Docket No. 105457.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

GEORGE K. BAILEY, Appellant.

Opinion filed February 5, 2009.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Section 12–603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS

5/12–603.1(f) (West 2004)) and section 108–1(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108–1(3) (West 2004)) both

provide that a law enforcement officer may not “search or inspect” a

passenger in a motor vehicle solely because the passenger has failed

to comply with the seat belt statute (625 ILCS 5/12–603.1(a) (West

2004)). The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether these

provisions were violated when a warrant check was run on the

defendant, George K. Bailey, a passenger in a vehicle stopped because

both the driver and defendant were not wearing seat belts. For the

reasons that follow, we conclude they were not.
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BACKGROUND

At approximately noon on July 2, 2005, Officer John Parry of the

Winnebago County sheriff’s office stopped a car after observing that

both the driver and front seat passenger, defendant George K. Bailey,

were not wearing seatbelts. After obtaining identification from the

driver and defendant, Parry returned to his squad car “to listen to the

license information and check for warrants.” The warrant check

revealed that defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for

misdemeanor domestic battery. Officer Parry arrested defendant,

handcuffed him, and placed him in the backseat of the squad car. He

then searched the interior of the stopped car. The search uncovered

cocaine. Defendant was subsequently convicted, in the circuit court of

Winnebago County, of possession of a controlled substance with

intent to deliver and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, defendant contended that his trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective because she failed to file a motion to quash

his arrest and suppress the cocaine found in the car. Defendant

contended that such a motion would have succeeded because the

warrant check conducted by Officer Parry was impermissible under

section 12–603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS

5/12–603.1(f) (West 2004)) and section 108–1(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108–1(3) (West 2004)) and,

without the results of the warrant check and the ensuing arrest, there

would have been no legal justification for the search of the car.

Further, according to defendant, a motion to suppress would have

succeeded because the search incident to arrest violated section

108–1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108–1(1)

(West 2004)), as well as the federal and state constitutions. The

appellate court rejected these contentions and affirmed defendant’s

conviction. 375 Ill. App. 3d 1055. We thereafter granted defendant’s

petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that he was denied his

sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his

trial attorney failed to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress the
 

1Before the appellate court, the State argued that defendant had waived

any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The appellate court rejected this

argument (375 Ill. App. 3d at 1059-60) and the State does not renew it here.

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drug evidence found in the car.1 To establish ineffective assistance of

counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was

deficient and that prejudice resulted from that deficiency. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052

(1984). An attorney’s performance must be evaluated from counsel’s

perspective at the time the contested action was taken and will be

considered constitutionally deficient only if it is objectively

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687-89, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-94, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. In

order to prove prejudice with regard to the failure to seek the

suppression of evidence, the defendant must “show that the unargued

suppression motion was meritorious and that there is a reasonable

probability that the verdict would have been different without the

excludable evidence.” People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 146 (1998),

citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305,

319, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2582-83 (1986); People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d

74, 108 (1996).

As he did before the appellate court, defendant contends that there

are four arguments which counsel should have raised in a motion to

suppress. We address these arguments in turn.

Section 12–603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and Section

108–1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 12–603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS

5/12–603.1(f) (West 2004)) provides:

“A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a

motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely

because of a [seat-belt violation].”

Section 108–1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS

5/108–1(3) (West 2004)) contains identical language:

“A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a

motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely
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because of a violation of Section 12–603.1 of the Illinois

Vehicle Code.”

Defendant contends that a warrant check is both a “search” and

“inspection” within the meaning of sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3)

and therefore prohibited under these provisions when the sole offense

committed is a seat-belt violation. Thus, according to defendant, the

warrant check run by Officer Parry in this case was illegal and his trial

counsel could have filed a successful motion to suppress the fruits of

the warrant check, including the cocaine, on this basis. We disagree.

“The law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal

sense.” Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395, 64 L. Ed. 322,

323, 40 S. Ct. 185, 186 (1920). See also Case v. Los Angeles Lumber

Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115, 84 L. Ed. 110, 119, 60 S. Ct. 1, 7

(1939) (“we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are

employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the

law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the

contrary”); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction

§46:04, at 152-53 (6th ed. 2000) (“if the term utilized has a settled

legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the legislature

intended to incorporate the established meaning”). The prohibition

against conducting a “search” was included in sections 12–603.1(f)

and 108–1(3) when they were enacted in 2003. See Pub. Act 93–99,

eff. July 3, 2003; 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1061. Then, as now, the term

“search” had a settled meaning in the realm of criminal procedure

which was derived from fourth amendment law: an examination of a

person’s body, property or other area in which the person has a

reasonable expectation of privacy. SeeKatz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967); Black’s Law Dictionary

1351 (7th ed. 1999).

It has long been held that the existence of an arrest warrant is a

matter of public record. Gist v. Macon County Sheriff’s Department,

284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (1996). Recent decisions continue to adhere

to this principle. See People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 233 (2008);

People v. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (2006). By definition,

a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public

matters. Because a warrant check does not implicate any area of

privacy, it is not a search under sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3),
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and it is not prohibited by those provisions. Accordingly, a motion to

suppress filed on this ground would not have been successful.

Defendant maintains, however, that even if a warrant check is not

a search, it is an inspection within the meaning of sections 12–603.1(f)

and 108–1(3) and thus is impermissible. According to defendant, the

plain meaning of the term “inspect” is not limited to “physical or

corporeal inspections” but may also include the investigation of a

passenger’s past wrongdoing that occurs during a warrant check. The

State, in response, maintains that sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3)

say nothing about prohibiting an inspection of a passenger’s public

records. Thus, in the view of the State, the plain meaning of the

statutory provisions is that only the physical inspection of a passenger

is prohibited.

The appellate court below concluded that the word “inspect” is

ambiguous in the context of sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3). See

375 Ill. App. 3d at 1062-64. The appellate court noted that several

dictionaries offer definitions of the term which can be used to support

either party’s position. Moreover, as the appellate court explained,

various intrinsic aids to construction do not resolve the word’s

meaning but, instead, only add ambiguity. 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1063.

We agree with the appellate court that the word “inspect” is

ambiguous in the context of this case. Unlike the term “search,” the

word “inspect” does not have a settled meaning in the law of criminal

procedure and may reasonably be read in more than one way.

Because the meaning of the word “inspect” is unclear, it is

appropriate to consider legislative history in order to determine the

legislature’s intent in adopting this term. People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d

195, 203 (1992). Senator Cullerton, the sponsor of Public Act 93–99,

stated during the debates on the bill that the prohibition against a

search or inspection was included to “reassure people” that a police

stop for a seat-belt violation “doesn’t give [law enforcement] any

extra right to go in and search someone’s car.” The Senator explained

that

“for the purposes of legislative intent, to make it clear.

Whatever the current practice is, whatever the current law is,

as set by case law or by *** statute, as to allowing police

officers to search vehicles, that’s not changed by *** this bill.”
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93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2003, at

27-28 (statements of Senator Cullerton).

Additional debate in the Senate further clarifies the legislative

intent:

“SENATOR OBAMA:

A second question, because I’ve heard a couple of

concerns. I just want to make sure. With respect to search and

seizure rules and regulations, I want to *** clarify this. Under

current law, if you are pulled over for a taillight being out ***

what are the rules currently governing whether a search can

take place, based on an ordinary traffic stop?

***

SENATOR CULLERTON:

Well, *** I assume it’s probably more case law than

statute, but *** the Supreme Court has kind of set out

through their decisions situations where police officers have

the right to go in and search in someone’s car, in the trunk or

whatever. That *** remains the same. Whatever those laws

are, whatever that case law is, that remains the same with this

bill. We only wanted to make sure people knew that this

particular bill doesn’t give one any extra right to go into a

search where they otherwise could not.” 93d Ill. Gen. Assem.,

Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2003, at 30-31 (statements of

Senators Obama and Cullerton).

A discussion between Representatives Franks and Beaubien in the

Illinois House reveals the same understanding:

“Franks: ‘Okay. I’m not sure I understand... I guess my

analysis here says that this would say that they can... that a

police officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle that

was stopped solely because of a seatbelt violation.’

Beaubien: ‘That’s correct, that’s part of the law... part of

the Act, yes.’

* * *

Franks: ‘But isn’t it the law right now that you can’t

search a vehicle unless there’s probable cause?’
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Beaubien: ‘I believe that’s correct, but there seemed to be

some need to put this in the Bill so it was very specific to all

parties involved this would not be used for a method of

stopping cars and searching vehicles with the normal

exceptions for open view and so forth.’

* * *

Franks: ‘Okay. ’Cause I’m just trying to figure out what

we’re *** doing here and I’m not trying ... no offense, I’m

just not sure I understand this. Because right now, I know the

law has probable cause and I’m not sure what this Bill does

any differently than maybe just codifying case law?’

Beaubien: ‘Representative Franks, *** this is not an area

that I am familiar with. I put the language in there because I

believe it sets forth what’s already in the law.’ ” 93d Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, May 20, 2003, at 26-27

(statements of Representatives Franks and Beaubien).

We think it abundantly clear, based on the legislative debates, that

the General Assembly did not intend for sections 12–603.1(f) and

108–1(3) to provide any additional rights above and beyond those

guaranteed by the search provision of the federal constitution. Stated

otherwise, the term “inspect” in the statutory provisions provides no

protection beyond that provided by the term “search.” And, as

previously noted, a warrant check is not a prohibited search.

In a further argument, however, defendant contends that

statements made during the legislative debates show that the meaning

of sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3) is controlled by the fourth

amendment case law which was in effect at the time the statutes were

enacted. See 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2003,

at 28 (statements of Senator Cullerton) (“Whatever the current

practice is, whatever the current law is, as set by case law or by ***

statute, as to allowing police officers to search vehicles, that’s not

changed by *** this bill”). Defendant notes that, when sections

12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3) were enacted in 2003, this court’s opinion

in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), was the law. Gonzalez

held that for a traffic stop to comport with the fourth amendment, the

scope of the stop must not be fundamentally altered. Defendant

further notes that, in People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515 (2003) (Harris
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I), this court applied the Gonzalez scope analysis and held that a

warrant check run on a passenger after the driver had been stopped

for a traffic violation impermissibly changed the fundamental nature

of the stop to a criminal investigation. Defendant acknowledges that

Harris I was subsequently vacated by the United States Supreme

Court (see Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L. Ed. 2d 94, 125

S. Ct. 1292 (2005)), and that the Gonzalez scope analysis was

overruled by this court in People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222 (2008)

(Harris II). Nevertheless, defendant argues that Harris I should

govern our interpretation of sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3)

because that decision reflected the legislature’s intent at the time the

provisions were enacted. And, according to defendant, under the

reasoning of Harris I, the warrant check run in this case was

impermissible.

Defendant misconstrues the scope of Harris I. In Harris I the

warrant check was run on the passenger after the driver had been

stopped for making an illegal left turn. Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at 517-18.

The warrant check altered the scope of the stop because the passenger

had nothing to do with the traffic violation. Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at

526-27. In this case, in contrast, the stop of the car was based on

defendant’s own failure to comply with the seat-belt law. Indeed,

Harris I specifically excluded from its holding those situations where

the passenger himself has violated a traffic law. Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d

at 531. See also 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §9.3(c), at 389 (4th

ed. 2004) (discussing Harris I with approval and noting that warrant

checks on passengers should be permissible when “ ‘the passenger has

violated a traffic law’ ”), quoting Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at 531. Harris

I thus provides no support for defendant’s contention that a warrant

check was impermissible in this case.

A motion to suppress filed on the ground that a warrant check was

prohibited under sections 12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3) would not have

been successful. Defendant therefore suffered no prejudice from

counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress on this basis.

Accordingly, this portion of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance

counsel is without merit.
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Section 108–1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Defendant also maintains that a motion to suppress would have

succeeded had it alleged that the search of the car violated section

108–1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108–1(1)

(West 2004)). Section 108–1(1) provides:

“Search without warrant. (1) When a lawful arrest is

effected a peace officer may reasonably search the person

arrested and the area within such person’s immediate presence

for the purpose of:

(a) Protecting the officer from attack; or

(b) Preventing the person from escaping; or

(c) Discovering the fruits of the crime; or

(d) Discovering any instruments, articles, or things which

may have been used in the commission of, or which may

constitute evidence of, an offense.” 725 ILCS 5/108–1(1)

(West 2004).

Defendant contends that because Officer Parry lacked reasonable

cause to search the car for one of the purposes set forth in section

108–1(1), and because the car was not within defendant’s “immediate

presence” when it was searched, the search violated the statute.

According to defendant, trial counsel could have filed a successful

motion to dismiss on this basis.

The appellate court below rejected this argument, in part, based

on People v. Hering, 27 Ill. App. 3d 936 (1975). See 375 Ill. App. 3d

at 1069-70. Hering explained that nothing in the language of section

108–1(1), or the committee comments thereto, suggests that the

statute “is to be exclusive. Rather, it authorizes searches incident to

arrest within prescribed bounds as to area and purpose.” Hering, 27

Ill. App. 3d at 941. In other words, according to Hering, section

108–1(1) is permissive, not restrictive. The statute lists several

instances in which police “may” conduct a search incident to arrest.

See also People v. Zeller, 51 Ill. App. 3d 935, 939 (1977) (section

108–1(1) “authorizes the search of an arrestee for a variety of

reasons”). But, according to Hering, the statute does not state that an

officer’s authority to search is limited solely to those instances and

that any other search is impermissible.

In determining whether an attorney’s performance is deficient,

every effort must “be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
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hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct.

2065. Hering, which was decided in 1975, was controlling authority

at the time of defendant’s trial in 2005. Hering foreclosed any

argument that the search at issue in this case was illegal under section

108–1(1). “Conduct of a lawyer will not be deemed deficient for his

or her failure to make an argument that has no basis in the law.”

People v. King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 197 (2000). Defendant’s trial counsel

was not deficient for declining to pursue the argument advanced here.

Accordingly, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in

this regard fails.

Federal Constitution

Defendant also contends that the search incident to his arrest

violated his rights under the fourth amendment. To understand

defendant’s argument, it is necessary to place it in context.

In 1969, the United States Supreme Court held, in Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969),

that police may conduct a search incident to arrest of the arrestee’s

person and an area within his “immediate control” in order to protect

the safety of the officers and prevent the destruction of incriminating

evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 89 S. Ct. at

2040. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S.

Ct. 2860 (1981), the Supreme Court applied Chimel to automobile

searches and created a bright-line rule to guide police in determining

the permissible area of an automobile search incident to arrest:

“[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the

occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of

that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”

Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.

Thereafter, in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L.

Ed. 2d 905, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004), the Court applied Belton and

upheld a search of a suspect’s car incident to arrest when the officer’s

initial contact with the suspect was outside the vehicle. The Court held

that so long as the arrestee was a “recent occupant” of a motor

vehicle, the police may search the car as an incident to a lawful arrest.

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 915, 124 S. Ct. at 2132.
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In an opinion concurring in the judgment in Thornton, Justice

Scalia concluded that where a defendant is handcuffed and secured in

the backseat of a squad car, the Chimel rationales cannot logically

apply because the risk that the defendant would grab a weapon or

evidentiary item from his car is “remote in the extreme.” Thornton,

541 U.S. at 625, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 916, 124 S. Ct. at 2133 (Scalia, J.,

concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia did

not advocate ovverruling Belton. Instead, he contended that the

Belton bright-line rule should be applied “to cases where it is

reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be

found in the vehicle.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632, 158 L. Ed. 2d at

920, 124 S. Ct. at 2137 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg,

J.).

Noting the foregoing, defendant now “asks this court to adopt as

a matter of federal constitutional law an analytical approach which

encompasses Justice Scalia’s restrictive approach to Belton and

supportsChimel’s narrow construction of the search incident to arrest

exception to the warrant requirement, authorizing searches

unsupported by probable cause only where necessary to protect officer

safety and preserve incriminating evidence.” Defendant points out that

the United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in

People v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640 (2007), cert. granted, ___

U.S. ___, 170 L. Ed. 2d 274, 128 S. Ct. 1443 (2008), wherein the

Arizona Supreme Court held that once an arrestee is handcuffed,

placed in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of an

officer, the warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified

under Belton or Chimel. Defendant contends that we should apply the

reasoning of Justice Scalia, as well as the Arizona Supreme Court in

Gant, to the facts of this case and “determine that the warrantless

search of [defendant’s] car violated the Fourth Amendment” because

neither officer safety nor the preservation of evidence was at risk once

defendant was placed in the squad car.

Defendant’s argument is misplaced. Whether or not this court

should adopt a particular application of the Belton rule going forward

is irrelevant to the question before this court, i.e., whether defendant’s

trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a motion

to suppress. In answering that question, and in particular whether

counsel’s performance was deficient, the proper focus of our analysis

must be on the facts and law known to counsel at the time of
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defendant’s trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694,

104 S. Ct. at 2065. At that time, case law uniformly held that a search

incident to arrest was permissible under facts similar to the ones at

bar.

For example, in People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498 (1994), this

court expressly rejected the defendant’s argument that a vehicle search

was impermissible because the defendant was handcuffed and seated

in the back of a squad car and, thus, there was no danger that he could

reach weapons or evidence. We stated: “it is *** settled that the

validity of a Belton search ‘is not affected by the circumstance that

defendant no longer had effective access to his vehicle when the

search was conducted.’ ” Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d at 506, quoting State v.

Grass, 250 N.J. Super. 74, 77, 593 A.2d 379, 381 (1991).

The appellate court had held likewise. See, e.g., People v. Kalivas,

207 Ill. App. 3d 415, 418 (1991) (“ ‘under Belton, a search of the

vehicle is allowed even after the defendant was removed from it,

handcuffed, and placed in the squad car’ ”), quoting 3 W. LaFave,

Search & Seizure §7.1(c), at 15 (2d ed. 1987); People v. Allibalogun,

312 Ill. App. 3d 515 (2000); People v. Loftus, 111 Ill. App. 3d 978

(1983). See also United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1505-06

(7th Cir. 1989).

As noted, an attorney’s performance “will not be deemed deficient

for his or her failure to make an argument that has no basis in the

law.” King, 192 Ill. 2d at 197. At the time of defendant’s trial, case

law was clear that Officer Parry’s search of the stopped car did not

violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights solely because defendant

had been secured in the backseat of the squad car. Trial counsel was

therefore not deficient for failing to raise this argument in a motion to

suppress. Accordingly, this portion of defendant’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is without merit.

State Constitution

Defendant also contends that the search of the stopped car

violated his rights under article I, section 6, of the Illinois

Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. As with his argument with

respect to the federal constitution, defendant contends that the search

violated the Illinois constitution because he was secured in the squad

car at the time of the search and neither officer safety nor the
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preservation of evidence was at risk. Again, we believe this argument

is misplaced.

In People v. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d 26 (2002), this court considered

“whether Belton’s bright-line rule extends to a situation where the first

contact the defendant has with the officer occurs after [the defendant

has exited] the vehicle.” Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36. The issue was

addressed under both the fourth amendment and the Illinois

Constitution. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 33-34. Although we ultimately

concluded that the Belton rule did not apply under the facts presented,

our analysis discussed the scope of the Belton rule at length (Stehman,

203 Ill. 2d at 36-42), and necessarily “presumed that, to the extent

Belton allowed the search, Belton was controlling.” See 375 Ill. App.

3d at 1076. Thus, Stehman may reasonably be read for the proposition

that the Belton rule applies not only as matter of fourth amendment

law, but as a matter of Illinois constitutional law as well. And, as

noted previously, case law at the time of defendant’s trial uniformly

held that the Belton bright-line rule applied in situations where the

defendant was stopped while in a vehicle, was arrested, and was then

secured in a squad car. See, e.g., Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d at 506.

Given these facts, we cannot say that trial counsel’s conduct fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness (Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064), when she failed to

file a motion to suppress on state constitutional grounds. Accordingly,

this portion of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

also fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant’s trial

counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress.

Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Affirmed.