## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it

____________ N o. 07
- 1949 I N R E : D I ANA H OLL AND , D ebto r-A pp ellee
. A PP E A L OF : R O Y S AF ANDA, Trustee .

____________ A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our tfo r the No rthernDi stricto f Illino is, Eas tern Di v isi on. No . 06 C5424

—Ronal d A . G uzman, Judge
.

____________ A RG UE D F EB RU AR Y 11, 2008

— D ECI DE D A UGUS T 19, 2008

____________
Befo re B AUER, K ANN E , a nd W I L L I A MS, C ircu it Judges . W I L L I A MS, Cir cu i tJudg e . W hen a debtorfiles f orbank

ruptcy i n I l l i noi s but own s rea l pro pertyi n Fl or i da, wh i ch sta te’ s l aw appli es i n d et er m i ni ng wh etherthe proper ty is ex e m p t from the d ebtor’s ban krup tcy est ate? Th at’s th e ce nt r alque st i o n r ai se d o n a ppea l he re a nd the answ ertur ns o n 11 U
. S. C. § 5 22( b) ( 2) ( B) ( 2005 ) ( w hi ch has s i nce be en r enum ber ed as § 5 22( b) ( 3) (B )). Debto r2 N o. 07
- 1949 Di a na Ho l l a nd b e l i e v e s t hi s pr o v i s i o n po i nt s us t o F l o r i da law ; th e t r u s te e o f h er ba n kr u p tc y e st at e p re fer s Illin ois l aw . The di str i c t c ou rtag re ed w i th H ol l and but neve r deci ded wh ethershe w as enti tl ed to an exem pti on under Fl or i da l aw ; i t i nstea d rem anded the m att erto t he bank

ruptcy cour t. Because the di str i ct court ’ s d eci si on w as not a fi nal appeal abl e o rd er , we dis m i ss thi s a pp ealf orl ack o fj ur i sdi ct i o n.
I . B AC KGR OUND On O ctob er 1 5, 2005 , H ol l and fi l ed f orChapter 7 ba nkrup tc y i n the N or ther n Dis tr i ct o fI l l i noi s. A l though do mi c i l e d i n I l l i no i s , Ho l l a nd s o ughtt o e xe mpt$ 3 5 0 , 000 w or th o funi nhabi ted r ealpro pertythatshe own s a s a t e na ntb y the e nt i r e t y i n F l o r i da, cl a i mi ngtha tF l o r i da l aw (as i ncor pora ted by 11 U
. S. C. § 5 22( b) ( 2) ) exem pts the l and fr om the bankr uptcy es tat e. The Chapter 7 ba nkruptcy tr ustee di sag re ed, ar gui ng that sect i on 5 22 i nstea d re quir ed the cour t t o apply Illinoi s l aw , wh i ch ( unli ke Fl or i da l aw ) would not exem pt the proper ty. W i t ho uta ddr e s s i ngwh i c h s t a t e ’ s e xe mpt i o ns a ppl i ed, th e ba nk r upt cyco ur t a ppl i ed I l l i no i s l aw and r ul ed i n the tr us te e’ s f av o r . On appe al, the di strict c o ur t r ev er se d a nd concl ud ed the bankr up tcy cour t s houl d have a pp l i ed F l o r i da l a w. Ho we v e r, the d i str i c tc o ur tdi d n o tde c i de whethe r F l o r i da la w ac tu al l y e nt i tl ed H o l l an d t o the ex em p t io n . Th e trus tee th en ap p ealed the d istri ct cou rt’s o r de r t o thi s c o ur t, a nd the di str i ct c o ur ts t a y e d p r o c e e din gs p en d in g t h is a p p ea l.N o. 07
- 1949 3 II. A N A L Y S IS U nfo rtun at ely f orev er yone , the parti es have gi ven l i ttl e t h ought to w hetherwe have a pp el l ate j uri sdic ti on i n thi s ca se. I n hi s “ J uri sdic ti onal Statem ent, ” the tr ustee ch ar ac te r i ze s th e di st r i ctc o ur t’ s o r der tha t r ev er se d a nd re m anded the bankr up tcy cour t’ s deci si on as a “fi nal j udg m en t” tha t “de n[ i ed] the T rus te e’ s o bj ec ti o n t o the Deb to r ’ s cl ai m ed ex empti o n i n F l o r i da r ea l e st ate . ” The tr us te e be l i ev es tha t “[ t] he D ist r i ctCo ur t’ s o r deri s co nsi der ed a fi na l j udg m en t be ca us e i t det erm ined th e D eb to r’s en tit lem en t t o a ba n kr u p tc y e x em p tio n .” The tr ustee i s m i sta ken. The di stri ct c ourt ’ s dock et re veal s there has been no “ fi nalj ud gm ent” i n thi s ca se. W hi l e th e di st r i ctc o ur t’ s o r derc o ul d ha ve t ak enthe p lac e o f a f o rm al R u le 5 8 jud gm en t, su c h an ord er w ou ld have const i tuted a fi nal j ud gm en t on l y i fthe cour t was actual l y “ fi ni shed w i th the cas e. ” See, e . g. , Ta y l o r-H o lm es v. O ffice o f t heCook Coun ty Pub
. Guar di an , 50 3 F
. 3d 607, 609 ( 7th Ci r. 20 07)
. A nd that ’ s no t w h at h appened her e. A l t ho ugh the di s t r i c tc o ur t ’ s o r de r h e l d tha tthe b a nk

ruptcy cour t s houl d have a pp l i ed Fl or i da l aw , i t nev er add re sse d w hetherH ol l and w as actual l y e nti tl ed to a bank r upt cye xe m pti o n. I nde ed, the o r ders ta te d, “ The Court express es no o pini on o n w hether H ol l and has a val i d exem pti on under F l or i da l aw . ” C f. In r eYoni kus , 996 F. 2d 8 66 , 868 ( 7th Ci r. 19 93) ( “Orders gr anting o r deny i nge xe mpt i o ns a r e a pp e a l a b l e a s fi na l j ud g men ts und er28 U
. S. C. § 1 58( d). ”)
. I fanythi ng , t h e or der s ugges ted

— as the t r us te e hi m se l fc o nc ede s i n h i s o pen i ng bri ef

— that the m att erhas been re m anded f orfurther4 N o. 07
- 1949 p ro c ee d in gs be for e t h e b an kr u p tc y c ou rt . See A p p ell an t’s Br
. a t 11
- 12 ( “T he Di st r i ctCour t r ev er se d the rul i ngofthe ba nk r upt cyj udg e a nd re m an ded f o r det er m i na ti o n o fthe validity of M s. H oll an d ’s exem p tion un d er Fl orida law
. ”). A s f ar as w e kn ow, thos e pr oce edi ngs hav e y et to tak e pl a c e a nd the ma t t e r r e mai ns s t a y e d. C i r c u i t c ou rt s re m ain sp lit on w h ich te st to ap p ly in deter m i ni ng wh ethera dist ri ct courtorder thatr em ands a c as e t o a ba n kr u p tc y c ou rtis ap p ea la b le. Se e, e . g. , In re Lo pez , 1 16 F.3d 1191 , 1 192 (7th C ir. 1 997) (cataloging case s). M os t c i rcui ts have hel d that s uch an or der i s no t fi nal an d ap p ea lab le u n les s t h e re m an d is for “ m in ist er ial” p ro c ee d in gs . Se e, e . g. , In re P ratt, 52 4 F
. 3d 580, 58 4- 85 ( 5th C ir. 20 08 ), cert . d e nied , 128 S. C t. 24 45 (20 08 ); In rePe nn Traf f i c Co. , 4 6 6 F
. 3 d 7 5 , 7 8
- 7 9 ( 2 d C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( p e r c u r i a m) ; In r e To rres , 432 F.3d 20 , 22-2 3 (1 st C ir. 20 05 ); In re P opk in & Stern , 28 9 F.3d 55 4, 55 6 (8th C ir. 20 02 ); In reO ve r l and P a rk Fin . Corp. , 236 F.3d 12 46 , 125 1 (1 0t h C ir. 20 01 ); In re A lva rez , 22 4 F .3d 12 73 , 127 5 (1 1t h C ir. 20 00 ); JoveEng’g v . IRS , 92 F. 3d 1539, 1547-48 (11th Cir. 1996); In re St. C ha rles Pre servati on Inve s t ors , Lt d. , 916 F.2d 727, 728-29 (D.C
. Cir. 19 90 ) (p er cu ria m ); see also In r eWal l ac e& Gal eCo. , 72 F. 3d 21 , 2 4 ( 4th Ci r . 1 99 5) ( “Di st r i ctc o ur t o r der s r emandi ng case s t o the b ankr up tcy cour t f orfurtherco nsiderat i on ar e n ot, ord in ar ily, fina l ord er s. ”). T h e Six th C irc u it “ w ill not deem fi nal a dist ri ct c ourt ’s d ecis i on r em anding to a ba n kr u ptcy co urt f orfurtherpro ceedi ngs i fthe dist ri ct cour t has notcer ti fi ed the deci si on pursuant to Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 54 ( b)
. ”In reB r o wn , 2 4 8 F .3 d 48 4, 48 5 (6 th C ir. 20 01 ); see a lso In re Yousif

, 201 F.3d 77 4, 78 1 (6 th C ir. 2 00 0) (M oo re , J. , c on c u rrin g). A n d th e T h ird an d N in th C irc u its ap p lyN o. 07
- 1949 5

m ult i
- f acto r bal anci ng t es ts to deter m i ne wh etheran or d er is fin al a n d ap p ea lab le in th is c on te x t. See In re Fo w ler, 394 F.3d 12 08 , 121 1 (9th C ir. 20 05 ); In rePr ans ky, 31 8 F. 3d 536, 54 0- 41 ( 3d Cir
. 20 03)
. O u r c i r c u i tpre ce d e n ta c c o r d s wi t h th e maj o r i t y v i e w: “ [ E ] v e n if th e d ec isio n of th e ba n kr u p tc y cou rt is fi n al, a dec i si o n b y the di st r i ctc o ur t o n a ppea l r emandi ngthe b an kr u p tc y c o u r t’s d ec isio nfor fu rt h er p ro c ee d in gs in th e b an kr u p tc y c ou rtis n ot fin al, an d so is n ot ap p ea lab le to thi s co urt, unl ess the furtherpro ceedi ngs c onte m pla ted ar e o fa pu re l y m i ni ste ri alcharac te r . . . . ” In re Lo pez , 11 6 F.3 d at11 92 . W h at re m a i n s t o b e d ec id ed h er e is h ar d ly m i ni s t e r i a l : t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t s t i l l h a s t o a n s we r t he $350 , 000 questi on wh etherH ol l and i s e nti tl ed to an ex em p tio n u n d er Flor id a la w . See In re A .G . Fin. Serv . Ctr., Inc. , 3 95 F
. 3d 41 0, 4 13 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 5) ( “T o say th atthe re m and is fo r a m i ni ste ri alacti s t o say thatthe dist ri ct j ud ge has full y re sol ved the l i ti gat i on: ther e is n o legal dec i si o n f o r a b an k r upt cy j udg e t o make , no f ac t to fi nd, no disc re ti on t o exer ci se. ”)
. Onlythen

— afterthe ban kruptcy cour t has m ade i ts fi nal r uling, t h e d i str i ct c ourthas r ev i si te d the c as e, a nd a fr es h n o ti ce o fa ppea l t o o ur cour t has be en fi l ed

— can we exer ci se j uri sdic ti on o ver th e m at te r. See In reFo x , 762 F.2d 54, 55-56 ( 7th Cir. 1985).

I I I . C ONC L US I ON The appeal i s D IS MIS S ED f o r l ac ko fj ur i sdi ct i o n.
8- 19- 08