Filed 10/23/20; Modified opinion ordered partially published 10/23/20 (mod. order and pub. order

attached to opinion)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MES INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DADSON WASHER SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

B297634

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SC127829

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed on September 25, 2020, be modified 

as follows:

On page 15, heading number “4” is deleted, and the following is 

inserted in its place: 

“3. Dadson Timely Filed Its Motion for Attorney Fees and 

Memorandum of Costs”

There is no change in the judgment.

________________________________________________________________________

EGERTON, J. EDMON, P. J. DHANIDINA, J.
Filed 9/25/20 (unmodified opinion)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MES INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DADSON WASHER SERVICE, 

INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

B297634

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SC127829

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.

Jay R. Stein for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Stark, Friedman & Chapman and Jeannette C.C. Darrow 

for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

In February 2017, plaintiff and appellant MES 

Investments, LLC (MES) purchased a 22-unit residential 

apartment complex in the West Hollywood area of Los Angeles. 

Some years earlier, in March 2002, the property’s prior owner 

entered into a written lease agreement with defendant Dadson 

Washer Service, Inc. (Dadson) for the lease of a laundry space 

in the complex. The lease had an initial term of 10 years and 

would automatically renew for two additional 10-year terms, 

unless Dadson elected not to renew it. The lease was already 

on its second 10-year term when MES purchased the property. 

MES notified Dadson that it had determined the lease was 

“no longer operative” because the renewal provision did not 

comply with Civil Code section 1945.5.

1 Dadson disagreed and 

refused to vacate the premises. MES filed suit for declaratory 

relief and cancellation of the lease.

Dadson defeated MES’s claims at a bench trial. Because 

Dadson had leased a non-residential area in the apartment 

complex for a commercial purpose, the trial court concluded 

section 1945.5 did not apply to the lease’s renewal provision. 

And, although the lease was not duly recorded, the court ruled 

MES was nevertheless bound by it, because MES had actual 

knowledge of the lease when it purchased the property. MES

1 Civil Code section 1945.5 makes an “automatic renewal” 

provision of a lease “for the hiring of residential real property” 

voidable “by the party who did not prepare the lease” unless the 

renewal provision is printed in “at least eight-point boldface type” 

and notice of the provision appears “immediately prior to the 

place where the lessee executes the agreement.” Statutory 

references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

appeals these rulings, as well as the court’s order awarding 

Dadson contractual attorney fees and costs. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dadson is a coin-operated washing machine service 

company. It provides and services washing machines and dryers 

in apartment buildings. The company has about 50 employees 

and about 3,500 active locations with property leases. Dadson 

enters into leases with the owners of apartment buildings 

and provides coin-operated laundry equipment for use by the 

buildings’ tenants. The leases typically provide for the building 

owner to share in the machines’ profits above a specified 

minimum.

On March 11, 2002, Dadson entered into a written lease 

agreement with 1235 N. Detroit Ave. Associates LLC (Detroit 

Ave. Associates). The lease provides: “LESSOR grants, 

conveys and transfers to LESSEE [Dadson] the exclusive 

use and possession of the laundry room(s) located at the real 

property commonly known as: [¶] 1235 N. DETROIT AVE., 

LOS ANGELES [¶] consisting of 22 units (“LEASED 

PREMISES”), for the purpose of installing, maintaining, 

and operating coin-operated laundry equipment, to have and 

to hold the same for and during a term of ten years.” The lease 

states that it “shall be binding upon all future owners of the 

real property described above” and that it “is the intention of 

the parties that this lease run with the land described above.” 

Additional terms and conditions are set forth on the backside of 

the one-page lease agreement, including an automatic renewal 
4

provision for two additional 10-year terms, unless Dadson gives

the lessor written notice of its intention not to renew.2

The actual street address of the 22-unit apartment complex 

is 1235 N. Detroit St.—not 1235 N. Detroit Ave. as stated in the 

Dadson lease. Thus, when the parties recorded the lease with the 

Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office, it was not duly recorded 

as part of the property’s chain of title.

Before MES completed its purchase of the property, it

received a preliminary title report from North American Title 

Company. The report disclosed an exception from title insurance 

coverage for “[a]n unrecorded lease dated March 6, 2002, 

executed by Jeff Lloyd [the Managing Member of Detroit Ave. 

Associates] as lessor and Dadson Washer Service, Inc. as lessee, 

as disclosed by a Lease of Laundry Space recorded May 24, 2002 

as Instrument No. 2-1208924 of Official Records.”

MES’s manager, Mark Samuel, reviewed the preliminary 

title report during escrow. Samuel also reviewed an electronic 

copy of the Dadson lease through a hyperlink included in the 

report. He testified that he “felt” the lease did not apply to his 

property because it stated the leased premises were located at

1235 N. Detroit “Ave.”—not “St.” Samuel did, however, search 

for the property address online, and found that when he searched 

2 Above the signature lines for the lessor and lessee on the 

front of the document, the lease states: “All of the terms and 

conditions set forth in the TERMS AND CONDITIONS on the 

reverse side of this page and in any addendums are incorporated 

and made a part hereof. LESSOR REPRESENTS THAT HE 

OR SHE HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES TO 

SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS.”
5

for 1235 N. Detroit Ave., the search engine returned pictures 

of his property at 1235 N. Detroit St.

Samuel also physically inspected the property before 

closing escrow. He saw washing machines in the complex’s 

laundry room, which also housed tenant mailboxes, a telephone 

utility box, and a water heater. He claimed not to have noticed

a large bright blue and white sign on a wall adjacent to two 

washing machines with “Dadson” written in very large letters.

On February 28, 2017, MES purchased the property. The 

day after closing escrow, Samuel sent a letter notifying Dadson

that MES was the “new owner of the property located at 1235 

N. Detroit St.” Samuel wrote that he was “reviewing all of the 

contracts related to the apartment” and that he would “get back 

to Dadson Washer in the near future.”

On April 18, 2017, Samuel sent a second letter to Dadson 

notifying the company of MES’s determination that “the lease 

in issue is no longer operative.” Samuel wrote: “My review of 

the lease establishes that it is in violation of Civil Code Section 

1945.5 as the renewal terms do not comply. I do not accept the 

lease as the new owner. At best you have a month to month 

tenancy.” The letter demanded Dadson “remove all of [its] 

equipment” by June 30, 2017. Dadson did not remove its 

equipment.

On July 19, 2017, MES filed its complaint against Dadson 

for declaratory relief, cancellation of the lease, and reasonable 

rental value. MES alleged Dadson could not enforce the lease 

as a “covenant running with the land” because the lease was not 

“ ‘duly recorded.’ ” And it asserted the lease’s automatic renewal 

provision was “void or voidable” because it did not comply with

section 1945.5.
6

After a bench trial, the court issued a proposed statement 

of decision ruling in favor of Dadson on all claims. The court 

rejected MES’s assertion that the failure to duly record the 

lease rendered it unenforceable against successors in interest.

Notwithstanding the deficient recording and the Ave./St.

discrepancy, the court found there was “overwhelming” evidence 

that MES had actual knowledge of the lease before it closed 

escrow. Thus, the court concluded MES was not a bona fide 

purchaser and MES did not acquire the property free of Dadson’s 

leasehold interest.

With respect to the automatic renewal provision, the court 

ruled section 1945.5 did not apply to Dadson’s lease. While the 

statute mandates how automatic renewal provisions must appear

in a lease for “the hiring of residential real property” (§ 1945.5), 

the court found Dadson did not hire “the leased premises for 

residential purposes.” Instead, it had hired the premises for the 

purpose of “ ‘installing, maintaining, and operating coin-operated 

laundry equipment.’ ”

MES objected to the proposed statement of decision. 

It argued the bona fide purchaser analysis was insufficient to 

establish the lease’s enforceability against a successor purchaser. 

MES maintained the lease could not be deemed a covenant 

running with the land due to the recording deficiency and, 

therefore, the court was required to determine whether the lease

was a personal covenant binding in equity against MES. As for 

section 1945.5, MES argued the court improperly “differentiate[d] 

between the residential aspects of the apartment house tenants 

and the commercial aspects of the laundry lease.” It argued this 

differentiation was contrary to the “real world practicalities” 

of the property’s composition.
7

After receiving Dadson’s response to MES’s objections, the 

court entered its final statement of decision without substantive 

changes. And, after briefing and oral argument, the court 

awarded Dadson prevailing party costs and contractual attorney 

fees as provided in the lease.

DISCUSSION

1. The Dadson Lease Is Enforceable Against MES 

under Civil Code section 1217

Because the Dadson lease was not duly recorded, MES 

contends it cannot be enforced against a successor in interest

(like MES) as a covenant running with the land. Thus, MES 

maintains the lease can only be “equitably” enforced as a 

“personal covenant,” upon a finding that “Dadson came into 

Court with ‘clean hands’, did not take advantage of its own 

wrong, and did not sleep on its own rights.” The trial court 

rejected this argument, concluding the lease could be enforced 

against MES under the Civil Code, without resorting to equity, 

because MES had actual knowledge of the lease when it acquired 

the property. The trial court correctly applied the controlling 

law.

Section 1214 provides that “[e]very conveyance of real 

property or an estate for years therein, other than a lease for 

a term not exceeding one year, is void as against any subsequent 

purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, 

in good faith and for a valuable consideration, . . . unless the 

conveyance shall have been duly recorded prior to the record of 

notice of action.” (Italics added.) However, section 1217 provides 

that “[a]n unrecorded instrument is valid as between the parties 

thereto and those who have notice thereof.” (Italics added.) 

“[S]ince recordation is not essential to legal recognition of 
8

a property interest, but only affects its priority as against 

subsequent bona fide purchasers, an unrecorded option may be 

a valid property right.” (Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. 

v. United States (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, italics added; 

12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2020) Real Property, 

§ 345 [“Even when a prior instrument is unrecorded, and there 

is therefore no constructive notice from the record, a subsequent 

purchaser may nevertheless have actual knowledge or 

constructive notice of it and, if so will not be a bona fide 

purchaser.”]; Gates Rubber Co. v. Ulman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 

356, 365.) Here, although the Dadson lease was not duly 

recorded as part of the Detroit St. property’s chain of title, 

it still constituted a valid property right enforceable against 

a subsequent purchaser who acquired the property with “notice 

thereof.” (§ 1217.)

MES does not dispute that it had actual notice of the 

Dadson lease before it purchased the Detroit St. property. It 

argues, however, that notice is only half of what is required to 

enforce an unrecorded leasehold interest against a subsequent 

purchaser, and it maintains the trial court erred when the 

court declined to determine whether the “equities required” 

enforcement. (Boldface omitted.) MES bases the argument 

on the following passage from Marra v. Aetna Const. Co. (1940) 

15 Cal.2d 375 at page 378 (Marra): “Even though a covenant 

does not run with the land, it may be enforceable in equity 

against a transferee of the covenantor who takes with 

knowledge of its terms under circumstances which would 

make it inequitable to permit him to avoid the restriction.” 

Marra is inapposite.
9

The passage from Marra concerns the “doctrine of equitable 

servitudes,” which can be invoked to enforce a covenant in equity 

that cannot be enforced under the law. (Marra, supra, 15 Cal.2d 

at p. 378.) The issue was whether a covenant in a grant deed 

prohibiting “ ‘the grantees, their successors and assigns’ ” from 

building any structure on the land “other than a one-family 

residence” for 40 years could be enforced against subsequent 

transferees. (Id. at p. 376.) The Supreme Court explained that

covenants, like the one at issue in Marra, “contained in a grant 

in fee of real property, are governed solely by section 1462 of the 

Civil Code, which provides: ‘Every covenant contained in a grant 

of an estate in real property, which is made for the direct benefit 

of the property, or some part of it then in existence, runs with the 

land.’ ” (Id. at pp. 377–378.) The decisions had consistently 

“interpreted this provision to mean that a burdensome covenant 

contained in a deed which in no way benefits the property 

conveyed is not binding at law upon the transferees of the 

grantee.” (Id. at p. 378, italics added.) Because the covenant was 

of “no conceivable benefit” to the property, the high court held 

it was “not binding upon the respondents under the provisions 

of the code.” (Ibid.) However, although the covenant could 

not be enforced at law, the Marra court observed that it might 

be enforceable under the doctrine of equitable servitudes if 

the respondents took the property “with knowledge of [the 

covenant’s] terms under circumstances which would make it 

inequitable to permit [respondents] to avoid the restriction.” 

(Ibid.)

Unlike the covenant at issue in Marra, Dadson’s lease is 

enforceable against MES under the Civil Code. As discussed, 

although a lease exceeding a term of one year is normally “void” 
10

against a subsequent purchaser unless “duly recorded” prior to 

the purchase (§ 1214), section 1217 makes the “unrecorded” lease

“valid as between the parties thereto and those who have notice 

thereof.” (§ 1217, italics added.) MES does not dispute the trial 

court’s finding that it had actual notice of the Dadson lease. 

Thus, the court correctly concluded there was no need to resort 

to the doctrine of equitable servitudes because enforcement was 

mandated under the Civil Code. (See § 1217.)

2. Section 1945.5 Does Not Apply to the Dadson Lease

Section 1945.5 makes an “automatic renewal” provision 

in a lease “for the hiring of residential real property” “voidable 

by the party who did not prepare the lease” unless the renewal 

provision is printed in “at least eight-point boldface type” 

and notice of the provision, in the same typeface, appears 

“immediately prior to the place where the lessee executes 

the agreement.” The statute’s apparent purpose is to give

a residential tenant (who likely did not prepare the lease) 

the option to avoid a new lease term unless the tenant received 

clear notice of the automatic renewal provision.3 It is undisputed 

that Dadson prepared the lease and that the automatic renewal 

provision did not meet section 1945.5’s typeface and notice

requirements.

3 The legislative focus on residential tenants is also apparent 

in the requirement for a notification to appear “immediately prior 

to the place where the lessee executes the agreement.” (§ 1945.5, 

italics added.) Thus, while the statute makes a noncompliant 

lease “voidable by the party who did not prepare the lease,” the 

statutory text strongly indicates the Legislature believed that 

party would, more often than not, be the residential tenant—

i.e., the “lessee.” (Ibid.)
11

The trial court determined section 1945.5 did not apply 

to the Dadson lease because the lease was not “for the hiring of 

residential real property.” (§ 1945.5, italics added.) Rather, 

the court found Dadson had leased “a room used for mechanicals

—a telephone box, a water heater, and mailboxes—within a 

residential apartment complex” for the purpose of “ ‘installing, 

maintaining, and operating coin-operated laundry equipment.’ ”

MES argues the trial court’s ruling improperly 

“differentiate[s] between the residential aspects of the apartment 

house” and the “commercial aspects of the laundry lease.” 

It maintains the Detroit St. property must be “considered an 

apartment complex as all aspects of it are provided to facilitate 

the habitation of the tenants,” including the “laundry room area.” 

Because the laundry area is an “essential component” of the 

apartment complex, MES argues it must be deemed “ ‘residential 

real property’ ” under section 1945.5. We disagree.

The interpretation of statutory language is a judicial 

function subject to our de novo review. (Ruiz v. Musclewood 

Investment Properties, LLC (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 15, 20 (Ruiz).) 

We apply established rules of statutory construction to interpret

the phrase “hiring of residential real property” in section 1945.5. 

“ ‘ “Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing 

a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to 

effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We must look to the 

statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. 

[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘In doing so, however, we do not consider 

the statutory language “in isolation.” [Citation.] Rather, we look 

to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine 

the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]” 

[Citation.] . . . We must harmonize “the various parts of a 
12

statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or 

section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ 

[Citation.] ‘ “The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s 

interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.” ’ ” (Ruiz, at 

p. 21.)

Section 1945.5 is found in Chapter 2 of Title 5 of the Civil 

Code, which governs the hiring of real property. Section 1940, 

the introductory section of Chapter 2, states in relevant part: 

“[T]his chapter shall apply to all persons who hire dwelling units

located within this state including tenants, lessees, boarders, 

lodgers, and others, however denominated.” (§ 1940, subd. (a), 

italics added.) Under subdivision (c), the term “ ‘Dwelling unit’

means a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a 

home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains 

a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common 

household.” (§ 1940, subd. (c), italics added.) 

MES argues we can take no guidance from section 1940, 

because “the title of Chapter 2 [of the Civil Code] is ‘Hiring of 

Real Property,’ not ‘Hiring of Dwelling Units.’ ” We fail to see 

how that distinction makes any substantive difference. In any 

event, while neither “residential real property” nor “commercial 

real property” are defined in Chapter 2, the terms are defined 

in Title 5 of the Civil Code at sections 1954.51 and 1954.26 in 

the Chapters governing residential and commercial rent control. 

The definitions set forth in those two sections evidence the 

Legislature’s plain recognition that both types of property can 

exist in a single structure.

Consistent with sections 1940 and 1945.5, section 1954.51 

defines “Residential real property” to include “any dwelling or 

unit that is intended for human habitation.” (§ 1954.51, subd. 
13

(e).) In contrast, section 1954.26 defines “Commercial property” 

to include “any part, portion, or unit thereof, and any related 

facilities, space, or services, except the following [¶] (1) Any 

dwelling or dwelling unit subject to the provisions of Section 

1940.” (§ 1954.26, subd. (d), italics added.) Construing section 

1945.5, which also appears in Title 5 of the Civil Code, consistent 

with these definitions and the definition of “dwelling unit” in 

section 1940, subdivision (c), we conclude a lease for “the hiring 

of residential real property” means a contract for the temporary 

possession of a dwelling unit—i.e., the part of a structure that 

is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by those who 

maintain a household in it.

MES acknowledges Title 5’s rent control statutes are 

relevant to our construction of section 1945.5. It also tacitly 

concedes the laundry room does not serve as a home, residence, 

or sleeping place for any of the apartment complex’s tenants. 

Nevertheless, MES asserts the rent control statutes do “not limit 

the definition of ‘residential real property’ to only the inhabited 

portions of the property.” (Underlining omitted.) It maintains 

the critical feature is not habitability, but whether the laundry 

room is an “integral part of the residential apartment house 

property.”

MES relies upon People v. Woods (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 

345, a criminal case that considered whether a “ ‘commercial 

laundry facility’ within the common area of an apartment 

complex” constituted “an inhabited dwelling house” under the 

burglary statute. (Id. at p. 347.)4 As the Woods court explained,

4 Under Penal Code section 460, first degree burglary 

is “[e]very burglary of an inhabited dwelling house; . . . [¶] 

. . . [a]ll other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.”
14

“[t]he burglary statute defines ‘inhabited’ as ‘currently being used 

for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not,’ ” and “[c]ase law 

has expanded the definition of ‘inhabited dwelling house’ to 

include areas not normally considered part of the ‘living space’

of a home.” (Id. at pp. 347–348, citing Pen. Code, § 459; People 

v. Moreno (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 109; People v. Zelaya (1987) 

194 Cal.App.3d 73.) Those cases had held that “a basement 

room or garage, ‘under the same roof’ with the living quarters, 

‘functionally’ connected therewith, and an ‘integral part’ thereof, 

is part of an ‘inhabited dwelling house’ within the meaning of 

Penal Code section 460.” (Zelaya, at p. 75; Woods, at p. 348.) But 

the rationale for this construction was rooted in a purpose unique 

to the burglary law—to “give effect to the legislative belief that: 

‘Victims inside buildings are more vulnerable to felonious conduct 

than victims out of doors.’ ” (Zelaya, at p. 75; see also Woods,

at p. 350 [“safety and privacy expectations surrounding an 

inhabited dwelling house are present in the common area 

laundry room of the apartment complex Woods burgled here”].) 

That purpose bears no relationship to the concern for tenant 

protection that apparently induced the Legislature’s adoption 

of section 1945.5. Woods and the other burglary cases are 

inapposite.

The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the 

laundry room was not residential real property, but rather a 

machine room, separate and distinct from the dwelling units 

that the tenants used as their homes, residences, and sleeping 

places within the apartment complex. The trial court correctly 

concluded section 1945.5 does not apply to the Dadson laundry 

room lease.
15

4. Dadson Timely Filed Its Motion for Attorney 

Fees and Memorandum of Costs

Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, a prevailing 

party “must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days 

after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment” or 

“within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.” 

Under rule 3.1702(b), a prevailing party must file a motion for 

attorney fees “within the time for filing a notice of appeal”—

i.e., within 60 days of being served by the superior court clerk or 

a party with the notice of entry of judgment or a filed-endorsed 

copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service, or 180 days 

after entry of judgment, whichever is first. (See rule 8.104.)

MES claims Dadson’s motion for attorney fees and 

memorandum of costs were untimely because Dadson filed the

papers long after it had “actual notice of the entry of judgment.” 

(Italics added.) However, the prescribed deadlines are not 

triggered by actual notice—they require service of the notice of 

entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1700, 3.1702(b), 

8.104(a).)

The record shows the court entered judgment on March 11, 

2019. But there is no record of a notice of entry of judgment 

being filed or served until May 24, 2019—the same date Dadson 

filed its memorandum of costs. Sixty days later, on July 23, 2019, 

Dadson filed its motion for contractual attorney fees under the 

lease.

MES asserts Dadson had “actual notice” of the entry of 

judgment because the superior court clerk used a self-addressed 

stamped envelope, which the court had asked Dadson to provide, 

to mail Dadson a copy of the judgment. The simple act of mailing 

a conformed copy of the judgment does not trigger the deadlines 
16

under the applicable Rules of Court, however, because there 

has been no service of notice of entry of judgment. The Advisory 

Committee comments to California Rules of Court, rule 8.104 

emphasize the importance of service for establishing these

deadlines: “[A] notice of entry of judgment (or a copy of the 

judgment) must show the date on which the clerk served the 

document. The proof of service establishes the date that the 

60-day period under subdivision (a)(1)(A) begins to run. [¶] . . . 

Although the general rule on service (rule 8.25(a)) requires proof 

of service for all documents served by parties, the requirement 

is reiterated here because of the serious consequence of a failure 

to file a timely notice of appeal (see subd. (e)).” 

It is undisputed that a proof of service did not accompany 

the judgment mailed to Dadson. Thus, until Dadson filed and 

served notice of entry of judgment on May 24, 2019, there was

nothing in the record to establish the deadlines for Dadson to 

file its memorandum of costs or its motion for attorney fees. (Cf. 

Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather 

Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 64 [for court clerk’s 

service of notice of entry of judgment to establish posttrial motion 

deadlines, “the clerk’s mailed notice must affirmatively state that 

it was given ‘upon order by the court’ or ‘under section 664.5’ and 

a certificate of mailing the notice must be executed and placed in 

the file”].) Based on this record, Dadson’s papers were timely.
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment and the attorney fees and costs awards are 

affirmed. Dadson is entitled to its costs.

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

DHANIDINA, J.
Filed 10/23/20

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MES INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DADSON WASHER SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

B297634

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SC127829

ORDER CERTIFYING FOR

PARTIAL PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on September 25, 2020, 

was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause

appearing, the opinion is now certified for publication with the exception 

of parts 1 and 3 of the Discussion. (Rule 8.1110, Cal. Rules of Court.)

There is no change in the judgment.

________________________________________________________________________

EGERTON, J. EDMON, P. J. DHANIDINA, J.