NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

PATRICIA S., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, E.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0371 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD530848

The Honorable Jennifer E. Green, Judge

DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen, P.C., Phoenix

By Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Thomas Jose

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 7-13-2021
PATRICIA S. v. DCS, E.S.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Patricia S. (“Grandmother”) appeals the juvenile court’s 

denial of her motion to dismiss orders of dependency and termination of 

parental rights involving her grandchild, whom we refer to as Erin1,

arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). Because we conclude 

Grandmother is not an “aggrieved party,” see A.R.S. § 8-235(A); Ariz. R.P. 

Juv. Ct. 103(A), we dismiss the appeal. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In April 2017, nineteen-month-old Erin was found alone, 

unsupervised, and crying outside of the hotel where she was staying with 

her Mother. When police arrived, they located Mother, who smelled of 

alcohol and showed signs of intoxication. Father, who lived in Oregon, had 

not had a relationship with Erin for approximately a year. Police contacted 

the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) who removed Erin from 

Mother’s care and filed a dependency petition. The juvenile court found

Erin dependent as to both Mother and Father.

¶3 Roughly one year later, Grandmother, seeking to have Erin

placed in her care, moved the juvenile court to allow her to intervene in the 

dependency proceedings. The court obliged. Erin was briefly placed with 

Grandmother, before being reunited with Father. The child was removed 

from Father’s care, however, after he allowed Mother access to Erin outside 

of the DCS approved safety plan. Grandmother again moved to have Erin

placed in her care. DCS opposed the motion, contending Grandmother, too, 

violated the safety plan by allowing Mother unsupervised access to Erin,

1 A pseudonym is being used to protect the child’s identity.
PATRICIA S. v. DCS, E.S.

Decision of the Court

3

and cross-motioned to place Erin with other relatives. The court granted 

DCS’ motion over Grandmother’s objection.

2

¶4 Following a severance trial, the court terminated Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights. Grandmother moved once more for Erin to be 

placed with her. Again, DCS opposed the motion, and the court denied her 

request. The court also denied Grandmother’s motion for contact with Erin.

¶5 Both parents appealed from the termination order

challenging only the sufficiency of evidence justifying termination of the 

parent-child relationship. Anna S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

1 CA-JV 19-0361, 2020 WL 2078278, at *2, ¶ 11 (Ariz. App. Apr. 30, 2020) 

(mem. decision). We affirmed the termination. Id. at *4, ¶ 20. Grandmother 

subsequently moved to dismiss the dependency proceedings, including the 

termination order, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Specifically, Grandmother argued that Oregon, rather than Arizona, was 

Erin’s home state contending that Erin had been in Arizona for less than six 

months when DCS took temporary custody of her, and that the court failed 

to hold a required UCCJEA conference with the Oregon court. The juvenile 

court issued a detailed order affirming its exercise of jurisdiction, 

concluding the evidence supported its prior finding that Erin had been in 

Arizona long enough to make Arizona her home state, and that it was not 

required to hold a UCCJEA conference because Oregon did not have 

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Grandmother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION 

¶6 In its answering brief, DCS contends, as a threshold matter,

that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because Grandmother is not an 

“aggrieved party” and the order which Grandmother is attempting to 

appeal from is not “final,” and thus, not appealable. “The jurisdiction . . . of 

any intermediate appellate court shall be as provided by law.” Ariz. Const. 

art. 6, § 9. Our jurisdiction over juvenile matters is governed by A.R.S. 

§ 8-235, which provides that “[a]ny aggrieved party in any juvenile court 

proceeding . . . may appeal from a final order of the juvenile court to the 

court of appeals.” A.R.S. § 8-235(A). Both elements must be present—the 

party must be aggrieved, and the court’s order must be final. Id.; Jewel C. v.

Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 2 (App. 2018). Accordingly, before 

2 Although the court had previously awarded Grandmother visitation 

while Erin was placed with Father, the court did not grant Grandmother 

visitation while Erin was placed with her other relatives and denied 

Grandmother’s motion for unsupervised visitation with Erin.
PATRICIA S. v. DCS, E.S.

Decision of the Court

4

we address the merits of Grandmother’s appeal, we first determine whether 

Grandmother is an “aggrieved party” and, if so, whether the juvenile 

court’s order denying her motion to dismiss is a “final order.” A.R.S. 

§ 8-235(A).

¶7 “To qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate 

to deny the party some personal or property right or to impose a substantial 

burden on the party.” Jewel C., 244 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 3 (quoting Pima Cnty. Juv.

Action No. B-9385, 138 Ariz. 291, 293 (1983)). If a party is “aggrieved,” they 

have standing to appeal a final order of the juvenile court. 

A.R.S. § 8-235(A); In re Kory L., 194 Ariz. 215, 217, ¶ 3 (App. 1999) (as 

amended) (concluding that because appellant was an aggrieved party, she 

had standing to appeal an order of the juvenile court). 

¶8 DCS contends Grandmother is not an aggrieved party 

because “she had no rights [which] the juvenile court could deny,” and 

because the order did not place a “substantial burden” on her. By contrast, 

Grandmother argues she is an aggrieved party because, “but for the 

juvenile court[’s] orders, [she] could have petitioned to pursue 

grandparent’s rights via A.R.S. [§ 25-409].” Grandmother also seemingly 

asserts the order denied her certain rights under A.R.S. §§ 8-513 and 8-514.

And, while Grandmother contends the order imposed upon her a 

substantial burden, she has failed to elucidate the nature of the burden 

imposed or to provide any evidence in support of her assertion.

¶9 Grandmother has not provided any authority in support of 

her claim that grandparents, who do not have current vested rights under 

A.R.S. § 25-409, may be aggrieved parties to dependency and/or 

termination orders.

¶10 Under A.R.S. § 25-409, grandparents may petition the court 

for visitation with their grandchild. However, a court is not required to 

grant visitation and may do so only upon a finding that visitation is in the 

grandchild’s best interests, and upon a finding that certain statutory 

grounds have been met. A.R.S. § 25-409(C). Thus, while grandparents are 

eligible to receive visitation, they have no right to visitation, absent a court 

order. See A.R.S. § 25-409; Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, 125, ¶ 23 (App. 

1999) (“Grandparent visitation is not automatic.”). Moreover, while 

“intervention [in dependency proceedings] . . . allows . . . grandparents to 

be heard; it does not confer any right to custody upon them.” Bechtel v. Rose

In & For Maricopa Cnty., 150 Ariz. 68, 73 n.3 (1986). Permissive intervention 

by a court of a non-parent relative, as occurred here when the juvenile court 

allowed Grandmother to intervene, “merely allows the relative to be 
PATRICIA S. v. DCS, E.S.

Decision of the Court

5

heard,” but again, “it does not confer any right to custody upon them.” Jewel 

C., 244 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 4. 

¶11 To be sure, parents and children have inherent, fundamental 

rights which, if denied by dependency orders, may qualify them as 

aggrieved parties. See Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 46, 

¶ 11 (App. 2006) (holding that a mother’s fundamental right to raise her 

children was “sufficient to make her an aggrieved party under [A.R.S.]

§ 8-235”); Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. B-9385, 138 Ariz. at 293–94 (recognizing 

that because children have the right to effective parental care, they may be 

aggrieved parties with rights to appeal orders of the juvenile court).

Grandparents, however, have no such fundamental right. Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (examining whether order granting 

grandparents visitation unconstitutionally interfered with the parent’s 

fundamental right over her children). And although A.R.S. § 8-514 

expresses a preference for placement with a grandparent, “the order of 

placement is a preference, not a mandate.” Antonio P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 218 Ariz. 402, 405, ¶ 12 (App. 2008). In short, grandparents have no 

independent rights to custody and placement under § 8-514. Jewel C., 244 

Ariz. at 350, ¶ 7. Furthermore, because A.R.S. 

§ 8-513 applies to children’s rights in maintaining contact with their 

relatives, it is inapplicable to Grandmother’s appeal. Accordingly, 

Grandmother cannot be an aggrieved party because she has no right to 

custody, to visitation, to placement, etc., that was aggrieved by the court’s 

order.

¶12 Lastly, because the court’s order merely affirmed its exercise 

of jurisdiction and did not impose a “substantial burden” or obligation on 

Grandmother, she is not an aggrieved party. See Jewel C., 244 Ariz. at 349 (to 

be an aggrieved party, the judgment must either deny a personal or 

property right or impose a substantial burden on the party); In re Kory L., 

194 Ariz. at 217, ¶ 3 (holding that a juvenile court order which imposed 

restitution obligation on mother of juvenile who pled delinquent to criminal 

trespass, made mother an “aggrieved” party, for purposes of standing, to 

contest restitution order under rule permitting an aggrieved party to appeal 

from a final order of the juvenile court). 

¶13 Because we conclude Grandmother is not an “aggrieved 

party,” we need not determine whether the court’s order was “final.”

Grandmother invites this court, in the exercise of our discretion, to accept 

special action jurisdiction over this appeal. We decline her invitation,

noting again that we previously considered and ruled upon both parents’ 

appeal from the termination order. 
PATRICIA S. v. DCS, E.S.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION 

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal.