United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-3245

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Gerald Lee DeCoteau

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant

v.

Alex Schweitzer, Superintendent of the North Dakota State Hospital

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Fargo

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 Submitted: November 13, 2014

 Filed: December 23, 2014

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Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge. 

Gerald Lee DeCoteau was found guilty of gross sexual imposition in 1996 and

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. His habeas petition in November 2012 had six

claims. The district court1

 dismissed the petition, finding four claims were

1

The Honorable Karen K. Klein, United States Magistrate Judge for the District

of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the

parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
time-barred, one was procedurally barred, and the other lacked merit. The district

court granted a certificate of appealability whether the statute of limitations in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies on a claim-by-claim

basis. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, this court affirms.

AEDPA’s statute of limitations applies to “an application” for a writ of habeas

corpus. Its one-year period runs

 from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States

is removed, if the applicant was prevented by filing from such State

action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

DeCoteau argues that the word application at the beginning of the statute

focuses it on the date of the latest claim within the entire application—allowing

review of all claims if at least one is timely. This court reviews de novo the

interpretation of a federal statute. Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir.

2003). 

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“Where statutory language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts—at least

where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to

its terms.’” Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2009). 

“[I]f the relevant text is not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we

will not look beyond it unless application of the plain language ‘will produce a result

demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” Id.

The language in § 2244(d)(1) is susceptible to more than one interpretation. As

then-Circuit Judge Alito explained in Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 118 (3rd Cir.

2004):

The reference to “the latest” date in 2244(d)(1) tells a court how to

choose from among the four dates specified in subsections (A) through

(D) once those dates are identified. This language does not tell a court

how to identify the date specified in subsection (D) in a case in which the

application contains multiple claims.

The better interpretation is “subsection (C)’s reference to ‘the constitutional right’ is

clearly a reference to a singular right, . . . and subsection (D)’s reference to ‘claim or

claims’ indicates Congress meant for courts to determine timeliness on a claim-byclaim basis.” Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 920 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)

(overruling Walker v. Crosby, 341 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003)). Accord Prendergast

v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012); Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d

1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012); Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 2007);

Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 118 (3rd Cir. 2004); cf. Cappozi v. United States,

768 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2014) (interpreting the parallel federal habeas limitations

period in § 2255(f) on a claim-by-claim basis).

If this court adopted DeCoteau’s interpretation, the limitations period would

have little to no significance. A defendant, by filing one timely claim, could resurrect

previously time-barred claims—a result the drafters did not intend. See Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005) (“Congress enacted AEDPA to advance the finality

of criminal convictions.”).

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This court, joining every other circuit to address the issue, holds that the statute

of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim within an application. 

* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed. 

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