Filed 11/21/22 Alpinieri v. Alpinieri CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN ALPINIERI,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LOUIS J. ALPINIERI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079217

 (Super. Ct. No. 

 37-2017-00012192-PR-TR-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Julia Craig Kelety, Judge. Affirmed.

Cunneen Booth, Dawn Hall Cunneen and Jess Raymond Booth for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Hughes & Pizzuto, Shannon Noelle Montisano and Anne Marie 

Rudolph for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Louis J. Alpinieri appeals a probate court order in favor of his son, 

respondent Steven Alpinieri.1 The order requires Louis to comply with the 

1 To avoid confusion, we refer to the parties by their first names, and 

intend no disrespect.
2

parties’ settlement agreement by executing a waiver of his right to his 

confidential medical information under the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act (HIPAA), as well as permitting Steven visitation rights 

when Louis is in a health care facility. 

Louis contends the probate court erred by ruling he could not include in 

the HIPAA waiver additional information regarding his concerns about 

Steven accessing his medical information. Louis also argues that if we 

reverse the order, Steven would not be the prevailing party and therefore this 

court should reverse the probate court’s separate order awarding Steven 

attorney fees and costs. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Parties’ Agreement

To resolve their probate-related disputes, the parties dismissed their 

probate court claims against each other and entered into an “agreement of 

settlement and mutual general release” (capitalization omitted, hereafter the 

settlement agreement), which the probate court approved. The settlement 

agreement’s section 3.16 states: “Louis agrees to execute a HIPAA waiver as 

to Louis’ confidential medical information and to include Steven’s right to 

visitation with Louis in a health care facility.” The agreement provides that 

the San Diego Superior Court “shall retain jurisdiction to enforce this

agreement,” which is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 

664.6, subdivision (a).

Steven’s First Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement

After Louis failed to execute a HIPAA waiver, Steven brought a motion 

to enforce the settlement agreement, which the probate court granted, 

ordering Louis to “execute a HIPAA waiver in favor of Steven that includes a 

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3

provision allowing some measure of reasonable visitation by [Steven] if and 

when [Louis] resides in a health care facility.” The court stated at the 

hearing: “The settlement agreement doesn’t bar [Louis] . . . from telling his 

doctors whatever he wants to tell his doctors. He just needs to sign the 

HIPAA release, that’s all. I have no idea—I thought this was a very strange 

provision and I had no idea. But he bargained for it . . . .” The court added: 

“So on the visitation side [Louis] has recourse there as long as he’s not in a 

nursing facility. . . . [H]e can get a restraining order, call the cops, whatever, 

to keep Steven away, because Steven has no rights to visitation under this 

agreement now while [Louis is] not in a facility. . . . And as to the HIPAA 

waiver, [Louis] signed the waiver as to confidential information, so Steven 

can be kept apprised of his father’s medical condition. But if it becomes 

abusive, then there are remedies there as well . . . .” 

Louis did not appeal from that order. Instead, he provided a two-page

“authorization for release of protected health information,” (capitalization 

omitted) authorizing his health care providers to release to Steven “[a]ll 

health information pertaining to my medical history, mental or physical 

condition, and treatment received.” However, the waiver goes on to state: “I

have been estranged from my son, Steven, for many years due to litigation 

between us that arose as a result of him stealing from me. Steven and I 

settled the litigation between us in 2017. As part of that settlement, I agreed 

to provide a HIPAA waiver in favor of Steven. I believed that I could revoke 

the HIPAA waiver, if I felt it necessary for my safety. The court, however,

disagreed and recently ordered me to comply with the terms of the settlement 

agreement. [(]See the March 10, 2021 minute order of the San Diego 

Superior Court, Probate Division, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and 

incorporated herein by this reference.[)] [¶] I do not feel comfortable with 
4

Steven having access to my protected health information. After the 

settlement agreement was reached, Steven continued to harass me when I 

did not want to rekindle our relationship. The police have been contacted on 

multiple occasions when Steven has caused disturbances at my home. While 

I do not wish to provide my protected health information to Steven, the court 

is ordering me to provide this authorization. [¶] Nevertheless, I ask that any 

health care provider presented with this authorization by Steven consider 

whether to exercise its/her/his powers under HIPAA not to release my 

protected health information.” (Some capitalization and italics omitted.)

Louis adds in the waiver: “The authority given to Steven herein shall 

NOT supersede any prior instrument or agreement that I may have provided 

to and/or made with any health care provider to restrict access to, or the 

disclosure of, my health and medical information. Rather, the authority 

given to Steven herein shall only supplement and be considered in

conjunction with any prior instrument or agreement that I may have

provided to and/or made with any health care provider to restrict access to, or 

the disclosure of, my health and medical information. [¶] Although 

information disclosed by a health care provider according to this 

authorization is subject to re-disclosure and may no longer be protected by 

the privacy rules of HIPAA (45 [C.F.R.] § 164 [(2013)]), California law 

prohibits the further disclosure of this information without a ‘new

authorization.’ It is my intention that this authorization form NOT be 

construed to be a ‘new authorization’ that meets the requirements of . . . Civil 

Code [section] 56.11 for purposes of . . . Civil Code [section] 56.13.” 

Louis executed a separate visitation authorization, which repeats 

verbatim some of his concerns about Steven. 
5

Steven’s Second Motion to Enforce the Court’s Order 

Steven filed a second motion to enforce the settlement agreement, 

contending Louis’s HIPAA waiver failed to comply with the court’s order: “By 

including unverified allegations of harassment and essentially directing 

health care providers to not disclose any information to Steven, the HIPAA 

waiver provides Steven with no realistic ability to obtain Louis’ medical 

information, as no reasonable health care provider would disclose any 

information in light of the directions and allegations made by Louis in the 

document. The HIPAA waiver completely deprives Steven of the benefit of a 

material term of the settlement agreement for which he bargained.” (Some 

capitalization omitted.)

Louis argued in opposition: “Steven failed to negotiate the form of the 

HIPAA waiver as part of the settlement agreement and now must live with 

the result, namely, that there is no agreement as to the form. So long as the 

instrument contains a HIPAA waiver, which the instrument executed by 

[Louis] does, it is sufficient for purposes of the settlement agreement. . . . 

As the court recognized . . . [Louis] is free to tell his doctors whatever he 

wants. . . . This makes sense given the court’s observation that despite

requiring [Louis] to provide a HIPAA waiver and visitation authorization, 

[Louis] is free to protect himself against the abusive and threatening 

behavior exhibited by Steven after the settlement agreement was entered. 

[Louis] does not know and cannot foresee all of the health care providers that 

Steven may seek to contact, or facilities at which he may seek to visit [Louis].

Rather than [Louis] guessing or having to contact each of his health care 

providers (to the extent [Louis] knows who they are in advance), [Louis] set

forth his concerns in the HIPAA waiver and visitation authorization so that 
6

when Steven presents either instrument, [Louis] can be assured that the 

provider is made aware of [Louis’s] concerns.” (Some capitalization omitted.)

The court granted Steven’s motion: “The information included in 

[Louis’s] waiver makes the waiver ineffective because it contradicts [Louis’s]

authorization for release of his medical information. Although the court’s 

order and the settlement agreement did not specify the exact language to be 

used, the inclusion of information that contradicts the [waiver] clearly does 

not comply with the order and the settlement agreement. As Steven

acknowledges, the order and the settlement agreement do not bar [Louis] 

from communicating any information to health care professionals but 

including that information within the waiver would be inconsistent with the 

settlement agreement. [¶] [Louis’s] concern that he cannot foresee all of the 

health care providers that Steven may seek to contact is minimal because 

[Louis] should be aware of most, if not all, health care providers that he has 

seen or will see. This concern does not warrant the execution of a waiver that 

would be inconsistent with the settlement agreement. Also, [Louis’s] 

argument that Steven cannot challenge the waiver because he did not 

challenge the visitation authorization lacks merit. That is not an adequate 

basis for estoppel, and the court’s order required the visitation authorization 

to be included . . . in the waiver, which [Louis] failed to do.” (Some 

capitalization omitted.)

The court ordered Louis to execute a waiver that states verbatim: “I, 

Louis J. Alpinieri hereby authorize my health care providers to release the 

following information to my son, Steven L. Alpinieri (‘Steven’): [¶] All health 

information pertaining to my medical history, mental or physical condition, 

and treatment received. [¶] This authorization shall apply to any health 

care providers, including physicians, nurses, and all other persons, who may 
7

have provided, or are providing at the time such health or medical 

information is sought by Steven, any type of health or medical care to me. If 

I reside in a health care facility, Steven shall have the right to visit me in 

that health care facility, subject to any rules or procedures of the health care 

facility. [¶] This authorization may only be revoked by (1) a written 

agreement signed by Steven and me; or (2) a court order. [¶] Any person or 

entity may rely upon a photocopy, facsimile, or electronic version of this 

signed document.”

Louis appeals from this probate court order.

DISCUSSION

Louis contends: “Despite the lack of any specificity regarding the form 

of the HIPAA waiver in the settlement agreement, the probate court 

erroneously read into the settlement agreement a prohibition against Louis 

informing his health care providers in writing about his concerns with Steven 

having his protected health information, while simultaneously asserting that 

Louis was free to tell ‘his doctors whatever he wants.’ . . . The settlement

agreement (and HIPAA) do not preclude Louis from engaging in written

communications with his own health care providers. In a similar manner, 

the settlement agreement does not limit Louis to orally ‘telling’ his wishes to

his health care providers. Therefore, the court erred when it so limited Louis’

ability to communicate with his own health care providers.” (Some 

capitalization omitted.)

On a motion to enforce a settlement under section 664.6, the trial 

court’s legal conclusions are not entitled to deference and will be subject to 

independent review. (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.) 

We also apply a de novo review because we are reviewing a written 

instrument about which there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence. (Parsons v. 
8

Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866.) We review the 

court’s ruling, not its reasoning. (AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare 

Services, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 923, 934.)

“ ‘The purpose of the law of contracts is to protect the reasonable 

expectations of the parties.’ [Citation.] ‘A contract must be so interpreted as 

to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of 

contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.’ [Citation.] ‘The 

interpretation must be fair and reasonable, not leading to absurd conclusions. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The court must avoid an interpretation which will 

make a contract extraordinary, harsh, unjust, or inequitable.’ ” (Citizens for 

Goleta Valley v. HT Santa Barbara (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1076–1077.)

Louis’s proposed HIPAA waiver was not effective. Although Louis’s 

waiver states the medical providers are authorized to share Louis’s medical 

information with Steven, it also includes information undermining that grant 

of authorization. It states Louis does not wish to provide the health care 

information to Steven, and it references their estrangement and their many 

years of litigation. Louis’s waiver includes unnecessary information about 

his previous belief he could revoke the HIPAA waiver for his safety, and the 

fact the probate court rejected that notion. This waiver also states Louis does 

not “feel comfortable with Steven having access to [Louis’s] protected health 

information.” Moreover, Louis’s waiver includes a reference to the federal 

regulations implementing the HIPAA, setting forth circumstances in which a 

medical provider may elect not to release medical information to a designee. 

Additionally, Louis’s waiver states that it does not supersede any previous 

authority he might have given to a health care provider to restrict access to 

or disclosure of, his health and medical information. 
9

Louis’s proposed waiver contained extraneous material that 

undermined the parties’ settlement agreement requiring him to provide a 

HIPAA waiver, which the parties intended to be effective. Louis 

acknowledges case law stating that “courts assume that each party to a 

contract is alert to, and able to protect, his or her own best interests. 

[Citations.] Therefore, courts will not rewrite contracts to relieve parties 

from bad deals nor make better deals for parties than they negotiated for 

themselves.” (Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, LLC v. 

Eves (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 164.) As Louis agreed to provide an 

unconditional HIPPA waiver, the probate court could not rewrite their 

settlement agreement to include Louis’s proposed conditions. “ ‘Section 664.6 

was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a 

settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit. [Citations.] . . . 

Although a judge hearing a section 664.6 motion may receive evidence, 

determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a 

judgment [citations], nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the 

material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties 

themselves have previously agreed upon.’ ” (Critzer v. Enos, supra, 187 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1252.) 

Louis argues “the fundamental issue in this appeal” is whether the 

settlement agreement prohibits him from sharing his concerns about Steven 

accessing his protected medical information in the HIPAA waiver. Louis 

relies on the court’s comments that he is free to separately communicate his 

reservations about the HIPAA waiver to his health care providers. But as 

stated, under our standard of review, we are not bound by the probate court’s 

reasoning. We review its ruling. Nothing in the plain text of the settlement 
10

agreement contemplates Louis elaborating on his concerns about Steven in 

the HIPAA waiver.

Louis does not argue with citation to the record or case law that the 

probate court’s HIPAA waiver, with its specific language that more closely 

aligns with the parties’ intent as set forth in their agreement, is inadequate 

or improper. Accordingly, he provides no reasoned basis to overturn the 

probate court’s ruling. “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must 

supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal 

analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287.) 

In light of our disposition of this case, we do not disturb the probate 

court’s order regarding attorney fees and costs.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.