No. 90-542 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

DARRELL D. RAFFETY, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-vsKANTA PRODUCTS, INC., Employer, and 

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workersf Compensation Court, 

The Honorable ~imothy Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Greg J. Skakles; Johnson, Skakles & Kebe, Anaconda, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Thomas E. Martello; Hughes, Kellner, Sullivan & 

Alke, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: October 10, 1991 

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,. . Decided: October 29, 1991 ~i 5.) . 1 . ..i -*, .. ...-... . --Lkt. 

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Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Claimant Darrell D. Raffety appeals from a judgment of the 

Workers' Compensation Court issued on October 10, 1990, which found 

that he was only entitled to 140 weeks of permanent partial 

disability benefits for injury to one eye, instead of 500 weeks as 

claimant argued. We affirm. 

The sole issue presented for review by the parties is whether 

the Workers' Compensation Court erred in limiting claimant's award 

of permanent partial disability benefits for injury to one eye to 

140 weeks. 

On October 17, 1983, claimant suffered an injury arising out 

of and in the course of his employment. Claimant was struck in the 

right eye by a nail while he was nailing sheet metal to a storage 

shed, resulting in loss of vision in the eye. At the time of 

claimant's injury, his employer was insured under Plan I11 of the 

Workers8 Compensation Act. A claim for compensation was filed with 

insurer, the State Fund, which accepted liability for the injury. 

Insurer, in addition to paying medical and temporary total 

disability benefits, paid 140 weeks of permanent partial disability 

benefits at the rate of $138.50 per week. 

On August 31, 1989, claimant petitioned the Workers' 

Compensation Court for permanent partial disability benefits in 

excess of the 140 weeks paid by the insurer. This petition was 

filed after the insurer refused to entertain a petition for 

benefits in excess of 140 weeks. Claimant contended he was 
entitled to 500 weeks of benefits, minus the 140 weeks previously 

paid by the insurer. Inasmuch as the dispute between the parties 

involved a question of law only, the matter was submitted to the 

Workersr compensation Court on an agreed statement of facts and 

briefs by the parties. On October 10, 1990, the Workersf 

Compensation Court issued its decision holding that the statutes 

governing permanent partial disability benefits were clear and 

unambiguous and limited the claimant to 140 weeks of benefits. It 

is from this judgment that claimant appeals. 

Both parties stipulated that the present dispute involved only 

a question of law. In reviewing conclusions of law, this Court 

will not apply the substantial credible evidence standard used in 

reviewing factual findings of the Workersr Compensation Court. 

Concerning this Courtrs review of conclusions of law by the 

Workersr compensation Court we recently stated: 

!'In such a case, the appropriate standard of review is 

simply whether the lower courtrs interpretation of the 

law is correct. We are not bound by the lower court's 

conclusion and remain free to reach our own.I1 

Schaub v. Vita Rich Dairy (1989), 236 Mont. 389, 391, 770 P.2d 522, 

523. Additionally, concerning our review of conclusions of law, we 

have stated: 

The reasoning for simply determining if the courtrs 

conclusions are correct is that no discretion is involved 

when a tribunal arrives at a conclusion of law--the 

tribunal either correctly or incorrectly applies the law. 

For that reason, this Court concludes that our standard 

of review relating to conclusions of law, whether the 

conclusions are made by an agency, workersr compensation 
court, or trial court, is whether the tribunal's 

interpretation of the law is correct. 

Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 

803 P.2d 601, 603. The instant case deals with a conclusion of 

law, and therefore, upon review we will simply determine whether 

the conclusion was or was not correct. 

At issue in this case is the Workerst Compensation Court's 

interpretation of 55 39-71-703 and -705 MCA, (1983), concerning 

compensation for injuries causing partial disability. Section 

39-71-703, MCA, has undergone significant modification in virtually 

every legislative session since 1983, and 5 39-71-705, MCA, has 

been repealed. However, it is well-settled that the law existing 

at the time of the injury governs. Watson v. Seekins (1988), 234 

Mont. 309, 312, 763 P.2d 328, 331. claimant's injury occurred in 

1983. Section 39-71-703, MCA (1983), reads as follows: 

(1) Weekly compensation benefits for injury producing 

partial disability shall be 66 2/3% of the actual 

diminution in the worker's earning capacity measured in 

dollars, subject to a maximum weekly compensation of 

one-half the state's average weekly wage. 

(2) The compensation shall be paid during the period of 

disability, not exceeding, however, 500 weeks in cases of 

partial disability. However, compensation for partial 

disabilitv resultins from the loss of or injury to any 

member shall not be payable for a sreater number of weeks 

than is specified in 39-71-705 for the loss of the 

member. [Emphasis added.] 

Section 39-71-705, MCA (1983), contains a schedule of injuries to 

various members of the body and a corresponding maximum duration of 

compensation available for each such injury and reads, in part, as 

follows: 
(1) In addition to temporary total disability benefits 

allowed in this chapter, indemnity benefits for loss of 

a member shall be paid at the weekly rate provided in 

39-71-703 and shall be paid for the following periods: 

. . . . 

Total blindness of one eye ............. 140 weeks . . . . 

Claimant points out that at the time of injury § 39-71-104, 

MCA (1983), mandated that the Workerrs Compensation Act be 

liberally interpreted. We construed this section to require that 

when a statute in the Act Itis open to more than one interpretation, 

one favorable to the employee and the other against him, we must 

give it the construction most favorable to the injured workman 

.... Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (1947), 120 Mont. 

485, 489, 188 P.2d 185, 186. The claimant contends that the 

statutes in question may be interpreted as allowing for 500 weeks 

of permanent partial disability benefits for the loss of an eye. 

We disagree. The Workersr Compensation Court was correct in 

determining that the statutes in question are clear and unambiguous 

on this point. 

Section 39-71-703, MCA, provides that compensation for partial 

disability "shall not be payable for a greater number of weeks than 

is specified in 39-71-705 . . . ." Section 705 unambiguously sets 

the maximum period for permanent partial benefits for loss of an 

eye at 140 weeks. The decision of the Workersr Compensation Court 

that the statute clearly precludes compensation in excess of 140 

weeks for the loss of an eye is correct. Additionally, the 
interpretation of the statute by the Workersf Compensation Court is 

in accordance with the existing case law construingthese statutes. 

In a case very similar to the present controversy, this Court held 

that for the loss of vision to one eye an injured worker is limited 

to 140 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. Johnson v. 

Industrial Accident Board (1971), 157 Mont. 221, 483 P.2d 918. In 

Johnson, as here, the injured worker alleged he was entitled to 

500 weeks of permanent partial benefits. The Court in Johnson 

held that the legislative intent was clear that an injured worker 

was limited to the maximum number of weeks of benefits as was 

indicated by the statutory schedule of injuries. This Court has 

consistently held that an individual with a scheduled injury is 

limited to the benefits set out in the schedule. Walter v. Public 

Auction Yards (1979), 181 Mont. 109, 592 P. 2d 497. As we explained 

in McDanold v. B.N. Transport, Inc. (1984), 208 Mont. 470, 477, 679 

The 500-week limit is simply a statutory maximum period 

for such compensation. The Legislature has further 

limited this period of disability to the number of benefit 

weeks for the comparable schedule injury under 

sections 39-71-705-708, MCA, but only when the injury is 

specifically listed in the schedule. 

Claimant presents two arguments in support of his contention 

that the above-mentioned cases were decided incorrectly by this 

Court. First, claimant argues that our later decisions concerning 

this issue are inconsistent with our prior opinion in Spieth v. 

Stuart (1956), 130 Mont. 216, 299 P.2d 106. In Spieth, we upheld 
the award of 500 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits for 

a scheduled injury. The insurer argued that the injured worker 

should be limited to 37 weeks as provided in the schedule. Spieth 

is not persuasive authority for claimant in the present case in 

that the statute in effect at the time of Spieth is dramatically 

different than the statute before us now. The statute interpreted 

in Spieth limited scheduled injuries to a particular dollar amount 

of compensation, but did not limit the scheduled injuries as to 

duration of compensation, as does the statute in question here. 

Had the last sentence of 5 39-71-703(2), MCA (1983), been in effect 

at the time of Spieth, the opposite result would have been reached. 

Claimant's second argument in support of his contention that 

this Court has misinterpreted 55 39-71-703 and -705, MCA, in the 

past is, in essence, an argument that the sections, as enacted, 

were neither fair nor wise. Further, claimant points out that 

other jurisdictions have not relied exclusively on such injury 

schedules for determining the duration of compensation benefits. 

Claimant argues forcefully that the statutes should have provided 

an option for injured workers to receive compensation for permanent 

partial disability based on impairment of earning capacity. It is 

argued that this would result in a fairer determination of the 

appropriate duration of compensation benefits than would relying on 

an arbitrary schedule of injuries and their corresponding benefits. 

Claimant's policy argument may or may not be correct, but in any 

event, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
legislature. The legislature adopted the statutes and they are 

clear and unambiguous. 

[I]t is the province of courts to construe and apply the 

law as they find it and to maintain its integrity as it 

has been written by a coordinate branch of the state 

government. When the terms of the statute are plain, 

unambiguous, direct and certain, it speaks for itself and 

there is no room for construction. 

Bay v. Department of Administration (1984), 212 Mont. 258, 265, 688 

 ina ally, claimant argues that an eye is not generally 

understood to be a "memberff and therefore the second sentence of 

§ 39-71-703(2), MCA (1983), does not apply. Regardless of the 

various conflicting definitions of what constitutes a gfmember,ll it 

is obvious that loss of an eye is a scheduled injury as set out in 

5 39-71-705, MCA (1983). 

The decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is affirmed. 

Justice 

We concur: I 

- ,Y I I I\ 

" Chief Justice