* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should n ot be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-10688

Summary Calendar

_______________

PAUL EDWARD NEAL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

S.D. WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(CR-H-92-92-2)

_________________________

October 29, 1996 Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Paul Neal appeals the dismissal, as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(d), of his pro se prisoner’s civil rights suit brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm in part and vacate and

remand in part.1 Alt h ough Richard McCoy also was listed as a plaintiff and signed the

complaint, the magistrate judge determined that McCoy was not a plaintiff when the

case was opened and denied a subsequent motion by Neal to consolidate his complaint

with a similar one filed by McCoy. The magistrate judge’s action is questioned by

Neal as an issue on appeal, and we address it below.

2 Section 804 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110

Stat. 1321 (1996), redesignated § 1915(d) as § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

2 I.

In the suit, Neal raised numerous complaints rega rding his

employ m ent in a shoe factory operated at TDCJ Clements Unit. 1 He

named numerous defendants, including the factory manager and the

unit warden. In addition to monetary damages, he sought injunctive

and other prospective relief. The parties consented to proceed

before the magistrate judge, who conducted a hearing pursua nt to

Spears v. McCotter , 766 F.2d 2179 (5th Cir. 1985), then dismissed

the suit as frivolous under § 1915(d), 2 conc luding that none of

Neal’s claims had merit.

II.

Neal argues that the dismissal was in error bec ause the

magistrate judge misconstrued some of his claims and failed to

address others. An i n forma pauperis complaint that lacks an

arguable basis in law or fact may be dismissed as frivolous

pursuant to § 1915( d). Eason v. Thaler , 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir.

1994). We review a § 1915(d) dismissal for abuse of discretion.

Booker v. Koonce , 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993).3 A.

Neal argues that he is in fear of violence and becoming a

victim of robberies and burglaries because of the shoe factory’s

r equirement that inmates work overtime. He argues that, because

inmates must work overtime if the shoe factory’s “quotas” are not

met, some “inmates resort to violence in order to try to convince

others to stop working.” He raises a similar claim with regard to

the fact that he is not paid for his work, asserting that because

the inmates are not paid, they are forced to steal from each other.

Prison officials have a dut y under the Eighth Amendment to

protect inmates from violence at the hands of other prisoners.

Farmer v. Brennan

, 511 U.S. 825,

___, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994).

But not every injury “by one prisoner at the hands of another

. . .

translates into constitutional liability for prison officials

responsible for the v ictim’s safety.” 114 S. Ct. at 1977. To

prove an Eighth Amendment violation, “the inmate must show that he

is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm,” and the prison official’s state of mind must be one

of “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or safety. I d.

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he is “aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of harm exists” and draws that inference. Id. at 1979.

In his complaint, Neal outlined the “th reatening situation”

caused by the administration’s overtime and refusal-to-pay4

policies. He also made a general statement, at the end of his

complaint, that “[w]ith respect to the above claims it is alleged

that all defendants

. . . knew or should have known that their

actions would serve to violate the rights and protections of

Plaintiff under law.”

At the Spear s hearing, McCoy testified that the defendants

were creating a “dangerous and threatening situation by working us

on weekends or working us overtime.” McCoy averred that he had, as

witnesses, “a couple of guys that got in a[n] altercation and

others that have been threatened.” I d. The magistrate judge asked

McCoy why the inmates would be threatened, and McCoy replied:

Well, if the[y] make a[n] announcement in the shoe

factory on Friday that they are going to be required to

work Saturday or the[y] will receive disciplinary if they

don’t, then a lot of guys really resent that and they get

in little groups and

. . . . They try to get and

convince other guys to go with them, because they know if

they need a lot of unity in order to make an impact, to

make an impression. So, the guys that don’t want to go

along with the group naturally are threatened or they

catch them later over in the

. . . housing area, or

. . . out by the shoe factory dumpster area or something like

that. The[y] do a number on them so they will . . . stay

. . . with the inmates.

Neal has failed to present facts to suggest that the defendants either knew, or had reason to know, that the overtime and nopay policies created a substantial risk to his safety. Other than

the unsupported assertions that the defendants’ policies caused a

threat of violence, Neal presented nothing to suggest that the

defendants were aware of facts from which the inference of5

potential harm could be drawn, or that they drew such an inference.

Moreover, assuming that plaintiff McCoy’s Spears testimony can

be considered for the purposes of Neal’s appeal, nothing in the

testimony indicates that the defendants were del i berately indifferent to inmate safety. McCoy’s testimony suggests that any

assault on an inmate for his failure to “strike” was made outside

the presence of the defendants. Thus, there is no indication that

the defendants knew or had reason to know that the overtime policy

created a “threatening situation.” Moreover, the connection

between any threat of violence Neal mig ht experience because

inmates steal from one another and the fa ct that inmates are not

paid for th eir labor is too attenuated to suggest deliberate

indifference.

B.

Neal also argues that the magistrate judge failed to address

his assertion that solitary confinement is excessive punishment for

refusing to work. Neal does not, however, argue that he has

refused to work or been given solitary confinement. Neal does not

have standing to raise this claim.

C.

Neal argues that the magistrate judge misconstrued his claim

that the conditions at the shoe factory violated OSHA safety6

regulations, because the thrust of “the complaint was based upon a

violation of protections from cruel and u nusual punishment.” He

argues that the magistrate judge’s rejection of his claim based on

a determination that OSHA did not create a private right of action

“misses the mark completely.”

The Eighth Ame ndment prohibits the imposition of prison

conditions that constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.”

Hamilton v. Lyons

, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted), i.e., the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain [or

if they are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime

warranting imprisonment, id. Neal’s allegations challenging the

conditions of con finement are subject to the “deliberate indifference” standard. W ilson v. Seiter

, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).

Thus, he must establish that the defendants knew th at he faced a

substa ntial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer , 511

U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1984.

Neal testified that he gets headaches every day that he works

at the factory; McCoy testified that polyvinyl chloride ("PVC"), a

compound used at the factory, is a known carcinogen. The safety

officer at the factory testified that the PVC compound “has been

reported to cause cancer in laboratory animals if they are given it

orally, if they eat it[,]” but argued that such was “the only way

that you are going to be injured by this material.” The safety7

officer further testified that, although the effects of overexposure to PVC vapors can be mildly irritating to some persons,

the problem was con trolled by proper ventilation at the factory.

The officer admitted, however, there was a time when the factory

had problems with ventilation because t he “Desmas” was producing

excess smoke. Regarding such, McCoy testified that he remembered

the “Desmas” “blowing-up” seven times in one day.

Although the magistrate judge indicated that the plaintiffs’

allegations might require an answer by the defendants, he dismissed

the complaint without addressing the Eighth Amendment claim.

Neal’s exposure to the conditions a rguably poses an unreasonable

risk of serious damage to his health, and Neal alleged facts that

could establish deliberate indifference. See Farmer , 511 U.S. at

___, 114 S. Ct. at 1984; Helling v. McKinn ey , 509 U.S. 25, 33-34

(1993) (exposure to environmental tobacco smoke).

Because Neal’s claim was not factually or legally frivolous,

we vacate and remand for further factual development. We emphasize, however, that we express no opinion as to what ultimate

decision the court should make; we only require further factual

inquiry, after which the magistrate judge can decide whether there

was deliberate indifference to any condition that existed.

D.

Neal argues that the magistrate judge failed to address his3 Neal also argues that the defendants’ use of quotas is a violation of the

decree in Ruiz v. Estelle

, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982). Violations of the R uiz

decree, without more, are not cognizable in a § 1983 cause of action. G reen v.

McKaskle

, 788 F.2d 1116, 1122 (5th Cir. 1986). Thus, insofar as Neal raises this

argument as a separate claim, it is without merit.

8 claim that shoe factory workers were discriminated against because

they must work overtime while other inmates do not. Shoe factory

workers apparently must work overtime if they do not make “quota”;

otherwise, they work a regular five-day week. 3 The S pears testimony was imprecise as to whether all other prison work groups had

similar quota requirements.

The equal protec tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

essentially is a mandate that all persons similarly situated must

be treated alike. R olf v. City of San Antonio , 77 F.3d 823, 828

(5th Cir. 1996). Equal protection is assured against all kinds of

invidious state action, even those di scriminations that do not

encroach on liberty or property. J ohnson v. Pfeiffer

, 821 F.2d

1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1987). In J ohnson

, the plaintiff claimed that

prison writ writers were denied equal protection because they were

given harsher treatment in parole consideration than was given to

other similarly situated TDCJ inmates. I d. at 1121-22. We

reversed the dismissal of the claim, noting t hat Johnson’s

allegations raised suggestions of invidious, group-based discrimination. Id. at 1122-23.

Similarly, Neal’s allegation that the shoe factory workers are

forced to work harder than other similarly situated workers because9

they must meet quota demands raises suggestions of invidious,

group-based discrimination. Nothing that is now in the record

provides a rational basis for this allegedly differing treatment.

See Rolf , 77 F.3d at 828 (holding that because neither a suspect

class nor a fundamental right is involved, the “rational basis”

standard of review is appropriate). The magistrate judge erred by

not addressing this claim. Accordingly, we vacate and remand,

again without suggestin g what decision should be reached after

factual development.

E.

Neal complains that the magistrate judge severed the complaint

he had intended to file jointly with McCoy. He argues that the

magistrate judge further erred by refusing to “reconsolidate” the

complaints. He also contends that he intended his complaint to be

a class action lawsuit.

The decision whether to sever or consolidate is within the

magistrate judge’s discretion. S ee Dillard v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 961 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1992)

(refusal to consolidate), cert. denied

, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993);

Hammons v. Adams

, 786 F.2d 1253, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986) (severance).

The magistrate judge’s apparent rationale for severing the cases,

and then denying Neal’s motion to consolidate, was “because of

security in the courtroom and the need for each Plaintiff to4 A dismissal pursuant to § 1915(d) may be made prior to service on the

defendants. S ee Boyd v. Biggers

, 31 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, Neal’s

assertion that the magistrate judge erred by failing to serve the defendants is

without merit.

10 represent himself.” Such was not an abuse of discretion. Neal’s

assertion that he intended for his complaint to be a class action

is frivolous, as he did not move for or otherwise request certification of a class.

With the exception of his Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims, none of Neal’s claims has merit. 4 Accordingly, we

AFFIRM the dismissal of those claims. S ee Sojourner T. v. Edwards

,

974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Ci r. 1992) (holding that court may affirm

judgment on any basis supported by the record), cert. denied , 113

S. Ct. 1414 (1993). The dismissal of the Eighth Amendment and

equal protection claims is VACATED and REMANDED.