In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 01-3425

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM H. TANKERSLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 99 CR 181—Rudy Lozano, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 22, 2002—DECIDED JULY 22, 2002

____________

Before POSNER, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. William H. Tankersley pled guilty

to two counts of criminal contempt of court. On appeal,

Tankersley argues that the district court erroneously declined to reduce his sentence by two levels for acceptance of

responsibility; that the district court erred when it enhanced his sentence for substantially interfering with the

administration of justice; and that the district court erred

when it enhanced his sentence for obstructing the administration of justice. We affirm in part, and we vacate and

remand in part.
2 No. 01-3425

I. Background

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a civil fraud

suit against Think Achievement Corporation, New Age

Advertising, and several other corporations, alleging that

the corporations engaged in consumer fraud in connection

with a nationwide telemarketing program for persons seeking employment with the Postal Service. Tankersley was

added as a defendant in an amended complaint that also

sought an injunction and other equitable relief, including

restitution and disgorgement. The district court entered

temporary restraining orders that enjoined the defendants’

unlawful practices, froze their assets, and appointed a

temporary receiver. Additionally, a stipulated preliminary

injunction was then entered that prohibited Tankersley

from, among other things, disposing of or transferring any

of his assets. 

However, Tankersley sold his Tiara 3500 Express Yacht

for approximately $213,500 in violation of the preliminary

injunction. In further violation of the injunction, Tankersley

attempted to transfer and conceal the proceeds of this sale.

Specifically, he attempted to mail a check payable to and

endorsed by him in the amount of $191,482.50 to Barclays

Bank in Nassau, Bahamas. On the outside of the envelop

containing the check, Tankersley used an alias, “John

Tinsley,” in an attempt to disguise the sender of the check.

Shortly thereafter, Tankersley was indicted for two counts

of contempt of court for his above stated actions and eventually pled guilty to both counts of contempt the day before

trial was scheduled to commence.

At sentencing for the contempt convictions, the district

judge determined that Tankersley was not entitled to a twolevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility under

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because (1) Tankersley failed to admit all

of his involvement in the underlying offenses; (2) Tankersley did not accept any responsibility for his actions until
No. 01-3425 3

the day before trial was scheduled to commence; (3) even

after he pled guilty, Tankersley continued to engage in conduct that violated the injunction; and (4) Tankersley never

showed any remorse for his actions. Further, the district

court judge determined that Tankersley’s sentence should

be enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) for substantially

interfering with the administration of justice by willfully

failing to comply with orders of the district court and that

Tankersley’s sentence should be enhanced under U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 for obstructing the administration of justice.

On appeal, Tankersley argues that he is entitled to a twolevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility because under the Sentencing Guidelines and under the Fifth Amendment he had a right not to disclose his financial status and

relevant conduct beyond what was necessary to convict for

the offense of contempt. Tankersley also contends that the

district court improperly enhanced his sentence for substantially interfering with the administration of justice. According to Tankersley, the district court improperly “double

counted” his conduct by punishing him for contempt

and enhancing his sentence on account of the same conduct. Finally, Tankersley contends that the district court

erred when it enhanced his sentence for obstructing the

administration of justice. The government concedes that the

district court’s basis for this enhancement was improper but

offers alternative grounds for affirming this enhancement

that were not considered by the district court. 

II. Analysis

We review the district court’s underlying factual findings

for clear error and the district court’s interpretation of the

Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Mayberry, 272 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2001). 
4 No. 01-3425

A. Acceptance of Responsibility

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level downward adjustment in offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,”

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and the burden is on the defendant to

demonstrate that he has accepted responsibility for his conduct. See United States v. Taliaferro, 211 F.3d 412, 414 (7th

Cir. 2000). When determining whether a defendant is entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction, a defendant must “truthfully [admit] the conduct comprising the

offense of conviction and [admit] the relevant conduct as it

relates to the offense of conviction.” United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).

Although a defendant is allowed to remain silent concerning

relevant conduct that is “clearly beyond the scope of his

offense of conviction,” it is in the discretion of the sentencing court to decide “whether the defendant has in all other

respects forthrightly avowed responsibility for his crime.”

United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1994).

In Carrera, we explained that a finding that the defendant

“was not completely honest in his admissions is an appropriate independent justification for denying the reduction”

for acceptance of responsibility. 259 F.3d at 828 (finding

that the “lack of trustworthiness in [Carrera’s] admissions,

his limited admissions, and his changing admissions” was

“an appropriate independent justification for denying the

reduction.”).

In this case, the district court found that Tankersley

failed to admit all of his involvement in the underlying contempt offense. The district court recognized that during his

plea hearing, Tankersley expressly agreed with the government’s summary of the facts constituting the crimes

charged, including the fact that Tankersley attempted to

disguise the check he was mailing to the Bahamas by using

an alias. Then, at sentencing, Tankersley denied that he

had any knowledge about who placed the name “John
No. 01-3425 5

Tinsley” on the envelope. In further support of the district

court’s finding, the government presented evidence that

Tankersley had used aliases on previous occasions. While

the district court gave several reasons for declining to grant

Tankersley a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, this finding that Tankersley failed to admit all of his

involvement in the underlying offense is a sufficient justification by itself. See id.

On appeal, Tankersley argues that the district court denied him a reduction because he refused on Fifth Amendment grounds to provide probation with a personal financial

statement and to disclose relevant conduct. Tankersley,

however, is mistaken. The district court listed multiple reasons for declining to grant Tankersley the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. One reason given was

that Tankersley failed to admit all of his involvement in the

underlying offense. Because we find no clear error in this

determination and because this determination is a sufficient justification to deny the reduction, see id., we must

affirm the district court’s decision to decline to grant Tankersley a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

B. Substantial Interference with the Administration

of Justice

Tankersley next contends that the district court erred

when it enhanced his sentence for substantially interfering

with the administration of justice. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that “if the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice,” the

offense level should be increased by three levels. U.S.S.G.

§ 2J1.2(b)(2). The Sentencing Guidelines further explain

that substantial interference includes “the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.”

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, cmt. n.1. In the present case, Tankersley

failed to comply with the district court’s preliminary injunc-
6 No. 01-3425

tion, and as a result of that failure, the government and

the receiver expended substantial resources investigating

Tankersley and securing his assets. For example, the government explained at Tankersley’s sentencing hearing that

many weeks of work went into tracking down and determining what happened to Tankersley’s yacht. Thus, the district

court properly applied this enhancement. 

On appeal, Tankersley contends that because his base

offense level for criminal contempt was calculated using the

guideline for obstruction of justice, it is not logical to allow

an enhancement for substantially interfering with the administration of justice. This argument is misplaced. The

Sentencing Guidelines expressly contemplate analyzing the

same conduct that constitutes obstruction of justice to determine whether “the offense result[s] in substantial interference with the administration of justice” and, if so, the

Sentencing Guidelines direct the sentencing court to enhance the sentence by three levels. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2).

Tankersley further contends that this enhancement cannot apply to him because the district court engaged in double counting by considering the same conduct to enhance

his sentence as it considered to punish him for criminal contempt. Contrary to Tankersley’s argument, however, double

counting occurs when a sentencing court applies two or

more upward adjustments based on the same conduct. See

United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 928-29 (7th Cir.

2001); United States v. Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152, 1163 (7th

Cir. 1998). In this case, the district court convicted Tankersley of criminal contempt because he sold his yacht and

he attempted to transfer the proceeds of this sale to the

Bahamas. Then, at sentencing the district court enhanced

Tankersley’s sentence because Tankersley’s conduct resulted in a substantial interference with the administration

of justice. 
No. 01-3425 7

C. Obstructing the Administration of Justice

Finally, Tankersley contends that the district court’s basis for enhancing his sentence for obstructing the administration of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was erroneous. At

sentencing, the district court enhanced Tankersley’s sentence because it found that he continued to violate the injunction by concealing assets in storage units and failing to

provide certain information to the receiver. However,

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 does not apply “unless the defendant obstructed the investigation or trial of the obstruction count.”

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, cmt. n.2. The conduct upon which the district court enhanced Tankersley’s sentence did not obstruct

the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, rather it obstructed the administration of justice with respect to

the FTC civil proceedings. Therefore, as the government

conceded at oral argument, the district court’s basis for enhancing Tankersley’s sentence was erroneous. We vacate

this enhancement and remand to the district court to determine whether proper grounds exist for enhancing Tankersley’s sentence pursuant to this Sentencing Guideline.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, and VACATE

and REMAND in part for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-97-C-006—7-22-02