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KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION APPELLANT 

V. IN SUPREME COURT 

CHRISTOPHER DAVID WIEST APPELLEE 

OPINION AND ORDER 

On December 19, 2016, the Supreme Court of Ohio suspended 

Christopher David Wiest! for two years, with the second year stayed on the 

condition he engage in no further misconduct. Thereafter, the Kentucky Bar 

Association (KBA) filed a petition with this Court asking that we impose 

. . recipro<?al discipline under SCR 3.435(4). We ordered Wiest to show cause, if 

any, why we should riot impose said discipline. Wiest responded to our showcause order; however, we hold that he failed to prove by substantial evidence 

that the grounds set forth in SCR 3.435(4)(a) and (b) were met in his case. 

Because Wiest failed to show sufficient cause, this Court hereby suspends him 

1 Wiest was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky 

on May 2, 2005. His bar roster address is 25 Town Center Blvd.- Ste. 104, Crestview 

Hills, Kentucky 41017. His KBA number is 90725. 
from the practice of law; as consistent with the order of the Ohio Supreme 

Court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Wiest represented Stanley Works in matters which typically concerned 

the company's proposed mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures. During this 

representation, Wiest personally purchased 35,000 shares of lnfoLogix stocka company Wiest knew Stanley considered acquiring. In the course of his 

representation of Stanley, Wiest received an email indicating that his client was 

willing to pay $4.75 per share for the InfoLogix stock. He had never heard of 

the company before this email. He understood that Stanley's interest in 

acquiring lnfoLogix was confidential until the acquisition became public later 

that year. 

InfoLogix announced in October 2010 that its stock had been delisted 

from the NASDAQ stock market. Wiest learned of this development and 

purchased 10,000 shares of the stock using his 401k account. Days later, he 

purchased another 25,000 shares. All of these purchases were at amounts 

well under what he knew Stanley would be paying if the. acquisition went 

through (ranging from $2.84 to $1.95). He did not communicate with Stanley 

at any point about his purchase of the stock. He eventually sold 13,510 of his. 

shares for $1.35 per share, taking a loss of almost $18,000. At that point, he 

was left with 21,490 shares. 

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In December, Stanley announced it was acquiring InfoLogix and paid 

$4.75 per share for its stock. Wiest contacted an attorney with experience in 

dealing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for advice. On 

advice of that counsel, Wiest sold his remaining lnfoLogix stock for a pretax 

profit of more than $56,000. The SEC issued a subpoena compelling Wiest's 

production of Stanley's confidential information. Wiest provided Stanley's 

confidential information to the SEC without communicating with Stanley 

regarding the investigation. 

Wiest was initially charged with violating four ethical rules. However, 

two of these charges were dismissed by the Ohici Board. of Professional Conduct 

panel assigned to his case and another was later dismissed by the Ohio· 

Supreme Court. Specifically, the panel dismissed one charge against Wiest for 

providing confidential client information to the SEC without Stanley's consent 

and another charge involving his use of Stanley's confidential information 

about InfoLogix for his personal stock trading without seeking Stanley's 

informed consent. The panel dismissed these charges on due-process 

grounds, based on its finding that Wiest was not given adequate notice of the 

charges. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the panel's dismissal of these two 

charges. That Court also dismissed another charge related to Wiest's 

disclosure of Stanley's financial information to the SEC without the company's 

consent on due process grounds. 

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With all other charges against Wiest dismissed, the Ohio Supreme Court 

considered the sole remaining allegation-that he had violated Ohio Rule of 

Professional Conduct 8.4(c) (which is comparable to our SCR 3.130c8.4(c)) for 

"engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation." Under this charge, the Cincinnati Bar Association, which 

filed the complaint, asserted that Wiest used confidential information from his 

representation of Stanley in his purchase of InfoLogix stock and did not consult 

with Stanley before he did so. 

In responding to this charge, Wiest insisted that his purchase of 

InfoLogix stock was not based on any confidential information he obtained 

through his representation of Stanley. He also stated that, in his personal 

opinion, Stanley did not plan to go ahead with the acquisition. The panel, 

however, was unconvinced and found that he had engaged in dishonest and 

deceitful behavior through using Stanley's confidential informatioq for personal 

monetary gain and failing to obtain Stanley's or his firm's informed consent 

before doing so. On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Wiest argued that 

there.was not clear and convincing evidence that he went forward with the 

purchase based on Stanley's confidential information obtained through his 

representation of the company. 

In finding that Wiest violated the rule in question, the Ohio Supreme 

Court stated that the parties "misapprehend[ed] the true nature of his 

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dishonesty and deceit and overlook[ed] Wiest's profound failure to appreciate 

what is perhaps one of the most fundamental of his professional obligationshis duty to communicate openly with his client." Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Wiest, 

No. 2016-0263, 2016 WL 7386245, at *5 (Ohio Dec. 19, 2016). That Court 

further pointed out that while the charges "focused primarily on Wiest's use of 

Stanley's confidential information, they also alleged that he failed to disclose 

his actions to his client (or his firm) or to seek 1?,is client's informed consent to 

his actions." Id. It went on to explain that "it is Wiest's repeated concealment 

of information that he was duty-bound to communicate to his client from · 

which we infer his intent to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation." Id. at *7. Ultimately, the court imposed a greater sanction 

than that recommended by the panel and suspended Wiest from the practice of 

law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the condition that he 

eng~ge in no further misconduct. 

In response to this Court's show cause order, .Wiest asserts that there 

was fraud in the Ohio proceedings and that any misconduct warrants a 

substantially different sanction than that imposed in Ohio. For the following 

reasons, we disagree and impose reciprocal discipline under SCR 3.435(4). 

II. ANALYSIS 

If an attorney licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth receives 

discipline in another jurisdiction, SCR 3.435(4) generally requires this Court to 

impose identical discipline. Subsections (4)(a) and. (b) read, in pertinent part: 

"(4) ... this Court shall impose the identical discipline unless Respondent 

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proves by substantial evidence: (a) a lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the out-ofstate disciplinary proceeding, or (b) that misconduct established warrants 

sub!!tantially different discipline in this State." Furthermore, SCR 3.435(4)(c) 

requires this Court to recognize that, in the absence of the circumstances set 

forth in subsections (a) and (b), "a final adjudication in another jurisdiction 

that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the 

misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State." 

A. Fraud 

Wiest first takes issue with the Ohio Supreme Court's statement that "he 

remained silent upon learning that his client was moving forward with its 

acquisition of that company and once again remained silent when the SEC 

issued a subpoena compelling him to produce his client's confidential 

information." Id. He asserts the Court should not have relied upon anything 

related to the SEC, as it had previously dismissed the SEC-related charges for 

lack of notice. Wiest contends that this basis for the Ohio Supreme Court's 

holding amounts to a due process violation-and, therefore, fraud. We 

disagree. 

While Wiest is correct that the phrase "remaining silent' does not appear 

in the complaint issued against him, this was merely the Ohio Supreme Court's 

articulation of the charges. In fact, the complaint indicated that Wiest's 

"undisclosed use of confidential information ... breached the duties of loyalty 

and confidentiality which he owed to his client." That Court merely relied on 

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his continued failure to communicate with his client as grounds for the ethical 

violation of engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 

Wiest also makes much ado about the fact that many of his actions were 

based on the advice of his counsel. He insists that, had he known that his 

actions after selling the stock were at issue, his attorney could have provided 

testimony showing that those actions conformed with his attorney's advice and, 

therefore, did not violate the ethical rule. Wiest did not consult an attorney 

until after he purchased the InfoLogix stock and Stanley announced it was 

acquiring the company. Therefore, this argument is irrelevant to the Ohio 

Supreme Court's evaluation of Wiest's earlier actions. This argument is totally 

irrelevant to our consideration since it fails to support a claim that the Ohio 

proceedings were in some way fraudulent. 

Wiest concedes that there is no case law to which he can point equating 

a due-process violation with fraud. Therefore, this is not the proper forum for 

Wiest to argue that the Ohio Supreme Court violated his due process rights. 

' 

Wiest filed notice in this Court that he was recently granted an extension of 

time in which to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 

He is obviously free to seek relief in the federal court system for any such due 

process violation-. but not through the attorney disciplinary process of this 

Commonwealth. We find our recent case Kentucky Bar Association u. Ward, 

467 S.W.3d 785 (Ky. 2015), instructive. There, the Ohio Supreme Court did 

not believe Ward's presentation of the facts or adopt his interpretation of the 

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Ohio ethics code and how it should interact with the law. We held that this did 

_·not constitute fraud for purposes of our rule. Id. at 788. 

Here, Wiest simply disagrees with the Ohio Supreme Court-just as in 

Ward. This disagreement does not rise to the level of fraud. The Ohio Supreme 

Court had the opportunity to view all of the evidence Wiest now directs us to. 

We are not tasked with determining whether we would have made a different 

decision-only with determining whether the decision reached by that Court 

was fraudulent. 

Wiest also alleges that the Ohio court did not base its ruling on sufficient 

evidence. He again relies on the fact that he was following the advice of his 

attorney concerning the SEC investigation. We point out that the Ohio 

Supreme Court did not base its ruling solely on Wiest's lack of communication 

to Stanley concerning the SEC investigation, but rather, on his general failure -, 

to communicate with his client concerning his purchase of the InfoLogix stock. 

Further, Wiest insists that his testimony concerning his alleged belief that 

Stanley did not plan on going ahead with the acquisition should have garnered 

more weight. The Ohio Supreme Court was in the best position to view the 

evidence in this case; our role here, again, is not to reweigh that evidence, and 

we cannot say that Court's ruling constituted fraud. 

· Wiest admits that he made a mistake in failing to communicate with his 

client, but insists that he violated a different rule than that for which he was 

charged and found to have violated. We point again to our holding in Ward. 

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The mere fact that Wiest disagrees with our sister state's high court does not 

amount to fraud. 

SCR 3.435(4)(c) requires this Court to·recognize that, in the absence of 

the circumstances set forth in subsections (a) and (b), "a final adjudication in 

another jurisdiction that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct shall 

establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding 

in this State." Therefore, insofar as we hold that the Ohio proceedings were not 

fraudulent, the Ohio Supreme Court's final adjudication establishes the · 

misconduct in this Commonwealth for purposes of this reciprocal disciplinary 

action. 

B. Sanction 

Wiest insists that his misconduct warrants a substantially different 

sanction under SCR 3.435(4)(b). He directs us to a number of cases in which 

we have imposed different sanctions than those imposed by the issuing state in 

our reciprocal-discipline cases.2 We point out, however: 

SCR 3.435(4)(b) only gives the Court discretion to impose a lesser 

degree of discipline "when and where appropriate." Kentucky Bar 

Ass'n v. Fish, 2 S.W.3d.786, 787 (Ky.1999). For example, the 

imposition of substantially different discipline may be appropriate 

in situations where the discipline is based on a violation of a 

foreign jurisdiction rule Cif professional conduct which has no 

corresponding rule in the Commonwealth. Such is not the case 

here as IPCR 1.4(b) is identical to the corresponding Kentucky rule, 

SCR 3.130-1.4(b), and IPCR 5.6(a) is also identical to its Kentucky 

counterpart, SCR 3.130-5.6(a). 

2 Wiest complains about the Ohio Supreme Court using-as an aggravating 

factor-his non-disclosure of SEC investigation to Stanley. We disagree with Wiest's 

argument as to the aggravator for the same reasons enunciated above. 

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Kentucky Bar Ass'n u. Truman, 457 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2015). As in Truman, 

the rules at issue here in Ohio and Kentucky mirror one another. 

It is also true that we may, at our discretion, impose different discipline 

when to do otherwise would be inconsistent with our case law. Given that 

Wiest used confidential information to engage in activities for his own gain and 

failed to communicate with his client concerning any of those activities, we 

choose not to exercise that discretion. Therefore, we impose discipline 

consistent with that issued by the Ohio Supreme Court. Wiest asks that we 

nin our discipline concurrently with his Ohio discipline-and that we choose to 

do. 

III. ORDER 

Having failed to show sufficient cause, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 

1. Wiest is suspended from the practice oflaw in Kentucky for a 

period of two years, with the second year stayed on the condition 

that he engage in no further misconduct, to run concurrently with 

his Ohio suspension; 

2. Under SCR 3.450, Wiest is directed to pay the costs associated 

with this proceeding, if any, for which execution may issue from 

this Court upon finality of this Opinion and Order. 

3. Under SCR 3;390, Wiest shall, within ten days from .the entry of 

this Opinion and Order, notify all Kentucky clients, in writing, of 

his inability to represent them; notify, in writing, all Kentucky 

courts in which he has matters pending of his suspension from the 

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practice of law; and furnish copies of all letters of notice to the 

Office of Bar Counsel of the KBA. Furthermore, to the extent 

possible, Wiest shall immediately cancel and cease any advertising 

activities in which he is engaged. · 

All sitting. All concur. 

ENTERED: April 27, 2017 

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