2021 UT App 31

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF A.R.F. AND M.J.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

A.M.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20200795-CA

Filed March 18, 2021

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Price Department

The Honorable Craig Bunnell

No. 1156143

Angilee K. Dakic, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, JILL M. POHLMAN,

and RYAN M. HARRIS.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 A.M. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court order 

terminating her parental rights, raising three challenges, two of 

which invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). First, she 

asserts that the juvenile court erred in determining that there 

was good cause to deviate from the child placement preferences 

established by ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Second, she alleges 

that the State, through the Division of Child and Family Services 

(DCFS), failed to make “active efforts” to assist her with 
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“remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to 

prevent the breakup of the Indian family.” See id. § 1912(d). 

Third, she challenges the juvenile court’s determination that 

terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests, and asserts that the court did not adequately consider 

feasible alternatives to termination and therefore it was not 

strictly necessary. We reject Mother’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2019, after Mother was arrested, DCFS removed 

teen A.R.F. and toddler M.J. from Mother’s custody and initiated 

a child welfare case. The children were taken into State custody, 

and eventually placed by DCFS in a local non-Indian foster 

home. The juvenile court put in place a Child and Family Plan

setting forth steps Mother needed to take in order to achieve

reunification with the children.1 This Plan required Mother to, 

among other things, submit to drug testing, attend drug 

treatment programs, and maintain gainful employment.

¶3 Mother initially told DCFS that she was not Native 

American and did not want ICWA procedures applied in her 

case. Later, however, she said that she believed she might be a 

member of the Cherokee Nation. Accordingly, the juvenile court 

set the matter for an ICWA Pretrial Hearing to be held on June 

19, 2019. On May 21, as required by the ICWA, DCFS sent notice 

of the upcoming hearing, along with a copy of the Continued 

Verified Petition for Custody and the Shelter/Pretrial Order, via 

registered and certified mail to: (1) the Eastern Band of Cherokee 

Indians, (2) the Cherokee Nation, and (3) the United Keetoowah 

Band of Cherokee Indians. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (setting forth 

 

1. Only Mother sought reunification. A.R.F. and M.J. have 

different biological fathers, neither of whom has meaningfully 

participated in the children’s welfare case.
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the ICWA notice requirements). On May 23, each of these tribal 

entities was served with, and signed for, the Notice, Petition, and 

Shelter/Pretrial Order. Only the Eastern Band of Cherokee 

Indians responded, advising that Mother and the children were 

not registered members or eligible to register as members of 

their tribe.

¶4 After the ICWA Pretrial Hearing, and based on the 

information that it had at the time, the juvenile court found that 

the children and Mother were “not members of, and [were] not 

eligible for enrollment or membership in, a federally recognized 

Native American Tribe for purposes of [the ICWA].” The court 

thus concluded that ICWA did not apply.

¶5 Over the next three months, Mother provided no

additional information regarding any tribal enrollment to DCFS 

or the juvenile court. But on September 10, 2019, Mother sent the 

juvenile court a screenshot of a tribal registration card indicating 

that she was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation. And 

about a week later, the Cherokee Nation responded to the ICWA 

notice that DCFS had sent in May and indicated that the children 

and Mother were “members of, or [were] eligible for enrollment 

or membership in, the Cherokee Nation for purposes of [the 

ICWA].” The letter further indicated that a caseworker assigned 

by the Cherokee Nation would contact DCFS. Thereafter, 

Mother’s DCFS caseworker attempted to contact the assigned 

caseworker, Mr. Tad Teehee2 (Tribal Caseworker), to see if he 

would be participating in the next review hearing, set for 

October 30, but he did not respond before that hearing. 

 

2. Mr. Teehee appeared as a representative of the Indian Child 

Welfare Department of the Cherokee Nation, which is involved 

with Indian children coming into state custody to ensure state

compliance with ICWA. He has previously testified 1,365 times 

as an ICWA expert witness in thirty states, including Utah. He is 

also an attorney licensed in Oklahoma and California.
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¶6 At the October 30 hearing, the juvenile court specifically 

found that “[t]he children and their mother are members of, or 

eligible for enrollment or membership in, the Cherokee Nation” 

for purposes of ICWA. The court also found specific needs for 

continued DCFS custody, additional ICWA placement efforts, 

and “active efforts” under ICWA to support Mother in 

rehabilitation and reunification. The court noted that the

children were “doing very well” in their DCFS placement in a 

local non-Indian foster home, which was intended to facilitate 

visitation with Mother. To implement the ICWA requirements, 

the court looked for potential placements with relatives or tribal 

members but found that none “could provide a safe, stable, and 

otherwise appropriate environment for the children.” DCFS 

stated it would seek input from the Cherokee Nation regarding

possible placement with an Indian family, in an effort to meet 

the priority placement preferences mandated by 25 U.S.C. 

section 1915(b). As to Mother, the court found that she failed to 

cooperate with DCFS or treatment providers to meet the courtordered reunification goals, and that she “continued to show a 

complete lack of accountability for her actions.”

¶7 A few weeks later, DCFS contacted Tribal Caseworker

and informed him that the children were not in an ICWApreferred placement. Tribal Caseworker advised that the 

Cherokee Nation was not asking for the children to be placed 

elsewhere because it was unaware of any Cherokee homes 

available to take the children, and because the children had been 

placed together in a stable, local foster home that facilitated the 

services required in the Child and Family Plan. After reviewing 

the record, Tribal Caseworker participated in a November 2019 

family team meeting and spoke with A.R.F. and Mother. Tribal 

Caseworker advised Mother and the family team that he did not 

believe the children would be safe in Mother’s home or care, so 

he supported continuing both children in DCFS custody and in

their foster placement. Thereafter, Tribal Caseworker continued 

to regularly communicate with both DCFS and Mother, and also

filed a formal Notice of Intervention on behalf of the Cherokee 
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Nation, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. section 1911(c), signaling his intent 

to participate in the proceedings and make recommendations as 

both the ICWA caseworker and the qualified expert for the 

Cherokee Nation. 

¶8 In January 2020, the juvenile court held another review 

hearing. It found that Mother was noncompliant with the

reunification requirements outlined in the Child and Family Plan

because she had failed to adhere to the drug testing schedule,

find stable employment, or engage in family therapy with A.R.F.

DCFS, the Guardian ad Litem, and Tribal Caseworker all 

recommended that it was in the children’s best interests to 

terminate Mother’s reunification services and change the 

permanency goal to adoption because:

Mother had failed to cooperate with [DCFS] and 

treatment providers’ recommendations for 

treatment; she refused to acknowledge any real 

wrongdoing on her part or show any 

accountability for her actions; she failed to 

demonstrate substantial compliance with her Child

and Family Plan requirements and the Court’s

Orders or that she had made any improvement or 

progress toward remedying the circumstances that 

led to the children’s removal from her custody; and 

the children had made notable improvements since 

being in a stable home environment with 

appropriate and consistent parenting by the [foster 

parents]. 

Tribal Caseworker again indicated that there were no Cherokee 

foster homes available to take the children, but he advised the 

court that the Cherokee Nation supported the children’s 

continued placement with the foster family, because the children 

were together, happy, and well-settled in their foster home, they 

were in the least restrictive placement possible, and A.R.F. 

wanted to be adopted by the foster family. Tribal Caseworker 
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further stated that this constituted “good cause” to deviate from 

the ICWA-preferred placement guidelines in this case, and

opined that it was in the children’s best interests to allow them 

to remain in their foster placement. See id. § 1915(b) (stating that 

the ICWA’s foster placement preferences shall be applied, “in 

the absence of good cause to the contrary”).

¶9 Based on the evidence before it, the juvenile court first 

found that DCFS had made “active efforts” to identify family or 

other tribal members to serve as a placement for the children, 

but none were identified that were “fit to assume physical 

custody” and could also “provide a safe, stable, and otherwise 

appropriate environment for the children.” Thus, the court 

concluded that there was “good cause” to deviate from the 

ICWA placement preferences. See id. Additionally, the court 

made extensive findings of fact and determined, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that custody of the children by any of their 

parents was “likely to result in serious emotional or physical 

damage” to the children within the meaning of the ICWA. See id.

§ 1912(e) (directing that no foster care placement may be ordered 

“in the absence of a determination supported by clear and 

convincing evidence” that “continued custody of the child by the 

parent . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical 

damage to the child”). Consequently, the juvenile court 

terminated reunification services and scheduled a permanency 

hearing for February. 

¶10 At the permanency hearing, the juvenile court heard from 

the parties, received evidence, and took judicial notice of the 

findings from the January review hearing. The only evidence 

Mother presented was a forged document she claimed was from 

her doctor; she provided nothing to overcome the court’s prior 

findings and “continued to be non-compliant with her Child and

Family Plan requirements, treatment recommendations, and 

court orders.” The court therefore concluded that additional 

services were not likely to result in achievement of the objectives 

of the treatment plan, that reunification was not probable, and 
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that an extension of reunification services was not in the best 

interests of the children. The court again concluded that DCFS 

had engaged in “active efforts” to accomplish the permanency 

goal of reunification of the family and to provide remedial and 

rehabilitative services to Mother and the children. Moreover, the 

court determined that there continued to be a substantial risk of 

serious emotional or physical damage to the children if they 

were returned to the custody of their parents. See id.

Accordingly, the court set the children’s primary permanency 

goal as adoption, with a concurrent permanency goal as 

permanent custody and guardianship with non-relatives.

¶11 While the termination hearing was pending, Mother 

continued to have virtual visitation with M.J. In June, Mother 

requested in-person visitation with M.J. After discussion of 

COVID-19 concerns related to the health and medical conditions 

of members of the foster family, the court denied the request and

Mother continued weekly virtual visits with M.J. 

¶12 At the termination trial, Mother claimed that DCFS 

violated ICWA requirements by failing to sufficiently investigate

certain relatives that she had identified as potential kinship 

placements. She testified that she provided DCFS with the 

names and contact information of six relatives: (1) M.J.’s paternal 

grandmother (Grandmother); (2) a great aunt (Great Aunt); (3) a 

paternal relative (Paternal Relative 1); (4) a second paternal 

relative (Paternal Relative 2); (5) M.J.’s paternal grandfather 

(Grandfather); and (6) Mother’s brother (Uncle). 

¶13 DCFS contended at the termination trial that none of these 

relatives provided a viable custody option. Regarding 

Grandmother, DCFS had investigated Grandmother’s living 

situation and informed her of the necessary steps to obtain an 

updated background check (BCI check). Grandmother not only 

failed to take the necessary steps to allow DCFS to obtain the BCI 

check, but she could not be approved for placement because she 

lived with an individual who would not pass a BCI check. She 
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had also failed to follow court orders in another child welfare 

case, and her professed health issues compromised her ability to 

provide appropriate care. Great Aunt, with whom Grandmother 

resided, failed to respond to DCFS or to express an interest in 

being a kinship placement. Great Aunt could also not be 

approved for placement because her son resided in her home 

and he could not pass a BCI check. 

¶14 The two paternal relatives were also unsuitable. Paternal 

Relative 1 did not follow through with the necessary steps to 

allow DCFS to obtain an updated BCI check, and also did not 

have a stable home for a kinship study. Paternal Relative 2 was 

not identified as a potential kinship placement until August 

2020, and Mother admitted that she had failed to provide DCFS 

with any contact information for Paternal Relative 2, who also 

did not express an interest in being a kinship placement. 

¶15 Regarding Grandfather, Mother provided DCFS with his

name but failed to provide updated contact information. DCFS 

sent notice to an old address it had for Grandfather but received 

no response. In any event, Mother admitted that she did not 

want Grandfather to be considered as a potential placement for 

the children because he did not live in Utah. 

¶16 And regarding Uncle, Mother said she “thought” she had 

talked to DCFS about Uncle, but she could not say when or 

whether she had provided his contact information. And in any 

event, Uncle told Mother he did not have room for the children 

and that he did not think he could provide what was necessary 

to be a kinship placement. Mother also admitted that she did not

pursue him as a kinship option because he lived out of state. 

¶17 After hearing all the evidence regarding potential kinship 

placements, the juvenile court found that DCFS made sufficient

active efforts to have all of these individuals considered for 

kinship placement, but due to each of these individuals’ lack of 
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follow-through or other circumstances, DCFS could not approve 

them as viable placement options. 

¶18 Tribal Caseworker also testified at the termination trial. 

He confirmed that DCFS provided timely notice to the Cherokee 

Nation under the ICWA and had provided documents to him 

after he was assigned. Tribal Caseworker recommended a “good 

cause” deviation from the preferred placements in the ICWA 

given the status of the case and the stability of the children. See

25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). This recommendation was also “based on 

not having any Cherokee Nation homes available in . . . Utah 

and not having any other homes that are certified by federally 

recognized tribes and not having any known family members 

that were available to take the children.” He testified that DCFS 

had made active efforts under the ICWA to provide 

rehabilitative services to Mother, which had proven to be 

unsuccessful. See id. § 1912(d). He also stated that he believed 

that it was in the children’s best interests to be adopted by the 

foster family. He testified that giving Mother additional time 

would not result in her rectifying the situation that caused the 

State to take custody of the children. Finally, Tribal Caseworker

testified that, due to Mother’s continued drug use and pending 

criminal drug charges (among other things), he believed

returning the children to Mother “would likely result in serious 

emotional, physical damage to the children.” See id. § 1912(f).

Tribal Caseworker testified that Mother’s drug use was not 

culturally appropriate in the Cherokee Nation and can only 

cause harm to children.

¶19 After considering the evidence, the juvenile court 

concluded that DCFS “made active, reasonable, and 

extraordinary efforts to provide remedial services and 

rehabilitative programs to the parents designed to prevent the 

breakup of the family pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); however, 

those efforts have been unsuccessful due to [Mother’s] resistance 

and the barriers she put up throughout the child welfare case.” 

The court also concluded that “[c]ontinued custody of the 
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children by their parents is likely to result in serious emotional 

or physical damage to the children pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1912(f).” Moreover, it determined that “[g]ood cause has been 

shown for the continued deviation from the placement 

preferences outlined in the Indian Child Welfare Act pursuant to 

25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).” Finally, the court concluded that it was 

“strictly necessary from the children’s perspective and it is in the 

children's best interest” for Mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated “so that the children can be adopted and remain in 

an environment where they will be secure, stable, and protected 

from further abuse and neglect.” The court concluded that it had 

“considered other permanency options for the children, but 

finds there are no other appropriate options that will best meet 

the children’s permanency needs.” The court then entered an 

order terminating Mother’s parental rights to A.R.F. and M.J.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶20 Mother raises three issues on appeal. First, she claims that 

the juvenile court erred in determining that there was good 

cause to deviate from the child placement preferences 

established by the ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Second, 

Mother claims that the court erred in determining that the State, 

through DCFS, satisfied the requirement to make “active efforts” 

to assist her with remedial services and rehabilitative programs

designed to avoid the breakup of an Indian family. See id.

§ 1912(d). Finally, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s 

determination that termination of her parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests and, more specifically, contends that 

the court did not adequately consider other options 

besides termination of her parental rights and that therefore 

termination was not strictly necessary under Utah Code section 

78A-6-507(1).

¶21 Termination of parental rights “presents a mixed question 

of law and fact.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435. “We 
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review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court some 

discretion in applying the law to the facts.” In re P.F., 2017 UT 

App 159, ¶ 19, 405 P.3d 755 (quotation simplified). Before 

terminating parental rights, the juvenile court must determine, 

first, whether statutory grounds for termination are present, and, 

second, whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the 

child’s best interest. In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 46, 472 P.3d 827. 

“Because of the factually intense nature of such an inquiry, the 

juvenile court’s decision should be afforded a high degree of 

deference.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12. “Thus, in order to 

overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the result must be against 

the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with 

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

(quotation simplified). “When a foundation for the court’s 

decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not 

engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” Id. “Further, we give 

the juvenile court a wide latitude of discretion as to the 

judgments arrived at based upon not only the court’s 

opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the 

juvenile court judges’ special training, experience and interest in 

this field.” In re J.M., 2017 UT App 193, ¶ 2, 407 P.3d 1000 (per 

curiam)(quotation simplified). 

ANALYSIS

I. Good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences

¶22 Mother first complains that the juvenile court erred in 

determining that there was good cause to deviate from the

ICWA’s placement preferences. The ICWA establishes 

“minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children 

from their families and the placement of such children in foster 

or adoptive homes.” 25 U.S.C. § 1902. For foster or preadoptive 

placement of a Native American child, the ICWA provides the 

following requirements, 
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In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a 

preference shall be given, in the absence of good 

cause to the contrary, to a placement with—

(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended 

family;

(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or 

specified by the Indian child’s tribe;

(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved 

by an authorized non-Indian licensing 

authority; or

(iv) an institution for children approved by an 

Indian tribe or operated by an Indian 

organization which has a program suitable to 

meet the Indian child’s needs.

Id. § 1915(b). “The term ‘good cause’ is not defined in the statute 

but was designed to provide state courts with flexibility in 

determining the disposition of a placement proceeding involving 

an Indian child.” In re P.F., 2017 UT App 159, ¶ 2, 405 P.3d 755

(quotation simplified).

¶23 First, “[w]here the initial placement with a foster 

family complies with ICWA, there is no reason that a child’s 

bond with her foster family, and the potential trauma inflicted 

to children who have already suffered abuse or neglect, should 

not be part of a court’s good-cause determination.” Id. ¶ 25 

(quotation simplified). At the outset, Mother denied any tribal

membership and, although DCFS provided notice under the 

ICWA to the Cherokee Nation and the two other federally 

recognized Cherokee tribes in May 2019, there was no response 

indicating tribal enrollment. Thus, when the children were 

initially placed in a non-Indian foster home, it was a proper 

placement because, at the time, there was no evidence that 
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they were children who qualified as requiring ICWA-preferred 

placement. See id. ¶ 28. But once Mother and the Cherokee 

Nation provided notice that the children were members of, or 

eligible for enrollment or membership in, the Cherokee Nation, 

DCFS fully cooperated with Tribal Caseworker to ensure 

proper placement for the children under the ICWA. Tribal 

Caseworker consistently opined that the children had developed 

bonds with the non-Indian foster family, and that disrupting 

the placement would inflict additional trauma. The court 

also made findings which noted that the children were doing 

well. Under these circumstances, there exist “grounds for 

good cause to depart from the ICWA placement preferences.” 

See id. ¶ 30. 

¶24 Moreover, the record shows that DCFS diligently tried 

to place the children in ICWA-preferred placements. DCFS 

actively investigated all possible kinship placements that 

Mother provided. While Mother claims on appeal that she 

provided the names of at least four possible kinship placements

that DCFS did not sufficiently investigate, the record 

demonstrates otherwise. DCFS contacted possible kinship 

placements and the majority of them did not timely respond or 

take steps to allow them to be considered as placements. In 

addition, the juvenile court’s detailed findings demonstrate that 

some of those placements could not be approved and Mother 

was so advised. Although Mother’s petition on appeal argues 

that there could have been placements with relatives or Indian 

families outside of Utah, Mother consistently resisted placing the 

children outside of Utah during the child welfare case. Mother 

also objected to the children being moved to an ICWA-compliant 

foster home out of the area. And notably, Tribal Caseworker 

never provided any placement options with Cherokee Nation 

homes and repeatedly stated that no such placements existed for 

the children; indeed, he took the position that that good cause 

existed for deviating from the ICWA’s placement preferences 

and for placing the children outside an ICWA-preferred 

placement. 
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¶25 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the juvenile 

court complied with the ICWA’s child placement preferences, 

and did not err in determining that there was “good cause” to 

deviate from the ICWA placement preferences in this case. 

II. DCFS’s active efforts to assist Mother in reunification

¶26 Next, Mother claims that the juvenile court erred in

determining that DCFS made active efforts to provide services to 

assist her in reunification with her children. The ICWA requires 

the State to make heightened efforts to help the parents of Native 

American children retain custody, providing that 

[a]ny party seeking to effect a foster care placement 

of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian 

child under State law shall satisfy the court that 

active efforts have been made to provide remedial 

services and rehabilitative programs designed to 

prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that 

these efforts have proved unsuccessful.

25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). “The phrase active efforts connotes a more 

involved and less passive standard than that of reasonable 

efforts.” In re C.D., 2008 UT App 477, ¶ 34, 200 P.3d 194.

¶27 Mother does not substantively challenge any ground for 

termination of her parental rights or any of the extensive 

findings regarding her lack of compliance with the services 

contained in the Child and Family Plan or court orders. Instead, 

she generally claims that the services offered to her did not 

constitute active efforts, but she only identifies lack of inperson—as opposed to virtual—parent-time, which the juvenile 

court determined was necessary due to COVID-19 concerns. 

Although Mother could not have in-person parent-time with 

M.J. during part of the case, this is not sufficient to overcome the 

substantial evidence of the services that were offered to her by 

DCFS over an extended period of time. Although Mother 
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eventually completed the required assessments, she did not 

complete the recommended treatments and did not consistently 

undergo drug testing. She denied she had a substance abuse 

problem and believed that she should not be required to 

complete any recommended substance abuse treatment. She 

found online classes that she proposed as the alternative to 

required classes, although they were not approved services. At 

one point, Mother even went so far as to forge a document from 

a medical provider to state that she was physically unable to 

avail herself of services and needed online classes. Further, she 

did not provide the documentation requested by DCFS to 

support her need for accommodation. Based on all of this 

evidence, the juvenile court determined that the State made 

“reasonable,” “active,” and even “extraordinary” efforts to assist 

Mother. This determination was amply supported by substantial 

evidence in the record, and was supported by the Cherokee 

Nation’s qualified ICWA expert.

III. Determination of the children’s best interests

¶28 Finally, Mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination

that it was in the children’s best interests and was strictly 

necessary to terminate her parental rights. Mother essentially 

claims that the court was required to make findings on specific 

alternatives to termination and that it did not engage in the 

required strict necessity analysis.

¶29 A court is required to address the factor of strict necessity 

as part of its determination of the child’s best interest. See In re 

B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 66, 472 P.3d 827. Under Utah law, the best 

interest analysis starts from the legislatively mandated position 

that “[w]herever possible, family life should be strengthened 

and preserved.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-503(12) (LexisNexis 

2018). “A court may then terminate parental rights only when it 

concludes that a different option is in the child’s best interest 

and that termination is strictly necessary to facilitate that option. 

If the child can be equally protected and benefited by an option 
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other than termination, termination is not strictly necessary.” In 

re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 66. “[W]hen the court considers a child’s 

welfare and best interest, the court’s focus should be firmly fixed 

on finding the outcome that best secures the child’s well-being.” 

Id. ¶ 64. “Utah law requires courts to analyze whether 

termination . . . is strictly necessary” and “explore whether other 

feasible options to termination of parental rights exist that could 

address the specific issues facing the family.” See In re H.F., 2019 

UT App 204, ¶ 14, 455 P.3d 1098. “After this consideration, if a 

juvenile court determines that no such alternatives are available 

or articulates supported reasons for rejecting alternatives that do 

exist, such findings are entitled to deference on appeal.” In re 

C.T., 2018 UT App 233, ¶ 16, 438 P.3d 100.

¶30 The juvenile court made extensive findings about the

children’s progress in the foster and proposed adoptive home. 

The children were loved and being cared for, their needs were 

being met, and they had been integrated into the foster family. 

Mother has not meaningfully challenged these findings. Instead, 

Mother asserts that the strict necessity analysis was not 

adequately performed because the court did not make specific 

findings on other available options. After making the findings 

regarding the foster and proposed adoptive family’s ability to 

provide a safe, stable, and loving home for the children—and 

Mother’s inability to do so—the court concluded that 

termination was “strictly necessary from the children’s 

perspective” and that it was in their best interests to terminate 

parental rights “so that the children can be adopted and remain 

in an environment where they will be secure, stable, and 

protected from further abuse and neglect.” This conclusion was 

based on two key findings. First, the court found that additional 

service options would not be beneficial because Mother 

consistently refused to comply or made excuses for 

noncompliance with even “basic requirements.” Second, as 

noted above, the juvenile court had already explored—as part of 

its duties under the ICWA—the possibility of kinship and other 

similar placements; indeed, it concluded that it had “considered 
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other permanency options for the children, but found there are 

no other appropriate options that will best meet the children’s 

permanency needs.” Under these circumstances, the court’s 

findings and determination regarding their best interests and 

strict necessity are not erroneous under Utah law and were 

based upon the court’s thorough consideration of alternatives.

Accordingly, we uphold the court’s determination.

CONCLUSION

¶31 The juvenile court did not err in determining that good 

cause existed to deviate from the child placement preferences set 

forth in the ICWA. The court likewise did not err in determining

that DCFS made active and sufficient efforts to assist Mother 

with remedial services and rehabilitative programs. And the 

court did not err in determining that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights was strictly necessary and in the children’s best 

interests.

¶32 Affirmed.