* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50361

Summary Calendar

CAROLYN SPRUILL

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

No. 5:07-CV-509

Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carolyn Spruill appeals the district court’s order affirming the

determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) that

Spruill is not disabled within the meaning of Title II of the Social Security Act

(the “Act”). Because we find that the Commissioner’s decision is based on

substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law, we affirm.

After suffering a back injury, Spruill applied for supplemental income and

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 12, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-50361

2

disability insurance benefits, claiming that her injury prevented her from

working. The Social Security Administration denied benefits initially and on

reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

determined that Spruill was not disabled because she could still perform light

work. The appeals council denied Spruill’s request for review, so the ALJ’s

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. The district court

affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Spruill appeals.

Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries: (1)

whether it is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) whether it comports

with relevant legal standards. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th

Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “relevant and sufficient for a reasonable

mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it must be more than a

scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d

289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992). “[W]e may neither reweigh the evidence in the record

nor substitute our judgment for the [Commissioner’s].” Villa v. Sullivan, 895

F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Here, the ALJ found that Spruill had the medically determinable

impairments of obesity, degenerative disc disease, status post laminectomy and

discectomy, and depression. Though these impairments prevent her from

performing her past work as a nurse’s aide, the ALJ determined that Spruill can

perform light work with certain limitations. Further, the ALJ found that a

significant number of jobs in the national economy meet this criteria, including

assembler of printed products, electrical assembler, and office helper. Spruill

argues thatthe ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence and did not

comport with relevant legal standards in three respects: by failing to afford

proper weight to the medical opinions, failing to properly evaluate her mental

limitations, and failing to properly address her credibility. 

Regarding the weight of medical opinions, Spruill argues that the ALJ
No. 08-50361

3

misconstrued her treating physician’s evaluations and failed to conduct the

detailed analysis required when a treating physician’s view is rejected.

However, the ALJ did not reject the opinion of Spruill’s treating physician—in

fact, he adopted the doctor’s opinion that Spruill can work with certain

restrictions. Dr. Crump, the treating physician, initially released Spruill back

to her former job as a nurse’s aide with instructions to wear a back belt and not

lift more than twenty-five pounds. When Spruill’s employer could not

accommodate this restriction, Dr. Crump advised Spruill to find a job not

involving heavy lifting. Rather than rejecting Dr. Crump’s opinion, the ALJ

adopted his conclusion that Spruill could no longer work as a nurse’s aide but

could do work with less heavy lifting. Though Dr. Crump observed that Spruill’s

back pain was “chronic,” he maintained that she could lift up to twenty-five

pounds. No medical evidence, from Dr. Crump or any examining physician,

contradicts the ALJ’s conclusion that though Spruill may experience

exacerbation of discomfort with increased activity, she has no functional

limitations precluding all work activity. 

Next, Spruill claims thatthe ALJ failed to address her mental limitations.

The record does not support this contention. The ALJ found that Spruill’s

depression constitutes a severe mental impairment, butthatthis impairment no

more than moderately limits her ability to function. The psychological

evaluation performed by Dr. Clark provides substantial evidence for this finding.

Dr. Clark noted that Spruill’s thoughts were organized, relevant, and coherent.

Further, Dr. Clark concluded that Spruill’s depression resulted from her injury

and inability to work, and would likely improve if she regained employment.

Though consultive physical examiner Dr. Mittal noted that Spruill had difficulty

concentrating, Dr. Mittal is not a mental health professional and was not

performing a psychological evaluation. The ALJ accommodated Spruill’s mental

limitations by restricting her to jobs involving only routine instructions, no
No. 08-50361

4

independent decision-making, limited interpersonal contact, and no contact with

the public. The record contains substantial evidence supporting the conclusion

that Spruill can perform this type of work.

Finally, Spruill argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess her

credibility. When an ALJ finds that a claimant lacks credibility, the ALJ must

articulate reasons for discrediting the claimant’s complaints. See Abshire v.

Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1988). This explanation need not follow

formalistic rules. See Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1994)

(observing that credibility conclusions are “precisely the kinds of determinations

that the ALJ is best positioned to make”). We accord great deference to the

ALJ’s credibility determination. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir.

2000). Here, the ALJ found that though Spruill’s impairments could produce the

alleged symptoms, her testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of those symptoms was not entirely credible. The ALJ

articulated the following reasons for this conclusion, all supported by the record:

Dr. Crump never prescribed Spruill any narcotic pain medication, Spruill never

followed up on Dr. Crump’s recommendation of physical therapy, no evidence

other than her testimony indicated dependence on a cane to walk, and both Dr.

Crump and Spruill herself observed that she is capable of lifting up to twentyfive pounds. The ALJ also found that objective medical testing revealed no more

than mild symptomatology, inconsistent with the disabling pain she described.

Accordingly, we find that the ALJ articulated adequate reasons for rejecting

Spruill’s testimony regarding the extent of her limitations and that these

reasons were based on substantial evidence.

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order in favor ofthe

Commissioner.