[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-13998

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00275-RH-CAS

ZOLTAN BARATI,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendants – Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(July 12, 2021)

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiff Zoltan Barati filed a complaint asserting various constitutional and 

civil rights claims against the Florida Attorney General and Motorola Solutions, 

Inc., in relation to the Attorney General’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s state-court qui 

tam action against Motorola. The District Court dismissed the case, and we affirm.

I.

A.

According to the complaint, Motorola had a contract with the State of 

Florida to produce an automated fingerprint identification system (“AFIS”) for the 

Florida Department of Law Enforcement. See State v. Barati (Barati I), 150 So. 3d 

810, 811 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). The plaintiff is a former Motorola 

employee who was involved in technical quality control and contract compliance 

for the project. The complaint alleges that the AFIS system failed to meet various

contract requirements with regard to accuracy, processing speed, and other factors; 

for instance, the contract called for 99.9% accuracy but the product performed with 

only 99% accuracy. The system also necessitated millions of dollars’ worth of 

maintenance and technical support to “keep it on life support.” Despite this, 

Motorola “claimed full compliance [with] the State requirements of the AFIS 

product for payment.” The plaintiff raised his concerns about the alleged

deficiencies through Motorola’s internal complaint process. Later, following the 

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transfer of the relevant Motorola division to another company, the plaintiff’s 

employment was terminated.

In 2009, the plaintiff brought a qui tam action against Motorola in state court 

under the Florida False Claims Act (“FCA”), Florida Statutes § 68.081 et seq. The 

case eventually resulted in two opinions from the First District Court of Appeal 

(“DCA”) in connection with the State’s subsequent dismissal of the action, one of 

which provides the following background information:

The Florida False Claims Act authorizes a private person or the 

State to initiate a civil action against a person or company who 

knowingly presents a false claim to the State for payment. . . . The qui 

tam complaint is filed under seal and is not immediately served on the 

defendant, so that the Department of Legal Affairs, on behalf of the 

State, may investigate the allegations made in the complaint and 

decide if it wishes to become a party to the action. . . .

After being served a copy of [Barati’s] qui tam complaint and 

relevant materials, the State of Florida conducted an investigation, 

pursuant to section 68.083(3), Florida Statutes. The State declined to 

join the qui tam action, which Barati thereafter prosecuted for 

approximately three and a half years.

Barati I, 150 So. 3d at 811-12. According to the complaint, the plaintiff conducted 

discovery in the state-court case and successfully defended against a motion to 

dismiss. The case was scheduled for trial. However, as the complaint also 

explains, the project manager for the Department of Law Enforcement filed an 

affidavit in February 2013 stating that he was pleased with the AFIS product. The 

complaint asserts that the project manager’s affidavit contained a number of 

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inaccuracies or inconsistencies with Department “cabinet documents” showing that 

the system was inadequate.

In July 2013, the Attorney General filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of 

the qui tam action pursuant to § 68.084(2)(a) of the FCA. See Barati I, 150 So. 3d 

at 812. This section provided that the State “may voluntarily dismiss the action 

notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action.” Fla. Stat. § 

68.084(2)(a) (2009); see Barati v. State (Barati II), 198 So. 3d 69, 73 n.2 (Fla. 1st 

Dist. Ct. App. 2016). The plaintiff contested whether the notice of dismissal was 

automatically effective on the ground that the State had not intervened in the action 

and that a relator should be provided an opportunity to challenge such a dismissal. 

Barati II, 198 So. 3d at 71. The state trial court ruled that it had been divested of 

jurisdiction by the notice of dismissal, and the First DCA affirmed, holding as a 

matter of first impression that “the Attorney General’s decision to terminate the 

litigation is unlimited by statute.” Id. at 71-72, 78, 85. The Florida Supreme Court 

declined to grant review, Barati v. State, No. SC16-834, 2016 WL 4429843 (Fla. 

Aug. 22, 2016), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Barati v. 

Florida, 137 S. Ct. 1085 (2017).

The plaintiff also alleges that the Attorney General acted in concert with 

Motorola and that the defendants “conspired to dismiss the Qui Tam case.” This is 

shown, according to the complaint, by Motorola’s seeking a longer time for the 

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scheduled trial in the state trial court, filing an amicus brief at the First DCA that 

allegedly contained false statements and claimed that the plaintiff’s case was 

frivolous, and giving donations “to candidates and committees helping to reelect 

Florida Department officials.”

Furthermore, the plaintiff states that he was harmed as a consequence of the 

defendants’ actions. In particular, the plaintiff suffered limited employment 

opportunities “because of the exposure of [the plaintiff as a] whistleblower,” and 

apparently also on account of statements by Motorola to the press depicting the 

plaintiff’s case as meritless. As a result, he became impoverished and was forced

to sell his home by the threat of foreclosure, ultimately taking refuge with family 

outside of the United States.

B.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this case in the District Court for the 

Northern District of Florida in 2018. His complaint, as amended, asserts thirteen 

counts, the first nine under the Due Process Clause or other Fourteenth 

Amendment provisions and the others under federal civil rights statutes.

A number of counts allege violations of substantive and procedural due 

process or raise related concepts of “rational basis test omission” or an “arbitrary 

and capricious” government action. Count V alleges the deprivation of a “vested 

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property interest . . . without due process,” and count VI alleges a deprivation of 

the plaintiff’s “liberty, the right to contract to engage in any of the common 

occupation[s] in life, a right to establish a home in the United States.” In addition, 

count III asserts an equal protection violation in which the plaintiff was “singled 

out for adverse, irrational government action.” And count IX alleges, among other 

things, that the plaintiff’s “privileges and immunities are abridged.”

Count X is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and alleges a “[c]onspiracy to 

interfere with civil rights,” and in particular a conspiracy “to deter . . . the relator as 

a witness . . . from attending and testifying” in his state court suit. Count XI

invokes § 1985(3) and alleges a deprivation of rights or privileges and an act in 

furtherance of a conspiracy “whereby another is injured in his person, liberty, or 

property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of 

the United States.” Finally, counts XII and XIII assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, including an allegation that the Florida Attorney General conspired or acted 

in concert with Motorola to injure the plaintiff and impede his lawsuit.

As remedies, the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages 

for “measurable monetary loss” due to the forced sale of the plaintiff’s home and 

other losses in the amount of $1,927,761, compensatory damages for “loss of 

reputation,” emotional distress, and associated harms in the amount of $9,000,000, 

and punitive damages. The plaintiff also requests “an injunction to reinstate the 

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scheduled Qui Tam trial” and an injunction requiring the government to comply

with the Fourteenth Amendment, apparently by showing a rational basis before 

dismissing a qui tam action.

The plaintiff’s complaint was screened in the District Court in accordance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis. 

The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal, and the plaintiff filed objections to 

the report and recommendation. The District Court then dismissed the case for 

lack of jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine.

II.

“[T]his Court may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground 

supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground was relied upon or even 

considered by the district court.” Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 

(11th Cir. 2012). We affirm the dismissal because the plaintiff’s complaint failed 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

At the core of the plaintiff’s case is the assertion that the Attorney General’s 

dismissal of his qui tam suit deprived him of a vested property interest, which 

could be construed as alleging a violation of the Takings Clause. However, a qui 

1 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84, 125 S. Ct. 

1517, 1521-22 (2005).

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tam action under the Florida FCA that has not concluded in a final judgment does 

not constitute a vested property right belonging to the relator. Under Florida law,

as explained by the First DCA, “[t]he Legislature is the sole authority of all rights 

granted private relators to file and litigate qui tam actions.” Barati II, 198 So. 3d at 

77. The Attorney General, rather than the relator, is the real party in interest in 

such an action and holds the substantive right to maintain or dismiss the suit, which 

is brought in the name of the State. Id. at 81-82, 84. “[T]he relator is and always 

remains an assignee of the State’s substantive right to prosecute a qui tam action,

albeit an assignee with some procedural prerogatives strictly defined by positive 

law and in no manner arising out of a common law or constitutional substantive

ground.” Id. at 81. In short, insofar as the qui tam suit is considered property, see 

id. at 82, it is the property of the State and not the relator. Likewise, “[i]n the 

analogous context of the [federal] False Claims Act, courts long ago rejected the 

argument that a constitutional protected property right vests upon initiating suit,” 

and “it is of no moment that [the relator] expended effort and resources in filing 

and pursuing the complaint.” Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 559 F. App’x 1042, 

1045 (Fed. Cir. 2012). There is hence no violation of the Takings Clause.

The plaintiff’s due process claims fail for similar reasons. “The 

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 

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Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 

(1972). The complaint does not identify any government action taken by the State 

that has deprived the plaintiff of a protected interest in liberty or property.

With respect to property, while the Due Process Clause encompasses a 

broader range of property interests than those protected by the Takings Clause, see 

Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1996), an interest 

can be considered property for due process purposes only if a person has “a 

legitimate claim of entitlement to it,” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709. 

Property interests are created and defined “by existing rules or understandings that 

stem from an independent source such as state law” and that “support claims of 

entitlement.” Id. In Roth, for instance, the Supreme Court considered the claim 

that a professor at a state university had a property interest in the renewal of his 

contract. The terms of his appointment, which “created and defined” his interest in 

employment, had no renewal provision, and there was no other state statute or 

university policy that secured a claim to renewal; hence, the Court held that the 

professor lacked a cognizable property interest in re-employment. Id. at 578, 92 S. 

Ct. at 2709-10. Here, likewise, any interest that the plaintiff had in the qui tam

action was created and defined by the Florida FCA, which expressly provided that

the State “may voluntarily dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the 

person initiating the action.” Fla. Stat. § 68.084(2)(a) (2009). “[T]here is no 

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common-law right for a relator to file a qui tam action,” Barati II, 198 So. 3d at 76,

and the facts alleged in the complaint provide no basis for inferring the existence 

of any other rule or understanding that would secure a claim to continuation of the 

suit following the State’s dismissal. Hence, the plaintiff did not have a legitimate 

claim of entitlement to prosecution of the qui tam action once the Attorney General 

dismissed it, and the State’s action did not deprive him of a protected property 

interest.

With respect to liberty, there is clearly no freestanding liberty interest in 

maintaining a qui tam suit. The plaintiff alleges that the State deprived him of his 

liberty by infringing on his “right to contract to engage in any of the common 

occupation[s] in life” and “right to establish a home in the United States.” The law 

recognizes the liberty of persons to engage in “the common occupations of life” 

and to “establish a home and bring up children.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S. Ct. 

at 2707 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626

(1923)). However, the plaintiff has identified no action by which the State has 

deprived him of any such liberty interest. The State did not restrain the plaintiff 

from engaging in any occupation or contracting for any form of employment, and 

it did not compel him to leave the country. The complaint therefore fails to state 

any claim of a violation of procedural due process.

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Substantive due process, on the other hand, primarily protects “fundamental” 

rights, though the analysis differs somewhat for executive action and legislative 

action. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994) (en 

banc). There is nothing in this case to suggest that any fundamental right is 

implicated; in fact, the complaint states that it concerns a “non-fundamental 

right.”2

 As we have held, “fundamental rights in the constitutional sense do not 

include ‘state-created rights,’” Hillcrest Prop., LLP v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.3d 1292, 

1297 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560), and the purely 

statutory right to prosecute a suit under the FCA is certainly state-created. Hence, 

in regard to the executive action of dismissing the plaintiff’s qui tam suit, there can 

be no substantive due process claim. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (“[A]reas in 

which substantive rights are created only by state law . . . are not subject to 

substantive due process protection under the Due Process Clause because 

2 The complaint also mentions “access to court at a meaningful time.” To the extent that 

the complaint raises a substantive due process claim based on the fundamental right of access to 

courts, see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004), that claim 

would be without merit. An access to courts claim requires identification of a “nonfrivolous, 

arguable” “underlying cause of action” which the defendant’s conduct prevented or is preventing 

the plaintiff from effectively pursuing. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15, 122 S. Ct. 

2179, 2186-87 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the plaintiff can no longer 

pursue his qui tam action against Motorola. In virtue of the State’s dismissal of that suit, 

however, the plaintiff now has no cause of action against Motorola that could serve as the 

requisite underlying claim. The dismissal did not simply prevent litigation of an existing cause 

of action but rather eliminated the plaintiff’s cause of action in its entirety. In particular, the 

right to bring the suit belongs to the State, with the relator being only an assignee, Barati II, 198 

So. 3d at 81, and when the State filed the dismissal notice it effectively withdrew the assignment 

of the action to the plaintiff.

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‘substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution.’” (quoting 

Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229, 106 S. Ct. 507, 515 (1985) 

(Powell, J., concurring))); Hillcrest, 915 F.3d at 1293, 1302.

3 In regard to 

legislative action, under substantive due process a statute not implicating a 

fundamental right is subject to rational basis review. Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 

750 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2014); TRM Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 941, 

945-46 (11th Cir. 1995). To the extent, then, that the complaint challenges the 

constitutionality of the FCA provision allowing for dismissal by the State 

notwithstanding a relator’s objection, substantive due process requires that this 

statute bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental end. TRM, 52 F.3d at 

946. This test is easily satisfied here. The statutory provision directly advances

the State’s interest in maintaining control of suits in which the State is the real 

party in interest and which aid in discharging the State’s responsibility to safeguard 

the public purse against fraud and other unlawful practices. Cf. Barati II, at 78-80 

(discussing separation-of-powers considerations). Since it is the State that is 

3 Under an alternative standard, substantive due process protects against executive action 

that is constitutionally arbitrary in that it “shocks the conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 

523 U.S. 833, 846-47, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716-17 (1998). Insofar as this formulation requires 

further analysis, this high standard clearly is not met here. As explained below in our discussion 

of equal protection, there are rational bases on which the State could have dismissed the 

plaintiff’s suit.

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wronged by an assertedly false claim, the State has the right to choose what 

response should or should not be taken toward the party responsible.

We turn now to the plaintiff’s equal protection claim. The complaint does 

not allege that the State discriminated against the plaintiff on account of any 

general characteristic such as race or nationality or membership in any social 

group; instead, the plaintiff simply alleges that he was “singled out” in an 

“arbitrary” and “irrational” fashion. The complaint thus seeks to raise what is 

known as a class-of-one equal protection claim, of the kind recognized in Village 

of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam). A 

government action challenged under a class-of-one theory is reviewed to determine 

whether there is a rational basis for any differential treatment of similarly situated 

persons. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 

2153 (2008). The class-of-one equal protection theory, however, does not apply to 

all forms of government action. The Supreme Court in Engquist held that it did 

not apply to public employment decisions, reasoning that the employment context

“by [its] nature involve[s] discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of 

subjective, individualized assessments.” Id. at 603, 128 S. Ct. at 2154. We have 

likewise found the class-of-one theory inapplicable to a state agency’s action of 

placing a credit union in conservatorship, on the ground that the agency’s decision 

was a discretionary one, of a “complex and multidimensional” character, for which 

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it needed to “be able to take into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances 

of the individual cases before it.” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1058 (11th 

Cir. 2019). The Attorney General’s decision to dismiss a qui tam lawsuit is also an 

essentially discretionary determination that, for the same basic reasons as those 

comprehended in the notion of prosecutorial discretion, requires consideration of a 

complex set of facts pertinent to each individual case. Hence, we do not think that 

the dismissal decision is subject to a class-of-one equal protection challenge.

Furthermore, even if the class-of-one theory were applicable in this context, 

the decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s qui tam action would pass the rational basis 

test. All that is necessary is that there be some conceivable reason supporting the

government action. See Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 

F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). Such bases for the State’s dismissal of the 

plaintiff’s suit can be seen from the complaint. The case was set for, but had not 

yet proceeded to, trial. The government might have needed to devote resources to 

monitoring the trial that it avoided expending by dismissing the suit. Cf. Swift v. 

United States, 318 F.3d 250, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Importantly, there are 

testimonial disputes in the case as to whether the AFIS system performed 

adequately, since the complaint itself indicates that the State’s project manager 

stated in an affidavit that he was pleased with the system. Indeed, the complaint 

discloses a number of specific disagreements between the plaintiff’s and the 

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project manager’s positions concerning the contractor selection process, the 

applicable quality standards for the product, and any need for warranty work. The 

complaint also asserts that the State decided to repurchase an additional AFIS 

system from the company to which the relevant Motorola division was transferred,

suggesting that the State may be continuing to work with the same entity or the 

same people that the plaintiff’s suit alleged to be responsible for fraud. These 

conflicts in the evidence or its interpretation, as well as the possible need for an 

ongoing working relationship with those involved, are rational bases for the State 

to exercise its discretion to discontinue a false claims action and not seek to impose 

penalties on a contractor. If the State’s officials think that a contractor’s product is 

satisfactory or that it would be unwarranted or disadvantageous to allow 

prosecution of a qui tam suit brought in its name, it is the State’s prerogative to 

dismiss the action in accordance with the statute. The plaintiff’s equal protection 

claim therefore must fail.

Count IX of the complaint appears to allege a violation of the Privileges or 

Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim is unfounded. We 

are aware of no authority for the proposition that the privileges or immunities of a 

citizen of the United States encompass a right to maintain a qui tam action 

notwithstanding the State’s statutorily authorized decision to dismiss it. Cf. Saenz 

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v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-04, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1526-27 (1999) (right to travel);

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-81 (1872).

Finally, the last four counts in the complaint allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 

1985(2)-(3) and § 1983. Count X alleges a conspiracy to “deter . . . the relator as a 

witness . . . from attending and testifying during the due co[u]rse of justice” in the 

scheduled trial or a scheduled motion hearing in his qui tam suit. The first clause 

of § 1985(2) imposes liability on persons who conspire to deter a witness “in any 

court of the United States” from attending or testifying in a proceeding in that 

court. A state court is not a “court of the United States” within the meaning of this 

provision, Seeley v. Bhd. of Painters, 308 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962),

4 and 

therefore this clause is inapplicable here; in addition, the scheduled trial and 

motion hearing were lawfully canceled when the state trial court ruled that it was 

divested of jurisdiction over the case. The second clause of § 1985(2) imposes 

liability on persons who “conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, 

obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State” 

with intent to deny a citizen the equal protection of the laws or injure a citizen for 

enforcing rights to the equal protection of the laws. No claim is stated under this 

clause either. The State’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s qui tam action in accordance 

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this 

court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

October 1, 1981.

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with the terms of the statute under which it was brought does not, on the facts of 

the complaint, constitute obstruction of justice. A claim under this clause also 

requires that the conspiracy involve a racial or otherwise class-based 

discriminatory animus, Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.

1981); see Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 722-23, 725-26, 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1485-

88 (1983), and no such animus is alleged here.

Count XI invokes § 1985(3) and alleges a “[d]epriv[ation] . . . of right[s] or 

privileges” in connection with a conspiracy causing injury or a deprivation of a 

right or privilege. Section 1985(3), in relevant part, proscribes conspiracies “for 

the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 

under the laws,” or for the purpose of preventing or hindering state authorities 

from securing the equal protection of the laws. This count fails to state a claim 

because this part of § 1985(3) again requires a racial or class-based animus not 

present in this case. Bradt, 634 F.2d at 801. The remaining two counts in the 

complaint are brought under § 1983, which imposes liability on persons who, 

under color of state law, deprive any person of “any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Section 1983 requires a 

deprivation of a right secured by federal law. Bradt, 634 F.2d at 799. As shown 

by our discussion of all the preceding counts, the complaint fails to state any claim

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for the violation of any federal right, and therefore the § 1983 claims must fail as 

well.

The claims in this case are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” such that 

they do not rise to the level of warranting the exercise of jurisdiction by a federal 

court. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946); Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998). The 

District Court was accordingly right to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.

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