4Knuckles El, et al. v. Toombs, et al.No. 98-2181opportunity to fulfill the requirements ofBrown, which theydid not do. We, therefore, simply hold here that where theallegedly "mixed" complaint does not carry out the pleadingrequirements set forth inBrown, it will be dismissed.2. Plaintiffs contend that they have no “availableremedy” because they seek monetary damages.Thecomplaint seeks declaratory, injunctive and monetary reliefand plaintiffs contend that their request for monetarydamages, which are not available under the Michigan system,exempts them from the exhaustion requirement. Where theprison has an administrative process that will review thecomplaint, plaintiff must exhaust even though moneydamages are not available.Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876,878 (6th Cir. 1999).3. Plaintiffs assert that claims of excessive force orassault by prison guards do not fall within the term“prison conditions” as used in the Prison LitigationReform Act.Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 642-44 (6thCir. 1999), decides this issue against plaintiffs’ contention.Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court isAFFIRMED.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0202P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0202p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________DEMETRIUSKNUCKLESEL;ERRICKE.PAYTON-BEY;MICHAELVAUGHN,Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.RAYMONDG.TOOMBS,Warden, et al.,Defendants-Appellees.;>1No. 98-2181Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.No. 97-00362—Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge.Submitted: May 2, 2000Decided and Filed: June 15, 2000Before: MERRITT, JONES, and CLAY, Circuit Judges._________________COUNSELON BRIEF:Demetrius Knuckles El, Ionia, Michigan, ErrickE. Payton-Bey, Ionia, Michigan, Michael Vaughn, Ionia,Michigan, pro se. Mark W. Matus, MICHIGANDEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,2Knuckles El, et al. v. Toombs, et al.No. 98-21811Section 1997e(a), as amended, provides:No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditionsunder section 1983 of this title [i.e., 42], or any other Federallaw, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or otherCORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, forAppellees._________________OPINION_________________MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This prisoners' appeal in a§ 1983 prison assault case is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997erequiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiffs,all inmates at Ionia Maximum Facility in Ionia, Michigan,allege that on numerous occasions between October 12, 1995,and March 18, 1997, defendants violated their rights under theFirst, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessiveforce and engaging in "retaliatory harassment." Plaintiffsconcede that they have not exhausted all availableadministrative remedies but argue that their complaint shouldnot be dismissed because some of the claims have beenexhausted and exhaustion is not necessary for theunexhausted claims. The issues before us are as follows:1. Plaintiffs contend that their cases should not bedismissed because their complaints contain bothexhausted and unexhausted claims.We reserve to anotherday the question of whether exhausted claims in a "mixed"complaint should be addressed when such claims otherwisemeet the pleading requirements or whether such a complaintshould be dismissed in its entirety. The complaint here doesnot meet the pleading requirements set forth inBrown v.Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.),cert.denied, 525U.S. 833 (1998), and it was therefore properly dismissed. InBrown, we held that the statutory language in 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a)1-- "no action shall be brought until all availableNo. 98-2181Knuckles El, et al. v. Toombs, et al.3correctional facility until such administrative remedies as areavailable are exhausted.administrative remedies are exhausted" – "should beinterpreted to mean precisely what is obviously intended –that a federal court should not prematurely decide the meritsof any such action."Id.We held that in order to effectuatethis language, a prisoner must plead his claims withspecificity and show that they have been exhausted byattaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositionsto the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation,describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and itsoutcome. The reason for the requirement to show withspecificity both the claims presented and the fact ofexhaustion is so that the district court may intelligently decideif the issues raised can be decided on the merits.District courts should not have to hold time-consumingevidentiary hearings in order simply to determine whether itshould reach the merits or decline under the mandatorylanguage of § 1997e ("No action shall be brought . . . ."). Inthe absence of particularized averments concerningexhaustion showing the nature of the administrativeproceeding and its outcome, the action must be dismissedunder § 1997e. There are thousands of these cases in theSixth Circuit district courts every year and approximately onethousand in the court of appeals. In the absence of specificaverments, a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing orotherwise spend a lot of time with each case just trying to findout whether it has jurisdiction to reach the merits.Here, plaintiffs simply state in their complaint that certainclaims have been exhausted without providing thedocumentation or other details required byBrown. There arenone of the particularized averments necessary for the districtcourt to determine what, if any, claims have been exhaustedor what has been done in an attempt to exhaust the claims.Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the entirecomplaint without prejudice after allowing plaintiffs a full