United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 13-1991 

HÉCTOR LUIS ROMÁN-OLIVERAS; SONIA MARÍA YAMA-RUIZ; FELICITA 

OLIVERAS-LÓPEZ, 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (PREPA); JAMES VÉLEZ; 

JULIO RENTA, 

Defendants, Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, Jr., U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Thompson, Lipez, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

Nicolás Nogueras-Cartagena and Nogueras Law & Associates on 

brief for appellants. 

Margarita Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General, and Rosa 

Elena Pérez Acosta, Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for 

appellees. 

August 5, 2015 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a suit 

that Héctor Luis Román-Oliveras, along with his wife and mother, 

brought against his former employer, the Puerto Rico Electric Power 

Authority (PREPA), and two individual supervisors. The potential 

obstacle that the plaintiffs must overcome to keep their suit alive 

arises from the settlement negotiations that took place in the 

summer of 2012. Because we agree with the District Court that 

these talks produced a binding oral settlement agreement that the 

District Court had jurisdiction to enforce, we agree with the 

District Court that this suit cannot continue. We thus affirm the 

judgment below that dismissed the suit on the basis of that 

settlement agreement. 

I. 

Román worked for PREPA for over twenty years. In March 

of 2006, however, he was suspended from his job, and in February 

of 2007, he was then dismissed. Román along with his wife and 

mother responded by filing this suit against PREPA, his supervisor, 

and the plant superintendent under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213; Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983; and several Puerto Rico laws. The plaintiffs alleged that 

the defendants had unlawfully targeted Román due to his medical 

disability and his union activities. 
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The District Court initially dismissed the complaint in 

its entirety. But on appeal, this Court partially reversed and 

reinstated the plaintiffs' ADA claim against PREPA and their claims 

under Puerto Rico law against all defendants. See Román-Oliveras 

v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2011). On 

remand, the parties then held settlement negotiations. Those 

negotiations took place in Judge Aida M. Delgado-Colón's chambers 

in July of 2012.1 Judge Delgado-Colón later memorialized an 

account of the discussions in a minute entry in December of 2012. 

In that entry, Judge Delgado-Colón recounted that the parties had 

reached a binding oral settlement agreement during the 

negotiations, and that all that remained was the submission of a 

final written settlement agreement. The parties, however, did not 

ultimately submit a final written agreement.2

 1 The reply brief raises for the first time the argument that 

nothing in the record shows that Román's wife or mother joined in 

settling the lawsuit. We deem this claim waived because of 

appellants' failure to develop it in the opening brief. See Young 

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 239-240 (1st Cir. 2013) 

("We have repeatedly held, 'with a regularity bordering on the 

monotonous,' that arguments not raised in an opening brief are 

waived." (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 

288, 299 (1st Cir. 2000))). 

2 The defendants, in the months following the July 2012 

settlement talks, circulated several draft agreements to the 

plaintiffs without receiving any response. Counsel for the 

plaintiffs finally responded in October of 2012 and suggested 

several changes to the written agreement. The parties informed 

the District Court of their lack of progress in arriving at a 

written agreement. The District Court urged the parties to 

finalize what it viewed as an already completed settlement in 

December of 2012 and dismissed the defendants' pending summary 
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In May of 2013, Judge Delgado-Colón recused herself from 

the case, which was then transferred to Judge Gustavo Gelpí. Soon 

thereafter, Judge Gelpí ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why 

he could not enforce the oral settlement agreement that Judge 

Delgado-Colón had found the parties had reached. The plaintiffs 

responded to that order by arguing that "an agreement had never 

been reached." The plaintiffs did not ask, however, for an 

evidentiary hearing on the existence of such an agreement. The 

plaintiffs also argued in response to the show cause order that, 

assuming such a settlement had been reached, the District Court 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce it in light of 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 

Judge Gelpí rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and 

dismissed the case with prejudice. He then ordered that PREPA 

deposit the settlement amount with the District Court. This appeal 

followed. 

 

judgment motion as "[m]oot in light of Settlement" in January of 

2013. 

The court then ordered the parties to finalize their 

settlement agreement by April 12, 2013. The plaintiffs, however, 

declined to sign the instrument circulated by the defendants. The 

District Court nevertheless found this unsigned instrument 

"captured the terms and conditions" of the oral settlement 

agreement. 
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II. 

On appeal, the plaintiffs repeat the same arguments that 

they made below. The plaintiffs argue first that even if there 

was a binding settlement agreement, the District Court did not 

have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce it. The plaintiffs 

rely on Kokkonen. 

There, the district court dismissed a lawsuit after the 

parties had executed a settlement agreement. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. 

at 377. The district court did not mention the underlying 

settlement agreement in the dismissal order. Id. Nor did the 

district court state that it was retaining jurisdiction to enforce 

the agreement. Id. Nevertheless, when one party later sought to 

have the court enforce the settlement agreement, the district court 

concluded that it had the inherent authority to provide a remedy 

to safeguard its earlier order of dismissal. Id. 

The Supreme Court rejected that ruling. The Court held 

that a post-dismissal suit to enforce a settlement agreement is 

simply a separate breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 379. The Court 

thus held that federal courts need an independent basis for federal 

subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce that contract claim. Id. 

at 381. 

The plaintiffs argue from Kokkonen that the District 

Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction here. But they are wrong 

to do so. The District Court indisputably had subject-matter 
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jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' suit and that suit had not yet 

been dismissed when the defendants sought to enforce the settlement 

agreement that they claimed had been reached. Thus, if the 

District Court correctly concluded that the parties had reached a 

final, oral settlement agreement, the District Court had subjectmatter jurisdiction to enforce it when it purported to do so. 

Kokkonen does not block a district court from enforcing a 

settlement agreement before the underlying suit has been 

dismissed. See Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st 

Cir. 1999) ("If . . . the settlement collapses before the original 

suit is dismissed, the party who seeks to keep the settlement 

intact may file a motion for enforcement."); see also Fid. & Guar. 

Ins. Co. v. Star Equip. Corp., 541 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2008) 

(same); Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 51-52 (1st Cir. 

2003) (concluding district court erred by failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing to enforce an alleged settlement agreement 

before proceeding to trial). 

That brings us to the second of the plaintiffs' arguments 

on appeal -- that the District Court erred in finding that there 

was a settlement agreement to enforce. Federal law governs our 

answer to that question because the underlying cause of action 

arises under federal law.3 See Malave, 170 F.3d at 220. And our 

 3 The complaint included claims under both federal and Puerto 

Rico law, but no party disputes the applicability of federal law. 
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review of the facts that the District Court found about whether 

the parties did in fact enter into such an agreement is only for 

clear error. See Kinan v. Cohen, 268 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2001). 

The record is clear that Judge Delgado-Colón found that 

the parties had entered into a final and binding oral settlement 

agreement as of July 2012. She clearly recorded that finding in 

a minute entry before she recused herself from the case. And 

because that finding was based on Judge Delgado-Colón's "personal 

knowledge through . . . a settlement conference," Malave, 170 F.3d 

at 221, we lend her finding particular weight. See F.A.C., Inc. 

v. Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de Puerto Rico, 449 F.3d 185, 

192 (1st Cir. 2006). Moreover, at the time Judge Delgado-Colón 

entered the finding, the parties did not object. Nor did the 

parties object when Judge Delgado-Colón dismissed a pending 

summary judgment motion as "[m]oot in light of Settlement." Thus, 

the parties' conduct -- after Judge Delgado-Colón found that a 

binding, oral settlement had been reached -- also reasonably 

suggested that "the existence of the settlement had . . . been 

conceded previously by both parties." Malave, 170 F.3d at 221. 

 

Since Puerto Rico law would apparently reach the same result, see 

Lopez Morales v. Hosp. Hermanos Melendez Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 

137, 142 (D.P.R. 2006), we will accept the parties' "implicit 

concession" that federal law applies, Mathewson Corp. v. Allied 

Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 857 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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Judge Delgado-Colón did recuse herself after determining 

that a binding, oral settlement had been reached. But we find no 

basis for concluding that Judge Gelpí, after assuming the case 

from Judge Delgado-Colón, erred in relying on the well-documented 

conclusion that Judge Delgado-Colón had already reached. Judge 

Gelpí, after all, issued a show cause order as to why the purported 

settlement agreement could not be enforced. But the plaintiffs 

proffered no evidence in response that might cast doubt on the 

existing factual record before Judge Gelpí. Nor did the plaintiffs 

ask Judge Gelpí for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 

there actually had been an oral settlement agreement. Instead, 

the plaintiffs left the determination of whether there was a 

settlement agreement to Judge Gelpí to make on the basis of the 

record as it then existed. Though the plaintiffs did contend that 

there was no settlement agreement for Judge Gelpí to enforce, that 

bare assertion does not suffice to show Judge Gelpí clearly erred 

in finding otherwise. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.