Docket No . 105457.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E OF I L LIN OI S, Appe llee, v.

GE OR GEK . B AIL EY , A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed February 5, 2009.

JUSTICE BU RKE de l i

v ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Freem

an, Thom as, Ki lb ride, Gar man, a nd Kar meier co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Sec ti on 12–603.1(f) of the I llin ois Vehi cle Code (625 ILCS 5/ 12 –6 03 .1 (f) (West 20 04)) a nd se cti on 1 08– 1(3 ) of

the Code of Crim in al Procedu re of 19 63 (7 25 IL CS 5/ 10 8– 1( 3) (West 20 04 )) b oth pr ovid e t hat a law e nfor cement off ic er may not “search or i

nspect” a passen ger in a m ot or vehicl e solel

y b ecause the pass enger

hasfai le d to comply with the seat belt stat ute ( 625 ILCS 5/1 2–603.1 (a) (West 2004) ). The pri

ma ry issuepr ese nt ed in

this appeal

is wh ether t hese pr ovisio ns were vi

olated when

a warrant check w as r un o n t he de f en da n t, George K. Bai

le y, a pas senger

in a vehi cle stopped because b oth the driv er and def

endan t were not wearing sea

t belts. Fo r t he
re as on s th

at f oll ow, we con cl ude th ey weren ot.-2- BACK GROUND At ap pr o ximat ely

noo n on J uly 2, 2 005 , O ffi cer Jo hn Par ry o f the Wi nne bago County sh

erif f’ s off ic e stopped a car after observi ng that b oth t he dr iver and front seatpa ss en ge r , de fe nd an t Ge o r ge K. Ba iley,
were not wea ring se at belts . Aft er obt aining ident ifi cat ion fro m the driv er and def endan t, Parry re tur n ed to hi s s quad

ca r “ to li ste n to t he li censein form ation an d check f

or wa rrants. ” The warrant chec k reveal ed t hat defend ant had a n ou t st anding a rr est war ra nt f or mi sde me an ordom esti c b atte

ry . O f f i cer Pa rry ar re ste d def

en da n t, han dcuff ed hi m, an d pla ced hi m i n the b ackseat

of the squad car. He then searched the i

nter io r of the stopped car. The search un covered cocain e. Defe ndan t was subs equ ent ly convict ed, in the ci rcu i t cou rt of Wi nne bago Coun

ty, o f pos se ss i on

of a c on trol l ed su b sta n ce wi th i n ten t to de l i v er an d s en ten ce d to 1 5 y

ea rs ’ i m pri son men t. On appea l, d efe ndan

t contended that his tri al counsel was co nst it ut io na lly

ineffect ive beca use she f

ai l ed to fi le a m ot ion to quash his ar re st and s upp re ss t he co caine fo und in t he car. Def enda nt contended

t hat suc h a mot ion wo uld have suc cee ded beca use t he
warran t c heck conducted by

Off ic er Parry was i

mpe rmissi ble under
se cti on 12–603. 1(f) of the Illin ois V e hicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12–6 03.1(f

) (Wes t 200 4)) an

d s ec ti on 1 08– 1(3 ) of

the Code of Crim in al Procedu re of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108–1(3) (West 2004)) and, withoutt he re sult s o f the war ra nt chec k and t he ens uing arrest, there
wo uld h ave b een

no legal j ustif i cation f or the s earch of

the c ar. Furth er, ac co r din g t o de fen da nt , a mo t io nto sup pr ess w ou ld have succeeded

because the search i

nci de n t t o arres t vi

ol ate d s ec ti on 108–1(1) of the Code of Crim in al Procedure ( 725 ILCS 5/108–1(1) (West 2004)), as well

as the f ederal and state c o nst it ut ions. The appe l l ate court rejected t he se co ntent ions and affi rmed defendant’s
co nvictio n. 37 5 I ll. App. 3d 1055. We there after g rant ed defendant ’s petition f or leave to appeal . 210 Ill . 2d R. 315.

AN AL YSIS Defendant’s sol

e c o nt en t io n o n app ea l is t ha t he wa s d en ied his si xth ame nd men t r igh t t o effe ct iv e as sis t an ce o f co un se l be ca us e h is trial atto rney faile d t o file a mot ion t o q uas h ar re st and s upp re ss t he1 Be fore th e ap pe ll ate c ourt, th

e St ate ar gued t ha t def

enda nt h ad wai ved any inef fec ti ve a ss is ta nce o f c ou ns el cl a im. The app ellate court rejected this
ar gument (3 75 Ill. App . 3 d a t 1 05 9- 60 ) a nd t he St at e does no t r enew it her e. -3- drug evi dence f ound i n the ca r. 1 To est abl

ish i ne f f ec ti ve as sista nc e of
co un se l, a def

en da nt m us t sh owboth that counsel’ s perform ance was deficient and that

pr eju di ce r es ul t ed fr o m t ha t de fic ien cy. Strickland
v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984 ). An at t or ney’s pe rfo rmance must be evaluated fro m counsel’s perspe ct ive at t he t ime the c ont est ed a ct ion wa s t ake n and w ill be
co nsider ed

co nst it ut io na lly de ficie nt o nly if it is o bje ct ive ly
un r ea so na ble un d er preva i l i ng profe ssi

onal norm s. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6 87-89 , 80 L. E d. 2d a t 693-94, 1 04 S. C t. at 2064-6 5. In
o rderto prove prejudi

ce wi th regard to the fai

lure t o se ek

th e su ppr es si on of e vidence , t he defend ant mus t “show that the unargued
su ppr es si on mo t io n w as mer it o r io us an d t ha t t he r e is a r ea so na ble pr ob ab i l i ty t hat t he ve r dic t wo uld have been d iff er ent wit hou t t he excl udabl e evi dence.” People

v. Harr is , 182 Ill . 2d 114, 146 (1998 ), citing Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 375, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305, 319, 106 S. Ct. 2574 , 2582- 83 (19 86); People v. Mo ore , 171 Ill . 2d 74, 108 (1996 ). As he did befo re t he ap pellat e co ur t , d efenda nt conten ds that there
aref our argu men ts whi ch cou n se l sh oul d h av e raise d i n a m oti on to sup pr ess. We ad dr ess t hese ar gument s in tu rn. Section 12–603.1(f) of

the Illinois Vehicle Code and Section 108–1(3) of

the Code of

Criminal Procedure Sec ti on 12–6 03.1( f) of the Ill

in ois Vehi cle Code (625 ILCS 5/12–603 .1(f) (West 20 04)) pr ovides:

“A la w enf orcemen t o ff ic er may not sea rchor i

n sp ect a motorveh

ic le , its contents, the driv er, or a pas se ng er so lely be caus e of

a [se at-be l

t viola tion ].” Se ction 108–1 (3) of the Co de o f Crim inal Pro cedur e (72 5 ILC S 5/108–1(3) (West 2004)) contains i dentic al la nguage: “A law enfo rc ement officer may no t s ea rc h or i n sp ect a motorvehi

cle, i ts co ntents, t he driv

er, o r a passenger so le ly-4- because of a vi

olation of Sec t ion 12 –6 03

. 1 o f t he I llino is Veh i cle Code .” Defend ant co nt ends t hat a wa rr ant chec k is bo t h a “se ar ch” a nd “inspect ion” withi

n the m eani ng of s ections 12–603.1(f

) and 108–1(3) and therefore prohibited unde rthese pro vi sions wh

en the sole off

ense com m i tted i s a se at- b el t v i ol ati on . Th us , a cc ordi

n g to def en da n t, t he
war ra nt check run

by O ffice rPa rry in

this case was i

ll egal and h is trial counsel co uld have fi

le d a suc ce ss f

ul moti on to s

uppres s th

e f rui ts of t he war ra nt check, i

ncl udin g the cocain

e, on this b asi s. We disagree. “The l aw us es f

am i l i ar legal ex pres sions i

n thei r f ami li ar lega l
sense.” Henry v. Uni ted States , 251 U.S. 393, 395, 64 L. Ed. 322, 323, 40 S . Ct. 185 , 18 6 (1 920 ). Se e al so Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. , 30 8 U .S. 10 6, 1 15 , 84 L. Ed. 11 0, 1 19 , 60

S. Ct. 1, 7 (1939) (“we adh

ere to the f

am i l i ar rul e tha t where words

are em ploy ed in an act which had at t he t ime a well kno wn meaning in the la w, t he y ar e u se d in t hat sens e unles s t he co nt ext re quir es t he contrar y ”); 2A N. Singer , Su

the rlan d on Statu tory Constru cti on §46:04, at 15 2- 53 ( 6t h e d. 20 00 ) ( “if t he t er m ut iliz ed has a s ettled le ga l mean

i ng, th e courts w

i l l norm al l y i nf er tha t the l egi slature in tended t o inc o r po r at e t he es t ab lishe d me an ing ”)

. T he pr o hibit io n agains t conduct in

g a “search” was i

ncl uded in sections 1 2–60 3. 1( f) and 108–1(3) when

they were enacted

in 2003. See Pub. Act 93–99, eff. J uly 3, 2003; 375 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 1061. Th

en , as n ow, the term “search ” had a settled mean i ng i n the rea l m of cri m i na l procedu re whic h wa s d er ived fro m fou rt h ame ndme nt law : a n ex amina t io n o f a perso n’s bod

y, pr oper ty or o ther area in which the person has a
r ea so na ble ex pe ct at io n o f p r iva cy. See Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967 ); Black’ s La w Di cti onary 1351 ( 7th e d. 1999 ). It ha s l ong bee n hel

d that the existence of an arrest warrant is a
ma tt er of publ i c rec ord. Gist

v. Macon Co unty

Sheriff’s Department , 284 Ill . App. 3d 367 , 377 (1 996). R ecent de ci sions c onti

nue to adhe re to this prin ci ple . See People

v. Harr is , 228 Ill . 2d 222, 233 (2008 ); People v. Roberson , 367 I ll . App. 3d 19 3, 201 ( 2006). By definitio n, a person cann

ot hav e a reasonab le

ex pe cta ti o n o f pr iva cy in p ub lic matters. Be ca us e a wa rr an t ch ec k d o es no t impli cate a ny are a of pr iva cy, it i s not a search un der sections 12–603.1(f

) and 1 08–1 (3),-5- and it i s not prohibi

ted by t ho se pr o vis io ns
. Ac co r di ng ly, a m oti on to su pp r es s file d o n t his g r o un d w o uld no t ha ve be en su cc es sfu l. Defend ant mai

ntains, ho we ver , t hat eve n if a wa rra nt c he ck i s n ot a se arc h, i t i s a n i ns pe cti on w i thi n th e m ea ni ng of se ct io ns 1 2– 60 3. 1( f) and 108–1(3) and thusis im per missibl

e. Acco rd ing t o d efenda nt , t he pla in mea ning o f t he t er m “ i

ns pe ct”i s n

ot l i m i ted to “ph y si cal or corpo real in spe ct io ns” but may als o inclu de t he inv es t iga t io n o f a passenger ’s past wrongdoing that occurs durin g a war ra nt chec k. The Stat e, in response, ma

in tains that sections

12–603.1(f) and 108–1(3) say nothin g about pro hi

bi ting a n in sp ec t io n o f a p as se ng er ’s pu blic
recor ds. Thus , in t he view o f the St at e, t he plain meaning o f the statutory prov i si ons i s th at on l y the ph y si cal i ns pe cti on o f a passen ger is prohib ited. The appella

te court bel

ow c onclud ed t ha t t he wo r d “ insp ec t ” is ambiguo us in t he co nt ext o f se ct io ns 1 2– 60 3. 1( f) and 108–1(3). See 37 5 Ill . App. 3d at 1062-64 . The appellate court noted that se ve ra l dictionaries off

er def i ni tions of the term whi ch can be use d to support ei ther part y’ s po sit ion. Moreover, as the appel la te court expl

ai ned,
va riou s int r in sic aids t o co nstru ction do not reso lve the wor d’s meaning but, instead, only add amb igu it y. 375 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 1063. We ag r ee wit h t he ap pe llat e c o ur t t ha t t he wo r d “ insp ec t ” is
am bi guous in the context of this

case. Unl ike t h e t er m “sear ch, ” t he word “i nspect” does not have a

settled meaning in

the la w of cri mi nal pr o ce du r e a nd may r ea so na bly b e r ea d i n mo r e t ha n o ne wa y. Because t he me ani

ng o f t he wo r d “ insp ec t ” is un cle ar , it is appr opri ate

to consi der l egi slati ve history i n orde r t o det er mine the leg isla t ur e’ s int en t in a do pt ing t his t er m. People v. L o we , 153 Ill . 2d 195, 203 (1 992 ). Sena t or Cullert on, t he sponsor of Publ ic Act 93–99, stated du r ing t he de ba t es o n t he bill t ha t t he pr o hibit io n a ga in st a search or inspe ction was i

ncl uded to “reassure people” that a poli ce st op f or a sea t-bel t viola tion “d oesn ’t gi ve [l aw en f orcem en t] a ny ex trari gh t to go in a

nd search someone’ s car.” The Sena to r explai ned that

“ f

orthe purpose s of

l egi sl ati ve i nten t, to make

i t cl ear. Wh atever t he cu rr ent pr act ice is, w hat ever t he current law is, a s set by case l aw or by *** s

tatut e, as to allowing po lic e off i cers to search v

ehi cl es, that’s not changed b

y *** thi s b i l l .”-6- 93d I ll. Gen

. Asse

m., Sena te Pro ceedi

ngs, Apri l 3, 2003, at 27-28 (statem

en ts of S enator Cul

l erton). Addi tional de ba t e in t he Se na t e fu r t he rcla r ifies t he le g islative i n ten t: “SE NAT OR O BAMA: A seco nd ques ti on, be ca us e I’ ve he ard a c oupl e of
concerns. I jus

t want to ma

ke sure. Wi

th respectt o s ear ch and sei zure ru les and re gulat ions, I w ant to *** cl arif y thi s. Under
cur re nt law , if

you are pu

l l ed ov er f or atail li ght bei ng out *** what are the rules

currently governi ng whet her a se arch can take place, b ased on an ordi nary traffi c stop?
*** SENATOR CULLERTON: We ll, *** I assum

e i t’s probabl

y m ore case law

than statut e, but *** t he Su pr eme Co ur t ha s kind o f s et out throug hthei r d ecisio ns sit uat ions w her e po lice officer s have t he right t o g o in and sea rc h in someo ne’s c ar , in t he t ru nk or whatever. That *** remai ns t he sam

e. Wha tever those laws are, whatever that

case law is, t ha t r ema ins t he sa me w it h t his bill. We o nly want ed

to mak e s ur e p eo ple kn ew t ha t t his pa r t ic ula rbill do es n’t giv e o ne an y ext r a r igh t t o go in to a search where they

ot herwi se could n

ot .” 93dIll . Gen . As sem., Senat e Proc ee di

ng s, A pri l 3, 2 003 , at 3 0-3 1 (state men ts of Senators Ob am

a an d Cul l erton). A dis cussi on between

Representativ

es Fra nks a nd Be aubien in t he Ill in ois House reve al s the sam e understandi

ng: “Franks: ‘Ok ay. I ’m no t sur e I un de r st an d... I gu es s my an alys is here say

s that this would say

that t hey can... that a police off ic er may not search or inspect a motor vehicl e that
wasstopped s ole l

y be caus e of

a se atbe l t viola tion .’ Bea ubien: ‘Th at’ s c orre ct, that ’s pa rt of the l aw ... pa rt of the A ct, yes.’ * * * Franks: ‘But is

n’t i t t he l aw righ t now t ha t yo u can’t
sea rc h a vehicle u nless t her e’s p ro bable ca use ?’-7- Bea ubien: ‘I bel

ie ve that’s correct, but th ere s eemed to be
so me n ee d t o pu t t his in t he Bill s o it wa s ve ry sp ec ific t o all partiesi nv olv ed thi s woul

d not b e us ed f

or ame thod

of st op ping cars and se arc hi ng ve hicl es wi th the normal
ex cepti ons f or open v i ew an d so f orth.’ * * * Franks: ‘Okay. ’Ca

us e I’m jus t t ryi ng to figure out what we’ re ** * d o ing he r e a nd I ’m n ot tr yi ng ... no o ff

ense, I’m just not sur e I unde rst and this . Because right now, I k now t he la wha s p r o ba ble ca us e a nd I ’m n ot sure what thi s Bi ll does any different ly than maybe just co difyi ng ca se law ?’ Bea ubien: ‘Rep re sent at iveFr an ks , ** * t his is not an area that I a m f

am il ia r with. I put the lan

guage i n there be cause I believe it se t s for t h what ’s alr ead y in the law.’ ” 93d Ill. Ge n. A ss em ., House Proceedings , May 20, 2003, at 26- 27 (statem en ts of R epres en tativ es F ran ks a nd B eaubi en

). We t hink it a bunda nt ly clear, base d o n t he legislat ivedebates, that t he Gene ra l Assembly did not intend for se ct ions 1 2–6 03. 1( f) and 108–1(3) to prov i de

an y addi ti o na l r igh

ts above and beyond those guaranteed

by the se arc h provi si on of t he federal

constitution. Stated otherwi se, the term

“inspect ” in the st at ut or y pro visions pr ovid es no prot ec ti onbey

ond that pro vi

ded by the term “s earch.” An

d, as pr eviou sly not ed, a wa rr ant chec k is no t a pr ohibit ed s ear ch. In a further argum

ent, however, def

en d ant contends that sta tem en ts ma de durin g the le gis la

tive de bates sh owt hat t he meaning of sec tions 1 2– 60 3.1 (f

) a n d 1 08 –1 (3 ) i s c on

trol l ed b y th e f our th amendment case la

wwhi ch wasi n e f f ect at the tim e the statutes were enacted. See 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senat e Pro ceedings, Ap r il 3, 2003, at 28 (s tate

men ts o f S enat or Cullert on) (“What ever t he cu rr ent pract ice is, whatever t he current law is, as set by case la w or by *** statut e, as t o allo win g p o lice o ffice r s t o se ar ch ve hic le s , th at’ s n ot chan ged by * ** t his b ill ”) . D efenda nt not es t hat , w hen se ct ions 12 –6 03 .1 (f) and 108–1 (3) were e nacted in 2003, t his court ’s opi ni on in People v. Gonzalez , 204 Ill . 2d220 (2 003), w as the law. Gonzalez he ld tha t f or a traf f i c s top to co m

por t wi th th e f our th amendment , t he
s cope of the stop must not be f undam entally al tered. Defendant further no t es t ha t , in People

v. Harr is , 207 Il l . 2d 515 (2003 ) (Harri

s-8- I ), t his co ur t app lied t he Gonzalez sc ope an al y sis a n d h el d th at a warrant ch eck run on a pass enger af ter t he dri ver had b een stopped f ora traff ic violation i

mpe rmis si bl y changed the f

und am en tal na ture of the stopto a crim

in al in vestigation. Def

endan t acknowledges

that H arrisI wa s s ub se qu en t ly vac at ed by t he Un it ed St at es Su pr eme Court(see Illinois v

. Harris , 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L. Ed. 2d 94, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005) ), and that t he Gonzalez scope anal

ys is was overru le d by this co ur t in People v. Harr is , 228 Ill . 2d 222 (2008) (Ha rrisI I ). N ev er th el es s, de f en da n t ar gu es th at Harr

is I sho uld govern our i nterpretati on of

sections 12–

603.1( f ) and 108–1(3) because that decisi

on refl ected the legislature’s in

tent at t he t ime t he pr ovisio ns were

e nact ed. And, acc or ding t o d efenda nt , u nder t he
reason ing o f Harris I

, the warrant check run i n thi s case was im permissi ble. Defend ant mis co ns t ru es t he s co pe o f Harris I. I n Harr is I t he
war ra nt ch

eck w as ru n on th e p as se

n ger a f te r t he dri

ver had b een stopped f ormaki ng a n i l l egal l ef t turn. Harri

s I , 207 Ill . 2d at 517-18. The warrant check

al tered t he scopeof the stop because the pas senger had no t hing t o do wit h t he t r affic vio lation

. Harri s I , 207 Ill . 2d at 526-27. In th

i s ca se, i n c ontras t, the stop of

the c ar was base d on defendant’s own

f ai l ur e to c om

pl y wi th th e s ea t- b el t l aw. Indeed, Harri s I sp ec ifica lly

excl ude d f rom i ts hol di ng th ose s i tuati ons w

here t he pas sen

ger h i msel f ha s v i ola ted a traf f i c law. Harris I

, 207 Ill . 2d at 531. See

also 4W . L aF av

e, Se arch & Se izu re§9 .3( c) , a

t 38 9 ( 4th ed. 2004) (discus si

ng Harris I wi

th app ro val and no t ing t hat war ra nt checks on passen

gers should be perm

is si ble when “ ‘the passen

ger has violated a traf f i c law’ ”), quot in

g Harris I

, 207 Ill . 2d at 531. Harri s I t hus p ro vides no sup po rt for defend ant ’s co nt ent ion t hat a wa rr ant check was

im permissi ble i n thi s case. A moti on to s

uppres s f i l ed on t he gr ou nd

that a warrant check was pr ohibit ed u nder sec t ions 1 2–6 03. 1( f) and 108–1(3) wo uld no t have been su cc es sfu l. D efe ndant the ref ore s uf f ere d n o pre j udi cef rom co un se l’ s decisi

on not to fi

le a m ot ion to suppr ess on this basi s. Ac co r di ng ly, t his p o r t io n o f de fen da nt ’s cla im of ineffect iveassi stance cou n se l i s wi th out m eri t.-9- Section 108 –1(1) of

the Code of

Criminal Procedure Defend ant also maintains t hat a mot ion to sup pr ess w ou ld have succeeded

had i t alleged that the search

of the ca

r vi ol ate d s ec ti on 108 –1( 1) of

the Code of Crim in al Procedure ( 725 ILCS 5/108–1(1) (West 2004) ). Sect ion 108–1(1) pr ovides:

“Search without warrant. (1) When a l aw ful a rr es t is effe cted a pea

ce of f i cer m ay reas onab l

y sea rch the p ers o n arrested and the area wi

thin such person’s i mm edi ate presence fo r t he p ur po se o f: (a) Prote cti

ng the of f i cer f rom atta ck ; or (b ) Preven

ti ng the pers on f rom es ca pi ng ; or (c) Di sc ove

ri ng the f rui ts of the cri me; or (d) Discoveri

ng any instruments, ar ticles, or t hi ngswhi ch
ma y hav e be en u se d in t he c o mmissio n o f, or w hi ch m ay con sti tute evi dence of , an off ense.” 725 I LCS 5/108–1(1) (We st 2004 ). Defend ant co nt en ds t ha t be ca us e O ffice rPa rry lac ke d r ea so na ble
cause to search the ca

r for one of the purpo ses set f orth i n s ec ti on 108–1 (1), and becausethe ca r wa s n ot wi th i n de f en da n t’s “ i m med i ate presence” when it was se arched, the search violated the statut e. Acco rd ingt o de fend ant , t ria l co uns el c o uld hav e fi le d a success ful motion to dism

iss on thi s basi s. The appella

te court bel

ow r eje cted this argum

ent, in part, based
on People v. Hering , 27 I ll. A pp
. 3d 93 6 ( 19 75 )

. Se e 3 75 I ll. App. 3d at 1069- 70. Hering

expl ai ned that not hing in the l an

gua geof se cti on 108–1 (1), o r

t he co mmit t ee co mme n ts t her et o, sug ges t s t hat t he sta tute “is to be exc lusive. R at her , it aut hor izes se ar ches incident t o arrest withi

n prescri bed b ounds as t o a re a and purpose.” Hering , 27 I ll. App. 3d at 94 1. In

othe r wor ds , ac cord

i ng to Hering , se cti

on 108–1(1) i s perm

i ssi ve , not res tri ct ive . The statut e lis ts several insta nc es i n

wh i ch pol i ce “ may ” c on duct a

se arch i n ci den t to ar re st. See also People v. Zeller , 51 Ill . App. 3d 935, 93 9 (1 977 ) (s ec ti on 108–1(1) “authorize s the sea rc h of an arres teef

or a v ari ety of
reas ons”). Bu

t, ac cord i ng to Hering , the statu

te doe s n ot s tate that an officer’s authority t o s ear ch is lim ited so lely to t hos e inst ance s and that any ot her search

is im permissi ble. In de t er mi ni ng w h eth er an attor n ey ’s perf orm an ce i s def i ci en t, ev ery eff ort mus t “be m ade to eli mi nate th e di storti

ng ef f ec ts of-10- h i n ds i gh t, t o r ec o nst ruc t t he cir cu mst an ce s o f co un se l’s ch all enge d
con du ct, an d to e va l ua te the c ond

uc t f rom cou nsel’s per spe ct ive at t he tim e.” Strickland, 466 U .S. at 689, 8 0 L. Ed

. 2d at 69 4, 10 4 S . C t. 2065. Hering , which

was deci ded i n 19 75 , w as

con trol l i n g a uth ori ty at the ti me of def endan t’s trial i n 20 05. H

eri ng for eclo sed any ar gument t ha t t he se ar ch at iss ue in this case was i

ll egal un der s ec ti on 108 –1( 1). “ Con

duc t of a l awy er wil l n ot be deem

ed de ficie nt fo rhis
orher f ai lure to make a

n argum ent that has no bas is i

n the law.” People v. King , 192 Ill . 2d 189, 197 (2000). Defe ndan t’s trial counsel
was not deficient for dec lini

ng t o p ur sue t he ar gument advan ced here. Ac co r di ng ly, defendant’s cl ai m of i ne f f ec ti ve as sista nc e of co un se l in this regard fails.

Federal Cons titution Defend ant als o co ntends that t he search i ncident t o his arrest violated his ri ghts und er the f ourt h a me ndment . T o u nder st and de f en da n t’s argu men t, i t i s n ec es sa ry to pl ac e i t i n con tex t. In 19 69 , t he Un it ed St at es Su pr eme Co ur t he ld, in Ch im el v. California , 395 U.S . 752 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969 ), that police m

ay conduct a s earch i

nci dent t o ar rest of the ar rest ee’s pe rs on and an area wi th i n h i s “ i m med i ate contro l” in order t o pro tect t he saf ety of t he officer s and pr event t he de st ru ct ion o f incrimi nat ing evi dence. Chimel , 395 U.S. at 763, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 89 S. Ct. at 2040. In New

York v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 ( 1981) , the Supreme Court appli ed Chimel

t o au t o mo bile searches and c re at ed a bright -line rule t o gu ide po lice in det er mini ng t he pe rmis sible a re a o f an au tom ob i l e s ea rc h i n ci den t to ar re st: “[W]h en a poli cem an h as ma de a lawful cus t od ial arr est of t he
oc cup ant of

an automobi

le , he m ay , as a c onte

m pora ne ousi nc i dent of that arrest, search the passen ger compartmen

t o f that aut omob i l e.” Belton , 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. The reaf ter, in Thornton v. United States , 541 U .S . 615 , 158 L. Ed. 2 d 905 , 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004), t he Court appli ed Belton and up he ld a search of a suspect’s car inci dent t o arr est when the o ff icer’s in itial contact with the suspect

was ou t side t he ve hic le. T he Co ur t he ld that so long as the

arrestee was a “rece

n t occupa

nt” of a m otor veh ic le , the police m

ay search the ca

ras an i nci dent to a lawful

ar re st. Thornton , 541 U.S. at 623, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 915, 124 S. Ct. at 2132.-11- In an opi n i on con cu rri n g i n th e j udg ment in Thornton , Justice Sc alia co nc lud ed t ha t wh er e a de fen da nt is han dcuff ed and sec ured in t he backsea

t o f a s quad car, the Chimel r at io na les ca nno t lo gic ally ap ply b ec au se th e ri sk th at t he de f

en da nt woul d gr ab a w ea pon or evi den tia ry i tem f rom h i s ca r is “ remote in the extreme .” Thornton , 541 U.S. at 625, 158 L . Ed. 2d a t 916, 124

S. Ct. at 213 3 (Sca

l i a, J., concurrin g, joined by Ginsbu rg , J. ). Neve rthel es s, Ju st ice Sc alia did not advocate ovverrulin

g Belton . Inst ead , he co nt ende d t hat t he Belton bright -line ru le sho uld be ap plie d “ t o ca se s w he r e it is
r ea so na ble to bel

ie ve ev ide ncer ele va nt t o t he cr ime of a rr est might be fou nd i n the v ehi

cl e.” Thornton , 541 U.S. at 632, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 124 S. Ct. at 2137 (Scali a, J., concurring, j oine d by Gin sburg, J.). No t ing

the foregoin

g, defen dant now “asks

this court to adopt as
a matte r of f ederal con sti tut io na l l aw an an

al ytical approach whi

ch encompasse s Ju sti

ceSca l i a’ s restricti

ve approa ch to Belton and
su pp orts Chimel ’s

na rrow constru cti on of the search

in cident to ar rest exce ption to the warrant requirem ent, authorizi

ng s ear ches unsupported by

proba bl e ca use onl y wh eren ec es sa

ry to prot ect offi

cer saf ety and p re ser ve in

crim in ating e vi dence.” Def

endan t po in ts out that t he Un i ted Sta tes Su preme C ourt has recen tly granted certio rari in People v. Gant , 216 A

riz. 1, 16 2 P.3d 6 40 (20 07), cert. granted , ___ U.S.
___ , 170 L . E d. 2d 2 74, 128 S. Ct . 1 443 (2 008 ), wher ein the Arizo na Su pr eme Co ur t held t hat onc e an a rr estee is han dcuff ed, pla ced in the back of

a patrol car, and under the supe rvi si on of an off i cer, the warrantles s search of the arrestee’s car

cann ot be j ustif

ie d under Belton or Chimel . D efenda nt co nt ends t hat we s hou ld app ly the
r ea so ning o f Ju st ice Sc alia , as we ll as t he Ar izo na Su pr eme Courtin Gant, t o t he fact s o f this ca se a nd “de t er mine tha t t he war rantless search of [ defend ant ’s] car violat ed t he Fo ur th Am endm ent” because nei ther off ic er saf ety n or t he preserv

ation of ev

ide nce was at risk once def endan t was p l ace d i

n the sq uad c ar. Defendant’s ar gument is mi splac ed. Whe t he r or not thi s court sho uld ado pt a pa rt icular app licatio n of t he Belton rule goi ng f orward is i rre l ev an t to t he qu es t io n be fo r e t his court, i.e. , whet her defendant’s trial counsel wa s c o nst it ut io na lly ineffe ct ive in f ai l i ng to f i l e a m oti on to suppress. In answeri

ng that question, an

d i n p ar t ic ula

r whether
cou nsel’s performa ncewas def

ic ie nt, the proper focus o f o ur an alys is must be on th e f ac ts a nd l aw kn own to cou ns el at the ti me of-12- defendant’s tria

l

. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L . Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. At that tim e, case law uni

form ly hel d that a search incident to arrest was permissi ble under f

acts si mi la r to the ones at ba r. For exam ple , in Peopl e v. Bailey , 15 9 I ll. 2 d 4 98 ( 19 94 ) , t his courtexpressl

y rej ectedt he de fendant ’s ar gument that a vehi cl e search
was impermissible becau se t he de fendant was han dcuff ed and sea

ted in the back of

a squad car

and, thus, there wasno da ng er t ha t he co uld
r each we ap o ns o rev ide nc e. We st at ed : “ it is * ** se t t le d th at the v al i di ty of a Belton s ear ch ‘ is

not aff ected by the ci rcumstance that de fe ndant no lo nger had e ffect ive acc ess t o his ve hicle when t he search was conducted.’ ” Bailey , 1 59 I ll. 2d a t 506 , q uo t ingState v. Grass , 250 N .J. Sup er. 74, 7 7, 593 A .2d 379 , 381 (1 991). The appe l l ate court had h

eld li kewi se. Se e, e.g. , People v. Kalivas , 20 7 Il l

. Ap

p. 3d 41 5, 418 ( 1991)(“ ‘ und er Belton , a sea rc h of t he
ve hic le is allowed ev

en af ter t he def

endan t was removed

fr o m it , han dcuff ed, an d p la ced in the squad ca r’ ”), quot in

g 3 W. LaF ave, Search & Se izure § 7.1(c), at 15 (2d ed. 19 87); People v. Allibalogun , 312 I ll. App. 3d 5 15 ( 200 0); People v. Loftus , 111 Ill . App. 3d 978 (1983 ). See

also Unite

d Stat es v . A rang o , 879 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (7th C i r. 1989 ). As noted, an

attorn ey ’s perf orm an ce“wi l l not be de emed d eficient f orhi s or he r f ai l ure to make a

n a rgu men t tha t has n o basi s in the l aw.” Kin g , 192 Ill . 2d at 197. At t he tim e of defendan

t’s t rial , case law was cl ea r th at O f

f i cer Pa rry ’s se arc h of the stoppe d c ar d

i d n ot v i ol ate defendant’s f

our th amendment right s so lely because defend ant had b een sec

ured in the backse at of the squad car. Trial counsel was there f ore no t de ficie nt fo rfailing t o r ais e t his argu men t i n a m oti on to suppress. Ac co r din gly, t his po rt ion o f defend ant ’s claim of ineffect ive
as sista n ce of cou n se l i s wi th out m eri t.

State Constitution Defend ant al so contends that the search of the stopped car viol ated his r igh t s u nd er ar t icle I , se ct io n 6 , o f t he I llinoi s Co nst itu t ion. Il l . Cons

t. 1970, a rt. I , §6. As w i

th h i s a rgum en t wi th respectto the fede

ral cons titution, defen

dant contends thatt he search violated t he Ill i noi s c ons ti tution because he was s ecured i

n the squad
ca rat th e ti me of th e s ea rc h an d n ei th er of f i cer s af ety n or th e-13- pre serv ati on of evi dence was

at risk. Agai

n, we believe t his arg ument is mi spl aced. In People v. Stehman , 203 Ill . 2d 26 (2002 ), this court considered “wh ether Belton ’s

b ri gh t-l i n e r ul e exten dsto a situation where the fi

rst contact t he de f

en da n t h as wi th t he o ffi cer oc cur s aft er [t he de fendant hasexi ted] t he vehi

cl e.” Stehman , 203 I ll . 2d at 36. T he i ssue was addressed under both the f

ourt h am

endm en t a nd t he I llino is Co nst itu t ion. Stehman , 203 Ill . 2d at 33-34. Alt ho ug h w e u lt imat ely concl uded that t he Belton ru l e d

i d n ot ap pl y un der the f acts presented,
our analysis discu ssed t he sco pe o f the Belton ru le at lengt h ( Stehman , 203 Ill. 2d at 36- 42) , a nd nec essa rily “presu med t hat , t o t he ext ent Belton al l owed the se arch, Belton was controllin g.” See 375 Ill . App. 3d at 1076 . Thus , Stehman ma y reas onabl

y b e read f or th e p ropos i

ti on that the Belton ru le app lies not onl y as matt er of fo ur t h amendment la w, but as a m

atter of Illi

nois constitutional

la w as wel l. A nd, as noted pr ev

i ous l y , c as e l aw at t he t ime o f de fen da nt ’s t r ial u nifo rmly he ld that t he Belton br igh t

- line r ule ap plied in situ at ions w her e t he defend ant was stopped while in a vehicle, w as a rr est ed, and was then
sec ured i n a squa d car. S ee, e.g. , Bailey , 159 Ill . 2d at 506. Giv en these facts, we can

not say that

t r ial c o un se l’s co nduc t fell be l owan objectiv e standard o f reasonabl

eness ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68 8, 8 0 L . Ed . 2d

at 6 93 , 10 4 S . C t. a

t 20 64 ), w

h en sh e f ai l ed to file a m oti on to su pp r es s o n s t at e c o ns t it ut io na l g r o un ds

. Ac co r di ng ly, t his port ion of

defen dant’s cl ai m of in eff ective assistance of coun s el also fai ls.

CONCLUSION For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e co nc lud e that defen dant’s trial counsel wa s n ot i n ef f ec ti ve f or fail in g to fi le a m ot ion to suppr ess. Accordin gly , the judgm

ent of the appel

la te court is aff irm ed.
Aff irmed.