IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-0269

Filed November 9, 2016

POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

vs.

REGINA REED,

Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal, 

Judge.

An employer appeals, and an employee cross-appeals, the district court’s 

judicial review decision. AFFIRMED.

D. Brian Scieszinski of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des 

Moines, for appellant/cross-appellee.

John T. Hemminger of Law Offices of John T. Hemminger, Des Moines, 

for appellee/cross-appellant.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.

Polaris Industries, Inc. appeals, and Regina Reed cross-appeals, the 

district court’s judicial review decision affirming the workers’ compensation 

commissioner’s award of benefits to Reed. Polaris claims the district court erred 

in affirming the agency’s industrial disability award to Reed when she has 

returned to her preinjury job with no reduction in earnings. Polaris also claims 

the district court erred in affirming the agency’s factual determination that Reed 

was working two to four hours less per day because of her injury. 

Reed was injured on August 1, 2010, when a tote box filled with 

motorcycle fender rails weighing approximately 170 pounds fell thirty-five feet, 

striking her on the head and back and knocking her to the ground. About a week 

later, Reed returned to her preinjury job, gradually increasing the time spent at 

work over the next few weeks until she was able to work full days. The treating 

doctor did not assign any work restrictions, though she testified at the workers’ 

compensation hearing that she is now in significant and constant pain and has 

reduced her work day by two to four hours each day.1 After the arbitration 

hearing in September 2013, the deputy commissioner awarded Reed ten percent 

industrial disability. On intra-agency appeal in September 2015, the 

commissioner increased that award to twenty percent industrial disability. 

Polaris sought judicial review with the district court. Reed generally 

denied the petition and filed an application for judgment pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 86.42 (2015). Both requests were submitted to the district court on 

 

1 Because Reed is a salaried employee, the work-hour reduction has not had an impact 

on her earnings as of the time of the workers’ compensation hearing. 
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written briefs, without oral argument. In its ruling on January 11, 2016, the 

district court affirmed the agency decision and then entered judgment in favor of 

Reed. However, the wording of the judgment entry did not comport with the 

agency’s ruling. On January 19, Reed filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1.904(2) to have the judgment entry amended. Before the court could 

rule on the motion, Polaris filed a notice of appeal on February 9. Two days 

later, Reed filed a notice of cross-appeal, seeking to protect the claims she made 

in her 1.904(2) motion. Polaris filed a response to Reed’s 1.904(2) motion on 

February 19, agreeing a modified judgment entry should be filed. On February 

22, 2016, the district court entered an order granting Reed’s motion and 

modifying the judgment entry to mirror the agency’s decision.2 

Our review of the district court’s judicial review decision is limited to the 

correction of errors at law. Finch v. Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc., 700 

N.W.2d 328, 330 (Iowa 2005). We apply the standards under Iowa Code section 

17A.19(10) and determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district 

court. Id. 

On appeal, Polaris claims the agency’s award of twenty percent industrial 

disability is inconsistent with the agency’s prior practice and precedent, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(h). It claims that prior cases, including 

 

2 Reed’s only claim in her cross-appeal is that we should consider the district court’s 

order of February 22, amending the January 11 judgment entry, to be part of the record 

on appeal, despite the fact Polaris filed its notice of appeal before the district court could 

rule on her 1.904(2) motion. Before the case was transferred to this court, the supreme 

court issued an order, in which it determined Polaris’s notice of appeal was premature 

and should be treated as an application for interlocutory appeal. It granted the 

application and ordered that the “appeal shall be considered as including the amended 

judgment of February 22, 2016.” We thus need not address Reed’s cross-appeal as the 

supreme court’s order resolved the issue of whether the district court’s February 22, 

2016 order was part of the record on appeal. 
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a case from this court, have concluded an award of industrial disability benefits 

was not supported by substantial evidence where the worker returned to the

preinjury position with no permanent restrictions. See Mid-American Energy v. 

Wright, No. 01-0312, 2002 WL 987870, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2002). 

The determination of whether a worker is entitled to industrial disability 

benefits, and if so, the duration of those benefits, is a fact specific inquiry in each 

case that is dependent upon the worker’s “functional disability, ‘age, education, 

qualifications, experience, and [the worker’s] inability, because of the injury, to 

engage in employment for which [s]he is fitted.’” Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. 

v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 852 (Iowa 2011) (second alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). We agree with the district court’s decision that the facts of 

Wright and the facts of the other agency cases cited by Polaris are sufficiently 

distinguishable from the facts of this case, such that an award of twenty percent 

industrial disability does not violate Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(h). See Finch, 

700 N.W.2d at 332–33 (noting, in a workers’ compensation contested case, “[t]he 

controlling legal standards are those set out in the workers’ compensation 

statutes and in [the supreme] court’s opinions, not in prior agency decisions” and 

section 17A.19(10)(h) does not “establish[] an independent requirement that the 

commissioner identify other agency rulings and explain possible inconsistencies 

between those rulings and the agency’s decision in a case not reviewable under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard”). While the commissioner did not specifically 

articulate its reasons for increasing the industrial disability award from ten to 

twenty percent, we do not find the agency’s decision on industrial disability to be 
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“irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable” or “unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, 

or an abuse of discretion.” See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m), (n). 

Polaris also claims there is a lack of substantial evidence under Iowa 

Code section 17A.19(10)(f) for the agency’s determination Reed was working two 

to four hours less per day. The district court noted, and we agree, substantial 

evidence for this determination can be found in Reed’s testimony and the 

testimony of her husband at the agency’s hearing. Reed testified she worked

twelve to fourteen hours per day before the injury, starting her day at 5:00 a.m. 

and leaving at 5:30 or 6:30 p.m. After the injury, Reed testified she is normally 

done with her day due to pain by 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. Reed’s husband agreed with 

her estimation of the change in her daily work hours. We therefore agree with 

the district court substantial evidence supports this factual finding of the agency. 

See Pease, 807 N.W.2d at 845 (noting, when reviewing whether a finding of fact 

by the agency is supported by substantial evidence, “our task is to determine 

whether substantial evidence, viewing the record as a whole, supports the 

findings actually made”). 

We affirm the district court’s January 11, 2016 judicial review decision, as 

amended on February 22, 2016.

AFFIRMED.