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2018 IL App (3d) 170229 

Opinion filed March 27, 2018 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2018 

SUZETTE R. MOOK and RACHEL M. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

TRAVELSTEAD, as Independent Executor ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

of the Estate of Jeremy S. Travelstead, ) Kankakee County, Illinois. 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) Appeal No. 3-17-0229 

v. ) Circuit No. 11-L-158 

)
 

ROBIN R. JOHNSON and JAMY C. )
 

JOHNSON, )
 

) Honorable Michael D. Kramer, 

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Lytton and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Suzette R. Mook and Rachel M. Travelstead, as independent executor of the 

estate of Jeremy S. Travelstead, filed suit against defendants, Robin R. Johnson and Jamy C. 

Johnson, alleging that defendants committed fraud by fraudulently concealing the surrender of a 

life insurance policy. As a result of surrendering the policy, the insurance company issued a 

check payable to the seven co-owners of the policy in the amount of $612,542.81. After forging 

at least one of the plaintiffs’ signatures and cashing the check, defendants unevenly distributed 

the funds, keeping $317,440.93 for themselves while distributing $295,101.88 to the other five 
 

 

beneficiaries under the policy. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of both 

plaintiffs and against each defendant awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. 

Specifically, the jury awarded (1) Mook a total of $44,960.56 in compensatory damages 

($22,480.28 against each defendant) and $254,491.44 in punitive damages ($127,519.72 against 

each defendant) and (2) Jeremy’s estate a total of $65,508.56 in compensatory damages 

($32,754.28 against each defendant) and $254,491.44 in punitive damages ($127,519.72 against 

each defendant). 

¶ 2 Thereafter, the circuit court of Kankakee County remitted Mook’s and Jeremy’s estate’s 

punitive damage awards to $20,000 and $10,000 respectively. Plaintiffs appeal the court’s 

judgment remitting their punitive damage awards. We reverse and remand with directions. 

¶ 3 FACTS 

¶ 4 In February 2017, plaintiffs filed an amended two-count complaint against defendants in 

the circuit court of Kankakee County. The complaint alleged that defendants committed fraud by 

concealing the surrender of a life insurance policy, insured upon the lives of June R. Lackey and 

Robert C. Lackey, by (1) forging their signatures on the request for policy surrender form, (2) 

using the ability to receive the only notice and communication from the life insurance company 

in order to deceive them, and (3) pursuing a course of conduct designed by artifice and trick to 

deceive them. Plaintiffs each sought $500,000 in compensatory damages plus statutory interest, 

$1 million in punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs associated with their suit. 

¶ 5 I. Undisputed Facts 

¶ 6 Jamy is an insurance agent. In August 1999, Jamy sold the life insurance policy at issue, 

which provided a benefit of $3.5 million upon the death of the last Lackey. Jamy’s agency 

received a commission of $112,000 on the initial sale of the policy. Initially, Lackey’s four 

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daughters and three son-in-laws, Aloha M. and Edwin L. Travelstead, defendants Robin R. and 

Jamy C. Johnson, Brenda G. and David R. Zack, and Suzette R. Mook were the owners of the 

policy. Pursuant to the policy, upon the death of the last of the insured, the proceeds were 

payable in one lump sum to the above-named owners, as beneficiaries, per stirpes. As of October 

21, 2002, the owners and beneficiaries of the policy included defendants, plaintiffs, the Zacks, 

and Jeremy’s sister Shannon Oddera. Jeremy and Shannon replaced their parents on the policy 

following their deaths. Jamy sent a letter to the insurance company informing it that Robin was 

the “main owner” of the policy and that all bills and information should be sent to her and any 

questions directed to him. He did not send this document to any of the other policy owners. 

¶ 7 The policy’s annual premium, due in August, was $140,000. Each of the seven owners 

paid the annual premium via a $20,000 gift they received from the Lackeys through the August 

2006 payment. Following the August 2006 premium payment, John Lackey announced that he 

would no longer fund his half of the owners’ annual premium payment and, commencing with 

the August 2007 payment, the owners could either make a loan from the policy against the cash 

surrender value to pay the premiums or surrender the policy. 

¶ 8 In early March 2007, Robin called the insurance company to inquire about surrendering 

the policy. At that time, the insurance company informed her that all seven policy owners needed 

to sign the surrender form. The insurance company then followed up with Robin by letter, dated 

March 9, 2007, indicating that surrendering the policy may not be in her best interest and that 

other options were available. The letter further noted that if the policy was surrendered that day, 

the early surrender charges would be $126,000 and its net cash surrender value would be 

$618,720.30. 

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¶ 9 On March 20, 2007, Robin submitted a “request for policy surrender form” to the 

insurance company with only her signature. In an April 2, 2007, letter, the insurance company 

denied Robin’s request to surrender the policy because “[t]he signatures of all [seven co-]owners 

are required to complete the request.” Later that month, Robin submitted additional forms that 

purportedly bore the signatures of all seven co-owners of the policy. On April 27, 2007, Robin 

negotiated a check payable to all seven co-owners in the amount of $612,542.81. She distributed 

those funds as follows: 

$35,000.00 Robin and Jamy Johnson Account No. 304-093 

$23,403.90 Robin Johnson Account No. 139-149 

$7,084.76 Aaron Johnson Account No. 173-592 

$60,000.00 Robin Johnson Certificate of Deposit 

$15,084.76 Robin Johnson Account No. 7252 

$6,000.00 Aaron Johnson Account No. 7250 

$45,254.29 Robin Johnson Account No. 2128 

$9,916.00 Robin Johnson Account No. 7252 

$30,000.00 Robin and Jamy Johnson Account No. 5407 

$1,000.00 Aaron Johnson Account No. 7250 

$25,000.00 Jeremy Travelstead Check 

$25,000.00 Shannon Odera Check 

$24,000.00 Edwin Travelstead Check 

$25,000.00 Chad Travelstead Check 

$90,508.56 Brenda Zack Check 

$90,508.56 David Zack Check 

$15,084.76 Matt Zack Check 

$79,697.22 Centrue Bank Check to pay off the balance of 

a note secured by a mortgage on 

Robin and Jamy Johnson’s 

home 

$5,000.00 Robin Johnson Cash 

Aaron Johnson is Robin and Jamy Johnson’s son. Edwin and Chad Travelstead are Aloha and 

Edwin L. Travelstead’s sons. Matt Zack is Brenda and David Zack’s son. 

¶ 10 

¶ 11 

Robert and June Lackey died prior to trial on April 3, 2009, and October 21, 2009, 

respectively. 

II. Trial Testimony 

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¶ 12 Robin testified that she did not inform Mook of any alternatives to surrendering the 

policy prior to submitting the request to surrender forms to the insurance company. Robin gave 

the surrender form to her mother, June, and she received it back from June with Mook’s 

signature on it. She obtained permission from Jeremy to sign his name on the surrender form 

after telling him that his grandmother wanted to surrender the policy. Robin could not recall 

having any conversation with Jeremy regarding alternatives to surrendering the policy. 

¶ 13 Jamy testified that he knew more than $300,000 of the $612,542.81 check received as a 

result of surrendering the life insurance policy was distributed to either himself, Robin, Aaron, or 

to the bank to pay off the mortgage on their home. 

¶ 14 Mook testified that she first became aware that the policy had been surrendered when her 

sister, Brenda Zack, told her so in May 2008. Mook called the insurance company to report that 

she had not signed a surrender form. The insurance company then faxed a copy of the surrender 

forms. Mook denied that the signatures on the surrender form or the subsequent check belonged 

to her. After Mook spoke with her niece, Shannon Oddera, and found out that she received 

$25,000, Mook confronted Robin. Within one week of the confrontation, Robin presented Mook 

with a cashier’s check for $45,000 and a check from June for $45,000, which Mook accepted. 

Mook further testified that the signature on the policy surrender check purporting to be Jeremy’s 

signature did not belong to Jeremy. In addition, neither the check nor the policy surrender form 

bore Mook’s signature. 

¶ 15 Jeremy’s testimony from his discovery deposition was then read into evidence. Jeremy 

was Aloha and Edwin L.’s son. He also had two brothers, Chad and Edwin, and a sister, Shannon 

Oderra. He gave Robin permission to sign his name on the surrender form after she told him his 

grandmother needed his signature. He assumed the money was going to his grandmother. The 

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signature on the back of the surrender check was not his. He was not in the state of Illinois in 

April 2007 and could not have signed the check. He did not give anyone else permission to sign 

the check on his behalf. Jeremy received $25,000 from defendants. 

¶ 16 III. Closing Arguments, Jury Instruction, and Verdict 

¶ 17 During closing argument, plaintiffs’ counsel reiterated that the face value of the policy 

was $3.5 million. He noted that had the policy been in effect at the time of June’s death, each 

owner would receive $434,000 after deducting for their loans. Counsel sought compensatory 

damages in the amount of $434,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $868,000 for each 

plaintiff. 

¶ 18 Following arguments, the trial court instructed the jury regarding punitive damages. The 

court informed the jury that it should consider the following questions when determining the 

propriety of punitive damages: (1) how reprehensible defendants’ conduct was, including (a) the 

facts and circumstances of their conduct, (b) the financial vulnerability of plaintiffs, (c) the 

duration of the conduct, (d) the frequency of the conduct, (e) whether defendants attempted to 

conceal their misconduct, and (f) whether plaintiffs put their trust in defendants; (2) the actual 

and potential harm caused by defendants; and (3) the amount of money necessary to punish 

defendants and deter others from future wrongful conduct. 

¶ 19 Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor. Specifically, the jury awarded 

(1) Mook a total of $44,960.56 in compensatory damages ($22,480.28 against each defendant) 

and $254,491.44 in punitive damages ($127,519.72 against each defendant) and (2) Jeremy’s 

estate a total of $65,508.56 in compensatory damages ($32,754.28 against each defendant) and 

$254,491.44 in punitive damages ($127,519.72 against each defendant). 

¶ 20 IV. Postjudgment Motions 

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¶ 21 On March 3, 2017, defendants filed (1) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict, or in the alternative, a motion for a new trial and (2) a motion for remittitur of punitive 

damages and a motion for stay of judgment. Regarding their motion for remittitur, defendants 

asserted “the award for punitive damages *** was so excessive that it indicated that the jury was 

moved by passion and prejudice and the verdict exceeds the necessary limits of flexible limits of 

fair and reasonable compensation. Further the judgment for punitive damages was so large that it 

shocks the judicial conscience and should be reduced.” 

¶ 22 In a written March 30, 2017, order, the trial court denied the motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. However, the court 

granted the motion for remittitur of punitive damages and for stay of judgment. Following a 

hearing, the court found that the punitive damage awards were improper and excessive. In the 

oral pronouncement of its decision, the court stated, in part, as follows: 

“In considering this motion the Court has carefully considered the 

facts of this case which is a private matter between family 

members, and there are many factual aspects of this case that 

would support the defendants’ position that to award punitive— 

punitive damages is improper. Among those facts is the fact that 

neither defendant signed the name of Suzette Mook on the request 

for surrender of the policy or on the policy proceeds check. And 

there is circumstantial evidence that the signature was put there by 

the mother of Robin Johnson, also the mother of Suzette Mook. 

There’s the circumstantial evidence that Robin Johnson may have 

been acting on behalf of her mother in *** surrendering the policy 

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and distributing the proceeds in the manner that she did. Plaintiff 

Travelstead testified that he understood the money involved was 

his grandparents’ money and that his grandparents’ could do with 

it what they wanted. And there was unrebutted testimony that 

Jeremy Travelstead gave permission for his signature to be added 

to the policy surrender request. 

Now, we are taught as children to honor our parents and to 

be patient with them when they get older. Robin Johnson may have 

been simply honoring her mother’s wishes in taking the action that 

she did, but one of those actions was—was to present a document 

to the insurance company that she knew had a false signature on it, 

and she presented a check for payment that she knew had a false 

signature on it, and she and her husband distributed proceeds 

unequally despite knowing they were joint owners with the other 

family members. This conduct is wrong no matter what the 

motivation, though Ms. Johnson was in a difficult position in 

trying to follow the law with regard to distribution of these 

proceeds and her mother’s wishes. Difficult position, but given that 

wrong there should be some punishment beyond simple restitution, 

but that punishment must be in proportion to the wrongful conduct. 

[The] Court notes that a conviction for forgery in Illinois carries a 

jail sentence and may require restitution and a possible maximum 

fine of $25,000. Plaintiff Suzette Mook testified she presented this 

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case to the State’s Attorney and no criminal charges were ever 

brought against the defendants. As we know the standard of proof 

in a criminal case is known as beyond a reasonable doubt. A much 

higher standard than the civil preponderance of the evidence 

standard. 

In this civil case the jury awarded substantial punitive 

damages that the Court finds were not warranted by the evidence 

and the jury awarded similar punitive damages—damage amounts 

to each plaintiff which the Court finds was also not supported by 

the evidence. The amount of punitive damages appears especially 

excessive give that the plaintiff’s attorney argued for punitive 

damages equally double the amount of actual damages and the jury 

went well beyond even the plaintiff’s attorney’s request for 

punitive damages.” 

¶ 23 In sum, the court pointed to what it considered circumstantial evidence that June Lackey 

forged Mook’s signature and that Robin was simply “honoring her mother’s wishes” by 

surrendering the policy and distributing the funds as she did. The court then opined that the 

punitive damages awarded by the jury were “especially excessive” because (1) a conviction for 

forgery carries a possible maximum fine of only $25,000 and (2) plaintiffs’ attorney only sought 

punitive damages in an amount double to the amount of compensatory damages. Accordingly, 

the court remitted Mook’s punitive damage award to a total of $20,000 ($10,000 against each 

defendant) and Jeremy’s estate’s punitive damage award to a total of $10,000 ($5,000 against 

each defendant). 

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¶ 24 Plaintiffs appeal. 

¶ 25 ANALYSIS 

¶ 26 Plaintiffs assert that the trial court abused its discretion by remitting their respective 

punitive damage awards. 

¶ 27 Punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, serve to punish the wrongdoer and to 

deter that party and others from committing similar acts of wrongdoing in the future. Slovinski v. 

Elliot, 237 Ill. 2d 51, 57-58 (2010). “Punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant’s 

tortious conduct evinces a high degree of moral culpability, that is, when the tort is ‘committed 

with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, 

or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.’ ” Id. at 58 

(quoting Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186 (1978)). Because punitive damages are 

penal in nature, courts must take caution to see that they are not improperly or unwisely awarded. 

Id. To that end, a “trial court may, in its discretion, with respect to punitive damages, determine 

whether a jury award for punitive damages is excessive, and if so, enter a remittur and a 

conditional new trial.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1207 (West 2016). However, a reviewing court is not free 

to reweigh the evidence and reduce a jury award merely because it may have arrived at a 

different verdict. Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (2003). Rather, a jury’s punitive damages 

award should not modified unless it is so excessive that it must have been a result of passion, 

partiality, or corruption. Blount v. Stroud, 395 Ill. App. 3d 8, 22 (2009). 

¶ 28 We review a trial court’s remittitur of a jury’s punitive damages award for an abuse of 

discretion. Slovinski, 237 Ill. 2d at 58. Ultimately, we must determine whether there is a basis in 

the record to support the trial court’s remittitur. Id. at 62. 

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¶ 29 In granting defendants’ motion for remittitur and reducing the punitive damages in this 

case, the trial court essentially reweighed the evidence and then, based on its assessment of the 

facts, including some irrelevant facts not of record, determined that the punitive damages 

awarded were excessive. Based on our review of the evidence, we find no basis in the record to 

support the trial court’s remittitur. 

¶ 30 In this case, the jury had evidence before it which supports its award of punitive 

damages. The record shows that reasonable jurors could conclude that the conversion in this case 

actually started in August 1999, when Jamy sold the policy to his in-laws and received a large 

commission. Defendants began their quest to commit fraud by concealment against their family 

members when, as early as October 21, 2002, they attempted to restrict all information pertaining 

to the policy from the other five owners by asserting that Robin was the “main owner” of the 

policy and that all billings, information, and questions should be directed to her or Jamy. 

Approximately 41⁄2 years later, Robin attempted to surrender the policy on her own despite 

knowing that all policy owners were required to sign the surrender form. After her attempt to 

surrender was denied, she obtained Jeremy’s permission to sign his signature on the surrender 

form under what the jury could have found to be false pretenses, i.e., by telling Jeremy that his 

grandmother wanted to surrender the policy. Next, Robin submitted the surrender form knowing 

that Mook’s signature had been forged. Finally, after negotiating the policy proceeds check with 

Mook’s and Jeremy’s forged signatures, defendants distributed more than half of the proceeds to 

themselves and their son and paid off the mortgage on their house, despite the fact that there 

were five other owners on the policy. Defendants distributed nothing to Mook until she 

confronted Robin, after which Robin gave her a check for $45,000. In addition, while the jury 

determined plaintiffs’ compensatory damages based on the actual surrender value of the policy, it 

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had evidence before it that had the policy been in effect at the time of June’s death, each owner 

would have received approximately $434,000. Thus, the jury clearly could have found 

defendants’ conduct reprehensible enough and the need for deterrence sufficient to warrant the 

punitive damages it awarded. 

¶ 31 We further note that the punitive damages awarded by the jury were only 5.66 times the 

amount of Mook’s compensatory damages and 3.88 times the amount of Jeremy’s estate’s 

compensatory damages. Defendants cite no authority in which a reviewing court reduced 

punitive damages which were single-digit multipliers on a motion for remittitur, nor did our 

research discover any. In fact, it appears that punitive damage awards in single-digit multipliers 

generally comport with due process. For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003), the United States Supreme Court declined to impose 

a bright-line ratio between punitive and compensatory damages but hinted that punitive damages 

in the single-digit ratio will generally satisfy due process. Specifically, the Court noted that “few 

awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 

significant degree, will satisfy due process”; that “an award of more than four times the amount 

of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”; and that 

“[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the 

State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards in range of 500 to 1, [citation], or, in this 

case, of 145 to 1.” Id. Based on the facts of this case, we find the punitive damages awarded by 

the jury are appropriate. 

¶ 32 Moreover, as indicated earlier, the trial court considered facts not in evidence in support 

of its decision to grant the remittitur in this case. Specifically, the court considered evidence that 

it heard during previous proceedings but which were deemed inadmissible at trial, including, for 

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example, the fact that the State declined to prosecute defendants criminally or that Robin was 

merely following her mother’s wishes. This was clearly error. Although a trial judge, acting as 

trier of fact, is presumed to consider only admissible evidence, that presumption is necessarily 

rebutted where, as here, the record affirmatively shows otherwise. People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill. 

2d 350, 354 (1962). 

¶ 33 Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion in granting the remittitur and 

reducing the punitive damage awards. 

¶ 34 CONCLUSION 

¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of circuit court of Kankakee County 

and remand with directions to enter judgment on the jury award. 

¶ 36 Reversed and remanded with directions. 

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