[Cite as State v. Lampley, 2011-Ohio-3814.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsTHOMAS J. LAMPLEY 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. 

Case No. 10CA30 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Common 

Pleas Court, Case No. 09-CR-650D 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 2, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JAMES J. MAYER, JR. R. JOSHUA BROWN 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 32 Lutz Avenue 
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO Lexington, Ohio 44904 

By: DANIEL J. BENOIT 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Richland County Prosecutor’s Office 

38 S. Park Street 

Mansfield, Ohio 44902 

Hoffman, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Thomas Lampley appeals his conviction entered by 

the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On August 28, 2009, Appellant was employed at the Mary McLeod 

Bethune Center (“MBCC”) owned by his wife. On that day, Appellant and his wife 

became involved in an argument, during which Appellant operated a vehicle in the 

MBCC parking lot coming close to and almost hitting LaShona Bronson who was also 

an employee of MBCC and an acquaintance of Appellant. A dispute then arose 

between Bronson and Appellant as to how close Appellant was to hitting her, and 

Appellant called Bronson a “bitch.” Bronson telephoned her husband, David Jermain 

Bronson, aka J.B. Bronson. She then told Appellant “We going to have somebody to 

take care of you” and “We got something for you.” J.B. subsequently came to the 

parking lot, but Appellant had already left the scene. 

{¶3} When Appellant returned to the MBCC parking lot, he encountered 

LaShona Bronson and her husband, J.B., who approached Appellant at the vehicle 

Appellant was driving. An altercation ensued. Appellant maintains J.B. approached the 

vehicle and began striking Appellant through the open window. J.B.’s friend, Danny 

McClain, had accompanied J.B. to the parking lot, and was outside the vehicle on the 
driver’s side. Appellant accessed a firearm stored in the MBCC’s van, and used the 

firearm to shoot and fatally wound J.B. 

{¶4} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury on four counts: 

murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), with a firearm specification; murder, in violation 

of R.C. 2903.02(B), with a firearm specification; having a weapon under disability, in 

violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); and tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 

2921.12(A)(1). 

{¶5} A jury trial commenced on February 23, 2010, and the jury returned a 

verdict of guilty on all four counts. The jury also returned a finding of guilt on the firearm 

specifications. 

{¶6} The trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment on 

count one, merging counts one and two. The court also imposed a five year sentence 

on count three and a two year sentence on count four, to be served consecutively. An 

additional three year mandatory consecutive prison sentence was imposed for the 

firearm specifications, for a total sentence of twenty-five years to life. 

{¶7} On March 10, 2010, Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court in 

Case No. 10–CA–30. Subsequently, on April 26, 2010, Appellant filed a petition to 

vacate or set aside his sentence in the trial court. 

{¶8} On August 10, 2010, the trial court overruled Appellant's petition for postconviction relief. On October 29, 2010, this Court dismissed Appellant's direct appeal for 

failure to prosecute because Appellant failed to submit a brief. 
{¶9} Appellant appealed the trial court's August 10, 2010 denial of his motion 

for post-conviction relief. Via Judgment Entry of March 9, 2011, this Court affirmed the 

trial court’s denial of the motion for post-conviction relief. 

{¶10} Appellant now appeals his conviction, assigning as sole error: 

{¶11} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 

ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.” 

{¶12} The decision to give a jury instruction is within the trial court's sound 

discretion. State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 443. In order to find an 

abuse of that discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. 

{¶13} “A criminal defendant has a right to expect that the trial court will give 

complete jury instructions on all issues raised by the evidence.” State v. Williford (1990), 

49 Ohio St.3d 247, 251, 551 N.E.2d 1279. In State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 

533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph three of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained 

lesser included offenses as follows: 

{¶14} “3. An offense may be a lesser included offense of another if (i) the 

offense carries a lesser penalty than the other; (ii) the greater offense cannot, as 

statutorily defined, ever be committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, 

also being committed; and (iii) some element of the greater offense is not required to 

prove the commission of the lesser offense.” 

{¶15} “Even though an offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser included 

offense of another, a charge on such lesser included offense is required only where the 
evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime 

charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense.” State v. Thomas (1988), 40 

Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶16} Appellant was convicted of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and 

(B), which read, 

{¶17} “(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful 

termination of another's pregnancy. 

{¶18} “(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of 

the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony 

of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of 

the Revised Code.” 

{¶19} Appellant argues the jury should have been instructed on the lesser 

included offense of involuntary manslaughter as defined in R.C. 2903.04, 

{¶20} “No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of 

another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to 

commit a felony. 

{¶21} “No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of 

another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to 

commit a misdemeanor of any degree, a regulatory offense, or a minor misdemeanor 

other than a violation of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a 

minor misdemeanor and other than a violation of an ordinance of a municipal 

corporation that, regardless of the penalty set by ordinance for the violation, is 
substantially equivalent to any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that 

is a minor misdemeanor.” 

{¶22} In State v. Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, the Supreme Court set forth 

the test as follows, 

{¶23} “If the evidence adduced on behalf of the defense is such that if accepted 

by the trier of fact it would constitute a complete defense to all substantive elements of 

the crime charged, the trier of fact will not be permitted to consider a lesser included 

offense unless the trier of fact could reasonably find against the state and for the 

accused upon one or more of the elements of the crime charged, and for the state and 

against the accused on the remaining elements, which, by themselves, would sustain a 

conviction upon a lesser included offense. 

{¶24} “The persuasiveness of the evidence regarding the lesser included 

offense is irrelevant. If under any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible for the 

trier of fact to find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the lesser 

offense, the instruction on the lesser included offense must be given. The evidence 

must be considered in the light most favorable to defendant.” 

{¶25} In State v. Fox (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 58, the Ohio Supreme Court held, 

{¶26} “In State v. Nolton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 133, 249 N.E.2d 797, this court 

held that if the evidence adduced on behalf of the defense is such that if accepted by 

the trier of the facts it would constitute a complete defense to all substantial elements of 

the crime charged, the trier will not be permitted to consider a lesser included offense. 

{¶27} “In this case, the evidence presented by the state showed only that the 

deceased was sitting in the bar drinking beer with three women, when the defendant 
came up behind him, asked if the deceased were looking for him, and then shot him as 

he turned around. 

{¶28} “The evidence presented by the defense was that the deceased had a bad 

reputation, was drunk, and was going to force the defendant to keep drinking with him. 

When the defendant refused, the deceased became hostile, threatened him, called him 

names, and came after him with a knife. The defendant backed up to the door and then 

shot only in self-defense when the deceased kept coming. 

{¶29} “If the prosecution's evidence is believed and the defense evidence 

disbelieved, there is only an unprovoked attack, which is clearly purposeful and 

malicious. If the defense is believed and the prosecution disbelieved, then there is 

clearly self-defense and no crime at all. Thus, the trier of the facts could not reasonably 

find against the state and for the accused upon any one or more of the elements of the 

crime charged and against the accused on the remaining elements. Therefore, a charge 

on the lesser included offense is not warranted, and an instruction on the lesser 

included offense in such an instance permits the jury to unnecessarily speculate on a 

compromised verdict. See State v. Loudermill (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 79, 81, 206 N.E.2d 

198; Bandy v. State (1921), 102 Ohio St. 384, 131 N.E. 499. 

{¶30} “As stated in the alternative by the court in State v. Nolton, 19 Ohio St.2d 

at page 135, 249 N.E.2d at page 799: 

{¶31} “‘On the contrary, if the trier could reasonably find against the state and for 

the accused upon one or more of the elements of the crime charged and for the state 

and against the accused on the remaining elements, which by themselves would 

sustain a conviction upon a lesser included offense, then a charge on the lesser 
included offense is both warranted and required, not only for the benefit of the state but 

for the benefit of the accused.’” 

{¶32} At the trial herein, Appellant argued the affirmative defense of self 

defense. Appellant’s argument to the jury was he shot J.B. in self defense; therefore, if 

believed, the evidence would support an acquittal on both the charges of murder and 

the involuntary manslaughter lesser included offense. Based upon the case law set 

forth above, we find the trial court did not err in electing not to instruct the jury on the 

lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Further, upon our review of the 

record, the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction on the offense of 

murder; therefore, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury. 

{¶33} Appellant’s conviction in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, P.J. 

Farmer, J. and 

Edwards, J. concur 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 

 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

THOMAS J. LAMPLEY : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 10CA30 

 For the reason stated in our accompanying Opinion, Appellant’s conviction in 

the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant. 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS