UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5249

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GERMAN CHANG MENDOZA, a/k/a Doloteo Arrollo Blanco,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00250-WO-1)

Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 18, 2011

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Graham T. Green, Assistant United States Attorney, WinstonSalem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to the terms of his written plea agreement, 

German Chang Mendoza pleaded guilty to interfering with commerce 

by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006) (“Count 

One”), and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a 

crime of violence, to wit: robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (“Count Two”). The district court 

sentenced Mendoza to a total of 132 months’ imprisonment, 

consisting of forty-eight months on Count One and eighty-four 

months on Count Two, to be served consecutively. In determining 

the sentence for Count One, the district court varied upward 

from the high end of Mendoza’s sentencing range under the 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines by eleven months. 

On appeal, Mendoza challenges only the substantive 

reasonableness of this upward variance. We have reviewed the 

record and discern no abuse of discretion in the district 

court’s sentencing decision. Accordingly, we affirm.

This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness, 

applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v.

Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 122 (4th Cir. 2011). Ordinarily, 

this review requires appellate consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51. However, because Mendoza “does not challenge 
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the procedural reasonableness of his sentence” (Appellant’s Br. 

at 8 n.1), we need only consider whether Mendoza’s sentence is 

substantively reasonable. 

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence, this court assesses “whether the District Judge abused 

his discretion in determining that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 

[(2006)] factors supported [the sentence] and justified a 

substantial deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 

U.S. at 56. The court “must ‘take into account the totality of 

the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the 

Guidelines range.’” United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 

(4th Cir.) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51), cert. denied, 131 S. 

Ct. 307 (2010). When the district court exercises its 

discretion and varies from the defendant’s advisory Guidelines 

range, it must explain its reasons for doing so. United States 

v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, __ 

S. Ct. __, 2011 WL 1671037 (U.S. May 31, 2011) (No. 10-10257). 

Although the district court “must ensure that its justification 

supports ‘the degree of the variance,’” it need not make “a 

finding of ‘extraordinary’ circumstances” in order to impose a 

sentence outside the defendant’s Guidelines range. United 

States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). 
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Mendoza contends that his variance sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary 

to achieve the statutory aims of sentencing and because the 

district court failed to appropriately weigh those 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors that supported his request for a withinGuidelines sentence. We disagree. 

In explaining its reasons for the upward variance in 

Count One, the district court identified several § 3553(a) 

factors that supported its decision. Specifically, the court 

cited Mendoza’s obstructionist conduct, which included providing 

a false name and date of birth to the police and minimizing the 

seriousness of the offense, and Mendoza’s leadership role in the 

robbery, as relevant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) — the nature and 

circumstances of the offense — and found these factors were 

unaccounted for in the Guidelines calculation for Count One. 

The court further opined that the robbery was “very violent,” in 

that Mendoza had pointed his firearm at a shop clerk’s head, see

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (sentence should reflect the 

seriousness of the offense), and that this too was not accounted 

for in the Guidelines calculation. Finally, the court addressed 

Mendoza’s personal history and characteristics, noting that it 

was sympathetic to Mendoza’s lack of a stable family environment 

and his substance abuse problems. The court ultimately 

concluded, however, that the danger Mendoza posed to the 
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community — evidenced by the fact that, despite his relatively 

young age (twenty-five), Mendoza had a history of using aliases, 

two convictions for driving while impaired, and a prior 

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon — trumped any 

leniency that these factors might otherwise support. Thus, the 

court opined that an upward variance was necessary to protect 

the public from any further crime Mendoza may commit. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). We thus conclude the district court’s 

well-reasoned explanation amply justified the extent of the 

variance it imposed. 

Because there was no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s reasoning in this case, we will defer to it. 

See Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d at 366–67 (holding sentencing 

court’s decision to impose a sentence six years longer than 

advisory Guidelines range was reasonable, because district court 

employed § 3553–based reasoning to justify the variance); see 

also United States v. Jeffrey, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.) 

(“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when 

determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) 

factors.”), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 

2, 2011) (No. 10-10894). We therefore affirm Mendoza’s 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED