No. 06-13-00046-CR

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

CLISTER RAY THOMAS, Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from Gregg County

* * * * *

STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

* * * * *

LISA C. McMINN State Prosecuting Attorney Bar I.D. No. 13803300

JOHN R. MESSINGER Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney Bar I.D. No. 24053705

P.O. Box 13046 Austin, Texas 78711 information@spa.texas.gov 512/463-1660 (Telephone) 512/463-5724 (Fax) PD-0117-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 1/29/2015 4:30:05 PM Accepted 2/4/2015 9:42:38 AM

ABEL ACOSTA CLERKNAMES OF ALL PARTI ES TO THE T RIAL CO URT’S J UDGMENT

*Th e pa rti es to th e tri al co ur t’s jud gm en t are th e St at e of Tex as an d App el la nt , Cl is te r Ray T ho m as

. *Th e cas e was tri ed be fo re th e Hon or ab le Vin cen t L. Dul web er, Co un ty Co ur t at Law No. 2 , Greg g C ou nt y

. *C ou ns el for App el la nt at t ria l was Davi d In gr am , P .O. Bo x 5 62 , Lon gv ie w, Texas 75 60 6.

*C ou ns el for App el la nt be fo re t he Co ur t o f App eal s was Tim Co ne , P.O. Box 41 3, Gil m er, Tex as 75 64 4.

* Co un se l fo r th e St at e at tri al was Pam el a Ik ech i Ego rn u Ib eh an d Jo hn Je r a l d Ro be rts , Greg g Co un ty Ass is ta nt Dis tri ct Att or ne y s, 10 1 East Met hv in St reet , Su it e 33 3, Lo ng vi ew, Texa s 7 56 01

. *C ou n s el fo r th e St at e on ap pe al was Zan Co ls on Bro wn, Greg g Co un ty Ass is ta nt Dis tri ct Att or ne y , 10 1 Eas t M et hv in Str eet , Sui te 33 3, Lo ng vi ew, Texa s 7 56 01

. *C ou ns el fo r th e St at e be fo r e t hi s Co ur t is Jo hn R. Mes si ng er, Ass is ta nt St at e Pro se cu ti ng Att or ne y , P.O. Box 13 04 6, Au st in , Texa s 7 87 11

.

iTABLE OF CONTENT S

INDEX OF AUT HORITIES.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii i

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF TH E CASE.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1) Is a defe nda nt w ho rel ie s on an “a ll or no thi ng ” st ra teg y ac tua ll y ha rmed by s ubmiss io n o f the w ro ng sta tuto ry m an ner a nd means ?
2) Sho ul d Al

m an za ’s fund amenta l erro r an al ys is be ab an do ned in fa vo r of rev ie w for ine ffec tiv e a ss is ta nce o f co uns el ?

ARGUMENT AND AU THORITIES.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

PRAYER FOR R ELIEF.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

CERTIFI CATE OF COMPLIANCE.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

CERTIFI CATE OF SERVICE.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
APPENDIX (Opi ni on of t he Co ur t o f App eal s)

iiINDEX O F AUTHORI TI ES

Cas es Ada mes v. St at e , 35 3 S .W .3d 85 4 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 11 ) .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Alma nz a v . St at e , 68 6 S .W .2d 15 7 (Te x. Cr im . App . 19 85 ) (reh ’g).

. . . . . . 4, 1 1, 1 3

Arr in gt on v. St at e , __ S.W .3d

__ , 20 15 Tex. Cr im . App . LEXIS 15 (Tex . Cri m

. App . Jan . 14 , 20 15 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 1 0, 1 4

Blu e v. S ta te , 41 S.W .3d 12 9 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 00 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Blu it t v. S ta te , 13 7 S .W .3d 51 (Tex . Cri m . App . 20 04 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Co le v. Arka ns as , 33 3 U.S. 1 96 (19 48 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Co si o v . St at e , 35 3 S .W .3d 76 6 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 11 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 1 0

Uni te d S ta te s v. C

ro ni c , 46 6 U.S. 6 48 (19 84 )..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 , 13
Delg ad o v . St at e , 23 5 S .W .3d 24 4 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 07 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Geli na s v. S ta te , 39 8 S .W .3d 70 3 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 13 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Ji men ez v. St at e , 32 S.W .3d 23 3 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 00 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Jo ur da n v . St at e , 42 8 S .W .3d 86 (Tex . Cri m . App . 20 14 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8- 9, 1 0

Mar in v. St at e , 85 1 S .W .2d 27 5 (Te x. Cr im . App . 19 93 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Mar ti n v . St at e , 20 0 S .W .3d 63 5 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 06 ) .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Pos ey v. S ta te , 96 6 S .W .2d 57 (Tex . Cri m . App . 19 98 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Sa ld an o v . St at e , 70 S.W .3d 87 3 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 02 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 , 12

St ri ckl an d v . W

as hi ng to n , 46 6 U.S. 6 68 (19 84 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 , 13

Ta yl or v. St at e , 33 2 S .W .3d 48 3 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 11 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

iiiTh oma s v. S ta te , 44 4 S .W .3d 4 (Tex . Cri m . App . 20 14 ) .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3 , 4, 8

Th oma s v. S ta te , __ S.W .3d

__ , 20 14 Tex. Ap p. LEXIS 1 38 40 (Tex

. App .–Tex ark an a Dec. 3 0, 2 01 4)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pa ss im

Th oma s v. S ta te , 41 1 S .W .3d 68 5 (Te x. Ap p.– Tex ark an a 2 01 3)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

W il li ams on v. St at e , 16 7 S .W . 36 0 (Te x. Cr im . App . 19 14 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

W oo da rd v. St at e , 32 2 S .W .3d 64 8 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 10 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

W oo le y v. S ta te , 27 3 S .W .3d 26 0 (Te x. Cr im . App . 20 08 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Y ou ng v. St at e , 99 1 S .W .2d 83 5 (Te x. Cr im . App . 19 99 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Rule s T E X

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C . art . 36 .19

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

T E X

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C . art . 62 .05 5( a) .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

iiiNo. 0 6- 13 -0 00 46 -CR

TO TH E COURT OF CRIM INAL APPEALS

OF THE STAT E OF TEXA S
CLISTER RAY THOMAS, App el la nt

v.
THE STAT E OF TEXA S, App el le e

* * * * *

STATE ’S PETI TI ON FOR DIS CRETI ONARY REVIEW

* * * * *

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS:

Co m es no w th e St at e of Tex as , by an d th ro ug h it s St at e Pro se cu ti ng Att or ne y ,

an d res pe ct fu ll y ur ge s th is Co ur t to gr an t d i s c r e t i on ary rev ie w of th e ab ov e na m ed

cau se , pu rs ua nt to th e ru le s o f ap pe ll at e p ro ced ur e.

STATE MENT REG ARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The St at e req ue st s or al arg um en t. Bas ed on th is Co ur t’s pr ev io us di sp os it io n
of th is cas e an d th e jury ch arg e er r o r in vo lv ed , di sc us si on wil l pr ov e he lp fu l.

Dis cu ss io n of th e se c o nd gr ou nd fo r rev ie w wil l al so li ke ly be ne ces sa ry to as su re
bo th th e be nc h an d ba r th at ov erru li ng Al m a n z a act ua ll y req ui res li tt le ch an ge in

su bs ta nt iv e la w.

1STATE MENT OF TH E CASE

App el la nt was co nv ic te d of fai lu re to reg is te r a ch an ge of ad dr es s as pa rt of hi s
du ty as a reg is te red se x of fen de r. The co u r t o f ap pe al s rev ers ed , ho ld in g th at th e

su bm is si on of on ly a m an ne r an d m ean s no t al le ge d in th e in di c t men t c a us ed

eg reg io us ha rm

.
STATE MENT OF PROCEDURAL HI STO RY

On Aug us t 28 , 20 13 , th e co ur t of ap pe al s rev ers ed ap pe ll an t’s co nv ic ti o n fo r
in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce. Thi s Co ur t rev ers ed an d rem an de d fo r co ns id erat io n of ch arg e 1

erro r. On rem an d, th e co ur t of ap pe al s rev ers ed ap pe ll an t’s co nv ic ti on in a pu bl is he d 2

op in io n o n Dec em

be r 30 , 20 14

. No m ot io n fo r reh eari ng was fi le d.

3

GROUNDS FOR REVI EW
1) Is a defe nda nt w ho rel ie s on an “a ll or no thi ng ” st ra teg y ac tua ll y ha rmed by s ubmiss io n o f the w ro ng sta tuto ry m an ner a nd means ?
2) Sho ul d Al

m an za ’s fund amenta l erro r an al ys is be ab an do ned in fa vo r of rev ie w for ine ffec tiv e a ss is ta nce o f co uns el ?

Thomas v. S tat e , 411 S.W .3d 6 85 ( T ex. App.–T exa rkana 2013 ). 1

Thomas v. S tat e , 444 S.W .3d 4 (T ex. Cri m . App. 2014 ). 2

Thomas v. Sta te , __S.W .3d_ _, 2014 T ex. App. LEX I S 1384 0 ( T ex. App.–T exa rkana Dec. 30, 2 014)

. 3

2ARGUMENT AND AUTHORI TI ES

App el la nt is a reg is te red se x of fen de r. He m

us t no ti fy au th or it ie s at le as t se ve n
da y s be fo re an in te nd ed m ov e an d wit hi n se ve n da y s aft erwar ds

. He ad m it te d ne ve r 4

rep or ti ng a ch an ge of ad dr es s be cau se he de ni ed m ov in g. Is it “ no th in g sh or t of th e

ran ke st sp ecu la ti on ,” t o c o n c l u d e th at th e jury th at fo un d hi m gu il ty of on e 5

no ti fic at io n d ut y

wou ld co nv ic t h im

of t he ot he r?
App el la nt was in di ct ed fo r fai li ng to no ti fy au th or it ie s be fo re he m ov ed

. Unf or tu na te ly, th e ap pl ic at io n po rti on of th e jury ch arg e an d m uc h of th e St a t e ’s

cl os in g arg um en t fo cu se d on a vi ol at io n of hi s du ty to no ti fy au th or it ie s wit hi n se ve n
da y s af te r m ov in g. Thi s Co ur t fo un d th at th e St at e m et it s bu rd en of pr oo f un de r th e
h yp o t h e t ic al ly co rrec t jury ch arg e bu t no te d th e ch arg e erro r an d rem an de d fo r

co ns id erat io n o f ha rm

. The co ur t o f ap pe al s fo un d e gr eg io us ha rm an d re ve rs ed : 6

S e e T EX

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C

. ar t. 62.0 55( a) (“ I f a per s o n r e q u i r e d t o r e gi s t e r u n d e r t h i s c h a p t e r 4 int end s to cha nge add re ss,

. . . the per son sha ll , not la te r tha n the sevent h d ay b ef ore the int end ed cha nge, re por t in per son to the loc al la w enf orc ement aut hor it y

. . . and pro vide the aut hor it y and the off ic er wit h the per son ’s ant ic ipa te d m ove dat e and new add re ss. I f a per son re qui re d to re giste r cha nges add re ss, the per son sha ll , not la te r t han th e l at er of th e sevent h day af

te r cha nging the add re ss . . . r epo rt in per son to th e l oca l la w enf orc ement aut hor it y in the m uni ci pal it y or cou nty in whic h the per son ’s new re si den ce is loc at ed and pro vide t he a uth ori ty wit h pr oof of id ent it y and pr oof

of re si den ce. ”)

. Sli p op . at 9. 5

Thomas , 444 S.W .3d at 11 (c it ing W ool ey v. Sta te , 273 S.W .3d 260, 271-72 (T ex. Cri m . App. 2008 ))

. 6 Appel la nt onl y cha ll enged t he s uff ic ie ncy of the eviden ce in his app eal ; he never rais ed eit her a com pla int unde r Alma nza or a due pro ces s complai nt bas ed in W ool ey or the ca ses upo n whi ch W ool ey re li ed. Wi th
re gard t o t he l at te r, h owever, th is Cour t h as hel d, T he

. . . rul e app li es onl y when a def end ant is con victe d on a cha rge tha t w a s n e i t h e r al le ged in an ind ic tment nor pre sen te d to the j ury, as the def end ant is the n not giv en suf fi ci en t n o ti ce as to the spe ci fi c cha rge. “I t i s a s m uch a viola ti on of due pro ces s to sen d an acc use d to pri son fol lowi ng con victi on of a cha rge on whic h he was never tr ie d as i t wo uld be to con vict him upon a char ge tha t
was never m ade .”
3Co ns id eri ng t h e jury ch arg e in it s en ti ret y , th e st at e of th e ev id en ce, an d th e

arg um en ts of co un se l, we fin d th at th e erro ne ou s jury ch arg e de ni ed Tho m as th e va lu ab le rig ht to ha ve th e jury de ci de hi s gu i lt on th e pr op er ba si s an d
au th or iz ed a co nv ic ti on fo r act io ns no t al le ge d in th e in di ct m en t. Thu s, Tho m as was de ni ed a fai r an d i m

pa rti al tri al

. 7

The jury acce pt ed ap pe ll an t’s te st im on y th at he ne ve r am en de d hi s reg is te red

ad dr es s. Had th e jury al so be li ev ed hi m whe n he sa id he ha d no t m ov ed , th ere wou ld

ha ve be en no du ty to no ti fy an d so no co nv ic ti on

. Far fro m be in g “ th e ran ke st

sp ecu la ti on ,” th e co nc lu si on th at ap pe ll an t wo ul d h av e b een co nv ic te d of fai li ng to

r e p or t a ch an ge of ad dr es s un de r an y th eo ry al le ge d is al m os t un av oi da bl e

. Th e

co ur t’s erro r ha s two cau se s. Fi rs t, th e co ur t’s vi ew of th e rec o r d i s ja u nd ic ed

. Seco nd , it fai ls to ap pr eci at e th e ro le de fen si ve st rat eg y pl ay s in an Alma nz a an al y si s.
The reco rd as a who le

The co ur t of ap pe al s’s vi ew of th e reco rd is be st su m m ari zed by it s em

br ace of

Ju dg e Co ch ran ’s di ss en t to th is Co ur t’s op in io n: “ Eve ry on e at tri al —t he jud ge , th e

pr os ecu to r, th e de fen se at to rn ey , th e jury—was fo cu se d so le ly up on th e ‘afterwa rd s’

ch an ge -o f-ad dr es s of

fen se , th e of

fen se th at ap pe ll an t act ua ll y di d co m m it bu t was no t

ch arg ed wit h.” Res pe ct fu ll y , th is is no t s o. 8

Adame s v. Sta te , 353 S.W .3d 854, 859-60 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 2011 ) (qu oti ng Cole v. Ark ans as , 333 U.S. 196, 201 (19 48) ). As thi s is not the cas e her e, it is per hap s unde rs ta nda ble tha t the cou rt of app eal s re viewed har m exc lus ively und er Alma nza v. S tat e , 686 S.W .2d 1 57 ( T ex. Cri m . App. 1985 ) ( op. o n r eh’ g).

Sli p op . at 9. 7

Sli p op. a t 9 ( q u o t i n g T h o m a s , 4 4 4 S.W .3d at 14 (Coc hra n, J ., dis sen ti ng)); see al so sl ip op. a t 7 8 (“ T he s ta te of

th e e videnc e a nd a rgum ent of cou nse l e xac er bat e[ d]” th e e rr ors in th e c har ge).

4The St at e’s di rect ex am in at io ns fo cu se d on th e of fe nse al le ged an d pr ov in g th at

ap pe ll an t ne ve r res id ed at hi s reg is te red ad dr es s. Dete ct iv e Kev in Bro wnl ee, who

he lp ed m an ag e th e reg is te red se x of fen de rs in Lon gv ie w, em ph as iz ed t he du ty to

no ti fy au th or it ie s “ a m in im um of se ve n da y s pr io r to m ov in g[ ,] ” an d th e di sc ret io n
he us es to wor k wit h reg is tra nt s wh o h a v e t o mo ve un ex pe ct ed ly. “ [O]f al l of th e 9

ru le s th at th ey ’re req ui red to co m pl y wit h, t h e n o ti fy in g of se ve n da y s pr io r to

ch an gi ng ad dr es se s is pr ob ab ly th e bi gg es t on e.” App el la nt ’s fai lu re? “ He m ov ed 1 0

f r om hi s lo cat io n wit ho ut no ti fy in g us at le as t se ve n da y s pr io r to m ov in g.” Th e 1 1

p r o pe rty m an ag er of th e ap art m en t ap pe ll an t cl ai m ed as hi s res id en ce li ve d a n d

wor ke d on si te bu t sh e ne ve r sa w ap pe ll an t th ere; no ne o f he r st aff ev er rep or te d

se ei ng hi m th ere, ei th er. The of fic er who is su ed th e cri m in al tre sp as s warn in g at th e 1 2

pr op ert y m an ag er’s be he st ex pl ai ne d h e w ou ld no t ha ve do ne so if it ap pe ared th at

ap pe ll an t l iv ed th ere. 1 3

The St at e’s cro ss -ex am in at io n of ap pe ll an t’s wit ne ss es was of a pi ece wit h it s
di rect ex am in at io n. Ash an ti Ji m ers on , th e ren te r of th e ap art m en t, sa id th at ap pe ll an t

3 RR 27

- 30. 9

3 RR 46

. 1 0

3 RR 34

. 1 1

3 RR 53

- 54. 1 2

3 RR 61

- 62. 1 3

5go es th ere “ of f an d on ” to se e Ji m ers on ’s m ot he r, Pam el a Esp y

. In res po ns e to re- 1 4

di rect , Ji m ers on sa id , “ He wou ld co m e whe n m y m om c[a]m e, so I do n’t kn ow if y ou
cal l th at li vi ng .” Esp y ha d a pe rm an en t ad dr es s whe re sh e res id ed wit h ap pe ll an t, 1 5 1 6

an d co nf irmed th at ap pe ll an t on ly st ay ed at Ji m ers on ’s ap art m en t th e two or th ree
ni gh ts a week th at sh e d id

. 1 7
App el la nt ad m it te d he ne ve r rep or te d an y ch an ge of a d d r e ss bu t de ni ed

vi ol at in g hi s du ty to reg is te r. He cl ai m ed th at he li v e d a t Ji m ers on ’s ap art m en t 1 8

“ev e r y da y ” an d th at he was tre sp as si ng do in g so ; he li ed to po li ce ab ou t o t h e r
ad dr es se s so th at th ey wou ld no t get ki ck ed ou t for hav in g a reg is te red se x of fen de r
th ere. The St at e qu es ti on ed hi s in ab il it y to r e memb e r J im ers on ’s ad dr es s de sp it e

1 9

kn owi ng th e ad dr es se s o f ot he r res id en ces an d p la ces of wo rk

. 2 0

On reb ut ta l, Dete ct iv e Bro wnl ee rei ter at ed th at th e du ty at is su e was reg is te rin g

a ch an ge of ad dr es s se ve n da y s pr io r to m ov in g, an d ha d a b r i ef ex ch an ge wit h

de fen se co un se l on th e lo gi st ic s of pr ov in g to au th or it ie s a m ov e th at ha s no t y et

3 RR 89

- 91. 1 4

3 RR 93

. 1 5

3 RR 84

- 85. 1 6

3 RR 83

- 84, 8 6- 87 ( “He wo uld come over t her e j ust when I ’m ther e.” ). 1 7

3 RR 10 1, 10 4. 1 8

3 RR 10 1- 02, 1 04, 1 16. 1 9

3 RR 11 6- 18. 2 0

6ha pp en ed

. Bro wnl ee was th e la st wit ne ss to tes ti fy

. 2 1

Des pi te th e St at e’s tri al fo cu s on th e fai lu re to no ti fy be fo re m ov in g an d

a p p e l la nt no t ev er li vi ng at hi s reg is te red ad dr es s, th e ab st ract an d ap pl ic at io n

po rti on s of th e ch arg e in ex pl ic ab ly in cl ud ed on ly fai lu re to no ti f y a fte r m ov in g. 2 2

And , whi le th e St at e’s arg um en t di d i n d ire ct ly refe r to Bro wnl ee’s te st im on y , it 2 3

rep eat ed ly reci te d th e el em en ts as se t ou t in th e erro ne ou s ap pl ic at io n pa rag rap h. Bu t

it als o re it erat ed it s t he or y th at ap pe ll an t n ev er re si de d a t J im ers on ’s apa rtment:
[Y]ou do no t CT so m eo ne fro m th ei r own res id en ce. Offi cers m ad e a 2 4 de te rm in at io n he do es no t res id e th e r e

. I f he di d, he wou ld co nt es t th e CT
warn in g. You can no t CT so m eo ne fro m th ei r res id en ce. He was n’t li vi ng th ere.

. . . [A]ll th e wit ne ss es on he re sa id th in gs th at can on ly le ad to on e co nc lu si on , th at th is de fen da nt di dn ’t res id e o n Gre en Str eet . It’s th e o nl y way

.

. . . [W] e’re no t ba si ng ou r arg um en t on th e CT warn in g be cau se he co ul d br eak th at la w. W e’re sayin g h e was no t t he re t o b eg in wit h.

. . . He was n’t o n Gre en Str eet , he’s n ot th ere n ow.

. . . He di dn ’t kn ow t he ad dr es s o n Gre en Str eet , st il l co ul dn ’t tel l i t if I as ke d hi m ag ai n b ecau se he di dn ’t li ve th ere. 2 5

So whe n th e co ur t of ap pe al s sa y s, “ Thro u g h o u t th e tri al , th e St at e li ke wis e

3 RR 12 5. 2 1

1 CR 24- 25. T her e was a sec ti on imm edi at el y pre ced ing ent it le d “Ac cus at ion ,” i n whi ch t he r el evant 2 2 por ti on o f t he i ndi ct m ent app ear s verbat im. 1 CR 24. Addi ti ona ll y, t he verdi ct for m re fl ect s t hat th e j ury fou nd a ppe ll ant guilt y “as c har ged in the in dic tment.” 1 CR 2 8.

3 RR 16 1. 2 3

“CT ” i s a comm on t er m fo r i ssu ing a c ri m ina l t re spa ss war nin g. 2 4

3 RR 16 0, 16 5, 16 7, 16 8- 70. 2 5

7fo cu se d pr eci se ly o n th e of fen se as ex pl ai ne d in th e jury ch arg e[,]” it is wro ng on 2 6

two co un ts

. As il lu st rat ed ab ov e, th e St at e fo cu se d on th e co rrec t m an ne r an d m ean s
th ro ug ho ut tri al un ti l cl os in g arg um en ts

. Mo reo ve r, ap pe ll an t ne ve r fo cu se d on ei th er
du ty un ti l cl os in g arg um en t be cau se , as reco gn iz ed by th is Co ur t an d th e co ur t of

ap pe al s, h is de fen se was t ha t h e h ad no du ty becau se he ha d n ot m ov ed

. 2 7

St rat eg ic ch oi ces App el la nt ’s de fen se is by far th e m os t im po rta nt co ns id erat io n. Thi s Co ur t ha s

rep eat ed ly he ld th at a de fen da nt ’s “ al l o r no th in g” st rat eg y m ay ren de r ch arg e erro r
ha rm le ss de sp it e an y th in g e ls e in th e rec or d a m el io rat in g a ny harm

.
In Co si o v. St at e , al th ou gh th e jury was to ld whi ch types of co nd uc t wen t wit h

each co un t of a se xu al of

fen se , th e jury was no t req ui red to be un an im ou s as to whi ch

in ci de nc e of each type of co nd uc t oc cu rred

. Thi s Co ur t m ad e sh or t wor k of th e 2 8

ha rm an al y si s. “ Co si o’s de fen se was th at he di d no t com m it an y of th e of fen se s .

. .

. The jury was no t pe rs ua de d

. . . . Had th e jury be li ev ed ot he rwis e, th ey wou ld ha ve

acq ui tt ed Co si o on al l co un ts

. . . . It is th us hi gh ly l ik el y th at th e jury’ s v erd ic ts

. . .

were, in fact , un an im ou s.” In Jo ur da n v. St at e , th e ch arg e di d no t ex pr es sl y req ui re 2 9

Sli p op . at 8. 2 6

Thomas , 444 S.W .3d a t 6

- 7; Sli p op . at 7- 8. 2 7

353 S.W .3d 7 66, 7 74 ( T ex. Cri m . App. 2011 ). 2 8

Id . at 777

- 78. 2 9

8jury un an im it y wit h res pe ct to di gi ta l pe ne tra ti on ve rs us p e ni le co nt act

. Bec au se 3 0

Jo ur da n’s “ pr im ary de fen si ve po st ur e, as ev id en ced by his own tes ti m on y , was t ha t

n o s ex ua l as sa ul t to ok pl ace” an d th e jury “ ob vi ou sl y reject ed hi s ve rs io n of th e

ev en t[,]” “ an y erro r in th e jury ch arg e i n f a i l i n g t o req ui re su ch ag reem en t di d no t

se rv e to un de rm in e th e pa rti cu la r de fen se he ch os e to pu rs ue .” In Arr in gt on v. St at e , 3 1

an ot he r un an im it y cas e, th e jury was “ co nf ro nt ed wit h two di am et ric al po si ti on s” an d

th is Co ur t fo un d no act ua l ha rm

. “ The jur y in th is cas e, aft er he ari ng al l th e 3 2

e v i d e n c e, cl earl y cred it ed H.A.’ s st or y an d di d no t be li ev e ap pe ll an t’s cat eg or ic a l

de ni al of al l accu sa ti on s. Had it be li ev ed ap pe ll an t ra th er t ha n H.A., i t wou ld ha ve

acq ui tt ed hi m

of a ll ch arg es .” 3 3

The em ph as is on de fen se st rat eg y i s n ot li m it ed to un an im it y cas es , an d 3 4

428 S.W .3d 8 6, 99 (T ex. Cri m . App. 2014 ). 3 0

Id . at 98. 3 1
__ S .W. 3d__ , 201 5 T ex. Cri m . App. LEX I S 15 at *1, 31 ( T ex. Cri m . App. J an. 14, 2 015)

. 3 2

Id . at *27

. 3 3

See , e.g. , Tayl or v. Sta te , 332 S.W .3d 483, 493 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 2 011) (“ T he def ens ive theor y was 3 4 tha t no sex ual abu se occ urr ed at any ti m e. I t is un l i ke l y t h a t t h e j ury bel ie ved tha t Appel la nt sex ual ly
ass aul te d the victi m bef

ore he tur ned 17 years old but not af te r. I n thi s cas e, the j ury ei the r bel ie ved Appel la nt or bel ie ved the victi m .”) ; Ma rt in v. Sta te , 200 S.W .3d 635, 642 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 2006 ) (a lt hough j ury m ust pas s on the exi st enc e of j uri sdi ct ion al pri or DWI con victi ons , def end ant ’s st ipu la ti on to suc h too k the m “ out of con te nti on” and so he was not egregiou sl y ha rmed by t hei r abs enc e in the cha rge). I t is al so the cen t r a l is sue in a sub m it te d cas e cur re ntl y pen din g bef ore thi s Cour t, Vil lar rea l v. Sta te , PD- 0332

- 13 (s ubmitt ed Sept ember 18, 2013) (“If the [s el f- def ens e pres um

pti on] ins tr uct ion s we re re qui re d t o be giv en sua spo nte , did the cour t of a ppe al s e rr by not con si der ing th e a rgum ent s of cou nse l a nd r eco rd as a whole in con duc ti ng its Alma nza har m ana lysis ?”)

. 9ap pl ie s reg ard le ss of whe th er an y th in g in th e reco rd te nd s to red uc e or ad d to ha rm

. 3 5

I n s h o rt, it is th e “ an al y ti cal m ean in g” of th e ve rd ic t in li gh t of th e ev id en ce a n d

de fen se th at de te rm in es ha rm

. The “ an al y ti cal m ean in g” of th e jury ve rd ic t in th is 3 6

cas e is th at th e jury wou ld ha ve co nv ic te d hi m on ei th er m an ne r an d m ean s ba se d on
it s reject i o n of hi s de fen se

. App el la nt ’s “ al l or no th in g” st rat eg y was eq ua ll y

ap pl ic ab le to bo th , and th e res ul t i s t ha t n o a ct ua l h arm can be sh own

. A bet te r way

As sh own ab ov e, th is Co ur t reg ul arl y gr an ts rev ie w of Alma nz a de ci si on s an d

of te n de ci de s th em on th e s tra te gy em pl oyed at tri al

. The ne ed fo r th is Co ur t to

rep eat ed ly clari fy

what “ th e la w app li cab le to th e cas e” m ean s, or to si m pl y co rrec t

a lo wer co ur t’s erro ne ou s ha rm an al y si s, in di cat es th at ne it he r th e ch arg es th em se lv es

no r th e lo wer co ur ts ’ ap pl ic at io n o f Alma nz a ha ve im pr ov ed si nc e it was d eci de d. 3 7

The pr ob le m pr es en te d in th is cas e il lu st rat es Alma nz a ’s cen tra l pr ob le m : it was m ad e

un ne ces sa ry by th e do ct rin e of in effe ct iv e a s si st an ce of co un se l (IAC) be fo re th is

See Cosi o , 353 S.W .3d at 777 (no thi ng in the cha rge or fr om the j udge or par ti es addr ess ed the er ror ); 3 5 Jou rda n , 428 S.W .3d at 92, 98 (St at e’ s emphati c advoca c y f o r n on- una nimity “i s obvious ly an import ant
con si der at ion in any ana lysis of egregiou s har m vel non , but it is not the onl y co nsi der at ion .”) ; Arr ing ton , 2015 T ex. Cri m

. App. LEX I S 15 at *19, 27- 28 (no thi ng in the cha rge or ar gum ent s of cou nse l inf ormed the j ury of th e pr ope r u nan imity req uir ement)

. Arr ing ton , 2015 T ex. Cri m

. App. LEX I S 15 at *31; See , e.g. , Jou rda n , 428 S.W .3d a t 9 9 ( “Any j uro r 3 6 who voted to con vict the app el la nt on the fa ct s of thi s cas e u n d e r the the ory tha t he pen et ra te d her vag ina wit h his fi nger m

ust , at a m ini m

um , have agree d tha t the app el la nt al so con ta ct ed K emp’s sex ual organ wit h his pen is .”)

. S e e Wo o d

a r d v

. S t a t e , 3 2 2 S

. W

. 3d 648, 661 (T ex. Cri m . App. 2010 ) ( Coch r a n , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g) 3 7 (“ Unfo rt una te ly, ti m es have not cha nged m uch si nce 1984 , nor have m is ta kes in j ury ins tr uct ion s dimini she d si gnifi can tl y.”).
10Co ur t ev en fle sh ed it ou t. Per ha ps it is ti m e to reco ns id er t hi s b od y of l aw.
Alma nz a w as pr em is ed on th e id ea th at art ic le 36 .19 im pl ic it ly pr ov id es fo r

rev ie w of un ob

jecte d- to fu nd am en ta l erro r no twi th st an di ng th e f act th at it pl ai nl y

st at es , “Al l o b

je c ti on s to th e ch arg e

. . . sh al l be m ad e at th e ti m e of tri al .” 3 8

Ass um in g th at th e st at ut e is “ in he ren tl y am big uou s,” an d th at res or ti ng to le gi sl at iv e

3 9

hi st or y an d th is Co ur t’s int erp ret at io n of its pr ed eces so r su pp or ts th e ho ld in g, th is 4 0

Co ur t has sh ift ed dr am at ic al ly fro m th e am or ph ou s co nc ep t of fun da m en ta l erro r to

Mar in ’s cat eg or ic al ap pr oa ch to pr es erv at io n. Thi s was ne ces sa ry , in pa rt, be cau se 4 1

fu nd am en ta l erro r juri sp ru de nc e “sim pl y can no t be ex pl ai ne d by refe ren ce to an y

un ifyin g pr in ci pl e or pr in ci pl es .” It is al so un fai r to th e op po si ng pa rty an d th e tri al 4 2

co ur t, and se rv es to red uc e, rat he r th an im pr ov e, th e cri m in al jus ti ce sy st em

. W he n

a pa rty is ex cu se d fro m ev en at te m p t i ng to co rrec t erro rs at tri al , th e res ul ts are an

T EX

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C . ar t. 3 6.19

. 3 8

Alma nza , 686 S.W .2d a t 1 66. 3 9

But see , e.g. , W

il li amso n v. Sta te , 167 S.W

. 360, 362-63 (T ex. Cri m . App. 1914 ) ( emphasi s a dde d): 4 0 Wi th [t his Cour t’ s dec is ion s on the for m er la w] bef ore the m the Legisl at ure del ibe ra te ly, in amendin g the ar ti cl e, st ruc k out the word s “or in m oti on for new tr ia l” and re qui re d tha t al l er ror s in the cha rge be obj ect ed to at the ti m e of the tr ia l and bef ore the cha rge is re ad to the j ury, re qui ri ng tha t the cou rt sub m it hi s c har ge to c ouns el fo r t hat pur pos e. And the que st ion is , ar e we aut hor ized t o i gnore t his pla in st at uto ry pro visio n of our la w . . . ? We do not thi nk so. .

. . Beca use th e e rr or in the cha rge i s not in any m ann er complai ned of unt il af te r verd ic t, we ca n no t c ons ide r i t u nde r t he p re sen t l aw[ .]

Ma ri n v. Sta te , 851 S.W .2d 275, 279 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 1993 ) (“ T hus , our syste m m ay be t hought to 4 1

con ta in rul es of thr ee dis ti nct kinds: (1) abs olu te re qui re m ent s and pro hib it ion s; (2) ri ghts of li ti gants whic h
m ust be implemente d by the syste m unl ess exp re ss l y w a i ve d ; and (3) ri ghts of li ti gants whic h ar e to be implemente d up on r equ est .”)

. Sal dano v. S tat e , 70 S.W .3d 8 73, 8 87 ( T ex. Cri m . App. 2002 ). 4 2

11un la wfu l tri al an d a jud ic ia l syste m bu rd en ed by ap pe al an d r e t ria l. All owi ng th e 4 3

op ti on on ap pe al to res cu e an at to rn ey who m ig ht no t ev en read th e ch a r ge be fo re

st at in g “ no ob

jecti on ” crea te s a pe rv ers e in cen ti ve to li e be hi nd th e lo g rat he r t o

4 4

en su re a fai r tri al th e fir st ti m e aro un d. The rat io na l e s t a t e d in Geli na s v. St at e is

ap pl ic ab le to fun da m en ta l er ro r ge ne ral ly and Alma nz a sp eci fic al ly:

A de fen da nt m ay no w rem ai n si le nt whe re a jury ch arg e is in co rrec t, ho pi ng fo r an acq ui tt al , a nd th en , i f a jury find s h im gu il ty, rai se th e is su e on ap pe al wit h th e ho pe of ob ta in in g a ne w tri al

. The St at e, ho wev er, ha s no su ch op po rtu ni ty gi ve n it s li m it e d r i g ht of ap pe al

. Not on ly is th e res ul t un fai r, bu t it al so en co ur ag es de fen da nt s to rem ai n si le nt wit h reg ard to erro rs in jury in st ru ct io ns an d rewar ds th e fai lu re to co rrec t ch arg e erro rs

. Bo th fai rn es s an d jud ic ia l
eco no m y fav or do in g a way

wit h s uc h a ho ld in g. 4 5
Beyond th e res ur ge nt req ui rem en t fo r pr es erv at io n (o r a cat eg or ic al ex cep ti on
ba se d on th e sp eci fic rig ht in vo lv ed ), IAC do es ev erythi ng Alma nz a is ne ed ed to do ,

an d do es it be tt er. St ri ckl an d an d Cr on ic , th e se m in al cas es on IAC, were de ci de d in

th e y ear be twee n Alma nz a ’s fir st op in io n an d th e op in io n on reh eari ng

. Si nc e th at 4 6

ti m e, it ha s be co me c l e a r t h at “ th e do ct rin e of in effe ct iv e as si st an ce of co un se l

ob vi at es th e ne ed to us e a do ct rin e of fun da m en ta l er ro r as a m ean s t o c or rect cas es

Id

. 4 3

See Blu it t v. S t a t e , 1 3 7 S

. W

. 3d 51, 53 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 2004 ) (a bl anket “no obj ect ion ” do es not 4 4 wai ve err or or pre vent r eview f or egregiou s ha rm).

398 S.W .3d 7 03, 7 08 ( T ex. Cri m . App. 2013 ). 4 5

Unit ed S tat es v. Cr oni c , 466 U.S. 64 8 ( 1984 ); Str ic kl and v. Washi ngt on , 466 U.S. 66 8 ( 1984 ). 4 6

12in wh i c h a n a c c us ed was de pr iv ed of a fai r tri al .” Thi s is es pe ci al ly tru e wit h 4 7

un pr es erv ed ch arg e err or

.
To be gi n, th e ne ed fo r ei th er an al y si s ari se s on ly be cau se de fen se co un se l

fai le d t o ob

ject. Seco nd , th e fo cu s of bo th is th e fai rn es s of th e pr oc eed in g an d

co nf id en ce in th e rel ia bi li ty of it s o u tc om e. As a res ul t, th ei r ha rm /p reju di ce 4 8

an al y se s are di ffi cu lt to di st in gu is h. Giv en th e se ve rit y of an erro r th at go es to th e 4 9

ve ry ba si s of th e cas e, de pr iv es th e accu s e d o f a va lu ab le rig ht , or vi ta ll y affe ct s a
d e f e n s i ve th eo ry , on e sh ou ld ex pe ct reas on ab ly pr of ic ie nt co un se l to reco gn iz e i t 5 0

an d pre ve nt it s in he ren t preju di ce. Thi rd , in pr act ic e, a la rg e se gm en t of Alma nz a ’s juri sp ru de nc e m irr or s rev ie w of in effe ct iv e as si st an ce cl ai m s. Ju st as ap pe ll at e co ur ts

wil l no t fin d IAC whe n co un se l’s pe rfo rm an ce can be ex pl ai ne d by so m e reas on ab le

st rat eg y , t h i s Co ur t refu se s to ap pl y Alma nz a whe ne ve r st rat eg y is im pl ic at ed

. 5 1

Blu e v . St ate , 41 S.W .3d 1 29, 1 44 ( T ex. Cri m . App. 2000 ) ( K el le r, J ., di sse nti ng). 4 7

Alma nza def

ine d fun damenta l er r o r a s er ror “ca lc ula te d to inj ure the ri ghts o f t he a ppe ll ant to th e 4 8 ext ent tha t he has not had a fa ir and imp a rt ia l tr ia l.” 686 S.W .2d at 172 (c it at ion om it te d). Simila rl y, t he ri ght to the ef

fe ct ive ass is ta nce of cou nse l is re cognized, not for it s own sake, but bec aus e of the ef fe ct it has
on the abi li ty of the acc use d to re cei ve a fa ir tr ia l. Cron ic , 466 U.S. at 658; Str ic kl and , 466 U.S. at 696 (“ the ult imate f ocu s of in qui ry m

ust be on t he f

unda m ent al fa ir nes s of

th e pr oce edi ng”).

Pose y v. Sta te , 966 S.W .2d 57, 71 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 1998 ) ( Wo m ack, J ., co ncu rr ing) ( “t he Alma nza 4 9 st and ar d for fi ndi ng re versi ble er ror in the om is si on of a cha rge wit hout obj ect ion —t he den ia l of a fa ir and impart ia l tri al —i s so high tha t when it is m et , the def ens e at tor ney’s fa il ure to obj ect woul d alm ost al ways amount t o i nef

fe ct ive as si st anc e of

cou nse l.” ).

Alma nza , 686 S.W .2d a t 1 72 ( cha ra ct er izing egregiou s ha rm). 5 0
Compar e Str ic kl and , 466 U.S. at 689 (de fe nda nt m ust overco m e the pre sumpti on that the cha ll enged 5 1 act ion m ight be con si der ed s o u nd tr ia l st ra te gy )
, wit h Del gado v. Sta te , 235 S.W .3d 244, 249 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 2007 ) (de fe nsi ve is sue s, le sse r- inc lud ed off ens es, and eviden ti ar y is sue s fr equ ent ly dep end upon tr ia l st ra te gy and ta ct ic s a nd s o ar e no t “ the la w app li cab le to th e c ase ” a bse nt re que st ).
13The se are no t ru le s wit hi n th e ap pl i c a t i o n o f Alma nz a rev ie w bu t ex em pt io ns fro m
it

. If an in st ru ct io n wou ld ha ve be en gi ve n if req ue st ed , th is Co ur t’s refu sa l to de em 5 2

de fen si ve om is si on s erro ne ou s is th e fu nc ti on al eq ui va le nt of th e de fere nc e gi ve n to

co un se l u nd er St ri ckl an d

. 5 3

Fi na ll y, i n a d di ti on to th e di m in is he d qu al it y of rep res en ta ti on en ab le d by

Alma nz a an d it s red un da nc y in th e face of IAC, it crea te s un ne ces sa ry in co ns is te nc ie s

on rev ie w. The in ab il it y to ad dr es s al l co m pl ai nt s ab ou t co un se l’s pe rfo rm an ce in an
Alma nz a cl ai m of

te n req ui res a writ , was ti ng jud ic ia l res ou rces by co ve ri n g t he 5 4

sa m e ch arg e erro r twi ce. Po st po ni ng a cl ai m of un pr es erv ed ch arg e e r r o r un ti l a

pr op er IAC a rg um en t ca n b e m ad e wou ld no t h ur t an ap pl ic an t’s ch an ces for rel ie f,

an d m an y cl ai m s wou ld be n e f i t f r o m th e op po rtu ni ty to de ve lo p ev id en ce of ot he r
fai lu res of co un se l. W it h th is in m in d, it wou ld be un jus t i f th e sa m e
ci rcu m st an ces —co un se l di d no t req ue st an in st ru ct io n to th e de tri m en t of hi s
cl ie nt —yield ed di ffer en t r e s u l t s fo r th e co nv ic te d pa rty de pe nd in g on ho w th e

ap pe ll an t o r ap pl ic an t s tyled hi s cl ai m

.

T his Cour t’ s de ci si ons to not app ly Alma nza ar e not limite d to m at te rs of st ra te gy

. See Ji mene z v

. 5 2 Sta te , 32 S.W. 3d 2 33, 2 36- 37 ( T ex. Cri m . App. 2000 ) ( ar ti cl e 36 .19 e st abl is hes th e s ta nda rd of re view fo r cha rge er ror s, but doe s no t a ppl y to co nst it uti ona l e rr ors th at wer e ob j ect ed t o). One m

ust ask how viabl e Alma nza is if

it m ust be si des te ppe d t o avoid an inj ust ic e.
See Y oung v. Sta te , 991 S.W .2d 835, 840 (T ex. Cri m

. App. 1999) (W om ack, J., con cur ri ng) (f ai lur e 5 3 to re que st an ins tr uct ion ra is ed b y the e videnc e i s no t n ece ssa ri ly def ic ie nt per for m anc e)

. See Arr ing ton , 2015 T ex. Cri m

. App. LEX I S 15, at *23-25 & n.3 (r epr oving cour t o f appe al s for it s 5 4 dis re gard of eviden ce “t hat woul d li kely have bee n ina dm is si ble had app el la nt obj ect ed to it at tr ia l” bec aus e

“ t h e re aso nab le nes s of cou nse l’ s tr ia l st ra te gy is not bef ore us in thi s app eal , and we do not con si der th a t
m at te r i n co nduc ti ng our e gregious

- har m ana lysis .”)

.

14Co nc lu si on

Wh en th e co ur t of ap pe al s “ fin d[ s] th at th e erro ne ou s jury ch arg e de n i e d

Tho m as th e va lu ab le rig ht to ha ve th e ju r y d e c i d e hi s gu il t on th e pr op er ba si s an d

au th or iz ed a co nv ic ti on fo r act io ns no t al le ge d in th e in di ct m en t[,]” it m is un de rs ta nd s
th e po st ur e of th is cas e. No o ne is arg ui ng th at ap pe ll an t sh ou ld be co nv ic te d of an

of fen se fo r whi ch he was no t ch arg ed . This Co ur t al read y de ci de d t ha t ap pe ll an t i s
fact ua ll y gu il ty of th e of fen se al le ge d in th e in di ct m en t an d rem an de d fo r

c o n s i d e r a t io n of whe th er tri al on th at of fen se was fai r ev en th ou gh th e ap pl ic at io n

pa rag rap h di ffer ed fro m th e in di ct m en t. In res po ns e, th e co ur t of ap pe al s fo un d ha rm
be cau se th e ap pl ic at io n pa rag rap h di ffer ed fro m t h e i n d i ct m en t. Res pe ct fu ll y , th at

ci rcu la r reas on in g, co m

bi ne d wit h it s m is ta ke n vi ew of th e reco rd as a who le , res ul te d

in a ha rm an al y s i s t h a t was fat al ly fla wed

. And it is fu rth er pr oo f th at rev ie w of

un ob jecte d- to ch arg e erro r is be tt er le ft to cl ai m s o f I AC in ap pl ic at io ns fo r writ of

ha be as co rp us , wher e th ey are o fte n re -u rg ed an y way

.

15PRAYER FOR RELIE F

W HEREFORE, th e St at e of Tex as pr ay s th at t h e C o u r t of Cri m in al App eal s

gr an t th is Pet it io n fo r Dis cret io na ry Rev i e w , a n d t h at th e de ci si on of th e Co ur t of
App eal s b e rev ers ed

.
Res pe ct fu ll y su bm it te d,

LISA C. McM INN Sta te Pro se cu ti ng Att or ne y Bar I.D. No. 1 38 03 30 0

/s/ Jo hn R. Mes si ng er JOHN R. MESSI NGER Ass is ta nt Sta te Pro se cu ti ng Att or ne y
P.O. Box 13 04 6 Aus ti n, Tex as 78 71 1 Jo hn .Mes si ng er@ SPA.Tex as .go v 51 2/ 46 3- 16 60 (Tele ph on e) 51 2/ 46 3- 57 24 (Fax )

16CERTI FICATE OF COMPLI ANCE

The un de rs ig ne d cert ifi es th at acco rd in g to th e W or dP erfe ct wor d co un t to ol

th e ap pl ic ab le po rti on of t hi s d oc um en t co nt ai ns 3,9 58 wor ds

. /s/ Jo hn R. Mes si ng er JOHN R. MESSI NGER Ass is ta nt Sta te Pro se cu ti ng Att or ne y

CERTI FICATE OF SERVI CE

The un de rs ig ne d cert ifi es th at on t h i s 29 da y of Ja nu ary, 20 15 , th e St at e’s th

Pet it io n fo r Dis cret io na ry Rev ie w was se rv ed el ect ro ni cal ly th ro ug h th e el ect ro ni c
fil in g m an ag er o r e-m ai l o n t he pa rti es be lo w.

Hon . Zan Co ls on Bro wn Greg g C ou nt y

Ass is ta nt Dis tri ct Att or ne y 10 1 Eas t M et hv in Str eet , Sui te 33 3 Lon gv ie w, Texas 75 60 1
zan .bro wn@ co .gre gg .tx .us

Hon . Tim Co ne P.O. Box 41 3 Gil m er, Tex as 75 64 4 ti m co ne 6@ ao l.co m

/s/ Jo hn R. Mes si ng er JOHN R. MESSI NGER Ass is ta nt Sta te Pro se cu ti ng Att or ne y

17APPENDIX

### In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 13

- 00046

- CR

CLISTER RAY THOMAS, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 188th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 41776

- A

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ. Opinion by Justice Carter2 OPINION

Clister Ray Thomas appealed his conviction of failure to com ply with sex

- offender registration requirements. This Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the judgment. Thomas v. State , 411 S.W.3d 685,

693

– 94 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2013), rev ’ d , 444 S.W.3d 4, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed our judgment, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Thomas’ conviction. Thomas , 444 S.W.3d at 11. In this opinion on
remand, we are called on t o consider whether Thomas was harmed by any error in the jury charge. Id . at 6. Because error in the jury charge egregiously harmed Thomas, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

I. Background

A detailed discussion of the f acts of this case is included in our previous opinion. See

Thomas , 411 S.W.3d at 686

– 87. For purposes of this opinion, we will confine our discussion of the facts to those pertinent to the issue before us. The indictment against Thomas alleged,
[ O ] n o r about the 13 th day of June, 2012, and anterior to the presentment of this Indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, CLISTER RAY THOMAS, hereinafter called Defendant, did then and there while being a person required to register with the local law enf orcement authority in the municipality where the Defendant resided or intended to reside for more than seven days to wit : Longview, Texas, and being a person required to comply with the registration requirements of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Crimina l Procedure and having a duty to verify registration annually for life because of a reportable conviction or adjudication for Aggravated Sexual Assault, did intentionally or knowingly fail to report in person to the Longview Police Department, the local la w enforcement authority in the municipality where the Defendant resided and had last registered and provide the Defendant ’ s anticipated move date and the new address3 anticipated not later than the seventh day before the anticipated move date as required by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

. . . . As stated in our previous opinion, A person commits the offense of failure to comply with registrat ion requirements if the person ‘ is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement’ of Chapter 62. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN . art. 62.102 (West 2006). Under article 62.055(a), “ [i]f a person required to register under this chapter intends to change address,

. . . the person shall, not later than the seventh day before the intended chan ge , report in person to the local law enforcement authority designated as the person ’ s primary registration authority by the department and to the

. . . officer supervising the person and provide the authority and the officer with the person ’ s anticipated move date and new address .” T EX

. C RIM

. P ROC

. C ODE A NN . art. 62.055(a) ( West Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). Under the indictment, Thomas
was only charged with failing to comply with this specific requirement

. The indictment does not allege that Thomas fai led to provide proof of his new address within seven days after changing the address

. See i d

. Id. at 688 (footnotes omitted). The application paragraph of the jury charge, unlike the indictment, did not include the failure to comply with the registratio n requirements by failing to advise the Longview Police Department of the anticipated move date and new address at least seven days before the move: The charge read, You must decide whether the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, four elements. The elements are that

—
1. the defendant was previously convicted of aggravated sexual assault; and

2. the defendant was required to comply with the sex offender registration program under chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and

3. the defen dant was registered with the Longview Police Department as a sex offender as residing at a residence in Longview, Gregg County, Texas; and4 4. the defendant changed his address for more than seven days and intentionally or knowingly failed to report in pe rson to the Longview Police Department to register the defendant’s new address. You must all agree on elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above. If you all agree the state has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above, you must find the defendant “not guilty.” If you all agree the state has proved each of the four elements above, you must find the defendant “guilty.” The jury found Thomas guilty “as charged in the indictment.” In sum, Thom a s was indicte d for failing to comply with sex

- offender registration requirements by failing to notify the appropriate authorities at least seven days in advance of his intended move, but the jury was charged with the law pertaining to the commission of that offense by a manner and means not alleged in the

indictment. 1

II. The Jury Charge Was Erroneous We employ a two

- step process in our review of alleged jury charge error. See Abdnor v.

State , 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). “ Initially, we determine whet her error

occurred and then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. ”

Wilson v. State , 391 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Abdnor , 871

S.W.2d at 731

– 32).

1 A person commits an offense if the person is required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and fails to comply with any requirement of the chapter. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN . art. 62.102(a); Young v. S tate , 341 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“Article 62.102 is a generalized ‘umbrella statute’ that criminalizes the failure to comply with any of the registration requirements set out in Chapter 62.”). Chapter 62 contains numerous distinct requirem ents in its various statutes. Id . The language of Article 62.055, though, states that a sex offender has a duty to report a change of address to the proper authorities both before and after a move. The failure to do so is an offense. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P R OC

. A NN

. art. 62.102(a). However, “the Legislature intended for the unit of prosecution to be one offense for each change of address.” Young , 341 S.W.3d at 426.5 “ [T]he jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, but it is bound to receive the law from the court and be governed thereby. ” T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN . art. 36.13 ( West 2007). “ A trial

court must sub mit a charge setting forth the ‘ l aw applicable to the case.’” Lee v. State , 415

S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d ) (quoting T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN . art. 36.14 (West 2007)). “‘ Th e purpose of the jury charge . . . is to inform the jury of the applicable law and guide them in its application. It is not the function of t he charge merely to avoid misleading or confusing the jury : it is the function of the charge to lead and prevent

confusion. ’” Id . (quoting Delgado v. State , 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2 007) )

. Here, the charge does not track the language of the indictment. While the indictment authorized conviction based on Thomas’ failure to inform the appropriate authorities of an anticipated change in address not later than the seventh day before the move, the jury charge authorized conviction only on proof that Thomas changed his residence for more than seven days without notifying the proper authorities of the new address. 2 Because the charge authorized a conviction on a theory different from that alleged in the indictment, the charge was erroneous.

S ee N unez v. State , 215 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2007, pet. ref’d) (charge authorizing conviction on theory different from theory alleged in indictment was erroneous); s ee
also Kleese v. State , 680 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1984, pet. ref’d ) (when application paragraph authorizes conviction on theory not alleged in indictment, charge is fundamentally defective).

2 The Court of Criminal Appeals described the hypothetically correct jury charge in this ca se as “o ne that authorized a jury to convict Appellant only (1) if he was required to register as a sex offender, and (2) he failed to report an anticipated change of address seven days before the intended change. ” Thomas , 444 S.W.3d at 10.6 I II

. The Charge Error Was Egregiously Harmful The level of harm necessary to require reversal due to jury charge error is dependen t upon whether the appellant properly objected to the error. Abdnor , 871 S.W.2d at 732. Here, because Thomas did not object to the charge, we will not reverse unless the record shows the error resulted in egregious harm, Ngo v. State , 175 S.W.3d 738, 743

– 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984 ) (op. on reh’g) , such that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial. See Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171; Loun v. State , 273

S.W.3d 406, 416 (Tex. App.

— Texarkan a 2008, no pet.). “Jury

- charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.” Stuhler v. State , 218 S.W.3d 706, 719 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). In making this determination, we review “the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant information in the record as a whole.” Villarreal

v. State , 205 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2006, pet. d ism’d , untimely filed ) (citing
Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171). Direct evidence of harm is not required to establish egregious

harm. Hutch v. State , 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The application paragraph of a jury charge specifies “‘ the fact ual circumstances under

which the jury should convict or acquit[; they are] the ‘ heart and soul ’ of the jury charge. ’” Riley

v. State , N o. 06

- 13

- 00210

- CR, 2014 WL 5899094 , at *1 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana Nov. 14 , 2014, no pet. h.) (quoting Vasquez v. State , 38 9 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 12 )). “ A charge that does not apply the law to the facts fails to lead the jury to the threshold of its duty : to decide

those fact issues. ” Williams v. State , 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Here, the7 appl ication paragraph was clearly wrong. Additionally, the charge also contains an instruction in the abstract section, immediately preceding the erroneous application paragraph: A person commits the offense of “Failure to Comply with Sex Offender’s Registration Requirements” if the person is required to register and intentionally or knowingly fails to comply with a requirement of the se x offender registration program under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely , if a person required to register changes address , and fails to report in person to the local law enforcement authority in the municipality in which the person ’ s new residence is located and provide the authority in the municipality in which the person ’ s new residence is located a nd provide the authority [sic] with proof of identity and proof of residence , where a defendant has resided for more than seven days. (Emphasis added). Although this instruction is a correct statement of the law in the abstract, it is

not a correct state ment of the law as applied to this case. We , thus , conclude that the jury charge,
as a whole, was erroneous. See Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171. The state of the evidence and argument of counsel exacerbate these errors. The jury charge deprived Thomas of t he right to have the jury consider the proper standard to be used in determining if he was guilty of the particular offense alleged in the indictment. At trial, Thomas defended against the offense as set out in the jury charge (failure to report after m oving)

. He testified that he did not change his registered address of 1900 South Green Street, Apartment number 210, because he did not actually move from that residence. Although Thomas admitted that he told police that he lived at a different address o n Houston Street, he explained that this misinformation was provided in an attempt to protect his family

from eviction. Thomas further testified that , at some point after June 13, 2012 , he attempted to change his registration to the Houston Street address by speaking with a clerk in the Longview

office for sex

- offender registration. He conceded, however, that he never changed his8 registration from South Green Street, again explaining that he never moved from that address.

Defense witnesses , including Tho mas’ girlfriend and her daughter , testified that Thomas

continued to reside at the South Green S treet address even after issuance of the criminal trespass warning. In closing, defense counsel argued , “The last element, that he moved for more than seven days and failed to notify the Longview Police Department, I don’t agree with. They’re saying because he was given a criminal trespass warning, he moved.” Counsel maintained that Thomas

continued to live at the South Green Street address after he receive d a criminal trespass warning
for that address, and to do so was not a violation of the sex

- offender registration requirements. Throughout the trial , the State likewise focused precisely on the offense as explained in the jury charge. The State argued that Thomas “didn’t go back to change the old address as he was required to do” and did not attempt to register his new address until law enforcement “found

him at the new address where he said he resides.” In its closing argument , the State maintained

th at Thomas “broke the law when he failed to register his address after being criminally trespassed from 1900 South Green Street, Longview, Texas.” (Emphasis added). And, in discussing the elements of the offense, the State asked the jury if

this defendan t changed his address for more than seven days and intentionally or knowingly failed to . . . make [the Longview P.D.] aware of it.

. . . . And all he had to do was go to the P.D., he still hadn’t done it. As we sit there, he still hasn’t d one it. All he had to do was go up to the P.D., meet Mr. Brownlee and say, “Listen, something happened.” You heard the detective testify that sometimes they know things happen. He gets kicked out, he gets CT’d, they9 know that. Maybe the house burns down. They go to him, they don’t stick to that
seven

- day window, they work with you.

. . . . And a ll you have to find is that sometime before this charge was brought

– that’s all we need to show, that sometime before this charge was brought and around the date that was said, he did change his address but didn’t come to the P.D. to report it. As aptly recognized by Judge Cochran in her dissent in this matter , “Everyone at trial

— the judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, the jury

— was focused solely upon the ‘afterwards’ change

- of

- address offense, the offense that appellant actually did commit but was not charged with.” Thomas , 444 S.W.3d at 14 (Cochran, J. dissent ing). Although the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Thomas’ conviction, Id. at 11, it would be nothing short of the rankest speculation to determine that the jury would have convicted Thomas had it b een correctly charged. Considering the jury charge in its entirety, the state of the evidence, and the arguments of counsel, we find that the erroneous jury charge denied Thomas the valuable right to have the jury decide his guilt on the proper basis and authorized a conviction for actions not alleged in the indictment. Thus, Thomas was denied a fair and impartial trial. In so finding, we reject the State’s contention that, because the jury need only determine that Thomas violated his duty to r eport a change of address and because the State proved both a

“before” and a “after” violation, Thomas was not harmed by the erroneous charge. In support of
this contention, the State relies on Young , 341 S.W.3d at 427

– 28 (“Jurors must unanimously agree only tha t a sex offender failed to fulfill his reporting duty; they are not required to agree as10 to how he failed that duty.”). In Young , however, the jury charge informed the jurors that “they could convict appellant if they found that he failed to give . . . no tice of his change of address ‘not later than the seventh day before his intended change of address’ or ‘not later than the seventh day after changing his address.’” Id . at 421. Unlike this case, the charge in Young

tracked the indictment. Id . at 419. And, unlike this case, both the charge and the indictment alleged both the “before” and “after” manner and means of violatin g the relevant statute. Here, the indictment alleged a failure to report before moving, and the charge instructed the jury to find Thomas guilty only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he failed to report seven days after moving. We , thus , find the Young case inapposite.

IV. Conclusion We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

Jack Carter Justice

Date Submitted: December 29, 2014 Date Decided: December 30 , 2014

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