J-S03005-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL MACEDO

APPEAL OF: PENNSYLVANIA STATE 

POLICE

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 695 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-CR-0002432-2009

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 20, 2024

Appellant, the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), appeals from the April 

13, 2023 order granting Appellee Christopher Michael Macedo’s petition asking

the trial court to vacate his registration requirements under Subchapter I of 

the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9799.51-9799.75.1 After careful consideration, we transfer this appeal to 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

A previous panel of this Court summarized the facts of this case as 

follows: 

____________________________________________

1 Among other things, SORNA’s Subchapter I provides that an offender who 

committed an enumerated offense between April 22, 1996 and December 20, 

2012 must comply with certain registration, notification, and counseling 

(“RNC”) requirements. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.52.
J-S03005-24

- 2 -

[Appellee] serially molested his younger siblings and 

step-siblings between February 2000 and February 2006. He 

was [11-years-old] when the first offense occurred. He was a 

few days shy of his 17[th] birthday when the last offense took 

place. The offenses occurred when [Appellee] was placed in the 

position of having to babysit the victims. The abuse stopped 

when he was no longer forced to care for the children. 

***

The instant offenses were not brought to light until July [] 2009, 

when [Appellee] was more than 20 years old. At that time[,] it 

was no longer feasible to treat him as a juvenile. 

***

On May 21, 2010, [Appellee] entered a plea of nolo contendere

to [10] counts of rape, seven counts of involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse [(“IDSI”] with a child, six counts of 

aggravated indecent assault, [10] counts of incest and [27] 

counts of indecent assault. The Commonwealth gave notice 

that it was seeking the mandatory minimum sentence on

[Appellee’s] rape, [IDSI,] and aggravated indecent assault 

charges. 

[Appellee] was referred to the Sexual Offender Assessment 

Board for an evaluation. Thereafter[,] the Commonwealth filed 

a petition to have him declared to be a sexually violent predator 

[(“SVP”)]. [The trial court] held an evidentiary hearing on the 

petition on September 7, 2010. On October 5, 2010, [the trial 

court] entered an order designating [Appellee] as an [SVP]. On 

that same date[, the court] sentenced him to imprisonment for 

not less than five nor more than [10] years plus an additional 

[20] years[’] probation. [This sentence included multiple 

five-year mandatory minimum sentences, all of which Appellee 

was to serve concurrently. Appellee was also subjected to 

lifetime sexual offender registration requirements.] 

Commonwealth v. Macedo, 43 A.3d 528 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished 

memorandum) (Table at 1-2). 
J-S03005-24

- 3 -

On July 20, 2022, Appellee filed a petition seeking to vacate his sexual

offender registration requirements.2 In his petition, Appellee argued that, 

because he was a juvenile at the time he committed the offenses, his 

continuing registration requirements under Subchapter I of SORNA 

constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated his due process rights 

under the Fifth and 14th Amendments of the United States’ Constitution, as 

well as Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In making this 

assertion, Appellee relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in In the 

Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (“J.B.”) and this Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Haines, 222 A.3d 756 (Pa. Super. 2019). J.B. held that 

SORNA's lifetime registration provision violated a juvenile offender’s due 

process rights by utilizing the irrebuttable presumption that was not 

universally true.3 Haines extended J.B. to juvenile offenders who were 

____________________________________________

2 Prior to filing the instant petition, Appellant challenged his judgment of 

sentence in a direct appeal before this Court. We affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence in 2012. Thereafter, our Supreme Court denied 

allocatur on February 21, 2013. As such, Appellee’s judgment of sentence 

became final on May 22, 2013, when the 90-day period to file a petition for 

writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13, The trial court, however, was 

permitted to exercise jurisdiction over Appellee’s July 20, 2022 petition 

pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 

234 A.3d 602, 617-618 (Pa. 2020) which explicitly stated that a challenge to 

the application of a sexual offender registration requirement need not be 

raised under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

3 We note that, in J.B., the Supreme Court considered the original version of 

SORNA (42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41), which became effective in 

December 2012. SORNA was amended thereafter, but the amendments are 

not germane to the issues discussed herein. 
J-S03005-24

- 4 -

convicted and sentenced after reaching majority. On August 2, 2022, 

Appellant entered its appearance and filed an answer to Appellee’s petition. 

Thereafter, the trial court entered an order stating that, because the 

offenses in this case occurred when Appellee was a juvenile, the “registration 

requirements of SORNA imposed as a result of the underlying offenses . . . 

must be vacated” pursuant to J.B. and Haines. Trial Court Order, 9/19/22, 

at 1. The court, however, noted that Appellee was “still required to undergo 

lifetime registration under SORNA because of the prior finding that he [met 

the criteria for SVP designation].” Id. The court then stated that it had “some 

concerns about the validity of [its] original finding that [Appellee was] a[n

SVP]” and requested further briefing to address “whether or not [Appellee’s] 

status as a[n SVP] may be revisited.” Id. Appellee, therefore, filed a 

subsequent brief in which he argued that, in light of his juvenile status at the 

time of the offenses, the application of Subchapter I’s irrebuttable

presumption of future dangerousness within the context of his SVP 

determination was unconstitutional. See Appellee’s Second Brief in Support 

of Petition to Vacate, 10/13/22, at *3-*7 (unpaginated). 

Ultimately, on April 13, 2023, the trial court granted Appellee’s petition, 

holding as follows: 

[This court] is satisfied that [Appellee] has demonstrated that 

1) SORNA encroaches upon his constitutionally protected and 

fundamental right to reputation with an irrebuttable 

presumption that all sexual offenders pose a high risk of 

committing additional sexual offenses; 2) SORNA’s presumption 

is not universally true as evidenced by the fact[] that [Appellee] 

himself stopped the problematic conduct while he was yet a 
J-S03005-24

- 5 -

juvenile, has since maintained employment and started a 

family, has remained crime free, and has been found to be a 

low risk of recidivism of sexual offenses by an expert; and 

3) alternative means, including periodic individual 

reassessment, exist to determine (the presumed fact of) 

whether a sex offender who committed his offense as a juvenile 

against another juvenile poses a continued, high risk of 

recidivating. See [J.B., supra; Haines, supra]. [Appellee] 

has shown that he will forever be negatively affected by the 

presumption imposed by SORNA and his SVP designation. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that 

[Appellee] is relieved from his court-ordered registration 

requirements under SORNA. It is further ORDERED that the 

[PSP] is enjoined from requiring [Appellee] to register under 

SORNA or publishing him as a registered offender under 

SORNA. 

Trial Court Order, 4/13/23, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted). This timely appeal 

followed.4 

____________________________________________

4 On June 14, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

No such statement appears in the record or on the docket. In general, the 

failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement would result in the waiver of an 

appellant’s issues on appeal. See Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. 

Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 224-225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en 

banc); see also Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) 

(explaining that an untimely concise statement waives all claims on appeal); 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“[F]rom this date 

forward . . . [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them 

to file a [s]tatement of [errors] [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal pursuant to Rule 

1925. Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”). 

The trial court’s docket does not reflect that the court’s order was served on 

Appellant, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c). It simply notes that the 

order was served upon the Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office and 

Appellee’s counsel. We are, therefore, unable to determine the date Appellant 

was served with the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order, as required by Rule 114, 

and similarly cannot conclude that Appellant failed to comply with the trial 

court’s 1925(b) order. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 472 

(Pa. Super. 2017) (finding that because the docket did not reflect whether 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S03005-24

- 6 -

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Does Appellant have standing?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its 

discretion in finding that Appellee’s designation as a[n SVP] 

was based on an irrebuttable presumption?

3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in extending [J.B., 

supra; Haines, supra] to Appellee who, as an adult, was 

classified [as] a[n SVP]?

4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its 

discretion in determining that Appellee’s [SVP] designation 

violated his right to reputation under Article [I], Section 1 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution?

5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its 

discretion in finding that Subchapter I as applied to Appellee 

is unconstitutional?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first 

determine whether we have jurisdiction to do so. Importantly, our Supreme 

Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the following types of cases: 

§ 722. Direct appeals from courts of common pleas

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals 

from final orders of the courts of common pleas in the following 

classes of cases:

* * *

(7) Matters where the court of common pleas has held 

invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of 

____________________________________________

service of the court’s 1925(b) order was effectuated, it could not conclude that 

the appellant failed to comply with the order). Accordingly, we decline to find 

that Appellant waived its claim on this basis. Moreover, in the interest of 

judicial economy, we decline to remand this matter to determine whether the 

trial court’s 1925(b) order was properly served. See id. at 472, n.2. 
J-S03005-24

- 7 -

the United States, or to the Constitution of this 

Commonwealth, any treaty or law of the United States or 

any provision of the Constitution of, or of any statute of, 

this Commonwealth, or any provision of any home rule 

charter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 722(7).

In addition, Rule 751 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

provides: 

Rule 751. Transfer of Erroneously Filed Cases

(a) General rule. If an appeal or other matter is taken to or 

brought in a court or magisterial district which does not have 

jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or 

magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss 

the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper 

court of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter 

shall be treated as if originally filed in transferee court on the 

date first filed in a court or magisterial district.

(b) Transfers by prothonotaries. An appeal or other matter 

may be transferred from a court to another court under this rule 

by order of court or by order of the prothonotary of any 

appellate court affected.

Pa.R.A.P. 751; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) (“A matter which is within 

the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or magisterial district judge of this 

Commonwealth but which is commenced in any other tribunal of this 

Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court 

or magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be treated as if 

originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial district of this 

Commonwealth on the date when first filed in the other tribunal.”); 

Commonwealth v. Herman, 143 A.3d 392, 394 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Where 

an appeal within the exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal is mistakenly filed in 
J-S03005-24

- 8 -

the wrong court, the proper course is to transfer the appeal to the correct 

judicial body.”).

The trial court herein held that the lifetime registration requirements 

which followed Appellee’s SVP determination rested upon an irrebuttable 

presumption that “all sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing 

additional sexual offenses.” Trial Court Order, 4/13/23, at 2. The trial court 

then determined that the application of the irrebuttable presumption violated 

Appellee’s protected reputational interest, especially considering his juvenile 

status at the time of the offenses. Id. at 1-3. Our case law uniformly holds 

that an appeal from an order invalidating SORNA’s registration requirements 

based on an irrebuttable presumption lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to Section 722(7).5 See 

____________________________________________

5

In a recent decision, a panel of this Court addressed an appellant’s challenge 

to a trial court’s order directing her to register as a sexual offender under 

Revised Subchapter H of SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. See 

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 241 A.3d 1149 (Pa. Super. 2020). In so 

doing, we held that “SORNA [was] unconstitutional as applied to [the 

a]ppellant because it creat[ed] an irrebuttable presumption that her 

convictions . . . ma[d]e her a risk to commit additional sexual offenses.” Id.

at 1151-1152. Upon review, we conclude that this matter is wholly distinct 

from that of Muhammad and fully within the jurisdiction of our Supreme 

Court. Indeed, unlike Appellee herein, the appellant in Muhammad was not 

convicted for crimes that are sexual in nature or are typical of those charges 

that give rise to SORNA’s registration requirements. Rather, her convictions, 

which included interference with custody of children, false imprisonment, 

unlawful restraint and conspiracy to commit the aforementioned offenses, 

arose from a single episode involving a custody dispute. Hence, the 

appellant’s challenge in Muhammad was clearly an “as-applied challenge 

limited to the particular circumstances of [her] case.” Id. at 1157. In this 

instance, like that of Torsilieri, Arnett, and Gruver, the trial court 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S03005-24

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2020) (appeal from 

trial court order declaring that RNC provisions of SORNA’s Revised Subchapter 

H utilized an irrebuttable presumption which violated the appellant’s right of 

reputation fell within exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); see also 

Commonwealth v. Arnett, 2023 WL 2232705 *1 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2023)

(non-precedential decision) (challenge to order declaring that SORNA 

Subchapter I utilized an irrebuttable presumption which violated the 

appellant’s right of reputation fell within exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 

Court); Commonwealth v. Gruver, 2021 WL 37475 *1 (Pa. Super. Jan. 5, 

2021) (non-precedential decision) (appeal from order finding that SORNA 

Subchapter H’s RNC requirements utilized an irrebuttable presumption which 

violated the appellee’s constitutional right of reputation fell within exclusive 

jurisdiction of Supreme Court).6 We therefore transfer this appeal to the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.7

____________________________________________

terminated Appellee’s registration obligations because it determined that 

SORNA Subchapter I utilized an irrebuttable presumption which 

unconstitutionally intruded upon Appellant’s fundamental right of reputation. 

We further note that the trial court applied its determination to invalidate 

Appellee’s registration requirements despite his status as an SVP, which is a 

question that has not yet been addressed by a Pennsylvania appellate court.

6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the Gruver appeal and affirmed 

the trial court in a per curiam order on other grounds. See Commonwealth 

v. Gruver, 252 A.3d 642 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam). 

7

In transferring the instant appeal, we express no opinion on whether 

Appellant has standing to contest the trial court’s April 13, 2023 order. See 

Commonwealth v. Cheeseboro, 91 A.3d 714, 720-722 (Pa. Super. 2014). 
J-S03005-24

- 10 -

Appeal transferred. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/20/2024