# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 1, 2018 *

Decided February 1, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 17-1745

LASHAWN N. LOFTON, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

SP PLUS CORP., f/k/a STANDARD
PARKING CORPORATION and TEAMSTERS LOCAL 727, Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 5716

Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, J udge

.

O R D E R

Lashawn Lofton seeks to reopen her case more than two years after we affirmed its dismissal as a sanction for lying on her application to proceed in forma pauperis. The district judge denied Lofton’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and then denied her motion to reconsider that decision. We
affirm.

* We have agreed to decide this case wi thout oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and le gal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 17-1745 Page 2

In 2012 Lofton, a parking garage attendant, sued her former employer, SP Plus Corporation, and her local union. The Seco nd Amended Complaint, filed by Lofton’s recruited counsel, claimed that SP Plus discriminated against her based upon her disability (the effects of prior strokes), discharged her in retaliation for reporting suspected theft, and was responsible for a batte ry or assault she suffered at the hands of a supervisor. Lofton also claimed that Teamsters Local 727 breached its duty of fair representation in the grievance process after SP Plus fired her.

SP Plus moved to dismiss Lofton’s co mplaint because, among other things, Lofton had omitted income, personal proper ty, and real estate from her successful application to proceed in forma pauperis. The district judge granted the motion on that basis and dismissed the case with prejudice. We affirmed the sanction in October 2014. Lofton v. SP Plus Corp. , 578 F. App’x. 603, 604 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 288 F.3d 305, 306–08 (7th Cir. 2002)).

In 2016 Lofton moved to reopen her case, to proceed in forma pauperis, and for recruited counsel. In her motion, Lofton said only: “I am [a] disabled person asking this court[] to have mercy for me.” Judge D arrah granted all three motions without explanation. One month later, the case was reassigned to Judge Pallmeyer, who vacated the order granting reinstatement because Loft on’s motion had not mentioned any of the
“narrow circumstances” covered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)—the only vehicle for reopening her case. Judge Pallm eyer then denied Lofton’s motion to reconsider, which was filed by her recruite d attorney. Lofton appeals both rulings.

Lofton, now pro se, wants another bite at the apple—that much is clear. But her brief is patently inadequate. On the first pa ge she declares that she had illnesses, and on the last page she asks us “for mercy.” In between, she does not address the district judge’s reasoning or make any cogent le gal argument; she larg ely discusses issues related to her disability and her loss of pension benefits. We would be well within our rights to dismiss Lofton’s appeal under Fe deral Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8).
See Anderson v. Hardman , 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001).

Addressing the merits of the appeal does not help Lofton. District judges have “‘discretion piled on discretion’” wh en making a Rule 60(b) decision. Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc. , 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Swaim v. Moltan Co. , 73 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 1996)). Although a movant is required to specify which Rule 60(b) ground justifies re lief, Lofton simply said that she had a disability. See Talano v. Nw. Med. Faculty Found., Inc. , 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).No. 17-1745 Page 3

Because she failed to make a discernible argument, the judge had reason enough to deny her motion. See Nelson v. Napolitano , 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011).

In any case, no Rule 60(b) ground justifies relief. If, as the judge thought, Rule 60(b)(1) (“mistake, inadvert ence, surprise, or excusable neglect”) was the most applicable subsection, Lofton missed the one-year jurisdictional deadline. F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 60(c)(1); see Arrieta v. Battaglia , 461 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2006). And Lofton did not argue that her health setbacks amounted to “extraordinary circumstances” under the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6). See Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Lofton’s recruited attorney filed the motion to recons ider in which he discussed only whether an amended complaint would be timely—but that is not a relevant Rule 60(b) argument.

Lofton’s remaining appellate contentions fail. She rehashes her original claims, which is inappropriate at this stage. See Swaim , 73 F.3d at 722 (“we review only the Rule 60(b) decision itself for an abuse of discr etion and will not visit the merits of the underlying ... judgment.”). And she alludes to other claims that were never brought before the district judge; those claims are waived. See Poullard v. McDonald , 829 F.3d 844, 855 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012)).

AFFIRMED.