### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Marc h 29 , 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. FR ED JOHNS ON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Cam pbell Cou nty

No. 11443 E. Sh ayne Sexton, Jud ge

No. E2005-00877-CC A-R3- CD F iled Jun e 30, 2006

T h e d e f e n d a n t, F r e d Jo h n s o n , w a s c o n v ic te d b y a Camp b e ll Co u n ty ju r y o f f iv e c o u n ts of

sexual battery , a Class E fe lony , and five counts o f aggra vated se x ual battery , a Class B f elony . He wa s sentenc ed to one y ear for each sex ual battery and eight y ear s for each ag g ravated sexual battery . He
rec eived a

total effective se ntence of twenty -seve n y ear s, twenty -four y ear s at 100% as a

violent offe nder f

or the aggr avated sexual battery counts and thre e y ear s at 30% as a Rang e I , standard of fe nd e r f or the se xua l batte ry

c ou nts . O n ap pe a l, h e arg ue s: ( 1) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d infaili ng to
c ha rg e le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s; ( 2) the jury

did no t un de rs ta nd or

fo llo w the c ha

rg e of the tr ia l c ou rt ; a n d ( 3 ) t h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t h i s c o n v i c t i o n s f o r a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y. Following our re view, we aff irm the judgme nts of the trial court but r emand for e ntry of cor rec ted judgme nts to reflec t that Counts 3 and 5 are c onsecutive to Counts 1 and 2.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f theCr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d and

Rem anded f

or Entry of Corre cte d Jud gm ents

A L AN E. G L ENN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Michae l G. Hatmake r, Jacksboro, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Fr ed Johnson.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B li nd Akr a wi , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Paul Phill ips, District Attorney Gene ral; and Scarlett W. Elli s, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F AC TS

On Oc tob e r 1 6, 20 02 , th e de fe nd a nt, F re d J oh ns on , w a s in dic te d b y the Ca mpb e ll Co un ty Gr a ndJury

fo r t e n c ou nts of

ra pe (C ou nts 1- 10 ), fi ve c ou nts of inc e st (Co un ts 1 1- 15 ), fo ur c ou nts of ra pe of a child (Counts 16-19), and one count of a g g ravated sexual battery (Count 20). TheT he vi ct i m wa s bo r n on N ovemb er 21 , 19 88 , and was four t een y ear s ol d a t t he t i me of t r i al

. I t i s t he po l i cy 1

o f t h is c o u rt to re fer to ju v e n ile v ic tim s o f sex u a l as sa u lt b y the ir initials.
-2- indictments were the re sult of the defe ndant’s ac ts a g ainst his g randdaug hter, M.J ., betwee n 1999 1 and 2002. At trial, M.J

. testified that her g randf ather “touche d [her] whe re he wasn’t supposed to” during the times that she lived with he r family on Axl ey Road, Br own For k Road, and De mory

Road. M. J. te sti fi e d tha t she a nd he r fa mil y mov e d into the Axle y Roa d h ou se in O c tob e r 2 00 1. M. J. sa id that, o n Jun e 3, 20 02 , th e de fe nd a nt “ lic ke d [he r] p ri vate pa rt ” a nd“ stu c k h is thin g in [he r]” wh ile they wer e in her mother’s bedroom. M.J

. said the defendant wore “[ a] rubber ” that he later flushe d down the toilet. The de fendant told M.J . that “[h] e loved [her] and [she] was a specia l litt le g irl.”
Although she could not rec all the exact dates, M.J. described oth er tim es the de fendant inappropriately

touched he r at the house on Axl ey Road. M.J . said the def

endant “ stuck his fing er up in [her]

. . . private part

. . . [a] couple times in [her] mom’s room an d o n ce i n t h e basement.” Once while she wa s in the basement watching television, the defe ndant “s tarted play ing w ith . . . [her] private part . . . [with] [h] is h an d s an d h is thing.” H e also “ play ed with [her] boobs.” On another day , the def

endant “ put his thi ng in [ her], and he p u t h is thing in [her] mout h” while they
wer e in her

mother’s be droom. M.J

. said this “ same thing happene d two or three times more” whe n she lived on Axl ey Road. M.J . said she neve r g ave he r g randf ather permission to touch her a nd that “[she’d] tell him to quit and he wouldn’t.”
Prior to moving to the Axl ey Road house, M.J

. and her family lived on Br own For k Road for “[a]bout a y ear .” At this location, the def endant “ touched [M.J .] under t h e cl o t h es

. . . in [ her] mom’s bedroom and the living ro o m

. ” M

. J

. said she wa s in the living room watching television when the de fendant “fe lt of” her brea sts and “stu ck h is finge rs up in [her] . . . [ and] moved them
aro un d. ” She sa id that w hil e sh e wa s in he r m oth e r’s bed roo m, the d e fe nd a nt “ stu c k h is thin g in [he r]” wh ile we ari ng “ [a] r ub be r. ” M. J. sa id the de fe nd a nt “ stu c k his thi ng in [h e r]” a t th is h ou se “two or thre e times more.” I n addition, the defe ndant “stuck his tong ue in – on – in [ her] and sucke d on [her] boobs.”

At the Demory

Road location, whe re M.J. li ved with her family “[ a] b o ut a y ear

or two” befor e moving to the house on Br own Fork Road, the def endant “ touched [M.J .’s] boobs” while they

“ we re play ing hid e a ndg o s e e k. ” M. J. sa id the de fe nd a nt “ wa s pla y ing wi th [h e r] b oo bs ” un de rn e a th her shirt in her bedroom. When interviewed by the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s, M.J

. did not tell the inves t i gat or about the inc ident at the De mory Road reside nce be cause she “thoug ht [ the defe ndant] was just play ing.”

On cross-e x amination, M.J

. acknow ledg ed that she did not “ know rig ht off the top of [her] head” how many times the defe ndant touched her but said it could have be en “[n]ine or ten times.”
Gail Clift, a sexual assault nur se examiner with Child Help in Knox ville, examined M.J . on June 28 , 2 00 2. Clif

t te sti fi e d th a t M. J. ha d th e fo llo wi ng inj urie s:-3-

She didha ve so me inj urie s in he r g e nit a l are a ; she had tw o very sp e c if ic inj urie s. She had a sma ll tear in an a rea t h at we ca l l the posterior f ourche t. She also had a clef t in her hy men at the six o’clock -- f ive to six o’cloc k position. S he had a notch that was noted in he r hy men at the thre e o’c lock and the twe lve o’c lock position.

Clif t ex plained that “[a] cleft in the hymen is cause d by blunt penetrating trauma” a nd that M.J .’s injuries wer e consistent with sexual abuse. On cross-examination, Clift acknow ledg ed that M.J.’s inj urie s c ou ld h a ve be e n c aus e d b y a pe nis , a fi ng e r, or a pe nc il.

Th e sixty -s ix-y e ar- oldde fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t M. J. a nd he r f a mil y liv e d w ithhim

a t hi s h ome o n A xl e y R o a d

. H e v e h e m e n t l y

d e n i e d h a v i n g a n y

t yp e o f s e xu a l c o n t a c tw i t h M

. J. The jury returne d the following verdic ts: Count s 1-5, g uilty of the lesse r-include d offe nse of sexual battery

b y force or c oerc ion; Count s 6-10, g uiltyof the lesse r-include d offe nse of se x ual battery without consent; Counts 11-15, not guilty of ince st; Count s 16-19, g uiltyof the lesse ri n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y; a n d C o u n t2 0 , g u i l t y o f a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

me rg e d Co un ts 6 -1 0 w ithCou nts 1-5 and se nte nc e d th e de fe nd a nt t o o ne y e ar a s a Rang e I , standard offe nder for eac h sexual battery

. Counts 1 and 2 wer e run c oncurr ently with eac h other but conse cutively

to Counts 16-20; C ounts 3 and 5 wer e run concur rently with eac h other but
consec utively

to Counts 1 and 2; C ount 4 was run consecutively to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5, for a total sentenc e of thre e y ear s at 30% for the sexual battery

convictions. T h e t ri al court sentence d the defe ndant as a

violent offende r to eig ht y ear s for each ag g ravated s exual battery

. Counts 16, 17, and 20 wer e run c onsecutively to eac h other and concur

rently with Counts 18 and 19 for a total sentence of twenty -four

y ear s at 100% for

the ag g ravated sexual battery convictions. The de fendant’s total eff ective se ntence was twe nty -seve n y ear s, with the ag g ravated sexual battery sentenc es to be serve d first.

AN AL YSI S

I. Le sse r -I nc lude d Offe nse Ins tr uc ti ons On appe al, the def

endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt “e rre d in failing to char ge t he lesser

included offe nses of, specific ally , child abuse and assault.” Howeve r, beca use the def

endant f ailed to reque st at trial instructions as to any lesser- included off

enses, this issue is waived.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 18 -1 10 (2 00 3) re qu ir e s, in p e rt ine nt p art : (b) In the abse nce of

a written reque st f

rom a party specific ally identify ing the pa rt ic ula r l e sse r inc lud e d of

fe ns e or of

fe ns e s on wh ic h a

jury ins truc tio n is so ug ht, the trial judge may char g e the jury on any lesser inc luded offe nse or of fense s, but no party shall be entitled to any

such cha rg e.T he d efend ant rel i es o n S tat e v. R o b ert P age, N o

. W 2 0 0 3

- 0 1 3 4 2

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 20 0 4 W L 3 3 5 2 9 9 4 (T enn. 2
C rim . A p p

. A u g

. 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 ), fo r h is c o n te n tio n tha t t h e w a ive r m a n d a te d b y se c tio n 4 0 -1 8 -1 1 0 is un c o n stitutio n a l. H o wever, s ub sequent t o hi s m aki ng t hi s argum ent , and as d i scus sed i n P age, 18 4 S.W

. 3 d at 22 3 , our suprem e co urt
re v e rs e d this c o u rt’s ho ld ing a n d ru le d tha t t h e sta tute w a s c o n stitutio n a l.
-4- (c) Not w ith s tan d in g a n y

o th e r p r o v is io n o f

la w to th e c o n tr ar y , w h e n the defe ndant fa ils to request the instruction of a lesser included offe nse as r equire d by this section, such instruction is waived. Absent a w ritten request, the fail ure of a trial jud ge to i ns tru c t th e jur

y on an y le sse r inc lud

e d o ffe ns e ma y no t be pre se nte d a s a ground for relief either in a motion for a new tr ial or on appeal

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110( b), (c) (2003) (empha sis added)

. I n the recent case of State v. Pag e, 184 S.W .3d 223, 229 (Tenn. 2006) , our supreme court, revie wing the constitutionalityof sec tion 40- 18 -1 10 , n ote d th a t th e statut e “ pla c e s a du ty on the de fe nd a nt to re qu e st a les se r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e in writing at trial to assig n as er ror on a ppeal the trial court’s f

ailure to instruct on such of fense s.” The court, c oncluding the statute wa s constitutional, ex plained:
[T]he waive r o f a

le sse r- inc lud e d off

e ns e fo r pur

po se s of ple na

ry app e llate re vie w i s constitutionally permissible. A trial court' s failure to instruc t on l es s er -included offe nses is not a structura l error

. See State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 190-91 (Tenn. 20 02 ) ( Ho ldi ng that f

a ilu re to i ns truc t onles ser -i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s is su bje c t to constitutional harmless err or ana ly sis). As a non-struc tural constitutional error , the omission of a lesser- included offe nse instruction is subject to waive r for purposes of plenary appellate revie w when the issue is not timely raised and prope rly prese rved. Se e State v. Te rry , 1 18 S.W. 3d35 5, 35 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) (d e fe nd a nt' s f a ilu re to r e qu e st lesser- included offen s e i n s t ruction at trial or in a motion for a ne w trial wa ived issue). Simil arly , issues involving other non-structura l c onstitut ional err ors must be prese rved to rece ive pl enary appellate revie w. See State v. Gome z, 163 S .W.3d 632, 645 (Tenn. 2005) (Six th Amendment rig ht to confront witnesses)

.
I d. at 230. 2

I n the current case, the trial court, prior to the conclusion of t he trial, inquired w hether the parties we re r equesting any lesser- included offe nse instructions, and defe nse counse l replied that he was “ g oing to a sk the [c] ourt to char g e sexual battery as a le sser i n cl u d ed” f

or Counts 1-10. Howeve r, af

ter a ll the evidenc e was prese nted, defe nse counsel did not file a motion asking the c ourt to char g e any

lesser- included off

enses a nd, in fac t, objected to the one s reque sted by the State:

THE COU R T : The Juryis outside the Courtroom. Now that we’ ve close d the evi d e n c e , I

w o u lda s k

th a t y o u s u b mi t y o u r

w r itte n r e q u e s ts f

o r le s s e r in c lu ded of fe ns e s so I

c a n b e pr e pa

ri ng that, i f y ou ha ve it.

. . . .-5-

[THE STATE] : O n t h e fi v e co u nts of rape , the State would be a sking f or a le sser in c lu d e d o f

s e xu a l b a tt e r y , w h ic h is Co u n ts O n e th r o u g h F iv e

. Co u n ts Si xte en, Se ve nte e n, Ei g hte e n a ndNi ne te e n, wh ic h a re ra pe of a c hil d, the State wo uldre qu e st t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d s o f

a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y.

T H E CO U RT : D o y o u w is h to b e h e ar d o n th a t, [d e f e n s e c o u n s e l] ?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Yes, y our Honor. T he defenda nt objects to the cha rg ing of the lesse r includeds a s reque sted by the State.
THE COURT: Any

particula r basis for – I mean, are y ou say ing that – are y ou say ing
as a matter of law these a

re not lesse r includeds, or

are y ou say ing that the proof doe s no t r a ise tho se ins truc tio ns ?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Both.
THE COURT: All rig ht. . . . . [ Y]our objection is overrule d, and the Court will give the cha rg es as r equeste d.

The trial c ourt then g ave the following lesser -i n cl u ded off ense instruc tions: C ounts 1-5, lesserincluded o ff

ense of sexual battery

by forc e or c oerc ion; Count s 6-10, lesser -included of fense of sexual batterywithout the consent of the vic tim; and Count s 16-19, lesser -included of fense of ag g ravated sexual battery

.
I n his brief, the de fendant maintains that he was “ not require d to reque st a ch ar ge on the lesser of fense s, and the c ourt had a n aff irmative duty

to char ge t h em.” W hile it is t rue that a trial
c ou rt sh ou ld “ sti ll g ive le sse r- inc lud e d of fe ns e ins truc tio ns , e ve n w he n n ot r e qu e ste d, wh e n th os e ins truc tio ns are ne c e ssa

ry fo r a fair tr ia l,” Pa g e , 1 84 S.W. 3da t 22 9, th e “ de fe nd a nt’ s f a ilu re to reque st a lesser- included off ense instruc tion in writing waives the rig ht to raise such omission as an issue on appea l.” I d. Acc ording ly , this iss ue is waive d. Howeve r, we will review the trial court’ s not char g ing le sser-inc luded offe nses under the doctrine of plain er ror. I d. at 230. When de te rm ini ng wh e the r s uc h a re vie w i s a

pp ro pria te , th e fo llo wi ng fa c tor s mu st b e e sta bli sh e d:
(a) the re cord must clea

rly establish what occurre d in the t rial court; (b) a clea r and
un e q u iv o c a l r

u le o f la w mu s t h a v e b e e n b r e a c h e d ; ( c ) a s u b s tan ti a l rig h t o f

the
acc used must ha ve been adver sely aff ecte d; ( d) the acc used [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for ta ctical r easons; and (e) consideration of the err or [must be] “nec essary to do substantial just ice.”

State v. Terry , 118 S.W .3d 355, 360 (Tenn. 2003) (citing State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ). I n addition, “[a]l l five factors mus t be established by the re cord be fore ” an appe llate court may

“re cog nize the ex istence of plain err or, and complete consideration of a ll the-6-

fac tors is n o t n e c e s s ar y w h e n it is c le ar f r o m th e r e c o r d th a t a t le a s t o n e o f th e f a c to r s c a n not be established.” I d. (citing State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 283 (Tenn. 2000) ).

I n th is c a se , th e de fe nd a nt n ot o nly faile d to re qu e st an y

le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e ins truc tio ns , he ob je c te d to the State ’s re qu e ste d les se r- inc lud e d in str uc tio ns . H e “ ha s f

a ile d to sh ow that he did not waive this issue for ta ctical r easons. Theref ore, the trial court’s failure to instruct on [t he lesser

inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s] do e s no t ri se to the le ve l of plain e rr or .” Pa g e , 1 84 S.W. 3da t 23 1. Th is i ssu e is wi tho ut m e ri t.

II. Jur y I nst r uc ti ons
The defe ndant arg ues that “[i] t is clea r

. . . that the jury

had an unc onstitut ional understanding of the la w i n r e a c hin g its g uil ty ve rd ic ts in c ou nts 1 th ro ug h 1 0 [a nd ] [t]he re fo re , th os e ve rd ic ts mus t be set aside.” The S tate responds “the trial c ourt g ave a proper unanimity

instruction and any

err or in the jury

instructions is harmless because the jury rea ched a

proper verdic t and the alternative convictions wer e prope rly merg ed by

the trial court.” We ag ree with the State.
Although the defe ndant was indicte d o n t en counts of r ape, the indictments refle ct two differ ent theorie s of only five separ ate acts. Counts 1-5 char g ed the defe ndant with r ape by forc e or coer cion while Counts 6-10 cha rg ed him with rape without the consen t o f t he victim. When instructing the jury , the trial court expl ained:

You ar e being asked to c onside r t wo s ep arate theorie s of ra pe, Counts One throug h Five, and I ’m g oi ng to try to make this as clea

r as I possiblycan in g iving the se ins truc tio ns

. Cou nts On e thr ou g h F ive a lle g e ra pe by fo rc e or c oe rc ion . Co un ts Six throug h Ten alleg e ra pe without the con s en t of [the] victim, remembering or keeping in mind the St ate ha s alleg ed only five fa ctual possibiliti es of a n offe nse.

I want to try

to k e e p th is - - I

do n’ t w a nt t o c on fu se y ou , b ut I ha ve de a lt w ith this particular law and in the rea ding of it, it can be very confusing

. And I ’m try ing t o - - a n d I w a n t t h e r e c o r d t o k n o w [ s i c ] a n d I w a n t t h e p ar t i e s t o k n o w , t h i s i s m y, y ou know, last attempt to try to ge t this t o y ou in a way that y ou will understand what y ou r j ob is at th is p oin t. When y ou consider Count One, for instance, I think the parties will ag ree that Cou nt O ne make s c e rt a in a lle g a tio ns abo ut a certai n e ve nt. Th a t same e ve nt w ill apply to Count S ix , but there a

re two possible the ories of rape that might be show n. I s tha t making a ny se ns e wh a tso e ve r? I s a ny on e un de r - - c a n a ny on e no t g ra sp that, that the -- that if y ou return a gu i l t y v erdict on Count One, for instance , forc e or coer cion, then y ou would not g o to Count S ix , y ou would not go to without conse nt b e c au s e t h e n yo u w o u l d h a v e m a d e yo u r d e c i s i o n o n t h a t

- - yo u h a v e p i c k e d a t h e o r y. Does that make sense? I

hope that these instructions make that cle ar.-7-

Despite the tria l court’s instruct i o n s , the jury returne d with guilty

verdic ts for Counts 1-5, lesserinc lud e d o ff

e ns e of se xua l batte ry by fo rc e or c oe rc ion , a ndfo r C ou nts 6- 10 , le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e of sexual battery

without consent of the victim. The trial court merg ed C ounts 6-10 with Counts 1-5 and sente nced the defe ndant only for Counts 1-5.

The de fendant insist s that the verdic ts show that “[t] he jury rema i n ed co n fused a s to the char g ed off

enses a nd the judg e’s instructions” and that the ve rdicts ar e “inc onsistent with the law.” We d is a g r e e

. Co u n ts 1

- 5 a n d Co u n ts 6

- 1 0 r e p r e s e n t th e s a me o f f e n s e s o f s e xu a l b attery , but completed throug h differ ent means, Counts 1-5 by forc e or c oerc ion and Counts 6-10 without the vic tim ’s c on se nt. As lon g a s “ the me a ns are no t mu tua lly e xclu sive

. . . the re is n o le g a l ba r t o verdic ts being returne d for” eac h count. State v. Addison, 973 S.W .2d 260, 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). I n ad d ition, “[ a] trial court should instruct a jury to rende r a ve rdict as to ea ch count of a multipl e count indictment which re quires spec ific jury finding s on differ ent theorie s . . . and if the jury does re turn a ve rdict of g uilt on more than one theory . . . the court may

merg e the of

fense s and impose a sing le judg ment of convic tion.” State v. Eddie Medlock, N o. W2000-03009-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1549707, at * 4 (T enn. C rim. App. J an. 16, 2002), pe rm. to appea l denied (Te nn. J uly 1, 20 02 ) ( c iti ng Ad dis on , 9 73 S.W. 2d a t 267)

. He re , th e jury ob vio us ly

fo un d th e de fe nd a nt a c te d w ith both force and coe rcion towa rd the victim, a nd without he r consent. We do not find the means her e mutually exclusive. W e conc lude that the jury v er d i ct s ar e not i nconsistent and that the tria l court ap p ro p ri at el y m er ged t h e o ff en s es an d i m p o s ed a s i n gl e j u d gm en t o f co n v i ct i o n fo r C o u n t s 1 t h ro u gh 5. This issue is without merit.

III. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
The de fendant arg ues t hat hi s “convic tions for a g g ravated sexual battery are not supported by the evid en ce

. T h i s i s particula rly true of the conviction with reg ard to c ount 20.” B eca use a jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of innocence wi t h which a de fendant is ini tially cloake d and repla ces it with one of g uilt, on appeal a c onvicted def endant ha s the burden of

demons t ra t i ng that t h e ev i d ence is insufficient. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Thus, we consider “ whether , after v i ew i ng the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U. S. 307 , 319 , 99 S. Ct. 27 81 , 278 9, 61 L . Ed. 2d56 0, 57 3 ( 19 79 ); se e a lso Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ) ( “ F ind ing s o f g uil t in c ri min a l ac tio ns wh e the r by the tr ia l cou rt or jury sh a ll be set aside if the evidenc e is insuff icient to support the finding s by the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond
a re asonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 190-92 (Te nn. 1992); State v. Ander son, 835 S.W .2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) . All questions involvi ng the cr edibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value to be g iven the evidenc e, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of

fac t. See S t a t e v

. P ap p a s , 7 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 3 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 8 7 )

. “ A g u i l t y v e r d i c tb y t h e j u r y, app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e , a c c re dit s the tes ti mo ny of the wi tne sse s f

or the State a ndre so lve s a ll conflicts in fa vor of the the ory of the State.” State v. Gra ce, 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our
su pr e me c ou rt

state d th e ratio na le fo r this ru le :-8-

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the jury see the witnesses fa ce to f

ace , hear their testimony and observe their demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judg e and jury are the primary instrumentality of justice to determine the weig ht and cr edibilityto be g iven to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial for um alon e is th e r e h u man a tm o s p h e r e a n d th e to ta li ty o f th e e v id e n c e c a n not be repr oduced w ith a written re cord in this Court.
Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (c iting Carr oll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W .2d 523 (1963))

.
To pr ov e a g g ra vate d se xua l batte ry , the State wa s re qu ir e d to sh ow bey on d a re a so na ble doubt that the defe ndant had “unlawf ul se x ual contac t w ith a victim .

. . [who] is le ss tha n thirteen (1 3) y e ars of

a g e .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -5 04 (a )( 4) (2 00 3) . “ Se xua l c on ta c t” is d e fi ne d a s:
[ T ] h e i n t en t i o n al t o u ch i n g o f t h e v i ct i m 's , t h e d e f e n d an t 's , o r a n y

o t h erp er s o n 's intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate ar ea of the victim' s, the defe ndant' s, or any other person' s intimate parts, if that int entional touching can be rea sonably construed a s being for the purpose of sexual a rousal or g ratification.

I d. § 3 9 -1 3 -501(6). The def endant a rg ues that the c onduct in Count 20 occurr ed during the times that the victim lived on Demory Road. He further arg ues t hat t he victim ’s t estimony shows that “she thought [the defe ndant] was play ing.” The victim’s testimony reve aled that when s he lived on Demory Road, the def

endant touche d her br easts under h ershirt. This evidence was more than
su ff ic ie nt f or a ratio na l ju ry

to fi nd the de fe nd a nt g uil ty of a g g ra vate d se xua l batte ry of the vic tim bey ond a re asonable doubt. A s for the other counts of ag g ravated sexual battery , the victim testified about numerous oc casions whe rein the defendant sex ually touched he r. Ag ain, this evidence was more than suf

ficient to convic t the defe ndant.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing au t h o ri t i es and re asoning , we a ffirm the judg ments of the trial
c ou rt a ndre ma ndfo r e ntry of c or re c te d jud g me nts to re fl e c t that Co un ts 3 a nd5 a re c on se c uti ve to Counts 1 and 2.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE