J-S27005-17

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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STANFORD AUGUSTO DOUGLAS, JR.

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3843 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 27, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003034-2005

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 22, 2017

Appellant, Stanford Augusto Douglas, Jr., appeals pro se from the 

order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his 

fourth petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On December 5, 2005, Appellant pled guilty to 

first-degree murder and related offenses arising from his involvement in a 

shooting death on March 27, 2005. Appellant was 29 years old at the time 

of the incident. The court sentenced Appellant on December 5, 2005, to 

mandatory life imprisonment, and a consecutive term of 1 to 7 years’ 

imprisonment. Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on October 10, 2006, 

which the PCRA court denied on October 3, 2008. This Court affirmed on 

February 19, 2010. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 996 A.2d 5 
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(Pa.Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant unsuccessfully 

pursued his second and third PCRA petitions in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 

On August 1, 2016, Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice on September 28, 2016, and denied 

Appellant’s petition on October 27, 2016. Appellant filed pro se on 

November 21, 2016, a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary Rule 1925(b) 

statement. 

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 

625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be filed within one 

year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 

9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or 

at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA allow 

for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be 

excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner asserting a timeliness 

exception must file a petition within sixty days of the date the claim could 

have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). When asserting the 

newly created constitutional right exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), “a 

petitioner must prove that there is a new constitutional right and that the 

right has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” Commonwealth 

v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 616 Pa. 
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625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (internal quotations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant relies upon two United States Supreme Court 

decisions as the bases for an exception to the PCRA timeliness requirement 

as well as for substantive PCRA relief: Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 

132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (ruling unconstitutional mandatory 

life without possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentences for juvenile offenders), 

and Montgomery v. Louisiana ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 

599 (filed January 25, 2016, and revised on January 27, 2016) (holding 

Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review). Appellant filed the 

current PCRA petition on August 1, 2016, beyond sixty days of the 

Montgomery decision. Accordingly, Appellant’s petition is untimely. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), supra; Commonwealth v. Secreti, 134 A.3d 

77 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding date of Montgomery decision controls for 

juveniles, who received LWOP sentences, for purposes of 60-day rule in 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)). Appellant correctly observes that mandatory LWOP 

sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional under 

Montgomery/Miller. At the time of the offenses, however, Appellant was 

not a juvenile; he was 29 years old and would not be entitled to relief under 

Montgomery/Miller in any event. Accordingly, we affirm.1 

Order affirmed. 

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1 Due to our disposition, we deny as moot Appellant’s motion “for leave to 

file a reply brief nunc pro tunc or for enlargement of time.” 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/2017