## NO S

. 12

- 21

- 00215

- CR 12

- 21

- 00216

- CR

IN THE COUR T OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS

PATRICK DELANE JOHNSON , APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEX AS , APPELLEE §

§

§ APPEAL S FROM THE 114TH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMO RANDUM OPINI ON Patrick D elane Johnson appeals his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and continuous violence against the family . In three issues, Appe llant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court ’ s judgment, the trial court erred in fa iling sua sponte to submit a charge on the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint, and the assessment of c ourt costs is improper . We mo dify and affirm as modified.

B ACKGROUND Appellant was charged by separate indictment s with the aggravated kid napping of Shannen Marvels and continuous violence against the family and pleaded “not guilty” to each charge. T he matter proceeded to a jury trial, following which the jury found Appellant “guilty” of both offenses. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on punishment. Ultimately, the jury assessed Appellant ’ s punishment at imprisonment for life for aggravated kidn apping and imprisonment for te n years for continuous violence against the family. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this ap peal followed.2 E VIDENTIARY S UFFICIENCY In his first issue, Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial
court ’ s judgment for aggravated kidnapping. Specifically, Appellant contends that there is no evidence that “ he acted wi th the specific intent of abduction.” Standard of Review and Governing Law The Jackson v. Virginia 1 legal sufficiency standard is the only st andard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each eleme nt of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v

. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 315

– 16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786

– 87; s ee also Escobedo v. State , 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.

– San Antonio 1999, pet. ref ’ d). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable do ubt. See Jackson , 443 U. S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State , 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson , 8 71 S.W.2d at 186. A jury is free to beli eve all or any part of a witness ’ s testimony or disbelieve all or any part of that testimony. See Lee v. State , 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff ’ d , 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) . A successful legal suf ficiency challen ge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing
court. See Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 41

– 42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217

– 18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct ev idence in establishing gu ilt, and circums tantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State , 521 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State , 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 1)). Each fact need not point directly a nd independently to the guilt of the appellant, provided that the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2007). Juries are pe rmitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted

1 443 U.S. 307, 315

– 16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786

– 87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).3 to reach conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptio ns. Id. An inf erence is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them, while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. I d. at 16. The sufficienc y of the evidenc e is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the l aw, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State ’ s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State ’ s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried.” Id. To support Appellant ’ s conviction f or aggravated ki dnapping as charged , the State was required to prove that he , with the intent either (1) to terrorize or (2) inflict bodily injury , intentionally or knowingly abducted Marvels

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 20.04( a ) (4), (5) (West 2019 )

. As a pplied to this c ase, “ a bduct” means to restrain a person with intent to prev ent her liberation by secreting or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found. See i d. § 20.01(2) (West Supp. 2021 )

. Moreover, for the purposes of our review , “ r e strain” means to restrict a person ’ s movements without consent by confining the person. See id. § 20.01(1). Restraint is “without consent” if it is accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception. Id. § 20.01(1)(A). As the Court of Criminal Appeals has summarized t he elements of the offense of kidnapping, the Stat e must prove ( 1) a restraint made ( 2) with a specific intent to prevent liberation by either of two particular means. Brimage v. Stat e , 918 S.W.2d 466, 475

– 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ; Robins on v. State , 568 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. App.

–Amarillo 2019, no pet.)

. The Evidence In the instant case, the record reflects that on April 8, 2018, Appellant was test driving a truck , while Marvels, his girlfriend, followed him in his vehicle

. Marvels pl anned to purchase a vehicle for Appellant with settlement funds she was to receive from a lawsuit . However, when the matter of Marvels’ s present inability to pay for the truck arose during the test drive, Appellant and Marvels pulled over in the parking l ot of a McDonald ’ s restaurant in Tyler, Texas, where the y began to argue

. There, Appellant pushed, slapped, and choked Marvel , and a bystander contacted police to report the matter

. The two then drove away in the truck Appellant4 had been test driving , bu t soon , they were pulled over by police in response to the bystander ’ s report. However, Marvels told the officer she had not been assaulted or suffered any injur ies , and the officer did not arrest Appellant. The couple returned to McDonald ’ s, where Marve ls retrieved Appel lant ’ s vehicle , and they drove in separate vehicles to a nearby La Quinta Inn where Marvels already had a room

. 2 Once in the hotel room, Appellant , who still was upset, threw Marvels’ s glasses across the room , pushed her on to the bed, an d choked he r with both hands . Marvels testified she pleaded with Appellant to stop choking her and that she believed she was going to die before she eventually lost consciousness. When Marvels regained consciousness , she asked Appellant to let her leave, but Appell ant ref used

. Later, w hen Appellant needed to urinate , he discovered that the layout of the bathroom made it impossible for him to hold onto Marvels’ s arm while standing at the toilet

. As a result, he decided to urinate in the sink where he cou ld maintain his gr ip on her

. Marvels stated that Appellant ’ s tight grip on her arm caused her pain

. Thereafter, Appellant sat in front of the door so Marvels could not leave. While he did so, he smoked a cigarette and threatened to burn Mar vels with the cigarette. When Ma r vels then tol d Appellant she needed to use the restroom , he allowed her to do so . W hile she was in the bathroom, she used her cell phone to call 9

- 1

- 1

. When she exited the bathroom, she showed Appellant that she had call ed for help, and Appellant fled

. Marvels testified that she was in the hotel room against her will with Appellant for between one and one and one

- half hours while Appellant restricted her
movements

–– she was not free to move about as she wanted or to leave the room

. M arvels further tes tified that while she was in the hotel room, she was frightened because she thought Appellant was going to hurt or kill her. After Appellant fled, Marvels went to her ex

- boyfriend ’ s residence on Timber Creek Dr ive in Tyler . Tyler Poli ce Officer Ronnie Freeman met her there and took her statement, in which she described to him the events that transpired between her and Appellant at the hotel

. Freeman testified regarding photographs he took of Marvels ’ s injuries , including bruises on he r neck and arm as well as swelling on her wrist. At trial, Freem an testified that based on her statements and her injuries, he concluded that the choking Marvels endured at the hotel could have killed her.

2 Marvels described herself on the date in question as “ h omeless” and testified that no one other than she and Appellant knew she had rented a room at La Quinta Inn.5 Later that night, Appel lant came to the Timber C reek Drive residen ce . There, he knocked on a window and summoned Marvels to come outside. When she did so, he deflated her car tires. Marvels contacted police

. In a verbal statement made to Tyler Police Officer Daniel Forbey , Appellant denied choking M ar v els earlier tha t day but admitted that he was at the hotel room with Marvels and that he refus ed to let her leave. Discussion Appellant argues that , under the facts of th is case, he committed the offense of unlawful restrain t rather than aggravated k idnapping. 3 More specifically, he argues that there is no evidence that he abducted Marvels because the State did not prove , as charged, that h e intended to prevent her liberation by secreting or holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found since the record reflects that Marvels had a key to the hotel room, opened the door, and let Appellant inside. 4 We disagree. First, the offense of kidnapping does not require that the defendant restrain the victim for
any par ticular period of time. Meg as v. State , 68 S. W.3d 234, 238

– 39 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref ’ d)

. Nor does the offense of kidnapping require that the victim be moved any particular distance. Id

. Furthermore, the fact that a victim initially accompanie s a defendant

v oluntarily into a hotel room does not preclude the possibility that kidnapping subsequently occurred inside the room

. See Anderson v. State , No. 13

- 96

- 124

- CR, 1997 WL 33642798, at *3 (Tex. App.

– Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Au g. 14, 1997, no pet.) (op., not des ignated for public ation) . I f the actor intended at any time during the restraint to secret or hold the victim in a place where she is not likely to be found, the offense is complete

. See Wells v. State , No.

3 Appellant make s no argument that the evidence is insufficient to support specific “aggravating” intent under Section 20.04(a)(4) and (5). See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 20.04(a)(4), (5) (West 2019 ).

4 Appellant notes that in Robinson v. St ate , where the victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant to his apartment, and where the state alleged the intent element of “abduction” under Section 20.01(2) either by appellant ’ s intent to secret and hold or by his use or threat of deadly force , the appel late court only concluded that the evidence was sufficient under the latter , alternative form of intent. See Robinson v. State , 568 S.W.3d 718, 723

– 24 (Tex. App.

– Amarillo 2019, no pet.); see also T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. 20.0 1 (2)( A ), ( B ) (West Supp. 2021 ). T hus, Appellant suggests the court in Robinson apparently had misgivings as to whether the evidence would have been sufficient if, as in this case, the only a l legation was that Appellant ab d ucted Marvels with the intent to secret and hold her in a plac e where she is unlikely to be found. We d isagr ee. In conducting a n evidentiary sufficiency rev iew,
a n appella te court only must analyz e the issue to the extent necessary to reach a final dispo sition of the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.1 . It must do this in a way that is as brief as practicable. See id. I f in its discussion of evidentiary sufficiency, an appellate court declin es to ad dress two alternative means of proving an element of an offense, it does not imply , without more, that the unaddressed element was not supported by sufficient evidence. See id.6 06

- 17

- 00180

- CR, 2018 WL 988412, at *1 (Tex. Ap p.

– Texarkana Feb. 2 1, 2018, pet. ref ’ d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

. The requirement of secreting the victim or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found is a part of the mens rea of the offense, not the actus reus. Kenny v. State , 292 S.W. 3d 89, 95 (Tex. App.

– Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref ’ d); see Brimage , 918 S.W.2d at 475

– 76. Thus, once restraint has been proven, the offense of kidnapping is complete when the actor evidences a specific intent to prevent liberation in this manner. S ee Kenny , 292 S.W.3d at 95. Accordingly, the s tate need not prove the actor accomplish ed a restraint by secretion but only that the actor completed a restraint and evidenced a specific intent to prevent liberation by secretion. See id. Intent can be inf erred from an accused ’ s conduct, remarks, and the surrounding circumstances. See id. Here, the evidence demonstrates that Marvels and Appellant entered a hotel room, which Marvels rented earlier . Marvels , who described herself on the date in question a s “homeless,” testified that no one other than her and Appellant knew that she had rent ed that hotel room. See Megas , 68 S.W.3d at 240 ( proof that victim is kept isolated from anyone who might have been of assistance meets element of se creting or holding in place where victim is not likely to be found );

c f

. Price v. State , 35 S.W.3d 136, 140

– 41 (Tex. App.

– Waco 2000, no pet.) ( jury could infer appellant ’ s intent to hide victim in place where he was unlikely to be found where evidence show ed that appellant c onfined victim in appellant ’ s hotel room ). Once they were in the room, Appellan t became so upset that he threw Marvels ’ s glasses across the room, pushed her onto the bed, and choked her until she lost consciousness . When she regained c onsciousness, he he ld her forcefully by the arm inside the room for a period of time , and, thereaft er, sat in front of the door while threatening to burn Marvels with cigarettes and refusing to let her leave the room for an additional period of time. Base d on our review of the record, we conclude that there was ample evidence to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant , with the intent either (1) to terrorize or (2) inflict bodily injury, intentionally or knowingly abducted Marvels

– – that is, he restri ct ed her movements without her consent by confining her with the intent to p revent her liberation by secreting or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found because he isolated her from anyone who might be of assistance

. See T EX

. P ENAL C OD E A NN

. § § 20.01(1), (2),7 20.04( a ) (4), (5) ; Megas , 68 S.W.3d at 240 . Therefo re, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court ’ s judgment. Appellant ’ s first issue is overruled.

L ESSER - I NCLUDED O FFENSE In his second issue, A ppellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sua sponte failing to submit an instruction in its charge on the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint. Standard of Review and Governing Law The trial judge has an abs olute sua sponte du ty to prepare a jury charge that accurately sets out the law appl icable to the specific offense charged. Oursbourn v. State , 259 S.W.3d 159, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We review alleged jury charge error in two steps

–– we first determi ne whether error ex ists, and, if so, we then evaluate whether sufficient harm result ed from the error to require reversal. Price v. State , 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Ngo v. State , 175 S.W.3d 738, 743

– 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Joshua v. S tate , 507 S.W.3d 86 1, 863

– 64 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet). The degr ee of harm required for reversal depends on whether the jury charge error was preserved in the trial court. Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (o p. on reh ’ g) (setti ng forth analysis for determining whether jury charge error requi res reversal). If the jury charge error properly has been preserved by an objection or request for instruction, reversal is required if the appellant has suffered “some ha rm” from the error. Vega v. State , 394 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Barrios v. State , 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). When , as here, the defendant fails to object or states that he has no objection to the charge, we will not re verse for jury char ge error unless the record shows the defendant suffered egregious harm. See Ngo , 175 S.W.3d at 743

– 44. Thus, in considering Appellant ’ s issues, we first must determine if there was error in the charge. See Joshua , 507 S.W.3d at 864. Only if we find err or do we address whether Appellant was harmed sufficiently to req uire reversal. Id. The trial court shall “deliver to the jury . . . a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case [and] not expressing any opini on as to the weight of the evidence[.]”
T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 36.14 (West 2007). A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser

- included offense if (1) the lesser offense is “included within the proof necessary to establish the offense charge d,” and (2) there i s “some evidence in the record that if the defendant8 is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense.” And erson v. State , 125 S.W.3d 729, 730 (Tex. App.

– Texarkana 2003, no pet. ) (citing Royster v. State , 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Cri m. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) )

. The elements of aggravated kidnapping are set forth above. A person commits the offense of unlawfu l restraint if the person intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. Id. § 20.02(a) (West 2019 )

. Unlawful restraint is a lesser

- includ ed offense of aggravated kidnapping. Id

. (citing Schweinle v. State , 915 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) )

. Accordingly, Appellant has satisfied the first prong of the Royster test. The question remaining is whether a reasonable ju ry, looking at all the evidence, could have found the evidence established Appellant ’ s guilt of only unlawful restraint, to the exclusion of the aggravated kidnapping charge, as required under the second prong of the Royster test. B oth restraint and abduct ion require the res triction of the victim ’ s movements. See Anderson , 125 S.W.3d at 730. The statutory distinction between “abduct” and “restrain” in this case is to be that the former requires the additional proof that the defendant intended to secret or hold the victim in a place where she is not likely to be found. See id. In applying Royster ’ s second prong, “the trial cou rt should make a determination as to whether the evidence of the lesser offense would be sufficient for a jury rationally to find t hat the defendant i s guilty only of that offense and not the greater offense.” Anderson , 125 S.W.3d at 731. “In determining whether the trial court erred in failing to give a charge on a lesser

- included offense, all of the evidence must be considered.” Id. “A jury, as tr ier of fact, is entitled to believe all or part of the conflicting testimony proffered and intr oduced by either side.” Id. “Furthermore, a jury can selectively believe all or part of the evidence admitted at trial.” Id. However, it i s not enough that t he jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some e vidence directly germane to a lesser

- included offense for the fact finder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is wa rranted. Id. Disc ussion In the instant case, we must consider if there is evidence in the record that if Appell ant is guilty, he only is guilty of unlawful restraint. Thus, there must be evidence of record that would allow the jury to conclude that App ellant never intend ed to prevent Marvels ’ s liberation by secretion. See , e.g. , Kenny , 292 S.W.3d at 95. This can be inferred from an accused ’ s conduct, remarks, and the surrounding circumstances. Cf. id.9 Appellant argues that the jury could infer his l ack of specific int ent because there is no evidence that he forced Marvels to rent the hotel room, forced her to open the door, or forced her to let him inside the room. However, as noted previously, the fact that a victim initially accompanie s a defendan t voluntarily into a hotel room does not preclude the possibility that kidnapping subs equently occurred inside the room

. See Anderson , 1997 WL 33642798, at *3

. Appe llant ’ s argument further does not consider that the jury reasonably could have determined that he formed the requisite intent after he was in the room with Marvels. See Wells , 2018 WL 988412, at *1

. Appellant has not cited , nor has our review of the record revealed, any evidence that supports the finding that Appellant intentionally restraine d Marvels but did n ot do so with the intent to isolate her in the hotel room fro m anyone who might be of assistance to her. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. 20.02(a) ; see also Megas , 68 S.W.3d at 240. Thus, we conclude that since there was no evidence that would allow the jury rat ionally to find that Appellant , if guilty, only was guilty of unlawful restraint, he was not entitled to an instruction on th is lesser

- included offense. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sua spont e declining to subm it an instruction in its charge for the lesser

- included offense of unlawful restraint. Appellant ’ s second issue is overruled.

C OURT C OSTS In his third issue, Appellant argues that the $ 251.50 in court costs should be deleted from the j udgment of convict ion for continu ous violence against the family because that case and his aggravated kidnapping case were tried together. The State agrees. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review the assessment of court costs on appeal to dete rmi ne if there is a b asis for the cost, not to determine if there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each cost, and traditional Jackson v. Virginia evidentiary

- sufficiency principles do not apply. Johnson v. State , 423 S.W.3d 385, 389

– 90 (T ex. Crim. App. 2014). Appellant need not have objected at trial to raise a claim challenging the bases of assessed costs on appeal. Johnson , 423 S.W.3d at 391. Court costs may not be assessed against a criminal defendant for which a cost is not expressl y p rovided by law. S ee T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 103.002 (West 2018). When a trial court improperly includes amounts in assessed court costs, the proper appellate remedy is to10 reform the judgment to delete the improper fees. Cates v. State , 402 S. W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. C rim. App. 2013). “In a sing le criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses or of multiple counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court cost or fee only once against the defendant.” T EX

. C O DE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. a rt. 102.073(a) (West 2018 ). For purposes of this rule, a person convicted of two or more offenses in the same trial or plea proceeding is convicted of those offenses in a “single criminal action.” Hurlburt v. State , 506 S.W.3d 199, 2 01

– 04 (Tex. App.

– Waco 2016, no pet.). Generally, the cost should be assessed in the case with the highest category offense or, when the convictions are for the same category of offense and the costs are the same, the costs should be assessed in the case w ith the lowest trial court cause number. See Shul er v. State , No. 05

- 20

- 00386

- CR, 2022 WL 99997, at *5 (Tex. App.

– Dallas Jan. 11, 2022, no pet.) ( op., not designated for publication). Discussion Here, appellant was charged by separate indictments with agg ravated kidnapping (c ause number 114

- 1208

- 19) and continuous violence against the family (cause number 114

- 1209

- 19)

. T he cases were prosecuted together in a single jury trial. Aggravated kidnapping is a higher category of offense than continuous violence against the family. Compare T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A

NN

. § 20.0 4(c) with T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 25.11(e) (West Supp. 2021 ). The costs assessed in the bill of costs in c ause number 114

- 1208

- 19 is $ 251.50

. The costs assessed in the bill of costs in c ause number 1 14

- 1209

- 19 also is $ 2 51.50

. Both judgments likewise provide for the assessment of court costs in the same amounts

. Additionally, the judgments each contain a document entitled “Attachment A

- Order to Withdraw Funds, ” which provides for the withdrawal o f funds from Appellan t ’ s inmate trust account of court costs, fees and/or fine s incurred in the amount of $251.50. We agree with the parties that court costs should not h ave been assessed against A ppellant in cause number 114

- 1209

- 19

. Therefore, we will m odify the judgment , A ttachment A, and bill of costs in cause number 114

- 1209

- 19 to remove the assessment of court costs. See Cates , 402 S.W.3d at 252 ; see also Foley v. State , No. 12

- 20

- 00017

- CR, 2021 WL 4898457, at *6 (Tex. App.

– Tyler Oct. 20, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., no t designated for publication) (modifying bill of costs by deleting improperly assessed fee). Appellant ’ s third issue is sustained.11 D ISPOSI TION We have sustained Appellant ’ s third issue

. H aving done so, we modify the judgment , Attac hment A, and bill of c osts in cause number 114

- 1209

- 19 to reflect that the total amount of court costs assessed is $0.00. Having overruled Appellant ’ s first and second issues, we affirm the trial court ’ s judgment in that cause as modified and af firm the trial court ’ s judgment in cause number 114

- 1208

- 19 in its entire ty
.

G REG N EELEY Justice Opinion delivered August 17 , 2022. Panel consisted of Worthen, C. J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

( DO NOT PUBLISH )

## COURT OF A PPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

AUGUST 17 , 2022

NO. 12

- 21

- 00215

- CR

PATRICK DELANE JOHNSON , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS , Appellee

Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114

- 1208

- 19 )
T H IS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and brief s filed herein, and the same bei ng considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the cour t below be in all things affirmed , and that this decision be certified to the court below fo r observance. Greg Neeley , Justice

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

J U DGMENT

AUGUST 17 , 2022

NO. 12

- 21

- 0021 6

- CR

PATRICK DELANE JOHNSON , Appellant V. THE STAT E OF TE XAS , Appellee

Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114

- 120 9

- 19 ) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record an d the brief s filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the court below should be modified and as modified, affirmed.
I t is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
to Attachment A, a n d bill of costs in cause number 114

- 1209

- 19 of the court below be modifie d to reflect that t he total amount of court costs assessed is $0.00 ; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed ; and that this decision be certified to the co u rt below for observance

. Greg Neeley , Justice

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., a nd Neeley, J.