Filed 11/5/20 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. PATTY ANN LAMOUREUX,
Defendant and Appellant. D077361

(Super. Ct. No. SWF1101 646)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Michelle May Peterson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Wint ers, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Annie Featherman Fraser , Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I INTRODUCTION Defendant Patty Ann Lamoureux ap peals a judgment of conviction
entered after the trial court vacate d her felony murder conviction and2

resentenced her under Penal Code section 1170.95, the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 ( 2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess. )

. 1 Lamoureux was released from custody for time served and , although she had excess custody credits, the trial court exercised its discretion to place her on parole supervision for the statutory maximum of three years . (§ 1170.95, subd. (g)

. ) On appeal, Lamoureux contends the trial court erred in declining to apply her excess custody credits to offset, i.e., reduce or eliminate, her three

year parole supervision period. Additionally, she claims the court failed to articulate a rational method of computation when it imposed a $560

r estitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b) ) , erred by not applying her excess custody credits to offset her restitution fine ( f ormer § 2900.5, subd. (a) ; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 466, eff. Apr. 4, 2011) , and miscalculated her presentence custody credits.
In Peo ple v. Wilson (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 42 ( Wilson ) , our colleagues in the First District, Division Three, conclude d that a court is not required to apply excess custody credits to offset the parole supervision period of a person who is resentenced under Senat e Bill No. 1437

. As discussed more fully below, we agree with the Wilson decision

. Therefore, we conclude the trial
court in the present case did not err in declining to offset Lamoureux’s parole supervision period by her excess custody credits

. As to Lamoureux’s remaining arguments , we conclude Lamoureux forfeited her challenge to the restitution fine by failing to object in the trial

court and the issue of her entitlement to additional presentence custody
credi ts is moot . However, we conclude Lamour eux’s excess custody credits must be applied to offset the restitution fine in its entirety

.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.3

Therefore , we modify the judgment to reflect that Lamoureux’s $5 6 0 restitution fine is deemed satisfied in full by application of her excess custody
credits

. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
II BACKGROUND
A In 2013, a jury convicted Lamoureux of conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182) and felony murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). It found true special circumstance allegations that: (1) the murder was perpetra ted during the commission of a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)); and (2) Lamoureux, though not the actual killer, had an intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the predicate felony ( id ., subds. (c) & (d)). On April 19, 2013, t he court sentenced
Lamoureux to prison for life without the possibility of parole.
T his court affirmed Lamoureux’s murder and conspiracy convictions, but concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the ju ry’s finding that
she had an intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life. ( People v. Miller (Sept. 15, 2015, D067451) [nonpub. opn.], rev iew den. Dec. 9, 2015.) Therefore , the court concluded Lamoureux was not eligible for a prison s entence of life wi thout the possibility of parole. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the judgment, in part, reversed the judgment , in part, and remanded the matter for resentencing. ( Ibid .) On remand , the trial c ourt

re sentenced Lamoureux to a prison term of 25 years to life.
B On January 11, 2019, after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, Lamoureux filed a petition to vacate her felony murder conviction and to obtain resentenc ing

. The People opposed the petition, asserting Senate Bill4

No. 1437 is unconst itutional because it amend s Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by vote rs, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) and Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, as approved by voters , Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)), violate s the separation of powers doctrine, and contravene s Marsy's Law (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008)). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition after finding that section 1170.95

— Senate Bill No. 1437 ’s resentencing provision

— amends Proposition 7. On appeal, a divided panel of this c ourt considered and rejected the People’s constitutional challenges to Senate Bill No. 1437. ( People v.
Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 ; see People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270 [companion case concluding Senate Bill No. 1437 is constitutional ].) Because we concluded there is no constitutional infirmity with Senate Bill No. 1437, we reversed the order summarily dismissing
L amoureux’s resentencing petition

. 2 ( Lamoureux , at p. 2 46 .) Lamoureux was released on bail on January 27, 2020 , and the court granted her petition on February 26, 2020

. The court vacated the felony
murder conviction and resentenced Lamoureux to the upper term of six years for her conspiracy conviction. It found Lamoureux was entitled to 3,590 credit s for ti me served, consisting of 648 presentence actual time credits ,

2 Following our decision, numerous other Courts of Appeal concluded Senate Bill No. 1437 is constitutional. ( People v. Lippert (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 304 ; People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041 ; People v. Superior Court of Butte County (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 896; People v. Lopez (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 589; People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207; People v. Johns (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 46; People v. Prado (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85, review granted July 22 , 2020, S262835 ; People v. Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 30 0; People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762; People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740; but see Lippert , at p. 314 (dis. opn. of Ramirez, J.); Nash , at p. 1084 (con. & dis. opn. of Poochigian, J.).)5

2,474 postsentence actual time credits , and 4 68 postsentence conduct credits

. It determined the custody credit s exceeded the new custodial sentence and therefore found the new custodial sentenc e satisfied

. However, it placed
Lamoureux on parole supervision for three years under section 1170.95, subdivision (g) . O ver Lamoureux’s objection, the court declined to apply her excess custody credits to offset the parole supervision period

. III DISCUSSI ON
A Parole Supervision

1 The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, effective January 1, 2019, for the expressed purpose of “ amend[ing] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that mu rder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. ” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f ).) To effectuate this goal, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188 and 189, the statutory provisions pertain ing to malice and the degrees of murder, respectively. ( Id. , §§ 2

– 3 .) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1170.95, which permits persons with murder convictions to petition the ir sentencing court s to vacate the ir
murde r convictions and to be resentenced on any remaining counts

. (§ 1170.95, subd s

. (a) , (e).) A person is entitled to vacatur of his or her murder conviction and resentencing i f the following conditions are met: ( 1) a charging document was filed against the person that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and6

prob able consequences doctrine; (2) t he person was convicted o f first or second degree murder following a trial or an accepted plea; and (3) t he person could “not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to [s] ection[s] 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill No. 1437. ( Id. , subd. (a).) At issue her e is a portion of Senate Bill No. 1437’s resentencing provision concerning parole supervision for resentenced defendants

—

s ection 1170.95 , subdivision (g). Section 1170.95, subdivision (g) states : “ A person who is resentenced pursuant to [ section 1170.95] shall be given credit for time served. The judge may order the petitioner to be subject to parole supervision for up to three years following the completion of the sentence. ”
Lamoureux contends a person who is resentenced under Senate Bill
No. 1437 is e ntitled , pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (g), to have his or her excess custody credits applied against any period of parole supervision
the court imposes

. She asserts she had 1,400 excess custody credits

— enough
to fully offset her three

- year par ole supervision period ( which she calculate s

as 1,095 days). Because the excess custody c redits exceeded the parole supervision period, Lamoureux claims the trial court erred in p lac ing her on parole supervision. 3 The proper construction of s ection 1170. 95, subdivision (g) presents an issue of statutory interpretation subject to our de novo review . ( Christensen v. Lightbourne (2019) 7 Cal.5th 761, 771.) “[W] e begin by looking to the statutory language. If the language is clear in context, our work is a t an end.

3 The parties dispute whether Lamoureux was entitled to additional custody credits. (See post Part. III.C.) However, Lamoureux assumes for purposes of discussion the trial court’s determination of her custody credits was correct and calculates her excess custody credits as follows: custody credits as determi ned by the trial court (3,590) minus the new six

- year custodial sentence imposed at resentencing (2,190 days) equals excess custody credits (1,400).7

If it is not clear, we may consider other aids, including the statute's legislative history. ” ( National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 498 .)
2
In People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399 ( M orales ), the Supreme Court considered whether excess custody credits automatically apply to reduce or eliminate a person’s parole period when the person is resentenced under Proposition 47 ( Prop. 47, as approved by vot ers, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014)). In a nswering this question, the Supreme Court interpreted a statutory provision that closely resembles section 1170.95, subdivision (g)

. Therefore, we begin our analysis with a discussion of the Morales decision.
In Morales , a defendant pleaded guilty to a f elony offense and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 403 .)
E ight months into the sentence, voters enacted Proposition 47, which reduced

many non
- violent crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and allowed persons serving felony sentences for reclassified offenses to petition to recall their sentences and to be resentenced for misdemeanor offenses. ( Ibid .) The defendant filed such a petition , which was granted, and the trial court imposed a jail sentence of time served. ( Ibid .) T he court placed the defendant on parole for one year , even though he had excess custody credits

. ( Ibid .) On appeal, the defendant argued he was entitled to have his parole period offset by his excess custody credits under a provision contained within Proposition 47

— section 1170.18, subdivision (d) (hereafter, the Proposition
47 statute ). The Proposition 47 statute states : “ A person who is resentenced

... shall be given credit for time served and shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence, unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentenci ng order, releases the person from parole. ”8

Applying well

- established principles of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court re jected the defendant’s arg ument and concluded a court is not required to apply a person’s excess custody cred its to reduce or eliminate

a parole period imposed under the Proposition 47 statute . ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 403.) The c ourt reasoned the Proposition 47 statute , despite granting “ ‘credit for time served’ ” to persons who are resentenced under Proposition 47, “ seems to require the one

- year parole period subject to the
court's discretion to order otherwise. It states that the person shall receive credit for time served and shall be subject to parole. ” ( Id. at p. 405.) As the
Morales court explained, the Proposition 47 statute establishe s a “ seemingly mandatory parole requirement (subject to the court's discretion) ....” ( Ibid. ) Next, the Morales court emphasized what the Proposition 47 statute does “ not state, namely that credit for time served could reduce the period of parole. ” ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 406.) T he court juxtaposed the Proposition 47 statute with section 2900.5 , “ the statute concerning presentence credit in ordinary cases ....” ( Ibid. ) As the court explained , presentence credits can ordinarily be credited towards a sentence during a person’s initial sentencing because section 2900.5 expressly provides that

“ (1) the person is entitled to credit for time served, and (2) the credit can9

reduce or eliminate the period of parole. ” 4 ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at

p p

. 405

– 406.) The Proposition 47 statute “ states the first of these but not the
second

. ” ( Ibid .) Because the Proposition 47 statut e says nothing about

excess credit s reducing o r eliminating a person’s parole period , the court had

“ no reason
... to assume the voters believed

... credit for time served co uld reduce the period of parole” when the y enacted Proposition 47. ( Id. at p. 406.) Further, t he Morales court reasoned that a custody credit offset would in many cases “undermine” the discretion of a court to impose a parole period for a pe rson who is resentenced under Proposition 47 . ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 405.) The court noted that a person seeking a recall of his or her sentence and resentencing under Proposition 47 “ will have been serving a felony sentence and, therefore, will often have substantial excess credit for
time served. In those cases, if excess credits can r educe or eliminate the period of parole, the court ’ s discretion will be curtailed or eliminated. ” ( Ibid. ) For all these reasons, the Morales court “ conclude [d] that credit for
time served does not reduce the parole period ” under the Proposition 47
statut e

. ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 403.) The court held , instead, that the “ electorate was informed, and it intended, that a person who benefitted from [Proposition 47] by receiving a reduced sentence would be placed on

4 Section 2900.5 states, in relevant part as follows: “(a) ... when the defendant has been in custody ... al l days of custody of the defendant ... shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment .... If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served .... [¶] .... (c) For the purposes of this section, ‘term of imprisonment’ includes any period of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation or otherwise ordered by a court in imposing or suspending the imposition of any sentence, and als o includes any term of imprisonment, including any period of imprisonment prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole , prior to discharge, whether established or fixed by statute, by any court, or by any duly authorized administrat ive agency. ” (Italics added.)10

parole for one year after comple tion of the r educed sentence, subject to the
court ’ s discretion to release the person from that parole. ” ( Ibid .)
3 More recently, i n Wilson , the Court of Appeal for the First District,
Division Three considered the issue presented here

— whether a court mus t apply the excess custody credits of a person who is resentenced under Senate
Bill No. 1437 to offset the person’s parole supervision period pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (g). B ased in part on the Morales decision , the
Wilson court determined the answer to this question is “no.” 5
As the Wilson court explained, section 1170.95, subdivision (g)

— l ike
the Proposition 47 statute

— “ states that (1) the [resentenced] person is entitled to credit for time served and (2) the court may order a parole peri od. ” ( Wilson , supra , 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 50 .) However, it “ does not state

— as section 2900.5 states

— that the credit may be used to reduce or eliminate any parole period the court may impose.” ( Id. at p. 50 .) Just as the Morales c ourt concluded “ the wor ds ‘ credit for time served ’ in the Proposition 47 statute do not mandate the use of excess credit to reduc e or eliminate the parole period,”
the Wilson court conclude d the words “credit for time served” contained in

se ction 1170.95, subdivision (g) do not , standing alone, mandate an excess credit offset against a person’s parole supervision period. ( Id. at p

. 50 .) Further, the Wilson court recognized that a mandatory excess custody
credit offset “would result in parole being eliminated or reduced in many cases governed by section 1 1 70.95 as defendants seeking relief under that

5 The Court of Appeal issued the Wilson decision after briefing in this appeal was complete. At our request, the parties filed supplemental briefing regarding the Wilson decision. Additionally, Lamoureux filed a request fo r judicial notice of the appellate briefing in the Wilson appeal, which we deny as unnecessary to the disposition of the appeal.11

section will have been serving lengthy felony sentences for murder by the time they petition for resentencing. ” ( Wilson , supra , 53 Cal.App.5th at p

. 51 ; see § 190, subd. (a) [genera lly, the punishment is 25 years to life for first degree murder and 1 5 years to life for second degree murder] .) This would

“ undermine the trial c ourt’s discretion in many cases. ” ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 405 .) Based on the language of section 1170.95, subdivision (g), as well as the provision’s legislative history, discussed post , the Wilson court concluded a “court is not required to mechanically apply excess custody credits to reduce or eliminate the parole period imposed at a resentencing pu rsuant [to]
section 1170.95. Instead, and notwithstanding excess custody credits, the court may exercise its discretion when deciding whether to order a period of parole.” ( Wilson , supra , 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 46 .) “ A contrary interpretation would requir e [the court] to add words to section 1170. 95 that do not currently exist. ” ( Id. at p. 52 ) We agree with , and adopt , the Wilson court’s reasoning

. Additionally , we believe t he Morales decision is instructive for another

reason not discussed in the Wilso n decision

. “When legislation has been judicially construed and subsequent statutes on a similar subject use identical or substantially similar language, the usual presumption is that th e Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary inten t clearly

appears. ” (

Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135; see People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199 [“[W] e must assume that, when enacting [legislation] , the Legislature [is] aware of existing
related laws and intend [s] t o maintain a consistent body of rules. ”].)
Both section 1170.95, subdivision (g) and the Proposition 47 statute are contained in the same article of the Penal Code (Part 2, Title 7, Chapter 4.5,12

Article 1). Both provisions address a resentenced person’s entitlement to credit for time served and the discretion of the court to order the person to be subject to parole supervision. Further, as noted, both provisions contain substantially similar statutory language. Given the se parallels between section 117 0.95, subdivision (g) and the Proposition 47 statute, we presume the Legislature was aware of the Morales decision and its analysis of the Proposition 47 statute

. We also assume the Legislature intended section 1170.95, subdivision (g) to receive the same construction the Morales
court previously gave to the Proposition 47 statute. These presumptions bolster our conclusion that section 1170.95, subdivision (g)

— like the Proposition 47 statute

— does not require a court to automatically offset a
resentenced p erson’s parole supervision period by the person’s excess custody credits

. 4 Lamoureux raises four main arguments in support of her claim that the court erred in placing her on parole supervision for a period of three years

. First , Lamoureux tries to dist inguish the Morales decision on grounds that the decision was based in part on Proposition 47’s unique legislative history

. In its discussion of legislative history, the Morales court assumed the voters who approved Proposition 47 “ read and were guided by the ballot materials concerning the proposition. ” ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 406.)
Included in these ballot materials was a Legislative Analyst analysis , which stated as follows: “ ‘ Offenders who are resentenced would be required to be
on state parole for one year, unless the judge chooses to remove that requirement. ’ ” ( Id. at pp. 406

– 407 .) According to the Morales court, this analysis unambiguously “ promised voters that offenders would be on parole for one year unless the judge deemed it not necessary....” ( Id. at p. 407.)13

This, in turn, suggested that the voters who approved Proposition 47 did not
intend to enact an excess custody credit offset. (See ibid. ) The legislative history for Senate Bill No. 1437 is not especially robust
on t he top ic of parole supervision for resentenced persons . But it is not silent either. An analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 conducted by the O ffice of Senate Floor Analyses state s that the bill “[a]llows the court to order [a] person granted relief to be subject to parole supervision for up to three years following the completion of the sentence.” ( Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 2018, p. 6.) Similarly , the Department of Fina nce’s enrolled bill report states that “[i] f a person is granted relief, the bill allows the court to impose a term of parole supervision up to three years.” (Dept. of Fin., Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017

– 2018 Reg . Sess.) Sept. 7, 2018,

p. 2.) T hese legislative materials, like the official ballot pamphlet materials for Proposition 47 , are “ easy to understand and enti rely unambiguous” in
their assurance that a court will have discretion to impose parole supervision

on a person who is resent enced

. ( Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 407.) Further, we acknowledge the general aim of Senate Bill No. 1437 was

“ ‘to restore proportional responsibility in the application of California’s murder statute’ [citation] by eliminating harsh sentences for defendants who played only a relatively minor role in a felony in which a victim was killed, while still retaining murder liability for more culpable defendants.” ( People v. Galvan (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1134 , 1143

– 1144. ) But , as the Wilson court
correct ly recognized, section 1170.95 also “ serves the ‘ objective of parole ’

— to provide ‘ supervision and counseling, to assist in the parolee’s transition from imprisonment to discharge and reintegration into society. ’ ” ( Wilson , supra , 53 Cal.App.5th at p p. 50

– 51 ; see § 3000, subd. (a)(1) [“The Legislature finds14

and declares that the period immediately following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive citizenship .”] .) In light of this goal, we believe “ it is consistent with the legislative purpose behind section 1170.95 to allow a court to impose a parole period even where excess custody credits exist. ” ( Wilson , at p. 51

. )
Moreover , Lamoureux has directed us to no legislative history supporting her co nstruction of section 1170.95, subdivision (g) , and we are aware of none based on our own research. We would expect there to be at least some indication in the legislative history that a court must apply a person’s excess custody credit s against a parole supervision period, if the Legislature had intended the statute to require an offset of this nature

. The absence of such legislative history suggests section 1170.95, subdivision (g) imposes no offset requirement

. ( Wilson , supra , 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 50 [“ there is no legislative history ” suggesting the parole supervision period must be offset by excess custody credits]; see Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169 [interpreting statute by reference to

“ legislative history or , more precisely, the absence of legislative history ”].) Second , Lamoureux contends section 1170.95, subdivision (g), should be interpreted to ensure consistency with section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), a provision governing custody credits in the determina te sentencing context. Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) states in part: “I n any case in which the amount of preimprisonment credit

... is equal to or exceeds any sentence
im posed ... the entire sentence shall be deemed to have been served ... and the defendant shall not be actually delivered to the custody of the secretary or to the custody of the county correctional administrator. The court shall advise the defendant that he or she shall serve an applicable period of parole

... unless the in

- custody credits equ al the total sentence, including both15

confinement time and the period of parole ....” Courts have interpreted
section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) “ as providing that excess custody credits apply to a term of parole. ” ( People v. Steward (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 40 7, 424;

see , e.g., In re Bush (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 133, 140

– 141.) S ection 1170, subdivision (a)(3) does not assist Lamoureux. As the Wilson court explained, the Morales court’s “discussion of section 2900.5 ... is equally applicable to section 1170(a)(3) as both sections are identical as to the purpose and rules concerning the application of credit for time served to reduce or eliminate a term of imprisonment and parole. [Citation.] As we must assume the Legislature had in mind section 1170(a)(3) when e nacting
section 1170.95, it was aware of section 1170(a)(3)’s rule allowing credit for time served and credit to reduce or eliminate any period of parole. We may further assume the Legislature was aware that the purpose behind the rule
in section 1170(a )( 3), like section 2900.5, was ‘ to equalize the treatment of ... those who could not post bail. ’ [Citation.] Consequently, had the Legislature not intended to leave the issue of parole to the trial court’s discretion in
section 1170.95, it could have easil y made specific reference to
section 1170(a)(3) or otherwise modified the court’s right to impose a parole period. [Citations.] Instead, the Legislature gave the trial court unfettered discretion to impose a period of parole at the completion of any sent ence imposed under section 1170.95. ” ( Wilson , supra , 53 Cal.App.5th at p p

. 51

– 52 ;

see Holmes v. Jones (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 882, 890 [“Where a statute with reference to one subject contains a given provision, omission of that provision from a similar stat ute concerning a related subject shows that a different intention existed.”] .) We agree with the Wilson court

. Third , Lamoureux argues that section 1170.95, subdivision (g)
establishes a deadline governing a person’s parole eligibility that in many16

respe cts resembles a statute of limitations. As best we can discern, she
contends s ection 1170.95, subdivision (g) prohibits a resentenced person from being subject to parole supervision at any point later than three years after
the comp le tion of the person’s sentence. She bases her argument on the following italicized language: “ The judge may order the petitioner to be subject to parole supervision for up to three years following the completion of
the sentence

. ” (§ 1170.95, subd. (g), italics added.)
Thi s argument raises the question: when is the sentence complete? According to Lamoureux, the sentence is complete upon the expiration of the
new custodial term impose d during resentencing. 6 For example , Lamoureux
claims her sentence was complete upon the expiration of her new six

- year custodial term

— a date that took place several years prior to her resentencing. Therefore , she contends she could not be subject to parole supervision later than three years after the expiration of her new six

- year custodial term

— a date that also preceded her resentencing

. 7 We are not persuaded by Lamoureux’s construction of section 1170.95, subdivision (g)

. In our view, the most natural reading of the statute is that

t he first prepositional phrase ( “ for up to three years ” ) modifies the noun immediately preceding it ( “ parole supervision ” ) , thereby establishing that a resentenced person may be subject to parole supervision for up to three years

6 After briefing was complete, Lamoureux sought judicial notice of an excerpt from the Operations Manual for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which she contends corroborates her argument as to when a sentence is complete. We deny the request, as the excerpt does not reference when the sentence is complete for a person who is resentenced under section 1170.95, le t alone corroborate Lamoureux’s argument.

7 Lamoureux does not identify the date she belie ves her sentence was complete. H owever, she calculates April 27, 2019 as the last date on which she could be subject to parole supervision.17

in duration

. (See People v. Tokash (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379, fn. 7 [“ a
p repositional phrase ordinar ily modifies nouns or pronouns”].) But this phrase is silent on the issue of when a person may be subject to parole supervision

. T hat subject is the province of the next prepositional phrase in
the statute ( “ following the compl etion of the sentence ” ). ( § 1170.95, subd. (g).) Read in full, the statute thus provides that a person may be subject to parole supervision following the completion of the sentence and, furthermore, the parole supervision period may be up to three years in duration. Our construction of section 1170.95, subdivision (g) is consistent with
the Morales court’s interpretation of the Proposition 47 statute. Like
section 1170.95, subdivision (g), the Proposition 47 statute provides that a person may be subject to parole for a defined period of time following completion of his or her sentence. (§ 1170.18, subd. (d) [a person “ shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence ”].)
The Morales court impliedly determined the defin ed period of time
established the maximum duration of the parole period , not a deadline akin
to a statute of limitations . (See Morales , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 405 [the Proposition 47 statute “ seems to require the one

- year parole period ”]; id. at

p. 409 [ “ the voters imposed a price for [the] benefit [of resentencing]

— parole for one year ”] .) Further , the court concluded a resentenced person could “be placed on parole when released on the reduced sentence, ” not merely upon the completion of the person’s new custodial term. ( Id. at p. 409, italics added ;

see People v. Hronchak (2016) 2 Cal.App. 5th 884, 890 [“An individual who successfully petitions for resentencing under Proposition 47 is subject to a

one
- year term of parole supervision following his or her release from custody ”], italics added, citing Morales , at pp. 404

– 405.) These conclusions18

confirm our interpretation of the nearly

- identical statute at issue here,
section 1170.95, subdivision (g). Further, we note that Lamoureux’s interpretation of sec tion 1170.95, subdivision (g)

— whereby a three

- year clock begins ticking upon the expiration of the new custodial term

— would in many cases mean a person would be subject to parole supervision only while the person is in custody, but not after the person’s r elease from custody. This runs contrary to the very notion “that a parole term begins only after release from prison.” ( In re Lira (2014) 58 Cal.4th 573, 582; see People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 608 [“It is apparent that a term of imprisonment a nd the onset of parole are distinct phases under the legislative scheme.”].) Having concluded that section 1170.95, subdivision (g) does not establish a three

- year deadline after which a resentenced person may no longer be subject to parole supervision , w e must still determine whether the trial court placed Lamoureux on parole supervision “ following the completion of the sentence , ” as section 1170.95, subdivision (g) requires. We conclude it
did. Assuming without deciding that Lamoureux completed her sen tence when her new six

- year custodial term expired, the court properly placed her on parole supervision “following the completion of the sentence” because it ordered her to undergo parole supervision upon her release from custody. Her release from custody occurred well after

— i.e., following the completion of

— her new six

- year custodial term

. Fourth , Lamoureux claims the Legislature rationally could limit a court’s discretion to impose parole supervision on a defendant who h as been resentenced under Senate Bill No. 1437. She contends such a limitation is consistent with Senate Bill No. 1437 ’s stated purpose of ensuring “ that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual ....”19

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (e).) We have no oc casion to determine the rationality of such a limitation because section 1170.95, subdivision (g), does
not curtail a court ’s discretion to impose parole supervision in the manner
Lamoureux suggests

. 5 In sum, we conclude s ection 1170.95, subdivision (g) d oes not require a
court to automatically apply a person’s excess custody credits to offset the person’s parole supervision period

. We conclude, instead, that a court has discretion to order a resentenced person to be subject to parole supervision for up t o three years in duration upon the person’s release from custody

. Therefore, we discern no error in the trial court’s order placing Lamoureux on parole supervision for three years upon her custodial release

. B
Restitution Fine
1 At the initial sentencing on April 19, 2013, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $560 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) . ( People v. Miller , supra , D067451 .) In her direct appeal, Lamoureux challenged the restitution fine

. She claimed the court mis applied the restit ution fine statute
in a manner that violated ex post facto principles because the court allegedly imposed the minimum restitution fine in effect at the time of sentencing ($280), multiplied by two for the number of convictions , rather than the
minimum rest itution fine in effect at the time she committed the offenses ($200), multiplied by two for the number of convictions

. ( Ibid. )
In our decision affirming the judgment, in part, and reversing the judgment, in part , we noted the $560 restitution fine was “ conspicuously equal to the inapplicable minimum fine in effect at the time of sentencing20

multiplied by the number of Lamoureux's convictions .” ( People v. Miller , supra , D067451 ) However, b ecause we were remanding the matter for purposes unrelated to the restitution fine, we did not determine whether the
trial court violated ex post facto principles in setting the restitution fine. We instructed the court “to modify the restitution fine in accordance with the applicable statutory minimum if appropriate, ” yet clarified that the court was

“ not precluded from setting the fine at the greater amount previously imposed [i.e., at $560] so long as it [did] so using a rational method of computation. ” ( Ibid .) The record does not indicate whether the court imposed a restitution fine at the resentencing hearing on remand and, if so,
in what amount. As noted, Lamoureux thereafter filed a Senate Bill No. 1437 petition to vacate her murder conviction and to be resentenced , which the court granted

. During resentencin g, the court again imposed a $560 restitution fine

. Now, Lamoureux challenges the restitution fine on grounds that the court failed to employ a rational method of computation when setting the amount of the restitution fine. The People assert Lamoureux forfeited her argument by failing to object to the restitution fine in the trial court . We agree. By not object ing to the restitution fine, Lamoureux forfeited the issue for our consideration

. ( People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 968 ( Pinon ) ; Peop le v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218 .) Further, the $560 restitution fine is less than the statutory maximum of $10,000 . ( § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1) .) Therefore , the sentence is not an unauthorized sentence subject to our correction on appeal desp ite Lamoureux’s failure to object in the trial court

. Lamoureux claim s her trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the restitution fine. We disagree

. “ If, as here, the record on appeal21

sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate court must reject [a] claim of ineffective assistance unless there can be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct

. ” ( People v. Kendrick (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 778.) We believe there is a satisfact ory explanation for counsel’s conduct

. During resentencing, the trial court imposed the upper term for Lamoureux’s conspiracy conviction

. Given the court’s imposition of the harshest possible custodial penalty, Lamoureux’s
counsel reasonably could have r efrained from objecting to the restitution fine for fear that an objection would have caused the court to reassess and
increase the restitution fine from $560 to an amount upwards of the statutory maximum of $10,000.
2 Next, we consider whether Lamoureux’s excess custody credits must be applied to offset her $560 restitution fine

. The People concede the excess custody cred its offset the restitution fine and w e accept the concession. At the time of Lamoureux’s offense in 2011, section 2900.5 provided in

p ertinent part as follows: “ In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody

... all days of custody of the defendant, including days

... credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4 019, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any fine on a proportional basis, including, but not limited to, base fines and restitution fines, which may be imposed, at the rate of not less than thirty dollars ($30) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence. If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shal l be deemed to have been served

. ”22

Under the pl ain terms of section 2900.5, as the statute existed at the time of the offense, the trial court was required to apply Lamoureux’s excess custody credits to reduce her $560 restitution fine at a rate of no less than $30 per day of excess custody cr edit. As previously noted, Lamoureux had a minimum of 1,400 excess custody credits. Even if the court were to reduce the restitution fine by the statutory minimum of $30 per day of excess custody credit, a mere 19 days of excess custody credits would offset the

r estitution fine in its entirety. Therefore, we deem the restitution fine
satisfied in full

. 8 (See People v. Morris (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 94, 101

– 103 [deeming defendant’s restitution fine satisfied under version of section 2900.5 in effect at the time of defendant’s offense ].) C Presentence Conduct Credits When the trial court sentenced Lamoureux on April 19, 2013, it determined she had 648 presentence actual time credits and zero presentence
conduct credits. Lamoureux asserts, and the People do not disp ute, that the court denied her presentence conduct credits because she stood convicted of felony murder and the court therefore applied section 2933.2, subdivision (c). Section 2933.2, subdivision (c) , is an exception to the rule that “ detainees in
local institutions are usually able to earn credit against their eventual sentence for good behavior and work performed. ” ( People v. Brown (2020) 52

8 Earlier in the op inion, we concluded the trial court was not required to apply Lamoureux’s excess custody credits to reduce her parole supervision period based on the language and legislative history of section 1170.95, subdivision (g). However, section 1170.95, subdivisi on (g) “says nothing about fines , and thus, unlike the issue of parole, it does not supplant the legislative intent of section 2900.5 as it applies to fines.” ( Pinon , supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 966

– 967 , italics added .)23

Cal.App.5th 899, 903 ; see § 4019 .) It “ totally eliminate [s] presentence conduct credit for defendants convicted of murder. ” ( Brown , at p. 903 .) When the court granted Lamoureux’s Senate Bill No. 1437 petition , vacated her murder conviction, and resentenced her , the court again determined she had 648 presentence credits. As the basis for its determination, the c ourt referenced and adopted its credit calculation from
the initial sentencing. Thus, it is apparent these 648 presentence credits consist entirely of actual credits

. Lamoureux contends the court erred in denying her any presentence conduct credits becau se her Senate Bill No. 1437 petition resulted in her
murder conviction being vacated

. Thus , according to Lamoureux, section 2933.2, subdivision (c) no longer applie s to her

. The People argue the issue of Lamoureux’s entitlement to presentence conduct cre dit s is moot . In the alternative, they claim Lamoureux was validly “convicted of murder” (§ 2933.2, subd. (a)), notwithstanding the changes effectuated by Senate Bill
No. 1437 , and section 2933.2, subdivision (c) therefore still applies to her

. We agree with the People that the issue of Lamoureux’s entitlement to presentence conduct credits is moot. “As a general rule, an appellate court only decides actual controversies. It is not the function of the appellate court to render opinions [‘ “ ‘] upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or ... declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in is sue in the case before it. [’ ” ’] [Citation.] ‘ [A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief. ’ ” ( People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.) As noted, Lamoureux has completed her new custodial term and been released from prison . She already has more than enough excess custody credits (1,400) to be applied against, and fully eliminate, her $5 6 0 restitution24

fine. (See ante Part III.B .) An award of presentence custody credits cannot operate to eliminate or reduce her parole supervision period. (See ante Part III.A .) Further, an award of presentence conduct credits to Lamoureux would
not remove a ny stigma of criminality . (See People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 688.) R egardless of the number of presentence conduct credits she receives, our judicial records will reflect that Lamoureux was
convicted o f felony murder, filed a successful petition for relief under Senate
Bill No. 1437, and was resentenced to a prison term of six years

. As no adverse collateral consequences would be avoided or ameliorated by an award of presentence custody credits, the is sue is moot. 9 ( People v.
Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 92

– 93 [defendant’s entitlement to additional
conduct credit s was moot because defendant was released from custody and

was not ordered to pay amount s against which excess custody credits may be appli ed ]; People v. Valencia (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 326, 327, 329 [ “ any contention concerning inadequate presentence credits is moot ” ].)
IV DISPOSITION The judgment is modified to reflect that Lamoureux’s $560 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b) ) is deemed sat isfied in full by application of her excess custody credits (§ 2900.5). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is directed to modify the abstract of

9 Lamoureux claims the award of ze ro presentence conduct credits renders her sentence “facially illegal” and marred by a “clerical error” subject to our correction. These arguments are inapposite to the issue of mootness. Even assuming the failure to award presentence conduct credits was erroneous, “ any determination by us that the trial court erred would have no practical effect ” for the reasons already discussed. ( Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 62, 81.)25

judgment to reflect this modification and to forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, J.

HUFFMAN , J.