J-A24002-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DAVID RITCHEY AND HOLLY 

RITCHEY 

V.

RUTTER'S INC., RUTTER'S HOLDING, 

INC, AND CHR CORPORATION AND 

GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, 

SUPREME CORPORATION, JIFFY 

LUBE INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

KATHLEEN SWEIGART, AND KEITH 

MCNAUGHTON, JR.

APPEAL OF: RUTTER'S INC., 

RUTTER'S HOLDING, INC, AND CHR 

CORPORATION

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2219 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 190801527

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2022

Defendants, Rutter’s Inc, Rutter’s Holding, Inc., and CHR Corporation 

(collectively, Rutter’s) appeal from the trial court’s order1 denying their motion 

to transfer venue, to either Cumberland County or York County, on the basis

of forum non conveniens. See Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1). After careful review, we 

remand with instructions.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See infra at 6 (discussing our Court’s grant of Rutter’s petition for review of 

interlocutory order denying change of venue).
J-A24002-21

- 2 -

Plaintiffs, David and Holly Ritchey (h/w), reside in Mechanicsburg,

Cumberland County. Rutter’s is a Pennsylvania corporation that has its 

principal place of business in York, Pennsylvania, and allegedly regularly 

conducts business in Philadelphia. On October 4, 2017, near the intersection 

of Slate Hill Road and Appleton Street in Lower Allen Township, Cumberland 

County, David Ritchey sustained personal injuries when a GMC2truck, owned 

by Rutter’s and operated by a Rutter’s employee, stopped quickly to make a 

left-hand turn.3 As a result of the truck’s abrupt stop, Mr. Ritchey lost control 

of and was thrown from his motorcycle. Mr. Ritchey sustained catastrophic 

and permanent injuries, including, but not limited to, a traumatic brain injury, 

fractured bones and ribs, vision loss, severe headaches, and cognition and 

memory loss.

Immediately after the accident, Mr. Ritchey was airlifted to Penn State 

Health Milton S. Hershey Medical Center (Hershey), in Dauphin County, for 

emergency medical care. After being released from Hershey, Mr. Ritchey 

received post-accident medical care for approximately three months at 

Jefferson University Hospital and Magee Rehabilitation Hospital, both located 

____________________________________________

2 On September 19, 2019, the parties stipulated that General Motors, LLC

(GM) “shall be substituted in as a defendant in this matter in place of General 

Motors Company.” Stipulation, 9/19/19, at ¶ 1. GM is the manufacturer of 

the Rutter’s truck.

3 The Rutter’s truck was three vehicles ahead of Mr. Ritchey’s motorcycle at 

the time of the accident. The two vehicles between Mr. Ritchey’s motorcycle 

and the Rutter’s truck were operated by additional Defendants, Kathleen 

Sweigert and Keith McNaughton. See infra at 4.
J-A24002-21

- 3 -

in Philadelphia. In March and April 2018 and, again, in January and February 

2019, Mr. Ritchey received rehabilitative care at Messiah Lifeways, which is 

located in Cumberland County. 

On August 14, 2019, the Ritcheys filed a multi-count complaint against 

Defendants4in Philadelphia County. In their complaint, the Ritcheys raised 

claims of negligence against Rutter’s, Jiffy Lube,5 GM and Supreme 

Corporation6 (Supreme Corp.) (Counts I-III), strict products liability against 

GM and Supreme Corp. (Count IV), and breach of express and implied 

warranties against GM and Supreme Corp. (Count V).7 The Ritcheys alleged 

____________________________________________

4 The Ritcheys also filed suit against GM, Supreme Corp., and Jiffy Lube 

International, Inc. Defendants Supreme Corp. and Jiffy Lube filed preliminary 

objections to the Ritchey’s complaint. The Ritcheys alleged, among other 

claims, that GM and Supreme Corp. had negligently designed, manufactured, 

assembled, distributed sold or supplied the subject GM truck, which could not 

be safely used as intended. Ritchey Complaint, 8/14/19, at ¶¶ 34-36. The 

Ritcheys also alleged that Jiffy Lube negligently performed maintenance upon 

and or/inspected the subject truck, including failure to ensure that the truck’s 

rear break light was operable. Id. at ¶¶ 29-32. The complaint also alleged 

that Supreme Corp. and Jiffy Lube sold a dangerously defective product.

The court granted, in part, Jiffy Lube’s preliminary objections striking, without 

prejudice, any allegations Plaintiffs made regarding recklessness, reckless 

conduct, and related claims for punitive damages. The court overruled the 

remainder of Supreme Corp.’s and Jiffy Lube’s preliminary objections. 

5 Jiffy Lube was ultimately dismissed, without prejudice, from the underlying 

lawsuit on August 12, 2020.

6 Supreme Corp. allegedly installed the body of the Rutter’s truck, which 

included the allegedly defective brake lights.

7 Holly Ritchey, in her own right, filed a loss of consortium against all 

Defendants. See Ritchey Complaint, 8/14/19, at ¶¶ 50-52.
J-A24002-21

- 4 -

that the Rutter’s truck “was equipped with an unreasonably dangerous and 

defectively designed rear brake light apparatus that failed to effectively warn 

vehicles travelling behind the truck of sudden stops.” Ritchey Complaint, 

8/14/19, at ¶ 19. On November 22, 2019, Rutter’s filed an answer and new 

matter, including cross-claims. The Ritcheys filed a reply to Rutter’s new 

matter.

On December 27, 2019, Rutter’s and CHR Corporation moved to join, as 

additional Defendants, Kathleen Sweigert and Keith McNaughton—the 

individuals who allegedly operated the two other motor vehicles traveling 

between Mr. Ritchey’s motorcycle and the Rutter’s truck when the incident in 

question occurred. See Motion for Leave to File Joinder Complaint, 12/27/19, 

at ¶ 5; see also Pa.R.C.P. 2253 (joinder of parties). On January 22, 2019, 

the court granted the motion and permitted Rutter’s to file a joinder complaint 

against Sweigert and McNaughton. Rutter’s filed its joinder complaint on 

January 28, 2019, and, after being served, Sweigert and McNaughton were 

joined in the case.8 

On March 16, 2020, Rutter’s filed a motion to transfer venue, based 

upon Rule 1006(d)(1); GM, Jiffy Lube, and Supreme Corp. joined in the motion 

to transfer. In the motion, Rutter’s alleged that the case should be transferred 

____________________________________________

8 On March 12, 2020, additional Defendant Sweigert filed an answer and new 

matter to the joinder complaint. Additional Defendant McNaughton filed his 

answer and new matter and new matter cross-claim on October 20, 2020.
J-A24002-21

- 5 -

from Philadelphia County to either Cumberland County or York County for the 

convenience of the parties and witnesses where: the underlying accident 

occurred in Cumberland County; none of the parties is domiciled or maintain 

its principal places of business in Philadelphia County; and, an overwhelming 

number of witnesses are located in or adjacent to Cumberland County or York 

County and “would suffer significant hardship and inconvenience if forced to 

travel more than 100 miles (each way) to Philadelphia County for depositions 

and trial.” Appellants’ Brief, at 7. To support its motion to transfer venue, 

Rutter’s attached 20 witness affidavits wherein each affiant attested to the 

fact that venue in Philadelphia County would be a “great hardship due to 

personal, family, and employment responsibilities and would otherwise be 

extremely inconvenient.” 

The Ritcheys filed a motion opposing the motion to transfer; Rutter’s 

filed a reply to the Ritcheys’ opposition motion. Between June and July of 

2020, the parties conducted several remote depositions9for purposes of the 

transfer motion. In addition, the parties filed supplemental briefs on the issue. 

____________________________________________

9 These depositions were held remotely via Zoom from the affiants’ 

Cumberland County and York County residences or places of business. Cf. 

Hoose, supra (stating defendant’s consistent appearance in chosen forum

for purposes of pre-trial procedures and discovery is legitimate consideration 

weighing against defendant’s claim of oppressive or vexatious forum). 

Likewise, we do not find compelling the Ritcheys’ claim that because Rutter’s 

chose to join additional defendants in Plaintiffs’ forum that it weighs against 

Rutter’s claim of vexatiousness or oppressiveness.
J-A24002-21

- 6 -

On July 30, 2020, the trial court denied Rutter’s motion to transfer, by order, 

without holding a hearing or issuing an opinion. 

On September 15, 2020, Rutter’s filed a petition for permission to

amend the July 30, 2020 order to include language certifying the interlocutory 

order for immediate appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 

702(b). The trial court denied the motion.10 Although the trial judge did not 

author a Rule 1925(a) opinion, in an order denying Rutter’s petition for 

permission to appeal, the Honorable James Crumlish, III, “provided the salient 

factors that [he] considered in exercising [hi]s discretion” to deny Rutter’s 

petition to transfer venue, stating:

1. The [c]ourt took into consideration the location of potential witnesses, 

their relationships to the parties and the availability of alternatives to 

in[-]person discovery and in[-]court testimony to alleviate 

inconvenience to witnesses, methods the [c]ourt itself has sought to 

perfect during the emergence from shutdown;

____________________________________________

10 In its order denying Rutter’s motion to amend the trial court’s July 30, 2020 

interlocutory order, the court stated that the instant matter did not involve a 

controlling question of law for which there was a substantial ground for 

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the interlocutory 

order would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter, 

noting that it had

fully consider[ed] the thorough briefing of the parties . . . 

consider[ed] the pled [c]omplaint [and the] identity of the claimed 

witnesses[,] and the failure of [Rutter’s] to disclose the 

lengthy treatment that [Mr. Ritchey] received at medical 

facilities in Philadelphia County relating to [Mr. Ritchey’s] 

claimed injuries[.]

Order, 9/15/20 (emphasis added).
J-A24002-21

- 7 -

2. The [c]ourt further considered the extensive treatment that Plaintiff 

David Ritchey received at medical facilities in Philadelphia, treatment 

that was not disclosed in Defendants’ moving papers, and treatment 

that provides more than an inconsequential or coincidental connection 

to this jurisdiction; 

3. The [c]ourt considered the nature of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff and 

the substantial likelihood that both the liability and damages phases of 

the case would require a significant number of experts, individuals for 

whom neither Philadelphia nor York [n]or Cumberland County would be 

a convenient forum;

4. The [c]ourt considered [] the (even if remote) possibility Defendants’ 

motivation or the transfer amounted to forum shopping to a jurisdiction 

with a lower verdict potential; and

5. [T]he [c]ourt took into consideration these factors in addition to the 

arguments of the parties and concluded that, in its discretion, 

Defendants had not met their burden to show that Plaintiffs’ choice of 

forum was vexatious, oppressive, or overly burdensome to Defendants.

Order, 11/4/20, at 1-2. 

On November 13, 2020, Rutter’s filed a petition for review in this Court, 

see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5571(d), Pa.R.A.P. 1311, and an application for stay, both 

of which our Court granted on December 10, 2020. See Per Curiam Order, 

12/10/20. Rutter’s raises the following issue for our consideration: 

Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion and/or committed 

an error of law in failing to follow the legal standard for 

transferring venue based on forum non conveniens established by 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cheeseman v. Lethal 

Exterminator, Inc., [] 701 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1997), and Bratic v. 

Rubendall, [] 99 A.3d 1 ([Pa.] 2014), where the “totality of the 

circumstances” overwhelmingly support transfer of venue.

Appellants’ Brief, at 4.

“A plaintiff’s forum choice should be ‘rarely . . . disturbed[;]’ [it] is 

entitled to great weight, and must be given deference by the trial court, but 
J-A24002-21

- 8 -

it is not "not absolute or unassailable.” Powers v. Verizon Pa., LLC, 230 

A.3d 492, 496 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quotation omitted). In ruling on a petition 

to transfer venue pursuant to Rule 1006(d)(1), a trial court is “vested with 

considerable discretion . . . to balance the arguments of the parties, consider 

the level of prior court involvement, and consider whether the forum was 

designed to harass the defendant.” Bratic, 99 A.3d at 7. It is wellestablished that a party seeking a change of venue bears a heavy burden in 

justifying the request, which requires an on-the-record demonstration of 

hardships. Walker v. Ohio River Co., 205 A.2d 43 (Pa. 1964).

On appeal, we will only reverse a trial court’s decision as to the transfer 

of venue if the trial court abused its discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion 

is not merely an error of judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden 

or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, as shown by the evidence o[f] 

the record.” Id. “[W]here the record does not reflect an abuse of discretion 

by the trial court, the Superior Court may not disturb a trial court's 

discretionary ruling by substituting its own judgment for that of the trial 

court.” Polett v. Public Communs., Inc., 126 A.3d 895, 923 (Pa. 2015).

Rule 1006(d)(1)11 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

____________________________________________

11 In its reply brief, Rutter’s specifically notes that it has only ever challenged 

venue based upon Rule 1006(d)(1). Appellee’s Reply Brief, at 9 (“Rutter’s 

Defendants never challeng[ed] the propriety of venue in Philadelphia County 

under Rule 1006(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure[.]”).
J-A24002-21

- 9 -

For the convenience of the parties and witnesses the court 

upon petition of any party may transfer an action to the 

appropriate court of any other county where the action could 

originally have been brought.

Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1) (emphasis added). In Cheeseman, supra, our

Supreme Court set forth a defendant’s burden to successfully change venue 

of a case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens as follows:

[T]he defendant may meet its burden of showing that the 

plaintiff’s choice of forum is vexatious to him by establishing with 

facts on the record that the plaintiff’s choice of forum was 

designed to harass the defendant, even at some inconvenience to 

the plaintiff himself. Alternatively, the defendant may meet his 

burden by establishing on the record that trial in the 

chosen forum is oppressive to him; for instance, that trial 

in another county would provide easier access to witnesses 

or other sources of proof, or to the ability to conduct a view 

of [the] premises involved in the dispute. But, we stress 

that the defendant must show more than that the chosen 

forum is merely inconvenient to him.

Id. at 162 (headnote and page number omitted) (emphasis added). Later, in 

Bratic, supra, our Supreme Court clarified the level of “oppression” needed 

for a trial court to grant a change of venue based on forum non conveniens. 

Specifically, the Bratic Court reaffirmed Cheeseman’s holding that “[m]ere 

inconvenience remains insufficient” to grant a venue change, but further

stated that “there is no burden to show near-draconian consequences.” 

Bratic, 99 A.3d at 21; id. at 7-8 (in seeking transfer under Rule 1006(d)(1), 

defendant must “demonstrate[],with detailed information on the record,” that 

chosen forum is oppressive or vexatious, not merely inconvenient). See 

Wood v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 829 A.2d 707, 712 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (en banc) (important considerations when measuring oppressiveness 
J-A24002-21

- 10 -

are: relative ease of access to witnesses or other sources of proof; availability 

of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining 

willing, witnesses; costs associated with witnesses’ attendance; and ability to 

conduct view of premises involved in dispute).

Rutter’s insists that this case is controlled by Bratic. In Bratic, Plaintiffs 

instituted a lawsuit in Philadelphia County for wrongful use of civil proceedings 

and common-law abuse of process claims based on a previously dismissed 

tortious interference lawsuit that had been brought in Dauphin County. Id.

at 3. Defendants petitioned to transfer venue of the wrongful use case to 

Dauphin County, pursuant to Rule 1006(d)(1), based on forum non 

conveniens. Id. In their petition, Defendants alleged that the pertinent 

witnesses and evidence were located in Dauphin County, that taking witness 

depositions would be a hardship if they occurred in Philadelphia County, and 

that trial in Philadelphia County would also prove to be a hardship. Id. at 4. 

To support their petition, Defendants provided seven affidavits from potential 

witnesses, all of whom lived more than 100 miles from Philadelphia. Id. Each 

witness stated in his or her affidavit that having trial in Plaintiffs’ chosen forum 

“‘would be both disruptive and a personal and financial hardship if [he or she] 

should be called to testify at deposition or trial’ because he or she ‘would have 

to incur substantial costs for fuel, tolls and, if traveling overnight, for lodging 

and meals[, and for] every day of deposition or trial in Philadelphia, [he or 

she] would be forced to take at least one full day away from [work].’” Id.
J-A24002-21

- 11 -

Relying on Cheeseman, the trial court in Bratic granted Plaintiffs’ 

petition to transfer venue for the following reasons: (1) the prior lawsuit took 

place in Dauphin County; (2) all Defendants were from Dauphin County; (3) 

each of Defendants’ eight witnesses lives more than 100 miles from 

Philadelphia County and “is engaged in business activities which make their 

ability to appear at trial in Philadelphia County far more of a burden than a 

trial in Dauphin County;” and (4) the only connection with Philadelphia County 

is the fact that all Defendants occasionally conduct business there. Bratic, 

99 A.3d at 4. On appeal, our Court affirmed the trial court’s order transferring 

the case to Dauphin County. See Bratic v. Rubendall, No. 2413 EDA 2009 

(Pa. Super. filed Jan. 14, 2011) (now-withdrawn unpublished memorandum 

decision). A divided Court en banc reversed our panel decision, finding that 

Defendants did not meet the burden of demonstrating that trial in the 

Plaintiffs’ forum “would be oppressive or vexatious,” noting that the trial court 

relied on irrelevant factors (Plaintiffs’ putative inconvenience; prior lawsuit 

having been brought in Dauphin County; Defendants’ sole connection to 

Philadelphia County is occasional business; and site of precipitating event 

occurred outside of Philadelphia County) and that Defendants “ha[d] not 

offered particularized averments sufficient to satisfy their burden as required 

by Cheeseman and its progeny.” 99 A.3d at 5. 

Our Supreme Court granted the Defendants’ petition for allowance of 

appeal and ultimately concluded that the trial court, after considering the 

totality of the evidence, properly transferred the case. Id. at 8. The Court 
J-A24002-21

- 12 -

pointed out that the trial court properly did not consider court congestion 

where it would not have borne on the ultimate consideration as to whether 

the chosen venue was oppressive or vexatious. Id. Moreover, the Supreme 

Court found that the affidavits presented by the defense did not lack the 

requisite detail to illustrate how businesses would be affected by trial in 

Philadelphia, where “the interference with one’s business and personal life 

caused by the participatory demands of a distant lawsuit is patent,” id. at 9, 

especially where the case involves a transfer from Philadelphia to a more 

distant county, like Dauphin. While the Court noted that “distance alone is 

not dispositive, . . . it is inherently a part of the equation.” Id. (“Dauphin 

County . . . is not a neighbor of Philadelphia, and one needs no detailed 

affidavit to understand the difference in logistics necessitated by a separation 

of 100 miles.”); id. at 10 (affidavits stating trial 100 miles away “is manifestly 

troublesome”). Ultimately, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Cheeseman

standard, but held that “the showing of oppression needed for a judge to 

exercise discretion in favor of granting a forum non conveniens motion is not 

as severe as suggested by the Superior Court’s post-Cheeseman cases.” Id.

Here, like in Bratic, Rutter’s argument is based on an allegation that 

trial in Philadelphia County would be oppressive. See Cheeseman, 701 A.2d 

at 162 (in addition to proving vexatiousness, defendant may meet burden to 

transfer venue under Rule 1006(d)(1), alternatively, by “establishing on the 

record that trial in the chosen forum is oppressive to him”). Accordingly, 

Rutter’s was required to demonstrate “with detailed information on the record, 
J-A24002-21

- 13 -

that [the Ritcheys’] chosen form is oppressive or vexatious to [Rutter’s].” Id. 

The Ritcheys point out in their response to Rutter’s motion to transfer that 

“[n]othing contained in [Defendants’] affidavits comes close to ‘detailed 

information’ that venue in Philadelphia is oppressive or vexatious” and 

“[Rutter’s argument] that the location of the alleged personal injury and a 

majority (if not all) of the prospective witnesses work or reside in Cumberland 

County . . . is unequivocally ‘not the type of record evidence that proves 

litigating the case in the chosen forum is oppressive and vexatious.’” 

Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer,5/5/2020, at 11-12. 

We disagree.

Rutter’s supported its motion to transfer with twenty affidavits from 

potential witnesses all averring trial in Philadelphia would be oppressive and 

a “great hardship,” see Bratic, supra; Thrower, supra. The Ritcheys 

countered Rutter’s motion with additional deposition testimony from two 

potential witnesses stating that trial in Philadelphia would not be oppressive. 

See Fessler v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. Inc., 131 A.3d 

44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2015). However, at least two other witnesses12 testified 

during their depositions that travel would be oppressive and more than 

____________________________________________

12 Instantly, the Ritcheys identified and obtained affidavits from two key 

eyewitnesses to the accident, Carol Vinck and additional Defendant 

McNaughton, who swore to their “willingness to travel to Philadelphia County 

for their depositions or for trial, and that it would not be oppressive or 

inconvenient for them to do so.” Id. at 13. Vinck was operating the vehicle 

behind Mr. Ritchey’s motorcycle at the time of the accident.
J-A24002-21

- 14 -

burdensome, citing the COVID-19 pandemic,

13 civil unrest, increased work 

obligations, and childcare needs as reasons for the now-apparent burden. See 

Bratic, supra at 9 (holding “when the case involves a transfer from 

Philadelphia to a more distant county, factors such as the burden of travel, 

time out of the office, disruption to business operations, and the greater 

difficulty involved in obtaining witnesses and sources of proof are more 

significant”).14 

One of the “salient factors” the trial court considered when ruling on 

the transfer motion is that two of Mr. Ritchey’s treating physicians are from 

____________________________________________

13 Although not precedential, we note that COVID came into play in the context 

of forum non conveniens in Favire v. CONRAIL, 2021 Pa. Super. Unpub. 

LEXIS 2554, *17 (No. 1757 EDA 2020) (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 21, 2021) 

(unpublished memorandum decision), where our Court stated:

In that same vein, the court considered the administrative 

difficulties associated with maintaining this action in Philadelphia 

concurrent with the COVID-19 pandemic, maintaining that 

COVID-19 has “strained the Philadelphia court system,” which is 

the largest trial court system in the Commonwealth and that the 

“[i]ntroduction of unnecessary cases or parties needlessly upsets 

the delicate balance between public safety and the public interests 

protected by court staff.” Id. at *16 (stating further that “public 

interest is not served having a Philadelphia jury risk exposure for 

a case that has only fleeting connections to this jurisdiction”).

14 The evidence gathered for the venue motion occurred at the beginning of 

the COVID lock-down period, when many courthouses, businesses, and cities 

were shutting down operations and transitioning to remote work. Notably, 

during the remote depositions counsel for the parties indicated that it would 

be difficult to estimate a trial date in the matter since trials had been halted 

in Philadelphia and the future landscape of jury trials amidst a pandemic was 

uncertain. 
J-A24002-21

- 15 -

Philadelphia. However, notably, the bulk of Mr. Ritchey’s post-accident acute 

care and rehabilitation took place in either Cumberland County or York County,

both distant from Philadelphia County. Cf. Hoose, supra (where majority of 

sources of proof, including witnesses and medical care providers, resided or 

were located in Philadelphia’s neighboring counties (i.e., Delaware County or 

Montgomery County), hardship not apparent to support transfer of venue).

Moreover, the trial court’s consideration that Defendants did not 

“disclose[] in [their] moving papers” that Mr. Ritchey received care at medical 

facilities in Philadelphia should not have been a decisive factor in the court’s 

transfer analysis under Rule 1006(d)(1), where the location and convenience 

of plaintiff’s witnesses is generally immaterial to central questions of 

oppressiveness to a defendant in a forum case. See Catagnus v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 864 A.2d 1259, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2004); Wood, supra at 715 (“the 

proper focus of the inquiry ‘is whether the choice of forum is oppressive or 

vexatious to the defendant’”) (emphasis added); but see Bratic, supra

(trial court’s mere mention of facts that none of plaintiffs was from 

Philadelphia and cost of counsel travelling to Dauphin County “does not 

constitute an abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law” where those 

factors were not sole reasons for judge’s decision).

In addition, when a case involves a transfer from Philadelphia to a more 

distant county, like Cumberland County or York County, “factors such as the 

burden of travel, time out of the office, disruption to business operation, and 

the greater difficulty in obtaining witnesses and sources of proof are more 
J-A24002-21

- 16 -

significant.” Bratic, supra at 564 (citation omitted). Here, Rutter’s 

presented twenty affidavits from potential witnesses averring that trial in 

Philadelphia would be oppressive and a great hardship due to personal, family 

and employment responsibilities. As our Supreme Court emphasized in 

Bratic, “the interference with one’s business and personal life caused by the 

participatory demands of a distant lawsuit is patent.” Id. at 563. 

Furthermore, the trial court’s conclusory statement that “neither 

Philadelphia nor York nor Cumberland County would be a convenient forum 

[for the] significant number of experts necessary for the liability and damages 

phases of the case,” is unsupported by record evidence. Out of the twenty 

affiants who stated that travel to Philadelphia would be a “great hardship due 

to personal, family, and employment responsibilities” and who averred that 

such a commute would be “oppressive and very inconvenient,” each one 

resides and/or work in Cumberland County or York County, counties that are 

more than 100 miles from Philadelphia.

15 See Bratic, supra (where case 

involves transfer from Philadelphia to more distant county, “distance . . . is 

inherently a part of the equation”).

Finally, with regard to the court’s statement that it considered “the 

(even if remote) possibility Defendants’ motivation for the transfer amounted

to forum shopping,” we note that the term “forum shopping” is traditionally 

____________________________________________

15 Cumberland County is roughly 137 miles from Philadelphia and York County 

is roughly 106 miles from Philadelphia. See Cubano v. Sheehan, 2016 PA 

Super 193, 146 A3d 791 n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2016) (court may take judicial notice 

of geographical facts).
J-A24002-21

- 17 -

used in the context of discussing a plaintiff’s choice of forum. See Fessler 

v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. Inc., 131 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citing Zappala v. James Lewis Group (Zappala II), 982 

A.2d 512, 521 (Pa. Super. 2009), and Cheeseman, distinguishing “between 

‘proper’ forum shopping in which the plaintiff seeks a certain forum because 

it is ‘closer to the office of plaintiff’s attorney, or closer to a transportation 

center,’ and ‘improper’ forum shopping, which occurs ‘where a plaintiff 

manufactures venue by naming and serving parties who are not proper 

defendants to the action for the purpose of manipulating the venue rules to 

create venue where it does not properly exist’”) (emphasis added). See also 

Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt. (Zappala I), 909 A.2d 1272, 1286 n.14 

(Pa. 2006) (“We disapprove of forum shopping and explain in detail that a 

defendant aggrieved by such a strategy has recourse through either forum 

non conveniens in accord with Rule 1006(d)(1)[,] or through averment that 

absent a transfer there cannot be a fair and impartial trial.”). 

After a comprehensive review of the record, it is unclear whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying Rutter’s motion to transfer venue 

on the basis of forum non conveniens. Walker, supra. Accordingly, we must 

remand for a detailed and comprehensive opinion in which the trial court 

explains the reasons behind its ruling. While we are aware of the 

“considerable discretion” that trial courts are vested with in balancing the 

arguments of the parties in a forum challenge, we find the trial court’s list of 

the “salient factors,” several of which are inappropriate for a transfer analysis, 
J-A24002-21

- 18 -

insufficient to conduct full and appropriate appellate review of the matter on 

appeal. 

We remand to the trial court for the preparation of a complete Rule 

1925(a) opinion, wherein it weighs all the relevant factors, Wood, supra at 

712, including the averments in the twenty detailed affidavits offered by the 

defense, applies Bratic to the facts of this case, and gives due consideration 

to the significance of the distance between the forum county and the transfer 

counties, Cumberland and York, in this matter. 

Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction retained.