### iiMitOFiy/,SHiKQTfIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE LARRY M. KASOFF, Appellant,

v. CCB CREDIT SERVICES, INC. Respondent. No. 68601-1-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: August 19, 2013 Verellen, J. — Larry Kasoff appeals the summaryjudgment dismissing his 

### action for a declaratoryjudgment underWashington's Collection Agency Act.1 Because CCB Credit Services Inc., an out-of-state collection agency licensed inWashington, may have committed a prohibited practice by failing to make a reasonable effort to obtain and provide an itemization ofthe amount owing, we reverse. The parties have not fully briefed the appropriate remedy ifKasoffestablishes a prohibited practice, and we decline to reach that question.
FACTS On July 2, 2010, Wells Fargo Bank, NA contacted CCB to collect $27,167.36 from Kasoff. On July 6, CCB sent Kasoff a letter demanding payment. Also on July 6, Kasofftelephoned CCB to dispute the collection account. CCB told Kasoffthat itwould 

### 1Chapter 19.16RCW.No. 68601-1-1/2 

### close the account, but on July 7, CCB requested and obtained Kasoffs credit report. CCB claimed that this was an automated procedure already set into action before the 

### CCB representative assured Kasoff on July 6 that CCB would cease collectionactivity. On July 10, Kasoffmailed CCB a letter requesting an itemization ofthe debt, 

### including a breakdown ofthe amount owing on the original obligation, interest charges, collection costs, and late fees that Wells Fargo applied before sending the account to CCB. An attorney for CCB contacted Kasoff and told him that CCB had ceased collection and closed the account. The attorney suggested Kasoff contact Wells Fargo

to obtain the itemization. Kasofffiled a lawsuit seeking a declaratoryjudgment that (1) CCB committed a prohibited practice under RCW 19.16.250(8)(c) when itfailed to provide the itemization 

### herequested; and (2) he is entitled to theremedy provided in RCW 19.16.450.2 CCB moved for summaryjudgment. The trial court granted CCB's motion, concluding as a
matter of law that CCB did not violate former RCW 19.16.250 because it ceased collection activity and no longer had a duty to provide Kasoffthe information he requested. Kasoff appeals.



### 2FormerRCW 19.16.450 (2010) specifies, "Ifan act or practice in violation of RCW 19.16.250 is committed by a licensee or an employee of a licensee in the collection of a claim, neither the licensee, the customer of the licensee, nor any other 

### person who may thereafter legally seek to collect on such claim shall ever be allowed to recover any interest, service charge, attorneys' fees, collection costs, delinquency 

### charge, or any otherfees or charges otherwise legally chargeable to the debtor on such claim: PROVIDED, That any person asserting the claim may nevertheless recover from the debtor the amount ofthe original claim or obligation."No. 68601-1-1/3
ANALYSIS Standard ofReview 

### This court reviews an order on summaryjudgment de novo, viewing allfacts in 

## the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party.3 Genuine Issue ofMaterial Fact Kasoff asserts that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that CCB did not violate RCW 19.16.250(8)(c). We agree. 

### Washington's Collection Agency Act "imposesrequirements forcommunications 

## about debts and regulates such communications in several otherways."4 The 2010 version of RCW 19.16.250(8)(c) applicable here defined "prohibited practices," including requirements for the first notice of a claim: 

### (c) Ifthe notice, letter, message, orform is the first notice to the debtor... an itemization of the claim asserted must be made including: 

### (i) Amount owing on the original obligation at the time itwas received by the licensee for collection or by assignment; 

### (ii) Interest or service charge, collection costs, or late payment 

### charges, if any, added to the original obligation bythe original creditor, customer or assignor beforeit was received bythe licensee for collection, if such information is known by the licensee or employee: PROVIDED, 

### That upon written requestof thedebtor, the licensee shallmake a reasonable effort to obtain information on such items and provide this 

### information to the debtor.[5]

3'Vallandiqham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400. 154 Wn.2d 16, 109 P.3d 805 

### (2005). Kasoffdid notfile a crossmotion for summaryjudgment in his favor below. 427 Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Washington Practice Creditors' RemediesDebtors' Relief § 1.45, at 62 (1998). 

### 5Former RCW 19.16.250(8)(c) (2010) (emphasis added). The current version of 

### this statute adds more requirements to a licensee'scommunications with a debtor, but the relevant language of subsection (8)(c) remains unchanged.No. 68601-1-1/4 Kasoffs declaratoryjudgment asked the court to rule on whether CCB committed

a prohibited practice by failing to make a reasonable effort to obtain the itemization he 

### requested underRCW 19.16.250(8)(c).6 Kasoffs requestfor a declaration ofhis remedy for such a prohibited practice is an entirely separate question. The following circumstances are relevant to the prohibited practice analysis: 

### (1) Wells Fargo forwarded the account to CCB without providing an itemization; (2) the original balance asserted inthe July 6 letter from CCB was $27,167.36; (3) Kasoff purportedly received statements from Wells Fargo reflecting no amount due on his personal line of credit; (4) Kasoff disputed that any amount was due on his account based upon those statements; (5) Kasoff requested an itemization; and (6) an attorney for CCB suggested Kasoff should contactWells Fargo for the information. A reasonable inference from these circumstances is that CCB had a direct and expeditious way to obtain an itemization for Kasoffby making a direct inquiry to Wells Fargo. But here, the record does not reveal whether the attorney for CCB or anyone else at CCB had any other communications with Wells Fargo about the account, or ifsome other concern led the attorney to suggest Kasoff directly contact Wells Fargo. The record does not reveal, for example, whether Kasoff had multiple accounts at Wells Fargo, or what gave rise to the Wells Fargo statements indicating no amount owing. Viewing the limited facts in the record with all reasonable inferences in Kasoffs favor, there is a question offact whether, under all the circumstances, CCB made reasonable efforts as required by RCW 19.16.250(8)(c).


### 6Kasoffacknowledges that CCB had an initial dutyto include an itemization in the first notice only if"such information is known," and that CCB did not know this information when it sent the demand letter. RCW 19.16.250(8)(c)(ii).No. 68601-1-1/5 Based upon the "inthe collection of a claim" language in RCW 19.16.450, CCB contends that any obligation to make reasonable efforts ended once CCB ceased 

### collecting thedebt.7 Butthatargument goes to the separate question ofthe appropriate remedy if a collection agency commits a prohibited practice. The plain language of RCW 19.16.450 addresses only a remedy available once a prohibited practice has been 

### established.8 The reference in section .450 to commission of a prohibited practice "in the collection of a claim" is not related to the separate question of whether the agency has committed a prohibited practice under section .250. To the extent Kasoff and CCB dispute the remedy available ifKasoffestablishes 

### a prohibited practice, neither party has adequately briefed that question, and we decline 

### to address it.9 The suggestion that ceasing collection efforts establishes a "safeharbor" insulating a collection agency from the remedy provided forin RCW 19.16.450will have 

### to await a more precise record and more thorough briefing.10

7Former RCW 19.16.450, which defines the debtor's remedy for a violation, 

### provides that the remedy applies "[i]fan act or practicein violation ofRCW 19.16.250 is committed by a licensee . . . in thecollection of a claim." (Emphasis added.). 8See Strenae v. Clarke. 89 Wn.2d 23, 33-34, 569 P.2d 60 (1977) (a statute's unambiguous plain language controls). 9 See Norcon Builders LLC v. GMP Homes VG LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 

### P.3d 835 (2011) ("We will not consider an inadequately briefed argument."). 

### 10 Notably, the prohibited practices identified in the currentversion of RCW 19.16.250 include several provisions that expressly recognize that upon written 

### requestfor specific items ofinformation, the collection agency shallprovide the information to the debtor "or cease efforts to collect on the debt until this information is 

### provided." See, e.g., RCW 19.16.250(8)(b) (the name ofthe original creditor); .250(8)(e)(ii) (theoriginal account number); .250(8)(e)(ii) (the date ofthe lastpayment). Theunchanged section .250(8)(c) itemization requestprovision at issue here does not include such a cease collection option.No. 68601-1-1/6 

### The limited record and briefing do not support summaryjudgment in favor of CCB on the discrete issue of whether CCB committed a prohibited practice under 

### RCW 19.16.250. Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences mostfavorably to Kasoff, whether CCB made a reasonable effort to obtain and provide the itemization he 

### requested is agenuine issue ofmaterial fact.11 We reverse thetrial court ordergranting summary judgment and dismissing Kasoffs declaratory judgment action. We decline to reach the separate question ofwhether a remedy under 

### RCW 19.16.450 is appropriate if Kasoffdoes establishCCB committed a prohibited practice. 

### Reversed and remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

# r^ W^VyPQ.,

11 See, e.g., Security State Bankv. Burk. 100Wn. App. 94, 101-02, 995 P.2d 

## 1272 (2000) (reasonableness is aquestion offactto be determined bythe trieroffact); Service Chevrolet. Inc. v. Sparks. 99Wn.2d 199, 205, 660 P.2d 760 (1983) (factual 

## questions should be determined as amatteroflaw only in the clearestofcases).