1 The permanent resident status of an alien like Ms. Nguyen, who obtains such status through marriage to a United States citizen, remains conditional for two years until the alien and his or her citizen s pouse jointly petition for removal of the 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________

No. 07-3889

____________ Thuy Thi Thanh Nguyen, *
* Petitioner, *
* v. * Petition for Review of * an Order of the Board Michael B. Mukasey, * of Immigration Appeals. Attorney General, * * [PUBLISHED] Respondent. *

___________ Submitted: March 11, 2008 Filed: April 14, 2008

___________ Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Thuy Thi Thanh Nguyen petitions for revi ew of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmedan Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) order of removal and denial of Ms. Nguyen’s application for a hardship waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (waiver of joint-petition requirement to remove conditions upon permanent resident status). 1 Respondent has moved to dismiss, asserting that we lackconditional basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. In instances where the qualifying marriage is terminated prior to the two-year anni versary date, as it was in Ms. Nguyen’s case, the Attorney General has discretion to waive the joint-petition requirement and remove the conditional basis of the permanent resident status if the alien demonstrates that “the qualifying marriag e was entered into in good faith by the alien.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B).
-2- jurisdiction over the discretionary denial of the hardship waiver and that we should not review the IJ’s findings that Ms. Nguyen was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(i) for committing marriage fraud and under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(A) and 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for fraudulently procuring an immigration benefit, because the BIA declined to rule on these findings given Ms. Nguyen’s concession of removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D) (termination of conditional permanent resident status). For the following reasons, we deny respondent’s motion to dismiss.

Although respondent is correct that we l ack jurisdiction to review either the BIA’s discretionary decision to deny a hardship waiver, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), or the BIA’s determina tions, in relation to a hardship-waiver decision, as to what evidence is credible and how much we ight to give that evidence,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), we have jurisd iction to review constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a petition for review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we may also review the nondiscre tionary determinations underl ying the denial of relief, such as the predicate legal question of whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining the alien’s elig ibility for discretionary relief, seePinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey , No. 07-1299, 2008 WL 583677, at *2 (8th Cir. Mar. 5, 2008); ReyesVasquez v. Ashcroft , 395 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2005). Here, the BIA did not exercise its discretion and deny Ms. N guyen a waiver; rather , the BIA found that because Ms. Nguyen failed to prove that she entered into the qualifying marriage in good faith, she did not meet the eligibility re quirements even to be considered for a2 Nor did the BIA or the IJ explicitly find Ms. Nguyen not credible. See Mohamed v. Gonzales , 477 F.3d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (“implicit credibility finding made in passing does not suffice”). Thus, the holdings in Suvorov v. Gonzales , 441 F.3d 618, 620-22 (8th Cir. 2006), and Ignatova v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2005), which focus on a dverse credibility determinations, do not preclude jurisdiction of this appeal.
-3- hardship waiver. 2We have jurisdiction to consider what the legal standard is for the good-faith determination and to review the threshold determination of whether the credited evidence meets the good-faith standard.

As to the findings of removability, even though Ms. Nguyen conceded removability under section 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), we are obliged to re view the decision that Ms. Nguyen is removable for havi ng committed marriage fraud and for having procured an immigration benefit by fraud or willful misrepresentation, because such findings could result in a permanent bar to entry into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (appeals court has jurisdiction to review final removal order); see also Ymeri v. Ashcroft , 387 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (app eals court is required to review finding that alien is removable under § 1182(a )(6)(C)(i), even if alien is removable on other grounds, because finding of fraud or willful misrepresentation results in permanent bar to entry into United States).

We therefore conclude that we have juri sdiction to consider the questions raised in Ms. Nguyen’s petition for review. Acco rdingly, we deny respondent’s motion to dismiss.

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