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_____________________________ *Ret ired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v. STANFORD AUGUSTO DOUGLAS, JR.

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3843 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 09

- CR

- 0003034

- 2005

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J. * JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 22, 2017 Appellant, Stanford Augusto Douglas, Jr., appeals pro se from the order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his fourth petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA” ), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546. On December 5, 2005, Appellant pled guilty to first

- degree murder and related offenses arising from his involvement in a shooting death on March 27, 2005. Appellant was 29 years old at the time of the incident. The court sentenced Appellant on December 5, 2005, to mandatory life imprisonment, and a consecutive term of 1 to 7 years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on October 10, 2006, which the PCRA court denied on October 3, 2008. This Court affirm ed on February 19, 2010. See Commonwealth v. Douglas , 996 A.2d 5J

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(Pa.Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant unsuccessfully pursued his second and third PCRA petitions in 2012 and 2013, respectively. On August 1, 2016, Appellant filed the curre nt pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice on September 28, 2016, and denied Appellant’s petition on October 27, 2016. Appellant filed pro se on November 21, 2016, a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary Rule 1925(b)
statement.
T he timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Turner , 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied , 625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becom es final. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a petition within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). When asserting the newly created constitutional right exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), “a petitioner must prove that there is a new constitutional right and that the right has been held by that court to apply retroactively .” Commonwealth v. Chambers , 35 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied , 616 Pa.J

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625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (internal quotations omitted). Instantly, Appellant relies upon two United States Supreme Court decisions as the bases for an exception to the PCRA timeliness requirement as well as for substantive PCRA relief: Miller v. Alabama , ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (ruling unconstitutional mandatory life without possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentences for juvenile offenders),

an d Montgomery v. Louisiana ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (filed January 25, 2016, and revised on January 27, 2016) (holding Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review). Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on August 1, 2 016, beyond sixty days of the Montgomery decision. Accordingly, Appellant’s petition is untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), supra ; Commonwealth v. Secreti , 134 A.3d 77 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding date of Montgomery decision controls for juveniles, who received LWOP sentences, for purposes of 60

- day rule in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)). Appellant correctly observes that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional under Montgomery/Miller . At the time of the offenses, however, App ellant was not a juvenile; he was 29 years old and would not be entitled to relief under Montgomery/Miller in any event. Accordingly, we affirm. 1
Order affirmed.

____________________________________________ 1 Due to our disposition, we deny as moot Appellant’s motion “for leave to file a re ply brief nunc pro tunc or for enlargement of time.”J

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/2017