J-S39007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP B. BAKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 295 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered November 29, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-38-CR-0000585-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 13, 2023

Appellant, Phillip B. Baker, appeals pro se from the November 29, 2022

Order entered in the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas denying his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-46, as meritless. Appellant raises numerous layered ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. After careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On October 

25, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of one count each of Involuntary Deviate 

Sexual Intercourse with a Child (“IDSI”), Indecent Assault—Complainant Less 

than 13 Years of Age, Corruption of Minors (“COM”), and Endangering Welfare 

of Children (“EWOC”)1 arising from the sexual abuse of his grandson between 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 4304(a)(1), 

respectively.
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January 2009, and May 2016.

2

 On April 17, 2019, the trial court imposed an 

aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years of incarceration and ordered Appellant 

to pay $2,500 in fines. On June 15, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s 

Judgment of Sentence and our Supreme Court subsequently denied 

Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 

237 A.3d 1057 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 

240 A.3d 104 (Pa. 2020). 

On August 2, 2021, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA Petition raising 

numerous allegations of error. In particular, Appellant asserted his trial 

counsel had been ineffective for failing to, inter alia: (1) file a pre-trial motion 

to dismiss the charges or seek a judgment of acquittal on statute of limitations 

grounds; (2) not “alert[]”

3

the trial court that the Commonwealth did not 

prove the “serious bodily injury,” “forcible compulsion” and mens rea elements 

of the offense of IDSI, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a); (3) object to the court instructing 

the jury that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction; 

(4) object to the admission of the victim’s videotaped statement to a 

Children’s Resource Center (“CRC”) child advocate as cumulative; and (5) 

object to the imposition of fines without holding an ability to pay hearing. 

____________________________________________

2 The victim was born in April 2006.

3 PCRA Petition, 8/2/21, at ¶ 42.
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The PCRA court appointed counsel who, on October 15, 2021, and 

September 8, 2022, filed Amended PCRA Petitions reasserting the grounds for 

relief set forth by Appellant in his original petition. 

The PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition on November 29, 

2022. Following the hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition in 

open court.

4, 5

 

On December 8, 2022, Appellant filed a motion requesting a Grazier6

hearing. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order granting 

the motion and scheduling a Grazier hearing for January 30, 2023.

Following the Grazier hearing, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s 

request to proceed pro se and notified Appellant that he had 30 days to file 

an appeal. 

This appeal followed.7 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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4 The court did not, however, notify Appellant of his appellate rights as 

required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(E) (“If the judge disposes of the case in open 

court in the presence of the defendant at the conclusion of the hearing, the 

judge shall advise the defendant on the record of the right to appeal from the 

final order disposition of the petition and of the time within which the appeal 

must be taken.”).

5 The court entered a written order dismissing the petition that same day.

6 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

7 The PCRA court’s failure to notify Appellant of his appellate rights on 

November 29, 2022, as required by Rule 908(E), constitutes a breakdown in 

the operation of the court. Because the court finally informed Appellant of his 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises the following five issues on appeal:

1. Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the [IDSI] crime 

of violence, where no serious bodily injury was claimed, nor 

proven, and Appellant’s jury was not charged to find the 

heightened culpability/mens rea required to commit this crime 

of violence, and, whether trial court’s failure to seek a 

judgment of acquittal constitutes ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and, whether PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these 

discrete issues did not violate Appellant’s right to effective 

representation as relief would be available under the PCRA[?]

2. Whether Appellant was unconstitutionally convicted of crimes 

whose statute of limitations expired as his jury was not charged 

to determine whether the element of negating a defense to the 

expired charges was proven by the prosecution, and, whether 

trial counsel’s failure to move for judgments of acquittal 

thereon constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and, 

whether PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these discrete facts 

rendered his representation ineffective as relief would have 

been available under the PCRA[?]

3. Whether the sentencing court erred as a matter of law in 

imposing fines absent the conduct of the required ability to pay 

colloquy under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9726(c), and whether trial 

counsel’s failure to object to this deficiency constitutes 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and, whether PCRA counsel’s 

failure to advocate this discrete issue did not violate Appellant’s 

right to effective representation as relief would be available 

under the PCRA[?]

4. Whether the testimony alone instruction violated Appellant’s 

due process right to a fair trial where his jury was directed that 

the mere words spoken by the complainant was sufficient to 

convict, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3106, and, whether trial 

counsel’s failure to object to this patently erroneous instruction 

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and, whether 

PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these discrete issues did not 

____________________________________________

right to appeal on January 30, 2023, we deem Appellant’s appeal from the 

November 29, 2022 order dismissing his petition, filed on February 21, 2023,

timely filed.
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violate Appellant’s right to effective representation as relief 

would be available under the PCRA[?]

5. Whether admission of the CRC video violated Appellant’s right 

of confrontation and his constitutional rights to due process of 

law, and, whether trial counsel’s failure to object to its 

admission constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and, 

whether PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these discrete facts 

rendered his representation ineffective as relief would be 

available under the PCRA[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6-8.

A.

We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine 

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and 

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). 

“This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the 

record contains any support for those findings.” Commonwealth v. 

Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

To prevail on a petition for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and 

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9543(a)(2). These circumstances include ineffective assistance of counsel, 

which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9543(a)(2)(ii). 

The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he 

burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Id. To
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satisfy this burden, the appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no 

reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) there 

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding 

would have been different absent counsel’s error. Commonwealth v. 

Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the 

test will result in rejection of the appellant’s claim. Id.

To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must prove a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the relevant proceedings would have been 

different but-for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 46 (Pa. 2012). Importantly, “counsel cannot be deemed 

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.

In each of his issues, Appellant asserts that both trial counsel and PCRA 

counsel were ineffective for failing to raise certain claims. He has, thus, 

presented layered ineffectiveness claims. “Where a petitioner alleges multiple 

layers of ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness 

relevant to each layer of representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 

A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022). “In determining a layered claim of 

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the 

defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of 

counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be 
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deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.” Commonwealth 

v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

B.

In his first issue, Appellant asserts a layered ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim based on his contention that the Commonwealth presented 

insufficient evidence to convict him of IDSI because the complainant did not 

claim, and the Commonwealth did not prove, that Appellant caused the victim 

serious bodily injury. Appellant’s Brief at 15-38. Appellant claims that trial 

counsel’s “failure to move for a judgment of acquittal at any time available to 

him” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se. Id. at 31. Appellant 

intertwines this claim with a claim that both trial and plea counsel were 

ineffective for not objecting to what Appellant characterizes as a “missing 

mens rea” instruction to the jury. Id. at 36. Appellant asserts, without 

citation to any authority that “it was incumbent on the trial court to charge 

Appellant’s jury to find” that he acted with “a mens rea of, at least, 

recklessness[.]” Id. at 19. He, thus, concludes, that the instruction the court 

provided the jury was “fatally deficient” because it did not “direct[] the jury 

to find any standard of culpability” let alone the “heightened mens rea

required to commit [IDSI] and an instruction on the requirement of forcible 

compulsion is entirely absent.” Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).

In considering whether this claim had merit, the PCRA court aptly noted 

that the Commonwealth charged Appellant with violating Section 3123(b) of 

the Crimes Code. Unlike Sections 3123(a) and 3123(c), Section 3123(b) does 
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not require proof of forcible compulsion or that the defendant caused serious 

bodily injury.8 Because conviction of this offense does not require proof of 

forcible compulsion or serious bodily injury, the PCRA court concluded that 

Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to

prove these elements was meritless. Given that this claim was meritless, the 

PCRA court then concluded that neither trial nor PCRA counsel provided

ineffective assistance for failing to raise it. 

The record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that neither trial nor

PCRA counsel were ineffective for failing to raise a claim that the 

Commonwealth did not prove elements of an uncharged offense. Moreover, 

the record belies Appellant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move for a judgment of acquittal. In fact, at the conclusion of the 

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, trial counsel did move for a judgment of 

acquittal, asserting that the Commonwealth had not “met the elements of the 

crimes to get this to the jury.” N.T. Trial, 10/24/18, at 165. 

With respect to his claim that the jury instruction was deficient, we are 

mindful that “[a] trial court’s charge to the jury must contain a correct 

statement of the law.” Commonwealth v. Patosky, 656 A.2d 499, 505 (Pa. 

Super. 1995) (citations omitted). When addressing challenges to a jury 

instruction, we consider the challenged portion in light of the entire 

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8 “A person commits [IDSI] with a child, a felony of the first degree, when the 

person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less 

than 13 years of age.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b).
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instruction. Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 88 (Pa. 2009). Here, our 

review of the court’s comprehensive instruction reveals that it correctly stated 

the law, including the elements of IDSI that the Commonwealth was required 

to prove, i.e., the age of the victim and whether Appellant engaged in deviate 

sexual intercourse with him. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/18, at 99-101. 

Accordingly, the PCRA court properly found that neither trial nor PCRA counsel 

were ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue. Appellant is, thus, not 

entitled to relief on this claim.

C.

In his second issue, Appellant claims that his counsel were ineffective 

for failing to assert a claim that his convictions of Indecent Assault, COM, and 

EWOC are illegal because a 2-year statute of limitations applied to those 

offenses. Appellant’s Brief at 39-46.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(3) provides that, with respect to offenses whose 

period for prosecution has expired, the Commonwealth may still prosecute

[a]ny sexual offense committed against a minor who is less than 

18 years of age any time up to the later of the period of limitation 

provided by law after the minor has reached 18 years of age or 

the date the minor reaches 55 years of age.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(3). Section 5552(c)(3) includes Indecent Assault, 

EWOC, and COM in the enumerated list of “sexual offenses.”

The PCRA court found this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

meritless based on the plain language of Section 5552. We agree. Section 

5552 is clear and unambiguous that the statute of limitations does not begin 
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to run on these offenses when the victim is a minor. Because the victim in 

this case was a minor, Appellant’s claim that the statute of limitations for 

bringing these charges had expired lacks merit. This claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, thus, fails.

D.

In his third issue, Appellant asserts that his trial and PCRA counsel were 

ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s imposition of fines without 

conducting a hearing to determine Appellant’s ability to pay. Appellant’s Brief 

at 47-52. He contends that evidence of his financial resources—what 

Appellant “had” in the way of a job, a house, the ability to pay for counsel—

contained in, inter alia the pre-sentence investigation report was insufficient 

to prove his ability to pay. Id. at 49 n.1. He argues, without citation to any 

authority, that the court was required to consider Appellant’s “future prospects 

of income creation” before imposing fines. Id. at 49 n.21.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c) permits the trial court to include the payment of

discretionary fines in a defendant’s sentence only if “it appears of record that[] 

the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c)(1). 

Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824 (Pa. 2009), in 

support of his claim that the trial court was required to hold a hearing to 

determine his ability to pay fines before imposing them as part of his judgment 

of sentence. Ford is, however, inapposite. 

In Ford, our Supreme Court held that the defendant’s agreement to pay 

a specific fine as part of a negotiated plea agreement did not constitute 
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evidence that he can or will be able to pay the fine. The Court noted that 

there was no record of the defendant’s ability to pay because “no inquiry was 

made, and no record existed, as to [the defendant’s] ability to pay the agreedupon fines.” Id. at 827 (citation omitted). The Court opined that, in the 

negotiated plea context, the trial court “should simply consider whether the 

defendant is or will be able to pay any negotiated fines.” Id. at 830-31. 

Notably, the Ford Court did not impose a requirement that the trial court hold 

a hearing to determine the defendant’s ability to pay.

Rather, we find Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), controlling. In Boyd, this Court held that a sufficient 

evidentiary basis for the imposition of fines exists where the court has the 

benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence investigation report detailing the 

defendant’s employment history and existing assets. Id. at 1274.

In explaining its conclusion that Appellant’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims based on his alleged illegal sentence lacked merit, the court 

noted that the evidence of record, including the findings in Appellant’s presentence investigation report, indicated that 

[e]ven though Appellant was retired, Appellant had a job that paid 

him $100,000 a year, had a house, and had the ability to pay for 

counsel. The pre-sentence investigation report provided relevant 

information, the trial provided information too, and nothing was 

presented to this [c]ourt that Appellant was unable to be 

employed, unable to work, was unable to hold a job, or has a low 

intelligence quotient. Notably, Appellant was an educated man, 

was gainfully employed throughout his years, and was in the 

military.

PCRA Ct. Op., 4/21/23, at 17.
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The record supports the PCRA court’s findings. Our review confirms that 

the pre-sentence investigation report contained information that Appellant 

had a job earning $100,000 per year for 40 years prior to his retirement. He 

served in the National Guard for six years prior to his discharge. He had assets 

in the form of a house and a car, and no mortgage or rent obligations. 

Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that there was sufficient evidence 

in the record to indicate that Appellant had the ability to pay the $2,500 fine 

imposed by the trial court. Because Appellant’s claim lacks merit, neither trial 

counsel nor PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise it. Accordingly, 

this claim does not garner Appellant relief.

E.

In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that his counsel were ineffective 

for not raising a claim regarding trial court’s instruction to the jury that the 

victim’s testimony alone, if believed, is sufficient to convict Appellant. 

Appellant’s Brief at 53-61. Appellant claims that this instruction violates his 

due process rights because it is a “patent violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3106.” 

Id. at 53. He argues, without citation to any authority that, because the 

instruction directs the jury to convict him if it believes the victim’s testimony, 

the instruction permits the jury to convict simply because the victim made an 

accusation—“the victim’s credibility needs not be tested [and] elements of the 

crime can be ignored . . .”. Id. at 55. He assails this as “patently ludicrous, 

unconstitutional and amounts to the utter abrogation of Appellant’s right to a 
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fair trial[]” because it “removes from the jury the duty to determine the actual 

elements of crime[.]” Id. at 55-56.

Our review indicates that the trial court instructed the jury, in 

accordance with the Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 4.13B, as 

follows:

The testimony of [the victim] standing alone, if believed by you, 

is sufficient proof upon which to find the defendant guilty in this 

case. The testimony of [the victim] in such as case as this need 

not be supported by other evidence to sustain a conviction. 

Thus[,] you may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of [the 

victim] convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant is guilty.

N.T. Trial, 10/26/18, at 95 (emphasis added).

Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 4.13B was derived from 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3106, a statute pertaining to sexual assault cases, which 

provides: 

The credibility of a complainant of an offense under this chapter 

shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility of 

a complainant of any other crime. The testimony of a 

complainant need not be corroborated in prosecutions 

under this chapter. No instructions shall be given cautioning the 

jury to view the complainant’s testimony in any other way than 

that in which all complainants’ testimony is viewed. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3106.

The PCRA court found Appellant’s claim meritless because the trial court 

gave the appropriate instruction to the jury. We agree that the trial court 

properly instructed the jury that the victim’s testimony alone—if believed by 

the jury—is sufficient proof of guilt. This instruction does not require the jury 
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to believe the victim, nor does it—as Appellant insists—permit the jury to 

convict a defendant simply because an accusation has been made against him. 

Appellant’s bald claim to the contrary, thus, fails.

F.

In his final issue, Appellant asserts that his counsels’ failure to raise a 

claim regarding the admission of the CRC video-recorded interview of the 

victim as cumulative constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s 

Brief at 62-72. He claims that the victim’s “unchallenged testimony [] was 

repetitive/cumulative and did not introduce distinctly corroborative claims.” 

Id. at 62. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly relied on the Tender 

Years Hearsay Exception to admit the recording because “the complainant was 

not unavailable and testified, rendering reliance thereon misplaced.” Id. at 

66. See also id. at 67-68 (characterizing the court’s “Tender Years” review 

“moot because the complainant testified.”).

The “[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (en banc) (citations omitted). “Accordingly, a ruling admitting 

evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of 

support to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 

168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). 
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The record here indicates that the trial court admitted this evidence over 

Appellant’s counsel’s objection pursuant to the Tender Years Hearsay 

Exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1. The Tender Years Hearsay Act creates an 

exception to the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence to 

allow the Commonwealth to present to the factfinder of a statement made by 

a child who was sixteen years old or younger at the time of the statement. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(a). Relevant to this appeal, a court may admit a childvictim’s out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted when (1) 

“the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and 

that the time, content[,] and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient 

indicia of reliability;” and (2) the child testifies at the proceeding or is deemed 

unavailable to testify. Id. at § 5985.1(a)(1)(i)-(ii). “Pursuant to this statute, 

indicia of reliability include, inter alia, the spontaneity of the statements, 

consistency in repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terms 

unexpected in children of that age, and the lack of a motive to fabricate.” 

Strafford, 194 A.3d at 173 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review of the Notes of Testimony from the PCRA Hearing, as well as 

the PCRA court’s opinion, indicates that Appellant argued at the hearing that: 

(1) his trial counsel attempted to prevent the trial court from admitting the 

CRC interview recording as evidence; and (2) the recording was at the same 

time both redundantly cumulative because the victim testified at trial and 

uniquely dissimilar from the victim’s trial testimony because of his 

mannerisms, way of speaking, and level of specificity. N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 
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1/30/23, at 15-16, 37-41, 47-50. The Commonwealth countered that the trial 

court had properly admitted it pursuant to the Tender Years Hearsay 

Exception. Id. at 16, 47-50.

The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the trial court misapplied the 

Tender Years Hearsay Exception because the victim testified at trial. This 

argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the exception, which 

expressly permits the admission of an out-of-court statement of a child victim

where, as here, the victim testifies at the proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

5985.1(a)(1)(ii)(A). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the recording should 

have been excluded because the victim’s statements in it were duplicative or 

cumulative of the victim’s trial testimony lacks merit. Appellant’s trial counsel 

and PCRA counsel were, therefore, not ineffective for declining to raise this 

meritless claim.
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G.

In sum, the PCRA court did not err in finding that each of Appellant’s 

layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit.

Order affirmed.

Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.

Judge McLaughlin concurs in result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/13/2023