In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-24-00025-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 89th District Court

Wichita County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC89-CV2023-2307

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

Ex parte Adan Chavez
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this appeal from the denial of a pretrial application for habeas relief, 

Appellant Adan Chavez challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to lower the 

bail amounts for his pending murder and deadly-conduct charges, set at $275,000 and 

$25,000, respectively. 

Chavez has complained before to this court that the bail amount on his murder 

charge—previously set by the trial court at $1,000,000—was excessive. See Chavez v. 

State, 671 S.W.3d 775, 779 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.). We agreed with 

Chavez, reversed the trial court’s denial of his bail-reduction request, and remanded 

the case for the trial court to set a reasonable bail. Id. at 791.

On remand, Chavez agreed to have his bail set at $275,000 on the murder 

charge. His deadly-conduct bail amount remained unchanged at $25,000. Chavez 

then filed another habeas petition to further reduce his bail amounts so that they 

totaled no more than $200,000 together. After a bail-reduction hearing, the trial court 

denied him his requested habeas relief. Chavez appeals this denial. We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Chavez is accused of shooting and killing Jorge Gonzalez in a convenience

store parking lot in October 2022, using a high-caliber, high-capacity, semi-automatic 

rifle.

1

 The State has also alleged that, prior to Gonzalez’s killing, Chavez had used the 

1The medical-examiner’s report admitted at the bail-reduction hearing showed 

that Gonzalez had suffered eight gunshot wounds to his head, torso, and arm. 
3

same weapon to shoot at the outside of Gonzalez’s home. We refer the reader to the 

background section of our previous opinion for a more in-depth discussion of the 

facts that precipitated Chavez’s being charged with murder and deadly conduct. See id. 

at 779–81. Here, we will concentrate on the facts relevant to our current 

determination—chiefly, the evidence adduced at the instant bail-reduction hearing.2

Chavez testified that after this court remanded the case on the issue of his

$1,000,000 murder-charge bail, he agreed to have that amount reduced to $275,000, 

making his total bail on both charges $300,000. He said that a bond company had 

requested a $12,000 down payment and $400 per week to cover this new bail amount. 

According to Chavez, this amount was still too high, as he and his family could only 

afford about $8,000 in total—“the same as last time.”

3

 Chavez testified, if released 

from jail, that he could earn up to $1,200 per week as a roofer. Chavez testified that 

he had no money or other assets that he could use to pay for his bail. 

Obtaining release was important to Chavez because he desired to work and 

support his three small children. His mother, five sisters, and five cousins all live in

the area and have said that they would help to ensure that Chavez meets the 

2This evidence includes Chavez’s testimony and sixteen exhibits admitted by 

the State, which include probable-cause affidavits, medical-examiner reports, 

documents related to a pending federal charge against Chavez, and incident reports 

from the jail. Chavez was the only witness at the hearing.

3At the previous bail-reduction hearing, Chavez’s mother testified that the most 

that she and the rest of Chavez’s family could afford to pay a bail bondsman was 

$8,000. See Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 780.
4

conditions of his bond. Chavez assured the trial court that he would follow all bond 

requirements, would have no contact with Gonzalez’s family, and that he did not own 

any firearms. 

On cross-examination, Chavez explained that he had a prior conviction for 

misdemeanor assault of a family member. When asked if the bonding company in 

that case had gone “off [his] bond,” Chavez replied that he could not remember but 

would not be surprised if that had occurred. The State then entered into evidence an

affidavit from Chavez’s former bonding agent who attested that Chavez had failed to 

comply with their bond agreement and who had requested that a warrant be issued for 

his arrest. Chavez then testified that he had a pending federal charge for “smuggling a 

human[:] . . . [i]llegal aliens.”

4

 He conceded that he had violated his bond in the 

federal case by failing to report a change of address and that a warrant was 

outstanding for his arrest. 

Chavez also testified about multiple write-ups that he had received for violating 

jail rules. These incidents, detailed in exhibits entered by the State, included

infractions for throwing a chess piece at a jail officer, unauthorized use of another 

inmate’s information to access a tablet, destruction of jail property for breaking his

inmate ID card, and refusing to comply with jail-staff directives. 

4Hearing exhibits related to this charge show that Chavez was indicted in 

July 2021 for transportation of aliens within the United States. See 8 U.S.C.A.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii).
5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

We review the trial court’s decision in setting a bail amount for an abuse of 

discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 

Ex parte Gomez, 624 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We will not disturb the 

decision if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Ex parte Estrada, 

640 S.W.3d 246, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d). The accused 

has the burden to show that the bail amount is excessive. Gomez, 624 S.W.3d at 576.

Bail’s primary purpose is to assure the defendant’s presence for trial. See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.01; Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1977). In setting bail, the trial court balances the defendant’s presumption of 

innocence and the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s presence at trial. See Ex 

parte Simpson, 77 S.W.3d 894, 896 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (per curiam); Ex 

parte Brown, 959 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).

The trial court’s discretion in setting a bail amount is governed by the following 

statutory criteria:

1. Bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the 

undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be used to make bail an instrument of 

oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was 

committed are to be considered, including whether the offense: (A) is an 

offense involving violence as defined by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

Article 17.03; or (B) involves violence directed against a peace officer.
6

4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be taken upon 

this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and 

the community shall be considered.

6. The criminal history record information for the defendant, including 

information obtained through the statewide telecommunications system 

maintained by the Department of Public Safety and through the public safety 

report system developed under Article 17.021, shall be considered, including 

any acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and any instances 

in which the defendant failed to appear in court following release on bail.

7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a). Other circumstances to be considered 

include the defendant’s work record, family and community ties, length of residency, 

and conformity with the conditions of any previous bond, as well as the existence of 

any outstanding bonds and aggravating circumstances involved in the charged offense.

Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

A defendant’s inability to meet the bail set by the trial court does not 

automatically make the bail amount excessive; “[i]f the ability to make bond in a 

specified amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting bond would be 

completely eliminated, and the accused would be in the unique posture of determining 

what his bond should be.” Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2003, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte Miller, 631 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1982, pet. ref’d)); see Estrada, 640 S.W.3d at 255 (stating that evidence of 

“enormous gap” between what bail appellant’s family said they could afford and what 
7

bail the court set favored reduction in bail but did not demonstrate that the bail was 

excessive). However, as noted, “[t]he power to require bail is not to be used to make 

bail an instrument of oppression.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15.

A defendant’s criminal history can in some cases suggest that the defendant 

would be a danger to the public if released on bail. See, e.g., Ex parte Lovell, 

No. 12-21-00206-CR, 2022 WL 598683, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 28, 2022, no 

pet.) (mem. op, not designated for publication). But the nature of the offense with 

which the defendant is currently charged and the possible sentence are the “primary 

factors” we consider in evaluating a bail decision. Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pets. ref’d).

III. DISCUSSION

A. CHAVEZ’S BAIL AMOUNTS NOT EXCESSIVE

As we explain below, Chavez has not carried his burden to prove that his bail 

amounts are excessive.

1. Nature of the Offense and Potential Sentence

Chavez is charged with murder and deadly conduct. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§§ 19.02(b) (murder), 22.05(b) (deadly conduct). Murder is a first-degree felony that 

carries a potential sentence of imprisonment for 5 to 99 years or life. Id. §§ 12.32(a),

19.02(c). Murder is also “an offense involving violence as defined by Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure Article 17.03”—a fact that courts are to consider when making 

bail determinations. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.03(b-3)(2), 17.15(a)(3)(A). 
8

Deadly conduct as charged against Chavez is a third-degree felony that carries a 

potential sentence of imprisonment between 2 and 10 years. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 12.34(a), 22.05(e).

There is no doubt that the alleged offenses were grave and violent. Chavez is 

alleged to have used a high-caliber, high-capacity rifle to shoot the victim’s house and 

then to have used that same weapon in a public setting to shoot the victim eight 

times, killing him. And the potential for a life sentence amplifies the importance of 

setting the bail amount sufficiently high to secure Chavez’s appearance at trial. See id.

art. 17.15(1); Scott, 122 S.W.3d at 869 (recognizing that the prospect of a lengthy

prison sentence might lead a defendant to not appear at trial). 

These factors weigh strongly in favor of a reasonably high bail amount.

2. Ability to Make Bail

Chavez testified that his bail amounts are still too high for him and his family 

to afford, even after they were reduced—by agreement—from $1,025,000 in total to 

$300,000. He said that a bonding company was seeking a $12,000 down payment but 

that he and his family could come up with only $8,000. 

In our 2023 opinion, we held that Chavez had “offered evidence that there was

an ‘enormous gap between what bail . . . he could afford and what bail the trial court 

actually set.’” Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 790 (cleaned up) (quoting Estrada, 640 S.W.3d at 

255). At that time, Chavez’s mother testified that the family could afford to pay only 

$8,000 to a bondsman but that Chavez’s $1,000,000 murder bail alone would have 
9

required them to pay $100,000. There is little question that $92,000 is an enormous 

gap. 

But the situation has changed for Chavez. Knowing how much he and his 

family could afford to pay a bondsman, he agreed to lower his total bail amount to 

$300,000. And the difference between what they can afford—$8,000—and the downpayment amount now needed for the bondsman—$12,000—does not constitute an 

enormous gap. At best, in light of these new facts, Chavez’s stated inability to make 

bail weighs only nominally in favor of a reduced bail amount.

3. Future Safety of Victim, Law Enforcement, and Community

Chavez testified that he did not own any firearms and that, if released, he 

would have no contact with the victim’s family. No evidence was adduced at the 

hearing to show a particular threat to the victim’s family or law enforcement if Chavez 

was released. 

However, the nature of Chavez’s violent offenses committed in public settings

raises a generalized concern for the community’s safety. See Ex parte Hanson, No. 02-

22-00045-CR, 2022 WL 1496533, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2022, no 

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that a murder charge raises a 

generalized safety concern).

Thus, on this record, this factor does not weigh substantially for or against a 

high bail amount.
10

4. Criminal History and Bail Compliance

The evidence showed that Chavez has a prior conviction for misdemeanor 

assault of a family member and a pending federal charge for transportation of illegal 

aliens and that he had violated his bond in both of those cases. It also indicated that 

Chavez had violated jail rules several times, including by throwing an object at a jail 

staffer. 

This factor weighs in favor of a high bail amount, particularly one high enough 

to ensure Chavez’s appearance at trial given that he has shown an inability to comply 

with bond conditions in the past.

5. Ties to the Community And Citizenship

Chavez has strong ties to the community. He has many family members in the 

area, including his mother, five sisters, numerous cousins, and three small children. In 

our previous opinion, we noted that Chavez is a United States citizen who was born 

in Texas and has worked locally since he was a teenager. See Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 

789. No evidence was adduced at the hearing to contradict these strong ties or to 

indicate that Chavez has ties elsewhere that would make him a flight risk.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a lower bail amount.

6. Not Used As Instrument of Oppression

In light of these factors, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Chavez’s habeas request for reduced bail. The nature of his

alleged offenses and possible sentence—which are the “primary” factors we are to 
11

consider—weigh heavily in favor of a reasonably high amount. See Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 

at 506. Additionally, his criminal history, past bond violations, and the recent 

reduction of his bail to an agreed-upon amount show that his bail is not being used as 

an instrument of oppression but, rather, to ensure his appearance at trial. See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(2). And Texas courts considering bail amounts in 

similar cases have routinely upheld amounts comparable to those in Chavez’s case. 

See Ex parte Reyes-Martinez, 653 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.)

(affirming $50,000 and $300,000 bail amounts for aggravated-assault and 

felony-murder charges); Ex parte McBride, No. 12-07-00241-CR, 2007 WL 4216370, at 

*2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 30, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (affirming $250,000 bail amount for murder charge and collecting cases); 

Ex parte Landry, 936 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (affirming 

$300,000 bail amount for murder charge).

B. CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY REPORT

1. Damon Allen Act and Gayosso

Though neither party raised it as an issue with the trial court or on appeal, the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) recently explained that it is imperative for an

appellate court—in effectuating its duty to consider the complete record on appeal—

to determine whether a trial court considered an Article 17.021 public safety report5in 

5An Article 17.021 public safety report must contain a number of items for a 

criminal defendant, including his identifying information; eligibility for a personal 
12

making a bail determination. See Ex parte Gayosso, No. PD-0513-23, 2023 WL 

8440099, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2023). 

The Damon Allen Act requires that a “magistrate considering the release on 

bail of a defendant charged with an offense punishable as a Class B misdemeanor” or 

higher must order the preparation of a public safety report. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 17.022(a). The magistrate is then required to “consider the public safety 

report before setting bail.” Id. art. 17.022(d)(1). 

In Gayosso, the intermediate appellate court contended that it need not be 

concerned with whether the Damon Allen Act applied to its case because the record 

made it clear that the trial court considered the appellant’s criminal history and 

because no argument had been raised on appeal that the trial court had failed to 

consider the public safety report. 2023 WL 8440099, at *2. The CCA disagreed, 

explaining that

an appellate court must consider the complete record that was before the 

trial court in determining whether the bail determination was an abuse of 

discretion. If the trial court did not consider the public safety report 

required by statute, then it erred, though the court of appeals might be 

able to consider the issues of preservation and harm. If the trial court 

did consider the public safety report required by statute, it was error for 

the court of appeals to not review the report.

Id. 

bond; “information regarding the applicability of any required or discretionary bond 

conditions;” and a summary of his criminal history, which includes previous 

convictions, pending charges, previous sentences of confinement, notation of certain

violent crimes, and previous bond failures. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.021.
13

2. Trial Court Erred By Not Considering Report

Because we could not determine from the record whether the trial court had 

considered the public safety report before setting Chavez’s bail, we abated this appeal

for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue. See Ex 

parte Delong, No. 02-23-00322-CR, 2024 WL 725111, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Feb. 22, 2024, no pet. h.) (abating for same reason). Specifically, we asked the trial 

court to provide findings about (1) whether it had considered the public safety report;

(2) if so, whether the report still existed or had been destroyed; (3) if the report had

been considered, any information in the report on which the trial court had relied in 

making its decision; and (4) any other information on which the trial court had relied 

in making its decision.

The trial court responded to our abatement order, finding that it had not 

considered a public safety report in determining Chavez’s bail. The trial court 

explained that its determination had been based on

• All testimony and evidence presented at the bail-reduction hearing;

• The trial court’s determination that Chavez’s testimony was not credible

regarding whether he would appear at trial, maintain employment, and follow 

bail conditions;

• Chavez’s criminal history, which included a prior family-violence conviction 

and “all of the circumstances related to his pending federal charge for 

smuggling illegal aliens”;

• The fact that Chavez had a history of violating prior bond conditions;
14

• The fact that Chavez had received multiple disciplinary violations while in jail;

• The “violent and dangerous circumstances” of the alleged offenses; and

• The fact that Chavez had “agreed to a cumulative bail of $300,000 for his 

charges before later deciding to contest the agreed-upon amount.” 

We hold that it was error for the trial court not to consider the public safety 

report. However, as we will explain, this error was not preserved for our review and 

was also harmless. See Gayosso, 2023 WL 8440099, at *2 (explaining that appellate

court may consider the issues of preservation and harm in reviewing such error); 

Delong, 2024 WL 725111, at *8 (holding that failure to consider report was harmless 

error).

3. Error Not Preserved

To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial 

court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if 

not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); 

Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Further, the party 

must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or object to the trial 

court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Because it is a systemic requirement, this court should 

independently review error preservation, and we have a duty to ensure that a claim is 
15

properly preserved in the trial court before we address its merits. Dixon, 595 S.W.3d 

at 223. 

Because Chavez has never complained (in the trial court or on appeal) that the 

trial court failed to consider a public safety report, we hold that the issue has not been

preserved for our review. 

4. Harmless Error

Even if the error had been preserved and raised on appeal, it would have been 

harmless to Chavez. In Delong, we set forth the applicable harm analysis:

[W]e disregard the trial court’s error if it did not affect [the appellant’s]

substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Analogizing this situation 

to one in which the trial court has failed to consider a presentence 

investigation report in assessing punishment, we will assess the effect 

that the trial court’s error had on its bail decision by considering the 

entire record, the nature of the evidence supporting the bail decision, the 

character of the error (i.e., the failure to consider the information in a 

mandatory report before making a bail decision), and how the error 

might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. See 

Yarbrough v. State, 57 S.W.3d 611, 619 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. 

ref’d); see also Bates[ v. State], [No. 02-20-00114-CR,] 2021 WL 1229962, at 

*3 [(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 1, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication)].

Delong, 2024 WL 725111, at *8. 

We have already discussed in detail the evidence before the trial court at the 

bail-reduction hearing and why that evidence supported its decision. The trial court 

had Chavez’s identifying information even without the public safety report. The 

report would have stated to the trial court whether Chavez was eligible for a personal 

bond, but there was no dispute as to Chavez’s bond eligibility. If Chavez had been 
16

ineligible for some reason, that information would have only harmed him. We know 

that the trial court considered Chavez’s criminal history and prior bond failures; the 

omission from the record of additional criminal history or bond failures that might 

have appeared in the report would only have benefitted him.

In other words, the trial court had from other sources most of the information

that would have appeared in the public safety report. And if there was any

information missing from the trial court’s consideration that would have appeared in 

the report, Chavez stood only to benefit from those omissions. See id. Accordingly, 

we hold that—even if Chavez had properly preserved the error or if it was not 

required to have been preserved—the trial court’s failure to consider the public safety 

report did not affect Chavez’s substantial rights. See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Chavez’s requested

habeas relief.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 21, 2024