J-A22020-17

J-A22021-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

G.N.I. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

C.S.

Appellee No. 581 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 23, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Domestic Relations at No(s): A06-07-62331-C-26

*****

G.N.I. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

C.S.

Appellant No. 977 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Domestic Relations at No(s): A06-07-62331-C-26

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2017

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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C.S. (“Mother”) and G.N.I. (“Father”), both pro se, cross appeal from 

the February 22, 2017 order,1 entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks 

County, denying Father’s petition to modify custody and his petition for 

contempt, ordering the parties to share legal custody of their minor son and 

minor daughter (“Children”), ages 12 and 14, granting Mother primary 

physical custody, and granting Father partial physical custody.2 After our 

review, we affirm.

This litigation has persisted for over ten years. The parties separated 

on July 31, 2007; the court entered an initial interim custody order, by 

agreement, on October 18, 2007. Since then, the parties have inundated the 

court with over 200 custody docket entries,3 unwilling to see beyond 

____________________________________________

1 We note some confusion as to the date the order was entered in this case. 

The trial court, in its opinion filed April 4, 2017, erroneously finds that Mother’s 

appeal was untimely filed on March 20, 2017. Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/17, at 

1. The purported order of January 23, 2017, however, was not entered on 

the trial court docket until February 22, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 301(a) (“[N]o 

order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the 

appropriate docket in the lower court.”); see also Pa.R.C.P. 236. Mother’s 

March 20, 2107 appeal, therefore, was timely filed from the February 22, 2017 

order. Father’s appeal, filed on February 8, 2017, which was taken prior to 

entry of the order on the docket and Rule 236 notice, was premature. This, 

however, is not fatal to his appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of

appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry 

of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the 

day thereof.”). Thus, Father’s notice of appeal is treated as filed on February 

22, 2017.

2 We have consolidated Mother’s and Father’s appeals pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

513.

3 See Trial Court’s Statement on the Record, 1/10/17, at 10. 
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themselves to grasp the effect this bitterness has on their children. In his July 

20, 2015 opinion, following two days of testimony on one of Father’s petitions 

for contempt, the Honorable Alan M. Rubenstein stated: “[The parties] are so 

full of venom for each other that they forget there’s two children here who 

can’t speak for themselves.” See Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/15, at 4.4 

Unfortunately for Children, the parties continue to ignore the advice and

admonitions of the Parent Coordinator, whom they hired, and the three trial 

court judges who have agonized through this litigation. As Judge Rubenstein 

stated, the parties are unable to stop focusing on their dislike for one another 

and instead focus on their children, see Trial Court’s Statement on the Record, 

1/10/17, at 5-6, and as he predicted, Mother and Father have filed appeals 

from the February 22, 2017 order. 

The order provides, in relevant part:

Father is to have partial physical custody Thursday after school 

until Monday morning and Thursday at 4:00 p.m. until Friday 

morning on alternative weeks. During the summer, the custody 

schedule will be modified to week-to-week. Mother shall be 

required to transport the children for all pick-ups and drop-offs, 

and to deliver the children to Father for his periods of partial 

custody. 

Order, 2/22/17. 

____________________________________________

4 The level of conflict has not abated. In his Statement on the Record, Judge 

Rubenstein characterized this “pitched battle” as a “war without end.” Id. at 

68. It is difficult for this Court to fathom how parents can continue behavior 

that is so destructive and contrary to their children’s best interests, bordering 

on emotional abuse. They are so blinded by hostility toward each other that 

they are willing to sacrifice their children’s well-being. 
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Mother raises the following claims (verbatim):

1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of law 

when its decision did not match the evidence, most recent 

custody evaluation done, Father’s recent selected 

abandonment of Children, and failed to consider the factors of 

custody based on facts including the need to protect the best 

interests of the Children and the Children’s well-reasoned 

preference to spend more time with Mother than they currently 

had?

2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of law 

based on the judge’s bias toward Mother and create an unfair 

courtroom, including confusing testimony in the verdict and 

citing things incorrectly versus what the record and evidence 

showed, as well as whereby [sic] the factors of custody were 

not fairly applied based on evidence due to the same bias?

a. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or 

error of law by ignoring Mother’s petitions and 

concerns shared that Father and Stepmother 

committed perjury on several instances with no 

recourse including violating rules of truth in courtroom 

[sic] and while under oath, and in documents 

submitted vs. the fabricated one Mother pointed out 

to the court, Father’s petitions submitted with blatant 

lies whereby Mother’s reply petitions showed source 

documents from third parties to show the facts; 

additionally Mother’s concern with Father and 

Stepmother knowingly gathering a copy of their 

sealed custody evaluation all in an attempt to divert 

this case from the truth?

Mother’s Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.

Father raises the following issues:5

____________________________________________

5 Father’s issues in his Statement of Questions Involved in his appellate brief 

differ slightly from those raised in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal. See Father’s Appellant Brief, at 4-5; Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, 2/8/17. We have taken his issues on appeal from his Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
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1. Should this Court vacate the lower court’s final custody order 

because it was based on unreasonable conclusions relative to 

[Children’s] need for stability, and therefore does not further 

the best interests of [Children] because:

a. The court’s most important conclusion relative to 

Children of sound judgment to provide a well-reasoned 

preference was not supported by the evidence and was 

thus not a sustainable finding (children contemplating 

suicide and expelled from two daycares with continual 

behavioral problems);

b. The court’s order was unreasonable because it failed to 

address the fact that [C]hildren are deprived of Father’s 

care for extended periods during the school week due to 

Mother’s created impediment with respect to proximity 

between homes, and which is particularly problematic in 

light of the court’s simultaneous conclusion that Mother 

discourages [C]hildren’s relationship with their Father 

and instigates turmoil? 

2. The trial court abused its discretion and/or committed an error 

of law by violating the Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment 

XIV) of the Constitution of the United States in denying a prose party from obtaining a copy of the custody evaluation report 

in upholding a discriminatory policy that only allows lawyers to 

obtain copies.

3. The trial court abused its discretion and/or committed an error 

of law in failing to recognize Father’s Petition for Special Relief 

filed on August 10, 2016, which was added to the docket and 

scheduled for trial on September 23, 2016 at the same time as 

the custody modification, and which evidence contained within 

contradicts the findings in the lower court’s opinion. 

4. The trial court abused its discretion and/or committed an error 

of law by not adhering to the Rules of Civil Procedure in not 

promptly disposing of the custody matter. 

Father’s Rule 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 2/8/17.

In reviewing a custody order, our scope and standard of review are well 

established.
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[O]ur scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of 

discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court that are 

supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not 

include making independent factual determinations. In addition, 

with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed 

the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial 

court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings. 

Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject 

the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of 

law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the 

trial court.

Collins v. Collins, 897 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

The paramount concern in any child custody case is the best interests 

of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5328, 5338. “This standard requires a caseby-case assessment of all the factors that may legitimately affect the physical, 

intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being of the child.” J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 

A.3d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “A party seeking 

modification of custody arrangements has the burden to show that 

modification is in the child’s best interest.” Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 

533, 539 (Pa. Super. 2006). Additionally, this Court has observed that

the discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters should 

be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature of the 

proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on the lives 

of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial 

court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot 

adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed record. 

Id. at 540.
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The factors to be considered by the court when awarding custody are 

set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). Section 5328(a) provides: 

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody. 

(a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all 

relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those 

factors which affect the safety of the child, including the 

following: 

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party 

and which party can better provide adequate physical 

safeguards and supervision of the child.

(2.1) Consideration of child abuse and involvement with 

 child protective services.

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf

of the child.

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on 

the child’s maturity and judgment. 

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent, except in cases of domestic violence 

where reasonable safety measures are necessary to 

protect the child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child 

adequate for the child's emotional needs. 
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(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and 

special needs of the child. 

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with 

one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from 

abuse by another party is not evidence of 

unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

Mother argues that although the court properly determined that she 

should remain the primary caretaker, the court abused its discretion in 

ignoring evidence that would support “more time with Mother[.]” See

Mother’s Brief, at 19-20. Mother suggests “adjusting [her] primary custody 

from the 5 overnights Father has every 2 weeks, and the alternating weeks in 

the summer.” Id. at 20. We find no support for this argument, and we find 

no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that there were no compelling 

reasons to alter the custody order. 

We have reviewed the custody hearings from April 16, 2015 to 

December 27, 2016, the January 10, 2017 Statement on the Record, wherein 

the court reviewed all of the evidence received, and, finally, the court’s 
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painstaking analysis of the statutory custody factors in both its January 10, 

2017 Statement on the Record and its May 31, 2017 Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Contrary to Mother’s claim, the court considered all the evidence, including 

minor daughter’s preference and her maturity in expressing that preference 

and Father’s “abandonment.” The court stated:

[Minor daughter] tells me she likes school. She does rather well. 

She’s involved in a jazz dance club. She’s a cross-country runner. 

She has great grades in math and science. All these things bode 

well for her remaining with [Mother]. She is a straight-A, high 

honor roll student. And after we go through the background of 

this child, she states, without any prompting, she looked right at 

me – and I wrote it down – she said, “I’ve been living through this 

for nine-and-a-half years.” . . . Her preference is strong to be 

with her mother for all the reasons she mentioned. All the reasons 

we accept. She’s an incredibly bright, articulate child, not just 

academically, but poised, and her preference is well-reasoned and 

grounded in reality. 

Trial Court’s Statement on the Record, 1/10/17, at 54-55, 58. The court also 

considered what Mother described as “Father’s abandonment,” when he only 

saw Children once in a two-month period in 2014 and his failure to tell Mother 

the address of his new home. The trial court considered the events leading 

up to this. Mother, however, would have the trial court, and this Court, ignore 

the evidence presented by Father as well as the tortured history of this case.

Mother was continually late for her drop-offs at Father’s home, and, 

ironically, it was Mother who would call the State Police when she was late for 

drop-off at Father’s home, and police would escort Children from her car to 

Father. Mother contacted Children and Youth Services several times, alleging 

child abuse, once when Father took minor son to the emergency room for an 
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allergic reaction to ibuprofen. The court characterized Mother’s actions as a 

“studied attempt to make Father’s life miserable.” Id. at 12. 

I also heard that Father – and rightfully so- was very upset, as he 

should be, that Children & Youth had contacted him on numerous 

occasions. . . . Children & Youth are a last resort. They deal with 

horrific acts; sexual abuse, physical abuse, neglect. . . . Father 

legitimately mentions that [minor son] had an allergic reaction to 

generic ibuprofen . . . [s]o he took the child to the hospital 

emergency room. As a parent one would be concerned if a child 

had a reaction to any medicine, prescribed or over-the-counter. 

Mother called the police and alleged there was abuse by Father. 

* * * * 

Later, Father moves, but he doesn’t tell Mother he moves. . . . 

What’s Father’s reason? He didn’t want the police to come to his 

new home. April of 2014; Father didn’t see [Children]. In May, 

he didn’t see them until Memorial Day. You get into June. He 

only saw them on Father’s Day. Father was spooked. I don’t 

blame him. He said he didn’t want Children & Youth or the police 

involved. . . . Mother admitted that four years ago she called 

Children & Youth. She alleged abuse by Father, which never 

happened. Father makes a mistake. I understand his anger. 

Id. at 22-24. 

In reaching its custody decision, the court considered the fact that 

Mother exposed Children to the police and Children and Youth, used bad 

judgment, and instigated turmoil. Despite this, the court found that Mother 

“is, apparently, capable of taking care of the children.” Id. at 46. The court 

also considered the fact that Father made his share of mistakes and 

contributed, wholeheartedly, to the continual discord between the parties. Id.

at 46-47. Mother’s argument goes on to recite the evidence presented to the 
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court that she believes supports an order that is in Children’s best interests, 

in other words, provides less time with Father. 

Father responds that Children “are not doing well under [Mother’s]

primary care,” as illustrated by their behavioral and emotional issues, and,

therefore, the court’s order maintaining the current custody schedule is not 

supported by the record. Father’s Brief, at 21-22. There was considerable 

testimony regarding minor son’s behavioral issues, minor daughter’s recent 

“contemplation of suicide,” and mental health counseling for Children. We are 

not convinced, however, that altering the custody order would alleviate 

Children’s emotional issues; we agree with the trial court’s assessment that 

Children’s behavioral and emotional issues are more a consequence of their 

parents’ dysfunction than the custody schedule. 

Next, Mother argues that the court exhibited bias against her and that 

as a result of that bias, it did not fairly apply the statutory factors. These 

claims are meritless. Notably, the court was equally critical of the parties’ 

behavior. Further, as we stated above, the court properly applied the 

statutory custody factors, both from the bench and in its opinion. Mother 

essentially seeks a reweighing of the evidence in order to a reach an even 

more favorable order. Father, in his cross appeal, seeks the same thing. Since 

the parties are unwilling to work out a custody schedule on their own, they 

are subject to the court’s determination of what is in their children’s best 

interests. We must defer to the trial court on issues of credibility and weight 

of the evidence, and our review of the certified record confirms the court’s 
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conclusions drawn from its consideration of the statutory best-interest factors. 

We see no reason to disturb the court’s custody decision based upon either 

party’s assessment of the evidence. Ketterer, supra. We find no error or 

abuse of discretion. Collins, supra; J.R.M., supra.

With respect to Father’s cross-appeal, we rely upon Judge Rubenstein’s 

opinion to dispose of his claims. Judge Rubenstein had the opportunity to 

observe the proceedings, over several years, and to make determinations 

concerning the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, including the minor 

daughter, who Mother called as a witness. We defer to his findings. Further, 

Judge Rubenstein performed a careful and detailed analysis of the Children’s

best interests, and the evidence presented at trial supports the trial court's 

determination that their best interests are served by maintaining the current 

custody schedule. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/22/17, at 15-21. Accordingly, 

we affirm the February 22, 2017 order based upon Judge Rubenstein’s 

opinion, and we direct the parties to attach a copy of that opinion in the event 

of further proceedings. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/20/2017
Circulated 10/10/2017 09:35 AM