FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSAMA AHMED FAHMY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAY-Z, AKA Shawn Carter; 

TIMOTHY MOSELY, FKA Timbaland; 

KYAMBO JOSHUA; ROB BOURDON;

BRAD DELSON; MIKE SHINODA;

DAVE FARRELL; JOSEPH HAHN;

CHESTER BENNINGTON; BIG BAD MR 

HAHN MUSIC; CHESTERCHAZ 

PUBLISHING; EMI BLACKWOOD 

MUSIC, INC.; EMI MUSIC 

PUBLISHING LTD.; KENJI KOBAYASHI 

MUSIC; LIL LULU PUBLISHING;

MACHINE SHOP RECORDINGS, LLC;

MARCY PROJECTS PRODUCTIONS II,

INC.; MTV NETWORKS ENTERPRISE,

INC.; NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT 

MUSIC; PARAMOUNT HOME 

ENTERTAINMENT, INC.; PARAMOUNT 

PICTURES CORPORATION; RADICAL 

MEDIA; ROB BOURDON MUSIC; ROCA-FELLA RECORDS, LLC;

TIMBALAND PRODUCTIONS, INC.;

UMG RECORDINGS, INC.; UNIVERSAL 

MUSIC AND VIDEO DISTRIBUTION,

INC.; WARNER MUSIC, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55213

D.C.

No. 2:07-cv05715-CASPJW

AMENDED

OPINION
2 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 8, 2017

Pasadena, California

Filed May 31, 2018

Amended November 1, 2018

Before: Carlos T. Bea, Consuelo M. Callahan,

and Paul R. Kelly,

∗ Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

 * The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 3

SUMMARY**

Copyright

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment 

as a matter of law in favor of rapper Jay-Z and other 

defendants on copyright infringement claims brought by the 

heir to Egyptian composer Baligh Hamdy’s copyright in a 

1957 arrangement of the song Khosara.

Jay-Z used a sample from the arrangement in the 

background music to his hit single Big Pimpin’.

The district court held that the heir, Osama Ahmed 

Fahmy, lacked standing to bring the copyright claims. First, 

the district court held that Egyptian law recognizes a 

transferable right of “adaptation,” such that when Fahmy 

transferred “all” of his economic rights to Mohsen 

Mohammed Jaber in a 2002 agreement, the transfer included 

the right to create derivative works adapted from Khosara. 

The district court concluded that the right of adaptation is an 

economic right under Egyptian law, not an inalienable moral

right. Second, the district court held that the conveyance of 

rights contained in the 2002 agreement complied with the 

requirements of Article 149, the Egyptian law governing the 

transfer of economic rights. Accordingly, the 2002 

agreement successfully conveyed a right of adaptation of 

Khosara to Jaber. Third, a reservation of rights found at the 

end of the 2002 agreement referred to the right to receive 

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

royalties, and thus did not confer standing on Fahmy to bring 

a claim of copyright infringement.

Affirming, the panel concluded (1) that Egyptian law 

recognizes a transferable economic right to prepare 

derivative works; (2) that the moral rights Fahmy retained 

by operation of Egyptian law were not enforceable in U.S. 

federal court; and (3) that, even if they were, Fahmy had not 

complied with the compensation requirement of Egyptian 

law, which did not provide for his requested money 

damages, and which provided for only injunctive relief from 

an Egyptian court. The panel held that the district court 

properly interpreted the 2002 agreement as conveying to 

Jaber the economic right to create derivative works. In 

addition, the fact that Fahmy retained the right to royalties 

did not give him standing to sue for copyright infringement.

COUNSEL

Keith J. Wesley (argued), Corbin K. Barthold, and Peter W. 

Ross, Browne George Ross LLP, Los Angeles, California, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christine Lepera (argued), Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp 

LLP, New York, New York; David A. Steinberg, Mitchell 

Silberberg & Knupp LLP, Los Angeles, California; Andrew 

H. Bart, Jenner & Block LLP, New York, New York; for 

Defendants-Appellees.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 5

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

Days before the turn of the new millennium, rapper JayZ released an album containing his soon-to-be hit single Big 

Pimpin’. The background music to that track used a sample 

from a 1957 arrangement by Egyptian composer Baligh 

Hamdy. Today, we are faced with the question whether the 

heir to Hamdy’s copyright (Appellant Fahmy) may sue JayZ for infringement based solely on the fact that Egyptian law 

recognizes an inalienable “moral right” of the author to 

object to offensive uses of a copyrighted work. We hold that 

he cannot.

I

A

In 1957, Baligh Hamdy composed the music to the song 

Khosara for the Egyptian movie Fata Ahlami. The song 

quickly became popular in Egypt. In 1968, Hamdy agreed 

to transfer certain license and distribution rights to an 

Egyptian recording company, Sout el Phan.1 When Hamdy 

died in 1993, his heirs inherited whatever rights he retained 

in Khosara. Appellant Osama Ahmed Fahmy (“Fahmy”) is 

one of these heirs.

In August 1995, Hamdy’s heirs, including Fahmy, who 

acted as the heirs’ representative, executed another 

agreement with Sout el Phan, confirming the continuing 

 1 The agreement was written in Arabic. A certified translation can 

be found in the record.
6 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

viability of the rights transferred through the 1968 

agreement.2 In December 1995, Sout el Phan transferred 

certain of its exclusive rights to a company called EMI 

Music Arabia (“EMI”). This agreement transferred to EMI, 

among other things, “the sole and exclusive right to protect, 

publish and/or sub-publish songs” contained on records in 

the Sout el Phan catalog, including Khosara. After the 

December 1995 agreement, EMI possessed the rights, 

previously held by Sout el Phan, to license and distribute 

recordings of Khosara in every country but Egypt. Sout el 

Phan retained the rights to license and distribute in Egypt.

Appellees enter the picture a few years later. In 1999, 

rapper Shawn Carter (professionally known as, “Jay-Z”) and 

music producer Timothy Mosley (professionally known as, 

“Timbaland”) produced a hit song, Big Pimpin’, that used 

portions of Khosara as a background track to Jay-Z’s rap 

lyrics.3 They thought the music was part of the public 

domain and did not obtain permission to use it. EMI 

disagreed. As a result, in late 2000, EMI asserted its rights 

to the music, and Mosley paid EMI $100,000 for the right to 

exploit Khosara in Big Pimpin’.

Fahmy became aware of Big Pimpin’ in December 2000. 

As a result, he authorized a U.S.-based intellectual property 

attorney, David Braun, to investigate a copyright 

infringement claim against Jay-Z. According to Fahmy, an 

 2 Also originally in Arabic, a certified translation of the 1995 

agreement is in the record. The parties agree that the 1995 agreement 

reaffirmed rights transferred in the 1968 agreement.

3 The Defendants-Appellees in this lawsuit include a long list of 

music producers and record labels, all of whom were involved in the 

production and/or distribution of various iterations of Big Pimpin’. For 

convenience, we refer to the Appellees collectively as “Jay-Z.”
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 7

attorney at EMI told Braun that EMI had a valid license to 

exploit Khosara but refused to disclose the agreement to 

Braun. Braun eventually declined to represent the Hamdy 

heirs.

Around 2001, control of Sout el Phan’s musical catalog 

passed to another Egyptian entity called Alam el Phan. In 

2002, independent of the agreements previously mentioned, 

Fahmy, as representative of the Hamdy heirs, including 

himself, signed an agreement with the owner of Alam el 

Phan, Mohsen Mohammed Jaber. The agreement 

transferred to Jaber certain rights to Khosara. Exactly which 

rights were transferred in this 2002 Agreement4 is the central 

dispute in this lawsuit. The agreement, in relevant part, 

reads as follows:

I, Osama Ahmed Fahm[y] . . . in person and 

in my capacity as the representative of the 

heirs of the late [Baligh Hamdy] hereby 

assign to Mr. Mohsen Mohammad Jaber . . .

and to whoever he selects, the right to print, 

publish and use the music of the songs stated 

in this statement [including Khosara] on all 

currently known audio and/or visual of 

videos, performances, records, cassette tapes, 

and cartridges in addition to all the modern 

technological and digital means such as the 

internet, telephones, satellites, or any other 

means that may be invented in the future 

including musical re-segmentation and 

alteration methods while maintaining the 

original segment of the music. This 

 4 Like the other agreements, the 2002 Agreement was written in 

Arabic. A certified translation can be found in the record.
8 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

authorization grants Mr. Mohsen 

Mohammad Jaber solely/or to whoever he 

selects, the right to publish and sell these 

songs using all the means available in all 

parts of the world. I do hereby approve, by 

signing this authorization to pledge not to 

dispose once again of this music, or 

republish, sell, or present them to any other 

individual, company, authority, or institution.

I do hereby further state that by signing this 

authorization and waiver of these pieces of 

music to Mr. Mohsen Mohammad Jaber, I 

would have authorized him solely and/or 

whoever he selects, fully, and irrevocably 

the right to use this music in whatever way 

he deems necessary. Mr. Mohsen 

Mohammad Jaber or his successors are 

solely the owners of the financial usage 

rights stated in [Article 147 of the 2002 

Egyptian Copyright Law5] for the pieces of 

music listed hereinafter in the Arab 

Republic of Egypt and the whole world 

[including Khosara], and the use includes all 

the usage means and methods whether those 

currently available or those that will be 

invented in the future and whether it was 

audio, visual or audiovisual including the 

new digital and technology means during the 

 5 The 2002 Agreement uses the phrase “Law No. 82 for the year 

2002.” But that phrase is a reference to Article 147 of the 2002 Egyptian 

Copyright Law.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 9

whole legal protection period specified by the 

law.

. . .

Mr. Mohsen Mohammad Jaber and his 

successor become the sole publisher of the 

melodies of these songs in all the current 

publishing means and in any way he deems 

whether it was direct or indirect. Mr. Mohsen 

Mohammad Jaber also has the right to 

transfer all these rights or some of them or 

dispose them to another company or 

institution using any trademark he 

selects. . . .

I [Appellant] did also fully assign to Mr. 

Mohsen Mohammad Jaber all our rights 

clarified in [the 1968 Agreement] between 

Sout El Phan Company and the musician 

[Baligh Hamdy], or any other contracts 

and/or rights pertaining to those pieces of 

music. As such, signing on this document is 

considered as a final quittance from any of 

our dues from Sout El Phan, and Mr. Mohsen 

Jaber, and his successor, has the right to 

request and receive any financial dues 

relevant to this music from any party . . . .

I [Appellant] received the amount of 115,000 

(only one hundred fifteen thousand Egyptian 

Pounds) for this waiver and declaration while 
10 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

maintaining our rights in respect of the public 

performance and mechanical printing.

(Emphasis added).

B

Notwithstanding this 2002 Agreement, Fahmy filed the 

instant lawsuit against Jay-Z in 2007, claiming to have 

retained certain rights to the Khosara copyright. The 

complaint contained three causes of action for copyright 

infringement6 under Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act7, 

and a state law claim for unfair business practices. The claim 

for unfair business practices was subsequently dismissed and 

is not at issue in this appeal.

On December 9, 2011, the district court granted Jay-Z’s 

motion for partial summary judgment, holding that based on 

the Copyright Act’s “rolling” statute of limitations Fahmy 

“may recover damages from any infringement only within 

three years prior to the filing of his lawsuit—i.e., from 

August 31, 2004 to the present.” That order is not 

challenged in this appeal.

 6 The three causes of action relate to three different infringements, 

all of which relate to Jay-Z’s Big Pimpin’. The first was based on the 

initial publication of Big Pimpin’; the second, based on a collaborative 

remake of Big Pimpin’, performed and published with the band Linkin 

Park; and the third, based on Fade to Black, a film which depicts Jay-Z 

performing Big Pimpin’. With respect to our analysis here, the claims 

are identical.

7 Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), gives

copyright owners the “exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . .

prepar[ation of] derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 11

On August 12, 2013, the district court granted Jay-Z’s 

motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of 

laches, holding that Fahmy’s more than six-year delay in 

filing his complaint after hearing of the infringement was 

unreasonable and prejudiced Jay-Z. However, on May 19, 

2014, the Supreme Court held in a different case that laches 

cannot be invoked to preclude copyright claims filed within 

the limitations period. See Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1967 (2014). Thereafter, the 

district court granted Fahmy’s motion for reconsideration 

and vacated its summary judgment order to the extent it 

barred certain claims based on laches.

On September 24, 2015, the district court ruled on 

several pretrial motions. First, it granted Jay-Z’s motion in 

limine to prohibit Fahmy from playing sound recordings of 

Khosara as evidence of the copyright. The court held that 

“[p]resenting the sound recordings at trial carries a 

significant risk of confusing and misleading the jury,” which 

was “particularly problematic because [Fahmy] admits that 

his copyright does not include the 1992 recording [of 

Khosara].”8 Second, the court granted Fahmy’s motion to 

bifurcate the liability and damages phases of the trial. Third, 

the court denied Jay-Z’s request to resolve at the outset of 

trial issues of foreign law, including whether the 2002 

agreement between Fahmy and Jaber “effectuated a 

complete transfer of plaintiff’s rights in Khosara, therefore 

denying [Fahmy] standing to bring the suit.” The court held 

that, because “neither party had presented expert testimony 

regarding the meaning of the 2002 agreement under 

 8 Fahmy filed a motion to reconsider this ruling at trial, which was 

denied.
12 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

Egyptian law,” there remained “genuine issues of fact as to 

whether plaintiff conveyed all of his rights.”

Trial commenced on October 13, 2015. The first phase 

of the bifurcated trial (liability) concluded on October 20, 

2015. That same day, Jay-Z filed a motion under Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 52 for judgment as a matter 

of law, asking the court to grant judgment in his favor on the 

ground that Fahmy lacked standing to bring the copyright 

claims. Fahmy also filed a Rule 50 motion for judgment as 

a matter of law, arguing that he had established Jay-Z’s 

liability under the Copyright Act.

On October 21, 2015, the court entered an order granting 

Jay-Z’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because the 

standing issue decided the case, the court declined to reach 

Fahmy’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

The district court decision proceeds in three parts, each 

of which is separately challenged by Fahmy. First, the court 

held that Egyptian law recognizes a transferable right of 

“adaptation,” such that when Fahmy transferred “all” of his 

economic rights to Jaber in the 2002 Agreement, that 

included the right to create derivative works adapted from 

Khosara. This first ruling included the holding that the right 

of adaptation is an economic right under Egyptian law, not 

an inalienable moral right.9 Second, the district court held 

that the conveyance of rights contained in the 2002 

Agreement complies with the requirements of Article 149, 

the Egyptian law governing the transfer of economic rights. 

Accordingly, the 2002 Agreement successfully conveyed a 

 9 The parties agree that the district court’s application of Egyptian 

law here was proper because the 2002 Agreement was formed and 

executed in Egypt.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 13

right of adaptation of Khosara to Jaber. Third, the district 

court held that the reservation of rights found at the end of 

the 2002 Agreement—i.e., the reservation of the “rights in 

respect of the public performance and mechanical 

printing”—refers to the right to receive royalties, and thus 

does not confer standing on Fahmy to bring a claim of 

copyright infringement.

As a result of the foregoing determinations, the district 

court granted Jay-Z’s motion for judgment as a matter law. 

Fahmy appealed.

II

We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment 

as a matter of law. Electro Source, Inc. v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., 95 F.3d 837, 838 (9th Cir. 1996). Whether a party 

has standing under the Copyright Act to sue for infringement 

and whether the district court correctly interpreted and 

applied foreign law are also reviewed de novo. Minden 

Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2015) (Copyright Act); Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 

810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (foreign law).

III

A

To have standing to sue for the copyright infringement 

alleged to have been done by Jay-Z’s adaptation of Khosara, 

Fahmy must have retained the exclusive right to prepare 

derivative works of Khosara, such as Big Pimpin’.

10 Fahmy 

 10 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the right “to prepare derivative 

works” among the bundle of “exclusive rights” vested in the owner of 

the copyright); see also § 201(d) (making each exclusive right 
14 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

advances three alternative arguments for why he has retained 

that right. First, he argues that, under Egyptian law, it is 

impossible to transfer the right to prohibit derivative works 

because it is a right subsumed within Egyptian “moral 

rights,” and is thus inalienable. Whether the terms of the 

2002 Agreement purport to convey it or not, Fahmy insists 

that he retains the right to prohibit derivative works. Second, 

he argues that, even if transfer of the right were possible 

under Egyptian law, the 2002 Agreement does not clearly 

and unequivocally convey that right to Jaber, as required by 

Egyptian law for any such conveyance to be valid. Thus, 

Fahmy asks us to hold, as a matter of contract interpretation, 

that the 2002 Agreement did not convey to Jaber the right to 

prohibit others to make derivative works. Third, Fahmy 

contends that he has standing to sue for copyright 

infringement by virtue of his right to receive royalties, which 

is reserved in the 2002 Agreement. None of his arguments 

are availing.

1

Copyright holders in Egypt possess both moral and 

economic rights. As both parties concede, Egypt recognizes 

a moral right of “integrity,” which is wholly separate from a 

copyright holder’s economic rights, and which confers upon 

the author of the copyrighted material the right to object to 

those derivative works the author deems to be “distortions” 

or “mutilations” of the work, whether or not the relevant 

economic rights have been transferred. As the district court 

 

transferrable “in whole or in part” and entitling the “owner of any 

particular exclusive right . . . to all of the protection and remedies 

accorded to the copyright owner by this title”). A logical extension of 

the exclusive right to “prepare” derivative works is the right to prohibit 

others from doing so without permission.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 15

explained, moral rights are intended to protect the 

“presumed intimate bond between authors and their works” 

and are based on the notion that an author’s work is “almost 

universally understood to be an extension of the author’s 

personhood.” In sum, moral rights protect the author’s 

personal or moral interests in the work and, for this reason, 

are not transferable to another party.

By contrast, economic rights protect the author’s right to 

profit from his work. Article 147 of the 2002 Egyptian 

Copyright Law11 (“Article 147”) provides that the author of 

a copyrighted work and his successor have “the exclusive 

right to authorize or prevent any form of exploitation of his 

work, particularly through reproduction, broadcasting, 

rebroadcasting, public performance, public communication, 

translation, adaptation, rental, lending or making the work 

available to the public in any manner.” Furthermore, Article 

149 of the same Egyptian statute (“Article 149”) allows the 

owner of a copyright to transfer “all or some of his economic 

rights.”

Fahmy contends that the exclusive right to prepare (and 

prohibit) derivative works is an inalienable moral right, not 

a transferable economic right. The record supports the 

proposition that an author’s moral rights in Egypt include 

some sort of limited right to object to supposed “distortions” 

or “mutilations” of the author’s work. But the record plainly 

does not support Fahmy’s argument that the specific right to 

prepare derivative works for profit is a non-transferable, 

non-economic right. Fahmy’s own expert testified that an 

“adaptation,” as used in Article 147, is the same thing as a 

 11 The parties agree that the 2002 version of the Egyptian Copyright 

Law governs here because it was the operative statute at the time of the 

2002 Agreement.
16 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

“derivative work.” Therefore, the plain language of Article 

147, which grants authors the right to authorize 

“adaptations” of their copyrighted works, and Article 149, 

which gives authors the right to transfer “all or some” of their 

economic rights, combine for the straightforward conclusion 

that the right to prepare derivative works from the 

copyrighted work for profit can be transferred under 

Egyptian law.

This conclusion would not necessitate the determination 

that Fahmy lacks standing to sue if the moral right to prevent 

“distortions” and “mutilations” were enforceable in the 

United States. However, Fahmy’s moral rights are not 

enforceable here for at least two reasons. First, federal law 

does not recognize the moral rights at issue here. The 

Copyright Act recognizes some moral rights, but only for 

certain “work[s] of visual art.” See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) 

(granting to “the author of a work of visual art” an 

inalienable right to prevent “distortion, mutilation, or other 

modification” which might prejudice the author’s “honor or 

reputation”); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 

746 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that, “[e]xcept for a limited 

universe of works of visual art, . . . United States copyright 

law generally does not recognize moral rights”). No 

provision of the Act recognizes a moral right to prevent 

distortions or mutilations of copyrighted music.

Moreover, while the Berne Convention12 offers some 

protection to foreign copyright holders in the United States, 

it does not help Fahmy. The Convention guarantees only 

 12 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 

Works (“the Convention”) is “the principal accord governing 

international copyright relations.” Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 306–

07 (2012). The United States joined in 1989. Id. at 307.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 17

that holders of foreign copyrights are afforded “the same 

protection” as holders of domestic copyrights, a policy 

known as the “principle of national treatment.” Creative 

Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 700 (9th 

Cir. 1995); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 

24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting 

3 David Nimmer & Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on 

Copyright § 17.05 at 17–39 (1994) (“The applicable law is 

the copyright law of the state in which the infringement 

occurred, not that of the state of which the author is a 

national or in which the work was first published.”). In other 

words, parties to the Convention, such as the U.S., are not 

required to grant foreign copyright holders rights which are 

not granted to its domestic copyright holders. Since our 

federal law does not accord protection of moral rights to 

American copyright holders as to non-visual art, neither does 

it recognize Fahmy’s claim to moral rights. That Fahmy 

retains moral rights in Egypt does him no good here.

Second, even if federal law recognized the moral rights 

of musical authors (or merely enforced foreign copyright 

law), the specific right Fahmy retains under Egyptian law 

entitles him only to injunctive relief in Egypt. The 2002 

Egyptian Copyright Law—after granting to authors the 

“perpetual[,] imprescriptible[,] and inalienable moral right[ 

]” to prevent a “distortion or mutilation of the work” in 

Article 143—specifies the author’s recourse for violations of 

such rights in Article 144:

Where serious reasons arise, the author alone 

shall have the right to request the court of first 

instance to prevent putting the work in 

circulation, withdraw the work from 

circulation or allow making substantive 

modification to the work, notwithstanding his 
18 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

disposal of the economic exploitation rights. 

In such a case, the author shall, within a delay 

fixed by the court, pay in advance a fair 

compensation to the person authorised to 

exercise the economic rights of exploitation, 

failing which the court decision shall have no 

effect.

Not only does the plain language of Article 144 grant 

exclusively injunctive relief, it also requires the author to pay 

“fair compensation to the person authorised to exercise the 

economic rights of exploitation.” Absent the payment of fair 

compensation, the court’s injunction has “no effect.” Thus, 

even in Egypt, Fahmy’s moral rights would be insufficient 

to win him anything but an injunction. And before he could 

obtain that, Fahmy would have to compensate Jay-Z fairly 

for limiting what would otherwise be an unencumbered 

economic right to exploit Khosara, a right for which Jay-Z 

already paid $100,000. The record is silent as to whether 

Fahmy has made any offer of such compensation. Indeed, 

such a proffered compensation is a far cry from the result 

Fahmy seeks here. Fahmy asks the court not simply to 

enjoin further use of Khosara but also to award him damages 

and a portion of Jay-Z’s “profits and gains.” We cannot do 

so. Assuming arguendo that Fahmy’s moral rights are 

enforceable in federal court, we could not grant the relief he 

seeks because he is not entitled to it—not even in Egypt.

Expert testimony confirms this reading of Article 144. 

Jay-Z’s expert, Egyptian lawyer Abou Farhat, testified that 

“[m]oral rights . . . are applicable only in Egypt.” When 

asked what recourse an author has when his moral rights are 

violated, Farhat said an author may “go [into] Egypt before 

an Egyptian court and ask it to enforce” his right to enjoin 

distortions and mutilations. Farhat’s testimony thus 
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 19

supports the above reading of Article 144 (i.e., that moral 

rights holders may seek only injunctive relief in Egypt) and 

comports with this court’s prior cases, which outline the 

“principle of national treatment” (i.e., that federal law treats 

foreign copyrights the same as U.S. copyrights). Farhat’s 

testimony also was not contradicted by the testimony of 

Fahmy’s expert, Dr. Hossam Mohammad Loutfi. 

Accordingly, like the district court, we credit Farhat’s 

testimony and find that the remedy set forth in Article 144 is 

for only injunctive relief in Egypt, and then only upon 

proffer of the compensation required in Egypt.13

We thus conclude (1) that Egyptian law recognizes a 

transferable economic right to prepare derivative works; 

(2) that the moral rights Fahmy retained by operation of 

Egyptian law are not enforceable in U.S. federal court; and 

(3) that, even if they were, Fahmy has not complied with the 

compensation requirement of Egyptian law, which does not 

 13 We emphasize that it is our prerogative under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 44.1 to “consider any relevant material or source, 

including testimony,” as we do here, in determining a question of foreign 

law. See Universe Sales Co., Ltd. v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 

1039 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is neither novel nor remarkable for a court to 

accept the uncontradicted testimony of an expert to establish the relevant 

foreign law.”). Moreover, because a determination of foreign law “must 

be treated as a ruling on a question of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, our 

review of the district court’s determination is de novo. See de Fontbrune 

v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992, 996–1000 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the 

“adoption of Rule 44.1 in 1966 marked a sea change in the treatment of 

foreign law . . . by making the process of ascertaining foreign law 

equivalent to the process for determining domestic law”); City of Harper 

Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 589 F.3d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(citing Rule 44.1 for the proposition that foreign law determinations are 

reviewed de novo).
20 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

provide for his requested money damages, and which 

provides for only injunctive relief from an Egyptian court.

2

The 2002 Agreement unambiguously conveys to Jaber 

the economic right to create derivative works. Egyptian law 

requires a conveyance of economic rights to (1) be “certified 

in writing,”14 and (2) “contain an explicit and detailed 

indication of each right to be transferred with the extent and 

purpose of the transfer and the duration and place of 

exploitation.” The 2002 Agreement is a writing which 

“assign[s]” to Jaber the right to “print, publish and use the 

music of [Khosara],” including with “musical resegmentation and alteration methods . . . in all parts of the 

world.” It also makes Jaber and his successors “solely the 

owners of the financial usage rights stated in [Article 147 the 

2002 Egyptian Copyright Law].” These “financial usage 

rights” are the economic rights listed in Article 147, which 

include the right of “adaptation,” i.e., the right to prepare 

derivative works. Thus, the plain language of the 2002 

Agreement purports to convey the very right that Fahmy 

needs to have so as to have a cognizable injury, and thus to 

have standing to sue for copyright infringement. 

Furthermore, the agreement also specifies the duration of the 

agreement (“the whole legal protection period specified by 

the law”) and the place of exploitation (“in all parts of the 

world”), as required by Article 149.

Fahmy argues that the 2002 Agreement is deficient for 

failing to “contain an explicit and detailed indication of each 

right to be transferred,” per Article 149. Specifically, he 

 14 Fahmy does not argue that the 2002 Agreement is invalid because 

it is not “certified.”
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 21

argues that the conveyance would fail, despite the parties’ 

intentions, because the agreement does not state “separately, 

clearly, and unequivocally” that it transfers the “right to 

make changes to future versions of Khosara.”

We find the district court’s refutation of this argument 

persuasive. The court held that “it would be unreasonable to 

interpret Egyptian law to require a copyright holder who is 

purporting to transfer ‘all’ of the economic rights in his 

copyright to also separately identify each economic right to 

be transferred.”15 Indeed, identifying each right to be 

transferred would not only be redundant, it also runs the risk 

of being counterproductive—in the future, the list could be 

“used to infer an intent not to transfer rights other than those 

specifically delineated.” Additionally, Article 147, by its 

own terms, does not purport to provide an exhaustive list of 

economic rights (“The author and his universal successor 

shall have the exclusive right to authorise or prevent any 

form of exploitation of his work, particularly through

reproduction, broadcasting, [etc.] . . . .”) (emphasis added)16, 

and the related Article 149 expressly allows for the transfer 

of “all or some . . . economic rights” (emphasis added). 

Neither of these provisions makes sense if a transfer of “all” 

economic rights is impossible without an exhaustive list. 

Finally, the record contains expert testimony indicating that 

 15 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 

LAW 101–02 (2012) (explaining that phrases which include “general 

terms,” such as the phrase “all persons” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 

should “be accorded their full and fair scope,” unless there is “some 

indication to the contrary”).

16 See READING LAW 132–33 (2012) (noting that the introduction of 

a list with the word “including” is presumed to be nonexhaustive). Here, 

we apply the same presumption to the words “particularly through.”
22 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

the only way to “assign[ ] all the rights” is to “refer to the 

Article 147 itself.” This is exactly what the 2002 Agreement 

does. Thus, we hold that the district court properly 

interpreted the 2002 Agreement: it conveys to Jaber the 

economic right to create derivative works.

3

Fahmy’s final argument is that the 2002 Agreement 

reserves his right to receive royalties,17 thus making him a 

“beneficial owner” of the Khosara copyright and conferring 

upon him standing to sue for copyright infringement.18 This 

argument also fails.

A copyright consists of a bundle of six statutorily created 

rights, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106. The statute confers upon 

the owner of the copyright the following exclusive rights:

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in 

copies or phonorecords;

(2) to prepare derivative works based upon 

the copyrighted work;

 17 A “royalty” is “[a] payment—in addition to or in place of an upfront payment—made to an author or inventor for each copy of a work 

or article sold under a copyright or patent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

1528 (10th ed. 2014). “Royalties are often paid per item made, used, or 

sold, or per time elapsed.” Id.

18 Jay-Z argues the court should ignore this argument as waived 

because it was not raised below. However, in Fahmy’s reply brief, he 

points to a spot in the record in which the argument was raised. We 

therefore consider it.
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 23

(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 

copyrighted work to the public by sale or 

other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 

lease, or lending;

(4) . . . to perform the copyrighted work 

publicly;

(5) . . . to display the copyrighted work 

publicly; and

(6) . . . to perform the copyrighted work 

publicly by means of a digital audio 

transmission.

17 U.S.C. § 106. Under the Copyright Act, “[t]he legal or 

beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is 

entitled to institute an action for any infringement of that 

particular right . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 501 (emphasis added). 

While the Copyright Act does not define “beneficial 

ownership,” this court has explained that “[t]he classic 

example of a beneficial owner is ‘an author who ha[s] parted 

with legal title to the copyright in exchange for percentage 

royalties based on sales or license fees.’” DRK Photo v. 

McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978, 

988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Warren v. Fox Family 

Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Fahmy’s copyright claims against Jay-Z specifically 

allege infringement of only the right to prepare derivative 

works under § 106(2).19 Fahmy thus must show that he is 

 19 Fahmy’s summary judgment briefing made it abundantly clear 

that he claims infringement only of derivative rights: “There is no claim 

in this case that Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s copyright only by 
24 FAHMY V. JAY-Z

the legal or beneficial owner of “that particular right” in 

Khosara’s copyright bundle. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). He 

has not done so. Fahmy points to the 2002 Agreement in 

support of the idea that he retained royalty rights, but the 

2002 Agreement states only that Fahmy retained royalty 

rights with respect to “the public performance and 

mechanical printing” of Khosara. Fahmy’s right to receive 

royalties from the “public performance” of Khosara clearly 

refers to the rights under § 106(4) and § 106(6). And 

Fahmy’s right to receive royalties from the “mechanical 

printing” of Khosara refers to a term of art in copyright law 

called “mechanical reproduction,” whereby royalties are 

paid every time a composition is reproduced, referring to the 

right under § 106(1).20

There is no evidence that Fahmy retained the right to 

collect royalties with respect to the creation of derivative 

works based on Khosara. Because Fahmy is not the 

beneficial owner of the right that Fahmy alleges Jay-Z 

 ‘reproducing’ – i.e., making identical ‘copies’ or ‘phonorecords’ – of any 

material object in which Khosara was first fixed in tangible form. 

Instead this case concerns the unauthorized preparation of derivative 

works.”

20 The term “mechanical reproduction” came about with the advent 

of player pianos—a disruptive technology that first allowed for the 

mechanical production of music through the reproduction and sale of 

player piano rolls. See Gary Myers & George Howard, The Future of 

Music: Reconfiguring Public Performance Rights, 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 

207, 215 (2010). While player pianos are a thing of the past, the 

“mechanical” term endures to describe reproductions of music on 

records, CDs, or even digital downloads. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 115. Each 

time that a record is reproduced in such a “mechanical” format, a 

“mechanical royalty” must be paid to the beneficial owner of the 

exclusive right to reproduction of the copyrighted work under § 106(1).
FAHMY V. JAY-Z 25

infringed—the right codified in § 106(2) related to 

preparation of derivative works—Fahmy lacks standing to 

sue for infringement of that right.

For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the district 

court’s conclusion that Fahmy lacked standing to sue Jay-Z 

for copyright infringement.21

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of 

the district court.

 21 Because we hold Fahmy lacks standing to assert a copyright 

infringement claim, we do not address his remaining arguments on other 

issues.