No. 86-580 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF 

R. G. C., a minor child. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Leif Erickson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert Stafford, pro se, Navato, California 

Carol Ann Henderson Owen, pro se, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips; Donald Murray, 

Kalispell, Montana 

Hash, O'Brien & Rartlett; James C. Bartlett, Kalispell, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 6, 1987 

Decided: September 15, 1987 

Filed: 

SEP 1 5 1987 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

R.L.S., the putative father of R.G.C., appeals an order 

of the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District. 

That court ruled his consent would not be required to an 

adoption of the seven-year-old boy because he had never 

supported the child, 5 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , MCA, and that the 

adoption would be in the best interests of the child, as 

defined by 5 40-6-130, MCA. R.L.S., acting pro se, argues 

that the court failed to consider his fitness as a parent 

before determining what was best for the child. We find no 

error; the child's best interest is paramount to any concern 

by R.L.S. We affirm the District Court. 

R.L.S. and C.A.C. had a relationship in 1979 in which 

they had sexual intercourse twice. Several months later 

C.A.C. told R.L.S. that she was pregnant but did not seek 

support. The baby was born out of wedlock on July 20, 1980. 

Although R.L.S. was in Montana until December 1980, he claims 

he never knew of the child's live birth until October 1984 

when O.K. and L.K., husband and wife, asked him to consent to 

their adoption of the boy. O.K. and L.K. had obtained 

C.A.C.'s consent but R.L.S. refused to give his consent. 

Thus, they resorted to legal action to terminate R.L.S.'s 

parental rights and to establish that his consent was not 

needed because he had never provided support for the child. 

R.L.S. has failed to supply this Court with a complete 

transcript of the District Court proceedings as required by 

Rule 9(b), M.R.App.Civ.P. According to that rule: 

Wherever the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support . . . a specific finding of 

fact by the trial court is to be raised 

on the appeal by the appellant, he shall 

he under a duty to include in the 
transcript all evidence relevant to such . . . finding. 

Where an appellant fails to produce the entire transcript, 

this Court will not address whether substantial evidence 

exists to support the appellant's factual claims. Matter of 

Adoption of J.M.G. (Mont. 1987), 736 P.2d 967, 970, 44 

St.Rep. 869, 873. In this case we shall view the ~istrict 

Court's findings of fact as true and consider only that 

court's application of the law to those facts. 

The District Court determined that C.A.C. delivered 

custody of the boy to O.K. and L.K. in August 1984, so that 

the boy could live with them and be adopted by them; C.A.C. 

subsequently signed the appropriate adoption forms and was 

later determined by a District Court to have done so 

knowingly and voluntarily. When O.K. and L.K. took the boy, 

he was not well nourished, all his belongings were in one 

box, and he was introverted and untrusting of adults. Since 

he has been with O.K. and L.K., he has become well nourished 

and happy and refers to them as his parents; there has been a 

tight family bonding. The boy also has done well in school, 

receiving a certificate that honored him as the child with 

the best attitude in his kindergarten. 

The court interviewed the boy. He told of living in 

motels and cars with C.A.C. He stated that he preferred to 

stay with O.K. and L.K. even though he realized C.A.C. was 

his natural mother. The boy now addresses O.K. and L.K. as 

his father and mother; they have provided the boy with a 

clean, comfortable, and suitable home. 

The court found that R.L.S. was aware of C.A.C1s 

pregnancy, but never bothered to inquire as to the birth of 

the child or to provide any support for the child. R.L. S. 

had never seen the boy before this trial. R.L.S.'s objective 

in this act.i.on is not to obtain custody of the boy, but to 
return the boy to C.A.C. He would take custody of the boy, 

however, if the court denied custody to C.A.C. 

Considering all this evidence, which this Court assumes 

as true in this appeal, the District Court found that it 

would be in the boy's best interests to remain with O.K. and 

L.K. It terminated R.L.S.'s parental rights under 

5 40-6-130, MCA, and determined that his consent to the boy's 

adoption under 5 40-8-111(1) (a) (v), MCA, was not required. 

The District Court then issued an interlocutory decree of 

adoption. 

On appeal, R.L.S. contends the District Court erred by 

considering the best interests of the child while not 

considering R.L.S.'s fitness as a father. He also argues 

that the District Court erred in its application of 

5 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , MCA, since that section requires a 

petition for adoption to have been filed before a court can 

determine that the parent's consent is not required. 

The District Court's initial question in a case such as 

this is whether the consent of the putative father is needed 

to effect the adoption. If it determines that the putative 

father's consent is - not required, then the court's foremost 

duty is to determine what the subject child's best interests 

are. Matter of Adoption of S.T.V. (Mont. 1987), 733 P.2d 

841, 842, 44 St.Rep. 425, 427; Matter of Adoption of Smigaj 

(1977), 171 Mont. 537, 539, 560 P.2d 141, 143. Our review 

indicates that the District Court ruled that the putative 

father's consent was not needed because he had failed to 

support the child. It then determined that adoption would be 

in the boy's best interests. We see no error. 

R.L.S. argues that 5 40-6-130 (1) , MCA, sets a standard 

for review that the District Court ignored. That section 

reads: 
If the putative father appears at the 

hearing and requests custody of the 

child, the court shall inquire into his 

fitness and his ability to properly care 

for the child and shall determine whether 

the father's parental rights should be 

given recognition in view of his effort 

or lack of effort to make provision for 

the mother while she was pregnant and for 

the child upon birth. . . . If the court 

finds that it would not be in the best 

interests of the child to grant custody 

to the putative father, the court shall 

terminate his rights to the child. 

R.L.S. argues that this section requires a finding by the 

District Court as to the putative father's fitness as a 

parent before the court determines what result would be best 

for the child. To add credence to this argument, R.L.S. 

cites Matter of Doney (1977), 174 Mont. 282, 570 P.2d 575, as 

authority for his argument that petitioners must show him to 

be an unfit parent. It is apparent that R.L.S. misconstrues 

Montana law since Doney was a question of guardianship, not 

one of adoption. Doney, 570 P.2d at 577. Additionally, this 

Court in Matter of M.G.M. (1982), 201 Mont. 400, 654 P.2d 

994, said that proof of abuse or neglect was required to 

terminate a natural parent ' s rights in a 

youth-in-need-of-care proceeding. In M.G.M., the Court 

specifically distinguished adoption proceedings and said that 

in adoption proceedings it is proper for the District Court 

to look at the child's best interests. Section 40-6-130, 

MCA, which speaks directly to the best interests of the 

child, was held to apply strictly to adoption proceedings. 

M.G.M., 654 P.2d at 997. 

The proper test under S 40-6-130 (1) , MCA, and the one 

employed by the District Court in this case, is the best 

interests of the child. The child's welfare is of utmost 

importance; termination of a putative father's rights to the 
child does not depend on the factors of abuse or neglect that 

are so crucial in guardianship cases. Where the District 

Court concludes, as it did here, that the child's best 

interests are not in the putative father, then a plain 

reading of 5 40-6-130(1) makes it abundantly clear that the 

putative father loses his rights to the child. We can 

discern no error in the District Court's handling of this 

issue. 

R.L.S. then argues that the District Court erred in its 

application of 540-8-111, MCA, which sets out the 

requirement of the natural parents' consent in adoption 

cases. 

Section 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , MCA, states: 

(1) An adoption of a child may be 

decreed when there have been filed 

written consents to adoption executed by: 

(a) both parents, if living, or the 

surviving parent of a child, provided 

that consent is not required from a 

father or mother: 

(v) if it is proven to the satisfaction 

of the court that the father or mother, 

if able, has not contributed to the 

support of the child during a period of 1 

year before the filing of a petition for 

adoption. 

R.L.S. argues that this section was used to determine that 

his consent to the adoption was not necessary. He argues 

that the section does not apply to him, though, because it 

requires that a petition for adoption has been filed, and no 

petition had been filed in October 1984, when he was asked 

for his consent. R.L.S. has never paid any support to or 
for R.G.C., the minor boy. His contention is that a formal 

petition would have put him on notice of the proceeding, thus 

allowing him to make support payments. "A statute should not 

be interpreted in favor of a father who seeks the benefit of 

parental rights but shuns the burden of parental 

obligations." In re Burton's Adoption (Cal. 1956) , 305 P. 2d 

185, 191; Matter of Adoption of S.L.R. (1982), 196 Mont. 411, 

415, 640 P.2d 886, 888; Matter of Adoption of B.L.P. (Mont. 

1986), 728 P.2d 803, 805, 43 St.Rep. 2116, 2119. This 

statute will not be read to R.L.S.'s advantage. 

The putative father's argument is a circuitous one, 

which, if adopted, would obliterate the statute. Consider 

the circumstances attendant in this case: O.K. and L.K. 

sought the consent of R.L.S. in October 1984 to adopt R.G.C. 

but he refused; O.K. and L.K. filed a petition for adoption 

on August 29, 1985; the District Court dismissed that 

petition as premature on October 8, 1985 since R.L.S.'s 

rights had not been terminated; the District Court decided on 

September 23, 1986, that R.L.S.'s consent was not required 

under S 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , MCA. To accept the putative 

father's argument would allow any natural parent to thwart a 

legitimate adoption proceeding merely by refusing his or her 

consent so that no valid petition for adoption could be 

filed. This would serve only to vitiate the statute. 

The putative father cites Brost v. Glasgow (1982), 200 

Mont. 194, 651 P.2d 32, as support for his argument. That 

case merely requires separate findings on the issues of the 

need for the parent's consent aside from findings on the 

merits of the adoption. Brost, 651 P.2d at 37. The District 

Court met that requirement. 

O.K. and L.K. began an adoption proceeding under 

5 40-8-109, MCA, one aspect of which was the paternity issue. 

In such proceedings, the one-year period of support 
provisions made for the child should be measured against the 

commencement of the adoption proceedings under $ 40-8-109, 

MCA, rather than against the date of the petition for 

adoption. This rule violates no sense of reasonableness and 

promotes the intent of the legislature as derived from the 

statutory scheme it enacted. Statutes should not be 

construed absurdly when a reasonable construction is 

possible. Darby Spar, Ltd. v. Department of Revenue (Mont. 

Our review shows that the District Court proceeded 

properly when it determined that consent of the putative 

father was not required. It then determined the best 

interests of the child and issued the appropriate orders. 

Such actions comply with the law in Montana. 

The child's best interest is one of the 

most important factors to be considered 

in determining whether a petition to 

adopt should be granted . . . Once the 

statutory requirements for consent to an 

adoption are met (S 40-8-111, MCA), the 

best interest of the child becomes the 

paramount consideration. 

S.T.V., 733 P.2d at 842. 

The District Court considered the question of the 

putative father's consent. It determined it was not needed 

because the putative father had never paid any financial 

support for the child. Thereafter, the District Court need 

only determine the child's best interest. It did this and 

issued an interlocutory decree of adoption for O.K. and L.K. 

We will not disturb this judgment. The District Court 

is affirmed. 
We concur: