31342 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

1FEMA is planning to consolidate REP–14 into a

new reference book. The contents of REP–14,

including any changes resulting from final action

on the issues discussed in this notice, will be

incorporated into this new reference book. At this

time, we are proposing to revise not withdraw REP–

14. We expect to formally withdraw REP–14 when

the new reference book is available.

2Adoption of the proposed Evaluation Criteria

will also render much of § C.2 of REP–14 obsolete.

Pages C.2–3 and C.2–4 of REP–14 speak to the

frequency with which particular REP–14 objectives

will be exercised. FEMA proposes to adopt the

Federal Exercise Evaluation Matrix, which appears

later in this document as Table 2 in place of the

exercise objective groupings which appear on Pages

C.2–3 and C–2.4 of REP–14.

3The preamble to 44 CFR part 350 is published

at 48 FR 44332 (September 28, 1983).

4See also, 44 CFR 350.13(a) which states in

relevant part ‘‘The basis upon which [FEMA] makes

the determination for withdrawal of approval [of a

State or local radiological emergency plan] is the

same basis used in reviewing plans and exercises,

i.e. the planning standards and related criteria in

NUREG 0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1.’’

5See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a

and 1.b

6See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a

(rules) and 3 (exercise evaluation guidance).

FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Radiological Emergency

Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation

Methodology

AGENCY: Federal Emergency

Management Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) proposes

to revise the Radiological Emergency

Preparedness Exercise Manual (REP–14)

dated September 1991 by adopting the

six Exercise Evaluation Areas described

in this notice in place of the 33 REP–

14 Objectives that are set out in Section

D of REP–14. If the Exercise Evaluation

Areas described in this notice are

adopted, Radiological Emergency

Preparedness exercises conducted

pursuant to 44 CFR 350.9 will be

evaluated against the criteria set out in

this notice. The proposed frequency

with which each of the proposed

Exercise Evaluation Areas will be

evaluated is also contained in this

notice. Adoption of the proposed

changes to REP–14 will render a

companion manual entitled

Radiological Emergency Preparedness

Exercise Evaluation Methodology (REP–

15) dated September 1991 obsolete. If

the proposed changes to REP–14 are

adopted, FEMA plans to rescind REP–15

and utilize a new form entitled

‘‘Evaluation Module’’ to document

evaluations. We invite comments on the

Exercise Evaluation Areas and the

proposed frequency for exercising each

area and the Evaluation Module form.

DATES: FEMA must receive comments

on or before August 10, 2001.

ADDRESSES: You may submit your

comments to the Rules Docket Clerk,

Office of the General Counsel, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, 500 C

Street, SW., room 840, Washington, DC

20472, or send them by e-mail to

rules@fema.gov. Please reference ‘‘REP

Exercise Evaluation Areas’’ in the

subject line of your e-mail or comment

letter.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Vanessa Quinn, Chief, Radiological

Emergency Preparedness Branch,

Chemical and Radiological

Preparedness Division, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, 500 C

Street SW., Washington, DC 20472;

telephone: (202) 646–3664, or e-mail:

vanessa.quinn@fema.gov, or Nathan S.

Bergerbest, Office of the General

Counsel, Federal Emergency

Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW.,

Washington, DC 20472, telephone: (202)

646–2685, or (e-mail)

nathan.bergerbest@fema.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) proposes to revise the

Radiological Emergency Preparedness

Exercise Manual (REP–14) 1 dated

September 1991 by adopting the six

Exercise Evaluation Areas described in

this notice and deleting the thirty-three

REP–14 Objectives that are set out in

Section D of REP–14. If the Exercise

Evaluation Areas described in this

notice are adopted, Radiological

Emergency Preparedness exercises

conducted pursuant to 44 CFR 350.9

will be evaluated against the criteria set

out in this notice.2

Adoption of the proposed changes to

REP–14 will render a companion

manual entitled Radiological Emergency

Preparedness Exercise Evaluation

Methodology (REP–15) dated September

1991 obsolete. If the proposed changes

to REP–14 are adopted, FEMA plans to

rescind REP–15 and utilize a new form

entitled ‘‘Evaluation Module’’ to

document evaluation activities. The

rescission will be effective on the same

date upon which the changes to REP–14

are effective and the Evaluation Module

form will be effective on the same date.

We invite comments on the Exercise

Evaluation Areas and the proposed

frequency for exercising each area and

the Evaluation Module form.

Background on Exercise Evaluation

FEMA, through its Radiological

Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

conducts exercises to evaluate the

ability of Offsite Response

Organizations (OROs) to respond to an

emergency involving a commercial

nuclear power plant. These exercises are

conducted in accordance with FEMA

regulations, which appear in 44 CFR

part 350.3 Although § 350.9 is the

portion of Part 350 that primarily speaks

to exercises, it does not specifically

address the standards under which

exercises are to be conducted and

performance is to be evaluated. These

standards are addressed in 44 CFR

350.5(a) which states:

Section 50.47 of [the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s] Emergency Planning Rule [10

CFR Parts 50 [Appendix E] and 70 as

amended and the joint FEMA-Nuclear

Regulatory Commission Criteria for

Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological

Response Plants and Preparedness In

Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG–

0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev 1 November, 1980)

* * * are to be used in reviewing, evaluating

and approving State and local radiological

emergency plans and preparedness and in

making any findings and determinations with

respect to the adequacy of the plans and the

capabilities of state and local government to

implement them. Both the planning and

preparedness standards and related criteria

contained in NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1,

Rev. 1 are to be used by FEMA and the

[Nuclear Regulatory Commission] in

reviewing and evaluating State and local

government radiological emergency plans

and preparedness.4

Planning Standard N of NUREG–

0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 addresses the

conduct of exercises. The Planning

Standard states that ‘‘Periodic exercises

are (will be) conducted to evaluate

major portions of emergency response

capabilities * * * and deficiencies

identified as a result of exercises * * *

are (will be) corrected.’’ Evaluation

criterion 1.a defines an exercise as ‘‘an

event that tests the integrated capability

and a major portion of the basic

elements existing within emergency

preparedness plans and organizations.’’

The Planning Standard N criteria

contain several requirements for

exercises. All exercises must simulate

an emergency that results in offsite

radiological emergency releases, which

would require response by offsite

authorities. Scenarios should be varied

from year to year and conducted under

various weather conditions; some

exercises or drills should be

unannounced.5 In other respects, the

Planning Standard N criteria

contemplate that exercises will be

conducted as set forth in Nuclear

Regulatory Commission and FEMA

rules and in exercise evaluation

guidance.6

In September 1991, FEMA published

the current exercise evaluation

guidance, which is REP–14. REP–14

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31343

7On March 27, 1991, FEMA noticed the

availability for REP–14 and REP–15 for public

comment in the Federal Register [56 FR 12734]. It

responded to public comments in a third

publication, REP–18. See, 57 FR 4880 (February 10,

1992) corrected by 57 FR 10956 (March 31, 1992).

8See, REP–14, pages C–2.3 to C–2.4.

9The Strategic Review Steering Committee was

composed of federal employees from FEMA

headquarters, FEMA regional offices and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

10The concept paper can be reviewed at http://

www.fema.gov/pte/rep/exercise.htm (viewed on

May 22, 2001).

11The transcripts of the three public meetings can

be reviewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/

trans.htm (viewed on May 22, 2001).

12FEMA is proposing to address each of these

issues through the changes described in this notice.

Other issues identified in the concept paper will

not be addressed through this notice. The concept

paper observed that some aspects of radiological

emergency preparedness can be demonstrated

separate and apart from the exercise. It suggested

that FEMA should provide guidance on when ‘‘out

of sequence’’ demonstrations are permissible.

FEMA has issued a policy statement on this issue

which was made effective October 1, 1999. The

policy statement may be viewed at http://

www.fema.gov/pte/rep/fnlpl-3.htm (viewed May 30,

2001). The concept paper also observed that some

aspects of radiological emergency preparedness are

satisfactorily demonstrated by actual responses to

disasters and emergencies or through other

exercises in which OROs participate and credit

should be given for demonstrated performance

outside of a REP exercise. FEMA is still considering

this issue. The concept paper suggested that FEMA

should explore alternative approaches to evaluating

emergency preparedness in addition to exercises.

For example, it is suggested that maintenance and

calibration of equipment that must be maintained

under a radiological emergency response plan, can

and should be verified separate and apart from an

exercise. FEMA currently requires that OROs certify

that various aspects of the radiological emergency

response plans are functional through an ‘‘Annual

Letter of Certification.’’ FEMA reserves the right to

audit an ORO’s representations in the Annual Letter

of Certification. Some of the evaluation criteria

contained in NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1

will not be exercised under the proposed Exercise

Evaluation Areas described in this notice. This is

because these criteria are most appropriately

verified, in FEMA’s judgment, through the Annual

Letter of Certification and audits pursuant thereto.

The concept paper recommended that FEMA

expand its program of staff assistance visits to

regularly provide feedback on emergency

preparedness issues. FEMA is expanding this

program.

13 63 Fed. Reg. 48225 (September 9, 1998).

14These were REP–14 Objectives 23, 31, 32 and

33. FEMA is proposing to eliminate REP–14

Objectives 23 and 31 in their entirety. Objective 23

tested the ORO’s ability to identify and utilize

federal and voluntary agency resources. FEMA

plans to take lead responsibility for identifying

available federal resources. The decision on

whether to use these resources belongs to the ORO.

A determination of whether the ORO is effectively

utilizing voluntary agency resources is more

appropriately made in reviewing the ORO’s plans.

Objective 31 tested the ORO’s ability to evacuate

non-essential personnel from the nuclear power

plant site. We have concluded that the emergency

preparedness benefit of evaluating this capability

separate and apart from the capability to evacuate

members of the general public is negligible.

However, Objectives 32 (demonstrate the capability

to carry out emergency response functions in an

unannounced exercise or drill) and 33 (demonstrate

the capability to carry out emergency response

functions during an off-hours drill or exercise) are

not proposed for elimination. These REP–14

Objectives would be folded into Exercise Evaluation

Area 5.a.2, which provides for an unannounced

drill of an incident requiring urgent response action

by ORO’s (also known as a ‘‘fast breaker’’). The drill

may occur during off-hours.

15 63 Fed. Reg. 58226–58227 (September 9, 1998).

16A compilation of comments and the Strategic

Review Steering Committee’s response appears on

Continued

established a series of 33 objectives

(REP–14 Objectives) that interpret and

apply the guidance contained in

NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1. A

companion document, REP–15

contained a series of forms and

checklists keyed to the 33 REP–14

Objectives for use by exercise evaluators

in documenting performance. FEMA

circulated both documents for public

comment.7

REP–14 also established the frequency

with which each of the objectives would

be demonstrated in exercises. The 33

REP–14 Objectives were divided into

three groups. Thirteen objectives in the

first group would need to be

demonstrated in every exercise. Nine

objectives in the second group should

be demonstrated in every exercise by

some but not all responding

organizations as the scenario dictates,

provided that all responding

organizations must demonstrate the

objective once every six years. Another

eleven objectives must be demonstrated

once every six years.8

Strategic Review Process

In June 1996, the Director of the

Federal Emergency Management Agency

initiated a strategic review of the REP

Program. This review was announced in

the Federal Register in June 1996 and

suggestions for improvement in the REP

Program were solicited from the public.

The respondents raised 180 issues.

Seventy comments specifically

addressed the conduct of exercises.

Many commenters suggested that FEMA

make exercise evaluation criteria

outcome-based and less prescriptive.

These commenters, representing States,

local governments, and industry,

suggested that evaluations should stress

successful completion of basic health

and safety objectives, with the specifics

of accomplishing this left up to the

OROs.

The comments were turned over to a

Strategic Review Steering Committee for

review.9 Due to the large number of

comments received on the conduct of

exercises, the Strategic Review Steering

Committee commissioned a concept

paper on exercise streamlining. The

concept paper was released to the

public 10 and comments were received

at stakeholder meetings in St. Louis, San

Francisco and Washington DC in

1997.11

The concept paper identified several

key issues for further consideration.

• REP–14 and REP–15 should be

revised to support a ‘‘results oriented’’

exercise evaluation process.

• REP exercises should concentrate

on radiological issues.

• REP–14 and REP–15 could be

streamlined by combining similar

objectives and points of review without

harming the evaluation process.

• REP–14 and REP–15 are out of date

due to changes in federal regulations,

guidance and terminology.

• The required demonstration

frequency of objectives should be

reevaluated. Some objectives should be

demonstrated more frequently and

others less frequently.12

On September 9, 1998, FEMA

published the draft final

recommendations of the Strategic

Review Steering Committee for public

comment. Recommendation 1.1

addressed the 33 REP–14 Objectives.

The Strategic Review Steering

Committee noted:

Exercises are currently evaluated in an

‘‘objective based format.’’ * * * This system

is very structured and leaves little latitude for

satisfying the objective by alternate means.

Stakeholders have identified the obvious

similarities between objectives. Experience in

exercise evaluations indicates that several

objectives can easily be combined, and others

deleted, without weakening the evaluation

process. * * * [We recommend] the

consolidation of current objectives into

* * * six Evaluation Areas * * * These

Evaluation Areas would be established to

support a ‘‘results oriented’’ evaluation

process. Results oriented evaluation allows

FEMA to focus on the outcome of actions

taken by players in the implementation of

their plans and procedures. This approach

will give the exercise players more latitude

to reach the desired results. Evaluators would

then concentrate on the results of an exercise

activity, not on the steps taken to arrive at

a result. Within each Evaluation Area,

objectives would be combined and

duplicative Points of Review would be

eliminated.’’ 13

The Strategic Review Steering Committee

recommended the consolidation of 29 of the

33 REP–14 Exercise Objective into six

Exercise Evaluation Areas with sub-criteria.

It also recommended the elimination of four

of the REP–14 Objectives.14

Recommendation 1.2 addressed the

frequency of demonstrations. The frequency

for exercising each of the evaluation areas

and sub criteria was set out in a table which

accompanied Recommendation 1.2.15

Respondents to FEMA’s request for public

comment generally favored

Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2.16 On March

31344 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

the REP Internet site, http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/

finalrecc10 99.doc (visited May 22, 2001).

17http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/comments.doc

(viewed May 22, 2001).

18http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/recini.htm

(viewed May 22, 2001).

19Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.4.

20Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.1.e

21REP–14 page D.30–1

22Additional assurance that OROs have sufficient

trained personnel to support twenty-four-hour

response and operations is contained in the Annual

Letter of Certification. FEMA may audit the ORO’s

representations in the Annual Letter of

Certification.

23We define key positions in this proposal in the

same way that they are defined in REP–14 Objective

30.1, i.e. communications, direction and control of

operations, alert and notification of the public,

accident assessment, information for the public and

the media, radiological monitoring, protective

response, and medical and public health support

functions.

25, 1999, the strategic review

recommendations, including

Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2 were turned

over to the REP Program by Kay C. Goss,

CEM, Associate Director for Preparedness,

Training and Exercises for further

consideration. This notice addresses the

proposed implementation of

Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2.

Implementation of Strategic Review Steering

Committee Recommendation 1.1

FEMA proposes to implement

Recommendation 1.1 through adoption of the

Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this

notice. Two drafts of the Exercise Evaluation

Area have already been released for public

comment on the REP website. The first draft

was released in November 1999. These

comments and responses from the drafting

group have been placed on the REP

website.17 A second draft was released in

March 2000.18

During the fall of 2000, FEMA conducted

pilot tests of the six draft Exercise Evaluation

Areas at four nuclear power plants in

different FEMA regions. A Pilot Evaluation

Team, comprised of REP Regional Assistance

Committee Chairs and FEMA headquarters

REP staff, observed and assessed the pilot

exercises. The team was instructed to

identify any evaluation areas that needed

revision. It was also asked to consider

whether the new evaluation methodology

provided an equal if not more robust review

of State and local emergency response plans

and procedures than the objective ‘‘checklist

approach.’’

The conclusions drawn by the Pilot

Evaluation Team are consistent with the

comments FEMA has received since the

inception of the strategic review process.

Based upon these comments and reports from

the Pilot Evaluation Team, FEMA has

concluded:

• The current REP–14 and REP–15

evaluation methodology resulted in

predictable exercises, judged against

checklists; exercises under the proposed

criteria will be based on emergency response

plans, not the checklists, and should

facilitate better coordination,

communication, decisionmaking and

implementation.

• Utilization of the new methodology will

facilitate the introduction of more

challenging scenarios geared to the particular

community being evaluated. It will reduce

the artificiality of exercises and more closely

replicate responses to real incidents.

• The proposed methodology, which

focuses on results, will increase ORO

enthusiasm for exercise participation and

substantially reduce the perception that the

evaluators are nit-picking performance.

• The proposed methodology is more

demanding on evaluators than the current

checklists. It requires that they explain in

narrative form what was observed and

whether performance was adequate. This will

result in more effective communication

between evaluators and OROs about exercise

issues and plan shortcomings. It will also

provide the REP Program with better data

from which to draw conclusions about

emergency preparedness on a national level.

• Emergency preparedness can be

significantly enhanced through better

focused exercise evaluation criteria, coupled

with FEMA’s renewed emphasis on the

Annual Letter of Certification and more

frequent staff assistance visits.

Highlights of the Proposed Exercise

Evaluation Areas

Evaluation Area 1—Emergency Operations

Management

Evaluation Area 1 has five sub-elements:

(a) mobilization, (b) facilities, (c) direction

and control, (d) communications equipment

and (e) equipment and supplies to support

operations.

Criterion 1.a.1 requires that the OROs use

effective procedures to alert, notify and

mobilize emergency personnel and activate

facilities in a timely manner. One of the more

difficult issues to arise from the strategic

review is how OROs demonstrate their

twenty-four hour staffing capability in an

exercise. The evaluation criteria associated

with Planning Standard ‘‘A’’ of NUREG–

0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1 require that ‘‘each

principal organization shall be capable of

continuous (twenty-four-hour) operations for

a protracted period.’’ 19 These criteria also

require that each State and local response

organization be capable of twenty-four-hour

emergency response.20

REP–14 Objective 30.1, which implements

these criteria, presently requires all agencies

responsible for providing twenty-four-hour

staffing demonstrate a shift change once

every six years. The shift change is

demonstrated by providing a ‘‘one-for-one

replacement . . . of key staff responsible for

communications, direction and control of

operations, alert and notification for the

public and the media, radiological

monitoring, protective response and medical

and public health support.’’ 21

REP–14 Objective 30.2 requires that

outgoing staff members should demonstrate

their capability to brief their replacements on

the current status of the simulated

emergency. The purpose of this

demonstration is to assure that the transition

from the outgoing to incoming shift is

accomplished without discontinuity in

operations.

The dissatisfaction within the REP

community about Objective 30 seems to stem

from time constraints associated with the

exercise. OROs will bring a second shift

(often composed of volunteers who must take

time away from other responsibilities) in for

the exercise, only to discover that there is

little time left in the exercise for the second

shift to actually demonstrate their

capabilities.

FEMA is sympathetic to the dissatisfaction

with the present approach. However, we are

equally uneasy about simply eliminating the

shift change requirement. NUREG–0654/

FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1, requires that we verify

that response organizations have sufficient

trained people in the key positions to

perform twenty-four-hour operations.

Moreover, we are concerned that our present

approach offers those on the second and the

third shift little opportunity to train for a real

emergency through exercise participation.

Our proposed criterion 1.a.1 eliminates the

requirement that OROs demonstrate a shift

change once every six years. In order to

assure that OROs have sufficient staffing to

support twenty-four hour operations, we

propose that the exercise evaluators inspect

the procedures for twenty-four hour staffing

at each facility and a staff roster to determine

whether the response organization has

identified the necessary personnel to carry

out critical functions. These critical functions

are the same functions named in REP–14

Objective 30.1. The inspection would occur

during each exercise.22 This approach is

consistent with Planning Standard ‘‘A’’ of

NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1. and its

associated criteria. Neither requires the

demonstration of a shift change.

However our consideration of the shift

change issue leaves us mindful of the need

to assure that key personnel on the off-hours

shifts can perform as well as the primary

responders. Without an opportunity to

observe the performance of these personnel

in an exercise, we are uncertain about

whether the key personnel on the off-hours

shifts can perform up to the standard that

those who regularly exercise do. Moreover,

we are concerned that our present exercise

approach denies those in key positions on

off-hours shifts an opportunity to train

through meaningful exercise participation.

For this reason, FEMA is inclined to

require that OROs demonstrate their twentyfour hour response capability by alternating

the personnel that participate in the biennial

exercises from among the shifts.23 For

example, the first biennial exercise of each

six year cycle might involve personnel from

the first twelve-hour shift. The second

biennial exercise in the six year cycle would

involve personnel from the second twelvehour shift. The third biennial exercise in the

six year cycle would involve personnel from

the third shift (if the ORO uses three shifts

in its plan) or the first shift (if the ORO uses

two shifts in its plan) This would provide an

opportunity for the key personnel on all

shifts to have an opportunity to train by

participating in an exercise as well as an

opportunity for FEMA to evaluate the

performance of all of the individuals who

will play key roles in an actual response.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31345

24References to the REP–14 Objectives will

appear in this form throughout this notice. REP–14

Objective 3.1 is Objective 3, Criterion 1.

25See, pages B.12 and B.21 of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, Radiological

Emergency Preparedness Program, Standard

Exercise Report Format (October 1995).

26The plume phase of the emergency focuses on

preventing exposure of a population to radiation

through direct contact with the plume.

27The ingestion pathway phase focuses on

preventing exposure of a population to radiation

through ingestion of foods that may have been

exposed to radiation.

We recognize that a limited number of key

personnel, such as a county Emergency

Management Director, intend to remain

involved in an actual emergency response on

a twenty-four-hour basis until the incident is

resolved. We are prepared to accommodate

the participation of these individuals in

every exercise, but expect that each will have

their designated successor participate in the

exercise. An exercise scenario might provide

that a county Emergency Management

Director is unable to perform his or her

duties and an alternate must step in to take

over the operation.

FEMA believes it is crucial for all

personnel expected to perform key roles in a

radiological emergency response to exercise

in their roles. However, we are not prepared

to move forward with a definitive plan to

achieve this objective without your

comments. If you do not agree with the

proposal described above, we would

appreciate your identification of alternative

means through which FEMA can assure that

the key personnel who are expected to work

the off-hours shifts are as well trained as

those who work the shift that most often

exercises. We are interested in your

comments about whether FEMA needs to

make any changes in the way it conducts

exercises, i.e. commencing exercises on

weekends, holidays or off-hours, to facilitate

participation from those who would serve on

the off-hours shifts in the event of an actual

emergency. We also seek your views on

whether or not this proposal will result in a

net benefit to emergency preparedness.

Our review of the issues associated with

the shift change also leads us to believe that

the briefing required by Objective 30.2,

which presently needs to be demonstrated

only once every six years, should be

demonstrated at every exercise in the future.

This provision has been written into

proposed criterion 1.a.1. We propose to give

OROs the option of bringing in a second shift

of key responders to receive the briefing or

to provide the briefing to the evaluators.

Criterion 1.b.1 requires that the ORO

demonstrate that its facilities are sufficient to

support the emergency response. Under the

proposed exercise methodology, facilities

will only be evaluated if they are new or have

substantial changes in structure or mission.

It seems redundant to require the reevaluation of a facility every two years if the

facility has not changed. This change does

not affect the current requirement that OROs

certify in the Annual Letter of Certification

that their facilities are available and adequate

to meet emergency response needs. FEMA

reserves the right to audit the representations

made in the Annual Letter of Certification.

Criterion 1.c.1 requires that key personnel

with leadership roles for the ORO provide

direction and control to that part of the

overall response for which they are

responsible. This requirement is identical to

that in Objective 3.1 24 of REP–14.

Criterion 1.d requires that communications

capabilities are managed in support of

emergency operations with communication

links established and maintained with

appropriate locations. The proper

functioning of communications equipment is

essential to success in any exercise, just as

it is essential to success in any response.

FEMA expects that both the primary and

backup communications systems, which are

required by Planning Standard F, Evaluation

Criteria F.1 of NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1

Rev. 1, will be fully functional at the

commencement of an exercise. Under REP–

14 the functionality of these systems were

tested at each exercise. Consistent with the

spirit of the proposed Exercise Evaluation

Areas, FEMA will not verify that the primary

and backup communications systems are

operational as a stand-alone evaluation item.

However, we will craft exercise scenarios

which call for the use of the primary system

and scenarios which assume the failure of the

primary system and require the use of the

backup system. The ORO will not know prior

to the start of the exercise whether one or

both systems will be tested as part of the

scenario. While an ORO may not be

penalized if a communications system fails,

so long as the other is operational, FEMA

will take note of all communications system

failures. They will be reported to Director of

the REP Program and to the appropriate

FEMA Regional Director and Regional

Assistance Committee Chair as a planning

issue.25 The ORO is expected to correct any

communication systems failure within 60

days of the conclusion of the exercise.

Criterion 1.e requires that equipment,

dosimetry, supplies of potassium iodide and

other required supplies are sufficient to

support emergency operations. The

requirements are similar to those in REP–14

Objectives 2.1, 5.1, 8.2 and 14.2. FEMA may

or may not verify that these items are

available and in good repair as a stand-alone

item in every exercise. However, our exercise

scenarios ordinarily require that the

equipment and supplies be put to use. If

equipment and supplies are unavailable or

non-functional then the ORO may not be able

to perform the emergency response activity at

an acceptable level. Equipment and supplies

that are not checked during an exercise will

be checked during a staff assistance visit.

Additional assurance that equipment and

supplies are available in appropriate

quantities and are properly maintained will

be obtained in the Annual Letter of

Certification. The representations contained

in the Annual Letter of Certification are

subject to audit.

Evaluation Area 2—Protective Action

Decisionmaking

Evaluation Area 2 assesses the ORO’s

ability to render decisions about what

protective actions members of the public and

emergency workers need to take in the wake

of an incident. It has five sub-elements:

emergency worker exposure control,

radiological assessment and protective action

recommendations and decisions for the

plume phase of the emergency,26 protective

action decision considerations for the

protection of special populations,

radiological assessment and decisionmaking

for the ingestion pathway exposure27 and

radiological assessment and decisionmaking

concerning relocation, re-entry and return.

The criteria in Evaluation Area 2 are

generally similar to those in REP–14. We

believe that proposed criterion 2.e.1

improves upon REP–14 Objectives 28.1 and

28.3 by eliminating the cumbersome standard

and optional approaches to re-entry and

relocation decisionmaking in REP–14.

Criterion 2.e.1 contains a single approach to

evaluating decisions in these areas

Evaluation Area 3—Protective Action

Implementation

Evaluation Area 3 assesses the ORO’s

ability to implement protective actions,

including evacuation. It contains six subelements: implementation of emergency

worker exposure control, implementation of

potassium iodide decisions, implementation

of protective actions for special populations,

implementation of traffic and access control,

implementation of ingestion pathway

decisions and implementation of relocation,

re-entry and return decisions.

Criterion 3.a.1 requires that emergency

workers demonstrate their ability to read

dosimetry and understand the protective

actions that they must take in response to

specified levels. This requirement is similar

to Objectives 5.1 and 5.2 in REP–14. Under

the former evaluation methodology,

emergency workers were subjected to the

equivalent of a ‘‘closed book examination’’

on these matters. The proposed methodology

makes it clear that emergency workers can

refer to published procedures and confer

with co-workers in responding to evaluator

inquiries, just as they would, if necessary, in

a real incident.

Criterion 3.b.1 tests the capability to

distribute potassium iodide and

appropriately instruct recipients on its use,

in accordance with the ORO’s emergency

response plan. Potassium iodide is a nonprescription thyroid-blocking agent, which

has been found effective in preventing

thyroid cancer in those exposed to radiation

during a nuclear plant incident. Criterion

3.b.1 also requires OROs to demonstrate their

ability to maintain records on the

administration of potassium iodide. Criterion

3.b.1 does not require that potassium iodide

actually be administered. It requires only that

OROs be able to demonstrate the

functionality of this aspect of the plan.

Criterion 3.c.1 evaluates the protective

action decisions that are implemented for

special populations other than schools

within areas subject to protective actions.

OROs must demonstrate a capability to alert

and notify special populations,

transportation providers (including special

resources for people with disabilities), and

31346 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

28The National Radiological Preparedness

Conference is an annual meeting of individuals

with an interest in radiological emergency

preparedness. The conference is sponsored by an

independent non-profit organization and is open to

the public.

29The current guidance entitled ‘‘Radiological

Emergency Preparedness (REP) Guidance To

Support Implementation of the Emergency Alert

System (EAS)’’ dated February 2, 1999 can be

viewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/easrep.htm

(viewed May 31, 2001). The guidance is contained

in Attachment ‘‘B’’ to the memorandum entitled

‘‘Background on the Emergency Alert System

(EAS).’’

establish reception facilities. The availability

of resources to transport special populations

out of the plume exposure pathway is key.

For this reason, proposed criterion 3.c.1

requires that OROs actually contact at least

1⁄3 of their transportation providers during

each exercise to determine whether buses

and drivers would be available if the exercise

were an actual emergency.

Criterion 3.c.2 evaluates the capability to

implement protective action decisions for

schools. The proposed criterion requires that

OROs contact each public school system,

licensed day care provider and participating

private school which would be required to

implement a protective action decision if the

exercise scenario were an actual emergency.

Simulation of these calls is not allowed.

REP–14 Objective 16.2 presently requires

that a single school bus be mobilized to drive

an evacuation route as part of an exercise.

FEMA does not believe that this

demonstration achieves any significant

emergency preparedness objective and is

proposing to delete it. We do reserve the right

to interview bus drivers to determine their

familiarity with evacuation routes.

Criterion 3.d.1 evaluates the capability to

establish and maintain appropriate traffic

control and access points. REP–14 Objective

17.2 requires an actual deployment to test

staffing capabilities. The proposed new

criterion would not require an actual

deployment. Capability could be established

through an evaluative interview with

appropriate public safety personnel. The

decision to no longer require actual

deployment stems from the recognition that

public safety agencies regularly establish

traffic and access control points in response

to non-radiological incidents. The new

criterion does not deprive FEMA of the

ability to request a demonstration of actual

deployment capability where appropriate. It

simply establishes that actual deployment

will not be required as a matter of course.

Criterion 3.d.2 evaluates the capability to

remove impediments to evacuation. REP–14

Objective 17.4 required that actual telephone

calls be placed to resources which might

assist in removing the impediments, e.g., tow

truck contractors. However, REP–14 did not

require that tow trucks actually respond and

remove the impediments. While there is

some value in determining whether OROs

maintain an accurate list of telephone

numbers, it is not necessary to mandate

regular testing of the ability to telephone a

tow operator. The tow operators that might

be relied upon in a nuclear power plant

incident are similar to those who might be

called upon in a traffic accident. Emergency

dispatchers can reasonably be presumed to

know how to contact tow operators.

Criterion 3.e.1 tests the availability and

appropriate use of adequate information

regarding water, food supplies, milk and

agricultural production within the ingestion

exposure pathway zone for implementation

of protective actions. REP–14 Objective 27.1

requires that various maps and information

sources required by Planning Standard J of

NUREG–0654/REP–1 Rev 1 be available. The

proposed criterion does not change the

requirement that these information sources

be available. However, it does not require

that an evaluator specifically check off that

they are present. Ingestion pathway exercises

will be evaluated based upon whether OROs

effectively use the information that must be

available in addressing the exercise scenario.

If the information is not available, OROs may

not be able to meet the new ‘‘results

oriented’’ criterion.

Criterion 3.e.2 evaluates measures,

strategies and pre-printed instructional

material for implementing protective action

decisions for contaminated water, food

products, milk and agricultural production.

REP 14 Objective 11.4 requires that

evaluators check off whether a distribution

list is maintained and Objective 27.3 contains

specific instructions on how implementation

of ingestion pathway decisions should be

evaluated. Through its level of detail, REP–

14 established a single correct way to

implement ingestion pathway decisions,

notwithstanding that alternative approaches

would also adequately protect public health

and safety. FEMA believes that it is

appropriate to give OROs the flexibility to

implement ingestion pathway decisions in a

way that they deem prudent. OROs will be

evaluated on the basis of whether their

decisions adequately protect public health

and safety.

Criterion 3.f evaluates decisions regarding

controlled re-entry of emergency workers and

relocation and return. This criterion

consolidates REP–14 Objectives 29.1, 29.2,

29.3 and 29.4.

Evaluation Area 4—Field Measurement and

Analysis

Evaluation Area 4 assesses the ability of

OROs to conduct and analyze field radiation

measurements. It has three sub-elements:

plume phase field measurement and analysis,

post plume phase field measurements and

sampling, and laboratory operations. The

evaluation criteria are similar to those that

appear in REP–14. The proposed evaluation

criterion encourages OROs to utilize

resources offered by federal agencies, where

appropriate.

Evaluation Area 5—Emergency Notification

and Public Information

Evaluation Area 5 looks at the ORO’s

ability to notify the public of an incident and

to effectively communicate protective action

recommendations. It contains two subelements: activation of the prompt alert and

notification system and emergency

information and instructions for the public

and the media.

Proposed criteria 5.a.1, 5.a.2 and 5.a.3

address activation of the prompt alert and

notification system. We believe that the

proposed criteria represent a significant

improvement in exercise methodology over

REP–14. Plume exposure exercises under the

REP–14 methodology have followed a

familiar pattern—they all involved a scenario

that incrementally escalates from a situation

requiring no action by the public to a

situation requiring urgent action by the

public. The REP–14 methodology did not test

the ability of ORO decisionmakers to reach

a decision on activating the prompt alert and

notification system in an atmosphere of

uncertainty. The scenario left no discretion to

the decisionmakers.

Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 remedy

this artificiality by requiring that alert and

notification decisionmaking be tested under

two different scenarios—one in which urgent

action is not immediately required and one

in which it is. Proposed criterion 5.a.1

addresses the situation in which urgent

action by the public is not immediately

required. Proposed criterion 5.a.2 addresses

the situation in which urgent action by the

public is immediately required due to

quickly deteriorating conditions at the plant.

This second scenario is known as the ‘‘fast

breaker.’’

Proposed criterion 5.a.1 requires that the

alert and notification system be activated in

a timely manner following notification to the

ORO by the nuclear power plant of an

incident that requires activation of the alert

and notification system but does not

immediately require urgent action by the

public. Whether decisionmakers initiate the

alert and notification system in a ‘‘timely

manner’’ will be judged in relation to the

scenario. We will also evaluate the quality of

the public notification.

Proposed criterion 5.a.2 requires that

activities associated with the alert and

notification system in a ‘‘fast breaker’’

situation must be completed within fifteen

minutes of the time that the ORO has

received verified notification from the

nuclear power plant of a situation that

immediately requires urgent public action.

The fifteen-minute requirement derives from

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations

which appear at 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix

E.IV.D. Since fast breaking situations are by

their nature unpredictable, FEMA proposes

to evaluate the ‘‘fast breaker’’ response in an

unannounced drill, separate and apart from

regular exercises. OROs will be notified of

the week in which the drill will occur, but

not the specific day or time. The ‘‘fast

breaker’’ drill can occur during off-hours. In

formulating criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2, FEMA

considered comments made at ‘‘fast breaker

workshops’’ during the April 2000 National

Radiological Emergency Preparedness

Conference 28 as well as comments submitted

in the strategic review. We are especially

interested in receiving written comments on

proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 from those

interested in ‘‘fast breaker’’ issues.

Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 do not

address what information must be contained

in an initial instructional memorandum to

the public. Under current FEMA guidance, 29

an initial instructional message must contain

five elements at a minimum. These five

elements include a coded ‘‘Emergency

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31347

30Emergency Classification Levels are a standard

way through which nuclear power plants

communicate the severity of incidents with onsite and offsite responders and regulatory agencies. See,

Planning Standard D, NUREG–0654/REP–1, Rev. 1.

Classification Level’’ 30 and a protective

action recommendation. Concerns have been

expressed in the strategic review process that

disclosure of an Emergency Classification

Level in an initial message does not provide

the public with useful information. Serious

questions have been raised about when a

protective action recommendation must be

made, particularly if evacuation routes need

to be cleared and reception facilities need to

be opened to support a safe and orderly

evacuation. For these reasons, FEMA is

requesting comments in a notice, which

appears in the same edition of the Federal

Register as this one about whether its current

guidance should be changed. We hope to

complete our review of this guidance

contemporaneously with our decision on

whether to implement the proposed Exercise

Evaluation Areas so that any changes

concerning the content of initial messages

can be incorporated into criteria 5.a.1 and

5.a.2.

Proposed criterion 5.a.3 addresses

notification of people living in very remote

areas, also known as ‘‘exception areas,’’ who

are not reached by alert sirens or tone alert

radios. People who reside in exception areas

are notified of an incident by mobile teams

called ‘‘backup route alerting teams.’’

Proposed criterion 5.a.3 is similar to the

REP–14 criterion with respect to notification

of people in ‘‘exception areas.’’

Proposed criterion 5.a.3 also addresses

backup alerting and notification of the

general public in the event of a failure in the

primary alert and notification system.

Criterion 5.a.3 requires that the completion of

backup alerting and notification within 45

minutes of the decision by offsite emergency

officials to notify the public of an emergency

situation. REP–14 required completion of the

notification within ‘‘approximately’’ 45

minutes after the decision. The proposed

criterion more closely conforms to the

requirement set forth in Appendix 3 to

NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1.

Proposed criterion 5.b.1 tests whether

OROs provide accurate emergency

information and instructions to the public

and the news media in a timely fashion.

While FEMA is considering whether

technical information such as Emergency

Classification Levels should be included in

alert and notification system messages, it

believes that this information should be

made available to the news media with a

plain Language explanation. The ORO should

be prepared to explain the Emergency

Classification Level and related technical

information in plain Language during an

exercise.

Evaluation Area 6: Support Operations/

Facilities

Evaluation Area 6 assesses the ability of

OROs to account for, monitor and

decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers,

and emergency worker equipment, to provide

temporary care of evacuees and to assure that

capabilities exist for transporting and treating

injured individuals who have been exposed

to radiation. These competencies are tested

in the four sub-elements associated with

Evaluation Area 6. The proposed Criteria are

consistent with REP–14. While REP–14

establishes a series of prescriptive procedures

that must be followed by the ORO, the

proposed criteria describe the result which

must be obtained, without instructing the

ORO on how to obtain it.

TABLE 1.—COMPARISON OF PROPOSED EVALUATION AREAS WITH NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, REV. 1 PLANNING

CRITERIA AND REP 14/15 OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA

Evaluation area/Sub-element/Criterion NUREG 0654 Criteria REP–14/15 Objective and

Criterion

1—Emergency Operations Management ...................................................................... ............................................. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 30

1.a—Mobilization

1.a.1: OROs use effective proceduresto alert, notify, and mobilize emergency

personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4 ...... 1.1, 1.2; 30

1.b—Facilities

1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response ....................... H.3 ...................................... 2.1

1.c—Direction and Control

1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and

control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

A.1.d; A.2.a, b .................... 3.1

1.d—Communications Equipment

1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available and at least one operates properly, and communication links are established with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.F.1, 2 .................................. 4.1

1.e—Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other

supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

H.7; J.10.a, b, e, J.11;

K.3.a.

2.1; 5.1; 8.2; 14.2

2—Protective Action Decision Making .......................................................................... ............................................. 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28

2.a—Emergency Worker Exposure Control

2.a.1: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and

appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including

the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

J.10.e, f; K.4 ....................... 5.1, 5.3; 14.1

2.b—Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO

dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental

conditions.

I.8,10; Supp. 3 .................... 7.1

2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors

and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions

(PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of

KI, if ORO policy).

J.9; J.10.f, m ...................... 9.1; 14.1

2.c—Protective Action Decisions for the Protection of Special Populations

2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.J.9; J.10. ............................. 9.1; 15.1

31348 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

TABLE 1.—COMPARISON OF PROPOSED EVALUATION AREAS WITH NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, REV. 1 PLANNING

CRITERIA AND REP 14/15 OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA—Continued

Evaluation area/Sub-element/Criterion NUREG 0654 Criteria REP–14/15 Objective and

Criterion

2.d—Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure

Pathway

2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and

appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning

criteria.

J.11 ..................................... 26.1, 26.2

2.e—Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return

2.e.1: Timely relocation re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and

criteria in the ORO’s plan and/or procedures.

M.1 ..................................... 28.1, 28.2, 28.3, 28.4, 28.5

3. Protective Action Implementation .............................................................................. ............................................. 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27,

29

3.a—Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

3.a.1: The OROs issues appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and

procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission

read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure

record or chart.

K.3.a, 3.b ............................ 5.1, 5.2

3.b—Implementation of KI Decision

3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are made available should a decision to

recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

J.10.e .................................. 14.1, 14.3

3.c—Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups

within areas subject to protective actions.

J.10.c, d, g ......................... 15.1, 15.2

3.c.2: ORO/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for

schools.

J.10.c, d, g ......................... 16.1, 16.2, 16.3

3.d—Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions

are provided to traffic and access personnel.

J.10.g, j ............................... 17.1, 17.2, 17.3

3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved .............................. J.10.k .................................. 17.4

3.e—Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate

information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production

within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

J.9,11 .................................. 27.1

3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material

are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated

water, food products, milk, and agricultural production.

E.; J.9,11 ............................ 11.4; 27.2; 27.3

3.f—Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations

and implemented.

M.1, 3 ................................. 29.1, 29.2, 29.3, 29.4

4—Field Measurement and Analysis ............................................................................. ............................................. 6, 8, 24, 25

4.a—Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses

4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine

and particulates.

H.10, I.8, 9 ......................... 6.1; 8.1, 8.2

4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.I.8,11; J.10.a ...................... 6.3, 6.4

4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate

locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will

move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any

significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity

has been collected on the sampling media.

I.9 ....................................... 6.4, 6,5; 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6

4.b—Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.I.8; J.11 .............................. 24.1

4.c—Laboratory Operations

4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to

support protective action decisions.

C.3; J.11 ............................. 25.1, 25.2

5—Emergency Notification and Public Information ................................................ ............................................. 10, 11, 12, 13

5.a—Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31349

TABLE 1.—COMPARISON OF PROPOSED EVALUATION AREAS WITH NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1, REV. 1 PLANNING

CRITERIA AND REP 14/15 OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA—Continued

Evaluation area/Sub-element/Criterion NUREG 0654 Criteria REP–14/15 Objective and

Criterion

5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are

completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum: (1) identification of the State or local government organization and the official with the

authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message; (2) identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement than an emergency situation exists at the plant; (3) reference to REP-specific emergency

information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by

the general public during an emergency; and (4) a closing statement asking

the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

E; E.5, 6.

10.1

5.a.2: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are

completed within 15 minutes of verified notification from the utility of an emergency situation requiring urgent action (fast-breaking situation). The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum: (1) identification of the State or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message; (2) identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement than an emergency situation exists at the plant; (3) reference to REP-specific emergency

information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by

the general public during an emergency; and (4) a closing statement asking

the affected and potentially affected population to say tuned for additional information. In addition, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to contact, in

a timely manner, an authorized offsite decision maker relative to the nature

and severity of the event, in accordance with plans and procedures.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

E; E.5, 6.

10.1

5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes of the initial decision by authorized

offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Appendix 3: B.2.c; E.6 ....... 10.2, 10.3

5.b—Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the

public and the news media in a timely manner.

E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.c ............ 11.1, 11.2, 11.3; 12.1, 12.2;

13.1, 13.2

6—Support Operation/Facilities ..................................................................................... ............................................. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22

6.a—Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and

Registration of Evacuees

6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space,

adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a, b .......... 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5;

22.1, 22.2

6.b—Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment

including vehicles.

K.5.a, b ............................... 22.1; 22.3

6.c—Temporary Care of Evacuees

6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have

resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American

Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been

decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

J.10.h; J.12 ......................... 19.1, 19.2

6.d—Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and

trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1; L.4 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5;

21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4

Replacement of REP–15 With the Evaluation

Module Form

Adoption of the proposed Exercise

Evaluation Areas will render REP–15 which

contains checklists keyed to the 33 REP–14

Objectives obsolete. FEMA plans to utilize

new forms called ‘‘Evaluation Modules’’ in

place of the REP–15 checklists. The

Evaluation Modules will be keyed to the

Exercise Evaluation Areas. A sample

Evaluation Module appears below.

BILLING CODE 6718–06–P

31350 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31351

BILLING CODE 6718–06–C

Implementation of Strategic Review Steering

Committee Recommendation 1.2

The REP–14 objectives are currently

evaluated at the frequency described on

Pages C–2.3 and C–2.4. Adoption of the

proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas will

render these pages obsolete. In Table 2

proposes the minimum frequency with each

of the Exercise Evaluation Areas would be

exercised. FEMA is open to ORO proposals

to voluntarily exercise certain criteria more

frequently than the minimums listed below.

TABLE 2.—FEDERAL EVALUATION PROCESS MATRIX

Proposed evaluation area and sub-elements Consolidates REP–14 objective Minimum frequency

1. Emergency Operations Management ........................................................ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 17, 30 ..

a. Mobilization ......................................................................................... ............................................. Every Exercise.

b. Facilities .............................................................................................. ............................................. Once if new.1

c. Direction and Control .......................................................................... ............................................. Every Exercise.

d. Communications Equipment ............................................................... ............................................. Every Exercise.

e. Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations ................................ ............................................. Every Exercise.

2. Protective Action Decisionmaking .............................................................. 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28 ..

a. Emergency Worker Exposure Control ................................................ ............................................. Every Exercise.

b. Radiological Assessment & Protective Action Recommendations &

Decisions for the Plume Phase of theEmergency.

............................................. Every Exercise.

c. Protective Action Decisions for the Protection of Special Populations ............................................. Every Exercise.

d. Radiological Assessment & Decisionmaking for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2.............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

e. Radiological Assessment & Decisionmaking Concerning Relocation,

Re-entry, and Return 2.

............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

3. Protective Action Implementation ............................................................... 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27,

29.

a. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control .................. ............................................. Every Exercise.

b. Implementation of KI Decision ............................................................ ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

c. Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations ........... ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.3

d. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 4 ................................. ............................................. Every Exercise.

e. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions ................................ ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

f. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions ......... ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

4. Field Measurement and Analysis ............................................................... 6, 8, 24, 25 .........................

a. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis ................................... ............................................. Every Exercise.

b. Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling ..................... ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

c. Laboratory Operations ......................................................................... ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.

5. Emergency Notification and Public Information ......................................... 10, 11, 12, 13 .....................

a.1 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System .................... ............................................. Every Exercise.

31352 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

TABLE 2.—FEDERAL EVALUATION PROCESS MATRIX—Continued

Proposed evaluation area and sub-elements Consolidates REP–14 objective Minimum frequency

a.2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System (Fast Breaking).............................................. Separate Drill once in 6 yrs.

a.3 Notification of exception areas and/or Back-up Alert and Notification System within 45 Minutes.............................................. Every Exercise—as needed.

b. Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public and the Media ............................................. Every Exercise.

6. Support Operations/Facilities ..................................................................... 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 ...............

a. Monitoring & Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers & Registration of Evacuees.............................................. Once in 6 yrs.3

b. Monitoring & Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment 3 ... ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.3

c. Temporary Care of Evacuees 5 ........................................................... ............................................. Once in 6 yrs.5

1Will be evaluated if new or changed substantially.

2The plume phase and the post-plume phase (ingestion, relocation, re-entry and return) can be demonstrated separately.

3All facilities must be evaluated once during the six-year exercise cycle.

4Physical deployment of resources is not necessary.

5Facilities managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), under the ARC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, will be evaluated once when

designated or when substantial changes occur; all other facilities not managed by the ARC must be evaluated once in the six-year exercise

cycle.

Coordination With the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

FEMA conducts and evaluates exercises in

part under authority of a Memorandum of

Understanding with the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. The text of the current

Memorandum of Understanding is published

in Appendix A to 44 CFR Part 353 (2000

edition). Section E of the Memorandum of

Understanding provides that each agency

will provide an opportunity for the other

agency to review and comment on emergency

planning and preparedness guidance

(including interpretations of agreed joint

guidance) prior to adoption as formal agency

guidance. FEMA has transmitted a copy of

this document to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission and requested their comments

no later than the date upon which the public

comment period closes.

Evaluation Area 1—Emergency Operations

Management

Sub-element 1.a—Mobilization

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to alert, notify, and mobilize

emergency personnel and to activate and staff

emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective

procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize

emergency personnel and activate facilities

in a timely manner. (NUREG–0654, A.4; D.3,

4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Extent of Play. Responsible OROs should

demonstrate the capability to receive

notification of an emergency situation from

the licensee, verify the notification, and

contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency

personnel in a timely manner. At each

facility, a roster and/or procedures indicating

24-hour staffing capability for key positions

(those emergency personnel necessary to

carry out critical functions), as indicated in

the plan and/or procedures, should be

provided to the evaluator. Although

demonstration of a shift change is not

required, each ORO shall demonstrate its

ability to transition from an outgoing shift to

an incoming shift without discontinuity in

operations either by having personnel in key

positions briefing the evaluators or their

actual replacements on the current status of

the simulated emergency. In addition,

responsible OROs should demonstrate the

activation of facilities for immediate use by

mobilized personnel when they arrive to

begin emergency operations. Activation of

facilities should be completed in accordance

with the plan and/or procedures. Prepositioning of emergency personnel is

appropriate, in accordance with the extent of

play agreement, at those facilities located

beyond a normal commuting distance from

the individual’s duty location or residence.

Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-ofsequence demonstrations is appropriate in

accordance with the extent of play

agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 1.b—Facilities

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have facilities to

support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to

support the emergency response. (NUREG–

0654, H)

Extent of Play. Facilities will only be

specifically evaluated for this criterion if they

are new or have substantial changes in

structure or mission. Responsible OROs

should demonstrate the availability of

facilities that support the accomplishment of

emergency operations. Some of the areas to

be considered are: adequate space,

furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation,

backup power and/or alternate facility (if

required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the

ORO’s plans and procedures and completed

as they would be in an actual emergency,

unless otherwise indicated in the extent of

play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.c—Direction and Control

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the capability to

control their overall response to an

emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with

leadership roles for the ORO provide

direction and control to that part of the

overall response effort for which they are

responsible. (NUREG–0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)

Extent of Play. Leadership personnel

should demonstrate the ability to carry out

essential functions of the response effort, for

example: keeping the staff informed,

coordinating with other appropriate OROs,

and ensuring completion of requirements and

requests.

All activities associated with direction and

control must be performed based on the

ORO’s plans and procedures and completed

as they would be in an actual emergency,

unless otherwise indicated in the extent of

play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.d—Communications

Equipment

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should establish at least

two reliable communication systems to

ensure communications with key emergency

personnel at locations such as the following:

appropriate contiguous governments within

the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal

emergency response organizations, the

licensee and its facilities, emergency

operations centers (EOC), and field teams.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two

communication systems are available, at least

one operates properly, and communication

links are established and maintained with

appropriate locations. Communications

capabilities are managed in support of

emergency operations. (NUREG–0654, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play. Communications equipment

and procedures for facilities and field units

should be used as needed for the

transmission and receipt of exercise

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31353

messages. All facilities and field teams

should have the capability to access at least

one communication system that is

independent of the commercial telephone

system and uses a separate power source.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the

capability to manage the communication

systems and ensure that all message traffic is

handled without delays that might disrupt

the conduct of emergency operations. OROs

should ensure that a coordinated

communication link for fixed and mobile

medical support facilities exist. The specific

communications capabilities of OROs should

be commensurate with that specified in the

response plan and/or procedures. Exercise

scenarios could require the failure of a

communications system and the use of an

alternate system.

All activities associated with the

management of communications capabilities

must be demonstrated based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 1.e—Equipment and Supplies

to Support Operations

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have emergency

equipment and supplies adequate to support

the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays,

dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other

supplies are sufficient to support emergency

operations. (NUREG–0654, H., J.10.a, b, e, j,

k; j.11; K.3.a)

Extent of Play. Equipment within the

facility (facilities) should be sufficient and

consistent with the role assigned to that

facility in the ORO’s plans and/or procedures

in support of emergency operations. Use of

maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, including air sampling

flow meters (field teams only), should be

inspected, inventoried, and operationally

checked at least once each calendar quarter

and after each use. They should be calibrated

in accordance with the manufacturer’s

recommendations (or at least annually for the

CDV–700 series or if there are no

manufacturer’s recommendations for a

specific instrument). A label indicating such

calibration should be on each instrument or

verifiable by other means. Note: Field team

equipment is evaluated under 4.a.1;

radiological laboratory equipment under

4.c.1; reception center and emergency worker

facilities’ equipment is evaluated under 6.a.1;

and ambulance and medical facilities’

equipment is evaluated under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate directreading and permanent record dosimetry and

dosimeter chargers should be available for

issuance to all categories of emergency

workers that could be deployed from that

facility. Appropriate direct-reading

dosimeters should allow individual(s) to read

the administrative reporting limits and

maximum exposure limits contained in the

ORO’s plans and procedures.

Dosimeters should be inspected for

electrical leakage at least annually and

replaced, if necessary. CDV–138s, due to

their documented history of electrical leakage

problems, should be inspected for electrical

leakage at least quarterly and replaced if

necessary. This leakage testing will be

verified during the exercise, through

documentation submitted in the Annual

Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff

assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the

capability to maintain inventories of KI

sufficient for use by emergency workers, as

indicated on rosters; institutionalized

individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for

facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan

and/or procedures, members of the general

public (including transients) within the

plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available

and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by

physical inspection at storage location(s) or

through documentation of current inventory

submitted during the exercise, provided in

the Annual Letter of Certification

submission, and/or verified during a Staff

Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI

should be within the expiration date

indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As

an alternative, a letter from the drug

manufacturer should be available that

documents a formal extension of the KI

expiration date. Another alternative is for the

ORO to obtain approval from FEMA based on

a certified independent laboratory testing to

extend the shelf life.

At locations where traffic and access

control personnel are deployed, appropriate

equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic

cones and signs, etc.) should be available or

their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Evaluation Area 2—Protective Action

Decision-Making

Sub-Element 2.a—Emergency Worker

Exposure Control

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that an Offsite

Response Organizations (ORO) have the

capability to assess and control the radiation

exposure received by emergency workers and

have a decision chain in place as specified

in the ORO’s plans and procedures to

authorize emergency worker exposure limits

to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency

workers are the recommended accumulated

dose limits or exposure rates that emergency

workers may be permitted to incur during an

emergency. These limits include any preestablished administrative reporting limits

(that take into consideration Total Effective

Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits)

identified in the ORO’s plans and

procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decisionmaking process, considering relevant factors

and appropriate coordination, to ensure that

an exposure control system, including the

use of KI, is in place for emergency workers

including provisions to authorize radiation

exposure in excess of administrative limits or

protective action guides. (NUREG–0654, K.4,

J.10. e, f)

Extent of Play. OROs authorized to send

emergency workers into the plume exposure

pathway EPZ should demonstrate the

following capabilities on the basis of

information in the emergency plan: (1)

Determination of radiation exposure limits to

be authorized for emergency workers; (2)

appropriate decision making, based on

projected doses and in accordance with

emergency workers’ exposure limits, as to

whether or not to send emergency workers to

areas within the plume exposure pathway

EPZ; (3) establishment of procedures to allow

emergency workers to voluntarily choose to

enter the plume exposure pathway EPZ

where radiation levels may expose

individuals to higher than pre-authorized

exposures for lifesaving missions, to protect

valuable property, or to protect large

populations; and (4) use of a KI decisionmaking process that involves close

coordination between appropriate assessment

and decision-making staff.

Whenever emergency personnel are

planning to undertake an operation, it is

essential that the best estimate of the

situation be known by the personnel

directing the operation. All sources of

information, including projected exposure

rate patterns, should be considered and a best

estimate made of the exposure likely to be

received during a specific mission. The

mission must be planned by taking into

consideration the most likely situation as

well as the most potentially hazardous

situation. Items to be considered include

alternative entry and exit routes, potential

changes in meteorological conditions, areas

or roads to be avoided, equipment and

vehicle failure, and other relevant items.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the

capability to make decisions concerning the

authorization of exposure levels in excess of

pre-authorized levels and to manage the

number of emergency workers receiving

radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate

the capability to make decisions on the

distribution and administration of KI, as a

protective measure, based on the ORO’s plan

and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose

compared with the established PAGs for KI

administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 2.b.—Radiological Assessment

and Protective Action Recommendations and

Decisions for the Plume Phase of the

Emergency

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which indicates that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the capability to

independently project integrated dose from

exposure rates or other information and

compare the estimated dose savings with the

protective action guides. OROs have the

capability to choose, among a range of

31354 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

protective actions, those most appropriate in

a given emergency situation. OROs base these

choices on PAGs from the ORO’s plans and

procedures or EPA 400–R–92–001 and other

criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee

protective action recommendations,

coordination of protective action decisions

with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other

affected OROs), availability of appropriate inplace shelter, weather conditions, evacuation

time estimates, and situations that create

higher than normal risk from evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective

action recommendations are based on

available information on plant conditions,

field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO

dose projections, as well as knowledge of

onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

(NUREG–0654, I.8, 10, 11 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play. During the initial stage of

the emergency response, following

notification of plant conditions that may

warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO

should demonstrate the capability to use

appropriate means, described in the plan

and/or procedures, to develop protective

action recommendations (PAR) for decisionmakers based on available information and

recommendations from the licensee, and

field monitoring data, if available.

When release and meteorological data are

provided by the licensee, the ORO also

considers these data. The ORO should

demonstrate a reliable capability to

independently validate dose projections. The

types of calculations to be demonstrated

depend on the data available and the need for

assessments to support the PARs appropriate

to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of

projected dose should be demonstrated.

Projected doses should be related to

quantities and units of the PAG to which

they will be compared. PARs should be

promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a

prearranged format.

Differences greater than a factor of 10

between projected doses by the licensee and

the ORO should be discussed with the

licensee with respect to the input data and

assumptions used, the use of different

models, or other possible reasons. Resolution

of these differences should be incorporated

into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The

ORO should demonstrate the capability to

use any additional data to refine projected

doses and exposure rates and revise the

associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process

involving consideration of appropriate

factors and necessary coordination is used to

make protective action decisions (PAD) for

the general public (including the

recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO

policy). (NUREG–0654, J.9, 10.m)

Extent of Play. Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to make both initial and

subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate

the capability to make initial PADs in a

timely manner appropriate to the situation,

based on notification from the licensee,

assessment of plant status and releases, and

PARs from the utility and ORO staff.

The dose assessment personnel may

provide additional PARs based on the

subsequent dose projections, field monitoring

data, or information on plant conditions. The

decision-makers should demonstrate the

capability to change protective actions as

appropriate based on these projections.

Where specified in the plan and/or

procedures, responsible OROs should

demonstrate the capability to make decisions

on the distribution and administration of KI

as a protective measure. This decision should

be based on the ORO’s plan and/or

procedures or projected thyroid dose

compared with the established PAG for KI

administration. The KI decision-making

process should involve close coordination

with appropriate assessment and decisionmaking staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in

decision-making, OROs should communicate

and coordinate PADs with affected OROs.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

communicate the contents of decisions to the

affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by ORO

personnel must be performed based on the

ORO’s plans and procedures and completed

as they would be in an actual emergency,

unless otherwise indicated in the extent of

play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.c—Protective Action

Decisions Consideration for the Protection of

Special Populations

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to determine protective action

recommendations, including evacuation,

sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI),

if applicable, for special population groups

(e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional

facilities, schools, licensed day care centers,

mobility impaired individuals, and

transportation dependent individuals). Focus

is on those special population groups that are

(or potentially will be) affected by a

radiological release from a nuclear power

plant.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions

are made, as appropriate, for special

population groups. (NUREG–0654, J.9, J.10.c,

d, e, g)

Extent of Play. Usually, it is appropriate to

implement evacuation in areas where doses

are projected to exceed the lower end of the

range of PAGs, except for situations where

there is a high-risk environment or where

high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or

infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples

of factors that should be considered are:

weather conditions, shelter availability,

Evacuation Time Estimates, availability of

transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs.

risk from the avoided dose, and

precautionary school evacuations. In

situations where an institutionalized

population cannot be evacuated, the

administration of KI should be considered by

the OROs.

All decision-making activities associated

with protective actions, including

consideration of available resources, for

special population groups must be based on

the ORO’s plans and procedures and

completed as they would be in an actual

emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the

extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.d.—Radiological Assessment

and Decision-Making for the Ingestion

Exposure Pathway

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the means to

assess the radiological consequences for the

ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to

the appropriate PAGs, and make timely,

appropriate protective action decisions to

mitigate exposure from the ingestion

pathway.

During an accident at a nuclear power

plant, a release of radioactive material may

contaminate water supplies and agricultural

products in the surrounding areas. Any such

contamination would likely occur during the

plume phase of the accident, and depending

on the nature of the release could impact the

ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences

for the ingestion pathway are assessed and

appropriate protective action decisions are

made based on the ORO planning criteria.

(NUREG–0654, I.8, 10; J.11)

Extent of Play. It is expected that the

Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) will

take precautionary actions to protect food

and water supplies, or to minimize exposure

to potentially contaminated water and food,

in accordance with their respective plans and

procedures. Often such precautionary actions

are initiated by the OROs based on criteria

related to the facility’s emergency

classification levels (ECL). Such actions may

include recommendations to place milk

animals on stored feed and to use protected

water supplies.

The ORO should use its procedures (for

example, development of a sampling plan) to

assess the radiological consequences of a

release on the food and water supplies. The

ORO assessment should include the

evaluation of the radiological analyses of

representative samples of water, food, and

other ingestible substances of local interest

from potentially impacted areas, the

characterization of the releases from the

facility, and the extent of areas potentially

impacted by the release. During this

assessment, OROs should consider the use of

agricultural and watershed data within the

50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the

food and water should then be compared to

the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in

the ORO’s plan and/or procedures. (The plan

and/or procedures may contain PAGs based

on specific dose commitment criteria or

based on criteria as recommended by current

Food and Drug Administration guidance.)

Timely and appropriate recommendations

should be provided to the ORO decisionmakers group for implementation decisions.

As time permits, the ORO may also include

a comparison of taking or not taking a given

action on the resultant ingestion pathway

dose commitments.

The ORO should demonstrate timely

decisions to minimize radiological impacts

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31355

from the ingestion pathway, based on the

given assessments and other information

available. Any such decisions should be

communicated and to the extent practical,

coordinated with neighboring and local

OROs.

OROs should use Federal resources, as

identified in the Federal Radiological

Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and

other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear

insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this

criterion will take into consideration the

level of Federal and other resources

participating.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 2.e.—Radiological Assessment

and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation,

Re-entry, and Return

Intent

The sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the capability to

make decisions on relocation, re-entry, and

return of the general public. These decisions

are essential for the protection of the public

from the direct long-term exposure to

deposited radioactive materials from a severe

accident at a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry,

and return decisions are made and

coordinated as appropriate, based on

assessments of the radiological conditions

and criteria in the ORO’s plan and/or

procedures. (NUREG–0654, A.1.b; I.10; M)

Extent of Play.

• Relocation: OROs should demonstrate

the capability to estimate integrated dose in

contaminated areas and to compare these

estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria

for relocation of those individuals in the

general public who have not been evacuated

but where projected doses are in excess of

relocation PAGs, and control access to

evacuated and restricted areas. Decisions are

made for relocating members of the

evacuated public who lived in areas that now

have residual radiation levels in excess of the

PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted

should be based on factors such as the mix

of radionuclides in deposited materials,

calculated exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and

field samples of vegetation and soil analyses.

• Re-entry: Decisions should be made

regarding the location of control points and

policies regarding access and exposure

control for emergency workers and members

of the general public who need to

temporarily enter the evacuated area to

perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are: the

assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading

and non direct-reading dosimeters for

emergency workers; questions regarding the

individual’s objectives and locations

expected to be visited and associated time

frames; availability of maps and plots of

radiation exposure rates; advice on areas to

avoid; and procedures for exit including:

monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and

equipment; decision criteria regarding

decontamination; and proper disposition of

emergency worker dosimeters and

maintenance of emergency worker radiation

exposure records.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the

capability to develop a strategy for

authorized re-entry of individuals into the

restricted zone, based on established decision

criteria. OROs should demonstrate the

capability to modify those policies for

security purposes (e.g., police patrols), for

maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire

protection and utilities), and for other critical

functions. They should demonstrate the

capability to use decision making criteria in

allowing access to the restricted zone by the

public for various reasons, such as to

maintain property (e.g., to care for farm

animals or secure machinery for storage), or

to retrieve important possessions.

Coordinated policies for access and exposure

control should be developed among all

agencies with roles to perform in the

restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate

the capability to establish policies for

provision of dosimetry to all individuals

allowed to re-enter the restricted zone. The

extent that OROs need to develop policies on

re-entry will be determined by scenario

events.

• Return: Decisions are to be based on

environmental data and political boundaries

or physical/geological features, which allow

identification of the boundaries of areas to

which members of the general public may

return. Return is permitted to the boundary

of the restricted area that is based on the

relocation PAG. Other factors that the ORO

should consider are, for example: conditions

that permit the cancellation of the emergency

classification level and the relaxation of

associated restrictive measures; basing return

recommendations (i.e., permitting

populations that were previously evacuated

to reoccupy their homes and businesses on

an unrestricted basis) on measurements of

radiation from ground deposition; and the

capability to identify services and facilities

that require restoration within a few days and

to identify the procedures and resources for

their restoration. Examples of these services

and facilities are: medical and social services,

utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate

term housing for relocated persons.

Evaluation Area 3—Protective Action

Implementation

Sub-Element 3.a—Implementation of

Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to provide for the following:

distribution, use, collection, and processing

of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent

record dosimeters; provide for direct-reading

dosimeters to be read at appropriate

frequencies by emergency workers; maintain

a radiation dose record for each emergency

worker; and provide for establishing a

decision chain or authorization procedure for

emergency workers to incur radiation

exposures in excess of protective action

guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low

As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as

appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue

appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and

manage radiological exposure to emergency

workers in accordance with the plans and

procedures. Emergency workers periodically

and at the end of each mission read their

dosimeters and record the readings on the

appropriate exposure record or chart.

(NUREG–0654, K.3)

Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate

the capability to provide appropriate directreading and permanent record dosimetry,

dosimetry chargers, and instructions on the

use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For

evaluation purposes, appropriate directreading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry

that allows individual(s) to read the

administrative reporting limits (that are preestablished at a level low enough to consider

subsequent calculation of Total Effective

Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure

limits (for those emergency workers involved

in life saving activities) contained in the

OROs plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the

basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits

as specified in the ORO’s plan and/or

procedures. Procedures to monitor and

record dosimeter readings and to manage

radiological exposure control should be

demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency

workers should demonstrate the procedures

to be followed when administrative exposure

limits and turn-back values are reached. The

emergency worker should report

accumulated exposures during the exercise

as indicated in the plans and procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the actions

described in the plan and/or procedures by

determining whether to replace the worker,

to authorize the worker to incur additional

exposures or to take other actions. If scenario

events do not require emergency workers to

seek authorizations for additional exposure,

evaluators should interview at least two

emergency workers, to determine their

knowledge of whom to contact in the event

authorization is needed and at what exposure

levels. Emergency workers may use any

available resources (e.g., written procedures

and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency

workers to each have a direct-reading

dosimeter, there may be situations where

team members will be in close proximity to

each other during the entire mission and

adequate control of exposure can be effected

for all members of the team by one dosimeter

worn by the team leader. Emergency workers

who are assigned to low exposure rate areas,

e.g., at reception centers, counting

laboratories, emergency operations centers,

and communications centers, may have

individual direct-reading dosimeters or they

may be monitored by dosimeters strategically

placed in the work area. It should be noted

that, even in these situations, each team

member must still have their own permanent

record dosimeter. Individuals without

specific radiological response missions, such

as farmers for animal care, essential utility

service personnel, or other members of the

public who must re-enter an evacuated area

following or during the plume passage,

should be limited to the lowest radiological

31356 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

exposure commensurate with completing

their missions.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 3.b—Implementation of KI

Decision

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to provide radioprotective drugs

for emergency workers, institutionalized

individuals, and, if in the plan and/or

procedures, to the general public for whom

immediate evacuation may not be feasible,

very difficult, or significantly delayed. While

it is necessary for OROs to have the

capability to provide KI to emergency

workers and institutionalized individuals,

the provision of KI to the general public is

an ORO option and is reflected in ORO’s

plans and procedures. Provisions should

include the availability of adequate

quantities, storage, and means of the

distribution of radioprotective drugs.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate

instructions are available should a decision

to recommend use of KI be made.

Appropriate record keeping of the

administration of KI for emergency workers

and institutionalized individuals (not the

general public) is maintained. (NUREG–0654,

E. 7, J. 10. e, f)

Extent of Play. Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the

capability to make KI available to emergency

workers, institutionalized individuals, and,

where provided for in the ORO plan and/or

procedures, to members of the general public.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

accomplish distribution of KI consistent with

decisions made. Organizations should have

the capability to develop and maintain lists

of emergency workers and institutionalized

individuals who have ingested KI, including

documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they

were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of

KI recommended by the designated ORO

health official is voluntary. For evaluation

purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not

necessary. OROs should demonstrate the

capability to formulate and disseminate

appropriate instructions on the use of KI for

those advised to take it. If a recommendation

is made for the general public to take KI,

appropriate information should be provided

to the public by the means of notification

specified in the ORO’s plan and/or

procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate

the basic knowledge of procedures for the use

of KI whether or not the scenario drives the

use of KI. This can be accomplished by an

interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 3.c—Implementation of

Protective Actions for Special Populations

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to implement protective action

decisions, including evacuation and/or

sheltering, for all special populations. Focus

is on those special populations that are (or

potentially will be) affected by a radiological

release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions

are implemented for special populations

other than schools within areas subject to

protective actions. (NUREG–0654, E.7; J.9,

10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should

demonstrate the capability to alert and notify

(e.g., provide protective action

recommendations and emergency

information and instructions) special

populations (hospitals, nursing homes,

correctional facilities, mobility impaired

individuals, transportation dependent, etc.).

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

provide for the needs of special populations

in accordance with the ORO’s plans and

procedures.

Contact with special populations and

reception facilities may be actual or

simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play.

At least 1⁄3 of transportation providers

(including special resources for disabled

individuals) must be actually contacted

during each exercise. All actual and

simulated contacts should be logged.

All implementing activities associated with

protective actions for special populations

must be based on the ORO’s plans and

procedures and completed as they would be

in an actual emergency, unless otherwise

indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials

decide upon and implement protective

actions for schools. (NUREG–0654, J.10.c, d,

g)

Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should

demonstrate the capability to alert and notify

all public schools, licensed day care centers,

and participating private schools within the

emergency planning zone of emergency

conditions that are expected to or may

necessitate protective actions for students.

In accordance with plans and/or

procedures, OROs and/or officials of

participating public and private schools and

licensed day care centers should demonstrate

the capability to make and implement

prompt decisions on protective actions for

students. Officials should demonstrate that

the decision making process for protective

actions considers (e.g., either accepts

automatically or gives heavy weight to)

protective action recommendations made by

ORO personnel, the ECL at which these

recommendations are received, preplanned

strategies for protective actions for that ECL,

and the location of students at the time (e.g.,

whether the students are still at home, en

route to the school, or at the school).

Implementation of protective actions

should be completed subject to the following

provisions: At least one school in each

affected school system or district, as

appropriate, needs to demonstrate the

implementation of protective actions. The

implementation of canceling the school day,

dismissing early, or sheltering should be

simulated by describing to evaluators the

procedures that would be followed. If

evacuation is the implemented protective

action, all activities to coordinate and

complete the evacuation of students to

reception centers, congregate care centers, or

host schools may actually be demonstrated or

accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview

process, appropriate school personnel

including decision making officials (e.g.,

superintendent/principal, transportation

director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus

driver should be available to demonstrate

knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation

of school children. Communications

capabilities between school officials and the

buses, if required by the plan and/or

procedures, should be verified.

Officials of the participating school(s) or

school system(s) should demonstrate the

capability to develop and provide timely

information to OROs for use in messages to

parents, the general public, and the media on

the status of protective actions for schools.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

specified above or indicated in the extent of

play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.d.—Implementation of Traffic

and Access Control

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the capability to

implement protective action plans, including

relocation and restriction of access to

evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element

focuses on selecting, establishing, and

staffing of traffic and access control points

and removal of impediments to the flow of

evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and

access control is established. Accurate

instructions are provided to traffic and access

control personnel. (NUREG–0654, J.10.g, j, k)

Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate

the capability to select, establish, and staff

appropriate traffic and access control points,

consistent with protective action decisions

(for example, evacuating,sheltering, and

relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should

demonstrate the capability to provide

instructions to traffic and access control staff

on actions to take when modifications in

protective action strategies necessitate

changes in evacuation patterns or in the

area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should

demonstrate accurate knowledge of their

roles and responsibilities. This capability

may be demonstrated by actual deployment

or by interview in accordance with the extent

of play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority

necessary to control access by certain types

of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they

should demonstrate the capability to contact

the State or Federal agencies with authority

to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31357

would be in an actual emergency, unless

specified above or indicated in the extent of

play agreement.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation

are identified and resolved. (NUREG–0654,

J.10.k)

Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate

the capability, as required by the scenario, to

identify and take appropriate actions

concerning impediments to evacuation.

Actual dispatch of resources to deal with

impediments, such as wreckers, need not be

demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual

or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

specified above or indicated in the extent of

play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.e—Implementation of

Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to implement protective actions,

based on criteria recommended by current

Food and Drug Administration guidance, for

the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ), the area

within an approximate 50-mile radius of the

nuclear power plant. This sub-element

focuses on those actions required for

implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the

availability and appropriate use of adequate

information regarding water, food supplies,

milk, and agricultural production within the

ingestion exposure pathway emergency

planning zone for implementation of

protective actions. NUREG–0654, J.9, 11)

Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should

demonstrate the capability to secure and

utilize current information on the locations

of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers,

fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers,

grain producers, food processing plants, and

water supply intake points to implement

protective actions within the ingestion

pathway EPZ. OROs should use Federal

resources as identified in the FRERP, and

other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear

insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this

criterion will take into consideration the

level of Federal and other resources

participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures,

strategies, and pre-printed instructional

material are developed for implementing

protective action decisions for contaminated

water, food products, milk, and agricultural

production. (NUREG–0654, E.5, 7; J.9, 11)

Extent of Play. Development of measures

and strategies for implementation of IPZ

protective actions should be demonstrated

during exercise play by formulation of

protective action information for the general

public and food producers and processors.

This includes the capability for the rapid

reproduction and distribution of appropriate

pre-printed information and instructions to

pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

control, restrict or prevent distribution of

contaminated food by commercial sectors.

Exercise play should include demonstration

of communications and coordination

between organizations to implement

protective actions. However, actual field play

of implementation activities may be

simulated. For example, communications

and coordination with agencies responsible

for enforcing food controls within the IPZ

should be demonstrated, but actual

communications with food producers and

processors may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-element 3.f—Implementation of

Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the

capability to implement plans, procedures,

and decisions for relocation, re-entry, and

return. Implementation of these decisions is

essential for the protection of the public from

the direct long-term exposure to deposited

radioactive materials from a severe accident

at a commercial nuclear power plant.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding

controlled re-entry of emergency workers and

relocation and return of the public are

coordinated with appropriate organizations

and implemented. (NUREG–0654, M.1, 3)

Extent of Play.

• Relocation: OROs should demonstrate

the capability to coordinate and implement

decisions concerning relocation of

individuals, not previously evacuated, to an

area where radiological contamination will

not expose the general public to doses that

exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs should

also demonstrate the capability to provide for

short-term or long-term relocation of

evacuees who lived in areas that have

residual radiation levels above the PAGs.

Areas of consideration should include the

capability to communicate with OROs

regarding timing of actions, notification of

the population of the procedures for

relocation, and the notification of, and advice

for, evacuated individuals who will be

converted to relocation status in situations

where they will not be able to return to their

homes due to high levels of contamination.

OROs should also demonstrate the capability

to communicate instructions to the public

regarding relocation decisions.

• Re-entry: OROs should demonstrate the

capability to control re-entry and exit of

individuals who need to temporarily re-enter

the restricted area, to protect them from

unnecessary radiation exposure and for exit

of vehicles and other equipment to control

the spread of contamination outside the

restricted area. Monitoring and

decontamination facilities will be established

as appropriate.

Examples of control procedure subjects are:

(1) The assignment of, or checking for, directreading and non-direct-reading dosimeters

for emergency workers; (2) questions

regarding the individuals’ objectives and

locations expected to be visited and

associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of

radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas

to avoid; and procedures for exit, including

monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and

equipment, decision criteria regarding

contamination, proper disposition of

emergency worker dosimeters, and

maintenance of emergency worker radiation

exposure records.

• Return: OROs should demonstrate the

capability to implement policies concerning

return of members of the public to areas that

were evacuated during the plume phase.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

identify and prioritize services and facilities

that require restoration within a few days,

and to identify the procedures and resources

for their restoration. Examples of these

services and facilities are medical and social

services, utilities, roads, schools, and

intermediate term housing for relocated

persons.

Communications among OROs for

relocation, re-entry, and return may be

simulated; however all simulated or actual

contacts should be documented. These

discussions may be accomplished in a group

setting.

OROs should use Federal resources as

identified in the FRERP, and other resources

(e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if

available. Evaluation of this criterion will

take into consideration the level of Federal

and other resources participating in the

exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Evaluation Area 4—Field Measurement And

Analysis

Sub-Element 4.a—Plume Phase Field

Measurements and Analyses

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to deploy field teams with the

equipment, methods, and expertise necessary

to determine the location of airborne

radiation and particulate deposition on the

ground from an airborne plume. In addition,

NUREG–0654 indicates that OROs should

have the capability to use field teams within

the plume emergency planning zone to

measure airborne radioiodine in the presence

of noble gases and to measure radioactive

particulate material in the airborne plume. In

the event of an accident at a nuclear power

plant, the possible release of radioactive

material may pose a risk to the nearby

population and environment. Although

accident assessment methods are available to

project the extent and magnitude of a release,

these methods are subject to large

uncertainties. During an accident, it is

important to collect field radiological data in

order to help characterize any radiological

release. This does not imply that plume

exposure projections should be made from

31358 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

the field data. Adequate equipment and

procedures are essential to such field

measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are

equipped to perform field measurements of

direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground

shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine

and particulates. (NUREG–0654, H.10; I.7, 8,

9, 11)

Extent of Play. Field teams should be

equipped with all instrumentation and

supplies necessary to accomplish their

mission. This should include instruments

capable of measuring gamma exposure rates

and detecting the presence of beta radiation.

These instruments should be capable of

measuring a range of activity and exposure

consistent with the intended use of the

instrument and the ORO’s plans and

procedures, including radiological

protection/exposure control of team members

and detection of activity on the air sample

collection media. An appropriate radioactive

check source should be used to verify proper

operational response for each low range

radiation measurement instrument (less than

1 R/hr) and for high range instruments when

available. If a source is not available for a

high range instrument, a procedure should

exist to operationally test the instrument

before entering an area where only a high

range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to

obtain sufficient information to help

characterize the release and to control

radiation exposure. (NUREG–0654, H.12; I.8,

11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play. Responsible Offsite

Response Organizations (ORO) should

demonstrate the capability to brief teams on

predicted plume location and direction,

travel speed, and exposure control

procedures before deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help

characterize the release and to support the

adequacy of implemented protective actions

or to be a factor in modifying protective

actions. Teams should be directed to take

measurements in such locations, at such

times to provide information sufficient to

characterize the plume and impacts.

If the responsibility to obtain peak

measurements in the plume has been

accepted by licensee field monitoring teams,

with concurrence from OROs, there is no

requirement for these measurements to be

repeated by State and local monitoring teams.

The sharing and coordination of plume

measurement information among all field

teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is

essential. Coordination concerning transfer of

samples, including a chain-of-custody form,

to a radiological laboratory should be

demonstrated. OROs should use Federal

resources as identified in the Federal

Radiological Emergency Response Plan

(FRERP), and other resources (e.g., compacts,

utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this

criterion will take into consideration the

level of Federal and other resources

participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation

measurements are made and recorded at

appropriate locations, and radioiodine and

particulate samples are collected. Teams will

move to an appropriate low background

location to determine whether any significant

(as specified in the plan and/or procedures)

amount of radioactivity has been collected on

the sampling media. (NUREG–0654, I.7, 8, 9,

11)

Extent of Play. Field teams should

demonstrate the capability to report

measurements and field data pertaining to

the measurement of airborne radioiodine and

particulates and ambient radiation to the

field team coordinator, dose assessment, or

other appropriate authority. If samples have

radioactivity significantly above background,

the appropriate authority should consider the

need for expedited laboratory analyses of

these samples. Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should share data in a

timely manner with all appropriate OROs.

All methodology, including contamination

control, instrumentation, preparation of

samples, and a chain-of-custody form for

transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance

with the ORO plan and/or procedures. OROs

should use Federal resources as identified in

the FRERP, and other resources (e.g.,

compacts, utility, etc.), if available.

Evaluation of this criterion will take into

consideration the level of Federal and other

resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 4.b—Post Plume Phase Field

Measurements and Sampling

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that OROs should have

the capability to assess the actual or potential

magnitude and locations of radiological

hazards in the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ)

and for relocation, re-entry and return

measures. This sub-element focuses on the

collection of environmental samples for

laboratory analyses that are essential for

decisions on protection of the public from

contaminated food and water and direct

radiation from deposited materials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams

demonstrate the capability to make

appropriate measurements and to collect

appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk,

water, vegetation, and soil) to support

adequate assessments and protective action

decision-making. (NUREG–0654, H.12; I.8;

J.10.a, 11)

Extent of Play. The Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) field teams should

demonstrate the capability to take

measurements and samples, at such times

and locations as directed, to enable an

adequate assessment of the ingestion

pathway and to support re-entry, relocation,

and return decisions. When resources are

available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ

gamma measurement is appropriate. All

methodology, including contamination

control, instrumentation, preparation of

samples, and a chain-of-custody form for

transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance

with the ORO plan and/or procedures.

Ingestion pathway samples should be

secured from agricultural products and

water. Samples in support of relocation and

return should be secured from soil,

vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that

received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs should use Federal resources as

identified in the FRERP, and other resources

(e.g., compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.),

if available. Evaluation of this criterion will

take into consideration the level of Federal

and other resources participating in the

exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 4.c—Laboratory Operations

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to perform laboratory analyses of

radioactivity in air, liquid, and

environmental samples to support protective

action decision-making.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of

performing required radiological analyses to

support protective action decisions.

(NUREG–0654, C.3; I.8, 9; J.11)

Extent of Play. The laboratory staff should

demonstrate the capability to follow

appropriate procedures for receiving

samples, including logging of information,

preventing contamination of the laboratory,

preventing buildup of background radiation

due to stored samples, preventing cross

contamination of samples, preserving

samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and

keeping track of sample identity. In addition,

the laboratory staff should demonstrate the

capability to prepare samples for conducting

measurements.

The laboratory should be appropriately

equipped to provide analyses of media, as

requested, on a timely basis, of sufficient

quality and sensitivity to support

assessments and decisions as anticipated by

the ORO’s plans and procedures. The

laboratory (laboratories) instrument

calibrations should be traceable to standards

provided by the National Institute of

Standards and Technology. Laboratory

methods used to analyze typical

radionuclides released in a reactor incident

should be as described in the plans and

procedures. New or revised methods may be

used to analyze atypical radionuclide

releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a

terrorist event) or if warranted by

circumstances of the event. Analysis may

require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff should be qualified in

radioanalytical techniques and

contamination control procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources as

identified in the FRERP, and other resources

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31359

(e.g., compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.),

if available. Evaluation of this criterion will

take into consideration the level of Federal

and other resources participating in the

exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO’s

plans and procedures and completed as they

would be in an actual emergency, unless

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Evaluation Area 5—Emergency Notification

and Public Information

Sub-Element 5.a—Activation of the Prompt

Alert and Notification System

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to provide prompt instructions to

the public within the plume pathway EPZ.

Specific provisions addressed in this subelement are derived from the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations

(10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.), and

FEMA-REP–10, ‘‘Guide for the Evaluation of

Alert and Notification systems for Nuclear

Power Plants.’’

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with

primary alerting and notification of the

public are completed in a timely manner

following the initial decision by authorized

offsite emergency officials to notify the

public of an emergency situation. The initial

instructional message to the public must

include as a minimum the elements required

by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part

50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG–0654, E. 1,

4, 5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play. Responsible Offsite

Response Organizations (ORO) should

demonstrate the capability to sequentially

provide an alert signal followed by an initial

instructional message to populated areas

(permanent resident and transient)

throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ.

Following the decision to activate the alert

and notification system, in accordance with

the ORO’s plan and/or procedures,

completion of system activation should be

accomplished in a timely manner (will not be

subject to specific time requirements) for

primary alerting/notification. The initial

message should include the elements

required by current FEMA REP guidance.

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as

‘‘the responsible ORO personnel/

representatives demonstrate actions to

disseminate the appropriate information/

instructions with a sense of urgency and

without undue delay.’’ If message

dissemination is to be identified as not

having been accomplished in a timely

manner, the evaluator(s) will document a

specific delay or cause as to why a message

was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message

should be fully demonstrated as they would

in an actual emergency up to the point of

transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or

test messages is not required. The alert signal

activation may be simulated. However, the

procedures should be demonstrated up to the

point of actual activation. The capability of

the primary notification system to broadcast

an instructional message on a 24-hour basis

should be verified during an interview with

appropriate personnel from the primary

notification system.

All activities for this criterion must be

based on the ORO’s plans and procedures

and completed as they would be in an actual

emergency, except as noted above or

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Criterion 5.a.2: After the State and local

governmental agency (agencies) point of

contact is notified by the licensee of the

situation requiring urgent action, activities

associated with primary alerting and

notification of the public in the event of an

emergency situation requiring urgent action

(a fast-breaking situation) are completed in

one of the two following ways:

(1) The State and local governmental

agency (agencies) point of contact has 15

minutes from verified notification by the

licensee in which to complete primary

alerting and notification of the public. In

addition, the initial point of contact must

demonstrate the capability to contact, in a

timely manner, an authorized offsite

decision-maker relative to the nature and

severity of the event, in accordance with

plans and procedures.

(2) The State and local governmental

agency (agencies) point of contact promptly

(in a timely manner) notifies State and local

official(s) of the situation requiring urgent

action, who then have 15 minutes in which

to complete primary alerting and notification

of the public.

The initial instructional message to the

public must include the elements required by

current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part

50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG–0654, E. 1,

3, 5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play. The ORO’s capability to

meet this criterion must be evaluated at least

once every six years during a fast breaker

drill. The ORO’s established fast-breaking

incident procedures will be evaluated. When

the ORO’s point of contact is notified by the

licensee of an emergency situation requiring

urgent action, the applicable ORO should

demonstrate the capability to sequentially

provide an alert signal followed by an initial

instructional message to populated areas

(permanent resident and transient)

throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ

in one of the following two ways:

(1) The State and local governmental

agency (agencies) point of contact

demonstrates the capability to sequentially

provide an alert signal followed by an initial

instructional message to populated areas

(permanent resident and transient)

throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ

within 15 minutes of verified notification

from the utility that a situation exists

requiring urgent action. The initial

instructional message should include the

elements required by current FEMA REP

guidance. The ‘‘clock’’ will start when the

transmission of an initial notification of a

General Emergency and a protective action

recommendation from the utility is

completed and verified. Within 15 minutes,

actual contact of the primary notification

system facility (facilities) and dissemination

of the initial message to the public should be

demonstrated; this is when the ‘‘clock’’ will

stop.

Broadcast of the message may be

simulated; however, once again, all activities

leading to that point should be demonstrated.

In addition, the ORO(s) should demonstrate

the capability to contact, in a timely manner,

an authorized offsite decision-maker relative

to the nature and severity of the event, in

accordance with plans and procedures. This

contact may occur either prior to, or

immediately subsequent to, activation of the

primary alerting and notification system.

Although it must be accomplished in a

timely manner, contact of the decision-maker

does not have to be completed within the 15-

minute timeframe discussed above. The drill

will be terminated when the alert signal

activation (simulated) is initiated, the

broadcast (simulated) is initiated by the

primary notification system facility

(facilities), and an authorized offsite

decision-maker has been contacted.

(2) The State and local governmental

agency (agencies) point of contact

demonstrates the capability to promptly (in

a timely manner) notify State and local

official(s) of the situation requiring urgent

action, who then must sequentially provide

an alert signal followed by an initial

instructional message to populated areas

(permanent resident and transient)

throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ

within 15 minutes of notification by the

point of contact. The initial instructional

message should include the elements

required by current FEMA REP guidance.

The ‘‘clock’’ will start when the transmission

of an initial notification of a situation

requiring urgent action is received by the

State and local governmental official(s).

Within 15 minutes, actual contact of the

primary notification system facility

(facilities) and dissemination of the initial

message to the public should be

demonstrated; this is when the ‘‘clock’’ will

stop. Broadcast of the message may be

simulated; however, once again, all activities

leading to that point should be demonstrated.

The drill will be terminated when the alert

signal activation (simulated) is initiated and

the broadcast (simulated) is initiated by the

primary notification system facility

(facilities).

The drill will be scheduled to be

conducted ‘‘Unannounced’’ within a oneweek window. The evaluators and controllers

for each jurisdiction will be briefed in detail

concerning the extent of play and timing of

the drill. Evaluators and controllers will be

stationed at each location where actions will

be initiated, where alert signals are

controlled, and at the applicable primary

notification system facility (facilities). The

actual activation of the alert signal may be

simulated; however, all activities leading up

to activation should be demonstrated and

should be completed within the 15-minute

time frame. It should be noted that

coordination among OROs is normally

desirable; however, in the event of a fast

breaker situation this coordination is not

necessary prior to activation of the primary

alert and notification sequence.

All activities for this criterion must be

based on the ORO’s plans and procedures

31360 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

and completed as they would be in an actual

emergency, except as noted above or

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with

FEMA approved exception areas (where

applicable) are completed within 45 minutes

following the initial decision by authorized

offsite emergency officials to notify the

public of an emergency situation. Backup

alert and notification of the public is

completed within 45 minutes following the

detection by the ORO of a failure of the

primary alert and notification system.

(NUREG–0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play. Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-approved

exception areas (identified in the approved

Alert and Notification System Design Report)

5–10 miles from the nuclear power plant

should demonstrate the capability to

accomplish primary alerting and notification

of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes

following the initial decision by authorized

offsite emergency officials to notify the

public of an emergency situation. The 45-

minute clock will begin when the OROs

make the decision to activate the alert and

notification system for the first time for a

specific emergency situation. The initial

message should, at a minimum, include: a

statement that an emergency exists at the

plant and where to obtain additional

information.

For exception area alerting, at least one

route needs to be demonstrated and

evaluated. The selected routes should vary

from exercise to exercise. However, the most

difficult route should be demonstrated at

least once every six years. All alert and

notification activities along the route should

be simulated (that is, the message that would

actually be used is read for the evaluator, but

not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the

extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile

public address system will be conducted at

some agreed upon location.

Backup alert and notification of the public

should be completed within 45 minutes

following the detection by the ORO of a

failure of the primary alert and notification

system. Backup route alerting needs only be

demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance

with the ORO’s plan and/or procedures and

the extent of play agreement, if the exercise

scenario calls for failure of any portion of the

primary system(s), or if any portion of the

primary system(s) actually fails to function.

If demonstrated, only one route needs to be

selected and demonstrated. All alert and

notification activities along the route should

be simulated (that is, the message that would

actually be used is read for the evaluator, but

not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the

extent of play. Actual testing of the Public

Address system will be conducted at some

agreed upon location.

All activities for this criterion must be

based on the ORO’s plans and procedures

and completed as they would be in an actual

emergency, except as noted above or

otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 5.b—Emergency Information

and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to disseminate to the public

appropriate emergency information and

instructions including any recommended

protective actions. In addition, NUREG–0654

provides that OROs should ensure the

capability exists for providing information to

the media. This includes the availability of

a physical location for use by the media

during an emergency. NUREG–0654 also

provides that a system be available for

dealing with rumors.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate

emergency information and instructions to

the public and the news media in a timely

manner. (NUREG–0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a,

b, c)

Extent of Play. Subsequent emergency

information and instructions should be

provided to the public and the media in a

timely manner (will not be subject to specific

time requirements). For exercise purposes,

timely is defined as ‘‘the responsible ORO

personnel/representatives demonstrate

actions to disseminate the appropriate

information/instructions with a sense of

urgency and without undue delay.’’ If

message dissemination is to be identified as

not having been accomplished in a timely

manner, the evaluator(s) will document a

specific delay or cause as to why a message

was not considered timely.

The Offsite Response Organizations (ORO)

should ensure that emergency information

and instructions are consistent with

protective action decisions made by

appropriate officials. The emergency

information should contain all necessary and

applicable instructions to assist the public in

carrying out protective action decisions

provided to them (e.g., evacuation

instructions, evacuation routes, reception

center locations, what to take when

evacuating, information concerning pets,

shelter-in-place instructions, information

concerning protective actions for schools and

special populations, rumor control telephone

number, etc.). The ORO should also be

prepared to disclose and explain the

emergency classification level (ECL) of the

incident. As a minimum, this must be

included in media briefings and/or press

releases. OROs should demonstrate the

capability to use language that is clear and

understandable to the public, including

tribes, within both the plume and ingestion

pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration

of the capability to use familiar landmarks

and boundaries to describe protective action

areas.

The emergency information should be allinclusive by including previously identified

protective action areas that are still valid as

well as new areas. The OROs should

demonstrate the capability to ensure that

emergency information that is no longer valid

is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast

media. In addition, the OROs should

demonstrate the capability to ensure that

current emergency information is repeated at

pre-established intervals in accordance with

the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

develop emergency information in a nonEnglish language when required by the plan

and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are

exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a

system exists for rapid dissemination of

ingestion pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses in

accordance with the ORO’s plan and/or

procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to

provide timely, accurate, concise, and

coordinated information to the news media

for subsequent dissemination to the public.

This would include demonstration of the

capability to conduct timely and pertinent

media briefings and distribute press releases

as the situation warrants. The OROs should

demonstrate the capability to respond

appropriately to inquiries from the news

media. All information presented in media

briefings and press releases should be

consistent with protective action decisions

and other emergency information provided to

the public. Copies of pertinent emergency

information (e.g., EAS messages and press

releases) and media information kits should

be available for dissemination to the media.

OROs should demonstrate that an effective

system is in place for dealing with rumors.

Rumor control staff should demonstrate the

capability to provide or obtain accurate

information for callers or refer them to an

appropriate information source. Information

from the rumor control staff, including

information that corrects false or inaccurate

information when trends are noted, should

be included, as appropriate, in emergency

information provided to the public, media

briefings, and/or press releases.

All activities for this criterion must be

based on the ORO’s plans and procedures

and completed as they would be in an actual

emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the

extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 6—Support Operation/

Facilities

Sub-Element 6.a—Monitoring and

Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency

Workers, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the capability to

implement radiological monitoring and

decontamination of evacuees and emergency

workers, while minimizing contamination of

the facility, and registration of evacuees at

reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/

emergency worker facility has appropriate

space, adequate resources, and trained

personnel to provide monitoring,

decontamination, and registration of

evacuees and/or emergency workers.

(NUREG–0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

Extent of Play. Radiological monitoring,

decontamination, and registration facilities

for evacuees/ emergency workers should be

set up and demonstrated as they would be in

an actual emergency or as indicated in the

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices 31361

extent of play agreement. This would include

adequate space for evacuees’ vehicles.

Expected demonstration should include 1/3

of the monitoring teams/portal monitors

required to monitor 20% of the population

allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Prior

to using monitoring instrument(s), the

monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of

checking the instrument(s) for proper

operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological

monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate

the capability to attain and sustain a

monitoring productivity rate per hour needed

to monitor the emergency planning zone

(EPZ) population planning base within about

12 hours. This monitoring productivity rate

per hour is the number of evacuees that can

be monitored per hour by the total

complement of monitors using an

appropriate monitoring procedure. A

minimum of six individuals per monitoring

station should be monitored, using

equipment and procedures specified in the

plan and/or procedures, to allow

demonstration of monitoring,

decontamination, and registration

capabilities. The monitoring sequences for

the first six simulated evacuees per

monitoring team will be timed by the

evaluators in order to determine whether the

twelve-hour requirement can be met.

Monitoring of emergency workers does not

have to meet the twelve-hour requirement.

However, appropriate monitoring procedures

should be demonstrated for a minimum of

two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency

workers may be simulated and conducted by

interview. The availability of provisions for

separately showering should be

demonstrated or explained. The staff should

demonstrate provisions for limiting the

spread of contamination. Provisions could

include floor coverings, signs and

appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off

areas) to separate clean from potentially

contaminated areas. Provisions should also

exist to separate contaminated and

uncontaminated individuals, provide

changes of clothing for individuals whose

clothing is contaminated, and store

contaminated clothing and personal

belongings to prevent further contamination

of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any

individual found to be contaminated,

procedures should be discussed concerning

the handling of potential contamination of

vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the

use of action levels for determining the need

for decontamination. They should also

explain the procedures for referring evacuees

who cannot be adequately decontaminated

for assessment and follow up in accordance

with the ORO’s plans and procedures.

Contamination of the individual will be

determined by controller inject and not

simulated with any low-level radiation

source.

The capability to register individuals upon

completion of the monitoring and

decontamination activities should be

demonstrated. The registration activities

demonstrated should include the

establishment of a registration record for each

individual, consisting of the individual’s

name, address, results of monitoring, and

time of decontamination, if any, or as

otherwise designated in the plan. Audio

recorders, camcorders, or written records are

all acceptable means for registration.

All activities associated with this criterion

must be based on the ORO’s plans and

procedures and completed as they would be

in an actual emergency, unless otherwise

indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 6.b—Monitoring and

Decontamination of Emergency Worker

Equipment

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) have the capability to

implement radiological monitoring and

decontamination of emergency worker

equipment, including vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has

adequate procedures and resources for the

accomplishment of monitoring and

decontamination of emergency worker

equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG–

0654, K.5.b)

Extent of Play. The monitoring staff should

demonstrate the capability to monitor

equipment, including vehicles, for

contamination in accordance with the Offsite

Response Organizations (ORO) plans and

procedures. Specific attention should be

given to equipment, including vehicles, that

was in contact with individuals found to be

contaminated. The monitoring staff should

demonstrate the capability to make decisions

on the need for decontamination of

equipment including vehicles based on

guidance levels and procedures stated in the

plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and

decontamination should be set up as it would

be in an actual emergency with all route

markings, instrumentation, record keeping

and contamination control measures in place.

Monitoring procedures should be

demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle.

It is generally not necessary to monitor the

entire surface of vehicles. However, the

capability to monitor areas such as air intake

systems, air filters, radiator grills, bumpers,

wheel wells and tires of vehicles, and door

handles, as a minimum, should be

demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles

that were in contact with individuals found

to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and

provisions for vehicles and equipment that

cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated

and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion

must be based on the ORO’s plans and

procedures and completed as they would be

in an actual emergency, unless noted above

or otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 6.c—Temporary Care of

Evacuees

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) demonstrate the

capability to establish relocation centers in

host areas. Congregate care is normally

provided in support of OROs by the

American Red Cross (ARC) under existing

letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care

facilities demonstrate that the centers have

resources to provide services and

accommodations consistent with American

Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in

MASS CARE—Preparedness Operations,

ARC 3031) Managers demonstrate the

procedures to assure that evacuees have been

monitored for contamination and have been

decontaminated as appropriate prior to

entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG–

0654, J.10.h, J.12)

Extent of Play. Under this criterion,

demonstration of congregate care centers may

be conducted out of sequence with the

exercise scenario. The evaluator should

conduct a walk-through of the center to

determine, through observation and

inquiries, that the services and

accommodations are consistent with ARC

3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary

to set up operations as they would be in an

actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities

may be demonstrated by setting up stations

for various services and providing those

services to simulated evacuees. Given the

substantial differences between

demonstration and simulation of this

objective, exercise demonstration

expectations should be clearly specified in

extent-of-play agreements.

Congregate care staff should also

demonstrate the capability to ensure that

evacuees have been monitored for

contamination, have been decontaminated as

appropriate, and have been registered before

entering the facility. This capability may be

determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are

demonstrated, material that would be

difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots,

blankets, sundries, and large-scale food

supplies) need not be physically available at

the facility (facilities). However, availability

of such items should be verified by providing

the evaluator a list of sources with locations

and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion

must be based on the ORO’s plans and

procedures and completed as they would be

in an actual emergency, unless noted above

or otherwise indicated in the extent of play

agreement.

Sub-Element 6.d—Transportation and

Treatment of Contaminated Injured

Individuals

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG–

0654, which provides that Offsite Response

Organizations (ORO) should have the

capability to transport contaminated injured

individuals to medical facilities with the

capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the

appropriate space, adequate resources, and

trained personnel to provide transport,

monitoring, decontamination, and medical

services to contaminated injured individuals.

(NUREG–0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent of Play. Monitoring,

decontamination, and contamination control

31362 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Notices

1Planning Standard F, evaluation criterion E.7

2Objective 11.

3Objective 11.

4Attachment ‘‘B’’ to Memorandum for FEMA

Regional Directors and Regional Assistance

Committee Chairs from Kay C. Goss, Associate

Director for Preparedness, Training and Exercises.

The attachment can be viewed at htpp://

www.fema.gov/pte/rep/easrep.htm. (viewed May

30, 2001). This document is referred to as the

‘‘February 2, 1999 Guidance’’).

5 44 CFR 350.5.

6 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix E) and

Part 70.

7Planning Standard ‘‘E’’, evaluation criteria E.7

provides that ‘‘Each [ORO] shall provide written

messages intended for the public, consistent with

the [nuclear power plant’s classification scheme. In

particular, draft messages to the public giving

instructions with regard to specific protective

actions to be taken by occupants of affected areas

shall be prepared and included as part of the State

and local [emergency response plans]. Such

messages should include the appropriate aspects of

sheltering, ad hoc respiratory protection, e.g.,

handkerchief over mouth, thyroid blocking or

evacuation * * *’’

efforts will not delay urgent medical care for

the victim.

Offsite Response Organizations (ORO)

should demonstrate the capability to

transport contaminated injured individuals

to medical facilities. An ambulance should

be used for the response to the victim.

However, to avoid taking an ambulance out

of service for an extended time, any vehicle

(e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to

transport the victim to the medical facility.

Normal communications between the

ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving

medical facility should be demonstrated. If a

substitute vehicle is used for transport to the

medical facility, this communication must

occur prior to releasing the ambulance from

the drill. This communication would include

reporting radiation monitoring results, if

available. Additionally, the ambulance crew

should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge

of where the ambulance and crew would be

monitored and decontaminated, if required,

or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed

prior to transport, done enroute, or deferred

to the medical facility. Prior to using a

monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s)

should demonstrate the process of checking

the instrument(s) for proper operation. All

monitoring activities should be completed as

they would be in an actual emergency.

Appropriate contamination control measures

should be demonstrated prior to and during

transport and at the receiving medical

facility.

The medical facility should demonstrate

the capability to activate and set up a

radiological emergency area for treatment.

Equipment and supplies should be available

for the treatment of contaminated injured

individuals.

The medical facility should demonstrate

the capability to make decisions on the need

for decontamination of the individual, to

follow appropriate decontamination

procedures, and to maintain records of all

survey measurements and samples taken. All

procedures for the collection and analysis of

samples and the decontamination of the

individual should be demonstrated or

described to the evaluator.

All activities associated with this criterion

must be based on the ORO’s plans and

procedures and completed as they would be

in an actual emergency, unless otherwise

indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Dated: June 5, 2001.

Archibald C. Reid III,

Acting Executive Associate Director,

Preparedness, Training & Exercises

Directorate.

[FR Doc. 01–14637 Filed 6–8–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6718–06–P

FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Radiological Emergency

Preparedness: Alert and Notification

AGENCY: Federal Emergency

Management Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: FEMA is considering whether

it should continue to require State and

local emergency management agencies

to characterize and to identify the

appropriate Emergency Classification

Level (ECL) when initially notifying the

public of incidents at nuclear power

plants. We also are considering whether

to leave to the discretion of State and

local emergency management agencies

what, if anything, to say about

protective action recommendations. We

invite your views on these issues and on

any other concerns that you may have

about the content of initial notification

messages.

DATES: Please submit your comments on

or before August 10, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Please submit your

comments to the Rules Docket Clerk,

Office of the General Counsel, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, 500 C

Street, SW., room 840, Washington, DC

20472, or send them by e-mail to

rules@fema.gov. Please refer to the ‘‘REP

Alert and Notification Notice’’ in the

subject line of your e-mail or comment

letter.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Vanessa Quinn, Chief, Radiological

Emergency Preparedness Branch,

Chemical and Radiological

Preparedness Division, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, 500 C

Street SW., Washington, DC 20472;

(202) 646–3664, or (e-mail)

vanessa.quinn@fema.gov, or Nathan S.

Bergerbest, Office of the General

Counsel, Federal Emergency

Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW.,

Washington DC 20472, (202) 646–2685,

or (e-mail) nathan.bergerbest@fema.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), through its Radiological

Emergency Preparedness program (REP),

reviews the emergency response plans

of Offsite Response Organizations

(OROs), which are the State and local

emergency management agencies

responsible for responding to incidents

involving nuclear power plant. FEMA

also conducts exercises to test the

capability of OROs to perform in

accordance with the provisions of their

plans. These activities are undertaken

pursuant to FEMA regulations, which

appear in Part 350 of Title 44 of the

Code of Federal Regulations and a

Memorandum of Understanding

between FEMA and the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission which appears

at 44 CFR Part 353, Appendix A.

FEMA recently completed a strategic

review of the REP program. In the

course of the strategic review, questions

were raised regarding what information

should be included in the initial

message informing the public that an

incident has occurred at a nuclear

power plant.

FEMA requires that OROs

demonstrate their ability to

communicate effectively with the public

following an incident at a nuclear power

plant. We address how this initial

notification should be given to the

public in several guidance documents.

These include the joint FEMA/Nuclear

Regulatory Commission Criteria for

Preparation and Evaluation of

Radiological Emergency Response Plans

and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear

Power Plants (NUREG–0654/REP–1,

Rev. 1), dated November 1980 1, FEMA’s

Radiological Emergency Preparedness

Exercise Manual (REP–14), dated

September, 1991 2, FEMA’s Radiological

Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Evaluation Methodology (REP–15),

dated September, 1991 3 and FEMA’s

Guidance for Providing Emergency

Information and Instructions to the

Public for Radiological Emergencies

Using the New Emergency Alert System

(EAS), dated February 2, 1999.4

FEMA regulations require that

planning standards and evaluation

criteria in NUREG–0654/FEMA REP–1,

Rev. 1,5 and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s emergency planning

rule 6 are to be used in evaluating ORO

plans and capabilities. While both the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s

emergency planning rule and NUREG–

0654/FEMA REP–1, Rev. 1 contemplate

that initial notification messages will be

made in a timely manner, neither

prescribe the content of the initial

notification message.7