IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Aqua America, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Jermon Jeffers, deceased), : No. 1831 C.D. 2017

Respondent : Argued: November 15, 2018

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge (P.)

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: December 4, 2018

Aqua America, Inc. (Employer) petitions this Court for review of the 

Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) November 14, 2017 order 

affirming the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision granting Bernice 

Jeffers’ (Claimant) Fatal Claim Petition filed on behalf of her deceased husband 

Jermon Jeffers (Decedent) and awarding their daughter Janice Jeffers (Janice)

dependent benefits. Employer essentially presents one issue for this Court’s review: 

whether the WCJ’s finding that Janice had a disability was supported by substantial 

evidence.1 After review, we vacate and remand. 

On April 27, 2015, Decedent was fatally injured in a tractor-trailer 

accident that occurred while he was in the course and scope of his work for 

Employer. At that time of his death, Decedent was married to Claimant. Their 

daughter, Janice, who was then 17 years old, suffered from retinitis pigmentosa (RP), 

 

1 Employer presented two additional issues: (1) whether the Board erred in finding that the 

parties stipulated to Janice’s dependency, and (2) whether the WCJ erred by placing the burden of 

proving Janice’s dependency on Employer. See Employer Br. at 4. Because those issues are 

subsumed in this Court’s discussion of the stated issue, they are combined herein.
2

an incurable, progressive eye disease that substantially impaired her peripheral 

vision.

2

 

On May 7, 2015, Employer filed a Notice of Temporary Compensation 

Payable (NTCP) and began paying Claimant WC benefits.3 On May 11, 2015, 

Claimant filed a Fatal Claim Petition (Petition) for death benefits, therein 

representing, inter alia: “Daughter, Janice [], is disabled and dependent, and 

compensation shall continue.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a. In its answer to the 

Petition, Employer denied and demanded proof that “Janice [] is ‘disabled and 

dependent’ such that her ‘compensation shall continue.’”4 R.R. at 7a. 

 

2 The Jeffers had four children, only three of whom were minors on April 27, 2015: Janice 

(17), Jasmin (9) and Jameel (8). Initially, Employer challenged dependency claims made for Janice 

and Jasmin. However, Employer “abandon[ed] further appeals regarding Jasmin’s claim.” 

Claimant Br. at 6 n.1. Therefore, this appeal is limited to Janice’s claim. 

3 The NTCP reflected, in pertinent part:

In order to begin immediate payment of benefits to [Decedent’s]

family, [Employer is] filing a TNCP [sic]. Death benefits are not

typically payable under a TNCP [sic], this will at least allow benefits 

to begin while [Employer] await[s] copies of [Claimant’s] marriage

certificate, her birth certificate, and the birth certificates of her four 

children. Once [Employer] receive[s] these required certificates[,] [it] 

will issue a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation and fil[e] an 

Agreement for Compensation for Death. 

Reproduced Record at 2a. Because Employer did not file an Agreement for Compensation for 

Death, Claimant filed the Fatal Claim Petition. See Claimant Br. at 3-4. 

4 Employer contends that the Board erred in finding that the parties stipulated to Janice’s 

dependency at the August 18, 2015 WCJ hearing because “no such stipulation was ever rendered.” 

Employer Br. at 9. The following exchange took place at the August 18, 2015 WCJ hearing:

[Claimant’s Counsel]: . . . . The oldest of the minor children is 17 

turning 18 in March. So we want to make sure that her benefits 

would, our position, continue as the result of her disability. . . . 

[WCJ]: Okay.

[Employer’s Counsel]: Yeah, Judge, from my understanding[,] the 

two children that they maintain will be [sic] remain dependent 

even after they become 18. One at 17 who has an eye issue, 

blindness issue. . . . We’re going to have to have her looked at.
3

WCJ hearings were conducted on August 18, 2015 and February 25 and 

April 19, 2016. On December 8, 2016, the WCJ granted the Petition “with respect to 

. . . Jani[ce’s] . . . entitlement to dependency benefits” which “shall continue beyond 

the age of 18 until such time as Employer meets its burden of proving that [Janice is] 

capable of self-support.”5 R.R. at 138a (WCJ Dec. at 12). Employer appealed to the 

Board, which affirmed the WCJ’s decision. Employer appealed to this Court.6

Initially, “[a] claimant seeking to prevail on a [fatal] claim petition bears 

the burden of proving all elements for an award.” Reading Anthracite Co. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Felegi), 789 A.2d 404, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). 

Specifically, Section 307 of the WC Act (Act)7 provides, in relevant part:

Compensation shall be payable . . . to or on account of 

any child . . . only if and while such child . . . is under the 

age of eighteen unless such child . . . is dependent because 

of disability when compensation shall continue or be 

paid during such disability of a child . . . over eighteen 

years of age or unless such child is enrolled as a full-time 

student in any accredited educational institution when 

compensation shall continue until such student becomes 

twenty-three.

 

R.R. at 15a-16a. Later during that WCJ hearing, Employer’s Counsel represented that they may be 

able to come to some agreement regarding Janice’s claim, but he would not be sure until he 

received Janice’s medical examination results. See R.R. at 32a. Based on this Court’s record 

review, it is not clear that Employer stipulated to Janice’s dependency. Moreover, if it had, there 

would be no basis for Employer’s challenge on appeal. Notwithstanding, based upon our 

disposition of Employer’s first issue, this issue is moot.

5

Janice’s birthday is March 15, 1998. See Claimant Br. at 4; see also R.R. at 23a. Janice 

turned 18 years old on March 15, 2016. She is currently 20 years old.

6

“On review[,] this Court must determine whether constitutional rights were violated, errors 

of law were committed, or necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial competent 

evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

7 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708. 

Section 307 of the Act was recognized as unconstitutional on other grounds by Grimm by 

Grimm v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Fed. Express Corp.), 176 A.3d 1045 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018). 
4

77 P.S. § 562 (bold and italic emphasis added).

8

 Pursuant to Section 307 of the Act, a 

decedent’s children are eligible for death benefits: (1) until they are 18 years old; (2) 

until they are 23 years old, if they are enrolled as full-time students in an accredited 

educational institution; or (3) they are over 18 years of age but dependent due to 

disability. Hertz Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Johnson), 724 A.2d 395 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1999). Thus, as a matter of law, Janice was entitled to dependent death 

benefits until she turned 18 years of age on March 15, 2016. Thereafter, in order for 

Janice to be eligible for such benefits, Claimant had to prove either Janice was a fulltime student, or dependent because of a disability. 

 Employer argues that the WCJ’s finding that Janice was disabled by her 

RP was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Employer avers that 

Claimant “only proved that [Janice] has a diagnosis[,] but [] failed to prove an actual 

disability” that would justify continued dependent benefits for Janice after she turned 

18, given that her vision remains largely intact and has not resulted in functional 

deficits. Employer Br. at 9. 

“As with all claim petitions, the elements necessary to support [a fatal 

claim petition] award must be established by substantial evidence. Substantial 

evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gibson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Armco Stainless & Alloy Prods.), 861 A.2d 938, 943 (Pa. 2004). 

At the August 18, 2015 WCJ hearing, Claimant testified that Janice had 

vision problems during childhood, but was diagnosed with RP when she was 15 years 

old, approximately two years before Decedent’s death. Claimant described that, over 

 

8

“The intent of the Act is to grant dependency death benefits to dependent children of 

deceased employees for the purpose of providing some measure of the support that they would have 

received had their parent or legal guardian not died as a result of their work injuries.” Wilson v. 

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 88 A.3d 237, 248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
5

time, the RP has resulted in Janice losing her peripheral vision, and has caused her 

eyes to be slow to adjust from light to dark and dark to light environments. She 

related that, because Janice cannot see things around her, Claimant must guide Janice 

to keep her from bumping into things, falling down steps and getting hurt.

Claimant articulated that Janice was a senior at a public high school, and 

[s]he’s able to get around and everything by herself, but the 

doctor has been in touch with the school nurse that any of 

her teachers that have . . . the blinds open and things like 

that [sic] so she can see the board. Cause they use a lot of 

the white boards now instead of the chalkboard --

. . . .

and there’s a glare and she cannot see if the lights are out.

R.R. at 26a-27a. Claimant reported that Janice is not involved in any other school

activities.

Claimant recalled that Moore Eye Institute ophthalmologist and 

vitreoretinal surgeon Ravi D. Patel, M.D. (Dr. Patel) has been treating Janice for 

approximately one year as of the hearing date. She stated that Dr. Patel tests Janice 

every six months to determine whether the RP has worsened. Claimant explained 

that Janice must conduct weekly self-examinations to detect whether bleeding 

associated with peripheral vision loss (which would lead to permanent scarring) is 

occurring. 

Claimant also presented Dr. Patel’s December 29, 2015 deposition 

testimony that Janice has RP, which is a rare, hereditary genetic disease of the retina 

that limits peripheral vision. He described that, “the younger it presents, the more 

severe it is[,]” R.R. at 41a, being both aggressive and progressive. See R.R. at 42a, 

53a. Dr. Patel expressed that Janice’s condition is “a young presentation.” R.R. at 

41a. He explained that RP progressive “degeneration . . . starts peripherally and 

works its way centrally,” R.R. at 41a, and will cause one’s visual field to constrict 
6

more and more to the point of tunnel vision, “and [then the] tunnel aperture over time 

gets smaller and smaller and smaller.”9 R.R. at 42a. Dr. Patel reported that total 

blindness from RP is rare, and that most people are “able to at least maintain a 

pinhole.”10 R.R. at 42a; see also R.R. at 54a. 

Dr. Patel further detailed that RP affects night vision, or dark adaptation, 

which is the adjustment between different lighting environments, explaining:

So when you go from a very lighted area to a dark area, 

even though the patient has that central vision, when the 

lights are off, essentially [the patient has] no vision because 

of the rods being destroyed in [RP]. And the peripheral 

rods that we have in our retina help us with our night vision. 

If you don’t have that, even though you’re functional, your 

central retina is attacked, not having those peripheral rods 

comp[romises] your night vision and your central vision.

R.R. at 42a-43a. He stated that it is difficult for individuals with this problem “to 

drive or to do any kind of really daily function without proper lighting.” R.R. at 43a.

Dr. Patel demonstrated that Janice’s RP has severely restricted her visual 

field to the point where she has vision only just beyond the sides of her face, to about 

her shoulders (i.e., a 20-degree visual field on each side). See R.R. at 43a; see also

R.R. at 68a-69a (Janice’s test results). He declared that, although Janice’s testing 

over the past year did not change, a larger time sample is necessary because there is a 

“very high, if not certain correlation,” R.R. at 53a, “given [Janice’s] early 

presentation, [that] she . . . will have deterioration as she gets older[,]” although “how 

likely and how fast it is, [] is very difficult to determine.”11 R.R. at 49a; see also R.R. 

 

9 Dr. Patel explained that he has never seen progressive RP stabilize, although he has read 

articles about mild RP cases where the visual field constriction is stationary and non-progressive. 

See R.R. at 53a.

10 Dr. Patel reported that “less than 20 degrees of visual field” is legal blindness, and “the 

progressive, aggressive [RP] types generally do get to that area.” R.R. at 42a; see also R.R. at 54a.

11 Dr. Patel stated that he could give a more definitive statement in five years. See R.R. at 

49a, 53a.
7

at 53a. He asserted that there is no cure for RP, no surgery that can better Janice’s 

RP, and although visual rehabilitation therapy “can help with magnification for near 

work, [] it will never expand her visual field.”12 R.R. at 44a; see also R.R. at 55a. In 

his October 16, 2015 letter to Claimant’s counsel, Dr. Patel classified Janice’s longterm prognosis as “guarded.” R.R. at 60a. 

Dr. Patel pronounced that Janice cannot legally drive, and she is having 

difficulty seeing writing on whiteboards and overhead projectors at school if the 

lights are off. See R.R. at 50a. 

A. Because of their constricted vision field, she can’t see 

where she steps when she looks down and especially in a 

darker environment when her functional central vision is

compromised. So even though she has 40 degrees of total 

field, in a darker environment that diminishes.

Q. So the vision that she does have is compromised by this 

difficulty in adjusting from light to dark or dark to light, in 

addition to the fact that she doesn’t have a wide visual

field?

A. Correct.

Q. So it’s not as though her tunneled vision is perfect 

vision; it’s still affected by the difficulties with light, dark 

and adjustment?

A. Correct. Just because she’s 20/30 doesn’t mean she’s 

20/30 all the time. It gets compromised with different 

lighting environments. Especially, it gets severely

compromised when she’s in total darkness.

Q. And going from indoors to outdoors, like from bright 

light to darker light?

A. Yeah, it takes her time to adjust. It takes her about 90 

seconds to 3 minutes to adjust. So that 20/30 acuity, that 

 

12 Dr. Patel testified that Janice’s visual acuity is 20/30 bilaterally. She does not wear

glasses because she does not have any refractive error that requires glasses and, even with a 

prescription, she is not going to see better than 20/30. See R.R. at 49a-50a. So, although limited in 

scope, what vision Janice has is clear. 
8

sharp acuity she may have centrally is always in flux based 

off of ambient light.

Q. And when you say takes time to adjust, what is her 

vision like while it’s adjusting?

A. It’s below 20/30. I mean, that is the hard place and 

difficult to say exactly what it is, but it’s not 20/30.

Q. And so it’s greater compromised?

A. Yeah, correct.

R.R. at 56a-57a. Dr. Patel concluded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 

based upon Janice’s history and his August 14 and 28, 2014 and February 26 and 

August 17, 2015 examinations and testing, that “[Janice] is disabled[,]” and “she is 

not able to []support herself” as a result. R.R. at 44a; see also R.R. at 40a, 57a. 

Employer offered the April 1, 2016 deposition testimony of 

ophthalmologist and oculoplastic surgeon Edward H. Bedrossian, Jr., M.D., F.A.C.S. 

(Dr. Bedrossian), who examined Janice at Employer’s request on December 8, 

2015.13 Dr. Bedrossian’s review of Janice’s history, Dr. Patel’s testing and his own 

testing confirmed that Janice’s visual acuity is 20/30 bilaterally and she has RP with 

peripheral constriction and problems with dark adaptation, see R.R. at 90a, 95a, 102a, 

it is progressive, and “there’s nothing, at least as of right now, that we can do that will 

slow the progression.” R.R. at 91a; see also R.R. at 105a. Dr. Bedrossian

acknowledged that RP is rare, and that “there’s no way to predict whether it’s going 

to stop. She can be the way she is now for the rest of her life or it can progress. 

There’s really no way of knowing, so she needs surveillance[,]” every six months. 

R.R. at 92a; see also R.R. at 101a. However, he acknowledged that since Janice’s RP 

presented at such a young age, her peripheral vision loss could eventually leave her 

 

13 Dr. Bedrossian is “not a retina specialist,” but rather refers his patients to retinal 

specialists when necessary. R.R. at 77a. Specifically, he refers most RP patients to retinal 

specialists. See R.R. at 99a.
9

with only pinpoint vision. See R.R. at 103a-104a, 107a. Like Dr. Patel, in his 

independent medical report to Employer’s counsel, he categorized Janice’s prognosis 

as “guarded.” R.R. at 126a. 

Dr. Bedrossian observed Janice move around his examination room 

without assistive devices, and admitted Janice was “more comfortable with her

mother helping guide her out through the doorways and to the office.” R.R. at 96a. 

He stated that Janice could not drive, be on a ladder or safely play sports, but she can 

read and could do a job that did not require her to drive or use her peripheral vision. 

See R.R. at 98a. He agreed that peripheral vision loss and night vision problems add 

to an RP sufferer’s difficulty conducting activities of daily living without someone to 

direct them, but stated that Janice’s condition will not prevent her from attending 

college or working. See R.R. at 106a, 108a.

“A determination of dependency is a question of fact within the province 

of the [WC] authorities.” Grimm by Grimm v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fed. 

Express Corp.), 176 A.3d 1045, 1054 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Further, “[t]he WCJ has 

exclusive authority to act as fact finder, determine credibility of witnesses, and weigh 

the evidence. The WCJ’s findings will not be disturbed if they are supported by 

substantial, competent evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint 

Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted).

‘Moreover, we are to draw all reasonable inferences which 

are deducible from the evidence in support of the 

factfinder’s decision in favor of that prevailing party.’ It 

does not matter if there is evidence in the record supporting 

findings contrary to those made by the WCJ; the pertinent 

inquiry is whether the evidence supports the WCJ’s 

findings.

3D Trucking Co., Inc., v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fine & Anthony Holdings 

Int’l), 921 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted) (quoting 
10

Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164, 168 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)).

The WCJ in this case made the following findings of fact:

8. Based upon a review of the evidentiary record as a 

whole, this [WCJ] accepts the testimony of [Claimant] in its 

entirety as credible and persuasive. Significant in reaching

this determination is that [Claimant’s] testimony is 

essentially uncontradicted, supported by the testimony of 

Dr. Patel . . . . Additionally, her testimony is based on her 

first[-]hand interactions with her daughter [Janice]. Also

significant is this [WCJ’s] observation of [Claimant’s] 

demeanor while testifying and hearing her testimony first[-

]hand.

9. Notably. Drs. Patel and Bedrossian essentially agree on 

the diagnosis of RP affecting [Janice’s] peripheral vision 

and night vision. Dr. Bedrossian agrees that the difficulties 

with night vision, which is more than an inability to see at 

night but also issues with light and dark adaptation, add 

additional problems with performing activities of daily 

living. He also agrees that [Janice] cannot drive and has to 

be careful walking down steps.

10. Based upon a review of the evidentiary record as a 

whole, the [WCJ] finds the testimony of Dr. Patel more 

credible and persuasive than any contrary testimony of 

Dr. Bedrossian. Accordingly, the testimony of Dr. 

Bedrossian is rejected wherever inconsistent with the 

testimony of Dr. Patel and the testimony of Dr. Patel is 

accepted as fact. Significant in reaching this determination 

are the following:

a) Dr. Patel specializes in diseases of the retina and 

the vitreous, [he] completed a residency in 

ophthalmology and a vitreoretinal fellowship and 

performs retinal surgeries. While Dr. Bedrossian is 

board certified in ophthalmology, he specializes in

ophthalmology and subspecializes in plastic 

reconstructive surgery and trauma. Dr. Bedrossian 

is not a retina specialist.

b) The medical analysis of Dr. Patel is clear, logical 

and well[-]supported. His testimony is based on the 
11

examinations and testing performed and his 

expertise.

11. [Janice] has an aggressive and progressive form of [RP]

which was diagnosed at the age of 16 in August of 2014 and 

detrimentally affects her peripheral vision and night vision 

which also includes light and dark adaptation. She has 20 

degrees out of 90 degrees of peripheral vision on each side,

with anything less than 20 degrees meeting the criteria for 

legal blindness. She cannot see at night, has problems with 

adapting to changes in lighting and her vision is 

compromised with different lighting changes. [Janice] had 

RP on the date of her father’s death on [April 27, 2015] and

will always have RP. It is incurable, will progress and 

nothing can slow the progression. RP adversely affects 

[Janice’s] ability to perform activities of daily living. 

[Claimant] guides [Janice] when she goes out and after 

sunset because she cannot see what is around her. [Janice]

is not self-supporting without assistance.

R.R. at 132a (WCJ Dec. at 6) (emphasis added). Based upon those factual findings, 

the WCJ concluded:

6. [Claimant] sustained her burden of proving that when 

Decedent . . . died[,] [Janice] was a minor and had a 

physical disability and was not capable of self-support.

7. Employer failed to sustain its burden of proving that 

[Janice] was capable of self-support after attaining the age 

of 18 and thus [Janice’s] dependency benefits shall 

continue.[14]

R.R. at 136a (WCJ Dec. at 10). Accordingly, the WCJ granted the Petition, thereby 

granting Janice continuing dependent death benefits after she turned 18 years old. 

The Board agreed.

As a matter of law, Janice was entitled to disability death benefits until 

she was 18 years of age, on March 15, 2016. There is no record evidence that Janice 

 

14 The WCJ erred by placing the burden of proving Janice’s dependency on Employer at this 

stage. Claimant had the burden of proving Janice’s eligibility for dependent benefits. Reading 

Anthracite Co. 
12

was thereafter enrolled as a full-time student at an accredited educational institution. 

Thus, in order for Janice’s disability death benefits to continue after her 18th

birthday, Claimant had to establish that Janice was “dependent because of disability.” 

77 P.S. § 562. 

Regarding dependency, we acknowledge:

No rigid rule can be laid down as to the amount or character 

of evidence necessary to show dependency, and each case 

must be controlled by its own circumstances. Morris v. 

Yough Coal & Supply Co., . . . 109 A. 914 [(Pa. 1920)]. 

‘While dependency must be actual[,] it is not necessary 

that it be exclusive; it must be real but need not be total. 

. . . Dependency does not mean sole and exclusive support. 

. . .’ Walker v. Aluminum [Co.] of [Am.], . . . 138 A.2d 197 

[(Pa. Super. 1958)].

Walker v. Heavey, 219 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 1966) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, “support must be defined in the terms of the living standards and 

circumstances of life of the individual involved.” Id. at 468.

Although the parties’ medical experts agreed that Janice has a medicallydiagnosed physical condition that has been and likely will continue to progress until 

she is legally blind and has affected some of her activities of daily living, Claimant 

did not offer substantial evidence that Janice was dependent after she turned 18 due to 

a “disability” as that term is used under the Act.

This Court has ruled:

To prove a disability, the claimant must show not merely 

physical impairment, but loss of earning power. Coyne

[v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Villanova Univ.)], 942 

A.2d [939,] 945 n.7 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)]; Bissland v. 

Workmen’s Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (Boyertown Auto Body 

Works), . . . 638 A.2d 493, 495 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1994); 

Somerset Welding & Steel [v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Lee)], 650 A.2d [114,] 119 n.9 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)]. 
13

‘[F]or the purposes of receiving [WC], ‘disability’ means

loss of earning power, and thus although a claimant may 

suffer a . . . physical disability, it is only if that physical 

disability occasions a loss of earnings that [an 

individual] will be ‘disabled’ under the meaning of the 

Act and will be entitled to receive compensation.’

Bissland, 638 A.2d at 495.

BJ’s Wholesale Club v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pearson), 43 A.3d 559, 562-63 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (emphasis added).

15

 Here, Claimant offered no evidence relative 

to whether and to what extent Janice’s RP affected her earning power such that Janice 

was “dependent because of disability” after she turned 18 on March 15, 2016.16 77 

P.S. § 562.

Based upon our review, drawing all reasonable inferences in Claimant’s 

favor, as we must, we hold that credible record evidence supports the WCJ’s 

conclusion that Janice has a physical impairment that continued beyond her 18th

birthday and likely will progressively worsen. However, because there was not 

substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Janice’s RP makes it impossible for 

her to earn an income, the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s conclusion that Janice

is entitled to dependent death benefits after March 15, 2016.

 

15 Although BJ’s Wholesale Club and the cases relied upon therein involved injured workers 

rather than a deceased worker’s dependent, it is nevertheless applicable here, where Section 307 of 

the Act used the term disability without modification from its use in the rest of the Act. 

In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the 

Statutory Construction Act [of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act)], 1 

Pa.C.S. §§ 1501[-1991], which directs us to ascertain and effectuate 

the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). To 

accomplish that goal, we interpret statutory language not in isolation, 

but with reference to the context in which it appears. 

Commonwealth v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016). Although the General Assembly could 

have defined disability in the specific context of Section 307 of the Act differently, it did not do so. 

16 Notably, two of the WCJ hearings took place before Janice’s 18th birthday. The third 

hearing occurred just after her 18th birthday. Therefore, it is possible such evidence was not yet 

available.
14

Accordingly, the Board’s order is vacated and the Board is directed to 

remand the matter to the WCJ for a hearing to determine the extent, if any, of Janice’s 

earning power. 

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Aqua America, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Jermon Jeffers, deceased), : No. 1831 C.D. 2017

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of December, 2018, the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board’s November 14, 2017 order is vacated, and the matter is 

remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge