IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–0719

Filed April 24, 2015

Amended September 25, 2015

SHANNON and DANNY NELSON, Individually, and on Behalf of E.N. 

f/k/a E.N., a Minor,

Appellees,

vs.

LYNN M. LINDAMAN, LYNN M. LINDAMAN, M.D., P.L.C. d/b/a 

LINDAMAN ORTHOPAEDIC, and MERCY MEDICAL CENTER –

DES MOINES,

Appellants.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. 

Blink, Judge. 

Medical defendants, sued for malpractice for failing to detect child 

abuse, appeal district court’s order denying their motion for summary 

judgment based on immunity under Iowa Code section 232.73 for 

assisting the investigation by the Iowa Department of Human Services. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

John T. Clendenin, Hayward L. Draper, Ryan G. Koopmans, and 

Jess W. Vilsack of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants 

Lynn M. Lindaman and Lynn M. Lindaman, M.D., P.L.C. 

Connie L. Diekema, Erik P. Bergeland, Kellen B. Bubach of Finley, 

Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig, Hilmes & Gaffney, P.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant Mercy Medical Center – Des Moines. 
2

Eric M. Updegraff of Stoltze & Updegraff, P.C., Des Moines, and

Jeff Carter and Zachary C. Priebe of Jeff Carter Law Offices, P.C., 

Des Moines, for appellees. 
3

WATERMAN, Justice.

In this appeal, we must address the immunity from civil liability 

afforded by Iowa Code section 232.73 (2009) for a physician participating 

in a child abuse assessment. The physician treated the infant victim’s 

broken arm and told the investigator for the Iowa Department of Human 

Services (DHS) the father’s version of how the injury occurred was 

plausible. The baby was left in his parents’ care and three weeks later 

suffered a severe brain injury while with his father. 

The infant’s adoptive parents filed this medical malpractice action,

alleging the physician’s negligence and reckless or willful conduct was a 

proximate cause of the baby’s subsequent injuries because the DHS

relied on his assessment to initially decide to leave the baby with the 

baby’s father. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting 

the physician participated in the DHS assessment in good faith and 

therefore is immune from liability under section 232.73. The district 

court ruled that questions of fact precluded summary judgment, and we 

allowed the defendants’ interlocutory appeal. 

For the reasons explained below, we hold the defendants are 

entitled to good-faith immunity under section 232.73. Undisputed facts 

establish the physician participated in good faith in the DHS assessment. 

We therefore reverse the order denying summary judgment and remand 

the case for the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

The parents of E.N., a three-week-old infant, brought him to the 

emergency room at Mercy Medical Center with a broken arm on June 18, 

2009. His father, Jonas Neiderbach, claimed that he heard a snap as he 

set his baby down with his arm behind him. Dr. Scott Barron, a 

pediatric emergency room physician, did not believe the father’s story. 
4

Dr. Barron believed the spiral fracture could not have been caused by 

E.N.’s body weight, especially because the baby’s bones were pliable. 

Dr. Barron reported his concerns to the DHS, which began a child abuse 

investigation under Iowa Code section 232.70. DHS caseworker Darla 

Brown came to the hospital, spoke with Dr. Barron and E.N.’s parents, 

and reviewed E.N.’s medical records. Meanwhile, Dr. Barron referred 

E.N. to Dr. Selover, who agreed the injury was consistent with abuse. 

Dr. Selover questioned the father’s story because at E.N.’s age infants 

typically extend their arms forward rather than backwards. Dr. Selover 

contacted Dr. Lindaman for assistance in treating the fracture. 

Dr. Lindaman lacked significant experience evaluating claims of child 

abuse in infants, but as a pediatric orthopedic surgeon was well qualified

to treat the fracture. 

On June 19, Dr. Lindaman saw E.N. and successfully immobilized 

the arm. Dr. Lindaman noted in his treatment plan, “At this time the 

injury does fit with the mechanism described. I don’t see any signs of 

any other skeletal trauma.” Meanwhile, Brown had already told the Polk 

County Attorney she would probably be requesting a no-contact order

against the father. Brown phoned Dr. Lindaman to continue gathering 

information for her assessment. Her notes of their conversation state:

This worker spoke[] with Dr. Lindaman . . . .

Dr. Lindaman indicated that if the father was holding baby 

by the chest and laying him down on the bed, placing him 

down with one side of his body coming into contact with the 

bed first, that it was plausible that the arm on that side of 

the body could get pinned under his body behind him. 

This worker questioned whether a child, weighing only 

8 lbs. 11 oz., would have enough force to create this injury. I 

also provided information that dad had provided a different 

explanation with how he laid [E.N.] down, with one hand 

under its head and the other under its butt. I also 

questioned whether a crying child’s arm would go back 

behind him as he would more likely to be pulling his arms 
5

tight in front of him. Through this line of questioning, he 

stated on several occasions, “the mechanism they described 

fits the fracture seen.” 

Dr. Lindaman also indicated that he did not see any 

other injuries. He also stated that the family appeared 

appropriate and they brought [E.N.] in immediately. 

Dr. Lindaman stated that he saw no evidence to indicate 

healing of the fracture, which would indicate it was 

consistent with the time frame provided by parents. All 

these factors lead to his assessment of the injury. 

Following her conversation with Dr. Lindaman, Brown decided not

to seek a no-contact order and allowed E.N. to go home with a family 

safety plan in place. E.N.’s parents and paternal grandfather, with whom 

E.N. lived, agreed that E.N.’s father would not be left alone with E.N. 

Due to her continuing concerns and what she saw as conflicting medical 

opinions, Brown spoke with her supervisor and scheduled a 

multidisciplinary team meeting for June 30 to discuss E.N.’s case. 

On June 26, Dr. Lindaman conducted a follow-up visit with E.N. at 

his office. Dr. Lindaman performed a physical examination while E.N. 

remained in his mother’s arms. The arm bone was in good alignment 

and x-rays taken that day showed good early healing. Dr. Lindaman 

focused on the healing arm bone fracture without examining E.N. for 

signs of any other injuries. It is unknown whether a full body 

examination that day would have detected the rib fractures that were 

discovered twelve days later. 

The multidisciplinary team meeting on June 30 involved 

representatives of the Polk County Attorney’s Office, the DHS, 

Des Moines police, and medical professionals. Every medical 

professional present agreed that E.N.’s injuries could not have occurred

as the father described them. Dr. Oral reviewed the radiographs with 

two additional colleagues including another pediatric orthopedic 

specialist to confirm that the story the father told was inconsistent with 
6

the type of injury. After receiving an email from Dr. Oral, Brown

prepared the paperwork requesting a no-contact order for E.N.’s father 

on July 6. Meanwhile, Dr. McAuliff explained the reasons for the 

multidisciplinary team’s conclusions to Dr. Lindaman, including the fact 

that infant flexor tone at one month does not allow an infant’s arms to 

easily fall behind its body. After that discussion, Dr. Lindaman did not 

change his original opinion regarding biomechanics, but acknowledged 

the flexor tone information made the father’s story very unlikely. 

The court entered the no-contact order on Wednesday, July 8. 

Normally, such orders are served immediately. However, the DHS 

decided to serve the no-contact order on Friday, July 10 when the family 

returned from a nearby camping trip. In fact, the family was not 

camping. E.N.’s grandfather (a DHS employee) took E.N. to DHS 

headquarters the afternoon of July 8 to meet his coworkers, and E.N. 

appeared to be in good health at that time. The DHS did not attempt to 

serve the order that afternoon. On the evening of July 8, E.N. was 

admitted to the hospital with massive brain injuries. E.N. also had 

seventeen rib fractures, some fresh and some older. 

E.N.’s mother and father were charged with child endangerment. 

The mother pled guilty and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. The 

father was found guilty by a Polk County jury and sentenced to fifty 

years in prison. See State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 189 (Iowa 

2013). 

In an affidavit executed January 10, 2013, Dr. Lindaman described 

his involvement with E.N. and the DHS. He described his impression of 

being called in for a limited consultation regarding the treatment of a 

fracture. He states that he was aware other physicians were already 

evaluating child abuse issues, and therefore he 
7

made no effort to make my own evaluation of the credibility 

of the father with regard to the medical history . . . . The 

only opinion I developed was that . . . the history could 

possibly be consistent with the type of spiral humeral 

fracture I observed in this child. 

Dr. Lindaman also described his phone call with Brown as follows:

As the DHS investigator’s notes of the call they had with me 

indicate, I refused to give them any opinion regarding the 

credibility of the father’s story or regarding child abuse, even 

though they raised with me some issues that they thought 

undercut his credibility. The reason I refused to give them 

any opinion regarding credibility and child abuse is because 

I had not performed an investigation regarding child abuse. 

Therefore, each time the DHS raised an issue concerning 

that, I repeated the only opinion I could help them with for 

their assessment; namely, my opinion that, as a matter of 

biomechanics, the mechanism that the parents had 

described to me fit the fracture seen, by which I meant that 

the father’s story about the arm being pinned and twisted 

behind the child’s back, if true, could be consistent with a 

spiral humeral fracture occurring in that arm. 

E.N. was subsequently adopted by Shannon and Danny Nelson. 

On June 10, 2011, they filed this action individually and on behalf of 

E.N. They alleged Dr. Lindaman negligently failed to detect and report 

the child abuse and that Mercy Medical Center – Des Moines was

vicariously liable for Dr. Lindaman’s negligence.1 The Nelsons further 

alleged Dr. Lindaman’s conduct was “reckless and/or willful” and sought 

punitive damages against him and Mercy. The Nelsons never alleged 

Dr. Lindaman believed the statements he made to DHS were untrue. The 

Nelsons do not claim Dr. Lindaman mistreated the arm fracture itself. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on several grounds: the

immunity under Iowa Code section 232.73 and the lack of evidence to 

prove causation or the willful and wanton misconduct required for 

1The Nelsons sued Dr. Lindaman personally as well as “Lynn M. Lindaman, 

M.D., P.L.C. d/b/a Lindaman Orthopaedic.” We will refer to both as “Dr. Lindaman.” 

 
8

punitive damages. The Nelsons resisted and submitted expert medical 

testimony that Dr. Lindaman breached the standard of care. The 

Nelsons also argued defendants waived the immunity defense by failing 

to plead it. Defendants filed motions to amend their answers to plead 

immunity, and the district court allowed the amendments.2 On April 1,

2013, the court denied the summary judgment motions, stating:

Based upon the record made the court concludes that the 

summary judgment motions should be denied. There are 

genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant 

doctor rendered an opinion or not for DHS, whether reliance 

on that opinion caused injury to the child, whether the 

doctor’s communications to DHS were in good faith or not, 

whether the doctor’s conduct provides immunity and 

whether the communication with DHS was actually aiding or 

assisting in a child abuse assessment. 

We granted defendants’ application for interlocutory appeal and retained 

the appeal. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“We review a district court decision granting or denying a motion 

for summary judgment for correction of errors at law.” Wallace v. 

Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 

(Iowa 2008). “A matter may be resolved on summary judgment if the 

record reveals only a conflict concerning the legal consequences of 

undisputed facts.” Id.; see also Garvis v. Scholten, 492 N.W.2d 402, 403 

(Iowa 1992) (same). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled 

2The Nelsons do not specifically argue on appeal that the district court abused 

its discretion by allowing the amendments. The Nelsons’ appellate brief argues the 

amendments were untimely, but articulates no unfair prejudice resulting from the delay 

in pleading the immunity defense. We conclude the district court acted within its 

discretion by allowing the amendments and, therefore, reject the Nelsons’ waiver 

argument. 

 
9

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “The moving 

party has the burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact.” 

Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Iowa 2005). “An issue of fact is 

‘material’ only when the dispute involves facts which might affect the 

outcome of the suit, given the applicable governing law.” Wallace, 754 

N.W.2d at 857. An issue is “genuine” if the evidence in the record “is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving 

party.” Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, who is entitled to every legitimate inference that we 

may draw from the record. Id. “Speculation is not sufficient to generate 

a genuine issue of fact.” Hlubek, 701 N.W.2d at 96. 

III. Analysis. 

We must decide whether the district court erred by denying 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the statutory 

immunity in Iowa Code section 232.73. We will discuss the scope of 

immunity under that statute and then address whether the defendants 

were entitled to summary judgment on the record in this case. 

We begin with the text of section 232.73, which in relevant part 

provides: 

A person participating in good faith in the making of a 

report, photographs, or X rays, or in the performance of a 

medically relevant test pursuant to this chapter, or aiding 

and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report 

pursuant to section 232.71B, shall have immunity from any 

liability, civil or criminal, which might otherwise be incurred 

or imposed. The person shall have the same immunity with 

respect to participation in good faith in any judicial 

proceeding resulting from the report or relating to the 

subject matter of the report. 

Iowa Code § 232.73(1). 

Section 232.73 provides a form of qualified immunity. See Hlubek, 

701 N.W.2d at 96 (noting statutes immunizing conduct performed in 
10

good faith provide qualified, not absolute, immunity). “Qualified 

immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided 

by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 

1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment 

based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 

531 (Iowa 1990) (same). Summary judgment is an important procedure 

in statutory immunity cases because a key purpose of the immunity is to 

avoid costly litigation, and that legislative goal is thwarted when claims 

subject to immunity proceed to trial. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, ___ U.S. 

___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1056, 1064 (2014) (“[T]his 

[immunity] question could not be effectively reviewed on appeal from a 

final judgment because by that time the immunity from standing trial 

will have been irretrievably lost.”); Hlubek, 701 N.W.2d at 98 (noting 

statutory immunity removes the “ ‘fear of being sued’ ” and affirming 

summary judgment (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 

102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 408 (1982))). Indeed, in 

Hlubek, we recognized the defendants’ observation that “statutory 

immunity, like common-law immunity, provides more than protection 

from liability; it provides protection from even having to go to trial in 

some circumstances.” 701 N.W.2d at 96. Qualified immunity is “an 

entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 

L. Ed. 2d 411, 425 (1985). 

In Garvis, we specifically noted the purpose of immunity under 

section 232.73 is to remove “the fear of litigation” for those assisting 

child abuse investigations. 492 N.W.2d at 404; see also Ellen Wright 

Clayton, To Protect Children from Abuse and Neglect, Protect Physician 

Reporters, 1 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 133, 146 (2001) (calling for 
11

absolute immunity for physicians reporting child abuse or assisting 

investigations into suspected child abuse because “[r]elieving the fear of 

litigation will promote appropriate reporting”). Defendants argue that to 

allow the claims in this case to proceed to trial would have a chilling 

effect on the willingness of the medical community to communicate with 

child abuse investigators. We share that concern and apply the 

immunity statute as written to effectuate its purpose. 

A. The Scope of Immunity Under Iowa Code Section 232.73. 

Section 232.73 applies in medical malpractice actions brought against 

private physicians who provide information to child abuse investigators. 

Maples, 450 N.W.2d at 530–31. The purpose of the statute is “to 

encourage those who suspect child abuse to freely report it to authorities 

without fear of reprisal if their factual information proves to be faulty.”

Id. at 530. “An additional purpose is to encourage those having 

information about child abuse to come forward when asked to do so, 

without the fear of litigation should it later be shown that the information 

was improperly released.” Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404. These legislative 

purposes, in our view, apply equally to both physicians who initiate 

reports to the DHS, and to those, such as Dr. Lindaman, who respond to 

inquiries from child abuse investigators. The statute applies the same 

good-faith immunity to both those who report suspected abuse and those 

who assist in investigations initiated by others.

“Good faith” under section 232.73 is determined under a subjective 

standard. Id. “Reasonableness and the objective (reasonable person) 

standard are the hallmarks of negligence. Because immunity under 

section 232.73 extends to negligent acts, reasonableness and the 

objective standard play no part in determining good faith.” Id. 

Therefore, good faith “rests on a defendant’s subjective honest belief that 
12

the defendant is aiding and assisting in the investigation of a child abuse 

report.” Id. We further observed: 

“As good faith means only honesty in fact, negligence 

ordinarily has no significance. That is, the honesty in fact 

that constitutes good faith merely requires honesty of intent 

and it is not necessary to show that the person was diligent 

or non-negligent. Bad faith, then, is obviously something far 

more extreme than a failure to observe reasonable . . .

standards or the standards of a reasonably prudent [person]. 

It is irrelevant that the person in question was negligent in 

forming a particular belief. All that is required . . . is the 

actual belief or satisfaction of the criterion of ‘the pure heart 

and empty head.’ ” 

Id. (quoting Jackson v. State Bank of Wapello, 488 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 

1992)). Thus, persons aiding or assisting in a child abuse investigation 

are entitled to immunity under section 232.73 if they act in good faith as 

we described in Garvis. To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must 

have evidence the defendant acted dishonestly, not merely carelessly, in 

assisting the DHS. Id. 

We are mindful of the legislative directive that chapter 232 “shall 

be liberally construed to the end that each child under the jurisdiction of

the court shall receive . . . the care, guidance and control that will best 

serve the child’s welfare.” Iowa Code § 232.1. The legislature elaborated 

on the purpose of the child abuse reporting provisions:

Children in this state are in urgent need of protection 

from abuse. It is the purpose and policy of this part 2 of 

division III to provide the greatest possible protection to 

victims or potential victims of abuse through encouraging the 

increased reporting of suspected cases of abuse, ensuring the 

thorough and prompt assessment of these reports, and 

providing rehabilitative services, where appropriate and 

whenever possible to abused children and their families 

which will stabilize the home environment so that the family 

can remain intact without further danger to the child. 

Id. § 232.67 (emphasis added). We have observed that “the forceful 

language of the statute articulates a well-recognized and defined public 
13

policy of Iowa.” Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296, 

301 (Iowa 1998). We therefore construe the immunity provision in 

section 232.73 liberally to encourage communications between 

physicians and DHS child abuse investigators. This is consistent with 

our general approach to construe statutory immunity provisions broadly.

See Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 777, 784 (Iowa 2004)

(surveying cases construing Iowa statutory immunity provisions broadly 

and exceptions to immunity narrowly). 

In Maples, parents brought their four-month-old child to a hospital 

where Dr. Siddiqui diagnosed the baby with failure to thrive that she

attributed to poor parenting skills. 450 N.W.2d at 529. The child was 

placed in temporary foster care, but further studies determined that 

malabsorption syndrome was responsible for his failure to gain weight. 

Id. at 530. After the child was returned to his parents, they sued 

Dr. Siddiqui for their loss of companionship and society while the child

was in foster care. Id. Dr. Siddiqui moved for summary judgment based 

on section 232.73 immunity. Id. The district court granted summary 

judgment, and we affirmed. Id. at 530–31. 

The case turned on the communication Dr. Siddiqui made to the 

juvenile authorities. Id. at 530. That communication caused the child’s 

removal from the home. Id. The parents argued that the doctor’s 

negligence in diagnosing his condition negated the good-faith element of 

section 232.73. Id. We disagreed because the parents’ interpretation 

“would thwart the apparent purpose of section 232.73, which is to 

encourage those who suspect child abuse to freely report it to the 

authorities without fear of reprisal.” Id. Indeed, we noted that no

statutory immunity would be needed unless liability would otherwise 

exist for a negligent act or breach of duty. Id. We observed that our 
14

interpretation “accords with the decisions of courts in other 

jurisdictions.” Id. at 531. 

In Garvis, we elaborated on the good faith required to establish 

immunity. 492 N.W.2d at 404. Laurene Garvis attended counseling 

sessions with Dr. Scholten, during which she discussed her relationship 

with her children. Id. at 403. An investigator for the DHS called 

Dr. Scholten, identified herself as a protective services investigator, and 

requested information from the counseling sessions. Id. Dr. Scholten 

provided that information, and the child abuse report ultimately proved 

founded. Id. Laurene brought suit for compensatory and punitive 

damages for disclosure of confidential medical information. Id. The 

parties disagreed whether a subjective or objective standard of good faith 

should be used to establish immunity under section 232.73. Id. at 403–

04. We adopted the subjective standard. Id. at 404. This followed from 

Maples because we had already decided in that case that the immunity 

covered negligent acts. Id. We affirmed summary judgment dismissing 

the claims for both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. 

These cases make clear that a physician responding in good faith 

to inquiries from a child abuse investigator is entitled to immunity from 

claims alleging not only negligence, but the willful, wanton, or reckless 

conduct required for punitive damages. See id. at 403–04. The 

legislature, when it chooses, knows how to limit immunity provisions to 

simple negligence claims because in other immunity statutes it has 

carved out exceptions to allow claims alleging gross negligence or other 

heightened misconduct to proceed.3 By contrast, section 232.73 

3A look at the current Code illustrates this point. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 85.20(2) 

(2015) (providing coemployees immunity from a workers’ compensation or negligence 

claim, but allowing claims against coemployees alleging “gross negligence amounting to 

 
15

expressly provides immunity from “any liability, civil or criminal, which 

might otherwise be incurred or imposed.” (Emphasis added.) “This court 

has no power to read a limitation into the statute that is not supported 

by the words chosen by the general assembly.” Cubit, 677 N.W.2d at

782. If the legislature wanted to exclude from section 232.73 claims 

alleging reckless or willful misconduct, it would have said so, as it has in 

other statutes providing immunity for persons acting in good faith.4 

such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect for the safety of another”); id. 

§ 669.14(8)–(9) (immunizing the state for negligent design or construction, but allowing 

claims based on gross negligence); id. § 670.4(1)(g)–(h) (granting the same immunity as 

section 669.14(8)–(9), but for government subdivisions). Other statutes exclude from 

immunity provisions claims of intentional or knowing breach of duty. See, e.g., id.

§ 28H.4(2) (immunizing directors and officers of a council of governments “except for 

acts or omissions which involve intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law, 

or for a transaction for which the person derives an improper personal benefit”); id.

§ 497.33 (immunizing a director, officer, member, or volunteer of a cooperative 

association except for improper benefit, intentional infliction of harm to the cooperative, 

or intentional violation of law); id. § 504.901 (immunizing a director, officer, employee, 

member, or volunteer of a nonprofit corporation except for financial benefit, intentional 

harm, or an intentional violation of law); id. § 613.19 (granting the same level of 

immunity to directors, officers, employees, members, trustees, or volunteers of any 

nonprofit organization); id. § 669.24 (immunizing state volunteers from personal liability 

“except for acts or omissions which involve intentional misconduct or knowing violation 

of the law or for a transaction from which the person derives an improper personal 

benefit”). Yet, another set of immunities protects conduct short of actual malice or a 

criminal offense. See, e.g., id. § 461C.6 (recreational immunity exception allowing 

claims for “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn”); id. § 669.14(13) (allowing 

claims based on an “act or omission [that] constitutes actual malice or a criminal 

offense”); id. § 669.21 (requiring indemnification for tort claims against state employee 

unless the claim was based on “a willful and wanton act or omission or malfeasance in 

office”). 

4Again, a look at the current Code illustrates this point. See, e.g., Iowa Code 

§ 91B.2 (immunizing employers who provide work-related information about a current 

or former employee “in good faith,” but not if the employer acted with malice or the 

information “knowingly is provided to a person who has no legitimate and common 

interest”); id. § 135.147 (granting immunity to a person who “in good faith and at the 

request of . . . the department of public defense renders emergency care or assistance to 

a victim of the public health disaster . . . unless such acts or omissions constitute 

recklessness”); id. § 613.17 (giving immunity to any person who “in good faith renders 

emergency care or assistance without compensation . . . unless such acts or omissions 

constitute recklessness or willful and wanton misconduct”); id. § 915.3 (immunizing 

“[a]ny person who, in good faith and without remuneration, renders reasonable aid or 

_______________________
16

B. The Record Supporting Summary Judgment on Immunity. 

Against this backdrop, we turn to the evidentiary record to determine if 

defendants were entitled to summary judgment under section 232.73

(2009). The issue is not whether Dr. Lindaman was negligent or even 

reckless in failing to detect child abuse. Rather, the question is whether 

he “participat[ed] in good faith . . . in . . . aiding and assisting in an 

assessment of a child abuse report” within the meaning of section 

232.73. We conclude that undisputed facts establish his immunity 

defense as a matter of law. 

Dr. Lindaman was one of E.N.’s treating physicians. It is 

undisputed the DHS investigator, Brown, elicited Dr. Lindaman’s input 

to help determine whether the baby’s fracture resulted from child abuse. 

Dr. Lindaman responded to the DHS inquiries. He gave his opinion to 

Brown that the father’s version of how the baby’s arm was injured was 

“plausible.” As he put it to Brown, the “mechanism described fits the 

injury seen.” That is, he communicated to the DHS that the spiral 

fracture suffered by E.N. could have happened the way the father 

described. Other doctors disagreed. But, again, the issue is not whether 

Dr. Lindaman was wrong, reckless, or negligent in forming or 

communicating his opinion to the DHS. Rather, the question for 

summary judgment is whether he acted in good faith in participating in 

the DHS investigation. To avoid summary judgment, the Nelsons needed 

evidence generating a genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Lindaman

acted dishonestly in communicating with Brown. See Garvis, 492 

N.W.2d at 404; see also Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 

assistance to another against whom a crime is being committed . . .” without any 

additional qualifying words). 

_______________________
17

852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or 

practice run, it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a 

[nonmoving] party must show what evidence it has that would convince a 

trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.)); Green v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 713 N.W.2d 234, 245 

(Iowa 2006) (affirming summary judgment when nonmoving party failed 

to “identify specific facts that reveal the alleged underlying motive”); 

Hlubek, 701 N.W.2d at 98 (concluding after review of deposition 

testimony that nonmoving party resisting summary judgment on goodfaith immunity defenses failed to “ ‘set forth specific facts showing there 

is a genuine issue for trial’ ” under [Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure] 

1.981(5)); Hoefer v. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Ins. Trust, 470 N.W.2d 336, 338–39 

(Iowa 1991) (“While intentional torts . . . are generally poor candidates for 

summary judgment because of the subjective nature of motive and 

intent, the rule is not absolute and . . . there is no genuine issue of fact if 

there is no evidence.” (Citation omitted.) (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.)).

Courts applying equivalent subjective good-faith immunity statutes 

have not hesitated to grant or affirm summary judgment when there was 

no evidence the defendant was dishonest in reporting to the child abuse 

investigator. See, e.g., Wolf v. Fauquier Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 555 

F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2009); Watson v. County of Santa Clara, 468 

F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156–57 (N.D. Cal. 2007); O’Heron v. Blaney, 583 

S.E.2d 834, 836–37 (Ga. 2003); Baldwin Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Trawick, 

504 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); J.S. v. Berla, 456 S.W.3d 19, 

24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015); S.G. v. City of Monroe, 843 So. 2d 657, 661–64

(La. Ct. App. 2003); Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley, 824 A.2d 107, 121–23 (Md. 

2003); Yuille v. State, 45 P.3d 1107, 1110–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); 
18

Whaley v. State, 956 P.2d 1100, 1106–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); Lesley 

v. State, 921 P.2d 1066, 1075–76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); Thomas v. 

Sumner, 341 P.3d 390, 400–01 (Wyo. 2015). As the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded:

In other words, the statute provides that immunity will 

dissolve only in those infrequent circumstances where 

someone used the reporting system for purposes other than 

that for which it was designed—namely, the protection of 

children. It is very clear what the General Assembly wished 

to do, and we will not make public policy of our own by 

pursuing a different course—specifically, that of 

discouraging the reporting of suspected child abuse by 

exposing either mandatory or voluntary reporters to the 

significant risk of civil liability. Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to plaintiffs suggests that Stephens was 

at worst negligent in making the report, and negligence is a 

far cry from “bad faith.” 

Plaintiffs have not alleged or suggested any untoward 

animus, pre-existing bad blood, desire for revenge, or the 

like that would strip Stephens of immunity. 

Wolf, 555 F.3d at 319. The Watson court required proof the defendant 

knowingly made a false report or recklessly disregarded its truth or 

falsity because permitting a lesser showing to avoid immunity

would discourage reporting and invite protracted litigation. 

Indeed, the protections of [California Penal Code] § 11172 

would be meaningless if immunity applied only after 

defendants are able to assert and prove its application in 

litigation. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims fail unless they properly 

allege facts showing that defendants are not subject to 

§ 11172 immunity. In addition, under § 11172, to the extent 

plaintiffs claim that defendants are not mandatory reporters, 

plaintiffs nevertheless must allege facts showing that 

§ 11172 immunity does not apply because the report was 

false and the person making the report knew the report was 

false when made or made the report with reckless disregard 

of the truth or falsity. Plaintiffs have not done so. 

Watson, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (citation omitted). 

The Georgia Supreme Court declined to read an objective 

reasonableness standard into that state’s immunity statute because to 
19

do so would make it more difficult to grant summary judgment and 

increase litigation risk, resulting in a chilling effect on reporting child 

abuse:

A subjective standard is even more appropriate under the 

child abuse reporting statute because it . . . imposes 

criminal penalties. Thus, the relevant question is whether 

the reporter honestly believed she had a duty to report. A 

reporter acting in good faith will be immune even if she is 

negligent or exercises bad judgment. 

. . . . 

. . . The court of appeals confused the two separate 

aspects of immunity under the statute, superimposing a 

requirement of reasonableness on the good faith standard. 

Under the court of appeals standard, even if a reporter has 

reasonable cause to believe that child abuse has occurred, a 

jury question could still exist on the issue of bad faith. This 

interpretation chills the reporting requirement and fails to 

honor the legislative goal of protecting children by 

encouraging the reporting of suspected child abuse. 

O’Heron, 583 S.E.2d at 836–37 (footnotes omitted). The Georgia Court of 

Appeals elaborated on the subjective good-faith standard and 

distinguished medical negligence in holding medical defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment:

Bad faith is the opposite of good faith, generally 

implying or involving actual or constructive fraud; or a 

design to mislead or deceive another; or a neglect or refusal 

to fulfill some duty, not prompted by an honest mistake as to 

one’s rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister 

motive. Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, 

but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, 

and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of 

known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. 

Standing alone, the failure of [the medical center’s] personnel 

to take into consideration the effect [the child’s] prescription 

medicine might have had on the results of her urine test at 

most constitutes evidence that [the medical center] was 

negligent or guilty of exercising bad judgment in forming its 

professional opinion that [the child] might be the subject of 

child abuse. However, . . . [evidence] of mere negligence or 

bad judgment is not [equivalent to evidence of a] refus[al] to 

fulfill [a] professional dut[y], out of some interested or 

sinister motive, [nor is it equivalent to evidence of a 
20

conscious act based on] some dishonest or improper 

purpose. 

Baldwin Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 504 S.E.2d at 710 (citation omitted) (internal 

quotations marks omitted). 

Washington appellate courts have discussed the proper role of 

summary judgment on the issue of subjective good-faith immunity in 

several child abuse reporting cases. In affirming summary judgment for 

a defendant physician and hospital, the Washington Court of Appeals 

stated:

Good faith flows from a “mind indicating honesty and 

lawfulness of purpose.” Good faith is wholly a question of 

fact. But if reasonable persons could reach but one 

conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate. 

The Yuilles complain that Dr. Feldman and the 

Hospital reported the abuse here without properly verifying 

medically that any abuse occurred. Even assuming this is 

correct, it is insufficient. The statute does not require that 

the information giving rise to the suspicion of abuse be 

investigated or verified before it is reported. The duty to 

investigate lies with the authorities, not the individual 

making the report. So the failure to verify or investigate does 

not rule out immunity. 

Yuille, 45 P.3d at 1111 (quoting Whaley, 956 P.2d at 1106). The same 

appellate court emphasized that evidence of dishonesty is required to 

avoid summary judgment on the good-faith immunity defense:

The standard definition of good faith is a state of mind 

indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose. Nothing in 

the record suggests that Hupf was dishonest in reporting her 

suspicion of abuse or that she acted with any unlawful 

purpose. The fact that she, as a child care provider, was 

subject to criminal penalties if she reasonably suspected 

abuse and failed to report it is a compelling consideration on 

the side of concluding her purpose was lawful. 

Whaley, 956 P.2d at 1106 (footnotes omitted). In yet another decision, 

the Washington Court of Appeals held a physician was entitled to 
21

summary judgment on the good-faith immunity defense when no 

evidence indicated he acted in bad faith. Lesley, 921 P.2d at 1076. 

In Rite Aid Corp., Maryland’s highest court surveyed cases from 

other jurisdictions, including our decision in Garvis, to hold a subjective 

good-faith standard applied for that state’s statutory immunity defense 

and required proof of dishonesty to avoid summary judgment. 824 A.2d 

at 116–19. The Rite Aid Corp. court acknowledged “questions involving 

determinations of good faith which involve intent and motive ‘ordinarily’ 

are not resolvable on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 119. But,

the high court went on to say “ ‘even in cases involving intent and 

motive, if the prerequisites for summary judgment are met—there [being]

no material dispute of fact—summary judgment may be granted.’ ” Id.

(quoting Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 630 A.2d 1156, 1161 (Md. 1993)). In 

holding the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, the Rite Aid 

Corp. court stated:

For the respondents to oppose the summary judgment 

motion successfully, they must have made a showing, 

supported by particular facts sufficient to allow a fact finder 

to conclude that Mr. Rosiak lacked good faith in making the 

report of suspected child abuse. They might have done so by 

producing specific facts showing that Mr. Rosiak knew, or 

had reason to know, that the photographs did not depict a 

form of child abuse and, in total disregard of that knowledge, 

filed a report anyway. What the respondents have produced 

are general allegations, that simply show that all of 

Mr. Rosiak’s actions in making the report can be second 

guessed. Legitimizing this sort of Monday-morning 

quarterbacking would render the immunity conferred by 

[Maryland Code Annotated, Courts and Judicial Proceedings]

§ 5–620 and [Maryland Code Annotated, Family Law] § 5–

708 essentially useless. 

Id. at 121. 

The Wyoming Supreme Court applied that state’s subjective goodfaith immunity statute to affirm summary judgment dismissing a father’s 
22

lawsuit against his son’s counselor. Thomas, 341 P.3d at 400. The court 

emphasized evidence of negligence was insufficient to defeat the 

immunity; to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must have evidence 

defendant acted in bad faith, defined “as acting with a malicious motive 

or making deliberately false accusations.” Id. at 400–01 (citing Elmore v. 

Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Wyo. 1992)). The Kentucky Court of 

Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing a father’s lawsuit 

against a psychologist who performed a custody evaluation. J.S., 456 

S.W.3d at 23–24. The court noted that while good faith is a subjective 

“ ‘determination of the state of the mind of the actor,’ ” id. at 23 (quoting 

Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton, 381 S.W.3d 286, 292 (Ky. 2012)), summary 

judgment is appropriate when there is insufficient evidence of bad faith 

such as “acting with knowledge of the information’s falsity.” Id.

Conversely, courts have denied summary judgment when there 

was evidence the defendant acted dishonestly reporting child abuse. 

See, e.g., Owen v. Watts, 705 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) 

(concluding that the defendant had ulterior motives for a report when the

parties were long-standing adversaries in petitions to adopt a child); 

J.E.B. v. Danks, 785 N.W.2d 741, 750 (Minn. 2010) (concluding there 

was evidence of “personal spite” and exaggerated language in the child 

abuse report that supported a finding of actual malice). 

The summary judgment record in this case is devoid of evidence

from which a jury could find Dr. Lindaman acted dishonestly—that is, 

that he believed the statements he made to the DHS were untrue. To the 

contrary, one of the plaintiff’s experts conceded that Dr. Lindaman 

“believed . . . in his own mind” what he was saying to the DHS and the 

other expert said, repeatedly, that he had no opinion as to 
23

Dr. Lindaman’s state of mind. Summary judgment therefore was 

appropriate on statutory immunity.

The Nelsons argue immunity should not apply because 

Dr. Lindaman failed to cooperate with the DHS. They rely on his affidavit 

stating, in part, that he “refused to give [the DHS] any opinion regarding 

the credibility of the father’s story or regarding child abuse.” (Emphasis 

added.) But, a person does not need to give an opinion on the ultimate 

issue in order to be “aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child 

abuse report.” It is undisputed that Dr. Lindaman gave the DHS his 

biomechanical opinion that the fracture he observed could have been 

caused in the manner described by the father. The DHS relied on 

Dr. Lindaman in part in assessing whether the child was abused. He 

thereby aided in its assessment. That brings him within the scope of the 

statutory immunity. That he declined to say more does not defeat the 

immunity. There is no evidence Dr. Lindaman had a definitive opinion 

he intentionally withheld from Brown about the father’s credibility or 

child abuse. 

To allow this lawsuit to proceed would unwind statutory immunity. 

Many people when dealing with the government are hesitant to offer 

views on whether individuals under investigation are or are not guilty or 

are or are not lying. To deny immunity to a doctor who offers his medical 

observations in good faith but declines to go this extra step would deter 

doctors from responding to DHS inquiries altogether out of fear of being 

sued.5 

5Notably, plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument that if Dr. Lindaman had 

said nothing to the DHS he could not have been sued. Moreover, the very opinion that 

Dr. Lindaman declined to give to the DHS, i.e., whether the father was credible or not, 

is one that normally would not be allowed to be given in a courtroom. See State v. 

Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 677 (Iowa 2014) (reaffirming our commitment “to the legal 

principle that an expert witness cannot give testimony that directly or indirectly 

 
24

The Nelsons also criticize the scope of the examination that 

Dr. Lindaman performed on June 26. But, the criticism does not relate 

to Dr. Lindaman’s medical treatment of E.N.’s fracture. Rather, 

plaintiffs’ argument is that Dr. Lindaman should have done more to look 

for signs of child abuse, and if he had done more, he would have offered 

different opinions to the DHS. Again, there is no claim that Dr. 

Lindaman acted in bad faith; plaintiffs’ argument is merely that Dr. 

Lindaman was negligent in performing his role in E.N.’s child abuse 

assessment. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on several other 

grounds—lack of evidence to prove causation or the willful and wanton 

misconduct required for punitive damages. Because we conclude the 

immunity defense is dispositive, we do not reach those alternative 

grounds for summary judgment.

IV. Disposition. 

For those reasons, defendants were entitled to summary judgment 

on all claims based on the immunity in Iowa Code section 232.73. We 

therefore reverse the district court’s order denying their motion for 

summary judgment and remand the case for entry of an order granting 

summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 

All justices concur except Cady, C.J., who concurs specially, and 

Appel and Hecht, JJ., who dissent. 

comments” on the credibility of a witness); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 

1986) (stating “most courts reject expert testimony that either directly or indirectly 

renders an opinion on the credibility or truthfulness of a witness”). 

_______________________
25

#13–0719, Nelson v. Lindaman

CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 

I concur in the result reached by the majority. It is a result that 

ultimately comes down to the reasonableness of the permissible 

inferences that would support a finding of the lack of good faith of 

Dr. Lindaman during the time he assisted in the assessment of child 

abuse. There is evidence in the record to show Dr. Lindaman 

participated in good faith, though mistaken in medical fact. On the other 

hand, the evidence in the record does not support a legitimate inference 

that Dr. Lindaman was seeking to avoid the assessment of child abuse or 

that he did not express an honest belief. The inferences raised by the 

Nelsons concerning Dr. Lindaman’s lack of good faith were too 

speculative to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, 

summary judgment based on immunity granted under Iowa Code section 

232.73 (2009) is appropriate. 
26

#13–0719, Nelson v. Lindaman

APPEL, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. 

I first review the factual record presented in the defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment, making all inferences favorable to the plaintiffs 

as the nonmoving party.6 Second, I review the relevant Iowa statutes. In 

particular, I note the distinction in the immunity provisions of Iowa Code 

section 232.73 (2009) between the first prong of the statute, involving 

mandatory reporting, and the second prong of the statute, which extends 

immunity to those “aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child 

abuse report” made to the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS). 

Third, I examine the manner in which Iowa courts and other 

jurisdictions have handled motions for summary judgment involving 

immunity statutes. Finally, I apply principles gleaned from the previous 

discussion to the unique facts of this case. As will be seen below, I 

conclude the trial court correctly denied summary judgment in this case.

6As a preliminary matter, I note the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ 

amendment to their answer asserting the affirmative defense of immunity under Iowa 

Code section 232.73 (2009) should have been denied. The majority notes, in a footnote, 

that the plaintiffs did not specifically use the term “abuse of discretion” to describe the 

appropriate standard of review for a district court’s decision to allow an amendment to 

the pleadings in their appellate brief before this court. I would not find the argument 

waived for failure to state the magic words of the undisputed standard of review. See 

Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 766, 768 (Iowa 2002) (allowing amendment 

subject to abuse of discretion). On the merits, however, the motion to amend came four 

months prior to the discovery and pleading deadlines and five months before the 

scheduled trial. Further, from the beginning of the litigation, the nature of 

Dr. Lindaman’s participation in the Iowa Department of Human Services investigation 

was identified as a factual issue. The plaintiffs did not seek an extension of time in the 

summary judgment proceedings to conduct further discovery with respect to the 

immunity issue. Under these circumstances, I agree the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing the amendment in this case. 

 
27

I. Overview of the Summary Judgment Record Viewed Most 

Favorably to the Plaintiffs. 

E.N. was brought to the hospital by his parents on June 18, 2009, 

with a broken arm. His injury was a spiral fracture. A spiral fracture of 

the bone runs at an angle through the bone rather than evenly across it. 

Spiral fractures usually require a twisting force to occur. 

When asked at the emergency room how the injury occurred, 

E.N.’s father stated that he was putting E.N. on his bed, that the child 

put his arm behind his back, and that E.N.’s weight caused the bone to 

snap. At the time, E.N. was a twenty-two-day-old infant, who weighed 

eight pounds, eleven ounces. 

Dr. Scott Barron, the emergency room physician who first 

examined E.N., suspected nonaccidental injury. Dr. Barron told E.N.’s 

father that he was required to report the fracture to DHS. E.N. was 

admitted to the hospital under the care of Dr. Douglas Selover, who also 

suspected nonaccidental injury. 

Dr. Selover contacted Dr. Lynn Lindaman, a pediatric orthopedic 

surgeon, to provide consultation with respect to E.N.’s fracture. When 

asked by a DHS child protective worker about E.N.’s injuries the 

following day, Dr. Lindaman responded that the father’s story of how the 

injury occurred was “plausible.” A contemporaneous DHS record 

describes the conversation as follows:

This worker questioned as to whether a child, weighing 

only 8 lbs 11 oz, would have enough force to create this 

injury. I also provided information that dad had provided a 

different explanation with how he laid [E.N.] down, with one 

hand under his head and the other under his butt. I also 

questioned as to whether a crying child’s arm would go back 

behind him as he would more likely to be pulling his arms 

tight in front of him. Through this line of questioning, he 

stated on several occasions, “the mechanism they described 

fits the fracture seen.” 
28

When informed of Dr. Lindaman’s statement that the father’s story 

of how the injury occurred was “plausible,” Dr. Selover exclaimed, “You 

got to be kidding.” Dr. Selover talked with Dr. Lindaman about the 

cause of the injury during E.N.’s initial hospitalization. At that time, 

Dr. Selover expressed his view that it was a pretty clear-cut case of 

nonaccidental injury. 

While DHS staff continued to be suspicious of the injury, 

Dr. Lindaman’s repeated statements that the father’s story was 

“plausible” and that “the mechanism” described by the father “fits the 

fracture,” caused them pause. Prior to talking to Dr. Lindaman, DHS 

planned to seek a no-contact order against E.N.’s father. After talking 

with Dr. Lindaman, the DHS child protective worker consulted her 

supervisor. She was concerned the orthopedic specialist treating E.N. 

had repeatedly emphasized that the mechanism described by the father 

“fit the injury.” They interpreted his comments as an opinion not 

supporting the presence of child abuse. As a result, the decision was 

made not to seek a no-contact order at that time. DHS staff, however, 

informally urged the mother not to allow E.N. to be with his father alone, 

but no further immediate action was taken at the time of E.N.’s discharge 

from the hospital. 

DHS continued to have concerns about E.N., however, and the 

case was presented to a multidisciplinary team for review. The team 

included five physicians with experience in evaluating cases of child 

abuse. At a meeting on June 30, all agreed the injury could not have 

occurred as described by the father. One of the participants, 

Dr. Resmiye Oral, requested medical records for further review by 

orthopedic specialists to confirm the unanimous view of team members. 
29

Dr. McAuliff, another physician, was dispatched to confer with 

Dr. Lindaman. 

On July 6, the evaluators at the University of Iowa sent an email 

advising that the injury could not have happened as indicated by E.N.’s 

father. On July 7, DHS began working with the county attorney to file a

no-contact order.

On July 8, Dr. McAuliff shared with the multidisciplinary team 

that he had spoken with Dr. Lindaman. Dr. Lindaman was more 

forthcoming with Dr. McAuliff than he had been with DHS staff earlier in 

the case. Dr. Lindaman told Dr. McAuliff that he had not seen many 

infants in his practice and had never seen this type of injury before. In 

light of his discussion with Dr. McAuliff, Dr. Lindaman agreed that the 

injury was suspicious.

Unfortunately, on July 8, before DHS served the no-contact order, 

E.N. arrived at the hospital with head trauma and other very serious 

injuries. 

In June of 2011, the plaintiffs filed suit naming Dr. Lindaman, his 

professional corporation, and Mercy Medical Center – Des Moines as 

defendants. A deposition of Dr. Lindaman was part of the summary 

judgment record. At the deposition, Dr. Lindaman took a very narrow 

view of his professional responsibilities and the nature of his discussions 

with DHS.

Dr. Lindaman took the position that his job was the management 

of the fracture and the concerns of Dr. Barron, that the trauma may have 

been nonaccidental, was not his concern because it did not impact his 

management of the fracture. Dr. Lindaman stated that he did not 

explore whether the injury was in fact consistent with the father’s 

explanation because “that’s an investigative function through DHS or to 
30

the police, not [] medical.” He further stated that “to investigate whether 

the mechanism happened the way dad explained, that’s not a medical 

investigation. That’s a legal or criminal investigation.” Dr. Lindaman 

testified that in his interaction with DHS, “[h]e was not providing 

information on the safety of the child. [He] was providing information 

only on the humerus fracture.” According to Dr. Lindaman, his 

statement to DHS was “merely on [his] orthopedic evaluation of [E.N.]. 

[H]e was not speaking with them on judging what happened at [E.N.]’s 

home.” 

Dr. Lindaman also testified in his deposition that while the father’s 

story “could be consistent” with the injury, it would not commonly occur 

when putting the child down and would be “a rare kind” of injury. He 

stated in his deposition that if he had been the emergency room 

physician on the day E.N. arrived, he too would have reported the injury 

to DHS the way Dr. Barron did. 

Dr. Lindaman also filed an affidavit in connection with the “Motion 

for Summary Judgment as to the Lindaman Defendants.” In that 

affidavit, Dr. Lindaman stated that the only opinion he developed was 

that “if the history the father was providing to [him] was true, that 

history could possibly be consistent with the type of spiral humeral 

fracture [he] observed in this child.” 

He further stated that he was aware of the opinions of Dr. Selover 

and Dr. Barron suspecting child abuse prior to his conversation with 

DHS. He stated he was not surprised that the child abuse investigators 

seemed to have concluded that E.N.’s fracture was due to child abuse 

“since spiral humeral fractures in non-ambulatory children are rare.” He 

also asserted he would have reported the incident to DHS if the case had 

been reported to him in the first instance. 
31

The records of Dr. Lindaman’s conversations with DHS, however, 

do not indicate that he advised DHS that he took a very narrow view of 

his responsibilities and that he was not “judging [assessing?] what 

happened at E.N.’s home.” He did not advise DHS that spiral humerus 

fractures in nonambulatory children are rare, that he would have 

reported the incident had E.N. been presented to him in the first 

instance, or that his opinion was limited solely to the biomechanics of 

the possibility of a fracture occurring if the story told by E.N.’s father 

were true. He simply repeatedly told DHS that the story was “plausible” 

and the “mechanism” described “fit the injury.” 

The record in the proceedings related to the motion for summary 

judgment contained the report of one of the plaintiffs’ experts, 

Dr. Geoffrey Miller, an orthopedic surgeon. In reviewing the file, 

Dr. Miller stated that while it was possible Dr. Lindaman may have 

simply made an oversight in his initial opinion, 

the orthopedic surgeon did not make the diagnosis of nonaccidental trauma in his consult, even as a possibility even 

though he acknowledged an ongoing workup for that 

diagnosis. This could be an oversight, but his decisions 

afterwards make this explanation tenuous at best. It does 

not appear to have been an oversight with the repeated 

opportunities to modify the diagnosis after meeting with DHS 

and other treaters, as well as his deposition testimony . . . 

where he specifically disagreed with other doctors.

In a supplemental report, Dr. Miller characterized the failure of 

Dr. Lindaman to detect rib trauma in E.N. as “further evidence of this 

doctor’s inexplicable and stunning disregard for the suspected child 

abuse diagnosis made by both of the other treaters.” Another of the 

plaintiffs’ medical experts opined that Dr. Lindaman “obtained a history 

that makes no sense as a reasonably certain medical explanation for a 

cause of a spiral fracture in a 22 day old infant.”
32

The district court held that there were genuine issues of material 

fact as to whether the defendant doctor rendered an opinion or not for 

DHS, whether reliance on that opinion caused injury to the child, 

whether the doctor’s communications to DHS were in good faith or not, 

whether the doctor’s conduct was actually aiding or assisting in a child 

abuse assessment, and whether the doctor’s conduct was entitled to 

immunity for his conduct. We granted the defendants leave to file an 

interlocutory appeal.

II. Iowa’s Child Protection Reporting and Immunity Regime.

A. History of Concern Regarding Failure to Report Suspected 

Child Abuse. For many years, underreporting of child abuse by medical 

professionals has been recognized as a significant problem. Concern 

about participation of medical professionals in the child abuse reporting 

system continues notwithstanding the passage of mandatory child abuse 

reporting statutes. As noted by one commentator, “fear of legal action is

frequently a reason for not reporting.” Marjorie R. Freiman, Note, 

Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse 

Statutes, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 243, 263 (1982). According to an article 

in the prestigious journal of the American Medical Association, 

physicians sometimes do not wish to get involved in child abuse 

reporting situations, despite the fact that statutes mandate such actions. 

See John M. Leventhal, The Challenges of Recognizing Child Abuse: 

Seeing is Believing, 281 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 657, 658 (1999).

According to yet another commentator:

[R]ecent studies reveal that physicians admit that they do 

not report all suspected cases of child abuse and neglect. 

They offer several justifications for this noncompliance. The 

most common explanations are concerns about the way child 

protection agencies handle reported cases and beliefs that 

state involvement often does not help the child. Some 
33

physicians publically admit that they do not want to get 

involved with the legal system, a sentiment probably held 

privately by many physicians.

Ellen Wright Clayton, To Protect Children from Abuse and Neglect, Protect 

Physician Reporters, 1 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 133, 140–41 (2001) 

(footnotes omitted). 

B. Overview of Iowa Statutory Framework. Part two of division 

III of Iowa Code chapter 232 addresses child abuse reporting, 

assessment, and rehabilitation. See Iowa Code §§ 232.67–.77. Iowa 

Code section 232.67 provides explicit legislative findings. Under this 

Code provision, the legislature declared “[c]hildren in this state are in 

urgent need of protection from abuse.” Id. § 232.67. The legislature 

further stated the purpose of the statutory provisions was “to provide the 

greatest possible protection to victims or potential victims of abuse 

through encouraging the increased reporting of suspected cases of 

abuse, [and] ensuring the thorough and prompt assessment of these 

reports.” Id. 

In order to achieve the legislative purpose, chapter 232 part two 

establishes a system of mandatory and permissive reporters of child 

abuse, a reporting procedure, and a structure for investigation of reports 

by DHS. Id. §§ 232.69–.77. Knowing and willful violations of reporting 

obligations are a simple misdemeanor, id. § 232.75(1), as is the 

knowingly false reporting of child abuse, id. § 232.75(3). A person who 

knowingly fails to report or interferes with mandatory reporting is civilly 

liable for damages proximately caused by such failure or interference. Id.

§ 232.75(2).

While the statute thus imposes affirmative obligations on 

mandatory reporters, it also contains an immunity provision which is at 
34

the heart of this appeal. The immunity provision in Iowa Code section 

232.73(1) provides that

[a] person participating in good faith in the making of a 

report . . . or aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child 

abuse report . . . shall have immunity from any liability, civil 

or criminal, which might otherwise be incurred or imposed. 

The statute has two classifications for immunity. The first prong 

protects persons who “make a report” of child abuse under Iowa Code 

chapter 232. Id. § 232.73(1). Dr. Lindaman plainly does not fall in this 

category. The statute also provides, however, that immunity extends to

persons who in good faith are “aiding and assisting in an assessment of a 

child abuse report” by DHS. Id. It is the second prong of the statute that 

is implicated in this case. 

C. Applicable Iowa Caselaw. We have had a few occasions to 

interpret the immunity provision of Iowa Code section 232.73. The first 

case is Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1990). In that case, the 

plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against the defendant, 

Dr. Siddiqui, claiming their son was placed in foster care because of an 

improper diagnosis of the cause of the child’s malnutrition. Id. at 529. 

The plaintiffs sought to recover for their loss of companionship as a 

result of the removal of their son from their home. Id. In this case, we 

held that Dr. Siddiqui, on the facts presented, was entitled to immunity. 

Id. at 530–31.

We rejected the notion that the immunity statute did not apply 

because the action was a medical malpractice action. Id. at 530. 

Instead, we focused on “the causal theory of plaintiffs’ loss-ofcompanionship claim.” Id. We noted the claim was tied to the courtordered placement “[i]rrespective of the other elements of damage which 

might have resulted from defendant’s improper diagnosis.” Id. Clearly, 
35

Maples does not stand for the proposition that there can be no recovery 

in a medical negligence claim where a report of child abuse is involved. 

The immunity in Iowa Code section 232.73 where a good-faith report has 

been made extends only to the extent that the plaintiff’s claim for 

damages is causally tied to the report itself. See id.

In Maples, we also considered whether alleged negligence is 

sufficient to defeat the good-faith requirement of the immunity statute. 

Id. We concluded that a showing of negligence does not defeat good 

faith. Id. If negligence alone was sufficient to defeat good-faith 

immunity, we reasoned, the immunity statute would be deprived of its 

bite. Id. We did not hold, of course, that immunity applies to all cases 

where negligence was involved, but only that a showing of negligence was 

not sufficient to deprive a defendant of an immunity defense if good faith 

under one of the prongs of the immunity statute could be established. 

See id.; cf. Whaley v. State, 956 P.2d 1100, 1106 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) 

(holding immunity in child abuse reporting statute extends only to 

damages caused by the making of a child abuse report). 

Our second case dealing with the immunity provisions of Iowa 

Code section 232.73 is Garvis v. Scholten, 492 N.W.2d 402 (Iowa 1992). 

In Garvis, the plaintiff asserted the defendants improperly disclosed 

certain confidential medical information in the course of a child abuse 

investigation. Id. at 402. The fighting issue in the case was whether the 

good-faith standard in the statute was objective or subjective. Id. at 

403–04.

We held the standard for good faith was subjective. Id. We 

declared “[g]ood faith in section 232.73 rests on a defendant’s subjective 

honest belief that the defendant is aiding and assisting in the 

investigation of a child abuse report.” Id. at 404. We quoted a case from 
36

the commercial context noting that good faith means only honesty in 

fact, colorfully described as including situations involving “ ‘the pure 

heart and empty head.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State Bank of Wapello, 

488 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 1992)). Because the “subjective good faith in 

aiding and assisting the investigation went unchallenged,” we declined to 

disturb the district court’s ruling sustaining the defendants motion for 

summary judgment. Id.

The takeaway points from Maples and Garvis are important but 

narrow. First, Maples establishes that the mere presence of negligence is 

plainly insufficient to defeat immunity. 450 N.W.2d at 530–31. Second, 

Maples stands for the proposition that immunity applies to damage 

claims causally related to the reporting or aiding and assisting in an 

assessment of a child abuse report or a child abuse investigation. Id. 

Third, Garvis held that the standard for evaluating the making of a report 

or aiding and assisting a child abuse investigation is “subjective honest 

belief” in making a report or in “aiding and assisting in the investigation 

of a child abuse report.” 492 N.W.2d at 404. In neither of these cases 

did we address the question of the proper standards to be applied in a 

motion for summary judgment based on the immunity provision. To that 

I now turn.

III. Standards for Summary Judgment of Immunity Claims. 

Courts considering immunity defenses in the context of motions for 

summary judgment have taken a variety of approaches. In some cases, 

courts have determined that immunity issues should be decided by the 

court in advance of trial in order to achieve the policy purposes that 

underlie immunity. See, e.g., May v. Se. Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 

P.2d 732, 738–39 (Wyo. 1993). At the other extreme, some courts have 

held that questions of subjective good faith always involve questions of 
37

fact. See, e.g., de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187, 1191 (lst Cir. 

1986) (noting that on the “issue of subjective good faith, there might 

always be a question of fact [and that] it is difficult to think there could 

ever be summary judgment”); Sabia v. Neville, 687 A.2d 469, 473 (Vt. 

1996) (rejecting a subjective good-faith standard because “a material 

issue of fact would always be present, precluding summary judgment” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). In between the two poles, some 

courts have employed a shifting burden of production approach where 

once a defendant makes a prima facie case for immunity, the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff to produce at least some evidence from which an 

inference of lack of good faith can be drawn. See, e.g., S.G. v. City of 

Monroe, 843 So. 2d 657, 662 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 

Even when summary judgment for the defendant is not precluded 

in subjective good-faith immunity cases, however, the courts recognize 

there is rarely direct evidence of subjective good faith, and as a result, 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from circumstantial evidence 

are sufficient to generate a fact question on the issue. See United States 

v. Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting intent is rarely 

susceptible of direct proof and must be established by legitimate 

inferences from circumstantial evidence); Van Nattan v. United States, 

357 F.2d 161, 162 (10th Cir. 1966) (intent is seldom shown by direct 

evidence and “in most cases must be proved by inference from the facts 

and circumstances of the particular case”);7 Synthon IP, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 

7The holdings in these cases, of course, provided the impetus for the United 

States Supreme Court to adopt an objective good-faith test in immunity cases involving 

alleged government official misconduct. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 

800, 818–19, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738–39, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 410–11 (1982).

 
38

472 F. Supp. 2d 760, 779 (E.D. Va. 2007) (noting that intent rarely can 

be proven by direct evidence). 

In Iowa, we have not yet considered the proper approach to 

summary judgment when the plaintiffs contest the defendant’s claim of 

good-faith immunity under Iowa Code section 232.73. In Maples, the 

issue was not how to approach the question of subjective good faith in 

the context of summary judgment, but only whether the presence of 

negligence defeated immunity under the statute. 450 N.W.2d at 530. In 

Garvis, although summary judgment was granted, no one contested the 

subjective good faith of the defendants and thus the result in the case 

does not help us in this particular situation when subjective good faith is 

contested. 492 N.W.2d 404.

We have, however, applied our summary judgment framework in 

other immunity contexts when subjective good faith has been at issue. 

In Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Iowa 2005), we considered 

whether area education agency (AEA) officials were entitled to summary 

judgment in a case in which the plaintiff charged they tortiously 

interfered with his contractual and prospective business relations and 

intentionally inflicted emotional distress by investigating charges of 

sexual abuse. The applicable statutes provided immunity for AEA 

personnel who participated in good faith and acted reasonably in such 

investigations. Id. at 96–97 (citing Iowa Code sections 280.27 and 

613.21 (2001)). We held the evidence showed the defendants had acted 

in good faith and the plaintiff “ha[d] presented no contrary evidence on 

the issue.” Id. We applied a similar approach in Green v. Racing 

Association of Central Iowa, 713 N.W.2d 234, 245–46 (Iowa 2006). 

If the approach in Hlubek and Green were applied under Iowa Code 

section 232.73, a declaration of subjective good faith by a defendant 
39

might ordinarily be sufficient to require the plaintiff to produce evidence 

from which legitimate inferences of lack of good faith could be shown. 

Yet, even under this type of approach, as observed in a case cited by the 

majority, questions of subjective good faith are “ordinarily” not resolvable 

upon summary judgment.8 Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley, 824 A.2d 107, 119 

(Md. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted);9 see also Miller v. Dep’t of 

Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 97 (Cal. 2005) (noting “issue of a plaintiff’s subjective, 

good faith belief involves questions of credibility and ordinarily cannot be 

resolved on summary judgment”); Hoefer v. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Ins. Trust, 

470 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Iowa 1991) (whether statements were expressions 

8The caselaw repeatedly emphasizes the difference between “objective good 

faith,” which is more amenable to summary judgment, than “subjective good faith,” 

which turns on credibility issues. The leading case is Harlow, in which the Court 

rejected a subjective good-faith standard in the context of immunity in favor of objective 

good faith because subjective good faith “rarely can be decided by summary judgment.” 

457 U.S. at 816–18, 102 S. Ct. at 2737–38, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 409–10; see also Maestas v. 

Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that in order “to encourage courts 

to resolve qualified immunity questions on summary judgment, the Court removed the 

subjective-good-faith factor”); Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 474–84 (Ky. 

2006) (contrasting availability of summary judgment when immunity is objective good 

faith with lack of availability of summary judgment when a subjective good-faith 

standard is employed); Sabia, 687 A.2d at 473 (rejecting subjective good-faith standard 

in immunity context because summary judgment would not be available).

9The majority cites a number of child abuse statutory immunity cases in which 

summary judgment was granted. Many are distinguishable from the present case in 

that they do not involve an alleged failure to aid and assist a child abuse investigation, 

but instead involve a challenge to a report of child abuse. See Wolf v. Fauquier Cnty. 

Bd. of Supervisors, 555 F.3d 311, 318 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting immunity asserted based 

upon affirmative report of child abuse); Watson v. County of Santa Clara, 468 F. Supp. 

2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that California statute grants immunity with 

respect to mandated or authorized reporting, but not aiding and assisting); S.G. v. City 

of Monroe, 843 So. 2d 657, 659–60, 661 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (noting physician moved for 

summary judgment on ground that she was immune from liability based upon 

affirmative report of child abuse). In addition, some of the cases cited by the majority 

involve a different substantive standard than that applicable under Iowa law. See Wolf, 

555 F.3d at 318 (noting Virginia statute employs a strong presumption of immunity and 

places the burden on person who would overcome immunity); O’Heron v. Blaney, 583 

S.E.2d 834, 836–37 (Ga. 2003) (noting that immunity sustained based on “objective” 

reasonable cause to suspect child abuse has occurred, unlike under the Iowa statute). 

 
40

of insincere opinion intended to deceive or mislead was “ordinarily a jury 

question” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The consequence of the Hlubek–Green type approach is that 

subjective good faith is determined through an examination of the 

circumstances in each particular case, and “proof of intent or state of 

mind is rarely established as fact by direct evidence, but may be inferred 

from the facts regarding the individual’s actions or other circumstances.” 

S.G., 843 So. 2d at 662. In the summary judgment context, of course, all 

legitimate inferences are made in favor of the nonmoving party. Wallace 

v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 

(Iowa 2008). 

IV. Application of Principles. 

I now turn to the application of the above principles to the facts of 

this case. There is no question under our caselaw, and under the 

majority of caselaw from other jurisdictions, that the mere fact that 

Dr. Lindaman may have been negligent in his evaluation of E.N. is not 

sufficient to escape the application of the immunity provided by Iowa 

Code section 232.73. See Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404. And, while it is 

true the immunity provision applies only with respect to damages caused 

by a report or by a bad faith failure to aid and assist, Maples, 450 

N.W.2d at 530, the plaintiffs make no suggestion on appeal that damage 

to E.N. was caused by anything other than the failure of the state to 

intervene under chapter 232. 

Turning to the specific language of the immunity statute, it is 

important to recognize that this case does not involve a situation in 

which a mandatory or permissive reporter triggers a DHS investigation 

by making a report protected by the immunity provision of Iowa Code 

section 232.73. Dr. Lindaman filed no report with DHS. While the 
41

legislature plainly desired to encourage reports of suspected child abuse 

when it enacted the child protection provisions of the Code, id. § 232.67, 

these policy reasons are not at work in this case. This case does not 

involve protecting a mandatory reporter who stepped forward to report 

suspected child abuse and is entitled to immunity in order to encourage 

others to do the same. 

Instead, this case involves the second or the aiding-and-assistingin-an-assessment-of-a-child-abuse-report prong of Iowa Code section 

232.73. And, this case involves a claim of failure to aid and assist in 

good faith, not an arguably overzealous report of suspected child abuse. 

The question is not whether Dr. Lindaman did too much, but whether he 

did too little. Specifically, the question raised in this case is whether 

Dr. Lindaman was in “good faith” engaged in “aiding and assisting” DHS 

“in an assessment of a child abuse report.” Id. § 232.73.

There is evidence in the record that Dr. Lindaman was in fact 

avoiding aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report. 

He testified that in his conversations with DHS, he was not “judging what 

happened at E.N.’s home” and that he was “not providing information on 

the safety of the child.” This does not sound like aiding and assisting in 

an assessment of a child abuse report by any standard, objective or 

subjective. Further, if he were acting in subjective good faith, and aiding 

and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report, surely he would 

have disclosed that spiral fractures in infants are “very rare” and that if 

he would have been the physician during intake, he would have filed a 

child abuse report too. He disclosed these views when defending a 

lawsuit against him, but he did not offer them to DHS when it was 

assessing the report of child abuse involving E.N. The fact he did not 

offer these views to DHS suggests he did not see his role as aiding and 
42

assisting in an assessment of the child abuse report. He was not 

judging, and he was not providing information relating to safety. 

In addition, a jury could conclude that Dr. Lindaman’s minimal 

and cramped response to DHS was designed to further his own interest 

in not getting drawn into a potentially controversial matter. Surely, a 

subjective desire of not wanting to get involved or to pass the buck to 

someone else would be an ulterior motive that would defeat subjective 

good faith under the statute. Indeed, the existence of such motivations 

among professionals was one of the reasons for the enactment of child 

abuse reporting statutes in the first place. 

There is other evidence that supports inferences against 

Dr. Lindaman’s claim of entitlement to immunity. According to the 

plaintiffs’ view of the evidence, the notion that a twenty-two-day-old 

baby, after placed in bed by his father, put his arm behind his back and 

then suffered a spiral fracture under his own weight is obviously suspect. 

Indeed, the plaintiffs’ point to Dr. Selover’s contemporary reaction to 

Dr. Lindaman’s position, namely the exclamation, “You got to be 

kidding.” Yet, Dr. Lindaman declared that the father’s story was 

“plausible” and the mechanism “fit the injury.” He defended his 

responses in his deposition as technically correct as a theoretical matter. 

However, he further emphasized in his deposition that he viewed the 

assessment of whether child abuse occurred as someone else’s 

responsibility as it did not relate to his management of the fracture. Is 

this “not-my-department” type of response consistent with subjective 

good faith in “aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse 

report?” Could a reasonable jury conclude that Dr. Lindaman was 

attempting to avoid entanglement in a sticky situation rather than aid 

and assist DHS in its investigation? Instead of cooperating with DHS 
43

investigators and others on the medical team in a collaborative fashion, 

could a reasonable jury conclude that Dr. Lindaman preferred to head for 

the exit and allow others to take responsibility rather than get involved? 

Could a reasonable jury conclude that his evasive responses were not 

aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report, but really 

an act of stone walling and hand washing? If so, then Dr. Lindaman was 

not aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report in 

subjective good faith under Iowa Code section 232.73. 

The lack of support in the record for his position from every other 

physician who reviewed the file as part of a child abuse assessment 

arguably tends to support the inference that Dr. Lindaman just did not 

want to get involved. The plaintiffs point to Dr. Selover’s statement, “You 

got to be kidding,” as telling. And as stated by the plaintiffs’ expert, 

Dr. Lindaman held to his opinion long after it made any sense to do so. 

He arguably originally decided to give a brusque, incomplete, and even 

misleading answer to DHS in a verbal game designed to avoid getting 

drawn into a controversy and then decided to attempt to avoid 

professional embarrassment by defending it when challenged by 

Dr. Selover. His attitude toward the DHS assessment could be regarded 

as not a good faith “how can I help you?” but rather something else, a 

defensive posture akin to “don’t ask me, I’m just the bone guy, I’m not 

responsible. Anything is possible. Don’t confuse me with the facts or the 

opinions of others. I’m busy. Good-bye.”10

10It is apparent from the record that Dr. Lindaman sought to restrict his 

exposure to a claim of negligence by limiting his role in the treatment of E.N. to the 

management of the fracture. While this strategy may be an effective defense with 

respect to limiting the scope of his duty in the underlying negligence claim, it tends to 

undercut his claim of statutory immunity because he was not aiding and assisting in an 

assessment of a child abuse report, but was instead focused solely on management of 

the fracture. 

 
44

Of course, a jury could well come to a much more favorable 

conclusion after assessing Dr. Lindaman’s credibility and hearing all the 

evidence. There is no question that on the evidence presented a 

reasonable jury could conclude he was expressing his honest opinion 

and he was not very knowledgeable about infants. Perhaps, as the 

saying goes, a jury could conclude this is a case involving a defendant 

with “ ‘a pure heart and an empty head.’ ” Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 

(quoting Jackson, 488 N.W.2d at 156). Alternatively, a reasonable jury 

could conclude the real problem in this case was that DHS investigators 

misconstrued Dr. Lindaman’s statements and erroneously concluded 

that his observation that the mechanism described “fit the injury” was by 

implication a statement of opinion that child abuse did not occur, or at 

least was not substantiated, and not realize they were receiving a “don’task-me-that’s-not-my-department” type answer. However, the question 

is whether, on its unique facts, the plaintiffs have enough evidence from 

which legitimate inferences may be drawn to proceed with the case. I 

conclude there was enough to do so. 

In closing, I note the result today does not promote the policies of 

the child abuse reporting statutes. This case should not be confused 

with a reporting case in which a professional takes the sometimes 

difficult but legally required step of reporting suspected child abuse. In 

that setting, generous immunity may be appropriate. There, the statute 

demands the reporter receive the benefit of the doubt and may be 

deprived of immunity only if not acting in good faith. 

Here, however, the question is whether Dr. Lindaman’s minimal 

and narrow participation in the assessment of the child abuse report was 

sufficient to entitle him to statutory immunity that requires good faith in 

the aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report. The 
45

policies underlying immunity can certainly be offended by making it too 

difficult to obtain, but the policies of the statute are also undermined by 

extending immunity too far. One must ask whether stretching immunity 

in Iowa Code section 232.73 to cover the unique circumstances of this 

case “ ‘provide[s] the greatest possible protection to victims or potential 

victims of abuse through encouraging the increased reporting of 

suspected cases of such abuse [and] insuring the thorough and prompt 

investigation of these reports.’ ” State v. King, 434 N.W.2d 627, 629 

(Iowa 1989) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.67 (1987)). I doubt it. By granting 

summary judgment on the immunity question in this setting, when the 

plaintiffs’ claim of lack of subjective good faith in aiding and assisting in 

an assessment of a child abuse report is at least plausible, to use 

Dr. Lindaman’s unfortunate term, I fear the purposes of the mandatory 

reporting statute will not be promoted, but will be undermined. I fear the 

takeaway from this case will be that evasive and uncooperative responses 

to DHS child abuse investigators will be regarded as legally protected 

conduct. If so, our child protection system has lost some of its teeth. I 

hope I am wrong in that regard. 

The undisputed bottom line, however, is that the child abuse 

reporting system failed E.N. in this case, with tragic results. 

Hecht, J., joins this dissent.