PRESENT: Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 

JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 

KATHERINE E. JAMES, TRUSTEE OF THE COLUMBIA 

BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 090444 JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 June 10, 2010 

CITY OF FALLS CHURCH, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

This appeal involves a landowner's application to 

consolidate three lots of real estate into one lot. The primary 

issue we decide is whether a zoning administrator's 

interpretation of an applicable zoning ordinance was binding, 

pursuant to Code § 15.2-2311(C), on a planning commission's 

decision whether to approve a consolidation application. 

Because a planning commission is not an "administrative officer" 

and because the zoning administrator did not issue a "written 

order, requirement, decision or determination," we conclude that 

Code § 15.2-2311(C) is not applicable in the situation before 

us. For these and other reasons, we will affirm the circuit 

court's judgment that the planning commission's denial of the 

consolidation application was based on the applicable 

ordinances, and was not arbitrary or capricious. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

The trustees of Columbia Baptist Church (Columbia Baptist)1

seek to consolidate seven contiguous lots of real estate located 

in the City of Falls Church (the City) into one lot containing 

approximately 5.7 acres. The seven lots range in size from 

7,500 square feet to 156,791 square feet and are zoned either R1A (low density residential district) or T-1 (transitional 

district) under the City's zoning ordinances. Three of the lots 

contain historic structures subject to the City's Historic and 

Cultural Conservation District (HCC) ordinances.2

Initially, Columbia Baptist, in a letter to the City's 

zoning administrator, requested "a zoning interpretation" to 

determine whether Columbia Baptist could consolidate the seven 

lots. In a letter dated October 3, 2006, the zoning 

administrator responded that the consolidation would be 

permissible under applicable ordinances. The zoning 

 

1

 The appellants in this appeal are the trustees holding 

legal title to Columbia Baptist's real estate and the church's 

director of administration. Those individuals, along with the 

church, will be collectively referred to as "Columbia Baptist." 

2 See Falls Church City Code § 48-204 (providing 

descriptions of R-1A, T-1, and HCC districts). 

The City re-codified its code subsequent to the submission 

of briefs in this appeal. For purposes of clarity, this opinion 

will refer to the current sections rather than the former 

sections cited by the circuit court and the parties. The recodification did not involve substantive changes to the sections 

at issue in this appeal. 

2 
administrator stated that although "the actual consolidation 

process is a Planning Commission function[,] the Zoning Code 

does provide for the circumstances arising out of an approved 

consolidation." Quoting Falls Church City Code (City Code) 

§ 48-800(a), which states that a lot in the R-1A district on 

which an HCC-designated structure is located "shall not be 

reduced in size such that it no longer meets the minimum lot 

size, frontage, and setback requirements of a lot in the R-1A 

district," the zoning administrator concluded that Columbia 

Baptist's consolidation plan "results in a much larger lot and 

does so without reducing setbacks," thus satisfying the 

requirements of that ordinance. The zoning administrator 

further concluded that, pursuant to the applicable zoning 

districts, "there is a by right use available for the existing 

structures after a consolidation." 

After receiving the zoning administrator's response, 

Columbia Baptist prepared its consolidation application and 

plat, which it filed with the City's Planning Division in 

January 2007. Several months later, a senior planner from the 

Planning Division submitted a report to the City of Falls Church 

Planning Commission (Planning Commission) regarding Columbia 

Baptist's consolidation application. According to the senior 

planner, the proposed consolidation would constitute a 

"subdivision" as that term is defined in City Code § 38-1 and, 

3 
pursuant to City Code § 38-34(4), building sites must have the 

dimensions and areas required by the City's zoning ordinances. 

Continuing, the senior planner concluded that the 

consolidation "would be reducing the size of several lots 

subject to the HCC district regulations to zero." The lot 

lines, therefore, would be "extinguished and a building site 

containing the minimum lot area for R-1A lots would not be 

provided for each of the designated structures," thus violating 

City Code § 48-800(a).3 Since one of the HCC designated lots was 

already below the minimum lot size required in the R-1A 

district, the senior planner further concluded that any 

additional reduction in size would also violate the provisions 

of City Code § 48-800(a) prohibiting a "lot existing at the time 

of designation of the structure which is substandard with 

respect to the minimum lot size . . . requirements of a lot in 

the R-1A district" from being "further reduced in size." For 

these reasons, the senior planner recommended that the Planning 

Commission deny the consolidation application. 

The Planning Commission subsequently considered Columbia 

Baptist's consolidation application along with the senior 

 

3

 The senior planner believed the zoning administrator's 

contrary interpretation was "based on 'circumstances arising out 

of an approved consolidation,' and therefore set[] forth zoning 

information under the scenario that a subdivision ha[d] already 

occurred." 

4 
planner's report. Columbia Baptist argued that its proposed 

consolidation would not reduce the lot sizes to zero, but rather 

would increase the size of the lots to one larger lot. During 

the hearing, one of the Planning Commission members commented 

that the zoning administrator seemed to assume that a 

consolidation had already been approved. Some members also 

expressed concerns about the lack of information concerning what 

plans Columbia Baptist had for the property if the seven lots 

were consolidated. After discussion, the Planning Commission 

unanimously denied the application "for the reasons set forth in 

the [s]taff report and as stated in the [s]taff recommendations 

on Page 4 of the [s]taff report." 

Pursuant to Code § 15.2-2260(E), Columbia Baptist filed a 

complaint in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, appealing 

the Planning Commission's decision. Columbia Baptist alleged 

that the Planning Commission's denial of "the consolidation 

application was not properly based on the applicable ordinances 

and was arbitrary and capricious." Therefore, Columbia Baptist 

asked the circuit court to approve its application or direct the 

Planning Commission to do so. 

At a hearing before the circuit court, Columbia Baptist 

presented testimony from, among others, the zoning 

administrator, who stated that part of his job included 

"rendering interpretations of the zoning ordinance." The zoning 

5 
administrator also testified that he understood the 

consolidation had not been approved and that his interpretation 

of City Code § 48-800(a) was "for a potential application to 

consolidate." He further explained that he reviewed his 

response to Columbia Baptist's request for a zoning 

interpretation with the City's attorney and the general manager 

of the City's Development Services Department before sending it 

to Columbia Baptist, and noted that no one appealed his 

"determination" to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals. The 

zoning administrator reiterated his conclusion that, "[f]rom a 

zoning standpoint, there is no prohibition against a 

consolidation." 

On cross-examination, the zoning administrator, however, 

conceded that subdivision of property is the responsibility of 

the Planning Commission. And, when asked if his conclusion 

"assumed a consolidation had been approved," the zoning 

administrator replied, "Yes." On re-direct, the zoning 

administrator then again stated that at the time of his 

response, he understood a consolidation of Columbia Baptist's 

seven lots had not taken place. 

At the conclusion of Columbia Baptist's evidence, the City 

moved to strike the evidence. According to the City, Columbia 

Baptist failed to establish that the Planning Commission's 

disapproval was not properly based on the applicable ordinances, 

6 
or was arbitrary or capricious. The City argued that the 

provisions of City Code § 38-34(4) require building sites to 

have the dimensions and area required by the applicable zoning 

designation. The proposed consolidation, the City asserted, 

violated not only City Code § 48-800(a) by eliminating the lots 

on which the HCC-designated structures are located, but also 

City Code § 38-34(4) by reducing the lot sizes such that they no 

longer met the minimum lot size required in the R-1A zoning 

district. 

Columbia Baptist responded, arguing that although the 

Planning Commission was charged with approving consolidations, 

the zoning administrator was charged with interpreting zoning 

ordinances. Thus, according to Columbia Baptist, the Planning 

Commission was required to follow the zoning administrator's 

interpretation that the proposed consolidation would not violate 

the zoning ordinances, specifically City Code § 48-800(a). In 

addition, Columbia Baptist stated that it was not seeking to 

eliminate either the historic designations or the historic 

buildings. 

The circuit court granted the motion to strike. The court 

concluded that although Columbia Baptist relied upon the zoning 

administrator's interpretation, the Planning Commission had "the 

authority and the right" to deny the application based on its 

7 
interpretation of the applicable zoning ordinances and that its 

decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 

Columbia Baptist filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that 

while the circuit court decided whether the Planning 

Commission's decision was arbitrary or capricious, it failed to 

determine whether the Planning Commission's decision was 

properly based on the applicable ordinances as required by Code 

§ 15.2-2259(D). Columbia Baptist further asserted that the 

Planning Commission based its decision on erroneous facts, i.e., 

that the church intended to demolish the historic structures, 

and that the zoning administrator believed consolidation had 

already occurred when he responded to Columbia Baptist's request 

for a zoning interpretation. Finally, Columbia Baptist argued 

that the zoning administrator's October 2006 letter was a 

decision or determination under Code § 15.2-2311(C) and 

consequently a "thing decided" since an appeal of that 

"determination" was not taken. 

The circuit court subsequently entered a final order 

granting the motion to strike, holding that Columbia Baptist 

failed to carry its burden to prove that the Planning 

Commission's decision was not properly based on the ordinances, 

or was arbitrary or capricious. The court dismissed the 

complaint with prejudice, and this appeal followed. 

8 
ANALYSIS 

On appeal, Columbia Baptist challenges the circuit court's 

judgment on three grounds. First, it asserts the circuit court 

applied the wrong standard of review in granting the City's 

motion to strike the evidence. Next, Columbia Baptist contends 

the circuit court erroneously concluded that it failed to meet 

its burden of proof to show that the Planning Commission's 

decision was not properly based on the applicable ordinances, or 

was arbitrary or capricious. Finally, Columbia Baptist argues 

the circuit court erred in finding that "the Planning Commission 

had the right and authority to disregard" the zoning 

administrator's interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a). We 

will address the issues in that order. 

With regard to the first issue, Columbia Baptist correctly 

notes that a trial court is required to accept as true all 

evidence favorable to a plaintiff and any reasonable inferences 

that may be drawn from such evidence when ruling on a motion to 

strike the plaintiff's evidence. Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 

Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1997). "The trial court is 

not to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence, and may 

9 
not reject any inference from the evidence favorable to the 

plaintiff unless it would defy logic and common sense."4 Id.

Columbia Baptist argues that the circuit court failed to 

apply these principles because it did not accept as true the 

evidence favorable to the church when granting the motion to 

strike. Instead, according to Columbia Baptist, the court 

accepted as true two factually incorrect assumptions upon which 

the Planning Commission purportedly based its decision: (1) that 

Columbia Baptist would destroy the historic structures if the 

consolidation were approved, and (2) that the zoning 

administrator based his interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a) 

on the belief that consolidation had already taken place. 

According to Columbia Baptist, its evidence demonstrated both 

that it had no plans to demolish the historic structures and 

that the zoning administrator did not think consolidation of the 

seven lots had already occurred. Columbia Baptist thus argues 

that if the circuit court had accepted its evidence as true, it 

would have denied the motion to strike. 

Contrary to Columbia Baptist's assertions, the record 

contains no evidence that either the senior planner or the 

Planning Commission based their respective decisions on an 

 

4

 When reviewing a trial court's decision to strike a 

plaintiff's evidence, this Court likewise views the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lee v. Nationwide 

Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Va. 279, 284, 497 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1998). 

10 
assumption that the zoning administrator believed consolidation 

of the seven lots had already occurred. Although the senior 

planner noted in her report that the zoning administrator's 

response was "based on 'circumstances arising out of an approved 

consolidation,'" she did not recommend denial of the 

consolidation application for that reason. Rather, the senior 

planner explicitly stated, in both the analysis and 

recommendation portions of her report, that the proposed 

consolidation would eliminate the existing lot lines of the R-1A 

lots on which the historic structures are located, thereby 

reducing the size of those lots to zero in violation of City 

Code § 48-800(a). The Planning Commission denied the 

consolidation application "for the reasons set forth in the 

[s]taff report and as stated in the [s]taff recommendations on 

Page 4 of the [s]taff report." 

Similarly, the Planning Commission did not base its denial 

of the consolidation application on the assumption that Columbia 

Baptist would demolish the historic structures if the 

consolidation were approved. As Columbia Baptist notes, some 

citizens thought the historic buildings would be destroyed and, 

at the Planning Commission hearing, voiced their disapproval of 

the application for that reason. And, some members of the 

Planning Commission expressed general concerns because they did 

not know Columbia Baptist's future development plans for the 

11 
lots. Any concern about destruction of the historic structures, 

however, did not form the basis of the Planning Commission's 

decision, and Columbia Baptist's contention otherwise is 

inaccurate. See West v. Mills, 238 Va. 162, 168, 380 S.E.2d 

917, 921 (1989) (finding insufficient evidence that a planning 

commission's decision was influenced by citizen pressure). 

In the absence of evidence showing that the Planning 

Commission based its decision on incorrect factual assumptions, 

the circuit court necessarily did not fail to accept as true the 

evidence favorable to Columbia Baptist as well as all reasonable 

inferences drawn from that evidence. See Austin, 254 Va. at 

138, 486 S.E.2d at 287. In sum, this assigned error has no 

merit. 

In its second assignment of error, Columbia Baptist asserts 

the circuit court erred in finding that it failed to meet its 

burden of proof to demonstrate, pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-2259(D) 

and -2260(E), that the Planning Commission's decision was not 

properly based on the applicable zoning ordinances, or was 

arbitrary or capricious.5 Citing Seymour v. City of Alexandria, 

273 Va. 661, 643 S.E.2d 198 (2007), Columbia Baptist first 

 

5

 Columbia Baptist filed its consolidation application as 

both a preliminary and final subdivision plat, see Code §§ 15.2-

2259(D) and –2260(E), respectively. The circuit court's final 

order, however, references only Code § 15.2-2260(E). The 

operative language in both sections is identical. 

12 
argues that the Planning Commission failed to base its decision 

on the applicable ordinances "but instead [relied] on a 

misinterpretation of the ordinance and upon the Planning 

Commission's desire to have before it an application showing 

[Columbia Baptist's] (as yet undetermined) development plans for 

the properties' future use." As already explained, the Planning 

Commission's determination was not based on concerns regarding 

Columbia Baptist's future development plans, or the lack 

thereof, for the property. Although some Planning Commission 

members voiced concerns about the absence of such plans, the 

Planning Commission's denial of the consolidation application 

was based on the senior planner's report and the conclusion that 

the proposed consolidation would violate City Code § 48-800(a). 

In Seymour, the public as well as planning commission 

members voiced concerns about future use of certain property, 

and the commission actually stated those concerns as one of the 

reasons for disapproving an application for a preliminary 

subdivision plat. 273 Va. at 665-66, 643 S.E.2d at 200. In 

contrast, the Planning Commission here did not rely upon future 

development plans as a basis for denying Columbia Baptist's 

consolidation application. 

Columbia Baptist further argues that although the circuit 

court concluded the Planning Commission's denial of the 

consolidation application was not arbitrary or capricious, it 

13 
failed to address whether that denial was "properly based on the 

applicable ordinance." Our review of the record reveals that 

the circuit court did not fail to determine whether the Planning 

Commission's decision was properly based on the applicable 

ordinances. In granting the motion to strike, the circuit court 

stated that "the [P]lanning [C]ommission [had] the authority and 

the right to do what [it] did." That statement necessarily 

reflects the circuit court's conclusion that the Planning 

Commission's decision was properly based on the applicable 

ordinances. 

Finally, with regard to the second assignment of error, 

Columbia Baptist contends that since the zoning administrator 

concluded the consolidation would be permissible under City Code 

§ 48-800(a), the Planning Commission's interpretation to the 

contrary was arbitrary or capricious. Columbia Baptist asserts 

not only that the Planning Commission misinterpreted the zoning 

administrator's position,6 but also that there was no evidence 

the zoning administrator's interpretation was wrong. In sum, 

Columbia Baptist argues it carried its burden to demonstrate 

that the Planning Commission's denial of its consolidation 

 

6

 As already explained, the Planning Commission did not base 

its denial of the consolidation application on erroneous factual 

assumptions. 

14 
application was not based on the applicable ordinances, and was 

arbitrary or capricious. 

A trial court must sustain a planning commission's decision 

approving or disapproving a preliminary or final subdivision 

plat unless the decision "was not properly based on the 

ordinance applicable thereto, or was arbitrary or capricious." 

Code §§ 15.2-2259(D) and -2260(E); see also Board of Supervisors 

of Culpeper County v. Greengael, L.L.C., 271 Va. 266, 277, 626 

S.E.2d 357, 363 (2006). On appeal, "the trial court's judgment 

is presumed correct and will not be set aside unless the 

judgment is plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence." 

Greengael, 271 Va. at 277, 626 S.E.2d at 363. 

The ordinance at issue, City Code § 48-800(a), states: 

A lot in the R-1A . . . district on which a 

designated structure is located shall not be reduced 

in size such that it no longer meets the minimum lot 

size, frontage, and setback requirements of a lot in 

the R-1A district. A lot existing at the time of 

designation of the structure which is substandard with 

respect to the minimum lot size, frontage, or setback 

requirements of a lot in the R-1A district shall not 

be further reduced in size, unless any substandard 

feature remains unaffected. 

Further, according to City Code § 38-1, a "[s]ubdivision" 

includes, inter alia, "the consolidation of two or more lots or 

parcels." 

We agree with the circuit court that the Planning 

Commission's decision was properly based on the applicable 

15 
ordinances, and was not arbitrary or capricious. Columbia 

Baptist's application proposed, in part, to consolidate three 

lots containing historic structures into one, larger lot. 

According to City Code § 48-800(a), each of those lots cannot 

"be reduced in size such that it no longer meets the minimum lot 

size, frontage, and setback requirements." Consolidating the 

three lots upon which the historic structures are located 

necessarily requires the elimination of lot lines, meaning the 

lots would no longer satisfy the frontage and setback 

requirements. In addition, as the senior planner explained in 

her report, extinguishing the lines for three lots means that "a 

building site containing the minimum lot area for R-1A lots 

would not be provided for each of the designated structures." 

(Emphasis added.) 

We have defined an act as "arbitrary and capricious" when 

it is " 'willful and unreasonable' and taken 'without 

consideration or in disregard of facts or law or without 

determining principle,' " School Bd. of the City of Norfolk v. 

Wescott, 254 Va. 218, 224, 492 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1997)(citation 

omitted), or when the deciding body "departed from the 

appropriate standard in making its decision." Johnson v. Prince 

William County Sch. Bd., 241 Va. 383, 389 n.9, 404 S.E.2d 209, 

212 n.9 (1991). In denying Columbia Baptist's consolidation 

application on the basis of City Code § 48-800(a), the Planning 

16 
Commission did not disregard facts, applicable law, determining 

principles, or the appropriate standards. In sum, Columbia 

Baptist failed to show that the Planning Commission’s denial of 

its consolidation application was not properly based on the 

applicable ordinances, or was arbitrary or capricious. Thus, we 

conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding that 

Columbia Baptist failed to satisfy its burden of proof under 

Code §§ 15.2-2259(D) and -2260(E). 

Finally, in the third assignment of error, Columbia Baptist 

asserts the circuit court erred in ruling that the Planning 

Commission had the authority to ignore the zoning 

administrator's interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a). 

According to Columbia Baptist, the provisions of Code § 15.2-

2311(C) prohibited the Planning Commission from rejecting the 

zoning administrator’s interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a) 

because that interpretation was not appealed within 60 days. 

Columbia Baptist further argues that the zoning administrator 

alone has the authority to administer and enforce the zoning 

ordinances and his interpretation was made in that official 

capacity. The Planning Commission, although given the power to 

approve consolidation of lots, does not have the authority to 

administer zoning ordinances and was required, according to 

Columbia Baptist, to accept the zoning administrator’s 

interpretation. 

17 
We agree with the City that Code § 15.2-2311(C) is not 

applicable in this case. That section states: 

In no event shall a written order, requirement, 

decision or determination made by the zoning 

administrator or other administrative officer be 

subject to change, modification or reversal by any 

zoning administrator or other administrative officer 

after 60 days have elapsed from the date of the 

written order, requirement, decision or determination 

where the person aggrieved has materially changed his 

position in good faith reliance on the action of the 

zoning administrator or other administrative officer 

unless it is proven that such written order, 

requirement, decision or determination was obtained 

through malfeasance of the zoning administrator or 

other administrative officer or through fraud. The 60-

day limitation period shall not apply in any case 

where, with the concurrence of the attorney for the 

governing body, modification is required to correct 

clerical or other nondiscretionary errors. 

Code § 15.2-2311(C). 

By its terms, the statute only limits the subsequent 

actions of a "zoning administrator or other administrative 

officer." Id. The Planning Commission, however, is neither. 

Because "administrative officer" is not defined in the statute, 

we give the term its ordinary meaning. Thompson v. 

Commonwealth, 277 Va. 280, 289, 673 S.E.2d 469, 473 (2009). The 

term "administrative officer" is singular. In contrast, a 

planning commission consists of five to fifteen members who are 

appointed by the governing body and must be residents of the 

locality. Code § 15.2-2212. 

18 
Furthermore, Code §§ 15.2-2309(1) and –2311(A) refer to 

"administrative officer[s] in the administration or enforcement 

of this article," i.e., Article 7 pertaining to zoning. In 

contrast, Article 2 contains the statutory provisions regarding 

local planning commissions, which "serve primarily in an 

advisory capacity to the governing bodies." Code § 15.2-2210. 

Thus, the Planning Commission is not an "administrative 

officer." 

In addition, the provision in Code § 15.2-2311(C) 

prohibiting "change, modification or reversal" pertains only to 

a zoning administrator's or other administrative officer's 

"written order, requirement, decision or determination." In 

this case, however, the zoning administrator merely provided an 

interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a). In its letter to the 

zoning administrator, Columbia Baptist requested "a zoning 

interpretation." And in his reply letter, the zoning 

administrator made clear that he was responding to "a request 

for an interpretation." He further stated: "While the actual 

consolidation process is a Planning Commission function[,] it is 

my interpretation" that the ordinances permit the consolidation. 

(Emphasis added.) That "interpretation" lacked the finality of 

an "order, requirement, decision or determination" under 

Code § 15.2-2311(C). See Board of Supervisors of Stafford 

County v. Crucible, 278 Va. 152, 160-61, 677 S.E.2d 283, 287-88 

19 
(2009) (finding that Code § 15.2-2311(C) did not apply to a 

zoning verification letter because the letter did not 

affirmatively approve the project at issue and establish a 

vested right, but merely interpreted the definition of "school" 

under the then-current zoning laws); see also Code § 15.2-

2286(A)(4) (discussing a zoning administrator's decision on an 

application for modification from an ordinance and stating that 

"[t]he decision of the zoning administrator shall constitute a 

decision within the purview of [Code] § 15.2-2311). 

Regardless of the applicability of Code § 15.2-2311(C), 

Columbia Baptist, nevertheless, maintains that the Planning 

Commission has no authority to interpret zoning ordinances 

because that responsibility lies exclusively with the zoning 

administrator by virtue of Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4). However, 

pursuant to City Code § 38-4 and City Charter § 17.29 as well as 

Code § 15.2-2259, the Planning Commission has the authority to 

approve subdivision plats. See also Code § 15.2-2258 (requiring 

landowner to submit a proposed subdivision plat to a planning 

commission). Further, the Planning Commission is required to 

provide specific reasons for disapproving a plat by 

"identify[ing] deficiencies in the plat that cause the 

disapproval by reference to specific duly adopted ordinances, 

regulations, or policies." Code § 15.2-2259(A); see also City 

Charter § 17.29 (the Planning Commission must consider a 

20 
subdivision plat in "the light of the regulations and 

restrictions applicable to the same and approve or disapprove 

the plat in accordance therewith"). The Planning Commission 

thus necessarily must interpret and apply relevant zoning 

ordinances in approving or disapproving a proposed subdivision 

plat.7 The Planning Commission was not obliged to adopt the 

zoning administrator’s "interpretation" of City Code § 48-

800(a). Thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that the 

Planning Commission could disregard the zoning administrator's 

interpretation in deciding whether to approve or disapprove the 

consolidation application. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court. 

Affirmed. 

 

7

 Columbia Baptist also argues that City Code § 38-89 makes 

the approval of its subdivision application a "ministerial" act. 

That section, however, deals with the consolidation of vacated 

plats and is inapplicable to this case. 

21