(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. ET AL. v. PROMEGA 

CORP.
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 14–1538. Argued December 6, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017 

Respondent Promega Corporation sublicensed the Tautz patent, which 

claims a toolkit for genetic testing, to petitioner Life Technologies

Corporation and its subsidiaries (collectively Life Technologies) for 

the manufacture and sale of the kits for use in certain licensed law 

enforcement fields worldwide. One of the kit’s five components, an 

enzyme known as the Taq polymerase, was manufactured by Life 

Technologies in the United States and then shipped to the United 

Kingdom, where the four other components were made, for combination there. When Life Technologies began selling the kits outside the

licensed fields of use, Promega sued, claiming that patent infringement liability was triggered under §271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which 

prohibits the supply from the United States of “all or a substantial

portion of the components of a patented invention” for combination

abroad. The jury returned a verdict for Promega, but the District

Court granted Life Technologies’ motion for judgment as a matter of

law, holding that §271(f)(1)’s phrase “all or a substantial portion” did

not encompass the supply of a single component of a multicomponent 

invention. The Federal Circuit reversed. It determined that a single 

important component could constitute a “substantial portion” of the

components of an invention under §271(f)(1) and found the Taq polymerase to be such a component. 

Held: The supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention 

for manufacture abroad does not give rise to §271(f)(1) liability. 

Pp. 4–11.

(a) Section 271(f)(1)’s phrase “substantial portion” refers to a quantitative measurement. Although the Patent Act itself does not define 

the term “substantial,” and the term’s ordinary meaning may refer 
 

 

 

2 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. PROMEGA CORP. 

Syllabus 

either to qualitative importance or to quantitatively large size, the 

statutory context points to a quantitative meaning. Neighboring

words “all” and “portion” convey a quantitative meaning, and nothing 

in the neighboring text points to a qualitative interpretation. Moreover, a qualitative reading would render the modifying phrase “of the

components” unnecessary the first time it is used in §271(f)(1). Only

the quantitative approach thus gives meaning to each statutory provision. 

Promega’s proffered “case-specific approach,” which would require 

a factfinder to decipher whether the components at issue are a “substantial portion” under either a qualitative or a quantitative test, is

rejected. Tasking juries with interpreting the statute’s meaning on 

an ad hoc basis would only compound, not resolve, the statute’s ambiguity. And Promega’s proposal to adopt an analytical framework

that accounts for both the components’ quantitative and qualitative

aspects is likely to complicate rather than aid the factfinder’s review. 

Pp. 4–8.

(b) Under a quantitative approach, a single component cannot constitute a “substantial portion” triggering §271(f)(1) liability. This 

conclusion is reinforced by §271(f)’s text, context, and structure. Section 271(f)(1) consistently refers to the plural “components,” indicating that multiple components make up the substantial portion.

Reading §271(f)(1) to cover any single component would also leave little room for §271(f)(2), which refers to “any component,” and would

undermine §271(f)(2)’s express reference to a single component “especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention.” The better reading allows the two provisions to work in tandem and gives

each provision its unique application. Pp. 8–10. 

(c) The history of §271(f) further bolsters this conclusion. Congress

enacted §271(f) in response to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 

Corp., 406 U. S. 518, to fill a gap in the enforceability of patent rights

by reaching components that are manufactured in the United States 

but assembled overseas. Consistent with Congress’s intent, a supplier may be liable under §271(f)(1) for supplying from the United 

States all or a substantial portion of the components of the invention 

or under §271(f)(2) for supplying a single component if it is especially

made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple

article or commodity. But, as here, when a product is made abroad

and all components but a single commodity article are supplied from

abroad, the activity is outside the statute’s scope. Pp. 10–11. 

773 F. 3d. 1338, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

and ALITO, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–C. ALITO, J., filed an opinion 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, 

J., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., took no part in the decision of the case. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–1538 

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. PROMEGA CORPORATION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 

[February 22, 2017]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case concerns the intersection of international 

supply chains and federal patent law. Section 271(f )(1) of 

the Patent Act of 1952 prohibits the supply from the 

United States of “all or a substantial portion” of the components of a patented invention for combination abroad. 35 

U. S. C. §271(f )(1). We granted certiorari to determine

whether a party that supplies a single component of a 

multicomponent invention for manufacture abroad can be 

held liable for infringement under §271(f )(1). 579 U. S. 

___ (2016). We hold that a single component does not

constitute a substantial portion of the components that

can give rise to liability under §271(f )(1). Because only a

single component of the patented invention at issue here

was supplied from the United States, we reverse and 

remand. 

I 

A 

We begin with an overview of the patent in dispute.

Although the science behind the patent is complex, a basic 

understanding suffices to resolve the question presented 
 

 

 

2 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. PROMEGA CORP. 

Opinion of the Court 

by this case.

The Tautz patent, U. S. Reissue Patent No. RE 37,984,

claims a toolkit for genetic testing.1 The kit is used to take 

small samples of genetic material—in the form of nucleotide sequences that make up the molecule deoxyribonucleic acid (commonly referred to as “DNA”)—and then synthesize multiple copies of a particular nucleotide sequence.

This process of copying, known as amplification, generates

DNA profiles that can be used by law enforcement agencies for forensic identification and by clinical and research

institutions around the world. For purposes of this litigation, the parties agree that the kit covered by the Tautz

patent contains five components: (1) a mixture of primers 

that mark the part of the DNA strand to be copied; (2)

nucleotides for forming replicated strands of DNA; (3) an 

enzyme known as Taq polymerase; (4) a buffer solution for

the amplification; and (5) control DNA.2 

Respondent Promega Corporation was the exclusive

licensee of the Tautz patent. Petitioner Life Technologies

Corporation manufactured genetic testing kits.3 During

the timeframe relevant here, Promega sublicensed the

Tautz patent to Life Technologies for the manufacture and

sale of the kits for use in certain licensed law enforcement 

fields worldwide. Life Technologies manufactured all but 

one component of the kits in the United Kingdom. It 

manufactured that component—the Taq polymerase—in 

—————— 

1The Tautz patent expired in 2015. The litigation thus concerns past 

acts of infringement only. 2Because the parties here agree that the patented invention is made

up of only these five components, we do not consider how to identify the

“components” of a patent or whether and how that inquiry relates to 

the elements of a patent claim. 3Applied Biosystems, LLC, and Invitrogen IP Holdings, Inc., are also 

petitioners in this proceeding and are wholly owned subsidiaries of Life

Technologies Corporation. The agreement at issue here was originally

between Promega and Applied Biosystems. 773 F. 3d 1338, 1344, n. 3 

(CA Fed. 2014). 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

the United States. Life Technologies shipped the Taq

polymerase to its United Kingdom facility, where it was

combined with the other four components of the kit. 

Four years into the agreement, Promega sued Life 

Technologies on the grounds that Life Technologies had 

infringed the patent by selling the kits outside the licensed fields of use to clinical and research markets. As 

relevant here, Promega alleged that Life Technologies’ 

supply of the Taq polymerase from the United States to its 

United Kingdom manufacturing facilities triggered liability under §271(f )(1). 

B 

At trial, the parties disputed the scope of §271(f )(1)’s

prohibition against supplying all or a substantial portion 

of the components of a patented invention from the United 

States for combination abroad. Section 271(f )(1)’s full text 

reads: 

“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 

supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, 

where such components are uncombined in whole or

in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United 

States in a manner that would infringe the patent if 

such combination occurred within the United States, 

shall be liable as an infringer.” 

The jury returned a verdict for Promega, finding that

Life Technologies had willfully infringed the patent. Life 

Technologies then moved for judgment as a matter of law,

contending that §271(f )(1) did not apply to its conduct 

because the phrase “all or a substantial portion” does not

encompass the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention.

The District Court granted Life Technologies’ motion. 
 

4 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. PROMEGA CORP. 

Opinion of the Court 

The court agreed that there could be no infringement 

under §271(f )(1) because Promega’s evidence at trial 

“showed at most that one component of all of the accused 

products, [the Taq] polymerase, was supplied from the 

United States.” 2012 WL 12862829, *3 (WD Wis., Sept.

13, 2012) (Crabb, J.). Section 271(f )(1)’s reference to “a

substantial portion of the components,” the District Court

ruled, does not embrace the supply of a single component. 

Id., at *5. 

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed

and reinstated the jury’s verdict finding Life Technologies 

liable for infringement.4 773 F. 3d 1338, 1353 (2014). As 

relevant here, the court held that “there are circumstances 

in which a party may be liable under §271(f )(1) for supplying or causing to be supplied a single component for combination outside the United States.” Ibid. The Federal 

Circuit concluded that the dictionary definition of “substantial” is “important” or “essential,” which it read to

suggest that a single important component can be a “‘substantial portion of the components’” of a patented invention. Ibid. Relying in part on expert trial testimony that 

the Taq polymerase is a “‘main’” and “‘major’” component

of the kits, the court ruled that the single Taq polymerase

component was a substantial component as the term is 

used in §271(f )(1). Id., at 1356. 

II 

The question before us is whether the supply of a single 

component of a multicomponent invention is an infringing 

act under 35 U. S. C. §271(f )(1). We hold that it is not. 

—————— 

4Chief Judge Prost dissented from the majority’s conclusion with 

respect to the “active inducement” element of 35 U. S. C. §271(f)(1). 773 

F. 3d, at 1358–1360. Neither that question, nor any of the Federal 

Circuit’s conclusions regarding Life Technologies’ liability under 

§271(a) or infringement of four additional Promega patents, see id., at 

1341, is before us. See 579 U. S. ___ (2016). 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

A 

The threshold determination to be made is whether 

§271(f )(2)’s requirement of “a substantial portion” of the

components of a patented invention refers to a quantitative or qualitative measurement. Life Technologies and 

the United States argue that the text of §271(f )(1) establishes a quantitative threshold, and that the threshold 

must be greater than one. Promega defends the Federal

Circuit’s reading of the statute, arguing that a “substantial portion” of the components includes a single component if that component is sufficiently important to the 

invention. 

We look first to the text of the statute. Sebelius v. Cloer, 

569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6). The Patent Act 

itself does not define the term “substantial,” and so we 

turn to its ordinary meaning. Ibid. Here we find little 

help. All agree the term is ambiguous and, taken in isolation, might refer to an important portion or to a large 

portion. Brief for Petitioners 16; Brief for Respondent 18;

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12. “Substantial,” as it is commonly understood, may refer either to 

qualitative importance or to quantitatively large size. See, 

e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 

(defs. 1c, 2c) (1981) (Webster’s Third) (“important, essential,” or “considerable in amount, value, or worth”); 17 

Oxford English Dictionary 67 (defs. 5a, 9) (2d ed. 1989) 

(OED) (“That is, constitutes, or involves an essential part, 

point, or feature; essential, material,” or “Of ample or 

considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions”). 

The context in which “substantial” appears in the statute, however, points to a quantitative meaning here. Its 

neighboring terms are the first clue. “[A] word is given

more precise content by the neighboring words with which 

it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 

294 (2008). Both “all” and “portion” convey a quantitative 

meaning. “All” means the entire quantity, without refer-
 

 

6 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. PROMEGA CORP. 

Opinion of the Court 

ence to relative importance. See, e.g., Webster’s Third 54 

(defs. 1a, 2a, 3) (“that is the whole amount or quantity of,” 

or “every member or individual component of,” or “the

whole number or sum of ”); 1 OED 324 (def. 2) (“The entire

number of; the individual components of, without exception”). “Portion” likewise refers to some quantity less than 

all. Webster’s Third 1768 (defs. 1, 3a) (“an individual’s 

part or share of something,” or “a part of a whole”); 12

OED 154, 155 (def. 1a, 5a) (“The part (of anything) allotted 

or belonging to one person,” or “A part of any whole”). 

Conversely, there is nothing in the neighboring text to

ground a qualitative interpretation.

Moreover, the phrase “substantial portion” is modified

by “of the components of a patented invention.” It is the 

supply of all or a substantial portion “of the components”

of a patented invention that triggers liability for infringement. But if “substantial” has a qualitative meaning, then

the more natural way to write the opening clause of the

provision would be to not reference “the components” at

all. Instead, the opening clause of §271(f )(1) could have

triggered liability for the supply of “all or a substantial

portion of . . . a patented invention, where [its] components are uncombined in whole or in part.” A qualitative

reading would render the phrase “of the components”

unnecessary the first time it is used in §271(f )(1). Whenever possible, however, we should favor an interpretation

that gives meaning to each statutory provision. See Hibbs 

v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004). Only the quantitative 

approach does so here. Thus, “substantial,” in the context 

of §271(f )(1), is most reasonably read to connote a quantitative measure. 

Promega argues that a quantitative approach is too

narrow, and invites the Court to instead adopt a “casespecific approach” that would require a factfinder to decipher whether the components at issue are a “substantial 

portion” under either a qualitative or quantitative test. 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Brief for Respondent 17, 42. We decline to do so. Having

determined the phrase “substantial portion” is ambiguous,

our task is to resolve that ambiguity, not to compound it 

by tasking juries across the Nation with interpreting the 

meaning of the statute on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 345–346 (1997). 

As a more general matter, moreover, we cannot accept

Promega’s suggestion that the Court adopt a different 

analytical framework entirely—one that accounts for both

the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the components. Promega reads §271(f )(1) to mean that the answer 

to whether a given portion of the components is “substantial” depends not only on the number of components involved but also on their qualitative importance to the

invention overall. At first blush, there is some appeal to 

the idea that, in close cases, a subjective analysis of the 

qualitative importance of a component may help determine whether it is a “substantial portion” of the components of a patent. But, for the reasons discussed above, 

the statute’s structure provides little support for a qualitative interpretation of the term.5 

Nor would considering the qualitative importance of a

component necessarily help resolve close cases. To the 

contrary, it might just as easily complicate the factfinder’s 

review. Surely a great many components of an invention 

(if not every component) are important. Few inventions, 

including the one at issue here, would function at all

without any one of their components. Indeed, Promega

has not identified any component covered by the Tautz 

—————— 

5The examples Promega provides of other statutes’ use of the terms

“substantial” or “significant” are inapposite. See Brief for Respondent 

19–20. The text of these statutes, which arise in different statutory

schemes with diverse purposes and structures, differs in material ways 

from the text of §271(f)(1). The Tax Code, for instance, refers to “a 

substantial portion of a return,” 26 U. S. C. §7701(a)(36)(A), not to “a

substantial portion of the entries of a return.” 
 

 

 

8 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. PROMEGA CORP. 

Opinion of the Court 

patent that would not satisfy Promega’s “importance” 

litmus test.6 How are courts—or, for that matter, market 

participants attempting to avoid liability—to determine

the relative importance of the components of an invention?

Neither Promega nor the Federal Circuit offers an easy

way to make this decision. Accordingly, we conclude that

a quantitative interpretation hews most closely to the text

of the statute and provides an administrable construction. 

B 

Having determined that the term “substantial portion” 

refers to a quantitative measurement, we must next decide whether, as a matter of law, a single component can

ever constitute a “substantial portion” so as to trigger

liability under §271(f )(1). The answer is no. 

As before, we begin with the text of the statute. Section 

271(f )(1) consistently refers to “components” in the plural. 

The section is targeted toward the supply of all or a substantial portion “of the components,” where “such components” are uncombined, in a manner that actively induces 

the combination of “such components” outside the United 

States. Text specifying a substantial portion of “components,” plural, indicates that multiple components constitute the substantial portion.

The structure of §271(f ) reinforces this reading. Section 

271(f )(2), which is §271(f )(1)’s companion provision, reads

as follows: 

“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 

supplied in or from the United States any component

of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a

staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 

—————— 

6Life Technologies’ expert described the Taq polymerase as a “main” 

component. App. 160. The expert also described two other components 

the same way. Ibid. 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

substantial noninfringing use, where such component

is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such 

component is so made or adapted and intending that 

such component will be combined outside of the 

United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United 

States, shall be liable as an infringer.” 

Reading §271(f )(1) to refer to more than one component 

allows the two provisions to work in tandem. Whereas 

§271(f )(1) refers to “components,” plural, §271(f )(2) refers

to “any component,” singular. And, whereas §271(f )(1) 

speaks to whether the components supplied by a party

constitute a substantial portion of the components, 

§271(f )(2) speaks to whether a party has supplied “any” 

noncommodity component “especially made or especially

adapted for use in the invention.” 

We do not disagree with the Federal Circuit’s observation that the two provisions concern different scenarios. 

See 773 F. 3d, at 1354. As this Court has previously observed, §§271(f )(1) and 271(f )(2) “differ, among other 

things, on the quantity of components that must be ‘supplie[d] . . . from the United States’ for liability to attach.” 

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 454, n. 16 

(2007). But we do not draw the Federal Circuit’s conclusion from these different but related provisions. Reading

§271(f )(1) to cover any single component would not only 

leave little room for §271(f )(2), but would also undermine 

§271(f )(2)’s express reference to a single component “especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention.”7 Our conclusion that §271(f )(1) prohibits the supply 

of components, plural, gives each subsection its unique 

—————— 

7This Court’s opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 

437, 447 (2007), is not to the contrary. The holding in that case turned 

not on the number of components involved, but rather on whether the 

software at issue was a component at all. 
 

 

 

10 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. PROMEGA CORP. 

Opinion of the Court 

application.8 See, e.g., Cloer, 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 6).

Taken alone, §271(f )(1)’s reference to “components” 

might plausibly be read to encompass “component” in the

singular. See 1 U. S. C. §1 (instructing that “words importing the plural include the singular,” “unless the context indicates otherwise”). But §271(f )’s text, context, and 

structure leave us to conclude that when Congress said

“components,” plural, it meant plural, and when it said

“component,” singular, it meant singular.

We do not today define how close to “all” of the components “a substantial portion” must be. We hold only that 

one component does not constitute “all or a substantial

portion” of a multicomponent invention under §271(f )(1).

This is all that is required to resolve the question presented. 

C 

The history of §271(f ) bolsters our conclusion. The 

Court has previously observed that Congress enacted 

§271(f ) in response to our decision in Deepsouth Packing 

Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518 (1972). See Microsoft 

Corp., 550 U. S., at 444. In Deepsouth, the Court determined that, under patent law as it existed at the time, it

was “not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United States.” 406 U. S., at 527. The 

—————— 

8Promega argues that the important distinction between these provisions is that §271(f)(1), unlike §271(f)(2), requires a showing of specific

intent for active inducement. Brief for Respondent 34–41. But cf. 

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. 754, 765–766 

(2011) (substantially equating the intent requirements for §§271(b) and 

271(c), on which Promega asserts §§271(f)(1) and (f)(2) were modeled).

But, to repeat, whatever intent subsection (f)(1) may require, it also

imposes liability only on a party who supplies a “substantial portion of

the components” of the invention. Thus, even assuming that subsection

(f)(1)’s “active inducement” requirement is different from subsection

(f)(2)’s “knowing” and “intending” element—a question we do not reach 

today—that difference between the two provisions does not read the

“substantial portion” language out of the statute. 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

new §271(f ) “expand[ed] the definition of infringement to

include supplying from the United States a patented 

invention’s components,” as outlined in subsections (f )(1) 

and (f )(2). Microsoft, 550 U. S., at 444–445. 

The effect of this provision was to fill a gap in the enforceability of patent rights by reaching components that 

are manufactured in the United States but assembled 

overseas and that were beyond the reach of the statute in 

its prior formulation. Our ruling today comports with 

Congress’ intent. A supplier may be liable under 

§271(f )(1) for supplying from the United States all or a 

substantial portion of the components (plural) of the invention, even when those components are combined 

abroad. The same is true even for a single component 

under §271(f )(2) if it is especially made or especially 

adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or

commodity. We are persuaded, however, that when as in

this case a product is made abroad and all components but 

a single commodity article are supplied from abroad, this

activity is outside the scope of the statute. 

III 

We hold that the phrase “substantial portion” in 35

U. S. C. §271(f )(1) has a quantitative, not a qualitative, 

meaning. We hold further that §271(f )(1) does not cover 

the supply of a single component of a multicomponent 

invention. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this 

case. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–1538 

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. PROMEGA CORPORATION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 

[February 22, 2017]

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 

I join all but Part II–C of the Court’s opinion. It is clear 

from the text of 35 U. S. C. §271(f) that Congress intended 

not only to fill the gap created by Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 

Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518 (1972)—where all of the

components of the invention were manufactured in the

United States, id., at 524—but to go at least a little further. How much further is the question in this case, and

the genesis of §271(f) sheds no light on that question. 

I note, in addition, that while the Court holds that a 

single component cannot constitute a substantial portion 

of an invention’s components for §271(f)(1) purposes, I do

not read the opinion to suggest that any number greater

than one is sufficient. In other words, today’s opinion 

establishes that more than one component is necessary, 

but does not address how much more.