The Honor able Edmund A. Sar g us, J r., United S t at es Dist rict Judge f or the Southern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. The di s tr ic t c o u rt f

o u n d th a t t h e e v id e n c e d id

n o t e s ta b li s hb y a p r e p o n d e r an c e th a t A

p p e ll ant 1 committed the other two a lleg ed violations, robber ies on April 15, 2008 and June 2, 2008.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0567n.06 No. 09-1336 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, ) ) P laintif f - App ellee, ) ) On App eal from the United v. ) St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e ) Eastern Distr ict of Michigan DI’MITRI R. HENDERSON, ) ) Defendan t Appellant. )

Before: G IBBO NS and KETHLEDGE, Circ uit Jud ges, and S ARG US, DistrictJudge. * SA RG US, DistrictJudge. Def endant- Appellant Di’Mitri He nderson ( “Appe llant”) challeng es the sente nce imposed by the district court for violations of supervised rele ase. Of four alleg ed super

vised rele ase violations, Appellant admitted to one (fa ilure to r eport to the probation depar tment) and, following sever al violation he aring s, was found g uilty of another (larc eny ). On 1 Marc h 9, 2009, Appellant wa s sentence d to two y ear s in custody followed by

one y ear of super vised rele ase. Appellant contends that his se ntence is procedur ally unrea sonable be cause the district court alleg edly based A ppellant’s sente nce on inaccur ate infor mation, failed to consider the fa ctors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) a nd 3583(c) , and tre ated the su p er vised rele ase a dvisory rang e asNo. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

2 mand a tor y in i mpo sin g an a dd iti on a l one y e ar of su pe rv ise d re le a se . App e lla nt a lso a sse rt s th a t hi s

se nte nc e is s ub sta

nti ve ly unre a so na

ble be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

all eg e dly arb itr ari ly

se le c te d h is sentenc e, base d the sentenc e on impermissible fac tors, and g ave a n unrea sonable amount of weig ht to s uc h f a c tor s. For the re asons that follow, we AF F IRM the se nte nc e imp os e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACK GR OUND Ap pe lla nt w a s o ri g ina lly c on vic te d o f A idi ngand Ab e tti ngthe Tr ans po rt a tio n o f C ounte rf e it Se c ur iti e s in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 23 14 (R . 1 a t 17 ), a Cla ss C fe lony

fo r t he purp os e of

18 U. S.C. § 3583(e) (3 ). 1 8 U.S.C. § 3559. After ser ving his sente nce, he commence d a thre e y ear term of supervised r elea se in Fe bruar y of 2008. (R. 1 at 19; R. 2 at 1

. ) On Oc t o b er 22, 2008, the district court issued a

war rant for Appellant’s arr est based on f our alleg ed violations of supervise d rele ase: (1) a n April 15, 2008 incident which resulted in state charg es of Armed Robbery , (2) a n incident on May 2, 2008 which resulted in state charg es of Unar med R obbery , (3) a J une 2, 2008 incident whic h

re su lte d in state c ha

rg e s o f R ob be ry , a

nd (4 ) f a ilure to r e po rt

to t he pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e . ( R. 2 .) At

a hear ing on N ovember

19, 2008, Appellant admitt ed to the fourth violation, failure to repor t to the probati o n o f

f ic e . ( R. 2 4 a t 5

– 6 ; R. 2 6 a t 1 2 1

– 2 2

. ) F o ll o w in g s e v e r a l e v id e n ti ar y h e aring s, the district court found by

a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e that Appe llant also committed the second violation by

committing larc eny from a person, a felony in the state of Michig an, on May 2, 2008. (R. 26 at 392.) After havingfound that Appe llant committed t he sec ond and four th violations, and immediately prior to sentenc ing, the district court gave Appellant, his counsel, a nd the Gover

nmentNo. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

3 an opportunity

to speak. Appe llant’s counsel indicated that Appellant, who suffe rs fr o m seizures due to a gunshot w ound to his head, wished to be allowed to live with his mother. (R. 26 at 393.) The Gove rnment empha siz ed that the larc eny violation was a ser ious offense , a “pr edator y crime of violence,” and aske d the cour t to consider a the maxi mum term of two y ear s. ( Id. at 395–96.) The district cour

t beg an its sentencing discussion by noting that the parties had not objecte d to the probation off

icer ’s ca lculation of an a dvisory ran g e of 30 to 37 months, but the maxi mum statut or y pe na lty fo r t he vio latio n w a s tw o y e ars . T he c ourt state d: [T] he Court is drawn to a s en t en ce of 24 months simpl y by attending to the rec ommended ra

ng e that beg ins six months hig her than that. And I must say , g iven the nature of the off

ense a nd the impact that su ch offe nses have on the victims of crime, a sentenc e at the lowe st possibl e end of the g uideline ra ng e strikes me a s being insuf fi ci en t. But I

am constra ined by

the statutory

two-y ear maxi mum. The defe ndant her e has a

history of assault. He has a his tory of l arc eny . He ha s a history of we a po ns -r e late d o ff

e ns e s dat in g ba c k to a

ve ry e arl y a g e . H e fa ile d to re po rt , fa ile d to sta

y in t ou c h w ithhis pr ob a tio n o ff ic e r, and a ll the wh ile , w a s e ng a g ingin at least the behavior that I have found proven by a preponde ranc e of the e vidence here , that is to say illicit behavior

. And combined with the extraordinary cell phone usage t h at t h e defenda

nt contributed to, if he is not wholly responsible for

it, it’s dif fi c ult fo r me to se e ho w the de fe nd ant wa s d oin g any thi ngpr od

uc tiv e or us e fu l to himself, his effor

ts to rehabilitate or be nefit himself, his f amily , society

or any body else duringthe time he wa s on relea se and f ailed to report and stay

ing out of touch, but at least robbingMs. Waraniak. (R. 26 at 397–98.) The c ourt then sentenc ed Appe llant to two y ear s in custody followed by

one y ear of su pe rv ise d re le a se . Re g ard ing the te rm of su pe rv ise d re le a se , the c ourt state d, “ it wi ll be a c a se to m on ito r f

or the Court

to d e te rm ine whe th er the de fe nd ant h a s ma de re a so na ble ste ps to t

ry to

acc ommodate himself upon his next rele ase to the r equire ments of the law.” ( Id. at 398.) The c ourt then aske d whether the parties had any mistakes, conce rns, or c orre ctions for the

rec ord. Appe llant’s counsel stated that, although he may need to r esea

rch the issue, he believe d thatNo. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

4 once the court ha d revoke d Appellant’s supe rvised re lease and g iven him the maxi mum term of impriso n m en t , the cour

t was pre cluded f

rom imposing additional super vised rele ase. The court

a sk e d App e lla

nt’ s c ouns e l to fo llo w up and se e k c or re c tio n of the se nte nc e if the su pe rv ise d r e le a se was in fa ct unauthorized by statute. (R. 26 at 398–400.) J udg ment was entered on Marc h 9, 2009; Appellant filed this timely appea l on March 18, 2009. ( R. 21, 22.) II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We review

s e nte n c e s im

p o s e d f o ll o w in g r e v o cation of supe rvised re lease under the same “ defe rential abuse- of-discr etion standard” that we a pply to se ntence s imposed following conviction, a standa rd

we c larified in United Stat es v. Bolds , 5 1 1 F. 3 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 8 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Gall v. United States , 5 52 U. S. 3 8, 41 (2 00 7) ; Rita v. United States , 5 5 1 U

. S

. 3 3 8 , 34 1 ( 20 07 ); Uni ted States v. Booke r , 543 U.S. 220, 260–61 (2 0 05)). This standa rd has both proc edura l and substantive components. Id. at 5 7 8 (c i t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). I f a se ntencingjudge , afte r announc ing a proposed sen t en ce , asks the par ties whether

they h av e an y o b je c ti o n s n o t p r e v io u s ly

r a is e d , an d

if th e p arti e s d o n o t o b

je c t, th e np la in

- e r

r o r r e v ie w applies on appea l to those arguments not preser ved in the district cour

t. United States v. Vonne r , 516 F. 3 d 3 8 2 , 3 8 5 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( en b an c) (c i t i n g Un ite d S tates v . B os tic , 3 71 F .3 d 8 65 , 8 72 –7 3 ( 6th Cir. 2004)). To demonstrate plain err or, a pa rty must “show (1) e rror

(2) that ‘ was obvious or c lear ,’ (3 ) that ‘a ff

e c te d de fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l ri g hts ’ and (4 ) that ‘a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty , o r p ub lic reputation of the judicial proce eding s.’” Id. at 3 8 6 (q u o t i n g United States v. Gardiner , 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). “ ‘[O] nly in exceptional circumstanc es’ will w e fi n d s u ch er ror—only

. . .No. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

As we note d in Bolds : 2 B e c a

u s e th e r e ar e n o G u id e li n e s f o r s u p e r v is e d r e le a s e r e v o c a ti o n s e n te n c e s , . . . “ [i ]n imposing a te rm of imprisonment following revoc ation of super vised rele ase, the district court must c onsider the policy statements containe d in Chapter Seven of the Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s [as we ll a s] the re le va nt statut or

y fa c tor s li ste d in

18 U. S.C. § 3553(a) .” These policy statements indicate that in imposing such a se ntence “the c o u rts h o u l d

s an c t i o np r i m ar i l y

t h e d e f e n d an t ' s b r e a c ho f

t r u s t , w h i l e t a k i n g int o acc ount to a li mited deg ree , the s eriousness of the underly ing crime and the cr iminal his to r y o f th e v io lato r . ” U

. S. S. G

. c h

. 7 , p t. A , I n tr o d u c to r y Co mm e n t 3 ( b ) ( 2006). The policy

statements also provide sug g ested ra ng es for appropr iate sente nces ba sed upon the g rade of super

vised rele ase violation and the criminal hi s t o ry cate g ory of the def endant. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a ) (2006)

. Bolds , 511 F.3d at 579 n.5 (citations omitted). 5 ‘whe re the err or is so plain that the trial judg e . . . [ wa s ] d erelict in countenanc ing it.’” Id. at 386 (q u o t i n g Gardiner , 463 F.3d at 459). A. P roce dural Reasonab leness Review Our proce dural rea sonablene ss r eview consists of three steps. First, we must ensure that the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y c a lc ulate d th e a

pp lic a ble a dv isor y ra

ng e . Se c on d, the c ourt mus t 2 have c onsidered the § 3553(a) fac tors as we ll as the parties’ argum en t s for a sentenc e outside the advisory rang e, g iving both par

ties an opportunity

“‘to a rgue for whatev er s entenc e they

deem appropr iate,’” consideringthe § 3553(a) fac tors, and makingan individualized assessment based on the f acts a nd the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. Bolds , 5 1 1 F. 3 d at 5 7 9

– 8 0 (q u o t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 49). F ina lly , w e mus t “e ns ur e that the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s ‘ a de qu a te ly

e xpla in[e d] th e c ho se n s e nte nc e to allow for me aning ful appe llate re view and to promote the perc eption of fa ir sentenc ing.’ ” Id. at 580 (q u o t i n g Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. a t 50 ). “ Re ve rs ibl e pr oc e dura l e rr or oc c ur s if the se nte nc ing jud g e fa ils to ‘set for th enoug h [of a statement of r easons] to satisfy the appe llate cour t that he has c onsidered theNo. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

6 parties’ arguments and has a rea soned basis for exercising his own leg al dec ision making a uthority .’” Id. (q u o t i n g Ri ta , 551 U.S. at 356). “[T] he re cord must contain the dis t ri ct court’s rationale f or conc luding that the se ntence imposed is ‘sufficient but not g reater than ne cessa ry , to comply with the purposes’ of sentenc ing se t forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. a t 580. Whil e the dis tr ic t cou rt ne e d n ot “ e ng a g e in a

‘r itu a lis tic incantation to establish consider ation of a leg al issue’” or “make spec ific finding s relate d to eac h of the fa ctors conside red,” the cour t must articulate the r easons it re ache d the sentenc e imposed. Id. at 5 8 0 (q u o t i n g United States v. Mc Clellan , 1 6 4 F. 3 d 3 0 8 , 3 1 0 (1 9 9 9 ); ci t i n g United States v. Jack son , 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 2005)). I t is insufficient simply to list the § 3553(a ) fa ctors and the def endant’ s various cha

rac terist i cs without ref

err ing to the a

pplicable a dvisory

rang e or explaining the decision to sta y within or deviate from that rang e. Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Cousins , 469 F.3d 572, 577 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). Rather, “[t ]he district court must provide a c lear explanation of why it ha s e it

h e r a c c e p te d o r r e je c te d th e p arti e s ’ ar g u me n ts an d th e r e b y c h o s e nth e p arti c u lar sentenc e imposed, re g ardle ss of whethe r it is within or out side of the Guide lines.” Id. (c i t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). B. Sub stantive Re asonab leness Review After we ha ve found the district court’s sente ncingdecision to be proc edura lly sound, we must “then consider

the substantive re asonable ness of the se ntence imposed under a n abuse- ofdiscretion standa

rd.” Id. at 5 8 1 (q u o t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51)

. I n revie wing for substantive

rea sonablene ss, we mus t “‘take int o acc ount the totality of the c ircumstance s, including the extent of any varia nce fr o m t h e Gu i delines ra ng e.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). F or sentenc esNo. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

7 within the advisory

rang e, we may apply a rebuttable presumption of substantive re asonable ness, but we may not apply a pre sumption of unreasona bleness to se ntence s outside the applica ble advisory rang e. Id. (c i t i n g Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. at 51 ; Ri ta , 551 U. S. at 3 54 -5 5; United States v. W illiams , 436 F.3d 70 6, 70 8 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 6) ); United States v. Noel , No. 08-5988, 2010 U.S. App. L exis 7248 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished pa

nel opinion applying a

presumption of re asonable ness to a s ta tutor y maxi mum

s en t en ce t h at fe l l b el o w t h e Gu i d el i n es ra n ge) (c i t i n g United States v. J ohnson , 445 F.3d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. de nied , 547 U. S. 119 9 ( 20 06 )) . In g e ne ra l, w e mus t g ive “ du e de fe re nc e ” to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s con c lus ion tha t th e se nte nc e imp os e d is wa rr ante d b y

the § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s. Bolds , 5 1 1 F. 3 d

at 5 8 1 (c i t i n g Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. at 51 ). “ Th e fa ct tha t [we ] mig ht h a ve re a so na bly conclude d that a diffe rent sente nce w as appr opriate is insuffic ient to justi fy reve rsal of the district court.” Id. (q u o t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). III . DI SCU SSIO N A. P r oc e dur al R e as ona ble ne ss As dis c us se d a

bo ve , w e re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on fo r p ro c e dura l r e a so na

ble ne ss i n three steps, ensuringthat the district court: (1) proper ly calc ulated the a dvisory

rang e; (2) c onsidered the other § 3553( a) f

actor s and the parties’ arguments; a nd (3) adequately articulated its reasoning for imposing the c h o s en sente nce, inc luding a ny reje ction of the pa

rties’ a rguments. Id. B e c a

us e App ell ant do e s n ot a

pp e a l on the ba sis of

any ob je c tio n h e pr e se rv e d at se nte nc ing , h e mus t demonstrate pla in error : obvious or cl ea r er ror that affe cted his substantial rig hts as well as the fairne ss, integr ity , or public re putation of the judicial proc eeding s. Vonner , 516 F.3d at 386.No. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

8 F ir st, Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot d isp ute tha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y c a lc ulate d th e a

pp lic a ble

a dv iso ry ra ng e to b e 30 to 3 7 mo nth s. Second, the r ecor d shows that the district c ourt g ave both pa rties “the oppor

tunity to argue for whatever

sentenc e they

deem a ppropriate ” and ma de an individualized assessment base d on the fa ct s and upon a thorough consideration of all of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. I t is undisput ed, and the senten c in g h e ar in g tr an s c r ip t s h o w s , th a t t h e c o u rt p r o v id e d

ano p p o rtu

n it y f o r Ap p e ll an t a

n d the Gover nment to spe ak in support of whatever sentenc e they

deeme d appropr iate. (R. 26 at 393–96.) Appellant conte nds, howeve r, that the district cour t failed to consider

the statutory

fac tors, instead tr e a tin g the su

pe rv ise d r e lea se adv is ory ra ng e a s ma

nd a tor y . ( De f. ’s B r. 16 .) Th e re c or d s ho ws , ho we ve r, tha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ma de an ind ivi du a lize d a sse ssm e nt ba se d u po n th e § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) , a district cour t ma y re v o k e a t erm of supe rvised re lease and sentenc e a supe rvised re lease violator to an additional prison term after considering the fa ctors set fo rt h in 1 8 U.S .C

. § 35 53 (a ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on sid e re d a

nd a dd re sse d th e fa c tor s se t f

or th i n § 3553(a) (1) whe n it discussed the nature of t h e o ff en s e; t he impact that suc h offe nses have on vic tim s; t he Ap pe lla

nt’ s h ist or

y of a ssa ult , la rc e ny , an d, a t an e arl y

a g e , w e a po ns -r e late d o ff

e ns e s; and the Appe llant’s failure to report to his probation off icer . (R. 26 at 397; PSI at 7–10 (c riminal h i s t o ry i n cl u d i n g, inte r a lia , four char g es of car rying a conce aled wea

pon, two larc eny

char g es, and

one assa ult char g e).) The district cour t further considere d Appellant’s e x traordina ry mobile phone use, for which Appe llant’s mother wa s billed, and noted that “i t ’s d i fficult . . . to see how the de fe nd ant w a s d oin g any

thi ngpr od

uc tiv e or us e fu l to him se lf , his e ff or ts t o r e ha bil itate or be ne fi t himself, his family , society or any body else.” (R. 26 at 369, 398.)No. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

The di stri ct cou rt d id n ot expli citl y refer to the need for the sentence imposed to d eter crimin al 3 cond uct, prot ect the pub lic , and avoid unwarrant ed sentence dispari ties. How eve r, “ althou gh explici t mention of . . . [all of th e statutor y] factor s may facili tate review, th is cou rt h as neve r re quire d the ‘ritu a l inca nta tion’ of th e fa cto rs to a ffirm a se nte nce .” Un it e d S ta te s v . J ohns on , 4 03 F.3 d 8 13 , 81 6 (6 th Ci r. 2 00 5) ( holding t hat “ [t]he dis tri ct c ourt com mi tted no err or” wher e i t “may not have men ti o n e d a ll o f

t h e st a tu to ry f a ct o rs o r t h e gu id e li n e s e x p li ci tl y” ) ( ci ti n g U ni t e d S t ates v. W as hin gt on , 147 F.3d 490, 490 (6th Cir. 1998)). We th ere fo re find that th e d istrict co urt suf ficie nt ly de mon stra te d co nsid era tio n o f t he fa ctor s a s re qu ired in 18 U.S .C. § 3583(e)(3). 9 I t also appea

rs t hat t he court considere d fac tors under § 3553(a) (2)( D), providingAppellant with corre ctional treatment in the most effec tive manner , when i t imposed additional supervised rele ase a nd stated that “it will be a c ase to monitor for the Court to de termine whether the def endant ha s ma de re a so na

ble ste ps to t

ry to a c c omm od a te him se lf up on his ne xt re le a se to t he re qu ir e me nts of the law .” (R. 26 at 398.) 3 Appellant also c ontends that the district court base d the sentenc e on inac curate information. (De f.’s B r. 15.) Spec ifically , during sentenc ing, the district court noted that “ it’s difficult . . . to see ho w the de fe nd ant w a s d oin g any thi ngpr od

uc tiv e or us e fu l . . . d

ur ingthe tim e he w a s o n r e le a se and fa iled to report a

nd [was] staying out of touch, . . . [and] robbing [t he victim].” (R. 26 at 398.) Appellant conte nds that by ref err ing to the supervised rele ase violation a s a form of “ robber y ,” the court showe d that it based its sentence on a cr ime other t h an l ar ce n y , which the c ourt had found committed by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. The rec ord is c lear , howeve r, that the district c ourt understood which crime Ap p el lant actua lly committed. Following sever al evidentiar y hear ings, a

nd just mom ents befor e commenc ing the sentenc ing, the district court had f ound by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that “D efen dant

e ng a g e d in

be havio r t

hat amou nts to larc e ny fr om a pe rs on , a fe lony in the state of Mic hig an. ” (R

.No. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

10 26 at 392.) That the district co u rt colloquially ref err ed to Appellant’ s violation as “robbing ” the victim, rather tha

n as “c ommitt ing larce ny ” from the victim, does not call into question the court’s understandingor re asoning , and it cer tainly does not constitute plain err or. The re cord r efle cts that the district court c are fully revie wed a

nd considere d Appellant’s b a c k gr o u n d , th e n a tu r e a n d c ircumstance s of the off

ense, a nd Appellant’s be havior duringsupervised rele ase. We find that the court did not c ommit pl ain er ror in imposing A

ppellant’s sente nce a

nd find that the sentenc e wa s proce durally rea sonable. B. Subst ant ive Re as ona ble ne ss Appellant also contends that his sentenc e is substantively unrea sonable. B eca

use the district court imposed a statutory maxi m u m sentenc e that fe ll below the advisory rang e, it is entitled to a

re b u t t ab l e presumption of substantive reasona bleness, and w e g ive due de fer ence to the district court’s conclusion that the sentenc e is w arr anted by the § 3553(a) fac tors. Bolds , 511 F.3d at 581 (c i t i n g Ga ll , 1 28 S. Ct . at 59 7) ; Noel , 2010 U.S. App. L exis 7248 (unpublished pane l opinion) (citing Johnson , 445 F.3d at 798, cert. de nied , 547 U.S. 1199 (2006)). Appellant asse rts that his sentence is substantively unrea s o n ab l e bec ause the district court arbitra rily selec ted his sentence , based the sentenc e on impermissible fac t o rs , and g ave a n

unrea sonable amount of weig ht to such fac tors. (De f.’s B r. 19

. ) Appellant first contends that the court “ arbitra

rily imposed the m ost severe sentenc e[] available .” ( Id. at 20.) As discusse d above, the dis tr ic t c ourt su ff

ic ie ntl y e xpla ine d its re a so ns fo r imp os ing the se nte nc e , d e mon str a tin g that it did not arbitrar ily

selec t such sentenc e.No. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

11 Ap pe lla nt a lso a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ba se d it s se nte nc e on

and g a ve an unr e a so na

ble amount o f we i gh t t o impermissible factor s. During sentenc ing, the district court stated that Appellant’s f

ailure to stay

in touch with his probation office r whil e “eng ag ing in . . . illicit behavior” (larc eny ), “c ombined with the extraordinary cell phone usa g e that the defenda nt contributed to,

. . . it’ s d if fi c ult

. . . to se e ho w the de fe nd ant w a s d oi ng anyth ing pr od uc tiv e or us e fu l to him se lf

, h is eff orts to reha

bilitate or bene fit himself, his f amily , society

or any body else.” (R. 26 at 369, 398.) Ap pe lla nt p oints o ut t

hat th e c ourt

“ sp ent muc h ti me dis c us sin g the re c or ds of [Ap pe lla nt’ s] c e ll ph on e ” and

c on te nd s that “ g ivi ng any we ig ht to the c e ll ph on e us a g e wa s unre a so na ble and an a bu se of discre tion.” (De f.’s B r. 20–21.) We rejec t the notion that the district court’s consider atio n o f Appellant’s mobile phone

rec ords amounted to plain er ror. The district court spent sig nificant t i m e d uring the evidentiar y he ari ng s in qu ir ingint o App e lla nt’ s p ho ne re c or ds be c a

us e the re c or ds of

fe re d e vid e nc e as to Appellant’s whe rea

bouts and ac tivity

during the alleg ed violations of supervise d rele ase. ( See R. 26 at 377–82.) Dur ing se ntencing , the cour t refe rre d to Appellant’s phone use only as supporting

e vid e nc e , a lon g wi th A pp e lla nt’ s su pe rv is ed rel e a se vio latio ns , o f A pp e lla nt’ s a pp are ntl y unproductive use of hi s term of supervised relea se. Appellant’s possession and ext ensive use of a mob ile ph on e ind ic a te s that he ha d the me ans to ca ll his pr ob a tio n off ic e r an d to ot

he rw ise c omp ly with the require ment of super vised rele ase that he have regular c ontact with his probation offic er. Appellant, whose prese ntence investigation repor t indicates a history

of assa ult, larce ny , and

we a po ns -r e late d o ff

e ns e s, vio late d th e ter ms of his su pe rv ise d r e le a se by

fa ili ngto r e po rt

to h is probation off

icer and by snatching a woman’s purse out of her hands. Consideringthe totality of theNo. 09-1336

United States v. He nderson

12 circ umstances, includingthe advisory rang e, the § 3553( a) f

acto rs, t he natur e of the offe nse, and Appellant’s history , we f ind that Appellant has n o t rebutted the presumption of substantive

rea sonablene ss, and that the below- advisory rang e sente nce imposed is substantively rea sonable. IV . CO NC LU SII ON F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e se nte nc e imp os e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED

.