SIXTH DIVISION                                             FILED: 12-13-96No. 1-95-0853  BELL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND                )  Appeal fromLOAN ASSOCIATION                        )  the Circuit Court                                        )  of Cook County.     Plaintiff-Appellant,               )                                          )     v.                                 )                                        )RAYMOND T. WAGNER, JR.,                 )  Director of the Illinois                )Department of Revenue and               )  PATRICK QUINN, Treasurer of             )  the State of Illinois,                  )  Honorable                                        )  Joanne L. Lanigan      Defendant-Appellee.                )  Judge Presiding.     JUSTICE ZWICK delivered the opinion of the court:     This case comes to us on cross-motions for summary judgment.The sole issue presented is whether interest paid by the FederalHome Loan Bank of Chicago ("FHLB") to its depositors on dailyinvestment deposit accounts is exempt from State taxation. Thecircuit court determined that interest on such accounts is notexempt. We affirm.     Plaintiff, Bell Federal Savings and Loan Association("Bell"), brought an action to recover money paid under protestto the Illinois Department of Revenue ("the Department"). Bellearns interest on a deposit account with the FHLB, known as adaily investment deposit account or "DID account." Bell paidtaxes under protest on the interest earned on this account for athree-month period in 1992 to the Department, and filed acomplaint for injunction and declaratory relief asking thecircuit court to declare that Bell is entitled to a refund of thetax and any penalties incurred. The court found that the FederalHome Loan Bank Act ("the Act") does not preclude the State ofIllinois from taxing the interest earned by Bell on this account.The circuit court therefore granted the defendants' motion forsummary judgment, and denied Bell's motion for summary judgment.      A motion for summary judgment may be granted when "thepleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1994); Purtill v.Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986). MaywoodProviso State Bank v.York State Bank & Trust Co., 252 Ill. App.3d 164, 625 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1993). When all parties move forsummary judgment, the court is invited to decide the issues thuspresented as a matter of law, and entry of summary judgment forone party or the other is proper. Maywood Proviso, 252 Ill. App.3d at 171. Where facts are undisputed and the court's decisionrests on the proper interpretation of a statute, we review thecircuit court's ruling de novo. Kaszubowski v. Board ofEducation, 248 Ill. App. 3d 451, 618 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1993)     At issue is the proper interpretation of section 1433 of theAct which states in pertinent part:          "Any and all notes, debentures, bonds, and          other such obligations issued by any bank,          and consolidated Federal Home Loan Bank bonds          and debentures, shall be exempt both as to          principal and interest from all taxation          ***." 12 USC � 1433 (1994).Bell argues that its DID account falls within the "other suchobligations" language of the Act.     To support its motion for summary judgment, Bell attachedthe affidavit of John C Savio, senior vice president and chieffinancial officer of Bell. Savio stated its DID account with theFHLB is "operated very similar to a commercial checking account."Savio also stated that the FHLB uses the DID deposits infurtherance of its purpose of making available low-cost funds forhome mortgages. In the memorandum accompanying its motion forsummary judgment, Bell argued that DID accounts fit within thecatch-all statutory language of the Act, in that, althoughadmittedly not "notes," "debentures" or "bonds," DID accounts are"other such obligations" of the FHLB. Bell also argued thatallowing the state to tax the interest on the DID accountinterferes with "the essential purpose" of the Act.     The defendants motion for summary judgment contended thatBell's DID account does not constitute an "obligation" within themeaning of section 1433, and that the DID account interest issubject to taxation in Illinois. The defendants relied on FirstFederal Savings and Loan Association of Claremore v. Oklahoma TaxCommission, 743 P.2d 640 (Okla. 1987), where the Oklahoma SupremeCourt held that the interest earned on an account similar to thatmaintained by Bell was not exempt from State taxation. Thedefendants also argued that there are no substantive similaritiesbetween the DID account and notes, bonds, and debentures.Additionally, the defendants argued that DID accounts are not"issued" within the meaning of section 1433.     Before addressing the arguments raised, it is helpful to setout some background. The Federal Home Loan Bank system wascreated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932. 12 U.S.C. ��1421 - 1449. There are twelve regional FHLBs in the system, whichwas created by Congress to provide a reliable source of funds tohomebuyers. Fidelity Financial Corporation v. Federal Home LoanBank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1986). The FHLB is owned byits member banks, which are required by law to purchase stock inthe FHLB. 12 U.S.C. � 1426. The FHLB "is a federalinstrumentality organized to carry out public policy and itsfunctions are wholly governmental." Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers,200 F.2d 420, 446 (9th Cir. 1952). Each FHLB is authorized underthe Act to make secured advances to its member banks. 12 U.S.C. �1930. Long-term advances, however, may be made only for thepurpose of providing funds for residential housing finance. EachFHLB has the power to borrow and give security and to payinterest thereon and to issue debentures, bonds, or otherobligations. 12 U.S.C. � 1431. Consolidated debentures andconsolidated bonds, which are the joint and several obligationsof all the Federal Home Loan Banks, may also be issued. 12 U.S.C.�1431(b) and (c).     Of particular relevance to this case is that each FHLB hasthe power to accept deposits made by member banks. 12 U.S.C. �1431(e). The FHLBs may be authorized to be drawees of and toengage in or be agents or intermediaries for, or otherwiseparticipate or assist in the collection settlement of (includingpresentment, clearing, and payment of, and remitting for) checks,drafts, or any other negotiable or nonnegotiable items orinstruments of payment drawn on or issued by members of any FHLB.12 U.S.C. � 1431(e)(2)(A).      After reviewing both the language of the Act and itshistory, we conclude that the circuit court correctly rejectedBell's claim that the interest income it receives from the FHLBon its DID account is exempt from State taxation. Section 201 ofthe Illinois Income Tax Act imposes a tax measured by net incomeon every individual, corporation, trust, and estate for eachtaxable year on the privilege of earning or receiving income inor as a resident of Illinois. 35 ILCS 5/201 (1994). Although theIllinois Income Tax Act allows for a deduction from taxableincome on amounts that are exempt from taxation under statutes ofthe United States (35 ILCS 5/203(b)(2)(J)(1994)), we find theinterest earned by Bell on its daily investment deposit accountnot to fall within this federal exemption.     The primary rule of statutory construction, to which allother rules are subordinate, is that a court should ascertain andgive effect to the intent of the legislature. Bonaguro v. CountyOfficers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 634 N.E. 2d 712(1994). In interpreting a statute, the language used by thelegislature must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. In thiscase, however, the words "other such obligations," cannot beplainly understood outside the context in which they are used.See e.g., People v. Britz, No. 77618, (Ill. Sup. Ct., Oct. 18,1996), slip op. at 24 (statutory reference to "other medicationsunder medical directions" cannot be plainly understood). We musttherefore turn to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which providesthat a specific provision, when followed by a general provisions,is read to control the general when both relate to the samesubject matter. Britz, slip op. at 24. Moreover, a class ofunarticulated persons or things referred to in legislation isinterpreted as those "others such like" the named persons orthings. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services ofIllinois, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 475 N.E.2d 536(1985); Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436,328 N.E.2d 318 (1975).      With this principle in mind, we look to the specificinstruments enumerated by Congress which are intended to generatetax-free income: notes, debentures and bonds.     A "note" is defined as an "instrument containing anexpress and absolute promise of signer (i.e. maker) to pay aspecified person or order, or bearer, a definite sum of money ata specified time." Black's Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed. 1990). A "debenture" is defined as a "[l]ong-termunsecured debt instrument, issued pursuant to an indenture. Apromissory note or bond backed by the general credit andearning history of a corporation and usually not secured by amortgage or lien on any specific property; e.g., an unsecuredbond." Black's Law Dictionary 401 (6th ed. 1990). A "bond" isdefined as a "certificate or evidence of a debt on which theissuing company or governmental body promises to pay thebondholders a specific amount of interest for a specified lengthof time, and to repay the loan on the expiration date. Along-term debt instrument that promises to pay the lender aseries of periodic interest payments in addition to returning theprinciple at maturity." Black's Law Dictionary 178 (6th ed.1990).     According to Bell, its DID account is "very similar to acommercial checking account." A bank checking account, however,is nothing more than a sum of money deposit with a bank andsubject to be drawn out by the customer's check. The UniformCommercial Code defines the term "account" as "any deposit orcredit account with a bank and includes a demand, time, savings,passbook, share draft, or like account, other than an accountevidenced by a certificate of deposit." 810 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(1)(1994). A bank deposit is defined as "cash, checks, or draftsplaced with a bank for credit to the depositor's account.Placement of money in a bank thereby creating a contract betweenthe bank and the depositor." Black's Law Dictionary at 145.      Bell's DID account does not share characteristics in commonwith those debt instruments explicitly exempted from taxation byCongress. First and foremost, Bell's DID account is not an"instrument." As a type of bank account, the DID account it ismerely a "sum of money placed with [the FHLB] on deposit"(Black's Law Dictionary 144 (6th ed. 1990)), and subject to bedrawn out by Bell at will. An "instrument," on the other hand, is"a writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act oragreement." Black's Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed. 1990).      Moreover, notes, debentures and bonds all refer to debtinstruments that include, in general, promises to pay specifiedamounts at specified times. The DID account, although bearinginterest, is not a debt instrument issued by the FHLB. The moneyin the DID account is available to Bell on demand, which is incontrast to the promise to pay at specified times inherent in thedebt instruments that qualify for the tax exemption. Anotherdistinguishing feature is the fact that when the FHLB issuesnotes, debentures, and bonds, only it as the payor can consent toan increase in the amount borrowed. With these instruments,therefore, the FHLB has direct control over the amount of itsindebtedness. With the DID account, on the other hand, it is Belland other DID depositors which control the amount of Bell'sobligation.     The structure of the Act also supports our analysis. Underthe Act, the FHLB has the power to borrow money by "issuingdebentures, bonds, or other obligations upon such terms andconditions as the Board may approve ***." 12 U.S.C. � 1431(a).Consolidated debentures may be issued "in order to provide fundsfor any bank or banks ***." 12 U.S.C. � 1431(b). In contrast tothe explicit power of the FHLB to borrow money by issuingobligations in order to carry out the provisions of the Act, theFHLB is also given the power to accept deposits of member banksand assist in the collection and settlement of checks, drafts, orother items drawn on or issued by member banks. 12 U.S.C. �1431(e). Thus, in drafting the Act, Congress distinguishedbetween the power of the FHLB to borrow money in order to carryout its purpose by issuing debt obligations and the ability ofthe FHLB to provide a service to its member banks by acceptingdeposits.     Furthermore, Bell concedes that if its DID account interestis to be exempted from State taxation, the interest must accrueas a result of some instrument "issued" by the FHLB. Section 1433explicitly requires this. In order to accommodate this statutoryrequirements, Bell argues that an "issuance" occurs in thecontext of its DID account because "credits" are "issued" to itsaccount by the FHLB when a deposit is made. It also contends thatthe existence of an issuance is evidenced by the FHLB's "physicaldelivery of the DID account statements."      A similar argument was rejected by this court in BellFederal Savings & Loan Association v. Department of Revenue, 111Ill. App. 3d 890, 444 N.E.2d 798 (1982). There, the court deniedBell's claim of State tax exemption for its FHLB stock dividendsand the refund of its pro-rata share of the Federal Savings andLoan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") secondary reserve. Thepertinent provision of the National Housing Act, which pertainedto the FSLIC issue, provided that states were prohibited fromtaxing the principle and interest of "[a]ll notes, bonds,debentures, or other such obligations issued by the [FSLIC]." 12U.S.C. �1725(e) (repealed 1989). Bell argued that the statutoryprovisions requiring the FSLIC to refund the contributions madeto the secondary reserve constituted "obligations issued by" theFSLIC. Bell Federal, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 894.     The appellate court was not persuaded by Bell's argument. Itfound that the exemption applied only to certain obligations that"are 'issued' by the FSLIC when they are placed into circulation"and did not apply to the statutory duty to refund thecontributions, which was not, in any sense, "issued." BellFederal, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 894.     Finally, we agree with the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holdingin First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Oklahoma TaxCommission, 743 P.2d 640 (Okla. 1987). There, on similar facts,the court upheld the Oklahoma Tax Commission's assessment ofcorporate income tax on the interest earned by a savings and loanassociation from overnight demand deposits. The court agreed withthe Oklahoma Tax Commission that the interest earned on thedeposits was not a federal obligation under section 1433. FirstFederal, 743 P.2d at 645-646. The First Federal court noted thatthe word "obligations" could be interpreted to "embrace virtuallyeverything which a bank is bound to pay." 743 P.2d at 645. Thecourt also cited the "settled rule" of statutory constructionthat tax exemptions are not to be inferred lightly and that taxexemptions will not apply unless they are already granted bystatute. First Federal, 743 P.2d at 645. The courtfound that Congress, by using the term "issued," meant for theexempt obligations to refer to those which might be issued in theexercise of the borrowing power of the United States." FirstFederal, 743 P.2d at 645. Thus, the court concluded thatovernight demand deposits are subject to taxation by the State ofOklahoma.     Bell attempts to discount the value of the First Federaldecision by arguing that the court's reasoning was flawed. Inparticular, Bell faults the First Federal court's reliance onHibernia Savings and Loan Society v. San Francisco, 200 U.S. 310,26 S. Ct. 265, 50 L. Ed. 495 (1906), a case that Bell claims hasquestionable validity in light of the Supreme Court's decision inAmerican Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855,77 L. Ed. 2d 1072, 103 S. Ct. 3369 (1983).      We find the First Federal court's citation to the Hiberniadecision to have been proper. In Hibernia, the Court found thatchecks issued by the United States Treasurer for interest accruedon certain bonds were subject to state taxation. The Court foundthat the checks, although technically "obligations" of the UnitedStates, were not within the spirit of the statutory exemption.Hibernia, 200 U.S. at 316. The Court reasoned that, because thechecks were payable immediately, they were for all practicalpurposes "the money itself." Hibernia, 200 U.S. at 315. While, asnoted by Bell, the statute upon which the Hibernia Court reliedhas been amended as discussed in American Bank and Trust, theteachings of the Court regarding the meaning of "obligations" isstill valid. See Rockford Life Insurance v. Illinois Departmentof Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 190-91, 107 S. Ct. 2312, 96 L. Ed. 2d152 (1987) (the Court, four years after deciding American Bankand Trust, cited to Hibernia when discussing the purpose behindthe governmental tax immunity doctrine). Bell's criticism of theFirst Federal court's use of the Hibernia decision isunwarranted.      Bell also argues that taxing the interest on its DID accountinterferes with an essential purpose of the FHLB. According toBell's argument, DID accounts are an indispensable and integralpart of the FHLB's ability to make available low-cost funds forhome mortgages and, without such deposits, "the FHLB would haveto secure higher-cost funds from elsewhere, such as the issuanceof bonds."      Bell's analysis is not relevant to its claim that the tax onits interest income violated the FHLB Act. An examination ofwhether a tax would interfere with a governmental purpose isrelevant only in the context of a claim under the constitutionaldoctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, which is based on theproposition that "the borrowing power is an essential aspect ofthe Federal Government's authority and, just as the SupremacyClause bars the States from directly taxing federal property, italso bars the States from taxing federal obligations in a mannerwhich has an adverse effect on the United States' borrowingability." Rockford Life Insurance, 482 U.S. at 190. Bell has notmade such a claim in this case.      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered by the trialcourt is affirmed.     Affirmed.     McNAMARA, J. and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.