[Cite as State v. Knight, 2024-Ohio-4518.]

Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Edward A. Czopur, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office, for PlaintiffAppellee and

Atty. John B. Juhasz, for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: September 11, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LAVONTAE KNIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 MA 0102

Motion for Reconsideration

BEFORE:

Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Denied.
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Case No. 22 MA 0102

PER CURIAM.

{¶1} Appellee State of Ohio (Appellee) has filed an application for 

reconsideration pursuant to App.R. 26(A)(1), asking this Court to reconsider its June 6, 

2023 Opinion and Judgment Entry reversing Appellant’s convictions and remanding his 

case for a new trial. State v. Knight, 2024-Ohio-2176 (7th Dist.) (Waite, J., dissenting). 

For the following reasons, we deny Appellee’s application.

{¶2} App.R. 26 provides for the filing of an application for reconsideration, but 

includes no guidelines to use in determining whether a decision should be reconsidered 

and changed. Matthews v. Matthews, 5 Ohio App.3d 140, 143 (10th Dist.1981). The test 

generally applied is whether the application calls to the attention of the court an obvious 

error in its decision or raises an issue for our consideration that was either not at all or 

was not fully considered by us when it should have been. Id. “Mere disagreement with 

this Court's logic and conclusions does not support an application for reconsideration.” 

State v. Carosiello, 2018-Ohio-860, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). Rather, App.R. 26 provides a 

mechanism by which a party may prevent miscarriages of justice that could arise when 

an appellate court makes an obvious error or renders an unsupportable decision under 

the law. Id. 

{¶3} Appellee contends that our Opinion is contrary to law because we found no 

Brady violation by the State in delaying the production of DNA evidence, yet held that the 

delay contributed to cumulative error. Appellee maintains that we did not suggest the 

appropriate discovery sanction even though we held that more than a continuance was

warranted. Appellee further asserts that any sanction short of dismissal of the case 

limited the situation to a common discovery violation and thus did not impact the trial, as 

required in order to contribute to cumulative error. Appellee further asserts that our 

Opinion is contrary to law because we failed to consider the abuse of discretion standard 

in reviewing the trial court’s denial of a continuance to defense counsel upon discovery 

of possible juror misconduct. 

{¶4} Our determinations are not contrary to law and we considered the abuse of 

discretion standards in our Opinion. We considered the abuse of discretion standard 

when we addressed Appellant’s third assignment of error concerning alleged Brady
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violations. Knight, 2024-Ohio-2176, ¶ 100. We cited State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, 

where the Ohio Supreme Court applied the abuse of discretion standard and held that 

“[s]anctions for a Crim. R. 16 discovery violation are within the discretion of the court.” 

Knight, 2024-Ohio-2176, ¶ 100. We also cited Darmond and Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 

Ohio St.3d 1, *5 (1987), where the Court held that a trial court must consider certain 

factors and impose the least drastic sanction possible to cure a discovery violation. 

Knight, 2024-Ohio-2176, ¶ 100. 

{¶5} We found that while the trial court in the instant case properly held that no 

Brady violation occurred from the State’s nearly two-year delay in notifying the defense 

that Allen May’s DNA evidence was found in the car, the court erred by imposing the least 

restrictive sanction of a continuance of the trial. Knight, 2024-Ohio-2176, ¶ 104-105. We 

explained that more than a continuance was necessary based on the lengthy delay by 

the prosecution in disclosing the DNA, the questionable tactics used by the same

assistant prosecutor in this case and in another of Appellant’s cases, and the leniency of 

the trial court in that other case for similar discovery violations. Id.

{¶6} Appellee contends that we should have suggested the discovery sanction 

that the trial court should impose. However, in Darmond, the Ohio Supreme Court 

indicated that it was “not mandating a specific procedural course of conduct” for the trial 

court to take as a discovery sanction. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 41. The Court held 

that while discovery violations by the state can result in the dismissal of a case, the trial 

court must first consider factors in determining that a lesser sanction would not be 

consistent with the purposes of the criminal discovery rules. Id. Thus, the Court left it to 

the discretion of the trial court to determine the sanction. 

{¶7} Just as in Darmond, we did not suggest a discovery sanction or order the 

trial court to impose a certain sanction for the State’s discovery violation. Knight, 2024-

Ohio-2176. Rather, we cited Darmond and held that sanctions for discovery violations 

are within the trial court’s discretion. Id. at ¶ 100. We further cited Darmond and 

Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, *5 (1987) and held that trial courts must consider 

certain factors in determining sanctions and courts must impose the least restrictive 

sanction possible to cure the violation. Id. at ¶100-101. We found that a more restrictive 

discovery sanction was necessary in the instant case based on the State’s lengthy delay 
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in disclosing the DNA evidence, the assistant prosecutor’s similar behavior in another of 

Appellant’s cases, and the trial court’s prior leniency for that similar behavior. Id. at ¶ 

101. 

{¶8} Appellee further contends that we did not apply the abuse of discretion 

standard when analyzing the trial court’s decision to deny a continuance of the Remmer

hearing to defense counsel. However, we cited cases considering and applying the 

abuse of discretion standard in conjunction with a motion for new trial and removing a 

juror in cases involving outside influences. Knight, 2024-Ohio-2176, ¶ 62. We held that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for new trial on the basis of

juror misconduct or by denying counsel’s request for a continuance before immediately 

proceeding to voir dire in the Remmer hearing. Id. at ¶ 86. 

{¶9} Finally, Appellee asserts that the harmless errors we identified did not 

impact Appellant’s trial so as to be deemed cumulative and warranting a conviction 

reversal. This Court has already addressed this issue when we discussed the errors 

constituting cumulative error. Therefore, Appellee has not called to our attention an 

obvious error or an issue that we did not fully consider when it should have been. 

{¶10} For these reasons, Appellee’s application for reconsideration is denied as 

no obvious error exists in our Opinion and we fully considered all issues raised. 

JUDGE MARK A. HANNI

JUDGE CHERYL L. WAITE

JUDGE CAROL ANN ROBB

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.