alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 122.

#### J. J. & M. Taxman Refining Co., Inc. *v.*Wichita Falls.

October 14, 1935.

*Mr. Harry C. Weeks*for petitioner.

*Messrs. James T. Montgomery*and *Thomas R. Boone*for respondent.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, 2d Supreme Judicial District, of Texas, denied.
#### SNR ROULEMENTS, Plaintiff, and Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. and Koyo Corporation of U.S.A., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and NSK Corporation, NSK Bearings Europe, Ltd., and NSK Ltd., Plaintiffs, and NTN Corporation, NTN Bearing Corporation of America, American NTN Bearing Manufacturing Corporation, NTN-Driveshaft, Inc., and NTN Bower Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and NTN-BCA Corporation, Plaintiff, and INA Schaeffler KG and INA USA Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee, and The Torrington Company (now known as Timken U.S. Corporation), Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 05-1297, 05-1323.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Dec. 8, 2006.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 2007.

*993RADER, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROST, Circuit Judge.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This CAUSE having been heard and considered it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
| (1)   | Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending January 31, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending January 31, 2011, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Clear-Lite Holdings, Inc. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated: March 22, 2011 |   | /s/ Paul E. Niedermeyer                             |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|                       |   | Paul E. Niedermeyer                                 |
|                       |   | Chief Financial OfficerPrincipal Accounting Officer |
#### Jackson Bryant BAUGUS, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. BILLINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 10-35983.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 19, 2011.*

Filed Jan. 10, 2012.

Jackson Bryant Baugus, Terre Haute, IN, pro se.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Jackson Byrant Bau-gus appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging that defendants violated his due process rights as a result of his car being seized and retained in police custody for over seven years. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A or 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Baugus’s action as time-barred. *See*Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1) (three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); *Jones v. Blanas,*393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions[.]”); *see also Wallace v. Kato,*549 U.S. 384, 391, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (“The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Baugus’s remaining contentions, including that the district court improperly denied his motion to proceed in forma pau-peris, are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
SECOND
AMENDMENT

TO

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

QUEST SOLUTION, INC.

AND

SCOT ROSS


 


The
Employment Agreement, dated November 20, 2014, as amended by that certain First Amendment to Employment Agreement, dated April
27, 2015 (collectively, the “Employment Agreement”), by and between Quest Solution, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
“Company”), and Scot Ross, an individual (the “Executive”) is hereby amended, effective
as of May 2, 2016 (the “Effective Date”), as set forth herein.


 


Section
1.1 of the Employment Agreement is hereby is amended by deleting Section 1.1 in its entirety and substituting the following in
its place:


 


1.1
Position. Executive shall serve as the Company’s Vice-President of Finance, with such duties as are customarily associated
with such position for a public company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Executive shall report to and perform the specific duties
and responsibilities assigned to him by the Company’s Chief Financial Officer.


 


Executive
waives the right to voluntarily resign with “Good Reason,” as that term is defined in Section 5.2(c) of the Employment
Agreement, provided it is limited only to the change in position as set forth in this Second Amendment.


 


Except
as specifically amended herein, all other terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement shall remain unchanged and shall continue
in full force and effect.


 


[Signature
Page Follows.]


 




    	 



    	 	 	 



    

 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and the Executive have executed this Second Amendment to Employment Agreement as of the Effective
Date.


 


	 	QUEST
    SOLUTION, INC.
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    Tom Miller
	 	Name:	Tom
    Miller
	 	Title:	President
	 	 	 
	 	EXECUTIVE
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    Scot Ross
	 	Name:	Scot
    Ross


 


Signature
Page to Second Amendment to Employment Agreement
EXHIBIT 32


<PAGE>


     In connection with the quarterly report of Synergy  Resources  Corporation,
(the  "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter  ended  November 30, 2008 as filed
with the  Securities  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report") Ed
Holloway,  the Principal Executive Officer of the Company and Frank L. Jennings,
the Principal  Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the company.


 January 20, 2009                        /s/ Ed Holloway
                                         ------------------------------------
                                         Ed Holloway, Principal Executive
                                            Officer


 January 19, 2009                        /s/ Frank L. Jennings
                                         -------------------------------------
                                         Frank L. Jennings, Principal Financial
                                            Officer
No. 239.

#### Rowe *v.*Nicholson, Superintendent.

October 14, 1935.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the *574Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and motion for leave to proceed further *in forma pauperis*denied.

*Mr. Otis W. Rowe, pro se.*

No appearance for respondent.
No. 593.

#### Jones *v.*Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.

December 9, 1935.

*Mr. R. Douglas Feagin*for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and motion for leave to proceed further *in forma pauperis*denied.
# C_2010205EN.01000701.xml

| 29.7.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 205/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 205/7

---

Notice for the attention of the persons and entities to which restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and in Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 apply

2010/C 205/03

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The following information is brought to the attention of the persons and entities that appear in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (1) and in Annex V to Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (2).

1

2

The Council of the European Union has decided that the persons and entities that appear in the above mentioned Annexes should be included in the lists of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and in Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran.

The attention of the persons and entities concerned is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities of the relevant Member State(s) as indicated on the websites in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 423/2007, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds for basic needs or specific payments (cf. Article 10 of the Regulation).

The persons and entities concerned may submit a request to the Council, together with supporting documentation, that the decision to include them on the above mentioned lists should be reconsidered, to the address provided above, by 15 September 2010.

The attention of the persons and entities concerned is also drawn to the possibility of challenging the Council's decision before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 275, second paragraph, and Article 263, fourth and sixth paragraphs, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, p. 39.

1

(2)  OJ L 103, 20.4.2007, p. 1; OJ L 335M, 13.12.2008, p. 969.

2

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ramon Campos GARIBAY, Appellant.

No. 10-1202.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 7, 2010.

Filed: July 9, 2010.

*591Christopher Wolfe, U.S. Attorney’s Office, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for Appel-lee.

Ramon Campos Garibay, Waymart, PA, pro se.

Andrea K. George, Federal Public Defender’s Office, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Before LOKEN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ramon Campos Garibay pleaded guilty to a drug trafficking charge, and the district court1 sentenced him to 46 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising as a potential issue that the court’s sentence is unreasonable.

The plea agreement in this case included a waiver by Garibay of all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal the sentence imposed on him, so long as the sentence did not exceed 87 months in prison. Based on Garibay’s statements during the change-of-plea hearing, we conclude that he entered into both the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily. Further, the appeal waiver applies, because the sentence that Garibay received was below 87 months in prison; the argument raised on appeal falls within the scope of the waiver; and we cannot see any miscarriage of justice that would result from enforcing the waiver in these circumstances, particularly when Garibay received a sentence at the bottom of the uncontested Guidelines range. *See United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (discussing enforceability of appeal waiver); *United States v. Michelsen,*141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir.1998) (same)

Finally, having reviewed the record independently pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), for any nonfrivolous issues not covered by the waiver, we find none. Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The HONORABLE MICHAEL J. DAVIS, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
#### Mayra Delgadillo DE PEREZ; Jose Alfredo Perez Hernandez, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

Nos. 07-74012, 08-71599.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 25, 2010.*

Filed June 11, 2010.

Griselda Trujillo, Esquire, Considine, Sorensen & Trujillo, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioners.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Jeffrey Ronald Meyer, Esquire, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated petitions for review, Mayra Delgadillo De Perez and Jose Alfredo Perez Hernandez, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming an immigration judge’s *643(“IJ”) decision denying their applications for cancellation of removal, and the BIA’s order denying their motion to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo due process claims, *Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft,*324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir.2003), and for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft,*381 F.3d 855, 857 (9th Cir.2004) (per curiam). We grant the petition for review in No. 08-71599, and dismiss the petition for review in No. 07-74012.

The BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it applied the wrong standard to determine whether the performance of prior counsel resulted in prejudice. *See id.*at 858-59 (BIA abused its discretion when it determined that counsel’s performance did not result in prejudice by directly adjudicating whether the petitioners would win or lose their claim). The BIA required petitioners to demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal, when they need only demonstrate that counsel’s performance “may have affected the outcome of the proceedings” before the IJ. *See id.*(quoting *Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir.2004)). We therefore remand for the BIA to determine, under the correct standard, whether petitioners were prejudiced by prior counsel’s conduct.

We need not address the petition for review in No. 07-74012 in light of our disposition in No. 08-71599.

IN NO. 07-74012: PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

IN NO. 08-71599: PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED. Respondent shall bear the costs for this petition for review.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Martinez, Appellant.

[874 NYS2d 858] —

Motion for writ of error coram nobis denied. Present — Hurlbutt, J.P., Martoche, Smith, Fahey and Pine, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Antonio R. AZPEITIA, also known as Markei Pena, also known as Antonio Ramirez, Appellant.

No. 09-3798.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 29, 2010.

Filed: July 9, 2010.

*590Andrea E. Belgau, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Omaha, NE, for Appellee.

Antonio R. Azpeitia, Omaha, NE, pro se.

Julie A. Frank, Frank & Gryva, Omaha, NE, for Appellant.

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement containing a waiver of his right to appeal, Antonio Azpeitia pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) & 924(a)(2). The district court1 sentenced Azpeitia to 140 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The government has moved to dismiss the appeal.

We will enforce the appeal waiver in this case because Azpeitia’s appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the record shows the requisite knowledge and voluntariness, and enforcing the appeal waiver would not constitute a miscarriage of justice. *See United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en bane) (court should enforce appeal waiver and dismiss appeal where it falls within scope of waiver, both plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result; one important way district court can ensure plea agreement and appeal waiver are knowing and voluntary is to question defendant properly about decision to enter agreement and to waive right to appeal); *see also United States v. Estrada-Bahena,*201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in *An-ders*case).

Having independently reviewed the record under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues not covered by the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we grant the government’s motion to dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company      at the dates and for the periodsindicated. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  November      16, 2009    |   | /s/ Lei      Liu         |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                      |   | Lei      Liu                       |   |
|                                                      |   | Chief      Executive Officer       |   |
|                                                      |   | (Principal      Executive Officer) |   |

----
IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1173 

Recognizing the 100th anniversary of the Vermont Long Trail, the oldest 

long-distance hiking trail in the United States, and congratulating the 

Green Mountain Club for its century of dedication in developing and 

maintaining the trail. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 11, 2010 

Mr. WELCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing the 100th anniversary of the Vermont Long 

Trail, the oldest long-distance hiking trail in the United 

States, and congratulating the Green Mountain Club for 

its century of dedication in developing and maintaining 

the trail. 

Whereas James P. Taylor conceived of the idea of developing 

a long-distance hiking trail in the Green Mountains of 

Vermont, and the Green Mountain Club was formed on 

March 11, 1910, in Burlington, Vermont, to make his 

dream of a Long Trail a reality; 

Whereas the Long Trail is the oldest long-distance hiking 

trail in the United States; 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 1173 IH 

Whereas the Long Trail extends 273 miles along the spine 

of Vermont’s Green Mountains, from the Massachusetts 

border to the Canadian border; 

Whereas the Long Trail provides pedestrian access to mountain peaks, waterfalls, wildlife, and foliage in all seasons; 

Whereas the Long Trail traverses scenic valleys and the tallest summits of the Green Mountain State; 

Whereas the Green Mountain Club continues to protect, defend, and promote the Long Trail and its 100-year history in Vermont; 

Whereas the mission of the Green Mountain Club is to make 

the Vermont mountains play a larger part in the life of 

the people by protecting and maintaining the Long Trail 

system and fostering, through education, the stewardship 

of Vermont’s hiking trails and mountains; and 

Whereas the birth of the Long Trail is a testament to the 

hard work of many dedicated individuals and its continued existence is evidence of the perseverance of the Green 

Mountain Club and countless volunteers: Now, therefore, 

be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives recog2 nizes the 100th anniversary of Vermont’s Long Trail, the 

3 oldest long-distance hiking trail in the United States, and 

4 congratulates the Green Mountain Club for its century of 

5 dedication in developing and maintaining the Long Trail. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Tyrus Miguel COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-30163

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 26, 2010.

Rene I. Salomon, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rebecca Louise Hudsmith, Esq., Federal Public Defender’s Office, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Tyrus Miguel Cooper, Pollock, LA, pro se.

Before SMITH, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Tyrus Miguel Cooper has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Cooper has filed a response. He has also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. Our independent review of the record, counsel’s brief, *18and Cooper’s response discloses no non-frivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. Cooper’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. DERRICK DAVIS, also known as D, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-30063

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 22, 2010.

Maurice Edwin Landrieu, Esq, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Diane Hollenshead Copes, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gary V. Schwabe, Jr., Esq, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Derrick Davis, federal prisoner #27548-034, appeals the district court’s ruling that he was ineligible for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the amendments to the crack cocaine Guideline. Although Davis argues that he was eligible for such a reduction, when a defendant such as Davis is “subject to a statutory minimum sentence above the upper end of his guideline range, ... 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides no authority to the district court to later modify the sentence based on amendments to the guideline range.” *United States v. Carter,*595 F.3d 575, 581 (5th Cir.2010).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.'