J-S12004-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DANIEL MATTHEW KLAHR 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1518 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 6, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-SA-0000239-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2018

Daniel Klahr appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, following his summary conviction1 of

disorderly conduct (public inconvenience).2 After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 As this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Parks, 768 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 

Super. 2001): 

Our standard of review of a trial court’s adjudication entered 

following a de novo trial on a summary offense is limited to 

whether the trial court committed an error of law and whether the 

findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence. 

The adjudication of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent [an] . . . abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion exists 

when the trial court has rendered a judgment that is manifestly 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, 

or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. 

Id. at 1171 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4).
J-S12004-18

- 2 -

The trial court aptly summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On April 19, 2017, Heather Bailey, with her son as a passenger, 

parked in a perpendicular parking space in the lot of a McDonald’s 

in Exeter Township, Berks County, having planned to meet 

someone there. She noticed she had parked somewhat crooked, 

so she began to move out of the space and back in to straighten 

out her car. At this point, []Klahr pulled in with his pickup truck 

and trailer, parking across several marked spaces with the front 

of his truck pointing toward the driver side of Ms. Bailey’s car. Ms. 

Bailey testified that the truck was quite close to her car, while 

[Klahr] testified there was a space in between.

With her window still closed, Ms. Bailey turned toward [Klahr] and 

said, “What are you doing?” or possibly, “What the **** are you 

doing?” She initially testified that she did not use the obscenity 

but admitted she may have, but perhaps only after [Klahr] got out 

of his truck and asked her, “What the **** did you say?” The 

evidence did not establish the exact sequence of events, but the 

two argued. [Klahr] began videotaping and walking around Ms. 

Bailey’s car. Ms. Bailey opened her window and told [Klahr] to 

get away from her car, said she would call the police, and indeed 

did call and speak to dispatch. [Klahr] told Ms. Bailey she needed

to learn how to park and made comments about her smoking in 

the car with her son and using bad language around him. [Klahr] 

continued to record video while leaning against his truck and 

eating a sandwich. Ms. Bailey got out of her car, now visibly and 

audibly on the phone with dispatch, and went to get the license 

plate number from the back of [Klahr’s] truck. [Klahr] got back 

into his truck, backed up a bit, and then drove forward to leave. 

As he pulled forward, his truck hit the side of Ms. Bailey’s leg. She 

was not hurt.

Mr. [Michael] Flaherty, his girlfriend Casssandra Kern, and their 

two daughters were also parked at the McDonald’s. The 

commotion attracted their attention, particularly as the argument 

got louder. Mr. Flaherty testified to hearing the argument, seeing 

the parking situation, seeing [Klahr] videotaping, and seeing 

[Klahr’s] truck graze Ms. Bailey’s leg. Mr. Flaherty, feeling that 

he had witnessed a hit-and-run, asked his girlfriend to get out and 

stay with their daughters and with Ms. Bailey, while he drove after 

[Klahr]. He called 911 and followed [Klahr] for several minutes, 

eventually blocking [Klahr’s] vehicle with his own and alerting a 

police officer in an unmarked SUV. By the end of the incident, 
J-S12004-18

- 3 -

when Ms. Kern came over to ask if they were okay, Ms. Bailey and 

her son were crying.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/17, at 1-3.

After a summary hearing, before the Honorable Madelyn S. Fudeman, 

Klahr was found guilty of disorderly conduct and ordered to pay a $300.00 

fine. This timely appeal follows, in which Klahr presents one issue for our 

consideration: “Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of 

law wherein the Commonwealth’s evidence presented at trial failed to 

establish that [Klahr] committed any act(s) which either jeopardized the public 

peace, prompted civil unrest, or otherwise arose to a disorderly conduct 

offense.” Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

Pursuant to section 5503, disorderly conduct is defined, in relevant part 

as:

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause 

public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly 

creating a risk thereof, he:

* * *

(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive 

condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of 

the actor.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4) (emphasis added). “Public” is defined in section 

5503(a)(4) as any place “affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to 

which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included 

are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places 

of business or amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises which are 

open to the public.” Id. at § 5503(c) (emphasis added).
J-S12004-18

- 4 -

“The offense of disorderly conduct is not intended as a catchall for every 

act which annoys or disturbs people; it is not to be used as a dragnet for all 

the irritations which breed in the ferment of a community.” Commonwealth 

v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 947 (Pa. 1999)). “It has a specific purpose; it has a 

definite objective, it is intended to preserve the public peace.” Id. Our courts

have repeatedly emphasized that the goal of section 5503 is to protect the 

public. See Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100 (Pa. 2008) 

(“Certainly, [s]ection 5503 is aimed at protecting the public from certain 

enumerated acts.”); Hock, supra at 946 (“The cardinal feature of the crime

of disorderly conduct is public unruliness which can or does lead to tumult and 

disorder.”).

 When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we consider: 

[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. . . . Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or 

none of the evidence.
J-S12004-18

- 5 -

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

Instantly, the trial court acknowledges that it “placed considerable 

weight on the testimony of a disinterested witness, Michael Flaherty.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/21/17, at 1. At the summary hearing, Flaherty testified 

that he had his window down in the McDonald’s parking lot and heard “a

commotion;” he turned around and “saw a couple arguing.” N.T. Summary 

Hearing, 9/6/17, at 20. Flaherty noticed that Klahr’s and Bailey’s voices got 

louder as their argument escalated. Id. at 22. Flaherty testified that he 

watched the situation in the McDonald’s parking lot unfold between Klahr and 

Bailey, observed Klahr videotaping the incident, and watched as Klahr’s truck 

pulled off and grazed Bailey’s right leg. Id. at 20. Believing that he had 

witnessed a hit-and-run, Flaherty asked his girlfriend to stay with Bailey while 

he followed Klahr’s truck for a couple miles, eventually blocking Klahr’s truck, 

and calling 9-1-1 about the situation. Id. at 21. 

Bailey testified that Klahr walked around her vehicle videotaping her and 

her son for several minutes, despite her protests to stop, which made her feel 

uncomfortable and prompted her to call the police. Id. at 15. Bailey also 

testified that when Flaherty’s girlfriend and daughters went to check on her, 

both she and her seven-year-old son were crying. Id. at 8.

Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to prove that 

Klahr was guilty of the summary offense of disorderly conduct. He created a 

physically offensive condition by arguing loudly, continuing to videotape Bailey 
J-S12004-18

- 6 -

and her son against her protestations, and hazardously driving off in his truck 

and striking Bailey’s leg in the process. Moreover, the altercation occurred in 

a public place, a McDonald’s restaurant, with bystanders who were disturbed 

by the disruptive situation. Cf. Hock, supra (defendant’s actions did not 

constitute disorderly conduct where defendant uttered single epithet in normal 

tone of voice while walking away from an officer, did not alarm or frighten 

officer, and there were no bystanders). 

Viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial, in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence to 

enable the fact-finder to find every element of disorderly conduct beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Bruce, supra. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/2018