UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

DEANTA MARQUIS LONG, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 18-5015 

(D.C. Nos. 4:16-CV-00141-JHP-FHM and 

4:11-CR-00086-JHP-1) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Deanta Long requests a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the 

denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. 

I

Long was convicted of several cocaine and firearms charges in 2013. He was 

sentenced to 211 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction on direct 

appeal. United States v. Long, 774 F.3d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 2014). We rejected 

Long’s arguments that: (1) a search warrant affidavit failed to provide probable 

cause; (2) he was entitled to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 5, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

(1978); and (3) the district court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of 

information regarding a confidential informant. Long, 774 F.3d at 656. 

Long then filed a § 2255 motion raising four ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. The district court denied relief and declined to grant a COA. Long filed a 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, which was also denied. Long now seeks a COA from 

this court. 

II

A prisoner may not appeal the denial of habeas relief under § 2255 without a 

COA. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). This 

standard requires Long to show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for 

that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner 

or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). 

Long contends that his counsel was ineffective in several respects. To succeed 

on an ineffective assistance claim, a prisoner must establish “that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish 

prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694. 
3 

First, Long argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

object to an in camera interview of a confidential informant who did not appear at 

trial. However, our court has repeatedly approved of in camera interviews of 

confidential informants “for purposes of challenging the informant’s reliability and 

the existence of probable cause, and where the trial court in its discretion held the in 

camera hearing and determined that disclosure was not necessary for this purpose.” 

Sandoval v. Aaron, 562 F.2d 13, 14-15 (10th Cir. 1977). And the informant’s 

presence was not required at trial. See United States v. Moralez, 908 F.2d 565, 567 

(10th Cir. 1990) (“Disclosure of an informant is not required . . . where the informant 

is not a participant in or a witness to the crime charged.”). 

Second, Long asserts that the officer who prepared a search warrant falsified 

his affidavit, thereby committing fraud on the court, and counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise this issue. However, Long does not provide any record citations or 

other evidence in support of his assertion. His ineffective assistance claim therefore 

fails. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (if an “omitted issue 

is without merit, counsel’s failure to raise it does not constitute constitutionally 

ineffective assistance of counsel” (quotation omitted)). 

Third, Long argues his counsel was ineffective in presenting the argument that 

he was entitled to a Franks hearing. We agree with the district court that Long has 

not established prejudice for any such failing. As we explained on direct appeal, a 

magistrate judge found after an in camera hearing that a confidential informant did 

exist and provided the information contained in the affidavit. Long, 774 F.3d at 663. 
4 

Long does not provide any specific argument that counsel could have raised that 

would have resulted in a Franks hearing. 

Finally, Long argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when he 

sought to represent himself at trial. But “[a] criminal defendant has a constitutional 

and a statutory right to waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial.” 

United States v. Akers, 215 F.3d 1089, 1096 (10th Cir. 2000). The record reflects 

that the district court ensured Long made his decision “knowingly and intelligently.” 

United States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2002). We thus conclude Long 

has not shown prejudice. 

III

 We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. Long’s motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge