F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT Sep tember 1 9, 2006 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1715 0 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00491 -CV -BH -M MIC HAEL L EON POW E,

Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us GRANT CULLIVER, Res po nd en t-Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e S o u t h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 19, 200 6) Be fo re D U BIN A , H U L L and W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

Mi ch ae l P ow e, an A la

ba m a state pr iso ne r pr oc ee din g pro se , appe al s th e dism issal of his habeas corpus p etition, 28 U. S. C. § 225 4, as bar red bythe oney ear statut e of

li m itatio ns o f the A nti te rr or ism and E ff ec tiv e D eath P en al ty

A ct of 1996 (“ AE DP A” ), Pub. L . N o. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (199 6). The issue before thi s C ourt i s w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in dis m iss ing P ow e’ s § 2 254 pe tit ion by c onc lud ing that e qui ta

ble tol lin g di d no t a

ppl y und er the spe ci fi c fa ct s of

thi s ca se . B ec au se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac tua l f ind ing that P ow e did

not e xe rc ise due dil ige nc e is n ot c le ar ly

e rr one ous, w e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of Po w e’ s § 2 254 pe tit ion . BACKGROUND Po w e w as c onvi ct ed

in A la ba m a state c ourt f

or f ir st- de gr ee r ap e an d sentenced to life im

prisonm ent without po ssibi lity of parole. T he Alabam a Court of Cr im ina l Appe al s a ff

irm ed the se nte nc e on Apr il 20, 200 1, and i ssu ed a ce rt if ic at e of j udgm en t onMay

8, 200 1. Be tw ee n June 21, 200 1, and M ar ch18, 200 2, P ow e atte m pte d to obt ai n hi s trial transcript and rec ords from his appellate attorney

and subs equently -appointed po st -co nv ic ti on att orne y

in ord er t o p rep are ape ti ti on un de r Ala . R. Cri m P. 32 . Powe sent two letters to his appellate attorney , G lenn L. Davidso n, and one letter to h is a ppoi nte d c ouns el f

or the Ru le 32 p ro ce ed ing s, L ila Cl ev el an d. P ow e al soPowe did not produce a copy of this letter. Consequently , this is an unsupported 1 asser tion included in Powe’s objection to the mag istrate’s r eport a nd rec ommendation. 3 as se rt ed that so m et im e be tw ee n Augus t 21 , 200 1, and J anuary 20, 200 2, he se nt a le tte r to the tr ia l c ourt j udge r eque sti ng tha t the j udge dir ec t P ow e’ s a ppe llate attor ne y to fo rw ar d hi s r ec or d so that he c oul d purs ue pos t- co nvi ct ionr em ed ie s. 1 Powe asserted that he did not receive his trial transcr ipt un til March 28, 2003, af ter Po w e’ s f am ily m em be rs c ont ac te d hi s a

ppoi nte d c ouns el f

or the Ru le 32 pr oc eed in gs . O n M ay 1, 200 3, P ow e fi le d aRu le 32 p et iti on i n A la ba m a state c ourt. T he A la ba m a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s ul tim at el y a ff irm ed the tr ia l c ourt’ s de ci sio n to d en y P ow e’ s pe tit ion . T he S upr em e Co urt of A la ba m a de nie d P ow e’ s pe tit ion fo r a w ri t of

c er tio rari , and the A la

ba m a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s is sue d a ce rt if ic at e of f ina l j udgm en t onJun e 14, 200 4. On July 20, 2004, Powe executed the pro se § 22 54 h ab ea s pe tit ion currently at issue. T he m agistrate j udge iss ued a report re com m ending that Po w e’ s pe tit ionbe dis m iss ed a s ti m e- barr ed . P ow e fi le d ati m el y obj ec tio n to the report, acknowledging th at w ithou t equitable toll ing, the m agistrate w as corre ct that his § 2 254 p etition was tim e-barr ed, how ever he argued that the dist rict court shou ld a ppl y e qui ta ble tol lin g inhis c as e. S pe ci fi ca lly , P ow e re que ste d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e qui ta

bly tol l the pe ri od b et

w ee n June 21, 200 1, and M ar ch28, 200 3,4

because during that tim e his appellate attorney s failed to provide him with his trial tr an sc ri pt, de spi te his r ep eate d r eque sts . H e ar gue d th at thi s pr ec lud ed

him f ro m fi lin g aRu le 32 p et iti on w iththe state in tim e to t oll the A E D PAli m itatio ns pe rio d. The district court ultim ately dism issed Powe’ s § 225 4 petitio n as tim ebarred. Pow e appealed the district court’ s order and petitioned th e district court fo r a cer ti fic at e o f ap pe al ab il it y (“ COA”). In hi s p et it io n fo r a COA, Po we re ite rate d hi s arg um en t tha t e qui ta ble tol lin g sh oul d a

ppl y f or the ti m e dur ing w hic h he dil ige ntl y

sou ght his tr ia l transc ri pts but

c oul d no t ob ta in the m

f ro m his attorney s. T he district court denied Powe’ s petition for a COA , c onclud ing th at Po we ha d n ot sat is fie d t he “ su bs ta nt ia l s ho win g” req ui rem en t. Po w e the n pe tit ion ed

thi s C ourt f

or aCO A . W e gr an te d aCO A on the iss ue of w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y de te rm ine d th at

appe llant w as not

e nti tle d to equit ab le tol lin g of

28 U . S. C. § 22 44( d) (1 )’ s on e- y ear statut e of li m itatio ns ap pli ca ble to 28 U . S. C. § 22 54 p et iti ons.

STANDARD OF REVIEW W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to de ny e qui ta ble tol lin g de novo . La wr en ce v . F

lor ida , 42 1 F .3d12 21 , 12 24 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ), cert. gran ted , 126 S. Ct . 162 5, 164 L . E d. 2d 3 32 ( 2006 ). T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac tua l de te rm inatio ns,5

ho wev er, we rev ie w forcle ar erro r. Id . T he c le ar

e rr or “ standard

r equir es us t o affir m a district court’ s finding s of fac t unless th e re cord lacks substant ial evidence to supp ort that determ ination .” D re w v . D ep ’t of Co rr. , 297 F . 3d 1 278, 1283 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). “ [A ] de te rm inatio n re gard ing aparty ’ s di lig en ce is a fi ndi ng o f fa ct that w ill not

be dis tur be d un le ss clear ly err oneous .” Id

. (internal quotation m arks om itted).

DISCUSS ION T he A E D PAim

pose s aone -y ear statut e of li m itatio ns f

or f ili ng a § 22 54 habe as pe tit ion . 28 U . S. C. § 22 44( d) (1 ). T he pe ri od b eg ins to run f oll ow ing one of f our e ve nts , inc lud ing “ the da te on whic h th e j udgm en t be cam e fi na l by the conclusio n of direct re view or the e xpiration o f the tim e for se eking su ch review .” Id . T he j udgm ent becom es “ final” on the date on which the U. S. Suprem e Court iss ue s ade ci sio n onthe m er its of the pe tit ion er ’ s di re ct

appe al , de nie s c er

tio rari , or af te r the e xpi ratio n of

the 90 d ay s inw hic h th e pe tit ion er c oul d have f

ile d su cha pe ti ti on . B ond v. M

oore , 309 F. 3d 77 0, 773 (11th Cir. 2002) ( quot ing Kaufman v. United States , 232 F . 3d 1 336, 133 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ). “ T he ti m e dur ing w hic h a pr ope rl y f ile d a ppl ic at ionf

or S ta te pos t- co nvi ct ionor

oth er c oll at er al r ev ie ww ith respect to the pertinent j udgm ent or claim is pendin g shall no t be counted toward an y pe rio d o f li m it at io n . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2 24 4( d) (2 ).6

Additionally , the statute of lim itations m ay be equitably

tolled where a pe tit ion er “ unt im el y

f ile s be ca use of e xtr ao rd inary

c ir cum stanc es that are both bey ond h is control and u navoid able even w ith dili gence.” Lawrence , 421 F. 3d at 1226 (quotation om itted). E quitabl e tolling is applied sp aringly and is an extraordinary

rem edy that is “ lim ited to rare and exception al circ um stances, such as when the S tate’ s conduct p revents the petition er f rom tim ely filing.” Id

. When ev al ua tin g w he the r a pr iso ne r is e nti tle d to e qui ta ble tol lin g, “ [e ] ac h c as e tur ns o n its own facts. ” Kn igh t v . Sc hof ie ld , 292 F . 3d 7 09, 711 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) . T he pe tit ion er be ar s th e bur de n of

sho w ing that the c ir cum stanc es w ar rant e qui ta

ble to ll in g. Drew , 29 7 F .3dat 1 28 6. W e ha ve r ep eate dly

he ld tha t m er e attor

ne y ne gli ge nc e is n ot a

ba sis f or eq ui tabl e to ll in g. H

el ton v . Se c’

y for D ep ’t of Co rr. , 259 F . 3d 1 310, 131 3 ( 11th Ci r. 200 1) ; Ste ed

v . H ea d , 219 F . 3d 1 298, 130 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ; Sand vick v . United States , 177 F. 3d 12 69, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1999). Moreover, even if a pr iso ne r show s th at

“ ex tr ao rd inary

c ir cum stanc es ” oc curr ed , the pr iso ne r m ust sti ll es ta bli sh tha t he a ct ed

w ithdue dil ige nc e in o rd er to be e nti tle d to e qui ta

ble to ll in g. Se e H

el ton , 25 9 F .3dat 1 31 3. As an initial m atter, the equitable tolli ng requested byPowe would render his § 22 54 p et iti on t im el y . W ith out e qui ta ble tol lin g, the A E D PAli m itatio nsThis date is 90 day s from May 8, 2001, the date on which the Alabama Court of Criminal 2 Ap pe a ls e nte re d Po we ’s c e rt if ic ate of jud g me nt. We g ive Pow e the be ne fi t of the 90 -d ay pe ri od in wh ic h he c ou ld have fi le d h is p e tit ion fo r c e rt ior ari to t

he U. S. Su

pr e me Court , see Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (allowing90 day s to se ek cer tiorari af ter the “ court of la st resort” de nies discre tionary revie w), e ven tho ugh it do e s n ot a

pp e ar h e fi rs t so ught r e vie w f ro m A la bama ’s highe st c ourt . Witho ut e qu ita ble tolling, howeve r, Powe’s § 2254 pe tition remains time-barr ed re g ardle ss of the application of the 90- day period. P o we r equests equitable tolling from June 21, 2001, throug h Marc h 28, 2003. I f the 3 appropr iate trig g eringdate wa s August 6, 2001, se e su pra note 2, then he is not entitled to have the peri o d fr o m J u n e 21, 2001, throug h August 6, 2001, toll ed bec ause that period of time wa s not counted a g ainst him. Thus, the period of time at issue is f rom the trig g eringdate of August 6, 2001, until Marc h 2 8, 20 03 , th e date on wh ic h Po we re c e ive d h is tri a l tr ans c ri pts .

7 pe ri od w oul d have be en

tr igg er ed on Augus t 6, 200 1, and w oul d have r un unti l 2 Powe filed his Rule 32 petitio n on May 1, 2003. T hus, the one-y ear AE DP A lim itations period would have expired before Pow e filed his state court collatera l petition , and his state court petition would n ot have statuto rily tolled the federal li m it at io ns pe rio d u nd er 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 44 (d )(2 ). Se e W eb ste r v . M

oore , 199 F . 3d 12 56 , 12 59 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). If the district court had tolled the period while Powe wa s awa iting his trial tr an sc ri pt, the A E D PAc loc k w oul d have start ed on M ar ch28, 200 3, the da te he 3 re ce ive d th e tr an sc ri pt, and r un f or 34 d ay s un til May

1, 200 3, the da te he f

ile d hi s Rule 32 collateral state petition. T he tim e during which his Rule 32 p etition was pe ndi ng i n st at e co urt w oul d have tol le d th e fe de ra l l im itatio ns p er iod in ac co rd an ce w ith28 U . S. C. § 22 44( d) (2 ). T hus, the c loc k w oul d have start ed a ga in on Jun e 14, 2004, the date on which the A labam a Suprem e Court issued a final j udgm en t onP ow e’ s R

ule 32 p et iti on, and r

un f or 36 d ay s un til Jul y

20, 200 4, the8

da te on whic h P ow e ini tiate d hi s § 2 254 pe tit ionw iththe dis tr ic t c ourt. T hus, with the requested period of equitable tollin g, Pow e’ s petition would have been ti m el y fil edby app ro xi m at el y

29 5 d ay s. Po w e ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in de ny ing e qui ta

ble tol lin g because he had no control ov er his attorney s’ failure to provide him with the trial transcripts which he needed to file his Rule 32 petition in the Alabam a state court an d b ecau se he act eddi li ge nt ly in at te m pt in g t o o bt ai n h is tri al tra ns cri pt s. A lth oughthe c ir cum stanc es of thi s c as e pr es en t so m e re as ona ble de ba te a s to Po w e’ s di lig en ce in atte m pti ng t o f ile his Ru le 32 p et iti on, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ad e a fa ct ua l f ind ing that e qui ta

ble tol lin g di d no t a

ppl y be ca use P ow e fa ile d to ex er ci se due dil ige nc e. T he standard of r ev ie wf or thi s f ac tua l f ind ing by the dis tr ic t c ourt ( cl ear er

ro r) is dis posi tiv e of

the ins tant a

ppl ic at ionof

e qui ta ble to ll in g. See D rew , 297 F . 3d at 12 89- 90. It is not ew orthy

that P ow e ap pare ntl y

c ont ac te d bo th o f his appe llate attorney s num erous tim es and solicited th e help of the trial court j udge in an attem pt to ob tain his trial transcripts. H e knew of the im pendin g deadline and was ac tiv el y a tte m pti ng t o e nsur e that hi s a tto rn ey s e ith er f ile d hi s R ule 32 p et iti on o r s e n th i m h i s tr i a l tr a n s c r i p ts o h e c o u l df i l e i th i ms e l f

. As d i s c u s s e dp r e v i o u s l y, thi s C ourt ha s st at ed

on num er ous oc ca sio ns tha t m er e attor ne y ne gli ge nc e is n ot9

su ffi ci en t t o warran t eq ui tabl e to ll in g. H el ton , 259 F . 3d at 13 13; Steed , 219 F . 3d at 130 0; Sand

vick, 177 F. 3d at 127 1-72. T hose cases, how ever, are dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m the pr es en t c as e on f

ac tua l gr ound s. T he c ir cum stanc es in the thr ee c as es r ef

er en ce d w er e not

“ ex tr ao rd inary ” be ca

use the y inv olv ed sim ple hum ane rr or s—i n othe r w or ds, m ist ak es or ove rs igh ts, suc h a s m isunde rs tandi ng a statute or rely ing on the eff iciency of the postal service, which occur on a r egular ba si s. Se e H

el ton , 259 F . 3d at 13 13; Steed , 219 F . 3d at 13 00; Sand vick, 177 F . 3d at 127 2. I n th e ins tant c as e, how ev er , the c ir cum stanc es are arg uably

“ extraordinary ” because P owe’ s attorney s’ failures w ent bey ond si m ple m istakes in to th e rea lm

of a tt orne y

m is co nd uc t. It appe ar s th at

P ow e’ s a tto rn ey s vi olate d a t l ea st tw o f undam en ta l t en et s of pr of es sio na l r es pons ibi lit

y . F ir st, “ [a ] law y er

sha ll ke ep ac lie nt r ea sona bly inf orm ed about the status of

am atte r an d pr om

ptl y c om ply w ithr ea sona

ble re que sts f or inf orm at ion . ” A la . Ru le s of P ro f’ l C ondu ct

R. 1. 4 ( 1990 ). P ow e se nt tw o le tte rs r eque sti ng h is tri al tr an sc ri pt t o hi s f ir st a ppe llate a tto rn ey

and d id n ot re ce ive ar es pons e unt il ove r ei ght m onths a ft er

he se nt the f

ir st l ette r, w he n th e at to rn ey wrot e Po we to in fo rm

hi m th athi s n ew at to rn ey

ha d t he tri al tra ns cri pt . Po we th en wrot e h is sec on d a tt orne y , bu t n ev er re cei ve d ares po ns e fro m he r.10

A se co nd t en et

of pr of es sio na l r es pons ibi lity

state s th at

“ [a ] law y er

sha ll abide by a client’ s decisions concerning the objectives of r epresentation . . . .” A la . Ru le s of

P ro f’ l C ondu ct

R. 1. 2. P ow e m ad e it cl ear to b otha tto rn ey s th at he w i s h e dt o p u r s u e aR

u l e 3 2 p e t i t i o n i n at i mel y m a n n e r . Ev e n i f th e a t t o rn e ys be lie ve d su chape tit ionw as not w ar rante d, P ow e al le ge s th at the ir f ai lur e to pr ov id e h im

wit h h is tra ns cri pt s p rev en te d h im fro m fil in g t he pe ti ti on hi m se lf. T hus, the be ha vio r of

P ow e’ s a tto rn ey s m ay

have be enso f

ar out sid e the r an ge of acce pt ab le pro fes si on al co nd uc t t o b e co ns id ered “ ex tra or di na ry .” N one the le ss, e ve n if

P ow e’ s a tto rn ey s a ct ed

w ithsuc h m al fe as an ce a s to am ount to “ ex tr ao rd inary

c ir cum stanc es , ” Po w e m ust sti ll showhe a ct ed

w ithdue di li ge nc e in ord er t o b e en ti tl edto equi tabl e to ll in g. Se e H el ton , 25 9 F .3dat 1 31 3. T he dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that P ow e did

not a ct w ithdue dil ige nc e fo r the f oll ow ing re as ons: ( 1) P ow e’ s a tte m pt t o ob ta in h is tra

nsc ri pt c onsi ste d of

w ri tin g on ly

f our letters—three to his attorney s and one to th e trial j udge; (2) Powe did no t seek further help fr om

the trial court, despite his k nowledge of the im pendin g deadline; an d ( 3) P ow e co uld

have f ile d hi s R ule 32 p et iti on w ith out

his tr an sc ri pt, expla ini ng t o th e co urt tha t he w as una ble to obt ai n th e tr an sc ri pt f ro m his attor ne y s. P ow e ha s no t sh ow n th at “ the r ec or d la ck s su

bst an tia l e vid en ce ” to11

su pp or t t he se fin di ng s u nd er cl ear e rro r rev ie w. Drew , 297 F. 3d at 128 3 (internal qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) . The fir st fin di ng si m

pl y su m m ari zes th e fac ts as a ll eg edby Powe. Si m ilarl y , the se co nd d istri ct c ourt f ind ing is co nsi ste nt w ithP ow e’ s ve rs ionof the facts. Pow e does not claim to have m ade additional attem pts to con tact the trial court, e ither on his o wn or through his fam ily m em bers. Though Powe a lleges that he ha d f am ily m em be rs w ho w er e tr

y ing to co nta ct

both a tto rn ey s, he doe s no t co nte nd tha t the se f

am ily m em be rs a tte m

pte d to c ont ac t the tr ia l c ourt. F urthe r, in the letter Pow e provided from his first attorney

dated Marc h 1, 2002, the attorney sugg es te d th at

P ow e co nta ct

the c le rk of the tr ia l c ourt t o r eque st h is r ec or ds and pr ovi de d P ow e w ithhe r ad dr es s, y et P ow e pr ovi de s no e vid en ce that he a ct ed on t h i s s u g g es t i o n . Th u s , t h er e i s s ub s t an t i al ev i d en ce t o s up p o rt th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fin di ng th atPo we di d n ot see k fu rth er h el p fr om th e tr ia l co ur t. Fi na lly , P ow e ha s no t sh ow n th at the r ec or d la ck s su

bst an tia l e vid en ce to supp ort the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s th ir d de te rm inatio n—tha t P ow e co uld have f ile d aRu le 32 p et iti on w ith out

his tr ia l transc ri pts . P ow e’ s arg um en t onthi s po int c onsi sts of the c onc lus or

y state m en t tha t “ the re w as no w ay ” he c oul d f ile the Ru le 32 p et iti on w i t h o u th i s tr i a l tr a n s c r i p t . T h e f o rm u s e dt o f

i l e aR u l e 3 2 p e t i t i o n i n A l ab a ma state court contains ins tructions requiring the petition er to “be as specific a s12

poss ibl e as to the f

ac ts” that su

ppor t e ac h gr ound

f or r el ie f. A la . R. Cr im . P . 32 app. T he detailed instruction s, howe ver, say nothi ng abou t attaching trial transcripts. P owe f

ails to articulate specific r easons for which the transcript was necessary in his case, nor does he point ou t inform ation in th e transcr ipt that was o u t s i d e t h e k n o wl ed g e h e a l re ad y h ad o f t h e t ri al p ro ce ed i n g s . P o we ’s unsu pported, general a llegation is not sufficient to satisfy his burden to show that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n la ck ed sub stanti al sup portin g e vid en ce in the record. T hus, as there w as substant ial evidence in the recor d to sup port the dist rict co urt’ s f ind ing that he did

not a ct w ithdue dil ige nc e, P ow e ha s no t ov er co m e the

“ ‘very hi gh st an da rd ’” of d em on st rat in g c le ar erro r. See D rew , 297 F . 3d at 12 89- 90 ( quot ing

I n re H ill sbor ough H

olding s C orp. , 127 F. 3d 13 98, 1401 (11t h Cir. 1997 )). CONCLUSION A lth oughthe c ir cum stanc es of thi s c as e pr es en t a

r ea sona ble de ba te a s to w he the r Po w e’ s a tto rn ey s’ a ct ion s c onst itu te d “ ex tr ao rd inary c ir cum stanc es ” an d as to Po w e’ s di lig en ce in atte m pti ng t o f ile his Ru le 32 p et iti on, w e w ill not dis tur b th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ac tua l f ind ing that P ow e fa ile d to e xe rc ise due di li ge nc e u nl es s i t i s cl earl y erro ne ou s. See Lawrence , 42 1 F .3dat 1 22 4- 25 . Powe has not sh own that the rec ord lacks “ subs tantial evidence” to supp ort the district13

court’ s finding that he failed to exerc ise due dilig ence. A ccordingly , w e A FFI RM the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of P ow e’ s § 2 254 pe tit ion . AFFIRMED.