alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Order Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

October 14, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

128294 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 128533 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Justices

v SC: 128294 COA: 246706

JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/ Wayne CC: 02-004374

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 128533 COA: 246706

JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/ Wayne CC: 02-004374

On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal the January 27, 2005 judgment of the Court of A ppeals are considered and, pursua nt to MCR 7.302(G)(1), we direct the Clerk to schedule o ral argument on whether to gran t the applications or take other peremptory action perm itted by MCR 7.302(G)(1). We further order the Wayne County Court to appoint Neil J. Leithauser to represent the defendant in this Court.

The parties shall file supplemental briefs w ithin 28 days of the date of this order, and are directed to include among th e issues briefed: (1) whether People v Bigelow , 229 Mich App 218 (1998), was decided corre ctly, (2) whether, if the rule in Bigelow is followed, but the felony murder conviction is reversed or vacat ed on appeal or in habeas proceedings, there are important real-world c onsequences that flow from the prior vacating of the predicate fel ony underlying the subject felon y murder conviction, and (3) in particular, whether a previo usly vacated predicate felony can be “revived” if the felony murder conviction is reversed or vacated on appeal or in habeas proceedings._______________________________________ __ 2

The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michig an are invited to file briefs amicus curiae on the issues stated above.

s1010 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 14, 2005

Clerk
#### Glenn WINNINGHAM, Appellant v. Douglas SHULMAN, et al., Appellees.

No. 10-5039.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 7, 2010.

Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 30, 2010.

Glenn Winningham, Whaite Plains, NY, pro se.

BEFORE: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GINSBURG and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed December 30, 2009, be affirmed. The district court properly dismissed this action as frivolous. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); *Denton v. Hernandez,*504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992) (court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if the facts alleged are “clearly baseless”). Claims like those of appellant, involving “bizarre conspiracy theories, [or] fantastic government manipulations of [one’s] will or mind,” *Best v. Kelly,*39 F.3d 328, 330-31 (D.C.Cir.1994), are “obviously frivolous,” *Hagans v. Lavine,*415 U.S. 528, 537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jamie RUBIO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-40906

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 22, 2010.

Gerard Raphael Rawls, Robert Lavelle Hobbs, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gary R. Bonneaux, Federal Defender’s Office, Beaumont, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jamie Rubio has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in *398accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Rubio has not filed a response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. The Government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *398published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
crypto.com | Derivatives North America

crypto.com | Derivatives

200 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 1400

Chicago, IL 60606

Jaime M. Walsh

+1 (312) 884-0927

Jaime.walsh@nadex.com

20221021(1)

October 21, 2022

Via CFTC Portal Submissions

Mr. Christopher Kirkpatrick

Secretary of the Commission

Office of the Secretariat

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

3 Lafayette Centre 

1155 21st Street, N.W. 

Washington D.C. 20581

RE: Weekly Notification of Rule Amendments: Nadex Amends Strike Widths - Submission Pursuant to 

Commission Reg. §40.6(d)

Dear Mr. Kirkpatrick:

Pursuant to Section 5c(c)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended (“Act”), and Section 40.6(d) of 

the regulations promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “Commission”) under the Act 

(the “Regulations”), North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc. (“Nadex”, the “Exchange”) hereby provides notice 

that it amended the strike widths of various contracts during the week of October 17, 2022 due to increased or 

decreased volatility, as the case may be, in the underlying markets upon which the Nadex contracts are based. 

Amended strike widths are reflected in Exhibit A.

Nadex hereby certifies that the additions and amendments contained herein comply with the Act, as 

amended, and the Commission Regulations adopted thereunder. No substantive opposing views were expressed to 

Nadex with respect to these additions. Nadex hereby certifies that notice of these events was posted on its website 

at the time of this filing.

Should you have any questions regarding the above, please do not hesitate to contact me by telephone at 

(312) 884-0927 or by email at jaime.walsh@nadex.com.

 Sincerely, 

Jaime M. Walsh

Head of Legal
crypto.com | Derivatives

200 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 1400

Chicago, IL 60606

20221021(1)

EXHIBIT A

Week of October 17, 2022

Contract Trade Date of Change Strike Width Adjusted 

From

Strike Width Adjusted To

20-Minute Wall Street 30 (Wide) 

Binary

October 17, 2022 8 16

20-Minute Wall Street 30 (Narrow) 

Binary

October 17, 2022 6 12

2-Hour Wall Street 30 Binary October 17, 2022 24 48

20-Minute US 500 (Wide) Binary October 17, 2022 1.5 3

20-Minute US 500 (Narrow) Binary October 17, 2022 1 2

2-Hour US 500 (Wide) Binary October 17, 2022 3 6

20-Minute US Tech 100 (Wide) Binary October 17, 2022 4 8

20-Minute US Tech 100 (Narrow) 

Binary

October 17, 2022 3 6

2-Hour US Tech 100 (Wide) Binary October 17, 2022 12 24

20-Minute US SmallCap 2000 (Wide) 

Binary

October 17, 2022 1.4 2.8

20-Minute US SmallCap 2000 

(Narrow) Binary

October 17, 2022 1.2 2.4

2-Hour US SmallCap 2000 (Wide) 

Binary

October 17, 2022 2.8 5.6

Daily Wall Street 30 Binary October 17, 2022 40 80

Daily US 500 Binary October 17, 2022 6 12

Daily US Tech 100 Binary October 17, 2022 24 48

Daily US SmallCap 2000 Binary October 17, 2022 4 8

Daily Crude Oil Binary October 17, 2022 0.4 0.8

Daily Gold Binary October 17, 2022 3 6
# C_2010278EN.01000701.xml

| 15.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 278/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 278/7

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions at its meeting on 15 April 2010 concerning a draft decision relating to Case COMP/39.317 — E.ON Gas

Rapporteur: Poland

2010/C 278/04

| 1. | The Advisory Committee shares the Commission's concerns expressed in its draft decision as communicated to the Advisory Committee on 26 March 2010 under Article 102 of the Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee shares the Commission's concerns expressed in its draft decision as communicated to the Advisory Committee on 26 March 2010 under Article 102 of the Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proceedings can be concluded by means of a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proceedings can be concluded by means of a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments offered by E.ON AG are suitable, necessary and proportionate. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments offered by E.ON AG are suitable, necessary and proportionate.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, in light of the commitments offered by E.ON AG, there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission, without prejudice to Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, in light of the commitments offered by E.ON AG, there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission, without prejudice to Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

---
#### Tufts *vs.*Cheatham.

1. Where notes were given for a fount and apparatus for the manufacture of soda-water, the title being retained by the vendor until payment should be made, and with the right in him, in case of non-payment of any note at maturity, to retake immediate possession of the apparatus and remove the same, if, upon a trial of the fount and apparatus by the vendee, they did not come up to the representations and covenants of the vendor, as to their quality and condition, and proved worthless, the vendee had a right to rescind the contract without the consent of the vendor, he being able to restore the vendor to the condition in which he was before the contract was made. Code, §2860.

2. The evidence being conflicting, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing a new trial, and this court will not interfere

Judgment affirmed.

November 17, 1885.

Hall. Justice.

[Suit was brought by Tufts against Cheatham on certain promissory notes. These had been given for the purchase price of a fount and apparatus for the manufacture of soda-water. By the terms of these notes, the plaintiff retained title to the property until they were paid, and reserved the right, in case either of them was not paid at maturity, to enter, without process of law, and retake possession of and remove the apparatus. The defence set up was that the apparatus had entirely failed to answer the purpose for which it was purchased, and to come up to the representations made and covenants entered into by the plaintiff as to its quality and condition; that twice it had exploded, once with a pressure of less than 150 pounds, again with less than 100 pounds, although represented as having been tested at 800 pounds to the square inch; that in consequence of its defective construction, it had become worthless ; that the defendant had offered to return it and to rescind the contract, and was entitled to have of the plaintiff the money he had paid and the cost of transportation, amounting to about $50, which he proposed to recoup and *866set off as the damage he had sustained. Upon most of these issues the testimony was conflicting, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant for $50. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to law and evidence, and on its refusal, excepted.]
Cite as 2017 Ark. 133

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

Nos. CR-92-1385 and CR-00-528

DON WILLIAM DAVIS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS 

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered April 17, 2017

DISSENTING OPINION.

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice

I dissent from the majority’s decision today to take the matter as a case and stay Davis’s

execution. Davis’s mental competency is not at issue and the United States Supreme Court’s

action in McWilliams v. Dunn, 634 F. App’x 698 (11th Cir. 2015) likely has no bearing on

Davis’s case. The United States Supreme Court can enter a stay in Davis’s case if it deems it

appropriate. Accordingly, I dissent. 

WOOD, J., joins.
#### Tyrone HURT, Appellant v. U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Appellee.

No. 06-5175.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Sept. 14, 2006.

Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 8, 2006.

Tyrone Hurt, Washington, DC, pro se.

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington, DC, for Appellee.

BEFORE: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the brief filed by appellant, and the supplements thereto. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s dismissal order filed May 30, 2006 be affirmed, although the dismissal should be with prejudice, as noted in the memorandum opinion accompanying the district court’s order. The district court properly dismissed appellant’s action as frivolous, as his claims lack an arguable basis in law. *See Neitzke v. Williams,*490 U.S. 319, 325, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
CERTIFICATIONS  I, Huoqi Chen certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Kerrisdale Mining Corporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) for the registrant and have: (a)         designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b)         designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements, for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; (c)         evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (d)         Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a)         all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b)         any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  Date: December 5, 2008 /s/ Huoqi ChenHuoqi Chen, Chief Financial Officer
#### Lillian Bernstein, Appellant, v Parthenon Enterprises, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[874 NYS2d 817]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), dated December 31, 2007, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered June 25, 2008, which, upon the order, is in favor of the defendants and against her dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied, and the order is modified accordingly; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action *(see Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment *(see*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The defendants made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the alleged defect was trivial and nonactionable and did not possess the characteristics of a trap or nuisance (see *Trincere v County of Suffolk,*90 NY2d 976 [1997]; *Shiles v Carillon Nursing & Rehabilitation*
      *884
      *Ctr., LLC,*54 AD3d 746 [2008]; *Morris v Greenburgh Cent. School Dist. No.*7, 5 AD3d 567 [2004]). However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact, inter alia, as to the height differential of the alleged defect and whether the alleged defect was trivial *(see Ayala v Gutin,*49 AD3d 677 [2008]). Rivera, J.P., Spolzino, Ritter and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Evelyn WING, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-7002.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 9, 2012.

Decided: Feb. 13, 2012.

Joseph Evelyn Wing, Appellant Pro Se. Joe Exum, Jr., Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Joshua Bryan Royster, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Evelyn Wing seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wing has not made the req*236uisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certifícate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
| (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.  |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/ Ed Holloway                          |
|--------|------------------------------------------|
|   | Ed Holloway, Principal Executive Officer |

|   | /s/ William Scaff, Jr.                          |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
|   | William Scaff, Jr., Principal Executive Officer |

|   | /s/ Frank L. Jennings                          |
|--------|------------------------------------------------|
|   | Frank L. Jennings, Principal Financial Officer |