IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0540

Filed September 4, 2024

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ELENA MAE BELL

AND BARRETT ANDREW BELL

Upon the Petition of

ELENA MAE BELL,

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

And Concerning

BARRETT ANDREW BELL,

Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica Zrinyi 

Ackley, Judge.

Both parties appeal the property-division provisions of the decree dissolving 

their marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON

CROSS-APPEAL.

Jamie A. Splinter of Splinter Law Office, Dubuque, for appellant/crossappellee.

Andrew B. Howie and Jonathon P. Tarpey of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud 

& Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Langholz, J., and Bower, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2024).
2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Elena Bell petitioned to dissolve her three-year marriage with Barrett Bell in 

January 2022. And after a dissolution trial—in which Barrett had an attorney and 

Elena represented herself—the district court issued a decree dissolving their 

marriage in February 2023. Both parties appeal, challenging the property division 

in their dissolution decree. Barrett also argues that the district court failed to act 

as an impartial trier of fact. And both request an award of appellate attorney fees. 

But Barrett did not preserve error on his challenge to the district court’s 

impartiality. So we cannot consider it. And on our de novo review of the property 

division, we agree that the district court’s division was equitable. But to avoid any 

potential confusion, we modify the decree to clarify that Barrett’s $19,772 payment 

to Elena is the full extent of his responsibility for her debts and any remaining 

balance on the Discover credit card remains assigned to Elena—not Barrett. We 

thus affirm the decree as modified. And we decline to award either party appellate 

attorney fees. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Elena and Barrett married in December 2018 in Wisconsin before moving 

to Dubuque in June 2019. They were both in their fifties—and Barrett was about 

five years older than Elena. The parties had no children together.

During the marriage, Barrett worked at a Bible college, a public high school, 

and a grocery store. Barrett initially worked as a teacher at the college until he lost 

his job in August 2020. He collected unemployment through the CARES Act and 

worked sporadically at the grocery store until he started at the high school in 

August the next year. He had an estimated annual gross income of $36,000 to 
3

$44,000 during the marriage, including funds he received from the CARES Act 

during the COVID-19 pandemic and his Oklahoma state pension. 

Elena worked at the same Bible college as Barrett and another public 

school, and earned about $40,000 per year from wage income, as well as some 

other income from eBay sales, tutoring, and semi-pro backgammon tournaments. 

She worked at the college until her employer “found out [she] filed for divorce.” 

She then accepted the position teaching in the public school. 

The parties largely kept separate finances with each holding separate bank 

accounts, revolving credit lines, and auto loans. Barrett characterizes himself as 

a more conservative budgeter and Elena testified that he is frugal and does not 

like to carry personal debt. So many marital expenses have been charged to 

Elena’s personal lines of credit. Elena had some credit card debt coming into the 

marriage, but it has ballooned since then. Neither party provided extensive 

histories of the changing credit balances during the marriage, but both agree that 

the credit card debt got out of hand during the marriage. 

The parties’ only major marital asset was a residence, which they sold in 

June 2021. After satisfying the mortgage and a purported loan to Barrett’s parents, 

the parties evenly split the remaining $30,000 proceeds. Following that sale, the 

parties were transient, resided in various hotels, and primarily lived on credit. In 

June 2022, Barrett bought a new home in the name of the Barrett Bell Trust—the 

purchase price being 100% mortgaged. The new home is not a marital asset. The 

parties each individually hold a variety of pre-marital retirement accounts. 

Both parties testified that the other has issues with various vices. Elena 

testified that Barrett had problems with excessive drinking throughout the 
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marriage. And this problem eventually led to the approval of a petition for a mentalhealth civil commitment in June 2021, which was later dismissed. Elena testified 

that the petition was dismissed because Barrett asked her not to participate in the 

proceedings and promised to seek treatment independently. According to Elena, 

Barrett also sought help for his drinking from his parents in Oklahoma during the 

period the parties were living out of hotels. And he has previously been arrested 

for public intoxication. Barrett and Elena both testified that Elena has spent 

significant sums of money gambling at casinos. How much of that spending 

resulted in debts still owed at the time of trial is unclear and was the subject of 

significant dispute during trial. But at least $3600 is reflected in the credit card 

statements submitted as exhibits. The full extent to which these vices financially 

impacted the marriage is disputed. Still, there is little doubt both parties played a 

part in the path to divorce. 

Elena petitioned to dissolve their marriage without help from an attorney in 

January 2022. Trial was held a year later in February 2023. By then, the parties 

had lived separately about eight months. The only disputed issue was the division 

of the parties’ assets and debts. The court issued the dissolution decree four days 

later. And a few weeks after that, in response to a 1.904 motion by Barrett, the 

court clarified the decree. Among the changes, the court struck a two-page 

itemization and assignment of the parties’ assets and debts that it inadvertently 

included at the end of the decree, which the court stated, “was not used by the 

Court in rendering its decision” given that their marriage “was too short of a 

marriage to do a balancing and the Court awarded each of the parties their premarital and their individual assets.” Barrett now appeals and Elena cross-appeals.
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II. Error Preservation on the District Court’s Impartiality

Barrett first argues that the district court engaged in judicial misconduct by 

failing to act as an impartial trier of fact and failing to hear evidence before making 

its decision. And so, he asks us not to give the district court’s factual findings any 

deference in our de novo review of the decree. See Miller v. Miller, 202 N.W.2d 

105, 108–09 (Iowa 1972) (providing that remedy for district judge’s misconduct in 

talking to a recused judge about the case—when that issue had been presented 

to and rejected by the district court). Elena counters that Barrett has not preserved 

error because he failed to raise the issue of impartiality in any way before filing this 

appeal. We agree with Elena that the issue is not preserved for our review.

“To preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be raised and then 

decided at the trial level.” In re Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 469–70 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 2020); see also In re Marriage of Ricklefs, 726 N.W.2d 359, 362–63 (Iowa 

2007) (refusing to address merits of challenge to district court’s impartiality when 

error was not properly preserved). This error-preservation requirement gives the 

district court an opportunity to fix the error itself “at a time when corrective action 

can be taken.” Heiar, 954 N.W.2d at 470 (cleaned up). And it prevents 

“sandbagging—that is, it does not allow a party to choose to remain silent in the 

trial court in the face of error, take a chance on a favorable outcome, and 

subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” 

State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 199 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up).

Barrett contends that an email sent by the district court to the parties 

attempting to identify the factual issues to be litigated at trial was, in reality, the 

court engaging in judicial misconduct by telegraphing a future ruling for Elena. He 
6

also contends that it was inappropriate for the district court to provide Elena—a 

self-represented litigant—with the proper forms to complete before trial, and that 

the court provided more leniency in the rules of evidence to Elena than it did to his 

attorney during the trial. 

But Barrett never raised the issue of the court’s impartiality in the district 

court. He lodged only two objections during trial—one to the introduction of a piece 

of testimony on the ground of relevance, and one to the introduction of new exhibits 

after trial. Yet Barrett is not appealing these evidentiary rulings—he is arguing 

judicial misconduct occurred because of partiality by the district court. He never 

asked the judge to recuse in a written or oral motion. And his 1.904(2) motion 

contained no request to reconsider, enlarge, or amend because of the court’s 

alleged partiality when ruling.

Barrett concedes that “he did not specifically” challenge the judge’s 

impartiality in the district court. But he contends his arguments to the court about 

what evidence was properly considered should be good enough to raise the issue. 

We see nothing in Barrett’s arguments to the district court that would have alerted 

it that he was challenging the judge’s impartiality so that corrective action could 

have been taken. And the district court never decided and rejected a claim of 

partiality. So Barrett has not preserved the issue for appellate review. 

III. Property Division

We review a district court’s division of property in a dissolution decree de 

novo. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). Yet we 

are mindful of the district court’s preferred fact-finding position and will only disturb 

a decree when it fails to do equity. See id. at 703. 
7

In a dissolution decree, “[t]he court shall divide all property, except inherited 

property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably between the parties.” 

Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2022); see also In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 

671, 678 (Iowa 2013) (“Iowa is an equitable distribution state.”). Dividing property 

equitably requires considering the facts of each case and the factors in Iowa Code 

section 598.21(5). See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 682. While an equal division 

is often equitable, “the division need not be equal in most short-term marriages. 

Rather, it is often equitable to simply award the property to the party that brought 

it into the marriage.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 2016); see also Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(a), (b) (requiring consideration of 

“[t]he length of the marriage” and “[t]he property brought to the marriage by each 

party”).

Consistent with these principles, the district court “awarded each of the 

parties their pre-marital and their individual assets” because this was more 

equitable than an equal balancing given the short duration of the marriage. This 

approach was particularly appropriate because the parties also mainly kept their 

finances separate. The exceptions, according to the court’s review of the 

evidence, were that the parties used many of Elena’s credit cards for their marital 

living expenses—especially after they sold their house—and Barrett established a 

Dupaco Community Credit Union account during the marriage with marital funds. 

And so, the court found that while Elena would retain her debts and Barrett the 

Dupaco account, it was equitable for Barrett to pay Elena $19,772 to somewhat 

lessen the disparity of the division.
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Barrett takes a shotgun approach to challenging the property division. But 

many of his challenges are aimed at the wrong target. He argues that the district 

court erred in including some of his premarital property in the marital assets—his 

Wisconsin retirement account (“WI WETF”) and the property at 2410 Coates 

Street. Barrett appears to largely base his theory on the figures found in a balance 

sheet initially located on the last page of the decree. But in its ruling on Barrett’s 

1.904 motion, the court struck that balance sheet from the ruling, explaining that it 

was included in the ruling by mistake: “The final decision was not based on the 

balance sheet. . . . it is not referenced in the decree, was not used by the Court in 

rendering its decision and it is not relevant.” And Barrett is requesting relief from 

several district court rulings that were in his favor—all of the assets that Barrett 

asks this court to award him were already granted to him by the district court—

“[Barrett] is awarded his . . . WI WETF” and “[Barrett] is hereby awarded the home 

on Coates Street.”

Barrett also argues we should correct the balance sheet to reflect the 

order’s equal division of the medical debts and Barrett’s Navy Federal Credit Union 

debt. But again, we need not address the balance sheet because the district court 

struck it from the ruling. And Barrett contends the district court should not have 

included “written off” debts in the marital debts. Yet this argument seems to be 

based on a misunderstanding of the concept of writing off debt. Writing off debt is 

a corporate accounting procedure by the lender. When a lender writes off debt, it 

has not forgiven the debt. The lender is merely recognizing that the account is 

delinquent and reports the debt as a loss on its financial statements—which has

no effect on the debtor’s obligation to pay the debt. No evidence was presented 
9

suggesting that any “written off” debt was forgiven. So this claim of error also lacks 

merit. 

Turning to his arguments more on point, Barrett contends that he should not 

have been ordered to pay Elena $19,772 and that instead she should pay him 

roughly $10,000, or at least there should be no payment by either party. He argues 

the court reached this wrong result because neither his $18,000 Dupaco account 

nor Elena’s credit card debts should have been considered marital assets or debts. 

But neither argument holds up.

Barrett held $18,000 in a Dupaco account created following his receipt of a 

check from his parents for $24,000. Outside the parties’ testimony, there is no 

evidence of the purpose for this payment. Barrett claimed that this payment was 

a gift from his parents of Walmart stock—paid in cash as an “early inheritance” 

rather than in stock. But Elena contested this claim and Barrett admitted that his 

parents have loaned him large sums of money at many points in his life. Barrett 

testified that he owed his parents as much as $40,000 at one point. Elena testified 

that Barrett refused to provide evidence of the other large transfers. And the record 

shows that both parties provided limited financial information in the form of exhibits. 

So the district court was forced to primarily use the parties’ testimony to form a 

clearer picture of their financial situation, especially in the case of the Dupaco

account. Giving the district court’s first-hand assessment of the testimony 

deference, we decline to disturb the court’s finding that this account was marital 

property.

As for Elena’s credit-card debts, Barrett argues they should not have been 

included in the marital property to calculate his payment because Elena did not 
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provide credit card statements to reveal what percentage of the Discover creditcard debt is due to cash advances for gambling and that such gambling amounted 

to marital dissipation. “In determining whether dissipation has occurred, courts 

must decide ‘(1) whether the alleged purpose of the expenditure is supported by 

the evidence, and if so, (2) whether that purpose amounts to dissipation under the 

circumstances.’” In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Iowa 2007)

(citation omitted). 

True, Elena’s Barclays credit-card statements reveal she charged 

significant sums in cash advances to that card to fund gambling outings—over the 

$3600 accounted for in the statements provided. And the Diamond Jo Casino 

records reveal that Elena lost over $60,000 from gambling over the course of the 

marriage. But Elena testified that the Discover credit-card debt is largely from 

when she and Barrett were briefly living out of hotels after selling their home, and 

that during the marriage, she paid nearly all their collective expenses with the 

Discover card. She explained:

[Barrett] is very frugal. He’s got money. He’s very frugal. We both 

admit that. He doesn’t pull out his credit card for anything. He lives 

debt free. So any entertainment, any fun we did, any dinners we 

went out to, and we went on vacation one time . . . where he said 

that he didn’t have any money. This was after he had bought a 

camper, but he couldn’t afford the gas. He couldn’t. I paid for 

everything. I said, Barrett, I want to go on vacation. I’ll pay for the 

gas. I’ll pay for the cost of the campsite. I’ll pay for all of the food. 

Elena also claimed that all of their basement remodeling was paid for with the 

Discover card. In response, Barrett claimed that his CARES Act payments in 

excess of $11,000 may have been “spent on the house and things,” which 

presumably included remodeling, but that he could not remember what he spent 
11

that money on. But when Elena clarified that the basement remodeling was 

completed over six months before Barrett received any CARES Act money, he 

admitted that money could not have been spent on the remodeling. 

Like other topics of dispute, the parties did not provide the court an 

extensive history of Discover card statements, making it impossible to verify 

exactly which expenses should be allocated to the parties as marital assets or how 

much, if any, of that debt could be attributed to Elena’s gambling. And the district 

court held that Elena is responsible for the debt on account for which statements 

showing gambling charges were submitted to the court. The only thing clear from

Elena and Barrett’s back-and-forth testimony about the main debt—the Discover 

credit-card account—is that there was frequent comingling of joint and individual 

expenditures. We cannot conclude from the evidence provided that Elena 

engaged in marital dissipation in regard to the credit-card debts included by the 

court or that it was improper to include them in the marital debts. 

Based on these findings that the Dupaco account and much of the creditcard debt were marital assets and debt, it was equitable for the court to hold Barrett 

responsible for a portion of the debt and to give Elena a portion of the assets by 

ordering the payment of $19,772. As the court reasoned, “The figure was arrived 

at by an analysis of the manner of living of the parties, including their habits and 

vices, and their debt accumulation, which all fell on [Elena] as they travelled, lived 

and incurred obligations on [Elena’s] credit cards.” The Dupaco account and 

credit-card debt nearly cancel each other out, with neither party coming out far 

ahead of the other. We thus affirm the order for Barrett to pay Elena $19,772.
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Still, we modify the language of the decree in one respect. While it does 

not seem to be the district court’s intent, one could interpret the decree and the 

1.904 ruling to assign the Discover credit-card debt to Barrett separately from his 

$19,772 cash payment obligation to Elana and not to require Elena to use the 

payment to pay off the credit-card debt.1 Such a result would impose a double 

obligation on Barrett, which would be inequitable. Because we have affirmed 

Barrett’s payment obligation, we thus modify the decree to clarify that the Discover 

credit-card balance remains the obligation of Elena. While she would be wise to 

use the cash payment from Barrett to pay down her debt, she need not do so. But 

if she does not, that decision will not affect Barrett.

On her cross-appeal, Elena argues the district court erred in awarding the 

$18,000 Dupaco account to Barrett rather than splitting it equally because the court 

found it is marital property. While her argument might have appeal in isolation, it 

overlooks the full context of the property division. True, the court did not award

Elena $9000 from that specific account. But it ordered Barrett to pay more than 

twice that amount—$19,772—in a cash payment to equitably divide the parties 

marital assets and debts, including the Dupaco account. Increasing the award to 

Elena by another $9000 would be inequitable. And to the extent that she is just 

arguing that she should have been awarded some portion of the account directly 

1

In the original decree, the court ordered that Barrett “is responsible for . . . the 

Discover Credit Card balance.” The decree also required that Barrett pay his 

judgment of $20,000 (later modified to the $19,772 referred to in this opinion) within 

sixty days and that “[o]nce received, [Elena] shall pay the Discover Credit Card 

balance.” But then in its 1.904 ruling, the district court said, “Now that the parties 

are divorced, the award of cash to [Elena] is hers to use or hers to save. It is of no 

concern to [Barrett].”
13

in place of the cash payment, we cannot say equity requires that change. Indeed, 

we see little distinction between the district court’s award and that alternative. We 

thus affirm on Elena’s cross-appeal too.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

Both parties request we award them appellate attorney fees. Appellate 

attorney fees are awarded at our discretion and are not a matter of right. See In re 

Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). When determining 

whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party 

seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay the fees, and the relative 

merits of the appeal. McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687. Considering those factors, 

we decline to award either party appellate attorney fees. Appellate costs shall be 

split equally.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSSAPPEAL.