AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed March 6, 2023 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00448-CV 

MEOSHA JACKSON, Appellant 

V. 

HEAD START OF GREATER DALLAS, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-19136 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Rosenberg1

Opinion by Justice Rosenberg 

Appellant Meosha Jackson appeals the trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of appellee Head Start of Greater Dallas, Inc. (Head Start) on 

Jackson’s intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. In two issues, 

Jackson contends the trial court erred in granting Head Start’s traditional summary 

judgment motion because the motion lacked supporting evidence and, as to Head 

Start’s affirmative defense of preemption, lacked a factual and legal basis. In a third 

issue, Jackson contends the trial court erred in granting Head Start’s no-evidence 

1

 The Hon. Barbara Rosenberg, Justice, Assigned. 
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summary judgment motion because she presented evidence of the elements of her 

claim, including outrageous conduct, severe emotional distress, intentionality or 

recklessness in the outrageous conduct, and proximate causation. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

Background 

In 2018, Head Start employed Jackson as a health assistant. In that position, 

she educated parents of Head Start students on health issues and conducted 

enrollments and screenings. Breana Henderson, a health specialist, had been 

Jackson’s supervisor for over a year. Dorruth Boyd, a Head Start health service 

manager, was Henderson’s supervisor and the director of Jackson’s department. 

According to her deposition testimony, Jackson went to Henderson’s office to 

deliver some notices during the workday on June 27, 2018. Jackson thought the 

office was empty; the door was closed and she did not recall seeing lights. Upon 

entering the office, Jackson observed Henderson and another health assistant 

engaged in a consensual sexual encounter. Everyone jumped; Jackson immediately 

walked out, closing the door behind her. She was “embarrassed” and “scared.” 

Several days later, Henderson spoke to Jackson about the incident and Henderson’s 

conduct. Jackson was offended by the lack of “decency” and “decorum” of someone 

having sex in the office. 

Henderson testified by deposition that neither the June 27 incident nor the 

subsequent discussion occurred. 
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According to Jackson, Henderson began to find fault with Jackson after the 

June 27 incident. Nothing had changed in Jackson’s work performance, but 

Henderson would “poke around” and find things Jackson had not done and text or 

email Jackson. Henderson also investigated Jackson’s use of leave under the Family 

and Medical Leave Act and adjusted the screening and enrollment schedules in ways 

that Jackson believed were unfair. Henderson made sarcastic remarks about Jackson 

being available to attend scheduled meetings.2

 Jackson also believed Henderson’s 

November 2018 annual review of Jackson was unfair. 

Jackson testified that Boyd was not receptive to Jackson’s complaints about 

Henderson and squelched any discussion of the June 27 incident. On August 14, 

2018, Jackson approached Boyd to discuss some issues Jackson had with Henderson, 

but Boyd cut Jackson off and said they would need to have a meeting for Jackson to 

voice her concerns. Boyd, however, never scheduled the meeting. 

On September 20, 2018, Jackson called Boyd to discuss a disagreement she 

and Henderson had over the screening schedule. Boyd advised that they “figure it 

out.” During the call, Jackson told Boyd that Henderson and the other health 

assistant were “messing around.” Boyd, however, hung up. 

After receiving her annual review in November 2018, Jackson complained to 

Boyd that Henderson had been “abusing her supervisory role.” Jackson “screamed 

2

 Jackson also complained of a remark by Boyd. Specifically, Boyd commented on Jackson’s lack of 

questions during a meeting, despite having told Jackson before the meeting “not to ask stupid questions.” 
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at [Boyd] and was telling her that . . . all of this stuff is going on because [Jackson] 

caught” Henderson “in a sex act.” Before Jackson could explain, Boyd cut her off 

and explained that they needed to have a meeting with everyone involved. Again, 

no meeting was scheduled. 

In April 2019, Henderson prepared an action plan for Jackson. The action 

plan, which Jackson considered a “write-up,” noted issues with (1) interpersonal 

relationships with Head Start families and other employees; (2) recordkeeping 

procedures; (3) adhering to the enrollment schedule; and (4) attendance. Jackson 

disagreed with the plan. Further, Henderson would not provide information to help 

Jackson correct any deficiencies. Noting that she had never been written up before, 

Jackson believed Henderson “needed [Jackson] gone,” as did Head Start. Jackson 

also believed Henderson and/or Head Start had an obligation to report the June 27 

incident. 

In August 2019, Jackson and Henderson had a lengthy email exchange. 

Jackson forwarded the email exchange to Boyd along with a request to change 

supervisors. As a result of the exchange, Boyd wrote up both Henderson and 

Jackson, noting a need to improve their handling of interpersonal relationships. The 

three women also had a meeting. Boyd denied Jackson’s request for a supervisor 

change because there was “no objective evidence of a stressful environment.” 

Jackson testified that she explained the problems had arisen because she “caught” 

Henderson and the other health assistant having sex. Henderson responded that “she 
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wanted all the lies to stop.” Jackson suggested that Boyd “pull up the cameras” and 

do an investigation; Boyd responded that she would have to investigate both 

Henderson and Jackson. 

In a note about the meeting, which Jackson wrote shortly thereafter, she made 

no mention of the June 27 incident or her efforts to explain the incident to Boyd. 

Both Boyd and Henderson disputed that Jackson discussed the June 27 incident 

during the meeting. According to Henderson, Jackson referred to Henderson and 

the other health assistant but did not elaborate when Henderson asked Jackson what 

she meant. Boyd testified that she did not receive any notice of sexual activity 

between Henderson and the other health assistant prior to October 2019. 

Jackson left her employment with Head Start in October 2019 because she 

“had had enough.” She did not recall what occurred that day to make her leave, but 

testified that she “had enough of all of the intimidation, being angry, crying, upset, 

[and] uncertainty.” 

In December 2019, Jackson filed this suit against Head Start, alleging that she 

was the victim of an intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress arising 

out of the sexual conduct she observed and the subsequent conduct of Henderson 

and Boyd. Head Start filed a combination traditional and no-evidence summary 

judgment motion, asserting Jackson could not establish, or had no evidence to raise 

a fact issue, that (1) Head Start’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the 

emotional distress Jackson suffered was severe, or (3) Jackson had no alternative 
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cause of action that would provide her with a similar remedy. The trial court held a 

telephonic hearing on the motion. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order 

granting Head Start’s motion and dismissing Jackson’s claim with prejudice. This 

appeal followed. 

Standard of Review 

“After adequate time for discovery, a party . . . may move for summary 

judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements 

of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at 

trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The nonmovant has the burden to produce summary 

judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged 

element of its claim or defense. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 

248 (Tex. 2013). 

We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency 

standards as directed verdicts. Id. We consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if 

reasonable jurors could and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless 

reasonable jurors could not. Id. We sustain a no-evidence challenge “when (a) there 

is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of 

law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital 

fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or 
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(d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

If a defendant files a combination traditional and no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment, we first review the summary judgment under the no-evidence 

standard. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If, 

as in this case, the trial court does not specify its ground for granting the summary 

judgment motion, we must affirm its decision if any ground presented to the court 

and preserved for appellate review is meritorious. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; 

see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In its no-evidence summary judgment motion, Head Start asserted that 

Jackson had no evidence on the following elements of her claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) severe 

emotional distress; and (3) no alternative cause of action. In her third issue, Jackson 

contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because she 

provided summary judgment evidence to raise a fact issue on each of the elements. 

A party claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must prove: (1) 

the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was 

extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused the claimant emotional distress; and 

(4) the emotional distress was severe. Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. 

2003) (per curiam); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993). 
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Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a “gap-filler” cause of action; it is 

available only when no other alternative cause of action is available to a plaintiff. 

Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998). 

Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress rarely are meritorious 

because “most human conduct, even that which causes injury to others, cannot be 

fairly characterized as extreme and outrageous.” Rico v. L-3 Commc’ns Corp., 420 

S.W.3d 431, 441 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (quoting Kroger Texas Ltd. 

P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006)). For a defendant’s conduct to 

be actionable, it must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to 

go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 

utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 

144 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004); see also Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 

814, 817–18 (Tex. 2005). Conduct that is tortious or otherwise wrongful is not 

necessarily extreme or outrageous. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 

2001); Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 215–16 (Tex. 1999) (an action that 

is “intentional, malicious, or even criminal does not, standing alone, mean that it is 

extreme or outrageous for purposes of intentional infliction of emotional distress”). 

Texas courts follow a strict approach when intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claims arise in the workplace; an ordinary employment dispute will not give 

rise to a claim. GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999) (citations 

omitted). Accordingly, employment matters such as “criticism, lack of recognition, 
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and low evaluations” are not actionable, even if unfair or unpleasant. Hoffman-La 

Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 449 (quoting Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 613). Instead, “an 

employee must prove the existence of some conduct that brings the dispute outside 

the scope of an ordinary employment dispute and into the realm of extreme and 

outrageous conduct,” which “exists in only the most unusual of circumstances.” 

Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 613 (citations and footnote omitted). 

The trial court determines, in the first instance, whether a defendant’s conduct 

was extreme and outrageous. Id. at 616. The issue becomes a question for the jury 

only when reasonable minds may differ. Id. The court considers the context, the 

relationship between the parties, and the defendant’s conduct “as a whole.” Toles v. 

Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 261–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Tiller, 121 

S.W.3d at 715. The court examines the defendant’s conduct throughout the parties’ 

relationship because intentional infliction of emotional distress is most often a 

“continuing tort.” Toles, 45 S.W.3d at 262. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson, the summary judgment 

evidence shows that she entered Henderson’s office and, for a moment, observed a 

consensual sex act. A few days later, Henderson discussed the incident and her 

conduct with Jackson. Afterwards, Henderson increased Jackson’s workload and 

became critical of Jackson’s work performance. Boyd cut off Jackson when Jackson 

complained about Henderson and refused to assign a new supervisor to Jackson or 

recognize that Jackson’s work environment became stressful as a result of the June 
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27 incident. Jackson believed Henderson and Boyd were using negative reviews and 

disciplinary measures as a means to terminate Jackson. 

To be sure, Henderson’s conduct on June 27, as alleged, was inappropriate 

and unprofessional. That alone, however, does not render the conduct extreme and 

outrageous for purposes of maintaining an intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claim.3 Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 758 (wrongful conduct is not, standing alone, 

“extreme and outrageous” conduct). Those Texas courts that have upheld a finding, 

or found a fact issue, on extreme and outrageous conduct in an employment context 

have done so only when the plaintiff was the subject of unwanted harassment or 

advances and usually over an extended period of time. See, e.g., Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 

at 613, 616–17 (supervisor engaged in “pattern of grossly abusive, threatening, and 

degrading conduct”); Fields v. Teamsters Local Union No. 988, 23 S.W.3d 517, 

531–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (supervisor threatened 

to fire employee if she did not succumb to repeated sexual advances over threemonth period); Gonzales v. Willis, 995 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

1999, no pet.) (defendant repeatedly initiated sexually explicit conversations and 

made “vile” sexual advances in spite of plaintiff’s protests and suggested he could 

3

 Jackson asserts that both Henderson and Boyd “admitted” the “outrageousness” of the “sex act.” 

Henderson, who denied the incident ever happened, testified that, if it did happen, it would be outrageous. 

Boyd testified that she would not have wanted to see it, it would have been shocking, and she could imagine 

it being outrageous for Jackson. In any event, the trial court, guided by Texas law, determines if there is 

evidence to raise a fact issue on whether the conduct was sufficiently extreme or outrageous to serve as a 

basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 616. 

 
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help plaintiff get a job in return for sexual favors), overruled in part on other grounds 

by Hoffmann–La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 447–48. Here, Jackson does not claim any 

extreme and outrageous conduct initiated against her. Instead, she claims to have 

happened upon Henderson engaged in sexual conduct a single time with another 

employee. 

Nor does the subsequent conduct of Henderson and Boyd show an extreme 

and outrageous course of conduct. To the contrary, the sarcastic remarks and 

negative comments, excessive workload, negative review, and discipline, even if 

done in a retaliatory manner, are the very workplace insults, indignities, threats, and 

annoyances that Texas courts have determined do not give rise to a claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 613; 

Brewerton, 997 S.W.2d at 216 (negative comments in employee’s file, assigning 

excessive case load, and repeatedly recommending that plaintiff not be allowed to 

continue on tenure track, as a matter of law, was not extreme and outrageous); Tex. 

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 611–12 (Tex. 2002) (failure to 

use reasonable care in investigating agent for alleged insurance fraud was not 

extreme and outrageous); Porterfield v. Galen Hosp. Corp., 948 S.W.2d 916, 921 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (supervisor’s conduct, which 

amounted to poor communication and was discourteous and demanding, was not 

extreme and outrageous); Saucedo v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 974 S.W.2d 117, 124 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (swearing at, insulting, and threatening 
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employee and blaming him for supervisor’s mistakes was not extreme and 

outrageous); Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

1993, no writ) (making sexually suggestive and embarrassing remarks and 

“mentally” undressing employee was not extreme and outrageous). 

The Texas Supreme Court decision in Bruce is instructive. 998 S.W.2d 605. 

Several employees sued GTE based upon their supervisor’s behavior, which 

included sexual innuendo, vulgar obscenities, repeated physical and verbal threats, 

and demeaning conduct. Id. at 613–14. Recognizing that liability may arise when 

a person with authority engages in repeated or ongoing harassment, the supreme 

court determined the supervisor’s conduct supported the jury finding of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 616–17. The severity and regularity of the 

supervisor’s abusive and threatening conduct, which made the workplace “a den of 

terror for the employees,” brought his behavior into the realm of extreme and 

outrageous conduct. Id. at 617. 

The supreme court, however, distinguished those situations in which a 

supervisor’s conduct, even conduct that was an abuse of the supervisor’s position of 

power, amounted to mere insults, indignities, or annoyance. Id. at 612–13. The 

court cautioned that an employer must have latitude to “supervise, review, criticize, 

demote, transfer, and discipline” its employees in a permissible way and, as a result, 

extreme and outrageous conduct in the employment context “exists only in the most 

unusual of circumstances.” Id. 
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The bar an employee must meet to assert a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress in the workplace is exceptionally high. See id. at 617. Clearly, 

the conduct at issue in this case does not compare to the conduct at issue in Bruce. 

Having considered the evidence in the light most favorable to Jackson, we conclude 

that she had not produced summary judgment evidence to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact on the extreme and outrageous conduct element of her claim against 

Head Start. The evidence shows, at most, an unfortunate employment dispute; there 

is no evidence of a regular pattern of severely abusive behavior “‘so outrageous in 

character, and so extreme in degree’” as to support a claim for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress. See id. at 611 (quoting Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621). 

Accordingly, because Head Start negated the second element of Jackson’s 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial court did not err in 

granting summary judgment in Head Start’s favor. We overrule Jackson’s third 

issue. 

Conclusion 

We conclude that the trial court properly granted Jackson’s no-evidence 

motion for summary judgment. Having resolved this issue, we need not reach her 

remaining issues or Head Start’s other grounds for summary judgment. See 

Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 

 
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We affirm the trial court’s order. 

220448F.P05 

 

/Barbara Rosenberg/

BARBARA ROSENBERG 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

MEOSHA JACKSON, Appellant 

No. 05-22-00448-CV V. 

HEAD START OF GREATER DALLAS, 

INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-19136. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Rosenberg. 

Justices Pedersen, III and Goldstein 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s Order Granting 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is AFFIRMED.

 It is ORDERED that appellee HEAD START OF GREATER DALLAS, INC. recover 

its costs of this appeal from appellant MEOSHA JACKSON. 

Judgment entered this 6th day of March 2023.