### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 6, 200 8 TAR KIS JON ES v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelb y County No. P-28338 W. Fr ed Axley, Judge

No. W2007-01165-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed May 28, 2008

The pe titioner, Tarkis Jones, sought post-convic tion relief a fter ple ading guilty to charge s of sec ond degre e murde r, unlawf

ul possession of a we apon, and a ssault. The S helby C ounty Criminal C ourt denied r elief afte r an evidentiary hearing. On appea l, the petitioner ar gues that his guilty plea was unlawfully induce d and that he rec eived the ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. We aff irm the denial of post-convic tion relief.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Judgment of the C riminal Court Aff irme d
J A M ES C UR W OOD W I TT , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELL ES and D AVI D G. H AYES , JJ., joined.
La rry Co pe la nd , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, Ta

rkis J on e s. Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; L acy Wilber, Assistant A ttorney Gene ral; and Alexia Fulgham, Assistant District Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
OnMay 1 2, 20 03 , th e pet it ion e r p le d g uil ty i n Sh e lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt to second de gree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-1 3 -2 1 0 (2 003) ; assault, see id § 39-13-101 ; and unlawf ul p o s s e s s io n o f a we apon, s ee id. § 39-17-1307. For the c harge of sec ond degre e murde r, the petitioner wa s sentence d t o 1 3

. 5 y ea rs at 100 per cent in the De partment of Corr ection. For the c ha rg e s o f a ssa

ult a nd un la wf

ul p os se ssi on of

a we apo n, thepe tit ion e r w a s se nte nc e d to 11 mon ths , 29 days, to be served in the wor khouse, and to run c oncurr ently with the murder se ntence

. The de fendant filed a pe tition for post-conviction relief on April 14, 2004, which wa s amende d on Se ptember 23, 2004 , and October 5, 2004 . An evidentiary hearing was held on Dec ember

7, 2006, and the post-c onviction court denie d the petition on April 9, 2007.
At thepo st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , th e pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d th a t he pled guilty beca use lea d counsel told him it was in his best int ere sts and t h at he could not be suc cessf ul at trial. The-2-

petitioner i nsisted that a more thoroug h investigation by counsel, including i nterview s with Dianne Pinkins , Antonio Gra

y er, Ty rone Basse tt, and Rufus Gladness, would have suppor ted his claim that he wa s not the shooter in the homicide. He tes t i fi ed t h at af t er be ing appointed to repla ce a prior a tto rn e y, c ou ns e l on ly v isi te d h im in pri so n o nc e , w he n h e ha d a ple a a gr e e me nt t o p re se nt h im. Acc ording to the petitioner, counse l never showed him evidenc e of any additional investigation and never revie wed any witness statement s or photos with him. The petitioner testified that he a sked counsel to pre pare sever al motions that were ne ver f iled.
On cr oss examination, the petitioner a dmitted that no one coerced him to ac cept the plea a gree ment. He wa s confuse d abo u t h is legal rights because he “didn’t re ally understand the sy stem and di d n ’t really

understand what [counsel] was saying to me at the time, beca use I was probably , eig hteen y ear s old.

. . . and jus t didn’t really understand the law and the words and stuff that he wa s expl ainingto me at the time.” The petitioner testified that counsel told him he wouldn’t ha ve to se r

v e m o r e th ans i x o r

s e v e ny e ar s i nc o n f

i n e m e n t , an d

th ath e d i d

n o te xp r e s s an y

o f his c on c e rn s to the jud g e be c a us e he wa s youngand

did no t kn owhe c ou ld d o th at.
Antonio Turner

testified t hat he g ave a

statement to the police which implicated the petitioner as the shoote r. He admitted that this stateme nt w as false a nd that “[i] t was bec ause a ll of the pressure was on me and they was saying that I had done the murder, or whateve r, and Iwasn’t just try ing to be caught up in this .”

Cou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t he h a s b e e n a lic e ns e d atto rn e y p ra c tic ing c ri min a l la w i n Tenne ssee since 1982. He ha s participate d i n “t h re e or four hundre d” jury trials a nd “[p] robably, se ve ra l th ou sa nd ” gu ilt y p le a s. Cou ns e l e xp la ine d that a pu bli c de fe nd e r w a s o ri gin a lly a ssi gn e d to thec a se un til a

c on fl ic t de ve lop e d. W he n th e tria l c ou rt app oin te d h im a s su bs titute c ou ns e l, the c a se was alre ady set for trial. Counsel te stified that when he was appointed to t h e c as e, t h e plea a gr e e me nt b e ing of

fe re d b y th e state wa s f

or 15 ye ars
. Counsel testified that “the c ase w as alre ady in v es t i g at ed by the public de fende r’s office . And I re call, spec ifically, stating on the re cord w hen he ap p o i n t ed m e, that the ca se had alre ady bee n investigated.” H is recor ds indicated that he met with the petitioner “a bout six , or seve n times, at least, it may

be more than that,” ove r the one -y ea r period he participated in the ca se. Couns e l te sti fi e d th at th e on ly thi ng pe tit ion e r ev e r sou g ht wa s a ple a a g re e me nt s e nte nc inghim to 13 .5 y e ars , a

nd wh e n th e State of

fe re d 1 3. 5 ye ars , th e pe tit ion e r a g re e d to a c c e pt i t.
Counsel insist ed he c ounseled the pe titione r on hi s rights and the conse quence s of pleading guilty, and he spent a “gr ea t d ea l of time g oing ove r these thing s” bec ause of the p et i t i o n er ’s y o un g age . The pe titioner never indicated to him he would rather go to trial. Couns el had no re collection of being t old by petitioner of a need t o interview Mr. Turner

. He reca lled that Mr. Turne r and a

second c o-def

endant gave detailed statements saying the pe titioner was the shooter

. Counsel testified, “But , if [the pe titioner] told me it was important to talk to [Mr. Turne r], I wouldn’t have f elt comforta

ble proc eeding without talking to him.” H e denie d ever telling the petitioner he could not win at trial, stating “I don’ t talk like that.”-3- On c ro ss exami nat io n, cou ns el t est if ied th at h e nev er t ol d t he p eti ti on er he wo uld on ly serve six or seven ye ars in prison. He stated that he made sever al attempts to contact witnesse s, but that they could not be located.

The trial court denied the motion for post-conviction re lief, finding spec ifically that “[t]hefac t that the witnesses we re not found or re- interviewe d does not constitute ineffe ctive assistance of counse l,” and that “ [b]a sed on the testimony, counsel cannot be viewed as re ndering ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.”

On appe al, the petitioner a lleges that his plea wa s unknowing and involuntary and that trial counsel was i neff ective f or failing to properly investigate potential witnesses, including se ve ra l un na me d p ote nti a l e ye wi tne sse s, a lon g wi th An ton io Gr a ye r, Mr . T urne r, or Di a nn e Pin kin s, a ndfaili ng to pr op e rl y ex plain the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f a gu ilt y p le a

to the pe tit ion e r. Be c aus e thepo stc on vic tio n c ou rt ’s de nia l of re lie f i s su pp orte d inthere c or d, we a ff irm th a t c ou rt ’s jud gme nt. The post-c onviction petitioner bea rs the burde n of proving his or her allegations by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30- 110(f) (2006). On ap p ea l , t he appe llate court acc ords to the post-conviction court’s findings of fac t the weight of a jury verdic t, and these f indings are conclusive on a

ppeal unless the e vidence preponde rate s against them. He n l ey v. State, 960 S.W .2 d 572 , 5 78 -7 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Bates v. State, 973 S.W.2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). By contrast, the post-c onviction court’s c onclusions of law rec eive no de fer enceor pre sumption of corr ectne ss on appea l. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tenn. 2001)

.

We w ill now address the c laims of the petitioner individually.
A. Petitione r ’s c lai m that th e gui lt y pl e a w as unla wf ully induc e d and e nt e r e d wi th out unde r st andi ng the c ons e que nc e s.

The pe titioner first argue s that h i s g u i l t y plea wa s unlawfully induced and enter ed without understanding the conse quence s. Du e p ro ce s s demands that a guilty plea be ente red voluntarily, knowingly, and understa ndingly. See B oykin v . Alabama , 3 95 U. S. 2 38 , 2 42 -4 4, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). “[T] he cor e re quirement of Boy k in is ‘that no guilty plea be acc epted without an aff irmative showing that it was i ntelligent and voluntary.’” Bl an ke ns hip v . S tat e , 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Fontaine v. United States , 526 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1975) ). The ple a mus t r e pr e se nt a “v olu nta ry a nd int e lli ge nt ch oic e a mon g the a lte rn a tiv e c ou rs e s of a c tio n o pe n to the def endant.” Nor

th C ar oli na v . A lfo rd , 4 00 U. S. 2 5, 31 , 9 1 S. Ct. 16 0 ( 1970 ). A ple a is involuntary if the ac cused is incompete nt or “i f i t is the product of ‘ignor ance , incomprehe nsion, coer cion, terr or, induce ments, [or] subtle or blatant threats.’” Bl an ke ns hip , 8 5 8 S

. W. 2 d at 904 (quoting Boyk in, 395 U.S. at 242-43).

In this c ase, the petitioner testified that he made the choice to plead guilty based upon his be lie f that hec ou ld n ot b e su c c e ssf ul at tria l. A lth ou ghhe c la ime d th at hedidno t c omp le te ly understand his lega l options, t he petitioner a cknowledg ed t h at hi s counsel explained the conseque nces of

the guilty pleas to him. Couns el testified that he d i scussed the State’ s evidenc e fac ing the petitioner and that it wa s the petitioner’s choice to ple ad guilty. The petitioner testified-4-

that he wa s advised of his rights b ef o re en tering his pleas. More over, nothing in the transc ript suggests that the pleas we re the product of “‘ i g n o ra nce, inc omprehe nsion, coerc ion, terror , inducements, [or] subtle or blatant thre ats.’” See B lankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904 (quoting Boyk in, 395 U.S. at 242-43). Unde r t hese c ircumstance s, the petitioner has f ailed to establish by clea

r and convincing evide nce that his guilty pleas we re not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter ed.
B. P e ti ti one r 's c lai m o f i ne ff e c ti ve as sis ta nc e of

c ouns e l. The pe titioner also argue s that he rec eived the ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitut ion and ar t i cle I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Con sti tut ionbo th r e qu ir e that a de fe nd a nt in a crimi na l c a se re c e ivee ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l. See U. S. Con st, a me nd

. VI ; Te nn
. Con st, art

. I, § 9 ; se e als o Bax te r v . R os e , 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975). “Claims of i neff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel areconsidere d mixed questions of law a nd fac t and ar e subjec t to de novo revie w.” Se rra no v . S tat e , 13 3 S.W .3 d 59 9, 60 3 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; se e Sta te v. Burns , 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . When a defe ndant claims ineff

ective a ssistance of counsel, the c ourtmust determine (1) whether counsel’s pe rformance was within the range of c ompetencedemande d of attorne ys in criminal case s, see Bax ter , 5 2 3 S

. W. 2 d at9 3 6 , an d (2 ) w h et h er any def icient per formanc e pre

judiced the pe titioner, see Strickland v. Washington , 4 6 6 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2068 (1984). Se e als o P owe rs v . S tat e , 9 42 S.W .2 d 5 51 , 55 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). Cou rt s n e e d n ot a dd re ss the se c omp on e nts in a ny pa rt ic ula r or de r or e ve n a dd re ss b oth if the petitioner f

ails to meet his burden with re spect to one. Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580.
A r e vie wi ng c ou rt

mus t in du lgea

str on g p re su mpt ionthat c ou ns e l’s c on du c t f a lls within the range of re asonable profe ssional assistance. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 6 9 5 , 1 0 4 S

. Ct. at 20 70 . T his cou rt sh ou ld not se c on d- gu e ss i nf

orme d ta c tic a l a ndstr a te gic de c isi on s b y d e fe ns e counsel. Henley , 960 S.W.2d at 579. We must evaluate c ounsel’s performance from counsel’s perspe ctive at the time of the allege d err or and in light of t h e t otality of the evidenc e. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct . at 2070.

Howeve r, this court’s de fer enceto counsel’s tac tical dec isions will d ep end upon counsel’s a dequate investigation of defe nse options. Burger v. Kemp , 4 83 U. S. 7 76 , 7 94 , 1 07 S. Ct

. 3114, 3126 (1987). Assuming adequate i nvestigation, the fact that a st rate gy or tac tic failed or hurt the def ense doe s not alone support the c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 95 8 S. W .2 d 1 56 , 1 65 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ); se e als o J e rryWh ite side Dic ke rso n v . S tat e , No. 03C01-9710-CR-00472, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 16, 1998).

Insu m, a de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to pe rf e c t r e pr e se ntatio n, on ly c on sti tut ion a lly adequate re prese ntation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). To show prejudice , the petitioner must demonstrate a rea sonable proba

bility t hat but for c ounsel’s def icient perf ormanc e, the r esult of the proc eeding would ha ve bee n differ ent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 2068

. A r e a so na blepr ob abil ity is “ a

pr ob abil ity su ff

ic ie nt t o u nd e rm inec on fi de nc e in the outcome.” Id.

The re co rd supports the post-convic tion court’s dete rmination that the petitioner failed to e stablish his claims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel by clea r and convincing evidenc e.-5-

The trial c ourt found that trial counsel pe rformed an a ppropriate investigation into t he ca se, and that finding i s s u p p o rt ed in t he re cord. That certain motions were not filed doe s not per se e ntitle the petitioner to relief

. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s consistently he ld that the entry of an informed a ndc ouns ele d guilt y p le a c on sti tut e s a n a dmi ssi on of a ll o f the fa c ts ande le me nts ne c e ssa ry to su stain a c on vic tio n a nda

waive r o f any n on -j urisd ic tio na l de fe c ts o r c on sti tut ion a l ir re gu lari tie s. See State v . McKinney , 74 S.W.3d 291, 306 (Tenn. 2002) (citing State v. Carter , 988 S.W.2d 145, 14 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; State v. Pe ttus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) ).

Fin a lly , o f the pe tit ion e r’ s p ote nti a l w itn e sse s, on ly Anto ni o T urne r w a s c a lle d to te sti fy a t th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng . N o e vid e nc e ins truc ts u s a s to wh a t th e oth e r a lle ge d w itn e ss te sti mon y w ou ld p ro vid e . “ W he n a [p os t- c on vic tio n] pe tit ion e r co nte nd s tha t tria l cou ns e l fa ile d to discover, interview, o r p rese nt witnesses in support of his defe nse, these w itnesses should be prese nted by t he petitioner at the evidentiary hearing.” Bl ac k v . S tat e , 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Ge ne ra lly , pr e se nti ng su c h wi tne sse s in the po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng is the on ly wa y ape t i t i o n e r c a n e s t ab l i s h t h a t “ t h e f a i l u r e t o d i s c o v e r o r i n t e r v i e w a w i t n e s s i n u r e d to h is prejudice . . . or . . . the failure to have a known witness pr esent or c all the witness t o the stand re s u l t ed i n t he denia l of critica l evidencewhich inure d to the prejudice of the pe titioner.” Id. Ac c or din gly , e ve n a

pe tit ion e r w ho e sta

bli sh e s th a t tria l c ou ns e l de fi c ie ntl y p e rf orme d b y faili ng to investigate or c all witnesses i s entitled to no relief “unless he can produce a material witness who (a ) c ou ld h a ve be e n f

ou ndby a re a so na bleinv e sti gatio n a nd(b ) w ou ld h a ve te sti fi e d fa vo ra bly in support of his defe nse if ca lled.” Id. at 757-58. Thus, we need not addre ss the eff ect of any potential trial witness exc ept Mr. Turne r.

The claim that counsel failed to utili ze pote ntial witness Mr. Turner was dissipated by not only counsel’s testimony that Mr. Turner ’s testimony would not have be en bene ficial in light of hi s prior contradictory statement to the pol ice, but also the findi ng by the post-conviction court that the “Petitioner fail[ed] to prove his claim by cl ea r an d convincing evide nce.” Thus, the petitioner failed to establish prejudice with respec t to trial counsel’s failure to use any or all of the pr os pe c tiv e a lib i w itn e sse s at tria l.

Having re viewed the petitioner’s c laims for post-convic tion relief and conclude d that the re cord supports the post-conviction court’ s denial of his cla ims, we affirm the judgment of the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

___________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WI TT, JR., JUDGE