i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 28 9- CV CI TY OF SAN AN TON IO , Appellant
v . Emeterio a

nd Rosa Maria DE M IG UE L , Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 5, Be x ar County , Texas Trial Court No. 304,367 Honora ble H. Paul Canales, Judge Presiding Opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: Febr uary 3, 2010 REVERSED AND RENDERED This is an acc eler ated a

ppeal f rom the trial court’s de nial of the City of San Antonio’s (“ the City ”) pl ea to the jur isdiction. W e re verse and re nder a judgme nt dismi ssing a

ppellees’ nuisance
c l a i m a g a i n s tt h e C i t y.04
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- 2- BACK GR OUND I n September 1965, the City ’s Public Works Department a pproved Stree t and Dra inag e Plans (“Plans”) for the c onstruction of the Nor th Star Hills S ubdivision Unit -5. Pursuant t o the Plans, a
concr ete- lined open dra inag e cha nnel—construc ted by

an outside deve loper—dire cts wate r flow fr om t wo no rt he rn are a s o f t he su bd ivi sio n o nto Ta

ra Dr ive , w he re the wate r f low c omb ine s w ith draina g e from Ta

ra D rive a nd discharg es it onto L orene L ane. T he Plans instructed the de veloper to g ra de the str e e t and pr op e rt ie s at the e nd of Ta ra Dr ive in or de r to dir e c t the dr a ina g e of wate r t o L orene L ane. Specifica lly , the Plans instruc ted the develope r to f ill in L ot 8 to a minimum of one foot above the top of the curb in or der to c ontain the draina g e within the r ight- of-wa y . This did not happen. Appellee s Emeterio a

nd Rosa Maria D e Mig uel (“ the plaintiffs”) own and reside at 502 Tara Drive—the trac t former ly known as L ot 8. On September 7, 1989, the plaintiffs sued the City for p r o p e rt y d a m a g e t o t h e i r r e s i d e n c e . T h e l aw s u i t a l l e g e d t h e C i t y “ c o n s t r

u c t e d a dr a i n a g e f

a c i l i t y”
near the plaintiffs’ r esidenc e that divert ed s u rf ace water onto their proper

ty during rainfa ll. After a benc h trial, the trial cour t rende red judg ment ag ainst the City and awa rded the plaintiffs $25,000 in d a ma g e s, wh ic h th e City pa id t o p la int if

fs
. On July 13 , 2 00 5, the p la int if

fs fi le d th e un de rl y

inglaws uit

a g a ins t th e City

fo r i nv e rs e condemnation and nuisance , alleg ing he avy rains diver

t flood water s onto their proper ty by way of a City -owne d storm water draina g e cha

nnel. I n response , on May 30, 2006, the City filed its orig inal plea t o t he jurisdiction and tra ditional and no evidenc e motions for summary judgme nt. On September 29, 2006, the City filed its supp l em en t al plea to the jurisdiction and tra ditional and no evidenc e motions for summary judgme nt. I n its supplementa l motions for summary judgme nt the04
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- 3- City argue d, a mon g oth e r thi ng s, that th e pla int if fs ’ c la ims we re ba

rr e d b y re s ju dic a ta

and the statut e of lim itatio ns . O n M ay

30 , 2 00 7, the tr ia l c ourt

he ld a he ari ng on th e mot ion s and su bs e qu e ntl y ruled “ that [t he City ’s] Moti on as to Plaintiffs’ suit for I nverse Condemnation under Ar ticle 1 § 17 of the Te xas C on sti tut ion

is m e ri tor iou s and sh ou ld in a ll thi ng s be g ra nte d .
. . .” Th e tr ia l c ourt

did not rule on the City ’s plea to the jur isdiction. On May 7, 2009, the City filed another plea to the jurisdiction on the nuisance claim alleg ing (1 ) t he tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra

nti ng of its mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a s to the pla int if fs ’ i nv e rs e condemnation claim is a conclusion “that the City lacke d the re quisite intent to be held liable under Article I , § 17 o f t h e T ex as Constitut ion” and ( 2) the plaintiffs did not alleg e the City took any intentional act to damag e their proper ty . The plaintiffs did not file a response , but at the hear ing on the City ’s plea, the plaintiffs relied on the ir response to the C ity ’s 2006 pl ea to the jur isdiction and on their own pre viously

filed motion for partial summary judgme nt. I n those pleading s, the plaintiffs alleg ed the City

“knows that the ma intenance of its drainag e fa cility , taken tog ether with rec urre nt heavy rain, is ca

using ide ntifiable har

m to the property

. . . .” The trial court held a hear ing on the plea a nd subsequently

denied it. This acc eler ated a ppeal by the City ensued. SOV ER EIG N I M M UN ITY Sovereig n immunit y

deprive s a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction f or lawsuits in whic h the g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty

ha s b e e n s ue d unles s it co ns e nts to s uit and , th us , s ov e re ig n im mun ity

is p r o p e r ly a s s e rte d in a p le a to th e ju r is d ic tion. T

ex. D ep’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 224-26 (Te x . 2004). In its sole issue on appeal, the City argues the trial court does not have subje ct-matter

jurisdiction over the pl aintiffs’ nuisanc e cla im because (1) g overnme ntal04
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- 4- immunit y has not clea

rly been w aived by

statute and (2) the nui sance does not rise to the level of a
co n s t i tu t i o n al t ak i n g.

NUISANCE RISING TO LEVEL O F CONSTIT UTIONAL TAKING Nu isa nc e lia bil ity ari ses o nly

wh e n g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity is c le arl y and un a mbi g uo us ly waived. City of Dallas v. Jennings , 142 S.W .3d 310, 316 (Tex. 2004). I n some ca ses, a c ity may be held liable f

or a non- neg lige nt nuisan ce—that is, one that rises to the level of a constitutional taking
. Id. ; see Cozby v . City of W aco , 1 1 0 S
. W
. 3 d

3 2 , 4 0 ( T e x . A p p . —W a c o 2 0 0 2 , n o p e t . )
. In
o t h er s , t h e Te x as Tort Claims Act may waive immunity

from nuisanc e cla ims. Miranda , 133 S.W. 3d a t 22 5; see T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 101.021 (Ve rnon 2005). He re, the plaintiffs do n o t as s er t t here exis ts any statutory waiver of immunity

and we have f

ound none; there fore , we c onclude ther e is no statutory waiver
. Consequ en t l y , the City can only be liable f

or
a non-neg lige nt nuisa

nce r ising to the leve l of a c onstitut ional taking
. See J ennings , 142 S.W .3d at 312. A rti c le I , s e c ti o n1 7 o f th e T e xa s Co n s ti tu

ti o n
—th e “ ta k in g s ” c la

u s e
— p r o v id e s “ [n ]o pe rs on ’s pr op e rt

y sh a ll b e take n, dama g e d o r de str oy e d for or a pp lie d to publ ic us e wi tho ut a de qu a te compensation being made, unless by the consent of such per son.” T EX . C O N ST . art. I , § 17 (ame nded 2009). At the he art of the taking s clause lies the premise that the g overnme nt should not “f orc[e] some people a lone to be ar public burdens which, in a ll f airne ss a nd justice, should be borne by the public as a w hole.” Steele v . City of Houston , 6 0 3 S
. W
. 2 d 7 8 6 , 7 8 9 (T ex . 1 9 8 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Armstrong v. United States , 8 0 S. Ct. 15 63 , 15 69 (19 60 )). To pr op e rl y a sse rt a no n- ne g lig e nt n

uis anc e c la im ag ainst a g overnme ntal entity , a par ty must plead and show the f o l l owing elements: (1) the g overnme ntal entity

i n t en t i o n ally

perf ormed a n act in the e x erc ise of its lawful author ity ; (2) that04
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- 5- resulted in the taking , damag ing, or destruction of the party ’s prope rty ; ( 3 ) fo r p u b l i c use. Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co. , 39 S.W .3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001)
. Her e, the City ’s plea to the jurisdiction challeng ed only the first ele ment; there fore , we lim it our analy sis to whether a fac t issue exis ts on the question of whethe r the Ci ty intentionally perf ormed a n act that r ises to the level
o f a t ak i n g. Th e Ci ty ’s f

ir st a rgume nt i s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt , b y dis mis sin g the pla int if

fs ’ i nv e rs e
c on de mnatio n c la im, c on c lud e d “ the City la c ke d th e re qu isi te int e nt to be he ld l ia ble un de r A rt ic le I , § 17 of the Te x as Constitut ion.” We disag ree . The City based its motion for summary judgme nt
on a var iety

of g rounds, including res judicata ar ising out of the 1989 lawsuit and that the ten-y ear statut e of lim itatio ns fo r i nv e rs e c on de mnatio n d a ma g e s c la ims ha d r un . T he tr ia l c ourt

did no t st a te the g rounds on which it rendere d summary judgme nt in favor of t he C ity ; theref ore, the trial court’ s judgme nt could have be en base d on res judicata or lim itations, and not on any deter mination
re g ard ingthe City ’s int e nt. Next, the Ci ty

argues the plaintiffs did not plead or show the City

kn ew a specific ac t was
c a us ingide nti fi a

ble ha rm or kn e w that spe c if

ic pr op e rt y dama g e wa s su

bs tanti a lly

c e rt a in t o r e su lt from an a

uthorized gove rnment ac tion. See J ennings , 1 4 2 S.W .3d at 314 (holding that, when
a sse rt ingc on sti tut ion a l tak ing c la im, ple a de r m us t sh owg ov e rnme nta l e nti ty kn ow s sp e c if

ic a c t is causingidentifiable ha

rm or knows spec ific prope rty damag e is substantially cer tain to result from
a uth or ize d g ov e rnme nt) . We be g in o ur ana ly sis of

thi s a rgume nt b y

loo kin g to t

he pla int if

fs ’
a lle g a tio ns c on ta ine d in

the ir pe tit ion , w hic h a

re a s f oll ow s: This [ flood control or storm sewe r] fac ility is designe d and built so as to collect and d ivert surfa ce w ater s from seve ral stre ets in the neig hborhood. The sur fac e water c oll e c tio n a

re a is at a hig he r e le vatio n than Plai nti ff s’ ho me . U nf

or tun a te ly the fa c ili ty04
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- 6- is de signe d and constructe d in suc h a wa y that it collects surfa ce w ater during heavy rains and dive rts that surfa ce w ater direc tly onto the proper

ty of the Plaintiffs. . . . Since on or a

bout J anuar

y 1991 th e C i t y h as had actual knowle dg e that the damag e to Plaintiffs’ home is occ urr i n g. On J anuar y 10, 1991 City

Ordinanc e No. 72914 was pa ssed to compensate the Plaintiffs for th e d am ages sustaine d by the Plaintiffs up to September 1990.
. . . Howeve r, t he C ity has done nothing to cor rec t the dra inag e, and the intermittent flooding ha s continued.

. . . Nuisance . The de sign a

nd maintenanc e of the City ’s flood cont rol or storm sewe r fa cility

is s u ch that it creates a nuisanc e which nuisa nce ha s damag ed and destroy ed the Plaintiffs’ pr operty . We construe the pla intiffs’ pleading s and ar g ument s l i b era lly to assert the unde rly ing g ov e rnme nt a c tio n that re su lte d in the takin g wa s th e City ’s fa ilure to c or re c t th e dr a ina g e pr ob le m. The plaintiffs point to a January 1991 City

memo as ev i d en ce the City knew damag e wa s substantially

cer tai n to follow from the c ontinued operation of the draina g e fa cility during heavy
ra ins . T he me mo s ta te s in pa rt : An o n -s i t e i n s p ec t i o nb y

Dr ai n age p er s o n n el co n fi rm ed t h at t wo ex i s t i n g 3 6 " pi p es d i s ch ar ge 119 cubic f

eet of water per se cond into a concre te channel which empties direc tly into Tara Drive. During heavy rains Tara Drive cannot contain the water discharg ed; it jumps t he cur b and flows direc tly into the De Migue l pr operty . Even a new street constructe d to cu rre nt desig n standards ( whi ch Tara Drive is not) c ould handle only 65 cubic f

eet pe r sec ond, or a bo ut 5 8 p e rc e nt o f t

he w ate r del ive re d at th is p oin t. T he on ly pe rm ane nt s olutio n to thi s draina g e proble m wo u ld

b e c o n s tr u c tion of proposed but pre sently unfunded dr ainag e proje ct 74X, L orene Drive, at a projec ted cost of $995,000. I t appea rs the plaintiffs a

rg ue that the City ’s ac knowledg ment that the dra inag e proble m can only be
corr ecte d by

the construc tion of “dra i n age p ro ject 74X” and its failure to fund and c onstruct “dra inag e proje ct 74X” de monstrates the City ’s intent to cause flooding on their prope rty , resulting in a taking . We disag ree .04
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1 ... T he 1 9 9 1 C i t y m em o s ta t ed : “ T here was no b asi s f o r di sput e t hat t he d i rect ed f l o ws of runof f drai nage wa t er s c au s ed dama g e t o t h e f ou n dat i on a n d ot h er s t r u ct u r al pa r t s f o t h e D e M i g u el r es i den ce . Fa ce d w i t h c er t ai n t y on the issu e o f l ia b ili ty, a ju ry w a s w a ive d a n d the d a m a g e issu e su b m itt e d [to the ] c o u rt fo r d e te rm ina tio n .”

- 7- A per son’s proper

ty may be “ta ken, dama g ed or destroy ed .
. . if an inj ury results from e ither the construc tion of public works or their subsequent maintena nce a nd operation.” See City of Tyler v. Likes , 962 S.W .2d 489, 504-05 (Te x . 1997) (inter nal quotations omitt ed). Howeve r, a c ity has no duty to p ro v i de dra inag e or f acilities ade quate f

or all floods that may

occur or re asonably

be
anti c ipate d a s long a s the c ity do e s noth ing to inc re a se the fl owof surf a c e wate r a c ro ss t

he land in question. T

he City of B or ge r v . G ar c ia , 2 90 S.W. 3d 32 5, 33 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mari llo 20 09 , p e t. fi le d) ; Norman & Schaen, I nc. v. City of Dallas , 536 S.W .2d 428, 429-30 (Te x . Civ. App.—Dallas 1976, writ ref

’d n.r.e.)
. “The exis tence of such liability would tend to deter the city from providing
even partial relief

from flooding .” Norman & Schaen, I nc. , 536 S.W .2d at 430. I n deter mining the extent of the protection to be pr ovided, a c ity “must weig h the nee ds of the entire community and allocate available res o u rc es s o as best to serve the intere sts of all its citiz ens.” Id. Her e, the plaintiffs point to no new action taken by the City afte r the conclusion of the 19 8 9 l aw s u i t t hat resulted in an inc rea sed flow of surfa ce w ater

acr oss their proper

ty . T h e p l a i n t i f

f s ’ 1 9 8 9 s u i tw a s b a s e d

o nn e g l i g e n c e , an d

t h e C i t y d i d

n o td i s p u t e i t s l i a

b i l i t y. 1 Af te r t he 19 89 laws uit , th e pla int if fs po int to n o n e w a c tio n on th e City ’s pa rt that c a us e d th e ir damag es; instead, they point to the City ’s failure to f und a new projec t. Howeve r, we c onclude the City ’s dec ision to not fund the c onstruction of “dr ai n ag e proje ct 74X” doe s not convert a ny
ne g lig e nc e on the City ’s pa rt int o an int e nti on a l takin g by the City
. Me re ne g lig e nc e that e ve ntu a lly contributes to the destruction of proper ty is not a taking
. Likes , 962 S.W .2d at 505. Ther efor e, the04
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- 8- City ’s continued maintena nce of the fa cility

is, at most, no more now than i t was in 1989: neg lige nce. Also, a simil ar argument was re jected by the Texas Supreme Court in City of S an An ton io v. Pollock, wher ein the Pollocks argued the c ity ’s knowledg e tha t s u b s idence , ponding, a nd g as g e ne ratio n a

nd mig ratio n a

re inh e re nt i n th e op e ratio n o f a land fi ll wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o s ho w the c ity knew its operation of the landfill was substantially cer tain to damag e their pr operty . City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 2 84 S.W. 3d 80 9, 82 1 ( Te x. 20 09 ). Th e Court he ld t hat th e “ ne g lig e nt f

a ilure to preve nt landfill ga s migra tion in thi s case is no evidence that [t he ci t y ] i ntended to dama g e the Pollocks’ property .” Id. CO NC LU SION After examining the re levant evide nce a n d c o n s tr u in g th e p la intiffs’ alleg ations in their favor , we c onclude the pla intiffs did not present a c laim on which g ov er n m en t al immunit y is waived. There fore , we r ever se the trial court’s order and rende r judg ment dismiss ing the plaintiffs’ nuisanc e claim ag ainst the City

for lac k of jurisdiction.

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice