J-S52035-14

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

T.K. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

D.M.A.

Appellee No. 769 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-09-CR-01222-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2014

Appellant, T.K. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the Bucks 

County Court of Common Pleas, which required Father to turn over to 

counsel for Appellee, D.M.A. (“Mother”), a copy of a deed of trust under 

which Father is a trustee and contingent beneficiary, in this child support 

matter. We affirm. 

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case.1 Therefore, we have no reason to 

restate them. 

____________________________________________

1 Throughout its opinion, the trial court states that it held a hearing on 

February 7, 2014, to determine Father’s support obligation for the parties’ 

two children; and that the court directed Father to pay a fixed amount for 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father raises three issues for our review: 

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY 

ORDERING [FATHER] TO PROVIDE A COPY OF A DEED OF 

TRUST TO [MOTHER] THAT WOULD VIOLATE THE PRIVACY 

AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIRD PARTIES?

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY

ORDERING [FATHER] TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE DEED 

OF TRUST TO [MOTHER] WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 

THAT [FATHER] WAS RECEIVING INCOME THEREUNDER?

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY NOT 

PROVIDING ANOTHER REMEDY BY WHICH DISTRIBUTIONS 

TO [FATHER] THAT WOULD BE INCOME FOR SUPPORT 

PURPOSES COULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO [MOTHER] 

WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONFIDENTIALITY AND 

PRIVACY OF THIRD PARTIES?

(Father’s Brief at 4). 

Preliminarily, we observe that appellate briefs must conform in all 

material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355 

(Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 696, 764 A.2d 50 (2000) (citing 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing specific 

requirements of each subsection of brief on appeal). Regarding the 

argument section of an appellate brief, Rule 2119(a) provides:

Rule 2119. Argument

(a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

child support. The record makes clear, however, Father has primary 

physical custody of the parties’ children, and upon Father’s complaint for 

child support, the court determined Mother’s child support obligation. 
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into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; 

and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type 

or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point 

treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly, where an appellant fails to properly raise or 

develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief is wholly inadequate to 

present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits of the 

claims raised on appeal. Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000) 

(holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set forth adequate 

argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked 

meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements; 

appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court 

abused its discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v. Glosser, 

892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments must 

adhere to rules of appellate procedure, and arguments which are not 

appropriately developed are waived on appeal; arguments not appropriately 

developed include those where party has failed to cite any authority in 

support of contention); Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155 

(Pa.Super. 2002) (stating appellant must support each question raised by 

discussion and analysis of pertinent authority; absent reasoned discussion of 

law in appellate brief, this Court’s ability to provide appellate review is 

hampered, necessitating waiver of issue on appeal). 

Instantly, the argument portion of Father’s brief is not divided into 
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separate sections for each question to be argued. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

More importantly, Father cites no legal authority to support his claims on 

appeal.2 See id. Father’s failure to develop his claims on appeal with 

discussion and analysis of pertinent authority precludes meaningful review 

and waives his issues for appellate review. See Lackner, supra; Haiko, 

supra; Butler, supra. 

Moreover, after a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the 

parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable 

Alan M. Rubenstein, we conclude that even if Father had preserved his 

issues for our review, his claims would nevertheless merit no relief. The trial 

court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the 

questions presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 11, 2014, at 4-10) 

(finding: initially, discovery order in question is immediately appealable 

under collateral order doctrine, where Father asserts deed of trust contains 

privileged information, court’s determination of purported privilege can be 

addressed without deciding underlying issue of child support, interests of 

beneficiaries’ alleged confidential information would potentially go 

unprotected without immediate review, and privacy concerns at issue are 

rooted in public policy; regarding merits of Father’s claims, deed of trust is 

____________________________________________

2 The only citation to legal authority in Father’s appellate brief is in his 

statement of jurisdiction. See Father’s Brief at 2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

742). 
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relevant to underlying issue of child support, as Father may receive 

distributions in future which will impact his income for support purposes, and 

details regarding when Father will receive distributions may lead to 

admissible evidence in subsequent support hearing; discovery request is not 

unduly burdensome or unreasonable or beyond scope of discovery; Father 

does not cite any specific privilege that would prevent him from turning over 

copy of deed of trust to Mother’s counsel, but to extent Father asserts 

fiduciary duty to protect other beneficiaries’ information, there is no explicit 

statutory duty to keep that information private or recognized independent 

common law privilege in trustee-beneficiary relationship; Father failed to 

explain what information in deed of trust, if disclosed, would violate privacy 

and confidentiality of other beneficiaries; court gave absolute limiting 

instructions that copy of deed of trust cannot be disseminated to anyone 

other than Mother’s counsel and no additional copies can be made; Father 

presented no evidence that disclosure of deed of trust in this circumstance 

will endanger Father’s role as trustee or place him at risk of breaching 

fiduciary duty; thus, court’s order directing Father to provide Mother’s 

counsel with copy of deed of trust was proper). Accordingly, Father’s issues 

are waived for appellate review; had Father preserved his claims, we would 

have affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2014
Circulated 10/02/2014 01:53 PM

 
Circulated 10/02/2014 01:53 PM
 
 
 
 
 
Circulated 10/02/2014 01:53 PM