2020 IL App (1st) 160327-UB

No. 1-16-0327 

December 28, 2020 

First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RONALD SMITH, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 99 CR 15711 

Honorable 

Vincent M. Gaughan, 

Judge, presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hyman and Pucinski concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s denial of defendant’s pro se motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition is reversed and remanded for further proceedings where 

defendant presented a colorable claim of actual innocence.

¶ 2 Following a 2001 jury trial, defendant Ronald Smith was found guilty of first-degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1998)) and sentenced to 35 years in prison. In 2015, defendant 

filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging actual innocence 

based on newly discovered evidence that (1) Darrell Harris, a newly discovered eyewitness, 
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observed defendant standing down the street from the victim at the time of the murder, and (2) 

defendant’s signed, written statement was a product of police coercion. The circuit court denied 

leave to file the successive petition. We affirmed, finding that defendant failed to present a 

colorable claim of actual innocence because Harris’s affidavit did not raise the probability that a 

reasonable jury would not convict defendant considering the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 

See People v. Smith, 2019 IL App (1st) 160327-U, ¶ 46. 

¶ 3 On September 30, 2020, our supreme court denied a petition for leave to appeal filed by 

defendant but directed this court to vacate our judgment and reconsider the matter in light of People 

v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, to determine whether a different result was warranted. See People 

v. Smith, No. 124963 (Ill. Sept. 30, 2020) (supervisory order). After reconsideration, we conclude 

that defendant has presented a colorable claim of actual innocence. Therefore, we reverse the 

circuit court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings under the Act. 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 We recount the background of the case only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues 

on appeal. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his oral and written 

statements to police. Defendant argued that he only signed a written statement because the police 

told him that he could go home if he did so. Defendant further contended that he was not informed 

of his Miranda rights prior to interrogation and that he was unable to understand his Miranda

rights “due to [his] physical, physiological, mental, education, and/or psychological state, capacity, 

and condition.” 

¶ 6 At a pretrial hearing on the motion, Chicago police detective David Wright testified that 

he was present when defendant signed the handwritten statement on June 14, 1999. Wright stated 
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that defendant had been advised of the Miranda rights before an earlier interview that day and that, 

prior to defendant signing the written statement, Assistant State’s Attorney John O’Grady 

readvised him of his rights. Wright had no difficulty communicating with defendant, and defendant 

did not indicate that he was unable to understand his rights on either occasion. Wright did not hear 

anyone tell defendant that he could go home if he signed a confession. 

¶ 7 O’Grady also testified that he advised defendant of the Miranda rights, which defendant 

stated he understood, and that he had no difficulty communicating with defendant. O’Grady denied 

hearing anyone tell defendant he could go home if he signed a confession.

¶ 8 Defendant testified that he turned himself in at a police station upon hearing that Detectives 

Wright and James Sanchez were looking for him. At the police station, defendant met with Sanchez 

after waiting about five minutes. Sanchez took defendant to an interview room, locked the door, 

and left without providing the Miranda warning to him. Wright came in about 30 minutes later 

and told defendant that the police “wanted [him] as a witness and [he] would be out of there in no

less than four or five hours.” Wright proceeded to interview defendant for about 30 minutes 

without reading him the Miranda rights. Approximately “thirty minutes to an hour” after the 

interview, Sanchez came in to “check on” defendant and asked him “if [he] needed a cigarette or 

something.” O’Grady arrived “a couple of hours after” Sanchez and conducted two separate 

interviews with defendant. During the first conversation, which lasted “[n]o longer than twenty 

minutes,” O’Grady did not advise defendant of the Miranda rights. Defendant asked O’Grady 

when he would be able to leave, and O’Grady replied, “don’t worry about it, we’ll get you out of 

here as quick as we can.” Defendant offered to write down “exactly what happened,” but O’Grady 

rejected the offer because he wanted all the witness statements to “coincide together.” 
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¶ 9 Defendant next spoke with O’Grady “about an hour or two” later while Sanchez and 

Wright were present. None of the individuals Mirandized defendant. O’Grady presented defendant 

with a piece of paper and explained again that all the witnesses in the case were required to sign a 

statement and that “they had to all coincide.” Defendant testified that he signed the written 

statement in multiple places “[b]ecause I thought I was a witness.” He did not read the statement

before signing it because O’Grady was “covering it up.” Defendant asked if he could read the 

statement, but O’Grady refused. 

¶ 10 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. In so ruling, the court found that the 

State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was advised of the Miranda

rights, and that he was not told that he could go home if he signed a confession. 

¶ 11 The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Deborah Dean testified that, at about 3:15 p.m. 

on June 10, 1999, she and her fiancé, Arnett Williams, walked from their apartment to the corner 

of Walnut Street and St. Louis Avenue. There, they encountered three men—defendant, Tony 

“Four-Tone” McGruder, and Albert “BD” Johnson—whom they knew from previous drug 

transactions. Williams owed drug debts to all three men and repaid all but $5 of what he owed to 

McGruder. Dean and Williams returned to the corner of Walnut and St. Louis around 8 p.m. and 

purchased crack cocaine from the three men. They went back to the corner again around 1:30 a.m. 

and attempted to purchase more crack cocaine on credit. When they arrived, defendant, McGruder, 

and Johnson were playing dice and drinking bottles of beer. As Williams was talking to Johnson, 

McGruder “jumped into the conversation” and yelled at Williams about the $5 he owed. Defendant 

also yelled at Williams, claiming that he owed him money as well. McGruder and Williams 

exchanged punches before Williams pulled out a box cutter and “grazed” McGruder. McGruder 
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screamed “this bitch, he scratched me. I’m going to kill this mother f***.” Williams ran away as 

McGruder and defendant threw beer bottles at him. When Williams slipped and fell, McGruder hit

him in the head with a bottle. Then, defendant and McGruder kicked Williams as he lay on the 

ground. 

¶ 12 Dean and Williams fled to their apartment. Upon discovering that Dean lost her keys, 

Williams retraced his steps in search of them while Dean waited in front of the apartment. Dean 

next saw Williams as defendant and McGruder were chasing him toward the apartment. When 

Williams fell to the ground, McGruder punched his lower body and defendant kicked and punched

his upper body and head. Johnson tried to pull McGruder off Williams but was unsuccessful. 

Johnson walked away toward Fulton Street. Dean saw McGruder “jab” Williams three times,

although she did not actually see a weapon. Defendant and McGruder then fled. 

¶ 13 Johnson’s testimony was virtually identical to Dean’s. In addition, Johnson testified that 

he heard McGruder say, “[H]e cut me. I’m going to kill this mother f***” after the first encounter 

with Williams. Johnson was standing on the corner of St. Louis and Walnut when Williams 

returned about five minutes later. Defendant and McGruder grabbed beer bottles out of a trash can, 

and McGruder said, “He cut me, I’m fitting to kill him.” Defendant and McGruder chased 

Williams, both throwing beer bottles at him as he ran. Johnson watched the chase from near the 

alley between Fulton and Walnut. When Williams slipped and fell, defendant kicked and punched 

his “face and chest” while McGruder kicked and punched his lower body. Johnson ran over, 

grabbed McGruder’s arm, and told him to “chill out,” but McGruder pushed him away. As 

defendant continued to beat Williams, McGruder pulled out a pocketknife and stabbed Williams

two or three times. Johnson fled, and was later apprehended by the police. He was taken to a police 
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station, where he identified a photograph of McGruder. Johnson acknowledged at trial that he was 

on probation for two previous convictions for delivery of a controlled substance, and that he had a 

different possession of a controlled substance case pending in the circuit court. However, he 

testified that the State had not made any threats or promises in exchange for his testimony. 

¶ 14 Sanchez testified that he and Wright interviewed defendant at the police station on June 

13, 1999. Before questioning defendant, Sanchez read him the Miranda rights. After reading each 

right, Sanchez asked defendant if he understood, and defendant responded affirmatively. Sanchez 

and defendant then had a “20 to 30 minutes” conversation during which defendant admitted to 

punching, kicking, and throwing beer bottles at Williams after they argued about Williams’s drug 

debt. Defendant, Johnson, and McGruder then went back to their dice game, during which 

McGruder told defendant that “if Mr. Williams came back and he was able to catch him he was 

going to kill him.” When Williams returned, defendant and McGruder chased him and threw beer 

bottles at him. Williams fell to the ground and defendant kicked and punched his upper body. 

McGruder pulled a knife and stabbed Williams. Defendant then fled. 

¶ 15 O’Grady testified that, on the night of June 13, 1999, he traveled to the police station to 

interview defendant. With Wright present, O’Grady explained to defendant that he was a 

prosecutor, and informed him of the Miranda rights. Defendant stated that he understood each 

right and told O’Grady about his involvement in Williams’s murder. O’Grady then had Wright 

leave the room so that he could talk to defendant alone. O’Grady asked defendant how the police 

had treated him. Defendant replied that they were treating him “fine,” and had given him bathroom 

breaks, cigarettes, and soda. They did not threaten him or make him any promises. 
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¶ 16 O’Grady talked to defendant again “[a] few hours later” while Wright was present. 

O’Grady told defendant that he wanted to memorialize his earlier statement and explained the 

options for doing so. O’Grady offered to hand write a summary of defendant’s earlier statement, 

allow him to make any changes, and then choose whether he wanted to sign it. Alternatively, 

O’Grady offered to bring in a court reporter to transcribe defendant’s words verbatim, from which 

he could make revisions. Lastly, O’Grady stated that “the third option would be that we would just 

leave it as the oral statement he had already given me.” Defendant replied that he wanted to do the 

handwritten option. O’Grady obtained a blank statement form with preprinted Miranda warnings 

at the top. Defendant read part of the Miranda warnings out loud to prove that he could read. 

O’Grady then wrote a “summary” of defendant’s earlier statement while defendant was 

“reminding [him] or prompting [him]” about what to write. Defendant and O’Grady reviewed the 

written statement line by line, and defendant made several revisions. Defendant, O’Grady, and 

Wright initialed by the revisions and signed each page of the statement. 

¶ 17 O’Grady read the statement to the jury. Before the handwritten portion, the preprinted 

Miranda rights section read: 

“I understand I have the right to remain silent and that anything I say can be used 

against me in a court of law. I understand that I have the right to talk to a lawyer and have 

him present with me during questioning. And if I cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will 

be appointed by the court to represent me before any questioning. Understanding these 

rights, I wish to give a statement. Ronald Smith. 

After being advised and stating that he understood his constitutional rights, and 

after being advised and stating that he understood that John O’Grady is an assistant state’s 
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attorney, a prosecutor, a lawyer, and not his lawyer, [defendant] states that he wants to give 

his statement, which is in summary and not in word-for-word form.” 

¶ 18 The handwritten portion stated that defendant, McGruder, and Johnson were playing dice 

when Dean and Williams approached them and asked to purchase crack cocaine on credit. 

Williams became upset when he was denied, and McGruder and defendant argued with him. 

McGruder and Williams “started swinging fists at each other,” and Williams pulled out a box cutter 

and cut McGruder. Williams fled, and defendant and McGruder chased him with beer bottles in 

hand. They threw the bottles at Williams, caught up to him, and kicked him as he lay on the ground. 

Williams got up and ran away, and the others went back to their dice game. 

¶ 19 After Williams left, McGruder stated that “he was going to kill [Williams] if he was able 

to catch [him].” Williams returned, and defendant and McGruder grabbed more beer bottles and 

chased him. When Williams slipped and fell, defendant and McGruder kicked him in the head and 

threw bottles at him. McGruder then pulled out a knife and stabbed Williams. Defendant fled. 

¶ 20 The statement concluded: 

“[Defendant] states that he has been treated find [sic] by the police and Assistant 

State’s Attorney O’Grady. [Defendant] states he has only been here since the early evening 

and he has been allowed to use the bathroom whenever he wanted. [Defendant] states he 

has had cigarettes to smoke and pop to drink. [Defendant] states he is free from the effects 

of drugs and alcohol and he is giving this statement totally free and voluntarily. 

[Defendant] states nobody has made any threats or promises to him for this

statement. [Defendant] states he was told about the different ways his statement could be 

given. [Defendant] was told th[at] he could give his statement in handwritten form or in a 
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court reported form, or he could leave it as an oral statement only. [Defendant] states he 

has chosen to make a handwritten statement.

[Defendant] states he has read this whole statement and he showed that he can read 

English by reading the first typewritten paragraph of this statement out loud. [Defendant] 

states he has been allowed to make any changes or corrections to this statement that he 

wanted to.” 

¶ 21 Dr. Eupil Choi, a deputy chief medical examiner, testified that Williams’s death was a 

homicide caused by multiple stab wounds. Williams also had abrasions on his head and upper body 

that Choi found were “consistent with someone who has been kicked and punched.” 

¶ 22 At closing, the State argued that defendant was accountable for the murder because he 

“willfully joined in” when McGruder attacked Williams. In response, defense counsel 

acknowledged that defendant chased, kicked, and threw beer bottles at Williams, but argued that 

defendant did not share McGruder’s intent to kill and did not know that he was carrying a knife. 

¶ 23 The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The court denied defendant’s 

motion for new trial, which argued, inter alia, that it erred in denying defendant’s pretrial motion 

to suppress. After a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 35 years in prison. 

¶ 24 On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to adequately explain 

the reasons for its sentencing decision and abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence. 

People v. Smith, No. 1-01-1969 (2002) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

We affirmed. Id.

¶ 25 In April 2003, defendant filed an initial pro se postconviction petition, alleging that he was 

denied effective assistance of counsel, that he was tried for an offense never presented to the grand 
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jury, and that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court 

summarily dismissed the petition, and we denied defendant leave to file a late appeal (People v. 

Smith, No. 1-03-2900 (2003) (dispositional order)). 

¶ 26 Defendant filed a successive postconviction petition in March 2004, asserting, inter alia, 

actual innocence. The claim was based on an affidavit from Dean in which she acknowledged that 

defendant “had something to do with the frist [sic] part of the fright [sic],” but averred that he was 

“[n]ot invol[ved] with the actual killing of Arnett Williams” and “was not the one who cut him.” 

Defendant also attached his own affidavit in which he averred that, on retrial, Dean would “recant” 

her original testimony and “add more detail” to the events described in her affidavit. In April 2004, 

defendant filed a motion to amend his successive petition, which the circuit court denied. On 

appeal, we found that the circuit court had neglected to rule on the successive petition itself, and 

consequently remanded for second stage postconviction proceedings because more than 90 days 

had passed since its filing. People v. Smith, No. 1-04-1774 (2006) (unpublished order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23). On remand, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We 

affirmed the dismissal, and our supreme court denied defendant’s pro se petition for leave to 

appeal. 

¶ 27 In May 2008, defendant filed another pro se motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition in which he alleged actual innocence based on a different affidavit from 

Dean. In this affidavit, Dean averred that defendant was involved in the “first part of the fight” 

wherein he and McGruder “hit and kicked” Williams. Dean and Williams ran home, but upon 

realizing that they had lost their keys, Williams returned to the scene of the fight and reengaged 

with McGruder. During this “second part of the fight,” McGruder stabbed Williams. Defendant 
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was not beating Williams but was “down the street walking toward us to see what had happened” 

because Dean was screaming. McGruder fled on foot, and defendant followed without realizing 

what McGruder had done. The circuit court denied leave to file the successive petition on the 

grounds that Dean’s new affidavit was unlikely to change the result on retrial. We affirmed, finding 

that the affidavit was neither newly discovered nor sufficiently exonerating considering the 

“overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s accountability adduced at trial.” People v. Smith, No. 1-

08-2948 (2010) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 28 In April 2010, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising, 

inter alia, actual innocence based on Dean’s second affidavit. U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Rednour, No. 

10 C 2767, 2010 WL 4363380 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2010), at *6. The federal district court dismissed 

the petition with prejudice. Id., at *7. 

¶ 29 In October 2008, July 2010, August 2011, and May 2012, defendant filed petitions for 

relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

1401 (West 2012)). On each occasion, the circuit court denied relief and we affirmed after granting 

appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). 

People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 122557-U; People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 113264-U; 

People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 102843-U; People v. Smith, No. 09-0107 (2008) (unpublished 

order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 30 In January 2012 and October 2013, defendant filed two additional motions for leave to file 

successive postconviction petitions, both of which the circuit denied. We affirmed the denial of 

the January 2012 motion after appellate counsel moved to withdraw (People v. Smith, 2015 IL App 
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(1st) 132576-U), and the record does not show that defendant appealed the denial of the October 

2013 motion. 

¶ 31 Defendant filed another pro se section 2-1401 petition in March 2015, claiming actual 

innocence based on our supreme court’s then-recent ruling in People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 

115527. The circuit court dismissed, finding that “Fernandez does nothing to exonerate 

[defendant] of criminal liability,” because here “evidence presented [showed] that [defendant] 

kicked the victim with the co-defendant which led to his stabbing.” The record does not show that 

defendant appealed. 

¶ 32 On July 20, 2015, defendant filed the instant pro se motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition, alleging that he was actually innocent because (1) Wright and O’Grady 

coerced him into signing a written confession, and (2) Harris’s attached affidavit established that 

defendant was not beating Williams when McGruder stabbed him. In the affidavit, Harris, a fellow 

inmate at Western Illinois Correctional Center, averred that he was walking toward the corner of 

St. Louis and Walnut on the night of the murder when he heard glass breaking. He looked toward 

Fulton and saw defendant standing by the alley between Fulton and Walnut. Harris also saw a man 

being chased down St. Louis and Fulton by two other men, whom Harris did not recognize. The 

man being chased fell, and his pursuers began punching and kicking him. Harris noticed some 

money and dice on the ground, so he bent down to pick up the money. As he bent down, he heard 

a man scream. When Harris looked up, defendant was running away. One of the attackers was still 

kicking the man on the ground, and the other was stabbing him with a “shiny object.” Harris ran 

away before anyone could see him. He explained that he did not come forward sooner because he 
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was scared, had stolen the money, and did not realize that an innocent man had been convicted of 

the murder before running into defendant in prison. 

¶ 33 The circuit court denied defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition, stating 

that his claim of police coercion was procedurally barred and not supported by the record. The 

court also found that defendant’s claim of actual innocence failed because Harris’s affidavit, which 

placed defendant at the murder scene, did not exonerate him. 

¶ 34 We allowed defendant’s late notice of appeal and affirmed, finding that defendant failed to 

present a colorable claim of actual innocence because Harris’s affidavit did not raise the probability 

that a reasonable jury would not convict defendant considering the overwhelming evidence of his 

guilt. See Smith, 2019 IL App (1st) 160327-U, ¶ 46. On September 30, 2020, our supreme court 

denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal but directed this court to vacate our judgment and 

consider the effect of the supreme court’s opinion in People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, to 

determine whether a different result was warranted. See Smith, No. 124963 (Ill. Sept. 30, 2020) 

(supervisory order).

¶ 35 ANALYSIS

¶ 36 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file a 

successive petition because he stated a colorable claim of innocence based on Harris’s affidavit.

Additionally, defendant now styles his claim of police coercion as evidence that would undermine 

the strength of the State’s trial evidence, thereby increasing the probability that Harris’s affidavit 

would change the result on retrial. 

¶ 37 The Act provides a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who allege substantial 

violations of their constitutional rights at trial. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. The Act 
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is not a substitute for an appeal; rather, it is a mechanism for a defendant to assert a collateral 

attack on a final judgment. Id. The Act contemplates only one postconviction proceeding; 

however, this bar will be relaxed when a defendant can establish either cause and prejudice for 

failing to raise a claim in an earlier proceeding, or actual innocence. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. A defendant 

must therefore obtain leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 24 

¶ 38 A request to file a successive petition based on actual innocence is reviewed under a higher 

standard than the frivolous or patently without merit standard applied to an initial petition. 

Id. ¶¶ 25-29. The circuit court should deny leave to file a successive petition when it is clear from 

a review of the petition and supporting documentation that, as a matter of law, the petition cannot 

set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 24. 

Accordingly, leave of court should be granted where the petition and supporting documentation 

raises the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

the defendant considering the new evidence. Id. 

¶ 39 At the pleading stage of postconviction proceedings, all well-pleaded allegations in the 

petition and supporting affidavits that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken 

as true. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 45. When determining the legal sufficiency of a

postconviction petition, a court is precluded from making factual and credibility determinations. 

Id. We review the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging actual 

innocence de novo. Id. ¶ 40. 

¶ 40 To establish a claim of actual innocence, a petition’s supporting evidence must be (1) 

newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it 

would probably change the result on retrial. Id. ¶ 47. Evidence is newly discovered if it were
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discovered after trial and a defendant could not have discovered it earlier through the exercise of 

due diligence. Id. Evidence is material when it is relevant and probative of a defendant’s innocence, 

and noncumulative if it adds to the information that the fact finder heard at trial. Id. Conclusive 

evidence is evidence that, when considered with the evidence presented at trial, would probably 

lead to a different result at retrial. Id. “The conclusive character of the new evidence is the most 

important element of an actual innocence claim.” Id. Therefore, the ultimate question is whether 

the evidence supporting the petition places the trial evidence “in a different light” and “undermines 

*** confidence in the judgment of guilt.” Id. ¶ 48. Our supreme court has determined that the new 

evidence need not be entirely dispositive to be likely to alter the result on retrial and that probability 

is the key to considering whether the fact finder would reach a different result after considering 

the prior evidence along with the new evidence. Id. 

¶ 41 Here, to determine whether defendant has set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence, 

we consider whether the successive petition, along with the supporting documents, raised the 

probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable trier of fact would find him guilty of 

first-degree murder considering the new evidence.

¶ 42 The contents of Harris’s affidavit, namely that Harris was present at the scene of the 

stabbing, and saw defendant standing by an alley and then running away while another man was 

being beaten and stabbed by two other unidentified men, is newly discovered, material, and 

noncumulative. Harris did not testify at trial and explained in his affidavit that he did not come 

forward earlier because he had stolen money from the scene and did not know that defendant had 

been convicted of the offense until they encountered each other in prison. The fact that Harris saw 
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defendant running away while Williams was being beaten and stabbed is material to the issue of 

defendant’s guilt and not cumulative of the evidence at trial. 

¶ 43 Having determined that the facts contained in Harris’s affidavit are newly discovered, 

material, and noncumulative, we turn to whether those facts, “when considered along with the trial 

evidence, would probably lead to a different result” at retrial. Id. ¶ 47. 

¶ 44 In the case at bar, the State argues that the facts contained in Harris’s affidavit are neither 

exonerating nor conclusive because the affidavit places defendant at the scene of the stabbing and 

“leaves open the possibility” that he “personally engaged” in the fight when Harris was not looking 

or was accountable for Williams’s death based upon actions Harris did not see. The State asserts 

that because defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder based upon a theory of 

accountability, “it does not matter that Harris saw other people attacking the victim” because 

Harris “clearly” did not see the entire incident. The State further argues that the testimony of

Sanchez and O’Grady as well as defendant’s statement establish that defendant was beating 

Williams at the time of the stabbing. 

¶ 45 However, as our supreme explained in Robinson, although the conclusive character of new 

evidence is the most important element of an actual innocence claim, ultimately, 

“the question is whether the evidence supporting the postconviction petition places the trial 

evidence in a different light and undermines the court’s confidence in the judgment of guilt. 

[Citation.] The new evidence need not be entirely dispositive to be likely to alter the result 

on retrial. [Citation.] Probability, rather than certainty, is the key in considering whether 

the fact finder would reach a different result after considering the prior evidence along with 

the new evidence. [Citation.]” Id. ¶¶ 47-48. 
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¶ 46 Thus, the question before this court when assessing if a defendant has met “the low 

threshold applicable to a colorable claim of actual innocence” is “whether the new evidence, if 

believed and not positively rebutted by the record, could lead to acquittal on retrial.” Id. ¶ 60. 

¶ 47 Ultimately, taking Harris’s factual averments that defendant was running away while 

Williams was being beaten and stabbed as true, defendant has presented evidence that could place 

the trial evidence in a different light and undermines confidence in the guilty finding. See id. ¶ 76 

(finding that an affidavit providing evidence that a different person is guilty was “of such a 

conclusive character as to lead to a different result on retrial”). At trial, Dean and Johnson testified 

that defendant and McGruder attacked Williams and during the attack McGruder stabbed 

Williams. Thus, the evidence at trial connecting defendant to the fatal attack was the identification 

testimony of Dean and Johnson, and defendant’s statement. This identification testimony is 

directly contradicted by the assertion contained in Harris’s affidavit that defendant was not the 

person beating Williams while McGruder stabbed him. Here, as in Robinson, we are unable to 

assess the reliability or veracity of Harris’s affidavit without engaging in a credibility 

determination. See id. ¶ 83. Moreover, although defendant’s signed statement was presented at 

trial, he has consistently rejected the veracity of that statement. 

¶ 48 We also observe that in Robinson, our supreme court determined that the appellate court 

erred in finding “that the evidence in petitioner’s supporting affidavits d[id] not satisfy the 

conclusive character element because it merely conflict[ed] with the evidence presented at trial.” 

Id. ¶ 57. The court clarified that it “has never held that a request for leave to file a successive 

petition must be denied if the new evidence conflicts with the trial evidence.” Id. The court 

explained that “[i]f the new evidence of innocence d[id] not contradict the evidence of petitioner’s 
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guilt at trial, the filing of the successive petition would be pointless, and the purpose of the Act 

would be rendered meaningless, which is a result that must be studiously avoided.” Id. 

¶ 49 Our supreme court’s clarification of these principles as explained in Robinson, that 

evidence of actual innocence need not be dispositive and that such evidence may support a showing 

of actual innocence even where it conflicts with the trial evidence, guides our analysis of 

defendant’s claim of actual innocence.

¶ 50 Accordingly, taking as true the allegations in Harris’s affidavit, as we must at this stage of 

proceedings under the Act, we conclude that a factfinder could determine that this new evidence 

exculpates defendant in the murder and refutes the State’s evidence at trial. Id. ¶ 45. We note that 

the new evidence in Harris’s affidavit is not positively rebutted by the record. “[T]he existence of 

a conflict with the trial evidence is not the same as finding that the new evidence is positively 

rebutted.” Id. ¶ 60. To be positively rebutted, it must be “clear from the trial record that no fact 

finder could ever accept the truth of that evidence, such as where it is affirmatively and 

incontestably demonstrated to be false or impossible.” Id. Here, the record does not affirmatively 

demonstrate that a trier of fact could never accept the veracity of Harris’s statements. See id. ¶ 73 

(finding that a newly discovered eyewitness affidavit that contradicted, but was not positively 

rebutted by, the State’s eyewitnesses regarding identification of offender was “reason to allow 

petitioner to proceed, with counsel, on his colorable claim of actual innocence”). 

¶ 51 Accordingly, because defendant has satisfied the pleading requirements for obtaining leave 

to file a successive postconviction petition, his claim of actual innocence must be advanced to 

second stage proceedings under the Act. See id. ¶ 85 (“the only issue presented in this case is 

whether [the defendant] may file his successive postconviction petition that alleges he is actually 
No. 1-16-0327 

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innocent of the crimes for which he has been convicted and sentenced”). Accordingly, we reverse 

the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings under the Act. 

¶ 52 Reversed and remanded.