Affirmed and Opinion filed August 4, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00685-CR

JAMON DERRELL WALKER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 351st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1395164

O P I N I O N

Appellant Jamon Derrell Walker challenges his conviction for capital 

murder, arguing in a single issue that the trial court should have granted his motion 

to suppress evidence found on appellant’s cell phone pursuant to a search warrant

because the warrant’s supporting affidavit did not establish probable cause. 

Concluding the affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and 

that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND

At about 2:00 a.m. on July 18, 2013, officers from the Houston Police 

Department responded to a 911 call and found the complainant, Gerald Williams,

shot to death in a church parking lot. A witness who lived next door to the church

told police that after he had heard a gunshot, he looked out from his porch and saw 

someone put what looked like a rifle into the backseat of a dark-colored car and 

drive away. Police determined the car seen leaving the scene was the 

complainant’s car, and the complainant’s cell phone was missing from his cell 

phone belt clip. When police located the complainant’s car the next day and 

initiated a traffic stop, appellant was driving the car and had the complainant’s cell

phone in his hand. Police also found a cell phone belonging to appellant in the car. 

Police took appellant to the station for questioning. In a recorded statement, 

appellant admitted to being involved in the shooting. Officer Jesus Sosa obtained a 

search warrant to examine the contents of appellant’s cell phone. The 

complainant’s cell phone number was saved as a contact in appellant’s phone. The 

complainant and appellant had exchanged multiple calls and text messages during 

the time period leading up to the shooting. Texts between appellant and the 

complainant on the night of the shooting indicated that the two men were planning 

to meet and that appellant was bringing a gun. Appellant’s text message to the 

complainant read, “I got the heat nd everything lets doit nd move on homie! [sic]” 

Appellant’s text messages to others indicated that appellant not only had a shotgun

but also that he intended to obtain a car and expected to get money the night of the 

shooting. Police also recovered a shotgun from appellant’s residence. The 

recovered weapon was consistent with the shotgun shell found at the scene where 

the complainant’s dead body was discovered. 
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Charged with capital murder, appellant pleaded “not guilty.” At a bench

trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence from his cell phone on the grounds 

that the search warrant’s supporting affidavit failed to establish probable cause. 

The trial court denied appellant’s motion, finding that the affidavit provided a 

substantial basis for probable cause. The trial court admitted the text and call 

information from appellant’s cell phone into evidence. 

The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life 

confinement without parole. Appellant now appeals his conviction, challenging

the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

While we typically review a trial judge’s motion-to-suppress ruling under a 

bifurcated standard, a trial court’s determination whether probable cause exists to 

support a search warrant’s issuance is restricted solely to the affidavit’s four 

corners. Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When 

reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, appellate courts as well as 

trial courts apply a highly deferential standard of review because of the 

constitutional preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant over 

warrantless searches. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011). If the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search 

warrant probably would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, we will uphold the 

magistrate’s probable-cause determination. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 

(1983); Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873. The magistrate may interpret the affidavit in a 

non-technical, common-sense manner, drawing reasonable inferences solely from 

the facts and circumstances contained within the affidavit’s four corners. Bonds, 

403 S.W.3d at 873. We are not to invalidate a warrant by interpreting the affidavit 
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in a hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner. Id. When in doubt, we

are to defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made. Id.

APPLICABLE LAW

A search warrant may not legally issue unless it is based on probable cause. 

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I § 9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

1.06 (West 2005). Under Texas law, “[n]o search warrant shall issue . . . unless 

sufficient facts are first presented to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable 

cause does in fact exist for its issuance” and “[a] sworn affidavit setting forth 

substantial facts establishing probable cause” is filed with the search-warrant 

request. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(b) (West Supp. 2015). Probable 

cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability 

or substantial chance that evidence of a crime will be found at the specified 

location. Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 872–73. Probable cause is a flexible and nondemanding standard. Id. at 873.

When a trial court examines whether there is probable cause to support a

search warrant, the trial court is restricted to the four corners of the affidavit. 

McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. For an evidentiary search warrant, the sworn affidavit 

must set forth facts sufficient to establish probable cause that (1) a specific offense

has been committed, (2) the specifically described property or items that are to be 

the subject of the search or seizure constitute evidence of that offense or evidence 

that a particular person committed that offense, and (3) the property or items 

constituting evidence to be searched for or seized are located at or on the particular 

person, place, or thing to be searched. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(c), 

18.02(a)(10) (West Supp. 2015).1

 

1

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions dealing specifically with 

search warrants for cell phones of arrestees. But, because these provisions were not yet in effect 
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ANALYSIS

Appellant alleges that Officer Sosa’s affidavit did not provide a sufficient 

basis to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Specifically, appellant 

argues the affidavit did not establish the second requirement—that the specifically

described property or items made the subject of the proposed search or seizure 

constitute evidence of the offense or evidence that a particular person committed 

the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(c)(2) (West Supp. 2015).

Applying a common-sense reading to the affidavit, we conclude it contained

sufficient facts from which the trial court could find probable cause that the cell 

phone to be searched contained evidence that appellant committed capital murder. 

The affiant established the following pertinent facts: 

 affiant was investigating the capital murder of the complainant; 

 appellant was found with the complainant’s car and cell phone the day 

after the complainant’s shooting;

 appellant’s cell phone was found in the complainant’s car after appellant 

was driving it;

 appellant was questioned as a suspect in the capital murder; 

 appellant admitted he was involved in the complainant’s shooting and 

drove off in the complainant’s car; 

 appellant planned to sell the complainant’s car and cell phone; 

 appellant knew the complainant and communicated with the complainant 

primarily via cell phone; and

 appellant and the complainant had been planning to commit robberies 

together.

 

at the time of the underlying offense and trial, the provision governing search warrants for “mere 

evidence” is applicable.
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Appellant argues that, based on the facts set forth in the affidavit, the 

magistrate could not have inferred that evidence probably would be found in 

appellant’s cell phone, but rather made a guess based on the “general expectation 

that incriminating evidence exists on a cell phone.” Appellant also argues that the 

affidavit established nothing more than “mere suspicion” that the cell phone might 

contain evidence, focusing on the absence of any specific allegation that appellant 

talked to the complainant via cell phone about shooting him. 

A substantial basis for probable cause rests in the allegations that appellant 

and the complainant had been communicating via appellant’s cell phone, planning 

robberies around the time that the complainant was killed while being robbed of 

possessions later found in appellant’s possession. From these facts, a magistrate 

properly could have inferred that appellant’s cell phone probably contained 

information that evinced appellant robbing and killing the complainant, including 

communication between the two of them showing how and why they came to be in 

that parking lot together that night. We conclude there is a fair probability or 

substantial chance that evidence of a capital murder would be found in the contents

of a cell phone belonging to a suspect who had confessed to shooting the 

complainant and who exchanged numerous text messages and phone calls with the 

complainant around the time of the shooting. See Humaran v. State, 478 S.W.3d 

887, 899–900 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court could have concluded 

that there was a fair probability that evidence relating to the commission of an 

offense, capital murder, would be found on appellant’s cell phone. See id. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION

When considering the totality of the circumstances, the warrant’s supporting

affidavit provided a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 

suppress evidence. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the 

trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices McCally and Brown.

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).