Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1709-JT-2144 | April 16, 2018 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Amy P. Payne

Monroe County Public Defender

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Robert J. Henke

Deputies Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

D.P., K.P., and M.P. (Minor 

Children), 

 and

J.P. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 16, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

53A01-1709-JT-2144

Appeal from the Monroe Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

53C07-1605-JT-318

53C07-1605-JT-319

53C07-1605-JT-320
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1709-JT-2144 | April 16, 2018 Page 2 of 11

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] J.P. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to D.P., K.P., 

and M.P. (“the Children”), upon the petition of the Monroe County 

Department of Child Services (“the DCS”). Mother presents the sole issue of 

whether the DCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, the requisite 

statutory elements to support the termination decision. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother gave birth to three children, in 2000, 2002, and 2008.1 The eldest child, 

D.P., has spina bifida and uses a wheelchair. The DCS became involved with 

the family after school personnel reported that D.P.’s catheter was not properly 

drained and he was sitting in a stained, urine-soaked chair, and Mother’s 

boyfriend called 9-1-1 to report that Mother was suicidal. On May 15, 2015, 

Mother received a drug screen and tested positive for THC, the active 

ingredient in marijuana. On May 27, 2015, she tested positive for 

methamphetamine. At that time, the Children were removed from Mother’s 

care. They were placed in the home of Mother’s parents (“Grandparents”).

 

1 Their father, Mother’s former husband, is not an active party to this appeal.
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[3] On July 13, 2015, the Children were found to be Children in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”). Mother admitted the allegations that the Children were CHINS 

due to medical neglect and Mother’s drug use. She was ordered to participate 

in various services, including substance abuse assessment, drug screening, and 

individual therapy. She was also ordered to maintain an appropriate home and 

permit service providers to visit the home.

[4] Mother was evaluated by a therapist and diagnosed with cannabis use disorder 

and an unspecified personality disorder with antisocial traits. Her subsequent 

participation in services was sporadic. She attended some therapy sessions and,

on a few occasions, met with a caseworker and home-based services provider. 

However, Mother was unwilling to provide a full substance-abuse history and 

did not facilitate any home visit. Her services were suspended due to lack of 

compliance, and she did not visit with any of the Children.2 The DCS 

scheduled 59 drug screens for Mother. She failed to show up for 11 screens and 

had positive results for 44 of the 48 drug screens administered; 4 were negative. 

Primarily, Mother tested positive for THC, but she repeatedly expressed an 

unwillingness to forgo marijuana use.

[5] On May 17, 2016, the DCS petitioned for termination of Mother’s parental 

rights. A fact-finding hearing was conducted on April 25, 2017 and May 23, 

 

2 At the request of the eldest two children, the CHINS court entered an order that no visitation between 

Mother and her eldest children take place. However, Mother was not prohibited from visitation with the 

youngest child, who expressed a desire to see Mother. Mother was informed that her visitation rights as to 

her youngest child were not suspended, but she never affirmatively requested visitation.
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2017. On August 2, 2017, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. Mother now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] When we review whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we 

will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 

1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). We will consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. In so doing, we give 

“due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). We will set aside 

the trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of 

Child Servs, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). In order to determine whether 

a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial 

court’s judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly 

supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the 

judgment. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132. 

Requirements for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

[7] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re 

Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind. 2014). Although parental rights are 

of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of those 
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rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 

147 (Ind. 2005). The State is required to prove that termination is appropriate 

by a showing of clear and convincing evidence, a higher burden than 

establishing a mere preponderance. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1144.

[8] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out the elements that the DCS must 

allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence in order to terminate a 

parent-child relationship:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six 

(6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not 

required, including a description of the court’s finding, the date 

of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been 

under the supervision of a local office or probation department 

for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) 

months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of 

services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 
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the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of

the child.

[9] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, and 

therefore the court need only find that one of the three requirements of 

subsection (b)(2)(B) was established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

Analysis

[10] Mother contends that insufficient evidence supports the termination decision. 

She concedes that the Children have been removed for the requisite time period 

and she does not specifically challenge the proof as to the element of a 

satisfactory plan. She focuses upon whether there is clear and convincing 

evidence of a reasonable probability that she would fail to remedy the 

conditions that led to the Children’s removal or that continuation of the parentchild relationships poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. She also focuses 

upon whether the DCS established by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the Children’s best interests.

[11] Remedying Conditions. Mother argues “it was clear error for the trial court to 

enter a judgment of termination against Mother when it was made clear that 
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Mother was working to rectify the issues that resulted in removal of children 

from the parental home in the first place.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. According 

to Mother, the trial court’s factual findings as to her non-compliance and 

inconsistent cooperation with services are clearly erroneous. Mother asserts 

that she “reasonably complied” in light of her unfamiliarity with the legal 

process and “the gravity of her personal situation.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. At 

the termination hearing, Mother had admitted to failing to maintain contact 

with the DCS and her attorney, failing to complete therapy, failing almost all 

her drug screens, and not arranging visitation or a home inspection. She 

conceded that she was not informed as to the Children’s educational progress or 

medical procedures. However, she explained that she had gone through an

eviction, was depressed by her sons’ rejection of visitation, and sometimes felt

that her efforts were futile. 

[12] In determining whether the conditions resulting in the children’s removal will 

not likely be remedied, a “two-step analysis” is employed. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 

636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; 

and second, we must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that 

those conditions will not be remedied. Id at 643. In the second step, the trial 

court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, 

taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. Id. (citing Bester, 

839 N.E.2d at 152). The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. Id. The trial court has 

discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only 
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shortly before termination. Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to 

changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past 

behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[13] Here, the Children were removed because of medical neglect and Mother’s drug 

use. In this regard, the trial court made several factual findings: Mother 

intermittently participated in therapeutic services; she was inconsistent with 

participation and sometimes not candid with her providers; one lapse of 

services extended to six months; Mother took limited accountability for her 

situation; Mother failed most drug screens administered to her; Mother stated 

to multiple persons that she did not intend to stop using marijuana; Mother had 

a pattern of failing to meet D.P.’s medical needs; Riley Children’s Hospital 

personnel were unable to reach Mother during D.P.’s admission; and Mother 

had not made meaningful progress toward enhancing her parental abilities.

[14] The findings have evidentiary support. Family Case Manager Amanda Grossi 

(“FCM Grossi”) testified that Mother did not maintain contact with DCS – it 

became “kind of hit and miss.” (Tr. at 141.) FCM Grossi also testified 

regarding Mother’s attitude toward marijuana use and her opposition to 

services. Although Mother cooperated with the administration of numerous 

drug screens, she failed most of them and expressed the opinion that she did not 

need services to be successful. Mother also asserted that marijuana was legal in 

some other states and opined that the DCS should offer her a reward for ceasing 

marijuana use. At times, Mother self-reported that she had ceased using 

marijuana, in contradiction to the drug screen results. 
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[15] Court Appointed Special Advocate Angie Raymond (“the CASA”) testified 

that Mother initially refused to engage with her while reportedly “trying to get 

her life stabilized.” (Tr. at 179.) Mother later engaged with the CASA, but 

“consistently stated she was not willing to consider herself as someone who is 

dependent on substances and she was not going to engage in removing her use 

of marijuana from her life.” (Tr. at 180.) The CASA explained that visitation 

had been arranged for Mother and her youngest child, but Mother failed to 

show up for the first visit, and then failed to confirm a second visit. According 

to the CASA, the child was very upset and the CASA would no longer 

recommend visitation. Mother’s home-based case worker testified that she was 

unable to gain access to Mother’s home and Mother’s services were terminated 

for non-compliance, specifically: “I was unable to get her to return contact [sic] 

for appointments and to show for appointments that were scheduled.” (Tr. at 

51.) Similarly, Mother’s therapist testified that Mother had stopped attending 

sessions and he had attempted to reach her to reinstate services, without 

success.

[16] In sum, the DCS presented evidence that Mother did not perceive that she had 

a substance abuse problem and did not complete any of the services offered to 

her. Mother insists that she “truly worked to remedy the conditions of her 

family situation” but the trial court “failed to fully appreciate” her efforts. 

Appellant’s Brief at 23. In essence, Mother is asking that we reweigh the 

evidence and accord greater weight to her testimony of employment, current 

housing stability, and future aspirations. We will not do so. In re V.A., 51 
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N.E.3d at 1143. The DCS presented clear and convincing evidence from which 

the trial court could conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that led to the Children’s removal will not be remedied.3 

[17] Best Interests. Mother also contends that the DCS did not present clear and 

convincing evidence that termination is in the Children’s best interests. In 

determining what is in a child’s best interests, the court must look to the totality 

of the evidence. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. 

denied. Here, there is evidence that the Children have progressed in 

Grandparents’ care, where they receive appropriate educational instruction and 

medical care. Grandparents have expressed a willingness to adopt the Children 

and the Children have expressed a desire to be adopted by Grandparents. 

Meanwhile, Mother has not availed herself of services so as to maintain 

relationships with the Children and make meaningful progress in remedying the 

conditions that led to removal. The GAL and FCM Grossi recommended 

termination of Mother’s parental rights.

[18] We have previously held that recommendations by the case manager and 

CASA to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions 

resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 1158-

 

3 Because one of the three requirements of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) has been met, we need 

not address Mother’s argument that continuation of the parent-child relationships does not pose a threat to 

the Children. 
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59. Here, the DCS showed, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination 

of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests.

Conclusion

[19] The DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the requisite elements to 

support the termination of parental rights. 

[20] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.