J-S49006-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW EBO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 58 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0002821-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2021

Appellant, Matthew Ebo, appeals from the December 13, 2019 order 

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The record demonstrates that on September 14, 2012, a jury found 

Appellant guilty of criminal homicide (first-degree murder), 

robbery – infliction of serious bodily injury, robbery of a motor vehicle, 

carrying a firearm without a license, conspiracy to commit robbery – infliction 

of serious bodily injury, and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with

the May 16, 2011 shooting death of the victim.

1

 On November 28, 2012, the 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), 3702(a), 6106(a)(1), 903(c), and 

903(c), respectively. Appellant was tried jointly with co-defendant, 
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trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without parole for his 

criminal homicide conviction and an aggregate, consecutive 46 to 92 years’ 

imprisonment for the remaining convictions.2

While Appellant’s case was pending on direct appeal before this Court, 

Appellant filed an application for remand based upon alleged after-discovered 

evidence.3 In a per curiam order issued on August 6, 2015, this Court 

remanded Appellant’s case and instructed the trial court to conduct a hearing 

to address Appellant’s request for a new trial based upon this after-discovered 

evidence. On December 22, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s request,

and Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal. On June 21, 2017, this 

Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions but vacated his unlawful sentences for 

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Thaddaeus Crumbley (“co-defendant”). The trial court, in a bench trial, 

convicted Appellant of possession of a firearm prohibited, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6105(a)(1).

2 The trial court imposed a sentence of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for 

robbery of a motor vehicle, three and one-half to seven years’ imprisonment 

for carrying a firearm without a license, two and one-half to five years’ 

imprisonment for possession of a firearm prohibited, ten to twenty years’ 

imprisonment for conspiracy to commit robbery – infliction of serious bodily 

injury, and twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit 

murder. All of these sentences were to run consecutive to Appellant’s life 

sentence.

3 Appellant’s direct appeal was docketed with this Court at 1194 WDA 2013. 

The after-discovered evidence included the unsworn statement of a witness

who testified at Appellant’s trial (“trial witness”), in which the trial witness 

recanted her pre-trial and in-court identifications of Appellant and his 

co-defendant as the shooters involved in the victim’s murder. See

Commonwealth v. Ebo, 174 A.3d 91 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished 

memorandum).
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robbery of a motor vehicle and conspiracy to commit robbery – infliction of 

serious bodily injury. Commonwealth v. Ebo, 174 A.3d 91 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (unpublished memorandum) (finding, that the mandatory minimum 

sentences imposed pursuant to Section 9712 of the Pennsylvania Sentencing 

Code were illegal under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), as 

determined by this Court in Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 

(Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 124 A.3d 309 (Pa. 2015)). Appellant filed 

a petition for allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court subsequently 

denied on December 13, 2017.

On January 17, 2018, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant but held Appellant’s 

petition in abeyance because of Appellant’s pending resentencing procedure. 

On February 28, 2018, the trial court resentenced Appellant to life 

imprisonment without parole for his criminal homicide conviction together with 

an aggregate, consecutive sentence of 46 to 92 years’ imprisonment for his

remaining convictions.4 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial 

court subsequently denied on April 11, 2018. Counsel for Appellant filed a 

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4 The trial court fashioned the same length of consecutive sentences for 

Appellant’s convictions of robbery of a motor vehicle, carrying a firearm 

without a license, possession of a firearm prohibited, conspiracy to commit 

robbery – infliction of serious bodily injury, and conspiracy to commit murder 

without imposing mandatory minimum sentences pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9712.
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notice of appeal on May 8, 2018.5 This Court, in a May 30, 2018 per curiam

order, discontinued Appellant’s direct appeal from resentencing at Appellant’s 

request.6 Appellant’s judgment of sentence, therefore, became final on May 

30, 2018. See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (holding, that for purposes of the PCRA, a petitioner’s 

judgment of sentence becomes final on the date he, or she, discontinued the 

direct appeal).

On June 29, 2018, Appellant amended his original PCRA petition raising 

a claim for relief based upon after-discovered evidence. Appellant 

subsequently filed a supplement to his amended PCRA petition setting forth, 

in detail, the argument that Appellant was entitled to a new trial based upon 

after-discovered, exculpatory eyewitness testimony. On May 10, 2019, the 

PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition, and subsequently 

denied Appellant’s petition on December 13, 2019. This appeal followed.7

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

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5 Appellant filed pro se a notice of appeal on May 16, 2018. While 

Pennsylvania’s prohibition against hybrid representation does not nullify 

Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal since Appellant has a constitutional right 

to an appeal, Appellant’s pro se notice is of no consequence since counsel 

previously instituted appellate proceedings on his behalf. See 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623-624 (Pa. Super. 2016).

6 This Court docketed Appellant’s appeal at 679 WDA 2018.

7 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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[1.] [Whether] the PCRA court erred in denying relief where

[Appellant] established his after-discovered evidence claim 

through [] exculpatory eyewitness testimony[?]

[2.] [Whether] the PCRA court erred in denying relief by 

incorrectly concluding that [the eyewitness’s] testimony was 

offered solely to impeach [the trial witness], when in fact 

[the eyewitness’s testimony] was [] offered as substantive, 

exculpatory evidence [to establish Appellant's] innocence[?]

[3.] [Whether] the PCRA court erred in denying relief because 

[the eyewitness’s] testimony is likely to compel a different 

verdict at a new trial[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

In sum, Appellant contends the PCRA court erred in finding that the

after-discovered evidence, namely the exculpatory testimony of an eyewitness 

to the murder, did not merit post-conviction relief. Appellant’s Brief at 17-34.

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings 

of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the 

record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 

A.2d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review 

the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 
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A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 

(Pa. 2014).

To receive a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, a petitioner 

must satisfy a four-part test requiring

the petitioner to demonstrate the [after-discovered] evidence: (1) 

could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial 

by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely 

corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach 

the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different 

verdict if a new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018), citing

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 

1198 (2009). “The test is conjunctive; the [petitioner] must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in 

order for a new trial to be warranted.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 

A.2d 356, 363 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2010). In 

addition, the after-discovered evidence must be producible and admissible. 

Small, 189 A.3d at 972.

The “salutary goal of the after-discovered evidence rule [is] to limit 

continued litigation without being so rigid as to shut out [after-]discovered 

evidence from a credible source which may lead to a true and proper 

judgment.” Small, 189 A.3d at 975 (citation omitted, emphasis added). As 

is the case with recantation testimony, when the after-discovered evidence is 

exculpatory eyewitness testimony, a request for a new trial based on the 

exculpatory eyewitness testimony hinges on the credibility of the testimony. 
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Id. “[T]he inquiry into whether the evidence would likely result in a different 

verdict [is] the lodestar of the after-discovered evidence analysis.” Id. at 976 

n.12 (stating, the second and third parts of the after-discovered evidence test 

are subsumed by the fourth part regarding likelihood of a different outcome), 

citing Commonwealth v. Perrin, 59 A.3d 663, 669 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(Wecht, J., concurring), vacated, 103 A.3d 1224 (Pa. 2014). In short, only 

credible testimony satisfies the fourth part of the after-discovered evidence 

test.

In determining whether the after-discovered evidence is of such nature 

and character that it would compel a different verdict if a new trial were

granted, “a court should consider the integrity of the alleged after-discovered 

evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall strength 

of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Padillas, 997 A.2d at 365 

(citations omitted). It is axiomatic that if the after-discovered evidence is 

incredible, then it would not compel a different outcome, and as a result, the 

PCRA court must deny the request for a new trial regardless of whether a 

petitioner satisfied the first three parts of the test. Small, 189 A.3d at 977. 

The precedent set by our Supreme Court in Small requires the PCRA court, 

as the fact-finder at the evidentiary hearing, to make definitive findings of 

fact, which are supported by the record, and conclusions of law with regard to 

the credibility of the after-discovered evidence. Id. at 978. The PCRA court 

is in the superior position to make credibility determinations and assess 
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whether the credible after-discovered evidence is of such importance that it 

will change the outcome of the case. Id.

Here, the PCRA court made the following findings of fact based upon the 

eyewitness’s testimony:

On May 16, 2011, the day [the victim] was shot to death at the 

Leechburg Gardens Apartments in Penn Hills, [Pennsylvania, the 

eyewitness] was working as a jitney driver. That evening, shortly 

before the shooting occurred, [the eyewitness] picked up two []

African American men and drove them to the Leechburg Gardens 

[A]partment[s]. [The eyewitness] claimed that he recognized 

these men because they had used his jitney services "more than 

ten" times in the past. He described one of the men as being 

"really tall" with "dark skin," approximately [six foot, eight inches]

in height. He described the other man as being "short" and 

"light-skinned." When presented with photographs[,] he was able 

to identify the individuals in those pictures as the men he had 

driven to the Leechburg Gardens [A]partment[s on May 16, 

2011]. He [] nicknamed them "stretch" and "young buck" but 

recalled that they referred to each other as "Ron and Rome or 

something like that."

[The eyewitness] dropped these men off at the Leechburg

Gardens [Apartments] at approximately 7:00 p.m., when it was 

getting dim outside. After he dropped them off, [the eyewitness]

testified to the following series of events:

I was turning my car around [in the parking lot] so I could 

[exit the parking lot]. I [] had to go the bathroom by the 

fire hydrant and the big Christmas tree. As I'm standing up 

peeing, a white car comes in the parking lot, two guys 

started busting off caps, and everybody started shooting at 

each other. I dove on the ground, crawled in my car, 

dropped my seat back[,] and pulled out [of the parking lot].

[The eyewitness] testified that he "clearly" saw that "Ron and 

Rome" were firing their guns "over in that direction towards the 

parking lot in that area" where the white car was located.

However, he also testified that he "wasn't paying no attention" to 

what or who they were shooting at because he dropped to the 

ground as soon as he saw "the sparks and fires." As he described 
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it: "I dropped down, peed on myself, crawled in my car, kicked 

my seat back and just pulled off. I started lifting my head up as 

I am pulling out [of the parking lot]." After [the eyewitness] got 

back inside of his vehicle [and exited the parking lot], he noticed 

that the white car had pulled out behind him[. H]e thought that

the people inside of the white car were going after him because of 

what he had just witnessed. Even though [the eyewitness] saw 

Ron and Rome shooting at the people in the white car, [he]

thought that Ron and Rome were now in the white car behind him. 

However, [the eyewitness] never saw anyone get in or out of the 

white car, and he could not see inside of the vehicle at any point.

[The eyewitness] was able to retreat safely from the scene, but 

he never went to the police to report the shooting that he []

allegedly witnessed, and, at that time, he was unaware that 

anyone had been killed in the shootout. Law enforcement also 

never attempted to contact him in 2011[,] about the shooting. 

When asked why he decided to come forward with this information 

in 2018, [the eyewitness] testified as follows:

I was in the Allegheny [C]ounty jail, and I was on the fourth

floor just coming in, and these gentlemen was talking and 

they was pointing at me. So they called me to be released.

As I am coming downstairs to be released, some young 

guy told me - he was from Turtle Creek or something - he 

told me that I was there. And I said, "[w]here?" He 

says "you was there for the [Leechburg Gardens 

Apartments’] shooting." And he goes, "say that you 

wasn't, and I'll jump on you." I'm like, what the hell? 

So I put my foot on the bunk and stood up to fight to 

defend myself.

[The eyewitness] testified that this young man was a fellow 

inmate whom he did not know and had never seen before. This 

unidentified inmate told [the eyewitness] that he knew [the 

eyewitness] was [at the apartment complex] that night because 

[the inmate] was [also at the apartment complex that night]. 

[T]he inmate provided the details of the incident, telling [the 

eyewitness] "exactly where it happened, exactly what time it was. 

The inmate said the guy's name that died." The inmate also told 

[the eyewitness] that "[Ron and Rome] were the two men that did

it." [The eyewitness] was scared that this inmate was going to 

physically assault him. He "felt threatened enough to jump on the 

bunk and brace" himself "for just two of them against me." The

jail guards had to [] prevent an altercation. [The eyewitness]
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testified that he "didn't know any of this [information the inmate 

provided]" and that he was "in shock" because he was "being 

attacked" so he "had to do research on why" he was "being 

attacked."

[W]hen [the eyewitness] was released from jail shortly thereafter, 

he had a friend of his fact-check the information that the inmate 

[] provided on her cell[ular tele]phone because he wanted to know 

why he "was threatened for my life in jail." He asked his friend to

[search] "the days, dates things like that." When he saw the 

pictures of [Appellant and his co-defendant] and learned that they 

had been convicted of the murder, he "knew they were not the 

people that" he had driven to the [apartment] complex. This 

prompted [the eyewitness] to write a letter to [the co-defendant]

telling him "that I knew they were innocent because I was there."

[The eyewitness] decided to reach out to [the co-defendant]

because he had a brother in prison who he believes was wrongfully 

convicted, and he did not "want an innocent man to be in jail." 

[The eyewitness] further testified that he does not know and has

never seen any member of the [co-defendant’s] or [Appellant’s]

family and that [Appellant and the co-defendant] were not present 

during the shooting incident that he witnessed.

[The eyewitness] confirmed that the witness statements that were

attached to [Appellant’s] PCRA petition[] were true. [Although

the eyewitness] claimed he saw "something in one line 

somewhere" when he was reading [the typed witness statement]

that was a discrepancy, [] he never scratched anything out or 

attempted to correct this purported discrepancy. [The 

eyewitness] did not attempt to contact law enforcement or the 

[Allegheny County] District Attorney's Office with the information 

he [] relayed to [the co-defendant] through his letter.

When questioned by [the PCRA] court, [the eyewitness] clarified 

that he did not actually see anyone get struck by a bullet, he did 

not see what the victim looked like at any point, and he did not 

see anyone laying on the ground. He also testified that he never 

saw anyone get out of the white car before the shooting started 

and he did not see who entered the white car after the shooting 

because he "wasn't paying attention" and "everything happened 

in a tenth of a second."
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PCRA Court Opinion, 2/5/20, at 5-11 (formatting, original brackets, ellipsis,

and record citations omitted; emphasis in original).

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erroneously applied the four-part

after-discovered evidence test when reviewing his claim for relief based upon 

the eyewitness’s exculpatory testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 26. While 

Appellant agrees with the PCRA court’s finding that he satisfied the first two 

parts of the after-discovered evidence test, Appellant asserts that he satisfied 

his burden of proof as to the third and fourth parts, as well. Id. at 25. 

Specifically, Appellant contends that the eyewitness’s testimony was not 

offered solely to impeach the testimony of any other witness who testified at 

trial but, rather, would provide exculpatory evidence identifying two male 

perpetrators, other than Appellant and his co-defendant, who were 

responsible for the shooting death of the victim. Id. Appellant further 

contends that the PCRA court erred in making a determination as to the 

credibility of the eyewitness’s testimony and whether this testimony would 

compel a different verdict. Id. as 27. In arguing that it was the role and 

function of the jury to determine the credibility of the eyewitness’s testimony 

and whether the testimony would compel a different verdict, Appellant 

asserts,

It would be for the jury to consider [the trial witness’s] testimony, 

[the eyewitness’s] testimony, [and] all other testimonial evidence, 

whether direct or circumstantial, to assist in reaching a reliable 

verdict. [Appellant] did not proceed to a bench trial. Thus, it was 

not for the PCRA court to compare [the trial witness’s] testimony 

[] to [the eyewitness’s testimony] and to decide that [the 
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eyewitness’s] testimony would not have compelled a different 

verdict.

Id.

The PCRA court found that the eyewitness’s testimony failed to satisfy 

the third and fourth parts of the after-discovered evidence test. We, however, 

conclude that Appellant met the third criteria under that test.8 Nonetheless, 

Appellant’s failure to establish any one part of the four-part after-discovered 

evidence test is fatal to his request for a new trial. Small, 189 A.3d at 972. 

Thus, while we conclude that Appellant met the third part of the 

after-discovered evidence test, we review the PCRA court’s determination that 

Appellant failed to establish that the eyewitness’s testimony would likely result 

in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

With regard to the fourth part of the after-discovered evidence test, the 

PCRA court stated,

the [PCRA] court finds that it is unlikely that [the eyewitness’s]

testimony would compel a different verdict at trial when 

considered against the evidence as a whole. In addition to [the 

trial witness’s] clear and unequivocal [in-court testimony in which 

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8 The PCRA court found that the eyewitness’s testimony was “presented solely 

to impeach the strong, unwavering identification testimony of [the trial 

witness.]” PCRA Opinion, 2/5/20, at 15. We disagree with this assessment. 

Although the eyewitness’s testimony, in part, would impeach that of the trial 

witness, the PCRA court erred in determining that it was offered solely for 

impeachment purposes. If a new trial were granted, the eyewitness’s

testimony would be used to identify two male shooters, neither of whom were 

Appellant or his co-defendant, and no other evidence offered at trial identified

individuals, other than Appellant and his co-defendant, as the shooters. 

Consequently, we find, and the record supports, that Appellant proved the 

third part of the after-discovered evidence test.
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she identified Appellant and his co-defendant as the shooters

involved in the victim’s murder], other circumstantial evidence 

linked [Appellant and his co-defendant] to the shooting. (See Trial 

Court Opinion, [] 6/25/14).

Ultimately, [the PCRA] court did not consider [the eyewitness’s]

testimony to be credible because of the inconsistencies contained 

therein and because of the clear motive to fabricate his testimony

out of fear for his life. For example, [in his witness statement, the 

eyewitness stated] he had driven Ron and Rome in his jitney "two 

to three" times prior to the day of the shooting, but at the hearing 

he testified that he had driven them [] "more than ten times." In 

his testimony[,] he said he had taken Ron and Rome to [the] 

Leechburg Gardens [Apartments] before, but in his witness 

statement[,] he says [the evening of the incident] was the first 

time he had ever taken them there. In his witness statement, the 

"friend" who helped him research the shooting after he was 

released from jail was a male, but at the hearing, [the eyewitness]

testified that this friend was a female.

As [the eyewitness] noted several times throughout the hearing, 

he was approached by an inmate who told him, "you was there 

for the shooting say that you wasn't, and I'll jump on you." The 

inmate told him who was killed, who the shooters were, and the 

time and location of the shooting. As [the eyewitness] put it, the 

inmate "was mentioning so much. It was just too much chaos.”

Thus, it is impossible to discern whether [the eyewitness’s] 

testimony is purely a product of his memory or the information he 

had been threatened into "remembering" seven [] years after the 

murder. The [PCRA] court also questions why this unidentified 

inmate[,] who allegedly was present at the shooting and 

possessed this information, threatened [the eyewitness] into 

coming forward and has not come forward himself to corroborate 

[the eyewitness’s] testimony

Another factor that further diminishes [the eyewitness’s]

credibility is the fact that his alleged motive to come forward, after 

his life was threatened, was to help clear the name of purportedly 

innocent men[. Y]et he never contacted the authorities, or the 

District Attorney's Office, with the information he had about their 

"wrongful" convictions. The [PCRA] court is also compelled to note 

that, somewhat conveniently, the men known as "Ron and Rome" 

were found dead[, together,] in the same vehicle in early 2012, 

and "Rome" was [the co-defendant’s] cousin.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 2/5/20, at 15-17 (ellipsis, original brackets, and some 

record citations omitted).

Contrary to Appellant’s argument, when presented with a request for a 

new trial based upon after-discovered evidence, it is the role and function of 

the PCRA court to determine the credibility of the witness and assess whether 

the credible after-discovered evidence would likely result in a different verdict. 

See Small, 189 A.3d at 978 (stating, it is the duty of the PCRA court to assess 

the credibility of the witness, explicitly setting forth its determination, and if 

credible, determine the significance, if any, the new testimony would likely 

have on reaching a different verdict). Here, the record supports the PCRA 

court’s explicit determination that the eyewitness was not credible. A review 

of the record demonstrates significant inconsistencies between the 

eyewitness’s hand-written statement, the typed witness statement prepared 

by a private investigator that the eyewitness reviewed and initialed, and the 

testimony he offered at the PCRA evidentiary hearing. For example, in his 

hand-written statement, the eyewitness stated, “I think the guys[’] names 

were Ro [and] Ron. I called them bro Ro or young bucks.” In the typed

witness statement, the eyewitness stated, “I do not know their real names but 

. . . I call them Ron and Rome.” When asked at the evidentiary hearing 

whether he knew the men’s names, the eyewitness testified, “I call one 

Stretch and the other one Young Buck.” N.T., 5/10/19, at 8. The eyewitness 

stated that when he transported the two men, he heard them call each other 

“Ron and Rome[.]” Id. at 9, 26. Aside from the discrepancies noted by the 
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PCRA court, the eyewitness also testified at the evidentiary hearing that he 

hand-wrote his statement and sent it to the co-defendant after obtaining the 

co-defendant’s prison address from an internet search. Id. at 37, 39-41. In 

his typed witness statement, the eyewitness stated, “I found out the name of 

the attorney that represented [the co-defendant] and wrote her a letter saying 

that her client was not guilty of the shooting and that the wrong man had 

been convicted of the murder.” See Commonwealth Exhibit 1. Finally, the 

eyewitness offered no explanation as to why, or how, an inmate at the 

Allegheny County Jail, who was unknown to the eyewitness, recognized him

seven years after the shooting, how the inmate could approach the eyewitness

while he was being released, and why the inmate would allegedly provide the 

eyewitness with exculpatory evidence, including the names of the two 

shooters, while simultaneously admitting that he was also an eyewitness. 

Based upon the record before us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 

PCRA court’s determination that the eyewitness was not credible.9 Therefore, 

Appellant failed to satisfy the fourth part of the after-discovered evidence test, 

____________________________________________

9 Moreover, we concur with the PCRA court that the after-discovered evidence, 

namely the eyewitness’s testimony, would not likely result in a different 

verdict. The trial witness definitively identified Appellant and the co-defendant 

as the shooters, observed the victim fall to the ground after being shot, and 

witnessed Appellant and the co-defendant flee in the victim’s white car. 

Conversely, the eyewitness stated that he did not see anyone get shot, he 

never saw anyone lying on the ground after being shot, he never saw the 

driver of the white car, and he never witnessed anyone get out of, or into, the 

white vehicle. N.T., 5/10/19, at 42-44.
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and the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in 

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/19/2021