Filed 6/24/24 In re Liana H. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re LIANA H. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B331253

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04666A-C)

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

LIBBY H.,

Defendant and Appellant;

EMMANUEL A.,

Real Party in Interest and 

Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Minors.

* * * * * *

Libby H. (mother), the mother of Liana (born June 2015), Lovere 

(born September 2016), and Lanaya (born May 2019), appeals from a 

judgment terminating juvenile court jurisdiction with an exit order 

granting physical custody of the children to their father, Emmanuel A. 

(father), and permitting mother monitored visitation. Mother contends 

the juvenile court abused its discretion in (1) requiring mother’s visits 

to be monitored; and (2) granting father tie-breaking authority in 

choosing a monitor. Mother argues the grant of tie-breaking authority 

constituted a de facto delegation to father of authority to decide 

whether mother may visit with her children. We conclude mother 

forfeited the second issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court, and 

further conclude that regardless of forfeiture, no abuse of discretion 

occurred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Initial investigation

On November 24, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received an expedited immediate 

referral alleging mother and her boyfriend George P. engaged in a 

physical altercation at a restaurant with the children present. The 

family had moved to Burbank from Georgia seven months earlier.
3

Mother and George P. had been arguing inside the restaurant, 

then went outside, got in their car, leaving the two older children, then 

aged six and seven, in the restaurant unsupervised. While the adults

were arguing in the car, George P. began driving erratically with the 

youngest child in the back seat not secured by a seatbelt or child 

restraint. Police responded and arrested mother for domestic violence 

and George P. was arrested for child endangerment.

In an interview with the social worker, mother reported she and 

George P., who is not the biological father of the children, had been 

together for approximately 11 months. The biological father resided in 

Georgia, from where mother had moved due to domestic violence with 

father. George P. followed mother to California.

Mother explained while the family was eating at the restaurant,

mother and George P. began arguing. George P. threw a cup for 

reasons unknown, and things escalated. Mother followed George P. to 

the car with the youngest child, leaving the older two children in the 

restaurant. She denied any physical altercation. Mother and 

George P. were living together and continuously engaged in verbal 

altercations. The mother of George P.’s children had a temporary 

restraining order (TRO) issued against him. Mother denied the use of 

drugs or alcohol and denied any mental health conditions other than 

being autistic. Mother reported all three children were autistic, but 

functioning properly. The oldest child had an individualized education 

plan coming up. Mother claimed to be on the verge of going to jail 

because she continuously brought the children late to school.

George P. also reported he and mother had been together 11 

months and attended weekly counseling. George P. attended individual 

counseling for his temper twice a week. George P. reported the fight in 

the restaurant was based on a miscommunication. He got in the car to 

keep the peace and mother followed him with the youngest child to 

talk, and then slapped him on the back of the head. George P. denied 

hitting mother during the incident. He claims not to have noticed the 
4

older two children were not in the car. He merely pulled the car out,

then stopped. He left the keys in the car, and walked away. George P.

denied any physical altercations with mother.

Regarding the restraining order in Georgia, George P. stated his 

ex-girlfriend falsified documents that he engaged in violent behavior. 

He denied any mental health concerns. He reported mother is autistic 

but a good mother.

Petition and detention hearing

On November 29, 2022, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of Liana, 

Lovere and Lanaya pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

300.1 Count b-1 alleged mother placed the children in detrimental and 

endangering conditions by leaving them in a restaurant without 

supervision and by allowing George P. to drive erratically with Lanaya 

in the back seat, not properly secured in an appropriate child safety 

seat. Count g-1 alleged mother failed to make an appropriate plan for 

the children’s ongoing care and supervision after she was incarcerated 

for domestic violence.

A detention hearing was held on November 30, 2022. Mother 

was appointed counsel and entered a general denial. The court found 

father to be the children’s presumed father and ordered DCFS to 

exercise due diligence in contacting him.

Mother’s counsel proposed stipulated testimony on behalf of 

mother that mother’s criminal charges were dropped, she had not seen 

George P. since she was released, he was no longer living in her home, 

and she was willing to enroll in a parenting class and a domestic 

violence support group, as well as any other programs the court 

thought necessary, as soon as possible. All counsel agreed to the 

stipulated testimony, and the court accepted the stipulation.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
5

The court ordered the children detained and vested temporary 

custody with DCFS. The court set a pre-release investigation hearing 

date to determine whether release to mother was appropriate. Mother 

was permitted monitored visitation at least three times a week for 

three hours per visit.

Prerelease investigation

DCFS recommended the court not release the children to mother, 

as it was premature. Father reported during his relationship with 

mother she was arrested for domestic violence and deemed to be the 

aggressor. Father also had obtained a TRO against mother in the past. 

DCFS had concerns about previous domestic violence.

At the prerelease investigation hearing, the juvenile court 

ordered the children remain in foster care pending receipt of documents 

from Georgia. The court continued the existing visitation order and 

gave DCFS discretion to allow extended and overnight visits between 

mother and the children.

Reports and interim hearings

On January 3, 2023, the dependency investigator spoke with 

father, who reported visiting via FaceTime with the children, who were 

happy to talk to him. Paternal grandfather Eugene A. reported mother 

and father had an “okay relationship” but mother was “very pressing” 

whereas father was more relaxed. Paternal grandfather claimed to love 

mother like a daughter and was angry with her for leaving the state 

without telling him. He was shocked to learn mother had left the kids 

in a restaurant, claiming she was good at watching the kids. Paternal 

grandfather thought the children should return to Georgia because 

father had a nice home and family support. Paternal grandfather 

offered mother the opportunity to come to live with him, but mother 

declined. Paternal grandfather had no safety concerns regarding father 

and the children.

In 2017 mother obtained a 12-month protective order against 

father, who was required to participate in a family violence 
6

intervention program. A November 2018 charge of felony cruelty 

against father was dismissed. Father provided supporting 

documentation. Mother pled no contest to a 2018 count of disorderly 

conduct against father.

In 2019, mother reported father head-butted her, choked her, 

punched her, and broke her phone. However, mother had no marks on 

her, and father denied touching her. No arrests were made due to lack 

of evidence of a physical altercation. Law enforcement reported mother 

had a history of making false allegations against father. For instance, 

mother called the police a week earlier and reported father had hit her, 

but later confessed she made up the allegation because she wanted 

police to make father leave the home. Mother tried to get two TRO’s 

against father. The first was denied by the court, and mother did not 

appear for the hearing for the second.

Mother provided a progress report for her child abuser’s 

treatment program, where she had attended three sessions and was 

receptive to the program.

Liana, age seven, was interviewed and confirmed mother and 

George P. were arguing at the restaurant. Liana reported mother said 

“can you watch my kids” to a lady, adding, “She didn’t sit at the table 

and eat with us, she works there.” Lovere, age six, reported “mommy 

said to stay in the food place” while she went outside to see George. 

When she was taking too long, Lovere and Liana went outside, where 

Lovere saw mother and George yell at each other.

Both mother and George P. denied mother hit him, but George 

had reported to the police that mother slapped him on the head. 

Mother denied leaving Liana and Lovere alone in the restaurant.

Father wanted the children to live with him. Mother had not told 

him she was leaving Georgia or that the children were in foster care. 

Father had a home for the children and everything they needed.

Mother told the dependency investigator the children’s caregivers 

were not answering the phone during mother’s scheduled time for calls, 
7

but mother was unable to corroborate this with a screenshot of her call 

log. The children’s caregivers reported that during a monitored visit, 

mother was overheard telling Liana to “say that someone was there.” 

Mother had obtained the caregivers’ personal cell phone number and 

had given it to the children’s talent agent, who called the caregivers 

repeatedly. Phone visits between father and the minors were going 

well, and the minors were excited to speak with him. Liana and Lovere 

told the dependency investigator they wanted to be with mother.

Father reported good relationships with paternal grandfather 

and his 11 younger siblings. He also had a good relationship with 

paternal grandmother prior to her death a few years earlier. Father 

and mother were in a relationship for four or five years. They began 

living together in the second year. Father denied physical altercations 

with mother, and denied knowing she was autistic. Father said mother 

liked to yell and had outbursts. Father recently got his own place and 

works full time as an Amazon driver. Father wanted his children to 

live with him. He had space, resources, finances, and support from his 

father and siblings.

Father made his first appearance at the January 17, 2023 

adjudication hearing via WebEx. The court appointed counsel for him. 

Father was non-offending and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 

His request that the children be released to him was denied by the 

court. The court also denied mother’s request for unmonitored visits, 

but noted DCFS had continued discretion to liberalize as appropriate.

The matter was set for a contested hearing.

In February 2023, DCFS expressed concern that mother was 

coaching the children. For example, it was reported mother had told 

the children to say her friend Alice was with them in the restaurant 

when mother left them there. When asked about this, mother did not 

respond. Mother reported she was autistic and was not trying to coach

the kids but was reminding them what happened and why they were in 

foster care. The social worker reminded mother she was not to speak 
8

about the pending case with the children. Mother replied she was 

autistic and did not always process everything the social worker said.

Lovere also revealed potential coaching. He informed the social 

worker his “real dad” was nice to him on the phone. However, his mom 

told him his “real daddy hit her.” Lovere revealed mother told him this 

on a recent visit at Burger King. Lovere stated, “mommy also told me 

to say those four words: Mommy didn’t hit George. George didn’t hit 

mommy.” When the social worker pressed Lovere as to what mother 

told him to say, Lovere stated, “I only remember she only said four 

words. That George didn’t hit mommy and mommy didn’t hit George, 

and that my real daddy he hit my mom when I was little.” Lovere said 

his real father pulled his mother’s hair, but when asked to 

demonstrate, Lovere clarified, “he almost pulled my mom’s hair.” 

When asked about any other incidents between mother and father, 

Lovere repeated, “she only said those four words.” Based on this 

information, DCFS concluded mother was coaching the children and 

asked the court to admonish mother not to speak with the children 

about the case.

Mother picked up a prescription for Lamaya but did not give it to 

her for one week because the children told her they were fine. Lamaya 

reported that mother and George had hit each other, and they talk to 

each other on the phone during visits. Lamaya reported mother hit 

George in the face and there was a lot of blood.

In a report filed on February 24, 2023, DCFS reported Georgia 

DCFS conducted a courtesy assessment at father’s home and had no 

concerns. There was food in the pantry and adequate sleeping 

arrangements for the children. Father had a stable income and an 

adequate support system and desired to have the children in his care. 

Father had no criminal history in Georgia and DCFS had no safety 

concerns. DCFS recommended the court order the children to reside 

with father and terminate jurisdiction with a family law order granting 
9

father sole physical custody, joint legal custody to mother and father, 

and monitored visits for mother.

On February 28, 2023, mother and father appeared with counsel. 

Minor’s counsel addressed the new recommendation to close the case 

with “a home of parent father order.” Counsel requested DCFS 

financially assist father in coming to California to visit the minors in 

person. Counsel for minors requested DCFS interview father about his 

plan for the care of the minors if returned to his custody. The court 

ordered DCFS to provide transportation costs for father to visit the 

children and to observe the visit and discuss with father his plan of 

care for the minors if returned to his custody.

In March 2023, father informed DCFS he had located a school 

and daycare for the children. He had a large extended family to help 

with child care and support. He had arranged for medical and dental 

care for the children, and an autism specialist. He was financially 

capable of caring for the children.

During a visit in early March, the children recognized father, 

exclaimed “Daddy!” and ran from the playground to greet and hug him. 

The children willingly engaged with father, who was appropriate 

during the visit. He was attentive and ensured their safety. Father

was observed reviewing colors with Lamaya and giving her praise. 

Liana stayed within close proximity of father throughout the visit. 

Lovere and Lamaya repeated “watch me daddy” as they engaged in

different activities in the playground. When Lamaya fell asleep, father 

carried her while Liana and Lovere continued to play. Father 

remained attentive to Liana and Lovere while he held Lamaya. When 

the visit was ending, Lamaya was still asleep, but Liana and Lovere 

asked to have more visits with father and asked about the next visit. 

Overall it was a good visit. Father was caring and nurturing with the 

children and they were excited to see him. DCFS continued to 

recommend the court terminate jurisdiction with a “home of parent 

father order” and a family law order granting father sole physical 
10

custody, with joint legal custody to mother and father and monitored 

visits to mother.

Mother was participating in domestic violence counseling and 

parent education. She was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with 

mixed anxiety and depressed mood.

Statements were made by the children about father owning guns. 

Father admitted owning a gun he purchased the year before, but 

reported it was not kept in the home, as it was stored in a locked case 

in the trunk of his car. The children had not lived with father in three

or four years, so father was uncertain how they would know he had a 

gun. Father provided documentation of the gun’s registration and 

receipt of purchase. When asked how he knew father had a gun, 

Lovere reported having seen it when he was a baby. He added that 

father’s guns were black and blue, and father had 100 guns. Lovere 

wanted to see his father again and denied being afraid of him. Liana 

also reported seeing a gun when she was one year old. Liana appeared 

nervous and did not make eye contact. She was unable to describe the 

gun. Liana also denied being afraid of father and wanted to visit with 

father.

The children visited father in Georgia in April 2023. They were 

excited for the visit, and greeted him with hugs and smiles. The 

children did well and were happy to be with father and their relatives, 

including their two-month-old half sister. By the end of the week, all 

three children reported wanting to stay with father. 

During an April 2023 monitored visit, a social worker observed 

the minors had written on their tablets that they want to go home and 

return to their school. In response to the social worker’s query, mother 

said that it was a prayer and the children were writing what they felt. 

After the visit, the social worker interviewed the children separately 

and privately. When asked about the note on the tablet, Lovere 

responded that mother told him to write that. When the social worker 

asked Liana about the writing on the tablet, Liana began to walk and 
11

look away. The social worker informed Liana that she was not in 

trouble and did nothing wrong. Liana admitted mother had told her to 

write those words.

The social worker called mother, and again asked about the notes 

on the tablets. Mother said they were prayers for hope. When asked 

again if mother told the children to write that, mother admitted she 

had and became defensive, saying she is always bullied and this is their 

religion. Mother began crying, stating she was autistic and having a 

panic attack.

In April 2023, the social worker asked mother if she was 

pregnant. Mother responded it was obvious she was pregnant, and if 

anyone from DCFS had asked she would have told them. DCFS had no 

information concerning the whereabouts of the father of the unborn 

baby. In an unannounced visit to mother’s home, DCFS found it in 

disarray and continued to recommend the children be ordered to live 

with father.

Progress hearing/settlement conference

On April 12, 2023, the parents appeared for a progress hearing 

and settlement conference. An amended petition, with counts b-2 and 

g-1 stricken, was received by the court. Mother waived her trial rights 

and pleaded no contest to count b-1, which involved the November 2022 

altercation with George P. The court set a contested disposition 

hearing.

Disposition hearing

The contested disposition hearing took place on June 6, 2023. 

Mother and father each appeared with counsel. The juvenile court 

admitted DCFS’s reports, including the most recent report 

recommending the children be ordered to the home of parent, father, 

and mother allowed unmonitored overnight visits as well as

unmonitored phone and video calls with the children. DCFS further 

recommended the case remain open for an additional three months to 

allow DCFS an opportunity to assess the children in the care of father. 
12

However, at the hearing counsel for DCFS asked the court to remove 

the minors from mother’s custody and grant mother monitored visits. 

Father and the minors agreed. Minors’ counsel asked for two months of 

continued court supervision, but father and county counsel requested 

termination of juvenile court jurisdiction with a custody order.2

Mother argued for return of the minors to her custody and 

continued court supervision. In the alternative, she asked the court to 

liberalize her visits to unmonitored, including one overnight visit per 

month.

Minors’ counsel argued mother had a pattern of unaddressed 

behavior involving domestic violence, which she continued to deny. 

Further, there was evidence mother was coaching the children. Given 

mother’s conflicting statements about the November 2022 incident at 

the restaurant, as well as evidence of mother coaching the children, 

minors’ counsel argued there was an adequate basis to remove the 

children from mother. Counsel asked that mother’s visits with the 

children be monitored pending a psychological evaluation.

In its June 16, 2023 ruling, the juvenile court removed the 

children from mother and terminated jurisdiction with a custody order 

awarding sole physical custody to father, joint legal custody to mother 

and father, and monitored visits to mother pursuant to section 361.2. 

The court found mother had unaddressed domestic violence behavior 

and lacked insight, as she continued to deny she had been a perpetrator 

of violence. In response to mother’s request she be given time to work 

towards unmonitored visits, the court noted that mother absconded 

2 At the hearing, counsel for DCFS stated it was unclear why there 

was a change in DCFS’s recommendation. Counsel indicated, “I don’t 

know [DCFS’s] basis for that change in recommendation as it does not 

appear that there are any new safety concerns as they relate to father. 

And so I will submit that issue to the court about whether or not the 

court believes at this time the court would require further supervision 

of this case.”
13

with the children without telling father. The court found continued 

supervision of the children unnecessary because they could safely be 

placed in the care of father.

Father requested that the monitor be a mutually agreed-upon 

monitor with tiebreaking authority to father. Father further requested 

that in the absence of an agreement, the visits be monitored by a 

professional monitor paid for by mother. Mother’s counsel made no 

objection, but requested minimum monitored visitation at least one 

weekend per month. The court ordered: “Mother to have monitored 

visits. Monitored by a mutually agreed upon monitor. Father will have 

tiebreaking authority to decide on the monitor. Father . . . is not to be a 

monitor. Or there will be a professional monitor paid for by mother. 

She’s to have visits a minimum of one weekend per month, and she will 

pay for the travel for the visits. She will have monitored virtual and 

telephonic visits three times a week, three hours per visit, or an ageappropriate duration.”

Mother’s counsel did not object to the terms of the monitoring, 

but asked for a modification allowing the visits to take place in Georgia,

noting it might be less expensive for mother to travel to Georgia than 

for the children to come to California. The court agreed to the 

modification.

On July 19, 2023, mother filed a notice of appeal from the 

June 16, 2023 orders.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable law and standard of review

The juvenile court released the minors to father and terminated 

jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). Section 361.2,

subdivision (b)(1) permits a juvenile court to “provide reasonable 

visitation by the noncustodial parent.” A custody order issued 

pursuant to this provision “shall continue unless modified by a 

subsequent order of the superior court.”
14

A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion orders that 

promote the well-being of dependent children, including all “

‘reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, 

maintenance, and support of the child.’ ” (In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 177, 180.) A juvenile court’s decision to terminate 

dependency jurisdiction and issue an exit order pursuant to section 

362.4 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court 

(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) Under this standard, we may not 

disturb the order unless the court exceeded the limits of legal 

discretion. (Ibid.)

II. Forfeiture

A reviewing court will normally decline to consider a challenge to 

a ruling if an objection to the ruling was not made in the trial court. 

(Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 686.) A parent 

who fails to object to the terms of a visitation order in the juvenile court 

may not claim such error on appeal. (Ibid.)

Mother argues for the first time on appeal that the juvenile 

court’s order giving tiebreaking authority to father improperly 

delegates to father the authority to determine whether any visits occur 

at all. However, mother failed to object in the juvenile court to the 

terms of the monitoring requirement. When father’s counsel asked for 

mother’s monitor to be mutually agreed upon by the parents, with 

father having tie-breaking authority, mother’s counsel made no 

objection or any mention of her argument here that the order 

constituted an impermissible delegation of authority to father.

An objection in the juvenile court would have allowed the trial 

court to address mother’s concerns in the first instance. Permitting a 

challenge under the circumstances is unfair to the court and the 

adverse party, as it allows mother to take advantage of a possible error 

on appeal when it could have been easily addressed in the trial court. 

(In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501.)
15

Mother acknowledges her failure to object in the juvenile court, 

but asks this court to exercise its discretion to consider her claim on the 

merits. Mother argues the facts are undisputed, and application of the 

forfeiture rule is not automatic where it presents a pure question of law 

on undisputed facts. (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 

1450, 1459.) While this court has discretion to review certain forfeited 

issues, the discretion of a reviewing court to excuse forfeiture “should 

be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal 

issue.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Mother has not 

presented an important legal issue for this court to review. Instead, 

the procedure by which a monitor was to be chosen was a discretionary 

decision based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, 

“[b]ecause these proceedings involve the well-being of children, 

considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount 

importance.” (Ibid.)

3

Mother has forfeited her challenge to the terms of the juvenile 

court’s monitoring requirement. However, as discussed below, even 

had mother not forfeited the challenge, the order was not an abuse of 

the juvenile court’s discretion.

III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in crafting 

the exit order

A. The monitoring requirement

Mother argues the juvenile court’s requirement that all contact 

between mother and the children be monitored constitutes an abuse of 

3 Mother points to In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, as an 

example of a case in which the court of appeal rejected a claim that 

review of the exit order was not preserved because mother failed to 

object in the juvenile court. While the A.C. court mentioned the 

forfeiture argument, it did not address the issue, therefore we decline 

to rely on A.C. as authority on this point.
16

discretion.4 Mother was granted a minimum of nine hours of weekly 

telephone calls and video visits, as well as monthly weekend in-person 

visits. All such visits are required to be monitored. Mother points out 

that DCFS recommended unmonitored visits, and the juvenile court 

made no reference to this recommendation. Mother contends the 

juvenile court did not articulate a rationale for requiring all contact 

between mother and the children to be monitored, and thus the 

requirement is arbitrary, falling outside of the juvenile court’s 

discretion.

Contrary to mother’s assertion, the juvenile court did articulate a 

rationale for requiring a monitor. Specifically, the court found that 

mother had unaddressed behavior involving domestic violence, denied 

having been a perpetrator of violence, and had a history of making false 

allegations against father. In addition, the court noted mother had 

absconded with the children, leaving Georgia for California without 

father’s knowledge or consent. In short, the court expressed concern 

with mother’s credibility and her trustworthiness with the children. 

DCFS also articulated concern that mother was coaching the children 

to say false things. For these reasons, the juvenile court did not abuse 

its discretion in requiring mother’s visits with the children to be 

monitored.

B. Monitor selection provisions

Mother also argues the monitor-selection provisions of the exit 

order are an impermissible delegation of authority to father to 

determine whether there will be any contact at all between mother and 

the children. Mother cites In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196 for 

the proposition that a juvenile court may not delegate absolute 

discretion to determine whether visitation occurs. (Id. at p. 213.) 

However, the Chantal S. court determined the juvenile court’s order in 

4 As mother argued to the juvenile court that her visits should be 

unmonitored, mother did not forfeit this issue.
17

that case, which required a therapist to facilitate visits between a 

father and child, did not run afoul of the rule against delegation of 

discretion. (Id. at p. 214.) Instead of completely delegating authority, 

the juvenile court specified “that visitation commence in a carefully 

restricted setting when father’s chosen therapist determines that father 

has progressed satisfactorily.” (Ibid.)

In In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119 (T.H.), also cited by 

mother, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over the 

children and placed them in their mother’s custody, allowing 

supervised visitation by father “ ‘to be determined by the parents.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 1121.) The T.H. court found this to be “more than simply a 

delegation of the authority to set the ‘time, place and manner’ of the 

visitation—it effectively delegates to mother the power to determine 

whether visitation will occur at all.” (Id. at p. 1123.) Unlike the order 

in Chantal S., this order “gave mother an effective veto power” over

father’s right to visitation. (Id. at p. 1124.)

As illustrated by Chantal S. and T.H., a juvenile court may 

delegate to a third party the responsibility of managing the details of 

visits, including the time, place, and manner of visits. (In re Moriah T. 

(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374 (Moriah T.).) “Only when a visitation 

order delegates . . . the absolute discretion to determine whether any 

visitation occurs does the order violate the statutory scheme and 

separation of powers doctrine.” (Ibid.)

The juvenile court in this matter did not delegate “the absolute 

discretion to determine whether any visitation occurs.” (Moriah T., 

supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.) Instead, the court specified that 

monitored phone or video visits will occur a minimum of three days per 

week, for three hours per day, plus a minimum of one weekend inperson visit per month. Pursuant to the court’s order, mother has the 

absolute right to these visits, and father has no veto power.

In re A.C., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at page 796 supports our 

conclusion. In A.C., the court’s oral order—which conflicted with its 
18

written order—showed the court’s intention to order that the parents 

agree on the monitor to supervise visitation, or if they were unable to 

do so, the father would choose the monitor. This order “did not 

constitute an impermissible delegation of authority to determine 

whether visitation would occur.” (Id. at p. 800.) The similar order in 

this matter also does not constitute an impermissible delegation of 

authority.

Mother argues father could veto each and every proposed 

monitor, such that there would be no mutually agreed-upon monitor. 

Mother further argues the financial burden of requiring mother to hire 

a professional monitor for nine hours a week of telephonic or virtual 

visits and 48 hours for the once monthly in-person visits is not within 

the realm of possibility for mother. These objections are largely 

speculative. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that father 

would intentionally undermine mother’s visits. Father has a large 

family in Georgia and has indicated his family is willing to assist with 

the children. In addition, the paternal grandfather stated he loves 

mother like a daughter and offered mother the opportunity to live with 

him in Georgia, an offer which mother declined. In the event that 

mother is unable to visit with the minors, she may enforce her right to 

visitation in a family law court. (T.H., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 

[Exit orders 

“ ‘become part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child 

and will remain in effect until they are terminated or modified by the 

family court’ ”].)

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 

mother’s visits to be monitored or in giving father tie-breaking 

authority in deciding upon a monitor.
19

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

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ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

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HOFFSTADT, J.