J-S73022-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GREGORY R. AMOS

Appellant No. 1181 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of March 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-41-CR-0000491-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2014

Gregory R. Amos appeals his March 24, 2014 judgment of sentence, 

which was imposed pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea to one count of 

possession with intent to deliver cocaine,1and one count of driving under 

suspension.2 Amos’ counsel has filed with this Court a petition to withdraw 

as counsel, together with an “Anders” brief.3 We grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw, and we quash Amos’ appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The trial court has summarized the procedural history of this case as 

follows:

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a).

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
J-S73022-14

- 2 -

On March 8, 2013, Trooper Joel Miles charged [Amos] with 

possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, 

driving a vehicle with a suspended registration, driving without a 

license, and driving while his license was suspended or revoked.

On August 21, 2013, [Amos] entered a guilty plea to possession 

with intent to deliver more than 10 grams of cocaine and driving 

under suspension (DUS). The plea agreement provided that the 

Commonwealth would waive all mandatories and any school 

zone enhancement, and [Amos] would waive his eligibility for 

Boot Camp and a Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (RRRI), 

forfeit $195, and receive a sentence of thirty to sixty months for 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and a 

$1000 fine and consecutive thirty-day sentence for DUS.

On March 24, 2014, the court sentenced [Amos] to two and one 

half to five years’ incarceration in a state correctional institution 

for possession with intent to deliver cocaine and a $1000 fine 

and a concurrent fifteen to thirty days’ incarceration for DUS. 

The court specifically noted that [Amos] was ineligible for RRRI 

due to a simple assault conviction, but he also waived RRRI and 

boot camp eligibility as part of the plea agreement.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 8/11/2014, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted; some 

numerals and punctuation modified).

Amos did not file a post-sentence motion after his sentence was 

imposed on March 24, 2014. On June 23, 2014, Amos mailed a pro se 

petition, entitled “Petition for Appellate Review of Sentence” to this Court, 

which we received on June 26, 2014. On July 17, 2014, this Court entered 

an order granting the application “to the extent that it shall be treated as a 

Notice of Appeal, filed in the trial court on June 27, 2014.” The trial court 

did not direct Amos to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 
J-S73022-14

- 3 -

1925(a), the trial court issued an opinion in support of its order on August 

11, 2014. 

Before addressing the merits of the underlying issue that Amos 

presents for our review, we first must pass upon counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (en banc). Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under 

Anders, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established 

by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 

(Pa. 2009). The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of the 

Anders brief to the appellant. Attending the brief must be a letter that 

advises the appellant of his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue 

the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the 

appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention in addition to the points 

raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 

A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007); see Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 
J-S73022-14

- 4 -

A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 

748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Our review of counsel’s petition to withdraw and the accompanying 

brief reveals that counsel substantially has complied with the Santiago

requirements. Counsel has provided a factual and procedural history 

detailing the events relevant to the instant appeal in his brief. Brief for 

Amos at 5. Amos identified one issue to counsel that he wanted to raise on 

appeal: a claim that, because the trial court failed to sentence Amos to a 

RRRI minimum sentence, the sentence imposed is excessive and an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 8. Counsel addresses the applicable facts and principles of 

law, ultimately concluding that this claim would be frivolous. Id. at 11-12. 

In his petition to withdraw as counsel filed with this Court, counsel again 

certified that he has “made a conscientious examination of the record and 

current case law and believes that the appeal is frivolous.” See Petition for 

Permission to Withdraw as Counsel, 8/22/2014, ¶5. Although counsel has 

not referred to any information in the record that counsel believes arguably 

would support Amos’ pursuit of relief, we acknowledge that the absence of 

such a reference reflects the fact that counsel believes that there is no 

information in the record that supports Amos’ claim. 

Additionally, in accordance with Nischan, counsel has sent Amos a 

copy of the Anders brief and a letter informing him that: (1) he has the 

right to retain new counsel; (2) he may proceed further with his case pro se; 

and (3) he may raise any points that he deems worthy of the Superior 
J-S73022-14

- 5 -

Court’s attention. Letter, 9/19/2014. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel 

substantially has complied with the requirements set forth in Nischan, 928 

A.2d at 353. See also Millisock, 873 A.2d at 751. 

We now must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the issue identified by Amos in this appeal is, as counsel 

claims, wholly frivolous, or if there are any other meritorious issues present 

in this case. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744) 

(“[T]he court – not counsel – then proceeds, after a full examination of all 

the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so 

finds, it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw . . .”). We agree with 

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous, but we do so for different 

reasons. Indeed, as we set forth below, Amos’ untimely notice of appeal 

renders this Court without jurisdiction

“It is well settled that the timeliness of an appeal implicates our 

jurisdiction and may be considered sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. 

Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). This 

Court does not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

 If no post-sentence motion is filed within ten days after the 

imposition of a sentence, a defendant has thirty days from sentencing to file 

a direct appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3). Amos’ 

sentence was imposed on March 24, 2014, and Amos did not file a postsentence motion. Therefore, Amos must have filed a notice of appeal on or 
J-S73022-14

- 6 -

before April 23, 2014. Amos mailed his pro se petition to this Court on June 

23, 2014, and by this Court’s order on July 17, 2014, the petition was 

deemed to be a notice of appeal filed in the trial court on June 27, 2014. 

Even giving Amos the benefit of treating June 23, 2014 as the filing date 

pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,”4 his notice of appeal was still 

untimely by nearly two months. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of this appeal.

We conclude that counsel substantially has complied with the 

requirements of Anders and Santiago, and agree with counsel’s conclusion 

that Amos’ appeal is frivolous, though for different reasons. The 

jurisdictional defect implicated by Amos’ untimely notice of appeal prevents 

us from considering the merits of Amos’ claim.

Appeal quashed. Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/2014

____________________________________________

4 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Smith v. Pennsylvania 

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 683 A.2d 278 (Pa. 1996).