F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S , a California L imited Partnership,

Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

C I T Y O F F I L L M O R

E , a California Municipal Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 12-55549

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-07562- SJ O-RZ

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California S. J ames Otero, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted November 7, 2013—Pasadena, California

F iled September 2, 2014

B efore: Alfred T. Goodwin, Ray mond C. F isher,

a nd Richard R. Clifton, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e CliftonE L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 2

SUMMARY *

F air Housing Act / Standing

The panel reversed the dismissal

, f o r l ack of Article I I I standing

, of a seniors-only mobile home park owner’s action claiming violations of the F air Housing Act when the City o f F illmore, California, alleg edly interfered with an a pplication for a subdivision of the mobile home park by causing unreasonable delay s a

n d imposing ex traleg al conditio ns because of a fear that subdivision would lead to the opening of the park to families.

The panel held that, under th e f a cts alleg ed in the complaint, the mobile home park owner suff e r e d a concrete and particulariz ed, actual injury

, in t h e form of added

ex p enses caused b y the city ’s interference with the subdivision application, a nd therefore had Article I I I standing
to p rosecute the a ction. T he panel reversed the district court and remanded for further proceeding s.

COUNSEL

Rob e r t S

. Coldren and Mark D. Alpert (arg ued), Hart, King & Coldren, Santa Ana, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J effrey Malawy (arg

u ed), Ale s h i r e & W y

nder, L L P, I rvine, California; J

. Rog er My e rs a nd C h armaine Hilton B uehner,

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 3

My ers, W idders, Gibson & J ones, L L P, Ventura, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

OP INION

CL I F TON, Circuit J udg e :

F air h ousing is the topic of the da y , as we are presented with a case involving the F air Housing Act (“ FH A ” )

. El Dorado Estates (“El Dorado”), is a mobile home park owner located in the City of F illmore (“City ” )

, California. L itig ation between El Dorado an d the City arose out of E l Dorado’s application for a subdivision of its seniors-only mobile home park, the El D orado Estates Mobile Home Park (the “Park”). I n its complaint, El D orado alleg es that the City interfered with the application by causing unreaso n ab le delay s a nd i m posing e x traleg al c onditions because of a fear tha t subdivision would lead to El D orado o pening the P ark to families.

P r otracted state court proceeding s surro u n d i n g t h e l e g a l i t y of various conditions the City imposed on El Dorado when processing its subdivision applica t i o n eventually led to El Dorado bring ing this action in federal court, alleg ing that the City ’ s actions violated various provisions of the F H A

. El Dorado’s complaint was dismissed by th e d i strict court for lack of standingunder Article I I I

.

W e disag ree that E l Dorado lacks Article I I I standing

. W h en the i n

j u ry suffered by El Dorado is construed a s alleg ed in El Dorado’s complaint, i t b e comes clear that El Dorado h as suffered a concrete a nd particulariz ed, actual, injury

, in the form of a dded ex penses c aused by the City ’sE L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 4

interference with El Dorado’s subdivision application. According ly

, we rever se the district court and remand for further proceeding s.

I. Background 1

El Dorado is the owner of a mobile home park located within the City

. The Park is operated by El Dorado as a senior rental park, i n w hich homes are rented o ut to residents w ho are 55 y ears of ag e or older.

I n 2008, at the r e q

uest of Park re s idents, the City considered a dopting a mobile home r e n t c ontrol ordinance. El Dorado publicly discussed opening the Park to families—that is, to residents of all ag e s, including c hildren—in r esponse to the rent control ordinance, an a c t i o n that it is free to undertake without seeking approv a l f rom the City or the Park’s res i d e n ts. I t instead decided to ex it the rental mobile home park business b y subdividing the Park i n t o sing le lots to be sold to residents.

The leg al sag a that e ventually led to this case beg an when El Dorado a

pplied to the City f

o r a subdivision pursuant to California law. Many residents opp o s e d the subdivision for fear that it would lead to the Park’s conversion from a senior park to a family park, a nd the City t w i c e deemed the application incomplete and imposed additional requirements
not contemplated by California law. The City ’s efforts delay ed, increased the c ost of, and prevented the subdivision.

1 Co n sisten t w ith th e m o tio n to d ism iss stag e o f th e p ro ceed i n gs , w e

reco u n t th e b ack g ro u n d a c c e p t i n g th e alleg atio n s in El Do rad o’ s co m p lain t as tru e.E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 5

I n response, El Dorado sued the City in C a l i f ornia state court. There, El Dorado was succes s f u l in o b taining a court order that eliminated the vast majority of the requirements imposed b y the City

. The City thereafter approved the application, subject to compliance with local flood mitig ation
reg ulations and w ith the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), a condition that w as imposed contrary to the City staff’s judg ment that the subdivision was ex e m pt from CEQA review.

The CEQA condition ma y h ave been merely pretex tual. City officials made statements that sug g est that the City used the CEQA condition as a way to prevent the conversion to a family park. The C i t y further offered to waive the CEQA condition if El Dorado would commit to maintaining the Park

as a senior park. El Dorado w e n t b ack to state court to challeng e the impos i t ion of the conditions. Althoug h the court upheld the imposition o f the CEQA environmental r eview, it prohibited the City from considering local reg ulations.

I n lig ht of the protracted litig atio n a nd imposition of the CEQA c ondition that survived El Dorado’s challeng e in state court, E l Dorado filed this a c t i o n. El Dorado alleg ed in its F irst Amended Complaint as its sole cause of action that the City violated the F HA, namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)–(b) a nd 3617, w h i c h p r o h i b i t d i s c r i m ination, including discriminatory land us e decisions, on a c count of familial status. El Dorado fu r t her alleg ed that the City c a used it damag es throug h both unreasonable d e l a y s and costly

, ex traleg al conditions in processing the subdivision application. I n partic u lar, El Dorado alleg ed that the C ity “acted with the intent o f coercing

, interfering w i th and preventing El Dorado from potentially

making housing available for families.”E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 6

The City filed a motion to d ismiss under F ederal Rules o f Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court h eld that El Dorado lacked standing under Article I I I and therefore
g ranted the City ’s motion and dismissed El Dorado’s complaint without leave to amend.

El D orado timely appealed the distr i c t court’s order
g ranting the Cit y ’s motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction under 28 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 91, and we review de novo a district court’s deci s i o n t o g rant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Colony Cove Props

. , L L C v. City of Carson
, 640 F .3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011).

II. Discussion

As it comes to u s, this appeal raises only one substantial question: we need to d ecide whether El Dorado has Article I I I

s t a n d ing to prosecute this action ag a inst the City in federal

c o u rt. W e conclude that El Dorado h as standing in the constitutional sense. W e therefore reverse the district court’s order dismissing the complaint for l a c k of jurisdiction a nd remand for further proceeding s.

Standing derives from the case-or-cont r oversy requirement of Article I I I

. Allen v

. W right

, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 ( 1984 ). Standing to bring suit in federal court under Article I I I is an “ irreducible constitutional minimum” consisting o f three elements: injury in fact, c ausation, a nd redressability

. Lujan v. Defenders of W ildlife

, 504 U.S. 555, 5 6 0–61 (1992). An injury in fact is an invasion of a l e ga l l y protected interest that is both ( 1 ) concrete and particulariz ed and (2) actual or immi n e nt, a s o pposed to c onjectural o r hy pothetical. Id. at 560. Causation is satisfied so long as the injury is “fairly traceable t o t h e defendant’s alleg edlyE L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 7

unlawful conduct.” A llen

, 468 U.S. at 751. Fi n a l ly

, redressabili ty requires only that the injury be likely to be redressed if the requested relief is g ranted. Id. I n the contex t of the F HA and housing discr i m i n a t i on, a plaintiff need not be among the class discr i m i n a ted ag ainst in order to have standing

. See, e.g. , Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman

, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982). I n particular, an o rg aniz a tion may have standing to bring suit on its own behalf, without rely ing in a representative capacity on the standing of any third parties. Id.

A. Injury in Fact

The requirement of injury in fact h as be en the source o f much co n f

usion in this c ase. The district court analy z ed the particular provisions of t h e F HA under which El Dorado broug ht suit to conclude that the interference the City c aused with El Dorado’s subdivision a pplication “does not g ive r ise
to a claim under the F HA because [ E l Dorado’s] inability to

‘ p otentially make housing available for f a m i l ies’ is n ot an injury ” and held that El Dorado therefore lacked standing

. El Dorado arg ues, however, that the dis t rict court’s analy sis misconstrues the alleg e d injury suffered b y El Dorado. W e ag ree. El Dorado’s a lleg ed injury is not its inability to make housing available (wheth er potentially or not) to families. Rather, its a l l eg ed injury consists of the ex p enses incurred throug h unreasonable d elay s and ex traleg al conditions imposed by t he City in processing the subdivision

a p p l i cation, alleg edly in the belief that El Dorado would b e opening the Park to families after subdivision. I n other words, the City ’s interference with El Dorado’ s s u b division application directly i n

j u r ed E l D orado, reg a

rdless of El Dorado’s intent with reg ard to providing housing for families.E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 8

I t is a c oncrete and particulariz ed inj u r y s u ffered only by El Dorado, and it is an actual injury that requires no conjecture.

I t is true, a s the City arg ues, that this injury ex ists as a leg ally protected intere s t o n ly because the F HA prohibits discrimination ag ainst families, thereby creating a new leg al rig ht “the invasi o n of which c reates standing .” Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 578 ( quoting W arth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). W h at El Dorado has alleg ed, w hich we must take a s true at the motion to dismiss stag e, is that the City has discriminat e d a g a i n st families by interfering with El Dorado’s

s u b d i vision application and c onditioning a p p l i c a t i o n a p p r o v a l

on El Dorado’s promising not to o pen the Park t o families. The rig ht not to have to endure housing discrimination, even if one is not a mong the class of persons discriminated ag ainst, is a c onstitutionally cog niz able leg a l int e r e s t supporting standing

. S

ee Havens
, 455 U.S. at 37 8

– 7 9 ( holding that an org aniz ation has standing in its own capacity to sue to r ecoup costs incurred in combating racially discrimina t o r y steering practices); see also id. at 375–78 (opening the door to a white plaintiff bring ing suit ag a inst a pro p e rt y owner for housing discri m i n a t i o n a ga i n st blacks under the r ubric o f “‘neig hborhood’ standing ” ). El Dorado’s alleg ed injury thus satisfies the injury -in-fact requirement. 2

B. Causation and Redressability

Havi n g established the a ctual injury alleg ed by El Dorado, causation and redressability easily follow.

2 View in g th e in

j u ry alleg ed b y

El Do rad o as describ ed i n th i s sectio n , w e also co n clu d e th at El Do rad o ’ s claim s are rip e f o r ad j u d icati o n

. S ee Th o ma s v. A n c h o ra g e Eq u a l Rig h ts Co mm’n
, 2 2 0 F.3 d 11 3 4
, 11 3 8

– 3 9 (9 th Cir. 1 99 9 ) (en b an c).E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 9

The delay s and ad d i tional ex penses El Dorado was subjected to w e re a direct result of the City ’s alleg ed interference with the subdivision application. El Dorado’s alleg ations therefore demons t r ate that its injury is fairly traceable to the City ’s conduct.

I n addition, the district c o u rt c o u ld redress El Dorado’s alleg ed injuries. I t could award damag es that w ould allow El Dorado to recoup the additional c o sts incurred in connection with the City ’s interference with the subdivision application. I t could also enjoin the City from continuing t o d elay the processing o f or impose ex traleg al con d i t ions on the subdivision application. El D orado’s alleg ed injury is thus likely to be r e d r e s sed were the court to g rant its requested relief.

I n sum, we conclude that El Dorado has A rticle I I I standing to prosecute this action ag ainst the City

.

A s an alternative basis to affirm the district court’s judg ment, the City arg ues that El Dorado has failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), referencing th e m o t i on to that effect it filed in the district court. Having dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court did not reach that Rule 12(b)(6) motion. W e d ecline to take it up in the first instance. Subsequent to the district court ’s order in this case, the Supreme Court indicated that the question of whether a particular plaintiff has a rig ht to sue under a g iven substantive statute, thoug h often p reviously discussed as “p r u d ential standing

, ” is more appropriately dealt with not in terms o f standing b ut instead as a matte r o f statutory interpretation, determining “whether a leg islatively conferred cause o f action encompasses a p articular plaintiff’s c laim.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
, 134 S. Ct. 1377,E L D O R A D O E S T A T E S V

. C I T Y O F F I L L M O R E 10

1387 (2014). I f r a i s e d

, that question should be addressed b y the district court.

III. Conclusion

El Dorado has established Article I I I standing

. According ly

, the d i s t rict court’s o rder dismissing the complaint f

or lack o f jurisdiction must be r e v ersed. W e remand for further proceeding s.

REVERSED and REMANDED.