NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. DAVID SHINN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; TRINITY FOOD SERVICES,

Defendants

- Appellees,
and CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections

- in his individual and official capacities; RONALD TOWLES, Supervisor,
Defendants. No. 20

- 15600
D.C. No. 2:19

- cv - 05525

- SPL

- MTM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20 , 2021 * *

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 28 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 15600

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN , Circuit Judges. Arizona state prisoner Anthony James Merrick appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional claims. We have jurisdictio n under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court ’ s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes , 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s claim s against defendant
Shinn in his of

ficial capacity because Shinn is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and Merrick does not seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.
See Flint v. Dennison , 488 F.3d 816, 824

- 25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacit ies ) ; see also Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown , 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (the Eleventh Amendment “ does not

. . . bar actions for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against st ate officers in their official capacities for their alleged
violations of federal law

. ” ). The district court properly dismissed Merrick ’s conditions

- of

- confinement
claim s because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant s
knew of or disregarded an excessive risk to Merrick ’s health. See Farmer v.
Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 8 3 7 (1994) (prison officials are liable for denying a prisoner humane conditions of confinement only if they know of and disregard a3 20

- 15600

substantial risk of serious harm)

. The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s claims based on his inability to purchase items at the prison store as well as the prices at the prison store because there is no constitutional right to purchase prison canteen products. See
Keenan v. Hall , 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (prisoners have no constitutional right to purchase canteen products). The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s equal protection claim s
because indigent prisoners are not a protected class . See Taylor v. Delatoore , 281 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002) (i ndigent prisoners are not a protected class for purposes of stating an equal protection claim ). The district court properly dismissed Merrick ’s access - to

- court claims
because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show an actual injury . See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 349

- 53 (1996) (elements of an access

- to

- courts claim and actual injury requirement); see also Christopher v. Harbury , 5 36 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (to plead an actual injury, the complaint “should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),[ ] just as if it were being independently pursued”). The district court properly dismissed Merric k ’s failure

- to

- train and failure

to

- supervise claims because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show that there was an underlying constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202,4 20

- 15600

1207 (9th Cir. 2011) ( a supervisor is liable under § 19 83 only if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor ’ s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation ). The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing as duplicative
Merrick’s claims in his initial complaint based on allegations regarding Keefe

stores

. See Cato v. United States , 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) ( holding
that the distric t court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed claims that repeated allegations that were previously dismissed under the district court’s authority to screen in forma pauperis complaints ). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denyi ng Merrick ’s motion to appoint counsel because Merrick did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
AFFIRMED.