[Cite as State v. Quin, 2021-Ohio-4205.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: 

 Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

 Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

-vs- 

 Case No. 2021 CA 00044 

CHRISTOPHER M. QUIN 

 

 Defendant-Appellee O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Licking County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 20 CR 00611 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 29, 2021 

APPEARANCES: 

 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

 

WILLIAM C. HAYES APRIL CAMPBELL 

Licking County Prosecutor 46 1⁄2 N. Sandusky Street

 Delaware, Ohio 43015 

PAULA M. SAWYERS 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

20 S. Second Street, Fourth Floor 

Newark, Ohio 43055 

 

 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 2 

Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant the state of Ohio appeals the judgment entered by the 

Licking County Common Pleas Court granting Defendant-appellee Christopher Quin’s 

motion to suppress evidence taken from the search of a motor vehicle. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On May 23, 2019, Quin was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Licking 

County, Ohio. The driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision died at the scene 

of the crash. Five days after the accident, police obtained a search warrant to search the 

car Quin was driving at the time, including computer data from the vehicle. 

{¶3} Quin was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury with one count of 

aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a). Quin moved to 

suppress evidence taken from the motor vehicle on the basis the search warrant was 

unsupported by probable cause. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding 

the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause because the affidavit supplied by 

police was a “bare bones affidavit,” and further the good faith exception did not apply 

because the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 

believe in its existence entirely unreasonable. 

{¶4} It is from the June 14, 2021 judgment of the trial court the State prosecutes 

this appeal, assigning as error: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT 

CHRISTOPHER QUIN’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 3 

{¶5} The State first argues in its judgment finding the search warrant to be 

unsupported by probable cause, the trial court focused on the lack of information 

regarding the allegation of driving while intoxicated, while ignoring the fact R.C. 2903.06 

and R.C. 2903.08 also apply to reckless or negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 

{¶6} In the instant case, the affidavit used to secure the search warrant provided 

Sgt. Frank Horvath of the Ohio State Highway Patrol had good cause to believe evidence 

of the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide, vehicular 

manslaughter, aggravated vehicular assault, or vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.08 or R.C. 2903.06 are being kept in the vehicle Quin was driving at the time of the 

accident, which was housed at a towing company. The affidavit provides a single 

paragraph of the facts upon which the affiant’s belief is based: 

 On May 23rd, 2019, A Ford Explorer, driven by Christopher Quin, was 

traveling eastbound on Palmer Road. At the same time, a Toyota Camry 

was traveling southbound on Mink Street. The Ford Explorer ran the stop 

sign at the intersection and struck the Camry in the right front passenger 

door. As a result of the collision, the driver of the Camry lost their life. OVI 

is a suspected circumstance and the investigation is still underway. 

{¶7} Search Warrant Affidavit, May 28, 2019. 

{¶8} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, 

Article I, Ohio Constitution, prohibit the government from conducting unreasonable 

searches and seizures of persons or their property. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 4 

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271 

(1991). In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted for a 

search warrant, a trial judge or magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision 

whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and 

basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. George, 

45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640, at paragraph one of the syllabus (1980), citing Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). As a reviewing 

court, we must accord great deference to the issuing judge's determination of probable 

cause. See George, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Doubtful or marginal cases should 

be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. Id. The totality of the circumstances must 

be examined in determining whether probable cause existed for a search warrant. Illinois 

v. Gates, supra. “Probable cause” means only the probability and not a prima facie 

showing of criminal activity. George, supra, at 644. See, also, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 

85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). 

{¶9} We are unable to definitively determine whether the trial court considered if 

the affidavit provided probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of either reckless 

or negligent driving, in addition to evidence of driving while intoxicated. However, in 

reaching our ultimate conclusion, we specifically recognize the charges alleged in the 

affidavit included charges of reckless and/or negligent driving. 

{¶10} The trial court examined both the conclusion Quin ran a stop sign as well 

as the allegation of intoxication in granting the motion to suppress: 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 5 

 Here, the affidavit provided only that a traffic accident occurred 

between two vehicles and that the Defendant’s vehicle ran a stop sign. 

However, other than the officer’s claim, there was no information provided 

to the issuing judge that supported this conclusion. Nor, were there any 

facts provided to support any allegation that OVI was a suspected 

circumstance, as the affiant described. Significantly, there is no evidence 

to suggest, and the State does not argue, that the affidavit made any 

reference to, or incorporated by way of attachment, any of the results of the 

crash scene investigation, or of witness statements claiming to have 

smelled an odor of alcohol. Had this information been provided probable 

cause would have been established, but it wasn’t. 

{¶11} Judgment Entry, June 14, 2021. 

{¶12} We agree with the conclusion of the trial court the affidavit was insufficient 

to provide probable cause evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle Quin was 

driving. There is no information provided as to the basis of Sgt. Horvath’s conclusion 

Quin ran a stop sign, nor is there anything in the affidavit to suggest probable evidence 

of reckless or negligent driving by Quin would be found in the motor vehicle. The mere 

fact Quin was involved in an accident which resulted in a death does not, in and of itself, 

demonstrate a probability evidence of his reckless or negligent driving was involved. To 

hold otherwise would mean all vehicles involved in an accident could be searched without 

anything more. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 6 

{¶13} More importantly, we find the affidavit does not set forth any facts supporting 

a basis for the affiant’s conclusion Quin ran the stop sign, nor the affiant’s suspicion of 

alcohol. The affidavit does not refer to an accident report or to witness statements, nor 

are such documents attached.1 The affidavit contains no information to support the 

affiant’s conclusion Quin ran a stop sign. The only reference in the affidavit to the 

investigation was it was ongoing. 

{¶14} The State also argues even if the warrant was unsupported by probable 

cause, the motion to suppress should have been denied because officers relied in good 

faith on the warrant. 

{¶15} The “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule is set forth in United 

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and adopted by 

the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986).. 

Under the “good faith exception,” the exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar 

the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in 

objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral 

magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. State v. George, 

45 Ohio St.3d 325, 330, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), citing Leon, supra at 918-23, 926, 104 

S.Ct. 3405. However, even under the “good faith exception,” suppression of evidence is 

appropriate where any of the following occurs: 

1 Quin attached such documents to his motion to suppress, including a witness’s statement he smelled 

alcohol at the scene of the crash. However, the documents were not supplied to the judge who issued the 

warrant, nor were they referenced in the affidavit. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 7 

 * * the magistrate or judge * * * was misled by information in an 

affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false 

except for his reckless disregard of the truth * * *; (2) * * * the issuing 

magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role * * *; (3) an officer purports to 

rely upon * * * a warrant based upon an affidavit so lacking in indicia of 

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable; or (4) * * * depending on the circumstances of the particular 

case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e. in failing to particularize the 

place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers 

cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. 

{¶16} Leon, supra at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. 

{¶17} The trial court found the good faith exception did not apply in the instant 

case because the conclusions in the affidavit were not backed up by factual assertions. 

The trial court concluded the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of 

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. We 

agree. 

{¶18} The Leon court applied the good faith exception where it found the warrant 

“was supported by much more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit,” as the affidavit related the 

results of an extensive investigation.2 Id. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405. We find in contrast, the 

warrant in the instant case was issued solely on a bare bones affidavit. The affidavit 

2 In Leon, the United States Supreme Court considered only the question of the application of the good 

faith exception, and did not review the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding the warrant 

unsupported by probable cause because the information in the affidavit was stale and failed to establish 

the credibility, reliability, or basis of knowledge of the informant. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00044 8 

recites no reference to facts discovered in the investigation of the accident. The affidavit 

sets forth a conclusion Quin ran the stop sign without any factual basis as to how the 

officer came to such knowledge, and sets forth no facts for the conclusion intoxication 

was suspected. This is a prime example of a “bare bones” affidavit. We find the trial 

court did not err in concluding the warrant was based upon an affidavit so lacking in indicia 

of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. 

{¶19} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Licking County 

Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Baldwin, P.J. and 

Gwin, J. concur