

upon the veracity, accuracy and insight of the Appellant and his ability to provide an 

accurate measure of his abilities. While Dr. Stergiou does not feel that the Appellant is 

malingering, he does have an incentive at this juncture to focus on his disabilities. The 

fact that he completed the cross-country motorcycle trip after concluding that he would 

likely not be able to finish it gave the trial court grounds to suspect that Appellant did not 

have an accurate perception of his capabilities. This incident of self-doubt is consistent 

with Dr. Lowenstein’s conclusion that Appellant’s view of his abilities and disabilities are 

inaccurate and that his current state of mind may be more closely related to the upheaval 

that he is experiencing as a result of the divorce proceedings. 

{¶32} Both Dr. Stergiou and Dr. Nickison conclude that Appellant’s emotional 

state renders him unemployable, but neither provide a clear explanation for the apparent 

inconsistency between that conclusion and what Dr. Stergiou describes as an “active 

lifestyle.” The Appellant’s experts suggest that operating a motorcycle can be an 

automatic activity requiring little focus or concentration, but that conclusion is refuted by 

Appellant’s own concern about his ability to complete the trip and common experience. 

Operating any vehicle for long periods of time, as much as seven hundred miles in a day 

requires the driver to remain aware of the road conditions, speed, weather and others on 

the road. A motorcycle rider is taxed further by exposure to the elements and the 

requirement of maintaining balance. While short trips may be simple, an argument that 

travel of hundreds of miles in one day does not require stamina and concentration defies 

common sense. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 14 

{¶33} Neither of Appellant’s experts claim to be experienced in vocational 

rehabilitation, another point that can be viewed as undermining their determination the 

Appellant is unemployable. Dr. Nickison conceded that he had not investigated 

employment opportunities for Appellant and that it was possible that vocational expert 

could find a job for him, and that people with Appellant’s ailments can work, undermining 

his conclusion that Appellant would not be able to hold a job. Dr. Stergiou also 

acknowledged that persons with Appellant’s diagnosis can work and function at a high 

level. The only vocational expert, Dr. Oestreich, concluded that Appellant is employable 

in a minimum wage position. And while Appellant’s expert, Dr. Tannenbaum was not 

retained to express an opinion regarding Appellant’s ability to hold a job, he suggested 

that we will not know if he can be employed until he attempts to be employed. While Dr. 

Oestreich may disagree with that conclusion, that comment weakens the opinions of Dr. 

Stergiou and Dr. Nickison that Appellant is unable to be employed in any context. 

{¶34} Appellant’s failure to seek employment prior to trial, during the two years 

this matter was pending, indirectly lends support to a conclusion that he is employable. 

Dr. Lowenstein notes that Appellant has grown accustom to life without financial 

responsibilities and Dr. Oestreich, after challenging Appellant for an explanation for his 

inability to find employment, concluded that he “had not seen anything concretely 

documented that precludes work of at least a sedentary nature.” He also noted that 

Appellant’s reported symptoms were inconsistent with his reported activities, suggesting 

that Appellant is more capable that he would like to admit. His failure to seek employment 

of any nature, or attempt to obtain a vocational evaluation from the Bureau of Vocational 

Rehabilitation as suggested by Dr. Lowenstein, between the date of the filing of the 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 15 

divorce on May 29, 2014 and December 22, 2016, the last day of trial lends further support 

to Dr. Lowenstein’s conclusion that it is not a physical or emotional disability that prevents 

him from being employed, but the sudden realization that he must become more selfsufficient. 

{¶35} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by imputing an income of $21,000.00 to Appellant as there is sufficient relevant, 

competent, credible evidence to support such a conclusion. The first assignment of error 

is denied. 

{¶36} Appellant invests only a small portion of his argument on the second and 

third assignment of error, perhaps in recognition of their lesser significance in comparison 

with the first assignment. He offers no legal authority for either assertion, which suggests 

that the trial court’s conclusion was not erroneous, but only objectionable to Appellant. 

{¶37} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred 

by failing to include reimbursed business expenses in the Appellee’s gross income. First, 

we note that Appellant did not bring this specific objection to the attention of the trial court 

in his objections to the magistrate’s decision. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53, objections to a 

magistrate's decision must be specific. Stephens v. Bertin, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2006 CA 

00052, 2006-Ohio-6401, ¶ 25. Appellant did reference the expense reimbursements in 

paragraph 10 of his objections, but includes no assertion that the magistrate erred by 

failing to include those expenses in Appellant’s income. For that reason, this assignment 

of error is not properly before us. However, because Appellant does reference the 

reimbursed expenses in his objections, describing them as income, we believe it 

appropriate to consider the merits in the interest of justice. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 16 

{¶38} Appellant asserts that the reimbursed expenses should be included as 

income because they reduce Appellee’s living expenses, but he cites to no precedent or 

statute that supports his contention, leading this Court to conclude that no such support 

exists. Reimbursed business expenses can be included in “self-generated income” but 

only in the context of a determination of child support when it is demonstrated that 

Appellee received income from “self-employment, proprietorship of a business, joint 

ownership of a partnership or closely held corporation, and rents minus ordinary and 

necessary expenses incurred by the parent in generating the gross receipts.” R.C. 

3109.01(B)(19). The Appellee was described as an employee in the record and the issue 

is spousal, not child support, so this section is inapplicable. 

{¶39} The reimbursed expenses received by Appellee are not labeled income by 

the Ohio Revised Code, any relevant precedent or any tax authority. The Magistrate 

considered this issue and concluded: 

92. Plaintiff/Wife resides in Florida. Her current consulting assignment is in 

California. She travels back and forth most weeks. She pays for 

transportation including airfare, lodging, meals, fuel, and car rental out of 

pocket and is reimbursed within certain parameters by the client. She keeps 

these reimbursement funds separate from her earnings, and uses a 

separate credit card to pay her business expenses. 

93. Defendant/Husband argues that these reimbursements should be 

included in Plaintiff/Wife's income. It is not income, but rather 

reimbursement for expenses, and therefore not included in her income. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 17 

 

{¶40} These payments are distinct from the fringe benefits described in Merkel v. 

Merkel, 51 Ohio App.3d 110, 112, 554 N.E.2d 1346 (1988) or Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio 

St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d 144 (2013) where the courts found no distinction 

between providing what it described as a fringe benefit and the money to purchase the 

same. In Morrow the Appellant did not have his own vehicle or cell phone and relied upon 

the automobile and phone provided by his employer for personal use. If it had not been 

provided by the employer, Appellant would be compelled to make the expenditure for his 

own use. Id. at ¶ 15. In Merkel, housing was provided free of charge and appellant therein 

did not provide his own housing. In the case at bar, Appellee is reimbursed for business 

related expenses incurred as a result of her employment, only if she submits a request, 

subject to parameters established by the employer. The fringe benefits in Morrow and 

Merkel were provided by the employer without any obligation by the employee to 

document the expense or file a request and are distinctly different from the expense 

reimbursements Appellee received. 

{¶41} For those reasons we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing 

to include them in Appellee’s income and deny Appellant’s second assignment of error 

{¶42} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred in 

awarding only $6000.00 per month spousal support for an indefinite period, first repeating 

his contention that he is unemployable, that the Magistrate failed to consider portions of 

R.C. 3105.18 and because the rational for the calculation is not described in the trial 

court’s findings. He also contends the Magistrate overlooked the debt service of $1579 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 18 

per month combined with the monthly expenses of $5953.00 per month as well as the 

need to obtain health insurance. 

{¶43} We have often reiterated that while R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), does contain 

fourteen factors the trial court must consider, if the court does not specifically address 

each factor in its order, a reviewing court will presume each factor was considered, absent 

evidence to the contrary. Carroll v. Carroll, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2004–CAF–05035, 

2004–Ohio–6710, ¶ 28, quoting Watkins v. Watkins, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT 2001–

0066, 2002–Ohio–4237, ¶ 21 (additional citations omitted). In this instance, however, the 

magistrate devoted sixteen pages of analysis to the spousal support question, walking 

through all of the applicable R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) considerations. 

{¶44} The Magistrate listed a number of facts in support of her conclusion over 

sixteen pages and considered all of the requirements of R.C. 3105.18. Debt was 

considered in a prior section of the Decision and is not an express element to be 

considered under R.C. 3105.18, so the lack of any mention in the section addressing 

spousal support is not abuse of discretion. The Magistrate addressed health insurance 

by requiring each party to be responsible for their own coverage, and ordered Appellee 

to cooperate as needed to insure Appellant was eligible for COBRA at her employer if he 

should so choose. 

{¶45} Appellant’s claimed monthly expenses of $5,953.50 was taken directly from 

his affidavit filed with the trial court on October 19, 2015 which includes $1,245.00 per 

month for health insurance, so that amount was clearly included in the magistrate’s 

analysis and need not be duplicated. Appellant complains of the trial court’s failure to 

consider Exhibit III, the “fin plan” but that document was only briefly identified by Appellant 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 19 

during his testimony. The source and significance of the information is not clear and 

facially it appears inaccurate as it attributes $144,000.00 to Appellee as self-employment 

income, a figure not supported in the record as Appellee is not self-employed. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by not considering this document as its probative value 

and reliability are minimal. 

{¶46} The trial court reviewed all of the elements of R.C. 3105.18 and the 

evidence upon which it relied to conclude that Appellee would be obligated to pay 

Appellant $6000.00 per month, covering all his monthly expenses of $5,953.00. We note 

a contradiction between the expenses claimed in Appellant’s affidavit and his testimony 

could support a significantly lower amount. Appellant claims a monthly fuel expense of 

five-hundred dollars, a cost suggesting regular daily travel, yet he maintains his typical 

day consists of getting out of bed upstairs, going downstairs, and laying on the couch. 

He claims a health insurance expense of $1254.00 per month as part of the $5,953.00, 

but during his testimony, he described a health insurance plan with a premium several 

hundred dollars lower. The Magistrate noted that Appellant’s “groceries and meals out 

numbers are inflated based upon the checking account statements.” 

{¶47} The trial court did not challenge the Appellant’s claimed expenses, but the 

inconsistencies in the evidence could support a conclusion that the Appellant’s expenses 

were significantly less than what was represented in affidavit and that the award of 

$6,000.00 per month was more than sufficient to support Appellant. 

{¶48} We hold that the trial court’s analysis and award was based upon 

substantial, credible evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. Appellant’s third 

assignment of error is denied. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-29 20 

{¶49} The decision of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division is affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Hoffman, P.J. and 

Wise, John, J. concur.