The Honora ble J oseph H. McKinley , J r., United States District J udg e for th e W estern * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0468n.06 F iled: Jun e 29, 2007 No. 06-4079 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

BA RBARA DA VI SON, Administratrix of the Estate of No rm an Davison; I ndividually and as next frie nd for Kelly Davison, Noe lle Davison, and Br ianna Da

vison; P ersona l Represen t ati ve of the Next of Kin of Norman D avison, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,

v. C O LE S E W E LL C O R P O RA T IO N an d P E LLA CORPOR ATI ON, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM T HE UNI TED

STATES D I STRI CT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN D I S T RI CT OF O H IO

Be fore : MOORE and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and McKI NL EY, District Judge. * GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Pla int if f B arb ara Da vis on , in div idu a lly , and

in h e r c a pa c ity a s A dmi nis tr a tr ix of

the e state of dece dent Norman Davison, and next frie nd of their c hildren, appe als an orde r of the district c ourt g ra nti ngde fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. In its op ini on and or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld that pl a int if

f h a d not sub mitte d suf

fi c ie nt ad mis sib le e vid e nc e fr om whic h a re a so na ble jur or c ou ld find defe ndant s n egl i g ent or that their a lleg ed neg lige nce w as a pr ox imate ca use of Nor

manCase No. 06- 4079

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Th e bu sin ess in vit or , th e Ho me De po t st or e of Re y no lds burg , O hio , is no t a

pa rt y to t his 1 action. - 2 - Davison’s pe rsonal injuries. Reg ardingthe claim for wrong ful death, the district court ruled that pla int if f’ s a lle g a tio ns and

e vid e nc e fa ile d to e sta

bli sh that N or

man D a vis on ’s su ic ide wa s a fore seea ble re sult of defe ndants’ alleg ed neg lige nce. A ccor d i n gly , the district court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

defe ndants. Plaintiff has timely appea led. F or the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e a ff

ir m. I. This case orig inated fr om Ba rbar a Davison’s J uly

2004 state cour

t complaint in which she alleg ed that her

husband, Norma

n Davison, while a

patron at a Home De po t store, sustained 1 damag es “w hen he w as injured upon be ing struc k in the head a nd neck by

a metal br acke t that was part of a display ” that was alleg edly constructe d and maintained by defe ndants. As a re sult, Norman Davison alleg edly

suffe red pe rsonal injuries and u lt im a te ly c o mmitt ed suicide. D avison’s complaint

se t f or th f ive c ounts a g a ins t de fe nd ants Col e Se we ll Cor po ratio n and Pe lla Cor

po ratio n: fa ilure to

wa rn (C ount O ne ); fa ilure to “ no tif y ” (C ount T wo ); ne g lig e nc e (C ount T hr e e ); los s o f “ su pp or t, society , and ser

vices” (Count Four) ; and wrong ful death (Count Five). Def endants re moved the ca se to fede ral c ourt based on diversity of citi zenship. I n October 2004, the district court set a case manag ement sche dule for the production of e x pert re ports, expert wi tne ss d isc ov e ry , a

nd dis po sit ive mot ion s. Di sc ov e ry wa s c on tin

ue d s e ve ra l ti me s a

nd la ste d unti l Aug ust 28, 2005, when Richar d Silverman, plaintiff’s liability and ca usation expert, was depose d.Case No. 06- 4079

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- 3 - On J anuar

y 6, 2006, defe ndants filed a motion for summ ary judgme nt. Def endants’ motion soug ht the exclusion of Davison’s expert witnesses, includingSilverman. Def endants contended that Silverman could not “off

er a ny opinion to a reasonable deg ree of eng ineer ing pr obability that links any alleg ed neg lige nce on be half” of def endants. De fenda

nts cited S ilverman’s testimony in which he adm i t t ed that he ha d “absolutely no idea what cause d” the a ccide nt and could point to six teen p o s s ib le c a

u s e s . F in a ll y , d e f

e n d an ts r e li e d

u p on Da u b er t

v. Me rrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc

. , 50 9 U .S. 57 9 ( 19 93 ), in r e qu e sti ngthat th e dis tr ic t c ourt e x erci se it s “ g a te ke e pin g fu nc tio n” to

e xclu de Silv e rm an’ s te sti mony . In h e r r e sp on se to d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on, pl aint if f d id n ot r e qu e st a Da ub e rt he ari ngor se e k a Rule 56 (f ) c on tin ua nc e fo r a dd iti on a l ti me to p ro vid e “ fa c ts e sse nti a l to justify ” her

opposition. F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(f). On July 28 , 200 6, the dis tr ic t court g ra nte d d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. F ir st, the di strict court held that Davison’s claims failed beca use “the rec ord . . . conta in[ ed] no evidence that the alleg ed ac cident eve r happe ned.” Sec ond, the district court he ld, “[e]ven assuming that an

acc ident did occur ,” plaintiff’ s neg lige nce c laim failed be cause “Mr. Silverman’ s repor t and testimony are the only piece s of evidenc e submitt ed by Plaintiff that g o to the issues of the condition of the store display and the ca use of Mr. D avison’s alleg ed hea d injury .” Pursuant to Da ub e rt , “Mr. Silverman’s opinions are without fo u n dation and ar e not stated with a suf ficient de g ree of pr ob a bil ity .” F ina lly , the dis tr ic t c ourt ru le d that the te sti mony of pla int if f’ s p syc ho log ic a l “ e xpe rt ” was inadmissible, and a ccor dingly , “a r easona ble juror c ould not find that De fenda nts’ alleg edCase No. 06- 4079

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Plaintiff has not appea led the exclusion of the testimony of its psy cholog ical “e x pert” Dr. 2 Delphi M. Toth. - 4 - neg lige nce pr ox imatel y ca u sed Mr. Da vison to commit suicide.” Thus, the district court g rante d 2 defe ndants’ summary

judgme nt motion. This timely

appea l followed. II. F ir st, Da vis on argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt o n th e ba sis that plaintiff pre s en t ed i nsufficie nt evidence that an ac cident occ urre d. On this issue, Davison

asser ts corre ctly

that defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt was not based on this g round. We review de novo a dis trict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt. Ma yv . F ra nk lin Cou nty Com m’rs , 437 F.3d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 2006). “The district court, and this Court in its review of the dis tr ic t c ourt , mus t vie w the fa c ts a nd any inf e re nc e s r e a so na

bly dr a wn fr om t he m in the lig ht m os t favor able to the p ar t y ag ainst whom judgme nt was ente red.” Kalamazoo Acquisitions , L.L.C . v. W estfield Ins. Co., Inc ., 395 F.3d 3 3 8 , 342 (6th Cir. 2005) (c iting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Ze nit h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (198 6 )). Summary judgme nt is appropriate when “ the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file , t o gether with the

a ff ida vit s, if any , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l fa c t and that the mov ingpa rt y is e ntitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 (c ). Ne ve rt he le ss, a me re sc int ill a of evide nce is insuffic ient; “ther e must be evide nce on which the jury could re asonably

find for the [non-movant] .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 252 (1986). Entry of summaryCase No. 06- 4079

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- 5 - judgme nt is appropriat e “ag ainst a par ty who fa ils to m ake a

showing sufficie nt to establish the exis tence of an e lement essential to that par ty ’s ca se, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). At the outset of its opinion, the district court lamented: The re cord be fore the C ourt is scarc e on fa cts. The only evidentiar

y materia ls on the rec ord ar e the de position and r ep o rt o f engine er Richa rd H. Silverman a

nd the deposition of neuropsycholog ist Dr. Delphi M. Toth. To the extent that any documents we re discove red, a ny aff idavits give n, or any

depositions taken of the de c e de nt, B arb ara

Da vis on , e y e wi tn esses to t

he inc ide nt, Ho me De po t e mpl oy e e s, repr esentative s o f Defendants, or tre ating phy sicians, none of those materia ls have been submitted. T h e o n l y d e s c r i p t i o no f

r e c o r d o f t h e a l l e g e d

i n c i d e n ti s f

o u n d i nt h e c omp la int , wh ic h st ate s th a t on

“ Ap ri l 5, 20 00 , D e c e de nt N or man D a vis on

wa s a bu sin e ss invitee on the premises of a H ome Depot r etail store whe n he wa s injured upon being struck in the head a

nd neck by

a metal br acke t that was par t of a display” construc ted and maintained by

Def endants. Compl., ¶¶6-7. P l a i n t i f f h a s n o to f

f e r e d an y d i r e c te v i d e n c e r e g ar d i n g M r . D a v i s o n ’ s a l l e g e d i n j u r y. Plaintiff has not submitt ed any diag nosis f

ro m a treating phy sician or a ny other medical rec ords. Aside from the testimony of Plain t i ff’s non-trea ting ne ur op syc ho log ist , th e re is n o e vid e nc e a bo ut the natur e , ty

pe , e xten t, o r s e ri ou sn e ss of the injury

. Al tho ug h th is s y

no ps is is cor

re c t, we c on c lud e that it wa s er ro r fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt

to b a se its ruling on the l ack of evidentiar y support for the c laimed ac cident. Althoug h “district cour ts are wi de ly a c kn ow le dg e d to po sse ss the po we r t o e nte r s umm ary jud g me nts su a s

po nte ,” thi s is on ly

“ so l o n g a s t h e l o s i n g p art y wa s on notice that she had to comeforward w ith all of her ev idence .” Employe rs I

ns. of W ausau v. Petroleum Specialities, Inc ., 69 F.3d 98, 105 (6th Cir. 1995) (quotingCase No. 06- 4079

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- 6 - Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 3 17 , 3 26 (1 98 6) ) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . Su a

sp on te g rants of summar

y judgme nt are g ener ally

disfavore d. W

ausau , 69 F.3d at 105. Her e, we conclude that neither the cou rt n o r defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt provided suff

icient notice to plaintiff that the f actua l basis for her

claim of a

n ac ci d ent was challeng ed. III

. Nonethele ss, w e aff

irm the judgme nt of the district court ba sed on its alternative ruling that pla int if f f a ile d to pr e se nt s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to c re a te a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f a c t th a t de fe nd ants

wer e neg lige nt or that their alleg ed neg lige nce w as a pr ox imate ca use of the a ccide nt. On this issue, plaintiff contends that the district court abuse d i t s d i s cr et ion by excluding the testimony of her expert, Richard Silverman. We disag ree . This court re views the ex clusion of ex pert testim ony for an abuse of discretion, even if

the

r u l i n g r e s u l t s i n th e e n t r

y o f s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tf

o r t h e o p p o s i n g p art y. Meridia Prods. Liab. L itig. v. Abbott Lab. 4 4 7 F. 3 d 8 6 1 , 8 6 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 5 26 U. S. 13 7, 15 2- 53 (1 99 9) ; Nelson v . Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. , 243 F.3d 244, 248 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s instruction in Dau bert , 5 09 U. S. at 58 9, dis tr ic t c ourt s p e rf or m a “g ateke eper ” func tion, ensuring that “a n y an d all scientific testimony or evide nce a dmitted is not only rele vant, but reliable .” The Da ub e rt Court proce eded to identify a non-e x haustive list of fac tors that assist the district courts, including whe t h er a theor y has g ained g ener al ac cepta nce by the scientific c ommunity

and whether an expert’s conclusion follows fr om its premise. Id. at 589-93;Case No. 06- 4079

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- 7 - Meridia Prods

. , 4 4 7 F. 3 d at 8 6 8 (c i t i n g Gen. Elec. Co. v. J oiner , 5 22 U. S. 1 36 , 1 46 (1 99 7) ; F ED . R. E V ID . 7 02 (A dv iso ry

Com mitte e Note s) ). I t is br oa dly a c c e pte d th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt “ ha [s] ‘consider able leeway ’ in making these sorts of de terminations.” Id. (c i t i n g Kumho Tire Co. , 526 U.S. at 152). In revie wing a Da ub e rt ruling , “we must re view the rec ord to de termine whe ther the district court er

red in its assessment of the rele vance and re liability of t h e expert testimony .” Gree nwell v. Boatwright , 184 F.3d 492, 498 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Her e, in addr essing S i l verma n’s testimony , the district court thoroug hly analy zed the pr of fe re d te sti mony

a s f oll ow s: I n support of [Davison’s neg lige nce c laims] , Plaintiff has submitted an expert repor t from eng ineer

Richard H. Silverma

n. Mr. Silverman believe s that the acc ident “wa s c a us e d b y so me so rt

of fa ilure of a pa rt of the dis pla

y str uc tur e .” Silv e rm an Re po rt , p. 1. The repor

t lists six teen possible c auses for the alleg ed acc ident, such as “insuffic ient scre ws,” misalig ned hing es, and insuff icient inspection. Id ., p. 2. Ac c or din g to t

he re po rt , “[i]t i s im

po ssi ble to e sta

bli shthe sp e c if

ic c a us e fo r t his failure ” bec ause the disp lay was dismantled rig ht after the ac cident occ urre d. Id. , p. 1. Mr. Silverman testified at deposition that he had “a bsolut el y no idea what cause d this [ acc ident ]

. ” Aug. 28, 2005 De p. of Richar d H. Silverman, p. 91. Mr. Silverman conc ludes in his report that Def endants wer e “totally responsible” for the acc ident. Silverman Report, p. 2.

. . . . Mr . Silve rm an’ s o pin ion s are wi tho ut f ound a tio n a

nd the y fa il t o s pe c if

y the c a us e o f M r . D av i s o n ’ s a l l e g e d

h e a d i n j u r y w i t ha s u f f i c i e n td e g r e e o f

p r o b a b i l i t y.

. . . . At de po sit ion , Mr

. Silv e rm an wa s a sk e d a bo ut the mate ri a ls h e br ou g ht w ithhim in a folde r. The f

older co n t ai n ed the depositions of Mr. Davison and Ms. Davison, a repor t from Def

endants’ e x pert, a

Home De pot acc ident repo rt , an d depositions of sever al per sons whose name s are unfamiliar to the Court. SeeSilverman Dep., pp. 7- 8. No ne of

the se mate ri a ls are on the re c or d. Th ou g h h a vin g a ll o f t ho se mate ri a ls, Mr. Silverman mentioned just four items on which he based his re p o rt : (1)Case No. 06- 4079

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- 8 - photogr aphs of the display in the Rey

noldsburg , Ohio stor e [ the alleg ed site of the acc ident]; (2) visits he m ade to a Home Depot st ore in Boston, Massachuse tts to l ook at a display

in t h at s t o re ; (3) Ms. Davison’s deposition testim ony that a scr ew that “mig ht have be en ther e [in the display ]” was missing; and (4) Interne t resea rch a bout scre ws. Id. , pp. 61, 62, 69. These items do not for

m a reliable foundation. Most problematic is Mr. Silverman’s visit t o a Home D epot store in B oston. There is no evidence establishing that the display Mr. Silverman viewe d i n Boston wa s the same a s the one in Rey noldsburg wher e Mr. Da

vison was alleg edly

injured. Mr. S ilverman ne ver w ent to the Rey noldsburg store, see Silverman Dep., p. 99, and he admitted that the photog raphs he viewe d of the Rey

noldsburg store we re of

such poor qua lity

that they

wer e “impossible to follow .” Id ., p. 62. Mr. Silverman stated the display he sawin the Boston store “ could have been similar” to the one in the photog raphs. Id. The Court finds that Mr. S ilverman lacked a reliable foundation upon which to state his opini on on the condition of the Rey noldsburg store disp lay

and on the c ause of

the alleg ed acc ident to Mr. Davison. Se e Da ub e rt , 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. Ct . at 2795 (e x pert te sti mony may no t be ba se d o n s pe c ulatio n) ; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Lt d. , 224 F .3 d 7 97 , 8 01 (6 th Cir . 200 0) (“ An e xpe rt ’s op ini on , whe re ba se d on ass ume d f a c ts, mus t f ind so me su pp or t f or tho se a ssumpt ion s in

the re c or d. ” ); Sh aw v . S

tra c k ho us e , 920 F.2d 1135, 1142 (3d Cir. 1990) (e x pert opinion that assumes fa cts not supported by the re cord should be disre g arde d). Mr. Silverm an’s opinions are also leg ally insufficient be cause he fa iled to identify the ca use of the a lleg ed injury

with a sufficient deg ree of ce rtainty . Plaintiff has attempted to establish ca

usation throug h expert opinion. E x pert testimony may be used to establish proxim ate cause when a c ase involves “ complex is sues outside the are a of c ommon knowledg e, such a s an i n j u ry ’s cause and ef

fec t.” Lad

e re r v . S t. Rita’s Med ., 122 Ohio App. 3d 587, 598, 702 N.E.2d 476, 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)

. . . . An e xpe rt

a tte mpt ingto e sta

bli shpr oximate c a

us e mus t st a te his op ini on in t er ms of probability

. Shumake r v. Olive r B. Cannon & Sons, Inc

. , 2 8 Ohio St. 3d 367, 369, 504 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ohio 1986). “Opinions stated with a lesse r deg ree of cert ai n t y m u s t be excluded as spe culative.” Id. Probability means more than a 50 pe rc e nt l ike lih oo d, and pr oo f of the po ssi bil ity of a c a us a l c onne c tio n is ins uf

fi c ie nt. Id. a t 36 9, n. 3; Stinson v. England , 6 9 O h io St

. 3 d 4 5 1 , 4 5 5 , 6 3 3 N.E.2d 532, 537 (Ohio 1994) ( “[A]n event is proba ble if there is a g reater than f ifty perc ent likelihood that it produced the occur renc e at issue.” ). Mr. S ilverman was only

able to identify

possible cause s of the alleg ed ac cident. The repor t said that there wa s “s o m e sort of f ailure” with the display , but it wasCase No. 06- 4079

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- 9 - “impossible to establish the specific c ause.” Silverman Report, p. 1. Mr. Silverman testified that “we cannot identify specific cause or ca

uses for the incident” a

nd that “ther e could be other possible ca uses” than the six teen he listed. Si lverman D ep., pp. 87, 90. He then c oncede d, “We have a bsolutely no idea what cause d this.” Id. , p. 91. T h o u g h p r o x i m a t e c a

u s e i s u s u a l l y a

qu e s t i o no f f

a c t f o r t h e j u r y, see Uddin v. Embassy Suites Hotel , 1 65 Oh io A pp . 3 d 6 99 , 7 12 , 8 48 N. E. 2d 51 9, 52 9 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 20 05 ), sp e c ulatio n and c on je c tur e are ins uf

fi c ie nt a s a

matte r o f l aw t o e sta

bli sh proxi mate ca

use. . . . He re, Mr . Silverman’s opinions fall woef ully short of identifying the cause of Mr. Da vi s o n ’s al l eg ed injury

with a suffic ient deg ree of probability

and, ther efor e, must be excluded fr om consideration. The c rux of Davison’s appe al reg ardingthe leg al suffic iency of Silverman’s testimony is that the district court erre d in excluding S ilverman’s testimony with respe ct t o the i ssues of neg lige nce and proximate cause beca use al l o f t h e six teen identifie d potential cause s of the ac cident that Si lv e r ma nc it e d w e r e a r e s u lt o f d e f e n d an ts ’ a ll e g e d

n e g li g e n c e . T h is ar g u me n t i s u np e r s u a s iv e . We ag ree with the analy sis and conclusion of the district c ourt that Silverman’s h y p o t h es i s was not supported by

an ade qu ate f

actua l foundation, but rather was ba sed solely

upon conjec ture a

nd speculation. For this re as o n , we co nclude the Da ub e rt ruling of the district cour t excluding Silverman’s testimony

was not an a

buse of discr etion. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis trict cou rt on

the a lte rn a tiv e g ro un d th a t in response to defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt, plaintiff failed t o s u b m i t sufficient admissible evid en ce i n support of her alleg ations of neg lige nce a nd proxi mate ca

use to cre ate a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t. F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 (c ); Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322. I V.Case No. 06- 4079

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De fe nd ants a lso no te that, a s D a vis on ’s e xpe rt a dmitte d, no n- pa

rt y Ho me De po t a c tua lly 3 dis ma n tl e d th e d is p la

y , an d th e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e p r o f f e r e d to s u g g e s t th a t d e f

e n d ants wer e re sp on sib le fo r t

he dis a sse mbl y . D avis on a dmi ts t his in h e r r e sp on se br ie f, but c on te nd s th a t it should not prec lude defendants’ liabili ty beca use “defenda

nts may be liable f

or the disassembly

of the display

under c ontrac t or ag ency principles.”

- 10 - Finally , Davison conte nds that she is entitled to a re buttable pre sumption of neg lige nce unde r Ohio law because defe ndants alleg edly “spoiled” the evidenc e. Specif ically , Davison conte nds that “the storm doo r d i s p l ay

was disassembled while in defe ndants’ contr ol, and sanc tions may lie for

s p o l i at i o n of the e vidence , including a rebuttable presumption of neg lige nce imposed on the spoliator.” Althoug h defe ndants conc ede that Ohio rec og nizes a tort cause of action for spoliation of e vid e nc e , the y argue that su c h a tor t w a s n ot p le a de d in

pla int if f’ s c omp la int

. Rathe r, the fi rs t

3 time that Davison mentioned the issue wa s in her re sponse brief in oppositi on to defe ndant’s motion for summary

judgme nt. For the se re asons, def endants urg e this court to af fi rm t h e o rd er of the dis tr ic t c ourt

. Def endants a re corre ct; Davison did not alleg e in her complaint a cla im in tort for spoliation. Pur su ant t o Ohi o law , a cla im fo r int e rf e re nc e or sp oli a tio n of ev ide nc e re qu ir e s th a t a pla int if f m us t prove a ll of the following elements: “( 1) pendingor probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledg e on the pa

rt of def endant that litigation ex ists or is probable, (3) wil lful destruction of evidenc e by defe ndant desig ned to disrupt the plaintiff' s case , (4) disruption of the pla intiff’s ca se, and (5) damag es proxi mately cause d by the def endant’ s acts[.] ” Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. , 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993) . Gene rally , a plaintiff may not raise a

claim for spoliation of evidenc e for

the first t ime in oppositi on to a def endant’ s motion for summary judgme nt. See MatyokCase No. 06- 4079

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This circuit has pr eviously deter mined that, in dive rsity case s, “[t] he rule s that apply to the 4 spoiling of e vidence and the r ang e of a ppropriate sanctions ar e define d by state law.” Nationw ide Mu t. F ireIn s. Co. v . F

or d M oto r Co ., 17 4 F .3 d 8 01 , 8 04 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; se e als o B e c k v . H aik , 377 F.3d 624, 641 ( 6th C i r. 2004). I t appea rs that eve ry

other c ircuit to directly

addre ss this i ssue has conclude d that, even in diversity case s, fede ral law applies to questions of spoliation of evidence and appropr iate sanctions. Se e, e .g ., Fl ur yv . D aim le r Ch ry

sle r Co rp ., 427 F.3d 939, 943- 44 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. de nied , –

U. S. – , 1 26 S. Ct . 2 96 7 ( 20 06 ); Hodge v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 360 F.3d 446, 4 4 9

- 5 0 ( 4 t hC i r . 2 0 04 ); K i n g v. Ill. Cent. R.R. , 337 F.3d 550, 555- 56 (5th Cir. 2003). We are , of c o u r s e , c u r

r e n t l y b o u n d b y Nationw ide Mutual and Bec k, seeSalmi v. Sec ’y of He alth & Human Servs ., 774 F.2d 685, 689 ( 6th Cir. 1985); 6th C IR . R. 206(c) (“Repor ted pane l opinions are binding on su bs e qu e nt p ane ls. ” ), wh e the r t he ru le se t f

or th i n th os e op ini on s is c or re c t or no t. - 11 - v . M oo re , 2000 WL 1232417, *2 (Ohio App. 6 Dist. Sept. 1, 2000). Thus, any cl ai m i n t ort for spoliation must fail. To the extent Davison claims that she is not advanc ing the afor ementioned tort c laim, but

rathe r a “ le g a l pr inc ipl e e mbo die d in the ma xim omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem (a l l t h i n gs

are pr e sume d a g a ins t a

wr on g do e r) ,” thi s to o f

a ils . D a vis on

c ite s Lou k

inas v. Ro to -Ro ote r S

e rv s. Co. , 855 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (Ohio App. 1 D ist. 200 6 ), for the a pplication of this principle under Ohio law. I n Loukinas , the t ri al cour t excluded expert testimony as a sa nction for spoliation of 4

e v i d e n c e b e c a

u s e i td e t e r

m i n e d t h a tt h e e v i d e n c e h a d

b e e ni n t e n t i o n a l l y a l t e r e d o r d e s t r o ye d

b y a party or i ts expert befor e the defense had an oppor tunity to examine the evidence

. Id. On a pp e a l, the Oh io C ourt

of Ap pe a ls c on c lud e d th a t th e tr ia l court did no t e rr in t his de te rm inatio n b e c a

us e “[i] f a thre shold showin g o f s p o l i at ion is made, the burde n then shifts to the proponent of the evidenc e to prove that th e o t h er s i de wa s not prejudiced by the alter ation or destruc tion of the evidenc e.” Id.Case No. 06- 4079

Da v iso n v . Co le Se we ll Co rp ., e t al

.

- 12 - I n the present case , this principle is inapplicable. Davison has made no alleg ations of intent that would support such sanc tion or presumption. Ohio courts have applied a g ener al principle, analog ous to D avison’s “spoliation” a rguments, that a “ne g ative, or a dverse , infere nce a rises whe re a par ty who has c ontrol of the evide nce in que stion fails, without satis fac tory explanation, to provide the evidenc e.” Brokamp v

. Merc y Hosp. Anderson , 726 N.E.2d 594, 608 (Ohio App. 1 D ist. 1999). “F or example, this concept applies wher e the party willfully suppresses e vidence that, if produce d, would explain that party ’s con duct.” Id. Neve rtheless, Brokamp qu a lif ie s th e a pp lic a tio n o f t

his pr e s u mp ti o n b y s tati n g th a t “ O h io c o u rts n o r ma ll y w o u ld r e qu ir e a s tr o n g s h o w in g of malfea sance –or at lea st gr o s s n egl ec t

–befor e appr oving suc h a cha rg e.” Id. at 608-09 (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Ag ain, Davis o n h as not alleg ed, much less pr offe red evidenc e, that the display

was intentionally or neg lige ntly disassembled, there by spoiling nec essar

y

e vid e nc e and

re qu ir inga

pr e sumpt ion

of ne g lig e nc e . Si mpl y

put, n o evi dence wa s o ff e re d w ith

re sp e c t to the dis pla

y ’s dis a sse mbl y . Davison admits that the first time she argued the a pplication of this princ iple was in he r response to he r motion for summary judgme nt. Accor dingly , neither a tort claim, nor a pr esumption of spoliation of evidence , is allowable unde r the c ircumstance s. V. For the re asons stated a

bove, the judg ment of the district cour t is affirmed.