Rel: June 14, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

_________________________

G.P.

v.

Dale County Department of Human Resources

Appeals from Dale Juvenile Court

(JU-21-41.03 and JU-21-42.02)

EDWARDS, Judge.

In February 2023, the Dale County Department of Human 

Resources ("DHR") filed in the Dale Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

petitions seeking to terminate the parental rights of K.R. ("the mother") 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

2

and of G.P. ("the father") to A.E. and D.P. ("the children").1 After two 

continuances, the juvenile court held a trial on the petitions on August 

17, 2023. On September 7, 2023, the juvenile court entered a judgment

in each action concluding that the mother and the father were "unable or 

unwilling to discharge their responsibilities to and for [each] child" and 

terminating their parental rights to each child. In those judgments, the 

juvenile court found "that the father had [had] ample time to show his 

ability and willingness to care for the child[ren] but that he [had] failed 

to do so" and that the father, despite having testified that he was not 

aware that the children had been in foster care, had "[known the] 

children were in foster care for nearly two years before he reached out to 

a caseworker." The juvenile court also found that the father had not 

provided material support for the children, that DHR had made 

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the father, that no viable alternatives 

to the termination of the father's parental rights existed, and,

specifically, that DHR had "explored all potential relative resources 

1The petition relating to D.P. was assigned case number JU-21-

41.03. The petition relating to A.E. was assigned case number JU-21-

42.02.
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

3

without locating a suitable placement for the child[ren]." The father 

timely appealed those judgments. The mother has not appealed.

The termination of parental rights is governed by Ala. Code 1975, 

§ 12-15-319. That statute reads, in part:

"(a) If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing 

evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that 

the parent[] of a child [is] unable or unwilling to discharge [his 

or her] responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct 

or condition of the parent[] renders [him or her] unable to 

properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition 

is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, it may 

terminate the parental rights of the parent[]. In a hearing on 

a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall 

consider the best interests of the child. In determining 

whether or not the parent[] [is] unable or unwilling to 

discharge [his or her] responsibilities to and for the child and 

to terminate the parental rights, the juvenile court shall 

consider the following factors including, but not limited to, the 

following:

"....

"(2) Emotional illness, mental illness, or 

mental deficiency of the parent, or excessive use of 

alcohol or controlled substances, of a duration or 

nature as to render the parent unable to care for 

the needs of the child.

"....

"(4) Conviction of and imprisonment for a 

felony.
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

4

"....

"(7) That reasonable efforts by the 

Department of Human Resources or licensed 

public or private child care agencies leading 

toward the rehabilitation of the parent[] have 

failed.

"....

"(9) Failure by the parent[] to provide for the 

material needs of the child or to pay a reasonable 

portion of support of the child where the parent is 

able to do so.

"....

"(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his 

or her circumstances to meet the needs of the child 

in accordance with agreements reached, including 

agreements reached with local departments of 

human resources or licensed child-placing 

agencies, in an administrative review or a judicial 

review."

The test a juvenile court must apply in a termination-of-parentalrights action is well settled:

"A juvenile court is required to apply a two-pronged test 

in determining whether to terminate parental rights: (1) clear 

and convincing evidence must support a finding that the child 

is dependent; and (2) the court must properly consider and 

reject all viable alternatives to a termination of parental 

rights. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. 1990)."
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

5

B.M. v. State, 895 So. 2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). A juvenile court's 

judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. P.S. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 143 So. 

3d 792, 795 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). "Clear and convincing evidence" is 

"'[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each 

essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness 

of the conclusion.'" L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2002) (quoting Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)). Although a juvenile 

court's factual findings in a judgment terminating parental rights based 

on evidence presented ore tenus are presumed correct, K.P. v. Etowah 

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 43 So. 3d 602, 605 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), "[t]his 

court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the 

findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that 

the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing." K.S.B. v. 

M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 653 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). That is, this court

"'must ... look through ["the prism of the substantive 

evidentiary burden," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 254 (1986),] to determine whether there was 

substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

6

finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, 

that would "produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm 

conviction as to each element of the claim and a high 

probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." '" 

Id. (quoting Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008), quoting in 

turn Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(c)).

The record reveals the following facts relating to the father. The 

father was late to the termination-of-parental-rights trial. The father's 

counsel explained that the father had believed that the trial was set to 

begin at 1:30 p.m. and that he was en route to the Dale County 

courthouse from his home in Vero Beach, Florida. The juvenile court 

concluded the testimony being offered by DHR and continued the trial to 

after the lunch break, permitting the father to appear at that time to 

present his own testimony. 

Dominique Thomas, the DHR caseworker assigned to the cases at 

some point in early 2023, testified that she had intended to reach out to 

the father in the week following her assignment to the cases; however, 

she said, the father had contacted her before she had attempted to contact 

him. Thomas said that the father had told her that he had seen the 

children at the mother's house at some point during the pendency of the 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

7

dependency proceedings, which had apparently begun in 2021, and that 

he had been under the impression that the children were transitioning 

back into the home of the mother at that time. 

Thomas explained that she had required the father to submit to 

both a hair-follicle drug test and a urine drug test in March 2023. She 

said that the father's urine drug test was negative for illegal substances 

but that he had tested positive for marijuana and cocaine on his hairfollicle drug test. According to Thomas, the father held a medicalmarijuana card, but, she said, when she viewed the card in March 2023, 

she noticed that the expiration date on the card had passed. She said 

that he had denied regular use of cocaine but had admitted that he had 

tried it after the October 2022 death of his mother, for whom he had been 

caring during her terminal illness.

According to Thomas, the father had begun visiting the children 

after March 2023 and had visited A.E. once or twice and D.P. four times. 

She said that D.P. was 11 or 12 years old and indicated that he suffered 

from unspecified behavioral issues. She explained that "you can tell 

there's no real bond [between the father and D.P.]. [D.P.] wants a 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

8

relationship with [the father] but, because of the inconsistency on [the 

father's] part, there's really not much there." She also commented that 

D.P. had negative perceptions of the father that had been caused by 

information that the mother had provided to him. Thomas further 

explained that D.P. "wants to [return to the father's custody] but the 

negative perceptions kind of hinder him from just coming out with it." 

Regarding A.E., Thomas indicated that she desired to return to the 

father's custody. Thomas said that A.E. was nine years old.

Thomas testified that the father had disclosed a criminal history on 

the home-evaluation questionnaire that he had completed. Specifically, 

she testified that the father had been incarcerated for a 2012 robbery 

conviction in Indiana. She also noted that he had disclosed a 2014 

conviction for failing to have a driver's license and convictions in 2017 

and 2018 for possession of marijuana. Thomas testified that the mother 

had reported that her relationship with the father had included acts of 

domestic violence on his part, but no detailed evidence relating to the 

domestic-violence allegations against the father was presented. 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

9

When initially questioned about whether DHR had sought to 

complete a home study on the father through the Interstate Compact for 

the Placement of Children ("ICPC"), Ala. Code 1975, § 44-2-20 et seq., 

Thomas said that DHR had declined to request an ICPC home study from 

the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCF") because, she 

said, the father had tested positive on his hair-follicle drug test. That 

fact, she said, would have resulted in a denial of the home study by DCF. 

However, Thomas later testified that

"[DHR] was not able to start [the ICPC process] because 

[DHR] had to wait for DNA testing. And [DHR was] waiting 

for [the father's] substances abuse results, and so whenever 

[DHR] got everything together, [the trial] was [set] within, 

like, two weeks. And so ICPC typically takes a while."

Victoria Shaw, a DHR supervisor, testified that DHR does not "send off 

for an ICPC because it's going to be denied at that proceeding state 

because of the drug concerns." She further explained that DHR could not

pay for any services for the father, who resided in Florida, and indicated 

that DHR could not move forward with any plan for the father because of 

his residing in Florida and having no ICPC approval. Instead, she 

explained, the father would have to seek out and pay for any 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

10

recommended services in Florida. She stated, however, that DHR would 

complete an ICPC home study on the father if ordered to do so.

The home-evaluation questionnaire that the father had completed 

was admitted as an exhibit at the trial. The questionnaire listed the 

father's address and revealed that he lived with his girlfriend, K.C., and 

a 12-year-old "stepdaughter," J.M., in Vero Beach. According to the 

responses on the questionnaire, the father was employed by a tree-service

company and had been so employed for four years. The questionnaire 

also contained the names of relatives of the father, including S.W., the 

father's sister; D.E., the father's brother; and C.G., an aunt of the father 

who lives in Alabama.

According to the father, he had not been aware that the children 

had been in the custody of DHR since February 2021. He said that, before 

visitation was reestablished in March 2023, he had last spoken to D.P. 

nearly two years before the trial and that, at that time, D.P. had been at 

the mother's house. However, he later admitted that he knew that DHR 

had removed the children from the mother's custody a second time. He 

also said that he had asked the mother if he needed to come and get the 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

11

children and that she had told him that she "would take care of it." The 

father said that he had not been able to focus on the children because he 

had been taking care of his mother, who had suffered from cancer, for 

approximately two years preceding her death in October 2022.

The father testified at the trial that he had been incarcerated for a 

robbery he had committed when he was 18 years old. He admitted that 

one of his convictions had, in fact, been for possession of cocaine. He 

denied, however, that he used cocaine, stating that it had been in the 

automobile with him and his "friend" at the time. 

The father stated that he would be willing to submit to another 

hair-follicle drug test on the date of the trial. He explained that he would 

be negative for all substances other than marijuana, for which, he said, 

he had an active medical-marijuana card. At the conclusion of the trial, 

counsel for DHR indicated that DHR would be willing to submit an ICPC 

home-study request if the father passed his hair-follicle drug test. The 

father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test; the results again indicated 

that he was positive for cocaine metabolite and marijuana. 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

12

On appeal, the father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the juvenile court's conclusion that he is unable and unwilling 

to discharge his parental responsibilities to and for the children. He 

specifically contends that the record contains no evidence indicating that 

his potential use of any illegal substance impacts his ability to parent the 

children. See A.M. v. R.S., 373 So. 3d 215, 220-21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022)

(explaining that "a party seeking to terminate the parental rights of a 

parent based on that parent's drug use must establish that the parent's 

use of drugs impacts the parent's ability to perform the duties of a 

parent"); J.C. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 293 So. 3d 901, 909 

(Ala. Civ. App. 2019). The father also challenges the judgments insofar 

as the juvenile court concluded that DHR established that no viable 

alternative to the termination of his parental rights existed. He points 

out that DHR had not initiated the ICPC process, that DHR presented 

no evidence about his current circumstances, and that DHR had not 

presented evidence regarding the consideration and rejection of 

placement of the children with any relative resources identified by the 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

13

father as a potential alternative to the termination of the father's 

parental rights. 

In its appellate brief, DHR presents the following argument in 

response to the father's contention that it failed to present clear and 

convincing evidence that no viable alternative to the termination of his 

parental rights existed:

"The record reflects that DHR personnel undertook an 

ICPC investigation in order to determine if placement with 

the father was a viable alternative to the termination of his 

parental rights. In J.A. v. Etowah Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 

12 So. 3d 1245, 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), this Court 

determined that a juvenile court may base its determination 

as to whether a placement is a viable alternative to the 

termination of parental rights ... on the totality of the 

evidence. In the underlying matter, placement with the 

father was not a viable alternative to the termination of 

parental rights. Thomas had also been unable to conduct a 

home evaluation of the father's residence. (R. 21.) She 

explained that the ICPC process had been started but would 

not be successful. (R. 21.) Thomas also explained the delay 

in the ICPC process including waiting for the DNA testing to 

confirm paternity and waiting on drug screening. (R. 31.) 

Additionally, Shaw explained that the delay in the ICPC 

process also related to substance abuse concerns. If an 

individual had an issue with substance abuse and tested 

positive, especially on a hair follicle screen, the ICPC ... forms 

are not forwarded for processing because [the ICPC request]

will be denied due to drug use concerns. (R. 48.). ... [T]he 

father tested positive for cocaine and marijuana, clearly 

demonstrating that he had not addressed his drug abuse. 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

14

Based on the foregoing, the trial court could have reasonably 

determined that there was no viable alternative to the 

termination of parental rights, given the remote possibility of 

the father addressing parenting deficiencies and achieving 

the requisite stability to safely care for the children after they 

had been in care for more than two years. S.B. v. State Dep't 

of Human Res., 743 So. 2d 470, 472 (Ala. Civ. App, 1992). 

Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably determined 

that no viable alternative to the termination of parental rights 

existed."

DHR's brief at 16-17.

Of course, the father does not argue that placement with him was 

a viable alternative to the termination of his own parental rights. DHR's 

response to the father's argument is illogical and does not answer the 

father's argument in any meaningful way.2 DHR does not even 

acknowledge the legal principles applicable to the father's argument. 

2We further note that DHR makes contradictory statements in that 

argument, stating both that DHR conducted an ICPC investigation and 

that it did not, and in other sections of its brief, including that it made 

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the father, which, it says, failed, and 

that the father had failed to cooperate with services. Thomas testified 

that the father had complied with the request that he undergo a 

substance-abuse assessment but that DHR had not offered the father 

services recommended in the assessment because he lived in Florida. She 

stated that DHR was unable to pay for any services in another state. No 

other evidence contradicted that testimony. 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

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We have often stated that, in addition to establishing the 

dependency of a child and that grounds for the termination of parental 

rights exist, "DHR must also present evidence indicating that there are 

no viable alternatives to the termination of a parent's parental rights." 

A.R.H.B. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 378 So. 3d 543, 549 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2022). We have also reiterated that "'DHR must present 

"evidence of recent attempts to locate viable alternatives in order to 

establish that termination of parental rights is the least [drastic]

alternative." '" C.T. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 8 So. 3d 984, 

987 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (quoting V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 

So. 2d 915, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting in turn Bowman v. State 

Dep't of Hum. Res., 534 So. 2d 304, 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)) (emphasis 

omitted). Because DHR was petitioning for the termination of the 

father's parental rights in the present cases, DHR bore " '"the burden of 

proving the lack of a viable alternative by clear and convincing 

evidence." '" A.R.H.B., 378 So. 3d at 551 (quoting D.J. v. Etowah Cnty. 

Dep't Hum. Res., 351 So. 3d 1067, 1074 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), quoting in 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

16

turn K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 910, 912 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2017)). 

The record in the present appeals does not contain such evidence. 

DHR failed to pursue an ICPC home study on the father's home and did 

not present testimony or other evidence indicating that DHR had 

contacted the relatives listed on the father's home-evaluation 

questionnaire. DHR also failed to present evidence indicating that 

Thomas or any other caseworker had asked the father to provide the 

names of any relatives that he might desire to be considered for 

placement of the children, much less that any DHR caseworker had 

contacted any of the father's relatives to see if they may be a possible 

resource for the children. Without such evidence, we are constrained to 

reverse the judgments of the juvenile court terminating the parental 

rights of the father to the children and to remand the cases to the juvenile 

court for that court to enter judgments denying DHR's petitions insofar 

as they requested termination of the father's parental rights. See

A.R.H.B., 378 So. 3d at 551 (explaining that this court will reverse a 

judgment terminating parental rights when the record lacks evidence 
CL-2023-0676 and CL-2023-0677

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indicating that efforts to locate and to investigate relatives were made);

see also K.F. v. Millwood, [Ms. CL-2023-0393, Feb. 23, 2024] ___ So. 3d 

___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). Having concluded that the failure to 

present clear and convincing evidence that no viable alternative to the 

termination of the father's parental rights existed, we pretermit 

discussion of the father's other arguments on appeal. See J.M.S. v. 

B.M.H., 379 So. 3d 419, 424 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) (indicating that this 

court may pretermit consideration of other issues raised on appeal when 

our resolution of one issue is dispositive of the appeal); L.M.W. v. D.J., 

116 So. 3d 220, 223 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (same).

CL-2023-0676 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2023-0677 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.

Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.