32410 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices

on June 26. Arrange for oral

presentations by June 22.

ADDRESSES: Boeing Commercial

Airplane Group, 535 Garden Avenue,

N., Building 10–16, Room 11G4, Renton,

WA.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Effie

M. Upshaw, Office of Rulemaking

ARM–209, FAA, 800 Independence

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591,

Telephone (202) 267–7626, FAX (202)

267–5075, or e-mail at

effie.upshaw@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant

to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal

Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–

463; 5 U.S.C. app. III), notice is given of

an ARAC meeting to be held June 27–

28, in Renton, WA.

The agenda will include:

June 26

• Opening Remarks

• FAA Report

• Joint Aviation Authorities Report

• Transport Canada Report

• Harmonization Management Team

Report

• Executive Committee Report

• Human Factors Harmonization

Working Group (HWG) Report

• Seat Test HWG Report

• Design for Security HWG Report

• Ice Protection HWG Report

• Engine HWG Report

• Continued Airworthiness Assessment

Methodology Working Group Report

• Flight Test HWG Report

• Electromagnetic Effects HWG Report

• Powerplant Installation HWG Report

• Mechanical Systems HWG Report

• Cargo Standard HWG Report

June 27

• General Structures HWG Report

• Airworthiness Assurance HWG

Report

• Extended Range with Two-Engine

Aircraft Tasking Update

• Loads & Dynamics HWG Report

• Flight Guidance System HWG Report

• System Design and Analysis HWG

Report

• Avionics Systems HWG Report

• Electrical Systems HWG Report

The ARAC is expected to approve the

following submittals for forwarding to

the FAA:

• Recommendations addressing

installation of a primary ice detection

systems, or visual cues for recognizing

ice accretion on specified airplane

surfaces (Ice Protection HWG);

• Recommendation revising the Class B

cargo compartments and establishing

standards for a new Class F cargo

compartment; and

• Technical reports drafted under the

fast track process by the Human

Factors, Loads and Dynamics,

Mechanical Systems, and Avionics

Systems HWG’s.

Additionally, there will be a

discussion/review of FAA-prepared

documents that evolved from technical

reports prepared by the System Design

and Analysis HWG under the fast track

process.

Attendance is open to the public, but

will be limited to the space available.

Visitor badges are required to enter

Boeing Building 10–16. Please confirm

your attendance with Norm Turner,

(425) 234–3312, or by e-mail—

norman.g.turner@Boeing.com.—and

provide the following information: full

legal name, country of citizenship, and

company that you represent, if

applicable. Please arrive 15 minutes

early to avoid any problems with

parking or badges.

The public must make arrangements

by June 22 to present oral statements at

the meeting. Written statements may be

presented to the committee at any time

by providing 25 copies to the Assistant

Executive Director for Transport

Airplane and Engine issues or by

providing copies at the meeting. Copies

of the documents to be approved may be

made available by contacting the person

listed under the heading FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT.

If you are in need of assistance or

require a reasonable accommodation for

the meeting or meeting documents,

please contact the person listed under

the heading FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT. Sign and oral interpretation, as

well as a listening device, can be made

available if requested 10 calendar days

before the meeting.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 6, 2001.

Brenda Courtney,

Acting Director, Office of Rulemaking.

[FR Doc. 01–15163 Filed 6–12–01; 2:26 pm]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Policy Statement Number ANM–01–02]

FAA Policy on Type Certification

Assessment of Thrust Management

Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of policy statement;

request for comments.

SUMMARY: This notice announces an

FAA policy applicable to the type

certification of transport category

airplanes. This notice advises the

public, in particular manufacturers of

transport category airplanes and their

suppliers, that the FAA intends to adopt

a new policy concerning the type

certification assessment of thrust

management systems. This notice is

necessary to advise the public of this

FAA policy and give all interested

persons an opportunity to present their

views on it.

DATE: Send your comments by July 16,

2001.

ADDRESSES: Send all comments on this

policy statement to the individual

identified under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mike McRae, Federal Aviation

Administration, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Transport Standards Staff,

Propulsion/Mechanical Systems Branch,

ANM–112, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,

Renton, WA 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–2133; fax (425) 227–1320; email: mike.mcrae@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

You may comment on this policy

statement by sending any written data,

views, or arguments as you may desire.

You must identify the Policy Statement

Number ANM–01–02 on your

comments, and send your comments, in

duplicate, to the address indicated

above. The Transport Airplane

Directorate (Transport Standards Staff)

will consider all communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments.

Background

The FAA traditionally has certified

automated thrust management features,

such as autothrottles and ‘‘target rating’’

displays, on the basis that they are only

conveniences to reduce crew workload

and do not relieve the crew of any

responsibility for assuring proper thrust

management. Consequently, even when

the crew is no longer directly involved

in performing a given thrust

management function, they must be

‘‘aware’’ when this function is not being

performed safely. Further, when they do

become ‘‘aware’’ of any thrust

management malfunction, they must be

capable of taking appropriate corrective

action to safely address that

malfunction.

For most thrust management systems

(TMS) that the FAA has certified to

date, this crew ‘‘awareness’’ has been

accepted as coming from:

a. Inherent aircraft operational cues

(for example, failure of the throttles to

properly respond to an autothrottle

command is usually assumed to be

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices 32411

detectable by improper movement of the

throttle levers, engine indications, or

other inherent aircraft responses); or

b. Adherence to training and

procedures (for example, crews are

trained to cross-check the TMS ‘‘target

rating’’ against the Quick Reference

Handbook rating or the rating on a

dispatch sheet); or

c. Dedicated failure detection and

annunciation (for example, if the

autothrottle detects that it cannot

perform its function, under some

circumstances it will automatically

disconnect itself and announce that fact

through a crew alerting feature).

Service History Involving TMS Issues

There have been at least two recent

accidents related to TMS effects:

1. March 31, 1995, Tarom Airbus Model

A310–300, Bucharest, Hungary

The airplane crashed shortly after

takeoff. The Romanian investigating

team indicated that the probable cause

of the accident was the combination of

an autothrottle failure that generated

asymmetric thrust and the pilot’s

apparent failure to react quickly enough

to the developing emergency.

2. November 24, 1992, China Southern

Boeing Model 737–300, Guilin, China

The airplane crashed shortly before

landing at Guilin. The Civil Aviation

Administration of China team

investigating the probable cause of the

accident concluded that the right auto

throttle did not react during descent and

level off. As a result, the thrust

asymmetry induced the airplane to roll

to the right. The flightcrew failed to

recognize the abnormality and make

correction in time, ‘‘followed by

wrongful control input and crashed.’’

Data from these accident

investigations have provided evidence

that it is incorrect to assume that the

flight crew will always detect and

address potentially adverse TMS effects

strictly from inherent operational cues.

Similarly, other service experience

suggests that it is not reasonable to

expect the flight crew to adhere strictly

to operational checks that are not

specified in the flight manual, and that

usually indicate the system is working

correctly. It is not sufficient to find that

the flight crew ‘‘should normally be

able’’ to detect and safely accommodate

these failures. Instead, it should be

found that the flight crew is anticipated

‘‘always’’ to safely accommodate these

failures. This distinction is intended to

differentiate between those ‘‘human

errors’’ that are simply part of

anticipated human behaviors and

limitations, and those that are

‘‘extraordinary’’ or ‘‘negligent.’’

The FAA maintains that transport

category airplane type designs should

safely accommodate anticipated human

errors. Therefore, the FAA has

concluded that dedicated failure

detection and annunciation is necessary

to provide adequate ‘‘crew awareness’’

of TMS malfunctions.

Intent of This General Statement of

Policy

The FAA intends the policy discussed

in this notice to ensure that the actual

criticality of automated thrust

management features is identified and

adequately addressed during type

certification compliance with the failsafe requirements of Title 14, Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR), part 25,

including:

§ 25.901(c) (‘‘Powerplant:

Installation’’),

§ 25.903(b) (‘‘Engines’’), and

§ 25.1309(b) (‘‘Equipment, systems,

and installations’’).

This policy is included in a draft

Advisory Circular (AC) 25.901–1X,

‘‘Safety Assessment of Powerplant

Installations,’’ which the Aviation

Rulemaking Advisory Committee

(ARAC) developed and submitted to the

FAA as a recommendation for issuance.

(Refer to 56 FR 2190, January 22, 1991,

for more information about ARAC. Refer

to 57 FR 58845, December 11, 1992, for

more information about the ARACsponsored working group assigned to

develop the recommendation.)

Draft AC 25.901–1X currently is part

of a planned ‘‘Safety Assessment’’

rulemaking package that will include

several proposed rules and advisory

circulars. The FAA plans to issue those

proposed documents for public

comment at a future date.

However, the FAA has chosen to

publish this particular segment as a

general statement of policy in advance

of the complete AC 25.901–1X.

To reduce the exposure to accidents

like those described above, the FAA

expects to use this policy to identify and

correct any similar unsafe conditions in

the current transport fleet and for all

future type certification activities.

Effect of General Statement of Policy

The general policy stated in this

document is not intended to establish a

binding norm; it does not constitute a

new regulation and the FAA would not

apply or rely upon it as a regulation.

The FAA Aircraft Certification Offices

(ACO) that certify transport category

airplanes and/or the thrust management

systems installed on them should

generally attempt to follow this policy,

when appropriate. However, in

determining compliance with

certification standards, each ACO has

the discretion not to apply these

guidelines where it determines that they

are inappropriate. Applicants should

expect that the certificating officials will

consider this information when making

findings of compliance relevant to new

certificate actions.

In addition, as with all advisory

material, this statement of policy

identifies one means, but not the only

means, of compliance.

Because this general statement of

policy only announces what the FAA

seeks to establish as policy, the FAA

considers it an issue for which public

comment is appropriate. Therefore, the

FAA requests comment on the following

proposed general statement of policy

relevant to type certification assessment

of thrust management systems.

The Policy Statement

Thrust Management Systems. A

System Safety Assessment is essential

for any airplane system that aids the

crew in managing engine thrust (for

example, computing target engine

ratings, commanding engine thrust

levels, etc.). As a minimum, the

applicant must assess the system

criticality and failure hazard

classification.

The system criticality will depend on:

• The range of thrust management

errors it could cause;

• The likelihood that the flight crew

will detect these errors and take

appropriate corrective action; and

• The severity of the effects of these

errors with and without intervention by

the flight crew.

The hazard classification will depend

on the most severe effects anticipated

from any system. The need for more indepth analysis will depend upon such

things as the system’s complexity,

novelty, initial failure hazard

classification, and relationship to other

aircraft systems.

Automated thrust management

features, such as autothrottles and target

rating displays, traditionally have been

certified on the basis that they are only

conveniences to reduce crew workload

and do not relieve the flight crew of any

responsibility for assuring proper thrust

management. In some cases,

malfunctions of these systems can be

considered minor, at most. However, for

this to be valid, even when the flight

crew is no longer directly involved in

performing a given thrust management

function, the flight crew must be

provided with information concerning

unsafe system operating conditions to

32412 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 115 / Thursday, June 14, 2001 / Notices

enable them to take appropriate

corrective action.

Consequently, failures within any

automated thrust management feature

that could create a catastrophe if not

detected and properly accommodated

by flight crew action should be

considered either:

1. A catastrophic failure condition

when demonstrating compliance with

§ 25.1309(b) and/or § 25.901(c); or

2. An unsafe system operating

condition when demonstrating

compliance with the warning

requirements of § 25.1309(c).

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 1,

2001.

Dorenda D. Baker,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–14489 Filed 6–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

Environmental Impact Statement:

Cambria County, PA

AGENCY: Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The FHWA is issuing this

notice to advise the public that an

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

will be prepared for a proposed

transportation improvement project on

S.R. 0056 (Route 56) in Johnstown,

Cambria County, Pennsylvania.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David W. Cough, P.E., Director of

Operations, Federal Highway

Administration, Pennsylvania Division

Office, 228 Walnut Street, Harrisburg,

PA 17101–1720, (717) 221–3411 or

Vincent S. Greenland, P.E., Project

Manager, Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation, District 9–0, 1620 North

Juniata Street, Hollidaysburg,

Pennsylvania 16648, (814) 696–7179.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

FHWA, in cooperation with the

Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation (PENNDOT), will

prepare an EIS to identify and evaluate

transportation improvements to Route

56 through the West End of Johnstown,

Pennsylvania. Included in the overall

project will be the development of a

reasonable range of alternatives that

meet the project need and supporting

environmental documentation and

analysis to recommend a preferred

alternative for implementation. An

extensive public outreach/involvement

program has been developed

specifically for this project.

Based on preliminary traffic studies

performed as part of the Route 56 West

End Traffic Study in 1998,

improvements to the highway system

through Johnstown’s West End are

necessary to improve traffic conditions.

Identified project needs included safety,

geometric deficiencies, deficient

operational characteristics including

poor access and traffic flow with heavy

truck volumes, and transportation

factors limiting economic vitality.

Possible alternatives to the project

include: No build; transportation system

management (TSM); relocation

alternative to the east through

Minersville and around Coopersdale

connecting to S.R. 0403; relocation

alternative to the east through

Minersville and around Coopersdale

crossing over 403 and the Conemaugh

River prior to connecting back to Route

56 north of Oakhurst; partial relocation

alternative that crosses the Conemaugh

River north of Fairfield Avenue, follows

S.R. 403 through Coopersdale and then

crosses back over the Conemaugh River

prior to connecting back to Route 56

north of Oakhurst; partial relocation

alternative that runs along the Norfolk

Southern railroad tracks and the

Conemaugh River east of Morrelville

and Oakhurst connecting back to Route

56 north of Oakhurst; relocation

alternative to the east through

Minersville that crosses the Conemaugh

River southwest of Coopersdale and

runs along the Norfolk Southern

railroad tracks and the Conemaugh

River east of Morrelville and Oakhurst

connecting back to Route 56 north of

Oakhurst; a relocation alternative that

entails a combination of the alternatives

described above; and two additional

relocation alternatives yet to be defined.

These alternatives will be the basis for

a recommendation of an alternative to

be carried forward for detailed

environmental and engineering studies

in the EIS. Incorporated into and

studied with the various alternatives

will be design variations of grade and

alignment.

Letters describing the proposed action

and soliciting comments will be sent to

appropriate federal, state, and local

agencies, and to private organizations

and citizens who have previously

expressed or are known to have interest

in this project. Public involvement and

agency coordination will be maintained

throughout the development of the EIS.

To ensure that the full range of issues

related to the proposed action are

addressed and all significant issues are

identified, comments and suggestions

are invited from all interested parties.

Comments or questions concerning this

proposed action and the EIS should be

directed to PENNDOT at the address

posted above.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Program Number 20.205, Highway Planning

and Construction. The regulations

implementing Executive Order 12372

regarding intergovernmental consultation on

Federal programs and activities apply to this

program.)

James A. Cheatham,

FHWA Division Administrator, Harrisburg,

PA.

[FR Doc. 01–15022 Filed 6–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–22–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Transit Administration

Notice of Granted Buy America Waiver

AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration

(FTA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of dear colleague letter.

SUMMARY: The Federal Transit

Administration (FTA) issued a ‘‘Dear

Colleague’’ letter on March 30, 2001,

addressing inquiries regarding its Buy

America regulations that focused on the

calculation of the cost of the

components and subcomponents of

rolling stock. In order to ensure wide

dissemination of this letter, it is

published below, together with further

explanation in this preamble.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE

CONTACT: Meghan G. Ludtke, FTA,

Office of Chief Counsel, Room 9316,

(202) 366–4011 (telephone) or (202)

366–3809 (fax).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FTA has

received inquiries about the transit

industry’s calculation of the cost of

components and subcomponents of

rolling stock under the Buy America

provisions. See 49 U.S.C. 5323(j) and 49

CFR 661.11. More specifically, based on

information in a 1995 FTA Buy America

handbook, there was concern that

grantees were identifying the entire

propulsion system as one component for

purposes of calculating the domestic

content of rolling stock. As a result, on

March 30, 2001, FTA issued a ‘‘Dear

Colleague’’ letter explaining the

applicability of the Buy America

requirements to the procurement of

rolling stock.

A propulsion system normally

consists of a traction motor, propulsion

gearbox, acceleration and breaking

resistors, and propulsion controls.

According to the appendices of the Buy

America regulations applicable to

rolling stock, each of these items should