[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Price , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4926.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -4926
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLEE , v . P RICE , A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Price , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4926.]Criminal law—R.C. 2925.02(A)(3)—Corrupting another with drugs—Causationelement jury instructions—But-for causation—Independently sufficient causation—Contributing-factor causation—Trial court did not abuse its
discretion in instruc ting jury on causation. (Nos. 2019-0729 and 2019-0822—Sub mitted June 16, 2020—Decided O ctober 20, 2020.)
C ERTIFIED by and A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 107096, 2019-Ohio-1642.

__________________ K

ENNEDY , J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Eighth District Court of Appeals,
which also certified a conflict between its judgment and a judg ment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, we c onsider whether a trial court, w hen instructing a juryS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 on the causation element of the offense of corrupting another w ith drugs, is required to inform the jury that it must find not only that the accused’ s conduct was the “butfor” cause of serious physical harm to the victim—i.e., that wi thout the accused’s conduct, the injury would not have occurred—but also that it wa s an “independently
sufficient cause” of that harm. {¶ 2} Appellant, Mark Price, relies on the United States Supreme Cour t’s
decision in Burrage v. United States , 571 U.S. 204, 218-219, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014), for the proposition that a jury instruction on the causation
element must instruct on both but-for causation and independent sufficiency. But Price did not request this speci fic instruction. Instead, he a sked the trial court to instruct the jury that he coul d not be convicted of corrupting another with drugs unless the jury found that his c onduct was the but-for cause of the victim’s serious physical injury or, alternatively, an independently sufficient cause of that harm. The trial court gave t he jury the essence of the instruction th at he requested. Price did not object to its language, and the court of appeals proper ly held that he has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in givin g the instruction that it
did. {¶ 3} Turning to the certified-conflic t question, we conclude that th ere is no conflict. Although the Eighth Dis trict in dicta criticized the Fifth District’s reasoning in the certified-conflict case, the Eighth District’s actual holding in this case that there was no abuse of discretion in instructing the j ury is not in conflict with the Fifth District’s holding that the offense of corruptin g another with drugs requires proof of but-for causation. {¶ 4} Therefore, we address the proposition of law raised in case No. 2019- 0822 and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, and we di smiss case No. 2019-0729 as improvidently certified.January Term, 2020

3 Facts and Procedural History {¶ 5} In the early morning hours of August 1, 2016, James Dawson contacted his neighbor, Tierra Fort, and the two then exchanged a series of text messages regarding Dawson’s attempt to find someone to sell him heroin. Acting as an intermediary in exchange for a share of the drugs, Fort c ontacted Price and asked him to sell a gram of heroin to Dawson for $100. Price d elivered the drugs in a baggie to Fort’s apartment at around 3:00 a.m., and Fort g ave him the money that had been supplied by Dawson. Dawson came to Fort’s apartm ent, picked up the drugs, and left after givi ng Fort approximately $20 worth o f them. {¶ 6} Dawson was found dead in his apartment of an apparent overdose around 10:40 a.m. the next day, August 2, 2016. A Lakewood pol ice officer who responded to a 9-1-1 call observed a “pinkish-powder residue” a nd a “straw” (the hollow tube of an ink pen) on the kitchen table. There were al so six pills on the floor near Dawson’s body as well as prescription bottles in the apartment. Detective Amelio Leanza searched Dawson’s cellphone and discove red the text messages Dawson had exchanged w ith Fort. That same day, he obt ained a warrant
for Fort’s arrest and a warrant to search her apartment. He ex ecuted both warrants
and seized Fort’s cell phone, drug paraphernalia, and a rock of heroin, as well as a credit card coated with a powder that was similar in appearance to the powder found
on Dawson’s kitchen table. {¶ 7} Detective Leanza interviewed Fort and learned that someone with the street name “Bam,” who was a c ontact on Fort’s cellphone, had s upplied the drugs. He searched Facebook using Bam’s cellphone number, and Fort ide ntified Price from a picture on Facebook. Detective Leanza had Fort call Pri ce to arrange a controlled purchase of drugs, a nd she confirmed that Price was the passenger in a blue Chrysler 200 when he arrived at the agreed-upon location, the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority station at 117th Street an d Madison Avenue. Officers arrested Price, and while Detective Leanza was placing Price in a policeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 cruiser, he saw Price go limp and realized that Price had consu med the drugs.
Detective Leanza administered Narcan to counteract an overdose. When paramedics arrived to treat Price, they discovered a baggie con taining a pinkish-tan substance in his mouth. He was transported to a hospital for o bservation for a time and later to jail. {¶ 8} Tests of the pinkish powder found in Dawson’s and Fort’s apartm ents, on the credit card used to cut it, and in the straw showed that they contained heroin and fentanyl. {¶ 9} The Cuyahoga County Grand jury returned a 22-count indictment alleging that Price committed 1 count of involuntary manslaught er, 2 counts of corrupting another with drugs, 11 counts of trafficking, 6 coun ts of drug possession, 1 count of tampering with evidence, and 1 count of possessing c riminal tools in addition to various specifications. {¶ 10} Joseph Felo, D.O., chief deputy medical examiner and forensic pathologist for the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office, performed an autopsy on Dawson’s corpse and t estified at trial that he initi ally thought that heart and lung disease could have caused Dawson’s death. However, a toxicological evaluation identified a high level of fentanyl—which he called “a potent narcotic
medication” and which was not one of Dawson’s prescribed medica tions—and two prescription antidepressants, mir tazapine and escitalopram, in Dawson’s system. Dr. Felo described respiratory depression (in which the body sl ows down breathing and the lungs “essentially stop”) as a side-effect of fentanyl that could manifest itself in the physical changes he had observed in Dawson’s orga ns, particularly his lungs. He determined the cause of Dawson’s death to be acute i ntoxication by the combined effects of escitalopram , fentanyl, and mirtazapine—wit h fentanyl “the primary cause” and the antidepressants having “a very small rol e” in the respiratory depression that killed Dawson.January Term, 2020

5 {¶ 11} The defense presented the testimony of Robert J. Belloto Jr., P h.D., as an expert in pharmacology and toxicology. Dr. Belloto expla ined that because the heroin in Dawson’s system had metabolized and the level of fentanyl in a person’s blood system can increas e after death, it was his opin ion that Dawson had lived for up to five hours after taking a dose of heroin and fe ntanyl. Dr. Belloto opined that Dawson had not died of an acute overdose from the p owder containing heroin and fentanyl, although he admitted that a pure dose of f entanyl could also explain the level detected in Dawson’s blood. Dr. Belloto beli eved that a heart disorder likely caused Dawson’s death. {¶ 12} After the defense rested, defens e counsel requested a jury inst ruction
drawn from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Burrage , 571 U.S. 204, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715. As articulated by defense coun sel, the requested instruction was, “Where the drug distributed by the Defendant—t his is the holding of [ Burrage ]—is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s deat h or serious bodily injury, a Defenda nt cannot be responsible unless such use was the but-for cause of death or injury. ” According to defense counse l, “It’s about causation. [ Burrage ’s] subject matter deals with the federal statute that deals wi th heroin and overdoses, but the issu e in the case is causation.” {¶ 13} The trial court denied Price’s request for this specific instru ction and instead instructed the jur y on causation as follows:

Cause. The State charges that the act or failure to act of th e Defendant caused the death of James Dawson. Cause is an essent ial
element of the offense. Cause is an act or failure to act whic h in a natural and continuous sequence directly produces the death of a person, and without which, it would not have occurred. Natural consequences. The Def endant’s responsibility is not
limited to the immediate or most obvious result of the Defendan t’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 act or failure to act. The Defendant is also responsible for t he natural and foreseeable consequences or results that follow in the ordi nary course of events from th e act or failure to act. Other causes not a defense. There may be one or more causes of an event, however, if a Defendant’s act or failure to act was one cause, then the existen ce of another cause is not a def ense. Intervening causes. The Defendant is responsible for the natural consequences of the De fendant’s unlawful act or failure to act even though the death of a person was also caused by the intervening act or failure to act of another person or agency. Independent intervening cause of death. If the Defendant inflicted an injury not likely to produce death, and if the sol e and only cause of death was natural cause or fatal injury inflicted by another person, the Defendant who inflicted the original injury is not responsible for the death.
Causation. Conduct is the cause of a result if it is an event , but for which the result i n question would not have occurred.

Price did not specifically object to this language. {¶ 14} The jury acquitted Price of i nvoluntary manslaughter but found him guilty of the remaining counts a nd specifications. The trial c ourt merged some
counts as allied offenses of s imilar import, and it sentenced P rice to an 8-year term in prison for corrupting another with heroin, served consecutiv ely to an 8-year term for corrupting another with fenta nyl and concurrently with term s of 12 months for heroin tracking, 6 months for a second count of heroin traffick ing, 12 months for fentanyl trafficking, 12 months for a second count of fentanyl trafficking, 12 months for tampering with evidence, and 6 months for possessing criminal tools. In all, the trial court imposed a n aggregate sentence of 16 yea rs in prison.January Term, 2020

7 {¶ 15} The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed in part and rever sed in part. It rejected arguments t hat the convictions were not s upported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence a nd that the trial court deprived Price of the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. And relevant here, the appellate cour t concluded that the trial cou rt had not abused its discretion in denying Price’s re quest for the instruction drawn from Burrage , explaining that “it appears that the trial court’s instructions set forth a ‘but-for’ test that Price sought. Further, the record reveals that the trial court’s instructions, taken in their entirety, fairly and correctly state the law applicabl e to the evidence presented at trial.” 2019-Ohio-1642, 135 N.E.3d 1093, ¶ 43. H owever, the court of appeals determined that the trial court had erred in failing to merge the two convictions for corrupting anothe r with drugs as allied offense s of similar import.
It therefore remanded the matter to the trial court for resente ncing. {¶ 16} The court of appeals, sua sponte, certified that its judgment i n this case conflicts with the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in State v.
Kosto , 5th Dist. Licking No. 17 CA 54, 2018-Ohio-1925. {¶ 17} In Kosto , the Fifth District held that there was insufficient evidence that the accused committed involuntary manslaughter or corrupte d another with drugs, because the state had failed to prove that selling the v ictim heroin was the
but-for cause of harm to the victim. Id. at ¶ 24, 29. In that case, the state’s expert
testified that the victim had died from the combined effects of cocaine and heroin, and he was not able to say that heroin use was the sole cause o f death. Id. at ¶ 21.
And because there was insuffici ent evidence of causation, the c ourt of appeals
concluded that the defendant’s a rgument regarding the jury inst ruction on causation

was moot. Id. at ¶ 30. {¶ 18} We determined that a conflict existed and directed the parties to brief the following issue: “Whether the ‘but-for causality’ rationale of Burrage v. United
States , 571 U.S. 204, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014), applies to the ‘causeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 serious physical harm to [anot her]’ element of R.C. 2925.02(A)( 3).” 157 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2019-Ohio-3797, 131 N.E.3d 952. {¶ 19} However, upon further review, we conclude that no conflict exis ts. We recognize that the Eighth District expressed disagreement wi th the Fifth District’s reasoning in Kosto , stating that the Fifth District “ ‘failed to consider whether the heroin that Kosto provided the victim was a substan tial or contributing factor to the victim’s death or serious physical harm and wheth er the resulting harm was foreseeable.’ ” 2019-Ohio-1642, 135 N.E.3d 1093, at ¶ 41, quoting State v. Carpenter , 2019-Ohio-58, 128 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 54 (3d Dist.). But that stat ement is dicta given the differing circumstances of the two cases. The Eighth District here
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in inst ructing the jury, because “it appears that the trial court’ s instructions set forth a ‘bu t-for’ test that Price sought.” Id. at ¶ 43. The Eighth District did not uphold an instruction th at causation
could be established if the acc used’s conduct was a substantial or contributing factor to the resulting harm. Accordingly, the judgments of th e Fifth and Eighth
Districts do not conflict on the same question, and we dismiss the certified-conflict case as improvidently certified. See Article IV, Section 3(B)(4), Ohio Constitution;
S.Ct.Prac.R. 8.04. {¶ 20} We also accepted Price’s discretionary appeal on the following proposition of law:

The jury must be instructed that a distributor of drugs is only responsible for causing death to the user of those drugs when t he evidence proves that the ingestion of the drugs provided by the distributor was an independent cause of death and that, but for the ingestion of those drugs, t he user would not have died.

See 157 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2019-Ohio-3797, 131 N.E.3d 961.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 21} Price maintains that the trial court’s instructions were defici ent because they did not require the jury to find both that his act ions were the but-for cause of serious physical harm to Dawson and that his actions w ere independently sufficient to cause that harm. He asserts that by instructing the jury that the existence of another cause of that harm is not a defense, the t rial court essentially permitted the jury to find him guilty if it determined that his actions were only a substantial or contributing fact or in bringing about that harm. Law and Analysis

Jury Instructions {¶ 22} As we explained in State v. White , “[a] trial court has broad discretion to decide how to fashion jury instructions, but it m ust ‘fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant an d necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact f inder.’ ” 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Comen , 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 640 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus . Although “[w]e require a jury instruction to pre sent a correct, pertinent stat ement of the law that is appropriate to the facts,” id. , we have recognized that “there is a limit, and ‘[n]o purpose is served, for instance, b y requiring courts to present redundant jury
instructions or instructions that are so similar to other instr uctions to be presented as to be confusing,’ ” id ., quoting State v. Griffin , 141 Ohio St.3d 392, 2014-Ohio4767, 24 N.E.3d 1147, ¶ 5. Burrage v. United States {¶ 23} In Burrage , 571 U.S. 204, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715, the United States Supreme Court constr ued a federal sentencing-enha ncement statute, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), that imposes a 20-year mandatory-minimu m sentence on an offender who unlawfully distributes a Schedule I or II drug, when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.” The victim in that case had died following an extended drug binge that included us ing heroin thatS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 Marcus Burrage had sold him. The government charged Burrage wi th distributing heroin and sought to prove tha t the victim’s “ ‘death * * * res ulted from the use of th[at] substance.’ ” Burrage at 207, quoting the indictment. However, expert witnesses testified at Burrage’s trial that although the victim ’s use of heroin contributed to his death, they could not say that the victim wo uld have lived if had
he not taken the heroin. Id

. {¶ 24} The Supreme Court explained that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “results from” imposes a requirement of actual causality : that but for the defendant’s conduct, the harm would not have occurred. Id. at 210-211, 212. It rejected the government’s argument that because drug overdoses often involve multiple drugs, the court should apply “an interpretation of ‘r esults from’ under which use of a drug distributed b y the defendant need not be a but-for cause of death, nor even independently su fficient to cause death, so lon g as it contributes to an aggregate force (such as mixed-drug intoxication) that is it self a but-for cause of
death.” Id. at 214-215. {¶ 25} The Supreme Court first dis tinguished but-for causation from situations “when multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, produce a result.” Id. at 214. It cited an example in which A fatally stabs B at the same time that X, ac ting independently, fatally shoots B. In t hose circumstances,
neither A’s nor X’s action can be considered the but-for cause of B’s death—B would have died notwithstanding the fatal stab wound because he was shot at the
same time and vice versa. Id. at 215. But the Supreme Court did not need to apply such a rule, “since there was no evidence here that [the victim ’s] heroin use was an independently sufficient cause o f his death. No expert was pre pared to say that [the victim] would have died fro m the heroin use alone. Id

. {¶ 26} It then rejected the government’ s additional argument that the term “results from” could encompass action that “was a ‘substantial’ or ‘contributing’ factor in producing a given result.” Id. , 571 U.S. at 215-216, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187January Term, 2020

11 L.Ed.2d 715. According to this approach advocated by the gover nment, when a contributing factor, standing al one, is not sufficient to bring about the harm, causation is theorized to exist when contributing factors combi ne to produce the
harm. Id. Calling this theory “less demanding (but also less well establi shed),” id. at 215, the court explained that if Congress had intended the m andatory-minimum sentence to apply when the drug u se only contributed to the vic tim’s death, it could have done so, but “[i]t chose instead to use language that impo rts but-for causality,”
id. at 216. {¶ 27} Accordingly, the Supreme Court he ld that “at least where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently suffi cient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unles s such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury.” Id. at 218-219. {¶ 28} That holding is not binding on this court. It interprets the m eaning of a specific federal statute, and it does not establish any co nstitutional rule applicable to the states. For t his reason, the Supreme Court’s statements regarding the meaning of but-for causati on, independently sufficient caus es, and contributing factors do not control the outcome today. See State v. Burnett , 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 422, 755 N.E.2d 857 (2001) (“the Supremacy Clause binds state c ourts to decisions of the United States Supreme C ourt on questions of federal stat utory and constitutional law”). Burrage is persuasive authority only. Instructions on Corrupting Another with Drugs {¶ 29} R.C. 2925.02 provides:

(A) “No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
* * * (3) By any means, administer or furnish to another or induce or cause another to use a controlled substance, and thereby causeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 serious physical harm to the other person , or cause the other person to become drug dependent[.]

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 30} Despite the way he frames his argument, Price did not ask the t rial
court for an instruction that the word “cause” as used in R.C. 2925.02(A)(3) requires a finding that the accused’s conduct was both the but-for cause of serious physical harm to the victim and an “independently sufficient cause” of that harm.
See Crim.R. 30(A) (“any party may file written requests that the c ourt instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests”). But even if he had, Price’s reliance

on Burrage as requiring that instruction is misplaced. As explained abov e, the court
in Burrage distinguished but-for causation fr om “independently sufficient ” causation, conceptualizing them a s mutually exclusive theories of causation. Id. , 571 U.S. at 215, 218-219, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715. Ther e is no but-for cause of harm when independently s ufficient causes of that harm coincide. {¶ 31} Instead, at trial, Price sought a n instruction stating: “Where the drug distributed by the Defendant * * * is not an independently suff icient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a Defendant cannot be responsible unless such use was the but-for cause of death or injury.” {¶ 32} The trial court gave t he jury the essence of this instruction, albeit in different language, but Price di d not raise any specific object ion to the phrasing that the trial court used in giving it. See State v. Barnes , 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002); Crim.R. 30(A) (“a party may not assign as e rror the giving or the failure to give any instructions unless the party objects b efore the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection”). {¶ 33} First, the trial court defined “cause” to mean “an act or failu re to act which in a natural and continuous sequence directly produces th e death of a person,January Term, 2020

13 and without which, it would not h ave occurred.” Its instructio ns further stated that “[c]onduct is the cause of a result if it is an event, but for which the result in question would not have occurred.” These instructions informed the jury that it could not convict Price of corrupting another with drugs unless it found that Price’s conduct
was the but-for cause of Dawson’s death. {¶ 34} The trial court also gave an i nstruction regarding “independent ly sufficient causes” when it instructed the jury that “[t]here ma y be one or more causes of an event, however, if a Defendant’s act or failure to act was one cause, then the existence of another cause is not a defense.” This in struction still required Price’s conduct to be a cause of Dawson’s death, and as noted a bove, cause was
defined to mean “an act or failure to act which in a natural an d continuous sequence directly produces the death of a person, and without which, it would not have
occurred.” {¶ 35} Lastly, Price maintains that the instructions permitted the jur y to find him guilty if it found that the drugs Price sold to Dawson thro ugh Fort were a substantial or contributing fact or to Dawson’s death. He asser ts that “us[ing] the ‘substantial or contributing cause’ analysis to determine the ‘ but-for’ cause * * * is exactly the opposite [of the] lega l reasoning utilized by the C ourt in Burrage .” {¶ 36} But the Supreme Court in Burrage described a contributing factor as one that, standing alone, is not sufficient to bring about the harm. Id. , 571 U.S. at 212, 214-216, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715. And here, the ju ry instructions required the jury to find that P rice’s act directly produced Da wson’s death, without which, that death would not have occurred. Therefore, the tria l court’s instructions did not permit the jury to predicate guilt based on a finding t hat the drugs Price furnished to Dawson merely contributed to his death.
Conclusion {¶ 37} Price asserts that in the jury instructions on corrupting anoth er with drugs, the jury should have been instructed that his sale of dr ugs must have beenS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 both the but-for cause of Dawson’s death as well as an “indepen dently sufficient cause” of Dawson’s death. However, Price did not ask the trial court to give that instruction. Rather, he sought an instruction that the jury wa s required to find either
that his conduct was the but-for cause of Dawson’s death or that it was an independently sufficient cause o f Dawson’s death. The trial co urt provided the
essence of that instruction. And because the trial court did n ot instruct the jury that it could convict Price if it found that the drugs he supplied t o Dawson were a substantial or contributing cause of Dawson’s death, the propri ety of such an
instruction is not before t his court in this case. {¶ 38} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed i n case No. 2019-0822, and case No. 2019-0729 is dismissed as improvide ntly certified. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and
S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Katherine E. Mullin, Jeffrey Schnatter, and Patrick Lavelle, As sistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Susan J. Mora n, for appellant. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor Ge neral, and Diane R. Brey, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Attorney General Dave Yost. Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert B

. McCaleb, Assistant Public Defende r, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office.

_________________