1

09-5345- cv Fa rra r v. St ra tf

or d UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

## SU MM AR

Y O RD ER Rulings by summary order do not have prec edential effect . Citation to a summary order filed onor af te r Ja nu ary 1 , 20 07, is pe rm it te d a nd is gov er ne d b y F ed er al Rule of A pp ella te Pro ce du re 32. 1 a nd th is co ur t’ s Lo cal R ul e 3 2.1 .1. Wh enci ti ng a

su mm ary o rd er

ina d oc um en t f

ile d w ith thi s court, a party must

cite eithe r the Federal Appendix or an ele ctronic databa se (with the notation “summary order”). A party c iting a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party

not re pr es en te d b y c ou ns el
. At a stat ed term of the Unite d States Court of Appe als for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United Stat es Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the Cit y of New York, on the 26 day of August, two thousa nd and ten.

th PRESENT: R AL P H K. W I NTER , J OSÉ A. C AB RANES , D ENNY C H IN , Circuit Judges
.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x F R AN KL I N F ARR AR , Plaintiff-Appellant ,
v. No. 09-5345- cv T O W N O F S TR AT FORD , Defendant-Ap pellee
.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x FO R APP EL LA

NT: Fra nk linFa rra r, pro se , Stratford, CT. FO R APP EL LE E: Wa rre n L. H ol co mb , B er ch em , Mo se s & De vli n, P.C ., Milford, CT.2

Appeal from a Dece mber 11, 2009 judgment of the United States Dist rict Court for the Di st ric t o f Co nn ec ti cu t (

Al vinW. Th om ps on , Ju dg

e ). UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD JU DG ED , A

ND DE CREED that the District Court’s judgment be AF FI RM ED
. Pla in ti ff- ap pe lla nt

Fra nk linFa rra r, r ep re se nt edby

co un se l inth e D is tr

ic t C ou rt , b ro ugh t thi s action against the Town of Stratford (“Town”) alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e et seq . The District Court ent ered judgment for the Town after a jury rendere d a verdict in the Town’s favor. Farrar, proceeding before this Court pro se , appeals from the District

Court’s judgment arguing that the Court e rred by instructing the jury not to co ns id er

ev en ts th at

to ok pl ac e b ef or e N ov em be r 18 , 20 03— th e d at e h e f ile d h is ad mi ni st ra ti

ve discrimination charge, which allegedly w as the occ asion for the claimed retaliation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on ap pe al
. If a party to a civil action w ishes to object t o the district c ourt’s instructions to the jury, Fe de ra l R ul e o f Ci vil Pro ce du re 51 m an da te s that th e p ar ty “do so onth e r ec or d, st at in g di st in ct ly the matt er objected t o and the grounds for the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1). “The purpose of the Rule is to allo w the tr ial c ou rt anop po rt unit

y t o c ur e a ny

de fe ct s i n the in st ru ct

io ns be for e se nd in g t he ju ry

to de lib er at e. ” Fogarty v. Near N. Ins. Brokerage, Inc. , 16 2 F. 3d 74, 79 ( 2d Ci r. 1 998 ). Wh ena p ar ty

fails to ob je ct

to a j ury i ns tr uc ti oninac co rd an ce wi thRule 51, we may r ev ie w the ju ry in st ru ct io n o nly “ for

‘fu nd am en tal’ e rro r.” Ja rv is v. F or d M ot or Co
. , 28 3 F. 3d 33, 62 (

2d Ci r. 2 002

) (quo ti ng Shade v. Hous. Auth. of New Haven , 251 F.3d 3 07, 312 (2d Cir. 2 001)). The “fundamental error” standard is difficult to meet:

Fundamental error is more egregious than the “plain” error that can excuse a procedural default in a criminal trial, and is so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very int egrity of the trial. We have found relief from fundamental error to be warrante d when the jury c harge deprived the jury of adequat e legal guidance to reach a rat ional decision. Id. (citations and som e internal quotat ion marks omitted). Here it is undisputed tha t Farrar failed to object to the challenged jury instruct ion either at the charging conference or afte r the instruction wa s given to the jury. We the refore review the ch alle nge d i ns tr uc ti onfor

fun da me nt al

er ro r o nly. Undertaking that review, we conclude that the District Court ’s jury instruction was not erroneous, much less so fundament ally flawed as to “deprive[] the jury of adequate le gal guidance to3

re ac h a ra ti on al de ci si on .” Id

. The challenged instruct

ion served only to limit the sc ope of the ev id en ce th at

th e j ury c ould co ns id er

in re ac hi ng a

ve rd ic t o n Fa rra r’s re talia ti oncl ai m. Be ca us e h is counsel maintained a t the cha rging conference that Farrar’s claim arose from the filing of an administrative charge on Novem ber 18, 2003, the instruction was consistent with Farrar’s theory of th e c as e. Ac co rd in gly , the re wa s n o e rro r, l et al on e a “fu nd am en tal e rro r,” an d Fa rra r’s so le argument on appeal is meritle ss. CONCLUSION For th e f or eg oi ng r ea so ns , the De ce mb er 11, 200 9 ju dgm en t o f t he Di st ric t C ou rt is AF FI RM ED
. FOR THE COURT, Ca th er in e O ’H ag anWo lfe , C le rk o f Co ur t