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Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CEA CASES 

NAME: CORN PRODUCTS REFINING COMPANY 

CITATION: 13 Agric. Dec. 1117 

DOCKET NUMBER: 55 

DATE: DECEMBER 8, 1954 

DOCUMENT TYPE: DECISION AND ORDER 

AGRICULTURE DECISIONS

BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

(No. 4118) 

In re CORN PRODUCTS REFINING COMPANY. CEA Docket No. 55. Decided December 8, 

1954. 

Non-exempt Hedging -- Estimated or Anticipated Sales -- Trading Limit

Where corn futures purchases are made against estimated or anticipated sales 

of corn products and by-products, which sales are not covered by contracts to 

sell, it is held, such estimated or anticipated sales are not commitments that 

qualify futures purchases of the commodity as hedges exempt from trading limits 

under the act. 

Exempt Hedging -- Trading Limit

Bona fide hedging transactions exempted from trading limits under the act are 

sales of futures to the extent that such sales are offset in quantity by 

purchases of the same cash commodity and purchases of futures to the extent that 

such purchases are offset by sales of the same cash commodity. 

Hedging in Sales to Subsidiary -- Trading Limit

Where respondent sells its product at a fixed price to a wholly owned 

subsidiary, there is no risk of price fluctuations which would qualify the 

contracts as the basis for hedging operations exempted from trading limits under 

the act. 

Hedging in Sale of Products and By-Products -- Trading Limit

Where futures are purchased as hedges against a sale of the commodity itself, 

they may be for the full amount, but futures purchased as hedges against the 

sale of products or byproducts shall be reasonably related to the market risk to 

qualify as bona fide hedges exempt from the trading limit. 

Due Process -- Unlawful Discrimination -- Constitutional Law

Where respondent claimed that the act is unconstitutional as the order is 

discriminating and deprived respondent of property without due process of law in 

that the limitations favored respondents competitors, held, it 

is not appropriate for an agency charged with the administration of a statute to 

declare it unconstitutional, and the fact that a regulation may bear more 

heavily upon one person than another does not make it unlawful. 

Speculation in Bona Fide Hedging -- Spreads or Straddles -- Trading Limit
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The Commodity Exchange Act makes the futures transactions of any person 

subject to the trading limit orders of the Commodity Exchange Commission 

regardless of the degree of speculation involved in such transactions, unless 

the transactions are exempt as "bona fide hedging" under the act, or are exempt 

by the Commission as spreads or straddles. 

Term "Reasonable" Hedging

Paragraph (B) of section 4a(3) of the Commodity Exchange Act classifies as a 

hedge the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery in such amount as 

would be a reasonable hedge against the products or by-products of such 

commodity, and the term "Reasonable" refers to such items as conversion factors, 

and this paragraph does not expand the term beyond the definition of "bona fide 

hedging transactions" in section 4a(3). 

Price Commitment in Bona Fide Hedging

An essential characteristic of true hedging is a price commitment with 

respect to the cash commodity or product which is protected by a futures 

transaction. 

Mr. Benj. M. Holstein for Commodity Exchange Authority. Mr. Samuel A. McCain of 

New York, New York, and Mr. Woodson D. Scott of Lord, Day & Lord of New York, 

for respondent. Mr. Jack W. Bain, Referee. 

Decision by Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 

Chapter 1), instituted by a complaint issued under section 6(b) of the act (7 

U.S.C. 9) on July 22, 1952, by K. T. Hutchinson, Acting Secretary of 

Agriculture. The respondent, Corn Products Refining Company, is a corporation 

whose principal place of business is New York, New York. It is engaged in the 

business of manufacturing and selling various products and by-products of corn. 

The complaint charges that the respondent traded in corn futures in excess of 

the trading limit of 2,000,000 bushels fixed by the order of the Commodity 

Exchange Commission (17 CFR 150.1) issued under section 4a of the act (7 U.S.C. 

6a). The complaint alleges that on April 11, 

1952, as the result of transactions theretofore executed on the Chicago Board of 

Trade for its account, respondent had a net long position in corn futures of 

approximately 3,650,000 bushels, exclusive of spreading in the same grain 

between markets, that only 207,000 bushels of this position constituted bona 

fide hedging transactions exempt from trading limits by the act and the 

commission's order, and that during a specified period thereafter it held a net 

long futures position of more than 2,000,000 bushels. 

On August 19, 1952, respondent filed an answer admitting that it had a long 

position in corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade on the dates and in the 

quantities specified but denying that such position violated the act or the 

order. Respondent contends that its long position represented bona fide hedging 

transactions against outstanding contracts for, and anticipated sales of, corn 

products and by-products and was, therefore, exempt from the position limit 

established by the commission. In support of this contention, the answer 

describes in detail the respondent's operations, its requirements for raw 

materials, and the contracts which it entered into with its customers. It is 

also alleged in the answer that the act does not authorize the issuance of the 

order of the commission and that, if it does, the act is unconstitutional as the 

order is discriminatory and deprives respondent of property without due process 

of law in that the limitations contained therein favor respondent's competitors 

in the corn refining industry and in industries producing competitive products. 

Prior to the hearing in this matter, the parties entered into a stipulation 

of facts which was made a part of the record. The stipulation consists of a 
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description of the respondent's operations, its requirements for raw materials, 

and the extent and form of its outstanding contracts. Attached to the 

stipulation are 22 exhibits containing data with respect to respondent's 

inventories, prices, products, sales, and futures transactions. 

Jack W. Bain, Office of Hearing Examiners, United States Department of 

Agriculture, presided at a hearing which was held in New York, New York, on 

October 14 and 15, 1952, and March 3, 1953. The respondent was represented by 

Samuel A. McCain and Woodson D. Scott, both of New York, New York. Benjamin M. 

Holstein, Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Agriculture, 

appeared as counsel for the complainant. At the hearing, four witnesses 

testified on behalf of respondent and respondent introduced 19 exhibits in 

addition to those attached 

to the stipulation of facts. The complainant cross-examined respondent's 

witnesses and offered rebuttal evidence by the testimony of one witness. 

Both parties filed briefs and oral argument was held before the referee in 

Washington, D. C., on June 25, 1953. The referee issued his report on September 

29, 1953. The report contained proposed findings of fact, conclusions and an 

order recommending that respondent be found to have violated the act 

substantially as charged. Both parties filed exceptions to the referee's report 

and oral argument upon the exceptions was held before the Judicial Officer in 

Washington, D. C., on April 13, 1954. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The respondent, Corn Products Refining Company, is a New Jersey 

corporation whose office and principal place of business is located at 17 

Battery Place, New York, New York. The respondent is engaged in the business of 

manufacturing and selling products and by-products of corn and operates 

factories at Argo and Pekin, Illinois, and North Kansas City, Missouri. 

Respondent is licensed to do business and does business in the States of New 

York, New Jersey, Illinois, Missouri, and Texas. 

2. The respondent processes over 50,000,000 bushels of corn a year and sells 

about 77 percent of the products and by-products to its subsidiaries and 23 

percent to unaffiliated purchasers. Starch, gluten feed, gluten meal, syrup, 

and dextrose (corn sugar) are the principal products and by-products obtained 

from the processing. Respondent's brand name for dextrose is cerelose. 

3. Respondent estimates, and the estimate may be accepted as fact for the 

purpose of this proceeding, that of the corn processed by the nine companies 

engaged in processing corn by the wet milling process, it processes nearly 44 

percent, its nearest competitor in size processes 14 percent, the next two 10 

percent each, the fifth in size 9 percent, and the other four less than 5 

percent each. 

4. Corn Products Sales Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of respondent and 

is licensed to do business and does business in 42 states and the District of 

Columbia. 

5. The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, hereinafter referred to as the 

Chicago Board of Trade, was at all times material to these findings and 

conclusions a duly designated contract market under the provisions of the 

Commodity Exchange Act. 

6. Section 2(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(a)) defines the 

term "commission" to mean "the Commodity Exchange Commission, consisting of the 

Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General." 

7. Section 4a (1) of the act (7 U.S.C. 6a (1)) provides, in pertinent part, 

as follows: 
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"Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale of such 

commodity for future delivery made on or subject to the rules of contract 

markets causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in 

the price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate 

commerce in such commodity. For the purpose of diminishing, eliminating, or 

preventing such burden, the commission shall, from time to time, after due 

notice and opportunity for hearing, by order, proclaim and fix such limits on 

the amount of trading under contracts of sale of such commodity for future 

delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market which may be done by 

any person as the commission finds is necessary to diminish, eliminate, or 

prevent such burden. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the 

commission . . . from exempting transactions commonly known to the trade as 

'spreads' or 'straddles' or from fixing trading limits applying to such 

transactions different from trading limits fixed for other transactions." 

[Emphasis supplied.] 

8. Section 4a(2) of the act (7 U.S.C. 6a(2)) provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows: 

". . . it shall be unlawful for any person -- * * * 

"(B) directly or indirectly to buy or sell, or agree to buy or sell, under 

contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery on or subject to the 

rules of any contract market, any amount of such commodity that shall result in 

giving such person a net long or net short position at any one time in or with 

respect to any such commodity in excess of any trading limit fixed by the 

commission for net long or net short position in such order for or with respect 

to such commodity." [Emphasis supplied.] 

9. Section 4a(3) of the act (7 U.S.C. 6a(3)) provides, as follows: 

"(3) No order issued under paragraph (1) of this section shall apply to 

transactions which are shown to be bona fide 

hedging transactions. For the purpose of this paragraph, bona fide hedging 

transactions shall mean sales of any commodity for future delivery on or subject 

to the rules of any board of trade to the extent that such sales are offset in 

quantity by the ownership or purchase of the same cash commodity or, conversely, 

purchases of any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 

board of trade to the extent that such purchases are offset by sales of the same 

cash commodity. There shall be included in the amount of any commodity which may 

be hedged by any person -- [Emphasis supplied.] 

"(A) the amount of such commodity such person is raising, or in good faith 

intends or expects to raise, within the next twelve months, on land (in the 

United States or its Territories) which such person owns or leases; 

"(B) an amount of such commodity the sale of which for future delivery would 

be a reasonable hedge against the products or by-products of such commodity 

owned or purchased by such person, or the purchase of which for future delivery 

would be a reasonable hedge against the sale of any product or by-product of 

such commodity by such person." [Emphasis supplied.] 

10. On December 22, 1938, the Commodity Exchange Commission, pursuant to 

authority vested in it by section 4a(1) of the act, issued an order (17 CFR 

150.1; 3 F. R. 3145) which provided, in part, as follows: 

"As used herein, the word 'grain' includes . . . corn . . . and the word 

'person' includes individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and 

trusts. 

"Findings of Fact 

"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act 

(U.S.C., 1934 ed. and Supp. III, title 7, sec. 6a), the Commodity Exchange 

Commission, after full consideration of the record made at a public hearing held 
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in Chicago, Illinois, beginning December 1, 1937, of which due public notice had 

been given, and at which all persons were given opportunity to hear, present, 

refute, and comment upon evidence in the premises, does hereby find the 

following: 

"A. Except as otherwise stated herein, trading in any one grain for future 

delivery on a contract market, by a person who holds or controls a speculative 

net position of more than 

2,000,000 bushels, long or short, in any one future or in all futures combined, 

in such grain on such contract market, tends to cause sudden and unreasonable 

fluctuations and changes in the price of such grain not warranted by changes in 

the conditions of supply or demand, and is not needed to maintain market 

liquidity or to facilitate hedging on such contract market. * * * 

"Upon the foregoing facts, it is concluded that in order to diminish, 

eliminate, or prevent the undue burden of excessive speculation in grain futures 

which causes unwarranted price changes, it is necessary to establish limits on 

the amount of speculative trading, under contracts of sale of grain for future 

delivery on contract markets, which may be done by any one person; that 

2,000,000 bushels is a reasonable limitation on the net long or short position 

which any person may hold or control and upon the daily purchases or sales which 

any person may make, in any one grain or any one contract market, in any one 

future or all futures combined; * * * 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the following limits on the amount of trading under 

contracts of sale of grain for future delivery on or subject to the rules of 

contract markets which may be done by any person be, and they are hereby, 

proclaimed and fixed, to be in full force and effect on and after December 31, 

1938; 

"POSITION LIMITS 

"1. The limit on the maximum net long or net short position which any one 

person may hold or control in any one grain on any one contract market, except 

as specifically authorized by paragraph 2 hereof, is: 2,000,000 bushels in any 

one future or in all futures combined. 

"2. To the extent that the net position held or controlled by any one person 

in all futures combined in any one grain on any one contract market is shown to 

represent spreading in the same grain between markets, the limit on net position 

in all futures combined set forth in paragraph 1 hereof may be exceeded on such 

contract market, but in no case shall the excess result in a net position of 

more than 3,000,000 bushels in all futures combined nor more than 2,000,000 

bushels in any one future. * * * 

"The foregoing limits upon position and upon daily trading shall not be 

construed to apply to bona fide hedging transactions 

as defined in paragraph (3) of section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act." 

The position limits established in said order of the Commodity Exchange 

Commission were in full force and effect at the time of the transactions 

involved herein. 

11. On April 11, 1952, as the result of transactions theretofore executed for 

its account on the Chicago Board of Trade, the respondent held the following net 

long open contract position in corn futures: 

Future Quantity 

May 1952 1,640,000 bushels

July 1952 1,500,000 bushels

December 1952 510,000 bushels

Total 3,650,000 bushels
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No part of this long position in corn futures represented spreading in the 

same grain between markets. On the same date, as the result of transactions 

theretofore executed for its account on other boards of trade, respondent held a 

short open contract position in September raw sugar futures of 7,000 long tons 

and in October cottonseed oil futures of 840,000 pounds. 

12. As of April 11, 1952, respondent had the following outstanding contracts 

for the sale of corn products and by-products to its subsidiaries and to 

unaffiliated purchasers: 

(a) Contracts with various purchasers, including its subsidiaries, for the 

sale of starch, syrup and dextrin for delivery within 30 days at the market 

price on the day of shipment, the manufacture of which would require 1,059,000 

bushels of corn. 

(b) Contracts with unaffiliated purchasers for the sale of dextrose for 

delivery within 30 days at the market price on the day of shipment, the 

manufacture of which would require 547,000 bushels of corn. 

(c) Contracts with Corn Products Sales Company, a wholly owned sales 

subsidiary, for the sale of dextrose for delivery within 30 days at fixed 

prices, the manufacture of which would require 2,007,000 bushels of corn. 

(d) Contracts with unaffiliated foreign purchasers for the sale of starch, 

syrup and dextrose at fixed prices, the manufacture of which would require 

207,000 bushels of corn. 

(e) Contracts with unaffiliated purchasers for the sale of 41,000,000 pounds 

of gluten feed and meal for delivery within 30 days at fixed prices, the 

manufacture of which would require approximately 3,090,000 bushels of corn, 

which would, at the same time, yield 105,000,000 pounds of starch or 130,000,000 

pounds of syrup. 

13. Dextrose sells in competition with cane sugar. Historically, the market 

price of dextrose follows the price of refined cane sugar and dextrose sells at 

a fixed differential of 15 or 16 percent below the market price of refined cane 

sugar. Cane sugar is sold at a firm price for 30 days ahead. A change in the 

price of refined cane sugar will not take effect until 30 days after the change 

is announced. The maximum market price of dextrose is predictable and, as a 

practical matter, is fixed for at least 30 days. 

14. By experimenting for some years, respondent has developed a method of 

using futures markets by which it assures itself of a profit in what it calls 

its cerelose operations. Following this method in connection with 15,225,000 

pounds of dextrose it expected to sell to customers the latter part of 1952, on 

April 11, 1952, it had purchased 510,000 bushels of December corn futures, and 

had sold 7,000 long tons of raw sugar futures and 840,000 pounds of cottonseed 

oil futures. 

15. Respondent forecasts what its sales will be for months ahead, and the 

error in its forecasts has proved to be small. Based on such forecasts, it 

schedules the amounts of corn it will process 60 days ahead. It considers the 

future demand of its customers (what it forecasts it will sell) to be an 

obligation, whether or not covered by contract. 

16. Respondent's trading in futures is not done for the purpose of 

speculating in price differences, but in good faith for the purpose of 

offsetting risks and reducing costs in its business. It regards such trading as 

proper and legitimate hedging. 

CONCLUSIONS

I

Section 4a(1) of the act (7 U.S.C. 6a(1)), quoted above in Finding of Fact 7, 

finds that excessive speculation in futures of any commodity on or subject to 

the rules of contract markets is an undue and unnecessary burden upon interstate 

commerce and 
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provides that the Commodity Exchange Commission for the purpose of diminishing, 

eliminating or preventing such burden shall, from time to time, after notice, 

hearing, etc., ". . . proclaim and fix such limits on the amount of trading

under contracts of sale . . . for future delivery on or subject to the rules of 

any contract market which may be done by any person as the commission finds is 

necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent such burden." [Emphasis supplied.] 

Section 4a(2), as seen from Finding of Fact 8, makes it unlawful for any person 

to buy or sell any amount of a commodity for such future delivery in excess of 

any daily trading limit fixed by the commission or which will give a person a 

position in excess of any trading limit for net long or short positions fixed by 

the commission. The only exceptions to the trading restrictions contained in 

the act are (1) the authorization in section 4a(1) to the commission to exempt 

"spreads" or "straddles" and (2) the exemption for bona fide hedging 

transactions in section 4a(3). 

It is seen, then, that the act provides for orders by the commission fixing 

trading position limits for any person, that a position in excess of such limit 

is unlawful, and that the only transactions exempted by the act from trading

limits are those specified. Therefore, whatever the degree of speculation 

involved in the futures transactions of a person, the act makes them subject to 

the trading limit orders of the commission unless the transactions are exempt as 

bona fide hedging transactions under the act or are exempt by the commission as 

spreads or straddles. 

The respondent argues that the trading limit provisions of the act apply only 

to speculative trading, that the commission's order can only do likewise, that 

the respondent's corn futures trading is not speculative because it is done to 

stabilize the cost of corn to it and to assure a continuing source of supply of 

corn for the respondent's manufacturing and selling needs and that, therefore, 

whether or not its futures transactions are exempt as hedging, the trading limit 

provisions of the act and the order are inapplicable to it. Of course, the 

respondent's futures transactions are carried on in connection with its business 

and do not represent the kind of trading engaged in by those who trade only in 

price differences. As we have seen, however, the act provides for fixing 

trading limits, makes it unlawful to exceed the trading limit and exempts only 

bona fide hedging transactions and spreads or straddles when so provided by the 

commission. Whether or not the kind of trading done by the respondent should 

 

have been treated the same for the trading limit purposes of the act as the 

trading of a speculator trading only in price differences was a matter for 

decision by Congress. The act appears to make no distinction among types of 

trading except for the exemption for bona fide hedging transactions. The 

statutory provisions have the effect of throwing into the broad category of 

speculative trading, transactions which are not bona fide hedging transactions. 

The commission's order fixing 2,000,000 bushels as the position limit for corn 

futures exempts bona fide hedging transactions and provides higher limits where 

spreads between markets in corn futures are involved. The order follows the 

act. There is no question of spreads involved so that we come down to the main 

issue in this proceeding, namely, whether the respondent's net long futures 

position of 3,650,000 bushels on April 11, 1952, was in violation of section 4a 

of the act and of the commission's order or whether its corn futures purchases 

were bona fide hedging transactions exempt by the act and the order at least to 

the extent that the respondent's position exceeded 2,000,-000 bushels. 

II

The respondent contends that its entire long futures position of 3,650,000 

bushels constituted hedges exempt under the act and the order. The basic 

reasoning in support of this contention is that the respondent is entitled under 

section 4a(3) (B) of the act to have considered as hedges the amount of corn 
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futures purchases which would be a reasonable hedge against future sales of corn 

products and by-products by the respondent. The respondent argues that "sale" 

in section 4a(3) (B) extends to sales of products and by-products to take place 

in the future without the existence of contracts of sale at the time of the 

futures purchase, that unquestionably its business necessitates the grinding of 

corn for sales of products and by-products and that corn futures purchases 

against such future sales of products and byproducts are hedges under the act 

subject only to whatever limits on amounts of such purchases are set by the word 

"reasonable." The respondent ventures an opinion that an amount of purchases to 

cover its "nearby needs," for example, a sixty-day supply (amounting to 10 to 12 

million bushels) would not be unreasonable. 

As part of its case on this phase of the problem, the respondent points out 

that its futures trading is done for protective purposes rather than 

speculation, that is, that its futures purchases 

 

tend to assure it supplies of cash corn as well as to stabilize the costs of 

corn to it. In this latter connection the respondent adverts to the fact that 

prices for corn products and by-products are relatively more stable than corn 

prices and that trading in futures as the respondent does, that is, by treating 

account-wise the profit or loss on its futures transactions as part of the cost 

of corn purchased, tends to smooth out fluctuations in its cost of corn. The 

respondent urges that it forecasts with great accuracy its needs for corn and 

the prices at which it will sell corn products and by-products in the future and 

that, therefore, these forecasts which it regards as commitments, supply a 

legitimate basis for regarding futures purchases against such forecast sales as 

hedging exempt from trading limits by the act. 

The respondent seemingly makes use of the word "reasonable" in section 4a(3) 

(B) of the act as though it confers a completely different and much wider 

immunity from trading limits than section 4a(3) prescribes. We do not believe 

this to be the case. Section 4a(3) lays down a definition of "bona fide hedging 

transactions" which requires a futures purchase to be balanced by a sale of the 

cash commodity and vice versa. Paragraph (B), dealing in hedging with respect to 

products or by-products of a commodity as distinguished from the commodity 

itself, permits the addition of what would be a reasonable hedge in such cases. 

Obviously paragraph (B), in using the word "reasonable," refers to such items as 

conversion factors and is not an indefinite expansion of the word "reasonable" 

in the case of products or by-products of a commodity beyond the definition of 

"bona fide hedging transactions" in section 4a(3). Obviously, too, the word 

"hedge" in paragraph (B) does not have a meaning different from that in section 

4a(3). There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended 

to enlarge exemptions for trading with respect to products and by-products, as 

distinguished from commodities themselves, to anything reasonable or 

commercially advantageous to the trader without reference to the definition of 

bona fide hedging transactions. In other words, if anticipated sales of a cash 

commodity itself without fixed price commitments would not qualify futures 

purchases as a bona fide hedging transaction under section 4a(3), anticipated 

sales of the product of a commodity would not make futures purchases against 

such sales a hedge under section 4a(3)(B). 

In essence, a hedge is the assumption of a new risk in order to offset an 

opposite risk to which the hedger is subject. Webster's 

 

New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1950). n1 In the futures market, the 

traditional function of hedging is to supply a form of insurance against price 

fluctuations n2 in connection with transactions in the cash or "spot" commodity 

or products of such commodity and is based upon the assumption that price 

movements in the cash commodity market will parallel those in the futures 

market. Hedging is employed by buyers or owners of the cash, that is the 

physical, commodity and those dealers or processors who have entered into 
Page 9 

contracts for the forward sale of the commodity or product thereof and who at 

the time of making the contracts for forward sale do not own the commodity to be 

delivered or processed. 

n1 The Oxford New English Dictionary (1901), giving usage illustrations 

as far back as 1672, defines "hedge" to mean: "8. To secure oneself against 

loss on (a bet or other speculation) by making transactions on the other 

side so as to compensate more or less for possible loss on the first." 

n2 The value of futures trading for such purpose has been the historical 

defense against eliminating or curtailing futures trading. 

A typical illustration of hedging by futures purchasers follows. A flour 

miller contracts in midsummer to deliver 5,000 barrels of flour in the late fall 

at a price based upon prevailing prices for wheat. The contract price is 

sufficient to cover costs and insure a milling profit. The month of November 

arrives and the miller, by reason of an advance in the price of wheat, may be 

compelled to pay a higher price per bushel than the price on which he based his 

estimate when he contracted to mill the flour at the fixed price. The advance 

in wheat prices may well destroy any anticipated milling profits. In order to 

eliminate the risk of a change in the price of the raw material, the miller will 

buy December wheat futures contracts at the time he makes the contract for the 

sale of the flour. In the interval between the time when the contract for the 

sale of the flour is made and November when he will need the wheat to 

manufacture the flour, the price of wheat may rise or fall. When November 

arrives, he purchases wheat of the quality and grade he desires. If the price 

of wheat has advanced, he loses the amount of the advance since he has to pay 

more for the wheat than the price of wheat at the time he made his contract to 

sell flour, but at the time he obtains the actual cash wheat, he simultaneously 

closes out his hedge transaction by selling the December futures contracts. He 

makes a profit on his futures transaction which balances his loss on the 

purchase of the cash wheat and insures to him his normal milling profit on the 

manufacture and sale of the flour at a small 

 

cost in commissions. If the price of wheat has declined between the time of 

making the contract to sell the flour and the purchase of the necessary wheat, 

the profit on the purchase of the wheat is balanced by a corresponding loss on 

the futures transaction. 

As can be seen from the illustration, the hedge is used to insure processors 

against loss due to price changes in commodities. Its purpose is to insure 

processing profit. Its object is not to return a speculative profit, for the 

reason that any profit derived on the futures merely equalizes or offsets a loss 

which has been incurred on a transaction or market position in the cash 

commodity market. The cash market transaction and the exchange transaction are 

complementary. By means of the futures-trading, the hedger passes on to others 

a market risk, that is, the risk of price change in the commodity. Accordingly, 

an essential characteristic of true hedging is a price commitment with respect 

to the cash commodity or product which is protected by a futures transaction. 

In other words, a futures sale is a hedge to the extent that the trader owns or 

purchases an equivalent amount of the cash commodity or products or by-products 

thereof and a futures purchase is a hedge to the extent that the trader has 

contracts for forward sales of the cash commodity or products or by-products of 

the commodity at fixed prices. See testimony of Dr. W. E. Beach, tr. pp. 178-

180; article on "Hedging," Encyclopedia Britannica (1942 ed.); n3 Hoffman, 

Future Trading Upon Organized Commodity Markets (U. of Pa. Press, 1932), pp. 

377-418; Hoffman, Hedging by Dealing in Grain Futures (1925), pp. 114, 123-124; 

Vol. VII, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Grain Trade (1926) pp. 

33-47; Hoffman, Future Trading and the Cash-Grain Markets (U. S. Dep't of 

Agriculture, Circular No. 201, 1932) p. 22; Baer and Woodruff, Commodity 

Exchanges (Harper, 3d ed., 1935) pp. 83-88, 118-120; Emery, Speculation on the 

Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States (Columbia University, 1896) p. 
Page 10 

160; Baer and Saxon, Commodity Exchanges and Futures Trading (Harper, 1949) pp. 

197-218. 

n3 The first paragraph of this article states: "Hedging, a method by 

which traders in commodities may partially or entirely insure themselves 

against loss from price fluctuations. The technique of hedging is the 

making at about the same time of two contracts of opposite though 

corresponding nature; one a genuine trade contract with a view to obtaining 

a dealer's ordinary trade profit, the other an insurance or protective 

contract in the speculative or 'futures' market which counteracts loss (and 

profit) on the first transaction through price fluctuations . . . ." 

There are many reported court decisions dealing with hedging and these, too, 

generally regard hedging to be a form of protection 

 

from price fluctuations and expressly or impliedly consider as an essential 

element of a true hedge a price commitment with respect to the cash commodity or 

product thereof that is hedged. n4 

n4 E.g., United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 263 U.S. 

611, 619 (1924); Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Company, 198 

U.S. 236, 249 (1905); Commissioner v. Farmers and Ginners Cotton Oil 

Company, 120 F. (2d), 772, 774 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941);Borllin-Harrison Company 

v. Lewis Company, 182 Tenn. 342, 187 S.W. (2d) 17, 23 (1945); Lyons Milling 

Company v. Goffe & Gardener, 46 F. (2d) 241, 247 (C.C.A. 10th, 1931). In 

Commissioner v. Farmers and Ginners Cotton Oil Company, supra, the general 

principles are given as follows (p. 774): 

"A hedge is a form of price insurance; it is resorted to by business men 

to avoid the risk of changes in the market price of a commodity. The basic 

principle of hedging is the maintenance of an even or balanced market 

position. To exercise a choice, of risks, to sell one commodity and buy 

another, is not a hedge; it is merely continuing the risk in a different 

form. That is what the taxpayer did in this case. It did not retain its 

crude oil and sell refined; it sold crude and bought refined when it had no 

actual commodity on hand or future commitments to be protected from price 

variations. [Emphasis supplied.] 

While one may run across an occasional use of the term "hedging" in a broader 

sense than its traditional meaning, and while there may be, as claimed by the 

respondent, an opinion in some quarters of the trade n5 that the term 

encompasses trading done for protective purposes but without price commitments, 

there seems little doubt as to the legislative intent of the Commodity Exchange 

Act which is necessarily what we are concerned about in this proceeding. Section 

4a(3) exempts "bona fide hedging transactions" from trading limit orders and 

defines bona fide hedging transactions as sales of futures to the extent that 

such sales are offset in quantity by purchases of the same cash commodity and 

purchases of futures to the extent that such purchases are offset by sales of 

the same cash commodity. This is the definition of traditional hedging. 

Paragraphs (A) and (B) add amounts which can be considered as "hedging 

transactions" under the act, (A) being amounts of a commodity which the trader 

expects to raise and (B) amounts of futures sales of a commodity which would be 

a reasonable hedge against ownership or purchase of the products or by-products

of the commodity and amounts of futures purchases of a commodity which would be 

a reasonable hedge against sales of products or by-products of the commodity. 

As we have pointed out above, "reasonable hedge" in the case of products or byproducts of commodities is subject to and governed by the definition of "bona 

fide hedging transactions" given in section 4a (3). 

n5 The respondent, e.g., cites a current rule of Commodity Exchange, 

Inc., of New York to the effect that (for margin purposes) a hedge shall 
Page 11 

include a futures purchase against the sale of a product from the commodity 

or a related commodity or any amount of such commodity or related commodity 

which a person in good faith intends to consume as manufacturer, etc. 

 

The legislative history of the act confirms our conclusion that the intent 

was to exempt from trading limits what was considered to be "legitimate" or 

"bona fide" hedging, namely, the futures trading supplying protection from price 

fluctuations to traders in cash commodities and processors having price 

commitments with respect to the cash commodities or products thereof. See 

section 3 of the act which contains a legislative finding that futures trading 

transactions ". . . are utilized by shippers, dealers, millers and others 

engaged in handling commodities and the products and by-products thereof in 

interstate commerce as a means of hedging themselves against possible loss 

through fluctuations in price . . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] Hearings before 

Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 3009, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-105, 108 

(1935); Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on H.R. 6772, 74th 

Cong., 2d Sess. 10-18, 38-46, 231-235, 255 (1936). See also the discussion in 

the Senate, 80 Cong. Rec. 6161, 7853, 7855, 7909, 7912, 7918, 8012, 8014, 8015, 

8086, 8087, 8089 (1936). 

Accordingly, it is seen that whatever assurance from the standpoint of 

getting supplies of corn to process may be afforded the respondent by its 

purchases of corn futures, such a reason for futures purchases does not make 

them hedges under the act. We come down, then, to the bare question as to 

whether future, expected, or anticipated sales of corn products and by-products 

qualify corn futures purchases against such sales as hedges under the act when 

such sales are not covered by contracts to sell but are forecast or estimated 

with a high degree of accuracy both as to volume and price. 

Anticipated sales of a commodity or its products or by-products are not 

commitments that qualify futures purchases of the commodity as hedges exempt 

from trading limits under the act. Regardless of the accuracy of its forecasts, 

the respondent is under no binding obligation to sell its corn products in any 

particular amounts at fixed prices. The prices at which it sells its products 

are not tied down but are free to reflect any changes in the price of corn 

during the interval between the purchases of the corn futures and the sales of 

the products. As a matter of economics, then, it would seem that no matter how 

the respondent keeps its accounts, the respondent is not passing on to others a 

 

market risk when it purchases corn futures but is itself assuming a risk of 

change in the price of corn. n6 But, at any rate, an examination of the act 

shows that paragraph (A) of section 4a(3) specifically provides that the amount 

of a commodity a person is raising or in good faith expects to raise may be 

hedged. This, of course, means that the hedging authorized by paragraph (A) was 

not allowed by section 4a(3) without paragraph (A) and, since anticipated 

ownership by the raising of a commodity was specifically added to 4a(3) and 

anticipated sales of a commodity or products were not, the inference is obvious 

that anticipated sales do not afford a basis for hedging under section 4a(3). 

It is clear, too, that the intention of Congress was to write a tight definition 

of hedging which would leave little room for broadening by administrative 

interpretation. n7 

n6 See p. 399 of Hoffman, Future Trading Upon Organized Commodity 

Markets (U. of Pa. Press, 1932). Hoffman describes as "open speculation," 

but commonly associated with hedging, the situation in which a cotton 

merchant sells futures before he purchases actual cotton although the 

operation might prove to be a wise policy in view of the type of business 

anticipated during the forthcoming season. 

n7 Senator Pope of Idaho, apparently the floor manager of the bill in 

the Senate, stated as follows: ". . . the definition of bona fide hedging, 
Page 12 

which appears in the first part of the bill, is so specific that no 

regulation could be made by the Secretary of Agriculture contrary to it or 

expanding it. I think the definition of hedging is very specific, and is 

limited strictly to the amount of cash grain, either bought or sold, plus 

the amount of grain that may be raised for a period of 1 year by one who 

owns or has rented land or the products and by-products of the commodity. 

That is so specific and is so definite that, in my opinion, and in the 

opinion of others who appeared before the committee, there would be no 

reason to say that the Secretary could go beyond that definition or extend 

the definition of hedging." 80 Cong. Rec. 7854 (1936). 

Any lingering doubts about the act's meaning in this respect are dispelled by 

the defeat in the Senate of a proposed amendment to the bill that became the act 

which sought to qualify as hedging under the act futures purchases of a 

commodity against anticipated sales of the products of the commodity. n8 80 

Con. Rec. 7910 (1936). The defeat was due to disapproval of the amendment's 

objectives rather than, as urged by the respondent, a belief that the amendment 

was unnecessary because such purchases were treated as hedges by the bill 

without the proposed amendment. 

n8 The proposed amendment was offered by Senator Murphy of Iowa and 

admittedly sought to enlarge the definition of hedging in the bill to 

permit large manufacturers of grain to purchase grain futures against 

anticipated sales of grain products. The justification advanced for the 

proposed amendment is much the same as that supplied by the respondent in 

this proceeding. (80 Cong. Rec. 7908 (1936). 

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we disagree with the 

respondent's claim that its estimated or anticipated sales of 

 

corn products exempt its corn futures purchases as hedges under the act. No 

part of the corn futures purchases in issue should be classified as hedges under 

the act due to such anticipated sales of corn products. 

III

Next there are for consideration the sales contracts for corn products listed 

in Finding of Fact 12. As shown by Finding of Fact 12 (a), the respondent had 

outstanding contracts as of April 11, 1952, with various purchasers, including 

its subsidiaries, for the sale of starch, syrup and dextrin for delivery within 

30 days at the market price on the day of shipment, the manufacture of which 

would require 1,059,000 bushels of corn. Under the pricing provisions of these 

contracts, there were present no fixed commitments by the respondent as to 

price. The market prices for the products could reflect any intervening changes 

in the price of corn between the dates of the sales contracts and the deliveries 

under the contracts. There was no risk of price fluctuations incurred by the 

respondent and therefore, any corn futures purchases against such contracts 

would not be needed to protect against the risk of price fluctuations. We have 

concluded above that hedging exempted by the act involves the essential 

characteristic of a price commitment (except in connection with the raising of 

commodity) with respect to the cash commodity or product and, since such 

commitment is absent in connection with these contracts, nothing should be 

deducted as hedges from the respondent's long futures position of 3,650,000 

bushels because of these contracts. The contracts with the respondent's 

subsidiaries, as explained below with respect to the respondent's fixed price 

contracts with Corn Products Sales Company, are subject to an additional 

disqualifying factor. 

IV

Finding of Fact 12 (b) recites that the respondent had outstanding contracts 

as of April 11, 1952, with unaffiliated purchasers for the sale by respondent of 

dextrose, or refined corn sugar, for delivery within 30 days at the market price 
Page 13 

on the day of shipment, the manufacture of which would require 547,000 bushels 

of corn. On the surface, it would appear that the conclusion expressed with 

respect to the contracts for the sale of starch, syrup, and dextrin also applies 

to the contracts for the sale of dextrose since the pricing provisions are 

identical. However, although these contracts provide for the sale of dextrose 

 

for delivery within 30 days at the market price on the day of shipment, it 

appears from the evidence that the interrelationship between the price of cane 

sugar and dextrose and the pricing peculiarities of the cane sugar industry 

operate to result in fixed-price dextrose contracts. The testimony in this 

proceeding indicates that the market price of dextrose is predictable and is, in 

actuality, fixed for a period of 30 days because dextrose sells at a fixed 

differential below the sugar price and sugar prices are fixed for 30 days ahead. 

While the testimony is not clear as to what happens when sugar prices are 

reduced rather than advanced, upon the evidence in this proceeding, the 

recommendation of the referee that futures purchases against these contracts be 

considered hedges under the act is adopted. The amount of such futures 

purchases to be so considered is determined below. 

V

From Finding of Fact 12 (c) it appears that, on April 11, 1952, the 

respondent had outstanding contracts with its wholly owned subsidiary, Corn 

Products Sales Company, for the sale by respondent to its subsidiary of dextrose 

at a fixed price, the manufacture of which would require 2,007,000 bushels of 

corn. It is complainant's position that the respondent corporation does not 

subject itself to a market risk or hazard when it sells its products at fixed 

prices to a wholly owned subsidiary and that, therefore, such contracts could 

not be the bases for hedges under the act. In the usual case where a processor 

makes a forward sale based upon then existing prices for the commodity, a market 

risk is present because a rise in the price of the raw material after the 

contract is entered into and before the raw material is procured will result in 

a loss to the seller and a gain to the buyer. 

Since the subsidiary is wholly owned by the respondent, the subsidiary's 

profits and losses are those of the respondent. If the price moves against the 

seller, respondent loses, but as the owner of the buyer, it also gains and vice 

versa. There is, then, no risk of price fluctuations which would qualify the 

contracts as the bases for hedging operations exempted from trading limits by 

the act. If this be disregard of the corporate separateness of the sales 

subsidiary, we think it justified. If large companies having wholly owned sales 

subsidiaries can make fixed price contracts with their subsidiaries the grounds 

for hedging, the act's provisions for trading limits would be frustrated by such 

companies. In the field of public law, corporate separateness is often ignored 

 

where recognition of the separate entity in a particular instance would enable 

evasion or circumvention of public law. "It is well settled, however, that the 

corporate entity may be disregarded when failure to do so would enable the 

corporate device to be used to circumvent a statute." Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch et al., 94 F. (2d) 601, 618 (App. D.C. 1939). See also the numerous 

cases cited in Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 45. 

VI

The respondent had outstanding contracts on April 11, 1952, as shown by 

Finding of Fact 12 (d), for the sale by respondent to unaffiliated foreign 

purchasers of starch, syrup, and dextrose at fixed prices, the manufacture of 

which would require 207,000 bushels of corn. The complainant concedes that 

futures purchases against such contracts are hedges under the act. These 

contracts provide for the sale of corn products at fixed prices and consequently 

create a market risk. Therefore, respondent's long futures position should be 

reduced because of such contracts, the amount to be computed below, in 
Page 14 

determining whether respondent's long position exceeded the trading limit 

established by the commission. 

VII

Finding of Fact 12 (e) discloses that the respondent, on April 11, 1952, also 

had outstanding contracts for the sale by respondent to unaffiliated purchasers 

of 41,000,000 pounds of gluten feed and meal for delivery within 30 days at 

fixed prices which would require 3,090,000 bushels of corn to manufacture. 

These sales would appear to be items against which the purchase of corn futures 

would be a hedge under the act. The question remains, however, as to the amount 

of corn futures that may be purchased as a hedge thereon. The respondent 

contends that it should be permitted to classify the entire 3,090,000 bushels of 

corn futures as hedges. The complainant, on the other hand, contends that only 

about 770,000 bushels of corn futures may be so classified because feed and meal 

are corn by-products and represent only about one-fourth of the total products 

derived from the milling of corn. 

The respondent does not claim that it has fixed price commitments for the 

sale of the starch or starch products, but only for the by-products, feed and 

meal, which represent approximately one-fourth of the yield from a bushel of 

corn. Section 4a(3)(B) of the act provides that "there shall be included in the 

amount of any commodity which may be hedged . . . an amount 

 

of such commodity . . . the purchase of which for future delivery would be a 

reasonable hedge against the sale of any product or byproduct of such commodity 

. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] Where futures are purchased as a hedge against a 

sale of the commodity itself, there is no problem as to quantity. Section 4a(3) 

of the act provides that bona fide hedging means the purchase of any commodity 

for future delivery to the extent such purchases are offset by sales of the same 

cash commodity. n9 However, when dealing with the purchase of futures against 

the sale of products or by-products of a regulated commodity, the statute 

contains the qualification as to reasonableness of amount of futures that may be 

purchased as a hedge. The purchase of a given amount of corn futures would be a 

reasonable hedge against the forward sale at fixed prices of all the products of 

such amount of corn, but it is not believed that it would be a reasonable hedge 

against the sale of only a fourth of such products. Where the commodity yields 

different processed products, there would be considerable duplication if each 

product were hedged as if it were the total yield of the commodity processed. 

Since the respondent has a market risk only with respect to one-fourth of the 

3,090,000 bushels of corn, the purchase of corn futures beyond 770,000 bushels 

because of such risk could not be considered a reasonable hedge. This is 

especially so in view of the legislative intent to restrict and define the 

amount of futures that may be purchased as a hedge. The amount of futures 

purchases to be deducted from the respondent's position as hedges because of 

these contracts is computed below. 

n9 Senator Pope, when explaining the bill in the Senate, stated: "The 

important thing in that connection is that on one side or the other of 

these transactions exists a cash commodity, and as the cash commodity is 

necessarily limited in amount, the future trading would be limited to the 

amount of the cash commodity." 80 Cong. Rec. 6161 (1936). See also Hearing 

Before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on H.R. 6772, 74th Cong., 2d 

Sess., 201 (1936). 

VIII

We come next to the respondent's "cerelose operations" described in Finding 

of Fact 14. Cerelose is the respondent's brand name for dextrose. These 

operations consist of the purchase of corn futures against the simultaneous sale 

of raw sugar futures and cottonseed oil futures. It is respondent's position 

that this operation is a reasonable hedge under the act because it insures the 
Page 15 

profit which it expects to realize from its anticipated dextrose production. On 

April 11, 1952, respondent was long 510,000 

 

bushels of December corn futures as against a short September and October 

futures position of 7,000 long tons of raw sugar and 840,000 pounds of 

cottonseed oil, respectively. Respondent's explanation of this transaction is 

that the cost of production of dextrose is determined by the cost of corn, but 

its selling price is determined by the price of refined cane sugar with which it 

competes. In planning future production and sales of dextrose, the respondent 

observes the relationship between the price of cane sugar and the price of corn 

and determines when this relationship is such that if cash corn were obtained 

and manufactured into dextrose, the dextrose could be sold at a fair profit. It 

then buys corn futures in an amount equivalent to its expected dextrose 

production. In the course of producing dextrose, corn oil is derived as a byproduct. There is no corn oil futures market, but corn oil competes with 

cottonseed oil and its price is related to the price of cottonseed oil. 

Accordingly, in order to fix the selling price of corn oil which will be 

produced together with the dextrose, the respondent sells cottonseed oil futures 

in an amount equivalent to its expected corn oil production. All these futures 

operations are conducted simultaneously. 

Respondent appears to be contending that the purchase of the 510,000 bushels 

of corn futures is a reasonable hedge against the anticipated production and 

sale of dextrose and that "the fact that in the dextrose price insurance 

operation other commodities are used does not affect the validity of the 

purchase of corn futures against the sale of corn products as a hedge under the 

Act." Anticipated sales of dextrose, as we have concluded above, do not afford a 

valid basis under the act for classifying futures purchases against such sales 

as hedges. The purchase of corn futures against sales of cottonseed oil futures 

and sugar futures is a straddle and not a hedge. Under section 4 of the act a 

futures purchase of a commodity can be a hedge only against the sale of such

commodity or a product or by-product thereof. Sales of sugar and cottonseed oil 

futures are not sales of the commodity, corn, or products or by-products 

thereof, with respect to which the futures purchases are made. 

IX

We have determined, then, that there exists bona fide hedging under the act 

for corn futures purchases by the respondent (1) against the respondent's sales 

contracts for dextrose described in Finding of Fact 12 (b), (2) against the 

respondent's fixed price sales contracts for starch, syrup and dextrose to 

foreign purchasers 

 

described in Finding of Fact 12 (d), and (3) against the respondent's sales 

contracts for meal and feed described in Finding of Fact 12 (e). Regarding 

547,000 bushels of corn futures purchases as a hedge for the dextrose contracts 

mentioned in Finding of Fact 12 (b) and 207,000 bushels of corn futures 

purchases as a hedge for the contracts mentioned in Finding of Fact 12 (d), 

there is available a total of 754,000 bushels as a hedge against these 

contracts. About one-fourth of the production from a bushel of corn is feed and 

meal so that in addition to serving as hedges for the sales contracts for 

dextrose, starch and syrup, one-fourth of the 754,000 bushels, or 188,500 

bushels, should also serve as a hedge against the respondent's feed and meal 

sales contracts referred to in Finding 12 (e). Deducting these 188,500 bushels 

from 770,000 bushels which is a reasonable hedge for the 41,000,000 pounds of 

feed and meal contracts, leaves 581,500 bushels of futures to be added to the 

754,000 bushels to get the total bushels of corn futures purchases exempt from 

trading limits as hedges. The total is 1,335,500 bushels. Subtracting this 

total from the respondent's net long position on April 11, 1952, of 3,650,000 

bushels gives a result of 2,314,500 bushels or a net long position in excess of 

the trading limit of 2,000,000 bushels. Accordingly as alleged in the 
Page 16 

complaint, the respondent by virtue of its net long position in corn futures on 

April 11, 1952, and thereafter violated section 4a of the act and the order of 

the commission. 

Respondent contends that because the 2,000,000 bushels limit, as here 

interpreted, is the equivalent of the corn requirements of its competitors for 

from 60 days to a year, but of respondent's requirements for less than two 

weeks, the limit discriminates against respondent in violation of the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. It also alleges that because the law 

prescribes no trading limits for sugar futures, limits on corn futures 

unlawfully discriminate against respondent by restricting it while not 

restricting its competitors who sell cane sugar. Even if it were appropriate 

for an agency charged with administering a statute to declare it 

unconstitutional, we would not do so on these grounds. A regulation is not 

unlawful because it may bear more heavily upon one than upon another. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944); Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig 

Refining Company, 338 U.S. 604, 618-619 (1950). "Congress may choose the 

commodities and places to which its regulation shall apply." Currin v. Wallace,

306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939). 

All exceptions, suggestions, objections, arguments, etc., of the respondent 

inconsistent with this decision and order are overruled. 

The sanction authorized by section 6(b) of the act is an order to the 

contract markets requiring such markets to refuse for a specified period all 

trading privileges thereon to a person who has been found to have violated the 

act or any of the rules and regulations thereunder. The act provides for a 

court review of such an order to refuse trading privileges. The matters 

involved in this proceeding present issues upon which honest differences of 

opinion may exist and which have not been settled by court decisions under the 

act. Any sanction, therefore, should be a minimum one. In the light of all the 

circumstances, it is concluded that an order should be issued requiring the 

contract markets to refuse all trading privileges to the respondent for a period 

of one day. 

ORDER

Beginning on the 30th day after the date of this order, all contract markets 

shall refuse all trading privileges thereon to the respondent, Corn Products 

Refining Company, for a period of one day. 

A copy of this decision and order shall be served upon the respondent and 

upon each contract market. 

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