* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

______________

No. 96-40064

Summary Calendar

______________

JIM WEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

2:93-CV-14

_________________________________________________________________ July 19, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge * :

Defendant-Appellant Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") appeals

the district court's order and judgment granting Plaintiff-Appellee

Jim Weaver's ("Weaver") motion for an award of front pay and

denying Amoco's motion for reinstatement and judgment in favor of

Weaver for $280,000 plus interest. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from the district court's order after

remand in this case on the issue of reinstatement and front pay

following a jury verdict in favor of Weaver on his age1 For a complete summary of the facts and procedural history

in this case, see Weaver v. Amoco Production Co. , 66 F.3d 85 (5th

Cir. 1995).

2 discrimination claim. 1 In the first appeal, we vacated the front

pay award and remanded to the district court for a more thorough

review of Amoco's offer of reinstatement and for arti culated

findings. W eaver

, 66 F.3d at 89. On remand, the district court

concluded that Weaver met his burden of demonst rating that

reinstatement was not feasible. Specifically, the court found that

although Amoco offered to reinstate Weaver, Amoco's excessively

hostile at titude toward Weaver throughout the litigation of the

case has rendered the environment too hostile f or an employment

situation to succeed. In addition, the court noted that the

numerous technological advances that have been made since Weaver's

termination would necessitate extra time for Weaver to train, and

that the court believed that Amoco would not allow Weaver the

necessary time to improve. Finally, the court determined that a

front pay award of $280,000, in addition to the jury's liquidated

damage aw ard of $105,000, was not excessive considering the

evidence at trial indicating that Weaver would lose around $600,000

by 65 if he was unable to locate a new job.

REINSTATEMENT VERSUS FRONT PAY

Front pay is not awarded unless the pla intiff demonstrates

that reinstatement is not feasible. W alther v. Lone Star Gas Co.

,

952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola

Metro Bottling Co., Inc.

, 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied , 493 U.S. 842, 110 S.Ct. 129, 107 L.Ed.2d 89 (1989)). "We3

rev iew the district court's decision that reinstatement was not

feasible for an abuse of discretion." I d. (citing Deloach v.

Delchamps, Inc.

, 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990)). We find that

the district court's conclusions on remand, supp orted by an

articulated finding that hostile relations exist between Amoco and

Weaver, sufficiently demonstrate that Weaver's reinstatement is not

feasible. The district court judge is in the best position to make

a determination regarding the feasibility of reinstatement because

he is able to witness, first hand, the evidence presented at trial

along with post-trial motions and hearings before the court. The

court in this case concluded that Amoco's hostile attitude toward

Weaver exceed the animosity level that commonly arises betw een

opposing parties throughout the litigatio n process. Taking into

consideration the district court's findings and the fact that

Amoco's offer of reinstatement, which was not made until after the

jury return a verdict in favor of Weaver, is for a position that no

longer exists at Amoco, we f ind that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that reinstatement is not

feasible.

Furthermore, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in awarding front pay in addition to the jury's

liquida ted damage award. We have previously stated that a

substantial liquidated damage award may indicate that an additional

award of front pay is inappropriate

. Walther , 952 F.2d at 127.

However, our review of the record reveals that the district court

properly addressed this factor in allowing the additional award of4

front pay. S ee id. at 127-28. The district court found that

"[a]lthough the Court has considered the $105,000 award of

l iquidated damages which was assessed against Amoco, a front pay

award of $280,000 is still necessary to make the plaintiff whole."

The court's finding is supported by evidence presented a trial

indicating that Weaver could lose up to $600,000 by the time he

reaches 65 if he is not able to find another job. Therefore, we

find the district court's front pay award of $280,000 is not

excessive or inappropriate.

ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL

Weaver seeks an additional award of $5,000 in attorneys' fees

for services rendered on this second appeal. It is within our

discretion to award attorneys' fees for the appeal of an ADEA case.

Hendrick v. Hercules, Inc.

, 658 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981).

We find that due to the simplicity of the issues raised in this

appeal an award of $2,000 in attorneys' fees is reasonable.

Accordingly, we award $2,000 in attorneys' fees for services

rendered in connection with this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the order and judgment of

the district court awarding front pay is AFFIRMED. Attorneys' fees

are awarded to Weaver in the amount of $2,000 for services rendered

on appeal.