NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JACE FRANK EDEN, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

GERALDINE A. DEUBLEIN, Trustee of the Geraldine A. Deublein Living 

Trust dated August 10, 2005; CATTLEMEN’S, LLC; and TIM and 

TIFFANY CYWINSKI, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0854

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County

No. S0900CV201400435

The Honorable Dale P. Nielson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jace Frank Eden, Show Low

Plaintiff/Appellant In Propria Persona

Moore Law Firm PLLC, Show Low

By Nicholas D. Patton

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees 
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge James P. Beene joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Jace Frank Eden appeals from an order dismissing his civil 

complaint on the basis of res judicata. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Geraldine Deublein, as Trustee of the Geraldine Ann 

Deublein Living Trust (“Deublein”), sued Branding Iron Plaza, LLC, and 

Stan and Debi Jackson — lessees of a restaurant located on the LLC’s

property.

1 Deublein owned property adjacent to the LLC’s, where she too 

operated a restaurant. Deublein alleged the LLC was interfering with her

use of an easement. 

¶3 The superior court held an evidentiary hearing to consider 

Deublein’s request for a preliminary injunction. On November 12, 2013, 

the court issued a written ruling, stating, in pertinent part:

 In July 1955, “three separate easements were conveyed and 

recorded by and between the predecessors in interest to the 

properties at issue. The three owners of the properties, by 

three separate conveyances, granted each other easements 

for ‘drive-way purposes’ and they specifically retained for 

themselves the right to use the land conveyed for ‘drive-way 

purposes and for access to their own property for repairs or 

additions to utilities.’ The easements all specifically state 

that they run with the land.”

 Deublein historically used the easement “for drive-way 

purposes to access the back of [her] restaurant for delivery 

vehicles and garbage trucks.” 

 

1 We refer to Branding Iron Plaza, LLC and the Jacksons collectively 

as “the LLC.”
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN et al.

Decision of the Court

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 Deublein sold her property to the LLC in 2006. The LLC 

ceased using the easement for deliveries and built an outside 

dining area that “completely blocks off the easement access 

to the back of [Deublein’s] restaurant for receiving 

deliveries.” 

 After the LLC defaulted on its purchase loan, foreclosure

proceedings ensued, and Deublein resumed operation of her 

restaurant. 

¶4 The court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the LLC 

to “remove the structures and outside dining area blocking the easement 

within 30 days of the date of this signed order.” Failure to comply, the 

court ruled, “could result in contempt of court, additional sanctions . . . 

and/or an order authorizing the Plaintiff to employ the appropriate 

services to remove the structures with the [LLC] being responsible for the 

costs of removal and storage or disposition of the material.” 

¶5 After the injunction issued, Deublein filed a “Motion for 

Judgment on the Record.” The LLC failed to respond, and the court 

granted the motion, stating: 

Rule 7.1(b) states that if the opposing party does not file an 

answering memorandum or response, the Court may deem 

the failure to respond as a consent to granting the motion. In 

this case, the motion for judgment on the record should be 

granted not only because [the LLC] did not respond, but also 

because it absolutely has merit and is supported by the 

evidence and the law. 

The superior court subsequently issued an order: (1) “[a]djudging the 

Easements as recorded . . . to be valid and of full force and effect;” (2) 

“[q]uieting title to the Easements” in Deublein; and (3) “issuing a 

permanent injunction restricting [the LLC] from taking any steps to 

obstruct or otherwise interfere with [Deublein’s] use and maintenance of 

the easement.” Eden filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the LLC. This 

Court directed the LLC to appear through counsel, and when it failed to 

do so, the appeal Eden filed was dismissed. 

¶6 On August 6, 2014, Eden filed a “Complaint of Forcible 

Entry and Detainer and Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction 

and Quiet Title” against Deublein and related defendants (collectively, 

“Appellees”). Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing Eden’s action was 
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN et al.

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4

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Eden opposed the motion, asserting 

he was not a party to the earlier litigation, that action was not resolved on 

the merits, and his claims were “of [a] different nature” from those 

decided in the earlier proceedings. The superior court granted Appellees’ 

motion to dismiss, stating, in pertinent part:

[T]he Court ruled against [Eden] in a matter that concerns 

the easement in the present case. The complaint, though 

difficult to read, clearly seeks relief from the judgment 

already entered . . . . The Court cannot find that any 

allegations in the complaint are different from the issues 

already decided in the previous case. 

¶7 Eden’s timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) 

and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the superior court’s dismissal order de novo. 

Peterson v. Newton, 232 Ariz. 593, 595, ¶ 4 (App. 2013). Res judicata — also

known as claim preclusion, Circle K Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 179 Ariz. 422, 

425 (App. 1993), precludes “a claim when a former judgment on the merits 

was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in 

issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, 

determined in the former action.” Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 57, ¶ 7 (1999). 

Claim preclusion requires proof of: “(1) an identity of claims in the suit in 

which a judgment was entered and the current litigation, (2) a final 

judgment on the merits in the previous litigation, and (3) identity or 

privity between parties in the two suits.” Peterson, 232 Ariz. at 595, ¶ 5. 

¶9 As Eden’s complaint makes clear, the requisite identity of 

claims exists between his action and the prior litigation. The complaint

alleges that Eden’s title policy shows no conveyances to Appellees or their 

property and that Appellees have “no written document that grants any 

conveyance” to his land. Eden further asserts that “verbal permission” for 

Appellees to use the easement “stopped on 5-1-2006 when the plaintiff 

purchased the defendants land” and that Appellees abandoned the 

easement. The complaint further alleges the easements “have been 

extinguished” and that Eden has obtained a “prescriptive easement” to 

the parking lot through adverse possession. Eden alleges Deublein 

“committed fraud upon the court” and the LLC in the first action in order 

to obtain the preliminary injunction. 
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN et al.

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¶10 Eden is clearly seeking to overturn the judgment in the first 

action and is also asserting issues that could have been litigated in that 

proceeding.2 Claim preclusion applies both to previously litigated issues 

and to issues that could have been litigated in the earlier action. Special 

Events Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 228 Ariz. 332, 335, ¶ 11 (App. 2011); see 

also Howell v. Hodap, 221 Ariz. 543, 547, ¶¶ 19–20 (App. 2009) (the relevant 

inquiry is whether the claims “arise out of the same nucleus of facts.”). 

¶11 Nor does the record support Eden’s assertion that the first 

action was not decided on the merits. In entering judgment against the 

LLC in that proceeding, the court ruled that Deublein’s motion 

“absolutely has merit and is supported by the evidence and the law.” The 

court had before it the record from the preliminary injunction 

proceedings, including the deeds granting the easements and a stipulated 

survey of the properties. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2)(C) (evidence received 

during preliminary injunction proceedings and that would be admissible 

at trial “becomes part of the trial record.”). 

¶12 Finally, Eden argues he was not a party to the prior 

litigation. Privity exists, though, if there is “substantial identity of 

interests” and a “working or functional relationship” by which the 

interests of the party and the putative privy “are presented and protected 

by the party in the litigation.” Hall, 194 Ariz. at 57, ¶ 8. In the first 

proceeding, Eden sought to intervene, asserting he was the “real party in 

interest” after the LLC was dissolved and its property transferred to him. 

The record demonstrates that Eden was in privity with the LLC for 

purposes of claim preclusion.

 

2 To the extent Eden intended to assert claims based on conduct 

unrelated to Appellees’ use of the easement, his complaint fails to set forth 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8. As the superior court observed, the 

complaint is “difficult to read,” and courts do not “accept as true 

allegations consisting of conclusions of law, inferences or deductions that 

are not necessarily implied by well-pleaded facts, unreasonable inferences 

or unsupported conclusions from such facts, or legal conclusions alleged 

as facts.” Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, 389, ¶ 4 (App. 2005). 

 
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm the judgment of the superior court. Appellees 

request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 12-341.01. See Squaw Peak Cmty. Covenant Church of Phx. v. Anozira Dev., 

Inc., 149 Ariz. 409, 414 (App. 1986) (awarding appellate fees under 

§ 12-341.01 based on deed including an easement). In the exercise of our 

discretion, we grant Appellees’ request and will award a reasonable sum 

of fees, as well as taxable costs, upon compliance with Arizona Rules of 

Civil Appellate Procedure 21.