UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ WENDELL JAY MOSIER, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v. JAMES FARREN; AMY RHOADES; CULPABLE AGENTS; TXOAG TITLE VII CSED; CAROLINE WOODBURN; LANA KING (KEMPER); JOHN TERRY, Defendants–Appellees. No. 17-1310 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-01144-LTB) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Wendell Jay Mosier appeals the district court’s dism issal for improper venue of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. 1 We affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mosier is pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). But we don’t act as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 25, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 BACKGROUND Mosier is an inmate in th e Potter County Detention Ce nter in Amarillo, Texas. He filed pro se a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complain t in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Each defendant was a Texas resident. Mosier claimed that Texas denied hi m due process and violated his doublejeopardy rights by filing a crim inal non-support charge for child-support arrearages he assertedly had already paid in full. He claimed that the resulting judgment led Texas to garnish his wages and deplete his savings account. The magistrate judge, in an order to s how cause, asked Mosier to explain why the action shouldn’t be dismissed or transferred for improper venue. Mosier then filed a document titled “Ame ndment to Relief Sought.” R. at 65. In it, he claims “a significant loss of property in the form of lost wages as a resident of Colorado.” Id. The following day, he filed a re sponse to the show-cause order titled “Cause to Proceed in the Current Venue.” Id. at 69. In that doc ument, he stated that a substantial part of the property rele vant to his claim i nvolves wages and bank accounts based in Colorado. The district court sua sponte determin ed that venue was improper, finding that “Mosier’s assertion regarding wages a nd bank accounts in Colorado do not [sic] demonstrate that a substantial part of property that is the subject of the [complaint] is situated in Colorado.” Id. at 77. The court also found that “because it appears that [] Mosier’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[,]” transfer to a district with venue wouldn’t be in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).3 So the district court dismissed the case without prejudice for improper venue and entered judgment by separate order. See id. ; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Th is appeal followed. DISCUSSION On appeal, Mosier makes the same argum ent that he did below: that Texas violated his constitutional rights through its child-support proceedings. He fails to address the controlling issue—whether the di strict court incorr ectly dismissed his complaint for improper venue. 2 But construing his pleadings liberally we turn to that argument, first addressing whether venue was improper, and then, whether the district court erred by di smissing, rather than tr ansferring, the case. We review de novo whether venue was proper (because that determination is an interpretation of the venue statute). See Pierce v. Shorty Small’s of Branson Inc., 137 F.3d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 1998). An d we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to dismiss, rather than transfer, a case. See Johnson v. Christopher , 233 F. App’x 852, 854 (10th Cir. 2007). A. Was Venue Proper 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that, a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any de fendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substa ntial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a s ubstantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

2 Instead, he lambasts th e district court for making “no decisions based on any of the material facts,” and not “conside r[ing] any grounds for relief” other than “jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9.4 (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisd iction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C § 1391(b). And as the district court determined, it’s undisputed that all the defendants reside in Texas, eliminating § 1391(b)(1) as enab ling venue in Colorado. 3 And because venue would be proper in another district, § 1391( b)(3) isn’t a potential avenue

to venue. Thus, the only possible route to venue lie s in § 1391(b)(2), whic h establishes that venue is proper in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events relevant to the action occurred, or where a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. And below, thou gh recognizing that substantial parts of the relevant events occurred in Texas, Mosier argued that the relevant property was “taxable wages” and “Federal Bank accounts,” which presum ably are located in Colorado. 4 R. at 71. But Mosier’s claim is about Texas state court proceedings and against Texas residents. C.f. Coando v. Payne , 127 F. App’x 418, 419 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] review of [the] complaint clearly establishes th at all of the alleged events giving rise to his claims occurred in [a different state].”). So the distri ct court was correct to reject Mosier’s vague references to garnished wages and emptie d bank accounts. And venue was improper in the District of Colorado.

3 Mosier agreed that “[t]his provision would place the venue in the Federal District Court in Amarillo[,] Texas.” R. at 70. But he further stat ed that the “local judiciary” is bias ed against him. Id.

4 He also claimed that Colo rado is his true place of re sidence, arguing he spent relatively little time in Texas since 1999. The plaintiff’s dom icile doesn’t factor into the venue analysis.5 B. Was Dismissal, Rather Than Transfer, Proper Where it is “in the intere st of justice,” a district court shall transfer an improperly filed case “to a ny district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). But Mosier “offers us no reason to believe that an injustice will resu lt from the dismissal as opposed to a transfer by, say, operation of a statute of limitations upon his claims.” Johnson , 233 F. App’x at 854. And Mosier offers us no other reason that the district court abused its discre tion in dismissing the case. Nor does our review of the record reveal any. See id. (“In the facts and circumstances of this case, we discern no such abuse given that the suit was filed in such an obviously improper venue.”). Thus we find no abuse of discretion. CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case. We al so grant Mosier’s motion to proceed on appeal with out prepayment of filing fees.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge