I -- { t_ ED COURT OF APPEALS D! VISIMIVI 11 2014 FEB 20 AM 9* 24



### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON,Respondent,

V. CHRIS ALLEN FORTH, No. 19429 - 5 -II Consolidated With No. 43041 -0 -II
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORSWICK, C.J. — 

### On November 8, 1994, ajury found Chris Allen Forth guilty offirst degree child molestation and bailjumping. The trial court imposed a special sex offender 

### sentencingalternative (SSOSA) sentencethat allowed Forth to serve his 75 month sentence 

### undercommunity supervision, subjectto certain conditions. In 1995, Forth appealed his first degree child molestation conviction to this court. While his appeal was pending in this court, Forth fled the State and we granted the State' s motion to dismiss his appeal. We issued a 

### mandate from that appeal on November 18, 1996. Forth was later arrested pursuant to a bench

warrant on December 16, 2011.No. 19429 - 5 -II Consolidated With No. 43041 -0- II 

### At Forth' s February 3, 2012 SSOSA revocation hearing,the trial court found that Forth had failed to complete court-ordered treatment and failed to report to his community corrections officer as directed. The trial court entered an order revoking Forth' s SSOSA sentence and 

### committing him to 75 months ofincarceration and 36 months ofcommunity custody. Forth 

### timely appealedthetrial court's SSOSA revocation order, asserting that (1) thetrial courtfailed to credit him for time he served in an Idahojail while awaiting extradition to Washington. On October 30, 2012, our Supreme Court ordered this court to recall our mandate and to 

### reinstate Forth' s original appeal. On December 4, 2012, we reinstated Forth' s original appeal, in which he argued (2) the trial court erred by admitting child hearsay evidence without weighing on the record each ofthe nine factors for determining the hearsay statements' reliability under State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 ( 1984); and (3) sufficient evidence did not support his conviction. We consolidated Forth's original appeal with his appeal from the trial court' s 

### SSOSA revocation order and allowed the parties to file supplemental briefing. Forth filed a supplemental brief in which he asserts that (4) his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the reliability of the child victim' s hearsay statements, ( 5) his appellate counsel was ineffective 

### forfailing to obtainthe entireverbatim record ofproceedings ofForth'strial,and (6) appellate counsel' s failure to obtain the entire trial record violated his state constitutional right to appeal.

Forth has also filed a statement of additional grounds for review (SAG), in which he 

### asserts (7) the trial court erred by failing to credit him with time he had served in the community before revocation ofhis SSOSA sentence. We affirm Forth' s convictions.but remand to the trial 

### court for a determination ofwhether Forth was serving time in Idaho solely in regard to the

2No. 19429 - 5 -II Consolidated With No. 43041 -0 -II Washington offense for which he sought credit and, if so, a recalculation ofthe credit for time served that Forth is entitled to under RCW 9.94A.505(6). FACTS Forth and Tina Bennett married in 1982 and had two children; JAB and TB.1 Forth and 

### Tinadissolved theirmarriage in 1988, and Tina latermarried Donald Bennett.2 Underthe terms ofthe parties' dissolution decree, JAB and TB spent a majority oftheir time living in Pendleton, Oregon with Tina and visited Forth for four weeks every summer and on every other holiday. In the summer of 1991, JAB and TB went to visit Forth in Puyallup, Washington. AfterTB 

### returned to Pendleton and started the first grade, she became more aggressive and began physically " striking out at people, mostly boys." Report of Proceedings ( RP) ( Nov, 2, 1994) at 7. 

### One evening in August 1992, TB climbed onto Donald's lap, gave him a hug, and asked for " special attention." RP (Nov. 2, 1994) at 7. Tina and Donald asked TB what she had meant by " special attention," and TB responded, "[ S] pecial attention like ... daddy Chris gives her." 

### RP (Nov. 2, 1994) at 8. When Tina and Donald again asked TB what she had meant by " special
attention," TB became frustrated and went to her bedroom. Tina went.to TB' s bedroom and
asked her again what she had meant by " special attention," but TB said that she couldn't tell her. 

### After Tina assured TB that she could tell her anything, TB revealed that Forth had touched her

1 

### We referto thejuvenile victim and her brother by their initials to protecttheir privacy interests. 2 Because Tina and Donald Bennett share a last name, we refer to each individual by their first name for clarity, intending no disrespect.

3No. 19429 - 5 -II Consolidated With No. 43041 -041 inappropriately during her visit with him in the summer of 1991. Specifically, TB stated that Forth had touched her breasts and vaginal area with his hands and his mouth. TB also described a "toilet game" that she said occurred in Forth' s bathroom, where Forth had directed herto

urinate in his mouth. RP ( Nov. 2, 1994) at 11. Tina reported TB' s allegations to the Oregon Children' s Services Division (CSD). . CSD caseworker Linda Olson interviewed TB on August 21, 1992. Using anatomically correct drawings ofa female child and a male adult, TB described to Olson the same incidents of 

### Forth's sexual misconduct that she had disclosed to Tina. TB told Olson that the incidents 

### occurred during hervisit with Forth in the summer of 1991. 

### On July 14, 1993, the State charged Forth with one count offirstdegree child molestation. The State later amended its information to include a bailjumping charge, after Forth failed to appear at an October 20, 1993 hearing. 

### Before trial,the trial court held a hearing to determine the admissibility ofTB' s hearsay statements to Tina and Olson. The trial court ruled that TB' s hearsay statements to Tina and Olson were admissible at trial, stating: 

### Well, the Court at this point makes evidentiary rulings only and in this case, like 

### every other case, the jurors will be free to believe all or part or none of the testimony of any witness who testifies in the case. The child' s competence to 

### testifyhas been conceded,so we'll state thejurors will either believe or disbelieve the child. We then get to the mother and to Linda Olson. The Court, of course, can take judicial notice and note that there are always motivations, ex-husband, ex - wife, there can be lots of animosity or maybe not such animosity and all different gradiations [ sic] and variations. Other than the obvious fact that this ex-husband and ex - wife, I didn' t detect any particular 

### motivation to do anything otherthan what a mother should do. That doesn't mean 

### I'm putting a stamp of accuracy on any particular witness, but I didn't see
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anything other than the ex-husband, ex - wife syndrome to detract from the testimony of mother. And of course whether she should or should not be believed, again, can be argued to thejury. As far as Ms. Olson, all of us are handicapped by the allegations that something happened in 1991. It, whatever it was, was disclosed in 1992 and people had to act upon it, or they did act upon it in 1992. It' s now November 1, 1994 and we all have to struggle with that, and whether that hurts or helps the state, whether that hurts or helps the defense, remains to be seen. 

### I find that any inconsistencies or problems with Linda Olson's report are simply things where there can be problems and both sides can argue whether these are problems that should cause anybody to particularly believe or disbelieve a particular witness. 

### The Court will rule that the hearsay statements ofthe mother and of Linda Olson are admissible.... . 

### We' ll note an exception to the defense on the Court' s ruling and as I say, I 

### don't know if a cautionary instruction is appropriate or not, but I' ll certainly consider it. RP ( Nov. 1, 1994) at 57 -59. 

### At trial, TB, Tina, and Olson testified consistently with the facts as stated above. 

### Additionally,Tinatestified that she and Donald had driven to Seattle from Pendleton acouple of weeks afterJuly4, 1991, to drop offJAB and TB with Forth for afour - weekvisit. On crossexamination, Tinatestifiedthat during the pendency ofher marriage dissolution in 1988, she had taken TB to adoctor after suspecting thatTB had been sexually abused, butthe doctor determined thatthere was no evidence ofsuch sexual abuse. Tina stated that she became 

### concerned about possible sexual abuse in 1988, when TB told her that "daddy had spanked her down there." 

### RP (Nov. 2, 1994) at 32. She further stated that she didn't tell Forth about her suspicions in 1988 because " it didn' t seem important," and because she was embarrassed to tell Forth about her suspicions after the doctor' s examination revealed no evidence of sexual abuse. RP ( Nov. 2, 1994) at 32 - 33.

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### Prior to Donald' s testimony,the State requested that the trial court allow Donald to testify about TB' s statement that she had asked him for " special attention." Outside the presence
of thejury, Donald stated that TB had asked him for " special attention," that he did not know 

### what she had meant bythe statement,that TB nevertold him what she had meant bythe statement, and that TB did not talkto him about her allegations ofForth' s sexual misconduct. 

### Following this inquiry, defense counsel stipulated to the admissibility ofTB's hearsay statement to Donald. Forth testified that he drove to Pendleton in late June of 1991 to stay with his 

### grandmother for her 80th birthday party and for afamily reunion. He furthertestifiedthat Tina dropped offJAB and TB at his grandmother' s house on July 6 or July 7, and that he drove the 

### children to Puyallup a couple ofdays later. Forth stated that his visitation with the children 

### continued until July 16, 1991, atwhich pointhe drovethe children backto Tina's home in Pendleton. The testimony ofdefense witnesses Joe Forth, Forth's olderbrother; Cory Haugsted, Forth' s half -

brother; Myrna Coan, Forth' s mother; and William Coan, Forth' s stepfather, all 

## substantially supported Forth'stestimony regarding thetimeline ofJAB andTB' svisitwith him in the summer of 1991. In addition, Joe Forth and Myrna Coan both testified that the bathroom 

### in Forth' s home was too small for Forth to lie on the floor in the manner that TB had alleged. 

## Thejury returnedverdicts finding Forth guilty offirstdegree child molestation and bail jumping. Thetrial court imposed a SSOSA sentence that allowed Forth to serve his 75 month sentence under community supervision, subject to certain conditions.

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On April 26, 1995, Forth filed a timely notice ofappeal challenging his first degree child 

### molestation conviction. In November 1995, while Forth's appeal was still pending review in this court, the State filed a petition in the trial court to revoke Forth' s SSOSA sentence. Forth failed to' appear for his SSOSA revocation hearing and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.3 On April 23, 1996, the State filed a motion with this court to dismiss Forth' s appeal, asserting that he 

### waived his rightto appeal by fleeing this court'sjurisdiction. On June 5, 1996, acommissioner ofthis court entered an order conditionally dismissing Forth' s appeal. We dismissed Forth's appeal on August 8, 1996, and issued our mandate on November 18, 1996. Forth was arrested
on December 16, 2011. 

### Following a February 3, 2012 SSOSA revocation hearing,the trial court entered an order 

### revoking Forth's SSOSA sentence, findingthat he hadfailed to complete treatment and had failed to report to his community corrections officer as directed. Forth asserted at the revocation 

### hearingthat he was entitled to six months and three days credit fortime served in Idaho on the bench warrant. The trial court disagreed, stating: 

### You were sitting in the Idaho jail because you went to another jurisdiction, and we had to extradite you back here. You don' t get credit for the time you spent in 

### the Idahojail. You only get credit forthe timeyou spent in our state and ourjail. RP (Feb. 3, 2012) at 11 - 12. On February 8, 2012, Forth timely appealed the trial court' s order revoking his SSOSA sentence. 3 For reasons that are unclear from the record on appeal, Forth' s bench warrant was quashed; a 

### second bench warrant for his arrest issued in December 1998. It was revealed at the February 3, 

### 2012 SSOSA revocation hearing that Forth had fled to Idaho and had assumedthe name " John Conrad" until his arrest on December 16, 2011.

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On April 12, 2012, Forth filed a motion with this court to recall the mandate from his 1995 appeal, which motion we denied on June 27, 2012. Forth filed in our Supreme Court a 

### motion for discretionary review ofthe order denying his motion to recall ourmandate. On October 30, 2012, our Supreme Court ordered this court to recall our mandate and to reinstate Forth' s appeal. On December 4, 2012, we reinstated Forth' s appeal, consolidated that appeal 

### with his appeal from the trial court's SSOSA revocation order, and allowed the parties to file supplemental briefing. ANALYSIS I. CHILD HEARSAY EvIDENCE 

### Forth first contends thatthe trial court erred by admitting evidence ofTB' s hearsay 

### statements to Tina and Olson. Specifically, Forth argues thatwe should reverse his first degree child molestation conviction because the trial courtfailed to evaluate on the record the nine Ryan 

### factors for determining the reliability ofchild hearsay statements. Because evidence presented at 

### the child hearsay hearing supports the trial court's conclusion that TB' s hearsay statements were reliable, and thus admissible under former RCW 9A.44. 120 ( 1991), we disagree. 

### We review atrial court's decision to admit child hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Borboa, 157 Wn.2d 108, 121, 135 P. 3d 469 ( 2006). A trial court abuses its 

### discretion ifits decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds orfor

untenable reasons. State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P. 3d 638 ( 2003). The childNo. 19429 - 5 -II Consolidated With No. 43041 -0 -II 

## hearsaystatute, former RCW 9A.44.120,4 governed the admissibility ofTB' s out - of - court statements and provided in relevant part: 

### A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another or describing any attempted act of sexual contact with or on the child by another, not otherwise 

### admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings, including juvenile offense adjudications, in the courts ofthe state ofWashington if:

1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the 

### jury, that the time, content, and circumstances ofthe statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and

2) The child either: a) Testifies at the proceedings; or b) Is unavailable as a witness: PROVIDED, That when the child is unavailable as a witness, 

### such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. Because TB testified at trial, the issue before us is whether her statements were 

## sufficiently reliableto be admitted throughthetestimony ofTinaand Olson. In determining whether the time, content, and circumstances of a child' s hearsay statements provide sufficient 

### indicia ofreliability, atrial court applies the nine Ryan factors. State v. Woods, 154 Wn.2d 613, 623, 114 P. 3d 1176 (2005) ( citing Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165). Those factors include:

1) whether the child had an apparent motive to lie, ( 2) the child' s general character, ( 3) whether more than one person heard the statements, ( 4) the spontaneity of the statements, ( 5) whether trustworthiness was suggested by the timing of the statement and the relationship between the child and the witness, ( 6)

4 

### The language offormer RCW 9A.44. 120 remains substantially the same in its current form. 

### The current statute now contains language allowing forthe admission ofchild hearsay evidence where the out -

of - court statement sought to be admitted described " any act of physical abuse of 

### the child by anotherthat results in substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.04.110." LAWS OF 1995, ch. 76, § 1.
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whether the statements contained express assertions of past fact, ( 7) whether the child' s lack of knowledge could be established through cross - examination, (8) the remoteness of the possibility of the child' s recollection being faulty, and ( 9) 

### whether the surrounding circumstances suggested the child misrepresented the defendant' s involvement. Woods, 154 Wn.2d at 623 ( citing Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 175 -76). A trial court need not determine 

### that every Ryan factor is satisfied before admitting child hearsay evidence underformer RCW 9A.44. 120; it is sufficient ifthe evidence before the trial court shows that the Ryan factors are substantially met." State v. Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 652, 790 P-. 2d 610 ( 1990). Here, Forth does not contend that the evidence presented atthe child hearsay hearing 

### failed to support the trial court' s ruling on the admissibility ofTB' s hearsay statements to Tina and Olson. Instead, he argues onlythatthe trial court abused its discretion by admitting TB's 

### hearsay statements withoutweighing onthe record each ofthe nine Ryan factors. Butatrial court need notfind that every Ryan factor weigh infavor ofreliability,so long asthe factors are substantially met." Swan, 114 Wn.2d at 652. Moreover, we will affirm a trial court' s 

### admission ofchild hearsay evidence where the reliability ofthe evidence is apparentfrom the
record. State v. Stevens, 58 Wn.App. 478, 487, 794 P.2d 38 ( 1990). Here, the record contains 

### sufficient evidence thatthe Ryan factors were substantially met and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting those statements at trial. II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Next, Forth asserts that sufficient evidence did not support his first degree child molestation conviction. Again, we disagree.

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Sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction if any rational trier offact could find the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 ( 2006). A 

### defendant claiming insufficiency ofthe evidence admits the truth ofthe State' s evidence and all 

### inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence. State V. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P. 2d 1068 ( 1992). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P. 2d 99 ( 1980). We defer to the trier of fact on 

### issues ofconflicting testimony, credibility ofwitnesses, and the persuasiveness ofthe evidence. State v. Walton, 64 Wn.App. 410, 415 -16, 824 P.2d 533 ( 1992). To convict Forth offirst degree child molestation, the State had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the essential elements of former RCW 9A.44. 083 ( 1990), which statute
provided in relevant part, "

### A person is guilty ofchild molestation in the first degree when the person has sexual contact with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the
perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least thirty - six months older than the victim." And former 

### RCW 9A.44.010 ( 1988) defined "sexual contact" as " any touching ofthe sexual or other intimate parts ofa person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party." Forth does not assert that the State failed to present evidence in support ofthe elements of 

### first degree child molestation but, instead, contends that no rationaljury could have found his 

### guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in light ofthe conflicting evidence regarding the timing ofTB' s
visitation with him in the summer of 1991: Forth also contends that the State' s evidence with regard to the " bathroom game" incident failed to support his first degree child molestation

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conviction in light ofdefense witnesses' testimony regarding the bathroom' s size. Forth' s contentions essentially askthis court to reweigh the evidence and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. But we defer to the trier offact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness ofthe evidence. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 ( 1985). 

### Accordingly, Forth's argument regarding the sufficiency ofthe evidence used to convict him is meritless and we do not address it further here. III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

### Next, Forth asserts in his supplemental briefthat his trial counsel was ineffective for 

### stipulating to the admissibility ofTB' s hearsay statement throughthe testimony ofDonald, and that his original counsel on appeal was ineffective for failing to order a complete transcription of his trial record. We disagree. 

### We review ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims de novo. State v. Binh Thach, 126 Wn. App. 297, 319, 106 P. 3d 782 ( 2005). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

### claim, Forth must show both that (1) counsel' s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ( 1984); State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 344 - 45, 150 P. 3d 59 (2006). 

### Performance is deficient if,after considering all the circumstances, it falls below an objective standard ofreasonableness. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334 - 35, 899 P.2d 1251 ( 1995). Prejudice results ifthe outcome ofthe trial would have been different had defense counsel not

rendered deficient performance. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 337. If Forth fails to establish either 

### prong ofthistest, our inquiry ends and we need not considerthe other prong. State v.

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Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P. 2d 563 ( 1996). We strongly presume that counsel is effective and the defendant must show the absence ofany legitimate strategic or tactical reason 

### supporting defense counsel' s actions. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 337. To rebut this presumption, the defendant bears the heavy burden of "establishing the absence of any
conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel' s performance. "' State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 42, 246 P. 3d 1260 ( 2011) ( 

### quoting State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 2004)). A. Trial Counsel Forth asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the admissibility of 

### TB' s out -

of - court statement to Donald because the statement was not admissible underformer 

### RCW 9A.44. 120. Although Forth is correctthat TB' s statement regarding " special attention" did

not describe any " act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another," at least with 

### regard to Donald who testified that TB never explained to him whatthe statement meant, it is for 

### this very reason that he cannot demonstratethat his trial counsel's stipulation prejudiced him. Moreover, because Tina also testified as to TB' s initial statement regarding " special attention," 

### Donald'stestimonywas cumulative andtherefore did not prejudice Forth.Accordingly, Forth cannot show that the outcome ofhis trial would have been different had his counsel objected to 

### the admissibility ofTB' s statementto Donald and,thus, he fails to demonstrate thathistrial counsel rendered.ineffective assistance.

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B. Appellate Counsel Next, Forth asserts that his original appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to order a complete verbatim transcription of his trial record. Specifically, Forth asserts that his appellate 

### counsel was ineffective forfailing to order atranscription ofjuryvoir dire, opening statements,
and closing arguments.5 Absent a record ofthese proceedings, however, we cannot evaluate whether the outcome of Forth' s appeal would be different had his original appellate counsel 

### ordered a'transcription ofthese records. State v. Burke, 132 Wn.App. 415, 419, 132 P.3d 1095 2006) ( citing McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335). 

### Accordingly, on the record before us, Forth fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. IV. RIGHT To APPEAL Forth also argues that his appellate counsel' s failure to order a complete verbatim 

### transcript ofthe trial proceedings deprived him of his right to appeal under article I, section 22, of our State Constitution. We disagree.

A criminal defendant is `constitutionally entitled to a ` record of sufficient completeness' to permit effective appellate review of his or her claims." State v. Tilton, 149 Wn.2d 775, 781, 72 P. 3d 735 ( 2003) ( 

### quoting State v. Thomas, 70 Wn.App. 296, 298, 852 P.2d 1130 ( 1993) ( 

### quoting Coppedge v. UnitedStates, 369 U.S. 438, 446, 82 S. Ct.917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 ( 1962)). However, a " record of sufficient completeness" does not necessarily equate with a 5 In his supplemental brief,Forth asserts that these records are no longer available as reporter' s 

### notes may be destroyed after 15 years under RCW 36.23. 070. It has not escaped our attention that Forth' s absconsion likely contributed to his inability to now provide a complete verbatim transcript of trial.

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complete verbatim transcript of trial. Tilton, 149 Wn.2d at 781. And the absence of a portion of 

### the trial record is not reversible error unless the defendant can demonstrate prejudice. State v. Miller, 40 Wn.App. 483, 488, 698 P. 2d 1123 ( 1985). Again, on the record before us, Forth 

### cannot demonstrate anyprejudice resulting from the absence ofa portion ofhis trial record. Accordingly, he cannot showthat he was deprived ofhis article I, section 22 right ofappeal and we affirm his convictions. V. ORDER REVOKING SOOSA SENTENCE Next, Forth challenges the trial court' s order revoking his SSOSA sentence, asserting that 

### the trial court erred by failing to credit him fortime served in an Idahojail while awaiting extradition backto Washington State. Because the trial court erred by ruling as a matter oflaw that Forth was not entitled to credit for time served in an out - of - state correctional facility, we 

### remand to thetrial court for a determination ofwhether Forth was serving time in Idaho solely in regard to the Washington offense forwhich he sought credit and, ifso, to recalculate his credit for time served. We review de novo atrial court' s decision to award an offender credit for time served. State v. Swiger, 159 Wn.2d 224, 227, 149 P. 3d 372 ( 2006). 

### When interpreting a statute, our duty 

### is to implement the intent ofthe legislature. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 801, 92 P.3d 228 (2004). 

### Where a statute' s meaning is.plain on its face, we must give effect to that meaning 

### as expressing the legislature' s intent. State v.Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). We determine a statute's plain meaning from the ordinary meaning ofthe statute' s language, as

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well as from the general context ofthe statute, its related provisions, and from the statutory scheme as a whole. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at 600.

RCW 9. 94A.505( 6) provides, "

### The sentencing court shall give the offender creditfor all confinementtime served before the sentencing ifthat confinementwas solely in regard to the
offense for which the offender is being sentenced." 

### A trial court may not award credit for time 

### served on other charges. In re Pers. Restraint ofPhelan, 97 Wn.2d 590, 597, 647 P.2d 1026 1982). 

### By its plain language, RCW 9.94A.505(6) requires sentencing courts to credit offenders 

### with all confinement time served before sentencing ifsuch confinement was solely in regard to 

### the offense being sentenced. And the statute does notcontain any language limiting such credit
to time served in a Washington State facility. The State argues, however, that RCW 9. 95. 0606 

### precludes Forth from receiving credit fortime served in an out - of - statejail while awaiting his extradition to Washington. But RCW 9.95.900(2) states that RCW 9.95. 060 applies to " any 

### felony offense committed before July 1, 1984, andto anyoffense sentenced under RCW 9. 94A.507 and committed on or after July 1, 2001." Here, Forth committed his offense in 1991
6 RCW 9. 95.060 provides in relevant part: 

### When a convicted person seeks appellate review ofhis or her conviction and is at 

### liberty on bond pending the determination ofthe proceeding bythe supreme court or the court of appeals, credit on his or her sentence will begin from the date such convicted person is returned to custody.... If such convicted person does not seek review ofthe conviction, but is at liberty for a period oftime subsequent to 

### the signing of the judgment and sentence, or becomes a fugitive, credit on his sentence will begin from the date such convicted person is returned to custody.

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### and, thus, RCW 9.95. 060 does not apply to his sentence. Accordingly, we do not considerthe 

### State' s argument regarding RCW 9.95.060. Instead, we rely on the plain language of RCW 

### 9.94A.505(6) to holdthatthe sentencing court was required to credit Forth with time he served in an Idahojail, provided that Forth served such time solely in regard to the Washington offense being sentenced. 

### Here, the record is unclear as to whether Forth had been serving time in an Idahojail 

## solelyfor his Washington offense because thetrial courtforeclosed anyfurtherpresentation of evidence onthat issue by ruling as amatter oflawthat Forth was notentitledto creditfortime

served in an out - of - state facility. 

### Similarly, it is unclear how muchtime Forth had served in the Idaho jail while awaiting his extradition.7 

### Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for a 

### determination ofwhether Forth was setving time in Idaho solely in regard to the Washington offense forwhich he sought credit and, ifso, to recalculate the creditfortime served that Forth is entitled to under RCW 9.94A.505( 6). VI. SAG 

### In his SAG, Forth argues thatthe trial court erred by failing to credit him with time he 

### served on community custodybefore the revocation ofhis suspended sentence. Butour Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not entitled to credit against his sentence fortime spent in the 

## communityundera SSOSAbeforethe defendant's suspended sentence was revoked. State v.

7 The trial court must resolve these factual issues on remand.

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Pannell, 173 Wn.2d 222, 224, 267•P. 3d 349 ( 2011). Following Pannell, we reject Forth' s SAG
argument. We affirm Forth' s convictions but remand to the trial court to determine whether Forth' s 

### confinement in Idaho was solely in regard to his Washington offense and, ifso, to recalculate the credit to which Forth is entitled under RCW 9. 94A.505( 6). 

### A majority ofthe panel having determined thatthis opinion will notbe printed inthe Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed forpublic record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

U7,- r-nncTtr• Worswick, C. J.

M.