140 Nev., Advance Opinion (CO 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

STORM LUNA GRIFFITH, 

INDIVIDUALLY; AND ISAIAS LUNACORTEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

ZOE RIVERA; AND L.R., THROUGH 

ZOE RIVERA AS NATURAL PARENT 

OF L.R., 

Respondents. 

No. 86755 

SEP 19 2 

EL ETH A. aRcy N 

CLE CURT 

BY 

EF DEPUTY CLERK 

Appeal from a short trial judgment in a personal injury action. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jessica K. Peterson, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Martinez Dieterich & Zarcone Legal Group and Melanie Muldowney, Las 

Vegas, 

for Appellants. 

The Powell Law Firm and Paul D. Powell, Jonathon C. Roberts, and Torn 

W. Stewart, Las Vegas, 

for R.espondents. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, PICKERING, and 

PARRAGUIRRE, JJ. 

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sq. -6 sird9S--
OPINION 

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.: 

In August 2021, a vehicle driven by Storm Griffith and owned 

by Isaias Luna-Cortez (hereinafter appellants) collided with a vehicle 

holding Zoe Rivera and her daughter L.R. (hereinafter respondents). 

Respondents filed a complaint against appellants, and the case proceeded 

to court-annexed arbitration. Respondents succeeded at arbitration, and on 

October 25, 2022, appellants filed a request for trial de novo. The very next 

day, on October 26, 2022, this court issued an order amending the Nevada 

Short Trial Rules. See In re Creation of a Cornrn. to Study the Rules 

Governing Alternative Dispute Resolution and Nev. Short Trial Rules, 

ADKT 0595 (Order Amending the Rules Governing Alternate Dispute 

Resolution and Nevada Short Trial Rules, Oct. 26, 2022). Among the 

amendments was a change to NSTR 27(b)(4) increasing the amount of 

attorney fees a short trial judge may award from $3,000 to $15,000. Id. The 

order stated that the amendments would become effective beginning 

January 1, 2023. Id. 

A short trial was held on March 3, 2023, and respondents again 

prevailed. Respondents then filed an application for fees, costs, and 

prejudgment interest, and the short trial judge awarded $15,000 in attorney 

fees to each respondent, totaling $30,000. The district court entered a final 

judgment consistent with the short trial judge's award. Appellants now 

appeal, arguing that because they filed their request for trial de novo before 

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the rule change, the short trial judge should have applied the preamendment, $3,000 attorney fee cap.1

DISCUSSION 

Appellants argue that the short trial judge erred by applying 

the attorney fee rule change retroactively to award respondents $15,000 in 

attorney fees. We review a trial court's award of attorney fees for an abuse 

of discretion. Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 860, 138 P.3d 525, 533 

(2006). But questions of retroactivity are reviewed de novo. Corp. of the 

Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 

Seventh Jud. Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. 67, 70, 366 P.3d 1117, 1119 (2016). 

When a statute or rule is amended, "[t]here is a general 

presumption in favor of prospective application." Delucchi v. Songer, 133 

Nev. 290, 293, 396 P.3d 826, 829 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting 

McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 203, 871 P.2d 296, 298 (1994)). But 

this general presumption "does not apply to statutes or rules that do not 

change substantive rights and instead relate solely to remedies and 

procedure." Valdez v. Emps. Ins. Co. of Nev., 123 Nev. 170, 179-80, 162 P.3d 

148, 154 (2007) (emphasis added). Such procedural and remedial rule 

changes "will be applied to any cases pending when . . . enacted." Id. at 180, 

162 P.3d at 154. 

'Appellants also argue on appeal that the short trial judge erred by 

awarding the maximum attorney fee amount per plaintiff, as opposed to 

interpreting the fee cap as a per-side limitation. But appellants failed to 

raise this argument below even though respondents requested the 

maximum amount per party in their application for attorney fees. 

Therefore, the argument is waived. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 

Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial 

court ... is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on 

appeal."). 

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Appellants argue that the short trial judge improperly applied 

the rule change retroactively because the rule change affected their 

substantive rights. Respondents assert that the amendment was merely a 

procedural change governing the available remedy and therefore retroactive 

application is appropriate. "The line between a substantive and a 

procedural rule is a 'hazy' one." Sequoia Orange Co. v. Yeutter, 973 F.2d 

752, 757 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Arn. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 

1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But we have stated that "a substantive standard is 

one that creates duties, rights, and obligations, while a procedural standard 

specifies how those duties, rights, and obligations should be enforced." Lyft, 

Inc. v. Eighth Jud, Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 832, 838, 501 P.3d 994, 1001 (2021) 

(quoting Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 573 (2019)). 

Rules providing the circumstances under which attorney fees 

may be awarded, such as NSTR 27(b), are typically considered substantive. 

See WPH Architecture, Inc. v. Vegas VP, LP, 131 Nev. 884, 889, 360 P.3d 

1145, 1148 (2015). However, the specific amendment to NSTR 27(13)(4) at 

issue here did not create or remove any conditions under which a short trial 

judge may award fees. Rather, the amendment simply increased the 

maximum amount of attorney fees a short trial judge may award. Thus, it 

did not create or remove any duty, right, or obligation; it simply "specifie[d] 

how those [preexisting.] duties, rights, and obligations should be enforced." 

Lyft, 137 Nev. at 838, 501 P.3d at 1001 (quoting Azar, 587 U.S. at 573). In 

other words, it may be reasonably characterized as a procedural 

amendment governing the available remedy. See Republican Atrys Gen. 

Ass'n v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 136 Nev. 28, 32, 458 P.3d 328, 332 

(2020) (recognizing attorney fees for a prevailing party as an available 

remedy); In re W.N. Connell & Marjorie T. Connell Living Tr., 134 Nev. 613, 

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618, 426 13,3d 599, 603 (2018) (acknowledging attorney fees as one of a 

variety of remedies available in a breach of fiduciary duty action). 

But "[d]etermining whether a statute alters substantive rights 

and thereby has retroactive effect 'is not always a simple or mechanical 

task.'" Salloum v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 137 Nev. 549, 551, 495 P.3d 513, 

516 (2021) (quoting Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 

129 Nev. 813, 820, 313 P.3d 849, 854 (2013)). Indeed, the distinction 

between substantive and procedural rules has been characterized as a 

"logical morass." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989). 

Fundamentally, this distinction—and how it relates to questions of 

retroactivity—depends less on abstract classification than on context, with 

a focus on "familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and 

settled expectations." Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999); see 

Salloum, 137 Nev. at 551-52, 495 P.3d at 516 (noting the "fundamental 

notions of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations" 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is true that the increase in the 

attorney fee cap from S3,000 to SI.5,000 multiplied the risk of pursuing a 

trial de novo and did so after a trial de novo request was filed. But notice 

of' the rule change was published 67 days before the change took effect. 

Appellants argue that they reasonably relied upon the 

expectation that attorney fees would be capped at S3,000 when they 

requested a trial de novo. But "[a] statute does not operate 'retrospectively' 

merely because it . . . 'upsets expectations based in prior law." Sandpointe 

Apartments, 129 Nev. at 821, 313 P.3d at 854 (quoting Pub. Emps.' Benefits 

Program v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 124 Nev. 138, 155, 179 P.3d 542, 

553 (2009), and Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994)). 

The short trial was held over four months after this court issued the order 

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amending the short trial rules in ADKT 0595 and two months after the 

changes went into effect. Even crediting the argument that the risk of 

increased attorney fees was substantive, appellants were provided fair 

notice of the rule change and had ample opportunity to change course to 

either withdraw the short trial request before incurring that risk or 

otherwise conform their conduct to the increased risk. Cf. Martin, 527 U.S. 

at 358 (noting that attorneys had the opportunity to withdraw from the case 

to avoid a lower hourly rate brought about by a newly enacted statute). 

Further, the policy of discouraging frivolous short trial requests remains 

the same under both the original and amended rule. Because the parties 

were provided fair notice of the rule change, any continued reliance on the 

$3,000 attorney fee cap after the issuance of ADKT 0595 was not 

reasonable. Therefore, the amendment "did not upset any reasonable 

expectations of the parties," Martin, 527 U.S. at 358, and the district court 

did not err by applying the amended rule to this case.2

CONCLUSION 

The amendment to NSTR 27(b)(4) did not affect the parties' 

substantive rights but was instead a procedural rule change governing the 

2We recognize other jurisdictions have found that "substantive rights 

and obligations [regarding] attorney fees . . . vest and accrue as of the time 

the underlying cause of action accrues," and therefore amendments to 

attorney fee limitations alter the substantive rights of the parties. See, e.g., 

L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 466 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. Dist. 

Ct. App. 1985), approved, 481 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1986). But in our view, no 

party has a vested right in any amount of attorney fees through NSTR 27 

until after the short trial, at which point the prevailing party is determined. 

See Vested, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ("Having become a 

completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not 

contingent; unconditional; absolute . . . ."). 

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available remedy. Thus, the short trial judge did not err by applying the 

amended rule to this case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district 

court. 

J. 

Parraguirre 

We concur: 

AlC1-4..0 J. 

Stiglich 

Picked. , J. 

Pickering 

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