No. 92-379 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1993 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vCKARLES FRANCIS MOSLEY, 111, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court Of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Edward P. McLean, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

James Park Taylor, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana; 

Carol E. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana; Robert L. Deschamps 111, County 

Attorney, Missoula, Montana; Karen Townsend, Deputy 

County Attorney, Missoula, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: January 21, 1993 

Decided: June 10, 1993 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, 

Missoula County, denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 

We affirm. 

We consider the following issues on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err in denying defendantis motion 

to excise certain information from the application for search 

warrant? 

2. Did the District Court err in determining that the warrant 

set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause? 

On June 14, 1991, a confidential informant contacted agent 

John Reed (Reed) of the Montana Criminal Investigation Bureau and 

stated that Charles F. Mosley I11 (Mosley) may be maintaining a 

marijuana grow operation at his residence on Lyon Creek Road near 

Missoula. This informant had previously supplied reliable 

information. 

A week following this contact, Detective Tom Lewis of Missoula 

County Sheriff's Department and Agent Mark Brady from Montana 

Criminal Investigation Bureau conducted a drive-by of Mosley's 

residence which was a metal quonset hut. Two vehicles were located 

near the quonset hut; a license search indicated that one belonged 

to Charles Mosley and the other to Merita Mosley. 

On June 26, 1991, Reed conducted another drive-by and observed 

the same two vehicles. Shortly thereafter, on July 2, 1991, Reed 

had contact with a citizen informant. The informant stated that 

in late fall or early winter of 1990 Mosley had burned an riunknownlf 

2 
substance on his property; the substance smelled like marijuana. 

According to the informant, he knew what marijuana smelled like 

from personal experience. The informant also stated that an 

unknown male showed up at Mosley's residence daily. If Mosley was 

not home when the unknown man arrived, he would wait for Mosley's 

arrival. 

On July 2, 1991, Detective Lewis searched the narcotics 

intelligence files for any former activity by Mosley. The 

following information from that file was included in the 

application for search warrant: 

1. On November 9, 1981, the Missoula City Police 

Department received information from a confidential 

informant that the Defendant [Mosley] was employed at 

Five Valleys Bowling Alley in Missoula and was selling 

dangerous drugs to other people at work. This informant 

stated that Mosley had gotten most of the barmaids hooked 

on cocaine. The transactions were supposed to have 

occurred after work in Mosley's van. 

2. On November 17, 1982, Mosley was arrested and charged 

with felony theft. During the booking process, a hash 

pipe and three ziplock baggies were found on Defendant 

[Mosley]. Defendant was convicted on February 8, 1983, 

for felony theft and possession of dangerous drugs. 

3. On March 13, 1984, Detective Phil Williamson of 

Missoula County Sheriff's Department was contacted by 

another confidential informant who stated Defendant 

[Mosley] was selling drugs from his residence. Informant 

stated he had observed traffic in and out of Defendant's 

residence for some time and the visitor stayed for only 

a short period of time. Informant stated Defendant drove 

a van and was employed at Westside Lanes. Defendant was 

then on probation for possession of dangerous drugs. 

Informant stated that he also felt that Defendant was 

selling drugs at his place of employment. 

4. October 29, 1985, Detective Joe Serve1 of the 

Missoula County Sheriff's Office met with one of the 

owners of Westside Lanes Bowling Alley. That individual 

stated that an employee of the bowling alley had told him 

Chuck Mosley was selling drugs while at work. 
Also included in the warrant application is a statement 

establishing that indoor growth of marijuana plants can be detected 

by a search of applicable powers bills. The warrant included a 

description of the cyclic pattern and an explanation of why the 

wattage showed a pattern--marijuana requires air circulation 

heaters for drying the marijuana plants. 

The warrant also states that on September 10, 1991, the 

original informant called police again with the observation that 

the mysterious man on the motorcycle was again at the Mosley 

residence. Police went to the Mosley residence and noted the 

registration number of the motorcycle. Upon a check of appropriate 

records, police determined the cycle was owned by a Thomas 

Campbell. A search of police records determined that Campbell had 

engaged in previous drug related activities. The narcotics 

investigation file also indicated that a search of Campbell's 

residence on July 15, 1991 on a different drug related charge, 

produced a number of marijuana plants and drug paraphernalia. 

The warrant also erroneously reported that Charles Mosley had 

reported a trespassing incident in Missoula. This incident in 

reality involved Mosley's father who had the same name. 

A warrant to search the Mosley residence at Lyon Creek Road 

was issued on September 11, 1991 by the Fourth Judicial District 

Court. The subsequent search disclosed the following in Mosley's 

residence: three paper bags of marijuana, a black garbage bag 

containing three-fourths pound of marijuana, a vinyl case with drug 

paraphernalia, a counter balance scale, zip-lock baggies (two with 
marijuana, and one with marijuana seeds), a baggie of mushrooms, 

two books on marijuana cultivation, two long pipes, equipment (a 

fan, spray bottles, three grow lights, extension cord with timed 

plant light boxes), a Smith and Wesson semi-automatic handgun, and 

an Olympic Arms semi-automatic rifle. 

On September 25, 1991, Mosley was charged with one count of 

criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell pursuant 

to felony statute 5 45-9-103, MCA, and one count of criminal 

possession of drug paraphernalia pursuant to misdemeanor statute, 

5 45-10-103, MCA. Mosley pled not guilty to both counts, and filed 

a motion to suppress the physical evidence as well as a motion to 

disclose the identities of certain confidential informants. A 

suppression hearing was held December 18, 1991. On December 24, 

1991, the District Court issued its opinion and order, denying both 

motions. 

Mosley subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

court order pursuant to State v. Valley (1992), 830 P.2d 1255, 49 

St.Rep. 30. The court did reconsider its earlier order in light of 

the Valley reasoning and concluded that the Valley decision did not 

dictate a different ruling from the court. 

On April 22, 1992, the deputy county attorney for Missoula 

County filed an amended information charging Mosley with two counts 

of criminal possession of dangerous drugs pursuant to 5 45-9-103, 

MCA, and one count of criminal possession of drug paraphernalia 

pursuant to § 45-10-103, MCA. On the same day, Mosley reversed his 

plea and signed a plea agreement wherein he entered a plea of 
guilty to two counts of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and 

one count of criminal possession of drug paraphernalia. However, 

as part of this agreement, Mosley preserved his right to appeal the 

District Court's denial of his pretrial motions, including the 

motion to suppress evidence. The State agreed to recommend a 

suspended sentence of five years on each felony count of possession 

of dangerous drugs and six months on the misdemeanor count of 

possession of paraphernalia. 

The District Court sentenced Mosley on June 15, 1992, to two 

suspended five year terms and one suspended six month term at 

Montana State Prison at Deer Lodge. On June 22, 1992, Mosley filed 

this appeal. 

I 

Did the District Court properly deny the motion to excise 

certain information from the warrant application? 

Mosley argues that the court was required to excise any 

information included in the warrant application if the information 

is a deliberate falsehood, or was included in reckless disregard 

for the truth. Mosley's contention is that authorities 

intentionally made false statements or made statements with 

reckless disregard for truth when writing the application for a 

search warrant. Therefore, Mosley argues that the following facts 

should be excised from the application: 1) information from 

anonymous informants dated November 9, 1981, May 13, 1984, and 

November 29, 1985 (the information is stale and uncorroborated) ; 2) 

the statement that Thomas Campbell had a "long history of drug- 
related offenses1'; 3) the August 4, 1991 trespassing incident; and 

4) the cyclic pattern of his electric bill which was merely a 

conclusory statement by the Officer. Mosley also argues that the 

application omitted the material fact that a necessary ventilation 

system was not observable at Mosleyls residence. 

The State argues that before the court is required to excise 

material from a warrant, Mosley must make a substantial preliminary 

showing that the State acted knowingly or intentionally when making 

a false statement or included statements with reckless disregard 

for the truth. Mosley has not done this, according to the State 

and the information of which he complains is not required to be 

excised. 

The United States Supreme Court has determined that 

truthfulness of factual statements made in an application for a 

search warrant can be challenged. Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 

U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667. See also State v. Sykes 

(1983), 194 Mont. 14, 663 P.2d 691. We adopt the Franks procedure 

for challenging the truthfulness of statements made in an 

application for search warrant as hereinafter stated and as also 

stated in Sykes. The defendant must first make a substantial 

preliminary showing that a false statement was knowingly or 

intentionally made, or was made with reckless disregard for the 

truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-156. If defendant makes such a 

showing, and the misstatement was necessary to a finding of 

probable cause, a hearing must be held at defendant's request. 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. When a hearing is held, the allegation of 
perjury or reckless disregard must be proved by defendant by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Once proved, the offending 

information must be excised from the warrant application. If after 

the egregious material is excised, the remaining content is 

insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must 

be voided and the fruits of the search excluded. Franks, 438 U.S. 

at 156. 

In order to make a preliminary showing of an intentionally 

made falsehood, the defendant must provide more than conclusory 

statements. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. The defendant must make an 

offer of proof that contains affidavits, sworn statements or other 

reliable witness statements which tend to prove that false 

statements in the application were deliberately made. Franks, 438 

U.S. at 171. Information contained in a warrant application will 

be deemed truthful when the information put forth is believed or 

appropriately accepted by affiant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. 

Mosley first argues that information concerning anonymous tips 

dated November 9, 1981, March 13, 1984 and November 29, 1985, 

should have been excised because they are stale or uncorroborated. 

Of pivotal concern to Mosley's claim that these earlier incidents 

be excised is his total lack of evidence that these incidents were 

in fact false or were intentionally included to mislead the court. 

A false affidavit statement is one which misleads the magistrate 

[or court] into believing the existence of certain facts which 

enter a person's thought processes in evaluating probable cause. 

State v. Grof f (Iowa 1982), 323 N.W. 2d 204. The record contains no 
affidavits, reports, or witness statements which prove that the 

State intentionally misrepresented these incidents in an attempt to 

mislead the court. Therefore, we conclude these incidents need not 

be excised. 

Mosley also argues that the characterization of Thomas 

Campbell's criminal record should have been excised. Lewis stated 

in the application that Campbell had a long history of drug-related 

offenses in the Missoula area. The State argues that it used the 

word "offenses" to mean suspected criminal activity involving 

drugs. The court construed the word "offenses" to mean all known 

criminal activity as well as convictions. 

We have already stated that the word "offense" in an affidavit 

in support of a search warrant means a violation of laws of Montana 

or its political subdivisions. State v. Kelly (1983), 205 Mont. 

417, 430, 668 P.2d 1032, 1040. In an application for search 

warrant, the word "offense" is to be construed as a definite, known 

violation of the law, not an alleged violation or suspected drugrelated activity. Lewis testified that he meant that Campbell had 

a long history of suspicion of drug-related activity. Lewis used 

the word "offense1' erroneously. 

The important fact is that a current search of Campbellls 

residence in July of 1991 turned up drugs and drug related 

equipment. The evidence found in that search is concrete and 

current and was capable of standing on its own without the 

statement of Campbell's past. Once again we conclude that Mosley 

did not present evidence to show that Lewis included the 
information with an intention to mislead the court. We, therefore, 

conclude that there is no basis to strike the reference in the 

application concerning Campbell. 

Mosley further contends that the trespassing incident which 

involved his father and not himself should have been excised from 

the application. The State argues that this incident was innocent 

error and that Mosley failed to provide evidence that the State 

intentionally included this information to mislead the court. 

Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient to 

excise the alleged false information. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 

The trespassing incident is totally immaterial to the determination 

of probable cause for this warrant to issue. Apparently, Mosleyrs 

father has the same exact name and it is he who was involved in the 

trespass action. Mosley alleges that Lewis used this incident in 

an attempt to give the impression that Mosley gave a false address 

to police. But Mosley provides no evidence to indicate the truth 

of this allegation. We conclude that the use of this incident was 

innocent error and was not included intentionally to mislead the 

court. 

Mosley next argues that the cyclic pattern of electric use 

statements made by Lewis must be excised because they are merely 

conclusory statements according to State v. Wilson (1992), 837 P.2d 

1346, 49 St.Rep. 844. Further, according to Mosley, Lewis did not 

give his credentials for making such analyses. 

We have stated that: 

Sufficient information must be presented to the 

magistrate to allow that official to determine probable 

10 
cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the 

bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such 

an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, 

courts must continue to conscientiously review the 

sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. 

Wilson (1992), 837 P.2d at 1348, 49 St.Rep. at 845. 

In Wilson the only information about power usage in the search 

warrant application was the conclusory statement that defendant's 

power bills reflected a power use "consistent with that of a grow 

operation." We stated in Wilson: 

No data from the record was included in the application 

nor any information concerning the detective's experience 

analyzing power usage records. 

Wilson, 837 P.2d at 1347, 49 St.Rep. at 845. 

In one respect, the situation we have before us is quite 

different. Detective Lewis expressly stated the cyclic pattern 

reflected by Mosley's electrical use: 

The power records reflect that January 1988 the 

electrical consumption was 859 kilowatts and in August 

1988 the electrical consumption was 1121 kilowatts. In 

this comparison the electrical consumption in the warmer 

months was higher than in January. In January 1989 the 

electrical consumption was 864 kilowatts whereas August 

the same year the consumption was 434 kilowatts. The 

following year, January 1990, the electrical consumption 

was 1,038 kilowatts while the consumption during August 

was 928 kilowatts. The current electrical consumption at 

the Mosley residence of 2,179 kilowatts is higher than 

the electrical consumption in January of the same year. 

The electrical consumption at this residence also 

indicates a cyclic pattern consistent with that commonly 

seen with indoor marijuana grow operations. From July 

1990 through May 1991, several such patterns are evident. 

The one thing he did not provide is his experience analyzing 

power usage records. Although he stated his position of authority 

he did not indicate what technical expertise he possessed which 

would enable him to interpret the above facts. We conclude that 
because Officer Lewis did not include in his application for search 

warrant any information concerning his experience analyzing power 

usage records he has not met the Wilson test. 

However, Mosley has not presented evidence to indicate that 

this omission was knowingly or intentionally made. Therefore, we 

conclude no reason exists to excise the power usage facts from the 

application. However, because a sufficient foundation was not set 

forth, we will disregard the information of electrical power 

records in our further analysis under Issue 11. 

Mosley also argues that Lewis intentionally omitted the fact 

that he had not seen a ventilation system at Mosley's residence. 

According to Mosley, such an omission is material because marijuana 

requires adequate ventilation. The State contends the information 

was not a necessity for a warrant to issue. We agree. The 

omission that Mosley complains of is immaterial to an issuance of 

a warrant given the other information included in the warrant 

application. 

We finally conclude that Mosley did not prove his allegations 

at the suppression hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. His 

burden of showing that any false statement was knowingly or 

intentionally made, or was made with reckless disregard for the 

truth has not been met. Therefore, we hold that the District Court 

did not err in denying Mosley's motion to excise certain 

information from the warrant application. 

I1 
Did the District Court err in determining that the application 

for warrant set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause? 

The District Court denied Mosleyls motion to suppress all 

physical evidence seized at his residence because the application 

for search warrant established probable cause. In issuing the 

search warrant, the District Court relied on the following 

incidents from the application for search warrant: 

1. On June 14, 1991, a confidential inf ormark contacted Agent 

Reed and stated that defendant may be maintaining a marijuana grow 

operation at his residence. 

2. On July 2, 1991 a concerned citizen noted that Mosley had 

burned a substance in an outside barrel which smelled like 

marijuana burning. 

3. On July 2, 1991, sheriff's Deputy Tom Lewis searched the 

Narcotics Intelligence files which revealed incidents involving 

drugs on November 9, 1981, November 17, 1982, March 13, 1984, and 

October 29, 1985. 

4. On July 25, 1991, Detective Lewis applied for and received 

a subpoena for Mosleyl s power records. Detective Lewis stated that 

the records established a cyclic use of electricity consistent with 

an inside marijuana grow. 

5. Auqust 4, 1991 - trespassing incident in Missoula. 

6. September 10, 1991, original informant contacted Reed 

about mysterious motorcycle rider. The next day the owner of the 

motorcycle was identified as Thomas Campbell who himself has a long 

drug history. The court stated that it was taking a common sense 
approach required by Crowder, and looking only to the four corners 

of the application. The court indicated that taken separately, 

each incident alone would not equal probable cause. 

Using the practical, common sense approach required under 

Gates and Crowder and looking only to the four corners of 

the Application this Court concludes, that taking all of 

the items together and applying the 'totality of the 

circumstances' test, this Court has a 'substantial basis' 

to conclude that probable cause existed. 

Order and Opinion, December 24, 1991. 

This Court's function on appeal from the District Court's 

review of a search warrant is not to review de novo the court's 

determination that probable cause justified issuance of a search 

warrant; rather, the Court must presume the lower court properly 

issued a search warrant after subjecting the application to a 

"totality of the circumstances" test. State v. Baldwin (1990), 242 

Mont. 176, 789 P.2d 1215. The duty of the reviewing court is to 

ensure that the magistrate or the lower court had a "substantial 

basisu to determine that probable cause existed. State v. Crowder 

0(1991), 248 Mont. 169, 810 P.2d 299. 

We conclude that the court had a substantial basis to 

determine that probable cause existed. In arriving at this 

conclusion, as previously stated, we are not considering the 

statements relative to the electrical power records. Probable 

cause to issue a search warrant may be based on a tip from a 

confidential informant. State v. Crain (1986), 223 Mont. 167, 725 

P.2d 209. Here, the warrant application contained two calls from 

a previously accurate informant and one call from a concerned 

citizen. The application also contained information indicating 

14 
that Mosley had been previously convicted on drug charges and that 

a person regularly seen at Mosley's residence had been found to 

possess drugs and drug paraphernalia. 

In determining probable cause to issue a warrant, it is not 

the number of statements, tips or events that is determinative. 

State v. Valley (1992), 830 P.2d 1255, 49 St.~ep. 30. It is the 

probative force of one, some or all of them. Valley, 830 P.2d at 

1256, 49 St.Rep. at 31. Probable cause does not mean that the 

State had to provide a prima facie showing of criminal activity on 

Mosley's part; the State merely had to show a probability of 

criminal activity on Mosley's premises. See State v. Sundberg 

(1988), 235 Mont. 115, 765 P.2d 736. 

The application provides a substantial basis that such a 

probability of criminal activity was occurring on Mosley's 

property. We hold that the District Court did not err in 

determining that the application for search warrant set forth 

sufficient facts to establish probable cause. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler specially concurring in part and 

dissenting in part. 

I concur with the majority's decision to affirm the District 

Court. However, I disagree with its reasons. 

Specifically, I would not follow the U.S. Supreme Court's 

decision in Franks v. Delaware (l978), 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 

57 L. Ed. 2d 667. However, I conclude that after excising the 

false or inadequate information from the affidavit in support of 

the State's application for a search warrant, there was sufficient 

information to establish probable cause for the issuance of a 

search warrant pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test 

adopted in Statev. Jensen (1985), 217 Mont. 272, 704 P.2d 45. 

In Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, false information 

contained in an affidavit in support of an application for a search 

warrant need not be excised unless the defendant could establish 

that when the information was included, the affiant knew that it 

was untruthful or had a reckless disregard for the truth. The 

Montana Constitution provides an independent right to the citizens 

of this State to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

It also provides that no search warrant shall issue without 

probable cause. False information provided in support of a search 

warrant does not provide probable cause. What difference does it 

make what the applicant's state of mind is when the false 

information is submitted? Furthermore, if false information is 
provided in support of an application for a search warrant, how 

does the person whose privacy has been illegally violated prove the 

state of mind of the person who provided the information? 

Applying the right found in the Montana Constitution to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures, I would hold that in 

determining whether there was probable cause fox the issuance of a 

search warrant, false information included in the search warrant 

should be disregarded and onlythe remaining information considered 

by a reviewing court. 

For these reasons, and based on our prior decisions, I would 

excise the following information from the affidavit filed by the 

State in support of its application for a search warrant in this 

case: 

1. The information contained in the files of the Missoula 

County Sheriff's Department (with the exception of defendant's 

record of convictions) for the reason that the information was 

stale and inadmissible pursuant to our decision in State v. vahy 

(1992), 252 Mont. 489, 830 P.2d 1255. 

2. The information allegingthatdefendanthad contactedthe 

sheriff's department about a trespass to his property for the 

reason that such information was false. 

3. The allegation that Thomas Campbell had a long history of 

drug-related offenses because that allegation was false. I would 

allow the allegation that illegal drugs were found in Campbell's 

residence in 1991. 
4. The information about defendant's power usage because 

there was no foundation for the conclusion in the affidavit that it 

had any significance, and was, therefore, inadmissible pursuant to 

our decision in Statev. mkon (l992), 254 Mont. 317, 837 P.2d 1346. 

The majority's adoption of the Frank rule cannot be reconciled 

with our previous approach to the use of improper or inadequate 

information in an application for a search warrant. In Valley, we 

held that a search warrant based on stale information did not 

provide probable cause. In Wilson, we held that a search warrant 

based on conclusory statements did not establish probable cause. 

Yet, in this case the majority is willing to adopt a rule that the 

statements which are blatantly false can be used to establish 

probable cause unless defendant can prove that the affiant had a 

dishonest state of mind when the information was provided to the 

magistrate. In Montana, false information has been elevated to a 

position of greater value than information which is simply stale or 

conclusory. 

In spite of these problems with the majority opinion, I 

conclude that after excising the objectionable material from the 

application for a search warrant, there was sufficient basis to 

establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant under 

our previous decisions. The affidavit in support of the 

application established that a reliable informant believed that 

defendant may be maintaining a marijuana growing operation in his 

home. The informant described the premises where the growing 
operation was being conducted, and that description was confirmed 

after an investigation by the Missoula County Sheriff's Department. 

A separate, citizen informant, whose reliability is presumed by our 

previous decisions, informed the law enforcement officers that he 

had observed defendant during that same year burning what he 

believed to be marijuana plants on his property. The defendant's 

file at the sheriff's office showed that in 1982 he was convicted 

of possession of illegal drugs. Finally, the citizen informant 

identified Campbell as someone who came to defendant's premises 

regularly at the same time of day, and Campbell was identified as 

someone who had recently been found to possess illegal drugs and 

drug-related equipment. I conclude that the cumulative effect of 

these facts established probable cause for the issuance of a search 

warrant. 

For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the District 

Court. 

Justice Karla M. Gray joins in the foregoing concurrence and 

dissent. 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting. 

I dissent and would reverse the conviction of the defendant 

because I do not believe either the United States Constitution or 

the Constitution of the State of Montana ever contemplated 

obtaining a warrant through the use of false information in the 

affidavit. I would reverse. 
June 10, 1993 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following 

named: 

James Park Taylor 

Attorney at Law 

111 N. Higgins, Ste. 303 

Missoula, MT 5980211401 

Hon. Joseph P. Mamrek, Attorney General 

Carol E. Schmidt, Assistant 

Justice Bldg. 

Helena, MT 59620 

Robert Deschamps, 111, County Attorney 

Karen Townsend, Deputy 

Missoula County Courthouse 

Missoula, MT 59802 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF~ONTM