NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CRAIG ALLAN GOLLIHAR, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0757

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201301522

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Daniel DeRienzo, PLLC, Prescott Valley

By Daniel J. DeRienzo

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. GOLLIHAR

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Craig A. Gollihar appeals his conviction and the 

resulting sentence for kidnapping, a class two felony. He argues that the 

trial court erred by denying his motion to admit evidence of the victim’s 

prior sexual abuse as a child pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 13-1421(A)(3).

1 For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The victim, A.M., was the only person working at a Motel 6 in 

Kingman on the evening of December 1, 2013. After renting a motel room 

for two nights, Gollihar called the front desk and told A.M. that his

television remote was not working. She brought him a new remote and 

returned to the front desk. Fifteen minutes later, he called the front desk 

again and told A.M. the new remote was not working.

¶3 She then went to his room to show him how to use the remote. 

After Gollihar opened the door, A.M. took the remote from his hand, left 

the door open, and walked into the room. She showed him how to work 

the remote, placed the remote on the desk and turned to leave the room,

but Gollihar had closed and locked the door. He grabbed her by the 

shoulders and threw her on the bed. Gollihar then climbed on top of her, 

straddling her, and pinned her arm down while trying to remove her jacket. 

A.M. screamed, and Gollihar covered her mouth with his hand and told her 

not to scream. A.M. then hit Gollihar in the head several times with her free 

hand and managed to push him towards the nightstand. She ran to the 

 

1 We cite to the current statute unless otherwise noted. 

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the conviction. 

State v. Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536, 538, ¶ 2, 287 P.3d 830, 832 (App. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 
STATE v. GOLLIHAR

Decision of the Court

3

door, disengaged the security latch, and ran to the office where she called 

the police and motel manager.

¶4 Officer Sandeen responded, arrested Gollihar, and took him 

to the police station. Gollihar was “extremely belligerent,” and smelled 

strongly of alcohol. In fact, after being arrested, he slurred, “The party’s 

over.” Gollihar was subsequently indicted for kidnapping and attempted 

sexual assault.

¶5 During the first day of trial, Gollihar filed a motion to admit 

evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1421. 

Specifically, Gollihar sought to admit that the victim had previously been a 

victim of “some type of sexual offense” as a child and believed a conviction 

resulted. Gollihar claimed that the evidence was admissible under A.R.S. § 

13-1421(A)(3) as evidence of the victim’s motive to accuse him of the 

offense. He also requested an evidentiary hearing, and then made an oral 

motion to continue the trial or, alternatively, for a mistrial. The court 

denied Gollihar’s motions, finding the evidence was not admissible because 

it would not show “case specific” or “defendant specific” motive as 

required by the statute. The court further held that the evidence was

irrelevant and prejudicial to the rights of the victim.

¶6 The jury convicted Gollihar of kidnapping but was unable to 

reach a unanimous verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. The trial 

court subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the attempted 

sexual assault charge without prejudice. The trial court found that Gollihar 

had one prior felony conviction, and sentenced him to the presumptive 

term of five years’ imprisonment with ninety-four days of presentence 

incarceration credit.

¶7 Gollihar filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 

12–120.21(A)(1), 13–4031, and –4033(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Gollihar contends that the court erred by denying his request 

for a continuance and an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the 

victim’s prior childhood sexual abuse. He argues the victim’s childhood

sexual abuse was relevant and admissible under A.R.S. § 13-1421(A)

because it may have led her to “misperceive” his actions, providing a 

“motive” for her to falsely accuse him of a crime. 
STATE v. GOLLIHAR

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse 

of discretion. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 167, 800 P.2d 1260, 1275 

(1990). Further, a trial court “has considerable discretion in determining 

whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 

its unfairly prejudicial effect.” State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 405, ¶ 29, 998 

P.2d 1069, 1078 (App. 2000). 

¶10 The admissibility of evidence of a victim’s prior sexual history 

is governed solely by Arizona’s rape shield law, A.R.S. § 13-1421. Gilfillan, 

196 Ariz. at 400–01, ¶ 15, 998 P.2d at 1073–74; see also State v. Herrera, 232 

Ariz. 536, 549-50, ¶ 39, 307 P.3d 103, 116-17 (App. 2013) (A.R.S. § 13–1421

“dictates the circumstances under which specific instances of a victim’s 

prior sexual conduct may be admitted”). Section 13-1421(A) permits the 

admission of “instances of the victim’s prior sexual conduct”3 in limited 

situations, and then only if the trial court finds the evidence is relevant, 

material to a fact in issue, and the probative value is not outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice or inflammation of the jury. Further, a trial court 

may admit such evidence only if the evidence is one of five enumerated 

types of evidence. Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing by clear 

and convincing evidence that the evidence is relevant and admissible. 

A.R.S. § 13-1421(B). 

¶11 A defendant may not introduce a victim’s sexual conduct 

“without a court order after a hearing on written motions is held to 

determine the admissibility of the evidence.” Id. However, “[i]f new 

information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the 

evidence described in subsection A admissible, the court may hold a 

hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence under subsection A.” 

Id. 

¶12 On appeal, Gollihar argues that A.M.’s alleged history of 

sexual abuse as a child was relevant to her motive to accuse him of a crime 

and therefore admissible under § 13-1421(A)(3). Gollihar relies heavily on 

State v. Lujan, 192 Ariz. 448, 967 P.2d 123 (1998), which predates codification 

of the rape shield law, to argue that he could have found an expert to testify 

in support of his theory that the victim’s alleged sexual abuse ten years 

earlier caused her to misperceive Gollihar locking the door, pushing her 

onto the bed, straddling her and covering her mouth with his hands. He 

 

3 Prior sexual assaults qualify as sexual conduct under rape shield laws.

State v. Dixon, 226 Ariz. 545, 554, ¶ 47, 250 P.3d 1174, 1183 (2011) (“[I]t would 

be anomalous to protect rape victims from questions about prior consensual 

conduct, but subject them to cross-examination about assaults.”).
STATE v. GOLLIHAR

Decision of the Court

5

claims that Lujan is controlling because the legislature essentially codified 

the judicially-created rape shield law adopted by the Arizona Supreme 

Court in State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976). 

However, Lujan is instructive only to the extent it is consistent with the 

plain wording of the rape shield statute. See Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. at 401 n.3,

¶ 16, 998 P.2d at 1074 n.3 (noting that the rape shield statute “seemingly 

codifies the rule enunciated” in Pope and its progeny).

¶13 However, even if applicable, Lujan does not support 

Gollihar’s claim. In Lujan, the defendant was charged with child 

molestation for placing his hand inside the nine-year-old victim’s bathing 

suit and rubbing her “front private part” while they were in a swimming 

pool. 192 Ariz. at 450, ¶ 2, 967 P.2d at 125. Lujan claimed he had merely 

dunked the victim in the pool and did not touch her inappropriately. Id. at 

451, ¶ 8, 967 P.2d at 126. He sought to admit evidence of the victim’s 

contemporaneous sexual abuse by two other men and produced expert 

testimony that the contemporaneous molestations could make a child 

develop “hypersensitivity” to “any physical touch by another adult male.” 

Id. at 450, ¶¶ 3-4, 967 P.2d at 125. Our supreme court held that the trial 

court abused its discretion by precluding the evidence because the “nearly 

contemporaneous sexual abuse” supported the defendant’s defense. Id. at 

451, ¶ 8, 967 P.2d at 126. The court also noted that Lujan “laid a foundation 

connecting the factual predicate of abuse with the defense legal theory” and 

“made a sufficient offer of proof explaining why [the victim] might have 

incorrectly accused him of an inappropriate touching even if such touching 

did not occur.” Id. at 453, ¶ 18, 967 P.2d at 128. 

¶14 In contrast, the victim in this case was an adult when 

assaulted by Gollihar, and the prior sexual abuse allegedly occurred ten 

years earlier, when she was a child. And Gollihar did not make a sufficient 

offer of proof establishing a nexus between the alleged prior abuse and his 

acts. See State v. Oliver, 158 Ariz. 22, 32, 760 P.2d 1071, 1081 (1988) (“In 

Arizona, evidence of prior sexual history is inadmissible on the issue of 

motive unless the record clearly establishes a factual predicate from which 

motive can be inferred.”); Herrera, 232 Ariz. at 550, ¶ 41, 307 P.3d at 117

(finding evidence of victim’s prior sexual history inadmissible under 

§ 13-1421 and noting that the defendant “ha[d] to have something more” to 

establish a connection between the alleged sexual activity and the crimes 

charged and that there was “no good-faith basis” to admit the evidence). 

¶15 The record supports the court’s determination that Gollihar

failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the victim’s alleged 

childhood sexual abuse incident was relevant or admissible under 
STATE v. GOLLIHAR

Decision of the Court

6

§ 13–1421(A)(3) as evidence of her motive to accuse Gollihar of a crime. 

Therefore we find no abuse of discretion. And, even if we assume for the 

sake of argument that the court abused its discretion by not continuing the 

trial and allowing Gollihar some time to secure an expert to testify that the 

victim, because of her past trauma, misperceived his actions and intentions, 

we find the error harmless. The jury, without the evidence that Gollihar 

wanted to attempt to find and produce, did not find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of attempted sexual assault. The jury, however, found 

him guilty of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt because he lured the 

victim into his room, closed and locked the door, pushed her onto the bed, 

straddled her, and kept her from voluntarily leaving until she started 

screaming and hit him. Consequently, the evidence presented at trial was 

sufficient for the conviction. 

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Gollihar’s conviction and 

sentence.