NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHNATHAN ARTHUR FIELDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JUSTIN McQUEEN, #8063; Police Officer 

at Phoenix Police Department, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-16389 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02863-GMS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2019**

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Johnathan Arthur Fields appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising 

from his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 26 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-16389 

U.S.C. § 1915A); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 

F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal based on the statute of limitations). We 

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Fields’s Fourth Amendment unlawful 

search and seizure claim as time-barred because Fields filed this action after the 

applicable statute of limitations had run. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542; TwoRivers 

v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (two-year statute of limitations for 

§ 1983 actions brought in Arizona); see also Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[F]ederal law holds that a cause of action for illegal search 

and seizure accrues when the wrongful act occurs, even if the person does not 

know at that time that the search was warrantless.” (internal citation omitted)).

The district court dismissed Fields’s malicious prosecution claim because 

Fields failed to allege that he was prosecuted in the absence of probable cause. 

However, Fields alleged that defendant McQueen falsely stated in his police report 

that Fields had consented to a search. These allegations are sufficient to state a 

claim. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(setting forth elements of a malicious prosecution claim and stating that a finding 
3 18-16389 

of probable cause can be rebutted by “showing that the criminal prosecution was 

induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful 

conduct undertaken in bad faith”). We reverse the district court’s judgment in part 

and remand for further proceedings on Fields’s malicious prosecution claim. 

Furthermore, because the district court did not address Fields’s false imprisonment 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, we remand for the district 

court to consider these claims in the first instance.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fields’s motions 

for leave to amend the complaint because Fields failed to comply with the local 

rules. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 

1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Broad deference is given to a district court’s interpretation 

of its local rules.” (citation omitted)).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Fields’s “motion for answering brief” (Docket Entry No. 22) is denied as 

unnecessary.
4 18-16389 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.